

**The Thematic of Tragedy: Readings of Rebellion, Revolution and
Regulation in Mainstream Security Narratives**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**The Thematic of Tragedy: Readings of Rebellion, Revolution and Regulation in Mainstream Security Narratives**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


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CERTIFICATE

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List of Abbreviations

ACTL	All Ceylon Tamil League
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CJPME	Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East
CTS	Critical Terrorism Studies
CWC	Ceylon Workers Congress
EPRLF	Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
EROS	Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FP	Federal Party
IPE	International Political Economy
IPKF	International Peace Keeping Force
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JYC	Jaffna Youth Congress
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MISURASATA	Miskito Sumo Rama Sandinista All Together
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	National Constituent Assembly
PLF	Peoples Liberation Front
PLOTE	Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
SCAF	Supreme Council of Armed Forces
SLAF	Sri Lankan Armed Forces
SLFP	Sri Lanka Freedom Party
TELO	Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation
TNT	Tamil New Tigers
TUFYO	Tamil United Front Youth Organisation

TULF	Tamil United Liberation Front
UNCAT	United Nations Convention Against Torture
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHR	United Nations Human Rights
UNP	United National Party
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAPATRIOT	Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
USCIRF	United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The purpose of the study is to engage with the thematic of tragedy in International Relations, especially with regard to security issues. Contextualisation seems to have been relegated to the corners within the conversations regarding tragedy, in the mainstream security narratives. Therefore, a pertinent analysis would draw attention to the ‘who’ of tragedy and circumstances under which tragic situations unfold. This study would address tragedy from the vantage point of the marginalised people. From a critical-theoretical perspective, the notions of pain and harm could be viewed as inevitable and inseparable components of the phenomenon of tragedy. It is possible to reconceptualise tragedy by engaging in a double reading of rebellion, revolution and regulation. Such a reading could reveal that certain sections of population suffer persecution owing to the discrimination meted out to them by extant practices.

Tragedy could be understood as an incident which causes devastation and suffering to somebody. Tragedy is ideally understood as an incident or occurrence in which the loss is irreparable and the compensation incompatible with the damage caused. A form of tragedy, which is a matter of concern, is reflected in the discrimination and violence an individual or a community inflicts on another in the global society. It is this form of tragedy that is generally overlooked in societal practices. The underlying feature for a tragedy, from the viewpoint of a layperson, is simply this: an unanticipated situation which cannot be undone but would have to be faced because there is no escape from it.

A tragedy by design and definition is painful and entails a component of harm. Analysing the contemporary global system, several inequalities could be deciphered. The manner in which these exclusions are internalised within the society speaks for the rigidity in ideas that mars governance in most parts of the world. Moreover, the state invariably constitutes that section of the society which is hegemonic and whose views are mostly in resonance with the power wielders (Bigo 2002). In other words, it is not an overstatement to suggest that the state is inclusive of the elite and reflective of the influential echelons of the citizenry. In such cases, the security of marginalised people is at stake: non-decisions on threats that face these communities accrue from the discursive practices of state security which consider these as unviable and unfounded.

The concerns of the marginalised— whether as a community or as an individual— have remained secondary to the mainstream of ‘security studies’, a sub-discipline of International Relations. In the mainstream literature, security studies have been understood as ‘the study of the threat, use and control of military force’ (Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988). It intends to focus upon the state and is largely threat-specific (Walt 1991). Herein, the mainstream in International Relations is constitutive of theories which are grounded in positivism and rationality, that is to say that the epistemological bases of these theories is scientific and the studies within these epistemes proceed from instrumental logic (Smith 2000). This has laid the foundation of International Relations in the US and continues as a dominant perspective in security studies there although there has been ‘openness’ and ‘plurality’ in the UK (Smith 2000).

However, with the advent of the ‘new thinking’ on security issues, the mainstream in security studies that was largely constitutive of the realist paradigm has been challenged by the ‘reflectivist’ approach in security studies by taking into cognition the vantage point of non-state actors (Smith 1999). With the emergence of critical security studies, all the more attention has been given to ‘people’ and their quest for security (Booth 2007). In ‘global politics’ (Linklater 1995), legitimacy is accorded to certain types of violence such as torture, police firing, *lathi* charge, to name but a few of them. Hence, what has emerged in security studies is a practice of labelling according to the convenient positions of the state.

Critical security studies mount a critique on the state-centric notion of security and intends to bring forth an alternative understanding of ‘security’ (Smith 1999; Booth 2007). What could be considered as a security measure of the state could become insecurity for an individual. For instance, Booth (2007) rephrases Cox (1981) to argue that ‘security is always for someone and for some purpose’. Security, therefore, lies in the perception of the individual and does not have a universal or singular meaning. In the process, what goes unrealised is that every kind of violence prejudices some group or individual and renders it painful and harmful for the victim. Therefore, in order to broaden the theoretical boundaries of tragedy, there is a need to engage with the marginalised communities, which critical security studies could facilitate.

The real puzzle is the following: why is it that certain incidents are seen as tragic while others are dismissed or merely conceded as a functional consequence of societal or

political relations? There is seemingly a politics behind recognising certain incidents as tragedy. In this research, tragedy is seen from a critical-theoretical viewpoint which is divergent from the mainstream perspective in security studies. Herein, tragedy is perceived as a situation where there is an occurrence of harm and pain, not just at the physical or material level but also at the psychological level to the marginalised community or an individual.

Nevertheless, the dominant trend towards interpreting tragic situations in security studies is, invariably, from the vantage point of the state. On reconstructing the event from a different context, however, the narrative bears testimony to a divergent trajectory. By using the dimensions of pain and harm, it is possible to understand tragedy from the perspective of the marginalised segments of the global society. This would enable a lucid post-positivist diagnosis of the existence of tragedy in global politics which is grounded in an understanding where people are prioritised over states. A study that is embedded in historical and sociological dimensions would enable a reconceptualisation of the tragedy thematic, wherein pain, harm and exclusion of marginalised people constitute the definition of tragedy.

It is possible to read tragedy critically by engaging in research that throws light on different manifestations of tragedy. There are several instances that cause pain and harm to marginalised communities and individuals: genocide, riots, civil wars, social exclusion, disintegration of states, and interdiction of minorities, besides many others. Amongst these cases, the study engages with rebellion, revolution and regulation because they capture the occurrence of tragedy across a spectrum of situations that have historical relevance. Rebellion indicates annihilation of marginalised people; revolution induces anxiety amongst the underprivileged people; regulation leads to physical confinement of an individual. In these three cases, therefore, there is a visibility of pain and harm. Interestingly, these are not full-fledged conventional wars. Also, in all of the three cases, there is a security dimension from the viewpoint of the marginalised individual which has hitherto gone unaddressed. Moreover, a tragic erudition of these cases could bring forth a new understanding of tragedy in security studies. The idea is to reflect upon the multiple dimensions of tragedy.

Rebellion could be understood as a violent resistance against an established authority. The tragedy lies in the manner in which the silenced voices break out causing damage

to the adversary and also to oneself. The case of suicide bombings by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka is intriguing. This group came into existence following a series of political episodes, including the failure of peaceful and political means to assert rights and demands, the socio-political exclusion of the Tamil population by the Sinhala elites and the repressive measures unleashed on the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The LTTE did not have any religious prophecy guiding its actions—rather its motivations laid elsewhere in professing the cause for a separate homeland and equal opportunities for the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. In this regard, it is also interesting to note that the LTTE was the organisation that first brought suicide bombing to the South Asian region. Though considered heinous by the state, there is seldom any account of suicide bombing in security studies that would consider the very act— that somebody blew up one’s own body to kill others— as tragic.

The second case that elucidates tragedy is revolution. A ‘revolution’ is capable of bringing about changes in the ‘political and economic structures of the state in question’ as well as releasing ‘energies’ that transcend ‘state’s boundaries’ (Cox 1983). Revolution is a forcible change in existing political and social order. A revolution *vis-à-vis* rebellion could be differentiated in terms of purpose, intensity, process and outcome. A revolution could be structured, non-coercive and has a long gestation period. Rebellion, on the other hand, is usually retaliatory, sporadic, violent and episodic.

However, there are unintended consequences of a revolution— anarchy, parochialism, secession, violence, besides many others. The contemporary political developments in Egypt and Tunisia, following the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes in 2011, represent such a narrative. This case has been taken up because it is synchronous and the change of regime is unprecedented in the Arab world. Tragedy lies in the conundrum within which the people, especially religious minorities (Colombo 2013) and women as well as other gender and sexual groups (Sjoberg and Whooley 2013), are caught because the ‘revolution’ did not bring about substantive changes in their social and political positions. Theoretically, revolution sounds progressive. However, practically, it may end in turmoil, inducing ‘anxiety’ amongst its population. Anxiety is caused by the ‘inability to locate the existential threat’ which becomes the ‘foundational sentiment defining the human condition’ (Berenskoetter 2007). Thus

viewed, tragedy could be seen as being coded in political revolutions, wherein ‘emancipation’ (Booth 2007) of the marginalised people has been rendered incomplete.

Finally, tragedy is inherent in regulations imposed by the state in the guise of security. In this study, regulation implies physical imprisonment by the state of the civilians—suspected, implicated or accused, but not necessarily convicted— which debars public intrusion and far removes the detainee from unrestricted scrutiny. From the viewpoint of the captivated civilian, regulations are tragic— they cause physical confinement, humiliation and agony. The insecurities that surround the ‘confined’ person are silenced in security accounts which are concerned with the professed security concerns and interpretations of threat by the state.

To this extent, torture and confinement are extreme actions by the state. Though ethically problematic, its use has hitherto not been abandoned in either authoritarian states or democracies. From the perspective of normative theory, the resurgence of torture as an information procuring and punitive method in the liberal western states is a cause of concern. Herein, the case of the state legislations in the US after 11 September 2001 has been taken up for study. The backlash on the Muslim community in the aftermath of attacks on 11 September 2001 in the US bears testimony to the ways in which regulations could transform into acts of cruelty and inhumanity. The reactions of the US have no precedence in its own history. This has also triggered an alienation of the Islamic world by the West. The study makes an attempt to thematically recast tragedy by focusing on these three cases, namely rebellion, revolution and regulation.

The literature on tragedy in International Relations could be said to traverse different trajectories. This study focuses upon the dimensions of pain and harm in the thematic of tragedy, thereby privileging human agency. For this reason, a critical-theoretical approach is taken up in this study. Within the realist literature, tragedy is seen as inherent in the international system, which is anarchic and, therefore, unpredictable (Mearsheimer 2001). There is ‘competition’ and ‘insecurity’ amongst states for the lack of a central governing authority (Jervis 1978; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). For classical realists, the assumption that human beings have essentially a ‘power-craving’ nature which, therefore, leads to competition (Morgenthau 1946; 1967) could also constitute the tragic dimension of international politics for it is not alterable. The primary problem with this conceptualisation of tragedy is its uncritical acceptance of

the international system as ungoverned, incalculable, compulsive and therefore, 'tragic'. The very notion of tragedy has not been explicated upon within realism because the attribution is to power defined in terms of capabilities which renders the international system unchangeable; there is no cognition of agency in global politics.

Herein, the critique on 'immutability thesis' is important to observe (Linklater 1998: 19). Linklater (1998: 21) argues that neorealism, being a 'problem-solving theory committed to promoting the smooth functioning of the inter-state system', replicates political structures and power relations which are considered 'unjust' by political subjects. To this extent, as a structural theory, neorealism secure interests of 'the great powers and the dominant groups of the global system' by keeping the political structures intact while, simultaneously, circumventing the 'political aspirations of the excluded groups' (Linklater 1998: 20). Therefore, 'immutability' sustains institutions and political arrangements which are perpetuate 'inequalities of power and wealth': it denies the 'alternative possibilities' (Linklater 1998: 20-21). Critical theory argues that 'rationality of efforts' can bridge the gulf between actuality and potentiality', rendering 'change in global politics' possible and desirable (Linklater 1998: 22). In this vein, the thematic of tragedy needs to be addressed through alternative, and suppressed, viewpoints rather than accepting it as a given and unchallengeable phenomenon of world politics.

In normative theory, tragedy has mostly been seen as a category of dramatics or art form in which the protagonist has to make a choice between ethical issues. It is interesting to note that normative theory points to the ethical concern of the actor (Frost 2003) but do not consider it as a 'disaster'. Mayall (2003) agrees with Frost (2003) that tragic choices are agonising. The crux of his argument is precisely this: the realisation of the possibility of a tragic outcome is necessary for accepting 'responsibility' for 'well-intended' actions (Mayall 2003). He likens the ethical question in international relations to a 'duel' in which only one side could win. Although, Frost (2003) and Mayall (2003) differ slightly by engaging in such an analysis, there is recognition of the presence of ethical questions in global politics. However, this does not take into cognisance the severity of the act that follows such a decision which is impeded by a moral dilemma. Why is there no engagement with the act itself?

Euben (2007) adds yet another dimension to afore-mentioned debate on tragedy. He argues that there is a connection between understanding and action and attributes 'consequentialist' dimension to the notion of tragedy. Hence, on the basis of Greek tragedies, it could be argued that there are paradoxes and dilemmas that surround the protagonist and are not evasive (Euben 2007). However, even here, tragedy is viewed from the standpoint of an art form which does not project it in the light of suffering that it causes. Also, to view tragedy as a consequence of human action has the potential drawback of accepting the moral judgement inherent from the very start— there is no scope for getting into the destruction or suffering that is caused by or during the process. There is a need to recast the interpretation of tragedy in such a way so as to figure a way out of tragedy through human agency— a way that is circumscribed in International Relations.

Yet another theoretical reflection on tragedy argues that it is part and parcel of the human condition and would always be present owing to the problem of 'ethical choice' (Lebow 2005). Lebow (2005) goes on to argue that tragedy is inescapable and there is always an insurmountable tension between moral self-understanding and the imperatives of political life. Rengger (2005) also points to the insufficiency of the debate between Mayall (2003) and Frost (2003) and says that their arguments are not very different from the realist understanding of tragedy because they, too, just as realists agree that there is a permanent tension in human experience and, therefore, the world is essentially tragic. This is indeed a very pessimistic way of looking at International Relations. Nonetheless, Rengger (2005), too, subscribes to the notion that human nature is not changeable and craves for power. This has the limitation of curtailing the level of analysis and at the same time subscribing to the 'immutability thesis' which Linklater (1998 and 2007c) has criticised in his seminal work. Tragedy, therefore, gets subsumed into the more theoretical terrain of power, rationality and ethics rather than being focused upon the question: what is it in the event that qualifies it as a tragedy? This is the most crucial component of reconceptualising tragedy which requires that different vantage points be taken into account.

The above-mentioned discussion largely captures the dominant debates that revolve around tragedy: the first appertains to the cognisance of ethical choices that exist in International Relations and second, the realisation that the possibility of tragedy or tragic outcome is necessary for accepting 'responsibility' for 'well-intended actions'

(Mayall 2017) that go wrong. However, they do not go beyond the mere delineation of the ethical choices that an individual has, which renders theoretical evaluation stagnant. Since the world society is interlinked, there is a requirement to engage with the performance of the act itself and analyse tragedy from the dimension of harm and pain.

Within the domain of critical theory, the theme of tragedy is a relatively new entrant. From the viewpoint of the Frankfurt School (Critical Theory) there is the problem of harm in global politics which is an impediment in the attainment of emancipation and also in facilitating the 'civilising process' (Linklater 2011). Linklater (2007a) also questions the use of physical abuse as punishment along the lines of Rosemary Foot (2006). Linklater problematises (2007a) the relegation of torture behind closed doors which has rendered it as an acceptable practice by the people, who approve of it as an exceptional action undertaken to prevent or contain certain extra-legal activists.

Zehfuss (2003) argues that there is a construction of identity that takes place between 'us' and 'them' which endures that the differentiation between two civilisations become so stark that one is viewed as the antithesis of the other, hence giving an unwarranted sanction to resort to any means to contain the 'other'. Garbed within the discourse on prevention of terrorism and crime, the resort to physical torture or war on terror seems to be an appropriate action in conventional thinking (Foot 2006; Linklater 2007a). However, when the vantage point is moved to the sufferers, these acts seem notorious and disproportionately cruel. There is recognition within Critical Theory of the 'problem of harm' in International Relations (Linklater 2011). However, these theoretical investigations have never been elevated to broaden or explicate upon the conception of tragedy.

The issue raised by the Frankfurt School with regard to common sufferings could also be captured within the debate between Rengger (2005) and Lebow (2005), the central bone of contention being the following question: is it possible to compose global politics in such a way that it could take cognisance of the connections that exist between individuals and community? (Beardsworth 2008). The essence of the debate is whether it is appropriate to argue that there is a necessary link between the individual and community, which for Lebow (2005) is not possible but for Rengger (2005) is an important part of global politics. These views are in contrast to each other and representative of the several dimensions that are present in the realm of the

international. When discussed within the thematic of tragedy such differing views are also found. The views of Lebow (2005) and Rengger (2005) are in sync with the larger trend in International Relations which does not explicate upon agency in the tragedy thematic. The angst within these communities is because of the politics of privileging certain sections of the society over others, and the relative deprivation that flows from such practices.

Within the critical tradition, yet another strand is post-modernism or post-structuralism— those viewpoints that challenge the existing structures of knowledge and argue for rigorous and inclusive discursive practices (Kellner 1987; Biersteker 1989; Ashley 1996; Rengger and Thirkell-White 2007). Within the thematic of tragedy, such views find representation in the works of Brown (2007), who argue that the issue of tragedy is one of ‘political purchase’. This is to argue that the interpretation of certain events as tragedy speaks for the bias that exists as a tragedy. Moreover, the notion of tragedy in International Relations, for Brown (2007), has been based on an instrumental logic— one that moves towards resolution of issues or problems. In other words, there is no critical mass in the evaluation of tragedy and there is almost a non-recognition of extant realities— those that are harsh, non-abstract and represent a gory picture of global politics.

The literature that is ‘anti-foundationalist’ (Brown 1994), in effect, argues that certain issues are concealed from discussions or misrepresented in public forum because there is a denial of their very existence. Therefore, the mainstream in International Relations has concentrated mostly on the dilemma of taking one or the other action and this would constitute a tragedy. However, the assumption is that an action— depending upon the available options, both or all of which are sub-optimal—has to be taken. Mearsheimer (2001) also argues that the tragedy of the great powers lies in the constant ‘struggle of power’ in anarchy which cannot be compromised upon, in the international system. Put differently, ‘to act (under certain circumstances) is to do wrong’ (Brown 2007: 9), and this becomes a tragedy. The question that is not addressed is whether non-action would be the right choice because even this could imply a regressive step— the marginalised and suppressed may get further silenced. For strengthening its base in security studies, people, especially communities that are ostracised by the state and majority population, need to become the cynosure of the tragedy thematic.

Another strand on post-modernism focuses on sources that bring alternative narratives to the fore and argue for the need to challenge the dominant discourse as they reveal a single interpretation of an event among many others, that have been relegated to the background (Zehfuss 2003; Jabri 2006; Butler 2009). Butler (2009) discusses the vagaries of contemporary wars and argues that there is an epistemological and ontological bias that underlies the discipline of International Relations. Taking critical insights into the ‘war against terrorism’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, she argues that there is a need to look at the narratives other than that of the western powers to have a glimpse of the more inhumane and violent side of these wars (Butler 2009: 61-62). For this reason, she relies on the potential of photography and poetry, especially those that reveal the pain and suffering of the inmates at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisons (Butler 2009: 64). These cinematic visions and poems interrogate the celebrated chivalry of the western ideals of war—they transform the hitherto romanticised version of war into a repulsive crime against humanity, reveal that the eulogies for ‘us’ are far outnumbered by elegies of the ‘other’ and dismantles the accolades of pride and honour into threnodies that refracts attention from the jubilant victories to the abhorrent sadism afflicted upon the vanquished.

Similarly, for Zehfuss (2003), it is important to bury the memories of the events of 11 September 2001 because it keeps alive the distinction between the West and the non-West and, hence, makes the former insensitive towards the plight and grief of the latter. Jabri (2006) also argues that the representation of war in Iraq was about attracting the ‘gaze’ across the globe for purposes of demonstrating the strength of the US; this very ‘tactic’ would produce a counter-discourse in art that would expose the excesses of the war that have been unleashed on the civilians and soldiers of the defenders.

The larger theoretical point that could be fleshed out from this argument is with regard to the ‘forms of political subjectivity that emerge in spaces of governmentality’ (Jabri 2011). Hence, there is ample discussion on the construction of an enemy ‘other’ and the virtual extermination that is required of a particular community in order to contain terrorism. This aspect could be further explicated upon to argue that state regulations could be read as tragedy in global politics because they test human endurance of physical pain and psychological trauma.

Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) is a new variation within the critical tradition which questions the epistemology, ontology and methodology that have guided research and the understanding of terrorism in global politics. For Jackson (2009), the admissibility of the contemporary knowledge system and its application to the understanding of terrorism is not only bereft of political objectivity but also buttress the religio-cultural dogmatism that prevails in the society and, thus, fortifies existing edifices of power in global politics. Terrorism also has a 'political usage' (McDonald 2009) by means of which the views of the hegemonic groups are reinforced and this becomes the dominant discourse. Also, it is corroborated with issues of security and securitisation and all of this culminates into the labelling of certain communities, actions and ideologies as survival or existential threats to the society.

In this regard, even the politics of naming a particular group as a 'terrorist organisation' is significant. The branding of LTTE as a 'terrorist' group undermined the 'political project' of the organisation, namely 'Tamil self-determination' (Nadarajah and Sriskandharajah 2005). Similarly, Hellmich (2005) argues that before naming the *Al Qaeda* as a 'fundamentalist' or 'terrorist' organisation, there is a need to question the ideas internal to the group, rather than assuming their religious commitments. Scholarly works based on field research, also suggest that in order to counter the 'mere threat' of terrorism, an entire community, rather than selective individuals, is targeted by deliberately exclusive policies (Vermeulen 2014). Therefore, CTS seeks to address the question of 'emancipation' and bring about a change in the foundations of the study of terrorism, by making a case from the perspective of the confined.

Dillon (1996) also argues that the very manner in which states tend to secure themselves creates insecurity amongst people. Hence, security from the perspective of the state renders certain communities vulnerable to the whims and arbitrariness of law and order. Brown (2002) also argues along similar lines: the discursive practices in the US are such that it tends to equate terrorism with Islam and the Muslim world. Such a semantic construction has an immediate impact on popular visions of a community and gives an unwarranted sanction to the state to engage in atrocious incision of individuals from a respectable to a despicable life. The arguments and perceptions thus created around the issue of security causes ethical as well as physical harm to the marginalised people. In this respect, the philosophical works of Sontag (2003) and Weil (1952) become significant, who focus on the idea of pain and harm in societies across the world. The

task is to utilise these classic ideas for enlarging the bases for studying security from the vantage point of the people. It is for this reason that there is a need to dig deeper into the sufferings of the subjugated people.

A crucial aspect of International Relations is the emphasis laid upon materialism in world politics. The focus has been on the materiality and rationality of states and agency has mostly been diminished in these studies. However, critical viewpoints on materialism have been brought out in some recent works. Marlin-Bennett (2013) argues that there are constructive ways of understanding power and political life by stressing upon agency. Agency, for critical theorists, is the human body which could be both, the receiver of interest as well as the source of information (Marlin-Bennett 2013). For this reason, one could suggest that human bodies, in the literal sense of the term, are the recipients of global politics. Here, again, the identity of the body matters.

Two ways in which these human bodies could be used are torture and suicide bombing. Besides harming the body, they also become the site of suffering. If torture is the consequence of the control exercised by the state over bodies, suicide bombing subverts that rationale—the bomber exercises control over his/her body in spite of the wishes of the liberal state (Michelsen 2013). For Hirst (2013), in spite of Nietzsche's proclamation of 'death of God' (Nietzsche 2007 quoted in Hirst 2013) in International Relations, there is a relation that is drawn between the human and the divine and the process through which the body is subjectivised. It is to be noticed, that human actions that cause bodily self-destruction such as suicide bombing have been studied only to the extent that they engage with the rationality and the strategic predicament of the act (Pape 2005; Bloom 2005; Gill 2007). The literature on suicide bombing seems to judge the motivations and aims of such a technique (Hopgood 2005; Pape 2005; Pedahzur 2005). This strategic perspective camouflages the significance of the body in politics—it is symbolic and demonstrates the agential power of human beings. Suicide bombing is not be a mathematical calculation but a performance which delivers a strong message of retaliation and dissent.

Some scholars focus on the employment of female suicide bombers by the LTTE and emphasise the politics that connects gender and body (De Mel 2004; Tambiah 2005; Rajan 2011). This set of literature brings out a gendered perspective on suicide bombing. To this extent, it engages philosophically with the human body and the

significance of the corporeal. This literature also advances a critical feminist perspective which is not grounded in instrumentality. However, it does not seem to grapple with the predicament of the rebel. Therefore, it is relevant to focus on the agonies of the human body and argue that the manner in which it suffers pain reveals a tragic dimension of security issues, the narratives for which come from agencies operating in global politics.

Another way in which the role of the human agency comes to the fore is its political participation and initiative to bring a change in the discriminatory and regressive practices of the state. One such manifestation on the global scene is revolution. People participate and engage in order to make a change in their societal and political conditions. Revolution may bring about political turmoil; it is mostly engaged with the intention to bring positive changes. The recent Arab ‘uprisings’ have been viewed as a protest against dictatorship in these states and also as a consequence of the liberal programmes that have influenced the Arab world for the last few decades (Hatina 2011; Bogaert 2013). More generally, the use of information technology, internet and social networking websites have been highlighted as playing a partisan role in generating an upsurge (Gregory 2013; Sakr 2013).

Some scholars, however, have given attention to the significance of the use of public space by the people in Egypt, Bahrain and Tunisia and argue that it was the popular texture of the uprising that presented a solid case against the existing authoritarian regimes (Valbjorn 2012; Levine 2013; Dakhli 2013; Khalaf 2013) while others discuss the predicament of a ‘(post-) democratised’ Arab world for the people (Teti 2012; Valbjorn 2012; Bogaert 2013). However, the focus has not shifted to an analysis of the suffering of the people of the Arab world in light of the limited political changes that the ‘revolution’ has brought.

The political transition did not liberate the marginalised communities from socio-political repression. The discussions on the possibility of democracy in the Islamic world along with the conversation of ‘liberalism’ and ‘secularism’ in the Arab world have superseded the virtual and substantive struggle of the people that still continues (Bayat 2005 and 2007; Valbjorn 2012). The limited success or abject failure of the revolution is not the catastrophe; indeed the mishap lies in the political vicissitudes, which though cataclysmic, did not emancipate the people from the grip of the

hegemonic group and their endurance against the auspices of the ruling elites continue. The resurfacing of the plight of the people after efforts to bring about positive changes in their situation has obstructed progress— this is an inadvertent predicament for the people and the harm that it causes physically and ethically is tantamount to a tragedy.

Hence, the thematic of tragedy needs to be broadened and the definitions of tragedy hitherto used in International Relations need to be re-evaluated. The literature thus far has not brought the marginalised communities to the nucleus of the tragedy thematic. In order to rescue the project, there is a need to emphasise upon the anguish of individuals and groups which are subjected to neglect and deprivation. In realism, tragedy has hitherto been viewed as unavoidable and implicit. It is interesting to note that from a very different standpoint, normative theory also considers tragedy as unavoidable, although it engages with ethics in global politics by considering the perspective of the protagonist. However, since agency is not explicated upon, tragedy seems inescapable. A study of the tragedy thematic grounded in critical theory would bring to the fore, several ways in which the existing power ratio excludes, thereby, bringing human agency to the centre of the discursive practices of security studies and problematising its significance in the global realm not just as sufferers but also as those capable of liberating from extant labels.

The study intends to understand the thematic of tragedy as it could be found in the incarnations of rebellion, revolution and regulation. These cases focus on the routine suffering of many sections of the society which goes undiagnosed and unaccounted for. It is for this reason that rather than focusing on a particular region, an attempt has been made to choose cases that are geographically spread, *viz.* South Asia, the Arab world and the US. Notwithstanding geographical locations, tragic situations seem to be omnipresent. The purpose is to engage with the notion of ‘global interconnectedness’ (Linklater 2007c) and apply it to the thematic of tragedy. Tragedy, in this study, is understood as a phenomenon that causes pain and harm to the people— whether it is physically visible or ingrained within state practices. The vantage point of the agency in security narratives of tragedy is, hitherto, unaddressed. A discursive shift in the thematic of tragedy is possible by privileging people over the state in global politics.

Considering tragedy from this perspective, it is pertinent to realise that there is a politics of labelling certain events as ‘tragic’ whereas others are dismissed as mere incidents or

at best, a consequence of unavoidable circumstances. The challenge is to rescue the labelling of tragedy from a state-centric viewpoint and broaden its thematic premise. In this regard, the study seeks to focus on rebellion – suicide bombings by the LTTE, revolution – contemporary political developments in the Arab world and regulation – confinement and torture by the US in the aftermath of the attacks on 11 September 2001. Amongst other instances of tragedy, the chosen cases cover and capture a spectrum of situations, *i.e.* annihilation, anxiety and confinement thereby showing a clear-cut variation along the dependent variable.

The rationale of the study is to theoretically reflect on the thematic of tragedy by engaging in a ‘double reading’ of rebellion, revolution and regulation. The research is undertaken from the vantage point of the marginalised people. The agential perspective is being taken up precisely for the reason of deprivileging the state and prioritising the views of the marginalised people who are denigrated and whose miseries fade into oblivion in spite of the regular discrimination that they suffer at the hands of the state as well as predominant groups in the society. It also enables a recognition of the tragic phenomenon that exists in the realm of security and which has been veiled by security considerations of the state. Hence, the study intends to engage with the thematic of tragedy in International Relations by adhering to a critical-theoretical viewpoint so that the exclusionary and discriminatory trends in ‘global politics’ could get highlighted.

The scope of the study is to reconceptualise tragedy in security studies. The common underlying feature of a tragedy for purposes of this research is pain, harm and trauma that marginalised people suffer, which is a culmination of historical processes of inequity and inhibition. A tragic event has repercussions for a community or individual which could stymie their development and progress for eternity. The study addresses the cases through an emotional lens rather than relying upon objectivity and instrumentality. The idea, herein, is to shift the theoretical focus of the tragedy thematic as being a question of ethical choice to a concern on suffering as an impediment to the ‘civilising process’ (Linklater 2007c) in global politics. Theoretically the study hinges on emancipation which can be understood as liberation from fear and unhindered progress of communities (Booth 2007). The theoretical argument intends to focus upon tragedy from the perspectives of the marginalised people who has not been prioritised in security studies.

This study is grounded in critical theory. The following research questions have formed the bases of this study:

- (i) What is it that impedes contextualisation of tragedy from an agential perspective in security studies?
- (ii) What is the tragedy in rebellion, despite a forceful ventilation of grievance against the ruling authority by the marginalised people?
- (iii) In what way does a revolution become tragic, in spite of its professed liberating tendencies?
- (iv) Why are regulations tragic, given that they ostensibly enhance the security of the state?

At the beginning of the research, the following four hypotheses were proposed:

- (1) A double reading of rebellion, revolution and regulation enables an engagement with the dissenting narratives, thereby privileging human agency in security studies.
- (2) From the perspective of the rebel, the certitude of self-annihilation, coupled with the stigmatisation of the subjugated group, renders rebellion tragic.
- (3) A revolution becomes tragic when it unfolds into a situation of uncertainty and transitional turmoil, further jeopardising the marginalised citizens.
- (4) From the vantage point of the confined community, regulation curtails civil liberties, thereby rendering it a tragedy.

The first hypothesis is concerned with the methodology of research on tragedy. It was a claim of the research that double reading as a method could bring to the fore hidden or concealed voices within the security narratives. This hypothesis has been the connoisseur of this research and withstands any pressure that could come from positivist methods. Similarly, the second hypothesis has also been verified by the study. By scrutinising the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the vicious circle of violence becomes evident and testifies the statement.

The third and fourth hypotheses are also substantive. However, by the end of the research, the third hypothesis could be put in the context of minorities rather than extending it to an entire spectrum of marginalised citizens. It could be reformulated as follows: revolution becomes tragic for minority citizens as there is uncertainty and transitional turmoil, thereby making their living conditions more precarious than before.

The fourth hypothesis also stands verified. However, the pain and suffering therein is more pronounced than the hypothesis had suggested. Therefore, two more propositions could be added in order to fully appreciate the nature of tragedy present in state regulations: first, the entrapment of physicality ensures psychological captivity, thereby making it tragic; second, torture encapsulates the body and ensures its control from outside, tragically bereaving the individual from self-monitoring.

In this study, a critical study is taken up to understand the ways in which tragedy is manifest in the realm of security. By means of alluding to the historical-sociological approach, an attempt has been made to deconstruct narratives by heeding the voices that are silenced in the mainstream discourse on security. Since tragedy is being studied from the critical-theoretical perspective, there is a need to engage with the postpositivist analysis. Critical social science is the basis of such a study.

The dependent variable of research is tragedy. The cases have been chosen methodologically. Multiple cases have been taken up for theoretical explication on tragedy which are as follows: rebellion – suicide bombings by the LTTE, revolution– contemporary political developments in the Arab world and regulation– illegal detentions and torture in the aftermath of attacks on 11 September 2001 in the US. The three cases – rebellion, revolution and regulation – are chosen to show ‘variation on the dependent variable’ (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 129). The independent variable of research is the marginalised people– those who mostly remain passive or are silenced. The intervening variables of research are pain, harm and trauma.

The chosen cases of rebellion, revolution and regulation are reflective of the ways in which tragedy manifests itself in global politics, given that they cause pain and harm to the marginalised people. Another reason as to why these cases are chosen is that they hold promise towards envisaging ‘global interconnectedness’ (Linklater 2007c), which forms the basis of the critical-theoretical project of ‘progress’ and ‘emancipation’

(Booth 2007). Furthermore, these cases cover a spectrum of tragic situations in the realm of security studies— annihilation (rebellion), anxiety (revolution) and confinement (regulation). Another variation is evident in the manifestation of pain and harm on the human agency; it is stark in rebellion, subtle in revolution and hidden in regulation. Therefore, these three cases indicate the spectrum of variation on the dependent variable.

The first case is that of rebellion which is understood in this study as a resistance against existing social and political structures and practices. An extreme case of expressing dissatisfaction and malaise is that of suicide bombing. There is a concentric circle of subjugation, rebellion, state reaction, interdiction, marginalisation, repression and so on. The LTTE was a dissident group that engaged in suicide bombings. The idea is to harm for the sake of harm— to avenge harm— to the extent of bodily self-destruction.

The second case elucidates the tragedy in revolution. In this study, revolution is understood as a process that aims at liberating civilians which could bring about cutting-edge changes in the existing system. The recent political developments in the Arab world are the most significant because of its contemporaneous nature as well as its unprecedented regional context. Moreover, it is significant to note that the political changes could not stabilise governance. Socio-political marginalisation of certain sections of the population has dampened the efforts for equity. The unpredictability in governance has, therefore, rendered the marginalised citizens anxious. Tragedy, herein, is subtle, unlike in the case of rebellion.

Yet another manifestation of tragedy is state regulations imposed at the behest of security concerns which leads to confinement or arbitrary detention of civilians. In this study, regulation implies arbitrary state measures which impinges upon civilian security. For this reason, the case for illegal detentions and torture in the aftermath of attacks on 11 September 2001 in the US is taken up. The relegation of such heinous acts to the walls of the detention centres or jails provides less opportunity for scrutinising the horrific and malicious policing that has the approval of the state (Foot 2006; Linklater 2007a; Butler 2009). The attempts to exterminate or target a certain group of citizens speak for the bigotry of state which curtails liberties and thus impedes emancipation. The tragedy in regulation is from the vantage point of the confined civilian.

The thrust of the study is to engage in a double reading of the tragedy thematic from the perspective of the marginalised group. For Ashley (1988), the first reading is a ‘heroic act’, which simply means that the prevailing discourse is not just predominant but the only one that is available and acceptable; it is hence a ‘monologue’. The second reading, however, requires that the variable be rescued from a monologic discourse and its sheer acceptability be questioned (Ashley 1988). A double reading of the tragedy thematic would bring to the fore the various ways in which tragedy is indeed observable in even those phenomena of global politics that are otherwise considered to be liberating and progressive— there is much more at stake than what is understood at the first glance.

Deconstruction through double reading, therefore, challenges the dominant wisdom on tragedy in International Relations and brings the perspective of the marginalised communities to the fore. In this way, alternative viewpoints emerge on tragedy which is much more questioning of the contemporary global issues, such that the several dimensions of security do not get subsumed within a single narrative.

Organisation of the Thesis

This study is methodologically grounded in postpositivism. There is an engagement with critical security studies. The main aim is to understand the predicaments of the marginalised sections of the society. It was very important to have methodological clarity. The research design was not intended to be positivist in any way, though hypotheses have been proposed at the outset of the research. It is, however, not based on falsification. The reasons as to why postpositivism throws more light on matters of non-state security have been explained in the chapter titled ‘The Method on Double Reading’. The chapter has been inserted to elaborate on the shortcomings of positivism, to explain how postpositivism and mixed methods could bridge those gaps and to elucidate that the use of alternative methods is an asset for research in security studies. Double reading is a critical re-reading of texts, episodes and documents which has hidden connotations, conditions and prescriptions, unrecognisable in a rudimentary glance. The chapter describes the manner in which deconstruction through double reading could unravel the tragedy in rebellion, revolution and regulation.

The study then proceeds to the three cases, neatly headed under three different chapters, each flowing from the concern of tragic outcomes in global society. The chapter on 'The Rebellion in Suicide Bombing' argues that a contextual analysis of rebellions in general reveal the angst of a subjugated community. More specifically, there are desperate and defensive attempts by marginalised citizens to improve their positions. However, violence becomes a method only when all possibilities for reconciliation fade. It is at this point, that the rebels make their presence felt in different ways. As the case study taken up in this chapter shows, the Tamils in Sri Lanka faced discrimination at the hands of the Sinhala majority since the 1940s, ultimately culminating in the formation of extra-state organisations. By elucidating on suicide bombings by the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the politics of pain and harm on the body of the self and others as an upsurge against repressive practices is studied critically.

In Chapter Four, titled 'Re-examining Revolution: The Case of the Arab World', there is an attempt to re-examine revolution by focusing on its implications for the marginalised strata of society. It has been argued in the chapter that revolution, progressive as it may sound, turns out to be captivating for minority citizens. A distinction has been drawn between political and social revolution. In retrospect, revolutions could bring political change without any guarantee of social alterations. This makes the position of the marginalised sections of the society very precarious. In light of the developments after the 2011 political transition in Tunisia and Egypt, the predicament of the religious and gender minorities has been observed. There is an engagement with state legislations and constitutions that have been promulgated after the political turmoil. It has been argued that the constitution of each of these countries does not provide guarantees to the minorities and in this sense is reminiscent of its earlier counterparts, thus instilling fear and anxiety in the minority sections of the society.

The fifth chapter, 'Confinement and Torture in State Regulations', argues that state regulations cause confinement of citizens and prohibit their physical movements, thus bearing testimony to the manner in which the state succinctly overstates security concerns, and secluding certain communities. Herein, the concern lies with the discourse on torture and confinement as an interrogation and punitive technique in as much it defies international conventions on torture. The phenomenal rise in the justification of its use on non-state actors, suspending their fundamental rights, reveals

the extremities of state practices. Moreover, these acts of mistreatment go unaddressed at the international forums because they are perceived to be a domestic legislation. This chapter deals with this concern in the context of detainment of suspects after the attacks on 11 September 2001 in the US and would evaluate tragedy from the perspective of the confined. The idea is to highlight the excesses of the state on its citizens and the rhetorical practices it engages in, so that the act of torture becomes acceptable to the society.

The thesis ends with the chapter on 'Conclusion'. This chapter summarises the main inferences of the study. By engaging with the cases of rebellion, revolution and regulation, it is possible to understand tragedy from the agential perspective. Herein, the main findings with regard to the specific cases of suicide bombing by the LTTE, political developments in the Arab world and the backlash on the Muslim community in the US in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 has been explicated upon. The net inference could be summarised as follows: double reading deconstructs predominant security narratives by viewing the protagonists from an agential perspective, and thereby bringing forth divergent opinions, otherwise suppressed in global politics. The study demystifies mainstream security narratives and takes the road of alternative methods in security studies.

CHAPTER 2

The Method of Double Reading

In this chapter, double reading would be discussed, firstly, as a method in social science and especially International Relations, and secondly, as being an antidote to the limitations of positivist methods. The main argument of the chapter could be summarised as follows: double reading of rebellion, revolution and regulation enables an engagement with the dissenting narratives, thereby privileging human agency in security studies. Herein, there are three layers of argument which relates to tragedy in International Relations. Firstly, the occurrence of pain and harm contextualises ethical challenges confronted by global citizens, who have been victims of discriminatory practices, and tragedy lies in their predicament to achieve emancipation. Therefore, a deeper analysis of suffering is dependent upon repository of knowledge domains that confronts issues of inclusion and exclusion.

This leads to the second level of argumentation, *viz.*, the shift in the ‘referent object of security’ (Booth 1991), namely from state to citizens, exposes their suffering, thereby salvaging a tragic rendition of global phenomenon such as rebellion, revolution and regulation. Thirdly, contextualisation from the vantage point of the suppressed, subjugated or silenced, enables an empathetic engagement thereby extricating the analysis from extant practices of security which deprivilege human agency in global politics. Overall, the method of double reading questions equivocal acceptance of certain ideas at the international level. For studying tragedy as a thematic, double reading unravels the truth of human society and problematises those ideas which have been normalised in public and political discourses.

The chapter proceeds in seven sections. In the first section, research methods in International Relations would be discussed. Herein, the main thrust is upon the significance of context-based study of security. In this regard, a critique has been mounted on the dominance of positivism in International Relations, including mainstream security studies, which has delimited the terrain of the discipline. In the following section, research methods in critical security studies have been discussed. The crux of the argument is that observation-based collection of data and study of cases is also empirical: this could be significant in the discovery of new agenda appertaining

to security rather than being merely used for theory building and development of scientific models. In the third section, deconstruction through the method of double reading has been discussed. It has been argued in this section that double reading enables an empathetic engagement with the cases of rebellion, revolution and regulation. Additionally, reading provides a framework through which security narratives could be assessed critically. It has also been argued that the method of double reading questions extant premises and practices in global politics. Subsequently, the manner in which the readings of rebellion, revolution and regulation deconstructs mainstream security narratives has been discussed. In the final section, it has been argued that tragedy in global politics could be understood in terms of the pain, anguish and malevolence inflicted upon the marginalised communities of the global society, which is brought to the fore through an engagement in reading and critical security studies.

Research methods in International Relations and its application to security studies

The scientific method of research in Political Science (and International Relations) could be understood as the way of inquiry through ‘experimentation, observation and theory construction’ to bring to the fore the qualities of a particular object as it exists ‘in nature’ (Wong 2011: 452-53). Scientific research is considered to have ‘two pillars’, namely, ‘theories and observations’ which are drawn at the levels of theory-building and empiricism (Bhattacharjee 2012: 3). It is argued that ‘scientific method leads to scientific knowledge’, only if there is a ‘relation’ between the proposition and the outcome of the scientific method (Wong 2011: 452). Induction and deduction are two paradigms within scientific method (Wong 2011: 455). Both of these paradigms are grounded in positivism, which emphasises upon ‘objective knowledge’ and says that a ‘proposition’ could be considered ‘true’, if only it is based on factual and observable ‘reality’ (Wong 2011: 453). Scientific method of conducting research in International Relations are seen in several theoretical foundations including rational choice, behavioural analysis and quantitative research, besides others.

Positivism has been the cornerstone of research in International Relations ever since it started to emerge as a separate discipline from Political Science. With the advent of Enlightenment in Europe in the eighteenth century, it was argued that the world can

only be understood by ‘systematically comprehended’ realities which is only possible by resorting to science (Held 1980: 160-61). Auguste Comte is a significant name amongst philosophers who emphasised upon the ‘assessment of matters of fact available in experience’ for ascertaining realities (Comte 1975 cited in Held 1980: 161). This, in other words, lay emphasis upon observation-based knowledge and gives rise to scientific methods of research in social sciences.

Giddens (1977: 238-39) categorises positivism into three sub-categories: ‘positive philosophy’, ‘logical positivism’ and ‘positivistic sociology’. The first sub-category refers to the ideas of Comte, as mentioned earlier. Logical positivism refers to the conception of positivism as envisaged by the Vienna Circle wherein empiricism is used as a method and the fact-value binary reinforced. The third sub-group, namely ‘positivistic sociology’ refers to the works in social sciences which utilises the framework of Comte and attempts to formulate laws for social sciences in the manner of natural sciences (Giddens 1977: 239). Although there are differences amongst them, they commonly adhere to the idea that empirical knowledge is not related to morality or ethics and it is empirics which is constitutive of methodological foundations in social sciences (Giddens 1977: 238).

It is also worth mentioning that the urge to bring scientific analysis to the realm of social sciences stemmed from the historical milieu of the time which was challenging the domination of dogmatic knowledge. For Immanuel Kant, ‘dialectics’ enables an understanding of ‘social forces of political order and transformation’ (Kant 1989 cited in Roach 2008: xiii). This means that social phenomena need not be taken as a given but is rather subjected to rationality which can be different for individuals and for the society. The emphasis on rationalism based on empirics became the basis of knowledge structures. Liberalism, in its initial stage, therefore, was dynamic and revolutionary to the extent that it challenged existing structures of power (Heywood 2003). With the strengthening of scientific bases of analysis, social sciences method came increasingly under its influence.

Interestingly enough, the roots of critical theory are also drawn from the works of Liberal philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Kant’s views etched towards the idea of an ideal society which is based on cosmopolitanism and envisages the idea of world citizenship (Kant 1989 cited in Roach 2008). Therefore, there is an underlying ethics which binds

citizens of the country. Kant points out that there is an ‘objective principle’ in the form of civil laws which guide the subjectivity of a person to choose his/her actions (Kant 1989 cited in Roach 2008: 2), and to this extent the individual has ‘moral autonomy’ that could enable him to ‘act in accordance with universal maxims or imperatives’ (Roach 2008: 3). Horkheimer and Adorno (1972 cited in Held 1980: 66-67) argued that ‘mean-end rationality undermines the status of critical, substantive rationality’ which moves towards values and attitudes. The advocacy of individualism in the sixteenth and seventeenth century philosophy, led to the growth of assessment of means or techniques by which ends could be achieved (Held 1980: 67). In effect, the study of social sciences became clinical and was based on the assumption that actions need to be self-regarding in such a manner that they maximise interests.

Positivism, excludes morality from facts. For Comte (1975 cited in Held 1980: 161), ‘human beings and institutions must be viewed as “neutral objects” which can be investigated’ by scientific methods. In other words, just as numeric or alphabets, value does not exist outside of the material being. Therefore, the subject of study needs to be taken in its objective presence. For Comte (1975 cited in Held 1980: 161), ‘social institutions are unalterable’, and, therefore, it is possible to see a general pattern in their conduct just as it happens in the study of natural sciences. Smith (1996: 11) argues that positivism has presented a ‘unified view of science’ and has utilised methodologies which are grounded in ‘natural sciences to explain the social world’, thereby sustaining its ‘empiricist epistemology’. To this extent, positivism limits itself to explaining social and political phenomenon more generally.

Critical methods, including the Kantian proposition, is not based on mere observation or the strict separation of fact and value. It takes into account the subjectivities revolving around a phenomenon: fact and value are dichotomous. The aim is not to deal with the problem but indeed to dig deeper into the issues and problematise them for enhancement of knowledge (Cox 1981). According to Hegel (1967), ‘reason is the certainty of consciousness that is all reality’. It means that the person becomes aware of the self in relation to his/her surrounding and rationalises his/her actions according to the consequences that it could bring. In his critique of instrumental rationality, Habermas argues that there are ‘norms’ which are ‘intersubjectively recognised’ and therefore, appear as natural and universal principles which needs to be followed: this can be challenged rationally by means of ‘discourse’ generation (Habermas 1976 cited

in Held 1980: 330-331). Habermas, therefore, directly draws from Hegel's philosophy of self-consciousness that develops according to the perceived relations between the self and the outside. It must be mentioned that both scientific and critical approaches arose in the context of social sciences in general and not International Relations in particular— it was only in the later stages that scholars began to discuss methods specifically in the context of the conduct of politics across states and societies.

At the very beginning, it needs to be acknowledged that International Relations theory has been indebted to scientific research methods. Behavioural analysis, hypothesis testing, causation and quantitative techniques are some examples of scientific method in International Relations. As Hamati-Ataya (2018) points out, behaviouralism was based on the belief of 'unity of science and the unity of human behaviour'. By observing the behaviour of human beings, the existence of accountable facts and its impact upon the surrounding environment, propositions could be made regarding the social world (Hamati-Ataya 2018). The basic tenet of behaviouralism, as articulated by Easton (1953 cited in Hamati-Ataya 2018), could be argued as being based on 'observations', scientific 'techniques' and value-neutrality of objects, which is 'descriptive' and 'predictive'. Therefore, behavioural analysis is dependent on mathematical calculations, including 'measurement, quantification, testing, and replication' to show the relationship between variables of research (Hamati-Ataya 2018). David Singer's 'levels-of-analysis' (Singer 1961) in systems theory and Robert Putnam's 'two-level game' (Putnam 1988) are examples of behavioural research in International Relations.

Hypothesis-testing implies that the proposed statement could be empirically tested and verified through data collection or cases. This could also be done with the development of 'counterfactuals' (Fearon 1991). 'Counterfactual cases' are those which are based on 'hypothesised causal factor', actually not present (Fearon 1991). The idea is to observe whether the presence of that particular factor would have influenced the outcome. Causality is an important technique in establishment of the proposed argument. Causality is defined as 'a *theoretical* (original emphasis) concept independent of the data used to learn about it' (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 76). The effect of the independent variable upon the dependent variable explains the outcome (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 77). According to Brady (2008: 217), 'causal statements explain events, allow predictions about the future and make it possible to take actions for the future'.

The correlation between variables could be established by both qualitative and quantitative research (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 81-82). Quantitative research relies on surveys, data and statistical techniques (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008: 481-82). These techniques are important for ‘analysing a large number of observations’ (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008: 482). A classic example of quantitative research is Bruce Russett’s explanation for deterrence (Russett 1963). However, quantitative research does not merely imply a large set; it could be a small number of cases also. At the same time, the observations could be qualitatively developed by means of set relations or representation through models (Ragin 2008: 2-3). Quantitative research has been used extensively in the field of security studies, especially those which are concerned with the causes of war, thus privileging systems analysis and undermining the role of domestic politics (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008: 483).

The dependence on scientific methods has been a result of a thorough search for empiricism in the international domain, hence affecting the methodological choice in the discipline of International Relations, including issues of security. In order to substantiate the point, it is important to look into theoretical perspectives in International Relations and the method that these theories adopt. For instance, progress in the discipline of International Relations has been adjudged by ‘choices about what it means to achieve’ in measurable terms (Elman and Elman 2003a: 1-2). Hence, there is a tilt in the discipline for empirically grounded research.

In this regard, Moravcsik (2003: 157) argues that there is a ‘distinct research programme’ of liberal theory in International Relations which is ‘progressive’ because there is a ‘temporal and heuristic novelty’ in liberal philosophy that Lakatos considers as important for progress in theory building. Moravcsik (2003: 180-81) substantiates his argument by referring to the ideas of Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, emphasising the relevance of their propositions in the contemporary times. Moravcsik (2003: 184) also argues that the liberal research programme is progressive when assessed through ‘background theory novelty’ of the Lakatosian framework (Lakatos 1970 cited in Moravcsik 2003: 184), according to which the liberal theory has predicted more strongly than the other research programme of realism and institutionalism. For this reason, the liberal research programme is argued to be progressive.

Similarly, the debates that arise in the field of International Relations persuade scholars to revisit some core claims of their research and, in the process, become more 'sophisticated' than its earlier version (Jervis 2003: 277). This shows 'progress' in International Relations theory because the issue of cooperation and conflict is a 'puzzle which has to be explored rather than an anomaly that challenges the core' propositions, in the Kuhnian sense. Schweller (2003: 311) argues that progress in International Relations could be adjudged by observing whether small bodies of theory have generated 'cumulative knowledge'. Neoclassical realism has attempted to unite the 'untested assertions of early realist thinkers and move towards assimilation— it is, therefore, progressive in the scientific manner because it has contributed towards a meta-theory (Schweller 2003: 316). These are some of the ways in which the development of International Relations theory is discussed and ascertained, and the focus has remained on the scientific analysis.

Herein, it is significant to draw attention to the Lakatosian analysis of scientific rationality, which is in turn dependent on the intellectualisms of Kuhn and Popper. Lakatos (1970: 91-195 reprinted in Schick 2000: 20-23) critiques Kuhn (1962) for his understanding of scientific rationality. Kuhn argued in his seminal work that research in social sciences is guided by a 'paradigm' which is a result of empirical research and is also a road-map for future research (Kuhn 1962 cited in Fuller 2003: 19). In this regard, Lakatos observes that the clash between Kuhn and Popper is not simply with regard to epistemology but it is more about the manner in which 'scientific progress' can be viewed in the challenge posed to 'novel facts' (Lakatos 1970 as reprinted in Schick 2000).

Drawing from Lakatos, the scholarship in International Relations has identifiable 'positive and negative heuristics': the former being those which consist of 'auxiliary hypotheses' and is alterable, whereas the latter is the unchangeable 'hard core' (Elman and Elman 2003b: 30-33). By keeping a set of assumptions as unchallengeable, International Relations has sustained its focus upon the state. King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 229 cited in Jackson 2011: 2) have argued that research in social science can only be meaningful if it is grounded in scientific method. The 'progress' in International Relations theory has, therefore, been understood in one meta-theoretical framework. Bennett (2003: 492-94) has argued against the adherence to 'any single view of science'

in order to extricate progressive trajectory in the discipline. However, scholarship in International Relations has continued to hover around the Lakatosian framework.

Yet another way of deciphering the methodological trends in International Relations is by means of an in-depth engagement with the ‘Great Debates’ of the discipline. Very often the evolution of the discipline is told through these debates (Schmidt 1998; Lake 2013). This way of writing the history of the discipline has resulted in eclectic theorisations and are mostly Western-centric (Lake 2013). In other words, the disciplinary trajectory of International Relations, has treaded along the experiences of the Western, mostly American and European. Nevertheless, by looking at these debates (or discussions), it is possible to understand the emergence and eventual dominance of positivism in the discipline. The four debates could be spelt as follows: realists versus idealists; traditionalists versus behaviouralists; inter-paradigm or the neo-neo debate; and rationalists versus reflectivists or positivists versus post-positivists. The fourth debate marks a culmination of the confrontations between positivism and post-positivism and, from the viewpoint of this research, is of utmost significance.

It must also be noted at the very outset, that some scholars consider the positivist-postpositivist debate as the third great debate in International Relations and do not take the inter-paradigm discussion as a debate because of the theoretical cross-conversations being grounded in the same epistemological and methodological edifices, which makes the debate futile and a misnomer (Lapid 1989; Lake 2013). The arguments between the positivists and the post-positivists are considered to be of significance because it questions the metaphysical assumptions in the discipline of International Relations, unlike the earlier debates— for this reason, the rationalist-reflectivist divide is considered as the third debate in International Relations by some scholars in the discipline (Lapid 1989; Lake 2013). For the purposes of this research, however, it is important to engage in the inter-paradigm debate because it brings to the fore the disagreements between positivists, who subscribe to the same meta-narrative. In order to understand the trajectory of rationalist-reflectivist debate, it is important to critically assess the earlier debates and their contemporary relevance.

The first debate, to begin with, which took place in the 1930s and 1940s, saw the divide between ‘utopians’ (idealists) and realists. According to Mearsheimer (2005), Carr was identified with the realists, not only because of his opposition to the idealist world view

which emphasised on peace but also for his emphasis upon power, wherein he argued that ‘power is an essential ingredient in politics’, the ultimate manifestation of which could be seen in international wars (Carr 2001 cited in Mearsheimer 2005). In this debate, Carr brought out a categorical argument against idealism’s grounding of world politics in normativity only: it needs to be accompanied with empiricism (Carr 1946 cited in Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008: 7). This, at the very outset, brought in a distinction between those propositions which were imaginative and those that were real world scenarios.

In his critique of a utopian world order, Carr (1946: 9-10) argues that ‘political utopia’ can only be progressive and successful if it is coupled with ‘political reality’. Therefore, for Carr (1946: 10), the realist thought emphasised that events must be studied as they are, rather than ‘wishing’ what they could be, because ‘acceptance of facts’ and ‘analysis of their causes and consequences’ balances utopian claims. To this extent, Carr (1946: 10) did not overrule the importance of utopianism in as much he pointed out that the ‘barrenness of realism’ could be ‘counter-acted’ by utopianism. It is of note that classical liberals as Carr did not outrightly reject knowledge claims other than scientific. Carr’s critique on idealism is identified as a debate because it marked a break with the predominant views of International Relations scholars during the inter-war period in the 1920s and 1930s. At a time, when International Relations was evolving as a discipline, the debate represented two sides of the same coin.

Wilson (1998), however, argues that the distinction between scientific realism and normative idealism has been misinterpreted as a debate because Carr and contemporary ‘idealists’ did not engage in overruling the other perspective. Osiander (1998) argues that the idealists in the early twentieth century believed in a ‘shared paradigm’; to this extent, the idea of international anarchy and balance of power were understood and accepted by the idealists. Schmidt (1998) also points out that much of the International Relations scholarship during the inter-war period acknowledged and utilised the conception of anarchy and state sovereignty— this definitely contradicts the claim of Carr and other realist scholars that the world view of the idealists were not in tune with reality. It could be argued that they were looking at a different conception of the world order which could be based on peace and co-operation, thus presenting a positive picture of inter-state relations (Schmidt 1998), while at the same time being fully aware of the doldrums in the international system, given its inextricably self-operating

mechanism minus any regulative authority. Therefore, it is a false assumption that the views of the idealist thinkers of the inter-war period were purely, as Carr (1946) repeatedly points out, 'utopian'.

Ashworth (2002), in the context of the first great debate argues that the 'construction of the realist-idealist debate' was an important foundational narrative that could provide legitimacy to the current trends in International Relations discipline that marginalises 'liberal internationalism'. Brian Schmidt (2005), in this context, has argued that there is a reluctance to revisit history in International Relations because that could potentially question the 'early history of the discipline', which is deterministic in understanding the evolution of the discipline. The assumption that the history of the field is already known, along with other factors, 'simplifies' and, therefore, 'distorts' the history of the discipline (Schmidt, Brian 2005). As Cox (2012: xiii-xiv) points out in this regard, that by digging deeper into the roots of the history of the discipline, 'a more textured', 'complicated' and 'interesting' picture comes to the fore, which is instrumental in redrawing the historical bases of knowledge in the discipline.

Although there were differences that existed between the idealists and the realists in terms of the core and content of the study of International Relations, it does not qualify as a 'debate' for the lack of any formal exchange of arguments between the two categories of thinkers (Wilson 1998). When a 'retrospectively constructed tradition as realism' is portrayed as an 'actual' tradition, the understanding of the discipline comes to be based on artificial knowledge system (Schmidt 1998). For Ashworth (2002), the state of the discipline was much more complicated than the mainstream projects because in Britain the trend in International Relations was etched towards liberal internationalism which was 'threatened' by the left while in the US, it was facing a challenge from isolationists. Moreover, the argument of Carr needs to be read in conjunction with the idealist position that emerged at that time (Ashworth 2002)— this, again, is missing in the historiography of the International Relations discipline (Schmidt, Brian 2005). The exchange between realists and idealists needs to be problematised. The argumentation could not be solely based upon what the discipline ought to be— it is more of an exchange of ideas of alternative ways of approaching International Relations.

Moreover, the term 'science' has been used very loosely in the literature of International Relations (Jackson 2011: 3). Jackson (2011: 3-4) argues that both Morgenthau (1946) as well as Carr (2001) in their published works made a 'vague' mention of scientific analysis; analytically there is no understanding of science which is present in their writings. The classical realists while attempting to move towards a science of world politics, did not spell out the manner in which these approaches were scientific. In this sense, their disagreements and critique of the idealists were problematic. Carr (2001: 4-5 cited in Jackson 2011:5) wanted to move towards 'a more comprehensive view' of world politics. Moreover, political ethics was given importance by classical realists. The intention, herein, was to base ethics on the logic of science. Eventually, science came to acquire significance in International Relations theory and this got reflected in the second debate.

The 'second debate' was more methodologically entrenched and pitched historical analysis against scientific method. According to Bull (1966), there are two approaches to the study of International Relations— 'classical' and 'scientific'. By 'classical' approach, it is implied that the method used for analysis is 'philosophy, history and law' and there is 'reliance in the exercise of judgement' (Bull 1966: 361). The scientific approach, on the other hand, argues that research claims in International Relations should be 'based either upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict, empirical procedures of verification' (Bull 1966: 362). The behavioural school preached for devout positivism which meant that analyses need to be based upon empirical data which is 'value-neutral' and could contribute towards theory building (Hamati-Ataya 2012). This was in contrast to the historical analysts who believed in judgement rather than merely focusing upon objective theorising. Kaplan (1966: 3-4), in this regard, points out that even 'intuitions' are dependent upon scientific procedures, because 'falsification' provide ground for the development of 'new intuitions'. In other words, the scientific theorists believe that progress in the discipline is heavily dependent upon scientific method. Therefore, the separation of facts and values were an important criterion for theorising in the case of behaviouralists. This indeed became a guardian angel for International Relations scholarship.

Kaplan (1966: 4-5) argues that 'systems and process' can provide a reasonable basis for studying international politics, because it provides the researcher with subject matter. This scientific method, enables research because it provides ground for

accumulating details and streamlining the selection of facts (Kaplan 1966). Carr (1946: 2) critiqued the scientific approach because he drew a distinction between natural and human sciences, wherein the latter is reliant upon 'purpose' that guides analysis and impulse for the research. In support of realism, though, Carr (1946) did not advocate scientific approach. Bull (1966) argued that the scientific approach suffers from 'intellectual puritanism' because of its vociferous advocacy of objective knowledge. This objectivity is problematic because the question of morality in international politics, thus, gets compromised (Bull 1966).

On the point of morality, classical realists were also persuasive. Carr (1946: 146-47) insisted that the notion of morality is extremely significant in International Relations because the morality of an individual and morality of the state gets reflected in their behaviour that impacts upon the international system. The 'morality of a state' which determines how the inter-state relations needs to be conducted and the 'morality of an individual' to facilitate the decisions of the state are essential for understanding international politics (Carr 1946: 158). For an assessment of human behaviour, scientific theorists rely on psychoanalysis and behavioural theories of psychology, which clearly shows the 'motivations' of the actor (Kaplan 1966). The debate reflected the academic divide that has occurred between American and British International Relations scholars in the 1960s, wherein the former propounded the behavioural view, whereas the latter was in support of historical/philosophical theorisation of the subject.

There has been a critical review of the 'second debate'. In this context, it has been argued that this debate laid down a strict separation between scientism and historicism and argued that these two were incommensurable (Curtis and Koivisto 2010). A binary is drawn between the ideographic and the nomothetic approaches. Herein, 'nomothetic' is concerned with generalisable and universally applicable rules whereas 'ideographic' refers to analysis of specific historical events (Curtis and Koivisto 2010). The question, in a nutshell, is whether the gulf between the ideographic and the nomothetic could be bridged. Historical sociology has challenged this trend and has made International Relations research integrate the two methods rather than treat them as binaries (Curtis and Koivisto 2010). The divide between the two approaches could also be considered artificial. Firstly, the discipline of International Relations draws heavily on historical events and epochs (Latham 1997). Hence, even when a scientific analogy is drawn between different phases of International Relations, historical evidence cannot be

ignored. Secondly, there is an overlap between the study of politics and history, and, to this extent, ‘debates within the discipline of History revolve around claims and counter-claims about the adequacy of differing narratives’ (Roberts 2006: 703), thus rendering it a scientific pattern for value addition.

It is also important to point out that there is a greater perceived ‘divide’ between History and other social sciences that needs to be addressed in order to assess the full implications of the utility of History in International Relations (Lawson 2010). As a counter to Lawson’s argument, History has been relegated to the backseat by neo-positivists and is mostly used as ‘context-free “data”’, thus reducing its presence to bare minimum in International Relations (McCourt 2012). The ‘historical mode of knowledge production is indispensable to IR in addressing its substantive issues’ (Suganami 2008: 327). The ‘historical turn’ has, therefore, produced a change, albeit limited, in the methodological conscience of International Relations scholars, though its recent resurgence has shown promise for subjective historicisation within the discipline.

The ‘ideographic-nomothetic divide’ in International Relations has been challenged, most significantly by the English School. According to Little (2000), unlike ‘monists’, the English School believes in methodological pluralism: the ‘ontologically’ differentiated units, such as international system, international society and world society could be studied by different methodologies such as positivist, interpretivist and post-positivist. Therefore, there is no reason for maintaining a methodologically rigid posture while studying International Relations. This point is enlightening for the participants of the second debate because it shows that scientific/empirical methods could be compatible with interpretivism, though there is surely a possibility that the epistemic bases for the latter could be at variance with the former.

However, as Jackson (2011: 6) points out, both the sides agreed that knowledge in ‘world politics’ has to be based upon ‘empirically grounded and justified claims’. Therefore, there were disagreements regarding the conduct of doing research: whether the reliance has to be on theory building based on propositions or on the ‘historical reconstructions’ of world politics (Jackson 2011: 7). As Jackson (2011: 7) points out, if this viewpoint is taken into consideration then the gap between the two schools of thought does not seem unsurmountable. At the same time, the focus for both the groups

was the state: while the behaviouralists engaged in a ‘systems analysis’, the traditionalists focused on the historicity of world politics. The English School, in this regard, focused on the ‘international society’ and argued that there are ‘common interests’ that the ‘society of states’ intend to maintain (Bull 1966). Additionally, by arguing against the use of history as a sheer collection of data that is ‘decontextualised’, a relationship between neo-positivism and history could be deduced (McCourt 2012). The knowledge, thus, propounded contradicts some of the binaries that were drawn by participants of the second debate.

The gulf between the philosophical and the scientific approach could also be bridged by ‘objective idealism’, which means to say that ‘social relations’ could be retrieved in the various ‘stages of human history’, which consolidates human reactions with natural processes (Krombach 1992)—therefore, the divide between history and philosophy, on one hand, and natural science, on the other, is imaginative rather than real; inauthentic rather than legitimate; conversant rather than parallel. McCourt (2012) points out, in this regard, that critical realists also look into the correspondence between ‘causal mechanisms’ and ‘observed outcomes’ by looking closely into historical narratives. This is not a simplistic view of history as positivists recognise but as a nuanced idea which gets to the roots of the issues and constructs, reconstructs or deconstructs notions regarding global phenomena.

The positivist methodology was used by different theoretical paradigms in International Relations. The similarity in methodological preferences, however did not mean that these were united on the epistemological side. In the ‘third debate’, the argumentation lies between neo-realism, neoliberalism and Marxism. Sometimes, it is also considered to be an engagement between realists and liberals in the general sense, as distinguished from neorealism or structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism (Waever 1996: 155-56), with Marxism being a key rejoinder and contributing significantly to a critical assessment of the mainstream in International Relations. According to Lamy (2008: 126), neorealism and neoliberalism are ‘more than theories’ because they elucidate a particular area of study and ‘define an agenda for research and policy making’. At the look of it the schism appears to be theoretical and, as Waever (1996: 156) argues, unresolvable right from the outset. Neorealism is co-equated with structural realism of Waltz (1979: 46), wherein he argues that structures influence the functioning of the international system. Neoliberalism has different connotations (Lamy 2008: 126): in

the scholarly world, it is closer to ‘the promotion of capitalism and Western democratic values and institutions’ (Lamy 2008: 127). The third debate has also been termed as the ‘inter-paradigm’ debate.

The first difference that arises between the neorealists and neoliberals is on the cognition of the primary actors in International Relations. For realists, the state is the primary actor and influences the international system most substantively (Wohlforth 2008: 132). The liberals, however, argue that institutions, elite organisations and transnational corporations play a significant role in world politics (Keohane 1988; Moravcsik 1997). In this regard, regimes are considered to be ‘intervening variables’ that lies ‘between basic causal factors, on the one hand, and outcomes and behaviour, on the other’ (Krasner 1982: 185). Moravcsik (1997) argued that ‘state-society’ relations majorly impact behavioural patterns of state. Krasner (1982) has made a similar argument, that is, regimes play an important role in shaping state behaviour and that their significance keeps changing, while one regime replaces the other as being influential in international politics.

The second difference arises in their attitude towards anarchy (Powell 1994). For realists, the absence of a centralised governing authority in the international system makes it uncertain and strengthening of security measures remains the only means for the states to survive in this uncertainty: for this reason, they are engaged in a competition with one another (Wohlforth 2008: 133). It is similar to the Hobbesian idea of anarchy, according to which the absence of a centralised governing authority could lead to political disorder (Milner 1991). Milner (1991: 85) argues that viewing anarchy as ‘the fundamental background condition of international politics’ is ‘overly reductionist’ since factors such as ‘strategic interdependence among the actors’ also provide the basis for world politics.

The liberal/neoliberal position also assumes that the international system is anarchical but argues that cooperation rather than conflict could be a consequence of anarchy (Krasner 1982). Liberals argue that institutions are the ‘mediators’ that facilitate ‘cooperation in the international system’ (Lamy 2008: 133). According to liberal International Relations theory, ‘the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics’ rather than ‘capabilities’ or ‘institutions’ as argued by realists and institutionalists (Moravcsik 1997). To this extent, liberal International Relations theory

argues that state behaviour is determined by ‘societal ideas, interests and institutions’, which are important for the state to assess its strategic interests (Moravcsik 1997).

Therein, the third difference arises from the approach of realists and liberals towards the analysis of gains (Powell 1994), wherein the former argues for relative gains through competition for the purpose of maximising security and the latter advocates absolute gains through cooperation that could minimise the possibility of conflicts (Waeber 1996: 149-150). Lamy (2008: 133) also points to the liberal idea of ‘absolute gains’ which is in sharp contrast to the realist notion of ‘relative gains’. Powell (1994) argues that the realist advocacy of relative gains does not elucidate how it favours the state in the international system, because if the strategic considerations are the most vital, then relative gains are a ‘consequence’ and not a determinant for state behaviour. Therefore, the inter-paradigm debate was concerned less with methodology and more with centrality of actors, motives and capabilities that influence the international system.

The theoretical debate, however, camouflages a very significant point on methodology that the two positions— liberals and realists— advocate. Waltz, in an interview with Halliday and Rosenberg (1998) critiques positivism for attempting to present reality as it exists in theory. For Waltz (1979: 44), ‘structures are an abstraction from reality’ and therefore, a particular theory could explain only certain phenomenon. In this sense, unlike other realists, Waltz categorically says that he is ‘Kantian and not positivist’ (Halliday and Rosenberg 1998). The neoliberals, however, attempted to use positivist methodology in their attempt to counter Waltz’s proposition of ‘relative gains’ (Waltz 1979: 134). For instance, Keohane and Nye (2001: 20) critique realism for its assumption of uncertainty, its overemphasis upon territorial security and the insignificant status they accord to transnational corporations in world politics. Their argument, to the contrary, is that ‘complex interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality’ (Keohane and Nye 2001: 21), and, for this reason, they do not arrange the actors in the international system hierarchically. Keohane and Nye (2001: 22) do not dismiss realism: they argue that the reality of world politics ‘lies in between realism and complex interdependence’. The characteristic features of ‘complex interdependence includes ‘multiple channels’ to connect states and societies, ‘absence of hierarchy’ in political issues and the reduced risk of military engagement between states (Keohane and Nye 2001: 22). In this manner, Keohane and Nye (2001: 22-23)

argue that not only military but also issues of cooperation become important in International Relations.

In this process of critiquing structural realism, however, the normative tinge of classical liberalism gets compromised and there is an over-indulgence in making empirically sound propositions. Similarly, Reus-Smit (2001) critiques Moravscik (1997) for his proposition that liberal International Relations theory could be formulated in 'nonideological and nonutopian' ways. Reus-Smit (2001) argues that the attempt to confront realism on positivist grounds had eroded the political theory bases of liberalism. This is a regressive step backwards, methodologically, because it compromises on the major tenets of liberal political theory.

Marxism, too, contributes to this debate (Waever 1996: 148). The first intervention is with regard to the identification of actors and the parsimonious nature of International Relations theory. With regard to actors, Marxist scholars of International Relations emphasise upon 'political conflictual approach', which means the existence of power relations within the state (Waever 1996: 152). Therefore, Marxists argue that there are conflicts of interest, but, unlike the realist thesis, 'they operate within states and across states between the oppressor and the oppressed (Waever 1996: 152-3).

In contrast to realism, Marxism does not suffer from parsimony and identifies that power flows from and shapes structural relations. This is the most significant contribution of Marxism in International Relations theory, wherein they argue for changing the power ratio that could emancipate the marginalised sections of the state (Hobden and Jones 2008: 146). Marxism differs from realism and liberalism in its conceptualisation of 'time': realists argue that the international system is 'static'; for liberals, changes are slow to occur and, to this extent, the system is 'evolutionary'; for Marxists, dynamic changes reflect a break from the past and therefore, 'revolutionary' (Waever 1996: 152-54). For these reasons, Marxism presents a differentiated view on world politics by bringing in the societal dimension and engaging in a critical assessment of state.

Yet another contribution of Marxism in world politics is on methodological grounds, wherein Marxism engages in historical materialism and argues for bringing a change in the international system rather than considering it to be unalterable (Hobden and Jones 2008: 146). It, however, did not essentially challenge the idea of structures in

International Relations theory, proposed by neorealism. History was the driving force behind understanding development, which could be seen in the tangible changes at the structural level (Hobden and Jones 2008: 145). As Marxism emphasises upon structures, Waever (1996: 152) considers it to be a 'structural' theory. Boix and Stokes (2007: 21) also point out that Marxism laid down a structural theory 'which relied on systemic, broad explanations, to explain political outcomes'. The idea of historical materialism states that the 'real is the production and reproduction of material life' which controls the formation of political, legal, social and economic institutions and lays the bases upon which the 'superstructure is constructed' (McLellan 1977 cited in Brown 1993: 228). Marxism became congruent to 'general purpose method' and was applied to international ethics (Brown 1993: 226). To this extent, instrumental logic could be attached to Marxism because it engages in specific historical episodes, albeit treating history as a repository of data, to explain changes at the structural level.

Teschke (2008: 184-85) argues that Marxism could reformulate the problematic of conflictual social relations out of oppressive structures by interpreting the relation between 'social forces' and the manner in which they affect the emergence of political communities, reconfiguring their 'interactions and interpenetrations' and contextualising the 'spatial orders' in the given epoch more substantively. Marxism contributed to the inter-paradigm debate in International Relations, though it fell short of challenging the positivist methodology prevalent in the discipline because of its commitment to instrumentality. It must also be pointed out that the contribution of Marxist scholars of International Relations did not remain confined to this debate. In fact, the interventions made by Marxism in the inter-paradigm debate revealed the presence of an alternative theory, which was not grounded in parsimony and did not subscribe to state centrism. Inconclusive as this debate was bound to be, it did provide a platform for the range of critical theoretical perspectives, which followed non-positivistic methodologies.

It was only after this third debate that International Relations witnessed a surge in postpositivist theories which only sometimes address the real methodological concerns. Guided by political and social philosophy, the thrust of the study moved in several directions. Roach (2008: xxi) argues that since global problems which need redressal are multiple and labyrinthine, methodological approaches could also be 'open-ended'. When supported by theories which are concerned with epistemology, philosophical

analyses become robust and long-lasting (Mackenzie 2000). It is for this reason, that there is no single critical theory but several critical theories— each one of these representing a specific quodlibet and diagnosing a denouement to the quagmire.

The positivists argue that ‘fact/ value and theory/ practice’ are dichotomies, and from a critical perspective, these reify a particular type of ‘value-orientation’ and legitimises certain practices while at the same time excludes other values and practices (Held 1980: 170). Herein, instrumental rationality gets questioned and overshadowed critical issues come to the fore. To go back to Kantian philosophy, the individual has the reasoning power to act according to the universal guidelines and therefore, to balance out personal freedom with ethical codes (Kant 1989 cited in Roach 2008b: 3-4). Cox (1981) looks into the relationship between ‘history and knowledge’ to argue the manner in which there could be a link between ‘explanation and normative’ (Hutchings 2001: 81) aspects in International Relations. Post-modernists also question the epistemological basis for distinguishing between fact and value as well as the distinction that is drawn between morality and politics (Hutchings 2001: 82). Therefore, the idea of a dichotomous relation between fact and value is propounded in critical theory. By doing so, critical theorists prohibit analysis in clinical objective ways and reiterates subjectivity in social sciences, including International Relations.

In this regard, Cox’s distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical theory’ is significant (Cox 1981) wherein he argues that each perspective highlights those issues which it conceives as a ‘problem’. On the one hand, problem-solving theories intend to engage in instrumentalist rationality and seek solution to the highlighted issues by dealing with the cause of the problem (Cox 1981). On the other hand, critical theory is reflective and questions the very emergence of social and economic structures and power relations (Cox 1981). According to Linklater (2001: 23-25), the aim of critical theory is to unclasp ‘progress’ from the clutches of rigid and seemingly immutable structures in order to achieve emancipation. Methodologically, therefore, both approaches are different: critical theory relies on historicisation whereas problem-solving is ahistoric (Cox 1981); critical theory questions existing social relations whereas problem-solving takes social relations as a given and the structures as unchangeable (Linklater 2001); critical theory focuses on issues which are not only ‘sub-systemic’ (Singer 1961) but also frames the problematic from the perspective of

the citizens whereas problem-solving focuses on the state which is at the heart of such theories.

Following this, the next debate in International Relations was between positivist and postpositivist approaches. It is sometimes also called the rationalist-reflectivist divide (Lake 2013). The dialectics (of this debate) lead to ‘methodological pluralism’ which emphasises on ‘plurality’, thus, bringing various view-points into the discipline (Roach 2008a: xx). Several scholars argue that this debate raised ontological concerns (Keohane 1988 and Lapid 1989 cited in Lake 2013). However, it did not mark a progress in the discipline (Lake 2013). The debate drew lines between two methodological positions, that is positivists and postpositivists. The postpositivists included social constructivists as well as post-structuralists. In sum, all those who questioned the foundations of the extant knowledge claims and were eventually labelled as ‘anti-foundationalist’.

The contestation between positivists and postpositivists is largely around assumptions of ‘unity of science’, the ‘distinction between facts and values’, the patterns of regularity and their argument that reality could be understood through ‘neutral facts’ (Smith and Owens 2008: 178). According to the first point, the positivists argue that social sciences could be studied using the same methodology as natural sciences (Smith and Owens 2008: 178). In this regard, the methodology in positivism is ‘unduly quantitative and behavioural’ (Smith 1996: 34). Lake (2013) argues that positivism is a ‘misnomer’ because it is only ‘methodological falsification’ (Popper 1963 cited in Lake 2013). Smith (1996: 34), however, argues that some scholars reject positivism as a methodology while at the same time keeping its epistemological basis intact. Therefore, positivism is sometimes used for its epistemological bases rather than as a methodology.

There has been a scrutiny of the utility of positivism in the discipline of International Relations because of its quantitative leanings. However, postpositivism has also been critiqued for adding to the list of ‘posts’ that have come to inhabit the discipline of International Relations (Der Derian 2009: 190). However, the significance of postpositivism cannot be underplayed because, unlike classical/historical approaches to the discipline, it has challenged the core assumptions of positivism including its emphasis upon fact-value differentiation and its epistemological bases. As a method

that is used by post-structuralists, critical theorists and post-modernists, postpositivism enables a questioning of the given 'supreme epistemology, ultimate theory that can prove' a reality and claim to be the truth (Der Derian 2009: 194). Therefore, postpositivism by engaging in interpretation raises new concerns for the discipline of International Relations, including the validity of a grand theory. It challenges the 'meta-theoretical assumptions of traditional international relations' (Jones 2001: vii). In the framework of a verbal theoretical exchange between the mainstream and the fringes of International Relations, this debate, sometimes called the 'final debate in IR' (Lake 2013), revealed the fissures in methodologies used therein.

In this debate, there is '“an inter-paradigmatic profile”', which critically assesses the scientific meta-theoretical positions (Lapid 1989). It is also argued that postpositivism questions the ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions that go uncritically accepted because the theory has reached a 'thematic level' and any information that is contradictory is either ignored or declared invalid (Lapid 1989). The debate between positivists and postpositivists was grounded in the questioning of ontological assumptions as well as challenging the absolute picture of scientific rationality, grounded in empiricism and objectivity. There are two meanings that could be accorded to ontology, wherein the first implies 'the affirmation of the ultimate reality of the universe' and the second, means the identification of 'basic constitutive structures' that could be used to understand historical episodes (Cox 2001: 45-46). This understanding of ontology is reflective of two different positions in International Relations: one, that takes metaphysical aspects as unquestionable and therefore, the theories that emerge are parsimonious, whereas the other reflects on the significance of interpretivism and contextualisation. At the level of theorisation in International Relations, the first position on ontology is reflected in neorealism which assumes the international system to be unchangeable (Waltz 1979), whereas the second meaning of ontology could be attributed to critical theorists who argue that 'ontology is a work in progress' (Cox 2001: 46). The ontological grounding of this debate showed the promise of postpositivism in International Relations which was more susceptible to diversity and pluralism.

The most significant contribution of the debate has been to strengthen the grounds for postpositivism in International Relations as is evident in the emergence of critical theoretical positions. Although, critical theory itself has not been able to achieve its

goal fully in replacing the neorealist positions in International Relations which continue to focus on systems, it has definitely posed a substantive challenge to behaviouralism—something that historical approaches could not accomplish. Bernstein, Lebow, Stein and Weber (2000) argue that the theories of International Relations are ‘mistaken’ in their quest for a ‘predictive theory’ on scientific lines because the analogy between natural and social sciences is fallacious. In other words, social sciences, including International Relations, need not be limited to quantitative analysis because perspectives have a significant role in theory building.

Yet another binary that is often addressed in International Relations is the ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ traditions in the discipline. Both of these approaches are different from each other as their motives for studying the particular event or phenomenon is grounded in different rationalities. According to Trout (2002), the word ‘understanding’ is mostly used by scientific professionals in a sense of ‘good or correct explanation’. This is, however, problematic because it suffers from the biases of ‘overconfidence and hindsight’ (Trout 2002): therefore, it is important for analytical purposes to draw a distinction between these two. Herein, Hollis and Smith’s (1991: 1) distinction between the ‘explaining’ and the ‘understanding’ traditions needs to be brought to the fore. The ‘explaining’ tradition is grounded in scientific rationality and method (Hollis and Smith 1991: 45). According to this tradition, there was an attempt to ‘locate causes and laws of behaviour’ in international politics; this method was adopted first by the realists and continued with neo-liberal institutionalism (Hollis and Smith 1991: 46). The ‘understanding’ tradition, however, argues that in order to analyse the social world, the ‘experiences’ of people, ‘linguistic’ and discursive meanings as well as ‘context’ and ‘ideas’ are important factors to be considered (Hollis and Smith 1991: 69-70). The social setting and the ‘actions’ taken have interpretive and narrative templates: this addresses the point that *‘action must always be understood from within’* (original emphasis) (Hollis and Smith 1991: 72).

Hollis and Smith (1991: 2-4) argue the contention between the ‘two traditions’ lie on the ground that explanation is an ‘outsider’s’ view whereas understanding is an ‘insider’s’ perspective: the former is based on objective facts while the latter is governed by subjectivities; explanation attempts to deal with causality and causal analysis whereas understanding takes up the narrative into consideration; the two are also differential in terms of methodology wherein explanation draws its base from

‘Logical Positivism’ whereas understanding goes beyond mere verification of the claims made (Hollis and Smith 1991: 12).

It is also of note that certain scholars believe that explanation could be related to understanding on grounds that ‘science is global rather than local’ (Friedman 1974). However, understanding a phenomenon or event is sometimes specific and there is no need of generalising it for the sake of theory building; rather theory could be built on narratives and on unique experiences. Jackson (2011: 8-9) argues that the most significant implication of the arguments posed by Hollis and Smith (1991) was the point that ‘scientists’ in International relations ‘did not have a monopoly on knowledge construction’. There are other ways of knowledge production which are equally important. The drawback of this distinction lied, on one hand, in the identification of ‘explanation’ tradition with realists and institutionalists, while, on the other, the ‘understanding’ tradition was bereft of specific theoretical paradigms, in effect granting theoretical recognition to the ‘explaining tradition’ (Jackson 2011: 9).

It is not an overstatement to suggest that research in security studies has also seen a predominance of positivist method. Herein, it is significant to point out that security issues have been subsumed within the larger literature on International Relations in state-centric theories such as realism, liberalism, neo-liberalism and social constructivism. Therefore, the methodology in the analysis of security issues has also been very clinical and is based on the specification of tangible and descriptive threats. This has conveniently sidelined any questions regarding the referent object of security, which is the state. The focus has always been on the identification of threat that could be seen in stockpiling of armaments, possession of nuclear weapons, capability of the state to engage in warfare and so on. The thrust has been upon state security, the measures it could take and the ways in which it could ensure its survival in the anarchic world order. The argumentations between the rationalists and reflectivists has indeed been reflected in security studies also (Lamont 2015: 15). Research undertaken in the sub-field comes under the influence of the debates that revolve around core methodological concerns.

An important caveat remains to be considered: can any study of security be ‘uncritical’ (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 2)? The methodological concerns for studying security— what it constitutes, how it operates and in which manner is it perceived— is challenging because security can never be complete and it is an unmeasurable unit.

There are several studies on security which can be critical: the narrative is, therefore, the kernel of critical research. Threats affect people who live within the state in different ways (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 23). Common in the critical project on security is the intention to uncover competing discourses from differing vantage points. Ultimately there is a dual process of ‘broadening’ and ‘deepening’ of security studies (Buzan 1991; Krause and Williams 1996; Booth 2005). This problematises theories on security which suffers from the fallacy of over-generalisation as well as parsimony. Critical security studies, just like critical International Relations theory, could make use of hermeneutics or interpretations.

There is an objection towards the ‘broadening’ and ‘deepening’ of security studies from realism on grounds that stretching off the subject to include more than the issue of military security will make security studies vast (Walt 1991). This is, however, the central agenda of critical security studies: to expand the narrow base of understanding security. The way in which the discourse on security gets shaped is reflective of the several ‘political problems’ that exist in the society (Dalby 1997: 7). Herein, the main concern lies with the ‘politics’ and ‘ethics’ of security and the manner in which it renders life ‘progressive’ (Browning and McDonald 2013). By raising questions about the structures that create knowledge and challenging the extant overarching generalisations, the subjugated realities are brought to the fore. Herein, the research is ‘interpretive’ and grounded in philosophy so that diverse ideas about ‘dialogic’ politics is highlighted (Moore and Farrands 2010: 1-2). As mentioned earlier, by engaging with hermeneutics or interpretations, it is possible to harrow a plethora of rationales, distinct from the hegemonic idea of what constitutes threat and security. Hence, critical security studies, engages in conversations with existing perceptions on security and attempts to embed the discourse in social and political philosophy.

Methods in critical security studies

Moving away from the mainstream, critical interpretations of security brings to the fore the vagaries of people, especially the marginalised and unprivileged sections of the society. The thrust on agency has emerged in security studies because of the advent of post-structural theories and Critical Theory that lays emphasis upon the veracity of opinions present— and excluded— in the public domain. The critical perspectives dig

into the extant beliefs and practices of security and intend to bring forth an alternative to the dominant trend. It can be argued that a change in perspective requires a change in method of research. The main purpose of this study is to understand tragedy as a thematic in global politics, contextualising pain, harm and trauma from the perspective of the marginalised global citizens. By bringing human agency to the forefront of theorisation, it is possible to discern a terrain of socio-political exclusion in world politics through security discourses and practices. Tragedy in global politics lies in the ethically unproblematised and unchallenged spectrum of security practices that obstructs the progress of marginalised communities, thereby, addressing emancipation as a central concern in security studies.

The choice of method reflects the intention and purpose of the research (Leander 2008: 11-12). Rather than drawing a binary between positivism and postpositivism, it is more important to focus on research questions— the analysis follows the diagnosis. Is the conception of tragedy a political idea? How does tragedy manifest in global politics? Is tragedy inescapable? Tragedy in International relations, from an instrumental perspective, gives a sense of its recurrence, and to this extent, seems to be irresolvable. Postpositivism intends to look beyond the dominant ways of addressing concerns. Therefore, the thrust is placed upon agency, especially those that gets suppressed in the mainstream discourse. When tragedy is brought into the active domain, it could be escapable. Moreover, the various strands within the critical fold are reflective of the different standpoints that are present in global politics. There are different perspectives within the critical belt which voice the concerns from marginalised sections of the society and this is amply captured by critical theorists. In this study also, there is an engagement with critical perspectives to elucidate on the thematic of tragedy.

The critical turn in International Relations has been influenced by the Frankfurt School thinkers as well as post-modernists. As Linklater (2007b) points out, ‘global solidarity was possible because human beings have similar vulnerabilities to mental and physical suffering’. This implies that ideas of pain and harm could be theorised and worked upon in such a way that practically it becomes possible to develop ‘global moral codes’ (Linklater 2007b) that could lead to emancipation. At the same time, it could also be argued that critical theory sometimes lapses into Eurocentrism and etches closer to ‘problem-solving theories’; in order to have a comprehensive ‘global reconciliation’ this gap needs to be bridged (Hobson 2007). Positions offered by Linklater (2007b) and

Hobson (2007) may appear contradictory since the first position proposes that there are commonalities in human suffering whereas the latter points out to the inherent Westernism embedded in critical theory. On a closer scrutiny, however, both these positions advocate contextualisation rather than generalisation as well as emphasise upon the manner in which values mould understanding of facts. Therefore, in essence, in spite of the vast variety of critical theories, emancipation emerges as a common theme between them.

Within critical research, there are different methods to question the existing structures of knowledge and power. The commonality between all the approaches is that they are in tandem with each other and attempt to engage in interpretations rather than falsification. As mentioned earlier, critical approaches advocate methodological pluralism (Roach 2008). One of the major templates of global politics is to interpret inter-cultural relations and the social meanings these have and for this purpose there is a need to look into variegated edifices of knowledge in order to unearth ‘the truth’ (Farrands 2010: 33). From the start, critical theory recognises that there cannot be a singular identity or reality. This understanding has enabled critical theorists to remain bounded with their knowledge claims while at the same time acknowledging the presence of alternative perspectives. As George and Campbell (1990) argue that unlike the mainstream that pretends to be united in terms of methodology (positivism) and epistemology, critical theory need not be singular but it could rather provide ‘thinking space’ for the representation of diverse voices in global politics. The ‘critical stage’ in International Relations theory (Linklater 1992), appreciates the presence of multiple viewpoints, thereby engaging in conversations rather than contradictions, dialogue and not monologue, reciprocity as against detachment and empathy, and not antipathy, towards global citizens.

Moreover, in spite of the various theories that emerge from postpositivism, including Marxist, Frankfurt School and post-Marxist scholarship, it is possible to draw their roots in the ‘critique of reason’ that goes back to the works and philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Hutchings 2001: 79; Roach 2008: 2). The main concern, therefore, is not to live within defined boundaries but to challenge given limitations that seems unbreakable and immutable (Hutchings 2001: 80). By its very temperament, critical theory could grow and develop while at the same time maintaining its purpose of critiquing and questioning. The global ‘order’ intends to protect certain ‘discrete communities’ rather

than the entire human society and this calls for revisiting extant structures of relations which could be constitutive of ‘emancipatory project’ (Rengger 2001: 91-92). In its concern with bringing to the fore ‘ethical-political problems’ of the contemporary times, a variety of methods could be utilised such as ‘deconstruction’, ‘existential phenomenology’ and ‘psychoanalysis’ (Bankovsky, Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos 2014). Critical theory has philosophical foundations and believes in dialectics and hermeneutics (Bankovsky, Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos 2014) that widens the scope of studying the problem of emancipation.

This particular study intends to focus on the concerns of the marginalised sections of the society. Critical theory focuses upon ‘questions of inclusion and exclusion’ (Linklater 1992). In this study the concerns of communities and individuals who are desecrated by the hegemonic custodians of the society and normalises the suffering of the former in discursive practices are discussed. The study digs deeper into emergence of structures of power which enhances discrimination against selective sections of the society. In the context of tragedy, the problem has to be located in critical locations of pain, harm and suffering of communities and individuals that is observable but ignored. For the purpose of clarity, three inter-related factors could be identified as being the defining features of this study on the thematic of tragedy in global politics. Firstly, the labelling of certain occurrences in global society as tragedy unravels the politics of identification and exclusion. Secondly, interpreting tragedy in a selective manner, raises ethical concerns regarding the ‘referent object of security’ (Booth 2007). Thirdly, the vocabulary or semantics that packages the discourse leads to the representation of episodes as catastrophic— the underlying grammar, depictions and wordings are constitutive to the narrative of tragedy. These three factors— politics, ethics and vocabulary— contribute to the conception of tragedy in global politics.

For this reason, epistemological reliance on science may not be accurate and definitive in social science research (Adam 2014: 6). In this regard, postpositivism could be differentiated from positivism in its argument that the usage of statistical methods and empiricism alone ‘a priori do not enable the attainment of scientifically relevant insights’ (Adam 2014: 6). The terms ‘empiricism and positivism’ are not adequately defined in International Relations: empiricism refers to the ‘reliability of information’ that is collected through data and documents whereas positivism is ‘the creation of laws, models, concepts and most importantly theories for the explanation and sometimes the

testing of data' (Neal 2013a: 43). Postpositivism is not against the usage of data but the creation of models, generalisation and falsification: it intends to move beyond the usage of data and information for instrumental reasons. Therefore, the usage of an integrated approach that moves towards 'meta-analysis', which is a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques (Adam 2014: 6) is envisaged in postpositivism. In this manner, the 'context' of the phenomenon could be addressed. Therefore, for addressing the questions of politics, ethics and vocabulary in the thematic of tragedy in global politics, there is engagement with an integrated pluralistic method. Context-centric approaches could alter the knowledge claims of tragedy in security studies.

The idea of critical research is to proceed through 'critique and inquiry' (Salter 2013a: 2-3). Critical security studies have been 'critical' of the mainstream explanations and approaches to security. At the same time, however, critical security studies lack 'clarity and method' (Salter 2013a: 1). Critical security studies attempt to prioritise 'methodological questions over ontological abstraction' (Salter 2013a: 1-2). In other words, the manner in which research would proceed is given more importance than the 'nature' of the research (whether it is problem-solving, critical or anti-foundational). The idea of critical research on security studies is to argue from an agential perspective (Salter 2013a: 2). This perspective brings to the fore the variety of socio-political problems. Herein, 'causality is emergent' and not 'efficient' (Salter 2013a: 2). This implies that particular situation could lead to 'a set of politics, identities, or policies'. However, it is not a 'source' that acts in isolation (Salter 2013a: 2-3). To this extent, the research design need not be based on 'carefully measured hypotheses and rationally focused "clean" questions' (Lobo-Guerrero 2013a: 25). In this regard, 'wondering' is a critical 'research aptitude' because there could be a need to bring in new terminology and expressions, rather than being based on 'analytical framework' (Lobo-Guerrero 2013a: 25).

'Criticality' is understood as a 'posture' that acknowledges 'different dimensions of knowledge production' and argues that there is a politics that binds 'epistemology, ontology and methods' (Guillaume 2013: 29). Criticality is important in security studies because it is important to go beyond the conception of the international as purported by state thinking (Guillaume 2013: 29). Therefore, rather than answering or resolving issues of security, the emphasis is upon reflexivity (Guillaume 2013: 31). The research design, to this extent, is not fixated but keeps questioning the politics and the agenda of

research. As mentioned in the previous section, empiricism is useful for critical research also in terms of the data and information that it could provide, not merely leading to theory building but also for providing substantive research inputs (Neal 2013a: 43). In the field of critical security studies, integrated approach is important primarily for two reasons. Firstly, plurality in the method of conducting research unravels different aspects of the political issue. Secondly, 'inquiry' through variegated methods throws up significant disjunctions in the ethics of conducting politics. Critical security studies, in this regard, could decipher trajectories in contemporary politics that addresses concerns of living, progress and emancipation for the citizens of the global society.

There are five 'turns', indicative of research methods in critical security studies, which could be identified in the literature: 'ethnographic', 'practice', 'discursive', 'corporeal' and 'material' (Salter 2013a: 3-4). The 'ethnographic turn' is research based on extensive participation in terms of field observation, first hand interactions or interviews and 'archival or discourse analysis' (Salter 2013b: 51). According to Ratelle (2013: 78), ethnographical research serves two major purposes: first, it is important for understanding the 'sense and meaning' that people give to their 'daily life' and second, by being involved in the very 'environment', it is possible to discern the 'interstices of power'. The main purpose of conducting an ethnographical research is to contextualise (Salter 2013b: 51). Although ethnography is primarily a method that is used in anthropology, it is relevant for security studies primarily because it is grounded in the 'culture' of the place or region (Salter 2013b: 56).

Ethnography also enables 'reflexive inquiry' (Kunz 2013: 63). Reflexivity could be understood as the interactions between social, political and cultural elements that results in the generation of new 'empirical material', and, therefore produces a distinct episteme (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2000: 9 cited in Kunz 2013: 63). Ethnographical inquiry also raises questions about 'participation, agency and power' in particular contexts (Johnson 2013: 70). The manner in which an actor responds in a specific situation speaks for the predicament in global society. More importantly, observation could help an empathetic engagement with the security situation (Salter 2013b: 51). By means of one's own experiences and feelings of insecurity, the context could be understood (Crane-Seeber 2013: 74). This is similar to Sontag's narration of pain (2003) wherein she argues that being in a situation of insecurity enables one to analyse security issues.

The ‘practice turn’ refers to the study in critical studies which is based on field work. According to Salter (2013c: 86):

Field analysis is a method that takes as its object the formal and informal practices within a structured, rule-governed, objective social sphere that is not predetermined by institutional or national boundaries, but share a logic, or a sense of the rules of the game.

Although participant observation is also present in this method, this need not be based on exclusive interviews or development of context. It argues for the ‘functional definition’ of the field wherein various security practices could be questioned (Salter 2013c: 90). It refers to the management of security which deliberately aims at the ‘governmentality of unease’ (Bigo 2011 cited in Salter 2013c: 88). Therefore, it questions security practices. Field analysis is also based on ‘*dispositifs*’ which implies that there is a ‘mechanism’ as well as ‘strategy’ to maintain the *status quo* when it comes to security measures (Bonditti 2013: 103-4). According to this method, rather than identifying with a particular interpretation, the various thoughts could be given due consideration: in a final analysis a political critique of the problem could be mounted (Bonditti 2013: 104). This method questions structures of power that leads to insecurity amongst people. For this reason, it is possible to ‘maintain commitments to a series of critical questions and hesitations’ by means of ‘knowledge claims’ that could be made in research (Muller 2013: 104). The way in which the security problem is presented remains crucial for questioning security practices. Therefore, presentation of data and information is a significant component of critical methods.

In the above context, it is evident that the vocabulary, wordings and language constitutes a narrative. This is precisely what the ‘discursive turn’ emphasises upon—the construction of meanings through meanings and societal practices (Mutlu and Salter 2013: 113). It refers to ‘discourse analysis’ which is ‘a method’ to understand ‘spoken, sign-based, or any other significant semiotic markers that provide meaning to the social world surrounding us’ (Mutlu and Salter 2013: 113). This discourse analysis could be argued to be based upon ‘*continuity, change or rupture*’ (original emphasis) (Mutlu and Salter 2013: 113). It is useful in understanding the ‘impact of language’ (Mutlu and Salter 2013: 118). According to Lobo-Guerrero (2013b: 121), archives are an important source for the creation of discourse because the material found in ‘records’ speak for the different conceptions of reality. Similarly, ‘legislative practices’, that is the manner in which laws are framed, is also constituent of a discourse (Neal 2013b: 125).

However, archives and law making are not only constituent of a narrative but also corroborates ‘supporting material, social and knowledge networks or *dispositifs*’ (original emphasis) (Neal 2013b: 128). Discourse analysis provides an array of perspectives: the source material leads to knowledge production while at the same time extant knowledge could be deconstructed.

Yet another method in critical security studies is the ‘corporeal turn’ which refers to ‘concepts related to the body’ (Mutlu 2013a: 140). These are constitutive of three different features namely, ‘affect, emotion and somatic’ (Mutlu 2013a: 140). There are ways in which the ‘subject and object relations’ could be framed through security practices and the manner in which these ‘affect social relations’, raising questions of ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘emergent’ nature of ‘security relations’ (Frowd and Leite 2013: 152). Mutlu (2013b: 156) argues that ‘affect and emotion’ leads to ‘corporeal origins of discourses, policies and practices of security’. In other words, the social interactions, relations and the human agency provides a guideline for interpreting security issues.

Emotionality plays a significant role in understanding security perceptions. The body can ‘resist, challenge and/or transform various structures of power’ (Shinko 2013: 163). The body has emotional components which is manifest in various reactions such as ‘fear, humiliation, shame, passion, awe, disgust, and rage, among others’ (Wiebe 2013: 160). The body has the capability to act and, in ways that, it defines power structures (Shinko 2013: 163). However, there are certain problems in addressing the impact upon the body: there are problems in deciding how much the body has been affected or whether it has been affected at all (Salter 2013a: 7). Shinko’s analysis in this method is relevant as she points out that ideas of ‘self-making and performativity’ when read in conjunction opens up the possibility of questioning the structures as well as the relations of power (Shinko 2013: 163). Vayrynen (2013: 172) also argues that there is a need to access ‘research material’ for the purpose of understanding ‘the corporeal choreographies and affective and somatic enactments’ through which the protagonist’s ‘political agency emerges’. The corporeal turn is relevant for understanding the agentialising prowess of the body which interacts, interprets and redefines the societal relations.

The ‘material turn’ in critical security studies looks at the ‘social life’ of an object—‘objects have *thing-power*’ (Mutlu 2013c: 173). This implies that objects are capable

of contributing to politics through their ‘constructive and destructive’ roles (Mutlu 2013c: 173). Objects are considered to be ‘actants’, which are described as ‘material mediators between actors *that act* and systems *that behave*’ (original emphasis) (Mutlu 2013c: 173). There is a focus upon objects in security practices which could be harmful or are argued to be a cause for insecurity (Aradau 2013: 181). These objects come to occupy the centre in security practices. The insecurity that, thus arises, is an epithet—it is suggestive of the constituent elements of insecurity. The infrastructure which enhances security identifies certain objects that is a cause of fear and which needs to be controlled. Objects such as drones or weapons of mass destruction are significant in the shaping of security relations. There is a political dimension to both destructive and ‘non-lethal weapons’, wherein there is a ‘connection between the materialities of security and the legitimation of political authority’ (Anais 2013: 195). There are interactions between ‘micropolitics of security and macropolitical rationalities’ through which there are interactions in global security infrastructures (Voelkner 2013: 206). Therefore, objects could define security studies research programme. As a method, it enunciates a method which takes into cognisance the presence of non-human objects as agents of shaping and questioning structures of power.

It must be noted that these methods are not rigid and water-tight. There are overlaps between all of these. There are three aspects which runs through all of the methods: observation, subjectivity and agency. Critical security studies by design and definition cannot follow a rigid path because security issues need to be nuanced. The researcher has to decipher various means to understand a problem. Critical security studies attempt to balance ‘details and context’ (Lobo-Guerrero 2013a: 28). Questioning is an important dimension of doing research in this field (Guillaume 2013: 31). Therefore, critique and inquiry continue to engage a problem situation rather than resolving the same. Methodological pluralism could lead to different ways of conceptualising security in International Relations. The different ‘turns’ in critical security studies, could provide a cogent and coherent thematic inquiry in security studies through engagement in source of knowledge. There is an attempt to show the manner in which reading could provide space for both critique and inquiry to address concerns on security and emancipation and, in the context of this research, could broaden the thematic of tragedy.

Double reading: deconstruction and critique

Deconstruction could be defined as (Zima 2002: 1):

an attempt to liberate critical thinking from institutionalized philosophy and to question in a radical way the dominance of concepts as well as systematic terminology (original emphasis).

In other words, it is a way of inquiry that does not proceed with objective knowledge. It is based on the 'rejection of the foundationalist conception of philosophy' and, therefore, questions the 'legacy of Enlightenment' (Mouffe 1996: 1). Post-structuralism rejects the idea that there are rigid meanings of words: '*meaning is a process* (original emphasis): the sentence may end but the process of language does not' (Griffin 2013: 210). To put simply, the meanings of the words are derived. This derivation is based upon the context of the reader. The assumption that words have fixed meanings renders socio-political issues unproblematised. Griffin (2013: 210) points out that the 'structurality' leads to 'centred meanings' of words due to which other words acquire meaning according to the 'social discourse' thus created. Zima (2002: 16) points out that although deconstruction has its variants, it criticises 'systematic thought' and 'find their orientation in Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics'. In International Relations, contributions of deconstruction could be grouped in three categories: 'interpretation, challenge and possibility' (Griffin 2013: 211).

Interpretation results from a combination of 'understanding and practising' (Griffin 2013: 211-212). Language constructs and accords meanings to the world (Griffin 2013: 212). There is an 'underlying structure that makes the signifying act possible and governs it in some way (Nealon and Giroux 2012: 146). Rather than assuming stability of meaning, deconstruction questions the extant discourses and connotations (Griffin 2013: 212). The central idea of interpretivism is to unravel the perspectives which are camouflaged, marginalised or subsumed within a larger narrative. The second contribution of deconstruction in security studies is the challenge that it poses to relations of power, wherein security becomes conditional upon the preservation of particular interests (Edkins 1999: 142 cited in Griffin 2013: 212).

The point of engagement is simple: to question the limited analyses which is based on available information or data. In the quest to make research in International Relations empirical, there is a negation of the presence of accounts for which no data has yet been created. More than that, the separation of facts from values prohibits questioning of

those phenomenon which are present but could not be quantified. This excludes certain topics from discussion in International Relations right from the outset. Herein, the third contribution, namely the ‘possibility of alternatives’ needs to be mentioned (Griffin 2013: 213). In security studies, there are differing narratives. By virtue of deconstruction, it becomes feasible to engage in dissenting narratives which questions the existing meanings of security.

Postpositivism questions the boundaries of knowledge which are closely fastened with what is visible. The main intention is to question through critique and deconstruct the hegemonic understandings. In its theoretical version, post-structuralism questions existent power dynamics. Ashley (1996: 241) argues that all interpretations emerge from a particular standpoint and this is indeed subjective because it restricts the understanding that others would have regarding the instance. In order to break free from the clutches of limited interpretations, an involvement with the subject becomes important without which it is not possible to come up with competing perspectives. The critical mode, also punctures commonly held beliefs by cross-examining the knowledge claims. Post-structuralism, therefore, does not rely exquisitely on objectivity: it does not detach the significance of values from fact. Referring to the works of Ashley (1996) and Cox (1981), Murphy (2007) argues that ‘critical’ theory scholars attempted to signify ‘the necessity and value of interpretive and hermeneutic sciences’ by reiterating the idea of emancipation.

For Derrida, deconstruction is not something that could be applied from outside: it is something inherent (Derrida 1998 cited in Zehfuss 2009: 143). Reading, in this regard, is an important method. According to the Cambridge Dictionary (2018), reading could be defined as ‘the skill or activity of getting information from books’. This, however, is a very simple understanding of reading. According to Jennings (1965: 3-4), the art of reading usually starts ‘as a sort of matching game in which the child was trained to fit appropriate symbols together, beginning with the letters and building up to words and sentences’. In other words, reading is considered to be the action of comprehending alphabets and words within a given grammar. Reading is guided by the language: ‘language is a social system of meaning, and reading is essentially the *social production of a relation* (original emphasis) among a set of signifiers’ (Nealon and Giroux 2012: 25). Therefore, reading is dependent upon the context of the reader, the usage of words and vocabulary and the connotations it has within particular social settings.

Double reading is one of the ways of deconstructing hegemonic knowledge and interpretations. It could, first and foremost, raise concerns about the assumptions underlying a study as is common in positivist research. Second, in order to do so, sources of knowledge are revisited and it is a matter of assessment where an alternative discourse could be pursued. In the process, new evidence, even those that challenge or contradict existent beliefs, could be unravelled. As Zehfuss (2009) points out, reading does not imply that the meaning of the text could be altered: Derrida (1998 cited in Zehfuss 2009) is in fact arguing that the more one reads the clearer the aspects of writing becomes. Thirdly, reading in between lines also reveals what has not been focused upon. Reading is not just about ventilating or devising ideas; it is also a 'process of negotiation among contexts' (Nealon and Giroux 2012: 23). In other words, the condition or background to the situation is instrumental in the formation of viewpoints.

Double reading takes the text critically. For Derrida (1967), text can be interpreted or 'read' in at least two ways: first, it could be read superficially and takes the account as given while in the second reading the finer nuances are ascertained and their larger connotations. It provides a 'scholarly reconstruction of a text' (Critchley 2005). Derrida could be accorded the status of a 'reader' who believed in 'critical engagement with the text': rather than taking meaning verbatim, there has to be a scrutiny of the intention of the text (Davis 2010: 27-28). In other words, texts have two meanings: explicit and implicit. At a glance, explicit meaning gets prominence and justifies the text whereas the second meaning is camouflaged and is deciphered on a deeper interpretation. In effect, one form of reading constructs social notions whereas the other questions the viability of such constructions. In other words, it 'destabilises' the meaning of the text by including those connotations that were excluded in the first instance of reading (Kakoliris 2004). To borrow from Morton (2005), double reading evokes the 'internal tensions and questionable assumptions of history' that are constitutive of the first reading. Therefore, the idea is to engage with contemporary notions and rescue the discourse from singular interpretations.

The trend in International Relations, has been on the separation of 'facts' and 'values' (Cox 1981). Moreover, there is a reliance on scientific modelling (systems theory, rational choice theory, etcetera) and theory building (neorealism, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, etcetera), rather than on contextualisation and observation. In effect, the discipline focused upon material capabilities and the manner in which these could

be perceived in international politics. Both realists and liberals are concerned with ‘the balance between conflict and cooperation in state relations’ (Heywood 2011: 14). In this way, they are ‘problem-solving’ theories since they proceed from ‘objective knowledge’ (Cox 1981). However, the challenge that critical theorists, including Frankfurt School, post-modernism and post-structuralism, posit to this common practice in the disciplinary premises of International Relations is in terms of questioning the prevalent practices therein (Spegele 2002). The critical theorists emphasise upon the ‘role of consciousness in shaping social conduct, and, therefore, world affairs’ (Heywood 2011: 15). In other words, it attempts to bring about significant changes in understanding global politics and ‘liberating’ communities, groups and individuals by considering their predicaments. Critical theorists ‘oppose the dominant forces and interests in modern world affairs’ (Heywood 2011: 16). This could be done in several ways: for instance, historicisation reveals trends in social relations and how it has shaped or continues to shape contemporary narratives. In deconstruction, interpretations ‘are not subject to any form of falsification’ and focuses ‘on “how” rather than “why” questions’ (Griffin 2013: 213). In a similar manner, ethics could also help in understanding the manner in which emancipation could take shape.

In the mainstream thinking of security studies, the externality of threat or identification of enemy comes from a particular segment. On scrutinising further, it is possible to understand the pattern in the identification of the enemy (Campbell 1992). In the case of theories of International Relations, ‘reading’ could imply locating newer avenues as theorists may discover fresh sources hitherto unused and thereby discard the ‘narrowness of the approaches’ (Pin-Fat 2010: 5). Herein, the discursive shift takes place—once the ‘missing’ are reported the concrete narratives succumb to counter-questioning. Veronique Pin-Fat (2017) emphasised in her interview that there can be several meanings of a particular phenomenon and all the meanings and interpretations can co-exist. Pin-Fat (2017) went on to point out that she insists on ‘conversation’ rather than a specific definition (of ethics in International Relations). On the basis of this interview (Pin-Fat 2017), it could be argued that there is no singular way to read a classical text or re-interpret a particular phenomenon: rather from a critical theoretical viewpoint it is more important to engage with the different opinions.

This argument is similar to the Habermasian idea of ‘communicative action’ that attempts to strike a conversation between differing viewpoints. Habermas, therefore,

resorts to linguistics to argue for ethical discourse (Habermas 1974 cited in Held 1980: 328). It must be noted that Habermas does not make reading but speech or linguistics as the basis of criticism. However, any form of language ultimately questions existing knowledge frames: discursive spaces could, therefore, be created by bringing issues for discussion and searching alternative perspectives. For Derrida, speech and writing are not entirely different from each other (Zehfuss 2009: 141). The idea ingrained in the exercise of reading is to engage rather than label particular events as tragic or adhere to a particular understanding of tragedy.

Reading can also be a 'performative'. For Ashley (1988), the first reading produces a 'heroic discourse' which is also a 'monologue'. However, a denser version produces a 'dialogue' (Ashley 1988). Moore and Farrands (2010) argue on similar lines that knowledge can be produced by conversation between states as well as individuals and social groups. Communication or opening of dialogue is the only way to bring out the divergences in opinion. According to Habermas, in 'everyday communications', there is 'an objective representation of the world' (Habermas 1987 Devenney 2004: 30). However, there is 'rationality implicit in communication between subjects': the focus needs to be upon 'intersubjective relations, rather than instrumental rationality' (Devenney 2004: 30). The use of words, phrases and grammar show the variations that are present in a particular text. The exercise in reading entails subjectivity. The perspective from which reading is being done is also important: 'who' is reading 'what' is a very significant aspect of reading because it builds up the narrative and is ultimately responsible for the creation of a discourse. In this way, reading 'can be an open-ended process of interpretation' (Nealon and Giroux 2012: 27). Words have effects upon the reader, and it could be at variance with the meaning intended by the author— this dichotomy is present in texts which could ascertain discourse ethics.

There are two sides of reading: one, the perspective of the author and two, the interpretation of the reader. In the first instance, reading provides an overview of the text and much could be taken to mean literally and approvingly; the subsequent reading strikes a different chord and makes the reader think beyond the literal and normal. Deconstruction is both a methodology as well as 'an ethical praxis of reading' (Critchley 2005). Only with this, a rethinking of established notions begins to take place. Derrida argues that 'signs' reveal differences between as well as within certain elements (Derrida 1972 cited in Atkins 1983: 17-18). The emphasis lies on reading the

text with precision and basing its acceptance critically rather than on its face value. Therefore, for Derrida, no form of reading or phenomenon could be taken for granted: it has to be questioned in order to challenge the ontological edifice upon which it is built (Davis 2010: 17-18). By digging deeper into the text, questioning some of its assumptions and highlighting the disjunctions between some parts of it, the floor is opened for critique.

Zehfuss (2017) said that a typical Derridean reading consists of an engagement with texts that are brought out by the state. To add, these texts which are brought out by the state are re-read in order to assess the claims that these make and the hidden connotations therein (Zehfuss 2017). Reading texts which have originated from the institutions of state are significant because they could potentially reveal the contradiction that exists between the claims made by the state and the inherent pitfalls. In some cases, marginalisation and discrimination is embedded in the body of the text. Constitutions, for that matter, are a case in point. As these are considered to be the guardian of the state and have a legally binding character, *prima facie* constitutions shape political programmes of the state. However, constitution also shapes social relations and the relative positioning of the various sections of the society. It is essential to scrutinise and read documents including legislations keeping in mind the societal concerns therein. The fourth chapter in this study attempts a double reading of the constitutions of Tunisia and Egypt after the political transformations of 2011.

Nietzsche engaged with language and writing styles (Nietzsche 1999 cited in Bleiker and Chou 2010: 10-11). For Nietzsche, the 'form' of writing was more important than its content (Bleiker and Chou 2010: 12-13). Double reading, in other words, is a deeper account and capable of shaking the foundations of a very sturdy extant structure. The methodological change also implies a change in the epistemological and ontological changes that is required for envisaging newer ways of understanding global socio-political issues. Yet another implication of reading is to challenge extant understandings of particular concepts and ideas. The conception of a 'rebel' is significant to discuss from the perspective of this study. Drawing from Fortin's argument (Fortin 1989: 191) about the political meaning and conception of 'terrorist' in International Relations, it could be argued that the word rebel also constitutes 'inter-textuality': the aggressive and irrational perception of the rebel, the labelling of violence as illegitimate and unwarranted and the fear inculcated within the civilians with regard to rebellious

actions constitutes a typical security discourse. It is not an overstatement to suggest that typecasting of rebels dismantles the possibility of resistance in civil or violent forms. Reading these definitions with more caution, suggests that there is a preclusion of definite norms while there is an acceptance of certain others in mainstream security discourses.

In the context of security studies, uncertainty at the international level that prejudices state security has been the primary focus of research. Tragedy has also been conceptualised in the mainstream on grounds of anarchy and unforeseen international events (Mearsheimer 2001: 2-3). This understanding of tragedy seems to be extremely narrow because it hinges upon the security of just one unit, which is the state. It refuses to look at the sub-systemic level where there is a veracity of actors and agencies. Deconstructing the notion of state security could open new ways of looking at global events and from those perspectives which are otherwise not supported by the mainstream. Double reading questions the assumptions upon which the notion of security is constructed.

Understanding security merely from the perspective of the state enhances social exclusion, for, all measures, however much unjust those may seem, could be justified on grounds of state vulnerability to external threat. While doing so, targeting a select group of people becomes unhindered. For Butler, the key question is to inquire the manner in which power excludes (Butler 2004 cited in Masters 2010: 115). Knowledge is a 'public activity' (Ree 2013). It does not emerge in vacuum. There is a politics behind the circulation of particular knowledge structures. Therefore, there exists a desire for the subject to be recognised at the political level (Paipais 2011). The whole idea is to highlight a counter-discourse which could focus upon marginalised voices. Double reading, by definition, could deconstruct the discursive practices and strike a conversation with the monologue that exists in security studies.

From the perspective of this thesis, which is focused on the thematic of tragedy, double reading is significant for two reasons: one, it critically assesses the extant discourses on tragedy in International Relations; two, it provides space for a deeper understanding of tragedy. Herein, the study is focused upon the instances of rebellion, revolution and regulation. In the following sections, an attempt has been made to lay out a map for re-reading of these three phenomena, embedding them in the particular cases that are

chosen within those. Overall, it could be argued that security practices require a more nuanced understanding of these cases in order to locate the victim. The method of double reading fleshes out those symptoms which are inherent but not stated. These are constitutive of critical viewpoints and deconstruct the ascendant treatise.

Reading rebellion

The chapter on rebellion contextualises the act of denying prolongation of toleration by a group of people. It is sometimes sporadic and sometimes organised. The actions invariably speak of the grievances of the people. It also reveals the inability of the administration to fulfil the requirements of a community due to which feelings of detestation manifest itself, at times most brutally. There is no celebration of rebellion even by those who are party to it: the struggle has only erupted due to regular discrimination faced by certain communities and far from the resolution of the core issues which has caused it. Rebellion unnerves the ruling groups because it is a sign of the failing of the administration to satisfy the desires of the people to a great extent. Invariably, there are historical precedents of rebellious events.

Most studies on rebellion deal with the history of the events: its cause, course and consequence (Wood 2002). These are mostly works of history that dwell upon archival source material for elaborating on its inception and its occurrence (Ackroyd 2014). Description underlies such works and they become useful for information collection. The greatest merit of these works is that their scope is broad and provide a historical erudition of the episodes. The question that remains unaddressed, however, is with regard to the extremities of actions involving the killing of civilians and facing the backlash, thereby leaving their problems unresolved.

Rebellion is a political concern because it represents anger and desperation on part of people. It may not have a definite end: there could be no summation of causes for which the marginalised communities involve in the use of violent disapprobation. For this reason, there has to be an engagement with the most brutal affliction of violence. There is a narrative that sympathises with the ruling authorities and the counter actions that they take up are justified on grounds of defence. The acutest case provide the maximum amplitude for auditing the eloquent annals of state security. As mentioned earlier, reading is also acting; it could also be interrogative. It could raise questions on those

points which have been dismissed or trivialised in a text. Reading is also an art: it is not just about the words but also about the creativity the language has. Through the glossary used in the text, an image is formed in the mind of the reader. As Barthes (1977: 79) says,

Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances - as though any material were fit to receive man's stories.

This concisely puts up the function of a narrative that is told through words. It could make use of inputs and perspectives that come from the stories, poetries or texts that are in circulation. Creativity does not necessarily imply aesthetics, though the latter is of significance in critical studies of security. Herein, it is implied that reading opens up the possibility of understanding the scenario by imagining the description and thereby, becoming more sensitive towards the subject. There is an attachment felt with the mishap: though detached from the scene, the emotional quotient of the episode is enhanced. The way in which information on 'agonies of war', expressed through news items, images and captions/headlines, must be responded to, is a crucial question (Sontag 2003). Reading has a relational value also: it could enable the reader to establish a connection with the episodes without being their victims. Therefore, reading with subjectivity in place, unravels a plethora of knowledge that is otherwise in abeyance.

In the analysis of rebellion, therefore, it is important to pay attention to the narrator of the episode and its interpreter. This form of reading is a layered reading of the episodes and the various interpretations that revolve around it. Suicide bombing for that matter has a very strong anti-rebellion discourse inherent. To borrow from Sontag (2003: 11),

To those who are sure that right is on one side, oppression and injustice on the other, and that the fighting must go on, what matters is precisely who is killed and by whom.

This is the tragedy in rebellion particularly because the sentiments on the other side are against the actions undertaken by the group. Reading rebellion in suicide bombing entails an exercise in engaging with multiple narratives. Deleuze (1979 cited in Davis 2010: 56-57) stated that the idea in reading need not be one of interpreting: by engaging in the 'messages or intentions' that the texts produced, 'he wanted to create something new through his encounters with them' (Davis 2010: 56). 'Deleuzian' engagement with

texts has the potential to rescue the discourse from biasness and throw up new possibilities for understanding the situation.

In the chapter on rebellion, the case of suicide bombing by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka has been taken up as a specific case. As would be elucidated in the chapter, the Tamils in Sri Lanka were alienated linguistically, geographically and ultimately politically which disillusioned them with the promises of the majoritarian Sinhala government. The cascade of suicide bombers was the culmination point of the resentment amongst the minority groups. It is important to recognise that there are two casualties in suicide bombing: those who get killed in the bombing and the bomber. The first perspective is an agonistic, traumatic and emotional rendition of the devastation. It goes without saying that the plight of the civilians afflicted by the blast, the mutilated, sometimes unrecognisable human bodies, the unhealable injuries of the survivors and the desperation to search for those who are missing, makes the situation chaotic, despicable and inexorable.

The second perspective is that of the bomber: the person who inflicts the carnage and destructs the body of the self. In the case of the LTTE, a larger group dynamic was prevalent which encouraged to kill by self-explosion. While the discourse on suicide bombing by political elites sympathises with the civilian victims and considers it to be scatological, condemnable and heinous act, the rhetoric on part of the group was a ballad that encouraged suicide bombing for the larger cause of acquiring a Tamil homeland within Sri Lanka. The catastrophe lies in the devastation and killings without the fulfilment of the stated cause.

The commonality in both the narratives is that it is rife with emotions. The reading of both these narratives is a pre-condition for discerning the peculiarity of the situation in which a rebel, that is, the suicide bomber, is located. It is important to recognise, therefore, as Sontag (2003) has pointed out, it depends upon the reader/viewer what is it that they want to see (or who's story they want to read). Deleuze, in this sense, provides a solution to the problem of bias/subjectivity wherein he suggests that all narratives need to be apprehended, before drawing inferences. For the study of rebellion, therefore, the *texte explicatif* needs to be studied from both angles— only then a thorough picture would come to the fore and the scope of a new argument could become possible.

Reading revolution

Revolution, in this research, investigates the gap that exists in the glorification of political overthrow and the societal turmoil that is witnessed. Revolution, commonly perceived as a catalytic phenomenon that brings in radical and substantive changes in a given field, has to be understood in conjunction with the impact felt at the societal level. In this study, there is an engagement with the critical aspects of revolution. Revolution is sometimes used interchangeably with progressiveness. The accolades surrounding revolution, however, is a celebration of the political overthrow. The reality at the societal level is more blurred: the beneficiaries of the revolution are limited. The political changes have an impact upon the society. However, some sections of the society, especially the marginalised communities, feel unsafe in the changing situation. This is because the scramble for power leaves them uncertain of their social standing. On observing the changes at the political level through the lens of the marginalised communities in the society, it could be argued that the reality of revolution is grim.

Re-assessing revolutions requires an engagement not with the end result of the political superstructure but the impact of these on the populace. The claims of victory of revolution need to be contextualised in the case of the marginalised civilians, rather than drawing conclusions from the net product. In this regard, revolution need not be treated as a given: it could mean different things to different people. If it is liberation for some, it could mean turmoil for others and yet a few may feel no difference between their past and present circumstances. Revolution attracts attention because it means that the contemporary political system is thrown out of gear and there is scope for the formation of a new government. But does it mean anything more than that? As Steinem (1970), said in one of her speeches, *Living the Revolution*:

The first problem for all of us, men and women, is not to learn, but to un-learn. We are filled with the Popular Wisdom of several centuries just past, and we are terrified to give it up. Patriotism means obedience, age means wisdom, woman means submission, black means inferior—these are preconceptions imbedded so deeply in our thinking that we honestly may not know that they are there.

This ‘Popular Wisdom’ (sic.), it has been argued in this research, is the hindrance for the full realisation of the benefits of the revolution. Changes at the level of administration does not mean that there would be alterations in social hierarchies also. The emphasis on changing the rulers forgets the miseries of the marginalised in the

society. The attachment of the value of progress to revolution stereotypes the cases: this is an assumption, as well, because sometimes it may simply mean ‘a radical change’. There are others who had, in history, considered revolution as harbinger of peace and liberty. In order to motivate people in the American colony of Virginia, Patrick Henry (1775) persuaded the delegates present for voting to join the American Revolution:

...This is no time for ceremony. The question before the House is one of awful moment to this country. For my own part I consider it as nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery; and in proportion to the magnitude of the subject ought to be the freedom of the debate. It is only in this way that we can hope to arrive at truth, and fulfil the great responsibility which we hold to God and our country. Should I keep back my opinions at such a time, through fear of giving offense, I should consider myself as guilty of treason towards my country, and of an act of disloyalty towards the majesty of heaven, which I revere above all earthly kings.....

In this speech, the ‘question of freedom or slavery’, is allegorical. It is appealing to the extent that it appeals for fearlessness amongst people in order to challenge the authorities: the call for liberation is univocal and urges the people to join together in the struggle.

The ways in which revolution is understood by the above speakers is vastly different. For Steinem (1970), there has to be a transformation in the common knowledge, which implies changes in the perceptions and assumptions of the people with regard to ‘others’. On the other hand, for Henry (1775), it was a political cry in need for emancipation from the suppression that the settlers in the American colony were facing. This reasserts the claim that there is no one meaning of revolution. Of notice is the point that both Patrick Henry and Gloria Steinem are Americans: yet their speeches on revolution, separated by almost two hundred years, reflects entirely different concerns. Henry’s appeal is full of divine allegories and the conditions of freedom and slavery as heaven and hell (Henry 1775). Steinem (1970), on the other hand, is grounded in social realities; her speech is interspersed with structural inequalities embedded in history, society and culture. The connotations of both the text is different, though they address the common theme of ‘revolution’.

Yet another example subverts the logic of revolution on its head: the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini (1979), the inceptor of the political overthrow, said in one of the first speeches he made on his return to Tehran in 1979,

I must tell you that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, that evil traitor, has gone. He fled and plundered everything. He destroyed our country and filled our cemeteries. He ruined our country's economy. Even the projects he carried out in the name of progress, pushed the country towards decadence. He suppressed our culture, annihilated people and destroyed all our manpower resources. We are saying this man, his government, his Majlis are all illegal. If they were to continue to stay in power, we would treat them as criminals and would try them as criminals. I shall appoint my own government. I shall slap this government in the mouth. I shall determine the government with the backing of this nation, because this nation accepts me.

This marked the end of the Shah's rule in Iran and completely delegitimised his government. The Iranian Revolution was historical not just as an episode but also because of the uniqueness that it enshrined. It unravelled the different manifestations of revolution. The revolution of 1979 in Iran neither brought in a self-styled communist regime nor was there a shift to liberal democracy. It moved in the opposite direction of a theocratic state, which, in principle, is contradictory to the spirit of revolution as understood in the West.

What is evident, therefore, that the revolutionising of the people on the political front can happen positively by arousing their consciousness towards the political situation (Henry 1775), by awakening the society towards its presumptions and the fallacies therein, which impacts upon their responses towards fellow citizens (Steinem 1970) and by blatantly delegitimising contemporary institutions and establishing the new ones (Khomeini 1979). This ignites the urge to re-read revolutions for their variegated causes, concerns and consequences.

In this study, political overthrow is seen just as one facet in the trajectory of revolution. Political alteration, however much glorified, does not warranty that social changes would occur at the same pace as the political overthrow. Indeed, society is deeper to penetrate than the political level. It is, what could be called, the core and crust respectively: only when the latter is removed the elements within become visible. Often in revolutions, this top layer is removed only partially with the political overthrow: the governmental machinery is removed but the system continues to exist as a new class of political elites replace the former. The real effort lies in looking at the core: the problems, issues and challenges. It is for this reason that after the political overthrow, the societal trends require scrutiny. This could be done by studying documents that the state comes up with the promise of transforming the plight of the people.

In this regard, a reading exercise becomes important. The first question is what has to be read? If the idea is to assess the connections that the political overthrow could have with societal progress, then the introduction of new dynamics by the state has to be studied in its capacity to impact upon the society. Second, it needs to be asked, what has happened to those people who are not constituent of the socio-political elite? To address this concern, the vast demographic terrain has to be searched. Empirically, the sorting could follow the research design. Since this work particularly deals with critical security issues, it is imperative to look into the conditions of the marginalised sections of the society such as religious and gender minorities.

In this thesis, the case of minorities in Egypt and Tunisia after the political upheavals in 2011 have been studied. Though predominantly populated with Sunni Muslims, who were at the forefront of bringing political changes, both these countries are also home to Shiite Muslims, Bahai's, Jews and Christians. Apart from that, there are cultural and linguistic minorities such as Berbers who inhabit some parts West Africa. Most significantly, there is a variance even in the Sunni Muslim population in terms of their political ideologies. Also, horizontally and vertically, gender minorities such as women and other gender and sex groups are also constitutive of the social fabric. Does the new regime take this diversity into cognisance? More crucially, has it been able to rescue the minorities from their past ordeals? Has the clamour for the political overthrow also been echoed at the societal level?

These questions stir up the imagination of the observer of revolution, in general and the political theatricals that have been corroborated in Egypt and Tunisia from 2011 to 2017 in particular. By engaging in a study of the primary documents, introduced by the new government, it is possible to estimate where the minorities lie in the eyes and aspirations of the new regimes. It is for this reason that the constitutions of Tunisia and Egypt, drafted and promulgated after 2011, are read along with the previous constitutions of these countries to assess what changes have been brought about in the lives of the religious, cultural and gender minorities. It is deconstructive reading that yields a window of opportunity to ascertain the realities that lie in the contemporary societies of Egypt and Tunisia.

Derrida (1972 cited in Atkins 1983: 21-22), in this regard, points out that the mere presence of some phenomenon does not ensure that it exists in reality: therefore, it is

both ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ at the same time. Derrida said that it depends upon our thoughts as to how we are going to interpret the text, and that it is ‘ “always possible” ’ that some mistake could be made in reading it (Derrida 1988 cited in Stone 2005). In fact, in some way, Derrida emphasised on the part of interpretations that could question the extant logic of the text (Derrida 1988 cited in Stone 2005). For Derrida, views need to be ‘developed’ by a reader after a ‘critical engagement’ with the text (Derrida 1992 cited in Davis 2010: 27). This text has to be read in such a way that it is able to unravel the realities that are hidden therein.

A Derridean reading of the constitutions of Egypt and Tunisia could decipher the extant trends in these societies. The first reading of these documents suggest that substantive changes are being attempted at the societal level. But is it the truth? Reading in-between lines, taking the subtle and the implied into account and fleshing out areas where there are explicit and implicit exclusions, the claims of the government and the political elites could be contested. A reading grounded in hermeneutics, that reads beyond the written words, alleges discrimination and insecurity that lies beyond the superficial changes. It represents an alternative interpretation which has the capability to unfold the realities of revolution rather than presuming its reassurances at face value.

Reading regulation

In this study, regulation is being understood as the rules issued by an authority. With this preliminary understanding of the term, the role of regulation is to oversee and implement governance measures in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the state. Unlike rebellion and revolution, the genesis of regulation is from the state and its principle institutions. In this way, the case of regulation strikes a different chord with the reader— it is issued in public interest, for streamlining civilian functions and above all, for ensuring that the state as well as its citizens are able to lead an organised life. How, then, can regulations be perceived as tragedy?

There are two parties to regulation— the donor and the recipient. The donor is referred to the authorities who are involved in law making and issuing directives. The recipient are the people on whom the laws are implemented. Amongst the recipients also, there are two categories: neutral and receivers. Neutral are those citizens who remain unaffected by the new rules and their routine life does not get affected by it. Receivers

are those citizens who are affected by the implementation of laws, directly or indirectly. The receivers could be constitutive of a very small fraction of the population and therefore, the impact of the regulation on them goes unacknowledged. The neutral persons, who are not affected by the rules, also choose to accept these unquestioningly. The rules, although worded universally, becomes burdensome for the receivers. It is this perspective that the study asserts upon.

A thicker reading of regulations reveals that some laws in the modern sovereign states provide extra-judicial authority to its armed and policing forces. These legislations are catastrophic for the civilians who have to confront them. Even though, the seeds of abuse of authority are inlaid, its implementation goes unquestioned. In effect, it is unwarranted power in the hands of a few who are implementing the regulations. It is for this reason that the risk of its abuse is high and yet these are put into practice. Therefore, the engagement is with those who are directly afflicted by the regulations, with no institutional protection behind them.

However, it is wrong to presume that all regulations are exclusionary though all have an element of control ingrained within them. As Patrick Schmidt (2005: 2) points out,

Regulatory systems are pervasive in modern society. They are tools with which political systems have found mechanisms, both of convenience and of necessity, for the propagation and implementation of rules.

Therefore, there is a bridge that connects rule making and rule implementation and that is the regulatory systems which are involved in rule adjudication. While the process continues, there is no redressal from the side of the recipients and the regulations continue on the rationality of enhancing mechanistic qualities of the state. Regulations— whether economic, legal or social— are definitely political. They strengthen some sections in the society while exposing certain communities to the perils of it— sometimes inadvertently, as in the case of economic regulations and sometimes deliberately, as it happens in legal directives.

Regulations are seldom opened for deliberation in the public forums because the initiators are the state and its institutions. The lack of questioning on state directives concentrates authority in the hands of a few. When it comes to security measures, the state retains the prerogative to speak on the issues and decide what is most desirable for the citizens. The problem lies in the secrecy and inviolable aspects of it. This puts recipients of the regulation at a risk— legitimacy of the laws does not guarantee its

justiciability. The case of regulations is studied from this perspective. The case of anti-terrorism laws that were passed in the US after 11 September 2001 could be discussed in this regard. Heywood (2011: 287) argues that ‘terrorism is a social or political construct’ through which ‘certain groups and political causes’ are rendered illicit ‘by associating them with the image of immorality and wanton violence’. These activities carried out by selective sections of the society is considered to be inauthentic and requires to be controlled by the state. Thus presented, legislations after 11 September 2001, which curtailed civil liberty and were a warranty for the abuse of human rights, were rendered acceptable by the society.

Reading regulation requires a different approach because, unlike rebellion and revolution, it has a strong foundation such as an act of the legislature or special laws. Where can one begin in this regard? Regulatory documents are upfront about the maintenance of law and order in the country and make it plain that the written rules would be practiced. Moreover, there is an umbrella of laws that the state intends to provide to its citizens for security reasons, while in the process it has to undertake certain risks. Moreover, regulations are responsive and not absolute— some of these come into existence to handle a particular situation and to this extent seems to require immediate attention. In the first instance, regulations appear to be sacrosanct because of their legal validity and their clear-cut purpose of enhancement of governance. Therefore, there is less to deconstruct because the intentions are not camouflaged but explicit.

Herein, a Cavellian reading could be of substance. Cavell (1979 cited in Davis 2010: 135) argues that the text holds the reader and commands to look into a particular direction: it is up to the reader to take the full implications of the text. In retrospective, regulations do have such an impact upon the reader: it provides information, impacts upon the receiver and encounters his/her thoughts. Cavell, therefore, provides a space for learning about the situation through reading and how humans respond in their environment (Bruns 1999 cited in Davis 2010: 137). In the contemporary context, this direction in reading is important because the text also shapes the opinions of the reader. In an interview with Kreisler (2008), Cavell says that he was equally enthusiastic about movies and exclaimed the influence that moving images could have on the psyche of the people.

Regulations also provide knowledge; but they are also authoritative in concealing knowledge. In the study undertaken in this research which is with regard to torture and detention in the US after 2011, it is evident that the published US laws tell us a lot—they are categorical about suspending *habeas corpus* rights of citizens, of using extensive methods of interrogation and taking all measures to ensure security from non-state actors. While they are blatantly laying down claims for all of these, there is a superseding discourse on raising to ground those actors who are potentially dangerous to the global society. The loophole of security regulations lies in not being able to identify right at the outset as to who would be affected by the law. Therefore, there is a sense of danger that is inherent in regulations for marginalised communities.

Torture laws, for that matter, are more stringent because they are also a performative. The violent physical abuse of the body of the detainee leaves him/her in a traumatic condition. This precariousness is inherent in regulations and exposes the individual to authoritative whims. The first reading of regulation captures that part of the prohibition which is aimed at securing the civilians. The laws are worded in terms of security and the intention of the state to control the source of threat. In a critical reading, however, the regulations could be deconstructed because they aim at generating apprehension in the society regarding particular security issues.

To this extent, the semantics suggest that the state draws upon certain fears of the population and surfaces itself as the protector of the people by means of the regulation. Rather than assuaging the consternations of the people, regulations keep these fears alive in the minds of the people. Therefore, the reader has to think and bring out the ordinary into picture and read the ordinary more carefully (Cavell 1979 in Davis 2010: 136). Herein, laws seem to be an aspect of regular governance, intended to maintain law and order in the society. However, the manner in which this law and order is carried out could be questionable—the context of the regulation and the subject to be controlled raises concerns for the emancipation of the confined communities. Regulations could be an emotional response to a political situation. A critical reading of regulation could potentially bring the emotionality subtle in regulations, to the forefront.

The thematic of tragedy: an engagement in reading

The thesis engages in a double reading of the thematic of tragedy from the perspective of the ‘citizens’ of the global society, especially the marginalised communities. Here, a distinction between the ‘thematic’ and the ‘problematic’ has to be drawn. A ‘problematic’ is ‘object’ of the research which is ‘customary, passive, non-participating’, and has been ‘stamped with otherness’ (Abdel-Malek 1963 as cited in Chatterjee 1986). A ‘thematic’, on the other hand, is a concept which is broader and constitutes a general foundation for all subjects and in this capacity, it is a ‘field of historical evolution’ (Abdel-Malek 1963 as cited in Chatterjee 1986). On the basis of this distinction, ‘tragedy’ is called or defined within the scope of a ‘thematic’, whereas ‘people’, as a variable that needs to be problematised, could be termed as the ‘problematic’.

The visibility of violence in global politics— both physical and structural— that marginalises communities, renders the conceptualisation of tragedy in abstract terms reductionist. To this extent, the research is grounded in critical theory and addresses the question of emancipation for the ostracised and subjugated people in the global society. Three features provide the bedrock of this study: contextualisation as opposed to generalisation, subjectivity that moves away from clinical scientific appropriations and a critical grounding of the research in terms of theory, method and cases. There are two substantive arguments that the study makes. First, contextualisation from the vantage point of the suppressed, subjugated and silenced communities could invoke human agency in global politics and extricate the analysis of tragedy from instrumental logic. Second, narratives of pain, harm and trauma in contemporary global society unravels the ethical challenges confronted by global citizens, and their predicament lies in the quest for emancipation. The movement of the research is in the direction of the thematic of tragedy— it denotes that tragedy is an active participant in research, it is broader, evolved over a period of time and provides a general foundation of knowledge.

Although the research is not variable driven, the delineation of variables could provide clarity to the thematic of tragedy. Herein, the dependent variable of research is tragedy which would require viewing the depths of global politics to see through the various ways in which tragedy manifests itself. The three cases – rebellion, revolution and regulation – are chosen to show ‘variation on the dependent variable’ (King, Keohane

and Verba 1994: 129). The independent variable of research is the ‘people’ of the global society, especially the marginalised and weaker sections of the society – those who mostly remain passive or are silenced. Independent variables are those which explain the phenomenon (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 77). Herein, the marginalised communities and their living conditions account for tragedy in global politics. The intervening variables of research are harm and pain. It is the harm and pain that one actor causes to the other, either physically or structurally, that renders its position in the world as strong or weak. The manner in which certain communities or segments are silenced, speak for their relative deprivation and designed exclusion. The study is based on contextualisation and observation. It is argued that a post-structural methodology is possible, if methodology is defined as ‘the procedures and choices by which theory becomes analysis’ (Hansen 2006: 1-2). In other words, by observing the ‘real world’ (Hansen 2006: 1; Salter 2013b: 52) and situating the problem in global politics, analysis could proceed through critique and questioning.

The chosen cases of rebellion, revolution and regulation are reflective of the ways in which tragedy manifests itself in global politics, given that they cause pain and harm to people living in global society. The reason as to why these cases are chosen is that they hold promise towards envisaging ‘global interconnectedness’ (Linklater 2007c), which forms the basis for the critical-theoretical project of progress and emancipation. Case studies in postpositivist research is important because it provides insights and space for observation, on the basis of which global society could be understood. In this regard, ‘elite interviews’ are considered of utility, especially if they are ‘non-standardised, unstructured or focused’ (Fielding and Thomas 2001 cited in Blakeley 2013: 160), because it is possible for the researcher/interviewer to cover themes and topics more broadly, thus giving space to the ‘respondent’ to take the interview in different directions. Moore and Farrands (2013: 233) argue, ‘interpretive understanding enables a scholar to grasp complexities and nuances of meaning which positivist and structuralist forms of analysis miss’. The interpretive research does not claim generalisable propositions ‘but it enables us to explore specific cases, and to compare them, in their specific detail’ (Moore and Farrands 2013: 233).

Hansen (2006: 2) argues that empirical research is both feasible and relevant for postpositivist research design. She argues that poststructuralist research focuses on ‘written and spoken text’ and is dependent on ‘textual selection’ (Hansen 2006: 2). She

goes on to argue that there is ‘a methodology for developing research designs and selecting texts’ which is required for the method of reading (Hansen 2006: 9). The case study is not merely a ‘test’ for the propositions because these are ‘constitutive and not causal’ in poststructuralism— case studies could be ‘a medium for continued theoretical and methodological discussions’ and to this extent, these are considered to be ‘case-study plus’ (Hansen 2006: 11). For this reason, case studies are important in postpositivist research design. In this study also, the cases proceed from epistemological concerns and throws up methodological queries in the understanding of global politics.

Tragedy has been understood in security studies as a phenomenon which would continue to exist in global politics. In the mainstream International Relations, tragedy is assumed to be recurrent because of the uncertainty of the international system (Mearsheimer 2001: 2-3); in liberal theory, tragedy occurs because ‘well-intended’ actions may not have the desired outcomes (Mayall 2017); according to normative theory, the choice is ethical and sub-optimal and whichever option is chosen by the protagonist it is bound to ‘under-cut an important ethical value’ that is inhere in the other option (Frost 2017); for post-structuralists, tragedy in International Relations is one of ‘political purchase’ (Brown 2007) and to this extent, actions are simulated by particular structures and therefore, in any way the action of the protagonist is biased and monitored. A double reading of rebellion, revolution and regulation, envisages tragedy in those phenomena of global politics that are otherwise considered to be liberating and progressive— there is much more at stake than what is understood at the first glance. There is a matrix of violence in global politics, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, which is real, visible and prevalent and, yet, acceptable in the global society— this is the ethical concern which the study addresses. Contextualisation of fear of the marginalised communities, including suppression and political exclusion, could render tragedy therapeutic through discourse ethics and communicative actions.

CHAPTER 3

The Rebellion in Suicide Bombing

The Oxford Dictionary defines rebellion as, ‘an act of armed resistance to an established government or leader’ (Oxford Dictionary 2014a). History has witnessed several rebellions. In the context of colonisation, there have been several instances of uprisings, at regional and country levels. In 1906, a rebellion started at Natal in Zululand, a small British colony in Africa, due to the rising concerns over the transfer of power from the coloniser to the natives (Stuart 2013). Similarly, peasant rebellions in India such as the Santhal rebellion and the Indigo rebellion are also concrete examples of resentment and discontentment against the rulers, over here the British colonisers, owing to economic coercion and forced labour (Bandopadhyay 2008: 192-93).

These examples may give the impression that rebellions were a feature that is unique to the colonial period and that it is confined to the erstwhile colonies. However, rebellion dates back to ancient times and is spread across the globe. The slave rebellion in Rome in 73 B.C. can be cited in support of this argument. Spartacus, a slave, inflamed one of the most violent episodes of resistance and till date this event remains a famous symbol of rebellion (Shaw 2001). The English Rebellion of the sixteenth century, was also a period of turmoil in England that bears testimony to the uniting of England and Scotland, a decision that still bears the marks of dissensions in the Scottish society (Ackroyd 2014). Wood (2002: 49) points out that that accounts of riots and resistance that occurred in sixteenth century peasant rebellion in the American colony ‘ruptures the assumption that politics stemmed only from the central state and the “political nation” of the gentry and nobility’. In the case of the English rebellion, also, the peasants and ‘plebeians’ (Ackroyd 2014) or common people were at the forefront, who had been suffering from the financial discrepancies by the ruling monarchy. In the above examples, the protestors belonged to peripheral sections of the society, even though their contributions in economic activities was significant. This trend of a rebellious group belonging to a socially unprivileged section of the society had continued into the contemporary era. In this light, rebellion could as well be seen as

continuity through times in the form of violent insurrections by socially, politically and economically marginalised groups against oppression of the ruling elite.

Rebellious events are often accompanied by bloodshed, rioting and mayhem. The backlash on the protesting groups from the political elites is all the more bestial. The counter-measures undertaken by the police and government are ruthless and transcend beyond the affected areas and entrap civilians who are not even remotely involved in rioting. Rebellion could be understood primarily from two perspectives. The first perspective comes from the state, constitutive of government, institutions and elites, who argue that the only source of legitimate action and governance is the state and that dissidence challenges this authority. The second perspective comes from the 'rebel', according to whom the insurrection is a form of resistance against the ruling group. A third perspective could also be categorised which comes from the 'outsider' (Hollis and Smith 1991: 2). This viewpoint is extremely significant for neutralising the dominant discourse. As an 'outsider', the two standpoints could be scrutinised by according due regard to both the perspectives. The trend in understanding rebellion, however, has etched towards the perspective that comes from the state.

Rebellion, by design and definition, has a component of revenge; aggression and anger are inherent to rebellion. The labelling of a rebel is invariably as anti-state and anti-social element. However, there is seldom any attempt of looking into the socio-political situation that causes a community to dissent from the views of the ruling group in extreme ways. For social constructivists, narratives of transversal struggles do not render the state redundant but conveys that the perspectives and 'stories' of the state are privileged and legitimised over those of other actors (Shapiro 1996 cited in Bleiker 2000: 8). State, therefore, remains at the centre for discussion in rebellion in the mainstream security studies. As rebellion evidently challenges the authority of the state, it is pertinent to analyse the ethics of dissent rather than assuming that there are vested material interests ingrained in political protests.

As a social theory of International Relations, social constructivism critiques neorealism and neoliberalism because of their 'shared commitment to rationalism' because of which 'identities and interests of agents' are assumed to be 'exogenously given' (Wendt 1992: 391-92). To this extent, Wendt (1992: 393) argues against the ' "logic" of anarchy' and says that 'self-help and power politics are institutions' of international

politics rather than being a cause for anarchy. However, Wendt (1992) does not dispense with the idea of anarchy— he attempts to problematise the concept. He also argues that the study of material interests of state is compatible with social constructivism so long as it can explain social relations (Wendt 1995). The attempt, therein, is to explain ‘how seemingly natural social structures’ are the result of ‘practice’ (Wendt 1995: 74). Herein, it must be noted that social constructivism, though tilting towards normativity, is more concerned with explaining international politics. For this reason, Wendt (1987: 337) provides a critique of ‘structural theories’ of International Relations because they fail to ‘explain the properties and causal powers of their primary units of analysis’; Wendt (1995) is also disapproving of critical theory because it does not explain world politics. As social constructivism hinges on explanatory theorisation, parsimony in International Relations theory is not done away with. Though social constructivism has normative basis, it believes in scientific method and falsification of hypothesis against evidence (Wendt 1995). This, therefore, leaves causal analysis unproblematized. McCourt (2012) argues, in this regard, that a ‘non-neo-positivist’ approach in International Relations can bring forth the relevance of historical knowledge and political practices.

In this study, rebellion is understood in a nuanced manner: rebellion is not just a sporadic outburst of anger against the governing authority but a culmination of dissatisfaction against extant political and social cultures. The anger of certain communities is a reaction against the constant disavowal of their aspirations by the polity. The reactions could indeed be contextualised in a series of events. The grievances emerge from regular processes of exclusion which have systematically deprived certain segments of the society. The understanding of rebellion, in this study, is not just confined to armed insurrections and overthrowing of a ruling government. The meaning herein has been taken in a more expanded version to include the sentimentality behind such destructive actions: the intention is to harm for the sake of vengeance without assurance of progress or change in the *status quo* of the state. The aggrieved people ventilate their anger through acts of aggression. The form of revulsion includes rioting, protests and political violence such as assassinations and bombings. An extremely intriguing form of rebellion is suicide bombing.

Rebellion could be seen as tragic, not because of the instability it creates for the dominant structures but by means of which the challenge is posed to the existent power

structures. The act or performance of suicide bombing causes death of the individual: herein, emancipation is deluged by the deafening screams of the ostracised communities. There is no certainty how emancipation could be achieved in an atmosphere of such animosity where the extirpation of the attacked is matched to the carnage of the self. Does it lead to the liberation of the rebel? Or, does it become a viscous circle of violent actions? These ethical questions could have multiple interpretations, depending upon the subject. For this reason, reading has been taken as a method: this could unravel the layers of narratives in rebellion, otherwise camouflaged by state rhetoric of vulnerability and anti-statism.

What is the tragedy in rebellion, despite the forceful ventilation of grievance against the ruling authority by the marginalised people in global politics? The main argument in this chapter could be summarised as follows: the act of suicide bombing is an expression of angst and desperation by a community which has been secluded from the mainstream of polity and society. The tragedy, herein, lies in the very extreme act of self-destruction. Rebellion, in such a case, requires a reading that problematises atrocities of the state on the society. Rebellion, in the mainstream narrative, is usually seen as a pragmatic idea that intends to achieve interests and representation in politics by challenging the *status quo* (Gurr 2011: 59-60), and in the process, becomes a ‘threat’ and generates ‘intense security dilemma’ for international system (Posen 1993; Roe 1999; Rose 2000). Roe (1999) and Rose (2000) address ‘ethnic conflicts’ to be a ‘tragedy’ for international relations in the post-Cold War era.

However, contextualisation questions the several aspects of exclusion and the trajectory could reveal the milder forms of protests that culminated into radical acts. Looking at ‘emancipation’ as an approach in International Relations that is interested in liberating individuals and communities from oppressive structures, whether political or social, it has been argued that ‘radical change’ is needed at the conceptual, practical and practicable aspects of global politics (Spegele 2002). When exclusion occurs in both — theoretical and practical— segments of the society, marginalised communities reveal their angst against the dominant ideas and practices. Hence, rebellion could be contextualised in the vagaries and political discrimination confronted by the marginalised communities.

The chapter proceeds in five sections. In the first section, the concept of rebellion is discussed. The idea that rebellion is ingrained with violence, is examined. The concept of violence by itself is partially defined in International Relations. It is, however, impregnated with negative connotations and considered detrimental for the society and people. The connections between rebellion and violence could be dissected to contextualise the violent actions in a rebellion. The section traverses a conceptual terrain which consists of viewpoints that come from different theoretical perspectives in International Relations. Atrocities on human population by the state or ruling sections or majority communities is shrouded in the national security narrative, thus concealing the real issues of discrimination. In this study, there is an engagement with emancipation and an attempt has been made to understand rebellion through a critical security studies perspective. This section forms the bedrock upon which the subsequent sections are developed.

In the second section, the case of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka (LTTE) is introduced and discussed. The genesis of LTTE is historically traceable and accompanied by the shaping of identities of pre-dominant communities in Sri Lanka after the declaration of independence in 1945. Therefore, the origin, growth, expansion and, finally, extermination of the LTTE has to be seen in the socio-political context of the country, with special reference to the increasing marginalisation of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka since 1950s. The estrangement between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities in the country, forms a historical trajectory as is evident by accounts from the ancient and medieval sources of information.

As will be discussed in the third section of the chapter, the rivalries were mostly political in the ancient and medieval era, directed towards consolidation, maintenance and expansion of authority in Sri Lanka. With the advent of British colonialism, and the struggle for independence, the differences between the communities were temporarily suspended, with the promise of mutual accommodation of both the majoritarian Sinhala and the minority Tamil populations. Post-independence, the differences emerged to the surface, resulting in political assertiveness on part of the Sinhala political parties. Exclusion of the Tamil population at educational, political and social level, led to a crisis in the political leadership representing Tamils: political co-optation did not bring them the promise of equality in civic rights, while remaining silent and bearing witness to their continued exclusion did not seem to be a viable option. It

was under these circumstances, that the LTTE filled the political vacuum and emerged as a new hope for the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. The case of the LTTE is taken up because it was the first organisation to attempt suicide bombings on an extensive scale. Moreover, it has ceased to exist as an organisation after the civil war in Sri Lanka ended in the defeat of the LTTE in 2009, and, therefore, it is possible to observe the changes in the situation of the Tamil population in the aftermath of the civil war in Sri Lanka.

In the fourth section, the case of suicide bombing by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka has been taken up for study. A primary contestation in this section is physical self-destruction, which raises questions about the existing socio-political equilibrium. It is an act that debunks the mainstream understanding of power: the capability of an actor to make another actor engage in actions that it would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957), which in the parlance of politics, represents the 'third dimensional' view of power (Lukes 2005: 25-27). For Dahl (1957), 'power is a relation, and that it is a relation among people'. Therefore, the relation among people are understood in terms of their ability to exercise authority over others. The section also engages with the discourse on suicide bombing: both the thesis and the anti-thesis. This enables contextualisation of the performance of suicide bombing. Additionally, feminist and post-colonial perspectives are discussed in some details and contest the preponderance of security discourses which privilege the state over communities and individuals. In the final section, it has been argued that double reading contextualises rebellion, thus rendering it a tragedy from the perspective of marginalised citizens in global society. Herein, the emphasis is laid upon deconstruction of the standard narrative.

The concept of rebellion in International Relations: a theoretical understanding

The discipline of International Relations has, no doubt, engages in the explication of conflict and war. Realists, for that matter, focus upon the 'uncertainty' that exists in the international system because of the lack of any central governing authority (Waltz 1979: 105; Mearsheimer 2001: 2). This leads to a competition between states for 'survival' and each state engages in maximising its security. The opinion of realists could be generalised thus, though there are differences that exist amongst realists (Wohlforth 2008: 131). The difference between defensive and offensive realism

appertains to the question of power, wherein defensive realists opine that states need not maximise power because ‘the system will punish them’ (Mearsheimer 2006: 72) for doing so whereas offensive realists argue that ‘it makes good strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony’ (Mearsheimer 2006: 72-73).

The argument of the classical realists that human beings have a power-mongering nature which makes them engage in the maximisation of power by engagement in war (Morgenthau 1946; Carr 1946) focuses on ‘nation-state’, which remains an essential level of analysis that shapes state actions at the international level (Singer 1961). This position was compromised with the emergence of structural realism wherein the international system became the level of theorisation (Waltz 1979: 110). Herein, the idea that every state needs to secure itself by building upon its military capabilities became pragmatic.

With the end of the Cold War, realists argued that the stability of the international system depends upon the capability of the ‘great powers’ and it is this that maintains balance at the international level (Mearsheimer 1991). As Mearsheimer (2005), referring to the works of E.H. Carr points out, ‘power is an essential ingredient in politics’. However, Williams (2005: 7) argues that the acceptance of power as a central idea in realism does not imply that only power relations, to the extent that they could inflict violence on others, be studied in International Relations. In other words, contemporary realists give disproportionate emphasis on power and its manifestations, which is centred around the state. The realist views, therefore, are more concerned about ‘balance of power’ and inter-state competition rather than looking underneath the state. War or conflict is an inevitable part of international politics and states could only secure themselves: the eventuality of war cannot be done away with.

Realists, as it is evident, do not care so much about the crises that exists within the state. For them, states are the primary actors and source of power. For Waltz (1988), occurrence of conflicts cannot be explained merely by looking into domestic pressures such as ‘economic systems, social institutions and political ideologies’; rather there has to be an association between the domestic factors and the international outcomes. To this extent, structural realism argues that material capabilities enhance the power of the state: therefore, military assets and economic factors are important variables in

determining a state's position in the hierarchical and anarchic international system (Waltz 1979: 114). However, neoclassical realists differ slightly on this viewpoint and argue that 'unit level variables' cause systemic pressures, thereby explaining the decision of the state (Rose 1998). During the Cold War, there was no physical engagement of military capabilities between the 'great powers'; this period was, however, witnessed by intra-state conflicts in the Third World and the involvement of the super powers therein.

In a similar manner, liberalism also focuses upon domestic political factors and explains their role in International Relations. According to Moravcsik (1997), 'the configuration of state preferences matters the most in world politics'. For this reason, the preferences and choices of elites in the society is important for shaping the preferences of international system (Moravcsik 1997). For rational choice theorists, war could be a result of the calculations of a state with regard to their net loss or gain from such a situation. As Jervis (1988) points out, a state could engage in a war, even if it is certain of losing, in circumstances where its defeat is less critical than non-engagement. In other words, whether a state will engage in warfare depends upon its cost calculations: the price of non-engagement is higher in certain circumstances than being defeated. Game theory highlights the concerns not just with the problem of conflict but also of co-operation at the international level (Snidal 1985). For both liberals, neoliberals and rational choice theorists the focus is upon the state and what causes (or deters) conflict between them.

War or conflict continues to be the prerogative of the state in spite of minor deviations or differences between them. In his critique of 'grand theory', Brown (2013) succinctly argues that scholarship in International Relations needs to focus upon the 'problems of the dispossessed', highlighting of real issues which obliterate the growth of individuals and communities and, thereby, speaking of the ways in which human progress could be more judicious. In the context of conflict, therefore, scholarship in security studies need to address the core socio-political problems which manifest in violent actions by the people.

'Emancipatory International Relations' refers to those theories that aim at 'liberating' individuals or groups as well as understand the ways in which the actualisation of such practices could be made possible (Spegele 2002). With the advent of the Cold War, the

views that bring ‘men and citizens’ close together were sidelined in the discipline of International Relations (Devetak 2013: 172-73). The purpose of engaging in a study that insists on the paramount positioning of citizens is to change the social standards by means of criticism (Linklater 2007c; Devetak 2013: 170). Post-structuralism intends to expand the agenda of social theory by engaging in ‘historicity’ of events (Ashley 1996: 245). Questions of human agency become important and there is a reflection upon human conditions that call for popular uprisings (Bleiker 2000: 23; Ashley 1996: 246). To push the argument further, certain groups resort to violence on the exhaustion of peaceful and political means of resolving their problems because there is a regular denial of political inclusion, which hinders these groups from being empowered. The use of physical violence is not justified; however, the antipathy of the state and the elites compels the denigrated sections to assert themselves in seemingly injudicious ways, such as self-immolation or suicide bombing.

Rebellion is understood in this study as an asymmetric conflict— both in terms of power resources as well as magnitude. Certain groups are considered global threats whereas others are dismissed as local rebels. For Bob (2005) the reason as to why certain rebel groups become a cause of concern globally, while others do not, lie in their motivation and savvy attitude to attain those goals. The ability of the groups to present themselves as determined upon bringing change decides how well they could ‘market’ themselves (Bob 2005). The argument is valid to the extent that not all rebel groups are globally targeted. It, however, overlooks sudden events that unnerve ruling groups. Moreover, there is a ‘politics in naming’ particular groups as ‘terrorists’, ‘rebel’, etcetera (Bhatia 2005; Hellmich 2005). The power of a name and the ripples that it creates has social and normative implications which the global media amply uses in the framing of conflict (Bhatia 2005). Due to the power of modern media to transfer images of ‘terrorism’ on an immediate basis, there is a fetishization of these groups (Der Derian 2005). Hence, the portrayal of a group in highly radical terms determines whether it could be considered a global threat. Post 11 September 2001, there has been a severe backlash on regional and local groups, those have revealed dissenting tendencies and aggressive actions. Though some of the groups have existed for a very long time, the idea to erase these from the political scene is a more recent development.

Rebellious action could be seen as a culmination of several precedents. Security and war, to this extent, are closely linked to a continuum of violence that is manifested in

disobediences, rioting and protests, besides others (Aradau 2012). It could also be argued that violent protest is also a response to ‘organised violence’ such as war which is undertaken by the state (Barkawi 2012; Aradau 2012). More significantly, rebellion intends to destroy existing power dimensions that prioritise certain concerns over others. However, rather than treating rebellion in merely its instrumental capacity, it is pertinent to interrogate various narrations, and, thereby, question the traditional ways of representing the rebel. Herein the choice lies between two suboptimal outcomes—either to tolerate oppression quietly or to vent anger. For Brown (2007), this is tragic; there is a need to accept that there are such choices to be made and confronted.

Yet another question that deserves attention is: who rebels? The dissident individual or group invariably has a story of repression and social exclusion. There are two forms of rebellion that are recognised in contemporary security discourse: group rebels and ‘lone wolf’. In cases where a community is deprived and faces discrimination at the political and social level, people organise themselves for the purpose of achieving their political vendetta. For Tilly (2003), there are several forms of violence out of which attack on ruling classes as well as genocides are cases of collective or episodic violence. Though most common and expressive, group dynamism is not the only way in which rebellion takes place. Sometimes, the upsurge is carried out by individuals who work independently. Political assassination is an example of such a case. It is a ‘leaderless resistance’ that makes a single person prominent for his/her ability to cause destruction (Michael 2014). In the last few decades, protest movements have been marked by ‘street fighting between anarchist militants and police forces’ and it has been seen that these ‘militants’ operate autonomously (Zuquete 2014: 95). Herein, the term ‘militants’ is being used with reference to works of scholars, who argue for the emergence of ‘lone wolf terrorism’ in recent years (Michael 2014; Zuquete 2014; Kaplan and Costa 2014). However, in this chapter, the idea is to deconstruct the mainstream perspective on rebellion and observe it from the viewpoint of the protagonist, namely the marginalised communities. Therefore, terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘militancy’ is being used only with reference to works of other scholars and does not intend to equate these with rebellion.

Rebels operating singularly usually do not have a long-term goal but intend causing immediate damage. There could be any number of precedents that govern such an action and could be based both on personal memories or collective experiences

(McCauley and Moskalenko 2014). In the mainstream thinking, such individual operatives are considered dangerous and uncontrollable because of the sheer number. However, there is also an agreement that all ‘radical thinkers’ do not become rebels in the society (McCauley and Moskalenko 2014; Michael 2014). The labelling of the individuals as being anti-state could be arbitrary: it could only be a dissenting opinion, not on lines with the state agenda. By ventilating the alternative view, polarisation becomes a possibility, which is ultimately detrimental to societal stability. In the process of circulating and propagating the tangential viewpoint, dissident ideas are sown in the society. This generates trepidation in the society regarding the aims, intentions and ambitions of the non-state organisation or individual who is involved in the dissemination of competing discourses: there is a backlash on the community on the pretext of targeting individuals who engage in rebellious activities.

In the conventional domain of security studies, security is understood and conceptualised from the perspective of the state. However, state also prejudices the security of individuals and groups that do conform to values and ideas, other than those of the state (Bigo 2011). For this reason, the state exerts authority to control and, sometimes, silence dissenting opinions. Moreover, some realists (Walt 1991) even question the wisdom of expanding the agenda of security to include economic security, environmental security, societal security, and so on (Buzan 1991: 8). Ullman (1983) argues that concentrating solely on military threats makes a state fallaciously derecognise other pervasive threats to the state and its people, thereby reducing its ‘total security’, while at the same time other states engage in arms race reducing security levels globally. From an English School perspective, Bull (1976) convincingly argues that world order has to be based upon redistribution of power which could ensure stability in the Third World rather than merely focusing upon the ‘Great Powers’—therefore, arms control needs to be supplemented by changes in the world order. These theoretical arguments led to the ‘widening and deepening’ of security especially in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 187-89). Although, each of these perspectives added value to the analyses of security, especially in the context of post-Cold War and emerging post-colonial states, the perspective was largely state-centric and did not address concerns which emanated from the populace.

Security studies moved in a different direction with the argument that security has to penetrate the societal levels and take into consideration the threats of the individual so

that it could guide policy- making by the state, while at the same time shaping public opinion on security issues (Rothschild 1995). The critical bend, therefore, lays emphasis on the question: who is insecure and how? It clearly stresses upon the point that security is not entirely the concern of a sovereign state defending its territories; it is also about the fear and liberation of individuals and communities who are indefensible. Moreover, security threats have to be ‘understood in particular contexts’ wherein the recognition of an issue as a security factor is an important approach (McDonald 2008: 564).

Critical security studies problematises the manner in which the state poses threat to its people (Floyd 2007). Yet again, voices critical to this aspect of security is not homogenous and presents a variety (George and Campbell 1990). Booth (1991) argues against the realist logic that war is unavoidable and says that power needs to be decentralised towards the formation of a ‘global civil society and a global community of communities’. In studying security, rather than a homogenising project, it is more important to recognise the multiplicity of fear and insecurity that exists (Brincat, Lima and Nunes 2012: 2). Herein, it is also possible to argue that long persisting apprehensions about security make people respond in violent ways in order to preserve their rights and material interests: the reactions of the state are covered under the garb of necessity and security.

The reason as to why the counter measures of the state could be justified is because rebellious actions have the component of violence ingrained in it. Though the backlash on the groups by the state precedes rebellion, it does not get questioned in security narratives and is considered imperative for ‘national security’. Violence, on one hand, could be argued to form the thrust in International Relations, especially security studies (Campbell and Dillon 1993: 2-3). On the other hand, Thomas (2011), argues that the term or concept of violence is not used in International Relations as it ought to be because violence gives a sense of illegitimacy to the act of armed aggression by an actor, including the state. Physical carnage used by non-state actors only is considered as violence whereas force or coercion denotes the legitimate use of policing and regulation by the state. The distinction between power, strength, force, authority and violence needs to be discussed in this regard (Arendt 1969: 43). For Arendt, power is the ‘instrument of rule’ by which governance takes place (Arendt 1969: 36) whereas strength represents the characteristic of an individual. Similarly, force, for Arendt

(1969: 44-45) is a term of physical sciences which reveals the release of energy; authority indicates the quality of a person or institution which is recognised by others as legitimate source for issuing orders that they ought to comply with. Finally, for Arendt (1969: 46), violence is 'instrumental' and is used for the attainment of definite end. The distinction drawn could be useful in studying rebellion from a critical perspective. Can rebellion be interpreted as a strife for power? Or, is it a form of political violence?

Tilly (2003) assigns the term violence to all acts of aggression undertaken by non-state actors and to those groups that do not have legitimate authority to inflict physical damage on people and property. Violence could also be embedded in the societal and political norms— some of which by design and definition intends to exclude certain sections of society thereby unleashing both structural and physical violence. Thomas (2011) argues, in the context of violence, that the state's use of force is considered legitimate whereas use of force or the threat to use force by non-state actors is considered illegitimate. Within the framework of critical security studies, the unquestioning acceptance of this distinction is problematic because from the very beginning state is considered as the victim and the rebel as the enemy. However, such analyses could form the preface of studies on rebellion. Where is it that the ontological search for uprising could begin? The views of the politically powerful sections of the society are invariably opinionated against any form of dissidence. Methodologically, it poses severe challenges; the alternative is to revisit the sites of contention and take more than one rationale into account.

Yet another recent concept introduced in International Relations is that of 'horrorism' (Weber 2014). 'Horrorism' is an idea conceptualised by Adriano Cavarero (2009). It refers to a 'violent violation of vulnerable humans who are defined by their simultaneous openness to the other's care and harm' (Cavarero 2009 cited in Weber 2014). Herein, Weber introduces this idea in International Relations to argue that by engaging in analysis of war art, it is possible to see the terror and horror that war brings for innocent non-combatant civilians. The tragedy, however, lies in the extraordinary thrust laid upon terror and a neglect of horror that dawn on the minds of the citizens during war calamity. It brings to the fore the discussions of relationships between war and citizenship (Weber 2014). The most significant argument that comes out of the concept of 'horrorism' is as follows: the violence in present times requires scrutiny into

the manner in which it is grounded in and ‘exchanged through state/citizen relationships’ (Weber 2014). The description of an incidence as a perpetual threat and the attempts to make people absorb the fear is momentous because it nullifies any scope for contestation. In democratic states, where opinions cannot be suppressed technically, these are contraptions to cull obloquy against the state.

It is important to consider the background of a rebellion. Invariably, it is marked by the sudden fear of a group which can bring destruction for the society at large. The views go to the extent of inflicting opprobrium against a particular community. The lopsided situation is not confronted by competing narratives because there is no conversation with and no inclination to provide space to the dissenter. On a closer analysis, the agitator could be a victim of majoritarian practices: the group or community that is dissatisfied with the existing political and social norms, does not see the change coming unless voice is raised against it. Trumbore (2003) argues that states use more aggression against contending forces if there are ethnic clashes as compared to those states where civilians do not ventilate their grievances through aggressive means.

It has also been argued that states that engage in ethnic discrimination and inequality have a greater tendency to use force during a conflict (Caprioli and Trumbore 2003). Caprioli (2005) draws a link between gender discrimination, economic inequality and violence and argue that this is indeed a strong reason for ‘intrastate conflict’. Tilly (2003: 34-35) argues that ‘opportunity hoarding’ happens due to inequalities and exploitation, therefore resulting in ‘collective violence’. Tilly (2003: 1) introduces the term ‘collective violence’ to imply the use of coercion and force by groups. Tilly (2003: 9) argues that when the state engages in coercive actions against certain groups that could, as well, fall under the category of ‘collective violence’. These reasons, important as they are, do not speak for the discrimination in the society that has continued for a prolonged duration. The distinction drawn between the domestic and the international in mainstream International Relations disrupts the attempt to scrutinise social patterns and norms. Moreover, the literature that focuses on violence, in general, do not bring to the fore the social exclusion and denigration that certain communities face because they do not have political backing and adequate resources to their disposal.

Rebellions have the potential to destabilise a ruling government. However, a mob uprising that turns violent is met with state coercion and due to the lack of organisation

and resources it gets suppressed. Why does the state repress certain sections of the society? In the garb of security, the state unleashes its authority over the people. Bigo (2002) observes that state wants to portray itself as the security provider for the people and in order to maintain this superiority they engage in a regular process of identifying an enemy of the state (Campbell 1992). Violent political dissidence questions the legitimacy of the state as the representative of common interests. The state, which consists of the 'state apparatus and the governant' (Bigo 2002) represent the opinion of selective groups. The posturing of rebellion is also such that it does not threaten the territorial boundaries of state but intends to challenge the current equations of power. Also, rebellion may not be an organised form of violence at least in its earlier stages. Later on, however, as the uprising spreads, small organisations that have common concerns may emerge unified in the political struggle.

The grievances of the marginalised communities and individuals come out in the open due to immediate events. A recent example comes from the town of Ferguson, USA, where a teenaged 'Black' youth by the name of Michael Brown was shot by a 'White' police officer Darren Wilson. Demonstrations and riots have followed the event and has brought to the fore the differences between the Blacks and the Whites, thus reiterating racism. Crilly (2014) observes,

Across the country, it has polarised opinion between those who see a nation where white cops kill black men, and those who have donated £100,000 to a fund for Officer Wilson, or lit their porches blue to show support for the police.

One of the defining problems of the US society has been that of racism and the juxtaposition of the Whites and the Blacks. Although much of it remains covered under the garb of democracy and liberalism, incidents of shooting of the Blacks and their justification on administrative grounds, as was evident in the Ferguson shooting incident, highlights the raging gap that has continued to exist in the American society between the different racial groups. The demonstrations became violent and witnessed the burning of shops by a rioting mob which was demanding a query into the shooting incident and justice for the deceased. This was met by police backlash and throwing of tear gas on the protesting mob. The episode brought out the persisting clash between the two communities to the surface where one group is fighting for justice for the slain teenager whereas the other is demanding justice for the officer who shot the youth. In

spite of the different versions of the story, racism as a problem seems to have resurfaced in the American society.

Racial episodes are only one example; there are several instances that demonstrate discrimination on the basis of race or origin. Although in a liberal democratic set up, there is scope for protest and making demands for justice by peaceful means, the very incidences bear testimony to the prejudicial treatment meted out to certain sections of the society. Episodes of racial, ethnic or religious discrimination contests the notion of universal ethical practices within a liberal democracy. Therefore, rebellion in its extreme forms is possible even in those regions where representatives are elected by popular voting. For this reason, it could be argued that rebellion could occur in democratic states also: more precisely, it could flesh out a case of routine and programmed biasness and prejudice that jeopardises sections of society, ultimately causing unprecedented reactions from the marginalised communities.

In this regard, historical sociology could bring a new direction to the study of rebellion. The idea behind engaging in this perspective is to put 'modern features' into 'broad historical context' so that the happenings of the present appear more meaningful (Linklater 2013: 138). For Hobson (2002: 5), a reading of history in International Relations ought to be used as a mechanism to re-evaluate theories and re-examine contemporary events, thereby redesigning the research agenda in International Relations. Hobden (2002: 43) argues for the need of history and sociology in the study of global politics and insist on the significance of multi-causality in the discipline. It could enable an ethical understanding of scenarios which is, in certain cases, an appropriate step to take (Suganami 2011). The socio-historical context enables to view materialisation of security practices *au courant* with relation to the political subjectivities created by 'cosmopolitan' praxis (Jabri 2012). Historical sociology opens the possibility of discussing the state as well as the non-state entities' and their relation with other actors (Hobden 1998: 5). Although, it is not thoroughly deconstructive, it is definitely a beginning point for research in the critical security field as it provides scope for questioning the contemporary events and locating their trajectory. For the study of rebellion, the socio-historical context could provide knowledge on the occurrences and both sides of the argument could be assessed, thus opening space for a dialogue between two extreme actions: repression and rebellion.

It is difficult to shortlist the reasons as to why particular groups of people feel the need to change existing power structures. One of the key reasons is deprivation— increasing instances of inequity between different sections of the society might cause a rise in the indignation of people. Second, there could be an act of deprivileging of certain communities, meaning that some of their rights and privileges have been taken away, thus leading to feeling of insecurity within these groups. Rebellion, observingly, is carried out by those communities who do have some resources at their disposal and were at some point in history more privileged than at present. The dissenting actions proceeds from the deprivation which these groups have faced consistently over a period of time.

The discourse on security does not adequately capture the predicaments of these secluded groups who exist but have no guarantee of their rights. There is a tendency in security discourses of the state to identify a community as being antithetical to the values of the majority sections of the society. Campbell (1992: 18) argues that in an age of ‘globalisation’, ‘danger’ is to be ‘understood as an effect of political practices rather than the condition of their possibility’. Bigo (2002) argues, in this regard, that the ‘immigrant’ is constructed as the ‘foreigner’ who has to be controlled; the ‘nationals’, as differentiated from the ‘foreigners’, require protection from the immigrants. The state becomes the ‘security provider’ of the people (Bigo 2002). Therefore, Bigo (2002) argues that the liberal state governs on the basis of the fear that it creates amongst its population. The necessary corollary is the identification of an enemy, who has to be feared and controlled.

These circumstances are true for the post-colonial states as well, the security imperatives of which are different than the Western states. Herein, the fear that was inculcated amongst the people had a historical background: it was directed against the minority communities who were politically ambitious and competent against the dominant sections of the society. Colonialism did not end with the expulsion of foreign forces from these states: it rather started a new struggle that concerned the accommodation of communities within prescribed territorial limits. Invariably, however, this lapsed into the tyranny of the majority and the suppression of the minorities. The consequences were different in different circumstances: secession, genocide and civil wars were the most prominent amongst these. The democratic system was also not promising for certain states which, though seemed to be of some

utility in the beginning, began to show its weaknesses soon after due to the fallacies of the majoritarian rule and the lack of experience in implementing democratic norms in the society.

Post-coloniality as a theoretical perspective does bring to the fore arguments and concerns specific to the Third World and erstwhile colonies. It is considered as a critical-theoretical trend because it looks into the issues concerning the communities living therein rather than focusing on Third World states as 'subaltern Realism' (Ayooob 1998) does. Meera Sabaratnam, in her interview (2017) says, that post-coloniality emphasises on the point that 'I, too, am a subject; I am not just an object; I, too, have ideas, I have political ambitions..... and so on'. Postcolonial theory represents the concerns of the peripheral sections of the society and, to this extent, it looks through the lens of the unprivileged people. The redressal of grievances become important for discursive ethics which leads to the emancipation of communities.

Herein, the case of the Tamil diaspora in Sri Lanka is assessed critically: their historical presence in the geographical space, their evolution as a potent community in the region, the decline in their political and social space after the decolonisation of Sri Lanka, their fight for space and their engagement in violent actions including suicide bombing, the governmental backlash, the annihilation of LTTE and the carnage unleashed on the Tamil population. The rebellion of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, it is argued, has to be read in conjunction with the changing political and social realities of the country that continued to deprive the Tamil community, in spite of the significant contributions that the latter had made to the Sri Lankan culture and polity in the past, including the quest for independence from the British colonisation.

The tragedy lies in the actions of specific groups which advocated extreme measures for the attainment of their political goals and the reaction of the state that failed to recognise the political and civic demands of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka, who had resorted to non-violent means to attain their goals, such as participation in democratic procedures, formation of political parties and engagement in social works for the benefit of the Tamil population. The extremities on either side ensured stalemate and continually deprived the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka.

Marginalisation, Rebellion and Emancipation: The Case of Tamils in Sri Lanka

Given the immense scope of tragedy, as discussed in the previous chapter, as a conceptual tool in understanding security aspects that global society confronts, it is of relevance to engage in real cases that jeopardise the normal living of people. Herein, the word 'normal' implies standard or typical. The question that deserves attention is precisely this: why do people resort to activities that demand seclusion from routine social and public life, bereft of personal considerations and ingrained with life-threatening circumstances? The idea is to dismantle occurrences across the globe from conventional discourse and get into non-sanitised, problematic spaces by means of critical investigations.

In this context, deconstruction through double reading could be of extreme significance since, to borrow the Derridean language, reading 'in-between lines' alters the positioning of the 'signified' (referent object that changes according to context) (Derrida 1967). In this study, the 'signified' is the marginalised section of the society that becomes suffers from exclusionary state practices and then retaliate in unimaginable ways. However, in the case of rebellion, the Deleuzian style of reading could yield new insights: the attempt lies in carving out a fresh perspective on rebellion which is not based on the reading of a singular document but takes more than one narrative into account. Instead of stereotyping and straightjacketing discourses on rebellion, it is pertinent to engage in divergences that are present.

The thematic of tragedy in International Relations, from the perspective of critical thinking, could be deciphered in several instances on the global scene that prejudices communities or individuals. Context has been considered of immense importance in tragedy (Euben 2007). Marginalisation, pushes these groups or individuals to confront hardships, and contest their extradition and eradication in the society. This ignorance, at some stage, becomes catastrophic because the feeling of discrimination triumphs over the indifference of the powerful sections of the society. Sabaratnam (2017), in her interview, says that rebellion, from a 'post-colonial gaze', has to be read according to the historical circumstances, identity formations, structural factors that combines to assert themselves in particular ways. The growth of a rebellious group within the Tamil population in Sri Lanka, as it shall be contextualised, was also a reverberation to the growing animosity of the Sri Lankan government towards its minority sections.

In addition to blatant prejudice of the state against certain communities, there are related social problems that crop up. For instance, availing of housing facilities in majoritarian areas or getting employment on equal terms or parity as the majority groups instils a sense of isolation in the peripheral sections of the society. This supplement the fear of the abused people and distances them from the society. It is also an overstatement to suggest that all those who suffer resort to violence and fight against the suppressors. In fact, most of the people choose to remain quiet and suffer in silence. At best, they may report the cases of discrimination and appeal for a resolution. However, the reactionaries are typecasted and viewed as a security concern in general. This is both denigrating and unjust for the sufferer. A critical engagement with the acute actions then becomes a necessity in order to intensify knowledge about the rebels. Although the LTTE is blamed for the domestic pandemonium, the genesis of the group was a product of the political nonchalance of the Sinhala ruling elites, the apathy towards the Tamils which trickled down to the bottom of the Sri Lankan society and thus ripped apart the diverse social fabric of the country.

Drawing upon the 'taxonomy of harm', as suggested by Linklater (2011: 29), it is possible to understand the various ways in which human denigration takes place. Harm, in the literal sense, has both physical and abstract connotations. From the plight of poor children begging on the streets to the disastrous instances of leakages in nuclear and chemical plants, each episode seems to tell a story of suffering. To rephrase Sontag (2003), there does not seem to be 'an antidote' (Sontag 2003: 95) to human pain and suffering, given episodes of structural and physical violence. It is difficult to quantify pain and harm. Both impact upon the psyche of the person. In this regard, the individual's experience of feeling of deprivation is also important. There are first-hand accounts of the erstwhile LTTE members, who recount their experiences of discrimination and the dangerous life that they led. There are also accounts to suggest the formidable conditions that existed in Sri Lanka during the civil war in 2007-2009.

The celebration of the defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka has to be read in conjunction with the calamities that the Tamil population suffered in the country. According to the Report of the Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch 2009), the civilians suffered critically during the last phase of fighting because the Sri Lankan military showed no mercy in bombing the northern Vanni region, including the targeting of hospitals, which comes under the 'no fire zone', causing massive civilian casualties. There has also been

evidence of mistreatment of the prisoners of the civil war which were extremely brutal and against global conventions (Macrae 2011). The United Nations Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights (UNHCHR) in August 2015, brought out a critical report which ‘documented the credible accounts of unlawful attacks, killings, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual violence, and attacks on humanitarian assistance’ (World Report 2016).

This is the catastrophe in rebellion— the struggle for the recognition of identity and legitimate claims entails the danger of incertitude of life because of the *modus operandi* of the rebels that renders their protests felonious, thereby expelling or derecognising assertions. The infliction of violence on the local population, projected the LTTE as a force to be reckoned with. However, because of the indiscriminate use of force in the civil war between 2007-2009, both by the LTTE and the Sri Lankan military, the legitimacy of the war stands questionable. The state, despite its assurances of protection of civilians in Sri Lanka, failed to ensure that civic life does not get interrupted. The aggressiveness on part of the LTTE transgressed on the normality of life. A double reading of rebellion decodes human suffering in terms of denigration and incertitude for people belonging to the marginalised community, who are not involved in the carnage. Tamils in Sri Lanka were the victims after the elimination of the LTTE: arbitrary arrests, torture, lack of medical facilities in the Tamil dominated areas and the continued process of othering of minorities depict the tragic circumstances for the Tamil community in Sri Lanka.

Brief History of Tamils in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is geographically located in the Indian ocean, off the southern tip of the Indian peninsula. In spite of its close proximity to India, which did influence its culture, the separation of the two land masses by a narrow strip of water body, the Palk Strait, ensured that Sri Lanka developed as a ‘distinctive and autonomous’ civilisation (De Silva 1981: 4-5). Both the Sinhala Buddhist and the Tamil Hindu population, it is commonly argued, came from India and settled in the island eventually. According to an anonymous text, which appeared in the eighteenth century in Jaffna, Vijayakumara, son of the king of Lada, was expelled to this island and he recruited Buddhists from Siam and Burma to populate the island: the latter eventually became the Sinhala

Buddhist population in Sri Lanka (Anonymous, Eighteenth Century reprinted in Holt 2011). More concrete evidence comes from ancient texts such as *Culavamsa* and *Mahavamsa* of the fourth and fifth centuries CE (Holt 2011: 9). In the eleventh century BCE, the Cholas of Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu invaded the island and set up their empire: the struggle between the Sinhalese and the Tamil Hindu rulers continued until the latter was overthrown by the former. Therefore, some contemporary scholars continue to label the occupation of Sri Lanka by Indo-Aryan rulers as ‘colonisation’ (De Silva 1981: 7). This, however, is not to suggest that the Tamils and Sinhalese were always entangled in a struggle for power; in reality, they continued to co-exist either as rulers or the ruled until British colonisation which brought a new set of challenges that were to be confronted by the Sri Lankan population.

The Tamil identity, it is argued, developed along with the Sinhalese ethnic group (Indrapala 2005: 30-31). The geographical contiguity between Tamil Nadu and northern Sri Lanka fuelled the influence on the cultural patterns of the latter such as the Tamil language as well as Shaivism, especially between the third and the ninth centuries BCE (Indrapala 2005: 170-71). At the same time, there was transformation of the political, religious and economic terrain of the Tamil population as very distinct from the Sinhalese (Indrapala 2005: 170-72). Both civilisations, however, continued to flourish demarcating their areas of rule. The invasion of the Cholas on the Sinhalese empire marked a shift in the centre of administration. They later lost to the Buddhist king Dutugemunu, thereby re-establishing Sinhala hegemony according to Devarakkhita Jayabahu Dharmakirti’s account written in the fourteenth century (Dharmakirti 14th Century). This defeat is often celebrated in Sri Lanka for its discursive prowess which suggests that the Tamils were bound to be defeated by the Sinhalese as is evident by the legend of Dutugemunu.

However, this is an impressionistic imagery as the wars in the ancient societies were not based on ethnicity. The Tamil kingdoms continued to exist in the north of the island and their claims to autonomy came to an end only with the ‘complete subjugation’ by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century (Hoole 1995: 79). The Sinhalese continued to rule for some time longer than the Tamils. The decline of the Sinhalese kingdom set in only by thirteenth century largely due to decline in the ‘hydraulic’ infrastructure which was the backbone of the kingdom’s economy along with the coming of Portuguese in the island (De Silva 1981: 83-84). The kingdom of Kandy, which was the stronghold

of Buddhist rulers fell much later in the sixteenth century with the power dynamics sifting between the Western colonisers.

Colonialism by the Western powers brought new challenges for Sri Lanka and contemporary political problems could be traced to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the coming of the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch and finally British colonisers two major changes could be deciphered: at the level of economy, there was an attempt to utilise Sri Lankan plantations for export of spices and coffee and at the societal level, Christianity was introduced as a new religion which dismantled Buddhism as the state religion of the Sinhala kingdoms especially the Kandyan Empire (De Silva 2006 reprinted in Holt 2011: 138-141). This became the cornerstone of Sri Lankan struggle for independence: the restoration of Buddhism to its original status in a post-colonial state, thus prejudicing the native minorities in Sri Lanka, including the Tamils who vouched for a secular state that took their ethnic considerations into account (De Silva 2006 reprinted in Holt 2011: 144-45). Though the Tamil identity could itself be argued as a product of language and religion, there has been internal tensions between them such that their representation as singular is problematic (Holt 2011: 458). With the emphasis being laid upon the reinstatement of the majority, the post-independent constitution sowed the seeds of separatism in Sri Lanka.

There are instances to suggest that the roots of Tamil nationalism and their demand for a separate homeland or 'Eelam' goes back to the colonial era wherein the domination of the Sinhala community was leading towards a foreseeable minority suppression. Contrary to the much-reiterated rivalry between the Sinhala and the Tamil communities since the ancient times, the quest for a separate sovereign entity is a more modern phenomenon. The Tamil speaking population in Sri Lanka, can be divided into two categories. First, the 'Ceylon' Tamil minority 'concentrated in the far north of the island, on and near the Jaffna Peninsula and along the east coast' (Kearney 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011: 492), belonging in most cases to the Hindu community, speaking the Tamil language and settlers from the southern part of India since the eleventh century CE. The second Tamil speaking population consists of Indian immigrant workers who came from Southern India in the nineteenth century and eventually started to live in the interior hilly areas in Sri Lanka (Kearney 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011: 492). It is the former category of the Tamil population that came into conflict with the majority Sinhala population.

Agreeable is the fact that the Tamils were not united themselves: there were religious, social and geographical dissensions amongst them. The most notable was the difference between two Tamil political groups namely, the All Ceylon Tamil League (ACTL) which was representative of all Sri Lankan Tamils and professed a conservative perspective bent on maintaining casteism and dowry system while the other organisation, the Jaffna Youth Congress (JYC) was a progressive and nationalist association that intended to emancipate the lower castes and move towards social equality (Russell 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011). The latter was more specifically based in and constituted of members from the Jaffna peninsula. Due to its composition of middle class educated and unemployed members, coupled with their techniques of focusing at 'grass-root levels', in the 1930s, the Jaffna Youth Congress became popular with Sri Lankan Tamils as well as the peasant population (Russell 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011).

The problem, however, started with the boycott of the 1931 elections by the JYC, promulgated by the Donoughmore Constitution which intended to bring in territorial representation on the basis of universal adult suffrage, on grounds that it went against the ideal of complete independence and that it could lead to 'communalist thinking' in the country (Russell 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011: 479). The elections were, however, conducted and the entire Northern Province which had the majority of the Tamil population went unrepresented (Russell 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011: 483). In the long run, the discrimination against the Tamils increased rather than their miseries being sympathised with: there was no attempt to bring social reforms in the Tamil community and educate them politically so that they could become progressive. Therefore, this community which constituted almost 22 per cent of the population in 1931 was left to fend for itself and without any concrete resolution of their socio-political status in Sri Lanka.

Although Russell (1978 reprinted in Holt 2011) has critiqued the decision of the Jaffna Youth Congress on grounds that it was a tactical blunder and led to its 'nemesis' by the end of 1930s, on a closer scrutiny of the Donoughmore Constitution it seemed as a rational attempt by the JYC. This is because territorial form of representation ensured that the ruling prowess would always vest with the majority Sinhala community and not resolve the problems of minority representation: it had awarded the Sinhalese with more representation and jeopardised the interests of the Tamils. Moreover, the Tamils

(non-Jaffanese) who got elected in the Executive Council could not adequately represent the interests of the Tamils because they were far outnumbered by the majority community, along with the non-cooperation from the side of the Tamil dominated Northern province, which made it severely difficult to work for the interests of the community. The call of the JYC, though universal in its appeal and aiming at long-term solutions, went unheard by the Sinhala community which was keener on accommodating its own interests rather than integrating the country and disavowing the British rulers (Kearney 1978 and Russell 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011).

The problems did not subside with the full independence of Sri Lanka in 1948. In reality, it started a new spate of crisis that ultimately led to the growth of ethnic dissensions in the country. One of the common aspersions cast on the British by the Sinhala community was that during their period of colonisation, the Tamil speaking population was patronised and given more promising posts in civil services and other government offices in order to suppress Sinhala community (Russell 1978 and Kearney 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011). The Tamils made to higher posts under the British rule because of their superior education from Christian missionary schools, which were set up in the Jaffna region and their proficiency in English language (Russell 1978 and Kearney 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011). However, this became a publicised political narrative of the Sinhalese politicians after decolonisation.

The manner in which the political narratives took shape in Sri Lanka, along, ethnic and linguistic lines needs to be understood within the framework of postcoloniality and the perilous circumstances under which the decolonisation took place. This has to be understood in the context of a suppressed population and the marginalised groups within the colonised. The struggle for liberation has, invariably, been confronted with internal strife of the communities— mostly the minority versus the majority group. The reason as to why there is no singular narrative of the anti-colonial struggle lies in the multiple articulations present therein— the colonised refuses to be treated as an ‘object’ and asserts its agency (Seth, Gandhi and Duttton 1998). This agency responds in different ways in the same setting. There are ‘obscured expressions of people’ (Soguk 2006), which come to the fore through alternative modes such as poetry and narratives. These alternative narrative, which are expressions of marginalised sections of the society, reveal the political, economic, ethnic, linguistic or gender-based discrimination experienced by communities and individuals (Soguk 2006). In this regard,

‘cosmopolitan politics’ creates ‘particular’, and not general, renditions of politics, thus creating a ‘self-understanding of subjects as political’ (Jabri 2012: 626). This realisation manifests strongly and vividly in practical political space and is resonant with the community’s feelings of oppression and exclusion (Soguk 2006). The reification of identity has the effect of opening divergent viewpoints.

Within the ‘critical tradition’, the postcolonial question is extremely significant because it is not only a critique on Western ideas of conceptualisations, but also links ‘the critique of reason and progress’ (Vasilaki 2012: 8). In order to strengthen the postcolonial segment in the critical tradition, it needs to be acknowledged that there are divergent viewpoints present amongst the marginalised subjects of the colonised state. The idea in postcolonialism is not to portray the West as the bogey, but to decipher the tensions that exist in the erstwhile colonies and historicise their exegesis which problematises the very simplistic majority-minority divide. The ‘“minor”’ epistemes are obscured by the preponderant knowledge and there is an aggressive ‘“deterritorialisation”’ of the former in terms of their identity, thereby revealing the trajectory of repression and the struggle for power (Deleuze and Guattari 1986 cited in Gandhi 1998: 43). Marginalisation in discursive practices accrue not only from the imposition of knowledge from ‘outside’, but also from assertions which intend to quell pluralism in the global society. This is very well reflected in the case of the communities in Sri Lanka, where there was a systematic suppression of the minorities— at first subtle, then blatant and finally brutal.

At the time of independence (or withdrawal of British rulers from Sri Lanka) in 1948, the political acrimony between the majority and the minority groups, though in tension, was not at an all-time high. The onus of this disjunction could be laid upon the Soulbury Commission of 1946, sent under Lord Soulbury, who became the first Governor General of independent Sri Lanka, which considered the crisis of the minority groups and sought to resolve their grievances. In lieu of the suggestions made, therein, it was recognised that the minorities need to be given more constitutional protection. It, therefore, replaced the much detested Donoughmore Constitution of 1931. One of the major breaks from the Donoughmore Constitution was the provision made to the electoral districts. The Soulbury Constitution of 1946 in Part IV, Delimitation of Electoral Districts, reads:

Where it appears to the Delimitation Commission that there is in any area of a Province a substantial concentration of persons united by a community of interest, whether racial, religious or otherwise, but differing in one or more of these respects from the majority of the inhabitants of that area, the Commission may make such division of the Province into electoral districts as may be necessary to render possible the representation of that interest. In making such division the Commission shall have due regard to the desirability of reducing to the minimum the disproportion in the number of persons resident in the several electoral districts of the Province (Soulbury Constitution 1946).

This Constitution, therefore, tried to relieve the grievances of the minority. The most appreciable part of this clause was that it neither sidelined the interests of the minority nor did it concede their demand for communal electorate— it was both judicious and reflected the concern of the numerically inferior groups. It also provided for the creation of new constituencies depending upon the population figures and territorial occupation of the provinces (Ceylon Constitution Order in Council 1946: Part IV, Article 41, Clause 2). This was done to doubly ensure that there is no under representation of the minority sections of the Sri Lankan polity whether linguistic or religious.

It must be noted, however, that the independence granted to the Sri Lankan state was partial in as much as it continued to be a Dominion with the British Commonwealth of Nations until 1972, when it was rechristened Republic of Sri Lanka. The Soulbury Commission report of 1945 and the subsequent Constitution thus promulgated clearly adheres to the bestowing of Dominion status on the island-country (Ceylon Constitution Order in Council 1946: Preamble). Therefore, the Tamil and Sinhala political groupings continued to struggle politically, without engaging so much in vehemence or malevolence. Moreover, the Constitution of 1946 has only ensured that all communities could be represented; it was not certain that the legislative power would also be distributed equally amongst the population on the basis of electoral votes. The House of Representatives could be dominated by the majority community because there was no provision for proportional representation. Due to these reasons, the deprivileging of the minorities was certain, if the ruling party was in absolute majority in the House.

With the coming of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) under Solomon Bandaranaike in 1956, the fears expressed by minority representatives became a reality: the year marked the beginning of marginalisation for Tamils. The party had rallied around the issue of official language and advocated the dismemberment of English language in order to denude the colonial legacy. The consequence was the ‘Official

Language Act No. 33 of 1956', more commonly known as the 'Sinhala Only Act' which recognised Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka while at the same time diminished the scope of Tamil as an official language. This dealt a severe blow to the compromise that has been reached between Sinhala and Tamil nationalists who had agreed prior to independence that English shall be replaced as an official language with the native languages: the '“swabhasha” movement' got transformed into 'Sinhala only' demand due to resurgence of Sinhala nationalism (Kearney 1978 reprinted in Holt: 495). This was also a turning point for Tamil politics in Sri Lanka because after this the struggle eventually drifted towards the demand for a separate homeland.

In spite of the mainstream political manoeuvring, alienation of the Tamil population continued through the next two decades. Manivannan (2014: 5) argues that a 'political monologue' was created and manufactured in the Sri Lankan society which indeed was a product of the 'cultural chauvinism of the majority Sinhala community'. It was agreed between SLFP and the Federal Party (FP) that a negotiable solution would be sought for the Tamil issue by accommodating their concerns in a Sri Lankan polity and this formed the basis of political alliance between the two parties which brought them victory in the elections of 1960. However, just after assuming office in the elections of 1960, under pressure from 'Sinhalese extremists', Mrs Srimavo Bandarnaike pushed for the implementation of the Official Language Act of 1956 throughout the island, thus, alienating the Federal party in the Parliament and making it substantively clear that it is not willing to make concessions to the Tamil population (De Silva 1981: 526-527).

It is also noticeable that the Sri Lankan state had a tendency to curb minority influence in all sectors. For example, by bringing educational institutes under state control, it tried to eliminate the independence of Roman Catholic schools which took state aid. Similarly, the small community of Muslims were aggrieved by the inaction of the government to pass a legislation, according judicial status to '*qazis*' (Muslim clerics who solemnise marriage) (De Silva 1981: 529). There was also vehement opposition by the 'Sinhala extremist' to abandon the bill for the provision of district council in 1968, because it could pave way for a federal structure which would distribute powers between the centre and the provincial governments (De Silva 1981: 530). Therefore, De Silva (1981: 525-26) rightly points out that in the 1950s and 1960s there was a clear-

cut attempt by the Sri Lankan government to systematically dilute the minority status of citizens and enlarge the influence of majority Sinhala Buddhist population.

As a result, when Sri Lanka acquired the status of a sovereign state and got complete independence in 1972, the political rhapsodies of the earlier decades, especially the 1960s, became the diapason of the majority community and descant for the minorities. With the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1972, it was very clear that the minorities— whether religious or linguistic— cannot strive for equality in citizenship, civil rights and liberties with the majority Sinhala speaking Buddhist populace. This is because the Constitution laid down specific provisions for the safeguard of the majority sect along with a special position that was accorded to Buddhism in the Constitution of 1972, thus foregoing any discussion of making this island-country a secular state. According to Chapter II, Article 9 of The Constitution of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1972):

The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14 (1) (e) (The Constitution of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1972).

Strengthened by the adoption of this Constitution, there was repression of the political aspirations of the Tamil minority. It was under these circumstances that the constitutional methods of asserting ethnic and linguistic rights came under the radar. Until the promulgation of the Constitution of 1972, Tamil political leaders had not advocated the idea of a separate homeland, but an insisted upon recognition of the cultural demands of the minority Tamil population (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011: 510). It was after 1972 that the Federal Party as well as other Tamil political parties came under the singular banner of Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) with the Vaddukodai Resolution of 1976 (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011: 511). It was during the subsequent election of 1977 that TULF propagated the idea of a separate ‘homeland’ for Tamils within the Sri Lankan country. This evidently showed signs of movement from constitutional methods to unilateralism, thereby laying fertile ground for militarisation of Tamil population (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011: 511).

Yet another reason to adopt ‘separate homeland’ as the political aim by the Tamil leadership was the rising impatience witnessed on part of Tamil youth in the northern part of Sri Lanka, including those who were a part of Tamil United Front Youth

Organisation (TUFYO) (Kearney 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011: 498). This put pressure on the senior leaders of the Tamil United Front (TUF) to indicate their intentions of moving towards the goal of self-determination, not only to appease the youths, but also to control vehemence on part of the Tamil youth. Kearney (1978 reprinted in Holt 2011: 498) argues that the incidences of carnage and violence, such as ‘bombings, shootings and robberies’, was on the rise in the 1970s, which was believed by Tamil political leaders to be the handiwork of ‘an underground movement of Tamil youths with links to South India’. In the years following 1972, several members of TUFYO were arrested without being charged of any offence; arbitrary detentions also ensued after the assassination of the Mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Durayappah, in 1975 (Kearney 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011).

However, it is presumptuous to say that they were only Tamils who were involved in episodic violence. The dilution of Tamil recognition as a political entity in Sri Lanka was accompanied by anti-Tamil pogroms. Even peaceful Tamil congregations such as academic events were interrupted by the police. This happened in 1974, where an international conference of scholars in Jaffna, was disrupted by the police and resulted in the death of eight people and causing injury to several others (Kearney 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011). This police intervention was ‘unprovoked’ (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011: 514). Further, the Jaffna Library was burnt down by a ‘security unit’ and this destroyed some ‘unique manuscripts’ and several books (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011: 514). As mentioned earlier, detention of Tamil youths was already on the rise. Finally, the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1983 alarmed the Tamil youth as well as the newly formed LTTE since it bore testimony to the extreme actions that the Sinhalese were taking against the Tamil population of Sri Lanka (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011: 514). The pogrom was ‘an immediate reaction to an ambush’ of a military truck by the LTTE (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011: 514). Wilson (2000 reprinted in Holt 2011: 503) points out that there have been suggestions that the pogroms were ‘pre-planned’ and ‘some communal-minded’ members of the ruling government were participants in the carnage. Manivannan (2014: 4) argues that ‘the Tamil militancy was the consequence than the cause’ of the ‘political discourse’ in Sri Lanka which had ‘brutally suppressed’ the ‘nonviolent resistance in the early decades after independence by the moderate Tamil leadership’. This also led to the dilution of trust of the Tamil

populace in the Tamil political leaders and the legitimisation of the LTTE amongst the Tamils of Sri Lanka.

The rebellious attitude was a culmination of the growing frustrations of the Tamil political community in Sri Lanka. An important observation remains that for a very long time, the Tamil politicians did not advocate a bifurcation of the Sri Lankan state: they were only demanding the recognition of a distinct Tamil identity. However, the chauvinism inherent in the new Constitution of 1972 made the Tamils feel more and more insecure— their apprehensions being encouraged by the growth in episodic violence against the minorities and the inaction on part of the police and military forces.

On the political front, the Federal Party, the Tamil Congress along with certain others organisations such as the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), an association of Indian Tamil estate-workers, formed the Tamil United Front (TUF). The Tamils feared that lower caste Hindus would be converted to Buddhism and would be eventually assimilated in the Sinhala society, thus seceding a significant number of Tamil members of the society (Kearney 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011). At the same time, not only was Sinhala declared the official language of Sri Lanka by the Constitution of 1972, youth who were educated in Tamil and English found it increasingly difficult to find employment because of the priority given to Sinhala language. Moreover, the government passed a legislation regarding the criterion for admission in universities and colleges of Sri Lanka. According to this legislation, the cut-off marks for admission in universities was laid down: the threshold for students from Tamil medium schools were disproportionately higher than students who took their examinations in the Sinhala language. This was done on grounds that scoring marks in Tamil language examinations were easier than scoring in the Sinhala language (Kearney 1978 reprinted in Holt 2011: 496). It was an arbitrary move on part of the state to interdict the Tamil community, since they were well educated and very competent for government jobs. This legislation was clearly an attempt to reduce the number of Tamil students in the state universities, further alienating them from the rest of the population. The chances of restoring the distinctness of the Tamil culture was simultaneously eroded with the proclamation of unitary structure in Sri Lanka according to the Constitution of 1972, which increased centralisation of authority.

In this context, feelings of insecurity are bound to occur— there was no guarantee of security to the minorities, the political climate was increasingly anti-Tamil and the discourse was being implemented practically in the Sri Lankan polity. The practice of othering or alienating a particular community reaches its zenith when the efforts to denigrate becomes virtual and penetrates the societal levels. There is a level of indifference towards the plight of the ‘other’ because the latter is considered to be unfathomable. The ‘self/other *problematique*’ in International Relations could be resolved by resorting to ‘the exercise of critique’ (Paipais 2011). Critique, however, gets suppressed in an atmosphere of malevolence and the actions of the ‘other’ are seen as necessarily pejorative and unwarranted. This is similar to what Bigo (2002) terms as ‘structural unease’ created by ‘neo-liberal discourses’ in which there is a perpetual and regular insecurity that ‘some citizens’ feel because they are ostracised. The insecurity results in the acceptance, whether willing or tacit, of choices or alternatives which is otherwise objectionable. The resort to violence is not the starting but the culminating point of several prior episodes.

In the light of the above historicisation, the genesis of LTTE and their engagement in extreme acts of destruction such as suicide bombing could be understood as performances for reversing the nonchalance of the Sri Lankan government towards the Tamil problem and re-asserting their agential prowess. In the following section, suicide bombing by LTTE has been analysed in the context of hostile conditions posed by the majority groups: the tragedy lies in the physical destruction of the person, along with the continued onslaught of the extradited community, thus, jeopardising their security and abetting their reactions.

Suicide bombing as rebellion: reading LTTE’s resistance

The emergence of the LTTE in Sri Lanka was the culmination of the suppression and atrocities meted out to the ethnic Tamil minority group. The movement within the Tamil community, as has been discussed in the previous section, was political in nature since the colonial times; it gradually evolved into an insurgent rebellious group (Nadarajah and Sriskandrajah 2005) in the face of unabated marginalisation of the ethnic group. Ethnic rivalries between the Sinhalese and the Tamil minority began to gain ground in Sri Lanka after its independence over socio-economic and cultural

equality rights (Hassan 2011: 72). However, the demand of separate homeland along with the appropriation of violence on part of the Tamil community, was a gradual evolution and the reasons lay in the growing callousness of the state towards redressing the grievances of the minority community.

Fair (2007: 172) points out that the LTTE started to 'militarise' in the 1970s. It has also been pointed out that the LTTE also began the protest for a separate 'homeland' during the same period (Hassan 2011: 72). Therefore, there has been a movement from political dissidence to militarisation of Tamils in Sri Lanka after forty years of struggle for the rightful space of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Suicide bombing missions of the LTTE are being categorised as rebellion in this study because of the sheer magnitude of such actions by a single group and the number of volunteers prepared to perform the act bears testimony to the extent of agitation felt by the Sri Lankan Tamils. In fact, women in large numbers volunteered and participated in the execution of aggression against the ruling government, and their allies, to the extent of annihilating their own self.

Suicide bombing can be understood as an act of killing oneself by the use of confetti or explosives which results in obliteration of the physical body accompanied with carnage and ruination afflicted on the surrounding, mostly executed in line with organisational agenda, such that the blitz causes trepidation and anxiety amongst citizens for their survival. In this study, the term used throughout is suicide bombing and not 'suicide terrorism' (Bloom 2005; Hafez 2006; Pape 2005; Pedahzur 2005; Crenshaw 2007), 'suicide missions' (Gambetta 2005), 'murder-suicides' (Oliver and Steinberg 2005) and 'martyrs' (Davis 2003) because herein the act is seen as a continuum in a long process of excruciation—the idea is to contextualise the act in a historical spectrum rather than labelling the deed. The purpose of the research is to locate the vagaries of the marginalised groups and their encounters with the ruling regimes rather than focusing on global terrorism. Suicide bombing is not analysed over here for the sake of categorisation: it is assessed as a communitarian reaction and not as pre-emption because the choice of individuals to end their life must come from deep-seated socio-political tensions and deprivations which, if not enacted on war footing, could lead to further annihilation.

According to the American Psychological Association (2015), 'suicide is the act of killing yourself, most often as a result of depression or other mental illness'. The Centre

for Disease Control and Prevention (2015) defines suicide as, ‘death caused by self-directed injurious behaviour with an intent to die as a result of the behaviour’. Durkheim (1897 cited in Jones 1986) defined suicide as, ‘all cases of death resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he knows will produce this result’. Durkheim (1897 cited in Jones 1986) also argued that suicide occurs due to ‘insufficient or excessive degree of integration or regulation’: depending upon the condition, suicides could be categorised into ‘egoistic’ (suicide due to excessive self-indulgence), ‘altruistic’ (suicide caused for adherence to larger communitarian concerns such as the practice of *sati* in India) and ‘anomistic’ (suicide due to a temporary deterioration in social and economic conditions such as divorce or economic depression). Therefore, suicide for psychologists is the act of injuring oneself whereas sociologists relate suicidal tendencies to social interactions.

Hassan (1985 and 1995 cited in Hassan 2011: 3) argues that suicide need not be considered as an end in itself: it can also convey a strong message to the society and polity about the prowess of an individual and control that a person can exercise upon the body of the self. In other words, an individual cannot be bereaved of agential powers and emancipation could be achieved through affliction of death on self, even if life is being controlled by an external authority. Suicide, in any form, showcases dissatisfactions and insecurities in a typical society. In the same frame, suicide bombing represents high levels of dejection— political, economic and social. The manifestation of the latter is, however, very powerful and reiterates the dynamism with which the anatomy could be exonerated.

Why is suicide bombing being considered as a form of rebellion? Rebellion, by design, intends to question the predominance of the ruling group. Killing oneself in a public place, either targeting a particular individual or a group of civilians, probes the social patterns that have resulted in the acute act of self-destruction. Critiquing instrumental rationality, Critical Theory (Frankfurt School) argues that, there are historical contexts in which events and objects come to acquire the status of ‘ “facts” ’: the certainties indicated are in reality the product of societal perceptions and the manner in which they interact with their surroundings to make knowledge claims (Brincat 2012). Contrary to the mainstream perspective, which considers suicide bombing to be either strategic (Gambetta 2005; Crenshaw 2007) or an irrational act (Pedahzur 2005; Oliver and Steinberg 2005), critical theory interrogates the social edifices which has resulted in

brutal actions. From the viewpoint of the protagonist carrying out the suicidal action, there is something amiss in the system which has continued to evade the preferences of selective communities, inducing such an ultimate step. The argument does not engage in the justification of rebellion but intends to problematise the situation.

Herein, it has been argued that the malevolence does not lie exclusively in the act of suicide bombing but is an extension of the violence, albeit brutal and painful, that exists in the global society. Nevertheless, violations of civilian liberties and rights are normalised whereas actions by marginalised communities are considered an aberration. Both war and suicide bombing cause fear and insecurity amongst people (Asad 2007: 39-40). The spatial and temporal dimensions of war and violence transcend battlefield in the modern times and it continues to grow from deep rooted social relations and political institutions (Jabri 2007: 1). However, the state actions are not questioned because they have immunity in the legal sense, although international law calls for humanitarian law it is far from providing protection to people (Asad 2007: 40). At the same time, there is a process of recognising the enemy and labelling it as anti-state (Der Derian 2005), which further empowers the state against rebelling groups. Therefore, every action of the rebel has a counter by the state which strengthens the state's position *vis-à-vis* the rebels. The state actions could be equally unreasonable and arbitrary such as unwarranted arrests, torture, detention and so on. The ardent anti-rebel discourse, however, nourishes, rather than obstruct, state actions. There is 'a sustained rhetoric of terrorism' (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 88) that obscures counter-narratives in global politics. More appealing is an inquiry into the choice of killing: why does a rebel engage in suicide bombing, given that there are other ways of inflicting harm?

The question of ethics is immanent in politics and, therefore, significant for understanding tragedy in International Relations (Beardsworth 2008). In the context of rebellion, the 'revolt' is 'metaphysical' in nature, which means that it is against the 'conditions of life' (Camus 1956 cited in Read 1991: Foreword). For Camus, 'the sense of absurdity comes from the conflict humans (sic.) longing for order and meaning and the disorder and meaninglessness that we experience in our daily lives' (Camus 2005 cited in Gordon 2016: 590). In other words, the desire for stability and recognition is checkmated by the gruesome realities, thus testing the patience of individuals or community: the society precariously sits on the brink of a volcano that can erupt with galvanising impact. Rebellion, in this sense, is not confined to the sentiment of bringing

a change; it, first of all, sounds the death knell of political agendas that claims universality and then there is an attempt to improve the position of the self. Further, Beardsworth (2008: 129) argues:

Tragic wisdom is predicated on the revelation of the disavowed bond between individual and community through the individual's fate and the interaction of emotion and reason through which this revelation is made.

The point, herein, is with regard to the normativity of the action that is being undertaken for individual as well as communitarian reasons. Suicide bombing, in this context, is a sad episode for human morality and political ethics because it reveals revulsion and vengeance against the ruling group and its social allies.

Suicide bombing is also considered to be a project against the western states which advocates liberal democracy because it reveals the power that an individual has over his or her own body (Michelsen 2013). The rebellion, herein, could be located in the disagreements upon essential questions that the West intends to universalise. The extreme actions undertaken by selective groups and individuals project communities as being anti-West and against liberalism. As Hirst (2013: 138) points out, with the Nietzschean proposition of the 'Death of God', there is a 'foundationlessness' in the discipline, for 'the subject can no longer rely on upon divine points of reference as a means by which to ascertain meaning, value or direction' related to a particular cause. The connection between the divine and the self has been falsified on grounds that there has to be an engagement with what lies 'outside' the body (Hirst 2013: 139). Herein, subjectivity becomes more nuanced rather than a simple equation that exists between the divine and the human. On the political side of the argument, by puncturing the notion of the divine, the individuals are in control of themselves. This implies that there are no chains to bind a person and enforce particular norms, which can now be questioned because their bases have been dismantled. In other words, the commonsensical understanding of how the world works could be replaced by how the world ought to work.

The right on the body of the self as is manifest in suicide bombing also goes against the liberal notion, which covertly keeps the 'right to kill' with the state itself (Michelsen 2013). Suicide bombing, thus, comes as an anomaly to the liberal project. In the context of this study, only those suicide bombings that are related to the 'sub-systemic level' (Singer 1961) are being scrutinised. More significantly, however, from a critical theory

perspective, it is of value to look into the phenomenology: the strength to endure the pain and suffer death rather than repression testifies to the agentialising prowess of the human body. To this extent, the role of religious ideologies in the conduct of suicide bombings has been minimised in this study. The focus is largely on the performative: the tragedy of self-annihilation from a normative perspective quizzes social and political structures that compel individuals to reveal extreme levels of revulsion. The politics of exclusion denigrates positions of individuals and communities. In the language of critical theory, the 'pain' of the body reveals the dissatisfaction and helplessness of protagonists.

According to Hamilton (2007: 913), the most repetitive 'metaphors of violence' occurs in relation to the 'body'. The ways in which the body provides information or can be a recipient of information speaks for the agential powers that it can possess (Marlin-Bennett 2013). Agential powers could address key concerns about the self, including those related to security and which induce harm and suffering in the global society. Feelings of harm and pain are suppressed in the mainstream of security studies. This is because instrumental rationality and scientific explanation is privileged over emotionality and context in the discipline. It is also because states are considered as the most important actors in the international system, and this leads to a behavioural analysis of the state in the given anarchical system. Jeffery (2014) argues that the 'neuro-scientific approach' of understanding emotions in International Relations has the drawback of being a method for 'data generation and collection' rather than a method for interpretation of emotions based on contextualisation.

However, critical theory goes beyond the quantitative reasoning and intends to scoop out those layers of humanity that go unaddressed in the mainstream. Postcolonial literature within International Relations looks into this multiplicity of emotions that are present in world politics, transcending boundaries of state, society and culture (Ling 2014). Besides giving thrust upon normativity, emotionology is also considered to be a part of critical thinking. There is a 'political task: emancipation' (Ling 2014: 583) that can be attained only with the recognition that there are emotions in global society and these cannot be captured by complete reliance on neuro-biological sciences but have to be understood within the framework of social relations (Jeffery 2014). The idea of collective emotions (and how they might change over a period of time) shows 'the inter-relationships between emotions, social structures and collective identities' (Linklater 2014:

574). Anger is an emotion which has a significant space in world politics because its manifestation as a 'negative emotion' (Linklater 2014) questions the extant socio-political structures of power which impedes emancipation.

Group sentiment of the deprived community is extremely significant in understanding the motivation of a rebellious act. In the case of the Tamil diaspora in Sri Lanka, there was a regular marginalisation of the group under the Sinhala majority, which was aggravated after decolonisation in 1948 and became more poignant after 1972, once Sri Lanka claimed complete independent status. Incipient separatism was evident amongst Tamil political thinking since 1960s. With the change in the leadership of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a decree 'to launch the struggle for a separate sovereign Tamil state' (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011: 113) was promulgated from 1977. However, there was no implementation of such demands until the 1980s. Two immediate events could be cited for the rise of violent struggle in Sri Lanka: (a) the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1983; (b) the lapse of Tamil political parties in the Sri Lankan Parliament (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011). Both of these above-mentioned reasons could be assessed in some details.

The growing deprivations of the Tamil community witnessed its most heinous outcome in the pogroms of 1983. It was a 'Sinhala pogrom against Tamil people living throughout southern Sinhala-dominated parts of the island' (Tambiah 1997 reprinted in Holt 2011: 641). Earlier in 1971, there has been an 'insurrection' in Sri Lanka, carried out by the People's Liberation Front (PLF), which was mostly a youth movement. PLF reflected the grievances of the youth against the ruling government which provided them with good educational opportunities but not with proportionate employment opportunities, thus causing anxiety amongst the educated unemployed and pushing them towards extreme actions (Kearney and Jiggins 1974 reprinted in Holt 2011: 619). However, this did not have an ethnic tinge nor did it aggravate the Tamil-Sinhala differences.

The riots of 1983 were directed against the Tamils who lived in Sinhala majority areas in the south and central parts of the island: there were squad attacks on their residences and businesses, and the rioters were organised by some politicians of the United National Party (UNP) led government because of which there was no shield for the Tamils (Tambiah 1997 reprinted in Holt 2011: 646-47). In 1958, there were riots

between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, following the Sinhala-Tamil language controversy: however, it was the result of growing tensions over a sensitive political issue that occurred under growing pressure from the Buddhist '*bikkhus*' over the then UNP government in Sri Lanka (De Silva 1981: 514-15). Moreover, since the 1970s, the anti-Tamil sentiment has increased in many folds including educational, employment and social deprivations and the intolerance was manifest in the growing number of riots that is in 1977, 1981 and 1983 (Tambiah 1997 reprinted in Holt 2011). The last of the major ethnic riots, it gave impetus to the violence inherent in such movements that were hitherto suppressed.

Secondly, in August 1983, the Sri Lankan Parliament enacted the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of 1972, by which the 'establishment of a separate state within the territory of Sri Lanka' was outlawed, and it was ruled that any person or organisation that is engaged in the 'support, espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate' of such a cause (Article 157A (1) and (2)) is liable to be tried under the given law. It also required that the Tamil political parties and associations take such an oath of allegiance towards the 'Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka', and sign the declaration with regard to the amendments to the Constitution, that is Article 157A and 161 (d) (iii). This, in effect, meant that there was no possibility of having a federal structure in which the Tamil majority areas could have their own constitution. TULF, the opposition party in Parliament refused to obey the situation and resigned from Parliament. As a result of this, there was a vacuum in Tamil political representation—and it was appropriately filled in by Velupillai Prabhakaran's LTTE (Wilson 2000: 113-14 reprinted in Holt 2011).

The formation of the LTTE marked an upsurge in instances of extreme reactions. The group, initially called the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) was founded in the 1970s. The support for the formation of a separate state had been applauded by the Tamil civilians as was evident by the 1977 elections, which the TULF swept in the 'Tamil dominated districts of the North and the East' (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 87). In the wake of ethnic tensions in the 1980s, and the redundancy of Tamil parliamentary political parties, the aggressive groups came to acquire legitimacy with the Tamil civilians in this political vacuum (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011). Here again, the fear of annihilation was superseded by the anger of the deprived Tamil community, which has been facing discrimination regularly.

At the same time, the anti-terror discourse was finding its political space by the late 1970s. In 1979, the Parliament legislated the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which gave unmeasured and arbitrary powers to the military and police force. One of the provisions of the Act says that ‘any police officer not below the rank of Superintendent’ could, without warrant, arrest any person, search any place, ‘stop and search an individual’s vehicle’ and ‘seize any document or thing’ (Prevention of Terrorism Act 1979, Part II 6 (1)). The language of the Act was such that it delegitimised the Tamil separatist movement: the spectrum of defining terrorism was broad and attempted to cull any political dissensions on part of the Tamil politicians (Prevention of Terrorism Act 1979):

.....public order in Sri Lanka continues to be endangered by elements or groups of persons or associations that advocate the use of force or the commission of crime as a means of, or as an aid in, accomplishing governmental change within Sri Lanka, and who have resorted to acts of murder and threats of murder of members of Parliament and of local authorities, police officers, and witnesses to such acts and other law abiding and innocent citizens, as well as the commission of other acts of terrorism such as armed robbery, damage to State property and other acts involving actual or threatened coercion, intimidation and violence.....

The actions of the LTTE and other organisations which resorted to the use of force, were labelled as ‘terrorists’ by the Sri Lankan government with the aid of the act. At the time of enactment of PTA in 1979, ‘there was an incongruence in the scale of Tamil militancy and the scale of government’s discursive and military response’ (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 91). It was only in 1987, that the LTTE started its long siege with suicide bombing attacks at public places as well as assassinations, thus leading to ‘an intensification of the Tamil struggle’ (De Voorde 2005: 184). It is true, however, that the LTTE was not the only armed Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka: there were at least ‘thirty-seven Tamil militant groups’ out of which only five, namely the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), were of significance (Wilson 2000 reprinted in Holt 2011). The LTTE, however, partly because of its leadership and partly because ideologically it envisaged a traditional Tamil society, gathered far more volunteers and after 1991 remained the only threat to the Sinhala government.

The Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka is also worth mentioning because of the critical support that the Indian state agencies and the military provided to the Sri Lankan state. In this regard the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 needs a critical assessment. As peace-keepers between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE, the Indian military suffered heavily as they got embroiled in a conflict with the LTTE, resulting in bloodshed (Hall 2013). It also culminated in the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. There was no neutrality on part of the Indian military troops, who co-operated with the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) to the detriment of the Tamils. In 1992, as a result of the assassination, Indian intervention was called off.

There has been a fear that the LTTE has intentions of transgressing upon Indian sovereignty as is evident by the words of S.B. Chavan in 1992 (Aryasinha 2001). Jaganathan and Kurtz (2014) argue that India's intervention as a 'responsibility to protect' civilians during civil war in the region has been limited. The intervention in Sri Lanka by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was indeed to protect the minority Tamil population. However, the IPKF got engaged in a military confrontation with the LTTE and in the process the purpose of intervention, namely protection of the Tamil population, was defeated. As Jaganathan and Kurtz (2014: 465-66) argue, the military operation by the IPKF, called the *Operation Poomalai*, 'ended up dissatisfying almost every group possible, including the Tamils in Sri Lanka and those residing in the state of Tamil Nadu in India'.

The intervention indeed had the results opposite to what was actually intended by India: the IPKF fought the LTTE instead of peacefully resolving the dispute, the Indian troops failed to protect the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, rather facilitating genocidal practices by the Sri Lankan state and rendered India ineffective in peace resolution in the region. This was evidently reflected in the final phase of the last Eelam war, which bore testimony to 'a massacre which transcended every civilized norm' (Manivannan 2014: 7). The analogy of war with 'massacre' is not overstated since there was a large-scale use of chemical weapons, attacks on civilian facilities and detentions and disappearances of Tamil civilians.

Another trend that came to the surface in regional politics after the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka, was the disavowing of dissident or secessionist movements altogether.

The LTTE, after the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, has been called ‘the most advanced terrorist group in South Asia’ (Aryasinha 2001: 28). This further undermined the claim of the group of setting up a Tamil state within the Sri Lankan island, while justifying the onslaught by the Sri Lankan state and the Tamil ‘genocide’ through ‘several pre-meditated steps and concealed strategies’ (Manivannan 2014: 87-88). There was also a marked change in the position taken by the Indian state after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, wherein the support for the cause of LTTE declined in the Indian political circle. The suicide bombing was interpreted as an act of vehemence and vengeance; it could also be seen as a symbolic performance which privileges emancipation over materialism of the body.

The suicide bombings by the LTTE stands out because of the altruistic and community bonding that the act reflects (Hassan 2011). Drawing from Fanon, it is possible to argue that in a ‘politically conscious and goal directed violence’, there is a boost in the psyche of the rebel (White 2007). The destruction of the body of the rebel creates fear in the oppressor’s mind— Fanon considered this as a revenge of the ‘colonised’ against the ‘coloniser’ and argued that it is ‘instrumental violence’ which has a definite end as compared to ‘absolute violence’ which was witnessed during decolonisation (Fanon 1963 in Kawash 1999: 239). Though Fanon’s work was more specific to the decolonisation struggle, the argument is valid for a subjugated group that fights to relieve itself of oppression. The aesthetic destruction of the body captures the trauma suffered by the marginalised community. In the case of suicide bombing, whether the protagonists were Algerians, Lebanese, Palestinians or Tamils, there has been a history of suppression that these groups have suffered at the hands of the rulers. The reactions of the suppressed against the rulers is viewed as detrimental for state security and cast in negative light. The counter-actions of the state or rulers against certain communities remain unabated, thereby inviting violence from the other side.

The destruction of the body of the self does not, however, change the status quo of the state— the backlash of the state is rigorous and fails to differentiate between the innocent and the aggressor. In fact, such incidents give legitimacy to state actions. In the case of Sri Lanka, the last few years, *viz.* 2008-09, of the civil war was marked by abductions and disappearances of youth and the government did not undertake any responsibility for the same (Human Rights Watch 2008). There are several cases that revealed the indifference of the government towards the disappeared. For example,

former Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was also the most vocal and offensive leader in the civil war against the LTTE, in an interview with *Al-Jazeera* journalist James Bays (2013) said that the number of disappearances is exaggerated although his government has set up an enquiry commission.

The UN report on the disappearances, however, provides a very different picture and points out the inadequacy of the measures undertaken by the government. According to the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on advice and technical assistance for the Government of Sri Lanka on promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka (2013), the government of Sri Lanka had only implemented some suggestions given in the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (UNHCHR Report 2013). It also pointed out that ‘extrajudicial killings, abductions and enforced disappearance in the past year highlight the urgency of action to combat impunity’, further attesting to the deplorable conditions of the minorities in Sri Lanka even after the elimination of the potent LTTE (UNHCHR 2013). The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, in her opening remarks on 31 August 2013, said:

There are a number of specific factors impeding normalization, which – if not quickly rectified – may sow the seeds of future discord. These are by and large to do with the curtailment or denial of personal freedoms and human rights, or linked to persistent impunity and the failure of rule of law.

The government is dismissive of claims made by international and non-governmental organisations regarding human rights violation on the minorities. Pillay, after presenting her report and recommendations at the UNHCR, came under severe criticism by some ministers of President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government. Udaya Prabhat Gammanpila (2013) accused Pillay of being biased in favour of the Tamils in Sri Lanka:

Although Pillay is from South Africa, she is of Tamil ethnic origin. She is a community conscious activist as reflected in her struggles against discrimination of Indian community and women in South Africa. Since her graduate studies were sponsored by her community because of her humble background, she has an emotional attachment to the community. In this background, being a Tamil, she has no moral right to be in any fact finding mission on alleged killing of 40,000 innocent Tamils.

Gammanpila (2013) goes on to criticise Pillay and other members of the UNHCR Commission as ‘sympathizer of minorities’ and argued that she had a ‘prejudiced mind towards Tamil separatism’. Yet another minister of the Rajapaksa government, Mervyn

Silva, along with ‘Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinist’ (Manivannan 2014: 95), also protested against the visit of Pillay and the UN Human Rights Commission. Although Mahinda Rajapaksa, the then President of Sri Lanka, apologised for the derogatory comments made by Gammanpila and some other Ministers on Pillay, he also denies the claims of human rights violation by the Sri Lankan state and military during and after the last Eelam War, that is between 2007-2009. In his interview with James Bays for *Al Jazeera* (2013), Rajapaksa denies such claims. He says that the evidence against the state and military is not substantive whereas the country has suffered from the violence inflicted by the LTTE. This has exaggerated the antagonism against the Tamils in Sri Lanka even after the government was successful in uprooting the organisation.

Additionally, in 2012, Defence Minister Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, argued that the Sri Lankan North is not meant just for the Tamils and that nationals of the country have a right to settle anywhere within the state’s territory. This was not just theoretical but was also manifested practically. There have been ‘massive and rapid Sinhala settlements in the North and the East of Sri Lanka’ (Manivannan 2014: 107) since 2009. The semantics and the actions had the effect of delegitimising the entire agenda of Tamil separatism because it reifies the universal Sri Lankan identity. This has been termed as the ‘Sinhala colonization of traditional Tamil homeland’ (Manivannan 2014: 107). It has amply clarified the intentions of the Sri Lankan government and military that they derecognise the demands of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka.

Evident in the case of Tamils in Sri Lanka is the deprivation they had faced since the 1980s until the present times. The security of minorities in Sri Lanka has diminished ever since 2007. According to the 2016 Human Rights Report, five to six persons, accused of crimes against the Tamil community, were acquitted. There are orders by local magistrate to arrest army officers who had fired at a protesting crowd, killing three persons, at Rathupaswala in 2013; the orders have not been carried out until 2016 (Human Rights Report 2016). Under these circumstances, the Tamil and other minorities in Sri Lanka must be facing a crisis. In the context of Tamils in Sri Lanka, Manivannan (2014: 8-9) argues that the ‘process of reconciliation’ needs to be ‘politically constructed with appropriate constitutional and administrative measures’. With the ‘revelation of war crimes and crimes against humanity’, the Sri Lankan state has to be upfront about the political resolution of the problem (Manivannan 2014: 10). Although the Sri Lankan state, justifies its actions on grounds of security enhancement,

it has been a verified reality that this state has ‘fought wars continuously against its own people since independence’ (Manivannan 2014: 20). This reveals the extent to which the Sri Lankan state is prepared to use force in order to safeguard the super-structure of the state. It must also be noted that there is a general disrespect shown towards ‘highly placed women’ in Sri Lanka by government officials, as is evident by the comments on Pillay and the first woman Chief Justice of Sri Lanka (Manivannan 2014: 96). Therefore, the conviction towards security is accompanied with the preparedness to assert authority where needed. The question, then, is: security for whom?

The state and security is prioritised in the mainstream security studies. It is for this reason that the civilians do not get adequate attention. To borrow from Booth (2007), ‘security is always for someone and for some purpose’. Only with the idea of ‘progress’ could there be ‘emancipation’ of individuals (Booth 2007). However, certain communities are denigrated to the extent that they begin to engage in extreme forms of violence that further deteriorates their political and social standing. Such groups are caught in a conundrum: to react could mean a backlash from the state, but protestations could be necessary under the growing indifference of the state towards its people. Suicide bombings are used interchangeably with ‘suicide attack’ because ‘a suicide bombing is most often defined as an attack where the death of the bomber is the means by which the attack is accomplished’ (Harowitz 2015). However, this study uses the term suicide bombing thoroughly since it is descriptive action. The purpose of this study, is to observe the relevance of these acts for certain groups which do not have a political leverage in any case.

The argument put forth by realists with regard to the rationality/irrationality of the actors relates to the instrumental logic of rationality, that is reasoning directed towards a certain end (Kahler 1998). But there are rationalities of different kind which do not find expression in the mainstream thinking of International Relations. Linklater (2007c: 38) critiques Realism for its insistence on the ‘primacy of strategic interaction and the need for states to advance their understanding’ of how they could compete with other states. For Habermas (1984 cited in Linklater 2007c: 38), human reasoning is ‘interdependent with, but far from reducible to, ‘technical instrumental rationalisation’. For critical thinking, the rationality is more of a derivative of powerful discourses that generates knowledge in the society.

This knowledge creates a façade of the ‘good’ and the ‘evil’ where invariably ‘evil’ is ‘an attribute of foes to be eradicated’ (Abdel-Nour 2004). Dissidence, in general, has been given the impression of ‘evil’ in society. The process of ‘othering’ and exclusion has also been a part of security discourses. As Campbell (1992) would argue, security discourses have always engaged in identifying with an enemy. However, the major repercussion of the identification of ‘evil’ with certain groups is the societal indifference that gradually concretises social injustice. It is for this reason that rebellion has to be read differently from the vantage point of the dissident group.

Suicide bombing causes bodily self- destruction. The act is tragic in two ways: one, the very idea to kill someone while destroying the person of the self; two, it has the potential to narrate a story that has not been foretold. Over here, the ‘inside’ story, which comes from the insider or protagonist, becomes more concrete than the ‘outside’ story (Hollis and Smith 1991: 2). The vantage point of the narration problematises certain beliefs about the society and communities living therein. The patterns of disapproval of the mainstream point to ‘a space of thought’ where the marginalised sections or individuals find a forum to express themselves (George and Campbell 1990). Episodes of non-conformity, especially those which are accompanied by violence on minority sections of the society, raises question with regard to the actual state governance and its credibility of the claim of protecting its civilians.

The question is not whether state representatives are capable of handling the pressure of non-concurrence and paroxysm; the motivation or circumstances that has led to the raucous is the more troubling catechism. From the lens of post-modernism, in this context, the significance of the ‘body’ and the pain that it suffers becomes symbolic: by destroying the physical self, the authorities are handicapped because they cannot arrest the perpetrator. The road to liberation for a bomber does not lie in the fulfilments of the political demands, but in ensuring that the state could no longer control them. Such acts are invariably interpreted as psychopathic, insane, irrational and atrocious. This, however, does not refrain groups and individuals from such actions because it makes sense for the rebels to question the state apparatus, albeit with violence.

To re-emphasise on phenomenology, bodies are agencies by themselves and the manner in which suicide attacks are carried out bears testimony to this claim. Fanon (1968 cited in Gibson 1999: 108) has argued that ‘rebellion gives proof of its rational basis’ by the

'actions and not reactions' that the rebels engage in. In this regard, it could be argued that materialism in world politics denotes the aesthetic claims of mainstream narratives that equate power and resources, including the human resource. The destruction of this resource symbolises the exasperation with the body and the needlessness of its presence. War, for that matter, is considered a 'masculinist' domain and the women in war are presented as living in desperate and awful times (Denov and Gervais 2007). With women participating in suicide bombing missions the understanding of their positioning during war circumstances changes from being impuissant to becoming the most powerful. This is another reason as to the attribution of suicide bombing as a rebellion: it brings those agencies into action that are otherwise hidden or subdued by the mainstream security narrations. Over here, the plea of marginalised within the 'social outcastes' become all the more significant because it reveals the extent to which suffering has been rendered on communities and death seems more reasonable than facing despair on a regular basis.

The relevance of these performances lies not in the explosion of the human body, but in the revelation of the suffering of people on regular basis. Critical security studies, in this regard, is more concerned with the normative dimensions of security that denies rights to certain sections of the society and also engages in practices that goes against the interests of the socially marginalised groups. In the process of targeting a said group of violent actors what indeed happens is the exclusion of the entire community. Drawing from the Aberystwyth School of Critical security studies, human emancipation is based on the notion of unsolicited and uninterrupted growth of individuals (Booth 2007). This is itself drawn from the Frankfurt school of thought, more commonly known as Critical Theory of which Jurgen Habermas was the most distinct proponent. Critical Social theory was introduced in International Relations by Andrew Linklater. It is argued that critical theory can be understood as 'a constellation' of several viewpoints that circulate around the common theme of 'emancipation' (Jones 2001: 4). Exclusion at all levels ensures that a community is not able to rise above its differences with other social groups as well as the ruling authorities, hence breeding a sense of anti-statism within certain communities. There are no formulae for achieving emancipation. However, by readily ostracising members of a community, emancipation is thwarted, further stifling the possibilities of being liberated from suppression.

Rebellion as Tragedy

Drawing upon the ‘taxonomy of harm’, as suggested by Linklater (2011: 29), it is possible to understand the various ways in which human denigration takes place. Harm, in the literal sense, has both physical and abstract connotations. Critical theory, with its emphasis on emancipation, recognises that there could be suppressed viewpoints which needs to be incorporated and more importantly heard in public sphere. The actions and reactions of the LTTE was a reflection of the social and political ostracism that the Tamil community has faced since the promulgation of the Sri Lankan constitution in 1972. The harm inflicted upon the Tamil community is observable through the historical trajectory of marginalisation as has been outlined in the previous section.

Additionally, in spite of the victory of the Sri Lankan state in the gruesome battle between the SLAF and the LTTE in 2007-2009, rehabilitation of the Tamil community and the promise of egalitarianism between citizens seem to evade the Sri Lankan society. This is evident by the deprivation of the Tamil dominated areas in terms of resource and space as well as the judicial inactions against the accused war criminals, who are members of the army or the government. Keen (2014) argues that the socio-political position of the Tamils in Sri Lanka is comparable to ‘a camp’ as envisaged by Agamben (1999). The metaphor of a camp suggests a foreclosed space, which is generally veiled from the outside world. In a similar vein, Agamben (Agamben 1999 cited in Keen 2014) argues that ‘a camp’ is like a ‘hidden matrix’ unlike a city which is viewable: in the event of a ‘security threat’, a particular group of people would be considered as ‘without rights’ and a ‘legitimate object of killing’ (Agamben 1999 cited in Keen 2014: 3). Keen (2014) argues that there was a similar situation in Sri Lanka, wherein the Tamils were detained and tortured in the garb of ‘care and humanitarianism’. As is evident by witness biographies and interviews, Manivannan (2014: 112-14), points out the vagaries of individual Tamils, particularly the plight of women, during the civil war and after the elimination of the LTTE.

The narration of every individual is unique while at the same time it sketches a picture of the numerous distresses that society at large confronts. There are marginalised within privileged sections of society (women, physically or visually challenged from amongst the economically enriched sections of the society); what is more gruesome is the agony that certain sections and communities bear; the most distressing instance is that of the trials and tribulations that is endured by the marginalised within the unprivileged

sections of the society. The idea, over here, is not to compare between miseries of people who live in the global society or arrange their troubles in a hierarchical order; it is done for the purpose of revealing the trajectories in a social setting which is fraught with discriminatory practices and trends that speak out against exclusionary state practices. It is important to understand the relevance of tragedy as a concept because it is capable in bringing out deep seated grievances of people out in the open.

It is also of significance to make reference to Nietzsche's idea of tragedy which he equated with Greek 'tragic myths' and argued that aesthetics such as art and music were required to express desperations that exist (Nietzsche 1999). This enhances the connotation of a word, namely 'tragedy', that is annotated in literature and grammar: it also provides an interpretation for events, episodes, occurrences and cases in International Relations. Frost (2003) argues that the notion of tragedy is useful in understanding the normative concerns and ethical problems that require 'transformation of our international practices'. In his interview, Frost (2017) emphasised that there is 'a clash between International Relations and communitarian ethics'. Therefore, the 'ethical puzzle' needs to be unpacked, which brings subjectivity into action (Frost 2017). As has been discussed in the introductory chapter, the attempt in this study is to broaden the domain of tragedy and look into forms of exclusion at the global level that is disturbing to the human conscientiousness.

The infliction of harm and violence on a group or individual is reciprocated by brutality and carnage. This becomes a vicious circle— violence leads to more violence, each time having a greater intensity. It could also be argued that each time a clash emerges, insensitivity towards the plight of the other decreases. The cataclysm lies in the regular denial and unprecedented interdiction which breathes sentiments of hatred and revenge. The inability to change circumstances and carve out a political space for itself becomes the antecedence for aggression in order to reverse the existing scenario. The situation becomes grim further if the rivalling groups are asymmetric in terms of power commensurability— that is, if one group has support and legitimacy of the people whereas the other is already maligned and considered felonious.

A strong source of exaggerating the fear of the culpable other is popular culture, especially movies and television shows. Erickson (2007: 197-98) argues that television shows in the US before and after 11 September 2001, engage in a narrative that exposes

the problems in counter-terrorist operations and ‘the dangers to human rights posed by both overt and covert security measures’. This tends to colour the communities into black and white, thereby reducing the ability of people to tell for themselves which groups are indeed perilous in reality. For Dillon (1996: 7), ‘limits’ are set by the ‘institutional delineation of public space’ that reduces the presence of humans by curtailing the freedom of their being by restricting their presence in universal and neutral arenas. Therefore, curtailment of expressive forums denies the opportunity to comprehend the multiple dimensions that engulfs security concerns, which is not confined to the definitions of security that the state propagates.

In this study, tragedy is being treated as a catastrophe or an irredeemable happening. The damage that a tragic incident unleashes cannot be cured or undone: it could only, at best, be prevented in future by taking adequate measures. Brown (2007: 9) observes that there are circumstances in which ‘to act is to do wrong’ and argues that International Political Theory (IPT) has hitherto refused to acknowledge this reality. Euben (1990: 8) argues that there is a complicated relation between liberty and community: the idea of ‘private liberty’ enables the attainment of political goals while community functioning restricts individuality. However, when the individual as well as community gets purged, the urge to break-free from established systems gains fervour.

It is in this context that rebellion is taken as a case within tragedy. Erskine and Lebow (2012: 8-9) point out two ways in which tragedy is germane to *au courant* International Relations: firstly, it alerts against the ‘dangers of power and success’; secondly, it complicates ‘conceptions of justice’. In the exemplification of tragedy, rebellion could raise ethical questions which are in tension with the prevalent and acceptable state and societal rhetoric: what is tragic about a rebellion, given that it has the potential to change status quo? Why is it that an armed resurrection against the ruling authority is delegitimised and illegalised from the very start? How could these actions, invariably violent and intentional, be read in the larger field of global politics?

The first question relates to the very thrust of this study, namely tragedy in global politics and the manner in which issues of security are understood. Rebellion of any nature and magnitude has its own precursors such as preceding events, a current legislation, fiery speeches or a history. A historical example of a rebellion is the mutiny of 1857 in India that started off with an Indian sepoy killing a British military official

which in turn was a reaction against the continued ignorance of the British officials of the native religious and cultural sentiments. The introduction of the cartridge for rifles was greased with the fat of cows and pigs and had to be bitten by the teeth before use. This marked a saturation point for the Indian sepoys who were already suffering from racism and cultural discrimination in the barracks and within the ranks of the British army. The mutiny, that started in the barracks, spread throughout northern India and encouraged the princely states such as Jhansi to rise against the British power. To begin with, it was considered to be a local event that took place in the military cantonments of Barrackpore; it soon aroused the suppressed anger in other regions against the ruling British colonialists.

The rebellion was an expression of ‘antipathy’ towards the policy of the British colonisers (Streets 2001). It, however, did not yield much positive result for the Indian mutineers. Some of the princely states lost whatever little power were left with them and the political control was entirely transferred to the British Crown from the East India Company. In this regard, historian Herbert (2007: 1-2) has argued that judging by the mere results, the ‘mutiny’ does not seem to be ‘an outstandingly momentous historical event’; however, the sheer magnitude and the concerns it aroused in the British circles made it appear as an extremely traumatic epoch. Hence, the augmentation of fear from rebellion and the hazards that it could bring on the society and polity is actually an attempt by the state and elites to delegitimise dissensions in the society: reprisals unveil the grievances and injustices that particular communities suffer. At the same time, delegitimation of the dissenting groups renders justification for frenzy state actions at the behest of ascertaining security.

It is conceded that rebellion could cause political turmoil and brings the state and its agencies to safeguard their vested interests. At stake, however, is the civil liberty of the people. It could be argued that at the slightest hint of protest, the government mobilises military resources to quell any dissensions. This speaks for the apprehensive nature of the ruling groups and reveals their willingness to go to any extreme for protecting themselves. In the contemporary times also, as in the case of Syria, there was a backlash from the government on protesters and the status quo remains unchanged, while the legal measures have been strongly reinforced on the society. Interpreting rebellion from the perspective of the rebel is challenging because it requires a critical scrutiny of the legitimate authority. It is tragic that in spite of all measures— violent or otherwise—

circumstances deteriorate rather than improve for the suffering communities. Rebellion, in this context, is understood as the last episode in the vast spectrum of events or protests that demand changes in the existing political and social systems. In this study, an attempt has been made to read rebellion within the framework of security that is critical for people and analysing state's measures that discriminates and disadvantages certain sections of the society.

The second question, therefore, is very closely related to state and its implementation of violence. In the mainstream of security studies, there are viewpoints given with regard to intra-state episodes: one, these conflicts do not have a bearing on international arena because sovereign states are the primary actors in the international realm and it is the military crises that needs to be emphasised upon (Walt 1991); according to the second set of argument, the focus of security has to be on rational actors with a focus upon relative gains (Snidal 1985; Jervis 1988). From this viewpoint, non-state actors are neither rational, since there is no interest in achieving tangible benefits, nor in possession of economic and military resources. Both of these are dismissive of episodes of rebellion because of the strict distinction drawn between the domestic and the foreign, which for some scholars are now changing especially in terms of governance (Rosenau 1997).

For critical security, however, boundaries are problematised, and so are state actions (Booth 2007; Bigo 2014). For this reason, there needs to be a reliance on alternative methods. The study of the critical cases through images reveal that there is an interplay between the image, the written and the oral discourse which work in tandem to 'securitise' narratives (Hansen 2011). Studying security of the people requires a thorough examination of ground realities and the conditions under which communities survive. In other words, there are atrocities, torture and genocides that occur across the global society which has to be understood from the standpoint of global ethics and quest for emancipation.

In this context security of the people appear at the forefront: why is state violence not questioned? In other words, state actions are considered legal and legitimate whereas a response to violent state actions is labelled illegal and dangerous (Tilly 2003). The main premise upon which the critical security studies has built its edifice could be summarised as follows: on reversing the context and by focusing upon marginalised

groups the security narrative, in terms of fear and disquiet, could present a different trajectory (Booth 2007; Browning and McDonald 2013). This study has taken critical security studies as a framework and reading as a deconstructive method. It has pointed out in Chapters 1 and 2 that critical security studies as such is not a monolith. The three schools of thought in critical security studies, however, adhere to the principle of understanding security through interpretive methods rather than upholding the rationale of anarchy and security maximisation.

Reading, similarly, is philosophically grounded and has been undertaken differently by different philosophers. This chapter, particularly, alludes to Deleuze's style which engages with multiple facets of an episode. Therefore, it engages in a deeper analysis of the idea of rebellion and argues that the state or ruling authorities are also responsible for these episodes. Moreover, there is an attempt to reclaim rebellion from the state perspectives and locate it in an environment where the doors for political negotiations have failed. The entire gamut has to be taken into account— demands, protests, political means and, finally violence. There are historical evidences to suggest that no mutiny occurs all of a sudden: there are precursors to a specific episode. However, the finale catches the eye and attention of the political sleuths, obviating the memories of those movements which were neutral, bloodless and non-belligerent.

This brings to the third point about understanding the repercussions of rebellion in the larger field of global politics. In their book, MacMillan and Linklater (1995) argue that the state concept is no longer unchallenged and therefore, the boundaries which traditional International Relations conforms to, need to be questioned. In this regard, the 'cosmopolitan/communitarian' debate is important to understand (Shapcott 2001: 30-31). On the one hand, 'cosmopolitan' argument holds that 'citizenship' could include 'species and sub-state community' (Linklater 1995 cited in Shapcott 2001); on the other hand, communitarians focus on the individual's relation to the community (Brown 1995 cited in Shapcott 2001). It tells about the manner in which the idea of state citizenship has not given cognisance to certain communities thereby leading to deprivation and exclusion of particular sections of the society. This communitarianism is hindered by the 'politics of cosmopolitanism' (Jabri 2011), which targets specific subjects by standardising a security discourse and poses the state and its institutions as the vanguard of the people.

At the same time, it also attempts to understand the responsibility and emotional connection that an individual could have with the community to which the individual belongs. Relying on the “‘mobilisation power’ of security”, Floyd (2007: 328) observes that it is imperative to concede security question as ‘issue-dependent’ rather than casting the concern in terms of ‘positive’ (Booth 2005 cited in Floyd 2007: 328) or ‘negative’ (Waever 1995 cited in Floyd 2007: 330) security. Rebellion could manifest itself in several forms. The manner in which such acts are carried out has no definite pattern. Zehfuss (2014: 617) argues aptly in this regard: ‘the world is full of other people and they do not always agree with us’. In global politics, the multiplicity of such cases demands scanning of events which are context-specific but share similarities with occurrences in other regions. The phenomenon, therefore, transcend boundaries. A thicker reading of rebellion could appreciate its significance in the thematic of tragedy in the global society.

The intention of the chapter has been to assess rebellion not in terms of its end but the means adopted for the achievement of the same. More than that, it is a study which critically looks at the discursive frameworks within which rebellion is understood. The aspect of emotion is very evident in rebellions: there is anxiety, anger, redemption and feelings of retribution. The counter-rebellions could be viewed as an exercise of state authority which has political baggage. On part of the rebels, however, it is a battle that has to be taken up on account of their exclusion and unabated miseries. Their reactions lead further to their incarceration. A Deleuzian reading suggests that rebellion is a tragedy because the quest for emancipation for marginalised communities traverses a precarious terrain that is violent and unyielding.

Chapter 4

Re-examining Revolution: The case of the Arab World

Why is revolution tantamount to a tragedy, given that it ostensibly aims to bring about systematic and positive changes in the society? Revolution, by design and definition, entails a constructive exercise which is marked with struggle to achieve desired political ends. History is replete with narratives of struggle that culminate in change of political structure— the end of absolute monarchy in France in 1792, along with the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) which marked the promising beginning of liberty in Western Europe, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 that brought Tsarism to an unanticipated end, or the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that overthrew monarchy and changed the entire fabric of the Iranian society. There are innumerable such episodes that could be labelled as revolution because of the excessive impact that they brought at the political but also at the societal levels.

In the three examples corroborated above, oft-cited for their rigour, consequences and impact on global level, there are four observations that could be made. First, revolutions are spread across geographical spaces— they are a feature consistent with human societies. Second, revolutions have been witnessed since the eighteenth century and its prowess in challenging extant political elites is yet unsurpassed. Third, revolutions start with the overthrowing of the government in power, which in turn implies that there is a change in power differentials. Fourth, revolution has been used across the board of ideological proponents— it had been the cornerstone of early Liberal philosophers, followed by the assiduous advocacy of it by proponents of Marx, while at the same time being used by progressivists and conservatives alike, thereby becoming a melting pot for political contestants. Another significant observation about revolution lies in its continuity through time— it was seen in the past and it has been recurring even in the contemporary times. The most significant example, in this regard, is the Nepalese revolution of 2006 which overthrew two centuries of monarchy from power. Revolution, therefore, continues to capture the imagination of people who intend to bring substantive changes in the political structures.

In this study, revolution has been conceptualised as a continuum of socio-political movement, that intends to emancipate suppressed sections of the society by means of political representation and discursive space. Revolution could be understood as having two components. One, the political agenda which gears towards altering the power ratios. Two, the social dimension which intends to represent marginalised population through collective political participation. The dismantling of extant political structures, however, may not invariably lead to liberation of marginalised communities. This could come through sustained community efforts through agential assertions. Progress in society, in the aftermath of political restructuring, reiterates the sense of belonging to the marginalised sections of the society. Revolution, therefore, is neither episodic nor static—it constitutes a spectrum of political, social and emotional narratives.

How does revolution, as a phenomenon, become a common intellectual idea that sees its manifestation at the political level? What could explain the recurrence of political revolutions across the globe? In order to answer the first question, it is desirable to relate the intellectual processes with the historical context of the political movement. There is an inevitable emotional component to the upsurge emerging out of the desperate conditions in which people have lived. This is true for the French Revolution which was marked by a hatred towards the ruling monarchy as was witnessed in the imprisonment of King Louis and his queen Mary Antoinette, finally resulting in the abolition of monarchy in 1792, followed by the trials and execution of the King and the Queen in 1793. Emotionality could also be demonstrated in the American Revolution of 1775: it was indeed the determination of the settlers to evict British colonisers in spite of the gap in material capabilities. In this regard, there is a clear etch that emotional rationality has over instrumental logic in revolutionary scenarios.

Revolution is not a mere rhetoric—it is practical politics altering the face of the ruling elite, at the minimum, and of the society at large. The bandwidth of revolution is also immense. It does not, normally, stop at the political level—it digs deeper into the societal roots, affecting its nature, culture, tastes and preferences. The advent of Romanticism in European culture, for that matter, dates back to the influence of the French Revolution in the middle of the Eighteenth century. Revolution affects music, literature, art and popular culture in undefined limits. The ideology and policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was embodied in its music as could be seen through certain symphonies (Luo 2016). Similarly, In the Mozambican revolution, the earliest

cries of protest as well as despair and sorrow were represented metaphorically through poetry as the natives were severely repressed and discriminated by the White colonisers (Africa Today 1969). Therefore, the relation between music, poetry, art and literature with revolution is reciprocal: one could be a response to the other. The estimation of the impact of revolution, in measurable terms, is, therefore, not predictable. It is indeed enormous. The more fascinating aspect of the revolution, however, is to scrutinise the composition and representativeness of the revolution that would ultimately be decisive of the ripples that it creates in the society.

More generally, revolution could be defined as, ‘a forcible overthrow of a government or social order in favour of a new one’ (Oxford Dictionary 2014b). Revolution, it may appear, is a very inappropriate case or instance for understanding tragedy. For, whatever side effects the revolution has, it does bring about tangible changes in the institutional set-ups of the state. Most often, it results not only in a change of leadership but also alters the entire face of the constitutional arrangement. Ranging from the form of government to the people who govern, there could be an infinite number of developments. It invariably highlights the tensions between people and the ruling classes. Hence, revolution as such could be seen as bringing liberation from repression and ventilates the dissatisfaction of the people. In this way, it could be argued as being progressive and representative of people’s preferences.

However, while reading revolution historically, there is a hint of it being an uncertain process. Rahul Rao, in his interview (Rao 2017), precisely pointed out the tragedy that lies in revolution. He opined that there is a tragedy (in revolution) when it portrays the tensions that are inherent in revolution: ‘on the one hand, revolution wants to bring in new things, but it also has to defend itself; for defending itself it goes back to the old ways’ (Rao 2017). In other words, a revolution intends to cull repression by means of counter-repressive agitations. This remains a continuity from the past political ambitions of exercising control. Since a revolution is mostly ungoverned, there is a lurking fear of its dilapidation which could be as rapid as was its genesis. There is a desperation among revolutionaries to ensure that the motive and effects of the revolution is not challenged from within. Invariably, there are ‘counter-revolutionary’ (Rao 2017) tendencies that are present in societies. It, therefore, entails a phase which is marked by violence, aimed at suppressing any counter-opinion from within as well as threat emanating from outside the revolutionising domains (Rao 2017). Therefore,

revolution is marked by phases of violence that questions the very pursuit of bringing substantive changes at the political and societal levels.

A revolutionary political movement could succeed in overthrowing the contemporary rulers or subside due to the enormity of challenges in the turbulent socio-political sphere; it could bring about substantive political changes but remain conservative socially; it is also the case that the call for a revolution is welcomed by initial clamours, yet it fails to become a mass movement. In the case of the French Revolution of 1789 or the Russian Revolution of 1917, for instance, Rao (2017) argues that for strengthening their defences, the revolution engages in ‘hypervigilantism’ (Rao 2017) in order to check counter-revolution— this is tragic because it defeats the purpose of the revolution. To categorise revolution as progressive from the start, therefore, has the potential danger of restricting analyses to the end result only and overlooks the period during the revolution, namely its journey from ignition through protests and eventual stability. It could indeed create a cataclysmic situation especially for the socially marginalised sections of the society. Revolution has the potential to change the entire gamut of political relations; at the same time, however, it has the power to throw the entire society into jeopardy, thus rendering the movement a simulacrum for politics by other means.

In this chapter, there is an attempt to look into the process of revolution and observe the changes that it brings about at the microscopic levels of the society. Herein, revolution is being studied as a people’s movement that intends to bring about tangible changes in the political institutions and socio-economic governance which challenges the extant political set up. The question that needs to be addressed is as follows: does revolution necessarily benefit the marginalised sections of the society, given that it intends to alter socio-political power ratios? Additionally, the sheer intention of revolution can also be questioned: does the political transformation guarantee social breakthroughs for the marginalised communities, who have been victimised and repressed under the auspices of the previous regime? These concerns have to be viewed in light of the stature of the minority and socially unprivileged groups of the society, particularly those sections which have been repressed in the polity. The explication of their socio-political standing could provide insight into the substantive alterations that the overthrow of the regime has brought to the lives of the people. The political recognition of societal segments as depressed, backward or minority, renders possible

the progress, and therefore, emancipation of the marginalised sections. Political recognition of a community is the first step towards accordance of their rights and is an acknowledgement of the obligation that the political class has towards the people. The qualitative change in the circumstances of the fringe groups could be ascertained by analysing the living standards of these communities over a period of time, which is inclusive of the period before and after the political oust. It is, therefore, desirable to look into political as well as the social reforms that is experienced through the marginalised sections of the society.

In the context of security studies, such cases are extremely crucial from the critical perspective. Does repression end with the overthrow of dictatorship? Security of the people may be jeopardised even after the political change. This is because the new structures of power may not be able to provide sufficient protection to the people. Critical security studies, particularly the Aberystwyth School, with its emphasis upon emancipation and progress, intends to focus upon the plight of the people specially those who are less privileged. Hence, it is pertinent to observe the manner in which a movement by the people prohibits some individuals from expressing their desires and in essence remains a struggle confined to a small group of people. The years preceding the enthronement of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1791 is evidence to the afore-mentioned claim. Lefebvre (1962: 135) makes a distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizens of the French Revolution: ‘active’ citizens were those people who were actually involved in governance whereas ‘passive’ were those who were denied space in governance by the post-revolutionary government. In the above-mentioned example, certain sections of the society were left out of the purview of governance. Why then is revolution invariably celebrated as a liberating process, wherein it could lead to the exclusion of certain sections of the society?

The concern is raised because of two observations: one, political overthrow does not necessarily accompany upgradation or rescue of the marginalised sections of the society from deprivation and exclusion; second, the transformations are accompanied by violence, bloodshed and scramble for power after the initial coalition to overthrow the ruling regime. Therefore, revolution does not imply a peaceful non-violent transformation. As Rao (2017) says, the classic expression to notify the vagaries of the revolution since the times of the French Revolution has been the imagery of ‘the revolution devouring its children’. This allegory is indeed interesting because it

signifies that subsequent phases of the revolution could be harmful for the people or initiators of the revolution. The image of the revolution bringing damage to its own defenders gives it a counter-productive texture.

At the same time, some changes are fast and noticeable. For instance, the fall of the Bastille in France in 1789 is a glorious moment. It is symbolic because it represents that the monarchy has been challenged in its most authoritarian sector namely policing. Similarly, the 'Boston Tea Party' of 1773 was a symbolic engagement between the settler colonists and the East India Company wherein the former was opposed to taxation imposed by the English Crown since they were not represented in the Parliament. The moment itself was of extreme significance as it revealed the dedication of the settlers to make America independent of the control of the British East India Company. The fleeing of Batista from Cuba to the Dominican Republic, thus leaving political battle to be won by Fidel Castro in 1959, was yet another significant historical moment. It must be noted, however, that these moments are not an end by themselves. In fact, these initiate a series of new interactions and arrangements.

There is also ample evidence to suggest that there could be a sustained grievance of the common people that have gone unaddressed which contributes towards the upsurge. The February 1917 revolution in Russia was a representation of the frustration of people due to shortage of food supplies arising out of military blockades during the First World War, which began in 1914. The popular opinion was against the continued participation of Russia in the War; however, the Tsar did not show any signs of withdrawal. At the same time, popular support for overthrowing a current government could be an antecedent for a revolution. This is evident in the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 which brought an end to a pro-Western government and marked the installation of a theocratic state in Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini. Therefore, popular support is a significant component for the success of a revolution. As mentioned earlier, this support is often corroborated with a lot of fervour and zest, rendering people sensitive to the revolutionary legacy.

However, the question remains whether the political movement represents both the majority and the minority sections of the society. Herein, the term 'majority-minority' is used for signifying the numerical strength as well as the political positioning of the various sections of the society. It must be reiterated that there are communities which

are numerically strong and outnumber other groups but are politically marginalised since they are not constituents of political elites. Therefore, minority refers to both numerical as well as political minorities. Herein, an attempt could be made to define minority population. According to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNHR), the definition of ‘minority’ is inclusive of ‘both objective factors (such as the existence of a shared ethnicity, language or religion) and subjective factors (including that individuals must identify themselves as members of a minority)’ (UNHR 2010). It draws from the definition of minorities as given by Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1977 (Capotorti 1977 cited in UNHR 2010):

A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members—being nationals of the State—possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.

The definition amply captures the essence of belonging to a minority. However, sometimes despite numerical superiority, particular groups are kept out of power. This was the case with the Blacks in South Africa. The UNHR recognises that such groups are also to be brought under the rubric of minorities under international law (UNHR 2010).

In this context, it needs to be addressed whether political overthrow carry with it an agenda of empowering the weaker sections of the society? The argument envisaged the conditions of the marginalised segments of the people who are neither a part of the revolution nor against it. Mostly, it constitutes those sections of the society who have suffered because of limited political space and are socially outnumbered such as minority groups or suppressed sections which includes, but is not limited to, women, other gender or sex categories and disabled people. The UNHR (2010) declaration considers people with gender, disability and different sexual orientation as being constitutive of a minority in order ‘to combat multiple discriminations’. During a crisis situation, these groups enter into conflicts with the majority communities and lapse into oblivion for the lack of political support.

To substantiate this point, the case of the federal units in the USSR could be discussed. The policies of the Gorbachev era engendered 'inter-ethnic conflicts among non-Russians' (Jones 1992: 77). The articulation of grievances came from both the majority and the minority ethnic groups. The minorities argue that there is a 'mantle of exploitation and oppression' (Jones 1992: 77) that comes from the dominant sections of the society; this is in the form of 'intensified competition for jobs, resources, and political representation (that) has rekindled territorial, historical and cultural animosities' (Jones 1992: 77). The grievances of the majority ethnic communities are on grounds 'that minority group rights discriminate against the dominant group's individual rights' (Jones 1992: 78). On the point of discrimination, the majority sections argue that it was the result of the policies of the Russian government which needs to share the 'blame for promoting certain national groups over others as the preferred executors of central rule' (Jones 1992: 78). Therefore, under circumstances where the majority assert their demands as more significant for the growth of the society, the minority sections are left in limbo.

Yet another example are the ethnic minorities in the Nicaraguan revolution, which became the 'Achille's heel' for the revolutionary government politically, morally and militarily (Bourgeois 1985: 22-23). Bourgeois (1985: 22-23) argues that 'the crisis' could be historically contextualised and understood 'as the outcome of several hundred years of tension between ethnic minorities and the Mestizo national majority'. For this reason, there is a tension between the urge for change and the turbulent situation it unleashes on minority sections of the population, who are politically disadvantaged.

The idea of revolution hinges on the idea of break from the past. However, this break is not elucidated from the viewpoint of the sufferer. The façade of liberation ignores the suppression of some people and their diversified viewpoints. The process of universalisation is also problematic from the perspective of the marginalised sections of the society because it denies the resolution of socio-economic disparity that has existed in the society prior to the political overthrow. Revolution could be capable of bringing significant changes in the polity: at stake is the social positioning of the fringe communities which have not been an active participant in the political movement.

Before proceeding further, it is pertinent to look into the diverse meanings of revolution and explain its scope within this research. There are certain phases in history which are

labelled 'revolution' in retrospect, such as the 'scientific revolution'. During the seventeenth century, the 'conceptual, methodological and institutional foundations of modern science' were laid down: historians have labelled this period as 'scientific revolution' (Henry 1997: 1). As Henry (1997: 1-2) point out, the 'Scientific Revolution' is 'primarily a historian's category'. Therefore, this phase that ranges from sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, is a fairly long period in which different scientific inventions were witnessed along with industrialisation, urbanisation, etcetera. This is very distinct from political revolutions, which, though spread over some years and phases have a specific duration. There are historical cases such as the French or the American Revolution which began with the intention of changing the existing political situation and was marked by a period of turmoil and uncertainty.

This distinction is made for primarily two reasons: firstly, scientific inventions or economic innovations is the result of individual hard work and the determination to do something new. These, however, are extremely difficult to adjudge and methodologically difficult to corroborate between personal psyche, the processes involved and the end result. Socio-political movements are different; for one, these address concerns that the society faces, and secondly there is a group dynamic involved. The second reason for making such a distinction is to clarify the extent of research: a re-examination does not imply a complete rejection of the idea of revolution. It intends to critically analyse the vacant situation that revolutionary periods witness and the manner in which it manifests in the society, thus affecting the socially marginalised groups. The research addresses revolution in the second sense, namely the politico-social alterations that are brought through a sustained movement, resulting in tangible differentials of power.

It is also desirable to draw a few more terminological distinctions. The first set of distinction is between rebellion and revolution. Rebellion, as discussed in the previous chapter, is an act of aggression against the ruling government most often by the use of violence. Revolution, however, could be either violent or peaceful. The aim of a revolution is more than posing a mere challenge to the ruling government—it attempts to bring about systemic and structural changes at the political as well as the societal level. Rebellion is mostly sporadic and episodic whereas revolution could be sudden and unorganised but moves towards sustenance, negotiations and stability, sometimes becoming the backbone of the polity. Also, rebellion might not have a definitive end in

mind; revolutions, however, begin for a particular purpose and other events become consequential to the achievement of this primary aim. Revolution can also become ambitious and enhance its scope towards further progress and development of the society. There are works wherein revolution and rebellion have been used interchangeably. Lawson (2015) discusses the political outbreak of the slaves of St Domingue in 1791 and refers it as ‘revolt’ or ‘rebellion’. In a footnote, Lawson (2015) argues, ‘revolutionary struggles are considered in a broad sense, i.e. as contestations over state power sustained by mass mobilization, an ideology of social justice, and an attempt to enact forceful institutional change’ (Goldstone 2014: 4 cited in Lawson 2015: 300). For Lawson (2016: 106) ‘revolutions need to be seen as intersocietal (sic.) “all the way down”’. Hence, there is hardly any distinction that has been drawn between rebellion and revolution— all forms of resistances have been clubbed under the category of ‘revolutionary struggles’ (Lawson 2015 and 2016). However, in this study the distinction is drawn to read security perspectives critically— the semantics suggest particular trends towards legitimising political episodes globally. The theoretical similarities masquerade the emotional and philosophical underpinnings of the political situations. A critical reading suggests that there is a vocabulary for rebellion and revolution that runs parallel in political discourse in security studies.

The second set of distinction is between revolution and civil war. Civil wars could be defined as ‘a war fought by different groups of people living in the same country’ (Cambridge Dictionary 2016). Fearon (2007) understands a civil war as ‘a violent conflict within a country fought by organised groups that aim to take power at the center (sic.) or in a region, or to change government policies’. Revolutions begin with disgruntlement against the government normally starting with protest and opposition to the government by peaceful means. Revolutions, however, could lapse into a situation of civil war under the following circumstances: one, when there is a divergence of interest amongst the revolutionaries after the political overthrow; two, when one faction becomes militarily powerful and hijacks the opportunity to not only overthrow the current regime but also unleash forceful governance on the people. Civil wars are, therefore, fought between two groups which are considered to represent different sections of society. Revolution, however, does not claim to be aggressive against people but attempts to change the dynamics in the extant political structures. Civil wars and

revolutions could be differentiated both ‘conceptually and academically’ (Armitage 2009: 20):

Civil wars are destructive; revolutions are progressive. Civil wars are sterile; revolutions are fertile with innovation and transformative possibilities. Civil wars are local and time-bound; revolutions have occurred across the world in an unfolding sequence of human liberation. Civil wars mark the collapse of the human spirit; revolutions, its unfolding and self-realisation.

Moreover, civil wars are invariably accompanied with the use of physical violence as compared to revolution where the movement could be non-violent and yet marks a break from the past.

The categorisation of revolution as tragedy may appear to be an overstatement, especially when differentiated from civil wars or rebellion. For this purpose, it needs to be clarified that the argument is contextual and not a general one. The aforesaid argument takes into cognisance that there could be substantive sections of the society which welcome such efforts. The focus, therefore, is on the fringes of the society. Their views are often suppressed during the revolutionary course, as was the case under the previous regime. Therefore, the promise of progress that the revolution envisages remains unfulfilled. As mentioned earlier, to ensure the success of the new establishment, divergence in political opinions is seldom encouraged. It is for this reason, that the French revolution is not a monolith— rather it is constitutive of phases, each representing the interests of a particular section of the society. The revolution reached its culmination with the advent of Bonaparte to the French regime, who hailed as the emperor of France, once again bringing into existence a monarchical structure of political governance.

In this sense, it is desirable to assess whether prior suppression has been replaced by inclusion in the public discourse. The example of the French Revolution and the declaration of the rights of citizens could be cited in this regard. The French Revolution, with its emphasis upon equality of citizens, does not consider ‘race’, class or gender as markers of the political community, rather the individual is considered as important and sovereign in their own right. For this apposite position, immigrants from erstwhile colonies of West and North Africa as well as other European nationalities settled in France. However, the distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans are drawn in ‘ethno-cultural classifications’, thus discriminating and interdicting the latter (Laachir

2007). Therefore, over a period of time the call for equality of rights must also be corroborated with political and cultural space for the minority cultures. Herein, the rigidity of the French state leads to discriminatory practices in spite of the democratic ethos that the French Constitution ingrains. The revolutionary ideals might be inclusive; there is definitely a need to carry that spirit forward rather than being rigid or prescriptive.

The leaders of the revolution may also represent only sectarian interests. Not to discredit the idea of revolution, it remains an observation that the brunt of the tidal changes is very often borne by the minority and weaker sections of the society. The minorities suffer because of the indefiniteness of the political changes: these sections confront the challenge of redefining their interests and loyalties to the new regime. For instance, during the Turkish nationalist revolution the minority citizens of Turkey suffered due to the pursuance of ‘ethnocultural nationalism’ by the Turkish political elites in the 1920s, including economic policies that deprived the ethnic and linguistic minorities of Turkey (Eligur 2017). The revolutionary period is one of endurance and resuscitations often marked by uncertainty for the minority sections.

The weaker sections of the society such as women or economically unprivileged suffer due to insecurities of on part of the incumbent power wielders. In the case of the French Revolution, this became very evident. As Gupta (2015) points out, participation of women in ‘public sphere’ resulted in ‘male anxiety due to fear of social ruin caused by female ignorance and insubordination’. This further led to the passage of laws which restricted political activities by women— semantically though power was vested equally ‘with all men’, and women were left out of the discursive framework (Gupta 2015). For this reason, there are attempts to discriminate between sections of the society. Under such circumstances, sufferings of the people are more pronounced. It is, however, masqueraded by nominal structural changes which are initially only miniscule and insufficient to resolve larger vagaries of the society, polity and economy. Again, the example of the Nicaraguan revolution could be cited. In the initial phase, the Nicaraguan government passed legislations that was favourable to the indigenous population; however, there was a growing tension with the mass Amerindian movement – Miskito Sumo Rama Sandinista All Together (MISURASATA) – whose leadership was imprisoned in the beginning of 1981, thus delegitimising the minority movement.

In this study, tragedy is being studied from the perspective of the powerless, apolitical, marginalised and subjugated sections of the society. A revolutionary scenario puts their situation into further turmoil. The political positions of the contesting groups capture the weaker segments into a circumstantial imbroglio. The uncertainty itself appears akin to a tragedy: people are forced to move out of their comfort zones and their quest for a settlement seems never ending. This uncertainty does not arise out of instrumental notion which focuses on the end result— this is rather an emotional moment, which stalls progress of people and incapacitates normality in their living. Therefore, anxiety of the people and their misgiving demeanours during a revolutionary transition is indeed appalling. The hunger for political change invariably quells the thirst for societal stability. Watershed period as it may be, paroxysm eludes the strife for positive developments.

Often marked by violence, there is no smooth transition of power. Given the turbulent situation in which the marginalised sections of the people find themselves during the transitory period, they are entrapped in a turmoil from which they need to be emancipated. Revolution intends to bring emancipation of the society. The process, however, is uncertain and is confronted with several obstacles ranging from societal pressures to changing political alliances and so on. The concern is to assuage the fear of the hitherto ostracised sections of the society. Although the end of overthrowing or challenging the political authority may be achieved after a period of resistance, there is no guarantee for the progress of the marginalised sections of the society.

From the perspective of critical security studies, the ‘ethics of security’ (the meaning and manifestations of ‘progressive practices’) is as much important as the ‘politics of security’ (political implications of security) (Browning and McDonald 2011). The normative concerns regarding security is often sidelined when there is a contestation amongst political groups. The scenario of a revolution is complicated: there is a leadership which has suddenly been stripped of its powers; ideological groups engage in their scramble for power; the lack of order and governance provides space to the radical forces to make their presence felt at the societal level. When the structures are in jeopardy the security of the people is severely compromised upon. The security of the people is significantly reduced more so due to contestation between political factions to gain control. Reading revolution as tragedy is a reassessment of the

structural, social and political end results of the revolution that often misses the tale of struggle and disquiet of the interim periods of political transition.

The revolution in the Arab world, beginning in 2011, is a substantive case. This is because it provides a glimpse of the convoluted and delicate political scenario that the polity and the society confront in the contemporary times. It is interesting to note that the desired result, namely overthrow of dictatorship, did not culminate into aspired political institutions— the situation unfolded differently in the various countries. The focus is on those states where political rulers and structures were brought down such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. However, the impact of these changes was also felt on neighbouring states such as Syria, Kuwait and Bahrain. Since the focus is on marginalised people, there is an attempt to look into the region in terms of a larger community. In this regard, contemporary cases of revolution in the Arab world seem relevant. Beginning with the overthrow of the regime in Tunisia in January 2011, followed by similar uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, have revoked the debates on democracy, civil rights and religion in the entire region.

The initial clamour of the revolution and overthrow of the dictators were eventually lost in the tussle for power that ensued. The new regimes have proved to be as much suppressive as the earlier governments. In fact, in Syria, where the uprising did not culminate in the overthrow of President Bashar al Assad, the government took to more stringent measures and the attempt has been to curb opposition altogether. In an interview by Qawwas (2014: 167), Dr Khair El-Din Haseeb pointed out that the ‘Syrian regime.....is gradually gaining strength and control’. The more intriguing case is that of Egypt where the urge to bring political change was successful; yet the manner in which events unfolded to the extent of discrediting certain popular social groups have raised apprehensions of the international community. This makes the claim of revolution as positive and progressive questionable in as much it has denied freedom of expression and fair adjudication to political opponents. In this chapter, there is an attempt to study revolution from the perspective of minority communities in order to have a microscopic view of the vagaries of the political turmoil that the region has been witnessing.

The engagement is mostly qualitative. Revolution in International Relations mainstream has been understood in its instrumental capacity. In his work, Walt (1996:

vii) explains ‘why revolutions intensify the security competition between the states and sharply increase the risk of war’. The theory of ‘balance-of-threat’ is used to justify the initiation and eventually the spread of revolution. The extent of ‘security competition’ gets enhanced because revolution alters the perspective of the state and instils the fear that it would spread to other countries: for this reason, revolution tends to counteract threat in an anarchical system (Walt 1996: viii). Yet another oft-cited view of revolution comes from Marxist Theories of International Relations, although Marxism does not count as the predominant International Relations theory. The Marxist conception of revolution intends to wage a war against the capitalist society resulting in its overthrow: this is a reiteration rather than a challenge of the realist conception of revolution (Davenport 2011).

Both Realist and Marxist perspectives tend to suppress the political agency of the people because there is a desired goal to be achieved. Herein, reference could be made to the view of Halliday (1990: 4), who argues that revolution has both practical as well as normative dimensions, both of which could be used to appreciate its occurrence in the international sphere. The idea, herein, is to deconstruct the mainstream views of revolution that is grounded only in the assessment of tangible political changes. It has been argued that visible changes at the institutional level does not bring about substantive changes at the grass-root levels. For this reason, the society has to be brought together and provide justiciable opportunities for everyone. This is not a singular process. It is compounded by the space provided to the people in public forum. Rather than being a dynamic process, the revolution sometimes captures people in a conundrum from which they can neither escape nor survive the situation. In this regard, the movements and turmoil in the Arab societies is pertinent for an analysis of tragedy that has been brought about as a result of political changes.

In what way does a revolution become tragic, in spite of its professed liberating tendencies? — this is the central research question that will be raised in this chapter. The central argument of the chapter is as follows: a revolution becomes tragic when it unfolds into a situation of uncertainty and transitional turmoil, further jeopardising the marginalised citizens. The space provided to the peripheral groups of the society post-revolution gives a molecular view of the actual revolutionary prowess to bring substantive alterations in the society in terms of inclusivity. In the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the condition of the less privileged sections of the society after revolution is a

matter of concern. Additionally, this could facilitate the study of newly democratised regions in more critical terms.

The chapter proceeds in five sections. In the first section, the meaning and interpretations of revolution in global politics have been analysed. After observing the structural, cultural and economic theories of revolution and differentiating it with other similar terms such as rebellion and civil war, an attempt has been made to define revolution as it will be used in this study. In the second section, the revolution in Egypt and Tunisia is taken up for study. It is seen in relation to the central claims of the chapter. In the third section, the event of the ‘uprising’ has been described. The role of narratives in revolution has been analysed to explicate upon the tragic circumstances during the revolutionary phase. In the fourth section, the marginalised communities in Egypt and Tunisia and their participation, political representation and protestations have been discussed in the post-revolutionary context. The political positioning of women and other gender groups as well as religious minorities in Tunisia and Egypt have been dealt with in details. In the fifth section, the idea of revolution has been critically read. The arguments are based on the empirical cases of Tunisia and Egypt. Some references have also been made to other political revolutions which have occurred in the past such as the French, American, and Haitian. The section deals in methodology and the idea of deconstruction embedded in post-positivism has been brought in to re-interpret revolution. In the final section, some theoretical reflections are made on revolution. Also, the manner in which a re-examination of revolution could contribute to a study of tragedy in critical security studies has been elaborated.

Interpreting revolution in global politics

Revolution, as has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, is used in the sense of political transition that occurs due to protest against the ruling group or leader and results in the overthrow or abdication of the leader. Therefore, the political impact of revolution is indeed very significant. However, the societal security of people after the political overthrow is also important to consider as it reflects the circumstances under which civilians continue to live. In this section, several theories and philosophies with regard to revolution has been discussed.

Historically, revolution has been understood as an attempt to liberate from the domination of a ruling group. The French Revolution, in this regard, was the epitome of all such revolutions which caused a significant alteration in the powers of the monarchy and the Church. At the same time, the Revolution gave powers to the common people, who, during the '*ancien regime*' were known as the 'Third Estate'. The highest point in the French Revolution was the declaration of the liberal principles of liberty, equality and fraternity which marked the break-off with the ruling monarchy that systematically discriminated against the masses, otherwise considered burdensome by the ruling section of the society (Kropotkin 2009: 7). It was also a momentous decade because for the first time in the state of France there was a Declaration on the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789 (McPhee 2001: 3). In spite of the several phases within a decade, which is from 1789 to 1799, the most significant development was this very declaration because it revealed the aspiration and intention of the French revolutionaries to rescue the populace from the clutches of the monarchy.

In the earlier chapter, it has been argued that rebellion as a phenomenon has been witnessed ever since the ancient times; rebellions by slaves or peasants were a substantive example. However, revolution is regarded as a more recent phenomenon, associated with the rise of the modern West (Foran 1997: 2-3; Goodwin 1997: 9). This is because unlike rebellion there are both intellectual currents as well as organised non-violent protests in a revolution. At the same time, revolution could have historical precedents, which set the stage for the final overthrow of the extant institutions. For a layperson, revolution could be defined as 'a change in the way a country is governed, usually to a different political system and often using violence and war' (Cambridge Dictionary 2015). According to Encyclopaedia Britannica (2016a), 'a revolution constitutes a challenge to the established political order and the eventual establishment of a new order radically different from the preceding one'.

On a deeper analysis, it is revealed that the processes are time taking, has precedents and there is a significant time lapse between the seizure of power and the formulation of new laws. This interim period is critical because the transition of power means severe contestation between political factions. An illustration is the changes on the French societal and political scene that saw several phases such as the aristocratic rule, Jacobins, the Girondins and, finally, the coming of Napoleon Bonaparte to power in 1799. According to Crook (2007: xi), the liaison between international war and political

revolution makes the emergence of a stable political outcome more difficult and this is what happened in France. This intervening phase, that is between political overthrow and installation of a new government, is crucial to analyse because it presents severe challenges for the people.

Revolution has invariably been associated to struggles for power against the ruling and the emerging political groups. It has been viewed as a movement for emancipation of the people which is a revulsion against the tyranny of the few to gain freedom (Arendt 1963: 11). The oft-cited example is that of the revolution in Russia of 1917 which overturned monarchy in March 1917, followed by the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917. It is commonly argued that the inefficiency of the Tsarist regime during the First World War caused severe hardships at the domestic level and the popular sentiments were in favour of withdrawal from war (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016b). In the colonial context, revolutions were meant to overthrow colonial regimes. In this regard, the American Revolution is a typical example. The resistance in America started in opposition to the efforts of the British colonialists to tighten their grip on the colonies and in the process the revolutionaries broke from the stagnant traditional life to a more 'fluid, bustling, individualistic world' (Wood 2002: 4). Foran (2005: 19) argues in the context of the Third World that the 'process of dependent development' is the root cause of discontent and this gets reflected in their participation in anti-state movements. This holds true not just for the colonial period but also the post-colonial phase.

There is also a need to correlate socio-political movements with party ideologies, democratisation and other forms of non-conformist political positions (McAdam 2003: xiii). An example of such a revolution could be seen in the Iranian Revolution. Goldstone (2003: 2) argues that social movements need to be normalised in the political discourses such that the boundaries between 'institutionalised and non-institutionalised politics' get fuzzier. However, the normality of social movements may not imply a change in the political positions. It is here, that the differences between social movements and political uprisings become stark. Social movements form a part of 'normal politics' (Goldstone 2003: 2-3). Eventually, these bring changes in the political system through legislations and policies.

Contrary to this, political unrest could be sudden and climactic for the ruling regimes. They emerge out of immediate concerns such as authoritarianism, resource crunch,

etcetera. The government at this stage technically loses its credibility and the emergence of new alternatives brings about the change in the political system. Therefore, revolution becomes a catchword. Revolution could be followed by a struggle for attaining equal rights or safeguarding particular interests. Moreover, social movements could be located both inside and outside the institutions, though this trend has now been changing and people from within the institutions are more likely to engage in social movements (Goldstone 2003: 4). Revolution, on the other hand, is mostly carried out by people outside the institutions of power: those people who aspire for political representation and are hitherto unrepresented. These groups may have an ideological grounding; they are, however, out of power and intend to take over the government by surprise. The ultimate idea is the seizure of power.

Unlike rebellion, a political uprising could also be pre-planned and need not necessarily be leaderless. An example in this regard is the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, which was headed by Lenin and exclusively aimed at setting up of a Communist state in Russia. The Iranian revolution of 1979 is also a significant episode because Ayatollah Khomeini was ideologically opposed to the Shah regime, which, he argued, was liberal and westernised. Both Lenin and Khomeini carved out a base in the Russian and Iranian society respectively by addressing the economic plight of the people and providing political explanations for the dilapidated state of affairs of the people.

However, 'social revolution' has a slightly different connotation. Goodwin (1993: 9) argues that social revolutions were only possible with the advent of the nation-states because it facilitated the notion of 'radical transformative processes' in the political system. A synthetic approach to social revolutions suggests that it is a product of the combination of economic, political, social and external factors (Tiruneh 2014). Goodwin (1993: 9), in this regard, points out that state engages in identity formation, socialisation and even emotional motivations in the civil society. Therefore, it has an important role to play in revolution. To extrapolate, 'social revolution' is one which intends to capture this power of the state and subvert it by addressing collective grievances. Rather than taking it from the perspective of the state, however, it could also be argued that certain estranged groups demand certain changes and intend to concretise it by challenging the political authority of governance. In this sense, social revolutions could have a deeper meaning which intends to study the subjectivities of

the agitating people. This provides an insight into the social fabric and the dichotomies between communities: the ambivalences ultimately get reflected in political dissidence.

Yet another meaning of social revolution could be the ‘method of social transformation’ (Kautsky 1902). The economic developments could be regarded as important wherein it has been argued that mediocre economics along with non-democratic government and ‘state ineffectiveness’ are variables that affect the coming of revolution (Tiruneh 2014: 6). In this regard, the conquest of power by an otherwise oppressed group of people which overturns the political regime becomes an essential feature of social revolution (Kautsky 1902). In other words, the dynamics between the oppressor and the oppressed could potentially change in the aftermath of the political upheaval. Therefore, the social revolution could actually transform the dimensions of power in a society. For instance, post-revolution economically impoverished people could be brought at par with the influential sections of the society through reforms and policies but in an aggressive manner.

There are several theories of revolution that come from sociology and political science. These include structural, cultural and Marxist theories of revolution. The aforesaid list is not exhaustive and there are grey areas as well. The structural theories of revolution focus upon the state. There are several perspectives within the structural approach. These focus upon processes that enable the state to control ‘economic, associational, cultural and even socio-psychological phenomenon’ (Goodwin 1997: 9). Social structures speak for social relations and when these interactions get into a process there is a flux, which could ultimately cause revolution (Wickham-Crowley 1997: 37-38). For societies which suffer from political changes, the social relations simultaneously come under turmoil.

In the discipline of International Relations, revolution does not emerge as a core concern for the scholars. In the mainstream, revolution is considered to be indicative of uncertain times and situation that causes instability in the system (Halliday 1990). Halliday (1990) argues that revolution challenges the central tenet of realist thinking that excludes domestic factors from the study of the discipline. However, realists have themselves given some attention to revolution in international relations. Walt (1996: 21) has argued that revolution creates a balance between powers and therefore maintains stability in the international system. Desch (1997) has also appreciated

Walt's theory of revolution and pointed out that it provides a very strong opinion of the defensive realist position on the maintenance of power. Walt (1996: 3-4), in a nutshell, has explained the relation between revolution and the full outbreak of war: why do these occur in certain cases while fade in others? Walt (1996: viii) attributes it to the 'balance-of-threat' thesis.

However, the idea of revolution itself has not been very prominent in the discipline of International Relations. Reus-Smit (2012) has argued that the disjunction between theory and practical relevance is indeed overdrawn in International Relations. For instance, in the context of liberal International Relations theory, Reus-Smit (2001: 574) argues that the normativity of liberal theory gets diluted because of its engagement in positivism. Revolution being a practical phenomenon could be studied in more pragmatic and normative terms in International Relations, adding to the knowledge of politics at the global level. The attachment of instrumentality with the occurrence of revolution compromises on its normative component (Reus-Smit 2001: 574-75). Moreover, strategic logic does not explain the variance of revolution and its recurrence since the political upheaval brings instability in the society.

The main argument, herein, is that revolutions could be understood in several ways. As for the discipline of International Relations, the choice could be made from amongst the various sociological interpretations of revolution. For instance, the cultural theory of revolution could be utilised to see the transformation and advent of new forms of culture in global politics and the manner in which these are normalised within the discourse. It could substantially add to the emerging global norms. Moreover, the socialisation of units could potentially provide a better understanding of transforming social relations. Similarly, structural theory of revolution focuses upon the changing apparatus of state. It could be used to understand the moment where the public forces the change on the regime. Walt (1996) in his work comes closer to such an analysis where he argues for the opportunistic significance of revolution in maintaining a balance of power.

The Marxist theories provide a critique on the neo-liberal world order and initiate a discussion that is concerned with international political economy and the idea of global justice. Revolution as such has been very explicitly defined by Marx and others. For Marx and Engels (1970 cited in Heywood 2003: 92), the 'proletarian revolution' is a

‘social revolution’, that would overthrow the bourgeoisie from control of the mode of production thus leading to the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. In International Relations, there has rarely been a bridge that connects revolution to the realm of the international. Teschke (2005: 7-8) argues, in this context, that there has been a fixation on ‘domestic’ factors and an assertion that countries pursued ‘different paths’ to capitalism. For this reason, there has been a failure ‘to problematise the fact that these plural roads towards capitalism do not run in parallel and mutual isolation’ in neither spatial nor temporal sense (Teschke 2005: 7). The interpretations of revolution are more concerned with the economic challenges that the working class faces and, therefore, they are concerned with the subversion of class dynamics.

Although Marxist theories have been used to explain the concentration of wealth and uneven development through World Systems as well as Dependency theories, there has been little engagement with revolution in International Relations. An attempt has been made by Anievas (2015: 843) who argues that theories of ‘uneven and combined development’ could provide a conceptual framework to revolution by linking ‘sociological’ and ‘geopolitical’ ideas. Revolution, in Marxist ideas, mostly lines up with a change in both economic dynamics of power along with political changes that a proletariat revolution brings about. Although over generalisation could be problematic, the cross-roads between the various avatars of capitalism could be taken into consideration for understanding the global patterns of the spread of the revolution (Teschke 2005). This would also provide insight into the exclusionary patterns and their dissemination in the global society.

Post-structural interpretations could draw from either liberal or Marxist interpretations of revolution since it questions power and discourse. The agency is more significant for post-structural theory. Post-structuralist scholars in International Relations promote ‘new ways of thinking agency, power and resistance’ (Ashley 1996: 245). They bring intertextuality to the centre of the disciplinary practices of International Relations (Der Derian 1989: 3). They question historicity according to which books are written or research work done on grounds of contemporary social contexts (Alker, Biersteker and Inoguchi 1989: 136). In this way, by referring to the non-conventional sources of history, fresh perspectives are provided in the field of global politics including environment, feminism, and imperialism, to name a few.

Yet another link could be drawn between post-colonial thinking in International Relations and their idea of revolution. Post-colonialism as a branch within critical theory looks into narratives of the erstwhile colonies and considers studying International Relations from the perspective of the post-colonial societies. Revolutions in the Third World arise due to issues such as ‘agency, political culture, and coalitions, and the dimensions of ethnicity....., class and gender’ (Foran 2005: 13). For Goldstone (1991: xxiv-xxv), the revolutions that have caused the overthrow of the existing governance in several parts of the world were invariably followed by ‘a zesty period of competition’ and raising ‘great debates about freedom’. The Third World has indeed been the site of revolution in the contemporary times. The case of the Arab world, in this regard, is very fitting.

Revolution can be read again from the perspective of those agencies who have been suffering for a very long time under the governing bodies. The political battle in the aftermath of deposition further jeopardises the interests of the marginalised sections of the society. The question that deserves analysis could be formulated in the following manner: how has the political uprising affected the position of the minorities and weaker sections of the society? Is the ‘security’ of people higher in magnitude than that before the revolution? By reading in-between lines and revising the local discourses, it is methodologically possible to revisit the dominant discourse that celebrates revolution.

To sum up, the definitional scope of revolution in this research is twofold: one, it is being understood as a process in which the political overthrow is only an episode in a series of events; two, after the political overthrow, it is a struggle of the people to bring substantive metamorphosis at all levels of governance in order to make the society judicious. In the following section, this understanding of revolution is applied to the uprising in the Arab world, witnessed in 2011 and thereafter. The research critically examines the scenario in two societies: Egyptian and Tunisian. The period from 2011 to 2017 have been studied in this research since these societies are still undergoing the political turmoil and the social amalgamation in the new setting is an ongoing process.

Analysing revolutions in the Arab world: The case of Egypt and Tunisia

The revolutions in the erstwhile colonies have their context in geographical setting, socio-economic dynamics and political structures. Some of the post-colonial societies still continue to suffer from internal political strife and even political authoritarianism. The struggle in these societies is not just against the tyrannical presidencies but also a movement to improve their own living, both economically and politically. The sentiment behind the upheaval is equally significant to consider— it speaks for the hidden frustrations and irreconcilable differences with the power-wielders. Therefore, ‘agency, political culture, and coalitions, and the dimensions of ethnicity (or “race”), class, and gender’ are related cohesively to the aspiration of bringing change in the power relations (Foran 2005: 13). It is in this backdrop that the revolutions of the Arab world will be studied and critically appreciated in this research.

There were several shades and texture that have been seen in the Arab political upheavals after 2011. Ranging from the irresolvable situation in Syria to the deteriorating conditions and political rifts in Libya, from the dynamic movements in Tunisia, stagnancy in Yemen to the turbulence in Egypt, and from the surrender of political elites in Tunisia and Egypt to suppression in Syria and Bahrain— there are indeed several narratives to tell, accolades to sing, reasons to grieve and moments to celebrate. The study does not claim to capture all of these features in a single frame but insists that there are emotions that mark revolutionary phases— rejoice, fear, anxiety and uncertainty— which is typical of revolutionary discourses yet obscured by the domination of discussions with regard to tangible gains and losses.

The political turmoil in 2011 in the Arab world was celebrated not only in the revolutionising countries but also across the world as a coming of democracy to the Arab Islamic world. The reactions of the US and some other western countries were also ‘ambiguous’ because there were concerns about the economic and strategic factors in the wake of the uprising which could be followed by the introduction of democratic system (Carothers 2011). The Australian Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd (2011), in an editorial of *The Australian*, called it ‘unexpected democracy revolutions in the Arab region’. In a speech at the Brookings Institute, Washington D.C. on 6 June 2011, French Foreign Minister, Alian Juppe, delivered a speech and said that the ‘Spring’ was the result of ‘political will of responsible citizens’ and ‘an act of faith in man’s surge

forward and his ability to surpass himself’ (Juppe 2011). However, it remains to be seen whether the change in government has actually altered the situation of the less privileged sections of the society.

In this chapter, the cases of Egypt and Tunisia would be studied in details, although some references will also be made to the current circumstances in Libya, Yemen and Syria. The study intends to focus upon the verification of the theoretical arguments that attempts to question the celebration of revolution without necessarily taking note of the testing situation for the marginalised groups. A critical reading of the previous and contemporary constitutions, legal practices on the use of force and scrutiny of the media and press can yield results. Rather than taking any stance on the situation in these states, the idea is to theoretically grapple with the task of interpreting these changes and scrutinise the condition of the marginalised people living in these parts. In this regard, the condition of minority groups such as gendered, religious and cultural, is all the more significant. It is also of relevance to contextualise the revolution in the historical legacy of the countries as such.

The Event of the ‘Uprising’

The ‘Arab Spring’ blossomed in December 2010, with the self-immolation of a young fruit vendor in the small town of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia over police atrocities. Mass protests broke out in retaliation against the government which had long denied the people the right to protest. In his last official address to the people of Tunisia on 13 January 2011, President Zine al Abidine Ben Ali said that he has indeed ‘understood’ the demands and desires of the Tunisian people and that he intends to bring about substantial changes in the political and economic systems of the country (Ali 2011):

I have tasked the government.....to reduce the prices of basic commodities and foodstuffs—sugar, milk, bread, etc. As for political demands.....I have decided on full freedom for the media, in all its forms, and not shutting down internet sites, and rejecting any form of censorship on them, while ensuring the respect of our morals and the principles of the journalistic profession. As for the commission that I announced two days ago to look into corruption, bribery, and the mistakes of officials, this commission will be independent—yes, independent—and we will ensure its fairness and integrity.

This speech was not only pragmatic, intended to win support of the people, but also very emotional as the President condemned the violence both by the state police forces as well as from violent protestors, thereby appealing for their sensitivities towards peaceful approach that would lead to changes gradually (Ali 2011).

In spite of the sensitive appeals made by the President as well as the promises that he made, there was no slowdown of the movement. To borrow from Polletta (2006: ix), story-telling or narrative of a protest or agitation is extremely relevant in as much it throws up several interpretations, some of which are contradictory and ambiguous. In the case of Tunisia also, the appeal of the President went in vain. Labelling the movement as 'violent' (Ali 2011) and portraying it as a hindrance to the progress of the society, was antithetical to the motivational spirit of the people. In contrast to this, the commitments of the President proved to be too little and too late: it was amply clear by the growing number of Tunisian protestors on the streets that the movement was gaining momentum day by day.

The protests in Tunisia ultimately resulted in the abdication and fleeing of Tunisian President Zine al Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011, leaving the political field open for contestation. It was followed by another uprising in Egypt and led to the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak from power. Mubarak (2011), too, anticipating the repercussions promised to step down as President and pave way for free and fair elections to take place in Egypt. He, at the same time, warned against aggression by protestors as it could break the stability and unity of the Egyptian people (Mubarak 2011):

.....The country is passing through difficult times and tough experiences which began with noble youths and citizens who practise their rights to peaceful demonstrations and protests, expressing their concerns and aspirations but they were quickly exploited by those who sought to spread chaos and violence, confrontation and to violate the constitutional legitimacy and to attack it.

Those protests were transformed from a noble and civilised phenomenon of practising freedom of expression to unfortunate clashes, mobilised and controlled by political forces that wanted to escalate and worsen the situation. They targeted the nation's security and stability through acts of provocation theft and looting and setting fires and blocking roads and attacking vital installations and public and private properties and storming some diplomatic missions.....

There was, therefore, an attempt to delegitimise the entire protest movement. However, the veteran Egyptian leader probably underestimated the determination of the people to

change the political power ratios and to this extent there was indeed significant cooperation between the different sections and political factions of the Egyptian society. It was because of the combined efforts of the secular, religious and military segments that President Mubarak was forced to step down as President of Egypt in February 2011.

Egypt experienced unity between various actors in the very beginning of the revolution, which resulted in the abdication of power by Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. There were several actors who came to the forefront to show their disenchantment with the Mubarak regime as was evident in the high assemblages at the Tahrir Square in Cairo. Once the overthrow happened, however, the political actors began to press for their own interests ultimately revealing the fault-lines therein (Tripp 2015: xvi):

The elements that came together in the ‘Tahrir moment’ benefitted from the novelty of an unscripted drama. However, when each tried to fix that moment by dictating the script that Egypt should follow into the future, it was clear that there were wildly divergent interests at work.

These dissensions became clear in June 2012, when people began protesting against Mohammad Morsi’s presidency and once again resorted to public demonstrations. The military led the overthrow of President Morsi from power. This marked the second phase of the revolution. As Tripp (2015: xvii) points out, there was a decree passed in November 2013 which ‘effectively banned public protests’ by obligating people to take permission from seven sources of police if there was to be ‘an assembly of more than ten people’. The military under President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi consolidated authority over Egypt. The period is often seen as ‘counter-revolution’ (Abou-El-Fadl 2015: 5; Pratt 2015: 47) and marked ‘a lethal and vicious circle of repression and violence’ (Tripp 2015: xvii). Therefore, political space in Egypt became restricted and the alliances at the beginning of the revolution faded into oblivion.

Gaddafi of Libya and Saleh of Yemen were the next ones to fall from power. As Lynch (2012: 20-21) points out there was a contrast between the early periods of revolution and the later ones; increasingly there was a resistance on part of the ruling governments to concede the demands of the people. This was reflected in both Libya and Yemen. Protests in the city of Benghazi, in Libya, began on 15 February 2011. The government reacted by shooting at the peaceful protestors, which resulted in further uproar throughout eastern Libya. When the attempts began to show signs of a military takeover

by the rebel forces, the state began to bombard its own citizens (Deeb 2013: 64-65). Ultimately, this culminated in the declaration of Libya into a 'no-fly zone' by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 on 17 March 2011, thus paving the way for the intervention by NATO forces two days later. The resolution (UNSCR 1973 2011) stated that it:

Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

It was in Libya that the situation collapsed into a civil-war scenario and the positivity of the revolution, as in Tunisia and Egypt, was obscured by the brutalities and human rights violation on part of militias in Sirte and Misrata in Libya. There has been ample evidence to suggest that not only was Muammar Gaddafi brutally killed by the opposition forces, but his son Mutassim Gaddafi as well as other supporters of the government were subjected to physical abuse and violence before being executed (Human Rights Watch 2012). The report has appealed to the Libyan authorities to investigate the human rights abuses meted out to the detainees.

The trend was somewhere in the middle in Yemen— neither was the movement as peaceful as it was in Tunisia or Egypt, nor did it lapse into a civil war situation. It was accompanied by the use of brute forces on at least two occasions: first, it opened fire on prison detainees in March 2011, who gathered in the prison courtyard to show support for the protestors; second, when armed forces of the government opened fire on protestors and killed about forty of them in the capital city of Sana (*Al Jazeera* 2011). The movement progressed from a youth initiative to a 'nationwide political coalition bringing together almost every sector of Yemeni political society' (Lynch 2012: 400-401). President Saleh fired his cabinet of ministers on 20 March 2011; this resulted in the apprehensions arising from within his own tribal community. The climax came through in Yemen with the defection of the top military commanders to the side of the protestors (*Al Jazeera* 2011; Lynch 2012: 406). The stalemate in Yemen continued to

worsen over a period of time: Saleh finally stepped down in November 2011 accepting the GCC transition plan which gave him immunity and paved the way for ‘transition to a new elected government’ (Lynch 2012: 404). However, the acceptance was quite late and by then factionalism has dented the strength of the opposition. The case of Libya and Yemen followed by Bahrain and Syria has clearly revealed that unlike Tunisia and Egypt, ‘repression’ and not acceptance of public demands would be the order of the day (Lynch 2012: 410).

In this study, emphasis has been laid upon Tunisia and Egypt because the political changes in both these countries were a result of internal uprising with no external support or interference. This is in contrast to Libya, where there was intervention by the NATO forces and the only achievement, thus far, has been the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi from power. As Fetouri (2015) points out, there is no central government in Libya for more than four years after Gaddafi’s death with two ‘quarrelling governments’ in Tripoli and El Bayada and absolute social and economic insecurity for the civilians. In the case of Syria, the uprising did not lead to the fall of President Assad from power. In fact, the government reacted severely and crushed the uprising. In spite of the rising threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to the region, the Syrian government has not reconciled its differences with the population and has continued its authoritative governance. On 6 January 2013, the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, in a speech at the Opera House said (Al-Assad 2011):

They call it a revolution, but in fact it has nothing to do with revolutions. A revolution needs thinkers. A revolution is built on thought. Where are their thinkers? A revolution needs leaders. Who is its leader? Revolutions are built on science and thought not on ignorance, on pushing the country ahead not taking it centuries back, on spreading light not cutting power lines. A revolution is usually done by the people not by importing foreigners to rebel against the people. A revolution is in the interest of people not against the interests of people. Is this a revolution? Are those revolutionaries? They are a bunch of criminals.

This revealed the attitude of the government which was very clear at containing the uprisings. The revolutionary spirit in any of the countries where the political changes took place in the Arab world post 2011, were not marked by impromptu intellectual thoughts. Intellectual thoughts need not guide revolutions: they could as well be the product of revolutionary changes. At a time when media and press censorship was quite strong in Syria, it was, in any case, very difficult for the intellectual thoughts to fructify.

The onslaught on the opposition, also, has been a regular feature of the entire region wherever the slightest signs of dissidence were present. The situation was somewhat different in Yemen, wherein there were peaceful protests by the youth, which eventually transformed into a violent power game between elitist echelons of the Yemeni polity, and was followed by a massive economic distress (Thiel 2012); Bahrain was another venue where protests broke out against the ruling Al Khalifa monarchy: in spite of the protestors making demands for an elected and parliamentary system of government, the repression was successful because of the timely intervention of authorised military troops from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates along with the support of the USA (McEvers 2012).

Before getting deeper into this discussion, a mention could be made of the situation that arose in Bahrain which was more symbolic in nature. The Pearl roundabout was razed to the ground after protests arose there and it has now become a symbol of anti-state protests (Khalaf 2013). This is more of a symbolic victory for the protestors and it remains to be seen whether any substantial change will occur in practice. Bahrain is one country where the protests did not lead to the overthrow of the ruling monarchy. However, there is agreement between scholars that even if the authoritarian regime is overthrown it does not mean that a democratic regime is in sight (Bellin 2011; Valbjorn 2012).

If this is the case, then what is the difference between the governments of the past and the present in Egypt and Tunisia? How are they different from those Arab countries where the protests were suppressed high-handedly such as Syria and Bahrain? The real concern lies with the population that is undergoing the transitional phase. Historically also, the periods of transition determine the success or failure of the revolution and the ultimate transformation of the entire polity. According to the Human Rights Watch World Report 2012, 'Bahraini authorities used lethal force to suppress peaceful anti-government and pro-democracy protests, killing seven and wounding many more'. Therefore, the use of force to suppress protests have also been a regular feature of the Arab world.

In the case of Jordan, due to factionalism at the political and societal level, no substantive force could be formed to challenge the ruling Hashemite kingdom (Tobin 2012). Therefore, the entire region since January 2011 has been witnessing substantial

political upheavals with different outcomes. The case of Tunisia and Egypt present the more concrete symbols of popular discontent. It is still early to suggest the absolute success or failure of the revolution. However, the interim period is relevant because it reveals the urge of the ruling government to actually fulfil the desires of the people. The 'break from the past' may have come in terms of governance. It is, however, the societal turmoil that needs to be resolved post political upheaval.

Drawing from the previous section on the theories of revolution, it could be observed whether the revolution was 'structural', 'cultural' or 'economic'. Drawing from Goodwin's argument (1997), the revolution was definitely structural in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen because it overthrew the ruling authoritarian governments out of power. In Tunisia and Egypt some democratic steps have been taken ever since 2011 but the reforms have not been concretised. The more disputable side of the revolution is its cultural aspect. Has there been any change in political and social culture in terms of enhanced inclusivity? This transition is somewhat evident in the resurgence of Islamist groups on the political scene of the revolutionised states, of which the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the most prominent. However, the revolutionary trend is still in its infancy at the social level.

The uprising that started with self-immolation of a young fruit vendor, Mohammed Boazizi in December 2010 in Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia, found tremendous support from the social media. The discursive space for the people has, thus, been expanded during the course of the revolution. As Lynch (2012: 37) points out, 'the new Arab public sphere' is the political participation of citizens of the Arab world 'to engage in sustained argument, debate, and discussions about their common concerns'. However, 'who' makes use of these spaces and who finds more representation is much more crucial. Have the minority groups and women made use of the cyber space in ventilating their opinion on the new rulers? What about the anxiety that arose amongst the disenfranchised sections of Tunisia and Egypt due to the unprecedented change in the regime?

The revolution in Tunisia and Egypt marked the end of authoritarian regimes of Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak respectively. In the aftermath of the political overthrow, there was the need of re-drafting the Constitution. In this regard, the political parties in Tunisia showed some maturity as has been evident by the elections of 2014

wherein Nida Tounees, a ‘secular nationalist’ party and Ennahda, a ‘moderate Islamist’ party engaged freely and fairly in a democratic contestation (Quamar 2015: 270). This is in contrast to Egypt. In Egypt, the military has been controlling the political destiny of the state and the 2014 elections were indeed an attempt to provide legitimacy to Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Sanyal 2015: 289-290). It is also argued that the parliamentary elections held between 17 October and 2 December 2015 in Egypt has completed the process of bringing the system together (Nafaa 2016: 165). Though, the ‘Corrective Revolution’ of 2013 in Egypt followed by the victory of el Sisi in the presidential elections of 2014 has ensured ‘unfavourable political environment for parliamentary elections’ (Nafaa 2016). Not only this, the election process itself did not arouse any confidence in the electorate (Sanyal 2015: 303). Therefore, the situation in both the countries is apparently different: while Tunisia seems to be stabilising, Egypt is yet to enter a successful democratic phase.

According to a survey commissioned by the Center of Arab Unity Studies (carried out before the revolution of 2011), the Arab population, in principle, is not in disagreement with the ethos of democracy (Sawani 2014). It, however, could take some time for the absorption of the democratic values in the political and social cultures. What is more important, however, is to go beyond the definitional boundaries and critically appreciate the contributions that the revolution has actually made to those Arab societies which were successful in overthrowing the dictators such as the Tunisian and Egyptian societies along with Libya and Yemen. There is definitely some progress that has been made on the political front in terms of governance. Litsas (2013) has argued that the ‘Arab Spring’ is an ‘international event’ that could create substantial crisis in the neighbouring societies. Democratisation in the Arab world could be seen in terms of the rise in political competition which was absolutely absent earlier. This has brought some of the Islamist forces, earlier opposed to democracy, within the fold of democratic processes and this has helped to marginalise the voice of violent organisations (Drevon 2014).

There are, however, dissenting opinions. Abdelali (2013: 199), argues that the ‘spring’ in the Arab world is more of the rejection of authoritarianism than a ‘democratic transition’. Moreover, in spite of the revolution in some countries of the Arab world, authoritarianism continues in most other parts. At the same time, political overthrow does not completely overrule the possibility of a return to a dictatorial regime (Brynen,

Moore, Salloukh and Zahar 2013: 9). Moreover, there were several smaller uprisings that took place in the rural areas of Egypt from 1997-2000, followed by irregular protests at the district level (2000-2007), succeeded by the 'Kefaya' (Enough) Movement (2004-2011) and finally culminated in the political overthrow at Cairo (January 2011) (El Nour 2015).

Lynch (2012: 33-35) also argues that the 'new generation' of the Arab region, with access to internet and multiple sources of information, were eventually seeking their space into a 'participatory' forum. The participation on the Arab youth in the movement was evident in the 'massive protests (which) marched simultaneously through Cairo, Rabat and Sana in 2000' (Lynch 2012: 34), coupled by the 'Cedar Revolution' of Lebanon in 2005, the 'Kefaya movement' of Egypt, the tribal protests 'against the government in Jordan and Kuwait' Lynch 2012: 35) and workers' strikes in Tunisia and Algeria. It is for this reason that revolution could be seen as a continuum of episodes: horizontally across the Arab region and vertically through different levels of the society.

The question is precisely this: does the society feel liberated in the aftermath of the revolution? Although, it is difficult to summarise or generalise the indices for countries which have seen political turmoil under a decade, it is possible to sense a trajectory and observe the direction in which it is moving. The purpose of this research is to enquire into the socio-economic and political progress in the aftermath of the revolution that has the potential to lead to the emancipation of the repressed communities and individuals in these societies.

In this regard, revolution cannot be viewed merely as a structural transformation because that provides a superficial view. The celebration of the political overthrow puts the marginalised community into a paradoxical situation: reforms could bring respite for the society in general but a tumultuous change can jeopardise the contemporary living conditions and social arrangements of the minorities in particular. The anxiety amongst the population during the transitional phase is captured in their posture to maintain status quo while at the same time attempting to converse with the political elites. Revolution in the Arab world, when studied from the perspective of the marginalised sections of the society, is tragic because it entraps them into a conundrum where choices are indeed very limited. Democratisation processes are incipient in Tunisia and Egypt: co-option, inclusion and participation of the peripheral sections of

the society could be an important threshold for assessing the political milieu and socio-political trajectories.

An important caveat with regard to the Arab world after the revolution is the correlation between democratisation, religionisation and securitisation. In spite of the prevalence of the 'standard' approach to security that is 'top-down' and focuses upon state, critical perspectives on 'Middle-Eastern' security highlight the local narratives on 'decolonisation' and 'post-colonial statehood' (Bilgin 2012: 28-30). After the revolution, the Islamist groups have also tried to make a comeback. These groups were delegitimised during the ruling period of Ben Ali and Mubarak in Tunisia and Egypt respectively. However, these groups do not have a 'religious monopoly over the public sphere' (Roy 2012: 49). It implies that there is no single interpretation of Islam in the socio-political sphere. However, the situation changes substantially with the co-option of the religious parties into the democratisation process itself.

A parallel could be drawn with those societies where the uprising was suppressed with an iron hand. At a time when the result of a full-fledged democratic structure is awaited in some of the Arab countries, the 'Arab Gulf' has begun to see the interaction between opposition movements and political authorities (Fakhro 2011). The Arab revolutions have ignited 'political consciousness in the Saudi youth'; however, there is a lack of a civil society that can transform this consciousness into pragmatism (Sunitan 2011). Though there is a divergence even in terms of Islamist factors such as Salafis and Hannabalis, it does not culminate into effective political opposition. In Kuwait, after 2011 the monarchy has suppressed Bedouin political claims by engaging in the unity discourse of the Kuwaiti nation while in Bahrain, there was an emphasis on 'the nation's multicultural character' which discredited the Shiite political movement in spite of its representativeness (Beaugrand 2016).

With reference to those countries where the political oust happened successfully, the process of integration of the different political groups was a significant exercise. It is similar to the Gramscian idea of 'passive revolution' wherein the 'dialectic of revolution-restoration' has not been resolved between social classes and therefore co-option of groups into the mainstream or hegemonic ideas become pertinent to bring transformation (Cox 1983). In the context of the Arab world also, the political overthrow as such did not lead to the culmination of diverse viewpoints; the cross-party

coalition followed the ouster and opened gates for negotiations between political participants. From the perspective of security, this co-option is significant because it removes any threat of politicisation outside of the democratic procedure itself.

Potentially, this is positive for democracy in the Arab world. In the 2014 parliamentary elections of Tunisia, the moderate Islamist Party of Ennahda came second to the victorious Nida Tounnees which is a secular nationalist party. Although, Ennahda was the party in power during 2011, they accepted defeat and, thus, facilitated the democratic take over by Nida Tounnees (Quamar 2015). Similarly, after the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, the *Al-Azhar* mosque in Cairo made several attempts to legitimise its position in the Egyptian society by making references to ‘human rights, liberty, and, above all, the separation of religious and state institutions’ (Roy 2012: 49). Therefore, co-option of Islamists in the electioneering process became a significant feature of the post-revolutionary Arab world.

Post-democratisation scholars have a different view, wherein they argue that the very understanding and interpretation of democratisation is Orientalist in approach and does not contextualise the argument in ‘Middle-Eastern’ situation (Teti 2012). Teti (2015) argues that the European Union understands democracy more from the perspective of civil and political rights and, in the process, marginalises socio-economic issues which were actually a core concern of the protests in Egypt and Tunisia. In this regard, Mameli (2013: 378) argues that the ‘cultural congruence’ could be brought amongst the people of the Arab world by focusing on ‘indigenously acceptable approaches to change’. At the same time, ideas of social justice and economic equality are the core of Islamic tenets, thereby facilitating the methods in the achievement of the same; this could be utilised to fulfil the demands for socio-economic rights of the people in Egypt and Tunisia and form the backbone of their democratic structures (Etzioni 2013). Changes need to be brought about in the society with respect to the requirements of the citizens: otherwise revolution begins its backlash on the people, thereby making it reductionist.

In a nutshell, scholars in the West have conceptualised democracy in the Arab world from the perspective of civil and political rights of the people rather than focusing on the socio-economic ones. In this regard, Corm (2015) argues that the discussions in the international media have not focused on the ‘developmental style’ of the political parties whether Islamic or secular. Moreover, democratisation requires the building of

‘democratic political institutions’ which could minimise the possibility of ‘renewal of autocracy and authoritarianism in the Arab world’ (Abdelali 2013: 198). Imad (2014) argues that the Arab revolutions intend to reform the political structure by bringing democracy at the centre, but due to the presence of religious political organisations the task seems all the more difficult. However, the counter argument to this is provided by Etzioni (2013) who argues that the Islamic tenets of social equality and justice, if utilised judiciously, could actually be the bases of conversation between the secular and religious groups. In addition to this, the revolution by itself was the result of the efforts of more traditional groups such as labour unions, working class and Islamists of different ideologies whereas the claims were monopolised by liberals and leftist activists (Lynch 2012: 41). Therefore, the pluralism of the society also speaks for the passionate attempts to bring change in the polity.

Furthermore, the revolution has not transformed the economic plight of the Tunisian and Egyptian economies; unemployment and inflation continue to mar the society (World Bank Report 2015). Hence, the revolution in Egypt and Tunisia is yet to become a success for the economically weaker classes who participated in the revolution with the intention of transforming the economic situation of the country. M’Barek (2016) argues that the post-revolutionary moment has been marked by a ‘gloomy economy and multiple terrorist attacks’ and in order to combat terrorism citizens ought to be given ‘a dignified life’. According to the World Bank Report (2015), in the post-revolutionary period, ‘economic activity has been slow’, ‘recovery in external demand has been largely absent’, ‘exchange rate depreciated gradually over 2014’ and ‘unemployment has slightly increased in 2015’. Moreover, corruption and bureaucratic red tape are hindrances in the development of the entrepreneurial institutions and stultifies growth (Achy 2011). In spite of the overthrow, the socio-economic changes have not emerged in a substantive way.

At the same time, the revolutions in the Arab world have challenged the traditional idea of revolution being co-terminus with the notion of secular. Post-secularism, as a divergent thought, suggests that the idea of ‘democracy, freedom, equality, inclusion and justice’ may not necessarily be pursued successfully under a secular framework (Mavelli and Patito 2012: 931). Both the religious and the secular citizens are entitled to contribute to the narrative in a public sphere and this, in turn, enables the spread of democratic ideas and revolutionary spirit: religion and revolution are, therefore, not

contradictory (Barbato 2012). The idea, over here, is to challenge the dominant rhetoric which propounds the incapability of religion to bring socio-political changes. Mavelli (2012: 1059-1060) also argues that the graphics of police abuses on people that was circulated in the social media brought the Islamists and secularists groups together to question the authoritarian regime of Egypt. Imad (2014) points to the changing discursive practices of the Islamists which appertain to the functioning of the state under duress from the opposition. Therefore, there have been efforts toward reconciling opinions on part of the hard-liners.

In International Relations, revolution is studied as ‘a systemic challenge to existing patterns of international order’ and offers alternatives to the same (Halliday 1999). According to Walt (1996), revolution balances threats that emerge in anarchy because of its inertia for generating conflict in the international system. However, the Arab revolutions could be seen in a different light from the mainstream theorisations. For Lynch (2012: 21), the Arab uprising was understood as ‘a single narrative of protest with shared heroes and villains, common stakes, and a deeply felt sense of shared destiny’: this, however, is not the case where the different segments of the society opine differently on the point of revolution. It could also be argued that the post-secular literature is embedded very much in the Western discourse of their contemporary scenarios rather than focusing on other geographical spaces where transition of power is actually occurring (Camilleri 2012). In this regard, the transition in the Arab world is of significance because it could empirically testify the arguments of the post-secularist scholars as well as deconstruct epistemic boundaries which are based on binaries.

With regard to the aforesaid argument, it could also be pointed out that the revolution in the Arab world was not as spontaneous as it is sometimes made out to be. The overthrow was a culmination of the resistance that has been in the public space for some preceding years (Mavelli 2012). The climax, however, was less unforeseen. The governments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen have always been criticised for their low human rights records especially regarding freedom of expression and rights of minorities (International Religious Freedom Report 2015; World Report 2015; Amnesty International 2016). Amnesty International (2016) observes that in Egypt:

On average three to four people per day are seized according to local NGOs, usually when heavily armed security forces led by NSA officers storm their homes. Many are held for months at a time and often kept blindfolded and handcuffed for the entire period.

The post-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt are grappling with the situation between transforming the society into a more democratic space and controlling public opinion. This tussle is marked by the suppression of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which was not allowed to participate in the 2015 parliamentary elections although they were successful in 2012. The most dramatic event was the removal of President Morsi from office following a military coup in July 2013 (Osman 2015). Therefore, democratisation has not been accompanied by a fair political contestation in Egypt. This uncertainty has created anxiety and unease amongst the Arab population, both horizontally and vertically. From the perspective of the marginalised sections of the society also, the political revolution has not been accompanied by either constitutional guarantees of the security of the individual or community rights.

The marginalised in the revolutions of 2011

Who is the marginalised in the crises of the Arab world? The Arab world is typically known for the dominance of political authority either in the form of a dictatorial regime or monarchy. Opinions in the public realm were generally suppressed. Therefore, even though demographically Sunni Arabs are predominant in the region, there was hardly any political viewpoint outside that of the state. Ever since the uprisings of 2011, these dynamics came into tension. The rapidity with which the authoritarian rulers were removed in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, sent waves of protest across the region. This has also contributed to the public sphere. The question, however, remains with regard to the representation of the viewpoint of the various segments of the society.

For Linklater (1996: 280), critical theory envisages a societal system that is based on 'open dialogue' and marks a 'break with unjustified exclusion'. Drawing from this line of thought, with the overthrow of the authoritarian governments, space ought to be provided to the weaker sections of the Arab society that include women and other gender, economically impoverished and above all the religious and ethnic minorities. The weaker sections of the society reflect starkly upon the policies of the government

and the societal status of the people: this brings to the fore the dimensions of governance and the real effect of a change in political circumstances. This section is divided into two parts: religious minorities and women and other gender, wherein it has been argued that the minorities continued to live in suspicion and anxiety after the political overthrow in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 because there was a dearth of societal warranties and assurances for these sections of the society.

Religious minorities

According to the United Nations Office of the Human Rights Commission 2010 (UNHR), minorities are generally understood as religious, linguistic or ethnic people who are 'numerically inferior' in the region and are culturally, religiously, ethnically or linguistically distinguishable from the majority population: as such these groups are severely marginalised having least access to infrastructures and minimal political participation. The situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions is slightly different because sometimes the ruling regime belongs to the minority group whereas the majority population is ruled over. Syria is an important example in this regard. President Bashar al Assad belongs to the religious minority of the Alawis; yet the military and political elites consist of the Alawi minority alongwith the Druze and loyal Shiites (Landis 2012). Similarly, Gaddafi and Saleh belonged to minority groups of the region (Landis 2012). Yet another example is Iraq which was ruled by a Sunni dictator (Saddam Hussein) even though it has a predominantly Shiite population. In the context of Egypt and Tunisia, however, Mobarak and Ben Ali respectively belonged to the majority Sunni Arab population.

The majority-minority question did not find so much prominence in the earlier discursive practices in either Tunisia or Egypt mainly because authoritarianism did not allow such discussion. The problem comes to the forefront with the surge of democracy in the Arab world and the changing political order therein. In some of the Gulf states, such as Kuwait and Bahrain, the monarchic regimes have 'promoted some groups over others to secure their loyalty' (Beaugrand 2016: 234). Sawani (2012) draws attention to the rise in conversation between Arabism and Islamism which are increasingly shaping new identities in the fresh context. This is another factor as to why the minority question is being raised whereas earlier it was suppressed by the larger state narrative.

Moreover, the religious or ideological groups continue to form a part of the political scene where the idea is to cooperate with each other to form a democratic regime (Jourchi 2013). Under these circumstances, the political placing of the minorities and women/other gender is extremely crucial. Herein, the research focuses on the new Constitutions of Tunisia and Egypt. It is interesting to observe how much civil and political space the drafting committee is willing to concede to these sections of the society. In this context, focus is upon some predominant minorities, who are also natives of the region.

According to the World Population Review (2017), Tunisia has a primarily Arab population consisting of Sunni Muslims (almost 98 per cent). Less than one per cent of the population identify themselves as Berber; since no census was taken since 1956 on ethnic and linguistic lines, their exact population is difficult to ascertain (The Graduate Centre 2015). Jews and Christians constitute about two per cent of the population (World Population Review 2017). Therefore, the population of Tunisia, in terms of religion is not very diverse and the minorities, especially Jews have declined in population over the years.

Tunisia, in the aftermath of the revolution, brought together different political organisations in order to facilitate debates for the new Constitution which was formally adopted in January 2014 (Lesch 2014). In the case of Tunisia, the religious minorities constitute a small proportion of the population. Shiite Muslims, Bahais and Christians together form a microscopic one per cent of the population (International Religious Freedom Report 2011). Therefore, Tunisia is predominantly a Sunni Muslim state. The institutional stability of Tunisia during the regime of Ben Ali was achieved by the creation of a master discourse that spoke of the 'Mediterranean narrative' and in the process absorbed the discourses of the minority groups (Bond not dated). The Berbers, an ethnic and linguistic minority in Tunisia, are also natives of present day Tunisia. Berbers are minority in both absolute numbers in Tunisia as well as in proportion to their population in Morocco and Algeria (UNHCR 2007). The alienation of the linguistic and religious minorities has been systematic although the situation was not as chronic as it has been in some other Arab states such as Iraq and Libya.

The new Constitution (2014) technically guarantees civil rights to all citizens and says that the state is based on ‘citizenship, will of the people, and the supremacy of law’ (Article 2). In addition to this, Article 3 of the Constitution of Tunisia (2014) states:

The people are sovereign and the source of authority, which is exercised through the people’s representatives and by referendum.

Article 6 of the Constitution proclaims that the Tunisian state is ‘the guardian of religion’ and has in essence declared the neutrality of places of worship from ‘partisan instrumentalisation’. In addition, it has also declared resistance against ‘calls for takfir’ since it creates intolerance and hatred amongst people (Article 6). As compared to the earlier constitution, the new draft seems to be more promising and progressive in terms of recognising and guaranteeing certain rights to the people. It remains to be seen how much in reality could they actually secure the minority and weaker sections of the society.

In the draft Constitution, there are two points of concern, which also sounds detrimental to the spirit of democracy. First, Article 1 of the Constitution explicitly declares that the religion of the state is Islam and the language adopted by the Constitution is Arabic. At the outset, the predominance of the majority religion comes to the forefront. Additionally, the recognition of Arabic as the language of the state implies discrimination against linguistic minorities such as Berbers. Second, Article 3 (Referenda) and Article 6 (Freedom of religion and Freedom of Opinion/Thought/Conscience) of the Constitution (2014) are amendable provisions unlike Article 1 and Article 2 (Official or national languages/official religion/type of government envisioned). Moreover, protection of religion does not come under either ordinary laws or deemed organic laws, though the latter has the provision for ‘freedoms and human rights’. The Constitution above all lacks severely in identifying the minority groups such as Jews, Christians, Bahais, Shiite Muslims and Berbers. While universalising and guaranteeing citizenship rights to all, the specific provisions that relate to the protection of minorities are not explicitly present.

From the perspective of the minorities, it ought to be seen how much progress it makes from the earlier Constitution of Tunisia that was promulgated in 1957. Article 5 spoke about ‘pluralism’, ‘tolerance among individuals’ and defended ‘the free practice of religious beliefs provided this does not disturb public order’ (Constitution of Tunisia

1957). Additionally, it stated that ‘citizens have the same rights and obligations’ (Article 6), ‘are equal before the law’ (Article 6) and could ‘exercise all their rights in the forms and according to the terms provided for by law’ (Article 7). Therefore, in terms of constitutional provisions there has been a meagre change in the political and social positioning of the minorities.

The only change is in terms of constitutional guarantees. For instance, the earlier Constitution (1957) gave an active role to political parties in as much as they could ‘contribute to supervising citizens’; however, political parties could not be formed on the bases of ‘religion, language, race, sex or region’ (Article 8). This implicitly overshadowed any commitment towards protecting minority interests. By the new Constitution of 2014, the freedom to form political parties is guaranteed and the criterion for the foundation is not yet given: Article 35 rather demands obedience to ‘law, financial transparency and the rejection of violence’ by political parties (Constitution of Tunisia 2014). The idea of the Constituent Assembly appears to be the control of radical organisations rather than subjugating minority opinions. At the same time in the absence of adequate representation in the Parliament, the minority interests are still not secured.

Another significant point relates to the election of the executive and the electorate. Article 74 of the Constitution states that Tunisian nationals ‘whose religion is Islam shall have the right to stand for election to the position of President of the Republic’. Explicit in this term of the Constitution, is the removal of any possibility of contestation to the highest office by a citizen of any other religion. Moreover, Article 75 provides for the election of President ‘by an absolute majority of votes cast’ (Constitution of Tunisia 2014). Here again, there is a lack of quorum which could in the long run be detrimental to the interests of the minority. The numerically inferior could suffer from the lack of representation in the Parliament: House of Representatives also does not promise to represent the weaker sections of the society in spite of certain constitutional safeguards against the abuse of power.

Egypt, too, represents Sunni Muslims most dominantly besides having Christians, Nubians and Berbers as religious and ethnic minorities (Maps of World 2013). In Egypt, Coptic Christians form a sizeable minority of about ten per cent of the total population and have a history of suppression (Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East

(CJPME) 2011). Under the regime of Hosni Mubarak, this minority community, could represent itself only through state: therefore, the Coptic Christians were compelled to accept ‘an official Coptic Orthodox Church relations (sic.) with the government’ (CJPME 2011). However, ‘the Coptic Orthodox Church obtained the permission to apply the Christian Canon Law for personal and civil status court rulings, notably in the case of marriage and divorce for Christians’ during the Mubarak regime (CJPME 2011). Though minimalist, the right accorded to the Copts guaranteed state protection to this minority group on at least the front of personal laws.

With regard to Egypt, it must be mentioned that in terms of minorities, it is much more diverse as well as numerically larger as compared to Tunisia. These include Coptic Christians; Nubians; Bahai’s and Jews (International Religious Freedom Report 2012). However, there are smaller groups of the Bedouins and Shiites who are also concentrated in some parts of Egypt. Amongst these the largest number is that of Coptic Christians and it is this group which is more often persecuted than others. The Copts are indigenous Egyptian Christians who constitute six to nine per cent of the total population with a strong presence in the south (Minority Rights Group International 2011). It must be noted that the term Copts denoted all Egyptians historically, however over a period of time it became a ‘symbolic indication of Christianity’ (Mogib 2012). Nubians, on the other hand, came under the Egyptian rule by the Condominium Agreement of 1899 which drew boundaries between Egypt and Sudan (Minority Rights Group International 2011).

According to the December 2013 draft of the Egyptian Constitution, several points could be brought out in favour of religious freedom (The Arab Republic of Egypt Draft Constitution 2013). For instance, Article 64 allows freedom of practising religious rituals and ‘establishing places of worship for the followers of revealed religions’ (The Arab Republic of Egypt Draft Constitution 2013) as a right. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has very succinctly brought out the flaw ingrained in this provision: while including Jews and Christians in the category of ‘protected minorities’, it seals the fate of Bahai’s as it is not recognised as a legitimate religion (USCIRF 2015). In this regard, it must be pointed out that there is a distinction drawn between the ‘people of the Book’ (*Dhimmis*) and other minorities in Islam. Since Bahai is a deviation from Shiite Islam, it is considered heretic and therefore, its minorities are regularly persecuted in some parts of the Arab world.

Article 3 of the 2014 Constitution states explicitly that the personal laws and religious affairs of the Christians and the Jews are the jurisdiction of their sources of law (Constitution of Egypt 2014). The other encouraging clause of the Constitution is Article 53 which states that there would be equality amongst citizens in the observance of public rights and duties and no discrimination shall be made ‘on the basis of religion, belief, sex, origin, race, colour, language, disability, social class, political or geographical affiliation or for any other reason’ (Constitution of Egypt 2014). Technically, at least, this Constitution warrants some assets to all citizens.

The definition of an Egyptian citizen is enshrined in Article 6 of the Constitution of Egypt 2014:

Citizenship is a right to anyone born to an Egyptian father or an Egyptian mother (requirements for birthright citizenship).

Being legally recognized and obtaining official papers proving his personal data is a right guaranteed and organised by law (requirements for naturalisation).

Therefore, the cultural aspect of citizenship as being a part of the Egyptian parentage has been emphasised. This, again, by definition, does not exclude native Christians or Jews. But the cultural minorities such as Berbers or Nubians do not get adequate guarantee of their citizenship. At the same time, Article 87 states that every citizen can vote in elections and also contest it (Constitution of Egypt 2014). Additionally, the qualifications for the Presidential candidate also stress upon the Egyptian citizenship of the candidate. Interestingly enough, references to Islam is minimised in the Constitution although Article 1 states that Egypt is ‘a part of the Muslim world’ and Article 2 points out that the ‘principles of the Islamic Sharia are the principle source of legislation’ (Constitution of Egypt 2014).

According to the findings of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission (2015), which has testified before the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) (2015), religious freedom got ‘deteriorated dramatically’ under the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt. After the military ouster of 2013, which brought Sisi in power, the Egyptian government has taken extreme measures to control opposition. Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood have been severely persecuted. So far as the minorities are concerned, the condition of the Copts ‘remain precarious’ (USCIRF 2015); Bahais and Jehovah’s Witnesses are outlawed; anti-Semitism is evident in ‘state controlled and semi-official media’ (USCIRF 2015). However, Article

235 has provided for the building and renovation of Churches for Christians (Constitution of Egypt 2014).

At the same time, there have been episodes of attack on Christian localities and Churches. In the beginning of the revolution, there was a bonhomie between Coptic Christians and Muslims, and the unity was symbolic of the political change (Pratt 2015: 53). Therefore, it remains to be seen how much of the provisions of the Constitution are actually enforced by the government machineries in order to secure the minority groups. However, the attacks on Christians have been unabated since 2011. The most significant violence against Coptic Christians was the 'Maspero Massacres' in October 2011. In this episode, Christian protestors were killed in Cairo, who were demanding investigation in the burning of a church (Pratt 2015: 53). The protests by Copts were indeed significant because it implied that they were willing to defy the orders of the Pope 'to not protest' (Pratt 2015: 53). The church authorities were, in turn, under the obligation to follow state orders.

The protests were an act of defiance by the Copts who are placed within a 'double communal bind' (Sedra 2012 cited in Pratt 2015: 53). From the perspective of the minorities in Egypt, revolution has opened space for political participation while at the same time their assertions have been met with violence. At a time when even political opponents are being repressed, it has become all the more difficult to sustain the rights of the religious minorities. The Muslim Brotherhood which was actually successful in the parliamentary elections of 2011 and was moving forward towards democratisation (Farg 2012) has been under severe threat. Therefore, in Egypt, opposition on all fronts is being controlled with an iron fist. In the case of Egypt, therefore, the situation is much more volatile.

The Constitution of 2014 has clearly ignored some minority groups. The Nubians are mentioned only in Article 236 which relates to economic and urban development (Constitution of Egypt 2014); however, in the section on linguistic and cultural rights they do not find any reference. Contrary to the promise of 'democratic transition' (Affaya 2011), Egypt is precariously placed during the transitional phase. At this stage, no guarantees could be given to either the religious minorities or sectional minorities. The political uncertainty could trickle down to the bottom most rung of the society if adequate reassurances do not come from state institutions. The shifting political

permutations and combinations suggest that the political space in these countries could be gripped in contestations, thus making the situation volatile for the citizens in general and the marginalised people in particular.

Women and other gender

The other concern relates to the societal and political positioning of women and other gender. Again, Title Two, namely Rights and Freedom, of the Tunisian Constitution is instrumental in upholding equality amongst its citizens (Constitution of Tunisia 2014). According to Article 21, 'male and female' will not be discriminated against when it comes to the issue of rights and duties (Constitution of Tunisia 2014). Very evidently, the Constitution identifies the gender and does not leave any scope for discussion with regard to the third gender or other gender. Similarly, Article 40 of the Constitution guarantees work and decent working conditions as a right to 'every citizen, male and female'. The identification of the citizens as belonging to just two gender categories does not do anything to ensure support to the minority gender. Again, citing from Article 74 of the Constitution of Tunisia (2014), it could be argued that it explicitly says only 'male and female' citizens can have the right to run for Presidential elections.

The counter-argument could suggest that the explicit indication of 'male and female' has been done to ensure equality to men and women. However, the document by design and definition is exclusionary of other gender. The very usage of the term 'male and female' in the Constitution of Tunisia (2014) specifies or fulfils the biological criterion of gender rather than 'men and women' which are more social terms. The ignorance of this differentiation marginalises the third gender both politically and socially. Moreover, Article 7 family has been identified as the 'nucleus of the society' (Constitution of Tunisia 2014). Once again, this discriminates against those who are not a part of the family unit of society.

Some movements within Tunisia have started demanding their rights. For instance, a feminist organisation by the name of 'Chouf minorities' is aimed at empowering women who are engaged in 'non-normative sexuality' and demands decriminalisation of sex work in order to facilitate their normal living in the society. Hali (2015) argues against the discrimination meted out to the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgenders) in Tunisia to point out that the Second Republic guarantees 'freedom of

conscience' (Article 6) as well as 'protection of privacy' (Article 24) (Constitution of Tunisia 2014). It is argued that homosexuality is 'considered deviant in the Arab cultural imagination' and its unacceptability made evident by semantic discourses that engages in derogatory and abusive terms to refer to the same (Guellouz 2016). The apprehension of the sexually marginalised is corroborated by the transition in which new bases are laid for the foundation of the Constitution and that still does not recognise the legitimacy of these groups.

In Egypt, the question of women rights and recognition of the other gender is lost in the struggle for stability. The rights of women, to begin with, could be put into a perspective of the past and the present. In the contemporary Article 11, 'The lace of women, motherhood and childhood', there is a separate section on women and their rights (Constitution of Egypt 2014), in which it says that women will be treated at par with men and there would be 'appropriate representatives of women in the houses of Parliament' (Constitution of Egypt 2014). Here again, Article 10 identifies family as the basic unit of society (Constitution of Egypt 2014). Given that the Egyptian Constitution is based on the principles of *Sharia* (Islamic jurisprudence), there is no mention of the other gender.

In this regard, it is to be noted that there are special provisions for the disabled in the society. Article 17 (Societal Security), Article 81 (Rights of the Disabled) and Article 244 (Representation of Youth, Christians and disabled persons, etcetera) could be cited as instances where the specific concerns of certain marginalised groups are recognised (Constitution of Egypt 2014). Therefore, the state makes its intention of protecting women and disabled people of the Egyptian society but does not mention its policies towards other gender. Although in several capacities the Constitution of Egypt (2014) is open-ended and the usage of the term 'citizens' suggest gender neutrality, in practice the scope for the minority gender is extremely limited. As compared to the earlier Constitutions, the post-revolution Constitutions sound democratic. However, on a thicker reading, there is a sense of prejudice against the minority groups. Post-revolution, the majority and stronger sections of the society have come to take the centre-stage in both political participation as well as making legislation.

In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the positioning of women during and after the revolution, a gendered perspective is relevant as it could reveal the dual

face of the revolution with regard to women wherein there is both emancipation as well as repression (Sjoberg and Whooley 2013: 15). Emancipation for women came through the expanding discursive spaces in the otherwise restricted political space. At the same time, there was visible repression of women as the revolution proceeded because there was a struggle for power. The agential powers of women were deliberately suppressed in the aftermath of the fall of Morsi government in June 2013. The images of the Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt in 2011 and 2012, where women participated and were confronted by the police or militia, bore testimony to their political assertion.

In the post-Mubarak era in Egypt, there was an attempt to delegitimise the role of women from public spaces and their participation in revolution ‘through the use of sexualised violence against women protestors’ (Pratt 2015: 55). Egypt has a history of women participation during Nasser as well as Mubarak’s political movement, the Kefaya movement, the Mahalla strikes of 2008 and continued in the revolution of January 2011 (Mostafa 2015). The suppression of women and their denial to political participation became contingent in the face of growing public assertion. As Mostafa (2015) argues, ‘*feminine sensibility*’ (original emphasis) introduced ‘a struggle for freedom and justice’, which was an anti-dote to the ‘*masculine chauvinism*’ (original emphasis) of the ‘military regime’. The participation of women in the movement in Egypt and Tunisia was also emotional as there was an urge to break away from the patriarchal power structures, which excluded women from public space.

Most analyses on global political economy, in general, has remained ‘gender blind’ and, therefore, not taken the feminist perspective more critically in international political economy (IPE) (Waylen 2006). In the case of Tunisia, there are rights given to women at par to men by the Constitution of Tunisia (2014). However, there are no guarantees for social security and does not protect them from the clutches of patriarchy. The male and female ought to have had equal representation given the ‘gender parity requirement’ in the Constituent Assembly formed in 2011 post-revolution; however, there were only 49 women out of 217 members body that is approximately 24 per cent of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) (Ajmi 2011). This definitely suggested under-representation of women in the framing of the sacrosanct document. Although more women were able to join later due to death or resignation of male members of the NCA, in line with the vertical list system, most women were not heads of the drafting committees (Cherif 2014).

Additionally, there were immense difference of opinion between them because of their political experiences and ideologies (Cherif 2014). This is suggestive of the point once again that women and gender issues are often presented as a monolith— this universalisation is a façade since it silences the dissonances amongst women. Feminist scholars, in general, agree that social theorising needs to challenge the inequalities in social structures (Waylen 2006). However, Carver, Cochran and Squires (1998) points out that there are disputes with regard to the ‘epistemological, ontological and normative questions’ in feminist literature rather than any imagined consensus amongst them. So, while the political vendetta of some Feminists, especially from the Ennahda party may have got accommodated, there are other apriori views that have remained unaddressed in Tunisian political discourse.

The aspirations of the various genders and sexual groups in Tunisia for political representation is viable— it is rendered problematic in a climate where there is a surge in political realm and a sudden re-assertion of subjectivity in public discourse. Hatem (2013) argues that the role of women needs to be studied in conjunction with the state and the rise of political Islam. It has to be studied critically from the perception of the community that is witnessing the changes. Therefore, in the context of the Arab world, the arguments cannot be drawn from a liberal perspective since it is vehemently absent in the polity, society, culture and traditions of the Arab region though in terms of its economy it is neo-liberal to a great extent.

It has also been argued that the Arab revolution could be seen as ‘creative destruction’ of the globalisation process which has promoted the aspirations of the Arab people in the years preceding the revolution (Al-‘Afifi 2012). Therefore, in areas of security and economics the region has not been exempt from neo-liberalisation and has borne both its benefices as well as its vagaries as much as the other parts of the world. However, the social and political situation has been much different. As the region has not been spared of monarchy and dictatorship, societal frameworks have, at best, tried to adjust with the rising influence of westernisation but have strongly stood against it becoming the norm of the Arab society.

With regard to women, feminism needs to be understood in the context of the Arab society. The debates on feminism mostly revolve around on two issues: first, question of equality with men and second, the question of westernisation. According to the

Foucauldian argument, ‘otherness’ is a ‘process’ that is ‘produced’ culturally (Foucault 1998 cited in Lazreg 2013). By this understanding, discourse on women rights and power relations between men and women in the Arab world is also reminiscent of both Oriental and Islamic culture. In the contemporary times, the Islamic versus western perception seems to dominate the discussions on women issues where the different groups objectify women in different ways. This tussle was well brought out in Tunisia between the women drafters of the Constitution which represented two opposing views— religious and secular. This also led to the weakening of the women group within National Constituent Assembly of Tunisia.

Re-examining revolution

The apprehension of the people of these revolutionary societies lies in the inability of the hegemonic groups to give ample protection to the people. There is a difference between ‘being safe’ and ‘feeling safe’ (Booth 2007: 10). Only with the accomplishment of both these factors, it could be argued that people are secured and, therefore, emancipated. The contemporary circumstances in the Arab world are far from this threshold of security. This point could also be read in conjunction with a methodological aspect of International Relations. The postpositivist approach in International Relations argues for the ‘prioritisation of process over substance’ and based upon the idea of ‘transaction’ between social entities (Guillaume 2007). Methodologically, this is again helpful for the study of the Arab world post-revolution since it gives scope to study processes of inclusion and exclusion in global politics.

Emotions such as fear and anxiety are difficult to be measured in quantitative terms; by looking at alternative sources of information these could be deciphered on the global scene (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008). In other words, emotions are not measurable and therefore, it is not possible to have a clinical analysis of it. The argument also relates to the emotional aspect of the post-revolutionary Arab world, namely anxiety, which is abstract and subtle. However, the twist and turn of the events therein could speak for the desperation with which people are trying to hold onto their positions in the society. The recently victorious majority of the Sunni Muslims in the region are eager to emphasise their relative strength in the political space. In the process, they are overtly and covertly denying space to the minorities as well as the weaker sections of the

society. There is a double denial here: first, the people in general are not being assured of the fulfilment of the fundamental demands; second, some of the minorities are kept tamed by means of minor concessions while others continue to be ostracised since there are no guarantees of security for them.

The case of the Baha'is in Egypt is important to consider in this regard: has there been any progress in their socio-political positioning post-revolution? According to the Constitution of 2014, it remains doubtful whether they would be recognised as full citizens of Egypt. Moreover, the Constitution differentiates them from the rest of the religious minorities and as such denies them any assurance of religious security. According to Article 46, the state guaranteed the 'freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites' (Constitution of Egypt 1971). However, the Article 43 of the Constitutions of Egypt 2012 and Article 64 of the Constitution of Egypt 2014, categorically mentions that these rights are given to the followers of 'divine religions' (Constitution of Egypt 2012) or 'revealed religions' (Constitution of Egypt 2014) respectively. In fact, the significance of the *Al Azhar* institution is symbolically represented in the in Constitutions framed post-revolution, that is in Article 4 of the Constitution of Egypt 2012 and Article 7 of the Constitution of Egypt 2014— a provision that was absent in the Constitution of 1971. This is not to suggest that the earlier Constitution was more promising for the Baha'is since the rights and liberties of the people were in general jeopardised. However, the clauses of the post-revolutionary Constitutions definitely cause trepidation and quandary for the exiguous section of the Egyptian society.

Similar arguments could be made in the case of Shiites in Tunisia or minority genders in these revolutionary states. These add up to a large part of the society that does not get ample contentment only by the political dissolution or supplantation of the government. The consternation of their endangerment due to the evolution of new policies and schemes lead these groups to maintain silence on certain fundamental issues which includes exclusion and deprivation. In spite of the claims of representation, invariably there are instances in Egypt and Tunisia which questions the inclusiveness of the political principles in the post-revolutionary period. Fear and anxiety is not a superficial concept; it is a more substantive phenomenon that emerges due to given power relations.

To argue on more critical lines, fear sometimes ‘inhibits’ the process of securitisation in liberal societies which often suffer from the drawbacks of pluralism and the threat of ‘enmity’ and ‘extremity’ from certain sections of the society (Williams 2011: 455). There is no logical outcome of the fear that is created amongst the people because it does not deter people from pushing from their political positions. At the same time, when the fear could not be generated in a collective, then it fails to be a securitising point (Rythovan 2015). Fear from the ‘apostate’ communities is utilised by the politicians to marginalise certain groups under circumstances when the government is not able to fulfil the expectations of the majority community. In turn, such measures create apprehensions amongst the marginalised population.

Deconstruction of readings of revolution is based on three grounds: first, the perspective of the marginalised in the revolution; second, the reading of revolution in conjunction with the processes following political overthrow; third, understanding revolution in conjunction with certain emotions such as fear and anxiety. From a translational aspect, the social fields in which the agencies interact become crucial for the security thinkers (Stritzel 2011). This argument could be rephrased in the context of the Arab world revolution also wherein the interactions between social groups produce meanings of security and insecurity; at the same time, governing prerogatives recognise certain claims as legitimate while they dismiss others.

For critical theorists, especially the Frankfurt School, the changes that are brought about in a society has to come with ‘an emancipatory intent’, with compulsorily some progress in the situation of the people (Rengger and Thirkell White 2007: 6). The liberation of the people post-revolution is selective— it is only over a period of time that the situation begins to stabilise. Adjudging from the perspective of the stronger sections of the society such as the elite and the majority Sunni community, the political transformation of power has enhanced their space in public discourses. The relative positioning of the minorities raises questions with regard to the applauses for the revolution.

The alternative understanding of revolution suggests a holistic exercise that is embedded in incorporating diversified viewpoints. Thinking differently widens the scope of confronting mainstream agendas which is barbed within the identity constructions (Connolly 1989: 332) and thus helps in deconstructing existing norms.

Studies on revolution have focused on class interests. The manner in which the class interests play out in a setting where polity is not very stable is important to consider. In this context, revolution by itself does not bring a change in the circumstances of people. Given that economically, neither Tunisia nor Egypt have done well reiterates the inconsistencies of the revolution.

Herein, the respective histories of Tunisia and Egypt need to be read in tandem with the contemporary occurrences. It is an overstatement to suggest that the revolutions in the Arab world have occurred for the first time in history. In Egypt itself, Nasser seized power from the erstwhile rulers. Even in the Constitution of Egypt, the revolution against the French and Nasser's revolt has been celebrated in the Preamble. Similarly, Bourguiba of Tunisia led the revolution in 1956. Therefore, the spirit of revolution was very much glorified; nevertheless, in the new Constitutions this seems to be missing.

In this regard, the post-modernist challenge is to account for the subtle side of revolution. There are several strands in critical theory, and therefore it is argued to lack in consistency (Kurki 2011). By reframing theorisations, the critical and philosophical edge will have much more to contribute to International Relations (Kurki 2011). Moreover, this inconsistency is more of an asset than a hindrance in the re-thinking of revolution. Re-thinking implies traces of earlier views and the manner in which it could be understood more deeply for having a wholesome perspective (Arfi 2012: 1-2). By digging deeper into contemporary analyses, it is possible to underpin the fault lines that the revolution has brought in the Arab world.

The tragedy in revolution: critical security narratives

By engaging in a double reading of revolution, the quandaries of a people in transition could be appreciated. Security during the transitional phases of the revolution could be at its lowest. The governed and the governors are all in a paradoxical situation where they can neither act strongly nor be inactive. For Brown (2007), to act is to do wrong: this is the tragedy in certain circumstances where there any action or performance would be detrimental to the ethics of global politics. However, inaction by itself could be detrimental to the security of the people. At the same time, there is a lack of accountability during a political turmoil. Therefore, the situation becomes grim.

Moreover, revolutions are unforeseen and there is no limit to the exigencies that the society may witness after the political overthrow. The situation is both cataclysmic as well as indecisive. Herein, revolution is a changing political reality for people that they are yet to come to terms with.

When seen in continuity from the past, the religious and cultural minorities in the Arab world as well as the suppressed sections of the society have gained minimally from the political overthrow. The circumstances during the turmoil is all the more suffocating. On one hand, previous arrangements with the polity, however much unsatisfactory these may have been, remain suspended, while on the other, new arrangements are yet to be made. In security studies, the fear which is aroused by disorder could be captured in the snippets of harm and denigration of minorities and weaker sections of the society which continues even after the political and constitutional changes. The tragedy is manifest in the deprivation of all individuals from guarantees of progress and equality.

Revolution intends to bring positive and progressive changes in the society. There are triggers that lead to the sudden revelation of popular discontent. In reality, there have been undercurrents of dissatisfaction and it is only controlled by force and repression. The overthrow of authoritarianism in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya is indeed a landmark in the history of the Arab region. The problem lies in eulogising this materialisation of freedom as absolute and universal. As has been pointed out earlier, the political overthrow was a symbol of the anxiety and anger of the citizens of these countries. However, there was no road map as to where the movement could proceed. The ousting of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt did not necessarily imply the beginning of democratisation. Herein, the insistence is upon the anxiety and apprehensions that revolution brings to the marginalised sections of the society— the vehement protests on the streets perturb their normal alliances; the calumnious sloganeering revokes their social arrangements; the execution of the majoritarian programme lapses into the political vendetta of appeasing the larger sections of the community. For the repressed sections, unless there is a holistic culmination of events into a full-fledged agenda to secure the unsecured segments, there is only scant assurance of their safety under the aegis of the new regime.

The tragedy lies in the despicable condition of the weaker and extradited sections of the society, who do not get respite from domination and suppression even after the political

overthrow. The emotion of anxiety and fear, least referred as they are in International Relations, provide a compelling tableau into the vagaries of these groups. There is a stark discrimination drawn between the dissenting opinions within the majoritarian groups and the dissonance with the minorities. The latter suffers due to their non-assimilation into the vanguard of prevailing political curriculum while at the same time unable to find adequate representation through the preponderant sections of the society. Security leading to emancipation and progress is therefore not verifiable given that the community at large suffers from hiccupping attitudes of the political newcomers.

In this chapter, revolution has been re-examined to argue that behind the clamours of the political overthrow lie a deeper agenda of subjectivity and subjection— subjectivity which is captured in the unceasing turmoil of the transition periods and subjection of the individual to acclimatise to the rapidly changing scenario. The mistrust in the vacillating situation renders the individual helpless, especially those who belong to the weaker sections of the society. Read in this way, the meaning of tragedy could be broadened to include the insights from the marginalised groups whose narratives are often camouflaged within the larger community discourse.

Critical security studies with its emphasis on emancipation and progress contributes to the understanding of revolution from the perspective of the marginalised sections of the global society. Revolution needs to be conceptualised as a movement for political change as well as social inclusion. Historical and contemporary narratives bring to the fore the revelation that several voices are scuttled during the revolutionary transition. Therefore, revolution could have a tendency to be hegemonised by political elites. When political overthrow results in a scuffle for power between groups, the politically disadvantaged sections sense insecurity. For Booth (2007: 10), emancipation comes from the ‘feeling’ of security. Given the plethora of political activities during the course of the revolution, the despondency and anxiety of the denigrated sections is a continuity from the past. This political overthrow inadvertently becomes an entrapment for the marginalised people, thereby disputing the cosmopolitan and iconoclastic imagery of revolution, and calling for a cavilling and pedantic understanding.

CHAPTER 5

Confinement and Torture in State Regulations

What is the tragedy in state regulations, given that it ostensibly enhances state security? The state is the custodian of legitimate force. It is entitled to use the same to maintain order and prevent anti-state activities. How, then, could regulations and state control be questioned? It must also be considered that within the Westphalian state system, sovereignty is territorially recognised and the actions of the state within its domestic territories is a legal use of authority. This typical understanding of the state system has undergone a transition with the advent of non-state actors in the global society. Clearly, there are ethical standards which the international community has set forth for the states to follow within their territories. These norms address, but is not limited to, the questions of policing, human rights and discrimination against global citizens. For this reason, a scrutiny of state practices that causes pain and harm to citizens is possible to explore.

There are ethical norms in the global society that has the potential to question state actions: laws on human rights, anti-torture conventions, treatment of prisoners of war, equality of civilians, etcetera, provide threshold for critical analysis. In other words, global norms for preventing citizens from deprivation, marginalisation and ostracism enables scrutiny into state regulations. This chapter engages in the tragedy of state regulations that encaptivates a person physically. The trauma emerges not only from the physical pain that the human body suffers but also from the emotional deprivation inflicted by confinement of the body. Herein, there is an engagement with global emancipatory norms and the quest of the confined person for emancipation. To this extent, an agential perspective emanating from the marginalised communities is analysed vis-à-vis a statist perspective that places state security prior to international ethical standards.

In this chapter, the issues are specifically addressed in the context of liberal democratic state. To begin with, liberalism in International Relations is considered to be a mainstream perspective because of its state-centric approach and its assumption of a hierarchical state structure in anarchy. At the same time, liberalism is often portrayed as being the most viable theoretical competitor for realism wherein realism presents a

'pessimistic view of human nature' and therefore, focus on conflicts in international relations whereas liberalism presents an optimistic view of international relations, thus focusing on co-operation in the international system (Heinze and Jolliff 2011: 319). Moreover, liberalism, unlike realism, also recognises the role of non-state actors (Heinze and Jolliff 2011: 319). Liberalism argues that 'state preferences' decide the engagement of states in world politics: these preferences are dependent upon the 'social context' of the state in a globalised world order (Moravcsik 2008: 234). In other words, there are interactions between various groups in and across states which determine the state behaviour. Liberalism looks into the societal context of the state to explain the functioning of the international system.

Liberal political theory, however, is not a monolith. In the social contract tradition of liberalism, 'the origins of political power (were) placed in the people' (Schultz 2011: 593). Hence, there was a recognition of the consent of the people to be governed and bound by a contract. As Schultz (2011: 593) points out,

The notion of a social contract is at the root of concepts such as constitutionalism, limited government, majority rule, and respect for individual rights.

There were two contending groups of liberal thinkers which emerged during nineteenth century: one group argued for involvement of government in political and economic matters ('welfare liberals') whereas the other group insisted on the limited intervention by the government (neoclassical liberals) (Grigsby 2011: 596). However, liberals including neoclassical, modern and libertarians are concerned with individual liberties. As Goldfinger (2011: 616) points out, '(t)he liberal tradition's primary political concern is the interest of the individual'.

In International Relations theory, liberalism has variants. Moravcsik (2008: 240-242) classifies these in the following manner: (a) 'identity and legitimate social orders', (b) 'commercial liberalism' and, (c) 'republican liberalism'. The first variant of liberal theory deals with social identification of groups, their political positioning and the 'allocation of citizenship rights' (Moravcsik 2008: 241) within this framework. The second variant is concerned with the economic aspects of trade and inter-state relations, whereas the last one deals with representation of social groups within domestic political institutions. There are claims of liberalism leading to peace in international relations (Doyle 1986) because of its recognition of cosmopolitanism and social welfare.

The claims of liberalism on democratic peace and non-conflictual nature is, however, questionable. As Simpson (2008: 258) points out liberal states have ‘a greater propensity to go to war than other states’. This is because the liberal democratic states are capable of shaping popular opinions because they are the guardians of ‘humanity’ (Simpson 2008: 258). This has the sanction of carrying out violence against those communities and societies which, according to the liberal states, need to be controlled for the benefit of the global society. According to Dunne (2009: 108), liberal states are peaceful towards democracies: however, the logic of peace does not necessarily extend to the non-democratic and non-liberal states. This, as Simpson (2008: 259) points out, does not lead to the abolition of war altogether but only as ‘a juridical category’, so that it is exempt from the scrutiny of international law. There are cases of human rights violation, arbitrary policing and initiation of conflict which is garbed in a security discourse.

Herein, there is a chasm between liberal ideological position of state and implementation of the same, where institutions are redesigned to reinforce state authority, thus, undermining liberal principles of equality and justice. There are violations of basic rights of citizens and undermining of human rights that is carried out by appropriating laws operational within the state. In other words, practices otherwise questionable within the ideological framework of the state itself, are rendered acceptable by invoking or advancing legislations that could provide a protective belt to these practices. Detention and torture, which encaptivates the body of the person, denies bare minimum freedom, prohibits movement and abuses the physicality of the person, has been in-vogue in the last two decades, in spite of global standards which have been set up to prevent custodial atrocities on the detainee. This resurgence or revival of blatant abuse of authority, verily against international standards and thus impeding emancipation of individuals and communities, makes state regulations a tragedy. Considering the backlash on Muslim citizens in the US after 11 September 2001, which includes legislative as well as unwarranted force used by the US state agencies in their self-professed task of countering terrorism, there is a deprivation suffered by the community. This is, in turn, contradictory to the provisions of the state for its citizens as well as ethical standards of the international community.

State control is a subject matter that has been extensively explored in both critical theory as well as mainstream International Relations theory including realism and

liberalism. The former critiques state power whereas the latter attempts to explain and rationalise it. Ever since the recognition of a state with the basic features underlined in the Westphalian settlement of 1648, namely territory, population and sovereignty, there has been a justification for the exercise of state authority. This argument is reminiscent of the concept of 'garrison state' (Lasswell 1941) which was introduced in 1941 by Harold Lasswell. Lasswell (1941), in his seminal article, argues that in future the states will come to be ruled by the elites, who would use political symbolism to motivate popular opinion. At the same time, he predicted, there would be a rise in 'internal violence', which would be directed against 'counter-elite' sections of the society (Lasswell 1941). This was suggestive of the disproportionate use of authority against citizens by the ruling elites. To sum up Lasswell's argument, the world is moving towards 'garrison states' where the 'specialists in violence are the most powerful group in the society' (Lasswell 1941). The violence manifests itself in several ways including restrictive state actions.

Lasswell's argument is pertinent in the context of current state practices, especially after 2001, as mentioned earlier. Tragic as the bombings were on 11 September 2001, the reactions of the state and the society were also cataclysmic. The memory of the 'fall of twin towers' or 'the crash of Pentagon' was kept alive by repeat telecasts on television as well as highlighting it as the single-most important factor for the survival of the US and its population. This visual emphasis became the core bases for violent state reactions, in spite of the human rights critique directed against the state. In this regard, it must be argued, the threat of 'global terrorism' annexed other commitments towards liberal and normative concepts. As Der Derian (2009: 70) points out, the view on terrorism 'has suffered from a corrosive mix of official opportunism, media hype, and public hysteria'. McCulloch (2010: 208-209) argues that the US has engaged in 'the establishment of global carceral complex', which could potentially render 'mass incarcerations' as routine processes in the global society and thus, transforming 'garrison state to garrison planet'. For this reason, the portrayal of a civilisation in threat from terrorism superseded the concerns of citizen rights.

The tragedy in regulation lies in the constrained conditions of the captivated individual. Security narratives of the state are forceful to the extent of justifying inhumane actions, as is prevalent in instances of torture and confinement. There is a process of marginalisation that begins with semantic disparagement, continues with regressive

measures of systematic social occlusion and solidifies with discursive provocations in the society. The creation of an image of the enemy, which is to be controlled, becomes the rationale for state actions. Campbell (1992: 34) has argued that the US has always constructed its security discourses around ‘range of threats’, including ‘world communism, the economic disintegration of Europe, Red China, North Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, “terrorists”, drug smugglers and assorted’. In the contemporary scenario, the argument could be seen as portraying the Muslims as the ‘threat’ of global peace and also as anti-US. This rationalisation accords a certain degree of acceptability of the violent state practices.

State regulations, in this chapter, are seen in the form of both legislations as well as policing. Legislations provide legitimacy to policing and surveillance, and for this reason, state security protocols are blatantly carried out irrespective of the trauma and suffering that is felt by the detained person. Regulation by the state compels citizens to live in awe and fear; the edifice of new laws and curtailment of earlier provisions reifies the fear amongst the population that emanates from a particular source, not necessarily lethal yet depicted to be so, while at the same time creating apprehension against a specific community. In spite of objections raised and critique mounted on such policies, the citizenry has to comply with the orders of the state. Therefore, there is a vicious circle of fear, regulation, captivity, torture, trauma, revulsion, redemption, violence and fear.

The chapter attempts to embed the concept of tragedy in the restriction of physical movement coupled with severities inflicted on the body of the person under control. State policies and actions can lead to the curtailment of civic rights of a citizen enormously: the right of the police to arrest people on grounds of suspicion and subject them to inhumane treatment is a case in point. The convictions of the state while maintaining its security protocol does not depend upon its cognition with any particular ideology: authoritativeness is prevalent irrespective of democracies, despotism or monarchy. These are considered legitimate actions because of the state warranties of security and there is little scope to contest these practices within existing judicial set-ups. Moreover, there are no safeguards for the prisoner: the denial is absolute in terms of space and security. Even in states where the liberal ideology is the basis of politics, there is subjugation of the individual. Under circumstances, the confined body is left to the whims and fancies of the detainer. An imagery of the dark prison cells in which

detainees are beaten, questioned and humiliated comes to mind and this is not abstract but real. The trauma in torture and confinement is dual: physical pain caused due to infliction of violence and the problem of rehabilitation in the society, thereafter.

The chapter revolves around the following question: why are regulations tragic, given that they ostensibly enhance the security of the state? The study interrogates the state logic of security which seems to be biased and hypocritical. Herein, critical security studies with its focus upon individual insecurity and trepidation forms the threshold from which a magnified view of state atrocities could be discussed. There is an attempt to understand the emotional dimensions of regulation: which emotions guide their formulation and how are regulations emotionally received. As Linklater (2014: 576) points out, there is an emotional aspect in the sociological processes where ‘collective emotions’ play an important role in building of social structures. This anger manifests in the processes of exclusion and is melancholic for the excluded communities. The ventilation of anger is possible through creation of public opinion and its efficient mobilisation, which facilitates the acceptance of state regulations.

The chapter is divided into several sections. In the first section, there is an attempt to conceptualise regulation. There is an overview of the meanings of regulation. Apart from the various connotations of regulation, its meanings, significance and relevance in security studies is also discussed. In the second section, the practice of torture in liberal democracies in contemporary times have been discussed. The main argument in this section is that torture is used indiscriminately without any clear-cut understanding of its repercussions. The section engages in the discourse on torture and the philosophical underpinnings of exercise of authority from the perspective of the captivated individual is explicated.

In the following section, the case of the US is introduced and the social implications of the torture laws, which were brought into force after 11 September 2001, for the marginalised communities are elaborated upon. Regulation is studied as a catastrophic incident for the ostracised sections of the society, causing pain and harm to the marginalised citizens of the global community. Herein, the study is embedded in the afore-mentioned case of the US after 11 September 2001. It is the central argument of this section, that the use of torture and extermination policies of the US was an emotional reaction— it was a ventilation of anger at being defied by a group of

individuals, and the failure of the US state to prevent the aggression. With specific reference to the case of the US, Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) have been suggested as the edifice upon which the structure for such analysis could be constructed. In the final section, a double reading of regulation and the manner in which it can contribute to the development of the thematic of tragedy in security studies has been discussed.

State regulation: meanings and connotations

According to the Merriam Webster's dictionary (2016), a regulation could be defined as 'an authoritative rule dealing with details or procedures'. The Cambridge dictionary (2016) defines regulation as, 'an official rule or the act of controlling something'. The Collins dictionary (2016) understands regulation as 'rules made by a government or other authority in order to control the way something is done or the way people behave'. The various dictionary meanings have two things in common: one, the notion of control which underlines the idea of regulation; two, the presence of a subject that has to be or needs to be kept under vigilance and discipline.

The reason for providing multiple meanings of regulation is to emphasise upon its semantic significance and the consistent vocabulary that is ingrained. A regulation intends to prohibit and control the citizens and govern according to directives issued by the state or any other authority in question. The form and shape it takes is not singular: it could range from legislations, surveillance, arrests, confinement and so on. It is also multi-dimensional because it could impact the relative positioning of select group of citizens. Regulations by state are particularly restraining because they carry with them a narrative of exclusion and solidifies lines of discrimination. As is evident by the definition, there is a sense of legitimation that is ostensibly present and for this reason, the authority of regulations over every one is unchallengeable.

Invariably, the institution that exercises maximum control and intends to enhance authority, is the state. The state within its domestic space exercises influence and emphasises upon its jurisdiction to do so. Before proceeding to the details of regulation, the political and legal bases of exercising authority have to be understood in the context of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty, though, remains unclear and 'essentially uncontested' in International Relations, which enables the treatment of the concept as a given and stable (Weber 1995: 2-3). The tendency is to move towards addressing

other supposedly relevant questions of International Relations, while leaving aside the problematisation of the concept of sovereignty (Weber 1995: 2-3). The unquestionable acceptance of the term 'sovereignty', secures the state practices and actions, even if it is harmful for the people and violates international standards. It is equally important to understand its relevance within the international community and the changes that new developments in the concept have brought about in the state-citizen relationship. The idea of sovereignty of the state, therefore, needs some attention in this regard.

Hinsley (1986: 26) argues, 'the idea of sovereignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community'. Sovereignty is understood in two ways: 'internal' sovereignty and 'external' sovereignty. By internal sovereignty, it is implied that there is a 'supreme command' within the territories of a state that 'rightly exercises its authority' (Held 2004: 162). Increasingly, there is a shift in the ideas of what constitutes the political power and legitimacy. As Hardin (2007: 236-37) argues that simply forming a government does not mean that the people recognise it as legitimate: that is subject to the approval of citizens and has a psychological component upon the people. Since the formulation of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the state has been given the prerogative to make laws within its own domestic borders.

The second aspect of sovereignty is 'external'. This implies that 'there is no final and absolute authority above and beyond the sovereign state' (Held 2004: 163). Therefore, the state has minimal interference from the outside powers. There is a cognition by other states of the jurisdiction of a state in its territory and over its population. Due to the use of force and exercising of central authority the state is able to ensure its survival in a highly competitive 'self-help system' in the international sphere (Waltz 1979: 57). Therefore, states are 'nominally free and equal' (Held 2004: 163). To this extent, Donnelly (2005: 35) argues that 'hierarchy and anarchy are two principal political ordering principles'. This is in resonance with structural realism of Waltz (1979: 61). In this context, Keohane (2004: 150) critiques realism for its insistence upon the 'monopoly of force' and the strengthening of state control.

'External' sovereignty means that the authority of a particular government over a territory and population is recognised by other states as well as non-state actors. Grimm (2015: 78-79) argues that there is an acknowledgement of authority from external sources and for this reason, there was emergence of 'external law', also called

‘international law’, which ‘specialised in external relations among states and was not concerned with a state’s internal order’. This brings the state within the fold of international community, and at the same time clarifying that the sheer presence of territory, population and government does not make a sovereign state, but recognition of such authority by others is also important.

In this context, Weber (1995: 3-4) argues that there is a ‘political struggle’ to ‘fix the meaning of the word sovereign’ in such a way that it suggests a ‘particular state’ with certain features, boundaries and legitimacies attached to it. This is the production of a particular type of state which is vested with arbitrary powers. The conceptualisations within the literature of International Relations creates structures of power and the rationale is to operate within this framework. It has also been argued that the state system where sovereignty is defined in terms of territory and population may not continue to exist but be replaced by a ‘modern and secular system’, wherein the authority had to be shared with the lower levels of administrators (Bull 2003: 580). In this sense, the continuation of the state system is not a given but contingent upon situation and its acceptance in the international community. Contrary to this viewpoint, however, the legal basis of the existence of state, namely sovereignty, has not been replaced by any other factor. This is because the institutions of state and the elites who are at the helm of political affairs, use the means at their disposal to ensure their consolidation of power.

Legitimacy, as Hardin (2007: 237) points out, can be based on three ideas: first, legitimacy is grounded on the consent of the people; second, the contribution of the state towards the welfare of its citizens; third, the manner in which the government works towards continuing its position of power. On either of these grounds, the claim for legitimacy can be made. It must be noted that all of the three conditions are firmly rooted in the idea of democracy. In other words, a discussion of legitimacy of authority on grounds of consent from people, welfare actions of the state as well as enhancement of power, is relevant to democratic states. Though democracy is a broad category. More specifically, democracies based on liberal ideologies are the focus of study.

From the liberal perspective also, constitutionalism automatically restrains the power of the state: therefore, the state is regulated from within, without the need for any foreign intervention (Keohane 2004: 150-151). For these reasons, the state technically

has unrestrained power in its own hands. In certain cases, however, there is a normative idea about saving civilians by means of external interference wherein the engagement of the state in atrocities towards its own population is clear cut and requires involvement of the international community (Wheeler 2000: 2). This is in sharp contrast to practices of liberal states inside their boundaries where they uphold extreme measures to control extra-state forces, while during the course of this exercise, justify detention and torture. Therefore, there is a tension between formulation of global values, and its practical application within the state. The extension of ethical principles inside the dominion, remains the prerogative of the state— this is a signification of the state's authority inside its anointed territory.

With the logic of 'external' sovereignty in place, at the very outset, internal political decision-making is an obligation of state institutions. There is no scope for external intrusion or verification. Even with the advent of liberal democracy, the prerogative for making laws remains with the state. The extent to which the state goes on to assert its authority is manifested in the regulations it imposes upon the people— it surpasses discourse on individualism, rights and equality with the sole focus on state security, thus, heavily compromising upon human security. The tilt towards ensuring security of state implies surveillance, policing, curtailment of civil liberties and the subordination of people to the state orders, even if these are detrimental to the interests of the citizens. In the context of terrorism and counter-terrorism, the state narrative takes precedence over all others, including those which reify the liberal basis of societal cooperation and toleration. There is a suppression of other views and virtually becomes a monologue because the state does not make any concessions to the marginalised citizens and other actors in security issues even in democratic states.

Democracies, though, are the most secure forms of government. In comparison with authoritarian states or 'non-democracies', citizens in a 'well-functioning' democratic state experience higher degree of liberty, economic growth and 'human development', while at the same time suffering less violence and prejudice (Warren 2006: 382). However, state practices in democracies betrays this perception by resorting to legislative means for making violence by state acceptable. In other words, within democratic institutions, the state utilises its infrastructure to curtail liberties of the people procedurally. Nonetheless, these undermine democratic ideals where citizens are inimical to the polity.

Therefore, the tactics and techniques of state control in a democracy are different from authoritarian state. In a democracy, stringent laws and regulations have to be justified in such a way that it does not alienate the government from its people. Ideally, in a democracy the identity of a citizen ought to be irrelevant—irrespective of the subjectivities of an individual, one has equal rights, duties and opportunities to stand by. It is a common observation, however, that there is a deliberate attempt to exclude certain citizens by means of identity construction which is an ‘uncertain and unstable’ process (Saward 2006: 401). Hardin (2007: 236) argues that although they are citizens ‘who comply and who consent, but it is usually the state or the laws that are said to be legitimate’. This dichotomy is symbolically significant because in spite of the democratic rhetoric, in reality, there is limited powers in the hands of the citizens. It is relevant to build upon the support of the people, even if they exclude certain sections of the society. This has to be done in such a way that the policies of the government become acceptable and are implemented with the support of the elites and majority population.

In the most common of the discourses on state regulation, it is emphasised that enforcement of rules is important for the protection of civilians. According to Newton and Van Deth (2005: 284), it is the ‘traditional task of the government’ to enforce law and order by controlling ‘internal disorder’ and ‘foreign aggression’, while at the same time preventing dangerous internal scenarios such as those emanating from ‘modern life’ (for example, atomic plants). This levies two sets of ideas upon the reader: first, the state needs to be given higher authority for facilitating its role as the guardian of the people; second, there is a semantic superiority accorded to the state, which covertly relegates the citizens to the secondary level. Hence presumptuously, state regulations are studied as an assessment of the state in carrying out its duties towards civilians, but the question of accountability and insecurity of the people is seldom raised in mainstream security narratives of regulation. By justifying regulations in the sense of securing individuals, the possibility of reconsidering these, and discussing their futility and authoritative nature is deemed redundant at the very start. In spite of the universal language of laws and regulations, there is a vocabulary that delineates particular values as distinct and, therefore, problematic for the society. Though covert, there is a tendency to identify certain communities as the source of insecurity (Campbell 1992: 3-4). The creation of negative perception regarding particular communities, in turn, enables the

state to portray itself as the saviour of the citizens (Bigo 2002). This is the most typical and commonly acceptable understanding of regulations and domestic laws. Regulations not only become a legitimate action on part of the ruling sections of the society but also a *sine qua non* for the well-being of the society.

At the same time, civilians expect the state to safeguard their interests. The elite sections of the society are especially enamoured by the state policies which are strict in exercising control and yield authority and power to the state to do the same. It is for this reason that consent of people forms the bases of formulation of such laws. As Bigo (2002) appropriately points out, the state is not just constitutive of the government but also the upper echelons of the society. Therefore, the state fulfils its presumed security requirements with the support of the elite sections of the society. This, while retaining the spirit of law and order, has the effect of appeasing the majority groups. The legitimacy of actions, thus, acquired by the state is partial yet influential. More than anything else, it enables the state to carry out its policies and directives, however much, it is opposed to the interests of minority sections. As O'Neill (2010: 35) points out, legitimacy 'creates power that relies not on coercion but on consent'. This consent of citizens compromises upon the security of marginalised communities. It also leads to construction of a security discourse which mirrors the perception of the state as to what or who is constitutive of threat.

Saward (2006: 404) argues that the recent change in attitude towards citizens regurgitates certain questions of citizenship and new ways to probe the state-citizenship relation. To this extent, 'forums' are important arenas of dialogue and discussion: it is through 'deliberative democracy' that citizens actively participate and discuss questions of 'participation, toleration, recognition of others and so on' (Saward 2006: 404-405). This is critical for the advancement of democracy and for making democracy productive for citizens in general. New ways of looking at democratic system might also invoke new ways of representation that would be more reflective of the opinion of the people (Saward 2006: 415).

In this regard, it is important to consider the statist theories. According to the statist theories in general, the authors attempt to understand the institutions of the state as well as the relationship of the state with its citizens (Batta 2011: 91). According to Skocpol (1979 as cited in Batta 2011: 92), the state is capable of creating its own institutions

and pursue its interests because it is an autonomous entity. This autonomy of a modern state sometimes reaches far beyond the penetration of public scrutiny. However, the acceptance of this discourse is complete and comes in handy for the state structures. Krasner (1984 cited in Batta 2011: 93) also argues that states have autonomy because their task is not just to draft policies but also to make it acceptable to the people and for this, they require power and authority. These arguments invariably tilt in favour of states making policies even though these may be regressive for the citizens, especially the marginalised communities. On the other hand, scholars such as Almond (1988 cited in Batta 2011: 93) and Eckstein (1960 cited in Batta 2011: 93), insist on the relationship between state and society and the manner in which society provides inputs to the state for policy making. In effect, in both ways the state stands to get the benefit of doubt and is seen as the harbinger of security and protection for the society, in turn, prejudicing rights of civilians, particularly marginalised communities.

The state engages in making policies that afflicts certain sections of the population. In this regard, state exercises control coercively and on unfounded fears that cast a dark light on the security of the marginalised communities. It also provides safeguards for civilians that come from particular sections of the society. As Bigo (2002) observes, the state is not a monolith but a combination of government and elites who work together to privilege themselves and exercise authority over the citizens. Though any ruling or regulation, especially in a democracy, is assumed to be universal, it becomes evident that it is also protective of certain institutions and practices. In liberal democracies, this is all the more problematic because in essence they pledge to civil rights of citizens, ensure basic liberties as well as guarantee judicial equality. Toleration, if not willing acceptance, is an essential feature. Although, by definition, toleration implies that there is absence of peaceful co-existence between sections of the society, the principle is indicative of assimilative ‘societal tendencies’ (Galeotti 2006: 564). In essence, liberal democracy, supposedly, combines the competitive task of ‘popular rule with antimajoritarian features’ (Plattner 2010).

In this regard, it could be argued that there are ‘two concepts of politics’, which are interrelated but are very different in their historical genesis and conceptualisations: ‘the sphere concept’ that has the intention to segregate ‘politics’ as distinct from other ‘sectors’ and ‘the activity concept’ that is concerned with the practical aspects of politics including its contextual setting and relevance (Palonen 2006). The

distinctiveness of the two concepts gets reflected in the extradition inflicted by the state upon certain sections of the society in cases of state control and regulation. This deludes the basic principles of liberalism, namely, toleration of values and protection of minority rights. Moreover, in the garb of a regime that has public sanction, the global norms are relegated to the margins. The violation of human rights, for that matter, is one of the ways in which citizens fail to get assurance from the state regarding their security. By compromising these very tenets, as will be evident on assessing the case of the US after 11 September 2001, the ethos of democracy is lost to the statist prerogatives of authoritarianism. This case would be substantiated in the subsequent pages with an engagement with torture and confinement in the US as a reaction against the terror attacks.

Levi-Faur (2011: 3) opines that regulation is a 'highly contested concept'. According to this argument, the various understandings of regulation stem from the variegated political motivations. For instance, the 'Far Right' attaches negative connotations to regulation as the term is representative of authoritarian governance and the symbol of curtailment of liberty of people; the 'Old Left' considers it to be a 'part of the superstructure that serves the interests of the dominant class and frames power relations in seemingly civilized forms'; 'Progressive Democrats' consider it to be a means of controlling the capitalists who aim at profit-maximisation; some view it as a 'matter of the state and legal enforcement'; still others consider it to be 'the work of social actors who monitor other actors, including governments' (Levi-Faur 2011: 3). In this sense, regulation could be conceptualised depending upon the political ideology.

More than an analysis of the idea, the studies on regulation seeks to address causality rather than understanding the concept as such. It is not an overstatement to argue that indeed regulation has never been treated as a concept. It is considered more of a practical application than an idea that needs explication in International Relations. Most of the arguments hinge upon the notion of state as a controlling authority within a neo-liberal order. In the above understanding of regulation, the role of governments and states are considered primary. In this context, the manner in which they affect policy decisions are argued by the above understanding of regulation, but they do not say anything about the explication of the term.

Levi-Faur's (2011: 3) understanding of 'regulation' and his argument that it is 'a highly contestable concept' needs to be reconsidered. This is because there is no conceptualisation of regulation in International Relations. The way in which regulation is observed is in fact a consequence of the larger theoretical ideas and ideologies rather than any concrete conception. In the case of security studies, arguments have hardly revolved around the act of regulating. It could be argued that the Copenhagen School of critical security studies engages in the securitisation practices of the state and in this regard focus on the discursive functioning of the state. However, they do not provide a theoretical understanding of regulation. Moreover, regulation is casted in less critical terms. It is wrapped in a discourse of necessity and authenticity. The neoliberal world order does not insist on the separation of politics and economics; these are considered complementary and relevant for the growth of the society as such. Edkins (2014: 132-34) raises the question, 'Why do we obey?'. Drawing from Max Weber's work, she answers, 'power and authority as possessed by a specific and identifiable few' are considered to be 'legitimate' (Edkins 2014: 143). Exercise of authority because of its ostensible legal sanction renders obedience to rules and regulations possible.

According to Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004: 2-3), there are four kinds of regulation that are normally spoken about and these relate to specific disciplinary practices. First, the evolution and transformation of the meaning of the word 'regulation', which is sometimes both confusing and contradictory. Second, the term discusses the 'changing relation between competition and regulation and its implications for the role of politics' (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004: 2-3). Third, it attempts to elaborate on the political nature of the state in a 'neo-liberal' context. Fourth, there is an attempt to unravel the political bases of regulation, 'considering the possibility that the changing social context of regulation has had a major impact on its rise' (Levi-Faur 2004: 3).

This classification is methodologically tidy in as much as it tells us about the different ways in which regulation can be interpreted. The first relates to the historical embeddedness of the concept, its genesis and evolution. The second meaning of regulation is more on the economic front and relates the role of politics and economics. The third meaning is related to the political aspects of the state and the manner in which it exercises authority. Finally, the meaning of regulation draws a correlation between sociological aspects and politics of regulation. It observes the way in which the social meaning of regulation changes with time. However, there are overlaps between the four

ways of thinking about regulation which has not been discussed. For instance, the historical grounding of regulation is not possible to understand fully unless the political bases for the genesis of the regulatory state is taken into account. Similarly, the correlation between society and regulatory state actions is closely linked to the historical genesis of regulation. Therefore, this classification, clinical as it is, lapses when practical efforts are made to address the question of regulation.

Regulation could be understood with both state-centred and societal perspectives (Levi-Faur 2011: 1-2). According to the state centred interpretation, state laws are given importance whereas in a society-centred understanding, focus is upon the role and significance of institutions in making laws (Levi-Faur 2011: 2). There is a third understanding also which is based on legal and juridical understandings of regulation and insist upon the state's exercise of 'social control' (Levi-Faur 2011: 2). These are some of the most commonly acceptable ways of understanding regulation. These give a sense of the various ways in which regulation could be understood. Moreover, they are useful in understanding and appreciating the role of various institutions, such as state, government and non-state actors in the making and implementation of regulation as such.

According to the state-centred interpretation of regulation, the focus is on mostly on state made policies and programmes. Law and Kim (2011: 113) argue in the context of the US state policies that there are two standard theories of regulation: 'public interest' and 'capture'. Both these theories operate on the economic front. They are closely related to operational economics. The theory of public interest is more 'traditional' in nature. It argues that 'government regulation arose to combat market failure' (Law and Kim 2011: 113). The second theory, namely, 'capture theory', states that 'producers sought regulation to restrain competition' (Law and Kim 2011: 113). These theories explain and elucidate upon the economic regulations. Law and Kim (2011:113) continue to put in a fresh perspective to argue that the 'use of force by the state' depends upon its 'nature and form'. An important corollary could be seen with the political policies of the state: if there is an economic turmoil in the country, it leads to the tightening of political rules and impact civilians in a more stringent manner. However, explication on the political front has remained very little.

Yet another sense in which regulation is used in academic literature, is in terms of government accountability that provides legitimacy to the policies however much restrictive they may be (Rose-Ackerman 2011: 171). There are three theories under this rubric: the 'performance accountability' which states that a 'high level of efficiency and integrity' is needed in the public sector, 'rights based accountability' which implies that there are 'legal constraints that protect individuals against the abuses of arbitrary power', and 'policymaking accountability' which argues that the process of making policies should be reflective of democratic ideals (Rose-Ackerman 2011: 171-72). Once again, this interpretation is more closely related to economic facets and inadvertently reflects the implications for political activities. It also shows the linkages between economics, politics and legalities in spite of the efforts to keep these as distinct from each other as possible.

Some of the legal scholars perceive regulation in the form of its purpose: whether laws ought to 'command', 'steer' or 'facilitate' the process of control (Cohn 2011: 185). Therefore, the question really is which form of law to choose and in what direction the policies ought to move. There is also a distinction that is drawn between 'formal laws' and the laws which are derived from 'norms' (Scott 2001 cited in Cohn 2011: 185-86). The legal component of regulation is extremely important to understand. It is the legal sanction that makes a policy into law and binding upon citizens. Cohn (2011: 186) argues that laws bring citizens within the fold of governance while at the same time putting restrictions on them. This also suggests that there is a duality in regulation: on the one hand, the citizens are the regulated or controlled whereas the state is the regulator or controller. He also argues that state regulations are not sealed by statutes and, to this extent, there are constraints that are placed upon agency-based regulations since these are themselves the product of particular legal statutes.

The crux of the matter lies in the argument that even agencies that are under the control of law have the sanction of the state legitimately. It is for this reason that legality is extremely significant in International Relations, especially in security matters. The laws are also drafted taking into account certain factors such as economic and socio-political dimensions in mind. The legal vocabulary delineates roles and standards for various actors and groups in the society. It becomes an unchallengeable authority, which has the ultimate say on issues of dispute. This, in turn, influences the decisions and relative positioning of the agencies. According to Gilardi and Maggetti (2011: 201), state

control has increased due to the support of non-state agencies and ‘independent regulatory agencies, that is, regulators that are not under the direct control of elected politicians’. The strength that is derived from and given to the state, is also facilitated by legal sanctions.

Therefore, the correlation between regulations and state agencies can be observed by looking into the legal dimension of regulations that are formulated. Legality grants the agencies to function in certain ways. On the political front, however, these allowances sometimes play into the hands of the authorities. The relation of law with regulation is strong because in the absence of a legal sanction, the regulation could be a toothless lion or even a damp squib. ‘Adversarial legalism’, a kind of system that is undertaken in the United States, could be understood as something that has enhanced formality, ‘rule-based relation’ and regulation of judicial activities (Kagan 2001 and Keleman 2002 cited in Schmidt 2004: 273). For the purpose of this chapter, legality of regulations and their impact upon civilians are significant to assess. As Richter-Montpetit (2017) points out, although liberalism is based on the principle of ‘rule of law and respect of legal equality, law is a very central mechanism through which liberalism normalises and (makes) invisible practices including torture’. In the case of the US after 11 September 2001, since regulations always had a legal sanction, procedures for legalisation needs also to be considered.

In this regard, Schmidt (2004: 273) also argues that the compromise or balance between the private and the public views is difficult to achieve because of the procedural politics which has to decide upon the restrictions and favours that would be given to each of the sectors, and in some ways, also to the actors. This balance could be struck only by means of legal backing. This is also restricted sometimes. As Schmidt (2004: 274-75) argues, formal laws foil ‘the emergence of informal norms, private sector self-regulation and non-state influence on regulatory outcomes’. This happens due to the interaction with ‘hierarchical models of interaction’ (Schmidt 2004: 274-75). The regulatory bodies go through a legality that makes rules acceptable to the society. Once again, the dependence of regulation on law making is clear, while at the same time it is also substantively argued that law making has its own biases and limitations. When it comes to security policies and legislations, especially, there is a significant aspect of control implied in the laws. It manifests the intentions of the state to establish authority

over its subject while at the same time severely compromising on some of their basic rights.

The factor of 'accountability' and 'transparency' are also important for a regulatory state. Especially in the case of economic issues, both the criteria are important to be met. Accountability makes the state responsible and transparency makes the state responsive to inimical problems of the state. It also enables scrutiny within the global community so that there could be lesser abuse of power, while at the same time it provides stronger basis for policy making. This also has repercussions for the understandings of citizenship and the relation between state and citizens. As Lodge (2004: 125) points out, there is a transition from the political to the economic conception of citizenship, which is a product of 'the move towards the regulatory state'. Therefore, certain conceptions such as citizenship though political in nature are getting transformed into an economic idea. With this change, the very notion of citizenship is being brought under the economic profile. Therefore, when regulations are drafted within the intention of enhancing security, it is convenient for the state to portray the economic outsider as a threat and draft laws that politically excludes or marginalises people. Agency is important even in political issues; in the case of regulation there is a strengthening of the economic notion of citizenship which helps biased policies and programmes at the political front. Therefore, accountability and transparency are moulded to fit into the desires and aspirations of the political class.

The change of the idea of citizenship could be marked by three kinds of 'drifts': 'agency drift' which implies that there is a tendency to evade the control in 'the pursuit of self-interested actions' (Stigler 1971 cited in Lodge 2004: 126); 'bureaucratic drift' which means that the bureaucracy regulates through 'selective or biased attention' (Lodge 2004:126); and 'coalition drift' which connotes that the leading party of the coalition tries to insist upon its own preferences than the decisions of the entire coalition (Lodge 2004: 126). These changes are reflective of the ways in which ideas can go on to shape norms in the field of regulation.

Yet another way in which regulation figures in the disciplinary discourse is with regard to its 'visibility' (Horn 1995 cited in Lodge 2004: 126-27). This relates to issues of transparency. Once again, the manner in which the liberal world order operates could be considered. Governance in the liberal society implies that rules could be scrutinised

and reviewed— people have the right to information. Heywood (2003: 38), in this context, has argued that ‘the need for consensus in society’ has been the cornerstone of twentieth century liberal theories on democracy: this ‘has the crucial advantage of maintaining a consistent level of accountability and popular responsiveness’ (Heywood 2003: 38). According Richter-Montpetit (2017), ‘the liberal states always already rests on “illiberal” security practices’. Even in the liberal world there are spaces in which governance takes place under secrecy and nothing gets out in the public sphere.

The above-mentioned discussion is relevant because it identifies certain aspects related to regulation such as relation between state and citizens, questions appertaining to citizenship, accountability, responsibility and transparency. However, these imply identification of some of the features of regulation, rather than a conceptual terrain. Aspects of state control not just appertain to economic issues but also to socio-political aspects. By drawing upon some of the features mentioned, regulation could be grounded as a concept. More specifically, within the security framework, regulation emerges as a significant practice. It reifies security practices by the state. Regulations enmesh the citizens with the state protocol. With regard to security protocols, there is recognition of someone or something that has to be brought under control. There is no unanimity with regard to the cognition of the dangerous element— whether it is an individual, a community or a phenomenon of the society. For the lack of clarity, a vacuum is created, which is adequately filled up by the state discourse. This provides a common understanding of ‘who’ or ‘what’ has to be feared and controlled.

Security matters unnerve the state. Though, what could be defined as a security concern has not been clear: whether it is the threat arising out of protests towards government policies, ideological differences with the ruling groups, or is it dissidence from the minorities? Or is it merely but sharply an anti-thesis of the state agendas? The plethora of prohibitions and rules that the state brings about under the garb of sovereignty is sometimes quite unfounded. There are, however, more influential factors involved sometimes in drafting internal regulations. These at times are also the result of globalised fear or global insecurity. To borrow from Keohane (2004), there is an ‘institutionalisation of fear’ of terrorism which results in the creation of policies which are instrumental in countering these actions. Therefore, security is often framed into ‘global networks’ (Clark 2004: 178-79).

It has been argued that the intention of terrorism is not to ‘bring about death and destruction, but to create unease and anxiety about possible future acts of death and destruction’ (Goodin 2006 cited in Heywood 2011: 284). According to Robert Jackson (2007: 136-37), the global and inter-connected world faces a critical situation, they rely upon the ‘cooperation of other states’. The impact of the external collaboration is also felt due to enhanced measures that could restrict the threats. In contemporary global politics, fear is also ‘shaped and induced by social media discussions’ (Oksanen, Kaakinen, Minkkinen, Rasanen, Enjolras and Steen-Johnsen 2018). In effect, regulations are considered not only imperative for the security of state but also significant for reiterating state supremacy across the international community.

Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010: 106-107), however, argue that the debates around terrorism are ‘deeply political’: it is a ‘label’ for particular acts and actors. In other words, there are no parameters that could decide what terrorism is, except the application of the term. Heywood (2011: 286) argues that not only ‘political violence’ carried out by non-state actors but ‘all forms of political violence or warfare aim, at some level, to strike fear into the wider population’. Posing a critique on the study of terrorism after 11 September 2001, Jackson (2009: 67) argues that the production and dissemination of knowledge is ‘politically biased’ and solidifies the extant ‘structures of power in society, particularly that of the state, and to promote particular elite political projects’. Moreover, it is used as an ‘umbrella term’ (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 108) for organisations which are in protest or dissidence against the pre-dominant political views.

Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010: 108) argue that the ‘*referent object* of terrorism’ (original emphasis) requires scrutiny, since ‘states can be terrorists too’. Historically speaking, states have been involved in the cultivation of fear among its citizens, including Western democracies (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 108). This could be related to Edkins’ argument that rules and laws are obeyed by citizens because they have been legitimised by the state (Edkins 2014: 143). Similarly, Heywood (2011: 286) argues that the term ‘terrorism’ is ‘used as a political weapon, implying that the group or action to which it is attached is immoral and illegitimate’. By using the semantics of terrorism, state actions and policies are deemed acceptable. It is, therefore, important to understand the theoretical underpinnings of regulation.

Theoretical perspectives on regulation

It is of note that in spite of the perpetual presence of security infrastructure and policing actions, there has been very limited theoretical interpretation of the very term 'regulation'. The reliance on dictionary meaning/s of the word stems from this very concern. Although in liberal economics, regulation has been explicated upon in several ways, the political aspects of it rarely comes to the fore. The apprehension about regulation stems from the overt and covert ways in which it excludes citizens and particular communities. Regulations are hardly a subject of critique because they trickle top down and is shrouded in a non-discursive frame. As a result of this, there is an identified domain within which criticism or analysis cannot penetrate. It is, therefore, imperative to understand the connotations of the word 'regulation' in terms of theories of International Relations, particularly security studies, so as to appreciate the critical edge it contains.

Security studies coming from the mainstream perspectives often work towards justifying security policies, even if these are detrimental to the interests of the global population. Realism, for instance, is mostly concerned with the security threat emanating from outside the state territories. There is an external threat which is perpetuated by the anarchical state system. The self-interested actors aim for maximisation of their interests. In this regard, there is a strengthening of the military capabilities of the state. While emphasising upon this, the state does not reflect upon the morality of certain actions. Hence, if waging a war is in the interest of the state, they might do so irrespective of whether it is calamitous. This does not necessarily imply that the state goes against international standards or questions of legitimacy. It does, however, according to the realist logic, maximises its security through arms race and enhancement of capabilities.

It must be pointed out here that the causal analysis which is grounded in humanism and rationality has been spearheaded in the discipline of International Relations by two schools of thought, namely realists and liberals: realists argue that due to the self-interested nature of human being, wars will continue to be fought whereas liberals argue that wars can be 'moderated' through 'institutionalism' and 'economic interaction' (Kurki 2008: 88). What is to be noted is that the realists do not intend to control the state system but provides materialistic solutions to improve the relative positioning of

state: the stronger the military and defence of a state, greater the possibility of its survival (Waltz 1979: 162-163). The liberals, however, argue for controlling and regulating. Therefore, liberal policies invariably control politics through economic factors and vice-versa.

This is not to suggest that one is more ethical than the other. As Molloy (2008) argues realism, especially classical realism, is not bereft of ethicality. On the basis of the works done by E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau, Molloy (2008: 83) argues:

Carr and Morgenthau provide two competing perspectives on the possibility of ethical life in international relations. Carr can be seen as a pragmatist, convinced of the social construction of norms and ethics in international society. The relativism of Carr offended Morgenthau, who insisted on a transcendent perspective on matters of political morality, a perspective located outside of politics and rooted in a moral philosophy of the lesser evil.

Therefore, classical realism is indeed not bereft of normative essence. The works of later scholars have rendered realism as being ungrounded on morality. However, their morality has a different connotation: in no way does it imply that the state will not consider its own profit and loss. It rather implies that the ethical dimension of politics lies in maintaining power without any recourse to high moral standards common to the societal ideas (Donnelly 2008: 150-51). As Molloy (2008: 84) argues, the ethics of real politics does not lie in 'subordination of political interests' but in 'accommodation of political power and ethics'. In effect, there is a normative grounding of power that has to be pursued with the purpose of maintaining itself in the international system.

The stance of realists and liberals on regulations, especially extreme measures as confinement and torture, are, therefore, important to consider. The peculiarity, in state directed regulation, lies in its application within its territories. This could include suspension of fundamental rights, transgress human rights and indifference towards the circumstances of the citizens involved. The threat is not perceived to be external, but lies within and, therefore, has to be eradicated by responsible state actions. In this way, there is an emphasis placed upon the hazards that certain individuals could bring to the society and for that reason they have to be checked on time. The discourse presented by the US on its policing activities after the 'crimes' (Brown 2002: 263) of 11 September 2001 is relevant over here. The identification of the threat from a particular group was likened to the episodes of the fall of twin towers and the Pentagon, which in turn sanitised the state protocol of torture and detention in the US. Violence through

infliction of torture was justified on grounds of containing terror threats to the country— exercising control over minds and bodies of individuals were considered important.

There is, however, a strong case presented against torture techniques such as ‘waterboarding’ by realists. Walt (2009) argues that although realism is a ‘positive’ but ‘amoral’ theory of International Relations, the protocol of realism is to enhance state security and national interest by ‘minimising the number of enemies’ that a state has. By resorting to tortuous techniques of interrogation, the state enhances the threats that it has to confront (Walt 2009). In the context of the US, Walt (2009) points out that torture provides a ‘powerful rhetorical argument’ against the US and defeats their purpose or discourse on countering terrorism. This realist position is reflective of the danger that torture and unprecedented police actions throws up and the precariousness of the security of the state.

At the same time, offensive realists as Mearsheimer (2006: 234-35) argue that non-state actors as *Al Qaeda* also operate within the state system and, therefore, have no intentions of overthrowing the US state and establishing a religious Islamic empire in its place. This also throws the purported fear of non-state actors into convulsions from within the logic of national security— if it is true that the US as a country would continue to exist, then the foundations of fear against particular groups is unwarranted. However, this realist logic is overpowered by liberal operationality of the states, which embeds fear within the people. It is of note that the argument for torture and policing actions comes from liberal regimes and, in this regard, even goes against the realist perspective.

The liberal school of thought, in its avatars of classical liberalism, neoclassical liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism and new liberalism, can argued to be morally on a higher ground than realism is. In contrast to realism, which emphasises upon power maximisation and relative gain, liberalism emphasises upon benefits for all and absolute gains. By this standard, liberal theories are normatively more influential. According to Heywood (2011: 61-62), in all of the afore-mentioned versions, the idea of ‘harmony and the balance of competing interests’ is the major concern of liberal thought. Liberalism in essence intends to observe the prevalence of ‘peace and international cooperation’ in the international system and argue that international actors are

‘interdependent and law-governed world’ (Heinze and Jolliff 2011: 319). Heywood (2011: 62) points out that liberals accept that there is competition in international politics: this competition ‘is conducted within a larger framework of harmony’.

In this way, liberal theorists are more optimistic than the realists. In fact, there is a nexus between liberalism and idealism that has given rise to the positioning of the state as not just a self-interested actor but also as a responsible and responsive party in the international system (Heinze and Jolliff 2011: 319-320). In spite of the severe competition from Realism which insisted upon the maximisation of power, liberalism held its ground and its relevance became clearer after the end of Cold War. To cite Heinze and Jolliff (2011: 322):

The post-war order was fundamentally organized as a rule-based international order, wherein international cooperation was encouraged as a means to ensure peace, economic prosperity, and human rights.

Liberalism has, however, been extremely successful in maintaining its political promise as compared to the idealists. Regulation, in effect, can be argued to be a part of liberal policies whether it be in the economic or in the political field. Hence, regulations are closely related and are a product of the liberal world order. The anomaly lies within the liberal project which emphasises upon individualism while at the same time intends to bring them under the arching state authority.

Social constructivism, as a theoretical perspective of International Relations, also relies on the perceptions of the state which is in turn dependent on the institutions and ideologies of the state. Herein, perceptions could be deciphered within this theory on torture and institutional developments. The institutional and ideological factors, though social constructivists argue, reflects the position of the state in question, it is also evident that the state sometimes undermines its ideological standpoints in order to assert its authority. For instance, the liberal state uses its authority against civilians, thereby curtailing liberty of the individual, which is the foundation of liberal societies. Taking the human rights regime as a case in point, constructivists argue that it is logical for states to bring human rights values within its domain as it could set a ‘legitimate standard’ for cognition of statehood (Dunne and Hanson 2013: 46-47).

The problem, however, lies in the double standards that crop up wherein proponents of human rights regime fail to implement it within their own states. From within social constructivist thinking, the manner in which international norms take roots within the

state structure is dependent upon the ideological and institutional framework of the state. The anomaly lies in the usage of torture in liberal democracies. In this regard, once again the case of the US is extremely significant wherein there is a chasm between the political underpinnings of the state and the practices that it subscribes to. This makes the US institutional practices a critical case because it neither operates with the self-help rationality nor with ideological consistencies.

Critical theory of International Relations, intends to focus on emancipation by critique and public discourse. Most works from the critical schools of thought focus on critiquing extant views on the manner in which power relations are shaped in the society (McCormack 2010: 3). Critical theory attempts to understand politics from the perspective of the marginalised civilians. However, the critical perspectives are often suppressed because these do not reflect the views of the state, and to this extent they are dissident in nature. The most significant contribution of critical theory is that it does not accept mainstream perspectives verbatim. It challenges the commonly acceptable views on critical terms and focuses on the population that is marginalised in the state discourses. Torture, policing, confinement and prohibition placed upon citizens throws up security concerns.

The case of regulation is all the more intriguing. This is because rule making and rule adjudication seems to be a part and parcel of state functions; however, the manner in which it is implemented is seldom questioned. Moreover, there are no guarantees against the abuse of these rules on part of rule makers. More problematic is the discursive practices that support state atrocities. The crux of the matter vests in policing and control of the authorities that are designed in such a way so as to exclude certain sections of the society. Such laws and regulations target people who are at the fringes. The immediate impact is indeed felt by people who find themselves at odd with mainstream policies.

From the perspective of the citizens, the prohibitions are not only irrelevant but also at extremes. The state, by means of its coercive authority, creates an illusion of threat that emanates from certain sections of the society. The discourse on security from the perspective of the state inevitably focuses on control and prohibition. At the slightest hint of threat, the state takes aggressive steps. In the event of a threat, the state puts all its resources at disposal to contain the eminent danger. While doing so, however, it

jeopardises the security of the individuals. Laws and conventions regarding torture and detention become rampant. The threat of terror from outside gets transformed into repressive terror enacted through the state. It is exaggerated to the extent of refusing to hear the appeal of the detained person. The confinement behind the walls of the detention centre is symbolic: it removes the detained person from the site of the society. What happens inside closed chambers remains confidential and does not come outside. This becomes detrimental to the interest of the confined person. There is no scope for a free and fair trial of the detained person.

Under these circumstances, the idea of regulation appears as regressive and tormenting for the people. The awe and anxiety felt by the detained and the pain exerted by torture breaks the morale of the person. The legitimisation of authority becomes the sanction for carrying out inhumane and abnormal human behaviour. The physical confinement of an individual, the prison cell and the torture techniques all move towards the end of defiling and degenerating the human body. It becomes a subversion of the liberal values which is legitimised on grounds of state security. Protecting the state, thus becomes the priority and takes precedence over individual's security predicament which in turn is dependent upon the state authorities. When the protecting authorities become hostile to a particular community, then the individuals become all the more vulnerable to malpractices and arbitrary actions.

The emancipatory ideal is rarely associated with regulation. The idea of torture and detention has been questioned within the post-modern and post-structural frameworks in security studies. Herein, arguments hinge upon the most pulverised view of state control, namely the use of legitimate violence. In this study, however, regulations are reflected upon not merely in terms of the extent of control that they exercise but also the very genesis of such ideas and their social impact. As Patrick Schmidt (2005: 1-2) points out:

Regulatory systems are pervasive in modern society. They are tools with which political systems have found mechanisms, both of convenience and of necessity, for the propagation and implementation of rules. Like the portrait of regulatory lawyers, the contemporary administrative state rests on foundations in tension, between ideals of a free-ranging policy process and a process encumbered by mechanisms of accountability. The most distinguishing feature of regulatory systems is the necessity of discretion – political choice – infused throughout the administrative state.

The 'political choice' referred by Patrick Schmidt (2005: 2) is extremely significant because it determines the role that the state is going to play in securitising and pushing for certain laws of regulation. In turn, the policing activities of the state will be decided.

It is in the context of policing and protection that regulations became tragic. Regulation, as is evident by the above discussion, is very much a part and parcel of the neoliberal world order. The idea is to govern: who governs and by what means are the important follow up questions. In an age of economic crises and rising global challenges, the onus is upon the state to tackle the situation. In the case of any untoward incident the government is caught off-guard and reacts sharply to the incidents. The result is stringent regulations which deprive individuals of their comfort zones. The theoretical interpretations are worth because they reveal different angles of regulatory state practices. Nevertheless, these cannot lead to the development of regulation as a concept because for doing that theoretical and methodological ideas are required which could be concretised and put within the fold of conceptions. An important assumption is that regulations by state are imperative for its security apparatus. The problem really is that it is presumptuous that state protocols enhance security of civilians. Many a times, regulations restrict human movements and reduce their capabilities as individuals belonging to the civilised society. From this perspective, regulations have hardly been assessed critically.

In this sense, regulations are anomalous in a liberal state because technically it hinges upon the ideas of liberty, equality and justice. With the marginalisation of individuals, these essential principles are compromised upon. Moreover, when it comes to the security of the state, there is a dehumanisation of the detained people. This becomes a challenge not only to the very core of liberalism but also to the spirit of international norms that has set guidelines for the treatment of prisoners and human rights concern. In this regard, regulations have to be read again not only as a means to achieve the end of governance but also as a method to emphasise upon its supreme command on within the sovereign territory.

The main argument proposed in this chapter is: from the vantage point of the confined individual, regulation curtails civil liberties and inflicts pain and torment, thereby rendering it a tragedy. The torture narrative is justified on grounds of state security and survival of the larger population, especially in matters related to violent activities by

non-state actors. This argument is, however, misplaced because there is a huge gap between the proposed intention of such legislations and the actual practice of it. From here on, the aberration on part of state activities become clearer: the selectivity of its implementation, the identification of the enemy in a particular community, the indifference on part of the authorities regarding the consequentiality of such actions, and the trepidation it causes upon the targeted communities showcase the attitude of the state authorities to go to any extent to implement such legislations.

In this chapter, regulation implies state directives of monitoring, supervision and control specially over security measures. The focus is particularly on detention and torture that bereaves the subject of agential capabilities. The imagery of jail signifies that the individual is confined within the limits of a cell and does not have liberties to move or speak. There is cordoning off of the individual from the rest of the society. This removes the person from the site of the world and in this sense, removes him from public vision. Confinement and torture, therefore, remains the prerogative of the state authorities and invariably it is considered imperative for the security of the state. At the same time, there is an obligation on part of the states to consider international ethical norms on human rights and dignity of life. Detention and torture are contradictory to these normative propositions. The state and policing authorities, however, never seem to grapple with this incongruity. The solution to the various security threats evidently lies, for the authoritative institutions, in exercising control over the population. This becomes an anomaly in the liberal democratic format of governance; nevertheless, this is never a predicament for the state, even if the application or implementation of regulation transgresses on the liberty of the people.

In this context, the practice of torture and illegal detention presents a grave situation. The individual, however, guilty is denigrated to inhumane levels. This dehumanisation is antithetical to either human rights as a liberal principle or as an international statutory law. In case of the former, civic rights of an individual ought to be maintained even when charged with an offence, while at the same time the dignity of the person is warranted by the state. In the latter case, there are standards that have been set up at the international level, for the protection of the confined or arrested person through the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) and the Geneva Conventions. The problem could be stated as follows: in spite of anti-torture conventions at the global level, state authorities continue to resort to practices of harm and it goes unchallenged

by the society. The dilemma lies in the emancipation of the individual who has been physically entrapped and bereft of basic liberties.

Understanding torture: a critical perspective

To begin with, torture has been defined in Article 1 of the UN Convention Against Torture, 1984 (UNCAT) as follows:

For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

This definition clearly reveals the intentions of the international law makers to protect the dignity of the individual to the extent that it does not harm their physique as well as intends to protect them from inhumane treatment. Very often this convention comes as an obstacle against sovereign states’ domestic policies which one way or the other upholds the use of torture, mostly under the garb of securing the state interests and protecting other citizens.

In critical security studies, the ideas of pain and harm find ample space for analysis. There could be an assessment of the agony, anguish and anxiety of the prisoner by understanding more generally how prisons’ function. Ranging from rigorous questioning, use of brute force, solitary confinement, threat of death sentence, sexual harassment, poor living conditions, verbal abuse— these work along with the restriction of movement physically to entrap an individual. However, it is difficult to analyse the extent of trauma and suffering on the part of the detainee. In the case of torture, there are seldom any guidelines for the use of force and invariably it is interpreted as an arbitrary and randomised choice which is unquestionable by law. Being unclear on at least certain fronts, such as the number of torture hours, the distinction to be made between persons of different age groups while using violence and the duty on part of the prison authorities to prevent transgression of humanitarian limits, provides a tool in the hands of the tormentor to use his/her own discretion. The very approval of torture testifies to the domineering and injudicious rules of the state. Interpreted as being

essential for the security of the state, it becomes the point of departure for the state and the civilians.

There are scholars who justify the use of torture because it could potentially bring out new information and therefore lead to confession. When it comes to the security of the state, this form of force is given a lot of weightage. In the case of ‘war on terrorism’, especially, it has been argued that resort to torture yield important information. Blakeley (2007: 376) argues that it is ‘believed’ by the proponents of torture against ‘terrorists’ that they would reveal hitherto undiscovered information rather than continuing to suffer the ‘physical and psychological torment’. Kearns (2015) argues that after the re-emergence of torture in public scene during the Second World War, conventions against its use were brought into force; in spite of this, however, states, including democracies did not denounce torture. After 2001, in the context of ‘war on terror’, there has been an increasing tendency to justify its use in order to procure intelligence. In order to provide rationale to its use, terms such as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, ‘stress methods’ and ‘torture lite’ is used which is differentiated from the use of actual torture because these are questioning mechanisms which is ultimately beneficial for the survival of human civilisation (Wolfendale 2009). As Farrell (2013) argues the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ is an oft-cited reason why ‘aberrational torture’ could be used exceptionally. There are, however, no prescribed limits to the use of torture, and the attempts at its rationalisation is superfluous because it may hardly reveal meaningful and true data.

Three reasons are given, mostly, for the continuation of torture in spite of its international invalidation, namely, ‘national security’, ‘civil discipline’ and ‘juridical’ reasons for the same (Rejali 2009 cited in Kearns 2015). The first two are of utmost significance because it directly relates to state prerogatives at reinforcing its authority. As would be elucidated subsequently in this chapter, this discourse finds ample support in the US after 11 September 2001. This has enabled the state to stretch the narrative down to its population, resulting in its acceptance, whether tacit or whole-hearted. Counter-narratives have often faced the backlash from Islamophobes in the US. This tendency has also been found in the countries of Western Europe where there is a direct attack on the religious values of the Muslims. The issue of the published cartoons of Prophet Mohammad by a Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in 2005 is a significant case because it reveals the kind of epistemological terrain a society is following wherein

such depictions become possible and acceptable (Hansen 2011). It was possible to caricature the Islamic Prophet because of the wave of Islamophobia that has gripped the West after 2001. There was fear from Islam (and some of organisations that professed it) as well as a desperation to denigrate it. This denigration also justifies torture and confinement meted out to prison inmates in the detention centres of the US. The societal indifference to imageries including the ones that ostensibly reveal atrocities unleashed on the other community is worrisome because social antipathy facilitates exclusion at all levels.

Torture is hardly considered a matter of sentimentality— it is rather bereft of all emotions and feelings. The common-sensical argument has it that a tormentor need not feel guilty because such exercise carries a legal sanction. Therefore, torture has two distinct layers— first, the approval of such practices by the state, going against the international conventions and second, its practice, which is carried out by the concerned authorities. It is argued that due to the infliction of pain, there have been cases where information has been revealed (Blakeley 2007; Farrell 2013). A closer analysis reveals that this is indeed a façade for protecting particular interests, especially those of social and political elites (Blakeley 2007). Farrell (2013) has also argued that the excessive methods of interrogations is not always productive as the prisoner could give incorrect and partial information just to save himself/herself. Richter-Montpetit (2014: 44) also argues that the information or ‘confessions’ that is acquired through the use of torture ‘produces notoriously unreliable data’ and is therefore, opposed by ‘most interrogation experts’. The over-exaggeration of the utility of torture is more of a weapon to offend humanity rather than a matter of ascertaining security. Besides, the use of torture as a form of punishment is also not rare. The mistreatment of ‘accused’ or ‘suspects’ is guided by the narrative of their being the enemies of the state— again a ludicrous proposition that is so frequently upheld and remains uncritical.

Herein, one could refer to the ‘corporeal turn’ in critical security studies. It has already been discussed in the second chapter of the thesis, that the corporeal turn refers to ‘the bodily reactions and their socio-political meanings and interpretations’, alongwith the concepts of ‘affect, emotion and somatic’ in the human mind (Mutlu 2013a: 139-140). The ‘corporeal analysis’ attempts to understand ‘the body as both the subject and object of discourses, practices and policies of (in)security’ (Mutlu 2013: 146). According to Scarry (1985: 2), the narratives of ‘physical pain’ has the potential of telling a ‘story’.

However, she argues that expressing physical pain is difficult and there are ‘political repercussions’ of this ‘inexpressibility’— the practice of pain remains unquestioned and undiagnosed (Scarry 1985: 11-12). Managhan (2013: 167) argues in this regard that bodies are a political site: there are ‘processes by which culture is imprinted on bodies’ and these imprints constitute the ‘subject’ in International Relations by extending its scope ‘to read the emergence of particular bodies’ historically. Torture is a form of espousing security structures in global politics. The body becomes the point of conversation because of its presence, use and abuse. As Butler (2009: 33) points out, ‘the body is a social phenomenon: it is exposed to others, vulnerable by definition’. The manner in which the body could be represented signifies its agential potency. Therefore, as Scarry (1985: 17-18) points out, physical pain and the expression of it is a powerful ‘weapon’ for building a discourse.

The idea of afflicting pain on others affects the human mind. Fear is inculcated amongst the people in general about a perceived threat that is unreal and has no reasonable grounding. ‘Collective fear appraisals’ are culturally bound and these facilitate securitisation by the state because they are able to use group psychology and emotions to regurgitate anxiety that is present amongst the citizens (Rythoven 2015: 464). The inculcation of a feeling of insecurity is a parallel activity to the use of draconian regulations that implicates particular communities. By the use of discursive power, there is an emotional appeal to believe in the protective power of the state. Imageries, symbols, popular media and in the contemporary times, social media supplement the narratives of the state. This still does not sound promising for the infliction of indiscriminate violence; however, its uncritical acceptance renders it problematic and equally of concern for global conventions preventing such acts, thus making the threshold for ethics more slippery.

The tragedy, herein, is layered within the state discourse of command and control. The security apparatus of the state is built under the presupposition that the state is under threat from external and non-state actors. Bigo (2002) points out that the state sets up a paraphernalia that could give a sense that the abstract threats are actually real and promising. For example, the security measures that are taken at the airport to check the influx of the people into the country, though more of a formality, appears to be compulsory for considerations of security (Bigo 2002). By continually focusing on the singular issue of enhancing security of the people, the state contrives a situation of

apprehension amongst the people. The fear thus generated helps the state to create an enemy. From a translational perspective on security, it is possible to recreate the meaning of security by engaging with its context and history, thereby revealing a trajectory within security practices (Stritzel 2011). To readapt Benedict Anderson's category of 'imagined communities' (Anderson 2006), there are 'imagined enemies' from which the society has to be protected. Therefore, the catastrophe is dual: one, innumerable measures could also not satiate the security psyche of the people and they would always ask for more which in turn would give the government opportunities to enhance security measures; two, the identified 'enemy' becomes stranded, ostracised and continue to remain under awe from the authorities. There is no escape from the arbitrariness and absolutism of state functions for the identified enemies.

By this understanding of security, torture and confinement becomes a significant means to fulfil these necessities. It is more of a contradiction in the democratic countries which considers torture to be productive and beneficial for the state, where there is an absolute 'indifference' to the 'maltreatment of their presumable enemies' (Dorfman 2004: 5). Kearns (2015) argues that the practice of torture is likely to continue even in states which uphold human rights because there is no entity to enforce the UNCAT and also because the public opinion on the same is variant, some of whom are ignorant of the non-consequence of the act for which it is being conducted. The return to torture practices in the last two decades and the justification for its use is alarming for two reasons: first, it shows the gaps in international conventions which in spite of its good intentions fails to be effective; second, there is a clear asymmetry between the detained person and the authorities because they are stripped off their rights to a fair representation. Though the record of non-democratic states on human rights is dismal, its promiscuous rise in liberal democracies has bruised humanitarianism fatally.

On the theoretical front, this chapter is embedded in Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). In CTS, the state practices of controlling terrorism are questioned and critiqued. The perspective of the imprisoned person is as important as the state. CTS Although the study does not strictly deal with terrorism and counter-terrorism, there is an attempt to consider the terror activities of the state on the pretext of controlling terrorism as such. For doing so, it is important that the anti-terror laws of the states under consideration as well as international standards for torture and control be studied in conjunction. It will become amply clear that the international laws are normatively more enduring than

the domestic laws which are stringent, pragmatic and inconsiderate towards the accused. The more essential part is to argue for a re-evaluation of the study of regulation in security narratives from critical quarters.

CTS draws from the Frankfurt school of Critical Theory. According to Toros and Gunning (2009: 89) argues that there are two ways in which the Aberystwyth school of critical security studies can contribute to the understanding of terrorism. Firstly, by ‘a process of deepening’, which implies that the understanding of terrorism is contextualised rather than being based on ‘ontological and ideological assumptions’ (Toros and Gunning 2009: 89). Secondly, by ‘broadening’ the idea of terrorism to include violence by both state and non-state actors as well as considering the ‘socio-historical context’. By removing the assumptions of state-centric analysis, it is possible to question state’s actions of ‘counter-terrorism’ (Toros and Gunning 2009: 95), thus enabling a shift in the ‘referent object’ of studying terrorism. It has also been argued by Jackson, Murphy and Poynting (2010: 1-2) that ‘state terrorism’ in spite of the vast magnitude of sufferings that it inflicts on people, it has not been adequately discussed in the literature on terrorism, which seems to be focused upon violent actions perpetrated by the non-state actors.

CTS, therefore, considers terrorism more broadly and argues that research on terrorism needs to proceed through analysis of violence, irrespective of the perpetrators of it. It is for this purpose, that the actions of the state rather than being qualified as a security measure or mere prohibition be quizzed point by point. For doing so, it is significant to look deeply into narratives and experiences within the prison cell. Very often the torture techniques are not only innovative but are also designed in such a way that they have a lasting impact on the psyche of the person. The humiliation that comes along with the physical pain traumatises an individual for very long. On this note, torture has to be read metaphorically in order to understand the genesis of the innovations.

The question of ethics in International Relations has been relegated to the margins by the mainstream thinkers: their focus is on state security. Normativity is a far-fetched idea for the realist thinkers. This is because their main concern is with pursuing self-interest and maximisation of security. The question whether technology excludes at least some people was of insignificant concern. In the process, normative grounding of the affliction of regulations on the sufferer gets rare attention. Normative theory has

contributed substantially in this direction. For Frost (1996: 2), the normative questions are a matter of concern in day to day happenings. When it comes to the question of security, however, invariably there is an aversion to the ethical dimension: that some sections of the society can get adversely affected by the policies and legislations is seldom a concern for the authorities. The stringency of the regulations renders individuals insecure. The question is whether the state is willing to provide adequate safeguards for the imprisoned people. The tragedy in confinement, therefore, lies in the denial of basic humane space to the imprisoned people.

In this chapter, the tragedy in regulation is critically analysed. Herein, by regulation, the rules, prohibitions, law making and implementation and prevention maintained by the state, by means of policing, administration and judicial proceedings is implied. However, state regulations, invariably, also have a component of arbitrariness which is manifest in detention without legal procedures, use of torture during investigations, fake encounters and insufficient scope for fair judicial hearing. Engaging in a critical discourse of state regulation, the chapter intends to focus upon the predicament of the citizen when veiled from the rest of the society. Citizenship in a liberal democracy uses the vocabulary of cosmopolitanism, rights and duties and equal opportunity for all. Why, then, does the accused civilian is not provided with adequate legal representation? How does societal prejudice come to bear upon the detainees? These aspects relate to the pain and harm that is suffered by the prisoner— physical pain which is caused during incarceration and psychological harm that is inflicted due to their dismal treatment when arrested. For states, that uphold democracy promotion and liberal values in rhetoric, extreme steps during investigations seem an anomaly. The study in this chapter is two-fold: one, theoretically to approach regulation from the perspective of the captive and question the logic of inhumanity in spaces far removed from public scrutiny; two, methodologically, deconstruction of the logic of a superstructure that dominates citizens is sought.

In this regard, the case of the United States and has been taken up for study. After the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US, the state agencies made rampant and arbitrary arrests under the pretext of terror activities. In the process, however, several innocent civilians were subjected to unlawful treatment. The threat of terrorism acquired the status of an absolute discourse in the maintenance of security within the US. The ‘urgency’ of combating terrorism on all fronts became the *raison de eta* of the state. It

is tilted against the Muslim community and Islamic societies and have taken precedence over other security matters. The case of the US is more problematic because of the actual use of torture at detention centres against delinquents and their refusal to forego excessive techniques. A double reading of regulation engages with the question of this absoluteness in discourse and practice of the state which transgresses upon human dignity. Torture is used as an investigation technique; in the case of the US, it degraded human beings to a baser level. Regulations imposed by the state, especially those which prohibit citizens of their physical movements, bear testimony to the manner in which the state succinctly overstates security concerns and cause seclusion of certain individuals.

In the following sections, the case of the United States after 11 September 2001, has been studied and discussed. It is a critique on state policies of regulation and control that prejudices the basic rights of people. In this regard, there is task for critical security studies to argue for the security of the people. At the same time, it is also an unveiling act of the policies of the liberal states that engage in curtailing individual freedom. Confinement deprives people of access to basic amenities. Torture breaks the courage of the detained person and dehumanises the body. Needless to say, the trauma is a mental strain on the minds of the people. It is for this reason that the critique on regulation has to be philosophically embedded and understood as a defilement process that is uncivilising and denigrating for the individual.

Detention and Torture in the United States post 11 September 2001

International Relations, as a discipline, has given considerable attention to security issues after 11 September 2001. Most of the arguments are focused upon and revolve around the state concerns of security and protection. Ironically enough, there is a move away from the idea that insecurity comes from other rival/competitive states. After 2001, there has been an increasing emphasis upon the identification of militant organisations, whether home-grown or global, as the most critical threat to the state. Even the United Nations has strived to redefine terrorism in 2001 and again in 2004. However, they have not been able to come up with a definition that could be universally implemented.

On 12 September 2001, the UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning the attacks on the United States of America in equivocal terms. Apart from expressing 'its deepest sympathy and condolences to the victims and their families' and, more generally, to the people of the US, the UNSC Resolution 1368 (2001), called upon 'all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks' as well as called on the international community 'to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts'. On 28 September 2001, the UNSC passed another resolution that was intended on regulating the source of finance for the militant organisations.

According to UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001), all states must 'prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts'. This Resolution is made binding on all states by bringing it under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as mentioned in the UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001), thus emboldening states to act against dissident groups within their territories on the pretext of combatting terrorism. Noticeable is the point that the US, which is well known for setting up tough security measures, further enhanced it. The vigour with which it was re-installed is appalling because it cut across both the legislative framework as well as provided over-riding powers to police authorities. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, 2001, acronymised as the USA PATRIOT Act 2001, is one of the strongest legislations that have been passed by the Congress and, clearly, compromises on some basic principles of the US state (US Congress 2001).

In this chapter, there is an attempt to critically assess the measures of the state which perturbed civilian life and demonised the Muslim community. The security predicament for the marginalised community was dual: of extermination by the state and their denigration in the society. It has been argued that through a counter-terrorist discourse, the state was able to camouflage the atrocities and discrimination meted out to the detained people and, thus, severely contradicted its liberal democratic principles. From the perspective of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS), it is argued that the use of torture causes human denigration and is counter-productive as it undermines human rights. Torture and detention precludes the civilians from the site of violence and these actions are, therefore, only visible to the detainer and the detainee. It strengthens the state's unleashing of violence and increasingly subverts questioning of state practices.

Herein, there is a need to engage with the predicament of the confined civilian who is bereaved of his/her liberties. There is a de-normalisation of their lives. The tragedy is contextual. Regulation is not grounded on the promise of universalisation: it is implemented selectively sometimes targeted on definite groups of citizens. Regulations, while originally intended to control practices within the state so that it could be universally beneficial to all the citizenry, became a tool to discriminate between citizens. Therein lies the root of tragedy: laws that apparently intends to protect civilians, prejudices their security by compromising on their rights and privileges, thus reinforcing state authority.

The concern is dual in the case of torture and detention: on the one hand, there is aggression on part of the US state authorities towards its own citizens, albeit Muslim citizens, while on the other hand, there is a narrative of civilian protection that speaks of a threat that comes from the Muslim community globally. In one stroke, therefore, the state manages to become the trustworthy guardians of the entire population while at the same time relegates a particular section of the citizenry to the corners. The citizens inadvertently get co-opted into a process of othering. Hence, the havocs unleashed in the airplane attacks on 11 September 2001 becomes the incurable wound that the state must diagnose. The emotions of the citizens from the feeling of helplessness quickly transforms into anger and revenge. In this way, there is a rift created in the society, thus preventing them from making any queries into state actions and prejudices. According to Linklater (2014: 577), after 11 September 2001, the significance of anger in world politics has come to the fore because the 'liberal "civilised" societies' acknowledges 'anger's status' in bringing to justice the 'illiberal groups'. To this extent, the reactions of the liberal states could be unrestrained in global politics.

The onslaught of the police authorities on the Muslims in the US after 11 September 2001 has surpassed earlier state security measures. There has been a severe compromise on individual privacy since the surveillance included scrutiny into personal emails and bank accounts. This was considered to be a transgression in many respects but did not undergo any severe challenge because of the overarching national security discourse. The ensuing actions by state bodies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) towards 'suspects' did not show any consideration for the ethos of the constitution that gives the accused a chance to be represented by a lawyer. By treating the situation after the terror strikes as war-like, the passage of draconian legislations was facilitated. The

violence experienced by ‘criminalised and racialised communities’ in the US after 11 September 2001, was ‘a warning to whole communities (sic.) about their place in the social and economic hierarchy and the price of transgression’ (McCulloch 2010: 196). The failure of the state to protect its citizens is camouflaged in a discourse that puts the entire blame on a different set of actors and portrays the state as being victimised. This garners support and sympathy of the people.

The enforcement of these legislations that were carried out with conviction. The legislations also brought out the deep-seated apprehensions in the American society regarding immigrants and therefore, the marginalisation was seen at both the political and the social level. The liberal cosmopolitan ethos that the US society was known for, irrespective of its political commitments, got deluged in marginalisation of the Muslim community. In this regard, the relation between the liberal institutions and the discourse on war on terror is important to observe. Dunne (2009) argues that the call to the international community by the US after the 11 September 2001 for a ‘a militaristic response to the threat posed by *Al Qaeda*’ on grounds of ‘self-defence’, was ‘an implausible claim which enabled the US and its allies to turn domestic conflict in failing states into a legitimate *casus belli*’. In other words, the logic of waging war against terrorism by the US eroded the liberal political norm which is essentially anti-war because it ‘endangers their (citizen’s) life and is a waste of economic resources’ (Dunne 2009). According to Richter-Montpetit (2017), law plays a crucial role in ‘enabling the practices of torture’ and in ‘reproducing the liberal state domestically as well as internationally’. Therefore, rather than providing ‘shield to the population from harm’ by the state, laws makes harm possible (Richter-Montpetit 2017). McCulloch (2010: 197) argues that the US plays the ‘role of a global jailer’ and this role needs to be understood in the context of ‘the mass incarcerations of which the United States is a global leader and exemplar’. Therefore, by resorting to the legal superstructure, the ethical debates around policing was silenced in security discourses.

The transformation at the societal level became a bigger cause of concern for the Muslim community in the US as there were reported regular cases of racial and religious discrimination whilst the state remained a silent spectator to this development. This has had far reaching implications for the Muslims in the US: the state to go ahead with its anti-terror policies in effect making the US soil more insecure for the marginalised community. Barber (2003: 33) argues that the US state generated ‘fear’ in

its population, which is more 'reckless' than 'any the terrorists can conceive'. As Dunne (2009: 110-111) argues, since international institutions are 'procedurally liberal' and inclusive of non-liberal states, there is a tendency in liberal populations 'strongly buy in to the importance of procedural correctness'. For this reason, it has been empirically demonstrated that there is support for counter-terrorism (Dunne 2009).

There were several unwarranted detentions in the US after 11 September 2001, which were 'well publicised crimes by the state' and intended to 'terrify and repress the wider communities from which the victims come' (Poynting 2010: 181). McCulloch (2010: 198) argues that 'torture and gross mistreatments' that evidentially happens in 'US offshore prisons' are also reflective of the 'experiences of millions of US prisoners incarcerated in domestic prisons and immigration detention centres'. Herein, the trauma for the victimised population emerges not just due to the physical violence inflicted upon them, but it is also emotional. There is a politics of 'recognition' which is the underlying feature of the 'watchful technologies of sovereignty in this war' (Amoore 2007). There is a 'betrayal of trust' (Edkins 2003: 4): the 'very powers' which the people considered to be their protectors became the 'tormentors' (Edkins 2003: 4) and the society, which the Muslims thought they were a part of, extradited them. There is an 'assumption' that images can validate 'identity of people' and this became the 'basis for belonging and expelling' (Amoore 2007: 218) people. The vigilance in the US after 11 September 2001 penetrated through the societal structures because of the use of images and visuals. Therefore, the traumatic memories not only constitute the physical harm or the legal procedures, but also the pain of being segregated from the society of people.

After 11 September 2001, the attempts to keep the memories of the 'fall of the towers' and the unprecedented 'attack' on its soil was kept afresh. As Zehfuss (2007: 2) argues, 'references to the past are usually called upon with conviction, and in order to underline the certainty of what is claimed, recourse to memory involves uncertainty'. In other words, by constantly being reminded of what has happened previously, the apprehension is kept intact. Edkins (2002: 249) argues that there were four responses to 11 September 2001: 'securitization, criminalization, aestheticization and politicization'. Each of these responses could be utilised to assess the impact of the day and the efforts of the state and the media to keep awake those reminiscences. It was reflected in the strengthening of security measures but also vigilance, surveillance and

discursive practices which revolved around the othering of Muslims in the US. The threat from extremist versions of Islam became the cornerstone of these discourses. As Brown (2002) points out, this threat was overplayed by the US at the international level, because the so-called ‘war on terror’ was actually a hunt for a specific group, *Al Qaeda*, whose political ideology has a very limited appeal amongst world citizens and therefore, do not pose any concrete threat to the international order. The failure of the US policies that followed, lie in their inefficiency to realise this aspect: the legislations were stringent while at the same time creating societal rifts and antipathy towards Muslim citizens.

Although the use of torture does not guarantee correct flow of information (Farrell 2013; Richter-Montpetit 2014), it continued unabated in the US policing system after 11 September 2001. The reasons for the acceptance of ‘carceral violence’ lies in the ‘social relations and structures of feelings’ that renders such practices acceptable (Richter-Montpetit 2014: 58). There is a ‘differential distribution of vulnerability and security’ which is achieved by ‘regulating’ people, in this case the Muslims in the US (Richter-Montpetit 2014: 58). In this context, ‘the body’ becomes the venue for interactions between people, ultimately leading to the ways in which social relations get shaped in the world (Butler 2009: 54-55). Within this corporeal logic, the Muslims are ‘enslaved’ and represents the dichotomy that exists between the ‘Muslim terrorist’ and ‘the civilizational Whiteness of the torturer’, thus reinforcing the authority of the state (Richter-Montpetit 2014: 45). Butler (2009: 128-129) argues that ‘the acts of torture’ against the non-Western people needs to be understood as ‘actions of a homophobic institution’ which engages in ‘misogynist practices’ intended towards ‘breaking the sexual and moral codes’ of the subject forcefully. To this extent, torture becomes a method of not only physical but also cultural, sexual and racial assault— an act which is not meant for information collection but inflicting emotional and physical pain on the body of the detained person.

In this regard, the argument of Steele (2011) is very substantive because he says that ‘intentions and intentionalities’ need not camouflage the question of accountability— the latter is of utmost importance because there are people and communities who suffer due to the actions of the state. Judging the intention of the state could be both normatively insufficient as well as analytically problematic because the citizens can only go by the information and monologues that the political elites provide (Steele

2011). Accountability of those actions and their implications for the sufferer is of ethical value— this is the decisive factor of how much the state and the government feels responsible for their actions towards their people. The way in which a state assesses its wrongful deeds, addresses the grievances and make corrections towards the damages done provides a window to trust its actions, without which the aggrieved and afflicted citizens lose faith in the system. In the case of the US after 11 September 2001, the state underestimated the fear and awe that has come to guard the Muslims in the US, both in the citizens and those living in diaspora. This, in turn, created uncertainty amongst the Muslims about their own survival. Security measures by the state puts civilians at risk from the use and the abuse of its powers.

Critical Assessment of US Security Practices

With special reference to the US and the discipline of International Relations, it is pertinent to point out that there has been a disproportionate emphasis upon the threats that the US faces from other actors. During the Cold War, the trend was to focus upon arms race and nuclear deterrence whereas after 1991, there was an urge to maintain power by the US to remain the most powerful state. In the context of 11 September 2001, Smith (2002) argues that the disciplinary practices of International Relations in the US have been such that they fail to understand rationalities of non-American cultures: therefore, the discipline is methodologically constraining. Moreover, there has always been a theoretical proximity to realism in International Relations. There are two major implications of this: one, the state has been seen as vulnerable amidst uncertainty; two, the militarisation of the state has gone unquestioned. Unlike its European counterparts, which has witnessed several ‘turns’ in the discipline, the US branch has remained mostly unaffected by these.

Power and its exercise has indeed been the cornerstone of interpreting security issues in American International Relations. Emphasising upon military power, Mearsheimer (1991) has argued that the end of the Cold War could engulf Europe in war because there would be a struggle for attainment of power, thereby making it an unstable zone. The focus has therefore been upon state’s military status and how it affects the position of the state. Waltz (1993), using his theory of structural realism, gave emphasis upon the uncertainty that comes along with the setting off the Cold War as there could be a

scramble for power. The contrary views also come from within realism wherein it has been argued that there would be stability at the international system because of the concentration of power in the hands of the US and 'unipolarity' is not in decline (Wohlforth 1999). Therefore, irrespective of the historical phase, since 1945, the discipline of International Relations has sustained its focus upon state and the distribution of powers within the international system, thus limiting the subject material. As a result, International Relations in the US has not been able to explain some of the 'pressing inequalities in world order' (Smith 2002), which requires an engagement with actors other than the state and ideas other than the maximisation of material capabilities. Smith (2002) argues that after 11 September 2001, the US has envisaged the study of International Relations in such a 'restrictive' way that it excludes 'the understanding of other cultures and rationalities'.

Security studies in the US has also been focused upon national security. As Walker (1990) argues that although there is an acknowledgement that security threats could emanate from sources other than those related to military components, invariably the analysis is grounded in the security of the state. For this reason, security issues have mostly been concerned with the redressal of state vulnerabilities to threats emanating from within or without the country. There are assertions that security studies have to be understood in both its 'deepened' and 'widened' terms (Buzan 1999; Booth 2007). Buzan (1999) succinctly points out that security studies have been concerned with 'the politics of freedom from the pursuit of threat', though the referent objects may differ according to the perspective of the author—it could range from state security to that of an individual. Smith (1999) also argues that since the 1980s the discipline of security studies has undergone a change and within the 'new thinking' there are dissensions, while at the same time it has continued its proximity 'to the state and to the practice of ensuring military security'. This shows the resilience of security studies in particular to cling onto the state as its primary concern. It becomes a necessary corollary that individual and community security becomes jeopardised.

By prioritising state security, all other forms of insecurities stand justified. Individual liberty, though a guaranteed fundamental right, could be suspended while ensuring national security. The problem lies within the agenda itself, which upholds state security as primary but more importantly, it transgresses upon individual rights thus making the latter extremely vulnerable to state authorities. Critical security studies,

while problematising state security also looks into the variety of fears and threats that are present in the global society (Booth 2007). In this way, in spite of the differences between the Aberystwyth, Paris and Copenhagen school, the questioning of state's security discourses is common to all. For this reason, there has been a scrutiny of state narratives and the manner in which they produce particular fears or threats have been brought to the fore.

The case of the US security policies post 11 September 2001 was, it could be argued, not a defensive strategy in any case. By labelling it a 'war' legitimacy was provided to arbitrary steps that the US state undertook against some of its own citizens, stripping them of their *habeas corpus* right to appeal in a court of law and denying them any representation. The arrangements were such that no detained person could have a fair chance for determining whether they were accused or convicted. The reactions of the US after 11 September 2001, could be divided into two parts: first, the physical engagement in war in Afghanistan under the pretext of combatting terrorism; second, there was an internal backlash on the Muslim community within the US which included social segregation and interdiction.

In a seminal work, Greenberg and Dratel (2005) unveil the trajectory in which the use of torture techniques was made legal. They lay out a timeline which suggests that since the occurrence of terror attacks on 11 September 2001, there was a movement towards extreme securitisation that could not be challenged because of the determining character of the laws. Greenberg and Dratel (2005) point out that on 14 September, 2001, three days after the attacks were carried out in the US, President Bush declared a state of 'National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks'. The declaration of an emergency has major consequences on citizens of a democracy. First and foremost, there is a suspension of fundamental rights and second, state authority prevails over and above the interests of the citizens. According to the CRS Report for Congress, 2007, the Constitution does not make provisions for the suspension of any of its clauses, 'with the exception of *habeas corpus*'. By the US Constitution, the writ of *habeas corpus* determines whether the detainment of an individual is lawful. Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2, states:

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

The terminology used by President Bush, provided the constitutionality of the suspension of the writ. It is, however, questionable whether it was either a ‘rebellion’ or an ‘invasion’ to call for national emergency. A legal strategy was brought in force for preventing the detainees to challenge their arrest in US Federal courts by setting a precedence in the advisory issued to William Haynes II, General Counsel of the US Department of Defense on 28 December 2001, by two Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals, John C. Yoo and Patrick F. Philbin that ‘Federal Courts in the US lack the jurisdiction to hear *habeas corpus* petitions of prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba’ (Greenfield and Dratel 2005: xxv). It was, therefore, designed to deny any resort to the judicial institutions, that gave the officers-in-charge complete authority over the detainees.

The posing of the threat of *Al Qaeda* and Taliban on the US soil was exaggerated from the start. Brown (2002) argues convincingly that the political ideology of these groups has a very limited appeal amongst the world citizens and that it may have no repercussions for the international order. The problem lies in the presentation of the problem and attaching the ‘emergency’ tag to the episodes. This provides the state with a full sweep while at the same time putting the living of its citizens in jeopardy. The point, precisely, is this that even without the proclamation of an emergency, the state could have taken steps to ensure its security: the authoritarianism reflected in the state policies levied a challenge to its democratic credentials.

Considering the detention procedures and the torture techniques, it needs to be argued that even with the extreme atrocities inflicted on the bodies of the detained person, they could not be bereaved of their agential capabilities. The bodies become a site of pain and trauma. The very infliction of violence upon these bodies, alleviates their agential potentiality for their tolerance and survival in spite of the grievous and adverse situation. The hunger-strike carried out by detainees at Guantanamo Bay and force-feeding by the US Joint Task Force is significant in this regard. Citing the case of hunger-strike and force-feeding in 2013-2015 at Guantanamo, Purnell (2015) argues that the incidence reveals the prowess of the detainees and their resistance is subversive of the power manifestation of the US state. This pain is dual: first, the physical violence and harassment suffered by the inmates and second, the methods adopted to cull resistance of the detainees who are opposing inhumane measures.

Dauphinee (2007) argues that the pain suffered by the tortured bodies could neither be understood by visual imageries nor is it useful for making an argument against ‘war on terror’. Purnell (2015), however, argues that the resistance that is put forth by the captives reiterates the point of agency and is relevant for understanding the ways in which power dynamics could be challenged through human agency. This viewpoint challenges the expression by Dauphinee (2007), who has argued that the pain suffered by the detainees is ‘unimageable’. Therefore, any effort to express it through images ‘obliterates the human subject whose world is already undone by the experience of pain’ (Dauphinee 2007: 140-41). Purnell (2015), dwells deeper into actions rather than images and argues that there are signs of resistance and this reifies human subjectivity rather than obliterating it. In this way, torture itself puts agential capabilities into motion, which at first tolerates, then resists and finally, defeats the agent of pain.

Further, the image of the body in pain also divulges the chronicles of vehemence inflicted not just on a single body but upon the human society. There are semantics that protect acts of violence, while damaging the individual and individuality of a person. Beating and ‘scarring’ a body damages it not only ‘anthro-biologically’ (Steele 2011), but also aesthetically denigrates it so much that it appears opposite to the societal notions of beauty. This has important repercussions because even the individual who is suffering from the lashings, come to see oneself as different from the rest of the society. The images that are circulated lament this extortion of the body, which are made ugly and unacceptable in the society. The tortured bodies reveal the pain, while Dauphinee’s (2007) argument is apt that the actuality of pain and trauma suffered cannot be adequately captured in the images. However, in disheveling the human body, there is a creation of a distinct identity— which is cautiously present.

Also relevant is the very location of the detention and torture centres. In the case of the US, the Guantanamo Bay prison is located away from the US mainland, thus making it remote and inaccessible. However, there is a contradiction between earlier uses of torture and the one that is being witnessed after the terror attacks in the US in 11 September 2001. Previously, the use of torture was confined within the premises of the prisons or such centres which were anointed for the purpose. In public space, however, there was no acceptance of the act of torture being carried out. This has substantively changed after 2001 and definitely during the ‘war on terror’, which rather than taking away torture inside closed walls blatantly brought it in the open. Foot (2006) argues

that in spite of the knowledge that torture is morally as well as legally unacceptable, it is being debated in the US media as a necessary method in counter-terrorism. This is not only taking an exception to the global norms and laws, but also is an impediment in the progress of society.

As Linklater (2007) argues, the extreme measures of torture are argued against on grounds that it hampers, what Norbert Elias calls, the 'civilising process', and, to this extent, there has to be a firm shield around global norms which are against torture. The screening of torture from public view on grounds of security or insecurity does not justify its use, even if it is pitted against those individuals who engage in violence (Linklater 2007). Foot (2006) makes a solid argument against the US discourse on torture, saying that in order to justify the use of torture, there is a constant attempt by the US state department to redefine torture and treatment of inmates in its self-professed task of counterterrorism.

The 'lines of insecurity' is defined for the modern state, and therein, the modern sovereign state need not bring in the category of the 'barbaric' or non-human to legitimise certain practices, albeit violence. Violent state practices are justified on grounds of 'exceptionalism'. As Frost (2009: 142) points out, there are several reasons, including ethical, which are given for the use of torture: the harm and violation of rights done to the detained person needs to be 'weighed against the harm' that would be inflicted on citizens if 'acts' of terrorism are carried out. This ethical logic has the tendency to contest the normative ideas against torture and constantly constructs a discourse that supports state actions. Purnell (2015: 271) argues that there is a 'boundary work' that attempts to engage in 'practices implicated in the materialization, reproduction, disruption, and (re)negotiation of socially constructed and violently maintained boundaries'. These so-called boundaries identify human beings, readily marginalising certain sections of the society. The laws and conventions which were enacted in the US after 11 September 2001, alienated the Muslim community and thus, diluted the rights and dignity of global citizens.

Regulation, critical security studies and tragedy

Regulations are tragic for more than one reason. First, regulations prohibit citizens, mostly selectively, thereby relegating them to the periphery. Side by side, the

explanation given for these prohibitions or warrants are garbed in a non-contestable fashion such that any person or group that questions these laws are anti-state. This invariably throws the citizens in a conundrum where they can neither oppose nor accept the situation. Herein, tragedy could be found in the ethical choice that people confront— both are sub-optimal. Acceptance of the regulations unquestioningly imply that they could be placing themselves and fellow citizens at risk from state arbitrariness; opposition to it also invites state wrath. Indeed, opposition to certain laws is not possible because of the protectionist tinge in them which inadvertently make them immune from criticism. The obligation of the citizens towards the state is given more importance than the rights of the citizens where, unfortunately, the former completely overshadows the latter.

In the specific case of regulation in the US after 11 September 2001, there is a surge towards emotional responses to the ‘crimes’ (Brown 2002) committed on that particular day. The labelling and alienation of the Muslim community that followed occurred at the legal, political and social levels of the US society. The infliction of torture on the detained individuals has raised questions on the ethics of policing and detention. The trauma that the detained individual goes through is both emotional and physical. The interaction between the tormentor and the tormented is a ‘double-bind’. According to Elias (1987 cited in Dunning 2016: 35), a ‘double-bind’ process is one in which two social groups are involved in a conflict, ‘which none of them can fully control’. In this sense, the interaction reaches a deadlock and neither of the two conflicting parties could be insulated from each other’s actions. Dunning (2016) argues that the reactions of the groups are out of fear of the other group; each side constructs an image or idea about the opposition. Therefore, the ‘responses’ of the groups are ‘based on their fantasy ideas of each other’ (Dunning 2016: 35). The ‘fantasy ideas’, as Dunning (2016: 35) terms them, are perpetrators of fear, apprehension and trepidation of the interacting groups against each other.

When ‘terrorism’ is in picture, the colouration of a particular group as a fearful and irrational people renders them as different from the other groups which are tamed and controlled. This juxtaposes two groups in a society— the ‘established’ and the ‘outsider’ (Dunning 2016). This analogy is similar to Bigo’s identification of the immigrant being the ‘antigen’ into the societal environment (Bigo 2002). These interactions reveal that the societal groups are interlinked and the abetment of ‘outsider’

as the threat or the fear does not reconcile the ‘established’ group because the ‘decivilising’ processes question the norms of the latter (Elias 1997 cited in Dunning 2016: 35-36). The ‘decivilising process’ emerges out of the feared conception of the other which minimises the scope for ‘rational action’, thus strengthening the ‘fantasy’ beliefs of people (Elias 1997 cited in Dunning 2016: 35-36). In this context, regulation becomes tragic because it is based on imagined perceptions of people, which leads to alienation, marginalisation and ostracism.

Tragedy is most evident in extreme or extra-judicial regulations imposed by the state such as torture and confinement. The use of torture has been justified on the ground that it leads to revelation or disclosure of information. However, the abuse of the body shatters the mind of the individuals. Confinement of the body, under the control of an authority, symbolises that the person cannot act or think according to his/her preferences. The trauma that an individual suffers is unmeasurable to the extent that it leaves the confined person at the mercy of the tormentor. Whether or not the person is guilty does not matter to the tormentors; it is a matter of routine, a part of the job that has been anointed to them and to which they have to be loyal to their employers. Their training has yielded them the strength to undertake the task of torturing; there is no guilt or shame in what they are doing because it is normal and dutiful of them to perform such tasks. This is the gravest form of tragedy where consciously human beings make choice to inflict pain on others; guilt does not seem to overcome their deeds because they consider it to be regular procedure.

Herein, constitutive International Relations theory could be used to argue that in the global society actors are recognised within a particular ethical grounding of the ‘practices’ in which they are involved (Frost 2009: 147). This ethical standing is in doldrums when the actor is using torture: there are global norms that prohibit the use of torture and for this reason, wherever it is carried out, it is extremely difficult to justify (Frost 2009: 146-47). Frost (2009: 144) argues that ‘the torturers and those being tortured are all civilians and citizens’. The behaviour towards fellow humans, marked by insolence and indifference, questions the normative basis of regulations or laws that sanctions detention and torture because there are legal and international standards that argue against its use (Frost 2009: 144). The entrapment of the physical body, along with the infliction of pain, makes the individual suffer unaccountable trauma. Frost (2009:

144-45) points out that torture is often kept a secret and removed from the public view, it testifies to the point that torture is ethically unacceptable in the global society.

Herein, Elias's (1956) conception of 'involvement and detachment' needs to be discussed. According to this idea, there are varieties of relations that the humankind is engaged in; 'involvement' and 'detachment' refer to 'sets of mental activities' which decide the relationship a human being has with another, with 'non-human objects and with himself' (Elias 1956). In an age, where human beings are less dependent on natural forces and more on fellow humans, the relationship between human societies have also changed: there are alterations in relations which were 'unintended' or unanticipated (Elias 1956).

An important phenomenon in this regard is the deployment of 'organised force', which was intended to control the relation but results in further interdependence between the groups because there has to be a group which could be controlled. This takes us back to the point on 'double bind process' (Dunning 2016)—neither of the two groups could control the situation and the escalation of the conflict was unintentional. The 'decivilising process' (Elias 1997 cited in Dunning 2016: 35-36) which is viewed as 'detachment' in human relations in public sphere, reifies the 'involvement' that the group has with another (Elias 1956). This ambivalence is tragic because human relations and suffering are in jeopardy, thus rendering fear as the guiding principle for determining human relations. The tragedy lies in the insecurity that human groups perceive from each other rather than appreciating the inter-relationships.

Elias's conception of 'involvement and detachment' (Elias 1956) have been further developed upon and debated so that social interactions could be understood in the contemporary context. Drawing from 'the *developmental* nature of knowledge' (emphasis original) (Elias 1956 cited in Lever and Powell 2017), social processes could be understood in terms of the relations that human societies share between them. Lever and Powell (2017) argue that there are 'secondary forms of involvement' which reveals the 'negative effects of state/ elite policies in the current period'. Elias argues that 'individuals were compelled to show more self-restraint in their relations with each other', as the social, political and economic situation became complex in global society (Elias 2007 cited in Lever and Powell 2017). In other words, human beings began to view themselves as different from each other, which in turn is a result of the changes

that have occurred in the society. This argument is resonant with the view of Linklater (2007c) that the social processes in a global society are susceptible to changes.

Kilminster (2004: 27) reads Elias's argument of involvement and detachment as emerging out of particular 'emotions': this is different from the 'scientific detachment' and is more sociological in nature. To elaborate, there are beliefs regarding the security of the self and the threat of the other. This calls for a redefinition of the extant social dynamics. The social processes undergo a change through state policies, legislations and regulations. This implies that there is a negative engagement with the societal groups in the unmaking of social relations.

Lever and Powell (2017) argue that the changing human relations are due to the alteration in power relations and the decline in social welfare activities of the state, thus 'recasting state-citizen relations'. In this context, it could be argued that there is an 'involved detachment' amongst human beings (Lever and Powell 2017). The case of regulations reifies Elias's concepts of 'involvement' and 'detachment' (Elias 1956). The paradox for the human society lies in re-assurance of security for oneself and the manner in which this could be achieved. The state-citizen relation is political but also emotional. State regulations reassure particular sections of the citizenry of their well-being and security. At the same time, it prejudices the security of certain communities. In spite of the awareness that regulations could be detrimental to the safety of some individuals in the society, there is a 'detachment' from the suffering of the other. The social processes get reflected in public policies, civic laws and legislations. This also suggests the gaps that occur in human relations, wherein there are privileged and marginalised sections of the society, and each viewing the other as their anti-thesis.

Critical security studies with its emphasis upon bringing human beings to the centre of security issues, is immensely important for theoretically embedding torture laws. To this extent, the Copenhagen school brings to focus the securitisation practices of the state. As Waever (2007: 73) argues, '(b)y definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so'. Copenhagen theorists argue that in International Relations, security is mostly linked to the military threat the state confronts whereas there is an entire ambit of security issues that goes deeper than the state such as the individuals (Waever 2007: 69-70). McDonald (2008) argues that securitisation approach could be strengthened by explicating on the processes through which frames

of references are constituted and has a bearing on the construction of security. In other words, there are ways in which political communities are constituted, 'more than the designation of threat' (McDonald 2008). This enables a broadening of the construction of threat.

This broadened conception of securitisation could substantiate on the instance of regulation also since it reveals the discursive frames through which security is constructed. In the case of regulations in the US after 11 September 2001, the political vocabulary constructed a security predicament that emanated from Islamism and *Jihad*. This effectively alienated the Muslim community not only in the US but also in other parts of the Western world. Williams (2003) argues that apart from the 'speech-act' that is the cornerstone of political discourse ethics of the Copenhagen school, 'televisual images' are crucial in the contemporary times to construct the 'enemy'. This viewpoint provides a theoretical understanding for the telecast of the 'fall of the twin towers' (Brown 2002). This was instrumental in keeping the memory of the event alive and the trauma (Edkins 2002) which was suffered by the American people due to the episode. Securitisation is a significant dimension of regulation because it throws insight into the reasons for the acceptance of stringent legislations such as torture warrants and non-warranted detention.

However, the Copenhagen approach is limiting in two ways: firstly, the construction of security threat emanates from the perceptions of certain privileged sections of the society, thereby subduing the opinions of the rest (Williams 2003); secondly, the securitisation theory revolves around 'existential threats', which is similar to Carl Schmitt's real politics concern (Williams 2003). For these two reasons, securitisation could be clubbed with the quest for emancipation and governmentality which has the potential to bring the marginalised voices to the centre of security studies. For a critical rendition of state regulations, the main tenets of the Paris and the Aberystwyth Schools could be referred.

The Paris School of critical security studies focuses on marginalised people and the manner in which the government attempts to exercise control over the population. It also questions the power structures which trickles fear in the global society (Bigo 2002). According to Singler (2018), there are inter-connections between 'development and security' which could be understood through the Foucauldian biopolitics. Bigo (2002)

argues that there are infrastructural set ups which places agential constraints on human beings, and thus, discriminates between people on a regular basis. Similarly, Singler (2018) points out that there are ‘structural characteristics’ as well as distinctive criterion laid down by the ‘global liberal order’ that differentiates between people, especially post-Cold War. This differentiation leads to ‘securitisation of development’, which, Singler (2018) argues is highly questionable because the merging of security and development legitimises ‘depoliticisation’ of particular communities and relegates them to the backdrop of global liberal order. In other words, certain sections of the population are kept aloof from societal development, which is justified on grounds of security by the liberal world order. The Paris school is, therefore, concerned with biopolitics and processes of exclusion.

The case of regulation could be understood through biopolitics and on lines with the Paris school. There is an identification of a group or a community which is viewed as being detrimental to the interests of the society, read elites. This security practices revolve around the alienation of these groups. Regulations legitimise state use of authority and force. Given the structural nuances, the agential restraints are facilitated. The techniques of torture, for instance, implies a control of the body of the person and subjects the person to surveillance. Critical security studies question the ethical basis of exercising control over human agency. The problematisation of the security practices, including policing and surveillance, could provide space for discussion for the vagaries of the alienated communities.

Critical security studies also lay down a format for understanding emancipation of communities and people from their daily struggles (Booth 2007). This view is propagated by the Aberystwyth School which draws on the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. Conceptualising ‘security as emancipation’ (Booth 2007), requires three significant facets. First, sense of security emerges from experiences and therefore, need not be pre-defined; second, ‘critique’ suggests the ways in which the lives of people could be made free from ‘unwanted and unnecessary constraints’ (Nunes 2012); third, ‘transformation’ of the existing socio-political relations becomes important for realising the liberation of people (Booth 2007; Nunes 2012). Nunes (2012) argues that the concept of emancipation could be explicated upon further by incorporating two dimensions: the manner in which the ‘reality of security’ is traversed by politics and ‘the different dimensions of power’. In this context, Nunes (2012) argues that

emancipation is reliant on the ways in which material politicisation takes place and the operation of power through governmentality. Emancipation needs to be understood as a way forward for critical security studies.

In the study of regulations, especially relating to detention and torture, emancipation of the human being needs to be read in conjunction with the extant politics and security discourse as well as the structures of power which restrain progress of people. The Aberystwyth school with its emphasis upon emancipatory politics, brings the encaptivated human being to the centre of analysis. Security, when looked through the perspective of the tormented person, is reduced due to particular legislations and discourses of the state. The Aberystwyth school, therefore, conceptualises security from the perspective of the marginalised community which intends to achieve emancipation from the regular threats emanating from legislations and governance.

Floyd (2007) argues that in spite of the seeming differences between the three schools of critical security studies, it is possible to bridge the gap between them by utilising the concepts of 'securitisation' and 'desecuritisation' that is used by the Copenhagen school scholars and relating it to the concept of 'communality' that is present in the Aberystwyth School so that the analytics are more robust and theoretically more pronounced. Nunes (2012) is also flagging the need of conversation between the Aberystwyth and other schools of critical security studies so that the 'critical' aspect of security studies could be maintained. Therefore, emancipation could be conceptually strengthened by drawing from the Copenhagen school's notion of securitisation and the Paris school's idea of 'governmentality and biopolitics'. In the case of regulation, critical security studies raise questions of the 'ethics of politics' (Browning and McDonald 2013) which is central to both the Aberystwth and the Copenhagen schools as well as problematises the structures of power (Nunes 2012), a viewpoint undertaken by the Paris school. In this way, critical security studies provide a theoretical basis for understanding regulation in global society.

By using the theoretical lens of critical security studies, the individuals and the politics of exclusion comes to the picture. The problems also get enhanced because of the claims of denial by the elitists over any such practice and cause. To that degree, regulations, in terms of directives issued by the state and in the ostensible interest of the civilians, is oblivious to the vagaries of the human community which would be victimised by the

same. In this regard, critiquing policing actions of the state becomes a gruesome exercise because of the protective shield provided by the state: missing people, fake encounters, arbitrary detentions and the infliction of violence on them is legitimised. The state backlash is indiscriminate. It does not even spare its own citizens. Tragedy lies in the physical inescapability of the people which forces them to tolerate atrocities. In effect, there is no choice left for the detainee but to suffer. Emancipation, in the case of regulation, lies in the liberation from both physical pain and the related trauma. Critical security studies provide a framework for reading regulation since it argues from the perspective of the captivated individual. The infliction of harm on the human body through torture and detention raises normative concerns in International Relations.

The tragedy in regulation lies in the vindication that politics breathes within the marginalised community. The security predicament of the marginalised section could clash with the etiquettes of policing. In this manner, violence germinates and the society is locked in a conflict which seems to be unending. The suffering of the body, clearly, is a traumatic memory. Herein, emancipation of the individual is caught between memory and progress. The pain and trauma suffered by the individuals physically and emotionally renders regulations tragic in a critical reading.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

In this study, the aim has been to broaden the scope of the thematic of tragedy by means of engaging with three concrete cases namely, suicide bombing by the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the plight of the minority sections in the aftermath of political turmoil in 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia and the denigration of Muslim population in the United States of America after 11 September 2001. The reason as to why these three cases, very different from each other, were chosen is because of the manifestations of mishaps in global politics. These cases are geographically removed from each other, but globally united under the banner of cosmopolitanism and world citizenry— concepts which typically allude to the critical bent of research in International Relations. The methodological thrust of the research is on double reading. Critical security studies, with its engagement in marginalisation, emancipation and securitisation, provides the theoretical edifice for this study.

Herein, tragedy has been understood in the context of global society where practices of exclusion and ostracisation affect marginalised sections of the society. In this study, the focus has been on marginalised communities in the global society. The three cases, namely, suicide bombing by the LTTE in Sri Lanka, religious and gender minorities in the political revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 and the onslaught on the Muslim community in the US after 11 September 2001, suggest that the individual experiences of exclusion, trauma and violence are prevalent within the marginalised communities. For this reason, it could be argued that tragedy in global politics lies in regular and sustained processes of exclusion that emulsifies social relations and delimits political spaces for marginalised communities, and their quest for emancipation.

Tragedy, by definition, is manifested in several ways in global politics: there is exclusion of ethnic, linguistic, racial or religious minorities, women, indigenous people, disabled, people in war-zones, persons with varied sexual orientation, etcetera in global society. These segments of population are not only relegated to the political background but are also deemed to be absent from the socio-political discourse. This study is not exhaustive. It deals with those instances where there is marginalisation of communities through structural and physical violence, thus exacerbating their emancipatory

tendencies. There is an attempt to understand security issues through the lens of the marginalised. State-centred perspectives on security reveal the apprehensions of the state and clearly delineates the ‘protector’ and the ‘predator’— the former is the state and the latter are the members of a particular community who need to be controlled by the legitimate authority. Critical security studies begin with the perspective of the marginalised community and speaks about their fear and insecurity. This does two things: first, it produces a counter to the state narratives and questions social exclusion; second, the multiplicity of views rescues security discourse from the soliloquy of the state. On the basis of this study, it could be argued that contextualisation of security from the perspective of the marginalised communities has the potential to dismantle mainstream narratives.

The three cases have been divided into three separate chapters. Chapter Three is titled ‘The Rebellion in Suicide Bombing’. The chapter has explicated upon the making of a rebel and the narrative of repression that underlies rebellious actions. In this chapter, the main aim has been to read rebellion from the perspective of the rebel unlike mainstream security narratives that understand rebellion from the viewpoint of the state. Rebellion in International Relations, has been characterised in the following way: violent actions that move towards destabilising the extant political structures and are targeted for their dissidence (Bob 2005; Hellmich 2005). In this study, rebellion has been understood as an emotional upsurge against the discriminatory socio-political processes, which have continued for a period of time, ventilated through aggression and violence and mostly constituent of suppressed sections of the society. It has been argued in this chapter that rebellion could be a logical choice for those sections of the population that have been suffering from regular discrimination which has continued unabated, finally raising the indignation of the community. The malevolence and antipathy are both a vicious circle as well as an upward spiral.

Rebellion is an asymmetrical conflict. However, the emphasis on their immanence as threat is sometimes disproportionate given that the state has the utmost resources at its behest. The rebels, however, gain points for the utilisation of their agential powers including that of their physical bodies. Herein, suicide bombing is an uncontrollable form of rebellion because however much the state tries, it cannot control the body of the person. Suicide bombing is, therefore, an extreme form of rebellion because it is not a mere act of killing: it reveals the desperation of the people to emphasise upon their

presence. Herein, a specific case of suicide bombing by the LTTE has been analysed. This particular case has been historicised because it consists of a significant aspect of the formation of Tamil identity. On the basis of the research conducted, it could be argued that separatism in Sri Lanka was expedited by the regular discrimination against the Tamil population by the state. The urge to rehabilitate themselves is very much prominent in the actions of the LTTE as they disregarded their lives for the achievement of their goals. The tragedy, more generally, lies in the situation of the marginalised citizens: their struggle does not seem to end even if they endanger their own lives and there is a backlash on the community which further prejudices their normal living.

In the mainstream security narratives, suicide bombing has been viewed as a violent and aggressive action, which is carried out with the intention of engaging in terrorism and destabilising the state structure (Bloom 2005; Hafez 2006). Most scholars on suicide bombing have viewed the enterprise as being goal oriented— there is a vested purpose for the act and a mission to cause fear amongst the population (Pape 2005; Crenshaw 2007). Yet another set of scholars, focus on the violent act and by their very semantics – such as ‘suicide terrorism’ (Bloom 2005; Pape 2005; Pedahzur 2005; Hafez 2006; Crenshaw 2007), ‘suicide missions’ (Gambetta 2005) and ‘murder suicides’ (Oliver and Steinberg 2005) – render the act unacceptable. However, critical security perspective suggest that the act is emancipatory: there is a liberation from the sufferings of the individual and symbolically it reveals the power of people over their bodies. Rebellion, when viewed from the perspective of the marginalised community, could be read as the ventilation of anger through a defining moment of death.

Chapter Four titled, ‘Re-examining Revolution: The Case of the Arab world’, has engaged with an understanding of revolution. In this chapter, the process of revolution has been examined and the changes that it brings about in the society has been critically observed. Herein, revolution has been understood as a political movement that involves people and brings about a tangible change in the political institutions and leadership of a state. The question that has been addressed is as follows: does revolution necessarily benefit all sections of the society? This concern has been viewed in the light of the stature of the minority and socially unprivileged groups in the Egyptian and Tunisian societies after 2011 and its attendant political turmoil. By drawing a comparison between the past and the present political situations of religious and gender minorities,

it could be argued that their exclusion has deepened because of the instability at the political level.

In the context of security studies, such cases are extremely crucial from the critical-theoretical perspective. If there is a fight to discontinue dictatorship, does repression end with its overthrow? Or does it alter in form and continues to exist even in the new regime? More importantly, does power-mongering end with the deposition of the previous government? Security of the minorities is jeopardised even after the political change. Critical security studies, with its emphasis upon emancipation and progress, intends to focus upon the plight of the people specially those who are less privileged. Revolution is invariably celebrated for its liberating ideas: but in reality, the benefit does not extend to all sections of the society. The tragedy herein lies in the quagmire of the minorities to attain emancipation and egalitarianism which the revolution itself does not bring about.

The critique of the mainstream understanding of revolution stems from its ontological grounding that is essentially factual and superficial. As Brown (2013) points out, the ‘grand theory’ in International Relations lacks ‘action-guiding as well as world-revealing’ features because of which realism and liberalism (the two important constituents of the mainstream in IR) have failed to add value to International Relations theory. Therefore, the explanation of revolution in the mainstream is built upon the assumptions of international system in International Relations. This narrative collapses when revolution creates varying effects on the society. Therefore, a deeper reading of revolution reveals that the political outcome is a visible but meagre part of a movement—there is progress in the society, along with anxiety amongst marginalised civilians, a scramble for power within the society and transitional turmoil. This reading questions the portrayal of revolution in a conventional sense since, from the perspective of the marginalised sections of the society, revolution could potentially perturb their contemporary living.

In Chapter Five, ‘Confinement and Torture in State Regulations’, the tragedy in regulation is critically analysed. Herein, by regulation, the rules, prohibitions, law making and implementation and prevention maintained by the state, by means of policing, administration and judicial proceedings is implied. Engaging in a critical discourse of state regulation, the chapter intends to focus upon the predicament of the

citizen when veiled from the rest of the society. The study in this chapter is two-fold: the first is to approach regulation from the perspective of the captive and question the logic of inhumanity in spaces far removed from public scrutiny; the second, methodologically, deconstruction of the logic of a superstructure that dominates citizens is sought.

The central argument of the chapter could be summarised, thus: from the vantage point of the confined individual, regulation curtails civil liberty, thereby rendering it a tragedy. The study interrogates the state logic of security which seems to be biased and hypocritical. Herein, critical security studies with its focus upon individual insecurity and trepidation forms the threshold from which a magnified view of state atrocities could be discussed. In this regard, the case of the United States is taken up for study. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the state agencies made rampant and arbitrary arrests under the pre-text of terror activities. In the process, however, several civilians were subjected to unlawful treatment. The threat of terrorism acquired the status of an absolute discourse in the maintenance of security within the US. The ‘urgency’ of combating terrorism on all fronts became the *raison de eta* of the state. A double reading of regulation engages with the question of this absoluteness in discourse and practice of the state which transgresses upon human dignity. Torture is used as an investigation technique; in the case of the US, it degraded human beings to a baser level.

The first reading of regulation places it in the liberal framework, wherein ‘liberty with restraints’ is an acceptable idea. However, the irony lies when there are severe limitations placed on the people from a particular community or section of the society. A double reading of regulation engages with the concerns of the extradited sections of the society. Hence, regulation has a grammar of exclusion and insecurity for the marginalised community. In the context of confinement and torture, the body of the person in captivated and controlled— these ‘bodies in pain’ (Scarry 1985) are critical reflections of pain and harm in global society. The trauma that the person physically suffers also has an emotional impact. Emancipation is caught within the triad of ethics, emotions and exclusivity.

From the beginning, the focus has been on security specific issues and within that the predicament of the marginalised communities have been highlighted. To this extent, the research has drawn heavily from critical security studies. It could be concluded that the

study does not identify with any one branch of critical security studies. This is because the idea is to engage with the thematic of tragedy and see its different manifestations on the global scene. For this reason, rebellion has been analysed from the perspective of the rebel in as much a historicisation reveals their marginalisation and represents a typical case of the tyranny of the majority. Herein, the Aberystwyth school with its emphasis upon the liberation of communities and individuals has been utilised as a critical lens. Similarly, in revolution struggle of the minority communities in political turmoil speaks of their persistent predicament. The chapter on regulation, however, borrows from the Paris and Copenhagen Schools because it enquires into the securitisation practices of the state. Emancipation and the quest of the protagonist to achieve the same is the subject matter of study commonly found in all the three cases.

It goes without saying that towards the conclusion of the study, the emphasis on emancipation takes precedence over aspects of securitisation and it is this that has preoccupied the study towards its finale. Emancipation or freedom from fear that leads to the sustained development of the individual is the thrust of the study. Though there cannot be a singular inference given the volume of the study, it could be more generally argued that emancipation could be envisaged as a continuous struggle that has to be carried on for consistent improvement in the orderly living of an individual or a community. This is clubbed with tragedy not because of the indefiniteness of the struggle but because global citizens strive for the achievement of an uncertain goal. It is not instrumental to the extent that there are no measured steps that could be taken towards the same. It is normative because there is a humanitarian grounding of the issues concerned. At the same time, emancipation is a subjective concept because in each of the three cases it has varied meanings: the rebel's emancipation lies in the recognition of their political aspirations, the minorities in a revolution want liberation from suppression and the achievement of equality, and the prisoner seeks humane treatment in the context of a liberal world order which intends to give citizens individual rights and freedom. Tragedy, herein, seems not to be immutable but resolvable by changing the essential conditions that deprivilege certain sections of the society.

In the beginning of the thesis, one research question addressed the problem of tragedy directly: what is it that impedes contextualisation of tragedy from an agential perspective in security studies? This is one of the questions that has been of utmost

concern throughout the study. On the basis of the study conducted, two propositions could be formulated:

- (1) The suffering of the subject when hidden from the foresight obstructs emancipation, thus rendering it unproblematic.
- (2) When security is understood as a concern for the growth of societies it becomes necessary to engage with the people, thus enabling contextualisation of their vagaries and challenges.

In other words, only when security studies is rescued from its instrumental logic and security issues are historicised and placed under a context then the perspective of the people could be understood and the catastrophes that engulfs them be discussed.

Unlike mainstream International Relations, the study makes it amply clear that a nuanced understanding of tragedy is only possible by a critical engagement with people and communities rather than placing it in the context of the states only. In the mainstream perspective, because of the presumption of the unchanging structures of international system, it is conclusive that tragedy is unavoidable— there will be an unabated competition for procurement of self-interests. Contrary to this perspective, tragedy definitely seems avoidable, if the political arrangements are diagnosed and, therefore, altered. It requires an engagement with global society and international norms that could give citizens their due. The thematic of tragedy is broadened by considering the global cases which testifies to the argument that turbulence in politics perturbs the life of civilians.

The emphasis is placed upon methodological rigour which need not be confined to positivism. Postpositivism with its emphasis on deconstruction enables to see the layers of discourses that lies beyond a state action: what appears to be an important security measure could be endangering particular communities. Double reading improves analysis because it digs deeper into statements which are taken at face value in the initial reading. It does not change the text but assesses the sub-texts as well as the implications of the document. In this way, deconstruction is not bereft of empiricism, but does not consider fact and value to be separable. To this extent, mixed methods have been used. By a combination of cases along with varied narratives associated with it, contextualisation is a logical outcome.

Hypothesis 1, proposed at the beginning of the research, was stated as follows: A double reading of rebellion, revolution and regulation enables an engagement with the dissenting narratives, thereby privileging human agency in security studies. This argument, towards the end of the research, is more concrete and it could be considered to be the cornerstone of the study in as much as it demystifies the myth of state power politics. By means of engagement with exclusionary state practices, such as marginalisation of linguistic, religious and cultural interests in the case of Tamils in Sri Lanka, political extradition in the case of minorities in Egypt and Tunisia and violent state intrusions in the case of Muslims in the US, it is inferred that there is a politics of labelling communities by the state and the privileged sections of the society, which jeopardises the interests and sentiments of certain communities in global politics.

Hypothesis 2 related to the chapter on rebellion with suicide bombing as its significant manifestation. It stated: From the perspective of the rebel, the certitude of self-annihilation coupled with the stigmatisation of the subjugated group, renders rebellion tragic. The manner in which the rebel takes extreme measures to establish the cause has been discussed in the chapter and it reveals the desperation of the protagonist to fight out the deplorable conditions which they have been subject to. Rebellion, to that extent, is spontaneous. In some cases, as in the case of Sri Lanka, the tendency to go against the legitimate authorities emerges eventually. Suicide bombing by the LTTE is a reaction to the indifference of the Sinhala politicians towards the sizeable minority of Tamils. The rebels may not consider self-killing as unethical, but it is a choice between two sub-optimal outcomes, to borrow the words of Mervyn Frost (Frost 2017). Tragedy, herein, is viscous because it keeps adding to the burden of the already subjugated communities. In the light of the above assessment, it could be said that the argument is substantive and can withstand critical tests.

Hypothesis 3 stated: a revolution becomes tragic when it unfolds into a situation of uncertainty and transitional turmoil, further jeopardising the marginalised citizens. It has to be flagged that in the case of revolution, marginalised citizens relates to minorities. Considering that even political elites of yesterday could be imprisoned and given unfair trials, and there is no sense of justice that prevails except for the fancies of the revolutionary government, this hypothesis could be qualified in the following manner: revolution becomes tragic for minority citizens as there is uncertainty and transitional turmoil, thereby making their living conditions more precarious than

before. This qualification makes the concerns of the researcher very clear. For one, there is an engagement with particular minority groups. Second, there is a comparison that is drawn between the situation of the minorities in the earlier regimes and that under the contemporary ones. The chapter on revolution was challenging primarily because the Arab world is still undergoing revolutionary episodes and stability as yet has evaded the region; any changes at the political level shorter than a decade is difficult to adjudge. Notwithstanding these, however, the study shows the dual face of revolution: on the one hand, there seems to be an end of a repressive political era, while on the other, it fails to provide assurances to the minorities, regarding their political space in a new political setting.

The last hypothesis was proposed in the context of regulations implemented by the state: From the vantage point of the confined individual, regulation curtails civil liberties and inflicts pain and torment, thereby rendering it a tragedy. Herein, state legislations have been critically scrutinised in the context of regulations after 11 September 2001 in the US. The magnanimity of the prohibitions that the state imposes reaches its zenith with the confinement and torture of individuals. Infliction of pain and harm is justified on grounds of national security. The imagery of threat emanating from particular communities, syncs well with a society which has undergone severe havocs from terrorism. The state plays on this sentiment to hide its own infirmities and while portraying itself as the guardian angel of the citizens: a contradiction that is most pronounced. From the perspective of Critical Theory, emancipation in this case is dual: physical as well as mental. It could be argued that restrictions on the body of the person is the final constraining factor. In the hypothesis proposed, emphasis has been given on the infliction of pain and harm on the body of the person and that being tragic in global politics. However, the tragedy is deeper in this case and two inferential statements needs to be added:

- (1) The entrapment of physicality ensures psychological captivity, thereby making it tragic.
- (2) Torture encapsulates the body and ensures its control from outside, tragically bereaving the individual from self-monitoring.

These two statements are supplementary to the major argument that was proposed and brings out the catastrophe that is found in uncontrolled state authority. The larger

problem lies with the compromise in the neo-liberal agendas and violation of human rights that goes unquestioned by the people.

At the end of the research, four substantive arguments could be made which could be read in conjunction with the proposed hypotheses:

(1) The instrumental logic attached to the thematic of tragedy has ensured that only certain events are labelled as ‘tragic’ while others, including state-induced violence and injustices are camouflaged within security imperatives thus prohibiting tragedy to be understood from the standpoint of the people.

(2) The occurrence of pain and harm contextualises ethical challenges confronted by global citizens, who have been victims of discriminatory practices, and tragedy lies in their predicament to achieve emancipation.

(3) The suffering of citizens in the global society is rendered tragic in a double reading of rebellion, revolution and regulation which shifts the referent object in security narratives from the state to the people.

(4) A theoretical study, contextualised from the vantage point of the suppressed, subjugated or silenced, enables an empathetic engagement thereby extricating the analysis from extant practices of security which deprivilege human agency in global politics.

The thematic of tragedy needs to be broadened in International Relations and particularly in security studies because of the ethical component it carries. By studying themes which sound non-political, such as pain, harm and trauma, there is an engagement with peripheral subjects and issues. The aim of the research was to do precisely this, that is place the said question within a larger conversation. Rather than stating particularly what tragedy means, the attempt has been to show its various manifestations and elaborate on the various shapes it could shape—each time impeding emancipation and facing socio-political challenges. It could be said that cases other than these could be taken up for studying as being tragic, especially those which have a dominant narrative. Asking, ‘is there no dissidence?’—is the beginning of critical research in general and eventually proceeds away from the over-arching discourse. Tragedy in security studies could be a reliable variable to assess political conditions.

This has been the very attempt in this research. Therefore, conceptual elucidation of tragedy could procure the benefits of critical engagement in security studies.

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APPENDIX I
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
FIELD TRIP 2017

SL.NO	NAME OF THE INTERVIEWEE	INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION	DATE OF INTERVIEW	PLACE OF INTERVIEW
1.	Rahul Rao	SOAS, London	9 March	SOAS, London
2.	Meera Sabaratnam	SOAS, London	10 March	SOAS, London
3.	Reem Aboul Fadl	SOAS, London	10 March	SOAS, London
4.	Mervyn Frost	King's College, London	10 March	King's College, London
5.	Melanie Richter-Montpetit	University of Sheffield, Sheffield	9 March	University of Sheffield
6.	Lisa Stampnitzsky	University of Sheffield, Sheffield	9 March	Sheffield
7.	Nicholas Wheeler	University of Birmingham, Birmingham	13 March	University of Birmingham
8.	Maja Zehfuss	University of Manchester, Manchester	14 March	University of Manchester
9.	Veronique Pin-Fat	University of Manchester, Manchester	14 March	University of Manchester
10.	Andrew Linklater	Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, Wales	15 March	Aberystwyth University
11.	Milja Kurki	Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, Wales	15 March	Aberystwyth University
12.	Jan Ruzicka	Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, Wales	15 March	Aberystwyth University
13.	Jenny Edkins	Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, Wales	15 March	Aberystwyth University
14.	James Mayall	University of Cambridge, Cambridge	17 March	University of Cambridge