

Dialectics of Knowledge Formation and the Self :


A Study of Hermann Hesse's Novels

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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Doctor of Philosophy

by

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INTRODUCTION

In order to introduce the reader to the works of Hermann Hesse and the fundamental premises of my research, it is quintessentially important to take into account the fact that literature (and philosophy as well) unflinchingly mirrors the deepest and probably the subtlest workings of the human mind, its feelings, passions, and a gamut of experiences that are, for the most part, the by-products of the external social determinants. Literature not only explores and examines the individual's spatial and empirical relationship with the outward phenomena but also delves deep into the intricate ways of self-realization engaging with psychological and philosophical studies/realities.

Conceptualizing the self has been, implicitly or explicitly, a major preoccupation of both literature and philosophy throughout the ages and a call for the study of the self would inevitably engage literature, philosophy, psychology and various other disciplines simultaneously, or even juxtapositionally.

Primarily, this research purports to study the construction and transformations of the self in Hermann Hesse's novels, while at the same time foregrounding the Nietzschean concept of Dionysian and Apollonian elements that underlie most of Hesse's novels. There are several ways in which the category of the self has attracted philosophers for a long time and as far as Hesse is concerned, the self is constructed through an empiricist mode of knowledge acquisition. All his novels are in the traditional European form of bildungsroman with a consequential evolution of the protagonist as a liberated (enlightened) person, as a person who knows the self only after flouting the ossified ways of living, thinking and believing that shackle the development of man as man. Following Nietzsche, Hesse tried to create a world free from the pessimism and nihilism of a fundamental meaninglessness.

As we know, the Apollonian in Nietzsche designates what is the unique individuality of anything. It is related to form and structure with an edifying impulse. For instance, sculpture is an Apollonian art as it has to do with a specific form and structure. Conversely, the Dionysian refers to the absence of individuality. Drunkenness, madness, passion, instinct, enthusiasm, ecstasy, music, etc. are Dionysian qualities. Speaking about the Dionysian, Nietzsche says, "The satyr, in which the Greeks saw nature, was the primordial image of man, the expression of his highest and strongest emotions...." And again, "Here the illusion of culture was wiped away by

the primordial image of man. Here the real man revealed himself, the bearded satyr who cried out with joy to his god. In comparison with him the man of culture was reduced to a misleading caricature” (Nietzsche, *The Complete Works* 97-98). Ancient Greek tragedy, according to Nietzsche, incorporated and intensified a tension between both the elements allowing the audience the full spectrum of human condition. Nietzsche again says, “And consequently, wherever the Dionysiac invasion was successful, the Apollonian was negated and destroyed. But just as certain is it that where the first onslaught was successfully withstood, the esteem and majesty of the Delphic god was expressed more rigidly and more threateningly than ever” (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 27). Hermann Hesse too attempted at the synthesis of both the opposites through reconciliation. Like Marx, Hesse also applies a binary opposition. This dialectical process runs throughout most of his novels. He combines this dialectical theory with yet another idea: ‘the triadic rhythm of humanization.’

In Hesse’s opinion, man’s process of humanization begins with innocence. But in course of time he gets into the whirl of good and bad, culture, morality, man-made ideals, etc. Finally, he gets disappointed as these so-called ideals and morality do not manifest any reality. Consequently, he either falls down or gathers faith. But there is a third stage, according to Hesse, which synthesizes the rational and the pious in man and leads to a true state of humanity. His protagonists question and drop their initial values and develop a new consciousness that is born of empirical realities.

In *Peter Camenzind*, Hesse’s first novel named after its protagonist, we envisage the type of transformation to be found in his later novels. Like Hesse’s other protagonists, e.g. Siddhartha, Goldmund, and Harry Haller, Camenzind suffers deeply and undergoes many intellectual, physical and empirical journeys.

Another novel by Hesse, *Beneath the Wheel*, presents the story of Hans Giebenrath, a sensitive boy sent to an elite seminary, who fails to develop himself as a person because of much scholastic knowledge resulting in his mental illness. Finally, he comes back to his village and is given to do the work of a blacksmith and he enjoys the work. Here, Hesse focuses on the need of concretization instead of abstractions. The Dionysian impulse is evident here: Giebenrath has feeling, instinct.

Nietzsche had a strong influence on Hesse and *Gertrud* (influenced by Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*), apart from many others, is a very good example of this. Muoth represents the passionate Dionysian elements of art, while Gertrud represents the more refined Apollonian elements. The fact that Kuhn's opera is the result of their relationship suggests the combining of the two elements to form a work of high art – the art that the Greeks practised by combining the two binary oppositions.

The novel *Knulp* centres around the character of Knulp, a drop-out who perpetually wanders, is dependent on friends, and who refuses to tie himself down to any job, place or person. He continues this Dionysian attitude of the irrational, instinctual, passionate and chaotic throughout his life. After disillusionment, he goes to a forest and asks God what the purpose of his life is. God replies that he did not want him to be a doctor, an artist or anything else. Rather, God wanted him to bring joy to the lives of people and lead them to the world of freedom, mental freedom. Thus, as a drifter, he finds the meaning of his life and self; to him the meaning of the self seems to be a consideration of existence as a whole. Here, a synthesis of the dichotomy between the Dionysian and the Apollonian is attempted at. First comes the Dionysian impulse in Knulp as he wanders and leads a careless and instinctual life in a state of intoxication keeping himself away from ambitions. But Hesse turns this careless and aimless life into a meaningful one by consigning Knulp the duty of bringing joy to the lives of people – perhaps an Apollonian tendency. He makes Knulp a rewarding failure when God says that he (God) couldn't have used him in any other way. Knulp wandered everywhere and brought a breath of freedom to the people who stayed home.

In *Demian*, Emil Sinclair is a young boy who was raised in a bourgeois home described as a Scheinwelt, 'Scheinwelt' being a play on words which means 'world of light' as well as 'world of illusion'. Through the novel, accompanied and prompted by his mysterious classmate Max Demian, he descends from and revolts against the superficial ideals of this world and eventually awakens into a realization of self. Thus, only after a revolt against the superficial ideals of the world does he find a realization of his own self – the essence of life. There seems to be a good influence of Nietzschean philosophy on this novel too. The man-made ideals and faiths are set at naught and it is the self and the will to empower the self that finds an outlet finally transforming the subject into an esoteric, self-loving being. Here the self becomes important as it is opposed to the negative connotation of the word 'selfish'. The novel also shows the influence of Carl Jung's psychology. Hesse said the novel was a story of Jungian individuation, the process of opening up to one's unconscious. This unconscious is the door to reach the realm of the self.

In the beginning itself, Sinclair sets forth his spirit, “I cannot call myself a scholar. I have always been and still am a seeker but I no longer do my seeking among the stars or in books. I am beginning to hear the lessons which whisper in my blood” (Hesse, *Demian* 6). Demian emerges as a rebel. He does not have sympathy for the thief who repents with Christ on the cross. Instead, his sympathy goes out to the thief who will not repent. In his own words, “He has character and there are only too few people of character in the Bible. Perhaps he was a descendent of Cain’s. Don’t you agree?” (Hesse, *Demian* 66). The Nietzschean tendency of considering the Dionysian (the thief in this case) not inferior to the Apollonian finds an epitome in the character of Demian. Sinclair has a dream in which he sees a bird. He sends a picture of the same bird to Demian. Then Demian tells him, “The bird is struggling out of the egg... The egg is the world. Whoever wants to be born must first destroy world. The bird is flying to God. The name of the God is called Abraxas” (Hesse, *Demian* 100). The Gnostic deity Abraxas is used as a symbol throughout the text, idealizing the harmonious union of all that is good and all that is evil in the world. Demian argues that the Catholic God, in contrast, is an insufficient god; it rules over all that is wholesome, but there is another half of the world of inconsistencies and irregularities, over which this austere god has no or very little control.

The story of *Siddhartha* takes place in ancient India around the time of Gautama Buddha. It starts as Siddhartha, the son of a Brahmin, leaves his home to join the ascetics with his companion Govinda. The two set out in the search of enlightenment. Siddhartha goes through a series of changes and realizations as he attempts to achieve this goal.

Experience is the aggregate of conscious events experienced by a human in life – it connotes participation, learning and perhaps knowledge. Understanding is comprehension and internalization. In *Siddhartha*, experience is shown as the best way to approach reality. Hesse’s crafting of Siddhartha’s journey shows that understanding is acquired not through scholastic, mind-dependent methods, nor through immersing oneself in the carnal pleasures of the world and the accompanying pains. It is the totality of these experiences that makes understanding possible. Thus, individual events are meaningless when considered in themselves: Siddhartha’s stay with the *samanas* and his immersion in the worlds of love and business do not lead to liberation; yet they cannot be considered distractions, for every action and event that is undertaken and happens to Siddhartha helps him to achieve understanding. The effect of the sum total of these events is what we can call experience.

For example, Siddhartha's passionate and pained love for his son is an experience that teaches him empathy; he is able to understand child-like people after this experience, whose motivations and lives he could not comprehend earlier. And while the world clung to him and made him ill and sick of it, he was unable to understand the nature of the world. Experience of the world at this point did not lead to understanding; perhaps it even hindered it. In contrast to this, Siddhartha's experience with his son allows him to love, something he has not managed to do before; but, once again, the love itself does not lead to understanding. The novel ends with Siddhartha becoming a ferryman, talking to the river, talking to stones, at long last at peace and capturing the essence of his journey:

Slowly he walked along in his thoughts and asked himself: "But what is this, what you have sought to learn from teachings and from teachers, and what they, who have taught you much, were still unable to teach you?" And he found: "It was the self, the purpose and essence of which I sought to learn. It was the self I wanted to free myself from, which I sought to overcome. But I was not able to overcome it, could only deceive it, could only flee from it, only hide from it. Truly, no thing in this world has kept my thoughts thus busy, as this my very own self, this mystery of me being alive, of me being one and being separated and isolated from all others, of me being Siddhartha! And there is nothing in this world I know less about than about myself, about Siddhartha!" (Hesse, *Siddhartha*).

A major preoccupation of Hesse in writing *Siddhartha* was to cure his 'sickness with life' (*Lebenskrankheit*) by immersing himself in Eastern philosophy. The reason why the second half of the book took so long to write was that Hesse "had not experienced that transcendental state of unity to which Siddhartha aspires. In order to do so, Hesse lived as a virtual semi-recluse and became totally immersed in the sacred teachings of both Hindu and Buddhist scriptures. His intention was to attain that 'completeness' which, in the novel, is the Buddha's badge of distinction." The novel is structured on the three stages of traditional Indian life – of a student (*brahmacharya*), of a householder (*gārhasthya*) and recluse/renunciate (*vānaprastha*) as well as the Buddha's four noble truths and eight-fold path which form twelve, the number of chapters in the novel. Ralph Freedman mentions how Hesse commented in a letter "[m]y Siddhartha does not, in the end, learn true wisdom from any teacher, but from a river that roars in a funny way and from a kindly old fool who always smiles..." (qtd. in Freedman 233). Freedman also points out how *Siddhartha* described Hesse's interior dialectic: "All of the contrasting poles of his life

were sharply etched: the restless departures and the search for stillness at home; the diversity of experience and the harmony of a unifying spirit; the security of religious dogma and the anxiety of freedom” (96). Finally Siddhartha says to Buddha that redemption “has come to you in the course of your own search, on your own path, through thoughts, through meditation, through realizations, through enlightenment. It has not come to you by means of teachings!” (Hesse, *Siddhartha*). Thus the protagonist makes his way from the realm of the spirit to the senses before he finally achieves the liberating synthesis on the river that flows between the two realms.

Narcissus and Goldmund is the story of a young man, Goldmund, who wanders around aimlessly throughout Medieval Germany after leaving a Catholic monastery in search of what could be described as ‘the meaning of life’, or rather, meaning for his life. Narcissus, a gifted young teacher at the cloister school, quickly makes friends with Goldmund, as they are only a few years apart, and Goldmund is naturally bright. Goldmund looks up to Narcissus, and Narcissus has much fondness for him in return. After straying too far in the fields one day, on an errand gathering herbs, Goldmund comes across a beautiful woman, who kisses him and invites him to make love. This encounter becomes his epiphany, and he then knows he was never meant to be a monk. Goldmund is filled with the desire to experience everything, learn about life and nature in his own hands-on way. With Narcissus’ support, he leaves the monastery and wanders around the countryside, setting the scene for a story that contrasts the artist with the thinker. It spans many years, detailing specific incidents where Goldmund learns important things, and he often muses on these experiences and the ways of life.

Nietzsche is influential even here. The polarization of Narcissus’ individualist Apollonian character stands in contrast to the passionate and zealous disposition of Goldmund. Hesse, in the spirit of Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*, completes the equation by creating Goldmund as an artist and wanderer (a Dionysian endeavour) balanced out by Narcissus, the structured and stable clergyman (an Apollonian approach), and highlighting the harmonizing relationship of the main characters. Goldmund is presented as an evolving seeker who attempts to embody both Apollonian and Dionysian elements, thus capturing Nietzsche’s conception of the ideal tragedy. Goldmund comes to embody a wide spectrum of the human experience, lusting for the gruesome ecstasy of the sensual world yet capturing and representing it through his talent as a sculptor.

Like most of Hesse's works, the main theme of this book is the wanderer's struggle to find himself, as well as the Jungian union of polar opposites (Mysterium Coniunctionis). Goldmund represents art and nature and the 'feminine mind', while Narcissus represents science and logic and God and the 'masculine mind'. These 'feminine' and 'masculine' qualities are drawn from the Jungian archetypal structure, and is quite reminiscent of some of his earlier works, especially *Demian*. Throughout the novel, Goldmund increasingly becomes aware of memories of his own mother, which ultimately results in his desire to return to the *Urmutter* (primordial mother). The thesis and antithesis of spirit and nature are embodied in the lives of Narcissus and Goldmund, who achieve a symbolic unity to the extent that they complement each other's existence.

Hesse cannot always be studied as a purely philosophical novelist. He has linked his writing to society at large and the then Germany in particular. The tensions created by the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany directly contributed to the creation of the *Glass Bead Game* as a response to the oppressive times. Hesse attempted to work against Hitler's suppression of art and literature. The socially involved aspects of this novel earned the Nobel Prize for Hesse.

Now if we view how the self is constructed, can it be possible to say that what we call the self is, to borrow David Hume's words, simply a 'bundle of perceptions'? Do Hesse's protagonists carry the same bundle of perceptions? The answer is probably in the affirmative.

Hesse knew the religion of nature that is always opposed to the social and mental structures man has raised. His protagonists go alone without a teacher. All find the meaning of existence in the self as it is the self that teaches one to think. But this self is diametrically opposite to the general connotation of the word. It is a realization of existence as a whole; it is a process of humanization and fraternity. It goes along the lines of the German tradition of Marxian humanism. In Marx religion is the opium for people. In Hesse too, religion shackles the natural growth of man, and one has to "Become what you are!", as said Nietzsche.

Hesse emerges as a romantic writer hovering around in the world of imagination and yet telling the ultimate truth. He expresses his opposition to currently accepted values by putting his pacifism against militarism, his cosmopolitanism against nationalism, his tolerance against anti-Semitism, and his conception of a world culture against a narrow European civilization. His pacifism, universalism, tolerance and attempt to free man from the shackles of the mind and man-made values, and to inspire for a natural life are praiseworthy, but he seems to be mystical

somewhere when he touches eastern philosophy and this prevents him from being a purely philosophical person. In every novel of his, opposites like rationalism and empiricism, Eros and Thanatos, conscious and unconscious, the Manichean light and darkness, etc. manifest themselves profoundly. However, Hesse tried to create something in the line of the ancient Greeks by fusing them. A unique synthesis of both the polar opposite elements generates a harmonious humanism in Hesse, which most of the existing social movements cannot ensure us of as they always try to take us to some extremes.

Some key research queries which are to be handled in this study are as follows:

- What is the self in Hermann Hesse?
- How and to what extent was Hesse influenced by Nietzsche?
- Where does Hesse's concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis lead us to?
- What is the final meaning of life that Hesse's characters find?
- Was Hesse a pacifist/humanist writer whose religion was man?
- What is the role of philosophy in pacifism?
- What kind of philosophy and pacifism work hand in hand?
- What was Hesse's outlook toward religion and spiritualism? How did he pronounce a spirituality totally unrelated to and different from the so-called religions and spiritualisms which has God as the centre?

Though much has been studied with regard to Hermann Hesse as a novelist as a whole, little focused work exists regarding his discussion of the driving force that concerns a natural man, which would be the prime objective of my study. Hesse teaches a spiritualism which is completely averse to the concepts of God and religions. His spiritualism is the spiritualism of humanism. This tone perhaps sets forth the present study.

Of course, Hesse has been studied in philosophical terms, and his human concern and his incessant quest for the reality of life and this world, has received some critical focus. But little attention has been paid towards Hesse as a philosopher influenced by Nietzsche. This focus definitely leads this study to a deeper analysis.

Apart from discussing Hesse in philosophical terms, he can be discussed in relation to his contemporary society too, which is a perspective not much of existing research takes up. The

political condition of the then Germany was worsening owing to the war. Pacifism was the only option then. This work would also try to focus on the social aspects of Hesse's works so as to see why an alternative consciousness of aversion to war emerges in him instead of the high jingoism of military takeover.

Hesse vindicates the Dionysian. Knowledge is formed more through the Dionysian than through the Apollonian because the former is related to the empirical perceptions of human beings. The empirical is solely based on Dionysiac instincts and experiences. Conversely, one lacks the experiential, the empirical in the Apollonian, which is just nothing more than a set of formulaic intellectualism. It is through the Dionysiacally empirical that Hesse's protagonists, whose development is his aim, and it also gives all his novels the form of a bildungsroman, acquire knowledge and form the self.

However, the Apollonian is not discarded altogether. It has been blended with the Dionysian and a synthesis is formed out of these two human forces. But for the most time, Hesse is preoccupied with the Dionysian through which he develops his protagonists who flout all established boundaries of societal customs and traditions. In defying the norms of the culture which he was born into, Hesse emerges as an iconoclast. His protagonists go their own way, feel the world freely and emerge with a lot of experiences of the real world.

The First Chapter focuses on theoretical postulations on the self and a few other categories and dichotomies. It discusses causality, phenomenon, noumenon, empiricism, rationalism, transcendental idealism, knowing and willing, with reference to Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, etc. It prepares the ground for the next chapters and especially the categories of self and knowledge. Starting from the ancient Greek times, it tries to understand the hitherto conceived forms of the self. It also studies the various concepts of knowledge and tries to explore how knowledge and the self are conceived and also which of these two are primary.

As it is impossible to see literature and philosophy in isolation with society, the Second Chapter discusses Hesse's socio-political milieu – the then Germany of political upheaval, and connect it to his works. It also discusses how and to what extent Hesse was influenced by the social realities of his times and to what extent he influenced or tried to influence his society. We are here able to know what effects Hesse's characters would have achieved had the social milieu, i.e. the wars not provided a backdrop.

The Third Chapter discusses Hesse's engagement with binary oppositions, especially of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. Camenzind, Giebenrath, Knulp, Sinclair, Siddhartha, Haller, Goldmund, H. H., and Knecht are Dionysian protagonists depicting whose development and efforts of self-realization is the objective of the novelist. They are all accompanied by their mentors, or to use a better word, foils whose primary motive is help their friends develop their own conscience and personality.

The Fourth Chapter discusses Hesse's theory of thesis and synthesis as found in his novels which has been recognized as Hesse's triadic rhythm of humanization. This synthesis is a transcendence beyond good and evil, to Zarathustra's song which joyously celebrates all the tones to their full intensity. But, most importantly, it cannot be had without flouting the hitherto dearly-loved abstract intellectualism. Such transcendence of binaries is possible only when experience becomes the basis of self-affirmation. And certainly experiences are contingent on the external world, which incorporates socio-economic, socio-political, and socio-cultural realities. The self of man is not an innately-formed given but is formed by the consciousness he acquires from the society he lives in, and this fact naturally endorses empiricism.

CHAPTER ONE

Understanding Theories of the Self

A. DIALECTICS

First of all, it should be stated that any achievement of mankind is useless unless it undergoes a thorough evaluation which requires quintessentially a prolonged process of questioning and answering even if, in some cases, it leads to infinite regress. In foregrounding the term 'dialectics' in this research/chapter, my purpose is to try to validate, although it has already been validated way back in history, the legacy of the dialectical tradition that will undoubtedly help me clear up my way for the next chapters. The method of dialectics is perhaps as old as Greek philosophy but it usually becomes convenient for one to propel one's study from Socrates, despite the fact that he was not the first to practise this method, and it follows from this that all western philosophy can be said to be a footnote to Socrates. The method was followed and developed by many path-breaking philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Though first practised systematically by Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides, it is reasonable to suppose that it was Socrates who practised and developed it more extensively and methodically. Nietzsche called Socrates the dialectical hero of the Platonic drama. Socrates opened his dialogues in discursive fashion rather than in polemical argumentation, which he thought would help in reaching at truth. Undoubtedly, it was Aristotle who could not understand the freshness and the revealing power of the dialectical method and made the scope of philosophy narrow. He tried to methodize philosophy, an act which was sacrilegious for the very spirit of the science that always proceeds further in quest of the better by way of dialectics and beyond. When Heraclitus was saying that everything is continuously in flux because of inner struggle and opposition, he was probably implying this very process of dialectics, which consists of oppositions of thesis and antithesis, of arguments and counter-arguments, propositions and counterpropositions. As R. C. Pinto would put it, resolution of disagreement through rational discussion and ultimately the search for truth is the purpose of the dialectical method of reasoning (138-139).

Socrates even examined the very first premises of an argument to examine the validity of a belief. He cross-examined his interlocutor's premises so that a contradictory inconsistency could be found out for further inquiry. And in the premises lay the theses and antithesis which could be the ground of the argument.

First of all, it should be clarified that the dialectical method I am to talk about is not in the line of Plato's formulation of it. Plato appropriated the method of dialectics gradually. In his middle dialogues, "it becomes the total process of enlightenment, whereby the philosopher is educated so as to achieve knowledge of the supreme good, the form of the Good" (Blackburn 99). Here we are offered another interpretation of the dialectic as a method of intuition. The Socratic dialectical method should not be taken as an intuitional means of reaching at the Supreme Good but as a scientific technique of argument. Socrates was very democratic in that he tried to elicit knowledge. Quite the opposite of it, Plato and Aristotle tried to fill knowledge in their student's minds. In one way, this unidirectional mode of imparting of knowledge seems to be against the very spirit of dialectics. Socrates never tried to teach anything. A very good testimony to this fact is his own statement: *I know that I know nothing*. And "when he found that he alone admitted to himself that he *knew nothing*; while on his critical wanderings throughout Athens, addressing the greatest statesmen, rhetoricians, poets and artists", he found "only the simulation of knowledge" (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 65). This disavowal of knowledge speaks for his declining to be a teacher who fills knowledge in his students. The fact is that he just played the role of midwifery. As Socrates himself says in this dialogue:

[Soc.] And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?

[Theaet.] Yes, I have.

[Soc.] And that I myself practise midwifery?

[Theaet.] No, never.

[Soc.] Let me tell you that I do though, my friend: but you must not reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and therefore they only say of me, that I am the strangest of mortals and drive men to their wits' end. Did you ever hear that too? (Plato, *Theaetetus*).

He declared himself to be barren like the midwives who did not do anything more than soothing the women in labour. By asking questions to which he himself did not know the answers, he pushed the dialectical method ahead. Questions make one think and find some answers which is the individual's own answer, own achievement, own truth. His method allowed one to accept the veracity of one's own findings. Hereby we can put, in sharp contrast, that method of teaching and learning which fills the accepted patterns of thought from outside; surprisingly enough such opinions are ideological as seems to be the case with Aristotle. But Socrates is different:

[Soc.] Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but differs, in that I attend men and not women; and look after their souls when they are in labour, and not after their bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And like the mid-wives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, is very just—the reason is, that the god compels-me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my own soul, but those who converse with me profit. (Plato, *Theaetetus*).

Socrates is in no way putting himself in a privileged position of knowledge as was the case with most of the philosophers. He is always declaring himself a barren midwife—a woman who cannot produce—and at the same time he is asking questions which he himself cannot answer. He is offering 'one good thing after another' to the person in labour to soothe her/him and let her/him taste many things. This intellectual 'genuine birth' will take place in the form of experience, empirical reality. The following dialogue exemplifies a good dialogical process:

[Soc.] You forget, my friend, that I neither know, nor profess to know, anything of! these matters; you are the person who is in labour, I am the barren midwife; and this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help to bring your own opinion into the light of day: when this has been accomplished, then we will determine whether what you have brought forth is only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth. Therefore, keep up your spirits, and answer like a man what you think.

[Theaet.] Ask me.

(Plato, *Theaetetus*).

‘To each man his own are right’ places man in the centre instead of anything else. Placing man in the centre means placing his findings in the centre; there is no imposition from outside or otherwise. The art of questioning and answering and delivering the mind from non-thinking habits are very central to the Socratic mind. Socrates makes his process very friendly and encouraging through participation. He says:

I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed; for the attempt to supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and this must be the case if Protagoras Truth is the real truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the shrine of his book. (Plato, *Theaetetus*).

Thus in the Socratic method, dialectic is the process of eliciting the truth by means of questions aimed at opening out what is already implicitly known, or at exposing the contradictions and muddles of an opponent’s position. The Socratic spirit of inquiry, for example, is found in the first statement that Theaetetus in *Theaetetus* makes: “We should ask”. The dialogue follows as:

[Soc.] By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were, tuned alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who said so was or was not a musician?

[Theaet.] We should ask. (Plato, *Theaetetus*).

Socrates invites discussion from the participants; he asks them to refute him if his arguments are wrong. He does not prefer direct proclamation of what he has found, namely, he uses premises to argue. In *Meno*, Socrates expresses his preference of replying in ‘the dialectician’s vein’ in which we observe a lot of freedom, equality and equanimity. Let us look at the following lines to notice this liberalism:

MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is—what sort of answer would you have given him?

SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity?—all which words I use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated—that is all which I am saying—not anything very difficult. (Plato, *Meno*).

Usually dialectics starts with a given hypothesis which raises thesis and anti-thesis. Another situation is when a presupposition of a thesis and anti-thesis is denied and a third thesis—synthesis—is discovered as a consequence. Sometimes a proposition or a synthesis is refuted; sometimes opposing assertions are combined; sometimes a qualitative improvement in the dialogue is arrived at.

Socrates typically argues by cross-examining his interlocutor's claims and premises in order to draw out a contradiction or inconsistency among them. According to Plato, the rational detection of error amounts to finding the proof of the antithesis. For example, in the *Euthyphro*, Socrates asks Euthyphro to provide a definition of piety. Euthyphro replies that the pious is that which is loved by the gods. But, Socrates also has Euthyphro agreeing that the gods are quarrelsome and their quarrels, like human quarrels, concern objects of love or hatred. Therefore, Socrates reasons, at least one thing exists which certain gods love but other gods hate. Again, Euthyphro agrees. Socrates concludes that if Euthyphro's definition of piety is acceptable, then there must exist at least one thing which is both pious and impious (as it is both loved and hated by the gods) — which Euthyphro admits is absurd. Thus, Euthyphro is brought to a realization by this dialectical method that his definition of piety is not sufficiently meaningful.

Equality is an essential component of the dialectic method. If the participants do not have a sense of equality and proper importance, dialectics ceases to be dialectics. There can never be any true argument where the student feels it inappropriate to ask questions and argue with the teacher. In fact, a student should not feel that it is only the teacher who knows and whose knowledge can be taken for granted. Rather, he should question even the teacher's knowledge. Socrates' disavowal of any knowledge places the participants of his dialogue in a comfortable position.

Let us remind ourselves of the elenctic method used by Socrates. The method often involves logic refuting an argument by proving the falsehood of its conclusion. Roland Hall says, "The Socratic elenchus was perhaps a refined form of the Zenonian paradoxes, a prolonged cross-examination which refutes the opponent's original thesis by getting him to draw from it, by means of a series of questions and answers, a consequence that contradicts it" (qtd. in Vlastos 2).

Socratic elenchus is a search for moral truth by question-and-answer adversary argument in which a thesis is debated only if asserted as the answerer's own belief and is regarded as refuted only if its negation is deduced from his own beliefs.

First and foremost elenchus is search. The adversary procedure which is suggested (but not entailed) by the Greek word (which *may* be used to mean "refutation", but may also be used to mean "testing" or, still more broadly, "censure", "reproach") is not an end in itself. If it were, Socrates' dialectic as depicted in Plato's earlier dialogues would be a form of eristic, which it is not, because its object is always that positive outreach for truth which is expressed by words for searching, inquiring, investigating. This is what philosophy is for Socrates (Vlastos 4).

The general mode is a sequence of questions formulated as tests of logic and fact proposed to help a person or group find out their viewpoints about some subject, exploring the definitions, seeking to characterize the general characteristics shared by various particular instances. The extent to which this method is employed to bring out definitions implicit in the interlocutors' beliefs, or to help them further their understanding, is called the method of *maieutics*. The process of discovery in the question-answer technique of Socrates is not *elenctic* but *maieutic*. It is only with *Theaetetus* that this process seems to have been given a procedural form through the

midwife metaphor. Socrates sounds quite empirical when he does not claim to teach anything. He says of his interlocutors in the *Theaetetus*: “they have learned nothing from me but have themselves discovered for themselves” (Plato, *Theaetetus*).

In Plato’s earlier dialogues—in all of them except the *Euthydemus*, *Hippias Major*, *Lysis*, *Menexenus*—Socrates’ inquiries display a pattern of investigation whose rationale he does not investigate. They are constrained by rules he does not undertake to justify. In marked contrast to “Socrates” speaking for Plato in the middle dialogues, who refers repeatedly to the “method” he follows (either in general or for the special purpose of some particular investigation), the “Socrates” who speaks for Socrates in the earlier dialogues never uses this word and never discusses his method of investigation:

Zeno, whose dialectic had become classical by this time—Aristotle calls him “the inventor of dialectic”—had practised systematically the thing Socrates forbids: each of his paradoxes investigates the contradictory consequences of its counterfactual premise. Why should Socrates ban this modality of philosophical argument? He doesn’t say. I suggest that he has three reasons.

First, to test honesty in argument. In eristic, where the prime object is to win, one is free to say anything that will give one a debating advantage. In eristic arguments, the participants fight and quarrel without any reasonable goal, because the sole aim here is for the sake of conflict as opposed to the seeking of conflict resolution, just to win. In elenchus, the prime object is search. (Vlastos 8).

In the *Republic*, Plato puts the eristic method in contrast with the dialectical method. He says: “But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such insanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement” (Plato, *Republic*). Even in the dialogue *Euthydemus*, he satirizes the eristic method.

Different from Plato, Schopenhauer considers that only logic pursues truth and dialectics and eristic do not aim at finding the truth because their sole aim is victory. He calls them “eristic dialectic”, which he says only tabulates and analyzes dishonest stratagems. He differentiates between logic and dialectics and says that these words and synonymous terms lasted through the

Middle Ages into modern times. Further he says that in recent times, and particularly by Kant, “Dialectic has often been used in a bad sense, as meaning “the art of sophistical controversy”; and hence logic has been preferred, as of the two the more innocent designation. Nevertheless, both originally meant the same thing; and in the last few years they have again been recognised as synonymous” (Schopenhauer).

He prefers to define logic as “the science of the laws of thought, that is, of the method of reason”; and dialectic as “the art of disputation”. He further clarifies that logic deals with a subject of a purely à priori character, separable in definition from experience, namely, the laws of thought, the process of reason. And dialectic, on the other hand, would treat of the intercourse between two rational beings who, because they are rational, ought to think in common, but who create a disputation, or intellectual contest. Schopenhauer undervalues experience and therefore views that the individual’s argument and variation spring from the difference essential to individuality and specific experience. As he says:

Logic, therefore, as the science of thought, or the science of the process of pure reason, should be capable of being constructed à priori. Dialectic, for the most part, can be constructed only à posteriori; that is to say, we may learn its rules by an experiential knowledge of the disturbance which pure thought suffers through the difference of individuality manifested in the intercourse between two rational beings, and also by acquaintance with the means which disputants adopt in order to make good against one another their own individual thought, and to show that it is pure and objective. (Schopenhauer).

Very strangely, he considers dialectic and eristic synonymous and coins the term ‘Eristical Dialectic’. I quote him again:

In other words, man is naturally obstinate; and this quality in him is attended with certain results, treated of in the branch of knowledge which I should like to call Dialectic, but which, in order to avoid misunderstanding, I shall call Controversial or Eristical Dialectic. Accordingly, it is the branch of knowledge which treats of the obstinacy natural to man. Eristic is only a harsher name for the same thing. (Schopenhauer).

There can be no derogatory explanation of dialectics like this. Schopenhauer seems no less than a cynical man. It seems that he failed to understand the scientific methodology of this method. It becomes more certified when he uses the two words ‘eristical’ and ‘dialectical’ together to express a single meaning. He meant that dialectic can give birth to disputes only and can never take us to the truth. But did he ask himself that without disputes—which quintessentially includes questions—the truth remains veiled? That which Schopenhauer calls truth is entirely subjective which may be misleading, because it does not have any concrete ground on which it can stand. At least, dialectic has a firm ground of its own—the ground of experience, and argument based on that experience. If Schopenhauer calls some mystical thing, which he and his so-called logic find, the truth of anything, there are possibilities of several pitfalls. It is very difficult to understand how he could conclude that it would be inexpedient to pay any regard to objective truth or its advancement in a science of dialectic; since this is not done in that original and natural dialectic innate in men, where they strive for nothing but victory (Schopenhauer). It seems he might have seen this method from a negative angle. In fact, anything, any method can be subjected to the base purpose of controversy and winning. So, it does not apply to dialectics only. Even in the inner logic, which Schopenhauer talks of, a controversy can be created and the pre-existing prejudices and predilections of the individual can exert influence to win over what is not in the habit of the individual. It so happens in reality that our pre-systematised mind thinks on the basis of that very system, because the thinker (the individual) is always, already pre-conditioned by the social, physical, and circumstantial forces. This point will be elaborated while I would talk about dialectical materialism in the coming pages of this section of this chapter.

A man may be objectively in the right, Schopenhauer says, but may come off worst in the eyes of the bystanders. He exemplifies, “For example, I may advance a proof of some assertion, and my adversary may refute the proof, and thus appear to have refuted the assertion, for which there may, nevertheless, be other proofs. In this case, of course, my adversary and I change places: he comes off best, although, as a matter of fact, he is in the wrong” (Schopenhauer). This example fails to see that there is no transcendental truth; the truth of one man can be false for another. Assertions cannot be universal and cannot be universally accepted. In saying that the adversary may win even when he is in the wrong, Schopenhauer forfeits to see that the concept of right or wrong depends on the individual. In his dialogues, as I think, Socrates seldom or ever concluded

anything as the final knowledge; he just left every dialogue unfinished. Virtually all Socratic dialogues end in aporia; it is this very aporetic quality that prevents one from blind acceptance. It follows from this that what he really intended to do was to introduce the habit of inquiry instead of blind acceptance. Dialectics is this habit of inquiry. Schopenhauer's logic is not refuted at all; in fact, dialectics requires logic and logic requires dialectics. But his avowal of logic and rejection of dialectic as eristical does not sound comprehensive.

Let us come back to Socrates' elenctic, which Plato formalized, the technique he uses to investigate the nature or definition of ethical concepts such as justice or virtue. First of all, Socrates' interlocutor asserts a thesis, for example "Courage is endurance of the soul", which Socrates considers false and targets for refutation. Socrates secures his interlocutor's agreement to further premises, for example "Courage is a fine thing" and "Ignorant endurance is not a fine thing". Then he argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that these further premises imply the contrary of the original thesis, in this case it leads to: "courage is not endurance of the soul". Consequently, he claims that he has shown that his interlocutor's thesis is false and that its negation is true. The exact nature of the elenchus has always been debated. The question that has always been posed about it is whether it is a positive method of inquiry of knowledge or only a method for debate only.

May be that Socrates wanted to reveal the fact that what people think as true and ultimate is in reality not so. Once one learns the art of inquiry, one may possibly come to realize that the erstwhile knowledge was nothing but illusion and it could be conceived otherwise. Moral concepts such as virtue, temperance, piety, courage, wisdom, etc. do not have any concrete definition. These can be analysed and interpreted any way. Therefore, Socrates infused the idea of examination, inquiry, etc. which challenged the veracity of the interlocutors' moral beliefs. By declaring his ignorance, he, perhaps, wanted to convey that personal endeavour is more bearing than that of others. His aporia leaves scopes for others to think independently. That "life without examination [dialogue] is not worth living" exhorts one to see one's life with one's own eyes, independently. With this intention did Socrates employ his method of philosophical inquiry.

The motive for the modern usage of this method and Socrates' use are not necessarily equivalent. Socrates rarely used the method to actually develop consistent theories, instead using myth to explain them. The *Parmenides* shows Parmenides using the Socratic method to point out the flaws in the Platonic theory of the Forms, as presented by Socrates; it is not the only dialogue in which theories normally expounded by Plato or Socrates are broken down through dialectic. Instead of arriving at answers, the method was used to break down the theories we hold, to go 'beyond' the axioms and postulates we take for granted. Therefore, myth and the Socratic method are not meant by Plato to be incompatible; they have different purposes, and are often described as the 'left hand' and 'right hand' paths to the good and wisdom.

But it is also equally difficult to agree that Socrates' dialogues are not a form of eristic, and that he used this only for the achievement of a particular kind of 'truth'. I have no objection to the fact that he philosophized for the sake of searching 'truth', (and his entire life was a quest, as we would read somewhere). But equally important is the fact that he indicated a method of inquiry which can be used by posterity to inquire and reject and accept according to his or her own opinion or discretion. Undoubtedly, there is no transcendental truth. The truth of one person is not necessarily the truth of another. The conception of truth varies from person to person. The quest of philosophy to search some universal truth is really absurd. Socrates does not show any type of inclination to tell others that "this is the truth". Conversely, he has instigated others to see and find on his own. Come and see with your own eyes if the truth is there; and undoubtedly this seeing and finding will be quite different from what we term as the "universal truth". We construct some opinions of truth and see it as the universal truth. It is a matter of great compunction that Socrates, and most of Western philosophy, has been studied from the viewpoint of Christianity which itself is a mental and social construct.

In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says that the ancient meaning of 'dialectic' is 'the logic of illusion' and proposed a "Transcendental Dialectic" where pure reason reaches. It is commonly guessed that the source of Hegel's dialectic was Kant's division of the mental faculties. Kant divided mind into three faculties: Pure Reason, Practical Reason and Judgment; all the three served respectively as thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Again, the Critique of Pure Reason has three parts: Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic. He

world, the soul and God form the three Ideas of Reason. The world stands for the outer world, the soul for the inner world and finally God for the synthesis of the inner and the outer. Hegel was inspired to further the two poles of thesis and antithesis of antinomies. Kant limited the scope of knowledge to phenomena which led to doctrine of the *unknowable*. But Hegel tried to know even the *unknowable* through his Dialectic which led to Speculative Reason. Hegel speculated that no one can be satisfied with the contradictions only; it is an unavoidable tendency of the mind to arrive at a conclusion. Speculative Reason propels everything to a sphere beyond abstract understanding.

What might be generally said of Hegelian dialectics hardly comes to concrete terms unless it is exemplified. The point is that there is a lot of difference between theoretical postulation and praxis. For a beginner, Hegel seems something beyond practicality, but uniquely Marx formulated and built upon Hegel's formula of dialectics his dialectical materialism. In fact, Hegel is useful in creating a conceptual framework:

Hegel's aim was to set forth a philosophical system so comprehensive that it would encompass the ideas of his predecessors and create a conceptual framework in terms of which both the past and future could be philosophically understood. Such an aim would require nothing short of a full account of reality itself. Thus, Hegel conceived the subject matter of philosophy to be reality as a whole. This reality, or the total developmental process of everything that is, he referred to as the Absolute, or Absolute Spirit. According to Hegel, the task of philosophy is to chart the development of Absolute Spirit. This involves (1) making clear the internal rational structure of the Absolute; (2) demonstrating the manner in which the Absolute manifests itself in nature and human history; and (3) explicating the teleological nature of the Absolute, that is, showing the end or purpose toward which the Absolute is directed ("Hegel's Dialectic").

In fact, Hegel grounded his theory in abstraction, in ratiocination. Parmenides' view that what is rational is real and what is real is rational influenced him and led to the concept of the Absolute, which is grounded in the existence of something very abstract. From this follows the point that the Absolute has been "regarded as pure Thought, or Spirit, or Mind, in the process of self-development" ("Hegel's Dialectic").

In Hegelian Dialectics, we find the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, although he did not use these terms directly. Hegel used the term *Widerspruch*, meaning contradiction, to foreground polar opposites of thesis and antithesis, which meet at a higher level to make a synthesis. Although Hegel was very economical in using the categories of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, they make his concept of the dialectic easy for understanding. He first tries “to show that the attempt to categorize anything that is, simply and immediately, as ‘Being’, is an attempt that both ‘negates itself’, or ends up categorizing everything as ‘Nothing’, and then that this self-negation requires a resolution in the higher-order category of ‘Becoming’” (“Dialectic”, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* 368). The third category transforms the earlier categories by maintaining and resolving the contrariness:

This identity, abstract as it thus appears, between the two categories may be at once met and opposed by their diversity; and this was the very answer given to Anselm long ago. In short, the conception and existence of the finite is set in antagonism to the infinite; for, as previously remarked, the finite possesses objectivity of such a kind as is at once incongruous with and different from the end or aim, its essence and notion. Or, the finite is such a conception and in such a way subjective, that it does not involve existence. This objection and this antithesis are got over, only by showing the finite to be untrue and these categories in their separation to be inadequate and null. Their identity is thus seen to be one into which they spontaneously pass over, and in which they are reconciled. (Hegel, *The Logic of Hegel* 333-334).

If we look at Hegel’s Dialectic for the purpose of any concrete paradigm, as Marx did, the method seems to be useful. But it is only the method that should be observed; the Hegel’s idealism should be kept aside to avoid complications which engage most philosophers. The thesis, if we look for some practicality, might be taken as an idea or a historical movement. Such an idea or movement would naturally contain within itself incompleteness that would give rise to opposition, or an antithesis, a conflicting idea or movement. As a result of the conflict, a third point of view would arise, which we recognize as synthesis. This category of synthesis is supposed to overcome the conflict by reconciling at a higher level the truth contained in both the thesis and the antithesis.

This synthesis would become a new thesis that would generate another antithesis, giving rise to a new synthesis. In such a fashion the process of intellectual or historical development would be generated continually (“Hegel’s Dialectic”). Hegel remarked that there nothing in history which is a product of chance, but everything has developed dialectically.

There are two types of dialectics, as described in *Phenomenology of the Spirit*. Ascending dialectics concerns and starts with the present concrete world and unfolds itself to a wider horizon to reach finally an Absolute concept. In *The Science of Logic*, Hegel describes descending dialectics which starts from the first and last point of any concept and results in a multiplicity of concepts. The *Science of Logics* is the great attempt by Hegel at deriving and explaining – descending dialectics- the system of the world with its multiplicity:

The Object is immediate being, because insensible to difference, which in it has suspended itself. It is, further, a totality in itself, whilst at the same time (as this identity is only the *implicit* identity of its dynamic elements) it is equally indifferent to its immediate unity. It thus breaks up into distinct parts, each of which is itself the totality. Hence the object is the absolute contradiction between a complete independence of the multiplicity, and the equally complete non-independence of the different pieces. (Hegel, *The Logic of Hegel* 334).

In measure, quality and quantity face each other, but quality is covertly quantity and quantity quality. These are immediate to each other; measure is only their identity. Between the interplay of quantity and quality, several characteristics get negated. The fluctuation of measure between quantity and quality is implicitly essence. Furthering his argument of Dialectic in the *Logic*, Hegel uses the example of quantity and quality as follows:

The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other words, these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent authority. On the one hand, the quantitative features of existence may be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other hand, this increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change. (Hegel, “The Logic”. 202).

Again,

Quantity (...) is not only capable of alteration, i.e. of increase or diminution: it is naturally and necessarily a tendency to exceed itself. This tendency is maintained even in measure. But if the quantity present in measure exceeds a certain limit, the quality corresponding to it is also put in abeyance. This however is not a negation of quality altogether, but only of this definite quality, the place of which is at once occupied by another. This process of measure, which appears alternately as a mere change in quantity, and then as a sudden revulsion of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the figure of a nodal (knotted) line. (Hegel, "The Logic". 204).

Again,

The ordinary consciousness conceives things as being, and studies them in quality, quantity, and measure. These immediate characteristics however soon show themselves to be not fixed but transient; and Essence is the result of their dialectic. (Hegel, *The Logic of Hegel* 205-206).

In short, we can conclude that Hegel gave the concept of a thesis which inevitably has an antithesis followed by a synthesis. Every concept can be seen as thesis which necessarily has an antithesis. At a higher level, this thesis and antithesis meet and give birth to a synthesis. For the existence of any synthesis, thesis and antithesis are indispensable conditions. Again that synthesis is taken as a thesis which has its antithesis and synthesis. The same process goes on until, as Hegel says, until it reaches the Absolute. This absolute may be very easily deconstructed as we can argue, following Derrida, that since there is no solid ground for any thesis, we can never get to the Absolute. It is impossible to imagine the Absolute, since there is no transcendental signified.

However, the Hegelian Dialectic had structural use for Karl Marx, who formulated the concept of Dialectical Materialism in his social theory. Karl Marx adopted Hegel's theory of dialectic advance—the principle of growth and advance—and formulated the theory of Dialectical Materialism. Dialectical Materialism, a combination of Dialectics and Materialism, is a methodology of understanding the reality of thoughts, emotions, or the material world. This is the fundamental procedure of Marxism. Encyclopaedia Britannica outlines Dialectical materialism as a "philosophical approach to reality". It describes it as follows:

For Marx and Engels, materialism meant that the material world, perceptible to the senses, has objective reality independent of mind or spirit. They did not deny the reality of mental or spiritual processes but affirmed that ideas could arise, therefore, only as products and reflections of material conditions. Marx and Engels understood materialism as the opposite of idealism, by which they meant any theory that treats matter as dependent on mind or spirit, or mind or spirit as capable of existing independently of matter. For them, the materialist and idealist views were irreconcilably opposed throughout the historical development of philosophy. They adopted a thoroughgoing materialist approach, holding that any attempt to combine or reconcile materialism with idealism must result in confusion and inconsistency. (“dialectical materialism”, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*).

Hegel’s dialectics was metaphysical and abstract, since he considered movement and change as the central force of the world spirit, or Idea. Everything is in a continuously changing and evolving. Contradictory aspects meet and with the force of change they get transformed. So it is change that is at the centre of things. Marx and Engels declared that the spirit of change was found in the material world. Therefore, it is the events that would speak of the principle of change, not the principles that would speak of the events. Marx realized that Hegelian dialectics was mystified; so he felt it necessary to make it scientific by demystifying it:

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell. (“1873 Afterword to the Second German Edition”, *Karl Marx Capital Volume One*).

The main difference between, apart from other significant differences, Hegelian Dialectic and Dialectical Materialism is that the former is focused on mind and ideas whereas the latter maintains that matter is the fundamental reality of the world. For Hegel matter is the product of the mind and therefore mind is in the centre of everything. But Marx turned this concept upside down by foregrounding matter at the base of all things. He believed that it is matter, the material world that

creates ideas. Therefore mind is conditioned by the material forces, which is always external. The human brain, the senses get influenced, impressed and moulded by the external world which is nothing but material. Marx explains how his dialectic is different and opposed to Hegel's dialectic:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. ("1873 Afterword to the Second German Edition", *Karl Marx Capital Volume One*).

Marx rejected Hegel's dialectic on many grounds. The major ground was that Hegel's ideas sounded abstract and mystic, which did not have any concrete ground. It did not include any description of historical processes, of how history manifests itself in a process. Engels viewed that motion was the key factor in historical, social and experiential change. It is from this motion of change that matter changes giving birth to newer forms continuously and the changes in the material world makes qualitative changes in the empirical world. Hence the idea is a product of matter. Nothing is eternal but the eternally changing matter. Engels offers a very good description of matter and change:

It is an eternal cycle in which matter moves, a cycle that certainly only completes its orbit in periods of time for which our terrestrial year is no adequate measure, a cycle in which the time of highest development, the time of organic life and still more that of the life of being conscious of nature and of themselves, is just as narrowly restricted as the space in which life and self-consciousness come into operation. A cycle in which every finite mode of existence of matter, whether it be sun or nebular vapour, single animal or genus of animals, chemical combination or dissociation, is equally transient, and wherein nothing is eternal but eternally changing, eternally moving matter and the laws according to which it moves and changes. (qtd. in "Dialectical Materialism").

We find objective and subjective dialectics in the entire nature. Subjective dialectics is nothing but the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature. There is always a motion which works in between continual conflict of the opposites giving them ever newer passages into one another, or into higher forms that determines the life of nature (“Dialectics” *Dialectics of Nature. Frederick Engels 1883*). Dialectical materialism denies the presence of absolute boundaries. It states that matter is moving from one state into another, which in our point of view may be irreconcilable with it (“Dialectical Materialism”). Frederick Engels makes a very pungent remark which is characterized by a scientific spirit:

For it [dialectical philosophy], nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side; it recognizes that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute — the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits. (“Hegel”).

We can definitely hold Hegel as an idealist to whom thoughts and ideas were not abstract pictures of things outside. To him, things were followed by ideas. Ideas made first appearance in the world and things followed as their reification. The fact is that one cannot establish any connection between the order of things if one views ideas as the precedent of matter. It is here that the problem in Hegelian dialectics emerges.

An important aspect of dialectics is the process of negating that creates the possibility of another negation. This process continues and fosters the very spirit of dialectics. It is very simple that in adhering to a particular thing and taking it as the ultimate, it is difficult to proceed to another possibility. That is to say, in negating the final, there is the possibility of another final. In the same way, negation and its sublation and determination opens up the scope of another negation. As Marx says:

Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: *Omnis determinatio est negatio* — every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublimate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. (“Dialectics. Negation of the Negation”).

A minute study can enable us to say that nature, the entire universe is dialectical. Its structures and processes are composed of oppositions, of negations. Each moment each negation is negated by another one. This negation of the negation is found everywhere and every time in continuous progression. But an understanding of this entails a free mind on part of the philosopher. It needs independence from mystification. Idealist philosophy is primarily concerned with what we do not know and can only guess. It mystifies philosophy. Therefore, such ideal and abstract approach to understand the order of things is the essence of Hegelian idealism. In Hegel’s dialectics, it is impossible to go beyond the Absolute. It again creates a state of non-dialectics. Then, infinite process of dialectics becomes a necessity, for:

An exact representation of the universe, of its evolution, of the development of mankind, and of the reflection of this evolution in the minds of men, can therefore only be obtained by the methods of dialectics with its constant regard to the innumerable actions and reactions of life, of progressive or retrogressive changes (“Dialectics” *Frederick Engels Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*). But the contribution of the Hegelian method of dialectics cannot be underestimated because: “for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual, is represented as a process – i.e., as in constant motion, change, transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development” (“Dialectics” *Frederick Engels Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*).

In *Dialectics of Nature*, Engels said:

Probably the same gentlemen who up to now have decried the transformation of quantity into quality as mysticism and incomprehensible transcendentalism will now declare that it is indeed something quite self-evident, trivial, and commonplace, which they have long employed, and so they have been taught nothing new.

But to have formulated for the first time in its universally valid form a general law of development of nature, society, and thought, will always remain an act of historic importance. (“Dialectics” *Engels’ Dialectics of Nature*).

Anything which glorifies the existing state of things acquires the fillip of the age and consequently becomes a fashion, and even acquires the meaning of common sense or common knowledge. For instance, the mystified form of dialectic became generally accepted in German philosophy. In its rational form, it is in opposition to bourgeoisdom and its advocates. This is because in its affirmation of the existing state of things, it includes the recognition of the negation of that state. It recognizes the inevitability of the break-up of that state of things. For dialectics holds that every historically developed social form is in fluid movement. As a result of this movement, the existing state of things takes into account its transient nature as of momentary existence, because it allows nothing to be imposed upon it, and is critical and revolutionary in its essence. (“1873 Afterword to the Second German Edition” *Karl Marx Capital Volume One*).

Thus, dialectics even when glorifying any state of things regards it as transient. In his *Anti-Duhring*, Engels says: “Each new advance of civilisation is at the same time a new advance of inequality. All institutions set up by the society which has arisen with civilisation change into the opposite of their original purpose” (“Dialectics. Negation of the Negation”).

Dialectics is concerned with the process of change, and not with any particular idea, or ideation. It follows from this that what is relevant today may become irrelevant tomorrow and vice versa. For instance, any institution that is established for a specific purpose may turn out to be antagonistic to that very purpose in future. As a thorough principle of development, Hegelian dialectics holds a place as the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy. “The great

fundamental principle that the world is not to be realized as a development of ready-made things, but as a development of processes, in which the things, seemingly stable the concepts, go through an continuous change of coming into being. This notable primary thought has, since the time of Hegel in particular, has pervaded common consciousness thoroughly. In its general use, it has hardly been refuted. But, to accept this basic principle in theory, and to apply it in practice are two different things. A very remarkable point is that nothing can claim to be final, absolute, and sacred in dialectical philosophy. It shows the transient character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it, except the continuous process of change, of continuous ascending from the lower to the higher. This process of continuous ascending is completely reflected in Dialectics. Thus, as Marx too says, dialectics is “the science of the general laws of motion both of the external world and of human thought” (Lenin 7-9). Lenin describes his dialectical understanding of the concept of *development* as:

A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (“the negation of the negation”), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; “breaks in continuity”; the transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence and the closest and indissoluble connection between all aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly revealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal process of motion, one that follows definite laws — these are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that is richer than the conventional one. (Lenin 7-9).

One thing that is to be differentiated from dialectics is formal logic. Dialectics is not a proof-producing instrument like formal logic. Neither is it like mathematics. As Engels explains it in his *Anti-Duhring*:

Herr Dühring's total lack of understanding of the nature of dialectics is shown by the very fact that he regards it as a mere proof-producing instrument, as a limited mind might look upon formal logic or elementary mathematics. Even formal logic is primarily a method of arriving at new results, of advancing from the known to the unknown — and dialectics is the same, only much more eminently so; moreover, since it forces its way beyond the narrow horizon of formal logic, it contains the germ of a more comprehensive view of the world. (“Dialectics. Negation of the Negation”).

The central contradiction to be resolved in Marxist dialectics is located in class struggle. It is by foregrounding this contradiction that Marx could understand the dialectical contradiction between mental and manual labour. The progress from quantity to quality, the negation of the first premise and then the negation of that negation are central to it.

The base of class struggle is capital. The capitalist owns the machine and buys labour at a cheap rate. This labour is of those people who can work skillfully but do not have the capital. Therefore, they cannot buy the necessary equipment. Thus, the final product that is sold in the market is the outcome of two elements: capital and labour. As a rule, all value should go to those put their labour. Capital, as thesis, and labour, as antithesis are in dialectical opposition. Through the dialectical process, their opposition is unified that creates a synthesis.

Karl Popper criticizes the dialectic negatively in his essay “What is Dialectic”. He says: “The whole development of dialectic should be a warning against the dangers inherent in philosophical system-building. It should remind us that philosophy should not be made a basis for any sort of scientific system and that philosophers should be much more modest in their claims. One task which they can fulfill quite usefully is the study of the critical methods of science” (Popper 335). He defines it as “a theory which maintains that something—for instance, human thought—develops in a way characterized by the so-called dialectic triad: thesis, antithesis, synthesis” (Popper 421). In this definition, Popper catches up only one aspect of the three laws of dialectic as enumerated by Friedrich Engels. These three laws are, to remind again, the laws of opposites, of the transformation of quantity into quality and quality into quantity, and of

negation of negation. He catches up only the law of the negation of negation. Probably, he forgets to consider the unity and struggle of the opposites and how everything proceeds from quality to quantity because of movement and development in nature. He sees thesis and antithesis as mutually exclusive.

Dialectical discourse is different from normal discourse. It engenders and entails mature thinking as thinking itself is dialectical process. Dialectics is “the doctrine concerning how opposites can be and are identical (how they become identical), under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another, why the human mind must understand these opposites not as dead and frozen but as living, conditional, and dynamic” (Ilyenkov 76,78).

Bertrand Russell writes in *The History of Western Philosophy* that the “dialectic method—or more generally the habit of unfettered discussion—tends to promote logical consistency, and in this way is useful. But it is quite unavailing when the object is to discover new facts” (93). He is probably right in his second observation. But the usefulness of the method cannot be denied. Finding a niche with Hegel, it emerged as a fully-developed scientific method of philosophical discussion.

B. KNOWLEDGE

The fundamental concern of philosophy has been the search for wisdom on the basis of premises which are always without a valid ground. A premise lacking a valid ground produces a number other premises to further the discourse of “wisdom” which always exists in deference. One may be surprised to know that most philosophers are concerned with wisdom rather than empirical knowledge. This predilection has deprived philosophy of its status a pure science. The very etymology of the word philosophy connotes that philosophy is love for wisdom. The Greek word “philo” means love and “sophia” means wisdom. But the etymology is not to be blamed for this as it came later to designate what had been practised earlier. It would better have been “philosia” had the early philosophers concerned their study with what they saw rather than what they

thought. “Philosia” means love for seeing. But pure rationalists as they were, they could not say what they saw but they could say only what they only speculated. Otherwise, they would not have left merely abstraction for the posterity with the advice to abhor sentient happiness.

The abstract rationalism, however, had within it the seeds of the empirical mode of perception that was later theorized by the empiricist approach. Empiricism as an antithesis of rationalism was later synthesized by Immanuel Kant. But Friedrich Nietzsche venture to go beyond the philosophers’ disagreement and wrote his *Beyond Good and Evil*. He transcended the mind-matter dichotomy. He expressly made it clear that there is no objective world structure beyond the apprehension of man. We will discuss this further in relation to rationalism and empiricism in the pages to follow. At present, it is essential to know the nature of knowledge and its formulations throughout history in order to understand evolution or development of Hermann Hesse’s characters.

Generally for convenience, Socrates is held as the starting point of study, though he was not the first philosopher, because we know about most of the pre-Socratic philosophers primarily through his dialogues written down by his student Plato. We know Thales of Miletus (624-550 B.C.) as the first philosopher. Thales was primarily interested in finding out facts underlying the composition of the universe ad he found out that the whole universe is made of water through the process of transformation. Anaximander (611-547 B.C.), who also belonged to Miletus, held that the primary substance of the universe was ‘boundless something’. Another philosopher of Miletus Anaximenes (585-528 B.C.) considered air as the primary substance of the universe.

Then came Pythagoras (580-500 B. C.) with his theory of mathematics and ethics and stated that knowledge is derived from the intellect and the knowledge supplied by the senses is false. He was followed by Xenophanes with his religious philosophy, Parmenides with his idea of reality, and Zeno with his support of Parmenides that one is the reality.

Though they were contemporaries, Parmenides and Heraclitus expressed opposed views of the world. The former viewed that since the senses give a false view of things, knowledge acquired through it is false and it is only thought that gives us a true view of reality. Thus he considered reality as one and unchangeable. But for Heraclitus only change is the reality, since everything is constantly changing.

The Ionian philosopher Anaxagoras created the idea of *nous* to explain the composition of the universe. An atheist, he regarded that the entire universe is set into motion by *nous*. He regarded that there are uncountable elements in the universe.

As we proceed, we find the claim to knowledge getting more and more rigid and proclamatory. The Sophists, for instance, claimed to know and teach. Socrates is perhaps the only person in philosophy to claim that he knew nothing, (except the Sceptics who denied any possibility of knowledge). The Sophists kept an instead of the composition of the universe at the centre of their philosophy. They put questions regarding the nature of knowledge and inspired John Locke in the seventeenth century. The Sophists' view of morality is based on pleasure. There is no morality beyond pleasure. What is pleasurable for one is one's morality.

Protagoras held that man is the measure of all things; hence the *homo mensura* was the measuring rod of the Sophists. Knowledge is perception and perception is relative; it varies from person to person. So, knowledge cannot be the same to all; it is relative. Thought or reason does not have any role in constituting knowledge. The following dialogue from Socrates *Theaetetus* throws some light on Protagoras' theory of knowledge:

[Soc.] Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing it, Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not:-You have read him?

[Theaet.] O yes, again and again.

[Soc.] Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?

[Theaet.] Yes, he says so.

[Soc.] A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?

[Theaet.] Quite true.

[Soc.] Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?

[Theaet.] I suppose the last.

[Soc.] Then it must appear so to each of them?

[Theaet.] Yes.

[Soc.] And "appears to him" means the same as "he perceives." (Plato, *Theaetetus*).

Georgias held that no knowledge is possible and even if there is the possibility of any knowledge, it cannot be communicated. An object is not felt in the same way by all. Georgias' scepticism was the product of his relativism of knowledge.

Socrates thought that the meaningfulness of life is found in the true knowledge. In the pursuit of knowledge he asks Theaetetus in *Theaetetus* about knowledge. The first definition Theaetetus gives is that knowledge is perception. The second definition is that knowledge is true belief and the third one defines it as true belief with an account (logos). Through the dialectical method, Socrates proceeds and provokes his partner to argue. Firstly, the proposal that knowledge is perception is disproved. The proposal that knowledge is immediate sensory awareness is rejected on the ground that knowledge is not found in our bodily experiences but in our reasonings about these experiences. The dialogue goes on as:

[Soc.] And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?

[Theaet.] He cannot.

[Soc.] Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained?

[Theaet.] Clearly.

[Soc.] And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great difference between them?

[Theaet.] That would certainly not be right.

[Soc.] And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?

[Theaet.] I should call all of them perceiving-what other name could be given to them?

[Soc.] Perception would be the collective name of them?

[Theaet.] Certainly.

[Soc.] Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more of being?

[Theaet.] Certainly not.

[Soc.] And therefore not in science or knowledge?

[Theaet.] No.

[Soc.] Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?

[Theaet.] Clearly not, Socrates; and knowledge has now been most distinctly proved to be different from perception.

(Plato, *Theaetetus*).

The second definition Theaetetus agrees to is that knowledge is true opinion and raises the question how opinions are possible from sensory experiences. But it is also disproved on the ground that it is impossible to define knowledge as true opinion combined with explanation.

[Soc.] And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge?

[Theaet.] Exactly.

(Plato, *Theaetetus*).

And again Socrates says:

[Soc.] And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge.

(Plato, *Theaetetus*).

The third definition, knowledge is true belief with an account, is explained by Socrates “Dream Theory” in which he posits that there are two kinds of existents—complexes and simples. It explains that an account means an account of the complexes to understand the simples. Thus, for example, knowledge of a thing means true belief about it with an account of it that analyses it into its simple components. So, true belief and an account of its composition is knowledge. In other words, “right opinion” which “implies the perception of differences” with knowledge of difference is knowledge:

[Soc.] If, my boy, the argument, in speaking of adding the definition, had used the word to "know," and not merely "have an opinion" of the difference, this which is the most promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to acquire knowledge.

[Theaet.] True.

[Soc.] And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair argument will answer "Right opinion with knowledge,"-knowledge, that is, of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is adding the definition.

[Theaet.] That seems to be true. (Plato, *Theaetetus*).

But the query of knowledge does not give any conclusion and the dialogue ends in *aporia*. Whatever be Socrates definition of it, one cannot deny the fact that he keeps enough scope for further inquiry. Finally he himself seems to be dissatisfied with his final definition. As he himself says:

[Soc.] But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything! And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion?

[Theaet.] I suppose not. (Plato, *Theaetetus*).

His scientificity lies in the fact that he does not affirm, assert or confirm anything. Not only this, he also acknowledges that it is the limit of his thinking. He says:

[Soc.] But if, Theaetetus, you should ever conceive afresh, you will be all the better for the present investigation, and if not, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, and will be too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art; I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great and famous men know or have known in this or former ages. The office of a midwife I, like my mother, have received from God; she delivered women, I deliver men; but they must be young and noble and fair. (Plato, *Theaetetus*).

Socrates even criticizes himself for his very quest for and discussion on knowledge. He questions the very act of knowing, and the very condition of ignorance without knowing the true nature of knowledge. This condition of being in doubts and without any fixed definition is characteristically Socratic. The following lines evince this characteristic well:

[Soc.] And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb "to know"? The truth is, Theaetetus, that we have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands of times have we repeated the words "we know," and "do not know," and "we have or have not science or knowledge," as if we could understand what we are saying to one another, so long as we remain ignorant about knowledge; and at this moment we are using the words "we understand," "we are ignorant," as though we could still employ them when deprived of knowledge or science. (Plato, *Theaetetus*).

The knowledge theory of Socrates and Plato is a preparation, a foregrounding of their affirmation of the idea that virtue is knowledge. Socrates in saying that an unexamined life is not worth living alluded to a life of virtue. By living a life of virtue no one does wrong because one does wrong only in ignorance. No one does wrong knowingly. It builds up his concept of "good". Whatever is advantageous and gives happiness is good. This concept of good as happiness was later explained by his disciples in various ways. Aristippus, for instance, explained it as pleasure of the senses. However, Socrates did not inculcate anything to his students. But Plato is quite different from him, for he affirmed that what he knew was right and inculcated his principles to his students. In this way,

he seems to have gone in opposition to the dialectical method of inquiry. In giving the theory of Forms, he seems to have filled most of his writing with mysticism. His epistemology is based on intuition. The following words aptly show Plato's abstract ideas and his limited way of thinking:

When Plato was discoursing about his "ideas," and using the nouns "tableness" and "cupness;" "I, O Plato!" interrupted Diogenes, "see a table and a cup, but I see no tableness or cupness." Plato made answer, "That is natural enough, for you have eyes, by which a cup and a table are contemplated; but you have not intellect, by which tableness and cupness are seen." (Laertius, "Life of Diogenes").

Plato believed in a world of perfect or ideal forms. He held the non-corporeal world as real and, surprisingly and ridiculously enough, the real world seemed to be an imitation to him. In contrast to him, Diogenes seems to be more honest to his philosophy because he did not just philosophize like Plato, but also taught by living example. He thought that civilization represses man and therefore man should be free from it. He rejected normal ideas about human decency.

Plato was impractical, elusive and full of delusion. His philosophical system is not as simple and convincing as those of Socrates and Diogenes, for "he employs a great variety of terms in order to render his philosophical system unintelligible to the ignorant. In his phraseology he considers wisdom as the knowledge of things which can be understood by the intellect, and which have a real existence: which has the Gods for its object, and the soul as unconnected with the body. He also, with a peculiarity of expression, calls wisdom also philosophy, which he explains as a desire for divine wisdom. But wisdom and experience are also used by him in their common acceptance; as, for instance, when he calls an artisan wise (*sophos*) (Laertius, "Life of Plato"). Aristotle does not deserve mention in the context of the dialectical system.

Aristippus, one of Socrates' disciples, held pleasure as the result of knowledge and pain as the result of ignorance. He preferred the pleasure of the senses to the pleasure of the intellect (Laertius, "Life of Aristippus"). The Cyrenaics developed a sceptic theory of knowledge. They did not believe in the existence of any self. The Sophists were probably responsible for Aristippus' doctrine that sensations alone can give us knowledge. Things in themselves can give us no information, neither can it give information about the sensation of others (Copleston 121).

All knowledge is acquired through immediate sensation which are purely subjective motions. No claim of any objective knowledge can be made on this basis as every individual's subjective experiences vary. The only thing that can be accepted is the fact of knowing.

Theodoros, one of the later Cyrenaics, gave the same principle of pleasure as Aristippus had done and added that pleasure resulted from knowledge. Likewise, ignorance was the source of grief.

Scepticism declares the impossibility of knowledge, even with respect to ignorance. The school was founded by Pyrrho, who asked three questions to himself:

- (1) What things are and how are they constituted?
- (2) How are we related to these things?
- (3) What should be our attitude towards them?

Pyrrho realized that it was impossible to answer these questions. So, he proposed that everything was indistinguishable and unknowable as truth is neither contained nor transmitted by the senses:

The Pyrrhonian system, then, is a simple explanation of appearances, or of notions of every kind, by means of which, comparing one thing with another, one arrives at the conclusion, that there is nothing in all these notions, but contradiction and confusion; as Aenesidemus says in his Introduction to Pyrrhonism. As to the contradictions which are found in those speculations, when they have pointed out in what way each fact is convincing, they then, by the same means, take away all belief from it; for they say that we regard as certain, those things which always produce similar impressions on the senses, those which are the offspring of habit, or which are established by the laws, and those too which give pleasure or excite wonder. And they prove that the reasons opposite to those on which our assent is founded are entitled to equal belief. (Laertius, "Life of Diogenes").

Aenesidemus, another Greek skeptical philosopher, says that all perceptions are relative and have interaction with each other. When we become accustomed to the repetitiveness of custom or anything else, the imprint of our impressions becomes less indelible. And it is a reality that all men grow up with different beliefs, laws and customs. In such circumstances, the truth differs in importance in the mind of the individual. As a result, there is the impossibility of any absolute knowledge because every individual comes up with his own perception and organizes his sense perceptions according to himself.

The Sophists' doctrine of *homo mensura* (man is the measure of all things) clarified that perceptions and sensations vary from person to person. Georgias had already mentioned three basic facts of his theory of knowledge. There is nothing and even if there is anything it cannot be known. And even if there is any knowledge, it cannot be communicated. As nothing can be proved, the Sceptics suspended their judgment to attain a state of "*ataraxia*" or tranquil mind. Without any involvement in the movement of will and action, one can enjoy the state of "*ataraxia*". One cannot rely on moral opinions, for they are based on customs and conventions.

Like the Stoics and the Epicureans, the Sceptics espoused the empirical method of knowledge. Scepticism went to such extremes that Arcesilaus is said to have known nothing, not even his ignorance. This formula of Arcesilaus distinguishes Pyrrhonism from Academic Scepticism, though there was slight difference between them.

Sextus Empiricus (160-210 A. D.) gave complete surviving account of Scepticism. His doubt of the validity of induction was later utilized by David Hume. He applied the argument of infinite regress to every type of reasoning:

Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is trustworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on *ad infinitum*. (Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism* 179).

Though Pyrrho, Arcesilaus, Carneades and Sextus Empiricus concerned themselves with pre-Socratic philosophy, Socrates and Plato, Scepticism could develop properly with Epicurus, Stoics, Cynics, and Megarians. The Sceptics were not a major school during the period of Spesippus and Xenocrates. Pyrrho believed that “neither our perceptions nor our beliefs are to be trusted, the appropriate intellectual attitude towards the world being the suspension of judgment; and that suspension of judgment brings with it that peace of mind which is the sum of human happiness” (Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism* xvii).

Sextus Empiricus defines scepticism as “an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgment and afterwards to tranquillity (Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism* 4).

In the very first chapter of *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Sextus Empiricus categorizes philosophical investigation into three types:

- (1) Some have “claimed to have discovered the truth”.
- (2) Others have asserted that “it cannot be apprehended”.
- (3) And some others “go on inquiring”.

Dogmatists like Aristotle believe that they have discovered the truth. Academics like Carneades believe that the truth is inapprehensible. And the Sceptics keep on searching (Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*). Thus, Empiricus divided philosophy into three major types: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic.

The basic tenet of Scepticism is to present an equally strong proposition against a proposition in order to finally lead to a state of no dogmatizing. The main aim of such process is to attain a status of calmness. Sceptics do not dogmatize as they have no doctrinal rule. A dogmatizing theory declares the things about which it dogmatizes as really existent whereas the Sceptic theory does not accept anything as absolute. A dogmatizing theory considers its findings as substantially true whereas the formulae of the Sceptics are disproved by themselves. In the words of Sextus Empiricus, “our task at present is to describe in outline the Sceptic doctrines first premising that of none of our future

statements do we positively affirm that the fact is exactly as we state it, but we simply record each fact, like a chronicler, as it appears to us at the moment” (Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism* 4).

Thus, Scepticism refutes all types of dogmatism. Not only this, it also drops the possibility of any knowledge. Such denial of knowledge is a kind of extremism which Epicurus did not accept. He differed from the Sceptics as he accepted that knowledge is possible. He based his epistemology on empiricism and anti-Scepticism. According to him, knowledge ultimately comes from perception of the senses. We get knowledge of the external world through sensations and the first sensation becomes the “measuring rod” of subsequent sensations. Sensations are truthful in nature as they are received passively through the sense-organs. It is a mechanical activity; therefore it does not contain any error in itself. But if we want to make judgments about the external world, we must have certain concepts beforehand. These concepts should not require any explanation for their validity: they cannot be reduced even by way of infinite regress. The basic concepts that Epicurus enumerates, for instance, are some preconceptions such as ‘body’, ‘person’, ‘usefulness’. These preconceptions, which are themselves product of the senses, cannot escape the senses owing to repeated experiences and are therefore imprinted in our minds.

The basic tenet of the Epicurean theory is pleasure, a state of *ataraxia*. Mind, according to Epicurus, is an organ of the body as a change in the body affects a change in the mind and vice versa. Epicurus directed philosophy to practical life in order to create the condition of happy and peaceful life free from pain and fear with a lot of friends around. He partly borrowed from Aristippus who favoured pleasure of the body and of the present moment. But he differed from Aristippus in that he preferred long-lasting pleasure instead of momentary pleasure. Pleasure of the moment was to be avoided if it was followed by pain. It is sense-perception and observation that is the base of knowledge; it is sense perception that testifies that bodies exist, and it is by sense perception that we can infer what is not self-evident (Inwood and Gerson 6).

Epicurus considered pleasure and pain as the measure of good and evil. In other words, everything that is pleasurable is good and everything that is painful is bad. This was the basis of his morality. The fact that senses are the source of knowledge of good and evil characterises Epicurean epistemology.

Descartes, regarded as the founder of modern philosophy, declared: “I think therefore I am,” which is known as his “cogito”. This is a starting point of his quest for certainty which is his fundamental criterion of knowledge. He thinks that nothing can be known unless it is absolutely certain. He says that “the knowledge, *I THINK, THEREFORE I AM*, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophizes orderly” (Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*). He begins his quest of knowledge by doubting all beliefs to know if there is anything which cannot be doubted.

Firstly, Descartes questions the validity of beliefs as they, too, he thinks, are derived from the senses. As the senses are sometimes deceptive:

Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. (Descartes, *A Discourse on Method*).

Sense perceptions can be doubted. They can be reproduced or imitated in dreams and there are no sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. So reason should be the evidence of anything according to Descartes:

For if it happened that an individual, even when asleep, had some very distinct idea, as, for example, if a geometer should discover some new demonstration, the circumstance of his being asleep would not militate against its truth; and as for the most ordinary error of our dreams, which consists in their representing to us various objects in the same way as our external senses, this is not prejudicial, since it leads us very properly to suspect the truth of the ideas of sense; for we

are not infrequently deceived in the same manner when awake; as when persons in the jaundice see all objects yellow, or when the stars or bodies at a great distance appear to us much smaller than they are. For, in fine, whether awake or asleep, we ought never to allow ourselves to be persuaded of the truth of anything unless on the evidence of our reason. (Descartes, *A Discourse on Method*).

Descartes says that we know things of our daily life through the senses. But we are deceived by the senses which is evident from our illusions and hallucinations. Even the truth of science can be doubted easily.

Descartes offers two arguments to certify the existence of God. The first argument starts from his realization of his being, having the idea that God is a perfect being. He says: “How do I know that [God] has not brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while at the same time ensuring that all these things appear to me to exist just as they do now?” (Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”). He thinks that to doubt, it is necessary that he exists and therefore, the act of doubting certifies his existence. He says:

But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am (COGITO ERGO SUM), was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search. (Descartes, *A Discourse on Method*).

It follows from this that the act of his doubting cannot be doubted by him. A state of insurmountable certainty is reached, when he goes to the extreme of doubt. Then he finds that his existing is certified in both dream and real conscious state. Even if there is a demon to deceive him, he must exist to be deceived. For this certainty, he used the expression *Cogito ergo sum*, which implies that consciousness is the means of knowing the self as something which exists. Thus, it is the consciousness that certifies the existence of his self.

In support of the certainty of the *cogito*, Descartes substantiates his argument by providing another point. He feels that the only thing that gives him assurance of his existence is that he perceives “clearly and distinctly” that he exists. The awareness of his thinking that he perceives substantiates his belief that he exists. He says that whatever he perceives very clearly and distinctly is true:

That consequently all which we clearly perceive is true, and that we are thus delivered from the doubts (...) proposed.

. . . the highest doubt is removed, which arose from our ignorance on the point as to whether perhaps our nature was such that we might be deceived even in those things that appear to us the most evident. The same principle ought also to be of avail against all the other grounds of doubting that have been already enumerated. For mathematical truths ought now to be above suspicion, since these are of the clearest. And if we perceive anything by our senses, whether while awake or asleep, we will easily discover the truth provided we separate what there is of clear and distinct in the knowledge from what is obscure and confused. There is no need that I should here say more on this subject, since it has already received ample treatment in the metaphysical Meditations; and what follows will serve to explain it still more accurately. (Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*).

He verifies his *cogito* on the basis of clearness and distinctness and takes it as the touchstone of all further knowledge. But he does not explain this “clarity and distinctness” elaborately. He defines simply defines this quality of clearness and distinctness as follows:

What constitutes clear and distinct perception?

There are indeed a great many persons who, through their whole lifetime, never perceive anything in a way necessary for judging of it properly; for the knowledge upon which we can establish a certain and indubitable judgment must be not only clear, but also, distinct. I call that clear which is present and manifest to the mind giving attention to it, just as we are said clearly to see

objects when, being present to the eye looking on, they stimulate it with sufficient force. and it is disposed to regard them; but the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other objects as to comprehend in itself only what is clear. (Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*).

Descartes means to say that an idea must be present to the mind and the mind must be attentive to it. In the same way, the distinctness of a perception depends on its precision and its separation from all other perceptions. Despite his establishing clearness and distinctness as the criterion of truth, Descartes fails to use it in the building of knowledge on account of its subjectivity and vagueness.

In trying to understand how knowledge is acquired or if there is any possibility of knowledge, Descartes established the dualist problem of mind and matter. He considered mind as a non-corporeal substance that distinct from material or bodily substance. By a substance he meant that which exists without any dependence; it is dependent in its existence, for it is own attribute and its principle property that constitutes it. Consequently, consciousness is the attribute of the mind and extension that of the body. Thought can be known as constituting the nature of the mind and extension can be known as constituting the nature of the body:

Thought and extension may be regarded as constituting the natures of intelligent and corporeal substance; and then they must not be otherwise conceived than as the thinking and extended substances themselves, that is, as mind and body, which in this way are conceived with the greatest clearness and distinctness. Moreover, we more easily conceive extended or thinking substance than substance by itself, or with the omission of its thinking or extension. For there is some difficulty in abstracting the notion of substance from the notions of thinking and extension, which, in truth, are only diverse in thought itself (i.e., logically different); and a concept is not more distinct because it comprehends fewer properties, but because we accurately distinguish what is comprehended in it from all other notions. (Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*).

Descartes realizes that he exists as a thinking substance which he cannot doubt. But when he doubts that he has a body, he distinguishes between two distinct substances—mind and body. He says about this distinction of the thinking and the corporeal that:

this is the best mode of discovering the nature of the mind, and its distinctness from the body: for examining what we are, while supposing, as we now do, that there is nothing really existing apart from our thought, we clearly perceive that neither extension, nor figure, nor local motion,[Footnote: Instead of "local motion," the French has "existence in any place."] nor anything similar that can be attributed to body, pertains to our nature, and nothing save thought alone; and, consequently, that the notion we have of our mind precedes that of any corporeal thing, and is more certain, seeing we still doubt whether there is any body in existence, while we already perceive that we think. (Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*).

And again, he mentions the *cogito*:

By the word thought, I understand all that which so takes place in us that we of ourselves are immediately conscious of it; and, accordingly, not only to understand (INTELLIGERE, ENTENDRE), to will (VELLE), to imagine (IMAGINARI), but even to perceive (SENTIRE, SENTIR), are here the same as to think (COGITARE, PENSER). For if I say, I see, or, I walk, therefore I am; and if I understand by vision or walking the act of my eyes or of my limbs, which is the work of the body, the conclusion is not absolutely certain, because, as is often the case in dreams, I may think that I see or walk, although I do not open my eyes or move from my place . . . but, if I mean the sensation itself, or consciousness of seeing or walking, the knowledge is manifestly certain, because it is then referred to the mind, which alone perceives or is conscious that it sees or walks. (Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*).

His dualism is found even in his concept of knowledge. He identifies ideas through which we cognize the external world. Thus, he divides knowledge into ideas and external objects of which

ideas are formed. As he says: “And thus we may easily have two clear and distinct notions or ideas, the one of created substance, which thinks, the other of corporeal substance, provided we carefully distinguish all the attributes of thought from those of extension” (Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*). In the Third Meditation he says that knowledge is found in innate ideas, and sense experience cannot give us universal knowledge. Innate ideas do not depend on our perceptions; they are clear and distinct unlike factitious and adventitious ideas which are illusory. Innate ideas belong to the mind alone, for thought is the attribute of the mind:

Finally, even if these ideas do come from things other than myself, it doesn't follow that they must resemble those things. Indeed, I think I have often discovered objects to be very unlike my ideas of them. For example, I find within me two different ideas of the sun: one seems to come from the senses—it is a prime example of an idea that I reckon to have an external source—and it makes the sun appear very small; the other is based on astronomical reasoning—i.e. it is based on notions that are innate in me (or else it is constructed by me in some other way)—and it shows the sun to be many times larger than the earth. Obviously these ideas cannot both resemble the external sun; and reason convinces me that the idea that seems to have come most directly from the sun itself in fact does not resemble it at all. (Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”).

Descartes tried to extend innate ideas to sense-generated ideas as well. He could not find the place of sense-generated ideas in the mental series. Experience of colour, taste, hearing, etc. is innate but sense-generated. This conception led Descartes to believe that all ideas are innate. Though Descartes proposed the concept of dualism of mind and matter, he was not certain about the latter directly, but he was very certain about the former. Russell writes in his *History of Western Philosophy* that: ““I think, therefore I am” makes mind more certain than matter, and my mind (for me) more certain than the minds of others. There is thus, in all philosophy derived from Descartes, a tendency to subjectivism, and to regarding matter as something only knowable, if at all, by inference from what is known of mind” (564).

Spinoza, like Descartes, was a rationalist, but treated unlike the latter, the mind as the idea of the body. This merging of the mind-body schism ends both materialism and idealism, and the problem presented by Descartes. Spinoza claims that mind and body express the same reality and are the different attributes of a single substance, (Nature), which exists in itself and is self-contained, and self-conceived. The creator and all his substance is one, self-creating and therefore entirely free. All relations in this one substance are logical, and therefore their knowledge means the knowledge of reality. The internal relations are so essential and logical that there is nothing contingent; everything is as it is; it could not be otherwise. Spinoza says: “In the nature of things nothing contingent is admitted, but all things are determined by the necessity of divine nature to exist and act in a certain way” (*qtd. in Shouler 208*).

The one substance has infinite attributes but the two attributes the human mind can understand are thought and extension. Each and every attribute is essential for the one substance what it is. It is thus easy to think of world as a system of the intellect or as a system of the physical. But thought and extension should not be seen as parallel entities; they are just various aspects of the one substance. They should not be seen in bifurcation, opposition or parallelism. A human body is a Mode, a modified substance of the one substance and cannot be seen separately. It is a form structured from the one substance. Hence body is a mode of an attribute of extension and mind an attribute of thought.

Although individual bodies are not unrelated to each other, they strive to maintain their individual existence. Such endeavouring for existence is their very essence. The existence of individual bodies is enhanced and obstructed by other bodies. This striving for self-identity and existence is called *conatus* by Spinoza. The endeavour (*conatus*) wherewith each thing endeavours to persist its own being is nothing more than the actual essence of the thing itself. Nietzsche in the nineteenth century rejected it as a “superfluous teleological” principle. Instead of Spinoza’s “drive to self-preservation”, he posited the “will to power” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 44).

Spinoza also claims that everything happens out of necessity; there is no free will: “In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity” (Spinoza, *Ethics*).

According to Spinoza, there are three stages of knowledge. The lowest level is that of pictorial one, of imagination generated by the sense experiences. Since these ideas and imaginations are unrelated, they create what Spinoza calls “vague experience”. In the rationalist tradition of thinking to which Spinoza belongs, knowledge has to pass through the filter deductive reasoning. The second stage of knowledge is that of “adequate ideas” formed by “common notions”. These ideas are based on general human thought. This is the state of reason. Finally, Spinoza commits himself to a form of knowledge higher than reason. Reason is held superior to imagination, which is pictorial of the sense experiences. But it is inferior to intuitive knowledge, the third stage of knowledge. It is knowledge of the essence of things. It understands things in relation to the one substance. The mind realizes itself as eternal. When it comes to realize its status as a modification of the one substance, it feels love and joy comprised in the one substance.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz defended the doctrine of innate ideas. He argued that there are two kinds of truth involved in knowledge, one is necessary and the other is contingent. Necessary truths are characterized by logical and mathematical certainty. They are based on the law of opposition, and are self-evident and self-contained, eternal and unchangeable. These are the truths of reason the opposite of which is impossible. On the other hand, contingent truths are truths of facts the opposite of which is possible. The necessary truth relies on the principle of contradiction whereas the contingent truth on the law of sufficient reason. By sufficient reason he means that “in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise” (Leibniz).

Leibniz maintained that reality consists of an infinity of substances, which he calls monads. Monads are indivisible units of existence with different characteristics. They cannot be extended and divided, and are therefore ultimate reality as they are not matter but energy. All monads possess varying degrees of consciousness. Every monad has its own future possibilities. A human being is made of innumerable monads in which there is a dominant monad. The dominant monad called the spirit monad unifies all the monads in being conscious of them.

Leibniz defends the principle of innate ideas as he argues that sense experience alone cannot account for knowledge. Not only this, he also ascribed these mental dispositions and ideas to the unconscious mind (perceptions). He differed from Descartes who held that the mind is fully aware of all its contents. His monads resemble the Modes of Spinoza. He sounds to be deterministic in saying that everything in the monad is previously determined. As a result, it is obvious that the external determinants (world or reality) make no difference to the monads, since their future potentialities are previously determined. In conceptualizing the pre-established harmony of monads, Leibniz comes quite close to Spinoza's concept of the one substance.

The problem of ascertaining the sources and origin of knowledge, according to Descartes, is the fundamental problem to be settled:

Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what OBJECTS our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry. (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*. Volume I).

John Locke, one of the first British empiricists, held that knowledge is derived from the senses. As a challenge against the rationalist philosophy of mind, he set forth his empiricism to refute the principle that the mind contains innate ideas, which accepted that ideas are not acquired but lie previously in the human mind as part of its constitution. He based his theory of knowledge on the concept of *tabula rasa* that signifies an empty mind or a blank paper. In the second book of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, he explains that the mind is just like a white paper without any characters on it.

It is through experience that the mind acquires knowledge; the experience provides raw materials to the mind to work with in the form of sensations and reflections. Sensations are received when the sense organs get stimulated through contact with the external world. The sensations build up the consciousness. Impressions are registered from outside. Through memory and reflection, sensations are organized into knowledge. Universals, the Platonic ideas, are not transcendental but “the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use” (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*. Volume II). Primary qualities are there in the outer world and the secondary in the mind. The mind makes images of the things lying in the external world. Ideas represent the primary qualities of the external world, which are real. The primary qualities include extension, form, motion, solidity, etc. The secondary qualities are taste, colour, sound, odour, etc. The primary qualities belong to the external world. They have nothing to do with the idea or mind of the individual; they are neutral. But the human sensory organs react and get affected in turn.

The secondary qualities are found in the consciousness of the individual and vary with each person. They vary according to the nature of the sensory organs; therefore, they are subjective. Difference in circumstances and the nature of the sense organs of various persons decide the nature and quality of the experience. The mind gets impressions from the external world just as a wax shows the form or shape of what it is pressed against. It thus becomes aware of the ideas born of it.

Locke classified ideas into two types: simple ideas and complex ideas. Simple ideas, as he says, cannot be produced by us, since they are as simple as, for example, ideas of heat, bitter, cold, etc. Their reality is evident in their simplicity; they are the basic experiences and do not contain any other ideas. They are not fictions, imaginations of our faces, but natural and real productions. Locke defines simple ideas as those ideas “which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but ONE UNIFORM APPEARANCE, OR CONCEPTION IN THE MIND, and is not distinguishable into different ideas”. (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*. Volume I). Besides uncompoundedness, simple ideas have two more characteristics. The first characteristic is that the mind is passive in receiving the ideas; the second one is that they are directly known as the contents of actual experience. The ideas received through such experience are not subjective modifications but the appearance of real things existing outside.

The first experience a person has is that of sensation caused by the external world. The mind determines the presence and nature of the external world as it feels. The second experience starts when the mind receives information about the procedural happenings inside. It is just a reflection of the first sensory experience to transform the experienced objects into an idea.

Complex ideas are created when the mind becomes active and combines simple ideas. For instance, we can have the idea of a unicorn, combining the ideas of a horse and a horn, whereas in reality we might have never seen such a creature:

The next operation we may observe in the mind about its ideas is COMPOSITION; whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from sensation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of composition may be reckoned also that of ENLARGING, wherein, though the composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless a putting several ideas together, though of the same kind. Thus, by adding several units together, we make the idea of a dozen; and putting together the repeated ideas of several perches, we frame that of a furlong. (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*. Volume I).

But only sensation and reflection cannot, as Locke says, combine the simple ideas into a unity. It is through comparison and abstraction that the mind unites them. When two ideas are brought together for comparison, the mind identifies the similarities and dissimilarities. In Book III of *The Essay*, where he discusses language and its relation to the mind, Locke suggests that ideas precede language. Ideas have their own meaning even without words which are required as signs only in order to communicate with others. Unless supported by ideas, words have no meaning of their own.

As to the process of abstraction, he says that all existing things are particular, but when a child grows up, it finds some common characteristics in people and things, and by and by it develops general ideas. As Locke says: “Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence” (*An Essay Concerning*

Humane Understanding. Volume II). Each abstract idea has its own essence. In “Of Knowledge and Opinion” of *The Essay*, Locke says that “knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas” (*An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*. Volume II).

There are three sources of knowledge: intuition, reason (demonstration), and experience. Locke says that “sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge” (*An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*. Volume II). By intuition a person knows that light is light, that darkness is darkness is darkness, that black is not white, that a circle is not a triangle. Locke considered it as the highest kind of knowledge, for it is more direct and transparent.

Demonstrative knowledge is a sequence of the agreement and disagreement between two ideas followed by another one. Knowledge of the external objects acquired through the senses is sensitive knowledge. It is knowledge of “particular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz. INTUITIVE, DEMONSTRATIVE, and SENSITIVE; in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty” (*An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*. Volume II). Locke did not call it knowledge proper, although it is unavoidable as the base of simple ideas.

Locke made a significant departure from the erstwhile Cartesian model of innate ideas. He found the concept of innate ideas as devoid of any scientific argument and a hindrance to free argument that can be possible only by scientific thinking. While Descartes claimed the reality and certainty of his *cogito*, though making doubt itself the very process of his study, Locke believed that knowledge proper is certain.

The major difference of Locke from other empiricists is that he did not accept that knowledge is acquired through experience alone, as he said that knowledge may be acquired by reason or intuition also. Though he denied the concept of innate ideas, he accepted the possibility of *a priori* knowledge.

In response to Locke's theory of ideas, George Berkeley set forth his idealist theory. It is very surprising that he refused to accept that there is any existence of matter. Instead, he posited the existence of finite mental substances. He considered the world outside just as a collection of ideas and nothing else. He says:

Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their BEING (ESSE) is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other CREATED SPIRIT, they must either have no existence at all, OR ELSE SUBSIST IN THE MIND OF SOME ETERNAL SPIRIT. (Berkeley).

His most acclaimed principle that "to be is to be perceived" signifies that only ideas exist. All things around us are only ideas and not matter. Things exist only because we perceive them, their existence. This is not an exception to the human bodies; they equally apply to all. When we perceive our body, we feel only some sensations inside our consciousness.

The world consists of only two kinds of things: spirits and ideas. Spirits are active beings that cause and perceive ideas whereas ideas are passive beings that are caused and perceived. Here Berkeley reduces the world to ideas and spirits. Ideas can be perceived but spiritual substance cannot be perceived. Berkeley does not give any strong argument in support of the spiritual substance. In viewing ideas as immediate objects of knowledge, he follows Locke, but differs from him completely by negating his distinction of primary and secondary qualities. He follows Locke's ideas of sense, reflection and imagination. He says that: "the opinion STRANGELY prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction".(Berkeley).

Berkeley again says that “all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all these bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world have not any substance without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known” (Berkeley). We can know only the spirit, which is the thinking substance. The material substance cannot be known, since it does not exist. To prove his principle, Berkeley says that nothing but an idea can resemble an idea: “If we look but ever so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas” (Berkeley). Thus, an idea resembles only an idea. Berkeley considers all principles as ideas and refutes Locke’s view of independence of matter and ideas on the basis that perception of matter is an idea and an idea only can resemble an idea. In Berkeley’s opinion, thus, only ideas exist in this world. But ideas are inert because they are not caused by themselves. There is a continual occurrence of ideas after ideas in the human mind. It is to the spiritual substance, the spirit, that Berkeley consigns the cause and source of all ideas; he negates altogether the existence of a material substance. One’s own mind does not cause ideas; only a spirit can be cause of ideas. Ideas are passive as there are “some other will or spirit that produces them” (Berkeley).

Berkeley also distinguishes between ideas of sense from ideas of imagination. He says that the “ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are” (Berkeley). The ideas of senses are ideas of sensible qualities like taste, colour, smell, and so on. They are strong and distinct but their images are vague and dim. But they are orderly, coherent and steady. The ideas of imagination are not free of will; they are assembled altogether by one’s fancy.

For instance, if we put one hand in a bucket of cold water, and the other in a bucket of warm water, and then plunge both hands into the same water, one of our hands will feel cold and the other warmth. He means to say that it is the sensation of ours than the property of the water that makes the water perceptible to us. Thus, he refutes the secondary quality of objects posited by Locke. As to the primary qualities, he says that size, for instance, is not the quality of an object because the size of the object is contingent on the distance between the object and its observer. Consequently, size cannot be considered as the property of the object, for it varies with observers.

Berkeley's concept brings us to subjectivism, in which only ideas exist and there is no reality outside of experience. He leaves the Cartesian dualism back and leads to epistemological monism. He moved towards such extreme immaterialism that he declared the findings of science as helping rather than as original account of things. The subjectivist idea of knowledge seems to be impractical and devoid of solid grounds. Bertrand Russell remarks that the idea of non-existence of the material world creates confusion:

In the first place, there is a confusion engendered by the use of the word 'idea'. We think of an idea as essentially something *in* somebody's mind, and thus when we are told that a tree consists entirely of ideas, it is natural to suppose that, if so, the tree must be entirely in minds. But the notion of being 'in' the mind is ambiguous. We speak of bearing a person in mind, not meaning that the person is in our minds, but that a thought of him is in our minds. When a man says that some business he had to arrange went clean out of his mind, he does not mean to imply that the business itself was ever in his mind, but only that a thought of the business was formerly in his mind, but afterwards ceased to be in his mind. And so when Berkeley says that the tree must be in our minds if we can know it, all that he really has a right to say is that a thought of the tree must be in our minds. To argue that the tree itself must be in our minds is like arguing that a person whom we bear in mind is himself in our minds. (Russell, "Idealism").

It is with David Hume that Western epistemology took a new turn and made a departure from dogmatism and traditionalism to free and scientific observation. Hume rejected the mind-matter dualism of Plato and Descartes and even denied that there existed any permanent self. In saying so, he offered epistemology a logical conclusion. He was perhaps the first and the most influential philosopher to have applied experience and observation most scientifically and most logically as a method of philosophical study. In the introduction to *A Treatise of Human Nature*, he clarifies it:

It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since the lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. (Hume).

Also, "the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other sciences", and the method for this science assumes "experience and observation" as the foundations of a logical argument (Hume).

The most important observation of Hume is that experience is the source of all knowledge. Sensory organs are at the root of all perception. Hume divides perception into two types: impressions and ideas. Impressions are our elemental experiences; they are "all our sensations, passions and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul" (Hume). Ideas are only reflections or copies of the impressions. They are "the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion" (Hume). When we reflect, we find the same images and ideas constantly changing, coming and going.

The mind is an association of ideas and experiences; it is nothing but the sum total of impressions, ideas, desires and sensations. All our sensations get associated and unified by the laws of resemblance, of proximity in time and space, and of causation. Ideas are caused by impressions and the faculty of memory stores them in order so that they can be reorganized by imagination. Thus, simple ideas can be reorganized to make complex ideas; they are combined by the faculty of imagination.

Hume's reasoning is based on inductive inference. How things behave when they go "beyond the present testimony of the senses, and the records of our memory". Hume identified a pattern of regularity in the behaviour of objects. On the basis of induction, he argued that we reason by associating constantly conjoined events. This act of association is the basis of the concept of causation. Cause and effect are not part of the way the things are in the world. What we know as cause and effect is just a habit of mind developed through our experience of things. The mind usually observes pairs of events such as fire creates heat, candle produces light, and so on. Since such things are associated with each other, one reminds of the other. Therefore, cause and effect are not necessarily related.

Hume argued that humans have knowledge of things through direct experience. The mental behaviour is governed by custom. He offers a very logical explanation of vice and virtue, which are generally considered as having their inherent and universal properties. Contrary to this general opinion, he says that their so-called qualities are bestowed on them by the human experiences. He clarifies that vice cannot be identified as vice:

till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; though, like that too, it has little or no influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour. (Hume).

It is only our natural reactions to actions, feelings or emotions that provide meaning to vice, virtue or other moral qualities. We reflect on our own feelings and in return get their impressions on our mind. Hume questions the rationalist philosophers' idea of substance:

But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it. (Hume).

Hume offered a very convincing account of disagreement between moral judgments. Since perceptions of morality, or qualities like this, depends on the perception of the individual, no criterion of eternal moral values can be drawn up as rationalists had endeavoured to do by the use of the faculty of reason.

Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century tried to bring together the rationalist and empiricist approaches to knowledge. This was the effort for which he is basically known. He proposed that experience is purely subjective and needs no processing by pure reason. Not only this, any use of reason without applying it to experience leads to theoretical abstraction. He was the first major philosopher to locate the source of understanding in both experience and *a priori* concepts.

Hume, whom Kant credited with having wakened up from his “dogmatic slumber”, disproved the theory of cause and effect by explaining that every event did not necessarily have a cause. He said that the concept of cause and effect that we have is a product of the conjoined events that we experience. It is a result of sense impressions we have of the world of events. But Kant disagreed with this and argued instead that any objective experience can only be had if we have the concept of cause.

The base of knowledge, Kant says, is the subjective experience of the external world. First, the senses receive the experience of the external world. Then through certain receptive laws of the mind it gets processed and becomes knowledge. Sensory experiences give intuitions to the mind and intuitions become objective conceptual knowledge by means of understanding. He says about the fundamental nature of sensuous cognition in general:

What we have meant to say is that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, and that if the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity

of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. We know nothing but our mode of perceiving them -- a mode which is peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, certainly, by every human being. (Kant, "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements" *Critique of Pure Reason*).

Kant subdivided his subjects with so many technical terms that his terminology presents a difficulty in outlining his concepts. However, as far as the issue of human knowledge and cognition is concerned, he discusses basically synthetic and analytic judgments as well as *a posteriori* and *a priori* propositions. Analytic propositions are those whose predicate concept is contained in the subject concept. For instance, "Everybody occupies space" or "All bachelors are unmarried". In synthetic propositions, the predicate concept is not contained in the subject concept. For instance, "All bachelors are happy." Or, "All bodies have weight." Here the distinction of *a posteriori* and *a priori* knowledge becomes relevant. The knowledge we gain from sense experience is *a posteriori*. *A priori* knowledge is always, already contained in the human mind and has no dependence on external experiences. Mathematics and scientific knowledge pertain to this type as they are not born of our experiences.

Kant further argues that *a priori* knowledge is synthetic because experience is not involved in it. For instance, mathematics is a synthetic, *a priori* knowledge. Kant associated *a posteriori* knowledge with synthetic propositions and *a priori* knowledge with analytic propositions. Following this method, he finally posited that we are capable of synthetic *a priori* knowledge as our experience and the faculty of understanding meet at a certain point and later on processed by the latter. Experience is based on the perception of external objects and *a priori* knowledge. Kant explains it further:

But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made

us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called a priori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience. (Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*).

The external world provides those things which we experience through our senses. The mind processes all experience acquired information and gives it order of time and space. According to the “transcendental unity of apperception”, the concepts of the mind and the intuitions which acquire information from phenomena get synthesized by the faculty of understanding. Both concepts and intuitions are necessary for knowledge:

Our nature is so constituted that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous, that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous intuition is the understanding. Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensuous faculty no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under conceptions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot intuit, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. But no one ought, on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements contributed by each; we have rather great reason carefully to separate and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, aesthetic, from the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, logic. (Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*).

Kant then proceeds to the concepts of time and space and says that it is impossible to acquire experience of any object without locating it in a certain time and space. The mind arranges all sensory experiences in frames of time and space. Through the categories of the understanding functioning within time and space, the mind processes conceptual unification. Time and space are forms of sensibility that are *a priori* necessary conditions for experience.

What is “out there” in the mind contains the forms of time and space. Kant accepted, unlike Hume, the concept of causality. He argued that causality is pure concept of understanding and without it we cannot experience the external world. He makes distinctions of two worlds: the world of *noumena* (things-in-themselves) and the world of phenomena. The *noumena* cannot be known; it is possible to know the world of phenomena only. The *noumena* are independent of the mind. It is only the phenomenal world which can be known. With this very bent of mind, Kant directs the course of his study in *The Critique of Pure Reason* towards the critique of pure reason, of the phenomenal world rather than the *noumenal* world. The transcendental world is ideal and not real. This is called his transcendental idealism. Kant thus subverted the hitherto accepted belief that time and space were real entities. He declared them as categories of the mind. He thus emerged as a phenomenalist, who claimed to know only the world of phenomena.

Thus, the process of knowledge acquisition, according to Kant, involves sensory experience and a certain faculty of the mind, which actively formulates and organizes in accordance with its own laws:

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it.

But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called a priori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience. (Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*).

Kant's theory of knowledge can be summarized, in his own words, as: "All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought" (Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*). Before Kant, as we have seen, epistemology was struggling with the schism of mind and matter. Kant offered a synthesizing theory, but even his epistemology is not satisfactory. To speak it frankly, Kant rather complicated the issue and led to no practical solution. His concept of *noumena* and transcendental idealism lead us to the same confusion. We are here again led to something innate and mystic from which the empiricists had freed philosophy. Kant's epistemological idealism has no practicality.

On the contrary, epistemological realism is logical, scientific and free from prejudices as it is based on sense data. It is completely empiricist in approach. Though John Locke was the first person to take a strong empiricist step, it was David Hume who developed empiricism thoroughly with his scientific approach.

C. THE SELF

Irrespective of geographical and temporal boundaries, the riddle of the self has always presented a vortex of complexities and difficulties before mankind. Attempts at solving the riddle and arriving at a unanimous conclusion has been made throughout centuries, but unanimity of conception is very hard to come by. All philosophy is, more or less, centred around the mind body dichotomy, which arouses Nietzsche's contempt for the philosophers' quarrel.

No finding can be claimed to be irrevocable, for knowledge lies in flux; any claim of knowledge to be transcendental or ultimate nullifies the very nature of knowing. Heraclitus' proclamation that one cannot step into the same river twice pinpoints this very quintessence of knowing. Marx and Engels too considered the world as continuously changing. But since this section is dedicated to study the concept of self, we drop the idea of discussing knowledge temporarily for the next section. The main focus of this section would be on how the self is constructed through an empiricist mode of perception. To foreground this, it would be expedient to understand some Greek philosophy.

In Plato's *Phaedo*, Socrates refers to himself not as a "body" but as a "rational soul" (Plato, *Phaedo*). Socrates reminds the interlocutors that he is his rational soul, and this time the rational soul in question is meant to be individual and is characterised in terms of 'me'. For Plato reason or intellect was the true self. Through Diotima in the *Symposium*, Plato argues that one cannot remain the same person after having gone through an experience. Heraclitus' interest in the self is suggested by his saying that he went in search of himself and looked for the *logos* of the soul. Since everything is in a flux, our knowledge can never remain constant.

Nay even in the life, of the same individual there is succession and not absolute unity: a man is called the same, and yet in the short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in which every animal is said to have life and identity, he is undergoing a perpetual process of loss and reparation-hair, flesh, bones, blood, and the whole body are always changing. Which is true not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain the same in any one of us, but are always

coming and going; and equally true of knowledge, and what is still more surprising to us mortals, not only do the sciences in general spring up and decay, so that in respect of them we are never the same; but each of them individually experiences a like change. For what is implied in the word 'recollection,' but the departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten, and is renewed and preserved by recollection, and appears to be the same although in reality new, according to that law of succession by which all mortal things are preserved, not absolutely the same, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind unlike the divine, which is always the same and not another? (Plato, *Symposium*).

Plato ascribes to Protagoras an early form of phenomenalism, in which what is or appears for a single individual is true or real for that individual. Antisthenes, a pupil of Socrates and regarded as the founder of Cynicism regarded virtue as the aim of life and considered pleasure as a necessary evil. He said that he “would rather go mad than feel pleasure” (Laertius, “Antisthenes”). He insisted that “virtue was a thing which might be taught” (Laertius, “Antisthenes”). In abstinence from physical pleasures, he considered the existence of the self as something immaterial. And unsurprisingly, most of Greek philosophy considered the self as something immaterial. It was Epicurus who replaced the existing concepts regarding self and soul with a completely new pattern of thinking. He said that the soul was material and there was no need to fear from any divine punishment (Epicurus, “Principal Doctrines”). He insisted that nothing should be believed if it is not tested through direct observation and logical deduction.

The Stoicism, especially its founder Zeno, considered the soul as *tabula rasa*, which was later adopted by John Locke. It holds that an object makes its impression on the soul which is already like a white paper. But Chrysippus, another Stoic who followed Zeno, disagreed with this argument and argued that the soul cannot have only one impression at a time; rather it receives a number of impressions at a time and retain some while receiving others (Laertius, “Life of Chrysippus”). Chrysippus, as he was through and through a materialist, viewed the soul as a mixture of air and fire. The soul was more of air; so many people could speak and feel at the same time.

Chrysippus claimed that nothing happens without a cause and there is not a single uncaused cause. The world is characterized by causal necessity. Everything that happens is followed by something else which depends on it. Everything is causally connected; nothing in this world comes into being without a cause. In this way, Chrysippus eliminated the non-causal and arbitrariness of philosophy which maintains that a future event will happen no matter what we do in the mean time. Through this he found enough space for making free will and determinism compatible.

What comes to the fore is Chrysippus' empiricist epistemology, which served as an alternative to the theories of Plato and Aristotle. According to Chrysippus, as Diogenes Laertius writes, "the first instinct of a living being is that of self-preservation, insofar as nature makes it "its own" in relation to itself from birth: thus, the self for each individual is his specific constitution" (Ramelli xxxiv).

Hierocles, the Stoic philosopher of the second century, considered rudimentary self-perception as an attribute of all animals and humans. He credited all animals with self-perception and self-love. That is to say every animal including human beings is endowed by nature with the capacity that it needs to orient itself to be the kind of animal that it is. Continuities and differences are reconciled because the animal modal of self-perception identifies only the starting point of a human self (Long, *Stoic Studies* 262). A mature human self differs from an animal's self because "should" does not enter into the animal's perception (Long, *Stoic Studies* 262). Hierocles took an animal's *oikeion* as the starting point of his ethics. He says that "as soon as an animal is born, it perceives itself" (Long, *Stoic Studies* 263). The following is what he says in support of his argument:

- (i) The fact that animals perceive themselves is evidenced by the fact that:
 - (a) Animals perceive their specific parts.
 - (b) Animals perceive their equipment for self-defence.
 - (c) Animals perceive their weakness and strength.
 - (d) Animals perceive the powers in other animals.
- (ii) Animals perceive themselves continuously, as shown by:
 - (a) The continuous interaction of their souls and bodies.
 - (b) The fact that they perceive themselves even during sleep.

- (iii) Animals perceive themselves as soon as they are born since:
 - (a) Continuous self-perception implies self-perception from the beginning of life.
 - (b) No time for the beginning of self-perception is more plausible than the beginning of life.
 - (c) Perception of eternal things begins at birth, and presupposes self-perception.
 - (d) Self-perception is prior to the perception of anything else.
- (iv) As soon as it is born, an animal has *oikeiosis* to itself and its constitution.
- (v) The proof of (iv):
 - (a) An animal must have an attitude of affection for the *phantasia* of itself that it has.
 - (b) Animals under all circumstances seek preserve themselves.
- (vi) As an animal develops, its mode of *phantasia* becomes more refined.
- (vii) When mature animals have four kinds of *oikeiosis*, which include affection for their offspring as well as for themselves.
- (viii) Man is a social animal.

Hierocles specifies that soul and body are related to each other as both of them are material entities. Since they are purely material, they effect each other continuously. In the process of the relations that result from this interaction, an animal perceives its self. Self-perception precedes the perception of the external world.

As we have observed earlier, an animal acquires perception of itself immediately after its birth. All these perceptions take place through the natural faculty of sensation. After perceiving their natural parts, their weakness and strength as equipment of self-defence, and their use, animals coordinate between soul and body. They acquire this perception gradually. But human beings have this knowledge from the beginning owing to the intimate bond between soul and body.

What follows from the aforementioned mode of perception is that soul and body are integrated in such oneness that any perception of the external world becomes simultaneous with self-perception. It leads us to accept that one becomes what one perceives; that is to say, perception is the self. For example, when we perceive the colour white, we perceive ourselves whitened as we find ourselves involved in the act of perceiving. When we perceive that there is heat, we perceive warmth. It is the act of perception that unites the soul and the body to create a composite self.

Not only this, every perception implies the perception of perceiving apart from the perceiver and the perceived. Hierocles clarifies this with the use of the syllogism that perception requires perception of itself before perceiving any object (Long, *Stoic Studies* 260). But we find a problem with Hierocles regarding this point. The problem is that in perception's implying the perception of perceiving, the perception of perceiving again necessitates another act of perceiving and the same process will continue to infinity, or we can call it infinite regress.

The act of self-perception right from the initial stage of any animal has a propensity to self-preservation and self-love. Gradually, the animal becomes conscious of its constitution. In the same way, human beings too progress from self awareness to self-preservation realizing their self and individuality. Finally, the act of perceiving begets self-love and the self of the animal emerges completely. This is the Stoic concept known as self-ownership or *oikeiosis*.

All animals behave in a self-preserving way and are aware of both themselves and themselves in relation to other animals. Hierocles described the mind as the central point of a series of concentric circles. He equated it with the self which is a network of circles. These circles are created out of a given self called *autos tis*. The body is represented by the first circle outside the mind. Many other circles represent other things. Finally, an animal or human being has three levels of self: the self in itself, the self identified by the body, and finally the self identified by others in society. Thus, from the mind the self extends to the body, family, extended family, community, towns, country and finally the entire human race.

The Stoic Epictetus considered the self as something inviolable. He is known for the following dialogue in which he contemplates: ““But I will put you in chains.” Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower.” (Epictetus, *The Discourses* 3).

What Epictetus continuously discusses in his discourses is *prohairesis*, the volition or will. He makes it autonomous. What he includes under this term is each person's individual self with the capacities of reason, desire, intention, and reflexive consciousness (Long, *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life* 92).

Epictetus emphasizes on volition as the real self of an individual. Every action of an individual is solely his own in a unique way. The driving force behind these actions is the volition of the individual, who is always free in his desires and thinking. This volition is given to man by nature unimpeded. Further, Epictetus distinguishes between good and bad volition and argues that good volition is the unperverted will. An opposing will rises in every human being which frustrates him. But a good will does not frustrate. Since will is the self, self can be modified by individual efforts.

The Stoics were purely rational people who “were primarily interested in the mind and its faculties for the light that such inquiry could shed upon the self” (Long, *Stoic Studies* 265).

Plato discusses the knowledge of individuality in the First Alcibiades. As early as the 5th century B. C., the Pythagoreans had practised self-interrogation of the individual self. We find Socrates talking about individuality and the self, though implicitly, in his discourses. As the Sceptics denied the possibility of knowledge, it was difficult for them to take the concept further. For the Stoics, individuality and self remained somewhat psychological. The Neoplatonists developed the concept in relation to theological issues and claimed to have found higher reality in something mystic. Plato’s “Know thyself” served as the starting point of their study. Plotinus, Cicero, Augustine, etc. looked for truth within their soul. It was something they had borrowed from the Stoics.

In the concept of the self in the Greek philosophy, we always find an emphasis on the soul or something which is purely rationalist or mystical. It was Epicurus who thought of the self as something material and concrete. Epicurus’ foregrounding of the material self further inspired Karl Marx for his thesis. For Epicurus all knowledge comes from the senses and thoughts are merely weak sensations. Body is the self; it includes the mind which is material, not the immaterial mind of Plato.

In the modern sense, René Descartes may be taken as the starting point in the study of the self, especially for his concept of the *cogito* and the mind-body dichotomy. He is sometimes called the father of modern philosophy which is an epithet that can be questioned on some logical grounds. It cannot be discussed here since the scope of this study precludes its detailed analysis. In positing his concept of dualism, Descartes identified the existence of a consciousness that pertains to the domain of the mind. This idea of the causal interaction between the immaterial mind and the material body was further known as the problem of Cartesian dualism. Though the

idea of the material and immaterial has always been discussed in Greek philosophy, it is Descartes crystallized the distinction in the modern sense.

But one can doubt the success of such conceptualization in influencing empiricists like Hume. The main reason behind this is that Epicurus had already expounded the theory of the material world as the essence of everything. According to Epicurus, senses, which were not philosophical at all, constituted knowledge and the self of a person. It is easy for one to infer the emergence of Hume's empiricism even if Descartes had not conceptualized.

However, Descartes brought the concepts of self and knowledge to the attention of modern philosophy. His concepts inspired philosophy look beyond metaphysics that had unnecessarily occupied philosophers. In the *Meditations*, Descartes puts emphasis on the self and asks himself: "But what, then, am I ? A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses; that imagines also, and perceives." (Descartes "Meditation II").

Again, as Descartes says in the Sixth Meditation: "I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing" (Descartes "Meditation VI"). He confirmed the existence of a thinking self by the proposition *cogito ergo sum* with certainty. The existence of a self is easily accepted, but problems with the Cartesian arise when the mind is endowed with innate qualities. Descartes does not account for the source of the innate faculty of the mind and consigns it to something mystical. Likewise, Leibniz recognized the self as self-propelled and active. Berkeley went to the height of abstraction. Probably, Epicurus was more advanced than these rationalists despite the fact that he lived in those times when scientific thinking had not made much progress.

A scientific study of the concept of the self starts from John Locke and culminates in David Hume's objectivism. Locke's *tabula rasa* proved that the mind was passive. It was the actively perceptive senses that formed knowledge and the self. The identity of man as a living creature is "nothing but a participation of the same continued life" (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*. Volume I). According to Locke, the self is known through intuitive knowledge and "Consciousness makes personal Identity" (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*. Volume I). Locke says regarding perception:

it being impossible for any one to perceive without PERCEIVING that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himself that which he calls SELF:—it not being considered, in this case, whether the same self be continued in the same or divers substances. For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*. Volume I).

David Hume completely rejected the idea of the mind as something innate. The self to him was nothing but perceptions. He thus presents the problem of the innate idea as follows:

There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. (Hume).

We cannot be conscious of what we call our *self*, since we do not have an idea of any self. It is impossible to find any constant self because the self we know is not any one impression, but impressions. It is the referent to our impressions and ideas:

It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea. (Hume).

What we perceive as the self, says Hume, is a “bundle of perceptions”, which are linked by the property of constancy and coherence. The idea of the self is nothing more than sensations and experiences. Hume further says that this bundle enables him to deny the existence of any immaterial substance. All our sensations are bound together by the laws of association, namely, the law of resemblance, the law of proximity in time and space, and the law of resemblance.

In fact, what we find in reality testifies and verifies Hume’s concept. What we generally know as self is nothing but the totality of our perceptions and experiences. Perceptions determine the nature of the self. Since we get experiences every day, our perceptions also change continuously. The external world plays a very significant and decisive role in our perceptions. This concept has been elaborated by Marx and Engels.

A very high praise is unnecessarily bestowed upon Immanuel Kant for his “practical reason” and “pure reason”. His concepts reveal that he could not free himself from the metaphysics of the ancients.

Kant refuted the view that the mind is a substance. Consequently, the self and knowledge could not be made direct objects of knowledge. Moreover, only the experiences could be known and the knower cannot be known. Kant’s deficiency lies in his declaration of the inability to know the knowing subject. The schism between the knowable and the knower remained as before in his theory. Kant says that the mind has an organizing faculty to organize the experiences. There is an organic unity that we call the self. He says:

I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that "I am." This representation is a thought, not an intuition. Now, as in order to cognize ourselves, in addition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, there is necessary a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given; although my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon (much less mere illusion), the determination of my existence can only take place conformably to the form of the internal sense, according to the particular mode in which the manifold which I conjoin is given in internal intuition, and I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. (Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*).

Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. In this way, the consciousness of the self does not necessarily know the self. As Kant says:

The consciousness of self is thus very far from a knowledge of self, in which I do not use the categories, whereby I cogitate an object, by means of the conjunction of the manifold in one apperception. In the same way as I require, for the sake of the cognition of an object distinct from myself, not only the thought of an object in general (in the category), but also an intuition by which to determine that general conception, in the same way do I require, in order to the cognition of myself, not only the consciousness of myself or the thought that I think myself, but in addition an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which to determine this thought. (Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*).

Existentialism concerned itself majorly with the issues of self, identity and the human condition. Nietzsche was very critical of the idea that the self is an entity or substance. In his *Beyond Good and Evil*, he criticizes philosophers' preoccupation with "the will to truth", "the celebrated veracity of which all philosophers" had "spoken with reverence" (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 33).

Antithesis cannot, according to him, be considered as the origin of anything. As examples can be cited the expressions such as “truth in error”, “will to truth in will to deception” or “the unselfish act in self-interest (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 33). Instead of such origin, says Nietzsche, anything of highest value must have origin on its own.

He criticizes metaphysicians of conceiving “thing-in-itself”, which is but a product of prejudice. This prejudice has always been considered knowledge and ultimately glorified as truth. The metaphysicians had “faith in antithetical values” with certainty:

It has not occurred even to the most cautious of them to pause an doubt here on the threshold, where however it was most needful they should; even if they *had* vowed to themselves ‘*de omnibus dubitandum*’. For it may be doubted, firstly whether there exist any antitheses at all, and secondly whether the popular evaluations and value-antitheses, on which the metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely foreground valuations, merely provisional perspectives, perhaps moreover the perspectives of a hole-and-corner, perhaps from below, as it were frog-perspectives, to borrow an expression employed by painters. . . It might even be possible that *what* constitutes the value of those good and honoured things resides precisely in their being artfully related, knotted and crocheted to these wicked, apparently antithetical things, perhaps even in their being essentially identical with them. (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 34).

Nietzsche asks philosophers why “truth” rather than untruth becomes the condition of life, and also what impel one to assume the antithesis between true and false. Conscious thinking is usually contrasted with instinct. In Nietzsche’s words: “Just as the act of being born plays no part in the procedure and progress of heredity, so ‘being conscious’ is in no decisive sense the opposite of the instinctive—most of philosopher’s conscious thinking is secretly directed and compelled into definite channels by his instincts” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 35).

In Nietzsche's opinion, philosophy had become a realm of prejudices of philosophers. Whatever was said was with the purpose of disproving some concept. It was a childish activity. What these philosophers called inspiration was a by-product of their prejudice:

while what happens at bottom is that a prejudice, a notion, an 'inspiration', generally a desire of the heart sifted and made abstract, is defended by them with reasons sought after the event—they are one and all advocates who do not want to be regarded as such, and for the most part no better than cunning pleaders for their prejudices, which they baptize 'truths'—and *very* far from possessing the courage of the conscience which admits this fact to itself, very far from possessing the good taste of the courage which publishes this fact. (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 36).

Nietzsche criticized the Stoics, for they had created their own concept of nature. The Stoics' imperative of 'live according to nature', as Nietzsche says, meant the same as 'live according to life'. The gist of Nietzsche's argument is that every philosopher wants something which is the reverse of their predecessors. Nietzsche points out how the Stoics' precept of living according to nature shows that philosophy is creating the world in its own image:

Why make a principle of what you yourselves are and must be?

In truth, the matter is altogether different: while you pretend rapturously to read the canon of your law in nature, you want something opposite, you strange actors and self-deceivers! Your pride wants to impose your morality, your ideal, on nature - even on nature - and incorporate them in her; you demand that she be nature "according to the Stoa," and you would like all existence to exist only after your own image - as an immense eternal glorification and generalization of Stoicism. For all your love of truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, so rigidly-hypnotically to see nature the wrong way, namely Stoically, that you are no longer able to see her differently. And some abysmal arrogance finally still inspires you with the insane hope that because you know how to tyrannize yourselves - Stoicism is self tyranny - nature, too, lets herself be tyrannized: is not the Stoic - a piece of nature? (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 39).

Further, Nietzsche comments on Descartes' *cogito* that presupposes that there is an "I", that there is such an activity as thinking and knowing. Descartes does not doubt that he is thinking. Nietzsche asks the meaning of "I think":

when I analyze the event expressed in the sentence 'I think' I acquire a series of rash assertions which are difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove - for example. that it is I which thinks, that it has to be a something at all which thinks that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of an entity thought of as a has cause, that an 'I' exists, finally that what is designated by 'thinking' has already been determined - - that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided that matter within myself, by what standard could I determine that what is happening is not perhaps 'wiling' or 'feeling'? (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 46).

Nietzsche is surprised at Descartes' certainty of the concept of "I". He is surprised at the "immediate certainty" and asks: "Whence do I take the concept of thinking? Why do I believe cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an "I", and even of an "I" as cause, and finally of an "I" as the cause of thought?" (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 46).

Kant was proud of his categorical imperative and said: "This is the hardest thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics" (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 41). By discovering the faculty of synthetic judgments *a priori*, he also could not be free from prejudice.

Nietzsche rejects the principle of causality and action. He says that philosophers speak of will as if it were a very easy thing as, for example, Schopenhauer had purported to say that the will alone is known to us. Philosophers take up a popular prejudice and exaggerate it. Some affirm that thoughts come and go without any exercise of the human mind. These philosophers admit:

that a thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want; so that it is a *falsification* of the facts to say: the subject 'I' is the condition of the predicate 'think'. *It* thinks: but that this 'it' is precisely that famous old 'I' is, to put it mildly, only an assumption, an assertion, above all not an 'immediate certainty'. For even with this 'it thinks' one has already gone too far: this 'it' already contains an *interpretation* of the event and does not belong to the event itself. (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 47).

It was the will to power that was the basic human motive. This will to power accounts for the coming of the thought when “I” want and not when “it” wants. But the prejudices of philosophy as Nietzsche says, hindered it from venturing into the depths: “It has generally become clear to me what every great philosopher has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; moreover, that the morel (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy have every time constituted the real germ of life out of which the entire plant has grown” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 37). In *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche points out that philosophers do not, in fact, seek self-knowledge:

We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge--and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves--how could it happen that we should ever *find* ourselves? It has rightly been said: 'Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also' [Matthew 6.21]; our treasure is where the beehives of our knowledge are. We are constantly making for them, being by nature winged creatures and honey-gatherers of the spirit; there is one thing alone we really care about from the heart--'bringing something home.' Whatever else there is in life, so-called, 'experiences'--which of us has sufficient earnestness for them? Or sufficient time? Present experience has, I am afraid, always found us 'absent-minded': we cannot give our hearts to it--not even our ears! Rather, as one divinely preoccupied and immersed in himself into whose ear the bell has just boomed with all its strength the twelve beats of noon suddenly starts up and asks himself: 'what really was that which just struck?' so we sometimes rub our ears *afterward* and ask, utterly surprised and disconcerted, 'what really was that which we have just experienced?' and moreover: 'who *are* we really?' and, afterward as aforesaid, count the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our life, our *being*--and alas! miscount them.--So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we *have* to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law 'Each is furthest from himself' applies to all eternity--we are not 'men of knowledge' with respect to ourselves." (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* 1).

The riddle of the self engaged the existentialists like the Greek philosophers. Gabriel Marcel questioned himself: "Who am I?" Jean-Paul Sartre brought the existentialist philosophy to the attention of the world, especially with his *Being and Nothingness*.

Engaging with a critique of phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Sartre propounded his theory of consciousness, being and phenomena. He pointed out that a significant development of modern philosophy was towards freedom from the earlier dualism. He says that human existence is of two types, being and nothingness. Furthermore, there are two types of being: being-in-itself, which can be approximated by human beings, and being for itself, which is the being of consciousness. The existence of the thing-in-itself is obscure to itself.

In the second chapter of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre discusses that people generally cannot transcend their situations. But it is needed for their full realization as a human being. Identity and the self are constructed by the external situations. But these determinants should be transcended, as Sartre would like to say citing the example of a waiter in a café:

[W]hat *are we* then if we have the constant obligation to make ourselves what *we are* if our mode of being is having the obligation to be what we are? Let us consider this waiter in the cafe. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope-walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually re-establishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. All his behavior seems to us a game. He applies himself to changing his movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other; his gestures and even his voice seems to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at *being* a waiter in a cafe. There is nothing there to surprise us." (Sartre, "Sincerity").

As an existentialist, Sartre underlines the human condition as something not pre-determined. Since human beings have not been given any formed nature, he has to make decisions in choosing his own conditions of living. Pointing out the undetermined nature of man, Sartre says, “Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing—as he wills to be after that leap towards existence” (Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism”).

Man has the capability to choose and reject according to his own suitability. But the majority of people shift their responsibility to the factors of heredity and environment and thereby there is no sense of personal responsibility. When a man stands dissociated from such responsibility of environment, he feels personal freedom and realizes his self. But the problem of man arises when he sees himself alienated, for man “being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being” (Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism”).

Sartre means to say that man should look to himself to heighten his consciousness and awareness. But man is always found in social misconceptions of himself; the basis of these misconceptions is determined by social positions. By the instance of the cafe waiter, Sartre shows that the waiter is not his condition but a waiter by misconception. In order to get rid of such social misconception, men should realize themselves as beings who exist. It is the presence of other persons that makes one to look at oneself and see one’s world as it appears to the other. This is realization of subjectivity in others and it has no location outside but inside the person. In the presence of others, the totality of a person’s subjectivity is hindered and the person is influenced by others presence. In the presence of others, it is difficult not to be influenced and to maintain full subjectivity.

The gist of Sartre’s existentialism is that man exists but it is only later on that he becomes his essential self. This self is conditioned by the external presences whereas man already exists in his own self without any interference. In other words, man’s real self is always obscured by the external conditions.

In “The Technologies of the Self”, Foucault examines how the concept of the self and its formulations in the philosophical tradition went hand in hand with the politics of dominance. He focuses on the different ways in which human beings develop knowledge about themselves. He says:

As a context, we must understand that there are four major types of these "technologies," each a matrix of practical reason: (1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform I themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (Foucault).

He reconsiders the *Alcibiades I* of Plato and mentions how through the concepts of "Take care of yourself" and "Know thyself" the erotic and the politic were brought together. The order of the two principles of ancient times "Take care of yourself" and "Know thyself" has been changed. In Greco-Roman culture, knowledge of oneself seemed to be the outcome of taking care of one's self. In the modern world, understanding of one's self has become the primary principle (Foucault). Foucault examines the philosophical process of formation of the concept of the self. The self always had implications of an "active political and erotic state".

It seems that all philosophers, except a few genuine ones, have created their own tubs and relegated philosophy to a tale of a tub and here one is definitely reminded of Jonathan Swift's *A Tale of a Tub*. Western philosophy has not been able to rise above the concepts of soul, morality, virtue, and so on, and Foucault rightly observes: "the hermeneutics of the self has been confused with theologies of the soul-concupiscence, sin, and the fall from grace. . . a hermeneutics of the self has been diffused across Western culture through numerous channels and integrated with various types of attitudes and experience so that it is difficult to isolate and separate it from our own spontaneous experiences." (Foucault). All philosophers seem to be proving their own theories and disproving others from their own tubs. But mankind has produced merely some philosophers who have been able to rise above their own tubs and see the world with fresh and unprejudiced eyes. While Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley divested philosophy of seeing the world as it is, Hume, who reacted against excessive subjectivism, and Nietzsche relieved it from dogmatic reductionism and status quoism and created an aroma of exhilarating philosophy.

The overall impression the Greek philosophy makes on a student of philosophy is that philosophers have been occupied mostly with what is generally classified as rationalism. As we have seen, the rationalists view the self as something innate and immaterial whereas the empiricists view it as material, objective and experiential. However, Kant tried to synthesize the two tendencies, but he remained primarily a rationalist. But is David Hume who brought the empiricist approach to the attention of the world. As we have seen, Hume's basic theory rests on the concept of perception which is the source of all knowledge and self-perception. The self is constructed in course of time by the same knowledge acquired through the senses. In fact, what we call man, as Hume thinks, is a bundle of the perceptions acquired by the senses. Hume's conception that human behavior is governed more by desire than by reason endorses the importance of the Dionysian in the building of human cognition, knowledge and self. In his own words: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. As this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other considerations." (Hume). In foregrounding such an empirical theory of knowledge, Hume disproved very successfully the age-long and dearly held, though illusive, concept of a metaphysical self. Even Nietzsche considered sensory experiences and perceptions as the source of all that we generally call man's self: "All credibility, all good conscience, all evidence of truth comes only from the senses" (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 100).

Which comes first—knowledge or self? The self was the basis of all knowledge in Greek philosophy. According to Hume, knowledge, that is, perception is the basis of the self. First of all, knowledge is acquired and the acquired knowledge forms the self. But both the processes are interrelated. This study gives us the idea that the self is formed through experiences and sense perceptions more than through the processes that are held by subjective idealism.

CHAPTER TWO

Contextualizing Hermann Hesse

A. HERMANN HESSE AND THE ZEITGEIST OF HIS AGE

It is difficult to think about anything isolating it from time and space, for everything is coextensive with these two factors. Consequently, literature cannot stand aloof from the age and the context it is a product of. In fact, its primary objective is to represent the zeitgeist of a particular age and place, which acquires universal meanings and dimensions, sometimes instantly and sometimes in course of time. Studied in isolation with his age, a writer is likely to be minimised in his scope and also misconstrued. Even when dealing with the aesthetic and philosophical aspects of his writing, he cannot be isolated from his social setting, especially in the case of a literary author. Literature and its relationship with life cannot be undervalued at any cost, for it is from the ripples of real life experiences that the fountain of literature springs. But the ways of this relationship vary from writer to writer, from reader to reader, and consequently every creation contains some distinct specialities and meanings about it. Generally, the extent of a writer's capability to maintain realism may be taken as a touchstone to his work's value. The intensity and veracity of a work can be evaluated not only on the basis of its philosophical depth and aesthetic qualities alone but also on the basis of the degree of its social commitment. Every writer is bound to be influenced by the socio-political conditions of his time, however detached he might strive to remain.

To study Hesse's surroundings and the world he lived in is certainly not with any other purpose than to examine how the external determinants influenced the mental world of the artist and went a long way in shaping his ideas on life and literature. Since everything acquires meaning through context; meaning is contextual and relative. Every writer lives a world of his own and creates other similar worlds in his writing making the personal impersonal in order to represent the world at large. Although the incapability of art, as Plato posits it, in representing what is real persists since the represented object is thrice removed from reality, the fact remains that the imagined world of the artist is a reality in itself. Furthermore, literature should not only be committed to representing society as it is but should also exhort it to better changes either covertly or overtly.

Then a major issue is: who is important—the individual or the society? But more important than this is the act of scrutinising the intention, the concern of a writer. If he is focusing on the individual as a representative of a society with an intention favourable to the public, his work deserves attention as a humanitarian endeavour. Conversely, a writer foregrounding the society without favourable intention towards the public is hypocritical. Each artist constructs his own perception of reality and his selection of facts in the construction of this reality presents an ever-changing pattern. The novelist may paint a picture of the society honestly as he sees. But he may also do quite the reverse of it. And therefore his portrayal cannot be taken at its face value without knowing his intention. Thus, as to who is more important—the individual or the society - --- is not a question to be concerned with more than is the intention of the writer. For the sake of the society means for the sake of the individual and for the sake of the individual means for the sake of the society. But in all cases, it is by considering the society at large that the individual is to be considered. The fact is that it is the individual who is ultimately affected. Considering the society means considering the individual in the long run and vice versa.

But for a writer like Hermann Hesse, it is the individual he is interested in as he seems to uphold the idea that the individual is a product of the society and influences the society in turn. The most important thing is—what is the writer writing for? Undoubtedly, Hesse wrote for peace and harmony in a world of high jingoism even though he was reprimanded, rebuked and ridiculed for this. He is also concerned with Nietzsche's ideas of superman.

His age was an age of literary transition, which he has expressed with minute detail. This honest and seemingly artless representation of society really makes him readable even today. Peter Heller rightly says: “The literature of an age of transition, a literature which has become problematic and unsure of itself, has a function and value insofar as the writers attempt to confess with the utmost sincerity their own problems, their own misery, and the problems and misery of their time”(Heller 132).

Although the intent of this research is to deal with the philosophical aspects of Hesse's writing and not the external politics that was the order of the day in the then Germany, we cannot avoid the latter as literature does not and cannot exist in a social and political void. Even philosophy

sometimes loses its relevance, coherence and significance in the absence of a social context. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote his *Zarathustra* in the context of the then Christian society and society in general and criticised penetratingly contemporary civilisation. Societal circumstances have produced many philosophers; even so it remains difficult to say that philosophers are conditioned by their society to a larger extent. However, rationalists put before us the concept of innate faculty, which we have discussed in the first chapter. The best way is to study philosophy, literature and society in juxtaposition, in relation to each other. As Herrmann points out:

In an appreciation for Hermann Hesse's having sent him a copy of *Journey to the East* as a gift for his 75th birthday, Jung sent him in return a copy of "Psychology and Literature," underscoring it with the words: "Allow me to reciprocate your gift with a specimen *bordering on the domain of literature.*" (C. G. Jung, *Letters*, Vol. 1. Princeton, NJ, Bollingen, p. 563, italics mine.) To "border" on the domain of literature means that Jung saw his works as existing in an area outside the literary field, yet directly adjacent to it. Jung was a psychiatrist first and foremost, who tried to maintain a psychological attitude toward literature and the arts through the lens of his scientific understanding (37-38).

Therefore, the effort in this chapter has been at understanding the social, political and literary zeitgeist of Hesse's Germany so that we can examine the extent of Hesse's detachment from and attachment to his society and its influence on his personal and literary life, though not in so much detail inasmuch as much subjectivity may debar focus on the central idea. Hesse shows his socio-political concerns as follows:

A glance at the table of contents will show that I wrote "political" or timely articles only in certain years. But from this it should not be inferred that I relapsed into sleep in between, and turned my back on current affairs. To my own great regret, this has been impossible for me since my first cruel awakening in the First World War. Anyone who looks into my work as a whole will soon notice that even in the years when I wrote nothing on current affairs the thought

of the hell smouldering beneath our feet, the sense of impending catastrophe and war, never left me. From *Steppenwolf*, which was in part a cry of anguished warning against the approaching war and which attacked and ridiculed as such, down to *The Glass Bead Game* with its world of images seemingly so far removed from current realities, the reader will encounter this feeling time and time again, and the same tone may be heard repeatedly in the poems. (Hesse, *If the War Goes On* 5).

Before discussing Hesse in relation to his times, it is essential to have a general overview of the political conditions of Germany as well as how arts and institutions such as literature were appropriated for consent generation and dissemination of nationalistic sentiments. First, we will try to understand the political conditions, which changed all the spheres of human activity including art and literature, which forced writers to surrender to the then regimes and promoted some never-to-be writers to the height of fame.

The history of Germany, for the convenience of study, can generally be studied as follows:

The First Reich: The Holy Roman Empire (800/962-1806)

The Second Reich: The German Empire (1871-1918)

The Weimar Republic (1919-1933)

The Third Reich: Nazi Germany (1933-1945)

The word Reich is used for the “German State”, which is not related to what is the country of Germany today, but the Germanic lands in ancient times. The First Reich also known as The Holy Roman Empire (a continuation of the Roman Empire in Europe), was ruled by Charlemagne (Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Czech republic, eastern France, Northern Italy and western Poland), with a period beginning in the 9th century and finishing in the 19th century. In 962, Otto I became the first emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the medieval German state. The Second Reich, also known as The German Empire, was ruled by the Hohenzollern dynasty from 1871 to 1919. It is during this period that Bismarck the “Iron Chancellor” united Germany, and paved the way for the First World War. William II was the last German Emperor and King of Prussia, who ruled over both the German Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia from 1888 to 1918. The Weimar Republic, sometimes called the pre-Third

Reich, was founded at Weimar in 1919. It was a period of considerable public and cultural activity. It was overthrown by Hitler's rise to power in 1933. The Third Reich, also called the Nazi Germany, was controlled by Hitler, who called it The Third Reich because he thought that under his leadership Germany could reunite the old Holy Roman Empire, bringing Germany back to its glorious days. This Reich was terminated with the fall of Germany at the end of World War II. The term Reich was used by Nazi propagandists to mean that the Holy Roman Empire was the first Reich, the 1871 German Empire the Second Reich, and their own period as the Third Reich. This was done to suggest the past German glory which they were proud of. Their political slogan *Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer* ("One people, one Reich, one leader") was nothing but a continuation of the Germanic past.

With the crowning of Otto I the Great began the Holy Roman Empire in Germany. Before him the nobility exercised decisive powers in appointment of bishops and abbots. Rules regarding the appointments were made stricter and chastity was given supreme value. Otto I enjoyed great authority on the national church which he established and appointed clerics on his own discretion. But when Henry III ascended the throne of the Holy Roman Empire, the relationship between the church and the empire worsened. As a result of the extreme authority of the king over the church, a controversy followed between Henry III and the Pope. Finally, the emperor succumbed to the powers of the clergy, giving scope for the secular forces to intervene. The great majority of the German population was farmers, who were controlled by nobles and monasteries. The towns which had emerged were controlled by patricians. Guilds were formed by craftsmen to control the towns but it was difficult. A few of them were open to women. Society was divided into many classes such as the merchants, clergy, artisans, physicians; paupers were not granted full citizenship. Issues of taxation, public spending, regulation of business, and market supervision gave rise to political tensions (Nicholas 300-307).

When Frederick II ascended to the throne, the conflict between the church and the state grew. The church acquired immense power and consequently Frederick II was excommunicated. His excommunication led to the rise of independent states governed by ecclesiastical princes. Then Maximilian I reigned between 1493 and 1519. He tried to bring about certain reforms but these reforms contributed in fragmenting the Empire.

The Catholic Emperors tried to expand their territory to achieve authority over the church. Catholics and Protestants fought for their own supremacy. Decline in population and economy resulted as an aftermath of the war. France took over the territory of the empire, which had nearly collapsed.

The German princess proclaimed the Prussian King Wilhelm I as the "German Emperor" in 1871. King William I declared Otto von Bismarck chancellor of Germany in 1862. Bismarck unified Germany as the "Second German Reich" and excluded the Austrian and the Habsburg territories. His laws were against any step of socialism and tried to crush the struggle of minor groups. The German Empire was thus founded, with twenty five states. In 1888, Wilhelm II became the emperor of Germany. He made Bismarck resign as he wanted freedom in his affairs. Authoritarianism, discrimination of the non-Germans subjects like the French, the Polish, and the Danish started in the new forms.

The year 1894 saw the establishment of the Association of German Women's Organizations. But this association did not allow working-class women; it only allowed women of the bourgeois class. It was The Socialist Workers' Party which included women of the working-class.

It is a noteworthy fact that the Germany in which Hesse was born was burgeoning rapidly in economic and political terms. Imperial Germany was full paradoxes. For several decades, it was unable to assert itself as a true nation-state. Industrialisation had created much fragmentation; such breaches were impossible to be patched up. There was much contradiction inside. A major contradiction was that the political and constitutional framework was pseudo-democratic and, in many respects, authoritarian. We can say that Germany was facing many confrontations between the state and so-called *Reichsfeinde* (enemies of the state) as well as more subterranean tensions in the field of labour relations and sexual politics. In the 1870s and 1880s, socialists and ethnic minorities were discriminated and suppressed. These communities were made to feel that they were aliens to the new Germany; only that group could identify with the nation state which was not Catholic, socialistic or which were not related to any other cultural or ethnic group. Heavy-handed legislative repressive laws like the Falk Laws of the *Kulturkampf*— which literally means 'struggle for civilisation', referring to the anti-Catholic campaign, and the

Sozialistengesetz— law outlawing socialist activities were made. Not only this, the language laws which prohibited the use of languages other than German in schools attended by Poles, Danes and French speakers, attempted to perpetuate the social structure, legitimate the new German state and impose a uniform culture. All these were enacted through the education system, and the Protestant Church (Abrams 17).

Unified Germany was not at ease as there lay many social, cultural and political aspects which hindered peace and harmony. Religion, ethnicity, law codes based on these grounds were always at base of the unease. Lynn Abrams well overviews the Germany of the 1870s:

The Germany of 1871, newly unified in political terms, might at first sight be said to have displayed a significant degree of cultural unity, largely owing to the predominance of the German language, but it was profoundly disparate in terms of almost any other indicator---religion, ethnicity, law codes, level of industrialisation and so on. Modernisation encompassed a wide range of phenomena: industrialisation development, urbanisation, the emergence of mass politics, the spread of education, the rise of a class-conscious proletariat, the growth of a sophisticated bourgeoisie, and the beginning of a reappraisal of gender relations. These multifaceted processes of change imparted a heterogeneity to the new German Empire which the governing elites did little to come to terms with. (16).

One of the important and positive changes of industrialisation was that it triggered up a questioning of traditional gender roles. Imperial Germany was so much strictly patriarchal that women were second-class citizens under the law. They had no right to engage in political activities and therefore had no political representation. Women's condition was so worse that they had no secure future if they did not marry. For them, marriage was perhaps the best way to avoid economic scarcity. However, women's struggle for equality started in the 1860s, and gathered force in the 1880s and 1890s. Middle-class women, who were denied access to equal education and professions while men of the same social class were achieving greater status and prosperity, started openly to challenge the patriarchal nature of bourgeois society (Abrams 17). But the patriarchal society was so strong that women's voice sounded perhaps like a cry in the wilderness. Positive changes followed in course of time though.

Although several positive changes took place in socio-cultural spheres, polarisation of social classes and groups marred the prospects of liberalism. Aggressive nationalism, imperial conquest and military aggrandisement remained the same as before. Women and the weaker groups of the society remained marginalised. Abrams draws a good picture of the society of this period:

German society underwent a process of progressive pluralisation in the decades prior to the First World War , as a variety of socio-cultural milieux began to establish their presence, often by means of separate cultural networks—for example, for Catholics, Poles, socialists, women and youth---but at the same time it also became more polarised. The gap between the social classes, between the sexes, between the state and society became larger, and this in turn prompted the ruling elite to engage in increasing desperate strategies to stave off political change. (18).

The unification of the country in 1871 and its victory over France filled in a sense of national pride. A high sense of status and security was being enjoyed by the nobility. As material forces are the determinants of a society, the poor, the lower-middle classes were only able to try to imitate them. Manliness, discipline and self-sacrifice were valorised and tenderness and tolerance were marked as negative qualities. The result was a society in which there was no respect for human sentiment. It was a society of officialdom. Although there was some scope for the liberal and individual elements, authoritarian hold, conservatism and nationalism was the order of the day. Lynn Abrams says that the

attempts, consisting of aggressive nationalism, imperial conquest and military aggrandisement, culminated in 1914 in the outbreak of war. For a time in 1914 it appeared that Germany had indeed come together as a nation state, as the Kaiser's appeal for a civil truce appeared to be heeded, but this was later revealed as a false identity. Similarly, in the Habsburg Empire all national groups greeted the war with some enthusiasm, whilst Switzerland confirmed its neutrality. Social tension and political disintegration were temporarily concealed by an impressive facade of monarchical splendour and military power. But war brought only a temporary national consensus, and as it dragged on the polarisation of society became increasingly evident on the home and the combat fronts. (18).

Gradually, the working classes amassed political strength, but they were not powerful enough to exercise power. In spite of so much enthusiasm, Germany was defeated in the First World War:

Germany's experience of 'total war' shattered what had only been a fragile consensus in 1914. As a consequence of war-weariness, longing for peace, but above all anger and resentment at the ruling classes who had failed to implement any democratic change, German workers joined the revolutionary unrest initiated by soldiers and sailors in November 1917. . . .

Within the intellectual and artistic community the experience of war had been traumatic and was judged to be a massive waste of life . . . (Abrams 18).

Undoubtedly, Germany was full of vigour and was eager to demonstrate its energy which was, as it were, lying repressed. But its defeat in the war alleviated the enthusiasm of the people. The year 1918 was a transitional phase in German history because it created conditions that paved the way to the birth of a Republic—the Weimar Republic. During the German Revolution of 1918—19, soldiers were found averse to war, as it were, a seed of internal revolution were sown. Workers and soldiers were making their own councils. People had lost their faith in the Kaiser. Thus it was because of the need of an alternative, or rather as a reaction that the Weimar Republic was established in 1919 and Friedrich Ebert served as its first President.

This republic sought to replace the long German tradition of obedience and strictness with a democratic and humanitarian one. But the Weimar Republic proved to be a failure despite many successes; massive inflation in 1922-3 and the economic decline of 1929 compelled the parliamentary system to wither. As a result, the middle classes felt the rule of the erstwhile emperor better than the present parliamentary system. Undoubtedly, the civil service and the army were dissatisfied with the republic every time. Apart from the middle class, the army and the civil services, there were many other groups were inclined to undervalue the republic. These groups believed that Germany was invincible and should try its powers again. The most dominant of these groups was that of the National Socialists, whose leader, Hitler, after having served a short sentence was heading towards, with dogged determination, overthrowing the present republic. Not only this, he was also restructuring a disciplined society to prepare for another war. Industrialisation brought many problems like unemployment but the unification provided employment to a considerable extent.

During the 1920s Germany was undergoing a phase of exuberant creativity. There could be found a mixture of uncertainty, hope and cynicism. But national pride, which was at its highest peak, was fostered by propagandists who disseminated the feeling of the *Rausch*, of a sense of national community and fate. But it goes without saying that the feeling of such an enthusiasm, and of its enactment in the workings of fate, was found in men of all persuasions alike. The character and destiny of Germany was identified as different from all other nations. The entire nation was moving in headlong intensity towards a new war. Germany was conceived as having a distinct destiny and character. The sense of destiny, sacredness had justified the inevitability of nation and war so much that even writers were entangled into it. Hermann Hesse wrote in *Demian*:

I too found myself being embraced by men I had never seen before, and I understood the experience and joyfully returned to it. they did it in a moment of *Rausch*, not of a deliberate striving after destiny; but their *Rausch* was sacred, because it was the product of that one brief, disturbing glance that they had cast into the eyes of destiny.(154).

Politics, literature and social events came in closer contact unprecedented in the history of Germany. Writers like Ernest Toller, the dramatist, Erich Muhsam, the anarchist writer and Gustav Landauer, the intellectual were so much interested in current affairs that they even upheld posts in political offices. Such direct and demeaning involvement was never seen in Germany. But it was Hesse who was anguished by such involvement. As far as the culture of Germany is concerned, the Weimar republic went hand in hand with a vibrant cultural life that quickly became the stuff legend, although there was very much political instability. “Weimar culture was a culture of city-dwellers...” (Willett111). Technology and arts and its expressionism were embracing each other gradually. For example, as we will see in the coming chapters, Hesse’s *Demian* embodies the expressionist style at its best. The superiority of German spirit over politics was so much emphasised that all other aspects were neglected. Lynn Abrams explains it as follows:

Whilst it has been said that German intellectuals, including writers, emphasized the superiority of the spirit (*Geist*) over politics, denying the reality of Germany’s socio-political development, it is undeniable that from the cultural philistinism of the Wilhelmine state to the postmodern aesthetics of the present

day, German culture, and not least literary output, has rarely remained indifferent to, and has often existed in a state of tension with, the prevailing political authority. (15).

The Weimar Republic could not endure the growing effect of modernisation on the economy, politics and society. The Republic's weak economy exemplified by industrial stagnation, lack of investment and structural collective redundancy was not capable of paying for the developing welfare policies. It was not able to meet the expectations of young people who considered themselves as the important generation, and could only contribute to the rising polarisation of society and politics. The republic came under constant criticism from all sides. The socialists and communists resentfully criticised the capitalist economy that was to lead to six million unemployed by 1933. Conservatives and nationalists criticised the moral shamelessness, political limitations and social benefit prerequisites of a regime they had never unequivocally supported. It was this amalgamation of social, economic and political predicament, debatably a predicament of industrial class society as a whole, which proved the weaknesses of the Republic. It was the point of development for the National Socialists (Abrams 21).

The Nazi party suppressed labour unions. Joseph Goebbels, the major Nazi propagandist, prohibited public opinions. When the Nazis came to full power, they started consolidating their position by means of a process of forcing people into their own line. They started suppressing the political opponents, the delimitation of the labour movement, and the assertion of power at the regional and local level and attempted to coerce the German people to conform to the Nazi ideology. The people's community that was built was based on a common destiny and a common political faith, to which class and status conflicts are essentially foreign (Abrams 21).

The social-revolutionary programme of National Socialism was very ambiguous. It at the same time promoted modern and anti-modern opinions. It was innovatory in a political sense, but at the level of the change of society it was inconsistent. While putting forward an anti-urban, anti-industrial, anti-feminist vision, at the same time it can be argued that Nazi Germany was the supporter of the modern, technological state. The only constant policy was that of extreme nationalism, and it is nationalism that was the only real revolutionary aspect of the agenda such socialism. But it was a society based on inequalities:

One element of the *Volksgemeinschaft* was to be the achievement of egalitarianism on the basis of loyalty to the Party and talent. Nazi society was to be characterised by upward mobility and equal opportunity, although of course only those who qualified for membership of this society—the ‘racially pure’, the ideologically sound, the social conformists, those who were willing to serve the nation—were permitted access to the first rung of the ladder. An increasingly broad range of persons were excluded, among them beggars, gypsies, ‘asocials’, the physically and mentally disabled, rebellious youth.. And of course this society of upward mobility rewarded those who saw their future was with the Party (Abrams 22).

B. LITERATURE OF THE PERIOD

Everything—and literature was obviously no exception—had got politicised in the Germany of Hesse’s times. Writers had unavoidably to play a very significant role in this hyper-sensitized situation. When we look into the literary trend of the period, we find that there were basically two types of writers—one type was of those who became the mouthpiece and conscience of the society and the other was of those who were writing fictions to give an escape from the harsh realities of life. Yet, there was a third category of writers who were out and out propagandists, whose aim was nothing but personal and national aggrandisement, which we will discuss in the coming pages. Some writers do not fit any categorisation however.

Heraclitus’ idea that war is the father of all things sometimes sounds contextual. In the situations of war painters, sculptors, writers, and even composers, get influenced and create a world of make believe in their work. Some, who are undoubtedly political, make the most of the opportunity to valorise the dominant forces for their own ends. Conversely, some cannot help but tell the truth of their heart for the sake of humanity at the cost of exile even. So was Hermann Hesse who left the Nazi Germany to live in Switzerland to avoid any compromise with his art and ideas. The world wars and the socio-political conditions of Germany influenced his writing very much. A testimony to this is the fact that all his novels directly or indirectly show the bearings of the world wars, which we will discuss in the coming pages.

The overview, in the previous section of this chapter, of the political atmosphere of Germany makes it easier to move towards the literary environment. Whether the literature of Germany during Hesse's career could find full blown expression and in what direction it flourished are perhaps the main points of concern that would provide a backdrop against Hesse's own writings, his views. Hesse, born as he was during the German Imperial period and lived through the Weimar Republic to many years after the Second World War, started his writing career during the imperial period, although it is only during the world wars that his writing could mature.

As far as the literature of the Weimar Republic is concerned, it was expressionist in style and tone. Although traces of expressionism can be found to have been felt before the Great War, it was identified in 1911 in Germany. It challenged the values and beliefs of the nineteenth century. There was a strong opposition to the past. Expressionists attempted to give a new meaning to life that had become sullied and hollow. The spirit of their movement was revolutionary and yet not political. The movement was against stability and stereotyped way of life and favoured free and powerful expressions. It was a step against authoritarianism, the ugliness of industrialization and militarism. Although it challenged the pre-existing structures of society, it was not a completely free movement as its roots were in the pre-war period and therefore not free from conservative traditions. Ronald Taylor says:

Its subjectivity, its passionate commitment, its emphasis on the emotional and the irrational rather than on calculated poise and intellectual refinement recall Romanticism.

Expressionists hated industrial society that had degraded human life, considered the inner man. Man was the touchstone of meaning. They thought they were the moderns and that it were they who recognised the vital animal, dynamic facts of life. (36).

Nietzsche, too, contributed by overthrowing the dominating concepts of values and morality of the nineteenth century through his intoxicating Dionysianism. But there were several negative fissures in the movement which prevented it from full flowering. Abrams says that "although many artists and writers, particularly in the avant-garde Expressionist movement, were inspired to produce some of their most radical and political work during the revolutionary period, the

dominant mood was negative. . ." (19). However, the Weimar Republic was democratic in ethos. But the seeds of this liberalism in arts and literature were sown in the pre-war years. Theatre was the dominant literary genre of the Weimar Republic. Lighter creation was favoured by the entertainment industry and a return to comedy was thus promoted. Berlin got unprecedented international fame and notoriety as the home of experimental art, innovation—and decadence (Sagarra and Skrine186).

The Weimar Republic allowed considerable space for science, literature and arts. Hermann Hesse, Thomas Mann and Bertolt Brecht were some of the renowned writers. Actually, all those who had been utterly dissatisfied by the Kaiser-reich got an opportunity of expression. A progressive constitution with proportional representation and universal suffrage was introduced in Germany for the first time. This undoubtedly had far reaching undercurrents in the social life. Industrialisation triggered up modernisation in daily life activities. Abrams views that the Weimar Republic can be "used as a byword for cultural modernity, and it is certainly the case that in the broadest socio-cultural sense Germany in the 1920s had modernised to an extent that affected all spheres of everyday life (19).

Literature needs censor of the existing powers and fillip of the age to find a niche. There is hardly any age in human history in which free thinking and writing has been accepted without much trouble for the writer. Anything can be easily accepted if it is in accordance with the spirit of the dominant forces. But the truth manifests itself, more often than not, in contradiction with the dominant forces. If we look at the literary history of Germany, we find similarities that the fate of literary genres has undergone. Social and political upheavals fostered the sentiments of war and nationalism. If we take into account the outlook of the masses during the Weimar Republic, we do not find high enthusiasm for war and nationalism. In fact, they feel war as a dehumanising and unwanted evil, for they had just had the bitter experience of the First World War. Natter rightly observes:

Literature published during the Weimar Republic about the lost war is engaged in an effort to create a rubric of understanding capable of filling the abyss caused by defeat, abduction and the social experience of mass death. Ant narrative about the war, even in the form diaries , memoirs, or letter collections

characteristic of much of the war literature published during the Weimar Republic, is not only a chronicling of a given individual's experiences while serving (for example) along a section of the western front. It is also, among other things, a judgment of the Kaiserreich, the military and civilian leadership between 1914 and 1918, and an expression of one's attitude toward the republic. (27).

But the moment we turn towards the Third Reich, we have a completely different picture. The National Socialists did not want to hear anything which did not enthuse people with nationalist sentiments. Not only this, they embraced war as an ethical force which they considered essential for national interests.

When we overview the literature of the Weimar period generally, we find that an angst, a dissatisfaction owing to the war is expressed with a sense of some loss, collapse of society. Loneliness had left man in an absurd condition. Pointing out the condition of man and art, Ronald Taylor quotes Bertolt Brecht who says that: "The war made deep inroads into art. Man cried out in his agony: racked with pain, tortured, crippled, he mounted the pulpit and preached with the tongues of men and of angels..... Artists expected everything of the suffering man who was 'good'." (34).

Boredom and fatigue followed Germany after 1918. People wanted relief either through religion, or through drugs or through any other means. Some felt a unique sacredness in political commitment. But the question always remained to be answered, as it always remains, whether it was individual personality or the society which was the root of crisis. Psychologically, there was no inclination for another war. But this state of the mind was utilized by those who were propagandists of the state; they inculcated values of war in the minds that were seeking peace. In no age, perhaps, do we find so much indoctrination. A unique collaboration between politics and literature was established during these years. This collaboration gave birth to a new aesthetics of literature that overestimated nationalism as a cultural, social and spiritual necessity. A particular ideological knowledge about nationalism was created and disseminated through the interaction of academic and publishing agencies:

The lingering effects of the efforts of these mediating agencies during the first world war in propagating a specific aesthetic and social program would have lent, had they known of these efforts, considerable evidentiary support to Horkheimer and Adorno's characterization of the tautological effect of reality production in the understanding at work in *Aufklärung* (enlightenment/propaganda): "The senses are already determined by the conceptual apparatus even before perception can occur.... Kant intuitively anticipated what Hollywood first made routine: pictures are precensored during their production in accordance with the faculty of understanding's standards, according to which they will also be seen afterward. Public judgments meant to be sustained by perception were already rendered before perception could take hold." (Natter 34).

The most important point that strikes our mind is systematic appropriation of literature. Writers were being produced in bulk. Those people who had never thought of being a writer were being bestowed many rewards for writing nationalist literature. A full-fledged industry of writing business was spread all around. The advancement of the printing press, professional, political, religious, scientific, and local journals were published for an increasing number of readers. It is difficult to find any "European engaged in the work process who could not, in principle, find an opportunity to publish somewhere or other an account of a work experience, a complaint, a report, or something of the kind" (Benjamin 33). In most cases in Germany, the reader became the writer. The only criterion of merit was to be in agreement with the ideology of the regime. In such a criterion, genius has to suffer a lot as the difference between the reader and the writer gets blurred. The First World War provided the raw material for the topics of writing. It is quite surprising that writers like Junger, Remarque, Koppen, and Wehner each either had no ambition, before 1914, to become writers. This shift of the position of the reader and the writer, more and more readers becoming writers became a very common practice after the First World War. Not only this literary, training was being given to those readers who wanted to be writers Many authors received their literary training during the war, as poets or writers of short stories or letters published in army or civilian newspapers (Natter 24).

Of many war-centred writers, Junger was a very noted one, who is sometimes branded as “an intellectual precursor of the Nazis” (Krimmer 71). He is also referred to as representing “Germany’s inner emigration, if not outright opposition to National Socialism” (Ibid). His books like *The Battle as Inner Experience* reflect the tendency of the German people of that time to mystify and spiritualise war. Junger was hostile to democracy and had immense attraction for an authoritarian state. His writings, along with all others’ of his type, are paradigmatic and symbolic of how far inhuman literature can be. Krimmer explains how literature was given a transcendental and universal significance:

Junger’s text, for example, never shies away from the suffering of war, but it is also steadfast in its belief in a cosmic order that endows the slaughter of the First World War with a transcendental meaning. It is this mythical view of the war that absolves the individual soldier from political responsibility. Paradoxically, Junger, who insists most forcefully on the possibility of individual agency in the everyday theatre of war, conceives itself as part of a cosmic cycle of death and rebirth wholly removed from the realm of human influence. (69-70).

In the huge project of nationalism and jingoism, renowned intellectuals of Germany contributed by writing essays, treatises,, novels and poetry. They all welcomed the rise of nationalism assigning more and more reasons to justify it. On the whole, this activity was sentimentalized prose writings which were preceded by poems to make reading a sentimental activity. Indoctrination of nationalism was perpetuated by such writers with the help of a completely sensitizing vocabulary and dramatic presentations of the situations. What gave unique vigor to their writing was the concept of Germany’s place under the sun. The following words of Natter give some idea of how the Germans felt about their country:

Germany is a country at the centre of things. Its culture occupies a central position. European culture in its entirety, which is actually universal human culture, gathers itself like a burning point on this German soil and in the heart of the German people..... We Germans represent the last and the best of what European culture has brought forth; our strength and self-esteem is based on this understanding. (124).

The emergence of Germany as the strongest power was usually the content of writing for writers like Walter Bloem, who was patronised by Wilhelm II. Bloem played a pivotal role in disseminating much of nationalist literature as he was also the director of a press agency. Such writers professed great fidelity and dedication to their patrons.

Needles to say, literary texts, like all writing, are social constructs. A literary text is the production of many interactive agencies and institutions which influence each other. A study of German literature written before 1945 brings to light the collaboration between the state and the writer. In such conditions, independent literature cannot be produced and it is quite difficult to say that any particular view is the view of the writer. When the writer is degraded to such a state, it is really difficult to know the true spirit of the times the writes about. Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of polyphonic voices, of intertextuality becomes relevant in such a given. Like the text, the author too has polyphony of voices and many of his voices get marginalised in the interplay of the dominant voices. Control over social discourses is one of the chief means of hegemonisation and its continuation. When the Nazis wanted to bring anything into practice, they first theorised it by means of the available discourses. For such theorisation, they needed the help of literature, through which most of the public discourses are constructed. Literature served as a dominant means of ideological dissemination. This shift of literature from its own canon to the canon constructed by the state made almost every writing nothing more than propaganda. In such conditions, it is but natural that quantity will overpower quality:

In a war of culture, the problem of *Bildung* as it related to *Volkserziehung* (national education) gained new currency and sharpened expectations of the role of literary culture and the publishing industry in disseminating the ideas of the new age. Speaking on behalf of the book trade and to its constituent members in 1914, Heinrich Lhotzky promulgated the call in his article "Don't Skimp on Books!": "Do you really know what books have done for Germans? They have helped us to win the great victory of becoming the most important people of the world. That we have become the first people on earth is due in no small part to the fact that we produce the greatest number of books. You will see that . . . the largest library will be victorious!" (Natter 124-125).

Reading and writing as a whole is a participatory activity. What writers seek to convey forms only one part of the discourse. A major part is formed by the group of publishers, book reviewers, editors, book sellers and readers. It is a fact that all books cannot be published. Publishers need the patronage of the dominant voices to pass the book through the filter of the existing discourses. It is rather necessary to comply with the spirit of the dominant discourses lying around, if a book has to be published. Readers play a very significant role. But it is a fact that readers too are pre-conditioned by the existing discourses. Barthes went far in foregrounding the reader with regard to the meaning of any text. Remarkably enough, it was earlier held that the meaning the author has embedded the text with was the final meaning. But Barthes reversed the idea by declaring that the reader has his own sense of signification. As he observed: “The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination” (qtd. in Betancourt). We cannot fix the meaning of any text and expect the same fixed meaning from the reader. Instead, a text is a polymorphous whole whose meaning cannot be constrained by a single reader's mind and perceptions. But another point comes up to the fore when we situate the reader as a determining factor in the meaning of a text. Irrevocably, the reader is a product of many determining forces. They are subject to what Derrida calls the “incessant movement of recontextualisation”, and therefore, there is “nothing outside the context” (Royle 65). Readers too are constructed by educational practices, class, and gender. The act of moving interpretative authority from the author to the reader basically shifts the function of the author to the reader and continues to allocate intentionality. It attributes power to the reader.

The reader of Germany between 1914 and 1945 was also a product of the collaboration between the organized book publishing and the state apparatuses. The activities of Cotta, Ullstein, and Reclam during the war show up different aspects of the interface between the publishing industry and the military in expanding a reading public and in creating and disseminating “knowledge” about the ongoing war. The types of texts sought for and published shows an active role in moving public opinion about war events and a regular explanation on their part of how to structure the events and facts in the “unprocessed historical record” into a narrative (Natter 177).

The role and importance of the printing press grew day by day leading to their hegemony. Consequently, those writers who did not comply with the requirements of the printing press were never acknowledged as popular writers. Compliance with the norms of the press definitely meant compliance with the dominant ideology. Disparity with the norms of the dominant ideology could mean the closure of the press. As an apparatus of the state mechanism, it had to be very cautious of the message that could reach the reading public. A special type of language was created, for the traditionalists always kept a close eye on the language the press used to communicate with the public. Sometimes, some technical words which had public meanings were avoided to ward off subjectivity and doubt. It was expected that any expression be used as sparingly as possible.

Newspapers were directed to publish inspiring and nationalistic news in a particular way. Officials had kept close eye on the proceedings of the press so that nothing that can divert the attention of the people can be published. Bloem elaborates the newspapers' goals in discussions with the editors as the "awakening and satisfying" of the spiritual needs of the people. "They should reveal secure paths to the seekers, shore them up for the uncertain, sustain the wavering, teach the ignorant, cheer the assiduous, and lead the intellectually motivated upwards" (Natter 56). Witkop noted that the New Testament, Goethe's *Faust*, Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* were very popular among the people, and he saw it as a sign of spiritual preparedness. Not only this, he also explained that the conditions at the time filled people with a sense of Zarathustra's sublime soul (Natter 96). He was trying to say that they are not doing any less important job by publishing books. They were purportedly doing the job of dissemination of such a type of knowledge through fully propagandist literature that persuaded the people in every way.

Literature was written with special objective to cater to people's spiritual needs. All felt that people needed reading materials to foster their sense of nationalism. Therefore, all book agencies were deployed in procuring books that could nourish nationalistic sentiments. On the other hand, local newspapers purported to have direct line to the happenings and printed their articles with complete earnestness.

Nietzsche was so much appropriated so much that literature and philosophy lost all significance. He was appropriated to the extreme that his writing served as a very special collaborator. In Nietzsche's radicalism, his contempt of culture, his 'will to power', his anti-Christianity, and

immoderate manner, Nazi apologists found much to appreciate. About his Europeanism, however, they have nothing to say, and that he detested nationalism, and any form of folk adoration is something they ignore. At the same time Nietzsche did believe that a higher race could and must be bred. So the Nazis happily distorted Nietzsche's superman to their own idea and take out from his abundance of often paradoxical sayings the substance that serve their purpose. Even a simple phrase like 'the will to power' could be distorted to an unimaginable effect. *Zarathustra* was interpreted as a sign of spiritual preparedness. It is an example of how any work can be interpreted in quite the opposite terms of what the author intends to say. In fact, al effort was made to utilize Nietzsche's philosophy. One needs to differentiate Nietzsche from Nietzscheanism, and even more from Nazism, yet there remain areas in Nietzsche's thought that are directly associated with, and accountable for, later movements that cite his name (Taylor, *Literature and Society in Germany* 243).

Nietzsche identifies war with a heightened form of life, whereas peace is a sign of decline. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, war is not only meaningful in and of itself, it is also capable of providing the world with meaning. And yet, although Nietzsche defines war as energizing and purposeful, he also criticizes every effort to conceal aggressive impulses with a polish morality (Krimmer 65-66). But his concept was interpreted literally and therefore the Germans could not understand the essence of what he said.

Such volunteerism is limited, however, by consideration of the necessity of the work to appear as an object to be read. Between 1914 and 1918 in Germany, a work or text typically would have been written by an author (perhaps upon solicitation), accepted by a particular publishing house , reviewed by state and military censors, and printed in numbers deemed acceptable by authority (given the limitations of paper and glue rationing) before it was presented to readers. Roger Chartier has therefore urged that "it it is essential to remember that no text exists outside of the support that enables it to be read; any comprehension of a writing, no matter what kind it is, depends on the forms in which it reaches its reader" (Natter 177). Consideration of this material process determines the possibility both of a traditional reading of the "text itself" and one that postulates "a direct immediate relationship between the 'text' and the reader, between the 'textual signals' used by the author and the 'horizon of expectation' of those he addresses'" (Natter 177).

To seek out the workshop origins of a text or series of texts is not to reinstate origination as the linchpin of meaning but to consider any textual presentation as being already a mediated representation constituted by the play of institutional forces. In the language of formalism it is belatedly to bare the device in a manner that conjoins a linguistic analysis with consideration of the institutional forces that prefigure a work's presentation. Within this conceptual space beyond origins and authorship, the publishers appear as privileged readers, who on a very fundamental level determine literary value because they determine what will be published and available for reception. The limits to that privilege during the war became apparent when the work accepted by the editorial board was submitted to the military censors, and the commodity thereafter was purchased by enough readers to make a profit.

This was carried out through indoctrination using the education system, the media, and Nazi organisations and their equivalents, as well as through the transformation of social experience. However, it is far from certain whether the Nazis did achieve the classless, let alone harmonious, society. Indeed, it is more likely that they created new tensions around issues of race and loyalty to the party, while they were unable to break down traditional forms of identity such as those based on class, religion, or region (Abrams 21-22).

C. HERMANN HESSE'S STANCE ON LITERATURE AND SOCIETY

Hermann Hesse always disliked the cultural propaganda of German nationalism in equal proportion to the bourgeois mass civilization. In complete contrast to him was Ernst Junger, who viewed it as a spiritual awakening and an intensified mystical experience. His outlook can be displayed as a paradigm of how a non-political experience such as spiritual values can be exploited to suit political purposes. But for Hesse, it was all meaningless; he was a pacifist, a humanist for whom nothing more than the welfare of human beings mattered much. The affairs of politics did not fascinate him even a little. But he too, as man cannot be unaffected by his surroundings, felt it imperative to voice his resentments.

The most important fact is that Hesse was a very original writer inasmuch as he clearly expressed his mind and heart in his writing, and therefore he always expressed freely. Personal feelings shaped his works more than anything. But it does never mean that he was not concerned about

his society. This reshaping of personal feelings into artifacts cannot be seen in such an extraordinary and incomparable way as in Hesse. As Ralph Freedman says, “He acted and wrote as though everything in his daily life had to be brought into a circle of tension, where an unceasing quest for form was at the heart of his sustained effort to hold his life together. Although this is also true of other artists, in Hesse the immediacies of his life are incessantly, and at times almost unreflectively, transformed and moulded through the word” (4). Realism and romanticism was very well coalesced in his art as was the case in his real life too. This counterbalanced relationship between the real aspects of his life and his art is found in all his novels.

As far as his exposure to political Germany is concerned, the first major gesture Hesse made was taken in a brief feuilleton piece in 1914, and it was instantly picked up by many German newspapers. The piece “O Friends, Not These Tones” was a diffident complaint addressed to journalists. Most of Hesse’s articles connected with the war of 1914-1918 appeared in *Neue Zürcher Nachrichten*. Hesse says:

At that time (and until 1923) I was still a German citizen. Since then I have never been fully forgiven in Germany for having once taken a critical attitude toward patriotism and militarism. Though immediately after the lost war, as again today, a certain section of the German population felt very much drawn to pacifism and internationalism and occasionally echoed my ideas, I remained an object of distrust (Hesse, *If the War Goes On . . .* 4).

However, Hesse wrote political and timely articles only in certain years, it cannot be said that he was detached from the current happenings. In almost all his novels, he warns the Germans of the impending consequences of the world wars. Even when he stopped writing on current affairs for some time, the thought of the impending war never left him. From *Steppenwolf*, which partly warns against the approaching war, to *The Glass Bead Game*, seemingly far removed from current realities, this feeling of unrest and premonition pervades his thought throughout and significantly decides his course of life and hence his art too. He was never political but politics affected his career much:

When I call my articles “political,” it is always in quotes, for there nothing political about them but the atmosphere in which they came into being. In all other respects they are the opposite of political, because in each one of these essays I strive to guide the reader not into the world theatre with its political problems but into his innermost being, before the judgement seat of his very personal conscience. (Hesse, *If the War Goes On . . .* 5).

Undoubtedly, he did not mean politics in the strict sense of the word, but the atmosphere of politics which inflicted man outwardly and inwardly. By the ‘innermost being’ he means the conscience of man which is the “judgement seat” of right and wrong. In “Shall There Be Peace”, Hesse raises his voice strongly to endorse his internationalism in place of nationalism: “Now is the time to oust those statesmen who conceive foreign policy in terms of self-seeking national programs, who ignore the cry of mankind! Why wait until their stupidity has shed the blood of more millions?”(Hesse, *If the War Goes On . . .* 37).

He was very anguished by the sycophant attitude of the intellectuals of his time. He refers to the hypocrisy of the age, and fulminates intellectuals and educationists who sang the praise of political demagogues: “We prefer a madman, who does a mad thing with his whole heart, to the professors who can be expected to kowtow to the new regime . . . We are all for a “transvaluation of all values”—but such a transvaluation can only be effected in our own hearts” (Hesse, *If the War Goes On . . .* 65). He referred to the mania of the war as “theatrical, hysterical heroisms” (Hesse, *If the War Goes On . . .* 77).

He found himself at odds with popular sentiments. While some of his writings roused the displeasure of patriots, some provoked the pacifists. He was soon subjected to the unfriendliness of the former and to the reproach of the latter. The pacifists’ criticism of Hesse was perhaps as superfluous as the nationalists’ denunciation. He had a Goethean blending of patriotism and supranationalism:

By the beginning of 1916, Hesse was so distressed by the swell of disapproval from so many unexpected sources that and for so little reason that he sought refuge in seclusion and silence. He continued to tend to his duties in Bern but his writing tapered off sharply and for a year and a half he refrained from all social comment. He stopped reviewing war books, wrote no more war poems, no longer

countered his detractors, made no further effort to influence the German public, and ended his printed encouragements to the soldiers on the front. The lull that set in was a period of resolute reconsideration and incubation, the beginning of what Hesse was later to term his awakening (*Erwachen*) and his transformation (*Wandlung*). Now, for the first time in his life he began seriously to take stock of himself and of the world. (Mileck, *Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 77-78).

Hesse's main argument, however, was directed less against war itself than against intellectuals and artists who chose to enter the fray, whether in enthusiastic participation or pleading protest. The former could only extend international enmity from politics into the realms of thought and art, and the supplications of the latter were futile. Intellectuals and artists would do better to look to themselves, to continue to nurture their humane supranational values, and to leave war to the politicians.

In his previous essays, he avoided extended comment on war. He wanted Germany to adopt the art of peace and practise a supranational humanity. After Hesse published many humanitarian essays unfavouring the war, superpatriots began to scrutinise his every subsequent publication. He had much more faith in the exceptional individual than in organisations.

In *Tagebuchblatt*, sent to *Zeit-Echo* (Munich) on November 23, 1914, and published soon thereafter, Hesse tried to account for his ambiguous stance. He did not belong to those whose commitment to the war was a spontaneous untroubled response to duty, or to those whose involvement was based on sheer delight in violence and destruction, but to the unsettled and wayward, to those who abhorred the war. His head and heart were obviously not in accord and Hesse was averse to admitting as much. Nor was he about to assume a less ambiguous posture.

It can generally be observed that Hesse's writing before 1916 is primarily concerned with his own life and work, and chooses by preference to ignore political ongoings in the outside world. But it is with the First World War that he woke from his idyll and started speaking out in a series of pacifist essays. Most of these essays, collected in the volume *If the War Goes On*, contrasted sharply with the general euphoria with which most European intellectuals greeted the war. The experience of being disliked because of his pacifism produced a mental crisis from which, in 1916-17, Hesse sought relief through psychoanalysis. But his concern could not be baffled. It,

however, hindered the publication and distribution of his books. Especially, those works containing passages critical of the times were not printed.

Hesse's writing is so personal that it sometimes seems difficult to differentiate between the writer and the protagonist. In search of the nature of the self, he did profound research that most of his novels show. But he was not unconcerned with the external realities, for a writer cannot be unconcerned. For instance, his first novel *Peter Camenzind*, which seems to be just a romantic musing of a young man, has concerns with the real world. And yet, it is a very personal account of Hesse. Camenzind, the protagonist has to undergo the same problems and disappointments Hesse had to face in his early years. Camenzind's Nimikon resembles Hesse's Calw. Hesse's Berner Oberland reminds one of Camenzind's Alps, his Maulbronn, Camenzind's secondary school, and his Tübingen Camenzind's Zurich. Camenzind travels to Florence as Hesse had made his trip to Italy. Camenzind falls in love with Elisabeth as Hesse had fallen in love with Elisabeth La Roche. Hesse was influenced by the historian Jacob Burckhardt; so was Camenzind's inclination to history. Like Hesse, Camenzind decides to avoid women and intends to renounce worldly affairs, but he realises later that the decision was irrational (Mileck, *Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 33). All literary tastes of the both have greater similarities to the extent that the novel sounds to be autobiographical. Almost all the problems Camenzind faces are Hesse's own problems. Camenzind's problems and his fascination for nature can be taken as a projection of Hesse's own mind. Another instance can be found in *The Glass Bead Game*. The educational province of Castalia, which provided a setting for the novel, came to resemble Hesse's childhood Swabia physically which in turn embodied his own solution to the crises of his time. It became the "island of love" or at least an island of the spirit" (Freedman 348).

The quest knowledge and the individual self is pervasive throughout all Hesse's novels. With *Camenzind*, he begins the quest inspired by his loneliness. As he says: "I was overwhelmed sometimes for a day, sometimes a night, by an indefinite loneliness and gloom which vanished without a trace, only to return weeks or months later. In time I became as accustomed to it as a trusted friend until it seemed less of a torment than a disquieting weariness which had its own particular sweetness" (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 59). To avoid his loneliness, he travelled far and wide like Camenzind who says:

It was, I felt, my way of showing a little affection to the earth which was offering itself to me with dumb entreaties—an idea which caused me to laugh at myself. These journeys became one of the foundations of my later life, for since then I have spent the greater part of my life wandering for weeks or months through many countries. I grew accustomed to walking far afield with little money and a hunk of bread in my pocket, spending entire days in solitude and frequently passing night in the open (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 59-60).

Peter Camenzind is a reflection of Hesse, the novelist in the making and his initial understanding of the world. He is not so much focused on social concerns than his own problems, but he makes the external circumstances responsible for those problems. It is here that we identify the novelist as socially concerned and his inner world as a reflection of the world outside. It is here that we also discern that the outside realities influence the inner personality of man—an issue which will be discussed in the fourth chapter. Hesse's writing was very autobiographical. Even those who met him found that his writing was genuinely personal. For instance, Miguel Serrano recalls: "When I first met Hermann Hesse, I found him more like Narcissus than Goldmund. He had stopped wandering and was living a life of introspection in his isolated retreat at Montagnola. Nevertheless, both Narcissus and Goldmund continued to exist within him together" . . . (7).

Hesse goes on meandering as a romantic lover catching up the beauty of rivers, lakes, meadows, forests and the countryside greenery. Hesse the aesthete rather than the pacifist is dominant here, the undertones of a pacifist can always be found in all his writing. In fact, he sought a relief from the callousness of the world through his aestheticism and romanticism. But gradually he started feeling that it was nothing but escapism. Consequently he took new approaches to life. But when these had been relatively unsuccessful, he managed to establish more and more contact with others but he was hardly able to find one who could understand him (Mileck, *Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 33). Therefore, his feeling of loneliness persisted as Camenzind's loneliness and dissatisfaction persists.

Camenzind's story basically contains three main points—self-contemplation, description of nature, and social comment. But this social comment does not help Hesse emerge as a realist. His characters do not emerge with full expression; they are rather commented upon than drawn in

realistic detail. The backdrop against which he draws his characters is not well sketched. No city or place has been given a detailed picture of its own. They appear only as names to be referred to. Sometimes, it seems that the novel does not qualify as a novel on account of its lack of character sketch or action.

In *Peter Camenzind*, Hesse is critical of the society. The novel is very autobiographical, and it gets poetic flavour in the protagonist's aspiration to become a poet. The novelist is a seeker and as a novice he seeks life through literature. Peter Camenzind sows the seed of seeking which Hesse's future protagonists like Siddhartha, Goldmund, and Harry Haller would take up for further inquiry and fulfillment. He travels far and wide to accumulate knowledge and experience the world. He undergoes profound suffering. During his studies, he falls in love with Rosi Girtanner. He starts further wandering to experience the world. He falls in love with yet another girl Elizabeth, whose love makes him love life deeply and in course of time this love extends to all objects around him. Thus his ability to love things increases. In his company with an invalid Boppi, he experiences true human love by helping him. In Boppi, he finds a fulfillment of humanity.

In his second novel *The Prodigy* too, he remains quite autobiographical, perhaps more autobiographical than *Peter Camenzind*. The story begins with Hans Giebenrath, a talented boy, preparing for an important state examination. The entire society he lives in is concerned about his performance. He is, ironically, so talented that:

There was no doubt about Hans Giebenrath's talents. The masters, headmaster, neighbours, the local vicar, his fellow-pupils, everybody in fact agreed that the boy had a fine and quite exceptional intellect. His future was therefore already fixed and mapped out. For in Swabia talented boys—provided their parents could afford it—there was but one narrow path and it was to the Seminary by way of the *Landexamen* and thence to the Protestant Theological College at Tübingen and from there either to the pulpit or to the lecturing desk (Hesse, *The Prodigy* 7-8).

Finally, the boy gets admission to the seminary and his teachers and parents keep on inculcating intellectual lessons to the boy rather against his will. Gradually he becomes mentally ill because

his parents, who are only concerned about his studies, are negligent of the boy's desires—the desires which the development of his personality entails. To alleviate his mental distress, he develops friendship with Hermann Heilner, one of his school-mates, who is very liberal and leads an easy and care-free life without paying much attention to his work. As a result of his negligence to studies, Heilner is expelled from the seminary. Eventually Giebenrath's performance too decreases despite his hard work and is therefore sent home.

When Giebenrath comes back home, he feels his sullen mind, which has been so much applied to studies that it is rather difficult to recollect childhood sensations and experiences. Apprenticed as a blacksmith, he enjoys the work. The concrete work gives him some relief from the abstraction the teachings of the seminary had created. But it also does not help him much.

The autobiographical similarities between the novelist and the protagonist are evident in a very pronounced way in this novel. Giebenrath's *Landexamen* is Hesse's state examination. He goes to the seminary; the very dormitory, the teachers, their names disguised, reminds one of the seminary in which Hesse had got admission. Giebenrath is offered the same courses as Hesse had been and is fond of Homer, Latin, and history as Hesse had been. Hesse's friend Lang figures as Hermann Heilner. Giebenrath too is insulted by his fellow students as Hesse had been.

Giebenrath is the relatively obedient and diligent boy Hesse had been in Goppingen and had continued to be in Maulbronn until his truancy. But moody and self-assertive Hermann Heilner is also Hesse, particularly the disobedient Hesse of Bad Boll, Stutten, and Cannstatt. Like intelligent Hesse before him, Heilner had also rendered the essay portion of the state examination in verse. He also plays the violin and writes poetry as Hesse had done in Maulbronn, and his French leave was Hesse's. Giebenrath's mental and physical tiredness and his homecoming to Calw recalled Hesse's withdrawal from Maulbronn. His headmaster is also just as delighted to be free of a bothersome ward as Hesse's had been. And Giebenrath's consequent apprenticeship in a machine shop harked back to Hesse's own apprenticeship in the Perrot tower-clock factory (Mileck, *Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 35-36).

Hans Giebenrath and Hermann Heilner together tell Hesse's story of 1891 to 1895, just as Peter Camenzind and his close friend Richard together tell Hesse's story of 1901 to 1903. The awkward reserved nonconformist Peter is what Hesse was at the time, and friendly and cheerful.

Giebenrath, too, is what Hesse was, and Heilner is the person he had to become if he was to make anything of his life. The hopeful Heilner in him appeared and went his free way. This self-projection in the semblance of close friends was to become a frequent literary technique in Hesse's prose. Of his future couples, the protagonist is almost always what Hesse thought himself to be, and the close friend is almost always what Hesse would have liked to be, or had to become to realize himself. The protagonist every time remains what he is when his friend is simply what he himself would like to be, or becomes what his friend symbolizes when this change is compulsory for his self-realization.

Joseph Mileck rightly considers *The Prodigy* as a psychological study. To substantiate this idea he elicits the fact that "Hesse's characters continue to have little visibility, and the outside world, though it now assumes greater physical reality, continues to be little more than an appropriate backdrop for inner drama" (*Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 36-37). Although this feature remains with Hesse throughout his writing career, he reflects upon the world outside with no less attention. To him, the outer is no less important than the inner. Most of the distress of the protagonists, for instance, Camenzind, Giebenrath, Emil Sinclair, and others, is created by the outer circumstances. In *The Prodigy*, Hesse criticises very critically the education system, its adverse impact on children. The very experience of learning is defiled. Since childhood a child gets the experience being subordinated. Learning never becomes an exhilarating experience. It always gets distorted by authoritarian imposition of pre-accepted norms.

The Prodigy was Hesse's contribution to the polemic literature in the German writing world at the turn of the century. It was a relentless condemnation of the adult world. Parents, teachers, and preachers are reproached for their lack of understanding of and sympathy for their students, and for their self-righteousness, ineptitude, and insincerity. The young, sensitive and gifted are neglected.

In *The Prodigy* Hesse expresses his disgust for the world of useless values, constrained by conventions which the protagonist does like and is therefore dissatisfied in a society which doesn't pay heed to originality. The weaknesses of the education system and students' inability to discard it are some of the issues addressed in this novel. He examines the complexity of the world.

The Prodigy is a masterful tirade against the education system, against the dullness of society. Hesse understood the yearning of the age to have an education system in which individual development should be compatible. Going even further, Hesse commented upon the conventional wisdom and its custodians, puritanical morality and its confessors. It is a big achievement of Hesse that in *Demian* he firmly established the solidarity of the class against those who inculcate lessons without any significance. Every youth of Hesse's times would have loved reading the novel, for it is deeply concerned with their personal feelings. Because this book with its fundamental attitude differed from the more optimistic steadfastness of the other books, the readers were thankful to bring together the two points of view from the same writer. After substituting ideas, they could see that Hermann Heilner was completely unlike Siddhartha. The dissimilarity enhanced their responsiveness of personal responsibility in asserting and fulfilling one's self and talents.

The story of Hesse's third novel *Gertrude* is very simple and straightforward. It was an evaluation of life, of self-inquiry born out of the need of catharsis Hesse had had owing to psychological problems. Despite the fact that Gertrude does not love Kuhn, Kuhn continues his love. It is Kuhn who brings Gertrud and Muoth in contact with each other when he auditions them for his new opera. This love affair and its consequences become the inspiring factor for Kuhn's opera, the success of which is his cherished desire. The basic concern of the novel is the Apollonian and Dionysian elements, which will be discussed in the third chapter.

Gertrude while Hesse had tried and failed in establishing a social contact with the world in *Camenzind*, he becomes rather successful in this in *Gertrude*, which though looks like an effort in self-justification, a drawing of self portrait. In it *Camenzind*'s story seems to have been presented in a variegated form. A psychological conflict always dominates these novels. There are oppositional characters. For instance, pessimistic Kuhn is set in contrast with the self-indulged and happy Muoth.

In fact, the novelist is projecting his own self in various ways, though the basic formula of presentation is always the same, namely through a foregrounding of oppositions. It is always noteworthy that one part of the opposition concerns with what the novelist is and the other one with what he wants to be. The third chapter of this work shows how he inclined towards the Dionysian tendencies, which are tokenistic of freedom.

Hesse wrote *Gertrude* with Gaienhofen as its background. In it he cultivated a comparatively impersonal mode of expression. The inner world of the violinist-composer remained impersonal and his contact with the outer world, which is more fictitious than that of Camenzind, remained personal for the most part. Similarities between Hesse's personal life and his fiction are to be found again in many forms. To put it in Mileck's words:

Despite Hesse's cultivation in Gaienhofen of a more impersonal mode of storytelling, the inner world of his violinist-composer Kuhn, like Camenzind's, remained impersonal, and Kuhn's outer world, albeit more fictive than Camenzind's, continued to draw freely upon the personal for its filler detail. Konrad Lohe, Kuhn's fourth grade teacher of Greek, was testy Professor Schimid, Hesse's fourth-grade teacher of Greek in Calw. Kuhn begins to play his violin at the age of twelve, Hesse had begun just before his twelfth birthday. At sixteen, music becomes for Kuhn the passion writing had become for Hesse by the same age. Hesse had written his first love poems during his last two years in school, and Kuhn composes his first love songs during his last year in school. Kuhn's parents are as concerned about their son's choice of profession as Hesse's had been about his determination of to become a writer. His father is much that Hesse's father was. His interest in butterflies was Hesse's, as was his brief preoccupation with theosophy. Kuhn's opera was undoubtedly Hesse's *Bianca*, the libretto written for but never used by the composer Othmar Schoeck. And Hesse's own troubled marriage served as a model for the mismarriage of Kuhn's close friends Heinrich Muoth and Gertrud.

Kuhn is the person Hesse had been in Basel, the lonely misfit-observer knocking timidly on the door of life, and he becomes Hesse the disenchanting artist-bourgeois of Gaienhofen desperately intent upon making self-acceptance possible and life palatable. To this end, Hesse and his spokesman Kuhn embrace a fatalistic philosophy of life, evolve a Nietzschean theory of art . . . Author and protagonist managed to achieve, if not an ideal, at least a functional adjustment to the self and to life (*Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 58-59).

The novel was not a success and Hesse himself was not satisfied with it. When it went out of print, he did not show any regret for it. He was more of a neo-Romantic visionary than a scientific observer of reality, and yet he managed to give gripping accounts of the social pressures which prevented talented individuals from achieving their potential in present-day Europe. One of his major concerns was the education of the young, and he repeatedly returns to the harm that was being done by an ossified system to young people during their formative years (Durrani xiii-xiv).

In *Demian*, Sinclair goes in the company of Demian, leaving the lighted world. This lighted world is a symbol of the bourgeois comfortability and sense of security. The world he goes out to experience is the Dionysian world ---the world of adventure and uncertainty---where there no fixed rule of the lighted bourgeois world. Hesse might be talking about the world of the so-called uncultured, proletariat people, who live life naturally, free from social chains. The conflict which is visible on the mental level is equally visible on the social level. Demian's home represents the Apollonian world and the outer world he steps into the Dionysian.

In the final chapter war breaks out, clearly identified with the First World War because of the geopolitical circumstances of the conflict. It turns out that Demian has the rank of lieutenant, and there are strong hints in their novel that war will have a beneficial effect: Deep down something was coming into being, something like a new humanity. Naumann rightly observes that "Demian, for instance, tries to find a mystic union with the whole of the universe, with the dark as well as with the light forces, but at the same time this new religious feeling is identical with the spirit of the coming age, of future society"(39).

It is in *Demian* that the youngsters see Hesse as the interpreter of their deeper consciousness. Following this design, Sinclair is the young one born into an orderly world—pure, calm and clean. He lives in the bourgeois world but has much attraction for the other. To satisfy his curiosity, he goes to the real world. But outside he finds his mentor Demian who makes him face his own weaknesses. In fact, Demian comes only to make him independent. He is his guide to the path of self realization. But he does not teach him anything because teaching would be a repetition of what has already been discovered. Sinclair goes on looking for truth independently. It is true independence that Demian teaches Sinclair.

Siddhartha is an exceptionally intelligent boy who apparently has a disciplined existence yet feels dissatisfied. Siddhartha starts a journey of self-discovery that takes him through a period of abstinence and continence followed by one of sensual indulgence. A meeting with the Buddha is rationally significant but not spiritually touching, and Siddhartha continues his quest. He finally finds peace by a river. This quest for self and identity persists throughout Hesse works. It reflects the autobiographical and thoughtful nature of Hesse's writing. Hesse's works are unique, idiosyncratic. Hesse surpasses in the delineation of personal predicament. His writing became popular because of this characteristic. Siddhartha made Hesse a renowned novelist. The novel is as much a work of art as it's engagements with philosophy. There are obscurities about the philosophy the novelist wants to present in the book. Some critics observe that the novel was inspired by the story of Gautama Buddha. Casebeer points out:

The syllable *Om* which Siddhartha apparently uses as a *mantra* (it begins and ends all Brahmin prayers) is important to this novella, for it is the syllable that the river utters at a crucial moment in the conclusion. Its three letters (actually A-U-M) stand for the three most important *Vedas*; the three elements of the universe; the three gods Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, and so on—in short, as a friend of mine has remarked, "*Om* summarizes all of Hinduism." The stress that Hesse places on the syllable concerns this *unifying* or summarizing power. Thus in the chapter "Om" Siddhartha, after hearing in the sound of the river every possible voice, finally perceives that they all blend together: "the great song of a thousand voices consisted of one word: Om—perfection."... (29).

Again, in the words of Brown, who seems to disagree with the purport of the above words of Casebeer:

The structure itself shows that the remainder of the story is Siddhartha's alone and that this wisdom differs from Gautama's. The concept of a Buddha provides Hesse with the appropriate conveyor of his wisdom and Gautama provides the pre-eminent example. It remained for the author to create his own Buddha and to borrow for him some credentials from the tradition. The result is a new, Hessean Buddha (195).

Madison Brown cites Misra who “sees the novel as Hesse's attempt to discover the meaning of life from an existential not Indian point of view” (193). He substantiates his point that Hesse has not borrowed completely from Indian sources. Again, he cites Bharati Blaise, who in her “very informative and systematic dissertation "The Use of Indian Mythology in E. M. Forster's A Passage to India and Hermann Hesse's Siddhartha" (unpub., University of Iowa, 1969), presents a wealth of detailed information regarding Hesse's use of things Indian and arrives basically at the same conclusion-namely that the final product is non-Indian” (Brown193). In fact, Hesse’s intention is not to inculcate any culture. All references to different cultures are only symbolic. If they are understood literally, it is difficult to arrive at the meaning the author intended to communicate to his audience. As far as the Indian elements are concerned, Brown rightly observes that “the importance of the Indian elements in *Siddhartha* is not their authenticity but their significance as the cultural context for the story or as components in Hesse's religious system or as symbolic material by means of which Hesse expresses his views” (Brown 194).

Siddhartha had a social purpose of providing the Germans an option of peace. Its aim was philosophical, psychological and social at the same time. It brought forth the lesion of humanism and pacifism. It is clear from all the viewpoints it is studied. Its publication would probably have been a demand of the time. It seeks to teach freedom to the individual soul. It “is Hesse's attempt to restore his faith in mankind, to regain his lost peace of mind, and to find again a harmonious relationship with his world” (Malthaner 105).

Hesse became successful as very few have become, especially in depicting the dissatisfactions and sexual ambivalences of youngsters who are occupied in a quest of identity. And if peace and harmony is what they pine for, then Hesse’s *Siddhartha* offers them peacefulness, calmness and composure. It also provides them a relief from the business of the century. In it Hesse has offered them some optimism and some prospect of fulfillment as “Siddhartha realizes, too, that all life is one, that all creation is an indivisible one, that trees and birds are indeed his brothers; he sees his great mistake in trying always to do something instead of just to be” (Malthaner 108).

The attraction of *Siddhartha* lies in its impressive images. The connotation of Siddhartha as the ultimate meaning of life flouts philosophical definition and can be implied only by the poetic passages. In fact, *Siddhartha* has a social connotation. It is probably surprising to think of

defying a comfortable middle class bourgeois system only for the philosophical meanderings of Siddhartha. As Malthaner says: “Hesse's books are confessions, and the story of Siddhartha is his own story describing his own doubts and struggle. He, too, had rebelled: against the pietistic orthodoxy of his parents and the strict school system in Germany that destroyed any attempt of independence in its pupils. So he ran away to shape his own life” (104-105).

In a pervading dissatisfaction with the world, its disorder and disappointments, the youth found Hesse's writing identifiable with their own conditions and had some optimism. Siddhartha influenced the mind of the thinking youth and influence the searching ones who wish to understand the world. Siddhartha goes on to understand and experience everything in the world. He keeps on changing his views and it nourishes his understanding because he does not accept anything without questioning. Even after accepting anything he proceeds to know more and more. This idea of self realization creates hope in young people. They identify with Siddhartha who invigorates them with a positive attitude to life. Siddhartha fills positivism in the people of his times.

Hesse's believed in peaceful acceptance of all aspects of life as an essential outcome of participation in life. It is also the main thought of *Siddhartha*. For Siddhartha meets Gautama early on in the book and regretfully dismisses him as being, perhaps, not quite Eastern enough. It is one of Hesse's most popular novels among those of the young who are most heavily involved in their own bead game; but it also narrowly misses being comic.

Looking for a new morality, the youth find a somewhat similar drifter in *Siddhartha* who, exceeding the traditional dichotomy of good and evil, accepts all extremes of life in one harmoniously unified vision. Siddhartha's quest for identity takes him to the realms of abstinence and continence. He experiences the world and with it gets self-awareness. He learns from the river, from its banks, from its graceful and harmonious flow. Acceptance of all the extremes enables him to love all creatures. The novel is relevant to Hesse's Germany. Casebeer rightly observes that the book has special appeal to those people who seek peace:

Such a book is best approached by those who seek calm. It is written in a low key. The plot does have moments of drama.... Yet the tone in which these [dramatic] incidents are presented and the emotional texture of those incidents

which surround them, the rhythmic nature of the sentences and the plot-delaying passages of imagery, all unite to present the reader an experience which leads to tranquillity. The events and people are far away in space and in time as are the events and people of legends. There is little sense of conflict between the hero and those about him. There is even little such sense of conflict within him—such a prominent feature of *Steppenwolf* and *Narcissus and Goldmund* (31).

Siddhartha's development can be seen on three levels. The first level is when he is born in a state of unity with all being as a child is born —dutiful, respectful, loving, and happy. But the real world is not so as the child sees it to be. Realities shape his attitude, behaviors, and personality. When Siddhartha knows from the existent patterns of knowledge that the world consists of both good and evil, he proceeds to a second level of humanization which is characterized by depression and loneliness. The societal and cultural codes make him aware of morality and ethics. He feels that all these are only human constructs and may vary from context to context. He feels it against his will to hold fast the uninformed, subjective and illogical standards of thoughts and principles established by conventional ethical systems. He thinks that these codes of society reject so much of what is very natural. He finds such moral and ethical codes, and patterns of thoughts as something which creates imbalance. This is how he sees the realities of the world. On this level, he is found examining the thought systems and their relevance to the world. He finally sheds all his belief in this second level, that is, the pre-existing patterns of thinking. He then embarks on to the third level which is a synthesis of the experiences born out of the first two levels. On this level, he transcends good and evil. If this dialectical triad of development is seen in Hegelian terms, it will keep on going as it will go on recoiling and recoiling. But the dialectical progress of Siddhartha cannot be, however, completely Hegelian, since it can keep on changing to infinity. But Hegelian dialectics posit an Absolute. Siddhartha's progression defies this concept of the Absolute, since he finds the river as his best teacher. It is the river which he learns from. He learns from its banks. His learning from the river is symbolic of continuous change, in which even knowledge and perception keeps on changing. One is led to assume that the experience and truth Siddhartha had is not ultimate but will keep on changing. Siddhartha's education is not irrelevant to mankind despite the fact that the novel discusses the development of an individual. Casebeer explains this point significantly:

For [Hesse], the universe hung together. It was harmonious. It included man. It was folly to focus upon the ego, to consider oneself a discrete individual. Certainly, the individual is isolated in some very important and fundamental ways even from the individual closest to him . . . But to Hesse the most important fact about each of us was not our individuality but our relationship to the whole universe. Siddhartha elaborates upon the point with the metaphor of the stone.... [The] stone has the potential of everything it has been or participated within in the past—plant, animal, man—and it has the potential of everything that it will be or participated within in the future; given an infinity of time, it has the potential of becoming everything in the universe. Finally, if the distinction between *been*, *being*, and *becoming* is artificial and arbitrary, the stone is *now* everything it has been and everything it potentially will be . . . And yet, Siddhartha points out, the stone *is* a stone, individual and unique and quite concrete as well as a universe of possibilities. And, in that sense, each of our egos does exist . . . But these defeats are only part of reality. Beyond our egos is the universe to which they belong, with which they will merge, from which they will re-emerge (24-25).

In *Steppenwolf*, Hesse depicts/portrays the bourgeois hypocrisy with all intensity. Harry Haller, the protagonist, is a typically bourgeois personality, but he is totally dissatisfied with this identity of his. Harry despises the formal character of social life: “What is commonly meant by the word ‘man’ is never anything more than a transient agreement, a bourgeois compromise” (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 74-75). Cultural belongings and one’s social and class identity, it seems, exist solely as a useless thing, toughened remnants of a formerly effervescent world for which contemporary heirs cannot even show regret authentically, so dried has their emotional sensibility become. Social life seems to have acquired an obligatory character; its forms are maintained and respected only for the sake of maintaining and respecting them, but they are devoid of meaning, and the participants are humiliated at their own assent, even though they never question it. As Haller says:

all our striving, all our culture, all our beliefs, all our joy and pleasure in life--- already sick and soon to be buried there too. Our whole civilization was a cemetery where Jesus Christ and Socrates, Mozart and Haydn, Dante and Goethe were but the indecipherable names on mouldering stones; and the mourners who stood round affecting a pretence of sorrow would give much to believe in these inscriptions which once were holy, or at least to utter one heart-felt word of grief and despair about this world that is no more. And nothing was left them but the embarrassed grimaces of a company round a grave.”(Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 92-93).

Commenting upon the monotonous life of the bourgeois and their formal culture, Haller reflects:

Just as I dress and go out to visit the professor and exchange a few more or less insincere compliments with him, without really wanting to at all , so it is with the majority of men day by day and hour by hour in their daily lives and affairs. Without really wanting to at all, they pay calls and carry on conversations, sit out their hours at desks and on office chairs ; and it is all compulsory, mechanical and against the grain, and it could all be done or left undone just as well by machines ; and indeed it is this never-ceasing machinery that prevents their being , like me , the critics of their own lives and recognizing the stupidity and shallowness, the hopeless tragedy and waste of the lives they lead , and the awful ambiguity grinning over it all. And they are right, right a thousand times to live as they do, playing their games and pursuing their business, instead of resisting the dreary machine and staring into the void as I do who have left the track. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 93-94).

Hesse shows how a disjunction of knowledge and society happened in the Wilhelmine Germany in which modern civilization seeks only progress and evolution without considering the very essence of life. Walking in despair, Haller meets a professor whom in earlier years he used to see a good deal and discuss oriental mythology. The professor invites Haller to his home. After talking to him for a while, there he sees a sentimental portrait of the famous German poet Goethe. This portrait is very different from the portrait Haller has in his mind and he therefore feels very bad and criticises the sentimentality of the portrait:

Instead of saying a prayer or taking a nap, I followed a wayward impulse and picked up the first thing I saw. It chanced to be a small picture in a frame that stood on the round table leaning back on its paste-board support. It was an engraving and it represented the poet Goethe as an old man full of character, with a finely chiseled face and a genius' mane. Neither the renowned fire of his eyes nor the lonely and tragic expression beneath the courtly whitewash was lacking. To this the artist had given special care, and he had succeeded in combining the elemental force of the old man with a somewhat professional make-up of self-discipline and righteousness, without prejudice to his profundity; and had made of him, all in all, a really charming old gentleman, fit to adorn any drawing room. No doubt this portrait was no worse than others of its description. It was much the same as all those representations by careful craftsmen of saviors, apostles, heroes, thinkers and statesmen. Perhaps I found it exasperating only because of a certain pretentious virtuosity. In any case, and whatever the cause, this empty and self-satisfied presentation of the aged Goethe shrieked at me at once as a fatal discord, exasperated and oppressed as I was already. It told me that I ought never to have come. Here fine Old Masters and the Nation's Great Ones were at home, not Steppenwolves. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 95).

The professor is very complacent with the things happening all around. In fact, he is a representative of the established and celebrated culture which is stagnant and far removed from the life forces. He will read his books, have his meal bed with his wife and that is life for him. He believes only in the acquisition of knowledge and progress and evolution whether it concerns life and humanity or not. His nationalism, intellectual superciliousness and haughtiness show to Haller the very uselessness of his own previous research. Haller sheds light on the limited perception of the professor:

I paused a moment in front of the house and looked up at the windows. There he lives, I thought, and carries on his labors year by year, reads and annotates texts, seeks for analogies between western Asiatic and Indian mythologies, and it satisfies him, because he believes in the value of it all. He believes in the studies whose

servant he is; he believes in the value of mere knowledge and its acquisition, because he believes in progress and evolution. He has not been through the war, nor is he acquainted with the shattering of the foundations of thought by Einstein (that, thinks he, only concerns the mathematicians). He sees nothing of the preparations for the next war that are going on all round him. He hates Jews and Communists. He is a good, unthinking, happy child, who takes himself seriously... (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 94).

In fact, Haller is against the increasing rigidity of the middle-class normalcy, complacency, the formal character of society, and a sullen cultural formality which has no relevance to life. Haller wants rebellious change which fills life, affirms it in essence. He dislikes the edification of a culture that has little relevance to life and is celebrated highly just for the sake of national aggrandizement. His anger at seeing Goethe's portrait in a form different from that one he has in his mind is mostly because he does not find anyone to share it with anyone. He contemplates suicide. Goethe's portrait in the professor's home emerges as a cultural icon (typical of the bourgeois/middle-class society). Haller's rebellion is very tangible:

and between my two selves there opened an immense field of operations. For it was at once clear to me that this disagreeable evening had much more significance for me than for the indignant professor. For him, it was a disillusionment and a petty outrage. For me, it was a final failure and flight. It was my leave-taking from the respectable, moral and learned world, and a complete triumph for the Steppenwolf. I was sent flying and beaten from the field, bankrupt in my own eyes, dismissed without a shred of credit or a ray of humor to comfort me. I had taken leave of the world in which I had once found a home, the world of convention and culture, in the manner of the man with a weak stomach who has given up pork. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 99-100).

The threat of German nationalism, the frantic pleasure seeking mood of many people at the time, and of the complacency of the bourgeoisie, who were concerned only to establish and maintain a sense of equilibrium. He distrusts this feeling of equilibrium, of contentment, as being symbolic of the mediocrity of the middle classes. Longing to experience some strong emotion, he decides

to visit a drinking-tavern. Passing down the 'smug and well-brushed' stairs, Haller reflects on the strange attraction which this orderly bourgeois house has for him, and describes as 'a temple' the little vestibule where the nephew had met him. As he walks through the wet streets, Haller recalls the joys of his youth and the deeply felt experience of a recent symphony concert. Throughout this section it is clear that Harry feels himself to be out of sympathy for with modern life and entertainments, and this reinforces his conviction that he is indeed crazy, a Steppenwolf. Haller's crisis is symptomatic of the times in which he lived.

The Treatise on Steppenwolf section explores the relationship between the conventional bourgeois society and the creative individual. The values and stagnant culture of the German bourgeoisie always infuriated Hesse, for it lacked creativity and rationality. The bourgeois class in Germany included industrialists, professors, writers, intellectuals, civil servants and also the lower-middle classes. It also included people of modest means who worked in offices and shops that catered to the needs and fashions of these people. What arouse Hesse's fulmination of these people most was their hypocrisy and material comfort, which they valued much more. He repudiated the complacency of these well-to-do people to whom coziness mattered most. Apart from this, the educated philistines were always found absorbed in acquisition rather than utilizing what they previously possessed. Hesse also disliked their sentimental spiritualism which was a byproduct of their extreme comfort and their readings of the works of 'great' German and Romantic authors. The emotional music of Richard Wagner, too, led these people to self-indulgence and sentimental exuberance. Thus, the bourgeoisie was highly sentimental about nationalism, and such patriotism had even formed the literary tastes of the time.

The contemporary rotten civilization displeased Hesse so much that he wanted its decay with the hope that some natural freshness would emerge out of this. As he did not like the over-glorification of the national spirit, so did he not find any meaning in spiritual escapism. Probably, he thought that the experience of art could provide some solace from the distressful experiences of life. He remained dissatisfied with the bourgeois complacency and its understanding of art and literature. In this way, even *The Steppenwolf* remained very autobiographical for Hesse:

The name which Hesse chose to give to the prostitute who introduces Haller to jazz and to sex can be accounted for more readily. Hermine is not only Haller's female counterpart but also his diamón personified. She also resembles Haller's poet friend, whom Hesse facetiously called Hermann. Since Haller and his friend Hermann are both projections of Hermann Hesse, what more appropriate name than the feminine form of Hermann could have been chosen for this enigmatic female? (Mileck, "Names and the Creative Process" 173).

Although he was quite hostile to the middle classes yet his relationship to it creates some for ambiguity. He was undoubtedly conscious of the fact that he had originated in it and also wished to share the coziness, orderliness and stability it provided. But there are instances of his efforts to come out of it. That is why he created unruly and wayward characters such as Goldmund and Steppenwolf. In *The Steppenwolf*, he emphasizes that the scant importance of the unconscious in the bourgeois culture had adverse impacts on the development of the personality. Such marginalized consciousness filled a sense of disgust in him.

Such ambiguous relationship to the bourgeois is found even in Harry Haller, who feels himself as an outsider. The very first impression of him one has is that of the bourgeoisie. He is first described as man who is drawn to the comfort and cleanliness of an orderly lodging-house:

'Look at this little vestibule,' Haller went on, 'with the araucaria and its wonderful smell. Many a time I can't go by without pausing a moment. At your aunt's too, there is a wonderful smell of order and extreme cleanliness, but this little place of the araucaria, why, it's so shiningly clean, so dusted and polished and scoured, so inviolably clean that it positively glitters. I always have to take a deep breath of it as I go by; don't you smell it too? What a fragrance there is here—the scent of floor polish with a fainter echo of turpentine blending with the mahogany and the washed leaves of the plants, of superlative bourgeois cleanliness, of care and precision, of feeling of duty and devotion to little things. I don't know who lives here, but behind that door there must be a paradise of cleanliness and spotless mediocrity, of ordered ways, a touching and anxious devotion to life's little habits and tasks (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 19-20).

Such houses remind Haller of his bourgeois childhood. His landlady guesses it by his demeanor that he seems to have been used to it and therefore longs for it. The lady, while answering the editor's question as to why Haller smells so good here, replies, "There's a smell of cleanliness and good order here, of comfort and respectability. It was that that pleased him. He looks as if he hadn't been used to it lately and missed it" (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 11). Haller observes the contrast between the respectable atmosphere of the house and his own disordered attic with his Steppenwolfish loneliness.

The nephew (Haller) in the Preface can be taken as a paradigm of the bourgeoisie who lives his life of morality and duty, but who is who is at the same time disturbed by the Steppenwolf inside. But this disturbance of the inner mind is justified by the bourgeois hypocrisy of orderliness and morality. Haller hates the bourgeois attachment to complacency and orderliness. He hates the contentment, the search for balance which bourgeois life presents, yet he comes to recognize that his hatred of the Goethe portrait stemmed from the fact that he could see himself in it. The old intellectual Haller had been just such a bourgeois idealization of Goethe, a spiritual winner whose all-too-noble gaze shone with the meaning of grand contemplation and humanity, until he was almost overcome by his own nobleness of mind.

In the scene before the Masked Ball, when he bids farewell to his old life in the Steel Helmet, Haller seems able to come to terms with his feeling for the past, which he accepts as bourgeois sentimentality. Haller shares Hesse's views on the patriotic folly of the War, and his fear that the increasing pace of nationalistic fervor of contemporary Germany would lead inevitably to another war. Both Haller and Hesse had lost their public reputations through those open denunciations and both were branded as traitors. Hesse's attack upon the unthinking patriotism of the German intellectual is contained in his portrayal of the professor who 'has not been through the war' and 'hates Jews and communists'. This trait of nationalism, however, was only one of the deep faults which Hesse saw in the bourgeois and wished to expose. Pointing out the importance of *The Steppenwolf*, Stephen Koch says: "The final third of *Steppenwolf* is one of the great moments in modern literature, a moment original to the point of being in a class by itself, and one with an importance to future art which is not to be patronized" ("Narcissus and Goldmund" 227). *The Steppenwolf* had a strong influence on the people of that time.

In *Narziss and Goldmund*, Hesse's clear understanding of the complexities of life persuade one to outward exploration of the whole range of beauty and depravity that is generally looked down upon. His understanding of man's emotional confusion draws towards a sensitivity to the symbolic truth of the quest for significance in a paradoxical world. Narziss and Goldmund represent the basic worlds that Hesse plays out: the intellectual and the sensual, the possibilities of withdrawal or involvement, and the ultimate union of the aesthetic and the practical. But this exploration of the human psyche does not preclude its social concern. It definitely speaks of its milieu. It has a symbolic reference to the types of people who could be categorized in the form of Narziss and Goldmund. Narziss represents the old world structure and Goldmund the new which had to find its truth on its own, for the old truth of Narziss cannot satisfy the inquiring attitude of the modern youth. Hesse as a pacifist sought a peaceful acceptance of all aspects of life as a necessary outcome of participation in life. This is rather obviously what he wants to say in *Narziss and Goldmund*, though it related, for the most part, to the story of Goldmund's life and the development of his character.

The novel is mostly autobiographical and has a lengthy and fascinating narration. It has a history and it is certainly true of all creations of art that they do not get created without a reason. All literary outputs have their causes way back in the life of their writers; they have emerged out of life and are part of the life of their creators.

The Glass Bead Game discusses Hesse's concept of time and history and his whole intellectual evolution. Much longer than the previous novels of Hesse, *The Glass Bead Game* seems to take the form of a historical biography. Different from Hesse's practice in the earlier novels, almost as much endeavour is applied to the creation of the Bead Game as upon the experiences of the central figure in the story, Joseph Knecht. The main focus of the novel is to narrate the story of Knecht, a famous Magister Ludi or Master of the Bead Game. It narrates the significant change which came in Hesse's thoughts, especially with respect to the scope and authenticity of time and history (Olsen 351-352). It is Hesse's experiment with time philosophies. He first kept Knecht aloof from time, but in the long run he found that there is no realism without the concept of time. In fact, it is impossible to think of anything beyond time and space. As Olsen points out:

[Despite] his apparent disavowal of the radical "time philosophies" of the twentieth century, Hesse ultimately rejected the eternalization of Being which he had so long and so avidly sought. Joseph Knecht arrives at a conception of existence in which time, rather than being interpreted from the standpoint of and in opposition to eternity, is considered in its own right. . . . As long as he attempts to remain aloof from the existential reality, Knecht fails. By abandoning this attempt, he succeeds in discovering a sense of permanence within the transitory, the continuity which, according to . . . the later Hesse, lies at the heart of time itself.

And so Hesse came full circle. His final vision was of the changeable, the transitory. Not without great foreboding, he cast his lot with Heidegger, Bergson, Thomas Mann, and all of the other twentieth-century thinkers who have found time unavoidable. But, rather than succumb to nihilism, he chose to nurture the only meaning left for the inquiring mind of the contemporary age (353-354).

The Glass Bead Game depicts an ideal society contrary to the real society of Germany. It is a society of writers, poets, musicians and all other arts with freedom from state and politics. Its espousal of isolation from the outside world is ironically an answer to the politics-ridden society of that time when literature could never be a truthful representation of the ongoings of the society. When Hesse wrote this novel, it was not allowed for publication. Probably, it speaks for the criticism he has incorporated in it:

As was to be expected, Hesse, to whom the essence of human existence is a perpetual "transcending" from one step to the next, was bound to reach another plateau after the dead-end street of *Der Steppenwolf*. The pendulum that swung all the way to nature, instinct, the subconscious, had to swing back to the spirit, the mind, the conscious (*Geist*). This third phase began with *Die Morgenlandfahrt* (1932) and found its last and lasting expression in the author's educational novel disguised as biography, *Das Glasperlenspiel* (1943), which was published under the title *Magister Ludi* in this country in 1948. Set in the nebulous future of a fictitious twenty-fourth century, with ironical reflections on our current "modern" age, the book is a final reaffirmation of the spirit which is

held to be superior to both the realm of the soul (the world of vision and feeling) and the realm of nature (the world of instinct and the senses). Its hero Joseph Knecht is the member of a monk-like order devoted to playing the glass-bead-game, i. e., a symbol for the various functions of the human mind. It is significant, however, that Knecht- like Goethe's Faust-finds his final fulfilment in placing his cultivated mind (*Geist*) at the disposal of another human being. Thus, service to the community becomes the highest goal for an author who started out as a socially indifferent dreamer and intellectual at the turn of the century (Hill 249).

The influence of Hesse's contact with Jung is noticeably clear in all novels of Hesse. His elaborately musical world-weariness gave way to the balanced and somewhat mesmerizing prose of his best novels, *Siddhartha*, *Narcissus and Goldmund* and *The Glass Bead Game*. These novels show the much attuned attitude of a wise man happily at peace with himself and the world. It is noteworthy that Hesse tried to assure himself to have been a consistent writer. But Hesse was too honest a writer to be wholly consistent. He was so progressive that even the most instructive and informative of his writings have echoes of continuing conflict. It shows his originality as a writer and his honesty to writing.

This directs to one more feature of Hesse's writings which is the philosophical and poetic character of it. He uses a language which is individual and public, personal and impersonal—a simple but very lyrical language, which is excellent to communicate the feelings and emotions of the youth. But over all, it is his sensibility of the delicate emotions of the youngsters, which he expresses in a lucid and unaffected style that makes him more impressive:

Youth is one of Hesse's major literary themes. It occupies the author in many of his autobiographical sketches, in numerous short narratives, and in most novels. Two of them, [*The Prodigy*] and *Demian*, are devoted exclusively to a depiction of youth. Hesse readers are not surprised, therefore, that this theme is equally prominent in his reflective writings, especially his letters, many of which are replies to youths asking for advice (Koester181).

Man's life and his distresses are the concern of all of Hesse's works. There is much vigour in them with which Hesse reaffirms some basic aspects which not only have served humanity in the past but which are also helpful for the future. He eliminates all those patterns of thought that hinder the development of man as man and impose codes of culture. Undoubtedly, he is a champion of individuality, but such individualism is always meant for the development of mankind as a whole.

Hesse tells young people that the squares do not understand them; both convey the feeling of being crushed by the claims of a world which they fear. He compensates for the loneliness by asserting that he knows of another world, a dream world which belongs to poetic souls alone.

In other words, Hesse was a romantic. Moreover, Hesse purposefully reminded his readers of those first German romantics who came a hundred years before him. He imitated their language, their titles, and the moods they created. He brought again for the German people the romantic age because they had a rebirth of the romantic. In reviewing these themes and recreating these poetic images, Hesse was very contextual to his times.

He seems to be an inefficient novelist; there is not much story or characterisation in his novels. But as a psychological and philosophical writer, he has something very significant to say. His social concern is by way of philosophy and psychology. The purpose of his story is not to create an aesthetic edifice of narration, but rather to put some point before the public. Story and character were not his first priority. They were just a means of saying what he wanted to convey.

Those who seek to evaluate Hesse as a novelist would probably not find much praise for him. But those who explore his philosophy would certainly find much. They will find in Sinclair, Haller, and Goldmund a person who expresses their unconscious mind, which they do not have the courage to accept. But these heroes accept the facts of the unconscious, the Dionysian without any hesitation:

Though at heart a humanist, he rejected the culture that had been built on the humanist values; though as intellectual as the great classical writers, he renounced their reliance on man's intellectual capacities, and he opened the way

for the great succession of anti-intellectualistic writing, for the great evasion from the technocratic XXth into some utopian century where magic would provide for the material and spiritual needs of mankind. Above all, I think we were attracted by his message that the age of individualism had passed and some new community was called for. It was not his fault that others interpreted this new community as the community of the trenches, the suppression of the individual, the cult of the state (Pachter 88-9).

Hesse tries to intensify the strength of man so that he may be competent of the highest form of experience. Like most German intellectuals, Hesse seems to be unmindful of the societal and opinionated issues of the days, content with the status of an aristocratic middle-class environment, and exclusively concerned with the personal problems of an insightful shy person who found himself rooted in a rich intellectual convention, full of idealistic reminiscence, and somewhat disdainful of the bourgeoisie. His *Peter Camenzind* may be cited as a typical instance of his writing this phase.

Hesse's prominence and distinctiveness as a writer rests to a large extent on the combination in himself and his work of the provincial and the cosmopolitan activist. *The Glass Bead Game* is his best play on these two poles of his being: his idyllic childhood and the most complex problems of the world and culture. His criticism exposes another characteristic of that pole which exceeds regional and national boundaries. The Bead Game is an affirmation of timeless truth:

The Bead Game itself cannot be described with precision since Hesse himself avoided doing so. Generally, it represents a very complex and sophisticated symbolic sign system designed to encompass and summarize all human knowledge around a central idea. Hesse apparently initially conceived of the Game as a cure-all for the ills of modern pluralistic civilization, as a refuge for sensitive souls like Siddhartha, Harry Haller, and H. H. Believers in values and culture could therefore rally around the Game and devote themselves to the affirmation of timeless truth rather than being condemned to sterile criticism or ironic detachment (Olsen 351-352).

Demian's glorification of the individual, self-knowledge and self-realization bear respondent harmony. The youth was given the choice of a new philosophy and novel opportunity. Despite support of the individual, social criticism, optimistic attitude of life, and favorable cultural moment, Hesse's name would barely have become an epitome in the world but for his capability to make universal the closely personal. Hesse universalized his autobiography. His fiction describes his life and his concerns; but they also reflect the lives and the concerns of his readers in general. It is this correlation of reader with character and in turn with novelist that makes Hesse more relevant to his readers.

From *Demian* to *Steppenwolf*, Hesse was fervently devoted to self-understanding. His art realistically accounts the interior course of his thoughts. The rather customary poetic realism and the elusive examining and unclear feeling of his earlier works now give way to a more novel vibrant expressionism in which Hesse comes to understand his constant inner disagreement. Hesse's selection of names in *Demian* and *The Steppenwolf* signifies a subsequent change. The names of his characters show much creativity. They are evidently more deliberate. Understanding their origin calls for more speculation, and it is sometimes difficult to know their full implication. The names Sinclair and Demian can be explained comparatively clearly. However, although this elucidation is usually based on the general spirit of the novel, Demian is really a special name. On the other hand, Beatrice, Knauer, and Frau Eva do allow of more than guess. In the illustration of Knauer and of Frau Eva, Hesse used his earlier method of direct categorization by name. Delicate and feeble Knauer, obsessed by sex, is rightly what his name suggests. On her more refined plane, Frau Eva is just as suitably named. As her name instantly suggests, she is much more than Demian's mother.

But in *The Journey to the East*, Hesse simply called his hero H. H. One can guess that it is Hermann Hesse himself, but the novelist has not mentioned it anywhere. But looking at the course of the story and the attitudes of characters, one can presume that H. H. is the inquisitive Hermann Hesse himself and Leo is his ideal self as Demian is Sinclair's ideal self. It seems that Hesse paid more attention to the names of Josef Knecht and Plinio Designori in *The Glass Bead Game*.

There may be two purposes in mind when he chose these names. One reason is that his protagonist's name was to mirror the ideal which he introduced in *Siddhartha* and developed in *The Journey to the East*, and reiterated in *The Glass Bead Game*. The other reason is that the names of his protagonist, the presenter of the symbols, and of his protagonist's mentors, the representatives of the instinct, had to be suitably antithetical.

Hesse felt detached from the others. But he had a higher responsibility, the responsibility of a writer. Nietzsche influenced him much and inspired him to focus on the herd culture. The selected folks, however, belong together and they wish for a binding link. This concept is discussed clearly in *Demian*. It is the opposite of his disinterestedness from society. It can be seen as a longing for community. The protagonists of the novels are in quest of guides. They find their guides in personally trusted individuals, mostly in rather older friends. There is a connection in his world, a link from person to person. All are related and the individual has a collective goal:

In order to gain a clearer view of the development of Hesse's ideas on the alternative enlightened community it is worth looking at his depiction of the League of the Journeyers to the East, to whom *The Glass Bead Game* is dedicated. *The Journey to the East* is modelled on the *Bundesroman* form which was popular in German literature in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, his favourite literary period . . . The journey itself traverses time as well as space, combines individual goals with the secret collective goal, and includes an array of historical and fictional characters, many drawn from his own novels. The central character, H.H., describes the East as 'not only a country and something geographical, but it was the home [*Heimat*] and youth of the soul, it was everywhere and nowhere, it was the union of all times' (51-2) (Wilde 89).

It is difficult to find any real society in Hesse's work. The difficulty is totally resolved in his great work of art "The Rainmaker". This story comprises one of the three imaginary autobiographies of the hero of *The Glass Bead Game*. The weatherman in the society of a stone-age village uniquely knows almost everything that is known to his time; the world as it appears to his generation is his living-space; it matches accurately to his requirements. He has only a

constricted sphere of conscious knowledge, but beyond that knowledge he has a miraculous power of inspired union with the whole of nature. The weather symbolizes this supernatural communication. At the same time, through his place in the whole of nature, he also has his place in the centre of society. He construes nature to his society. His unusual position as soothsayer, as one who stands in a supernatural association to the universe, is acknowledged as a meaning by the people. It is a role, because it is not an individual talent. The weatherman is only a mysterious connection in the sequence; he get the entire of what he knows, trying to expand it a little conceivably, and hands it on through the ages, from person to person. It is obvious from this utopian story on a symbolic level that Hesse introduces society, because he has found his good reason for it. What is important for Hesse is not of a moral character. The fundamental problem for him is intellectual, the difficulty of situating himself. Thus, society is for him not a moral or ethical but an intellectual need.

The position of man in Hesse's humanism is at the center between nature and intellect. The intellect is by no means higher than nature. Every role of the intellect, in *The Glass Bead Game* for example, is personified by man: the accurate communication of the tradition does not take place in the ambiguity of books, but from person to person. A man's calling comes to him in youth by way of another human being. This humanism responds to a requirement of our era. It endeavors to discover a novel gauge for man. Man has been at large from an external influence of morality or ethics. Nevertheless, the concept does not seem to be satisfactory that he is completely free to decide his own course and to mold his own image. This thought is a custom of the moderate movements in the history of Romanticism. It has guided various modern writers to put themselves up as an evaluator for men. For this the artist had to produce their best in their highest experiences. In modern literature, the writer is the one who is accountable only to himself. His capability to experience and to produce adequately rationalizes his self. His aim is to know his self better.

Hermann Hesse belongs to an artist-philosopher tradition not specialized with a particular school of thought. He is concerned with the individual's pursuit for freedom and for constant conditions to express thoughts and realism. For instance, Haller in *The Steppenwolf* has awareness of the paradoxical problems of human values and empirical knowledge. He recognizes that the pursuit

for optimistic standards entails attaining a balance between good and evil. It is an equilibrium that will permit them to work in truth and untruth simultaneously, to amalgamate love and hate into a better understanding.

The variety and obvious lack of discipline of artist-philosophers such as Nietzsche have been the annoyance of the academic philosophers. Though Hermann Hesse is part of this artist-philosopher convention, he displays an eminence which defies him being categorized into any particular school of thought:

Hermann Hesse is perhaps one of the most paradoxical and enigmatic of modern writers. An image of the self defined by individuality is matched by an author who is many things to many men . . .

He has been praised as one of the masters of the modern German novel, yet he has been criticised for his lack of comprehension of the novel's form, for the flatness of his characters, for the poverty of his imagination. Academic critics have praised him for his intelligent use of ideas and art forms, and of various literary traditions, while anti-intellectual readers have valued him precisely because he eschewed intellectual complications and because, with Gide, he has supposedly jettisoned all books. Hesse has been seen as belonging within the broad stream of European fiction by some and as decisively outside it by others. He has exemplified the changes in society since the beginning of this century and at the same time has remained resolutely aloof (Boulby 338).

The outcome of this perverseness and defiance leads to new moral ideals, and Hesse represents Nietzsche's concept of the will to power which implies the eternal succession of the superman. Hesse thus expressed his belief that he was serving life, even political life, in the best way through the serious play of the novel *The Glass Bead Game*. Themes such as the continuity of intellect, the polarity intrinsic in the dialectical process, service to intellect becoming in a higher synthesis service to life evolve in the novel. It should also be kept in view that the obvious excellence of Castalia and the glass-bead-game from the beginning was observed as the focus of the historical process and not resting in an eternal utopian sphere. Ralph Freedman observes that the "tensions of the early months of the New Germany directly contributed" to "the formation of his *Glass*

Bead Game during the next few years” (348). The novel was so realistic, though it reads like a purely Utopian novel, that “Joseph Knecht, his main protagonist, became more and more a representative German of that time” (Freedman). Joseph Knecht, the Magister Ludi, an elite student of Castalia and appointed Master of the Game, is an epitome of transformation and perfection. The novel’s narrator recounts Knecht’s story as a legend rather than as strict biography and traces Knecht’s development from his teenage years at the schools Eschholz and Waldzell, to his years as Master of the Game, and, to his entry into the *vita activa*. The novel recounts the existential experiences of his life.

Hesse's apolitical personality reaches its elevation in his own vigorous declaration that he is thoroughly apolitical, that the only thing political about what he writes is the atmosphere in which they are written. He is basically concerned with the personality development of the individual which is not completely outside the reach of politics. Though Hesse may not match with the form of the political intellectualism, it would definitely seem that he characterized that other common figure in historical literature, the apolitical German. Though this affirmation contains some truth in it, it does not describe Hesse's position well. In fact, one can disagree that there is not much similarity between the apolitical German and Hesse's apolitical views. It is better to say that Hesse was detached from direct politics. One can find a significant stability and even evenness to his position and it seems to be instinctive. It is in discernible dissimilarity with the apolitical eccentricities of many writers in Germany. His refutation notwithstanding, he does in fact have a political philosophy. The objective of saying this is not to deform his outlook or to go to an unimportant declaration of the covert political proposition of an apolitical position. He is really apolitical. Hesse's political attitude has many sources, such as mysticism, philosophy, Nietzsche, Romanticism, Goethe, pacifism, and the education of his protagonists. They are put in a common milieu with his hatred of bourgeois hypocrisy, his aversion to scientific developments. But there is also much hopefulness in his thought. He has an attachment to the ethics of peace and humanity which requires being associated with realism. Though one is likely to misinterpret his novels, the novels provide various examples of Hesse's vigorous denunciation of escapism in all forms. His concern with pure instinct, childhood innocence, utopianism and aestheticism has significant social relevance. The individual is always engaged with his personal development but is always concerned with his society:

Neither the Hermann Hesse family, nor the nation, nor his time are realities that mean anything to the individual. The individual is alone, on the one hand, but always in search of an ideal condition, of something universal that belongs to him. He seeks to locate himself in a living-space which is larger than himself, but with which he can identify himself and thereby recognize his duties and his place in life. This living-space of the individual has for Hesse from the very beginning a social as well as a philosophical aspect. In *Peter Camenzind* (1904), the first of his novels, the hero feels at home in a vague pantheism, but he also likes to think that he is situated within the continuous sequence of generations in his home village (Naumann 38-39).

He disliked for the politics of parties and propaganda, but he did not see himself as irresponsible or as an escapist. His politics of indifference meant neither lack of concern nor lack of feeling. Disinterest suggests something strongly personal. It is optimistically an abandonment of the frenzied pursuit of external solutions so that an encouraging of the self may develop through which peace may be practised honestly as living knowledge.

Indifference refers to a method of self-purification as a required precondition to the realization of advanced awareness. Hesse's understanding of this fact is of fundamental importance in his later novels. It implies the instant basis of his politics of detachment. Hesse insists more on internal transformation. Hesse's personal description of the politics of disinterest can be shown by the very difficult stance he chose for himself. Never did he explicitly denounce them, although his hatred of their policies is beyond question. The consequence was that his writings were neither condemned nor recommended. His position is a very righteous one. One can have an authentic appreciation of his justification if we first think the progress of his political thinking. In modest tones, and while declaring his own attachment and compassion with Germany, he reprimands the thinkers for give up the ideals of peace and humanity. This provocative propaganda merely degenerates matters. The true role of the intellectual in such times is to maintain the ideals of humanity. Hesse was unhappy by the criticism of him as a coward which his writing provoked in Germany. The center of his attention increases beyond the activities of scholars to include the larger inhumanity, yet it at the same time narrows to a resistance of the individual who must resist the pressures of society. It is easy to see that "his bitter anti-capitalism . . . is romantic and backward-looking" (Hollis 112).

Hesse clarifies that he is not a pacifist in any organizational or programmatic sense. He denies to accept that world peace can be possible in rational ways, by preaching, organization, and propaganda. Peace can be made real only through living knowledge. The essay "Zarathustra's Return" written in a Nietzschean language to appeal to youth is his most significant option for Germany to return to sanity. Like the Nietzschean original, this Zarathustra also drives away prospective disciples and completely disagrees with the so-called developers of humanity. The youth should follow their destiny, they should let it become their god and love it—in the specific Nietzschean equivalence—as a mother loves her child. Destiny is to grow experiencing the suffering and solitude of life, growing in power and stillness until at last the internal voice can be heard and the personal being rouses. There is no other God and he exists nowhere else. The frenzied pursuit of business and politics, the frantic feeling that one had to be doing something, anything, is itself an escape from reality. Hesse constantly appealed to youth to engage in self-examination. He was determined in his own opinion. It is evidently clear from his novels. Hesse's resolution was based on a strong attachment to quality. He was resolute in discarding all hard work to transform the world by power. The ethics of peace and humanity cannot be cooperated without primarily changing them. In due course, the work of intellectuals will survive that of politicians, but they ought not to anticipate having instant impact on politics. Politics is the area of magnitude; the intellectuals' realm is that of quality. One cannot play by rules of magnitude without giving up quality. These instances of Hesse's self-justifications must be adequate. Really, it should not give rise to surprise if his logic is flawed since he is very hesitant of the efficiency of reason to bring change. He is rightly says that his purpose is to lead the reader into his personal being, there to understand for himself the existing awareness of peace. He requests to do so through fundamentally fictional and illogical devices of parable, fantasy, autobiography, paradox, and his novels and poems. These techniques can be very useful in creating humanitarian response in people, but Hesse is on the whole rather taciturn about how that reaction can be transformed into internal tranquillity. But without detailing further how this is to be achieved, Hesse creates the confusion that he is merely a quietist. Hesse was isolated from politics by disposition and belief. As an intellectual, a certain amount of indifference was an intrinsic part of his work. None of these concerns prohibited Hesse from having a vigorous interest in contemporary affairs or in speaking out in justification of his principles in ways which he thought proper. Hesse has a strong determinism of social transformation:

All men who have influenced human history . . . were able to do so only because they were "ready for fate" . . . Hesse's determinism can sound on occasion like Marx's ironclad historical dialectic. At one point (1932-33), he asserts that Communism would come and triumph" . . . But at the same time Hesse finds Marx's economic mode of thought specialized, one-sided and inflexible [517]; it is probably the hope Marx gives for moral progress through historical predestination that encouraged Hesse. (Newton 526).

Still, his energetic indifference, as the expression itself explains, fashioned its own ambivalent attitude. It is worth observing that he does not think that a cooperative protest even if imprudent or inefficacious has to be embedded in principles and ethical zeal. There is another problem that by rebuffing conventional politics and cooperative protest, he does not support the role of helpful action in society. He thinks that the self-realized individual can accomplish the needs of society. It can then be said that "self-realization, which involves some withdrawal from the world into the self, is not equated with total rejection of society. It is merely Hesse's contention that one must first develop individual potential fully (during youth) in order to be of the greatest possible use to humanity as a whole (during adulthood)" (Koester 186).

But his standpoint does not refuse effective action, but rather clarifies its real scope. He believes that the quality of society will change through internal transformation and by personal example. To those persons who cannot recognize his principle, his conclusion may seem unreasonable. Hesse directs his readers to the inner self rather than engage them in discussions and debates. At least, two clarifications emerge from this predicament. First, it seems to be extensively understood that the responsibility of the intellectual is to play an energetic role in political affairs. But Hesse discarded both arguments. Hesse's position is not eccentric. One ought not to suppose that Hesse characterizes the apolitical German as represented by historians. However, one can find some similarities between the typical apolitical German character and Hesse's characters. But there is a fundamental difference. Hesse's support of education, his emphasis on moral authority, his attention to the inner voice beyond critical reason are different from the conventional concepts related to these themes.

But different from the advocates of vulgar idealism, he was not contemptuous of politics or disdainful towards the uneducated. The Expressionists moved from political rebellion to submissive detachment, but Hesse did not do so. It is better to say that the politics of indifference for him was far more than indifference to politics.

So far it has become evident that the external world was an influential determinant of Hesse's writings. It is also very tangible that there is a direct relationship between the public and private worlds of the writer. Undeniably, man is a product of the outer circumstances. An age or a society a very responsible for what a writer writes. The literary concerns of Hesse would have been something else, had the German society been otherwise. The external world has a significant influence on the output of an artist. In almost all the novels Hesse, the exterior is not only a background but also a determining factor. It is functional and purposeful. Joseph Mileck rightly observes, "The exterior world in Hesse's prose commonly has more purpose than independent meaning; it is essentially functional, providing a necessary and often enhancing setting. In *Peter Camenzind*, nature is not only the framework in which Camenzind lives and has his being, but it also symbolises a world more ideal than that of civilization" (*Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 88).

As a writer, Hesse understood his responsibility well. His personal world reflects the public world at large. Simply, it may seem that Hesse ignored the essential relationship between the writer and his audience, just as he seemed not to like the contact between the writer and his age. But in fact, he is both concerned with his public and conscious of the writer's role as the representative of his age. Hesse flourishes on contradictions. He gives the writer a territory essentially outside of history, but he also sees the writer as the man who takes upon himself the common burden, as the person who interprets his private feelings in terms of public significance (Heller: 134).

Undoubtedly, Hesse wrote as a representative of his age. From *Peter Camenzind* to *Knulp*, we find Hesse as a lonely drifter busily occupied telling his own tales—tales which have deep personal grounds but significant public overtones. It is, however, only with *Demian* that he became explicitly concerned with his age. With *The Glass Bead Game*, he comes up to apply his erstwhile psychological and philosophical discoveries to be fully demonstrated in the external world of Castalia. External circumstances shaped Hesse's literary outputs not less than his personal world. Hesse would have written something other than what he wrote had there not been their necessity.

CHAPTER THREE

The Dionysian Mode of Knowledge Formation

Hermann Hesse's concern as a novelist has always been to untie the knots of the psyche and solve the intricacies of the human nature, which, however, seem to be very lucid and smooth on the surface level, but is replete with psychological convolutions and implications deep down. It is a general tendency of man to ignore and repress the tensions that underlie his personality. Psychoanalysis went far in this direction in exploring the complexities of the human mind, especially the workings of the conscious and the unconscious with the efforts of Sigmund Freud, who laid the foundation of psychoanalysis in the first half of the twentieth century. There is no denying the fact that the human self is a gamut of polar and opposed tendencies as far as psychology would go to say. And, therefore, it goes without saying that the human self is a bundle of paradoxes that can be studied in various psychological ways. But these paradoxes are not limited to the mental world only; they encompass all spheres of life; they are manifest in both the mental and the physical. It would therefore not be inappropriate to say that the world is made of paradoxes.

All artefacts of human civilisation, especially literature and arts, possess a common tendency to accept and hold dear only one side of the polar opposites and neglect the other half altogether. Postmodernism and postcolonialism, as significant movements, brought to light the study of the other and thus purported to make the periphery an exhilarating experience. With this the subaltern, the marginal got momentum. Mikhail Bakhtin's attempt to discover the polyphonic voices and the presence of intertextuality may be taken as an endeavour in the direction of understanding the presence of opposites and polarities. All these recent developments notwithstanding, the Greeks had already incorporated the elements of paradoxes in their art. Friedrich Nietzsche made a significant contribution in exploring their artistry by writing *The Birth of Tragedy*, in which he gives a detailed account of how the Apollonian and Dionysian elements were combined together by the Greeks to make tragedy more comprehensive and enjoyable. It is on account of this very quality of ecstasy that he first named the book "Greek Cheerfulness", although it was not finally published by this name. Amongst the Greeks, Nietzsche finds an art form which transcends all the nihilism and pessimism of an essentially meaningless world.

The incorporation of these two elements, as Nietzsche finds, has been felt as a composite necessity in art as “art derives its continuous development from the duality of the *Apolline* and *Dionysiac*, just as the reproduction of species depends on the duality of the sexes, with its constant conflicts and only periodically intervening reconciliations” (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 14). The two terms Apolline and Dionysiac were borrowed from the Greeks, who expressed their doctrines of art in clear forms of their deities instead of concepts: “To the two gods of art, Apollo and Dionysus, we owe our recognition that in the Greek world there is a tremendous opposition, as regards both origins and aims, between the Apolline art of the sculptor and the non-visual, Dionysiac art of music” (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 14). These two propensities were always combined together as their inseparability could not be denied. They were always in opposition to one another, incited each other to more powerful births and were continued by the bridging capacity of art. The Apollonian designated what was the unique individuality of anything. It was related to form and structure with an edifying impulse. For instance, sculpture is regarded as an Apollonian art as it has to do with a specific form and structure, Apollo being the god of restraint:

Apollo, the deity of all plastic forces, is also the soothsaying god. Etymologically the ‘shining one’, the deity of light, he also holds sway over the beautiful illusion of the inner fantasy world. The higher truth, the perfection of these states in contrast to imperfectly comprehensible daily reality, the deep awareness of nature healing and helping in sleep and dreams, is at the same time the symbolic analogue of soothsaying powers and of art in general, through which life is made both possible and worth living. But our image of Apollo must incorporate the delicate line that the dream image may not overstep without becoming pathological, in which case illusion would deceive us as solid reality; it needs that restraining boundary, that freedom from wilder impulses, that sagacious calm of the sculptor god. (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 16).

Apollo refers to the principle of individuation, to the cognitive forms of appearance. In contrast to the Apollonian stands the Dionysian that refers to absence of individuality. It is characterised by drunkenness, madness, passion, instinct, enthusiasm, ecstasy, music, and so on. It is analogous to intoxication:

Under the influence of the narcotic potion hymned by all primitive men and peoples, or in the powerful approach of spring, joyfully penetrating the whole of nature, those Dionysiac urges are awakened, and as they grow more intense, subjectivity becomes a complete forgetting of the self. (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 17).

While Apollo is related to dreams, which Nietzsche refers to as “appearances”, Dionysus is associated with drunkenness. A fundamental contrast is that the Apollonian is based on the principle of individuation—*principium individuationis*—that leads man to see everything in distinctness and to the world of reason. On the contrary the Dionysian prompts the disintegration of the *principium individuationis*, the dissolution of the individual self. In this all distinctions and differences between man and man, and man and nature get blurred and:

all the rigid and hostile boundaries that distress, despotism or ‘impudent fashion’ have erected between man and man break down. Now, with the gospel of world harmony, each man feels himself not only united, reconciled, and at one with his neighbour, but *one* with him . . .

Singing and dancing, man expresses himself as a member of a higher community: he has forgotten how to walk and talk . . .” (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 17-18).

Nature itself is the source of these opposite artistic powers without the intervention of the human artist. Negation and affirmation are always together. Some arts ascertain individuality, intellectuality and formal culture, while negating at the same time the opposite of it. But even in opposing it, its existence is affirmed, since in affirming anything, one also affirms the existence of its opposite, for one cannot draw meaning without the other. The same follows in negating anything too. But very few art forms can incorporate the both. Probably no art except that of the Greeks, as many would argue, incorporated both of them successfully. The two tendencies of the Apolline and Dionysiac

spring from nature itself, *without the mediation of the human artist*, and in which nature's artistic urges are immediately and directly satisfied; on the one hand as the world of dream images, whose perfection is not at all dependent on the intellectual accomplishments or artistic culture of the individual; on the other as an ecstatic reality, which again pays no heed to the individual. . . Faced with these immediate artistic states in nature, every artist is an 'imitator'—either an Apolline dream artist or a Dionysiac ecstatic artist or else—as for example in Greek tragedy—a dream artist and an ecstatic artist at one and the same time. This is how we must imagine him as he sinks down, lonely and apart from the revelling choruses in Dionysiac drunkenness and mystical self-negation, as his own condition, his unity with the innermost core of the world is revealed to him *in a symbolic dream-image*. (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 18).

In the beginning, the Greeks were Dionysiac Barbarians who later progressed to be the Dionysiac Greeks. The barbaric elements were checked by the reconciliation of between Apollo and Dionysius and “it was here that nature was first given its artistic celebration, here that the breakdown of the *principium individuationis* became an artistic phenomenon” (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 20). Music was first a Dionysian art which was later formulated and structured by Apolline influences. It was, in fact, known as an Apolline art only because of its rhythm, structural technicalities. Dionysian music was emotional and subjective and man's symbolic faculties were aroused to their highest intensity. There emerged a feeling never before experienced and trying to find expression. A new world of symbolism was born with the symbolism of the body and its rhythmic motions in the complete gesture of the dance.

As stated earlier, Apollo symbolises the *principium individuationis*, ethics, moderation and self-knowledge. With exist the aesthetic necessity of beauty and the admonitions such as ‘Know thyself’ and ‘Nothing to excess!’ (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 26). In contrast to it, Dionysius symbolised hubris and excess. When a lyric poet says ‘I’, it does not signify his person but his universal and primal oneness, his experiences of the Dionysiac. For instance, folk songs are Dionysiac; so “it must also be historically demonstrable that any period richly productive of folk songs has also been most intensely stimulated by the Dionysiac, which we must always see as the substratum and precondition for the folk song” (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 33).

Folk songs are the raw material for the formal music of the world. They mirror the world musically. Melody produces poetry, which is the formal manifestation, or rather we can call it “appearance”, of the Dionysiac emotions: “In the poetry of the folk song, then, we see language doing its utmost to imitate music: hence, with Archilochus, we see the beginning of a new world of poetry that most profoundly contradicts the Homeric world” (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 33). The word is Apolline, sound is Dionysiac; poetry is Apolline, music is Dionysiac.

In Greek drama, the chorus was not the ideal spectator conscious of the fact that he was watching a work of art, but that who recognised real beings in the figures of the drama. It has a natural state created by the influence of Dionysiac music. The satiric chorus undid the effect of culture. The invention of such chorus was the outcome of a desire for the primal and the natural that could nullify the Apolline boundaries of civilisation and provide man a sense of unity:

Nature, still unaffected by knowledge, culture still unforced -that is what the Greeks saw in their satyr, and for that reason they did not conflate him with the apes. On the contrary -he was the archetype of man, the expression of his highest and *most* intense emotions, an inspired reveller enraptured by the closeness of his god, a sympathetic companion in whom god's suffering is repeated, the harbinger of wisdom from the very breast of nature, a symbol of nature's sexual omnipotence, which the Greeks were accustomed to considering with respectful astonishment. The satyr was something divine and sublime; he must have seemed particularly so to the painfully broken gaze of Dionysiac man. He would have been insulted by the dressed-up, meretricious shepherd: his eye rested in sublime satisfaction on the undisguised, untroubled and wondrous traits of nature; here, the illusion of culture had been erased from the archetype of man - it was here that the true man revealed himself, the bearded satyr celebrating his god. Before him, the man of culture shrivelled up into a mendacious caricature. (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 40-41).

Dionysiac influences dissolved individuality and created a sense of collectivism. The chorus, which was Dionysiac, formed the central part of the drama and the actors were merely Apolline appearances. In this way, it can be said that the drama was the Apolline symbol of Dionysiac knowledge and effects.

By bringing the 'spectator' on the stage, Euripides, a friend of Socrates, is said to have degenerated the Greek drama. He replaced the actors of the Apollonian dream-state with the common man of the real world. With this the primitive and powerful Dionysiac element was replaced by non-Dionysiac art. The Apolline had emerged out of the Dionysiac to check and balance it and the both struggled for dominance. But Euripides, who followed Socratic intellectuality and logic of 'only the one who knows is virtuous', removed the Dionysiac by introducing a non-Dionysiac art of morality and philosophy.

Art should not be inferred from a single principle. It emanates from paradoxes. It is a combination of two opposite forces. Apollo is the transfiguring genius of the *principium individuationis*, the path to redemption through illusion. Dionysius breaks the *principium individuationis* to open the path to the core of being, of primal oneness. From Euripides onwards, the diminution of the Dionysiac has persisted:

Whenever Dionysiac excitements have reached a significant level, we may always sense how the Dionysiac release from the fetters of individuation is made tangible in a diminution, to the point of indifference or even of hostility, of political feelings; just as clearly, Apollo, the founder of states, is also the genius of the *principium individuationis*, and state and patriotism cannot live without the affirmation of the individual personality. (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 99).

To recapitulate, one can say that the Apollonian Represents thinking, principle of individuation, value for human order and culture, the dream state, celebration of appearance and illusion, plastic and visual arts, and human beings as artists. Conversely, the Dionysian represents feeling, celebration of nature and existence, music, state of intoxication, wholeness of existence, and human beings as the work and glorification of art. In other words, the Apollonian is self-controlled, rational, ordered and logical whereas the Dionysian is chaotic, passionate, musical and instinctual.

The primary motive of this chapter is to discuss how we find this world of opposites in Hermann Hesse's novels. For this, we discussed the Apollonian and Dionysian forces of art in relation to the Greeks as studied by Nietzsche. The world of opposition pervades most of Hesse's writing in

such a way that sometimes it seems that he had tried to synthesise these elements practically. However, it may, somewhere, seem difficult to identify this element in his early novels as they are rather sketches of a youth disillusioned by the realities of the world, but the later ones are vivid pictures of a mature artist.

As it has already mentioned in the second chapter, *Peter Camenzind* was Hesse's romantic meandering against the backdrop of nature and civilisation. The very first sentence of the novel is Dionysiac in essence. It reads as "In the beginning was the myth. . .", and the myth is related to the Dionysiac (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 5). The myth is symbolic of the Dionysiac, "the myth that speaks symbolically of the Dionysiac wisdom" (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 79). The novel first discusses the childhood of the protagonist, Peter Camenzind, that was full of mirth and ecstasy. Even when he did not know the names of the trees, the lakes, mountains and streams that he saw around his native place, he felt very deeply the smooth blue-green water, the snow-caped mountains, waterfalls, bright and sloping meadows. They are his teachers; all enhanced his understanding of the world as it is rather than as it is presented by people in general. In fact, Camenzind is a seeker of freedom, which he feels can be found absolutely in nature. Hesse has also said:

Peter Camenzind's dissatisfaction and yearning are not directed at the political circumstances of the time, but rather, in part, at himself . . . in part at a society of which, in his youthful way, he is critical. He finds people in the world around him too contented, too self-satisfied, too polished and normal; he wishes to live more freely, more intensely, more aesthetically attuned, more nobly than they do. From the outset, he sees himself in opposition to them, without noticing, however, how much he really is attracted to their world. (Helt 123-124).

The Prodigy, Hesse's second novel, is bitterly critical of the education system in which he was educated. Such education system did not take into account the development of personality or the self of children. Rather it focused on the bleak tenet of morality and mediocrity. No deviation of interest or thinking was recognised as a development. Such callous and mechanised orientation of education was relentless to man's humanitarian development.

Hans Giebenrath, the protagonist of the novel, is a very talented boy who is sent to a seminary in Maulbronn. In the seminary, he develops friendship with Hermann Heilner, who is less diligent and more liberal than he is. Heilner soothes Hans in periods of depression, but, as he is not laborious, he is expelled from the seminary and Hans thus feels loneliness. After sometime, Hans, too, is sent home owing to his poor performance and mental illness.

But Hans's homecoming does not solve his problems. He remains alone and depressed and cannot make friendship with anyone as he has never looked beyond books. All his childhood, he remained glued to books and thus lost the blissful lure of childhood. In the village, he is finally apprenticed as a blacksmith and he seemingly enjoys the work as it has not much to do with the mind. This work, unlike the intellectual abstraction of the academy, is concrete and practical.

Hesse's relentless indictment of the education system of the Germany of his times is Dickensian in many respects. Guardians were not so much concerned about the happiness of their children as they were about their educational success. The educational system that Charles Dickens criticises in his *Hard Times* is equally factual and monotonous. Thomas Gradgrind's motto that children are like pitchers to be filled up to the brim reminds one of the Germans of the bourgeois class too. Hesse was very concerned about the education system as he says: "School is the only question of modern culture that I take seriously and that occasionally upsets me" (Wahlbusch 24). The next chapter sheds some more light on this issue. Here, the basic concern is to study the opposites of the Apollonian and Dionysian elements and how Hesse deals with them.

It is, however, with *Demian* that this polarity becomes distinctly vivid and manifest. Hesse's early writings shed light on this only partially, but despite this, enough examples of this is found in the novels of the early period. In fact, the early novels envisage the type of characters to emerge in the later ones. A very common point, for instance, that we find in all Hesse's novels is that the protagonist is always accompanied by a friend who plays his counterpart, his other self, or his mentor. So do we find in *The Prodigy* that Hermann Heilner is Hans Giebenrath's friend and comfort. Heilner is less hardworking and very liberal in his studies whereas Hans is very rational, logical and focused on his studies and success. In other words, the former represents Dionysiac qualities and the later Apolline qualities. The very first impression of Heilner one has at a glance is:

It was obvious from the first day that he was a poet and scholar; the legend ran that he had written his composition in the *Landexamen* in hexameters. He was an energetic and eloquent talker, possessed a beautiful violin and gave one the impression that one could read his character which consisted chiefly of a youthfully immature mixture of sentimentality and light-heartedness like an open book. (Hesse, *The Prodigy* 67-68).

Hans's reputation as the most diligent boy gets established as soon as he enters the academy. The oldest boy in Hellas, as the academy was popularly known, was Emil Lucius, who was hard-working and as dry as an old grey peasant. He had no look of a boy; so bored and monotonous he had become. Hans worked as hard as Lucius and enjoyed the respect of all other students except Heilner "who had gained a reputation for ingenious levity and jeered at him for being a 'swot'" (Hesse, *The Prodigy* 72).

The novel throughout presents a bookish atmosphere in which all children develop a frenzy of systematic seriousness at the cost of natural boyishness. Artificiality develops in their relationships as they grow up. But Heilner, the Dionysiac, is quite untouched by such feverish frenzy of monotonous academic seriousness:

The romantic Hermann Heilner who had tried in vain to find a congenial companion now strode daily by himself through the woods in his free time and was particularly attracted by the forest-lake, a brown, melancholy stretch of water surrounded by reeds and overhung with the fading foliage of ancient trees. The sad beauty of this corner of the woods made an irresistible appeal to the sensitive boy. Here he could dreamily draw rings in the still water with a twig, recite Lenau's "Reed-songs" and as he lay among the rushes reflect on the autumnal theme of the dying year while a shower of leaves came down and the leafless tree-tops sighed in melancholic harmony. (Hesse, *The Prodigy* 74).

While other students are busy with their books, Heilner looks outside the window through which the world of nature is visible. He is an enthusiast who does precious little work and dislikes workaholics. He practises the secretive and unusual art of expressing his feelings in verse and creating his own world of emotions and imagination. He is unruly and "appeared to luxuriate in

his melancholy as if it was some strange and precious possession” (Hesse, *The Prodigy* 78). In fact, he is a master of imagination and there is rarely anything that he cannot transform to this faculty. He can apply it even to mathematics.

Heilner’s utterly Dionysiac spirit cannot let him remain a disciplined boy of the seminary. One day the principle finds him accompanying the so-called bright and arduous Hans and reproaches him for this act. On this Heilner gives the principal a good retort explaining the intimacy of his friendship with Hans and the impropriety of anyone’s intervention. He is strictly asked not go out with Hans because Hans, too, can be disobedient in his company. But he does not obey the principal and bunks his classes a boy of instincts as he is. He does not attend his classes and:

lay only a few miles away in a wood. He was too chilled to sleep but he drew deep breaths enjoying his freedom and stretched his limbs . . . He had been on the go since midday, had bought a loaf of bread in Knittlingen and now and again took a bite from it as he gazed through the spring branches still only lightly clad with leaves at the darkness, the stars and chasing clouds. Where he would finally land up was a matter of indifference to him; at least he had escaped from the loathsome college and had shown the Principal that his will was stronger than all his orders and prohibitions. (Hesse, *The Prodigy* 119).

Heiner spends nights in woods, and heaps of straw in a field. When he comes back, he is not regretful at all and refuses to apologise and displays no sense of subordination to his teachers. Finally, he is expelled from the seminary in disgrace, which “—in his own mind at least—is a triumphant escape, a victory of will over the Ephorus, and Heilner’s resulting exultant mood finds expression in his poetic and pugnacious interior monologue” (21 Wahlbusch). Heilner is a precursor of Goldmund in *Narziss and Goldmund*, who is Hesse’s complete paradigm of the Dionysian spirit.

Gradually, Hans’s learning capacity too deteriorates to the level that he is sent back home. He feels himself unloved and without any interest in anything. He sits in the small garden in the sun and lies down on the ground and gives himself to dreams and tormenting thoughts. Whenever he tries to read, he is haunted by the joyless and intimidating school days.

Starting with Peter Camenzind in with the friendship of Camenzind and Boppi, Hesse carries the same technique, the technique of parallelism, of friendship, in which the friends identify each other as their opposites, through *The Prodigy* to all his novels. Friendship is a pleasure, a luxury, a comfort, a mood for Heilner. It identifies his being, his sense of unity opposed to the Apolline individuality. Heilner, sometimes, snatches Hans's books as he is found reading every time. For Hans, friendship is sometimes a guarded treasure and sometimes an overwhelming burden. He develops inside himself an abstract world of intellectuality, which is an Apolline characteristic. Both the friends are a comfort to each other:

One might form the impression that the exemplary Giebenrath was really only an agreeable toy for his friend, a kind of house cat, and Hans himself sometimes felt this to be the case. But Heilner clung to him because he needed him. He had to have someone, a confidant, an audience, someone to admire him . . . He also needed someone who could comfort him, someone in whose lap he could lay his head in his moments of depression. Like all such natures, the young suffered from the attacks of a mysterious, somewhat vain melancholy the causes of which lie partly in the gentle leave-taking in from childish things, partly in the as yet purposeless exuberance of animal spirits, vague longings and desires, partly the mysterious growth into manhood. And he also had an unhealthy craving for sympathy and affection. Earlier in his life he had been a mother's darling and now, still unripe for a girl's love, his accommodating friend played the role of comforter. (Hesse, *The Prodigy* 84).

But their friendship always has two contrastive elements. While Heilner is frivolous and poetic, Hans is conscientiously ambitious. Although both are clever and exceptionally gifted, Heilner rejoices in the half derisive appellation of genius whereas Hans is attached the odium of being a model boy. But, as per the Dionysiac and Apolline model, "both boys were filled with a strangely happy feeling of harmony and silent and secret understanding" (Hesse, *The Prodigy* 100). Warmth, affection and enthusiasm characterise their friendship.

The duality of self occupies all the attention of Hans, for he constantly wrestles with the two opposite forces inside him. One of the forces prompts him to enjoy nature without any restraint; the other creates a thirst for the intellectual side of life and success. The former can be identified as his Dionysiac impulse for unity with nature, the latter his striving for individuality. Striving for individuality is, for the most part, a product of external social customs.

It is, however, with *Demian* that Hesse displays maturity in his philosophical and psychological themes. This novel tells the story of a young boy, Emil Sinclair, raised in a bourgeois family, which he describes as *Scheinwelt* meaning “world of light”. When Sinclair is ten years old, Demian gets admission in the school where Sinclair reads. Eventually, they develop an intimate friendship and usually discuss philosophical themes with each other, and one day even the story of Cain and Abel. One day, Sinclair sees a girl and takes her to be his ideal of beauty. Although he does not talk to her, he names her Beatrice and paints her picture at home. Surprisingly, he finds that it is a picture of Demian too.

Demian hears a sound of music emanating from a church one evening and goes there to hear it. He meets the organist Pistorius whom he accompanies to the bar and has some discussion on the god Abraxas. In fact Demian seeks to learn something from Pistorius, but he finds that Pistorius’s thinking is limited to some extent. He goes to Demian’s old house, but the owner of the house shows him a picture of Demian’s mother. Sinclair realises that the picture resembles the pictures he has been painting for a few days. Finally, in the town where his college is located, Sinclair meets Demian, who takes him to his own house and introduces him to his mother, Frau Eva. Gradually, Sinclair develops great affinity with Frau Eva.

This attachment with Demian and Frau Eva has deep psychological implications, though on the surface level, it may sound somewhat mystic, which it is not. The distinction between the “world of light”—the bourgeois household in which Sinclair is brought up—and the real world outside represents the existence duality. The household world is described as follows:

This world was familiar to me in almost every aspect . . . in it gentle and friendly conversation, washed hands, clean clothes and good manners were the order of the door. In this world the morning hymn was sung, Christmas celebrated . . . beautiful and ordered. (Hesse, *Demian* 7-8).

This is the world of bourgeois household in which everything is lighted, neat and clean, and comfortable. But while Sinclair is growing up to the age of puberty, he is also being conscious of the outer world, the other world that consists of the middle class. This is a world of the “dark” that always has an attraction in the subconscious mind of Sinclair, who says:

The other world, however, also began in the middle of our own house and was completely different; it smelt different, spoke a different language, made different claims and promises. This second world was peopled with servant girls and workmen, ghost stories and scandalous rumours, a gay tide of monstrous, intriguing, frightful, mysterious things... Everywhere you could smell this vigorous second world—everywhere, that is, except in our house... There it was all goodness. It was wonderful to be living in a house in a reign of peace, order, tranquillity, duty and good conscience, forgiveness and love... (Hesse, *Demian* 8).

Sinclair observes the worlds exist so closely, and it is this odd thing, this opposed polarity of the two worlds that makes him enthusiastic to know about the other world. At the local grammar school which he attends, the boy Franz Kromer represents the other world. Demian explains to him the dichotomous nature of the world and also the way to transcend it. He has been introduced as a mentor and guide to Sinclair in the novel only for the latter’s development making the novel a *Bildungsroman*. Right from the beginning, Sinclair shows a unique fascination for Demian:

While we were being told the story of Cain and Abel, I kept glancing over towards Demian whose face held a peculiar fascination for me, and I observed his bright, clever, unusually resolute face bent diligently over his work; he looked less like a schoolboy doing his ‘prep.’ than a research student absorbed in some individual problem of his own. (Hesse, *Demian* 29-30).

Demian initiates in Sinclair a dialectical quest for the solution of problems of the duality of the mind and the world. Sinclair’s real quest begins by listening to Demian with respect to Cain and Abel. Demian represents Cain as a noble man and Abel as a coward and this surprises Sinclair who has always thought along simple lines. Initially, what Demian says seems nonsensical to

Sinclair, but eventually he accepts it. Afterwards, Sinclair discovers that he himself has the mark of Cain and starts his quest for its meaning. He says: “Indeed I myself who was Cain and bore that sign had imagined that the sign was nothing to be ashamed of but a distinction rather. . . (Hesse, *Demian* 35).

The mark of Cain on Sinclair alludes to Nietzsche’s influence on Hesse, especially the transcendence beyond god and evil. Hesse provides a remedy for Sinclair, who is bored of the bourgeois morality, mediocrity and its hollowness, through Demian who shows him the way to transcend the dichotomies. A reference to Nietzsche’s influence on *Demian* is reflected in Ritchie Robertson’s words as well:

Sinclair is cured of bourgeois moralism by absorbing his mentor’s Nietzschean reinterpretations of familiar stories: Cain is understood as someone ostracised for being bolder and cleverer than others, and preferable to the pious coward Abel; the unrepentant thief seems preferable to the penitent one; morality is described a relative; and when Sinclair enters on puberty, Demian tells him that the sexuality which Christianity demonises must be accepted as part of reality, which ought to be held sacred as a whole. (53).

Nietzsche’s use of the word “herd” has enough significance with reference to the notion of Cain in the minds of the masses. Cain is generally held as a villain, but Hesse develops him to a heroic stature through the mark of Cain on Sinclair. The worn-out patterns of thought are replaced by new ones. Demian gives an exegesis of the story of Cain in the same vein: “Yes. I believe, then,” he continued, “that this story of Cain can be interpreted differently. Most of the stories we are taught are valid and authentic but it is possible to see them from another angle than that of the teachers’ and it gives them much more sense.” (Hesse, *Demian* 32).

By thus presenting the story of Cain in this manner, Demian unveils the world of opposites to Sinclair. The world manifests itself in new ways as Sinclair is approaching adulthood. At this stage, sex that is generally associated with sin begins to make appearance. To Sinclair, sex represents the dark world, but this dark world is found within himself. He realises: “The important thing was that the ‘dark world’, the other world was there once again. What had once

been Franz Kromer was now embedded in me. And in this way the ‘other world’ was gaining power over me from outside” (Hesse, *Demian* 54). Earlier, Kromer was symbolic of the dark world, but now this world is found within Sinclair’s own self. Hesse seems to suggest that the other world or what can be called the Dionysiac exists on two levels—external and internal. Sometimes, it is realised outside and sometimes inside. Thus the polarity can be studied with two perspectives—one from the angle of the outside world that comprises the bourgeois and the proletariat, the other from that of the psychological one that deals with the Dionysiac and the Apolline on the level of the impulses and instincts.

In the third chapter “The Thief on the Cross”, Demian again takes up for discussion other concepts such as this. When he hears his teacher talking about Gethsemane and Mount Golgotha (biblical references), he says to Sinclair, “This story has something about it that I don’t like, Sinclair. Read it through, pass your tongue over it; there is an insipid element in it. . . Don’t you agree?” (Hesse, *Demian* 66). In order to solve Sinclair’s confusion, Demian shows him how the world consists of good and evil elements and how these are complementary to each other. He explains that nature has all the elements in itself with a unique harmony and unity; to divide it simply into good and evil is to misconstrue the world. The discretion of man lends meaning to anything good or bad. The thief on the cross to the left, for instance, shows no repentance. As a man of character he remains true to himself as Cain is. This explanation of Demian has indirect allusions to Nietzsche’s *Beyond Good and Evil*, in which the philosopher transcends the boundaries of the dichotomies. Demian’s argument too seems to point out the same:

The point is that this God of both the Old and New Testaments is a wonderful figure but not what he purports to represent. He is all that is good, noble, he is the fatherly, the beautiful, the most high, the sentimental—all right! But the world consists also of other things which are merely ascribed to the Devil. And that half-section of the world is suppressed; it is ever mentioned. It is the same as the way they celebrate God as the father of all life but the whole of sex-life which is the basis of life itself they are silent about, or indeed, whenever possible describe it as sinful and the work of the Devil! I have no objection to people honouring this God Jehovah, far from it. But I consider that we should

sanctify and honour everything, the whole world, not merely this artificially separated, official half! . . . Otherwise you must create God for yourself who embraces the Devil in himself and before whom you don't have to drop your eyes in shame when the most natural things in the world take place. (Hesse, *Demian* 67-68).

The world of internal conflicts, which culminates in Harry Haller in *The Steppenwolf*, begins to surface in Sinclair as he grows older. Sinclair feels loneliness in the absence of Demian and spends time in the company of reckless boys. He drinks and involves in orgies and expresses his resentments against the stereotyped world. But he soon leaves all this when he sees the girl, whom he names Beatrice, and whose beauty has a deep impression on his mind and transforms his mode of living. His love with her inspires him to paint her picture but surprisingly, he finds the picture resembles Demian. After some time, he finds that the picture has a resemblance to himself. Consequently, he realises that all these resemblances are his own self: "For a long time I sat opposite it even after the picture had faded out. And gradually a feeling came over me that it was neither Beatrice nor Demian but myself. Not that the picture was like me—I did not feel it should be—but the face somehow expressed my life, it was my inner self, my fate or my daimon" (Hesse, *Demian* 92).

The psychological implication behind the resemblance is that the picture represents the mind that has several images and forces inside. All these forces are continuously in struggle with each other; one exists for the other, though they are opposed. The opposition of thesis and antithesis gets synthesis at a higher level.

Beatrice no longer holds Sinclair's imagination after some time. Now, Sinclair begins to paint other images of his self. He paints the bird on the crest of the door of his house. The bird protrudes half-way out of the earth, or an egg, which represents, in this context, the bourgeois world. When Sinclair sends the picture to Demian, Demian replies: "The bird is struggling out of the egg . . . The egg is the world. Whoever wants to be born must first destroy a world. The bird is flying to God. The name of the God is called Abraxas" (Hesse, *Demian* 100).

The birth of a new world is related to the urge to create something new out of a Dionysiac spirit, for the Dionysiac hero suffers and a world is created out of this, out of his music. Sinclair's teacher Dr. Follen explains to him the Gnostic divinity Abraxas, who is said to combine within himself both the elements of good and evil. This explanation makes deeper impression on Sinclair before who emerges a new vision of the co-existence of opposites, though he does not yield to it immediately. Dreams often occupy his mind, but one dream constantly repeats itself. In this particular dream, Sinclair has a passionate and incestuous hug with a woman who is at the same Demian and his mother: "The form that embraced me had something about it of both my mother and my friend Demian . . ." (Hesse, *Demian* 104-105)). He feels that this dream is related to Abraxas himself: "Ecstasy and horror, a mixture of male and female, an intertwining of the sacred and profane, flashes of profound guilt in the most tender innocence—such was the nature of my love fantasy, such was Abraxas" (Hesse, *Demian* 105). In this context, love sheds its meaning as the animal instinct that Sinclair had experienced previously with a sense of guilt. Nor is it the pious and the spiritual cult that he had associated with the image of Beatrice. It was a mixture of both. In Sinclair's view, love encompasses all—man and woman, humans and beasts, good and evil, and so on. It creates a world of full acceptance of all opposites taking them as complementary.

Sinclair does not cease his quest even after this experience of the dream. He wanders restlessly in quest of something more than this. He happens to meet Pistorius, whose organ playing impresses Sinclair. In the very Nietzschean vein, Sinclair asks Pistorius about Abraxas and related questions presenting before him his bourgeois boredom of hollow morality: "Everything else is moral and I am after something that isn't. I have always found moralizing intolerable. I don't know how to put it. Do you realize that there must be a god who is both God and Devil? There is supposed to be one, I have heard about it." (Hesse, *Demian* 111). Sinclair wants to live by the instinct rather than by intellectual moralising.

Nietzsche's influences are remarkable in the text. Sinclair shows much fondness for Nietzsche, as he says: "I had a few volumes of Nietzsche on my table. I lived with him, felt the loneliness of his soul, shared his prescience of the fate that drove him unceasingly on, suffered with him and rejoiced that there had been one man who had relentlessly followed his destiny" (Hesse, *Demian*

147). He tries to follow Pistorius's advice to live out his dreams of Demian and the mother image fully. Many discussions follow and eventually he finds that Pistorius's world-view is not wide and genuine as it is based on his knowledge of his second-hand experience, not on his personal and lively experiences. Such knowledge is borrowed knowledge and has less credibility. He seeks and values personal knowledge which has its origin in empirical experience. Such knowledge needs newness and liveliness as "the New must be really new and different and must spring up from new soil and not be created from museums and libraries" (Hesse, *Demian* 140).

It is Demian who finally proves to be Sinclair's real mentor and whose mother Frau Eva helps him understand the world of harmony in the opposites. Sinclair loves her as deeply as possible and feels that to possess her means to possess himself. His love dissolves the differences caused by his ego.

The world of intoxication and instincts is given as much value as the world of rationality and moralism as the Gnostic Abraxas represents both. It is represented by the symbol of a bird breaking free from an egg. Demian observes: ". . .we had indeed a god whom we honoured but he represented only one half of the world purposely separated, that is to say the official, authorised 'world of light.' But we ought to be able to honour the whole world and so we must have either one god who was also devil or side by side with the cult of God we should institute a cult of the Devil. So we had Abraxas the god who was both God and Devil" (Hesse, *Demian* 103).

The love of Sinclair for Beatrice starts on the subconscious level and has Dionysian qualities. David Allen Cook identifies Nietzsche's Dionysiac spirit with Freud's unconscious:

Both Nietzsche and Freud viewed man's character as a continuum of behaviour on an axis between the diametrically opposed and yet mutually dependent elements of the rational (Apollonian) and the irrational (Dionysian). A closer examination of these two great intellects' attitudes toward the Dionysian instinct in man will reveal similarities and differences, but both men saw it as the essential driving force behind human thought and behaviour. (Cook).

But Nietzsche's Dionysian and Apollonian instincts cannot be seen as analogous to Freud's conscious and unconscious. Oskar Siedlin finds problems in taking the mother image as a projection of the Freudian unconscious. The contradiction between Siedlin and Cook can be discerned by what Siedlin says about Frau Eva:

Those who have tried to fit Hesse to the Procrustean bed of Freudianism overlook the fact that Mrs. Eva is not "mother" but "mother image," not a psycho-physical reality but a myth, clearly evidenced by the fact that she is not Sinclair's mother (who does not appear in the book at all), but the mother of Sinclair's "double," Demian. To be sure, he is sex-object, too (the gossip about the incestuous relations between her and her son Demian is revealing). But the emphasis lies on her relationship to and meaning for Sinclair, and in this relationship the Oedipus-Jocasta motif is entirely lacking. (210).

The problem that Siedlin identifies with Freud is a rational reproduction of the symbolic image. It sounds relevant in the context of *Demian* because Frau Eva is a symbolic mother image, the very source of life and instincts. It cannot be limited just to the Oedipal libido-object.

All the characters can be studied as representatives of Sinclair's own mind; Demian, Frau Eva and Beatrice—all represent his Dionysiac impulses. Pistorius represents his limited thinking. Theodore Zeolkowski rightly asks: "Does Demian really exist, or is he a symbolic representation of Sinclair's *daimon*?" (89). In fact, Demian is none other than Sinclair's own image. Sinclair finds the picture of Beatrice that paints resemble Demian and Frau Eva and sometimes even his own self. This resemblance definitely leads one to assume that Demian, Frau Eva and others are none other than the projections of Sinclair's own self.

It follows from this that Demian and Frau Eva represent the Dionysiac Sinclair as opposed to the bourgeois Sinclair of the lighted world who is bored of his morality and which he wants to avoid. Sinclair longs for a life of instincts and free from all intellectualism. However, he does not disregard the presence of the opposites symbolized by Abraxas. Yet, he transcends the limitations of a stereotyped world and develops his personality. Hesse unites all the opposites to proceed to his triadic rhythm of humanization.

Having settled the world of psychological conflicts in *Demian*, Hesse proceeded to intensify his pacifism with *Siddhartha*. The title of the novel suggests an engagement with oriental mysticism, but the fact manifests itself somewhat otherwise. However, most criticism on *Siddhartha* assigns it a mystic tone. Whether it involves mysticism is a different issue altogether and therefore calls for a separate study. As far as this study is concerned, it is not difficult to find polar oppositions of instinct and intellect embedded in the text. It is well-expressed in what Ralph Freedman says about the protagonist Siddhartha: “All of the contrasting poles of his life were sharply etched: the restless departures and the search for stillness at home; the diversity of experience and the harmony of a unifying spirit; the security of religious dogma and the anxiety of freedom” (96).

Siddhartha, the obedient and handsome son of a Brahmin, is dissatisfied with the philosophy of life taught to him in his household. Not satisfied with what he has learnt, he along with his companion Govinda leaves home in search of knowledge and joins the ascetics. But both the boys leave the ascetics and Govinda joins the Buddha. But Siddhartha has a questioning mind and thinks that no teaching can be enlightening, though he has enough respect for the Buddha, and therefore goes along his journey in quest of the ultimate truth. In the course of his wanderings, he happens to meet a beautiful and young courtesan named Kamala, who sets him to a job so that he can be able to present her gifts and whatever she desires. One Kamaswami instructs Siddhartha in his business.

Besides a number of paradoxes that one can find in the text of *Siddhartha*, there are, as always in Hesse, the polar opposites of the Apollonian and the Dionysian, too. It can be found on two levels—on the levels of characterization and psychoanalysis. On the level of characterization, it is transparent that Siddhartha emerges with the Dionysiac propensity of the wanderer and vagabond with his spirit as his guide. On the other hand, his Apolline friend, Govinda, has limitations and lives by rules and principles. A basic difference in the personality of both the friends is visible right from the beginning. Govinda is not so much discontented with his present knowledge as Siddhartha is. He always tries to follow Siddhartha: “He wanted to follow Siddhartha, the beloved, the splendid. And in days to come, when Siddhartha would become a god, when he would join the glorious, then Govinda wanted to follow him as his friend, his companion, his servant, his spear-carrier, his shadow” (Hesse, *Siddhartha*). He walks by

Siddhartha's side and is always intent upon relying on the principles of others rather than his own. But Siddhartha does not give him any principle; the two friends rarely talk when they walk. When Govinda joins Gotama the Buddha, Siddhartha congratulates him for his decision and inspires him to take his own decisions even in future. But Govinda always remains a follower of some or the other principles. He is never able to make a principle of his own. His aversion to search of his own and the tendency to imitate is an Apollonian characteristic or trait.

But Siddhartha, the wanderer, does not get attached to any thought or principle. He is a wayfarer, a drifter of the empirical, of the lively experiences of the real world, and not of the world of real thoughts. He has an inquisitive mind unwilling to yield to any unexamined and second-hand thought. While Govinda says that they have learnt much from the Samanas, Siddhartha disagrees. It is evident from the following discourse:

Siddhartha answered: "How old, would you think, is our oldest Samana, our venerable teacher?"

Quoth Govinda: "Our oldest one might be about sixty years of age."

And Siddhartha: "He has lived for sixty years and has not reached the nirvana. He'll turn seventy and eighty, and you and me, we will grow just as old and will do our exercises, and will fast, and will meditate. But we will not reach the nirvana, he won't and we won't. Oh Govinda, I believe out of all the Samanas out there, perhaps not a single one, not a single one, will reach the nirvana. We find comfort, we find numbness, we learn feats, to deceive others. But the most important thing, the path of paths, we will not find." (Hesse, *Siddhartha*).

Govinda is stirred up by such words. He wonders how it could be possible that so many austere and venerable Samanas who are searching will not find the path. In fact, Govinda is Siddhartha's "intimate friend", yet he is "the seeker of comfort in institutions and dogma" (Mileck, *Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 172). But Siddhartha has the passions of life and the Dionysian instinct to merge and dissolve his individuality with the universe. When Govinda meets Siddhartha in old age, he is surprised to see the latter's contentment with his findings which are rather bizarre to Govinda, the man of abstract thoughts and principles. He thinks to himself:

This Siddhartha is a bizarre person, he expresses bizarre thoughts, his teachings sound foolish. So differently sound the exalted one's pure teachings, clearer, purer, more comprehensible, nothing strange, foolish, or silly is contained in them. But different from his thoughts seemed to me Siddhartha's hands and feet, his eyes, his forehead, his breath, his smile, his greeting, his walk. (Hesse, *Siddhartha*).

Govinda is the shadow of Siddhartha and therefore his another self as Demian is none other than a reflection of Sinclair's own personality. He is often visualized by Siddhartha in his dreams. Here is an instance of such dreams:

In the night when he slept in the straw hut of a ferryman by the river, Siddhartha had a dream: Govinda was standing in front of him, dressed in the yellow robe of an ascetic. Sad was how Govinda looked like, sadly he asked: Why have you forsaken me? At this, he embraced Govinda, wrapped his arms around him, and as he was pulling him close to his chest and kissed him, it was not Govinda any more, but a woman, and a full breast popped out of the woman's dress, at which Siddhartha lay and drank, sweetly and strongly tasted the milk from this breast. It tasted of woman and man, of sun and forest, of animal and flower, of every fruit, of every joyful desire. (Hesse, *Siddhartha*).

Govinda's living "his entire life by the rules" (Hesse, *Siddhartha*) is drawn in sharp contrast to Siddhartha's living a life without rules, living a life in which life itself is the rule. Mileck too opines that "Govinda is the self-effacing, institution-oriented person Siddhartha should not become . . ." (*Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 170). Govinda lives by reason unlike his friend Siddhartha. These two opposed approaches to life Apollonian and Dionysian. Siddhartha's world is not Apolline, in which rules dominate the instinct and the very life force. He champions the Dionysiac world of the free will. The general tone of the text denotes that Hesse intends to give more credibility to the Dionysian. A hint of this can be found in the story when Siddhartha speaks of Govinda's refuge in Gotama the Buddha's teachings, "Govinda, my friend, now you have taken this step, now you have chosen this path. Always, oh Govinda, you've been my

friend, you've always walked one step behind me. Often I have thought: Won't Govinda for once also take a step by himself, without me, out of his own soul?" (Hesse, *Siddhartha*). Govinda represents the Apollonian in contrast to the Dionysian Siddhartha. His always walking one step behind Siddhartha reminds one of the originality and vigour of the Dionysian impulses. Hesse exalts the Dionysian, yet putting the Apollonian beside it.

While Govinda learns from teachings, Siddhartha learns from the outside world, the real world. Siddhartha learns from the river, from stones, from trees and plants, from his physical experiences, from his sexual relationship with Kamala, and from all that pertains to the experiences. His knowledge is first-hand unlike that of Govinda. Siddhartha learns from rivers, stones and trees the lesson of unity. The river teaches him much more than anything else; it teaches him oneness of the whole universe. It encompasses everything and speaks thousands of voices at once. Siddhartha tells Vasudeva, the ferryman: "Isn't it so, oh friend, the river has many voices, very many voices? Hasn't it the voice of a king . . . and of a bull, and of a bird of the night, and of a woman giving birth, and of a sighing man, and a thousand other voices more?" (Hesse, *Siddhartha*).

Siddhartha and Vasudeva always sit together by the river silently; they feel in it the voice of life, the voice of what exists in oneness. The polyphony of the river does not imply the dissolution of identities but their co-existence with attraction and repulsion at the same time. When Siddhartha understands this polyphony and its musical rhythm, he realizes the oneness of opposites. It teaches him the transcendence of good and evil. Earlier he could not understand the voices separately but later understands them fully:

Already, he could no longer tell the many voices apart, not the happy ones from the weeping ones, not the ones of children from those of men, they all belonged together, the lamentation of yearning and the laughter of the knowledgeable one, . . . everything was one, everything was intertwined and connected, entangled a thousand times. And everything together, all voices, all goals, all yearning, all suffering, all pleasure, all that was good and evil, all of this together was the world. All of it together was the flow of events, was the music of life. And when Siddhartha was listening attentively to this river, this song of a thousand voices,

when he neither listened to the suffering nor the laughter, when he did not tie his soul to any particular voice and submerged his self into it, but when he heard them all, perceived the whole, the oneness, then the great song of the thousand voices consisted of a single word . . . (Hesse, *Siddhartha*).

Hesse's main intent was to say that everything exists in harmony rather than in isolation. One thought is dependent on another thought. The opposite of every thought is equally important for it to validate itself. Every thought is one sided and it can get validity only by negating another thought. But in negating the other thought, it makes it equally important. It is this process of affirmation and negation that lends meaning to a thought or idea. The triadic rhythm of thesis, antithesis and synthesis that Hesse used in *Demian* is prolonged in *Siddhartha*. The development of *Siddhartha* shows a structural symmetry. Siddhartha is on the level of the mind in the beginning since he hankers after knowledge. Then he embraces the world of physical and sensual pleasures. And again this development is carried to the level of the self—a synthesis of the mind and the body. The first four chapters can be devoted to the world of the mind and the next four chapters to the world of sensual pleasures. The last four chapters are devoted to the development of the self (Mileck, *Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 168). The river itself has been employed as a symbol of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. One side of the river represents Siddhartha as the man of the mind; the other side represents him as the man of sensuality. Thus the river shows a synthesis of both the sides. It is in order to illustrate this very triadic rhythm of humanization that Hesse used the river as a symbol. The river is Siddhartha's teacher. Freedman rightly observes, "The vision of the unity of things, which Siddhartha discerns in the flux of the flowing river, in the motions and sounds of the river that "roars in a funny way," emerges as the novel's finale it is both a visual image and a musical chord that brings all of life's contradictory movements together: an image caught by eye and ear . . ." (233).

The novel starts with Siddhartha as a boy practising rituals and trying to find the truth of the world. He questions the established institutions of thoughts and proceeds to join the Samanas and becomes a Samana. He practises asceticism rigorously but finds it unable to show him his path. He leaves the Samanas and proceeds towards Gotama the Buddha. He questions the usefulness of his teachings because he thinks that it is difficult to show one's enlightenment through teachings. One has to find it through one's own empirical experiences.

The antithesis of this asceticism starts when Siddhartha enters the world of sensual pleasure with Kamala, the courtesan. The third stage, which is the synthesis of the world of asceticism and pleasure, abstinence and continence, comes when Siddhartha has the experiences of both the ascetic and the sensual. Mileck observes that “. . . the tripartite nature of this substance (the mind, body, and the soul) found accordant rhythmic expression in triadic structure, action, and phraseology; and this harmonizing of substance and form was extended to a harmonizing of inner state, outer situation, and mode of expression. This is Hesse's conscious artistry in its extreme and its best” (*Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 172).

The river is probably the best example of this synthesis. It is a meeting point of all forces; it is a symbol of change and continuity. Heraclitus's claim that one cannot step into the same river twice sounds relevant in this context. The river signifies change, flux, continuity and flexibility. If one steps into the same river twice, one's experience will definitely not be the same. Certainly, he or she will not be the same person who had stepped into the river for the first time. After his second stepping, his consciousness will bear its imprint and definitely he will not be the same person. Then, he will be a person with the experience of stepping into the river twice. It's related to the empirical. Even if we do not take this psychological view into consideration, it is a fact that the river is continuously flowing and changing each moment. It is the same with Siddhartha. Ralph Freedman observes that the “river has become part of Siddhartha's mind . . .” (233). Now Siddhartha's mind embodies all the dichotomies of existence.

Siddhartha, the iconoclast, seems to be Hesse's own ideal through whom he seeks to express his own approach to life. He takes up similar styles like the Buddha—styles of questioning and wandering in search of knowledge and truth—and he probably finds the truth. But there are dissimilarities between the Buddha and Siddhartha. In fact, Hesse “spoke of Buddha's recognition that the self is a mere receptacle, that the saved soul must struggle away from the error of individuation and become one with universal harmony, an image Hesse captured in Siddhartha's final vision” (Freedman 232). Hesse develops his Siddhartha in different style. Pointing out the differences between the Buddha and Siddhartha, Joseph Mileck says:

Their lives take similar courses and each ultimately finds his peace, but their assessments of life, their goals in life, the adjustment of each to life, and the message each leaves behind him are distinctly different. For Buddha, the physical world and life in all its involvements are Maya, a transient, painful illusion; for Siddhartha, all this is the very stuff of treasured being. Buddha's goal is a release from ... reincarnations and its incessant suffering, and a quest for Nirvana, an oblivious extinction; Siddhartha's goal is life in all its temporal agony and bliss. Buddha's is a denial and Siddhartha's an affirmation of the self. Siddhartha's message is to stand in awe of the self and of life, to embrace both for what they are, and to live fully. Buddha's message is to get these things behind one just as quickly as possible. (*Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 164-165).

Siddhartha is materially interested in the real world whereas the Buddha teaches renunciation of the material world. He does not look for the existence of any mystic world. He lives happily in the present and loves a stone as much as anything else. His is a concrete world, a world of acceptance and affirmation.

The conflicts that seemed to have reconciled were again revoked by *The Steppenwolf*, in which Hesse dealt with more intricately intertwined complexities of the human mind. The world of oppositions seemed to have reconciled with *Siddhartha*, but it was not so in reality. Hesse contradicted his findings again in *The Steppenwolf*. It was surprising that "*Siddhartha*, the serene Oriental legend in which all doubts seemed to have settled, was followed by the weird Grand Guignol of the *Steppenwolf*" (Seidlin 222-223). Hesse's mental world was of oppositions, a fact which all his novels suggest. Probably the reconciliation in *Siddhartha* was an attempt to tame these oppositions but the result did not answer all the questions of Hesse. With changes and continuity, Hesse proceeded forward with his own contradictions turning his own synthesis into thesis and antithesis in a dialectical process. Perhaps, no work of Hesse explores the complexities of the human self so comprehensively as *The Steppenwolf*, probably the most complex of his novels.

The Steppenwolf meaning “the wolf of the steppes,” is the story of a bourgeois man Harry Haller, who is bored of the bourgeois intellectuality. Haller leaves a manuscript to a chance acquaintance, the nephew of his landlady. The nephew of the landlady adds a preface to the manuscript and gets it published. The manuscript is titled “Harry Haller’s Records”.

Harry wanders aimlessly dissatisfied with the stagnant bourgeois lifestyle. While he is wandering, he meets a person carrying an advertisement for a magic theatre which reads “Magic Theatre-Entrance Not For Everybody, For Madmen Only!” the person gives Haller a booklet entitled “Treatise on the Steppenwolf”. Thus, *The Steppenwolf* contains three sections—“Preface”, “Harry Haller’s Records” and “Treatise on the Steppenwolf”. “Haller’s Records” details the life of Haller and the Treatise forms the main argument of the novel. The Preface serves as the prelude to the main part of the book.

Harry Haller, who addresses himself as the ‘Steppenwolf’ or ‘wolf of the steppes’, lives in a Swiss-German town, reads and writes and is not concerned about his appearance in outside world. The “Treatise on the Steppenwolf” describes his condition very aptly. It addresses him by his name which surprises him. One day, Haller is invited by a friend who is a conventional professor of Oriental religions. When Haller visits his friend’s house, he finds his friend to be a nationalist, and insults him and his wife by criticizing his wife’s picture of Goethe. The picture which the professor’s wife admires is different from how Haller imagines Goethe to be. Haller feels that the picture is very much offensive to Goethe’s merit. But he is very repentant of his rudeness to his friend and his wife.

In the mean time, he meets a beautiful and brilliant prostitute, Hermine, who scolds him for his foolishness and gives him motherly care. She indulges him in self-explanation in order to know about his thinking, which she sometimes jeers at. She asks him to meet a second time so that he may remain engaged in her thoughts. When they meet the second time, she teaches him how to dance, introduces him to drugs and initiates him into the life of love. Thus, Haller is completely engrossed in Hermine’s love and accepts it as an important and undeniable aspect of life. Hermine introduces Haller to Maria, with whom he develops a love affair, and Pablo, who is a jazz musician. In course of time, Haller finds that he is absorbed in jazz and other entertainments which he despised earlier.

The Treatise mentions that Haller must accept that he has not only a dual self but that his personality consists of many selves, which he should accept with humour and laughter. Under the influence of psychedelic drugs, Haller expresses his selves in Pablo's metaphorical Magic Theatre, in which Haller sees all his selves one by one. He sees all his faces and also many women having sex with him. He also sees the Immortals like Mozart.

The Apollonian and Dionysian oppositions get more explanation in this novel. Initially, Haller identified only a duality within himself. But later on, particularly after reading the Treatise and visiting the Magic Theatre, he realizes that he has many souls. As per the instruction of Hermine, he tries to laugh at this with self-irony and humor. But his drives are only two—Apollonian and Dionysian. All his motives and desires can be categorized within these two.

In fact, it is a disparity between the bourgeoisie and the natural man. The natural man wants to lead his life by instincts and in his own ways. Haller is a representative of that man overburdened with his bourgeois morality and sense of stagnancy. Although he belongs to this society, he feels like an outsider in it. As a polished bourgeois man, he is sensitive and well-mannered and does not demand much pleasure, but as a natural man he wants to enjoy to the extent that he cannot hesitate in offending the philistine. In the society the bourgeois Haller has suppressed his instinctual nature. But this nature remains under repression only as long as he hopes and endeavours to adjust to the society. But since he finds it difficult to adjust to society, the instinctual in him gets released and dominates his personality. The very beginning lines of the Treatise put forth his instinctual and Dionysiac personality:

There was once a man, Harry, called the Steppenwolf. He went on two legs, wore clothes and was a human being, but nevertheless he was in reality a wolf of the Steppes. He had learned a good deal of all that people of a good intelligence can, and was a fairly clever fellow. What he had not learned, however, was this: to find contentment in himself and his own life. The cause of this apparently was that at the bottom of his heart he knew all the time (or thought he knew) that he was in reality not a man, but a wolf of the Steppes. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 51).

Certainly, this man was a wolf, the Dionysiac, who had been changed into a human being after his birth. In his childhood, he might have been wild, disorderly and disobedient, and would have been 'civilized' by those who brought him up. He becomes an intellectual as a consequence. The editor of the novel "repeatedly refers to Haller as an intellectual, but he gives no clear idea as to what he means by that term.: it is supposedly visible in Haller's appearance and manifest in the fact that he has thought more than the other people . . ." (Richards 75-76). Undoubtedly, Haller has thought more than other people because of his suppressed character. He is full of repressed instincts which make him think more than others. But it is not Haller's suppression alone; it represents his entire society, as the Preface says:

the Steppenwolf's look pierced our whole epoch, its whole overwrought activity, the whole surge and strife, the whole vanity, the whole superficial play of a shallow, opinionated intellectuality. And alas! the look went still deeper, went far below the faults, defects and hopelessness of our time, our intellect, . . . It went right to the heart of all humanity, it bespoke eloquently in a single second the whole despair of a thinker, of one who knew the full worth and meaning of man's life. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 14).

Haller represents the people of his times and probably of all times. He subverts the bourgeois myth that the human self contains intellect, and not instinct, and he also removes the stigma put on schizophrenic illness. He reconciles the intellect and instinct for a higher unity.

A hater of society's petty conventions, Haller draws a contrast between his instincts and the ordered middle-class life. He is "a wolf of the Steppes" which "had lost its way", the Dionysiac way, and "strayed into the towns and the life the herd." It was difficult to find a more striking image than this for his "shy loneliness, his savagery, his restlessness, his homesickness . . ." (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 22).

Music, a very dominant feature of the Dionysian, is present in the very movement of the prose, from hazy contact with Hermine to Pablo's Magic Theatre. This feature makes the novel a symphony in prose. The musical ambience "unites the two seemingly contradictory aspirations of Haller's ego: on the one hand the striving towards (and even temporary achievement of) the

level of the Immortals, and on the other, the return to the starting-point, which for him is the individual personality” (Pavlyshyn 43). Music enables Haller to dissolve the ego of his individuality and achieve a state of egolessness. As music serves as the expression of the Dionysian spirit, so does Mozart through his mastery over the Dionysian power of harmony, and jazz through its sensual arousal of the instincts to a Dionysian ‘Rausch’ (Pavlyshyn 44).

Initially, Haller has a very high opinion of Mozart’s music alone and looks down upon other types of music. This choice is typical of his bourgeois upbringing without any taste for the so-called popular music. But the ball teaches him to love all types of music, even jazz music which he hates in the beginning. At the end of the novel, Haller gets the assurance that both Mozart and Pablo would wait for him. Mozart represents high culture and Pablo low culture. Haller recognizes the links of commonness between classical and jazz music and views Mozart and Pablo as not different from each other. However, there is no implication of the convergence of the typical characteristics of these two categories of music or culture. Hesse has tried to get at a point where the edifying character high culture and the all-embracing capacity of low culture can have a confluence. Under the influence of music, Haller sheds his bourgeois personality for the moment and reveals his instincts. The dance party he attends is full of women and music. It is an orgiastic party which teaches Haller to develop the spirit of collectivism. Such confluence of music and women gives him an unprecedented pleasure and experience:

An experience fell to my lot this night of the Ball that I had never known in all my fifty years, though it is known to every flapper and student--the intoxication of a general festivity, the mysterious merging of the personality in the mass, the mystic union of joy . . . A hundred times in my life I had seen examples of those whom rapture had intoxicated and released from the self, of that smile, that half-crazed absorption, of those whose heads have been turned by a common enthusiasm. I had seen it in drunken recruits and sailors, and also in great artists in the enthusiasm, perhaps, of a musical festival; . . . I myself breathed the sweet intoxication of a common dream and of music and rhythm and wine and women--I, who had in other days so often listened with amusement, or dismal superiority, to its panegyric in the ballroom chatter of some student. I was myself no longer.

My personality was dissolved in the intoxication of the festivity like salt in water. I danced with this woman or that, but it was not only the one I had in my arms and whose hair brushed my face that belonged to me. All the other women who were dancing in the same room and the same dance and to the same music, and whose radiant faces floated past me like fantastic flowers, belonged to me, and I to them. All of us had a part in one another. And the men too. I was with them also. They, too, were no strangers to me. Their smile was mine, and mine their wooing and theirs mine. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 197-198).

This is Dionysian intoxication, in which all women and men kiss each other, feel each other and know each other, and consequently no difference remains. Pablo's Magic Theatre and its music provide Haller a harmonious personality. This harmony is achieved through humour and laughter. The novel ends with a note of lesson for Haller—the lesson to laugh and live in humour. The dance party with Hermine extends the Dionysian instincts and everyone learns to escape from the *principium individuationis* to the unity of nature.

The novel has a triadic pattern of thematic development explaining the motif that man develops from innocence to knowledge, and then from knowledge to a transcendence of knowledge. Haller gains knowledge given by his bourgeois social upbringing and finally transcends it by indulging in orgies and music and dance parties. In the Preface, the perception of Haller one gets is one-dimensional, that is to say, he has known only the intellectual side of life. In the next section, "Harry Haller's Records", Haller is found with mental conflicts, which is rather a consequence of his intellectuality. But in the dance parties with Hermine, Maria and Pablo, as well as Pablo's Magic Theatre, Haller learns how to harmonize the mental conflicts. The following words of Pavlyshyn reflect this triadic rhythm:

. . . the "Welt" [world] image, the "Spiegel" [mirror] symbol, the dismissal of Harry's over-simplified self-image as man and wolf, the dissolution of individuality, the multifaceted ego, the laughter motif. These elements are first stated as possibilities in the final section of the "Tractat" and are later transformed into experience in the magic theater episode. (Pavlyshyn 40).

Haller finds the Dionysian ambience of madness and intoxication in the company of women. Madness can be found right from the beginning when Haller reads the advertisement “Magic Theatre—Not for Everyone! For Madmen Only!” the theatre is symbolic of madness and it is essential for Haller to go to the theatre to develop his personality by unleashing his natural instincts. Despite having carefully repressed instincts and having been brought up in a bourgeois household of “culture”, Haller does not fail to recognize his madness. He accepts this madness as his strength and as his real self which social conventions have not recognized as saneness. In fact, he seems to purport that madness is his reality. In calling himself mad, Haller means that he is not mad like the people of his time. In his madness, he reveals his saneness as opposed to the madness of the age. In this context, the meaning of madness gets changed from a derogatory pejorative one to a positive one. It is reversal of values imposed on the individual by the society. The so-called rationality of society becomes a barrier in the development of the individual, who can view the world differently from his so-called madness. Madness thus acquires positivity by subverting its socially accepted meaning.

In fact, Haller is man who has suffered from the civilization of his times in particular, though he indirectly refers to all ages and the entire human race. He does not unleash his repressions until Hermine enters his life. Hermine represents the role of the feminine in the development of personality; it is how Hesse realized in the company of women. She is an epitome of carnal pleasures, love, care and motherhood and productivity in contrast to Haller's masculinity which is unproductive. Nietzsche equates unfruitfulness with masculinity when he says, “Unfruitfulness itself disposes one to a certain masculinity of taste; for man is, if I may be allowed to say so, ‘the unfruitful animal’” (*Beyond Good and Evil* 101). Hermine is not an intellectual and neither does she want to be. She likes what Haller dislikes—an antagonism by way of which the novelist develops his theme. She teaches dancing and sensual pleasures. Haller soon discovers her kindheartedness and falls in love with her, but she is not his lover; she only initiates him into the art of love to free him from his intellectual obsession. When he lives in isolation and depression, she rekindles new hopes and rejuvenates in him “the will to live”. She says:

‘You like me,’ she went on, ‘for the reason I said before, because I have broken through your isolation. I have caught you from the very gates of hell and wakened you to new life. But I want more from you—much more. I want you to be in love with me. No, don’t interrupt me. Let me speak. You like me very much. I can see that. And you’re grateful to me. But you’re not in love with me. I mean to make you fall in love with me . . . (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 130).

Hermine represents the Dionysiac, the sensual and significant in Haller. She is, like Pablo and others, none other than Haller's own image in the same way as Govinda is Siddhartha’s self-image. Likewise, Demian is Sinclair’s image and Boppi is Camenzind’s image. Almost all the characters in Hesse are projections or manifestations of the protagonist’s own mind.

Haller cannot ignore the call of the Dionysiac Hermine who considers love making as her vitality. He has to accept her exhortation to love her that is equally balanced in proportion to her love for him. He finally hears the call of her love:

I mean to make you fall in love with me, and it is part of my calling. It is my living to be able to make men fall in love with me. But mind this, I don't do it because I find you exactly captivating. I'm as little in love with you as you with me. But I need you as you do me. You need me now, for the moment, because you're desperate. You're dying just for the lack of a push to throw you into the water and bring you to life again. You need me to teach you to dance and to laugh and to live. But I need you, not today—later, for something very important and beautiful too. When you are in love with me I will give you my last command and you will obey it, and it will be the better for both of us." (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 130).

Gradually, Haller feels that Hermine understands him very well and is helpful in rejuvenating his appetites. But for this he must obey her every command. Hermine is the Dionysiac instinct of Haller and her sole purpose is to remind him of her existence. She succeeds in showing him that his personality does not have only a human and a wolf but many selves. She leads him on the path to discover these thousand of selves and also how to take them humorously and lightheartedly and

not seriously. Her person is portrayed as half-real and half-imaginary and well devised to reflect Haller's thoughts. Her function is symbolic of Haller's unconscious mind. In the beginning, she appears as a real person with an independent character of her own. But gradually we find that she represents Haller's another self and is a figure of poetic imagination. She is so intimately related to Haller that he says, "And she treated me exactly in the way that was best for me at that moment, and so she has since without an exception" (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 130).

It is also notable that the very existence of Hermine in the novel is never confirmed; the manuscript left in Haller's room reflects a story that completely revolves around his personal experiences. In fact when Haller asks Hermine what her name is, she turns the question around. When he is challenged to guess her name, he tells her that she reminds him of a childhood friend named Hermann, and therefore he concludes, her name must be Hermine. Metaphorically, Haller creates Hermine as if a fragment of his own soul has broken off to form a female counterpart.

The underlying theme of transcendence is shown within group interaction and dynamics. Throughout the novel Haller concerns himself with being different, with separating himself from those he is around. Haller thinks that he is better than his surroundings and fails to understand why he cannot be recognized as such, which raises the idea that in order to rise above a group one must first become one with a part of it. In course of time Haller's dependence on Hermine grows more and more, so much that he expects everything from her. His attachment grows so much that he sometimes goes against his own inclinations and principles. But they have deep understanding of each other. Hermine plays the role of a courtesan with a fairly good taste and she introduces Haller to "the little arts and lighter sides of life" and teaches him to be silly:

"I know," she said when I spoke of it. "I know that well enough. All the same, I shall make you fall in love with me, but there's no use hurrying. First of all we're comrades, two people who hope to be friends, because we have recognized each other. For the present we'll each learn from the other and amuse ourselves together. I show you my little stage, and teach you to dance and to have a little pleasure and be silly; and you show me your thoughts and something of all you know." (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 147).

She is natural in all her activities, so natural that her mood sometimes changes from profound seriousness to childlike frivolity. She is so natural that she surrenders herself to each and every moment to get to the full spectrum of every experience. She emerges more as motherly figure than as a lover. He takes all care of Haller, who behaves like a child before her. Not only this, she also acts as his childhood friend with both male and female features. It is interesting to note that Hermine has masculinity and her name, which Haller guesses as Herman, too arouses curiosity. In her appearance, there is combination of a boy and a girl and her features are hermaphroditic. Haller describes her face as a magic mirror which reflects his own face. And Hermine too accepts this fact when she says, "Doesn't your learning reveal to you that the reason why I please you and mean so much to you is because I am a kind of looking glass for you, because there's something in me that answers you and understands you?" (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 128). This acceptance provides a valid ground to assume that Hermine is a reflection, or a mirror of Haller's own personality. This mirroring reveals his concealed Dionysian instincts.

Pablo, the jazz musician, also plays as important a role as Hermine in the process of Haller's self-education and individuation. Efficient in the arts of sensuality, which Haller has an aspiration for, he is a shallow but charming musician. Haller dislikes the jazz music, but Pablo's efficiency impresses him and he realizes the significance of popular music. In the Magic Theatre, the figures of Mozart and Pablo merge symbolically, which implies that the high and low culture, the classical music of Mozart and the popular music of Pablo come to a confluence, though retaining their own identities. The togetherness of Mozart and Pablo teaches him to regard every type of art and laugh with humour. His humorous way of life teaches Haller laughter, lightheartedness and enjoyment—the motto of his Magic Theatre. His manner of entertaining people give the aroma of a contented person as Haller himself recounts:

His manner of entertaining us consisted in sitting beside us, in smiling upon us, in looking at his wrist watch and in rolling cigarettes--at which he was an expert. His dark and beautiful Creole eyes and his black locks hid no romance, no problems, no thoughts. Closely looked at, this beautiful demigod of love was . . . a complacent . . . young man with pleasant manners. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 130).

The extreme sexual desire of Haller Maria is represented by Maria, whose beauty is probably the only thing that attracts him. Haller feels most comfortable in dancing with her and says, "I liked her very much, and I was delighted that she was so indulgent about my dancing" (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 149). He acknowledges that Maria is the first woman he has really loved. But this love is deeply rooted in sexual pleasures. The character Maria is associated with the pleasure of senses which Haller has to be taught. Her actions are directly motivated by the senses. She well versed in the art of deriving pleasure from the senses:

All her art and the whole task she set herself lay in extracting the utmost delight from the senses she had been endowed with, and from her particular figure, her color, her hair, her voice, her skin, her temperament; and in employing every faculty, every curve and line and every softest modeling of her body to find responsive perceptions in her lovers and to conjure up in them an answering quickness of delight. The first shy dance I had had with her had already told me this much. I had caught the scent and the charm of a brilliant and carefully cultivated sensibility and had been enchanted by it. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 167-168).

During the first night of his stay with her, Haller sees images of women and the weariness of his soul fades away with this visualization. Real happiness comes to him in his love affair with Maria, who satisfies his sensual desires at best and teaches him to live the present moment with all fullness. Hesse gives a very lively and erotic account of Haller's first sensual experiences with Maria, whom he finds already lying in his bed when he returns home after the ball is over. Haller himself describes it vividly:

I kissed her eyes, her mouth and neck and breasts. A moment ago I had thought of Hermine with bitterness and reproach. Now I held her gift in my hands and was thankful. Maria's caresses did not harm the wonderful music I had heard that evening. They were its worthy fulfillment. Slowly I drew the clothes from her lovely body till my kisses reached her feet. When I lay down beside her, her flower face smiled back at me omniscient and bountiful.

During this night by Maria's side I did not sleep much, but my sleep was as deep and peaceful as a child's. And between sleeping I drank of her beautiful warm youth and heard, as we talked softly, a number of curious tales about her life and Hermine's. I had never known much of this side of life. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 161).

Haller spends the night with Maria, whose love-making enhances the effect of joy had from the music of the ball. He has also learnt how to derive pleasure from fashion and popular music. Maria has had variegated sexual experiences with both men and women. Nevertheless, she gives response to Haller's innocent attraction to her. Haller is much surprised at Pablo's invitation to have a love-orgy with Maria, but he finally agrees and enjoys many love-orgies. He gradually learns about many female friends of Pablo's circle and also finds that Maria and Hermine are lovers. Taking these love-affairs into account, one can definitely be led to believe that Hesse has shown interest in lesbianism. But this issue needs a separate chapter for elaboration. The people of this love-orgy are all human beings with kindness and humanism. For instance, Pablo shows kindness to a fellow musician who is in need. Hesse has endowed such characters with kindness and humanity.

But all such love-orgies are developed basically for a single purpose—Haller's development—around which all other characters are developed. The development of his personality is the central motive of the novelist; others characters are only complementary. As it is a study of the psychological progress of Haller, it is also important to notice that all the characters are nothing but the representations of his own personality. Hermine, Pablo and Maria are Haller's Dionysiac self repressed by the bourgeois morality.

He has a sharp and high spirit in the voice. Harry Haller is introduced as a comfortable middle-class man. According to the editor, he was in his youth educated in the sense that the breaking of the will was the foundation of all education. This education only made him able to teach him how to hate himself. This self-hatred becomes the base of a number of properties Haller is seen having, although with dissatisfaction. Haller loves classical music, especially Mozart and Haydn. Haller's personality is in the human and wolf, which face each other irreconcilably and close only

in rare moments of calm. Haller hates the bourgeois ideology, but lives especially in middle-class homes. He has a need for independence, but his freedom costs him the social structure he has been brought up in. He is nocturnal and sleeps very long in the morning. He does not eat and drink regularly.

Though it is generally held that all the protagonists of Hesse have their other sides representing the mind of the protagonist himself, the secondary characters too learn from the protagonist and the education-process is reciprocal. Each helps the other, some by exposing to the world of the senses and some by recourse to the world of thought. But the world of instincts dominates the world of thought. However, they pursue their own distinct paths, for they cannot be otherwise. For instance, Hermine also learns from Haller but she cannot be intellectual and neither does she want to be. She is naturally predisposed to go by her instincts, by her passions. For the centrality of the novel lies in exploring the personality of Haller, Hermine appears at a specific time of his life, just as Demian appears for Sinclair. She is a very experienced guide and understands him thoroughly. Haller obeys her so much that her voice seems to be Haller's own. As per this assumption, her dialogues can be taken as Haller's own. She is an articulation of his voice. This externalization has a therapeutic effect on Haller and restores his mental and emotional equilibrium. In Hermine's company, Haller recognizes his better self.

A completely new way of life is discovered by Haller in the company of Hermine, who teaches him to enjoy and appreciate all aspects of life. Hermine proves to be a vital force, the path to freedom for him. By learning to dance and love, Haller has accepted all the hitherto neglected aspects of life. Consequently, he sheds all the remnants of his bourgeois identity. He accepts everything as a flux in the order of nature. His ecstasy after intoxication and his words "I was no longer myself" and "My personality was dissolved in the carnival frenzy" speak of the transformation of his personality. But it is possible only on account of his acceptance to be "mad", which is the condition for the Magic Theatre, and the second part of the novel describes the full course of his development from an intellectual with an imaginary disagreement between two poles of his being, to a man with an all-embracing acceptance of the world around him. The Magic Theatre is like a mirror which reflects his present condition. It brings the novel to its climax and permits Haller the realization of his personality (Robertson 55).

In the beginning, Haller's personality shows that his abnormally powerful superego had reduced the functions of his ego and his ability to enjoy life and have sensual pleasure. But by the efforts of Hermine, Maria and Pablo, and their love-orgy and Magic Theatre, Haller's ego is ego is reawakened and he enjoys all the aspects of life. He realizes the importance of Dionysian qualities and accepts, "I had never known much of this side of life" (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 161).

The presence of the characters that represent Haller's inner self makes the novel seem like an allegory, which it is not at all. The protagonist is reflected in a multitude of mirrors which juxtapose the sense-self and the transcendental self. His experiences go deep into the mind and discover the reality of the subconscious. Not only this, he also sees his face mirrored on the wet pavements of the lighted street. His self-effacing is also implied by Hermine's glances in her pocket mirror and by continual mention of mirrors. In the Magic Theatre of Pablo, Haller visualizes his universal self-image and empathizes with the whole world. It is observable that the small mirrors into which Haller first gazes turns into a full-length mirror and reveals the duality of his self.

The magic mirror gives the novel a psychological, philosophical as well as aesthetic dimension. It assumes the structure of timelessness as all times—past, present and future—merges together and reflect Haller's image. This image makes the Dionysian more vivid and transparent to him. The Treatise offers a reconciliation of themes through the Magic Theatre. In Haller's process of individuation, the mirror probably plays the most important role.

The musicality of the Magic Theatre is natural and instinctual as the very movement of the novel itself is musical or "a sonata in prose"—to use Theodore Ziolkowski's words—and creates an aroma of intoxication. But the characters, which though seem to be artificial, are real. As Ziolkowski opines, "Hermine, Pablo, Maria, and the entire demimonde of *The Steppenwolf* exist on a realistic plane consistently throughout the book. Only Haller's sense of double perception bestows upon them the added dimension by which they assume symbolic proportions" (*The Novels of Hermann Hesse: A Study in Theme and Structure* 213). But it does not imply that Hermine, Pablo and Maria are not reflections of Haller's own personality. They are the manifestations of his inner self. They are different and undoubtedly represent different qualities and their central motive is to inspire him to proceed towards the realization of the subconscious, towards what has remained unexpressed in his mind, the Dionysian instinctual force.

Hermine is what Haller's subconscious aspires to be but cannot be, for it costs him all that he has learnt and held sacred, moral, eternal and great. It is difficult for him to give up his highly-held intellectual values, but to be as Hermine is, he has to. Hermine reminds him of this difficulty:

You, Harry, have been an artist and a thinker, a man full of joy and faith, always on the track of what is great and eternal, never content with the trivial and petty ... And all that you once knew and loved and revered as beautiful and sacred, all the belief you once had in mankind ... has been of no avail and has lost its worth ... (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 175).

But the Apollonian and Dionysian polarities were not so well sketched until the publication of *Narziss and Goldmund*. This novel depicts the story of two friends, who are completely different from each other but identify themselves with each other.

The story is set in Medieval Germany. Goldmund gets admission in a monastery of Mariabronn, in which lives the Abbot Daniel and the novice and the youngest teacher Narziss. Narziss quickly develops friendship with Goldmund, as there is not much difference of age between them, and Goldmund has a unique natural brightness. Both have sympathy for each other, but Narziss knows it very well that their ways are different and cannot be brought together. As Goldmund is wayward, unruly and willful, he instigates his fellow pupils and secretly goes out of the monastery to a village and meets girls at a farm house and makes love with them. Goldmund and his companions return to the monastery the same night. But Goldmund feels guilty of setting the norms of the monastery at naught and confesses to Narziss. After straying too far in the fields one day, on an errand gathering herbs, Goldmund comes across a beautiful gypsy woman, who kisses him and invites him to make love. This meeting becomes his epiphany; he now learns that he was never meant to be a monk. Finally, he leaves the monastery with the cooperation of Narziss and wanders aimlessly in quest of what could be described as "the meaning of life", or rather, meaning for his life. Goldmund discovers that he is very good-looking to women, and has numerous love affairs with women of different types. He wanders in the forest, which can be experienced intensely. The stop at a farmer's brings him a night of love with the farmer's wife who succumbs to his uncomplicated appeal. Goldmund learns to know women and is happy.

Spring comes and Goldmund arrives in a rich, fertile area. One day, he sees a particularly beautiful carved Madonna in a church and feels his own artistic talent awakening and seeks out the master carver, with whom he studies for several years. He had made a drawing of a specimen of his friend Narcissus. However, in the end Goldmund refuses an offer of guild membership, preferring the freedom of the road. He leads to the chagrin of his master a rather extravagant and unregulated life. He returns old and tired, but with an inner contentment and balance. A conversation between the two brings them to the concept where the human spirit and the sense of man, the thinker and the artist, the ascetic and the maternal face each other. Finally, he is reunited with his friend Narcissus, now an abbot, and the two reflect upon the different paths their lives have taken, contrasting the artist with the thinker—the contrast Hesse wanted to highlight. Narcissus' and Goldmund's relationship becomes more intense and complicated—the differences come to light. Goldmund looks up to Narcissus, and Narcissus has much fondness for him in return.

Right from the beginning, the Apollonian and Dionysian poles have been foregrounded in the text apparently. While Narziss is dark and thin of face, Goldmund open and radiant as a flower. While Narziss is a thinker, Goldmund a dreamer and a child. Narziss was a man of “the intellect, to which his rigid life was wholly dedicated, and only in his secret mind, at moments when his thoughts were the least guarded, had he given himself up to the vice of pride, of delight in his own knowledge and keen wits” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 21). He is an ascetic and therefore a man of principles and rules, which he values above everything—so much that even love is theoretical to him. He therefore represents the Apollonian personality and Hesse has drawn his character with this point of view in mind.

But Goldmund's character has been cast in straightforward contrast to Narziss's endow him with all the Dionysian characteristics. He wanders in woods, deserts and fields, but does not like the life-style of the ascetics. His wandering certainly reminds one of Harry Haller's wolfish nature that defies human civilisation. *The Steppenwolf* does not reconcile Hesse's fantasy and is continued even in *Narziss and Goldmund*. Goldmund reminds one of the same Dionysian instincts to live in the present as Haller and the Immortals do. He wanders and does not care for fair and tender feelings: “He thought of nothing, as he tramped over empty fields. What was to

be gained by thoughts or feelings, no matter how fair and tender they might be? He must keep warm, and find some refuge for the night, keep alert, as a fox or marten, in the rigour of this froze world, and, if he could, not let himself perish in icy fields: nothing but that was worth considering” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 119).

He wanders in the empty snow-bound country, without shelter, path, or bite to fill his stomach. He grows wild and desperate at last, howling his need like a beast, sinking again and again, worn out; longing only to sleep, and die in the snow. But hunger grants him no peace. He runs on madly, passionate to live. Hunger and despair quicken and spur him to proceed ahead with soulless strength and wild desire. The sheer Dionysiac force of naked life in him inspires him to the instinctual. From juniper-bushes laden with their snow, he claws the bitter fruit with his fingers and chews them. The bitter taste of the fruit increases his thirst and he devours handfuls of snow to quench his thirst. But in such hardship, he seems to be enjoying himself in the present which is of utmost importance to him. He never thinks of the future.

Narziss has the calming influence of an intelligent, erudite reliable man who stands above all Goldmund’s uncertainty and weaknesses. He is always to be found in the monastery; his presence is predictable, as well as his kindness and loyalty. Hesse has endowed Narcissus with the highest virtues of an ascetic with predestined aims. Narziss expresses his position and limitations to Goldmund:

Listen, Goldmund. Our friendship has been a good one: it has had its particular goal, and reached it, since now you are roused from your half-sleep. But now we have no more to achieve. Your purposes are still uncertain, and I can neither lead you nor accompany you. Ask your mother; ask her image, and listen. My aims are not misty and far-off; they lie here around me in the cloister, demanding fresh efforts with every hour. I can be your friend, I can never love you. I am a monk, and have taken my oath to God. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 63).

Both Narziss and Goldmund have limitations which they cannot transcend, for it is the demand of what they are. It is an undeniable fact that Goldmund cannot become what Narziss is and Narziss too cannot become what Goldmund is. But Narziss’s love for Goldmund is unflinching

and intense to the degree that he is always eager to help him to be what he is gifted with, to blossom in his own fullness. Narziss is mature and has unique empathy for his friend. It is only he who understands Goldmund—a fact which Goldmund himself acknowledges earnestly. Hesse has endowed him with a unique understanding of Goldmund's nature. It is how he has created Narziss who "had seen into the depths of Goldmund's nature, which he understood completely, despite their difference, as the other, lost, half of his own" (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 31).

Narziss has such a passionate and deep understanding of his young friend that he knows so well his ways and predestination. And not only this, Goldmund too glows with pleasure at the sight of his beautiful, meditative teacher, Narziss. In order to please his friend, he wears himself out with industry as a skilful and patient scholar. But his love of Narziss is checked by a feeling that this master cannot be happy with his ways. It is difficult for him to take the good and saintly abbot for his ideal. It is really difficult to love this subtle scholar, the learned, the penetrating Narziss. But at the same time, Narziss is his guide to his path. He cannot deny his love and without loving him he cannot proceed on his path. Conversely, Narziss too cannot but support his friend's urges, although these urges disagree with his principles. He loves him, feels with his pain, and succours it—a fact Goldmund knows very well. His thoughts are engaged about Goldmund far more than he even dreams and wishes this fresh and lively boy, his friend, could sense in him his opposite and completion, wishes to see into his soul, guide him, and enlighten his mind, cherish him and bring him to blossom. Such friendship is really strange:

It was a strange friendship that grew up between Narziss and Goldmund, one which pleased few, and, at times, almost seemed to displease the friends. Narziss the thinker had at first to bear the heavier burden. To him all was thought, even love. In their love he was the guiding spirit, and, for long, only he of the two was conscious of the depths, scope, and meaning of their bond. For long, although he loved, he was alone, knowing that his friend could not in reality be his till he had led him into the knowledge of himself. Goldmund gave himself up to this new love with eager joy, playing unconsciously like a child. Narziss, responsible and conscious, accepted and pondered their high destiny. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 29).

Narziss finds Goldmund endowed with gifts for ever denied him. It has been granted him to further their growth, yet he himself would have no share in them. He delights in seeing his friend made whole and free, and yet in his delight there is some depression. He knows Goldmund better than the boy himself, who, though he has found his soul again, and is ready to follow where it guide him. Goldmund himself cannot tell which way it might beckon. But Narziss has observed that his friend's path leads through lands he himself can never travel in. Goldmund listens to the soul, to the Dionysian instincts of his spirit. It appears to him that only love is basic, only heartfelt and free devotion, to satisfy all disparity, to make a bridge between all opposites. He is sometimes surprised to see how sour and assured, comprehensible and inexorable Narziss is. It surprises him that to Narziss the natural gifts of love and a pleasing vagrancy together through the lands of friendship and desire appear to be things strange, or never required. To Narziss, this ecstasy in paths shows the way nowhere and wonderful wandering without a purpose is something he would not tolerate. But he knows his friend perfectly well. It is true that when Goldmund is sick, Narziss is troubled. In affairs of school and wisdom he assists and suggests him on a lot of points. He interprets complicated passages in books for him, opens out new paths in the realms of grammar, logic, and philosophy; but never does he seem really contented, and never at one with his friend. But Goldmund feels that this is more than literalism, more than an elder and wiser demonstrating his power. He feels that some profound attachment of love lie deep down his heart. Yet he can hardly understand the depth of this attachment.

In fact, Narziss knows well enough how much there is of merit in Goldmund. Nor is he heedless to the bright, delicate loveliness of the boy, his innate power and zest for life, and the promise of his youth. It is certainly Narziss who fills his soul with dreams of Dionysiac ecstasy. He reminds Goldmund of his true nature:

I am only your superior in this: I am awake, whereas you are only half-awake, and at times your whole life is a dream. I call that man awake who, with conscious knowledge and understanding, can perceive the deep, unreasoning powers in his soul, his whole innermost strength, desire, and weakness, and knows how to reckon with himself. The task that brings us together, the whole, the whole aim and purpose of our friendship, is that you should learn from me

how to do it. In you, Goldmund, nature and intellect, consciousness and the world of dreams, are set very far from one another. You have forgotten your childhood, which still strives up from the depths of your being, to possess you. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 44).

Their natures are completely different from each other—one is intellectual and the other instinctual. Narziss cannot be a vagabond and Goldmund cannot be an ascetic. To try to be so is nothing but wastage of the energy they both have been endowed with. That is why Narziss continues to emphasize Goldmund to pursue his own nature and not to impose on himself what he cannot accept by heart. Narziss articulates this difference in their nature, which resounds in Goldmund's ears, when he says, "You sleep on your mother's breast, I watch in a desert." "Your dreams are all of girls, mine of boys" (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 78). It is impossible for Narziss to come closer to Goldmund's instinctual knowledge, since it is against his asceticism. It is not his task either, a fact he himself acknowledges: "It is my earnest. It is not our task to come together; as little as it would be the task of sun and moon, of sea and land. We two, my friend, are sun and moon; sea and land. Our destiny is not to become one. It is to behold each other for what we are, each perceiving and honouring it in his opposite; each finding his fulfilment and completion" (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 42). Such disparities notwithstanding, they have something in common which bridge the differences. Their love has immense strength to pursue the incompatibles in unison.

After leaving the seminary, Goldmund begins a restless vagabond life. He charms a number of women and seduces them. He feels happy to know that he is uniquely gifted in alluring all women he meets. A man of passions, he always looks forward to meeting new women. The following is an instance of how eagerly he waits a woman:

It was good to wait, knowing all the while that a woman, full of love, was on her way.

She came with a linen bundle, into which she had tied a great manchet of bread and a cut of bacon. She undid the knots, and set it out.

"For you," she said to him, "eat."

“Later,” he answered her, “I am hungry for you, not for bread. Oh, show me the beauty you have brought me!”

She had brought him his fill of beauty, strong thirsty lips, and gleaming teeth, strong arms, browned by the sun, though within her clothes, down from below her neck, she was white and tender. Of words she knew little, but deep in her throat could sing with a note of clear enticement, as she felt his touch upon her skin, his hands more sensitive and gentle than anything she had known in all her life, till she shuddered with delight and purred like a cat. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 93-94).

But he cannot spend the rest of his life with any of them. After his first experience of love, Goldmund decides to conquer the whole wide world. Narcissus has a high expectation of this moment for a long time and interrupts his ascetic practices in order to say goodbye to his friend. Wandering he reaches a church, where he discovers a carved wooden- statue of a Madonna, which impressed him so much that he embarks on a quest for the carver. The statue looks like his mother and is so perfect that he gets fascinated and goes to the master of this figure in order to learn from him his arts and crafts. He learns the art, and from the experiences of his life influenced and inspired by Narcissus, the young artist himself makes a nearly perfect masterpiece. He sees his mother's image flashed in it. This image of the mother drives him to gain new life experiences. So he leaves the city and his master, Bishop. He is a drifter, seldom sleeping twice in the same place, everywhere desired and appeased by women, made thin by tramping and little diet. He sleeps with many women; they leave him at daybreak, many go in tears. Goldmund often thinks, “Why is it that none ever stays with me? Why, if they love me so that they break their marriage vows to still their need of me for a night, must they all go running back to their husbands, from whom mostly they fear to be whipped?” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 95).

How Hesse describes the temptation of Goldmund who recounts his first experience of love and sensuality. Goldmund says to Narziss,

I wanted to say that it was not any small infringement of rule that weighed me down that day, and caused me to weep. It was something else; it was the maid! It was a feeling which I could never make clear to you; a feeling that if I yielded to that temptation, if once I stretched out my hand to touch her, I should not be able to come back here, that hell would suck me in, like a swamp, and never let me go again. And I felt that then there would be the end of all fair dreams, all virtue, all love of God and His goodness. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 33).

Hesse has tried to invest Goldmund with powerfully Dionysiac sensual instincts to raise him as a typical man of powerful will. The following lines express his sensitivity to it:

It was good to wait, knowing all the while that a woman, full of love, was on her way.

She came with a linen bundle, into which she had tied a great manchet of bread and a cut of bacon. She undid the knots, and set it out.

“For you,” she said to him, “eat.”

“Later,” he answered her, “I am hungry for you, not for bread. Oh, show me the beauty you have brought me!”

She had brought him his fill of beauty, strong thirsty lips, and gleaming teeth, strong arms, browned by the sun, though within her clothes, down from below her neck, she was white and tender. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 93-94).

No woman really asks Goldmund not to leave her, and not one to take her along with him. None, for the sake of love, show readiness to share his joys, and the need of a vagrant’s life. It is how Hesse characterises sensual love, which is always fleeting in every place and each moment. Goldmund gives up all thoughts of finding himself a sleeping-place, and walk on by moonlight, through the quiet, silvery world, very content, rejoicing in the strength of his legs. He journeys on tufts, runs against trees, in the snow. Yet the will to tread is strongest in him, ever inspiring and urging him forward. In these two years he learns all there is to learn of vagrants’ lives. He leans solitude, freedom, the instinct to search out beasts and trees. He also learns fleeting love without any faith in it. For days and months he feels the breeze of summer fields, of forests and

the snow. The days of hunger teach him to struggle against it all, and give him grim ecstasy. He feels that there is not much more to be learnt in the world and wishes to talk of it to Narziss as no one else can understand it.

He reaches villages, discovers houses set between the river and red vineyards and begs his victuals. Next day he trots on along the way with the river beside. As night draws in, he dawdles by rivers' edges under fair trees. The river flows calmly, sighing, and touching the banks, and it is amidst such natural bounties that Goldmund enjoys himself.

The image of the mother brings great joy to Goldmund. This image is symbolic of the very root of being. It does not lead him back to the peace of cloister schools and dormitories, and a life-long fellowship with monks. It has nothing in it of the commands laid on him by the world. It is related with his emotion and full of life as any sensation in his body. It signifies all the gentleness of the senses, sweet tastes of life, the gentleness of love, and the clear and serene promise of smiling happiness in her. In fact, Goldmund is "defined and created through women, who are the substance from which he derives his reality" (Koch, "Prophet of Youth: Hermann Hesse's *Narzissus and Goldmund*." 87). Narziss again recounts his differences between men of intellect and men of instinct:

"To be sure," Narziss concluded. "Men of dreams, the lovers and the poets, are better in most things than the men of my sort; the men of intellect. You take your being from your mothers. You live to the full: it is given you to love with your whole strength, to know and taste the whole of life. We thinkers, though often we seem to rule you, cannot live with half your joy and full reality. Ours is a thin and arid life, but the fullness of being is yours; yours the sap of the fruit, the garden of lovers, the joyous pleasaunces of beauty. Your home is the earth, ours the idea of it. Your danger is to be drowned in the world of sense, ours to gasp for breath in airless space. You are a poet, I a thinker. You sleep on your mother's breast, I watch in the wilderness. On me there shines the sun; on you the moon with all the stars. Your dreams are all of girls, mine of boys--" (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 44-45).

A unique Nietzschean drunkenness characterises Goldmund's love, which has a transforming influence on him. Goldmund is deeply influenced as it is evident from his first deep experience of any woman:

... I lay out there in the fields, and fell asleep, and when I woke my head lay on the knees of a woman ... Not that I held this woman to be my mother. . . . All the longing I had ever felt in my life, all secrets and sweet fears that had lain asleep in me, came to life, transformed and renewed, with another meaning in them. In a little time she had made me older by many years. Now I know much, and of this I was suddenly quite certain: that I can live here no longer, not another day in this cloister. I shall escape as soon as it is dark. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 74).

Finally, Narziss compliments Goldmund to have succeeded in knowing and being aware of his self. Now, both the friends understand each other very well as they have seen the difference between them. They also learn that some men take their destiny from women. Those who are so destined live freely and instinctively. It shows the basic difference between spirit and intellect. Goldmund is the man of the spirit and Narziss that of the intellect. For the former, longing to be a monk in the cloister would be perceived as inappropriate.

As the text implies, Hesse's intent seems to make the Dionysian Goldmund successful in his wanderings, and passions. Goldmund is completely satisfied with whatever he has done, with all his wanderings. He, in fact, finds the meaning of his life, and "Narziss smiled rather sadly: "What shall I do in the end? Who knows? . . . But my aim is this: always to be where I can serve best, where my disposition, talents, and industry may find their best soil and be most fruitful. That is the only aim in my life." And again Narziss says to Goldmund, "A monk's whole life may be spent in learning Hebrew; or he may live to annotate Aristotle, to decorate his cloister church . . . or a hundred and one other things. But none of all these are final aims. I neither wish to multiply the riches of the cloister, nor reform the order, nor the church. What I wish is to serve the spirit within me, as I understand its commands, and nothing more. Is that an aim?" (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 63-64). But the end of the novel shows the triumph of Goldmund for his embracing the mother figure, which Narziss fails to understand.

Hesse, the romantic, gives a vivid and lively detail of the forests and deserts that Goldmund traverses and where his Dionysiac personality flourishes. Right from the beginning, the novel sets forth the aroma of romantic meanderings. It describes Goldmund's going out of the cloister very romantically. A group of good staunch companions, of whom, Adolf, is the leader, break their enclosure and go secretly into a village. They have taken from earlier generations the habit of remembering that they themselves would never be monks. They go on this pleasurable adventure and, in the thick of night, they all creep back again. It is a transgression, which may invite a sound whipping from the teachers. It is meant for rousing them out of tediousness. It is an escape into a world secret and prohibited, a little dishonest, and yet a release and a way to cheerfulness.

They go outside the cloister, stand together on a high road, and make their way into the dark woods. All this is full of silence and enthusiasm, and pleases Goldmund most. Hearing the twitter of night birds and looking at the gleaming of stars between silent clouds, they reach a village where there are no lights. They go up a fence and stand in a garden. One of them knocks at the shutter. The shutter opens and one by one they climb through the window, into a kitchen. There stands a girl, a lean peasant, who holds out her hand to the newcomers while behind, out of darkness, comes another young maid, with long and dark plaits. The maid with the plaits offers them a stone pitcher. They drink from the pitcher; it is a strong brew of cider. Despite knowing the fact that their secret creeping out of the mill and stealing on through the dark wood is prohibited, Goldmund feels no compunction at setting a rule at naught. The maid kisses his mouth like a child. His will says that he should not do this, but his heart sighs for it again and again. This small episode of adventure and excursion to relieve the boredom of books is Hesse's own fantasy. It helps create an atmospheric effect for setting the Dionysian background of romance and adventure that Goldmund is to embark upon later.

And to add to his romantic temper, Hesse describes the tranquillity of the forest like a romantic. He describes the atmosphere of the woods through which Goldmund and his companions make their way to the village: "In a long while they came out on an open space where, over widely separated pines, a wan sky stretched away before them and around them, lay a valley, clothed in meadows. They waded through a little, silently trickling stream. Here in the open it was even quieter than in the woods . . ." (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 79).

As it is generally found, Hesse always provides his protagonists with a guide, a foil for the development of their personality. In *Narziss and Goldmund*, it is the personality of Goldmund whose development is the purpose of the novel. Narziss's role in the novel seems to be more occupied with the objective of helping Goldmund develop his personality. In fact, he, like Demian in *Demian*, and Hermine, Pablo and Maria in *The Steppenwolf*, has the function of guiding the Dionysiac protagonist Goldmund. He very adequately performs his task as a foil to Goldmund. The following words of Narziss remind one of the help and support Demian offers to his friend Sinclair:

Listen, little Goldmund, this too is part of my ambition! Whether I become a teacher or abbot, confessor, or whatever else it may be, I never wish to be of such a sort that when a strong man crosses my path—a man of high worth and real capacity—I find myself unable to understand him, find myself his enemy in my heart, unable, if I will, to further his purposes. And this I say to you: You and I may turn into this or that; we may meet either good or bad fortune; but you never shall lack my help if you truly ask for it, and feel in your heart that you need me, since my hand will never be against you. Never. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 64-65).

Narziss is probably a return to Demian with more maturity and compassion as well as a basic difference in personality. Demian's personality is quintessentially never in disagreement with that of Sinclair as Narziss and Goldmund are set in contrast to each other. Sinclair follows Demian's path of life and thus their life-views are not different from each other. But Narziss and Goldmund manifest complete polarity of difference in their personality. Despite this disparity of character, Narziss and Demian have marked similarities. Both are considerate and regular, sober and intellectual, and intentionally detached and very much self-assured. Each is more gentleman than youngster, more intellectual than learner, and more mentor than companion. Both are instantly attracted by these proud young princes among the less important common herd, and both promptly yield to their concern. Narziss knows Goldmund better than Goldmund knows himself. He is resolute to wake up him to himself and to life, initiates him to moral discussions. He also has, as Demian discusses with Sinclair, religious, philosophical, and moral discussions,

and helps him find his way freely so that he can realize himself. Hesse endowed Narziss with Demian-like sympathy, empathy and the ability to read thoughts and be present or appear when needed. In his serious bearing, his role, and in the workings of his relationship with Goldmund, he is like Demian. *Narcissus and Goldmund* is, perhaps, the richest novel Hesse wrote. His keen insights to the complexities of life entice the reader to outward exploration of the whole range of beauty and depravity that man encounters; his understanding of man's emotional turmoil pulls inwardly towards a responsiveness to the symbolic truth of the search for meaning in a paradoxical world. Narcissus and Goldmund represent the basic worlds that Hesse plays out: the intellectual and the sensual, the possibilities of withdrawal or involvement, and the ultimate union of the aesthetic and the practical.

Goldmund resembles Knulp, the Dionysian drifter in many ways as Narziss has the towering influence of the guide like Demian. Knulp centres on the character of Knulp, an idler who continuously wanders and is dependent on friends, and refuses to tie himself down to any particular job, place or person. Knulp spends his days aimlessly. During the tale he gains the affection of the tanner's wife, but resists her advances. Instead he attempts to court a girl named Barbra Flick who had recently arrived in the town as a household servant. The chapter culminates after Knulp convinces Barbra to abandon her post in the night and dance with him.

Towards the end of the novel a disillusioned and weak Knulp goes into the forest where he begins a conversation with God. In this conversation, Knulp asks God why he, Knulp, has not done anything of consequence in life. He states that he could have been a successful doctor or artist; he could have married and peacefully settled down. Knulp questions God and asks him about the purpose of his existence. During the conversation, Knulp begins to hear God's reply. God states that he did not make Knulp to be any of these things, rather that he wanted him to bring joy into the lives of people and make them feel a "homesickness for freedom." Upon receiving this answer from God, Knulp experiences a sense of peace. The novel ends with Knulp accepting his final passage from this world with a sense of purpose.

Knulp has from an early age been a wanderer. His domain is the forest and meadows of Germany, and his friends are everywhere. He has no home and no wife, but nor does he have any desire for either. He loves freedom, while recognising that even the free aren't absent from life's struggles. *Knulp* is an early work of German Nobel Laureate Hermann Hesse's, one that sees him developing themes he would later go on to explore in immense depth and detail in his mature works.

Knulp is the type of fellow who has a friend wherever he goes, and if he does not, then he soon will. He can talk to anyone about what interests them; he knows just enough about every profession or interest to coax his interlocutors into revealing their thoughts and emotions and engage them in conversations.

The life certified by this official passport was a product of Knulp's invention, and with infinite art he spun out the fragile thread of this pseudo-career. In reality, though he did little that was expressly prohibited, he carried on the illegal and disdained existence of a tramp. Of course, he would hardly have been so unmolested in his lovely fiction if the police had not been well disposed toward him. He had seldom been arrested and never convicted of theft or mendicancy, and he had highly respected friends everywhere. Consequently, he was indulged by the authorities very much as a nice-looking cat is indulged in a household, and left free to carry on an untroubled, elegant, splendidly aristocratic and idle existence.

In 'Early Spring', Knulp visits his friend Emil Rothfuss, who has recently married. The couple seems happy enough, but soon the wife finds herself drawn to Knulp's carefree spirit. Knulp, however, finds a young servant girl from a nearby house more appealing.

She may have been eighteen or nineteen, not very tall, with an attractive olive complexion, brown eyes, and thick brown hair. Her pleasant, quiet face did not look exactly happy; all in all, she seemed rather woebegone as she sat there on her hard green box, and Knulp, who knew the world and young girls as well, had a pretty fair idea that the poor thing hadn't left her native village very long ago with her box, and was homesick.

Knulp strikes up a conversation (something notably missing from his non-existent relationship with Emil's wife) with the young girl. They discuss her hometown of Achthausen, and soon the young girl, too, has fallen for Knulp. Both women find his freedom appealing, but they both, from the very first, seek to restrict his freedom by placing restrictions of affection and expectation upon him. Knulp is a free spirit in the worst and best sense of the concept. He rejects society not out of spite but because it suits him better to wander where he will when he wishes. Knulp's lifestyle is *not* a lifestyle – it is who he is. He has the best relations with those who expect no more from him than what he is prepared to give, which is to say good conversation, the pleasure of sharing a meal or their home, and a chance to lighten one's heart with stories of places near and far. Knulp is, in his own way, a sage of sorts, and as with all sages one of the duties he places upon himself is that of dispensing advice and sharing the wisdom of his wandering ways:

No, Knulp was right in doing what his nature demanded and what few others could do, in speaking to strangers like a child and winning their hearts, in saying pleasant things to ladies of all ages, and making Sundays out of weekdays. You could only take him as he was, and when he needed a roof over his head, it was a pleasure and an honour to give him one.

The way I see it, everybody's got to figure out for himself what's true and what life is like; those are the things you can't learn from any book. When a man boasted of his happiness or his virtue, they usually didn't amount to much.

The second story, 'My Recollections of Knulp', begins on a strange note of happiness and sadness. "In those days I was young and gay, and Knulp was still alive." This story is more openly narrated, with reflections and asides inserted into the text. In 'Early Spring', the authorial presence was there, but it was not strong. Here, the narrator is quite chatty, and what's more seems to be in a reflective mood, willing to indulge in fond memories of Knulp.

Knulp's decision to become a vagabond allows him the luxury to think about and discuss higher concepts such as aesthetics and the place of art, the importance of death to those who are living, and the absence of it for those who are not, and other such matters. He is less constrained by the material than the rest of us, with the attendant capability to transcend matters of money and property and other mean things. He says to the narrator of the second story,

In the end, we all have a life of our own that we can't share with anyone else. You can see that when a friend or loved one dies. You weep and grieve for a day, a month, or even a year, but then the dear departed is dead and gone, and the person in the coffin might just as well be some homeless unknown apprentice.

The narrator notes that, though he had read a great deal, Tolstoy for instance, he was not always able to distinguish between sound and unsound reasoning, and he himself sensed as much. He spoke of learned men as a gifted child speaks of adults; he had to admit that they were stronger and better equipped than he, but he despised them for making no proper use of their learning and for solving no riddles with all their wisdom.

The third and last story is called, fittingly, 'The End'. The two other stories were concerned with death in a tangential manner, but here it comes to the fore. He notes, "There's nothing much wrong with me, and what there is, no doctor can cure." Later, Knulp recognises that, if he were to polish his shoes, then they would last a good month or two longer – longer, then, than he himself. His shoes will be worn by someone else, or they won't. But he, he knows, will be gone.

Toward the end of the story, after Knulp wanders his home town and remembers what was with the fondness age and one's dying can provide, after he speaks with people from his past about matters of the present and memories of their times together, after attempting to locate, if only visually, the places he knew and friends he once had, Knulp, in winter, at night, wanders and begins to hallucinate and, as he dies, imagines a conversation with God. God tells him,

Knulp agrees, finally, that everything is as it should be, and then he dies, but not before the sun shines again. His philosophy, what it is, has been explored and resolved, at least to the satisfaction of Knulp and God (and, really, what else could one ask?)

Knulp is a strange and comforting book. There is no conflict, no plot, and Knulp's life is neither presented as desirable for one's own choosing, or shown as an extended admonition. No, Knulp simply is the way he is, and that is explored, and his friends are who they are, and that, too, is explored. Hesse carefully avoids incrimination on either side, and though he is clearly deeply fond of Knulp and his ilk, he never explicitly argues for Knulp, either.

I suppose in essence, then, *Knulp* is in fact a lengthy metaphor for the rather sad concept that life is lived alone, with each and every one of us incapable, really, of being understood by any other. And no thing, no matter how beautiful or right or good, will last, and indeed this mortality or inevitability of destruction becomes a large part of what gives this thing these positives. A fine painting must fade and become lost. A song must be forgotten, and words never stay. Entropy is everything, and everything is, ultimately, doomed. Yet, for all this, *Knulp* is hardly a depressing tale. Knulp is a wonderful character, a joy, really, the way a child or a flower can be a joy – the joy of innocence and purity, in other words. I shall leave this review with a comment from Knulp on love, and by extension, life:

Every human being has his soul; he cannot combine it with any other. Two people can meet, they can talk with one another, and they can be close together. But their souls are like flowers, each rooted to its place. One can't go to another, because it would have to break away from its roots, and that it can't do. Flowers send out their scent and their seeds, because they would like to go to each other; but a flower can't do anything to make a seed go to its right place; the wind does that, and the wind comes and goes where it pleases.

The Journey to the East is written from the point of view of a man called H. H., who becomes a member of "The League", a timeless sect. The members of this sect include famous fictional and real characters, such as Mozart, Pythagoras, Don Quixote, Baudelaire, and Vasudeva, the ferryman in *Siddhartha*. The League embarks on a journey to the East in pursuit of the knowledge and "ultimate truth". They journey through time and space, across geography imaginary and real as "it arose from the freedom to experience everything imaginable simultaneously, to exchange outward and inward easily, to move Time and Space about like scenes in a theatre" (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 24).

Leo, a glad, amusing, good-looking member, beloved by everyone, having an empathy and affinity with animals, seems to be of more importance, but nobody in the pilgrimage, including the narrator, seems to understand this. Many years later, H. H. tries to write his story of the journey, even though he has lost contact with the group and believes the League no longer exists. But he is unable to put together any coherent account of it:

What makes my account particularly difficult is the great disparity in my individual recollections. I have already said that sometimes we marched along only as a small group; sometimes we formed a troop or even an army, but sometimes I remained in a district with only a few friends, or even quite alone, without tents, without leaders and without a Speaker. My tale becomes even more difficult because we not only wandered through Space, but also through Time. We moved towards the East, but we also traveled into the Middle Ages and the Golden Age; we roamed through Italy or Switzerland, but at times we also spent the night in the 10th century..." (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 23).

He has even sold the violin with which he once offered music to the group during the Journey. His passion was really only that of a violinist and story-teller, and was responsible for creating a musical ambience for the group. A long time devoted to small details lauds the members and increases their strength. He did not only play the violin and conduct the choirs, but also collected old songs and chorals. After a long time, he meets Leo and, having failed in his attempt to re-establish communication with him or even be recognized by him when he meets him on a park bench, writes him a long, touching letter of complaint, regret and entreaty and sends it to him that night. The next morning Leo visits H. H.'s home and tells him he has to appear before the High Throne to be judged by the officials of the League. H. H. finds it to his surprise that the Leo is actually President of the League, and the crisis in Morbio Inferiore was an examination of commitment. H. H. finds out that his deviation and time spent wandering was part of his trial, and is allowed to return to the League.

A special role in the League is played by the inconspicuous Leo, who wins the hearts of people and animals by his pleasing, humble way. H. H. himself is very impressed by him, "I was very fond of many of my comrades and leaders, but not one of them subsequently occupied my thoughts as much as Leo, while at that time he was apparently hardly noticed" (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 22). Leo's has unaffected manners and has something so pleasing, so unassumingly winning about him that everyone loves him. He does his work merrily, sings or whistles as he goes along. Moreover, all animals are friendly him. He always had some pets which joined the League. His ability to tame birds and attract butterflies reflects his Dionysian qualities.

The music, the celebration, the creative work, and the senses occupy space in the activities of the League. The "celebration in Bremgarten" is described as a highlight of the trip: one may imagine it as a large Festival with music, readings, arts and crafts, magic and much food and even more drinks. Sounds and harmonies admit to sympathize for the drifting nature of the characters. The music is understood through harmony. The Bremgarten celebration directs the course of the narrative. The playful handling of the time, the paradoxes, the illogical, is typical of Dionysian music. It seems the story takes place in the regions of Utopia and of the dream. The understanding of the morning land tour is not primarily a question of the intellect, but a question of passion and imagination.

The Journey to the East was another endeavor in self-exploration and narrative technique. It is also the most abstruse of Hesse's many vague tales. H. H.'s order of Eastern travelers is not just another secret society, but an assemblage of seekers of all time and from all places. The journey is a timeless series of travels and adventures, and not a physical expedition. It is not a geographic destination but a study in psychology. As H. H. Himself says, "For our goal was not only the East, or rather the East was not only a country and something geographical, but it was the home and youth of the soul, it was everywhere and nowhere, it was the union of all times. Yet I was only aware of this for a moment, and therein lay the reason for my great happiness at that time" (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 24). Undoubtedly, this journey to the east is not the journey to the East. It is journey to the psychology of man.

The basic dichotomies of Hesse's fiction are found here too in the character of the Leo and H.H., the former representing the Dionysian type and the latter the apollonian. Not only this, a synthesis of these two is also found towards the end of the novel. H. H. writes the history of the League and the journey and goes to an archive. He finds that all the archives refer to the journey to the east and the group to which he belonged. The archives also mention that the League had arrived at Morbio on its journey. And H. H. finds to his surprise that everything in the archives was distorted. And he finds that he cannot learn anything from the archives. Then he moves to another section where he finds a niche. There was nothing written in there. The following sentences show how the niche contained nothing but a figure:

The niche contained nothing but a figure, an old and worn-looking model made from wood or wax, in pale colors. It appeared to be a kind of deity or barbaric idol. At first glance it was entirely incomprehensible to me. It was a figure that really consisted of two; it had a common back. I stared at it for a while, disappointed and surprised. Then I noticed a candle in a metal candlestick fixed to the wall of the niche. A match-box lay there. I lit the candle and the strange double figure was now brightly illuminated. (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 92).

On a purely psychological level, H.H. and Leo represent the conscious and unconscious and their overlapping each other with fluctuations. The figure in the niche represents both of them. As H.H. recollects, "I now saw the double figure representing Leo and myself, not only becoming clearer and each image more alike, but I also saw that the surface of the figures was transparent and that one could look inside as one can look through the glass of a bottle or vase" (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 92). H.H. is the conscious Apolline man whose personality gets nourishment from that of Leo. They are, in fact, not two but nourish and strengthen each other, the Dionysian is the vital energy.

A major theme in the novel is also the isolation of the people in Hesse's time and the need to classify the whole. The theme of the voyage of the morning land is longing for service, finding community, exemption from the infertile brilliancy of the artist. The starting point of the story shows the personal crisis of H. H. In the narrative, he seems to be a frustrated man of bureaucratic nature. He thinks back to the time when he was member of the "Confederation of the morning land driver". Theme of the novel is his own admission the solitude of intellectual people and their personal life. H. H. tries to find an idea and a community to classify his desire for serving, finding community, and exemption from the barren lone brilliancy of the artist.

Though *The Journey to the East*, as Ziolkowski says, "reflects a development in Hesse's attitude, for the collective has taken precedence over the individual, a fact emphasized by the thematic stress on the ideal of service" (Ziolkowski, *The Novels of Hermann Hesse: A Study in Theme and Structure* 253-254), Hesse does not give up experiments with self-exploration and furthers it in *The Glass Bead Game*. The satisfied individual who has "completed the process of individuation need no longer insist enthusiastically upon his "precious personality". He is now "secure in

himself” and “can devote himself selflessly to the community” (Ziolkowski, *The Novels of Hermann Hesse: A Study in Theme and Structure* 253-254), but it cannot be denied that the individual in Hesse keeps on seeking, and seeks even in *The Glass Bead Game*.

The setting of *The Glass Bead Game* is an imaginary province of central Europe called Castalia and the story takes place at an unspecified date alluding to centuries into the future. Castalia is reserved by political decision for the life of the intellect. At the same time, it is also decided that it will remain indifferent to technology and economic matters. It is thus reserved for this stern order of intellectuals with a double mission. The first objective is to run boarding schools for boys, and the second one is to foster and play the Glass Bead Game, whose exact nature remains obscure and whose devotees occupy a special school within Castalia known as Waldzell. The rules of the game are not specified and clarified, and are so complicated that they are not easy to understand. It needs years of hard study of music, mathematics, and cultural history to play the game efficiently. In essence, the game is an abstract confluence of all arts and sciences. It is played only in the spoken form with abstract formulas. Players have to establish deep relations between apparently irrelevant topics. Thus, the game has adopted nearly a quasi-ritual character; the goal is to make deep connections between seemingly non-related subjects and to identify theoretical similarities between the arts and sciences.

The novel basically describes the life of a distinguished member of the Castalian Order, Joseph Knecht, who is also referred to as Magister Ludi, which is a play on words, since the Latin word ‘ludus’ means both ‘school’ and ‘game’ and ‘Magister’ means ‘teacher’. ‘Ludi’ is the plural of ‘ludus’. Magister Ludi thus means ‘master of the game’. The story records Knecht's schooling as a youth, his choice to become a member of the order, his efficiency in the Game, and his development in the order's hierarchy to become *Magister Ludi* in due course, the decision-making official of the Order's Glass Bead Game. He is significantly, impressed by the Music Master, one of the residents of Castalia, who appoints Knecht as a young student and has the most enduring and insightful influence on him throughout his life. As a student, he develops another significant friendship with Plinio Designori, a student from a politically dominant family who is studying in Castalia as a guest. Knecht discusses his views on the future of Castalia with Designori who thinks that Castalia is an abstract idea and will have scant impact on the outside world.

Knecht spends a lot of time outside Castalia and therefore acquires experience of the outer world also although he is educated within Castalian order. This experience finally shows its influence in his choosing to accept the external more than the illusory Castalian world. He, unlike the members of the order, goes out and learns Chinese, and many other things to enhance his knowledge. In course of time, he begins to question his loyalty to the order. The Castalian order holds that those who are intellectually privileged have a right to withdraw from life's big problems.

He gradually comes to doubt that the intellectually gifted have a right to withdraw from life's great problems. He starts viewing Castalia as an illusory world which has nothing to do with the practical world. It seems to him to be an ethereal and secluded community. He thinks that it is unaware of the problems outside its borders. He realizes that mere pure intellectual pursuits cannot solve the problems of man. This assumption raises a personal predicament and shakes his views as regards his awakening. Consequently, he resigns as Magister Ludi and asks to leave the order, apparently to become of value and service to the larger humanity. Though the members of the order request him not to resign, he does not adhere to the order. In the practical world, he takes a job as a tutor to the vigorous and strong-willed son of his friend Designori. Servant must realize that is because of the global political situation and the existence of Castalia on shaky ground. Of the friars, he warns, is not understood, and called to order, he left the academic world in order to devote himself to the service of a young man, the impolite and uneducated boy Designori Tito, the son of his old adversary Plinio.

The central hypothesis in the novel is the educational state of Castalia. It is an intellectual order of a selected class of people. Envisioned as a school of learning to avoid the degradation of all learning, this province is committed to the dissemination of thought and idea as an end in itself. It has a scholarly monocacy, devoted to the realm of the intellect. Epitomizing the paternal intellect, it has no place for women and procreation, grimaces upon all sexual and sensual concerns, and distances itself as much as possible from emotional response, sensibility and instinct. Its aim is to map out and reorganize intricate logical systems through which all these patterns of thought are related. It is both a unanimous language and a symbolic deductive system through which association, contact and interaction among statistics, figures and information

gathered from all the arts and sciences can be compared and put to practice. But it also purports to be a music of life. The main purpose of the Castalian order is the continuation and excellence of the game of Glass Beads, to which its sophisticated, intricate and highly structured educational system, its hierarchies and observances are dedicated. The Castalians's aspiration is integrate and amalgamate all the forms of human learning and choose music and mathematics as the best expression of the human spirit:

It is essential to understand that Knecht's defection from Castalia, far from implying any repudiation of the spiritual ideal, simply calls for a new consciousness of the social responsibility of the intellectual. He warns these intellectuals to give up their arrogant and self-satisfying game which can lead only to inbreeding . . . He makes a commitment by putting spirit and intellect at the service of the world. (Gropper, "The Disenchanted Turn to Hesse" 981).

The structure of *The Glass Bead Game* is made of conflicting images. The most operative images are the intellectual concepts, paradigms and hypotheses, such as the Game, or abstract ideas illuminating the oppositions of the novel. On the other hand, the journey into the world described in the conclusion creates an image of nature in all its diversity; its images seem to be pictures viewed by Knulp or Goldmund. This contrast interprets the novel's dialectic in which creative, imaginative, resourceful and disordered nature appears as the fascia of Castalia's ordered, regular and harmonious forms.

Castalia depicts the idea of opposites as a system. On the one hand, it exhibits a formal figure rather than a world in time because it is separate and protected and also discards movement and change. Mathematical affairs take the place of a changeable historical world. On the other hand, it seeks to synthesize dialectically the individual world of the instinct, fantasy and imagination and the logics. Knecht's respected teacher, the Old Music Master, tells him about the union, the synthesis of the various forms:

Remember this: one can be a strict logician or grammarian, and at the same time full of imagination and music. One can be a musician or Glass Bead Game player and at the same time wholly devoted to rule and order. The kind of person

we want to develop, the kind of person we aim to become, would at any time be able to exchange his discipline or art for any other. He would infuse the Glass Bead Game with crystalline logic, and grammar with creative imagination. (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

Castalia has many weaknesses, and surprisingly enough, the hero, the Magister Ludi, who eventually emerges as the best representative of Castalia, enumerates its weaknesses. First of all, it is worth noting that Castalians are secluded from all worldly responsibilities. It is an intellectual society in without any practicality. It is a hierarchical society in which every Castalian is expected to find his true place in the hierarchy. The hierarchy is perceived as an accord in which each plays his true role. A promotion in the hierarchy is considered as an opportunity to serve the Order. Father Jacobus very moderately presents Castalia's weakness, telling a somewhat older and wiser Joseph:

You are great scholars and aesthetes, you Castalians. You measure the weight of the vowels in an old poem and relate the resulting formula to that of a planet's orbit. That is delightful, but it is a game. And indeed your supreme mystery and symbol, the Glass Bead Game, is also a game. I grant that you try to exalt this pretty game into something akin to a sacrament, or at least to a device for edification. But sacraments do not spring from such endeavors. The game remains a game. (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

It is in this passage that we can discern Hesse's own doubts about Castalia and the Game, or about the questions of intellect for intellect's sake and art for art's sake. Joseph Knecht too observes that there are certain weaknesses in the Game. He, however, acquiesces. But the greatest weakness lies not in the Game but in the very Concept of Castalia. He points out the unproductivity of the Castalian Order:

We analyze the laws and techniques of all the styles and periods of music . . . but produce no new music ourselves. We read and exposit Pindar or Goethe and are ashamed to create verse ourselves. Those are accusations I cannot laugh at. And they are not the worst; . . . It is bad enough when he says, for example, that we

Castalians lead the life of artificially reared songbirds, do not earn our bread ourselves, never face necessity and the struggle for existence, neither know or wish to know anything about that portion of humanity whose labor and poverty provide the base for our lives of luxury." (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

The novel is equilibrium of opposing themes. Time and timelessness, reason and feeling are handled in close union. The oppositions of intellect and instinct are transparent in Knecht's biography. His life shows a cycle which mirrors the cycles of the Game but, moving beyond them also completes their dialectical purpose. He rises from the chaos of instinct to the world of intellect. His admission in Castalia, which he takes as his spiritual birth, seems to him to be the most significant occasion of his life. But, having acquired knowledge of the world of intellect, he moves beyond it, eventually returning to nature or the world of instinct.

Every stage of Knecht's education contains elements of its opposite. His problem is that of his double nature and which all the protagonists of Hesse face. Knecht may be compared to Harry Haller, Narziss and Goldmund, or H. H. and Leo. Like them he is also a seeker of the spirit and intellect. But he, however, includes an awareness of the manifold of human nature. The order entails the person's submission without his yielding completely all distinct and individual qualities.

"For us, the only hero worthy of our interest is a man who has been enabled by nature and education to allow his person to doddle almost entirely its hierarchical function, yet without losing that strong, fresh, admirable drive which creates the flavor and value of the individual."

In Hesse's method, the conflict between individual and order also articulates a tension of two kinds of mental image. The intellectual order is a tangible complement to the instinctive image. The Castalian order proclaims that a man who yields to the order and accepts its intellectual concerns can have a visualization of the spirit—a concern of the rational order without individual excitement. But a man concerned with the world of ideas may find his attracted by a sensual world, a Dionysian world, which distracts attention and concentration into chaos. With the Game of Glass Beads, the Castalian gives up his personal vision to an idealistic vision. This conflict between the individual vision and the idealistic vision pervades throughout the novel.

Hesse keeps on handling the opposites of nature and intellectualism, instinct and intellect in all contexts. Here the dichotomy exists between the self and the formal nature of the Glass Bead Game. The character in the novel reflects the oppositions of the game, the Castalian world, and the human hero at the same time.

The relationship between the protagonist and his ideal conveys itself also in an opposition of successive progress, structured on time. It also reflects the cycle structured on geometric form. As a symbolic quest, *The Glass Bead Game* coincides with a linear and dialectical ascent. This evolution is also suggested by the novel of education, the *bildungsroman* which traces Knecht's evolution from a boy in the primary grades to the most dignified and illustrious spokesperson of the order:

Joseph Knecht, the finest representative of human knowledge, as he works out his fate in the twilight of the Age of Reason. At the outset, the period seems far from a "twilight": through synthesis of all intellectual disciplines and development of an elite intelligentsia, the intellectual has freed himself from all bondage to society except an economic one which at the moment exacts no repressive control over the intellectual establishment centered at Castalia; the damage caused by twentieth-century political and military control of the intellectual has brought society to its senses. The intellectual is free. But he uses his freedom to worship Truth in itself in the form of the Glass Bead Game ruled by its priest, Castalia's most influential member, the Master of the Game—the Magister Ludi. Truth worshipped without an ethical obligation to human nature becomes, however, worship of something else: Beauty, a beauty of the symmetry and harmony of the systems of Truth appealing alike to the pure mathematician and the pure musician. Meanwhile, society is left to its own devices. Human nature responds to itself alone. (Casebeer141).

The technique of opposition within most of Hesse's protagonists between the self in the world of sense experience and its idealization is engrossed in the novel's world as a whole.

It is worth noting that the opposition of ideas is clearly declared. It has already been affirmed that in the chronicle in the novel, men and institutions seek to follow rules above empirical laws. In the legends and appendices, as given in the novel, they act through an instinctive consciousness of the empirical world. The protagonist is so defined and comprehensive that he includes both its teachings and its intrinsic contradictions. In his service, he does not change but only echoes what he sees. He tells his mind as he sees. Even in the beginning he has a lot of doubts, but he does not unleash them because of so many inculcative educations. Even when he resigns, he carries out a duality, a dichotomy which had been implicit all along. The novel seems to be ironical in when it raises an intellectual order and rejects it at a certain stage. Such subsequent rejection speaks of Hesse's endorsement of the idea that ideas can always be stagnant and therefore must keep on changing.

The novel's gist lies in the delicate and ingenious consistency of dialectically opposed ideas, themes and patterns. It is a dialectical process of ideas which finally lead to synthesis of opposing facts. In a dialectical development of ideas, themes and patterns, the two elements of opposition are always contrasted and resolved. This disagreement is typified by Knecht's successful assignment to a Benedictine monastery, during which he brings about a *mode of living* between the devout and worldly orders. His adversary, father Jakobus, discards Castalia's ideal society which has no sense of responsibility. Genuine *spirit* is indisputable and unchangeable. From its observances to its array of buildings, to the levels of authority, Castalia is edified as a strictly formal figure. At the same time, such a pattern of unity and harmony is dialectically opposed to the world of sense and experience in which it inevitably exists. Hesse consciously created Castalia in the form of a cycle. It is undeniable that this world contains the very change it abhors.

The chapter "the two poles" reflects the two extremes of Knecht's life: his loyalty to the glass bead game, to Castalia, and his own personal instincts. The former prescribes an austere life of intellect whereas the latter demands its absence. Consequently, there is a disagreement between the internal and the external world:

The two tendencies or antipodes of this life, its Yin and Yang, were the conservative tendency toward loyalty, toward unstinting service of the hierarchy on the one hand, and on the other hand the tendency toward "awakening," toward advancing, toward apprehending reality. (Hesse, *Magister Ludi*).

Knecht is placed between two extremes—one is his logical world of Castalia, namely idealization, and the other is that of the instinct, which inspires him to avoid idealization. He is portrayed as being both serious and serene; he resembles an ascetic and, at the same time, a dancer, a leader of men and yet also a child. The effect is to create the impression that Knecht bridges the divide between the world of reason and the realm of the imagination, the distinct poles. It is a synthesis too perfect to be compatible with reality.

The balance of the novel lies in the relationship between the world of intellect and of nature or instinct. With his decision to leave Castalia to become a tutor to his friend's son, Knecht's personal cycle represents the cycle of the game. His introduction to the world of intellect under the effect of the music master is reiterated as a beginning into the world of the instinct. Upon entering the world of instinct, Knecht emphasizes a new contrast between the norms of *instinct* and the Castalian norms of *intellect* and so brings forth another cycle. Indeed, Knecht's coming back to the instinct is another stride on the spiral stairs of the dialectic of the game and its rational effect.

Music performs a balancing role, reconciling the differences in terms of abstract laws which, however, reflect a sense of freedom. For Knecht, the music master is personified as the best representative of the Castalian order. He reveres him as his initiator, and, by going a step beyond him to the master of the game, he reifies his teachings yet more impeccably. But finally he also denies agreeing with his teacher by realizing the intrinsic contradictions of the Castalian world and by performing as per his recognition. There is a dualism between Castalia and the outside world. The novel's dialectic as a whole is affirmed in showing man's striving for unity. The biographies reiterate in more vividly imagistic terms for Knecht's quest for the visualization of unity.

The protagonist is put back as the novel's main theme by an assemblage of three forms: Castalia, the game of glass beads, and Knecht. The tension between *intellect* and *instinct* is described following this triad. Several narrative voices are brought together to make up a polyphonic rendering of Knecht's life and development. The implicit dialectic also characterizes the game of glass beads. It can deserve mention only in the realm of *the intellect*. Its sole purpose seems to harmonize the intellectual universe. And what we see here is Hesse as a man motivated for the reconciliation of opposites.

Hesse wanted a new principle that could exceed the traditional duality between good and evil and accept all extremes of life in one unified vision. In *Magister Ludi*, the Knecht strives to accept the longings of his inner self.

Finally, the game itself is ambiguous. It, however, purports to be a kind of synthesis of human learning in which various dissimilar themes are coalesced and even amalgamated. As it proceeds, relations between the themes acquire deeper and varied meanings. Although it is described intelligibly, the rules and mechanics are not explained in detail.

Hesse illustrates the game with full creative consciousness in such a way that it gives the impression of something flamboyantly true in the novel. Even so, he does not give any such detail which can enable it to be imitated in reality. But, most important of all, it should be understood that Hesse did not invent the game with the purpose of its imitation in reality. Had he intended so, he would have provided the complete set of rules required for the game to be played. Undoubtedly, it cannot be played, and so was Hesse's intention. But those people who are humourless and take the game literally for a game cannot understand the fact. The game, in fact, has been used as means for the sake of a symbolic representation of man's imagination and the world:

Symbolically, in a game performed according to the strictest rules with supreme virtuosity, the mandarins of a new culture work out a mental synthesis of all the spiritual values of all ages. Castalia, Joseph Knecht's sanctuary (clearly Hesse's in his own continuing search for a spiritual dimension of life) becomes a realm where all of the best thoughts and values are kept alive through the practice of the Glass Bead Game. It is a future society in which our youth has learned to distrust.

The game is superbly constructed, a product of tremendous experience and imagination and, because it incorporates so much of our irrational behavior, engaging and funny. Not to see the humor is to miss the fun and to miss the irony with which it was written. (Gropper, "The Disenchanted Turn to Hesse" 981).

This game lies at the heart of Castalian society. Since it is never clearly defined, it is proper to understand it as a kind of imaginative and intellectual play in which contraries are first explored as contraries, then recognized as integral elements necessary for a synthesis or unity. The Music Master describes that the game is really a medium through which a person may realize perfection in him and by means of that discovery can lead a more harmonious life. He says: "Each of us is merely one human being, merely an experiment, a way station. But each of us should be on the way toward perfection, should be striving to reach the center, not the periphery" (Hesse, *Magister Ludi*).

Hesse seems to have developed the game as out of music and mathematics. It is a combination of knowledge and ideas. It is more or less left to the reader's imagination with a few hints at sources and influences but with no clarification of how it really works. It is an allegory for a belief-system of esoteric and thoughtful universe which has existed all through each culture known to man. This idealistic cosmology is a representation of the basic system of order found in Castalia. These systems are generally represented through figurative varieties such as myths, legends, geometry, alchemy, hieroglyphics, harmonics, arithmetic, folklore, astronomy, magic, and so on, but what they all have in general is a unified idea of the procedure of expression of the world. Binary logic is a language into which the arts, sciences and humanities can be condensed, and can be used to symbolize musical, poetic, mathematical, ideas in union:

The Glass Bead Game is a ceremony partially academic and partially religious in character. Although Knecht's biographer states that its details are too complex for the layman to comprehend, its basis seems to be a symbolic language uniting the content and methods of all the arts and sciences; as the twentieth century logic so important to our computers has derived from a merging of logic and mathematics, so did the Game derive from a merging of mathematical and musical symbolic systems, which in turn was extended to express and unify the

rest of the academic disciplines. Its potential is limitless; it can produce "the entire intellectual content of the universe" through infinite combinations of themes from different disciplines brought into different harmonies unique to the individual player . . . (Casebeer, *Hermann Hesse* 141-44).

The Glass Bead Game is the creative and thoughtful handling of the representative forms which give vent to these systems of knowledge. These symbolic forms symbolize a system of language known only to a few who have looked for or been initiated into this uncommon and most esoteric wisdom. He describes it as a language which uses symbols as letters in an alphabet expressing a unknown language. There is no way to study symbolic language. Moreover, it seems feasible that game has an aesthetic beauty in the novel, for the game as described in the text gives an idea of form. It is clear that at a very basic level, the Game is an effort to create a musical polyphony of ideas rather than of music. Melody governs the Game:

All the insights, noble thoughts, and works of art that the human race has produced in its creative eras, all that subsequent periods of scholarly study have reduced to concepts and converted into intellectual property -- on all this immense body of intellectual values the Glass Bead Game player plays like the organist on an organ. And this organ has attained an almost unimaginable perfection; its manuals and pedals range over the entire intellectual cosmos; its stops are almost beyond number. (Hesse, *Magister Ludi*).

There is an ambiguity about the nature and rules of the game. Is it possible that intellectuals may be only preoccupied with the bead game and forget their reading and writing? Can they likewise not desire success and fame? No, it is not feasible.

The concept of the Bead Game seems to display similarity to the ideas of Leibniz who talks of a universally formal scientific language. The binary logic, which starts with Leibniz, motivated all computing, whatever specific architecture may be used. The Glass Bead Game is a game of binary logic. It is essentially a kind of mental synthesis of the different values of all ages and cultures. These values are seen vividly and the players welcome the nature of the world of appearances and enjoy its participation. But the game is contended by Plinio:

Plinio can say the most startling and discouraging things. For example, he contends that the Glass Bead Game is a retrogression to the Age of the Feuilleton, sheer irresponsible playing around with an alphabet into which we have broken down the languages of the different arts and sciences. It's nothing but associations and toying with analogies, he says. Or again he declares that our resigned sterility proves the worthlessness of our whole culture and our intellectual attitudes. We analyze the laws and techniques of all the styles and periods of music, he points out, but produce no new music ourselves. We read and exposit Pindar or Goethe and are ashamed to create verse ourselves. (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

Initially in the novel Plinio Designiori and Knecht argue the virtual qualities of Castalia and the world. Their opposition is obviously straightforward. Designiori speaks in favour of the world, and Knecht supports and values the order. But in excellently endorsing Castalia, Knecht represses his own doubts and thoughts that come freely in his soul. On the other hand, his friend Designiori shows both a thorough knowledge of the institutions in which he had been educated and his personal fondness and love for an instinctive and experiential way of life. Designiori comes to Castalia to study the game as a hobby. Designiori applies for admission to the Castalian order just as Magister Ludi decides to leave. In reversing their positions, each shows an analogous affection for the other's world. Like Demian and Sinclair, Siddhartha and Govinda, Narziss and Goldmund, they too reflect each other. They also represent the differences and contradictions between Castalia and the world.

In a number of ways, these two characters play roles in a fashion with which Hesse characterizes all his novels. They are symbolic or figurative dignitaries representing stages in the protagonist's quest. These are the mirroring of the conflicts of Knecht's dual nature. This feature can also be found in the minor figures, such as the Castalian "hot house flower" Tegularius or Knecht's predecessor Master Thomas von der Trave. All these characters reflect Knecht's conflicts but, in so doing, they also show the dialectic of ideas underlying both Castalia and the game. They reflect the protagonist as Pablo, Hermine and Maria reflect the nature of Harry Haller. Hesse has used the technique of mirroring in all his novels. In *The Glass Bead Game*, too, mirroring goes beyond the intellectual scheme into the world of instinct through corresponding figures in the fictional biographies given at the end of the novel.

Castalia is a rigid world in which individual's development is not possible. It is governed by stagnant rules which are worthless at a certain period of time. It is based on starkly stagnant intellectualism and therefore cannot foster any creativity. A number of instances are found to flout the principles of the Castalian order and to show its shortcomings. The Music Master, however, never tries to inculcate his own knowledge or understanding to his students, but gently leads them to find those possibilities of knowledge within themselves. For instance, he explains to Knecht:

To be candid, I myself, for example, have never in my life said a word to my pupils about the 'meaning' of music; if there is one, it does not need my explanations. On the other hand, I have always made a great point of having my pupils count their eighths and sixteenths nicely. Whatever you become, teacher, scholar, or musician, have respect for the 'meaning', but do not imagine that it can be taught. (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

In the ninth chapter, it becomes clear that Plinio feels himself fortunate to have known the outside world very well. He has seen both sides while Joseph Knecht has remained a virtually narrow-minded person within a narrowly circumscribed institutional existence. But ultimately he also realizes that true knowledge and experience lie in the outside world. After eight years as Magister Ludi, he sets on his journey to start a new life outside. That he should not adhere to the order cannot be believed in Castalia, for he is probably the best representative of the order. Knecht issues an open letter—written in part by a little neurotic friend, Tegularius—in which the game is bitterly criticized on the basis that it is an ephemeral cultural phenomenon, subject to the vicissitudes of time and to the benevolence or otherwise of the secular governments on whose financial support the republic of aesthetes is totally dependent. the whole Castalian order is thus debunked by Knecht.

There is no need of women in Castalia, for the place of women is taken up by involvements with boys and other men. It is province devoid of procreation. In such conditions, it is also natural that the students of the schools of Castalia would be shy, introvert and sexually retarded. Marriage is something “which every Castalian secretly longed to know more about”, but they cannot know because it is looked down upon. It is so unusual that:

In Castalia the sweetheart of a student does not ask herself: will he marry me? She knows he will not. Actually, there have been occasions when he did; every so often an elite student would return to the world by way of marriage, giving up Castalia and membership in the Order. But these few, rare cases of apostasy in the history of the schools and of the Order amount to little more than a curiosity. (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

Castalia is an impractical state and the Game is a theoretical musing. The circumstances in which contact is made with the opposite sex are strange and implausible. Thus, Castalia is a world of males and no female characters play any role in its affairs. Not only has this, the third biography of Knecht explicitly evinced a male world. People are busy with their rules of meditation. But where does this meditation lead them to? Probably, it leads them nowhere. It is nothing but a method of suppressing natural emotions.

From the very beginning, Knecht himself is shown as having some ambivalence about Castalia and the Game. Thus when his friend, Plinio argues with him regarding this, Joseph writes to the Magister Musicae:

For to be perfectly frank with you, dear Master, there is something in Plinio's point of view that I cannot gainsay; he appeals to a voice within me which sometimes strongly seconds what he says. Presumably it is the voice of nature, and it runs utterly counter to my education and the outlook customary among us. When Plinio calls our teachers and Masters a priestly caste and us a pack of spoon-fed eunuchs, he is of course using coarse and exaggerated language, but there may well be some truth to what he says, for otherwise I would hardly be so upset by it. Plinio can say the most startling and discouraging things. (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

He accepts the Dionysian side of reality and continues: "Presumably it is the voice of nature, and it runs utterly counter to my education and the outlook customary among us. When Plinio calls our teachers and Masters a priestly caste and us a pack of spoon-fed eunuchs, he is of course using coarse and exaggerated language, but there may well be some truth to what he says, for otherwise I would hardly be so upset by it" (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

Knecht has doubts about the Glass Bead Game. He acknowledges these to his teacher who suggests him about the limits of the human consciousness: “There is truth, my boy. But the doctrine you desire, absolute, perfect dogma that alone provides wisdom, does not exist. Nor should you long for a perfect doctrine, my friend. Rather, you should long for the perfection of yourself. The deity is within *you*, not in ideas and books. Truth is lived, not taught.” (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

Although Knecht is the Magister Ludi, some of his experiences have led him to question the relationship between Castalia and the world. He feels that the excessive aestheticism of Castalia cannot prove its utility. He is aware of the prospective worthlessness of the Order.

The Glass Bead Game requires a cultural condition in which nothing new, exciting, and adventurous is discovered and created. It requires only a conducive condition for a self-purposive, vain and uninspired handling of cultural stereotypes. The advent of such a cultural condition was the concern of many intellectuals in the first half of the twentieth century.

In his formal farewell discussion with the President of the Order, the Magister Alexander, Joseph Knecht sounds some of the notes which relates to his Dionysian instinct. He describes his initial unwillingness to enter the Vicus Lusorum. He acknowledges that the game demands more effort and energy, and it is a mental exercise. Contrary to it, he always finds an instinctual drive within him:

I had also observed fairly early that this enchanting Game demanded more than naive amateur players, that it took total possession of the man who had succumbed to its magic. And an instinct within me rebelled against my throwing all my energies and interests into this magic forever. Some naive feeling for simplicity, for wholeness and soundness, warned me against the spirit of the Waldzell Vicus Lusorum. I sensed in it a spirit of specialism and virtuosity, certainly highly cultivated, certainly richly elaborated, but nevertheless isolated from humanity and the whole of life -- a spirit that had soared too high into haughty solitariness. For years I doubted and probed, until the decision had matured within me . . . (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

For the "world" was the same thing for a Castalian that it had long ago been for the penitents and monks: something inferior and forbidden, no doubt, but nonetheless mysterious, tempting, fascinating. And Plinio truly made no secret of his attachment to the world; he was not in the least ashamed of it. On the contrary, he was proud of it. With a zeal still half boyish and histrionic, but also half consciously propagandistic, he stressed his own differentness. He seized every pretext for setting his secular views and standards against those of Castalia, and contending that his own were better, juster, more natural, more human. In these arguments he bandied about words like "nature" and "common sense," to the discredit of the over-refined, unworldly spirit of the school. He made use of slogans and hyperbole, but had the good taste and tact not to descend to crude provocations, but more or less to give the methods of disputation customary in Waldzell their due. He wanted to defend the "world" and interrogated the unreflective life of the "arrogant scholastic intellectuality" of Castalia. He did not want to be thought the dull-witted brute blindly trampling around in the flower garden of culture. (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

Designiori is the Dionysian well represented by Goldmund in *Narziss and Goldmund*. But the story is concerned with the development of Joseph Knecht, who, an Apollonian in the beginning, turns out to be a Dionysian by showing his distaste for the intellectually maintained order of Castalia. The Castalian society is declared impractical, for it is abstract and does not involve the real activities of the world. The very name, Castalia, is taken from a nymph of the Greek legend in which it is related to the god Apollo. The Castalian society, therefore, represents the Apollonian. Knecht rejects such intellectualism and embarks on his journey to the empirical, Dionysian world.

Thus Hesse's novels show a constant engagement with the Apollonian and the Dionysian and the ensuing dialectics in Hesse seems to mostly end in a general foregrounding of the latter over the former, leading to me having studied the same in this chapter and accordingly titled it "The Dionysian Mode of Knowledge Formation", though his novels, as is evident deals with both the Apollonian and the Dionysian.

Hesse's continuous reappraisal of the Dionysian and the Apollonian tendencies of the human mind is represented in all his novels. The Dionysian, the unconscious, instinct, femininity, creativity—all pertain to the same category and Hesse's protagonists develop their personality following this very empirical method. The following chapter discusses this process of empirical development through the instinctive and sensory Dionysiac.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Empirical Self

The Third Chapter purportedly shows how the human personality is a synthesis of the polar opposites of the Apollonian and Dionysian forces. It also concludes that Hesse individualised his protagonists not through the Apolline process but through the Dionysian one that permits the wanderer to empirically realise his personality in the real world. But it is not rejection of the Apollonian altogether, however. Rather, Hesse posited a concord of the oppositions, but only after undergoing the intoxicating experience of the Dionysiac. All the protagonists start their journey to self-quest as adolescents or youths and gather knowledge and experience from the world. They develop and emerge like figures that have realised their self, who have realised their evolution as a person; this feature ascribes each novel of Hesse the category of a *bildungsroman*.

The Dionysian, the mode of individuation that most of Hesse's protagonists follow, can be identified with the unconscious. Unconscious is the storehouse of ideas, feelings, and desires. The emergence of any feeling, idea or desire has its direct connection with the unconscious. The Dionysian represents the unconscious. Both are instinctual, irrational, and without rules. Both are based on and structured through empirical realities. It is the unconscious that stores the experiences which makes the personality. The conscious forgets the effects of any experience soon. But the unconscious stores it and shapes the personality. While the unconscious accepts all ideas, the conscious accepts only those which are censored by it. Thus, any experience first has its influence on the unconscious. It follows from this that the unconscious is structured through experience—the experience which is later modified by the conscious. However, Oskar Siedlin has shown his disagreement in considering Freud's unconscious synonymous with the Dionysian. But even when they cannot be used synonymously, they share some common features.

The typical drifter of the twentieth century fiction is always engaged with the workings of his own mind, always in quest of meanings and its centres. Disillusioned by the moral and ethical problems posed by the century, he strives to create meanings of his own. So are Hesse's heroes

who seek meaning in the real world, who seek the meaning of the individual self. But does Hesse offer them a stereotypical answer? No, he leaves them free to wander, to accumulate, to discern, to experience as per their own 'system' of knowledge acquisition. By 'system' is meant their self-developed process and not imposed from outside. Thus bohemians, iconoclasts, and outsiders dominate the twentieth century fiction.

Hesse's method is that of a dialectical triad in the process of individuation. The triad consists of thesis, and antithesis and synthesis. It can be seen on basically two different levels: on the psychological level and on the narrative level. On the first one, all the characters and movements of the story are taken as a representation, or rather reflection of the protagonist's own self. On the narrative level, the protagonist is always accompanied by a companion who is set straightforwardly in sharp contrast to him and who acts as his mentor or guide. On both the levels, the process of development is dialectical, which though follows the process of Hegelian dialectics is not Hegelian, for Hegelian dialectics posits a transcendental signified.

Firstly, it must be clarified that on the first level of the triad, that is related to the development of the protagonist, the mode of individuation is empirical. The Dionysiac hero goes on his way to experience the world and comes back with a bundle of experiences, or 'a bundle of perceptions', to use Hume's terms. And secondly, on the other hand, it is also worth noting that it is only the protagonist whose development the novelist is concerned with and no other character develops at all. All other characters remain virtually the same throughout. In some novels the protagonist is Dionysian and in some his guide is Dionysian. In *The Prodigy*, the Hermann Heilner, who is certainly not the hero of the story, is presented as a Dionysian character.

Is there any attempt to go beyond the polar opposites? Nietzsche's concept of a possibility of transcending good and evil sounds relevant in this context. *Demian* exemplifies this very well. Sinclair's leaving the lighted world of home is a renunciation of one pole of the opposites. In the end he also experiences the other side of the opposites—the unsafe world outside. Excursion beyond is possible only after knowing the two sides of this dualism, never from the middle point, or from adhering to only one of them.

Hesse wrote elaborate essays on Dostoevsky; these essays reflect the dialectical nature of his thought. In the enlightening essay “My Belief” (1931), he maintains that there is an “underlying unity” in everything. But it is only through a “reconciliation of conflicting opposites” that the “experience of unity” which is a “synthesis” can be achieved. Hesse uses this process in all his novels (Ziolkowski, “Introduction” xiii).

Starting from his first novel *Peter Camenzind*, Hesse entered the world of seeking. But what is this seeking? He sought to know the reality of the self and life. Philosophy is always related to seeking the essence of life. He starts the journey of seeking which lasts until his last novel *The Glass Bead Game*, a *bildungsroman*. Do Hesse’s protagonists progress from self to knowledge of from knowledge to self realisation?

Which should be placed first—knowledge or self? The question poses complexity. In fact, it is a fundamental question in philosophy. Following the empiricist school, it can be said that it is knowledge that comes first. The individual gets sense experiences in the outer world and views his self in relation to it. In fact, his very cognition is built by his contact with the world. In course of his interactions with the world, he creates an image of himself in his own opinion. In this process, a lot of impressions are achieved by other people’s remarks about the image of a person, who in turn gives his responses that are either positive or negative. It thus follows from this that the image of a person in his own opinion or in other’s opinion is a social and obviously mental construct.

In this context, it is, therefore, the first imprint, if we follow the *tabula rasa* of Locke, that creates the most dominant influence and is the deciding factor of a person’s personality to a greater degree. The individual creates an image of his own and people in general have their own opinions regarding him. He acts as per his own image and people’s behaviour with him influences his behaviour. Therefore, the image an individual has of himself does not emerge innately. It is created by the perceptions and experiences of the individual. An American psychologist once said that one does not talk to and behave with an individual but with the image one has conceived or created of him. In this study, the concern is with the image the individual creates of himself in his own mind, and not with the social image, which pertains to the sociological study.

From this, we are definitely led to say that the exterior is as important as the interior. Probably, Hesse realised this and left his protagonists free to wander and experience the world, and to learn through their own senses, through their own sense experiences. Such learning is definitely and completely different from learning through ideas. It is different from the learning for the intellect, from theories and principles. It has a ground—a firm ground of sensory experiences and the instinct.

Of all Hesse's protagonists, Goldmund is the best to exemplify the empirically individuated hero. Though the process of Hesse's exploration of the individual self begins right from the beginning, namely from *Peter Camenzind*, it is fully pronounced in *Narziss and Goldmund*. In *Camenzind*, the protagonist goes out to become a poet. He wanders and experiences the real world and comes back. He spends most of his time watching and enjoying natural beauties. Meadows, green fields, lakes and rivers attract him most—a characteristic of modernist fiction in which man is found seeking to take recourse to nature and romanticism. Recounting experiences of his childhood, Camenzind says:

At that time in my life I did not know the names of the lake, mountains and streams of my native place. But I saw the smooth blue-green water sparkling with tiny lights in the sunshine and, in a close girdle around it, the steep mountains whose gulleys were filled with glistening snow in their topmost heights, tiny waterfalls, and at the foot, the bright, sloping meadows, peopled with orchards and grey Alpine cattle. (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 5).

The novel starts from the child's world, a description of Camenzind's childhood experiences. The very second line talks of the naturalness of "the soul of every child" (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 5). Camenzind watches trees, mountains, gentle meadows and all other natural beauties: "The sight of the trees affected me more seriously and more deeply. I watched each with its independent life, forming its own particular shape, casting its own individual shadow" (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 6-7). His village is situated by the side of a lake and there are other villages bordering the lake. He perceives the atmospheric beauty around him. This is how his cognition develops by observing natural objects peacefully, and he loves them throughout his life.

The journey to the exploration of the self is started right from the beginning, from *Peter Camenzind* itself. Camenzind acknowledges, “. . . I set forth on my journey into life . . . and have stood on my feet ever since . . .” (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 23). This quest is continued up to *The Glass Bead Game*, but not so clearly declared in a sentence. Though the novelist shows the features of a novice by making such straightforward statements, the statement is quite meaningful. It reflects the very spirit of Hesse’s writing after *Camenzind*.

Initially, Hesse too, like Camenzind, was not interested in interacting with human beings. He was more interested in objects of nature. This is evident in what he says:

My early, single-minded contact with the earth, its flora and fauna, has allowed few social graces to blossom in me, and to this day my dreams are a remarkable proof of my tendency towards a purely animal existence. I frequently dream that I am a creature lying on the shore, usually a seal, and I am conscious of such an intense feeling of well-being that on waking, I return to human dignity, not with pride or rejoicing, but only with regret. (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 23).

Close relationship with nature since childhood had made Hesse grow up with complete empathy with trees, plants and animals. Such is his Camenzind—the boy who feels more comfortable with trees. In fact, as he says, he learns to feel men as taught by trees. It should not be taken literally, however. The gist is that nature has made an imprint on the boy’s mind, since he has remained in the company of nature since childhood. The boy Camenzind recollects his childhood and finds that in the store house of his memory, his unconscious, there are experiences and sense perceptions which tell much more. As a child, he was not able to understand the implications such experiences. But the grown up Camenzind now understands their implications and recalls his empathy with the trees:

Our men and women resembled them; they were hard, close-knit, niggard of speech—the best of them, the more so. Hence I learned to look upon men as upon trees and rocks, to think about them, to honour and to love them just as I loved the quiet pines. (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 7).

Camenzind learns the lesson of freedom from natural objects rather than from society and its pre-established norms. The vagabond in Hesse to be developed fully in *Narziss und Goldmund* is prefigured in this hero of the mountains. This is more tangible from what Camenzind recollects: “O lovely, restless floating clouds! I was an ignorant child but I loved and contemplated them, little knowing that I too should go through life like a cloud, wandering, everywhere a stranger, floating between time and eternity” (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 17).

As the process of individuation starts from Camenzind through wandering and flouting the established norms, in the same way the mode of individuation begins with the empirical senses. These two patterns of development of the protagonist continue in all the novels of Hesse. The mind of the child Camenzind reminds one of Locke’s *tabula rasa*: “And as my poor little heart was so blank and quiet, full of expectancy, the spirits of the lake and mountains inscribed their fine and stirring deeds upon it” (Hesse, *Peter Camenzind* 5). The psychological and philosophical facts about Camenzind fascinated Sigmund Freud too, as Freedman says: “It is no wonder that no less an expert of unconscious longing than Sigmund Freud praised *Peter Camenzind* as one of his favourite readings” (117).

The process of self exploration in Camenzind starts with nature, as in *Siddhartha* and others, and leads through world experiences to self realization. In the process of self-realization, each protagonist has his guide or an opposite, who really do not guide him to follow any principle, but to follow the very way of his own nature. They follow their own experiences and therefore the process of their individuation is essentially empirical.

The Prodigy criticises the pedagogy that valued only the intellectual development of a student. Hesse goes back to the imagination of his school, childhood and adolescence. It turned the romantic perceptions of self and world into pictures of his region that were drawn minutely. Hesse’s memories of his childhood were deeply rooted. Kurt J. Fickert says that this novel “depicts the making of the outsider, the development of his awareness of the social organism and his separation from it, his becoming an isolated cell” (172). Hans Giebenrath struggles with the world in which he lives:

It is his father's world, the world of middle-class society which respects money, respectability, and God (from a distance). Hans performs well in school and as a reward is going to be allowed to become, at state expense, a theologian. But Hans already has the mark of the outsider (the mark of Cain): the awareness that he is something other, something better than his well-fed, carefree friends (p. 18). However, Hans does not resist being led down the first few steps of the well-defined path which leads the brilliant offspring of the middle class to a safe and respectable career in the church; he goes to the seminary at Maulbronn on a scholarship. Here he feels the full weight of the educational system, which, with regimentation as its goal, forces the plastic stuff of young lives into conventional molds. Here spirit and intelligence are oppressed . . . (Fickert 172).

A very important class of characters seems to belong to no social class at all. These are the artists, writers and musicians who have always been prominent in the German literature and continue to populate the novels of writers like Hesse. There is a very long tradition of "eccentrics" and non-conformists—men who are in any way outside of the Company or the accepted conventions. Particularly in the twentieth century novel, where the outsider, the bohemian seem to be the model rather than the follower, the outsider motif has become a more general phenomenon. All of Hesse's characters are of this very class. The outsider motif is found in all the novels of Hesse, but it is only in *Demian* that this motif is well-pronounced for the first time. In *Peter Camenzind*, the protagonist shows this attitude very lightly. *Prodigy* is "more limited in its treatment of the outsider because in it Hesse is still concerned with the epic quality of the novel" (Fickert 177). In it Hesse has not been able to crystallize the outsider motif: "The very fact that the novel does not succeed, however, is due to the schism which results when Hesse abandons his epic presentation to make Hans Giebenrath a symbol of outsider-ness" (Fickert 177).

It is the outsider who develops his self through experiences, and it is in *Demian* that he starts his development perceptibly. Sinclair finds his path by flouting the existing systems of thoughts. He cannot develop his self without criticising social norms. *Demian* points out the need to understand both the permitted and the forbidden, when he advises Sinclair:

Therefore each one of us must discover for himself what is permitted and what is forbidden as far as he *himself* is concerned. . . . Whoever is too complacent to think for himself and be his own judge manages to accommodate himself to the 'shalt nots' as they exist at the present time. It is easy for him. But there are others who are conscious of the commandments in themselves; things are forbidden to them which every man does every day of his life, and other things are permitted to them which are otherwise prohibited. Every man must stand alone. (Hesse, *Demian* 70).

Standing alone entails a lot of difficulty; Sinclair has to set of his journey against what he has been taught in schools. He finds standing alone, that is, independence from the established system of thoughts as "hard" and "unpalatable", for it requires much "responsibility", but it is necessary for "self-reliance" (Hesse, *Demian* 68). He starts thinking freely and living his ideas. He experiences independently and appreciates Demian, who says: "Only the ideas that we really *live* have any value. You have known that your 'permitted' world was only half of the world and you have tried to subjugate the second half after the manner of the priests and teachers. It will not be to your benefit! It benefits no one once he has begun to think" (Hesse, *Demian* 69).

Sinclair does not profess himself as an intellectual unlike the educated people of his society. He does not like to be called great as the so-called great people have loved to be called. He is a true seeker who does not say that this or that is the ultimate truth. His is a philosophy of continuous change and development. He learns not only from books but also, and mostly, from his senses, from his sensory perceptions. Therefore, he says:

I cannot call myself a scholar. I have always been and still am a seeker but I no longer do my seeking among the stars or in books. . . . Mine is not a pleasant story, it does not possess the gentle harmony of invented tales; like the lives of all men who have given up trying to deceive themselves, it is a mixture of nonsense and chaos, madness and dreams. (Hesse, *Demian* 6).

The middle-class who has learnt to translate a part of its feelings into thoughts, misses the experiences themselves. Conversely stands Sinclair who feels everything without any

predilection. He falls in love many times. The empiricist mode of his individuation is very evident in his expression. He says that his very first meeting with Beatrice “made a deeper impression on me than anything before, and this infatuation had a profound influence on my life” (Hesse, *Demian* 87).

Transcending the dichotomies of good and evil, Sinclair proceeds to the third level of his development. But at all the levels, it is the mother principle which ultimately leads him to understand the basic unity of life. He comes to an acceptance of himself through his love for Demian's mother, named significantly Eva. It can be compared with a new awakening through the image of a bird struggling out of the egg. In *Narziss and Goldmund* it is the rediscovery of his mother which initially puts Goldmund in touch with his own nature, and at the end of the book it is to the mother figure of Frau Eva that he returns, where a clear relationship is established with the world of nature.

Nietzsche is mentioned several times in the text of *Demian*. Zarathustra is referred to many times. Like Nietzsche's Zarathustra, Sinclair experiences that man is not a complete and perfect being as he comes into the world, but only a trajectory of nature in the direction of the perfect man. This view echoes Nietzsche's concept of the Superman. The following is an instance of how Sinclair is impressed with Nietzsche's writing when he says:

During those weeks I had begun to read a book that made a more lasting impression on me than anything I had read before. Even later in life I have rarely experienced a book more intensely, except perhaps Nietzsche. It was a volume of Novalis, containing letters and aphorisms of which I understood only a few but which nevertheless held an inexpressible attraction for me. One of the aphorisms occurred to me now and I wrote it under the picture: "Fate and temperament are two words for one and the same concept." That was clear to me now. (Hesse, *Demian* 36).

During the period of profound loneliness after the rupture with Pistorious, the works of Nietzsche provide a source of consolation:

“A few weeks later I was enrolled as a member of the university of H--. I found everything disappointing. The course of lectures on the history of philosophy which I attended was as uninspired and stereotyped as the activities of the undergraduates. They were all so much to pattern; everybody behaved in an identical way and the animated gaiety on their boyish faces looked empty and artificial. But I was free. I had the whole day to myself, I lived in peace and comfort in a tumble-down house just outside the town and I had a few volumes of Nietzsche on my table. I lived with him, felt the loneliness of his soul, shared his prescience of the fate that drove him unceasingly on, suffered with him and rejoiced that there had been one man who had relentlessly followed his destiny.”(Hesse, *Demian* 146-147).

Besides direct references, there are also many indirect hints of Nietzsche’s influence. The herd culture is undoubtedly a Nietzschean concept. “I stood at the street corner listening as this punctually rehearsed gaiety of youth rang out in the night from the two inns. Community spirit everywhere, sitting about together everywhere, everywhere escape from fate and flight to cosy firesides!” (Hesse, *Demian* 146-147). Nietzsche’s observation that man is a status, a journey towards development is very well echoed in the following words of Demian:

The life of every man is a way to himself, an attempt at a way, the suggestion of a path. No man has ever been utterly himself, yet every man strives to be so, the dull, the intelligent, each one as best he can. Each man to the end of his days carries round with him vestiges of his birth—the slime and egg-shells of the primeval world. There are many who never become human; they remain frogs, lizards, ants. Many men are human beings above and fish below. Yet each one represents an attempt on the part of nature to create a human being. We enjoy a common origin in our mothers; we all come from the same pit. But each individual, who is himself an experimental throw from the depths, strives towards his own goal. We can understand each other; but each person is able to interpret himself to himself alone. (Hesse, *Demian* 6).

Demian is basically a novel of development. Its protagonist, in tune with Jungian individuation, is the symbol for comprehensible, logical thought, the friend and guide, who leads Sinclair out of bourgeois respectability, proletarian chaos, finally to meet and love Demian's mother, Frau Eva, who symbolizes the love of this world with its contrasts and opposites.

The outsider/drifter motif has become a convention in modernist literature. The modern drifter is the lonely individual who has discarded the conventional way of life and who seeks through the development of his individuality to achieve a better and humanitarian way of life. He avoids it by way of motivation from becoming absolutely obsolete because of his very endeavors in disobedience of the societal norms. Hesse's contribution to the outsider tradition consists in the main of the series of five novels from *Demian* on; from these he derives his analysis of Hesse's description of the outsider. But it starts typically with *Demian* in which Sinclair starts his search for an identity and the meaning of the self. Demian helps Sinclair distinguish between good and evil, to know the importance of the both, to understand all the sides of reality. But Sinclair has to go independently on his own path; Demian's guidance does not mean intervention at all. Rather it is freedom for Sinclair, who must have sense of an independent self:

But experiencing this side of life leads him to assessing its character. Sifting through the morass with the help of Demian, he assimilates for himself that which he recognizes as significant for self-pride. Note the personal choices. Demian made Sinclair face his own weaknesses, his own cowardice. . . . True independence, responsible action, means some isolation. Sinclair accepts that premise and ultimately achieves independence. (Gropper, "The Disenchanted Turn to Hesse" 983).

In this novel, a developed stage of the outsider can be observed: the outsider develops in his isolation without caring for social norms and leads an independent life. The novel does not does not narrate any story in the conventional method; it reads like procedural treatise of Sinclair's development. Hesse's philosophy for the outsider is *The Steppenwolf*, in which he recommends a way of life for the full-fledged outsider and provides him with humor as his reason for being.

The protagonist Emil Sinclair makes a success of himself as an outsider in the midst of despair and doubts. The story shapes the outsider in many respects and seems to be a philosophical treatise rather than a novel. It starts with the refutation of the bourgeois world and its moral values as an implicit fact, and the attention is at once directed towards an ideal which stands quite contrast with the middle-class system of values. The way of conventionality and compliance is for Hesse the middle-class way, the Philistine way, a way of falsehood and illusion. The denial of compliance to such a system first takes on a positive aspect in Demian. The outsider makes his own way after long searching within himself and assumes an identity. Sinclair always tries to become Demian, because he is his ideal. In fact, Demian is none other than Sinclair's own self. But remarkably enough, Sinclair pursues his seeking throughout the story:

Finally, as we witness Emil Sinclair growing up—vacillating between the light world of parental security and the dark world of solitary anguish—we watch the emergence of a great man "who wanted only to live in accord with the promptings which came from [his] true self," and we hear his cry "Why was that so very difficult?" In that cry comes the thrust of Hesse's novel: man never "arrives" at greatness; he is a seeker. (Gemello and Wilde 1267).

Like Nietzsche, Hesse seems to imply that man is nothing fixed, developed and completed, but rather something developing, an experiment, an intimation and future:

Demian recounts the story of Emil Sinclair from the age of ten to about twenty, his coming into awareness of the conflicting worlds of light (his parents' home) and darkness (the outside world, danger, sex, the shadow), his increasing torment as he struggles to reconcile the opposites at war within himself, and his journey toward the Nietzschean condition of existence beyond opposites. The goal is symbolized for Sinclair in his numerous dreams, his art, and his life by the successive images of Beatrice, Abraxas, and his friend Max Demian and Demian's mother Frau Eva. (Galbreath 28).

Frau Eva identified with self, life in all its fullness, good and evil. One can find here the influence of Jung's principle of *anima* and other archetypes on Hesse. But in *Demian*, the feminine symbol is obscure. However, the story does not purport to foster any Gnosticism:

It moves through the Jungian archetypal realm, without portraying the external world as evil or inimical, although any deep affinity with it has been lost, and instead moves toward the position of accepting both good and evil as encompassed within the larger totality of the self. Moreover, Sinclair's apocalyptic rebirth is explicitly placed in an evolutionary, historical context in which the birth of a new humanity is also occurring. (Galbreath 28).

It is only in *The Steppenwolf* that Hesse presents Jung's idea of the *anima* in the figure of Hermine, as a symbol of Harry Haller's soul, which he must learn to love. Harry's relation to his soul becomes at least one of progressive acquaintance and love. The mother figure, the soulful complement of intellect, is the variant offered in *Narcissus and Goldmund*, and here individuation is pursued through a more or less real creative activity. *Siddhartha* also involves a female figure, Kamala, a rather more realistic mediator of earthly love, like Maria in *The Steppenwolf*, but here the search does not lead to an *anima* or *Magna Mater* as goal, but to a mystical union of the polar opposites:

Demian is not actually a physical being, since he is ever separated from Sinclair, the character who narrates the book. In fact, Demian is Sinclair himself, his deepest self, a kind of archetypal hero who exists in the depths of all of us. In a word, Demian is the essential Self which remains unchanging and untouched, and through him the book attempts to give instruction concerning the essence of existence. Demian provides the young boy Sinclair with a redeeming awareness of the millennial being which exists within him so that he can overcome chaos during the years of adolescence. Demian says to Sinclair: "Listen, little one, if you ever need me again, do not expect me to come back so openly on a horse. Look for me within yourself." (Serrano 4).

Siddhartha's individuation is also empirical. It is quite surprising that most criticism is concerned with declaring *Siddhartha* unanimously as a work of mysticism. But the reality is rather the other way round. There are many passages in the text which preclude its being labeled as a mystic work. It is a work of empirical self-realization. Siddhartha rejects everything what has already been established as secondary knowledge. He starts his journey of primary experiences. He feels the world without any predilection:

He looked around, as if he was seeing the world for the first time. Beautiful was the world, colourful was the world, strange and mysterious was the world! Here was blue, here was yellow, here was green, the sky and the river flowed, the forest and the mountains were rigid, all of it was beautiful, all of it was mysterious and magical, and in its midst was he, Siddhartha, the awakening one, on the path to himself. (Hesse, *Siddhartha*).

However, words like 'mysterious' in the cited text is likely to be confused with. But it does not imply the mysticism that critics have assigned to the text. Right in the beginning, Siddhartha puts forth his rebellious sentiments: "Neither Yoga Veda shall teach me any more, nor Atharva Veda, nor the ascetics, nor any kind of teachings. I want to learn from myself, want to be my student, want to get to know myself, the secret of Siddhartha" (Hesse, *Siddhartha*). The knowledge that has been created by others, the knowledge of the intellect which is nothing but abstraction, does not attract him because such knowledge cannot answer his questions. On the contrary, such knowledge hinders him in experiencing the real world. As the texts mentions, "Too much knowledge had held him back, too many holy verses, too many sacrificial rules, too much self-castigation, so much doing and striving for that goal!" (Hesse, *Siddhartha*). It is obvious that Siddhartha does not like the knowledge of the lore or verses. He wants some concrete knowledge, knowledge with some validity.

In the very Hessean style of the iconoclast, Siddhartha rejects everything what he has been inculcated by society. He feels everything with his senses. His empiricism is well expressed in the following sentences:

"It is good," he thought, "to get a taste of everything for oneself, which one needs to know. That lust for the world and riches do not belong to the good things, I have already learned as a child. I have known it for a long time, but I have experienced it only now. And now I know it, don't just know it in my memory, but in my eyes, in my heart, in my stomach. It is good for me, to know this!"(Hesse, *Siddhartha*).

He experiences the real world; the best and most lively experience he has of anything is his sexual relationship with Kamala. This experience teaches him the fact that one cannot say about anything without experiencing it. Like Sinclair, he scorns the bourgeois world to experience what is generally prohibited or scorned. The Abraxas motif of *Demian* is found here also, but there is no direct reference to it. It can only be guessed, and it can be guessed not only in *Siddhartha* only but also in most novels of Hesse. The sensual relationship has much significance for *Siddhartha* as "his senses had become alive", and even for Kamala as "there was much they had learned, much they had experienced" (Hesse, *Siddhartha*).

The issue of self is the central concern of most of the novels of Hesse, especially of the books of his youth. Self-education has been for centuries a very favorite theme in German literature and men like Luther, Goethe, Kant, and many other leading German writers and philosophers were the inspirers of German youth in their longing for independence. The pre-modern quests of the self have are mostly traditional. The modern, especially the postmodern, ways of this study has been very influential in literature and other arts. The modern hero does not seek knowledge in books and teachers. As Gropper says:

In one book, *Siddhartha* (New Directions, 1951), the young hero confides, "I have little faith in the words that come from teachers." . . .

From my own reading of contemporary literature, I was able to agree that this author wrestled with the contradictions of life, defined and discarded the un-essentials that encumber and degrade man, envisioned a universal harmony in the world which accounted for the most varied aspects of human nature ("Literature for the Restive: Hermann Hesse's Books"1223).

In quest of knowledge, Siddhartha goes to Gotama Buddha of whom it was said that he had attained that blissful state of knowledge and had known salvation. Siddhartha goes to find him, hears him teach the multitude; but he realizes that the way of salvation cannot be taught, that words and creeds are empty sounds, that each man must find the way by himself, the secret of the experience cannot be passed on. So he leaves also Gotama Buddha and all teachers and teachings. Govinda, his friend, stays with Gotama and so Siddhartha abandons his past. He is now all alone. And he comes to the sudden realization that all through the years so far he has lived a separate life, that he actually never had sought a real understanding of his fellow men, that he knew very little of the world and of life all about him. For the first time in many years he really looks about him and perceives the beauty of the world. The world about him, from which he had fled, he now finds attractive and good. He must not seek to escape life but face it, live it. This is the startling new discovery Siddhartha makes and so he decides to leave the wilderness. He comes to the big city where he sees at the gate the beautiful Kamala, the courtesan. He finds her favor and she teaches him the ways of the world. He discards his beggar's clothes and becomes in short time a very successful merchant. But his heart is neither in his love nor in his business; yet all the pleasures of the world cannot satisfy his lust. He finds the world wanting, too, and, moreover, he must realize after a few years that the worldly things, the acquiring of money, have gradually taken possession of his life, that he is being enslaved and harassed by the necessity of making money in order to satisfy his extravagant tastes, that he has become a busy man. So he gives up all that he had acquired, leaves once again everything behind him, and goes back to the river which he had crossed when he gave up his life as a Samana. The triadic rhythm that can be found here is that: firstly, Siddhartha discards the worldly things. Secondly, he accepts them, and thirdly, he accepts all—a synthesis of all, discarding and acceptance, the third level. The empirical motive of Siddhartha exhorts him towards continuous development. He looks toward his self: “Having found the teachings of others to be useless, Siddhartha turned to his apparent Self as teacher. To find it he had to cross to the sensory side of the river” (Timpé 355).

Beside the river Siddhartha sits for a long time and lets his whole life pass in review before him. He finds that even the evil things which he had done lately had been necessary as an experience in order to bring him to an understanding of what life really was. But he also becomes discouraged because all his endeavors so far had not given him the desired insight and peace of soul. Then he learns from nature, especially from the river:

Siddhartha reaches into the finer inner fiber of the thinking adolescent and affects the searching spirit who wants to know his world, himself, and himself in relation to all that is the world. Siddhartha explores and experiences that which life presents to him, ever changing, ever growing, ever reaching that fulfillment of one's self. He knows the despair and aloneness that the adolescent must suffer before recognition of self. (Gropper, "Literature for the Restive: Hermann Hesse's Books" 1225).

Siddhartha devotes himself to the education of his son but must make the painful experience that his love is not appreciated and his endeavors are repulsed. His son does not want the life Siddhartha thinks best for him; he wants to live his own life, and thus breaks away from his father as Siddhartha in his own youth had broken away from his own father. How beautifully Hesse shows that the future, namely the son of Siddhartha is not to follow his path. He has to follow his own path, right or wrong. The son follows the path to the city which is not plausible in Siddhartha's opinion. But Hesse, the iconoclast, does not lose any chance to show that reality does not lie in stagnancy; it lies in change. However good Siddhartha's ways may be, his son follows his own path. This is typical of Hesse, the man and the novelist.

Being uninfluenced by Buddha, Siddhartha takes his attention back to himself, accepts the reality of the phenomenal world, which he has earlier held to be illusive, and accepts for the first time the isolation of the seeker operating without the support of pre-established certainties. His purpose remains the same: to seek for the meaning of life. Only the position of his questionings and his manner of functioning changes. Having given up the option of forcing a resolution by rational accomplishment, he tries to find answers with the help of the senses. It merits mention that that Siddhartha's capability for sensual experience is characteristic of all Hesse's

protagonists. Siddhartha's shift from the country to the town was observably intended to show that Siddhartha's experience of reality changes. The novelist gives him a broader dimension of experience. Probably, he wants to show that the intellectual alone is not the way to the solution of the problem. So he inspires Siddhartha for sensual indulgence, which does not contain any conceptualization. He examines which way can provide the answer to Siddhartha's questions. But even trading or sexual expertise or gambling does not satisfy his queries. Nothing of this sort is adequate to show him that he has found the answers.

But the ambiance of Siddhartha does not do much in enhancing his scope. It compensates in dull weirdness for what the novel lacks in accurate insight. A shallow reference to the East sounds only interesting but does not make a definite immediate appeal. It is also interesting that Hesse's real reason for turning to the East was not consent of faith, but a futile attempt to avoid the problems of an obstinately Western trend of understanding reality. Thus, the supposedly true character of reality is established solely by Siddhartha's personal distress. But Siddhartha feels satisfied by his experiential knowledge rather than merely the intellectual:

In the concluding scene of identity and transfiguration, Govinda, who has been a Buddhist monk, looks into the face of Siddhartha, who has spent his life immersed in the ego. Ironically, it is Siddhartha who is transformed; in his face Govinda sees the teeming multitudinousness of life itself, in all its beauty and in all its horror. . . There is the same mingling of horror and bliss, of loss of self into Self, the same transcending of the boundaries of personality The agent of this cycle was to be the Dostoevskian personality, described by Hesse in Schopenhauer's language as a return to primal self hood . . . (McArthur 606).

Siddhartha emerges with a sense of love and humanism. Not only this, he extends his feelings everything in the world. He does not believe in words or thoughts which are not products of experience. Nirvana is just a word for him; or, it may be a concept. But words and concepts do not have much difference. The following dialogue between Siddhartha and Govinda expresses it very well:

"I did it without any specific intention. Or perhaps what I meant was, that love this very stone, and the river, and all these things we are looking at and from which we can learn. I can love a stone, Govinda, and also a tree or a piece of bark. These are things, and things can be loved. But I cannot love words. Therefore, teachings are no good for me, they have no hardness, no softness, no colours, no edges, no smell, no taste, they have nothing but words. Perhaps it are these which keep you from finding peace, perhaps it are the many words. Because salvation and virtue as well, Sansara and Nirvana as well, are mere words, Govinda. There is no thing which would be Nirvana; there is just the word Nirvana."

Quoth Govinda: "Not just a word, my friend, is Nirvana. It is a thought."

Siddhartha continued: "A thought, it might be so. I must confess to you, my dear: I don't differentiate much between thoughts and words. To be honest, I also have no high opinion of thoughts. I have a better opinion of things. (Hesse, *Siddhartha*).

Regarding *The Steppenwolf*, Henry M. Pachter rightly observes, "On re-reading *Steppenwolf* I find that this is hardly a novel but rather a psycho-analytical tract" (85). He is right in his observation. The novel does not show any development in the story. It is, in fact, an account of Harry Haller's psychological development. Haller is a man who has been brought up in a bourgeois household. But in due course, he comes to hate it and its hollow morality and intellectualism. His tension is caused by two things—by his own dual nature on a deeply psychological level, and by his adjustment with the mannerisms of his society. As Edwin F. Casebeer notes:

Steppenwolf presents a contemporary, Harry Haller, struggling to become a Siddhartha. Tortured by twentieth century dualism, confused by its chaos, Harry progresses disappointingly little in proportion to his great effort. And he is exceptional, a disciplined intellectual whose repeated survival of traumas has given him an unclouded insight into his society. Paralyzed by equal commitments to the moderation and security of the middle class and to a Siddharthian self-realization, all he finally manages is to overcome this conflict to be able to take the first step toward godhood. (55-56).

He tries to avoid teachings; he wants to live a life of experience. He does not like hollow teachings and tries to avoid them as Siddhartha does in the process of individuation. Through a prostitute, Hermine, he learns to accept the multiplicity of his own nature rather than remaining a discontented bourgeois, a person searching for a balance. A man cannot live intensely except at the cost of his ego. He finds philistines everywhere. His problem is that he can neither reject them completely nor can become like them. The climax of the novel comes, however, at a ball in the Magic Theatre of Pablo, where Harry finds Hermine first of all "in hell," where she plays a variety of roles. In this theatre Harry chooses doors to observe several different performances which represent his own personality. It is also noteworthy that Hermine talks of herself and Harry as being "both children of the devil" and describes herself as "a kind of looking glass" for Harry, "because there's something in me that answers you and understands you" (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 55).

Haller's experiences include a much more varied range of empirical knowledge. The structure of *The Steppenwolf* illustrates the theory of multiple forms in the narrative point of view, which in turn indicates Haller's new perspectives as he moves through the three stages. There are three narrators: the editor in the introduction, Haller through his notebooks and poems, and Haller through the "Steppenwolf Tract." The first sphere is contained in statements of the young editor of the notebooks, who treats Haller with proper distance, as an object of historical interest and as an example of his generation. The note-books and the poems reflect the striving toward an ethical understanding through the diverse patterns of Haller's experience and through his artistic creations. The third sphere, the "Steppenwolf Tract," explores the realm of pure theory and is concerned with intellectual probing of the highest and most diverse plane of cognition. Haller suggests that fictions are fundamental to the creation of ideas and that oversimplifications often result from metaphoric representations. He finds in the Magic Theatre that his polar conception of reality can easily give way to a view that embraces all manifestations of life. The first step is merely to acknowledge the chaos of our souls in the world; the second is to transcend the chaos by realizing that it is all a natural part of life." Haller totally reverses his normal ethical world of intellectual values. He proceeds to experience the world. Is he like a Nietzschean superman? Probably, he is not a Nietzschean superman, as Pachter observes:

Moreover, this Nietzschean superman is quickly shown up to be quite a bourgeois himself. The God he was seeking, Abraxas, had to be the god of good and evil . . . The Nietzschean Superman was not to know good and evil but only his fate, or rather his entelechy. In *Demian* it is called destiny, in *Steppenwolf* it is the law of the senses, Freud's pleasure principle. (86).

As elsewhere, the Jungian principle of individuation can be found in *The Steppenwolf* too. Hesse had many conversations with Jung, and was influenced by him. Jung's purpose in psychotherapy was to enable one to arrive at individuation. He supposed to get this by bringing the conscious and the unconscious together. This process is well-represented in *The Steppenwolf* by Harry and the wolf respectively. As long as this synthesis has not been made, the unconscious works independently of and often in conflict with the conscious which ignores its existence. Apart from believing in Freud's conscious and unconscious, Jung posited two types of unconscious, the personal unconscious, created by the repressed episodes in an individual's history, and the collective unconscious, an inherited memory of central episodes or recurrent conditions in the history of the species. This collective unconscious represents itself in pervasive symbols and figures that appear in myths, literature, and art. But Hesse is more concerned about the unconscious and conscious of Haller's personality.

Harry Haller seems to be the conscious ego of the novelist himself. The wolf that Haller thinks he becomes at times is not anything else but his own unconscious which he cannot accept. And it is here that his problem begins. Society and all his learning have not taught him to accept it. He has been taught only to avoid it. But by avoiding the unconscious becomes more pronounced in him and makes him think over and over again. The most important elements of that unconscious which begin to emerge as he comes to terms with it are represented by Hermine and Pablo, who indirectly also represents Mozart. Hermine is the anima. Pablo-Mozart is the Self; the Magic Theatre is the visionary world which the self creates and systematizes to convey its real nature. The Magic Theatre provides Haller an opportunity to reconcile the two worlds of the unconscious and the conscious.

The problem of the middle-class cannot be solved unless it has the fortitude to accept the world as it is in reality as Haller does. Haller tries to accept the hitherto neglected emotions of his mind. He is a representative of the many Steppenwolves of the bourgeois society. The Steppenwolves are especially those people who are artists, intellectuals, and scientists. However, it does not delimit the inclusion of others under this category. The Steppenwolves have a unique ambivalence. On the one hand, they crave for the free, independent, flamboyant, and instinctive way of life. On the other hand, they think it can mean a devaluation of what they have dearly held as moral in society. But the temptation of the wolf in them, their base animal desires is equally strong. It is in such a condition that one finds Haller in the beginning of the story. It is self-realization through self-acceptance and experience that Haller learns that probably humour is a means to solve this problem.

Hesse is at his best in *Narziss and Goldmund* in showing that it is the experiences, or in better words, the empirical mode of individuation, that is more fruitful than the rational one. He starts the story by putting before the readers two different characters, who represent the two polarities of human life. The mind-body dichotomy of Western philosophy is made transparent through these two characters. The very title of the book suggests that the novel foregrounds two contrasting characters. It focuses on the difference in the characters representing the dichotomy of mind and soul, mind and emotion. Both the characters are in their own way typical in search of perfection. While Narcissus the disciplined mind pursues his career as an abbot, Goldmund leaves the convent to add to the real experiences of life—a way of life for Goldmund. Despite their differences, both complement each other and are dependent. Narcissus is a thinker or a man of intellect, Goldmund benefits as a person by his own sense of life.

So it is true to the pattern of the *bildungsroman* as far as the development of an individual, namely the development of Goldmund, is concerned. Narcissus is not much more than Goldmund's contrasting foil. He does not evolve; he only rises higher on the head of the monastery hierarchy and he is a bit stricter and older. At the end of the novel, he remains concerned, as he accepts before Goldmund the limits of rationality. Learning from books is not the nature of Goldmund. Narcissus says: "No, *amice*, that you could never learn. There are men who can learn many things, but you are not one of them. You will never be a learner. Why should you be? You have no need of it. You have other gifts, and far more than I: you are richer, yet not so strong as I am, and your life will be fairer than mine, and harder" (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 62).

Narziss is also a very different type of monk who does not hesitate in showing his friend the way he is capable of or interested in. In doing so, he, however, deprives the cloister of a future monk, but he is very confident in what he suggests Goldmund. He thinks that Goldmund has a natural instinct for instinctual pleasures. To suggest his to pursue his studies in the cloister would be against his nature. Therefore, he suggests him to follow his own ways. Goldmund asks him a very pertinent question: “By helping me and giving me back my memory, and freeing my soul, and so restoring me to health—were you truly serving the spirit? Have you not robbed the cloister of a zealous and obedient novice, and perhaps raised up an enemy of the spirit, one who will do and feel the opposite of all that you consider holy?” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 64-65).

But Narziss has his answers ready; he recognizes the intensity of Goldmund’s unconscious mind. In the following words of Narziss, it is evident that he too appreciates his friend’s ways of living. He also understands the importance of the unconscious that Goldmund represents. Probably, he craves for it, yet knows that he cannot adjust to it. When his friend asks him that he has deprived the cloister of a monk, Narziss says:

“Why not?” said Narziss very gravely. “*Amice*, you still know so little of me! True that in you I have spoilt a future monk, and in place of him opened out a path in you which may lead you to no common destiny. But even if tomorrow you were to burn down this whole fair cloister, or propagate some valid heresy in the world, I should not feel an instant’s remorse for having helped you to it.” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 64-65).

In *The Steppenwolf* Hesse tried to show the tension between the conscious and unconscious in a person who sought their synthesis. In *Narcissus and Goldmund* there remains another opportunity to indulge his feelings. Narziss is a positive figure, but the reader can hardly identify with him. It is Goldmund who can appeal to the readers. In the beginning of Goldmund's way to the search for his identity, Hesse perhaps sees himself in the young man who is called to free art and does not fit the stereotype of a middle-class profession. By the end it is really this search for the self, for the man who stands over his human weaknesses, the common thread through Hesse's favourite works.

In this novel, a dichotomy is evident that has relation to Hesse's life. He shows his own yearning for freedom and on the other hand, desires to lead a respectable life amongst other people. Narcissus embodies the intellect. He is a monk who has lived a life of asceticism and great self-discipline. He is a symbol for the intellect. Goldmund, on the contrary, embodies the sensual. He is an artist who has a large creativity and love and desire many women. He is the symbol of the wander, of lust and the desire for freedom, that Hesse felt forever. He succeeds in the book to present these contradictions believable and charming. The text of the novel contains a lot about art and artistic life, the reconciliation of opposites in human beings through art, etc.

Hesse began a work of quite another sort, which should balance for the first time the tension between spirit and Eros, the story of Narcissus and Goldmund. Narcissus and Goldmund seems to be like the earlier works a soul biography, but since during this work, the former divisions of Logos and Eros, of paternal and maternal principle in the two different forms of a complementary friends pair embodiment, the consequence is not discord, but dissolves in a real polarity. The story takes place in the world of the Middle Ages. The young and learned monk Narcissus is devoted to enthusiastic friendship with Goldmund. But during the life of the monastery for Narcissus, the asceticism of the mind is determined; it attracts Goldmund out into the world. Goldmund is an artist, a sculptor, whose finest work, a statue of John, is very artistic. It is transfigured into the likeness of Goldmund with poetic imagination.

The old opposition between the artist and the thinker, between creative design and think-driven permeation of the world, has become the parable of Narcissus and Goldmund to show the harmony and the higher unit. Goldmund savours the experience of the world. Narcissus is in the strict self-preservation of the spirit. Both have accomplished to reach their destination. But Narcissus has dissatisfactions with his philosophy.

Right from the beginning Goldmund is not interested in learning from books; he thinks that it is second hand knowledge felt and written by others. He relies only on what he senses with his perceptions. As the novelist himself says: "In his innermost heart he did not love learning, had no taste in him for grammar and logic, although these also had their beauty: his soul was given to the image, and sound world of litany" (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 39). The rebellious hero of *The*

Prodigy is well-pronounced here. Goldmund sets forth his disgust of bookish learning in a very clear manner. He believes “that the cup of a flower, or a little, slithering worm on a garden-path, says more, and has more things to hide, than all the thousand books in a library” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 60). Goldmund’s concept of the real world is different from Narziss’s. He considers the world of schools and cloisters to be a monotonous world. He “lived more truly in this dream-world than in the real”. In his opinion the world of “the school, the courtyard, the dormitory, the library, the cloister chapel”, was “only the surface of reality, a trembling outer film, encasing the image-world of dreams, the deep intensity of life” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 59).

But the ways of the drifter is really tough, and Goldmund too realizes this. But it does not hinder his spirit of wandering. He can feel that his way will be rough, but it has beauty for him. He proceeds towards the world of sensuality and feels that it “is very fine to love and know a woman, and give her love”. He says to Narziss: “Don’t laugh at me if what I say sounds crazy to you. But tell me this: to love a woman to comfort her with my love, entwine my body with her body, and feel myself altogether hers—all which you would call ‘to be enamoured,’ the thing you seem to scorn a little—why is it to be scorned? For me it is my path into life (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 76).

In no other novel has Hesse given such a profound detail of sensuality. Goldmund is the epitome of sensuality and instincts. Hesse has tried to make him a complete Dionysian. When Goldmund recollects his love-making, “We call to each other like beasts,” is the thought that came to him first. But words do not have much meaning in his love. As he himself says about his meeting Lisa: “Only then did he remember clearly how few had been the words that passed between them, how neither he nor Lisa had thought to speak until sports were at an end. Even then such words as they had used had been hurried, and of no account” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 78-79).

He thinks that the long talks he had had with Narziss were meaningless. Now, it seemed to him that he had entered a world of senses where words did not have much significance, where he called to one another with bird-cries, and hardly spoke, for it was not required. In sensual love he did not have the need of words or thoughts. What made most sense was only Lisa and her blind caresses without words, her desire and its sighing consummation. Hesse’s description of the romantic love is worth mentioning:

Lisa was there already, coming towards him from the wood. He stretched forth his arms to touch her, stroked her head with gentle, feeling, hands, her hair, her throat, her shoulders, her slim young body to her hips. His arm slid round her waist, and they went off together without a word, nor did he think to ask where she was leading him. Her step was sure, through the dark wood, and he had some trouble in keeping up with her, she seemed to see, like a marten or a fox, with night-eyes; went forward without once stumbling or running her head against dark branches. He let her lead him on to the thick of the wood, thorough the night; into blind, secret places without words, in a land without any thoughts. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 78-79).

He becomes more empirically strong after copulation like Harry Haller or Siddhartha. He learns from the love of many women and receives pleasure and gives pleasure. Again and again, he has the longing for new, unknown women, until he finally returns home permanently in the monastery Mariabronn. In Hesse's other works, we hardly find such vivid representation of the sensual love. The novelist has excelled in his depiction of romantic beauty, especially the atmospheric beauty of the woods. Goldmund goes on loving many women:

His mind followed and retraced them as he went his aimless way over fields: every joy he had felt he knew again; over and over again he touched and savoured. How many dreams this fair brown maid had given him, how many buds she had brought to flower, how much restless longing stirred, how much re-awakened!

Wood and heath lay before him; dried fallow land and dark brown wood, and beyond it there would be mills, castles, and villages, and then a walled town. Now the world lay open to him at last, waiting, ready to take him into itself, give him his share of joy and pain: he was no schoolboy now, to share out at the world through narrow windows, his way not a summer walk whose appointed end was a return. The whole vast earth was his reality, he was part of it, in it lay his destiny, its sky was his, its weather his. He was a small thing in a great world, running over fields like a hare, speeding on his way through blue and

green eternity, like a cockchafer, with no bell to drag him from his bed, and send him to church and school and dinner. How hungry he felt! Half a loaf of barley bread, a bowl of milk, and meal broth—what magic memories! His belly howled like a wolf. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 83-84).

Hesse represents through Goldmund to the unconscious mind of man. The unconscious is unorganised; it is away from civilization. Goldmund has been presented as a completely Dionysian person. He looks about him for a sleeping-place, and plucks up heaps of moss for his bed. He sometimes thinks that he would soon manage to build a hut, or even, perhaps, to make a fire. He wonders at his experience how women love, and truly they have no need of words:

This woman had needed only one with him, to tell him the place where he should meet her, and all the rest was said without speech. How she had told it him? With eyes, and a certain note in her low voice; and then, with something else, some emanation, a tenderness shining through her body, a sign by which all men and women know without telling that they please each other. It was all strange as some very subtle, secret tongue, and yet he had learnt it so easily. His heart leapt up to think of the coming night, longing for the time when he would know how this strong, yellow-haired woman could love, how her limbs would feel to his touch, and how she would move with him and kiss him: surely she would be very different from Lisa. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 92).

He has sexual relationship with many women. Yet he awaits another woman, and his heart is clear, his mind at peace. His lasciviousness grows. Yet he thinks it is good to love. He plucks a purple flower from the grass, holds it to his eyes, and gaze at the tiny arrow chalice, over which the veins ran in and out, around little pistils, fine as hairs. How life moves, trembling with desire, as much in a woman's lap as a thinker's forehead is well shown by him. He wonders why people do not understand the beauty of natural things. The flower fills him with a lot of sensory knowledge. He talks to the flower. He communicates with flowers. But not even two men could really talk: for each to know the other's thoughts they had need of a moment of special happiness, close friendship, and willingness to hear. It is fortunate indeed that love has such

small need of speech, or else love itself would have been bitter, full of misunderstandings and craziness. He felt how Lisa's eyes thrilled with pleasure could tell much more than thousands of erudite words. Even words of poets would never be enough to tell that feeling. It is the world of passion and love. Goldmund goes on loving:

But he never tired of learning from women. True he was more drawn towards young maids, those maids too young to have a husband, and in these he might have lost himself for longing. But such maids were mostly out of his reach, the protected, the cherished, the shy. Yet from women also he could learn: each left him something of herself, a way of kissing, a gesture, the fashion in which she defended herself or gave. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 95-96).

He learns from women and Narziss cannot even think of it; such beautiful contrast is not found in other novels of Hesse. Goldmund has charming manners. Every woman is attracted to him immediately:

His beauty alone would ever have sufficed to draw them so easily: it was his way of making himself their baby, open in his mind, curious and innocent in his greed, his perfect readiness to comply with whatever a woman cared to ask of him. . . He did nothing to which a woman was unwilling, nothing she herself had not first coaxed him to. It was this that many, of quick perceptions, could see or feel in him at once, and so they made of him their darling. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 96).

Thus he learns much from women, who shows him many ways and arts of love making him the master of wide experience. He also learns to perceive the multiplicity of women. His ear is attuned to every voice, and with many its sound is enough to let him know to a hair her needs and amorous limitations. His experience has grown to the level that he has learned to feel in the dark, with stroking fingers, the many sorts of women's hair, to distinguish one skin from another. Even then he begins to perceive that perhaps this refining of his senses is the true, hidden purpose of all his wandering; that in this might lie his deepest thought, driving him on from love to love, so that his faculty of distinguishing and perceiving might grow ever finer and more

multiple, and ever profounder for its use. Such is his deep intention that he should get to master women and love in all their thousand modes and differences, as some musicians become the masters of three or four instruments, or of many. Having gathered much experience of the real world, Goldmund comes back to his friend, Narziss. Goldmund acknowledges his guidance; to him “Narziss brought relief and freedom” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 29). He ponders over the fact that his desire had been awakened by the sight and kiss of a pretty maid. It was his first experience. But at the first experience, he has inhibitions or misgivings regarding his decision:

This had been his deepest fear: that everything he had dreamed till then of life, his hope and belief in his vocation, the future to which he felt predestined, had been imperilled at its root by that kiss given at the window, and the sight of the maid’s dark eyes. Destined by his father to be a monk, and accepting the behest with his whole heart, aspiring with all the fire of his young ardour to the pious heroism of chastity, he had known, at this passing touch, this first call of life to his senses, that here was his enemy and demon; that women were his worst and constant temptation. (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 29).

It is also surprising for Narziss that he does not understand what his friend will do with his experience. Even Goldmund does not know the purpose of all his experience, and where it will lead him. But he enjoys his experience. It seems odd to Narziss, the abbot, for whom everything must have a meaning, a purpose based on a principle. He ponders much on Goldmund and wonders: “But why was this young being, formed for a lover, this youth of the delicate perception, he who could love, and rejoice so well and fully in the scent of flower or morning sunshine, a horse, a flight of birds, a stave of music--- why was he set so firmly in his wish to become a priest and an ascetic?” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 36-37).

It is not difficult to recognize Hesse's employment with Friedrich Nietzsche as the dominant background for the story. Above all, the influence is of *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In addition, one can also find the influence Hesse's acquaintance with the theory of archetypes of the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung, who Hesse at times treated as relevant. Both Nietzsche's idea of reverse engineering of the mind to the child as well as Jung's archetypes of

the anima and the Great Mother are expressed explicitly in Goldmund's round-turn to the image of "mother". Goldmund always needs new experience and is driven by its vision to connect his life, which consists of the contradictions of the nomadic artist and his other passion. Again and again he sees his reflection in the phases of life the mother figure, which determines his life:

“I no longer care to strive after your learning,” he said, almost with a laugh, “and I feel now for all learning and intellect what once I used to feel for my father. I used to think I loved him very dearly, hoped that I had made myself very like him, and swore by everything he said. But my mother came back, to show me what true love is, and, beside her image my father’s memory shrank to nothing. It displeased me; I came near hating it. And now I almost think that all learning is like my father; that it hates my father, and has no love in it, and so I begin to despise it a little.” (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 60).

The novel is divided into twenty chapters, which have nearly the same size and structure. The story takes place in two parallel planes of action. The superficial layer is the background story and the external development of Goldmund can be divided into three major stages: the youth in the monastery, the time as an independent traveler and the reunion with Narcissus. On the second level of action, the narrator made parallel to the outer course of development of the mental (internal) development of Goldmund. Joseph Mileck expresses the characteristics of Goldmund very well:

Like most of Hesse’s protagonists, Goldmund is a man with a pressing quarrel. His dispute is with himself, and his grievance is dichotomy and its many polarities. Man is male or female, becomes a voluptuary or ascetic, a dreamer or a thinker, a thinker or an artist, an artist or an ordinary citizen, a citizen or a vagabond, is caught between the sensual and spiritual, between evil and good, and experiences joy or sorrow, and love or hatred. . . This dichotomy is the critical fact of existence with which Goldmund, like his predecessors, has come to terms. Like theirs, his whole life is governed by this challenge. (*Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 203).

This novel may be criticized for its escape from reality into the idyll. But anyone who criticizes the idyll in the novel, the dark side can be ignored in Goldmund's life, often by hunger and cold. The work contains distinctive features of a *bildungsroman* in which the hero is put through all sorts of influences to maturity. Hesse's protagonists cannot compete in the world; the traditional value system is set at naught. Hesse maintains the pattern of the *bildungsroman* to describe the development of characters. Goldmund can be realized but not in the bourgeois world outside. It seems to him empty and hollow. But he succeeded in building his own myth, and thus the meaningfulness in retrospect. Hesse used, similar to most nationalist authors, a slightly pathetic language, which allows no critical distance. The difference between integration and distancing of the reader is illustrated by the fact that Goldmund—significantly due to his uniqueness—is created entirely on the identification of the reader.

Although the story of Narziss and Goldmund is set in the Medieval Ages, it can be studied also in the modern, or also postmodern, contexts. The monastery represents the patriarchal world. Narziss is a representative of the world of rules and principles. He finds an intellectual home and spiritual sense of belonging in the cloister of Mariabronn. In contrast to him, Goldmund seeks meaning in his vagabonding through the world. He gathers knowledge practically and comes back to the monastery and settles down as a sculptor. He tries to transform his worldly experiences into works of exquisite art. It shows the practicality of his experience. He is productive. His wandering becomes productive. But what does Narziss's intellectual learning do? Probably the answer is in the negative. Narziss' philosophy is unproductive.

Now it is question why Hesse chose this medieval story of two different friends for the modern reader. What is the significance of the *vita contemplative* and the *vita active* in the modern context? Thematic structure of the novel provides one of the answers. The romantics of the nineteenth century had already developed a deep attraction for the Middle Ages, and their relationship to that earlier time period became a pleasant mode of expression for Hesse, who emerges as a neo-Romantic author of the twentieth century. Like a far-off mirror, its medieval imaginaries reflect the central aspects of our modern and post-modern realities. Highlighting the advance of rational history, this narrative mirror reflects purposely Adorno and Horkheimer's "dialectics of enlightenment," Nietzsche's "transvaluation of values", and the obscurity of all reason, which characterized the intellect and the psychosis of Germany's edifying history (Lubich 187). The story has modern relevance.

It is very obviously remarkable that the world of Narziss is patriarchal and androcentric. The androcentric societal hierarchy is based on male authority. It is based on discourses made by males. It is upheld by societal and sexual domination. Goldmund, by contrast is associated with the matriarchal world; he finds his true nature through the mother figure. He learns almost everything in the company of women. His world of love, dreams and experiences are characterised by female authority. In fact, his cognition is built up through love and sensual relationships:

Goldmund, by contrast is associated with the matriarchal myth of a gynocentric utopia, whose ideal state is characterized by female authority, based on social equality and social permissiveness, and centered in the material world, which finds its symbolic representation in the pagan Mother Goddess, living on earth. Whereas the patriarchal paradigm represents Christianity's historical reality . . . Together, this psychomythic model of the *magna mater* or Great Mother was to influence a wide variety of modern discourses ranging from Marxism and psychoanalysis to contemporary feminism. (Lubich 188).

The novel contains a concept of mobility. Goldmund's vagabonding has implications of freedom and independence. It is symbolic of liberation and emancipation of modern man and modern woman. It is noteworthy that "Goldmund's adventurous bachelorhood is linked with his need for personal independence. Time and again we read "I must have my freedom". The idea of personal freedom did not gain philosophical momentum until the Age of Enlightenment" (Lubich 238).

The monotonous mind of man is a hindrance in his circular development. His development is always linear. Man possesses only dry intellectualism whereas women's intellect is instinctual. When Goldmund looks back on his life, he concludes that "playfulness, love, contentment unmarred by thought—did not flourish among men; for that there had to be women and new places and constantly new impressions," (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 238). He learns through impressions. It is in this enduring sentimental and sensual education that Goldmund develops an affecting sensibility and erotic knowledge that exceeds by far the conservative boundaries of masculine sexuality. His personal knowledge of the senses and his fervent appreciation of all its

characteristics make him a wonderful match for the woman who comes to him. He fulfils their sexual desires with love and as per their erotic expectations. In this way, Goldmund establishes the authority of women in knowledge formation. “The role of women in society” is a “central aspect in Goldmund’s worldview”. He recognises “the importance of “Frauen”” (Lubich 194). And in this way, Goldmund’s worldview marks a shift of culture:

In a universe where the material world has become the center of cultural consciousness, caring for the earth and its well-being becomes increasingly important. In addition, the shift from Narziss’s culture of “Begriffe” to Goldmund’s world of “Bilder” anticipates the epochal turn from the verbal to the visual, from the (written) word to the image . . . (Lubich 200).

A central theme of *The Journey to the East* is the search for the ideal, the quest for spiritual maturity beyond the world of everyday life and the material survival, the development of development in humans and growth potential, the individuation and incarnation. Accordingly the action of the novel takes place largely into Upper Swabia and Damascus, the Lunar Mare , and the castle of Bremgarten push each other up easily, real people of all ages meet on literary figures. The story is narrated by the central character H. H. His is a musician in the group of the journeyers. He says: “I, whose calling was really only that of a violinist and story-teller, was responsible for the provision of music for our group, and I then discovered how a long time devoted to small details exalts us and increases our strength. I did not only play the violin and conduct our choirs, but also collected old songs and chorals. I wrote motets and madrigals for six and eight voices and practised them. But I will not give you details of these” (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 22).

This novel is about the self-realization of H. H. He is impressed by Leo who has very natural and simple manners of behaving with people and animals. Leo is friendly in an unassuming way. H. H. tells about the journey:

During the times I remained alone, I often found again places and people of my own past. I wandered with my former betrothed along the edges of the forest of the Upper Rhine, caroused with friends of my youth in Tübingen, in Basle or in

Florence, or I was a boy and went with my school-friends to catch butterflies or to watch an otter, or my company consisted of the beloved characters of my books; Almansor and Parsifal, Witiko or Goldmund rode by my side, or Sancho Panza, or we were guests at the Barmekides. When I found my way back to our group in some valley or other, heard the League's songs and camped by the leaders' tents, it was immediately clear to me that my excursion into my childhood and my ride with Sancho belonged essentially to this journey. . . . Later, when I had lost this happiness again, I clearly understood these connections without deriving the slightest benefit or comfort from them. When something precious and irretrievable is lost, we have the feeling of having awakened from a dream. In my case this feeling is strangely correct, for my happiness did indeed arise from the same secret as the happiness in dreams; . . . And as we League brothers traveled throughout the world without motor-cars or ships, as we conquered the war-shattered world by our faith and transformed it into Paradise, we creatively brought the past, the future and the fictitious into the present moment. (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 24).

H. H. understands his self through his own reflections. He feels that it is he who is the responsible for his experiences. The mirror motif of *The Steppenwolf* is reiterated in the following words: "And now that I want to hold fast to and describe this most important thing, or at least something of it, everything is only a mass of separate fragmentary pictures which has been reflected in something, and this something is myself, and this self, this mirror, whenever I have gazed into it, has proved to be nothing but the uppermost surface of a glass plane" (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 40).

H. H. learns through a figure which he finds on the niche of an archive. When he looks at it a shudder goes through him at the thought that he should still learn. He looked into the mirror. He had a view of the archives. He feels: "How awry, altered and distorted everything and everyone was in these mirrors, how mockingly and unattainably did the face of truth hide itself behind all these reports, counter-reports and legends! What was still truth? What was still credible ? And what would remain when I also learned about myself, about my own character and history from

the knowledge stored in these archives?” (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 91). H. H. feels the journey to be an educative process. Like Goldmund and Harry Haller, he wanders and learns through his experiences. In due course, he also learns, like Sinclair and Goldmund, that Leo represents his own personality. As he learns from the image in the archive, he says:

Only slowly did it dawn upon me. Only slowly and gradually did I begin to suspect and then perceive what it was intended to represent. It represented a figure which was myself, and this likeness of myself was unpleasantly weak and half-real; it had blurred features, and in its whole expression there was something unstable, weak, dying or wishing to die, and looked rather like a piece of sculpture which could be called “Transitoriness” or “Decay,” or something similar. On the other hand, the other figure which was joined to mine to make one, was strong in color and form, and just as I began to realize whom it resembled, namely, the servant and President Leo, I discovered a second candle in the wall and lit this also (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 92).

This process of realization is carried forward and finally unification is reached at through the flexibility in the figure. As H. H. says “Inside the figures I saw something moving, slowly, extremely slowly, in the same way that a snake moves which has fallen asleep. Something was taking place there, something like a very slow, smooth but continuous flowing or melting; indeed, something melted or poured across from my image to that of Leo’s” (Hesse, *The Journey to the East* 93).

The familiar theme of the hero’s identification of himself with his *daimon* is found even in this novel. H. H. has a unique fascination for Leo everywhere in the story. He observes Leo’s activities more than anyone else. In fact, it is only he who pays attention to Leo. He is very impressed by Leo’s unique manner of loving human beings and animals alike. Leo is the ideal image that H. H. wants to be and finally realizes that it is none other than his own self, his higher self. This is a central theme in the story: “The healing power of music is not a prominent theme of *Die Morgenlandfahrt*, although it is significant that the central figure is a musician, but the cure of life problems through humor is similar, and the guidance of the hero by a wiser person -

even if that person turn out to be but his own better self - is the same familiar theme” (Peppard 250). Leo represents self-realization. He is presented as a calm and contented person. His most important characteristic is his self-confidence. He knows his self well according to his own opinions. In contrast to him, H. H. is egoistic and inexperienced, but experiences many things under the guidance of Leo, who is always happy with his personality. His self-realization is the centre of the story; the journey to the East is symbolic:

In this the whole action of *Morgenlandfahrt* is summarized. H. H. takes himself seriously, too seriously, as is the wont of youth. He is egoistic and introspective and therefore filled with despair about himself, lacking in reverence for others. Leo symbolizes wisdom and maturity. He represents a man sure of his own personality and therefore not afraid to subordinate it to something higher than himself. (Farquharson125).

The novel ends with a unique symbol, H. H.’s coming upon with a figurine in the archives of the League. This little figurine is finally revealed as being hermaphroditic or androgynous. It resembles the hermaphroditism of Hermine in *The Steppenwolf*.

Joseph Knecht, the protagonist of *The Glass Bead Game*, shows the same kind of “indomitable drive toward self-determination which characterizes most of Hesse's heroes. Unlike his revered music master he does not identify himself totally with his office, nor does he lose himself in service to the ideals of the organization of which he has become a leader. He is not an ideal figure, but a seeker like Hesse's earlier heroes” (Peppard 251-252).

The same spirit of quest that characterized Hesse’s earlier novels are found in Knecht too. Like Siddhartha, Knecht also shows his concern for knowledge acquisition. He wishes for any ready-made dogma or system of knowledge that can stand true to his inquiries. But he realizes that there is nothing that can be free from dichotomies. Especially dogmas cannot be free from the polarities of thought and words. He seeks a third option, which Hesse provides by way of his triadic rhythm of humanization. The following words express how he wishes for a ready-made dogma that can lead him to his true self:

Oh, if only it were possible to find understanding," Joseph exclaimed. "If only there were a dogma to believe in. Everything is contradictory, everything tangential; there are no certainties anywhere. Everything can be interpreted one way and then again interpreted in the opposite sense. The whole of world history can be explained as development and progress and can also be seen as nothing but decadence and meaninglessness. Isn't there any truth? Is there no real and valid doctrine?" (Hesse, *Magister Ludi*).

He wishes for a real and valid doctrine that can give him knowledge and show the way to self-realization. A typically Hessian pattern of thought is dominant even here. The iconoclastic spirit of exploration of reality is found in Knecht too. No theory can teach him anything. He does not rely on those thoughts that do not have any empirical ground. He also feels that the nature of truth cannot be the same for everybody; it varies from person to person. He seems to appreciate Nietzschean herd culture. He goes to the Master Musicae, who speaks to him about the nature of truth:

The Master had never heard him speak so fervently. He walked on in silence for a little, then said: "There is truth, my boy. But the doctrine you desire, absolute, perfect dogma that alone provides wisdom, does not exist. Nor should you long for a perfect doctrine, my friend. Rather, you should long for the perfection of yourself. The deity is within *you*, not in ideas and books. Truth is lived, not taught. Be prepared for conflicts, Joseph Knecht — I can see they have already begun." (Hesse, *Magister Ludi*).

Hesse's heroes acquire knowledge according to their own impulses and cognitions. They freely choose and discard anything according to their own choices. However, in the beginning they feel somewhat inclined to acquire that knowledge which they find in their society. But such knowledge cannot answer all their questions. Consequently, they start their own journey. The Master Musicae rightly tells him: "Whatever you become, teacher, scholar, or musician, have respect for the 'meaning', but do not imagine that it can be taught. Once upon a time the philosophers of history ruined half of world history with their efforts to teach such 'meaning' . . ." (Hesse, *Magister Ludi*). It follows from this that Hesse has a certain purpose of making his characters know everything on the basis of their own perceptions. Nothing can be taught; the protagonist has to put his own endeavours to know anything.

Castalia is a useless society, for it does not include women. Everything is one sided; even the students are mentally retarded. Knecht develops without the company of woman. His character does not emerge strongly like that of Goldmund who's primary source of experience are women. As no woman plays any part in Knecht's development, his personality is completely monotonous and prosaic. He lives in seclusion in that completely secluded province of Castalia, from the moment he first feels called, to the time of his service in the highest office as master of the game of the glass beads. Although Knecht represents the spirit of Castalia at its best, he knows that the province of the mind does not represent the whole world. Castalia is an unproductive community:

As we have seen, Castalia had inherited from the League of the Eastern Wayfarers the function of saving remnant, but whereas that order was a voice crying in the wilderness and the early Castalians were a "tiny, brave half-starved but unbowed handful struggling against ignorance and bigotry," the Castalia of Knecht's own day takes its position and its authority completely for granted. Its atmosphere is no longer the sharp, cold air of the immortals, but the tepid air of complacent functionaries inclined to snobbery and self-satisfaction. What began in Hesse's imagination as a bold experiment, developed by the inexorability of his soul's logic into simply another community of the blessed" and his hero must say to himself "Nimm Abschied und genese!" (VI, 556) (Colby 23).

Knecht's character is balanced by that of Plinio Designori, his lifelong friend. Designori, as his name shows, is a member of the upper class of power and wealth. From him, and from the teachings of a famous historian, Father Jacobus, Knecht learns that outside and underneath the constant order of the mind there are the dark and ever-changing realities of the world. He learns that even the most perfect spiritual tradition will be swept away one day by the revolutions of the dark forces. Man and his history belong to both realms, to the mind and to the world, to that which is and to that which changes. Knecht acts upon this perception of the truth. He gives up his position in the spiritual hierarchy and seeks an anonymous place in the world of change. His duty in his new life is to pass on from one generation to the next an inspiration which prompts man to a full awareness of his situation in life.

The childish disagreement which led to Hesse's running away from school should be regarded as the most important event of his life. If it is empirically seen, it can be understood that a first experience decides the personality of man, or that a strong character exposes itself in its first fundamental experience. The event determined way of Hesse's outlook toward society. Hesse's rebellion did not take the usual shape of the conflict between father and son. It is true that in several places he depicts the inefficacy of the middle class family to guide a child in his difficulties. The major rebellion, however, is directed against the hierarchy of the spread of knowledge and forms. It is directed against the school and the teachers. Hesse speaks resentfully of the use of power made by teachers. In *The Prodigy*, he treats this theme alone. It was written as an objection against the spirit and the system of the state boarding schools. In other novels, he either resentfully dwells on the suffering of the child in school, or he glorifies the runaway. More often, he glorifies those students who defy the norms of the education system and set their own path towards self-realization.

Hesse's protagonists are also in disagreement with the contemporary systems in human society. They are heretics and iconoclasts, standing separately with their own bundle of experiences. They are able to master their personality. They are drifters who defy society completely. They do not follow any of its rules and lead a free life.

In *The Glass Bead Game*, the syllabus in the educational province emphasizes professional training. All types of venture are measured as arts, and what is emphasized in all of them is not the acquirement of abstract knowledge but a thorough command over suitable techniques. No exercise is an end in itself but is a means of making the individual constructive to humanity. Knecht has "an unquenchable thirst" "for an active part in the society of his fellow men" (Halpert 16). But the system is flawed and the student does not benefit from it. Their game of a most esoteric, illusive character certainly cannot be called a realistic, closely controlled, externalized action. As a matter of fact, Josef Knecht, its most inspirational player, discards it at the end specifically for being too secluded from reality, and for being too lightheartedly conceptual, and not practical. The story of the novel sounds somewhat Platonic in the beginning. As Charles Senn Taylor says:

Knecht enters Castalia under the influence of the Music Master and is eventually made Magister on the Music Master's suggestion—the role of music in Knecht's life needs no "proof." The role of mathematics is best discovered in the approach to music in the game itself. Glasperlenspiel players are historians of music; they are musicologists who have uncovered the spirit of classical music (VI, 98). Mathematics is the key to this uncovering and making fully clear the nature of music. Mathematics provides not only a model of perfect knowledge but also the means to raise the study of music to the same level of complete understanding ("The Platonism of Hesse's "Das Glasperlenspiel"" 163).

But Knecht's giving up the order and going out to experience the real world certainly speaks of Hesse's iconoclasm. The implication is that the Platonism of Castalia is of no use for the practical world. So, Knecht must learn from the real world. Knecht reminds the future teachers of the game that the game can lead to blank virtuosity, artistic arrogance as a variety of self-indulgence, contest, the striving for supremacy over others and thus to the misuse of power. So, Knecht feels that the education system of Castalian is not sufficient, and the Castalians need another educational system. Towards the conclusion, Castilians' meditative, scholarly lightheartedness is in due course discarded in support of a combination of the *vita activa* and the *vita contemplativa*.

The theme of polarities run even in *The Glass Bead Game*, though with less clarity than it is found in *Narziss and Goldmund*. The Protagonist Joseph Knecht struggles with the same dualism which is continuously found in Hesse's previous works. These tendencies exist, like the Naziss and Goldmund friendship—which derives its power from the joining together of opposite people—in a vitally mutually dependent, balancing relationship. Knecht, realizing that it would be inappropriate to deny one or the other of these urges, decides to embrace them both. But a special emphasis is given on the Dionysian, empirical side of experience. Hesse seems to believe that both the opposites are needed and cannot be avoided. He realizes that a state of only spirit results in social irresponsibility and isolation, and he also perceives that only nature, if carried to an extreme, leads to the glorification of animality. In his striving for wholesomeness, which is implied in the balance of thesis and antithesis, Hesse seems to agree with Goethe, who also had faith in the harmony of the opposites (Halpert 16-17).

Knecht gives up the Castalian principles to lead a life of real experiences. It is a foregrounding of empiricism. It also implies the abstract intellectualism of Castalia cannot help its followers to gain self-knowledge. Esther C. Gropper says that: “It is essential to understand that Knecht's defection from Castalia, far from implying any repudiation of the spiritual ideal, simply calls for a new consciousness of the social responsibility of the intellectual” (“The Disenchanted Turn to Hesse” 981). But it is a misinterpretation of the message of the story. By taking Knecht out of Castalia, Hesse meant that the rational and intellectual order which rests basically on abstract ideas cannot contribute anything to humanity. It is only in the real world that there is possibility of humanism. Knecht “must learn to know himself because self-knowledge for Hesse is the first law of life, and to be a human being means continuous individuation” (Halpert 13).

The novel is a dialectical process of balancing opposing themes. Intellect and instinct are dealt with in close union. These oppositions of intellect and instinct are obvious in Knecht's biography. His life shows a cycle which mirrors the cycles of the Game but, moving beyond them also completes their dialectical purpose. He rises from the chaos of intellect to the world of instinct. His admission in Castalia, which he takes as his spiritual birth, seems to him to be the most significant occasion of his life. But, having acquired knowledge of the world of intellect and finding it useless, he moves beyond it, in due course returns to nature or the world of instinct. Designori is his guide in the same way as Demian is Sinclair's *daimon*. They all represent the same self:

Like . . . Narziss and Goldmund, Knecht and Designori are a characteristic pair of Hesse's complementary self-projections. Each of the two is, as usual, most everything the other is not: one is of this world and the other is estranged from it, one is given to the body and the other to the spirit, and one is a participant and the other an observer. Theirs is also the characteristic relationship: each is drawn to and is needed by the other, each is taken with, yet wary of, the other, each is both irked by and concerned about the other, and their protracted dialogues are exercises in dialectics. Unlike previous double self-projections, however, Knecht and Designori respectively are not what Hesse had been and was, and what he would rather have been or had to be, but each is what Hesse had been. (Mileck, *Hermann Hesse: Life and Art* 269).

Various meanings are related to the aspects of knowledge. Knowledge is built through sensory experiences which builds the cognition. Knecht “knows from the very beginning that he must find his way by himself” (Halpert 14-15). Although he is “basically humble and docile”, he “develops into a self-reliant individual” (Halpert 15). He “relies chiefly on his own inner resources and is capable of independent decision” (Halpert 15).

The motif of dualism and dialectic triad is found continuously in Hesse's works. The relationship of Hermann Heilner-Hans Giebenrath in *The Prodigy*, the worlds of light and darkness and the Jungian process of individuation in *Demian*, the conflict of world and spirit in *Siddhartha*, the Goldmund-Narcissus dichotomy, the Leo-H.H. relationships in *The Journey to the East*, the spirit-nature and the *vita contemplativa-vita activa* themes of *The Glass Bead Game* are typical of Hesse's thematic concern. One of the duality themes is the interplay of masculine-feminine images, particularly in *Demian* and subsequent novels. It is clear that most other duality motifs are but variations on this theme. There is a clearly perceptible want of the feminine content in *The Glass Bead Game*. The childhood recollections of Hesse already establish a measurable dichotomy which as time progresses, will often be treated metaphorically and become far more complex. Turning to the dichotomy of the rational and the irrational already implicit in Hesse's understanding, the acceptance of those forces are opposed to our ideas of civilization. Associated with this is the whole idea of what Hesse names instinct that is close to the sensual side of life as opposed to spirit, which is generally translated as "spirit." The further opposition of spirit and soul is still complicated. In his "Guest at the Spa" Hesse writes:

My relation to the so-called 'intellect,' for example, is exactly the same as it is toward eating or drinking. Sometimes there is nothing in the world that attracts me so much and seems so indispensable as the intellect, as the possibility of abstraction, of logic, of ideas. Then again when I am satiated with it and need and long for the opposite, all intellect disgusts me like spoiled food . . . That a person all his life long should be able consistently to honor intellect and despise nature . . . seems to me, of course, very virtuous, dependable, and steadfast, but it equally seems to me repulsive and crazy, as though one wanted always to eat or always simply to sleep. (Hesse, *Autobiographical Writings* 96).

There is an important succession in the idea of triadic humanization. The process of humanization signifies the process of individuation, a term that Hesse has consciously borrowed from Schopenhauer by way of Nietzsche and Jung. The principle of individuation can be implied that by affirming ourselves as individuals we at the same time separate ourselves from the first stage. It is an indispensable stage toward the development of the individual personality. The third phase of individuation means reunification with totality on a higher level. The third stage of individuation is a transcendence of the individual beyond. But it is, surprisingly, a return to the community. One is engrossed, almost gracefully, into the whole again. The persistence upon individuality that is the identifying characteristic of man on the second level gives way to another concept: on the third level it is service to the whole and subjugation of the individual desire. Hesse's characters acquire a humanitarian attitude on this level:

Hesse is of course fully aware of the demerits inherent in the dialectical process. In his "Bit of Theology" (1932) he warns that nothing is more detrimental to philosophy than a strict and literal belief in typologies of any sort. Yet as a hermeneutic model he again presents us with the polarity of two fundamental human types, which he calls the man of reason and the pious man, characterising them in considerable detail. But even here we see the possibility—indeed, the necessity—of synthesis. For Hesse combines his dialectical theory of types with another idea outlined in the first part of the essay: the triadic rhythm of humanization. (Ziolkowski, "Introduction" xiv).

Consequently, the principle of considering the community after realizing the self is a characteristic of Hesse's characters who have reached the third level: the old Siddhartha, who spends his days as a ferryman; Joseph Knecht, who as Master of the Order must relinquish all individuality in order to think of society at large. In other words, the importance of individuality of the second level of individuation, represented by the obstinate self-seeking of Harry Haller, Emil Sinclair, young Siddhartha, or Goldmund, is in no way against the affirmed principle of humanitarian life. Rather, intense individualism and dedication to humanity matches with individuation and reunification with the whole. The implication is that one should first be true to oneself. The perception is that excellent self-knowledge will in due course inspire individuality to consider humanity on the third level of humanization.

But Hesse is more interested in the second stage, because it is on the second level—the level of conflicts—that the idea of conflicts gets crystallised. As a psychologically oriented artist, Hesse is concerned with disagreement and development, which is possible only on the second level. The first level is stagnant and already given. It is the second which creates the interest. But the innocence of childhood is shown not for its own sake, but only as a quality to be lost in antithesis to the chaos that follows; this is most noticeable in *Demian*. Hesse seeks reconciliation of the polarities of the human nature. But first, he studies these polarities and then proceeds to their rhythmization. In “A Bit of Theology”, he focuses on this process which he starts right from man’s innocence. The three stages of Hegelian dialectics—thesis, antithesis, and antithesis—are found in the three stages of man. Wright says: “I think we can see the possibility of a kind of Hegelian dialectics with thesis, antithesis, leading to a synthesis in a higher power still” (60). Of these stages, the first is that of innocence, irresponsibility, or even naivety, where men remain in the irresponsible animal world of their instincts and infant dreams. The second stage is that of consciousness of good and evil, and the claim for morality and human ideals. For those who pass through this, it ends inevitably in guilt, disillusionment, and despair, which leads either to defeat or to a third realm of the spirit. It is of course here that the philosophical expression of the polarities of good and evil are particularly relevant. Hesse's third stage involves their reconciliation with an advance into grace and release to a new, higher kind of irresponsibility. *Siddhartha* can be cited as an example of this triadic method:

The river is Hesse's symbol for the dialectic nature of selfhood: he first introduces it to the reader as divider and link between the basic dualism that pervades and comprises all of human experience, and later, when he has Siddhartha return to its shores to stay, the river becomes the all-encompassing representation of unity. The self's ability to lend coherence to the infinite multiplicity of the flux of life is derived from the same absolute criterion of constancy that has already been defined as the core of the self . . . (Molnár 84).

According to this pattern, which Hesse notices in all systems, the course of humanization begins with innocence, without any sense of responsibility. It is from here that man starts the feeling of guilt, the knowledge of good and evil, the order of culture, morality, religion, and human ideals.

But the realisation that these ideals are unattainable in reality despairs the individual. This despair leads to a third level that corresponds in its acceptance of all being to the magical thinking of the Dostoevsky essays. It is on this third level, Hesse argues in his concluding paragraph, that man gets the synthesis that solves their opposition and that allows them to enter a position of true humanity. It is noteworthy that in his pattern of his thought, if not in its content, Hesse goes somewhat along Schiller, Hegel, and Marx—the philosophers who produced systems of thought that contain a binary opposition operating continuously and being transformed within a historical sequence in time and space (Ziolkowski, “Introduction” xiv-xv).

The first stage would inevitably seem to be of little attention because it engages no conflicts. It gets importance when it is contrasted with the second. The third stage acquires importance from the first and the second. All the novels portray, in one way or another, the third stage, but only in *Siddhartha* is the level of simultaneity and entirety in fact maintained at the end. Or else, as is best shown in *The Steppenwolf*, the individual frequently goes back into the world of despair after little enticing glimpses of the third stage, which exists as a basis of hope and despair in one. Consequently, all of Hesse’s novels have a characteristic fundamental pattern: the triadic rhythm of humanization, which each hero follows according to the underlying unity of his nature:

Now this dialectical process, which underlies all of Hesse’s major novels, provides both the substance and the form of his most important essays. In the pieces in Dostoyevsky the thesis and antithesis of European man and Russian man are resolved in the synthesis of magical thinking, which refuses to accept conventional divisions into polarities and opposites. Hesse’s playful delight in the dialectical process shows up also in the “Variations on a Theme by Wilhelm Schafer” (1919), which opens with the assertion that any real truth must be capable of inversion. (Ziolkowski, “Introduction” xiii).

Hesse is interested mainly in the despair and freedom of man. His heroes are characteristically individuals who, living in the second stage, feel the necessity to make independent choices and decisions; they do not retreat to the cosy codes of conformity. They feel discontent because they are aware of a third possibility. They do not deem it reasonable to sustain the first and second

stages constantly. Apart from this, there are people who know only of the first stage, living in the first stage of innocence, and do not know of any paradox in life or of the challenge of freedom. But this opinion too cannot hold true. The fact is that everyone feels the discontent that Hesse's protagonists feel. But within the area that has staked out as his own fictional domain, he explores characters of the greatest variety and under the most varied circumstances. For instance, Sinclair, the adolescent hero of *Demian* who, in his questioning of established values, had much influence on the youth of the twenties; Siddhartha, the son of a Brahmin priest living at the time of Buddha; Harry Haller, the weary and cynical intellectual of Europe; Narziss and Goldmund, representatives of the sacred and profane in medieval Europe; Joseph Knecht, the symbolic leader of a spiritual monastic order projected into a future five hundred years hence. Over and over again, Hesse uses the same triadic rhythm, but each time in a different costume:

In Hesse's own essays he says that the child is born into a state of unity with all being. This is the young Siddhartha—dutiful, respectful, loving, happy. When he learns about good and evil, he advances to a second level of humanization characterized by despair and alienation, for he has been made aware of laws and moral codes. But he feels incapable of adhering to arbitrary standards established by conventional religious or moral systems because they exclude so much of what seems perfectly natural. Siddhartha finds his "self" submerged in a culture in which he sees . . . imbalance. This second level of awareness is that in which most men are condemned to live. Those like Siddhartha who are not willing to accept the lies, . . . who point out sense, happiness, and beauty, move on to the third level . . . to experience . . . to an emerging new culture. The same resolution reached in *The Glass Bead Game!* (Gropper, "The Disenchanted Turn to Hesse" 982).

The Steppenwolf, the lonesome wolf, is a type which, by virtue of its high degree of individuation, has transcended the realm of the bourgeoisie; he has reached what Hesse would call the second level. The author of the tract tells that most intellectuals and artists belong to this class: "Most intellectuals and most artists belong to the same type. Only the strongest of them force their way through the atmosphere of the bourgeois earth and attain to the cosmic. The

others all resign themselves or make compromises” (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 66). Such artists, intellectuals, and individuals are not capable of reaching the third level. Their strength is adequate only for bringing them into conflict with traditional reality and thus to make them miserable. Harry Haller, the Steppenwolf, belongs to this type. The Treatise suggests within the framework of the fiction, three escape hatch are open to him:

It is possible that Harry will one day be led to this latter alternative. It is possible that he will learn one day to know himself. He may get hold of one of our little mirrors. He may encounter the Immortals. He may find in one of our magic theaters the very thing that is needed to free his neglected soul. A thousand such possibilities await him. His fate brings them on, leaving him no choice; for those outside of the bourgeoisie live in the atmosphere of these magic possibilities (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 68).

These images are symbolic of the aforesaid themes. The magic mirror alludes to a peeping into the chaos of one’s own thoughts. The Immortals occupy the state of simultaneity. The Magic Theatre represents the full period of potentiality in the totality of the present moment. These are entrances from the second stage of individuation to the third. Those who cannot understand these go back frequently from the third level to the second.

The *Bildungsroman* describes Emil Sinclair’s growth from childhood to maturity. It is developed in three stages. The first is the child’s awareness of anxiety and guilt at the threshold of puberty, as he realizes that the universe is divided into the respectable world of light, inhabited by his parents and sisters, and the sinister, yet always subconsciously attractive world of dark, which appears at the periphery of middle-class existence. Max Demian teaches him the need to realize oneself at all cost and to transcend all the conservative dichotomies of good and evil. The former is expressed by the idea of the Sign of Cain; the latter is expressed in the symbol of the male and the female, God and Satan.

The second stage is an intermediate phase during which Demian is mostly absent and Sinclair, now a student in high school, is more and more fascinated for the world of “dark”. This is because the prohibited always has a unique attraction. In fact, the attraction lies in prohibition

and not in the thing prohibited. It is because of prohibition that Sinclair is attracted. Away from home in the provincial city, Sinclair enjoys in being for once accepted in the company of those who set themselves above the general crowd through their wild living and drinking. But the accompanying dissatisfaction and remorse also lead Sinclair to new aspirations. His appreciation of wholesome love at this stage of sexual awakening comes to him through an image of feminine beauty, a young woman whom he picturises in his mind and then seeks to paint. Immediately, this experience leads him to experience the world of “dark” and to turn toward guides and teachers who might show him the way to higher stages of self-realization. This stage is also characterised by his important relationship with an unconventional organist and theologian, Pistorius, who, knowing “Abraxas”, shows Sinclair the importance of the efficacy of the human will in transcending the polarities.

On the third level, the arranged method of the *bildungsroman* is overall softened in a mystical vision. When Sinclair meets Demian again as a young adult, he had come to acknowledge self-transcendence, achieved by a lengthy and arduous effort, as the true meaning of Demian’s teaching. The meeting with his friend can be seen as equivalent to the union of the self with its ideal image, which is now broadened to include not only Demian but also the figure of the universal Mother. The mother image symbolized by Frau Eva leads Sinclair to understand the entire world in a single vision or entity. It reflects Hesse’s humanism, for he makes his protagonist see the entire world as a single unity. Finally, he makes Sinclair experience that all the figures and visions that had emerged to him on the way to self-realization had really been images within his own self. It can be discerned from this that Hesse was influenced by Carl Jung. Heidi M. Rockwood shows the Jungian influence in the composition of *Demian*:

The protagonist of the novel, Emil Sinclair, an outwardly protected and happy but inwardly rather insecure child, is confronted by negative impulses. Jung calls this the emergence of the "shadow," an archetype of the collective unconscious. All archetypes are "involuntary manifestations of unconscious processes"(Jung, *Archetypes* 53), and Emil's shadow archetype is personified by his childhood enemy Franz Kromer. Unless an individual gains control over such an archetype and the tendencies personified by it, he or she cannot progress on the path to

individuation. However, after Emil, with Max Demian's help, has done so, he is ready to encounter a second archetype, the "anima," which appears to him in the form of the elusive Beatrice and, later on, as Frau Eva. The anima points the way to greater self-knowledge by acquainting a man with the "feminine" values of his unconscious. Help can also come from a less commonly present archetype, such as the "magus," or wise old man; Pistorius to some degree represents that archetype in Demian. More frequently such help comes from the archetypal projection of the "self," the perfected and individuated human being that can show the troubled person a glimpse of his or her future potential. Max Demian, Emil's friend, represents the self archetype in the novel (48).

Hesse has used Emil Sinclair as a symbolic hero, who is preoccupied by a need to render himself completely. Both the mode of his inquisitiveness and the theme of the novel are concerned with the realization of the self. But to express the self is really difficult for him. Many a concern underlies this difficulty—such as the concepts of the self, and of the unconscious, which define not only Sinclair as a character, and the physiognomies of the other figures, but also the form and content of the novel in general.

Seeking absolute self-realization as the most important thing, Hesse's protagonist attaches more importance to the powers of the unconscious as something more significant than either mental abstraction or anything else. In the beginning, the hero distracts his attention from the outside reality in order to experience the realities of the mind, which is the issue of his affirmation. In viewing peculiar forms, Sinclair realises how boundaries between impression and fantasy, the external and the internal, can be blurred, and how the self can create ever newer forms which reflect the act of creation. In the final stages, these visions of the universal power are identified with the hero's self-portrait, concentrated image, or symbol, of the self. Self realization basically involves particular concepts of the unconscious and of the self as a symbol. Sinclair's emerging realisation of this individuality of the self is rendered in the novel both psychologically and philosophically. His obscured wishes and feelings have been recognized psychoanalytically. Very significant is the whole idea of the theme: the Jungian projection of the individual unconscious. At the same time, these directly accessible psychoanalytic meanings are supplemented by mysticism.

The inner life of Hesse's protagonist is informed by ideas which have similarities with the Nietzschean "transvaluation" of good and evil. Like the psychological allusions, these ideas show the hero as the centre of the novel's theme and form. The expression of the self is identified with the image of the world as an inner image. Developed from the inner man, who includes all dichotomies within himself, its true realism creates the self in its symbolic meaning.

Within the symbolic pattern, the stages of the hero's development are marked by three characters. But they are not only the guides leading him to his ascending images: they are also pictures of his own changing condition. An ultimate unity, this triad of figures embodies Hesse's thesis of the manifold within unity. Demian is the most inclusive figure, supplemented by the other two members of the triad, the intercessor, Pistorius, and the mother, Frau Eva. Demian is Sinclair's transcendental ideal; as part of the latter's vision, he is also an aspect of the hero's self.

Demian is man, animal, and god. Watching him from afar, Sinclair wonders how his friend "wanders among them like a star, surrounded by his own atmosphere, following laws of his own" (Hesse, *Demian* 145). When Sinclair catches him unaware during a class in school, he finds him petrified, unworldly, an image above all conflict. As a symbolic figure, Demian's function is also an inner one. He is a typical symbol in Sinclair's mind, ready to be called upon whenever he is needed. As an inner voice, Demian is a controlling conscience. As Oskar Siedlin has shown, he is a *daemon* or eternal self, directing Sinclair from awakening to maturity and liberating him from himself through his final vision. Demian is revealed in the dark subconscious mirror in which Sinclair finds the knowledge he sought. He is Sinclair's symbolic self. He is an externalization of "the inner teacher" who "leads the hero on his way". Interestingly, "the name "Demian" resembles in sound so closely to "daimon" (215).

If Demian is a persistent symbol in the hero's perception, Pistorius, whom Sinclair discovers playing unethical music in an abandoned church, is a significant intermediary phase of development. Pistorius evidently mirrors a characteristic of Sinclair himself. Sinclair is fascinated by his wilful, original music, defying the boundaries of tradition; their relationship is recognized by their familiar knowledge of Abraxas which unites the organist with Demian's teaching. But despite these similarities with Demian, Pistorius fails to fully realize his own visions.

The final figure of the harmony is Frau Eva. She is a symbol for the union of opposites and includes the male and female, light and dark. On a major level, she is a symbolic figure representing self-realization, eternally feminine, and therefore, the origin of all men. In another meaning, however, she is also an image, the meeting point of all the images and figurative motifs. She reflects the hero's internal self in a wider perception. At one point, Sinclair describes her as "the symbolic image of my life" seeking to lead him "more and more deeply into myself" (Hesse, *Demian* 161). In his love for her, he experiences sensual love of reality and symbol. As an ultimate symbol of love, Frau Eva helps Sinclair's realize the unconscious self. Frau Eva teaches him self-discovery within the mirror of oneself. Through her impression on Sinclair as a person, as an image, and as a symbolic figure, she creates his unified awareness of self and world and makes it visible in the novel.

The three figures, Demian, Pistorius and Frau Eva, represent through their own actions the polarities and images within Sinclair himself. In fact, the images are fashioned by the thought, which they express, that the self must express itself fully, reconcile the oppositions which divide the inner and outer nature, and mirror itself and its visions in the novel. Their entrances and exits, and the events they participate, define the self as a unique intersection of appearances and as a universal vision. But this movement is also fashioned by a corresponding portrait of the self as a texture of individual images, discernment, and motifs whose accurate collection completes the novel's lyrical design.

Demian does not have a complicated dialectic like *The Steppenwolf*. Owing to this, the poetic quality can visibly be distinguished as a world of images fashioned by the symbolic hero. Subconscious imagery of picturing and painting are among its determining characteristics. For instance, the opposition of light and dark is revealed as actual pictures. The two worlds which Sinclair sees as a child are portrayed correspondingly as worlds of "clarity and cleanliness", "washed hands, clean clothes, good manners" as opposed to the house of "servants", and "ghost stories" (Hesse, *Demian* 8). These worlds are continuously put side by side. Sinclair, as a submissive hero, often experiences significant objects as if they were influencing him. Passively he looks on familiar objects in his home—clock, table, Bible and mirror, bookshelf and pictures—withdraw into the background, leaving him only with a passive feeling.

This image of objects in the hero's mind is seen by Hesse as an act of symbolic self-envisionment. During an important discussion with Pistorius, Sinclair is asked to see himself in the images cast by the fire. Hesse's technique is not of merely imbuing objects with some imagist sense, but is more composite. The objects not only portray themes and experiences but also act as motifs, have symbols of the opposing worlds.

In *Demian*, as also in the later *Steppenwolf*, Hesse depends primarily on this picturing method to make the progression of the novel smooth. It is mainly described by the images which Sinclair sees in dreams and externalizes in paintings. The progress toward his model self-portrait rests on the progress of a number of recurring patterns: the yellow sparrow-hawk, the picture of Beatrice, the god Abraxas, and, finally, the figure of Frau Eva. Demian, the adviser and guide, encroaches upon each of these pictures. In Hesse's scheme, these patterns maintain their original significance, but, as in a piece of music, they also merge with one another, appear in continuously new combinations, and usher in a forward development. The sparrow-hawk, which Demian first discovers above Sinclair's door, is a representative answer to the contrast between the two worlds and expresses the idea of Cain. His earlier endeavours to draw the sparrow-hawk are now combined with efforts to sketch Beatrice and turn out to be a picture of Demian and himself. The third motif is Abraxas, who is presented as a bird breaking out of the world. The theme of the bird is the expressive equivalent of the outer course of the development novel, in which Abraxas unites Demian and Pistorius. Respectively, the stage of Abraxas and the sparrow-hawk enhances Sinclair's knowledge and inspires him to come back to his painting of Beatrice with new and bright understanding. He matures in his awareness of the feminine painting that directs him toward the fourth motif—his appreciation of Frau Eva.

A variety of changes in the painting, and their concluding union with the sparrow-hawk symbol, provide a superb example of Hesse's technique. Besides, as his self-recognition becomes deeper, he appreciates that he had pictured not only Beatrice and Demian but also his own self: "Not that the picture was like me . . . but the face somehow expressed my life, it was my inner self, my fate or my daimon" (Hesse, *Demian* 92).

After the picturing of Beatrice had been connected with the Abraxas motif new outlooks come out: the enlarged picture is now also a challenge to its artist. Sinclair says: "I questioned the picture, I accused it, I caressed it, I prayed to it; I called it mother, I called it beloved, I called it whore and woman of the streets, I called it Abraxas" (Hesse, *Demian* 102).

He also feels himself wrestling with its image as Jacob had wrestled with the Angel of the Lord and receiving from it a similar redemption. The picture responds: "In the shine of the lamplight, the painted face transformed itself at each supplication. It became bright and luminous, black and sinister, closed pale lids over dead eyes, opened them again; it was woman, was man, was girl, was a small child, an animal." (Hesse, *Demian* 102). The figure of Sinclair's beloved had also been connected with Abraxas. This is as far as Sinclair can review the original portrait of the young girl Beatrice. "I lived with Demian, with the sparrow-hawk, with the picture of the great figure of my dreams who was my fate and my beloved. That was enough to live in, for everything looked outward to the great and wide expanse, and everything pointed toward Abraxas." (Hesse, *Demian* 190).

Before Beatrice's image can wholly merge with that of Frau Eva, woman must be introduced in her function as mother. A previous dream image had suggested Hesse's deliberate attachment with the two facts. The first is that Sinclair's mother welcomes him at the front door of his childhood home under the symbol of the sparrow-hawk. Her maternal embrace soon becomes intensely sexual.

In the final phase, the painting or picture, which dominates the novel's centre, is displaced by the inner image. Frau Eva teaches Sinclair the significance of dreams without the support of an external reproduction. This transformation makes him able to realize more and more effectively a concentrated vision of himself. The meaning sign becomes a symbol by a conscious effort. In this way, Sinclair seeks his union with Frau Eva literally in an act of the imagination; he experiences her presence and finds himself. "At this moment I felt as if I bore a crystal in my heart and knew it was my self. Coldness rose within me up to my chest" (Hesse, *Demian* 149-150).

The Treatise of *The Steppenwolf* is a modern interpretation of the romantic position, enriching the old dichotomies with the social significance of the nineteen-twenties. It also seeks to substitute a purely psychological attitude on man's divided state with an ideological underlying principle. The opposed elements within the self are man's sensual and spiritual nature.

Haller is made to realize unambiguously his dual character as a Steppenwolf and to present it humorously into the detached magic of art. In the supreme sovereignty of humour, rationality and sensuality are brought together, surpassing and unifying all areas of humanity.

In its conclusive expression, the Treatise surpasses the concept of dualism. By accepting and transcending the dichotomy of his own nature and in the world at large, the Steppenwolf reaches a higher unity: not that of a single self but of man as a whole. It is a development of the protagonist that makes the novel a typical *bildungsroman*. The Treatise concludes it as follows:

There is, in fact, no way back either to the wolf or to the child. From the very start there is no innocence and no singleness. Every created thing, even the simplest, is already guilty, already multiple. It has been thrown into the muddy stream of being and may never more swim back again to its source. The way to innocence, to the uncreated and to God leads on, not back, not back to the wolf or to the child, but ever further into sin, ever deeper into human life . . . You will, instead, embark on the longer and wearier and harder road of life. You will have to multiply many times your two-fold being and complicate your complexities still further. Instead of narrowing your world and simplifying your soul, you will have to absorb more and more of the world and at last take all of it up in your painfully expanded soul, if you are ever to find peace. This is the road that Buddha and every great man has gone, whether consciously or not, insofar as fortune favored his quest. All births mean separation from the All, the confinement within limitation, the separation from God, the pangs of being born ever anew. The return into the All, the dissolution of painful individuation, the reunion with God means the expansion of the soul until it is able once more to embrace the All. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 77-78).

The novel starts with the editor's introduction that is organized along narrative lines; the Treatise is seemingly an explanation of ideas; the description provides a record of a man's gradual departure from reality. It is Hesse's fine artistic achievement to put together the hallucinatory and the real world without ever showing their disagreement. The final movement in the direction of illusion is described in a very concrete descriptive scene. It is a visit to a bourgeois friend, a resident of the academic world, during which Haller shows his disgust against the impropriety and absurd jingoism of traditional society. The tensions caused by this meeting are released by Haller's reaction to a commonplace imitation of Goethe's likeness. The wolf nature breaks out of the decent exterior. After some days of roaming, he steps across the threshold of the realm of illusion. But if the real world presumes visionary qualities, the imaginary world continues an entry in actual life with jazz music, cafes, and dancing lessons. Hermine's company echoes the definite forms of the cosmopolitan city into which Haller symbolically descends.

The descriptions we find of in the notes are part of Haller's inner world. They also illustrate the main patterns of the novel of development. It is necessary to keep continuously in mind the paradox which pervades the dual nature of these notes, if one wants to understand them. Haller is factually trained for the way by means of which he can transcend himself, but he always remains the centre, the expressive consciousness in which teachers and teachings are engaged. This double action is explained by the two different ways in which the Treatise can be considered. As the description handed down by the editor, it forms part of the outside structure we have distinguished, joining the editor's expressions and the notes as whole. But once we view the Treatise as part of Haller's own record, we note a more significant internal structure. In this central triad, it is one of the three forms taken on by the symbolic hero, the other two being the Steppenwolf construct and the Magic Theatre. The novel's irony is enacted by this triadic form, because the various methods of teaching are also expressions of the self. Hesse experimented with this form even in his earlier novels. Some of these themes have been dealt with in Eastern philosophies by which Hesse was influenced, and for Hesse, the constant concern in using the same was self realization:

As a dialectician he conceived of self-discovery as 'wholeness' arrived at through a process of necessary struggle, identifying the positive in the negative and constantly questioning conventional notions of progress and achievement (Ziolkowski, 1) . . . In his earlier works the emphasis on paradox owed much to the Indian and Chinese philosophies which had influenced him from an early age and receives its clearest expression in *Siddhartha*, in which the eponymous hero experiences the extremes of poverty and wealth, power and dependence, self-discipline and gratuitousness, before finally achieving peace. (Wilde 87).

The impersonal proposal for Haller's education and his confrontation with the figures representing the immortals set the objectives and evaluate the progress of his education. He is guided particularly by three characters who are like the familiar symbolic personages, for Hermine, Maria, and Pablo resemble Demian, Pistorius, and Frau Eva in many significant ways. Hermine stimulates Haller and shows him the prospect of his self-realization; in this way, she suggests Demian. Maria, like Pistorius, is an intermediary figure, necessary to the hero's development. Pablo, like Frau Eva, is the most comprehensive symbol leading the hero to the realization of himself. But these relationships are made more complex. Its triad of characters produces a narrowing of the symbol into a picture in which knowledge and emblem, self and ideal are identified through complicated mirroring. They mirror the triadic structure. These figures represent not only different aspects of the hero, or particular stages in his growth, but also different types of mirroring which are unified and harmonized in the concluding scenes of the novel.

The similarity between Hermine's name and Hermann Hesse's associates her intimately with Harry Haller. It is a play on names and it expresses their relationship well. Haller persistently repeats that Hermine is his double, that she has qualities he himself lacks and craves for. In most respects she seems to reflect his self significantly. She really sees herself as Haller's mirror: "Don't you understand, my learned friend, that I please you and am important to you, because I am a kind of mirror for you" (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 197). In the dance of the Magic Theatre, she becomes momentarily the same with Haller: "We both stood still and gazed at each other . . . Before her glance, from which my own soul seemed to look at me, all reality collapsed, even the

reality of my desire for her. We glanced at each other, transformed by magic; thus gazed at me my poor little soul” (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 166-167). Although she is a prostitute by profession, and thus represents the physical, Hermine mirrors Haller's profession as a writer, an artist of the intellect very well. Her natural sensuality mirrors Haller's unconscious. But Hermine is also a power and initiates Haller into the practices of her world. She teaches him to accept his sensuality with fully humorous detachment. Hermine is generally accepted as “an *anima* figure in this individuation process” (Rockwood 48).

Their sexual union is like an ultimate objective, because in such a union the inadequate self joins its more complete image. But the union is possible only if he can understand it in humorous fantasy. Hermine represents not only Haller's inner image but also the personality he aspires to be. Apparently, she contains masculine qualities, which is symbolic of the fact that she is hermaphrodite figure. Having the look of boy and girl, mother and masculine friend, her features are “like living breath, waves of boy-likeness, of hermaphroditic magic” (Rockwood 48). She accepts the nature of both sexes in contrast to Haller's intellectual relentlessness. She is a fashioned figure of the self, a new creation of its being. Haller soon realizes that her teachings are not new but that she reminds him of his own world, gives it a new significance. The multiple qualities of his nature are gradually revealed to him: “These were, so it seemed to me, “Haller mused at one point, “not her thoughts but mine which the prophetess had read and inhaled and returned to me so that they now assume form and stand newly created before me” (Rockwood 56). Hermine becomes Haller's real and aspired self as Demian is for Sinclair. Beginning with her appeal for complete obedience, she instills in him a superior self-awareness. Besides, in teaching Haller the way to sensuality, she also teaches him ultimate detachment through the artists like Mozart. As Haller comes up to Hermine, she comes to personify the harmonization of his disagreement. She is really his magic mirror, which represents the hitherto neglected aspects of his personality.

It is noteworthy that there are three figures to help Haller develop his personality. These figures are Hermine, Mari and Pablo. Hermine shows Haller the way to the figures of the triad, his physical mistress Maria and the saxophonist Pablo. Maria symbolizes pure, physical love; to her, everything is “plastic material of love and of magic” (Rockwood 85). When Haller laboriously

ponders over his nature, she appears in his bed like a response given by a magician's trick. Haller refuses to change his intellectual mentality, but he is equally attracted to Maria's sensuality. Her objective is to introduce Haller's sensually impoverished personality with the understanding of nature and spirit. The novel is a *bildungsroman* and the meaning of the word *bild* is both *image* and *picture*. In Hesse's dialectical method, Maria's function is to bring out such image of the inner life as opposed to that of thoughts and ideas. During a night with her, Haller sees many images of his life rising from the unconscious mind of the intellectual who had "lived for so long empty and poor and without pictures . . ." besides, they are "magically released by Eros", and surprise Haller with the richness and variety of the "picture gallery of my life" which he had thought to be barren (Rockwood 85). Images of the subconscious, contained in the masculine intellectual self, are released by sensuality, which is feminine, to remind Haller of his memories and dreams unheeded by him so far.

Maria mediates between Haller's nature and the ideal self. Despite Haller's interest in her, he is also always drawn to a philosophical state of mind which is elucidated in the concluding scenes of the ball. Although he enjoys Hermine's greater understanding of his self, he must look for Maria for purely sensual pleasure. While Haller is dancing with Maria, he is called by Hermine. It means that Maria is a puppet, subservient to the higher teacher Hermine and even directed by her as Hermine, in turn, follows Pablo and thus the Immortals. But, on the other hand, Maria can also be taken as Hermine's physical self cleansed of all hermaphroditism. As a prostitute, she has all the feminine characteristics reflected in the Theatre and the Treatise.

A deeper meaning would suggest that Maria too is a mirror of Haller's personality. But the direct communication between theme and symbolic image, which is epitomized by Hermine, is substituted by a mirror in which many different figures are drawn together—an embodiment of the Magic Theatre's mirror as it is found in the Treatise. This act of unifying all dissimilar elements in a single organic whole is fulfilled by Maria's sexual nature; sexuality not only releases multitudinous images but also combines them in an ecstatic unity—a union of the senses. In the discussion of sexuality, Hesse does not hesitate. Schwarz rightly observes:

First, there is the matter of free love. Hesse is one of the few German writers who approach sex lightly and without a trace of bad conscience. He allows his heroes to engage in sexual acts of a purely bodily nature. Experience in general is writ large and includes the unrestrained roamings of Knulp and Goldmund along the German country roads in the search of women, nature, and adventure. But sex especially is beautiful, and its frequent descriptions, while bold, are never salacious. In the use of drugs as mind-expanding agents we see another prominent feature tailor-made for our young people. One of the favors that the gentle saxophonist Pablo bestows upon the harassed Steppenwolf in his attempts to re-educate him is the dispensation of hallucinogenic cigarettes or snuffing powders to relieve the depressions and inhibitions he is suffering. In-deed the novel is so constructed that the climactic scenes in the Magic Theater can be construed as the content of a psychedelic trip induced by Pablo's knowing ministrations. (982).

In the dance scene, Haller feels this union of the senses—the public performing of sensuality: “. . . the exultation of a festive communion, the secret of a person's submergence in the mass, the *unio mystica* of pleasure . . . I was no longer I, my personality was dissolved in the intoxication of the festival as salt is dissolved in water . . . my wooing theirs” (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 93).

Maria is an experienced sensualist; she displays this knowledge at the time of teaching Haller sexual techniques. She has had sexual relations with Pablo, who is also Hermine's lover, and especially Hermine herself. Maria symbolically contains all the experiences had from their relations. She is like a symbolic reflection of the Treatise's unifying magic mirror. When Haller understands these complicated relations, he identifies himself with Hermine's masculinity. Maria is a mirror harmonizing differences in the sexual performance like a pure, sensual harmony of music. She is the epitome of sexual experience and sensual harmony.

The jazz musician Pablo has the qualities of both Hermine and Maria. His peaceful yet sensuous character shows an ultimate unity which is surpassed only toward the end when sensuality is transformed into the spirit of Mozart. Although on an instant level Pablo is the masculine

spokesperson as Maria is the purely feminine, on a higher level he reaches complete transcendence. He is the ultimate teacher, advising the acceptance of the body and the attainment of harmony. He portrays harmony of spirit and nature, instinct and intellect. He has the capacity of speaking all languages, but he speaks especially well with his body, his eyes, and the sound of his voice. In the same way, he plays all instruments, but the sensual, the saxophone is his best means of expression. The saxophone is associated with sensuality. But in the Jungian process of individuation, he has a unique position:

Hermine's role as Harry's guiding spirit, his "mirror," as Artiss puts it (90), is not in dispute and does not require further discussion here. However, with Pablo the situation is different. It is much more difficult to see him as a clear representative of one particular archetype in the individuation pattern. A few critics consider Pablo an animus archetype. Schwarz, for example, makes this point (139); Webb also implies it in a passage more or less compressing the ideas of Ziolkowski, Boulby, and Rose, when he says that Pablo is often seen as a "sort of masculine counterpart of the anima figure" (117), a statement that essentially paraphrases, but misapplies, Jung's definition of the animus archetype. Other interpreters, such as Stelzig (216) and Schwarz (139), see Pablo as the shadow archetype, or at least, like Breugelmans, see him as "an aspect of his Shadow" (41). Frequently Pablo is also equated with the archetype of the wise old man. Most often, however, Pablo is seen as a mixed archetype who borrows some qualities from some or all of the above, which in effect goes contrary to the concept itself, since an archetype is by definition a representation of a single quality or characteristic. What is even more disturbing is that virtually no justification is ever given for putting Pablo into one or the other category. The reason for this confusion will become obvious when we look at the exact "qualifications" of this character to represent any of the archetypes. (Rockwood 48-49).

Pablo has a unique attractive appearance. Haller is attracted by his physical charm but he is distracted by his exotic, animal-like outside appearance. He is soon attracted by his playful

magical music. With his music and his opium cigarettes, Pablo displays sensual harmony. In the dance party, he creates the opium stimulated hallucination in which both he and Haller unite with Hermine and Maria in a sexual orgy. But when in the Magic Theatre he exchanges roles with Mozart, he also presents a similar promise in the world of spirit. It is at this context that Pablo acquires his transcendental role. As the head of the Theatre, he enables Haller to have visions of self-recognition and emerges as the main figure behind both Hermine's and Maria's activities. It follows from this that it is Pablo who is the main mirror in which all other figures, and hence all of Haller's aspirations, are reflected. Besides, as both a magician and Mozart, he transgresses the sensual and intellectual realms and makes their reconciliation in the realm of art. Pablo is the final magic mirror. Exemplifying the Treatise and the Magic Theatre, he plays his role well in the triad of characters. It lends to the triadic pattern of the novel.

In the novel, the mirror displays a twofold character. Its main role is like that of a picture painting its theme in a symbolic drawing. We saw in *Demian* how a novel can develop through consecutive extension of such self-portrait until a picture is achieved which corresponds with the ultimate image, the ideal image of the hero. But in *The Steppenwolf*, the mirror acquires an added role, using the capability of glass to all aspects together. Its way of showing an entity into its myriad workings, yet holding them together on an elusive surface, corresponds with Hesse's idea of the Magic Theatre. Haller's self-contemplation in Pablo's mirror shows this quality of the mirroring technique, comparing with Sinclair's similar reflection of the Beatrice image: "I saw, a little dissolved and cloudy, a ghostly, internally moving picture, heavily working and yeasting within itself: my own self, Harry Haller" (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 96).

This inwardly merging picture is vivid:

. . . and within this Harry [I saw] the Steppenwolf, a shy, beautiful wolf, though glancing about himself confused and anxious, his eyes glimmering now with evil now with sadness, and this figure of a wolf flowed through Harry in incessant movement, akin to a great river in which a tributary of different color churns and blends, fighting and full of unresolved longing for form. Sadly, sadly the flowing, half-formed wolf regarded me with his beautiful shy eyes. (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 96).

Progress, described as water, implies the unclear margins between two different images as they combine and characterize one another in their struggle for form. The image brings to surface Haller's internal worlds in a single expression; it portrays them properly and makes duality sensibly reachable.

As the mirror's exterior becomes a phase, figures proceed as if they were performing a show of the imagination. Thus, the mirror motif develops into that of the theatre, while retaining its task of reflecting in fantasy the subject's look in life. A good-looking sixteen-year-old version of Harry Haller leads the way into the passage of the Magic Theatre with its imaginative parody. The story develops through a change in the substantial nature of image and picture. It changes into a show in which Haller's present, past, and future are significantly revealed.

The idea of show needs more study in an expressive manner, because it involves an expansive idea of mirror and image. The protagonist is put as the observer of a show which depicts his inner self. He is participating as both audience and participant. He is the performer on a stage of life and the puppet on the stage of fantasy and play. This illusory role of the hero with two distinct roles has its origin in Hesse's method of concretizing the mirror by seeming to separate the subject gazing at the glass from the more composite image he reflects. Before setting up Haller as both a participant and an audience of the Magic Theatre, Pablo serves him opium cigarettes and liqueur, creating the ambiance of Dionysian intoxication. He then urges them: "[We] are here in a magic theatre. There are only pictures here, and no reality. Pick out pretty and gay pictures and show that you are no longer in love with your questionable personality" (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 102). After learning to laugh at the Steppenwolf, Haller steps through the magic mirror. The mirror is a magic doorway to a reflection of the inner self.

Haller's personality is influenced in a series of ridiculous exercises. These shows, with all their ironical propositions about amusement galleries, and cabarets, are successively different images whose very succession depicts Haller's inside nature. He first passes his indictment against modern society. Then he appraises the various figures of the full-length mirror as they are transformed into chess-men by the magician Pablo. In the next show, Haller is led to another vision of his self: a startling reversal of his own training in which a wolf trains a man until the man obediently turns into a beast. On the contrary, the concluding versions begin with a quiet agreement of resolution: the wish-dream *All Girls Are Yours*.

The development of the mirror image into individual scenes or acts is a significant method of expressive progression. Such a progress is time and again realized through the techniques of the motion picture. Haller's looking into a mirror, which reappears from time to time, always shows his self in which the wolf gradually predominates. But these meetings with mirrors interchange with the appearances of Mozart, who functions as an image signifying indifference.

This process of development has its likeness in the extension not only of pictures but also of musical tones. It is clear that the parallelism between imagery and music in the novel is conscious. Its development can be compared to musical sequences of repetitive notes. It is then, no chance that Mozart controls the concluding scenes. The conflict of man and wolf, peace and bestial anxiety, which suffuses most of the Magic Theatre, is transformed into a higher opposition by his disinterestedness. Mozart transforms Haller's puzzlement into the categories of art. With his detached cheerful music of profound instrumentation, he walks about light-footed. Art is in fact one of Pablo's magical concealing outfit. He also feels the dualism of nature and spirit, instinct and intellect. Motifs and chords mirroring such internal oppositions can present paradoxes without making them seem less paradoxical. They make the movement of contrasts lively.

Within this melodic and picturesque movement, the mirroring technique gives rise to an expressive metaphor in which the self is finally constricted with its model image. Hermann Hesse believed in the transformation of the outsider, harmonizing all the contradictions of a bourgeois civilization. In this regard, he resembles romantic writers who believed in the elevation of self-awareness to knowledge. The journey through the "inferno of my inner self" is really a march through a hallway of mirrors in which development is opposed by self-portraiture. *The Steppenwolf* is an expressive novel in which the workings of a psyche are caught, multiplied, and ultimately harmonized. As Hesse himself says: "Harry Haller is obsessed with the dual aspects of his personality, is torn between the poles of bourgeois and Steppenwolf, until he realizes that any simple duality of thesis and antithesis is an oversimplification that can be resolved only through the acceptance of a higher and more complex unity" (Ziolkowski, "Introduction" xiii).

Harry Haller faces identity crisis, just as Hesse did at the time of his psychoanalysis. He shares the modern man's consciousness of the absurdity of human condition. His self contains the wolf in him, which represents his authentic self, and the bourgeois, which is existentially unauthentic. The genuine self of Haller agrees with Nietzsche's denunciation of the herd culture as represented by the bourgeoisie and with his promotion of self-fulfillment and personal awareness. Lawrence Wilde also observes that "Nietzsche was the biggest influence on Hesse's thought" (87). The Treatise can be taken as a refined piece of psychoanalysis of Haller and of the outsider in general. It is the product of Haller's unconscious. It prefigures the way of his development. It needs that he should have the audacity to be himself.

The concern of psychoanalysis has an analogous motive. Its concern is not with the individual's successful reconciliation with his culture. Consciousness is only part of the procedure of development, which must also comprise action if the individual is to realize his full potential. Action also entails one's relatedness to others. Haller feels alienated and alone in the bourgeois world. His relationships to the members of his society are imitation or rather formality. He does get a genuine relationship with Hermine and with her anti-bourgeois friends through her. Pablo looks like a symbol of nature, of the Dionysian, which is what Haller, who symbolizes spirit and intellect, has denied and suppressed in himself. He also represents the unconscious and conscious of Haller.

Haller has experienced nothingness and absurdity. Nevertheless he has a faith and hopefulness which is usually not a quality of other existentialists. The climax of experiences Haller has on occasion, those moments in which he is aware of his full consciousness, provide constant sustenance to his hope and sustain him with harmony as symbolized by the Immortals and as articulated through humor and amusement.

In his seclusion he achieves communion and even establishes love relations in the world of Hermine and her friends. He has learned to act more instinctively and to progress from a pose of inactivity and passivity to a more profuse life of action and accomplishment. Probably the only way in which Haller does not expand is in his relationship to his culture and society. He remains the outsider.

The advance from a state of ingenuineness to a genuine selfhood is a characteristic of the Hesse's protagonists. When the ossified systems of society do not hold meaning, it becomes the general tendency of the protagonist to find his identity. He has to develop his own system of absolute values. However, it becomes very difficult for him.

The ingenuineness of Haller's dualistic view of himself is exposed by the Treatise, which propels him to begin his pursuit for a more genuine identity. He gains more insight and help from the advisers Hermine, Maria, and Pablo. Haller has to learn complete independence. After he learns from Hermine what is necessary for transforming his self, he must free himself from her, and carry on the quest on his own. For further acquiescence to her would be an obstacle and restraint to his quest. But the culture Haller has learned in his bourgeois upbringing cannot be given up so easily. He must bring outside the internal world and its images, which he has learned in the company of his *daimons* and especially the Magic Theatre. The self, which is the objective of Haller's quest, represents a centering. It also establishes a significance which was missing in Haller's life at the beginning of the narrative.

The Magic Theatre is closely linked to the Treatise, at the conclusion of which it is mentioned that it provides Haller the chance to bring repressed desires into consciousness and to achieve the outlook of humour, which the Treatise endorses. One can also argue that Haller completely ignores the lesson Hermine. Haller is really unfeeling to the complication of the picture of himself.

Lack of simplicity in the novel in respect of spirit and intellectuality is a case in point. The novel's editor constantly refers to Haller as scholarly, but he gives no comprehensible idea as to what he means by that term: it is purportedly perceptible in Haller's exterior and obvious in the fact that he has contemplated more than people in general. He shows the characteristics of calm neutrality and certainty of thought and knowledge, such as only intellectual men have. His look "pierced our whole epoch . . . the whole superficial play of a shallow, opinionated intellectuality" and "went right to the heart of all humanity", so that he recognized "what monkeys are!" what "monkey tricks" our "intelligence, all the attainments of the spirit, all progress towards the sublime" (Hesse, *Steppenwolf* 186).

The word spirit differs from the meaning of Haller's sceptical experiences. Hermine is also a skeptical figure. She aims to free him from his austere intellectuality and guide him back to nature. Similarly, the objective defined for him by the Immortals is to join them in the revelry of nature.

Haller's efforts to free himself from the bourgeois culture cannot succeed completely since he does not develop a new language. The opposing implications of ideas are disorienting and cause Haller to fluctuate between the hopeful understandings of the Immortals. He is conscious of the despondent recognition of the uselessness of all intellectual endeavour. Rather than attain an advancement to the laughter of the Immortals, which is based on their distinctiveness with themselves and their language, he remains attached to recurring cycles of conduct determined by the principles of the bourgeois society.

The novel's structural unity lies in a musical triadic patterning of thematic substance on a variety of levels. This systematizing motif is constant with Hesse's view of human development from innocence to lost innocence, from knowledge, conflict, and despair to a newly achieved wholeness and transcendence of conflict. As a composition regular with the expanding explanation of basic themes, which is smoothed in the sense that there is a go back to the fundamental themes and rather linear in the sense of a progressive transcendence away from limited previous perspectives, there is a spiral, which keeps with the ever-widening scope of the progression in the first part of the novel. Thus the narrative ensues with the editor's rather one dimensional approach, moves to Haller's multidimensional personality, and then to the ironic, and complex point of views of the Treatise and its expectation of release from disagreement on a higher level of assimilation. The rest of the novel shows the triadic pattern of development.

The first part of the triad is when Haller reads the Treatise to his first meeting with Hermine. The second concerns his growth and development under Hermine's guidance, and the third level starts with the carnival dance party. Haller reads the Treatise and becomes contemplative. He meets the professor who is his friend. It is his meeting with social world symbolically. Then he meets Hermine. Thus the Treatise, the professor and Hermine represent a triad. Hermine may be understood as a simplified representation of the treatise in a simple and practical way so that

Haller can understand the meaning of the Treatise properly and practically. The middle section also shows a triadic development which is signified by the characters Maria, Hermine, and Pablo. Maria prepares Haller for the height of his relationship with Hermine, and Hermine in return prepares him for Pablo and the Magic Theatre. It is an important fact that the three figures Hermine, Maria and Pablo stand for the three stages in Hesse's method of human development. Maria's genuine simplicity, Hermine's versatile complexity and Pablo's complete freedom and his identification with the Immortals represent three triadic functions. The concluding triad ensues with the ball and Haller's dancing with Maria and Hermine, and it progresses to his recognition of Pablo's direction. The proceedings of the Magic Theatre are not arranged according to the same triadic base as the previous stages. The triadic reconciliation is carried through all the novels:

In *Demian* it underlies the "Two Worlds" with which Emil Sinclair is confronted in the first chapter and which he seeks to reconcile through the aid of his friend Demian. In *Siddhartha* (1922) the hero makes his way from the realm of the spirit to the realm of the senses before he finally achieves the liberating synthesis on the river that flows between the two realms. And in *Narcissus and Goldmund* (1930) the thesis and antithesis of spirit and nature are embodied in the lives of the two central figures, who achieve a symbolic unity to the extent that they complement each other's existence. (Ziolkowski "Introduction" xiii).

The triadic style of growth is obvious more when it is recognized that Siddhartha accepts both his instinct and his intellect, but gives privilege to neither, and lives both to exhaustion. But self realization is achieved through the instinct as per Hesse's system of humanization. Casebeer rightly observes regarding Hesse's novels in general:

Throughout these novels there is a ... unifying factor—the personality of Hermann Hesse striving for self-realization through trying to live in his art the solutions that his own life have made attractive. While making an affirmation through following one course of action to its conclusion, Hesse has simultaneous awareness of other courses to be followed. Siddhartha succeeds through

meditation and withdrawal. But *Steppenwolf* begins with a Harry Haller who has tried such spiritual discipline and found it lacking. Ultimately, he withdraws also but into the chaos and horror of his own existence to find a necessary complement to all he esteems in himself. Goldmund leaves the spirit and the psyche altogether; he actively lives through his senses, body, and emotions in a violent and beautiful world. Only when he has exhausted his body can he withdraw to transcend it. Joseph Knecht also lives a life of action in the equally intricate and complex world of the intellectual. And only when he has exhausted its potential does he leave it. As varied as the approaches are, the process is the same: Hesse realizes himself by living through each life to its conclusion. He begins with an idea, tests it by experience, follows it to its end without ever losing sight of his ultimate belief in universal harmony. And then he begins with another idea. Each life is enriched by the experience of the former life. Each novel has more dimension. Each solution seems closer to *the* solution. (192).

After sensual love has been accomplished in Siddhartha, social love is initiated. Siddhartha's concern for and service to humanity becomes the newest ideal in Hesse's self-quest. The stage of his love develops from personal to social. Siddhartha lives, loves, and affirms life for all it is or appears to be, for life is the all. Siddhartha is more realistic and practical, for he opts for life. Haller prefers immortality and is therefore less practical. Siddhartha is irritated with his Platonism, and Haller finds relief in it.

Like *Siddhartha*, *Demian* is an explanation of youth's quest for the self, an externalization of the psychic residue, an elucidation of the inner and a sketchy representation of the external world, more symbolically than in actuality. But *The Steppenwolf* is a very fantastic and real illustration of experiences of life, a description of a psychological crisis both personal and representative of the society. It is an account that is both appearance and essence, and that for full understanding must be viewed both in reality and emblematically. Hermine, the most inscrutable of Haller's new contacts, best exemplifies this dual nature of the book.

Haller's friendship with Hermine is visibly emblematic like the Sinclair-Demian union. Uncomplicated Pablo is possibly too knowledgeable and too sensible, and voluptuous Maria, too liberal with her favours to be completely credible. Complicated Haller must meet a prostitute who is nothing less than his female self. When their friendship becomes too intimate, Hermine sleeps with Pablo so that Haller can detach himself and get self-dependence.

Although all the relationships in the novel have their indispensable significance, the development is in fact that of Haller's and not other's. But Hermine is somewhat more than just Haller's genuine or imagined female self. She is also closely associated with Haller's young poet-friend Herman; she is liked to him physically, and even has the feminine form of his name. This close relationship of Haller, Hermine, and Hermann is completely reasonable on the level of reality, but probably more responsible on the plane of symbolism. In this way it seems that all the three names are self-projection of Hesse. The name Hermann stands the young poet Hesse once was, Haller represents the man Hesse had become, and Hermine is Haller's "hero", his tutelage and to help him realize his better self. She, like Demian, is more knowledgeable and practical than Haller, better integrated and wiser. Both are firm and tolerant guides, each understands friend comprehensively, and each is highly appreciated and obeyed completely. Demian's voice sometimes resembles Sinclair's own, and Haller's own soul seems to gaze at him through Hermine's eyes. In this way it is obvious that Hermine and Demian are externalizations of the protagonists' own self. Similarly, Haller's conversations with Hermine and Sinclair's conversations with Demian can be taken as self-dialogue. Nevertheless, in these presentations of the self, there is an important practical difference. Hermine became a lively amalgamation of the real and the figurative, while Demian remained ethereal and purely symbolic. The connotation of the Haller-Hermine affair is not pretty believable.

In his audacious literary prospect from *Demian* to *The Steppenwolf*, Hesse maneuvered a dramatically changeable course from one exhilarating method of expression to another. His experimentation changed from time to time and it showed him the way from the Jungian complexities of *Demian* to the exotically contemplative arena of *Siddhartha*. It conclusively climaxed in the extremely innovative amalgamation of psychological realism and symbolism, imagination and phantasm of *The Steppenwolf*.

Surroundings, proceedings, and characters and their interactions are not only restricted to the psyche, but are also given negligible needed detail. The few actions that take place in this background are given little detail. This genuine and vaguely lit arena is populated by actual and correspondingly perceptible humans. Hermine's physical gestures and countenance reminds Haller of his friend Hermann. Maria's physical gestures are not given any detail. Views and feelings are primary and plentiful. There is little detail of atmosphere. Only Haller and his two-room residence are given more than Hesse's usual physical detail. Yet, this enlarged expressive detail was given to the Preface, and therefore does not hinder the stylistic uniformity of the story.

Haller's tale and that of his bourgeois culture are expressed not once but four times. Four harmonizing pairs of portraits are drawn in four different sections by three different people. The extraordinarily long and moderate Preface, attributed to the nephew of Haller's landlady, describes the external man and his physical gestures and temperament. First, it depicts Haller's bourgeois world and his dissatisfaction with it. It also depicts its physical realism, its members, their way of life, and their attitudes. This introductory study is enlarged by an introduced study, of Haller's internal self. It is the Treatise, which paints a similarly perceptive psychological picture of the bourgeoisie. Haller's own records give a thorough introduction of the bourgeois society. Haller's visionary evaluation of himself and of his self in Pablo's Magic Theatre balances each of his previous portraits. His psychedelic reconsideration of the bourgeois world and its culture substantiates its previous portraits. United, these four pairs of portraits give broader exposure. What in conventional picturisation could have become a monotonously extended treatise became a tale attractive in its description and exceptional in its composition.

From *Demian* to *The Steppenwolf*, Hesse was concerned with self-quest in particular. He was engaged with the complexity of polarities. Instinct and thought became a changeable and yet continued progression involving the intellectuality and animality of man, sensual love and social love, appearance and realism, relationship and seclusion, diversity and oneness.

For Sinclair, dichotomy goes little beyond the duality of irreconcilables intrinsic in Christian ethics and morality. A Nietzschean liberation is adequate to determine his predicament. Siddhartha is a normal assertion, methodical fatigue, and a decisive surpassing of dichotomy. A resentful Haller, who seeks something Platonic, has to undergo experience and accept humour. He has to accept the importance of the empirical to make polarity even acceptable. Goldmund in his struggling with resolution of dualism is something of a very human compromise between two possibilities: the brilliant model depicted in Siddhartha and Haller's heroic retreat into Platonism, though he chooses the experiential model of Siddhartha:

As always, Hesse's most important concern in *Narcissus and Goldmund* is realization of the Self and therefore synthesis of the two worlds. Harry Haller has vowed to "traverse not once more, but often, the hell of my inner being."... Goldmund is one of the thousand souls of Herman Hesse, and a very important one for him to explore. (Casebeer 98).

Goldmund's emphasis, like Siddhartha, is on accepting nature with full intensity. He experiences and realizes himself empirically. But the difference between Goldmund and Siddhartha is that Goldmund continues his quest unlike Siddhartha who makes peace with himself. Siddhartha tries to transcend dichotomy, but Goldmund continues to reevaluate it. But Goldmund acquires a very human insight into himself and life on a very practical and empirical level.

Same is the predicament of all Hessean heroes. Goldmund, like Haller, contemplates the same issue of polarities. But he accepts life in all its possibilities while Haller cannot do so. Haller can only worry in his wavering between polarities. Goldmund enjoys the dichotomies of nature, of instinct and intellectuality. Siddhartha embraces all the dichotomies:

The longer we consider Hesse's novel, the more clearly we realize that it is not a telescope focused on an imaginary future but a mirror reflecting with disturbing sharpness a paradigm of present reality....

Seeking a new morality, [the young] find a kindred wanderer in Siddhartha who, transcending the conventional dichotomy of good and evil, embraces all extremes of life in one unified vision. His has been a pursuit of self identity which takes him to the shores of sensuality and of asceticism. With experience comes insight and Siddhartha learns to travel the river of life which touches both shores and which ultimately—after sorting out his values—offers harmony, knowledge, and perfection. He reaches a level of awareness where one is capable of accepting all being. (Gropper, “The Disenchanted Turn to Hesse” 982).

But Haller set forth his quest to avoid the both. Siddhartha affirms actuality. Haller tries to evade reality and seeks a Platonic world. Goldmund too questions but accepts reality. He lives his life with full enjoyment. He is a Dionysiac hero. Siddhartha cares little for what is and what could and should be. While Haller is discontented with it, Goldmund enthusiastically accepts it. Goldmund reconciles intellectuality and animality.

Like most of Hesse’s major novels, *Narziss and Goldmund* puts side by side and examines two themes: the ideal and the actual. Narziss represents the ideal and Goldmund the actual. Narziss and Goldmund are complex personifications. They, like all of Hesse’s very human protagonists seek self-realization. Goldmund wanders freely and with no regrets over his doings. He is both a disciplined artist and a wandering voluptuary, and feels much comfortable in the outside world. He enjoys his life freely and intensely unlike his friend Narziss. Narziss turns his back upon the world, and is always occupied with spiritual things in the isolation of the monastery. But he lacks human warmth. Each has empathy and sympathy with the other, but neither can nor will substitute roles with the other:

Narziss und Goldmund approximates a synthesis, a symphony. Goldmund symbolizes the aesthetic-artistic man, reminiscent of Kierkegaard's Don Juan; Narziss is the intellectual-spiritual thinker. Between them in the middle region of life is the "master," who achieves a sort of Aristotelian golden mean in practical life. Goldmund and Narziss grow and mature according to their own laws, until they recognize each other's limitations. (Mueller 151).

If Goldmund accepts the monastic life which Narziss leads, he cannot develop his personality. Though Hesse seems to disregard both approaches to life, he gives preference to Goldmund's way of resolution of the dichotomy. Both the characters are psychological symbols. But it is Goldmund whose individuation and self-realization is the main theme of the novel. Casebeer rightly says:

Like *Siddhartha* and *Steppenwolf*, *Narziss and Goldmund* has a basic three-part structure: it begins in a world dominated by the intellectual, enters into the rehabilitating world of the sensualist, and re-emerges—in the final conversations of the two main characters—in an integration of the two world views. Instead of Siddhartha's mystical self-immersion or Haller's humor, the integrating element is now art. (101-02).

Though normally pacifying in his assessment of the past, Hesse remained resolute in his criticism of the bourgeois society. In *Demian*, Hesse deprecates it as the world of the herd, in the Nietzschean sense of the word. He recognizes it as the world of the cowardly weak and their hypocrite herd morality and ethics. As it is depicted in *The Steppenwolf*, middle class society is desirable in its sanitation, industriousness, order, in its importance of duty, and its awareness of rules. Generally, such a world order would seem to be desirable for everyone. But surprisingly and ironically enough, it is this very bourgeois orderliness that is the problem of Harry Haller. The bourgeois culture is stagnant, empty, and mechanical. Chauvinism and jingoism, acquisitiveness and utilitarianism, and no scope for something new for the development of the conscious are some of the problems of the bourgeois society that is Haller's discontent. Their well-being and self-satisfaction is not the central point which they are criticized for. Rather it is their emotional and mental stagnation, their rudeness and greediness, emptiness, insignificant pursuits. Like most of Hesse's characters, Goldmund is displeased and never makes his reconciliation with the bourgeoisie. This class is identical with the establishment, which was characteristically unfavorable for the development of free individual tendencies.

Though *The Glass Bead Game* and *Demian* may seem to be as diverse from each other, they are in fact closely related in both theme and narrative pattern. It can be taken as a development from Sinclair to Knecht. The journey to self realization begin strongly and hopefully under one

pseudonym and succeeded calmly and happily under another. *Demian* describes essential preliminary self-emancipation; the intervening novels serialize self-confrontation concluding in self-acceptance. *The Glass Bead Game* centers on the phase of self-realization and self-justification. Knecht gains confidence in man and life, and is responsibly delights in social participation. As Peppard says:

The same strivings, the same goals and ideals motivate the H. H. of the earlier book and the later Joseph Knecht. Both heroes must go through Hesse's characteristic pattern of learning. They proceed from an original certainty and feeling of belonging through a period of doubt and questioning to a final stage of regained certainty on a higher level of insight. This triadic scheme is somewhat obscured in *Das Glasperlenspiel*, where the third and final stage of Knecht's development is only hinted at. (247).

Demian and the Magister Musicae are the urges that determine the course of the story. All the relationships are merely supportive for the development of the character of the protagonist. For instance, Beatrice Sinclair's adventure with love, Pistorius his religious quest for answers and support, Knauer his positive appreciation of sex, and Frau Eva his ultimate realization of sex and self. Knecht's develops similarly through the contrasts of intellect and instinct. His realizes his self in outer world.

Self realization is the main motive Knecht; self-quest becomes his passion. Like the previous Hessean heroes, he too seeks to reconcile the world of instinct and intellect. Designiori inspires him to seek a harmony of these opposites. The same pattern of friendship which began in *Peter Camenzind*, with the friendship of Camenzind and Boppi, and became well-marked in *Demian* is found even in *The Glass Bead Game*. The Knecht-Designiori friendship is the most important theme of the novel. Designiori represents the Dionysian and Knecht the Apollonian with all its intellectual characteristics. It is the Dionysian which triumphs and it is Hesse's intention. In this novel the antithetical double self-projection is the most evocative of the Narziss and Goldmund friendship. It seems that Knecht and Designiori are merely variations of Narziss and Goldmund in the distant future of the Castalian province. It seems that the story is told again in a new fashion.

But there is , with but a change in focus. In *Narziss and Goldmund*, the focus is primarily upon the individuation of the Dionysian Goldmund while in *The Glass Bead Game* the emphasis is on the individuation of the Apollonian Knecht, who, however, comes to acknowledge the importance of the Dionysian later and gives up his intellectual pursuits to experience the real world. It is probably like a return to the Dionysiac world of Goldmund. The story struggles between shifts from physical to spiritual poles. There is not much difference between world in which Designori lives and through which Goldmund wanders. And both the characters show their disgust for the bourgeois world that Hesse knew and despised. The Castalian order of intellectuals resembles that of the monastery of Narziss at Mariabronn. Joseph Knecht, the Magister Ludi resembles Narziss, an abbot a religious order at the monastery of Mariabronn. However, Castalia looks like a secularized world order.

Designori's is a variation of Goldmund and Knecht's story is a detailed and comprehensive story of Narziss's in another form. Goldmund has an expansive and larger world of experience whereas Designori does not develop himself as a fully Dionysian character. Instead, it is Knecht here whose development is the concern of the novelist. Hesse wants to show that it is only through the experiential world that anyone can get knowledge of the self. Knecht's shift from the world of the intellect to the world of real experiences signifies that even the intellectual has to undergo real experiences on a sensory level. The abstraction of the Castalian society cannot be of any avail without real world experiences. In *The Glass Bead Game*, Hesse does not devote himself in the development of the Dionysiac character of Designori. Rather, this time it is the Apollonian Knecht whose development is his concern. But this concern has a very important implication. The development of the Apollonian through a Dionysiac method accepting all the Dionysian qualities is the motive of Hesse in this novel. And Knecht exemplifies it well. There is always a process of change and development. The best Dionysiac character Goldmund, even after he seems to have satisfied his sensual desires, says: "I know all that," he said, "although, till now, I had not thought it. But as I told you; I have no aim. This woman is not my aim, although she was very tender and gentle with me. Though I go to her it will not be for her sake. I go because I must; because it calls me" (Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund* 75).

Haller becomes his better self, just as Sinclair becomes his Demian and Siddhartha his Vasudeva, and the same process follows. The unconscious mind is the source of instincts and is creative. The unconscious is feminine and is related to the female figure, which is creative too. All the characters realize their self empirically. The spirit of continuity and change is well evinced by all the heroes of Hesse. Knowledge never remains stagnant; it varies with each experience. In this way, the self that emerges is purely empirical.

CONCLUSION

A myriad of points emerged in the course of studying Hesse as a philosophically yet socially concerned novelist whose pacifism was centred primarily on a humanism in which the individual found full scope of his development. It is basically the issue of the self that concerns Hesse in all his novels. In fact, his basic concern is the development of the protagonists through real and lived experiences rather than through intellectually taught and inculcated principles; this, however, is the characteristic that probably makes him a maverick novelist. Right from the beginning, all his protagonists are inclined towards understanding the self and the world at large. They have a unique inquisitiveness, and definitely it is the inquisitiveness of man in general.

The first section of the first chapter discusses dialectics which is necessary to understand for a better understanding of the discourses of philosophy. Socrates' dialectics was quite scientific in many respects, for he created enough space for the common people to discuss and debate. The most important aspect of his dialectics is that he did not intend to teach anything. What he really intended was to initiate a dialogue in which all the participants had the opportunity to express their thoughts according to their desire. Another typicality of Socrates is that he even examined the very first premises of an argument to examine the validity of a belief. He cross-examined his interlocutor's premises so that a contradictory inconsistency could be found out for further inquiry. And in the premises lay the theses and antithesis which could be the ground of the argument.

Another significant epistemological shift in the dialectical tradition was Hegel's dialectic that nearly changed the very structure of the dialectical method. Hegel introduced the concepts of thesis and synthesis and proposed the certainty of a transcendental Absolute. Following this very triadic structure, Marx in the nineteenth century laid down the basis of his theory on the dialectical method. He differed from Hegel basically in the fact that he denied the concept of the transcendental Absolute and, instead, identified a continuous process of change in everything. Following the basic premise of Hegel, he held that the synthesis becomes the thesis in course of time producing its antithesis and finally leads to another synthesis. While Hegel maintained that there is a transcendental Absolute after which there is no thesis, Marx posited the process keeps on going continuously and endlessly, and in this way change becomes the nature of things.

After understanding the dialectical method, it was easier to proceed to understand the theory of knowledge. Socrates' *Theaetetus* is perhaps the first treatise on knowledge. But his query of knowledge does not give any conclusion and the dialogue ends in *aporia*. The knowledge theory of Socrates and Plato basically affirms the idea that virtue is knowledge. Socrates' saying that an unexamined life is not worth living alludes to a life of virtue. It builds up his concept of "good" which holds that whatever is advantageous and gives happiness is good. This concept of happiness was later explained by his disciples in various ways. Aristippus, for instance, explained it as pleasure of the senses. However, Socrates had one quality that he did not inculcate anything to his students. But Plato affirmed that what he knew was right and inculcated his principles to his students. In this way, he seems to have gone in opposition to the very spirit of the dialectical method of inquiry. His epistemology is based on intuition. In his phraseology, Plato considers wisdom as the knowledge of things which can be understood by the intellect.

Protagoras held that man is the measure of all things; hence the *homo mensura* was the measuring rod of the Sophists. Knowledge is perception and perception is relative; it varies from person to person. So, knowledge cannot be the same to all; it is relative. Thought or reason does not have any role in constituting knowledge.

The Sophists' doctrine of *homo mensura* (man is the measure of all things) clarified that perceptions and sensations vary from person to person. Georgias had already mentioned three basic facts of his theory of knowledge. There is nothing and even if there is anything it cannot be known. And even if there is any knowledge, it cannot be communicated. As nothing can be proved, the Sceptics suspended their judgment to attain a state of "*ataraxia*" or tranquil mind. Without any involvement in the movement of will and action, one can enjoy the state of "*ataraxia*". One cannot rely on moral opinions, for they are based on customs and conventions.

Like the Stoics and the Epicureans, the Sceptics espoused the empirical method of knowledge. Scepticism went to such extremes that Arcesilaus is said to have known nothing, not even his ignorance. Georgias held that no knowledge is possible and even if there is the possibility of any knowledge, it cannot be communicated. An object is not felt in the same way by all. Georgias' scepticism was the product of his relativism of knowledge.

The Cyrenaics developed a sceptic theory of knowledge. They did not believe in the existence of any self. The Sophists were probably responsible for Aristippus' doctrine that sensations alone can give us knowledge. Theodorous, one of the later Cyrenaics, gave the same principle of pleasure as Aristippus had done and added that pleasure resulted from knowledge.

Aenesidemus, another Greek skeptical philosopher, says that all perceptions are relative and have interaction with each other. When we become accustomed to the repetitiveness of custom or anything else, the imprint of our impressions becomes less indelible. And it is a reality that all men grow up with different beliefs, laws and customs. In such circumstances, the truth differs in importance in the mind of the individual. As a result, there is the impossibility of any absolute knowledge because every individual comes up with his own perception and organizes his sense perceptions according to himself.

Epicurus considered pleasure and pain as the measure of good and evil. In other words, everything that is pleasurable is good and everything that is painful is bad. This was the basis of his morality. The fact that senses are the source of knowledge of good and evil characterises Epicurean epistemology.

Descartes, regarded as the founder of modern philosophy, declared: "I think therefore I am," which is known as his "cogito". This is a starting point of his quest for certainty which is his fundamental criterion of knowledge. He thinks that nothing can be known unless it is absolutely certain. He begins his quest of knowledge by doubting all beliefs to know if there is anything which cannot be doubted. His dualism is found even in his concept of knowledge. He identifies ideas through which we cognize the external world. Thus, he divides knowledge into ideas and external objects of which ideas are formed. In the Third Meditation he says that knowledge is found in innate ideas, and sense experience cannot give us universal knowledge.

Spinoza claims that mind and body express the same reality and are the different attributes of a single substance, (Nature), which exists in itself and is self-contained, and self-conceived. The creator and all his substance is one, self-creating and therefore entirely free. All relations in this one substance are logical, and therefore their knowledge means the knowledge of reality.

Leibniz defends the principle of innate ideas as he argues that sense experience alone cannot account for knowledge. Not only this, he also ascribed these mental dispositions and ideas to the unconscious mind (perceptions). He differed from Descartes who held that the mind is fully aware of all its contents. His monads resemble the Modes of Spinoza. Leibniz comes quite close to Spinoza's concept of the one substance.

John Locke, one of the first British empiricists, held that knowledge is derived from the senses. As a challenge against the rationalist philosophy of mind, he set forth his empiricism to refute the principle that the mind contains innate ideas, which accepted that ideas are not acquired but lie previously in the human mind as part of its constitution. He based his theory of knowledge on the concept of *tabula rasa* that signifies an empty mind or a blank paper.

It is through experience that the mind acquires knowledge; the experience provides raw materials to the mind to work with in the form of sensations and reflections. Sensations are received when the sense organs get stimulated through contact with the external world. The sensations build up the consciousness. Impressions are registered from outside. Through memory and reflection, sensations are organized into knowledge.

Difference in circumstances and the nature of the sense organs of various persons decide the nature and quality of the experience. There are simple and complex ideas. But only sensation and reflection cannot, as Locke says, combine the simple ideas into a unity. It is through comparison and abstraction that the mind unites them. When two ideas are brought together for comparison, the mind identifies the similarities and dissimilarities.

The major difference of Locke from other empiricists is that he did not accept that knowledge is acquired through experience alone, as he said that knowledge may be acquired by reason or intuition also. Though he denied the concept of innate ideas, he accepted the possibility of *a priori* knowledge. In response to Locke's theory of ideas, George Berkeley set forth his idealist theory. It is very surprising that he refused to accept that there is any existence of matter. Instead, he posited the existence of finite mental substances. He considered the world outside just as a collection of ideas and nothing else.

The most important observation of Hume is that experience is the source of all knowledge. Sensory organs are at the root of all perception. Hume divides perception into two types: impressions and ideas. Impressions are our elemental experiences; they are our sensations, passions and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul. Ideas are only reflections or copies of the impressions. Hume argued that humans have knowledge of things through direct experience.

Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century tried to bring together the rationalist and empiricist approaches to knowledge. The base of knowledge, Kant says, is the subjective experience of the external world. First, the senses receive the experience of the external world. Then through certain receptive laws of the mind it gets processed and becomes knowledge. Sensory experiences give intuitions to the mind and intuitions become objective conceptual knowledge by means of understanding.

No finding can be claimed to be irrevocable, for knowledge lies in flux; any claim of knowledge to be transcendental or ultimate nullifies the very nature of knowing. Heraclitus' proclamation that one cannot step into the same river twice pinpoints this very quintessence of knowing.

In this process of change and development, the category of the self too changes. Starting from the study of the various concepts of Greek and Western philosophies, the third section of the first chapter was dedicated to the understanding of the concepts of the self. Most Greek philosophy is rationalist in approach; it was only Epicurus who was the purely empiricist philosopher. Socrates believed in a self which he referred to as his soul.

It was Epicurus who replaced the existing concepts regarding self and soul with a completely new pattern of thinking. He said that the soul was material and there was no need to fear from any divine punishment. According to Epicurus, senses, which were not philosophical at all, constituted knowledge and the self of a person.

According to Hierocles, perception is the self. Epictetus emphasizes on volition as the real self of an individual.

According to Descartes, consciousness is the means of knowing the self as something which exists. According to Locke, it is the actively perceptive senses that form knowledge and the self. According to Hume, the self is nothing but perceptions.

The effort of the second chapter has been to understand the social, political and literary zeitgeist of Hesse's Germany so that we can examine the extent of Hesse's detachment from and attachment to his society and its influence on his personal and literary life.

The most important fact appeared is that Hesse was a very original writer inasmuch as he clearly expressed his mind and heart in his writing, and therefore he always expressed freely. Personal feelings shaped his works more than anything else. But it does never mean that he had no concern for his society.

However, Hesse wrote political and timely articles only in certain years, it cannot be said that he was detached from the current happenings. Undoubtedly, he did not mean politics in the strict sense of the word, but the atmosphere of politics which inflicted man outwardly and inwardly.

Peter Camenzind is a reflection of Hesse, the novelist in the making and his initial understanding of the world. He is not so much focused on social concerns than his own problems, but he makes the external circumstances responsible for those problems. It is here that we identify the novelist as socially concerned and his inner world as a reflection of the world outside. It is here that we also discern that the outside realities influence the inner personality of man.

The Prodigy is a masterful tirade against the education system, against the dullness of society. Hesse understood the yearning of the age to have an education system in which individual development should be compatible. It is in *Demian* that the youngsters see Hesse as the interpreter of their deeper consciousness.

The Glass Bead Game depicts an ideal society contrary to the real society of Germany. It is a society of writers, poets, musicians and all other arts with freedom from state and politics. Its espousal of isolation from the outside world is ironically an answer to the politics-ridden society of that time when literature could never be a truthful representation of the ongoings of the society. When Hesse wrote this novel, it was not allowed for publication. Probably, it speaks for the criticism he has incorporated in it.

Hesse's apolitical personality reaches its elevation in his own vigorous declaration that he is thoroughly apolitical, that the only thing political about what he writes is the atmosphere in which they are written. He is basically concerned with the personality development of the individual which is not completely outside the reach of politics.

So far it has become evident that the external world was an influential determinant of Hesse's writings. It is also very tangible that there is a direct relationship between the public and private worlds of the writer. Undeniably, man is a product of the outer circumstances. An age or a society is very responsible for what a writer writes. The literary concerns of Hesse would have been something else, had the German society been otherwise. The external world has a significant influence on the output of an artist. In almost all the novels of Hesse, the exterior is not only a background but also a determining factor.

The external circumstances shaped Hesse's literary outputs not less than his personal world. Man undeniably is a product of his social milieu. Hesse would have written something other than what he wrote had there not been their necessity. The age in which a writer writes anything is equally responsible for what he writes.

The third chapter, first of all, tried to understand the Apollonian and Dionysian principles as enumerated by Nietzsche. It is clear that the Apollonian represents thinking, principle of individuation, value for human order and culture, the dream state, celebration of appearance and illusion, plastic and visual arts, and human beings as artists. Conversely, the Dionysian represents feeling, celebration of nature and existence, music, state of intoxication, wholeness of existence, and human beings as the work and glorification of art. In other words, the Apollonian is self-controlled, rational, ordered and logical whereas the Dionysian is chaotic, passionate, musical and instinctual.

The Apollonian and Dionysian patterns are found in all the novels of Hesse. Even in his first novel, *Peter Camenzind*, this characteristic is identifiable, though not with much clarity. *The Prodigy*, Hesse's second novel, which is bitterly critical of the education system in which he was educated, presents the very pattern. The education system depicted in it did not take into account the development of personality or the self of children. Rather it focused on the bleak tenet of morality and mediocrity. No deviation of interest or thinking was recognised as a development.

Such callous and mechanised orientation of education was relentless to man's humanitarian development. The polarity between the morality and the mediocrity of the Apollonian education system and the Dionysian tendencies of Heilner, and later even of Giebenrath, are typically discernible in the novel.

It is, however, with *Demian* that this polarity becomes distinctly vivid and visible. Hesse's early writings shed light on this only partially, but despite this, enough examples of this is found in the novels of the early period. In fact, the early novels envisage the type of characters to emerge in the later ones. A very common point, for instance, that we find in all Hesse's novels is that the protagonist is always accompanied by a friend who plays his counterpart, his other self, or his mentor. So do we find in *The Prodigy* that Hermann Heilner is Hans Giebenrath's friend and comfort. Heilner is less hardworking and very liberal in his studies whereas Hans is very rational, logical and focused on his studies and success. In other words, the former represents Dionysiac qualities and the later Apolline qualities.

Hesse seems to suggest that the other world or what can be called the Dionysiac exists on two levels—external and internal. Sometimes, it is realised outside and sometimes inside. Thus the polarity can be studied with two perspectives—one from the angle of the outside world that comprises the bourgeois and the proletariat, the other from that of the psychological one that deals with the Dionysiac and the Apolline on the level of the impulses and instincts.

In *Siddhartha*, Govinda represents the Apollonian in contrast to the Dionysian Siddhartha. His always walking one step behind Siddhartha reminds one of the originality and vigour of the Dionysian impulses. Hesse exalts the Dionysian, yet putting the Apollonian beside it.

The Apollonian and Dionysian oppositions get a better explanation in *The Steppenwolf*. Initially, Haller identifies only a duality within himself. But later on, particularly after reading the Treatise and visiting the Magic Theatre, he realizes that he has many souls. As per the instruction of Hermine, he tries to laugh at this with self-irony and humor. But his drives are only two—Apollonian and Dionysian. All his motives and desires can be categorized within these two.

Certainly, this man was a wolf, the Dionysiac, who had been changed into a human being after his birth. In his childhood, he might have been wild, disorderly and disobedient, and would have been 'civilized' by those who brought him up. He becomes an intellectual as a consequence.

Music, a very dominant feature of the Dionysian, is present in the very movement of the prose, from hasty contact with Hermine to Pablo's Magic Theatre. This feature makes the novel a symphony in prose. Music enables Haller to dissolve the ego of his individuality and achieve a state of egolessness. As music serves as the expression of the Dionysian spirit, so does Mozart through his mastery over the Dionysian power of harmony.

This is Dionysian intoxication, in which all women and men kiss each other, feel each other and know each other, and consequently no difference remains. Pablo's Magic Theatre and its music provide Haller a harmonious personality. This harmony is achieved through humour and laughter. The novel ends with a note of lesson for Haller—the lesson to laugh and live in humour. The dance party with Hermine extends the Dionysian instincts and everyone learns to escape from the *principium individuationis* to the unity of nature.

Haller finds the Dionysian ambience of madness and intoxication in the company of women. Hermine represents the Dionysiac, the sensual and significant in Haller. But it does not imply that Hermine, Pablo and Maria are not reflections of Haller's own personality. They are the manifestations of his inner self. They are different and undoubtedly represent different qualities and their central motive is to inspire him to proceed towards the realization of the subconscious, towards what has remained unexpressed in his mind, the Dionysian instinctual force.

But the Apollonian and Dionysian polarities were not so well sketched until the publication of *Narziss and Goldmund*. This novel depicts the story of two friends, who are completely different from each other but identify themselves with each other.

Right from the beginning, the Apollonian and Dionysian poles have been foregrounded in the text apparently. While Narziss is dark and thin of face, Goldmund open and radiant as a flower. While Narziss is a thinker, Goldmund a dreamer and a child.

But Goldmund's character has been cast in straightforward contrast to Narziss's. Hesse has endowed him with all the Dionysian characteristics. He wanders in woods, deserts and fields, but does not like the life-style of the ascetics. His wandering certainly reminds one of Harry Haller's wolfish nature that defies human civilisation.

Goldmund listens to the soul, to the Dionysian instincts of his spirit. It appears to him that only love is basic, only heartfelt and free devotion, to satisfy all disparity, to make a bridge between all opposites. Goldmund celebrates his life like Zarathustra whereas Narziss lives as a follower of the mind in strict obedience to the monastery. Hesse has tried to invest Goldmund with powerfully Dionysiac sensual instincts to raise him as a typical man of powerful will. Hesse, the romantic, gives a vivid and lively detail of the forests and deserts that Goldmund traverses and where his Dionysiac personality flourishes.

In *The Journey to the East*, Leo's has unaffected manners and has something so pleasing, so unassumingly winning about him that everyone loves him. He does his work merrily, sings or whistles as he goes along. Moreover, all animals are friendly him. He always had some pets which joined the League. His ability to tame birds and attract butterflies reflects his Dionysian qualities. The playful handling of the time, the paradoxes, the illogical, is typical of Dionysian music. It seems the story takes place in the regions of Utopia and of the dream. The understanding of the morning land tour is not primarily a question of the intellect, but a question of passion and imagination.

In *The Magister Ludi (The Glass Bead Game)*, Knecht sounds some of the notes which relates to his Dionysian instinct. He describes his initial unwillingness to enter the Vicus Lusorum. He acknowledges that the game demands more effort and energy, and it is a mental exercise. Knecht is an Apolline character, but towards the end of the novel he embraces the Dionysian and goes out in the world to experience everything freely. And Designori, Knecht's Dionysian friend, stresses his own differentness. He seized every pretext for setting his secular views and standards against those of Castalia, and contending that his own were better, more natural, more human. In these arguments he bandied about words like "nature" and "common sense," to the discredit of the over-refined, unworldly spirit of the school. He wanted to defend the "world" and interrogated the unreflective life of the "arrogant scholastic intellectuality" of Castalia. He did not want to be thought the dull-witted brute blindly trampling around in the flower garden of culture. (Hesse, *The Magister Ludi*).

Designiori is the Dionysian well represented by Goldmund in *Narziss and Goldmund*. But the story is concerned with the development of Joseph Knecht, who, an Apollonian in the beginning, turns out to be a Dionysian by showing his distaste for the intellectually maintained order of Castalia. The Castalian society is declared impractical, for it is abstract and does not involve the real activities of the world. The very name, Castalia, is taken from a nymph of the Greek legend in which it is related to the god Apollo. The Castalian society, therefore, represents the Apollonian. Knecht rejects such intellectualism and embarks on his journey to the empirical, Dionysian world. Thus, Hesse's continuous reappraisal of the Dionysian and the Apollonian tendencies of the human mind is represented in all his novels.

Of all Hesse's protagonists, Goldmund is the best to exemplify the empirically individuated hero. Though the process of Hesse's exploration of the individual self begins right from the beginning, namely from *Peter Camenzind*, it is fully pronounced in *Narziss and Goldmund*.

Camenzind learns the lesson of freedom from natural objects rather than from society and its pre-established norms. The vagabond in Hesse to be developed fully in *Narziss and Goldmund* is prefigured in this hero of the mountains.

As the process of individuation starts from Camenzind through wandering and flouting the established norms, in the same way the mode of individuation begins with the empirical senses. These two patterns of development of the protagonist continue in all the novels of Hesse.

The process of self exploration in Camenzind starts with nature, as in Siddhartha and others, and leads through world experiences to self realization. In the process of self-realization, each protagonist has his guide or an opposite, who really do not guide him to follow any principle, but to follow the very way of his own nature. They follow their own experiences and therefore the process of their individuation is essentially empirical.

Sinclair does not profess himself as an intellectual like the educated people of his society. He does not like to be called great as the so-called great people have loved to be called. He is a true seeker who does not say that this or that is the ultimate truth. His is a philosophy of continuous change and development. He learns not only from books but also, and mostly, from his senses, from his sensory perceptions.

Siddhartha's individuation is also empirical. It is quite surprising that most criticism is concerned with declaring *Siddhartha* unanimously as a work of mysticism. But the reality is rather the other way round. There are many passages in the text which preclude its being labeled as a mystic work. It is a work of empirical self-realization. Siddhartha rejects everything what has already been established as secondary knowledge. He starts his journey of primary experiences. He feels the world without any predilection.

The triadic style of growth is obvious more when it is recognized that Siddhartha accepts both his instinct and his intellect, but gives privilege to neither, and lives both to exhaustion. But self realization is achieved through the instinct as per Hesse's system of humanization. Hesse rightly says: "My Siddhartha does not, in the end, learn true wisdom from any teacher, but from a river that roars in a funny way and from a kindly old fool who always smiles..." (qtd. in Freedman 233).

Narziss and Goldmund very well shows the pattern of the bildungsroman as far as the development of an individual, namely the development of Goldmund, is concerned. Narziss is not much more than Goldmund's contrasting foil. He does not evolve; he only rises higher on the head of the monastery hierarchy and he is a bit stricter and older. At the end of the novel, he remains concerned, as he accepts before Goldmund the limits of rationality.

Goldmund has sexual relationship with many women. Yet he awaits another woman, and his heart is clear, his mind at peace. He learns through impressions. It is in this enduring sentimental and sensual education that Goldmund develops an affecting sensibility and erotic knowledge that exceeds by far the conservative boundaries of masculine sexuality. His personal knowledge of the senses and his fervent appreciation of all its characteristics make him a wonderful match for the woman who comes to him. But Narziss turns his back upon the world, and is always occupied with intellectualism in the isolation of the monastery. Consequently, he lacks human warmth.

H. H., in *The Journey to the East*, understands his self through his own reflections. He feels that it is he who is the responsible for his experiences. H. H. learns through a figure which he finds on the niche of an archive. When he looks at it a shudder goes through him at the thought that he should still learn. H. H. feels the journey to be an educative process. Like Goldmund and Harry Haller, he wanders and learns through his experiences.

Hesse's heroes acquire knowledge according to their own impulses and cognitions. They freely choose and discard anything according to their own choices. However, in the beginning they feel somewhat inclined to acquire that knowledge which they find in their society.

Hesse's protagonists are also in disagreement with the contemporary systems in human society. They are heretics and iconoclasts, standing separately with their own bundle of experiences. They are able to master their personality. They are drifters who defy society completely. They do not follow any of its rules and lead a free life.

For instance, Knecht's giving up the order and going out to experience the real world certainly speaks of Hesse's iconoclasm. Knecht must learn from the real world. Knecht reminds the future teachers of the game that the game can lead to blank virtuosity, artistic arrogance as a variety of self-indulgence, contest, the striving for supremacy over others and thus to the misuse of power.

The main aim of *The Magister Ludi* is the self-development of Knecht and finally his orientation to society at large. Like the previous Hessean heroes, he too seeks to reconcile the world of instinct and intellect. Designori inspires him to seek a harmony of these opposites. The same pattern of friendship which began in *Peter Camenzind*, with the friendship of Camenzind and Boppi, and became well-marked in *Demian* is found even in *The Magister Ludi*. The Knecht-Designori friendship is the most important theme of the novel. Designori represents the Dionysian and Knecht the Apollonian with all its intellectual characteristics. It is the Dionysian which triumphs and it is Hesse's intention.

There is a remarkable succession in the idea of triadic humanization. The process of humanization signifies the process of individuation. The principle of individuation implies that we affirm ourselves as individuals; then we separate ourselves from the first stage. It is an indispensable stage toward the development of the individual personality. The third phase of individuation means reunification with totality on a higher level. The third stage of individuation is a transcendence of the individual beyond. But it is, surprisingly, a return to the community. One is engrossed, almost gracefully, into the whole again. The persistence upon individuality that is the identifying characteristic of man on the second level gives way to another concept. On the third level it is an openness to the whole and subjugation of the individual desire. Hesse's characters acquire a humanitarian attitude on this level as the Dionysian necessitates a merging with the all.

Consequently, the principle of considering the community after realizing the self is a characteristic of Hesse's characters who have reached the third level. For instance, the old Siddhartha, who spends his days as a ferryman; Joseph Knecht, who as Master of the Castalian order relinquishes all individuality in order to think of society at large. The humanitarian tone of Hesse is maintained throughout all the novels.

The myopia with Hessean studies is that he has been, more often than not, seen as a novelist representing Eastern material. But a deep study of the novels obviously shows that the final product of Hesse is Western, and not even Western but universal. *Siddhartha* and *The Journey to the East*, for instance, are not Oriental tales in essence but merely tales set in the East.

Though Hesse used the traditional bildungsroman form, his concern is characteristically modern and innovative. It is for this very innovativeness that Thomas Mann compared him to some modernist writers who experimented with the techniques of the novel. Hesse, like them, is concerned with the modern man's engagement with the self, though his study of the self defies any barrier of time and space.

Most of Hesse's protagonists are engaged with the workings of the unconscious mind that is the basis of their self-realization. The unconscious is always Dionysian. The method of knowledge formation and self-realization is empirical. All the protagonists embark on a journey to the experiential world and acquire knowledge through experiences. It is a fact that the process of change and development continues and characterizes Hesse's protagonists. Knowledge never remains stagnant; it varies with each experience. In this way, the self that emerges is purely empirical. The process of development through the instinctive and sensory Dionysiac is empirical and it is maintained through a triadic dialectics.

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Dialectics of Knowledge Formation and the Self : A Study of Hermann Hesse's Novels


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ABSTRACT



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The primary focus of this research is to study the construction and transformation of the self in Hermann Hesse's novels, while at the same time foregrounding the Nietzschean concept of Dionysian and Apollonian elements that underlie most of Hesse's novels. As far as Hesse is concerned, the self is constructed through an empiricist mode of knowledge acquisition. All his novels are in the traditional European form of bildungsroman with a consequential evolution of the protagonist as a liberated (enlightened) person, as a person who knows the self only after flouting the ossified ways of living and thinking that shackle the development of man as man.

A myriad of points emerges in the course of studying Hesse as a philosophically yet socially concerned novelist whose pacifism was centred primarily on a humanism in which the individual found full scope of his development. It is basically the issue of the self that concerns Hesse in all his novels. His basic concern is the development of the protagonists through real and lived experiences rather than through intellectually taught and inculcated principles; this, however, is the characteristic that probably makes him a maverick novelist. Right from the beginning, all his protagonists are inclined towards understanding the self and the world at large. They have a unique inquisitiveness, and definitely it is the inquisitiveness of man in general.

Following Nietzsche, Hesse tried to create a world free from the pessimism and nihilism of a fundamental meaninglessness. As we know, the Apollonian in Nietzsche designates what is the unique individuality of anything. It is related to form and structure with an edifying impulse. For instance, sculpture is an Apollonian art as it has to do with a specific form and structure. Conversely, the Dionysian refers to the absence of individuality. Drunkenness, madness, passion, instinct, enthusiasm ecstasy, music, etc. are Dionysian qualities. Ancient Greek tragedy, according to Nietzsche, incorporated and intensified a tension between both the elements allowing the audience the full spectrum of human condition. Hermann Hesse too attempted at a synthesis of both the opposites through reconciliation of binary oppositions. This dialectical process runs throughout most of his novels. He combines this dialectical theory with yet another idea: 'the triadic rhythm of humanization.'

In Hesse's opinion, man's process of humanization begins with innocence. But in course of time, he gets into the whirl of good and bad, culture, morality, man-made ideals, etc. Finally, he gets disappointed as these do not manifest any reality to him. Consequently, he either falls down or gathers faith. But there is a third stage, according to Hesse, which synthesizes the rational and the irrational in man and leads to a true state of humanity. His protagonists question and drop their initial values and develop a new consciousness that is born of empirical realities.

In *Peter Camenzind*, Hesse's first novel named after its protagonist, we envisage the type of transformation to be found in his later novels. Like Hesse's other protagonists, e.g. Siddhartha, Goldmund, and Harry Haller, Camenzind suffers deeply and undergoes many intellectual, physical and empirical journeys.

Another novel by Hesse, *Beneath the Wheel*, presents the story of Hans Giebenrath, a sensitive boy sent to an elite seminary, who fails to develop himself as a person because of much scholastic knowledge resulting in his mental illness. Finally, he comes back to his village and is given to do the work of a blacksmith and he enjoys the work. Here, Hesse focuses on the need of concretization instead of abstractions. The Dionysian impulse is evident here: Giebenrath has feeling, instinct.

Nietzsche had a strong influence on Hesse and *Gertrud* (influenced by Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*), apart from many others, is a very good example of this. Muoth represents the passionate Dionysian elements of art, while Gertrud represents the more refined Apollonian elements. The fact that Kuhn's opera is the result of their relationship suggests the combining of the two elements to form a work of high art – the art that the Greeks practised by combining the two binary oppositions.

The novel *Knulp* centres around the character of Knulp, a drop-out who perpetually wanders, is dependent on friends, and who refuses to tie himself down to any job, place or person. He continues this Dionysian attitude of the irrational, instinctual, passionate and chaotic throughout his life. After disillusionment, he goes to a forest and asks God what the purpose of his life is. God replies that he did not want him to be a doctor, an artist or anything else. Rather, God wanted him to bring joy to the lives of people and lead them to the world of freedom, mental freedom. Thus, as a drifter, he finds the meaning of his life and self; to him the meaning of the self seems to be a consideration of existence as a whole. Here, a synthesis of the dichotomy between the Dionysian and the Apollonian is attempted at. First comes the Dionysian impulse in Knulp as he wanders and leads a careless and instinctual life in a state of intoxication keeping himself away from ambitions. But Hesse turns this careless and aimless life into a meaningful one by consigning Knulp the duty of bringing joy to the lives of people – perhaps an Apollonian tendency. He makes Knulp a rewarding failure when God says that he (God) couldn't have used him in any other way. Knulp wandered everywhere and brought a breath of freedom to the people who stayed home.

In *Demian*, Emil Sinclair is a young boy who was raised in a bourgeois home described as a Scheinwelt, 'Scheinwelt' being a play on words which means 'world of light' as well as 'world of illusion'. Through the novel, accompanied and prompted by his mysterious classmate Max Demian, he descends from and revolts against the superficial ideals of this world and eventually awakens into a realization of self. Thus, only after a revolt against the superficial ideals of the world does he find a realization of his own self – the essence of life. There seems to be a good influence of Nietzschean philosophy on this novel too. The man-made ideals and faiths are set at naught and it is the self and the will to empower the self that finds an outlet finally transforming the subject into an esoteric, self-loving being. Here the self becomes important as it is opposed to the negative connotation of the word 'selfish'. The novel also shows the influence of Carl Jung's psychology. Hesse said the novel was a story of Jungian individuation, the process of opening up to one's unconscious. This unconscious is the door to reach the realm of the self. Demian emerges as a rebel. He does not have sympathy for the thief who repents with Christ on the cross. Instead, his sympathy goes out to the thief who will not repent. The Nietzschean tendency of considering the Dionysian (the thief in this case) not inferior to the Apollonian finds an epitome in the character of Demian. The Gnostic deity Abraxas is used as a symbol throughout the text, idealizing the harmonious union of all that is good and all that is evil in the world. Demian argues that the Catholic God is an insufficient god; it rules over all that is wholesome, but there is a world of inconsistencies and irregularities, over which this austere god has no or very little control.

The story of *Siddhartha* takes place in ancient India around the time of Gautama Buddha. It starts as Siddhartha, the son of a Brahmin, leaves his home to join the ascetics with his companion Govinda. The two set out in the search of enlightenment. Siddhartha goes through a series of changes and realizations as he attempts to achieve this goal. Experience is the aggregate of conscious events in a human in life – it connotes participation and learning. Understanding is comprehension and internalization. In *Siddhartha*, experience is shown as the best way to approach reality. Hesse's crafting of Siddhartha's journey shows that understanding is acquired not through scholastic methods, nor through immersing oneself in the carnal pleasures of the world and the accompanying pains. It is the totality of these experiences that makes understanding possible. Thus, individual events are meaningless when considered in themselves: Siddhartha's stay with the *samanas* and his immersion in the worlds of love and business do not lead to liberation; yet they cannot be considered distractions, for every action and event that is undertaken helps him to achieve understanding. The novel ends with Siddhartha becoming a ferryman, talking to the river, talking to stones, at long last at peace and capturing the essence of his journey.

A major preoccupation of Hesse in writing *Siddhartha* was to cure his ‘sickness with life’ (*Lebenskrankheit*) by immersing himself in Eastern philosophy. The novel is structured on the three stages of traditional Indian life – of a student (*brahmacarya*), of a householder (*gārhasthya*) and recluse/renunciate (*vānaprastha*) as well as the Buddha's four noble truths and eight-fold path which form twelve, the number of chapters in the novel. The protagonist makes his way from the realm of the spirit to that of the senses before he finally achieves the liberating synthesis on the river that flows between the two realms.

Narcissus and Goldmund is the story of a young man, Goldmund, who wanders around aimlessly throughout Medieval Germany after leaving a Catholic monastery in search of what could be described as ‘the meaning of life’, or rather, meaning for his life. Narcissus, a gifted young teacher at the cloister school, quickly makes friends with Goldmund, as they are only a few years apart, and Goldmund is naturally bright. Goldmund looks up to Narcissus, and Narcissus has much fondness for him in return. After straying too far in the fields one day, on an errand gathering herbs, Goldmund comes across a beautiful woman, who kisses him and invites him to make love. This encounter becomes his epiphany, and he then knows he was never meant to be a monk. Goldmund is filled with the desire to experience everything, learn about life and nature in his own hands-on way. With Narcissus’ support, he leaves the monastery and wanders around the countryside, setting the scene for a story that contrasts the artist with the thinker. It spans many years, detailing specific incidents where Goldmund learns important things, and he often muses on these experiences and the ways of life. The polarization of Narcissus’ individualist Apollonian character stands in contrast to the passionate and zealous disposition of Goldmund. Hesse, in the spirit of Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*, completes the equation by creating Goldmund as an artist and wanderer (a Dionysian endeavour) balanced out by Narcissus, the structured and stable clergyman (an Apollonian approach), and highlighting the harmonizing relationship of the main characters. Goldmund is presented as an evolving seeker who attempts to embody both Apollonian and Dionysian elements, thus capturing Nietzsche's conception of the ideal tragedy. Goldmund comes to embody a wide spectrum of the human experience, lusting for the gruesome ecstasy of the sensual world yet capturing and representing it through his talent as a sculptor.

Like most of Hesse’s works, the main theme of this book is the wanderer's struggle to find himself, as well as the Jungian union of polar opposites (*Mysterium Coniunctionis*). Goldmund represents art and nature and the ‘feminine mind’, while Narcissus represents science and logic

and God and the 'masculine mind'. These 'feminine' and 'masculine' qualities are drawn from the Jungian archetypal structure, and is quite reminiscent of some of his earlier works, especially *Demian*. Throughout the novel, Goldmund increasingly becomes aware of memories of his own mother, which ultimately results in his desire to return to the *Urmutter* (primordial mother). The thesis and antithesis of spirit and nature are embodied in the lives of Narcissus and Goldmund, who achieve a symbolic unity to the extent that they complement each other's existence.

Hesse cannot always be studied as a purely philosophical novelist. He has linked his writing to society at large and the then Germany in particular. The tensions created by the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany directly contributed to the creation of the *Glass Bead Game* as a response to the oppressive times. Hesse attempted to work against Hitler's suppression of art and literature. The socially involved aspects of this novel earned the Nobel Prize for Hesse.

Now if we view how the self is constructed, can it be possible to say that what we call the self is, to borrow David Hume's words, simply a 'bundle of perceptions'? Do Hesse's protagonists carry the same bundle of perceptions? The answer is probably in the affirmative.

Hesse knew the religion of nature that is always opposed to the social and mental structures man has raised. His protagonists go alone without a teacher. All find the meaning of existence in the self as it is the self that teaches one to think. But this self is diametrically opposite to the general connotation of the word. It is a realization of existence as a whole; it is a process of humanization and fraternity.

Hesse emerges as a romantic writer hovering around in the world of imagination and yet telling the ultimate truth. He expresses his opposition to currently accepted values by putting his pacifism against militarism, his cosmopolitanism against nationalism, his tolerance against anti-Semitism, and his conception of a world culture against a narrow European civilization. His pacifism, universalism, tolerance and attempt to free man from the shackles of the mind and man-made values, and to inspire for a natural life are praiseworthy, but he seems to be mystical somewhere when he touches eastern philosophy and this prevents him from being a purely philosophical person. In every novel of his, opposites like rationalism and empiricism, Eros and Thanatos, conscious and unconscious, the Manichean light and darkness, etc. manifest themselves profoundly. However, Hesse tried to create something in the line of the ancient Greeks by fusing them. A unique synthesis of both the polar opposite elements generates a harmonious humanism in Hesse, which most of the existing social movements cannot ensure us of as they always try to take us to some extremes.

Some key research queries which have been handled in this study are as follow:

- What is the self in Hermann Hesse?
- How and to what extent was Hesse influenced by Nietzsche?
- Where does Hesse's concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis lead us to?
- What is the final meaning of life that Hesse's characters find?
- Was Hesse a pacifist/humanist writer whose religion was man?
- What is the role of philosophy in pacifism?
- What kind of philosophy and pacifism work hand in hand?
- What was Hesse's outlook toward religion and spiritualism? How did he pronounce a spirituality totally unrelated to and different from the so-called religions and spiritualisms which has God as the centre?

Though much has been studied with regard to Hermann Hesse as a novelist as a whole, little focused work exists regarding his discussion of the driving force that concerns a natural man, which would be the prime objective of my study. Hesse teaches a spiritualism which is completely averse to the concepts of God and religions. His spiritualism is the spiritualism of humanism. This tone perhaps sets forth the present study. Of course, Hesse has been studied in philosophical terms, and his human concern and his incessant quest for the reality of life and this world, has received some critical focus. But little attention has been paid towards Hesse as a philosopher influenced by Nietzsche. This focus definitely leads this study to a deeper analysis.

Apart from discussing Hesse in philosophical terms, he can be discussed in relation to his contemporary society too, which is a perspective not much existing research takes up. The political condition of the then Germany was worsening owing to the war. Pacifism was the only option then. This work also tries to focus on the social aspects of Hesse's works so as to see why an alternative consciousness of aversion to war emerges in him instead of the high jingoism of military takeover.

Hesse vindicates the Dionysian. Knowledge is formed more through the Dionysian than through the Apollonian because the former is related to the empirical perceptions of human beings. The empirical is solely based on Dionysiac instincts and experiences. Conversely, one lacks the experiential, the empirical in the Apollonian, which is just nothing more than a set of formulaic intellectualism. It is through the Dionysiacally empirical that Hesse's protagonists, whose development is his aim, and it also gives all his novels the form of a bildungsroman, acquire knowledge and form the self.

However, the Apollonian is not discarded altogether. It has been blended with the Dionysian and a synthesis is formed out of these two human forces. But for the most time, Hesse is preoccupied with the Dionysian through which he develops his protagonists who flout all established boundaries of societal customs and traditions. In defying the norms of the culture which he was born into, Hesse emerges as an iconoclast. His protagonists go their own way, feel the world freely and emerge with a lot of experiences of the real world.

The First Chapter focuses on theoretical postulations on the self and a few other categories and dichotomies. It discusses causality, phenomenon, noumenon, empiricism, rationalism, transcendental idealism, knowing and willing, with reference to Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, etc. It prepares the ground for the next chapters and especially the categories of self and knowledge. Starting from the ancient Greek times, it tries to understand the hitherto conceived forms of the self. It also studies the various concepts of knowledge and tries to explore how knowledge and the self are conceived and also which of these two are primary.

The first section of the first chapter discusses dialectics which is necessary to understand for a better understanding of the discourses of philosophy. Socrates' dialectics was quite scientific in many respects, for he created enough space for the common people to discuss and debate. The most important aspect of his dialectics is that he did not intend to teach anything. What he really intended was to initiate a dialogue in which all the participants had the opportunity to express their thoughts according to their desire. Another typicality of Socrates is that he even examined the very first premises of an argument to examine the validity of a belief. He cross-examined his interlocutor's premises so that a contradictory inconsistency could be found out for further inquiry. And in the premises lay the theses and antithesis which could be the ground of the argument. Another significant epistemological shift in the dialectical tradition was Hegel's dialectic that nearly changed the very structure of the dialectical method. Hegel introduced the concepts of thesis and synthesis and proposed the certainty of a transcendental Absolute. Following this very triadic structure, Marx in the nineteenth century laid down the basis of his theory on the dialectical method. He differed from Hegel basically in the fact that he denied the concept of the transcendental Absolute and, instead, identified a continuous process of change in everything. Following the basic premise of Hegel, he held that the synthesis becomes the thesis in course of time producing its antithesis and finally leads to another synthesis. While Hegel maintained that there is a transcendental Absolute after which there is no thesis, Marx posited the process keeps on going continuously and endlessly, and in this way change becomes the nature of things.

After understanding the dialectical method, it was easier to proceed to understand the theory of knowledge. Socrates' *Theaetetus* is perhaps the first treatise on knowledge. Protagoras held that man is the measure of all things; hence the *homo mensura* was the measuring rod of the Sophists. The Sophists' doctrine of *homo mensura* (man is the measure of all things) clarified that perceptions and sensations vary from person to person. Like the Stoics and the Epicureans, the Sceptics espoused the empirical method of knowledge. Georgias held that no knowledge is possible and even if there is the possibility of any knowledge, it cannot be communicated. The Cyrenaics developed a sceptic theory of knowledge. Epicurus considered pleasure and pain as the measure of good and evil.

Descartes, regarded as the founder of modern philosophy, declared: "I think therefore I am," which is known as his "cogito". This is a starting point of his quest for certainty which is his fundamental criterion of knowledge. Spinoza claims that mind and body express the same reality and are the different attributes of a single substance, (Nature), which exists in itself and is self-contained, and self-conceived. Leibniz defends the principle of innate ideas as he argues that sense experience alone cannot account for knowledge.

John Locke, one of the first British empiricists, held that knowledge is derived from the senses. As a challenge against the rationalist philosophy of mind, he set forth his empiricism to refute the principle that the mind contains innate ideas, which accepted that ideas are not acquired but lie previously in the human mind as part of its constitution. He based his theory of knowledge on the concept of *tabula rasa* that signifies an empty mind or a blank paper.

It is through experience that the mind acquires knowledge; the experience provides raw materials to the mind to work with in the form of sensations and reflections. Sensations are received when the sense organs get stimulated through contact with the external world. The sensations build up the consciousness. Impressions are registered from outside. Through memory and reflection, sensations are organized into knowledge. In response to Locke's theory of ideas, George Berkeley set forth his idealist theory.

The most important observation of Hume is that experience is the source of all knowledge. Sensory organs are at the root of all perception. Hume divides perception into two types: impressions and ideas. Impressions are our elemental experiences; they are our sensations, passions and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul. Ideas are only reflections or copies of the impressions. Hume argued that humans have knowledge of things through direct experience.

Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century tried to bring together the rationalist and empiricist approaches to knowledge. The base of knowledge, Kant says, is the subjective experience of the external world. First, the senses receive the experience of the external world. Then through certain receptive laws of the mind it gets processed and becomes knowledge. Sensory experiences give intuitions to the mind and intuitions become objective conceptual knowledge by means of understanding.

According to Descartes, consciousness is the means of knowing the self as something which exists. According to Locke, it is the actively perceptive senses that form knowledge and the self. According to Hume, the self is nothing but perceptions.

As it is impossible to see literature and philosophy in isolation with society, the Second Chapter discusses Hesse's socio-political milieu – the then Germany of political upheaval, and connect it to his works. It also discusses how and to what extent Hesse was influenced by the social realities of his times and to what extent he influenced or tried to influence his society. We are here able to know what effects Hesse's characters would have achieved had the social milieu, i.e. the wars not provided a backdrop. The effort of this chapter has been to understand the social, political and literary zeitgeist of Hesse's Germany so that we can examine the extent of Hesse's detachment from and attachment to his society and its influence on his personal and literary life.

The most important fact is that Hesse was a very original writer inasmuch as he clearly expressed his mind and heart in his writing, and therefore he always expressed freely. Personal feelings shaped his works more than anything else. But it does never mean that he had no concern for his society. However, Hesse wrote political and timely articles only in certain years, it cannot be said that he was detached from the current happenings. Undoubtedly, he did not mean politics in the strict sense of the word, but the atmosphere of politics which inflicted man outwardly and inwardly.

Peter Camenzind is a reflection of Hesse, the novelist in the making and his initial understanding of the world. He is not so much focused on social concerns than his own problems, but he makes the external circumstances responsible for those problems. It is here that we identify the novelist as socially concerned and his inner world as a reflection of the world outside. It is here that we also discern that the outside realities influence the inner personality of man.

The Prodigy is a masterful tirade against the education system, against the dullness of society. Hesse understood the yearning of the age to have an education system in which individual development should be compatible. It is in *Demian* that the youngsters see Hesse as the interpreter of their deeper consciousness.

The Glass Bead Game depicts an ideal society contrary to the real society of Germany. It is a society of writers, poets, musicians and all other arts with freedom from state and politics. Its espousal of isolation from the outside world is ironically an answer to the politics-ridden society of that time when literature could never be a truthful representation of the ongoings of the society. When Hesse wrote this novel, it was not allowed for publication. Probably, it speaks for the criticism he has incorporated in it.

Hesse's apolitical personality reaches its elevation in his own vigorous declaration that he is thoroughly apolitical, that the only thing political about what he writes is the atmosphere in which they are written. He is basically concerned with the personality development of the individual which is not completely outside the reach of politics.

So far it has become evident that the external world was an influential determinant of Hesse's writings. It is also very tangible that there is a direct relationship between the public and private worlds of the writer. Undeniably, man is a product of the outer circumstances. An age or a society is very responsible for what a writer writes. The literary concerns of Hesse would have been something else, had the German society been otherwise. The external world has a significant influence on the output of an artist. In almost all the novels of Hesse, the exterior is not only a background but also a determining factor.

The external circumstances shaped Hesse's literary outputs not less than his personal world. Man undeniably is a product of his social milieu. Hesse would have written something other than what he wrote had there not been their necessity. The age in which a writer writes anything is equally responsible for what he writes.

The Third Chapter discusses Hesse's engagement with binary oppositions, especially of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. Camenzind, Giebenrath, Knulp, Sinclair, Siddhartha, Haller, Goldmund, H. H., and Knecht are Dionysian protagonists whose development and efforts of self-realization is the objective of the novelist. They are all accompanied by their mentors, or to use a better word, foils whose primary motive is help their friends develop their own conscience and personality.

This chapter explores the Apollonian and Dionysian principles as enumerated by Nietzsche and as found in Hesse's novels. The Apollonian and Dionysian patterns are found in all the novels of Hesse. Even in his first novel, *Peter Camenzind*, this characteristic is identifiable, though not with much clarity. *The Prodigy*, Hesse's second novel, which is bitterly critical of the education system in which he was educated, presents the very pattern. The education system depicted in it did not take into account the development of personality or the self of children. Rather it focused on the bleak tenet of morality and mediocrity. No deviation of interest or thinking was recognised as a development. Such callous and mechanised orientation of education was relentless to man's humanitarian development. The polarity between the morality and the mediocrity of the Apollonian education system and the Dionysian tendencies of Heilner, and later even of Giebenrath, are typically discernible in the novel.

Hesse seems to suggest that the other world or what can be called the Dionysiac exists on two levels—external and internal. Sometimes, it is realised outside and sometimes inside. Thus the polarity can be studied with two perspectives—one from the angle of the outside world that comprises the bourgeois and the proletariat, the other from that of the psychological one that deals with the Dionysiac and the Apolline on the level of the impulses and instincts.

In *Siddhartha*, Govinda represents the Apollonian in contrast to the Dionysian Siddhartha. His always walking one step behind Siddhartha reminds one of the originality and vigour of the Dionysian impulses. Hesse exalts the Dionysian, yet putting the Apollonian beside it.

The Apollonian and Dionysian oppositions get a better explanation in *The Steppenwolf*. Initially, Haller identifies only a duality within himself. But later on, particularly after reading the Treatise and visiting the Magic Theatre, he realizes that he has many souls. As per the instruction of Hermine, he tries to laugh at this with self-irony and humor. But his drives are only two—Apollonian and Dionysian. All his motives and desires can be categorized within these two.

But the Apollonian and Dionysian polarities were not so well sketched until the publication of *Narziss and Goldmund*. This novel depicts the story of two friends, who are completely different from each other but identify themselves with each other. Right from the beginning, the Apollonian and Dionysian poles have been foregrounded in the text apparently. While Narziss is dark and thin of face, Goldmund open and radiant as a flower. While Narziss is a thinker, Goldmund a dreamer and a child.

But Goldmund's character has been cast in straightforward contrast to Narziss's. Hesse has endowed him with all the Dionysian characteristics. He wanders in woods, deserts and fields, but does not like the life-style of the ascetics. His wandering certainly reminds one of Harry Haller's wolfish nature that defies human civilisation.

In *The Journey to the East*, Leo's has unaffected manners and has something so pleasing, so unassumingly winning about him that everyone loves him. He does his work merrily, sings or whistles as he goes along. Moreover, all animals are friendly him. He always had some pets which joined the League. His ability to tame birds and attract butterflies reflects his Dionysian qualities.

In *The Magister Ludi (The Glass Bead Game)*, Knecht sounds some of the notes which relates to his Dionysian instinct. He describes his initial unwillingness to enter the Vicus Lusorum. He acknowledges that the game demands more effort and energy, and it is a mental exercise. Knecht is an Apolline character, but towards the end of the novel he embraces the Dionysian and goes out in the world to experience everything freely.

Of all Hesse's protagonists, Goldmund is the best to exemplify the empirically individuated hero. Though the process of Hesse's exploration of the individual self begins right from the beginning, namely from *Peter Camenzind*, it is fully pronounced in *Narziss and Goldmund*. Camenzind learns the lesson of freedom from natural objects rather than from society and its pre-established norms. The vagabond in Hesse to be developed fully in *Narziss and Goldmund* is prefigured in this hero of the mountains.

As the process of individuation starts from Camenzind through wandering and flouting the established norms, in the same way the mode of individuation begins with the empirical senses. These two patterns of development of the protagonist continue in all the novels of Hesse.

The Fourth Chapter discusses Hesse's theory of thesis and synthesis as found in his novels which has been recognized as Hesse's triadic rhythm of humanization. This synthesis is a transcendence beyond good and evil, to Zarathustra's song which joyously celebrates all the tones to their full intensity. But, most importantly, it cannot be had without flouting the hitherto dearly-loved abstract intellectualism. Such transcendence of binaries is possible only when experience becomes the basis of self-affirmation. And certainly experiences are contingent on the external world, which incorporates socio-economic, socio-political, and socio-cultural

realities. The self of man is not an innately-formed given but is formed by the consciousness he acquires from the society he lives in, and this fact naturally endorses empiricism.

The process of self exploration in Camenzind starts with nature, as in Siddhartha and others, and leads through world experiences to self realization. In the process of self-realization, each protagonist has his guide or an opposite, who really do not guide him to follow any principle, but to follow the very way of his own nature. They follow their own experiences and therefore the process of their individuation is essentially empirical.

Hesse's heroes acquire knowledge according to their own impulses and cognitions. They freely choose and discard anything according to their own choices. However, in the beginning they feel somewhat inclined to acquire that knowledge which they find in their society.

Hesse's protagonists are also in disagreement with the contemporary systems in human society. They are heretics and iconoclasts, standing separately with their own bundle of experiences. They are able to master their personality. They are drifters who defy society completely. They do not follow any of its rules and lead a free life.

For instance, Knecht's giving up the order and going out to experience the real world certainly speaks of Hesse's iconoclasm. Knecht must learn from the real world. Knecht reminds the future teachers of the game that the game can lead to blank virtuosity, artistic arrogance as a variety of self-indulgence, contest, the striving for supremacy over others and thus to the misuse of power.

There is a remarkable succession in the idea of triadic humanization. The process of humanization signifies the process of individuation. The principle of individuation implies that we affirm ourselves as individuals; then we separate ourselves from the first stage. It is an indispensable stage toward the development of the individual personality. The third phase of individuation means reunification with totality on a higher level. The third stage of individuation is a transcendence of the individual beyond. But it is, surprisingly, a return to the community. One is engrossed, almost gracefully, into the whole again. The persistence upon individuality that is the identifying characteristic of man on the second level gives way to another concept. On the third level it is an openness to the whole and subjugation of the individual desire. Hesse's characters acquire a humanitarian attitude on this level as the Dionysian necessitates a merging with the all.

Consequently, the principle of considering the community after realizing the self is a characteristic of Hesse's characters who have reached the third level. For instance, the old Siddhartha, who spends his days as a ferryman; Joseph Knecht, who as Master of the Castalian order relinquishes all individuality in order to think of society at large. The humanitarian tone of Hesse is maintained throughout all the novels.

The myopia with Hessean studies is that he has been, more often than not, seen as a novelist representing Eastern material. But a deep study of the novels obviously shows that the final product of Hesse is Western, and not even Western but universal. *Siddhartha* and *The Journey to the East*, for instance, are not Oriental tales in essence but merely tales set in the East.

Though Hesse used the traditional bildungsroman form, his concern is characteristically modern and innovative. It is for this very innovativeness that Thomas Mann compared him to some modernist writers who experimented with the techniques of the novel. Hesse, like them, is concerned with the modern man's engagement with the self, though his study of the self defies any barrier of time and space.

Most of Hesse's protagonists are engaged with the workings of the unconscious mind that is the basis of their self-realization. The unconscious is always Dionysian. The method of knowledge formation and self-realization is empirical. All the protagonists embark on a journey to the experiential world and acquire knowledge through experiences. It is a fact that the process of change and development continues and characterizes Hesse's protagonists. Knowledge never remains stagnant; it varies with each experience. In this way, the self that emerges is purely empirical. The process of development through the instinctive and sensory Dionysiac is empirical and it is maintained through a triadic dialectics.