

**IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTES BETWEEN THE USSR AND CHINA:
A STUDY OF KHRUSHCHEV PERIOD**

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PRAVIN CHAND SINGH



**Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067
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JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

School of International Studies

New Delhi - 110067

Tel. : 2670 4365
Fax : (+91)-11-2674 1586

Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies

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
I declare that the dissertation entitled **“Ideological Disputes Between The USSR and China: A Study of Khrushchev Period”** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree to this university or any other university.


PRAVIN CHAND SINGH



CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


PROF. ANURADHA M. CHENOY
Chairperson


DR. RAJAN KUMAR
Supervisor

DEDICATED
TO
MY MOTHER & BROTHERS

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Pravin Chand Singh
Pravin Chand Singh

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Chapter: 1

Introduction

Disputes between USSR and China were started gradually just after the death of Stalin. The 20th Party Congress of CPSU in 1956 was the turning point in the history of the Soviet Union. This Party Congress was the first step towards the road of de-Stalinization taken by the leadership of the CPSU. A number of views advanced at the 20th party congress concerning the international situations and the international communist movement were in contradiction to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. In particular, the complete negation of Stalin on the pretext of “combating the personality cult” and the thesis of peaceful transition to socialism by “the parliament road” were gross violations of basic principle.

The criticism of Stalin at the 20th congress of CPSU was one-sided. Stalin’s life was that of a close Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary. For thirty years after Lenin’s death, Stalin was the foremost leader of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, as well as the recognized leader of the international communist movement and the standard-bearer of the world revolution. During his lifetime, Stalin committed some serious mistakes which had a bearing on the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Stalin rendered great services to the development of the Soviet Union and the international communist movement. After Lenin’s death Stalin creatively applied and developed Marxism-Leninism as the chief leader of the Party and the state. Stalin expressed the will and aspirations of the people, and proved himself an outstanding Marxist-Leninist fighter, in the struggle in defence of the legacy of Leninism against its enemies-the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and other bourgeois agents. Stalin won the support of the Soviet people and played an important role in history primarily because, together

with the other leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he defended Lenin's line on the industrialization of the Soviet Union and the collectivization of agriculture. By pursuing this line, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) brought about the triumph of socialism in the Soviet Union and created the condition for the victory of the Soviet Union in the war against Hitler; these victories of the Soviet people accorded with the interests of the working class of the world and all progressive mankind.

20th Congress of CPSU and Khrushchev:

It was necessary to criticize Stalin's mistakes. But in his secret report to the 20th Congress, Comrade Khrushchev completely negated Stalin. For from using a revolutionary proletarian party's method of criticism and self-criticism for the purpose of making an earnest and serious analysis and summation of historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he treated Stalin as an enemy and shifted the blame for all mistakes on to Stalin alone.

Khrushchev viciously and demagogically told a host of lies in this secret report, in 1955 and threw around charges that Stalin had a "persecution mania", indulged in "brutal arbitrariness", took the path of "mass repressions and terror", "knew the country and agriculture only from films" and "planned operations on a globe" that Stalin's leadership "became a serious obstacle in the path of Soviet social development", and many more. He completely obliterated the meritorious deeds of Stalin who led the Soviet people in waging resolute struggle against all internal and external forces and achieving great results in socialist transformation and socialist construction, who led Soviet people in defending and consolidating the first socialist country in the world. He succeeded in winning the glorious victory in the anti-fascist war and defended and developed Marxism-Leninism.

Apart from negating Stalin, Khrushchev also negated the basic theories of Marxism-Leninism which had been defended and developed by Stalin. In his report to the 20th Congress, under the pretext that "radical changes" had taken place in the world situation, Khrushchev put forward the thesis of "peaceful transition". He said that the

road of the October Revolution was the only correct road in those historical conditions”, but that as the situation had changed, it had become possible to effect transition from capitalism to socialism through the “parliamentary road”. In essence, this erroneous thesis was a clear revision of Marxism-Leninism teachings on the state and revolution and also a clear denial of the universal significance of the road of the October Revolution.

In his report, under the same pretext that “radical changes” had taken place in the world situation, Khrushchev also questioned the continued validity of Lenin’s teachings on imperialism and on war and peace, and in fact tampered with Lenin’s teachings. Khrushchev pictured the U.S. government and its head as people resisting the forces of war. He went on to say that the imperialists were beginning to admit that the positions of strength policy had failed and that symptoms of a certain sobering up were appearing among them. It was as much as saying that it was possible for the U.S. government and its head not to represent the interests of the U.S. monopoly capital and for them to abandon their policies of war and aggression and that they had become forces defending peace.

Khrushchev had declared that the Soviet Union wanted to be friends with the United States and to co-operate with it for peace, international security and in the economic and cultural spheres. Later this view developed into the line of “Soviet-U.S. co-operation for the settlement of world problems”. Following Lenin’s principle of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems, Khrushchev had declared that peaceful coexistence was the “general line of the foreign policy” of the U.S.S.R. This amounted to excluding from the general line of foreign policy of the socialist countries their mutual assistance and co-operation as well as assistance by them to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations, or to subordinating all this to the policy of so-called “peaceful coexistence”. These were the basic causes of emergence of disputes between USSR & China.

The questions raised by the leadership of the CPSU at the 20th Congress, and especially the question of Stalin and of “peaceful transition”, were by no means simply related to internal affairs of the CPSU, they were vital issues of common interest for all

fraternal Parties. Without any prior consultation with the fraternal Parties, the leadership of the CPSU had drawn arbitrary conclusions; it forced the fraternal Parties to accept a fait accompli and on the pretext of “combating the personality cult”, crudely interfered in the internal affairs of fraternal Parties and countries and tried to subvert their leaderships. Thus pushing its policy of sectarianism and splittism in the international communist movement. Subsequent developments had shown with increasing clarity that the revision and betrayal of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism by the leaders of the CPSU had grown out of above errors.

The CPS (Communist Party of China) had always differed in principle of its view of the 20th congress of the CPSU, and the leading comrades of the CPSU were well aware of this. Yet the Open letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU asserted that the Communist Party of China (CPC) previously gave the 20th Congress full support, that it “have made a 180-degree turn” in its evaluation of the 20th Congress, and that its position was full of “vacillation and wavering” and was “false”. But facts were showing a different situation. In April 1956, less than two months after the 20th Congress, in conversations both with Comrade Mikoyan, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and with the Soviet Ambassador to China, Comrade Mao Tse-tung expressed Chinese’s views on the question of Stalin. He emphasized that Stalin’s “merits outweighed his faults” and that it was necessary to “make a concrete analysis” and “an all-round evaluation” of Stalin.

On October 23, 1956, on receiving the Soviet Ambassador to China, Comrade Mao Tse-Tung had again pointed out, “Stalin deserves to be criticized, but we do not agree with the method of criticism, and there are some other matters we do not agree with”(Mao 1956). On November 30, 1956, on receiving the Soviet Ambassador to China, Comrade Mao Tse-Tung had again pointed out that the basic policy and line during the period when Stalin was in power were correct and methods that were used against enemies must not be used against one’s comrades. Both comrades Liu Shao-chi in his conversation with leaders of the CPSU in October 1956, and Comrade Chou En-lai in his conversations on 1st October, 1956 with the delegation of the CPSU to the Eighth

Congress of the CPC and on January 18, 1957 with leaders of the CPSU, also expressed Chinese's view on the question of Stalin. Both had criticized the errors of the leaders of the CPSU as consisting chiefly of "total lack of an overall analysis" of Stalin, "lack of self criticism" and "failure to consult with the fraternal Parties in advance".

Attempting to conceal these important facts, the Central Committee of the CPSU in its open letter had quoted out of context public statements by Comrades Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping to show that at one time the Chinese Communist Party completely affirmed the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This was futile. The fact was that at no time and in no place did the CPC affirmed the 20th Congress of the CPSU, agreed with the complete negation of Stalin or endorse the view of peaceful transition to socialism through the "parliamentary road". Not longer after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, on April 5, 1956, China published "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"; then, on December 29, 1956, China published "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". While refuting the anti-communist slanders of the imperialists and reactionaries, these two articles made an all round analysis of the life of Stalin. It affirmed the universal significance of the road of the October Revolution, summed up the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and tactfully but unequivocally criticized the erroneous propositions of the 20th Congress. It was a widely known fact that clarified the Chinese's stand.

Consequences of the 20th Congress of the CPSU:

After that congress, swollen with arrogance the imperialists and reactionaries everywhere had stirred up a world-wide tidal wave against the Soviet Union, against communism and its people. The U. S. imperialist saw the all-out attack on Stalin by the leadership of the CPSU as something that was "never so suited to our purposes" (Streibert 1956). They talked openly about using Khrushchev's secret report as a weapon with which to destroy the prestige and influence of the Communist Movement, and they took the opportunity to advocate "peaceful transformation" (Dulles 1956) in the Soviet Union.

The Titoites had become most aggressive. Flaunting their reactionary slogan of “anti-Stalinism”, they widely attacked the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system. They had declared that the 20th Congress of the CPSU created sufficient elements for the “new course”(revisionism) which Yugoslavia had started and that “the question now is whether this course will win or the course of Stalinism will win again” (Tito 1956).

The Trotskyites, enemies of communism, who had been in desperate straits, feverishly resumed activity. In its Manifesto to the workers and peoples of the Entire World the so-called Fourth International argued that at that time when the Kremlin leaders were themselves admitting the crimes of Stalin, they implicitly recognised that the indefatigable struggle carried on by the world Trotskyist movement against the degeneration of the workers, state, was fully justified.

Most striking among the events which took place during that period were the incident in Soviet-Polish relations and the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Hungary. These two events were different in character. But the leadership of the CPSU made grave errors in both. By moving up troops in an attempt to subdue the Polish comrades by armed force it committed the error of great-power chauvinism. And at the critical moment when the Hungarian counter-revolutionaries had occupied Budapest, for a time it intended to adopt a policy of capitulation and abandon socialist Hungary to counter-revolution. These errors of the leadership of the CPSU inflated the arrogance of all the enemies of communism, created serious difficulties for many fraternal Parties and caused the international communist movement great damage.

In the face of this situation, the Chinese Communist Party and other fraternal Parties persevering in Marxism-Leninism firmly demanded repulsing the assaults of imperialism and reaction and safeguarding the socialist camp and the International Communist Movement. China insisted on the taking of all necessary measures to smash the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Hungary. China insisted that in the handling of problems between fraternal Parties and countries correct principles should be followed so

as to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp, and it firmly opposed the erroneous methods of great power chauvinism. At that time the leaders of the CPSU had accepted Chinese suggestion and on 30th October, 1956 issued the Soviet Government's "Declaration on the Foundations of the Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship And Co-operation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist Countries", in which they examined some of their own past mistakes in handling their relations with fraternal countries. On 1st November, the Chinese Government issued a statement expressing support for the Soviet Government's declarations.

This was done by China in the interest of the international communist movement, and also in order to persuade the leaders of the CPSU to draw the proper lessons and correct their errors in good time and not slide farther away from Marxism-Leninism. But subsequent events showed that the leaders of the CPSU nursed rancour against China and regarded the CPC which preserved in proletarian internationalism as the biggest obstacle to their wrong line.

The 1957 Moscow Meeting of Fraternal Parties:

The 1957 Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties took place in Moscow after the repulse of the heavy attacks of the imperialists and the reactionaries of various countries on the international communist movement. The open letter of the Central Committee of the *CPSU* had played an "immense part" in defining the general line of the international communist movement. The facts showed the very reverse situation. The erroneous views of the 20th Congress on many important questions of principle were rejected and corrected by the 1957 meeting of fraternal Parties.

The well-known Declaration of 1957, adopted by the Moscow Meeting, summed up the experience of international communist movement, set forth the common fighting tasks of all the Communist Parties. It affirmed the universal significance of the road of the October Revolution, outlined the common laws governing socialist revolution and laid down the principles of Marxism-Leninism. It opposed the erroneous views deviating from Marxism-Leninism which were advanced by the 20th Congress. The principles

guiding the relations among fraternal parties and countries laid down in the Declaration were concrete expressions of the principle of proletarian internationalism and stand opposed to the great-power chauvinism and sectarianism of the leadership of the CPSU.

The delegation of the CPC, which was headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, did a great deal of work during the meeting. On the one hand, it had full consultation with the leaders of the CPSU, and where necessary and appropriate, waged struggle against them, in order to help them correct their errors; on the other hand, it held repeated exchange of views with the leaders of other fraternal parties.

At that meeting, the main issue of controversy between CPC and the delegation of the CPSU was the transition from capitalism to socialism. In their original draft of the Declaration the leadership of the CPSU insisted on the inclusion of the erroneous views of the 20th Congress on peaceful transition. In original draft it did not mention even a single word about non-peaceful transition, referring only to peaceful transition. Moreover, it described peaceful transition as “securing a majority in parliament and transforming parliament from an instrument of the bourgeois dictatorship into an instrument of a genuine people’s state power”. It was regarded as a violation of basic Marxist-Leninist theory on the state and revolution.

As a result of common efforts of the delegations of the CPC and the other fraternal Parties, the meeting finally adopted a version of the Declaration, which contains two major changes on the question of the transition from capitalism to socialism compared with the first draft put forward by the leadership of the CPSU. First, while indicating the possibility of peaceful transition, the declaration also pointed to the road of non-peaceful transition and stressed that “Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily”. Secondly, while speaking of securing ‘a firm majority in parliament’ the declaration emphasized the need to launch an extra-parliamentary mass struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realization of the socialist revolution.

Despite these changes, the formulation in the declaration on the question of the transition from capitalism to socialism was still unsatisfactory. Finally, China *conceded the point only out of the consideration for the repeatedly expressed wish of the leaders of the CPSU that the formulations should show some connection with that of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.*

Apart from these acts, China had presented an outline of its views before the Central Committee of the CPSU, on the question of peaceful transition in which the views of the CPC were explained comprehensively and clearly. As a result of the common efforts of the delegations of the CPC and the other fraternal Parties, the 1957 Declaration also corrected the erroneous views which the CPSU leadership had put forward at the 20th Congress on such questions as imperialism and war and peace. It added several important points on a number of questions of basic principle. The main additions were the thesis *that U.S. imperialism was the centre of world reaction and the sworn enemy of the people.* Further, the thesis that if imperialism should unleash a world war, it would doom itself to destruction, the common laws governing the socialist revolution and the building of socialism, the principle of combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution and construction in different countries, the formulation on the importance of applying dialectical materialism in practical work, the thesis that the seizure of political power by the working class was the beginning of the revolution and not its end; the thesis that it would take a fairly long time to solve the question of who will win—capitalism or socialism, the thesis that the existence of bourgeois influence was an internal source of revisionism, while surrender to imperialist pressure was its external source; and so on.

Attitude of the CPSU after 1957 Moscow Meeting:

After the Moscow Meeting of 1957 with its unanimously agreed Declaration, it was being hoped that the leadership of the CPSU would follow the line laid down in the Declaration and correct its errors. The leadership of the CPSU perpetrated increasingly serious violations of the revolutionary principles of the Declaration and the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties and countries, and departed farther and farther from the

path of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. This development aggravated the differences in the international communist movement and carried them to a new stage.

In complete disregard of the common conclusion of the 1957 declaration that U.S. imperialism was the common enemy of all the people of the world, the leadership of the CPSU passionately sought collaboration with U.S. imperialism and the settlement of world problems by the heads of the Soviet Union and the United States. Particularly around the time of the Camp David Talks in September 1959, Khrushchev lauded Eisenhower to the skies, hailing him as a man who “enjoys the absolute confidence of his people”(Khrushchev 1959) and who “also worries about insuring peace just as we do” (Khrushchev 1959). Moreover, comrades of the CPSU energetically advertised the so-called “spirit of Camp David”, whose existence Eisenhower himself denied, alleging that it marked “a new era in international relations”(Gromyko 1960) and “a turning point in history” (Khrushchev & Voroshilov 1960).

Completely disregarding the revolutionary line of the 1957 Declaration, in statements by Khrushchev, the Soviet press leaders of the CPSU vigorously advocated their revisionist line of “peaceful transition”, praised the “wisdom” and “goodwill” of the imperialists, preached that “a world without weapons, without armed forces and without wars” (Khrushchev 1959) could be brought into being while the greater part of the globe was still ruled and controlled by imperialism, that universal and complete disarmament could “open up literally a new epoch in the economic development of Asia, Africa and Latin America”,(Khrushchev 1959)etc. The CPSU published many books and articles in which it tampered with the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism, emasculated their revolutionary spirit and propagated its revisionist views and a whole series of important problems of the principle in the fields of philosophy, political economy, socialist and communist theory, history, literature and art.

In 1958 the leadership of the CPSU put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control. These unreasonable demands were rightly

and firmly rejected by the Chinese Government. Not long afterwards, in June 1959, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defence concluded between China and the Soviet Union in October 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture.

The leaders of the CPSU and Soviet publications also leveled many virulent attacks on the domestic and foreign policies of the CPC. These attacks were almost invariably led by Khrushchev himself. He insinuated that China's socialist construction was "skipping over a stage" and was "equalitarian communism" (Khrushchev 1959) and that China's people's Communes were "in essence reactionary" (Khrushchev 1958). By innuendo he maligned China as warlike, guilty of "adventurism" (Khrushchev 1959), and so on and so forth. Back from the Camp David Talks, he went so far as to try to sell China the U.S. plot of "two Chinas" and, at the state banquet celebrating the tenth anniversary of the founding of the people's Republic of China, he read China a lecture against "testing by force the stability of capitalist system".

The line of revisionism and splittism pursued by the leadership of the CPSU created serious confusion in the ranks of the international communist movement. It seemed as though U.S. imperialism had ceased to be the sworn enemy of the people of the world. Eisenhower was welcomed by certain Communists as a "peace envoy". Marxism-Leninism and the Declaration of 1957 seemed to be outmoded.

In the circumstances, in order to defend Marxism-Leninism and the 1957 Declaration and clear up the ideological confusion in the international communist movement, the CPC published "Long Live Leninism!" and two other articles in April 1960. Keeping to Chinese consistent stand of persevering in principle and upholding unity, CPC concentrated on explaining the revolutionary of the 1957 Declaration and the fundamental Marxist-Leninist theories on imperialism, war and peace, proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The views in these three articles were totally different from the series of erroneous views that were being propagated by the

leaders of the CPSU. However, for the sake of the larger interest, CPC refrained from publicly criticizing the comrades of the CPSU and directed the spearhead of struggle against the imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists. The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU spent much energy distorting and attacking “Long Live Leninism!” and the two other articles, but was unable to support its attacks with any convincing arguments.

The 1960 Moscow Meeting of Fraternal Parties:

In the latter half of 1960, a sharp struggle developed in the International communist movement around the Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' parties. It was a struggle between the line of Marxism-Leninism and the line of revisionism and between the policy of persevering in principle and upholding unity and the policy of abandoning principle and creating splits. It had become evident before the meeting that the leadership of the CPSU was stubbornly persisting in its wrong stand and was endeavouring to impose its wrong line on the international communist movement.

The meeting of the representatives of the 81 fraternal parties was held in Moscow in November 1960. Ignoring the desire of the Chinese and many other delegations to eliminate the differences and strengthen unity, on the eve of the meeting the leadership of the CPSU distributed among the representatives of the fraternal Parties gathered in Moscow a letter of 127 pages, which attacked the CPC more savagely than ever.

It is true that, both before and during the meeting, the leadership of the CPSU engineered converging assaults on the CPC by a number of representatives of fraternal parties, and relying on a so-called majority endeavoured to bring the delegations of the Chinese and other Marxist-Leninist Parties to their knees and compel them to accept its revisionist line and view. However, the attempts by the leaders of the CPSU to impose things on others met with failure, both in the Drafting Committee of the 26 fraternal Parties and in the meeting of the representatives of the 81 fraternal Parties.

The fact remains that many of the wrong thesis they put forward in their draft statement were rejected. Here are some examples:

1. The thesis of the leadership of CPSU that peaceful coexistence and economic competition from the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries was rejected.
2. Its thesis that the emergence of a new stage in the general crisis of capitalism was the result of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition was rejected.
3. Its thesis that there was a growing possibility of peaceful transition was rejected.
4. Its thesis about opposing the policy of “going it alone” on the part of socialist countries, which in effect meant opposing the policy of their relying mainly on themselves in construction, was rejected.
5. Its thesis concerning opposition to so-called “cliquish activities” and “factional activities” in the international communist movement was rejected. In effect this thesis meant demanding that fraternal Parties should obey its baton, liquidating the principles of independence and equality in relations among fraternal Parties and replacing the principle of reaching unanimity through consultation by the practice of subduing the minority by the majority.
6. Its thesis of under-estimating the serious danger of modern revisionism was rejected.

The fact remains that many correct views on important principles set forth by the delegations of the Chinese and other fraternal Parties were written into the Statement. The thesis on the unaltered nature of imperialism, on U.S. imperialism as the enemy of the people of the whole world, on the formation of the most extensive united front against U.S. imperialism; on the national liberation movement as an important force in preventing world war; on support by the socialist countries and the international working-class movement for the national liberation struggle; on the need for the working class and the masses in the advance capitalist countries under U.S. imperialist political, economic and military domination to direct their main blows at U.S. imperialist domination and also at the monopoly capital and other reactionary forces at home which betrayed their national interest; on the principle of reaching unanimity through consultation among

fraternal Parties; on the betrayal of Marxism-Leninism by the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; and so on. All these were in the Statement as a result of acceptance of the views of the Chinese and some other delegations.

From all the above, it could be seen that the struggle between the two lines in the international communist movement dominated the 1960 Moscow Meeting from beginning to end. The errors of the leadership of the CPSU as revealed at this meeting had developed further. From the draft statement of the leaders of the CPSU and their speeches during the meeting, it could be clearly seen that the main political content of the wrong line they were attempting to impose on the fraternal Parties consisted of the erroneous theories of "peaceful transition", while its organisational content consisted of erroneous sectarian and splitting policies. It was a revisionist line in fundamental conflict with Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The delegations of the Chinese and other fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties resolutely opposed it and firmly upheld the line of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

At the meeting the fraternal Parties which upheld Marxism-Leninism earnestly criticized the erroneous views of the leadership of the CPSU and compelled it to accept many of their correct views; in doing so they changed the previous highly abnormal situation in which not even the slightest criticism of the errors of the leadership of the CPSU was tolerated and its word was final. This was an event of great historical significance in the international communist movement. The principle of mutual solidarity as well as independence and equality among fraternal Parties and of reaching unanimity through consultation were observed at the meeting.

The 22nd Congress (1961) of the CPSU:

After the meeting of the 81 fraternal Parties, the leaders of the CPSU became more blatant in wrecking the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement. On the one hand, they took as their friend U.S. imperialism which the Statement declares to be the enemy of the people of the world, advocating "U.S.-Soviet co-operation" and expressing the desire to work together with Kennedy to "set about building durable bridges of confidence, mutual

understanding and friendship” (Khrushchev & Brezhnev’s greetings to Kennedy 1961). On the other hand, CPSU took some fraternal Parties and countries as their enemies and drastically worsened the Soviet Union’s relations with Albania. On December 1, 1960, Khrushchev signed the Statement on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and twenty-four hours later, violating what the fraternal Parties had agreed on, the same Khrushchev brazenly described Yugoslavia as a socialist country at the banquet for the delegations of the fraternal Parties.

The 22nd Congress of the CPSU in October, 1961 marked a new low in the CPSU leadership’s efforts to oppose Marxism-Leninism and split the socialist camp and the international communist movement. It marked the systematization of the revisionism which the leadership of the CPSU had developed step by step from the 20th Congress onward.

The leadership of the CPSU unleashed a great public attack on the Albanian Party of Labour at the 22nd Congress. In his speech Khrushchev went so far as openly to call for the overthrow of the Albanian leadership under Comrades Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu. Thus the leadership of the CPSU established the vicious precedent of a Party congress being used for public attacks on other fraternal Parties.

The 22nd Congress ran counter to the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement on many important questions of principles. Many of the erroneous views of the leadership of the CPSU which were rejected at the 1960 meeting of fraternal Parties reappeared. For instance, it described peaceful coexistence as the general principle of foreign policy, one-sidedly stressed the possibility of peaceful transition and slandered the policy of a socialist country’s relying mainly on its own efforts in construction as “going it alone”.

This programme crudely revised the essence of Marxism-Leninism, namely, the teachings on proletarian revolution, on the dictatorship of the proletariat and on the party of the proletariat, declaring that the dictatorship of the proletariat was no longer needed in the Soviet Union and that the nature of the CPSU as the vanguard of the

proletariat had changed, and advancing fallacies of a “state of the whole people” and a “party of the entire people”. It substituted humanism for the Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle and substituted the bourgeois slogan of ‘Liberty, Equality and Fraternity’ for the ideals of communism.

The Communist Party of China resolutely opposed the errors of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. Comrades Chou En-Lai, who headed the CPC delegation to the Congress, stated their party’s position in his speech there, and he also frankly criticized the errors of the leadership of the CPSU in subsequent conversations with Khrushchev and other leaders of the CPSU. In his conversation with the delegation of the CPC, Khrushchev flatly turned down their criticisms and advice and even expressed undisguised support for anti-party elements in the CPC. He openly stated that after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, when the leaders of the CPSU were beginning to take a “road different from that of Stalin” (De-Stalinization), they still needed the support of the fraternal Parties. He said, “The voice of the Chinese Communist Party was then of great significance to us”, but “things are different now”, and “we are doing well” and “we shall go our own way”.

Khrushchev’s remarks showed that the leaders of the CPSU had made up their mind to go all the way down the road of revisionism and splitting. The CPC had frequently given them comradely advice but they had simply ignored it and shown not the slightest intention of mending their ways.

Sino-Soviet Relation after 22nd Congress of the CPSU:

The following are some facts which show Sino-Soviet relation and unity of fraternal parties and countries since the 22nd Congress (1961).

1. The leader of the CPSU had tried hard to impose their erroneous line upon the international communist movement and to replace the Declaration and the Statement with their own revisionist programme. They describe their erroneous line as the whole set of Leninist policies of the international communist movement of recent years. They called their revisionist programme the “real

Communist Manifesto of our time” (Khrushchev 1961) and the “common programme” of the “Communist and Workers’ Parties and of the people of countries of the socialist community”(Khrushchev 1961.).

Any fraternal Party which rejected the erroneous line and programme of the CPSU and persevered in the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary principles of the Declaration and the Statement was looked upon as an enemy by the leaders of the CPSU, they (CPSU) opposed, attacked and injured it and tried to subvert its leadership by every possible means.

2. Disregarding all consequences, the leadership of the CPSU broke off diplomatic relations with socialist Albania, an unprecedented step in the history of relations between fraternal Parties and countries.
3. The leadership of the CPSU had continued to exert pressure on China and to make outrageous attacks on the CPC. In its letter of February 22, 1962 to the Central Committee of the CPC, the Central Committee of the CPSU accused the CPC of taking a “special stand of their own” and pursuing a line at variance with the common course of the fraternal Parties, and even made a crime out of CPC support for the Marxist-Leninist Albania Party of Labour. As pre conditions for improving Sino-Soviet relations, the leaders of the CPSU attempted to compel the CPC to abandon its Marxist-Leninist and proletarian internationalist stand, abandon its consistent line, which was in full conformity with the revolutionary principles of the Declaration and the Statement, accept their erroneous line, and also accept as a *fait accompli* their violation of the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties and countries.
4. The Central Committee of the CPSU rejected the proposals made by the fraternal Parties of Indonesia, New Zealand, etc, that a meeting of representatives of the fraternal Parties should be convened, as well as the five positive proposals made by the Central Committee of the CPC in its letter of 17th April, 1962 to the Central

Committee of the CPSU for the preparation for the meeting of fraternal Parties. In its reply of May 31, 1962 to the Central Committee of the CPC, the Central Committee of the CPSU went so far as to make the demand that the Albanian comrades abandon their own stand as a pre-condition for improving Soviet-Albania relations and also for convening a meeting of the fraternal Parties.

5. In April and May, 1962, the leaders of the CPSU used their organs and personnel in Sinkiang, China, to carry out large-scale subversive activities in the Ili region and enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union. The Chinese Government lodged repeated protests and made repeated representation, but the Soviet Government refused to repatriate these Chinese citizens on the pretext of the sense of Soviet legality and "humanitarianism". This was indeed an astounding event, unheard of in the relations between socialist countries.
6. In August 1962 the Soviet Government formally notified China that the Soviet Union would conclude an agreement with the United States on the prevention of nuclear proliferation. This was a joint Soviet-U.S. nuclear threat. The Chinese Government lodged repeated protests against this.
7. The leadership of the CPSU had become increasingly anxious to strike political bargains with U.S. imperialism and had been bent on forming a reactionary alliance with Kennedy, even at the expense of the interests of the socialist camp and the international communist movement. An outstanding example was the fact that, during the Caribbean crisis, the leadership of the CPSU committed the error of capitulationism by submitting to the nuclear blackmail of the U.S. imperialists and accepting the U.S. Government's demand for "international inspection" in violation of Cuban sovereignty.
8. The leadership of the CPSU had become increasingly anxious to collude with the Tito clique of Yugoslavia and was bent on forming a reactionary alliance with the

renegade Tito to oppose all Marxist-Leninist parties. After the 22nd Congress, it took a series of steps to reverse the verdict on the Tito clique and thus openly tore up the 1960's Statement.

9. Khrushchev made one by one statements and the Soviet press carried hundreds of articles attacking the CPC on a whole set of issues. Directed by the leaders of the CPSU, the Congresses of the fraternal Parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy and the Democratic Republic of Germany became stages for anti-China performances, and more than forty fraternal Parties published resolutions, statements or articles attacking the CPC and other Marxist-Leninist Parties.

In these grave circumstances, the CPC had no alternative but to make open replies to the attacks of some fraternal Parties. Between December 15, 1962 and March 8, 1963 CPC published seven such replies. In these articles, CPC continued to leave some leeway and did not criticize the leadership of the CPSU by name.

Despite the serious deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations resulting from the errors of the leadership of the CPSU, the CPC agreed to send its delegation to Moscow for the talks between the CPC and CPSU, and, in order that there might be a systematic exchange of views in the talks, put forward its proposal concerning the general line of the international communist movement in its letter of reply to the Central Committee of the CPSU dated June 14.

On the eve of the talks, the leaders of the CPSU publicly attacked the CPC by name, through statements and resolutions. At the same time, they unjustifiably expelled a number of Chinese Embassy personnel and research students from the Soviet Union. On July 14, that was, on the eve of the U.S.-British-Soviet talks, while the Sino-Soviet talks were still in progress, the leadership of the CPSU hastily published the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to Party organizations and all Communists in the Soviet Union and launched unbridled attacks on the CPC.

Immediately afterwards in Moscow, the leadership of the CPSU signed the treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests with the United States and Britain in open betrayal of the interests of the Soviet people, the people in the socialist camp including the Chinese people, and the peace-loving people of the world; Khrushchev went to Yugoslavia for a “vacation”, the Soviet press launched a frenzied anti-Chinese campaign; and so on and so forth.

This whole train of events strikingly demonstrates that, disregarding everything, the leadership of the CPSU was allying with the imperialists, the reactionaries of all countries and the renegade Tito clique in order to oppose fraternal socialist countries and fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties.

After all, the CPC hereby appealed again and again to the leadership of the CPSU to correct its errors and returned to the path of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, the path of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement. The international communist movement was going through an important period. The then debate had a vital bearing on the future of the proletarian world revolution and the destiny of mankind. But unfortunately, history proved this dispute as the collapse of USSR in 1991. And in this way the movement of international proletariat also ended forever.

Chapter-2

Attitude of Communist Parties towards Imperialism

During Khrushchev era, attitude of CPSU towards the USA and its allies was not a linear one. It passed through several ups and downs. Khrushchev always tried to build a peaceful and friendly relation with imperialist forces (mainly USA). The USA always tried to destroy socialism or to build up a relationship on its own conditions. But, in the case of CPC (Communist Party of China), situation was different. The USA did not recognize China under Mao as real China till 1972. So, relation between CPC and USA was like hostility in early period. But after Khrushchev's visit to USA in 1959, US-China relation had become less tense due to increased ideological differences between the USSR and China. But it was a political tactic taken by China to pressurize and frighten Khrushchev. But over all China-US relation under Mao was just opposite to each other. First we will see USSR-US relation after then China-US relation.

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CPSU and the Capitalist Bloc:



1. Early relations and Khrushchev's US visit (1957–1960):

Khrushchev sought to find a lasting solution to the problem of a divided Germany and of the enclave of West Berlin deep within East German territory. In November 1958, calling West Berlin a "malignant tumor", he gave the United States, United Kingdom and France six months to conclude a peace treaty with both German states and the Soviet Union. If one was not signed, Khrushchev stated, the Soviet Union would conclude a peace treaty with East Germany. This would leave East Germany, which was not a party to treaties giving the Western Powers access to Berlin, in control of the routes to the city. This ultimatum caused dissent among the Western Allies, who were reluctant to go to war over the issue. Khrushchev, however, repeatedly extended the deadline.

Khrushchev sought to eliminate many conventional weapons, and defend the Soviet Union with missiles. He believed that unless this occurred, the huge Soviet military would continue to eat up resources, making Khrushchev's goals of improving Soviet life difficult to achieve. In 1955, Khrushchev abandoned Stalin's plans for a large navy, believing that the new ships would be too vulnerable to either conventional or nuclear attack. In January 1960, Khrushchev took advantage of improved relations with the US to order a reduction of one-third in the size of Soviet armed forces, alleging that advanced weapons would make up for the lost troops. While conscription of Soviet youth remained in force, exemptions from military service became more and more common, especially for students.

The Soviets had few operable ICBMs, in spite of this Khrushchev publicly boasted of the Soviets' missile programs, stating that Soviet weapons were many and numerous. The First Secretary hoped that public perception that the Soviets were ahead would result in psychological pressure on the West and political concessions. The Soviet space program, which Khrushchev firmly supported, appeared to confirm his claims when the Soviets launched Sputnik 1 into orbit, a launch many westerners, including United States Vice President Richard Nixon were convinced was a hoax. When it became clear that the launch was real, and Sputnik 1 was in orbit, Western governments concluded that the Soviet ICBM program was further along than it actually was. Khrushchev added to this misapprehension by stating in an October 1957 interview that the USSR had all the rockets, of whatever capacity, that it needed. For years, Khrushchev would make a point of preceding a major foreign trip with a rocket launch, to the discomfiture of his hosts. The United States learned of the primitive state of the Soviet missile program from over flights in the late 1950s, but only high US officials knew of the deception. In January 1960, Khrushchev told the Presidium that Soviet ICBMs made an agreement with the US possible because "main-street Americans have begun to shake from fear for the first times in their lives". The perceived "missile gap" led to a considerable defense buildup on the part of the United States.

In 1959, during Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev took part in what later became known as the Kitchen Debate, as Nixon and Khrushchev had an impassioned argument in a model kitchen at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, with each defending the economic system of his country. Khrushchev was invited to visit the United States, and did so that September, spending thirteen days. Khrushchev went in Washington, DC for the first time in September 15, 1959. At his arrival, he proposed: "Over a period of four years, all States could affect complete disarmament and should no longer have any means of waging war"(Khrushchev 1959). The first visit by a Soviet premier to the United States resulted in an extended media circus. Khrushchev brought his wife, Nina Petrovna, and adult children with him, though it was not usual for Soviet officials to travel with their families. The peripatetic premier visited New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco (visiting a supermarket), Iowa (visiting Garst's farm), Pittsburgh, and Washington, concluding with a meeting with US President Eisenhower at Camp David. Khrushchev was supposed to visit Disneyland, but the visit was canceled for security reasons, much to his disgruntlement. He did, however, visit Eleanor Roosevelt at her home in Hyde Park, New York. While visiting Thomas J. Watson, Jr's IBM headquarters, Khrushchev expressed little interest in the computers, but greatly admired the self-service cafeteria, and, on his return, introduced self-service in the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev's US visit resulted in an informal agreement with US president Dwight Eisenhower that there would be no firm deadline over Berlin, but that there would be a four-power summit to try to resolve the issue, and the premier left the US to general good feelings. Khrushchev returned from the US convinced that he had achieved a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower (who in fact was unimpressed by the Soviet leader) and that he could achieve détente with the Americans. He pushed for an immediate summit, but was frustrated by French President Charles de Gaulle, who postponed it until 1960, a year in which Eisenhower was scheduled to pay a return visit to the Soviet Union.

2. U-2 and Berlin crisis (1960–1961):

Since 1959, Khrushchev had become obsessed with summit meetings between the Soviet Union and the United States. He had had many fond dreams and spread many illusions about them. He had extolled Eisenhower as “a big man” who “understands big politics”. He had enthusiastically praised Kennedy as one who “understands the great responsibility that lies with the governments of two such powerful states” (Mass Line Publication 1994). The Soviet press claimed that once the heads of the Soviet Union and the United States sat at the same table, history would arrive at a ‘new turning point’, and that a handshake between the two ‘great men’ would usher in a ‘new era’ in international relations. But it proved lie.

A constant irritant in Soviet–US relations was the over flight of the Soviet Union by American U-2 spy aircraft. On April 9, 1960, the US resumed such flights after a lengthy break. The Soviets had protested the flights in the past, but had been ignored by Washington. Content in what he thought was a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower, Khrushchev was confused and angered by the flights' resumption, and concluded that they had been ordered by CIA Director Allen Dulles without the US President's knowledge. On May 1, a U-2 was shot down; its pilot, Francis Gary Powers captured alive. Believing Powers to have been killed, the US announced that a weather plane had been lost near the Turkish-Soviet border. Khrushchev risked destroying the summit, due to start on May 16 in Paris, if he announced the shoot down, but would look weak in the eyes of his military and security forces if he did nothing. Finally, on May 5, Khrushchev announced the shoot down and Powers' capture, blaming the over flight on "imperialist circles and militarists, whose stronghold is the Pentagon", and suggesting the plane had been sent without Eisenhower's knowledge. Eisenhower could not have thought that there were rogue elements in the Pentagon operating without his knowledge, and admitted that he had ordered the flights, calling them “a distasteful necessity”. The admission stunned Khrushchev, and turned the U-2 affair from a possible triumph to a disaster for him, and he even appealed to US Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson for help.

Khrushchev was undecided what to do at the summit even as he boarded his flight to Paris. He finally decided, in consultation with his advisers on the plane and Presidium members in Moscow, to demand an apology from Eisenhower and a promise that there would be no further U-2 flights in Soviet airspace. During Paris Summit, President Eisenhower accused Khrushchev “of sabotaging this meeting, on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested” .Neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev communicated with the other in the days before the summit, and at the summit, Khrushchev made his demands and stated that there was no purpose in the summit, which should be postponed for six to eight months, that is until after the 1960 United States presidential election. The US President offered no apology, but stated that the flights had been suspended and would not resume, and renewed his Open Skies proposal for mutual over flight rights. This was not enough for Khrushchev, who left the summit. Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union, for which the premier had even built a golf course so the US President could enjoy his favorite sport, was canceled by Khrushchev.

Khrushchev made his second and final visit to the United States in September 1960. He had no invitation, but had appointed himself as head of the USSR's UN delegation. He spent much of his time wooing the new Third World states which had recently become independent. The US restricted him to the island of Manhattan, with visits to an estate owned by the USSR on Long Island. The notorious shoe-banging incident occurred during a debate on October 12 over a Soviet resolution decrying colonialism. Infuriated by a statement of the Filipino delegate Lorenzo Sumulong which charged the Soviets with employing a double standard by decrying colonialism while dominating Eastern Europe, Khrushchev demanded the right to reply immediately, and accused Sumulong of being “a fawning lackey of the American imperialists”. Sumulong resumed his speech, and accused the Soviets of hypocrisy. Khrushchev yanked off his shoe and began banging it on his desk, joined (less loudly) by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. This behavior by Khrushchev scandalized his delegation.

Khrushchev considered US Vice President Nixon a hardliner, and was delighted by his defeat in the 1960 presidential election. He considered the victor, Massachusetts

Senator John F. Kennedy, as a far more likely partner for détente, but was taken aback by the newly inaugurated US President's tough talk and actions in the early days of his administration. Khrushchev achieved a propaganda victory in April 1961 with the first manned spaceflight and Kennedy a defeat with the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. While Khrushchev had threatened to defend Cuba with Soviet missiles, the premier contented himself with after-the-fact aggressive remarks. The failure in Cuba led to Kennedy's determination to make no concessions at the Vienna summit scheduled for June 3, 1961. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took a hard line, with Khrushchev demanding a treaty that would recognize the two German states and refusing to yield on the remaining issues obstructing a test-ban treaty. Kennedy on the other hand had been led to believe that the test-ban treaty could be concluded at the summit, and felt that a deal on Berlin had to wait easing of East–West tensions. Kennedy described negotiating with Khrushchev to his brother Robert as “like dealing with Dad. All give and no take.”

An indefinite postponement of action over Berlin was unacceptable to Khrushchev if for no other reason that East Germany was suffering a continuous “brain drain” as highly educated East Germans fled west through Berlin. While the boundary between the two German states had elsewhere been fortified, Berlin, administered by the four Allied powers, remained open. Emboldened by statements from former US Ambassador to Moscow Charles E. Bohlen and United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman J. William Fulbright that East Germany had every right to close its borders, which were not disavowed by the Kennedy Administration, Khrushchev authorized East German leader Walter Ulbricht to begin construction of what became known as the Berlin Wall, which would surround West Berlin. Construction preparations were made in great secrecy, and the border was sealed off in the early hours of Sunday, August 13, 1961, when most East German workers who earned hard currency by working in West Berlin would be at their homes. The wall was a propaganda disaster, and marked the end of Khrushchev's attempts to conclude a peace treaty among the Four Powers and the two German states. That treaty would not be signed until September 1990, as an immediate prelude to German reunification.

3. Caribbean crisis and test ban treaty (1962–1964):

Superpower tensions culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis (for the USSR, the “Caribbean crisis”) of October 1962, as the Soviet Union sought to install medium range nuclear missiles in Cuba, about ninety miles from the US coast. Cuban President Fidel Castro was reluctant to accept the missiles, and, once he was persuaded, warned Khrushchev against transporting the missiles in secret. Castro stated, thirty years later, “We had a sovereign right to accept the missiles. We were not violating international law. Why do it secretly—as if we had no right to do it? I warned Nikita that secrecy would give the imperialists the advantage.”

On October 16, Kennedy was informed that U-2 flights over Cuba had discovered what were most likely medium-range missile sites, and though he and his advisors considered approaching Khrushchev through diplomatic channels, could come up with no way of doing this that would not appear weak. On October 22, Kennedy addressed his nation by television, revealing the missiles’ presence and announcing a blockade of Cuba. Informed in advance of the speech but not (until one hour before) the content, Khrushchev and his advisors feared an invasion of Cuba. Even before Kennedy’s speech, they ordered Soviet commanders in Cuba that they could use all weapons against an attack—except atomic weapons.

As the crisis unfolded, tensions were high in the US; less so in the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev made several public appearances, and went to the Bolshoi Theatre to hear American opera singer Jerome Hines, who was then performing in Moscow. By October 25, with the Soviets unclear about Kennedy’s full intentions, Khrushchev decided that the missiles would have to be withdrawn from Cuba. Two days later, he offered Kennedy terms for the withdrawal. Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a US promise not to invade Cuba and a promise that the US would withdraw missiles from Turkey, near the Soviet heartland. As the last term was not publicly announced at the request of the US, and was not known until just before Khrushchev’s death in 1971, the resolution was seen as a great defeat for the Soviets, and contributed to Khrushchev’s fall less than two years later. Castro had urged Khrushchev

to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack on the US in the event of any invasion of Cuba, and was angered by the outcome, referring to Khrushchev in profane terms; Khrushchev invited him to Moscow later, and was able to restore good relations.

To create more of an atmosphere of Soviet-U.S. co-operation, the leaders of the CPSU held a rally in Moscow in celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. At the same time, they sent a cultural delegation to the United States for celebrations there. But the result of the enthusiasm of the leaders of the CPSU was very disappointing. The entire staff of the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union refused to attend the Moscow rally, and the U.S. state department issued a special memorandum asking the American public to boycott the Soviet cultural delegation, which they denounced as “extremely dangerous and suspicious people”.

While the leaders of the CPSU were advocating “Soviet-U.S. cooperation”, the United States sent the agent Barghoorn to carry on activities in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government very properly arrested that agent. But, after Kennedy made the threat that the success of the wheat deal between the United States and the Soviet Union depends upon a reasonable atmosphere in both countries, which he said had been ‘badly damaged by the Barghoorn arrest’, the Soviet Government hurriedly released that U.S. agent without any trial, on the grounds of the concern of the U.S. high officials over F. C. Barghoorn’s fate, over the fate of an agent who the investigation confirmed, had been engaged in intelligence activities against the U.S.S.R..

After the crisis, superpower relations improved, as Kennedy gave a conciliatory speech at American University on June 10, 1963, recognizing the Soviet people’s suffering during World War II, and paying tribute to their achievements. Khrushchev called the speech the best by a US president since Franklin Roosevelt, and, in July, negotiated a test ban treaty with US negotiator Averill Harriman and with Lord Hailsham of the United Kingdom. Plans for a second Khrushchev-Kennedy summit were dashed by the US President’s assassination in November 1963. The new US President, Lyndon

Johnson, hoped for continued improved relations but was distracted by other issues and had little opportunity to develop a relationship with Khrushchev before the premier's ouster.

China's approach towards capitalist countries:

In 1949 China became independent under Mao's leadership against imperialist forces. On 1st October, 1949, Mao proclaimed the "People's Republic of China" with its capital at Beijing, which was renamed Beijing. Chiang Kai-Shek and approximately two million Nationalist Chinese retreated from main land China to the island of Taiwan. But USA denied Chinese existence under Mao as real China. Instead of Mao, USA recognized Chiang Kai-shek led China as real China, while most of the Chinese people were with Mao. USA did not want to support socialism, as Mao did in China at first time. China was the second largest and powerful socialist country after the USSR. Thus, the relationship of hostility between China and USA continued till 1972 when the USA recognized Mao led China as real China (Taiwan as a part of China) and China became permanent member of security council in UNO.

"Leaning to one side" Chinese Strategy:

In the Era of Mao Tse-Tung (1949-1976), the foci of Chinese foreign relations strategy shifted between the Soviet Union and the United States. The basic characteristic of Chinese foreign policy was that China struggled against a US-led imperialist camp through the Sino-Soviet alliance established in the 1950s. This has been widely known as the *yibiandao* (leaning to one side) strategy, which was adopted on the eve of the founding of the PRC. On June 30, 1949, Mao Tse-tung declared the *yibiandao* in his article on "People's Democratic Dictatorship". Mao stated that the forty years experience of Sun Yat-Sen and the twenty-eight years experience of the Communist Party had taught them to lean on one side, and they were firmly convinced that in order to win and consolidate they might have to lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in those forty years and twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception had the option of leaning either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence would not do, nor was there a third road. They opposed the Chiang

Kai-shek reactionaries who leaned to the side of imperialism, and they also opposed the illusions about a third road. The “leaning to one side” strategy was considered as the only option for the Chinese leadership under the specific internal and external environment at that time. Although in theory there might have been other choices. The *yibiandao* strategy had been formally adopted by the Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng and Franklin Wankun Zhang in Common Programme of the Chinese people’s Political Consultative Conference in September 1949 and embodied in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, alliance and mutual assistance concluded in February 1950. The “leaning to one side” strategy laid out the basic structure of Chinese foreign relations strategy in the 1950s -- cooperating with the Soviet Union to struggle against the US. Thus position of China was as a key member of the socialist bloc against the imperialist camp in the bi-polar world after the World War, II.

The “leaning to one side” strategy did not mean that China would lose its independence and become a satellite state of the Soviet Union. As Qian Qichen said- of course, *yibiandao* (leaning on one side) was constructed on the basis of independence, equality and mutual benefit. As a matter of fact the “leaning to one side” was just a strategy for survival, which was to guarantee China’s security, sovereignty and independence as it was in no position to deter the US alone. Earlier, on June 15, 1949, Mao declared at the Preparatory Committee of the New Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference that, China might be independent, and liberated. China’s affairs might be decided and ran by the Chinese people themselves, and no further interference, not even the slightest, would be tolerated from any imperialist country. On December 8, 1956, Mao emphasized again in a meeting with provincial secretaries-- their “leaning to one side” strategy meant that they were on the side of the Soviet Union, that “leaning to one side” was a relationship of equality. In many ways, the “leaning to one side” strategy was a security-oriented strategy with a fixed enemy. However, the attrition in alliance cooperation and the strong desire for independence of the PRC finally eroded the basis of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Khrushchev's visit to Washington, Taiwan and Other issues:

During the Beijing visit, Khrushchev criticized the Chinese Communist Party's heavy-handed tactics on the Taiwan issue and tried to win Mao's approval for a lessening of tensions with the Americans. Mao's response was non-committal on both issues. Khrushchev's subsequent visit to Washington raised Beijing's suspicions of a Soviet-American rapprochement over the heads of the Chinese leaders. Within the CCP, Mao and his comrades voiced their opposition to improved relations between the Blocs, and the Chinese press launched a series of attacks on U.S. foreign policy in the wake of Khrushchev's visit.

After Khrushchev's visit to USA, Mao attempted to lessen the impact of China's displeasure with Soviet policies. He tried hard to show his agreement with Moscow on every issue—the United States, Taiwan, India, Tibet, disarmament. It was unlikely, however, that his reassurances carried much weight in Moscow because of what the Soviets knew about the CCP's internal positions. On the contrary, Mao might have stimulated Khrushchev's suspicions of China's trustworthiness as an ally.

He agreed with the CC CPSU's conclusion, as contained in the information, which was as a result of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the USA. It had been carried out a real relaxation of tensions in the international situation. Mao Tse-Tung expressed extreme approval of the Soviet government proposal for general and complete disarmament which N.S. Khrushchev made during his voyage to the USA, and which was submitted for review to the United Nations. Mao Tse-tung said, the proposal of the soviet government for full disarmament, was really the best means of resolving the entire problem of disarmament. He underlined that general and complete disarmament was necessary. Further he said, at that time, the Peoples Liberation Army of China counted approximately two million people. The internal needs of the Chinese People's Republic [CPR] did not require an army of such a large size. Control over the internal situation in the country could be entirely realized by the people's militia, which consisted not of military personnel but of people working in industry. In the event that the matter led to the real achievement of general disarmament, the size of the army could definitely be

reduced. Mao Tse-tung continued, if the Americans set out to reduce the size of their own army then we definitely could take corresponding steps to reduce their own armed forces.

Mao Tse-Tung said further that a session of the Permanent Committee of the All-China Council of People's Representatives was set for October 14, at which would be accepted a resolution of approval and support for the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament. In this way, He added, the Soviet proposal would be supported by their Chinese parliament.

On Taiwan issue Mao Tse-tung noted that Comrade N.S Khrushchev in his conversations with Eisenhower had spoken very firmly and correctly about the Taiwan question. Mao Tse-tung continued, Taiwan was an inalienable part of China. On the question of Taiwan, there had not been and were not any sort of international acts in which the separation of Taiwan from China had been mentioned as number of countries had been divided in accordance with international agreements (Germany, Korea, and Vietnam) just after World War II. To the contrary, even during the war, in the Cairo Declaration, it had been decided that after the completion of military operations Taiwan would be freed from its Japanese occupiers and returned to China.

At the same time, Mao Tse-tung announced further, the Chinese People's Republic did not intend to start a war with the United States of America over Taiwan. Mao Tse-tung continued that they could wait 10-20 and even 30 or 40 years. In that case they were taking into account the experience of the Soviet Union, which over 22 years [1918-1940] did not take military measures to return the Baltic states to the ranks of the -USSR. However, while not starting a war over Taiwan, they would always say and pronounce that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the Chinese People's Republic.

In 1958, Mao Tse-tung stated, the Chinese People's Republic, as was well known, shelled the coastal islands in the Straits of Taiwan. That was after the Americans fell into a difficult situation in the Middle East. Mao Tse-tung added, in last year's situation, that step proved useful by adding to the American difficulties. Mao Tse-tung said further, that

the Chiangkaishisti [Nationalist Chinese] themselves wanted and had requested that such a shelling be conducted. It was true that during the first days after the shelling had begun Chiang-Kai Shek experienced some doubts regarding the fact that the CPR might intend to occupy the islands of Quemoy and Matsu as a result of the shelling. However, Chiang-Kai Shek soon, in the words of Mao Tse-tung, became convinced that the government of the CPR had no such intentions. The same was true regarding the Americans, continued Mao Tse-tung; for two weeks they thought that the PLAC (People's Liberation Army of China) intended to conquer the islands, but then they understood that that was not included in the plans of the government of the CPR.

Mao Tse-tung further emphasized, that the Chinese friends began from the fact that USA would not begin a war over the coastal islands. Besides that, he added, last year's shelling of the islands was undertaken when certain concrete conditions prevailed. Mao Tse-tung noted, at that time, the situation was already different.

Mao Tse-tung said that when Americans said that Chinese were war-like, nobody could accept that as true. But sometimes in a certain case it was expedient to show an opponent one's own firmness. For example, last year during the Middle Eastern crisis the U.S. State Department published a memorandum in which it made against the CPR various accusations of aggression in Korea, in Vietnam, and so on. However, the USA ended up in isolation. After our shelling of the coastal islands the Americans did not assume the obligation of defending Quemoy and Matsu, they took a passive position. It might seem, continued Mao Tse-Tung, that there it was a sort of very tricky and unclear matter, but in fact everything was clear enough. He added, Of course, all that was said relevant to the situation which obtained in the autumn of last year. Then, already, there was no sense in continuing those measures. Mao Tse-tung continued, overall, it was possible to consider the measures they took last year as one of the links in a chain of those troubles, which were created for the Americans. Another link in that chain was the advancement of the Berlin question by the Soviet Union. In the Middle-Eastern crisis, and the shelling of the islands, and the broaching of the Berlin question—these were all events which had caused trouble for the Americans. Mao Tse-tung noted, these events

made possible the achievement of several goals which USA posited in Europe. And in fact, he continued, the CPR would not begin a war with the USA, nor with Chiang Kai-shek over the Taiwan question.

As far as Chinese-American relations were concerned, Mao Tse-tung said that they, the Chinese, had done so far what they could. The Americans did not want to recognize China and every day conducted anti-Chinese propaganda, cursing them in all sorts of ways in the newspapers and in official pronouncements. Meanwhile, there was a single serious question in Chinese-American relations — the Taiwan question. Mao Tse-Tung said, they showed on that issue a certain readiness to compromise, on the question of the terms of cessation of the American occupation of Taiwan. They proposed that the Americans stay for a time on Taiwan, on the condition, however, that they would accept the obligation to leave the island over a certain period of time, said over 5-10 or 15 years. Mao Tse-tung said, they sort of traded with them. Which did Americans preferred — permanent tension in the region of Taiwan or a calm situation in exchange for the obligation to quit Taiwan over a period of time? This method of solving the question, observed by Mao Tse-tung was proposed by the Chinese side during negotiations with the Americans in Warsaw. And if the USA would agree with that, then the question of tension in the region of Taiwan could be settled. However, the Americans had turned out to be too thick-skulled; they placed their hopes on the use of force and on the creation of high pressure. The CPR did not send its airplanes to Taiwan, even reconnaissance flights of the CPR air defense forces did not fly there. At the same time, American-made planes flied from Taiwan to the mainland all the time, in fact not so long ago one airplane was shot down in the region of Peking with the help of arms which were received from the USSR. Therefore, the credit for the shooting down of the plane belonged to the Chinese anti-aircraft gunners.

Regarding the journey of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to the USA, Mao Tse-Tung said that the Cold War had already begun to be an unfavorable factor for the American imperialists themselves. And the imperialists would bring an end to the Cold War only when it turned into an unfavorable factor for them. Mao Tse-tung emphasized that he had

already spoken about this with Comrade N.S. Khrushchev during their meeting in July-August 1958. If the Americans wanted to end the Cold War then, it meant that it had become disadvantageous for them. It was another matter if the Americans, as earlier, were inclined to take a hard line, in that case China could be more than tough enough.

Right after that, Mao Tse-Tung said that during his meetings with Comrade N.S. Khrushchev in Moscow in November 1957 and in Peking in July-August 1958 he had exchanged views on the questions of turning the Cold War into a factor which would be unfavorable for the Americans, about which side fears war more, and about the character of aggressive blocs (NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact). These blocs could not be characterized only as offensive. They acted aggressively when China and Socialist camp undergo something disadvantageous, when events happened something like in Hungary. If Socialist bloc were strong internally, then the members of imperialist blocs would be required to sit on the defensive. They built bases like dams against a flood. One could liken the above-mentioned imperialist blocs precisely to those sorts of dams. The imperialists feared the infiltration of communist bacillae into the capitalist world.

Further, Mao Tse-tung said, their most dangerous enemies were West Germany and Japan. At that time these countries did not have colonies, while the USA, England and France had multiple spheres of influence. Mao argued, for instance, take the USA, everything beginning with Taiwan and ending with Turkey that in its essence was the "American world." The Americans grabbed a lot, they tried everywhere to hold on to everything, not wishing to let anything escape their grasp, not even Chinese island Quemoy. Mao said, for example, West Berlin; its territory was not big, its population also not large, however, the Americans fear losing it very much, clutching it in all sorts of ways, evidently fearing that their exit from West Berlin would lead to a decrease in their international authority, and that as a result of losing West Berlin they could lose everything else.

Regarding an evaluation of the perspectives for settling the problem of West Berlin, further, Mao said, he thought that western powers would begin, evidently, to

decrease their occupation forces in Western Berlin. It was possible, that in the long term, in about 10 years, or over a slightly longer term, the Westerners would be obligated to relinquish West Berlin entirely.

Mao repeated that the Americans fear very much giving anything up. He added, Therefore, also in the far east China then would not touch them, even in places where imperialist were weak, like Macao or Quemoy. Generally, the Americans did not want socialist camp to touch them anywhere, even to the slightest degree, did not want them to touch any territory which was under the influence of capitalism. Mao continued why they should harass Americans and its allies, they ourselves had a large territory, and they could take 20 or 30 years, or even more, to live and develop, and ultimately achieve a full victory over capitalism.

Mao underlined, overall the international situation was favorable for the socialist camp. He said: Comrade Khrushchev and the CC CPSU undertook good measures in relation to the United States of America. Mao added, the imperialists, had many weaknesses. They had serious internal contradictions. A rapid swell in the anti-imperialist liberation movement was occurring in Africa and Latin America. As far as Asia was concerned, there on the surface it was a certain decline [in the movement], explainable by the fact that in many countries of Asia the national bourgeoisie had already taken power. That had not taken place in Africa and Latin America. Those two continents for the USA, England, and France were still a source of trouble and tasks which were difficult to solve.

Right then, Mao again said that during the meetings with Comrade Khrushchev in Peking he had already articulated the thought that at that time West Germany and Japan represented the main danger to them and to the matter of peace. It could be said, America, England, and France, supported the maintenance of the status quo. Therefore, a relaxation of relations with the USA, England, and France was possible. And in certain cases the possibility even of joint efforts with those capitalist powers against West Germany and Japan was not excluded. Mao said, West Germany represented a danger not only for socialist countries, but also for the capitalist countries of the West.

The Americans at that time were the richest country, and therefore they supported to some extent the maintenance of the status quo. However, the Americans at the same time created tension even in those regions where they occupied an advantageous or even dominant position. For instance, the USA systematically hurt Cambodia, and incited neighboring states to act against it. The Americans even wanted to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, and to replace him with more obedient people.

Regarding that, Mao recounted, how on 24 May 1957, when the American embassy building on Taiwan was destroyed (and that deed was organised by people close to Chiang Kai-shek's son, Tsian Tszin-go). In the hands of the Kuomintang turned up secret American documents, in which were discussed American plans to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. Mao said that those documents were taken from the safes in the Embassy during the destruction of the embassy building were taken by participants in the demonstration with the help of heavy iron hammers. And so, the USA as an imperialist power in fact had not the slightest sympathy for Chiang Kai-shek, or for [Indonesian leader] Sukarno, or for Iraqi prime minister Abd al-Karim Qassem, or for Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. Mao said, so sharp conflicts existed inside the capitalist world.

“Fighting with two fists” Strategy and Sino-US Relation:—

In the 1960s, China adopted The *liangge quantou daren* (fighting with two fists) strategy as an anti-imperialist (US) and also anti-revisionist (Soviet Union) international united front strategy which was known domestically as the *liangge daren* strategy, or the *liangtiao xian* (two united fronts) strategy, or the *shijie geming* (world revolution) strategy.

After Khrushchev's visit to USA, relation between China and USSR became tense. The Sino-Soviet split, as well as the Sino-American confrontation took place in the 1960s. By the end of the 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, was perceived to be ready to co-operate with the US to control the world and impose many unreasonable demands on China's sovereignty. When Mao and other Chinese leaders opposed the

Soviet stand then Moscow took a number of steps to threaten China politically, economically and militarily, including the withdrawal of all Soviet specialists from China, abrogation of hundreds of agreements and contracts, and the engineering of border disputes involving the encouragement of national minorities living along the Sino-Soviet border to flee the Soviet Union. As a result, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union sharply deteriorated, and confrontation and strong mutual suspicions replaced the alliance relationship.

On the other hand, the Sino-American confrontation had not shown any signs of relaxation. Although the US welcomed the Sino-Soviet split, Washington continued to isolate China. The latter became the main target of the US strategy of containment pursued since the end of World War II. In the eyes of the US government, China was an immature, underdeveloped socialist state, similar to the Soviet Union in the Stalinist era. As such, it was adventurous and aggressive. It would even be more dangerous if it became a nuclear power. Hence the Kennedy administration did not regard the Sino-Soviet split as an opportunity to improve relations with China. Instead it considered that the Soviet Union had already become a mature socialist state sharing converging interests with the US. Under such circumstances, China adjusted its position in the new international strategic environment. The 'leaning to one side' strategy had lost its foundation, and China chose to uphold the two conspicuous flanks, anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism, as declared by Mao in early 1961. This was in line with the radical domestic political programme pursued by Mao at the time. The 'fighting with two fists' strategy declared by Mao was a passive response to the new international strategic power configuration. To a considerable extent, it was a product of 'leftist-deviationists' thinking of Mao and other Chinese leaders. The 'fighting with two fists' strategy pushed China to confront the two superpowers at the same time. The yitiaoxian (one united front) strategy In view of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, especially the armed conflicts along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969, the Chinese leadership realized that China's biggest threat came from the north. China's very survival was at stake, and China had to change its 'fighting with the two fists' strategy to escape from this strategically disadvantageous position.

In preparation for the increasing military threats from the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong called for preparation for war, for famine and for the people, while looking for allies to deter the Soviet Union. The best choice obviously was the US, the only country that could stand up to the Soviet militarily. Hence China had to improve its relations with the US. As the US also faced considerable pressure from the Soviet Union's expansionist designs and wanted to withdraw from the Vietnam War, President Nixon in fact made the initiative to approach China, which objectively offered China an opportunity to exploit the contradiction between the two superpowers. They might win over one of the two superpower (hegemony), never fight with two fists, declared Mao, they could take advantage of the contradiction between the two superpowers, and that was their policy.

Despite the death of both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1976, the yitiao strategy continued until 1982-1983. In sum, China greatly benefited from the yitiao strategy. Not only had China realized its security benefits, but the Sino-US rapprochement also promoted China's relations with many other countries, especially Western countries. As a result, China emerged from its isolation to the world community and laid a solid foundation for the next phase of reform and opening to the outside world could not have been so smooth and the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, the so-called Chinese Miracle might have encountered many more obstacles. The yitiao strategy facilitated China to become part of the international system, and this was an important legacy of Mao's final years.

Chapter-3

Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence

The first post Stalin party Congress (20th) of CPSU was one of the pivotal events of the Khrushchev era because it had ushered in several significant changes. It was held in Moscow from 14th to 25th February, 1956. The ideological disputes between USSR and China had emerged after the 20th party Congress. Khrushchev revealed some new ideologies in that party congress which contradicted with the traditional Marxist-Leninist Theory. He had propounded three peaceful theory- Peaceful Co-existence; Peaceful Transition and peaceful Competition. These three theories in cumulative is known as Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence policy.

Before trying to understand Khrushchev Peaceful Co-existence, it will be better for us to know earlier theory of Peaceful Coexistence. This policy was not a quite new idea. It was Lenin who advanced the idea that the socialist state should pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence towards countries with different social systems. But nature of this policy was different under Lenin-Stalin and Khrushchev period. The question of peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist countries could not possibly have arisen prior to the October Revolution, since there was no socialist country in existence. Nevertheless, on the basis of his scientific analysis of imperialism, Lenin foresaw in 1915-16 that socialism could not achieve victory simultaneously in all countries. It would achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others would remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois for some time. Lenin said that only the working class, when it won power, could pursue a policy of peace not in words but in deeds". These views of Lenin's could be said to constitute the theoretical basis of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

After the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin proclaimed to the world on many occasions that the foreign policy of the Soviet state was one way to peace. But the imperialists were bent on influencing the new-born socialist republic in its cradle. They launched armed intervention against the Soviet state. Confronted with this situation, Lenin had rightly pointed out that unless they defended the socialist republic by force of arms, they could not exist.

In the prevailing conditions, it was not yet possible for him to define the content of the policy of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. But the Lenin had laid down the correct foreign policy for the first state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and advanced the basic ideas of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Lenin's basic ideas of Peaceful Co-existence:

First, Lenin had pointed out that the socialist state existed against the imperialists' will. Although it adhered to the foreign policy of peace, the imperialists had no desire to live in peace with it and would do everything possible and seize every opportunity to oppose or even to destroy the socialist state. Lenin argued that international imperialism could not live side by side with the Soviet Republic, both because of its objective position and because of the economic interests of the capitalist class which were embodied in it. Further, the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time was unimaginable. One or the other might triumph in the end. And before the end had damaged, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states would be inevitable.

Therefore, he stressed again and again that the socialist state should maintain constant vigilance against imperialism. Hence, all workers and peasants must get the lesson that they were surrounded by men, classes and governments, who were openly expressing their extreme hatred towards them. Hence the socialist should remember that they were always at a hair's breadth from all kinds of invasions.

Secondly, Lenin pointed out that it was only through struggle that the Soviet state was able to live in peace with the imperialist countries. This was the result of repeated trials of strength between the imperialist countries and the Soviet state, which adopted a correct policy, relied on the support of the proletariat and oppressed nations of the world and utilized the contradictions among the imperialists.

According Lenin, in November 1919, when the enemy was beaten, he began talking about peace. Socialist had told those gentlemen, the imperialists of Europe again and again that they were agreed to make peace, but the formers continued to dream of enslaving Russia. But, now they had realized that their dreams were not fated to come true.

Thirdly, in carrying out the, policy of peaceful coexistence, Lenin adopted different principles with regard to the different types of countries in the capitalist world. He attached particular importance in establishing friendly relations with countries which the imperialists were bullying and oppressing. He pointed out that “the fundamental interests of all peoples suffering from the yoke of imperialism coincide” and that the “world policy of imperialism is leading to the establishment of closer relations, alliance and friendship among all the oppressed nations”. He said that the peace policy of the Soviet state would increasingly compel the establishment of closer ties between the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic(R.S.F.S.R.) and a growing number of neighboring states.

As for the basis for peace with the imperialist countries, such as the United States, Lenin suggested to keep distance from the U.S. led capitalists from touching us. He questioned about the obstacles to such a peace process, which were not from their side but from the side of the American (and all the other) capitalists, that was imperialism.

Fourthly, Lenin had advanced the policy of peaceful co-existence as a policy to be pursued by the proletariat in power towards countries with different social systems. He never made it the sum total of a socialist country’s foreign policy. Time and again Lenin made it clear that the fundamental principle of this foreign policy was proletarian

internationalism. He said that Soviet Russia considered that as her greatest pride to help the workers of the whole world in their difficult struggle for the overthrow of capitalism.

The Draft Programme of the Party which Lenin drew up for the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party laid down explicitly that “support of the revolutionary movement of the socialist proletariat in the advanced countries” and “support of the democratic and revolutionary movement in all countries in general, and particularly in the colonies and dependent countries” constituted the important aspects of the Party’s international policy.

Fifthly, Lenin consistently held that it was impossible for the oppressed classes and nations to coexist peacefully with the oppressor classes and nations. In the “These on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International”, he pointed out: that the bourgeoisie, even the most educated and democratic, may no longer hesitate to resort to any fraud or crime, to massacre millions of workers and peasants in order to save the private ownership of the means of production.

The above constitute Lenin’s basic ideas on the policy of peaceful coexistence. Stalin upheld Lenin’s policy of peaceful coexistence. In the thirty years during which he was the leader of the Soviet Union, he consistently pursued this policy. It was only when the imperialists and reactionaries made armed provocations or launched aggressive wars against the Soviet Union that she had to wage the Great Patriotic War and to fight back in self-defence. Stalin pointed out that “our relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the coexistence of two opposite systems is possible” and that “the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us” (Stalin 1952).

He also pointed out:

“The peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism is quite possible provided there is a mutual desire to co-operate, readiness to carry out undertaken commitments, and

observance of the principle of equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states” (Stalin 1952). While upholding Lenin’s policy of peaceful coexistence, Stalin firmly opposed withholding support from other people’s revolutions in order to curry favour with imperialism. He forcefully pointed out two opposite lines in foreign policy, “either one or the other” of which must be followed.

Now we will see Khrushchev’s Peaceful Co-existence:

1. Peaceful Co-Existence:

According to Khrushchev, Peaceful Co-Existence means to build a peaceful relation between Communist and Capitalist Countries. He refuted the earlier argument that wars between Capitalism and Socialism were inevitable. At the 20th party congress, He said, “there are only two ways: either peaceful co-existence or the most destructive war in History. There is no third way.” It denoted a relationship of, “Live and Let-Live” – a relationship of mutual tolerance, excluding not only military conflict but also hostile action. Khrushchev was the first general secretary of CPSU who paid visit to Washington on 15th September 1959 and said the purpose of visit was to improve diplomatic relations and to reduce the tensions between two powerful Blocks.

He strongly believed in the ultimate success of Communism. For him, this new policy- Peaceful Co-existence was a very effective and suitable mean to achieve goal of world-wide communism. Any way peaceful co-existence’s aim was not to demoralise any kind of Socialist Movement. This policy signified not the cessation of hostile action against the non-communist world, but the continuation of the struggle between the communist and the non-communist world by “peaceful” means. ‘Peaceful’ in this context meant merely the avoidance of the world war. Khrushchev had emphasized that the “policy of peaceful co-existence” involved “intense economic, political and ideological struggle” against the “capitalist camp”. This policy had been defined by communist authorities as “the highest form of class struggle between two opposite systems.” It was a tactic for the attainment of world victory without world war.

Under this policy he revealed number of new weapons which he used in his struggle against the non-communist world. Most of these weapons were rarely, or not at all, utilised by Stalin. First was Economic Assistance. Khrushchev and his colleagues were convinced that this weapon was one of the most effective means of bringing about the victory of world communism. By the end of 1960 the communist block countries had furnished a total of \$ 4,800,000,000 in credits and grants to 24 underdeveloped countries like Iraq, Indonesia, India, United Arab Republic (UAR), etc... The Soviet Union had provided about \$ 3,600,000,000 of the total credits and grants. The new nations were to be taught that full freedom from exploitation would not be attended until they break their economic ties with the West.

Second weapon which Khrushchev had used with great vigor was the Political weapon. There had been an endless series of exchange of visits between Khrushchev and the heads of government of foreign countries. These good will visits has usually been associated with some political purpose, such as offering support to uncommitted government on some issues calculated to bring them into conflict with the west. For Example; include support of India in Goa and Kashmir, of Indonesia in Dutch New Guinea and of Afghanistan in his claims against Pakistan. Another policy of political weapon was the development of Parliamentary contacts. Early in 1955 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR invited all parliaments to exchange parliamentary delegations with the Soviet Union as a part for the purpose of reducing existing world tensions. In the next three years parliamentary delegations from over thirty countries visited the Soviet Union and were fated by soviet deputies who paid reciprocal visits to twenty countries.

Finally, there had been Khrushchev's fondness for summit conferences, in this connection; mention should be made of his for more extensive use of the meetings of the United Nations. He had come to look upon the United Nation's assembly as an excellent forum for the propagandising of Soviet aims and policies and winning support on specific issues, particularly among the uncommitted and ex-colonial states.

The leader of CPSU and Khrushchev had lauded their concept of peaceful coexistence in superlative terms and differ from Lenin's policy. There are some statements and views expressed by the Khrushchev at different time and place.

1. The leaders of the CPSU maintain that peaceful coexistence was the overriding and supreme principle for solving contemporary social problems. They asserted that it was "the categorical imperative of modern times" and "the imperious demand of the epoch" (Ponomaryoy 1962). They say that "peaceful coexistence alone is the best and the sole acceptable way to solve the vitally important problems confronting society" (Rumyantsey 1962) and that the principle of peaceful coexistence should be made the "basic law of life for the whole of modern society" (Khrushchev 1960).
2. They hold that imperialism had become willing to accept peaceful coexistence and was no longer the obstacle to it. They said that "a few government and state leaders of Western countries are now also coming out for peace and peaceful coexistence" (Khrushchev 1960) and those they "understand more and more clearly the necessity of peaceful coexistence" (Khrushchev 1960). In particular they had loudly announced a U.S. President's admission of the reasonableness and practicability of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems.
3. They advocated "all-round co-operation" with imperialist countries, and especially with the United States. They said that the Soviet Union and the United States "will be able to find a basis for concerted actions and efforts for the good of all humanity" (Khrushchev & Brezhnev 1961) and could "march hand in hand for the sake of consolidating peace and establishing real international co-operation between all states" (Khrushchev 1960).
4. They assert that peaceful coexistence was "the general line of foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp" (Khrushchev 1961).

5. They also asserted that “the principle of peaceful coexistence determines the general line of foreign policy of the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist Parties” (Ponomaryov 1962), that it was “the basis of the strategy of communism” in the world today, and that all Communists had made the struggle for peaceful coexistence the general principle of their policy.

6. They regarded peaceful coexistence as the prerequisite for victory in the peoples’ revolutionary struggles. They held that the victories won by the people of different countries had been achieved under “conditions of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems” (Ponomaryov 1961). They asserted that it was precisely in conditions of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems that the socialist revolution triumphed in Cuba, that the Algerian people gained national independence that more than forty countries won national independence, that the fraternal Parties grew in number and strength, and that the influence of the world communist movement increased.

7. They held that peaceful coexistence was the best way of helping the international revolutionary labour movement to achieve its basic class aims. They declared that under peaceful coexistence the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism in capitalist countries had grown. They believed, moreover, that the victory of socialism in economic competition “will mean delivering a crushing blow to the entire system of capitalist relationships” (Ponomaryov 1961). They stated when the Soviet people enjoy the blessings of communism; new hundreds of millions of people on earth would say they CPSU leaders were for communism and that by then even capitalists might “go over to the Communist Party”.

2. Peaceful Competition:

Referring to peaceful competition Khrushchev suggested that instead of competing in the production of nuclear weapon, rockets, military aircrafts and other means of mass destruction capitalist and socialist countries should compete in the development of science, technology and culture which would benefit everyone. A huge money which was

spent on weapons, should be spent to serve humanity. If we would be economically strong then other countries would favour us and thus socialism would triumph throughout the world. According to Khrushchev, Socialism had no love for capitalism but wished to have peaceful competition. Peaceful coexistence provided the necessary conditions for peaceful competition. Khrushchev told about peaceful competition in a Soviet-Czechoslovakian Friendship Meeting on July 12, 1958. For over forty years, a socialist and capitalist system had existed. Of course, irreconcilable political and ideological contradictions existed and would exist between these two systems, and there was and still would continue to be a certain struggle between them.

That certain struggle was represented that day by the concept of peaceful competition, a corollary to peaceful coexistence. Peaceful competition made peaceful coexistence a dynamic, rather than a static, relationship. Conditions between the socialist and capitalist camps were not frozen. On the contrary, as Khrushchev indicated in 1957: "But in peaceful competition we will work to win out. Here if I may say so, the Soviet people will be on the offensive." (Hearst 1957). Peaceful coexistence had become a form of intense ideological, economic, political and cultural struggle between the "proletariat and the aggressive forces of imperialism."

On the ideological front, Khrushchev had frequently referred to peaceful coexistence in the field of ideology as treason. In 1955 he told the East German Communist leaders that whatever people might say about our smile but was not artificial in reality. He further argued, if anyone believed that the smile of the CPSU leaders meant that they had given up the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, they are badly mistaken.

Later in the year he asserted, "If certain people regard as a violation of the 'Geneva spirit' our conviction that victory will be on the side of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism, these people obviously do not understand the 'Geneva spirit' correctly. They should remember that we have never renounced our ideas, the struggle for victory of communism" (Khrushchev 1955). According to Khrushchev, in the 1960 Moscow Declaration they found that Peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social

systems did not mean conciliation of socialist and bourgeois ideology. On the contrary, it implied intensification of the struggle of the working class of all the Communist Parties, for the triumph of socialist ideas.

In his report to the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1963, Khrushchev said: “Hatred of class enemies is necessary, because it is not possible to become a good fighter for your people or for Communism if one does not know how to hate enemies. Yes, comrades, a harsh class struggle is now in progress throughout the world” (Khrushchev 1959).

Speaking on the new Seven Year Plan in 1958, Khrushchev said that the realization of the Seven Year Plan of the development of the national economy for 1959-1965 would be another important stage in peaceful economic competition of the two systems—socialism and capitalism. Strengthening of the domestic economy was intended to give the Soviets “a decisive advantage in the international alignment of forces” (Khrushchev 1959). The purpose of the plan was to affect favorably the balance of world forces and made it all the more likely that general nuclear war could be avoided.

Moreover, it provided the Soviet Union with an economic base from which they could exert themselves internationally. The leaders of the CPSU had long recognised a close relationship between economics and politics, arising out of Communist ideology. It was not surprising, therefore, that shortly after Stalin’s death the Soviet Union began to engage in international economic competition through trade and aid. Commentators in the West called it an “economic offensive.”(Allen 1960).

In 1955, for example, Khrushchev told a group of United States Congressmen visiting the USSR. That “we value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes.” Two years later the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikita S. Khrushchev, proclaimed: “We declare war upon you—excuse me for using such an expression—in the peaceful field of trade. We declare war. We will win over the United States. The threat of the United States is not the ICBM, but in the field of peaceful production” (Hearst 1957).

3. Peaceful Transition:

Peaceful Transition was just an opposite theme of the theory of revolution which was the main tool of Marxist-Leninist's ideology. This principal argument used by Khrushchev and CPSU leaders to justify their anti-revolutionary line of "peaceful transition" was that historical conditions had changed. Socialist movement had been strengthening since World War II and imperialism had been weakening. Several countries were emerging as independent states. In this way revolution or violence was not inevitable. According to this theory a capitalist state could be changed into a socialist society through parliamentary process. In this way Communist Party could also win in parliament of any country through free and fair election. After winning election, this party would form a government by its own members and all type of changes would take place in the country without any revolution or violence. so, there was no need of revolution for socialism. In the support of this theory Khrushchev gave several examples. The leader of CPSU gave example that in the 1870s Marx said that in countries like United States and Britain – the worker can reach their goal by peaceful means. Second example, in Hungary in 1919, the dictatorship of the proletariat was established by peaceful means, they alleged that the working class of Czechoslovakia won power by the peaceful road.

4. Theory of "State of the Whole People" and China's Objection:

At the 22nd Congress of the CPSU Khrushchev openly raised the banner of opposition to the dictatorship of the proletariat. He announced the replacement of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the "state of the whole people". It was written in the programme of the CPSU that the dictatorship of the proletariat "had ceased to be indispensable in the U.S.S.R." and that "the state, which arose as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, had, in the new, contemporary stage, become a state of the entire people".

It is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism that the concept of the state is a class concept. Lenin pointed out that the distinguishing feature of the state was the existence of a separate class of people in whose hands power was concentrated". The state is a

weapon of class struggle, a machine by means of which one class represses another. Every state is the dictatorship of a definite class. So long as the state exists, it cannot possibly stand above class or belong to the whole people.

After the victory of the socialist revolution, the proletariat and its party might strive unremittingly to fulfill the historical tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat and eliminate classes and class differences, so that the state would wither away. It was only the bourgeoisie and its parties which in their attempt to hoodwink the masses tried by every means to cover up the class nature of state power and describe the state machinery under their control as being “of the whole people” and “above class”.

The fact that Khrushchev had announced the abolition of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union and advanced the thesis of the “state of the whole people” demonstrates that he had replaced the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the state by bourgeois falsehoods. It was absolutely not the view of Marx and Lenin but an invention of the revisionist Khrushchev that the end of the dictatorship of the proletariat would precede the withering away of the state and would be followed by yet another stage, “the state of the whole people”.

Lenin had described the three stages in the process of development from the bourgeois state to the withering away of the state:

The first stage -- in capitalist society, the state was needed by the bourgeoisie -- the bourgeois state. The second stage -- in the period of transition from capitalism to communism, the state was needed by the proletariat -- the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The third stage -- in communist society, the state was not necessary, it withers away. He concluded: “Complete consistency and clarity”

In Lenin’s tabulation, only the bourgeois state, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the withering away of the state were to be found. By precisely this

tabulation Lenin made it clear that when communism was reached the state withers away and became non-existent.

Ironically enough, the revisionist Khrushchev clique also quoted this very passage from Lenin's *Marxism on the State* in the course of defending their error and then they proceeded to make the following statement- In USSR the first two periods referred to by Lenin in the opinion quoted already belong to history. In the Soviet Union a state of the whole people -- *a communist state system*, the state of the *first phase of communism*, had arisen and was developing.

If the first two periods referred to by Lenin had already become a thing of the past in the Soviet Union, then the state should be withering away, and where could a "state of the whole people" come from? If the state was not yet withering away, then it ought to be the dictatorship of the proletariat and under absolutely no circumstances a "state of the whole people".

In arguing for their "state of the whole people", the revisionist Khrushchev clique exerted themselves to vilify the dictatorship of the proletariat as undemocratic. They asserted that only by replacing the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the "state of the whole people" could democracy be further developed and turned into "genuine democracy for the whole people". Khrushchev had pretentiously said that the abolition of the dictatorship of the proletariat exemplified "a line of energetically developing democracy" and that "proletarian democracy is becoming socialist democracy of the whole people" (Khrushchev 1961).

Anyone with a little knowledge of Marxism-Leninism knows that the concept of democracy as a form of the state, like that of dictatorship, is a class one. There could only be class democracy, there could not be "democracy for the whole people". Then what was the essence of Khrushchev's "state of the whole people"?

Actually his “state of the whole people” was not a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat but a state in which his small revisionist clique wielded their dictatorship over the masses of the workers, the peasants and the revolutionary intellectuals. Under the rule of the Khrushchev clique, there was no democracy for the Soviet working people, there was democracy only for the handful of people belonging to the revisionist Khrushchev, for the privileged stratum and for the bourgeois elements, old and new. Khrushchev’s “democracy for the whole people” was nothing but out-and-out bourgeois democracy, i.e., a despotic dictatorship of the Khrushchev clique over the Soviet people.

5. Theory of “Party of the Entire People” and China’s Objection:

At the 22nd Congress of the CPSU Khrushchev openly raised another banner, the alteration of the proletarian character of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He announced the replacement of the party of the proletariat by a “party of the entire people”. The programme of the CPSU stated, “As a result of the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and the consolidation of the unity of Soviet society, the Communist Party of the working class had become the vanguard of the Soviet people, a party of the entire people”. The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU stated that the CPSU “had become a political organization of the entire people”.

Elementary knowledge of Marxism-Leninism tells us that, like the state, a political party is an instrument of class struggle. Every political party has a class character. Party spirit is the concentrated expression of class character. There was no such thing as a non-class or supra-class political party and there never had been, nor was there such a thing as a “party of the entire people” that does not represent the interests of a particular class.

The party of the proletariat was built in accordance with the revolutionary theory and revolutionary style of Marxism-Leninism; it was the party formed by the advanced elements that were boundlessly faithful to the historical mission of the proletariat, It was

the organised vanguard of the proletariat and the highest form of its organization. The party of the proletariat represented the interests of the proletariat and the concentration of its will.

Moreover, the party of the proletariat was the only party able to represent the interests of the people, who constituted over ninety per cent of the total population. The reason was that the interests of the proletariat were identical with those of the working masses.

In addition to its members of working-class origin, the party of the proletariat had members of other class origins. But the latter did not join the Party as representatives of other classes. From the very day they joined the party and they might abandon their former class stand and take the stand of the proletariat. Marx and Engels said that If people of that kind from other classes joined the proletarian movement, the first condition might be that they should not bring any remnants of bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, etc., prejudices with them but should whole-heartedly adopt the proletarian outlook CPSU leaders had argued during the talks between the Chinese and Soviet Parties in July 1963 and in the Soviet press that they had changed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union into a "party of the entire people" because:

1. The CPSU expressed the interests of the whole people.
2. The entire people had accepted the Marxist-Leninist world outlook of the working class, and the aim of the working class -- the building of communism -- had become the aim of the entire people.
3. The ranks of the CPSU consisted of the best representatives of the workers, collective farmers and intellectuals. The CPSU made unite in its own ranks representatives of over a hundred nationalities and peoples.
4. The democratic method used in the party's activities was also in accord with its character as the Party of the entire people.

According to the revisionist Khrushchev clique, the Communist Party should become a “party of the entire people” because it expressed the interests of the entire people. Thus, it followed that from the very beginning that it should have a “party of the entire people” instead of a party of the proletariat. Further, he argued that the Communist Party should become a “party of the entire people” because “the entire people had accepted the Marxist-Leninist world outlook of the working class”. But it was tough to say that everyone had accepted the Marxist-Leninist world outlook in Soviet society where sharp class polarization and class struggle were taking place? If Marxism-Leninism had really become the world outlook of the entire people, as they alleged, it followed that there was no difference in your society between Party and non-Party and no need whatsoever for the Party to exist. What difference did it make if there was a “party of the entire people” or not?

According to the revisionist Khrushchev clique, the Communist Party should become a “party of the entire people” because its membership consisted of workers, peasants and intellectuals and all nationalities and peoples. Did this mean then that before the idea of the “party of the entire people” was put forward at its 22nd Congress none of the members of the CPSU came from classes other than the working class? Did it mean that formerly the members of the party all came from just one nationality, to the exclusion of other nationalities and peoples? If the character of a party was determined by the social background of its membership, did it not then follow that the numerous political parties in the world whose members also come from various classes, nationalities and peoples were all “parties of the entire people”?

According to the revisionist Khrushchev clique, the Party should be a “party of the entire people” because the methods it used in its activities were democratic. But from its outset, a Communist Party was built on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism and should always adopt the mass line and the democratic method of persuasion and education in working among the people. Did it not then follow that a Communist Party was a “party of the entire people” from the first day of its founding? Briefly, none of the arguments listed by the revisionist Khrushchev clique held water.

Chapter-4

China's Ideological Objection to Peaceful Co-existence

On the question of peaceful coexistence the difference between the leaders of the CPSU, on the one hand and all Marxist-Leninist Parties and indeed all Marxist-Leninists, on the other, was not whether socialist countries should pursue the policy of peaceful coexistence. It was an issue of principle concerning the correct attitude towards Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence. It manifested itself mainly in three questions.

The first question was: In order to attain peaceful coexistence, was it necessary to ravage struggles against imperialism and bourgeois reaction? Was it possible through peaceful coexistence to abolish the antagonism and struggle between socialism and imperialism?

Marxist-Leninists consistently maintain that as far as the socialist countries were concerned, there was no obstacle to the practice of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. The obstacles always came from the imperialists and the bourgeois reactionaries. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were advanced to combat the imperialist policies of aggression and war. Under these principles, it was impermissible in international relations to encroach upon the territory and sovereignty of other countries, interfere in their internal affairs, impair their interests and equal status or wage aggressive wars against them. But it was in the very nature of imperialism to commit aggression against other countries and nations and to desire to enslave them. As long as imperialism exists, its nature would never change. That was why intrinsically the imperialists were unwilling to accept the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Whenever possible, they try to disrupt and destroy the socialist countries and they commit aggression against other countries and nations and try to enslave them.

History shows that it was only owing to unfavourable objective causes that the imperialists dare not risk starting a war against the socialist countries, or are forced to agree to an armistice and to accept some sort of peaceful coexistence. History also shows that there have always been sharp and complex struggles between the imperialist and socialist countries, which have sometimes culminated in direct military conflicts or wars. When hot wars are not in progress, the imperialists wage cold wars, which they have been ceaselessly waging ever since the end of World War II. In fact, the imperialist and the socialist countries had been in a state of cold-war co-existence. At the same time as they actively expanded their armaments and prepare for war, the imperialist countries use every means to oppose the socialist countries politically, economically and ideologically, and even make military provocations and war threats against them. The imperialists' cold war against the socialist countries and the latter's resistance to it are manifestations of the international class struggle.

The imperialists push on with their plans of aggression and war not only against the socialist countries but throughout the world. They try to suppress the revolutionary movements of the oppressed peoples and nations. In these circumstances, the socialist countries, together with the people of all other countries, must resolutely combat the imperialist policies of aggression and war and wage a tit-for-tat struggle against imperialism. This class struggle inevitably goes on, now in an acute and now in a relaxed form. But Khrushchev was impervious to these inexorable facts. He proclaimed far and wide that imperialism had already admitted the necessity of peaceful coexistence, and he regarded the anti-imperialist struggles of the socialist countries and of the people of the world as incompatible with the policy of peaceful coexistence.

In Khrushchev's opinion, a socialist country had to make one concession after another and keep on yielding to the imperialists and the bourgeois reactionaries even when they subjected it to military threats and armed attack or make humiliating demands which violate its sovereignty and dignity.

By this logic, Khrushchev described his incessant retreats, his bartering away of principles and docile acceptance of the U.S. imperialists' humiliating demands during the Caribbean crisis as "a victory of peaceful coexistence". At times, Khrushchev also talked about struggle between the two different social systems. But how did he see this struggle? He had said, "The inevitable struggle between the two systems must be made to take the form exclusively of a struggle of ideas" (Khrushchev 1960). Here the political struggle had disappeared. The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with differing socio-economic and political systems did not mean just an absence of war, a temporary state of unstable ceasefire. It presupposed the maintenance between these states of friendly economic and political relations; it envisaged the establishment and development of various forms of peaceful international co-operation.

Here, struggle had disappeared altogether.

He denied the basic antagonism between the socialist and capitalist systems, he denied the fundamental contradiction between the socialist and the imperialist camps, and he denied the existence of international class struggle. And so, he transformed peaceful coexistence between the two systems and the two camps into "all-round co-operation" (Khrushchev 1962).

The second question was: Could peaceful coexistence be made the general line of foreign policy for socialist countries?

China held that the general line of foreign policy for socialist countries must embody the fundamental principle of their foreign policy and comprise the fundamental content of this policy. What was this fundamental principle? It was proletarian internationalism. Lenin said that the foreign policy of the proletariat was alliance with the revolutionaries of the advanced countries and with all the oppressed nations against all and any imperialists. That principle of proletarian internationalism advanced by Lenin should be the guide for the foreign policy of socialist countries. Since the formation of the socialist camp, every socialist country had to deal with three kinds of relations in its foreign

policy, namely, its relations with other socialist countries, with countries having different social systems, and with the oppressed peoples and nations.

In Chinese view, the following should therefore be the content of the general line of foreign policy for socialist countries: to develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation among the countries of the socialist camp in accordance with the principle of proletarian internationalism; to strive for peaceful coexistence on the basis of the Five Principles with countries having different social systems and oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war; and to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed peoples and nations. These three aspects were interrelated and not a single one could be omitted.

The leaders of the CPSU had one-sidedly reduced the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries to peaceful coexistence. China question was: How should a socialist country handle its relations with other socialist countries? Should it merely maintain relations of peaceful coexistence with them? Of course, socialist countries, too, must abide by the Five Principles in their mutual relations. It was absolutely impermissible for any one of them to undermine the territorial integrity of another fraternal country, to impair its independence and sovereignty, interfere in its internal affairs, carry on subversive activities inside it, or violate the principle of equality and mutual benefit in its relations with another fraternal country. But merely to carry out these principles was far from enough. The 1957 Declaration stated that these were vital principles. However, they did not exhaust the essence of relations between them. Fraternal mutual aid was part and parcel of these relations. This aid was a striking expression of socialist internationalism.

In making peaceful coexistence the general line of foreign policy, the leaders of the CPSU had in fact liquidated the proletarian internationalist relations of mutual assistance and co-operation among socialist countries and put the fraternal socialist

countries on a par with the capitalist countries. This amounted to liquidating the socialist camp. The leaders of the CPSU had one-sidedly reduced the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries to peaceful coexistence. Chinese objection was: How should a socialist country handle its relations with the oppressed peoples and nations? Should the relationship between the proletariat in power and its class brothers who had not yet emancipated themselves or between it and all oppressed peoples and nations be one of peaceful coexistence alone and not of mutual help?

After the October Revolution, Lenin repeatedly stressed that the land of socialism, which had established the dictatorship of the proletariat, was a base for promoting the proletarian world revolution. Stalin, too, said:

The revolution which had been victorious in one country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries (Stalin 1953).

He added that “it constitutes . . . a mighty base for its further development [i.e., of the world revolution]” ((Stalin 1953).

In their foreign policy, therefore, socialist countries could in no circumstances confine themselves to handling relations with countries having different social systems, but must also correctly handle the relations among themselves and their relations with the oppressed peoples and nations. They might make support of the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations their internationalist duty and an important component of their foreign policy.

In contrast with Lenin and Stalin, Khrushchev made peaceful coexistence the general line of foreign policy for socialist countries and, in so doing, excluded from this policy the proletarian internationalist task of helping the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations. So far from being a “creative development” of the policy

of peaceful coexistence, this was a betrayal of proletarian internationalism on the pretext of peaceful coexistence.

The third question was: Could the policy of peaceful coexistence of the socialist countries be the general line for all Communist Parties and for the international communist movement? Could it be substituted for the people's revolution?

China maintained that peaceful coexistence connotes a relationship between countries with different social systems, between independent sovereign states. Only after victory in the revolution was it possible and necessary for the proletariat to pursue the policy of peaceful coexistence. As for oppressed peoples and nations, their task was to strive for their own liberation and overthrow the rule of imperialism and its lackeys. They should not practice peaceful coexistence with the imperialists and their lackeys, nor was it possible for them to do so.

It was therefore wrong to apply peaceful coexistence to the relations between oppressed and oppressor classes and between oppressed and oppressor nations, or to stretch the socialist countries policy of peaceful coexistence so as to make it the policy of the Communist Parties and the revolutionary people in the capitalist world, or to subordinate the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed people and nations to it.

China had always held that the correct application of Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence by the socialist countries helps to develop their power, to expose the imperialist policies of aggression and war and to unite all the anti-imperialist peoples and countries, and it therefore helps the people's struggles against imperialism and its lackeys. At the same time, by directly hitting and weakening the forces of aggression, war and reaction, the people's revolutionary struggles against imperialism and its lackeys help the cause of world peace and human progress, and therefore help the socialist countries' struggle for peaceful coexistence with countries having different social systems. Thus, the correct application of Lenin's policy of peaceful co-existence by the socialist countries was in harmony with the interests of the people's revolutionary

struggles in all countries. However, the socialist countries' struggle for peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems and the people's revolution in various countries were two totally different things.

In its letter of June 14, 1963, replying to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Central Committee of the CPC stated that It was one thing to practice peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. It was absolutely impermissible and impossible for countries practicing peaceful coexistence to touch even a hair of each other's social system. The class struggle, the struggle for national liberation and the transition from capitalism to socialism in various countries were quite another thing. They were all bitter, life-and-death revolutionary struggles which aimed at changing the social system. Peaceful co-existence could not replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country could only be brought about through the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country.

In a class society it was completely wrong to regard peaceful coexistence as "the best and the sole acceptable way to solve the vitally important problems confronting society" and as the "basic law of life for the whole of modern society". This was social pacifism which repudiated class struggle. It was an outrageous betrayal of Marxism-Leninism.

Back in 1946, Comrade Mao-Tse-Tung differentiated between the two problems and explicitly stated that compromise between the Soviet Union and the United States, Britain and France on certain issues "does not require the people in the countries of the capitalist world to follow suit and make compromises at home. The people in those countries will continue to wage different struggles in accordance with their different conditions" (Mao 1961).

This was a correct Marxist-Leninist policy. Guided by this correct policy of Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, the Chinese people firmly and determinedly carried the revolution through to the end and won the great victory of their revolution.

Acting against this Marxist-Leninist policy, the leaders of the CPSU equated one aspect of the policy to be pursued by the proletariat in power in its state relations with countries having different social systems with the general line of all the Communist Parties. They tried to substitute the former for the latter, demanding that Communist Parties and revolutionary peoples should all follow what they called the general line of peaceful coexistence. Not desiring revolution themselves, they forbid others to make it. Not opposing imperialism themselves, they also forbid others to oppose it.

The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Khrushchev's remarks had strenuously denied. It had been asserted that it was "a monstrous slander" to accuse the leaders of the CPSU of extending peaceful coexistence to relations between the oppressed and oppressor classes and between the oppressed and oppressor nations. They had even hypocritically stated that peaceful coexistence could not be extended to the class struggle against capital within the capitalist countries and to national liberation movement.

But such prevarication was futile. China wanted to know with leaders of the CPSU: Since the policy of peaceful coexistence constitutes only one aspect of the foreign policy of socialist countries, why had they asserted until recently that it represented "the strategic line for the whole period of transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale"?(Pravda,1963). In requiring the Communist Parties of all the capitalist countries and of the oppressed nations to make peaceful coexistence their general line, was Soviet Russia not aiming at replacing the revolutionary line of the Communist Parties with its policy of "peaceful coexistence" and willfully applying that policy to the relations between oppressed and oppressor classes and between oppressed and oppressor nations?

One more objection of China with the leaders of the CPSU was: Since the peoples won victory in their revolutions by relying primarily on their own struggles, how could such victory be attributed to peaceful coexistence or described as its outcome? Did not such allegations of USSR's mean the subordination of the revolutionary struggles of the peoples to its policy of peaceful coexistence?

China wanted to ask the leaders of the CPSU: Economic successes in socialist countries and the victories they score in economic competition with capitalist countries undoubtedly played an exemplary role and were an inspiration to oppressed peoples and nations. But how could it be said that socialism would triumph on a worldwide scale through peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition instead of through the revolutionary struggles of the peoples?

The leaders of the CPSU advertised reliance on peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition as being enough to “deliver a crushing blow to the entire system of capitalist relationships” and brought about worldwide peaceful transition to socialism. This was equivalent to saying that the oppressed peoples and nations had no need to wage struggles, make revolution and overthrow the reactionary rule of imperialism and colonialism and their lackeys, and that they should just wait quietly—until the production levels and living standards of the Soviet Union outstrip those of the most developed capitalist countries, when the oppressed and exploited slaves throughout the world would be able to enter communism together with their oppressors and exploiters. This was an attempt on the part of the leaders of the CPSU to substitute what they call peaceful coexistence for the revolutionary struggles of the peoples and to liquidate such struggles?

An analysis of these three questions makes it clear that Chinese difference with the leaders of the CPSU was a major difference of principle. In essence it boils down to this. Its policy of peaceful co-existence was based on Lenin's theory and was also based on the principle of proletarian internationalism. It contributed to the cause of opposing

imperialism and defending world peace and accords with the interests of the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations. The world over; whereas the so-called general line of peaceful coexistence pursued by the leaders of the CPSU was anti-Leninist, it abandoned the principle of proletarian internationalism, damaged the cause of opposing imperialism and defending world peace, and run counter to the interests of the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations.

Refutation of the Parliamentary Road:

The idea of the “parliamentary road” which was publicized by the revisionists of the Second International was thoroughly refuted by Lenin and discredited long ago. But in Khrushchev’s eyes, the parliamentary road seemed suddenly to have acquired validity after World War II.

But it was not true but also an ignorance of reality. Events since World War II have demonstrated yet again that the chief component of the bourgeois state machine was armed force and not parliament. Parliament was only an ornament and a screen for bourgeois rule. To adopt or discard the parliamentary system, to grant parliament greater or less power, to adopt one kind of electoral law or another—the choice between these alternatives was always dictated by the needs and interests of bourgeois rule. So long as the bourgeoisie controls the military-bureaucratic apparatus, either the acquisition of a “stable majority in parliament” by the proletariat through elections was impossible, or this “stable majority” was undependable. To realize socialism through the “parliamentary road” was utterly impossible and was mere deceptive talk.

About half the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries were still illegal. Since these Parties had no legal status, the winning of a parliamentary majority was, of course, out of the question. For example, the Communist Party of Spain lived under White terror and had no opportunity to run in elections. It was pathetic and tragic that Spanish

Communist leaders like Ibarri should follow Khrushchev in advocating “peaceful transition” in Spain.

With all the unfair restrictions imposed by bourgeois electoral laws in those capitalist countries where Communist Parties were legal and could take part in elections, it was very difficult for them to win a majority of the votes under bourgeois rule. And even if they get a majority of the votes, the bourgeoisie could prevent them from obtaining a majority of the seats in parliament by revising the electoral laws or by other means.

For example, since the World War II, the French monopoly capitalists had twice revised the electoral law, in each case bringing about a sharp fall in the parliamentary seats held by the Communist Party of France. In the parliamentary election in 1946, the CPF gained 182 seats. But in the election of 1951, the revision of the electoral law by the monopoly capitalists resulted in a sharp reduction in the number of CPF seats to 103, there was a loss of 79 seats. In the 1956 election, the CPF gained 150 seats. But before the parliamentary election in 1958, the monopoly capitalists again revised the electoral law with the result that the number of seats held by the CPF fell very drastically to 10, that was, it lost 140 seats.

Even if in certain circumstances a Communist Party should win a majority of the seats in parliament or participate in the government as a result of an electoral victory, it would not change the bourgeois nature of parliament or government, still less would it mean the smashing of the old and the establishment of a new state machine. It was absolutely impossible to bring about a fundamental social change by relying on bourgeois parliaments or governments. With the state machine under its control the reactionary bourgeoisie could nullify elections, dissolve parliament, expel Communists from the government, outlaw the Communist Party and resort to brute force to suppress the masses and the progressive forces.

For instance, in 1946 the Communist Party of Chile supported the bourgeois Radical Party in winning an electoral victory, and a coalition government was formed with the participation of Communists. At the time, the leaders of the Chilean Communist Party went so far as to describe this bourgeois-controlled government as a “people’s democratic government”. But in less than a year the bourgeoisie compelled them to quit the government, carried out mass arrests of Communists and in 1948 outlawed the Communist Party.

When a workers’ party degenerates and becomes a hireling of the bourgeoisie, the latter may permit it to have a majority in parliament and to form a government. This was the case with the bourgeois social democratic parties in certain countries. But this sort of thing only serves to safeguard and consolidate the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; it does not, and cannot, in the least alter the position of the proletariat as an oppressed and exploited class. Such facts only add testimony to the bankruptcy of the parliamentary road.

Events since World War II had also shown that if Communist leaders believed in the parliamentary road and fall victim to the incurable disease of “parliamentary cretinism”, they would not only get nowhere but would inevitably sink into the quagmire of revisionism and ruin the revolutionary cause of the proletariat.

There had always been a fundamental difference between Marxist-Leninists on the one hand and opportunists and revisionists on the other on the proper attitude to adopt towards bourgeois parliaments. Marxist-Leninists had always held that under certain conditions the proletarian party should take part in parliamentary struggle and utilize the platform of parliament for exposing the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie, educating the masses and helping to accumulate revolutionary strength. It is wrong to refuse to utilize this legal form of struggle when necessary. China suggested that proletarian party might never substitute parliamentary struggle for proletarian revolution or entertain the illusion that the transition to socialism could be achieved through the parliamentary road. It must at all times concentrate on mass struggles.

Lenin said that the party of the revolutionary proletariat might take part in bourgeois parliamentarism in order to enlighten the masses, which could be done during elections and in the struggle between parties in parliament. But to limit the class struggle to the parliamentary struggle, or to regard the latter as the highest and decisive form, to which all the other forms of struggle were subordinate, means actually deserting to the side of the bourgeoisie and going against the proletariat.

Apart from these, China rejected examples given by Khrushchev in the support of theory - 'Peaceful Transition'.

1. The leaders of the CPSU argued: Did Marx not "admits such a possibility (peaceful transition) for England and America"? It is true that in the 1870's Marx said that in countries like the United States and Britain "the workers can reach their goal by peaceful means". But it was not a common perception about revolution. There were some conditions for it. Firstly, Marx regarded this possibility as an exception even then. Secondly, in those days monopoly capitalism, i.e., imperialism, did not yet exist. Thirdly, in England and America there was no military then-as there was then-serving as the chief apparatus of the Bourgeois state machine.
2. Shutting their eyes to all the facts, leaders of CPSU stated, "In Hungary in 1919, the dictatorship of the proletariat was established by peaceful means ". It was glaring lie. To know realities we should see what Bela kun , the leader of Hungarian revolution, had to say .The communist party of Hungary gave slogan for socialist revolution: " Disarm the Bourgeoisie, arm the proletariat , establish Soviet power"(Kun 1960). Karolyi, the head of the Hungarian Bourgeois government at the time was quite explicit on peaceful transition. He declared that he signed a proclamation concerning his own resignation and the transfer of power to the proletariat, which in reality had already taken over and proclaimed power earlier. I did not hand over power to the proletariat, as it had already won it earlier, thanks to its planned creation of a Socialist army.

For this reason, Bela Kun pointed out that to say the bourgeoisie voluntarily handed political power over to the proletariat was a deceptive “legend” (Kun 1960).

3. Furthermore, they alleged that the working class of Czechoslovakia won “power by the peaceful road”. This is another absurd distortion of history. The Peoples’ democratic power in Czechoslovakia was established in the course of the anti-fascist war; it was not taken from the bourgeoisie “peacefully”. So in February, 1948 the reactionary inside Czechoslovakia, backed by USA imperialism, plotted a counter-revolutionary coup to overthrow the peoples’ government by an armed rebellion but the government led by the communist party immediately took action against it and counterrevolution failed. These facts clearly testified that the February event was not a “peaceful” seizure of political power by the working class from the bourgeoisie but a suppression of a counter-revolutionary bourgeois coup d’etat by the working class through its own state apparatus, and mainly through its own armed forces.

Peaceful Transition & Imperialist Forces:

With regard to the appraisal of the changes in historical conditions since World War II and the conclusions to be drawn from them, Marxist-Leninists hold entirely different views from those of Khrushchev. Marxist-Leninists held that historical conditions had changed fundamentally since the War. The change was mainly manifested in the great increase in the forces of proletarian socialism and the great weakening of the forces of imperialism. Since the War, the mighty socialist camp and a whole series of new and independent nationalist states had emerged, and there had occurred a continuous succession of armed revolutionary struggles, a new upsurge in the mass movements in capitalist countries and the great expansion of the ranks of the international communist movement. The international proletarian socialist revolutionary movement and the national democratic revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America had become the two major historical trends of that time.

In the early post-war period, Comrade Mao Tse-Tung repeatedly pointed out that the world balance of forces was favourable to them and not to the enemy, and that that new situation “has opened up still wider possibilities for the emancipation of the working class and the oppressed peoples of the world and has opened up still more realistic paths towards it” (Mao 1961).

Marxist-Leninists based themselves on the fact that the changes in post-war conditions had become increasingly favourable for revolution and on the law that imperialism and reaction would never change their nature. Therefore they draw the conclusion that revolution must be promoted, and they held that full use must be made of then very favourable situation and that in the light of the specific conditions in different countries the development of revolutionary struggles might be actively promoted and preparations must be made to seize victory in the revolution.

On the other hand, using the pretext of these very changes in post-war conditions, Khrushchev drew the conclusion that revolution might be opposed and repudiated, and he held that as a result of the changes in the world balance of forces imperialism and reaction had changed their nature, the law of class struggle had changed, and the common road of the October Revolution and the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution had become outmoded.

Khrushchev and his like were spreading a daylight dream tale. They maintained that then favourable international and internal conditions were taking shape for the working class of a number of capitalist countries to accomplish the socialist revolution in peaceful form. They said that “basic shifts in favour of socialism in the relationship of forces in the international arena” now created the possibility of “paralysing the intervention of international reaction in the affairs of countries carrying out revolution” (Beliakov & Burlatsky 1960), and that “this lessens the possibilities for the unleashing of civil war by the bourgeoisie” (Butenko 1961).

But it was not reality and Khrushchev was telling a lie or ignoring the truth.

Two outstanding facts since World War II were that the imperialists and the reactionaries were everywhere reinforcing, their apparatus of violence for cruelly suppressing the masses and that imperialism headed by the United States was conducting counter-revolutionary armed intervention in all parts of the world.

Then, the United States of America had become more militarized than ever and had increased its troops to over 2,700,000 men, or eleven times the 1934 total and nine times the 1939 total. It had so many police and secret service organizations that even some of the big U.S. capitalists had to admit that it tops the world in that respect, having far surpassed Hitlerite Germany.

Britain's standing army increased from over 250,000 men in 1934 to over 420,000 in 1963, and its police force from 67,000 in 1934 to 87,000 in 1963. France's standing army increased from 650,000 in 1934 to over 740,000 in 1963, and its police and security forces from 80,000 in 1934 to 120,000 in 1963. Other imperialist countries and even the ordinary run of capitalist countries were no exceptions to this large-scale strengthening of the armed forces and police.

Khrushchev was jealously using the slogan of general and complete disarmament to immobilize the people. He had been chanting it for many years then. But in actual fact there was not even a shadow of general and complete disarmament. Everywhere in the imperialist camp headed by the United States one found a general and complete arms drive and an expansion and strengthening of the apparatus of violent suppression.

The question was, why were the bourgeoisie so frenziedly reinforcing their armed forces and police in peace time? Could it be that their purpose was not to suppress the mass movements of the working people but rather to guarantee that the latter could win state power by peaceful means? Had the ruling bourgeoisie not committed enough

atrocities in the nineteen years since the War in employing soldiers and policemen to suppress striking workers and people struggling for their democratic rights?

In the past nineteen years, U.S. imperialism had organised military blocs and concluded military treaties with more than forty countries. It had set up over 2,200 military bases and installations in all parts of the capitalist world. Its Armed Forces stationed abroad exceed 1,000,000. Its "Strike Command" directed a mobile land and air force, ready at all times to be sent anywhere to suppress the people's revolution. And also in the same past nineteen years, the U.S. and other imperialists had not only given every support to the reactionaries of various countries and helped them to suppress the peoples' revolutionary movements; they had also directly planned and executed numerous counter-revolutionary armed aggressions and interventions, *i.e.*, they had exported counter-revolution. U.S. imperialism, for instance, helped Chiang Kai-shek fight the civil war in China, sent its own troops to Greece and commanded the attack on the Greece people's liberated areas, unleashed the war of aggression in Korea, landed troops in Lebanon to threaten the revolution in Iraq, aided and abetted the Laotian reactionaries in extending civil war, organised and directed a so-called United Nations force to suppress the national independence movement in the Congo, and conducted counter-revolutionary invasions of Cuba. It was still fighting to suppress the liberation struggle of the people of southern Viet Nam. Recently it had used armed force to suppress the just struggle of the Panamanian people in defence of their sovereignty and participated in the armed intervention in Cyprus.

Not only did U.S. imperialism took determined action to suppress and intervene in all people's revolutions and national liberation movements, but it also tried to get rid of bourgeois regimes which showed some nationalist colouration. During these nineteen years, the U.S. Government has engineered numerous counter-revolutionary military coups d'etat in a number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It has even then used violence to remove puppets of its own fostering, such as Ngo Dinh Diem, once they

had ceased to suit its purposes – kill the donkey as soon as you take it from the millstone, as the saying goes.

Facts had demonstrated that during those days in order to make revolutions and achieve liberation all oppressed peoples and nations not only had to cope with violent suppression by the domestic reactionary ruling classes, but had to prepare themselves fully against armed intervention by the opponents and especially the U.S. Without such preparation and without steadfastly rebuffing counter-revolutionary violence by revolutionary violence whenever necessary, revolution, let alone victory, was out of the question.

Without strengthening their armed forces, without preparing to meet imperialist armed aggression and intervention and without adhering to the policy of waging struggles against imperialism, countries which had won independence would not be able to safeguard their national independence and still then less to ensure the advance of the revolutionary cause.

Chapter-5

Conclusion

These ideological disputes could not be settled during Khrushchev period and continued more worsen further. Ultimately, these disputes not only weakened USSR –China relations, but also affected the international communist movement. It had its impact on the collapse of USSR in December, 1991. There were some individual factors responsible for these disputes. Khrushchev was concerned about peace and fearful of nuclear weapons. Khrushchev had argued that even a tiny spark could cause a world conflagration and that World War might necessarily be a thermo-nuclear war, which meant the annihilation of mankind. Therefore, Khrushchev had firmly argued that local wars in that time were very dangerous. So, he would work hard to put out the sparks that might set off the flames of war.

Khrushchev was so fearful to the possibility of nuclear war that he decided to visit USA in 1959. It was unprecedented event in the history of Soviet Russia and for socialist camp as well. Khrushchev was the first general secretary of CPSU who visited the USA to lessen the tension. But result did not meet to the expectations of Khrushchev. Cuban crisis could be seen as major threat to the world peace. The USA was all set to begin a war with the USSR. But Khrushchev made a treaty on the behalf of Cuba. Khrushchev did not try to take into account Cuba's view about this informal treaty and this was just like overpowering sovereignty of Cuba. This informal treaty shows Khrushchev's realization of ground situation. Mao strongly believed that 'power comes through the barrel of guns'. Mao was totally against Khrushchev's step in Cuban crisis.

Apart from these personality factors, there were some vital issues responsible for the ideological disputes between USSR and China. Beginning with the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev put forward the road of "peaceful transition" (transition to

socialism by the parliamentary road), which was taken by China as opposed to the October revolution. Capitalistic countries always used different tactics to prevent the socialist forces to come in power. They made unusual electoral provisions or anomalies in the election process to prevent the socialist forces as it has happened in the countries like, Spain, France and Chile.

We had seen that Communist Party of Spain lived under White terror and had no opportunity to run in elections. It was pathetic and tragic that Spanish Communist leaders like Ibaruri should follow Khrushchev in advocating “peaceful transition” in Spain. Since World War II, the French monopoly capitalists had twice revised the electoral law, in each case bringing about a sharp fall in the parliamentary seats held by the Communist Party of France. In the parliamentary election in 1946, the CPF gained 182 seats. But in the election of 1951, the revision of the electoral law by the monopoly capitalists resulted in a sharp reduction in the number of CPF seats to 103 that were; there was a loss of 79 seats. In the 1956 election, the CPF gained 150 seats. But before the parliamentary election in 1958, the monopoly capitalists again revised the electoral law with the result that the number of seats held by the CPF fell very drastically to 10, that was, it lost 140 seats.

In 1946 the Communist Party of Chile supported the bourgeois Radical Party in winning an electoral victory, and a coalition government was formed with the participation of Communists. At the time, the leaders of the Chilean Communist Party went so far as to describe this bourgeois-controlled government as a “people’s democratic government”. But in less than a year the bourgeoisie compelled them to quit the government, carried out mass arrests of Communists and in 1948 outlawed the Communist Party.

“State of the whole people” and “party of the entire people” were two new theories propounded by Khrushchev, which caused ideological disputes between both

countries. Khrushchev argued that Russia had entered in a new stage of socialist state which had no need of “dictatorship of the proletariat”. There was no class distinction in his state, so state would work in the interest of all people. It was straight betrayal of basic principle of Marxism-Leninism. State for all people means there is no class division which exists only after the end of state. Then there is no need of state, which is known as classless and stateless society. So, “whole people” and “state” both are contradictory concepts. In the same way “party” and “entire people” were also a contradictory concept and were modification of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

According to the revisionist Khrushchev clique, the Communist Party should become a “party of the entire people” because its membership consisted of workers, peasants and intellectuals and all nationalities and peoples. It means that before the idea of the “party of the entire people” put forward at its 22nd Congress, none of the members of the CPSU came from classes other than the working class and people of other nationalities. But this was not . If the character of a party was determined by the social background of its membership, then the numerous political parties in the world whose members also come from various classes, nationalities and peoples should be called as “parties of the entire people”. But this theory was confined to USSR only. Further, Khrushchev said that the method used in CPSU activities were democratic. But from its outset, a Communist Party was built on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism and should always adopt the mass line and the democratic method of persuasion and education in working among the people. Thus, it implies that a Communist Party was a “party of the entire people” from the beginning.

On the issue of Yugoslavia and Albania, Khrushchev also differs from Chinese leadership. Yugoslavia was a revisionist country and hence it was expelled from international movement in 1948. But Khrushchev always tried to make a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia under the leadership of Tito. He also violated the 1960’s statement of fraternal parties which had decided to boycott revisionist Yugoslavia. But Khrushchev considered Belgrade as his Mecca, saying again and again that he would

learn from the Tito clique's experience and declaring that he and the Tito clique "belong to one and same idea and are guided by the same theory".

He regarded Albania, a fraternal socialist country, as his sworn enemy, devising every possible means to injure and undermine it in one gulp. At the 22nd Congress of CPSU in October 1961, Khrushchev made public attacks on the Albanian Party of Labour. In his address at that Congress, the head of the Chinese Communist Party delegation, comrade Chou En-Lai took objection to that action by the leader of the CPSU, pointing out that it could not be regarded as representing a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. But Khrushchev declared that he was absolutely correct and was taking the only correct and genuinely Marxist-Leninist position principle in starting the discussion. He brazenly broke off all economic and diplomatic relations with Albania, arbitrarily deprived it of its legitimate rights as a member of mutual economic assistance, and publically called for the overthrow of its party and state leadership.

One major China's objection with USSR was that Khrushchev never gave equal importance to other communist parties and he made his own party superior over other fraternal parties. The 1957 Declaration and the 1960 statement clearly state that all communist parties were independent and equal. According to this principle, relations among fraternal parties should under no circumstances be like the relations between a leading party and the led, much less like the relations between a patriarchal father and his son. China always opposed any one party commanding other fraternal party, and it has never occurred that they themselves should command other fraternal parties. Chinese criticism of the leadership of the CPSU concerned its attempts to lord it over fraternal parties and to impose its line of revisionism and splittism on them. China's desire was merely the independent and equal status of the fraternal parties stipulated in the Declaration and the statement and their unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

In retrospect, I would like to submit that had Khrushchev followed the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement to strengthen international communist movement, the split with China would have been avoided. Because, in communist ideology each parties have equal right and decision is taken unanimously on behalf of socialist bloc.

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