

FOREIGN POLICY OF UZBEKISTAN, 1991-2007

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DECLARATION

I declare that the Dissertation entitled “**Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan, 1991-2007**” submitted by me in the partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University** is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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TO MY PARENTS

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PREFACE

The sudden and unexpected demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991 gave birth to new five independent sovereign states in Central Asia. Uzbekistan is one of the five sovereign entities. These newly independent countries of Central Asia were unfamiliar to international politics. The most important priority of these Central Asian states was to become a member of international community and to play a significant role in international politics. Both Russian Tsars and Soviet regime confirmed Uzbekistan's place in Central Asia. The Russian elevated Tashkent to their military and administrative centre soon after conquered it in 1865. It was still the seat of Russia's military presence in Central Asia when the USSR disintegrated in 1991. It indicates that Uzbekistan is so much important for the stability and prosperity of the region. Therefore, the study of Uzbek foreign policy is vital and very challenging.

Foreign policy of Uzbekistan has always been a mixture of nationalism and pragmatism. In fact various factors have influenced the Uzbek foreign policy. The geo-political location of Uzbekistan determines its foreign policy to a considerable extent. Several other factors like nature of political system, influence of Islamic challenges, the leadership and ruling elite, external pressure for economic reforms are also influencing the Uzbek foreign policy.

Uzbekistan has highly concentrated on strengthening relations with Asian and European states. Undoubtedly, priorities lie in its link with Russia because Russia is a vast market

for Uzbek goods and important source of technologies. Uzbekistan as well as Russia was very anxious about Islamic extremism. This common factor made these two countries a natural ally. But the relationships between these two countries were not that congenial during early phase of their independence. Uzbekistan was very much supportive to US policies in Central Asia and West Asia. This was particularly evident in two areas, the US relations to Iran, Iraq and Israel and expansion of NATO membership to incorporate the former Soviet states. Since the early 1990s China has expanded its trade investment, and security ties with Uzbekistan. In the perspective of “New great game” and smooth functioning of SCO, China is important for Uzbekistan. Turkey and Iran are the other major power of the region. The roles played by these two countries in Uzbekistan foreign policy are more limited in scope than had initially anticipated.

A major shift took place in Uzbek foreign policy after Andijan incident which occurred on May 13, 2005. During the events, Uzbek Government suppressed the rebellion in the city. United States and European Union criticized the Uzbek government and demanded for an independent investigation of the incident. Since then Us-Uzbek relations got deteriorated. After the Andijan incident Uzbekistan gave an ultimatum of 180 days to vacate the Karshi-Khanabad airbase. United States withdrew its troops from the Airbase within given time period.

On November 14, 2005, Former Russian president Vladimir Putin and Uzbek president Islam Karimov agreed to sign mutual security pact. The agreement called “treaty on Allied Relations”. The treaty has shifted the foreign policy of Uzbekistan. Therefore, Russia has a singular advantage in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s geographical proximity to

Russia and the past Soviet-era economic ties make the relationship between the two states a natural phenomenon. While the United States remains the pre-eminent geopolitical power at present, it is not possible for the United States to involve itself in Uzbekistan in any serious matter.

This research work consists of five chapters including conclusion. While discussing **introductory chapter**, it examines the conceptual framework and basic determinants of foreign policy.

The second chapter, titled, **Basic determinants of foreign policy**, deals about the various determinants of Uzbek foreign policy. Geography including location of Uzbekistan, nature of political system, economic condition of the country, leadership and influence of Islam are the basic determinants of Uzbek foreign policy.

Third chapter, titled, **Uzbekistan's relations with the other countries of the world**, examines the Uzbekistan's relations with major countries of the world like- Russia, USA, China, European Union, Turkey, Iran and Central Asian Countries.

Fourth chapter, titled, **Challenges of the foreign policy of Uzbekistan**, examines the major challenges of Uzbek foreign policy. Democratic and economic reforms, Islamic extremism, drug trafficking, poor human rights record and border dispute are major challenge of Uzbek foreign policy.

Finally the **conclusion**, it is based on findings of previous chapters and general understanding of Uzbek foreign policy.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CENTRAZBAT: - Central Asian Battalion.

CIS: - Commonwealth of Independent States.

CSTO: - Collective Security Treaty Organization.

EC: - European Community

ECO: - Economic community organization.

EU: - European Union.

FSU: - Former Soviet Union.

HT: - Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

IMF: - International Monetary Fund.

IMU: - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

ITU: - Islamic Movement of Turkestan.

NATO: - North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

OSCE: - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

PDPU: - Peoples Democratic Party of Uzbekistan.

PFP: - Partnership for Peace programme

SCO: - Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

UNO: - United Nations Organization.

UNSC: - United Nations Security Council.

USSR: - Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.

WB: - World Bank.

WMD: - Weapons of mass destruction.

WTC: - World Trade Centre

WTO: - World Trade Organization.

Chapter-1

INTRODUCTION: Conceptual Framework

The foreign policy of a country depends upon the goal of a country in establishing relations with other countries of the world. The formation of goal provides a sense of purpose and direction to foreign policy. Foreign policy is essentially the task of devising strategies that utilized nation- states capabilities to achieve the goals its leader set. (Bandyopadhyaya) J 1980:01).¹

By policy we mean a continuous process of decision and its implementation takes place within the organizational structure of the state. 'Policies are not simply any decision. They consist only those structures, detailed action and form a frame work that are needed for decision taken by an organizational hierarchy.

They involve an exchange of information both within state agencies and between a variety of external interest groups, and are directed at ensuring a higher probability of desired set of outcomes in future

Now the question arises what is foreign policy? In the word of 'Joseph Frankel, foreign policy is all about decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others.

Foreign policy is a study of the management of external relations and activities of Nations- states, as distinguished from their domestic policies (Brown Chris 2001: 75)². Foreign policy involves goals, Strategies, measures, methods, guidelines, directives, understanding and arrangements etc. by which national government conduct international relations with other countries of the world and with international organization and non-governmental actors. It is their attempt and effort to influence

the goal and activities of such actors, whom they cannot completely control because they exist and operate beyond their Sovereignty (Corlshaes 2002: 335)³.

The goal of foreign policy should be clearly definable and divisible into some concrete and specific components, without this it is impossible to formulate the goal oriented clear policies. Once the broad and long term goal has been decided upon, it is the task of the makers of the Foreign policy to test the rationality of every short term objectives in the light of this goal and to choose out of the alternatives means available at any given moment. That means or set of means which will logically lead to the most efficient realization of the rational short term objective and these and long term goal. (Bandyopadhyaya J, 1980: 01)⁴

Foreign policy consists of aim and measures that are intended to guide government decision with regard to external affairs, particularly relation with foreign countries. Government officials in leading positions such as President, Prime minister, Foreign minister, defense minister, finance minister etc, with their closest advisers are usually the key policy makers.

Policy making involves a means-end way of thinking about goals and actions of government. It is an instrumental concept: what is the problem or goals and what solution or approaches are available to address them? Instrumental analysis involves thinking of the best available choice or course, e.g. going connect advice to make thing happen according to one's requirement or wishes. It can be integral element of studying foreign policy, where foreign policy analysts seek to provide knowledge that is of some relevance to the policy makers. It involves Calculating the measures and methods that will most likely enable one to reach a goal, and cost and benefits of different available options. At that point policy analysis becomes not only

instrumental but also prescriptive. It recommends what will best enable a government to solve its Foreign policy problems.

The long term goal can be cumulative result of series of short term objectives, unless the latter are consistent with the long term goal and the means for their efficient realizations are rationally chosen. The actual long term result of foreign policy may diverge from set goal. For the achievement of the ultimate goal it is not necessary that means selected should be single unique one or static one. Different alternative mean may be chosen but there must be highest probability of their efficiency in achieving the given objective. (Ibid)⁵

Foreign policy and Decision making:-

The decision making in Foreign policy doesn't mean the formulation of a 'grand design' by a few individual in term of their personal wisdom and their perception in the global environment; involving the interplay of a wide variety of basic determinants, political institutions. Organizational pulls and pressure of bureaucratic political nature and the personalities of the decision makers such basic determinants as geography economic developments, political tradition, the international media, the domestic factors, military strength and national character, constitute the boundary condition of decision making which no rational decision makers can ignore (Ibid:9)⁶. Political institution such as public opinion, Party organizations, pressure groups, parliament and the cabinet must similarly be regarded as major parameter of the decision making system. The organization and structure of foreign office, its problem of coordination with other ministers and branches of the government and the personal political pulls and pressure are inevitable in a modern state.

Finally, the personalities of the ultimate decision makers, their ideological predilections, psychological propensities and above all, their need for personal political survival and growth, inevitably condition the final choice of ends and means. In term of system theory, the decision making system may be regarded as one which converts certain information inputs into policy outputs. Information regarding the basic determinants and the demand and support generated by the political institutions go into the decisional unit, which functions according to its own behavioral laws and its output is foreign policy. The result is that the actual foreign policy of a modern state, particularly a democratic state, depends upon various pulls and pressure, environmental contingencies and situational compulsions rather than the result of personal wisdom or a long term strategy fixed one for all. Under such constraints and compulsions both the ends and the means tend to be always in a state of flux. The decision makers have to define constantly of given situation, which in turns tend to overlap with the past and the future situation in the same field. Then the choice of alternatives with regard to ends and means is not absolute choice, but is limited and beyond the control of those who actually formulate Foreign policy. (Kelman C H,1977:167)⁷

Foreign policy and National interest

It is generally recognized that the states in international relations are guided or ought to be guided by the concept of permanent and universal goal, namely that of 'national interests'. Realists as well as idealist both are agreed on the point. However, there are wide disagreements between them regarding the content of the national interests. The concept of national interest as a goal of foreign policy is universal and

static but the actual national interests of any particular state are both specific and dynamic in the theory of international relations.

There are two school of thought regarding foreign policy-(1) Realist and (2) Idealist. On the one side, the extreme realists equates the national interest with national power. They define national power in terms of material strength, particularly military strength and capability of a nation. On the other hand the extreme idealist (or utopians) who associates national interest with aspiration of human kind, such as eternal peace or human brotherhood. Idealists are very much agreeing to sacrifice the material power of the nation for moral values. Between these two types of thoughts various moderate realists and idealists formulate their theories. Some of them are very much willing to combine material interest and power of state in broader and more general and universal objectives, depending upon their realist or idealist bias.

In a democratic country and democratic form of politics and government, the foreign policy of government like other decisions are tested in the light of public opinion, influenced by pressure groups, examined and criticized by the political parties and the press, filtered through parliament, moulded and shaped by the foreign minister and finally approved by the cabinet. (Bandopadhyaya J; 1980:10).⁸

It is therefore, expected that the ultimate determination of the national interest by the government is based on broad consensus generated by the democratic decision – making and, therefore, on the whole rational. (Ibid)⁹

There is not any unanimous view about the component of national interest among the scholars of International relations.

Now the question arises, what are the essential components of national interest? The minimum essential components of the national interests are security, national development, and world order. Security is the first guarantee of state's

international personality. National development is its categorical imperatives. Structure of international system (as Kenneth Waltz said in his theory) is minimum precondition for the independent existence for development, just as a civil society is minimum precondition for the independent existence and free development of an individual.

An important question arises here that, hence the important element of national interest is security, but security of what?

The most popular answer is that security means preservation of territorial integrity of the state. But this answer is not sufficient. We can see in history that various countries have lost their sovereignty without loss of their territory e.g. East European states surrender their sovereignty to considerable extent to Soviet Union. Similarly loss of some territory may be partial loss of sovereignty e.g. India lost some territory to China without loss of sovereignty. (ibid)¹⁰

“Neither territorial integrity without full sovereignty nor sovereignty with as full territorial integrity can be considered to be true security.” (ibid: 10).¹¹

External & Internal Security:

Another problem related to the foreign policy of a state is that of external security which is closely interlinked with its internal security. This is almost a truism, but difficulty arises because there are two different senses in which the term “internal security” is generally used. Firstly internal security is understood as stability and permanence of particular constitution or a particular government or from of government.

Secondly, by internal security mean, to the stability, viability and permanence of the state itself as an international personality which is to be defended against

violently anarchical or disorderly forces which threaten its existence directly from within or outside (made so weak) that can be defeated easily by external aggression.

From the point of view of International relations as a discipline, the first definition cannot be considered valid because this discipline (I.R.) is concerned with the stability of a particular government or form of government within a state. A state sometimes emerges stable and stronger as an international actor after some kind of incident, E.g. France after 1789 Revolution and Russia after 1917 Revolution. (Ibid:11).¹²

Generally it has been understood that investment of governments in defence sector increase the security of states. But heavy investment may lead to a shortfall in industrial and agricultural production. Hyperinflations which are not very healthy for any state or even defense sector itself. It may be threatened to internal security as well. So states may devote their resources primarily to the development, this is likely to generate high morale among the armed forces and the people is general. Although making available minimum investment in defense is also necessary. This is a more long term and durable form of security.

Many states in history tried to safeguard their security by influencing their international environment. The imperialist power of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century often justified their aggressive actions in terms of security. Then bigger states regarded smaller states on their border as vital to their security thus, Poland has always been regarded as an internal part of their security system by Germany and Russia. (Ibid P: 12)¹³.

After the Second World War a new type of security system came into existence. The two superpowers, USA and Soviet Union had developed military alliances in form of NATO and Warsaw Pact. Security is one of the important factors

that have led to the establishments of international law and International organization like League of Nations and United nations.

Foreign policy and National development

The relation between Foreign policy and national development is two fold in the form.

(1). for the case of developing country, their capability and volume of foreign trade, ability to help other states, investment in international affairs would be a low order.

Even their dependence upon other states would be in large scale. For the case of developed countries, all these elements of foreign policy would be much greater than developing countries. Developed countries would naturally be in dominant position in all these respect.

(2). National development is influenced by foreign policy. Development of developing states is highly affected by foreign policy. States such as Uzbekistan belonging to developing country position to make the maximum use of foreign policy for purposes of national development, with specially regard to defense and security, foreign direct investment and economic interests. In the case of developed states, since they have no major problem of development, the influence of foreign policy on their national development as such would logically be minimal. However, their mutual competition may give impetus to their technological and economic progress, and their foreign policy may also affect their security.

Commitment to a world order is thus a necessary precondition for the independent existence and free development of the state just as commitment to an organized civil society is an essential precondition for the independent existence and free development of the individual. Logically, the existence and progress of the world order would be conducive to the security and national development of a state and, hence, also an integral part of in national interest (Doctor H A, 1969).¹⁴

Approaches to foreign policy analysis

Foreign policy Analysis involves scrutinizing foreign policies and placing them in a broader context of academic knowledge. The academic context is usually defined by the theories and approaches.

The relationship between theory and policy is complex, because any one theory does not necessarily lead to any one clear policy option. In most cases there will be several different options. Even so, the choice of theory affects the choice of policy. This is partly because different theories emphasize different social values. Realist underline the value of national security, national military power and power balancing is the major way to achieving national security as Morgenthau have written in 'Politics among Nations'. On the other hand, Idealists emphasize that value of order and justice, freedom and democracies will support international cooperation based on international institutions. Foreign policy theorist concerned with defense and security issues are likely to take a realist approach. Emphasizing the inevitable clash of interest between state actors, the outcomes of which are to be determines by relative state power. On the other hand, those concerned with multilateral are just as likely to take liberal approach, emphasizing international institutions – such as United Nations or the World Trade Organization - as means of reducing international conflict and promoting understanding and common interests.

There are various approaches for foreign policy analysis. Some approaches are derived from International relations theories. Some are adapted from other disciplines such as economics and social psychology policy. Analysis approaches are evident not only in academic scholarship but also in advocacy think tanks and the analysis of exports associated with item.

There are various approaches of foreign policy which are given below-

(1) A Traditional approaches to Foreign policy:-

This approach of foreign policy analysis involves being informed about a government's external policies, knowing their history or at least their back ground, comprehending the interests and concerns that drive the policies and thinking through the various ways of addressing and defending those interests and concern. That includes knowing the consequences of past foreign policy decisions and actions. It also involves an ability to recognize the circumstances under which a government must operate in carrying out its foreign policy. The traditional approach involves the exercise of judgment and common sense in assessing the best practical mean and course of action available for carrying out foreign policies. In short, traditional foreign policy is a matter of gaining insight into the activity of foreign policy makers, either form experience or by careful scrutiny of past and present foreign policy.

Foreign policy analysis was traditionally the domain of diplomatic historians and public commentators. The subject still exists, although it now has many rivals. It was rooted in the state system and statecraft of modern Europe as which emerged and acquired its classic characteristics, during the period of late seventeenth and early twentieth centuries. There were several distinctive feature of traditional foreign policy. It was seen as a different sphere from domestic policies and activities of sovereign states. It was the realm of high politics how it is known as a national interest. It was guided by leading state officials (Carlsnaes, 2002)¹⁵

The main profounder of the traditional approach of foreign policy are Machiavelli and Grotious at an early period and George Kennan and Henry Kissinger at the modern period. The approach continues to appeal to historically minded international society

scholars and classical realists, because it gets into the detailed substance of Foreign policy.

(2). The comparative approach to Foreign policy:-

It was highly inspired by behaviouralist turn in political science. The ambition was to make some concrete solid and systematic theories and explanation of the foreign policy process in general. It was theoretically informed by James Rosenau's (1886) 'Pre- Theory' of foreign policy. Rosenau identified large number of relevant sources of foreign policy decision and grounded them into five Categories which be called idiosyncratic, role, governmental societal and systematic variable.

Rosenau proposed a ranking of the relative importance of variables of foreign policy, depending on the issue at hand and on the attributes of the states (e.g. size, political accountability, level of democracy etc). A large of empirical studies of foreign policy employed Rosenau's scheme, but pre theory never emerged as a clear explanation of foreign policy it remained a classification scheme.(Ibid)¹⁶

(3). The bureaucratic structure and process approach:-

This approach focuses on the organizational contest of decision making which is seen to be conditioned by the dictates and demands of the bureaucratic setting in which decision are made. Analyzing processes and channels whereby organizations arrive at their policies is seen to be a superior way to acquire empirical knowledge of Foreign policy. The strength of bureaucratic politics approach is its empiricism. This approach seeks to find out not only what happened by it happened the way it did.

(4) Cognitive model and psychology:-

This approach also focuses on the individual decision maker with particular attention to the psychological aspects of decision making. Robert Jenis has studied

misperception. Why do actors misperceive the intentions and action of others? Another example in this category is the work of Margret Herman. She studied the personality characteristics of 54 head of government, making the claim such factors as the leaders experience in foreign affairs, their political styles. Their political socialization and broader views of the world that help in order understand the ways in which leaders conduct foreign policy (Allison and zelikow 1999:144)¹⁷

(5) Multilevel and multi dimensional Approach

Over the past two or three decades, it has become increasingly clear that there will never be one big approach of foreign policy. It has also become clear that there would be never bug theory of international relations. Many scholars now use the various major theories presented earlier in this research work as approaches to study particular aspect of foreign policy making. In the realist tradition studies of balance of power behavior and deterrence & security dilemmas are examples of this.

Thomas Schillings's strategic realism has focused on game theory. He focused directly on Foreign policy decision – making. It was applied most successfully in Cold War period when United States and Soviet Union tried to displace together in the arena of WMD, nuclear arms and long range missiles. Scheling won the noble prize of economics 2005. For his game theory which applied in international relations especially in analysis of foreign policy.

Liberals believe in complex interdependence, the note of international organization and institution, process of integration and path of democratization are very important for this. Liberals give emphasis on elements which lead toward international peace and cooperation which make world safe and secure.

Neo-Marxists give importance to the relations between core and periphery, and have identified the vulnerable position of weak states as the basic explanation of the limitations and constraints on their room in making of foreign policy.

Basic determinants of foreign policy

Foreign policy of a nation is never unequally determined by one factor or a set of factors. It is result of the interplay of large number of factors that affect the foreign policy in different ways in different circumstances. Some of these factors are relatively stable, and they can be recognized as unchangeable determinants of foreign policy but it doesn't mean that variable determinants are not very important. They are also important because they are playing very important role in the process of decision making. The basic determinants of foreign policy are mainly geography, economics developments, political tradition domestic media, international media, military strength and national character. (Bandopadhyaya J. 1980:28)¹⁸.

(1) Geography: - We can see the importance of Geography in the thoughts of Aristotle and Kautilya but geopolitical thinking probably did not developed until the early nineteenth century, when the French philosopher, Victor Cousin, propounded a rather rigid brand of geographical determinism. In the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries several leading theorists such as Friedrich Ratzel in Germany Captain Alfred Mahan and Samuel Huntington in USA, Rudolf Kjellen in Sweden and Halford Mackinder in England laid great emphasis on the role of geographical factor in International relation.

But the speedy progress of aerial navigation and technological advancement and sophistication of Warfare in the nuclear age have led to serious depreciation of geopolitics. The current tendency among international relation theorist regarding to

industrial potential and technological level of a state are more important determinant of its role in international relation than geography.

Geography includes location, size, topography, state boundaries, population, Climate, hydrographic situation and soil etc.

Location, Shape and Topography –

The history of International relation shows that location has always been an important determinant of foreign relations of a state. The strategic location of Britain has helped her to rule over the waves in term of both trade and navel power. The geopolitical position of USA helped her in the past to follow on isolationist Foreign policy under Monore doctrine. While the land locked countries tend to have large armies and concentrated on land defense.

Location provides peace or war depending on whether the place is strategically important, the centre of big powers interest or not. Egypt, with the strategic suez size canal, has for long been a center of big power politics. Buffer states are often forced to be neutral. States located close to big power cannot but be influenced by the neighboring country in their Foreign policy. For example, Canada is governed by trends of her powerful neighbor, the USA. Similarly, Cuba could not afford to have Soviet missile because of its location and the Strong and vigorous opposition of the United States. A good example of how location affects security and Foreign policy is Japan Which has always felt obliged to take keen interest in the status of Korea (Ibid:30).¹⁹

Size: - Ratzel argued that space consciousness was an important determinant of a Nation's sense of its own destiny, which the citizens of a big state tended to be

broad, minded rather than those of small states. However, small states such as England, Portugal and Netherland have played a big role despite their small sizes. Famous French Geographer Camille vallaux, has pointed out that the Amsterdam with world wide trade connection has a much greater “space consciousness” than that of French peasant who lives in a much bigger country (Ibid)²⁰

Climate:-

The impact of climate on the power-potential and “Energy of Nations” has attracted the notice of scholar’s right from the time of Greek physician Hippocrates and the Greek philosopher Aristotle till today. Many American Scholars like Huntington, R.H. wheeler. C.W. Mills and others wrote about impact of climate on human behavior. We can see it in different form like, climate a ceiling on human performance In arctic region, people have spend much of their time in sustaining there life. Little wonder they are unable to compete in political and economic field on equal terms with inhabitants of the so called tempest zones. Few would doubt that the temperature does have an effect on bodily and mental vigoure. But it is very difficult to say that state must have a temperate climate to be a great power. Climate also affects the agricultural prosperity of country and the diet of its people which in turn affect the health and vigor of its people. India’s agricultural property has suffered because of uncertain monsoon. In brief, Climate like many other environmental factors influences the foreign policy.(Ibid)²¹

Population:-

Population is an important factor in Foreign policy but vast and rapidly growing population profoundly affects the foreign policy of states. Vast population

may decrease the rate economic growth and making states heavily dependent on other developed countries. The absolute size of population determines the per capita availability of land and other natural resources. Indian development has been highly effected by its large population. Although vast population is creating problems for various countries of the world, e.g. India and China are facing the same, but many countries is facing the problems of decreasing population. Russia is an example of this. The composition of population is also very important. If the population of any country is homogenous then formulation of any policy is very easy. Otherwise, it would be very difficult (Ibid).²²

Economic condition

The economic growth and condition largely determine the potential of any country. The rate of growth of any country determines the dependency or self-sufficiency of that country. If any country is economically self-sufficient its foreign policy would be independent. Economic condition also determines the extent of dependence on foreign aid, e.g., the bad economic condition of several African countries is responsible for their dependency on economic aid from other countries of the world. Economic development is the expansion and diversification for foreign trade. All these have obvious importance for foreign policy. Besides, economically developed countries play an active and constructive role in world politics. Japan and European Union are playing very dynamic role in international politics because of their economic strength.

The leadership and foreign policy:-

It is very difficult to determine the role of leadership in the formulation of foreign policy. Some dictators in the past like, Hitler and Mussolini have formulated

their foreign policy according to their will but we all know result of that. So, it is said that foreign policy is all about long term negotiations and policy decisions at the highest level. Even in party dictatorship, all the decisions are taken by various party institutions. In the Presidential form of Government, like in the USA, President has the authority constitutionally for taking all major decisions. But even in the USA, president has preferred to leave vital decisions to their Secretaries. In a cabinet form of Government, cabinet is the ultimate decision making body. A cabinet functions through conventions, political pulls and pressures. Apart from this, a politically strong and charismatic leader may personally decide all major foreign and domestic policies. This is more or less the in which decisions had taken in Nehru's era in India. Nehru was most influential leader until his death. His cabinet was known as "kitchen cabinet." Even in contemporary Russia, Vladimir Putin's inspiring leadership has contributed Russia to regain its position of erstwhile USSR in world politics. In the past, many great leaders have guided their countries in odd situations. We can see the W. Churchill's role in Second World War and T. Roosevelt's role in creating world institutions like UNO. He had also inspired US to play an active role in world politics and leave isolation policy. (Rathod PB,2004:31).²³

Apart from all these determinants, role of political institutions such as, public opinion, party institutions, pressure groups and Trade Unions are very important because any Government can not ignore the public opinion. Political traditions of a country also influence the foreign policy. E.g. Indian foreign policy has been guided by its political tradition of Anti-Imperialism, Anti-Racism and Asianism. Foreign policy and domestic policy are interlinked. Foreign policy is guided by number of domestic factors. Some of the basic determinants of foreign policy such as political

tradition and economic development are element of domestic milieu. The role of ruling elite is equally important in the formulation of foreign policy.

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Chapter- 2

Basic determinants of Uzbek Foreign Policy

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 gave birth to five new sovereign entities in Central Asia. These newly found independent sovereign entities are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan at the heart of the region tried to position itself to take advantage of its newly found freedom (Akabarazadesh, Sahram2005:8.).¹ Foreign policy of a country is determined by several interconnected domestic and external determinants. These basic determinants are geography (Location including size and shape) population, economic condition, and nature of political system, tradition and culture, leadership etc. of the country. Uzbekistan is not an exception. We can see the influence of these factors on Uzbek foreign policy too.


Geography:-

The Republic of Uzbekistan (Formerly the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic) is located in Central Asia. It is bordered by Kazakhstan to the north, Turkmenistan to the south, Kyrgyzstan to the east, Tajikistan to the south east and Afghanistan to the South. Uzbekistan is approximately equal to the size of Morocco and has an area of 447, 400 square kilometer (Europa year book; 2003).² It is the 56th largest Country in the World by area. In the CIS countries, it is the 5th largest by area and the 3rd largest by population (Web link).³

Uzbekistan is dry and land locked country. It is one of two double-land locked countries in the World i.e. a country completely surrounded by land locked

countries. The other is Liechtenstein. Any land locked country has limited option in International trade than the non-land locked countries. Uzbekistan is much depends on its other neighboring countries especially on Russia. In this prospective, we can see the Russian influence on the Uzbekistan's Foreign policy after the disintegration of the erstwhile USSR. The relations between these countries have been largely up and down but due to its location Uzbekistan do not want to take any extreme step, even after much closeness with the US during the period of 2001 to 2005. Uzbekistan is not only one of the larger Central Asian states but also the only Central Asian states to border all the other four states of the region. Uzbekistan also shares a short border With Afghanistan to the South (web link)⁴. This location made Uzbekistan strategically very important for the external actors in Central Asia, especially after the 9/11 incident due to its border with Afghanistan. But there is also some negative influence of its location. We can see this in term of border dispute. Uzbekistan has border dispute with various countries in this region. Current borders between central Asian countries were drawn in 1920s by the administrative decision From Moscow. It has been argued that the policies of the Soviet planner were deliberate and designed to prevent any separatism. At present, there are territorial disputes between all the Former soviet central Asian republics. In particular, Uzbekistan is belligerent towards its neighbors, due to this problem. Bagys settlement case is an example of border dispute in this region. The most complicated border negotiation involve in the Farghana Valley. Where a myriad of enclaves exist and all three countries which shares it- Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have both historical claims to each other territory. There was also a border disputes between

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Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan over 1200 mile long Kazakh and Uzbek border. In Nov 2001 through an agreement it has been settled down.

Population: - The population of Uzbekistan in 2005 was 26, 593,000(Britannica encyclopedia)⁵. In ethnic composition of Uzbekistan in 2000 is like this,

Ethnic group	Percentage of population	
	(2000)	(1989)
Uzbek	78.8	(71.41)
Russian	2.5	(8.3)
Tajik	4.7	(4.7)
Kazak	4.1	(4.1)
Tatar	3.3	(2.1)
Kara kalpak	2.1	
Other	5.0	(9.1)

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006 Book of the year Page-730

If we analyze this composition of ethnic group with the composition of ethnic group given in 1989 census we can find out that the percentage of the Russian population has changed. According to 1989 census the Russian were 8.3% of total population but in 2000 they remain only 2.5 of total population. It shows that due to anti Russian sentiments before 2000 most of Russian population migrated to Russia. It also shows that population growth has been minimum in Russian ethnic group. It also shows that Tazik

and Kazakh ethnic group remained unchanged while Uzbek and Tatar percentage have increased in total Uzbek percentage. Uzbekistan is ethnically heterogeneous (Akbarzadeh Shahram2005:5)⁶. The ethnic Uzbeks constitute more than 75 percent of the population the rest of the population belong to other Central Asian population. The leadership is almost exclusively Uzbek in its ethnic origin, and its nationalist posturing is primarily aimed at the ethnic Uzbek majority in Uzbekistan (Ibid: 6)⁷.

Economy:-

Economy is major factor of Foreign policy of any country. If any country is economically prosperous and stable then the foreign policy of that country would be independent. Economically stable country can influence other country by various means like aid and debt e.g. Japan is not a great military power but due to its huge and developed economy it plays an active and creative role in world order. If we take Uzbekistan on a parameter of economic development it comes somewhere in middle class. Uzbekistan is a developing country where primary sector (agriculture) contributes major part in gross domestic production. Along with many CIS states economics, Uzbekistan economy declined during the first year of transition and then recovered. After 1995, as the cumulative effect of policy reform began to be felt. Uzbekistan has very low FNI per capita (US \$ 610 in current dollars in 2006, giving a PPP equivalent of US \$ 2,250) (web link) ⁸By GNI percapita in PPP equivalentents Uzbekistan ranks 169 among 209 countries, among 12 CIS countries, only Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had lower GNI per capita in 2006 (web link)⁹. Uzbekistan is now world sixth largest exporter of cotton. Agriculture employs 28% of Uzbekistan's labour force and contributes 24% of its GDP, The major

import sources are Russia (26.4%) South Korea (10.8%), Germany (9.4%) and China (8.3%). The major exports destinations are Russia (21.2%), China (14%) Ukraine (7.0%) and Turkey (6.3%) in 2004. If we analyze these data we can easily see that Russia is a major export and import partner of Uzbekistan. This is main reason of Russian influence on Uzbekistan's Foreign policy. Russia knows her position and tried to invest in Uzbekistan in long term.

One major thing in economic Arena is related to the economic reforms in the country. The International community has made demand for economic reform and liberalization. United States and European Union have been extremely impatient towards economic reform in Uzbekistan. US scholars such as Paul wolfowitch, Zbigniew Brezeniski and Fredrick Starr said that slow pace of reforms is determining factor in setting agenda for US policy in Central Asia(Akbarzadeh Shahram 2005:04)¹⁰. The state in the hand of bureaucracy has remained a dominant influence in economy. Corruption is also a major cause of worry for Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's 2005 corruption perception Index was 137 out of 159 countries, whereas in 2007 Uzbekistan is at the very bottom of the ranking, 175 out of 179. This situation may harm foreign direct investment in Uzbekistan (Web link)¹¹. February 2006 report on the country by international crisis group suggests that revenues earned from key exports, especially cotton, gold, corn and increasingly gas, are distributed among very small circle of the ruling elite, with little or no benefit for the populace at large (web link)¹². The economic policies of Uzbekistan have harmed the foreign investment, which is the lowest in term of per capita in CIS. The large hurdle of foreign companies entering in Uzbekistan has been converting currency for years. In 2003 government accepted the obligation of Article VIII under the

International Monetary Fund, providing for full current convertibility. However, strict controls and tightening of border have lessened the effect of the measure (Web link)¹³. The government of Uzbekistan restricts foreign imports in many ways including high import duties. Excise taxes are applied to protect locally produced goods in highly biased manner. These measures are responsible for the increase of the prices of imported products as 100 to 150% which make them Unaffordable. A numbers of CIS countries are exempt from Uzbekistan import duties. Uzbekistan's external position has been strong since 2003, Due to price increase of gold and cotton which are the major export commodities of the republic.

Military strength:-

Although military strength is not a very important determinant of any country's Foreign policy, but strong and efficient military can increase the morale of the people of a country. It directly reflects in foreign policy. Uzbekistan possesses the largest military force in Central Asian region. The numbers of the people in Uniform are around 65000 (Web link)¹⁴. The structure of the Uzbek army is inherited from Soviet armed forces. Uzbekistan military equipment is not very modern and training system is not very modernized. The government of Uzbekistan spends about 3.7% of GDP on the military. Uzbekistan is also a signatory of NPT.

Uzbekistan Political system and its Foreign policy

The political system of Uzbekistan is best defined as authoritarian and secular (Akabarzadeh Shahram2005:01)¹⁵. Uzbekistan form of government is presidential. That

is why all the powers lie in the president of the republic. Uzbekistan's president I. A. Karimov sought to keep firm grip on the every section of the government and society. The new constitution, adopted in December 1992, contained extensive presidential power. The major powers of the president provided by the constitution of the republic are given below-

- * Appoint and dismiss the prime minister his first deputy prime minister, member of cabinet minister, the procurator general and his deputies with subsequent confirmation by the oliy majlis (Article 93 of Uzbek constitution).

- * Nominate the chairman and member of the constitutional court, the Supreme Court the higher economic court and the chairman of the board of the Central Bank.(Article 93:10)

- * Appoint and dismiss judges of regional district, city and arbitration court.

- * Appoint and dismiss regional administrators and for the city of Tashkent with subsequent confirmation by relevant regional and city council. The president has the right to dismiss administrators (hakims). If they violate the constitution or the laws or perform an act discrediting the honour and dignity.

- * Dissolve the oliy majlis (to be endorsed by the constitutional court) in case of extreme differences between the deputies of Parliament and President (ibid: 10)¹⁶.

The right to appoint regional hakims has been very effective and reliable way to extend presidents Karimov's control and authority to local levels. We can explain this in three ways. (1) Local hakims are answerable to the president. President

has used this to consolidate his position within the political elite and competing interests group (ibid) ¹⁷. Hakims loyalty and allegiance to president of the republic offer him a power base beyond the reach of jurisdiction of parliament. The informal nature of personal relations and the emphasis on the president and wisdom of his decision reinforce the entrenched image of Karimove as indispensable to the Uzbekistan future¹⁸ (ibid). (2) Through the hakims President's rule is projected at the local level. Hakim acts as the representative of the president. He has to power to confirm or rejects leaders at the level of neighborhoods (mahalla). As a consequence, aqsaqals (literally 'white beard) who are the respected leader of each locality are incorporated in the political system of Uzbekistan. Although the aqsaqals elected by mahalla residents, depend on the endorsement by regional hakim to assure the paid position of neighborhood. This arrangement allows hakim to intervene in mahalla affairs (Roy oliver2000:182)¹⁹. The respected position and their incorporation in political system are significant for president Karimov claim to popular mandate. This is an important pillar of power because aqsaqals play an important role in social life of his mahalla and perform various aspect of social security.

(3) In a cyclic system of mutual reinforcement, hakims and their council are allowed to nominate parliamentary candidates to legislature (oliy Majlis). In 1999 parliamentary elections 110 seats were won by local council candidates, including 75 provincial and city hakims (Akbarzadeh Shahram2005:11)²⁰, Occupying nearly 45% of the 250 seats in the oliy majlis. All these measures give president a significant degree of influence over oily majlis. The brief account of the institution of state makes it clear that Uzbekistan institutional hierarchy has been carefully crafted to privilege president

Karimov. We can see it in the institutional support (to ensure elimination of any type of challenge) provided in 1992 when the office of vice president was abolished. Until the abolition the office was held by Shukrulla Mirsaidov, an able political leader who was not always agree with Karimov's policies(Ibid)²¹.He was among 200 parliamentary deputies who signed an open letter in September 1995 Criticizing presidents Karimov's authoritarian tendencies. It is argued that Mirsaidov was preparing for a leadership challenge (Fierman William1997:378)²².After that Karimove understood that he would have to confront Mirsaidov and his allies if he wished to become unopposed ruler of Uzbekistan. President abolished the office of the vice-president to consolidate the president position and gave him unrestrained control over executive.

President Karimov has been personally involved in the selection of the cabinet minister and tried to appoint loyal officials. These arrangements made the office of the prime minister very symbolic and devoid the real power. This was accepted by former prime minister of Uzbekistan Abdulhasim Mutalov, who was removed from office in Dec 1995. Shahram Akbarzadeh is of the opinion that, 'president Karimov, power rests on a network of informal relations and loyalties, as well as formal institutions which allow the centralization of power and merging of the executive and the legislative branches of the state.'

Thus, enormous power of the President makes him/her able to play a deciding role in the formulation of Uzbekistan's Foreign policy and domestic policy as well. The other institutions may help him in this process but it is up to president whether he accepts or does not accept the proposal given to him. Unchallengeable position of president is real head of Decision-making and other members of cabinet are subordinates

to him. Constitutionally president in supreme, but it does not mean he is true dictator. He is often guided by public opinion and the national interest of the country, whether any policy is ultimately ratified. No one government will take steps against public opinion of the republic.

(iii) Leadership and Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy:

It would not be an exaggeration to describe the leader of Uzbekistan, president Islam Karimov, as tightening of grip over a regime and government which has strengthening his personal power(Petrov N. I 2001:79-80)²³. President Islam Abduganiwich Karimov is the most powerful man in Uzbekistan. Islam Karimov was born in 1938 in Samarkand. A few years after he took degree in mechanical engineering and economics he started working with republican Guslan (State Planning Committee) in 1966. Karimov's political Career started in 1986 when he became finance minister. He also selected first secretary of the communist party of the Uzbekistan in 1989. After the institutionalization of the presidential system throughout the Soviet Union in March 1990, he was elected president by the republican parliament (Akbarzadeh Shahram2005:9)²⁴.

In August 1991 a coup took place in the Soviet Union which collapsed within a short period of time. After the collapse of coup, the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan declared Uzbekistan as an independent state. On 17 Dec 1991 President Karimov issued a decree, banning communist party activities in government Organs. In December 1991 he was re-elected as a President of the republic in a general election. In 1994 the all-national referendum extended Karimov's presidential term up until 2000.

In the aftermath of the erstwhile Soviet Union the communist party of Uzbekistan was renamed as People Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU), with

Karimove elected as its chairman. In July 1996, a regular plenary meeting of the central committee of the party approved his resignation from the party thus in accordance with the provisions of the Uzbek constitution, President Karimove become a non-party man (PetrovN I 2001:62)²⁵.

After the independence all Presidents of the region have moved swiftly to consolidate their power and gained control over the process of change facing their regimes. Few did so with as much success as Islam Karimove (Kazemi Leila 2003:205)²⁶. "President Karimove has become the driving force behind every aspect of policy formation in independent Uzbekistan" (Bohr Annet1998:05)²⁷. Three major aspects or 'pillar' strategically adopted by Karimove which made his position very much strong in Uzbekistan. These are (I) establishment and protection of Uzbekistan's sovereignty, (II) the creation of domestic political stability, (III) and economic reform. This highlights the personal nature of politics in central Asia and underscores the importance of examining sub state variable to understand foreign policy in Uzbekistan.

Islam and its influence in Uzbekistan's Foreign policy:-

The Uzbek regime's relations with Islam have been very complex and contradictory. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan's regime had needed to enhance its legitimacy. 'The leadership was fully aware of the importance of Islam in Uzbek self identification and that no nationalist programme would be completed without Salient Islamic component (Akabarzadeh Shahram 2005:240)²⁸. President Karimove recognized the growing public interest in Islam and tried to embrace the religion public ally and symbolically. On the other hand, the Uzbek leadership tried to

separate Islam from politics. In other words we can say that, he (Karimove) has acted to neutralize the threat of organized political Islamic group. Policy makers of Uzbekistan viewed with grave suspicion to politicize Islam in any way beyond the prescribed framework to endorsing government policies, e.g. Karimove quickly took notice of the activities of Adolat Party, one of the most prominent political Islamic groups at the time of independence. Adolat Party is a self appointed militia group which is working in the Farghana Valley. It detains, punishes and tries, in adhoc courts individuals suspected of “Un-Islamic” behavior (Kazemi Leila 2003:211)²⁹. By March 1992 the Uzbek government crack down over the group and more than 100 of its leaders were arrested. The party activities were shut down there after. To gather support and discredit the opposition Karimove governments often claimed that Islamic extremist groups of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan are working together. He has blamed Islamic militants (often mislabeled ‘Wahhabis’) for various public crimes such as the brutal and high-profile murder of traffic officer in Namangan in 1997(Ibid).³⁰ The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) emerged from the ash of Adolat in Namangan and has pursued an agenda to overthrow Karimov’s government. It wants to establish pan-Turkic Islamic caliphate based in Farghana Valley. In Feb 1999, Uzbekistan faced a series of bomb explosions in Tashkent. ‘The Uzbek government viewed these attacks as an attempt by IMU not only to undermine the stability of the republic, but also to assassinate president Karimov, whose motorcade was 200 meters away from one of the blasts(Ibid)³¹. Shortly there after, Islamic fighters of IMU invaded the Batkan region of Kyrgstan, taking dozen of hostages and sending shock waves throughout Central Asia.

Since then, foreign policy of Uzbekistan have heavily influenced by the Islam. The civil war in Tajikistan had a huge impact of Uzbek leadership. 'The Tajik experience followed by the fall of Kabul to the Taliban convinced Tashkent that countering the Islamic threat would have to be Central to its foreign policy agenda.(Shahram Akbarzadeh 2005:39)³². The Uzbekistan behavior to neighbours especially in relation to Tajikistan and Foreign relations in Afghanistan are heavily influenced by Islam. Even though Uzbekistan is in principle committed to good relations with its neighbors and to regional cooperation it considers these threats (Islamist) to be greater priority than aggressive pursuit of cooperation. Extra-territorial intervention to tackle Islamic opposition is causing tense relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Further more, 'Uzbekistan's heavy handed approach to Muslims in Farghana Valley has led some Islamist activities to move to the Kyrgyz portion of the Valley, spreading the problems to its neighbor (Kazemi Leila, 2003:212)³³. Instability of Tajikistan and rise of Islamic opposition within Uzbekistan threatened the stability of the republic. This has also highlighted to need for Russian support in combating Islamic threats. This prompted Uzbekistan to seek a reapproachment in its relation with Russia (Ibid)³⁴. Karimove said that 'no one beside the Russia could guarantee security and stability in this region (Ibid)³⁵. Russia was also eager regain its influence in the 'near abroad'. In the year of 2000 the Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that the threats to Uzbekistan mean a threat to Russia. The two states have signed bilateral security treaties in 1989 and 2004(Ibid) ³⁶.At the end we can say that, Tashkent's Islamophobia was a determining factor in the way it conducted international relation. Rising Islamic opposition within, the Tajik civil war and

military gains of Uzbekistan have guided the Uzbekistan foreign policy in some considerable extends.

DIFFERENT PHASES OF FOREIGN POLICY

Uzbekistan gained its independence in 1991. After independence the main priority of the Uzbek government was to inter into international system and become member of international organizations. After independence Uzbekistan government has formulated its foreign policy according to its need and main aim was to achieve national interest. These five central Asian countries formulated their foreign policy according to their needs. We can classify the foreign policy of Uzbekistan into three phases. These three phases are based on orientations and major shift in the Foreign policy of Uzbekistan. These three phases of Uzbekistan foreign policy are-

(I) The first phase of Uzbek foreign policy covers the period from 1991 to september2001 because after the events of 9/11 the major shift took place in the foreign policy of the republic.

(II) The second phase of Uzbek foreign policy covers the period from september9/11 to Andijan incident.

(III- The third phase of foreign policy of the republic starts from the Andijan incidents which took place in May 2005. In the Post-Andijan period a major shift has been taken place in the Uzbek foreign policy.

First Phase of Uzbek Foreign Policy:-

The erstwhile Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991. The Central Asian republics were not prepared for independence. The five Former Soviet socialist republics were not prepared for independence. These five republics were found themselves into serious trouble because of lack of tradition of statehood and facing challenges of ethnic and national identification. The Current boundaries of the Central Asian republics were artificially imposed during Stalin's rule. Unique circumstances and urgency with which Soviet planner created borders that were far from ideal and neglected ethnic, geographical and another feature of the region. All these made cooperation between the republics very difficult. At the time of independence the Central Asian states were not much familiar with the international system. These states in general (and Uzbekistan in particular) were not very much familiar to international system. "The challenges they faced with independence in two related categories, one is associated with process of state-building and another is emanating from Soviet legacy" (Ibid: 206)³⁷.

Legacies from Soviet era:-

Legacies of Soviet period are central elements of the dynamics of policy formulation and problems these countries faced further. All five states had been depending on the distribution network for both the goods and transfer, 'thus the Soviet-era legacy of being economically pigeonholed as exporters of raw minerals and

agricultural products rather than industrial producers. (Ibid; 207)³⁸.As a result Central Asian economic development legged behind the rest of the former Soviet Union. The energy enterprises and transportation works were establish for the fulfillment of Soviet era requirement. Thus it created a huge problem for newly independent states. The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz republics found themselves dependant on Uzbeks gas, while the entire region is dependent on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan for much-needed water supplies. A series of key transportation routes have shown little respect for national boundaries. These factors not only disrupt the development of central Asia but also leaving them vulnerable to the problem with their neighbours.

Uzbek Foreign policy initiative After Independence –

We can identify the three major initiatives which have been taken by Uzbek Authority after independence. The initiatives are the pursuit of sovereignty, try to establish political stability in Uzbekistan which was necessary for the formulation of foreign policy and tackle International pressure for economic reforms.

For the persuasion of sovereignty Karimov continues to resist Russian led integration effort within the CIS and had raised voiced against Russian attempts to design supra national structure within the CIS Framework. ‘Uzbekistan entry into every possible international structure that can serve as counterweight to the CIS including the Central Asian Community, the economic cooperation partnership for peace and GUUAM also reflects Karimov’s effort to limit Russian influence in this region (Ibid: 208)³⁹.Nevertheless Uzbekistan has been forced to preserve this with Russia in Various areas of Foreign policy due to its economic and security needs and lack of alternatives.

The result of reducing ties with Russia was the quest for allies outside the CIS. The Uzbekistan's growing fear of Islamic threat has harmed its relation with countries like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The roles played by Turkey and Iran in Uzbekistani Foreign policy have turned out to be more limited in scope than it early anticipated. Karimov's attempts to seek allies in the West have grown in significance. During the first phase of foreign policy, Uzbekistan leadership tried to establish ties with U.S. slowly but successfully. Uzbekistan Foreign policy imitative to create a nuclear Free-zone in central Asia, Participation in Antiterrorism treaties and its cool relations with Iran have made Uzbekistan a Valuable state in the region for United States. During the early 1990s, Uzbek relations with Western Europe were limited due to authoritarian approach in managing internal stability.

As far as political stability in early period is concerned, the Uzbek government had suppressed the opposition and made the president very powerful constitutionally. But another challenge for Uzbekistan's political stability was Islamic opposition. In the first decade of independence the Uzbek leadership lobbied in the United Nations and asked the Western leaders to take the Islamic extremism in central Asia seriously. But its success was limited. It has changed after 11 September 2001. So far as economic reform is concerns with independence Karimov and Uzbekistan's ruling elite had no prior experience in managing the republic entire economy. One of the fundamental dimensions of Karimov's approach to economic reform was the decision to leave the ruble zone in 1993 and to introduce Som. This move produced enormous inflationary pressures and led to serious in the country's economy (Ibid: 214)⁴⁰. The strict currency control, trade restrictions with neighbors, tight border control and import control

Registration law had harmed the measures of economic reform and created a hostile climate for investment. The economic policies of the republic have also created a hostile environment for international investors despite the fact that attracting FDI has been central element of the country's stated foreign economic agenda. Although Uzbekistan got some investment but it was very limited in the nature. Apart from this, Uzbekistan Strict Currency control has also isolated it from global financial system. Finally we can say that 'Uzbekistan's economic program is intended to reduce independence on Russia, but the fact remains that Russia is Uzbekistan's largest trading partner (Bohr Annet 1998:51)⁴¹. This has forced Uzbekistan's to temper its Anti-Russia stance and recognized that in order to maintain favorable trade relations with Russia.

Nature of Foreign policy in first phase:-

So far as Uzbekistan's foreign policy is concerned it has concentrated on strengthening national independence attract Foreign direct investment and building economic and political ties with both west and East.'(Ibid: 43)⁴². Uzbekistan has joined a number of regional and extra regional organizations for this. During the first phase Uzbek Foreign policy had largely been U.S. and Western centric. Uzbekistan's policy makers thought that United States was the ideal partner for not only counter face Russia but as an ally against Islamic threat. The establishment of close ties between Tashkent and Washington, however proved to be more challenging than the Uzbek leadership had expected (Akabarzadeh Shahram 2005:56)⁴².

In this period, developments in Tajikistan and Afghanistan and their implications were two key factors to drive the policy of Uzbekistan. The major thing in

first phase was to Uzbekistan ambitions as a regional power which causes the conflict with Russian influence in Central Asia. Tajik civil war in 1992 and active participation of Uzbekistan showed the regional ambition of this republic. In this period Uzbekistan joined various international organizations. Although not every one but some of them considered as Anti Russian. After the CIS, Uzbekistan entered in CISCST (Presently known as CSTO) in May 1992. In March 1992, Uzbekistan joined United Nations. Uzbekistan was perhaps the most active participant of NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme (PFP) in 1994. In April 1999 Uzbekistan had entered in – GUUAM, which was considered as Anti Russian Organization. In June 2001 Uzbekistan entered in SCO.

As far as Uzbekistan policy towards West Asia is concern during the first phase of foreign policy Tashkent showed its interest in establishing diplomatic relation with Israel. Formal ties were established in Feb 1992. Uzbekistan is the first country in Central Asia which has established its relations with Israel. Islam Karimov is the first leader who visited Israel September 1998. On Iran issue; Uzbekistan regarded Iran as a dangerous influence in central Asia. When United States imposed a trade embargo on Iran in May 1995, President Karimov had endorsed that policy. The policy towards European Union was very balanced despite harsh criticism of human right violations. Uzbekistan policy towards South Asia was as usual as it was in Soviet era. There was not much changes have taken place. India which is one of the major countries in South Asia opened an embassy in Uzbekistan soon after Independence of Uzbekistan in 1991. Pakistan has showed great keenness in exploiting new openings in Central Asia. Geopolitical ambitions have merged with Islamic ideology and commercial acumen to produce a dynamic policy. China is a big neighbor of central Asia. China business

purposes and concern regarding Islamic extremism in Uzbekistan (China also faced in Xinjiang) have made China's position very important in Uzbekistan. However, after the establishment of SCO China's role has increased in Central Asia.

Second phase of Uzbekistan Foreign policy (after the 9th September 2001):-

The second phase of foreign policy of Uzbekistan covers the period from September 9/11 events to the Andijan incidents of May 2005. An incident took place in United States of America in September 2001. This attack has changed the entire course of International affairs. The military operations against Taliban launched on October 2001 brought more than 5,000 American troops in Central Asia. This deployment of U.S. forces to Russia's backyard was justified as a tactical move which was essential for successful conduct of the war in Afghanistan (Ibid: 72)⁴³.

President Islam Karimov was very much aware of the opportunity that September 11 offered. He was among the first leader to send a message of sympathy and solidarity to United States. He also said that Uzbekistan would carefully study any request for assistance from America. Uzbekistan authority denied firstly giving Uzbekistan's air space or territory for military action against Taliban, but under the chairmanship of President Karimov Uzbek Security Council announced to open its air space to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan on 1 October 2001. Although the Uzbek peoples were not happy in assisting military action on a Muslim country, but Karimov the Uzbek President emphasized that Uzbeks have also suffered at the hand of terrorist. George W. Bush, the American President assured that this war was not against Islam but against extremism. Within the six months Taliban were driven out by power. The

importance of Uzbekistan's role was also made clear by Donal Rumpfled in a visit in November 2001 to Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan also wanted United States assistance to eliminating the Islamic threat posed by the IMU in Uzbekistan.

The stationing of U.S. forces in Khanabad was a symbol to Uzbekistan's new found importance in United States United States foreign policy. This was formalized in March 2002 when Uzbekistan and United States signed and declaration on strategic partnership. This agreement confirmed Washington's Commitment to Uzbekistan's security and territorial integrity. The signing of the strategic partnership was described by President G.W. Bush as opening a new chapter in U.S. Uzbek relations. Uzbekistan had cordial relations with the United States during the period of 2002 to 2005. Due to closeness between these countries many observers have commented that, there would be negative impact on protection of human rights and move away from authoritarianism in Uzbekistan. The U.S. administration was aware of it and said that Uzbekistan's human right record continues to be a point of contention in Washington. The U.S. State Department has retained Uzbekistan in the list of countries of concern for their violation of basic freedom, including religious freedom and human rights. It was a gray Area in a second phase. As Uzbekistan started assisting the U.S led war against international terrorism, Tashkent began receiving huge US aid and economic assistance. In Dec. 2002, US officials announced that United State have recommended a reconstruction loan from IMF to help reform and rebuild Uzbek industries. Interestingly, U.S. did not try to invest in Uzbekistan despite of having good relations. It is note worthy that security cooperation started between Uzbekistan and U.K. after close relations with U.S. in Dec. 2001.

The establishment of close relations between U.S. and Uzbekistan brought a major shift in Uzbek-Russia relations. President Karimov was a vocal critic of Russia's imperial 'hangover' in relation to central Asia (Ibid: 79)⁴⁴. President Karimov also criticized the Russian view that Uzbekistan should have consulted to Moscow before allowing U.S. troops in the republic. He stated that, 'Russian leaders do not like the fact that Uzbekistan is carrying out its independent policy... But let me say once again that when the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan in 1974, starting a big war, no one asked for our approval'. (Ibid: 80)⁴⁵.

President Karimov gave every indication that new relationship with United States is irreversible. He also said that, 'American should not leave our region until peace and stability is established throughout the central Asia. They should stay as long as needed' (Ibid) ⁴⁶. Russian leaders have visibly angered and warned Uzbekistan 'not to overstep the line'. Moscow's move to establish an anti terrorism rapid reaction force at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, in Dec 2002, (which was just 20 miles away from American basic in Manas;) was widely seen as a measure to reverse its declining fortunes but this honey moon era of U.S. Uzbekistan relations could not last long. After May, 2005 entire course of the U.S. – Uzbek relations have dramatically changed in a negative direction.

Third Phase of Uzbekistan Foreign policy:-

A major shift took place in Uzbek foreign policy after Andijan incident which occurred on May 13, 2005. During the events Karimov suppressed the rebellion in the city. The United States joined the European Union and demanded for an

Independent investigation of the incident. Moscow, however, stood with Tashkent. After the Andijan incident Tashkent gave 180 days ultimatum for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Karshi-Khanabad Airbase. United States vacated Karshi-Khandabad Airbase within given time frame work.

On Nov. 14, 2005, Russian president Vladimir Putin and Uzbek President Islam Karimov agreed to sign mutual security pact. The agreement called the "Treaty on Allied Relations." This treaty has shifted the foreign policy of Uzbekistan. This alliance provided a security blanket to Uzbekistan. It would serve the purpose of limiting U.S. and E.U. attempts to Weaken Karimov's government. After signing the treaty Uzbek president said that objective of United States was to influence Uzbekistan's independent policy, disrupt peace and stability in the country, and make Uzbekistan Obey to the United States.

Therefore, Russia has a singular advantage because U.S. was not willing to offer the potential for economic investment and cooperation. Uzbekistan's geographical proximity to Russia and the past Soviet-era economic tie make the relationship between the two states a natural phenomenon. Russian economy is still the strongest and most powerful economy in the CIS. Additionally, Moscow knows that its influence can reestablish by economic, not by military means.

Anyway, after the multifaceted foreign policy of the 1990s and early 21st century, Uzbekistan moved towards a stronger partnership with players it perceives as reliable. While the United States remains the pre-eminent geopolitical power at present, it is not possible for the United States to involve in Uzbekistan in any serious matter.

Russia, on the other hand, retains its role in the former Soviet space as a preeminent economic and military power in the medium to long-term. Russian-Uzbek relation, can be expected to grow, with economic and security goals-and not political ones.

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Chapter - 3

Uzbekistan's Relations with the other countries of the world

The Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991. After the disintegration of the former USSR, five Central Asian republics emerged as independent sovereign states on the map of the world. So we can say that 'Contemporary Central Asia is a product of Soviet Union's disintegration. These five Central Asian Countries have tried to shape their relations with other countries of the World. The Central Asian states had least experience of International relations and World order at the time of independence. This chapter will focus on Uzbekistan relations with various countries of the world. Although, Tashkent consistently broadens its relations with Asian and European states, undoubtedly priorities lie in its link with Russia Primarily as a result of continuing economic dependence on the country'(Petrov N.I 2001:89)¹.Therefore, Uzbekistan's relations with Russia would be analyzed first.

Uzbekistan Russia Relations:-

Political Relations:

'Henry Hale' stated that 'Geography and the existing economic infrastructure destined Uzbekistan to remain close to Russia in its early year of Independence' (Akbarzadeh Shahram 2005:53)². Uzbekistan as well as Russia was very anxious about Islamic extremism. This common factor made these two countries a natural ally. President Karimov acknowledged that 'Russia is a main guarantor of peace and stability of Central Asia' (Ibid: 46)³. But beside this, it would not be an exaggeration to say that 'Russia relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia were

far from being the highest priority of new Russian administration (Bondarersky and Ferdinand 1994:40)⁴. Russian First Foreign minister Andrei Kozerev was the strong supporter of the theory of 'Atlantcism'. As a result, the first Russian Foreign policy doctrine was formulated in 1993. It proved to be strongly pro-Western. Perhaps Russian wanted some economic support for the West for the transformation of the Russian economy into the market economy.

The Russian Foreign minister Kozerev visit in Central Asia in April 1992 was an indication of the priorities. In fact that time US Secretary of State James Baker has already been there three times on official visits. Moreover, the region was regarded 'dead weight'. However, by the end of 1993, Russian Interest group and intellectual had begun to speak in favour of the relationship between Russia and Uzbekistan (including Central Asia).

The Civil unrest in Tajikistan provided the space for the formation of CIS CST. Tashkent joined it because Tashkent felt that Islamic threat cannot be faced alone. But unfortunately the relationship between Uzbekistan and Russia, which is a senior partner in CIS CST (launched in May 1992) were not very cordial. Russian military presence in Tajikistan was seen as a creating obstacle to Uzbekistan regional ambition. (Akbarzadeh Shahram, 2005: 47)⁵.

Tashkent was afraid that Russian can use the Tajik war as a pretext for its military presence in the region. This fear prevents in the Announcement that if there was not any progress in peace talks Uzbekistan would withdraw from the peace-keeping mission.

The tension between Russia and Uzbekistan over Tajikistan was instrumental for Uzbek withdrawal from CISCST in May 1999. Tashkent claimed that CIS CST had become a tool of Russian hegemony (Ibid: 48)⁶. Sentiments against Russian in Uzbekistan have started when Russia 'imposed onerous condition on ruble zone

members in 1993. Russian Duma passed a resolution declaring that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was legally invalid. These attempts have been seen in Uzbekistan as an imperialist ambitions of Russia. Russia has articulated a foreign policy doctrine that justifies Russian right to intervene in conflicts in Central Asian region on the ground of threat to Russian security as well as ethnic Russians in the region. Russia was also very keen to defend USSR's old border from any external invaders. But Uzbekistan strongly rejected this proposal. Uzbekistan leadership refused to sign the treaty for the Defence of CIS external borders in May 1999. There was also some disagreement on the dual citizenship of ethnic Russian which lived in Uzbekistan (Bohr Annet1998:57)⁷.

The visit of Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin to the republic in 1995, Tashkent refused even to discuss about the Russian minorities in Uzbekistan. Karimov said that Uzbekistan opposed and still opposed dual citizenship. Chernomyrdin supported him, saying that he did not see 'any serious problems connected with the Russian Diaspora in Uzbekistan (Petrov N. I 2001:90)⁸. In January 1996, Russian Foreign minister Kozyrev was replaced by Yuvgenii Primako. Who was considered as a Russia's leading expert on Middle Eastern affairs. Some observers said that Moscow intended to shifts its foreign policy focus from the West to South and the East. Primakov visited Uzbekistan in both January and February 1996. In March 1997, the prime minister of Russia and Uzbekistan Viktor Chernomyrdin and Utkir Sultanov met in Moscow and signed an agreement on basic principles and directions of the economic cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan in 1998-2000.

In early May 1998 President Karimov paid an official visit to Moscow. During the visit more that 20 documents were signed including 10 year program of economic

cooperation in economic sphere. In that visit Uzbekistan had showed a great attention of signing numerous bilateral documents. In fact Uzbekistan had recognized the importance of Russian support to flourish the Uzbekistan's economy. These purposes were unconditionally achieved. The leaders of Uzbekistan have never failed to proclaim their intentions to maintain and develop the relationship with Russia.

One another problem came out between these countries in political sphere in 1999 on the issue of NATO operation in Yugoslavia. Uzbekistan pro-NATO position was not acceptable to Russia. In April 1999, when Moscow was trying to create a united front against NATO operation in Yugoslavia, Uzbekistan deliberately distanced itself from Russia and refused to sign a declaration against NATO bombings. It is notable that Uzbekistan had joined NATO partnership for peace programme in 1994. In 1995, Uzbekistan took part in military exercise with US troops within the frame work of NATO partnership for peace. Uzbekistan along with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan formed the Central Asian Battalion (Centrazbat) as a peacekeeping force. Several exercises under the banner of CENTRAZBAT were held in 1997, 1998 and 2000 in Central Asia. Soon after leaving the CIS CST, Uzbekistan joined Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova in GUUAM (Ibid: 49)⁹. GUUAM's charter focused on economic integration, regional security, combating terrorism and organized crime. Perhaps the Uzbekistan strong anxiety to Combating Islamic insurgency compelled her to join GUUM. Uzbekistan decision makers miscalculated the ability of GUUAM. The real significance of GUUAM was symbolic. There was not any proper Mechanism and secretariat of GUUAM. So, it was very difficult to take any collective decision. All members of GUUAM have periodical disputes with Russia, and Uzbekistan decision to joined the GUUAM 'explicit its antipathy to words Moscow' (Ibid)¹⁰.

However, Uzbekistan in just few years knew ineffectiveness of GUUAM and decided to leave this organization in June 2005.

The growing intensity of terrorism in late 1999 and 2000 in Uzbekistan compelled Uzbek leaders to look for other allies. The newly found Shanghai-5 with China in leading role was ideal option. Shanghai-5 was originally formed for the confidence building measures military and defusing tension on the former Sino-Soviet border. This organization was established in 1996 in Shanghai by Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. But in 2000 this Organization have taken a strong 'Anti terrorist' position- quite similar to that of Uzbekistan. This convergence of interest against a Common enemy made possible Uzbekistan's admission in SCO (as an observer state to the Shanghai-5 in 2000), even though Uzbekistan did not share border with China. After Uzbekistan's formal entry in June 2001 the name of this organization had been changed. The new name is Shanghai cooperation Organization, (SCO). Apart from other issues one major strategy behind the joining of SCO was, to realize that Russia was not able to exercise undue pressure on Uzbekistan within the Framework of SCO by the presence of Beijing. Uzbekistan used to regard China as a Counter-face in this Organization. Although, the Uzbek leadership did not feel vulnerable to pressure from the Russia, it gained no tangible benefits in Combating religious terrorism.

Uzbekistan – Russia Relations in the Post 9/11 Period

The September 11 attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon in 2001 has changed the foreign policy of Uzbekistan in many ways. Uzbekistan was suddenly emerged as an important country in war on terror because of its location (Akbarzadeh

Shahram 2005:76)¹¹. The new U.S-Uzbek strategic partnership offered Tashkent an opportunity to make a long-sought readjustment its relations with Russia. Uzbekistan showed no hesitation to reject the Russian objection to the new strategic realities in Central Asia. As it is earlier discussed in second Chapter that Uzbekistan had strongly rejected the Russian Objections to allow U.S. troops in Uzbek soil and Air-space, this new boost to Uzbek self Confidence has given Russian leaders more cause of Concern. Russian analyst also openly questioned the Vladimir Putin's 'Coy' position to the American force deployment in Central Asia. A motion was put to the vote in Russian Duma, condemning the U.S. presence in Uzbekistan, although it was defeated.

It was perhaps in response to the Russian sentiments which foreign minister Ivanov Insisted that the U.S. forces in Central Asia will have to leave once their task of defeating terrorism accomplished. In response to this Russia anxiety, US commander of military operation in Afghanistan General Tomray Franks stated that Washington has no long term plans to station troops or to build a paramilitary base. He also denied that U.S. had signed a secret agreement with Uzbekistan to take Uzbek military base on lease for 25 years. He further stated that, there is 'no competition, whatsoever, between Russia and United states for spheres of influence' in Central Asia (Ibid: 80)¹².

President Karimov gave every Indication that the new relationship between United States and Uzbekistan is irreversible. As earlier discussed that, he told his Central Asian Counterparts in October 2002 that America should be here until peace and stability are established throughout Central Asia. Russian decision-makers and leader were very upset by Uzbekistan attitude. Boris Pastuthokl, Chairman of Duma Central Asian Affairs had warned Uzbekistan to 'not over step' the line. He further

stated that “the United States behaviour in the region is aggressive, and Russia will not be able to remain inactive for much longer time. Moscow’s establishment of an anti-terrorism reaction force in Kant in December 2002, have been largely seen as a step to counter U.S. presence in the region. Although, this base in Kyrgyzstan has established under the banner of CIS collective security treaty, but many observers stated that, Russian decision to establish the Anti-terrorism rapid reaction force in Kant was designed to counter the so called American hegemony in the region. This was precisely described by the Uzbek President that this move could result in a ‘military rivalry’ between the United States and Russia, with destabilizing consequences for the region(ibid:81)¹³.

Many Russian analysts have found that the new Challenge to Russia’s influence in Central Asia was very disappointing, especially since President Putin had tried hard to gain Russia’s role in the region. Putin efforts were back fired by the 11 September 2001. Although 9/11 did force to Russian readjustment in foreign policy. Despite all the closeness, the United States decided to limit its involvement in Uzbekistan to only security operations. Therefore, Russia has a singular advantage that U.S. was not killing to offer the potential for economic investment and cooperation. Uzbekistan’s geographical proximity to Russia and the Post-Soviet era economic ties make the relationship stable somewhere even in the era after 11 November 2001, which is considered as a lowest phase of relationship between these two countries. Even in the 2001 Russia was the largest investor in the Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, an incident occurred in the city of Andijan, where the rebellions tried to protest against the Karimov government. The aim of this incident was to destabilize the Uzbek Government.

The United States joined the European Union in calling for an independent investigation of the incident. However, Russia and China had supported the Uzbekistan. Russian regarded this incident as a mean to destabilize the Uzbek Government and reduce the Sovereignty of the republic. These stands provided the catalyst between the relations of these neighbouring countries. A little more than a month after the Andijan incident Tashkent restricted U.S. flights out of Karshi-Khandbad. On 29 July 2005, Tashkent chose to evict the United States from the base altogether, giving 180 days eviction ultimatum.¹⁴ (Web Link)

On November 14, 2005 Russian President Vladimir Putin and Uzbek President Islam Karimov agreed to sign a mutual security pact. The agreement called the “Treaty of Allied relations” formalizes Uzbekistan’s shifting foreign policy. For Russia, this alliance is important because it provided an opportunity to regain Russia’s traditional influence in its “near abroad.” The preamble of the treaty states that Russia and Uzbekistan “Will Fully meet the vital interest of the two countries people and serve the cause of ensuring and strengthening national, regional and International security and stability”(web link)¹⁵. Karimov echoed Putin statement saying “the strengthening of Russia position in Central Asia will guarantee peace and stability and meet the fundamental interests of our people”. Since then till today Uzbekistan has maintained its relations with Russia. Security concern in Uzbekistan made Russia once again a natural ally. We can see the closeness, when Putin send a congratulations message to Karimov after winning presidential elections in 2007. It is expected that Russia and Uzbek relations would sustain too longer time. Russian knows that only security and military concerns is not sufficient. Economic investment is also necessary. So it seems to be vital to take a glance on Uzbek-Russia economic relations.

Uzbekistan – Russia Economic Relations

Uzbekistan has no prior experience in managing the entire economy. After independence Uzbekistan has been reorienting its economy towards the industrialized West. In this process Uzbekistan relegating its traditional northern partner into secondary role (Bohr Annet 1998:57)¹⁶. Trade between these countries has been complicated by difficulties in settling accounts. But apart from this due to geographical locations and Soviet era legacy Russia was still a largest investor in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan stepped up from the Rouble Zone members in 1993 and adopted a new currency sum. The trade priorities lie in its links with Russia, primarily as a result of economic dependence on the country. The visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, to the republic in 1991 was very important. Both side signed fifteen documents during the visit including economic and military cooperation. It is interesting to note that almost five month elapsed between the official announcement of Chernomyrdin's forthcoming visit and his arrival, yet no body in the republic expressed dissatisfaction or impatience this was happen because of probably Russia remain an important economic partner of Uzbekistan(Petrov N I 2001:90)¹⁷. Chernomyrdin regarded the prospect of Uzbek- Russia relation 'very good'.

According to president Karmov, trade turn over between there two countries was \$ 1.5 bln in 1994 and expected to grow. Uzbekistan also joined custom alliance with Russia which it rejected earlier. Some other agreements were- On the basic principles and directions of economic cooperation in 1996-1997, on the creation of international radio-astronomic observatory and transnational Ilyushin financial-industrial group.

In March 1997, the prime minister of Uzbekistan and Russia, Utkir Sultanov and Viktor Chernomyrdin, met in Moscow and signed an agreement on the basic principles and directions of the economic cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan in 1998-2000(Ibid:91)¹⁸. This includes cooperation between the two countries in all sphere of economy including agriculture, chemical petrochemical industries and none—ferrous metal. The parties also agreed to create financial industrial group (Ibid: 93)¹⁹. The Uzbek President Islam Karimov paid an official visit to Russia in early May 1998. He signed more than 20 documents including the 10-year programme of economic co-operation between Uzbekistan and Russia. Russia also signed an agreement on Russia's purchase of 120IL-76 and IL4T cargo planes, manufactured in Uzbekistan.

The leaders of Uzbekistan have never failed to proclaim their intention to maintain and develop the relations with Russia. Despite the closeness of US relations with Uzbekistan in the Post-9/11 and till the Andijan incident bilateral economic relations between Uzbekistan and Russia were not deteriorated. In 2002, Russia was the major export and import partner of Uzbekistan with taking percentage of 17.2 in export and 20.5 in import. During the last few years Russia has been playing an active role in Uzbek economy. In 2002 Uzbekistan prepared a plan to implant joint investment projects with 37 Russian companies. With Russian companies 37 investment projects for \$2.099 billion (Gidadhubli R.G 2003:188)²⁰. The two countries also agreed on a list of projects of joint implementations. The majority of investments, more than \$ 2 billion- were expected to go to the oil and gas complex. For instance Gazprom planned to invest \$1 billion to develop gas condensate field in Ustyurt region and \$15 million to extend the life of the Shakhpakhty field under-protection sharing agreement terms. Lukoil also planned to take active part in energy

sector of Uzbekistan. Besides, promoting trade, both Russia and Uzbekistan have undertaken several joint ventures. The list also includes projects in machine building, metallurgy, mining and extracting, the power technology industry and processing of meat, dairy and agricultural products among their avenues. They are also trying to set up a joint venture for repair and maintenance work on MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters at the Chirlik aviation repair plant together with the Kazan and Rostov helicopter plants(Ibid:91)²¹. These are in addition to Russia's involvement in the energy sector of Uzbekistan. Thus, we can say that Russian economic ties with Uzbekistan have made the relationship between these two countries a natural phenomenon. Russian knows that its influence can be reestablished by economic means not by military means. Most importantly, unlike United States and other Western Countries Russian Companies are familiar with the absence of Western style tax system and so called irregularities in the republic. Apart from this, as new functionalist insisted in 'Spill Over' theory we can say that engagement in economic sphere will be reflects in political relations too.

Uzbekistan-US Relations

Prior to the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Uzbekistan did not have direct relations with United States of America. But after dissolution of the USSR the republic of Uzbekistan established its relations with US. The United States of America recognized Uzbekistan as an Independent sovereign state 25 December 1991 and established diplomatic relations with the republic on 19 February 1992. According to Uzbekistan, United States was the only remaining super power, which can be international partner for not only to counter face to Russia but also as an ally against the perceived Islamic threat. Uzbek leader also calculated that United States

may be a source of financial aid and investment in Uzbekistan's troublesome industry. However, establishment of close ties between Tashkent and Washington proved to be more challenging than the Uzbek leadership had expected earlier. Although United States welcomed the emergence of newly independent States and encouraged their integration into global economy but three inter-related issues have made Washington uneasy. These issues are absence of democratic reforms and liberalizations, absence of geo-strategic assets in the region and obvious priority given to Russia.

The absence of democratic reforms in Uzbekistan and violations of human rights irritated the U.S. Democratic administration of Bill Clinton. U.S. ambassador to Uzbekistan, Stanley Escuredo stated that, the question of democratic reform could not be ignored (Akbarzadeh Shahram 2005:82).²² Apart from all the anxiety of United States, Uzbek President Karimov made his first visit to United States in June 1996 (Bohr Annet 1998:66).²³ This visit did not conduct smoothly and President Clinton reported to decline a face to face meeting with Karimov due to Uzbekistan poor human rights record (Akbarzadeh Shahram 2005 : 62)²⁴. A brief meeting could be possible only after granting of a presidential pardon of eight political prisoners in Uzbekistan (Ibid).²⁵ Interestingly, after the cool meeting of both Presidents, Karimov was welcomed warmly by the Pentagon. U.S. Secretary of defense William Perry discussed security issues in Central Asia. Uzbekistan was very keen about the U.S. assistance in the military training and NATO partnership for peace Programme. The U.S. policy towards Central Asia was also influenced by vast reserve of oil and gas. U.S. decision-makers recognized the importance of the region and admit that it would diversify the source of energy and reduce the dependence on Persian Gulf region oil and gas. A 'Russia first' policy which was adopted by the Clinton administration was also responsible for the limited Cooperation with Central Asia in general and

Uzbekistan in particular in the early phase of Independence. Many Analyst and Scholars from John Hopkins University like Paul Wolfowitz and Zbigniew Brezezinski Criticized the 'Russia's First' policy. They argued that this policy may overshadow the other regions of former Soviet Union and their importance to the United States. They further stated that the 'Russia first' policy was ignoring Russia's failure to steer moderate and democratic course. Brezezinski insisted, close relations between United States and other States of Central Asia would not only allow the U.S. to have a role in making Central Asia stable but also temper any residual Russian imperial temptation (Ibid:65).²⁶

U.S. and Uzbekistan Relation in Changing

The August 1998 attacks by al-Queda on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were the catalyst that brought Washington and Tashkent together. Only a few months after this, the Senate approved the Security Assistance Act of 1998 to offer defense articles and service to a number of soviet republics, including Uzbekistan. Senate adopted a 'Silk road' strategy Act of 1998 (Ibid: 67)²⁷. This envisioned U.S. Assistance for the development of energy-extracting industrial and transport infrastructure as well as human rights and democratic reforms. According to Shahram Akabarzadeh, this Act also emphasized various issues like-

- Assist the region in developing intra-regional economic cooperation which would stabilize the region and eliminate any possibility of conflict.
- Provide economic, technical and financial assistance as well as development of telecommunication and transportation infrastructure in the region.
- Provide security related assistance including military education, counter-proliferation and surplus U.S. military equipment and supplies.

- Encourage democratic and free market institutions

The adoption of the bill was an indication of inevitable shift in United States perception about Central Asia. United States also recognized the importance of this region. Meanwhile, in August 2000 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) took four U.S. mountain climbers in hostage. The hostages however managed to escape their captors but it was no longer possible for United States to ignore the IMU in Uzbekistan. After that United US State Department classified the IMU as a terrorist organization. This move was highly welcomed by Uzbek Government.

Central Asian States and NATO Partnership for Peace Programme:

Relations with NATO hold a greater importance of the Central Asian States strategic relations with United States (AmbrosioThomas2005:111).²⁸ Apart from Security and strategic assistance programmes U.S. government also organized military exchange and joint military exercises in the frame work of NATO. Since the commencement of NATO PfP Programme in January 1994 at Brussels, military and civil representative have taken part in every events of NATO. Military officer from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have welcomed to different school of NATO member states. The NATO and Armed forces of U.S. were the instrumental for the creation of Central Asian Battalion (CENTAZBAT). Joint military exercises were organized on numerous occasions e.g., exercise in North Carolina in August 1999, the ultra Balance-97, the Balance Kayak-98 in Alma Ata and the Centrasbat-98 in Tashkent. All these events indicate that Central Asian States including Uzbekistan's desire to come closer to the Western Security structure with intention to eliminate the possibilities of Russian military domination. NATO Secretary General Javier Salona

visited Uzbekistan on March 13, 1997. Uzbekistan's Defense minister Rustom Ahmedov and Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov had talks with Mr. Salona regarding to military cooperation (Akbarzadeh Shahram 2005:61).²⁹

However, despite the diversification of the Security relations of the Central Asian states with U.S. and NATO, and other security organization, Russia has not given up its security concern of the region (Ambrosio Thomas 2005:111-112).³⁰ The first southern shield exercise 2000 in Tajikistan and the Southern Shield 2001 in Moscow took place under the supervision of the Chief of the CIS cooperation coordination staff. The main aim and objectives of these exercises was to train the forces of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan did not take parting these exercises.

War against International Terrorism and US-Uzbek Relations

The September 11 attacks on World Trade Centre led to a seismic shift in U.S. Uzbekistan relations. Uzbekistan was an obvious choice, owing both its locations and track record of military cooperation with United States. On October 7, 2001, during the visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Uzbekistan in the Context of Anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, United States and Uzbekistan signed an agreement after extensive negation between U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and Uzbek military and Security services. The U.S. Government was agreed to provide security and stability in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek government agreed for the extensive use of Karshi khanabad air base (Akbarzadeh Shahram 2005: 73).³¹ In early October 1991 more than 1,500 U.S. troops belonging to the tenth mountain division along with helicopter of Army. 60th special operation Aviation landed in Uzbekistan. During the visit of U.S. Secretary of state Collin Powell to Tashkent in early

December 2001, stated that U.S. interest in Central Asian region is beyond the current crisis of Afghanistan. U.S. forces had also presented in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but Uzbekistan was seen as a vital destination for the Ant-Taliban campaign. Uzbek President Islam Karimov visited United States in March 2002. Uzbekistan and United States signed a 'Declaration on strategic partnership' on this occasion. This agreement confirmed Washington's assurance to Uzbekistan security and territorial integrity. Another agreement includes a nuclear non-proliferation programme to replace highly enriched Uranium from an Uzbek research reactor with lower grade material. The signing of the strategic partnership was described by President G.W. Bush as a new chapter in U.S. – Uzbek relations (Ibid).³² The relations between Uzbekistan and United States were on its high by the end of 2002. Uzbekistan was regarded as a leading Central Asian dependable ally. Keeping in mind the fact, the people of Uzbekistan were not very easy about United States, because they regarded campaign against Taliban in Afghanistan as a campaign against Islam. Although, it's made clear by US authorities that this war is not against Islam but against extremism, one of the major causes to support to U.S. campaign of war against International terrorism was Islamic extremism in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has been facing Islamic extremism in form of IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir. On the other side, American people were very suspicious that acute closeness between Uzbekistan and United states could harm human right campaign and process of move away from authoritarianism. The Taliban Government was driven out from power within six month of the commencement of the U.S. led war against terrorism. It was made clear that Uzbekistan and Unites Stats relation were more complex than its earlier Anticipated because soon after the 9-11 the World bank and IMF did return Uzbekistan and offer a new reform package (Olcoot M.B 2007:336)³³. Uzbeks were very angry at the World Bank and IMF

officials. They argued that these financial organizations never made an attractive offer that can able to beat the criticism of Anti-reformist. The anti-reformers argued successfully that austerity measures would reduce standards of living in short run, creating a risk of social upheaval led largely by pro-Islamic elements that were becoming more visible in Uzbek society. Under these circumstances, it did not take long for the U.S.-Uzbek “Strategic” relationship begin to sour, and for both sides to walk away unhappy. The U.S. was uneasy by Uzbek Government’s unwillingness to either political or economic reform. Uzbekistan on the other side was not very happy. The Uzbek authorities thought that Washington would help to modernization the country’s security establishment and provide massive economic aid. The Uzbeks believed that they had taken serious risk for the relationship. The verbal support to U.S. on Iraq was a rarity in Central Asian states. They also felt that without prior consolations with Russia they invited Americans in the country. Russia was already frustrated and U.S. was not willing to materialize the promises. Tashkent failure to meet the terms and conditions of reforms promised to the United States in a series of letters and agreements, the Uzbek government not being certified by the U.S. Secretary of State as having made sufficient progress towards an improved human rights environment. (Ibid)³⁴ As a result, aid was reduced and restrictions were imposed on the operation of US-funded NGOs.

Shrinking Relation with Uzbekistan

The relationship between Uzbekistan and United States deteriorate after so called “Colour revolutions” in Georgia Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. There was a report that the United States played a significant role in brining the coloured revolutions in these three republics. In the meantime, a demonstration took place in Andijan in May

2005. Security forces suppressed them by excessive force. The crowds were largely unarmed, But an armed group which day before had seized a prison and took policemen and fireman as hostages in a building located near square where the civilian had gathered (Ibid).³⁵ The Uzbek security forces opened fire indiscriminately which caused nearly more than 500 deaths. United States and European Union demanded an independent investigation of the incident. Uzbekistan refused to accept the demand. As a result European Union imposed sanctions on Uzbekistan. In retaliation to it Uzbekistan cancelled the defense agreement and restricted the U.S. flights on Karshi-Khanabad. On July 29, 2005 Uzbekistan gave an Ultimatum to United States to vacate the US Air base within the period of six months. US withdrew its forces within given time framework. It said that, there is not any permanent enemy and friend in International politics, but it seems that, after Andijan incident Russia has a slightly edge over limited.

Although American presence in Central Asia is reality and we cannot ignore the U.S. factor in Central Asian Countries but as far as Uzbekistan is concern, U.S. is simply too far to get involved in this country in any manner.

U.S. Trade and Investment Policy towards Uzbekistan

Apart from political military and security cooperation, United States has also developed considerable economic and commercial relations throughout entire Central Asia. Corruptions at the highest level, currency convertibility problem and political authoritarianism in the region have been hurdle for this. After Karimov's visit to the USA in 1996, relationship between these countries, led to market improvement in the field of trade and commerce. The trades turn over increased, but not as much rapidly

as earlier anticipated. Perhaps the main cause of this was the nature of relationship between these countries has been largely security and military one. There were more than 229 Uzbek- US joint ventures in Uzbekistan, and more than 30 U.S. companies have opened offices in Tashkent. The largest US investments were made in the mining and fuel industries of the republic (Petrov N.I 2001: 94)³⁶. Uzbekistan Cotton and gold productions are among the highest rank in the World. It also has moderate energy reserves. American was highly interested in the area.

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia

(In million dollars)

Central Asia Countries	Cumulative Funds Financial Year 1992-2002	Financial Year 2001	Financial Year 2002 Budgeted	Financial Year 2003 Budgeted	Financial Year 2004 Request
Kazakhstan	885.95	74.87	89.34	42.72	32
Kyrgyzstan	635.03	41.46	95.66	37.85	40
Tajikistan	489.96	56.48	141.29	25.8	35
Turkmenistan	210.2	12.57	18.06	7.8	8
Uzbekistan	530.59	57.22	239.78	38.75	42
Total	2,759.73	242.6	584.13	152.92	157
Percent of Eurasia aid	13	21	25	20	27

Source: State Department, office of the co-ordinates for U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, cited by, Mohammad Munir Alam (2005), Iran and Central Asia: Emerging Geo-Political and Strategic imperatives in *Central Asia: Present Challenges and Future Prospect*, eds Rao V. N and Alam M. Monir, Knowledge World publication, New Delhi.

Uzbekistan's Relations with China

China is the immediate neighbour of five Central Asian republics shares its 3500 km long border with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. After the Independence of Central Asian republics China was very much keen to establish political stability in the region. China believes that Religious extremism is against this (Dutta Sujit 2003:151).³⁷ Greater involvement of United States and Russia has forced China to adopt a policy, which can achieve a stronger role in this region. China initiated the formation of Shanghai – 5 in 1996 were largely seen as a China Competitive strategy that can counter the U.S. The members of Shanghai -5 were- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Russia and China (Misra Amlendu 2001:305).³⁸ The purpose of this organization was to solve the border problem and to promote peace and cooperation in the region with an intention to develop greater trade relations with Central Asian Countries. Uzbekistan joined the organization in 2001, making it Shanghai six popularly called as Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

China's interest in Central Asia: -

China has the growing interest in the region's energy resources, politics and security architecture and its vital role as a land corridor to the Gulf. (Dutta Sujit, 2003:145)³⁹. For this, China has transformed the Xinjiang-Uighurs Autonomous

Region into free market zone in 1998 to strengthen cooperation with Kazakhstan and to open trade routes in the region, the Xinjiang region is China's largest province in size having a one of the biggest oil bearing basin the Tarim basin in the Asia. China is one of the largest oil Consumer in the World (Second after America) and it has not want any other power to divert the energy resources which lies near the door step to China. Due to American presence, China became a serious competitor for influence in the region. Apart from the energy need, China has been very cautious about American presence in the region. Keeping all there facts in mind it will be easy to analyse China-Uzbekistan relations.

Soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union Uzbekistan became an independent state. The people republic of China recognized Uzbekistan on 27 Dec 1991 as an Independent state. On January 1992, both the countries signed an agreement for the establishment of diplomatic relations. In Oct 1992, China opened its embassy in Uzbekistan.

So far as Uzbekistan is concerned it opened its embassy in China in May 1995. In 1992 Uzbek President Islam Karimov visited China and in April 1994 Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng made a visit to Uzbekistan. A number of agreements were signed. In his speeches Li Peng regularly affirmed China's interest in stability and security in the region. (Ferdinand Peter1995:100).⁴⁰ President of Uzbekistan made comments which were interpreted as offering support for the Chinese attempts to contain Uighur separation. China's security policy consists upon for pillars; Countering terrorism , Islamic military backing for higher Independence, military cooperation and countering the influence of major powers inimical to China(Dutta Sujit 2003:156).⁴¹ These Chinese strategies are very much suited to Uzbekistan because Uzbekistan faced Islamic militancy too. One major thing which was

instrumental for the good relations between these two countries was democratic reform issue. China had no complain about democratic process in Uzbekistan. China regarded Central Asia (including Uzbekistan) as a vast market for its goods. Bilateral trade with China has expanded rapidly since Independence, and Uzbekistan is current second largest trading partner in Central Asia after Kazakhstan.

In Uzbekistan 117 enterprises are run by Chinese Investors in which 94 are joint ventures and 23 enterprises are with 100% Chinese capital. During the period of 1995-2003 within the frame work of financial aid and Economic Cooperation by the Chinese side the followings have been allocated

Nature of Assistance	Soft loans (in million)	Scientific technical and humanitarian Cooperation (in million)
In Yuan's	260	42
In Dollar	31.7	5.1

Source: <http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t197865.htm>.

Despite the chronology of events it is necessary to analyse the major trends of the relationship between these to Countries.

Sino-Uzbek Relations in the Post-9/11 Period:-

After the September 11, 2001, the eagerness of some SCO member state bilaterally in the ‘War against terrorism’ raised a number of questions about the future of SCO and China’s plan for spreading its influence in Central Asia. Similarly, the absence of the SCO as a regional player in the War against terrorism has been noted (Sengupta Anita 2003:146).⁴² Some Analyst argued that SCO had been involved against the evil forces since 1996 and should have support the war against

terrorism. Chinese experts denied and stated that US is not an SCO member. So the organization could not join the war.

China's Central Asian neighbours Uzbekistan and Tajikistan offered invaluable assistance to U.S. So China plans to expand its influence in Central Asia seemed to come on halt. For this China reaction was very balance. Chinese Authorities thought that successful U.S. operations in Central Asia might actually stabilize the region and serve Beijing's near and mid-term interests.

In attempt to stabilize its influence in Central Asia, China adopted a Comprehensive diplomatic agenda. Chinese President Jintao visited the Central Asian states in June 2003 in 2002 just before the visit of Chinese president the Uzbek President U Sultanove visited China. In 2002 both Countries signed bilateral agreement in the field of education probation. Students and trainee exchanges are adjusted through the state line. In 2002, Common Circulation between there two countries have reached US\$ 130 min. As a result Uzbek export- import reached up to 17.3 million and 112.7 million. (Web link)⁴³ Unlike United States and European Union who had demand for an international investigation of Andijan incident Chinese stand was fully supportive to Uzbek Government. Chinese authority recognized this incident as an act to destabilize Uzbekistan. Soon after Andijan incident, Uzbek president Islam Karimov visited China. On May 2005, both countries signed 'Treaty of the Friendly and Cooperative partnership'. Chinese prime minister stated that 'the development of China-Uzbekistan relationship has been all long following to the principle of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefits.'"(Web link)⁴⁴ He further stated that both sides understand and support each other in major issue of concern, such as national Sovereignty territorial Integrity and Close cooperation in regional and international affairs. President Karimov said that he had frank and Constructive

talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao. Political nature of their deepening bilateral relationship with common security concern and the paramount importance of trade and economic interest were core issues of the discussions. According to Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Azomov, trade between these two countries in 2004 and first half of 2005 was \$ 367 million and \$ 250 million. These talks resulted in 12 documents signed boosting trading ties (Ibid)⁴⁵

The Oil industry is central to Chinese economic interests in Uzbekistan. Chinese companies already invested in this sector. Uzbekistan national holding company (NHC) and Chinese Sinopec signed an agreement to invest \$106 million in oil sector. (Web link).⁴⁶ It will also involve in focus ventures in Uzbekistan. N.Najimov, Chairman of Uzbek Agency for Foreign economic relations was very optimistic about links with China as a trading partner. He emphasized that such agreements with China have demonstrated the high level of political dialogue confined the closer links between these countries (Ibid).⁴⁷ The similarity in two sides on various issues gives little encouragement to those campaigning for the improvement of human rights within Uzbekistan or promotion of democracy within the country. However, Chinese trade interest and willing to establish influence in Central Asia has been responsible for the cordial relations with Uzbekistan as well. The Chinese position on democracy and pluralism was closer to the Central Asian regimes. China's assistance in military and technical area has also increased trade and economic relations. In short we can say that China would remain as an important external player in Central Asian region in general and Uzbekistan in particular.

UZBEK-EU RELATIONS

European Union is a geopolitical entity covering a large portion of European continent. The six original member of European Union were Belgium, France (West), Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Netherlands. Time to time the membership of this organization has been increasing and today the total numbers of member in this organization are 27. After the merger of European Economic Community and European Coal and Steel Community., it came to be known as a European Union.

The relationship of European Union with Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries are base upon the partnership and Cooperation agreement which was signed on, February 9, 1995. This treaty came into force on July 9, 1999. This agreement provides a broader framework of political relations between the entire countries and promotion of mutual trade relations and the development of investment activities. The EU and Uzbekistan also signed an agreement regard to textile products in 1993. As a consequence, exports From Uzbekistan were not subject to quota imposition. This agreement was valid until 2005. European Union has been very supportive to financing regional programme such as INOGATE and TRACECA. Since the 1992 the EU has provided Uzbekistan about €111 million for enhancing its infrastructure (Web link)⁴⁸. Within the context of the TACIS indicative national program, EU objectives over the four year, period from 2000 to 2004, were consists specially is three area.(Wood Steve2008:135).⁴⁸

1. Legislative reform and democratization
2. Support for market oriented economy
3. Development of agricultural economy.

Uzbekistan is in second position in Cotton export accounting for 6% of the global production. Ninety percent cotton export from Uzbekistan normally is to

European Community. As it has been mentioned earlier INOGATE programme was specially an initiative to ensure the transport of energy resources of Russia and Central Asia to Europe INOGATE Framework agreement was signed on July 22, 1999. Uzbekistan has entered in this agreement ((Emilian Kavalski 2007:43-45).⁴⁹ As far as TRACECA programme is Concern, It was initiated in 1993 in Brussels in EU- Central Asia and Caucasus ministers meeting. EU agreed to financed this project which was a transport axis project connecting with Central Asia via the Black sea, Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. Five central Asian Countries, there Caucasus Republics, Ukraine Moldova, Rumania, Bulgaria Turkey and Mongolia were part of it.

Following the 9/11 incidents and “War against International terrorism’ in Afghanistan Uzbekistan acquired an important geopolitical importance. EU long term goal such as democratization of political life, remove irregularities in the economies, combating organized, access to energy reserves and regional cooperation in the region were now associated with short term goals. Short terms goals were the cooperation with the countries to bring down Taliban regime, Cooperation on the distribution of humanitarian aid. Uzbekistan was a close ally of ‘War against International terrorism’. (Web link)⁵⁰ So, it was obvious that EU-Uzbek relations are very normal. EU decided to enhance its position in the region. It has decided to enhance political dialogue with countries of the region. The European Union is cooperating closely with those countries and International organization who are working in Central Asia. EU also decided to open a “Europa house’ in Tashkent. The main aim behind opening Europa house is to upgrade European presence in the region (Ibid).⁵¹

Uzbek-European Union relations in the Post-Andijan Period

Andijan is one of the 12 provinces of Uzbekistan located in Farghana valley. On May 12 and 13 of 2005, approximately 50-100 armed people gathered at main square of the capital. The aim was to protest the judgment of 23 local businessmen who were prosecuted for committing terror crimes as being a member of a group known as the Akramia. (Ibid)⁵²

However, they were suppressed by the Uzbek forces. Eyewitness said that around 500 civilians, including men and children, were killed, but the Government said that only 187 people were killed (Ibid).⁵³ European Union along with United States has demanded for an independent international investigation of this incident, but Uzbek authorities strongly reject the demand (Olcoot M B 2007:336)⁵⁴. As the Uzbek authorities remained intransigent, the EU general Affairs Council chaired by Jack Stalk, imposed an arms embargo, a visa ban on ministers and officials directly responsible for the Andijan events, suspended technical meetings under the EU-Uzbekistan partnership co-operation agreement and redirected assistance programmes to remove poverty and support human rights, democracy and Civil Society in the republic (Ibid)⁵⁵. Norway and Switzerland supported the EU by adopting similar measures. In November 2006, EU renewed the arms embargo and visa ban against Uzbekistan. For three months, but welcomed the Uzbekistan agreement to dialogue with EU on Andijan and human rights. However in November 2007, EU lifted the ban on technical meetings under the partnership cooperation Agreement under the partnership cooperation agreement in fact the impact of EU ban was minimal because Russia and China were very supportive towards Uzbekistan (Ibid)⁵⁶. It is notable that Russia is the largest investor and trading partner of Uzbekistan. Indeed, we can say

that EU is emerging economic power and having a good relation with Uzbekistan entrance in position in this region.

UZBEKISTAN - IRAN RELATIONS:

The Sudden demise of Soviet Union and the emergence of newly Independent republic in Central Asia have strongly affected the Iranian foreign policy. The demise of the Soviet Union was greeted with mixed feelings by Iranian political leaders. They welcomed the disappearance of the military threat passed by the superpower bordering the northern frontier of Iran, but they were more apprehensive that it might create a new set of dynamics for Iran's domestic and regional security (Alam M.M, 2005:186).⁵⁷ However the newly independent republics of the region provided an opportunity to Iran to expand its influence. Initially, Unwillingness of United State to take part in Central Asia in any matter and its 'Russia first policy' has provided golden opportunity to Iran to increase its influence. But later on, United States supported Turkey by trying to fortify its regional position and to contain Iran – so called "hostile regional power (ibid).⁵⁸ Iran's policy towards Central Asia is affected by various dynamics. These dynamics are regional and domestic determinants of Iranian foreign policy, the geo political role of Islam, Russia-Iran relations, US presence in the Central Asian region and Iran's Centrality and its geo political location in determining transportation of Central Asian hydrocarbon resources.

Iran relations with Central Asian Countries have been largely mixed. Iran Turkmenistan relations have been most expansive and successful as both states have adopted a policy of accommodation and security neutrality (Ibid: 191)⁵⁹. Economic link especially in the area of energy, pipelines and strategic transportation links have also shaped the bilateral relations. Iran Tajik relations are basically based on both

ideology and cultural ties. Iran success, however, in Tajikistan has been affected by the Russian domination. Iran's relations with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have been gradually improved since 1992, while overcoming the earlier ideological political barriers of radical Islamic threat during the Tajik civil war period (Ibid: 192)⁶⁰.

Iran's relations with Uzbekistan are most complicated. Uzbekistan's ambition of regional leadership has been viewed by Iran as an Imperialist strategy. Iran close relationship with U.S. and Israel and its view about Iranian nuclear programme have shaped the Uzbek-Iran relations in larger context.

Uzbekistan and Middle East Relations and its Impact on Iran:-

Uzbekistan supported US stand on Middle-East countries like Iraq, Iran and Israel. Sadayek Safaev, the first deputy foreign minister of Uzbekistan said in March 2002 that "Uzbekistan has voted 100 percent with United States in United Nations on the controversial issues (Akbarzadeh Shahram, 2008:57)⁶¹. On the question of Israel Uzbekistan deliberately kept it away from voting. Uzbekistan is the first central Asian country which established diplomatic relation with Israel. President I.A. Karimov is the first Central Asian leaders who visited Israel in September 1998. This indicates the closeness between Israel and Uzbekistan. Unlike U.S. and European Union Israel did not Comment any time on political reform and human right violations in Uzbekistan.

Another issue in Middle East is Iran long term dispute with United States. Uzbekistan regarded Iran as a dangerous influence in Central Asia. Iran was seen as a supporting religious fanaticism in Tajikistan and the Shiite minority in Uzbekistan (Ibid)⁶². Uzbekistan was fully stood by the U.S. view that Iran is a sponsor of International terrorism. So, when Clinton administration imposed trade sanctions on Iran in May

1995, Uzbekistan Indorsed that policy. This stand was leading to the cancellation of a planned visit to Tehran by the Uzbek foreign minister. The Uzbekistan pro-US Policy became clear once again When UN general Assembly took a vote on 'Iran – Libya oil sanction act'. Uzbekistan fully supported to United States.

On the issue of Iranian nuclearization, Uzbekistan always opposed because Uzbekistan is not favour of the nuclearization of the region. Uzbekistan wants to create a nuclear free zone in the region. According Touzbeki star Iranian nuclear programme will be a major threat for regional stability.

Trade relations with Iran:

The trade relationship between these countries has been largely ups and down due to its strained political relations. But since the last phase of 1990s positive tendency is marked in the trade developments. More than 58 agreements were signed in trade related issues which shaped the Iran-Uzbek trade relationship. Bilateral trade relations regulated with the agreements, such as 'agreement on promotion and reciprocal protections of Investments (Web link)⁶³.

Today more than 89 companies with participation of the Iranian investors are running in Uzbekistan. 23 of them are with 100% of Iranian Investment. There companies are basically produced, agricultural productions, spice, building materials and goods for daily use. In the sphere of transportation the construction are putting in operation of the railway live Tedjan-Sarakhs-Bandar-Abbas, in which experts from Uzbekistan also participated. This Construction has given opportunities to reach to the world market through Persian Gulf. National center for the drug control of the republic of the Uzbekistan signed an agreement with Iran on fighting against drug and Psychopathic substances. This agreement was signed on June 11, 2000. A joint

venture with Pharmaceutical Company of “Doctor Abidi” of Iran is created in Samarkand (Ibid)⁶⁴. Health ministry of Uzbekistan permitted this company to using 18 kinds of medicines in health care. In 2007 commodity exchange between Uzbekistan and Iran has reached US \$584.1 million. For instance export - \$554.0 million, import-\$30.1 million – that assumes positive balance for the sum \$523.9 million (Ibid) 64. Today Iran is included into the 10 basic trade partner of Uzbekistan. These two countries have cultural relations since ancient time. The Iranian scientist and scholars have participated frequently in Uzbek seminars and exhibitions. The Iranian singers are participating on a regular basis in the International music festival ‘Sharq-Taronari’ (oriental melodies) (Ibid)⁶⁵.

Thus, we can say that Iranian trade partnership is much stronger than the political one. Today’s United States relations with Uzbekistan are not good. So, it is in favour of Iran to have a good relation with Russia. Iran can enjoy a comfortable ties with Uzbekistan Iran is a major external power in the region and good relations would be beneficial for both the countries. Iranian policy in Uzbekistan has been characterized by restraint and moderation, fuelled by a desire to establish itself by a desirable economic power and non-Interventionist neighbor (Bohr Annet1998:62).⁶⁶

Uzbekistan – Turkey Relations:

For Centuries, the Central Asia is integrated into the cultures and economies of the Turkey (Ibid: 61)⁶⁷. Uzbekistan’s effort to maintain cultures and economic relations with Turkey was a natural out come economic relations with Turkey is a natural outcome for Independence. Turkey had common ethnic, linguistic and religious similarities with the erstwhile Soviet states, especially Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan which amounted nearly 85% of the former

Soviet Union's Muslim population (Sindhu K.S, 2005:179)⁶⁸. The majority of Turkey groups living in the central Asian states are predominantly Sunni Muslim). These common characteristics and Turkey's economic policies and secular institutions attracted the central Asian states towards it: With a hope that they would receive technical and financial support from Turkey (Ibid)⁶⁹. Turkey is tried hard to prevent Iran from emerging regional Muslim power in the region. Turkey relations with the U.S and Western European countries could prove it to present itself as a role model status for newly independent states in Central Asia. Major problem in this way was Turkey lacks of familiarity with the Socio-political behavior of these newly Independent Asian states, as it had kept itself isolated from these area due to the fear of Communism. (Ibid)⁷⁰ Soviet Union also did not allow much interaction with these states due to fear of Islamic fundamentalism.

Any way, the role played by Turkey in Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular proved to be more limited in scope that it earlier anticipated. Initially, the relationship between both countries developed without major problems. In 1991, Tashkent proclaimed its allegiance to the Turkish model of economic development. Uzbekistan also adopted the Turkish system of higher education. Turkey also provided training programme for Uzbek personnel in highly specialized skills area. The relationship between these two countries got deteriorated in 1993. Uzbekistan authority recognized that all Turkish model and methods were not suitable for Uzbekistan. It is argued that this was the cause of deterioration of relations, but another cause also involved. Some Turkish politicians criticized Uzbekistan and emphasized about Turkey's 'special role' and Islamic influence in the republic. Further, the Uzbek leaders were very anxious about Islamic influence in Turkey. Although Turkey is a secular state but Islamic influence is very strong in Turkey.

Uzbekistan fears lies in the fact that Turkish and Muslims influence might become very serious in some regions of Uzbekistan. Apart from this, some of Uzbek's opposition leader took shelter in Turkey. It was very frustrating for Uzbekistan leaders. Even cultural relations are turned out be weaker than earlier Anticipated, as evidenced by Tashkent's decision in August 1997 to recall Uzbek students studying in Turkish universities (Bohr Annet 1998:61)⁷¹

Uzbekistan's relations started to be better after Islamic oriented Government of Necmettin Erbakan. Uzbekistan active participation in NATO and Turkey's close ties with made this possible (Ibid) ⁷²Despite political difference between these two countries Turkish Investors are rapidly Uzbek-Turkish joint ventures operated in Uzbekistan in 2005. A large Uzbek-vehicle assembly plant called Samkochanto was put into operation in Samarkand (Web link)⁷³. Moreover, although bilateral trade figures are relatively low, Turkey still tops the non-CIS countries.

Uzbekistan and its neighbors

Uzbekistan is one of the Five Central Asian republics. It is also in a unique position. Uzbekistan shares a border with four other Central Asian republics such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan special role in this region has been recognized since the day of Soviet rule. In 1925, politburo member Mikhail Kalnin admitted, the Uzbekistan 'hegemonic role' in Central Asia. (Bohr Annet 1998:49)⁷⁴ Uzbekistan is most populous state in the region. Uzbek Diaspora is living in every country of central Asia.

Distribution of Uzbeks within Central Asia in 1989 -

Republic	Number	Percentage of Republic population
Uzbekistan	14, 123, 626	71.3
Kazakhstan	332, 016	2.0
Kyrgyzstan	550, 095	12.9
Turkmenistan	317, 352	8.0
Tajikistan	1,197,091	23.5

Source, Natsionalkyi Sostav Naseleniia: Chast II Moscovl, 1989, cited by Bohr Annet (1998), in, Uzbekistan politics and foreign policy, the royal institute of international affairs, publication. London.

If we analyze, this table it can easily find out that Uzbekistan has a relatively homogenous population.

Although it lacks the energy wealth Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan has the largest army, well developed Industries, an extensive network of research institutes of higher education establishments and a large intelligentsia (Ibid)⁷⁵. Giving these facts about Uzbekistan is just an attempt to mention the vital role of Uzbekistan in the Central Asia which has been very instrumental regarding the shaping relations of Uzbekistan with other countries of the region. Slight edge of Uzbekistan over these countries has been boosting the Uzbekistan Ambition of regional hegemony.

Uzbekistan is very much interested to have good relations with Kazakhstan than with any other Central Asian states. Perhaps Kazakhstan enthusiastic support to Russia is behind these relations. Uzbek president Islam Karimov and Kazakhstani president Nur Sultan Nazerbaev are two more important leaders in the region. Both

are competing to each other for establish their supremacy. The tightening customs measures by Kazakh authorities with Uzbekistan has been creating problems between there two countries. (Ibid)⁷⁶ Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan relations have been strained by fears among Kyrgyz leaders that Tashkent may take great interest in Kyrgyz affairs. Uzbekistan military exercises in Osh region of Kyrgyzstan which has a large Uzbek Diaspora led to some serious problem. Kyrgyz authorities accused Uzbek army for openly arming to the people of Osh region (Olcott M.B 1996:107)⁷⁷.

Uzbekistan had a periodical disagreement with its neighbours over the allocation of water resources and payments for oil and gas. In the Soviet era, most of water reservoirs were builds on Kyrgyz territories to irrigate the Uzbek's cotton fields. But after the disintegration, Kyrgyzstan demanded to payment for its water, but Uzbekistan reached harshly and threat to cut coal and gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan(Bohr Annet1998:50)⁷⁸.

In 1997, Kyrgyz Parliament adopted a resolution and revised the terms and condition that could enable Kyrgyzstan to receive payments from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. (Ibid)⁷⁹ Apart from this after a September 11, 2001 strong U.S. presence in the reason provided some common issues for these two countries. For example, President Karimov and President Akayev of Kyrgyzstan had been very supportive of US led war against terrorism. Uzbekistan was very much upset about Tulip revolution which took place in March 2005, in Kyrgyzstan. Because Uzbek leadership assumes the opinion that Western form democracy is a dangerous ideology for a young state.

While Uzbekistan's diplomatic relations with Kyrgyzstan has been by a large good, its relations with Turkmenistan were noticeably cool during the early years of

independence. (Ibid: 51)⁸⁰. There have been various disagreements regarding collective water use and ownership rights of a large oil and gas deposit situated on the two countries common border. Turkmenistan 'neutrality' has been very frustrating for Uzbekistan, specially regarding to the Uzbekistani Initiative for Central Asian Integration. Islam Karimov's special efforts to convince Turkmenistan to join central Asian Union, was an example of this. (Kaushik Devendra 2000:35)⁸¹. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have also signed agreements for construction of a gas pipeline to Pakistan through Afghanistan.

Although the conflict in Tajikistan is frequently characterized by the Uzbek leadership and Western media as a struggle between ex-communist forces and Islamic fundamentalists, the regional royalties and uneven distribution of power between central and regional units have played much more important role. The Khojand region in Northern Tajikistan has a large Uzbek population; these Uzbek minorities in Tajikistan are closely connected (culturally and economically) to Uzbekistan. In May 1992 Karimov played an active role in Tajikistani politics to secure a Khojandi-Kulobi alliance and its dominant position in Tajik government. In November 1994 Kulobis won the parliamentary and presidential elections. After that Uzbek minorities accused the Kulobi – dominated government, that they are being discriminated. Alarmed by this Uzbek Government advocated the Coalition government in Tajikistan that would include member of Tajik opposition. (Bohr Annet 1998:52)⁸² In April 1995, Karimov met leader of Tajikistan Uzbek Akbar Akbar Turajonzod, took the international community by surprise because he was closely associated with Anti Government activities. An assassination attempt was carried out on Tajikistan president Imomali Rahmonov in April 1997 during visit of Khojand. However, in

June 1997 a peace accord was signed by different factions of Tajikistan. But Uzbekistan role was very controversial in this matter. Uzbekistan relationship with Tajikistan However progressed swiftly after that incident. U.S. presence in the region in Post-9/11 period has significantly increased the importance of this region. Apart from Uzbekistan, Aiani (Dushame) airport in Tajikistan and Manas Airfield in Kyrgyzstan were used by Americans. Only Turkmenistan imposed strict limits on its military Cooperation with United States due to its 'positive neutrality'. (Olcoot M.B2007:338)⁸³. Uzbekistan was the first Country to provided such facilities to US and later all countries followed the same. The economic cooperation between Uzbekistan and central Asian Countries has always been minimal. Although. It is said that Central Asian Countries have always been on the top priority in economic sphere of Uzbekistan. Burt Russia china and South Korea are the main business partner of Uzbekistan.

Thus, it clearly indicates that the steps towards regional cooperation are necessary. Some initiatives have been already taken. Since the Independence Central Asian states have been developing regional cooperation through their membership in various forums such as CIS, the central Asian Economic union later renamed Central Asian Economic Community, Eurasian Economic Community and the Economic Cooperation Organization which includes Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. The prospect of future developments of regional cooperation in Central Asia viewed with optimism by its participants, particularly by president Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan who have provided a conceptual framework for Central Asian Union under the slogan 'our Common home Turkestan'(Kaushik Devendra 2000: 38)⁸⁴. However, the analysts are not very much optimistic about the future of regional cooperation in the region. They

stated that every Central Asian republics pursues its own interests and leader of none of these republics willing to delegate their powers to any supranational organ unless there is some grave political or economic crisis.

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Chapter - 4

CHALLENGES OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF UZBEKISTAN

Since the declaration of Independence of the republic of Uzbekistan, many attempts had been made to answer questions related to the challenges of Uzbek Foreign policy, but there are not unanimity among scholars. The orientation and practice of Uzbekistan's foreign policy since the nation achieved independence in December, 1991 the challenges at the domestic level have profoundly impacted the development of Uzbek foreign policy. Challenges at domestic level are political and economic reforms and Uzbekistan poor records regarding human right violations. At the external level, international terrorism including radicalization of Islamic forces within Uzbekistan, border disputes with neighboring countries and try to attract foreign direct investment are the major challenges of the Uzbekistan's Foreign policy. This chapter will explore the democratization and political process in Uzbekistan, which have been seen as an absence of reforms by the outside World. Islamic radicalization, border disputes, economic reforms are the other features of this chapter which are creating challenges for Uzbekistan foreign policy. These are the problems which have been creating international pressure for Uzbekistan. Apart from this, all the problems like drug trafficking and environmental problem like Aral Sea depletion will be also discussed.

DEMOCRATIZATION IN UZBEKISTAN

Democratization has been always a major cause for international pressure. External powers and countries have generally determined the form of political system in Uzbekistan

as authoritarian. This image has profoundly impacted on Uzbek Foreign policy. The financial assistance received from the West is limited, largely as a result of pressure on Uzbekistan for so called democratic reform. But it could be unfair if we would not consider Uzbekistan's Own view about democracy for a new state.

After the Independence the political elites of newly Independent countries of central Asia promised to build a democratic political system guided by rule of law and a constitution with provisions for human rights, Separation of power, Independent judiciary regular holdings of periodic elections which are generally considered to be the key features of a democratic form of Government (Mohapatra, N. K. 2005:46).¹ Uzbekistan which is considered as a hub of Central Asia due to its geographical location, vast natural resources and rich history, has been engaged in tackling the problem of how to consolidate the democratization process in the post- Soviet period and at the same time maintain its stability in view of its transitional problems (Fierman William 1997:378).² It would be unfair to say that attempts have not been taken towards democratization in Uzbekistan. The first step towards democratization in Uzbekistan was the holding of the presidential election in December 1991. The Birlik party, which was very popular, was not even able to register itself because it did not acquired members necessary of the party for the nomination of presidential candidate. Erk party candidate Muhammed Salih contested the presidential elections, however, he got only 12% percent vote. But this was a crucial step towards democratization because two candidates contested first time directly. After getting 86% percent of vote in his fovour the Uzbek president Islam Karimov made efforts to consolidate his position in Uzbekistan. Karimov made statement on several occasions that

strong leadership is necessary for country's transitional socio-economic and political situation. He further pointed out that "Western notion of democracy couldn't be applicable to the situation prevailing in the republic as it is likely to promote political instability and development process will be at stake (Shoheen Ayubi, 1995;3).³ He was also very critical of Western media for having 'repeatedly made Uzbekistan appears to be some kind of African dictatorship (Ibid).⁴ Another major attempt towards Democratization was to hold first competitive election in 1994 of oliy majlis which was established by the new constitution in December 1992. But only two parties were allowed to contest elections. The two parties were people Democratic party (PDP) and Fatherland Party. PDP won the election. After this election, president Karimov's tenure has been extended till 2000. At the same time president Karimov resigned from PDP and according to Western norms stated that "Only a non partisan Head of state act as a guarantor of the country's constitution and respect human rights. Before the new parliament election in 2000 the Uzbek parliament abolished the five percent margin for party blocs and all the five political parties were allowed to contest in the elections. In comparison to 1994 parliamentary election where only two parties were allowed to contest the elections, this was certainly a step forward towards more accountable and just democratization. The five democratic parties which were allowed to contest the elections were People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, Adolat Social Democratic party, Vatan Taraqqiyat (Progress for the fatherland party), Fidokorlar Party and Milly Tiklanish.

The Central Electoral Commission noted that election had taken place according democratic principles and laws of the country. The chairman of the central Electoral Commission Mr. Najmiddin Kamilov, stated that democratic process was developed in

Uzbekistan. Even international observer like OSCF headed by Madeline Wilken stated that, “they had assessed all aspects of the election campaign and elections and there have been many improvements in the legislative structure since the first step towards Democracy had been taken during the years of independence (Mahopatra, N. K. 2005:49)⁵. If we compare these elections with 1994 elections we can definitely notice that despite all allegations of electoral irregularities, efforts were made towards further Democratization with participation of five parties and attendance of International observers. In the January 2000 presidential elections, the Central Election Commission allowed all the five parties to participate in the elections. The largest political party or Uzbekistan People Democratic Party nominated their own candidate in form of Abdul hafiz Jalalove, while other parties have supported to Islam Karimov. It was quite a surprise because every one assumed that no one can fight elections against Islam Karimov. However, Karimov won the elections and got 91.9 percent of the total vote.

Mean while the 11 September events occurred. In the aftermath of 11 September incident many scholars argue that apart from change in the geopolitical situation one can also see a marked change in the perception of political elite about the existing political situation in the respective Central Asian republics (Ibid)⁶. The political elite suddenly realized the need to promote democracy to ease foreign pressure and to get foreign aid. The Uzbek Government also made some attempts in this regard. During his visit to Washington in March 2002, the Uzbek President Islam Karimov agreed to further democratize the country. Both countries signed an agreement on the strategic partnership and cooperation (Ibid).⁷ One very important and vital development took place after 11 September incident was the holding of referendum to extend the term of president and establishing a bi-cameral

legislature. Similar exercise was earlier held in Kazakhstan. This referendum was approved by overwhelmingly majority. The 93.65 percent of electorate approved the creation of a bicameral parliament and 91.78 percent of the electorate approved the extension of president's term from five to seven years (ibid)⁸.

The creation of bicameral legislature has in fact been a land mark even in the democratic history of the country since its independence in 1991. The basic purpose to introduce bicameral legislature was to improve the effectiveness of the legislature and further democratizing the country. If we consider about the composition of the Senate (Uzbek's parliament upper house), six member is elected from the every region, this was done to equal representative to the entire region. At the same time bicameral legislature by giving representation to all region of the country also provides equal opportunity to participate in the affairs of the state. The third election of Oliy Majlis and first ever direct election to its new bicameral parliament took place in December 2004. Elections took place for 120 seats of the legislative chamber of parliament. According to the Election Commission of Uzbekistan 489 candidates took part in the elections out of which 54 were independent. Five political parties- Adolat, Fidokorlar, Liberal Democratic Party, Milliy Tiklanish and the people's Democratic Party took part in the election. The voting procedure was held by international observers from as many as 35 Countries, conforming to democratic standards, which ruled out chances of bogus voting, intimidation or inducement to influence the outcome. However, according to the OSCE, the elections in Uzbekistan were short of OSCE Commitments and other International standards for democratic elections (ibid)⁹. Opposition groups Birlik, Erk and Ozod Dehkontar could not participate in these elections. But it will be wrong to judge Uzbekistan from the standards of democratic countries with

strong tradition of voting going back to centuries or many decades. Uzbekistan did not have democratic elections under a single communist party system. It was only when it became free after the break-up of USSR some 17 years ago that it began to shape its own destiny and take the affairs of state in the hands, without looking towards Moscow. But the process of democracy has now evolved and there is no going back on it. At the present moment there is a national consensus on the need of democratic reforms and democratization. The excessive power has been much talked in Western media. Critics emphasized that Karimov has maintained a tight grip on political activity which is against democratic process. They stated that, this has been achieved through a combination of judicial and extrajudicial harassment and elimination of its opponents. (E.g. the leader of Erk party Muhammed Solih who contested the first presidential election against Karimov currently living in exile). But the Uzbekistan's perspective is quite different. We can quote the statement of president Karimov, which was given after the establishment of bicameral legislature on 27 January 2002. He stated that "At a certain stage of historic change you need a strong will and a certain figure... and you have to use some authoritarian means at times. He further says, "Authoritarian power will diminish with the rise of political consciousness (Web link).¹⁰ Karimov believes that Uzbekistan is not ready for Western style of democracy. Karimov has frequently emphasized that 'evolution not revolution' is the answer to country's political problem. Karimov is also very aware about volatile situation of Afghanistan, with which Uzbekistan share a border. This country remains threat to the stability for the region. Instability in Tajikistan was a great lesson for Uzbekistan. Therefore, Uzbekistan has tried to established strong center which can face and tackle any problem .Karimov doesn't want a 'Rose revolution' which threw out

Eduard shevardnadze in Georgia or an "orange "version which shook up Ukrainian politics (Cherian john 2005.43)¹¹ and Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan which threw out Askar Akayev from the power. That is why when Andijan incident have occurred Uzbekistan regarded this as a threat of the country to the stability to the country.

Challenges to the Democratic process in Uzbekistan

The use of general nation of nationalism and the promotion of indigenous traditions (inter-ethnic relations) to gain public legitimacy have been creating problems for the democratic process in Uzbekistan. Excessive focus on Uzbek culture, literature and literary figures led to marginalization of national minorities especially Russian who have played substantial role in shaping the country's industrial, agricultural and educational level during the Soviet period. The drastic decline in the Uzbek economy after independence provided an impetus to the marginalization of Russian (Mohapatra N. K. 2005:60)¹². The Russian political alienation in new setup of Uzbekistan has responsible for their marginalization.

Another major factor which plays a big role to creating obstacles for the Democratization process in Uzbekistan is religious extremism. The emergence of religion based parties like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahir-al-islami (HTI) whose basic objective are to establish an Islamic caliphate governed by Koranic principle rather than the rule of law, has also stymied the growth of democratic governed state in Uzbekistan. These extremist groups have made demand of Islam as state religion, implementation of the shariyah in the state and Segregation of boys and girls in educational

institutions (Ibid)¹³. They also have demanded for the handling the primary education in the country. Uzbek Government could not appease these Islamic extremist groups. Therefore a series of terrorist activity and bomb explosions had occurred in Tashkent as well as various part of the country. These entire situations compelled Uzbek Government to centralize the power in one office that can fight successfully with these terrorists' organizations and groups. The Uzbek government pointed out on several occasions that we can not take any such initiative that can destabilize the existence of the country.

Apart from Islamic extremism another problem which creates problems for the growth of democratization in the post-Soviet Uzbekistan is nature of Uzbek economy. The major export items of Uzbekistan are cotton and gold. If the World prices declines of these products the impact on Uzbek economy is viable. We have seen in 1998 and 1999 when due to this Uzbek economy have deteriorated. In 1999 around 45,200 people were registered as unemployed. Although the exact figure were believed to be higher as a result of hidden unemployment in the region (Ibid).¹⁴ As we know that political stability of a country depends upon economic prosperity of the country. It is also fact that without stability whether it is political or economic, democracy cannot exist. At the end, we can easily say that, for a hunger and unemployed person democracy does not mean anything. A minimum necessity of life should be fulfilled otherwise democratic process cannot flourish in any country.

An analysis of democratic reforms as a challenge of foreign policy of Uzbekistan clearly shows that the like many newly independent states of Asia and Africa Uzbekistan facing similar problems. Although excessive external pressures have always faced by the

Uzbekistan, but its democratic progress cannot be regarded negative. Uzbekistan has got its independence seventeen years before, which is very short period of time for the development of democracy in the country. It needs some more time to adopt Western democratic values, norms and ethos in its Political system. Although Criticism is good because it provides opportunity to evaluate itself but excessive criticism may create some type of disappointment and it may harm progress and development. That is why a balance should be maintained by Western media and Western countries about democratic process in Uzbekistan.

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM: A CHALLENGE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF UZBEKISTAN:

Religious extremism has always been a major problem for Uzbek Foreign policy. The Religious or Islamic extremism has created challenges for Uzbek foreign policy since independence. As we know Islamophobia had been very prominent in Uzbek's government security concern and decision making. So it is necessary to evaluate the nature, activities goal and ambitions of these religious extremism in Uzbekistan.

Since the independence, Uzbekistan has been facing a number of security problems arising from the actions of the religious extremists groups and parties oppose to the Government (Dwivedi, R. K. 2005:124)¹⁵. These parties and groups are:

- * Islamic Renaissance/ Revival party (IRP)
- * Adolat (Justice)

- * Islam Lashkarlori (Warriors of Islam)
- * Tovba (Repentance)
- * Imon Chilar (Believers) or Akromlylar or, Khalifatchilar (Caliphate supporters)
- * Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
- * Hizb-ut-Tahrir (party of Liberation)
- * Islamic Movement of Turkestan (Central Asia)

During the Soviet era the Islamic activities are largely restricted and Soviet policies were framed with a view to undermine the hold of religion on people's mind. After independence of Uzbekistan, political Islam began to rise as an important factor of Uzbek social and political life. Some Central Asian analysts believe that political deprivation and corruption lead to frustration and discontent thus giving birth to religious extremism (Ibid)¹⁶. They believed that poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment and monetary inflation are the main cause of religious extremism. But these approaches cannot explain why extremism is emerging in those countries where economic condition is not bad at all. On the other hand, Moderate Islamic thinker had criticized this religious extremism because they assume that extremism ignores classical Islamic criteria for a just Jihad. Islam does not justify suicide attacks rather it prohibits the same. A passage from Hadish of the prophet Mohammed:

"Whoever kill himself in any way in this world will be tormented in that way in hell" and whoever kills himself in any way in the world will be tormented with it one the day of resurrection (Ibid).¹⁷

So, the Psychological and behavioral motivation are the key element behind the

suicide attacks and religious extremism which is based on intolerance.

EMERGENCE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN UZBEKISTAN:-

The religious extremism in Uzbekistan can be traced back to the 1950s. Muhammad Hindustani Rustamov or Haji Dolma was one of the influential unofficial spiritual leaders in Uzbekistan. For his Islamic activities he was arrested in 1929 and sent to Siberia and spent 15 years in jail. His followers joined the Wahhabi movement. He died in 1989, but his recorded speeches are still in circulation among Wahhabis which help in recruiting new members. To train their activist Wahhabies used illegal ways of sending their people to religious educational institutions in Islamic countries. Firstly they support the activists commercially and slowly activists generally become truly extremists.

THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL PARTY (IRP)

The Islamic Revival Party of the USSR was established in June 1990, in Astrakhan in the Russian Federation. However, this party could not work for a long time in Uzbekistan and was banned soon by the government. The party members and supporters worked secretly. Imam at the Ata Ali Khan Tura Mosque in Namangan and follower of Rahmatulla Qori, Abd-al-Ahad, along with his supporter called for an Islamic state based on Shariya. They claimed that this would solve all the socio-economic problems and would end despotism, inequality and criminal order (Ibid)¹⁸. Supporters of the banned IRP created the Adolat party (Justice party) in 1991. Two underground groups were also established with the purpose of establishing an Islamic state. These groups were Islam Lashkarlari (Warriors of Islam) and Turba. The activists of the Adolat party attacked the headquarters of the Communist Party of

Uzbekistan in Namangan on Dec 1991 because city administration did not allow to build a mosque at their desired place. By the time Tohir Yuldashev Abduhalilovich emerged as the strong leader in Farghana Valley. The main ambition of these religious extremists was to overthrow Karimov's government in Tashkent. Alarmed by this Uzbek government took strict action against these extremist groups. By 1995, the government was able to control their activities.

HIZB-UT-TAHRIR :

Hizb-ut-Tahrir-al-Islami (Islamic party of liberation) is religious-political party with its headquarters (amirat) is located in Western Europe (probably in Germany) and has its branches called amirates in Palestine, Jordan, Egypt and other Arab countries as well as Turkey and several European countries (Ibid).¹⁹ Hizb-ut-Tahrir was originally linked to the Muslim brotherhood. It was founded in 1952 by Taqi-al-Din al Nabhani in Jerusalem and was initially concerned with the caused of Palestinian liberation. The main goal of Hizb-ut Tahrir was to persue the boundless sovereignty of Allah led Hizb-ut Tahrir to go beyond existing state boundary and champion the recreation of one Islamic state to incorporate all Muslim societies (Akbarzadeh Shahram, 2005:34)²⁰. Hizb-ut-Tahrir believes that, for the creation of Islamic caliphate throughout the Muslim world, Jihad is necessary against corruption and Kufr (disbelief) which have replaced the shariya and Islamic way of life. The demise of Soviet Union and opening of central Asia to the outside world provided an opportunity to Hizb-ut-Tahrir to infiltrate this region. Its massage of social justice and Islamic unity appears to have found resonance among Uzbek youth who are being alienated by the absence of employment prospect and the failure of the social

security system to protect them against the adverse impact of market economy. Consequently, the projected Islamic state in Uzbekistan, a step towards creating transnational caliphates strongly appears to those Muslims who feel betrayed by the government of Islam Karimov (Ibid).²¹ Initially HT rejects violence as its objectives. Its strategy has proved to be its greatest asset in Central Asia, as well as in broader context. Its nonviolent campaign and moderate approaches which does not include ethnic favoritism, discrimination against Woman and favorers democratic practices – have made it an attractive choice. But HT's nonviolent strategy did not enable it to become a legal organization in Uzbekistan. Its nonviolent strategy allowed it to operate in European countries with fully freedom. HT used this freedom to conduct a propaganda campaign against the Uzbek regime aimed at influencing Western public opinion and human right organization. The Uzbek regime has insisted for many years that HT as an extremists organization with link to IMU. Tashkent has lobbied Russia, the European community and the United States to list HT as terrorist organization. Unlike the clear case of IMU Western powers have been very hesitant to do so (Ibid)²². However, Kyrgyz security forces found some solid evidence to link extremism with HT in the Osh and Jalal-Abad provinces of Kyrgyzstan. After the events of 11 September 2001, which caused U.S-led anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, made a profound impact on Hizb-ut Tahrir? After the campaign in Afghanistan against terrorist, the position of Hizb-ut-Tahrir changed and they became much more radical. Hizb-ut Tahrir aligned with Al-Qaeda, Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), proving their position with the fact that they fight for the creation of world caliphate (Dwivedi Ramakant, 2005: 132)²³. A group of HT named, Zamots is reported to have organized attacks in Tashkent, in which more than 46 were

killed. The suicide bomb attacks have occurred in front of US and Israeli embassies in Tashkent on July 30, 2004 in which seven people were killed and several others were injured. However, HT denied its involvement in these attacks. The radicalization of HT is very dangerous because having a large membership earlier this organization may try to politicize Islam Further which would be against Uzbek stability.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU):-

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was created by Tohir Yuldashev in 1996, soon after realizing that the Tajik opposition would sign a peace accord with Tajik government.(Ibid).²⁴ Tohir Yuldashev and his commanders Juma Numangani and Tajiboy were guided the IMU and also contributed in expanding and strengthening the base of IMU. Juma Numangani joined the Soviet military service in 1989.He also served for limited time in Afghanistan during the Soviet military presence there. From 1989 onwards he started the study of Islam and received spiritual education from the well known Abdulvali Mirzoyev. From 1991 he became an active supporter of wahabism in order to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan (Ibid).²⁵

The objectives of IMU are to overthrow Karimov's Government and establish an Islamic state. The IMU has been strongly anti Karimov and defines its aim as the removal of Kafir leaders from power in Tashkent and establishing an Islamic state. The clandestine and guerrilla nature of IMU activities have made it very difficult to find out about membership literature of the organization. In august 1999 an appeal to jihad was posted on the internet by the IMU which stated that 'The primary objective for this declaration of Jihad is the establishment of an Islamic state with the application of the shaahri, founded

upon the Koran and the noble Prophetic Sunnah' (Akbarzadeh Shahram, 2005 P-32)²⁶.

In February 1999, a series of bomb blast in Tashkent have been noticed which were immediately blamed on Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Sixteen people were died and more than hundred wounded in this attack. Uzbek president Islam Karimov had Survived in this attack. In August 1999 IMU fighters conducted a daring raid into the Batkan district of Kyrgyzstan, close to the border of Uzbekistan and took village officials, residents and four Japanese Scientist hostages (Ibid).²⁷ The IMU clarified that this operation was against Karimov Government in Uzbekistan and not intended to destabilize Kyrgyzstan. The objective of this incursion was to destabilize the situation in Uzbekistan and to create an Islamic state in Farghana Valley (Dwivedi Ramakant: 2005: 128)²⁸. In August 2000 and in July 2001, the IMU fighters attacked government forces in southern Uzbekistan in the mountain region just outside the Tashkent.

The Islamic Party of Turkistan also known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan till the 2003 had been recognized by USA state department as one of the most dangerous international terrorist organizations. The main objectives of this organization are to establish Islamic state and overthrow the Constitutional government. This party is getting financial support from international Islamic movement and Uzbek donations from Uzbek Diaspora in other Islamic countries. It also gain financial support form Pakistan and some other countries. IPT has associated with some Islamic groups of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Chechnya and Xingziang Uighur autonomous region of China (Ibid).²⁹ Tohir Yuldastev is the leader of IPT after the death of Juma Numangani. The leader of IPT made contacts various Islamic terrorist organization and movement like, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Ikhwan-al-Muslamin.

The IMU is proving to be much more agile and Challenging force than its predecessor, The IRP and Hizb-ut-Tahrir. It demonstrated a remarkable ability to maintain an organized fighting force with sufficient funds and logistics support to its Campaign. (Akabarzaden Shahram, 2005: 30)³⁰.

The Uzbek government has always been fearful regarding Islamic extremism in the country. Uzbek decision-makers also assumed that Islamic extremism is too strong to face alone therefore. Uzbek government has been seeking International support time to time.

Seeking International and Regional Support against Religions Extremism:-

Islam has always been a determining factor in Uzbek foreign policy. Uzbekistan has joined various regional and extra regional organization and groups for tackling religious extremism. After the civil unrest in Tajikistan in 1992 CISCST (currently known as a CSTO) was formed. Tashkent felt it necessary to join only power available for protect itself from Islamic extremism. But Tashkent relationship with Russia, the senior partner of CST was very abnormal and Uzbekistan decided to leave the CST in April 1999. However Uzbekistan is not a part of CSTO but cooperation between other central Asian Countries within the framework of CSTO is a positive step to containing the religious extremist forces in the region. After that, Uzbekistan joined Shanghai - 5 in June 2001 (Shanghai – 5 is presently known as Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO) for getting support in combating religious extremism. SCO summit is held in Tashkent on June 17, 2004, all the member countries, e.g., Russia, China, Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan expressed their determination to eliminate religious extremism from the region. By opening the anti terrorist center in Tashkent, the process has been institutionalized (Dwivedi Ramakant, 2005:129)³¹.

Uzbekistan has also signed various strategic partnerships to get external cooperation to contain extremism. In March 2002, U.S.-Uzbek strategic cooperation has included a cooperation framework regarding extremism and Uzbek security and Sovereignty. The strategic partnership agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Russian federation signed on July 17, 2004 is another example of Uzbekistan's urgency to seeking international support to tackle extremism in the country. After Andijan incident, United States involvement in Uzbek affairs is very limited. Therefore Uzbek president Islam Karimov and former president of Russia Vladimir Putin agreed to a mutual security pact. This security pact creates a military alliance between the two former Soviet republics, stating that "in case of aggression against one of the parties by a third state, it will be viewed as an act of aggression against both countries." The agreement allows the mutual use by both parties of each other's military bases and installations (Web link).³²

The unresolved conflict in Afghanistan, transnational character as drug trafficking and religious extremism have complicated the issue further, Although role of external powers remain an important factor in sustaining the phenomenon of religious extremism, drug trafficking and organized crime are the main factors which boost extremism and creates favorable conditions for terrorism.

Presence of Islam in Uzbekistan has never been a problem in Uzbekistan but Islamization of politics according to the objectives of IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a serious threat to the stability and security of the region. So there is necessity for comprehensive coordination between the Central Asian Countries.

At the end, we can say that, extremism has always been a serious challenge for Uzbek Foreign policy. In fact every policy decisions whether it is related to domestic or

external affairs, has directly effected from this. We can also find out important changes in Uzbekistan Foreign policy due to this.

Economic Reforms in Uzbekistan:-

With Independence, Islam Karimov and ruling elite of the country had no prior experience in managing the republic entire economy as this responsibility was previously under the Control of Moscow and their regional representative (Kazemi Leila, 2003: 213).

³³ Due to this economic reforms are the major challenges of the countries. After independence, Uzbekistan tried to diversify the economy which was totally based on agricultural or on the Soviet era's 'cotton monoculture.' Karimov's economic plan had focused on labour-intensive economy which was based on agriculture and mineral extraction both. He also tried to increase oil and gas production to move from net importer to net exporter. They have shifted some crop production from cotton to grains to improve self – sufficiency and maintaining costly subsidies on basic food stuff and energy.

One of the fundamental decisions have been taken by Karimov Government was to introduced a new currency and leave the ruble zone in 1993. The new currency is the sum. This move created high inflation in the country. The government responded by imposing strict currency Control trade restrictions with neighbors, tight border Control; import contract registration law had blocked the reform process and created a hostile climate for investment (Ibid).³⁴ Uzbekistan's policies have also created a hostile environment for international investors despite the fact that attracting FDI has been a Central element of country's stated Foreign policy agenda.

The policy of Uzbek Government has been responsible for the relatively low growth rate in economic development during the period of 1998-2003. Realizing the

relative decline and stagnation in economic growth in 1998 and 2002, the government initiated the policy of economic liberalization as part of reforms.

Under this policy state control was to be reduced (Gidadhubli R.G. 2005:82).³⁵ External pressures also contributed to this change in the Uzbek policy. For instance, in the spring 2001, The International Monetary Fund had decided to fund out Uzbekistan. Since the Uzbekistan government refused to implant the economic reforms this was perhaps the most serious step taken by IMF since its joined the organization after independence (Ibid).³⁶ In response to this, Uzbekistan announced a new reform plan to bring out some changes in its economy. This plan was made with the consultations with the IMF authorities. This plan was covering all sphere of economy. The main economic priorities of this programme were liberalization, deepening reforms, reducing the tax burden on economies entities, creating conditions for stimulating foreign investment development of small business and strengthening privatization and development of securities market (Ibid).³⁷

Addressing the joint session of parliament the Uzbek President Islam Karimov highlighted the shift in the economic policy of Uzbekistan in January 2005. He indicated some directives for administrative bodies and emphasizes about the shortcoming in the policies and performances of the economy. The Uzbek Government also made some attempts to administrative reforms to reduce the role of state in economy. The main arm of administrative reforms in Uzbekistan is to speed up economic reforms, to maintain sustainable economic growth, increase incomes and living standard of the population. As far, as the process of privatization is concerned in Uzbekistan, this process had been initiated right from the Independence of this country. But this policy measure got a boost in

the reform plan and the role of private sector has increased in the economy, till the 2002. The process of privatization was very slow. The World Bank was not also satisfied with the slow process of privatization in Uzbekistan as stated in its report of 2002. Perhaps the strict control of state packages in large enterprises to private investors was not high. But situation has changed after the implementation of the policy of Reform plan. As per the official report, Privatization programme for 2003 to 2005 included the sale of state holding in 3,728 enterprises including 2,40 companies to be sold entirely. Foreign Direct Investment has also increased. For instance, during the 1992-96, Uzbekistan received about \$ 10 million, but due to economic reforms the foreign direct Investment has significantly increased. In 2004, particular the fuel and energy sector was expected to receive the major of investment amounting to \$ 1.6 million (Ibid).³⁸

Although Uzbekistan economic reform programme has been intended to reduce dependence on Russia, But during the last few years Russia has been playing an active role in Uzbek economy. In 2004, Uzbekistan had prepared plan to implement jointly with Russian companies 37 investments projects for a total of \$ 2.099 billion.

Finally, it may be stated that Uzbekistan has entered in a new phase of transition to a market economy. Major shift have taken place which increased the growth rate and investment in Uzbek economy. Attempt to reduce the role of state in the management of economy, step-up investment, reduce tax burden, more currency convertibility on current account are responsible for the improvement of Uzbek economy. Despite all there reforms Western countries have been always criticizing Uzbekistan. They should know that, any reform can take place step by step. Any economy cannot be fully open. The state protection is necessary for small industries which are not so skilled to face the Multinational

Companies. The negative impacts of Globalization have seen in various young states, that is why Uzbekistan was very cautious about this. But now, Uzbekistan has taken various major to ease out from International pressure in Foreign policy and International Community must co-operate with it.

Human right and Uzbek Foreign Policy

Allegations about human rights violations on Uzbekistan have been one of the major challenges for Uzbek Foreign policy. Uzbekistan as a highly centralized state in which human rights, including freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, are not respected (Web link).³⁹ Restrictive regional laws also reduced the ability of religious communities to function in Uzbekistan. Uzbek Government has maintained high degree of control over the every section of society and religious practices. Government authorities also crackdown harshly on Religious Peoples, groups, and mosques that do not conform to government – prescribed practices or that the government claims are associated with extremist political programme (Ibid).⁴⁰ This has resulted into thousand of people's imprisonment in recent years. Many of those were tortured or beaten in detention. Though, we can not ignore that the security threats are still exist in Uzbekistan inform of IMU and Hizb- ut- Tahrir but these threats do not excuse or justify the scope and harshness of the government's ill treatment of religious believers. Due to anxiety of freedom and belief in Uzbekistan, the United States Commission on International Religious freedom issued a report and recommendations on Uzbekistan in May 2002 and placed Uzbekistan on its Watch list. In 2005, the Commission recommended the Uzbekistan be designated a "Country of particular concern," pursuant to the International religious freedom act of

1998 (IRFA) (Ibid).⁴¹ This commission visited Uzbekistan in October 2004 and met with various Uzbek human right activists. An intensive series of talks had organized with senior officials, of the Foreign and Internal affairs and Justice Ministries, the committee on religious affairs and the parliamentary Ombudsman office. The delegation also met with representative of Islamic, Jewish, Christian, and other religious communities. In addition to Tashkent, the Commission visited the cities of Samarkand, Farghana, Margilon and Andijan, where the delegation met with regional officials, human right activists and local religious leaders. As a result of its monitoring activities, the Commission has concluded that the government of Uzbekistan is responsible for severe human right-violations including freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief and recommends that the country be designated a 'country of particular concern (CPC).' Human rights situation is bad in Uzbekistan and no one can ignore this. However, many reports use over dramatized statements and exaggerations. Report that there is no independent media, that there is no access to the internet, and that all the opponents of Islam Karimov are either in jail or in exile, are all example of such exaggerated statement. So, the entire International Community needs a picture that does not come only from Interest group propaganda, because judgment based on inaccurate, over-dramatized reports or considering only one side of the picture lead to wrong diagnosis and ineffective, counter productive or even dangerous actions.

Border disputes as a challenge of Uzbek Foreign policy:-

As a result of the demise of Soviet Union in the early 90s, five independent States emerged on the map of Central Asia. Apart from the entire Soviet legacies border dispute is only one legacy which impacted most on Central Asian countries. Current borders

between Central Asian countries were drawn in 1920s by the administrative decision from Moscow. A separate commission was formed in 1922 to oversee the process of division of the region into the new republics. Unique circumstances and urgency with which the Soviet planner undertook this task created borders that are far from ideal and neglect ethnic geographical and other features of the region. Borders were nothing more than administrative line and were not demarcated during the Soviet rule. It has been argued that the policies of the Soviet planner were deliberate and were design to prevent any separation attempts by any republic.(ICG Asia Report,2002).⁴² Highly centralized Soviet planning and economic transportation links ignored boundaries between the republics. Strict Soviet political control suppressed any border territory related disputes. However, before the Soviet rule, there was no previous history of border limitation in the region, the region was divided between the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand and emirate of Bukhara. Borders between the Khanates and Emirates that ruled the region before the Russian expansion in the 19th century were not clear and frequently shifted as the balance of power between them changed (Ibid).⁴³ Also, nomadic tradition of the ethnic groups paid little attention to the concept of border and states.

Border disputes in Current Scenario:-

At present, there are territorial disputes between all the former soviet Central Asian republics. In particular, Uzbekistan is belligerent towards its neighbours, due to its larger population and stronger military in relation to other Central Asian Republics with possible exception of Kazakhstan. In early 2000, Uzbekistan's border security guards undertook a unilateral demarcation of the border, by building outpost with neighboring Kazakhstan. Kazakh government in turn reacted with unease. However, in November 16, 2001 an

agreement had signed by president Islam Karimov and President Nazerbayev. Both the leaders agreed that the remaining border question resolved 'diplomatically.'(Web link)⁴⁴

Meanwhile another problem, called the Bagys settlement started.

Bagys Settlement Case:-

The village of Bagys is situated north of Tashkent. This area is part of the land given for a lease to Uzbekistan from Kazakhstan during the Soviet era. Most of the its habitants are ethnic Kazakhs and prefers Kazakhstan because of higher living standard. Under the agreement signed in 1991 the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, part of leased land did go back to Kazakhstan, but not Bagys itself. In attempt to show their frustration, the residents of Bagys took to the streets on December 31, 2000 proclaimed the Independent Kazakhstan Republic of Bagys and elected a president and legislature. Infact people of Bagys wanted to be a part of Kazakhstan. However, they were disappointed with the lack of support from Kazakhstan. Since Independence in 1991, there have not been any genuine efforts on the ground to demarcate the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One option has been to resettle ethnic Kazakhstan from Bagys to other area of Uzbekistan (ICG Asia Report,2002).⁴⁵ However, this option would not set good precedent for other numerous border disputes in the region. In addition, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have significant ethnic minorities on each others territory. 80-85% of ethnic Uzbeks that live in Kazakhstan are settled in disputed border areas.

Sokh and Shakmardan:- Sokh and Shakmardan are two relatively large Uzbek enclaves in Kyrgyzstan. Unofficial statistics reveal that Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are in disputes over hundred of thousand hectared of land.

Myriad enclaves in Farghana Valley:-

The most complicated border negotiations involve in the Farghana valley where a Myriad of enclaves exist and three countries share it – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Every country has historical claims to each other's territory and economic interests in the transport route, rivers, reservoirs and Industries. Negotiations over border demarcation in the valley have been charged with tension and have stalled over scoring of disputed points.

In order to support cotton production in Uzbekistan, the Soviet Authorities not only funded the construction of Kyrgyz territory, but transformed some Kyrgyz land to Uzbekistan to build hydroelectric power plant. Moscow has agreed to compensate Kyrgyzstan with land, but Bishkek felt that offer is insufficient.

As a result of Soviet policy there is not a single state in the region which doesn't today make territorial claims on its neighbours. Despite effort by Soviet censors to hide historical borders conflicts. It is well known that Water and land Quarrel led to direct confrontation. The violent riots of Osh in 1990 demonstrated the levels of hostility between two ethnic groups over a couple of patched of hand.

Amu and Syr Darya disputes:-

While Central Asia is rich in Water resources, more than 91% of water originated from Amu and Syr Darya. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is the regions main

water consumer with Uzbekistan alone consuming more than a half of region water.(Ibid)⁴⁶

Also Amy Darya passes almost to the Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan border and Uzbekistan has its own claim. Excessive use of water is creating the deletion and salination of Aral Sea, which is instrumental for various environmental problems.

These are the some tangible problem of Uzbek foreign policy although the impact of international environment cant is ignored. Global warming and sustainable development are another World issues which affecting entire countries of the world as well as Uzbekistan.

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Conclusion

Foreign policy analysis is a study of management of external relations and activity of nation states, as distinguished from their domestic policies. Foreign policy involves goals, strategies, measures, methods, guidelines, directives, understanding and arrangement etc., by which national government conduct international relations each other and with international organization and non-governmental actors. The goal of foreign policy should be clearly definable and divisible into some concrete and specific components, without which it is impossible to formulate goal oriented clear policies.

Since, the Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991, Uzbekistan's Foreign policy has concentrated on national independence attracting foreign direct investment and building economic and political ties with the West and East both.

Uzbek Foreign policy has been influenced by various interconnected domestic and international factors or determinants. In fact, the geo-political location of Uzbekistan determines its foreign policy to a considerable extent. The geographical contiguity of Central Asia with Middle East, South and East Asian countries has automatically enhanced its geo-political significance to regional (Iran, Turkey, Russia, China) and extra regional (i.e., US and West European countries) players. Uzbekistan is a land locked country and any land locked country has limited options than the non-land locked country. A land county has also various constraints on International trade and transportation. Uzbekistan depends much on Russia regarding International trade. So, we

can see the Russian influence on Uzbek Foreign Policy is more than other countries. Uzbekistan did not take any extreme steps against Russia even after much closeness with US in the period of 2001 to 2005, due to its location. The main factor behind it is the location of the country.

The location made Uzbekistan very important for the external actors especially after 9/11 incident due to its border with Afghanistan. Apart its location, Uzbek political system and influence of Islam have been influencing Uzbek foreign policy since it got independence in Dec. 1991. Uzbekistan Islam phobia is a determining factor in the way it conducted international relations. Islamic challenges in Uzbekistan prompted it to seek a re-rapprochement in its relations with Russia. But the relationship between Russia and Uzbekistan has not always been normal. Although to say that a difficult relationship with Russia would be an understatement. In an interview with Russian daily Nezavisnaya Gazeta, Uzbek president Islam Karimov acknowledged that the Russia is the main guarantor of peace and stability in Central Asia.

As far as, Uzbekistan's policy towards US is concerned, Uzbekistan deliberately and systematically sought to allying its foreign policy with United States during early period of independence. Uzbekistan had been very much supportive of US foreign policy towards Middle East, especially in relation to Iran, Iraq and Israel and expansion of NATO membership. After the 9/11 incidents, Uzbek president Islam Karimov was among the first leader to send message to sympathy and condolence to US. The Uzbek Government fully supported US in the 'War against terrorism' and publically announced

that Tashkent would open its air space and Khanabad Air base to United States. Greater involvement of United States and Russia in the region has forced China to adopt a policy which can achieve a stronger role in Centra Asia. The Chinese position on democracy and pluralism is much closer to Uzbekistan which makes both countries strategic allies.

Andijan incident which took place on May 13, 2005 brought a dramatic reconfiguration of the internal security of Uzbekistan as well as a fundamental shift in Uzbek foreign policy. During the events, Karimov suppressed the rebellion in the city. The United States joined the European Union and demanded for an independent investigation of the incident. Russia, however, stood with Uzbekistan. After the Andijan incident Tashkent gave 180 days ultimatum for withdrawal of US troops from Karshi-Khanabad Airbase. United States vacated Khanabad Airbase within given time period.

Anyway, after the multifaceted foreign policy of the 1990s and early 21st century, Uzbekistan moved towards a stronger partnership with players it perceives as reliable. While the United States remain the pre-eminent geopolitical power at present, it is not possible for the United States to involve in Uzbekistan in any serious matter.

Russia, on the other hand, retains its role in the former soviet republics as a preeminent economic and military power in the medium to long-term. Russia-Uzbek relation can be expected to grow, with economic and security goals and not political ones. Turkey and Iran are other major powers in the region. For centuries the region is integrated into the cultures and economic ties with its neighbours like Turkey and Iran. The roles of these countries in Uzbekistan's Foreign policy are more limited in scope

that, it had initially anticipated. As far as the Uzbekistan relations with other Central Asian republics are concerned, it has largely influenced by periodical disagreement over allocation of water and border dispute.

As far as, challenges of Uzbekistan foreign policy is concerned, international terrorism, drug trafficking and economic reforms are main issues. Domestic issues like, Uzbekistan's poor human rights record and the absence of political reforms and border disputes are significantly creating challenges to Uzbek foreign policy. The image of Uzbekistan has profoundly impacted by these challenges. The financial and political assistance received from the West are limited, largely as a result of pressure on Uzbekistan for so called democratic and economic reforms and human rights records. But it could be unfair if we would not consider Uzbekistan own view about these issues. Many reports regarding to these issues are over dramatized statements and exaggerations. So, the entire international community needs a picture that does not come only from interest group propaganda. That is why a balance should be maintained by international community and global media.

Thus, we can say that, US- Russia competitive engagement in the region is creating dilemma for Uzbek foreign policy. Although, having a good relations with Russia is beneficial for Uzbekistan but deterioration of its relations with United States is not beneficial. That is why a readjustment of relations with US is necessary after Andijan incident. Islamic extremism and economic development are the core issues of Uzbek foreign policy. So, it seems that China's role in Uzbekistan would increase further. Uzbek

relations with its other Central Asian neighbours have influenced by several disagreements. It is against the regional cooperation. At the end, it seems today that Uzbek foreign policy would be pro- Russia in near future.

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