# GEOPOLITICS OF ETHNICITY AND NATION- BUILDING : A CASE STUDY OF INDONESIA

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University*
*in partial fulfillment of the requirements*
*for the award of the degree of*

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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**2010**

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Date - 28 July, 2010

## DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled ***"Geopolitics of Ethnicity and Nation-Building: A case study of Indonesia"*** submitted by me for the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru university is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

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## CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research work would not have been possible without the help of many people associated with me, with their unconditional love, support and motivation.

First of all, with all my sincerity, I would like to record my sense of gratitude towards my supervisor Dr. S. S. Deora. His affectionate and affable guidance, constant encouragement has gone a long way in writing and shaping my thoughts and ideas during my research work. He has been a constant source of inspiration.

I am extremely indebted to my dear parents for their love, support and motivation in every step of my life. Without their motivation I would never be able to stand at this position today.

I am thankful to my fiancee Shri. Shyamlendu, for being my pillar of support throughout the course of this work.

I would like to thank the staff members of JNU library, UN library, Rattan Tata library, Delhi University library, and Embassy of Indonesia for their generous help in providing me with the study material including the official documents.

I am also thankful to my seniors and friends, for their timely help and suggestions. My special acknowledgement to my senior Deep Narayan Pandey and my friends Moona Yasmin, Asmita Bakhshi, Mamta and Sonam who have helped me during the tough time.

For any drawback in this dissertation if any, I alone am responsible for it.

Pratibha Yadav
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**Date: 28 July, 2010**

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| ABRI | Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia |
| AD | *Anno Domini*, the Christian era |
| AH | *Anno Hijrae*, the Islamic era |
| AJ | *Anno Javano*, the Javanese era |
| AMS | Algemeene middelbare scholen, General middle schools |
| ASEAN | Association of South East Asian Nations |
| CSI | Centraal Sarekat Islam, Sarekat Islam Central (headquarters) |
| GAM | Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Independent Aceh Movement |
| GDP | Gross domestic product |
| GNP | Gross national product |
| IGGI | Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| OPEC | Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| OPM | Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Free Papua Organisation |
| PDI | Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party |
| PKI | Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party |
| PNI | Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party |
| PPP | Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party |
| PRRI | Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic |
| PSI | Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party |
| PSII | Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union Party |
| SI | Sarekat Islam, Islamic Union |
| UN | United Nations |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| VOC | Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, (Dutch) United East India Company. |

# CHAPTER I
# INTRODUCTION

# CHAPTER: 1

## Introduction

Ethnicity is a factor in the dynamics of demographic changes and political development. It is a linkages between ethnicity and population processes in the contest of nation building. Most countries are multi-ethnic, although in many cases there are one or more ethnic group that are demographically dominant While the difference in population size is crucial in determining the power relation among various ethnic groups, population size along will not have any significant impact on the power relationship among ethnic groups. In regard the processes of nation formation and state building in communities of colonies in Indonesia provides good examples in the interplay of ethnic group identities and other aspects of the society. Indonesia is a multi-ethnic empire-state created by wars of expansion and conquest, scarring the history of successive generations.

## 1.1 Conceptual Framework of Ethnicity and Nation-Building

To state an important observation from the outset: to fully grasp the conceptual discourse on ethnicity and nation building is at least difficult as to define the terms. At any rate, to unpack ethnicity and nation building so as to understand them better, we need to ask: under what historical politico-geographical condition are ethnicity and nation building likely to arise? What are the major attributes of ethnicity and nation building and what is their nature and manifestation under varied situations? Are ethnic and nationalist movements more prevalent in post-cold war period and what are their ramifications for crisis-prone, post colonial nation states such as those of Southeast Asia? What is their impact for the politics of such states? With these guiding questions, let us briefly review the discourse on ethnicity and nation building from the available literature.

### 1.1.1 Ethnicity

Ethnicity is an important factor for our inquiry about the nation-building as most nationalist movements. Ethnicity is derived from the Greek term ethnos, meaning people, nation or a country. Began as ethnic aspirations of a group, whose bonds were racial, linguistic and cultural. ( Gibbonns, 1930)

However, of late, the ethnic groups have been politicised to the extent that they manifest themselves in "ethno - centrism, communal consciousness that glorifies ones own race and its associated achievements, at the expense of others". (Daniel Bell, 1975) To consolidate such an identity, the ethnic groups begin to distinguish themselves (we) from the others (they).They perceives that they share a common identity. Ethnicity identity is, thus, formed on the basis of common descent relevant cultural and physical characteristics, and set of attitudes and behaviour pattern. As Daniel Bell states "ethnicity has become more salient because it can combine an interest with an effective tie," and that the upsurge of ethnicity today is the "emergent expression of primordial feelings, long suppressed but now reawakened or, as a 'strategic site' chosen by disadvantaged persons in the society. (Daniel Bell, 1975)

There are two main approaches of the understanding of the new ethnic phenomena.The first is the Primordialist approach of ethnicity and ethnic identities, which consider common descent as the more important factor, as the primordial loyalties can be activated more easily than rational principles and organisations founded upon them. The second approach is variously known as Situational, subjectivist or instrumental. It emphasises upon the group's member's perception of being different from others. This difference redefines the group's position in the society and the groups evolve their own strategies for the achievement of desired results. We can attribute the salience of ethnicity to the strategic advantages flowing from an ethnic identity. According to Daniel Bell the strategic choice made by the individuals emerges due to the following factors. It is:

1. people want to belong to "smaller units and find in ethnicity an easy attachment.
2. break-up of the traditional authority structures and the previous effective units have made the ethnic attachment salient.
3. politicisation of decisions that affect the communal lines of the people make way for the establishment of ethnic groups which becomes a ready means of demanding group rights of providing against other groups. (Daniel Bell,1975)

It can therefore, be summarised that ethnicity as identity and group attachment has both positive and negative impacts. Positively, it seeks to redress the grievance of the hitherto disadvantaged groups, but negatively, it means that men of one ethnic group need some other group to hate. The politics of ethnicity has replaced the politics of ideology which means the continuation of conflicts by other means. In defining the term ethnicity various scholars have emphasised upon different factors. Edmund Leach has used the 'structure relationship' along with "identity formation", in defining an ethnic group. (Edmund leach, 1954).

Anthropologist Eriksen argues that 'to great extent' the anthropologist's field work 'is the locus where ethnicity is created and re created and that 'ethnicity is created by the analyst when he or she goes out the world and poses question about ethnicity' (1993:1, 17). Another anthropologist, Roosens (1989) who emphasizes the creation aspect of ethnicity seems to underscore the pragmatist response of people to changing social realities, especially as a human shelter against domination and alienation by others. According to these two anthropologists, whose perspective is that of instrumentalist school, ethnicity can even be created and recreated at will. Arguably, identities of people may shift over time and/or ethnic consciousness may develop through time with the imperatives of resistance against domination and in response to changing needs of people. But it is wrong to simplify the creation of ethnicity to the anthropologists' fieldwork, especially as Eriksen does.

A very crucial aspect of the instrumentalists' analysis is the manipulability of ethnicity to promote open and hidden political, economic and ideological interests.

Ethnicity, then, is a set of descent-based cultural identifiers used to assign persons to groupings that expand and contract in inverse relation to the scale of inclusiveness of the membership.(Cohen 1978, p.387)

Ethnic groups are human groups that entertain a subject belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration. It does not matter whether or not an objective blood relation exists.(Weber, 2001)

An ethnic group have following characters. It is

1. is largely biologically self-perpetuating
2. shares fundamental cultural values.
3. makes up a field of communication and interaction
4. has a membership which identifies, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.(Barth, 1969)

The ethnic group is a modern social construct, one undergoing constant change, an imagined community too large for intimate contact among its members, persons who are perceived by themselves and or others to share a unique set of cultural and historical commonalities. It comes into being by reasons of its relationships with other social entities, usually by experiencing some degree of friction with other groups that adjoin it in physical or social space.

We see among these definitions certain similarities, which will be considered again later in this work. Barth, for example, views the ethnic group as "interacting", while Zelinsky seems to suggest that if the members of the community actually have a lot of intimate contact, they are disqualified from being an ethnic group. Although Zelinsky's definitions (along with accompanying discussion) nicely sums up the main features found in many of the others, this particular element of it seems questionable.

### 1.1.2 Nation- building

Whereas nationalism is the political expression of nationhood, the nation-state is the politico-geographical expression of nationalism. Ever since the French Revolution nationalism has been the main spiritual and emotional force cementing all elements of Statehood in the nation-State so that wherever the nation-State was a reality, nationalism buttressed and reinforced the State; and where it remained an aspiration, nationalism endangered the existing pluralist national entities. As many political geographers, since the time of Ratzel have noted, a historical perspective on nation-State reveals that a modern State is likely to show the largest stability and permanence when it corresponds closely with the nation. In such a case, the State becomes the political expression of the nation, the mechanism through which the welfare of the members of the nation is safeguarded and their identity. Nation-building refers essentially to the process of bringing culturally and socially discrete groups into an organic system, and establishment of a strong national identity inseparably bound with the territory of this system. There are four important aspects to this process.

(1) Progressive development among the constituent political communities of a deep and unambiguous sense of identity with the State and its ideals;

(2) Broadening and intensification of social communication among the constituent communities and region;

(3) Elimination of narrow (local caste and community based) social, economic, and psychological commitments with a view to preparing the protected people for new countrywide pattern of socialization and behaviour;

(4) Improvement of transport facilities by minimizing physical distances and thereby facilitating greater flow of goods and services between the different regions of the State

Nation is viewed here in context of the nation-state. At the more primitive level, the concept of nation represents a feeling of kinship. As the people in a state mature in political experience, their feeling of belonging together becomes less dependent on ties of language and "ethnicity", and more on common adherence to particular political concepts, ideals and institutions. The distinction between majority and minority communities dwindles into insignificance as the people learn to devote their ultimate loyalty to the state and its institutions.

Thus, nation-building may be viewed as the processes and the devices through which the sentiment of loyalty to the nation-State is fostered, and fissiparous and divisive tendencies are pacified and eliminated (Dikshit, 1976). In other words, nation-building may be viewed as the process of achieving political stability within the sovereign nation-state through the mechanics of active and free participation by its nationals in political process of the State. In this context, nationalism may be defined as the "justifying ideology of the nation-State"; a system of "symbols of justification for the acts of a State symbols by which the State-organized cohesiveness of a nation is advanced and justified"(Gerth & Mills, 1953). In the terminology of political geography, nation-building consists of the devices through which the "State-idea" is strengthened.

Nationalism and nation-building are primarily concerned with the people constituting the state as a political community. It is necessary therefore that we identify the basic types of national societies on the basis of geography, i.e., on the basis of variations in the spatial patterning and areal associations of their chief identifying elements such as ethnic, historical and others. The people of a nation generally share a common national identity, and part of nation-building is the building of that common identity. Some distinguish between an ethnic nation, based in race or ethnicity, and a civic nation, based in common identity and loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions, and the linkage of citizenship to nationality.

Ethnicity is generally defined as a sense of group belonging, based on ideas of common origins, history, culture, experience and values. An ethnic group is a group with a common ethic identity or ethnic consciousness. Indonesia is a multi-ethnic empire-state created by wars of expansion and conquest, scarring the history of successive generations. Ethnic nationalism is a form of nationalism wherein the "nation" is defined in terms of ethnicity. Whatever specific ethnicity is involved, ethnic nationalism always includes some element of descent from previous generations. Furthermore, the central theme of ethnic nationalists is that nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic ancestry.

Nation-state building and modernization bring with them increased ethnic conflict as different groups begin competing in larger economic and political systems in which, at any given point in time, groups differ in their numbers and their control of resources. In Indonesia such a new political circumstance people are forced into new social relationships and the logical place to begin to look for such relationships is to identify oneself as a member of a larger something based on those attributes that one carries around with oneself, namely one's language, historical place, race, and religion. Ethnicity, in the broader sense, becomes very important cultural marker that is played out within the context of power relations and the new politics of identity in Indonesia. This tendency may be exacerbated by elites who utilize these tendencies to satisfy their own individual interests that may or may not coincide with the interests of the group as a whole. In this complex situation, the demography of ethnicity is easily manipulated to serve the political and economic interest of powerful elites.

## 1.2 Ethnicity and Ethnic conflicts

Ethnic tension actually is not a recent phenomenon. It is potential in Indonesia and the seed of conflict were planted more than 30 years ago, when the complex process of state making was not creating political space for pluralism, but more uniforms. Moreover social commitment was so fragile, such as among social relationships or political cooperation. It was more in the *SARA* concepts (ethnic, religion, race and among groups) which actually it created negative impact for harmonize of civil society((Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti,2002). It could be detected from stigma of Indonesian and Chinese minority, which the stronger indication has shown on 13-14 May 1998 tragedy at Medan Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya and Palembang.

However, today in the social-political transition there is changing pattern and more complicate. Since the crisis started the structure Indonesian society faces many social, economy and political problem of ethnic. Ethnic violence ignited with East Timor's drive to independence, the revival of ethno-nationalism in the provinces of Aceh (in northern Sumatra) and Irian Jaya. These three regions had long histories of resistance to central authority in Java. The suffer continues and secular nationalism which based on region and largely on the sidelines, such as violence between the majority Muslims and minority Christians on eastern Maluku islands and Poso-Central Sulawesi, between local ethnic and Maduras in East Kalimantan.

These social conflicts phenomenon is interested in term of friction and transformation pattern from Indonesian and Chinese minority pattern to the local people and the new settlers and the other things. From this phenomenon of conflicts, there are three general patterns of conflicts:

(1) Economic and political conflict multi dimensional and latent;
(2) Political conflict movement and nationalism; and
(3) Natural resources struggle, communal and seed of ethnic consciousness.

First, the economic and political conflict multi dimensional and latent pattern grows particularly in the regions which actually had religion harmony, as occurred at Ambon and

Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara. That was such as what happened in Maluku 1999, in January of that year Ambonese Christians mobilized anti-new settlers feeling against the Bugis (ethnic from Sulawesi) and Butonese minorities, which are Moslem (Kompas1999). The main reason of conflict actually related with the history of new settlers came and the reason why they live there. All are the economical reasons. Unfortunately at the same time government recruited employees, which mostly the Moslem and usually they should be the ICMI member(Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti ,2002)[1]. This condition really disappointed and discriminated the Ambon Christian indirectly. Beside that, the violence dispread to West Lombok district, Central Lombok and Senggagi Tour region (Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti,2002)[2]. In Mataram the composition of ethnic are so heterogenic, as usually in other region in Indonesia, but there are some those dominated, there are Sasak, Sumbawa and Bima ethnics. This pattern is also showed in Waikabubak, Sumba, East Nusa Tenggara. When social violence was trigger by government recruitment employees (Pegawai Negeri Sipil= PNS) at East Nusa Tenggara, have consequences the ethnics conflicts, whereas in fact from the people composition, the new settlers are much less than local people, which the majority is Christian. Those situation causes the widespread of conflict have succeeded in attracting religious matter, as their identity, to their cause. Religion becomes tool of pressure the mass movement Second, this political conflict ethnic movement and nationalism kind of conflict actually grows on the region which has good and rich natural resources, but the local people do not have enough power and resource sharing that involves as the parts of managing these resources.

Even though the base of conflict is economic interest, the local people feel on the discrimination position, such as in Aceh, Riau and Irian Jaya. The national government has controlled them to much and exploited their natural resources all. Therefore, separatist movements are the best way for them (Riza Sihbudi et al, 2001).

Third, this natural resources struggle, communal and seed of ethnic consciousness pattern is showed such as in Sambas, West Kalimantan. The Sambas conflict was so unique;

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[1] Around the end of 1995, under Suharto power, the former Vice President BJ Habibie developed the new Moslem organization, which is called ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia,* Indonesian Academic Moslem Community). This organization spread to all of Indonesian Provinces through PNS. The political power which is base on PNS is use to be on the new order regime.

[2] In the first case shows a lot of places burnt, such as churches, 77 houses, 29 shops, 7 restaurants, and 14 cars were burnt. See P2P-LIPI research, *Anatomi Kerusuhan Sosial Di Indonesia* (The Anatomy of Social ConfliIndonesia), Kerjasama Kantor Menteri NegaraRiset dan Tehnologi RI dengan Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Mizan, Bandung, 2002.

it was among Malay, Dayak and Chinese with Madurese. Started from the armed robbery have been done by Maduras to Melayu on 17 January 1999 on Paritsetia village. Then they took revenge by burning houses. The violence fights and murder, even genocide could not be avoidable. Although the base of conflict much more of economic interest, the straightforward relationships between economic competition and ethnic conflict are difficult to establish. Such relationships are not wholly absent, but the economic problem explains much more at the top than at the bottom of developing societies. Every ethnic or a part of ethnic usually has difference in culture, history, preferences and imputed aptitudes and environment, such as even the Madurese in Kalimantan does not adapt easily with other Madurese in Madura Island-East Java (Kompas, 2001). Much more obviously, economic theories can explain it as a part of conflict interest, but not the extent of the emotion invested in ethnic conflict. As Horowitz points out that ethnic conflict are often labelled cultural conflicts, because cultural differences that usually divide ethnic groups. He remains that there are conception of the role of cultural differences in the politics of ethnic relations, which make the society has many cultural sections and one of them dominates the others (Donald, 1985) In spite of this, the dominate culture does not come from the local community, but the culture of new settler or the government. Thus the core of problem is marginalization of local communal that is related with the self of ethnic identity. It really becomes the fuse factor of conflict.

### 1.3 Ethnicity and Nation-Building in the Indonesia context: A case study

A last question to be asked in this general discourse on ethnicity and nation-building is: How relevant is it in Indonesia context? For the answer of this question there are several factors that can be drawn from the definition and theoretical discussion of them that are useful in understanding the concrete situation of Indonesia. To begin with, there is highly plausible explanation of ethnicity and nation-building that considers them as an ideology of mobilized collectivities shaped by both common historical claims and present responses of people to pre sent needs. Indonesia is multi-ethnic country. Indonesia has found more than 1,000 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the size of most ethnic groups is small, and only 15 groups have more than 1 million each. Indonesia as a whole, there is information on the eight largest ethnic groups namely the Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Minangkabau, Betawi, Buginese, Bantenese, and Banjarese. The plurality of Indonesia ethnic groups varies from one province to another. In some provinces the number of the majority ethnic group is much larger than the numbers of other ethnic groups. The diverse population was put together

Map : 1

Indonesia Political Map


100 E
120
140
BURMA
CAMBODIA
VIETNAM
South China Sea
PHILIPPINES
PACIFIC OCEAN
Andaman Sea
THAILAND
Sulu Sea
2004 Earthquake Epicenter
MALAYSIA
BRUNEI
Celebes Sea
SINGAPORE
Utara
Borneo
0
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Sulawesi
Sumatra
Java Sea
Seram
JAKARTA
Banda Sea
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Java
Flores
Arafura Sea
Bali
EAST TIMOR
Sumba
Timor Sea
INDIAN OCEAN
AUSTRALIA
100
120
140

by historical accident. It was Dutch colonialism. It was Dutch colonialism which provided various ethnic groups in Indonesia with a sense of "national" belonging. Under the Dutch rule, these ethnic groups received western education, ruled under the same economic and administrative system and discovered that they had similar. The pluralist characteristics in society have generated social relations between the various groups characterized by minority-majority relation, while the "dualistic" characteristics have resulted in a dichotomy situation characterized by potentially explosive inequality/asymmetric relations and relations that are perceived as fraught with injustice. This is especially true in the relationship with ethnic Chinese, but more recently in inter-ethnic and enter-religious relations between the various so-called indigenous groups in general as well. Nation-building is a concept that was the preoccupation or more appropriately, obsession, of Soekarno, the first president of the republic.

Nation -building in Indonesia started in the period of Dutch colonialism, especially during the Indonesian nationalist movement before World War II. But the systematic measures adopted by the state only took place after independence. Although, generally, many ethnic groups have identified themselves with the "Indonesian nation", ethnic tension and conflict continue, particularly in the three provinces of Aces, Irian Jaya, and Maluku as well as East Timor, which left Indonesia recently. The ethnic problem preceded globalization as ethnic conflict and rebellions took place in the 1950s and the 1960s, but it was contained during the early year of the Soehatro(father of development in Indonesia) regime. The cold war also had impact on Indonesia, and communism has always been perceived as a common threat. The led the goverment to take action against any ethnic discontent in the name of combating communists. The Western countries also supported Indonesian measures to secure political stability, often at expense of the minority groups. The Indonesian adventure in East Timor can be seen in this light. The end of the cold war removed the ideological justification and ethnic issues became very real problems. It has identified these ethnic conflicts as it challenges the concept of the Indonesian nation and sovereignty.

Nationalism in Indonesia has grown out of different historical experiences firstly, external threats from regional as well as global powers such as Dutch, Japanese, Chinese and western powers during the colonial scramble for Island; secondly, internal challenges to make a strong nation like recurring famine and subsequent dependence on foreign humanitarian aid, and inter ethnic distrust. During the imperial and the socialist period, political elites tried to "flock" all Indonesian together through the construction of a sense of "Indonesians" designed to transcend ethnics differences, to mobilize the population against external aggressors and to encourage it to sacrifice economic priorities for national unity and identity. The independence of Indonesia in 19 August, 1945 and the ethnic federalism introduced by the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia NKRI (the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) has to be reviewed in the face of the turmoil of armed conflict, and of inter-ethnic and inter-religious strife. The new political power elites in Indonesia argued that independence was a necessity for the development of a peaceful and prosperous Indonesia. Nationalists in Indonesia this is one of the main problems with ethnic independence.

### 1.4 Objectives of the Study:

The objective of this study is to investigate the complex nature of competing ethnic and nation building in Indonesia. The main objectives are these-

1. To analyse physical, economic conditions of Indonesia with a focus on role of geopolitics of ethnicity in nation building.
2. To describe making up of the discourse on ethnicity nationalism and politics, pluralism and geopolitics of Indonesia
3. To analyse the factors that formed the new basis of reordering the Indonesian state and society in terms of Ethnic nationalism, collective and individual right and the Indonesian people quest for democracy.

### 1.5 Research Problems:

- What are the historic processes that have led to the rise of ethnic nationalism in Indonesia?
- Why is the problem of ethnic nation building so enduring?
- What are the political, economic and social factors that shape the dynamics of ethnic and nation building in Indonesia?

### 1.6 Hypothises:

- In democratizing multi- ethnic societies such as Indonesia the dynamic of competing ethnic nation building significantly, affect the attempt to democratize state and society giving rise to inter – elite and inter ethnic rivalries.

- The political agenda of the democratization of state and society succeeds when the competing elites, who generally have separate interests of their own but play a crucial role in the mobilization of ethnic groups for collective action and for democracy.

## 1.7 Research Methodology:

The work is mainly a descriptive and analytical study. Relevant materials have been collected from various primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources include published books, journals, newspaper reports, documents in the form of gazetteers, travelogues and other government publications. The earlier census reports, statistical abstracts have also been used for understanding historical aspects, economy, population; socio-culture set up of the various ethnic groups residing in the Indonesia sub divisions. The proposed study will adopt the inductive method, falsification and undertake spatial analysis of the case studies. By taking up spatial study of Indonesia the attempt will be made to develop a comprehensive understanding of different aspects of nation building with reference to geopolitics of ethnicity. To serve this purpose, quantitative and statistical tools, maps, charts and diagrams will be deployed.

## 1.8 Review of Literature:

Merle Calvin Ricklefs (2001) in his book "*A history of modern Indonesia since c. 1200*" analyses the time of the encounter with the Dutch (1500), the Dutch colonial period (1600 - 1945), the nation's independence (1945), and the recent reformation of the nation (2000) in Indonesia. He highlighted the important question of how the diverse but related linguistic and ethnic communities of the Indonesia archipelago become a modern nation. And it sheds important light on the present crises and challenges facing Indonesia.

The period from 1942, the beginning of the Japanese occupation which brought an end to more than three centuries of Dutch rule in Indonesia, until late 1950, roughly the end of the first year of Indonesia, has been dealt by George Mc Turnan Kahin's, in his book. He has been presented there is an almost day to day account of the struggles between the Dutch and the Indonesians, among Indonesian individuals and faction and within the United Nations over all the complex political, economic, social and diplomatic issues growing out of the

Indonesian struggle for independence. Yet so well has the author selected his points and his data that there is little, if any, feeling of being smothered under floods of material of only ephemeral importance.

The rise of Indonesian nationalism, its nature, and relations with Western colonialism has dealt by Leo Suryadinata, in his book. He has presented the development of a modern Indonesia nation, its relationship with the citizenry and various measures adopted by the indigenous dominated government to foster nation-building. The position of the ethnic Chinese in this new nation is also examined. But no account of the implications of these new changes for the Indonesia region and which is of immense importance. The important of contemporary issues in Indonesia reflecting the importance of religious and ethnic dimensions in Indonesia. This matter has been dealt by Aris Ananta, in his article. He has presented the issues of separatist movement in a number of outer island provinces after 1998 and an exception in that link is made to political behaviour, namely voting patterns in the 1999 election and the extent of ethnic affiliation with particular parties. But on an overall it has been a generalized view taken in account of whole situation, which misses out the matter of self identification in Indonesia and its implications in detail. Leo Suryadinata in his book presents in to Indonesia system of government and elections. It's focused on the roles of the 1945 constitution and Pancasila, the DPR (Legislative Assembly) and the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) and the ways they have functioned during elections since independence. But democratic and ethnic problems have not been taken up here, which could have made the study more affective and fruitful.

Since 1998, which marked the end of the thirty-three-year New Order regime under President Suharto, there has been a dramatic increase in ethnic conflict and violence in Indonesia. It has been dealt by Jacques Bertrand, in his book, "Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia". He presented that conflicts in Maluku, Kalimantan, Aceh, Papua, and East Timor were a result of the New Order's narrow and constraining reinterpretation of Indonesia's "nation model". It is light on the root of religious and ethnic conflict at a turning point in Indonesia history. But the weakness and external factors of ethnicity and violence for Indonesia has not been taken here.

Wendell Bell and Walter E. Freeman in his book "Ethnicity and Nation-Building: Comparative, International, and Historical Perspectives" presents relation between ethnic cleavages and other cleavages and the role of ethnicity in giving a boost to the new nationalism of the twentieth century the role of the time dimension. He presented respectively with theory, status, conflict, and old rather than new states, result from a somewhat arbitrary division. But some of the contributions in the other sections of the book are detailed and not very "comparative." There are subject and author indices, but the absence of a "country" index does not help.

George McTurnan Kahin in his book, "Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia" focuse on The Indonesian struggle for independence and survival in the tricky geopolitics of Cold War Asia is an extremely important historical topic. Kahin analyzes the colonial history of Indonesia and recounts the exciting story of its independence movement. Leaders like the fascinating Sjahrir (oddly, Soekarno does not nearly get as much airplay as some might think appropriate) come alive and frequently provide a personal context for the road to freedom for one of Asia's most important countries. While Kahin's book is obviously dated, it's still a useful and interesting text with which to begin a study of Indonesia, Southeast Asia, or postwar nationalist movements in general.

Sharon Siddique in his book, "New Light on Indonesia's Ethnic Makeup" is focused official statistics were collected on ethnic groups in Indonesia for 70 years from the last colonial census in 1930, to the 2000 census. During the Soekarno and Soeharto regimes the issue of ethnicity was considered so sensitive that any mention of it was excluded from census data collection. Another interesting debate highlighted in the book is the perennial problem of how many Chinese actually reside in Indonesia. This book also contains an interesting chapter on the religious breakdown of the population. What stands out is that Indonesia has a large Muslim majority (88.2%) with a significant Christian minority (8.9%). Hindus and Buddhists are numerically insignificant. Interestingly, the annual Christian growth rate (2.5%) is higher than the Muslim (1.9%). This book lays out a feast of data for the thoughtful. It is particularly timely as businessmen, scholars and journalists grapple with the implications of Indonesia's decentralization policies on provincial-level politics and development dynamics. Certainly ethnicity and religion are issues that require careful consideration. This book is an invaluable reference.

So on an over all though all aspect related to the study of ethnicity in the Indonesia and its implications for nation building has been taken up but that is manly done in a detached manner. So to get the total picture in this regard one need to analyze all the related factors, this need to be tried upon in this research.

# *CHAPTER II*

# *POLITICAL- GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND OF INDONESIA*

# CHAPTER: 2

# Politico-Geographical Background of Indonesia

## 2.1 Introduction

A special analysis demands geographical understanding of the politico-geographic unit. A geographical understanding of the unit will be incomplete without knowing its topography, climate, soil, vegetation, drainage system and human resources. Topography tell us about the geological strength of the units; climate equips a researcher with the understanding of climate susceptibility; soil and vegetation tells us about the most basic natural resources; drainage system which can tells about the adaptability and availability of water transport and economic and human resource tells about the present level of development and quality and the future potential. This chapter is an endeavor towards understanding the geographical feature and their impact on ethnicity and nation building and its development in Indonesia.

The Republic of Indonesia is located in Southeast Asia on an archipelago of more than 17,000 islands astride the equator. Sumatra, the westernmost major island, lies south of Myanmar, while Irian Jaya or Papua on the island of New Guinea is the country's eastern extreme. Indonesia, formerly part of the Netherlands East Indies, proclaimed its independence on 17Aug 1945, after more than 350 years of Dutch control.

Indonesia is the largest country of Southeast Asia, about 1,948,700 square kilometres in area, with a maximum dimension from east to west of about 3,5,100 kilometres and a dimension from north to south of 1,800 km.. It is composed of some 13,670 islands, of which more than 7,000 are uninhabited. Almost 75 percent of Indonesia's area is included in the three largest islands of Borneo, of which about three-quarters, or 550,000 square km., is part of Indonesia; Sumatra, with 473,970 square km; and the Irian Jaya portion of New Guinea, with 420,540 square km. Nearly all of the total land area is accounted for with the addition of Celebes (174,600 square km.) and Java and the Moluccas (21600 square km.).

Indonesia was formerly known as the Dutch or Netherlands' East Indies; the islands were first named Indonesia in modern times by a German geographer A.Bastian in 1884,

# Map : 3
## Indonesia Physical Map


100 E
120
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THAILAND
BRUNEI
MALAYSIA
Kuala Lumpur
Pacific Ocean
Singapore
SINGAPORE
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Sumatra
Borneo
Sulawesi
0
New Guinea
Jakarta
Java
INDONESIA
EAST TIMOR
Sumba
Timor
Feet
10000
5000
2000
1000
500
Meters
3050
1525
610
305
153
Sea Level
Indian Ocean
AUSTRALIA
0
250
500 mi
0
250
500 km
100
120
140

although this name is thought to derive from Indos Nesos, "Indian Islands," in the ancient trading language of the region. The capital, Jakarta, is located near the northwestern coast of Java.

After a period of occupation by the Japanese (1942-45) during World War II, Indonesia declared its independence from the Netherlands in 1945. Its struggle for independence, however, continued until 1949; and it was not until the official recognition by the United Nations of Irian Barat as a part of Indonesia in 1969 and the incorporation of the former Portuguese territory of East Timor in 1975-76 that the nation took on its present form.

## 2.1 Physical Geography

### 2.1.1 Physiographic

Indonesia is an archipelago forming a highway between two Oceans, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean and a bridge between two continents, Asia and Australia. Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world, consisting of five major islands (Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Java, and Irian Jaya) and an estimated 17,508 islands. The territory of the Republic of Indonesia stretches from 6°08' north latitude to 11°15' south latitude, and from 94°45'-141°05' east longitude with a land area of 2,630 square kilometers (km2). The capital Jakarta is located in the northeast coast of Java island and covers 661.52 km2. The gross area (including inland water surfaces) of Indonesia is 1,904,350 $km^2$, though the gross country area including the domestic seas is about 9,600,000 $km^2$. The principal islands are Java and Madura, Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo), Sulawesi (Celebes), West Irian (West New Guinea) and Maluku (Moluccas). (Patrick Witton and Mark Elliott, 2003).

The island of Java including Madura (132,200 $km^2$ in area) is crossed by a chain of volcanic mountains, the highest of which is the Semeru in Eastern Java rising to a height of about 3,675 m. From the foot of the mountains, at an elevation ranging from 500 to 1,500 m extensive tablelands slope down to the lowlands of the coast. These tablelands and lowlands comprise 70 per cent of the land area. Only 20% area of the islands is under forests. Up to an elevation of about 400 m. the land is used for wet cultivation of paddy.

Sumatra (473,600 $km^2$) straddles the Equator and contains a long mountain range called the Bukit Barisan. The mountainous portion is small and there are vast stretches of lowland, consisting principally of marshy alluvial plains covered with forests and low vegetation.

Kalimantan (539,500 $km^2$), the largest island in the archipelago, has a vast terrain of lowlands, consisting principally of alluvial and swampy plains. The area occupied by mountains is relatively very small.

Sulawesi (189, 200 $km^2$), in contrast to Sumatra and Kalimantan, is mountainous and hilly with the exception of the central portion of the island where is a large expanse of lowland of recent alluvial mountains.

### 2.1.2 Climate

Indonesia's maritime equatorial climate typically produces high, even temperatures and heavy rainfall; temperature variations are generally due to island structure (elevation) and time of day, while rainfall may vary across the archipelago as a result of many different factors, among them monsoon patterns, which themselves vary according to location. Average temperatures at or near sea level range from about 23EC to 31EC. In most of the country, rainfall is comparatively heavy throughout the year, with a pronounced rainy season roughly between December and March. East of Surabaya, however, a dry season is increasingly noticeable, especially between June and October. The high elevations of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua receive about 3,000 millieters of rain annually; lower elevations, and much of Java, receive 2,000 or more millimeters; farther east rainfall ranges between 1,000 (Sumba) and 2,000 millimeters per year (Bali and Timor). (Patrick Witton and Mark Elliott, 2003).

### 2.1.3 Vegetation

Forest covers about 65 percent of the total land area of Indonesia. In Sumatra about 77 percent of the land is forested, in Kalimantan about 90 percent and in the other islands over 66 percent of the land is forest covered. In Java forest covers only 27 percent of the land because of the heavy concentration of people there.

On the whole the natural vegetation of the Republic is luxuriant tropical forest, but variations occur as a result of infertile soils, poor drainage, irregular rainfall, latitude and over exploitation of forests for timber. Poor soils can only support stunted hardy plants which are not of much commercial use. Where drainage is poor and the land is swampy the typical plants are mangrove or nipah palms. Where there are distinct wet and dry seasons plants like eucalyptus and teak predominate in contrast to the luxuriant dipterocarps of the equatorial forest. At high altitudes pines and sub-montane plants are found. Improper exploitation of forest also leads to variations.

### 2.1.4 Soils

Indonesia illustrates the relation between climate and source rock in the formation of soils. The rocks on Java are primarily andesitic volcanic (dark gray rocks consisting essentially of the minerals oligoclase or feldspar), while rhyolites (the acidic lava from of granite) are dominant on Sumatra, granites on the Riau Islands, granites and sediments in Kalimantan, sediments in Papua. The resulting soils in humid regions are mainly lateritic and of varying fertility depending on the source rock; they include heavy black or gray-black margalite soils. Black soils occur in regions with distinct dry season.

## 2.2. Economic background

### 2.2.1Agricultur

During the 1970s and 1980s, Indonesia followed a well recognized trend among developing nations: a decline in agricultural production as a share of GDP. The agricultural sector, however, was still vital for several reasons. The vast majority of people lived and worked in rural areas, and most of their income was from agricultural activities. Rice, which dominated agricultural production in Indonesia, was the staple food for most households, urban and rural alike. The government considered adequate supplies of affordable rice necessary to avoid political instability. The New Order's most striking accomplishment in agriculture was the introduction of so-called Green Revolution rice technology, which moved Indonesia from being a major rice importer in the 1970s to self-sufficiency by the mid-1980s. (Bruce Glassburner, 2007).

The 1980 population census indicated that 78 percent of the population was located in rural areas. This share continued to decline during the 1980s, but for a country at Indonesia's level of development, urbanization proceeded slowly. While agriculture contributed a decreasing share of GDP falling from 25 percent in 1978 to 20.6 percent in 1989 about 41 million workers, or 55 percent of the total labor force in 1989, still found employment in the agricultural sector. Within the agriculture sector, food crops accounted for 62 percent of the value of production, tree crops for 16 percent, livestock for 10 percent, and fisheries and forestry equally for the remaining 12 percent of agricultural production in 1988. (Patrick Witton and Mark Elliott, 2003).

### 2.2.2 Minerals

Indonesia is one of the world's leading producers of petroleum and leads the world in the production of liquefied natural gas. Natural gas fields are found mainly on Sumatra and Kalimantan. Offshore fields are being developed. The country's largest oil fields are on Sumatra. Indonesia is also a major producer of tin. Other minerals produced in significant quantities include coal and ores of aluminum, copper, and nickel.

### 2.2.3 Industries

Indonesia has a large and diverse industrial sector that includes food, chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber, and plastic product manufacturers. Except for large-scale facilities such as power plants, glass factories, and steel smelting factories, the majority of point source emissions come from boilers, generators, diesel engines, gas turbines, dryers, and incinerators. In 2000, 2,143 other industries were identified as possible air pollution sources in Jakarta. Majority of these industrial sources are textile and wearing apparel, chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber, and plastic product, food and beverages, paper, and paper products (Wirahadikusumah 2002). In particular, Surabaya has a rich history as a competitive industrial city in Indonesia. Its potential has been developed since World War II and during the Netherlands East Indies' rule. Its location has been strategic in establishing heavy or manufacturing industries. Key industries include shipbuilding, the manufacture of machinery, textile, glass, and metal products and the processing of food and petroleum. Surabaya has adopted a policy that does not allow heavily polluting manufacturers in the city. Middle and low emission manufacturers were allowed under the condition that they must be equipped with waste treatment facilities. (Bruce Glassburner, 2007).

### 2.2.4Transport

A wide variety of vehicles are used for road transport in Indonesia but the major type of motor vehicle is the motorcycle Vehicle fleet in 2002 was largely dominated by motorcycles (74%) and passenger cars (15%). Vehicle fleet in the country has more than doubled from 10.2 million in 1992 to 23.0 million in 2002. Motorcycles and passenger cars have increased during the same period by 245% and 214%, respectively. By the end of 2005, the Indonesian police headquarters has reported over 35 million units of motor vehicles of which 70.5% were motorcycles. Gaikindo, the association of vehicle manufacturers in Indonesia, posted 2005 sales of new four-wheel motor vehicles at 550,000 units, an increase of approximately 15–20% annually. The Association of Motorcycle Industries Indonesia has likewise posted total sales of 3.4 million motorcycle units 15% lower than that of 2004. If this rate of increase continues, the 2006 end-of-year forecast is approximately 750,000–800,000 units of four wheeled motor vehicles and 4.0 million units of motorcycles plying the streets of Indonesia (Bakri, 2006). In Jakarta, the total number of motor vehicles in Jakarta has more than doubled from 2,478,934 in 1995 to 5.1 million in 2006 and motorcycles comprise the bulk (Kono, 2003). Jakarta metropolitan police 2005 data reports that Jakarta has 2.5 million motorcycles, 1.3 million cars, 400,000 cargo vehicles, and more than 250,000 buses. Almost 50% of vehicles registered in Jakarta are motorcycles of which more than 60% are 2-stroke motorcycles. The motorcycle is a popular mode of transport among low- to middle-income Indonesians due to its relatively low cost and easier mobility during traffic jams. Motorcycles are used not only for personal transportation but also for informal-commercial transportation and for the delivery of goods (US Embassy Jakarta, 2006) .Approximately 71% of Jakarta's citizens use motorized transport and 55% rely on public transport services. However, the local government of Jakarta has invested a lot of resources in improving public transportation in the last few years. The bus rapid transit (BRT) system called TransJakarta opened in January 2004 to improve public transport and alleviate traffic congestion. It is the 1st closed BRT system in Asia. Three corridors operate: corridor I (Blok M-Kota), corridor II (Pulogadung-Harmoni), and corridor III (Harmoni- Kalideres). Four corridors are under construction and are expected to be launched by January 2007. Corridor I spans a length of 12.9 km. It uses 56 high-platform air-conditioned Euro 2 compliant diesel buses capable of carrying 83 passengers each. As of 2005, TransJakarta ridership averages 65,000 passengers per day on weekdays and 45,000 passengers per day on weekends. The entire 1st phase of Trans Jakarta BRT system is planned to have lines along 15 corridors. In other cities, like Surabaya, urban transportation modes vary widely from buses, *mikrolets* (small buses that can seat 9–12 people), *bemo* (small van that can carry about 7 passengers), *bajaj* (motor tricycle or rickshaw that can carry 2 passengers), to motorcycles, and *becaks* (nonmotorized three-wheeler). Private motor vehicles including motorcycles oft en dominate the transport system. In Surabaya, vehicle registration data for 2000 showed that there were 160,902

# Map:2
# Population Density of Indonesia


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Sumatra
Medan
Pekanbaru
Padang
Palembang
Population
Based on 1961 census
Djakarta
Java
Madura
Bali
KALIMANTAN
Balikpapan
Banjarmasin
Sumbawa
Sumba
Flores
Dili
Portuguese Timor
Timor
Celebes
Manado
Palu
Halmahera
Ceram
Sorong
IRIAN BARAT

passenger cars, 126,878 non-passenger cars, 687,79 motorcycles, and 3,017 rickshaws(Hartono,2003).

## 2.3. Human resource

### 2.3.1. Demography

The Indonesia population is the fourth largest in the world. In 2000 there were 205.8 million people, more than threefold the number in 1930. The population thus increased at an average annual rate of growth of 1.78% during the period 1930-2000.However, the growth rate had initially increased from 1.60% annually in 1930-61 to 2.06% in 1961-71 peaking at 2.37% n 1971-80. It then declined to 1.96% in 1980-90 and 1.37% in 1990-2000. Table 2.1 presents the Indonesian population in term of the number and percentage for Indonesia as a whole.

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**TABLE: 2.1**

**Distribution of Population by Province: Indonesia, 2000**

| No. | Province | Enumerated | Estimated | Non-response | Total | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam | 17,34,722 | 20,20,669 | 1,73,843 | 39,29,234 | 2 |
| 2 | North Sumatra | 1,15,06,808 | 0 | 1,35,682 | 1,16,42,490 | 6 |
| 3 | West Sumatra | 42,41,605 | 0 | 6,912 | 42,48,517 | 2 |
| 4 | Riau | 47,55,176 | 0 | 1,92,795 | 49,47,971 | 2 |
| 5 | Jambi | 24,07,166 | 0 | 0 | 24,07,166 | 1 |
| 6 | South Sumatra | 68,57,376 | 0 | 41,681 | 68,99,057 | 3 |
| 7 | Bengkulu | 15,62,085 | 0 | 1,719 | 15,63,804 | 1 |
| 8 | Lampung | 66,49,181 | 0 | 81,570 | 67,30,751 | 3 |
| 9 | Bangka-Belitung | 8,99,095 | 0 | 873 | 8,99,968 | 0 |
| 10 | Jakarta | 83,47,083 | 0 | 13,996 | 83,61,079 | 4 |
| 11 | West Java | 3,57,23,473 | 0 | 619 | 3,57,24,092 | 17 |
| 12 | Central Java | 3,09,24,164 | 0 | 2,99,095 | 31,223, 259 | 15 |
| 13 | Yogyakarta | 31,20,478 | 0 | 567 | 31,21,045 | 2 |
| 14 | East Java | 3,47,65,998 | 0 | 0 | 3,47,65,998 | 17 |
| 15 | Banten | 80,96,809 | 0 | 1,468 | 80,98,277 | 4 |
| 16 | Bali | 31,46,999 | 0 | 3,059 | 31,50,058 | 2 |
| 17 | West Nusa Tenggara | 38,30,597 | 0 | 1,78,004 | 40,08,601 | 2 |
| 18 | East Nussa | 38,08,477 | 0 | 14,677 | 38,23,154 | 2 |

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| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Tenggara | | | | | |
| 19 | West K alimantan | 3,73,950 | 0 | 2,83,403 | 40,16,353 | 2 |
| 20 | Central Kalimantan | 18,01,006 | 0 | 54,468 | 18,55,474 | 1 |
| 21 | South Kalimantan | 29,75,714 | 0 | 8,310 | 29,84,024 | 1 |
| 22 | East Kalimantan | 24,43,334 | 0 | 8,561 | 24,51,895 | 1 |
| 23 | North Sulawesi | 19,73,440 | 0 | 27,431 | 20,00,871 | 1 |
| 24 | Central Sulawesi | 20,12,393 | 24,366 | 1,39,234 | 21,75,993 | 1 |
| 25 | South Sulawesi | 78,01,678 | 0 | 2,49,108 | 80,50,786 | 4 |
| 26 | Southeast Sulawesi | 17,76,292 | 0 | 44,086 | 18,20,378 | 1 |
| 27 | Gorontalo | 8,30,184 | 0 | 3,311 | 8,33,495 | 0 |
| 28 | Maluku | 11,49,899 | 6,112 | 7,111 | 11,63,122 | 1 |
| 29 | Papua | 16,97,984 | 2,09,104 | 3,06,743 | 22,13,831 | 1 |
| 30 | North Maluku | 6,69,833 | 56,965 | 5,655 | 7,32,453 | 0 |
| | Total | 20,12,41,999 | 23,17,216 | 22,83,981 | 20,58,43,196 | 100 |

Source: Results of the 2000 Population Census (Indonesia).

Since its proclamation of independence in August 1945, the country has held population census for five times i.e. in 1961, 1971, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Such a census was once held during the Dutch colonialist's occupation as well but its result's accuracy was doubtful. However, its data could be used as comparative basis of reference. According to Kolonial verslag: Volkstelling 1930(colonial Report: Population census,1930), at the time the total number of population of the Netherlands East Indies now called Indonesia, was 60,700,000 heads, of which 41,700,000 heads (68.7%) occupied the island of Java. The island of Sumatra accounted for only 13.6 percent, Sulawesi 6.9 percent, Nusa Tenggara 5.7 percent, Kalimantan 3.6 percent, Maluku and Papua 1.5 percent. (Bruce Glassburner, 2007).

Population growth rate tended to decline during the past two decades. During the period of 1980-1990, population grew at an average of 1.97 percent per annum; it decreased to an average of 1.49 percent in the 1990-2000 periods. This declining growth rate was parallel with the decrease of a households' number. Based on the 1990 Census, there were 39,546,000 households with an average of 4.5 heads per household. The following decade saw the total households numbering 52,008,000 with an average of 3.9 heads per household.

The decline was chiefly due to the success of family planning programs starting into operation in 1970s. Age structure of Indonesia in 1971 and 2000 (Figer 2.1 & 2.2)


FIG. 2.1 AGE - SEX PYRAMID OF INDONESIA 1971

Source: Population Census 1971, (Indonesia).


FIG. 2.2 AGE - SEX PYRAMID OF INDONESIA - 2000

Source : Population Census2000, (Indonesia).

In 2002, of 91,600,000 working population, some 44.34 percent worked in agricultural sector, 19.42 percent in trade, 13.21 percent in manufacturing ployees in the sectors of services, manufacturing, trade, and agriculture. industry, and 11.30 percent in services. Higher proportion of the working population in Java earned their life in manufacturing and trade rather than in agriculture. The reverse applied in other islands. Further, the remaining 27.33 percent worked as labors or employees.

With its land area of about 6.75 percent of the country's total land area, Java accounts for about 58.83 percent of the country's total population. It means population density in Java Island is 997 heads per sq km. The Greater Jakarta, which accounts for only 0.4 percent of the country's total area, is home to about 4.01 percent of the country's total population, making its population density stood at 12,985 heads per sq km. Trailing behind is Banten with 1,100 heads per sq km. Outside Java, Bali is the most dense with 596 heads per sq pm, and North Sumatra with 162 heads. On the contrary, Papua which accounts for some 19.3 percent of the country's total area, is home to only 1.10 percent of total population, making its density of only six heads per sq km; Kalimantan (part of Indonesia), which makes up some 30.37 percent of the country's total land area, accounts for only 5.49 percent of the country's total population or with an average density of 20 heads per sq km.

In overcoming such uneven distribution of population, Indonesia had for many years introduced and carried out migration programs by moving a number of people from the densely populated islands (Java and Bali) to the sparsely populated islands (Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua). The programs ended a couple of years ago.

### 2.3.2 Religion

Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Approximately 80 percent of all Indonesians are devout Muslims. In general, Indonesia is a deeply religious nation and that also applies to the minorities of Christians, Hindus and Buddhists. As of 2000, approximately 88% Indonesia's 86.1% people are Muslims consisting of Sufis, Shias and Sunnis, 5.7% are Protestant, 3% are Catholic, 1.8% Hindu, and 3.4% believes in other religions (Table: 2.2). Officially, there are only six religions that are recognized by the Indonesian Government, namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. The government is however tolerant of other religions as well. Indonesian Constitution provides freedom of religion to all its citizens and states "every person shall be free to choose and to practice the religion of his/her choice" and "guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief". However, the First Principle of the State Philosophy "Pancasila", upholds a "Belief in One Supreme God". In Indonesia, religion plays a major role in everyday life of people. There are a number of different religions that are practiced in Indonesia, which exude a significant influence on the country's political, economical and cultural life.

**Table: 2.2**
**Religions of Indonesia, 2000**

| Religions | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Islam | 86.1 |
| Christianity | 5.7 |
| Hinduism | 1.8 |
| Other | 3.4 |
| Total | 100.0 |

**Source: CIA World Fact Book (Indonesia).**

### 2.3.3 Language

The major languages of Indonesia are Austronesian. Austronesian is a family of agglutinative languages spoken in the area bounded by Madagascar in the western Indian Ocean and Easter Island in the eastern Pacific Ocean. The major exceptions are those of West Irian, where Papuan languages are used, and some of the Moluccas, where the North Halmaheran language family is found. The Austronesian language family is broken into 16 major groups within which languages are closely related though distinctly different.On java there are three major language-Javanese, Sundanese, and Madurese. While on Sumatra there are 15, many of which are divided into a number of distinct dialects. Within the Toradja group, a relatively small population in the interior of Sulawesi, there are eight languages. In eastern Indonesia each island has its own language, which is often not understood on the neighbouring islands.

The national language of Bahasa Indonesia evolved from a Malay dialect spoken in the Djambi area of east Sumatra. It has much in common with other Malay dialects that have long served as regional lingua francas. Since it is a relatively simply and widely used language that was not associated with one of the dominant ethnic groups. Bahasa Indonesia has been accepted without serious question and served as a strong force of national unification, It is now learned by all children in the schools, where the local language is the medium of instruction during the first two years and Bahasa Indonesia is used for the remaining years. In 1972 a uniform revised spelling was agreed to between Indonesia and Malaysia so that communications will be improved and literature may be more freely exchanged between the two countries.

### 2.3.4 Ethnicity

The Indonesian motto, "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika"("Unity in Diversity"), is illustrated by the fact that within the Indonesian population there are more than 300 different ethnic groups and 250 distinct languages. Indonesia has found more than 1,000 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the size of most ethnic groups is small, and only 15 groups have more than 1 million each. Indonesia as a whole, there is information on the eight largest ethnic groups namely the Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Minangkabau, Betawi, Buginese, Bantenese, and Banjarese. The plurality of Indonesia ethnic groups varies from one province to another. In some provinces the number of the majority ethnic group is much larger than the numbers of other ethnic groups. The population composition of these ethnic groups is as follows-

**Table: 2.3**
**Major Ethnic Group of Indonesia, 2000**

| Ethnic Group | Percentage (%) |
|---|---|
| Javanese | 40.6 |
| Sundanese | 15.0 |
| Madurese | 3.3 |
| Minangkabau | 2.7 |
| Betawi | 2.4 |
| Bugis | 2.4 |
| Banten | 2.0 |
| Banjar | 1.7 |
| Other | 29.9 |
| **Total** | **100.0** |

Source: *CIA World Fact Book (Indonesia).*

#### 2.3.4.1 The western islands

The diverse ethnic populations of western Indonesia may be grouped into three broad groups: an inland wet-rice society, coastal peoples, and tribal groups. The first group, the strongly Hinduized wet-rice growers of island Java Bali, make up more than two-thirds of the population.With an ancient, highly sophisticated culture of strong social and agriculture traditions, it includes the Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, and Balinese peoples. The second group of Islamic coastal people is ethnically heterogeneous, in cluding the Malays from Sumatra and, from southern Celebes, the Makasarese, who are found in all coastal towns but are a stronger influence outside Java. The third group is the tribal peoples, including the Toraja and Dayak. Batak and Minankabau are including in Sumatra and the Minahasa in northern Celebes.

### 2.3.4.2 The eastern island

The islands are populated by a number of distinct ethnic groups. Typical of the coastal people are the Ambonese, who live along the coasts of Ambon and neighbouring islands, including westwrn Ceran. Many of the people living in the mountainous interior regions are called Alfurs, or Alfuros. The people of Irian Jaya, the native Papuans, display much more strongly the distinction between coastal and interior groups. Those in the foothills and on the coast have affinities with other Melanesian peoples to the east and south of New Guinea. In addition, Indonesians from the western islands have mixed with indigenous peoples in the coastal trading settlements. The people of the interior, on the other hand, have been isolated and insular for a long period of time.

### 2.3.4.3 Non-Indigenous peoples

The largest non indigenous group is the Chinese, who account for only about 2 percent of total population but control perhaps 75 percent of the nation's wealth. Most of the Chinese have lived in Indonesia for generations. The majority of them the peranakans, do not speak Chinese, have Indonesian surnames, and through intermarrying with Indonesians have developed distinct dialects and customs. Of the total Chinese population, most live in the towns and cities of Java and Sumatra. The Chinese also from a significant fraction of the population in Western Kalimantan and Riau Islands.

## 2.4 Traditional regions

The island structure of Indonesia provides natural boundaries that strongly influence the traditional regions. The coastal strip is inhabited by a somewhat homogeneous amalgam of traders who have spread throughout the island. The 'coastal Malays' are mixture of Malay, Javanese, and Makasarese (a people of southern Sulawesi) origins who are characterized by strong Islamic beliefs. They have tended to insulate the peoples in the interior, who have been allowed to preserve their local customs and traditions. On the smaller islands, administrative and traditional regions generally overlap, while on the larger islands the administrative structure was normally established to harmonize with traditional and cultural divisions.

### 2.4.1 Java

The tree provinces of Java most populous and culturally sophisticated part of the country-serve to illustrate the coincidence of traditional and administrative regions. Central Java is the centre of Javanese culture, history, and language; the site of its main historical monuments; and an area of large rural population. East Java is also inhabited by Javanese, with Madurese people in the east; it is similar to central Java but it includes the industrial city of Surabaja (surabaja) and places heavier emphasis on plantation agriculture. West Java is the land of the Sundanese, who are related to but quite distinct from the Javanese in language and tradition. In addition Java contains the two strongly contrasting especial districts ( Daerah Istimewa) of Djakarta, the capital city, which does not coincide with cultural or traditional patterns, and Jogjakarta, which is still ruled by a sultan and is a stronghold of Javanese culture and tradition.

### 2.4.2 Sumatra

The provinces on Sumatra also have a degree of traditional integrity. In the north, Acheh is a region of stricts Muslims who were long noted for their resistance to European influence. North Sumatra, with its major city of Medan, includes a rich plantation area along the coast and, at a higher elevation, the region inhabited by the Bataks, who were largely isolated until the 19th century. Djambi (Jambi), an oil-rich province in the east is inhabited by Malay people and is the area in which the Indonesian language developed. West Sumatra is the region of the Minangkabau people, who are devout Muslims and are noted for their matrilineal society in which property is passed on through the female line. South Sumatra is the area of the major rich oil fields. Lampung and Bengkulu are two of the major traditional regions in south Sumatra. Riau province includes part of the coastal swamp area of Sumatra, as well as the Riau islands to the east, which have their own traditions and culture.

### 2.4.3 The outer islands

On Kalimantan the division is between the coast and the inland region. Chinese and Malalay dominate the coastal regions, while a variety of Dayak tribes live in the interior, where they carry out primitive shifting cultivation. A similar pattern applies in West Irian and on many of the other islands were maritime-trading communities have been developed along the coast and agrarian, noncommercial societies, with strongly developed and highly localized customs, inhabit the interior.

East of Java, each island or group of islands has maintained its own distinct character, in many cases strongly influenced by religion. Bali is Hindu and is quite different in character and customs from any other part of Indonesia. Lombok is partly Hindu, but the influence of Islam is stronger. Sumbawa is Muslim, Flores is largely Roman Catholic, and Timor contains strong Protestant groups. These variations also prevail in Sulawesi and the Moluccas, where the Makasarese and Buginese of south Sulawesi are Muslims noted as seafarers and shipbuilders, while the Menadonese in north Sulawesi (Minahasa) and the Ambonese are Christian.

The barriers of the mountains and the sea have protected the character and traditions of many groups. Away from the major cities and areas of dense population, there are significant variations from one valley to the next and almost from one village to the next. In many cases the tribal groups the Toradjas (Torajas) of Sulawesi, the Dayak of Kalimantan, and the Gajo( Gayo), Lampung, and Batak peoples of Sumatra.

## 2.5. Settlements

Settlement in any area is intimately related to the habitat, habit and inhabitant. Significant historical event important policy and administrative decisions, efforts for physical improvements often leave imprints on the form and pattern of the settlement. No human settlement can function and thrive independently. A rural settlement expends on agricultural land for subsistence, on a market town for sale of surpluses produce and supply of necessities of life, and on larger urban centers for specialized sevices, higher education, medical facilities administrative, etc. similarly an urban settlement is also dependent on its umlands for supply of agricultural produce and various other purpose. Each human settlement has to e regarded as complementary unit of human activity.

### 2.5.1 Rural Settlements

Indonesia is basically a rural country, with almost 85 percent of the population living in agriculture areas. About half the population inhabits the inland wet-rice areas of Java, Madura and Bali, which have developed a highly sophisticated rural structure. Other areas of high rural population are found in parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi. Most of the rest of the country is sparsely settled by tribal groups who engage in shifting cultivation.

Rural structure varies considerably from region to region. Bali villages are clusters of walled family complexes with Hindu house temples, public buildings, and larger temples. The Batak villages around Lake Toba in north Sumatra, Minangkabau villages in west Sumatra, Toradja villages in south Sulawesi, and Dayak longhouses in Kalimantan each have their characteristic structure and building style. On Java it is very simple, with few organized groupings above the level of the household, while on neighbouring Bali there are strong groups related to working.

### 2.5.2 Urban Settlements

The overall level of urbanization in Indonesia is low in relation to other countries that are at a comparable stage of economic growth. This can be explained in part by the phenomenon of nonpermanent, or "circular," migration on Java and elsewhere: individuals from rural families live and work in the cities, but they return to their homes at least once every six months. Although there is some regional variation in urban growth rates, generally cities of every population size are growing rapidly.

Few of the cities, except for Jakarta, Surabaya, and Medan, have the heterogeneity of a true urban centre. Instead, they are the economic, governmental, cultural, and social centres for highly populated and distinct regions. The growth of the cities has not been accompanied by a parallel growth of industry, and the outlook of much of the urban population is still rural. Large parts of the population, even in Jakarta, live in replicas of rural villages, or kampongs, characterized by rural customs. Urban dwellers generally are better off than their rural counterparts, and urban services have gradually improved; but the availability of adequate housing, potable water, and public transportation services have remained critical concerns.

Four of Indonesia's five largest cities Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and  are on Java; the other, Medan, is located on Sumatra. These five cities may be considered as metropolitan areas rather than large provincial towns since they contain the major government, financial, and business offices. Other large cities, such as Padang, Yogyakarta, and Palembang, are centres of provincial government and of local trade and have limited international ties or contact with foreigners.

The cities have individual characters. Jakarta, as the capital and centre of finance, has fine government buildings, broad avenues and large fountains, and an increasing number of multistory hotels and office buildings. Surabaya is a major port and industrial city. Bandung, a former resort area and military centre, has much light industry and a number of universities. Semarang is the administrative capital and commercial hub of central Java. Yogyakarta, which was the capital of the revolutionary government between 1946 and 1949, is the seat of the ruling family of the sultan of Yogyakarta and remains the centre of Javanese culture. It also is the site of a major university, Gadja (Gajah) Mada, and of schools of art, traditional dance, and music and is the centre of the batik cloth industry. In Sumatra, Medan and its port city of Belawan constitute the commercial centre for the rich northern agricultural districts, and Palembang, Sumatra's second largest city, is the port for the oil industry and for a variety of other industries in the south.

The social composition of Indonesia's cities is highly diverse and reflects the heavy flow of migration from rural areas. The most varied of these is Jakarta: while many people may have been born or raised there, they often continue to refer to themselves in terms of their regional heritage such as Batak, Javanese, or Minangkabau and it is not uncommon for them to use their local languages at home.

The social and economic character of Indonesian cities is a continuing topic of study. A social hierarchy exists that is roughly composed of an elite group of government officials, military officers, and business leaders with a Western orientation; a growing middle class of civil servants, teachers, and other professionals and skilled workers who are significantly underpaid and must struggle to maintain their economic position; and a larger number of poorly educated unskilled labourers, traders, and other members of the informal economy who strongly identify with their villages and frequently move back and forth to engage in economic pursuits in both areas. This three-tiered hierarchy also conforms closely to an economic structure that is based on various government opportunities and on formal and informal business activities.

A transient foreign element of diplomats and company representatives plays a minor role in city structure. The permanent foreign element mainly of Chinese, Indian, and Arab business families is more fully integrated, but each group maintains its own contacts and patterns of life. The Indonesians gradually are developing an urban culture. This notion, perhaps more appropriately viewed as urban sophistication, is most conspicuous in Jakarta, with its strong international contacts. Since association with this international culture implies a degree of wealth, it is largely confined to the families of officials, professionals, and prominent businessmen. The lower-income groups, on the other hand, retain their basic ethnic cultures, strengthened by trips to home villages during times of harvest or during the Muslim month of Ramadan (a period of fasting and atonement).

Although Indonesia's social structure is decentralized, its administrative structure is highly centralized, with Jakarta the headquarters of the central government. Most taxes, including land and real estate taxes, are collected by the central government, on which city and provincial governments must depend for their revenue. Efforts have been made, however, to decentralize some government functions, particularly with respect to finance and to the management and delivery of various services.

**Political Background of Indonesia**

Two long-term presidents dominated Indonesia, a former Dutch colony, in the decades following World War II: Sukarno and Suharto. Sukarno, the main political leader of the independence movement and Indonesia's first president, forged a national identity through his *pancasila* or five bases:

1. Belief in one God;
2. Internationalism and concern for humanity;
3. National unity;
4. The sovereignty of the people; and
5. Social justice.

These principles were intended to provide a common rallying point for the disparate religious, cultural, political, and ethnic groups that populate Indonesia.

Suharto, a general, rose to rule Indonesia when Sukarno turned radical and confrontational. In September 1965, six senior generals were assassinated in an attempted coup by the powerful Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), and the military responded swiftly and brutally. Hundreds of thousands of people (mainly PKI supporters, peasants, and ethnic Chinese) were killed during the military's crackdown. As the newly appointed "commander for the restoration of security and order," Suharto oversaw the military's retaliation. Formal titles bestowed over the next few years provided evidence of his control of the government. He was granted executive powers in 1966, was named acting president in 1967, and was elected president by the People's Consultative Assembly in 1968. By 1970, when Sukarno died, the transition from Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" to Suharto's "New Order" was already complete.

Suharto annexed territory for Indonesia, including the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, where the Indonesian invasion led to an estimated 200,000 deaths. The Suharto regime was ruthless in suppressing dissent, stifling the press, and imprisoning opponents. Despite this, opposition leaders who gained prominence in the 1990s included Amien Rais, an Islamic reformer, and Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno. At the end of the 1990s, secessionist movements in Aceh and East Timor gained support and the economy faced a major crisis in 1997. Massive student-led protests forced Suharto to resign on 21 May 1998. Waves of violence, particularly directed at urban ethnic Chinese communities (which were perceived as in charge of an unjust economy), convulsed Indonesia as Suharto was toppled. When Suharto resigned he announced that the business-oriented but eccentric vice president, B.J. Habibie, would assume the presidency. Habibie was considered a caretaker rather than a real political contender.

Indonesia's Constitution gives broad power to the president, who is both head of state and chief executive. The presidential term is five years with no limits on reelection. The president is elected by the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat-MPR), which the president heads. The MPR consists of 695 members, with some elected and some chosen as regional delegates or as representatives of professional groups, political organizations, or the armed forces of Indonesia. It includes the 500 members of the House of Representatives, who are selected proportionate to the general election results. A number of decrees introduced in the late 1990s curbed the power of the president and the military, introduced the secret ballot, and provided legislative checks on the bureaucracy.

In 1999, following national elections, Abdurrahman Wahid was selected as president by the People's Consultative Assembly. Wahid, an influential Muslim intellectual, had refused to support Suharto's sixth consecutive term for the presidency and had become increasingly critical of Suharto's embrace of religion for the sake of increasing political legitimacy. In 1998, after Suharto's fall from power, Wahid organized the National Awakening Party, based on the principles of moderation, tolerance, and harmony. On taking office, Wahid accepted East Timor's referendum-approved independence and extended peace overtures to rebels in oil-rich Aceh, northern Sumatra. Ethnic violence persisted, however, and spread throughout the archipelago. Desperately needed economic reforms occurred only in fits and starts and Wahid appeared more interested in foreign than domestic policy. His relations with the People's Consultative Assembly were acrimonious. Despite his personal charm and the respect of the public, Wahid's unpredictability caused legislators to lose confidence in him. He also failed to get along with Megawati Sukarnoputri, whom he had relegated to the vice presidency.

## Conclusion:

One reason for great variety of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in Indonesia can be traced to its geographical location. Indonesia's variations in culture have been shaped, although not specifically determined by centuries of complex interactions with the physical environment. Although Indonesians are now less vulnerable to the vicissitudes of nature as a result of improved technology and social programs, to some extent their social diversity has emerged from traditionally different patterns of adjustment to their physical circumstances. It is in a strategic location astride or along major sea lanes from Indian Ocean to Pacific Ocean. Indonesia had to enact laws to govern the seas in accordance with the geographic structure of an archipelagic state. It stated that all the waters surrounding and between the islands in the territory came within Indonesia's sovereignty.

The Indonesian economy had virtually no industry and little more total production per capita than when controlled by Dutch colonialists. The new strategy permitted a larger role for private businesses and featured greatly simplified government regulations. Petroleum exports and the increasing exploitation of other natural resources funded imports of machinery and raw materials vital to rapid industrialization. Timber from Indonesia's vast rain forests, copper and nickel from remote mining sites, and traditional agricultural products such as rubber and coffee also contributed to buoyant export earnings.

Government agricultural programs brought the benefits of modern agricultural technology to millions of peasant farmers. The Green Revolution, based on the use of high-yielding seed varieties with modern inputs of fertilizers and pesticides, transformed subsistence rice farmers into productive commercial suppliers. Furthermore, new programs in the 1980s extended the benefits of modern agricultural techniques to other food and cash crops.

Indonesia which are located at the geographical, political, economical, or cultural margins of the collective, play a central role in the construction of national and state identities.

# *CAPTER: 3*

# *MULTI- ETHNIC SOCIETIES AND NATION BUILDING IN INDONESIA*

# CAPTER: 3

## Multi- Ethnic Societies and Nation Building in Indonesia

### Introduction

This chapter focuses on the multi ethnic composition of Indonesia. Including their family scheme, kinship, socialization, religion political and culture symbols. The chapter begins with elaborating about various tribes. Second part focuses on the impact of outside culture on indigenous culture of each tribe due to process of migration and hoe migration is changing the ethnic composition of each these tribes. Latter part of the chapter focuses on the history of Indonesia becoming a full fedged state and its gradual continuous transformation in the process of becoming a nation state including the impediments faced by it is doing so.

Ethnicity is nowhere but everywhere in Indonesia. It is nowhere because for 70 years between 1930 and 2000 no census measured Indonesia's ethnic composition. The New Order government of President Suharto (1966-98) had few explicit policies on ethnic groups, though it had several veiled and indirect ones. With the widespread support of the media and intellectuals, it was keen to develop a modern, non-ethnic Indonesia and therefore avoided mentioning anything 'ethnic'. The literature on ethnicity in Indonesia is surprisingly meagre and distorted as a result. (Mackerras, Colin 2003)

### 3.1 Multi-Ethnic Composition in Indonesia

Indonesia is a multi-ethnic society, with more than 1,000 ethnic/sub ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the size of most ethnic groups is small, and only 15 groups have more than 1 million each .The largest group were the Javanese at 45 percent of the total population. Sundanese made up 14 percent, followed by Madurese, 7.5 percent, and coastal Malays, 7.5 percent As a sign of its diverse population, fully 26 percent of the population in 1992 consisted of numerous small ethnic groups or minorities. The extent of this diversity is unknown, however, since Indonesian censuses do not collect data on ethnicity. However, from an examination of the published data, we have discovered 101 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in Indonesia along with their numbers, which are presented in Table 3.1.

# TABLE 3.1

## ETHNIC GROUPS COMPOSITIONS : INDONESIA , 1930

| 1930 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| No | **Ethnic Groups** | **Number** | **Percentage** |
| 1 | **Javanese** | 2,78,08,623 | 47.02 |
| 2 | **Sundanese** | 85,94,834 | 14.53 |
| 3 | **Madurese** | 43,05,862 | 7.28 |
| 4 | **Minangkabau** | 19,88,648 | 3.36 |
| 5 | **Buginese** | 15,33,035 | 2.59 |
| 6 | **Chinese** | 12,33,000 | 2.03 |
| 7 | **Batak** | 12,07,514 | 2.04 |
| 8 | **Balinese** | 11,11,659 | 1.88 |
| 9 | **Betawi** | 9,80,863 | 1.66 |
| 10 | **Malay** | 9,53,397 | 1.61 |
| 11 | **Banjarese** | 8,98,884 | 1.52 |
| 12 | **Acehnese** | 8,31,321 | 1.41 |
| 13 | **Palembangan** | 7,70,917 | 1.3 |
| 14 | **Sasak** | 6,59,477 | 1.12 |
| 15 | **Dayak** | 6,51,391 | 1.1 |
| 16 | **Makassarese** | 6,42,720 | 1.09 |
| 17 | **Toraja** | 5,57,590 | 0.94 |
| 18 | **Others** | 56,41,332 | 9.54 |
| | **Total** | **5,91,38,067** | **100** |

Source: *Population Census 1930(Indonesia).*

## TABLE 3.2

## ETHNIC GROUPS COMPOSITIONS : INDONESIA , 2000

| 2000 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **No.** | **Ethnic Groups** | **Number** | **Percentage** |
| 1 | **Javanese** | 8,38,65,724 | 41.71 |
| 2 | **Sundanese** | 3,09,78,404 | 15.41 |
| 3 | **Malay** | 69,46,040 | 3.45 |
| 4 | **Madurese** | 67,71,727 | 3.37 |
| 5 | **Batakk** | 60,76,440 | 3.02 |
| 6 | **Minangkabau** | 54,75,145 | 2.72 |
| 7 | **Betawi** | 50,41,688 | 2.51 |
| 8 | **Buginese** | 50,10,421 | 2.49 |
| 9 | **Bantenese** | 41,13,162 | 2.05 |
| 10 | **Banjarese** | 34,96,273 | 1.74 |
| 11 | **Balinese** | 30,27,525 | 1.51 |
| 12 | **Sasak** | 26,11,059 | 1.3 |
| 13 | **Makassarese** | 19,82,187 | 0.99 |
| 14 | **Cirebon** | 1,89,102 | 0.94 |
| 15 | **Chinese** | 17,38,936 | 0.86 |
| 16 | **Gorontalo/Hulandalo** | 9,74,175 | 0.48 |
| 17 | **Acehnese** | 8,71,944 | 0.43 |
| 18 | **Toraja** | 7,50,828 | 0.37 |
| 19 | **Others** | 2,98,57,346 | 14.66 |
| | **Total** | **20,10,92,238** | **100** |

Source: *Population Census 2001(Indonesia).*

Figure3.1



Source: *Results of the 2000 Population Census (Indonesia).*

Figure 3.1& 3.2 compares the five largest group in Indonesia. The eight largest ethnic groups namely the Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Minangkabau, Betawi, Buginese, Bantenese, and Banjarese. Other ethnic groups are categorized as "others". As seen in Table 3.1 &3.2, the Javanese and Sundanese remain the two largest ethnic groups in Indonesia. However, the difference between these two in terms of number and percentage is indeed striking ,a difference of about 19 million in 1930 and 53 million in 2000 and of 32.49 percentage points in 1930 and 26.30 percentage points in 2000. Together, the Javanese and Sundanese comprise more than half of the population of Indonesia. However, the percentage of the Javanese declined from 47.02% in 1930 to 41.71% in 2000, while the percentage of the Sundanese has increased from 14.53% in 1930 to 15.41%, assuming that the Bantenese14.53% in 1930 to 15.41%, assuming that the Bantenese had been categorized as Sundanese in the 1930 census.

**Figure 3.2**



Source: *Results of the 2000 Population Census (Indonesia).*

Some ethnic groups have declined in their ranks. For example, the Madurese was in the third group in 1930, but fourth in 2000. The Minangkabau moved from the fourth group to the sixth group (Figure 3.2); the Buginese, from fifth to eighth. Some (Suryadinata Leo, 2002) (the Malay, Betawi, and Batak) have risen in their ranks.

The Chinese was the sixth largest ethnic group in 1930, but the fifteenth in 2000, although the absolute number of ethnic Chinese us still increasing about0.5 million during the period 1930-2000.However, the number of ethnic Chinese in 2000 is under-reported.

There has been a lot of variation in the population growth rates by ethnic group, ranging from 0.65% among the Madurese to 2.84% among the Malay. Showsthat in addition to the Madurese, the Buginese, Javanese, Minangkabau and Balinese also have growth rates lower than the national rates (1.78%).

The remaining rates are higher than the national rates.There is no information on the population of Bantenese in 1930. If they are categorized as Sundanese, the number of "Sundanese" in 2000 should include the number of Bantenese in 2000.With this assumption, the "Sundanese" would constitute 17.46%, rather than 15.41%, of all Indonesian citizens in 2000. The growth rate of Sundanese would be higher 2.01% rather than 1.83 %.(Suryadinata, 2002)

As this increasingly mobile, multiethnic nation moved into its fifth decade of independence, Indonesians were made aware through education, television, cinema, print media, and national parks of the diversity of their own society. When Indonesians talk about their cultural differences with one another, one of the first words they use is adat (custom or tradition). This term adat is roughly translated as "custom" or "tradition", but its meaning has undergone a number of transformations in Indonesia. In some circumstances, for instance, adat has a kind of legal status certain adat laws (hukum adat) are recognized by the government as legitimate. These ancestral customs may pertain to a wide range of activities: agricultural production, religious practices, marriage arrangements, legal practices, political succession, or artistic expressions.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of Indonesians are Muslim, they maintain very different social identifications. For example, when Javanese try to explain the behavior of a Sundanese or a Balinese counterpart, they might say "because it is his adat." Differences in the ways ethnic groups practice Islam are often ascribed to adat. Each group may have slightly different patterns of observing religious holidays, attending the mosque, expressing respect, or burying the dead. (CIA World Fact Book, 2010)

Although adat in the sense of "custom" is often viewed as one of the deepest even sacred sources of consensus within an ethnic group, the word itself is actually of foreign derivation originally from the Arabic. Through centuries of contact with outsiders, Indonesians have a long history of contrasting themselves and their traditions with those of others, and their notions of 'who they are as a people have been shaped in integral ways by these encounters'. On the more isolated islands in eastern Indonesia, for instance, one finds ethnic groups that have no word for adat because they have had very little contact with outsiders. (U.S. Library of Congress 2010)

In the 1970s and 1980s, the notion of adat came to take on a national significance in touristic settings such as Balinese artistic performances and in museum displays. Taman Mini, a kind of ethnographic theme park located on the outskirts of Jakarta, seeks to display and interpret the cultural variation of Indonesia. When Indonesians talk about their society in inclusive terms, they are more likely to use a word like budaya (culture) than adat. One speaks of kebudayaan Indonesia, the "culture of Indonesia," as something grand, and refers to traditions of refinement and high civilization. The Hinduized dances, music, and literature of Java and Bali and the great monuments associated with their religion are often described as examples of "culture" or "civilization" but not "custom." However, as the following descriptions show, the wide variety of sources of local identification underscores the diversity rather than the unity of the Indonesian population.

### 3.2 Major Ethnic Groups and Distribution in Indonesia

Indonesia is home to approximately 20 carore people who are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse. The central authority is dominated by javanese who constitute 41% of Indonesia's population. Indonesiaes speak diverse languages. The state religion is Islam.

#### 3.2.1 Javanese

There were approximately 83,865,724 Javanese in the 2000, the majority of whom lived in East Java and Central Java and the rest of whom lived on Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and other islands. Altogether, some 100 million people lived on Java. Although many Javanese expressed pride at the grand achievements of the illustrious courts of Surakarta and Yogyakarta and admired the traditional arts, most Javanese tended to identify not with that elite tradition, or even with a lineage or a clan, but with their own villages. These villages, or kampung, were typically situated on the edge of rice fields, surrounding a mosque, or strung out along a road.

Most Javanese villages in the early 1990s were differentiated into smaller units known as either rukun kampung (village mutual assistance association) or rukun tetangga (neighborhood association). Rukun is an important Javanese word describing both "state of being and a mode of action. (Andrew Beatty, 1999)

#### 3.2.2 Sundanese

The Sundanese live principally in West Java, but their language is not intelligible to the Javanese. The more than 30,978,404 Sundanese in 2000 had stronger ties to Islam than the Javanese, in terms of pesantren enrollment and religious affiliation. Although the Sundanese language, like Javanese, possesses elaborate speech levels, these forms of respect are infused with Islamic values, such as the traditional notion of hormat (respect knowing and fulfilling one's proper position in society). Children are taught that the task of behaving with proper hormat is also a religious struggle the triumph of akal (reason) over nafsu (desire). These dilemmas are spelled out in the pesantren, where children learn to memorize the Quran in Arabic. Through copious memorization and practice in correct pronunciation, children learn that reasonable behavior means verbal conformity with authority and subjective interpretation is a sign of inappropriate individualism. (Mikihiro Moriyama, 2005).

Although Sundanese religious practices share some of the Hindu Buddhist beliefs of their Javanese neighbours for example, the animistic beliefs in spirits and the emphasis on right thinking and self control as a way of controlling those spirits Sundanese courtly traditions differ from those of the Javanese. The Sundanese language possesses an elaborate and sophisticated literature preserved in Indic scripts and in puppet dramas. These dramas use distinctive wooden dolls (wayang golek, as contrasted with the wayang kulit of the Javanese and Balinese), but Sundanese courts have aligned themselves more closely to universalistic tenets of Islam than have the elite classes of Central Java.

Although Sundanese and Javanese possess similar family structures, economic patterns, and political systems, they feel some rivalry toward one another. As interregional migration increased in the 1980s and 1990s, the tendency to stereotype one another's adat in highly contrastive terms intensified, even as actual economic and social behavior were becoming increasingly interdependent.

### 3.2.3 Balinese

There is probably no group in Indonesia more aware of its own ethnic identity than the nearly 2.5 million Balinese. Inhabitants of the islands of Bali and Lombok and the western half of Sumbawa, Balinese are often portrayed as a graceful, poised, and aesthetically inclined people. Although such descriptions date back six centuries or more and are at least partially based on legend, this characterization is also partly based on events in contemporary Indonesia. Virtually no part of Bali escaped the watchful gaze of tourists who came in increasing numbers each year to enjoy the island's beautiful beaches and stately temples, and to seek out an "authentic" experience of this perceived "traditional" culture. The market for traditional carvings, dance performances, and paintings boomed, and many Balinese successfully reinvested their earnings in further development of these highly profitable art forms.

Balinese have a long history of contrasting themselves profitably with outsiders. Although Hinduism had already established a foothold on Bali, the contemporary distinctive Hindu religious practices of the Balinese date back at least to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Javanese princes from Majapahit fled the advances of Islam and sought refuge in Bali, where they were absorbed into the local culture. Since that time, Balinese, with the exception of a minority of Muslims in the north, have maintained a generally anti Islamic political stance, preserving a great pride in their own culture. Indeed, segregation between themselves and outsiders has been an organizing factor in Balinese culture. (John Stephen Lansing, 1995).

### 3.2.4 Peoples of Sumatra

The vast, heavily forested island of Sumatra forms the southern perimeter of the Strait of Malacca. The strait is one of the most important lanes of shipping and commerce in the world, and historically a crossroads of cultural influences from the Middle East, India, China, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia and East Asia. Although nearly all of the approximately twenty ethnolinguistic groups of Sumatra are devout practitioners of Islam, they nonetheless differ strikingly from one another, particularly in their family structures.

#### 3.2.4.1 Acehnese

Situated in the Special Region of Aceh the northernmost provincial-level unit of Sumatra, the more than 3.4 million Acehnese are most famous throughout the archipelago for their devotion to Islam and their militant resistance to colonial and republican rule. Renowned throughout the nineteenth century for their pepper plantations, most Acehnese were rice growers in the coastal regions in the early 1990s.

Acehnese do not have large descent groups; the nuclear family consisting of mother, father, and children is the central social unit. Unlike the Javanese or Balinese family, the Acehnese family system shows marked separation of men's and women's spheres of activity. Traditionally, males are directed outwardly towards the world of trade. In the practice of merantau going abroad or away from one's birthplace young adult males leave their homelands for a time to seek their fortune, experience, and reputation through commerce. This may involve travel to another village, province, or island. This maturation process among males is viewed as growing out of the domestic female-dominated world of sensory indulgence and into the male world of reasoned rationality, whose practice is expressed through trade. One model of Acehnese family life is that a woman sends a man out of the house to trade and welcomes him back when he brings home money. When he has exhausted his money, she sends him out again. Meanwhile, women and their kin are responsible for working the fields and keeping the gardens and rice fields productive. (Justine Vaisutis , 2007)

This oscillating pattern of migration encountered some difficulties in the 1980s as increasing numbers of men failed to return to the Acehnese homeland, but instead remained and married in remote locations, such as Jakarta and Kalimantan. In addition, northern Sumatra experienced important changes because of the influx of temporary workers seeking employment in the oil and timber industries.

### 3.2.4.2 Batak

The term Batak designates any one of several groups inhabiting the interior of Sumatera Utara Province south of Aceh: Angkola, Karo, Mandailing, Pakpak, Simelungen, Toba, and others. The Batak number around 3 million. Culturally, they lack the complex etiquette and social hierarchy of the Hinduized peoples of Indonesia. Indeed, they seem to bear closer resemblance to the highland swidden cultivators of Southeast Asia, even though some also practice padi farming. Unlike the Balinese, who have several different traditional group affiliations at once, or Javanese peasants affiliated with their village or neighborhood, the Batak orient themselves traditionally to the marga, a patrilineal descent group. This group owns land and does not permit marriage within it. Traditionally, each marga is a wife-giving and wife-taking unit. Whereas a young man takes a wife from his mother's clan, a young woman marries into a clan where her paternal aunts live. (Justine Vaisutis , 2007)

When Sumatra was still a vast, under populated island with seemingly unlimited supplies of forest, this convergence of land ownership and lineage authority functioned well. New descent groups simply split off from the old groups when they wished to farm new land, claiming the virgin territory for the lineage. If the lineage prospered in its new territory, other families would be invited to settle there and form marriage alliances with the pioneer settlers, who retained ultimate jurisdiction over the territory. Genealogies going back dozens of generations were carefully maintained in oral histories recited at funerals. Stewardship over the land entailed spiritual obligations to the lineage ancestors and required that other in-migrating groups respect this.

The marga has proved to be a flexible social unit in contemporary Indonesian society. Batak who resettle in urban areas, such as Medan and Jakarta, draw on marga affiliations for financial support and political alliances. While many of the corporate aspects of the marga have undergone major changes, Batak migrants to other areas of Indonesia retain pride in their ethnic identity. Batak have shown themselves to be creative in drawing on modern media to codify and express their "traditional" adat. Anthropologist Susan Rodgers has shown how taped cassette dramas similar to soap operas circulate widely in the Batak region to dramatize the moral and cultural dilemmas of one's kinship obligations in a rapidly changing world. In addition, Batak have been prodigious producers of written handbooks designed to show young, urbanized, and secular lineage members how to navigate the complexities of their marriage and funeral customs.

### 3.2.4.3 Minangkabau

The Minangkabau who predominate along the coasts of Sumatera Utara and Sumatera Barat, interior Riau, and northern Bengkulu provinces--in the early 1990s numbered more than 3.5 million. Like the Batak, they have large corporate descent groups, but unlike the Batak, the Minangkabau traditionally reckon descent matrilineally. In this system, a child is regarded as descended from his mother, not his father. A young boy, for instance, has his primary responsibility to his mother's and sisters' clans. In practice, in most villages a young man will visit his wife in the evenings but spend the days with his sister and her children. It is usual for married sisters to remain in their parental home. According to a 1980 study by anthropologist Joel S. Kahn, there is a general pattern of residence among the Minangkabau in which sisters and unmarried lineage members try to live close to one another, or even in the same house. (Justine Vaisutis , 2007)

Minangkabau were prominent among the intellectual figures in the independence movement of Indonesia. Not only were they strongly Islamic, they spoke a language closely related to Bahasa Indonesia, which was considerably freer of hierarchical connotations than Javanese. Partly because of their tradition of merantau, Minangkabau developed a cosmopolitan bourgeoisie that readily adopted and promoted the ideas of an emerging nation state.

### 3.3 Ethnic Minorities

In Indonesia the concept of ethnic minorities is often discussed not in numerical but in religious terms. Although the major ethnic groups claimed adherence to one of the major world religions (agama) recognized by the Pancasila ideology Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, or Buddhism there were millions of other Indonesians in the early 1980s who engaged in forms of religious or cultural practices that fell outside these categories. These practices were sometimes labelled animist or kafir (pagan). In general, these Indonesians tended to live in the more remote, sparsely populated islands of the archipelago. Following the massacre of tens of thousands associated with the 1965 coup attempt, religious affiliation became an even more intense political issue among minority groups. The groups described below represent only a sampling of the many minorities. (Widjojo Nitisastro, 2006)

### 3.3.1 Toraja

One minority group that has been successful in gaining national and international attention is the Toraja of central Sulawesi. This group's prominence, beginning in the 1980s, was due largely to the tourist industry, which was attracted to the region because of its picturesque villages and its spectacular mortuary rites involving the slaughter of water buffalo.

Inhabiting the wet, rugged mountains of the interior of Sulawesi, the Toraja grow rice for subsistence and coffee for cash. Traditionally, they live in fortified hilltop villages with from two to forty picturesque houses with large sweeping roofs that resemble buffalo horns. Up until the late 1980s, these villages were politically and economically self-sufficient, partly as protection against the depredations of the slave trade and partly as a result of intervillage feuding associated with headhunting.

The Toraja have strong emotional, economic, and political ties to a number of different kinds of corporate groups. The most basic tie is the Rarabuku, which might be translated as family. Toraja view these groups as relations of "blood and bone," that is, relations between parents and children the nuclear family. Since Toraja reckon kinship bilaterally, through both the mother and father, the possibilities for extending the concept of rarabuku in several different directions are many. Another important kind of group with which Toraja have close affiliations is the tongkonan (ancestral house), which contrasts with banua (ordinary house). Tongkonan as social units consist of a group of people who reckon descent from an original ancestor. The physical structures of tongkonan are periodically renewed by replacing their distinctively shaped roofs. This ritual is attended by members of the social group and accompanied by trance-like dances in which the spirits are asked to visit. A third important kind of affiliation is the saroan, or village work group. These groups were probably originally agricultural work groups based in a particular hamlet. Beginning as labour and credit exchanges, saroan have since evolved into units of cooperation in ritual activities as well. When sacrifices and funerals take place, these groups exchange meat and other foods. (Justine Vaisutis , 2007)

With the oil boom in the 1960s and 1970s, there were massive outmigrations among upland Sulawesi young men looking for jobs in northeastern Kalimantan. During this period, many of these youths became Christians. But when they returned to their villages as wealthy men, they often wanted to hold large status displays in the form of funerals, causing what anthropologist Toby Alice Volkman calls "ritual inflation." These displays provoked intense debates about the authenticity of what some regarded as rituals of the nouveau riche. During this same period, however, Indonesia promoted a policy that encouraged the development of the non-oil-related sectors of the economy. Part of this policy involved the development of the tourist trade, and following coverage by the American media, waves of foreigners came to see the carnage of buffalo slaughter. These numbers swelled in the early 1990s. Because of the successful efforts of highly placed Toraja officials in the central government, their feasting practices were granted official status as a branch of Balinese Hinduism.

### 3.3.2 Dayak

Another group of ethnic minorities struggling for recognition in the 1980s were the peoples of southern Kalimantan. Traditionally, most of the scattered ethno linguistic groups inhabiting the interior of the vast island have been labelled collectively by outsiders as Dayak. Among the Dayak are the Ngaju Dayak, Maanyan, and Lawangan. Although they have traditionally resided in longhouses that served as an important protection against slave raiding and intervillage raids, the people of this region are not communalistic. They have bilateral kinship, and the basic unit of ownership and social organization is the nuclear family. Religiously, they tend to be either Protestant or Kaharingan, a form of native religious practice viewed by the government as Hindu. The Dayak make a living through swidden agriculture and possess relatively elaborate death ceremonies in which the bones are disinterred for secondary reburial.

A number of the peoples in the region practice the Kaharingan religion. Through its healing performances, Kaharingan serves to mold the scattered agricultural residences into a community, and it is at times of ritual that these peoples coalesce as a group. There is no set ritual leader nor is there a fixed ritual presentation. Specific ceremonies may be held in the home of the sponsor. Shamanic curing or balian is one of the core features of these ritual practices. Because this healing practice often occurs as a result of the loss of the soul, which has resulted in some kind of illness, the focus of the religion is thus on the body. Sickness comes by offending one of the many spirits inhabiting the earth and fields, usually from a failure to sacrifice to them. The goal of the balian is to call back the wayward soul and restore the health of the community through trance, dance, and possession.

Modern recognition of the legitimacy of Kaharingan as a religious practice has been the culmination of a long history of struggles for autonomy. Since the southern coast of Kalimantan has long been dominated by the politically and numerically superior Muslim Banjarese, Christian and Kaharingan adherents of the central interior sought parliamentary recognition of a Great Dayak territory in 1953. When these efforts failed, a rebellion broke out in 1956 along religious lines, culminating in the establishment of the new province of Kalimantan Tengah in May 1957.

The abortive coup of 1965 proved that independence to be fragile. With the unity of the republic at stake, indigenous religions were viewed as threats and labelled atheistic and, by implication, communist. Caught in a no-win situation, the Dayak also were told that they did not have an agama and thus became suspect in the anticommunist fever of the late 1960s. By the early 1970s, negotiations began between Kalimantan Tengah and the national government over recognition of the indigenous religion of the peoples of the province. This process culminated in official recognition in the 1980s of Kaharingan as an agama. (Widjojo Nitisastro , 2006).

### 3.3.3 Weyewa

The Weyewa inhabit the western highlands of Sumba, Nusa Tenggara Timur Province, where they cultivate rice, corn, and cassava using slash-and-burn farming methods as well continuous irrigation of padi fields. They supplement this income through the sale of livestock, coffee, and their distinctive brightly colored textiles.

Until the 1970s, there had been relatively few challenges to the Weyewa notions of political and religious identity. Because Sumba is a rather dry and infertile island, located away from the ports of call of the spice trade, it was comparatively insulated from the Hindu, Muslim, and later Dutch influences, each of which helped to shape the character of Indonesia's cultures. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Sumba was periodically raided for slaves by Muslim traders, the local inhabitants responded by building and living in fortified hilltop villages. Patrilineages, which structured these groups, became powerful units of politically motivated marriage alliances in which women were the currency of exchange. Each lineage was headed by a self-appointed raja, or "big man," who, in return for loyalty, cattle, women, and children, offered protection and guarded the sanctity of tradition.

These powerful lineages, symbolized by the spirits of deceased ancestors, remained the focus of Weyewa religious practice and political identity until the 1970s, despite the Dutch military conquest of the island in 1906 and nearly a century of Protestant missionary efforts. In exchange for the fertility of crops, the orderly flow of irrigation water, freedom from misfortune, and continued prosperity, descendants promised to offer ritual sacrifices of cattle, chickens, pigs, and rice. These promises were made in a form of ritual speech. (Widjojo Nitisastro ,2006).

The Weyewa system of production and exchange began to undergo major shifts in the 1970s, which resulted in a gradual weakening of the authority of lineages. One event that illustrates this process was the construction of an irrigation system and hydroelectric dam at the site of a sacred gushing spring at Waikelo in central-west Sumba in the mid-1960s. Throughout much of the 1960s, this spring watered some 300 hectares of rice fields, whose cycles of cultivation and fallowing were regulated by certain lineage elders carrying out the "words" of the ancestors. By the early 1970s, more than 1,500 hectares were available for continuous irrigation. Not only were traditional leaders unprepared to oversee and control this increase in the scale of production, but government officials took the initiative by encouraging farmers to abandon the ritual schedule of planting and harvest and to plant new high-yield, hardy, and fast-growing varieties of rice. These new varieties permitted two or more plantings per year. According to oral accounts of witnesses, the ownership of the new and ambiguous categories of land that emerged from irrigation was often assigned to individuals, not lineages. When disputes arose, government officials, such as police officers, judges, or district heads, rather than the raja, increasingly mediated the disputes and enforced the settlements. As a result, when asked to participate younger farmers were increasingly reluctant to invest in largescale and expensive ritual feasts honoring the spirits, because the government had more control over their lives than did the spirits. (Widjojo Nitisastro , 2006).

### 3.3.4 Tanimbarese

I The south eastern part of Maluku Province lived more than 60,000 residents of the Tanimbar archipelago in the early 1990s. They resided in villages ranging in size from 150 to 2,500 inhabitants, but most villages numbered from 300 to 1,000. Nearly all residents spoke one of four related, but mutually unintelligible, languages. Because of an extended dry season, the forests were much less luxuriant than in some of the more northerly Maluku Islands, and the effects of over-intensive swidden cultivation of rice, cassava, and other root crops were visible in the interior. Many Tanimbarese also engaged in reef and deep-sea fishing and wild boar hunting.

Unlike the Weyewa, Toraja, or Dayak, the Tanimbarese do not maintain an opposition between their native culture and an officially recognized Christian culture. Following a Dutch military expedition in 1912, Catholic and Protestant missionaries converted all residents of their archipelago by the 1920s. However, the Tanimbarese tradition is preserved through intervillage and interhousehold marriage alliances. Tanimbarese orient themselves socially toward their villages and their houses. The unity of the village is represented as a stone boat. In ceremonial settings, such as indigenous dance, the rankings and statuses within the village are spoken of as a seating arrangement within this symbolic boat. Intervillage and interhouse rivalry, no longer expressed through headhunting and warfare, continue to be represented through complex ritual exchanges of valuables, marriage alliances, and competitive relations between the Catholic and Protestant churches (one or the other of which counts each Tanimbarese as a member) (Widjojo Nitisastro ,2006).

Tanimbarese are affiliated with rahan (houses) that are important corporate units, responsible for making offerings to the ancestors, whose skulls were traditionally placed inside. Rahan are also responsible for the maintenance and distribution of heirloom property consisting of valuables and forest estates. Since Tanimbarese recognize a system of patrilineal descent, when a child is born they customarily ask: "Stranger or house master"? Since a male is destined to "sit"or "stay" in the house of his father, he is a "master of his house." If the baby is a girl, the child is destined to move between houses, and thus is a "stranger." The question of which house the girl moves to, and what obligations and rights will go along with the move, is one of the most important questions in Tanimbarese society. There are certain "pathways" of marriage that young women from certain houses are expected to follow, particularly if these interclan alliances have lasted more than three generations. Only if certain valuables are properly received by her natal family, however, is a young woman fully incorporated into her husband's home. Otherwise, her children are regarded as a branch of her brother's lineage.

The Tanimbarese traditionally engaged in both a local system of ceremonial exchange and, for centuries, in a broader Indonesian commerce in which they traded copra, trepang, tortoise shell, and shark fins for gold, elephant tusks, textiles, and other valuables. In the twentieth century, however, Tanimbarese began to exchange their local products for more prosaic items such as tobacco, coffee, sugar, metal cooking pots, needles, clothing, and other domestic-use items. In the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese merchants thoroughly dominated this trade and consequently gained great influence in the local village economy.

### 3.3.5 Asmat

The approximately 65,000 Asmat people of the south-central alluvial swamps of Irian Jaya Province are descended from a Papuan racial stock. They live in villages with populations that vary from 35 to 2,000. Until the 1950s, when greater numbers of outsiders arrived, warfare, headhunting, and cannibalism were constant features of their social life. Their houses were built along the bends of rivers so that an enemy attack could be seen in advance. Houses in coastal areas in the twentieth century were generally built on pilings two or more meters high, to protect residents from daily flooding by the surging tides of the brackish rivers. In the foothills of the Jayawijaya Mountains, Asmat lived in tree houses that were five to twenty-five meters off the ground. In some areas, they also built watchtowers in trees that rose thirty meters from the ground. (Widjojo Nitisastro , 2006).

The Asmat are primarily hunters and gatherers who subsist by gathering and processing the starchy pulp of the sago palm, and by fishing and hunting the occasional wild pig, cassowary, grubs, and crocodile. Although the Asmat population steadily increased since contact by missionaries and government health workers, the forest continued to yield more than an adequate supply and variety of food in the early 1990s. According to anthropologist Tobias Schneebaum, "ome Asmat have learned to grow small patches of vegetables, such as string beans, and a few raise the descendants of recently imported chickens. With the introduction of a limited cash economy through the sale of logs to timber companies and carvings to outsiders, many Asmat now consider as necessities such foods as rice and tinned fish; most have also become accustomed to wearing Western-style clothing and using metal tools."

'Asmat' believe that all deaths except those of the very old and very young come about through acts of malevolence, either by magic or actual physical force. Their ancestral spirits demand vengeance for these deaths. These ancestors to whom they feel obligated are represented in large, spectacular wood carvings of canoes, shields, and in ancestor poles consisting of human figurines. Until the late twentieth century, the preferred way a young man could full fill his obligations to his kin, to his ancestors, and to prove his sexual prowess, was to take a head of an enemy, and offer the body for cannibalistic consumption by other members of the village. (Widjojo Nitisastro , 2006).

Although the first Dutch colonial government post was not established in Asmat territory until 1938, and a Catholic mission began its work there only in 1958, the pace of change in this once remote region greatly increased after the 1960s. Many Asmat in the early 1990s were enrolled in Indonesian schools and were converting to Christianity. As large timber and oil companies expanded their operations in the region, the environmental conditions of these fragile, low-lying mangrove forests were threatened by industrial waste and soil erosion. Although Asmat appeared to be gaining some national and international recognition for their artwork, this fame had not resulted, by the early 1990s, in their having any significant political input into Indonesian government decisions affecting the use of land in the traditional Asmat territory.

### 3.3.5 Chinese

Identifying someone in Indonesia as a member of the Chinese (orang Tionghoa) ethnic group is not an easy matter, because physical characteristics, language, name, geographical location, and life-style of Chinese Indonesians are not always distinct from those of the rest of the population. Census figures do not record Chinese as a special group, and there are no simple racial criteria for membership in this group. There are some people who are considered Chinese by themselves and others, despite generations of intermarriage with the local population, resulting in offspring who are less than one-quarter Chinese in ancestry. On the other hand, there are some people who by ancestry could be considered half Chinese or more, but who regard themselves as fully Indonesian. Furthermore, many people who identify themselves as Chinese Indonesians cannot read or write the Chinese language.

Although the policy of the Indonesian government in the early 1990s favored the assimilation of the Chinese population into the local communities in which they lived, Chinese had a long history of enforced separation from their non-Chinese neighbors. For nearly a century prior to 1919, Chinese were forced to live in separate urban neighborhoods and could travel out of them only with government permits. Most Chinese continued to settle in urban areas of Indonesia even after this “quarter system” was discontinued in 1919. In some areas, such as Pontianak in Kalimantan Barat Province, Chinese even came to form a majority of the population. Although they had settled in rural areas of Java in the 1920s and 1930s, in the 1960s the government again prohibited the Chinese from exercising free choice of residence, requiring them to live in cities. (Widjojo Nitisastro , 2006).

Nearly all Chinese who immigrated to Indonesia came from either Fujian or Guangdong provinces in southern China. The dominant languages among these immigrants were ‘Hokkien’, ‘Hakka’, and ‘Cantonese’. Although there was great occupational diversity among contemporary Indonesia’s Chinese, most were either engaged in trade, mining, or skilled artisanry. In the early 1990s, Chinese continued to dominate Indonesia’s private sector, despite policies designed to promote indigenous entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, Chinese were not a monolithic group. Each immigrant group had its own distinctive characteristic some of which were accentuated overseas. One of the main contrasts among Indonesian

Chinese in the 1990s was seen in the differences between the peranakan (native-born Chinese with some Indonesian ancestry) and totok (full-blooded Chinese, usually foreign born). Although the distinctiveness and social significance of this division varied considerably in different parts of the archipelago, among the peranakan community, ties to the Chinese homeland were more distant, and there was stronger evidence of Indonesian influence. Unlike the more strictly male-dominated totok Chinese, peranakan families recognized descent based on both female and male lines. Peranakan were more likely to have converted to Christianity and to have assimilated in other ways to the norms of Indonesian culture. They often spoke Bahasa Indonesia as their first language. Some even converted to Islam.

In the early 1990s, totok considered themselves as keepers of Chinese cultural ideals and maintained their traditions through household shrines, reverence for ancestors, and private language instruction in Chinese schools. Highly oriented toward success, they saw themselves as more dedicated to hard work, individual social mobility through the acquisition of wealth, and self-reliance than the peranakan. Whereas peranakan were more likely to have settled on Java, totok were better represented in the other islands.

The government program of assimilation for the Chinese was carried out in several ways. Symbols of Chinese identity had long been discouraged and even occasionally prohibited: Chinese-language newspapers, schools, and public ritual use of Chinese names were all subject to strong governmental disapproval. In the years following independence, nearly 50 percent of Chinese Indonesians failed to seek Indonesian citizenship, however, either because of continuing loyalty to the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China on Taiwan, or because of the prohibitive costs of gaining citizenship papers. To carry out its stated policy of assimilation in a period of rapprochement with China, however, the Suharto government enacted new regulations in the 1980s designed to expedite the naturalization of persons with Chinese citizenship. The assimilation policy was successful. By 1992 only about 6 percent, or 300,000 out of approximately 5 million Chinese Indonesians were acknowledged by the People’s Republic of China as being Chinese citizens. Regulations announced in June 1992 by the director general of immigration allowed immigrants from China who had lived illegally in Indonesia for decades to receive entry permits and to reside legally in Indonesia once they obtained a Chinese passport. (Widjojo Nitisastro , 2006).

## 3.4 Ethnic Diversity through the Migration

Population movements or migration has been played a crucial role in the formation of Indonesia's society. It is the main factor of creating ethnic diversity in Indonesia. Movement of people between islands in insular Southeast Asia has always part of the trading networks that crossing the cultural and state boundaries. Some ethnic groups, such as Minangkabaus, Banjarese, Bugis, Makasarese, Butonese and Madurese are well known as the seafarers and traders; that traveled extensively not only in the insular Southeast Asia but as far as Madagascar and Pacific Islands.

The mixtures and intercultural exchanges between different ethnic groups has contributed into the hybrid and multicultural society in Indonesia. In this context the spread of religious teaching, especially Islam, also strongly interconnected with the movement of people. I many instances, religion and trade are brought together by these mobile ethnic groups. The Chinese and Arab traders, as well the European settlers contribute to the features of Indonesia's plural society today.

Although Indonesians particularly Javanese are sometimes stereotyped as highly immobile, rarely venturing out beyond the confines of their village environment, this image may be due to a lack of clear data and an extraordinarily complex pattern of movement in the population. By the early 1990s, outmigration had become as common a response to overcrowded conditions caused by rising population as resigned acceptance of impoverishment. Central Javanese, in particular, were leaving their home region in record numbers. The number of all Javanese leaving the island permanently was growing: there was a 73 percent increase in outmigration from 1971 to 1980. Some 6 percent of the population of the other islands was Javanese by 1980. Whereas most Indonesians who moved from one region to another did so on their own, some migration was organized by the government-sponsored Transmigration Program. From 1969 to 1989, some 730,000 families were relocated by this program from the overpopulated islands of Java, Bali, and Madura to less populated islands. Nearly half of these migrants went to Sumatra, particularly its southern provinces. Smaller numbers went to Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Irian Jaya. The overall impact on population problems in Java and Bali was limited, however, and there were increasing problems in finding suitable land on the other islands. Land disputes with indigenous inhabitants, deforestation, and problems of agricultural productivity and social infrastructure presented continuing difficulties for this program. (Widjojo Nitisastro , 2006).

During this period, Indonesians were also engaging in what demographers call "circular migration" and other kinds of commuting in greater numbers than ever before. This trend was linked in part to the exponential increase in the number of motor vehicles, from 3 per 1,000 in the 1960s to 26.2 per 1,000 in 1980 to 46.3 per 1,000 in 1990. With the widespread availability of public bus transportation among cities and villages, many workers commuted fifty kilometers or more daily to work. Other workers lived away from their homes for several days at a time in order to work. The World Bank estimated that 25 percent of rural households had at least one family member working for part of the year in an urban area.

Although the implications of this migration on the social and economic conditions of the nation remained unclear, without question Indonesians of different ethnic backgrounds and occupations increasingly intermingled. They also found themselves in circumstances where they could not rely on kin and village networks for social support, and so looked to government services for help. Two important areas in which government services provided support were education and health care.

The contract coolie movements were made on both permanent and temporary bases, but it was difficult to distinguish between them because temporary migration often involved absences of several years. Between 1913 and 1925 some 327,700 *kulikontrak* (contract coolies) left Java for *Tanah Sebrang* (the land beyond), representing some 15% of Java's population growth during the same period (Scheltema, 1926:873-4). Although many contract coolies returned to Java, an unknown but significant number settled in the outer islands and this is reflected in the fact that at the 1971 census, 10 percent of North Sumatra's population had lived in another province and more than two thirds of them had lived in North Sumatra for more than 10 years. This underestimates the impact of migration from Java-Madura since it excludes the Sumatran born children of Javan migrants. At the time of the 1930 Census enumeration, there were 379,000 coolies working on European estates in Sumatra, of which 290,000 were Javanese and 30,000 Sundanese (Volkstelling VIII, 1936:34).

There was also an international extension of the contract coolie system. A small number of Java-born persons moved out of Indonesia during the last century of colonial rule, under "contract-coolie" recruitment programmes to obtain cheap labour for plantations. In 1930, for example, there were 89,735 Java-born persons (Bahrin, 1967) and 170,000 ethnic Javanese (Volkstelling,1936) in Malaya, 31,000 emigrants in the Dutch colony of Surinam and 6,000 in New Caledonia (Volkstelling,1933). Smaller numbers moved to Siam (3,000 Java-born persons in 1920), British North Boreno (5,237 in 1922) and to a lesser extent Sarawak, Cochin China and Queensland, Australia (Scheltema, 1926).

**Figure: 3.3**

**Major Paths of Migration in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries in Western Java**


Sumatra
Main paths of population movement
Bantam
Krakatoa
BANTAM
Sunda Kelapa
Krawang
Ciasem
Udug Udug
Indramayu
CIREBON
Batu Tulis
Cikalong
Cirebon
Cianjur
Ukur
Sumedang
Java
Galuh
DEMAK
Sukapura
MATARAM
0 kms
100

Source: *Hugo, 1975*

Before 1931 there were some experimental attempts to establish agricultural colonies of settlers from Java in the Outer Islands, mainly Sumatra, but the two major colonies in 1930 had a total population of only 31,759 persons (Pelzer, 1945:191-210). However, when the depression of the 1930's forced curtailment of plantation industries and reduced the demand for Javanese labour, the government turned to colonization to replace contract-labour schemes as a measure to relieve population pressure in Java (Pelzer, 1945).

**Figure: 3.4**
**Indonesia: Major Interprovincial Lifetime Migration Streams (Those with more than 5,000 Persons) 1930**


Aceh
N Sum & Riau
W Sumatra
Jambi
Bengkulu
S Sumatra
Lampung
Jakarta
W Java
C Java
E Java
Yogykarta
S, E & C Kalimantan
W Kalimantan
N & C Sulawesi
S & SE Sulawesi
Maluku & Irian Jaya
Bali & W Nusa Teng
E Nusa Tenggara
Lifetime Migrants, 1930
250,000
50,000
10,000
5,000

Source: *Volkstelling, 1936*

Hence, between 1936 and 1940 the number of colonists in the Outer Islands trebled from 66,600 to 206,020 (Pelzer, 1945). It is clear that the colonists were predominantly from Central and East Java and Madura. This was the precursor of transmigration in Indonesia and although there is much discussion of force in this system there was no evidence of force being used in colonisation in the colonial period.

By the time the Dutch were evicted by the Japanese in 1941, European colonialism had transformed the East Indies' economy, society and demography. Major changes in population mobility as both a cause and consequence of this transformation included movers in which there was a significant element of force. The short Japanese occupation period was one in which there was significant forced migration. In addition to the massive evacuation of the Dutch, other European and Eurasian population in the face of the Japanese invasion and those remaining were put in internment camps. On Java there was a significant increase in the populations of several cities such as Batavia and Bandung from an influx of rural dwellers fleeing from the harsh requisitioning of agricultural products and "labour recruitment" policies of the Japanese (Kroef,1954; Heeren,1955). Smail (1964) notes that during the occupation, the disappearance of jobs on plantations with the Dutch withdrawal, forced delivery of large quantities of rice and forced recruitment of workers (the *romusha* scheme) there was a substantial amount of forced migration through the Japanese period. In a village surveyed by the writer in 1973 in West Java, it was reported that the Japanese killed or scared off all of the substantial Chinese population which lived there in the 1940s, requisitioned 60 percent of the rice crop so that villagers had to each cassava and they took away approximately 100 young men as *romusha* labourers, none of whom returned at the end of the war (Hugo, 1975). The taking of forced labour under the *romusha* scheme practiced by the Japanese in the East Indies as well as other parts of Southeast Asia resulted in the enslaving of many thousands of young men. They were sent to work not only elsewhere in the East Indies but also in Japan and in other countries. There were, for example, many Indonesian *romusha* who worked on the infamous Burma railway.

**Table: 3.3**

**Types of Conflict Initiating Refugee Movements with Examples from Indonesia in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and 1970s**

| **Type of Conflict** | **Indonesian Examples** |
|---|---|
| 1. Independence Struggles | Evacuation of virtually the entire Indonesian population (approximately half a million people) from the City of Bandung 1946-48 (Hugo, 1975:254). In West Sumatra the large scale evacuation of people from Dutch occupied coastal areas to the republican territories of the interior (Naim, 1973:135). |
| 2. Ethnic Conflicts with Autonomy/ Separatist Dimensions | Separatist movements in Irian Jaya have at times initiated refugee flows, some of them into neighbouring New Guinea (Garnaut and Manning, 1974:23; Roosman, 1980). |
| 3. Internal Ethnic Conflict Not Related to Separatists/Autonomy/ Struggles | In 1967 some 60,000 ethnic Chinese were forced out of the interior areas of West Kalimantan due to long-standing hostility against the Chinese (Ward and Ward, 1974:28). Similarly displacement of Chinese occurred in West Java in the 1950s (Hugo, 1975:245) |
| 4. Class Conflict | Persons displaced by the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) events of 1965. |
| 5. Inter-Elite Power Struggles | The PRRI and Permesta Rebellions in Central Sumatra and North Sulawesi during the 1950s were against the authority of Jakarta and were supported mainly by the educated elite. It caused substantial movements both during the rebellions and after authority was restored (McNicoll, 1968:44; Naim, 1973:139). |
| 6. State Intervention Conflicts | The Indonesian annexation of East-Timor in 1975 resulted in its people suffering great violence and |

| | |
|---|---|
| | dislocation such that its population in 1980 of 552,954 was less than in 1970 (610,541). Perhaps up to a half of the population were displaced during the late 1970's (Jenkins, 1978; 1979a and b, Rodgers, 1979; 1981). |
| 7. International Wars | The Second World War initiated many refugee flows throughout the entire region. Since then the compounding of internal struggle by external intervention has produced huge involuntary displacements of people, as for example in Vietnam and Cambodia (Keely, 1981:17). Some boat people came to Indonesia. |
| 8. Religious Based Conflict | In Indonesia rebellions aimed at making Indonesia an Islamic state erupted in West Java (1948-62), South/Southeast Sulawesi (1951-65), Aceh (1953-57; 1959-61) and South Kalimantan (1950-60). These initiated substantial migration flows (McNicoll 1968:43-8; Hugo, 1975; Harvey, 1974). |
| 9. Colonial Based Conflicts | Colonial rule tended to favour some groups over others. with decolonisation conflicts based upon these differences can initiate refugee movements. In Indonesia several groups from Maluku were fiercely loyal to the Dutch and after Independence there was an attempt to set up a Republic of the South Moluccas causing refugee movements (McNicoll, 1968:43). In fact many South Moluccans followed their colonial masters back to the Netherlands where they settled (Kraak, 1957:350). |

Source:*Categories modified and extended from Suhrke, 1981; Hugo and Chan, 1990*

While ethnic, religious and political factors may be the triggers of forced movement there are more fundamental elements such as inequalities, power imbalances, discriminations and inequity in access to resources which cause forced migration. Nevertheless, it provides a convenient framework to consider involuntary migrations in early independent Indonesia. The major conflicts, which produced significant forced migrations during the first three decades of independence, are depicted in figure 3.5.

**Figure: 1.5**
**Conflicts Creating Outmigration in Indonesia, 1950-65**


Daud Beureuh Aceh 1953-57
1959-61
Padang
Revolutionary Govt
of the Republic
of Indonesia
1958-61
Weslerling
Rebellion
1950
Darul Islam
Kartosuwirjo
West Java
1948-62
Ibnu Hadjar
1950-60
South Kalimantan
Revolt of Ardi Aziz
1950
Permesta Rebellion
1958-61
Kahar Muzakar
South & South East
Sudawesi 1951-1965
Republic of South
Maluku
1950
0 kms 500

Source: *Compiled from information in McNicoll, 1968*

### 3.5 Indonesia Nation-State Formation

The rationale for local decentralization in Indonesia is to be found far back in history. There were serious political reasons to carry out a far-reaching political decentralization that would involve the devolution to the local governments of powers to design and implement policies on matters that were of their own interest. The first was the need to find a solution to an old problem that Indonesia is not, and never was, a homogeneous country.

The ancient states of the archipelago are known from the records, mostly often written in Chinese, and of inscriptions and monuments, like those in central Java. The work of historians has recalled the 'Kingdom of Sri Vijaya', which seems to have centered in the regions of Palembang from the late eighth-century. States also emerged in Java, the greatest of which was to be the Majapahit Empire, which flourished in the fifteenth century CE (Tarling,1998). Until the early twentieth century, Indonesia was formed by a set of kingdoms and independent regions. Some of these kingdoms had their own political and economic institutions, which were very different, from one another (Ricklefs,2001). Local units existed as a political community governing themselves before the creation of the Indonesian state. The Dutch during their 350 years of colonization, as well as Japanese during their 3 years of occupation, acknowledged those local units and allowed them to continue self-governance (Schiller, 1955).

The regions and villages played and important part in the colonial era struggling against colonialism. One example is Aceh, which lies in the northernmost province on the island of Sumatra and the first part of modern Indonesia to have societies organized along Islamic lines, which probably began in the late 13th century. By the 16th century the Sultanate of Aceh controlled a substantial portion of Sumatra and parts of Malaya. Conquered only with great difficulty by the Dutch in the late 19th century, Aceh remained under more or less military control until the Japanese invasion in 1942. The Dutch never were able to regain a foothold in Aceh and many Acehnese fought against the Dutch near the city of Medan and raised money for the nationalist cause (Reid, 1979).

At the same time, when Diponegoro (the early nineteenth-century leader of the Java War against the Dutch), Tuanku Imam Bonjol (leader of early nineteenth-century Paderi War in Minangkabau regions in West Sumatra), Teuku Umar (a local ruler who at times led opposition to Dutch expansion into Aceh) and others fought in those days, there did not yet exist, there was not yet any hint of, any feeling of being Indonesia . Diponegoro fought for the land of Java, even then we cannot really say for the whole Land of Java. Tuanku Imam Bonjol fought for the Minangkabau, Teuku Umar for Aceh and others fought for their own region or local community. Even Javanese army at that time under Sentot Alibasjah became parts of Dutch army and fought against Aceh.

### 3.6 Idea and emergence of Indonesia in the context of Nation-building

The emergence of the idea of Indonesia was held in early twentieth century. The first three decades of the twentieth century witnessed a new territorial definition of Indonesia and the proclamation of a fresh colonial policy. The key developments of this period were the emergence of novel ideas of organization and the arrival of more sophisticated definition of identity. The former involved new forms of leadership and the latter involved a deeper analysis of the religious, social, political and economic environment. Ethic policy of colonial brought the impact on the rose of intellectual in Indonesia. Ideas of nation state from Europe were spread through education and organization.

The idea of emancipating Indonesian through the education was encouraged from an early stage by the journal Bintang Hindia (Star of Indies), first published in Netherlands in 1902. The Journal was distributed in Indonesia and was very widely read among the Indonesian elite before it ceased publication in 1906. The first modern organization was born under the name Budi Utomo in 1908. Budi Utomo primarily was organization for Javanese priyayi, an elite class of Javanese. It officially defined its area of interest as including the peoples of Java and Madura, thus reflecting the administrative unions of these two islands and including Sundanese and Madurese whose cultures were related to the Javanese (Ricklefs, 2001).

More active and significant organizations were soon formed. Some of them were religious, cultural and educational, some political, and several both. These organizations functioned at lower levels of the society and for the first time built links between villagers and new elite. The lesser priyayi class was important in several of these movements, but this was different branch of the lesser priyayi from the one who was active in Budi Utomo. Whereas Budi Utomo members were largely making their careers in government services, those who led more activist movements were almost entirely those who had gone through Dutch school but had then resigned or been dismissed from government jobs.

The idea of national Indonesian identity devoid of specific religious or local ties had even begun so widely accepted among the elite, and was being supported by developments in the cultural field. A new literature was growing, based upon the Malay language, which had been used for centuries as a lingua franca in the archipelago and was therefore essentially neutral in ethnic terms (Ricklefs, 2001). As this literature developed, Indonesian intellectuals stopped calling the language Malay and instead referred to it as the Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia). The linguistic vehicle of national unity was thereby born.

The important stage of Indonesia Nation State formation was in 1928, when the cultural and political trend towards Indonesian unity were formally joined at a Youth Congress held in Batavia. In its 'Youth Pledge' (Sumpah Pemuda) the congress adopted three ideals: one fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one language, Bahasa Indonesia. Beside that, the writer, W.R. Soepratman, introduced national anthem of Indonesia Raya for the first time. In celebration of the congress, Muhammad Yamin wrote a collection of poems, which were published in 1929 under the title Indonesia tumpah darahku ('Indonesia, Land of my Birth') (Ricklefs, 2001). These reflected the self-conscious conviction among young intellectuals that they were Indonesian first, and only Minangkabau, Batak, Javanese, Christian, Muslim or whatever.

The youth pledge marked the process from region ethnic to Indonesia nation, considering that the congress participants were came from the regions all over archipelago-from west to east archipelago. Padmo Wahjono wrote in his book "Negara Republik Indonesia" that Indonesia Nation had been emerged and existed in this stage (Wahjono, 1986). Indonesia nation at this period time had been laid for the foundation of the Indonesia State, which was achieved by the Declaration of Independence in 1945.

Modern constitution around the world in many aspects influenced Indonesia Founding Fathers who drafted the 1945 Constitution. It is reflected from their idea of constitutionalism in the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) meeting and Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) meeting. Besides that, they sometimes refer their idea taking examples and based on the former modern constitution especially Germany Constitution. In the Investigating Committee meeting, Yamin referred to United States Constitution, took examples of Russian Constitution. He also mentioned Weimar Constitution of Germany to be followed as the modern constitution, which guaranteed the citizen welfare (Bahar, Kusuma and Hudawati, eds, 1995). Even though Soepomo had his own idea of genuine Indonesian Constitution based on integrality idea, he kept referring to many modern constitutions for his argument.

## Conclusion

The ethnic groups of Indonesia have been linked to each other through contain common cultural elements and social norms. They are similar in various respects but not "same" altogether. Migration has been a key factor in dispersal various tribes among various other tribes of the archipalaego, however it has not been able to mellow down the differences among them altogether. Moreover to same extent it has been a cause of hostility and aversion among them. The tribes along with moving towards modern trends, have more firmly attatched themselves to fundamentals of their religion, ethnicity and culture to avoid any kind evasion by out group cultural elements. This has been a greatest factor for failure of Indonesia to become true nation state even after becoming a democratized state.

# CHAPTER IV

# COMPETING ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND STATE TRANSFORMATION

# CHAPTER: 4

# Competing Ethnic Nationalism and State Transformation

## 4.1 Historical Background of Nationalism in Indonesia

### 4.1.1 Prehistory:

Archaeological evidence indicates that ancestors of modern humans occupied sites in Central and East Java as early as 1.9 million years ago; presumably, these hominids were widely distributed in other areas. Fossils were found in 2003 of a tiny species of ancient hominid (homo floresiensis) that lived up until at least 18,000 years ago on the island of Flores in the Lesser Sunda Islands. There is evidence of modern humans as early as about 40,000 years ago, but they may have been present much earlier. By about 5,000 years ago, the circulation of peoples within the archipelago and the absorption of influences from outside had begun to create a diverse but related complex of cultures often identified as Austronesian. What is today Indonesia lay at or near the center of this complex, which eventually spread east throughout the Pacific, and west as far as Madagascar.

### 4.1.2 Early History:

Although Indonesian peoples clearly had contact with the outside world at an early date (cloves, found only in Maluku, had made their way to the Middle East as early as 4,000 years ago), physical evidence in the archipelago is much later. Sites containing Indian trade goods now date at about 400 B.C., and the first inscriptions (in eastern Kalimantan and West Java) at about 375–400 B.C. The first formal kingdoms of which we have extensive knowledge are Srivijaya (flourished c. A.D. 550–c. 1050), a Buddhist trading polity whose power was centered in the region of present-day Palembang and reached to coastal areas on the Malaysian peninsula and elsewhere, and Mataram, in Central Java, where magnificent Buddhist and Hindu monuments such as Borobudur and Prambanan were constructed in the eighth and ninth centuries. The greatest of the subsequent Hindu-Buddhist states, the empire of Majapahit centered in East Java, claimed hegemony from the late thirteenth to early sixteenth centuries over a wide trading region stretching from Sumatra to Maluku.

Islam entered the archipelago in about the eleventh century, but significant conversions did not take place for two centuries or more, beginning with Pasai (North Sumatra) at the turn of the fourteenth century and going on to Makasar and Central Java in the seventeenth century. Contacts from China deepened between the tenth and fourteenth centuries as a result of growing trade, but Mongol attempts to control Javanese power (in the late thirteenth century) failed, and early Ming dynasty (1368–1644) efforts to exercise great political and economic influence were fleeting. It was at this time also that Western visitors began appearing, starting with Marco Polo in the late thirteenth century and continuing with the Portuguese and Spanish in the sixteenth century. They were soon followed by the Dutch (1596) and the English (1601). Europeans affected trade and politics in specific places and periods, but for most of the archipelago beyond Java and parts of Maluku, colonial rule did not set in until the mid- or late nineteenth century.

### 4.1.3 Colonial Period:

Dutch power in the archipelago grew very gradually, and colonial rule was not a goal of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), which dominated trade from Amsterdam and, after the early seventeenth century, a fortified port called Batavia (now Jakarta) in West Java. But on Java local realities produced, by the mid-eighteenth century, a symbiotic Dutch-Javan relationship that survived the bankruptcy of the VOC in 1799 and soon took the shape of a colonial administration, which grew and consolidated during the late 1800s. In the first decades of the twentieth century, a modern Dutch colonial state extended its control to most of the areawe now call Indonesia. Simultaneously, some of the peoples ruled by this state discovered nationalism; the first groups date from the early 1900s, and by the 1920s and 1930s an array of modern political organizations and leaders, including the well-known nationalist figure Sukarno (1901–70), came to the fore. The struggle between the Dutch colonial government and the Indonesian nationalist movement was well under way when the Japanese occupied the Indies in 1942. They remained until the end of World War II in August 1945.

### 4.1.4 Independence Period:

On August 17, 1945, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed the independent Republic of Indonesia with Sukarno as president and Hatta as vice president. Allied forces (mostly British and British Indian troops) did not arrive until six weeks later, by which time the republic had begun to establish itself and nationalist pride had burgeoned. The period October-December 1945 was filled with violent conflict in which Indonesians made it clear they would defend their independence with their lifeblood. Forcing the Dutch to negotiate with the republic for an end to hostilities, the British withdrew in late 1946. The republic subsequently survived two Dutch "police actions" and an internal communist rebellion, and on December 27, 1949, The Hague formally recognized the sovereignty of a federated Republic of the United States of Indonesia, which a year later was formed into a unitary Republic of Indonesia.

Despite the holding of democratic elections in 1955, the years following the struggle for independence were characterized by political and economic difficulty: regional dissidence, attempted assassinations and coups d'état, military-civilian conflict, and economic stagnation. A period of Guided Democracy was announced in 1959 by Sukarno, who in September 1963 proclaimed himself president-for-life and presided over a political system in which the civilian nationalist leadership, much of the Islamic leadership, the large Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and the army were all at odds. This tense and hostile atmosphere was broken on September 30, 1965, with what appears to have been an attempted PKI coup against the Sukarno government. The precise circumstances remain unclear, but the immediate result was that a "New Order" coalition of students, intellectuals, Muslims, and the army brought about a military-dominated government that removed Sukarno and permitted a broad and deadly assault on communists, especially on Java, Bali, and Sumatra. In late 1965 and early 1966, an estimated 500,000 Indonesian communists and suspected communists were killed and many more arrested. On March 11, 1966, power was transferred from a seriously ill Sukarno to a high-ranking army officer, Suharto; the PKI was formally banned the following day. Suharto became the acting president on March 12, 1967, and the New Order era began.

The New Order era, which lasted for more than 30 years, has a mixed record. Like Guided Democracy, it was authoritarian, but it was more successful in bringing stability to the nation. Unlike Guided Democracy, its economic achievements were enormous and the well-being of the majority of Indonesians undeniably improved. Average life expectancy, for example, increased from 46 to 65.5 years. On the other hand, the state's heavy involvement in banking and industry, especially the petroleum and natural gas sectors, worked against competition and encouraged corruption on a large scale. Heavy-handed political control and propagandizing of a national ideology may have aided stability, but also did not prepare the nation for a modern political existence. A modernizing, educated, and better-off middle class grew, but gained little or no political clout; poverty was reduced, but some particularly severe pockets appeared to be intractable. Suharto provided strong leadership, but he did not provide for a wise transition and, in his last years, clung to power and favored family and friends. East Timor, which had been forcibly annexed to Indonesia in 1976, saw bitter conflict between the Indonesian military and local independence movements. When the Asian financial crisis hit in 1997–98, the New Order lost the economic justification that had guaranteed much of its public support, and there was a widespread call for Suharto to step down. He resigned on May 21, 1998, little more than two months after being selected for his seventh term as president.

Suharto was succeeded by Bucharuddin Jusuf Habibie, who sought first to resolve the East Timor situation and begin a new and more open electoral process. In 1999, following Indonesia's first freely contested parliamentary elections since 1955, Abdurrahman Wahid, well-known as both a progressive intellectual and as leader of Indonesia's largest Muslim organization (Nahdlatul Ulama, NU) became president. His quirky and often uncompromising leadership style, and questions about both his competency and his health, brought him increasing opposition and eventually serious threats of impeachment. He was dismissed from office in July 2001 in favor of Megawati Sukarnoputri, his vice president and head of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Megawati, Sukarno's eldest daughter, was decisively defeated in the September 2004 presidential runoff election by the Democratic Party candidate, retired army general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono was sworn in as president in October 2004.

## 4.2 The Origins of Secular Nationalism in Indonesia

Until 1870, the vast territory that became Indonesia today was divided into hundreds of smaller nations, tribes, and kingdoms. The inhabitants of these entities, while connected with one another through trade and a common religion (Islam), considered themselves to be separate entities[31]. Over the course of more than two centuries, from the first arrival of the Dutch in West Java in 1602 to the Dutch's conquest of Aceh in 1873, these entities were conquered and brought together by a European colonial power - the Dutch - as part of its empire in East Asia. The Dutch ruled over these entities as a single administrative territory and named it the Dutch East Indies. Thus, the idea of Indonesia as a single national territory was constructed from Dutch's conquests between the 17th and 19centuries[42]. Beginning in the late 19th century, as part of Dutch's effort to appease members of Indonesia's traditional aristocracy, it created an opportunity for the children of this group to have a Western-style education in Dutch-sponsored educational institutions. The aim of this policy was to train a new generation of indigenous civil servants to help administer the Dutch East Indies, and to "Westernize" members of this elite group so that they would not be influenced by alternative ideas (such as a renewed Islamic identity movement) that might lead them to rebel against Dutch's colonial rule[3]. The number of children who received this education was kept small. While many of the children that received this education came from the dominant ethnic Javanese and Malays[5], every major Indonesian a single empire, the extent oftheir actual power over these smaller states remained ethnic groups was represented as members of this new Indonesian elite[6]. Most members of this elite were Western, rationalist, and secular in their worldview.

. Many of them were influenced by the works of the 19th century European political philosophers such as Ernest Renan and Otto Bauer in forming their own conceptualization on what a nation is and who among its population should be included into it[7]. These elites believed in the idea that a nation is formed by the people who lived in a particular territory and shared a common experience, regardless of their ethnic, cultural, and religious differences[8].

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[3] . While two of these kingdoms, Sumatra-based Srivijaya in the 7 tand 8 centuries and Javanese-based Majapahit in the 14 century, sought to unite these numerous entities into a single empire, the extent oftheir actual power over these smaller states remained disputed, for they ruled mostly through imposition of tributes rather than direct conquests, and both of these kingdoms retained their power as empires only for a relatively short period of time (Merle C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, third edition, 2001).

[4] For an overview of Dutch's rule in Indonesia, see Ricklefs (2001).

[5] The Javanese form about 42 percent of Indonesia's population, while the Malays represent about 7 percent (Suryadinata et al (2003), *op cit*, pp. 7).

[6] Robert Van Niel, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1960)

They transformed this idea in their conceptualization of how the future Indonesian state should be constructed. Given their Western education and secularist orientation, it was no surprised that the brand of nationalism they sponsored was secular nationalism. When Indonesia declared its independence in August 1945, the founding fathers of the new nation were divided into two groups. The first group was the secular nationalists, along with Christian leaders representing Christian majority regions in Eastern Indonesia. The vision represented by the first group was for the new Indonesian state to be nationalistic, inclusive, and secular in orientation (Husein, 2005). The second group consisted of Indonesian Islamic leaders, who demanded that the new state should be built from a strong Islamic norms premises. These Muslim leaders received substantial political role during the Japanese occupation in Indonesia (1942-1945). This was because Muslim organizations had strong linkages to the rural population that could be easily mobilized by the Japanese for its war effort and because the Japanese had misgivings against nationalist Indonesian leaders due to their Dutch education and their political orientation toward the Western world. (Benda, 1977)

The contention between the two groups erupted in the open when the Muslim leaders proposed a clause to the proposed Indonesian Constitution that was later known as the Jakarta Charter. This clause read that Indonesia will be organized as "a Republic founded on the principles of the Belief in One God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law (sharia) (Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya)." The Muslim camp also demanded a Constitutional clause that will require Presidents of the new republic to be "a native born Indonesian who is a Muslim" and that

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[7] Both Renan and Bauer advocated the idea of a nation that belongs to a population that shares a common history and experience regardless of the different ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds of members of this population. For an example of their thought, see Ernest Renan (1882), "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" translated by Ida Mae Snyder, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith eds. , *Nationalism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 17-18.

[8] For an example of this influence, see Sukarno, *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism* (1926), edited and introduced by Ruth T. McVey (Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1969), pp

Islam be declared as the new state's sole official religion (Aritonang, 2004). These clauses encountered strong objections from the secular nationalists and Christian leaders, whom feared that they would turn Indonesia to become an Islamic state and would exclude the participation of Christians in the newly independent country. Christian leaders even issued a threat that Eastern Indonesia (Christian-dominated regions such as East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, and Central Sulawesi) would secede from the new state if these clauses remained in place (Aritonang, 2004). As a result of these oppositions, these clauses were removed from final version of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution. This satisfied secularist and Christian leaders but upset the Islamic leaders (Aritonang, 2004).

Nevertheless, the removal of the Jakarta Charter from the Indonesian Constitution created a deep wound among religious nationalists (conservative Muslims), whom strongly believed that since Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world and the vast majority of its population was Muslims, the country should become an Islamic state as well. This made them hold grudge against secular nationalists and their Christian allies, and as we will see in Section IV, one of the major contention that causes conflicts in post-independent Indonesia is between Islamic religious nationalists, Christians, and secular nationalists.

### 4.3 The Promotion of a Secular Indonesian Nationalism

With Indonesia's independence from Dutch rule, came a new challenge for Indonesia's new leaders: how to preserve the dominant idea of secular nationalism, which called for Indonesia to become a unitary nation-state. Indonesians were divided into multiple ethnic, cultural, and religious groups. While the 1945-1949 War of Independence managed to unite all Indonesians from these diverse groups to fight against a common enemy - the Dutch - there were no guarantees that such a unity would be maintained after the Dutch had left Indonesia for good. Soon after Indonesia gained its independence, several groups rose to challenge the conception of Indonesia as a secular multi-ethnic nation-state. Religious nationalists who were prevalent among conservative Muslim groups demanded that the new state should be organized under the Islamic law, to the chagrin of secular nationalists and non-Muslim religious groups (particularly Christians). At the same time, some Indonesian ethnic groups, who felt uncomfortable with the dominance of ethnic Javanese in the economic and political affairs of the new country, demanded more autonomy over their own regions (Liddle, 1997). The dispute between nationalists who supported a united Indonesian state with members of these sub-national groups became the catalyst of several armed conflicts between them that occurred throughout the 1950s (Bertrand, 2004).To meet these challenges, secular nationalists who controlled the Indonesian government, both Indonesia's founding president Sukarno and his successor, General Suharto, decided to pursue a number of strategies that promoted Indonesia's integrity as a unitary nation-state. These included the political and economic centralization of Indonesia under a strong national government; the promotion of a migration policy from the more populated (and politically dominant) island of Java to other Indonesian islands; and the use of the Indonesian army to suppress any ethnic and religious sentiments that the government considered as threats to Indonesia's national unity. However, these strategies backfired and instead may have contributed to the creation of sub-national discontentment that became the cause of the numerous ethnic and religious conflicts that have occurred in Indonesia within the last decade or so.

### a. Economic and political centralization to strengthen the national government.

The Indonesian government under the Sukarno and Suharto regimes responded to the demands for more equal sharing of economic and political power between national and sub-national governments not by devolving power from the national government to sub-national governments. Instead, it responded by further centralizing its power. It enforced this policy by deploying the Indonesian army throughout the Indonesian archipelago to snuff out potential sub-national conflicts before they even started. A national system of regional army command was created to conduct surveillance of regional political activities (Bertrand, 2004). In addition, under Suharto, most governors and other high-ranking officials who governed sub-national governments in Indonesia were active or retired military officers (Bertrand, 2004).

Another method employed by the Indonesian government to increase its power vis-à-vis the regions was by depriving sub-national governments from having a controlling stake over major economic resources in their respective areas (e.g., oil wells, mines, and forest lands) and by making them largely dependent on the national budget for most of their budgetary resources. This was done to prevent regions from establishing their own power bases that could potentially challenge the national government and to promote sub-national government leaders' loyalty by making them dependent on the national government's revenue for their political survival (Bertrand, 2004). It is estimated that under the Suharto regime, about three quarters of the provincial and local governments revenues came from national government subsidies (Liddle, 1997). At the same time, the national government limited the type of taxes and user fees that sub-national governments could establish and prohibited them from controlling lucrative economic assets that had the potential to produce windfall revenues to them (Bertrand, 2004). The dependence of sub-national governments on the national government for most of their revenues helped to temporarily curb their demands for more autonomy, since the national government could "punish" the regions that demanded such an autonomy by reducing the amount of subsidies and grants available to them.

However, these demands did not disappear completely, because sub-national governments continued to demand further economic and political power for themselves, even when such demands were expressed subtly to avoid potential reprisals from the national government. In some resource-rich regions such as Aceh and Papua, the lack of local control over the region's own natural resources may have fueled further demands of citizens from these regions to seek secession from Indonesia (Liddle, 1997).

For instance, in Papua, much of the export revenue generated from the region came from a mining concession operated by an American company, Freeport McMoran, which found a substantial amount of copper and gold in the region during the 1970s. Over the past three decades, the Freeport mine has generated billions of dollars in profits for the company and for the Indonesian government. However, very few of these profits were channeled back to support economic development in Papua[9] and in 2003, only about one-fourth of Freeport employees were Papuans, most of them worked on low-skilled jobs[10]. Numerous economic surveys always showed Papua to be one of the poorest Indonesian provinces[11].

It is no wonder that the lack of regional control over Papua's economic resources is one of the primary factors cited by proponents of Papua's independence as their rationale in waging a secessionist campaign against Indonesia. In the final years of the Suharto regime, the Indonesian government faced the dilemma of whether it should grant more autonomy to sub-national governments. Many national government officials realized that some form of regional autonomy was necessary, due to both the need to transfer more responsibility into sub-national governments and to alleviate the administrative burdens of the national government.

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[9] For instance, in 1990, Papua generated $600 million in export revenues, much of it came from the Freeport mine, yet the provincial government's development budget for that year was only $34 million, much of it were used to pay for the provincial civil servant salaries (Bertrand (2004), *op cit,* p. 151)

[10] Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action, *Indonesia Commission: Peace and Progress in Papua* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), p. 7.

[11] For instance, see Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), *Country Profile Study on Poverty: Indonesia*, March 2003, p. 7

However, no policy changes were made until the end of the Suharto regime (Bertrand, 2004). The fear that the granting of additional autonomy to the regions would lead into more secessionist demands was too strong within the Suharto regime. This fear led to its decision to maintain the status. It was a decision regretted by many Indonesian nowadays, since they believe that the sub-national conflicts that have occurred in recent years could have been avoided had the Indonesian government decided to grant more autonomy to the sub-national governments earlier(Liddle,1997).

### b. Population migration policy to promote national unity

The Indonesian government under Suharto heavily promoted internal population migration from the more heavily populated islands such as Java to other less-populated Indonesian islands. For nearly two decades (from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s), the Indonesian government resettled several million Javanese to the outer islands through its transmigrasi program. (Liddle,1997). While the primary goals of the Indonesian government's migration policy were to reduce the number of Indonesians living in Java[12] and to create a better economic opportunity for these migrants, it had other non-economic goals as well. Chief among them were to promote national integration and to enhance national security (Hoshour, 1997). Due to the fear of foreign and domestic 'subversive' activities in remote lands that remained 'empty' and 'unused,' the Indonesian government considered such lands as threats to Indonesia's national security. It is not surprising that many participants of the transmigrasi program were former soldiers of the Indonesian army (Hoshour, 1997). In addition, the transmigrasi program also had more subtle goals, such as promoting intermarriage between the migrants and members of the native population, who were considered by the government to be "less developed" than the migrants (Reimar Schefold, 1998).

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[12] It is estimated that about 2/3 of the total Indonesian population of about 230 million live in Java.

However, the transmigrasi program helped to create further discontent from the native inhabitants of these islands. The new migrants tended to have more economic skills and political clouts than the native population. Thus, the natives believed that the policy helped promoted unfair competition against them, which eventually would result in their displacement them from their land (Hoshour, 1997). Often, the lands used as settlements to these migrants were customary land that does not have legal protection under the Indonesian agrarian law. Thus, the native population was powerless when the government took away these lands and redistributed them to the new migrants (Hoshour, 1997).

Finally, since most of the Javanese migrants were Muslims, while a majority of the native inhabitants of the outer islands (especially in Eastern Indonesia) were Christians, further tensions were created between the natives of these islands and the migrants, who were accused as missionaries who planned to 'Islamize' their islands(Bertrand, 2004). We can see that many of the violent conflicts that occurred in these islands in recent years have both ethnic and religious dimensions. Thus, the Indonesian government's migration policy, which was aimed to promote national unity, in practice was creating further sub-national tensions that challenge the idea of Indonesia as a unitary nation-state.

### c. The use of the Indonesian army to enforce national unity

The Indonesian government also had invested heavily in equipping the Indonesian army and tasked it to suppress any potential sub-national challenges that the government considered as threats to Indonesian unity. In every major conflicts that arose in Indonesia in the last five decades, from secessionist movements in Aceh, East Timor, and Papua to other less prominent ethnic and religious uprisings, the intervention of the Indonesian army was always the first and often the only method used to resolve such conflicts. This means that violent means were always used in resolving such conflicts and the more peaceful means of resolving them were almost never deployed by the Indonesian government until very recently. In addition, the large losses of lives in these conflicts only created further discontent among sub-national groups that suffered from the harsh treatment of the Indonesian army. Such a treatment may even strengthen the will of some of these groups to seek full secession from Indonesia.

The Indonesian government also used the army to stage military campaigns with the aim to incorporate new territories that it claimed as parts of a greater Indonesian state. New territories that were incorporated into Indonesia after its initial independence in 1949 were West Papua (a Dutch territory that was not ceded to Indonesia's control in the 1949 settlement) in 1963 and East Timor (a relatively underdeveloped Portuguese colony) in 1975. In addition to these successful invasions, the Sukarno government launched an unsuccessful campaign (popularly known as konfrontasi) to seize North Kalimantan from Malaysia between 1964 and 1965. Each of these campaigns was done to reunite territories long separated from decades of colonial rule to the "mother" country of Indonesia. In their independence preparation in 1945, Indonesian founding fathers endorsed the idea that the Indonesian nation was not limited to the territories that were part of the Dutch East Indies, but also included the

Malay Peninsula (today's Malaysia and Southern Thailand), North Borneo, East Timor, the entire Papua Island, and other "surrounding islands (Donald K. Emmerson, 2005)."With this "greater" Indonesia vision, the Indonesian arm's invasions of West Papua, North Kalimantan, and East Timor, received their justification. However, these territorial invasions and incorporations were done against the wishes of the local population, who for the most part did not want to join the Indonesian state. Instead, they wanted to establish their own independent states (Bertrand, 2004). As a result, from the beginning of these invasions, there were strong resistance movements against Indonesia's rule. In their efforts to suppress such movements, the Indonesian army unleashed significant amounts of violence against the population of these territories. As a result, they failed to win the hearts and minds of these territories population, who lent their support to the rebels instead (Bertrand, 2004). Thus, the forced integration of Papua and East Timor into Indonesia became the catalyst of the secessionist movements that helped create violent conflicts in both of these territories.

## 4.4 Ethno-Religious Challenges to Secular Nationalism in Indonesia

In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis that severely affected the Indonesian economy between 1997 and 1999, discontent against the Suharto regime increased rapidly. The rapid deterioration of the Indonesian economy caused by the crisis had significantly increased poverty in Indonesia. In turn, this was blamed on the ineptness and corruption of the Suharto government. Suharto was not able to resolve such discontent by buying off his opponents as he did in past crises, since there were no valuable economic resources left that could be distributed to them (Karl D. Jackson, 2004). In the aftermath of violent demonstrations and riots that occurred in May 1998, Suharto was forced to step down from his position as the president of Indonesia. His 32-year rule over the country came to an abrupt end. Within a year after the end of Suharto's reign, multiple sub-national conflicts simultaneously erupted throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

These conflicts largely emerged from the widespread sub-national grievances that were not satisfactorily resolved during Suharto's rule. Instead, as we have seen in Section III, the policies pursued by both Suharto and his predecessor Sukarno have contributed to the rising discontent, which was primarily responsible for the eruption of these conflicts. The numerous conflicts that occurred in Indonesia during the last decade could be divided into two main categories: secessionist conflicts with the ultimate aim of achieving full separation from Indonesia, and non-secessionist conflicts between religious groups (in particular between Muslim and Christians) that were caused from increasing religious, political, and economic tensions between the adherents of these faiths. Each of these will be briefly analyzed in this section.

### a. Ethnic nationalism challenges to secular Indonesian nationalism

There are three ethnic conflicts in Indonesia with clear secessionist aims: the conflicts in East Timor, Papua, and Aceh. In East Timor and Papua, the main cause of these secessionist movements is because these regions are not part of the original Indonesian state that won independence from the Dutch in 1949. Instead, they were integrated into Indonesia by force despite the strong demands in both regions to form their own independent states after their colonial masters (the Dutch in Papua and the Portuguese in East Timor) had left them (Bertrand, 2004).

The forced integration of the two regions into Indonesia was accomplished by the Indonesian army, by using significant amounts of violence. In the process, the army killed a large number of the local population. It is estimated that about 300,000 East Timorese were killed during 24 years of Indonesian occupation there (1975-1999) and thousands have been killed in Papua since its forced integration into Indonesia in 1963(Bertrand, 2004). The cause of secessionist movement in Aceh is different from that in East Timor and Papua. Unlike these two regions, Aceh was part of the original Indonesian state and for some time, the Acehnese did try to become a part of the Indonesian state (Bertrand, 2004).

However, the Acehnese are one of the few, perhaps the only, Indonesian sub-national groups with an ethnic identity that is stronger than their identity as Indonesians. Their identity is based from nearly five centuries (1397-1873) of Aceh's existence as an independent Islamic sultanate that was recognized by many other countries in the world, even by most European empires and the United States Emmerson (2005). The Acehnese agreed to join the Indonesian nation under the condition that they receive a special autonomy within their own region. However, their demand for special autonomy was denied by the Indonesian government. During the 1950s, the Acehnese did not even have their own province (Bertrand 2003). This helped to form Aceh's first rebellion between 1953 and 1962, which ended when the Indonesian government established Aceh as an Indonesian province with a wide-ranging autonomy in economic, political, and religious affairs. However, this agreement was not honored after Suharto took office in 1966. His regime stripped the Acehnese of their economic and political powers, which rendered Aceh's special autonomy status meaningless (Bertrand 2003). The Suharto regime also created a permanent presence of the Indonesian army in Aceh. The army often used excessive force to quell any expressions of grievances that came from the Acehnese, which only increased the Acehnese's hatreds against Indonesians (Bertrand 2003).

Finally, these hatreds led to the formation of the Free Aceh Movement in 1976, which sought an independent Aceh state. While the movement initially failed to gain much popular support, the continued presence of the Indonesian army and its continued use of force in the efforts to put it down only increased the Acehnese's support for this secessionist movement.

By the mid 1990s it had been transformed into a popular movement with a significant following at the grassroots level. As of this writing, one of these territories (East Timor) has successfully reached its goal of full independence from Indonesia. Another one (Aceh) seems to be contained by the signing of a peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement. It was signed in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami tragedy that killed more than 200,000 Acehnese about one in every eight residents of the region. Under the terms of this agreement, the Acehnese will receive an extended special autonomy from the Indonesian government, including the rights to have their own flag, their own political parties, and their own court system. Aceh will also be able to retain up to 70% of the revenue generated from natural resources (mostly oil and gas) extraction conducted within the region (Government of Indonesia 2005).

The agreement seems to be holding for now. Thus, it appears that the secessionist conflict in Aceh has been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties involved. While Aceh remains part of Indonesia, it receives special autonomy that makes the region completely autonomous in governing its own affairs. However, while the conflict in Aceh seems to be over, the secessionist conflict in Papua has not been satisfactorily resolved. The Indonesian government had offered a special autonomy package that is similar to what it offered to Aceh, including the right to keep up to 80% of natural resources revenues extracted within Papua. However, the proposal was rejected by the leaders of Papua's secessionist movement, who demanded full independence from Indonesia. This in turn was rejected by the Indonesian government. Unlike in post-tsunami Aceh, the Indonesian government does not have the incentive to resolve the Papua conflict immediately. This is caused from the fact that the secessionist movement in Papua is much smaller compared with that in East Timor and Aceh. In addition, many Indonesian government officials believe that giving Papua an extended autonomy similar to what Aceh had received would create a significant financial drain to the Indonesian government, since both regions are the primary sources of natural resources revenue for the government (Douglas E. Ramage, 2006). Thus, the Papua conflict is currently in a stalemate. How it will be resolved, whether it will be similar to Aceh (remain with

Indonesia with an extended autonomy) or to East Timor (attain full independence from Indonesia), remains uncertain at this time.

### b. Religious nationalism challenges to secular Indonesian nationalism

While the three secessionist conflicts above form a significant part of all conflicts that have recently occurred in Indonesia, some recent conflicts Indonesia do not involve secessionist or ethno-nationalist demands. Instead, they occurred due to the increasing tensions between Indonesia's two major religious denominations, Islam and Christianity. While nearly 90 percent of Indonesians belong to the Islamic faith, Christianity is the dominant religious denomination among several Indonesian ethnic groups, who live in Eastern Indonesia (Bertrand 2004).

Given the significant number of Eastern Indonesians who are Christians, it is not surprising that a large part of religious-linked conflicts in Indonesia can be found in this part of the country. They are attributed to the increasing fundamentalism among the adherents of both faiths that have occurred within the last three decades (Bertrand 2004).

and to the increasing migration from Muslim dominated part of Indonesia to Eastern Indonesia, which is perceived by Christians as threats to their economic, political, and religious dominance(Bertrand 2004). These lead to the increasing tension between the two religious groups that often end in open conflicts between their adherents. While during the 1950s and 1960s many adherents of Islam and Christianity in Indonesia could be considered syncretic in their religious expressions, this changed from the 1970s onwards. This is attributed to Suharto's authoritarian rule that banned any political dissents to his rule and his countless interventions in the governance of political parties and secular civil society organizations. Such interventions made most of these organizations ineffective to serve as channels of dissent against the Suharto government. Religious groups were the only civil society organizations where government intervention was more limited and was not as deep as in secular organizations (Bertrand 2004). All four Indonesian provinces where Christians form the majority of the population were located in Eastern Indonesia: East Nusa Tenggara (88 percent), Papua (76 percent), North Sulawesi (69 percent), and Maluku (50 percent) (Leo Suryadinata, 2003).

Thus, many Indonesians who were disenchanted with Suharto's authoritarian rule (e.g., university students and intellectuals) joined religious groups in order to have more open discussions and express disagreements with various government's policies. In the process, they became more pious and orthodox in their religious expressions (Bertrand 2004).

The Suharto regime also required all Indonesians to join one of the four state recognized religious denominations (Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism). This requirement forced Indonesians who were either syncretic or used to belong in one of Indonesia's indigenous religions and other denominations not recognized by the government (e.g., Confucianism) to convert into one of the four recognized religions, but mainly to Islam and Christianity (Robert W. Hefner,2005). As a result of the conversions of these citizens, the membership of these two religious denominations increased significantly (Suryadinata , 2003).

Beginning in the 1970s, there has been an ongoing revival of traditional Islamic teachings and practices among Indonesian Muslims. As a result of this revival, many Muslims that previously only practiced their faith nominally are now becoming more devout and strict in their practices. There are several causations that are attributed as potential causes this revival, among them: increased promotion of personal religious piety done by the government to combat the communist threats, increased propagation activities done by conservative Muslim organizations such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), increased linkages between Indonesian Islamic preachers and intellectuals with their counterparts in the Middle East, and increased financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries in assisting Islamic propagation in Indonesia (e.g., constructing new mosques, printing textbooks, bringing preachers (imam) from the Middle East, etc) (Martin van Bruinessen, 2003)

As it become apparent to the Suharto regime that Indonesian Muslims are undergoing a revival of their faith, the regime began a gradual change in its policy on conservative Islam, from actively repressing it from the late 1960s to early 1980s to the accommodation and co-optation of conservative Islamist activists from the mid-1980s until its collapse in 1998

(Robert W. Hefner-2000)._Along with more accommodative attitudes toward conservative Muslims, the regime also began to implement policies that were directed to appease them. Many of these policies were also directed to address conservative Muslims' concerns about the threats of "Christian conversion" in Indonesia. The first policy directed to deal with alleged "Christianization" efforts was the joint degree of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Ministry of Home Affairs signed on September 13, 1969. It requires religious organizations who wish to build new houses of worships to seek a written permission from both the local government head (Bupati) and the local head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Such permissions are only given by the local head of the Ministry's office after consultation with both the Bupati and local religious leaders, as well as taking into account the plans of the building proposal and local inter-religious relations (Melissa Crouch, 2007). This decree also makes it illegal to convert private homes into houses of worships, creating a justification for conservative Muslims to disrupt worship services conducted in private homes and to destroy these homes. Since its enactment, incidences of church burnings and vandalizations have increased significantly throughout Indonesia. While during the Old Order regime (1945-1966) only two churches were destroyed, there were 456 incidences of church burnings and vandalizations recorded during the New Order regime and another 400 churches were destroyed during the reigns of subsequent regimes up to the present time (1998-2007) (Husein 2005).

Thus, instead of aiming to promote harmony among different religions in Indonesia, the decree actually does the opposite, promoting further religious divisions and encourage violence directed against religious minorities, particularly Christians. After the successful implementation of the 1969 decree, other decrees and regulations were enacted by the New Order government during the 1970s and 1980s directed to appease conservative Muslims and to eliminate their fear against "Christianization."

For instance, in 1978 the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued two degrees which prohibits proselytization activities directed to individuals and groups already professed an officially recognized religion and restricts foreign missionary activities in Indonesia (Husein, 2005). Despite the fact that theoretically these decrees applied to all officially recognized religions in Indonesia, in practice they were primarily targeted against Christian missionaries.

These degrees were enacted despite very strong objections from both the Protestant and Catholic Churches in Indonesia, which argue that these decrees violate the religious freedom clause of the Indonesian Constitution and severely limit proselytization activities to the few regions in Indonesia that are not predominantly Muslim. On the other hand, conservative Muslims supported the enactment of these degrees, stating that they will protect Indonesian Islamic umma from "Christianization" campaigns directed against them (Husein, 2005).

By the early 1990s the New Order regime had reversed its long-standing policies of keeping a careful watch over conservative Muslims and instead tried to embrace and co-opt them to join its sphere of influence. This could be seen from gestures such as the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in December 1990 and the appointment of Suharto's protégé B.J. Habibie as its chairman, and the well-publicized pilgrimage of Suharto to Mecca in 1990.(Hefner 2000: 128-156). More significantly, Suharto finally gave in to the demands of conservative Muslims to replace Christians serving as government ministers, top-ranking bureaucrats, and military officers with pious (santri) Muslims van (Bruinessen,2003). This could be seen in the composition of the Sixth Development Cabinet (1993-1998) which had no Christian servings in important government ministries, while included santri Muslim figures such as Feisal Tanjung (Armed Forces Chief of Staff), Abdul Latief (Labor Minister), and Wardiman Djojonegoro (Education Minister) in it.

The policy of appointing replacing Christian civil servants with Muslims also occurred in the regions. For instance, during the 1990s, in Maluku, a region that was historically a Christian majority region, its Muslim governor appointed Muslims to become local government heads (Bupati) and heads of most provincial government agencies, while tried unsuccessfully to install a Muslim as the head of the province's state-sponsored university. Similar appointments also took place in other predominantly Christian regions in Indonesia. For instance, in Flores, East Nusa Tenggara, which is predominantly Catholic, in the early 1990s the Bupati and almost all heads of local government agencies were Muslims (Bertrand 2004).

While Muslim groups defended these appointments by stating that they were made to redress "imbalances" in the composition of political appointments that historically favored Christians, Christians became concerned that their sudden lack of representation in national and local governments during the 1990s were part of an Islamization campaign conducted by the Muslims (Bertrand, 2004). Tensions between Muslims and Christians over these political appointments were considered to be the primary cause of violent conflict between members of the two religious traditions that occurred in Maluku and in many parts of Eastern Indonesia after the downfall of Suharto in 1998. The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 created further uncertainties among Eastern Indonesian Christians about their future. At the same time, it also provided an opportunity for them to seek redress for their discontent against Muslim Indonesians. They felt the need to regain control of political and economic institutions that were increasingly taken over by the Muslims. These resulted in the violent conflicts that occur throughout the Eastern Indonesian region from 1998 onwards. Specifically, they have occurred in the provinces of East Nusa Tenggara, South Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, and worst of all, in Maluku. The conflict there turned into a large-scale religious warfare between Muslims and Christians that occurred between 1999 and 2002. The war resulted in the death of tens of thousands Moluccans from both groups and displaced more than 500,000 Moluccans from their homes (Bertrand, 2004).

As a part of the peace settlement in Maluku, the province was divided into two separate provinces: North Maluku, which is predominantly Muslim, and South Maluku, which is predominantly Christian (Emmerson, 2005). Thus, while peace was restored in the region, a de facto ethnic cleansing was accomplished, with most Moluccan Muslims now live in North Maluku and most Moluccan Christians live in the South. It was a tragedy for a region where the two religiou faiths used to live together in a relative peace for decades.

## 4.5 Autonomous and Secessionist Movements

Center-periphery tensions between the dominant Javanese culture and minority groups in outlying regions have been sources of political instability and strife for the Indonesian state. Indonesia has in recent years adapted its approach to such strife and done much to alleviate autonomous or secessionist tensions.This relatively more moderate approach has reached accommodation where other efforts to quell Indonesia's centrifugal tendencies have failed. The primary security threats to Indonesia are generally thought to come from within. The political center of the Indonesian archipelago is located in Jakarta on Java, the densely populated island where 60% of Indonesia's population lives. Traditionally, power has extended from Java out to the outlying areas of Indonesia. This has been true both under Dutch rule, when Jakarta was known as Batavia, and the modern Indonesian state. Throughout its history there has been resistance in peripheral areas to this centralized control. This manifested itself in the predominantly Catholic former Indonesian province of East Timor, which is now an independent state, as well as in the far west of Indonesia, in Aceh, and in the far eastern part of the nation, in Papua and West Papua. Each of these regions has strong ethnic, cultural, and or religious identities very different from those of Java. Such diversity has led to debate about whether Indonesia is an organic state or an artificial creation of Dutch colonial rule.

Analysis of early Indonesian history reveals a level of integration in terms of economics and trade, if not extensive political unity. While early indigenous empires were precursors of the Indonesian state, political unity is generally considered to have been a product of Dutch colonial rule, including a series of lengthy wars to subdue outlying islands and independent political units. It has been suggested that a key lesson of Indonesian history is that unifying the archipelago administratively can only be done by the use of force" (Merle Ricklefs,2003). Forces of economic integration, or the creation of a national identity stemming from the nationalist movement which started in Java in 1908 could be viewed as other integrative forces (Jusuf Wanandi, 2002).

### 4.5.1Timor-Leste

The Portuguese, whose influence in Timor-Leste dates to the 1600s, gave up control of the island in 1975. With the Portuguese departure, three main parties emerged. Of these, Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente (Fretelin), a leftist leaning group, soon emerged as the dominant party. On December 7, 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor with the then tacit compliance of the United States and Australia.46 Indonesia, Australia, and the United States are thought to have been concerned that East Timor would turn into another

Soviet satellite state similar to Cuba. A third of the population of East Timor is thought to have died as a result of fighting or war-induced famine during the subsequent guerilla war fought by Fretelin against Indonesia's occupation. On August 30, 1999, East Timorese voted overwhelmingly to become an independent nation. 98.6% of those registered to vote in the referendum voted, with 78.5% rejecting integration with Indonesia. In the wake of the vote, pro-integrationist militias attacked pro-independence East Timorese and destroyed much of East Timor's infrastructure. More than 7,000 East Timorese were killed and another 300,000, out of a total population of 850,000, were displaced, many to West Timor. Hardline elements of TNI formed pro-integrationist militias in East Timor. These groups sought to intimidate the East Timorese into voting to remain integrated with Indonesia under an autonomy package being offered by then President Habibie. It is thought that the TNI had two key reasons for trying to forestall an independent East Timor. First, there was an attachment to the territory after having fought to keep it as a part of Indonesia. Second was the fear that East Timorese independence would act as a catalyst for further secession in Aceh and Papua. The subsequent devastation of East Timor may have been meant as a warning to others who might seek to follow its secessionist example. Some believe that TNI involvement in the violence stemmed largely from local "rogue" elements. Others believe that it was orchestrated higher up in the military command structure. East Timor gained independence in 2002. Since that time, Indonesia and East Timor have worked to develop good relations. The joint Commission of Truth and Friendship was established to deal with past crimes.50 A 2,500 page report issued in early 2006 by the East Timorese Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), which was given to United Nations General Secretary Kofi Annan, found Indonesia responsible for abuses of East Timorese during its period of rule over East Timor. The report reportedly found that up to 180,000 East Timorese died as a result of Indonesian rule.51 This created tension in the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and East Timor. Nevertheless, then East Timorese President Xanana Gusmao and President Yudhoyono reaffirmed their commitment to continue to work to resolve differences between the wo countries. More recently, the new President Ramos Horta called on the people of Timor- Leste to accept that Indonesians that committed human rights abuses in East Timor would never be brought to justice so that East Timor could move forward. The United Nations tribunal, which included the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit, shut down in May 2005. During its six-year operation, the tribunal convicted some East Timorese militia members for their role in the atrocities of 1999, but was unable to extradite any indictees from Indonesia. A parallel Indonesian investigation ended in acquittals for all Indonesians. A

2005 U.N. Commission of Experts found the Jakarta trials for crimes committed in 1999 to be "manifestly inadequate."

### 4.5.2 Aceh

Aceh is located at the extreme northwestern tip of the Indonesian archipelago on the island of Sumatra. The 4.4 million Acehenese have strong Muslim beliefs as well as an independent ethnic identity. Many Acehenese have in the past viewed Indonesia as an artificial construct that is no more than "a Javanese colonial empire enslaving the different peoples of the archipelago whose only common denominator was that they all had been colonized by the Dutch." The Acehenese fought the Portuguese in the 1520s as well as the Dutch in later years. The Dutch Aceh War lasted from 1873 to 1913; making it possibly the longest continuous colonial war in history. As a result of their resistance and independence, Aceh was one of the last areas to come under Dutch control. Its struggle for independence from Indonesia was once again taken up by the group Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) until a peace agreement was reached in the wake of the December 2004 tsunami which killed over 130,000 people and devastated much of Aceh. The peace agreement signed by GAM and the government of Indonesia in Helsinki in August of 2005 brought an end to a conflict that claimed an estimated 15,000 lives. Under the agreement, partial autonomy was granted to Aceh as was the right to retain 70% of the provinces considerable oil and gas revenue. The recently resolved struggle dates to 1976. In the late 1980s, many of GAM's fighters received training in Libya. GAM then began to reemerge in Aceh. This triggered suppression by the TNI from which GAM eventually rebounded. Former President Megawati then called on the military to once again suppress the Free Aceh Movement. This was the largest military operation for the TNI since East Timor. The decision to take a hard-line, nationalist stance on Aceh was popular at the time among Indonesian voters outside of Aceh. Under the leadership of President Yudhoyono, Indonesia leveraged the opportunity presented by the 2004 tsunami and achieved a peace settlement where previous peace efforts have come unraveled. Under the agreement, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) disarmed in December 2005 as the Indonesian Military TNI dramatically reduced its presence in Aceh. The election of December 2006 selected a radical ex-rebel candidate to be governor of Aceh over other candidates more closely aligned with Jakarta. Former independence fighter Irwandi Yusuf received approximately 40% of the vote in a field of eight candidates. The Islamic PKS party candidate received 10% of the vote. As governor, Irwandi has emphasized improving Aceh's economy, including efforts to attract foreign investment. An October 2007 International Crisis Group report pointed to post conflict complications and stated "The behaviour of many elected Free Aceh Movement (GAM) officials and ex-combatants is part of the reason for gloom: Acehenese voters seem to have substituted one venal elite for another. Extortion, robbery and illegal logging involving ex-combatants are cause for concern." It was reported in May 2008 that the central government would allow local Aceh parties to contest elections in 2009 inaccordance with the 2006 Aceh Administration Law. GAM renamed its local party Partai Aceh and indicated that this marked the end of its armed struggle for independence.

### 4.5.3 West Papua and Papua

The region, formerly known as West Irian or Irian Jaya, refers to the western half of the island of New Guinea and encompasses the two Indonesian provinces of West Papua and Papua. West Papua and Papua have a population of approximately two million and an area of approximately 422,000 square kilometers, which represents about 21% of the land mass, and less than 1% of the population of Indonesia. Papua has a long land border with Papua New Guinea to the east. About 1.2 million of the inhabitants of West Papua and Papua are indigenous peoples from about 250 different tribes, the rest have transmigrated to the region from elsewhere in Indonesia. There are about 250 language groups in the region. Papuans are mostly Christians and animists. The province is rich in mineral resources and timber. Papuans are a Melanesian people and are distinct from the Malay people of the rest of the Indonesian archipelago. Like Indonesia, Papua and West Papua were part of the Dutch East Indies. Many Papuans have a sense of identity that is different from the main Malay, and predominately Muslim, identity of the rest of the Indonesian archipelago, and many favour autonomy or independence from Indonesia. Papua did not become a part of Indonesia at the time of Indonesia's independence in 1949. The Dutch argued that its ethnic and cultural difference justified Dutch control until a later date. Under President Sukarno, Indonesia began mounting military pressure on Dutch West Papua in 1961. The United States sponsored talks between Indonesia and the Dutch and proposed a transfer of authority over Papua to the United Nations. Under the agreement the United Nations was to conduct an "Act of Free Choice" to determine the political status of Papua. The "Act of Free Choice" was carried out in 1969, after Indonesia had assumed control over Papua in 1963. The "Act of Free Choice," which led Papua to become part of Indonesia, is generally not considered to have been representative of the will of Papuans. A referendum on Indonesian control over Papua was not held. Instead, a group of 1,025 selected local officials voted in favor of merging with Indonesia. Papuan groups continue to oppose Indonesian control over Papua and West Papua. The Free Papua Movement, or Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), emerged in opposition to Indonesian control. By some estimates, as many as 100,000 Papuans are thought to have died as the result of military operations during the course of this conflict. Others assert that this figure is an overestimation. Coordinator of the Institute for Human Rights and Advocacy John Rumbiak has reportedly stated that "The Government in Jakarta has allowed the military to prevail in Papua, to take the security approach which has denied ordinary people their rights and enriched military officers who are making big money for themselves through dealings with mining, logging and oil and gas interests." The arrest and trial of Anthonius Wamang, who was sentenced to life in prison in November 2006 for carrying out an attack in 2002 that killed two Americans working for the Freeport mine near Timika, Papua, did much to resolve an issue that had been an impediment to closer relations between the United States and Indonesia. The mine is operated by a subsidiary of Freeport McMoRan. Some have wondered why Wamang and his co-defendants did not use the trial to reassert earlier statements that the Indonesian military was involved. The Human Rights Watch report, *Endemic Abuse and Impunity in Papua's Central Highlands,* of July 2007 made the following statement.

Among our key findings are that while civilian complaints of brutal treatment by soldiers continue to emerge, police officers rather than soldiers are responsible for most serious rights violations in the region today. We found that both army troops and police units, particularly mobile paramilitary police units (Brigade mobil or Brimob), continue to engage in largely indiscriminate village "sweeping" operations in pursuit of suspected militants, using excessive, often brutal, and at times lethal force against civilians. A June 2008 report by the International Crisis Group warned of the potential for inter-communal conflict in Papua. It pointed out that tensions were most acute along the west coast of Papua and that "continuing Muslim migration from elsewhere in Indonesia" was a key factor that is increasing strain between Christians and Muslims in Papua. A series of deadly attacks near the Grasburg mine in July 2009 killed 3, including an Australian technician, an Indonesian policeman and a security guard, and wounded. This led to the arrest of 12 suspects and speculation that the attacks were the work of disgruntled locals or related to "rivalry between security forces vying for contracts to protect the mine." Investigators have ruled out members of the OPM. Some believe a criminal syndicate could also be responsible.

### 4.6 Conclusion

From the above narratives, we can see that Indonesia serves as an excellent case study, not only on how a secular nationalist nation-state could be created from the many ethnic and religious groups that populated its territory, but also on how such a difficult and ambitious goal, could be threatened if the policy of maintaining national unity at all cost is pushed too far, without regard to competing nationalist ideas within the society based from ethnic and/or religious identities. It shows that secular nationalism is not the only viable paradigm in nationalism and nation-building project and that we cannot ignore ethnic and religious-based nationalism at face value, given that many groups used these variables to try to rally the people to support their causes. It also shows that suppressing such aspirations without reaching compromise with these competing forms of nationalisms only lead these groups to become more aggressive in their aspirations and motivate them to try achieving such aspirations through more violent means, generating further conflicts and denying the possibility that these competing ideas of nationhood can be reconciled via compromise agreed upon by all parties involved. This case shows that Indonesia's founding fathers managed to accomplish the goal to unify their fragmented nation successfully at first, culminated in the country's independence from the Dutch in 1949. However, they had problems consolidating these goals, since the idea of a unitary Indonesian state was shared initially only among the small group of elites who became the nation's founding fathers. Efforts to extent this idea to the rest of Indonesian population have encountered significant resistances from various sub-national groups, because in the early years of Indonesia's independence, many of its population did not think of themselves as members of a single Indonesia nation. In addition, as a country Indonesia is so vast and so diverse that it is impossible to govern it from a single power center without incorporating this diversity into the country's political system. The Indonesian government ignored the fact that national unity cannot be forced upon a population that is divided into so many diverse groups. These groups demand that the national government recognizes their own ethnic, cultural, and religious identities in addition to their identity as Indonesians. It also ignored the fact that such a unity cannot be imposed upon the population by force and enforced by a trigger-happy national army, which always responded to any sub-national grievances by using excessive force on the population that expressed them.

Finally, the national government encouraged distrust and resentment among Indonesia's diverse religious denominations, in particular, between Islam and Christianity, by promoting one religious denomination (Islam) over others through its political appointments and policies. In the end, Indonesian secular nationalists failed in their goal of promoting the idea of a unitary nation-state acceptable to the entire Indonesia's population.

Instead, they helped create a climate of anti-Indonesian sentiment where the various Indonesian ethnic and religious groups managed to reassert their own identities and place them ahead of their identity as Indonesians. The sudden fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 caused various ethnic and religious-based conflicts to break out simultaneously throughout the Indonesian archipelago, causing the death of tens of thousands of Indonesians and displacing millions others from their homes. While only three of such conflicts have a clear secessionist aims, and only one region-East Timor- has achieved its goal to fully secede from Indonesia, these conflicts only created more tension and distrust among different members of Indonesia's ethnic and religious groups. This deep distrust will not end without a change in the government's management of ethnic and religious relations in Indonesia. Ethnic and religious diversity at sub-national level should be considered as an asset in a multi-ethnic nation-state and not as a liability. This diversity should be promoted, not suppressed by the Indonesian government. In addition, the government should not favor any ethnic and religious groups over others and should not put any of these groups in a more advantageous economic and political position relative to other groups.

# *CHAPTER V*

# *CONCLUSION*

# Conclusion

Indonesia had been a Dutch colony since the early period of European colonial expansion. At the beginning of the 20th century the Dutch introduced the Ethical Policy, under which farming and limited health and educational services for Indonesians were developed. Railways, roads, and inter-island shipping were also expanded. The policy helped create two new social elements: a few Western-educated Indonesians and a smaller group of Indonesian entrepreneurs, who began to compete with a predominantly Chinese commercial class. The newly educated and somewhat prosperous Indonesians grew resentful of the colonial structure that denied them a role commensurate with their education and abilities.

The first important vehicle for the anti-Dutch nationalist movement was the *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Union), established in 1912. Growing out of a protective association for batik merchants, the Sarekat Islam by 1918 claimed a membership of more than 2 million people throughout the archipelago. The Dutch were initially conciliatory toward Sarekat Islam, and in 1916 they established the *Volksraad* (People's Council). In the Volksraad, selected representatives of major population groups could deliberate and offer advice to the government. After World War I (1914-1918), however, and especially after an abortive Communist-led insurrection in 1926 and 1927, the Dutch government adopted a more repressive policy.

In the 1920s the Indonesian nationalist movement was headed by leaders who were not primarily Muslim, notably Sukarno, an advocate of complete independence who founded the Indonesian Nationalist Party (*Partai Nasional Indonesia,* or PNI) in 1927. Despite the Dutch arrests and exiles of Sukarno (1929-1931, 1933-1942), Muhammad Hatta (1934-1942), and other nationalist leaders and the banning of the PNI and other noncooperating parties, the nationalist movement maintained its momentum. Only after Germany overran the Netherlands during World War II (1939-1945), however, did the Dutch even hint at a postwar transfer of political authority.

Indonesia is a multi-ethnic, multiracial and multireligious state. There are at least 250 ethnic groups, of which all but three are "indigenous"groups. They all have a homeland within Indonesia to identify with. Of these indigeous groups, the Javanese from about 47 percent of the population.Five other indigenous groups each consist of more han 2 percent of the Indonesian population: Sundanese(15 percent) Madurese(7 percent), Minangkabau(3.5

percent),Buginese(3 percent) and Balinese (2 percent).There are foreign "racial" groups, the Chinese, Arabs,and Indians, of which the Chinese from the majority(3 percent) Among these groups, there are at least six major religions(Islam, Potestantism, Catholic, Hindu- Bali, Buddhism and Confucianism) but 87 percent of the Indonesian population are Muslims. In the first place, one might have expected that local senses of ethnic identity might have entered into fierce combat with the notion of a unified Indonesian nation. Indeed, the strength of religious, regionalist and ethnic sentiment was such that developing consciousness in the Indies tended to express itself through such categories in the late 1910s and early 1920s.Indies archipelago to become one, mutually Javanese, Bataks, Dayaks, Timorese, Makasarese, Ambonese as well as Papuans have to be called ''Indonesians''. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the thinking and actions of Indonesians in this early phase was their preparedness, indeed, their enthusiasm, to accept the notion of Indonesia and not to allow local senses of ethnicity to deflect them from it. It was as if the great majority of them realised, once they appreciated the idea of Indonesia, that it was an idea whose time had come.

The summary of the work could be better analysed by having a look on findings regarding every objective.

My first objective was physical, economical and political conditions of Indonesia with a focus on role of geopolitics of ethnicity in nation building. The Indonesian archipelago represents one of the most unusual areas in the world, encompassing a major juncture of the Earth's tectonic plates, the dividing line between two faunal realms, and the meeting point for the peoples and cultures of mainland Asia and Oceania. These factors have created a highly diverse environment and society in which the only common elements are the susceptibility to seismic and volcanic activity, close proximity to the sea, and a moist, tropical climate.

In its economic development the country relies heavily upon its agricultural capacity- particularly rice cultivation and the export of such cash crops as coconuts, rubber, and tea; its petroleum products, of which it is the major producer in Asia; its rich deposits of tin and other minerals; and timber.

Indonesia is the most populous nation in Southeast Asia, and it is advantageously located between mainland Asia and Australia. As such, the country has a critical role to play in the development of its part of the world. In keeping with its size and importance, it is active in such regional and international groupings as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the United Nations.

Nation-building in Indonesia started in the period of Dutch Colonialism, especially durind the Indonesian nationalist movement before World War II. But the systematic measures adopted by the state only took place after independence. Nevertheless, the nation-building process in Indonesia has not been smooth. Although, generally, many ethnic groups have identified themselves with the "Indonesian nation",ethnic tension and conflict continue, particularly in three provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Maluku as well as East Timor, which left Indonesia recently. The intensity of conflict has increased in the last decade, coinciding with the end of the cold War and the globalization of the Indonesian economy. As a result, some observers have commented that the Indonesia may now be at the nation-destroying stage.

The next objective deals with describe making up of the discourse on ethnicity nationalism and politics, pluralism and geopolitics of Indonesia. The emergence and strength of nationalisms after decolonisation clearly highlight the contradictions and crisis of the nation-state in Indonesia (and beyond). At the same time the ability of national independence to deliver liberation and freedom in East Timor is (or in Aceh and Irian Jaya, if national independence is achieved will be) constrained by the serious limitations of the nation-state and the UN-centred nation-state system. The crisis of colonialism, the Cold War and the universalisation of the nation-state system after 1945 provided the context for the emergence of a range of nation-building projects around the world. However, following the founding and consolidation of a growing number of nation-states after World War II (and the elaboration of various versions of state-mediated national development), sovereignty continued to lie with the states, with serious implications for the well-being and welfare of the citizenry of the new (and not-so-new) nations.

The contradictions of the national development project in Indonesia were clearly evident under Sukarno (1945-65), and in the brutal and authoritarianr eorientationa nd reconfigurationo state-guidedn ational develop-ment under Suharto (1966-98). These contradictions flow from the complex history of colonialism, decolonisation, national liberation and the history of the Cold War. The serious limits of the Indonesian nation-state as it was consolidated in the Cold War era, had been exacerbated by new and revised forms of external pressure by the 1980s; these have increased in the post-cold war era. At the same time, the historical shortcomings and contemporary limitations of the nation-state as a vehicle for progress mean that the successful secession from Indonesia by East Timor, or the possible secession in the future by Aceh and Irian Jaya, have even less chance of living up to the promise of national liberation than did the new nation-states of an earlier era.

Through the process so far of nation state building, Indonesia has formed the framework of the state through the centralization of powers. But that framework may have been just for a fragile master-servant relationship, or an ostensible national unity, buttressed only by the central government's ability to control and ensure security. Decentralization has placed Indonesia in the stage of a true nation state building by letting it step into the question of the real substance of the nation state, or how to shape the future relationship between the central and the local. The historical experience in the strong centralized system was quite valuable in pursuit of a new shape of the state. Decentralization should be promoted steadily by fully digesting and learning from that experience. And local governments, not only the central government, should get involved in the process of the nation state building. The process of the nation state building and pursuit of a new ideal state require changes in the attitudes and consciousness of those participating in the process. Decentralization does not simply signify the transfer of administrative powers from the central to local governments, but provides an important opportunity to learn for a genuine nation state building in Indonesia.

The last Objective was to analyse the factors that formed the new basis of reordering the Indonesian state and society in terms of Ethnic nationalism, collective and individual right and the Indonesian people quest for democracy. The complexities of politics thus become simplified, in the language of ressentiment ethnic nationalism, into a 'good Us versus evil Other' formula. The result is a powerful ethnic ideology offering a simple diagnosis for contemporary problems and a simple prescription for their resolution - 'Once we were cohesive and secure. Things went wrong when our homeland was infected or invaded by the Others who usurped our legitimate rights. If this usurpation can be rectified by restoring the autonomy of our ethnic homeland, then we will once again be cohesive and secure'. Such a formulation becomes a self-validating cognitive and moral filter, since diverse contemporary grievances can be portrayed as arising from disruptive usurpations of the ethnic homeland by the demonized Other. This can be constantly validated by the exaggeration of the usurpations committed by the ethnic Other. The focus on the victimization of the community demonstrates to skeptical, apathetic or collaborationist elements, that there is no alternative to ethnic nationalist mobilization. The ressentiment process thus generates a similar "faulty reasoning and magnification of danger" to that outlined by Horowitz in his examination of the 'calculus' underlying ethnic riots.

In this respect it is also important to focus on the uneasy relationship between electoral democracy and ethnic and religious sentiments that tend to give far more attention to exclusive group interests while excluding a shared sense of citizenship. The paper concludes that democracy and citizenship, which are based on the rule of law, can only be achieved by strengthening the administrative and law-enforcing capacity of the state. When the authoritarian New Order regime fell apart, the state ideology, *Pancasila*, lost its near hegemonic authority and was challenged by a wave of religious, ethnic and regional identity politics. Because of democratisation and decentralisation, *Reformasi* intensified and accelerated these fragmented identities, which served as a means to mobilise new constituencies. The main victim of this process was, so it seemed, a shared sense of Indonesian citizenship. In the following pages I illustrate that the notion of citizenship was not only marginalised by the rise of ethnic and religious identity politics, it was also undermined by the failure of civil society groups to establish political alternatives. To conclude, I argue that democracy and citizenship both need a strong institutional setting, or state capacity, whereas Indonesia's present political configuration can be defined as a soft state.

Today Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world. One of the greatest achievements of the past decade is that electoral democracy has been established in Indonesia. People participate with enthusiasm in fair elections at the national, provincial and district levels. However, fair elections are not synonymous with institutionalised democracy based on the rule of law and characterised by transparency and accountability. Democracy has been established but the future of democracy in Indonesia will depend on the capacity of the state to guarantee the rule of law. Whereas the new political elites see the state primarily as a resource through which they can feed their clients, democracy requires more state capacity through which the rule of law and citizenship can be strengthened. This cannot be achieved overnight, it will take decades to improve the quality of the state to strengthen Indonesian citizenship.

The discourse of early Indonesian thinking about nation and citizenship is that regional expressions of ethnicity were not a particular hindrance or inconvenience in the development of a sense of Indonesian unity. Indonesians themselves found no insuperable difficulties in adopting their new identity as Indonesians, while retaining at the same time a consciousness of regional belonging.

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# *APPENDICES*

## Appendix:I

## Ethnic Groups of Indonesian Citizens: Indonesia, 2000

| No. | Ethnic Group | Number | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Javanese | 8,38,65,724 | 41.71 |
| 2 | Sundanese | 3,09,78,404 | 15.41 |
| 3 | Malay | 69,46,040 | 3.45 |
| 4 | Madurese | 67,71,727 | 3.37 |
| 5 | Batak | 60,76,440 | 3.02 |
| 6 | Minangkabau | 54,75,145 | 2.72 |
| 7 | Betawi | 50,41,688 | 2.51 |
| 8 | Buginese | 50,10,421 | 2.49 |
| 9 | Bantenese | 41,13,162 | 2.05 |
| 10 | Banjarese | 34,96,273 | 1.74 |
| 11 | Balinese | 30,27,525 | 1.51 |
| 12 | Sasak | 26,11,059 | 1.3 |
| 13 | Makassarese | 19,82,187 | 0.99 |
| 14 | Cirebon | 18,90,102 | 0.94 |
| 15 | Chinese | 17,38,936 | 0.86 |
| 16 | Gorontalo/Hulandalo | 9,74,175 | 0.48 |
| 17 | Acehnese | 8,71,944 | 0.43 |
| 18 | Toraja | 7,50,828 | 0.37 |
| 19 | Nias, Kono Niha | 7,31,620 | 0.36 |
| 20 | Minahasa | 6,59,209 | 0.33 |
| 21 | Buton, Butung, Butong | 5,78,231 | 0.29 |
| 22 | Atoni Metto | 5,68,445 | 0.28 |
| 23 | Manggarai | 5,66,428 | 0.28 |
| 24 | Bima | 5,13,055 | 0.26 |
| 25 | Mandar | 5,04,827 | 0.25 |
| 26 | Sumba, Humba, Tau Humba | 5,01,345 | 0.25 |
| 27 | Sambas | 4,44,929 | 0.22 |
| 28 | Peminggir | 4,26,723 | 0.21 |
| 29 | Kailli | 4,12,281 | 0.21 |
| 30 | Sangir | 3,96,810 | 0.2 |
| 31 | Komering | 3,89,467 | 0.19 |
| 32 | Rejang | 3,33,635 | 0.17 |
| 33 | Ngaju | 3,24,504 | 0.16 |
| 34 | Sumbawa, Semawa | 3,19,423 | 0.16 |
| 35 | Luwu | 3,18,134 | 0.16 |
| 36 | Using- Osing | 2,97,372 | 0.15 |
| 37 | Kendayan, Kenayan | 2,92,390 | 0.15 |
| 38 | Tolaki, Laki-laki, Lolaki | 2,89,220 | 0.14 |
| 39 | Pepadun | 2,80,247 | 0.14 |
| 40 | Serawai | 2,79,154 | 0.14 |

| No. | Ethnic Group | Number | Percntage |
|---|---|---|---|
| 42 | Muna, Tomuna | 2,67,722 | 0.13 |
| 43 | Kerinci | 2,54,125 | 0.13 |
| 44 | Dawan | 2,36,242 | 0.12 |
| 45 | Kutai | 2,24,859 | 0.11 |
| 46 | Bolaang Mongondow | 2,23,546 | 0.11 |
| 47 | Dyak | 2,21,957 | 0.11 |
| 48 | Musi Banyuasin | 2,13,918 | 0.11 |
| 49 | Lamaholot, Lamahot, Lamkolo | 2,06,488 | 0.1 |
| 50 | Belu, Teto | 1,97,302 | 0.1 |
| 51 | Rote, Roti | 1,85,316 | 0.09 |
| 52 | Pesaguan | 1,78,933 | 0.09 |
| 53 | Lio | 1,70,949 | 0.09 |
| 54 | Bakumpai | 1,55,906 | 0.08 |
| 55 | Tonteboan | 1,34,543 | 0.07 |
| 56 | Biak Numfor, Mafoorsch, Noe | 1,26,070 | 0.06 |
| 57 | Kei | 1,25,954 | 0.06 |
| 58 | Duri | 1,21,688 | 0.06 |
| 59 | Ambon | 1,20,969 | 0.06 |
| 60 | Dani, Ndani | 1,20,745 | 0.06 |
| 61 | Banggai, Mian Banggai | 1,18,556 | 0.06 |
| 62 | Gayo Lut | 1,17,509 | 0.06 |
| 63 | Selayar | 93,183 | 0.05 |
| 64 | Buol | 91,034 | 0.05 |
| 65 | Dompu | 90,635 | 0.05 |
| 66 | Lani | 85,685 | 0.04 |
| 67 | Abung Bunga Mayang | 85,342 | 0.04 |
| 68 | Gayo luwes | 81,172 | 0.04 |
| 69 | Talaud | 79,818 | 0.04 |
| 70 | Seram | 78,955 | 0.04 |
| 71 | Lembak | 77,241 | 0.04 |
| 72 | Saluan | 77,151 | 0.04 |
| 73 | Saparua | 68,194 | 0.03 |
| 74 | Alas | 67,424 | 0.03 |
| 75 | Ekagi,Ekai | 66,823 | 0.03 |
| 76 | Sula | 63,282 | 0.03 |
| 77 | Makian | 60,985 | 0.03 |
| 78 | Bawean,Boyan | 60,703 | 0.03 |
| 79 | Katingan | 60,171 | 0.03 |
| 80 | Mentawai | 54,419 | 0.03 |
| 81 | Pasir | 54,162 | 0.03 |
| 82 | Galela | 52,639 | 0.03 |

| Ethnic Group | Number | percentage |
|---|---|---|

|  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|
| 83 | Yali | 51,285 | 0.03 |
| 84 | Maanyan | 50,505 | 0.03 |
| 85 | Aru | 48,261 | 0.02 |
| 86 | Ngalum | 46,130 | 0.02 |
| 87 | Singkil | 44,153 | 0.02 |
| 88 | Simeulu | 42,803 | 0.02 |
| 89 | Bajau,Bajao,Bajo,Bayo | 40,712 | 0.02 |
| 90 | Yamdena | 39,320 | 0.02 |
| 91 | Donggo | 38,050 | 0.02 |
| 92 | Bukat,Buket,Ukit,Bukut | 35,838 | 0.02 |
| 93 | Tengger | 33,886 | 0.02 |
| 94 | Arab | 33,498 | 0.02 |
| 95 | Tonsawang | 30,941 | 0.02 |
| 96 | Halmahera | 26,018 | 0.01 |
| 97 | Baliaga | 19,791 | 0.01 |
| 98 | Laloda,Loloda | 19,323 | 0.01 |
| 99 | Morotai | 13,968 | 0.01 |
| 100 | Antinggola | 4,681 | 0 |
| 101 | Gebe,Gebi | 2,903 | 0 |
| 102 | Others | 1,39,72,741 | 6.95 |
|  | **TOTAL** | **20,10,92,238** | **100** |

**Source: Population Census2000 (Indonesia).**

## Appendix:II

## Distribution OF Percentage of Ethnic Groups by Administrative Divisions

| **Administrative Divisions** | **Percentage of Ethnic Groups** |
|---|---|
| Aceh | Acehnese 50 %, Javanese 16% |
| Bali | Balinese 89% |
| Banten | Bantenese 47%, Sundanese 23%, Javanese 12% |
| Bengkulu | Javanese 22%, Rejang 21%, Serawai 18% |
| Gorontalo | Gorontalo(Hulandalo) 90% |
| Jakarta | Javanese 35%, Betawi 28%, Sundanese 15% |
| Jambi | Malay 38%, Javanese 28%, Kernci 11% |
| Java Barat | Sundanese 74%, Javanese 11% |
| Jawa Tengah | Javanese 98% |
| Jawa Timur | Javanese 79%, Madurese 18% |
| Kalimantan Barat | Sambas 12% |
| Kalimantan Selatan | Banjarese 76% ,Javanese 13% |
| Kalimantan Tengah | Banjarese 24%, Javanese 18%, Ngaju 18% |
| Kalimantan Timur | Javanese 30%, Buginese 18%, Banjarese 14% |
| Kepulauan Bangka Belitung | Malay72%, Chinese 12% |
| Kepulauan Riau | Riau |
| Lampung | Javanese 62% |
| Maluku | Kei 11%, Butung(Buton) 11%, Ambon 11% |
| Maluku Utara | ni single group over 10% |
| Nusa Tenggara Barat | Sasak 68%, Bima 13% |
| Nusa Tenggara Timur | Atoni Metto 15%, Manggarai 15%, Sumba 13% |
| Papua | Javanese 12% |
| Riau | Malay 38%, Javanese 25%, Minangkabau 11% |
| Sulawesi Selatan | Buginese 42%, Makassarese 25%, Kaili 20%, Buginese 14% |
| Sulawesi Tenggara | Butung(Buton) 23%, Buginese 19% Tolaki(Lakilaki) 16%, Muna 15% |
| Sulawesi Utara | Minahasa 33%, Sangir 20%, Bolaang Mongondow 11% |
| Sumatera Barat | Minangkabau 88% |
| Sumatera Selatan | Malay 31%, Javanese 27% |
| Sumatera Utara | Batak 42%, Javanese 27% |
| Yogykarta | Javanese 97% |

Source: Population Census 2000(Indonesia).