

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND IRAQ CRISIS (2003): CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation titled "Indian Foreign Policy and the Iraq Crisis(2003): Continuity and Change" submitted by Ajay Yadav in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University and this is his own work.

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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For

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Dedicated to my father,

*Who was more excited
than me to see this work
come through, but passed
away while it was in progress.*

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INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE IRAQ CRISIS (2003): CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Introduction:

This work is about the Indian foreign policy after 1991. More specifically to see how it has been in its execution during the time of a crisis. The crisis that is taken up here is the Iraq crisis of 2003. It has been called a crisis because the game is still not over there and is not likely to be so even in the coming years. For us the matter of importance is how the Indian government saw it and how responded to it. What principles guided what interests motivated and what objectives it sought during the crisis? The necessity of conducting such a exercise emerged from the understanding that both India and the world are undergoing changes. New contradictions have been emerging like on one hand the world is globalising and on the other various fractious tendencies are emerging, of which terrorism is primary. Foreign policy and diplomacy of almost all nations are greatly engaged in handling the hot issue of terrorism. It is attempted here to see how India responded to it. This work is guided by another assumption according to which the reorienting elements behind Indian foreign policy, coupled with space provided by terrorism for international cooperation has thrown up a context for India to claim stake to emerging power in South Asia in near future and a global power in larger future. Control of the government at this time by a right wing party, BJP, makes such a forecast more probable. The taking up of Iraq crisis in this light is an attempt to see the portents of such a case. Iraq is neither a case of terrorism nor any potential theatre for India to express immediate territorial strategic concern, but definitely provides pointers to any such future crisis more closer home, say in Afghanistan.

Foreign policy of a state is the sum total of the PRINCIPLES, the INTERESTS and the OBJECTIVES which it formulates in conducting its relations with other states. **The principles** are code of right conduct which are considered desirable in themselves, such as adherence to treaties and non interference in internal affairs of other state. **Interests** are what the state

considers, in general terms, essential for its survival and development: such as territorial integrity, improvement of living standards and maintenance of a free way of life. **Objectives** are more or less precisely determined interests, formulated in the circumstances in which the relations with other state are conducted¹. There is however no fixity about any of these components, for principles, interests and the objectives are contingent on time, elements and actors. They change or dialectically put reorient with time. That is, like any other policy they enshrine continuity and change in their movement. This work is therefore about observable continuity and change in India's foreign policy in recent times. It can however still be surmised that principles of a nation are considered to be the core whereas the objectives are framed with short term or best gains in the hour of crisis or otherwise. We can see changes or beginning of the changes in Objectives, Interests as well as Principles since 1991.

The actual long term goal of foreign policy and the short term objectives which are consistent with it, as well as the choice of means open to the makers of foreign policy of any particular country depends on a variety of basic determinants like geography, political tradition and the national value system, economic development, the international milieu; and the whole process of policy formulation in which, at least in a democracy, public opinion, political parties, pressure groups, Parliament, the Cabinet, the Prime minister, the foreign minister and the foreign office play a more or less important role. The choice of alternatives with regard to both ends and means is not a absolute choice, but is limited and bounded by a wide variety of constraints which are not only beyond the formulators of foreign policy but also has to be taken into the stride to serve the nation to best of its interests.

National Interest

It is generally recognized that states in international relations are guided or at any rate ought to be guided, by the concept of a permanent and universal

¹ A. Appadorai, *Domestic Roots of Indian foreign Policy: 1947-72* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.6.

goal, namely, that of “national interest”. Realists as well as Idealists, amongst both statesmen and academicians, are agreed on this point, although there is a wide disagreement between them regarding the content of national interest. In the spectrum of views extreme Realists would equate national interest with national power, and then measure power in terms of material strength, primarily military strength. At the other end an extreme Idealist or a Utopian would identify national interest with some moral aspiration of entire mankind, like eternal peace, or human brotherhood, and be willing to sacrifice the material power of the nation for the moral upliftment of mankind. Between these two extremes are a whole range of qualified or moderate Realists and Idealists, who would be willing to combine the material interests and power of the state with some broader and more general and universal objectives, in different degrees, depending on their Realist or Idealist bias, and arrive at a synthetic conception of national interest.²

Indian statesmen or men of actions in India have traditionally tried to strike a kind of balance between idealism and realism. Their popularity being proportional to their success in this balancing act. But not many have been successful, at least in the eyes of their critics. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of independent India and the architect of foreign policy of India is a great example of praise and criticism on his attempts at trying this balance to the best of his abilities. Now same territory is being charted by the current Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee Who is seen as second Nehru in the matters of international politics.. In the west the Ideal approach to international politics has been represented in different degrees by a long line of thinkers from St. Pierre and Kant to Toynbee and Bertrand Russell; and Czar Alexander I of Russia who formulated the scheme of Holy Alliance, and President Woodrow Wilson of USA who argued that the attempt to “determine the foreign policy of a nation in terms of material interest” was “not only unfair to those with whom you are dealing , but it is degrading as regards your

² Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy* (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1970), p. 3.

actions”,³and formulated the famous Fourteen Points for world peace and world governments, are supposed to typify the idealist statesmen.⁴ In the case of realists in West, from Machiavelli to Morgenthau a long succession of Realist thinkers have gloried in the doctrine of power politics, and statesmen like Bismarck, Metternich, Cavour and Churchill are regarded by them as the ideal realists. In India most political parties, it is believed idealistically inclined, and all of them share more or less same amount of idealism. This however very much seems to be the hangover from non-violent freedom struggle that India waged. Interestingly even Indian freedom struggle was not only about non-violence; it constituted of many currents: Subash Chandra Bose was also a congressman who tried to utilize the most military means to win freedom. Therefore, historically parties and actors in India have differed in the amount of idealism and realism they have blended in at a point of particular crisis. For e.g. all Indian parties opposed the American aggression on Iraq on moral grounds, but differed on the course of action that India should take.

In a democratic form of politics and government, theoretically speaking, the foreign policy decisions of the government like other decisions, are tested in the light of public opinion, influenced by pressure groups, examined and criticized by the political parties and the press, filtered through the parliament, molded and shaped by the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister, and finally approved by the Cabinet. It is, therefore expected that the ultimate determination of the national interest by the government is based on a broad consensus generated by the democratic processes of decision making, and, therefore, on the whole rational. However, in the developing countries like India the low level of education, economic development and political consciousness militate against an articulate and rational public opinion, and make decision making, especially in foreign policy, except in case of a crisis, prerogative of a small elite group. Furthermore, the peculiar character of Indian polity is that it relies heavily on the personality factor; it has been true more so in case of the foreign policy. A personality on the other hand can be guided by

³ ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁴ ibid.

various factors, like his class, ambition for personal power and prestige, socio-cultural background, extra-territorial loyalty, and personal psychopathology. A further complication in the determination of national interest comes in the form of preferences that the respective political parties impose upon their leadership. For a political party, besides its ideology the strategies to secure electoral victory constitute an essential input in determining the national interest.

So what does national interest mean for India or for that matter for any other country? National interest, in objective terms, mean preserving political independence (i.e., freedom of the state to follow any policy, domestic or foreign, which it likes) and territorial integrity, by safeguarding its international boundaries. Simultaneously, national interest also has a subjective aspect which is generally an outcome of its historical past and the stage of socio-economic development it has reached; therefore this is particular to each country. For example the interest of “affluent society”, such as that of the USA is, naturally, to preserve that affluence and rid the society of such factors found by the nation as hampering its healthy and harmonious working. The interest of a revolutionary country like erstwhile USSR and Iran would obviously be to conserve the gains of the revolution. The interest of a developing country like India, cannot, obviously, be either of the above. Their most important national interest, outside of preserving their political independence and sovereignty and territorial integrity, is economic development: improving living standards by increased production and equitable distribution.⁵ In summary, therefore, **security** is the first guarantee of India’s international personality; **national development** is its categorical imperative; and an ordered pattern of international relations (or **World Order**) is minimum precondition for the independent existence of an individual.

Basic determinants:

There are certain factors that are basic in the determination of foreign policy like geography, economic development, political tradition, social

⁵ A. Appadorai.: *National Interest and India's Foreign Policy* (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1992), pp. 1-2.

structure, history & tradition and leadership constituting the domestic milieu. Developments at the international frontier though form a separate arena, but it in many ways form an interface with the domestic policies and posturing of the government. Even these basic determinants of foreign policy, however, vary in importance according to the circumstances, and affect the foreign policy making individually or collectively. A foreign policy can have a claim to rationality (i.e. serving best of the national interest) only when these have been seriously taken into account.

Geography:

Geopolitical speculation has a remote and long ancestry dating back to Kautilya and Aristotle; but articulate geopolitical thinking probably did not develop until the early 19th century, when the French philosopher, Victor Cousin, propounded a rather rigid brand of geographical determinism. In the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th century several leading theorists like Friedrich Ratzel in Germany, Captain Alfred Mahan, E.C Semple and Huntington in the USA, Rudolf Kjellén of Sweden and Halford Mac Kinder in England, laid great emphasis on the role of geographical factors in international politics. But the phenomenal progress of aerial navigation and technological sophistication of warfare in the nuclear age have led to a serious depreciation of geopolitics, and the current tendency among International Relations theorists is to regard the industrial potential and technological level of a state as a far more important determinant of its role in international relations than geography.⁶ Nevertheless, there are two important reasons why geography should be regarded as an important determinant of India's foreign policy. Firstly, there are various aspects of geography which tend to influence foreign policy irrespective of the degree of industrialization and the level of technology. Secondly, India and most of the neighboring countries will take a long time to attain the technological level of the superpowers, particularly in rocketry and cybernetics. Hence, it will not be possible for India in the foreseeable future to

⁶ ibid. no.2, p. 27.

ignore the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean either from the viewpoint of her trade and transportation, or from that of defence.

India's location: Location is a crucial factor in instituting a particular psyche to the country. The strategic location of Britain has helped her to rule over the waves in terms of trade and naval power. The geographical position of the US helped her in the past to remain unaffected by the internecine European wars in a great way but as it has moved ahead in technology and world trade it has transcended its geography. Its conception of national security widened to security of Western Europe which is her first line of defense; and also in the developments of Japan. The location of Japan has helped her to become one of the leading trading and shipping nations of the world. The absence of any important natural barrier between Europe and Asia made invasion from either side relatively easy in the past.

India has the highest mountain range of the world on the north and one of the three major oceans of the world on the south. The Khyber Pass in the North West of the Himalayas is the only link through which trade, commerce and culture was imported and exported. The carriers of the sword also used this creek throughout the history to converge in and give the India its current demographic constitution. But as the path is creeky so was the flow in and out of people, commodities and culture was creepy, giving the impression of exclusivity. Compared to this the interaction at the ocean had been abrupt, particularly after the victory of East India Company over the mighty, landed Mughal empire. The Indian Ocean has gained a steady importance in the calculation of security and trade promotion of India. India is a primary seafaring nation in the South Asian continent. India's strategic location in South Asia gives her a central position in Asian politics and adds to her geopolitical importance. All the major sea and air routes of the world pass through India, and India is in a sense a connecting link between the geographical areas of West Asia, South East Asia and the Far East. Any major happening in India would affect the rest of Asia and vice versa. From the geographical point of

view, India is a kind of a bridge between the East and the West, and becomes inevitably involved in major world problems.⁷

Besides its international geo-political significance India is seventh largest country in the world. Large size of a country entails a variety of ramifications. In the first place, unless the soil and subsoil are unusually barren, a large territory generally means a relatively large stock of natural resources. Therefore India like other big countries like USA, Russia and China stand to enjoy a larger chunk of resources towards national strengthening. Secondly, the vastness of India's territory has an important bearing on her external security. Unless there is a great difference in military power, it would not be easy for any other state to occupy the whole country. ⁸These two important consequences of the bigness of her territory make India an important and independent factor in international politics in her own right. Himalayas and the Indian Ocean form two most obvious and crucial frontiers. Nehru in 1963 explained: 'if it (Himalayas) is breached, the way to Indian plains and the oceans beyond would lay exposed; and the threat to India would then, likewise, be a threat to other countries of South and South-East Asia. India's determination to resist aggression and retain her territorial integrity is, therefore, a vital factor in the safeguarding of peace and stability throughout this whole area.'⁹ On the extreme west of northern frontier of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent is the Pakistan Occupied area of Kashmir, which is contiguous to Sinkiang province of China and almost contiguous to Tajikistan, and is thus of great geo political importance. There are at least eight great important passes in the Karakoram mountain range linking this area with Sinkiang, and an all-weather motor able road, roughly following an ancient (silk) trade and pilgrim route, connects Gilgit with Sinkiang. The military problem in this sector is essentially one of defending these passes. Such passes profligate as one move eastward of Himalayas. In fact, the security problem in these sectors is more political than military. Next, the Tibetan plateau is situated at a higher altitude than the sub-

⁷ Ibid., p. 29.

⁸ Ibid., p.30.

⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Times of India*, (New Delhi), March 31, 1963. *cited from* *ibid.*

Himalayan slopes on the Indian side of the frontier. The topography of the frontier is, therefore, generally favorable to an invading army from the north, and disadvantageous for either defensive or offensive operations from the Indian side. The Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan lie within the natural defense perimeter of India; any use of these soils for disruptive activities in India can cause immense harm to India and is capable of posing considerable political, military and diplomatic problems for India. More importantly, the ethnic frontier of Tibet spills over into the Indian borderlands across the Himalayas; almost all along the northern frontier, there is a Mongoloid fringe of population. Ethnocentric psychology among these people would pose a serious threat to security, both in peace and war time. India's domestic political, economic and cultural policies must, therefore, be fully geared to the complex task of integrating them politically, socially, economically and emotionally with the rest of Indians. Lastly it is important to note that Himalayan and the Karakoram mountains constitute a common line of defense for both India and Pakistan. This fact poses an overwhelming geopolitical compulsion on both the states not to deploy their armed forces against each other and thus weaken the external security of the subcontinent. From the geopolitical point of view, Indian diplomacy must, therefore, aspire for peaceful relations with Pakistan.

The logic of geography makes India a sea-faring nation. Indian Ocean is vital to our external political and economic relations; in fact to our very national existence. In ancient and medieval times the Indian Ocean witnessed a vast commercial traffic between India on the one hand and the Arab countries, South-East Asia and China on the other, as well as high maritime adventure on the part of Indians, especially in the South-East Asia. In the modern times, Indian Ocean was the play pool of many European countries who were attracted to the East by trade and religion. The struggle that took place between Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French, ultimately reduced India to be the satellite, most glittering, of England. Today, the Indian Ocean continues to play the vital role in national life and destiny. Almost our entire foreign trade and our heavy coastal trade depend on the freedom of the Indian Ocean. Indians

constitute the majority of the peoples living on the shores of the Indian Ocean. It offers the easiest and most effective means of communication between India and most of the neighboring countries. Regional trade in the Indian Ocean area would be most advantageous to India from the viewpoint of transportation costs, which constitute a major element in foreign trade. As in the case of northern frontier, the security of Indian Ocean is threatened by Pakistan and China: Pakistan from the Western side and China from eastern. It is therefore necessary for India to have a strong navy. For this purpose, the Laccadive Islands off West coast and Andaman and Nicobar Islands off the eastern coast constitute strategic geographical barrier.

The Pakistan factor: India and Pakistan since 1947 have invariably been in a state of political, military, economic and even cultural confrontation, almost relentless and exasperating. The Indo-Pakistan boundary represents the political division of a single geographical, ecological, economic and defense unit, with all resultant incongruities, anomalies and irrationalities.¹⁰ From all the possible contexts political agreement India and Pakistan seems a *sine qua non* of really well-founded economic advance.

Economic Development:

In a developing country, whose actual economic strength is necessarily low, the rate of economic growth largely determines the power potential, defined in material terms, which the Realists regard as the only factor of significance, but is at any rate one of the major elements, in contemporary international relations. The rate of growth determines how soon, and if at all, a developing state can hope to become a major power from the economic point of view; determines whether and after what period of the time the state can develop military capability adequate for its own security; it indicates, to a considerable extent, the viability or otherwise of the political system over a period of time. The style of development, along the rate of growth, determines the extent of dependence on foreign aid and the boundary conditions within which such aid is sought and secured. A related and major aspect of economic

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 43.

development is the expansion and diversification of foreign trade. All this has obvious significance for foreign policy. From the point of view of the national power potential, population, natural resources, and technology are generally considered to be the most important variables in the process of economic development.

Vast and rapidly growing population profoundly affects the making and working of the foreign policy, primarily by slowing down the rate of economic growth and making the country dependent on foreign aid. The rate of growth of population profoundly affects the rise in per capita income. Demographers have found that in a developing society the rate of population growth tends to pass, historically through three stages. In the first stage of industrialization national income and population generally tends to grow at a faster rate. In the second stage, population growth supercedes national income, largely on account of a fall in the death rate resulting from improved diet, medicine, health and hygiene. In the third phase the rate of growth of population tends to decline and fall below the rate of growth of income. Many of the developing countries, including India, are transition economies and are passing through the second phase of demography. From foreign policy point of view such a phase entails dependence on external sources of investment, for; the country is unable on its own to jump over the transition barrier. It has to come either as foreign aid or foreign investment. Both however involve risking the sovereignty, and largely depends upon the nature of polity as well as the dominant politico-economic ideology of the state at any particular time. After independence India decided to go for self sufficiency with import substitution as the primary strategy, therefore the mode of foreign aid was preferred over the foreign investment. This however started to reverse slightly over 1985 but greatly after 1991.

The richness and self sufficiency of the USA and Russia with regard to natural resources account to a large extent for their economic and military power. The fact that India has a relatively abundant supply of natural resources is, therefore important for her national power and foreign policy from the long run point of view. It must be realized, however, that the proper utilization of

the natural resources is a time-consuming process and is dependent on various other cooperating factors like capital labor, organization, technology and a relatively new set of social institutions and values. Hence the development of natural resources is a part of the total process of economic development. But mere possession of natural resources is not sufficient; relevant and latest technology is required to extract the maximum benefit from them. There is no country in the modern world which did not depend, to a greater or lesser extent, on borrowed technology in the early stages of economic growth, be it USA, Japan or Russia. This dependence is natural and more crucial for developing countries like India which failed to take off technologically in time because of the stifling colonialism imposed on them by the countries which are developed today. First world is not only morally bound to provide gapping technology to third world but the third world is rightful to demand that from the former. But this does not happen so easily. Securing relevant technology is a tough process and in this foreign policy is inevitably affected for cordial relations are required to be maintained with technologically advanced countries.

State and Economics: Economic development as such can take place under different, often conflicting ideologies and state systems. It has taken place in England and America under free enterprise and political democracy, in Germany under predominantly free enterprise and Fascism, in Japan under free enterprise aided by the state and in Soviet Union and China under wholly state controlled and regimented politico-economic system. But the economic, political and social disciplines needed for economic growth under different state systems are quite different. From the point of view of international politics, the significance of actual pattern of growth is that it largely determines a state's economic and political viability in the short run, the extent of its dependence on foreign aid, and its short run defense capability. Contemporary world politics being characterized by a high degree of political and ideological tension, the pattern of growth also acts as an important determinant of pulls and pressures exerted on the state by outside powers, and, therefore, also of the way in which it should deal with them. The growth pattern in turn is dependent

on the constraints imposed by the constitution, the role of the state, and the ideology of economic development.

In one-party state dedicated to total state control it becomes relatively easy to mobilize all the available manpower and other resources, and to canalize them into desired line of development. Moreover, by the introduction of rigid controls over factor and commodity prices, and by according preferential treatment to particular sectors of the economy at the cost of others, a totalitarian state can raise an artificial surplus, representing the economic deprivation of the bulk of the people in the short run, which can then be utilized for the rapid expansion of heavy industries and for military investment. This is what happened in USSR and with some modification happening in China. The democratic constitution of India, which has created, among other institutions, parliamentary government in a multi party system, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law including an independent judiciary, simply does not permit the state to adopt this pattern of economic development. Security of fundamental freedoms and the core values of the constitution became the criteria for the choice of the path of economic development. Moreover, when the country is confronted with the problems of poverty, overpopulation, illiteracy and superstition, the role of state assumes greater criticality. It has to act as the arbiter with regard to 'the inevitable conflicts between growth and justice, growth and equality, growth and national power and prestige.'¹¹ Thus, the central role demanded from the state in India obligates it to utilize foreign policy for the purpose of economic development. Foreign policy and economic policy need to move complementing each other. The diplomacy of economic development should constitute one of the most important elements of Indian foreign policy.¹²

Political Tradition:

The political tradition of any country is an important determinant of its foreign policy. Fundamentals of Indian foreign policy were laid by the

¹¹ Eugene Black, *The Diplomacy of Economic Development*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1961), p.13.

¹² *ibid.* p. 54.

Congress after independence on the idealist and non-violent ethos of the Indian National Congress. These ethos were being challenged as the congress declined in power, Nehru bearing the most severe brunt. In fact, at the beginning just after independence when the world doubted the potential of Indians to sustain the democracy which they had so enthusiastically and abruptly chosen, it was logically not greatly possible to adopt an aggressive attitude towards the foreign policy. Furthermore, the partition which had come with the freedom had infiltrated elements of religious hatred into the political organization of the country to an extent that now it always appears sitting atop an active volcano. In the recent days battle lines seem to have been drawn clear between religious assertion and secularism, the cherished aim of freedom movement and founding element of Indian constitution. All the three limbs of a democracy- Legislature, Executive and Judiciary- have their own vulnerabilities, and India has come to be affected by them on many counts, thereby stifling fuller realization of democracy. Incompetent, criminal and dishonest legislators; corruption at all levels of executive and a delayed justice are all severe obstacles in the way of a successful domestic policy. The degree of success in domestic policy is corresponded by success in the foreign policy. "Foreign policy begins and ends at home". In India it is however interesting to note that there is consensus to be seen in the foreign policy, at least in essentials, but is not true in case of domestic policies. It is perhaps so because India is constituted by diverse societies, communities and groups, which from the ancient days have antiquated and complex features, that at any time appears to be in transition. This might bring them at loggerheads with regard to best domestic policy, but not so when it comes to forge a foreign policy where they act as no less than any other modern state.

Most conscious effort at organizing this domestic transition began with the institution of Indian democracy in 1947. It aimed at establishing the following key elements: liberal constitutionalism; civic nationalism; the devolution of power in layered federalism; and group rights. Beyond this institutional structure, Indian democracy has been sustained by a political culture of tolerance, accommodation and suspicion to the excessive use of

violence.¹³ A liberal constitution consists of principles that limit the authority and power of the government and protect individuals and groups against government tyranny or the tyranny of others, including social majorities of any kind which, by virtue of superior numbers, could override the preferences of those who disagree with them. Civic nationalism is the notion that citizenship is based not on ethnic attributes but rather on political attributes, namely, the willingness to abide by the values and rules of a common political order. Being Indian in this view, is not a matter of ethnic belonging but rather that of political by virtue of birth formally but primarily by one's own reason. Devolution of power in layered federalism means that various units of have rights and responsibilities that can not be overridden by the central authorities, at least in the normal course of things. The first layer is that of division of power between the Centre and component states according to three lists, namely, the Union, the State and the Concurrent list. Subsequent layers were the formation of states according to language grouping in 1956 and creation of autonomous zones and councils in the areas where they were felt necessary, particularly in the tribal areas. Article 370 specially guards the autonomous status of a sensitive state of Jammu and Kashmir. Another layer of Indian federalism, in effect was created by the Panchayati Raj Acts of 1992 and 1993. According to these Acts, states must hold elections to panchayats and give them various powers, including some financial autonomy. The fourth limit on government and social dominance is the conferral of group rights. The most important of these rights are the rights of religious communities, language communities, and the caste and tribal communities. These rights in fact form crux of fundamental rights, which are further strengthened by the Supreme Court in the form of 'inferred rights'.

Indian democracy has rested not just on this political structure, but also on a particular kind of political culture. That political culture consists of three elements in particular: a valuation of tolerance, an aversion to violence, and a thick conception of political. The last needs slight elaboration; thick political

¹³ Kanti Bajpai: "The effects of terrorism on Indian democracy" in Sridhar.K.Khatri and Gert W. Kueck(ed.) *Terrorism in South Asia* (New Delhi: Shipra, 2003), p.183.

means not only the policy making on various socio-political problems but the process of policy or decision making. It is about the political process- it is about debate and dialogue. Politics is about forging a collective ethics, about articulating and understanding differences, about attempting to change people's minds, and, if necessary, about agreeing to disagree. Tolerance and an aversion to violence are tantamount to saying that on some occasion people may simply have to agree to disagree. They are therefore vital to the thicker conception of politics as much as this conception is vital to the prospects of tolerance and aversion to violence. In sum total the processes as well as the decision are needed to be consensus based.

Social structure:

Social cohesion in a state guarantees its health. All organs of society should work in unison to provide dynamism and motion to the state body. India is a modern state but an ancient civilization. Its social constitution is far from uniform. Doubts are cast over these historical diversities going their way to ail the state body. All modern state laid their claim to nationhood over certain unifying bonds. Arguably, therefore Indian nationhood fraught with diversities in all counts be it linguistic, religious, ethnic, social, cultural, political even culinary make it vulnerable to fragmentation. When the Indian democratic experiment was launched in 1947 it was assiduously projected by onlookers that this experiment is bound to fail. Launchers of the nation were aware of the diversities and they took special care to accommodate these in a framework that is seemingly pervaded by the lessons from history and guided by fraternal and prosperous future. Attempt was made to infuse unity in diversity. In the fifty so years that have passed, the ideological construct viz. unity in diversity has not failed but definitely it has never remained free from the crises. The diversities have been fanned to undermine the unity. Most threatening of these had been religious and ethno-cultural cum political. Linguistic crisis was more or less successfully countered with linguistic re-organization of states in 1956. It is religious diversity that has posed the most indomitable challenge to Indian polity on a national scale whereas ethno-cultural diversity has plagued in

particular the north and north-eastern fringes of the country. Caste is another division that threatens the social structure severely from within. Historically Indian society is configured under numerous tiled portal of castes, supported by the four pillars of *varna* ordering. Each brand of new entrant were let entry from the pillars of *varna* ordering and then left to the historical processes to work and rework the hierarchically arranged caste tiling. Learning from the history, the exploited castes have been provided with a positive discrimination in the otherwise strictly egalitarian constitution. But over time the caste diversity has become a victim of political game making. Caste differences are appropriated to indulge in rhetoric of national unity and assume the reigns of power.

There are a certain ideologues, particularly Hindu right represented by RSS and ilk who emphasize unity more than diversities; they are opposed to those who see India a collage of differences. For them India is more unified than different. Every Indian is constituted by certain core values that have potential to transcend the differences, which are nothing but facial. Philosophically, it is a debate between universal and particular. Problem with such a universal stand is that it is prone to monolithising the state body by underplaying the differences. Essentially, this is a fundamentalist stand and this stand is detrimental to the polity of the country in the long run. We will see how this particular position in communion with religious intolerance can be seen as a serious crisis for the nation.

International milieu: Unlike the domestic factors the international developments are beyond the grasp of a nation. World politics is played in a turf of immense complexity, where nations perform and justify their actions on the basis of all ideologies, making it difficult to gauge the actual purport of their actions. It is not possible to see what is actually happening at any particular time in the world; one at best can only perceive his part of reality and then act accordingly. Speculations were and are still rife over the reason behind America's Iraq invasion. They ranged from oil, Al-Qaeda to WMDs and Bush junior's sequel against Saddam. Some saw in this action US attempts at reordering the world according to its own preferences. Cloud over the action

are still not clear but India had to believe what US wanted it to believe while simultaneously perceiving the international milieu in its own terms and accordingly attempting to safeguard the national interest. Therefore in the formation of foreign policy of a nation, the international milieu is a given, like it or leave it.

United Nations Organisations provide the space for the nations to negotiate world politics if it is not of their liking. But nations seldom succeed in it because the organization is prone to manipulation by five permanent members of its Security Council who have the veto power with them. After the end of Cold-War even this space has been hijacked by the United States of America to sub serve its interest. US have in fact flouted it with impunity wherever it came in its way of executing world politics.

CHAPTER 1

ELEMENTS BEHIND REORIENTATION OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY -1991-92

As introduced, Indian foreign policy is a continuous reflection of continuity and change. It constantly seeks to image the flux of international politics under the duress of domestic constraints. For that matter even the domestic factors are not fixed inputs; they are also contingent on nature, time, demography and numerous human actors and parties. What is argued here in this chapter is that the period around the year 1991-92 has unleashed the forces in domestic as well as international milieu that they have brought about a marked reorientation in Indian foreign policy. Prior to this India was guided by non-alignment in the world politics and socialism at home. A huge debate has been on for long that argues that India failed in both these domains. Much of this debate emerges from two events: one, collapse of USSR and two, India's economic liberalization –both in the year 1991. The collapse of USSR had been so dramatic and painful that it was talked in all the discourses of politics vis-à-vis India; that India lost its friend, philosopher and guide in the loss of USSR. But the second event is seldom discussed. Economic liberalization, essentially, a domestic constituent of Indian foreign policy in conjunction with other domestic elements has endowed a new orientation to the way India deals with the world. Their timely analysis is crucial not only for the foreign policy thinking but also for the healthy domestic politicking. In particular the emergence of caste, coalition and BJP in Indian politics is a matter of concern so equal for foreign policy making as for domestic public administration.

This chapter discusses reorientation in international and domestic milieu.

International milieu:

Though India had adopted the policy of Non-alignment after Independence to stave off the power games of USA and USSR, it was lenient towards the latter. The presence of USSR provided India with an international

balance of power to counter not only Pakistan but also the politico-economic context to stay away from the capitalist USA. India's strategic partnership with Soviet Union did not incur a strategic enmity with United States and gave best of both of the world. Collapse of USSR and emergence of USA 1991 onwards did not simply mean fall and rise of countries; it in fact meant Collapse of communism and rise of capitalism, at least in the graspable time frame. Consequently, the capitalistic, free market forces and institutions emerged on the global scene as dominant panels and tools to run the world. USA's Cold war military strength spread over entire globe and worldwide acceptance of American food, freedom, films and fads gave it a kind of hegemony to prevail over. This hegemony is however not free from challenges and oppositions; if not from states then definitely from non-state actors.

For India, *end of cold war, collapse of USSR and the emergence of US as the unilateral power* meant matter of direct orientation in its foreign policy. Firstly, 'balance of power' of bipolar world disappeared. It unleashed positive as well as negative energies. For India, on the one hand it meant loss of a partner and a guide like USSR, a bulwark against US games of power, but on the other it forced the scope and space for India to conduct its foreign relations according to its preferences and capacity. Improved relations with Israel, US, China, and even Pakistan, to a great extent stem from this cause. India has embarked upon the policy of 'Look East' for South East Asia. Similarly it has also decided to participate in NEPAD (New Economic Policy for African Development and has been emerging bullish stronger in South Asia through multilateral (read SAARC) and bilateral treaties with individual countries. It has even moved to central Asia. Central Asia is a new area and of immense economic and cultural cooperation. India's ties with the Central Asian Republics have grown stronger as there have been several recent high-level visits from both sides. Closer to India in a geopolitical sense, the region of Central Asia has great historical and cultural ties with successive Indian empires and states beginning with the Indus Valley civilization in the second millennium BC. During the Greek expeditions in Asia and the subsequent Kushan Empire in northwest India, relations between India and Central Asia

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reached its high point. Under the Kushan rulers, the union of northwestern India and Central Asia into a common state resulted in free flow of men, ideas and institutions between the two regions. In recent years, India has developed very close ties with the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Moreover, India has substantial political stakes in some of the republics as India's interests are partly determined by Central Asia's geographic location as the extended neighborhood of India. In Central Asia, there is an infrastructure-building spree in many of the countries, besides investment in oil and other economic activities¹⁴

Secondly, as after the cold-war, Moscow itself started moving closer to the western capital, particularly to US; it signaled similar foreign policy behaviors for the countries which were earlier under Soviet influence. In a way it can be said that collapse of USSR created the space fertile for India getting closer to US. Economic, technological, and democratic imperatives further strengthened the case of India coming closer to the US. In 1991, the United States was the largest single-country export market for India, taking 18.9% of its exports; and the largest single-country supplier, providing 8.9% of its imports¹⁵. India, as it had decided to pursue free trade was enthusiastically received by US business interests as a huge market, thereby forming complementary economic sense. As has been seen in the Introduction how important technology is for the developing countries, India had no other option but to strengthen ties for technological cooperation with west, particularly US. It however did not also mean that Moscow has suddenly become obsolete; it did supply India with nuclear technology to set up a plant at Kudankulam and cryogenic engines for space research, but what is meant

¹⁴ . In terms of economic cooperation, Kazakhstan is very important for India. Moreover, India has very strong economic ties with Uzbekistan where many Indian companies like Ajanta Pharma have been of great success. The Uzbek President Karimov has visited India in 1991, 1994 and 2000 and signed various MOUs and agreements emphasizing on closer economic and diplomatic ties. India's economic ties with Turkmenistan are mostly in terms of oil and natural gas supplies from that country. Faster clearances at Bandar Abbas and then at other checkpoints have meant a reduction in transit and travel time from India to Central Asia. Recently, India, Iran and Afghanistan have agreed to develop a new route which will utilize the Chah Bahar Port of Iran to send goods through Afghanistan and to Central Asian countries.

¹⁵ Ramesh Thakur, *The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: OUP, 1994), p.170.



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here is the thrust towards US.¹⁶ Democratic imperative for 'US and India coming closer' mean natural alignment of countries following the same system of polity. But it is more of rhetoric than actual alignments; US has always considered Pakistan more of an ally than India regardless of the degree of democracy in Pakistan. It is its strategic choice, though India always raise this moral question to US who makes tall claims of democracy; it is better India should understand this American predicament. It is in other way an attestation of India's democratic strength, that America knows and scares that India can take independent decision, unlike the exclusive ruling elite of countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. But as we will see this democratic strength of India is being threatened at the hand of BJP is on the rise since 1991. India would get really close to the US as the ruling elite in India would get more exclusive in the future.

Thirdly, the rise of international terrorism has offered the strongest context to the changed idioms of World politics since 1991. International terrorism has filled the void that was created by the disappearance of international communism. US required something equally dangerous and equally international to carry on with its containment machinery, an existential necessity for American democracy to survive and American Presidents to get elected and re-elected. What was feared by USSR missiles in the peak of cold-war has been brutally surpassed by the Al-Qaeda. 11 September 2001 attack on America has endowed the threat with a natural McCarthyism that now not only America but entire world reels the fear of terrorist attacks. But interestingly this rise of international terrorism has been of some advantage to India. It has provided India with a horse that it can ride piggy-back to achieve international

¹⁶ The decline of Russia and its reorientation to the West is represented by Kozyrev under Yeltsin's Presidency. That factor abated and the pressure of domestic politics brought in Ivanov that forced the Russians to look to the East as well and balance their foreign policy orientation. This led to their agreements with China and focusing on issues of Indo-Russian bilateral relations. In that context there were the calls of the Russia- China-India understanding. However this could not be arrived at since the militarily powerful US intervened. Issues like the cryogenic deal, the issue of expansion of NATO against the interests of Russia and the US determination to develop the national missile defence system in violation of the ABM treaty were meeting grounds for an India-China-Russia understanding. But India could not have agreed to such an arrangement since its negative understanding of the Chinese role in South Asia. China future ambitions needed to be factored in, many of which were a concern to India.

cooperation on economic and strategic matters. India is an old victim to terrorism of various sorts, now it found the entire world in the same league, thereby getting sudden boost to its wails and cries to fight it (read Pakistan) out. At domestic interface it provided grounds to bring acts like POTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002) and strengthened the analyses of men like L.K. Advani regarding the role of Pakistani ISI and India's disturbed communal fabric.

Lastly, the post-1991 world has offered India with a scope to emerge as a strong center of power in world politics. It has much to do with the economic philosophy of the country that it has so decisively opted for itself in 1991. With economic consolidation in world markets, India is attempting a similar political consolidation in the world politics. A variety of historical, political and other factors have added a fillip to it. India has potential for it but also has disabilities. A lot what India stand to reap will emerge from the developments that are taking place in its domestic arena.

DOMESTIC ELEMENTS:

Domestically, it can well be argued that India has entered a new era with last decade of the twentieth century. This topic can be addressed from various angles; here it is done through three main debates that have been on the heat since the period around 1991. Loosely, the elements otherwise can be enumerated as **Economic Liberalization in 1991; Mandal Report in 1990-91; Coalition politics and rise of regional Parties in states; Demographic indicators; Nuclearisation of India; New Interpretation in History and Tradition; New Leadership.** They all figure in some or other form in the debate that follows.

_____ 1) Economic Liberalization in 1991

One can have different opinions about India's economic policy since independence. In 1993, then finance minister of government of India had opined "The country is now at a critical pass and if the economic restructuring is not allowed to go through, India will enter the 21st century as the poorest

Asian nation.”¹⁷ It was not that economic policy of India between 1947 and 1991 had been a complete failure. It produced growth rates well in excess of the record before independence. It created the foundations for still higher growth rates that the government can aspire to now. But at some stage the benefits were exceeded by the growth-stunting effects of the strategy of planned development in a mixed economy. By 1990s, the harmful legacies were more obvious than the beneficial ones. One commentator observed there were six things wrong with the Indian economic mantra till the path of economic liberalization was embarked upon in 1991: one, it adopted an inward-looking, import substitution path, rather than an outward looking, export-promoting route; it thus denied itself a share in world trade and the prosperity that trade brought in the post-war. Two, it set up an inefficient, and monopolistic public sector to which it denied autonomy of working; hence our investments were not productive and we had a poor capital output ratio. Three, it over-regulated private enterprise with worst controls in the world, and this diminished competition in the market; besides our merchant-businessmen were not ‘tinkerers’ and they were slow to innovate. Four, it discouraged foreign capital and denied itself the benefits of technology and world class competition. Five, it pampered organized labor to the point where we have extremely low productivity. Six, and perhaps most important, it ignored the education of half its children, especially of girls.¹⁸

Technically speaking, there was a contradiction which all the Third World countries had to resolve once they were relieved from the clutches of industrialized, imperial, capital West. They wanted industrialization of their economies but ideologically opposed to imperialism, colonialism and the capitalism. On the one hand science and technology of the West allured the Third World, on the other also instilled a sense of repugnance to capitalism since it was found logically to be at the base of all types of colonial

¹⁷ Finance Minister Man Mohan Singh in an address to the annual general meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry in New Delhi, 9 September 1993. Cf. Thakur Ramesh, *The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994, pg.259.


¹⁸ Gurcharan Das, *India Unbound* (New Delhi: Viking, , 2000), pg. Xii.

exploitation¹⁹. The USSR of the time provided the most formidable alternative to the choices available. It represented industrial pre-eminence yet committal against capitalism and imperialism. However, the choices were not so easy to make. Political leaders of the Third World had, in the course of their freedom struggles, expressed views on the models of development they prefer for their respective countries. Their Experience of the socialist countries was rather limited. The only countries which the Third World knew from experience were the countries of the capitalist world. For India, the choices ranged from indigenous Gandhian village based industrialization to capitalist and socialist ones. India decided to have everything, hence the mixed economy. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Planning Commission chairman P.C Mahalanobis shared a socialist belief in an interventionist state and aristocratic disdain for American-style consumerism. Their strategy was to transform India into an industrialized giant. The state would direct investment into capital goods production. Savings would be encouraged by restricting the availability of consumer goods. Imports would be curtailed through tariffs, quotas and bans; export would not be needed as a principal engine of growth for a country of India's size.²⁰

But in actual performance the strategy was not so greatly successful. Reasons for the undistinguished performance of India's plans included the neglect of agriculture, the failure to mobilize labor, the hostility to the private sector and the inefficiencies of centralized administration. Exogenous reasons for planning failures included the wars with China and Pakistan. The cumulative effects were a foreign exchange shortage which produced a balance-of-payments deficit that required an infusion of foreign aid; and deficit financing which institutionalized inflationary trends in the economy. By 1991 years of budgetary indiscipline by successive governments had brought India's economy to the brink (*figure-*)

¹⁹ Chandra Prakash Bhambri, *The Foreign Policy of India* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Limited, 1987), pp.2-4.

²⁰ Ramesh Thakur: *ibid*, p.260.



Source: Thakur Ramesh, *The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy*, OUP, New Delhi, 1994.

Persistent current account deficits saw foreign debt climb to \$71.6 billion, with 30.4% of export earnings going into debt servicing; foreign exchange reserves had fallen in January 1991 to a mere fortnight's worth of imports. For the 1990-91 Fiscal Year, the budget deficit was \$15,4bn or 8.4 %of GDP.²¹ India's quality of life indicators after 1951 had definitely improved but considerable social improvements did not reach the poorest

QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS, 1951-91

	1951	1978	1991
Infant mortality rate	183	132	90
Life expectancy	32	51	60
Adult literacy(%)	17	29	48

Source: *World Development Report*, annual volumes

India's record has been a failure by the standards of its own targets, the needs of the people and a number of developing countries which have achieved remarkable rates of growth over a long period. The development perspective of the first five year plan had set the target of doubling national income per head

²¹ *ibid.* pg 263.

by 1977; only half the target was achieved. The extent of poverty was barely dented. In 1990 410 million Indians (compared with 120 million Chinese) were still below the poverty line. In other respects too India's whatever progress paled into insignificance when seen in a comparative context. For example India's energy consumption per capita increased from 100kg in 1965 to 337 in 1991: that of South Korea went up from 238 kg to 1936kg. Industrializing economy of the sixties, like Singapore and South Korea left the poor countries further and further behind, India has remained anchored firmly around the low income economies' average from start to finish. Similar dismal performance was to be seen in other indicators be it rates of growth in GDP or average income; rates of growth in agricultural, industrial and manufacturing output; exports-imports ratio ; poverty reduction.....infant mortality rate etc. By the late eighties frustration against pursuing this strategy further was rife.

Moreover, with the increasing politicization of groups at lower end of the socio-economic spectrum, succession of governments has been forced to respond to their demands for a better life and greater opportunities. Sluggish growth limits those responses to two unsatisfactory options: 1) taking away from those groups in privileged positions or: (2) doing nothing. Both options would result in violent social protests, the former carried out by the privileged and the latter by upwardly mobile groups.²²

What all this meant in practical terms that only with profitable rate of growth (ranging between 6 and 9 percent) can the country afford to finance its social obligations and sustain its economic viability.

There was another desideratum that required India to face up to the challenge. During the second half of eighties First and Second World were going through a revolution of sorts in economic turf, response to which had been lukewarm by India. The European Community strove steadily to emerge as a single market by bringing about uniformity in laws and procedures, coordinating fiscal policies and promoting free flow of investment and technology; Japan was going ahead with a programme of optimizing its output,

²² Walter Andersen, "Recent Trends in Indian Foreign Policy", *Asian Survey*, vol. XLI. No. 5. (September/October 2001), p. 769.

choosing the best-possible combinations of geographical factors, technology, human resources and raw materials. The US, though not in the vanguard of technological change, was, nevertheless pushing its trade through a calculated assault on the protectionist policies of other countries and its advances in the service sector. The Soviet economy under Gorbachev was opening up to the first World, converting command economy to market-related one and inviting trade and investment through US and Western Europe. Similarly, the Eastern European countries also opened their economies to market forces

India was challenged on the counts of efficiency and quality. Europe was emerging as a single market with uniform laws and standards, production of Indian goods and services had to meet the requirements or else they would be routed. With the apparent shift in the economy of Soviet economy to market, India could not take it for granted that its goods will sell in the Soviet Union as they used to under the previous bilateral agreements. This was also true for Eastern Europe; they now could have the easy option of buying more efficient goods produced in the West. The US and other First World countries raised the investment levels to cater to the spurt in international demand of efficient goods and services. For India, the writing on the wall was bold and clear. Nothing short of an all-out effort on the part of private and public sector producers to get on with the job will do. Technological changes and managerial improvements were must. A total overhaul of government policies, especially those generating inflation on one side and promoting populism and fuzziness on the other, were urgently called for.²³

What was to be done?

Though there was not much to see for the common man but the writing on the wall made it apparent to the helmsmen that something is needed to be done. During 1990-93 India saw three governments – those of Mr. V.P. Singh, Mr. Chandrashekhar and Mr. Narsimha Rao. It was a terrible time for India, a variety of crises had gripped India on almost all counts. Politically it was a

²³ A.M Khusro, *Unfinished Agenda: India and the World Economy*, (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Limited, 1994), p. 13.

period of severe instability, socially, caste and religious fundamentalism was raising their head, terrorism in J&K and in North East had no ebbing. At such a time any fracture in the economic base would have been fatal for the territorial and ideological integrity of the country. To visit the economic situation again, there were three crises that threatened the country then:

First, Crisis of resources manifesting itself in the huge budgetary deficits of the central and state governments which had burgeoned to unmanageable limits due to deficit financing, i.e. by borrowing from the Reserve Bank. Deficit financing had its deleterious effects in the form of double-digit inflation, below-par performance by the infrastructure sector and diversion of exports into the inflationary market.

Second, there was the balance of payment crisis. This was partly contributed by the inflationary environment generated by the first crisis. In the process, augmenting imports and depressing exports. But it also arose due to the technological obsolescence and non-competitiveness of Indian goods and services, a high import tariff- about 125%, on an average- which made inputs for exports expensive, and an over-valued rupee which reduces exports and boosts imports.

The third crisis: Which was all pervasive, emanated from the command economy, with a growing plethora of regulations, price, wage and foreign exchange controls, and a oppressive licensing system- all of which flourished on bribery and corruption. These restrained production, trade and exports and raised the cost of operation, making it non-competitive. Compounded to that was the immense burden the treasury incurred on account of subsidies and populism.

It was only after the collapse of two successive governments that it became absolutely necessary to launch a new economic programme. Strategy that was employed necessarily constituted the programme of Liberalization, Privatization (though the word privatization was not used till recently) and Globalization, fashionably called as LPG. These were to be carried out in gradual manner through generations of reforms.

It is important to see the direction of these processes. It has been argued that India is passing through what may be called the third phase of development. The earlier pre-World War II phase was of imported goods, and the next phase, lasting 40 years, was one of import substitution – producing at home what was earlier imported. The present third phase is predicated on an up gradation of the quality of import substituted goods in order to make them competitive and exportable, and that can not be done without an application of technology, both domestic and foreign. With such technological up gradation, if Indian products become cost-effective and internationally saleable, the country goes into the fourth phase of export generation. It then helps itself with enhanced income and employment too.²⁴

How does it connect to foreign policy? Surmises can be made in following forms:

- (i) Economic diplomacy aimed at procuring higher technology and inviting foreign investment became top most priority. High Technology Groups were formed with Developed countries, specially the US and advancement towards supra-economic bodies, like India becoming a dialogue partner in ASEAN.
- (ii) International peace besides domestic calm would become the aspired aim of foreign policy for war is the serious obstruction in the way to economic prosperity for developing countries if not for the developed.
- (iii) With the adoption of the processes of liberalization and globalization in domestic policies, similar process were launched in the foreign policy, as logically the overall posturing of the country would require

Caste and Coalition politics:

_____The numerical strength of a group is important in a democratic polity. But even in colonial days Indians had learnt the lessons in mobilizing caste associations in procuring political, social and economic gains. Several castes would join together and launch movements for social reform, for the assertion of their rights and justice and for political power vis-à-vis the dominant castes.

²⁴ A.M Khusro, *ibid.* p.8

Non—Brahmin movements in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra are examples. It was hoped that free India would be free from these primordial loyalties, for loyalty to the state was supposed to takeover all other loyalties. But this has not happened so; in fact caste lessons are only being perfected with independence. Earlier caste associations were to scramble for share in governments jobs from the colonial masters who were separate from caste structure of India. But after Indians have taken over the government reins the ruling as well as the ruled, both are from the same context. The Constitution guaranteed reservation for exploited castes and tribes in the government jobs thinking the equilibrium would be reached within ten years. The anticipation of the Constituent Assembly was unfounded as all the empirical researches attest that caste mobilizations have increased over the years. In 1956, the Republican Party was formed as the party of the dalits now fighting not only for more reservation but importantly for the share in power at the state and Union assemblies. The Jharkhand Party was formed by Adivasi leaders in Bihar, and confined to Adivasis. Many regional parties on the caste lines tried to fight elections but either were not in larger numbers or their plans were foiled by the Congress. Kshatriya Sabha contemplated in early Gujarat in early 1950s realised it could not muster enough support to contest elections only on the strength of Kshatriyas. Similarly, the political elite of the Kurmis, Yadavas, and Koeris formed the Bihar Caste Backwards Caste Association in 1947 to contest elections. The plan did not take off thanks to the resistance of Congress leaders belonging to these castes. Congress was the party dominantly of upper castes or the dominant castes, say in Maharashtra of the Marathas. The parties initially resisted pressures from traditionally deprived castes and communities but soon the numerical strength of the deprived groups became a threat to their positions. The party elite accused the new aspirants backed by caste associations as casteist or communal. They prevented new entrants on 'secular' grounds, such as merit, seniority and party commitment. But as the competition intensified and as the caste associations of deprived castes successfully mobilized members for political activities, all parties began to woo leading aspirants of the caste who could mobilize the caste votes. Such political

aspirants joined different political parties, especially as Congress was declining in popularity, particularly after 1977 emergency fiasco. The Bhartiya Kranti Dal, under the leadership of Charan Singh, stood for the interests of peasant castes in UP in the 1969 elections. The alliance was called AJGAR: Ahirs, Jats, Gujjars, and Rajputs. In 1977 elections Congress itself flagrantly played the caste card; in Gujarat it formed KHAM, an alliance of Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis, and Muslims for the distribution of party tickets and political mobilization. By 1980s the casteisation of Indian polity was well accepted by all the parties and since then no party has lagged behind in championing this obvious strategy of winning power. Congress propped up OBCs in its 20-point poverty programme by providing them reservations in jobs, but soon it slipped out of its hand and ultimately consumed it by 1990s. The BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party) launched by Kanshi Ram in 1984 usurped a vast space of politics by mobilizing dalits, Muslims and OBCs. After the Mandal report in 1991 OBCs charted a new territory, finding their strength a crucial factor in the formation of the governments at the states and the center. The Lok Dal in Haryana usurped Haryana as the Jat party. The Samajwadi party in Uttar Pradesh was identified with backward castes in general and Yadavs in particular.

BJP and the Congress:

Since 1990s the BJP, which was identified more as a party of traders and merchants only, followed the strategy of Congress- of accommodating backward caste candidates in elections and successfully gaining the support of their backward caste fellows. BJP also succeeded in winning over the adivasis of central India and Gujarat as they could form governments in Jharkhand (2000), Chattisgarh (in 2003-04) and Gujarat. This has been achieved primarily as a result of the persistence work of Rasthriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) during the last decade or so. Compared to adivasis OBCs have proved to be renegade elements for the BJP as they had been able to counter its sweep in important states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Non-BJP political parties try to come together to fight the BJP on the basis of Secularism and a loose socialism but the casteist foundations of many of them foil the attempts from within. It is going to facilitate only BJP and its partners in the long run. The Congress is

seeing its worst times being dubbed by all, Muslims, dalits, OBCs and upper castes; it has to wait.

Pointers>> the above discussions on caste throw certain pointers for domestic and foreign policy of the country:

- (i) First, caste members, particularly the poor and marginalized who had hitherto remained untouched by the political process, were politicized and began to participate in electoral politics with an expectation that their interests would be served.
- (ii) Second, numerically large castes got representation in decision making bodies, and the strength of traditionally dominant caste got weakened²⁵
- (iii) A large chunk of population has come to stake claim to the developmental gains of the country since independence. This pressure is particularly felt in economic domain. A successful government has to create space in economy for them by creating jobs and raising the standards of life, or else face the electoral grunt in every election. It also explains the insistence on 'development' as poll plank by almost all the political parties in spite of their disliking.
- (iv) Assertion of marginalized and backward castes has, in a way, led to the rise of Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) by rolling up the Congress, particularly since late 1980s. And BJP has engendered policies of a new league both in domestic and foreign underpinned by the grandiose conception of *hindu rashtra*.

BJP's INDIA:

_____ BJP's India is a powerful India. It had been the misfortune of this country that in spite of being at the root of world civilization it had to undergo so many pains in its blemished history; it was attacked, ravaged, proselytized, colonized and congress-ized. Its ancient glory and grace was being hijacked by

²⁵ This explains the rise of middle and backward caste representations in most state assemblies. In UP, for e.g. the proportion of upper castes in the state assembly went down from 42% to 17% between 1967 and 1995; whereas the members of the OBCs increased from 24% to 45% during the same period. A similar pattern is found in Bihar and other states. Backwards castes have been asserting themselves into political space. Ghanshyam Shah (ed.), *Caste and Democratic Politics in India* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002), pp. 22-24.

the people of alien cultures: BJP is the party that can reverse this and restore the past glory of this divine mother land.....This is what how the BJP has been trying to portray itself *vis- á- vis* the country.

What is wrong? BJP's rise is generally not seen as a rise only of a political party alternative to Congress, but much more than that. In other words, BJP's rise is a precipitation of a socio-political phenomenon that was at a marginal level during the struggle for Independence and even after that till say 1980s. Much more is now known and written about the challenges the RSS-BJP and their ancillaries pose to India, it has, however not succeeded in restraining the BJP's march in any great way. It is a well known fact of history that any powerful 'ideology' or 'social idea' can become acceptable only when social situation is ripe for it. Why the appeal of Dr. S.P. Mookerjee of the Jana Sangha or V.D. Savarkar of Hindu Mahasabha or leadership of the Ram Rajya Parishad did not cut any ice with the so-called mythical Hindu voter in the Lok Sabha elections of 1952? If an appeal to Hindu sentiment on the basis of history of humiliations suffered by the Hindus is a sufficient cause for Hindu assertion, it should have been an effective instrument for the mobilization of Hindus in the 1950s. Why has the appeal to Hindu religious symbols succeeded only in the 1990s?

Many arguments have been given to explain the rise of BJP, for e.g. Jafferlot²⁶ has maintained that BJP has come to occupy power because of its mastery in the coalition politics, which other parties, particularly Congress failed in. This argument however fails to explain the proliferation of so many regional, caste based parties in the first place; whereas the BJP resorted to coalition politics only after realizing the fact that it can not still come to power only on its own. BJP is not enjoying coalition but waiting for it to come to power full-fledged, which might not take long now thanks to their propaganda that India is all fine when it is at the helm. It is shown by Anderson and

²⁶ Christofar. Jafferlot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to 1990s Strategies of identity- Building, Implantation and Mobilization* (With special reference to Central India) (New Delhi: Viking, 1996), pp.520.

Damle²⁷ that overall structure of Hindutva fraternity –RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal and Akhhil Vidhyarti Parishad have actively participated and supported BJP to its zenith. RSS in particular has been considered most consistent and committed on that point. Even Jaya prakash Narayan felt obliged to the RSS during his struggle against Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s government in 1974-75; he publicly proclaimed “that RSS workers are devoted nationalists”.²⁸Hansen and C.P. Bhambri have tried to base their analysis about the rise of BJP on the basis of class conflicts and middle class insecurity in particular, in a fast globalising World. This again brings us to the year 1990-91 when India opened the floodgates of free trade on to itself. It is interesting to see that rise of BJP is in convergence with the process of globalization.

Success Ratio of BJP Candidates in Lok Sabha Polls

<i>Year</i>	<i>Fought</i>	<i>Won</i>
1984	229	2
1989	225	86
1991	471	120
1996	471	161
1998	384	182
1999	338	182

The social, political and economical flux during the time of Ninth Lok Sabha election (1989) provided opportunities for reassuring ideologies to stage perform. On the one hand if caste based political parties were appearing to safeguard respective caste interests BJP and every member of its fraternity jumped into political activity to protect Hindu identity by launching mobilization for Ram Janmabhoomi. The ideologues of Hindu ‘joint family’ launched a counter offensive against the divisive caste politics of V.P. Singh and other supporters of Mandal Commission by mobilizing the Hindu Samaj on a common platform of liberation of Ram Janmabhoomi with a programme

²⁷ Walter Anderson and Damle Sridhar.D., *The Brotherhood in Saffron:the Rasthriya Swayamsevak Sanghand Hindu Revivalism* (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1999), pp.251-252

²⁸ C.f. C.P Bhambri, *Bhartiya Janata Party:Periphery to Centre* (New Delhi: Shipra, 2001), p.51.

for the construction of Ram Mandir at Ayodhya.²⁹ In other words the critical period of 1989-91 was the period of severe contestations of identities. Hindu religion based politics with a goal to establish a powerful Hindu identity replaced an all- India secular democratic politics in the 1990s because secular parties could not create a powerful united movement nor could they innovate any thing new to offer in terms of socio-economic goals to poor of India when the cold hands of globalization were knocking the doors. At least religion reassured them..... and didn't BJP say it will get jobs for every one through India's very own ancient swadeshi economics(which ironically now has slipped somewhere in the globalization flood). The dream of great and powerful Hindu India has been effectively and successfully sold by the Hindu 'joint family' to the upcoming rural and urban middle and upper middle classes who on the one hand have global aspirations and on the other they aggressively identify themselves with Hindu rituals, temples and other religious symbols. As all identity politics is based on the "other", in a multi religious country like India, Hindu identity was constructed by targeting other religious communities like Muslims and Christians. The theme of humiliation of Hindu Rashtra by foreign muslim invaders was brought in public discourse and symbols of humiliation like Ram Janmabhoomi or temple at Mathura or Kashi were projected as standing monuments of historical wrongs done against the Hindus by foreign muslim invaders. K.S. Sudershan, former Sarsanghachalak of RSS observed that:

“...the Muslim kept themselves away from the national mainstream because the religious fundamentalists want to keep them isolated”.³⁰ The mainstream is Hindutva.....This Hindutva is espoused as new political philosophy of the country and is being merited with intellectual outlook by re-writing history textbooks and defining what Indian culture is all about.

²⁹ C.P. Bhambri, *ibid.*, p.57.

³⁰ C.f. C.P Bhambri : *ibid.*, p.48.

The Foreign Policy Connection?

BJP rose into prominence on the basis of the socio-political programme that it successfully sold to India, particularly its middle class in a period of severe crises. Making India a powerful state by restoring its ancient central position was the hallmark of this new ideology. This claim to international 'power' was based on three counts- military, economic and cultural. First, military might, the most obvious element of 'power' was to be shown by detonating a nuclear device and enlarging the scope of conventional weaponry. The Pokharan II in the hot month of May 1998 was indeed a dramatic event; America's spy eyes failed to foresee India's misadventure and India entered the league of Nuclear weapon states. As Buddha smiled in the deserts of Pokharan, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced to the world India's power in a style, standing next to the Indian flag. Since then India has also been trying out new weapons suppliers, particularly Israel and USA. BJP highlighted this nuclear detonation as restorer of India's self confidence in a world where only power matters. BJP deliberately put these tests in a context of the world politics based on rigid 'realistic' underpinnings. One's voice is heard in proportion to the power one has; moreover hasn't Kautilya attested the same in the days of wisdom. It has been argued that by detonating the nuclear weapon (BJP's) India tried to follow the path to power the other five nuclear countries did. They have nuclear weapons therefore they are in the United Nation's Security Council; If we deserve that seat on all other counts we still don't have it because we are not taken seriously, for our power is only conventional. It has also been argued that these tests had become necessary because the NPT regime was staring India in the face. Once India would sign the treaty it would miss out an opportunity on testing the detonations and would lack the inventory required to maintain working nuclear deterrence. It was just the coincidence that the BJP was at the helm; probably P.V. Narsimha Rao had also tried to exercise this option but was caught by US spy satellites. BJP, championing the constituency of scientists and military revoked the theme of nuclear 'power' and as destiny would have it, it succeeded. However, the nuclear detonation has brought more problems for the country than laurels for

the BJP. Even for BJP the electoral gains were of no dramatic value in the thirteenth Lok Sabha elections; it remained at 182 only, with vote share in fact falling from 25.59% to 23.07%³¹. Reasons for it were perhaps the post-explosion scenario where severe sanctions were put on India by individual countries and economic and scientific imports were severely crippled. Financial loans from IMF, WB and ADB were curtailed. Most serious impact however was on the India-Pakistan military equation which was till now favorable to India became equalized. Pakistan threatened resort to nuclear arsenal if India threatened any misadventure on border. This new equation was the cause behind the failure of Operation Parakram in 2000-01, when India deployed its military strength on Pakistan border but fell short of any further action as Pakistani nuclear arsenal deterred it. In its efforts to raise the conventional weaponry after collapse of Soviet Russia, India has rallied around Israel and USA. India has recently leased several additional Fire-finding weapon locating radars in addition to those already contracted for purchase. Representatives from the Indian and US army are examining the Indian Army's requirement for significant Special Forces equipment and chemical and biological protection gear. The US and India are also looking into possible sales of the US Navy P3 maritime patrol aircraft for the Indian Navy. Israel is being engaged for the crucial early warning AWACS radar system. It has been argued that (BJP's) India is trying to close up to USA and Israel. This does not seem completely baseless but the talks of a Christian-Jews-Hindu triad are too far fetched. Would not a party who see the world politics in primarily military terms try to align close to the countries that have been powerful whenever it has come to flex their military muscle? It seems to be more of a case of birds of same flock finding shelter under one roof. Moreover with regard to USA the Pakistani factor makes it difficult for both America and India to progress with exclusively bilateral ties.

Economically, the foreign policy thrust of BJP has been on to maximize economic gains through bilateral as well as multilateral means. Economic

³¹ C.f. C.P. Bhambri, *ibid.* p. 257.

strength is the most formidable element of Realist power. It is not only domestically that

Party has been insisting on the issue of development as a crucial issue of focus in elections but it is actually trying to see that real time finance comes to India through non-resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs). It is moving towards East and West to chart out newer territories business and investment. Such a process of economic eagerness after economic liberalization would have been the course of any government but there is a degree of extra eagerness in BJP's efforts as it was seen in the current Iraq crisis where it was projected that if India participates in Iraqi reconstruction it would stand to gain immense economic advantage. In spite of the Parliament opposing the US aggression on Iraq the government seriously discussed the issue of troop's deployment there. This military-economic gains equation is something exclusive to BJP; it would again try to see this through in future crises, for it fits well into the overall idiom of 'power building' of the party. A strong military for strong economics and a strong economics for strong military is a crucial component of BJP's world view. One needs to be wary of its future pattern, particularly what it tries to achieve in the end if not expansionism?

Materially India is far behind the Western countries and since it bridges the gap there is a necessity of some gap filling superior ideology. BJP has found this ideology in the (Hindu) culture of India. Cultural diplomacy had always been the part of Indian foreign policy but with BJP it has become logical extension of its cultural nationalism at home. Human Resource Minister Mr. Murli Manohar Joshi leaves no opportunity in tracing the historic root of zero and gravity to India. Every thing intellectual and divine started from India is a hallmark of cultural fundamentalism of the party. Indian Diaspora is an important component of spread of this fundamentalism. In a foreign land the urge for a strong cultural identity has been well provided by the BJP. BJP and these NRIS find excellent bonhomie in such cultural nationalism. The government provided dual citizenship to people of Indian origin from E.U, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, leaving the Indians in other countries to their respective poor hosts. Pravasi Bhartiya Mela and Divas are

being celebrated now every year in the month of January as a congregation of Indian elites. These people appear more crucial for the building of a strong India than the rural Indians and poor Indian Diasporas. This trend is also well witnessed in the current genre of Indian movies, where the lead protagonists have strong NRI connection but he/she is equally strongly rooted in the traditional Hindu Indian culture. Therefore, what appears in current cultural diplomacy is a deliberate attempt to appropriate Indian culture by a special class for the special class, which is themselves class apart from rest of India but are India in visible sense.

CHAPTER 2

RISE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

*I will send my terror before you,
And will throw into confusion all the people...* [Exodus 23: 27]

Terrorism is not a new word, nor is it a new phenomenon.³² It is a psychological state, which human societies have experienced in all ages. Bloodshed and mayhem has been perpetrated in all the corners of the world some time or other. But it has taken a central role as the most dangerous threat to international security in the world today. In this sense, terrorism which is of concern to the international community involves something more than the mere resort to violence as would be the case in a civil commotion or riot. Terrorism involves the systematic threat or use of violence which is calculated to inspire a feeling of fear or dread in the victims of such acts. As one writer has observed:

“The creation of an atmosphere of despair breaks down the resistance of those who need to be persuaded; they are to be shocked and numbed, so weakened and demoralized and so pessimistic of hope that they become amenable to anything that release from tension”.³³

Aside from the dramatic collapse of the Cold War a little more than a decade ago, no other event has had such a profound impact globally as the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001. With only 19 suicide attackers and financial output estimated to around US\$ 500,000, more than 3,000 civilians were killed, with material damage of at least

³² Terrorism is meant to terrify. The word comes from the Latin *terrere*, “to cause to tremble,” and came into common usage in the political sense, as an assault on the civil order, during the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution at the close of eighteenth century. In fact even before that societies have known the fear of terror. Terror of nature in ancient days; terror of invaders in Middle Ages; now it is terror of terrorists of complex hues not limited to one region nor to one ideology except violence.

³³ Leiden and Schmitt, *The Politics of Violence* (1968).

US\$40 billion. The repercussions of 9/11 resulted in a decrease of world economic growth of about 1%, which amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars.³⁴ The greater lesson which 9/11 in fact conveyed was that no country in the world (read United State of America) is immune to terrorism. 9/11 internationalized terrorism. The most powerful country in the world felt terrorized for the first time in its young history, giving voice to the wails of many lesser countries against terrorism which they had been experiencing after World War-II, most often sponsored directly or indirectly by America itself. 9/11 created the floor through which rest of the world came on to international scenario, which otherwise were engaged in their domestic terrorisms. It is also from one point of view, recoiling of American global machinations on itself that internationalization of terrorism means. Threat is not real until it is perceived by the powerful and the wise!

Till recently terrorism was construed within the precincts of the State, and classifiable in two categories; one fighting for the rights enshrined in the state constitution but denied, and the other fighting against the very constitution attempting to replace it altogether with a new geographical and political composition of the state. The new trend is the transcendence of state boundaries by regional terrorist players in order to coordinate energies as well as to reframe the world order according to their ideals and fancies. It is about globalization of terrorism.

International Terrorism:

Although acts of violence may be resorted to in the course of committing common crimes such as robbery or extortion, these would essentially be matters of domestic concern, to be dealt with under domestic laws of a country, and would be outside the purview of international initiatives. Terrorism, which is of international concern deals with acts of violence: (i) which are politically motivated and are directed towards the achievement of a political objective; (ii) which involve indiscriminate violence on “innocent civilians”; and (iii) which involve a “foreign element”, i.e. a foreign perpetrator,

³⁴ Sridhar K. Khatri, *Terrorism in South Asia* (New Delhi: Shipra, 2003), p. 4.

a foreign victim or foreign territory.³⁵ Terrorism can be differentiated into ideological, ethno national, and religious according to the dominant constituent and motivation factor. The Cold-War was the era of ideological terror, which was considered important to be contained. Ethno national terrorism which has emerged stronger with time came in vogue after World War-I When for the first time representation of national aspirations was consented legitimacy. Religiously motivated terrorism is a recent thing and forms an important aspect of the internationalization of terrorism. Ideological terrorism of communist brand though was also international, is seemingly on decline but not dead. Maoist movement in Nepal has ransacked the entire country whereas PWG and MCC cadres across forest belt spanning Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh, and Jharkhand states of India pose threat to respective state governments. It is however the ethno national and religious terrorism that forming a complex mix at regional levels had appeared on the global scale. Ideologically, it is difficult to grasp this religion and ethnic rooted terrorism; most often there is a risk of interpreting it in terms of clash of religion and/or civilization. Courtesy, Taliban and their great guest Osama, Islam is the most targeted religion on this count. The problem however, has been protracted by ambiguity on the count of motivation, for often religious metaphors are utilized to perpetrate terrorism as well as in war against it. Another problem, this time not semantic, is about the defining what terrorism is, and how is it different from genuine feeling of wrong done? Liberals view it as a problem emerging out of economic, social, and political misery; conservatives attribute it to the natural stresses and strains of nation building; and the realists see it as a part of the competition between states. The only common ingredients of terrorism are the organized use of violence for political ends that is primarily directed at non-combatants. It is a sort of a global civil war and is a far cry from conventional war. One important characterization of international terrorism is its digital nature enabling terrorists to operate without geographic constraints and bring together and unite issue-oriented groups and religions through the course of globalization. The cadres

³⁵ A.R Perera, *International Terrorism* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1997), p. 1.

of even most monitored groups can remain in constant communication over the entire reach of the globe. Next, this international terrorism is high class terrorism and differs from earlier brands in a strategy that can perpetrate havoc manifold with resort to weapons of mass destruction to achieve their aims. Increasingly, the strategy of suicide missions is being preferred over hit and run style of yester years. Added advantage of it, besides, heightened efficiency, is the appropriation of martyrdom on the road to chivalry (in achieving desired international order), a factor of immense motivational value.

It is however not the aim of the chapter to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of terrorism³⁶. Here the main concern is to see how the space created by international terrorism has been appropriated in conducting India's foreign policy. We can delineate that in two phases. One before 9/11, another after that.

India and terrorism before 9/11: India has been witnessing terrorist violence since 1980, initially in Punjab and since 1989, in Jammu & Kashmir and other parts of India. More than 20,000 people have been killed in terrorist violence in Jammu & Kashmir, involving both shootings and bombings.

The 1992 serial bomb blasts in Bombay, masterminded by the Memon family, were one of the major incidents of terrorism in India in those years. The bomb blast in Lajpat Nagar in Delhi in 1996 had also resulted in a large number of civilian casualties. There have been many more incidents of bomb blasts in different parts of the country. After the collapse of Cold-War, bereft of USSR, India was forced to chart out an independent territory in its foreign policy. Right from the late eighties Pakistan had decided to venture greatly in terrorism. To its west it chose Afghanistan and to its east chose Kashmir. Though conditions in Afghanistan and Kashmir were greatly different but both were found fit to further the case of Islamic fraternity³⁷; the Pakistani

³⁶ for theoretical understanding one can resort to important books like Alexander, Yonah, David Carlton and Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979) ; Crenshaw, Martha(ed.), *Terrorism in Context* (University Park : Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) ; Guelke, Adrian , *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System* (London: I.B Tauris, 1995). ; Gutteridge, William(ed.), *The New Terrorism* (London: Mansell, 1986).

³⁷ It has been a natural style in Pakistan to divert politically unfavorable attention to issues of religious concern, more notably to Kashmir.

government, however always talked only of moral support extended to these freedom fighters. Intervention in Afghanistan was easy through the student militia of Taliban but not so in Kashmir where it had to rely more and more on proxy warfare, guided in both the cases by efficient ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency.³⁸ India at that time was straddling in its insecurities: its military had had hard experience in Sri Lanka, political instability had grown and economic structure was showing signs of cracks; partial liberalization in 1985 had just tried to bandage it and coalition days were knocking on door. India was wary of Pakistan's capability in sponsoring cross border terrorism from the role Pakistan had played in Khalistan movement in Punjab. But it was still not sure of mammoth designs that Pakistan backed terrorists had for Kashmir. It was only gradually that India saw the design; and also sadly to play down the legitimate terrorist frustration of local elements clubbed together all terrorism in Kashmir as Pakistan sponsored. Since then, India has been on war of a different kind where it knows where its enemies draw in numbers and ideas but could not do much as neither it could resort to same kind of reply nor put the nation on war fearing international isolation. It completely lost the war option when India exploded the nuclear device in May 1998 to which Pakistan responded gentlemanly making all the conventional warfare equation redundant. So the logical choices that were left with India were only dialectical in nature. That is it could only talk of force but can not use it; it can deploy troops but can not move in. Immediate repercussion of that was the Kargil war that Pakistan forced on India. Ridiculously, the deterrence that India talked after exploding nuclear device undeterred Pakistan from threatening India. It gave Pakistan the position to choose the time and place to poke India with gun while simultaneously keep up the banner of good neighborly talks up. The military coup by the Kargil man (Pervez Musharraf) further frustrated India; its dilemma protracted as it could neither fight nor talk, as it had decided after the coup, to not to talk to a militarist. But as the logic has to reign supreme India

³⁸ The role of Pakistan in creating the Taliban: the presence of Pakistani ISI and military advisors and regular army men with the Taliban has been reported by the Pak media, by the international media, by security analysts including of Jane's Defense Review. It has been also officially been stated by the Russian government

had to invite Musharraf for talks to Agra. The talks were bound to fail as both sides were still not sure that "talks" is the only boat that the countries have to sail through the sea of mutual enmity.

This is however only one dimensions of the story, say the domestic dimension of South Asian geo-politics. There had always been the factor of world politics. During the cold war US-USSR balance sort of always contained the Indo- Pakistan rivalry from flaring into a war of global consequence. End of Cold war, emergence of US as the unilateral power and nuclearisation of South Asia changed the entire sequence of events. Now, as no USSR was there, the US became only arbiter of international politics; its concern and consent became *sine qua non* for international concern and consent. It was terrible as it was but countries had no options; they were required to come around. And all countries in fact responded optimistically to it; renegade ones are fighting US is a matter of different concern, and will be dealt subsequently. India in a middle of its great economic transition obviously chose to come around and celebrate the coming together of US and India as coming together of great sister democracies, which though the US did not feel same way owing to its strategic calculations and its hierarchy of nations. Terrorism was the intelligent and logical choice which India utilized to bond with America beside others. *India settled on the strategy of sharing America's and other nations' pain caused by terrorism and quietly argued that great deal of it comes from Pakistan and it is the safest haven for terrorists if they fail to find any place to hide.*

This was in fact the time when many developed countries had been tasting the bitter pill of terrorism. World Trade Center in New York was bombed in 1993, Federal buildings were destroyed in Oklahoma in 1995, the bomb blasts at the Olympics in Atlanta and the destruction of a US military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in 1996, and finally the attack on American embassies in Africa(Kenya and Tanzania) in 1998. France had its spate of subway bombings with Algerian Islamic activists...

India went ahead with sympathetic heart to these countries and revealed that all this confusion and rot stem from Pakistan. For example a press note of Ministry of External Affairs in August 1998 linked Osama-bin Laden, who was

being bombed in Afghanistan for his role in embassy blasts in Kenya and Tanzania, 1998, with Pakistan and Kashmir.

The choice of Khost and Jalalabad as targets is significant. Many of the militants and mercenaries arrested in Jammu and Kashmir identified these two locations as the ones where they received training. Jane's Intelligence Review and the "Independent" of the UK based on investigative field reports identified Khost and Jalalabad as two of the centers where the Harkat-ul-Ansar cadres, who are active in Jammu and Kashmir, received training...Immediately following the bombings four people were arrested in Pakistan. One of them, Mohammed Sadiq Howaida confessed to Pakistani authorities both to having links with Osama Bin Laden and with the bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. He also said that some of others involved in the incident had already traveled through Pakistan to Afghanistan...The fact that Osama Bin Laden is being protected by the Taliban who function with Pakistan's support and who are refusing to surrender him and the fact that those who were involved in the bombings in Tanzania and Kenya chose to return to Pakistan en route to Taliban territory in Afghanistan once again highlights the emergence of Pakistan as not only a center for terrorists training but also as a safe sanctuary for extremists and terrorists who have perpetrated violence in different countries.³⁹

To read more of such arguments one can see how India participated in the global hunt of terrorists and always succeeded in locating them in Pakistan

In 1993, the World Trade Center in New York was bombed. The suspect was Ramzi Ahmed Yousef for whom the USA launched a worldwide manhunt. He was arrested in Pakistan in 1995 where he had taken refuge. The Americans believed he had links with Osama Bin Laden. Jane's Intelligence Review reported that he had links also with the Harkat-ul-Ansar which is active in Jammu & Kashmir and whose cadres come from the same religious schools (madrassas) and training camps as the Taliban. These schools are run by the Jamiat ul Ulema e Islam of Maulana Fazlur Rahman which is known to have been receiving funds from radical Islamic elements including Osama bin Laden. Maulana Fazlur Rahman was the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of Pakistan during former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's regime.⁴⁰

Mir Aimal Kansi, a Baloch, was convicted in 1997 for the killing of CIA officials outside CIA office in Langley, Virginia in 1993. He was again, after a worldwide manhunt, caught in Pakistan. Soon after his arrest, four American employees of the Union Texas Petroleum, along with a Pakistani driver, were killed in Karachi and the Aimal Secret Army claimed responsibility for the killings.⁴¹

³⁹ Embassy of India, web page 'A note on global terrorism'.

⁴⁰ MEA web site on terrorism: press notes; undated.

⁴¹ Ibid.

The US military compound at Dharam and Al Khobar in Saudi Arabia was bombed in 1995, for which the Americans blamed Osama bin Laden. Media reports from Egypt stated that an Arab, Hassan Al Sarai was arrested in Pakistan and sent to Saudi Arabia for involvement in the bombing.⁴²

The Harkat-ul-Ansar, functioning under the name of Al Faran, kidnapped five foreign tourists in Jammu & Kashmir in 1995, including an American national, Donald Hutchins, who managed to escape. He later told the media that the kidnappers were non-Kashmiris and spoke Urdu and were obviously from Pakistan. US reports suggested that the Al Faran was a front for the Harkat-ul-Ansar and US authorities interacted with Maulana Fazlur Rehman the mentor of the Harkat and the Taliban, to have the hostages released. One was beheaded and the others are still missing. The United States Government in 1997 banned the Harkat-ul-Ansar, declaring it a terrorist organization, and in continued reports between 1995 and 1997, the US State Department has been naming the Harkat-ul-Ansar, based in Pakistan, as a terrorist outfit operating in India, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Myanmar⁴³.

India related this logic not only with America but extended it for terrorism perpetrated in other countries as well.

France

In 1995, bomb attacks took place in Paris. Investigating into the attacks, the French DST (Direction de Surveillance du Territoire) submitted a report, which stated that extremists had been recruited and sent to military training camps in Pakistan. Many of those arrested were of Algerian descent. The DST maintained that a number of extremist youths were taken by religious organizations to Afghanistan and Pakistan and trained in 15 training camps. Paris Match carried a report on the Pakistani connection to terrorist activity in France on July 25, 1996.⁴⁴

Algeria

Algeria has witnessed continued massacres of civilians since 1992. The Government has been battling the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) whose cadres include the "Afghanis", Arabs who participated in the Afghan war after receiving training in Pakistan and then went back to fight their own governments in the name of Islamic jihad. Every day there are reports from Algeria of the massacre of large number of people, including women and children, who are found with their throats cut⁴⁵.

⁴² ibid.

⁴³ ibid.

⁴⁴ ibid.

⁴⁵ ibid.

Egypt

In 1995, the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad was bombed. Islamic Jihad and Al Gamaa Al Islamia took the responsibility. The leader of Islamic Jihad, Aiwani Zahrawi, is a close associate of Osama bin Laden. In the aftermath of the bombing, the Interior Minister of Egypt accused Pakistan of failing to take action against militants. Reports in the media indicated that Zahrawi as well as Mohd Ali Maqawi the suspected killer of former Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, were in Pakistan. The Egyptian media carried a number of reports on the training of terrorists in camps in Pakistan where nearly 2800 Arabs, according to Al Akhbar, were being given terrorist training. They included 600 Algerians, 600 Egyptians, 400 Jordanians and 400 Libyans. A total of nearly 20,000 Arab terrorists were reported to have been trained in those camps. The Egyptians accused the Markaz Al Dawa Al Ershad, which received financing from Saudi Arabia of being the nodal point for such training. The Markat Al Dawaa has an armed wing, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has been calling for a Jihad in Jammu & Kashmir and is reported to have been behind the mass massacres of Kashmiri Pundits this year in Jammu & Kashmir. The Al Wafd of Egypt stated that even Ramzi Yousef, responsible for the World Trade Center bombing, had links with the Markaz. Egypt signed an extradition treaty with Pakistan in 1996 and a number of people arrested by Pakistan were sent to Egypt to stand trial. However, in 1997, following the massacre of foreign tourists at Luxor in Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak attacked Afghanistan for emerging as a center for terrorist training. This was the period when the Taliban, supported by Pakistan, were ascendant in Afghanistan. The Egyptian media during this period had carried a number of articles, focusing on Pakistan as a base for extremist terrorism and narco-terrorism⁴⁶.

China

There have been reports of extremist activity in the Muslim province of Xinjiang of the People's Republic of China by radicals Uighers. An investigative report in the Far Eastern Economic Review by Ahmed Rashid gave details of Uighers being trained by the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan. The Jamaat-e-Islami, which is the patron of the Hezb ul Mujahideen who are active in Jammu & Kashmir, had run training camps for Afghan Mujahideen and subsequently for Kashmiri militants. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, the Chinese were reported to believe that the Taliban were instructing the Uighers. Media reports indicated that in 1997, Pakistan handed over 12 Uigher militants being trained by the Taliban to the Chinese authorities⁴⁷.

⁴⁶ ibid.

⁴⁷ ibid.

Philippines

Mohammed Sadiq Howaida, who was arrested in Karachi in the aftermath of the bombing of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and who confessed to being an associate of Osama bin Laden and involved in the bombings, was interrogated by the Pakistanis for information on a similar failed operation in the Philippines. He declined to give details.

Earlier, in 1996, investigations by the authorities in Manila had revealed a plot to kill Pope John Paul II during a visit to the Philippines. 15 terrorists were arrested in Manila. A Pakistani Mian Abid Mahmood was also arrested in connection with the plot. Those arrested were all close associates of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the mastermind of the World Trade Center bomb blast who, according to the police investigations, had been visiting Manila and had close links with the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group operating in the Philippines. Yousef's brother was reported to be one of those arrested. The Abu Sayaf group has been blamed, according to the reports in the Philippine media quoting security sources, for anti Christian violence since 1993. A police report indicated that this group also received funding from Osama bin Laden. Five Pakistani nationals were separately arrested for possession of explosives. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef was believed to have narrowly escaped during the raid by the security forces.

In 1998 again a number of Pakistanis were detained in Manila following a reported tip off by the FBI that they were planning terrorist activities⁴⁸.

Tajikistan

The Government of Tajikistan had filed a formal complaint before the United Nations regarding the role of Pakistan in training Islamic terrorists who were involved in insurgency and terrorist activities in Tajikistan. It had given a list of 100 mercenaries from different countries trained in Pakistan and arrested in Tajikistan⁴⁹.

Ethiopia

In 1995 Ethiopia filed a complaint before the Security Council that the people who attacked Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa had been trained in Pakistan⁵⁰.

Uzbekistan

Recently, the President of Uzbekistan had, in a press conference, publicly stated that terrorists trained in Pakistan and seeking to spread the fundamentalist Wahabi terrorism were engaged in destabilization of Uzbekistan, etc. The Uzbek television has run a number of documentaries based on the investigation of the people they have arrested to support this charge⁵¹.

48 ibid.

49 ibid.

50 ibid.

51 ibid.

International terrorism and India after 9/11:

It was being argued that 9/11 was another Pearl Harbor that dragged America into the World War against terrorism. Particularly from Indian point of view this was at least so. The collapse of World Trade tower vibrated some internal cord of India; it was nice to see America also suffer some pain which we Indians have been feeling for long. The whole site made Americans look vulnerable as never before. They sadly looked like all of us as if some myth was being broken. India fell in for US anticipating the same. Two years later when the infatuation is dying down, India is realizing the one-sidedness of whole affair. America had in fact tasted the bitter fruit of anti-American terrorism in 1998 only when its embassies at Kenya and Tanzania were attacked in a finely executed mission by Al-Qaeda. 9/11 was the unexpected and most dramatic assertion of that terrorism. Immediately after 9/11 Mr. Vajpayee, feeling not very different from common Indians, sought to win America by providing Indian shoulder to cry and trust. Government pledged its resources and strength in international fight against terrorism. In the realm of foreign policy, India utilized 9/11 in the following ways to its benefit:

- i) It found the international environment much conducive than ever to listen to India's concern on the terrorism perpetrated by Pakistan. It upgraded its campaign pitch from blaming Pakistani elements to implicating Pakistan in "sponsoring" terrorism in India. Drawing from Israeli style it put the responsibility of terrorism on the government under whose territory terrorists breathe. India, however has not yet dared to emulate Israel in eliminating terrorists across borders in hot chases, though there are many takers of it in India now then ever.
- ii) India utilized the cooperative space that international terrorist concern created in furthering its economic agenda of multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements.
- iii) The Indo-US defense cooperation took an upward turn after the September 11 incident with both countries reviving the apex level Defense Policy

Group (DPG). From virtually no interaction up to January 2001, the U.S. and India today have completed eight major military exercises.⁵²

13 December, 2001 attack on Indian Parliament stiffened Indian resolve to an extent that it lined up its troops on border with Pakistan. This troop exercise, sadly, soon demonstrated the chinks in the much cherished terrorist purge of this century. As India had already lost the conventional weapon equation with Pakistan, it was threatened by Pakistan with use of nuclear weapons if India ever considered adventure on its border. Next, in place of America coming to India's rescue at operation *Parakrama*, India saw US talking of nuclear crisis in South Asia. India's experience with US after 9/11 moved from excitement to caution as it encountered a number of crises in which India reached the conclusion that even in the war against terrorism there exists great deal of bias. We will see this particularly reflected in the Iraqi crisis. In a way America failed to cash on India's eagerness to strike a strategic partnership with it. It was more painful for India to see that the US posed the desired faith in Pakistan, which in India's eyes is no.1 terrorist itself and fitter than any country to intervene on the count of terrorism. Both Pakistan and India had volunteered themselves in the US led war against terrorism and both tried to lure the leader with their charms and potential, like two wives of an imperial lord. With US continuously preferring Pakistan over India, and even giving it the major non-NATO ally status. It seems America has preferred controllable sensuality over independent sensibility.

⁵² See details in chapter 5 pg. 74.

CHAPTER 3

THE US INVASION AGAINST IRAQ

- INDIA'S STRATEGIC STAKES

There are no permanent enemies or friends in world politics, there are only permanent interests

As it has been discussed in the introduction that all nations execute their foreign policy to sub serve their national interests, we can now see how India sought to do this in the wake of Iraqi crisis that began in April 2003. America's aggression on Iraq was not of India's liking, for neither Iraq was India's enemy nor Iraq had any thing to do with terrorism that had made India to appear on world stage to fight shoulder to shoulder with countries like America. It was America's war of its national interests as saw by Mr. George Bush, the country's president. There were various factors that impelled India not to challenge the aggression; it only passed the Parliamentary resolution condemning it. Firstly, USA is the world power today and it is not always possible for other countries to deter it from doing what it deems right. Secondly, owing to the kind of technological imperialism it practices, it is difficult for any developing country to aspire to counter it. In case of India its economic and technical engagement with USA makes it highly destructive to see the relation break. Thirdly, India has pledged its energies with USA in the global fight against terrorism, and has moved ahead in it through defense cooperation that it is as good as its partner. Lastly, during the last decade USA has come to occupy the top vertex in a triangle, whose other two vertices are Pakistan and India. The flow over Kashmir is no longer bilateral, it is trilateral.

On the other hand Iraq has always supported India's position on Kashmir. and people of two countries have always been friendly spanning vast stretches of time and civilization. For India, terrorism is Pakistan; falling of anti-terror axe on Iraq was sad and a betrayal with India. However, for us matter of concern here is to study the handling of this crisis under a foreign policy which we argue reoriented. This chapter forms the background to India's response to Iraq war.

a) India and Iraq

Iraq's oil potential has served as major area of interest for Indian policy makers. Iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia. According to figures based on exploration, drilling and reservoir studies carried out prior to August 1990, Iraqi proven oil reserves are conservatively estimated at 112bn barrels, with oil in place estimated at around 250bn barrels.⁵³ India has sustained healthy bilateral relations with Baghdad since its re-emergence in modern times. Iraq emerged as independent monarchy in 1932 with the end of British Mandate there. However, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930) and Baghdad Pact (1955) sustained the British privileges. It was only with the revolution of 1958 that both the Monarchy and the British presence were eliminated. Over the next few years the Iraq state developed a republican shape and ideology of Pan-Arabism rooted in the socialist idea of Michel Aflaq.⁵⁴ The socialist foundation of Iraq shared common grounds with India of those times and enriched the fertility for economic exchanges. The subsequent nature of economic exchange carved out friends between the two nations. As early as 1972, India was one of the first countries to sign a contract with the Iraq Petroleum company for the supply of crude oil. Visit of Saddam Hussein, then the vice president, to India in March 1974 offered respite to India from the oil price rise of 1973 by sanctioning loans on soft terms for oil import. Indira Gandhi's visit to Baghdad in January 1975, the first by the Indian Prime Minister, gave boost to economic and scientific cooperation between the two countries. In exchange for oil, India supplied goods and technical know how for setting up different development projects in sectors like industry,

⁵³ Almost no serious work on updating these figures has taken place since then, due mainly to the stoppage of exploration and appraisal drilling. The probability of new discoveries here is much higher than in other countries. Currently there are only 15 developed fields out of 73 discovered. The rest could contribute 3.7 million barrels/day, to which 1 million b/d can be added from partially developed reservoirs totaling around 4.7 million b/d. It is available and waiting to be developed. The question is when and how. [Middle East Economic Survey, 44: 8, 19 February 2000, p. D 3].

⁵⁴ Aflaq, born in a Greek Orthodox family in Syria viewed Arab nationalism as transcending religious or sectarian divisions. He advocated a synthesis between nationalism and socialism, and sought Arab Unity. [M.H. Ansari, *Hindu* (New Delhi), April 18, 2003, Baghdad... The Gift of God]. All references in the work are to the New Delhi addition of *Hindu*.

agriculture, public finance and railway infrastructure.⁵⁵ From 1968 until 1990, Iraq depended on its own efforts to develop its oil potential with the exception of three service contracts concluded in the 1970s. It is noteworthy that among those three, India's ONGC was awarded a block in the western desert. Other two were France's Elf for Buzargan field and Petrobras of Brazil for Majnoon field. ONGC did discover oil at Abu Khaima but oil productivity failed to meet the criteria for commerciality in contract. Indian economic interests in Iraq were affected by the eight year Iraq-Iran war. Over 70% of oil imports from these two countries and several construction projects in progress there felt into jeopardy.⁵⁶ During the three years period 1986-88, Iraq accounted for 1/3rd of total value of contracts awarded to Indian firms abroad.⁵⁷ But due to the war during that period the payment to foreign companies and workers, who were primarily contract labor, was deferred.⁵⁸ This discouraged flow of workforce to Iraq. While about 35,300 Indian workers went to Iraq in 1982, their numbers dropped to a mere 2,330 in 1987. Condition improved after the end of war when India's export to Iraq rose from 180 million in 1987-88 to Rs.1.26 billion in 1989-90.⁵⁹ The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and subsequent sanctions on Iraq brought the conditions again to low ebb. Not only India had to face soaring oil price in 1990-91 when the domestic political and economic crises were at their worst, it encountered great difficulties in evacuating around 180,000 Indians from Iraq and Kuwait. After the first gulf war in early 1991, as a part of the political campaign to re-establish contact with rest of the world, Iraq started inviting foreign oil companies. Consultations with Total and Elf of France and Brazilian Petrobras were of no avail in carrying exploration further. Stringent sanctions failed the attempts in 1995 again when Baghdad organized an

⁵⁵ See Ajay, N. Jha, "Indo-Iraqi Relations (1947-86): Need for Fresh initiatives in Verinder Grover (ed.) *West Asia and India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1992), pp.437-61; c.f. Boquerat Gilles, "Indian Response to the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91", *International Studies*, 38, 4 (2001), pp.427-440.

⁵⁶ See Girjesh C. Pant, "Indo-Gulf Economic Relations: A Profile", in Verinder Grover, *West Asia and India's Foreign Policy*, *ibid.*, p.66.

⁵⁷ *Frontline*, 16-29 March 1991, p.131. C.f Gilles Boquerat., *ibid.*, p.429.

⁵⁸ It has been estimated that the Iraqi government owed over 1965 million to twenty-six Indian Companies in 1995. Javed Ahmed Khan, *India and West Asia*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), p.123.

⁵⁹ All figures c.f. Gilles Boquerat, *ibid.*

international conference to offer lucrative grounds for investment. In early 2000 Iraq reviewed its policy in exasperation and declared that no new agreements are to be signed without a sufficient commitment by the contractor to start real development work on ground. The sole exception was the signing up of an agreement with ONGC's OVL (ONGC Videsh Limited) in November 2000 for exploration work on Block (8) in western desert adjacent to Saudi and Kuwait borders. Reliance, an Indian private company also secured an exploration contract in Tuba oilfield. Besides oil, India was actively present in Iraq through UN run oil for food programme. In fact, India has already acquired orders worth \$1 billion under this programme while products worth \$250 million have already been paid for. Even till January 2003 India and Iraq had two way trade. India exported commodities worth 94535.44 lakhs and imported good worth 12.82 lakhs of rupees.⁶⁰

In political sphere, Iraq over the years has always supported India on its Kashmir stand. Iraq counts India as one of the few trusted allies who it feels can count upon in the time of crisis. Further, the secular nature of Iraqi society has cast an image of close friends. Unfortunately, this area got embroiled in the war again.

b) India and the U.S.

It is really a surprise that world's strongest democracies – India and the US – have never fully succeeded in recognizing common grounds for collaboration. Perhaps the US vanity of its military and economic power and India's anti-imperial, non-racial and socialist ideology was too strong a hindrance to be transcended. For most part of bilateral relations US' world view of military confrontation, ideological rivalry and a domineering self-

⁶⁰ *Middle East Economic Survey*, (4 December 2000) mentions about the ONGC contract

- Reliance Project is reported in *Middle East Economic Survey*, (19 February 2001), p.D6.
- Food-for-oil figures quoted from *India Today*, April 21, 2003, p.39.
- And, the two-way trade figures are called from *Foreign Trade Statistics of India*, (March, 2003).

The figures are from April 2002 to Jan 2003. Export, Import figures for April, 2001 to January 2002 were Rs.71386.90 Lakh and 19.57 lakhs respectively. Tea (Rs.22447.07 lakhs) and Machinery (20123.34) were India's main export while importing primarily only fruits and nuts (11.39 lakhs) and occasionally some metalifer ores and metal Scrap.

righteous approach could not concede to India a position more than that of a surrogate and subordinate democracy.⁶¹ In response to which India shifted more and more towards Non-Alignment a concept which was borrowed from the American history. In this process who gained and who lost among the two is difficult to assess. It was however by late 1980s that economic strands started cob-webbing the two countries. Around 1986 American businessmen started seeing India as a "Big Emerging Market". By the later half of 1990's India had completed almost a decade of sustained impressive economic growth that made things look brighter. This was buttressed by the rise of a dynamic and vibrant community of Indo-Americans in the US who were also seeking a political identity and a role in the US bipartisan politics. By the same time India was making its presence felt in the information technology (IT) sector globally, with its strongest ripples registered in US industry and business.⁶² However, the fuller potential of economic bonds could not be realized owing to confrontation on issues like issue of disarmament. The US found that India was a firm and consistent defiant in the search for a global non-proliferation regime, initially, NPT, then CTBT. India's outright refusal of these regimes as discriminatory and unbound by a time table for global disarmament made it an obdurate element in South Asia. Further, in 1998 with Pokhran-II, the confrontation was ripe. Sanctions were imposed and economic ties were hijacked by US strategic concerns. However, the changing global security environment after attacks on the US embassies in Dar-e-Salam and Nairobi made both the sides to take a fresh look at the bilateral relations.

The fallout of it was a prolonged dialogue between Jaswant Singh, India's Foreign Minister and Strobe Talbot, then Dy. Secretary of State. This brought President Clinton to New Delhi in March 2000, and led to the broadening of Indo-US dialogue in the diverse areas of fighting terrorism, economic cooperation, science and technology policies and environment.⁶³ September 11, 2001 has brought the countries closer in their fights against

⁶¹ S.D. Muni, "Issues in Indo-US Relations" in *World Focus*, 280-281, (April-May 2003), p. 25.

⁶² *ibid.* p.26.

⁶³ *ibid.*

terrorism. Simultaneously, the US opened the gates for liberalizing the transfer of high technology and increase in trade and economic relations.⁶⁴ It is however, in the field of military ties that the cooperation is most striking. The fight against terrorism brought Indo-US military cooperation high on the agenda.

The military cooperation which initially started as joint exercises, enlarged into escorting of civil and military ships of the US by Indian navy to safety particularly in strait of Malacca and soon in the Arabian Sea; and regular interaction among officers over tactics and strategies. In economic sphere though the two way trade between the two countries has been near about \$14 billion and about 33% of the total FDI flowing into India is from US.

Along with these developments, the issue of Kashmir has also snowballed into an area of international focus. In the new parameter, for Pakistan, Kashmir is an issue of self-representation of Kashmiris, for India an issue of Pakistan sponsored terrorism, and, for the US a nuclear flashpoint. Diplomatically, India has pinned upon a strategy of restraining Pervez Musharraf through the US from supporting terrorism in Kashmir, while Pakistan clamoring for a US sponsored 'Road Map' to resolve Kashmir issue. There are ups and downs in this triangle as both India and Pakistan are partners of the US in the global war against terrorism.

With this background we can now move on to study how India responded to the actual crisis.

⁶⁴ K.K. Katyal, 26 March 2003, *Hindu*.

CHAPTER 4

INDIA'S RESPONSE TO US INVASION OF IRAQ-2003

Between Scylla and Charybdis, if I sail in either direction, I suffer shipwreck. Therefore, I have to be in the midst of the storm⁶⁵

- Mahatma Gandhi on World War-II

War on Iraq began on 20th march 2003. High intensity conflict seemed over with the occupation of Baghdad by the Allied Forces in the second week of April, the low intensity conflicts however continue with fatalities inflicted on the US-UK troops on daily basis.⁶⁶ It is still a long way to go in Iraq. The invasion of Iraq was done in violation of UN charter and was declared unilaterally by the US. It was alleged as a necessary war to make the world safer from terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and wild autocrats like Saddam. 'Shock and Awe' was the tactic employed for the fulfillment of desired aims, in which the heavy precision guided bombardment would shock the rulers up to awe and surrender. Strategy seems to have worked, but the Iraqi people and its rich history also appear to have paid a heavy price. Unlike the war in 1990-91 the current war impregnates radical changes in the emerging post-cold war world system.

For India, this time the crisis was not primarily about rising oil prices and fall in remittances but about finding its feet on the world system as an emerging and responsible power. Gilles Boquerat,⁶⁷ studying Indian response to the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91, argued that during that period India went through three different crises. They were political, economical and diplomatic.

⁶⁵ D.G. Tendulkar: *Mahatma*, (Ahmedabad: 1951-54), Vol. VI, p. 331.

⁶⁶ The *Philadelphia Enquirer* reported on 2 July 2003 that Paul Bremer, The U.S. administrators in Iraq, has asked for additional troops from pentagon till the international peace keepers arrive. The demand is made considering the growing resentment on the ground in Iraq and guerrilla attacks; - The Number of U.S. troops in Iraq remains at 146,000-almost the same when they were deployed at the height of the war additionally, there are 12,000 from Britain. Subsequently troops from countries like Japan, Italy, South Korea etc. joined in ranks. One year later with the Iraqis rising under Muqtada-al-Sadr, the young Shia cleric, pressure on US troops to increase their presence has become unbearable.

⁶⁷ Gilles Boquerat: "Indian Response to the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91", *International Studies*, 38, 4 (2001), pp.427-440.

Politically, India was passing through the tough phase of unstable governments having tenuous majority in Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament). Economically, the country was on the verge of a balance of payment default. Oil price rise confounded the crisis further. Diplomatically, Gilles argues, “in the 1990-91 war, the very first conflict after the end of the cold war, the NAM bloc faced the major challenge due to absence of the countervailing power of the Soviet Union, thus allowing the US to conduct the war as it saw fit. These crises left India with little room for manoeuvre and reduced it to the status of a peripheral actor on the world stage.”⁶⁸ In the present crisis the domestic political and economic conditions are favourable. It was in the diplomatic sphere where the crisis seemed most challenging. Compared to 1990-91, India’s position is no longer peripheral. Today, it is in a closer circle. And, India sees the development in Iraq not as a crisis to be tackled at domestic front but as an opportunity to make its presence felt in the international system. It seeks to contribute solutions and looks forward for assuming responsibilities. If 1990-91 was a transition period during which certain premises, which had formed the basis of India’s policies since Independence, were questioned, then 2003 is perhaps the period when we have started getting answers for forging better and responsible strategies in foreign relations. India’s response to this war has been two-forked. During and before the war it adopted the stand of ‘Middle Path’, for, both the warring parties were friendly to it. After the main battles are fought, India is seeking to participate in Iraqi stabilisation on its own terms.

This chapter attempts to analyse the Indian response to Gulf War 2003. It will involve exploring what the middle path constitutes? And also to see why such a path was chosen. India’s stakes in Iraq and growing ties with the US are primary reasons why India opted for the middle path. What and why of the Middle Path forms the context to understand the Indian response better. The Indian response can be studied as emanating from the Parliament; the government and political parties. Among the civil society, debates between intellectuals and protests by citizens formed another strong constituency of

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p.427.

response. As conclusion, attempts will be made to look at the future prospects of the things with respect to India's ties with Iraq and US. At domestic front Kashmir issue also got entangled with the crisis. It is necessary to see the repercussion of this war on Kashmir, and for that matter on India and Pakistan. Lastly, it is equally important to locate emerging world system and probable position of India in it.

What is Middle Path?

A diplomatic crisis faced all the countries when it became clear that the war was inevitable. They were supposed to take sides. Three positions were available. On the left it was entrenched opposition to the war on moral and ideological grounds. Leftists world over and France were brands of this response. Germany and Russia were lighter versions of this. On the right flank was another extreme where self-interest of countries found expression in downright support to US war effort. UK and Australia were pertinent cases with several other minor countries. The third was the 'Middle Path', the one adopted by India. It meant following things:

- a) Opposition to invasion because it was unilateral against the collective spirit of UN charter, an intervention in a sovereign country, anti-Iraqi people and overall, loose on grounds of immediate cause – Saddam's Iraq being a grave threat to world peace with his WMDs.
- b) Middle path also meant safeguarding of self-interests of the nation. These interests mean maximizing the economic, political and military 'power'.
- c) Since Middle path is equidistant from both extreme flanks it had neither to be blatant nor meek in its execution. The posture of middle path was therefore a policy which was mild, undertone and quiet. The debate over choice of appropriate word to deplore / condemn US aggression on Iraq is a case in point at attempting linguistic quietism.
- d) Further, the middle path approach always has an inbuilt scope of maneuvering as the changes would take place at various theatres, both

domestic and international. Adoption of resolution deploring the aggression at the fag end of the war when its need was not felt initially.

Why Middle Path?

Because the advantages of middle path overwhelmed the choice of either joining or opposing war. Most importantly, it safeguarded the tangible stakes that India had with the warring parties – Iraq and US.

The Government's Response

Studying Indian government's response to the current crisis has been an interesting case. It demonstrates how government's foreign relations are performed in an interface of international (systemic or external) and domestic (unit, or internal levels). Touching a little of theory, these 'external' and 'internal' environments are a 'given' to which making changes is not always possible. At best the government interprets them in a light which pervades and satisfies all the vertices of its attitudinal prism with which it images the surroundings. It is the nation's ideology, historical legacy and the manifesto of the dispensation at the helm of governance that constitute this attitudinal prism. With the images created through this, the government would venture out to interpret 'the given'. The divergence of responses in a country – obviously proportional to the degree of democracy available – would therefore depend upon the divergences in the interpretation of these 'givens' according to respective attitudinal prisms. The current crisis was interpreted by the left parties, the congress, the BJP and others differently, though perhaps sharing the common historical legacy of a non-violent solution to the problem and seeing nothing in war but destruction.

The current crisis started brewing since September 2002 when America declared that weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and absence of democracy demand active intervention. The US not only proclaimed itself to lead this 21st century purge but it was also accepted so by almost all other countries. However, the trouble started emerging when it was felt that the US was going overboard in asserting its leadership to an extent that was virtually

subsuming all global system, particularly, the UN. Such a stance made it uneasy for sovereign nations to submit their energies to the US efforts. It is a different matter to submit to an international community of nations than to a nation. Most of the nations therefore had to manoeuvre between the real politick of the US power, the necessity of the UN and the need to fight against emerging threat to world polity. In the case of India, it was on March 2, 2003⁶⁹ that the Prime Minister asserted that India does not want war and is hopeful of a solution through UN. And since, India has been friendly to both the US and Iraq, best it can do is to have a 'Middle Path'. This was the first policy posturing by India. Next day, the US ambassador, Robert Blackwill said "US is satisfied with India's stand".⁷⁰ But the left parties criticised the government severely for taking the 'middle path'. CPI (M) termed the stand as 'serious shift' in foreign policy.⁷¹ Party's parliamentary leader Mr. Somnath Chatterjee said 'what is the Middle path when there is threat of a real war.' Referring to the reported statement by Blackwill he said it amounted to direct interference in India's internal matters. "As if we are waiting for a certificate from the ambassador."⁷² The next few days saw the showdown between the UN weapons inspector and the US. Hans Blix, the chief UN inspector said Iraq's cooperation is coming active. The US labeled the Blix's report on Iraq as "a catalogue of non-cooperation by Iraq." The US wanted to give a halt to this grudging game of cooperation, and pressed the need for using force. Since the UNSC Resolution 1441 disallowed automatic resort to war, US-UK thought of coming up with the Second Resolution. It divided the UNSC. France and Russia made the opposition clear to any such resolution. Responding to this situation Mr. Yashwant Sinha remarked in Lok Sabha on March 7, 2003 that we are at a critical juncture in world history. This calls for the combined wisdom of international community.⁷³ At that time the dominant interpretation of the

⁶⁹ *Hindu*, March 3, 2003.

⁷⁰ *Hindu*, March 4, 2003.

⁷¹ *Hindu*, March 5, 2003.

⁷² *ibid.*

⁷³ Yaswant Sinha said this while intervening in the debate on a private member's resolution, moved by the CPI (M)'s Jibon Roy, on the impending war against Iraq, Urging the Government to take lead in uniting the non-aligned countries to take a united stand on the issue. [*Hindu*, March 8, 2003].

events that the government was able to make was that Baghdad was really complying with the UN resolutions. At the same time the Indian parliament took serious note of the 'Regime change' policy stressed out by U.S. for Iraq. It was Mr. Natwar Singh, the Congress Leader who imagined the dangers of this policy for the home turf, "suppose after Iraq, the US asks India and Pakistan to sit down and talk J&K what would you do if the regime change formula is extended." Interestingly, he also stressed that the world is faced with a "horrendous situations" to which the UNSC and NAM had no answer. The notable point here is that higher rungs of both, the BJP and Congress concurred over the irresolvability of the situation and irrelevance of global systems and subsystems in front of a trampling unilateral power. During this period, situation was really worsening in Iraq. On March 9th, Prime Minister was briefed comprehensively by the army on the likely impact of Iraq war on India. India's defense establishment anticipated resistance in Iraq to the Allied forces. Similarly, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on external affairs was told by independent experts that the US war on Iraq might not be a short one.⁷⁴ The committee was told that the economic impact of the war on India would be great and was likely to hit the growth rate. Iraqi resistance was the dominant proposition in the minds of Indian policy makers and it influenced the government's decision to go for the parliamentary resolution deploring the US aggression. The government had earlier refused to bring the resolution. At the all-party meeting on March 10, the government failed to bridge the differences in perception with some of its allies – DMK and TDP – and the opposition parties over India's stand. Most found India's Middle path approach is ambiguous and one that tacitly supported US aims. Away from home, war clouds were getting darker over Iraq. The US and France both were stepping up their lobbying for and against the second resolution in the UNSC. March 17 emerged as a probable date by which clouds would burst. The UN pulled out civilian staff from Iraq-Kuwait border and the inspectors virtually halted their

⁷⁴ This meeting on March 11 was presided over by professor Krishna Bose and K.N. Bakshi, J.N. Dixit, Hamid Ansari and P.M.S. Malik (all former diplomats), Bibek Debroy (economist) and Afsar Karim (Former General) [*Hindu*, March 12, 2003].

inspections barring unavoidable land patrols. The inspectors were finally pulled out on March 17 within hours of the President George W. Bush's 48 hours ultimatum to the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his two sons to leave the country. The US-UK duo dropped the idea of the Second Resolution. The UN was sidetracked. The Allied forces around Iraq were put on 4-hour notice. The Ministry of External Affairs in India could see the war around the corner. Its press releases of the day bemoaned "we are deeply disappointed by the inability of the UNSC to act collectively, specially the failure of the permanent members to harmonize their position on Iraq."⁷⁵ The past experiences of gulf war 1991 with regard to oil supply and evacuation of India's from the region gripped common man's mind. The issues were raked in the parliament, media and everywhere. Assuring statements flew from respective ministers. The government gave the picture that it has done its homework well, particularly after the March 12 statement⁷⁶ of the prime ministers to both the Houses of Parliament. In any case this homework was never tested for neither the oil supply fell any greatly or hardly any Indian – around 3.5 million – living in the region adjoining Iraq was threatened by decapitated missile system of Iraq. Around 50 Indians present in Iraq were already advised to leave the country well in time.⁷⁷

On March 20, the war drums were beaten. The U.S launched attack on Iraq. Bush telephoned the Prime Minister Mr. Vajpayee and apprised him of the situation. Expressing his deep anguish that the UNSC was not able to reach an agreement, the Prime Minister hoped that the military action would be concluded at the earliest. He told Bush of the need to provide humanitarian assistance, adding that India was ready to participate in such efforts. Everyone in the government was confronted with the stand that they would have on the situation. MEA said, "it is with deepest anguish that we have seen reports of the commencement of military action in Iraq." The Dy. Prime Minister when asked about what side he is, averred that "we are concerned about our national

⁷⁵ Navtej Sarna, MEA.

⁷⁶ The Statement was reported and published extensively.

⁷⁷ *Hindu*, March 10, 2003.

interest.” “Arguing from a sort of neutral stand Defense Minister George Fernandes said “the stand, we’ve taken per se makes it impossible for India to get involved in it any way.” Dr. Muzaffar Hussein Baig, Minister for Law, Parliament Affairs and Finance, J&K, expressed the other extreme – “Today it is Iraq but tomorrow it can be the turn of our country.”

It was clear that though India was not happy with the commencement of war, it decided to take the Middle Path. It had done so to safeguard the national interest. Any opposition to the US led war in Iraq and active mobilization against the US unilateral move might have elevated India’s stature in the developing World. Some analysts, however, argued that was there any scope for the developing world to do what UN had failed to do? Perhaps this was the realisation when India made it clear to Ali Akbar Velayati, the special envoy of the Iranian President Mohammed Khatami that India is not about to take any initiative through the NAM or otherwise on Iraq. The XIIIth NAM summit that occurred in the last week of February at Kuala Lumpur did criticise US for unilateralism and carrying out a regime change in a sovereign nation. But nothing substantial came out of it.

Substantial however did come out of a development that was unfortunately sad and tragic – the brutal Nadimarg massacre of 24 Kashmiri Pundits on a March 24, 2003. It was an event at the domestic domain but that definitely disturbed the patient nerves of the proponents of the Middle Path. The response that the government got from the US after the Nadimarg massacre appeared as a gross ill-reward for India’s stand on the current crisis. In place of reining in Mushrraf for failing to control his *jehadis*, the US state department asked for resumption of dialogue with Pakistan. Indian reaction was instant and sharp with increased rhetoric against the US and Pakistan. The MEA spokesperson retorted “If dialogue per se is more critical than combating international terrorism with all necessary means, then one can legitimately ask why both in Afghanistan and Iraq, military action, instead of dialogue has been resorted to.”⁷⁸ Taking the displeasure with the US response further, External

⁷⁸ Navtej Sama, MEA, Spokesperson, c.f. *Outlook*, (April 17, 2003); p.52.

Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha told the Parliament on April 9 that Pakistan's nuclear capability and alleged support for the Kashmir terrorist makes it a "fitter case" for intervention than Iraq.

Though the tone was softened later, but a show of diplomatic exasperation appeared necessary. It was exercised through passing the resolution in the Parliament condemning the US aggression. The estimated resistance as reported by Defense experts and others added more to the resolve as the resistance in Iraq would definitely have repercussion in India. Further, the opposition parties had been pressurizing for a Resolution for long, the demand that was not considered initially. A Resolution condemning US invasion of Iraq would have also usurped the sentiments of common Indians – protesting actively or not – thereby reflecting the overall expression of India.

The Parliamentary Resolutions

The war in Iraq started on 20th March, 2003. India adopted the Parliamentary Resolution on 8th and 9th April in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha respectively. [Resolution Appended] The Resolution 'deplored' the US aggression on Iraq 20 days later when the war was in final stage. At the international level things were changing fast. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher proclaimed that 'he hoped that the Saddam regime will collapse as soon as possible'. President Putin, meanwhile averred that Russia was not interested in seeing the defeat of the US in Iraq. On April 8, the channels across the world were beaming images of American soldiers being welcomed in Baghdad.⁷⁹

The Resolution was criticised on tactical grounds by intelligentsia in the country, for it was too late in time and blunted much of the leverage India had gained from its policy of middle path. Even at the domestic front, the resolution affair had become comic. Not because it was too late but it represented somersault of government's earlier stand of no resolution. Though the resolution opened with words like "as an expression of national interests".

⁷⁹ G. Parthasarthy, *Indian Express*, April 21, 2003.

It was read by most of the magazines as a case of 'national irrelevance'.⁸⁰ Further, it also demonstrated unclarity among political parties over choice of words. The choice for angst-ridden House was between '*ninda*' (deplore) and '*ghor ninda*' (deplore strongly / condemn) and after much soul searching it settled for just '*ninda*'. During the debate over resolution in the Parliament, there was however a feeling of gratification that India endorsed its principle stand of deploring unilateral aggression on a sovereign nation. Mr. Jaipal Reddy called the resolution 'extraordinary'. Shri E. Ponnuswamy said "I honestly feel that this resolution should have come 20 days earlier." Expressing his satisfaction Dr. Raghuvansh Prasad Singh said, "had the parliament not passed this resolution it would have been a big mistake". Talking about principles and interests Shri K. Mallai Swamy averred that "our country by virtue of its neutrality and its non-aligned policy has come out with a specific resolution to condemn what the aggressor is doing wrong". Giving a less emotional plea, Mr. P.A. Sangma highlighted interesting points about the war and India. He said, "first of all, the war is not about morals. It is plainly about the national interest of an individual country. The war is about commercial interest of a country. This war clearly shows the incapability and the failure of UN system. The UN has failed and something has to be done about it. The fourth lesson that we should learn is about the way war has been fought. The entire Iraq war has gone so much on high tech; we need to see our defense system itself now. The last point... is that the U.S will perhaps win the war in Iraq, but winning peace in Iraq is much more important."

The resolution expressed satisfaction for the decision of the government of India to commit Rs.100 crore in cash and kind to the UN including 50,000 metric tones of wheat to the World Food Programme. The House wished that Iraqi reconstruction is done under UN auspices.

⁸⁰ eg. *India Today*, April 21, 2003, p.4; *Outlook*, 15 April 2003.

Response of Intelligentsia

There are difficulties involved in categorizing a few people as intelligentsia. However, it is still necessary to note the response from this constituency. This constituency is peopled by university professors, former diplomats and experts of different fields with a broader purview. Here, it is not important to note the intellectuals but the nature of the debate that they propagated. Intelligentsia expressed their points of view either through newspapers, TV interviews or personalized writings. The positions taken by them were again of three types. Staunch anti-US Leftist scholars argued for India's active opposition to the war. A few intellectuals argued for an India more and more close to the US. Most however, stuck to the middle path and espoused their views about how best this path can be traversed.

All the intellectuals were nevertheless in agreement that the current crisis was of a serious nature and has severe global implications. Kanti Bajpai, Ex-Professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, and a regular interviewee at most of the news channels in the country mapped out five crises. First crisis, he argued was about the inevitability of war in Iraq. Second, growing irrelevance towards the UN is a matter of concern and blamed US for not only the UN's conditions but also for dividing the NATO and EU – the third crisis –, brewing up mainly in the west. Fourth was the issue of arms proliferation to state and non-state actors. He emphasized the need for a stringent inspection regime. Lastly, he pointed out at the humanitarian crisis wherever the terrorism and war on terrorism is waged. In this overall context he proposed India to rise above quietism. "India can not be content to lie low when there is so much at stake. We are disowning a legitimate role in the international community if we think that some tactical sidestepping will suffice."⁸¹ Tavleen Singh, a regular columnist favoured middle path for the country to safeguard national interest without getting bogged down by 'ideological mumbo-jumbo'. She criticised the US for bringing the agenda of morality into this war, when attacking a sovereign country is a far cry from any

⁸¹ Kanti Bajpai, *Indian Express*, February 24, 'No one writes to Saddam'.

sense of International morality.⁸² Shekhar Gupta, the Editor-in-Chief of *Indian Express* brought more clarity to this point when he described the US presence in West Asia in post-cold war as a rise of the US from isolationist power to an interventionist one, which will put frequent resort to force in realising its conception of world.⁸³ C. Raja Mohan, strategic affairs editor with *The Hindu* expressed his great pleasure in seeing the US and India coming closer. He titled this coming closer as a subject matter of his new book 'Crossing the Rubicon'.⁸⁴ Arguably, Raja Mohan has been vitriolic against India's bemoaning at the sidelining of UN "The absence of support in the UN did not deter India from taking unilateral military action in East Pakistan in 1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Nor did India take the permission of the UN to launch "bread bombing" of Sri Lanka in 1987. India had firmly rejected the UNSC resolution 1172 passed unanimously in June 1998 asking New Delhi to roll back its nuclear and missile programmes."⁸⁵ C.R.Ghareekan, India's former Permanent Representative to the UN, cautioned against writing off the UN. He in fact proposed the option of the UN resolution "Uniting for peace".⁸⁶ For India he suggested the NAM route to actively strive for averting this and future crisis. Rajeev Dhavan, a renowned legalist called the war illegal on all counts and called it a war of America's interests. He said illegality of it will destabilise and devastate the Middle East and trigger terrorist attacks by way of counter reactions.⁸⁷ Sudha Mahalingam, writing in *The Hindu* concurred with a many when she said that this war is all about America's eyes on Iraqi oil. Therefore, even contracts signed by Saddam's Iraq with countries other than US and UK (which never got any exploration title) endangered to abrogation by a US

⁸² Tavleen Singh, *Indian Express*, March 23, 2003.

⁸³ Shekhar, Gupta, *Indian Express*, February 17, 2003.

⁸⁴ C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Viking, 2003).

⁸⁵ C. Raja Mohan, *Hindu*, March 13, 2003.

⁸⁶ Adopted in 1950 by the General Assembly this Resolution was conceived to deal with such situations that the UN ought not to be prevented from carrying out its mission to maintain peace and security. Under this resolution the General Assembly can meet within 24 hrs. to consider the matter and make recommendations, including the use of the armed forces, to members when necessary. The procedure was effectively used in the 1956. Suez crisis. [World Focus, 280-281 April-May 2003, pp.30-31].

⁸⁷ Rajeev Dhawan, *Hindu*, April 4, 2003.

sponsored regime.⁸⁸ Aijaz Ahmad was perhaps the most prolific leftist voice. He occupied the centre stage in the fortnightly magazine *Frontline's* Iraq war analysis during February and March 2003. He put the onus of crisis not only on America's oil greed but primarily on imperialistic forces released by ultra-conservative cabal in the White House. He was the one who called the war as the 'war of occupation' (April 19, 2003). He concentrated great energies in cataloguing global resistance to this war, anticipating positive consequences.⁸⁹

J.N. Dixit, a former diplomat argued out that by being supportive of the US position on Iraq, India would ensure its political and economic interests, in both regional and global terms. He proposed that India had got to be realistic. And, the realistic position is to tell the US that India generally understands the logic of US policies, but as a friend, must point out the consequences of unbridled unilateralism.⁹⁰ Sanjay Baru brought down the arguments to realism, where national interests in the long run are preserved neither by allying with existing powers nor rhetoric and sloganeering against them but by patiently building up the attributes of modern power. This is to be done by developing country's very own political, economic and military capacities to much higher levels. This would be 'the Real Power'.⁹¹

Protest as a Response

If it was not only for US' shock and awe and precision bombing, this war was also about protests-the pure civil protests. The nature of protests world over demonstrated amply that now not only wars and economies are globalizing but same is true for the protests. The infrastructure and communication networks created in order to protest against the WTO meetings, environmental pollution affairs and other globalizing forces were put to the service of anti-war movements this time. Others who are not so anti-global, but felt that war was unjust, inhuman and simply bizarre trucked their energies with full time protesters. The logic of mobilisation was simple and

⁸⁸ Sudha Mahalingam, *Hindu*, April 4, 2003.

⁸⁹ Aijaz Ahmad, See *Frontier*, 28th March 2003 and 11th April 2003.

⁹⁰ J.N. Dixit, *Indian Express*, March 11, 2003.

⁹¹ Sanjay Baru, *Indian Express*, March 23, 2003.

convincing and often rested on the premise of good and evil. Bush-Blair duo was painted, stuffed and burnt as evil personified. The selfish and unrealistic policies of the US and UK were denounced as satanic. The protests varied in degrees. The first degree was of a simple march against the war. It might move sometimes to second degree to become violent. The ones that had an economic insight were of still higher degree. Such protests were a sort of callings for boycotting of goods of all Americans. However, the highest degree of protest could be the ones where movement would take the form of reprisals. That would then move close to what according to current definitions of safe world would be called terror strikes. The possibility of such a form of protest is not only not ruled out but actually feared by the whole world.

In India the broad constituencies from which the protests stemmed were vast and diverse. Left bodies and Muslim organizations took a great lead in organizing the protests. Not all the student that participated in anti-war movements had left affiliations. The protest moves declared by Muslim organizations and Mosques succeeded in mobilising real time masses. The anti-war temper definitely prompted all the political parties, including BJP, to lead the protests marches against US war on Iraq, which was unjustified, avoidable and was against one of 'our friend'. An insignificant protest infact supported the war on Saddam, hoping one day same would happen to Pervez Musharraf. Resolutions by state legislatures and ultimately the Parliamentary Resolution were another mode to show official type of protest. Another class of protests was led by artists, and intellectuals including teachers and professors.

The following table gives the catalogue of the period from 20th March – the day war commenced to April 13, 2003 when Baghdad was conquered – to see the nature of protests. It is neither an exhaustive compilation of all the protests nor a precise reporting of the marches, particularly with respect to number of participants. It is sourced from newspapers and internet.

Date	Place	Organiser	No. of participants	Nature
March 21	Delhi	CPI(M-L)	--	Demonstrations outside the American centre and later on Parliament street. U.S. flag was burnt, and the war was called a 'direct onslaught on Asia and the Third World.
	J&K (Srinagar, Baramullah, Pulwama, Anantnag; and Rajouri, Poonch & Doda in Jammu)	All party Huriyat Conference [APHC]	--	Mirwaiz Umar Farooz gave a call for muslims across the globe to unite in saving Iraq. Srinagar demonstration turned violent as it clashed with the Police.
	Bangalore	Local Mosque	2000 (Muslims)	Immediately after Friday Prayers. All peaceful
	Chennai	DYFI (Democratic Youth Federation of India, Youth wing of CPI(M)	--	At American Consulate. This war is for oil.
March 23	Delhi	Jama-Masjid	--	A rally chanting anti-US slogans. Shahi Imam, Syed Ahmed Bukhari expressed anger over the Criminal silence of Gulf countries. Who were letting a brother Muslim country being invaded.
	Dehra Dun	[NCP] Nationalist Congress Party	--	A rally from Gandhi Park to Clock Tower Peaceful. Peopled by intellectuals, social workers, journalists etc.
	Jaipur	20 different organization of Muslims Community	Around 6000	Burnt effigies of Bush and Blair and raised anti US-UK slogans.
March 24	Srinagar	Kashmir Bar Association.	--	Traffic off road, business establishment and educational institutions remain closed. Anti-US slogans were chanted by Kashmiri youth.

Date	Place	Organiser	No. of participants	Nature
	Bihar	State Legislature	--	State Legislative Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution against the US led attack.
March 26	Hyderabad	Anjuman-e-Alvi Akbari	1000 [Muslims-Shia]	A shia protest rally that terminated at the governor's residence. Condemned Us attack on Iraq especially the bombings over shia holy places Karbala and Najaf. Submitted a memorandum to the Governor demanding that Indian government should exercise its influence and stop the war.
	Hyderabad	School Children	400	A human chain was formed. Slogan: "We don't want war we want peace."
	Tamil Nadu	State Legislature	--	A resolution in state legislative assembly condemning the war.
March 27	Agartala	CPI(M)	--	Reportedly, a huge anti-war rally including intellectuals, artists, politicians, Government employees etc.
	Bangalore	KPCC [Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee]	--	A rally, criticised the Prime Minister for not strongly condemning the war.
March 28	Kolkata	6 left wing organizations, mainly students wing e.g. SFI, CPI(ML)	--	A strike at educational institutions demanding immediate end to war. CPI(M-L) gave a call for boycott of U.S. goods and blockade of US missions all over India.

Date	Place	Organiser	No. of participants	Nature
March 30	Kolkata	Left Parties CPI(M), CPI, RSP&FB	Around 4 lakh	A massive rally and procession. Former chief minister Jyoti Basu and current chief minister Buddhadeb also participated. Personalities from different walks of life like film maker Mrinal sen,, Singer actress Ruma Guha, PC Sorcar etc. effigies were burnt, sloganeering and peace songs were sung.
	Manipur	Ulema-e- Manipur	--	Condemnation at a gathering.
March 31	Delhi	Committee Against war on Iraq	--	Effigies of Bush-Blair and Cola Cola cans were burnt. March from Netaji Subhash Park to Ramlila grounds.
April 1	Delhi	Congress Party	--	Rally of Jantar Mantar. Mainly party workers. Slogans: "stop war in Iraq" "Bush stop Terrorism"
April 2	Kolkata	RYA (Revol- Youth Asscn.) + AISA (All India Student's Asscn) an affiliate of CPI(M-L)	--	An emotionally charged protest. Around 50 activists attacked a NIKE SHOWROOM and pasted bills inscribed with the slogan "QUIT INDIA".
	Delhi	NHRC (National Human Rts. Commission)	--	A protest demonstration.
April 3	Delhi	(Lawyers)	--	A good participation. Protest demonstration. Slogans: "No War" "Stop War".

Date	Place	Organiser	No. of participants	Nature
April 4	Kolkata	TIPU Sultan Mosque	--	A <i>fatwa</i> was issued asking all Muslims to boycott U.S. goods. The cleric described the White House as 'Slaughter House'
April 7	Amritsar	School Children	--	Protest Demonstration. Pigeon flying for peace.
	Delhi	Professors	--	Delhi University, Jamia Hamdard and Aligarh Muslim University protested peacefully in front of American Central Library.
April 8	Delhi	Parliament	--	The Parliamentary Resolution deploring the U.S. aggression on Iraq.
	Ahmedabad	AAT [Alliance Against Terrorism]	--	Protest rally in support of the US led war. First and only instance. Placards: "Kill Saddam, save the world": The Convenor said - "The support to the US attack against Saddam regime stems from the optimism that the superpower, in its trade to quell the menace of global terrorism, will help India get free from evil being followed by neighbourly Pakistan.
April 13	Hyderabad	Progressive Writers' Association [PWA]	--	Hundreds of writers and poets from all over the country. PWA's President Prof. Namwer Singh condemned the attack and criticised the mild stand taken by India.

CONCLUSION

The war part of the current crisis might be over,⁹² but as discussed, the challenges thrown up are far from tackled. Iraq is still burning. Firstly, growing irrelevance of UN is not in India's favour. This becomes an issue of increasing importance when seen in the context of India's quest for a permanent seat in expanded United Nations Security Council. India must actively participate in its restructuring and consolidation. Failure of systems and subsystems (read NAM) at the current crisis should not lead to their dysfunction. In fact, crises should invigorate a new spirit to these bodies to handle the future better.

Secondly, the international political system is experiencing the phase of unilateralism. India has shifted to a policy of active cooperation with that unilateral power. It is definitely a wiser course than a confrontationist one. However, we have to be realistic in engagement. India has to be self-confident of its politico economic-military strength, often described as India's preeminence, and should strive to mould this relationship as that of two equal partners. To achieve this, unit attributes (domestic economic and military might) must be raised considerably over coming decades quietly without indulging into unnecessary rhetoric. With regard to issue of Kashmir, this is more pertinent, for, India must see it by now that this is an issue that it has to handle on its own, a policy that is being pursued over the years.

Lastly, with respect to Iraq, we have many responsibilities and opportunities. Responsibilities, because we had been friends and it is our duty to be by the side of Iraqi people at this hour of necessity. Opportunities, because Iraq could turn out to be the crucial key on the energy sector. In addition to that, flow of Indian business and labour to Iraq can give a further boost to our industrial sector and the remittances.⁹³ India has to merge the

⁹² Bush had pompously announced on May 1, 2003 that major combat operations in Iraq were over.

⁹³ Major Industries of India's interest in Iraq could be steel, Telecom-with \$5 billion plus market for phones and software, seaports' upgradation with tenders up for worth \$300 million. Repair of major power plants and restoration of Grid links, with Indian players like BHEL (Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited) already enjoying good market value. Roads, Highways, Schools and Hospitals providing huge potential for capital investments and employment generation. Figures estimated in *India Today*, April 21, 2003, p.40.

pressures of responsibilities and avenues of opportunities through a constructive diplomacy. Meaning, Indian official presence in Iraq in some or other form emerges as a necessity. But on ground this has become a vexed issue. The US Ambassador in New Delhi, Robert Blackwill said India could play a “major role” in Iraq and be on the “inner board of directors” managing the security of the country.⁹⁴ The US has been eager to involve India in Iraqi stabilization force primarily to legitimize the occupation and to reduce the concentration of tired up US forces for a variety of reasons.⁹⁵ Deployment of one Indian army division can make it third largest presence of army in Iraq. Such a despatch, however, will reduce the policy of middle path and the parliamentary resolution deploring the unilateral anti-UN US war to a cipher. Besides, a letter bearing the signature of Saddam Hussein and distributed in Arab media has warned that all foreign troops on Iraqi soil will be treated as enemies. Though he is captured now but the resisters of all hues are still following this dictum. Any cooperation with occupying forces is severely punished, and in fact in the current Al- Sadr led nationalist uprising (April 2004) resisters are kidnapping the foreign troops as a strategy to force mother countries to withdraw troops. Arab and Muslim Public opinion which is vehemently opposed to the US, will be disappointed if India yields to US pressure. Back home it can have serious repercussions. It would not only put Kashmir to more terrorist attacks, but will also wreath a scense of indifference among certain sections of society. Moreover, as the casualties of Indian troops in Iraq – (a very probable case) – would be reported back, will create a huge emotional uproar against the deployment. Knowing this all, each political party has opposed the idea of sending troops to Iraq. The Prime Minister has sought for the national consensus on this issue. Simultaneously, the government has also been engaging the US officials and Pentagon teams. The government is basically buying the time. It perhaps fits well with the policy of Middle path.

⁹⁴ *Frontline*, July 18, 2003, p.48.

⁹⁵ Primarily, heavy cost – around \$ 3 billion per month – with no flow of Iraqi oil revenues yet and also because of intensification of resistance. See *frontline*, 18 July, 2003, p.52.

India needs to assert civilian aspect of cooperation. Pertinently relating to economic and political reconstruction. In the context of long existing friendship between India and Iraqi people, India's presence in these two crucial domains of Iraqi reconstruction will not only be welcomed by Iraqis but also sustainable for long. India should make America realise that it cannot run Iraq solely on its own terms. India has to shift the dialogue to non-military cooperation with the United States of America. Both, in Iraq and at home.

CHAPTER 5

ISSUE OF TROOPS DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE

Introduction

The crisis in Iraq is yet far from over. However, the developments since the beginning of war on March 19, 2003 have become graspable. The 'shock-and-awe' phase was claimed to have been completed on May 1, 2003 when the US President, George Bush declared the major combat operations over.⁹⁶ Far from coalitions' expectations, the post 'shock and awe' phase, essentially low intensity conflicts, has emerged as the most difficult part of the exercise. The Al-Sadr uprising in fact has become as good as mini war. By now, the number of the US soldiers killed in the Iraq operations is getting close to 700, with majority getting killed in the second phase.⁹⁷ The number of wounded is supposed to be more than double to the killed. And, even still, the much sought after restoration or stabilization of Iraq is far from any fructification. The governing council of the US selected Iraqis lacked the much needed faith and legitimacy of the common Iraqis. Inter-Shia rivalry has added a new dynamics to the divisions between Shias and Sunnis. The Kurdish issue is still a dormant volcano. The morale of the US led coalition troops is at its depressing low.⁹⁸ After twelve months of invasion of Iraq, many observers feel that the US might have conquered Iraq but has failed to conquer Iraqi people. The battle of guns in shock-and-awe phase has been decisively won by the coalition but it is faring badly in the battle of hearts in the current phase. It is at this juncture that a country like India has become important. It is now argued that the US might

⁹⁶ *The Hindu*, May 2, 2003

⁹⁷ As of Nov 21, the official death toll of US troops in Iraq stood at 424. Of these, 287 deaths occurred since May 1 when US President George Bush declared major operations over in Iraq.

⁹⁸ The coalition troops are psychologically so fearful of attacks, that it has depressed their professionalism to 'Save your Life' Syndrome. On August 10, panic-stricken soldiers fired for 20 minutes on a car carrying a father and three children, the youngest aged eight; troops mistakenly thought they were under attack. The killing of Mazen Dani, the reputed Reuter journalist on August 17 was an act of utter 'craziness'. Even till now the 'friendly-fire' is not fully over. Mutual hatred between the Americans and Iraqis is developing in an almost natural fashion.

have hi-tech weaponry to decimate the entire world, but it lacks the requisite intellectual and emotional capacity to win the hearts of the people it has conquered. India, with a rich historical legacy of peaceful stabilization of such conditions from the days of Ashoka to recent UN peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world, has assumed criticality at the theatre of international politics. It is however interesting to note that India has turned down the proposal of deployment of its troops in Iraq, irrespective of its fitness to do so. This paper attempts to see why India decided so.

This question is of particular importance considering India's preeminent role in international politics because of its population, strategic location in South Asia and growing economic cum military prowess. India's decision against the deployment came after vigorous deliberation carried out between May 22, when the United Nations Security Council Resolution. (UNSC) 1483 was passed asking countries to contribute troops under US command and 14 July when India decided it cannot. For India, it was for the first time since independence that it deliberated upon a theme of troop's deployment outside South Asia under a non-UN command. It was a debate between 'remaining in' and 'going out'. Though in the Iraq crisis India might have decided to remain in, but is not the seriousness of these deliberations symptomatic of a transition in India's foreign policy? The paper attempts to see this also. Next, what such a pattern of foreign policy might have in store for the future crisis, particularly in the context of ongoing conflict in Afghanistan?

The Developments

Major conflicts in Iraq were declared over by US by end April 2003. The low-intensity conflicts that began thence started crashing the hopes of a swift stabilization. The sagging morals of troops, piqued guerilla warfare, exposure of lies behind the launch of war and domestic pressure forced the US and UK to take shelter under the UN umbrella. The UNSC Resolution 1483 passed on May 22, 2003 (14-O, with Syria abstaining) was but ambiguous in giving any

major role to the UN.⁹⁹ The UN member countries were appealed to contribute troops in Iraq under the overall US led coalition command. Initially, many a countries like India who were looking for their due role in Iraqi reconstruction through the UN welcomed the Resolution enthusiastically. But the initial excitement soon died down as the nuances in the draft became clear. The onus from the international community once again suddenly shifted to respective national interests. On May 29, Government of India's Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) decided to postpone the decision on this contentious issue till the various factors are carefully analyzed.¹⁰⁰ India began collating information from various sources. During this time Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani's visit to the US and the UK was the most crucial wherein the 'drop in'¹⁰¹ style of Rumsfeld and Bush gave the impression of urgency and importance with which the US was looking for India's support. In his talks with George Bush, Advani said that CCS has postponed the decision twice, for some "clarifications" were needed – like the exact role of Indian troops in Iraq, duration and command structure. Bush promised a Pentagon team to visit India within a week. In the final statement, Advani said, "The response I got convinced me that the American government is earnestly endeavoring to recognize India as a major power. That kind of relationship is consciously built up."¹⁰² This made a section of the intelligentsia to speculate that Advani's statement was just a step away from sending troops to Iraq.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ This Resolution was sponsored by USA, Spain and UK with an attempt to offer bigger role to UN. It had four objectives to address (a) UN envoy would work independently and would not be answerable to the occupying power (b) it sought to lift sanctions against Iraq, imposed after 1991 Gulf War. It also allowed 6 months instead of 4 for phasing out "oil-for-food" programme. (c) Permit weapons inspector. (d) Allows lawsuit against new interim authority for any environment disaster.

¹⁰⁰ Considering the Middle Path approach during the war period, continuation of such a policy through delaying a decision on this issue was praised as wise diplomacy. See K.P. Fabian, 'should India send troops to Iraq', *The Hindu*, May 29, 2003.

¹⁰¹ Mr. Rumsfeld was scheduled to meet Mr. Advani in the Pentagon but dropped by at the hotel where Advani was staying. He is also said to have delayed his departure by several hours to meet Advani. Similarly, when Mr. Advani had gone to the White House for a meeting with the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, Mr. Bush very soon dropped by.

¹⁰² *Hindu*, June 11, 2003.

¹⁰³ Analyst believed so because of the bonhomie which Advani struck with US interlocutors and a few of his statements that he made there. In an Aaj Tak Interview Advani said "We cannot send troops to Iraq only because of the strident criticism by the opposition parties. They have done so without even weighing the merits of the case. Eventually, the decisions, will hinge on national interests." See 'Miles of Smiles', *India Today*, June 23, 2003. It was believed that he connected the issue of India

Back home the political parties started posturing themselves. The left parties – CPI (M), CPI, R.S.P. and Forward Block – in a joint statement declared their opposition to India’s sending troops to Iraq. And by June 10, the Congress Party expressed its dissatisfaction over the issue. Continuing its opposition to Indian government’s stand in 1991 Iraq war, when Chandra Sekhar was the Prime Minister, the Congress said this time the whole Iraqi exercise lacks any credible UN mandate including the May 22 UNSC Resolution 1483. Further, in the wake of Parliamentary Resolution against the aggression, it makes no sense in participating now.¹⁰⁴ Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), the socio-cultural backbone of the Bartiya Janta Party (BJP) during this initial phase showed openness over the issue. Its press statement said, “there was no question of RSS opposing move to send Indian troops”.¹⁰⁵ The Janata Party President Mr.Subramanian Swamy said, “Vajpayee’s somersault in the Iraq situation is vindication of my stand that India should have allied with the US in war. It should withdraw the parliamentary resolution now”.¹⁰⁶ Seeing opposition from the Congress, the main opposition party in the Parliament, the Prime Minister invited leader of the opposition in Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) Sonia Gandhi to discuss the issue. They met on June 15, a day before the Pentagon team arrived and two days before Advani came back from his Washington visit. The official statement remained as ‘No decision yet’.¹⁰⁷ This stance seemed to continue for the entire June month because Advani was to remain busy in the BJP *Chintan Baithak* in Mumbai till June 20; and on June 22 the Prime Minister was to leave for China.

On June 16th the Pentagon team of the US civilian and military officials led by Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary for Defense visited India to offer “clarifications”. The team held talks with Mr. B.S. Parekh, Joint Secretary in

sending troops with US restraining Pervez Mushraf to cease cross border terrorism in Kashmir. Pervez Musharraf was to meet Bush at camp David on June 24, 2003. *The Hindu*, June 11, 2003.

¹⁰⁴ *The Hindu*, June 11, 2003.

¹⁰⁵ RSS Chief Spokesperson Ram Madhav made this statement at a ‘meet-the-press’ programme organized at Nagpur-Union of working Journalists. ‘RSS Supports Centre’, *The Hindu*, June 12,

¹⁰⁶ ‘PM’s Somersault’, *The Hindu*, June 12, 2003.

¹⁰⁷ ‘No-Decision-Yet’ stance was affirmed publicly by the Defence Minister, George Fernandes, in Dehradun at Indian Military Academy (IMA) passing out parade. *The Hindu*, June 15, 2003.

Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and other top-level civilian and military officials, including the Foreign Secretary Mr. Kanwal Sibal and National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra. The team offered best of their clarifications, but they did not seem convincing enough, which made India to leave the decision very much open. At this point government promoted its own assessment of the ground situation. Mr. B.B. Tyagi, India's Ambassador to Iraq, then stationed in Jordan was asked to move into Iraq and get an independent assessment of the situation in Iraq.¹⁰⁸ Similarly it also activated other embassies in West Asia for their assessment in their host countries, if Indian troops are deployed in Iraq. Simultaneously the MEA allowed 500 Indian laborers to go to Iraq, as requested by a Kuwaiti company. And, a 3 member medical team was deputed to Iraq to work out the setting up of a 50-bed hospital in collaboration with Jordan.¹⁰⁹ This was all happening by the fag end of June month.

It is pertinent to note at this point of time, what the US and UK were expecting from the international community. Officially, both Bush and the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair announced publicly that there is no shortage of countries willing to send troops to Iraq. By end June the US State Department started announcing that sixteen countries have agreed to send troops to assist the US led coalition forces in Iraq. At the same time, informally the senior diplomats from the US and UK were trying to influence countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh etc. that were capable of sending their considerable and professional military personnel. To a question why these countries should join the coalition forces, the US foreign policy stand was clear: that 'any country that joins us, will have advantage in political and economic fields' in the post war reconstruction of Iraq. The US clarification made it abundantly clear that those responding positively to the US request will be serving their own self-interests and not a charity to the Coalition Authority (CA). Therefore each country which thinks of sending troops should self-

¹⁰⁸ A senior MEA official was sent to Jordan, Kuwait and other neighbouring countries to understand their opinion on India's sending troops. His report disfavored the deployment.

¹⁰⁹ *The Hindu*, June 18, 2003.

finance their deployment.¹¹⁰ This self-financing of deployment was definitely a big question for interested countries like Bangladesh.¹¹¹ But even if it was solved there were others more daunting questions. Igor Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister,¹¹² visited India on June 20 to impress upon the plain fact that Resolution 1483 does not offer any 'clear mandate' to send troops by the UN member countries. The Russian Foreign Minister also said that the ground situation in Iraq is worsening day by day. The Amnesty International termed the situation 'turbulent'. In addition, the assessment made by India's Ministry of External Affairs, after consulting Iraq's neighbors, categorically meant that Iraq's neighbors want India to stay out.

Though all the inputs were not yet put in place, the conviction in defense and foreign ministries of the Government of India was getting crystallized to the opinion that the coalition forces in Iraq are heading for a tougher time. A situation of chaos or even a civil war was not ruled out. Simultaneously, in an effort to put complete sincerity to the crucial diplomatic exercise, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) of the Ministry of Defense identified units for the probable deployment in Iraq. A full infantry division of around 17000, aided by artillery and armored brigades and led by a two-star general (Major-General) was announced on June 20, 2003.¹¹³

The portents of the final political decision became visible when on June 20 Bharatiya Janata Party, the majority party in the ruling National Democratic Alliance, formally disfavored the troops under US command.¹¹⁴

The ground situation in Iraq and approaching Assembly elections were commented upon as more probable causes for breaking the silence against the crucial 'yes'. Within two days, another right-flank party fell in for 'No'. Shiva Sena's (basically a regional party in Maharashtra province) Chief Bala Saheb Thackery said "the US did not consult us before invading Iraq. Besides it has

¹¹⁰ Robert, D. Blackwill, 'India could play a major role in Iraq.' *The Hindu*, June 20, 2003.

¹¹¹ General Colin Powell, US Secretary of State visited Bangladesh for troops deployment on 19 June 2003.

¹¹² Igor Ivanov is the Russian Foreign Minister, Supposedly came to India on a schedule visit.

¹¹³ June 21, 2003, *The Hindu*, 'Army identifies Unit for deployment in Iraq.'

¹¹⁴ *The Hindu*, June 21, 2003.

been supplying financial and military support to Pakistan. We cannot loose our Jawans in clearing up other's mess".

The NDA meet on 20 June 2003, however left the final decision to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister left for China buying some more time and leaving the decision wide open. For the next ten days or so the situation only further worsened in Iraq. Simultaneously, domestic pressure was mounting heavily on Bush and Blair. Six UK soldiers were killed in Basra on June 26, and the US encountered more organized and fatal attacks in the Sunni dominated triangle (the region between Al-Ramadi, Baqubah and Baghdad) and also else where. Meanwhile, Blair assured the British Parliament that 19-20 countries are likely to join peace keeping operations. The Democrats in the US asked Bush to muster a global force for Iraq, in particular the involvement of NATO. Consequently the month of July began with renewed pressure from the US and UK on friends and allies. Mr. Kanwal Sibal, the Foreign Secretary, reached Washington on July 2, 2003 for the final round of talks.

At home Mr. George Fernandes, India's Defense Minister revealed that the Pentagon team had failed to convince India on three issues. The involvement of UN, command and control of Indian troops, and the logistics, implying thereby that these were the issues Kanwal Sibal was expected to hammer out in the US. This was the time of some decision-making.

Government of India's ambiguity on the Indian troop deployment in Iraq invited piqued domestic pressure. All the major newspapers disfavored troops' deployment in their well-argued editorials. Several senior academicians strongly opposed the deployment in a joint statement issued on July 2. The statement read "sending of troops would do immense violence to all values the country has cherished since the freedom struggle. We cannot be identified as an occupying imperialist force. It'll be a mission for war making not peacemaking. We'll be sending a terribly wrong message to the people not only in Arab countries but also to our friends around the world including Europe and the US." ¹¹⁵ A number of regional organizations also made their representations

¹¹⁵ The Signatories to the statement included Prof. G.K.Chaqdhra, V.C., J.N.U., Prof. V.P. Dutt, former M.P. and former Pro-V.C. Delhi University, Prof. Bipan Chandra, eminent historian, Prof.

against the deployment. The Sarvodaya leaders Siddharaj Dhadda asked the Prime Minister not to succumb to the US pressure.¹¹⁶

Kanwal Sibal on his return said that there are some 'Grey Areas' in Resolution 1483. He added that even if we could not send the troops, it would not impair the India-US bilateral relations. It implied that his Washington talks failed to hammer out the issue to India's satisfaction. When asked, has not the US been able to convince India, he said, "they don't have to convince us. We have to convince ourselves". The Government of India however, was still far from being final on the decision. The parleys during the second week of July were hectic. Though the Army was prepared, the civil protests were piling up. A major protest march in which hundreds of activists of CPI (M) New Democracy, scholars, intellectuals, academicians, social activists and political leaders, along with Naujavan Bharat Sabha and Janhastakshep was organised in Delhi on July 10. By this time even the RSS changed its track, now strongly disfavoring troops placement under US authority. On July 12, the government decided 'on balance of considerations' that it cannot send troops to Iraq. The official decision formally announced was dated July 14. It said the entire Iraq crisis lacks any kind of UN sanctions. India does not want the repeat of IPKF and then there's no point in self-financing this deployment to get the Indian troops fired at in Iraq.¹¹⁷

Moreover, Indian assessment of ground situation was not favorable. 'Yes' to the deployment would have also alienated the countries of the West Asia, with Iran in particular.¹¹⁸ Apparently, the political elite felt that the probable economic and political gains are to be sidelined for important strategic considerations. Richard Boucher, the State Department spokesperson of the US responded, "We would have hoped that India would have made a different choice." The newly appointed George Bush's Press Secretary, Scott

Mushirul Hasan, Director, Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamica and seven more nosed scholar intellectuals of Delhi.

¹¹⁶ Siddharaj Dhadda wrote on the behalf of All-India Sarva Seva Sangh.

¹¹⁷ A Report in *The Hindu* citing an un-named reliable source, estimated it would be Rs. 130 million per annum.

¹¹⁸ *The Hindu*, July 15, 2003.

McClellan said “it remains our hope over time that India will be able to join these efforts too as many others countries are”. The US declared its intentions of looking for a broader mandate on Iraq to enable key nations in Europe and Asia to participate in Iraq. India expressed its hope of consideration in the wake of any such development in the UN. At the time of writing this paper any such resolution is yet to come. But even if it comes, would US compromise on its stand of not giving total control to the UN is being vigorously debated in Indian political circles. Even the Resolution 1483 has come under severe criticism. Some experts felt that the UN has tainted its image by its association with the US invasion of Iraq. Much of this criticism emerged after the August 19 Canal Hotel bomb blast (place where the UN office is head quartered in Baghdad). It further alienated the UN association with the US invasion of Iraq. The attack killed the Brazilian diplomat Sergio viera de Mello, posted in Iraq as Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan in June. Sergio de Mello had announced on arrival in Iraq that his foremost endeavour was to ensure that “freedom, dignity and security could be taken for granted by all Iraqis”.¹¹⁹

The grief and shock expressed by the international community at the incident meant a few important lessons for India. First, the situation in Iraq is getting day by day from bad to worse; second, the US forces and the UN activities not only lacked coordination but shared tension. The local population is apparently expressing their disapproval with the UN for its association with the invading forces. In this respect what are the prospects of US forces coordinating with Indian troops and establishments if put in Iraq? Lastly, the optimism in India that Iraqis might never welcome the US, but will feel relieved with the presence of international community through UN, from a friendly country like India, got dampened. The writing on the wall was clear: any form of association with Coalition Authority (CA) will bring in adverse reaction from common Iraqis and violent attacks from the Iraqi resistance groups.

¹¹⁹ Kofi Annan described the attack as an “act of unprovoked and murderous violence” and mourned the death of de Mello and his colleagues as a “bitter blow” for the UN. *Frontline*, September 12, 2003, pp. 52-56.

Considering these developments, India expressed its unwillingness to send the troops even after the UNSC Resolution 1483. Though the permanent commitment to this statement is doubtful indefinitely, it at least affirmed the decision in unambiguous terms against Indian military deployment Iraq. Later, in August 2003, the Defense Ministry said that India in fact has no troops to spare due to current domestic compulsions. This is India's current position on the issue.

With this development the initial phases of Indian dilemma about involvement in Iraq crisis is over.

Contexts

To make larger sense of the picture, it would be helpful to locate these developments in a larger context. One important development since the mid - 1990s is the increasing military cooperation between India and the US. In response to India's immediate and long-term security concerns to acquire the needed deterrence capacity, the earlier reluctant US decided to come forward to strengthen the Indo-US military ties. This is largely perceived as mutually beneficial as both countries have unique experiences in fighting low intensity/guerilla warfare and insurgency operations. From virtually no interaction upto January 2001, the U.S. and India today have completed eight major military exercises. 'COPE INDIA 02' held in Agra was the first and largest peace keeping command-post exercise ever held in South Asia. 'GERONIMO THRUST' held in Alaska was an endeavor which involved Indian forces and aircraft on American soil for the first time¹²⁰. In the field of defence sales, the Bush administration has worked with the US Congress to amend the requiring Congressional notification of all applications for export to

¹²⁰ Operation 'Cope India' was held from 11-26 May 2002 and Geronimo Thrust during 29 September to 11 October 2002. During the same time, interestingly, USA was having a similar kind of military exercise with Pakistan in the Jhelum-Khariyan area, after a gap of 5 years. In the post 9/11 World Scenario, such military operations have dramatically increased. Every country seems to have been participating. For eg. Indian had a naval exercise with France named Garud-I, II and III at Mumbai, Goa and in the Arabian Sea respectively from May to November 2002. On July 10, 2003 India participated in a multinational naval exercise called SUMMEREX in Indian Ocean. USA, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Madagascar, Mauritius and Indian participated in the exercise. India, infact had a first ever Sino-Indian military exercise off Sanghai on China's eastern coast as recently as November 14, 2003.

India of items on the US munitions list. Since October 24, 2002, the amendment stated, inter alia that only those major defense equipment (MDE) items above \$14 million require Congressional notice. This modification puts India in the same category with the US Treaty Allies such as South Korea and Japan. India has also recently leased several additional Fire-finding weapon locating radars in addition to those already contracted for purchase. Representatives from the Indian and US army are examining the Indian Army's requirement for significant Special Forces equipment and chemical and biological protection gear. The US and India are also looking into possible sales of the US Navy P3 maritime patrol aircraft for the Indian Navy¹²¹.

Some commentators argued that the US is trying to prop-up Indian as its subordinate partner in the South Asian region, and is doing so by beefing-up defense sales and exercises. Some elements in India are in fact receptive to it. But on the other hand it is ignored that the US Arms Sales Act of 1950s which is valid till now and India's self reliance policy are totally incompatible. At this point one must also take cognizance of the fact that the world has seen a qualitative change after the end of Cold War; and with the emergence of global terrorism as the common enemy of all the civil societies. From this sense, US and India coming closer - great democracies in their own regard- is understandable. The 2003 National Security Strategy of the United States, a policy document that bears the personal stamp of President Bush, proclaimed:

“...The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We've a common interest in the free flow of commerce including through the vital sea-lanes of Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and creating a strategically stable Asia. We start with a view of India as a growing world power with which we've common strategic interests”.¹²²

¹²¹ Robert D. Blackwill, 'U.S India Defense Cooperation', *The Hindu*, May 13, 2003.

¹²² C.f. Report Blackwill, 'U.S. India Defence Cooperation' *The Hindu*, May 13, 2003.

American expectations from growing military ties have been manifold. Indian navy in collaboration with the US navy could plan and execute a variety of joint operations in Indian Ocean. India could service the rest, repair, replenishment needs of various US military units operating in and around the South Asian landmass. The US and India could share much more information, improve doctrine and conduct exercise in support of Joint counter-proliferation operations. Importantly, India could collaborate with the US in peace-keeping operations by playing a greater role in providing intra-theatre lift for countries involved in humanitarian or peace keeping missions under a UN mandate.

Richard Boucher expressed his optimism in this context by saying that the US still hopes for revocation of the decision with regard to deployment of troops in Iraq; and India has also hinted that it may reconsider the troops deployment in case of favorable conditions¹²³.

The point here is for how long India can refrain from the US expectations from this new relationship. At this point of time, the growing Indo-US military inter-action does not envisage such automatic reaction from India in the pursuit of the US national interests globally. However, if a similar demand is made on India by the US in case of Afghanistan, either directly or through the UN, how India will respond needs to be pondered over. For instance, due to increased demand on NATO forces (which are currently deployed in Afghanistan), if India is requested to lend its military to replace the present NATO forces to Karzai government how India will respond to it?

The domestic transitions at home as discussed in chapter 1 form yet another context for India to make vigorous participation in the Iraq crisis. To think of it again - at the time of independence, India was convinced about the efficacy of socialism, self-sufficiency and non-alignment. Vast economic differences, colonial fears of trading companies and presence of two blocs made that logic look just right. In the field of foreign policy the Pakistan and

¹²³ Ibid.

China factor narrowed the focus to the region and elsewhere it assumed tacit pro-USSR approach.

It took the collapse of USSR and economic liberalization of the country in 1991 that this inwardness not only ceased but in fact blossomed into a frank outwardness.¹²⁴ Ideological and anti-colonial rhetoric made way to concrete and urgent bilateral and multilateral trade pacts. Commodities and tariffs replaced ideals and postures. Fear of foreign companies got replaced by mad rush to invite Foreign Direct Investment. Relevance of NAM was not only being questioned but also a constructive and engaging alignment with strong partners recommended. Domestically, increasing politicization of groups at lower end of the socio-economic spectrum, as a result of Mandal Report brought the rise of regional parties as well as the large chunk of the population asking for a share in political and economic gains of freedom.¹²⁵ In addition to this the burgeoning middle class stepped up their effort to claim higher standard of living and more number of jobs.¹²⁶

Now, the stymied growth rate of 2.5% to 3.5% during the preceding (Socialist) decades was unable to sustain this new growing India. Not only a fast GDP growth rate (touching 9% over time) but also an India with capacity to exercise nuclear option and portray as 'powerful' became the concomitant essentials of the psyche of emerging India. During the last decade India not only emerged as the biggest market but also the Indian professionals are dominating the international market and Indian Capital is looking for overseas markets. The great Indian Diaspora has spread world over and has formed rich and influential lobbies in many a country.

The point of argument here is that *these advancements created a thrust in the engine of foreign policy to reach out and grab the opportunities to further and strengthen the economic and strategic calculations.* Opportunities of economic engagement, diplomatic endeavor and strategic security became the collective turf for the

¹²⁴ Anderson Walter, "Recent Trends in Indian Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, No. 5, (Sept/October 2001), pp. 765-776.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Jayantanuja Bandhopadhyaya, "from Nalignment to Pro-Imperialism: Class and, Foreign Policy in India", *The Marxist* XIX2, (April-June 2003).

foreign policy to traverse. And, the current crisis in Iraq found itself at the very bent of this path.

The Debate

If not the war on Iraq, but definitely the issue of India sending its troops for deployment in war ravaged turbulent Iraq, has emerged as the matter of great controversy. It has affected not only the strategic, political and economic circles, but also the scores of soldiers, their families and almost every concerned citizen. Each analyzed the issue according to respective losses and gains that could be accrued and participated in the debate. In addition, the 1990-91 developments in Iraq and Kuwait where large scale Indian migrant labor worked created its own dynamics to the debate. India, this time understood the volatility of the situation and decided to take the decision to the advantage of the majority. That is, the exercise required a democratic decision. To note that how this debate proceeded and likely to proceed in such future crises, we have to earmark the constituencies of the participants and the dominant logics that were floated by them. Economic actors, strategic analysts, and civil society formed three independent constituencies. Military, owing to the democratic set up in India, did not participate in the debate as openly as other actors did. Yet it is important at least to note the perspective from which it looked at the developments. On the basis of logics floated, the constituency of economic actors favored the troops' deployment for the obvious economic gains that would emerge in the Iraq's reconstruction. Strategic analysts were divided between 'yes' and 'no', majority however favoring 'no'. The civil society was emotionally against the deployment. The leaders of political parties did think of repeating Nehru or Churchill by actively participating in International affairs, but their parties, considering the constraints of electoral politics and nearing Assembly and Lok Sabha elections could not let them take the risk of supporting an expedition which was sure to bring back coffins. For a soldier, such a posting would have definitely meant a substantial financial benefit, but the gravity of such a deployment and fear of casualties were too important questions that he was not willing to ignore.

The economic actors were not articulate enough to connect their logic of economic gains from Iraq and the deployment of troops there. They made their arguments within the framework of great boom in reconstruction of Iraq. The fear of economic slowdown at the beginning of the war later turned into the Iraq-ward ho. As early as April 10, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) decided to send a business delegation to New York to present the India's case to the UN office of Iraq programme (UNOIP) in a bid to maximize the country's business stake in the oil-for-food programme and seek participation in the reconstruction activity of the order of \$ 60 billion in post-war Iraq¹²⁷. By May 12 India expected fructification of orders worth over Rs. 3000 crores of goods and materials. In fact, at that point of time the prospects for Indian companies appeared brighter. However, it was argued from the other fronts that all major contracts have been clinched by the US-UK multi-nationals; and what Indian and others countries stood to gain were sub-contracts and labor tenures.

This side argued Indians are not in competition with the US, UK firms. Indian PSUs like IRCON and RITES have executed rail and other projects worth over Rs. 500 crore in Iraq in the 1980s¹²⁸. The Indian presence, however, has never been mega nor was it ever envisaged. In the current run up, it is scrambling to reassure its old position and perhaps to get an inch more. Interestingly, no concrete proposal emanated from either CII or FICCI that sought to project Indian Industrial and labor presence getting mega if the Indian troops are deployed. The President of CII, Anand Mahindra, however commended the government's diplomacy in not condemning the US war on Iraq outright, since it is likely to yield rich dividends ultimately for Indian corporates. Accepting that Indian economic presence there as sub-contractors, he said, "given the proximity to the region and India's ability to provide quality product at a relatively low cost, Indian companies will be the most competitive in areas like cheap automobile, food items, particularly wheat, potato and tea,

¹²⁷ A.C. Muthiah, President FICCI, reported in the *Hindu* April 11, 2003.

¹²⁸ See Girijesh C. Pant, "Indo-Gulf Economic Relations: A Profile", in Verinder Grover (ed.) *West Asia and India's Foreign Policy*; also see Gilles Boquerat, "Indian Response to Gulf Crisis of 1990-91", *International Studies*, 38,4 (2001), pp. 427-440.

stand to regain an old market at a firmer footing”¹²⁹. Around 78 companies have showed interest in Iraq. Mr. P.K. Sarathy, CEO of Tata Consultancy Engineering led a 25 member Indian team to explore grounds for these companies¹³⁰. India’s former Prime Minister Mr. Inder Kumar Gujral terming this industrial enthusiasm as an illogical contractomania, questioned the bloated up estimates of FICCI that over a period of 8 years, the reconstruction package would amount to \$ 500 billion.¹³¹ Favoring a grounded \$ 100 bn. estimate for Iraq from Iraq oil exports over 5 years; he opined there is something un-Indian and undignified in becoming a sub-contractor to the Pentagon and American multinationals. Perhaps ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Commission) was the only company that showed definite signs of its independent presence in Iraq. ONGC’s subsidiary ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) found its Block-8 oil exploration contract it had secured in Nov 2000, in tact¹³². The company has declared its plans to start drilling as soon as the situation in Iraq stabilized. The OVL is also in race to acquire the entire Tuba oil field capable of producing 200,000 b/d. Guided by the spirit of winning faith of Iraqis, the company has also planned to construct an oxygen plant for Iraqi hospitals and supply Rs. 100,000 worth of medicines¹³³.

Strategic analysts, as mentioned, were divided between ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. The proponents of ‘Yes’ were those who sought to connect the Greater India of the past with that of future. The connection ranged from the days of great Hindu civilization to the more recent Curzonian conception of natural India. Dr. C. Raja Mohan, articulated this Curzonian conception of taking greater diplomatic leaps for fixing natural frontiers of India, in his recently released book ‘Crossing the Rubicon: the Shaping of India’s Foreign Policy¹³⁴.’ Raja

¹²⁹ Bonanza likely for corporates in Iraq, *The Hindu*, May 2, 2003

¹³⁰ Indian Government also decided to send R.M. Abhyankar, Secretary in the MEA to Washington for talks with US officials on India’s participation in the massive reconstruction. Programme ‘Bright Prospects for Indian Companies’, *The Hindu*, April 12, 2003.

¹³¹ Inder Kumar Gujral based his assessment on the basis of Middle East Economic Survey estimates. Inder Kumar Gujral, “Real Purpose of troops to Iraq” *The Hindu*, June 19, 2003.

¹³² *Middle East Economic Survey* (MEES) 4, Dec. 2000.

¹³³ *The Hindu*, August 4, 2003.

¹³⁴ C. Raja Mohan, “*Crossing the Rubicon: the shaping of India’s foreign policy*”. This book was released by National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra.

Mohan saw a rare opportunity for India to be seized in Iraq.¹³⁵ Criticizing India's indecisiveness because of lack of UN mandate, he questioned, India's sympathy lies with whom, UN or Iraqi people? At this crucial time it was important to serve the national interest than promote multilateralism.

He argued, India's long term interests in Iraq are straight forward. It has a big stake in the political stability of Iraq, the establishment of an early representative government that will run the nation on modern, secular lines. India also has strong economic and energy interests to protect and develop Iraq. An India that moves boldly will be in a better position to shape the international debate on the future of Iraq and the Gulf. An India that ducks for UN cover will become marginal to Gulf Security. Inder Kumar Gujral disagreeing with such a stand articulated logic against the deployment.¹³⁶ Clarifying the concept, he argued, in the classical sense peace keeping implies the insertion of alien army units between two clashing groups of a country that may agree to stop fighting. And Iraq is obviously not such a case. It is an occupation. Deployment of Indian troops in the so called stabilization (not a peace keeping) force would mean nothing but stabilization of an occupation. And as the occupation is begotten by aggression, assistance in the occupation is tantamount to endorsing the aggression. It would be finicky to take such a stand after the Parliamentary Resolutions of 8th and 9th April 2003. Further straightening up the tenor of much celebrated coming closer of US and India, he opined, the felling of Saddam Hussein regime was the easier-part. The Pentagon is eminently qualified to undertake such tasks. To pacify and administer Iraq is not a task America is particularly competent to undertake. Moreover, the UNSC Resolution 1483 does not give mandate for any UN commanded force in Iraq. The mere fact that this Resolution has emerged from the portals of the UN does not obliterate the presence of the US as the dominant authority in Iraq.

Mr. Gujral called quid pro quo arguments of the US changing its pro-Pak policy and supporting India for permanent UN seat if India pledges its

¹³⁵ C. Raja Mohan: 'A rare opportunity', *The Hindu*, May 26, 2003.

¹³⁶ Inder Kumar Gujral, *ibid*.

troops to Iraq as illusionary. As the American foreign policy is run on its own strategic calculations it would be naive to expect the US to change its track in South Asia. India should take the final decision on its own merits.

Yet another streak of debate was to forecast the probable situation that might emerge when the troops are sent. Examples of Vietnam (1960's for US), Afghanistan (1980 for USSR) and Sri Lanka (1980s for India) were put forward. Most strategists feared the repeat of Sri Lanka.¹³⁷ The Indian peace-keeping contingent went to Sri Lanka as friends and saviors of the Jaffna Tamils and ended up provoking the hostility to India to such an extent that they assassinated the former Indian Prime Minister. Whatever may be said about the Indian performance in Sri Lanka, there were and are no two opinions about India's intentions, which were strictly honorable. In any case, India was invited by the legitimate government of Sri Lanka requesting India to send its troops. The other side forwarded the argument that India participated in non-Blue helmet operations in its neighborhood and brought peace swiftly to the country. The question of financing the deployment was also debated. Since the gains were unseen, self-financing was considered too risky and unsustainable an investment.

Indian Defense establishment played a neutral role in this controversy that swirled the entire country. Like a professional and loyal force, it abides by the final political decision.¹³⁸ The Sri Lanka experience, however, remains embedded in Indian military memory as an example of ambivalent, uncertain and unclear political direction on the strategic purposes of military psyche. In case of Iraq two issues were of considerable debate first, is it justified to ask the Indian military to continue a war declared unjust by the nation's parliament? And second, under whose command? The military would need to know the objectives of their deployment in Iraq. Unlike its deployment within India where the objectives are safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, such objectives would be amiss in case they are deployed in a foreign territory. Whose strategic and political aims they would serve if before

¹³⁷ Chinmaya R Gharekhan, 'Troops to Iraq', *The Hindu*, June 18, 2003.

¹³⁸ See V.R. Raghavan, 'Military Perspectives on Iraq' *The Hindu*, July 10, 2003.

any action they had to seek the orders of the US command structure? The Coalition Authority (CA) headed by Paul Bremer would instruct Indian commanders as to which political groups would be subdued and which group to be marginalized. In reality the US interests as viewed through its geo-political prism, would determine the Indian military operations in Iraq. What If there is a clash between Indian and US strategic considerations? It happened in Kosovo where Indian military commanders' perceptions varied with NATO troops under whom they were supposed to operate. In such a case Indian military commanders will be let in to an extremely insidious situation. It is what has been called the "grey area", "risky territory" and "a quagmire".¹³⁹ It involves numerous daily incidents that would crop up only after the actual deployment. Therefore it forms the critical input before any decision is taken now or in future. Next, death of a soldier for one's country earns the proud badge of a martyr for him, his family and the nation. How would this be accommodated for another country and for some one else's war? Domestic reaction, in clear words, would become unbearable in the long run. It would involve a great statesmanship on the part of political leaders to convince the nation. However, if such internationalism is brought under the purview of national interest, then it might add an aspect or more to the conception of Indian nationalism.

CONCLUSION

Interestingly, the issue of sending troops to Iraq generated a lot of intense debate in India. The final decision of July 14, 2003 of not sending the troops was an outcome of strategic calculations of the government and democratic ethos of the country's polity. To imagine the larger picture it is the process not the decision that assumes importance. The seriousness with which the issue was deliberated upon indicates the firmly entrenched elements of consensus politics in Indian foreign policy orientation. The ambiguities of UNSC Resolution 1483 of 22 May, 2003 were understood by 29th May by the

¹³⁹ Government used the term 'grey area'. Kannal Sibal, July 4, *The Hindu*, *Frontline* did a cover story calling Iraq a 'quagmire'. August 29, 2003 issue 'Risky territory' was the expression, used with a restraint in general reporting and by the analysts.

government, but it decided to postpone the decision. India for the first time sought deliberation on the question of troop deployment under non-UN command outside the region. Growing economic might, relations with the US strategic ambitions and economic gains were some of the factors that made India think seriously of military participation in the stabilization of aggression it has condemned through the Parliamentary Resolution. It for the first time, took note of the hard facts of international politics, which were debated intensely. It tried to respond to the expectations from section of world community. It sought constructive activity through a wider debate among all the affected nations. It is nevertheless a different matter that on the balance of consensus arrived at, it decided against the Indian troop deployment. The future calculations might also follow the same or might even not. Iraq is just a case; India has to decide on a number of emerging future crises. India decided to 'remain in' but the process was set to consult as extensively as possible, both inside the country and with friends before thinking in terms of 'going out'. It is regarding the debate about 'going out' that the transition is all about.

CONCLUSION

The US invasion of Iraq in the month of March 2003 can be taken as a watermark of US imperialism. Since March 2003 US intentions behind this aggression have become clearer and on the other hand present and future of poor Iraqis have gone murkier. Thousands of Iraqis are killed and huge numbers of them are fatally wounded. The psychological and social security of each Iraqi is shaken to peril. US invasion of Iraq is the worst human tragedy of this century, inflicted on innocent people.

India and many other countries could not do any thing to avert it. It is only the so called terrorists that are waging a nerve raking war against illegal occupation by US. Right from the beginning it had appeared clear that the US wants to lead the war on terrorism according to its whims but as it is the sole superpower not many choices were left with other nations. When India decided to do its bit it was guided by its assessment that things in Iraq will go wrong, but perhaps even India had not have imagined such a rut as Iraq is seeing now. Peace and prosperity seem distant today. It is definitely sad for Iraq but sadder for US who lost the moral right to lead the war against terror in its gibberish designs in Iraq. India had volunteered itself for this war, courtesy the right wing government at centre, but American calculations discouraged every bit of excitement in supporting it any longer. But again it is the nature of American unipolarity that most countries despite not liking American policies can not detach themselves from the universal net of America controlled world economics. Choice available mostly is limited only to criticism of its politics but coming round to it in any case so as to safeguard the economic well being of the globe and respective countries. India found itself in this predicament. On its role in criticizing the invasion, India did condemn it, but there were convulsions in drafting the condemnation in parliamentary resolution. Strangely it also showed enthusiasm in claiming the spoils once the first shock and awe phase was over.

What it implies is that there was not unanimity in deriding the aggression or there was heightened degree of realism which impelled to make material good from whatever the situation. There is a distinction that is required to be made- though all political parties condemned aggression but most right wing parties criticized not because it was morally outrageous but because India was not consulted or given a position equal enough of a Legitimate Regional General in the command of anti-terror alliance. The convulsion was about position that India deserves because of its size, population and importantly the historical greatness. And the economic and military might that remains amiss here can best be got by allying with powerful or by giving a damn to morality. It is sad for many in India that America preferred Pakistan over India.

But at the same time it is not fully justified to blame rightwing forces for whatever they felt remained only as a rhetoric or dramatics; the final position that India actually took was consistent with traditional anti-American position. What is important at this point is to note that there has been a context in appearing that argues for India to project itself as great power. Right wing just wants to hasten it. This work argues that this context has begun to appear from 1991 onwards owing to the economic liberalization, onerous demand in the economy to grow fast so as to accommodate more and more population in prosperity, strengthening of rightwing forces since 1989 elections(talking of great to greater India) and internationally the collapse of USSR, emergence of USA as the sole power. Rise of international terrorism has served India as a means to stage perform its first claim to this greatness, in which, sadly it has not been so greatly successful.

Terrorism apart there have been a great deal of literature that has come up projecting India's greatness and its emergence as a great power. There has emerged a fertile ground for such a debate. To take a note of this debate we have for e.g. Sandy Gordon (*India's rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and beyond, 1995*), Stephen Cohen (*India: Emerging Power, OUP, 2001*) and Barry Buzan (*South Asia Moving Towards Transformation: Emergence of India as a Great Power, 2002*).). They saw rise of India from their respective perspectives. For Cohen

it was from American point of view whereas for Buzan it was according to his Security Complex Theory (SCT). An Indian addition to this has been very recently made by C.Rajamohan (*Crossing the Rubicon: Changes in Indian Foreign Policy, 2003*) where he argues for reviving Curzonian map of India in which geographical frontiers extend to West Asia, central Asia and South East Asia. It needs to be observed that all these publications are conceived after 1991 giving credence to our argument that post 1991 India has seen the unleashing of energies favorable to India. There is however an ambiguity in defining what separates greater India from a great India. Great is ok but greater is imperial, though there is always a tendency for a great nation to become greater, as USA is going through at present. It will be a difficult task to determine this as India will encounter from the crises like the current one in Iraq. Afghanistan could be next.

The domestic interface however creates most indomitable context of how and when that great India would emerge. If we tabulate some of the orientations that seem to have been visible in the domestic polity it can be seen that India is entering a new phase, where it has challenges to face as well as opportunities to avail. India is definitely growing economically stronger, but the question remains for whom and how? If it is for a few business houses and limited services and at the cost of neglect of agriculture than such an economic might is difficult to survive for long.

S.No.	Factors	Influenced by	BEFORE 1991	AFTER 1991
1.	Geography	Degree of industrialization and level of technology	Vulnerability at Himalayas. More dangerous Indian Ocean however remained safe.	Protection through Wiring and resort to advanced technology to track human movement at passes and porous frontiers. Increased attention on Indian ocean. Defense cooperation across Indian ocean.
2.	Tradition and History	Discovery and constant rediscovery of it.	Composite tradition accepted as the hallmark. Influence of leftist history.	Chinks highlighted in composite culture with rightist history confronting leftist.
3.	The Social Structure	Reach of the elements of cohesion. Social organization and discrimination.	Pains of Partition paving way for stabilization. Secularism promoted as the state policy for social cohesion.	Doubts over the efficacy of secularism; appearance of allegations like pseudo-secularism. Feeling of unease among minorities.
4.	Political Organisation	Degree of democratic freedom.	Congress – dynastic wisdom with little scope for alternative front.	Appearance of regional parties, they with the emergence of BJP eroded Congress as the only choice. Ensuance of coalition era and political compulsion of consensus based decisioning
5.	Economy	Direction and intensity of State planning and policies.	Centrally planned socialist economy with emphasis upon import substitution and achieving self reliance.	Beginning of Indicative planning and pursuance of policies of liberalization, privatization and globalization of economy in 1991. Reduced role of the State.

6.	Leadership	Socio-education background and individual dispositions.	Towering dynastic personalities of international standing. Elitist traditional and ideal decision makers.	New regional brand of leadership. Pressures from coalition partners minimizing the dynamism of the leader.
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Military might glitters only when there is at least enough for every mouth to eat though it is not a rule. On the other hand any challenge to its multi religious and multi ethnic fabric is detrimental to its projection as a great power of any right.

India perhaps needs to wait a little longer. Hastening up to eat one's due hot curry, as an old tale says, might lead to burning of the fingers.

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

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