

**ROLE OF SRILANKA IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
(1961-1976)**

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PREFACE

A study of Sri Lanka adhering to the principles of non-alignment and playing an active part in the movement over a 15 years (1961 to 1976, that is being covered under this study) is relevant at a time when the international scene is still unpredictable.

Sri Lanka is an instance of how a small country without military or economic resources to be feared of by others could by virtue of its diplomatic resourcefulness have been able to successfully conduct its foreign policy. The evolution of foreign policy in Sri Lanka is essentially shaped by the stand it took as a non-aligned nation on various international issues. Tracing the course of Sri Lanka's involvement in the non-alignment movement virtually enables us to obtain a clear picture of the foreign policy perspective of the country during these years.

Since the subject of study is historical in nature reliance is placed more on recorded evidence. Efforts have been made to study the primary sources to the extent possible, and to analyse and interpret them in their proper perspective. The primary sources consist of the various declarations, joint communiques, trade protocols, texts of treaties, parliamentary debates, extracts from speeches, exchange of correspondence between leaders of countries or heads of Governments and other allied documents.

As for the secondary sources, journals, periodicals etc. have been fully made use of and analysed. The books available on

the subject particularly with a bearing on Sri Lanka are not numerous. Most of the books dealing in general with Sri Lanka have been consulted. Dissertations on any allied subject by scholars from Indian Universities are very few. With all these limitations a cogent and chronological account has been attempted.

The dissertation has been divided into five chapters the first being introductory, intended to familiarise the readers with the concept of non-alignment and Sri Lanka's initial participation in the movement. The second chapter deals with the period from the birth of independence upto the death of SWRD Bandaranaike. The third chapter deals with the period which begins from 1960 when Sirimavo Bandaranaike became the Prime Minister and ends with the coming to close of Dudley Senanayake's Prime Ministership in 1970. Again the division of the period on a ten yearly basis has been adopted as it corresponds with the duration of the terms of two Prime Ministers in Office. The term of an elected Government is treated as a milestone as in Sri Lanka peculiarly enough with every election there was a change of Government and with every change of Government there was change of policy approach.

The fourth chapter narrates the events during the period of Sirimavo Bandaranayake which culminated in the Colombo summit in 1976. The study stops with the Colombo summit.

As far as Sri Lanka is concerned the Colombo summit is the pinnacle of the success of its efforts in the non-alignment movement with its having succeeded to the Chairmanship of the movement. It had played the role of a hero at the summit and brought about the success of the summit in establishing a fair measure of ^{consensus} in many of the resolutions. This is to be appreciated all the more in the context of increased membership and of divergent shades of opinions. The ^{summing} up of all the chapters ^{are} given as conclusion in the fifth chapter.

I commenced my research under Dr. Emmanuel Divien, M.A., M. Litt., Ph.D., who guided me in selecting the topic and helped me in commencing the collection of material. I thank him for the unstinted encouragement and cooperation. Consequent on his transfer to the Department of Indian History, Dr.S. Kadhivel, M.A., Ph.D., took over as my guide. His invaluable direction, guidance and critical appraisal at every stage has greatly contributed to the completion of this dissertation. I can not adequately express my deep debt of gratitude to Dr. Kadhivel.

I thank Dr. V. Suryanarayan, M.A. Ph.D., Professor and Head of the Department, Centre for South & SouthEast Asian Studies, University of Madras, for providing me this opportunity to carryout this research and for giving valuable suggestions. My thanks are due to the staff, Librarian, and colleagues of the centre for South & SouthEast Asian Studies, for the help and advice rendered by them

during the course of my work. I am grateful to the Librarian and Staff of the Madras University Library and the Connemara Library for their assistance. I must also thank the Librarian, and Staff of the Indian Council of World Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs and Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, New Delhi, without whose assistance I could not have collected the needed material easily.

I cannot forget to record the help and assistance given at the various stages of the writing of this dissertation by Shri C.K. Raman, Research Scholar, working in the Centre. I am also grateful to Shri.M. Rameshkumar, Shri.A. Abdul Raheem, and Shri.M. Jaganathan, who in their own way were helpful to me in my work.

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CONTENTS

	Pages
PREFACE	I-IV
CHAPTER	
I INTRODUCTION	1-14
II NON-ALIGNMENT POLICY-ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATIONS 1948-1959.	15-54
III NON-ALIGNMENT UNDER SRIMAVO BANDARA- NAIKE AND DUDLEY SENANAYAKE.	55-91
IV NON-ALIGNMENT UNDER SRIMAVO BANDARA- NAIKE'S SECOND TERM (1970-77)	92-114
V CONCLUSION	115-119
BIBLIOGRAPHY	I-VI

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of newly independent nations in the aftermath of the second world war and the greatly increased aspirations for freedom and independence among those fledglings had widened the scope for changes in the world. Most of these countries were opposed to all tendencies aimed at drawing and incorporating them into the existing schemes and structures of international axis of power.¹ The conflicts within the inherited system of international political and economic relations and the virtual power vacuum into which these countries were thrown impelled them to search for new modes of international expression and action.² The menace of cold war had prompted them to extricate themselves from the consequences of involvement in the cold war blocs.

The newly independent nations soon realized that during the colonial era they were being deliberately separated by the imperial powers. Conscious of this they made efforts to come together and bring about a consensus among themselves in the matter of evolving a measure of international co-operation. This could broadly be called the Afro-Asian movement³. The initial fruition of these efforts was the first gathering of the Asian Nations held in New Delhi in March 1947 known as

1. A.W. Singham (Ed), The Non-Aligned movement in World politics, Delhi, 1977, pp 6-7.

2. Ibid.

3. G.H. Janson, Afro-Asia and Non-alignment, London, 1966 p.18.

the Asian Relations Conference. The first tentative suggestion of neutralism was made at this conference when it rejected the idea of an area of immobilisation of Asia in the event of war, as impractical.⁴ In all twentyeight countries were represented at this conference. Emboldened by its success one more conference of Asian nations (this time Afro-Asian Nations) was called to discuss the Indonesian question (1949). This conference paved the way for the formation of the Afro-Asian groups solidarity particularly at the United Nations.⁵ For the first time on the Korean Problem (1950), the Afro-Asian Nations were able to exemplify the policy of non-alignment which had first been formulated thus by Jawarharlal Nehru in 1946:

"We propose to function so as progressively to achieve that independence in action both in our domestic affairs and our foreign relations. We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation. We hope to develop close and direct contacts with other nations and to co-operate with them in the furtherance of world peace and freedom"⁶.

4. Ibid pp 57-61

5. Ibid.

6. Jawharlal Nehru, India's Foreign policy, Selected speeches, September 1946-April 1961. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi 1971, p.2.

In April 1954 at a meeting held in Colombo⁷ for discussing the peace settlement in Indo-China the Prime Ministers' of Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka accepted an Indonesian suggestion for a large Afro-Asian conference. This led in April 1955 to the famous Bandung meeting. The importance of Bandung was more as a symbol of a new dimension in world affairs than for any concrete results. It is significant that the subject matter of the conference anticipated many of the basic themes of later day non-alignment⁸.

At Bandung the participants expressed how conscious they were about their weakness. John Kotelwala of Sri Lanka said: "We by contrast come to the conference weak and relatively unarmed. We have no thermo-nuclear bombs in our pockets, no plan for armament factories or blue prints for ever more deadly methods of genocide in our brief cases"⁹. It was apprehended that such weakness would tempt many of them to borrow strength by aligning themselves with one or the other of the blocs and the Bandung leaders wanted to prevent this. Aligning with the super powers, it was thought was the cause of most of the problems and it was asserted that the "only thing that gives thosesnations security is a policy of keeping away from alliance"¹⁰.

7. Veron Mendis, "The policy of Non-Alignment", Marga Quarterly Journal, Colombo, 1976, vol.3, No.3, p.33

8. Ibid.

9. Asian-African Conferences selected documents of the Bandung conference 1955, pp 1,2. Quoted by Jovad Ajami, Foreign Affairs (New York) Winter, 1980/81, p.267.

10. Ibid.

It was a case of the weaker nations joining together not to achieve any military strength but to adopt a policy and thereby gain a psychic sense of security based on the thought that the super powers would not tamper with their freedom and sovereignty in violation of world public opinion, if they exercised non-alignment. Behind the moral attitudes of pacifism and co-existence was a shrewd political instinct that if military strength is not the strong point of some countries allow the weak countries more room for meneavour without joining any of the blocs¹¹.

We should not fail to mention that non-alignment with power-blocs is India's distinctive contribution to international politics, Nehru originated it and since 1947 it has been accepted by several states in Asia, Europe and Africa as part of their foreign policy. Amidst the background of the balance of power system then current, Nehru struck a new path; to him it appeared that a newly independent state was likely to lose its independence of action if it was a camp follower of the one or the other bloc, he also wanted to avail himself of the help which countries of both bloc might be in a position to give in economic development. Nehru also expanded with clarity and vigour that non-alignment was not the same thing as mentality: it was not a negative policy but a positive one; and that it would continue to peace in so far as the area of peace built up by the non-aligned countries would speak the

11. Ibid. p. 368.

language of peace, not of war. All in all it was a new way of looking at international politics which found favour with the bulk of the member independent states says Dr.A. Appadorai¹².

Thus non-alignment was born as an answer to the inadequacy of the balance of power theory¹³. It is not a policy as such but only a principle to be pursued in formulating the foreign policy of a country¹⁴. It simply refers to a state of being aloof from bloc conflicts¹⁵. The minimum criteria for non-alignment emphasises keeping away from military alliances concluded in the context of great power rivalry and an independent outlook in international affairs based on the principles of co-existence¹⁶. During the early stages of non-alignment the negative concept of keeping away from power blocs or refusing to align with them was the main core.

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12. A. Appadurai, Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1981, p.227.
13. T.V. Subba Rao, Non-Alignment in International Politics, New Delhi, 1981, p.20.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Conferences of Non-Aligned states : Documents upto and including the conference of Foreign Ministers held in George Town, Gayana, in August 1972, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1973, p.8.
Hereinafter referred to as Non-aligned Conference documents.

The positive aspect of non-alignment is the country's willingness and ability to exercise independence in international affairs. M.S. Rajan believes that "non-alignment consists essentially in the retention of substantial measure of freedom of policy and action in international affairs"¹⁷. The degree of such freedom is varied as warranted by the its national interest. Nehru observed "the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is more advantageous to the country"¹⁸. Thus by making national interest as the foundation of non-alignment, the concept was projected in international plane as a coherent, comprehensive, integrated international doctrine" says K.P. Misra¹⁹.

The years immediately following the Bandung Conference were marked by a deterioration in the international scene with an eruption of the struggle against colonialism caused by the outbreak of liberation movements, notably in Algiers. The background to this was an escalation of the cold war and an intensification of the arms race leading to dangerous confrontation over the problem of Berlin. There was also the protracted conflict in Indo-China, the inflamatory situation in the Middle-East and tension in the Pacific, reflecting the

17. M.S. Rajan, Non-Alignment : India and the Future, Mysore 1970, p.12 Quoted by T.V. Subba Rao, Opcit., p.2.

18. Jawaharlal Nehru, Op.cit., p.28.

19. T.V. Subba Rao, Op.cit., p.21.

strained relation between America and China in that area following the emergence of the People's Republic of China²⁰. It was against this background that the idea of non-alignment assumed their specific shape. At a meeting held in Cairo in June 1961 the prominent countries professing the creed of non-alignment decided that "in view of the recent world developments and dangerous increase in international tension a conference might be held towards improvement of international relations and the relinquishment of the policy of force and the constructive settlement of pending world issues and conflict"²¹. The result was the first non-aligned summit at Belgrade in 1961.

Initially twenty-five countries accepted the concept and joined the team which met formally for the first time in Belgrade²². Since then by the charisma of the leaders who championed it, the movement gained popularity and strength. Imperialism, colonialism and the allied political problems were the main themes of the non-aligned countries' united efforts during the first few years. Abolition of the remnants of colonialism, external and internal emancipation, peace and security of the world were the watch words of the movement and through periodical conferences, the non-aligned countries created a good measure of international consciousness about these problems²³.

20. Veron Mondis, Op.cit., p.38.
 21. Ibid.
 22. The Hindu, September 8, 1961.
 23. Jayatanuja Bandhopadyaya, "The Non-Aligned Movement and International relations". India Quarterly, New Delhi, June, 1977, Vol. XXXIII, No.2, p. 143.

With the slow consolidation of the non-aligned group the members started realising the importance of economic development. "Poverty, deprivation and "Marginalisation" of the masses in most non-aligned countries have become more widespread than before". Comprehensive analysis of the economic problems facing the non-aligned countries were drawn up and a wide ranging programme to combat it on all fronts were proposed²⁴. Non-aligned initiatives have been pursued through the agency of the U.N. which is one of the main instruments for the implementation of its policies. This was true in the pursuit of a new economic order, ~~where~~^h the U.N. has given the lead. It has thus been the constant endeavour of non-alignment to act in step with the U.N. both in the matter of economic development and in peaceful settlement of disputes. Although economic development is not part of the subject matter of ^{our} was discussion the contribution of the non-alignment movement to the economic betterment of the countries outside the power blocs can not be ignored.

The strength of non-alignment is that its character is unique in history. Today in most parts of the world people have taken or are trying to take charge of their affairs and give expression to their aspirations. This is unlike the past when a few powerful countries dominated the scene pretending to speak for peoples who were in fact down-trodden, This was particularly true of the imperialist

24. Ibid pp. 144-151.

era when a handful of powers claimed possession of over two-thirds of the world. The colonial powers have to face the realities and acknowledge the interests of the majority of the population of the world. This transformation in the character of internationalism is only a transfer of the political changes within states by which power has been vested in the people to the international sphere. Non-alignment has offered an opportunity for the peoples of the world to assert themselves and participate in shaping their destiny. Even if non-alignment did not exist, something comparable would have had to be invented to accommodate these developments²⁵.

A study of Sri Lanka's²⁶ involment in the non-aligned movement is a typical study of one of the small and less significant countries' adoption of the non-aligned policy in its conduct of foreign affairs. Sri Lanka represents the the attitude of small states which prefer non-alignment as against choosing the custodianship of power blocs. It also shows clearly how a country could gain prominence and popularity, among the international community if it shows

25. Veron Mondis, op.cit., pp.42-43.
 26. Ceylon's official name was changed to Sri Lanka on 22, May 1972. In this dissertation the name 'Sri Lanka' has been used evenwhile covering the period prior to 1972.

signs of genuine non-alignment. The political parties of Sri Lanka are polarised in their ideologies and their sympathies are with differing blocs. Invariably they alternate in forming the Government and in spite of this their foreign policy was made to conform to the principles of non-alignment and this runs as a continuing thread. The acceptance of Sri Lanka in the international group as a negotiator, arbitrator and a settler of disputes proves to the world that even small and inconsequential countries could make their voices heard and presence felt. It is the diplomacy of the leaders and their ability to convince the other nations that play a notable role in shaping the image of the country.

During the days immediately following the advent of independence Sri Lanka had developed an attitude of being in closest terms with the U.K. The Defence Agreement²⁷ entered into with Britain and the close co-operation with that country in the formation of policies was highly suggestive of a commitment to follow the U.K. in foreign policy matters. Nationalism in Sri Lanka during the pre-independence days was on a low key and the country, unlike many of the Asian states, obtained its independence not through national struggle but peacefully, as a result of the general decolonisation in the area. Therefore the

27. Detailed discussion made in the Chapter II

natural aversion towards the British that the other countries had developed, was conspicuously absent in Sri Lanka. The leaders had no qualms in accepting the British protective had in defence after the independence also and they even recognised the British queen as the 'symbolic head' of the state²⁸.

The pronounced anti-communist stand that Sri Lanka took in those days and the frequent fulminations of the Prime Ministers directed against communism and the communist countries, although Sri Lanka was not threatened by any of the communist countries, go to show that she was being unduly influenced by the U.K. The seeming alignment could be ascribed to the close tie up with the British and might not be intended to take up the cause of the imperialists deliberately. It was only a reflection of the influence of the U.K. particularly when the Sri Lankan leaders in power were mostly British educated elites susceptible to Western pressure²⁹.

But in matters concerning anti-colonialism and Asian Solidarity Sri Lanka was exhibiting a sympathetic attitude and was even taking great interest at the international meets designed to support the struggles of other countries³⁰. In such matters she did not look for guidance or approval from the U.K.

28. S. Namadivayam, Parliamentary Government in cylon 1948-1958, Colombo 1959, p.30. quoted by D.M. Prasad, Ceylons Foreign policy under the Bandaranaikes, New Delhi, 1973, p.8.

29. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka 1949-1974, London, 1974., p.267.

30. Sri Lanka participated in the Delhi Conference on Indonesia in 1949.

Although Sri Lanka was following the British line of thinking and action in foreign policy matters, yet she had exhibited her inclination not to tow the line of the U.S.A. on many occasions. Her refusal to join the SEATO pact came as a jolt to the U.S.A. Her recognition of China and her signing of the Rice-rubber pact with China much against the wishes of the U.S.A. go to prove that she was not adopting a totally pro-U.S. policy. Preference to national interests was considered more important and she did not meekly agree to all the proposals of the Western powers. In general it was an anti-communist, Pro-Western policy bordering on alignment with the West but with a certain measure of independence in the exercise of foreign policy, that Sri Lanka was following during those formative days. How far can she claim to have adopted a non-aligned attitude during these days is not at all in doubt but it could be said with certainty that it was not a total commitment to the Western Power bloc.

The transformation from such latent alignment and ambivalent condition to a state of strict non-alignment was brought about by the two Prime Ministers, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and Srimavo Bandaranaike. The reversal of policy started in 1956 when the new United Front Government thoroughly overhauled the foreign policy thinking.

"Tying Ceylon with the Western Bloc would have meant being politically, economically and otherwise subject to the bloc primarily dominated by the U.S. so loss of freedom would be definite in that case", ~~Ben~~ Bandaranaike argued³¹. He made bold departure in cancelling the Defence Agreement with the U.K. and in recognising many of the communist countries thereby changing the image of Sri Lanka. He said " we are committed only to peace in positive form to friendship among all nations" and thus announced that Sri Lanka "will not align with power blocs"³². The enthusiasm in swinging towards the leftist countries was kept in check and in the process the non-alignment idea got firmly established leaving its mark on all the policy decisions.

The role of Srimavo Bandaranaike in involving Sri Lanka in the non-aligned movement cannot be overstressed. She was generally pursuing an activist foreign policy even to the extent of being criticised by her opponents as indulging in a luxury that a small island cannot afford. During her first term as Prime Minister the world situation was changing fast. There were signs of thaw in the Cold war. The Sino-Indian conflict added another dimension to the problems. The Sino-Soviet rift had started in an embryonic form. Weak and underdeveloped

31.S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Ceylon: House of representatives, Parliamentary Debates Vol.19 (4-8-1954) Coll.458, Quoted by D.M. Prasad, Op.cit., pp. 48-49.

32.Ibid. pp. 101-102

nations were meeting fresh challenges and new pressures. It was in this situation that Srimavo Bandaranaike tried her best to make the non-alignment movement a success. The initiative that she took to mediate between India and China in 1962-63³³ gave credence to Sri Lanka's ability to lend leadership to the movement. When she came back to power after a break of five years during which period Sri Lanka was following a subdued and less activist foreign policy, she brought back the original enthusiasm in implementing the policy of non alignment.

She had the unique distinction of having attended all the the non-aligned summits from Belgrade in 1961 to Colombo in 1976³⁴. The zeal and sincerity that she had exhibited in pursuing the non-aligned countries' plans and programmes had enabled her to successfully obtain the consensus of the members for having a pre-preparatory meeting in Colombo before the Lusaka Summit. Again her dynamism and uniform popularity had been the reason for getting Colombo elected as the venue for the fifth non-aligned summit in 1976³⁵.

33. Detailed discussion made in the Chapter III

34. Ceylon Dailey News, (Colombo, August 3, 1976. ,

35. Detailed discussion made in the Chapter IV.

NON-ALIGNMENT POLICY-ADOPTION AND
IMPLEMENTATIONS 1948-1959.

Sri Lanka obtained its independence from colonial rule on 4th February 1948, through peaceful negotiations. Unlike most of the other nations of South and South East Asia, transfer of power took place in Sri Lanka, in a calm atmosphere.¹ D.S. Senanayake, a mature politician of considerable experience and popular acceptability,² became the first Prime Minister under a Westminster model constitution. It was ordained by the constitution that the Prime Minister should concurrently hold the Portfolios of Defence and Foreign Relations.³ Thus the independent charge of the portfolios besides the overall charge as the Prime Minister had inspired D.S. Senanayake to put in original thinking in the formulation of foreign policy matter and had enabled him to play a leading role in shaping the foreign policy of the country during the first four years after independence.

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1. "Ceylon is a classical example of independence of constitutional reform achieved step by step, almost entirely by constitutional means". Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a new Nation, New Delhi, 1980, p.80; K.M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, Delhi 1981, p.489; James Jupp, Sri Lanka; Third World Democracy, London, 1978, p.5
 2. Howard Wriggins, Op.cit., p.107.
 3. Section 46(A) of the 1948 constitution. See Ivor Jennings, Constitution of Ceylon, London, 1951, p.213.

The first act in the exercise of foreign policy by the independent country was to enter into a defence agreement with the United Kingdom (U.K.)⁴. Although no specific reason was given for the conclusion of the agreement in either the preamble or any of the schedules to the agreement, the reasons were not far to seek. Being part of the British Empire prior to independence the defence of Sri Lanka was naturally taken care of by the United Kingdom. Being located in a strategic position in the Indian Ocean⁵ the lack of a strong armed force to protect it was acutely felt, once the protection given by Britain was withdrawn. D.S. Senanayake in his statement on defence in the House of Representatives, echoed this thus, "We are specially in a dangerous position because we are in one of the strategic highways of the world".⁶

4. The Defence Agreement was drafted in 1947 along with the constitution and was intended to come into force simultaneously on the commencement of the constitution. The signing of the agreement was only formal.
5. "The importance of Ceylon is such that if English troops captured that island, its capture would be more important than all other conquests wherewith one could begin a war on India". Wrote French Admiral Suffren in 1782. Quoted in Sidney Bailey, Ceylon, New York, 1952, p.10.
6. Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol.1, No.8 (1-12-1947) Col.444.

Further, being primarily a nation of export-oriented plantation economy⁷, Sri Lanka had to entirely depend upon imports for its foodgrains and other essentials. The necessity of keeping the sea and air routes free from obstruction in order to bring in essential imports was also stressed by Senanayake: "If we had no imports for three months we should starve."⁸ He therefore frankly admitted that,

"I cannot accept the responsibility of being a Minister of Defence unless I am provided with means of Defence".⁹

Those were the days when the fear of communism was obsessing many of the nationalist leaders of Asia. Great nationalists like Nehru and Soekarno also were vary of

7. Sri Lanka's economy during the 1940s 50s depended mainly on the plantation products of tea, rubber and coconut which formed 34% GNP. These were essentially products intended for exports and against these the basic necessities were imported into the country thus entailing a heavy dependence on foreign trade. K.M.De Silva, (Ed), Sri Lanka-A survey, London, 1970, p.172.

8. Supra.6.

9. Ibid.

communists insurrection "as communists became suspect all over the region because of the threat they posed to nationalism and peoples political aspiration".¹⁰ Similarly D.S. Senanayake had also expressed several times his fear of communism and said that even at his advanced age he was in politics to protect Sri Lanka from Communism; that he believed in rebirth and felt that he would be born over and over again to keep in the fight against communism.¹¹ He felt that international communism did not seek peace but intended to bring about trouble in other countries.¹² From this it could be reasonably deduced that the conclusion of the defence Agreement was also possibly because of D.S. Senanayake's

10. D.R. Sardesai, Southeast Asia: Past and present, New Delhi, 1981, p.319.

"The P.K.I. (Communist Part of Indonesia) under Musso's leadership is attempting to seize power in our country. Fellow countrymen, in the name of the struggle for Indonesian Independence ... I want to explain to you that you must make a choice: to follow Musso and his P.K.I. who will destroy the idea of Indonesian independence or to follow Sukarno-Hatta who with the help of God, will lead you along the road to independence for Indonesia and freedom from all oppression." Speech made by Sukarno in September 1948, Quoted by J.D. Legge, Sukarno ; A political Biography, pp.220-231.

11. J.R. Jayawardane, "D.S. Senanayake: A study of his foreign policy". The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social studies, Colombo, Vol.V.Nos. 1-4 1955, p.54.

12. Ibid.

antipathy towards communism and to secure Sri Lanka from possible Communist designs.¹³ The first of

The fear of danger from India looms eternally in the minds of Sri Lankans. The memories of the pre-British days of enmity and the bitter relations of the historical times have ingrained a fear psychosis among the inhabitants of the island. Though D.S. Senanayake did not apparently magnify in the eyes of the public the possibility of Indian aggression it cannot be ruled out that to some extent this thought might have weighed in his mind in concluding the treaty with Great Britain¹⁴. He had in fact "claimed in the early years of independence that membership of the Commonwealth World provide a 'Counterforce' against any possibility of aggression from India in future"¹⁵. Judging from India's lack of military

13. Although it might appear to a foreign observer (Howard Wriggins) that Sri Lanka had little to fear from Soviet Russia yet the attitude that Sri Lanka Government took against Soviet Russia showed that it was quite apprehensive of the design of the latter. To the United National Party (UNP) Government in Sri Lanka Soviet Russia seemed to be a war mongering expansionist and imperialist power.

D.M. Prasad, Op.cit., p.8.

14. A Jeyarathnam Wilson: Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1974. London, 1974, p.273.

15. K.M. De Silva, Op.cit., p.507.

pre-eminence in 1948, there could be no possibility of any one conceiving of a military threat from India. However it is possible to hold that such an obsessive thought was not absent in the minds of the then rulers of Sri Lanka.¹⁶

To the persuasive influence of Britain in concluding the treaty cannot be minimised. Britain had great economic and strategic involvements in Sri Lanka, Malaya and Singapore still under British possession, besides certain small pockets like Borneo and Hongkong in the East. Sri Lanka's strategic location in the Indian Ocean also vital for the British defence system. The U.K. had still significant control over the Indian Ocean area through in Military bases in Sri Lanka helped the U.K. to continue in airlink with East Asian countries and British dominions like Australia and Newzealand. Feeling that British intend was bound to remain safe under such an agreement. British should have thought of this agreement and successfully persuaded Sri Lanka to accept it.¹⁷

In trying to analyse the reasons for D.S. Senanayake entering into the defence agreement, Howard Wriggins says that the Sri Lankan leaders had no experience in handling relationship with any other statesman but Indian or British

16. S.P. Iyer, The Commonwealth in South Asia, New Delhi, 1969, p.326.

17. D.M. Prasad, Op.cit., pp 10-11.

and therefore, only a "sheltered international relationship" could give them the practice in diplomacy and develop a sense of confidence in a more versatile approach to the world without undue risk to their newly won independence¹⁸.

These views are attempts to see some rationale for Sri Lanka concluding the defence agreement with the U.K. since the agreement is diplomatically silent about it. It is evident that the principal purpose was to ensure the needed defence protection for the island. The very fact that the agreement was concluded prior to the attainment of independence¹⁹ clearly shows that it was intended to protect the unprotected island from any foreign aggression, once it attains independence.

Let us examine the agreement in detail to find out its dimensions and possible efficacy to determine its relevance for our study. It was intended "for the effectual



- 18. W. Howard Wriggins, Op.Cit., p. 391.
- 19. The agreement is dated 11, November 1947, clause 5 of the Agreement says that it will take effect and come into force on the day when the constitutional measures necessary for enforcing on "Ceylon" a fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth of Nations shall come into force. For a detailed discussion of the Agreement see Ivor Jennings, Op.cit., p.248.

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protection and defence of the territories of both" and for affording the necessary facilities "for this purpose".²⁰ Under Article 1, the two Governments would "give to each other such military assistance for the security of their territories for defence of external aggression and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide".²¹ It was also agreed that "the Government of the U.K. may base such naval and air forces and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as may be required for those purposes and as may be mutually agreed"²². In pursuance of the provisions of the article the British were allowed to retain their naval installations in Trincomalee Harbour and the air base at Katunayake²³. Under Article 2, Sri Lanka agreed to grant for the objects mentioned in Article 1, the necessary facilities to the Government of the U.K., as might be mutually agreed. "These facilities would include the use of naval and air bases and ports and military establishments and the use of telecommunication facilities and the right of service courts and authorities to exercise such control and jurisdiction over members of the paid forces as they exercise at present."²⁴

20. Paragraph 2 of the preamble of the Defence Agreement.

21. Ivor Jennings, Op.Cit., p.246.

21. Ibid.247

22. Ibid.

23. K.P. Krishna shetty, "Ceylon's Foreign Policy, Emerging patterns of Non-Alignment". South Asian Studies, Jaipur, Vol.1, No.2, April 1966, p.3.

24. Ivor Jennings, Op.cit., p.247

The government of the U.K. in turn agreed to furnish to the Government of "Ceylon" with necessary military assistance whenever required towards the training and development of / Ceylonese armed forces.²⁵ Further the Governments agreed under Article 4 to establish, such administrative machinery for the purpose of co-operation "in regardsto defence matters, and to co-ordinate and determine the defence requirements of both Governments".²⁶

The defence agreement was subjected to vehement criticism both inside and outside the Parliament. The left wing opposition in the Parliament charged the Government with having acquiesced into the colonial pressure and accepted a 'fake' independence²⁷. Some critics feared that

25. Article 3 of the Defence Agreement, Ibid. p.247.

26. Ibid. pp.247-248.

27. Zeylanicus, Ceylon: Between Orient and Occident London, 1970, p.246. Speaking in the House of Representatives Communist Member Keuneman viewed, "that these agreements (Defence) do not give us the right for an independent policy in Defence and External affairs". Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives, Vol.1, 1947, Col.449.

there might be some secret agreements giving the U.K. certain bases in the island part from what is mentioned in the Defence Agreement. Answering these charges and doubts D.S. Senanayake categorically stated in the House:

"There are no secret agreements or informal undertakings. There is no question of giving base to any one These were only to be given when it becomes necessary in our own interests and after entering into an agreement. The only agreement we have entered into is one enabling us to come to some agreement in the future."²⁸

Denying that the U.K. brought pressure on him he justified the necessity for such an agreement with Britain and told the House:

"Let us confess that our freedom depends on somebody or the other undertaking to help us defend ourselves. Nor can we afford to pay anybody to defend us. As I look around the countries of the world, I see at the moment only one country with sufficient interest in us to defend us at their expense, and that country is Great Britain"²⁹

He tried to impress upon the members of the parliament that the agreement did not entail any infringement of independence.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid, Col. 444-445

It is necessary to examine how this treaty had harnessed the independent conduct of foreign policy by Sri Lanka was the country totally towing the line of the U.K. On all foreign policy issues or was it acting independently? A few instances could be studied to assess the measure of independence exercised.

One immediate consequence of the Defence Agreement was that Sri Lanka's application (June 4, 1948) for membership of the United Nations Organisation was vetoed by the USSR.³⁰ The Soviet delegate M. Malik disputing the independent status of Sri Lanka specifically pointed to the powers vested in the Governor General as the highest executive Officer of the Queen. He also drew the attention of the U.N. to certain rights which Sri Lanka had given Britain for her air and naval bases and to the fact that Sri Lanka's diplomatic interests in some cases were sometime looked after by the British diplomatic representatives.³¹ This move by the Soviet Union having created a feeling of wounded pride should have pushed Sri Lanka further on to the

30. Soviet Union had exercised its veto power three times (August 8, 1948, December 15, 1948, September 8, 1949) during the period to block Sri Lanka from becoming a member.

31. R.K., Jain (Ed). Soviet South Asian Relations: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Vol.2, New Delhi, 1978 Document 143, pp 277-282.

Sri Lanka was admitted into the United Nations in December 1955.

side of the Western Powers but the country did not lose its sense of balance and continued to pursue the same policy even after the rebuff also.

Despite this agreement Sri Lanka was pursuing a policy of anti-colonialism and its leaders had clearly expressed their aversion for colonial regimes elsewhere in the region. In 1948, D.S. Senanayake along with other Asian Powers, came out in forthright condemnation of the Dutch Police Action against the Republic of Indonesia. Sri Lanka refused harbour facilities to the Dutch Warships on the ground that they were being sent to crush the freedom movement in that country.³²

Again when in 1949 Nehru convened a conference on Indonesian question Sri Lanka participated in it by sending a delegation under the Leadership (Chairmanship) of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike.³³ In his vehement speech Bandaranaike said:

32. S. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, New Nersey 1964, p.17, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan and Burma also closed their ports and Air-spaces to Dutch Ships and Planes even before convening the Delhi conference on Indonesia. Also see G.H. Jansen; Afro-Asia and non-Alignment, London, 1966, p.84.

33. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was a minister in the Cabinet of D.S. Senanayake. In this capacity of Minsiter he was chosen to lead the delegation.

"In regard to Asia, this is a particularly flagrant attempt by the Dutch to reassert the principles of imperialism and capitalism. If it succeeds it is bound to have damaging effects on other countries that have recently obtained their freedom from colonialism".³⁴

This clearly reflected the anti-colonialist stand of Sri Lanka.

Looked at in the context of the active support that the U.K. was extending to the Dutch cause in Indonesia, such participation by Sri Lanka and condemnation suggests that the Defence Agreement had not in any way fettered her in pursuing an independent Foreign Policy. The Liberty of Sri Lanka had in pursuing a pronounced anti-colonial policy which was obviously directed against the Western powers including Britain clearly proves that the Defence Agreement was more a document for self-defence than one intended to rope Sri Lanka into the Power Bloc strategy.

Another important independent decision taken during the period of D.S. Senanayake's Prime Ministership was the recognition of the peoples Republic of China (PRC).³⁵ Though

34. Times of Ceylon, Colombo, January, 18, 1949.

Quoted by W. Howard Wriggins. Op.cit., p.436.

35. Sri Lanka recognised peoples Republic of China on January 8, 1950, Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1946-1947, London, p.10443.

Sri Lanka repeatedly expressed its opposition to communism, it was one of the earliest non-communist countries to recognise the PRC and to sever diplomatic relations with Kuomintang regime in Taiwan.³⁶

Such a decision might have been influenced by the fact that the U.K. had decided to recognise the PRC³⁷ almost at the same time and the decision to recognise was conveyed to the members of the Commonwealth at the meeting of the Commonwealth High Commissioners in London.³⁸ However, there was ~~something~~^{rs} specific to suggest that the U.K's decision might have solely influenced the Sri Lanka in according recognition to the P.R.C. It is possible that both were coincidental. Because, Sri Lanka had to take into consideration her economic ties with China such as rubber trade and coconut trade. In fact China was buy rubber.³⁹ Therefore, it could be said that the U.K's decision relieved Sri Lanka to a **Dilemma**. and

36. K.M. De Silva. Op.cit.p.508.

37. Britain recognised the Peoples Republic China on 6th January 1950, J.P. Jain, China in World Politics: A study of Sino-British Relations 1949-1975, New Delhi, 1976,p.24.

38. S.U. Kodikara, Ceylon's Relations with Communist Countries. South Asian Studies, Jaipur, Vol.2, 1967, p.108, Quoted by Lucy M. Jacob, Sri Lanka: From Dominion to Republic (A study of the changing relations with the United Kingdom), Delhi 1973,p.29.

39. (Even earlier) China was buying small amounts of Rubber in Colombo through Official Channels; price which was much higher than the usual "World Price". Ibid. p.405.

there was a certain amount of independent thinking in policy making.

D.S. Senanayake did try to give a shape to the independent foreign policy by calling it a policy of the "middle path". In 1951, speaking over the B.B.C. in London, he emphasised the point that he wished his country to follow "a middle path" in international politics and not to entangle itself into the power and ideological conflicts of cold war.⁴⁰

Let us sum up the march of events and the formulation of foreign policy during the period of D.S. Senanayake. He had accepted the Defence Agreement with the U.K. for ensuring the security of Sri Lanka. In spite of pronounced anti-communist feelings he recognised the PRC for pragmatic and economic reasons ignoring the general line followed by the Western powers other than Britain. This had exhibited his independent thinking and action. His Government participated in the conference on Indonesia which was patently directed against the imperialist powers. It was D.S. Senanayake who had talked of the "Middle Path" in the conduct of foreign policy thereby indicating his unwillingness to embroil Sri Lanka in the Cold War blocs. The trend during this period was exhibiting a drift towards a policy of independent thinking on foreign policy and an unwillingness to align or identify itself closely with

40. D.S. Senanayake's speech delivered over the B.B.C. on "the middleway of moderation as a path to peace", January 1951. The text of the speech reproduced in The Journal of Ceylon Historical and Social studies, Op.cit., p.114.

Western powers notwithstanding the agreement. Such an independent outlook should be all the more appreciated as ✓ it had developed inspite of the defence agreement. Although the agreement does not mention about any such obligation it could be reasonably assumed that as a quid pro quo for the defence protection the U.K. would expect atleast some measure of towing in line on the part of Sri Lanka. In this one could perceive the shadow of the non-aligned movement which was to totally influence the foreign policy of Sri Lanka later.

A.J. Wilson expresses the view that D.S. Senanayake "was the original protagonist of non-alignment and neutralism"⁴¹ It is not however sought to be suggested that during the days of D.S. Senanayake Sri Lanka was following a totally non-aligned policy. The background of the British educated politicians in power and their animosity towards communism and shaped their thoughts to take a sympathetic attitude towards the Western line.⁴² The irritation caused by frequent Soviet Veto preventing Sri Lanka from being evoked a member of the United Nations Organisation, made the Government adopt a complete negative attitude towards the Communist countries.⁴³ This had made

Sri Lanka get obliquely embroiled in the ideological conflicts

41. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy, change and continuity; The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, Colombo, Vol.IV, Nos(1 x 2), 1974, p.34. Quoted by K.M. De Silva, Op.cit., p. ?

42. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Op.cit., p.267.

43. K.M. De Silva, Op.cit., p.508.

of the cold war. However, inspite of this the Government was not totally following the line of U.S. led West as in the case of Phillipines or Taiwan but was exercising a considerable measure of independence, thus justifying the statement of K.M. De Silva that the trend towards non-alignment had begun under D.S. Senanayake himself.⁴⁴

D.S. Senanayake was succeeded by his son Dudley Senanayake who held office as Prime Minister for a short spell.⁴⁵ Although nothing much was achieved on the foreign relations front during his period, the rice-rubber barter with china which was to bring about in the later years strong and continued ties between China and Sri Lanka was concluded during his period.⁴⁶

The rice-rubber trade agreement was greeted with considerable dismay in the U.S. and Sri Lanka Government came under the strong pressure⁴⁷ from that quarter once it became known that such an agreement was being negotiated.

44. Ibid.P.508

45. Dudley Senanayake was Prime Minister from March 1952 to October 1953.

46. China-Ceylon Rice-Rubber five-year trade agreement was concluded on 18th December 1952. See R.K. Jain, China South Asian Relations 1947-1980, Vol.2, New Delhi 1981 Document 387, p.443.

47. Strong pressure against the rice-rubber pact: The American Government sought other means of discouraging the rubber shipments to China. In early 1953 it was agreed with the

However Dudley Senanayake or his successor did not reconsider their decision on this agreement. Thus this agreement was a demonstration of Sri Lanka's independence in external relations and her capacity to resist pressure from outside powers.

After Dudley Senanayake's death Sir John Kotelawala, (Oct 13, 1952) a nephew of D.S. Senanayake became the Prime Minister. Kotelawala retained the basic principles of foreign policy of D.S. Senanayake but gave new dimensions to it. Although he professed to continue the same principles of foreign policy he had exhibited a pro western tendency.

 United Kingdom that ships of American and British registry would be prohibited from carrying rubber to China and any ships engaging in the trade could not bunker or receive normal port facilities in British contracted ports, including Singapore and Hongkong. Sulphur is used as an essential spray to protect rubber trees from blight. Ceylon was among the countries to which shipments of sulphur from the United States were banned. These restrictive measures were serious annoyances, but they had no appreciable effect upon the trade with China that went ^{on} regularly.

W. Howard Wrigging, Op.cit., p.408.

In his first policy pronouncement Kotelawala stated that,

"In all our international relations, we will continue to have an independent approach without aligning ourselves with any power bloc. We will whole-heartedly pursue the path of peace".⁴⁸

With this as the background we can proceed to interpret Kotelawala's foreign policy.

In 1954, the Colombo Conference was convened by Kotelawala, for discussing the Indo-China question various common problems of Sri Lanka and the neighbouring Asian countries.⁴⁹ The participants were India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Burma.⁵⁰ Kotelawala took the initiative by mooted out the proposal and sending invitations to the various Prime Ministers who responded favourably when he expressed his hope that the conference might demonstrate to the world that the people of Asia knew what was good for them and the United voice of Asia's would be heard in the councils of world.⁵¹ On April 28, 1954 in his opening address at the conference he reminded the Prime Ministers that since pressure was developing all around the Asian States,

48. Parliamentary Debates; House of Representatives, 24th November 1953, Vol.16, No.8, Col.710.

49. Veron Mendis, *Op.cit.*, p.32.

50. Sir John Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Ministers Story, London, 1956, p.118.

51. *Ibid*, p. 119.

"We shall have to do something as a matter of urgency if we are not to be submerged in a world of conflict that seems dangerously near".⁵²

Thus he focussed the attention on the growing dangers all around Asian States and on the necessity to unite and protect themselves. The conference eliminated from its agenda individual problems of the countries or questions that did not concern all the countries in common, thus burying all their differences and made it a common voice of the Asian countries.⁵³ The importance of the Colombo Conference is that it was a starting point in the chain of Asian solidarity conferences as it was followed by Bogor conference (28th and 29th December 1954) which was soon to climax in Bandung (April, May 1955). "If for nothing else, the Colombo powers will be remembered as the gateway to the Bandung Conference of 1955 which was the first flowering of Afro-Asianism, representing the confluence of the emerging forces of Asia and Africa for the first time in post-war and perhaps in world history".⁵⁴

In the final communique issued at the end of the Colombo Conference it was stated that the Prime Ministers considered the situation in Indo-China a real threat to the security and peace of Asia and favoured immediate ceasefire agreement and direct negotiations between the parties principally concerned.⁵⁵ The Prime Ministers also expressed

52. Ibid.p. 119-120

53. Ibid.p. 118

54. Vernon Mendis, Op.cit., p.32

55. John Kotelwala, Op.cit., p.121.

their grave concern over the development of hydrogen bomb and other weapons of destruction and viewed that, pending an agreement on elimination and prohibition of such weapons, no further explosions of hydrogen bomb should take place. Besides these the conference expressed its regrets at the continuance of colonialism and described it as a violation of fundamental human rights and threat to the peace of the world.⁵⁶

A few days after the Colombo conference the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka allowed American transport planes carrying French troops to Indo-China, make use of a Sri Lanka Airport.⁵⁷ This act of Kotelawala was criticised as being in direct violation with the Joint Communique of the Asian Prime Ministers in letter and spirit. Explaining his position Kotelawala said that "it would have been unreasonable at that moment, before cease-fire had been declared in Indo-China, to deter one outside party from giving aid to the belligerents without any guarantee that the other party would not do the same. To do that would have been to increase the advantage of one side as against the other and he saw no purpose in being neutral for the benefit of the wrong party".⁵⁸ Again in the House of Representatives; he declared that even if the devil wanted to fight communism, he would be on its side. At the same time, he said, he was "alive to the danger of Ceylon

56. Ibid.p.122-123.

57. Ibid.p.127.

58. Ibid.

becoming the Catspaw of a Western power which wished to promote its own interests, regardless of Asian opinion".⁵⁹

This controversial move of Kotelwala was quite enigmatic particularly in the light of the Asian Prime Minister's Colombo Conference and the spirit it enabled the participants to cherish. His strong Pro-Western bias and his fear of communism might have prompted him to accede to the French-American request and there could be no doubt about his partisan attitude in this instance. This incident although projects the controversial quality of the Prime Minister nonetheless shows that the finality of decision making rested with Sri Lanka but the Prime Minister was susceptible to Western influence. As could be seen from the subsequent events such a tendency receded within a few months and the Prime Minister was asserting his independent way of acting.

Another major event in 1954 was the conclusion of SEATO Pact.⁶¹ No doubt much pressure was being exerted on Sri Lanka for joining the pact but Kotelwala successfully
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 59. Ibid.

60. In his obsessive fear of communism, he had even ordered in the year 1953, a ban on the importation of all communist literature from the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries. S. (V) Kodikara, Major trends in Sri Lanka non-alignment policy, After 1956, Asian Survey (California) vol XIII, No.12, p.112B.

61. South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) - Collective Defence Treaty signed in 1954 in Manila by Australia, France, Newzealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States of America following the defeat of the French in Indo-China. ?

resisted it and refused to become a party to the pact. In December 1954, when he was in the United States, he explained Sri Lanka's position to Americans when he stated that Asia should be left to Asians themselves to manage.⁶² Further explaining why Sri Lanka had not chosen to join the SEATO, he said,

"What SEATO failed to take into account is the fact that the defence of Asia must first be an economic defence. The military aspect is secondary. The Nations of Asia, if attacked will defend themselves to the utmost and with all the means at their command, but they do not believe that the first need is a defensive pact against aggression. They may need aid against aggression too, and will decide on their own when to call in this aid, if they cannot defend themselves unaided, but the first aid they need of anybody is economic aid".⁶³

He further explained that he was opposed to guiding Sri Lanka into joining any power bloc and rejected the concept of aligning for security and he quoted Lord Buddha Saying:

"Not at any time are enimities appeased here through enmity, but they are appeased through non-enmity. This is eternal law".⁶⁴

62. John Kotelawala, Op.cit., p.139.

63. Ibid. p. 140.

64. Ibid. p. 183.

Kotelawala's refusal to join the SEATO could be termed as an acid test for his independent foreign policy in which he had come out with success. That the SEATO was an anomalous treaty in which surprisingly most of the South East Asian Countries were not members⁶⁵ and that it was an extension of the cold war threat to the region, was realised by every one. But, for a Prime Minister of Sri Lanka who was under a Defence Agreement with Britain and was generally enjoying the friendship of the Western Powers, to give a blank negative answer to the proposal needed a lot of courage and independence.

The Bogor (Indonesia) Conference which was a prelude to the Bandung conference, was held in 28th and 29th December 1954, to discuss the Bandung arrangements.⁶⁶ Sri Lanka was one of the five sponsoring powers⁶⁷ which agreed to invite 25 countries of Asia and Africa including Communist China to the Conference.⁶⁸

At Bandung, Kotelawala strongly argued against the tendency of world powers "increasingly preparing for war as the only solution for keeping peace".⁶⁹ He said that by

65. James Avery Joyce, End of an illusion: A critical Study Analysis of cold-war alliances, London, 1969, p.122.

66. G.H. Jansen, Op.cit., p.169.

67. Other four sponsoring powers were India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Burma.

68. John Kotelawala, Op.cit., p.176.

69. Ibid, p.181.

preparing themselves for war nations get further away from the prospects of peace. Their strength brings no security, their armaments no defence.⁷⁰ He thus obliquely expanded the reason once again for Sri Lanka rejecting the SEATO. At the conference, he also dwelt upon the Afro Asian solidarity. "The Asian and African Countries if they stand together can unquestionably make their voice heard in world affairs and serve as the mediators and guardians of the world peace".⁷¹ Lending his support to panch sheel⁷² he said,

"The subject of peace is very much in my thoughts and very near to my heart as a follower of one of the great religions to which Asia has given birth. The heritage of Buddhism is one of the most precious possessions of my country and its heritage which we share with several other countries represented at this conference".⁷³

70. Ibid. p.182

71. Ibid. p.182

72. Panch Sheel, the five principles of peaceful co-existence which first found mention in the Indo-China Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India (1954) were; 1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2. Mutual non-aggression; 3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 4. Equality and mutual benefits and 5. peaceful co-existence.

73. A. Appadurai, Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy. Delhi 1981, p.228.

73. John Kotelawala Op.cit., p.183.

Kotelawala accepted the Panch Sheel principles and became a signatory to the Bandung Conference which introduced the new dimension to the international system as represented by the Afro-Asian Community in the world stage.

Under Kotelawala trade relation with Poland and Czechoslovakia were established in 1955 and Romania in 1956⁷⁴ and this was a significant new development. However, diplomatic links with some of the communist countries were not established although such links were being contemplated by his Government in its last months in office.⁷⁵ The trend was to open up relation with the communist countries but the pace in proceeding towards the goal was slow. It was perhaps thought that establishing trade relations would be a logical preliminary step towards establishing full diplomatic relations.

Kotelawala could be called the last of the Prime Ministers in the early phase who had guided the country in a path which had a strong accent on Western Ways of thinking. The influence of the long British rule and the absence of a strong nationalist movement in Sri Lanka have shaped many of the leaders of Kotelawala's time into followers of Western power oriented policies. Being an unabated champion of anti-communist propaganda, he made use of all international forms for attacking the communists. His strong pro-western bias was a reflection of his anti-communist position in international affairs.⁷⁶ His gesture in quartering the American planes

74. K.M. De Silva, Op.cit., p.508.

75. Ibid. p.509.

76. Ibid.

carrying French troops to Indo-China was an expression of his anti-communist feelings. But his fearless conduct in rejecting the SEATO proposal needs to be commended. His efforts in initiating the Colombo Conference and his participation in Bandung Conference indicate an awareness on his part of the necessity for Asian Solidarity and exhibit an independent approach in foreign policy making without looking for guidance from the Western powers. His frequent assertion that he had no intention of guiding Sri Lanka into joining any power bloc⁷⁷ had deterred him from firmly committing the country to follow the west. In general, pragmatic considerations governed major diplomatic initiatives during Kotelawala's Prime Ministership.

John Kotelawala did not complete his full term in office but dissolved the parliament in 1956 and went in for fresh elections wrongly predicting that it was the propitious moment for United National Party victory.⁷⁸ The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)⁷⁹ a strong exponent of Sinhalese

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid. p.501.

79. The S.L.F.P. (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) was launched by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on 2nd September, 1951, shortly after he resigned from the UNP government. A.Jeyaratnam Wilson, Op.cit., p.139.

Nationalism and socialist ideology headed by the veteran politician S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike Whipped up anti-Tamil feelings and contested the elections making Sinhalese claim for preferential rights as the main issue.⁸⁰ The SLFP joined hands with like minded leftist parties and formed a united front, known as Peoples United Front (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna - MEP⁸¹). Buddhist religious fervour was also kindled by pointing at the impropriety of holding elections in the year of Buddha's 2500 anniversary of Parinirvana.⁸² The cumulative effect of these propaganda combined with the Government's failure on the economic front⁸³ had resulted in a stunning victory⁸⁴ for the MEP and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike became the Prime Minister in April, 1956.

The coming to power of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike marks a prominent watershed in the recent history of Sri Lanka both in its internal matters and in its foreign relations. The new Government completely revamped the foreign policy thinking and the old loyalties and latent alignments were forgotten. The anti-communist stance was reversed.

80. S. Arasaratnam, Op.cit., p.27. The issues of 1956 election were elaborately discussed by Howard Wriggins in his book, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, Chapter IX, p.326-366.

81. Howard Wriggins, Op.cit., p.232; also see K.M. De Silva, Op.cit., p.332.

82. Howard Wriggins, Op.cit., p.343.

83. Economic issues were present though not dominant. S. Arasaratnam, Op,cit., p.28.

84. Howard Wriggins, Op.cit., p.361.

Even before becoming the Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike participated in the Asian Relations Conference of 1949 and the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia of 1949.⁸⁵ As the leader of the delegation from Sri Lanka, he played an effective role at both the meets.

When S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was in the opposition, (17th June 1952) he emphasized that in foreign relations the proper position for a country like Sri Lanka was neutralism as professed by Switzerland. He thought that as an Asian Country in the context of world affairs, Sri Lanka's position must be one of (a) not only friendliness with all nations but also certain aloofness from any of those blocs.⁸⁶ Even after becoming the Prime Minister, he maintained the same attitude when he said, "that we would like to be the Switzerland of Asia, that means following a neutralist policy".⁸⁷

85. D.M. Prasad; Ceylon's Foreign Policy under the Bandaranai-kes (1956-65). A Political Analysis, New Delhi 1973, p.147-157.

86. Speech made by the leader of opposition, in moving the amendment regarding external affairs, 17th June, 1952. Towards a New Era: Selected speeches of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike made in the Legislature of Ceylon. 1931-1939, Colombo, 1961. Hereinafter referred to as Towards a New Era.

87. Ceylon Daily News, Colombo, 25th May 1956.

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's election manifesto clearly outlined his foreign policy. It stated that the foreign policy of Sri Lanka,

"must be governed by the paramount need in the interest of our people of preserving peace. This object is best achieved by our country steering clear of involvement with power blocs and by the establishment of friendly relations with all countries. Therefore no bases can be permitted in our country to any foreign power and all foreign troops must be immediately withdrawn from our country".⁸⁸

An official seal was put on this policy when the Governor General in his speech from the throne declared on 20 April, 1956 that the Government would not align itself with any power blocs.⁸⁹

A clear exposition of his(S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike) foreign policy is also found in his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on 22 November 1956. He said

88. Quoted in W. Howard Wriggins, Op.cit., p.397.

89. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1955-56, p.14849-14850

that the people of Asia desired to build up a new society for themselves on the basis of friendship with all, which is best suited to the genius of their country. In this effort they would like to

"get some ideas and some principles from this side and some from the others until a Coherent form of society is made up that suits our people in the context of the changing world".⁹⁰

"That is why", he added.

" We do not range ourselves on the side of this power bloc or that power bloc. That is the philosophy of neutralism. It is not something dishonest, it is not a matter of sitting on the fence to see whether we can get the best of both the worlds. It is a position inexorably thrust upon us by the circumstances of the case. It is a position that will be of great help in the world situation today, for we do provide a bridge over the gulf between the two opposing factions!"⁹¹

Then referring to the expression "uncommitted nations", which was used by other countries to describe the policy of the non-aligned nations, he observed,

90. Foreign policy of Ceylon; Extracts from statements by the late Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. Colombo 1958, p.5, Hereinafter referred to as Foreign Policy of Ceylon.

91. Ibid.

"I strongly object to that word. We are committed between nations. We are committed to the cause of justice and freedom, as much as any one is. That briefly is our position in Asia"⁹²

In short he wanted to follow the policy of "friends of all, enemies of none". When critics were inclined to dismiss non-involvement as ~~a~~flight from reality and naive escapism S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike provided the classic answer saying that non-involvement was commitment to the hilt, commitment to peace, decency and civilised value. He thus asserted that non-involvement was a possible affirmation of peace.

Unlike his predecessor Kotelawala, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike did not entertain fears about subversion by "international Communism". Soon after his assumption of Office he annuled the ban on importation of communist literature from the Soviet Union, China and other communist countries which had been imposed by Kotelawala in 1953.⁹³

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike also established his policy of non-alignment on a firmer basis that had obtained before by exchanging diplomatic representation with Communist countries begining with Soviet Union and China. A Sri Lanka embassy was established in Moscow in 1957 and an Embassy was opened in Peking in the same year.⁹⁴ The Government also began exploring

92. Ibid.

93. S.U. Kodikara, Op.cit., p.1123.

94. Ceylon's Foreign Policy - A review. Ceylon Today, Colombo, Vol.XIII, No.3, March 1963, p.1.

the possibilities of increased trade with the Communist Countries and the prospect of economic and technical aid from the Soviet bloc.⁹⁵ On the face of it these moves appeared like a swing towards communist bloc but subsequent events proved that these moves were more to rectify, the earlier trend of a marked anti-communist feeling and action.

A significant feature of the implementation of the new policy was Bandaranaike's plea, soon after he became the Prime Minister, that the British bases in Sri Lanka be withdrawn. While in London during the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in 1956, he initiated discussions with the Government of the U.K. for the transfer of these bases.⁹⁶ Negotiations for the transfer began in London in December 1956, when it was agreed in principle that the bases would be handed over to Sri Lanka in 1957 on a date mutually agreed upon.⁹⁷ In the subsequent discussions held in Colombo in June 1957, the two Governments reached an agreement on the time and method of withdrawal. Under the terms of this agreement, the naval base at Trincomalee was formally transferred on October 15, 1957 and the Royal Airforce station at Katunayake was handed over on December 4, 1957.⁹⁸ Speaking at Katunayake airport on the latter occasion Bandaranaike declared, "today our independence is complete"⁹⁹

95. S.U. Kodikara, Op.cit., p.1123.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Foreign policy of Ceylon, Op.cit., p.17.

99. Ibid. p.21.

When the Suez canal crisis arose, (July 1956) the joint military action by Israel, Britain and France (October 1956) was vehemently condemned by Bandaranaike. He declared at a press conference in November 1, 1956, that the invasion of Egyptian territory have created a grave international situation and appealed to the concerned powers to effect an immediate withdrawal of forces from the Egyptian territory.¹⁰⁰

He along with the Prime Ministers of India, Burma and Indonesia denouncing the Anglo-French action in Egypt, met at the conference in New Delhi on November 12-14, 1956,¹⁰¹ and issued a joint communique. The Joint Communique welcomed the resolutions of the General Assembly directing the concerned powers to withdraw their forces from Egypt.¹⁰² Again in his speech before the United Nations General Assembly on 22 November, 1956, Bandaranaike reiterated his earlier stand on Egypt.¹⁰³ In consonance with this view, Sri Lanka's representative took part in the United Nations deliberation upon the question and contributed much to the solution of

100. The Hindu, November 6, 1956

101. This Conference was convened by Jawaharlal Nehru to discuss the matters of Suez canal crisis and Hungarian problems. See G.H. Jansen, Op.cit., p.243.

102. D.M. Prasad, Op.cit., p.196.

103. On 11th December 1956, a statement was made in the House of Representatives on his visit to the West as Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Towards New Era, p.836.

the problem.¹⁰⁴ This is the first instance since becoming a Prime Minister that Bandaranaike showed his inclination for mediation oriented non-alignment policy.¹⁰⁵

One other event that rocked the world during this period was the Soviet intervention in Hungary. Soviet Union invaded Hungary to quell the revolution which was engineered by certain sections of the Hungarian people against Hungarian Government.¹⁰⁶ S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike did not countenance the Soviet Action in Hungary. The New Delhi conference (November 12-14, 1956) which discussed the Hungarian question included in its communique the collective opinion of that,

"The Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Hungary speedily and that the Hungarian people should be left free to decide their own future without external intervention from any quarter".¹⁰⁷

104. Sri Lanka's contribution actually consisted of contacting Presidents names prior to the London Conference of April 1956 to find out his views to reach a settlement. Again Sri Lanka helped to arrive at a secret compromise formula to solve the crisis. She had effectively put across the Egyptian view point in the conference held in this connection and then helped to soften the attitude of the Western power.

105. K.P. Krishna Shetty, Op.cit., p.18.

106. Ibid.

107. R.K. Jain (Ed), Soviet South Asian Relations, New Delhi, 1978, Vol.2, p.243.

In the united Nations Sri Lanka along with other non-aligned nations, abstained from voting on the first draft resolution. Sri Lanka's explanation to the absention was that they did not have enough time to go through the resolution.¹⁰⁸ But later on it supported the U.N. Resolutions which asked the Soviet Union to keep off its hands from Hungary.¹⁰⁹ Here one can observe a contrast in Sri Lanka's reaction to the two events, namely Suez crisis and the Hungarian question. Sri Lanka vehemently criticised the Western powers in the Suez crisis, where as its criticism of the Soviet Union in the Hungarian crisis was on a low key. This contrast prevailed with almost all the non-aligned countries.¹¹⁰

In 1959, China suppressed the people's uprise in Tibet and annexed Tibet.¹¹¹ The Buddhist population in Sri Lanka acting through the All-Ceylon Buddhist congress not only denounced the Chinese supression of Tibetan freedom and desecration of monesteries but also urged the Prime Minister to raise the Tibetan question at the United Nations

108. G.H. Jansen, Op.cit., p.242.

109. Ibid.p.241.

110. Howard Wriggins, Op.cit., p.453.

111. In 1954, in a trade agreement concluded China, India, recognised Chinese Sovereignty over Tibet and renounced all the extra territorial privileges in Tibet that India had inherited from the British. Taking advantage of India's complacency in view of the Panch Sheel doctrine China built a border road linking Sinkiang with Tibet

or at an Afro-Asian Conference.¹¹² Bandaranaike without doing anything positive in the matter, continued to harp on his pet theme that Tibet was an 'internal affair' of China, that Tibetians should be permitted to follow their way of life under the suzerainty of China and that Sri Lanka would lend its good offices to bring about a satisfactory settlement of this trouble.¹¹³

It was quite surprising that inspite of Buddhist pressure he did not choose to say one word of condemnation against the Chinese. His pro-leftist inclination and his being conscious of the rubber-rice pact and other economic ties such as the rubber-rice pact with China had perhaps influenced him in adopting a non-interfering attitude.¹¹⁴ This instance showed his sense of pragmatism in not involving his country in a controversy on a moralistic stand when the things at stake were far more important to the welfare of Sri Lanka. But the swing in placing Sri Lanka's sympathy ----- thus consolidating its hold. There was an outbreak of rebellion in Tibet in the early part of 1959 and the Dalai Lama (The 'God King' and Buddhist Head of State) and tens of thousands of Tibetians fled the country thus leaving little resistance against the Chinese. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, London, 1968, p.197-200.

112. Keesing's contemporary Archives 1959-60, p.15802

Quoted by K.P. Krishna Shetty, Op.cit., p.21.

113. Urmila Phadnis, Religion and politics in Sri Lanka, New Delhi, 1976, p.281-282.

114. Ibid.p.282.

with the Communist bloc of countries which has been more than perceptible, indicates the watershed in the country's foreign policy.

Bandaranaike evinced considerable interest in the disarmament and prohibition of nuclear weapons question, when the matter came up for discussion in U.N. in 1958. A resolution known as the Seventeen-power resolution was overwhelmingly passed by voting. Sri Lanka following (by) U.S.S.R. line of arguments, refrained from voting. The matter at issue was that the resolution suggested application of the "technical approach" to control measure of conventional and nuclear disarmament. Sri Lanka considered an exclusive concentration in Technical aspects unwise and suggested that the technical and political discussion should proceed together. Again on the "Partial disarmament" formula Sri Lanka with a touch of pragmatism maintained that the realisation of one stage of disarmament should not be made dependent on the realisation of subsequent stages.¹¹⁵ Thus Sri Lanka made its presence felt in the United Nations by taking deep interest in these larger issues and by suggesting compromise formulae.

The exacerbation of the racial and ethnic differences in the country had resulted in frequent outbreak of violence and Sri Lanka lost its calm once for all. Bandaranaike soon

115. K.P. Krishna Shetty, Op.cit., p.21-24

became a victim of the holocaust of his own creation when a Buddhist monk assassinated him in September 1959. Even though he was in office as Prime Minister for a short span of time he had nonetheless left his indelible impression on the formulation of foreign policy. The nebulous policy of aligning with the west on some matters and joining the newly liberated Asian Countries on some other issues had been totally abrogated. The anachronistic Defence pact had been rescinded and thus the formal tie-up with a prominent members of the west was snapped.

Bandaranaike displayed a tendency towards playing a mediatory role in international disputes. Sri Lanka's participation in the U.N. Debates connected with the Suez crisis and the Hungarian situation had considerably lifted the image of the country in the international arena. Throughout these debates Sri Lanka based its arguments on the principles namely, 1. freedom to every nation to work out its own destiny and 2. non-intervention by an outside power in the internal affairs of a country. In the matter of the Hungarian situation it initially took a pro-soviet line unmindful of these principles but subsequently retrieved the steps in consonance with her policy of non-alignment.¹¹⁶ However Sri Lanka's attitude towards the Tibetan situation did not appear to be in conformity with the principles held dear by her. Sri Lanka brought out its capacity as a mediator in the disarmament and prohibition of nuclear weapon

116. Ibid. p.25.

test debates and disputes by suggesting compromise formulae. By then non-alignment as a concept in world politics was clearly shaping and emerging and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike unambiguously emphasised his country's support for it. Although he could not strictly adhere to the non-aligned principles when it involved or embraced the Communist countries his stand on such occasions could to a certain extent be interpreted as his anxiety to protect the interests of Sri Lanka. It should be said to his credit that it was S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who first led the country into the path of non-alignment and built an image for Sri Lanka as a mediator in international disputes.

NON-ALIGNMENT UNDER SRIMAVO BANDARANAIKE
AND DUDLEY SENANAYAKE.

After the assassination of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 25 September 1959, a state of confusion prevailed for a few months and no stable Government could be formed. In the general elections held in July 1960 the SLFP led United Front (UF) was once again returned to power with S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's widow Srimavo, as the leader.¹ She was the first woman Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and for that matter the first time in the history of any country a woman to hold the office of Prime Minister.² In her early policy pronouncements Srimavo Bandaranaike assured that her Government would continue the policies of the previous Government. "In External Affairs, my Government will maintain its policy of non-alignment with power blocs and of neutralism and co-existence. My Government's relation with the Commonwealth as well as the Foreign countries continue to be friendly"³ she said.

During the first five years of her rule Srimavo made a determined bid to follow the principles of non-alignment and "friendly relations with other countries" as laid down by her husband S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike.

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1. The result of the 1960 General Elections was a victory reminiscent of 1956 for Mrs. Bandaranaike's Party. It won seventy-five seats and could form a Government on its own. E.F.C. Ludowyk. The Modern History of Ceylon, London 1966, p.256.
 2. Ibid.
 3. D.B. Dhanapala, Madam Premier, Colombo 1960, p.33

In July 1960 soon after the assumption of power, events in Congo (30 June 1960) were moving with tragic inevitability towards the fragmentation of the newly emerging nation state. Belgium granted independence to Congo, but on the pretext of saving the lives of Belgian Nationals there, sent a large number of troops.⁴ The activities of these troops created such a complicated situation that the national Government of Congo was compelled to request the Security Council of the U.N. for Military assistance to enable her to maintain law and order within the territory and to ensure the territorial integrity and independence of Congo.⁵ Sri Lanka condemned Belgium's

4. Congo attained independence on 30 June 1960. But this did not resolve the differences between the Congolese leaders. Serious difficulties arose over the formation of the first cabinet in some of the province, within a week of independence a mutiny broke out in the national army. The departure of Belgian administrators, teachers, doctors, technicians and officials created a vacuum and resulted in chaos. The Belgian paratroops began widespread operations in Congo under the pretext of protecting Belgian lives, property and honour and avoid greater blood shed. D.N. Sharma, Afro-Asian Group in the U.N., Allahabad, 1969, pp.148-149.

5. Year Book of United Nations, 1960, New York 1961, p.52

action and supported the Security Council's resolutions of 14th July 1960, calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Republic of Congo. Sri Lanka opposed the stand of the Soviet Union pressing for the withdrawal of U.N. forces and also that of the U.S.A and U.K. proposing to recognise Kasavabu Government and if necessary to resort to force to make the U.N. move effective.⁶

On July 21, 1960, Tunisia and Sri Lanka placed a draft resolution before the Security Council, which requested the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the security council's resolution of 14th July and gave special authority to the Secretary General "to take all necessary action to that effect". The draft resolution was adopted unanimously by the Security Council which also requested all states not to intervene in the affairs of Congo since such intervention prevented the Congol^e Government from restoring law and order, and thus jeopardised the territorial integrity and political independence of Congo. It also invited the special agencies of the U.N. to help the Secretary General in building up the economy of that Country.⁷

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6. Urmila Phadnis, "Non-Alignment as a Factor in Ceylon's Foreign Policy". International Studies, Vol. XIII, No.4, April, p.440, Quoted by K.P. Krishna Shetty, Op.cit., p.27.
7. Year Book of United Nations, 1960, New York, 1961, p.54.

At a second Council meeting on August 8, 1960, Sri Lanka and Tunisia moved another resolution which asked the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the province of Katanga and invited the Security Council to declare that the entry of U.N. forces into Katanga was necessary for the full implementation of the resolution.⁸ Since Sri Lanka was not in a position to provide a large contingent of troops, as a symbol of help provided nine soldiers for composing the U.N. peace keeping force moving into Congo.⁹

Sri Lanka along with U.S.S.R. and Poland voted for holding a conference of the Security Council at Leopoldville as requested by the Congolese Premier, but this was finally turned down.¹⁰

In spite of the U.N. efforts, however the situation in Congo was worsening. An emergency special session of the General Assembly of the UN was called on September 1960, which adopted a resolution without any opposition. It called for vigorous action by the Secretary General in accordance with the terms of the Security Council's resolution and also requested him to assist the Central Government of the Republic of Congo to restore and maintain law and order throughout Congo, and

8. Ibid, p.55

9. D.M. Prasad, Op.cit., p.206.

10. Ibid. p.207.

safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the interest of international peace and security.¹¹ But disorder went on mounting in Congo. Imperialists interests inspired Katanga to secede and made cession of Katanga an excuse for Belgian troops remaining in the territory.

In Sri Lanka, as in many other Afro-Asian countries, people became critical of Dag Hammaraskjold, the U.N. Secretary General for the conduct of the affairs of Congo.¹² The arrest of Patrice Lumumba Congolese Prime Minister, in Congo and the maltreatment meted out to him by Mobutu's private army caused concern and anxiety in most of the peace loving countries including Sri Lanka. Srimavo Bandaranaike sent a telegram to Sri Lanka's permanent representative in the U.N. asking him to "see the Secretary General immediately and express to him my anxiety and concern for the personal safety of the Prime Minister" (Lumumba).¹³ The Sri Lanka Government considered the Government of Patrice Lumumba as the only legal Government of Congo and in the same telegram the Sri Lanka Prime Minister expressed her anguish:

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid. pp.207-208; also see: D.N. Sharma, Afro-Asian Group in the U.N. Allahabad, 1969, p.175.

"In my view the U.N. decision to seat Mr. Kasavabu's delegation was an unwarranted intervention by the U.N. in the internal affairs of Congo".¹⁴

Inspite of the feverish activity of the U.N. over the Congo issue it was ineffective and Congo was becoming an arena for super power intrigues. Soviet Union denounced the Secretary General of the UN and the great powers aligning for and against UN's role in Congo.¹⁵ It was a great set back for a small country like Sri Lanka which had pinned so much faith in the international body for maintaining peace and security in the world.

Patrice Lumumba's murder plunged the world into shock and sorrow. Sri Lanka also felt the shock deeply and all sections of political opinion expressed their grief at the tragedy. The Sri Lanka representative drafted a resolution in the Security Council condemning such acts of crime. As a symbolic gesture of its disapproval the Sri Lanka Government withdrew the contingent of nine soldiers it had sent to Congo.¹⁶ Eventhough Sri Lanka is a small island its participation in trying to diffuse the Congo crisis was commendable. It condemned the military action of Belgium and as a token of its participation in the peace keeping efforts even contributed a

14. Ibid.p.208.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

small number of soldiers for the United Nations peace keeping force. The Congo crisis gave an opportunity to Sri Lanka to take active part in the UN proceedings and thus got experience in the practical realities of international parleys. By symbolically representing the countries which had not aligned themselves with one or the other of the blocs Sri Lanka had focussed the attention of the world to the problems of decolonisation which formed the main core of the agenda for the non-aligned summit to follow in 1961. In short Sri Lanka did not choose to remain a dormant and obscure island in the international scene but made its presence felt during these eventful years.

The non-aligned countries first Summit Conference was held in Belgrade between 1st and 6th September 1961 after the preparatory conference held in Cairo in June 1961. Nineteen countries including Sri Lanka participated in the preparatory conference¹⁷ and adopted the following criteria for the issue of invitations to the non-aligned conference.

17. 1. Afghanistan, 2. Burma, 3. Combodia, 4. Sri Lanka, 5. Ethiopia, 6. Ghana, 7. Guinea, 8. India, 9. Indonesia, 10. Iraq, 11. Mali, 12. Moracco, 13. Nepal, 14. Saudi Arabia, 15. Somalia, 16. Sudan, 17. The United Arab Republic, 18. Yugoslavia, 19. The Provisional Government of Algeria was admitted during the Conference.

1. The country should have adopted an independent foreign policy based on the co-existence of states with different political and social systems and on non-alignment should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy.
2. The country concerned should be consistently supporting the movements for national independence.
3. The country should not be a member of multi-lateral military alliances concluded in the context of great power politics.
4. If a country has a bilateral military agreement with the great powers or is a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be deliberately concluded in the context of great power conflicts.
5. If it has conceded military bases to a foreign power the concession should not have been made in the context of great power conflicts.¹⁸

This was the first time the countries following a non-aligned line of policy made an attempt to define non-alignment concept as such. In the Belgrade conference 25 countries

18. Non-aligned Conference Documents, Op.cit., p.8.

participated and three countries were admitted as observers.¹⁹ On the day before the Belgrade Conference opened the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device at its Arctic testing grounds and announced that this was the beginning of a new series of atomic tests, which shocked the non-aligned states.²⁰ Thus the gloomy back drop had doubly reminded the participants of the necessity to pursue the path of peace and avoid alignment with the super powers.

Sri Lanka a cosponsor of the Belgrade Conference was represented by its Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike herself.²¹ She was the only woman among the heads of states who had participated in the conference.²² It is also noteworthy that upto the Colombo summit of 1976 she participated in all the summit conferences.²³ The Sri Lanka Prime Minister spoke at Belgrade as a woman and mother as well and declared,

19. Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen and Yugoslavia were full members and Bolivia Brazil and Ecuador were as observers. The Hindu, September 8, 1961.

20. Nassar said "shocked me just as it shocked world opinion" The Hindu, September 3, 1961.

21. Ceylon's Foreign Policy- A Review. Ceylon Today, March 1963, Vol.XII, No.3, p.3.

22. G.H. Jansen Op.cit., p.294.

23. Ceylon Daily News, August 3, 1976.

"I am happy to attend this great assembly not only as a representative of my country but also a woman and mother who can understand the thoughts and feelings of those million of women, the mothers of this world who are also deeply concerned with the preservation of human race".²⁴

"I do not for one moment believe that there is a single mother in the world who could bear to contemplate the possible danger of her children being exposed to atomic radiations and lingering deaths and not swift annihilation".²⁵

"It is not a co-incidence that the majority of under-developed nations believe in a policy of non-alignment. They are only too aware of the enormous economic tasks which confront them in the economic field and the need to devote their slender resources to the fulfilment of their tasks. They also realise that the tension which exists between ideological blocs can be traced directly to the existence of economic imbalance. As long as there exists a gulf between developed and the underdeveloped countries the possibilities of tension are immense".²⁶

24. The conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961,

Belgrade 1961, p.175.

25. Ibid.p.180.

26. Ibid.pp.179-180.

Finally all the 25 countries made an united appeal in the name of mankind to the power blocs to avoid all calamitous steps through war ... and resumption of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of any outstanding differences with due regard to the principles of United Nations Charter".²⁷

By framing the criteria for membership they had set the term for the nonaligned movement. The movement and the concept as such can be said to take a concrete shape after the summit. The non-aligned countries represented at Belgrade however, made it clear that they "do not wish to form a new bloc" and they expressed their willingness to co-operate with any Government which sought to contribute to "the strengthening of confidence and peace in the world". They recommended the abolition of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations and protested against establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries which was violation of sovereignty of such states. They also expressed their opinion in favour of peaceful co-existence, total disarmament, effective co-operation in economic and commercial fields and revision of U.N. Charter to make the important bodies of United Nations in harmony with the need of the U.N. with its expanded membership.²⁸ Most of these aims and objectives were in harmony with the policies of Sri Lanka as pronounced and practised from time to time.

27. Ibid. p.252.

28. Ibid. pp. 253-261.

Sri Lanka supported the police action taken by India in December 17-18, 1961, to liberate Goa from the Portuguese colonial hold. It was not a mere moral support that Sri Lanka gave but actual material support and ordered on 18 December 1961, the closure of all seaports and airports which might be used for the transport of troops, equipments and supplies to the Portuguese in Goa.²⁹ This prompt action of Sri Lanka may be considered as open step towards anti-colonialism and liberation from colonialism.

The Sino-Indian clash of the Himalayan ranges in 1962 was one of the major events in the recent history of Asia. The massive Chinese attack threw the unprepared Indian troops miles away from their lines of control. As the conscience keeper of the non-aligned world when India looked around for support none of the Asian neighbours except Malaya extended a friendly hand.³⁰ To the surprise of India Sri Lanka did not condemn the aggression.

29. Asian Recorder, New Delhi, January 15-21, 1962, Vol.VIII, No.3, p.4370.

30. Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya described Chinese aggression on 28th October 1962 as follows: "The open Chinese aggression in India is a glaring Red Signal of danger to non-communist Asia". The Hindu, October 19, 1962. Also see G.H. Jansen, Op.cit., p.326.

A variety of reasons were attributed for Sri Lanka's stand. The fear of a small island being swamped by India had always been there.³¹ Relations with India had been complicated by the disagreement over the fate of more than a million persons of recent Indian origin staying in Sri Lanka and this could have been at the bottom of the Prime Minister's mind.³² The more plausible reason suggested was the rubber-rice barter between China and Sri Lanka which had been in effect since 1952 and the possibility of its getting terminated in the event of Sri Lanka a hostile attitude towards China. Further the need for imported rice was growing more and more acute and the support from China became indispensable.³³ A pragmatic Prime Minister might have thought it unwise to tilt the balance and incur the displeasure of China.

31. Robert N. Kerney, "Ceylon-The continuing Crisis" Asian Survey, February 1963, Vol.VI, No.2, p.126, See also, Urmila Phadnis, "Ceylon and the Sino-Indian Border Conflict". Asian Survey, April 1963, Vol.VII, p.189.

32. Urmila Phadnis, Op.cit., p. 189.
Although this (Indian immigrants problem) did not occur just before the Chinese aggression nonetheless this had been an irritant since 1948 between India and Sri Lanka and remained unsolved.

33. Urmila Phadnis, Op.cit., pp.190-191.

The deep and spontaneous concern expressed by wide sections of Sri Lanka Public, condemning Chinese invasion of India appears to be a great tribute to the strength of historical and cultural ties at the peoples level although the official line of thinking was different.. Indeed many Sri Lankans seemed to view this question as much a matter of domestic policy as of foreign policy, for the conflict was considered as one endangering the peace and security of Asia.³⁴

Even before the Sino-Indian border dispute had deteriorated into actual fighting, leaders of various parties, the Sri Lanka freedom party (SLFP), the United National Party (UNP) and others had met on the same platform to express their deep concern over the question and had depreciated the "short-sighted policy of China".³⁵

Despite the prolonged hostility between the Sinhalese and the Tamils and their practice since independence of taking opposing sides on most of the issues, the Sino-Indian question did not draw support on ethenic lines. Alongwith Tamils many Sinhalese not only condemned Chinese agression but even volunteered to fight for India.³⁶ Dudley Senanayake,

34. Ibid. p.195.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

the UNP Leader and the leader of the opposition, addressed a letter to Prime Minister Nehru condemning Chinese aggression and expressing his and his party's support for India.³⁷ Thus the Sino-Indian border dispute had the effect to reversing the UNP's earlier distrust and suspicion of India, and rallied the party's support for India. Influential Press, English, Tamil and Sinhalese moulded the public opinion and condemned unreservedly the Chinese aggression over India and voiced surprise at the Sri Lanka Government's attitude in placing "strange sympathies" for "something happening far away in Atlantic (Cuba), while being deaf and blind to Red China's aggression on neighbouring India".³⁸

But the public opinion and the opposition parties criticisms did not in any way influence the thinking of the Government. A week after the Chinese invasion Nehru sent a circular message to all the governments of the world asking for their support.³⁹ The Sri Lanka Prime Minister responded to this message appreciating that "India would not want to do anything to prejudice her territorial integrity or self-respect by submitting to negotiations under pressure of armed forces".⁴⁰

37. Ibid.

38. Ceylon Daily News, October 23, 1962; ^{naikaba} (Sinhalese News paper) (Colombo) October 30, 1962 for a detailed discussion see Perimal Kumar Das, "The reaction of Common Wealth of Nations" International studies, New Delhi, July-October 1963, Vol.V, Nos.1,2. p.68.

39. G.H. Jansen, Op.cit., p.326.

40. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, November 5, 1962. Quoted by Perimal Kumar Das, Op.cit., p.68.

She did not in any manner express her support for India or brand China as the aggressor. On the contrary, she praised China for its unilateral cease fire, when it was subsequently declared. Further the Western Military aid to India was interpreted by Srimavo as a kind of entanglement with the power blocs.⁴¹ She thus wounded further the Indian sentiments. In December, 1962 during the conference of six non-aligned countries at Colombo⁴² she declared that "Sino-Indian conflict has also afforded an opportunity for the power politics of the "Cold War" to penetrate ... into the affairs of the Afro-Asian world".⁴³ Indian writers and Spokesman had vehemently denied that India's non-alignment policy had been prejudiced by her entanglement with China and cited the Soviet Union's decisions to fulfil her commitment in respect of MIG fighter planes to India. in support of the view that India's Foreign Policy remained unchanged.⁴⁴ But Sri Lanka refused to be drawn into taking sides to the conflict,⁴⁵ and from then onwards devoted its efforts to bring a settlement between the two Asian countries.

41. Ceylon Daily News, December 11, 1962, quoted by S.U.Kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations, Since Indpendence, Colombo, 1963, p.54.

42. Colombo conference discussed in detail in the subsequent pages

43. The Hindu, December 12, 1962.

44. S.U. Kodikara, Op.cit., p.54.

45. For instance, the Government refused facilities for the remittance to India of funds collected in Sri Lanka in aid of the Indian National Defence Fund, Perimal Kumar Das, Op.cit., p.69.

The first efforts in the direction of resolving the dispute was taken by President Nasser of United Arab Republic. On 26, October 1962, Nasser suggested a four point solution suggesting a cease-fire, the demarcation of a demilitarized buffer zone, negotiations and the withdrawal of troops to the positions they held prior to the recent clashes which began on the 20th October, that is behind the line where their forces stood on the 8th September last.⁴⁶

India accepted this after certain clarifications of the operative clause on withdrawals. The Chinese rejected the UAR proposals on the 2nd November, because their standards it came too close to India's wishes.⁴⁷ On 21 November 1962 China unilaterally declared a cease-fire. This declaration said that in the Western Sector and the middle sector of the border, Chinese forces would withdraw 30 Km behind the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959, India being likewise required to withdraw on its side of the line so as to create a demilitarized zone. In the Eastern sector Chinese Forces, according to the declaration would withdraw to the "illegal Macmohan line".⁴⁸

Against this background, the Sri Lanka Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike took initiative in convening the conference of six-non-aligned countries which was held in Colombo on

46. G.H. Jansen, Op.cit., p.331.

47. Ibid.

48. Kuldip Nayar, Between the lines, New Delhi, 1969, pp.170-171

10 December, 1962.⁴⁹ The countries participating in the conference decided that its purpose was not to consider the merits and demerits of the dispute, but to provide for an exchange of views in order to assist India and China to resume direct negotiations.⁵⁰ Accordingly the proposals emanating from the conference (a) urged China to carry out their proposal of 20 km withdrawal to military posts in the Western Sector: opposed to the Indian Government to keep their existing military positions and provided for the creation of a demilitarized zone in the area vacated by the Chinese, which would be administered by civilian posts on both sides to be agreed upon "without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area". (b) considered that in the western sector, the line of actual control of the areas recognised by both Governments could serve as a ceasefire line to their respective positions, the remaining areas in this sector were to be settled in the future discussions; (c) suggested that in the middle sector problems would be solved by peaceful means without resorting to force.⁵¹ The proposals were kept in secret, till they were communicated to the Governments of India and China. It was the wish of the conference that Sirimavo should visit Peking and New Delhi to convey to them the results of their deliberations.⁵²

49. The six non-aligned countries were Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and U.A.R., D.M. Prasad, Op.cit., p.354.

50. Supra 43.

51. Ceylon Today, February 1963, Vol.XII, No.2, p.27.

52. The Hindu, December 14, 1962. Also see T. Karki Hussain,

Although Sirimavo alone had been officially authorised to convey the proposals to India and China, all the delegation leaders except General Ne win, visited New Delhi and Peking either as a group or individually in January 1963, or in the immediately succeeding months. Sirimavo and the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio were in Peking (December, 31, 1962- January 7, 1963) a few days later presented the proposals with clarifications, to Nehru in the Company of Ali Sabari (UAR) and Kofi Asate Ofori Atta of Ghana.⁵³

When (January 21-25 1963) the Colombo proposals were placed before the Indian Parliament the opposition parties vehemently criticised it.⁵⁴ But later the opposition move was defeated and India accepted the Colombo proposals in toto.⁵⁵

As regards China, the Chinese Premier Chou-Enlai had in a letter to Srimavo dated 19th January 1963, stated that "the Chinese Government accepts in principle the proposals of Colombo conference as a preliminary basis for meeting of Chinese and Indian Officials to discuss the stabilication of Sino-Indian Conflict and International politics in the Indian Sub-Continent 1962-66, Faridabad, 1977, p.26.

53. G.H. Jansen, Op.cit., p.343.

54. N.G. Ranga of Swantra Party argued that there was no reason why they should accept the proposals of the Colombo Conference, when none of those countries had condemned Chinese aggression but aggressor with the Victim. The Hindu, January 25, 1963.

55. Kuldip Nayar, Op.cit., p.204.

the cease-fire and disengagement and to promote Sino-Indian boundary negotiations.⁵⁶

But the Chinese acceptance was subject to reservation. The basic Chinese stipulation was that, in the western sector in Ladakh, India could not have the right to introduce even normal civilian posts in the demilitarized zone; but that if India accepted this China, as a concession, would refrain from establishing its own civilian posts; in the eastern sector, in Assam, the stipulation was that the Indian Army should not advance to the Mc Mahon line; only armed civilian personnel were to move into the territory vacated^{by} the Chinese frontier guards. From these two demands China had not budged even an inch.⁵⁷ These amendments to the Colombo proposals suggested by China were totally unacceptable to India. Therefore, Sri Lanka could not get the acceptance of the Colombo proposals. In other words, the very purpose of the Colombo conference was defeated.

Sri Lanka's role as a peace maker in the Sino-Indian dispute was motivated by her manifest desire to prevent an open rupture between the two countries with both of which she had close economic and commercial ties, and with neither of which she could have afforded a breach of the existing goodwill

56. Peking Review, 6-10-11, February 1, 1963, Quoted by

S.U. Kodikara, Op.cit., p.574.

57. G.H. Jansen, Op.cit., p.344.

and friendly relations. Sri Lanka therefore, refrained from justifying the conflict as a moral issue and refrained from pronouncing any opinion on the relative merits of the case as presented by rival disputants.⁵⁸

The Sino-Indian border dispute was cleverly made use of Srimavo Bandaranaike to raise the stature and bargaining power of Sri Lanka. If she had taken the side of India in this dispute, she would have lost the valuable economic ties with China, which was sticking for more than a decade to a pattern of aid and trade favourable to Sri Lanka.

The Sino-Indian conflict proved to the world that all the pious talk about peace and solidarity was of no use. The hard realities of the world could not go with the idealistic vision of Bandung. A militarily strong power cannot be prevented from showing its fangs and there was no means to prevent conflicts between the countries outside the power blocs.

Sri Lanka had demonstrated to the world that even in disputes where a non-aligned country is involved the other non-aligned nations should observe a neutralistic attitude so that there could be a possibility of their acting as impartial negotiators for bringing about peace. Sri Lanka did make an honest attempt in this regard, although other considerations also played a role in Sri Lanka taking the stand.

58. S.U. Kodikara, Op.cit., p.58.

The Sino-Indian dispute is discussed in detail to focus attention on the part played by Sri Lanka to project itself as a mediator in the peace making efforts. Sri Lanka conscious of the reality of international tensions, projected itself in a neutral role and did make an earnest effort to bring about a negotiated settlement. The non-aligned countries in general took considerable initiative in this regard and Sri Lanka's Sirimavo Bandaranaike did not lag behind.

In 16, September, 1963, the Federation of Malaysia, consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo came into existence.⁵⁹ Prior to this a survey was conducted by a U.N. team appointed by the Secretary General of the U.N. to ascertain the consensus of the various composing units on their willingness to unite into a federation. According to the survey the entry of the units into the federation was only on a voluntary basis. Sri Lanka's representatives had attended the inaugural celebrations (Sep.16, 1963) of Malaysia.⁶⁰ Sri Lanka recognised Malaysia and had friendly terms with both Malaysia and Indonesia. Disputing in the Federation of Malaysia's territorial claims to North Borneo,

59. R.S. Milne; Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, Singapore, 1977, p.66.

60. Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, Ceylon: Senate, Parliamentary Debates, Vol.19, (21.1.1964) Col.2420.

Indonesia started a confrontation with Malaysia. Soviet Union approached Sri Lanka on behalf of Indonesia for permission to fly planes purchased by the Indonesian Air Force across Pakistan through Karachi and across the Sri Lanka through the Katunayake air port to reach Indonesia. After a careful consideration of the issues involved, Sri Lanka decided "not to help either side to receive their military supplies through the territory of Sri Lanka".⁶¹ Sri Lanka not only decided to deny facilities to the Soviet aircrafts going to Indonesia but also to the British and American air crafts and ships proceeding on military mission, to Malaysia. Here Sri Lanka adopted "a neutral" attitude and this in a sense explained her attitude in the Sino-Indian dispute where her stand was taken as anti Indian.

The second Non-aligned summit was held in Cairo, in 1964. The preparatory conference was held in Colombo from 23rd March to 28th March, 1964.⁶² This conference was

sponsored by President Josip Tito of the Socialist Federal Republic of the Yugoslavia, President, Abdul Nasser of the

61. F.R.D. Bandaranaike (Minister of Food and Agriculture and External Affairs made an announcement on August 19 about the Foreign Policy of the Sri Lanka Government.

Ceylon Today, September 1964, Vol.XIII, No.9, p.7.

62. Ceylon Today, April 1964, Vol.XIII, No.4, Text of the joint communique.

United Arab Republic and Mrs. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.⁶³ Twenty three countries participated in this conference as full members and two countries participated as observers.⁶⁴ Sam. P.C. Fernando, Sri Lanka's Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, was the Chairman.⁶⁵

Addressing this preparatory conference Mrs. Bandaranaike said,

"the main purpose of the second conference is to reaffirm our faith in the objectives which brought us together at the 1961 conference and to strengthen our determination to preserve in our policies".⁶⁶

A Joint Communique was issued at the end of the Conference on 28th March 1964.

The Joint Communique on behalf of their Governments unanimously declared the necessity for the holding of a second conference of the Heads of States or the Governments of the non-aligned states on an enlarged basis. The object of this conference was promoting and consolidating the principles of

63. Ibid.

64. 1. Afghanistan, 2. Algeria, 3. Cambodia, 4. Ceylon, 5. Congo (Leopoldville), 6. Cuba, 7. Cyprus, 8. Ethiopia, 9. Ghana, 10. Guinea, 11. India, 12. Indonesia, 13. Iraq, 14. Lebanon, 15. Morocco, 16. Nepal, 17. Saudi Arabia, 18. Cambodia, 19. Sudan, 20. Tunisia, 21. United Arab Republic, 22. Yeman, and 23. Yugoslavia and full members. Bolivia and Brazil attended as observers.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

the policy of non-alignment in order to safeguard peace and to assist the peoples of the world in the attainment of their aspirations for independence, relaxation of international tension and march towards progress. It was agreed to hold the Second conference of the Heads of States or Governments of the non-aligned states in Cairo during the first week of October 1964.⁶⁷

The Second non-aligned conference opened in Cairo on October 5, 1964, Forty-seven full members⁶⁸ and ten observers participated in this conference.⁶⁹ The Cairo Conference was held after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, the father and the great spokesman of the non-aligned movement.⁷⁰ Lal Bahadur Sastri the then Prime Minister of India participated on behalf of India.

67. Ibid.

68. Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Istani, Republic of Mauritania, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Labonon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nig^eria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Yeman, Yugoslavia and Zambia. Non-Aligned Conference Documents Op.cit., p.22.

69. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobeg, Uruguay, and Venezulea. Ibid.p.22.

70. Jawaharlal Nehru died on 27th May, 1964.

Sri Lanka was a sponsoring member and Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike participated in the conference as the leader of its delegation.⁷¹ In her speech, Mrs. Bandaranaike paid rich tributes to Jawaharlal Nehru.

"We pay homage to the memory of this fearless
Champion of peace, co-existence and rights of
oppressed people everywhere"⁷².

She condemned racial discrimination in South Africa and Rodhesia and demanded a rightful place for the P.R.C. in the U.N.⁷³

About the danger of nuclear weapons three proposals put forth by Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, were accepted unanimously by the conference and incorporated into the final declaration of the conference. The proposals were (1) The concept of nuclear free zones should be extended to cover areas and occasions that have not been free of nuclear weapons. (2) All non-aligned nations should take immediate action to close their ports and airfields to ships and air-crafts carrying nuclear weapons. (3) Colonial powers should not only undertake to liquidate existing leases in colonial territories, but they should refrain from establishing colonial territories new bases capable on being used for aggressive purpose.⁷⁴ The very same idea was reiterated in the United Nations by R.S.S. Guna-wardene, Sri Lanka's permanent representative at the United

71. Ceylon Today, November 1964, Vol.XIII, No.11, p.1.

72. Ibid.p.2.

73. Ibid.pp.4-8.

74. Ibid.

Nations and Chairman of the Sri Lanka delegation to the 19th session of the United Nations General Assembly in Newyork on December 21, 1964.⁷⁵

Sri Lanka was all along playing in the non-alignment movement a role much bigger in proportion to her size and economic influence. This was mainly due to the leadership of the Bandaranaiques during those eventful years. The policy of neutralism followed by them in the Sino-Indian dispute, in the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation and even in the subsequent Sino-Soviet difference have earned for them a name as a strict neutralist country.⁷⁶

Also the leading role played by Sri Lanka in the attempted negotiations between India and China have created an image about the peace-making ability of the country. All these factors have helped Sri Lanka to emerge as an important figure in the non-aligned group and then get an opportunity of playing the host in the Pre-Cairo preparatory conference and become a sponsoring country for the Cairo conference.

At both Belgrade and Cairo, Mrs. Bandaranaike was an enthusiastic participant, she identifying herself and her country unreservedly with the diplomatic initiatives that

75. Ceylon Today, January 1965, Vol. XIV, No.1, pp.1-9.

76. Relation between China and the Soviet Union started deteriorating during the period when Khrushchew was leading Russian administration.

followed from the conference. The tangible gain for Sri Lanka as a result of this exposure to international mediation is the development of strong trade ties with the countries outside the power blocs quite often on the basis of barter agreement and through this a greater diversity in the pattern of external trade.

The long spell of the rule of the Bandaranaiques was broken after the 1965 elections when the SLFP sponsored United Front was defeated and the UNP emerged as a largest single party.⁷⁷ Dudley Senanayake with the help of a few other parties including the Tamils Federal Party was able to form the Government.⁷⁸ The new Prime Minister regarded an active foreign policy as an expensive luxury for a small country like Sri Lanka and especially one which faced such

77. The United National party won sixty six seats out of the 151 Assembly seats. E.F.C. Ludowyk, Op.cit.,p.267.

78. Dudley Senanayake got support from various parties: the Federal Party, the two member MEP(Mahajana Eksath Paramuna-Peoples United Front). The C.P. De Silva group, and one member, 'group' of a strongly racist character. The Tamil Congress though not holding office in the new government supported it. The new coalition could command eighty five seats in the House, which with six nominated members would give it an absolute majority in an assembly of 151 seats. Ibid pp.267-268.

severe economic pressures.⁷⁹ However, while outlining this foreign policy it was mentioned that the principles of non-alignment as enunciated at the Bandung Conference in 1955 would be followed. It was also mentioned that Sri Lanka will support all moves towards general disarmament and will also oppose spread of nuclear devices. It was emphasised that the Security of Sri Lanka will be the Prime objective and the Government will maintain friendly relations with all countries for ensuring this.⁸⁰ Dudley Senanayake was critical about the non-aligned policy pursued by his predecessor and felt that it was not the 'real non-alignment'. His concept was of a policy not antagonising the West, non involvement in international affairs and to observe a neutral and less activist foreign policy. The line of thinking assumed a modest role for Sri Lanka as contrasted with the thinking of Mrs. Bandaranaike, Dudley Senanayake was in a way justified considering the backwardness of the country and its inconsequential stature in the international society.

In 1965 the relations between India and Pakistan was becoming strained on account of Pakistan's evil designs in the border near the Rann of Kutch and it looked as though an armed clash was inevitable. Dudley Senanayake sent personal

79. As a result of the inward looking economic policies followed by Mrs. Bandaranaike imports to sustain local industries were restricted on account of foreign exchange scarcity and the aid sources also had dried up. The country was facing a severe economic crisis during the last years of Mrs. Bandaranaike's rule and one of the reasons for her party failing to secure a majority was declining production and spiralling prices.

80. Ceylon Today, March-April 1965, Vol.XIV, Nos.3 & 4, p.10.

messages to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan appealing to both of them to desist from armed conflict. He said, "We are deeply concerned that such development should take place between the countries in our region, of the world, with both of whom we maintained ties of friendship".⁸¹ He also offered to render whatever assistance as would be possible towards a peaceful settlement.⁸²

In order to maintain the position of strict impartiality, he addressed identical letters to both the heads of Governments. He also had turned down a request from Indonesia in September, 1965, for permission to take military aircrafts with personnel from Indonesian Staff college to Pakistan.⁸³ The Indonesian request was rejected because Sri Lanka as a non-aligned country, did not want to permit any military aircraft or vessels carrying troops to India or Pakistan through Sri Lanka.⁸⁴ While Sri Lanka was evidently at pains not to take sides in the Indo-Pakistan war she was dismayed at China's posture and her ultimatum to India. Public opinion as expressed in Parliament and in the press revealed deep anxiety about the danger posed to Asia by

81. Ibid, June 1965, Vol.XIV, No.6. p.30.

82. Ibid. p.30.

83. The Hindu, September 13, 1965.

84. Ibid. This could be contrasted with the events in 1971 when before the Bangladesh war, India has prescribed, Pakistani flights over India. Sri Lanka had accommodated Pakistani planes by permitting overflights and stop-over for refueling in Sri Lanka Airport. For a detailed account of the 1971 incidents see Chapter IV.

a militant and expansionist China. Sri Lanka considered that her ^e destiny was linked with the destiny of the Indian Sub-continent and she was in no mood to accept the political tuteleage of Peking.⁸⁵

The UNP's Pro-Indian sentiments as demonstrated during the Sino-Indian conflict had once again taken the upper hand and Sri Lanka had started showing emotional attachment to India. Again the China element could be said had played a role. The SLFP's strong China Connection had influenced much of their thinking in foreign policy and in following neutrality in the Sino-Indian dispute. The UNP's lack of affection for China and influenced Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake to take a line which was slightly opposed to Pakistan and the tilt could be said to have been caused by China's support to Pakistan. The Soviet Union also viewed this new attitude towards China with some satisfaction.

Prior to the Indo-Pakistan clash China had exploded a nuclear device in May, 1965. The Government of Sri Lanka had expressed its regret over the explosion and released a statement hoping that the Government of China will direct its technical achievements in the fields adopted to peaceful uses of atomic energy.⁸⁶

85. Vincent Coelho, Across the Palk Straits, New Delhi, 1976 p.147.

86. Ceylon Today, Vol.XIV, No.6, June, 1965, p.30.

Relation with China became distinctly less cordial than under the previous Government although there was no change either in the unequivocal support given by Sri Lanka on the question of China's admission to the United Nations⁸⁷ or in the pattern of trade between the two countries, nor for that matter there was any substantial reduction of Chinese economic aid.

In August - September 1967 China accused Sri Lanka of connivance in pilfering Mao Tse Tung badges and copies of Mao's quotations from an embassy consignment. A series of abusive and pugnacious notes had burst from the Chinese embassy. Complicity of Sri Lanka with Taiwan and the Western Powers was also alleged. In spite of the repeated denial by the External Affairs Ministry, China was threatening Sri Lanka with grave consequences. No rational explanation could be thought of for these outbursts. Even the rice-rubber pact which

87. "We hope that the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations will also see the attainment of real universality in its membership with the seating of representatives of the peoples Republic of China in the United Nations as the only legitimate representatives of that country and its people", stated Sri Lanka delegate U.S. Amarasinghe at the 24th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Ibid.

September-October, 1969, Vol.XVIII, Nos.9,10; See also S.P. Varma, K.P. Mishra (Ed), Foreign Policies in South Asia, New Delhi, 1969, p.255.

which was due for expiry was subsequently renewed.⁸⁸ The change in the outlook of Sri Lanka's foreign policy and its withdrawal of the anti-west stand had perhaps infuriated the Chinese to indulge in such tantrums. Also at that time China was going through the pangs of the cultural revolution and this was a reflection of that, as similar such incidents were reported from some other countries also.⁸⁹

On the other critical issues of the day-Vietnam, Rhodesia, Namibia, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Arab-Israeli conflict - the Senanayake Government's policies were consistent with a continuing commitment to non-alignment. Its political instincts were more liberal and humanitarian than egalitarian and its natural allies were the less assertive and more moderate states outside the power blocs. The Prime Minister recoiled from an assertive roll in international relations and the views of his government were expressed with a moderation that was a sharp contrast to the fervour and intensity with which his predecessor in office had chosen to demonstrate her commitment to the Third World identity.⁹⁰

88. Robert N. Kearney, "Ceylon-Political stresses and Cohesion", Asian Survey, February 1968, Vol.VIII, No.2, p.108.

89. The other country where such incident took place was Burma during this period. Mr. Amarasinghe, Deputy High Commissioner, Sri Lanka High Commission, Madras, at an interview in Madras.

90. K.M. De Silva. Op.cit., p.534.

Dudley Senanayake was conscious of the stoppage of the American aid to Sri Lanka which was a sequel to Mrs. Bandaranaike's nationalisation of the Western Oil Companies and her refusal to provide adequate compensation for the assets of the nationalised companies.⁹¹ One of the firm diplomatic

91. The import and distribution of Oil in Sri Lanka had been a monopoly of three foreign companies Caltex and Standard Vaccum, which were American and Shell which was British. In 1961, in an effort to reduce the import cost of oil and to save foreign exchange, the Government of Sri Lanka (Mrs. Bandaranaike) set up a Petroleum Corporation, with the object of importing oil from other sources of supply, such as the U.S.S.R. and U.A.R. After the establishment of the Corporation, however, it was found that the prices of its own Purchases of Oil from such sources as the U.S.S.R. U.A.R. and Rumania was substantially lower than those of the foreign oil companies. In order to make the foreign oil companies supply oil at the lower prices the Government fixed the maximum price for importing petroleum products. Unable to import oil at the prices fixed by the Government the companies expressed their dissatisfaction at the move. Thereafter, the Government passed an Act taking over the Petroleum Corporation vesting the sole and exclusive right of importing, exporting, selling, supplying and distributing of petroleum products. There were negotiation for fixing the compensation payable to the oil companies and in the meantime, in order to pressurise the Sri Lanka Government the U.S. suspended the aid and other foreign assistance to Sri Lanka. Reacting to this move, the Government of Sri Lanka called off all negotiations for the payment of compensation. S.P. Varma, K.P. Misra (Ed). Op.cit., p.252-253.

moves of the new government was to negotiate a settlement of the question of compensation for these oil companies.⁹² Despite the controversy over the issue sparked by the Marxists opposition, Senanayake signed the compensation agreement as he thought this was essential to the creation of the favourable climate for an increase in the flow of economic assistance from Western nations.⁹³ This move

92. In June, 1965, An agreement was signed with the U.S. under the terms of which Sri Lanka agreed to pay, over a period of 5 years, a sum of Rs.55 Million to the Companies. Ibid.p.255.

93. In July 1965, the U.S. Agency for the International Development stated that Sri Lanka had again become eligible for U.S. aid, under the Foreign Assistance Act and in February 1966 an agreement was signed with the United States, by which Sri Lanka obtained a 7,500,000 loan to help finance the import of essential commodities for industrial and agricultural developments from the United States. A further Food-for-peace agreement under U.S., PL 480, was signed between the two countries in March 1966 under this agreement the U.S. agreed to provide 50,000 metric tonnes of wheat flour and 5,000 metric tonnes of Corngrain Sorghum (worth 4.1 million). Payment for these commodities was to be made in Sri Lanka Rupees and 70 per cent of the counterpart funds thus obtained was to be made available to the Sri Lanka Government in the form of long term loans for development projects. Ibid. pp.255-256.

demonstrated that the new government was more pragmatic in its attitude and was thinking more in terms of the benefit for the country than getting diverted by any ideological considerations. However, the propensity to lean more towards the Western countries in economic matters was pronounced.

Although Senanayake's involvement in international politics was on a low key yet it did not deter him from organising the informal meet, in March 1970, of the non-aligned countries prior to the preparatory meeting of Dar-es-Salaam. It was at this meeting that the importance of evolving global strategy in regard to economic development was stressed. It was also significant that this meeting stressed the need for regional economic co-operation.⁹⁴

To sum up, Dudley Senanayake reversed the earlier Government's policy of anti-west and Pro-China attitude and thus gave new interpretation to the concept of non-alignment. He thought it was enough for a small country of the stature of Sri Lanka to play a subdued role in international affairs and an activist foreign policy was unnecessary. He also realised the importance of Western aid for his country and therefore rectified Sri Lanka's relationship with the Western countries so as to create a better climate for favourable economic assistance. Relation's with India also

94. Asian Recorder, New Delhi, June 11-17, 1970, Vol.XVI, No.24.

greatly strengthened⁹⁵ as contrasted with the relations with China getting less cordial. Sri Lanka was still following the policy of non-involvement during this period subject to above overtones.

95. During the visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Sri Lanka in September 1967, the two countries resolved to explore avenues for closer economic and technical cooperation. In pursuence of this objective, the Commerce Ministers of the two countries met in New Delhi in June 1968 and agreed to appoint a Joint Committee on economic cooperation between Indian and Sri Lanka. The committee was required to examine the scope for closer cooperation in the expansion of mutual trade and exports to other markets, the promotion of industrial collaboration, the establishment of joint ventures, the fuller utilisation of available training facilities and skills and promotion of tourism. The committee hold its first meeting in Colombo in January 1969.

C.K. Raman, "India and Sri Lanka economic relations!" Commerce, Bombay Annual Number 1981, p.203.

NON-ALIGNMENT UNDER SRIMAVO BANDARANAIKE'S
SECOND TERM (1970-77).

In the general elections held in May 1970 the United Front headed by Srimavo Bandaranaike won¹ and thus she became the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka for a Second term. During this period she once again tried to bring in an activist foreign policy and play a significant role in the non-aligned movement.

On June 14, 1970, when the Seventh Parliament opened, the policies of the New Government led by Srimavo Bandaranaike, both on domestic issues and foreign relations were outlined by the Governor General William Gopallawa in his speech from the throne.²

As far as foreign policy was concerned it was stated that the Government would pursue an independent policy guided by Sri Lanka's national interest and based on (a) non-alignment with any military or power blocs, (b) the principles accepted at Bandung Conference of 1955, the Belgrade conference of 1961, and the Cairo Conference of 1964; (c) Opposition to imperialism and Colonialism, both old and new and racism; (d) Support for all measures in furtherance of world peace and disarmament (e) Solidarity with and support for all the National Liberation struggles against imperialism and colonialism, (f) the maintenance of friendly and mutually beneficial relations with all states that respect Sri Lanka's independence.³

1. James Jupp. Sri Lanka-Third World Democracy, London 1978, p.17.

2. Ceylon Today, January-July 1970, Vol.XXII, Nos.1-6, p.31.

3. Ibid.

The throne speech further stated that,

"The Government will extend full diplomatic recognition to the German Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, (North Vietnam) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam"⁴

It also suggested that the diplomatic relations with Israel will be suspended until such time as the Government of Israel either conforms to the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council of November 22, 1967 and subsequent dates and withdraw its armed forces from the territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria, Jordan which Israel occupied by forces after June 4, 1967 or arrive at any solution acceptable to the Arab States concerned.⁵

Later Sri Lanka gave diplomatic recognition to the German Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Korea and the provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. Sri Lanka's diplomatic relations with Israel were suspended in pursuance of the United Front's Pledge.⁶

4. Keating's Contemporary Archives, June 27-July 4, 1970, p.24050.

5. Ibid.

6. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "Ceylon": New Government takes office". Asian Survey, February 1971, Vol.XI, No.2, p.184.

Soon after coming to power Mrs. Bandaranaike had to face a revolutionary insurgency movement against the Government, called "J.V.P. (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) insurgency" or "Che Guevarist Movement", organised by unemployed youth supported by leftist elements.⁷

Its first attack was on the U.S. Embassy in Colombo on 6 March 1971 followed by violent outbreaks at various places.⁸ On March 17, 1971 an emergency was declared and troops were called out to assist the police in maintaining law and order throughout the country.⁹ As a further move the insurgents carried out lightning attacks on police posts and Government Centres. Such attacks continued in a sporadic manner and the police was unable to manage the situation and the army had to be pressed into service. But the small army of Sri Lanka¹⁰ could not control the insurgents and the country therefore requested and obtained military help from a number of countries to strengthen its forces. The countries which helped Sri Lanka during this crisis were, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, India,

7. This movement is elaborately discussed by James Jupp in his book Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy, London, 1978 in Chapter 10.

8. The Hindu March 8, 1971.

9. Keesings contemporary Archives, May 15-22, 1971, Vol XVIII, p.24605.

10. "Sri Lanka had one of the weakest armed forces in the world and its police were both poorly armed and unpopular". James Jupp. Op.cit., p.310.

Pakistan, Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic.¹¹ With such help the uprising was put down and on 8 May 1970 it was officially announced to have been crushed.¹²

Although the military assistance was drawn from so many countries it was only of a limited nature intended to help the local armed forces in some specialised sphere.¹³ Perhaps fearing that the trouble might escalate into a major conflagration Sri Lanka had indented the help of other countries but subsequently she felt confident that she would be able to deal with the situation on her own and therefore limited the nature and scope of the help sought.¹⁴

But what is really significant in this context is that India responded to Sri Lanka's urgent request for naval patrols, helicopter support and the supply of small arms and ammunition in concert with the big powers and with the full concurrence of the regional Asian Nations which were equally

11. The Hindu, April 13, 1971, April 14, 1971, April 15, 1971 and April 18, 1971. As far India was concerned this was the first time since independence that the Indian defence personnel had been sent out to help a friendly neighbouring country in distress, apart from India's participation in the International peace keeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations in Korea, West Asia, Congo, Cyprus and Indo-China States. But India had given arms aid to countries like Burma, Indonesia and Malaysia in the past for their internal defence against insurgency and subversion. Ibid. April 16, 1971.

12. Shri Ram Sharma, Indian Foreign policy Annual survey:1971 New Delhi 1977, p.68.

13. The Hindu, April 16, 1971.

14. Ibid.

interested in preventing a violent outbreak in the region. And even Pakistan could not accuse India of either aggression or intervention in Sri Lanka since it had also loaned two helicopters in response to a request for arms by Srimavo Bandaranaike Government.¹⁵ This is an unique instance when a non-aligned country was being helped by other countries belonging to both the power blocs and also to the non-aligned group, to put down an internal uprising. Sri Lanka's image as a non-aligned country had greatly enabled her to secure help from many countries cutting across blocs and ideological groupings.

About the foreign troops operation in Sri Lanka, Mr. Felix Dias Bandaranaike, Sri Lanka's Minister for Public Administration told the House of Representatives, that no foreign troops would be allowed to engage in combat operations. He further stated that "we are not interested in becoming another Vietnam".¹⁶

The presence of foreign troops in the Sri Lankan soil was criticised so vehemently by the opposition that it was even suggested that in ~~van~~ counter to her creed of non-alignment. But one interesting thing is that Sri Lanka got military aid from all the big powers and also neighbouring countries as mentioned earlier, cutting across all distinctions

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid, May 6, 1971.

of blocs or ideologies. Srimavo Bandaranaike said that the Government's non-aligned policy enabled Sri Lanka to get military assistance from India, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, Pakistan and Yugoslavia.¹⁷

Later, Columnist Mervyn De Silva, in an interview asked Srimavo Bandaranaike, on the propriety of receiving foreign assistance to put down the insurgency, and her reply was that it was in no way contrary to the non-aligned policy. She asserted that on the contrary,

"that is perhaps the best indication of the position I have taken in our relationship with the world. If I may speak now as the Minister of External Affairs, I doubt whether any country caught in a crisis of this kind has ever received such prompt and generous assistance from so many nations with different policies. I accept it as a tribute to the sincerity and steadfastness with which we have conducted our policy!"¹⁸

Another important event that happened during the second term of Mrs. Bandaranaike was the Bangladesh liberation war. This crisis caught Sri Lanka in an ambivalent position for being a small country she herself would not have liked the

17. Ibid. May 23, 1971.

18. Ibid. November 3, 1971.

dismemberment of Pakistan and the balance of power in the sub-continent getting disturbed.¹⁹

Earlier, when the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Plane to Pakistan, (January 30, 1971) and its destruction took place in February 2, 1971, Mrs. Bandaranaike deplored (Feb 12, 1971) the hijacking of the Indian Aircraft and expressed her grave concern over the resulting situation between India and Pakistan.²⁰ But later, when India withdrew landing and overflight facilities to Pakistani Planes after the hijacking and subsequent blowing up of the Indian Plane, Sri Lanka granted Pakistan International Airlines these facilities at the request of the Government of Pakistan.²¹ But Sri Lanka, however, agreed to comply with the request of overflying and refuelling only after certain conditions were accepted by Pakistan; the principal condition being that the aircrafts should not carry arms or nuclear devices.²² Consequently Pakistani Aircrafts reportedly made 103 Technical Landings (for refuelling only) at the Bandaranaike International Airport in the month of March and 40 landings in

19. S.U. Kodikara, "Major trends in Sri Lanka's Non-Alignment Policy after 1956". Asian Survey, December 1973, Vol.XIII, No.12, p.1134.

20. Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) News Review: South Asia (New Delhi), March 1971, p.14. It reports "The Cabinet ^(Sri Lanka) at its meeting on 12, February deplored the recent hijacking of the Indian aircraft..." quoted by Sivananda Patnaik, "Srilanka and the South Asian Sub-System: A study of Submacro International politics": India Quarterly, pp.150, 157.

21. The Hindu, March 22, 1971.

22. Ibid.

in April. Further in March 1971, 16 East Bound and 15 West Bound Pakistani Airforce Planes touched down at Bandaranaike international Airport.²³ These landings acquired much significance because of the continuing crisis in the relations between Eastern and Western sectors of Pakistan at the time. But Sri Lanka's Minister for communications, Leslie Goonawardene, asserted that the landings took place only during the phase when the Awami League Leader Mujibur Rahman was involved in negotiations with the Government of Pakistan. He emphasised that during the months from May to September, there "were practically no flights other than scheduled flights" through the Bandaranaike Airport and denied that there was any complicity on the part of the Government of Sri Lanka in regard to transport of troops or arms from West Pakistan to East Pakistan.²⁴ However Indian opinion took a contrary view and there was strong suspicion that the flights involved soldiers and war materials despite the Ministers contention that of the 143 Technical Landings in March and April, only two involved flights from Karachi to Dacca.²⁵ The increase in the strength of armed men in East Pakistan during this period brought support to the view that the planes routed through Sri Lanka might have carried armed personnel.

23. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973, London, 1974, p.269.

24. Letter addressed by Minister of communications to the Secretary for the Ceylon Committee for Human Rights in Bangladesh in Ceylon Daily News, October 28, 1971, quoted by A. Jayaratnam Wilson, Op.cit., p.269.

25. Ibid.

Sri Lanka viewed Bangladesh crisis as an internal problem of Pakistan. Even during India's Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's visit to Colombo October 1971, Sri Lanka stressed that 'her country's policy is one of the non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries'.²⁶ Shri Ram Sharma an eminent Indian foreign policy analyst observes that Swaran Singh or for that matter any other Indian could have realised Sri Lanka's policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries are applied to Pakistan was about as much a farce as was Germany's and Italy's non-intervention in Spain during the Civil War.²⁷ As is well known the East Pakistan question was not purely an internal matter. The huge influx of refugees into Indian territory as a result of genocidal policies of the Pakistani Government and the resultant tension in the ^{border} between India and Pakistan had changed the complexion of the issue. In spite of these the Sri Lanka Government's refusal to look at the problem in proper perspective had betrayed her lack of impartial outlook in the matter.

Also during the war between India and Pakistan²⁸ Sri Lanka declared its intention of keeping a strict policy of "non-alignment", and "non-involvement".²⁹ Replying to a

26. Shri Ram Sharma, Op.cit., p.74.

27. Ibid.

28. Indo-Pak war started on 3 December 1971.

29. The Hindu, December 11, 1971.

debate on the budget estimates for Defence and External Affairs Ministry in the House of Representatives Srimavo Bandaranaike said "Our Policy on the issue is well-known. We do not get involved in other's business, we are not prepared to take sides"³⁰.

In the Security Council debates on Indo-Pak War, Amarasinghe the Sri Lanka delegate expressed a similar view. Later speaking in the General Assembly he called for (1) an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops; (2) immediate consultations by Pakistan with acknowledged Leaders in Bangladesh to reach an agreement on measures which could enable refugees to go back to their homes without fear of reprisals and rescinding by Bangladesh leaders of the declaration of Independence and (3) extension of "Good Offices" by Indian Government to relieve itself of the crushing refugee burden.³¹

When opposition leaders in Sri Lanka raised questions in the Parliament about the speech^{of} Amarasinghe's 3 point proposals Mrs. Bandaranaike owned reluctantly and explained that the speech in the U.N. was only the views reflected the delegate of the Sri Lanka Government.³² Anyway Amarasinghe's speech created a strong feeling that Sri Lanka

30. Ibid.

31. The Hindu, December 11, 1971.

32. Ibid.

was committed in favour of Pakistan. Meanwhile Srimavo tried to play the role of mediator in the Indo-pak war on the line of the Colombo conference on Sino-Indian Border dispute.³³ But this did not materialise as perhaps, in the eyes of the contending parties of one of the parties Sri Lanka did not obviously practice a strict measure of non-involvement during this Indo-Pak conflict. However, in March 5, 1972 Sri Lanka recognised Bangladesh.³⁴

There were substantial reasons for Sri Lanka's inability to take a strictly neutral stand in this instance. The possibility of domestic repercussions namely the Tamil Minority was one of them. Sri Lanka had right from the start taken a stand that East Pakistan issue was an internal matter of Pakistan. The clamour of the Bengalis for a separate State could be equated with a similar situation in Sri Lanka where the Tamils of Northern districts had been agitating for a separate state.³⁵ Srimavo Bandaranaike's view the quarrel between the Sinhalese and Tamil population was comparable to the clash between the West Pakistanis and the East Bengalis, and the Tamil might cite this as a case in point. She was therefore scared of expressing herself clearly on such matter.³⁶ Also it cannot be ruled out that

33. The Hindu, December 12, 1971.

34. Asian Recorder, March 25-31, 1972, Vol.XVIII, No.13, p.10683.

35. Sri Ram Sharma, Op.cit., p.75 also Sivananda Patnaik, Op.cit., pp.151-152.

36. Sri Ram Sharma, Op.cit., p.75.

the Chinese influence on Mrs. Bandaranaike might have been yet another factor influencing her on Bangladesh.³⁷

Sri Lanka's attitude in the Bangladesh war was pro-Pakistani, notwithstanding her pronouncement of adherence to the policy of non-intervention. The help given to Pakistan for landing their planes in Sri Lanka, the speech at the U.N. made by Sri Lankan delegate and the other overt acts of sympathy were indication of support to Pakistan. This could be cited as an instance of a faltering step taken by Sri Lanka in its adherence to the principle of non-alignment or non-involvement.

The main thrust of Mrs. Bandaranaike's non-aligned policy was directed to obtaining in the comity of nations the approval for her own pet proposals to ensure that the Indian Ocean was made a zone of peace. At the Lusaka conference of non-aligned nations held in September 1970,³⁸ Mrs. Bandaranaike reminding the delegates of her original proposal at the 1964 Cairo Conference to make the Indian Ocean area a nuclear free zone, declared that Latin America and Africa had already been accorded such a status and urged that "all countries bordering the Indian Ocean join us not only in giving effect to this proposal, but also in keeping the Indian Ocean as an area of peace".³⁹

37. Ibid,

38. Srimavo Bandaranaike was elected as vice President of the Third Non-Aligned summit Conference.

39. Ceylon Today, September - October 1970, Vol.XIX, Nos.9,10, pp.5-6.

At the Lusaka summit economic problems were in the fore-front and the final communique was in the nature of a comprehensive analysis of the economic problem facing the Third World and it proposed a wide ranging programmes to combat it on all fronts. It may be said that since then there is a growing emphasis of the economic aspects of non-alignment which was carried further in Algiers and in Colombo.⁴⁰ It is noteworthy in this connection that the question of raising the economic issues was decided at the Colombo informal meet⁴¹ a few months before the Lusaka Meet and Sri Lanka's influence in drawing up the agenda cannot be minimised.

At the commonwealth conference held in Singapore in January 1971 Sri Lanka put the case for a peace zone in the Indian Ocean with characteristic force:

"The Indian Ocean area is a region of low solidarities or community interests. Although it forms geographical and historical entity, there are few co-operative links between countries in the region and they are

40. VeronMendis, "The Policy of Non-Alignment". Marga Quarterly Journal, Vol.3, No.3, 1976, p.40 also see Jayantanuja Bandopadhyaya. "The Non-aligned movement and International relations", India Quarterly, April-June, 1977, Vol.XXXIII, No.2, pp.146-147.

41. The informal meet was held in Colombo on 23-24 March, 1970

either bilateral or subregional. A peace zone in the Indian Ocean will provide countries of this region with time to develop trends, towards integration and co-operation, so that in course of time the Indian Ocean could move from one area of low solidarity to an area of high solidarity. In effect, a space zone will provide the transitional minimum conditions for the development of an "Indian Ocean Community" in which problems of security will be dealt with by orderly and institutional means for promoting peaceful change".⁴²

Sri Lanka's delegation explained at Singapore that the ultimate object of the peace zone would be to "stabilise the Indian Ocean as power vacuum so that the abrasive conflicts of the Cold war do not enter it and the region could concentrate on the abolition of its major problems of under development etc."⁴³

As a direct consequence of the exhortations at the Lusaka non-aligned summit and that at the Commonwealth Conference of Singapore insisting that Indian Ocean be made

42. Common wealth Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore. Ceylon Today, January-February 1971, Vol.XX, Nos.1,2. pp.1-23, also see: Asian Recorder March 12-18, 1971, Vol.XVII, No.11, p.10047-10048.

43. Asian Recorder, March, 12-18, 1971, Vol.XVII, No.11, pp.10047-10048.

a zone of peace, the United Nation's General Assembly declared the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace at its 26th session in December 1971.⁴⁴ According to the resolution it was decided to (1) "declare Indian Ocean in limits to be determined, to be a zone of peace; (2) call upon the great powers to enter into consultations with the littoral states of Indian Ocean with a view to halting the further expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from the area of all bases, military installations, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestations of great power rivalry; (3) call upon the littoral and hinterland state of the Indian Ocean, the permanent member of the security council and other major maritime users of Indian Ocean to enter into consultation with the view to implementing the declaration and ensuring that ; (a) warship and military aircraft would not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against any of its littoral and hinterland states; (b) Subject to the forgoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right of free and unimposed use of the zone by all nations was unaffected; and (c) arrangements are made to give effect to any international agreement ultimately reached on the question."⁴⁵

44. Year Book of United Nations, 1971, New York, 1970, Vol.25, pp.33-35.

45. Ibid.

Although the proposal received wide support from the members and several states, the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean such as France, Japan, the USSR, the U.K. and the U.S.A. expressed reservations.⁴⁶

The adoption of the General Assembly resolution moved by Sri Lanka was a major personal victory for Mrs. Bandaranaike and reaffirmed that Sri Lanka's non-alignment policy included both the island's interest and the region's security. It should be mentioned that India was one of the strong exponents and supporter of the resolution.⁴⁷

The next non-aligned summit at Algiers⁴⁸ could be considered a landmark on the development of economic aspect of non-alignment for the strategy which it formulated in the economic declaration covering such problems as trade and monetary questions, food problems, sovereignty and natural resources, transnational companies, transfer of technology,

46. Ibid.

47. The Hindu, December 18, 1971. For a detailed discussion see K.P. Misra, "Developments in the Indian Ocean area: Littoral Response" International Studies, January-March 1977, Vol.16, No.1, pp.17-33.

48. The Fourth Non-aligned Summit Conference, was held in Algiers from September 5 to 9 in 1973. It was attended by seventy-four full members, over a dozen observers and three guests from Europe.

cooperation among developing countries and environment. One of the most significant ideas to emerge from this conference was the programme of self-help between non-aligned countries through the mobilisation of their own efforts. In the field of International peace and security, the proposal for a peace zone in the Indian Ocean which has been pursued in the United Nations is a typical non-aligned initiative as it contains all the classic ingredients of its philosophy.⁴⁹

The fifth non-aligned summit considered ideologically the most important of all the summit conferences,⁵⁰ was held in Colombo in August 1976.⁵¹ Eighty six countries as full members and twenty one countries and organisations participated as observers and eight countries as guests.⁵² This was

49. Veron Mendis. Op.cit., p.40.

50. T.V. Subba Rao, Non-alignment in International Law and Politics. New Delhi, 1981, p.115.

51. This was the first time non-aligned summit conference was held in Asia. The other four took place in Europe (Belgrade), the Middle East (Cairo), Southern Africa (Lusaka) and North Africa (Algiers).

Ceylon Daily News, August 3, 1976.

52. The following countries participated as members in the conference: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina Republic, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Camaroon (United Republic of), Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Egypt (Arab Republic of), Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast,

three times the number attended the first non-aligned

 2. Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Democratic People's Republic of
 Korea, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon,
 Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malay-
 sia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambi-
 que, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palestine Liberation
 Organisation, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Republic of Maldives,
 Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Sao Tome & Principe, Saudi
 Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Soma-
 lia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, syrian Arab Republic,
 United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
 Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta,
 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen
 People's Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.
 The conference granted special status to Balize including
 the right to address the summit.

The following countries and organisations attended the
 conference as observers: Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador,
 El Salvador, Grenade, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, African
 National Congress, Pan African Ist Congress of Azania,
 Socialist Party of Puerto Rico, United Nations, Organisation
 of African Unity, Arab League, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity
 Organisation, African National Council of Zimbabwe, Djibouti
 Liberation Movement, South West African People's Organisation,
 Somali Coast Liberation Front, the Secretary-General,
 Islamic Conference.

The following countries attended the conference as guests:
 Austria, Finland, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Sweden,
 Switzerland, Colombo Summit Documents & Selected Speeches
 of the fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government
 of Non-aligned Countries.

Colombo, Sri Lanka, 16-19 August 1976. Peoples publishing
 House, New Delhi, 1976, p.83-84. Hereinafter referred to
 as Colomba Summit.

conference held in Belgrade in 1961.⁵³ Srimavo Bandaranaike was the Chairman of this Conference.

One of the significant features of this conference was the presence of Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In addition, Angola, Kampuchea, Laos and Democratic People's Republic of Korea also participated as members. The presence of these socialist countries made a qualitative difference in the proceedings of the conference .

One other important feature of the Colombo meet was the presence of the Secretary General of the United Nations at the Conference. The Secretary General's speech was one of the land-marks of the conference. He observed that the non-aligned movement has become a major instrument for world diplomacy.⁵⁴

In her opening address Srimavo Bandaranaike said:

"I declare most emphatically that non-alignment do not consider any nation or any people as their enemy, their fight has always been and always will be, against injustice, intolerance and inequity and the old concept of Empire, intervention and dominance and all theories which would attribute to any nation however powerful it may be excessive authority of responsibility for peace and stability in the world".⁵⁵

53. Only 25 countries participated as full members.

54. Ceylon Daily News, August 19, 1976.

55. Inaugural address by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Colombo Summit. Op.cit., p.45.

The non-aligned movement, she argued, was no longer interested in merely understanding the past but determined to change history, however, she asserted, it required action. It was with this in mind that the non-aligned movement launches on its programme for economic action, she said. In a sense, the non-aligned movement can be seen primarily as a strategy of diplomatic action in world politics, she added. "The non-aligned Community" she asserted, "has certainly reached the stage at which it ought to concentrate more than ever before, on lending economic substance to its political victories".⁵⁶

Despite the wide ranging spectrum of views expressed by the various countries certain measure of consensus was established and the Summit was able to arrive at conclusions which were incorporated in the declaration. The political declaration of the Colombo Summit had reiterated and re-affirmed the basic positions of the non-aligned movement against imperialism, racialism, colonialism etc. The summit arrived at the conclusion that the "underlying cause of international tension which imperilled world peace and security was attributable mainly to the forces of imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, racism, zionism and all forms of alien domination".⁵⁷ In regard to the situation in the

56. Ibid. p.38.

57. Political declaration, Ibid. p. 85.

Middle East it asserted that just and lasting peace can only come about through an overall settlement based on Israeli total withdrawal from all occupied Arab Countries and the Palestinian People's recovery and exercise of their inalienable national rights.⁵⁸

The summit roundly condemned the establishment of Diego Garcia military base as well as South African military bases in the Indian Ocean and called for their elimination.⁵⁹ It deplored the use of Veto by permanent members of the U.N. to block the entry of new countries in the U.N.⁶⁰ It urged member-states to lend their support for the admissions of Vietnam and Angola in the U.N.⁶¹ It was suggested at the summit that the member states should co-ordinate their views to formulate proposals for strengthening the work of the U.N.⁶²

As regards problem of development of non-aligned countries the most important idea in the economic declaration adopted by the conference was the decision to create a new universal monetary system.⁶³ The summit underlined that the absence of a fair monetary system has made the economic problems of developing countries more acute.⁶⁴ The conference

58. Ibid.p.104.

59. Ibid.p.115.

60. Ibid.p.118.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.p.

63. Economic Declaration, Ibid.p.137.

64. Ibid.

emphasised that through "Collective Self-Reliance" the developing nation should secure their legitimate economic rights in international dealings particularly through the use of their collective bargaining strength".⁶⁵ The declaration also reflected the widespread discontent over the resistance of some developed countries to implement the new international economic order.⁶⁶ The Colombo summit has touched on the most vital spot of economic organisation for development and that in the context of political struggle the greater unity among the non-aligned and their close Co-operation with socialist countries became a matter of vital importance.⁶⁷ Mrs. Bandaranaike said it is at best a broadly defined anti-imperialist front in world politics that is seeking redress for the ravages of nearly 300 years of capitalist exploitation of the World's resources.⁶⁸

The call of Colombo is a call for action, a call to go forward and carryout the urgent tasks of development despite the opposition. Colombo symbolises the determined effort for planned co-operation and collective self-reliance of the non-aligned. Colombo has been the venue of a non-aligned summit for the first time in Asia and a new stage of the

65. Ibid. p.138.

66. Ibid. p.141.

67. Sadhan Muherjee, "New perspectives of Nonalignment".

Ibid.p.20.

68. Ibid.

movement has begun.⁶⁹ Srimavo Bandaranaike's dynamism and leadership has been greatly responsible for the success of the Colombo Summit. The Colombo Summit could certainly be termed as a success. The induction of members belonging to various shades of ideology and divergent political and economic views had greatly changed the complexion of the non-aligned group. In spite of this certain amount of consensus on many areas have emerged as evidenced by the declarations. This is largely due to diplomatic Chairmanship of Mrs. Bandaranaike and this achievement as such is a success.

The non-alignment summit's effect on the internal politics of Sri Lanka was disappointing to the ruling party. The Government's attention and energies were concentrated on the preparation for the non-aligned summit. There was considerable criticism of the massive financial outlay involved in staging an important international conference of this size and nature. The net result of these diversions and propaganda was that the government was losing its hold over the electorate necessitating in the ruling party seeking postponement of the elections. There was opposition to the postponement idea even among the SLFP ranks and the Government had to withdraw it. Although the non-aligned meet was a success for Srimavo Bandaranaike's diplomacy yet it had not helped her in recapturing power.

69. Ibid. pp. 21-22.

CONCLUSION

Sri Lanka's foreign policy, particularly her involvement and abiding faith in the non-alignment movement, has been useful in serving the country's interest, is the question. Sri Lanka being located in a strategic point of Indian Ocean and not having been endowed with the resources to build a sound defence force should have been logically at the mercy of big powers. But by adopting a prudent foreign policy, she was able to carve out a position of respectability. The armed forces that she maintained was not adequate even to quell a domestic uprising and any threat from the sea all around from even a minor power would have thrown the country open for foreign occupation. By sheer diplomacy and policy Sri Lanka has been able to maintain herself free from any kind of foreign intervention. To this extent non-alignment has helped her.

In the days of D.S. Senanayake and John Kotelawala Sri Lanka's involvement in international politics was quite limited. The Afro-Asian bloc had not fully emerged in the United Nation by then and the country's foreign policy exertions were mostly concerning her own interests. With SWRD. Bandaranaike Sri Lanka's prominent entry into international politics had begun. Since then the country was fighting in most of the international discussions, parleys and negotiations. Sirimavo Bandaranaike too took a very active interest in international affairs and Colombo became the rendezvous of many an international conference. The attempt to settle the Sino-Indian border disputes was initiated

by Srimavo and the countries which joined in this attempt became known as 'Colombo powers'.

At the end of Srimavo Bandaranaike's first term of office the economy was in a bad shape and a recovery depended largely on the availability of foreign aid. In 1965, with the return of U.N.P., this was made the corner stone of economic policy. The successful effort to patch up with the U.S.A. and the Western Countries had enabled Sri Lanka to augment external resources. Thus at the time a change of policy was badly needed the new Government realised it and changed the internal policies so as to conform to the conditions and prescriptions of the World Bank and the IMF.

Dudley Senanayake disapproved of his predecessor's activist foreign policy and contended that the country could not afford such a luxury. He even pursued a subdued line of foreign policy activity during his Prime Ministership between 1965 and 1970. That the country during his Prime Ministership between 1965 and 1970. That the country could have concentrated better on its internal problem particularly economic difficulties can not be denied. The energies of the Government were more spent on foreign policy activity and instead this could have been focussed on domestic matters, he felt. Dudley Senanayake had proved that inspite of a less activist foreign policy he could achieve better help from foreign co-operation and solve the

foreign exchange problem through aid and assistance much better than his predecessor professing an active foreign policy. To a great extent looking after the interest of the country depends more upon correct diplomacy rather than upon an active foreign policy. To a great extent looking after the interest of the country depends more upon correct diplomacy rather than upon an active involvement in international politics.

The Second term of Srimavo Bandaranaike was a dismal period so far as Sri Lanka's economy was concerned. In the initial stages the Government's attention was fully engaged in countering the insurgency. The economic policy followed by the Government had not resulted in getting the expected returns and the country's growth started to suffer. The Prime Minister was trying to build an international image for herself and in the process she could not devote much time for domestic matters. Her participation in the Lusaka summit, Algiers summit, the commonwealth conference in Singapore, United Nations session on Indian Ocean and the various other International councils had cut considerably into her time resulting in domestic matters suffering for want of attention.

Even holding of the Colombo Summit was condemned by the leaders of opposition as an extravagant exercise, as stated earlier the Prime Ministers pre occupations in the various

international activities had burdened her so much that she could not concentrate much on domestic problems. The Colombo summit had proved to be a big drain on the economy and ^ethis ruling party had to face severe criticism both inside the parliament and outside.

Although analysing the economic results of this policy is not within the scope of this study yet we cannot looking at it while evaluating the beneficial effects of the policy decisions. Economically, Sri Lanka hadnot made appreciable advancement during this period and it is still rated as a least developed and seriously affected country. Some critics partly blames it as the foreign policy pursued but this cannot be asserted with certainty but this although could surmise that less activist foreign policy might have helped better concentration on nation building economic activities.

But Sri Lanka's contribution to the strength of non-alignment is substantial. Its distinction as being one of the promoters of the first non-aligned summit lends added image to its states in the international community.

Sri Lanka has had the distinction of participating in the non-aligned movement as an observer or a mediator. Unlike most of the other countries in this region, Sri Lanka had the unique privilege of not getting involved in any border clashes or in encountering hostile neighbours. Such an opportunity enabled her to make an impassionate study of the working of the non-aligned principles. It also contributed to her success as a staunch supporter and propagandist of the movement.

The weakness of non-aligned movement is that it can do nothing militarily to help any of its members although it can sympathise with the victim or raise the question in the international councils. Countries which are not exposed to military dangers, like Sri Lanka, had no occasion to get disillusioned by the failures of the intervention of the non-aligned Countries. Also Sri Lanka observed a strict policy of not taking sides when differences arose between the non-aligned countries or between two countries with whom she is equally friendly. Thus the non-controversial character has earned for Sri Lanka a reputation which helped her gain a lead among the pursuers of the non-aligned movement. Her impartiality helped to obtain military help from countries of both the blocs and of all shades of ideology when she was faced with a condition or insurgency in 1971.

Sri Lanka, found non-alignment an useful device for its pursuit of friendly relations with all Afro-Asian states, even when they were mutually hostile, such as in the conflict between India and Pakistan, India and China and Indonesia and Malaysia. This raised as a non-aligned country in the international arena.



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