

**NUCLEAR POLICY OF PAKISTAN UNDER  
ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO (1972-77)**

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CERTIFICATE

This dissertation titled "NUCLEAR POLICY OF PAKISTAN UNDER ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO (1972-77)" by MUKUL BIHARI VERMA is in partial fulfillment of Master of Philosophy degree of this University. This dissertation has not been submitted, partially or wholly, for any other degree of this or any other University. This is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for their consideration, for the award of M.Phil. degree.

  
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## PREFACE

This work is not merely an exercise in the past but has been painstakingly carried out with an eye on the present. Reluctance of India and Pakistan to sign the NPT and the Pakistani proposal of making South Asia as nuclear weapon free zone remain to be lively and hotly debated issues of South Asia today. Foundation of nuclear weapon programme of Pakistan were laid during Bhutto regime and concomitant nuclear posture evolved during 70s remains more or less valid and relevant today.

It was during the course of my interactions with Prof.S.D.Muni and Prof.Stephen P. Cohen I became interested in security related issues of South Asia.

I am grateful to my supervisor Prof.Kalim Bahadur for his erudite guidance and kind and considerate cooperation throughout the year.

I owe a lot to lively students and encouraging faculty members of South Asian Division, School of International Studies. In particular, I would like to express my profound gratitude to Prof.Muchkund Dubey; without his material, moral and academic support this work would not have been possible.

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Any mistakes in this dissertation are entirely my own.

*M B Verma*

New Delhi,

( MUKUL BIHARI VERMA )

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## C O N T E N T S

	PAGES
PREFACE	i
CHAPTER - I INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER - II DOMESTIC INCENTIVE	8
- Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	10
- Nuclear Weaoon Programme	16
CHAPTER - III EXTERNAL SUPPORT	27
- Reprocessing Plant	27
- Uranium Enrichment Path	32
- Role of USA	39
- The China Connection	46
- Islamic Bomb	50
CHAPTER - IV REGIONAL SECURITY	58
- India Factor	62
- NPT and Pakistan	69
- Nuclear Weapon Free Zone	79
CHAPTER - V CONCLUSION	90

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

S.M. Meyer notes three basic types of incentives for a country going nuclear. First, incentive of international political prestige and image-building. These can affect the country's appearance and posture. Second, incentives to advance national military and security objectives, to minimise external threats to the country and to strengthen its relative power position and strength. Third, incentives to support and promote domestic policies and to prevail in domestic political struggle.<sup>1</sup> All three categories of incentives are present in Pakistani domestic political system. The substance of each incentive and its significance for policy-formation is quite specific and unique in the case of Pakistan.

In the West, motives for going nuclear are studied in terms of finite objective that is to possess nuclear arms. The premise that once a country embarks on the nuclear path it will inevitably continue step by step towards production of nuclear arms is empirically false in the case histories of India and Pakistan. Hence nuclear weapon programme of Pakistan has to be studied as a country's efforts towards attaining the nuclear weapon capability.

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<sup>1</sup> S.M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, (Chicago, 1984), Chapter 3.

The requirements for the successful formation and implementation of a nuclear programme in South Asia may be analytically characterised in the following ways.

- (a) The programme must be technically sound and economically necessary; it must be seen as such by its constituents or potential users
- (b) There must be a sound administrative strategy by the country's scientific leadership to mobilize domestic and international support for the programme's objectives.
- (c) The programme must be seen to advance the country's domestic and international interests as they are defined by a country's political leadership at a given point of time.
- (d) The programme must advance the personal and organisational interests of the dominant political coalition of the country.

Unless all four conditions are satisfied the nuclear programme is likely to encounter political and bureaucratic apathy or interference as happened in the case of Pakistan during 50's and 60's.

The U.S.-sponsored (atoms for peace) exhibition toured Pakistan cities and it gained wide publicity and great popularity with the Pakistani people. The message of this exhibition was that atomic energy provided answers to the human search for food and energy security and for improved health care. Specifically the US government gave to Pakistan about 70,000 items of information about atomic energy and this

was a boost to the atomic energy constituency in Pakistan.

By 1955, the Paksitan government recognised its inability to fulfil its anticipated power requirements by traditional and non-nuclear sources. At the first International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva (8-20 August 1955), the economic need for nuclear power in Pakistan was discussed.<sup>2</sup>

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1956. It had a mandate to plan and to develop "peaceful uses of atomic energy with special reference to survey, procurement and disposal of radio-active materials planning and establishment of Atomic Energy and Nuclear Research Institute, installation of Research and Power Reactors, negotiations with International Atomic Energy bodies, selection and training of personnel, application of radio-isotopes to agriculture, health, industry etc."<sup>3</sup>

There is no evidence of Z.A. Bhutto's commitment to develop the military use of nuclear energy in Pakistan during 1955-66. His interest in nuclear subject, and his profile as

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<sup>2</sup> "Energy Requirements of Paksitan for the next Twenty Years and the Need for Nuclear Power." in the Proceedings of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Vol. 1, (New York, 1956), pp.216-18.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Nasir Ahmed, "Atomic Energy Commission", Pakistan Quarterly, Vol.7, No. 3, Autumn 1957, P.14.



the advocate of nuclear Pakistan, blossomed only after he left the government of President Ayub Khan in 1966. As a Minister of Natural Resources, Bhutto did nothing for the development of nuclear energy in Paksitan' he was not serious about nuclear energy.

Nevertheless, Bhutto is placed among the winning coalition of I.H. Usmani and Abdus Salam because there is one known instance where Bhutto played a role in Pakistani nuclear decision-making. In the Cabinet meeting called in 1963 to approve the KANUPP reactor, Bhutto played a positive role. The Paksitan Cabinet was under pressure from East Pakistan to give it a power reactor also. East Paksitan's argument was mainly political because the East Pakistani power grid was small. As Foreign Minister and a Cabinet member, Bhutto supported Usmani's point that the Eastern grid was small. However, there is another instance where Bhutto's attitude to Pakistan's nuclear programme shows him to be unprofessional and self-serving. When Usmani obtained government approval for the research reactor, Usmani wanted the USA to get a US vendor under the 'Atoms for Peace' programme. Bhutto wanted a civil contractor in Paksitan - his client - to be given the job even though he had no technical credentials in nuclear technology. On this issue, Usmani threatened to resign. This indicates that up to the mid-1960s Bhutto was not serious about nuclear energy development in Paksitan. It is clear

that the other two members of the 'winning coalition' were motivated solely by the need to harness nuclear energy for the economic benefit

of Pakistan. To them, foreign policy and military considerations were not relevant at that time. This is remarkable because during this period the civilian and military bureaucracies held the main strings of power in Pakistan.

The 1965 war shook every Ministry in Paksitan because it raised the question of Paksitan's survival. Start of Indian reprocessing in 1964 and the 1965 war led to the Foreign Office's active interest in a nuclear weapon option. Even though earlier Bhutto had shown no great interest in nuclear energy issues, as Foreign Minister he cashed in on the Foreign Office advocacy and the public mood about 'going nuclear'. His famous 'eating grass and going nuclear' statement was made in this context.

Whereas bureaucratic and political inference with scientific and technical planning was a hallmark of the 1956-9 period, in the second period the PAEC under Usmani was able to escape such negative intervention by its political masters and bureaucratic colleagues. The PAEC leadership successfully intervened against a proposal by the diplomatic branch, a powerful branch of the Paksitan government, to give some

military content to Pakistan's nuclear power programme.

Pakistan's posture against the NPT revealed the influence of the Foreign Office which held the legal responsibility to represent Paksitan in international conference diplomacy pertaining to arms control and disarmament questions. But in as much as the Foreign Office failed to move the government to change its policy in favour of a nuclear weapons option, the effect of Pakistan's anti-NPT stance on international opinion at this time (1964-70) whereas the government of Paksitan had actually decided not to change its policy, in effect, it had decided not to develop a Pakistani nuclear weapons option in response to India's nuclear weapons option as for any other reason.

In the aftermath of the 1971 war, Bhutto became the supreme arbiter of the destiny of Paksitan. In January 1972, he decided to for nuclear weapons. Chapter-2 deals with the domestic circumstances and Bhutto's complex motivations which facilitated or retarded the nuclear weapon programme of Paksitan.

Chapter-3 throws light on the reprocessing plant controversy and Pakistan's determination to buy and Western suppliers willingness to sell the crucial components for nuclear enrichment process. This chapter also takes into

account the role of USA, France, Canada, China, oil rich West Asian countries in the nuclear programme of Paksitan.

Chapter-4 looks into the anti-India pro-Western stand of Pakistan on NPT. Paksitan 's proposal of making South Asia as a nuclear weapon free zone was to mask the nuclear weapon programme of Pakistan.

Chapter-5 attempts to arrive at some conclusions.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### DOMESTIC INCENTIVE

Zulifikar Ali Bhutto's advent to power at the end of December 1971 marked the beginning of the most significant and momentous era in the nuclear development of Pakistan. In his own words, "It is due to my singular efforts that Paksitan has acquired the capacity."<sup>1</sup> No account of Paksitan's nuclear issue may perhaps be considered complete without exposition of Mr. Bhutto's contribution.<sup>2</sup> Leonard S. Spector writes, "Zulifikar Ali Bhutto was the chief architect of Pakistan's nuclear policy."<sup>3</sup>

In January 1972, Bhutto convened a secret meeting at Multan which was attended by distinguished scientists and bureaucrats of Paksitan. Weissman and Krosney write about this meeting.

Bhutto started slowly. He spoke of Paksitan's defeat and humiliation in war with India, and vowed that he would

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<sup>1</sup> Z.A. Bhutto, If I am Assassinated, (New Delhi, 1977), P.137.

<sup>2</sup> Akhtar Ali, South Asia : Nuclear Stalemate or Conflagaration (Karachi, 1987), P.42.

<sup>3</sup> Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York, 1985), P.71.

vindicate the country's honour. He said that he had always wanted Paksitan to take the nuclear road, but nobody had listened to him. Now fate had placed him in a position where he could make the decision, he had the people of Paksitan behind him, and he wanted to go ahead. Paksitan was going to have the bomb, and the scientists sitting under the shamiana (tent) at multan were going to make it for him.<sup>4</sup>

Paksitan's nuclear programme in its first phase 1953-71 was essentially peaceful because leadership was not in favour of weapon's programme "What do we need a bomb for? Pakistan is a poor country ... We can't afford it," Ayub had told Bhutto turning down latter's request for a nuclear weapon option, "We should put money in schools may be hospitals and industry."<sup>5</sup> In 1965, Ayub had turned down Bhutto's plea for a Rs. 300 million (P) reprocessing plant on the ground that Paksitan's economy could not bear such a heavy burden.<sup>6</sup> Ayub Khan's administration was largely following economic efficiency as criteria for allocating resources.<sup>7</sup> Besides, Paksitan did not have the requisite infrastructure.

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<sup>4</sup> Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney - The Islamic Bomb (New York, 1981), pp. 44-5.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, P.49.

<sup>6</sup> P.R. Chari, "Pakistan's Nuclear Option". Indian Journal of Asian Studies, New Delhi, Vol.1, Jan-June 1977, P.78.

<sup>7</sup> Akhtar Ali, n.2, P.43.

## PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Bhutto has claimed to have commissioned the famous American Architect Edward Stone to build the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology at Nellore and laid its foundation.<sup>8</sup> The Institute was established in 1965 to help Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission realise its plan in education, agriculture and medicine.

Bhutto negotiated with USA and IAEA for the supply of 5 M.W. nuclear research reactor and enriched uranium and plutonium. Ultimately US supplied a swimming pool type of research reactor which went critical in 1965 and is under IAEA safeguards, the US also supplied enriched uranium for the reactor which is housed in PINSTECH. The reactor uses 90 percent enriched uranium.<sup>9</sup>

Between 1964 and 1965 two agreements were arrived at between UK and Paksitan for the supply of uranium and other nuclear material for peaceful research purposes in Pakistan. Agreements were also signed with Spain and Italy. Meanwhile Pakistani personnel were receiving training in the US, FRG,

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<sup>8</sup> Z.A. Bhutto, n.1, P.137.

<sup>9</sup> Nuclear News (Cricafe, USA), June, 1981, P.91.

Canada and the Soviet Union. By 1972, the country had more than 550 qualified nuclear scientists and engineers.<sup>10</sup>

The separation of the eastern wing in December 1971 was a considerable loss to Pakistan's nuclear establishment and programme,. Not only did it mean the loss of a nuclear medical centre and an Atomic Energy Centre in Dacca, but also three nuclear research institutions in Chittagong, Rajshahi and Dacca, which were carrying on research to develop the application of radioactive isotopes on agriculture, medicine and industry, but it also meant that money invested on these institutions had gone waste as far as Pakistan was concerned. Even greater was the loss in the matter of trained manpower. A large number of Pakistani nuclear scientists and technicians, whether working in Pakistan or abroad, belonged to East Pakistan and they opted for Bangladesh.

Bhutto introduced changes in the organisation and working of the scientific (including nuclear) set up in the country. He personally took charge of atomic energy affairs. A separate Ministry of Science, Technology and Production was formed.<sup>11</sup> The Chairman of PAEC was made answerable only to him, scientists were given complete freedom to work in a

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<sup>10</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, "Pakistan and the Bomb", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Illinois, January, 1980, P.11.

<sup>11</sup> The Hindu (Madras), 21 Jan, 1972.



highly conducive atmosphere. Since Bhutto himself looked after the affairs of the PAEC, scientists did not have to depend on others for procuring equipment or in administrative matters.

In March 1972, Munir Ahmed Khan was appointed Chairman of the PAEC for 3 years. At the time of his appointment, he was incharge of the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, where he had been working as a nuclear power specialist for over 13 years.<sup>12</sup> Indigenous facilities to train scientists in the nuclear and allied fields were gradually expanded.

In 1973, 40 nuclear technicians were under training at Nellore. The number was to rise to 60 in 1974 and still go on increasing to give an out turn of 100 per year.<sup>13</sup> A large number of Pakistani scientists serving abroad were attracted back to their country and they, along with locally trained technicians did create a manpower base for Pakistan to launch a serious nuclear programme.

In UNDP funded uranium exploration work, carried on with IAEA cooperation (making arrangements for training and

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Pakistan Times, May 23, 1973.

supplying equipment) in the foothills of the Sulaimah Ranges from August 1971, led to the discovery of "abundant quantities" of uranium. The results were "so encouraging" that it was extended for another two years after the expiry of the three-year exploration project. For this UNDP was to contribute about one million dollars.<sup>14</sup>

A study of the long-term energy needs of Paksitan was undertaken by the IAEA in collaboration with PAEC in 1972. The study held that Paksitan will need eight 600 MW nuclear units between 1982 to 1990 and nine 600 MW and seven 800 MW units from 1990 to 2000. A progress report of the PAEC released towards the end of 1973, envisaged the beginning of the implementation of these recommendations in its projected plan for the next 12 years.

The most important argument advanced by Pakistan to explain and justify their country's active nuclear programme is the need to find an alternative source of energy "to overcome the deepening energy crisis which is beginning to undermine the economic stability" of the country.<sup>15</sup> Pakistan, it is said, is "one of the poorest countries in the world in

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<sup>14</sup> Paul Fent, "In the Field" - in the Himalayan Foothills, Bulletin IAEA, August, 1974, Vol. 16, No.4, P.25.

<sup>15</sup> Morning News (Karachi, 30 Januarv. 1979

terms of availability of fossil fuels",<sup>16</sup> (viz. oil and gas), and its hydro-electric resources are also limited.

The Canadian built KANUPP, country's first nuclear power plant, which became critical in 1971, was opened by Bhutto in 1972. It is a heavy water reactor with an installed capacity of 137 MW.

A 500-600 MW nuclear power plant, the second after KANUPP, was to be set up on the bank of the Indus river near Chashma Barrage (Mianwali District), about 320 km South-West of Rawalpindi. The project was approved by Pakistan's National Economic Council in July 1973. Negotiations had started with Canada for this plant. A senior principal engineer of PAEC, M. Shafique was named Project Manager of the Chashma Nuclear Power Project (CHASNUPP).

The dual purpose desalination-cum-power plants were to be built on the Arabian Sea near Karachi and in Baluchistan. The one planned near Karachi was to generate 400 MWS of power and produce 100 million gallons of fresh water to cater to the growing needs of Paksitan's biggest city. The proposed plant in Baluchistan was planned to generate 300 to 500 MW of electricity and produce 60 million gallons of de-salted water

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<sup>16</sup> Abdul Qayyam, "Nuclear Power and US dual standards", Dawn (Karachi), 26 April, 1979.

every day.<sup>17</sup> The PAEC envisaged a series of agro-agricultural complexes powered by nuclear energy along Mekran coast in the mid-1980s. Another project underway in the province was to locate under-ground water sources using radio-isotopes tracer techniques.<sup>18</sup>

A contract for the heavy water plant, to be built near Multan, was won by the Belgian firm Belgo Nucleaire and the \$ 10 million plant was scheduled for completion by 1980.

The PAEC operated four radio-isotopes medical centres at Lahore, Multan, Jamshoro and Karachi and planned two more including an Institute of Nuclear Medicine at Peshawar. It had also agricultural research centres working on the preservation of pests by radiation among other research.

Work on a uranium fuel fabrication plant was reported in April 1974 to have already begun. For the Rs. 35 million (P) project, Canada had offered an interest free loan of \$ 1.7 million which would have covered the entire foreign exchange component of the plant. This unit was to produce 20 tons of fuel a year to feed the Karachi nuclear plant.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Radio Paksitan, 1 October, 1973.

<sup>18</sup> Hongkong Standard, 12 December, 1973.

<sup>19</sup> Dawn, 21 December, 1973.

Since the formation of PAEC upto the end of 1975, Paksitan had invested Rs. 150 million (P) on nuclear research principally on exploring uranium and training scientists abroad and getting scientists trained within Paksitan by foreign trained scientists. But during a short period of one-and-half year that is from 1976 upto the middle of 1977, over Rs. 40 million (P) were invested for same purpose.

Total budgetary allocations for Pakistan's nuclear programme were Rs. 47.9 million (P) in 1975-76, Rs. 55 million (P) in 1976-77 and Rs. 550 million (P) in 1977-78.<sup>20</sup> Of the sum allocated for 1977-78, Rs. 400 million (P) was earmarked for the nuclear reprocessing plant for which Pakistan had entered into a deal to purchase from France. These figures do not necessarily include all the money spent on nuclear power and development programme. Annual allocations for Ministries like Energy, Industry, Agriculture and Health also included sums earmarked for expansion of institutions using nuclear technology which could come under these Ministries.

#### NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAMME

Bhutto wrote in late 60's :

All wars of our age have become total wars and it will

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<sup>20</sup> Jang (Rawalpindi), quoted in the Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 24 June, 1977.

have to be assumed that a war waged against Pakistan is capable of becoming a total war. It would be dangerous to plan for less and our plan should therefore include the nuclear deterrent.<sup>21</sup>

While he was a Minister in Ayub Khan's Cabinet, he had told him, "... Why is it that only the western countries and the Soviet Union can have nuclear weapons and not be questioned? An why it that everybody takes for granted as part of the world as it is?"<sup>22</sup>

Having risen to an exclusive executive power, Bhutto put into practice what he had lobbied for so many years - acquiring the weapon capability.

William Walker and Manns Lonroth say :

The reasons in these QNWS for embarking on a weapon programme may be grouped under three headings : insecurity, isolation and strategic ambition. Insecurity may provide an incentive in two respects. When a nation perceives itself to be at a military advantage in conventional or nuclear weapons vis-a-vis a foreign fear when a political regime is under

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<sup>21</sup> Z.A. Bhutto - Myth of Independence, (Lahore, 1969), P.153.

<sup>22</sup> Weissmann and Krosney, n.4, P.49.

threat domestically and may be tempted to use a weapon programme as a means of rallying support is a different reason that the impact may not come up to the expectation of the leadership.<sup>23</sup>

Isolation - the sense of being outcast in the international community -- may provide an incentive since a weapon option gives a psychological comfort that a last resort exists against hostile forces as well as providing the beleaguered country with enhanced bargaining power.

Strategic ambition may provide an incentive in so far as weaponry is perceived as enabling a country with regional or global pretensions to project power and influences and to challenge politically its peers in international community.

But whatever their security benefits or liabilities may be for Paksitan or other countries, the fact is that in the present world nuclear weapons have irretrievably lost their old political clout and have been shipped of much of their mystique. With further passage of time, they will inevitably

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<sup>23</sup> William Walker and Manns Lonroth -- Nuclear Power and Struggle : Industrial Competition and Proliferation Control (London, 1983), pp. 105-9.

come to be viewed much as chemical and biological weapons are seen today - nasty and brutish means of mass annihilation, not as technical marvels.<sup>24</sup>

The Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 has dispelled the awe and exclusivity of nuclear weapons and devices, and the world-wide debate which has followed has made it a common knowledge that exploding a nuclear device is not a very difficult task. India could do it, and countries of even smaller industrial base can do it also.<sup>25</sup>

Questioning the security and prestige motive for going nuclear, Akhtar Ali says,

"Many Pakistanis are under the illusion that with nuclear explosion, Pakistan would become a nuclear power. This appears to be too naive to be given attention, but we find that intelligent and responsible individuals have been victims of this myth. Another popular myth is that after acquiring a few Bombs, Paksitan would be able to 'deter' conventional or nuclear attack from India. This line of thinking is borrowed from the East-West nuclear competition. But in fact, deterrence is brought about by the capability of a disarming

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<sup>24</sup> Pervez Hoodbhoy - "Is the Bomb Really a Big Deal?" The News (Islamabad), 28 March, 1993.

<sup>25</sup> Akhtar Ali - Paksitan's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi, 1984), P.5.



pre-emptive first strike, resulting in excessive damage to the adversary, or by the ability to survive the pre-emptive strike and having a counter-strike capability. Such a situation is brought about only in two cases : (a) nuclear asymmetry i.e. when the adversary does not possess similar weapons, (b) in a sophisticated nuclear regime on both sides, brought about after years of development and scores of billions of dollars of expenditure. In fact, we find that in this race, enough is not enough. ... It is obvious that a rudimentary nuclear capability within the possible reach of Paksitan in a decade or so does not achieve any one of prerequisites of a deterrent.<sup>26</sup> Akhtar Ali makes a very substantial point when he says, "Literacy, economic mobility and freedom, and two meals a day may, it is often argued, make far superior a contribution to the defence of Pakistan, than a few or a few dozen nuclear warheads poised among a divided and alienated people."<sup>27</sup>

The constraints upon proliferation have been listed as cost, limited technological and industrial use, dependence

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid, P.5.


<sup>27</sup> Ibid, P.75.

upon foreign nuclear inputs, domestic public opposition, risk of unauthorised seizure of nuclear weapons, reaction of opponents, reaction of allies and reaction of other nations.<sup>28</sup>

From January 1966 to December 1971 the Indian nuclear explosion project had been canceled by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. One cannot think of any particular Indian nuclear development which could have induced a Pakistan nuclear response in January 1972 when Bhutto made the bomb decision. Rather the circumstances underlying Bhutto's decision were primarily, if not exclusively, domestic in nature. The timing and circumstances debunk the western theory about the deterministic relationship between India and Paksitan's nuclear actions. Rather the motivations lay at two levels : Bhutto's personal motivation, as well as Paksitan's domestic circumstances. Of the two, Bhutto's complex motivations played the dominant role. In fact from 1972 to 1977 nuclear activities of Paksitan had a dual character : peaceful - with respect to power generation at KANUPP and use of nuclear science and technology for medical and agricultural purposes' and military in search of plutonium and/or uranium bomb capability. The decisional context made the 'peaceful uses only' posture deceptive. Under Bhutto, the nuclear dice was never irrevocably cast. Bhutto's declaratory posture about

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<sup>28</sup> Lewis Dunn, "India, Paksitan, Iran : A Proliferation Chain", in William H. Overhault, ed., Asia's Nuclear Future, (Colorado, 1977), P.13.



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Paksitan's nuclear intentions was deliberately ambiguous but Pakistani nuclear activities 1972-7 were unambiguously linked to the development of the bomb option. Bhutto initiated both the plutonium and the enrichment routes to the Paksitan/Islamic bomb. He opened up the plutonium/reprocessing route in 1972, and it remained active until 1978. A.Q. Khan came to Paksitan and from 1975 the enrichment/uranium bomb route was possible. So during 1975-8 both routes were active. Beginning in 1972, Bhutto also initiated a Paksitan diplomatic peace offensive against India.

In Bhutto's thinking the nuclear factor was but one aspect of a complex but interlocking strategy whose aim was to insure the development of a Napoleonic-style political system in Paksitan with Bhutto as the centerpiece of Pakistani politics. Bhutto's mental make up, and his ideas to reform the power and the position of the Pakistani military, are revealed explicitly in his memoirs "If I am assassinated". Bhutto's writings reveal an egoistically motivated drive for personal power, a drive for internal (political and economic) reform and a drive to make Paksitan "tall" in the eyes of the world. In this framework Bhutto's nuclear strategy was instrumental in nature it was intended to develop other diplomatic, military and domestic - political options and objectives.

The introduction of nuclear weapons into Pakistan scene under his leadership could have diminished the importance of Pakistani Generals and at last caused a shift in the power balance in favour of civilian rulers. It would also have increased his popularity among middle-level and junior officers of the armed forces. To Bhutto, ever suspicious of military coups and military leaders, this would have constituted a cogent argument for acquiring nuclear capability.<sup>29</sup>

Given the persistence of Bhutto's ambiguous stance on Pakistan's nuclear option upto 1977, and given the pattern of Munir Ahmed Khan's technical, political conduct, a contrast between the 1972 bomb decision and the subsequent process of implementation is apparent. The PAEC did not keep its part of the 1972 bargain between Bhutto and Munir Ahmed Khan. The implication is that PAEC scientific leadership double crossed Bhutto after it had misled him into thinking that given the resources and the political will a plutonium bomb could be developed by clandestine means. This internal bureaucratic process was subtle and executed without publicity. It cannot be documented until, of if, Pakistan archival material are revealed for scholarly scrutiny. But two points are certain. First, the evidence shows that Munir Ahmed Khan's attitude to

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<sup>29</sup> D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Namboodri -- Pakistan's Islamic Bomb (New Delhi, 1979), P.16.

a Pakistan bomb evolved over time. In the early 1970's Munir Ahmed Khan very much favoured the bomb.<sup>30</sup> By late 70's, he had taken anti-bomb position, arguing that it was unlikely to increase the security of a Third World country, that it was likely to increase the danger of regional instability and insecurity and it could even create a global threat.<sup>31</sup>

Western pressure against Pakistan nuclearisation from 1975 onwards reinforced Bhutto's ambiguity about a crash nuclear programme, as well as Munir Ahmed Khan's resistance to the development of a real technical nuclear option as distinct from Bhutto's theoretical option of 1972. The Western pressure accounts for the evolution of Munir Ahmed Khan's attitudes. In the early 1970's Munir Ahmed Khan was in accord with Bhutto's quest for the bomb. However, by the late 1970s, after he had failed to produce the plutonium bomb, he advanced a thoughtful point of view against the bomb. The first position reflected his alignment with Bhutto, and against Usmani. The second reflected his alignment with the west, and against Bhutto. He himself welcomed the introduction of Dr. A. Q. Khan into the Pakistan Nuclear scene in 1974-5 (eventhough Munir Ahmed Khan and A.Q. Khan were fierce rivals)

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<sup>30</sup> Weissman and Krosney, n.4, P.83.

<sup>31</sup> Munir Ahmed Khan, "Nuclear Energy and International Cooperation : a Third World Perception of the Erosion of confidence." in Ian Smart, (ed), World Nuclear Energy (London, 1982), P.65.

because Munir Ahmed Khan knew of his inability and unwillingness to reprocess and to design a plutonium bomb for Bhutto. Munir Ahmed Khan encouraged Bhutto to follow the enrichment route - which bought Khan and the West more time to delay the bomb project. This is precisely what happened.

PAEC under Munir Ahmed Khan did a disservice to Paksitan's civilian nuclear power programme by agreeing with Bhutto's bomb decision. This decision aroused Western suspicion about Bhutto's intentions and led to western interruption of nuclear supply relations. This increased the technical and economic costs of KANUPP as well as future activities. Secondly, Munir Ahmed Khan's actions after 1972 must be judged to be a disservice to the military side of the nuclear programme as well, and to Bhutto's ambitions in the sense that Munir Ahmed Khan did not produce the plutonium bomb.

Munir Ahmed Khan was unwilling and unable to reprocess and to make the plutonium bomb during Bhutto's days in power. His hesitation reflected subjective and objective reasons. Among the subjective reasons, had Munir Ahmed Khan failed with the bomb his credibility in the Pakistani community would have been damaged. This could have damaged his career and his usefulness in Paksitan. It made little sense to help Bhutto in his pet project when he was losing power in Paksitan

politics and in international relations after Henry Kissinger's visit to Paksitan in 1975. A bomb by Munir Ahmad Khan would have damaged his ties with the IAEA again as a resting place. The objective reasons were also compelling : the New Laborations near PINSTECH and the CHASHMA reprocessing facility were not ready for significant activity during Bhutto's life time. Thus, a combination of personal, political and technical considerations in Munir Ahmed Khan's assessments account for the retarded development of the plutonium bomb option during the Bhutto era.

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CHAPTER THREE  
EXTERNAL SUPPORT

REPROCESSING PLANT

Bhutto's plan was to use the plutonium from Canadian reactor to make his first bomb.<sup>1</sup> The advantage with Canadian reactor is that it uses fuel from natural uranium (does not need enrichment), it does not have to be shut down for refuelling and new fuel rods can be mechanically built. It produces, in the used or irradiated fuel, large quantity of plutonium, which is more frequently used as a nuclear explosive. What was needed, then was a way to get the plutonium out of the used reactor fuel -- a reprocessing plant and to get it, Bhutto turned to French. Reprocessing on plutonium extraction was a French speciality and the job fell primarily on a highly specialised engineering firm called Societe General Poure de technique Nouvelle.

According to Salamat Ali also, Bhutto initiated a dialogue with France in February 1973 for the purchase of a

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<sup>1</sup> Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York, 1981), P.77.



nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.<sup>2</sup> However, according to Benazir Bhutto, "Reprocessing plant negotiations were initiated during the visit of Mr. Z.A. Bhutto; in France in 1975."<sup>3</sup>

From the beginning of negotiations, the French Atomic Energy Commission worked closely with SGN engineers and directly with Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. The French and Pakistani officials had signed an earlier agreement on nuclear cooperation which Bhutto; revived when he came back to power.<sup>4</sup>

After three years of intense negotiations, the reprocessing deal was finalised.<sup>5</sup> Negotiations on safeguards ended in 1975 and the International Atomic Energy Agency gave its approval on 24 February, 1976.<sup>6</sup> The two countries finally signed the deal on 16 March, 1976.

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<sup>2</sup> Salamat Ali, "Pakistan's Atomic Dilemma," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong), Vol.101, no.36, 8 September 1978, P.18.

<sup>3</sup> Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan Foreign Policy (Lahore, 1979) P.62 quoted in Akhtar Ali, South Asia : Nuclear Stalemate or Conflagration (Kafrachi, 1987), P.42.

<sup>4</sup> Patriot (New Delhi), 3 July, 1976.

<sup>5</sup> Z.A. Bhutto, If I am Assassinated (New Delhi, 1977), P.137.

<sup>6</sup> Times of India (New Delhi), 27 February, 1976.

Pakistan undertook that none of the reprocessing equipment or the material produced shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or for any other military purpose for the manufacture of any other nuclear device. The Pakistani consented to submit the Chasma plant to international safeguards, including regular visits to IAEA inspection. They also agreed that same provisions would apply to any future facility based upon the same type of reprocessing technology which was defined as any facility using the solvent extraction method.<sup>7</sup> A medium sized plant, the Chashma reprocessing unit was to have a capacity between 80 and 600 tons of fuel annually.

The fact that reprocessing plant by separating fissionable plutonium from the spent reactor fuel, could facilitate Pakistan in launching on a nuclear weapon programme caused anxiety in Canada and the USA. Both the countries dismissing as untenable Pakistan's claim that the reprocessing plant was essential for it to become self-reliant in peaceful uses of nuclear technology, pressed Pakistan to cancel the deal.<sup>8</sup> Pakistan refused to oblige.

Canada then suggested additional safeguards on the use

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<sup>7</sup> Weussnab & Krosney, n.1, P.96.

<sup>8</sup> International Herald Tribune (Paris), 12 August, 1976.

of residue from the Karachi reactor which Canada supplied with fuel under the annual renewable agreement. It was not to be used for the French plant.<sup>9</sup> While these negotiations were on, Canada stopped the supply of fuel fabrication plant which it had earlier contracted to supply to Pakistan. Pakistan's failure either to call off the reprocessing plant deal or to accept full scope safeguards by the deadline of 31 December, 1976 put an end to Canada-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. The fuel fabrication plant was cancelled.<sup>10</sup>

Dr. Henry Kissinger visited Pakistan and France in August 1976 to put pressure on them to get the deal annulled; neither of them responded. Even when the French enacted a new legislation imposing on selling the reprocessing technology, it was declared that the ban would not affect old contracts especially the contract with Pakistan.<sup>11</sup>

The French, under the constant American pressure, could not sustain the policy and in September 1977, during the visit of Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, the French Foreign Minister wanted Pakistan to study a modification of fuel reprocessing so that it would not produce pure plutonium.

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<sup>9</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review Vol. 92, No. 16, 16 April, 1976, P.56.

<sup>10</sup> Pakistan Time, 4 January, 1977.

<sup>11</sup> Weissman and Krosney, n.1, P.166.

They were now offering a co-processing plant instead of a reprocessing plant.<sup>12</sup> A co-processing plant produces a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides usable in reactors but does not separate plutonium which can be used for military purposes. Rejecting the proposal Agha Shahi said, "Pakistan will not accept any change or modifications in the agreement signed with France for the supply of nuclear reprocessing plant. Pakistan has adhered to all safeguards suggested by France. We are ready to discuss additional measures but we are counting on France to honour her signature."<sup>13</sup> After a full play of controversy the agreement died without a decent funeral.<sup>14</sup>

In June 1979 the last of technicians withdrew thereby putting an end to the French cooperation in the project.<sup>15</sup> Later a pilot scale reprocessing facility known as New Labs was completed with the help of Belgian firm -- Belgonucleaire and SGN although the French Government may not have been aware of SGN participation. The facility is capable of extracting plutonium from spent fuel, giving Pakistan a

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid, P.178.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, P.81.

<sup>14</sup> Akhtar Ali, South Asia Nuclear Stalemate or Conflagration (Karachi, 1987), P.42.

<sup>15</sup> Financial Times (London), 25 June, 1979.

second route to; nuclear arms.

In July 1978, from his death cell in Rawalpindi Jail, Bhutto; wrote a letter to President Giscard d'Estaing of France thanking him for his intercession to; try to save his life. The French President 's office released the letter after Bhutto's execution. Bhutto implied in his letter, through its technology and techniques, France had been able to; face up the challenges of communism directly. The implication was that Pakistan too was attempting to follow the French example and through its nuclear capability face the international ideological challenge. The letter shows that Bhutto; was fascinated by Napoleon and de Gaulle - the first, the conqueror of Europe who attempted to unify it; and the second, the inspirer of the independent French nuclear deterrent. Although many heads of States pleaded for Bhutto;'s life, it is of interest to note that he chose to; write only to; President Giscard d'Estaing to thank him for his intercession.<sup>16</sup>

#### URANIUM ENRICHMENT PATH

Ashok Kapur says two trends can be discerned since 1972 in the nuclear activities of Pakistan. One is towards

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<sup>16</sup> D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Namboodri, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb (New Delhi, 1979), P.14.

reprocessing (1972-5-8) and the other is away from reprocessing from 1978 onwards, after 78 it (reprocessing) had lost primacy in nuclear affairs "it was kept in latent form as an assurance." After 1978, enrichment became the primary route, from 1975-78 both reprocessing and enrichment paths were active.<sup>17</sup>

The story of adopting enrichment technology revolves around one man, Dr., Abdul Qadeer Khan, Director of Engineering Research Laboratory at Kahuta.

Khan, born in Bhopal (India), studied Metallurgy in West Germany and the Netherlands. He entered the employment of Research Institute of Urenco - The British-Dutch-West German Uranium Enrichment Consortium at Almelo, Netherlands, between 1972-75. He was able to obtain knowledge of the gas centrifuge technology there particularly when he was translating a secret German report. Khan was also able to obtain information on the name and address of other gas-centrifuge sub-contractors, information which he later used to obtain materials for Pakistan gas centrifuge process. After a few incidents which took place in autumn of 1975, Khan was removed from the gas centrifuge circuit at the instigation of

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<sup>17</sup> Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (New York, 1987), pp. 193-94.

the security officer of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. A brief enquiry that was instigated failed to show any direct connection with any intelligence activities on Khan's part. At the end of 1975, therefore, Khan was able to leave the country.<sup>18</sup> On the invitation of Bhutto he came to Pakistan and took over his new assignment.

The Pakistan plan entailed setting up a pilot plant at Sihala, near Islamabad and then a bit further down the road at Kahuta village, they would build a massive industrial unit of 10,000 centrifuge units. No safeguards would apply to either Sihala or Kahuta projects, since Pakistan had not declared the existence of the facilities to IAEA.

Pakistan called their new project "Project 706" and it was directly under the supervision of the Pakistan Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.<sup>19</sup> Military's Special Work Organisation was brought in to help the "Project 706".<sup>20</sup>

Pakistan then went about buying the various components to different parts of Europe "through resourceful Pakistan agents

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<sup>18</sup> Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York, 1985), P.71.

<sup>19</sup> Project 706 :The Islamic Bomb (Panorama recorded from a BBC transmission, 16 June 1980), pp. 1-2.

<sup>20</sup> Weissman and Krosney, n.1, P.175.

in Europe with the help of European Middle-men.<sup>21</sup>

Paksitani Minsiter at the Embassy in Bonn, Ikramul Haq Khan, was the chief purchasing agent in Europe and S.A. Butt was responsible for PAEC purchases.<sup>22</sup>

The buying campaign began in earnest in 1976. These still unnamed Paksistanis visited the Switzerland's firm which supplied valves. The firm checked it with the Swiss Government if the export was legal, the valves were not listed in the "trigger list" of the London Suppliers Club. The Paksitanis were impressed with this "aggressive selling" attitude and that "they upped their requirements."<sup>23</sup> They approached CORA Engineering to buy a gassification and solidification unit. They were supplied with it, as it was not listed in the "Trigger List". Orders were placed with a Dutch firm Van Doorne Transmisse for the supply of hardened steel tubes. Despite the Dutch Government asking them to stop it, the firm supplied Pakistan with the tubes, since the government could not invoke any regulation.<sup>24</sup>

In fact, none of Pakistan's secret deals would have come

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid, P.1.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, P.182.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, P. 182.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, P.184.



to light if it had not been for an industrial dispute in Britain in 1978 in Emerson, the Swindon Company.<sup>25</sup> The company was working on orders placed by Paksitan for 100 inverters and spares valued at Pound Sterling 11.5 million. Someone at Emerson told Frank Allaum that thbese inverters were part of the "Pakistan Special Project". He raised the question in House of Commons "Was the British Government aware that Emerson Electric had supplied Paksitan with a quantity of special inverters for driving ultracentrifuge in a uranium enrichment plant."<sup>26</sup> The Energy Minsiter, Tonny Benn, intervened and stopped an export of goods control order on shipments abroad of high frequency electric control equipment.<sup>27</sup>

However, the combined output of inverters already supplied and installed were sufficient to; make six to seven thermonuclear bombs.<sup>28</sup>

Other companies which were believed to; have helped Paksitan obtain key nuclear commodities include W. Canning

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<sup>25</sup> 8 days (London), 23 June, 1979 quoted in Sreedhar, ed., Pakistan's Bomb, (New Delhi, 1987), P.20.

<sup>26</sup> Weissman and Krosney, n.1, P.187.

<sup>27</sup> Sreedhar, n. 25, P.20.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, P.21.

Engineering in Britain; Alcom in Italy; Leybold Lenacius, Leifield and Aluminium Werken in West Germany.<sup>29</sup> Interestingly, these companies have not been persecuted, probably because the items have not been listed in nuclear control list.

The mastermind behind the uranium enrichment plan -- A.Q. Khan was sentenced to four years prison term on 14 November, 1983 by the Dutch Government. However, charges were dropped against him in June, 1986.<sup>30</sup>

Major Western governments continually advertise their commitment to non-proliferation. They claim that the NPT/IAEA safeguards supplier's control regime is the centre piece of the non-proliferation regime. Pakistani nuclear activities initiated by the Bhutto government, and pursued by the Zia government on the foundation laid by the Bhutto government, demonstrate that a determined nuclear proliferation can discover the cracks in the system. The cracks in the international non-proliferation regime are revealed in the Pakistani case by signs of 'collaboration' between three kinds of constituency : Pakistani buyers who are willing to organise and finance clandestine but not necessarily illegal purchasing channels, Western commercial sellers (private

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<sup>29</sup> Spector, n.18, pp. 38-39.

<sup>30</sup> Dawn (Karachi), 26 June, 1986.

company or a government nuclear exports organisation) who are motivated by commercial, not non-proliferation, aims; and its Western national authorities who are supposed to enforce nuclear exports regulations in conformity with their commitment to the nuclear treaty but whose record in this regard is on the whole poor.

Weissman and Krosney are of the opinion that the Western governments lacked the will and the mechanism to create an air-tight non-proliferation system, and they lacked a policing or an enforcement mechanism. Given the collective will of western supplier nations, the cracks in the system could be plugged.<sup>31</sup>

Ashok Kapur says the cracks should not be judged as deviation from the norm of non-proliferation. They should be judged as an essential part of a two-part norm : one part overtly opposes nuclear proliferation among countries which are not in the Western camp or which are not deemed to be 'frontline, strategic states'; and the second part, coverly, tolerates and promotes nuclear proliferation activity among Western allies. Pakistan's nuclear activities since 1972 fit into the latter category.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Weissman and Krossney, n.1, P. 194.

<sup>32</sup> Kapur, n. 17, P.143.

As far as success to enrichment programme is concerned, Dr. A.Q. Khan announced in 1984 that Pakistan had succeeded in producing enriched uranium but did not specify the level obtained.<sup>33</sup> General Zia said in an interview that Pakistan had enriched uranium to 5 percent.<sup>34</sup> Senator Cranston is of the view that Pakistan has completed construction of 1000 centrifuge units at Kahuta - enough to produce 15 kg of highly enriched uranium annually.<sup>35</sup>

#### ROLE OF USA

During the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, the United States by and large refrained from any direct action apart from sending a task force led by an aircraft carrier "Enterprise" into the Bay of Bengal on 15 December 1971, a day before the war ended and condemning India at United Nations.<sup>36</sup> Earlier the US had cancelled its aid to Pakistan on 8 November 1971. The failure of US to help Pakistan in the war could have

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<sup>33</sup> Nawa-i-Waqt, 10 February, 1984.

<sup>34</sup> Christian Science Monitor (New York) 1 March, 1985.

<sup>35</sup> Allan Cranston "Nuclear Proliferation and US National Security Interests", Congressional Record, 21 June, 1984, P.S7901.

<sup>36</sup> Shirin Tahir Kheli, United States and Pakistan : The Evolution of an Influence Relationship, (New York, 1980), P.44.

influenced Paksitan to develop its own security options. But it would be perhaps be too much to say that the US inaction guided Pakistan on a nuclear path.

Following the Indian explosion in '74, the US intensified efforts to; curb the spread of nucleasr weapon. In the fall o;f 1974, the US convened a secret meeting of the principal nuclear suppliers nations in London in an effort to gain acceptance of a uniform set of nuclear export standards.<sup>37</sup>

The US did not doubt Paksitan's intentions till reprocessing deal was signed; in fact it voted in favour of French-Pakistani-IAEA agreement when it came before the IAEA Board of Governors.

The elction year - 1976 - found Ford on the defensive vis-a-vis campaign by Carter especially on non-proliferation issues. Fort felt "obliged to respond" and to somehow placate the fears within the Indian lobby inside the Congress and the State Department of anotehr pro-Paksitani tilt in the making.<sup>38</sup> The growing congressional pressure particularly from Senators Rebicoff, Glen, Church and Percy compelled Ford administration to pressure Paksitan to dissuade it from advancing its nuclear

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<sup>37</sup> Spector, n.18, P.78.

<sup>38</sup> Kheli, n. 36, P.124.

programme.<sup>39</sup> Accordingly, the US approved the Canadian action to cut off the supply of fuel to KANUPP.

Kissinger personally journeyed to Paksitan and France in 1976 to pressure both to cancel the deal. It was during this meeting that Bhutto said Kissinger had threatened him to cancel the deal for reprocessing or else we "would make a horrible example of you".<sup>40</sup> Kissinger is also reported to have offered 100 A-7s to break the deadlock for the cancellation of the reprocessing deal. The offer, however, did not materialise.<sup>41</sup> The US pressure on France, also, did not yield anything initially. Later with the change of Government at Paris, French policy changed on this issue.

Things changed in the US also with the arrival of Carter. One of the first measures adopted by him was to stop the sensitive transfers of nuclear technology eventhough NPT permitted such transfers with safeguards. The International Security Assistance Act of 1977, which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and authorised international security assistance programme for 1978 required changes which came to be popularly known as Symington - Glenn Amendment (Section

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<sup>39</sup> Ashok Kapur, "Nuclearising Paksitan : Some Hypotheses", Asian Survey, Vol. 20, no. 5, May 1980, P.509.

<sup>40</sup> Bhutto, n.5, P.138.

<sup>41</sup> The Statesman (New Delhi), 17 November, 1976.

670). It dealt with nuclear reprocessing transfers and nuclear detonations and stated that for such country or countries, no US funds were to be used for providing military assistance or granting military education. Further, no military credits were to be made or guarantees given to countries which deliver nuclear reprocessing materials or technology to any as defined in the NPT.<sup>42</sup>

The amendment was, however, accompanied by a provision that the President may furnish assistance otherwise prohibited under the act if he certified in writing to the House and the Senate that the termination of the aid would be "seriously prejudicial to the achievements of the US non-proliferation objectives or jeopardise its common defence and security."<sup>43</sup>

The US pressure did not break any grounds with Paksitan. Bhatto had condemned the US efforts of delaying the deal and talked in terms of revoking the alliance.<sup>44</sup> "We are not treated as well as many other countries which are not even friendly with US", he had said.<sup>45</sup> He also accused the US of

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<sup>42</sup> Richard P. Cronin, "Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia", Middle East Journal, Vol.37, no.4, Autumn 1983, PP. 612-13.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, PP. 613-14.

<sup>44</sup> National Herald, 9 November, 1976.

<sup>45</sup> Dawn, 4 December, 1976.

a "massive huge international conspiracy against the Islamic State of Paksitan inlcuding a plot to oust him (Bhutto)".<sup>46</sup> While it is difficult to assess the viability of the charge, the fact remains that the US succeeded in getting the French reprocessing deal cancelled. President Carter visited France ion January 1978.<sup>47</sup> Consequently, the French modified the proposal (of the co-processing plant), whcih was unacceptable to the Pakistan leading to the cancellation of the deal.

It is important to note the US success was, if it can be called so, limited to exerting pressure on France. For, first, it did not, in any way, discourage the Pakistan from the nuclear path despite terminating military aid and economic aid to Paksitan in September, 1977.<sup>48</sup> Secondly, it led to Paksitan concentrating the attention on the enrichment path secretly. Particularly noteworthy is the fact the new Government in Paksitan also did not deviate from the policies of the previous government, so far as the nuclear issue was concerned.<sup>49</sup>

having got the reprocessing deal cancelled, the US started reviewing the question of aid. A senior officer,

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<sup>46</sup> Times of India, 29 April, 1977.

<sup>47</sup> The Statesman, 8 January, 1978.

<sup>48</sup> Spector, n.18, P.80.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, P.81.



Newson, was sent to Paksitan followed by a senior level delegation.<sup>50</sup> The argument used was that CHASNUPP was not in operation, so Paksitan was no longer violating US congressional legislation, hence aid ties could be resumed. And aid was resumed in October, 1978.

The US learned of Pakistan's attempts to put together the enrichment plant in 1978. An enquiry was ordered in October, 1978, following disclosure in UK. Estimates from the CIA, State Department, and ACDA all converted to on conclusion that unless action was taken immediately, Paksitan would go nuclear within a year.<sup>51</sup> Already armed with Congressional legislation, the US now moved quickly to impose sanctions in 1979 when it made public its concern over enrichment programme.<sup>52</sup> Announcing that the US was terminating aid to Paksitan, the Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, declared in a Congressional testimony, "... that the Pakistan programme is not peaceful, but related to an effort to develop a nuclear explosive capability".<sup>53</sup> All these facts notwithstanding, US economic and military aid to Paksitan was resumed as substantially as never before with the arrival of Second Cold

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<sup>50</sup> Kapur, n.17, P.189.

<sup>51</sup> Kheli, n.36, P.134.

<sup>52</sup> Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear (Cambridge MA, 1987) P.103.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, P.103.

War. Cold War objecting took precedence over non-proliferation objectives of the USA.

In spite of strong and forceful advocacy in favour of acquiring nuclear weapons in the sixties, Bhutto did not take inevitable nuclear path in early seventies when he became the all powerful Prime Minister of Pakistan. Intention of government leaders cannot necessarily be inferred from their speeches and speeches are intended for effect on domestic audiences. In select circumstances the greater the public advocacy less likely the actual commitment in the policy making process. Politicians project strong images to their (non-specialist) domestic audiences.

Theory of Indian challenge and Pakistan reaction upto 1974 is of limited use. Chain theory and regional nuclear arms race is not acceptable in South Asia. Pakistan till 1974 was not actually interested in having nuclear weapons. Even Bhutto's nuclear posture was verbal and purpose was to bargain for increasing conventional arms supply from the United States of America. Even after '74 Pakistan did not take an inevitable nuclear weapon programme. Its movement was to attain weapon capability.

Bhutto said, "If sufficient conventional armaments are

not supplied to Paksitan, it must concentrate all its energy on acquiring a nuclear capability. If Pakistan is not able to acquire weapons which can act as a deterrent, it must forego spending on conventional weapons and make a jump forward concentraing all its energy on acquiring the nuclear capability".<sup>54</sup>

Just prior to the lifting of arms embargo in February 1975, Bhutto said that Paksitan's nuclear weaoon policy was "under constant review" and depended on whether Washington provided Paksitan with sufficient conventional weapons.<sup>55</sup>

After 1974 Indian explosion Bhutto complained about the problem of Indian nuclear blackmail but in his meetings with the U.S. leaders he wanted to acquire more sophisticated arms i.e., he sought to strengthen the conventinal military mechanisms in response to the Indian threat perception.<sup>56</sup>

#### THE CHINA CONNECTION

The role of China in the nuclear programme of Pakistan is based on speculation and hypotheses for the simple reason - lack of clear cut evidence. This has been compounded by the

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<sup>54</sup> Dawn, 20 December 1974, pp. 117-18.

<sup>55</sup> Paksitan Times, 7 February, 1975.

<sup>56</sup> Kapur, n.39, P.504.

silence of Chinese leadership over the issue, except, perhaps mild denials every now and then.

Compared to the 1965 war, the role of China in the 1971 war had been minimal. In fact, when Bhutto had visited Peking in Novemebr 1971, Chiense leaders refused any active military support.<sup>57</sup>

When Bhutto visited China in 1972, the Chinese Government converted four past loans amounting to \$ 107 million into grants and deferred the payment of 1970 loan of \$ 200 million for 20 years.<sup>58</sup> China refuged Bhutto a defence pact, though it promised to meet Paksitan's defence requirements.<sup>59</sup> The Sanghai Communique issued at the end of Nixon's visit in 1972 mentioned support for Paksitan.<sup>60</sup>

Soon after Indian explosion in 1974, the Chinese leaders criticised the Indian Government for harbouring to become a sub-super power.<sup>61</sup> They pledged support to Paksitan specifically

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<sup>57</sup> Peking Review, no. 46, 12 December 1971, P.12.

<sup>58</sup> Nilofar Mahdi, "Sino-Pak Relations : Historical Background", Paksitan Horizon Vol. 39, No. 4, fourth quarter 1986, pp. 60-68.

<sup>59</sup> Asian Research Bulletin (Hongkong), 1-28 February, 1973, P.1623.

<sup>60</sup> Current Background, no.952, 27 March, 1972, P.36.

<sup>61</sup> Paksitan Times, 5 July, 1974.

against "nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail".<sup>62</sup> In 1975, the Chinese Vice Premier visited Paksitan and among other things, lent support to the Paksitani proposal for nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia.<sup>63</sup> The importance of the subsequent year was revealed by Bhutto in his death cell testament :

"... My single most impoortant achievement which I believe will dominate the portrait of my public life is an agreement which I arrived at after an assiduous and tenacious endeavour spanning over eleven years of negotiations. In the present context, the agreement of mine, concluded in June 1976, will perhaps be my greatest achievement adn contribution to the survival of our people and our nation."<sup>64</sup>

By deducting eleven years means negotiations for must have begun in 1965. A high level delegation headed by Bhutto visited Beijing between 26-30 May, 1976, which included the famour Paksitani nuclear physicist and nobel laureat Dr. Abdul Salam, Bhutto's scientific adviser. Two agreements were signed - one on scientific and the other on military cooperation.<sup>65</sup> Joint commuinique issued after Bhutto's visit said : "Paksitani PM thanked the Chinese PM for China's firm

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<sup>62</sup> Peking Review 5 July, 1974, P.14.

<sup>63</sup> Paksitan Times 21 April, 1975.

<sup>64</sup> Bhutto, n.5, P.203.

<sup>65</sup> Working People's party, 5 June, 1976.

support to the proposal of the Pakistani Government for nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia and expressed deep gratitude at China's willingness to assume appropriate commitments arising therefrom." However, it was never specified what these appropriate commitments were.

According to Namboodri, the Chinese help to Pakistan consisted of transfer of nuclear weapon's design information, assistance in setting up an enrichment plant, supply of nuclear test data, the conduct of a nuclear test on Pakistan's behalf (or to make a test site available), the supply of heavy water and the transfer of plutonium reprocessing technology.<sup>66</sup> According to Sinha and Subramanian, the 1976 pact alluded to by Bhutto was with China; Peoples Republic of China helped Pakistan build its reprocessing plant; and China's motivation was to gain access to Pakistan's CANDU reactor technology in exchange for Chinese reprocessing technology.<sup>67</sup> According to David Hart, Peoples Republic of China provided technical assistance at Kahuta in 1979.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> P.K.S. Namboodri, "China - Pakistan Nuclear Axis?" Strategic Analysis, IDSA, Vol. 6, No.7, October 1982, pp. 407-17.

<sup>67</sup> P.B. Sinha and R.R. Subramanian, Nuclear Pakistan, New Delhi, 1980, pp.41, 48.

<sup>68</sup> David Hart, Nuclear Power in India (New Delhi, 1983), pp. 132-3.

In 1980, a report said China had suspended nuclear cooperation with Paksitan after the overthrow of Bbutto; in July 1977 but after Soviet assisted coup in Afghanistan in April 1978 China suddenly became very friendly with Zia regime in Paksitan and some nuclear liaison wre resumed.

### IASLAMIC BOMB

Various reports suggested that Arab leaders had for some years been looking for opportunities to develop a nuclear option. Colonel Gaddafi of Libya naively sent his Prime Minster, Major Jalloud, to China in 1971 on a special mission to buy nuclear bombs from that country.<sup>69</sup> Earlier he had approached President Pompidou of France for the same purpose. Colonel Gaddafi in his frantic search for nuclear weapons even sought India's assistance. Egypt also had sought Indian help in manufacturing nuclear bombs for Arabs.<sup>70</sup> The Arab quest for nuclear weapons has to be understood in the context of Middle EAstern military balance, which had always been predominantly in favour of Israel, was further tipped in the latter's favour by the introduction of the nuclear factor.

In a parallel effort Iraq apopears to have launched a nuclear weapons programme of its own. Although Iraq had

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<sup>69</sup> Palit and Namboodri, n.16, P.6.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

signed NPT, the Iraqis were reported to have bought a Swimming Pool reactor from France which would have enabled them to produce weapon-grade plutonium. However, on 12 April, 1979, the equipment for that reactor, while stored in warehouse in a southern French port awaiting shipment, was mysteriously blown up, presumably by Israeli agents. Later reactor of Iraq itself was bombed and destroyed by Israel.

The Arabs had adequate money. As far as the conventional weapons were concerned, there was no problem in acquiring sophisticated weaponry from the West, since the West was only too eager to recycle some of the mounting reserves of petrodollars by selling back arms. But now conventional weapons superiority was not good enough though even this has persistently eluded them, because the US has ensured that Israel would always have superiority in this respect and the nuclear ambition could only be a dream.

Two developments turned this dream into a foreseeable reality. One was the emergence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the dynamic Pakistani leader, as a champion of the Islamic cause. It could not have been difficult for the flamboyant Bhutto to convince the leaders of the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia and Libya, that it was possible to develop an Islamic nuclear option. Secondly, the Pakistani civilian nuclear programme had by then reached such a level of sophistication



that it was possible for Pakistani scientists, with the facilities available to them, to embark on a weapons programme, if only it could be supported financially by the oil rich Arab countries.

There is no direct evidence of either Saudi Arabia or Libya or any other Arab country having actively collaborated with Pakistan on the nuclear project, in any case they possess neither the manpower nor the industrial infrastructure to participate directly in a nuclear weapons programme. However, Saudi Arabia and Libya have been major financial supporters of Pakistan in this venture.<sup>71</sup> Both countries have a common though not necessarily a shared interest in nuclearising the Arab world. The Libyan leader is noted for both his fanatical anti-zionist fervour and for his claim to the leadership of the Arab world; and Saudi Arabia consider itself the rightful guardian of a future Islamic bomb because, after all, it exercises guardianship over Islam itself.

The other major development which nurtured the idea of an Islamic bomb was the global proliferation of nuclear technology, materials and components. Most of the components for fabrication of fissile material are now available in the open market. Thanks to the loopholes in the NPT in which the sponsors, the nuclear weapon powers exempted themselves from

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

all nuclear safeguards. Paksitan, through its nuclear scientists abroad and its covert industrial conventions, have considerable leverage in the European nuclear markets to get access to the required materials.

The war of 1973 and the accumulation of petro-dollar changed the scene in West Asia and provided a ready-made opportunity for Paksitan. Bhutto was already convinced that his and Paksitan's destiny lay with the Arab world. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, Paksitan's economic and military connections with the Arab world had been developing significantly even before 1973; and the phenomenal rise in oil price opened up new opportunities for Paksitan to offer its goods and services to the oil rich Arab states. Secondly, the Pakistanis have always aspired to identify themselves with Islamic West Asia; indeed this was one of the basic underlying reasons for the alienation that developed between the east and west wings of the united Paksitan.

Bhutto pursued this Islamic connection vigorously after 1973. he expected a great deal of financial support from the oil rich countries and also possibly expected, through association with them, to gain international political stature. More than that, Bhutto aspired to a leading role for Pakistan in the Islamic world, for which in fact Pakistan was eminently suitable. After all, industrially and

technologically, Pakistan had been in the forefront of Muslim countries. Militarily the Pakistan armed forces had high professional reputation, better organised and armed than most Arab armies. Now Bhutto brought in an additional dimension. He became the most articulate spokesman for the Islamic countries in the countries of the world. Summit of Islamic conference was held at Lahore in 1974. It was for the first time that Pakistan was venue for this summit.

Let us view joint venture in the perspective of Pakistan - West Asian economic - military collaboration. Direct financial assistance from Islamic States to Pakistan was virtually non-existent prior to 1973-74. In contrast, by mid-1976 five Arab countries and Iran had provided grants and loans worth nearly \$ 1,000 million. During the period 1950-51 to 1975-76, Pakistan received nearly \$ 9,000 million in form of aid, more than half of which was from the Air Pakistan consortium. The United States was the largest single donor and multinational arrangements through the World Bank netted \$ 1,800 million. The socialist group also gave assistance to Pakistan. The Soviet overall credit amounted to \$ 611 million.

In comparison, in a matter of three years (between 1973-74 and 1976-77), Muslim countries ranked first in the list of aid donors to Pakistan. Abu Dhabi had by 1975-76 provided

assistance worth \$100 million, Iran \$ 628.6 million, Kuwait \$ 44 million, Libya \$ 80 million, Qatar \$ 10 million and Saudi Arabia \$ 130 million.

General purpose aid from Iran rose to \$ 730 million in 1977, with an additional \$ 75 million for project aid. Loans and investments from the United Arab Emirates came to \$ 192 million, from Libya \$ 133 million, and Kuwait \$ 50 million. Although there were cold economic reasoning behind these aid transactions and they were linked to the lending policies of global agencies like the World Bank and the I.M.F., such assistance can be regarded as a symbol of special relationship. Paksitan enjoyed the same status as Egypt and Syria as the largest aid recipient from the OPEC.<sup>72</sup>

Another important source of foreign exchange for Paksitan is remittances from Pakistanis working in Arab countries. By the end of 1977, there were more than 300,000 Pakistanis employed in the region, Libya having the largest number.

Although most of them were construction workers and skilled and semi-skilled workers, they also included professionals such as doctors and military experts. Bhutto writes, "We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid, pp. 36-37.

civilisations have this capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only Islamic civilization was without it, but, that position was about to change."<sup>73</sup>

The genesis of the Islamic bomb can, thus, be traced to the vision of Bhutto, for whom it would serve a dual purpose. If Paksitan were to mother an "Islamic" bomb (as distinct from purely national Pakistani bomb) the wrath of the rest of the world would not be directed against Paksitan alone. The Islamic connection would come to the help of Paksitan. Of the five nuclear weapon powers, three (the United States, Britain and France) are critically dependent on Arab oil and, therefore, could not risk antagonising the Arabs. Of the other two, Russia and China, the latter would not oppose the idea of an Islamic bomb because it could also be a Pakistani bomb to act as a check against India and help in counter-vailing Soviet influence among the radical Arab States. In any case, Paksitan can hope to survive any embargo or punitive measures the international community can met out, and cooperation from oil rich Muslim countries.

Possession of nuclear weapons by Paksitan may create, at best a strategic uncertainty in Arab-Islamic security calculations, as suggestions would be there of a possibility of transfer of the nuclear weapons to the Arabs. It is close

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid, P.138.

to impossible that such a transfer would ever take place. If at all Americans or Israelis consider it as a serious possibility, a direct assault might be made on Paksitan's nuclear facilities either directly by Israel or in collaboration with a regional country, with the blessing or connivance of a superpower. Other actions may include toppling the ruling group and launching economic sanctions. Facing these threats, it is next to impossible that Pakistan would ever think of such a transfer.<sup>74</sup>

In truth, Pan-Islamism - the dream of 19th century reformers like Jamaluddin Afghani - is a myth whose pursuit has yielded nought. As a corollary the "Islamic Bomb" is a meaningless quantity today. Individual Muslim countries may desire nuclear weapons and some have been engaged in this pursuit for years. But the motivations are essentially secular and nationalistic even if they are cloaked in Islamic garb. Just as Israel's nuclear weapons are intended to serve the State of Israel and not Judaism as a faith, so too the weapons sought by Paksitan, Iraq and Iran, are intended to serve the purpose of these States and not Islam.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Akhtar Ali, Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma, (New Delhi, 1984), P.95.

<sup>75</sup> Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Sense and Nonsense About the Islamic Bomb", The News (Islamabad), 21 March 1993.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### REGIONAL SECURITY

The term 'security' as it has been traditionally used in international relations literature is based on two major assumptions : one, that threats to a State's security principally arise from outside its borders, and two, that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and usually need a military response of the security of the target State is to be preserved. These assumptions were best summed in Walter Lippmann's celebrated statement that "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."<sup>1</sup> Lippmann's definition, according to Arnold Wolfers, "implies that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it. This is in accordance with the common uses of the term."<sup>1</sup>

Even those scholars who have differed from this starkly State-centered realist perspective and focussed on international rather than national security in terms of

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<sup>1</sup> Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy : Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943), P.51.

<sup>1</sup> Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration" : Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, 1962), P.150.

reducing external threats to the security of a State, especially of a major power with systemic security concerns. They have taken their philosophical cue from authors like Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, who have argued, to quote Wight, "if there is an international society, then there is an order of some kind to be maintained, or even developed. It is not fallacious to speak of a collective interest, and security acquires abroad meaning : it can be enjoyed or pursued in common."<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, the earliest of the twentieth century proponents of international security - the idealists of the first three decades - refused to distinguish the security of the parts from that of a system as a whole. The post-Second World War breed of system - central scholars has been more discriminating than its predecessors. They have argued from the assumption that the various segments of the international system are interlinked to such an extent that their security and welfare are dependent upon each other. While much of the initial impetus from this line of argument came from the awesome concentration of nuclear weaponry in the hands of two superpowers and the period arises in their relations from the Berlin blockade of 1948 to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the economic problems that the leading western industrialised

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<sup>2</sup> Martin Wight, "Western Values in International Relations" in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, ed., Diplomatic Investigations (London, 1966), P.103.



States faced from early 1970s, including the two oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-79, led to the crystallization of the "interdependence" argument.

The fundamental attribute of the Western concept of security is externally oriented. But it is clear that in the Third World which includes South Asia, despite the rhetoric of many of its leaders, the sense of insecurity from which states suffer emanates to a substantial degree from within their boundaries rather than from outside. While this does not mean external threats are non-existent, it does imply that where external threats do exist they often attain saliency primarily because of the insecurities and conflicts that abound within Third World states. Further more, it can be argued that these internal conflicts and insecurities frequently get transformed into inter-state conflicts because of their spill over effects into neighbouring States that often suffer from similar domestic insecurities.

The Third World's weak linkage with the systematic security agenda further circumscribes the utility of the traditional concept of security in explaining the problems of security that Third World States face.

While several Third World States have been allied with one or the other superpower, such alliances have been either fluid and temporary or inadequate deterrents to regional conflicts involving superpower allies (for example, Vietnam and Iraq) or incapable of preventing the dismemberment of at least one aligned State (Pakistan). The nature of alliances and of superpower commitments to their allies in the Third World are therefore vastly different from the character of alliances and of alliance commitments in the developed world. Alliance security, in contrast to the post-war situation in Europe, is not synonymous with or even inextricably tied to the security of even the most overtly aligned States in the Third World possibly except Israel.

All these factors and theories are helpful in explaining and understanding security syndrome of South Asia, one of the most important manifestations of this syndrome is nuclear weapon programme of Paksitan.

The inference for India is clear that the maximum penalty that the US can impose upon Paksitan will be to cut off its economic and military aid. Even that is doubtful unless Paksitan indulges in a provocative weapon test on its own soil. That was why Dr. A.Q. Khan could even claim Paksitan's

technological capability to fabricate a hydrogen bomb. President Zia too reasserted Pakistan is independent in its nuclear programme.<sup>3</sup>

Nuclear Proliferation has come to South Asia in one guise or another. Whether "de facto" or "threshold" or "undeclared," or "emergent" there is no question that India and Paksitan have the capacity to become nuclear armed States, even if they have not yet have a nuclear capability - indeed, even if they never acquire and deploy nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup>

Bhutto himself and many scholars have tried to establish Indian nuclear programme as the sole cause behind nuclear weapon programme of Pakistan. In the ultimate analysis, however, it is difficult to establish linkages between the two. Nuclear weapon programme of Paksitan cannot be explained by chain theory or cause and effect paradigm.

#### INDIA FACTOR

Nuclear explosion by India in 1974 was turning point in Paksitan's nuclear programme. Indian superiority in numbers

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<sup>3</sup> S.D. Muni, "The USA and The Asian the Giant", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 8, No.3, June 1984, P.214.

<sup>4</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, "1990 : South Asia's Useful Nuclear Crisis?" Paper presented to the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chicago, Illinois, 6-7 February 1992, P.5.

was amply proved in 1971 war. Now India had established a qualitative superiority over Paksitan in terms of technology. Indian explosion also meant that now Paksitan had to forget Kashmir issue and live under the shadow of hostile and powerful nuclear neighbour. Events of '71 could be repeated again. Paksitan did not sign NPT because great powers could not guarantee against nuclear attack on Paksitan or even nuclear blackmail by India.<sup>5</sup>

Bhutto characterized Pokharan explosion as a fateful development and said that "a more grave and serious event has not taken place in the history of Paksitan." He noted that the explosion had "introduced a qualitative change" in the situation between the two countries and that his country would not succumb to "nuclear blackmail".<sup>6</sup>

After the Pokharan the Prime Minster of India had written to reassure him that "there are no political or foreign policy implications" of the test and that India still adhered to its policy of using atomic energy solely for peaceful ends. Prime Minister Bhutto's reply to this was typical. He wrote, "It is a question not only of intentions but of capabilities. It is

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<sup>5</sup> Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Option and the West", in Mohammad Ashen Chaudhari, ed., Pakistan and Regional Security, (Karachi, n.d.)

<sup>6</sup> D.K. Palit and, P.K.S. Namboodri, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb, (New Delhi, 1979) P.16.

well-established that the testing of a nuclear device is no different from the detonation of a nuclear weapon. Given this indisputable fact, how is it possible for our fears to be assuaged by mere assurances, which may in any case be ignored in subsequent years. Governments change, as do national attitudes. But the acquisition of a capability, which has direct and immediate consequences, becomes a permanent factor to be reckoned with."<sup>7</sup>

Bhutto said to the Pakistani press, "... we are not going ahead with a nuclear programme for the explosion of a nuclear device which whatever India might say really means a nuclear device for military purposes. But our nuclear programme for peaceful purposes has undoubtedly been accelerated. ... and ultimately, if our backs are to the wall and we have absolutely no option, in that event, this decision about going nuclear will have to be taken."<sup>8</sup>

This statement indicated that Bhutto's plan to nuclearise Paksitan was reversible even after the Indian test, and second, there existed an inherent linkage or a trade - off between US conventional arms supply and Pakistani nuclear restraint. That is, even after the Indian test there was no

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Pakistan Times, 27 December, 1974.

deterministic connection between Bhutto's concern about the Indian nuclear activity. Bhutto's nuclear motivations and views about a Pakistani nuclear deterrent were complex and ambiguous and these complexities and ambiguities dominated the Pakistani nuclear policy making process as well as the nuclear activities.

Bhutto said in mid-sixties, "If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no alternative."<sup>9</sup>

According to Palit and Namboodri, "Bhutto's statement was a reaction to the commissioning of the plutonium reprocessing plant in India."<sup>10</sup> The wording of Bhutto's statement specifies an Indian bomb - Pakistani bomb linkage, but the context, which Palit and Namboodri correctly judge to be a technical event, the start-up of Indian reprocessing in 1965, suggest that Bhutto was reacting to Indian reprocessing rather necessarily indicating his commitment to a Pakistani bomb effort at that time.

Bhutto captured the essence of his thinking when he said, "Pakistan will always find it difficult to quantitatively keep

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<sup>9</sup> Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan (eds) Awakening the People (Bhutto, 1966-9 Speeches) (Rawalpindi, n.d.) P.21. Bhutto's speech at Larkana, 29 December, 1966.

<sup>10</sup> Palit and Namboodri, n.7, P.15.

pace with India but qualitatively we have maintained a balance in the past and will have to continue to maintain it in the future for our survival. It is for this reason that as Foreign Minister and Minister-in-charge of Atomic Energy, I warned the nation sometime back that if India acquires nuclear status, Paksitan will have to follow suit even if it entails eating grass."<sup>11</sup>

Pakistani nuclear activities upto 1971 were unambiguously peaceful, and not a single nuclear event occurred from 1956 to 1971 which was suspected by India or the international community. None of Pakistani nuclear activities during 1960s were determined by Pakistani fears about a bigger, militarily stronger, culturally or ideologically threatening, and nuclear India. Secondly, Bhutto played a marginal role in Pakistani nuclear affairs upto 1971. So even if Bhutto in the 1960s had a clear nuclear plan which is debatable in view of the ambiguities in his speeches and writings, Bhutto failed to change the nuclear policy of Paksitan government.

The Indian bomb-Pakistani bomb linkage is falsified because after Bhutto came to power in December 1971, he decided in January 1972 to build the Pakistani bomb. This decision was taken before India exploded its bomb in May 1974. So the point about "following India's suit" was demonstrably

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<sup>11</sup> Jalal and Hasan, n.10, P.21.

Bhutto's attitude towards Indo-Pakistan relations and nuclear affairs was revealed in 1962 when he said, "There is also the problem of further enlargement of the number of nuclear powers. Quite a few countries are feverishly engaged in the manufacture of fissionable material for weapon purposes with a view to forcing their entry into the atomic club. We cannot but regard this as a development of grave consequence which will inevitably result in destroying the balance of strength in the different regions of the world... .

The Geneva Conference has an equal number of representatives of the two great military combinations of the world - NATO and Warsaw Pact countries - five on each side. In addition to these ten, there are eight "un-committed" countries selected from Latin America, Asia, Europe and Africa. While Pakistan welcomes this representation, it is constrained at the same time to draw attention to the fact that the composition of the conference ignore the military realities in certain regions of the world and notably in that of South Asia. Disarmament negotiations must not only seek to preserve the equilibrium between the military strength of the East and the West on a global basis at each and every stage of the disarmament process, but must also maintain the balance of



power between the militarily significant countries of the each region."<sup>12</sup>

Here Bhutto stresses on Indo-Pakistani parity in diplomatic representation in the Geneva disarmament conference and military parity in South Asia.

Bhutto's strategy was to maintain pressure against India via the practice of Indo-Pakistan military balance of power politics. His operational strategy was two-fold : to use his diplomacy about non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament to mobilise international support for his quest to denuclearize India and to check India's ascendancy by encouraging the development and maintenance of international pressure through his insistence on a regional military balance. The maintenance of Indo-Pakistan military balance was the primary aim and Indo-Pakistan nuclear balance was the secondary aim. But a stable Indo-Pakistani military, diplomatic and psychological balance were transformed into an imbalance in the aftermath of the 1971 war. In terms of Bhutto's logic, nuclear weapon power of Pakistan must have been a substitute for conventional military superiority of India.

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<sup>12</sup> 'Disarmament Problems', Sind University, 30 March 1962, in Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan, ed. Reshaping Foreign Policy, 1948-66, Statements, Articles, Speeches, Vol. I (Rawalpindi, n.d.), P.166.

## NPT AND PAKISTAN

The Non-Proliferation regime, defined simply, means international framework of controls and undertakings built up around co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and designed to discourage diversion of nuclear materials or technology to military purposes.<sup>13</sup> The concept, however, has a much larger connotation, particularly when one comes to analyse the motives and attitudes of the countries to the various arms control agreements. The constituents of the Non-Proliferation Regime. For instance, a constituent of the regime is step-by-step approach to nuclear weapon free zone which is any zone recognised as such by United Nations General Assembly, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty has established by virtue of a treaty or convention. NPT too, another constituent of the non-proliferation regime, has a provision for establishment of such a zone.

Broadly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits transfer of any nuclear weapon or explosive device directly or indirectly from the nuclear to non-nuclear weapon States, makes it binding upon the non-nuclear weapon State,

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<sup>13</sup> Rodney Jones, Non-Proliferation : Islam, The Bomb and South Asia (Sages : Beverly California, 1981), P.9.

(and not on the nuclear weapons) to accept full scope safeguards of International Atomic Energy Agency. Subject to these, the treaty further calls on the Non-Nuclear Weapon States for obtaining benefits through unilateral or special international agreements. It provides for renew conferences after an interval of five years.

Pakistan's response to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, quite different from that of India, was first conveyed to the First Committee of the General Assembly in May 1968 by Agha Shahi.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, Paksitan welcomed the submission of the text of the draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the US and the Soviet Union. It also paid its tributes to the two superpowers and the UK for reaching such an agreement.

Taking the text issue by issue Agha Shahi said, "First we agree that the draft treaty is designed to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons than the existing five nuclear-powers."<sup>15</sup> He continued : "In principle Paksitan shares the view of non-nuclear weapon States that vertical proliferation and not only horizontal proliferation must be ended," but (quoting the Ethiopian delegate) he said, "the present

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<sup>14</sup> GAOR (on 13 May 1968), 22nd Session, First Committee, Meeting 1566, PP. 18-21.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, P.18.

difference between the nuclear powers compel us to consider the present approach as partial and practical goal short of ideal goal.<sup>16</sup> He also said that to link the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with measures restricting the arms race could result only in an impasse. Since the choice, according to him, before the world was "either to put an end to horizontal proliferation now or to pursue the goal of ending vertical proliferation as well as horizontal proliferation later, Paksitan supports the former."

Secondly, according to him, Paksitan agreed that the obligation on the non-nuclear weapon powers was much more than the nuclear weapon powers but in given reality of power in the world and the great disparity in strength and resources of the non-]nuclear weapon countries on the one hand and superpowers on the other "we must confess on being skeptical that an even balance can be struck ... we do not think it would be realistic to impose obligations on the nuclear powers similar in all respects to those that the treaty places on non-nuclear powers."<sup>17</sup>

In response to the third Article of the Treaty, Pakistan felt that to impose equal obligations on both was possible only when the stage could be set for total nuclear arms

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

control. "At present the stage is beyond our reach," said the delegate.<sup>18</sup>

While in responses to Article 4 and 5 Pakistan though (according to the delegate) that the conclusion of these in the treaty of nuclear non-proliferation became the Treaty for the proliferation of benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the maximum number of States. "We would hope that the nuclear powers party to the treaty will respond affirmatively and promptly to the request of any non-nuclear party," he said. As for Article 6, he said, that Paksitan did not question the good faith of the super powers.<sup>19</sup>

However, while accepting the basic premises and expressing support for the objective of the NPT, Islamabad refused to sign it once it was open for signatures.

Pakistan's concern against the NPT were multi-faceted. Paksitan sought 'unqualified adherence' to the Treaty, especially by potential nuclear weapon States.<sup>20</sup> In the

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid, P.19.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, P.19.

<sup>20</sup> SIPRI, The Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT, (New York, 1972), P.26.

context of international concerns of mid-1960's, these States were Israel, India, Argentina, South Africa, Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden, to list the prominent ones.

Paksitan stated, "In the final analysis, the position of Paksitan with regard to signing the treaty will turn on considerations of its enlightened national interest and national security if the geopolitical context of the region in which Paksitan was situated."<sup>21</sup>

Undoubtedly, the "geopolitical context" of the region included India but not exclusively so. In the historical context -- generally of Pakistani foreign and military relations, Paksitan-Soviet relations, Pakistani attitudes about communism and especially Soviet Communism and expansionism, Khrushchev's public threat to attack Peshawar with rockets in retaliation against U-2 flights originating from Peshawar - The geopolitical context included the USSR as well. One could as well enlarge the geopolitical context to include the north-western Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region where the superpowers rivalry had emerged by 1968. Here again the context is broader than a concern with India, and the targets of Paksitan declarations remained ambiguous and multiple.

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

Pakistani NPT diplomacy vigorously sought security guarantees for the non-nuclear weapon States which it felt ought to include the following elements.

1. Prohibition of first use of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon States against non-nuclear weapon States.
2. Immediate assistance to be given to non-nuclear weapon States which are victims of nuclear aggression.
3. Assistance should be forthcoming before the Security Council can act.
4. The Security guarantee should include all non-nuclear weapon States which have renounced the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, irrespective of whether they sign the NPT or not.<sup>22</sup>

All these four elements dealt with the political attitude and the strategic doctrines of the nuclear weapon powers and they had nothing to do with India.

Against this background, the first shift in Pakistan's approach to the NPT occurred in the 1970s. In his statement to the Committee for Disarmament, the Pakistan representative

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, pp. 26-27.

said, "Pakistan was and remains committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament. We appreciated that the objective of the Partial Test Ban Treaty was to promote this goal. Paksitan, therefore, voted in favour of the Treaty and signed it (but it did not ratify it). We similarly voted in favour of the resolution of the General Assembly which commended for adopting the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, we have to point out certain flaws in the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Prohibited nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water only. It did not prevent, and indeed has not prevented, the nuclear powers parties to the Treaty from further developing and sophisticating their nuclear arsenals. Also, by enabling India to explode a nuclear weapons device underground, the Treaty has failed to prevent further nuclear proliferation.

Paksitan's willingness to accede to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and to other international agreements on nuclear disarmament has obviously been affected by the knowledge that India had embarked on a course of nuclear armament. We have tried to inform the international community of this on several occasions. In these circumstances, Paksitan could not be expected legally to foreclose its option."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Paksitan statement in the Committee on Disarmament, 16 July, 1974.



This statement revealed a new policy line " 'We cannot accept the international agreements because India is seeking armament'. This line was not that 'we will sign the NPT if India does'. This line was to emerge later in the Zia era. The policy line was that Paksitan would have to go nuclear because India has gone nuclear. Another policy stance was that Bhutto kept up his professions about peaceful Pakistani Nuclear activities until the appearance of his death cell memoirs. 'If I am assassinated' (1979) which disclosed the military side of Pakistani nuclear activities. In similar vein, Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan never publicly admitted that PAEC activities have any military context.

In effect, a new direction a new combination of anti-Indianism and pro-Westernism emerged in Pakistan's arms control posture in the Bhutto era. The anti-NPT package of the 1960s contained philosophical, legal and strategic reasons in Pakistani official statements. This package was substantially modified in the 1970s. The philosophical and legal objections to the NPT were dropped in the 1970s. The quest for negative security assurances was maintained. The strategic dimension was adapted from the vague or diplomatic wording of 1960s about 'geopolitical realities' and given a sharper anti-India focus in the 1970s. This was presented as the reason (in contrast with the reasons given in the 1960s) to reject the NPT and the Partial Test Ban . As an aside it

is worth mentioning that Paksitan rejected the Partial Test ban Treaty in 1963, before the start-up of Indian reprocessing, before Indian Atomic energy Chief Bhabha spoke in favour of, in 1964, an Indian bomb programme, and before India's Prime Minister Shastri raised the possibility in late 1965 of an Indian test.

The new orientation of Paksitan's NPT diplomacy through the Bhutto and Foreign Office peace offensive reflected a diplomatic strategy of calculated deception. Its aim was to divert attention from Paksitan's bomb - related activities. In this aim Paksitan was successful. The underlying Pakistani assumption - which was quite correct - was that the West and China would not mind a situation where India's nuclear weapons option was foreclosed by Paksitan NPT diplomacy. That is, the Great Powers would not mind if a parallel situation emerged in Paksitan which forced India to negotiate on the issue. This was real politics in action. It reflected Bhutto's traditional mental make-up as well as the innovativeness of Paksitan diplomatic specialists, like Aziz Ahmed, Agha Shahi and Abdul Sattar.

In 1976 again, Pakistan called for a "total cessation" of underground nuclear tests. The threat of nuclear holocaust according to the delegation would continue till all the stockpiles were not destroyed by the nuclear weapon powers.

The delegates thought in terms of threat of security to non-nuclear weapon states from the nuclear weapon states.<sup>24</sup> The inherent right to benefit from peaceful nuclear technology, it must be stated, was through the tests etc. conducted by the nuclear haves. Paksitan had fully supported this aspect of NPT initially. Now Paksitan's stand changed on this issue. It started talking in terms of right of non-nuclear power to conduct the test. On 28 October 1979, Tass reported that General Zia said that he reserved his right to decide to detonate nuclear explosive device if that was needed for further development of Pakistan atomic power energies.<sup>25</sup>

It is interesting to note that India had on several occasions, offered a no-war pact to Paksitan beginning from the one in 1949 offered by Nehru to Liaquat. It was repeated in 1965, 1968, 1977 and 1980 by India to Paksitan and on all these occasions, Paksitan had rejected the proposal saying that a no-war pack can only follow resolution of mutual bilateral disputes.<sup>26</sup> However, the negotiations on this

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<sup>24</sup> UN Document A/Pv.8, Plenary Meeting 8, 1976.

<sup>25</sup> TASS (Moscow), 28 October 1979. Text in Worldwide Report : Nuclear Development and Proliferation, No.20, 3 December 1979, P.15.

<sup>26</sup> "No War Pact", UNI Background, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 16-22.

subject between two countries had been obstructed by Pakistan's reference to Kashmir at the UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva in February 1982.<sup>27</sup>

### NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE

The concept of nuclear weapon free zone means that countries constituting a region in the non-nuclear world should agree not to resort to nuclear proliferation and declare their region free from nuclear weapons. These countries, in return, are promised by some nuclear weapon powers, a guarantee as regards non-resort to nuclear threats. From the point of view of definition, a nuclear weapon free zone is a specified territorial entity, normally a recognised geographical region, in which the manufacture, receipt, storage and installation of nuclear weapons is forbidden. The UN General Assembly adopted a declaration on 11 September 1975 which incorporated the Mexican definition of a nuclear weapon free zone as under :

Nuclear weapon free zone, as a general rule, is any zone recognised as such by United Nations General Assembly, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty has established by virtue of a Treaty or Convention.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Paksitan Times, 27 February, 1982.

<sup>28</sup> SIPRI Year Book, 1976, P.303.

In the 16th annual session of the UN Atomic Energy Conference held in Mexico in September 1972, Paksitan put forward the proposal to denuclearize South Asia.<sup>29</sup> Introducing the proposal, Pakistani representative Munir Ahmed Khan called for a treaty between South Asian countries similar to Tlateloco Treaty for the denuclearization of Latin America.<sup>30</sup>

The proposal was reiterated by Bhutto while inaugurating the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) on 23 November, 1972, "For Paksitan atomic energy should become a symptom of hope rather fear. For this reason, we would welcome if the entire sub-continent by agreement between the countries concerned would be declared a nuclear free zone and the introduction of nuclear weapons banned."<sup>31</sup>

It is significant to note that idea was launched a few months after a decision to make nuclear bomb was taken at a secret meeting in Multan in January 1972. Thus argues Ashok Kapur, "Bhutto's peace offensive emerged in 1972 with the proposal to make South Asia a nuclear free zone ... The peace offensive was a consequence of the bomb decision. It gave Paksitan and Bhutto a diplomatic initiative it help Pakistan's image as a peace maker. Although the aim was to

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<sup>29</sup> Dawn (Karachi), 4 October, 1972.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 24 November 1972.

mask the bomb decision with the peace offensive - an opportunistic and instrumental action in our opinion, vintage Bhutto, given his belief in the theory of calculated deception."<sup>32</sup>

The idea of a nuclear weapon free zone was mooted two years before the Indian explosion took place. However, the explosion merely provided Paksitan with an opportunity to vindicate its stand on apprehensions to its security. The proposal was brought before the United Nations in 1974, when active campaign for nuclear free zone was launched. This is one of the main reasons why most authors see Paksitan's proposal for a nuclear free zone in the light of the Indian explosion. For instance, Zalmay Khalilzad says, "To meet the Indian challenge, Paksitan adopted a three-pronged policy which included expansion of its own programme, building up conventional forces, and to continue efforts to embarrass India in international forums by demanding that South Asia be made a nuclear weapon free zone."<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, (New York, 1987), P.155.

<sup>33</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, "Paksitan, the Making of a Nuclear Weapon Power", Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No.6, June 1976, P.546.

In the 29th session of the UN General Assembly on 28 October 1974, Pakistan submitted a resolution which sought to endorse in principle the concept of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia.<sup>34</sup> The first preambular para recognised the right of the States to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The second preambular para pointed to the "dangers of diversion for military purposes, inherent in the development of nuclear energy" and it was that which it sought to prevent in the South Asian region. The seventh preambular para dealt equitable and non-discriminatory system of verification and inspection. The eight para talked of treaty of Tlateloco which was to serve as a model to be emulated.

The first operative paragraph took note of the "affirmation" by regional countries that they intend to pursue their nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes and would not acquire nuclear weapons. The second operative paragraph endorsed in principle the concept of nuclear weapon free zone in South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear states as may be interested to initiate consultations with a view to establishing the nuclear weapon free zone, urging them to refrain from any action contrary to

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<sup>34</sup> General Assembly draft Resolution A/C.1/L.682.

the achievement of these objectives. The fourth operative para requested the "Secretary General to convene a meeting for the purposes envisaged."

During the debate in the General Assembly on the question, Paksitan stated that the generally recognised conditions for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone existed in South Asia. All the States, it argued, had already declared their opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons or to their introduction into the region. The five States possessing nuclear weapons had also, according to Paksitan, indicated their support or acceptance of the concept of establishing nuclear weapon free-zone. The declaration made by South Asian States, coupled with the encouraging attitude of the nuclear powers had set the stage for consultation on setting up nuclear weapon free zones in South Asia.<sup>35</sup>

Pakistan stated that the existence of "alliances" and "treaties of friendship" with nuclear weapon powers had not prevented establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in other areas of the world. Nor could, it said, proximity of nuclear weapon powers be an inhibiting factor for the creation of such zones. This latter factor should not militate against, but

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<sup>35</sup> GAOR, 29th Session, Plenary Meeting 2247, pp. 246-7; ibid, First Committee, Meeting 2002, P.41.



was yet another reason for the creation of nuclear weapon free zones. Paksitan argued that it was through such collateral measures that smaller states could ensure their survival and security.

Paksitan added that a meeting of the countries of the region could be convened by the Secretary General to begin the consultations under appropriate guidelines set down by the General Assembly in order to facilitate the process of negotiations and give it a sense of direction. It also called for establishment of the regime for independent observation and verification as a safeguards for diversion of peaceful nuclear programme to military end.<sup>36</sup>

India also tabled a resolution in the 29th session in which inter-alia it stated that "the initiative for the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in an appropriate region of Asia should come from the States of the region concerned taking into account its special features and geographic extent."<sup>37</sup>

During the debate on the issue it stressed that on Paksitan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia no consultations regarding its implications, feasibility

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> General Assembly draft resolution A/C.1/L.681.

and acceptability had taken place before the item was inserted on the agenda of the General Assembly. India was of the firm view that no such regional arrangement could be imposed from outside, they could only be developed and matured within the region concerned. Besides, India held, South Asia could not be treated in isolation for purposes of creation of nuclear weapon free zone, as it was only a sub-region and integral part of Asia and Pacific. It was necessary to take into account the security of the entire region.<sup>38</sup>

India argued that a genuine nuclear weapon free zone in the region required total absence of nuclear weapons. The existence of nuclear weapons in the region of Asia and Pacific in the region of Asia and Pacific, it felt and foreign military bases in the Indian ocean complicated the security environment in the region and made the situation inappropriate for the establishment of nuclear weapon free zone in the sub-region of South Asia.<sup>39</sup>

India emphasised that it had supported the establishment of nuclear weapon free zone in different regions of the world provided suitable conditions existed and the zone was proposed to be established with the initiative of agreement amongst the

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<sup>38</sup> Debate in GAOR, 29th Session, Plenary meetings 2309, P-1270; *ibid*, First Committee, Meeting 2016, 2020, 2022, PP. 12, 15-16.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*.

countries concerned. It added that conditions for the establishment of such zones differed from region to region, it was not possible to lay down general principles or devise a single formula which would cover all the cases.

Both Pakistani and Indian resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly.<sup>40</sup>

In its 1975 session the UN General Assembly once again adopted two resolutions - one by India and the other by Paksitan - the contents said nothing new but repetition of those adopted in 1974.<sup>41</sup>

The General Assembly reiterated the conviction in the 31st session in 1976.<sup>42</sup> Both India and Paksitan repeated their arguments. Countering the Indian argument, Pakistani representative said South Asia was as much a separate and distinct region geographically and politically, as other regions which have been or were in the process of becoming

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<sup>40</sup>; Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Resolutions 3476(30), 3476B(30).

<sup>42</sup> Resolution 31/78 voted on 10 December, 1976.

nuclear weapon free zone. However, he said, Pakistan had no objection if the limits of the proposed zones were extended to include such other regions of Asia as might be practicable.<sup>43</sup>

In 1977 the Indian resolution was dropped with her consent Pakistan, in its resolution, also called upon nuclear weapon states to respond positively to the proposal if they had not done so earlier.<sup>44</sup> Another notable development was that the US, Canada and Japan voted in favour of the resolution instead of abstaining. Yet another significant development was India which had earlier cast a negative vote, abstained, though in subsequent years it again voted against the Pakistani resolution.

In conformity with India's global approach, it has been argued that creation of NWFZs only in selected regions does not isolate it from the nuclear weapons of other nuclear powers, despite promises to the contrary, and which amounts legitimizing nuclear weapons elsewhere. India's specific objection has been that South Asian NWFZ without China is an artificial and untenable geographical concept.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> GAOR, 31st session, Plenary Meeting.8 and Ibid, First Committee, Meeting 42, pp 16-23.

<sup>44</sup> General Assembly Resolution 32/83 adopted on 12 December, 1977.

<sup>45</sup> Navnita Chadha, "India's Nuclear Policy : Changing Thrusts" in S.D. Muni (ed), Understanding South Asia, (New Delhi, 1994), P.200.

In 1991, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif suggested that there should be multilateral consultations between US, Russia, China, India and Pakistan in a five nation conference to discuss and resolve the issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

The Indian government seemed to have modified its stand to the extent that the proposed five nation conference could serve as a suitable multilateral platform to discuss the nuclear issue in South Asia, although its ultimate objective of creating Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in South Asia still remained unacceptable probably because it was already too late for that.<sup>46</sup>

In 1994 USA came out with the proposal of nine-nation conference - all the five members of UN Security Council, Germany, Japan, India and Pakistan - to resolve the nuclear issue in South Asia. Muchkund Dubey writes, "But for some strange reasons, instead of rejecting outright, the US proposal for a nine-power conference, New Delhi has agreed to be engaged in a discussion on it. By doing so, we are on the verge of falling into biggest and the most pernicious trap since independence."<sup>47</sup> He further cautions, "The fact is that

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<sup>46</sup> Muchkund Dubey's interview with Maleeha Lodhi in The News (Islamabad). 2 November 1991.

<sup>47</sup> Muchkund Dubey, "Ugly American Again : The View from India," Times of India, 12 April, 1994.

any hesitation or prevarication of this issue will be suicidal and launch us on the slippery path of irrevocably compromising our national security interest."<sup>48</sup>

In South Asia, only India and Paksitan have undertaken nuclear programme. Other countries of South Asia - Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives have been unable and unwilling to take up such a programme. More or less these countries have maintained silence on the nuclear issue of South Asia which has become necessarily a bilateral issue between India and Paksitan. In their perceptions. Due to its bilateral nature, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) could not take up this issue. India and Paksitan were on the brink on nuclear war in 1987 and again in 1990. Still no tangible solution has emerged as yet except an agreement between the two in 1988 for not to attack each other's nuclear installations.

Present nuclear scenario in South Asia remains as ambiguous as in 1970's. Pakistan will not sign NPT or accept international safeguards until India does so. India will be a part of global process of denuclearization.

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

During '60s Zulifikar Ali Bhutto along with some influential persons in the Foreign Office of Paksitan wanted Pakistan to take Nuclear weapons course. Bhutto's proposal was turned down by the Ayub regime and Paksitan's nuclear policy and activities remained entirely peaceful till 1971. Violent turn of events catapulted Bhutto to the supreme seat of power in Pakistan by the end of 1971.

In January 1972, Bhutto decided to have nuclear weapons for Paksitan and accordingly nuclear programme became weapon-oriented though efforts for harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes also continued.

Bhutto claimed to have played a key role for the establishment of Paksitan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology at Nellore in 1965. He also successfully negotiated with USA and IAEA for the supply of swimming pool type research reactor as well as enriched uranium and plutonium for PINSTECH. During '60s various agreements were arrived at between Paksitan and various western countries for the supply of nuclear material and training of Pakistani personnel in the nuclear science and technology. By 1972,

the country had more than 550 qualified nuclear scientists and engineers.<sup>1</sup>

In 1972 Bhutto personally took charge of atomic energy affairs. The Chairman of PAEC was made answerable to him. Only, Munir Ahmad Khan, in-charge of the Nuclear and Reactor division at IAEA, was brought back to Pakistan and was appointed Chairman of the PAEC for 3 years. Likewise, many eminent Pakistani scientists serving abroad were attracted back to their country.

The most important argument by Pakistanis to explain and justify the nuclear programme is the need to find an alternative source of energy because of very poor availability of fossil fuels like oil and gas in their country. The Canadian built Karachi Nuclear Power Plant was opened by Bhutto in 1972. The second power plant CHASNUPP was to be set up near Chashma Barrage (Mianwali District), about 320 km south-west of Rawalpindi. The dual purpose desalination-cum-power plants were to be built on the Arabian Sea near Karachi and in Baluchistan.

A contract for the heavy water plant, to be built near Multan, was won by the Belgian firm Belgo Nucleaire. Work on

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<sup>1</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, "Pakistan and the Bomb," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Illinois), January 1980, P.11.



a uranium fuel fabrication plant was reported in April 1974 to have already begun.

The PAEC operated four radio-isotopes medical centres at Lahore, Multan, Jamshoro and Karachi and planned two more including an Institute of Nuclear Medicine at Peshawar. It also had agricultural research centre working on preservation of fruits and fish and the eradication of pests by radiation among other research. Budgetary allocations for nuclear programme were substantially enhanced by the government.

Incentives for going nuclear-weapon programme are insecurity, isolation and strategic ambition. In case of Paksitan all of three are responsible to some extent. Though insecurity in the sense of external threat has been strongly refuted by many scholars. They argue that literacy, economic mobility, and freedom, and two meals a day may make far superior a contribution to the defense of Paksitan, than a few or few dozen nuclear warheads poised among a divided and alienated people.

The disincentive for proliferation have been listed as cost, limited technological and industrial use, dependence upon foreign nuclear inputs, domestic public opposition, risk of unauthorized seizure of nuclear weapons, reaction of opponents, reaction of allies and reaction of other nations.

Bhutto's declaratory posture about Paksitan's nuclear intentions was deliberately ambiguous but Pakistani nuclear activities between 1972-7 were unambiguously linked to the development of the bomb option. Bhutto initiated both the plutonium and the enrichment routes to the Pakistani bomb. He opened up the plutonium route in 1972, and it remained active until 1978. A.Q.Khan came to Paksitan and from 1975 the enrichment bomb route was possible. During 1975-8 both routes were active.

Bhutto's complex motivations, to a great extent, are responsible for weapon oriented programme of Paksitan in the '70s. His aim was to insure the development of a Napoleonic-style political system in Paksitan with Bhutto as the centrepiece of Pakistani politics. Nuclear weapons directly under his control would have diminished the importance of Pakistani Generals and would have caused the establishment of civilian authority over the armed forces. It would have also increased his popularity among the middle-level and junior officers of the armed forces.

The PAEC scientific leadership double crossed Bhutto after it had misled him into thinking that given the resources and the political will a plutonium bomb could be developed by clandestine means. Western pressure against Pakistani

nuclearisation from 1975 onwards reinforced Bhutto's ambiguity about a crash nuclear programme, as well as Munir Ahmed Khan's resistance to the development of a real technical nuclear option as distinct from Bhutto's theoretical option of 1972. In early '70s Munir Ahmed Khan was in accord with Bhutto's quest for the bomb. However, by the late 1970s after he had failed to produce the plutonium bomb, he advanced a thoughtful point of view against the bomb. In fact he was both unwilling and unable to produce the bomb.

Bhutto's plan was to use the plutonium from Canadian reactor (KANUPP) to make his first bomb. Reprocessing on plutonium extraction was a French specialty and the job fell primarily on a highly specialised engineering firm called Societe General pour le technique Nouvelle.

Bhutto initiated a dialogue with France in February 1973 for the purchase of nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. After three years of intense negotiations, the reprocessing deal was finalised and signed on 16 March, 1976. Pakistan had accepted stringent safeguards of IAEA for the proposed plan. The fact that reprocessing plant by separating fissionable plutonium from the spent reactor fuel, could facilitate Pakistan in launching on a nuclear weapon programme caused anxiety in Canada and in the USA. Pakistan's failure either to call off the reprocessing plant deal or to accept additional safeguards

on KANUPP by the deadline of 31 December, 1976 put an end to Canada-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. The fuel fabrication plan offer was cancelled.

Initially both Pakistan and France did not pay any heed to the advise of USA to call off the reprocessing plant deal

But later France succumbed to the US pressure and offered Pakistan co-processing instead of reprocessing plan. A co-processing plant produces a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides usable in reactors but does not separate plutonium which can be used for military purposes. Co-processing plant was not acceptable to Pakistan and after full play of controversy reprocessing plant agreement died without a decent funeral. Later a pilot scale reprocessing facility known as New Labs was completed with the help of Belgium firm -- Belgonucleaire and SGN although the French Government may not have been aware of SGN participation. The facility is capable of extracting plutonium from spent fuel giving Pakistan a second route to nuclear arms.

The story of adopting enrichment technology revolves around one man, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who came to Pakistan by the end of 1975 to join as Director of Engineering Research Laboratory at Kahuta. The Pakistani plan entailed setting up a pilot plant at Sihala, near Islamabad and then a bit further down the road at Kahuta village, they would build a massive

industrial unit of 10,000 centrifuge units. No safeguards would apply to either Sihala or Kahuta projects since Paksitan has not declared the existence of facilities to IAEA.

The Pakistanis went about buying the various components of enrichment technology to different parts of Europe through resourceful Pakistani agents with the help of European middle-men. Commercial interests of various Western companies prevailed over the non-proliferation objective of their respective governments. In fact Western powers have been encouraging selective proliferation.

Failure of USA to stand by Paksitan during 1971 war may be one of reasons for Paksitan to go for nuclear weapon option. Following the Indian explosion in '74, the US intensified efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapon. In the fall of 1974, the US convened a secret meeting of the principal nuclear suppliers nations in London in an effort to gain acceptance of a uniform set of nuclear export standards.

The US did not doubt Pakistani intentions till reprocessing deal was signed. Henry Kissinger personally journeyed to Paksitan and France in 1977, to pressure both to cancel the deal. Later under US pressure France modified the deal which was unacceptable to Pakistan and the deal became

ineffective and inoperational.

US brought in Symington-Glenn Amendment (Section 670) which dealt with nuclear reprocessing transfers and nuclear detonations and stated that for such country or countries no US funds to be used for providing military assistance or granting military education. Though US President could waive this amendment in special cases and circumstances. US economic and military aid to Paksitan was terminated in September 1977. Having got the reprocessing deal canceled US aid to Paksitan was resumed in October 1978. Again US moved quickly to impose sanctions in 1979 on Paksitan when it was convinced about enrichment programme of Pakistan. With arrival of second cold war non-proliferation objectives of US took a back seat and massive economic and military aid was supplied to Paksitan in spite of her consistent movements towards full nuclear weapon capability.

Paksitan till 1970 was no actually interested in having nuclear weapons. Even Bhutto's nuclear posture was verbal and purpose was to bargain for increasing conventional arms supply from USA. After '74 Indian explosion Bhutto complained about possibility of Indian nuclear blackmail but in his meetings with the US leaders, he wanted to acquire more sophisticated conventional arms.

The Chinese help to Paksitan consisted of transfer of nuclear weapons design information, assistance in setting up an enrichment plant, supply of nuclear test data, to conduct of a nuclear test on Paksitan's behalf, the supply of heavy water and the transfer of plutonium reprocessing technology.

In the name of Islamic bomb, Bhutto was able to receive huge financial assistance form the oil-rich West Asian countries. But the concept off Islamic bomb for common defence of ummah is a myth. Firstly, Islamic countries are fiercely divided among themselves. Secondly, Paksitan wanted to have nuclear capability or nuclear weapons to serve her own national interest not for the whole Islamic world.

In '70s fear of India may be one among many important considerations behind nuclear weapon programme of Pakistan which was, in fact, guide by Bhutto's complex motivations. Pakistani nuclear activities upto 1971 were unambiguously peaceful, and not a single nuclear event occurred from 1956 to 1971 which was suspected by India or the international community. None of Pakistani Nuclear activities during 1960s were determined by Pakistani fears about a bigger militarily stronger, culturally or ideologically threatening and nuclear India. Indian bomb - Pakistani bomb linkage is falsified because Bhutto decided in January 1972 to build the Pakistani

bomb. This decision was taken before India exploded its bomb in May 1974. So the point about "following India's suit" was demonstrably wrong.<sup>2</sup>

The maintenance of Indo-Pakistan military balance was the primary aim : an Indo-Pakistan nuclear balance was the secondary aim. But a stable Indo-Pakistani military, diplomatic and psychological balance were transformed into an imbalance in the aftermath of the 1971 war. In terms of Bhutto's logic and thinking, nuclear weapon power of Pakistan must have been a substitute for conventional military superiority of India.

A new combination of anti-Indianism and pro-Westernism emerged in Pakistan's arms control posture in the Bhutto era. The anti-NPT package of 1960s contained philosophical, legal and strategic reasons in Pakistani official statements. This package was substantially modified in the 1970s. The philosophical and legal objections to the NPT were dropped in 1970s. The quest for negative security assurance was maintained. The strategic dimension was adapted from the vague or diplomatic wording of 1960s about "geopolitical realities" and given a sharper anti-India focus in the 1970s. India factor was presented as reason to reject the NPT and the

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<sup>2</sup> Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, (New York, 1987) pp. 108-9.



Partial Test Ban Treaty. As an aside it is worth mentioning that Paksitan rejected the PTBT in 1963, before the start-up of Indian reprocessing , before Indian Atomic Energy Chief Bhabha spoke in favour of, in 1964, an Indian bomb programme, and before India's Prime Minster Shastri raised the possibility in later 1965 of an Indian test.

Bhutto's Paksitan had two main objectives first, to match India in the acquisition of nuclear explosive capability, and second, to induce Indian de-nuclearisation through the proposal of making South Asia a nuclear weapon free zone. The peace offensive served several objectives. First, it masked the 1972 bomb decision and clandestine bomb-related activities of the PAEC and the Pakistani buyers in Western Europe. Second, it sought to induce India into a false sense of security where "bilateral normalisation" and "confidence-building" became the buzz words. Third, it sought to induce India to join the NPT system. Finally, it was intended to bring Pakistan closer to the West. The lines of communication between Paksitan and the West were resumed via the arms control dialogue. This shows the vitality and innovativeness of Pakistani diplomatic machinery and Bhutto's flexibility in practice compared to his publicly cultivated anti-Western image.

Concept of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone is not practicable. It was not accepted in the case of Nordic countries. South Asia cannot be a nuclear weapon free zone when we have stockpiles of nuclear weapons in Tibet which is a part of South Asia.<sup>3</sup>

Today both India and Paksitan have nuclear weapon capability. India wants a global, comprehensive and non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime. She is willing to be a part of global process of denuclearization. Paksitan will not sign NPT or accept safeguards until and unless India does so. In the present scenario Parvez Hoodbhoy's proposal becomes very relevant, "Paksitan must once again seize the diplomatic initiative, which has been so important to it. But it can do so only if it is perceived by the international community as being sincere in working towards nuclear accommodation with India. Therefore, it will be necessary for Paksitan to take some form of meaningful unilateral action."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> K. Subramanyam (ed), Nuclear Proliferation and International Security (New Delhi, 1985).

<sup>4</sup> Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Paksitan's Nuclear Choices," The News (Islamabad), 22 March, 1993.

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