

**Federal Republic of Germany and
Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(1977 — 1987)**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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1989



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CENTRE FOR AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

20 July, 1989

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


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(1977-87)' by Sri B.VENKATADRI in partial fulfilment
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(Prof. R.P. Kaushik)

Chairperson


Dr. Christopher S. Raj)

Supervisor

To MY
Loving
Father and Mother

C O N T E N T S

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P R E F A C E

The intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) or Theatre Nuclear Force in Europe are important components of NATO nuclear strategy vis-a-vis Warsaw Pact. Significantly since 1950s American owned and controlled nuclear weapons have been developed in FRG as a part of NATO's nuclear strategy. FRG had no operation control over these forces. In 1970s the modernisation of INF especially in FRG became a subject of European debate in the context of Soviet modernization of their INF forces in the form of deployment of new mobile system SS-20s.

In the above context it is noteworthy that the period from 1977 to 1987, NATO's INF had a history of armament process through modernization; an arms control process through negotiations with Soviet Union; and a disarmament process with a signing of US-USSR INF treaty. In all these processes of armament, arms control and disarmament of INF, FRG's attitudes, responses and reactions are significant because they were not only related to actual deployment of missiles in FRG but also FRG's security perceptions.


A Historical background of the INF debate began in 1977, related to FRG's security policy has been dealt with in Chapter I. Thereafter in Chapter II, the present study attempts to identify specific reasons for the West Germans' acceptance of FRG's role in the INF debate. The significance of the topic 'FRG and INF Debate (1977-87)' stems from the fact that it enables us to study the role of a major alliance partner in arms control negotiations. While the INF talks held in Geneva were between American and the Soviet delegates, the American side had to respond at various stages to suggestion of its allied members. It is against this background that the German domestic politics as a factor influencing arms control debate at home and their subsequent impact on their governments has been studied in Chapter III. At an another level the Federal government was instrumental in initiating, sustaining and conclusion of the treaty. This particular role of FRG is highlighted in Chapter IV. Chapter 5 has certain concluding observations on the role of FRG in INF deployment debate and disarmament.

My interest in the chosen topic was a result of the paper entitled 'West European and American

Relations' that I had opted for during the M.Phil course work. I would like to acknowledge my deep respect and gratitude to my teacher and supervisor, Dr. Christopher S.Raj who has been helpful in guiding this work at various stages. I also thank Prof. H.S. Chopra for his encouragement.

I shall not fail to mention the kind assistance I received from my friends Vinayak, Sridharnath and Nandan Singh who have been a source of encouragement and companionship. Of immense support has been the joy of being in touch with my brother Ram Raj, sister Vaijayanthi, and aunt Pramilla throughout the period of my study at this university.

Dt. 21-07-1989


(B.VENKATADRI)

Chapter I

DEPLOYMENT OF INF IN FRG :
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Federal Republic of Germany with its legacy of aggression and war remains a dominant factor in East-West security relations. The existence of two Germanies - G.D.R and F.R.G - points to the inadequacy of a political settlement in the post second world war negotiation and manifestation of cold war politics.¹

It became a matter of 'obsession and preoccupation with Soviet and sometimes even western countries' decision makers to prevent Federal Republic of Germany from rearming and acquiring nuclear capabilities. In 1949, when FRG was granted sovereignty, America decided to restore the authority on economic, political and ultimately military matters from the occupying powers to the German government. This course was to proceed from the Petersberg Agreement of 24 November 1949 (which further relaxed Allied control on the German economy) to the Allied agreement to allow West Germany to establish a

1. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origin of the Cold War (New York, 1972), pp.124-29.

foreign Ministry in 1951.

After the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, the question of rearmament of West Germany arose along with it. If NATO were to guarantee the security of West Germany, some form of West Germany participation in the defense effort would be necessary. Therefore, US began to press its European allies to allow some West German rearmament.² This rearmament question became a major issue inside as well as outside Germany. Inside Germany many people feared that the rearmament means it could result in the permanent division of Germany. Outside Germany, the memories of World War II was still fresh in their minds. France feared that creation of a West German army that might one day come under the sovereign control of West Germany and it will be again a threat to its sovereignty.

So, to avoid this situation, France's then Prime Minister, Rene Pleven, proposed in October 1950 a plan for a European Defence Community(EDC) which would be

2. Roger Morgan, US and West Germany 1945-73 : A Study of Alliance Politics(London, 1974), pp.42-3.

subsidiary to NATO but would behave its own political and command structure.³

This plan was proposed by France for two purpose: First, to scuttle the rearmament plan for Germany under NATO and second in the proposed EDC, France will be a dominant partner in disguise. This plan was well received by US. and other countries as well, since it was felt that creation of EDC will be helpful for European integration.

Although the original proposal had been from France, it was they who finally rejected the plan of EDC in August 1954, chiefly on the grounds that it would infringe national sovereignty.⁴ When the EDC did fail, American-German government worked steadily together at their task in the month that followed until FRG was duly welcomed into NATO in May 1955. So after 1945, for the first time Germany would have its own army. Secondly, West Germany began to play a pivotal role in the Western security framework.

3. *ibid*, p.44.

4. Morgan, n.3, p.45.

During the issue of Non-proliferation Treaty in 1966, Germany was not allowed by Soviet Union to acquire nuclear capabilities. The four main arguments against this issue by FRG were: firstly, it might curtail Bonn's still unsatisfactory role in NATO's nuclear planning, secondly, that it might finally end the lingering chance of a NATO force along the lines of the Multilateral force, thirdly, it might bar the way to any form of European deterrent and, finally, Germany would relinquish the idea of national nuclear force only in return for Soviet concession on German reunification.

But Soviets were insisting that their ratification would not be forthcoming until Germany signed - the perpetuation of Germany's non-nuclear status.

Hence it is quite evident that since the creation of Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the western countries as well as Soviet Union were against the FRG to acquire any nuclear capabilities.

It is against a backdrop of hostile environment with limited scope of security, initiatives that Federal Republic of Germany evolved its security policy.

Chancellor Konard Adenauer's primary objective of foreign policy was protecting FRG against the USSR. In his view this was attainable only by a firm, integration of Federal Republic into the Western alliance, with nuclear guarantee being provided by the United States. He advocated the remilitarization of West Germany, which he also intended to use as a bargaining chip for regaining sovereignty in foreign affairs.⁵

Beginning in the late 1950s the United States sought to reassure North Atlantic Treaty Organisation members of the credibility of nuclear umbrella in two specific ways. First, by developing a wide range of strategic choices (both in terms of capabilities and doctrines). Secondly, by deploying nuclear system in Europe or 'off-shore' capable of striking Soviet territory that would 'couple' the defence of Europe more closely to American strategic nuclear guarantee.⁶

The nuclear systems deployed in Europe have traditionally been divided into two categories. First, these systems capable of striking the Soviet

5. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), pp. 598-600.

6. John Cart Wright and others, Cruise Pershing SS-20's - The Search for Consensus: Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Great Britain, 1985), p.3.

Union which have been known variously as theatre, long-range forces or intermediate Range Nuclear Forces(INF), and those systems which would be used in the proximity of any conventional conflict and known variously as tactical, battlefield or short range nuclear forces(SRNF).⁷

For geographical reasons and because of Warsaw treaty organisations and north Atlantic treaty organisation's military doctrines, West Germany would be a major area of combat in an armed conflict between East and West. Hence, the overriding objective in German security policy has been to prevent the outbreak of war, conventional or nuclear on German territory.

This has led to a strong emphasis on the deterrance aspect of alliance strategy and great sensitivity to any adverse developments that could weaken the credibility of deterrance.

Mostly the controversies in the Federal Republic have been concentrating on the issue of which combination of defences could most credibly present the

7. *ibid*, p. 46.

adversary with unacceptable risks and most effectively prevent war. The discussion had tended to put so much emphasis on the deterrance aspect of the defence policy that even conventional forces are mainly discussed in terms of their war preventing functions.

Helmut Schmidt in his book 'Defence or Retaliation', opined "...one may not force the adversary to have to resort to strategic nuclear weapons as his last resort; for that reasons one has to provide oneself with weapons to be able to fight a limited war aggression of the adversary which are less than all-out aggression; the threat of strategic devastation is not sufficient any more, minor threats are also necessary".⁸

So in Schmidt's opinion the concept of deterrance had to coincide with military strategy in case of conflict.

In the late fifties and early sixties Fritz Ester and Helmut Schmidt argued in terms of

8. Thomas Kappen, 'Development of Nuclear Weapons in West Germany', Bulletin of Peace Proposals(Norway) Vol. 14, No.4, 1983, p.330.

'defence dilemma'.⁹ To allow deployment of nuclear missiles or not, on Germany was the dilemma in question. The deployment of nuclear missiles in West Germany would increase the danger of the Federal Republic's self destruction. Helmut Schmidt demanded the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the ground forces designated for conventional defence force and asked for strong and highly mobile conventional forces.

In December 1957, the NATO Council decided to deploy American Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) in Europe which led to first public debate on nuclear question in FRG.¹⁰

The federal government firmly supported the storage of tactical nuclear weapon in West Germany and the equipment of the Bundeswehr with weapons capable of delivering nuclear warheads but rejected the deployment of American IRBM on West German territory for political and military reasons.

9. *ibid*, p.332.

10. John A.Reed Jr., *Germany and NATO*,(Washington, 1987), pp. 75-85.

Konard Ademaauer government's refusal was based on the fierce domestic debate over the Government decision to equip the Bundeswar with tactical nuclear system.¹¹ Moreover, Soviet leader Bulganan's suggestion to Ademaauer that the Soviet Union would link the reunification issue to the stationing of IRBM could provide a rationale for the withdrawal of American troops or promote the abandoning of NATO's strategy of forward defense.

Helmut Schmidt who was the defense expert of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1961, and who 18 years later became Chancellor was decisively engaged in the INF debate had emphatically rejected deployment of IRBM in Federal Republic.

In his book 'Defence or Retaliation' a tactical nuclear war would result in the almost complete destruction of Europe, deterring war through these weapons was implausible. Schmidt objected that a strict distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear forces was artificial, compared to the difference between conventional and nuclear weapons. Schmidt said that under no

11. *ibid*, pp.98-99.

circumstances was FRG to strive for a great power role.

From 1977-79 Schmidt proposed for INF deployment, because he perceived the global strategic context had changed in the late seventies as compared with early sixties when he had rejected ICBM deployment in FRG.

In 1970's the era of detente succeeding the cold war further reduced the tension between the superpowers. In the disarmament field also both the superpowers opened talks to limit the strategic arms. These negotiations came to be known as SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) with an objective to maintain a strategic nuclear parity between the superpowers which even after suffering a nuclear attack, it would leave the victim with enough force to counter-attack the offender.

The changing East-West relations had an effect on FRG's security policies. The Hallstein doctrine had lost its relevance after Willy Brandt became Chancellor with social liberal coalition government. His ostpolitik with its emphasis on working relations with Eastern Europe countries and recognition of territorial status quo of GDR, marked a turning

point in FRG's foreign policy to enhance its security without undermining the credibility of deterrence with the East.

Meanwhile super power negotiations on nuclear arms limitation that led to SALT-I were steps in arms control but these negotiations created some rumblings within NATO alliance. The European allies including FRG felt that these interests were overlooked by America and that nuclear deterrence was in jeopardy and there was a danger of US 'decoupling' from European continent.¹²

When the super power SALT II negotiations were in progress, the FRG's fear of Soviet Union's new intermediate range mobile - the SS-20 - apparently intended as a replacement for the older SS-4 and SS-5 surfaced.

12. Kappan, no. 8, p.333.

European concern about American SALT

policy was magnified into suspicion when they learned during 1975 and 1976 that the US SALT proposal included ban on long range Ground Launched Cruise Missiles(GLCMS) and Sea Launched Cruise Missiles(SLCMS) but no limits on the Soviet nuclear forces targetted against Europe.¹³

In May 1977 Carter administration proposed a three year ban on the development of long range GLCMs and SLCMs.¹⁴ When news of this suggestion reached Europe, it aroused a strong negative reaction combined with suspicion of President Carter's anti-nuclear preferences.

The Europeans perceived that the United States was more concerned about limiting the nuclear threat to the United States than the nuclear threat to Europe, and was willing to bargain away weapons important to European deterrance and security for obtaining limits on Soviet Strategic forces. The news reports in US about US Airforce and Pentagon evaluating

13. James A.Thomson, 'The LRTNF Decision : Evolution of US theatre nuclear policy, 1975-9', International Affairs(London) Vol. 60, 1984, p.603.

14. *ibid*, p.604.

cruise missile as an effective counter to SS-20 appealed to the Europeans especially West Germany. Hence European allies intensified their requests for technical and operational analyses of the cruise missile. The Carter administration however classified and restricted cruise missile information it would whet the European appetite for the missiles. Meanwhile German officials began to express anxiety about the imbalance of 'Eurostrategic forces'. Underscored by the existence of the SS-20 and suggested that cruise missiles might help redress this imbalance.¹⁵

The US administration internal debate between the US department of state and Pentagon revealed to European allies about the possibility of American cruise missile assuming an effective counter weapon to SS-20.¹⁶ This whetted the appetite of European allies especially FRG for its deployment in Europe.

15. *ibid*, p.603.

16. *ibid*, p.604.

However, the Carter administration was concerned primarily in reaching a SALT II agreement and was prepared to bater away for a treaty the Soviet demand for a ban on deployment of long range cruise missiles.

Simultaneously the Carter administration assured the European allies with suggestion that because US strategic forces provided ample coverage of targets in Soviet Union, NATO did not need long range cruise missile.

This episode led the German Government to suggest that the US alter its SALT position to permit the deployment of long range GLCMS and SLCMS. The suggestion was preemptorially rejected. Soon thereafter the West German chancellor Helmut Schimdt made his concern in public in the Alastian Buchan memorial lecture (sponsored by the International Institute of Strategic Studies) given on 28 October 1977 in London.¹⁷

17. Helmut Schimdt, 'The 1977 Alastian Buchan Memorial Lecture', Survival(London) Vol. 20, No. 1, 1978, pp.2-10.

Contrary to a now popular myth, he did not call for the deployment of cruise missiles or anything else in the speech. But he did outline his analysis of the implication of balance of forces in categories of comparatively below the strategic level.

These remarks were widely interpreted both in Europe and the United States as meaning that Schmidt was advocating the establishment of a 'Eurostrategic' balance through the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe as a counter to the SS-20.¹⁸ This marked a turning point in FRG's understanding of its role within the alliance and the East-West security system.

Politically, Schmidt was concerned that there be an overall parity in the East-West military balance so that West German Ostpolitik would not become to Soviet political pressure.¹⁹ The vacillation coupled with the indecisiveness of American foreign policy under the Carter administration led Schmidt to seek for NATO redressing its conventional force and

18. Gregory F. Treverton, (ed.), The Nuclear Confrontation in Europe (London, 1985), p.147.

19. *ibid*, p.148.

theatre nuclear force deficiencies through both arms control and modernisation.

Militarily, the Schmidt government was concerned with the reunification of US-Soviet strategic parity related to extended deterrence and the American nuclear guarantee to Western Europe.²⁰ Long range INF systems were perceived as providing an in-theatre military capability that by itself could deter Soviet aggression or the use of Soviet SS-20s. Their importance was seen as bigger for the possible use of American strategic system.

Indeed INF system were seen by the Schmidt government primarily as a means of holding American strategic forces 'hostage' to the defense of Europe.²¹

20. *ibid*, p.149.

21. *ibid*, p.149.

Chapter II

FRG AND NATO'S

DUAL TRACK DECISION

Almost since its inception the alliance has grappled continuously with the problem of extending the protection of American strategic nuclear power to the defence of Western Europe. Conscious of the potential devastation of any war, nuclear or conventional, Europeans have tended to advocate a strategy of absolute deterrence through the immediate threat of all out nuclear war, and have looked with unease and suspicion at any development that appears to distract from this ultimate threat, or that threatens to 'decouple' Europe from the American strategic nuclear guarantee.¹

The US on the other hand equally conscious of the awesome consequences for American territory of strategic nuclear war, has sought to avoid being faced with the choice of all-out nuclear war or defeat. While maintaining the ultimate threat of strategic nuclear retaliation, American officials have increasingly emphasized the need to deter

1. Christopher Coker, The Future of the Atlantic(London, 1984), pp. 58-98.

conflict at all possible levels through the provision of a wide range of capabilities and option.² They have endeavoured to look beyond deterrence and in the event that deterrence fail, to facilitate the termination of any conflict short of all-out nuclear war.

Awareness of its vulnerability as NATO frontline State and its renunciation of the manufacturing of nuclear weapons with the consequent dependence on the American strategic guarantee has given the FRG a particular interest in the evolution of the alliance strategy. At the same time the legacy of the FRG's immediate past and more particularly its long term interest in developing good relations with the East in 1970s in detente era has made German leaders sensitive to the potential implication of any changes in NATO defense doctrine.³ It has always stressed the collective nature of the alliance and the need for shared risk taken on the part of all its partners.

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2. Dean, Acheson, Present at the Creation, London, 1969, pp. 390-402.
 3. John, A. Read Jr., Germany and NATO, Washington, 1987, pp. 108-125.

By the mid 1970s a growing concern appeared within the NATO alliance that detente whatever its other merits, was not a substitute for continuing NATO military programme and that the Soviet Union was steadily building its military power in the European theatre military including its conventional, tactical nuclear and long range theatre nuclear force.⁴ Other European concern as to the implication for the alliance of developments relating to SALT negotiations was articulated by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In his book 'Defence or Retaliation' published in 1961, his discussion of graduated deterrence included the evolution of NATO's doctrine of flexible response and he consistently stressed the need for NATO to maintain a balance of forces with the East. Subsequently writing in 1970, he emphasized the need for direct relationship between the theater and strategic forces.⁵

4. Raymond, L.Gartroff, 'The NATO Discussion on Theatre Nuclear Forces', Political Science Quarterly(New York), Vol. 98, Summer 1983, pp.202-06.

5. Thomas, Kappen, 'Deployment of Nuclear Weapon in West Germany', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1983, p.329.

In a speech to the NATO Council on May 10, 1977, Chancellor Schmidt expressed his concern that

the SALT process may lead to a paralyzation of the Soviet and American central strategic forces and that the strategic nuclear component will become increasingly regarded as an instrument of last resort, to serve the national interest and protect the survival of those who possess these weapons of last resort.⁶

Since 1977 the NATO nuclear planning group began to focus on evaluating the imbalances in the long medium range nuclear weapons.⁷ Change in emphasis was the result of several factors:

I. a) The perception that strategic parity as codified by the SALT process accentuated existing imbalances at lower levels of forces; b) the development of cruise missile for which many argued had considerable potential for NATO defense, particularly as a counter to Soviet theater capabilities; c) suspicion on the part of many Europeans that the American administration, in order to secure a SALT II agreement would accept constraints on cruise missile that would prevent their utilization in the European theatre.

6. Schwarty, Davidn, Nato's Nuclear Dilemmas, (Washington, 1983, p.214.

7. Leon V. Sigal., Nuclear Forces in Europe, (Washington, 1984),p.57.

In October 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated in Congressional testimony on the SALT negotiation that the Alliance was reviewing its Theatre Nuclear posture, but that with existing submarine and forward based system no additional long-range ground or sea-based system were required.⁸

The European fear of disparity in strategic balance and the danger of the US 'decoupling' from the European continent were constantly on the agenda of West Germany's security debate.⁹ In Oct, 1977 Chancellor Schmidt warned US against neglecting West European security interests in SALT process. In his speech in October 1977 at Institute of International Strategic Studies, he said:

SALT neutralizes strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapon. It is vital interest to us all that the negotiations between the two super powers on the limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic weapon should continue and lead to a lasting agreement. The nuclear powers have a special



8. Raymond, L.Gartroff, 'The NATO Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces', Political Science Quarterly (New York), Vol.98, Summer 1983, pp.202-06.

9. Ibid, p.206.

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an overwhelming responsibility in this field. On the other hand, we in Europe must be particularly careful to ensure that these negotiations do not neglect the components of NATO's deterrence strategy.

We are all faced with the dilemma of having to meet the moral and political demand for arms limitation while at the same time maintaining a fully effective deterrent to war....We are not unaware that both the US and the Soviet Union must be anxious to remove the threatening strategic development from their relationship. But the strategic arms limitation confined to the US and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-a-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations. So long as this is not the case we must maintain the balance of full range of deterrence strategy....The Alliance must, therefore, be ready to make available the means to support its present strategy, which is still the right one and to prevent any development that could undermine the basis of this strategy.¹⁰

The main purpose of the Chancellor's speech was to make public his concern that under the bilateralism of the SALT process, certain aspects of European security were being ignored. Although he nowhere directly referred to TNF, his comments focussed public attention in

10. Helmut Schmidt, 'The 1977 Alastoin Buchan Memorial Lecture', Survival(London) Vol. 20, No. 1, 1978, pp.2-10.

NATO's deterrent capability. His position was also based on an effort to maintain a balance between the demands of military security and those of detente. While both defense and detente were acknowledged as equally important elements in assuring Germany's security, they were frequently presented as conflicting demands which required reconciliation or balancing.

To America and 'security Community' Schmidt's statement also implied a contrast to NATO's policy over previous 20 years. It indicated that somehow balance of military forces in European theatre could be considered separately from the overall military balance between the two blocs. By implication, therefore, the statement seemed to be questioning the ability of US forces outside the theatre - especially the strategic nuclear forces - to deter conflict in Europe and expressing the fear that parity achieved in strategic nuclear arsenals through SALT might make the theater nuclear balance, the so-called Eurostrategic balance, more important. Finally, it seemed to be a call for the rectification of existing theater imbalances; one of the most obvious of these was the growing imbalance of forces in the LRTNF category, highlighted by deployment of the SS-20 with no response from the West. Schmidt also mentioned in his speech the need to pursue the arms control of the

theatre nuclear forces as well as to modernize them.

Within Europe Schmidt's speech served to catalyse activity towards exploring ways to rectify the imbalance highlighted by Schmidt. According to one participant in the US decision making at the time, before the October speech many US officials had hoped that the general fears in Europe raised by the deployment of the SS-20 could be handled quietly, without resort to hardware, through discussion in the Nuclear Planning Group.

This attitude was reflected in the activity of the Defence Department over the next few months. In the early October 1977 the Nuclear Planning Group, at American instigation, created a so-called High Level Group (HLG) of allied foreign and defence ministry representatives. This meeting consisted of briefings and discussion on NATO doctrine and evaluating NATO nuclear capabilities and Warsaw Pact nuclear capabilities. A consensus was arrived at on March 1978 mainly by the efforts of David, E. McGiffert, American Assistant Secretary of Defence in charge of the Office of International Security Affairs at the Pentagon. The consensus points included: LRINF modernization was necessary; it should be an evolutionary upward adjustment; and it should endow NATO with an

enhanced capability to strike targets in the Soviet Union.

It is significant to note that the German and British officials strongly insisted on the adoption of the consensus that there should be "evolutionary upward adjustment" in the LRTNF. This formulation implied that the cruise missile will be deployed in Europe. The US State Department officials and National Security staff(NSS) were greatly disturbed by the position taken by the Pentagon in the HLG (High Level Group). Therefore they sought for inter-agency group in the American decision making process to be set up and that the decision made in the inter agency group may be presented in the High Level Group(HLG).However the US attempt to back away from HLG consensus again deepened German concern about American policy and whetted even further German and European appetite for cruise missiles.

Meanwhile in August 1978, the American inter agency group completed a study on the LRTNF. In essence, the study offered decision makers two options: first, to support the HLG consensus on the "evolutionary upward adjustment" and to determine the hardware that would be involved in such an adjustment; or secondly, to seek to set the issue aside by offering the allies "political" solution

such as assigning more US strategic forces to SACEUR. A cabinet level meeting recommended the first option to the President. On 1st January 1979 President Carter in his meeting with the three European leaders (German, British and French) informed his decision to support the deployment of LRTNF and was also prepared to take the lead in forging an alliance consensus around them. Subsequently, the US sought to tie its allies as tightly as possible to a deployment programme that specified locations, numbers and types of weapons and to complete this process by 1979.

The US strategy was complicated by the German government's so-called 'Non-Singularity Principle'.¹¹ Chancellor Schmidt held that Germany should not be the sole 'host' for the new missiles but that at least one other country on the European continent should also host the deployment. In addition, non-singularity meant to Germans that it was not enough to obtain the agreement of the host countries to deployments, rather the entire NATO alliance should join a consensus, thereby spreading the political burden of LRTNF even further.

Accordingly, US established two diplomatic tracks: one, in the HLG and later in the Special Group,

11. James A. Thomson, 'The LRTNF Decision: Evolution of US Theatre Nuclear Policy (1975-79)', International Affairs (London), Vol. 60, 1984, pp.602-14.

developed details of the emergent alliance position; the other involved periodic contacts between President Carter, through his designate envoy, David Aaron and allied leaders.¹²

In the course of initial consultation with allied leaders during the spring of 1979, the Germans and Dutch expressed concern that the definition of the hardware programme was moving quite rapidly in the HLG, whereas no parallel effort was being made to develop an arms control policy as counter part. Indeed, Chancellor Schmidt pressed for a parallel effort to negotiate arms limitation to respond to those in FRG who would oppose new missile deployment if it could be obviated by agreed arms limitation and to further East-West detente if possible.¹³

At the insistence of German and Dutch NATO had created a special Group (SG) to study arms control initiatives parallel to the LRTNF deployment schedule.¹⁴ The general conclusion were that future LRTNF arms control should formally take place within the

12. *ibid*, p.609.

13. Scrwarty, Davidn, *op. cit.*, p.231.

14. *ibid*, p. 232.

framework of the projected SALT III negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union. To this end, so-called 'objectives and principles' paper formed the basis of evolving internal US government decision and special group discussion. From the US perspective, the most important as these principles was that "arms control should be viewed as a complement to not a substitute for force modernization".¹⁵

With the emergence of Italy as a strong contender for basing LRINF, which took American officials by surprise, for they had reckoned that their only hope of finding a second continental basing decision, leaving the US with no bargaining leverage in arms control and no ability to convince the Congress that its allies intended to follow through with the deployments.

Although the US ultimately beat back these 'second decision' of arms control proposal with the help of some of its allies, the basic idea was subtly reintroduced in the form of Chancellor Schmidt's request to the US

15. James A.Thomson, 'The LRINF Decision: Evolution of US Theatre Nuclear Policy, 1975-9', International Affairs(London), Vol. 60, 1984, p.612.

that he be allowed to explain to the West German Social Democratic Party in its Berlin Convention in December that it would be 'theoretically possible' for arms control results to do away with the need for deployments altogether.¹⁶ Upto this point, it had been American and the German position that some deployments would be needed regardless of the outcome of arms control negotiation, although the negotiation might affect the overall size and shape of the deployment programme. However, in view of the Chancellor's mounting political problem within the SPD, the US acceded to his request.

During the consultation in HLG, the FRG delegate consistently decided for not equal number of intermediate forces on West European side compared to the Soviet Union in East.¹⁷ The intelligence and other reports disclosed that the Soviet had about 600 INF in Eastern base. What Germany wanted to have was not 600 equal number of nuclear forces but a number lesser than the Soviet's. The German rationale for this stand was

16. *ibid*, p.612.

17. Raymond L.Gartroft, 'The NATO Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces', Political Science Quarterly(New York), Vol. 98, Summer 1983, pp.202-206.

that the equal number forces would be a Eurostrategic balance in Europe and thereby decoupling from the American strategic forces. Hence in the discussion and deliberations of HLG a figure of 572 cruise and Pershing missiles was agreed upon to deploy. The little gap between 572 missiles on the West European side and 600 missiles on the Soviet side was perceived to provide a link between LRTNF and American strategic forces. To equal the Soviet forces numerically could have a 'decoupling' effect as it threatens to limit a war to Europe. As a result the HLG decided against attempting to equal Soviet force levels.¹⁸

Thus by the end of September 1979, both the HLG and SG had issued their final reports to their parent bodies, Nuclear Planning Group and the North Atlantic Council.¹⁹ The HLG report contained the 108 Pershing II and 464 GLCM deployment package. In SG report contained an analysis of the arms control issues for future consideration once the deployment decision was made.

18. *ibid*, p. 206.

19. Johncart Wright and others, Cruise Pershing and SS-20 (Great Britain, Brassy Defence Publisher, 1985, p.24.

Amid these developments, Leonard Brezhnev, the Soviet President in a major speech in East Berlin in early October 1979 proposed to reduce the number of Medium Range Nuclear (MRN) systems deployed in the exposed western parts of the Soviet Union, if no additional American systems were deployed in the Western Europe. Brezhnev viewed the proposed deployment of American intermediate system in Europe to be an attempt designed to upset the balance of forces in Europe and to attempt to secure military superiority for the NATO bloc. Brezhnev then coupled a strong attack on the NATO LRTNF plan with an offer to reduce Soviet system in exchange for abandonment of the project.

Brezhnev proposal was vague, but most important was that it came at a time when NATO deployment plan was moving into the final stage of formal approval. Moreover Brezhnev proposal challenged the NATO solidarity on the LRTNF deployment. Therefore, US and European decision makers found it difficult to abandon the project as it stood on the eve of success and especially in exchange for an uncertain and suspect Soviet offer.

At a special meeting of NATO foreign and defence ministers on 12 December 1979, in Brussels, NATO unanimously approved the 'two track' decision on the deployment of intermediate forces in Europe coupled with an attempt at arms control limitations on LRTNF.

The decision was to deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 GLCM (Ground Launched Cruise Missile). It was decided that all 108 (Pershing II) be deployed in FRG. The GLCMs were to be deployed throughout Western Europe in the following manner: 160 in Great Britain, 112 in FRG, 96 in Italy, and 48 each in Belgium and Netherlands. In latter two countries no actual deployment had been agreed by 1985.

In a NATO Communique of December, 1979, the LRTNF modernization and arms control were described as two parallel and compensatory approaches.²⁰ The statement further commented "success of arms control" in constraining the Soviet build up, can enhance Allied security, modify the scale of NATO TNF modernization requirements and promote stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and detente.

Hence, the NATO's 'double track' decision of 1979 shows the continuity of the connection between defence and detente in West German foreign policy.

20. Lawrence S.K.Kaplan, NATO and the US(Boston, 1988), pp.226-227.

Chapter III

FRG AND EURO MISSILE DEPLOYMENT:

DOMESTIC FACTOR

The debate over INF has been especially strident in West Germany, for several reasons:

- 1) given its unenviable position in central Europe, it finds itself continually trying to reconcile its security relationship with the West with its desire for *ostpolitik*;
- 2) it was the Federal Republic that provided much of the rationale for the NATO INF decision;
- 3) over the Euro Missile deployment Bonn government was under great pressure of political forces domestically and externally by the US and by the Soviet Union over the Euro Missile deployment.¹ It is proposed to examine in this chapter the various anti nuclear movements, political pressures and domestic compulsions over the Euro Missile deployment.

1. Jeffrey Boutwell, 'Politics and Peace Movement in West Germany', International Security(Cambridge MA), Vol.7, no. 4, 1983,pp.72-75.

During NATO's 'dual track' decision, the government in FRG was composed of coalition formed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Free Democratic Party (FDP). In evolving his government's position, Chancellor Schmidt succeeded in yielding the natural tendencies of a significant section of his own party which placed a high priority on negotiations, with those of his coalition partners and elements of his party who tended to emphasise the necessity of modernization in order to achieve this by acknowledging and accomodating the strong feelings within his party that every effort be made to safeguard relations with the East. The government's ultimate position was determined at the SPD Congress in Berlin in December 1979.² The following motion on INF (Intermediate Nuclear

2. David S. Yost, 'West German Party Politics and Theatre Nuclear Modernization Since 1977', Armed Forces and Society (Hull UK), Vol. 8, no. 4 (Summer 1982), p.540.

Force) was adopted by the efforts of SPD leader Aflon
Paweleyk:

The disparities in the nuclear medium range potentials should be compensated for by a combination of defense and arms control measures. These should include:³

- Political priority to arms control arrangement so as to reduce instabilities in this way.

- At the same time fixing the necessary defense option which could become effective if arms control fail..... the federal government should consent to the medium range weapons to be developed by the US...being stationed in Europe (in 1983 at the earliest) only on condition that their introduction can be renounced should arms control negotiation fail, though a reduction by the Soviets and a jointly agreed limitation by East and West in Europe on medium range weapon can be made unnecessary.

The SPD Congress apparently approved this deployment decision by a large majority only because Paveleyk, Brandt, Schmidt, Wenner Vorgh, and others were able to persuade the left in the SPD that arms control would be the priority. Schmidt's resounding personal success was demonstrated in the vote by which he was elected Party Deputy Chairman - 360 votes in favour,

3. ibidi, p.540.

24 opposed and 16 absentions.⁴

The opposition parties, the Christian Social Union(CSU), and Christian Democratic Union(CDU) supported the governments on the NATO proposal, but, more strongly than the governing coalition, emphasised the need for NATO to modernize in response to the Soviet build up. Manfred Wornier, Helmut Kohl and other CDU/CSU spokesmen noted that the SS-20's performance characteristics (mobility, accuracy, and rapid reload) give the Soviet Union the military option currently unavailable to the West. CDU/CSU spokesmen said that the Soviet achievement of strategic nuclear parity as part of a Soviet grand design to sever Western Europe from the US guarantee in order to subordinate Western Europe to Soviet political pressure.⁵ New US INF would therefore be welcome as an instrument to recouple the US guarantee to Europe.

Helmut Kohl did not deny the existence of strategic rationale for the modernization of INF. He

4. New York Times, February 20, 1980.

5. Davis Yost, n. 2, p.536.

said:

If the impressions gained foothold among the German and West European public that the global strategic and the Europe related continental strategic power ratio is shifting to the disadvantage of the US and the Atlantic Alliance, this might release tendencies towards a political understanding with the Soviet world power, something which the CDU has unequivocally opposed for decades. 6

At the same time, the CDU/CSU restrained its advocacy of deployment of new generation of INF. Perhaps the same consideration governing SPD-FDP coalition was influencing the CDU/CSU. These parties did not wish to give anyone the impression that the Federal Republic might somehow be seeking control over nuclear weapons or unilaterally encouraging the initiation of US threatre nuclear weapons deployment programme. Manfred Wornier, echoed the government's rejection of the idea that the new INF could be a bilateral US-West German decision. He said:

It is an explicit subject of a NATO decision of American President. This is not a matter of German nuclear arms. We do not want any nuclear arms, we do not have any

6. *ibid*, p.537.

and this is the way it should be....but the the federal government must say clearly what it is prepared to do. It must support the stationing of such American arms in Europe.⁷

The CDU/CSU seems therefore to have upheld the view that the government should make clear its willingness to follow an American lead on INF deployments.

These debate about modernization of theater nuclear forces in Federal Republic of Germany have often repeated the themes which were there in late 1950s and early 1960s. At that time, Helmut Schmidt and other SPD members championed the view that a strategy of early use of tactical nuclear weapons would be incredible and dangerously escalatory and that a build up of conventional forces "using the nuclear threshold" was necessary to provide usable options.⁸ Schmidt's observation in the 1960 about the unacceptable destructiveness of any tactical nuclear war in Europe were similar to the views of leading CDU/CSU members like Kai-Uwe von Hassel and Franz-Josfy Strauss.

7. *ibid*, p.537.

8. Helmut Schmidt, Defence or Retaliation, (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 210-13.

In 1979 Defence Minister of SPD-FDP government Hans Apel expressed the essence of the view:

Especially with respect of nuclear weapons we should kick the habit of imagining their (actual use). Whatever we do militarily in general and in the field of nuclear armament in particular is but a part of a deterrence policy.⁹

However the 1977-'79 debates revealed three changes in the terms of West German defence discourse. The first was that Manfred Wornier and other CDU/CSU spokesmen emphatically committed to deterrence. They generally appear to believe that credible deterrence flows from operationally effective military capabilities. The actual use of nuclear weapons must therefore be imagined and prepared for use in the event of failure of deterrence.

The second change concern the emerging tendency of the SPD left to regard NATO's conception of defence and deterrence as dangerous and to consider inadequate even the SPD-FDP government's dedication to detente.

The third change is the rise of antinuclear movements and peace movements against the deployment of

9. David Yost, No.2, p.542.

the missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The SPD left has a latent tendency within the party as a whole that has been from time to time evoked and even strengthened by various issues and leaders. The SPD left always tries to influence government policy to conform to its policy preferences. These members often appeal to public opinion and present their views at length in the frequent local and national congresses of the SPD.¹⁰ The overriding necessity of presenting and promoting detente has seemed at times to overshadow the government's attention to military sources of security.

Nevertheless, the SPD-FDP government had remained committed to the principle of maintaining military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and had insisted on the necessity for security of the US military presence in the Federal Republic and the US strategic guarantee to NATO. The FDP party chairman and Foreign Minister, Genscher, in 1979 had been particularly emphatic on this point. He said:

Detente policy is an additional factor in securing the peace in East and West, let me stress,

¹⁰. *ibid*, p.543.

it is an additional factor, it is not the foundation of our security. This foundation remain the maintenance of the defence and deterrance capability of the alliance. And nothing would be more dangerous for peace than the misunderstanding that striving for detente in itself provides security.¹¹

Except for the SPD left members who regard the Soviet threat a cold war fiction, all the SPD-FDP members remain conyinced of the FRG's dependence on the American strategic nuclear guarantee for security.

The other most important trend in FRG's domestic politics in the 1970s and the 1980s has been the use of political groups outside the mainstream of party politics - from the Green Party nationally to the Alternative List in West Berlin; from the various citizens initiative groups to single issue groups focusing on the reform and civilian nuclear power. The peace movement is led primarily by the Greens, an environmental party, and to a lesser extent by the Protestant and Catholic churches.¹² The disperate groups that merged into the Greens were active in the late 1970s protesting the government's nuclear energy policies, as well as

11. *ibid*, -p.544.

12. Viotti Paul R., 'European Peace Movement and Missile Deployment', Armed Forces and Society(Hull, UK), Vol. 11, No. 4, (Summer 1985), p.505.

addressing other environmental issues. It was primarily after the deterioration in East-West relations and the dimming prospects for arms control between the super powers that the leadership of the Greens turned their attention to the issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, and were supported by elements within both the Protestant church and the SPD.

Unlike the situation in other European countries, where the peace movements have the support of at least one major political party, the Peace Movement in West Germany was initially directed by activists outside the established parties.¹³ While many West Germans who demonstrate against nuclear weapons do not necessarily support the politics of the Green Party, the Peace Movement has become in many ways the foreign policy vehicle of the Greens.

Given the varied political currents that make up the Peace Movement and the Greens, it is easier to describe what they are against than what they are for. On the issue of theater nuclear weapons, both groups

13. *ibid*, p.510.

are opposed to the further deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe and in favour of various schemes for super power military disengagement from the continent.¹⁴ Although they oppose the NATO nuclear weapons, the Peace Movement is neither pro-Soviet nor united on how to fashion a new security arrangement for the Federal Republic. Those advocating a new security arrangement for West Germany most often propose solutions which are either 'European' or nationalist.¹⁵ Some argue that the Peace Movement in the Federal Republic must link up with peace movements elsewhere in Europe so that the continent can become a third force in international affairs. For others, such as Albertz and Lutheran pastor Helmut Gollwitzer, the aim is more explicitly nationalist to create a demilitarized, neutral, reunited Germany.¹⁶

Due to the growing antinuclear movement, the changed domestic political scene and, the deadlock in arms control negotiations between Soviet Union and USA,

14. Jeffrey Boutwell, 'Politics and the Peace Movement in West Germany', International Security(Cambridge M.A) Vol. 7, No. 4(Spring 1983), p.80.

15. *ibid*, p.84.

16. William E. Griffith, 'Bonn and Washington: From Deterioration to Crisis?', Orbis(Philadelphia) Vol.20, No.1(Spring 1982), pp. 117-33.

Chancellor Schmidt was in a great dilemma to support the INF deployment. He was specially sensitive to the forthcoming elections to Bundestag in October 1980. Schmidt government could not afford to alienate powerful faction in the SPD who were stressing for arms control negotiations. Therefore Schmidt in April 1980, made a series of speeches in which he re-emphasized the growing disparity in Medium range system caused by the ongoing Soviet modernization and wanted both sides to forgo the deployment of new or additional Medium Range Missile (MRM) for a certain number of years.¹⁷

Following Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in June 1980, the Soviet Union dropped their precondition that NATO rescind its decision and agreed that preliminary discussion on limiting medium range system could begin.

The preliminary discussion on limitation of Long Range Nuclear Forces(LRNF) began in Geneva in October 1980. The Soviet negotiation proposed that all medium

17. Eugenia V.Osgood, 'Euro-missiles : Historical and Political Realities', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists(December 1983), pp.13-21.

range carriers be included and that the counting formula be launched and that either side have the freedom to mix.¹⁸ These preliminary talks under the Carter administration were discontinued shortly before the election of American President. At the same time in October 1980 the election in the Federal Republic of Germany returned the SPD/FDP coalition to government. However, a month later in US Presidential election Carter was defeated by Reagan.

Considerable uncertain policy towards arms control by Reagan administration, drew larger opposition to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on German territory. The strident anti-Soviet rhetoric by Reagan administration, including the reference to Kremlin leaders as "liars and cheats", the assertion that limited nuclear war in Europe was possible, all these fuelled latent fears within various sections of West German public.¹⁹

Chancellor Schmidt worked assiduously to keep the support of the SPD left wing for the 1979 decision,

18. John Cart Wright, Cruise Pershing and SS-20, (Great Britain, 1985), p.25.

19. Jonathan Dean, 'Federal Germany after the Euro Missiles', Bulletin of Atomic Scientists(Chicago), December 1983, pp.31-8.

but it was a difficult and apparently not always successful effort. When the possibility even for opening LRNF negotiations appeared remote, the SPD left wing was increasingly vocal, with several voices raising demands for a review of the dual track decision.

Adding to this growing restiveness was the proposal by President Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981 for a moratorium on nuclear weapons deployment. The proposal was quickly rejected by NATO as propogandist, designed to freeze Soviet superiority and to drive a wedge into the Alliance.²⁰

In a Bundestag speech in early April 1981, the Chancellor Schmidt used unusually harsh language to criticize the Soviet Union - "This massive military disproportion represents a massive political danger".²¹

The opposition parties CDU and CSU cited other reasons for the growing anti-nuclear movements.

20. John Cart Wright, No. 18, p.99.

21. *ibid*, p.99.

According to a party spokesman, it was Moscow's arms control propaganda, supported by the German Communist Party, which became more influential during this period for the growth of anti-nuclear movements. Moreover, Reagan's insistence on Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Poland as conditions for commencing arms control negotiations was misrepresented by nuclear opposition groups.²² However, CDU spokesman maintained that huge majority of people in Federal Republic was still confident of American credibility.

In May 1981, during his visit to US Chancellor Schmidt explained to Reagan about the growing nuclear opposition groups in Germany due to the deployment decision and various other domestic factors. Those who were doubting the credibility of the American commitment to negotiation, were assured through a series of developments. The most important development was the May 1981 NATO Ministerial meeting in Rome and its final Communique, in which the importance was attached to dual track decision and a declaration was made that negotiations would open before the end of the year. Subsequently a letter sent in July

22. *ibid*, p.100.

from President Reagan to Schmidt also expressed his commitment to open negotiation.²³

In early November 1981, President Reagan announced that the US would table a "zero-offer" proposal at the resumption of the INF Geneva negotiations on 30 November 1981.²⁴ Zero option proposes a non deployment of the 572 Pershing II and Ground Launch Cruise Missiles (GLCM) in exchange for Soviet dismantlement of its intermediate range land based missiles wherever deployed.

Helmut Schmidt and other NATO leaders welcomed the 'zero offer'. But the Soviet Union rejected the zero option and described it as 'unrealistic', 'a joke' and 'amounting to unilateral disarmament for the Soviet Union'.²⁵ They further claimed that it violated the principal of equal security by excluding weapons of US forward based system.

Zero option did not dissolve the anti nuclear pressures within SPD. The left wing of the

23. New York Times, June 2, 1981.

24. New York Times, November 19, 1981.

25. Eugenie Osgood, no. 17, p. 20

SPD became increasingly vocal by demanding a review of the dual track decision. The anti nuclear groups outside the circle of established political parties also started its protests and demonstrations against the deployment of the Euromissiles in FRG and was fully supported by the Green Party.

The amalgamation of different groupings within the anti nuclear movement was reflected in a diversity of political aims and activities. Moral opposition to nuclear weapons or to nuclear power convinced with fears of war and with strains of pacifism, neutralism, nationalism and anti-Americanism, produced a wide array of opinions and goals. The unity in this diversity was a demonstration of opposition to LRINF. Between 350,000 and 480,000 people demonstrated at various sites during the Easter weekend in 1982.²⁶ Again during President Reagan's visit to Bonn in June 1982, some 350,000 marched to oppose the deployment of LRINF in Europe.²⁷

26. New York Times, Nov. 22, 1981.

27. Washington Post, June 11, 1982.

While anti nuclear movement was organising mass actions against deployment of Euromissile, supporters of the 1979 decision were engaged in favour of it. In June 1982, the CDU organised a pro-American rally, which attracted about 150,000 people.²⁸ The rally was intended to raise questions about the reports in the mass media about a growing anti-American and anti-NATO Federal Republic.

Schmidt government also launched a public information programme. They challenged the criticism of opponents. Chancellor Schmidt said: "Peace is not created". "When one renders oneself defenceless against the armament or threat of another".²⁹ He complained that there was no word of criticism of the Soviet Union's actions. During his meeting with Brezhnev in February 1982, Schmidt reiterated his support for the zero proposal and warned that the new NATO missiles would be deployed if the Geneva negotiations did not succeed in reaching to an agreement on the zero proposal. He also warned President

28. John Cart Wright, no. 18, p.102.

29. *ibid*, p.102.

Brezhnev not to influence public opinion against the position taken by Alliance governments.

Despite these efforts by Schmidt to counter the opposition to Euromissile deployment, deep rifts developed in the Social Democratic Party over issues like further spending cuts affecting social policy, nuclear energy and ecology. Meanwhile there was also pressure from the left SPD to review the dual track decision. Coupled with the intra party matters, the coalition partner FDP started slowly drifting away from SPD over economic issues and budgetary problems.³⁰

Against the background of short term economic and budgetary problems, intermingled with the FDP's power play, on 17th September Schmidt went before Bundestag to announce that he was forming a minority cabinet. Since four FDP ministers had resigned.³¹ On 1st October, the Bundestag voted on the "constructive motion" of no

30. Rainer Eisfeld, 'The West German Elections: Economic Fears and the Deployment Debate', Government and Opposition(London), 18(31), 1983, p.293.

31. *ibid*, p. 295.

confidence tabled by CDU and FDP against Schmidt government.³² The West Germany's Basic Law prescribed that a Chancellor may only be ousted if a successor receives the absolute majority of the parliamentary ballot.³³ Unfortunately, Schmidt failed to get majority vote and he resigned. Thus Helmut Kohl (CDU) was voted into office and he announced that he would seek a popular mandate in March 1983.

When the general elections were being held on 6th March 1983, it was viewed widely outside the Federal Republic as a 'Missile Referendum', the crucial vote determining issues were actually economic and social in nature.³⁴ Yet nuclear issues prompted sharp, acrimonious debate between the competing parties. The SPD began to move away from the NATO's dual track decision and were campaigning against the deployment of Eurcomissile in FRG.

32. *ibid*, p.293.

33. Geoffrey Pridham, 'Party Politics and Coalitions in Bonn', The World Today(London), January 1983, pp.21-29.

34. Helga Haftendorn, 'Germany and the Eurcomissile Debate', International Journal(Toronto) (40)(1), 1984-85, pp.68-95.

The CDU/CSU were firm on their commitments for the deployment of missiles.³⁵ The Soviet Union was also also actively involved in the campaign, to encourage those opposing deployment and intimidate those favouring it.

The CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), and its coalition partner regained power in the Bundestag elections.³⁶ But there was a change in the political scenario of the FRG. The Green Party, which was against the parliamentary system, contested the elections and won 28 seats in the Bundestag. This was seen by opposition parties as a threat to the deployment of new missiles on German soil.³⁷

The CDU/CSU and FDP government remained firm on the deployment issue as planned, should no result was achieved in the Geneva negotiations. At the same

35. See John Cart Wright, No. 18, p.104.

36. *ibid*, p.105.

37. Helga Haftendorn, No. 34, p.73.

time Kohl worked actively to encourage flexibility in INF talks and during his visits to Washington after the March elections in 1983 and his first visit to Moscow in July 1983, he pressed for a Summit meeting between Reagan and the Soviet leader.

While in Moscow, Kohl suggested an agreement on the recommendation of the so-called 'walk in the woods' understanding which was reached between Paul Nitze, US negotiator, and Yuri Kuznetsov in mid July 1982.³⁸ The plan called for limiting US cruise missile launchers and Soviet triple warhead SS-20s to a total of 75 each, while cancelling the deployment of US Pershing II missiles. Both Washington and Moscow had rejected the understanding and Kohl also refrained from giving his full endorsement after seeing the attitudes of US and USSR, but stressed that "all possible solution must be explored". But the FDP leader Genscher openly endorsed the 'walk in the woods' formula. The SPD who had opposed the zero option during the election campaign, had now recommended total elimination of all short and medium range nuclear systems from Europe.³⁹

38. John Cart Wright, No. 18, p.105.

39. *ibid*, p.106.

In mid-June the West German Peace Movement announced that a massive programme of demonstrations, blockades, and civil disobedience would take place in October 1983 as part of a co-ordinated European-wide effort to prevent the deployment of US missiles.⁴⁰ The plan included blockade of US nuclear bases, demonstration at the embassies and consulates of nuclear powers. The demonstrations were to culminate in three huge protests on 27 October 1983 in Bonn, Hamburg and New Ulm missile site outside Stuttgart.

On 22 October anti nuclear demonstrations were held in several European capitals and in some US cities. In the Federal Republic of Germany, there were major demonstrations in Bonn, West Berlin and Hamburg drawing an estimated total of 1 million people.⁴¹ The most important was the 'human chain' stretching from NATO military base at Stuttgart to the Pershing II base at New Ulm 70 miles away.⁴² This demonstration was addressed by Willy Brandt and Petra Kelly, a leader of the

40. The Guardian, June 15, 1983.

41. The Guardian, October 23, 1983.

42. The Guardian, October 23, 1983.

Green Party. Willy Brandt criticised US and the Soviet Union for not showing greater political will to reach an agreement in the Geneva negotiation and also stated that FRG needed no new nuclear weapons.

In the face of the continuing protests and tepid public support, the government scheduled a Bundestag debate and vote on the missiles for November 21-22 to ratify and lend legitimacy to the deployments.⁴³ Kohl at the same time conducted a campaign against anti-nuclear groups and continued his solid support for the dual track decision of 1979. He urged for greatest possible flexibility in the Geneva negotiations and convinced the Soviet Union of FRG's firm commitment to the Alliance.

Before the Bundestag debate in November, all the major parties held special conference on the deployment issue. The SPD at its special conference on 18-19 November passed a resolution for non-deployment of

43. Leon V. Sigal, Nuclear Forces in Europe (Washington, 1984, p.84.

missiles and, if deployed, their removal as slow as possible, and called on the Soviet Union to reduce its SS-20s.⁴⁴ The vote was 380 in favour of the resolution and 14 opposed, with three absentions. With the passage of the resolution, the earlier SPD balance achieved with some difficulty by Helmutt Schmidt to support equally dual tracks decision fell apart.⁴⁵

Both FDP and CSU party conferences strongly endorsed the deployment. The Green conference rejected any new missiles and called for a withdrawal from the Alliance.

The debate in Bundestag took place on 21-22 November 1983 and three resolutions were before the Bundestag: the government proposal in favour of deployment, and two resolutions opposed to deployment, one offered by the SPD, the second tabled by the Greens.⁴⁶

In the debate, Chancellor Kohl was firm in his support for dual tracks decision. Defence Minister

44. See 'NATO, Social Democratic Party's Opposition to Deployment' in FBIS, Daily Report, Weu, November 19, 1983, pp. 1-2.

45. *ibid*, November 20, 1983.

46. See John Cart Wright, No. 18, p.111.

Manfred Worner argued that without the NATO deployments the Soviet Union would retain a monopoly of INF missiles and would be in a position to apply political pressure to Europe. Willy Brandt, the chief opposition spokesman, considered the new deployments destabilising without enhancing security and suggested the Alliance search for a new concept to replace nuclear deterrence.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, he said SPD continued to support strongly membership in the Alliance and appreciated the leading role of the United States.

Helmut Schmidt who was isolated in this debate, explained why he was opposed to the SPD position and why he could not support the Kohl resolution, though he favoured deployment.⁴⁸ According to Schmidt, the failure to deploy would allow a dangerous nuclear imbalance to continue, at the same time that would raise questions among the Allies about the reliability of the Federal Republic. While the Soviet Union was responsible for creating the nuclear imbalance, he faulted both the Soviet Union and the United States for failure to reach an agreement in Geneva.

47. *ibid*, p.112.

48. *ibid*, p.113.

The vote on the three resolutions followed party lines. The Green resolution urging rejection of the NATO missiles and withdrawal from NATO was overwhelmingly defeated gaining only 28 Green votes. The SPD resolution opposing deployment was defeated, with 25 SPD MPs and 14 Greens abstaining. The government resolution favouring deployment and continuation of negotiations was passed with 286 in favour, 226 opposed and one (FDP) abstention.

The following day, 23 November, it was announced that the first Pershing II missile components were arriving and that the Soviet Union walked out of the Geneva INF negotiations without agreement on a date for resumption, charging that the United States had created a crisis in East-West relations. Thus first Pershing missile arrived finally in early January 1984.

Chapter IV

FRG AND INF TALKS TO TREATY

Ever since the conclusion of SALT I and SALT II treaties the process of arms control negotiations has been of immense political significance in East-West security relations. While at the global level arms control has had strategic parity as an objective to be attained, at the Euro-American level such agreements catered domestic needs such as to counter pressure politics and for better prospects in elections.

In this context the INF treaty stands out as the first limited disarmament treaty. While the treaty was a product of US-Soviet talks one cannot lose sight of the fact that the United States negotiated with an allies perspective. In a relative sense, the US was cautious to concede to the demands of its European allies and this in itself created a series of accommodation within the alliance. Hence the importance of studying the role of FRG in contributing to the momentum of the INF talks.

Helmut Schmidt's Visit to Moscow

In Dec. 1979, NATO announced the dual track decision of a) arms control for restoring balance in INF, b) deployment of missiles if the negotiations fail .

When these decisions were announced by NATO, the Soviets refused to negotiate on arms control and insisted that further talks will be held only when the NATO withdraws its deployment decision in Europe. The prospects of arms control negotiation entered another stage of uncertainty when Soviet intervened in Afghanistan and Carter administration declared to stop arms negotiations until the Soviets were withdrawn from Afghanistan.

This development produced great anxiety for Chancellor Schmidt as he was under pressure within his party for promoting arms control negotiations aimed at preventing LRINF deployment in German soil. Moreover, he was concerned about the prospect of arms control negotiations as it would have effect on the prospects of SPD party in the impending elections for Bundestag in October 1980. Therefore in April 1980, Chancellor Schmidt made a series of speeches in which he emphasised the growing disparity in Medium Range system caused by the ongoing Soviet modernization and wanted both sides to forgo the deployment of new or additional Medium Range Missile for a certain number of years. When Schmidt visited Moscow in June, 1980, the Soviet Union dropped its precondition that NATO rescind the 12 December 1979 decision

and agreed for preliminary discussions on limiting medium-range system.² The preliminary discussion began in Geneva in October 1980 on limitation of Long Range Nuclear Force(LRNF). The Soviet Position was that when all principal nuclear arms in Europe were taken into account totally a general balance already existed. Their objective was to freeze this balance at existing levels.³ They also proposed that all medium range carriers be included and that the counting formula be launched. However, the US presidential election process in October-November 1980 prevented any clear political direction for the arms control talks. Hence these talks were discontinued and were not resumed under the new American administration until 1981.

Reagan Administration:

For a considerable period uncertainty existed concerning the attitude of the Reagan administration towards the arms control component of the double-track decision. In early 1981, Ronald Reagan pledged to 'rearm America'

2. John Cart Wright, Cruise Missiles Pershing and SS-20(Great Britain, 1985, p.25.

3. *ibid*, p.27.

and negotiate from a 'position of strength'. Reagan charged that the Soviet Union ever since 1917 had the prime objective of promoting world revolutions and a one-world communist state. He declared that the Soviets were reserving the "right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat in order to obtain" their objective. He called the Soviet Union "an enemy" an "evil empire" and was apparently determined to lead an ideological crusade against the Soviet Union.⁴

Highly critical of the past arms control negotiations, Reagan described the ABM Treaty of 1972 as "fatally flawed" and said that his administration would "review" the SALT II treaty. He declared that so far detente has been a one way street and sought to resurrect the Kissingerian notion by stating that the American pursuit of detente would be based on linkage diplomacy, i.e, arms control and detente could not be divorced from the actions of the Soviet Union around the world.

One German official commenting on the disenchantment with arms control in the US told a NATO Special Committee:

This development has not taken place in Europe because we have never regarded arms control as an alternative to deterrence.

4. Lawrence Kaplan, NATO and United States, (Massachusetts, 1988), p. 159.

Our less Quixotic view of arms control has enabled us to maintain continuity in that view. It is in our interest to continue arms control as a realistic and practical process.⁵

Similarly all European officials generally agreed that attempting for close linkage between arms control efforts and Soviet international behaviour was unproductive and unwise and were thus hesitant about the approach of the early Reagan administration in this regard. The European view was generally that arms control negotiation and treaties must serve security.

During the course of uncertainty prevailing in US, over the arms control talks, there was growing interest in the Federal Republic of Germany over the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on its soil. The SPD left wing was increasingly vocal with several voices raising demands for a review of the dual track decision which gave impetus to anti-nuclear movements. Adding to growing anti-nuclear opposition was the proposal by President Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress in

5. John Cart Wright, n.2, p.25.

February 1981 for a moratorium on nuclear weapons deployment.⁶ Chancellor Schmidt criticised the Soviet proposal by pointing out that moratorium was advantageous to Soviets as Soviet military was disproportionately superior which signified a political danger.

Thus due to various political pressures from Allies and the growing anti-nuclear opposition in FRG, Reagan was forced to reckon that arms control negotiations "constitute a special category of East-West relations and that they must be dealt with outside the context of normal relations" and that the "talks should continue except under the most exceptional circumstances".

In September, 1981 Haig and Gromyko met in New York and established a framework for arms control talks that were to begin 3rd November, 1981 in Geneva. The initial negotiating approach adopted by the Reagan administration for the INF negotiations in Geneva followed the framework established by the Special Group under the Carter Administration.⁷ The essentials of this

6. John Cart Wright, no.2, p.99.

7. John Cart Wright, n.2, p.24.

position were: that the negotiations should adopt a step-by-step approach focusing first on the most threatening element of Soviet INF, namely the land based missile component (SS-20s, SS-4, SS-5); the global limitation with a European regional subceiling; the counting be warhead on launchers, and aircraft be considered at a latter stage.

Zero Option

In his debut as an arms controller, President Reagan announced on 18 November 1981, his zero-zero proposal, under which the United States and NATO were prepared to cancel deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe if the Soviets dismantled their SS-20s, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.⁸ Thus Reagan was proposing an elimination of an entire class of nuclear weaponry. The US delegation in Geneva tabled this zero-zero proposal as an opening position in the INF talks.

The proposal worked out reflected a decidedly hard-line approach and seemed designed primarily to part the onus of NATO's modernisation on the Soviet Union by

8. John Cart Wright, no. 2, p.62.

challenging it to dismantle its medium range weapons. It was a pragmatic response to the 'nervous allies', agitating anti-nuclear groups and peace movements.

Some officials in FRG, with whom the special committee met expressed the view that the zero option was attractive for political reasons, but unsound on strategic grounds. Politically it was seen as placing the responsibility for NATO modernisation on the Soviet Union, as well as holding out the prospect that an arms control agreement would make NATO deployments unnecessary. On strategic and doctrinal grounds the German officials noted that such an option was contrary to the fundamental rationale for LRINF modernization which existed irrespective of Soviets SS-20 deployments.⁹

The Soviet Union rejected the zero option as unfair, claiming that it violated the principal of equal security by including Soviet Asian deployments, while excluding French and British nuclear weapons as well as US forward based system. Gromyko reacted by saying that it was a zero option only for the Soviet Union and that this allegedly zero option still left room for a few other

9. John Cart Wright, no.2, p.26.

options. Brezhnev rejected the proposal and proposed instead a freeze and called for a phased reduction of European INF to 600 for each side by 1985 and to 300 by 1990.¹⁰

Brezhnev - Schmidt Meeting : Febraury 1982

The Federal Republic's continuing insistence on arms control option and its importance to global stability as well as to public confidence in strategic negotiations undoubtedly carried a certain weight in super power INF talks. During Schmidt's meeting with Brezhnev, the latter repeated his offer for a moratorium on deployment of new system in Europe and added another offer: "the Soviet Union would reduce unilaterally (by an unspecified number of unspecified weapons system) Soviet intermediate range system if the moratorium was accepted and NATO did not deploy".¹¹ But Schmidt sought for the Soviet support of zero proposal and warned that the NATO weapons would be deployed if the Geneva talks did not formulate its negotiation on the basis of zero option. He also warned President Brezhnev against trying to influence public

10. John Cart Wright, n.2, p.83.

11. ibid, p.84.

opinion against the position taken by Alliance governments.

The Soviet proposal to include British and French nuclear-capable system was, in the United States' view, both technically flawed and inequitable in principle. Ambassador Rostow outlined these objections:¹²

1) Most of the United Kingdom and French forces are not in fact intermediate range; they are Sea Launch Ballistical Missiles(SLBM) identical with Soviet and United States' SLBM forces. Most of the remainder system are nuclear capable aircraft. The Soviet predominance in intermediate range nuclear capable system in Europe is so great that there would be no justification for compensation to the Soviet Union for British and French nuclear forces even if they were under NATO command.

2) The claim of the Soviet Union for nuclear forces equal to or superior to these all other nations combined would be unjustified . It is a demand for absolute security for one country which is tantamount to absolute insecurity for all other countries.

12. *ibid*, p. 28.

3)The INF negotiations are bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and both the United Kingdom and France have stated their refusal to have their forces limited or compensated in negotiations between the two superpowers.

4) The Soviet proposal would have the effect of forcing the almost total withdrawal from Europe of United States dual-capable aircraft while not affecting most soviet dual capable aircraft.

With both sides sticking to their respective proposals, the INF talks couldn't and didn't progress any further.

Walk-in-the-Woods Proposal:

It was against a background of stalemate in negotiation that the two chief negotiators at Geneva attempted to resolve the impasse on their own during a private conversation in July 1982, later known as the Walk-in-the-Woods.¹³

The outline agreement arrived by Nitze-Kvitsinky 'Walk-in-the-Woods', included the following points:

13. *ibid*, p.65.

- a common limit of 75 launchers, in which one SS-20 with 3 warheads and one cruise missile launcher (4 single warhead missiles) would each count as a single launcher, the US would be allowed a total of 300 GLCM warheads and the Soviet Union the total of 225 SS-20 warheads;
- ban on deployment of Pershing II in Europe;
- a freeze on the number of SS-20's designated for Asian targets at 90;
- a limit of 150 medium range nuclear capable aircraft, including Badger, Blunder and Backfire on the Soviet side, and US F III and FB IIIs;
- exclusion of Britain and French nuclear systems.

The Walk-in-the-Woods proposal was discussed in US and Nitz was accused in suggesting the abandonment of Pershing II missiles. A senior US Pentagon official told the NATO Special Committee that the primary reason was US rejection of 'Walk-in-the-Woods' understanding was the allies particularly FRG was not consulted.

Change in Government in FRG

In September 1982, the ruling coalition in the FRG split over a series of issues which were primarily economic in nature.¹⁴ The new coalition partners, the

14. *ibid*, p.103.

CDU/CSU and FDP, agreed on leadership of Mr. Helmut Kohl as Chancellor. Soon after his election, Kohl said that FRG would work for 'genuine detente' and if the Soviet Union did not agree in the Geneva negotiations to reduce its missiles, the FRG was determined to go forward with deployments in 1983.¹⁵

Yuri Andropov offered to reduce Soviet Medium range missiles in the European theatre to the level the Soviets attributed to British and French nuclear missiles then currently deployed (162), provided that deployment of NATO's 464 GLCM and 108 Pershing IIs were cancelled.

Mr. Andropov did not specify in his speech whether the new Soviet proposal would entail destruction of Soviet missiles then deployed in the European theatre, or simply removal to bases east of the Urals from which they could still strike NATO territory. Soviet success have not been consistent on this point. Yuli Kvitsinsky, chief Soviet negotiator at Geneva, told a US Congressional delegation in Moscow on 11 January 1983 that the Soviet Union "would consider destruction of the missiles". Soviet

15. *ibid*, p.104.

foreign minister Gromyko also said during his January 1983 visit to Bonn that some SS-20s would be dismantled, and some redeployed so that they could no longer target Western Europe. Yet in discussion with West German SPD leader Hans Joachim Vogel in January, the Soviets reportedly offered to remove all SS-20s to 80 longitude, arguing that this would in theory prevent them from being able to strike Western Europe.

NATO member countries especially FRG rejected Andropov proposal on the ground that it would compensate the Soviet Union for British and French independent nuclear forces and still allow the Soviet Union to maintain INF superiority in Europe. Nevertheless Western Europe did not relish the stalemate in arms control negotiations. It urged the US in early months of 1983 to move beyond zero option at Geneva talks.

US responded by proposing a 'Build up, Build down' formula without indicating the number under which the US could deploy cruise missiles and Pershing II while Soviet Union will 'Build down' or dismantle SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5, until equal warheads limits were reached.

Helmut Kohl's Visit to Moscow: July 1983

After the general elections to Bundestag in March 1983, the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition retained power. Kohl's government endorsed President Reagan's 'Build up/Build down' interim proposal in Geneva, based on the principle of equal numbers of warheads on land based LRINF missiles. During his visit to Moscow in July 1983, there was apparently no indication of Soviet interest in dismantling any SS-20s.¹⁶ Kohl reasserted the FRG's commitment to deploy US missiles if there were no breakthrough in Geneva negotiations. Talking to Yuri Andropov he had raised the informal compromise formula of Walk-in-Woods but had received only a non-committal response.

As the 'Hot Autumn' approached (Professed demonstrations by Peace Movement against deployment of missiles in FRG and other European countries) the NATO members' parliaments would again debate the implementation of the 1979 decision to deploy new medium range nuclear missiles, the Soviet Union pursued a policy of threatening and cajoling the Alliance as a whole and individual member countries.¹⁷ There was little doubt in the West that

16. *ibid*, p.105.

17. *ibid*, p.73.

Soviet Policy was aimed at activating Western public opinion to oppose deployment, and, if possible, to break the solidarity of the Alliance.

Andropov - August and October 1983 Proposal

To provide a new posture to arms control negotiations, Mr. Andropov offered to 'liquidate' SS-20s in the European Soviet Union over and above the levels agreed in an arms control treaty. This August proposal was basically a reiteration of earlier Soviet proposals, with the classification that the Soviet missiles above 162 would not be redeployed to Soviet Asia.¹⁸

Alliance authorities did not consider the 20 August Andropov proposal a significant advance since it was based on inclusion of the French and United Kingdom strategic forces. However, the offer to destroy missiles made a factor of imbalance though an arms control agreement appeared promising at the same time that it appeared as tacit Soviet admission of medium range superiority.

18. *ibid*, p.89.

Soviet spokesman continued to charge the US with blocking the Geneva negotiations by the refusal to include UK and French strategic weapons and indicated that the Soviet capacity for new offers was becoming exhausted. These policy positions were repeated by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in his mid October meetings with FRG foreign minister Genscher.

The modified proposal of Andropov on 16 October 1983, essentially, was an elaboration of that made in December 1982 calling for Soviet parity with French and British systems and the May offer to count warheads on launchers.¹⁹ Specifically, the Soviet Union proposed that it would reduce its European based SS-20s to 140, which would equal the 420 warheads they ascribed to the British and French forces. The Soviet Union also suggested its willingness to freeze Asian SS-20 deployments as part of an agreement if there were no change in the 'strategic situation' in Asia. The Soviet offer did not interest the Europeans and the US rejected it, stating that it was unacceptable and non negotiable.

19. Eugenia, V.Osgood, 'Euro Missiles: Historical and Political Realities', Bulletin of Atomic Scientists(Chicago), December, 1983, p.20.

The final American INF proposal was made in November 1983 before the SPD convention and Bundestag debate on deployment of missiles. This new US offer, made after consultation with the Allies, was a refinement of the earlier build up/build down proposal indicating a global upper limit for Medium Range Nuclear Weapon and a US/NATO commitment that it could only deploy in Europe the number of medium range nuclear missiles equal to the Soviet number deployed.²⁰ The proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union. Moreover the Soviet Union threatened the Federal Republic with dire consequences should it support full implementation and deployment.

Bundestag Debate and Soviet Walkout

The decisive debate in the Bundestag took place on 21-22 November, 1983.²¹ Chancellor Kohl was firm in his support for dual tracks decision. He argued that the balance of power in Europe was at stake. Defence minister Manfred Wörner argued that without NATO deployment the Soviet Union would retain a monopoly of INF missiles and would be in a position to apply political

20. *ibid*, p.21.

21. John Cart Wright, no. 2, p.111.

pressure to Europe. Willy Brandt, the chief opposition spokesman made the SPD case against deployment. The government resolution favouring deployment and continuation of negotiations was passed in Bundestag. Soon after the vote in Bundestag the Soviets staged a walkout from arms control negotiations and refused to set a resumption date for negotiations. Meanwhile the first Pershing II was deployed in early January 1984.

Towards Broadened And Improved East-West Relations

Following the Bundestag vote and the Soviet Walkout in Geneva, the Kohl government maintained its programme of public and private diplomacy in support of the 'dual track' decision and watched carefully for signs of changes in overall East-West relations. One basic thrust of Kohl government became a renewed emphasis on the improvement of East-West relations while maintaining full support for the implementation of 'dual track' decision. However, for reducing East-West tensions and keeping the dialogue open, Chancellor Kohl announced in mid-December an invitation to Soviet leader Andropov to visit Bonn. He further suggested that the Federal Republic

22. *ibid*, p.112.

would seek out other areas for East-West cooperation. The Chancellor stated that he could welcome an early US-Soviet summit and, in the interests of reducing tension, announced in 1984 a visit to Hungary and his intention to improve relations with Poland.

Suspension of Negotiations

After the Soviet Walkout and during 1984, there was virtually no positive movement on the INF and SALT arms control negotiations. The US and Soviet positions were diametrically opposed to one another. The position adopted by the US and NATO was that no arms control concessions should be made to lure the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. The Soviets repeatedly stated their willingness to resume the negotiations, but only if NATO withdrew the missiles already deployed.

The Soviets hoped that after stalling out of the negotiations, European domestic political oppositions to INF would, in effect, halt their actual deployment. After initial demonstrations, missile deployment continued in FRG. Hence, the onus of lack of progress in arms control fell on the Soviet Union for its walkout. After Shultz-Gromyko meeting on 7-8 January, 1985, the two sides

agreed to begin new talks on IRNW soon.²³

Gorbachev Era

After Gorbachev took office, the procedural and substantive INF stand-off began to dissipate. On 7 April, 1985, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union was introducing a Moratorium on the deployment of its Intermediate Range Missiles and suspending the implementation of other deployments in Europe until November 1985.

A spokesman of FRG, Mr. Peter Boevisin said in Bonn:

It is certainly better if the Soviet Union does not deploy for half an year than if it continues to deploy and extends its considerable advantage in medium range missiles. Precisely where medium range missiles are concerned, a mutual moratorium would endorse the considerable Soviet advantage and reduce the incentive to negotiate.²⁴

Gorbachev during his visit to Paris in 30th October, said to the members of Parliament:²⁵

- An agreement on medium range nuclear weapons in Europe may be possible outside of direct connections with the problem of space and strategic arms.

23. The Arms Control Reporter(USA : Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies, 1985), pp.403 .25.

24. ibid.

25. Jack Hendelsohn, 'Wending Our Way to Zero', Arms Control Today(Washington), May 1987, p.6.

- French and British nuclear potential is growing rapidly. USSR is prepared to discuss an acceptance way out in direct dialogue with French and UK. This position he later reaffirmed in November US-Soviet Geneva Summit.

In January 1986, in his 'Disarmament by the year 2000' proposal, Gorbachev accepted zero INF levles in Europe and agreed to 'international procedure' and outside inspection to police a full mutual nuclear test ban.²⁶ He declared that all these terms the Soviets would agree provided Reagan stopped the development and deployment of the Strategic Defence Initiative(SDI) or the so-called 'Star Wars'.

Gorbachev proposal had certain appeal to public especially its promise of a nuclear free world. Moreover, the proposal and unilateral nuclear testing moratorium for a period of 19 months until February 1987 gave impetus to the peace movements and anti-nuclear opposition groups in West Europe especially FRG. The SPD and peace movements in FRG pressurized Kohl government to seek the United States for counter proposal and safeguard the East*West relations.

26. *ibid*, p.6.

In 24 Feb. 1986, US tabled a new proposal for INF reduction in Geneva.²⁷ It proposed, 1) reduction by both sides to 140 launchers by the end of 1987, with the USSR making proportionate reduction in Asia; 2) within the year 1988, the remaining missiles be cut by 50% and by the end of 1989 a global warhead ceilings, 3) the SS-20 launchers reduced were to be destroyed; 4) the removed US missiles that were stationed in Europe were to be withdrawn 5) short range INF defined as 50-1000 km range, would have an equal ceiling, at current Soviet levels or at the levels both sides had on January 1, 1982.

FRG's response to US proposal on inclusion of short range missiles was encouraging. Government spokesman Friedhelmost said, "the Reagan response dealt with the entire spectrum of political and security relations, including the imbalance of conventional forces which he called a problem of particular importance to the FRG".²⁸

The CDU arms control specialist Volkes Ruhe said of SRINF missiles during a visit to Washington on 5 September 1986: "There must be some regulations of these systems to

27. Arms Control Reporter, n. 23, 1987, pp.403-25.

28. *ibid.*, p. 403-25.

avoid the creation of a grey area in which Soviet forces can be expanded. The US understands our position and I think they will represent it".²⁹

By September 1986, Gorbachev had dropped his insistence on any constraints on British and French systems and accepted equal global limits on US and Soviet INF. The decision arrived at Reykjavik summit in October 1986 constituted a major breakthrough towards an accord.³⁰ It was agreed to eliminate the Soviet and US INF missiles in Europe, while each side would retain 100 warheads on such missiles in the Asian portion of the Soviet territory and on US territory beyond striking range of the USSR. It was also decided to start negotiations immediately on missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km range. Moreover the Soviets agreed that the relevant British and French nuclear forces would not be taken into account in setting the above mentioned agreed limits on Soviet-US INF missiles.

Separate INF Treaty

On February 28, 1987 Gorbachev announced that he would conclude an INF agreement without prior resolution

29. *ibid*, p. 403-25.

30. Adam M. Garfinkle, 'The 'INF' Arena After Reykjavik', *Strategic Review*(Washington), Fall 1986, p.28.

of the Soviet-US disagreement over SDI and ABM treaty (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty).³¹ The allies led by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and British Prime Minister Margeret Thatcher, gave their tentative approval to the zero-option INF agreement subject to concurrent sonstraints on "short range missiles". The possible elimination of the long range systems has heightened allied concern that they would be left vulnerable to the Soviet short-range systems and without a class of weapons to implant its strategy of escalation dominance, a strategy crucial to its doctrine of flexible response.

On March 4, 1987, the US tabled a draft treaty freezing Soviet SS-12/22 and SS-23 missiles, while maintaining the right to match the Soviet level. In order to match the Soviet level, US proposed either to convert the Pershing II missiles to short range Pershing I b missiles by removing a stage or deploying new missiles.³² The Soviet Union indicated willingness to withdraw the SS-12/22s forward - deployed in Czechoslovakia and East Germany and freeze their numbers at existing levels and discuss these systems in separate negotiations.

31. Jesse James, 'Controversy at Short Range', Arms Control Today(Washington), June 1987, p.11.

32. Jesse James, no. 31, p.13.

During Shultz' visit to Moscow in April, 1987, Gorbachev offered to eliminate Short-range systems in Europe as well, and to negotiate SRINF reductions in Asia as part of an overall INF agreement.³³ Shultz reacted favourably towards this 'second' zero option, but deferred final response until the US could consult his European allies.

Double Zero

This issue has caused a split in the ruling coalition government in FRG. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Party is opposed to elimination of Short Range Systems. The Christian Democrats have called for 'equal ceilings' at a low-level. The other party in the coalition, the FDP led by foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher favoured removal. The differences in Bonn delayed the decisions of the other European allies. However, at the NATO defence ministries' meeting in Norway, where the British government announced its formal endorsement of the zero SRINF proposal, it was reported that an 'informal consensus' favouring zero SRINF was reached by the ministers,

33. Jesse, James, no. 31, p.14.

on the condition that NATO modernize and increase these weapon system not included in the INF agreement.³⁴

West Germany remained the only ally refusing to support the double zero option.

On April 22, Volker Ruhe, a leading member of the West German parliament from the governing Christian Democratic Party arrived at Washinton. He told members of Congress and administration officials that West Germans were worried about Gorbachev's double zero proposal. Ruhe suggested that the US retain the right to deploy some nuclear missiles in Europe. Failing that, he suggested to US negotiators that they should demand additional concession from the Soviets in negotiations covering conventional and chemical weapons.

On April 27, 1987, Helmut Kohl, Genscher and other ministers met to resolve their differences on the double zero option. Kohl insisted that first LRINF missiles were to be dismantled and later negotiations on

34. Leon V. Sigal, 'The Long and Short of it: Allied Ambivalence About Zero INF Deal', Arms Control Today, May 1987, pp. 10-14.

missiles with a range of 500-1000 km to be commenced. In May, Kohl sent Ruhe and his parliamentary colleague Alfred Dregger to campaign against the double zero solution to Paris and London. But this campaign soon came to an end as both French and UK governments publicly announced their acceptance of double zero.

On 18 May, 1987, Kohl said:

The Double Zero option would leave the FRG uniquely targetted by SRNW(Short Range Nuclear Weapons). The plan would doom Germans on both sides of the wall and barbed wire.³⁵

Those privy to his thinking said he had concerns that the FRG would become a subject of Soviet blackmail, under the threat of chemical and conventional superiority.

When the other NATO allies decided to accept the Gorbachev proposal, FRG had little choice but to fall into line with rest of the Alliance. The decision was abetted by two regional elections in West Germany that produced disappointing results for Kohl's Christian Democratic Union. Meanwhile the public opinion polls showed that

35. Arms Control Report, 1987, p. 403.25.

an overwhelming majority were in favour of accepting the Gorbachev proposals. So on 4 June, 1987, Bundestag voted in favour of the double zero option.

Helmut Kohl in his speech to Bundestag said:

Let me say quite clearly that we do not support any attempts to remove all nuclear weapons from Europe totally.... of course, the role of nuclear weapons has to be reduced to the absolutely necessary minimum, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

It will be important to prevent weapons tendencies in the East from causing gaps in NATO's spectrum of escalation, leading to a loss of flexibility and thereby jeopardizing the alliances detente. 36

He further pointed out that Soviet overwhelming superiority in weapons with a range below 500 km, particularly in the form of 583 SCUD missiles, has no effective counter from NATO. This was the main consideration of the Federal government which restricted a favourable decision on a zero option in the 500-1,000 km range.

Even after agreeing to accept double zero option the road to US-Soviet INF agreement was not clear. The fate of the West German Pershing IA had to be

36. Arms Control Reporter, 1987, p.403.25.

resolved. On 27 April 1987, Soviet Union wanted the US warheads on these launchers be destroyed.

Pershing I-A

FRG owned 72 Pershing I-A missiles. The warheads are owned and controlled by the United States.³⁷

Kohl government insisted on retaining both its Pershing I-As and their warheads outside any US-Soviet agreement and on the rights to modernize its missiles. Yet its case was logically weak: with the warheads for the Pershing I-A in US custody and the missiles themselves manned by its German ally and assigned to NATO's integrated command, the United States could not convincingly make the argument that these missiles represent a wholly 'independent' deterrent like those of France. This difficult issue was further complicated by the fact that the US and FRG were discussing the replacement of the Pershing I-A with an improved Pershing I-B (a Pershing II with its second stage removed) which could be deployed within a year or so and which could extend its range somewhat.

37. Jonathan Dean, 'The INF Agreement: Pluses and Minuses for Western Security', Arms Control Today, July/August 1987, pp. 3-10.

Meanwhile, Soviet Union pointed out that since the American warheads would only be used with Pershing I-A, the FRG had effectively become co-owner of nuclear weapons. This was violation of the NPT(Non Proliferation Treaty).

On 6 August 1987, Snevardnadze declared that 72 nuclear warheads stand between an agreement on INF and SRN missiles. He further said:

We too have allies who are concerned over the fact that a neighbouring country retains short range nuclear missiles which provide a great threat to their security. They could ask for the stationing of similar system on their territories and the Soviet Union could meet their request. But what would a Soviet-US agreement be like as a result of all this? It would emasculated and anemic.....The Soviet people will never acquiesce in FRG becoming a nuclear power.³⁸

Helmut Kohl was under great pressure to forgo the modernization of the Pershing I-A. Some officials pointed out that Kohl was avoiding a strong public stand because he had to give up his strong stand against SRINF zero solution. Earlier in the year some stated that FRG was defending the Pershing I-A also because it wanted to be able to give FRG arms firms order for the maintenance, modernization and even development of missiles of that class.

38. Arms Control Reporter(Washington), p.403.25.

Due to domestic pressures within coalition government and from the NATO allies, Kohl announced on 26 August that Pershing I-A missiles would be reduced once all Soviet and American INF missiles had been eliminated. Kohl further said that Soviet Union and partners should do away with their modernization of missiles below the range of 500 km. Specifically he pointed out that SCUD-B missiles which were deployed on their territory (Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR), which particularly threatened the FRG's territory, which should be removed by the Soviets.³⁹

The last hurdle to INF treaty was removed by Shultz with assurance to Shervardnadze that when the Pershing I-A missiles would be dismantled, the warheads would be returned to the US. Thus ended the long process of negotiation resulting in signing of INF treaty on December 8, 1987.

The signing of INF treaty by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 8 December 1987, marked a major breakthrough in lowering the level of military confrontation and reducing the nuclear threat in Europe. For the first time, an agreement was reached to eliminate two classes of nuclear-missile arms of the Soviet Union and the United States. This

39. *ibid*, p. 403.25.

agreement does not merely introduce constraining levels on these systems, or limit them, but precisely eliminates American and Soviet intermediate range missiles, i.e., missiles with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 km as well as shorter-range missiles, which included missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 km.⁴⁰

The Soviet side has agreed to eliminate 470 deployed and 350 non-deployed intermediate-range missiles. On the United States side, 429 deployed and 260 non-deployed missiles would be eliminated. The USSR has also agreed to eliminate 926 deployed and non-deployed shorter range missiles and the United States 170 such missiles. Thus, a first significant step has been taken towards real nuclear disarmament for which Helmut Kohl commented - The first major disarmament achievement to which his government had made a "decisive contribution".

40. Alexei Obukhov, 'A Major Achievement Towards Nuclear Disarmament', Disarmament(New York), Vol. xi, no. 1, 87/88, p.13.

CONCLUSION

After the Second World War, the defeated and divided Germany, especially West Germany, ^{as a part of western bloc,} ~~quite ironically,~~ presented a threat to the Soviet bloc. Similarly, the Soviet bloc including East Germany posed a threat to the Western allies. Thus emerged alliance system NATO and Warsaw Pact to deter each other threat perception. In nuclear issues, however, the Western allies and the Soviet bloc had common cause to see that West Germany does not acquire nuclear capabilities. However, with the changes in global strategy and the growing imbalances in Euro Strategic forces, West Germany or Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) accepted the NATO alliance decision to deploy both tactical and intermediate nuclear weapons in its soil. Significantly FRG had no operational control over these nuclear forces.

The Super Power negotiations on arms limitation that led to SALT I were steps in arms control but these negotiations created some rumblings in Alliance. The European allies including FRG felt that their interests were neglected by America because they perceived that the SALT process and treaty would result in decoupling of American strategic forces committed

to Europe. When the super power SALT-II negotiations progressed, the FRG's fear of SS-20s posing Soviet strategic threat to Europeans surfaced. The SALT II proposals of Ford Administration of February 1976 and Carter Administration proposal of May 1977 gave the impression to FRG and European allies that America was much concerned about neutralizing the Soviet strategic threat to USA and not Soviet threat to Europe. The US administration's internal debate between the US Dept. of State and Pentagon revealed to European allies the possibility of American cruise missile assuming an effective counter weapons to SS-20. This whetted the appetite of European allies especially FRG for its deployment in Europe.

The Carter administration, however, was concerned primarily in reaching a SALT II agreement and was prepared to barter away for a treaty the Soviet demand for a ban on deployment of long range cruise missiles. Simultaneously the Carter administration assured the European allies with suggestion that because US strategic forces provided ample coverage of targets in Soviet Union, NATO did not need long range GLCMs and SLCMs. The suggestion was preemp-

torily rejected. Soon thereafter the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made his concern in Public in the Alastain Buchan Memorial Lecture (sponsored by the International Institute of Strategic Studies) given on 28 October 1977 in London. Contrary to a now popular myth, he did not call for the deployment of cruise missiles or anything else in the speech. But he did outline in his analysis of the implications of balance of forces in the emerging context. These remarks were widely interpreted both in Europe and the United States as meaning that Schmidt was advocating the establishment of a "Euro Strategic balance" through the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe as a counter to the SS-20.

The Euro Missile debate commenced on the prospect of deployment of American cruise and Pershing missiles to counter Soviet SS-20 missiles. This eventually culminated in NATO's two track decision in December 1979 involving deployment of 572 cruise and PershingII missiles in FRG, Britain, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium and the pursuit of arms control to reduce the number of such INF weapons in Europe

Federal Republic of Germany's position on

the NATO decision was unique in several respects, reflecting the country's role as a frontline NATO state. Main objective of the European states, especially FRG commitment to Arms control and disarmament was to reduce chances of FRG becoming a target of nuclear battle field. Moreover, FRG found its security served much better by process of detente and better east-west interaction than arm conforntation.

The super-power arms control negotiations process on the INF was not spontaneous. The SPD domestic INF position had a role in Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in 1980 to revive the deadlock in arms control negotiations in INF. In 1981 when President Reagan proposed 'zero option', meaning total removal of the Soviet INF and non-deployment of US cruise and PErshing missiles in Europe. West Germany endorsed it along with other NATO allies.

When Helmut Kohl became chancellor he endorsed the earlier FRG's stand on NATO's dual track decision and zero option. The Reagan 'zero option' proposal was rejected by the Soviets. Moreover, the Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and later Yuri Andropov made counter proposal to cut intermediate

nuclear forces with ranges over 1,000 km to 300 launchers for each side by the end of 1990. The Soviet proposal included counting of British and French forces being part of the Western count in reduction of missiles in Europe. These proposals were not acceptable to the US. The Reagan administration by the beginning of 1983 was not in favour of only removal of Soviet INF forces from Europe but their total dismantle as the simple removal from Europe could lead to deployment in Soviet Asia threatening American allies.

With the change in Soviet leadership and Gorbachev appearing on the Soviet scene the Soviets proposal changed from hardened position to concessions. The proposals included from delinking SDI from START negotiations, giving up the inclusion of French and British national forces and proposing double zero option involving the elimination of MRNF and SRNF from Europe and Asia.

The West German role in the INF talks acquired a predominance when FRG sought to maximize its national interests by responding positively to Gorbachev's proposal on arms control and disarmament. By accepting the double zero option and conceding the Soviet

demand of dismantling the Pershing I-A missiles from its soil during the last stages of INF talks, FRG exhibited a judicious blend of pragmatism and flexibility. In a nutshell, FRG's role was pragmatic because it did not lose the chance of enhancing its security through the means of arms control and flexibility in relation to other members of the NATO by responding positively to the Soviet offer. The West German pragmatism is also evident in its determined attempts to protect the integrity of NATO, credibility of deterrence and the recognition of its own important but limited role.

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