

**Diplomacy and Strategy: A Comparative Study
of India's Use of Military Force in the
India - Pakistan Wars of 1965 and 1971**

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**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment for the award
of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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1986

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
CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "*DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIA'S USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WARS OF 1965 AND 1971*" submitted by Mr. D. Bala Venkatesh Varma in partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend this dissertation be placed before the examiner for evaluation.



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

"Strategy", Voltaire is said to have remarked with contempt, "is murderous and conjectural". To the extent this study is not conjectural and succeeds in humanising the treatment of what is essentially a 'blood and iron' subject, I owe it to my supervisor Prof. M. Zuberi. Working under him has been an enlightening, exciting and what is more a tremendously enjoyable experience.

Under the Chairmanship of Prof. T.T. Poulouse, working in the I.P.O.D. Centre has been a source of immense pleasure. Mr J.N. Dixit, presently India's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka was most kind in granting me an interview which provided substantial insights about the 1971 India-Pakistan War. Mr A.K. Damodaran, Secretary to the Policy Advisory Committee, inspite of his busy schedule was most kind in clarifying points about India's foreign policy objectives and techniques.

Being a student of the Disarmament Studies Division has been a delightful experience. Long afterwards I am sure I will be proud to say that I marched with the class of '84.

Mr. Gajanan Hegde's typing on the Word processor proved that there need'nt always be many a slip between the cup and the lip.



D. Bala Venkatesh Varma

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INTRODUCTION

India has been involved in four major wars since independence. It has fought three wars with Pakistan - in 1947-49 over Kashmir, in 1965 and in 1971. Major border clashes between India and China took place in 1962. Indian armed forces were also involved in 'Police Action' in Hyderabad in 1948 and in Goa in 1962. As such the historical record of India's use of military force as an instrument of national policy is a rich store-house of information pertinent to any analysis seeking to establish a relation between war and politics in the developing world. The number of studies on India's military power and policy, quite unparalleled by academic and professional attention on any other developing state, /1/ is testimony to the twin facts of the importance of the wars that India has been involved in and the quality of autarkic strategic thinking in India. /2/ However, the numerous studies that are available are, more or less, atheoretical descriptive case studies. In the field of war studies, where there is an appalling lack of reliable information, these case studies are useful basic data gathering exercises. What is attempted here is theoretically oriented

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1. An exception to this is the literature available on the Arab-Israeli wars. But by any standards Israel is, more or less, a developed country.
 2. For a summary see, R.V.R.Chandrashekara Rao, "Strategic Thinking in India in the 1970s: Prospects for the 1980s" in Robert O'Neill, D.M. Horner (eds), New Directions in Strategic Thinking (Sidney, 1981), pp. 153-68.

secondary analysis of the data collected in atheoretical case studies. The aim is to arrive at theoretical generalizations in an area where little theory exists.

In an age of well-developed, or even over-developed, academic discipline of strategic studies, to make the claim that an analyst has little theoretical assistance to draw upon needs some explanation. To the extent that strategic studies can claim to be a respectable academic discipline, it owes it to links with military history and war studies. To the extent that the 'discipline' remains less than an honourable academic pursuit, it is because of its lineage since 1945. Today it is an appropriated discipline geared to policy-oriented studies of Anglo-American defence needs. This has resulted in an unbelievable lack of theoretical attention towards war and politics in the developing world./3/ What little exists in the form of Limited/Local/Small war/4/ theoretical constructs show conspicuous signs of their parentage. By rejecting the option of

3. For a critique see Barry Buzan in Barry Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones (eds.), Change and the Study of International Relations (London, 1981), Chapter 9; Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London, 1979). One work makes preliminary attempts at theoretical understanding of wars in the developing world. However, the effort remains far from comprehensive. See Robert Harkavy, Stephanie G. Neuman (eds) The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, vol. I & II (Lexington, Lexington Books, 1985).

4. "A limited war is fought for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state's will to another's and by means involving far less than the total military resources of the belligerents... the term is generally applied to... local
(contd...)

using the micro-replication method of testing theoretical propositions validated (or so it is claimed) by the standards of Anglo-American defence policy and their conceptions of international conflict in conflict situations in the developing world, this study registers the plea to rehabilitate strategic studies from its present "intellectual colonizers".

Alternatively, what is attempted here is an exercise in macro-hypothesis generation arising out of the inter-relations of structural elements of total systems. The method of treatment of the two case studies, the 1965 India-Pakistan war and the 1971 India-Pakistan war is designed to establish general empirical relations among two variables - Diplomacy/5/ and Strategy/6/. It

 non-nuclear wars in which the interests and deliberately restricted means of the super powers are involved on opposite sides, if only indirectly. The term local war is now reserved for the great number of local conventional wars in which neither of the super power is directly or indirectly involved" Robert E. Osgood, Problems of Modern Strategy, Adelphi Papers Number 54, February, 1969 (London, 1969), p. 41. This superpower fixation continues in discussion of small wars. For example, see, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Amelia C. Leiss Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970s (London, 1970).

5. "Diplomacy consists of modes and techniques of foreign policy affecting the international system." Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (New York, 1964), edn. 3, pp. 13-14. Deterrence, War conduct and post-war calculations are not wholly determined by military proportion; diplomacy of violence plays a major part, see Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, 1966), Chapter 1.
6. "Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil ends of policy", B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London, 1968), p. 334.

is hoped that the utility of such a study will throw light on these two structural elements of state craft and their inter-relationships as well as contribute to a general theory of utility of military force/7/ for a developing state in the present international system. The India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 are comparable cases./8/ They have similar characteristics in that both wars took place between the same armed forces, with nearly similar conditions of combat in an international system which had not changed enough to make comparison pointless but had undergone enough change to make its effect felt on the question of utility of military force. Yet they are dissimilar to the extent the political issues for which India (and Pakistan) went to war in each case were different.

The first two sections of the case studies deal with modalities involved in the definition of political objectives and

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7. Use of military force is organized coercion by a legitimate instrument of state power; it differs from power in that force is "essentially physical restraint or set of restraints, rather than essentially psychological relationship which is power". It differs from violence in that physical coercion or the threat of it is by an instrument of state. F.S. Northedge in F.S. Northedge (ed.) The Use of Force in International Relations (London, 1974), pp. 12-13.
 8. For a discussion on the comparative case study method, used in this study, see Arend Lijphart "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method" American Political Science Review (Berkeley), vol. 65, September 1971, pp. 682-93; Alexander L. George "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focussed Comparison" in Paul C. Lauren (ed.) Diplomacy (New York, 1979), pp. 43-68.

how diplomacy and strategy, by themselves and in conjunction with each other, determine the point at which use of military force is undertaken as a rational, national instrument of state policy./9/ The aim is to determine how decision makers come to decide that the political costs of continuing peace are more than the costs of going to war. Since the main concern of this study is to focus on the efficacy of one set of means as compared to another, the ends for which war is waged is relevant only to the extent that it determines the shaping of the means for their achievement. Discussion on why India and Pakistan went to war, per se, is not a primary concern of this study. How to a rational decision-maker, the perception of the efficacy and utility of use of military force influences the definition of the political objectives to be sought is the main thrust of argument of the first two sections on 'Approach of War' and the schema of 'Indian military options with the obtaining balance of forces' in each case. Composite macroscopic force ratios are by themselves only partial indicators of the strategic disposition of the two opposing sides. Indicators such as the number of men under arms,

9. Thus, the fundamental assumptions on war in this study are firmly placed in the Clausewitzian tradition. For a discussion see Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (ed. Anatol Rapoport) (Hammondsworth, 1968), p. 13; A critique of 'nation' as a unitary actor is provided in Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1971), Chapter I. A discussion on the assumption of rationality in William W. Kauffman (ed.), Military Policy and National Security (Princeton, 1956), p. 117.

tanks, artillery and combat aircraft assume contextual relevance only when viewed as weapons systems with distinctive qualitative characteristics integrated into an overall military strategy./10/

The third section of each case study seeks to describe and analyse India's use of military force in actual combat. The description of the course of the war is sector-wise taking into account its geographical features, terrain and deployment of forces,/11/ characteristic features of the main course of the war and a summation of the significance of the battle to overall strategy. Lastly, an overall assessment of India's military strategy and performance is attempted.

The fourth section deals with war-time diplomacy, the modalities of war termination and its consequences for peace./12/ The fact that diplomatic factors are treated last is no reflection on their importance: diplomacy is a continuous process, during war time only relational change with other

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10. For a discussion on problems associated with measuring balance of forces, 'force-to-space' ratios and war, see, B.H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defence (London, 1960); J.A. Stockfish, Models, Data and War: A Critique of the Study of Conventional Forces, R.1526 (Santa Monica, 1975) Trevor N.Dupuy, Numbers, Prediction and War (New York, 1979).
 11. For a general survey see Patrick O'Sullivan, Jesse W. Miller Jr., The Geography of Warfare (London, 1983).
 12. For a comprehensive theoretical assessment on war termination and diplomacy see Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, 1983).

instruments of state-craft, not its basic transformation, takes place.

The third chapter attempts a summary of the arguments developed in the two case studies. Their juxtaposition is attempted under four headings: (1) Escalation-Military and Political; (2) Force Structures and Conduct of War; (3) War as Purposive Violence: Political Consequences of Use of Military Force; and (4) Higher Direction of War. Keeping in view the type of subject matter and the obtaining theoretical constructs, the level of abstraction chosen for this chapter has been to strike a balance between placing too much emphasis on universal generalizations which would be too abstract to be of any value; they being so general and so obviously true that it is impossible to reject them;/13/ and finding indicators which by their nature are not unique to the particular situation thereby contributing to an enduring conception of war in the developing world.

13. This is one of the enduring problems of war studies. For the Philosopher's view see Carl Von Clausewitz, 'On War' (ed. and trans, Michael Howard, Peter Paret) (Princeton, 1976), pp. 170-74, 593.

CHAPTER -- I

THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965

Introduction

The India-Pakistan war of 1965 started on 1st September and ended on 23rd September 1965. This twenty-two day war/1/ involved fighting on India's western front and its navy did not take part in the war. The war was preceded by the confrontation between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch (April-June 1965) and the Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir (August 1965). The war was followed by an uneasy ceasefire and the Tashkent agreement only after which a withdrawal of troops from territory occupied during the war was undertaken by both sides.

This chapter is divided into four sections - (I) Kutch and Kashmir: Approach of War; (II) Balance of Forces: India's Military Options; (III) Strategy: India's Use of Military Force; and (IV) Diplomatic Factors and India's Response.

SECTION I

KUTCH AND KASHMIR: APPROACH OF WAR

The first major clash between Pakistan Army units and the Gujrat police took place on the 9th of April 1965 at Sardar Post

1. Pakistani accounts refer to the war as the Seventeen Day War - beginning from 6th September 1965

and Vigokot in the Rann of Kutch./2/ The Indian Army took over from the Gujrat police on that date and patrols fanned out into areas upto the international border except for the two small islands formed by Pakistani standing posts. Thereafter, Pakistani Army units continued to shell Indian positions and such tactical moves in the Rann were interspersed with diplomatic moves between India and Pakistan. On 19th of April 1965, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council asserting that the area in question was not Indian territory but territory in dispute between India and Pakistan./3/

Pakistan followed up its letter to the United Nations by extending its military activity on the Kutch-Sind border. Clashes took place on the night of 19/20th April at Point 84-30 miles east of Kanjarkot, and on 25th April at Biar Bet, 5 miles west-south west of Point 84. Clashes at Point 84 and Biar Bet continued till 28th April.

On the 24th April Pakistan ordered a general mobilization in response to which India placed its forces on alert on 26th April.

2. For details of the Kutch dispute, especially its legal aspects, see, C.J. Chacko, The Rann of Kutch and International Law, The Indian Journal of International Law (New Delhi), vol. 5, 1965, pp. 147-75
3. Details of the Kutch Confrontation are from Hari Ram Gupta, The Kutch Affair (Delhi, 1969), pp. 177-211.

Intermittent clashes continued through May and June, 1965. During May India occupied Pak posts in Kargil in Kashmir and Dahagram - a Pakistani enclave in Cooch Berar.

Britain and the United States were involved, through their diplomatic representatives, in trying to bring about a ceasefire in the Rann of Kutch and diplomatic efforts by the end of May came to centre on British mediation efforts. From meetings between President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri at the London Commonwealth Leaders' Conference a ceasefire agreement was concluded which came into effect from 1 July 1965./4/

The ceasefire agreement had the following implications for India's diplomacy:

- (a) The agreement expressed the hope that the reduction of tension in the area of Gujrat/West Pakistan border would contribute to a reduction of tension along the entire India-Pak border;
- (b) India agreed to determination and demarcation of the border in the area;
- (c) The agreement provided for the disengagement of Indian and Pakistani armed forces; and

4. Text of the agreement is reproduced in Appendix A.

- (d) International arbitration was accepted as a principle of settlement of disputes and left open the possibility that the Kutch agreement would become a precedent for the settlement of other India-Pakistan disputes.

At the height of the Kutch crisis, India moved units of the Army to concentration areas in the Punjab. However, India did not draw upon forces in the Punjab to strengthen Indian forces deployed in the Kutch. The Indian Army Chief of Staff, General J.N. Chaudhuri resisted pressures to retaliate in the Kutch./5/ It is to be noted that such pressures remained limited. The Pakistani forces probed over a wide front and the Indian units did not suffer any dramatic defeat which would have provoked public and political pressure powerful enough to unsettle strategic logic./6/

During the crisis escalation was further avoided by tacit mutual agreement by both sides not to use their respective air

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5. He argued thus: "This would have been a great mistake. We had no airfields in that area and our land communications were very poor. In any case the monsoons were due and they would have swamped the entire area. I came in for a lot of criticism here - Fortunately Mr. Chavan agreed with me and stood by me and the pressure was relieved". J.N. Chaudhuri, An Autobiography: As Narrated to B.K. Narayan (New Delhi, 1978), p. 190. For a differing version of civil-military differences over Kutch, see: Romesh Thapar, "Why we did not hit back in Kutch", The Economic Weekly: A Journal of Current Economic and Political Affairs (New Delhi), vol.17, No.19, May 15 1965, pp. 805-806.
 6. William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (London, 1972), p. 199.

forces./7/ However, Pakistan's use of Patton tanks in the Kutch provoked a diplomatic row between India and the United States,/8/ and matters were not helped by the cancellation of Prime Minister Shastri's visit to Washington scheduled for early June. American responses to India's protest clarified American position on conditions governing US arms transfers to Pakistan. The US pronouncements made a distinction between American injunction against Pakistani use of American arms against India and Pakistani use of those arms in self-defence./9/

The Indian government policy, between May and July, towards Pakistan was ad hoc, fragmentary and reactive. The government by signing the ceasefire agreement retracted on two counts from its earlier position: (1) by conceding that the tribunal to go into the dispute would be concerned with determination and demarkation, in effect conceding the Kutch dispute was a territorial dispute; and (2) conceding a link between the Kutch agreement and the withdrawal of Indian military forces from their concentration areas in the Punjab and withdrawal from the posts occupied in Kargil.

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7. John Fricker, The Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965 (London, 1979), p. 37. This restraint may have been facilitated for reasons as much political as personal. Air Marshal Arjun Singh and Air Marshal Nur Khan of the IAF and PAF, respectively, were batch mates.
 8. The Statesman (Delhi), 15 April 1965.
 9. Ibid, 30 April 1965.

* The Indian Prime Minister's visits to the Soviet Union in May/10/ and Yugoslavia in July/11/ focussed more on American intervention in Vietnam, disarmament and world peace and China's threat to peaceful co-existence among nations. Domestically, while the Government received wide support for the Kutch agreement, a significant and vocal minority, both in the opposition/12/ and the ruling Congress Party/13/ were able to put the government on the defensive. Issues like the food crisis and the Akali Dal leader Sant Fateh Singh's demand for a separate linguistic state in Punjab were additional political problems for the Shastri Government.

Operation 'Gibraltar': The infiltration of Pakistani agents and suboteurs, armed and trained by the Pakistan Army, started from the 5th of August./14/ By 8th August it was realized in India that the infiltration was extensive, well-planned and directly linked to the Pakistan Army. Initially, infiltrators crossed the ceasefire line at only two points, about 35-40 miles apart, converging on Srinagar. However, by 12th August, infiltrators

10. Ibid., 13 May 1965.

11. Ibid., 29 July 1965.

12. Ibid., 24 July 1965.

13. Ibid., Especially at the All India Congress Committee (AICC) session in Bangalore was dissent particularly audible.

14. For details see, A.J. Mohammed Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965 (New Delhi, 1983), pp. 35-40.

had not only attacked Indian Army units in Srinagar but their points of entry had increased manifold. The D-Day for Operation Gibraltar was 9th August, the target the twelfth anniversary processions in Srinagar to mark Sheikh Abdullah's arrest in 1953.

Indian response was directed, from the 16th of August, on the reoccupation of Pakistani posts in Kargil sector. On 24th August Indian troops crossed the ceasefire line to occupy two posts in Tithwal sector and on 26th crossed the ceasefire line (CFL) in the Uri-Poonch sector. By 29th of August, Indian troops were in control of the strategic Haji-Pir Pass - which was the main infiltration route into Kashmir.

The reoccupation of Kargil posts was intended to serve notice on Pakistan that India was willing and capable of protecting its vital interests and crucial points, especially as it involved the strategic calculations of China. The Kargil posts overlooked the strategic Srinagar-Leh highway. It also underlined the fact that while India was willing to go along with the Kutch agreement (as part of which Kargil heights were returned to Pak control) the agreement itself was neither sacrosanct nor could Pakistan derive political benefits from the diplomatic process initiated by the Kutch government. On 15th August, Prime Minister Shastri announced that Foreign Minister Bhutto's forthcoming visit to Delhi had been put off./15/

 15. Prime Minister's Independence Day Red Fort Speech, The Statesman, 17 August 1965.

India's response to the infiltration was reactive and ad hoc - both characteristics underlined by the fact of gross intelligence failure - at the tactical level of anticipating the number, training, tactics and weapons of the infiltrators and at the strategic level of expecting and deterring Pak policy of armed infiltration./16/

To make up for this strategic disadvantage, Indian operations, by necessity, had to extend from mopping up infiltrators within Kashmir, an area which consumed a very large number of troops, police and paramilitary personnel, to blocking points of entry. As these points of entry were under cover of fire, small arms and artillery clashes between regular Indian army and Pak army units were inbuilt into the process.

While abundant proof of Pak complicity and responsibility was available, it was not until 13 August that Prime Minister Shastri defined the problem as one concerning the entire gamut of India-Pakistan relations./17/ However, in a statement to Parliament Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan focussed more on the

16. A point asserted by a key figure in Kashmir politics, Karan Singh, Sadar-I-Riyasat: An Autobiography, vol. 2, 1953-1967 (Delhi, 1985), pp. 134-35.

17. He said in a broadcast to the nation on 15th August "The more important question before us now is not that of these infiltrators and their activities because we are quite clear as to what to do with them. The real question is that of our relations with Pakistan". The Statesman, 17 August 1965.

security of Jammu and Kashmir, as distinct from that of India as a whole and on the infiltrations and not on the Pakistan Army itself. There was a clear admission that mopping up of infiltrators was proceeding only slowly./18/ The Prime Minister later warned that "We will have to be prepared to go very far in the matter.... We may have to go to the points from which the raiders come to Kashmir." Similarly, the Defence Minister asserted India's right to take positions at the points of entry./19/

During his stop-over in Delhi, the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Kirill T. Mazurov, on 23 August, stressed "that it is entirely India's responsibility and duty to liquidate any infringement of the ceasefire in Kashmir and that any discussion over Kashmir between India and Pakistan should be purely bilateral without any interference by any third party"./20/ Similarly the Indian official spokesman, indicating that the British High Commissioner and the United States Ambassador in Delhi were in contact with the Foreign Secretary, stressed that

18. For the last 11 days we have had to face a new development posing a threat to the security of Jammu and Kashmir. This threat has taken the shape of an organized incursion of armed personnel disguised as civilians from across the ceasefire line." The Defence Minister's statement in both Houses of Parliament. Reported in The Statesman, 17 August 1965.

19. Ibid, 25 August 1965.

20. Ibid, 23 August 1965.

"there was no question of mediation nor had any proposal to this effect been made. No advice from the British Government to exercise restraint had been received by India so far"./21/

SECTION II

BALANCE OF FORCES AND INDIA'S MILITARY OPTIONS

GROUND FORCES

The Indian Army had a sanctioned strength/22/ of 825,000 men, organized into 16 full-fledged divisions and 4 infantry divisions on a reduced establishment basis. The Pakistan Army numbered between 160,000 to 180,000 men, organized into 6 divisions including one air defence brigade. Indian armour was organized into one armoured division while Pakistan fielded two armoured divisions./23/

At an aggregate level, India with 16 infantry divisions had a clear and significantly larger numerical strength over the 6 infantry divisions of the Pakistan Army. All other factors being equal, the Indian Army could have relied on a military strategy

21. The Statesman, 23 August 1965.
22. Post-1962 military expansion was finalized in 1964.
23. Military Balance 1965-1966 (London, 1965). A consolidated table is given in Appendix B.

seeking decisive victory by the sheer magnitude of numerical superiority. The necessity for a sophisticated military strategy requiring the pursuit of more moderate political objectives was underlined by the following qualifications in the deployment of the Indian Army.

The length of India's land borders/24/, coupled with the geopolitics of a two front situation with Pakistan and China, compelled India to tie down a substantial portion of its infantry forces along numerous volatile points on its borders. Border deployment patterns, as much influenced by tradition handed down from the British Indian Army, as by the post-independence political imperatives of "defending every inch of Indian territory" right upto the borders, consumed large numbers of infantry forces manning what was essentially a forward defence strategy./25/ Characteristically, the demands of border commitment were always too high to enable the Indian Army to set aside a considerable portion of its infantry forces as a strategic reserve.

Pakistan's deployment pattern, on the other hand, had as its main concern the border between West Pakistan and India. The

 24. India's land frontier including the boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir is about 9,000 miles. However, the de facto frontier relevant for defense purposes may be put at about 7,500 miles. See P.V.R. Rao, Defence Without Drift (Bombay, 1970), p. 65.

25. Sukhwant Singh, India's Wars Since Independence: General Trends, vol. three (Delhi, 1982), pp. 2-5.

defence of East Pakistan was sought to be managed with a combination of a limited force supported by paramilitary elements exploiting the terrain for a defensive strategy. In addition, East Pakistan's defence against India was sought to be buttressed by the factor of diplomacy at the regional level, especially with China./26/

The geography and terrain characteristics of West Pakistan offered the advantage of interior lines of communication and thereby considerably reduced the quantum of troops required for the defence of the border. Between the sectors of possible military action, between Kashmir, Jammu-Sialkot and the Lahore sector, Pakistan could move its forces along its very favourable lines of communication. Strategic mobility within West Pakistan was supplemented by a considerable capability for tactical mobility. The United States' military assistance to Pakistan not only helped the Pakistan Army improve its range and volume of fire power but also improved its mobility./27/

By 1965, Pakistan had constructed two canal networks as tank obstacles running parallel to the border with India. The Marala-Ravi Link canal, between Chenab and the Ravi provided

26. One of official explanations for Pakistan's membership of SEATO was East Pakistan's security.
27. C.W.S. Brodsky in Richard A. Gabriel (ed.), Fighting Armies: Non-Aligned Third World and other Ground Armies: A Combat Assessment (Westport, 1983), p. 21.

insurance against strategic penetration of Indian forces in the Sialkot sector. The Bambanwala-Ravi-Bedian (BRB) canal, popularly known as the Ichogil canal, running between Ravi and Sutlej provided forward line defence against Indian thrusts in the politically sensitive Lahore sector./28/ These canal networks provided static points along which enemy thrusts could be contained. From the Indian point of view these canals could be either tactical impediments or strategical defensive lines depending on its own military strategy. As tactical impediments, these canals were formidable obstacles to an assault force seeking to cross them at selective points. But for an assault force well dug in on one side of the canal bank, they provided protection against counter-attacks from the other side. In 1965, both India and Pakistan lacked any considerable capability for tactical mobility and action through helicopter borne infantry forces.

Thus, the obtaining force-to-space ratios between India and Pakistan were such that neither side could hope to design a

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28. Controversy exists as to what extent the defensive potential of the Ichogil canal determined Indian strategy. The charge of gross intelligence failure is put forward by Ravi Rikhye in Philip Towle (ed.) Estimating Foreign Military Power (London, 1982), pp. 207-208. The onus of responsibility is shifted from intelligence-gathering agencies to intelligence assessment by the Army in B.N. Mullick, My Years with Nehru 1948-1964 (Bombay, 1972), p. 117.



military strategy solely dependent for its execution on the factor of numerical superiority.

Of the 6 infantry divisions, Pakistan deployed 5 of them in West Pakistan while the defence of East Pakistan was entrusted to the sole 14th Infantry Division. India deployed a total of 7 infantry divisions on its western front, of which 2 were of mountain configuration and the infantry division (10th Infantry Division) assigned to the Chamb Jaurian sector was a reserve force.

Although published sources/29/ at that time placed the number of India's armoured regiments at 12 and Pakistan's at 10, an independent authoritative study of armoured warfare in the 1965 war has placed India's armoured regiments at 11 and Pakistan's at 17./30/

India had a total of about 1150 tanks consisting of 270 Centurians, 472 Shermans and 424 light tanks - PT-76s, AMX-13s and Stuarts. Pakistan had a total of about 1050 tanks, comprising 594 Patton tanks, 330 Shermans and 144 Chaffees./31/ India had one armoured division (1 Armoured Division) and an independent armoured brigade (2 Independent Armoured Brigade)

29. Military Balance, 1965-66.

30. Bhupinder Singh, 1965 War (Role of Tanks in India-Pakistan War) (Patiala, 1982), pp. 21-24.

31. Ibid., p. 24.

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Pakistan had two armoured divisions - the 1 Armoured Division and the newly raised 6 Armoured Division.

In terms of numbers of medium tanks, Pakistan had an edge, with 594 M-47/48 Pattons and 330 Shermans compared to 270 Centurians and 472 Shermans for India. In terms of quality, the M-47/48 Patton scored high and above the Centurian tank with its advanced tank technology - in speed, armour protection, fire-power and control and ability to operate at night./32/

Pakistan's armoured strength presented formidable challenges to Indian strategy. A mobile and hard hitting armoured force would be difficult to stop at the borders especially if its operational location and deployment pattern was not known in advance. It was, therefore, of paramount importance that prior intelligence be available of Pakistan's strategic intentions. Pakistan's defensive fortifications in the Ichogil canal limited space for manoeuvre between the Canal and the international border. Pakistan's commitment of armour in this area would therefore be only reactive and defensive. However, any infantry force crossing the border along a broad front would not only need armour protection against frontal penetration but also against an outflanking attack. In the Lahore sector, Indian armour could be used but only in a supportive role to the infantry - providing additional firepower and protection.

32. Combat capabilities of M-47/48 Patton tanks are detailed in Jane's Weapons Systems 1971-72 (London, 1971), p. 236.

The Jammu-Samba-Sialkot sector provided greater space for armour manoeuvre. The commitment of Indian armour to this sector would not only enable India to avoid static armoured battles of attrition but also, if penetration of forward defences were effected, provide an opportunity to strike at some of the nerve centres of Pakistan's military activity in the Sialkot-Pasrur and Narowal areas. Such a thrust would depend on the Indian armoured forces' ability to affect a breakin, and sustain a breakthrough with enough forces to be able to withstand a frontal Pakistani counter-attack and protect its flanks. This ability would depend on the composition of the Indian armoured thrust determining its sustainability and the protection of its flanks with substantial infantry cover.

The employment and performance of Indian armour was, therefore, crucial in preventing a successful armoured thrust by Pakistan. More significantly, any positive battlefield gains that India hoped to make in support of its political objectives substantially hinged on how it intended to use its armour.

Air Force

In the aftermath of the 1962 India-China War, the Government of India sanctioned 45 squadrons for the Indian Air Force. However, by 1965 the I A F was still in the process of expanding to 33 squadrons, with the total combat aircraft inventory

numbering about 550./33/ Its fighter ground-support squadrons consisted of Mystere IVS (4 squadrons with 25 aircraft each), interception squadrons - Gnats (4 squadrons with 25 aircraft each) and eight MIG-21 fighters. The fighter-bombers in the IAF were Hunters (150 organized into 6 squadrons) and several squadrons of the older Ouragon and Vampires. The Canberras formed the bomber squadrons (4 squadrons with 20 aircraft each)./34/ The Pakistan Air Force had a total of 200 aircraft of which 141 were combat aircraft. The PAF order of battle comprised 92 F-86F Sabre organised in 4 squadrons, 12 F-104A Lockheed Starfighters in 1 squadron, and 25 Martin B-57 Canberra bombers./35/

The main operational bases of the IAF were at Ambala, Chandigarh, Halwara, Pathankot, Adampur, Srinagar, Jamnagar and Jodhpur. The Pakistan Air Force operated from bases at Sargodha, Peshawar and Mauripur near Karachi. A lone squadron of F-86 Sabres operated from the Tezgaon airfield near Dacca./36/

Given the PAF's limited numerical strength and the operational effectiveness of its interceptor and fighter bomber

33. M.S. Chaturvedi, History of the Indian Air Force (New Delhi, 1978), p. 152.

34. Military Balance, 1965-66.

35. Fricker, n.7, p. 62.

36. Ibid., pp. 63-65.

aircraft, in the F-104 Starfighter and the F-86 Sabre, the IAF was faced with the task of determining to what extent its numerical superiority and adequate, well positioned basing facilities would translate into an operational capability effective enough to attain strategic air superiority. The quest for air superiority would involve strategic interaction of airforce units and air combat, both of which would entail progressively increasing attrition numbers of one's own forces. Depending on the ability of the IAF to suffer losses and yet continue operations, its strategy could be offensive - seeking and destroying Pakistani combat aircraft or defensive - concentrating on interception and defense of Indian political and military centres. A strategy seeking prior attainment of air superiority would distract it from the employment of air power in the crucial role of close-in air-support of ground forces. Therefore, in a short war with Pakistan in which crucial battles would be fought on the ground, the IAF would have to perform simultaneously the roles of interception, interdiction close-in ground support along with helping with inter-theatre logistical support. Neither of these roles by itself could be allowed to overshadow the other.

Navy

The naval strength of India and Pakistan were modest consisting of only rudimentary combat capabilities. India had in its Vikrant, a 16,000 ton aircraft carrier in addition to 2

Cruisers, 3 Destroyers, 5 anti-submarine Frigates, 3 anti-aircraft Frigates, 6 Mine Sweepers and a few other smaller ships. Pakistan's naval capability was even more modest with 5 Destroyers, 2 anti-submarine warfare Frigates, 8 Mine sweepers and 1 submarine./37/

Given these naval profiles, neither side was capable of even limited fleet-centered combat operations. Both naval forces were capable of defensive rather than combat operations. Even India's modest strike capability with 22 Sea Hawk strike aircraft on its aircraft carrier was too meagre to engage in meaningful combat for a broader military purpose. Within this context India could not risk the loss of any of its capital ships with its potential shattering repercussions for national morale.

Operation 'Ablaze'

At the height of the Kutch crisis, in response to Pakistan's general mobilization of its armed forces, Indian armed forces were placed on alert. Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan announced measures "involving the cancellation of all military leave as well as certain moves"./38/ Operation 'Ablaze' involved the

37. Military Balance, 1965-66.

38. India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 3, vol. 42, Session 11 of 1965, Col. 10980, dt. 26 April 1965.

movement of Indian units from their peacetime location to areas of concentration to familiarize troops with their future battle locations. As part of the Kutch Agreement, Indian Army units were withdrawn to their peacetime locations./39/ Significantly, however, India's main strike force - the 1 Armoured Division was held back at Jullandhur instead of returning to its peacetime location in Jhansi./40/

Since becoming Chief of the Army Staff, General J.N. Chaudhuri initiated a number of moves in an attempt to fundamentally change the strategic disposition of the Indian Army. Superfluous units from the order of battle were thinned out; forces committed to the teeth arms were increased while cutting down on the tail; telecommunications and command structures were rationalized./41/ By 1965 with the given force structures on either side, Gen. Chaudhuri felt that the purely defensive posture all along the international border, based on "outdated British concepts of a thin line of forward defence with brigade defended sectors in depth along the appreciated routes of ingress"/42/, had to give way to a more offence oriented posture involving a limited Indian advance into Pakistani territory./43/

39. The Statesman, 2 July 1965.

40. Singh, n.30, p. 33.

41. Chaudhuri, n.5, p. 178.

42. Singh, no.25, p. 22.

43. Chaudhuri, n.5, p. 189.

Such a shift in the Indian defence posture involved decisions at two levels: the political decision, in advance, to permit Indian armed forces to cross the international border and secondly, at the level of military strategy, of deciding the tactical objectives and the force commitments required for their attainment.

The declaratory policy of the Government of India, had been that any attack by Pakistan on Kashmir would be considered as an attack on India and consequently India would be at liberty to take measures to improve her defences. This was stated by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1957/44/ and was periodically reiterated by Indian political leaders. However, this declaratory policy did not find expression in the operational policy of the military until mid-1965. "The explanation for this omission was that a decision would only be taken at the time and the military would then be duly informed. Despite the public political statement the military were always in great doubt as to whether at the appropriate time any such permission would really be given"./45/

As Pakistan's intentions became increasingly clear by mid-May 1965, not only in Kutch but also in Kashmir, the Chief of the

44. India, Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 1, session 15 of 1957. col. 667; dated 25 March 1957. The first such statement was made by Nehru in 1951.
45. J.N. Chaudhuri, India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies (New Delhi, 1973), p. 43.

Army Staff obtained the political directive for the Indian Army to retaliate in case of any Pakistani moves in Kashmir./46/ This was in keeping with Prime Minister Shastri's statement in Parliament during the Kutch crisis that the Indian Army would defend the country and to do so would "decide its own strategy and the employment of its manpower and equipment in the manner in which it deems best"./47/ Whether this statement and the subsequent directive were in the nature of a carte blanche is not clear/48/ but essentially all decisions taken by the military were put up for clearance and approval to the political leadership.

Given the political authorization for a limited advance, Indian military strategy was governed by two factors: (a) troops available on the Western front, in effective numbers, were roughly equivalent to that of Pakistan; and (b) rapid expansion of the Indian Army after 1962 had resulted in some dilution of

46. Chaudhuri, n.5, p. 192.

47. India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 3, vol. 42, session 11 of 1965, col. 11585, dated 28 April 1965.

48. Gen Chaudhuri is not clear whether tactical military moves were cleared before hand or approved expost-facto by the Defence Minister, the Prime Minister and other decision-making organs concerned with higher direction of war. This did not include the Chief of Naval Staff. However, no indications point to differences of approach and emphasis between the political and military leaderships. See J.N. Chaudhuri An Autobiography, pp. 192, 194; see also, J.N. Chaudhuri India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies, pp. 44-45.

its fighting units. Against this background the Indian Army weighed its alternatives./49/

The first alternative was the occupation of some un guarded territory, which seemed unproductive and non-permanent.

The second was the occupation of, and substantial destruction to, a big city like Lahore. For this task neither were there sufficient troops nor was it politically advisable to seek the destruction of a major city of historical significance which would leave raw wounds, delaying unduly the eventual aim of living in amity.

The third alternative, and the one preferred by General Chaudhury, was "the destruction of equipment cheaply obtained but if destroyed expensive in every way to replace"./50/

Section III

STRATEGY : INDIA'S USE OF MILITARY FORCE

The 1965 war was confined, in its main course, to the front between India and West pakistan. This front could be subdivided into four main sectors as given below. The factors involved in distinguishing sectors include its geographical characteristics, political objectives sought in that region and the deployment and -----

49. See Chaudhury, n.5, pp. 189.

50. Ibid., pp. 189-90.

organization of military forces, in most cases under the operational command of a corps. The four sectors are: (a) Jammu and Kashmir including Chamb-Jaurian; (b) The Lahore Front; (c) Jammu-Samba-Sailkot, and (d) The Rajasthan Sector. The sequential order of sectoral description is determined by the importance of the sector to overall strategy and the chronological order of battles.


Chamb-Jaurian Sector

The Chamb-Jaurian sector, west of the Chenab, consists of the area formed by the southern most bulge of Pakistan-held Kashmir territory into Jammu and Kashmir bounded by the CFL which meets the international border at Bujeral. The two natural obstacles, the Munamwar Wali and the Chenab flow into Pakistan through this area. The hills north of the Chenab taper towards Akhnur forming a funnel opening into Pakistan. The only bridge over the Chenab in the area at Akhnur formed a focal point of communication between Jammu and the Rajouri-Poonch sector. The Chamb area is the only place which is tankable along the entire stretch of the CFL.

The Chamb-Jaurian sector, under the operational command of the Indian XV corps in charge of Jammu and Kashmir, was defended

51. Singh, n.30, pp. 39-40. See Map 1.

map-1 JAMMU AND KASHMIR



map not to scale

- international border
- x-x-x- ceasefire line
- }) pass

by a sole infantry brigade group (191 Infantry Brigade Group) before the area was reinforced by 10 Infantry Division. This division, raised as a reserve force in Bangalore, was allotted to XV corps on 28th August. 10 Infantry Division was still being raised and was only of 30% strength./52/

Opposite the Indian positions, Pakistan deployed units from the 12 Infantry Division, which was involved in the infiltration into Kashmir from the beginning of August, two regiments of armour from the 6 Armoured Division earmarked for the Sialkot sector and the entire complement of corps artillery and the divisional artillery of the 12 Infantry Division. Pakistan had 5:2 superiority over India in infantry, and 6:1 superiority in armour./53/

This vastly outnumbered Indian force in the Chamb/54/ came under increasing artillery, mortar and light machine gun fire from 14th August onwards./55/ Pakistan army pressure along the

52. Ibid., p. 40-41.

53. Ibid., p. 40.

54. Subsequent fighting highlighted the weakness of Indian positions in the Chamb sector. There was little truth in Pakistani claims that the Chamb sector was well fortified. For such a claim, see Mohammad Musa, "The Battle for the Defence of Pakistan", Dawn (Karachi), 6 September 1969.

55. Details in Gen. Nimmo's Report to the UN Secretary General, quoted by D.R. Mankekar, Twenty-Two Fateful Days (Bombay, 1966), p. 93.

entire length of the 470 mile CFL compelled dispersal of existing Indian units in Kashmir. Indian deployment in Kashmir was conditioned by four factors: (a) the XV Corps responsible for operations in Kashmir had to face Chinese troops in Ladakh and Pakistani units across the CFL; (b) combat insurgency which continued throughout August 1965; (c) difficult and mountainous terrain, poorly developed communications - only a highway link with the rest of India and no railway system, and (d) the ceasefire agreement of 1949 which fixed the number of Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir. To reinforce Chamb, India would have to thin out its commitments against infiltrators in Kashmir or thin out its defences in Jammu, in turn leaving that communications centre open to Pakistani pressure./56/

Given the disposition of Indian forces and the political constraints on reinforcements of Indian units into Kashmir, an Indian thrust towards Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, as feared by Pakistan/57/ at the time of Indian occupation of Tithwal (24 August 1965) and the assault and capture of Hajipir Pass (25-29 August 1965), would have been a difficult proposition. Indian plans for the defence of the Chamb

56. B.M. Kaul, Confrontation with Pakistan (Delhi, 1971), p. 22, see also Mankekar, n.55, pp. 91-92.

57. Quoted in Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (London, 1968), p. 319.

sector precluded any offensive action by Indian units across the CFL to compensate for tactical weakness in that sector.

Tactical weakness of the Chamb sector was underlined by forward deployment of Indian units thinly spread out with few tactical reserves and only meagre strength of armour to forestall penetration of forward lines./58/ Such tactical weakness was further underscored by the strategic vulnerability of Akhnur. The fall of Akhnur would have cut Jammu's northern line of defence, and would have resulted in the bottling up of Indian forces in Rajauri-Poonch area and those north of the Banihal Pass./59/

In spite of prior warning of concentration of Pakistani armour of about two regiments, and an infantry brigade opposite Indian positions in the Chamb sector from UN observers in that area, the multipronged Pakistan thrusts, from across points along the CFL and the international border, on 1 September 1965, could not be prevented. Forward based Indian units withdrew across the Munawar Wali Tawi to Jaurian and then to positions in the Troti Hills in a defensive perimeter around Akhnur. Jaurian fell to Pakistan units on 5th September 1965. Indian counter-attacks on 6th September and 8/9th September failed to make any impact. The

58. Singh, n.30, pp. 43-48.

59. Mankekar, n.55, pp. 91-92.

relative positions reached by both sides by 10/11th September 1965, remained more or less static upto the ceasefire./60/

The following points of relevance need to be emphasized.

(a) Indian reinforcements to the Chamb sector, inspite of a rapidly deteriorating tactical situation on 1 September 1965, were only two Brigades (41 Mountain Brigade and 28 Infantry Brigade) and one armoured squadron (20 Lancers).

(b) Pakistan's withdrawals from the Chamb sector began on 6th September 1965, when Indian forces crossed the international border in the Lahore sector. Units of the 7 Infantry Division, which had taken over from the 12 Infantry Division after Pakistani units had crossed the Munawar Wali Tawi on 5 September 1965, in addition to artillery and armoured units involved in Chamb operations were withdrawn./61/ The hesitation in exploitation of initial success, change over of command of operations in 'midstream' and the subsequent withdrawal of units, especially armoured, considerably weakened Pakistani offensive

60. Details of the Chamb operations are given in Singh, n.30, pp. 48-61 and V. Longer Red Coats to Olive Green: A History of the Indian Army 1600-1974 (Bombay, 1974), pp. 425-27.

61. Mankekar, n.55, p. 99.

thrust/62/ and gave breathing time for Indian units to strengthen defences. India withdrew the 41 Mountain Brigade from the Chamb sector to move to I corps operations in Lahore on 10/11th September 1965, a measure of Indian confidence that the stalemate obtaining at that time would continue./63/

(c) On 1st September 1965, in the face of a rapidly deteriorating tactical situation in the Chamb sector, the IAF swung into action in close-in ground attacks on advancing Pak armour positions. Four Vampires and Mysteres took part in 28 sorties on 1st September./64/

On overall use of the Indian Air Force in the Chamb sector, the following points stand out :

(i) The local Indian Brigade Commander radioed for air support at 11 AM on 1st September 1965./65/ Request for air support was cleared by the Army Headquarter but the political decision to allow IAF strikes was taken only at 5:10 PM on 1st September. Only at 6 PM in the evening of 1st September

62. A critique of this decision, counted as one of the strategic blunders of the Pakistani higher direction of war in 1965, is given in Asghar Khan, The First Round, the Indo-Pakistan of 1965 (New Delhi, 1979), p. 87.

63. Singh, n.30, p. 60.

64. Mankekar, n.55, p. 99.

65. Singh, n.30, p. 51.

were IAF aircraft in action over Chamb./66/ The political decision to use the Air Force, after much delay, suggests that the commitment of the air arm was realized as a step towards escalation.

(ii) Only Vampires and Mysteres were used on 1st September. There was no IAF activity over Chamb on 2nd September and the IAF scored its first hits of PAF Sabres on the 3rd and 4th of September with the introduction of IAF Gnats.

(iii) On 1st of September the IAF lost 4 Vampires./67/ Thereafter, the IAF withdrew Vampires and Ouragans from active combat operations, thereby, reducing the Indian frontline strength of aircraft of 128 Vampires and 56 Dassault Ouragans and the overall inventory by about 35%./68/

(iv) In spite of the introduction of the Gnats for combat air patrol with Mysteres performing ground support roles the IAF was unable to halt the Pakistani advance. The little measure of success in halting the Pakistani advance was achieved by default-Pakistani caution and inability to exploit success, and Indian _____ which broke the pace of Pak advance./69/ Contrary to some

65. Monkekar, n.55, p. 95.

66. _____, p. 96.

68. Fricker, n7, p.69. This point is also confirmed by Chaturvedi, n.33, p.139, and Kaul, n.56, p. 54.

69. Singh, n.30, p. 63.

accounts,^{70/} the IAF did not achieve tactical success in the Chamb. This may have accounted for Indian reluctance to hit at airforce bases of PAF strike aircraft operating in support of Pak army units - a strategic move which was implemented only after the Lahore sector was opened on 6th September.

The Lahore Front


Extending, roughly, from Dera Baba Nanak on the Ravi to Ferozpur on the Sutlej, this 45-mile front formed the most significant sector of Indo-Pak hostilities, comprising major population centres, notably Amritsar in India and Lahore in Pakistan, major religious centres, vast tracts of fertile land and a politically vocal people. Geographically the front was delimited by the two major rivers - Ravi and Sutlej - with numerous canals, nalas, drains criss-crossing the area. The Grand Trunk Road connected Amritsar with Lahore.^{71/}

The Bambanwala Ravi Bedian (BRB) canal - the Ichogil Canal, linked the Ravi in the north to Sutlej in the south. From Ghazi kaka in the north to Burki the canal was narrow and brick-lined. In the middle, between Burki to Bedian, it was slightly broader and unlined. These two segments, with water levels higher than the ground levels were primarily defensive moats. However, the

70. Chaturvedi, n.33, pp. 138, 140.

71. See Map 2.

map-2 CHAMB - FAZILKA



map not to scale

----- international border
----- canal

third segment of the canal between Bedian and Dipalpur canal in the Kasur sector was designed more for offensive than defensive purposes. It had ten bridges of concrete to facilitate infantry crossings and two major syphons to facilitate armour crossings./72/

The Lahore front was under the operational charge of the Indian XI corps consisting of three divisions (15 Infantry Division, 7 Infantry Division and 4 Mountain Division) forming the main thrust of the corps operations with two Infantry Brigade Groups protecting its flanks in the Dera Baba Nanak area and Fazilka-Hussainwala area respectively. Pakistani deployment on this front was two infantry divisions and one armoured division as a striking force. The Pakistani 10 Infantry Division covered the Atari-Dograi and Khalra-Burki lines, a front of about 16 miles and Pakistani 11 Infantry Division along with the Pak 1 Armoured Division covered the Kasur-Hussainwala line - a front of about 29 miles./73/

Indian forces crossed the international border on the morning of 6th September along three thrusts on a 30-mile front. The northern column consisting of 15 Infantry Division advanced towards Lahore along the Grand Trunk Road crossing the border at Wagah. The central column - the 7 Infantry Division advanced

72. The details of the BRB canal are from Longer, n.60, p. 428.

73. Singh, n.30, p. 69.

from Khalra northwest towards Burki. The southern column stuck towards Kasur from Khemkaran.

The 15 Infantry Division advancing on the Atari-Dograi axis achieved tactical surprise in the early hours of 6 September and reached Dograi on the Ichogil canal by mid-day. However, in the face of Pak pressure and inability to dig in on the banks of the Ichogil, Indian units withdrew to Gosal Dial. Thereafter, between 7-15 of September, Indian units unsuccessfully tried to retake Dograi. Determined Pak counter attacks were beaten back between the 8 and 10 of September. The Pak counter attack launched on 8th of September by units of Pak 10 Infantry Division achieved initial success but was unable to continue due to paucity of troops. The front of Atari Dograi axis spread north towards Ranian where limited Pak thrusts were contained. Between the 15 and 22nd September the front stabilized with defensive deployments on both sides. Just prior to the ceasefire on 23rd September successful Indian attempts were made to capture Dograi.

Along the Khalra-Barki axis, the Indian 7 Infantry Division made a cautious and slow advance inspite of little Pak resistance and captured Barki on the 10th of September. The bridge over the Ichogil was blown up by Pak forces and 7 Infantry Division did not have enough bridging equipment to effect a crossing. For the remaining period of the war, 7 Infantry Division progressively denuded of units, was involved in clearing and mopping up

operations and containing limited Pak counter attacks. On the whole activity was confined to artillery and small arms fire.

Indian 4 Mountain Division comprising the force on the Khemkaran-Kasur sector advanced upto the suburbs of Kasur facing negligible Pak resistance. In fact, the initial advance was slowed down fearing a trap of well-prepared Pak defences. This initial caution proved well-founded since, beginning with armour and motorized infantry, Pak counter attacks began in earnest from the afternoon of 6th September, in which units of the 1 Armoured Division were involved. 4 Mountain Division decided to withdraw to better defensive positions north and north-east of Khemkaran. Khemkaran fell to Pakistan on 8th September. Between 8th and 10th September, Pak units launched five attacks on Indian positions - for probing and softening up Indian defensive positions and recce-in-force. Units of 4 Mountain Division, which was reinforced on the 8th of September by the corps reserve - 2 Independent Armoured Brigade dug in around two horseshoe defensive positions, along the Chema-Valtoha line. The crucial battle of Asal Uttar took place on 10th September with the main Pak armour thrust being blunted resulting in the surrender of 4 Horse of Pak 1 Armoured Division. Having blunted the main Pak attack near Asal Uttar, Indian units launched limited attacks on Khemkaran on 12 September with no success. Khemkaran continued to be in Pakistani control upto the ceasefire inspite of Indian attempts to retake it just before the ceasefire came into effect.

The two infantry brigades entrusted with securing the flanks at DBN and Ferozepur performed essentially defensive tasks. The Indian 29 Infantry Brigade of 7 Infantry Division located in the DBN area failed to secure the bridge over the Ravi and the retreating Pakistan units (115 Infantry Brigade of 15 Infantry Division) blew up the Pakistani end of the Bridge on the 7th of September. Thereafter, Indian activity in the DBN area remained defensive and precautionary.


The 67 Infantry Brigade in the Fazilka-Suleimanke area secured its minimum objectives of containing Pakistani probes in the area. However, even these actions were barely sufficient as the resources were too meagre and the force ill-equipped to defend a long front line against Pak probing thrusts./74/

The Sialkot Sector

With Jammu in India and Sialkot in Pakistan as the main communication centres of strategic importance, a distance of only 27 miles between the two, the Sialkot sector offered to both sides an area suited for large armour deployment. Sialkot was a major communication centre - supplies to the Chamb sector and a network of railway lines to Wazirabad and to Pasur/Narowal and beyond to Lahore originated here. Between the Aik Nala, running past Sialkot to its south and the Marala-Ravi Link Canal, also

74. See Maps 3 and 4.


map-3 ATARI - WAGAH - DOGRAI



map not to scale

- international border
- canal
- main road

map-4 KHEM - KARAN - KASUR



map not to scale

----- international border
----- canal

running to the south of Sialkot between Marala Headworks on the Chenab to the Ravi, and Degh Nadi running just north of Zafarwal - an area of about 12-14 miles wide - offered an Indian armoured force room for manoeuvre to swing west to take Sialkot or to envelope Lahore from the north across the Ravi.

Indian forces in the Sialkot sector were under the operational command of I corps, which consisted of the sole Indian Armoured Division - 1 Armoured Division, 6 Mountain Division, 14 Infantry Division and 26 Infantry Division. The 26 Infantry Division based in Jammu was the biggest Infantry Division in the Indian Army, but it was progressively milked to reinforce other areas. 6 Mountain Division and 14 Infantry Division were both under strength, between them totalling only three infantry brigades. India's main strike force - 1 Armoured Division consisted of 1 Armoured Brigade (of three Centurian regiments), one motor Battalion (9 Dogra), one Lorry Infantry Brigade and three Sherman tank regiments./75/

Facing the Indian I corps was Pakistani IV corps which consisted of Pak 6 Armoured Division, 15 Infantry Division and 7 Infantry Division. As a result of the fighting in Chamb and later the opening of the Lahore front, a substantial redeployment from the Sialkot sector took place. Pak 7 Infantry Division took over operations in Chamb, before the Lahore front was opened.

75. Singh, n. 30, pp. 165-67.

However, with the opening of the Lahore front on 6th September, some forces from Chamb were withdrawn and by 9th September had joined IV corps forces in the Sialkot sector. Therefore, Pak 15 Infantry Division in addition to its original four infantry brigades was reinforced with 10 Infantry Brigade from Chamb. Pak 6 Armoured Division was reinforced, regaining its original 11 Cavalry Patton which took part in the Chamb operation and two Patton regiments (5 Hourse and 19 Lancers) of the Pak 1 Armoured Division which were to join 6 Armoured Division after the battle of Asal Uttar in the Lahore sector./76/

In the Sialkot sector, therefore, Indian superiority in infantry forces was balanced, more or less, by Pak armoured strength. In total, India's 8 armoured regiments pitted against a Pak armoured strength which grew progressively between 6-13th September from 7 armoured regiments to 10 armoured regiments. The massed concentration of armour on this front was an indication of the strategic stakes involved in deciding the course of the war.

The advance of 26 Infantry Division on the night of 7/8th September took place on a broad front on two axis - the Suchetgarh-Sialkot axis, and the Bujrangarhi-Sialkot axis. The aim of this division was to secure a lodgement in Pak territory. Its immediate task was to protect the western flank of I corps

76. Ibid., p. 167.

operations. On both axes, the advance of 26 Infantry Division was slow and cautious. While Unche Wains, Niche Wains and Bajragadi were taken before 10th of September, this division dug in into defensive positions to ward off Pak counter-attacks. Between 10-11th September these were limited to a few Pak tank assaults, artillery fire and air attacks. On 18th September, Indian units consolidated their positions at Tilakpur, Madhopur and Kalarwanda. Units of 26 Infantry Division controlled the Sialkot-Charpar road north of Sialkot and the road between Sialkot and Zaffarwal.

The loss of road links to and from Sialkot in addition to the presence of Indian troops near Sialkot as near as Kalarwanda, prompted Pak forces to make determined efforts, right upto the ceasefire time, to dislodge Indian positions or to improve tactical positions along the road links. Such moves were successfully countered by Indian units.

6 Mountain Division was entrusted with the task of taking and holding Charwa and Makarajke as a secure lodgement in Pak territory acting as a base and flank protection for the main Indian Armoured thrust to be launched between Charwa and Baghiari.

The advance of 1 Armoured Division began in the early hours of 8th September, with two Centurion regiments (17 Horse and 16

Cavalry) leading the advance in the direction of Phillorah with flank protection provided by two Sherman regiments and units of the division's Lorry Infantry Brigade. Contact with advance Pak armour units and air attacks from PAF aircraft was made by mid-day. The advance of the main armour thrust was cautious and slow, its speed being determined by the advance of forces committed for the protection of its flanks. In the face of Pak resistance 1 Armoured Division committed its reserve regiment (4 Horse) on 8th September itself. Thereafter, the Division spent 9 and 10th September regrouping in Sabzpir for the assault on Phillorah.

Having lost two precious days preparatory for the assault on Phillorah, the Indian armoured division had to perforce employ tactics to lure an ever increasing Pak armoured strength into a zone between Phillorah and Chobara and then employ an out manoeuvring attack on Phillorah from the opposite direction. This regrouping of the Indian armoured force to avoid frontal assault on the main Pak armour concentration, and the tactics designed to take on Pak armour in penny packets, in turn resulted in a dispersal of India's main armoured force in quest of its tactical objectives (Phillorah), thereby reducing the strategic potential of its only strike force. In addition, each of its tactical assaults were insured by a corresponding strength of units dedicated to flank protection. In the absence of numerical

superiority and strategic reserves such over insurance undercut the strike potential of India's 1 Armoured Division./77/


In the event, Phillorah was captured by Indian units on 11th September. However, the very basis of tactical disposition of Indian units, in addition to and in the face of increasing Pak reinforcements in that area, meant that the Indian advance beyond Phillorah towards Chawinda and beyond was slow and costly. Between 12-14th September Pakistani units organized a "Sitara-i-Hilal" defensive perimeter around Chawinda - with Chawinda jutting out as the star poised between the tips of a crescent. With the main infantry assault on Chawinda by 6 Mountain Division postponed till 18/19th September, Indian armoured units were engaged in securing and consolidating areas around Chawinda, an objective that eluded Indian units throughout the war. The battles on Phillorah, Butur Dograndi and Chawinda were the bloodiest in the Sialkot sector /78/ and denuded the offensive striking power of the Indian armoured division. In sum, Indian armoured action devoted to the classic phase of break in and dog fight for attrition of Pak armoured units, by itself, consumed effort time and material at a cost to Indian armour ability to effect and sustain a break-through. In the absence of additional fire power through air support or reinforcements from other

77. See Map 5.

78. Kaul, n.56, p. 42.

map - 5

JAMMU - SIALKOT



map not to scale

----- international border

sectors/strategic reserves, a stalemate on the front was an imperative conclusion to fighting in the Sialkot sector.

Rajasthan Sector

Between Ganganagar adjoining Punjab and the Barmer district adjoining Gujarat, the Rajasthan sector was 680 miles long, of which 550 miles consisted of desert land. Throughout the war this sector remained of secondary importance, so much so that in the initial days itself one infantry brigade was withdrawn from this sector to reinforce the Fazilka-Suleimanki area.

Limited skirmishes took place, mostly in the Barmer district of Rajasthan around the Gadra railhead. An Indian force of two battalions made half hearted attempts to take Gadra town across the border. Such probes were designed to tie down Pakistani troops opposite Hyderabad and prevent redeployment of Pak forces to Punjab.^{79/} However, most Indian actions were confined to clearing border posts taken by Pak forces. Such adhocism in Indian activity was in part necessitated by the need to defend a long border with limited number of troops, compounded by difficult terrain, and in part by Indian inability to judge the strength and intention of Pak forces. These mostly consisted of Pak Indus Rangers and irregular Mujahids. Withdrawal from some

79. Hari Ram Gupta, India Pakistan War 1965, vol. 1 (Delhi, 1967), pp. 190-93.

points to reinforce others inevitably resulted in loss of territory./80/

Main Features of India's Strategy and Performance

Characteristically, India fought its most important battles on land at dispersed points of a front between Kargil and Khemkaran - 800 miles long and even longer if the Rajasthan sector is taken into account. Broadly, the political imperative of preventing Pak incursions into Indian territory necessitated Indian military presence and action at widely dispersed points. The significance of this political imperative can be gauged by the fact that official versions of the war did not mention the important military victory of Indian forces at Asal Uttar until some time later "probably to avoid admitting Pakistan still held a section of Indian territory"./81/ The implications of this political imperative on military strategy compelled India to forego the flexibility and ability to concentrate its forces so that, in return, Pakistan would not have the option of exploiting Indian vulnerabilities by concentrating at points of its own choosing./82/

80. Kaul, n.56, p. 52; Mankekar, n.55, pp. 127-28.

81. Brines, n.57, p. 351.

82. Singh, n.30, p. 234.

India's XV Corps in charge of operations in Jammu and Kashmir was reinforced with the reserve Indian 10 Infantry Division to secure the defence of the Chamb sector. Towards the end of the war four more infantry battalions were inducted into Kashmir./83/ For reasons enumerated above the strategic disposition of the Corps was by necessity defensive. India did not reinforce the Chamb sector inspite of tactical weakness, which also meant its subsequent inability to take advantage of Pak withdrawals from Chamb.

India's XI Corps opposite the Lahore Sector fielded three infantry divisions and an independent armoured brigade. In 1965 India followed the traditional British practice of mechanical allotment of one armoured regiment per infantry division./84/ In total XI Corps had seven tank regiments. The I Corps opposite Sialkot had three infantry divisions and the sole Indian armoured division. This Corps had a total of only six tank regiments. Moreover, one of its Centurion regiments was replaced by a Sherman regiment, thereby further weakening the offensive potential of 1 Armoured Division./85/ Strategically, therefore, the distribution of forces and allotment of armour was distinctly

83. Estimated by Rikhye in Towle (ed), n.28, p. 207.

84. Leo Hieneman, Lessons from the War in Kashmir, Military Review: Professional Journal of the U.S. Army (Kansas), vol. 44, No. 2, Feb. 1966, pp. 26-27.

85. Singh, n.30, p. 235.

in favour of the Corps whose operations were essentially defensive in nature.

Neither XI Corps nor I Corps had any strategic reserves, nor did Indian deployment envisage reserve forces directly under the Army Headquarters. Indian defensive operations were the balance between dispersing forces to take and hold territory and concentrating forces to resist and contain Pak attempts at breakthrough. The distribution of Indian forces along the three lines of advance on the Lahore Sector, a distribution quite unrelated to the quantum and position of opposing forces,^{/86/} was in part responsible for Indian inability to reach and hold positions on the Ichogil canal. Consequently, the absence of a protective moat for defensive operations in the Atari-Dograï and khalra-Barki axis, meant that a proportionately larger force commitment was needed to hold ground between the Ichogil canal and the international border, thereby reducing the cost-benefit calculus which is central to any attrition strategy.^{/87/} Besides, the Indian commitment in Punjab did not draw in a corresponding commitment by Pakistan, thereby further reducing the strategic benefits of an attrition-dominated operational strategy.^{/88/}

86. Singh, n.25, p. 25.

87. Kaul, n.33, pp. 32-33.

88. Ibid., pp. 64-65; P.S. Bhagat, Shield and Sword (New Delhi, 1974), p. 24.

In the absence of reserves even a tactical break-through would have led to strategic repercussions. Likewise, the lack of reserves precluded the possibility of an offensive strategy even if success were achieved in containing a powerful Pak armoured offensive. Indian units were unable to retake Khemkaran as the Pak defences were well dug in. The 2 Independent Armoured Brigade was split between Khemkaran and Atari Dograi section, thereby reducing the ability of Indian forces in Khemkaran in tying down Pak forces in that sector.

Indian offensive operations, in the absence of reserves, lacked the capability to exploit any appreciable breakthrough in Pak defences. Unsure of the sustainability of an Indian offensive, Indian commanders were prone to insure their forces against Pak counter-attack by drawing on units from the main strike force, thereby further diluting their offensive disposition. Intrasectoral defensive certainty was procured at the cost of tactical flexibility. The Sialkot operations were characterized by caution and over commitment to flank protection of an armoured thrust which itself was deployed on a narrow front, resulting in an eventual degeneration of a manoeuvre-centered operational strategy into one of attrition where success lay not in reducing the opponents' armour strength but of conserving one's own forces while not yielding occupied territory.

Indian deployment did not provide for coordination between the Sialkot and the Lahore sectors. Deployment in the Dera Baba Nanak area was inadequate to seize the bridge over the river Ravi and put across a force large enough to threaten Pak positions in the Jassar-Narowal area. In addition, Indian inability to move on to the offensive after the battle of Assal Uttar in the Khemkaran area allowed Pakistan to redeploy units of the I Armoured Division to the Sialkot sector.

The opening of the Lahore front on 6 September and the Sialkot front on 8th September meant that the main strike force had lost the element of surprise to effect an early breakthrough. As Indian 1 Armoured Division had not been launched on the Lahore sector its use in the Sialkot was more or less certain./89/

The first IAF air-strikes against PAF bases took place after the PAF struck at IAF bases on the evening of 6th September. The initial Indian advance into Lahore was not proceeded by nor accompanied with IAF air support. Therefore, (a) the quantum of forces committed to the Lahore sector; (b) the willingness to forego the element of surprise /90/ for the main offensive

89. I Corps was ready for battle by 6th September, Singh, n.30, p. 173; This disproves the contention that XI Corps was launched on 6th September because it was the only corps in operational readiness, Mankekar, n.55, p. 99; Therefore, the timing of the Sialkot operation had a strategic rationale underlying it.

90. For Pakistan, the Indian move into Lahore was more of a political surprise rather than a military one. Brines, n.57, p. 335.

operations in the Sialkot sector and to launch the Lahore operations without prior attainment of air superiority; and (c) the unwillingness to redeploy forces from the Lahore sector to the Sialkot sector after a stalemate had been reached in the later after 16/17 September - all point to the essentially defensive disposition of India's strategy./91/

India's commitment of its air arm over Chamb was controlled and sensitive to political considerations. Only second line aircraft (Vampires and Mysteres) were used between 1-3 September and thereafter the introduction of Gnats was confined to fighter support for close air-support operations in that sector. Between 1-6 September no attempt was made to strike at the basing points of PAF aircraft involved in the Chamb operations./92/

IAF deep interdiction strikes were launched on the midnight of 6th September as a response to PAF late-evening attacks on Pathankot, Adampur, Halwara and Amritsar. IAF Canberra attacks on Pak airbases continued throughout the period of hostilities,/93/ an indication of the futility of the operations

91. Given such a disposition and Indian inability to reach the Ichogil canal, India did not possess the military capability to capture neither Lahore nor Sialkot - Chaudhury, n.5, p. 194. See also Brines, n.57, p. 329.

92. This reluctance provided an unexpected opportunity for the PAF to strike first, Asghar Khan The First Round - The India Pakistan 1965 (New Delhi, 1979), p. 15.

93. Chaturvedi, n.33, p. 146.

to gain strategic air superiority by striking at Pak air bases. Given the fact that the number of PAF airbases was limited, the IAF effort to gain air superiority was unsuccessful.

In the absence of air superiority, Indian air-power was distributed for diverse roles - protection of Indian airfields/ radar stations - battlefield interdiction and close air support operations. In addition to such diversification of combat roles, Indian air operations were further constrained by the relatively obsolete nature of a part of its inventory of combat aircraft. Vampires were withdrawn from combat operations after Chamb. In the face of Sabre F-86 and Starfighter F-104 interception capability, Indian deep penetration strikes were mostly limited to Canberra attacks at night.⁹⁴ For close-in ground support roles, IAF Hunters were too fast to support Indian forces after the battle was joined. On the other hand, IAF Mysteres had a better loiter capability over battle-fields but were vulnerable to Pak interception. Such ground support roles had to be provided with combat air patrol of Gnats. While the Mysteres were used as bait to Pak Sabres, such tactics invariably resulted in high attrition rates even without the IAF seeking out the opponents' airforce.

None of the major land battles had decisive IAF support. The battles at Khemkaran and Assal Uttar were decided by static

94. Fricker, n7, p. 131.

land defence of armour and artillery. Persistent air attacks on the Indian Armoured Division before and during the battles of Phillorah and Chawinda necessitated caution and reorganization slowing down the armoured thrust. Perhaps the most significant strategic omission of the IAF was its inability to prevent the redeployment of units of the Pak I Armoured Division, after the battle of Khemkaran, to the Sialkot sector.

Section IV

DIPLOMATIC FACTORS AND INDIA'S RESPONSE

United Nations Organization

In response to a letter from the United Nations Secretary General, expressing concern over ceasefire violations in Kashmir since the start of infiltration into Kashmir, the Indian government signified its willingness to abide by the ceasefire agreement provided Pakistan did likewise. In August Indian policy was directed at two levels: (a) India supported with minor modifications the move in the United Nations to publish the report of General Nimmo of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and supported the proposed visit of Dr. Ralph Bunche, UN Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, to the subcontinent to determine the responsibility for ceasefire violations and for finding means of strengthening the monitoring of the CFL by the UN MOGIP; and (b)

Indian military activity against infiltrators continued and extended to blocking routes of entry and ingress.

Pakistan was against the publication of General Nimmo's report and the visit of Dr. Bunche, demanding instead that the United Nations view the cases of ceasefire violations in the total context of the political problem of Kashmir. By mid-August, therefore, it was clear that Pakistan's aim in its support for infiltrators into Kashmir was designed to reopen the Kashmir issue in the world forum./95/

On 1st September 1965, Secretary General U Thant addressed identical letters to India and Pakistan and on 3rd September submitted to the UN Security Council a report on developments to date based on General Nimmo's evidence which confirmed the Indian account of the origin of the latest fighting. The report, which subsequently was to substantially influence deliberations in the Security Council and the role of the Secretary General, made the following points /96/ :

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95. The role of the United Nations Organization in the 1965 India-Pakistan war is detailed in Jyoti Bhushan Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (The Hague, 1968), pp. 352-371; K.P. Saxena, United Nations and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis (Delhi, 1974), pp. 289-297.
96. See, Keessings Archives (Bristol), vol. 15, 4-11 December 1965, p. 21105.

- (a) Both parties should respect the agreement they had entered into;
- (b) Pakistan should take effective steps to prevent crossings of the ceasefire line from the Pakistan side by armed men whether or not in uniform;
- (c) Both parties should evacuate from each other's territory; the respective armies should be withdrawn from the ceasefire line and India should vacate the Kargil posts at once;
- (d) Firing across the ceasefire line should stop, and
- (e) UN observers should be allowed full freedom of action and access by both parties on both sides of the line./97/

Significantly, the report stopped short of equating India with Pakistan. However, characteristic of UN attitude subsequently, it placed equal restrictions on military forces on the ground. Therefore, while it represented a diplomatic gain in so far as it blamed Pakistan for the infiltration, it placed restrictions which India found unacceptable. Except for the posts along the CFL India was not in possession of Pak territory, while Pak forces were well across the Munawar Wali Tawi in the Chamb sector. Moreover, the anti-infiltration drive was

 97. Report of the Secretary General on Current situation in Kashmir with particular reference to the ceasefire agreement, the ceasefire line and the functioning of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan - S/6651, Sept. 3, 1965, S.C.O.R. Twentieth Year, Supplement for July, August, September, 1969, pp. 239-52.

dependent on Indian military pressures on points of entry along the CFL.

In reply to the UN Secretary General's letter, Prime Minister Shastri on 4 September emphasized that the cause of the problem was the massive infiltration of armed personnel for which the Pak Government was responsible. The letter said:

Unless Pakistan agreed to undertake forthwith to stop infiltrators across the ceasefire line and to withdraw the infiltrators and its armed forces from the Indian side of the ceasefire line and the international frontier between Jammu and Kashmir and West Pakistan and unless India was satisfied that there would be no recurrence of such a situation there could not be any basis for the restoration of peace./98/

This formed the essence of India's requirements demanded from Pakistan through the United Nations, which remained the main channel of communication between India and Pakistan throughout hostilities even though diplomatic relations between the two were not broken. In this communication to the UN Secretary-General, Prime Minister Shastri left open the possibility of armed action by India./99/

98. Asian Recorder (New Delhi) vol. 11, No. 40, 1-7 October 1965, pp. 6698.

99. In the United Nations Security Council the Indian representative G. Parthasarathi echoed Prime Minister Shastri's warning, "We cannot be expected to wait for Pakistan to violate the ceasefire and to attack us at will and we cannot go from one ceasefire to another without our being satisfied that Pakistan will not repeat its acts of violation and aggressions in the future." United Nations Security Council Proceedings, Official Records, Session 1237, p. 44.

The United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions on the 4th and the 6th September, Resolution 209 of 4th September while calling for a ceasefire, significantly made no reference to previous resolutions of the Security Council. Resolution 210 of 6th September, passed after the Lahore front had been opened, noted with deep concern the extension of the fighting without specifically mentioning India. The resolution made two significant points: (1) It mentioned for the first time August 5th 1965 as the cut-off date which was to govern withdrawal of armed personnel by both sides; and (2) extended the mandate of the Secretary General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution.

In response to the United Nations Security Council resolution no 210 External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh laid down the following conditions before India could accept the Security Council resolution /100/ :

- (a) Effective steps by Pakistan to stop further crossings of the ceasefire line from her side, armed or unarmed men, civil and military, whether or not in uniform;
- (b) Immediate removal of all such personnel by Pakistan from the Indian side of the ceasefire line.

(c) Pakistan must vacate its aggression in the Chamb area of Jammu and give an undertaking to respect the sanctity of the International border; and

(d) India would have to be satisfied that there would be no further recurrence of such a situation.

Most significantly, this articulation of War aims of India and its conditions for negotiating peace were quite independent of the military situation on the battlefield. Neither the battles of Khemkaran nor Phillorah were joined when Indian conditionalities were laid down.

Secretary General U Thant arrived in Delhi on the 12th of September after visiting Rawalpindi between 9-11th September. During his stay, Pakistan put forward three points for ending the military conflict /101/ :

(a) A ceasefire should be followed by complete withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces from Kashmir;

(b) A UN force of Afro-Asian countries should hold the ground pending a plebiscite; and

(c) A plebiscite should be held within three months in accordance with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolution of 5 January 1949.

Pakistan, in effect, was demanding complete Indian withdrawal from Kashmir, calling for participation of Afro-Asian forces and had come down to specific modalities of its political demands.

While in Delhi, Secretary General U Thant suggested a ceasefire from the 14th of September. Replying on 14th September Prime Minister Shastri accepted the Secretary General's proposal for a ceasefire from 16 September 1965 (6.30 AM IST) provided Pakistan confirmed its acceptance by 9 AM of 15 September. He emphasized that the Government of India would continue to deal with infiltrators in Kashmir and would not agree to any disposition which would leave the door open for further infiltration or restrict Indian ability to effectively deal with those already in Kashmir. The Indian Government reiterated its "steadfast resolve to maintain the territorial integrity and sovereignty of India of which Kashmir was an integral part."/102/ With little progress in sight, U Thant left Delhi on 15 September around which date the military situation in the Sialkot sector, was fast approaching a stalemate - with Indian forces finding it increasingly difficult to effect a breakthrough to Chawinda.

Security Council deliberations between the 17-20th September were overshadowed by China's ultimatum to India. The Security Council resolution passed on 20 September 1965, demanded a

ceasefire from 22 September at 0700 hour GMT, a withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965, cautioned all states to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area and decided to consider what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict./103/

This resolution was a compromise between demands ranging from invoking Art 40 of the UN Charter and Chapter VII authorizing compulsory action (Netherlands) to reference to the Kashmir problem rather than a simple ceasefire (Jordan) and common United States-Soviet Union fears of possible Chinese intervention in the subcontinent./104/

Prime Minister Shastri on 22 September, before the Lok Sabha ruled out a unilateral ceasefire and rejected a request from the UN Secretary General for the same. However, upon hearing the confirmation of Foreign Minister Bhutto at the United Nations Security Council, a ceasefire was ordered from 23 September 1965 (3.30 AM, IST).

The UN Security Council passed resolution No. 215 on 5 November 1965. While reaffirming Security Council resolutions 209-211, this resolution channeled political pressure for a

103. S/Res/211 (1965).

104. Das Gupta, n. 95, pp. 365-67.

return to the status quo without India having to commit itself on any future political settlement of Kashmir. Between the ceasefire and the passing of Resolution 215 of 5 November 1965, which finally brought home to Pakistan that political concessions were not forthcoming from India, Pakistan used the following tactics./105/

[1] Political lobbying at the United Nations to gather support for its political demands combined with a threat to withdraw from the United Nations by 1 January 1966 if the Kashmir issue was not settled.

[2] Link military disengagement to political settlement of the Kashmir issue.

[3] Ceasefire violations to put military pressure on India./106/

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh replied that ceasefire and troop withdrawal could only be on a reciprocal basis and India was not prepared to link the two with any political question 'Kashmir was not negotiable'./107/

105. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No. 40, 1-7 October 1965, p. 6699; No. 41, 8-14 October 1965, p. 6764.

106. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No. 41, 8-14 October 1965 p. 6712.

107. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No. 43, 22-28 October, 1965, pp. 6727-29.

Ceasefire violations only increased international pressure on Pakistan to accept Security Council resolution 215 of 5 November 1965.

SOURCES OF PAKISTAN'S MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT

Pakistan was a member of two alliances - Central Treaty Organization and South East Asia Treaty Organization. Unable to get support either diplomatically or materially from these alliances, Pakistan turned to bilateral contacts. By 7 September, it was clear that neither Britain nor United States favoured CENTO and SEATO involvement in the war./108/ On 8 September, both Britain and United States imposed arms embargoes on India and Pakistan./109/

At a press conference on 15 September, President Ayub Khan indicated that Pakistan was in favour of the United States playing a more definite role and said that the Pakistani demand for a plebesite within three months was negotiable. The United States responded by emphasising the 'route to peace lay through the United Nations'./110/

108. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No. 40, 17 October 1965, p. 6695.

109. Ibid., p. 6693.

110. Ibid., p. 6700.

The high intensity of combat resulted in a heavy expenditure of ammunition and acute shortage of spares/111/ for Pak army/112/ and airforce./113/ Pakistan made representations to China, Iran, Turkey and Indonesia. While with China and Indonesia the problem of incompatibility of force structures restricted scope of transfers during the war, United States and alliance restrictions constrained arms transfers from Iran and Turkey./114/ Considering the short time-span of the war, Pakistan could not mobilize arms from other sources./115/

Indian representations in Delhi, Ankara and Teheran were made to dissuade Iran and Turkey from supplying military material to Pakistan. Prime Minister Shastri requested the Turkish Prime Minister, in a letter addressed to him, not to exacerbate the conflict by supply of arms./116/

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh declared in Parliament "Any country supplying arms or helping Pakistan when we are subjected

111. Edgar O'Ballance, "Events in the Indian Subcontinent" Brassey's Annual: The Armed Forces Year Book 1966 (London, 1966), p. 63, Bhagat, n.85, p. 36.

112. Khan, pp. 37, 52.

113. Ibid., p. 38.

114. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

115. Ibid., p. 57

116. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No. 40, 1-7 October 1965, p. 5596.

to aggression by Pakistan will be regarded as a highly hostile act"./117/ The Indian Government also made representations with the United States and the Soviet Union to ensure that arms from those countries did not flow into Pakistan through other countries./118/

Four days before the ceasefire, Afghanistan mobilized its troops, officially explained as a precautionary measure in view of the impending general elections./119/

China and Third Party Intervention

On 4 September, Marshall Chen Yi at a stopover in Karachi supported Pakistan for "her just action in Kashmir to repeal Indian armed provocation"./120/ On 7 September, the Chinese government sternly condemned India "for its criminal aggression" against Pakistan and warned that India's aggression against any one of its neighbours concerns all its neighbours./121/ On 10th September, PLA, units in Tibet were ordered to be "highly vigilant against provocations on the part of the Indian

117. India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 3, vol. 14, Session 12 of 1965, Col. 5112.

118. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No. 40, 1-7 October 1965, p. 6696.

119. Khan, n.88, pp. 99.

120. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No. 40, 1-7 October 1965, p. 6695.

121. Peking Review (Peking), 10 September 1965.

reactionaries."/122/ The US Secretary of State warned China by stating that 'Chinese warnings to India are matters of concern if these mean that Peking has in mind putting pressure on its southern neighbours'./123/

On 17 September China delivered its ultimatum demanding India withdraw "military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself, within three days or face the consequences". Three days later, after what Peking chose to interpret as a 'conspicuous change of line' by the Indian Government, the ultimatum was extended to 22 September and later abandoned because according to Peking, "the intruding soldiers had all run away"./124/

India's response was a combination of bilateral concession, political firmness and search for international support. In response to the Chinese note of 17 September Government of India convinced that Indian troops had not built military structures in Tibetan territory, said it had "no objections to a joint inspection of these points of the Sikkim-Tibet border where Indian personnel are alleged to have set up military structures in Tibetan territory"./125/ However, India stood firm in

122. New China News Agency (Peking), 10 September 1965.

123. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No. 40, 1-7 October 1965, p. 6695.

124. New China News Agency, 23 September 1965.

125. Asian Recorder vol.11, No. 41, 8-14 October 1965, p. 6714.

rejecting China's claim "to tell us anything about what we should or should not do about Kashmir which is an integral part of India. If China persists in aggression we shall defend ourselves by all means at our disposal".//126/

India alerted the Colombo powers to exert diplomatic pressure on China to refrain from military action. On 25 September an Indian Defence Ministry spokesman announced that Chinese troops had withdrawn from positions they had recently occupied.//127/

Most of Chinese troop movements during the war took place in Ladakh and Sikkim - about 800 miles apart. The Chinese did not subsequently reinforce the Chumbi Valley in Sikkim - which is only 70 miles from East Pakistan - an area of high Indian strategic vulnerability. In Ladakh the Chinese moved units into the Demchok area - within the Indian side of the line of actual control - but nowhere did the Chinese make attempts to cross into areas actually under Indian control.//128/

Therefore, such deliberate and controlled Chinese moves were intended more to influence war termination rather than prolong the course of the war. China's objectives were the following :

126. Prime Minister Shastri's statement, India, Lok Sabha Debates Session 12, Series 3, Vol. 46, no. 25, Col. 6570-71.

127. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No.41, 8-14 October 1965, p. 6716.

128. Ibid., p. 6714.

[a] It could not countenance a major shift in India's favour in the subcontinental balance of power.

[b] To demonstrate China's credibility and usefulness as an alliance partner.

[c] To serve notice that China's interest must be taken into account in any international settlement of the Kashmir question./129/

The diplomatic repercussions of the Chinese ultimatum resulted in an increase in international pressure, in the United Nations, to bring about a ceasefire. China's calculated brinkmanship achieved its objective./130/ Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto went to the extent of calling the September 20th resolution as 'China's Resolution'./131/

Pakistan's dependence on the United States for military hardware and on China for political and diplomatic support meant that only at a minimum level could Pakistan harness external support in its war against India. The Chinese were aware of the international repercussions any involvement in the war could

129. J.D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine (California, 1977), pp. 168-69.

130. Ibid., p. 169.

131. The Times (London), 6 October 1965.

have /132/ and were keen to make Chinese military intervention contingent on Pakistan's capability and willingness to fight till its political objectives were achieved./133/ India's strategic intentions and options viz-a-viz East Pakistan have to be viewed against the above points.

Significantly, no public statement by Indian political leaders exists on record whereby India precluded military activity against Pakistani military units in East Pakistan. On 11 September 1965, Prime Minister Shastri warned Pakistan against provocative attacks in eastern India - which by that time included airstrikes against Indian airfields at Barrackpore, Kalaikunda and Bagdogra and small ingressions into Indian territory./134/

In 1966 Bhutto claimed that China had told the United States in their bilateral meetings in Warsaw that Peking would intervene in the war if East Pakistan was attacked by India./135/ However,

132. An Apprehension as expressed to Khan, n.88, p. 41.

133. Ibid., pp. 41, 49. When asked by Ayub Khan why Premier Chou En Lai was keen to meet the Pak President, Air Marshall Asghar Khan replied: "They want to be reassured that we intend to fight before they make an important commitment on India's northern borders. They want to look into your eyes to see whether you will see the thing through".

134. Times of India (Delhi), 12 September 1965.

135. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 15 March 1966, p.499. Quoted by S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London, 1973), p. 338.

another Pakistani source suggests that the United States itself was seeking to put pressure on India to extract an assurance against Indian attacks on East Pakistan to gain some foothold in Pakistan's decision making in the conduct of the war./136/

Any comprehensive analysis of Indian 'non-decision' to initiate military activity in East Pakistan would have to include the following points :

[a] The escalation of military hostilities on the western front since August 1965 had no precedence in the India-Pakistan conflict. Pakistani expectation that India would not cross the international border in September 1965 also included the belief that East Pakistan would not be involved.

[b] Military attacks from East Pakistan were intermittent and did not cause much damage./137/

[c] A triangular relationship existed between Pak military success in the western front, Chinese willingness to intervene in the hostilities and India's reluctance to draw upon forces committed for defense against China for an offensive against East Pakistan. Paradoxically, in 1965, East Pakistan's security against Indian attack lay in Pakistan's inability to drive home

136. Altaf Gauhar in Khan, n.88, pp. XV-XVI.

137. PAF air attacks on IAF bases were more a result of communication gap between West and East Pakistan rather than attacks as part of an overall strategy; Khan, n.88, p. 27.

military victories on the western front in the quest for broader political objectives.

[d] Lastly, and most significantly, India was well aware that the people of East Pakistan did not share with West Pakistan their political leadership's obsessive passion on the Kashmir issue, let alone employing military force for attaining that political objective../138/

Soviet Union and Third Party Mediation

The Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin's letter of 4 September to India and Pakistan had the following features :

- [a] It equated India with Pakistan: "Both Pakistani as well as Indian regular armed units have been engaged in military operations".
- [b] It cautioned against possible outside interference: "These forces (not identified) are not averse to instigating India and Pakistan to extend the bloodshed for the sake of their own ends which have nothing in common with the interests of Indian and Pakistani peoples".

 138. The Awami League's Six Point formula of 1966 was a manifestation of the political schism between the two wings of Pakistan.

[c] It maintained that the war was of direct concern to the Soviet Union: "We would not be frank if we did not say that a military conflict in Kashmir is a matter of concern to the Soviet Government because apart from other things it is a development in a region which directly borders on the Soviet Union".

[d] It offered the Good Offices of the Soviet Union: "As far as it concerns the Soviet Union both sides could count in this matter on its cooperation or as it is said 'good offices' in this matter, we are ready for it provided both sides consider it useful."/139/

However, Soviet attitude at the United Nations /140/ supported Indian interests. In the Security Council debate on Resolution 209 (1965) the Soviet delegate was the only representative who referred to the 'Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir'. Moreover, the Soviet delegate emphasized the importance of bilateral settlement of disputes (this in the UN?) and the Kutch settlement was held as one such example.

The Soviet Union reiterated its offer of good offices on the 7th and the 13th September carried by its news Agency Tass./141/

139. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No. 40, 1-7 October 1965, p. 6696.

140. United Nations Security Council, 1237, p. 35.

141. Asian Recorder, vol. 11, No. 40, 1-7 October 1965, p. 6697.

This lowering of the communication from the desk of the Soviet Premier to that of its official news agency, allowed the Soviet Union to make two significant changes in its stance : (a) The statement of 7 September paid tributes to India's policy of nonalignment while no mention was made of any creditable attributes of Pak foreign policy; and (b) The statement of 13 September warned that "no government has the right to add fuel to the flames".

As a response to the Chinese ultimatum of 17 September, the Soviet Union announced that it would continue her regular arms supplies to India which had been paid for by the Indian Government'. The same statement also carried a warning: "If China executed its ultimatum threatening India with grave consequences Russia would make some response"./142/ With the continuing deadlock in the United Nations and the repeated ceasefire violations after 23rd September Premier Kosygin repeated his offer on 21 November 1965. Prime Minister Shastri indicated in Parliament that the Tashkent meeting would not involve negotiations on Kashmir./143/ On 28 November 1965, it was simultaneously announced in Delhi, Rawalpindi and Moscow that the Tashkent talks would begin from 4 January 1966.

142. Ibid., p. 6712.

143. India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, vol. 54, No. 14, col. 2470, 23 November 1965,

India's response to Soviet mediation offers was consistent, governed by the fact that on the crucial issue of Kashmir, Soviet mediation would not demand any preconditions, a possibility which always plagued Indian attitudes to the United Nations. In fact, public debate in India in October through December 1965 was centered not on Soviet mediatory process per se but on the political position that the integration of Kashmir into the Indian Union was not and should not be negotiable. Pakistan's acceptance of the Tashkent meeting was conditioned by (a) its disenchantment with the United States and Great Britain (b) its failure in the United Nations as symbolized by UN Security Council resolution of 5 November 1965 and (c) the fact that between October and December 1965, Indian forces were able to stabilize and hold their positions inspite of numerous ceasefire violations. The presence of Indian troops in Pak territory /144/ and the enormous Pak effort required to sustain extremely fragile ceasefire positions without an early prospect of a military disengagement prompted Pakistan to accept Soviet mediation. In strategic terms, therefore, Tashkent symbolized Pakistan's realization that it could no longer sustain a military posture in support of an ever-eluding political goal of a 'self executing machinery for the solution of the Kashmir problem'.

144. "The psychological effect of having Indians occupy territory in the Lahore and Sialkot areas.... was to say the least humiliating". Khan, n. 88, pp. 98, 118.

CHAPTER - II

THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1971

Introduction

Starting on 3 December, the India-Pakistan War of 1971 lasted fourteen days and involved fighting on two fronts and all three mediums of combat. The war ended on the Eastern front with the surrender of Pakistani forces in Dacca on 16 December 1971. A ceasefire on the Western front came into effect on 17 December 1971.

This chapter is divided into four sections: (I) Refugees, Resistance and Approach of War: Issues in India's Policy; (II) Balance of Forces: India's Military Options; (III) Strategy: India's Use of Military Force, and (IV) Diplomatic Factors and India's Response.

Section I

REFUGEES, RESISTANCE AND APPROACH OF WAR:

ISSUES IN INDIA'S POLICY

The simmering volcano of civil strife in Pakistan blew its top with the Pak Army crackdown in Dacca on 25 March 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was arrested and flown to West Pakistan.//1/

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1. For a background to the East Pakistan Question between the elections of September 1970 and the crackdown of March 1971, see Herbert Feldman, The End and the Beginning: (contd....)

A large number of East Pakistani politicians escaped to India; what was a trickle of flow of refugees into India in late March became a flood by mid-April./2/

At this stage two decisions taken by the Indian Government were of crucial importance :

- (a) The decision to keep the borders open for the refugees; and
- (b) the decision to treat the population influx as refugees eventually to return to their country./3/

The Indian Parliament adopted a resolution moved by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, on 31 March 1971, expressing sympathy and solidarity with the people of "East Bengal in their struggle for a democratic way of life" and demanding an immediate cessation of the use of force "and assured the people of East Bengal that their "struggle and sacrifice will receive the whole hearted sympathy and support of the people of India"./4/

Pakistan 1969-71 (London, 1975), pp. 98-138; G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (London, 1974). A more comprehensive analysis is provided by Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (Dacca, 1973).

2. Figures are cited in Bangladesh Documents (Ministry of External Affairs, India), vol. II, p. 82.
3. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reasoned: "Had we had not opened our borders we would have abetted Pakistani Genocide" India and Bangladesh: Selected Speeches and Statements (Delhi, 1972), p.29. She stated in Parliament, "Relief cannot be perpetual or permanent... conditions must be created to stop further influx of refugees and to ensure their early return..." Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, p. 674.
4. Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, p. 672.

Extensive press coverage, both national and international, of the crackdown by the Pakistan Army and the plight of the refugees created a tremendous upsurge of public opinion in India demanding immediate Indian intervention and later, when on 17th April the Provisional Government of Bangladesh was formed, its immediate recognition. The demand for intervention, fuelled by exaggerated accounts of Bengali resistance to the Pak Army crackdown, was partially mollified by the Indian Parliament's resolution of 31 March 1971 and considerably weakened as the Pakistani Army fanned out into the provinces to re-establish authority by the end of April 1971.

However, the demand for the recognition of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, continued unabated. Although contacts with the exile leadership were quickly established /5/, the Indian Government stalled on the question of recognition. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh laid down the Government stand in a statement to the Rajya Sabha on 25 May 1971 :

"..... if at any time we feel that it is in the interests of peace, it is in our national interest and it also helps the people who are fighting for freedom. If we recognise another country which by the United Nations is recognized as one country,

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5. The Awami League General Secretary, Tajuddin Ahmed secured an audience with Prime Minister Gandhi as early as 2 April 1971.

it is quite obvious that that country whose part is recognized as a sovereign independent country will react"./6/

By the end of May India's position on two issues was made clear; (a) that "what was claimed to be an internal problem of Pakistan had also become an internal problem for India" and therefore, India was "entitled to ask Pakistan to desist immediately from all actions which it was taking in the name of domestic jurisdiction". This assertion was clubbed with, (b) an appeal to "the great powers who have a responsibility. If they exercise their power rightly and expeditiously then only can we look forward to durable peace in our subcontinent. But if they fail, this suppression of human rights, the uprooting of people and the continued homelessness of vast numbers of human beings will threaten peace"./7/

The Indian Government's policy towards the East Pakistan question became a subject of intense debate in India. The constituent elements of the debate had numerous roots; inter alia, (a) blanket opposition to Mrs. Gandhi's policies; (b) support emanating mostly from West Bengal for Bengalis in East Pakistan; (c) opposition to Pakistan and its military Government;

6. Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, pp. 679-80.

7. Prime Minister Gandhi's statement in the Lok Sabha, 24 May 1971, Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, pp. 672-75. (Emphasis added).

and (d) the need to avoid war at any cost and therefore dependence on international pressure to solve the East Pakistan problem./8/ The debate was notable more for the vociferousness of its articulation than for the comprehensiveness of its policy recommendations. A notable exception to this generalization was the contribution to the debate by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis under Director K. Subramanyam./9/ Whatever the extent to which this Institute reflected official Indian thinking, the debate itself became an important element of the Indian posture during 1971./10/

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh visited Moscow, Bonn, Paris, Ottawa, New York, Washington and London between 6 and 22 June 1971. This extended diplomatic effort was intended to register India's position on East Pakistan: (a) "That a political solution acceptable to the people of East Bengal was the only way of ensuring a return to normalcy", and (b) "That the present situation was grave and fraught with serious dangers for the

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8. See Sucheta Ghosh, The Role of India in the Emergence of Bangladesh (Calcutta, 1983), pp. 70-93.
 9. See compilation of his writings in K. Subramanyam, Bangladesh and India's Security (Dehradun, 1972), pp. 95-113
 10. Pakistani trepidation was evident in references to this Institute in UN Security Council debates - see Bangladesh Documents, vol. II, p. 420; Also see Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (New Delhi, 1984), p. 78.

peace and security of the region"./11/ Indian efforts were directed at reducing international economic aid to Pakistan, /12/ as continuation of military aid to Pakistan would amount to politically condoning genocide and support for Pakistan's military rulers./13/

Between the end of May and early June General Yahya Khan announced a political package for East Pakistan along with the threat to put Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on trial. India mobilized diplomatic efforts committing the Government's support for the

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11. See Statement of Minister of External Affairs in both Houses of Parliament, 25 June 1971; Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, p. 697.
 12. These efforts succeeded in as much as the Aid-Pakistan Consortium meeting in Paris adjourned on 21 June 1971 without agreement on aid. See Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (London, 1975), p. 62. Maintaining six divisions in East Pakistan cost the Pakistan exchequer \$2 million per day, Robert La Porte Jr. "Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation", Asian Survey (California), vol. 12, no. 2, February 1972, p. 102; Also see G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent (New York, 1975), p. 208.
 13. See statements of Minister of External Affairs, Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha, 6 and 12 July 1971. Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, p. 696 and pp. 698-99. Despite a US embargo on arms sales to Pakistan in March, US arms continued to flow into Pakistan - suggesting continued administration support to Pakistan. The final amount was about \$3.8 million between March and December, 1971. Michael Walter, "The US Naval Demonstration in the Bay of Bengal during 1971 India-Pakistan War", World Affairs: Quarterly Review of International Affairs, (Washington) vol. 14, no. 4, Spring, 1979, p. 298.

personal safety of the Sheikh./14/ In fact, his well being and release from detention became a cardinal element of India's policy and its definition of a political settlement of the East Pakistan crisis. India also rejected mediation efforts between India and Pakistan as it would divert attention from what was a fight between the people of Bangladesh and the military rulers of Pakistan. India also rejected the stationing of United Nations observers on the borders between India and East Pakistan on similar grounds./15/

The American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited New Delhi in the first week of July 1971. This visit provided a break-point in the evolution of the East Pakistan crisis. It demonstrated that while the United States and subsequently it was to emerge, even China, were yet probing for Indian intentions, India was well set on its path of diplomatic offensive. While in New Delhi, Kissinger probed for Indian intentions./16/ He found

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14. See Prime Minister Gandhi's statement in Parliament, Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, pp. 711-13.
 15. India's attitude towards the United Nations is set out in Swaran Singh's statement, India, Lok Sabha Debates, series 5, vol. 4, No. 26, June 28, 1971, Col. 236-37. Also see Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, pp. 660-63. For a detailed study, see K.P. Misra, Role of the United Nations in the Indo-Pakistan Conflict (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1973).
 16. "I stressed that we were bound to continue to improve our relations with Peking. On the other hand, we could take a grave view of an unprovoked Chinese attack on India", Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Delhi, 1979), p. 860.
(contd..)

India determined to have Pakistan's economic and military aid cut off./17/ From Delhi to Islamabad, Peking and then back to Islamabad onward to Washington, Kissinger sensed that the United States was being overtaken by Indian actions./18/

Far from disrupting the evolution of Indian policy towards the subcontinental crisis, Kissinger's journey to Peking sharpened the focus of India's options - for inadvertently Kissinger's China journey helped India determine its bearings in the sea of global realpolitik. Indian reaction, spelt out on 20 July 1971, demonstrated that its reading of the situation /19/

After the Peking visit Kissinger changed his stance and again in November 1971 thought Chinese intervention unlikely even if the United States were to remain neutral. By his own admission Chinese warnings were designed for Washington not Delhi, Ibid., p. 862.

17. Ibid., p. 861.
18. "Our actions were outstripped by India's deliberate acceleration of tensions. On July 24th Kaul again rejected the idea of UN personnel on the Indian side of the border. On August 4, Ambassador Jha rejected suggestions.... that India control guerrillas operating from its territory. Jha made a new suggestion... that the United States take up an offer of contact with the Bangladesh exiles in Calcutta..." Ibid., p. 866. For American contacts with the Bangladesh Government in exile, see Ibid., p. 870. T.N. Kaul was the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.
19. "While we welcome the rapprochement between Peking and Washington, we cannot look upon it with equanimity if it means the domination of the two powers over this region or tacit agreement between the two to this effect". Statement of Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh in Lok Sabha, Bangladesh Documents, vol. I, p. 708.

and its contemplated actions /20/ were designed to only reinforce existing policy towards the subcontinent, not its modification, even if that meant an extension and formalization of Indian diplomatic commitments in the form of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Apparently encouraged by China's low key and remarkably less hostile attitude towards India and the East Pakistan question, /21/ Indian statements, even after the Kissinger visit left open the possibility of improvements of relations with China". /22/ A China which was not totally committed to Pakistan's political stakes was beneficial to Indian interests in that India could use the possibility of improvement of relations as a lever with

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20. "I sincerely hope that any Sino-American detente will not be at the expense of other countries, particularly in this region. We have, therefore, for sometime been considering ways and means of preventing such a situation from arising and meeting if it should arise. In this we are not alone, and there are other countries both big and small who may be more perturbed than we are. We are in touch with the countries concerned and shall see to it that any Sino-American detente does not effect us or the other countries in this region". Ibid., p. 708 (Emphasis added)
21. In a letter, dated 12 April 1971, to General Yahya Khan, Premier Chou Enlai stated a formula that was to be repeated till December 1971, "... the Chinese Government and people will, as always, support the Pakistan Government and people in their firm struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence". There was no reference to territorial integrity. For a discussion of Chinese attitude see J.D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy (Berkeley, 1977) pp. 173-74; Subramanyam, n.9, pp. 113-28.
22. "Whatever may be the present differences we do not take any rigid view in this respect and depending upon proper response we are even prepared to create conditions for the improvement of relations". Minister of External Affairs,
(Contd....

Pakistan, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed on 9th August 1971 in Delhi after a hastily arranged arrival of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. In the context of the situation in the subcontinent Article IX of the Treaty was of particular significance :

"Each High contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either being subject to an attack or threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries."/23/

India's management of the repercussions of this diplomatic bombshell was skilful and discreet and succeeded in conveying the impression that with the treaty in place the Soviets would counsel restraint on India and Mrs. Gandhi herself would be better able to resist the tide of public opinion in favour of intervention./24/ However, far from such one-way diplomatic démarche between the Soviet Union and India, the treaty provided

(f.n.23 contd..)

Swaran Singh's statement in the Rajya Sabha quoted in The Statesman, 5th August, 1971. During July, Foreign Policy Planning and Review Committee Chairman D.P. Dhar had two meetings with the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow.

23. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in Appendix C.

24. For an American submission to this impression see, Kissinger, n.16, p. 867. A public meeting organized by the Jana Sangh to demand intervention fizzled out after the signing of the Treaty, The Statesman, 10 August 1971.

the formal context within which India and the Soviet Union sought to influence each other's position right upto the outbreak of war. That the Soviet position finally came around to coincide with that of India, was the result of Indian diplomatic bargaining between August and mid-November 1971 and not something India got on the platter by the confirmation of the Treaty.

The starting point of India's diplomatic bargaining with the Soviet Union was the formula spelt out in the joint statement issued in New Delhi at the conclusion of the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit. It referred to two interrelated points, both clubbed together in one sentence. The Soviet preference was spelt out in the first part: "Both sides,..... reiterated their firm conviction that there can be no military solution...." The next part of the sentence went on to spell out India's preference. ".... and consider it necessary that urgent steps be taken in East Pakistan for the achievement of a political solution and for the creation of conditions of safety for the return of the refugees to their homes which alone would answer the interests of the entire people of Pakistan and the cause of preservation of peace in the area"./25/

The watershed in Indo-Soviet diplomatic manoeuvring came about during Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow between 27 and 29

 25. Text of Joint Statement is reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi, Govt. of India), vol. 17, No. 8, August 1971, pp. 163-64.

September 1971. Accounts of the meetings between Mrs. Gandhi, and the Soviet triumvirate - Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny suggest intense and detailed negotiations./26/ The joint statement issued on 29th September 1971 is most significant for it spelt out peristing differences of approach of the Soviet Union and India as well as India's determination, and what is more important, Soviet recognition of such determination to take steps to ensure its national interest./27/ The pace of events quickened after Mrs. Gandhi's return. In difference to Soviet pressure India stated that a political solution need not necessarily include an independent Bangladesh. This was, however, soon retracted in the face of growing protest within the Congress Party, from the provisional Bangladesh Government, and General Yahya Khan's actions - (a) the non-inclusion of Sheikh MujiburRahman as part of a political settlement, and (b) the movement of Pak troops to concentration areas on the western front./28/

26. Pran Chopra, India's Second Liberation (Delhi, 1973), pp. 90-91.

27. "The Soviet side took into account the statement by the Prime Minister that the Government of India is fully determined to take all necessary measures to stop the inflow of refugees who are already in India and return to their homeland without delay", Text of the joint statement is reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 17, No. 9, September 1971, pp. 187-90.

28. See Times of India, 9 October 1971, 17 October 1971.

India's reaction to this was to start the process of concentration of its own forces on the western front and to increase military assistance to the Mukti Bahini in the East. This, apparently irrevocable commitment on the ground, was a signal to Pakistan as well as to the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Western capitals between 28th October and 12th November was announced. This combination of military resolve on the ground and extended diplomatic approach to the West was powerful enough for the dispatch of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin to New Delhi on 21st October 1971. During the visit Indo-Soviet consultations were officially described as taking place under Article IX of the Indo-Soviet treaty./29/

By the time Mrs. Gandhi set out on her trip to Western capitals, India's calculus of diplomatic and strategic factors in the eventuality of war in the subcontinent was more or less set. Her trip provided the twin advantages of gaining more time, for Pakistan could not attack India while she was visiting Western capitals, and more time was needed for concentrations on the Western front to be completed and cashing in on the tremendous public support that existed in the West - largely nurtured by the sympathetic international press. In Western Europe the theme of Mrs. Gandhi's speeches was (a) the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as a precondition to any political settlement, and (b) the

29. The Statesman, 27 October 1971.

immence of war in the subcontinent for which Pakistani intrasigence was responsible./30/

While in Washington, Mrs. Gandhi rejected all the three proposals set forth by the Nixon Administration: (1) withdrawal of troops from the border; (2) bilateral talks between India and Pakistan; (3) stationing of UN observers on both sides of the India-Pakistan border./31/ Whatever the original intention of the Indian diplomatic efforts in the West, Mrs. Gandhi's return to Delhi without any sign of success in mobilising international pressure from Western Europe and the United States intensified public demands for intervention./32/ With the growing number of military incidents in the East and ceasefire violations in Kashmir, Indian forces were granted permission to cross the international border in self-defence./33/ With the outbreak of war on 3 December 1971 the Indian Government granted recognition to the Government of Bangladesh on 6th December 1971, and a joint command of Indian and Bangladesh forces in the Eastern theatre was formed.

30. Gandhi, n.3, pp. 49-95.

31. Mrs. Gandhi's meeting with President Nixon were "the two most unfortunate meetings Nixon had with any foreign leader" Kissinger, n.16, p. 878.

32. The US Ambassador in Delhi was told that public pressure would not allow a pull back of Indian troops. In any case the issue was not of Indian intervention but of Indian security. *Ibid.*, p. 891.

33. Times of India, 29th November 1971.

BALANCE OF FORCES : INDIA'S MILITARY OPTIONS

Ground Forces

The Indian Army had an overall strength of 860,000 men organized into 13 infantry divisions, 10 mountain divisions and 6 independent infantry brigades. Its armour has organized into a sole armoured division and 2 independent armoured brigades. its modest paradrop capability was organized around 2 Para brigades. Pakistan began the year with 12 infantry divisions but raised four more during the course of the East Pakistan crisis, two of them raised in West Pakistan to compensate for the two infantry divisions redeployed to the East. In addition, two other infantry divisions were sought to be raised in East Pakistan from among scattered units in that province, both these divisions were understrength when hostilities broke out. Pakistan's armour consisted of 2 armoured divisions and an independent armoured brigade./34/

By 1971, the expansion plans of the Indian Army, announced soon after the 1962 India-China war and finalized in 1964, were more or less complete. The arms embargo imposed by the United States and Britain in the wake of 1965 India-Pakistan war, and

34. Military Balance, 1971-72 (London, 1971). A consolidated table of the two opposing forces is given in Appendix D.

Indian purchase of Soviet arms between 1966 and 1971 substantially modified Indian force structures as had been originally planned./35/ A major re-equipping/re-tooling of ground forces was undertaken after 1967 and while the broad contours of the overall expansion was in place, restructuring of individual units was not yet completed by 1971./36/

Among the most significant features of the Indian expansion programme completed by 1971 was the functional differentiation of units earmarked for operation in the plains and those for combat on the Himalayan frontier. With 10 mountain divisions equipped, trained and acclimatized for mountain warfare, the previous caution infused into Indian strategic thinking weakened. Besides, such a capability opened up options for redeploying some of these forces for operations in the plains./37/

In addition to 200 Centurian and 250 Sherman tanks, India had acquired 450 T-54 and T-55 Soviet made medium tanks and 300 Vijayanta tanks, manufactured in India under license. Pakistani's medium tank strength included about 200 M-47/48 Pattons, 150 T-54/55 Soviet tanks and 225 T-59 Chinese

35. Maharaj K. Chopra, "India on the Eve of the Second Defence Plan", Military Digest, (New Delhi), No. 83, October 1969, p. 40.

36. D.K. Palit, The Lightning Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War 1971 (New Delhi, 1972), p. 40.

37. An Indian mountain Division differed from its infantry counterpart in having reduced artillery/heavy gun firepower, logistic/transport complements.

tanks./38/ India's overall superiority of 2:1 in medium tanks over Pakistan was overshadowed by the operational difficulties of the Indian manufactured Vijayanta Tank./39/

Pakistan's 300 light tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles (M-24, M-41, PT-76) compared with India's 50 PT-76s and 100 AMX-13 light tanks. Soviet made PT-76s, while of little consequence against a heavy armoured force, assumed greater strategic importance in the face of an opponent, who himself lacking armoured fire power sought compensation in terrain defence. This light amphibious tank assumed importance in 1971 for operations in East Pakistan. Similarly, India's Czech-made OT-62 armoured personnel carriers, of Soviet origin, having amphibious capabilities assumed similar importance./40/

38. The presence of Soviet T-54/55 in the armouries of India and Pakistan, of the Chinese T-59 variant in Pak armoured forces is an interesting example of how international politics influences arms transfers and in turn forces structures of Third World states. T-54/55 tanks were supplied by the Soviet Union to India and Pakistan in the post-Tashkent phase of 'balancing relations' in the subcontinent, this lasted till 1969. The T-59 variant of T-54/55 owes its existence to the Sino-Soviet split. To counter the possibility of 'mistaken identities' the Indian Army placed sheet steel tubes on the 100 mm barrels to distinguish Indian T-54/55s from those of Pakistan.
39. Sukhwant Singh, India's Wars Since Independence: General Trends, vol.3 (New Delhi, 1982), pp. 63, 88-89. Over 80 per cent of the Vijayanta tank force is said to have been down with mechanical problems.
40. Efforts were made during 1971 in the specific context of use in East Pakistan to increase the number of APCs. See Singh, n.39, p. 60.

American-made M-113 armoured personnel carriers provided protection/mobility for Pak infantry forces.

Both India and Pakistan, by 1971, had moved away from dependence on the 25 pounder gun inherited from the British Indian Army. India acquired about 350 160-mm and 140 130-mm guns; while Pakistan had 130-mm guns and 105/155 mm howitzers. In addition, Pakistan had American supplied Cobra anti-tank guided weapons. In addition, both countries had improved anti-aircraft gun/missile defences./41/

In sum, both ground forces, in addition to their traditional emphasis on general purpose infantry forces, had by 1971 new elements of sophistication both in organization and armaments, but not yet tested in battle as part of their respective operational strategies. For its part, India, as a consequence of the 1965 war, improved its logistics and lines of communication in the strategically vulnerable Akhnur area, the Himalayan front and in Rajasthan./42/ Its defences in the Punjab were strengthened by the construction of the Ditch-cum-Bund (DCB)./43/

41. Chopra, n.26, p. 117.

42. Ashok kapur, "Military Situation in South Asia", Military Digest, No. 82, July 1969, pp. 16-17.

43. This consisted of an anti-tank ditch wide enough to make necessary a deliberate bridging effort to negotiate it. It was covered by a high bund, concrete fortifications for static defence. Lt. Gen. P.S. Bhagat was the moving force behind this idea. Singh, n.39, pp. 31-32.

Air Forces

In terms of numbers of combat aircraft India possessed a marked superiority with 625 as compared to Pakistan's 285. India's order of battle showed a balance between its interceptor squadrons (7 MIG-21s and 8-Gnats) and fighter bomber squadrons (5 Sukhoi 7-BM; 2 Indian Marut HF-24; 6 Hunter F-56 and 2 Mysteres). In addition, it had 3 light bomber squadrons of Canberra B1s. Pakistan's interceptor squadrons consisted of 4 Chinese MIG-19s and 1 F-104 Starfighters. Its fighter bomber squadrons were 2 of French Dassault-Breguet Mirage IIIEs and 8 of F-86 Sabres fighter bomber/interceptor squadrons. Its modest light bomber capability consisted of 1 squadron of IL-28s and 2 of Canberra B-57s./44/

In terms of role specialization, both air force inventories presented marked improvement and sophistication for the tactical application of airpower. India's tremendous advance in its MIG-21 and its derivatives supplemented an existing air defence capability of Gnats and Hunters. With the advantage of numbers India had the option of allocation of particular roles to each aircraft type available for each operation at task. Therefore, while MIG-21s could be assigned air offence/interceptor roles, the slower but equally numerous Gnats were confined to purely air defence and point defence interceptor roles. Hunters, in turn, were freed for intermediate interdiction roles.

While the quantum of aircraft with the IAF and the types available facilitated specialized role allocation, the possible employment interactions with PAF and the resulting tactical environment effected Indian apportionment of its air power in a less certain manner, for the following reasons : (a) Pakistan's army build up in the East was not accompanied by a simultaneous build-up of its air power. In fact, the reverse happened. By December 1971, a lone squadron of F-86 sabres remained stationed in the East, for, what it was worth, guarding the air space for an army of over 4 divisions strength; and (b) concentrated in the West, Pak air power, in tactical terms, presented an impressive array of roles capability. The PAF Mirage IIIE as a multi-role aircraft, in its capabilities as an all-weather interceptor, day-attack fighter, long-range fighter bomber and intruder aircraft, had no competing counterpart in the IAF./45/ However, its limited number (just 2 squadrons and tremendously costly to replace) was a saving grace for the IAF. For the PAF with an aircraft inventory partially specialized towards certain roles with the rest of the inventory technically incapable of supportive roles, selective attrition of that specialized part could be strategically disastrous. It is this possibility that

45. As a long range fighter bomber and intruder aircraft the Mirage IIIE had a combat radius of 760 km with a warload of 1400 kg. Jane's Weapons Systems 1971-72 (London, 1971), pp.304-05

made imperative for the PAF to confine itself to a strategically defensive straight jacket.

For all its advantages in numbers, the IAF did not have the operational means to take advantage of a defensively oriented opponent. Its biggest drawback lay in the absence of a deep penetration strike capability. In the face of Pak Sabres, Starfighters and the newly acquired Chinese MIG-19 cannon armed day fighters and vastly improved ground based air defence capabilities any intruding force would require disproportionately heavy interceptor escort. For this purpose the Gnats were too slow for air offence/interception and the MIG-21s lacked the required range to accompany strategic interdiction forces./46/ Besides, any diversion away from air defence roles leaving Indian air space vulnerable was politically unacceptable.

The employment doctrine of IAF tactical air support aircraft - IAF Hunters for intermediate interdiction and battlefield isolation, Sukhoi SU-7 BMs and Marut HF-24s for close air support and day time counter-air operations was dependent on the strategic intentions of ground forces. Tactical air-support aircraft would be more needed in areas of potential Pak army concentrations and more so in areas where forces would actually join in battle. Therefore, apportionment of IAF airpower was

 46. The typical combat radius of a MIG-21F was 302 nm or 560 km. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1970-71 (London, 1976), p. 496.

dependent on the evolution of the Indian Army's operational plans. The IAF, for its part in the evolution of an overall strategy, had the resources - more than 215 transport aircraft for strategic mobility, and more than 200 MI-4 and Alouette III helicopters for tactical mobility, to facilitate dependence on forces mobility as a determining ingredient of the operational strategy. If political imperatives made mobile warfare necessary, the IAF provided, in substantial measure, the technical means to make it possible.

Naval Forces

India's ability to engage in fleet-centred combat operations rested on its aircraft carrier Vikrant and the substantial investment that the Indian navy had made toward carrier-centred fleet defences. Although nowhere near a similar conceptual unit, the carrier task forces in the United States navy, carrier-based strike capability in the Seahawks and Alizes (10 and 5 respectively, at any one time on Vikrant) and carrier escorts (5 anti-submarine frigates and 3-anti-aircraft frigates) fulfilled the minimum necessary conditions for a credible combat capability. In addition, the Indian navy had acquired 4 submarines, 9 destroyer escorts (of which 5 were ex-Soviet Petya class) to the inventory of vintage ships-2 cruisers and 3 destroyers. Pakistan's naval force consisted of 3 ex-French 'Daphne' class submarines and 1 ex-US 'Tench' class submarine.

This substantial strike capability was buttressed by 3 fast anti-submarine frigates and 5 destroyer/destroyer escorts.

The employment of Indian naval forces towards strategic ends meant fulfilling two contradictory conditions : (1) the dispersal of naval forces to shadow Pak ships on the high seas and imposition of a naval blockade/counter-band both in the West and in the East; and (2) or concentration in sufficient strength to be of strategic relevance to the main battles being fought on land. In the absence of an Indian naval capability to seek and destroy the Pakistani navy, the Indian navy had to settle for an employment doctrine which combined the two; the balance being determined by the imperatives of war on land.

Factors in the Evolution of India's Military Options:

The repercussions of the hijack of an Indian Airlines aircraft to Lahore on 30th January 1971 and its subsequent destruction were strategically of the utmost significance. During this rather curious episode India slapped a suspension of over-flights of Pakistani aircraft, setting in motion a move whose significance only increased as the tumultuous year progressed./48/ In one stroke India cut Pakistan into two, necessitating lengthy and costly flights, via Colombo; and

47. Military Balance, 1971-72.

48. Speculation about the intentions of the Indian Government during the hijack episode persist to this day, suggesting an
(contd....

resisted Pakistani-mobilized international pressure until its preconditions were met./49/ More significantly India resisted Soviet pressures for resumption of Pak over-flights over Indian territory and the withdrawal of Indian forces concentrated on the Punjab border in the months of February and March./50/ When withdrawal did take place in March it was done without any reference to externally imposed conditionalities.

For about two weeks after the Pak army crackdown in Dacca, the Indian and world press were filled with exaggerated reports of Bengali resistance - dramatised by Major Zia-ur Rahman's broadcast of declaration of independence over Chittagong radio. However, by the second week of April the Pak army was able to retake most of the provincial towns, and optimism about Bengali resistance began to evaporate./51/

India's initial response to the crisis in East Pakistan was conditioned by its failure to anticipate the nature of the

48.(contd)

intentional explanation of the anti-Pakistani posture in the context of the evolving crisis in East Pakistan. However, evidence suggests that such a posture had more to do with the mid-term Lok Sabha elections and Indian domestic politics. See Jackson, n.12, p. 37.

49. India demanded compensation and return of the hijackers - something that General Yahya Khan could not do in the face of opposition from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

50. Chopra, n.26, pp. 74-75.

51. The Statesman, 17 April 1971.

political crisis and the subsequent ferocity of the Pak army crackdown. Failure of intelligence at the political and tactical levels; /52/ inadequate appreciation of the problems of guerrilla warfare; /53/ the initial euphoria about Bengali resistance and the subsequent consolidation of authority by Pak army units - swung Indian public opinion from one extreme to the other./54/ The beginning of April saw demands for immediate and outright Indian intervention;/55/ towards the end of May this had changed to a belief that the Bengali resistance forces, "given a modicum of support from India in the way of border sanctuaries, arms and ammunition, coordination and training would be sufficient eventually to defeat the Pak army and liberate Bangladesh"./56/

The constituent elements of what was eventually to become the Mukti Bahini, in April 1971, consisted of a motely crowd of deserters from the five East Bengal Regiments and the 10,000 or so ill-armed men of the East Pakistan Rifles./57/ When the

52. Chopra, n.26, p. 76.

53. Palit, n.36, p. 49. An exception to this generalization, see: Hirammay Karlekar, "War without End: Military Prospects in Bangladesh", The Statesman, 24 April 1971.

54. "It is difficult to recall the days of April, May and June without a shudder at the naivete, sense of complacency and pitiful ignorance of the Indian elite". Mohammed Ayoob, K. Subramanyam, The Liberation War (New Delhi, 1972), p. 169.

55. Sukhwant Singh, India's Wars since Independence: The Liberation of Bangladesh, vol. 1 (New Delhi, 1980), p. 12.

56. Palit, n.36, p. 49.

Indian army took over the guidance of the guerrilla movement, on 30th April 1971, it was realized /58/ that, to organize and train these ill-armed, leaderless and scattered groups of Bengali resistance fighters would require Indian effort over a long time schedule involving novel strategical and tactical concepts./59/

A majority of the exile leadership of the Bangladesh movement consisted of rightwing Awami League members who had been elected (as MNAs and MPAs) in the elections of December 1970. The initial attempts at exclusion of left wing forces among the groups fighting for liberation only resulted in highlighting the schism between the political leadership of the movement, which lay in Awami League hands, and the military strength of the movement, which lay with groups not owing allegiance to the Awami League./60/ The Awami League, with Indian support, made certain that the young men recruited along the several hundred youth reception centres were ideologically loyal to the party./61/

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57. For a detailed breakdown of the Mukti Bahini, see P.B. Sinha, IDSA Papers: Armed Forces of Bangladesh (New Delhi, 1979), pp. 1-14.
58. Singh, n.55, pp. 34-35.
59. "The subcontinent had no previous experience of the scale of partisan warfare developing in East Pakistan". Ayob, Subramanyam, n.54, pp. 153.
60. Jackson, n.12, pp. 56-57.
61. Pointed out by Kathleen Gough in, Kathleen Gough, Hari P. Sharma, (eds) Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (New York, 1973), pp. 23-31.

Since repression in East Pakistan was directed against middle class educated youth, most of the recruits were ideologically inclined towards the Awami League. Eventually more than 250,000 volunteers reported to the camps for training./62/

For the evolution of the liberation movement Indian support was both a sustaining and a cementing factor. Whatever the differences between political and military leaderships of the liberation movement, both were acutely aware of the dependence on Indian material, political and diplomatic support. The political leadership could not do without military pressure inside East Pakistan to realize its political objectives, and this was not possible and sustainable without Indian material assistance. The military leadership was also aware that India would channelize support only through the exile political leadership based on Indian soil. Besides, Indian assistance was crucial in obtaining logistical and international support./63/

The strategy of the liberation struggle - a balance between the diverse political and military inclinations of its participants and the centrality of Indian material and political support, was laid down, in early May 1971, in what came to be

62. For an account of the training of the Mukti Bahini, see S.K. Garg, Spotlight: Freedom Fighters of Bangladesh (New Delhi, 1984), Chapter 4.
63. M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangladesh Movement" Asian Survey, vol. 12, No. 3, March 1972, p. 192.

Known as the "Teliapara Document". According to this document, approved by the Bangladesh Government in exile and Indian staff officers, the strategy of the liberation war would consist of the following : (a) the raising of a large guerrilla force to engage in 'hit and run' operations, to disrupt communications and 'liquidate' collaborators of the East Pak government; (b) the enlargement of regular units of the Mukti Bahini and their deployment as sector troops to provide cover for guerrilla operation; and (c) the training of regular forces for eventual full-scale direct attacks on Pak army strongholds./64/

The recruitment and training of the Mukti Bahini begun in earnest after May 1971, began to show results by July 1971. Small group raids were conducted 5-10 miles into East Pakistan territory all along the India-East Pakistan border. During monsoons the primary objective was to cut lines of communication of outflung Pak army units. By October 1971, with increased India tactical support, three brigade forces were making deep forays into East Pakistani territory attacking Pak army strongholds. In fact the success achieved during this period led some of the resistance commanders to declare, after the

64. Talikdar Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca, 1980), p. 112.

liberation war, that even without Indian intervention the Mukti Bahini was all poised for eventual victory on its own./65/ From the Indian view-point the most significant contribution of the Mukti Bahini was to force a faulty strategic deployment of the Pak army in the East "involving a rigid outpost policy which denuded them of balance and reserves"./66/

Pakistan Army build up in East Pakistan occurred in two stages: (a) between February and April 1971, and (b) October to November 1971. At the time of the crackdown in March the Pak Army in the East consisted of the 14 Infantry division and an infantry brigade which had moved from Quetta towards the end of May 1971. Immediately after March 25, 1971, two divisions - the Pak 9 Infantry division and Pak 16 Infantry division were moved to East Pakistan./67/ These divisions were deployed in the following manner: (i) Pak 14 Infantry division moved from Dacca towards Tangail, Mymensingh and Jessore, (ii) Pak Infantry

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65. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 122-24. The time period mentioned was an additional six months. By November 1971, Pakistan's incapability to reinforce East Pakistan lay in its unfavourable strategical disposition, including Indian pressure on West Pakistan. In compounding Pakistan's tactical weakness in the East with strategical weakness, India's role cannot be overemphasized.
66. Lachhman Singh, Victory in Bangladesh (Dehradun, 1981), p. 63.
67. Fazal Mugeem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership (Islamabad, 1973), pp. 67-68.

division was deployed in the North-Dinajpur, Rangpur and Bogra; and (iii) Pak 9 Infantry division spread out towards Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong. As the strength of the units increased and their logistics improved, columns fanned out to cover the entire countryside, in company and battalion groups, pushing the resistance fighters into India./68/

At this stage, Pakistan build up and deployment in the East was done purely in terms of anti-insurgency operations and not against a manifest Indian military threat. By military inaction between April and June, 1971, India succeeded, unwittingly according to some,/69/ in doing nothing that would reverse a process which deepened Pakistan's strategic vulnerability, upsetting the traditional defence plan which provided for the security of the East in Pakistan's ability to take and hold Indian territory in the West. The two crack Infantry divisions shifted to the East considerably lessened the quantum of infantry cover available for an offensive in the West, while providing no

68. Singh, n.55, pp. 12-13.

69. For example, the concentration of Indian troops on the western front in March/April 1971, would have automatically frozen Pak redeployments to the East. While any attempt to attribute motives and offer explanations for Indian inactions can at best remain conjectural, such a myopic action would have, indeed, been an aberration in an otherwise perfect record of the Indian leadership's long-term planning and sensitivity to the logic of politico-strategic goals. For discussion of this point see, Chopra, n.26, pp. 76-79.

guarantee of a stable front in the East. A belated realization of this strategic faux pas impelled Pakistan to raise two new divisions in the West - the Pak 17 Infantry division and 33 Infantry division./70/

President Yahya Khan on 19 July 1971, threatened all-out war if India tried to capture any part of East Pakistan as a base for an independent Bangladesh./71/ This became the basis for adoption by the Pakistan Eastern command of a forward posture of defence based on border outposts./72/ This was based on the apprehension that India would implement a limited aims strategy of seizing a substantial area of East Pakistan territory, which would become the basis for the recognition of an independent state. Pak army units were dispersed in forward positions and in small penny packets on the borders. In this stage of reorganization it is important to note that Indian diplomatic and political postures more than military, compelled the 'shaping' of forces in East Pakistan./73/

70. Khan, n.67, p. 148.

71. "President Yahya Khan Threatens War", Asian Recorder, vol. 17, No. 36, 13-19 August 1971, p. 10306.

72. For details of the Border outposts strategy see, Khan, n.67, pp. 109-110. A powerful critique of this strategy is provided by M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role (London, 1976), pp. 49-53.

73. Only sketchy details are available as to what prompted the Pakistani High Command to anticipate an Indian limited aims
(contd....)

Between October and November 1971, two ad hoc divisions were raised in East Pakistan from among scattered units already there and 3 battalions transferred from the West./74/. During this period deliberate Indian military operations were undertaken in conjunction with the Mukti Bahini to apply pressure all along the border to draw out the Pak army units, thus leaving a hollow interior free for guerrilla activity. Towards November serious clashes ensued with Pak troops, notably at Kamalpur (20-22 October), Boyra (21 November) and Hilli (23-27 November)./75/

The strategic disposition of Pak forces, their distribution between the two wings and their deployment pattern in the East, by August 1971, was the single most important factor which helped to lift the aim of Indian military planning from the traditional plane of fighting a war primarily in the West with a subsidiary

73. (contd) strategy. Indian accounts point to diplomatic signals from India that it contemplated the capture of a slice of territory for rehabilitating refugees. This was done through an official note to Pakistan which "as annotated by an official source for the Indian press could only bear this meaning. Simultaneously guerrilla training and support was increased". Chopra, n.26, p. 96. Pakistani accounts refer to more hard core intelligence (dis) information of Indian military intentions, Khan, n.67, p. 109.

74. Ibid., pp. 126, 130. Ad hoc units were raised to exaggerate Pak strength. Lt. Gen. Niazi, C-in-C Pak Eastern Command, claimed: "the enemy will be flabbergasted to see these additional Headquarters. He will mentally multiply our strength accordingly. It will certainly be a deterrent to him". Quoted by Saddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender (Karachi, 1977), p. 127.

75. Palit, n.36, pp. 72-75.

force conducting limited operations in the East, to that of defining political objectives in terms of a military instrument whose focus of use would be shifted to the East. In other words, what might have been politically desirable, i.e., the creation of an independent Bangladesh, from August 1971, onwards because militarily feasible. However, from India's point of view the translation of this feasibility into a viable military option required more than just a condition of Pak strategic vulnerability; this had to be complemented by a corresponding Indian ability to exploit Pakistan's strategic weakness. This translation involved the fulfilment of two related conditions, that:

- (1) in the process of definition of political aim and the organization of the military instrument for its attainment, India should not upset its own overall defence plans rendering it strategically vulnerable;
- (2) the process of mobilizing and organizing military force be done in such a manner as to (a) at a minimum, maintain the obtaining state of Pakistan's strategic vulnerability or (b) if possible, further aggravate Pakistan's strategic weakness.

The raison d'être of Indian military planning since the 1962 India-China War and more so after the 1965 India-Pakistan war was to cater for the needs of a two-front war, with West Pakistan and

China or at best (or worst is it?) a two-and-a-quarter front war involving limited operations against East Pakistan./76/ The East Pakistan crisis seemed to demand the creation of surplus military capability to enable the Indian military to perform additory functions over and above the core functions of defence against West Pakistan and China. Additionally, while Indian political objectives could be confined to the creation of Bangladesh, the military considerations of any such action, by definition, covered a much broader area of the geo-strategic canvas.

In the generation of usable military power for the above-mentioned additory functions, diplomacy performed two crucial roles: (1) allowed time for the restructuring of the military instrument; and (2) determined the extent and quantum of redeployments of Indian military forces.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation provided the matrix within which threat assessment and redesigning of force structures proceeded. Chinese force levels in Tibet consisted of 150,000 men - a third of which was deployed for internal security duties. For any action extending beyond a mere border skirmish a Chinese build up would have been necessary taking at least a month to be completed. By October no such build up was picked up by Indian intelligence./77/ Indian

76. Palit, n.36, p. 39.

77. Chopra, n.26, p. 110; Singh, n.55, p. 74.

deployments against East Pakistan were in place by the beginning of October suggesting careful orchestration of intelligence assessment and operational planning. Forces totalling about 5 divisions were left undisturbed on the Chinese border./78/ This quantum of force is an important indicator of the logic of Indian calculations : while diplomacy could be counted upon to deter Chinese military action on the northern and eastern borders, Indian military posture was, nonetheless, underwritten by Indian military ability to contain Chinese thrusts along expected lines of ingress, especially in the Eastern sector. The fact that these forces might remain unused in war, not contributing directly to the Indian effort against Pakistan, only increased their importance : their commitment for a credible border defence against China enhanced India's scope for autonomous military action against Pakistan while increasing Indian credibility with the Soviet Union.

The Indian XXXIII corps in the Siliguri corridor, /79/ and

78. Two divisions in Sikkim, two in the NEFA area, one brigade in eastern Bhutan and one truncated division west of Bhutan. Singh, n.55, p. 72.
79. With its HQ at Siliguri this corps consisted of 20 Mountain division, already in situ. To defend the corridor 6 Mountain division was moved from U.P.-Tibet border in the Central sector, leaving one brigade behind to take on the defensive functions of 20 Mountain Brigade from the Southern Command and 71 Mountain Brigade from Nagaland were under this corps. Ibid., p. 71.

IV corps in the eastern sector, /80/ while reoriented for operations against East Pakistan retained their original functions of defence against a Chinese threat. XXXIII corps progressively assessed its operational plans against East Pakistan in the light of updated intelligence assessments of Chinese intentions./81/ The IV corps was split into two, the larger section moving to Agartala, leaving the smaller one against possible Chinese threats. While the newly created II corps in West Bengal /82/ had no conceivable link with possible Chinese intentions and the 101 communication Zone Area centred around Tura was too small to be of any consequence against China, the estimation of Chinese intentions played a most significant role in the evolution of Indian military plans against East Pakistan./83/ So much so until the very last stages of the

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80. Based at Teliamura this corps consisted of 57 Mountain division, moved from anti-insurgency operations in Mizoram, 8 Mountain division from Nagaland and 23 Mountain division which was a reserve formation for the NEFA-Bhutan sector. Ibid., p. 71.
 81. As the chances of a Chinese intervention receded the operational plans of this corps changed to greater emphasis on offense and speed, centering around the Hilli-Balurgat waistline instead of operations from the top of the cap to prevent a Pakistani-Chinese link up. Ibid., p. 81.
 82. With its newly created HQ at Krishnanagar in West Bengal this corps got 9 Infantry division from Ranchi and 4 Mountain division which was already present as part of internal security duties. Ibid., p. 71.
 83. The build up of this zone area was deliberately low key so as not to attract Pak defences. 25 Infantry brigade already deployed was sought to be strengthened by induction of 166 Infantry brigade from Rangia in Assam depending on Chinese actions. Ibid., p. 72.

the planning process Dacca was not assigned to any of the four thrusts envisaged into East Pakistan./84/

While Dacca was always recognized as the ultimate political objective, the military plans for its capture depended on (a) the relative success achieved by each of the four thrusts in relation to opposition offered - which would determine the line of thrust with greatest potential to reach Dacca in the shortest period of time; (b) the decision to commit such a thrust to the capture of Dacca would then depend upon the extent to which it could be reinforced keeping in view Indian military needs against China and West Pakistan. The deeper the tactical commitment of a particular thrust into East Pakistan the more difficult it would be to extricate it for use against West Pakistan or China. /85/ In short, the race for Dacca reflected all the major concerns of Indian strategy: the attainment of the political objective in the shortest period of time, with a force commitment that would not drain Indian military strength to the detriment of its ability to effect war termination on all the fronts, on terms acceptable to India.

84. Ibid., p. 91, Singh, n.66, p. 48.

85. Much of the necessity for interservice coordination was derived from this imperative. The mobility and flexibility of airborne and seabased fire power offered one way out of this force-commitment/warstakes dilemma.

The actual process of deployment of forces, a definitive sign of escalation, had to be balanced with the needs of Indian diplomacy; /86/ the imperative need being that the two do not work at cross purposes. The location of Indian cantonements and the scant capacity of forward area accommodation, especially in the East, meant that the movement of troops had to be synchronized not only with the needs of diplomacy but also in the pattern that would satisfy the twin needs of resisting a Pak preemptive attack provoked by such a deployment and at the same time provide a strong cover to allow concentration of forces in terms of the operational plans laid down.

By the middle of October more than 80 per cent of Pakistan's forces in the west were deployed in forward areas./87/ Indian deployments in the West did not begin until those in the East were in place by early October./88/

86. Therefore, elaborate measures were undertaken to ensure secrecy and deception. Singh, n.55, p. 49.

87. Palit, n.36, pp. 71-72.

88. Lt.Gen. Candeth, in charge of western command in 1971, looks back with a sense of relief: "What worried me most... was the whole of the western border lay unguarded as Army HQ would not allow troops to be moved... lest that should alarm Pakistan... I felt it would be more prudent first to secure the western front, before carrying the massive concentration on the eastern front... the Army HQ... thought that any move of troops to the Western border would be considered a greater threat by Pakistan.... had Yahya attacked before the middle of October he would certainly have succeeded in over-running a large part of Punjab and our narrow corridor to Jammu and Kashmir." K.P. Candeth, The Western Front: The Indo-Pakistan War 1971 (New Delhi, 1984), pp. 11-12.

The sequence and time gap between the two deployments and the Pakistani reluctance to take advantage of temporary tactical weakness in the West suggests that Pakistan was not able to make out the offense or defense orientations of Indian tactical indicators. Indian formations and their deployment sequence and the diplomatic context in which they were done may have deliberately left the Pakistani high command wondering as to the real strategic intentions of India./89/ Mrs Gandhi's trip to the Soviet Union and later to Western Europe and the United States (late September to early November) may have provided India the diplomatic platform to use its military position on the ground (forces in place in the East and in the process of deployment in the West), especially as they conveyed an impression of temporary tactical imbalance, as a ruse to further the strategic aims of progressively improving its terms of war initiation. Therefore, by mid-November, with deployments in all sectors being completed, the Indian military could well go along with the prescribed political injunction of not attacking first and containing Pak

89. Pakistani miscalculation may have been as much due to ethnocentrism in strategic calculations as 'mirror imaging' of Indian susceptibility to external pressures - something of common experience to Pakistani decision-makers. An over-emphasis on Indo-Soviet differences, say, as manifested in the Joint Communique of September 29, 1971, may have well led Pakistani leaders to miss the transition in Soviet position soon thereafter making them complacent about Soviet status-quo promoting role in the subcontinent.


preemptive attack./90/ With deployments in place Indian operational strategy could well afford to allow Indian diplomacy to manoeuvre around for its "prized kill" - the branding of Pakistan as the aggressor./91/

Section - III

STRATEGY : INDIAN USE OF MILITARY FORCE

The India-Pakistan War of 1971 involved fighting in East Pakistan (Eastern front) and with West Pakistan (Western front) and all three mediums of combat. This section seeks to describe the course of the war in the Eastern and Western fronts focussing initially on the ground battles in the various sectors in each front. Its concluding part attempts a summation of India's application of military force taking into account the extent to which air and naval power influenced India's overall strategy.

90. However, such defensive readiness was at a cost to future offensive capability, "... all of my troops were committed to the ground, those in Punjab were too dispersed to be concentrated quickly and those in Jammu and Kashmir except 10 Infantry division in Chamb and 26 Infantry division were split up perched on the tops of mountains holding picquets". Candeth, n.88, p. 297.
91. Interviews with some participants in decision-making process suggest Indian success in deliberately feeding Pakistan that an Indian preemptive attacks was imminent - provoking thereby, General Yahya Khan to jump the gun. See Ayooob, Subramanyam, n.54, p. 216; Khan, n.67, p. 167.




EASTERN_FRONTNorth-Western_Sector

Comprising about one third area of East Pakistan consisting of the districts of Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogra, Pabna and Rajshahi and bounded on the north by the Siliguri corridor, in the East by the Brahmaputra (known in East-Pakistan as Jammuna) and Ganga (known as Padma) in the South, this sector derived its importance from two factors: [a] the vulnerability of the Siliguri corridor to Pak pressure exerted from this sector disrupting Indian communication and logistical links or even a possible link up with Chinese forces in the Chumbi valley; and [b] the terrain in this sector afforded the deployment of tanks and therefore the possibility of limited Pak thrusts into Indian West Bengal. However, numerous small streams and nallas in this sector made rapid advance problematic.

The Indian XXXIII corps responsible for this sector consisted of 20 Mountain division, two independent Brigades (71 Mountain Brigade and 340 Mountain Brigade) two armoured regiments less one squadron on T-55s and one squadron of PT-76s. Pakistani defence was organized around the Pak 16 Infantry division based at Nator. Its three brigades were evenly distributed to protect the Hilli-waistline and its northern and southern flanks. This sector had more than one third of infantry and more than half of Pak armour (Chaffes) in East Pakistan./92/

BANGLA DESH



Indian conduct of operations was influenced by its deployment of forces just prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In the last week of November Indian forces, to ensure security against Pak thrusts on Indian territory, extended limited operations against Pachagarh and Thakurgaon in the north and against the Hilli waistline./93/ In the face of heavy Pak concentration and stout resistance offered at Hilli, Indian plans were modified to bypass Hilli from the north and then reach Gaibanda/Gobindgung to cut Pak forces north to the Hilli waist-line. In the event, in the face of difficult terrain and constantly shifting objectives and diversion of forces,/95/ operations in this sector became too diffused to either reduce Pak army concentrations or reach transit points along the Jamuna to contribute to the main Indian effort against Dacca. In fact, by the time the Dacca surrender came about, important towns like Dinajpur, Saidpur, Rangpur, Rajshahi and Nator were still holding out indicating that a substantial Pak fighting capability remained intact in this

93. Ibid., pp. 73-78.

94. The Hilli operation and its influence on subsequent operations is significant, for it is the only instance in the entire Bangaladesh operations of Indian attempts to reduce a Pak fortress by direct assault. See Singh, n.55, p.169.

95. On 12 December, 63 cavary regiment was shifted to the Western front, on 15th the diversion of the remaining armoured regiment weakened Indian advance on Rangpur. Singh, n.66, pp. 86, 91.

sector. On the whole about 16,000 Pak army personnel and 6000 paramilitary surrendered in this sector./96/

South-Western Sector

Facing Calcutta, this sector, bounded in the north and east by the Padma and the Meghna, resting on the Bay of Bengal in the south, had important towns like Kushtia and Pabha at the head of the Hardinge Brigade across the Padma into the north western sector; Jessore - an important communications centre with roads leading to Jhenida, Faridpur and Khulna and access to the sea. The southern portion of this sector consisted of marshlands while the northern portions offered well developed road links for an Indian advance. The importance of this sector lay in: (a) the important towns and roadlinks leading upto the Padma; and (b) the proximity of Calcutta and the possibility of a Pak thrust towards it.

Indian forces in this sector consisted of 4 Mountain division and 9 Infantry division organized under the newly raised II corps. This corps had the advantage of well developed logistic and lines of communication network and air support from Indian airfields in West Bengal. In addition, it was allotted a

96. Ibid., p. 93. Whatever the quantum of surviving Pak forces, their effective employment in battle was doomed from the start by faulty deployment - this was exploited to the full by Indian forces.

regiment each of T-55s and PT-76s and 130 mm long-range artillery and bridging equipment./97/ Pakistani defences were organized under Pak 9 Infantry division based at Jessore - with a brigade each at Jhenida, Jessore and Khulna.

The operation of the Indian 9 Infantry division was conditioned by its involvement in limited skirmishes with Pak defences on the outskirts of Jessore since 21 November 1971. As this force was leaning on Jessore defences, the lack of room for manoeuvre necessitated time consuming artillery and air attacks to reduce the strongly entrenched Pak force in that town. Although Indian fire power was able to force a Pak withdrawal from Jessore (December 6, occupied by Indian forces on December 7) the withdrawing forces succeeded in getting to Khulna in the south and across the Madhumati river. 9 Infantry division again got down to clearing small pockets of resistance and crossing small riverlets and contacted the defences of Daulatpur-Khulna on 12 December, a full five days after the fall of Jessore. The extremely slow progress of 9 Infantry division could be discerned from the fact that, facing an opposition of just one battalion, it could progress only 30 miles in four days. By the time ceasefire was effected almost the entire division was built up for the reduction of Khulna./98/

97. Singh, n.55, p. 139-40; Palit, n.36, pp. 103-104. The II corps in terms of forces, was best disposed in comparison with the other two corps to create reserves to exploit a tactical battlefield success.

98. Singh, n.55, p. 142.

The advance of 4 Mountain division in the northern part of the sector proceeded swiftly; Jhunida fell on 6 December and Magura on 8 December. However, soon thereafter, the advance slowed down with the diversion of Indian effort between concentrating on taking Faridpur and the crossing of the river Padma into the backside of the 'Dacca Bowl', and Kushtia. Fearing attacks on the extended flanks of 4 Mountain division, advancing towards Faridpur, II corps diverted effort towards securing Kushtia./99/ In spite of this, neither the demolition of the Hardinge Bridge nor the crossing over of Pak 57 Infantry Brigade could be prevented. Precious time was lost in again diverting forces to the securing of crossings over the Padma at Faridpur.

In strategic terms, II corps was poised to effect a strategic penetration into the 'Dacca Bowl' any time after 7 December. However, with the diversion of Indian effort towards Khulna and Kushtia II corps failed to contribute in any substantial measure for the attainment of the primary objective. Here again, as in the north western sector the surrender of a majority of Pak forces in the sector was effected by Pak surrender at Dacca./100/

99. Ibid., pp. 144-45; Singh, n.66, pp. 106-18.

100. Singh, n.55, pp. 146-47; Singh, n.66, p. 112.

Northern Sector

With the Jamuna on its west, the 'Dacca Bowl' formed by the Padma in the South and the Meghna in the east, this sector, consisting of the districts of Mymensingh, Tangail and Dacca, provided for Indian forces the longest but the easiest approach to Dacca. The line of advance is interrupted by only two rivers - Brahmaputra and Turag. Keeping in view the distance, this approach to Dacca was left least defended.

The Indian 101 Communications Zone Area based at Tura in Meghalaya had as its original function logistical support for formations in the north-east. The underdeveloped nature of facilities and communications restricted the quantum of force commitment in this sector. Therefore, initially only the lone 95 Mountain Brigade was committed to this sector. Similarly, facing this bridge across the border was the lone 93rd Infantry Brigade of the newly raised Pak 36 Infantry Division with its headquarters at Dacca./101/

Throughout the operations, the drawbacks of a small force with limited fire power became increasing evident. While penetration of the border was effected at two places - Kamalpur and Haluaghat, Indian commanders found it difficult to strike a balance between bypassing Pak dug in positions and reducing them.

Bypassing without reduction of Pak positions exposed flanks to attack, for whose protection not enough troops were available; laying seige on Pak positions would have required time and manpower, and the two Indian Mountain brigades did not have the heavy guns necessary for reduction of entrenched positions./102/ By the time Indian advance crossed the Brahmaputra and blocked exist routes south of Jamalpur, it had consumed all units - distributed between clearing Pak resistance around Kamalpur, protecting Indian crossings over the Brahmaputra and blocking exist routes south of Jamalpur and Mymensingh with no troops left for attack./103/ While some Pak forces surrendered on the vacation of Jamalpur and Mymensingh, other units escaped the Indian gauntlet to fallback on the Dacca defences. In fact the vacation itself was more influenced by threat to Dacca from the east - from Indian IV corps forces than from the Indian forces in the northern sector./104/

The shortcomings of the Indian advance in this sector were sought to be overcome by the employment of airpower and transport. Repeated air strikes on Kamalpur, Jamalpur and

102. Ibid., p. 188. 76 mm guns of Yugoslav origin were inadequate for reducing concrete bunkers.

103. Ibid., pp. 192-94. The advance itself was slow, with troops being transported by bullock cart on land and by ferry for river crossings - hardly an attribute of a modern army executing a blitzkrieg strategy.

104. Ibid., pp. 190, 201.

Mymensingh partly compensated for the paucity of ground based heavy fire power in the Indian Mountain brigade. In order to strengthen the Indian advance, 2 Para Brigade was air-dropped at Tangail, a 100 miles north of Dacca, on December 11. /105/ This brigade linked up with forces on the ground of December 12 and achieved considerable success in blocking the escape routes of retreating Pak forces. Thereafter, with improved concentration of forces and logistics, the Indian advance in this sector by December 14 crossed the last natural obstacle to Dacca./106/

Eastern Sector

Extending from Sylhet in the north to Cox's Bazar in the south, with the Meghna on its west, this sector offered India the opportunity to secure Dacca through the shortest route. Because of this reason this sector was held in force by Pak forces. Besides, communications links on both sides ran close to the border leaving them open for disruption from the other side.

105. Singh, n.66, p. 149. An interesting, if improbable, Pakistani account has it that initially para drops of the Indian 2 Para Brigade were mistakenly left unopposed as the arrival of the much promised Chinese help. See, Safdar Mahmood, "The Role of the Superpowers in the 1971 conflict", Strategic Studies (Islamabad), vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 1982, p. 62.

106. Increasing rout of Pak withdrawals, support from the Tiger Siddiqui guerrillas in the Tangail forests, and improved logistics through use of a landing strip in the Targail area were factors responsible for the improved pace of the Indian advance after December 12th. See Singh, n.66, pp. 151-53.

The Indian IV corps in charge of the operations in this sector was the biggest force deployed for the East Pakistan operations - three mountain divisions and two ad hoc squadrons of PT-76s tanks. In addition, seven battalions of East Bengal Regiment and Mukti Bahini assisted Indian operations in this sector. Likewise, to defend this extended sector Pakistan deployed two infantry divisions - 14 Infantry division in the Sylhet/Maulvi Bazar - Brahmanbaria area and 39th Infantry division in Comilla-Feni-Chittagong area./107/

Prewar Indian operations were aimed at securing advantageous lodgements in Pakistani territory astride Pak strongholds at Sylhet, Akhaura and Laksham. In the north, the Indian 8 Mountain division, instead of attacking Sylhet from the north, advanced into East Pakistan territory from the south and east of Sylhet capturing Shamshearnagar and its airfield on December 2, Khulana and Brahman Bazar on December 6. The advance of Indian forces from this unexpected direction compelled Pak forces in that sector to fall back towards the north to Sylhet and south towards Ashuganj. On 8 December the advance towards Sylhet was quickened by the use of helicopters for the build up of Indian forces

107. See, *Ibid.*, pp. 154-58.

108. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-70, 186-88, 206.

against that Pak stronghold./109/ Between 13-17 December when the surrender of the Sylhet fortress eventually took place /110/ the IAF was used to pound Pak positions. Operations of the division were hampered by the diversion of one of its brigades as a corps reserve for possible use against Dacca.

While the task of Indian 8 Mountain division was to bottle up Pak forces in the north, the main operational task of offensive against Pak strongholds at Comilla and Feni lay with the Indian 57 Mountain division and 23 Mountain division. The advances of these two divisions came nearest to realising the speed and manoeuvre expected of Indian forces in the East Pakistan operations. Indian 57 Mountain division captured Akhaura on 5 December and instead of proceeding according to copybook procedure, of advancing towards the Pakistan stronghold of Daud Khandi, changed course to Brahmanbaria and Ashuganj./111/

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109. Between 7-8 December, 12 MI-4 helicopters of No.110 and 105 HU airlifted more than 1117 men and 225 tons of material across river obstacles. William Green, Gordon Swanborough, Pushpinder Singh Chopra (eds), The Indian Air Force and its Aircraft (London,1982), p. 52.
110. More than 107 officers and 6500 men surrendered on December 17 - indicating that a substantial capability for resistance yet existed. See Singh, n. 55, p. 158.
111. This change in tactics is indicative of: (a) the considerable freedom of action for the military in tactical operations; (b) delegation of decision-making down the military hierarchy; and (c) of course, the brilliance and boldness of the corps commander, Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh and divisional Commander Maj. Gen. Ben Gonsalves. See Singh, n. 66, p. 196.

Similarly, the Indian 23 Mountain division was able to reach Chandpur on the Meghna by December 9. However, the presence of the substantial number of Pak forces necessitated costly assaults on Ashuganj/112/ and Maynamati./113/

The panic induced by the rapid Indian advance compelled the retreating Pak forces to blow up the bridge across the Meghna at Ashuganj with half their forces on the wrong side of the river. The Indian advance benefitted immensely from total air superiority enjoyed by the IAF, the demoralized state of Pak defences and the support of the local population./114/ IAF helicopters were used to ferry across units of the 57 Mountain division between Ashuganj and Raipura/Narsinghdi (9-10 December) and units of the 23 Mountain division from Chandpur across the Meghna river./115/ The speed of the Indian advance prevented any of the Pak troops in the outlying sectors from falling back on Dacca. With the arrival of PT-76 tanks in Narsinghdi on


112. Ibid., p. 194.

113. H.S. Sodhi, "Operational Windfall: Emergence of Bangladesh" (New Delhi, 1980), pp. 236, 238.

114. The support of the local population reduced the need for reconnaissance and local intelligence gathering, small arms transportation in rickshaw and small ferry and reduced the logistical burden of airborne troops as they could procure food from the local population, Singh, n.66, p. 197.

115. On the whole 4500 troops and 515 tons equipment were air ferried across rivers between 11-15 December. Green, Swanborough, Chopra, no.109, p. 52. See Map.

MAP-7



Source: Lachman Singh, Victory in Bangla Desh, p.225.

13 December, the assault on Dacca defences advanced from Narsinghdhi to Demra and Tungji in the northeast and from Narayanganj towards Demra from the southeast. Meanwhile, the units of 101 Communication Zone Area and 2 Para Battalion converged on Dacca through Safipur and Sabhar in the north across the Mirapur bridge into Dacca. The first Indian units to enter Dacca were from its smallest formation advancing from the northern sector. Ground shelling of Dacca began on 14 December, Indian forces entered Dacca on the night of 15 December and by the evening of 16 December, the Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army surrendered to the "Joint Command of the Indian and Bangladesh forces in the Eastern Theatre".

Western Front

Extending from Jammu and Kashmir through Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan and Gujarat, this front embraced two operational commands of the Indian Army. The Western Command, with its operation headquarters at Jullundur, was responsible for the front extending from Ladakh to the northern districts of Rajasthan. The Southern command, based at Jodhpur, was responsible for the rest of Rajasthan and Gujarat.

Jammu and Kashmir

With the ceasefire line running along most of this sector area, this sector included the Ladakh district facing both


Chinese and Pakistani forces, the Kashmir valley, the hilly area south of the Pir Panjal Range and the plains area after the Munawar Tawi river. The mountainous terrain occupying most of the area of this sector and the long tenuous lines of communication compelled both sides to deploy large number of forces just for defensive/holding positions.

The Indian XV corps in charge of operations in this sector had under its charge five infantry divisions. The 3 Infantry division faced the Chinese in Ladakh, 19 Infantry division was in charge of defense of the Kashmir valley; 25 Infantry division was deployed in the hills of Poonch/Rajouri. Chamb was defended by a whole division - 10 Infantry division, and 26 Infantry division was deployed in Jammu. Facing this force were the 12 and 23 Infantry division of Pakistan's I corps. In addition Pakistan deployed a large number of paramilitary forces recruited and trained for operations across Pakistan-occupied Kashmir./116/ The Chinese had deployed a division force across the Indo-Tibetan border/117/ and while a possibility of a Sino-Pak linkup could not be ruled out in that area, given the time framework required for a build up and the long tenuous link of communication, the Chinese threat was not expected to materialize. A reverse


116. Sukhwant Singh, India's Wars Since Independence. Defence of the Western Border, vol. 2 (New Delhi, 1981), p. 20. See Map 8.

117. Ibid., p. 2.

MAP-8



Punjab



Rajasthan

SOURCE: ROBERT JACKSON, SOUTH ASIAN CRISIS, p117.

brigade in this area was withdrawn to strengthen Indian forces in the Ganganagar sector in Rajasthan./118/

The Indian build up, especially in the Chamb sector, was particularly large, given the experience of the 1965 War. This was done inspite of continuing restrictions of the Karachi Agreement./119/ All indicators from beyond the ceasefire line suggested the Pakistan might seek a repeat performance of its assault on Chamb in 1965. Under political directions of not initiating hostilities first, the Indian XV corps had to change its operational plans for the defence of Chamb from that which envisaged a limited offensive to unsettle Pak forces across the ceasefire line to that of deploying holding forces to survive a Pak attack and only thereafter go on to the offensive./120/ To make an already difficult task nearly impossible, XV corps was asked not to lose territory - this even while disallowing it to go on to the offensive. So powerful was this political injunction against loss of territory that Army HQ directed I corps, weakening its offensive potential in the Samba sector, to transfer a brigade to XV corps in the Poonch/Rajouri area./121/

118. The build up was objected to by the UN CMO Lt. Gen. Luis Tassara, But XV corps persisted. Candeth, n.88, p. 76.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid., p. 75.

121. Singh, n.116, p. 9.

As was expected, Pakistani attack came in strength on Chamb on the night of December 3/4. A total of 4 brigades including armour and artillery attacked Indian positions west of the Munawar Tawi river consisting of a lone brigade and two squadrons of armour./122/ Indian units withdrew on 6/7 December and secured defensive positions east of the river. Reorganized Indian units counter attacked on December 10, only to find that a substantial portion of the Pak force had withdrawn to reinforce Pak positions in the Sialkot-Suchetgarh area./123/ However, having suffered dislocation of the formations, Indian forces were unable to go on to the offensive to regain Indian territory west of the river./124/

Synchronized with the attack on Chamb, Pak forces aimed at isolating Poonch by infiltrating about three brigades./125/ Indian forces were able to exploit their favourable forward defense position against time-consuming surface infiltration. The IAF conducted ground support operations in the Poonch and Chamb areas - breaking up Pak attacking formations./126/ In fact

122. Candeth, n.88, p. 77.

123. Ibid., p. 83.

124. Singh, n. 116, pp. 76-77.

125. Candeth, n.88, p. 66.

126. In all 78 sorties were flown between 3-6 December in the Chamb area alone. In Poonch the IAF broke up Pak infiltration units through use of Napalm. Candeth, n.88, pp. 83-84; Singh, n.116, p. 50.

the fortunes of battle were of such importance to the Indian High Command that a disproportionately heavy commitment, especially after December 10, of IAF, was ordered to this sector./127/

Elsewhere, XV corps forces conducted holding and clearing operations in the Partapur, Kargil, Kashmir Valley and Uri sub sectors./128/ By the time ceasefire was ordered on December 17th, Indian forces had either contained limited Pak incursions or were in the process of straightening out the ceasefire line. The ceasefire did not inhibit any major Indian thrusts into Pak-occupied Kashmir as none were being contemplated. The only offensive operation conducted by XV corps was the attempt to secure lodgement in Pak territory in the Chicken-neck area astride the Chenab to protect the Akhnoor-Poonch roadway. As the operation was Infantry dominant, it was too slow to foil the escape of the opposing Chenab Rangers nor did it have enough armour to make a deeper penetration./129/ It needs to be noted

127. Candeth, n.88, p. 84. The Chamb battle was the costliest on the Western front, involving 400 Indians killed, 723 wounded and 190 missing. India lost 21,000 hectares of fertile land which was given up by Simla agreement. See Singh, n.116, p. 83.

128. Indian gains were as follows: Partapur 804 sq.kms and Kargil 110 sq.kms. In the Kashmir valley Pakistan occupied the Sipa valley; in the Uri sector Indian forces were unable to take Pak occupied territory owing to lack of leadership and disorganization. See Candeth, n.88, pp. 45, 63; Singh, n.116, pp. 29-42.

129. India occupied a total of 170 sq.kms of territory. Singh, n.116, pp. 84-85.

that no attempt was made to reinforce this thrust, the only successful one of XV corps, with forces from elsewhere, especially from Chenab after the withdrawal of the bulk of Pak forces.

South of Jammu, Panjab and Northern Rajasthan Sector

Extending from Samba, southeast of Jammu, round the Shakargarh bulge, along the Ravi into Punjab, cutting across the Lahore-Amritsar Grant Trunk Road, down along the river Sutlej into the Ganganagar district of Rajasthan, this sector more than 700 km long, was of immense geo-political importance. It contained important political and religious places, fertile tracts of land and irrigation canals and Indian communications links ran close to the international border.

The natural obstacles - the Ravi and the Sutlej were supplemented by the Ichogil canal protecting Lahore and the Ditch-cum-Bund defences in the Indian Punjab. Therefore, flank attacks assumed more importance than frontal assault. However, the scope was limited, with the Ravi bridged at one place across Dera Baba Nanak and the Sutlej at two places - opposite Ferozepur and Fazilka.

Indian forces in this sector were grouped under two corps totalling six infantry divisions, India's only armoured division and three additional armoured brigades. The extensive length of

the front necessitated the extra deployment of one independent infantry brigade and one para brigade. Of these forces, the Indian I corps responsible for Samba-Pathankot area employed three infantry divisions (54, 39, 36 Infantry divisions) and two armoured brigades against Pakistan's I corps forces consisting of three infantry divisions (5, 8, 1 Infantry divisions) one armoured division (6 Armoured Division) and an Independent Armoured Brigade (total of eleven armoured regiments). Pakistan's defence of the Shakargarh bulge was organized as forward static defences in the form of extensive land anti-tank mines and paramilitary forces with only a meagre complement of armour. The northern side of the bulge was held by Pak 15 Infantry Division, while the southern approaches were guarded by Pak 8 Infantry Division. Pakistan 6 Armoured Division and its accompanying 17 Infantry division were held back as a reserve force west of Pasrur./130/

With the above pattern of deployment of forces, it would have been necessary for the defence of the Sambha-Pathankot hump that either Indian forces go on to the offensive preempting any Pak attack; or else, while holding back, the strike forces employ adequate forces on the sides of the bulge to compell Pakistan to employ her reserve force and then strike according to the disposition of the Pak attack. In the event, neither of the two

occured. India's political imperatives precluded a preemptive armoured strike./131/ The feasibility of Indian feint attacks to force Pakistan to "reveal her hand", originally planned - one along the southern banks of the Chenab in the northern side of the buldge and the second at Gil ferry towards Pasrur from the south - decreased as forces from units so designated were diverted to Poonch and those remaining spread out to cover gaps on the flanks of the I corps operational area./132/

With the outbreak of hostilities the Indian I corps launched a two divisional thrust (54, 39 Infantry division) into the bulge. This cautious step-by-step advance, ensuring tactical balance and certainty, across extensive minefields, failed to draw out the Pak armoured division. On December 8th I corps committed its third division (36th Infantry Division) which made faster progress. This prompted the corps commander to undertake a reorganization of his forces to strengthen 36 Infantry Division line of attack./133/ Although this division was able to reach Shakargarh by 14/15th of December, the slow progress of the other two divisions and extra time thus gained enabled Pakistan to coordinate its counter-attacks. This resulted in major armoured

131. Mr. D.P. Dhar along with General Manekshaw visited the Western Command on December 1, 1971 to lay down this political injunction against preemptive attack. Candeth, n.88, p. 96.

132. Ibid., pp. 95-96; Singh, n.116, p. 95.

133. See Candeth, n.88, p. 106.

clashes between 14 and 17th of December - notably at the battle of Basantar./134/

On the whole, I corps penetrated only 8 miles in 14 days and failed to draw out to battle Pakistan's main strike force in that area./135/ While it is claimed that Indian forces could have gained the upper hand if allowed more time, /136/ the tactical disposition of each of the three divisional thrusts - narrow jabbing operations on a broad front and with little possibility of concentration for strategic penetration - it remains doubtful if the fortune of battle in the Shakargarh bulge would have been any different even if Indian operations were not cut short by the ceasefire.

Indian XI corps in charge of the area between Ravi and Sutlej and the area south of Sutlej deployed two divisions (15, 7 Infantry division) north of Sutlej one division (14 Infantry division) between Ferozepur and Fazilka and the defence of Fazilka, Suratgarh and Ganganagar was organized under an ad hoc 'Foxtrot Sector'. Facing this corps were Pakistan's IV and V corps whose both operational areas touched the Punjab border.

134. Pakistani casualties were heavy: 43 tanks destroyed and 222 men killed, to Indian 2 tanks destroyed and 169 killed. Singh, n.116, p. 105.

135. Ibid.

136. Candeth, n.88, p. 112.

Pak IV corps had two infantry divisions, and one additional infantry brigade. The armour of both these divisions was clubbed together to form Pak 3 Independent armoured brigade. Placed further south, in Multan, the II corps had Pakistan's second strike formation - its I armoured division along with three infantry divisions (18, 33, 7 Infantry Divisions) two additional brigades and two regiments of armour./137/

Fighting in this sector was mostly confined to attempts by both sides to secure favourable positions across "enclaves" of the other's territory to prevent crossings of the rivers. While Indian units attacked and secured the Pakistani enclave at Dera Baba Nanak (December 6/7), Pakistani units attacked the Hussainwala bridge across the Sutlej, opposite Ferozepur./138/ Indian forces counter attacked to secure the Shejra bulge to eliminate Pak pressure on the vulnerable spot of Khemkaran and Harike. However, Indian forces near Fazilka were too dispersed without any reserves to prevent Pak forces to secure a lodgement in Indian territory./139/

137. Ibid., pp. 115-18.

138. Ibid., pp. 124-126, 139-41.

139. Indian casualties were heavy; 189 killed, 196 missing, and 425 wounded. Ibid., p. 152.

The loss of territory in the Fazilka subsector was indicative of the stretched and disorganized state of Indian defences in the southern reaches of the XI corps operational area./140/ That the expected Pak armoured thrust in this area did not materialize had more to do with Indian operations elsewhere and not because of XI corps' success in deterring such an attack. Indian operations in the Longewala sector in the Rajasthan and in the Shakargarh bulge forced Pakistan to break up 33 and 7 Infantry divisions to send units to reinforce those areas. This resulted in the depletion of forces available for infantry cover for its 1 Armoured division thrust./141/ Moreover, the operationability of Pak 1 Armoured division was considerably weakened by determined air attacks by the IAF on its staging area in the Changa Manga forest. Damage caused to railway lines and marshalling yards carried out by the IAF as part of battlefield isolation effectively prevented the employment of Pakistan 1 Armoured division./142/

140. Designed on the lines of the Russian anti-tank defences at Stalingrad, Indian forces were organized into fortresses static defence and for use as pivots of manoeuvre for attack. Tactical imbalance was, therefore, inevitable. Singh, n.116, p. 167.

141. This is attested by Pakistani accounts : See Khan, n.67, pp. 213, 217.

142. See Candeth, n.88, p. 151; Chopra, n.26, p. 177.

Rajasthan Sector

This sector consisted of the districts of Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Barmer in Rajasthan and the Runn of Kutch in Gujarat. This front of about 1400 kilometres consisted for most part of desert tracts and the marsh lands of the Rann. The Southern Command in charge of this area had two infantry divisions (12, 11 Infantry Division) and about two regiments in all of AMX-13, Shermans and T-55s. Pakistan's 18 Infantry division under its II corps based at Multan was deployed opposite this sector.

Originally, Indian planning envisaged two divisional thrusts, one from Jaisalmer by 12 Infantry division towards Rahmyar Khan with the objective of cutting the railway line from Hyderabad to Bahanalnagar. The second thrust of 11 Infantry division was to proceed from Barmer towards Nayacheor onwards to Mirpurkhas to threaten Hyderabad. The Southern Command had no substantial reserves to influence battle on these two axes of advance, separated by a distance of 240 kilometres. /143/

Fortunately for India, after the outbreak of hostilities, before neither of these thrusts could make any headway, a limited Pakistani contingent of T-59 tanks attacked the Indian post at Longewala on 5 December. The attacking formation was scattered

and its advance halted by two IAF Hunters operating from Jaisalmer airfield./144/ In all, 17 tanks were destroyed and another 23 damaged. Eventhough this assault was contained, it nonetheless disrupted Indian 12 Infantry division advance whose operations were scaled down to a holding defensive posture. Indian 11 Infantry division in the face of negligible opposition covered 48 kilometres into the wastes of the Thar deserts in seven days. However, its advance stopped at the defences of Nayachor - by increasing reinforcements of Pak forces from Pak II corps./145/ By the time of ceasefire Indian forces were in occupation of about 12,200 sq. miles in pockets around Islamgarh, upto Naya Chor and around Nagar Parkar./146/

Main Features of India's Strategy and Performance

The 1971 war saw the partial completion of the process of functional differentiation of Indian ground forces - a process

144. In the absence of Pak air cover, Pak tanks were sitting ducks. The presence of only two Hunters is indicative of faulty interservice coordination. Although HF-24 Maruts and Gnats were introduced later, none had the loiter capability to pick targets among sand dunes. *Ibid.*, p. 211. This lack of Pak air cover is explained in Khan, n.67, p. 210. Initial absence may be explainable by imperatives of achieving surprise.

145. For logistical and communication link-up, an old railway line was repaired between Munabao and Khakhrapav. Inspite of this Indian 11 Infantry division was not structured for such long advances. The only achievement was the diversion of forces from Pak II corps, thereby reducing its potential for offensive.

146. Singh, n.116, p. 244.

that began in the aftermath of the 1962 India-China war. All formations deployed on the Western front were infantry divisions. On the eastern front, however, India had to make do with nearly six mountain divisions and an infantry division-plus for operations in an essentially plain terrain. The shortcomings in force-structure/terrain appropriateness index were evident in the paucity of integral mechanized transport, adequate river crossing equipment and heavy guns for fortified static-defence reduction./147/ Out of its frontline combat squadron strength of 38, the I A F deployed 10 squadrons against a known force of only a squadron of PAF F-86 Sabres in East Pakistan./148/ Such an overwhelming force commitment, even after complete air superiority was achieved after December 8, may be explainable by the following factors : (a) retention in the eastern theatre for defence against possible Chinese air intrusions; five squadrons of the total ten were MIG 21s and Gnats capable of such interception; (b) large air commitment to compensate for paucity of ground-based fire power of Indian mountain divisions and to enhance mobility and flexibility of these forces. Two helicopter units of the IAF remained in the east throughout the war; and

147. In the aftermath of the 1965 war, more emphasis was placed on armoured units than on artillery. These shortcomings became evident in combat operations. Singh, n.116, p. 227.

148. M.S. Chaturvedi, History of the Indian Air Force, p. 159-68.

(c) Indian air commitment in the west and carrying capacity of airfields in the Western and Central Commands of the IAF meant that additional forces could not be accommodated. In the event, only three squadrons were transferred to the western front, two of them MIG-21 interceptors. Indian deployments in the West were based along traditional concentration areas. The only exceptions were: (a) induction of two full divisions for the defence of Poonch/Rajouri and Chamb-Akhnur area, inspite of injunctions against such induction of additional forces by the Karachi agreement; and (b) extensive fortifications and obstacles in the Punjab front prompted the deployment of Indian I Armoured division by the flanks of the Punjab front - at Kot Kapura.

The application of military force was conditioned by two contrasting factors: the political injunction against preemptive attack in the west contrasted with the Indian Army's political sanction for progressive betterment of tactical positions in the east. Therefore, when the war started Indian operations in the East progressed along lines qualitatively different from those in the West, the only underlying strategic link between the operations in the two theatres being the over-arching political rationale for the attainment of which India was using military force. Between 12-15th December two armoured regiments were

shifted to the Western front - the only instance of such inter-theatre transfer of ground forces./149/

By the time hostilities broke out, Indian forces were leaning on the defences of Pak strongholds like Jessore, Hilli, Comilla and Shamshearnagar. While this disposition restricted room for manoeuvre of the leaning force, it enhanced that of the outflanking thrusts. The distribution of Indian forces in the East envisaged thrusts into the heart of East Pakistan in the form of coordinated peripheral constrictor strategy. However, out of four major thrusts, only two thrusts (of 101 Communications Zone Area from the north and IV corps from the east) converging directly towards Dacca the other two dispersing their forces towards secondary objectives. Even for those eventually to reach Dacca, coordination was effected only in the last two days of the war./150/ The speed of the Indian advance had more to do with the deployment pattern of the Pak army than with any distinctive quality of the force structures themselves. Gaps in Pak frontline defences were exploited and rout of the withdrawing Pak forces only facilitated Indian advance. This was achieved in spite of a meagre allotment of armour. Indian forces swept through gaps already in existence and their advance was -----

149. Allegations of Indian movement of forces from East to West were apparently baseless. For such allegations see, Henry Kissinger's comments in the Washington Special Action Group meeting of 8 December 1971, reprinted in Jackson, n.12, pp. 224-28.

150. Singh, n.66, p. 235.

aided by local population support and by helilift operations by the IAF. Excellent intelligence support from the Mukti Bahini and the local population acted as an indirect force multiplier - reducing the quantum of troops diverted for reconnaissance functions. In sum, the Indian advance into East Pakistan had all the gush characteristic of a blitzkrieg strategy without necessarily employing the 'punch'./151/

On the Western front, constrained by the political injunction, Indian military operations in the first phase of the war were directed towards recovering from the initial Pak thrusts into Indian territory. The only Indian offensive, the Shakargarh bulge attacks, did not find effective support from either the XV corps to the north or the XI corps to its south. The offensive itself was on a broad front with considerable forces diverted from attack echelons to flank protection. In the absence of strategic reserves no penetration of Pak defences could have been hoped for.

The Indian plans for offensive in the West were contingent on compelling Pakistan to commit her armoured strike formations. This was not achieved in Shakargarh. In the southern sector

151. The defining principle of a classical blitzkrieg is penetration not manoeuvre. Therefore, the term blitzkrieg is inappropriate for Indian corps operations in the East. For a theoretical discussion on Blitzkrieg strategy see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, 1983), pp. 35-42.

where Indian I Armoured division and Pakistan's I Armoured division were positioned, neither country retained the requisite infantry force to cover an armoured thrust. Indian forces were committed on holding positions; Pak forces designated for operation with Pak I Armoured division had to be diverted further south opposite Rajasthan. In sum, multi sectoral Indian deployment along an extensive front compelled dispersal of Pak forces; however, lack of inter-sectoral coordination prevented Indian forces from exploiting such dispersal of effort to secure strategic gains in the West.

By the 8th of December the IAF secured something that air forces only dream of - total air superiority in the East. This was put to effective use in the form of assistance to ground fire against Pak strongholds at Kushtia, Sylhet, Mymnamati and Dacca itself. Communication links for retreating Pak forces were severed especially along river ferries. Total air superiority allowed the IAF to use its helicopters for vertical envelopment of Pak forces./152/ Even minimal air opposition or coordinated ground fire could have seriously hampered operation of what was only a small force of 14 helicopters. Similarly, the paradrop at Tangail depended heavily on local support from Tiger Siddique's guerrillas.

152. So overwhelming was Indian superiority that even slow and drowsy Caribous were used for bombing raids.

In the West, the IAF retaliated against PAF bases and radar stations between 3/4 December and 6 December./153/ IAF Canberras Hunters, SU-7 Sukhois pounded PAF base targets. After 7th December, the IAF shifted focus from strategic interdiction to medium level interdiction concentrating on attacking lines of communication and on battlefield isolation./154/ Most notable examples are IAF attacks on the Changa Manga Forest basing Pakistan I Armoured Division and oil refineries near Karachi. Prominent ground support examples are IAF ground attacks near Poonch, Chamb, Fazilka and Ferozepur. The shortcomings of the IAF were, however, evident in the absence of a deep penetration capability. Canberra and Hunter deep strike raids on Pak bases proved costly as attrition rates mounted, in the face of determined combat air patrol activity of PAF aircraft over home bases with ground based radar guidance. Close in ground support activity was likewise hampered by lack of highpay load and low-speed aircraft in the IAF inventory. Mysteres and HF-24 Maruts required MIG 21 fighter support for such roles. In the crucial battle of Shakargarh, IAF aircraft were unable to dislodge

153. This was in retaliation against Pak preemptive against IAF airfields on 3 December. For an interesting explanation of its failure suggesting deliberate sabotage by PAF of strife-torn Pak Army HQ plans, see Ayooob, Subramanyam, n.51, pp. 216-18.

154. The IAF, inspite of its numerical superiority, could not afford the high attrition rates of its bombers. Singh, n.116, p. 314.

static entrenched defences although greater success was achieved in attacking mobile and therefore open targets as part of battlefield isolation. As Pakistani ground strike forces remained uncommitted, the need for extensive ground support operations did not arise. Therefore, the PAF held back its aircraft to avoid costly attrition./155/

The Indian navy announced its entry into the war with a blockbuster - the sinking of the Pakistani submarine Ghazi off Visakhapatnam on 3/4 December. Thereafter, relieved of the submarine menace, the Indian Eastern fleet centred around the 'Vikrant' - carried out operations in support of land forces in East Pakistan./156/

The flexibility of sea-based fire power and the importance of surprise in naval operations was demonstrated by the Indian navy's missile boat attack on Karachi on 4 December and again 8 December./157/ More than combat capability these daring attacks

155. The IAF sortie rate too dropped. On the whole the IAF flew 7300 sorties in 14 days, averaging 500 sorties a day. With 38 squadrons it works out to 1 sortie per aircraft per day - a turnabout rate better explainable by the decision to hold back rather than maintenance problems on the ground. See Singh, n.116, p. 319.

156. For details, see N. Krishnan, No way but Surrender: An account of the Indo-Pakistan War in the Bay of Bengal, 1971 (New Delhi, 1980), pp. 39-66.

157. The Russian made 'OSA' class missile boats with SS-N-2 Stynx missiles of range of 25 nm hit and sank two Pak destroyers - Khaibar and Shah Jahan.

depended on the element of surprise for their success./158/ The limitations of Indian naval power were well illustrated by Indian preference for contraband control instead of a more ambitious naval blockade.

The 1971 war presented numerous examples of operations conceived and executed on the basis of interservice coordination. The coordination between the Navy and the Air Force was seen in their simultaneous and coordinated attacks on Karachi. In the Eastern front, Pak targets like Chittagong and Cox's Bazar, out of reach of IAF aircraft based in northern Bengal and Meghalaya, were attacked by Seahawks and Alizes based on INS Vikrant.

Air force support to army operation was seen in Poonch, Chamb, Ashuganj, Khustia and Sylhet. Similarly the Pak assault on Longewala was battered by IAF attacks. The Longewala success of the IAF had more to do with absence of air opposition and ground fire rather than preplanned interservice coordinated action. It is important to note that during the entire war there is no instance of IAF ground support to a preplanned army offensive./159/

158. An Indian anti-submarine frigate, Khukri, was sunk by a Pak submarine. An account of how the Pak navy was caught unawares is given in Khan, n.67, pp. 230-231.

159. One Pakistan account claims that the IAF's inability to inflict attrition on PAF was responsible for the ceasefire. (contd....

The Army and Navy attempted to stage a sea-approach landing near Cox's Bazar to prevent Pakistani units from fleeing into Burma. However, the gross inexperience in marine landings became evident in this operation and the problems would have been compounded if onshore opposition had materialized.

By ceasefire time, the tactical disposition of Indian forces in the West was such that a major reorganization of forces would have been necessary for an escalation in military operations. With forces committed all along the front and the limited thrusts in Shankargarh and Rajasthan having reached their logistical limits, only a major redeployment of forces from the East could have changed the battlefield dispositions in India's favour. After Dacca's surrender in the East, a ceasefire in the West was only a logical conclusion.

(f.n. 159 contd...)

"..... the Indian attack strategy was based on a strong support from the air as part of their joint army-air operations... when the Indians realized that their airforce could not dominate in the air and guarantee free skies they gave up their more ambitious plans." Syed Shabbir Hussain, M. Tariq Qureshi, History of the Pakistan Air Force 1947-1982 (Karachi, 1982), p. 193. For a contrary view which holds that Pakistan really lost the war because of PAF inferiority. See Frank Bray, Alvin J. Cottrell, "The Armed Forces of India and Pakistan: A Comparative Assessment, RUSI and Brassey's Defence Year Book 1977-78 (London, 1977), p. 28.

IV

DIPLOMATIC FACTORS AND INDIA'S RESPONSE

United Nations Organization

On 3 December with the outbreak of hostilities, both India and Pakistan reported the state of war to the UN Secretary General, although neither state asked for a convening of the UN Security Council. But the gravity of the situation prompted nine member-states of the Security Council to demand a meeting on 4 December. Between the 4 and 6 December as many as nine draft resolutions were tabled in the Security Council. These resolutions were a combination of two or more of the following points: (a) immediate ceasefire; (b) withdrawal of troops; (c) political settlement in East Pakistan or Bangladesh, and (d) condemnation of India for aggression against Pakistan.

The United States' draft resolution of 4 December emphasised immediate ceasefire and mutual withdrawal of troops and a reference to "the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan"./160/ The Chinese draft resolution of 5 December, combined immediate ceasefire and withdrawal and condemnation of India "for committing aggression against Pakistan"./161/ The Soviet position, as

160. S/10416, 4 December 1971.

161. S/10421, 5 December 1971.

enumerated in its draft resolutions of 4 and 6 December, while calling for immediate ceasefire and cessation of all hostilities, sought efforts by Pakistan to give "immediate recognition of the will of the East Pakistan population as expressed in the election of December 1970". /162/ With a deadlock in the Security Council, the issue was passed on to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution./163/

The Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 1971 clearly indicated the opinion of a vast majority of states and their preference for the principles of non-intervention and territorial integrity./164/ The resolution was passed by 104 votes with 11 against and 10 abstentions. By the end of the first week of war, Indian military operations had reached fruition in neither of the fronts - only after 9th of December did Indian forces reach the river defences of the Dacca Bowl; India had made no spectacular gains in the West. Against this background the vetoes of the Soviet Union cast on December 5th and 6th helped India gain more time. Indian efforts were directed initially towards emphasising that the United Nations concern itself not just with the ongoing hostilities but with their causes as well. India argued that since the essential

162. S/10418, 4 December 1971; , S/10428, 6 December 1971.

163. S/RES/303, 6 December 1971.

164. S/RES/2793 (XXVI), 7 December 1971.

conflict was political, only a political settlement giving expression to the will of the people of East Pakistan, as demonstrated in the election of December 1970, would bring peace to the subcontinent./165/

With the granting of recognition to the Government of Bangladesh on December 6, India's position underwent a shift in emphasis./166/ Thereafter the centre piece of India's arguments at the United Nations was its demand for an "unconditional withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Bangladesh"./167/

Therefore, in the first phase of the war the proceedings in the United Nations were important for Indian policy for the following reasons: (a) they reflected the general trend of world opinion as expressed by governments of member states, which was not favourable; (b) they focussed on the political stances taken by the United States and China, which were again unfavourable; (c) they confirmed the political support of the Soviet Union for India's political aims, including its efforts to help the Govnment of Bangladesh to gain international recognition; and (d) the United Nations acted as a forum where Indian war aims

165. See Statements of Mr. Samar Sen, Representative of India, in the UN Security Council on December 4th and 5th Bangladesh Documents, vol. II, pp. 425, 452.

166. Pakistan broke off diplomatic relations with India on December 6, 1971.

167. Bangladesh Documents, vol. II, p. 463.

were formally crystallized. Significantly, Indian recognition of Bangladesh Government and its subsequent demand for an unconditional withdrawal of Pak forces from Bangladesh was done when Indian forces had not yet cracked the defences of the 'Dacca Bowl' nor had achieved substantial progress in the West.

Armed with the overwhelming vote in the United Nations General Assembly, the United States returned to introduce a draft resolution in the Security Council on 13 December 1971 emphasizing that India had not expressed its willingness to accept an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal as set forth in the General Assembly resolution./168/ The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. By this time, with the Pak Army being routed in Bangladesh, American concern, as expressed in repeated clarifications demanded by the US ambassador to the UN, shifted to Indian intentions on the future conduct of war-regarding Bangladesh, West Pakistan and Kashmir. On the former two Indian position was categoric :

"..... India has no territorial ambitions in Bangladesh or in West Pakistan. India would be willing to discuss any ceasefire or withdrawal which would ensure the freedom and aspirations of the people of Bangladesh and which would ensure

the vacation of aggression by Pakistani troops from Indian territory."/169/

On Kashmir, the Indian position was less categorical, reflecting its desire not to get entangled in a self-imposed diplomatic cobweb on an issue where a military solution remained an open possibility.

"As for Pakistan occupied Kashmir, I would suggest to the Representative of the United States to put this question to Pakistan concerning what its intentions are, because it is concentrating only on that part of Jammu and Kashmir which is on our side of the ceasefire line.... We shall certainly use force to repeal Pakistan's renewed aggression, whether it is in Kashmir or anywhere else in India"/170/

When the ceasefire came about on 17 December 1971, the Security Council was duly informed. In the later half of the India-Pakistan war the UN merely reflected international reactions to the war. While it played no instrumental role in bringing about peace, it continued to play a contributory role in the resettlement and rehabilitation of Bangladesh refugees returning from India.

169. Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement in the Security Council, reprinted in Bangladesh Documents, vol. II, p. 533.

170. Ibid., p. 543 (emphasis added).

Indo-Soviet Consultations

Public Soviet support for the Indian political position was spelt out in the Tass statement issued on December 5, which blamed Pakistan for the war and warned outside powers to keep out. Soviet support also was evident in the United Nations.

Consultations as part of the Indo-Soviet Treaty were initiated in the last week of October. During the war these consultations were continued and the very fact that they were public and announced before hand meant that the exercise of Indo-Soviet consultations itself was used as an instrument of diplomacy as much as the substance of those discussions was a factor in Indian wartime strategy.

Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, V.V. Kuznetsov arrived in Delhi on 12 December and with successive extensions was to remain till the end of the war. India was represented in Moscow by Foreign Policy Planning and Review Committee Chairman D.P. Dhar./171/ In the age of instant long-distance communications, the presence in the respective capitals of high ranking officials meant that India and the Soviet Union were doing more than keeping each other informed of a fast developing situation. Through this diplomatic prism local Indian military actions were magnified into geostrategic proportions. Logically, therefore,

171. The Statesman, 12 December 1971.

the task of Indian diplomacy was to maintain the freedom for autonomous military action and yet use Indo-Soviet consultations as an instrument to shield India from the international consequences of such action.

While plenty of speculation exists as to the nature of a 'tempering' influence of the Soviet Union on Indian military operations,/172/ the fact that Indian military operations could no longer be judged solely in terms of their tactical significance in regional terms, introduced a qualitative new factor in Indian strategic calculations. These were put to test under American and Chinese pressures.

American and Chinese Pressure

In a predictable and logical extension of the stance taken by the Nixon administration ever since the eruption of the crisis in East Pakistan,/173/ the United States moved to progressively increase pressure on India. The logic of American pressure was

172. See Kuldip Nayar, Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Sub-continent (Delhi, 1972), p. 181. Vijay Sen Budhiraj, "Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh", Asian Survey, vol.13. No. 5, May 1973, p. 493. The Statesman, 12 December, 1971.

173. For a labouriously concocted analysis attempting to prove that if there was ever a 'tilt' in American policy between March and December 1971, it was towards India, see, Leo B. Rose, "The Super Powers in South Asia: A Geostrategic Analysis", Orbis (Pennsylvania), vol. 22, No. 2, Summer, 1978, pp. 395-413.

operational at two levels: (a) against India itself to restrict scope for autonomy in strategic decision-making and also to undercut the material base dependent on which India had displayed a considerable capacity for strategic autarky; and (b) to bring to bear, through the Soviet Union, pressure on India to maintain a regional equilibrium acceptable by the standards of American global interests.

On 2nd December 1971, Pakistan formally invoked Article I of the 1959 bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan./174/ The next day the United States cancelled all outstanding licenses for arms equipment to India worth \$2 million and military supplies worth \$11.5 million. At the same time while economic aid to India was cut off, aid to Pakistan was declared to be under review./175/ The United States took the lead in supporting Pakistan's case at the United Nations.

By 8 December 1971, apprehension grew in the Nixon administration of the alleged Indian intentions to dismember

174. This had no significant effect on events since the State Department took refuge in "appropriate action subject to US constitutional processes", it did not specify what action to be taken. So bemoans Kissinger, n.16, p. 895.

175. See Statement by State Department Spokesman, 3 December 1971, reprinted in R.K. Jain (ed.), U.S. South Asian Relations 1947-1982, vol. 3 (Delhi, 1983), p. 28.

West Pakistan./176/ Realizing that measures taken until then had not been effective the administration searched for "what the next turn of the screw might be"./177/ American Congress and public opinion would not have permitted open assistance to Pakistan./178/ Therefore, the Nixon administration moved to a demonstration of American arms aid. It refused to give assurances to India "to ease Indian Government concern regarding help Pakistan might receive from outside sources"./179/ Jordan and Saudi Arabia had publicly expressed their desire to aid Pakistan. In the event, no substantial arms transfers took place.

The next turn of the screw were a demonstration of American arms themselves. Task Force 74 was formed sometime around 7/8 December and from its base in the Gulf of Tonkin was sent to a

176. The source of such an assessment is said to have been a mole in Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet. Kissinger, n.16, p. 901; for a contention that "Nixon and Kissinger were virtually alone in the U.S. Government in interpreting the report as they did", see Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia", Asian Survey, vol. 20, No. 4, April 1980, p. 355.
177. Henry Kissinger's loaded phrase in Washington Special Action Group Meeting, 8 December 1971, Proceedings, reprinted in Jackson, n.12, p. 225.
178. For a detailed study of US Policy under each constraints, see Dan Haendel, The Process of Priority Formulation: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 (Boulder, 1977).
179. Diplomatic cables from the State Department to US Ambassadors in India, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, reprinted in Jackson, n.12, p. 232.

holding position off Singapore by 10 December. Between 10-13 December, the Task force was held back. It set sail into the Straits of Malacca on 14th December debouching into the Andaman Sea the following day./180/

The composition of the Task Force 74 was as follows: /181/

<u>Type</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Capabilities</u>
75,000 ton nuclear powered attack carrier.	<u>USS Enterprise</u>	F-4 Phantom II aircraft with interceptor role range of 1450 km and ground attack role range of 1600 km.
'Iwo Jima' class Amphibious assault ship	<u>USS Tripoli</u>	32 helicopters and 2090 assault troops.
Guided Missile Frigate	<u>USS King</u>	Fast carrier task force screen capability in surface to air and antisubmarine protection.
"Forest Sherman" class Guided Missile Destroyers.	<u>USS Decatur</u> <u>USS Parsons</u> <u>USS Tartar</u> <u>Sam</u>	Surface to air and antisubmarine warfare for carrier protection; 127 mm guns for on shore fire.

In sum, the offensive capabilities of the Task Force consisted in its carrier aircraft capable of medium range air interception and ground attack roles and the battallion board USS Tripoli with its helicopters for asault and bridge-head securing roles.

180. James M. McConnell, Anne M. Kelly, "Super Power Naval Diplomacy: Lessons of the Indo-Pakistan Crisis of 1971", Survival (London), vol. 15, No. 5, September-October 1973, p. 290.
181. Jane's All the World's Air Craft, 1971-72, p. 361; Jane's Fighting Ships, 1971-72 (London, 1971), pp. 459, 463, 503.

During the war the Soviet Union made two reinforcements to its modest naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The first reinforcement entered the Indian Ocean on December 12, having left its base at Vladivostock around 6/7th December. The second one departed from its base on 13/14 December, sighted off Tsushima Straits on 15 December and arrived in the Indian Ocean on 18th December. The time schedule of fleet movements suggest that only the second reinforcement was a reaction to Task Force 74./182. The composition of the Soviet fleets also strengthens this contention. Consisting of Kynda and Kresta class, surface to surface missile carrying cruisers, Kashin class surface to air missile carrying destroyers and F class attack submarines, the Soviet fleets had platforms for coordinated anti-carrier operations and self-protection.

The intrusion of this potential threat of Task Force 72 as a factor into Indian strategic calculations was based on information from three sources : (a) the departure of Task Force 74 as was announced in Saigon and its progress towards the Indian Ocean must have been known to Indian intelligence. In fact, the logic of this American action suggests that indeed it was intended to be so; /183/ intercepts of messages between Pak naval

182. McConell, Kelly, n.180, p. 289.

183. Chopra, n.26, p. 197.

forces in Chittagong and Dacca and between Rawalpindi and Dacca; /184/ (c) American threats communicated to the Soviet charge d'affairs in Washington on 11 December which must have been communicated to New Delhi./185/

Indian reaction was discernible at three levels. The Task Force added a greater sense of urgency to the Indo-Soviet consultations underway in Moscow and New Delhi. Indian military operations were undertaken specifically designed to deny objectives to any invading American force./186/ Since the Task Force was a public act of intimidation, a matching demonstration of public defiance was shown by the Indian Government./187/

Numerous assessments have suggested that the American Task Force was instrumental in increasing Soviet pressure on India to

184. Krishnan, n.155, p. 53.

185. Kissinger, n.16, p. 53.

186. On December 12th, repeated naval air and air force strikes were made on airfields and dock facilities at Chittagong and Cox's Bazar to deny their use by American landing forces. Krishnan, n.155, p. 62.

187. At a mammoth public meeting in New Delhi on December 12, Mrs. Indira Gandhi warned outside powers from interfering in the war", that they some treaties or Agreements with Pakistan.... It was not a pact to fight democracy.... we do not have the weapons that they have.... But we have the soul of India.... We shall show to the world... that inner spirit of man for which India stands today cannot be crushed or shaken", Gandhi, n.3, p. 139.

settle for a ceasefire after the fall of Dacca./188/ This assessment needs to be severely qualified for the following reasons.

Ambassador L.K. Jha was called to the State Department on 9 December for an assurance that Indian warplans did not include dismemberment of West Pakistan and annexation of Kashmir. He categorically stated that there was no intention of territorial annexation in the West. He, however, gave no assurance on Kashmir. Again, on 12 December Ambassador Jha left open India's options over Kashmir./189/ This position was repeated by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in the United Nations on 13th December. Therefore, on the crucial issue of Kashmir, surely the focal point of any Indian military intentions on the Western front, the advent of the Task Force (December 10th) had no qualitative effect on Indian war plans.

Indian military operations against the ports of Chittagong and Cox's Bazar and the destruction of ships to be used for evacuation of Pak troops removed any worthwhile political objectives for which American military power could have been applied. Having been denied any worthwhile objective, by Indian

188. Kissinger, n. 16, p. 913. Safdar Mahmood, "The Role of the Superpowers in the 1971 Conflict", Strategic Studies (Islamabad), vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 1982, p. 58.

189. Kissinger, n.16, pp. 903-904, 908.

military action, the American force could not have risked an escalation beyond that of demonstration of force. This was more so because of a substantial Soviet naval combat capability in the Indian Ocean./190/

China's support for Pakistan in the United Nations was apparent throughout the war. On 16th December Chinese position on the war underwent a two-fold change. On that day the first reference of Chinese support to territorial integrity of Pakistan was made. China also issued a 'mild' protest to India alleging that its troops had crossed over into Chinese territory./191/ However, this Chinese diplomatic protest came too late and was overtaken by India's decisive victory in Bangladesh and the ceasefire on the Western front.

Dacca Surrender and Ceasefire:

By the 15th of December Indian forces advancing from the east (Indian IV corps) were just 12 kilometers from Dacca.

190. In the absence of shore-based early warning, American task forces normally employ two carriers together, using one of them for fleet defences. In the presence of Soviet surface to surface missile capability, it is doubtful if the Americans could have taken chances. Ravi Rikhye in Philip Towle (ed.) Estimating Foreign Military Power (London, 1982), p. 213.

191. New China News Agency, 16 December 1971. For a view suggesting that the Soviet Union threatened diversionary military action in Sinkiang, see, R.C. Thornton, "South Asia: Imbalance in the Subcontinent", Orbis, vol. 19, No. 3, Fall 1975, pp. 868-69.

Towards the north of the city forces of 101 Communication Zone Area were in contact with Dacca defences by the early morning of 16th December.

Indian pressure on the East Pakistan High Command was not just military. On 8 December General Manekshaw broadcast his first message on radio asking the Pak troops to surrender. Thousands of leaflets were dropped on Pak garrisons with the same message. The effect of this combination of military and psychological pressure began to tell on the East Pakistan High Command. On the afternoon of 10th December the Military Advisor to the East Pakistan Governor, through the United Nations Communications Network, sought permission from General Yahya Khan to effect a conditional ceasefire. This included an immediate ceasefire, arrangement of facilities for the repatriation of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan, withdrawal of the Indian forces from East Pakistan and the summoning of the elected representatives of East Pakistan to effect a peaceful transfer of power. This message transmitted through the UN Headquarters in New York leaked as an offer of ceasefire and provoked an immediate reaction from Islamabad denying such permission./192/

Between 11th and 14th December attention was directed to the problem of evacuation of foreign nationals from Dacca and the

192. Asian Recorder (New Delhi), vol. 18, No. 1, 1-7 January 1972, p. 10540.

possibility of American and Chinese assistance. On 14th December the I A F conducted air raids on the Government House in Dacca which promptly secured the resignation of the Governor of East Pakistan. On that day the East Pakistani Command sought conditional surrender - the terms being the regrouping and repatriation to West Pakistan of Pakistani forces and guarantees of the safety of the paramilitary forces which had cooperated with the martial law administration. The Indian reaction was to offer a cessation of air strikes for a twenty-four day period with a demand for unconditional surrender. The Pakistani response, sought to be communicated to UN to Delhi, was a ceasefire for a few hours to enable negotiations for a surrender. Apparently, even at this late stage the East Pakistani Command hoped for a conditional surrender. This message was intercepted and air raids were intensified on Dacca. The Indian Army by 16th December increased its stranglehold. Making a direct reference to General Niazi's offer of surrender, General Manekshaw demanded the surrender of Pak troops with the assurance that the provisions of the Geneva Convention would be strictly adhered to. //193/ General Niazi finally threw in his towel at 8.00 A.M. on 16th December. The 'Dacca Surrender' ceremony took place that afternoon.

193. Ibid.

In sum, four points stand out :

- 1) A skillful combination of Indian military and psychological pressure was increasingly brought to bear on the Pakistani command in Dacca. This suggests a bargaining process through graduated military responses largely facilitated by the use of the Air Force, an instrument which lends itself easily to centralized control.
- 2) Gen. Manekshaw was the central figure in articulating India's position in the operationalization of the bargaining process leading to the Dacca Surrender. This suggests a considerable delegation of visible authority to the military leadership from Indian civilian leadership.
- 3) The channels of communications were: (a) the UN networks; (b) the United States Consul General's Office in Dacca, and (c) Indian Army Communications Network. If diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan had not been broken whether the opportunity for utilization of that channel of communication for intra-war bargaining would have provided for greater visible participation of the Indian civil leadership remains a moot question.
- 4) A close relation was discernible between the Pakistani will to resist and the hope of external assistance. Between 10th and 15th December the transition from conditional

ceasefire to unconditional surrender was to a large extent explainable by the decrease in the probability of American and Chinese intervention. As a war aim, unconditional surrender of Pak forces in the East was something more than an Indian military prerogative; it represented a non-negotiable war aim of the liberation forces of Bangladesh who were partners in the joint command. The surrender itself was a testimony to the control of the Indian Army over the Bangladesh forces, a belief which prompted the Pak forces to surrender. In the event, the surrendering Pak forces were able to secure protection against Bengali reprisals./194/ Prime Minister Indira Gandhi offered an unilateral ceasefire to begin at 8.00 P.M. on the evening of 17th December over All India Radio. The element of unilateralism signifying magnanimity of a victor, and the public channel of communication, designed to be heard as much in Islamabad as in New York, Washington, Peking and probably, Moscow, increased manifold the pressure on the Pakistani High Command to follow suit./195/ Pakistan Radio announced that Pakistani forces would reciprocate the ceasefire from 7.30 P.M., 17th December 1971.

194. So much so that some Pak units were not disarmed till 19th December for self-protection against Bengali reprisals. Singh, n.66, pp. 241-42.

195. Khan, n.67, p. 217.

CHAPTER - III

INDIA'S USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WARS OF 1965 AND 1971: AN ANALYTICAL COMPARISON

Escalation - Military and Political

1965

At the height of the Kutch crisis Indian Armed Forces were placed on alert and moved to concentration areas on the Western Front. As part of the Kutch agreement mutual troop withdrawals were effected. Indian diplomacy during the Kutch crisis was characterized by dependence on external mediation; it clarified India's international position and the sources of diplomatic support in its conflictual relationship with Pakistan. Although the Indian Government did not recognize a relation between the Kutch agreement and its applicability to other contentious Indo-Pak issues, it did agree to the withdrawal of Indian forces all along the Western Front and from the Pak posts captured in Kargil.

The infiltration from Pakistan occupied Kashmir, caught the Indian Government unawares. It was slow in anticipating and determining the nature of infiltration and the extent of Pak complicity. Therefore, by the time the Indian Government came around to defining the problem as one concerning the entire gamut of Indo-Pak relations, the infiltration was well under way. The government's definition of the problem and its method

of handling it was within the framework of the United Nations restrictions governing the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Therefore, Indian military actions in Kashmir were restricted in scope and reactive in character.

The Indian Government's political determination to deal with the Kashmir infiltration was not matched by a military commitment on the ground leading to gross failure of credibility of political posture contributing to failure in military deterrence. Its effect - Pakistani incursion into Chamb - was met with local Indian tactical weakness. This restricted the scope of military options open to India to compensate for tactical weakness. A process of escalatory commitment was resorted to, as seen in the use of the IAF over Chamb. However, lack of coordination between the political and military in Indian strategy resulted in its inability to secure escalation-dominance. Loss of control over the escalation process was demonstrated in India's resort to the opening of the Lahore front - a strategic move undertaken before the tactical battle in the Chamb was fully realized. The imperative need to resort to strategic surprise to facilitate this transition in Indian strategy reduced the operational efficiency of Indian forces as they went into battle not from forward areas but from the concentration areas. The operations, especially of the Indian I corps opposite Sialkot, were effected by its mode of advance.

1971

Between January and February, Indian forces concentrated on the Western front were pulled back as part of an independently arrived at decision without any reference to external conditionalities. Against this background, the escalation of the crisis in East Pakistan was not reason enough to apply military pressure on the Western front against Pakistan. The Indian Government reasoned that such military action could only follow upon the definition of political objectives in the conflictual relationship with Pakistan.

The process of definition of political objectives was autonomous to the extent possible. The views of the provisional government of Bangladesh, Mukti Bahini and the Bangladesh refugees found expression in Indian policy but only to the extent as determined by that policy: e.g., non-recognition of the Bangladesh government till December 1971. Indian diplomacy played a most significant role in the definition of political objectives, their articulation and their mode of attainment. It provided the background to and the instrument for a process of military 'conflict-control' with Pakistan.

As a background to conflict-control, diplomacy provided the standard by which India could judge and anticipate the reaction of and repercussion on the international system of the evolving crisis in East Pakistan. This was an essential input into Indian

policy making and the definition of the schema of Indian political objectives. As an instrument of conflict-control, diplomacy provided the Indian military time to gear up for operations in East Pakistan. It also made an essential contribution to the evolution of India's strategic options; by forcing a faulty deployment pattern on the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, it enabled the Indian military to plan for the total liberation of Bangladesh instead of a limited-aims strategy. While performing an enabling function for Indian strategy, diplomacy also outlined the limits which Indian strategic planning had to take into account.

The process of escalation was gradual, with military commitments vetted at each stage through the frame of evolving Indian political objectives. The Border Security Force was initially entrusted with the task of aiding the Mukti Bahini operations. This para-military force performed the desired role without provoking Pakistani military reaction, as would have been the case had Indian military support been manifestly open from the beginning itself. By late October/early November when it did become manifestly open, India had achieved escalation-dominance - through a combination of military pressure in the East and its orchestration with other instruments of statecraft-diplomatic efforts, and management of public opinion, both foreign and domestic. Refusal to station UN observers on the Indian side of

the border with East Pakistan largely contributed to India's freedom of action.

Indian forces were brought to their concentration areas on the Western front only in mid-October, well after the process of deployment had been completed in the East. This was a tangible sign of Indian confidence in having acquired control over the escalation process. The logic of the political injunction against a preemptive attack on the Western front was related more to the expected diplomatic spin-offs, in deference to the possible military advantages of a preemptive strategy.

Force Structures and Conduct of War

1965

This war was characterized by the political imperative of not losing Indian territory along the entire stretch of the India-West Pakistan front. The distribution of forces and allotment of armour was distinctly in favour of the corps opposite Lahore whose operations were to be essentially defensive in nature. The Indian limited-aims strategy of carrying the war into Pakistan's politically sensitive territory in the Lahore front degenerated into a strategy of attrition for two reasons: (1) Indian forces did not have sufficient strategic reserves to sustain the thrusts or to take advantage of Pakistani tactical weakness; and (2) Indian forces were unable to reach the Ichogil

canal to convert it into a defensive moat against Pakistani counter-attacks. The necessity to dig-in on open ground for static-defence, with meagre anti-tank capability with Indian infantry forces, reduced the operational effectiveness of the attrition strategy.

Indian offensive operations also degenerated into a battle of attrition in the Sialkot sector due to: (1) lack of strategic reserves inducing caution on Indian commanders and their inability to commit forces for a manoeuvre-dominant operational plan; and (2) the low sustainability of Indian offensive operations - the lack of mechanized infantry forces was a restraining factor on the pace of the armoured advance.

Beyond the military task of securing the defence of Chamb/Akhnur by a diversionary attack in the Lahore sector, Indian military plans remained ambiguous as Indian political objectives in the war were also to remain undefined. The absence of tangible standards for determining the relative importance of sectors, explainable by the lack of defined political objectives, was evident in the initial emphasis on the Lahore sector and then only later on the offensive operations in the Sialkot sector. When operations in both sectors degenerated into battles of attrition with Pak forces, there were no strategic reserves that could be committed to battle to tilt the scales in India's

favour. In the absence of orchestration of military strategy with defined political objectives, the force-distributive function of strategic planning had remained stunted.

The dichotomy between the thrust of ground operations and operations of the IAF, again explainable by lack of defined political objectives to be pursued by the use of military force, was evident in the IAF efforts to secure air superiority. In the conceptual gap between the total war aims of the IAF and the more limited aim of Indian ground forces, the Indian Army operations suffered from lack of coordinated close-in-ground support from the IAF. The IAF's inability to secure air superiority was partly attributable to its lack of any deep penetration strike capability. The IAF ground support functions suffered from an imbalance in the ratio of aircraft required for air interception and fighter protection for slower aircraft operating in a hostile environment.

1971

The focus of Indian operations in the war of 1971 was in the Eastern theatre. As the Western front against Pakistan and the Himalayan front against China, had traditionally dominated Indian strategic thinking, Indian armed forces' operations in the Eastern theatre necessitated development of infrastructural capabilities and the diversion of forces from China front. The

extent of reorientation of Indian formations towards East Pakistan was determined at the outer limit by diplomatic assessment of China's intentions and the lower limit was set by the political objective sought to be achieved through the use of military force in East-Pakistan. The resulting asymmetry of capabilities vis-a-vis Pakistan in the East was only marginally in favour of India, necessitating commitment of four thrusts designed to converge on Dacca. This process of creation and retention of strategic choices in the East was at the cost of Indian strategic reserves in general and reserves for the Western front in particular.

In the event, Indian forces in the East were able to exploit weaknesses in Pakistan's deployment patterns. Inadequacies of fire power and mobility of Indian mountain divisions were compensated for by the use of air power. The resulting speed of the Indian advance induced a structural collapse of the Pakistan Army: victory by encirclement rather than attrition resulted in the capture of a large number of prisoners which became a significant factor in postwar diplomacy. Since the combat conditions of the Pakistan Army were exceptional a most important lesson of the Bangladesh campaign is that it cannot be considered testimony to the structural adequacy of the Indian military. Inhibited by political constraints and deployed on a wide front, Indian forces in the West were unable to achieve and coordinate multiple points of force concentration to offset the more advantageous Pakistani

armour capability. Indian advances into Shakargarh were slow and cautious, explainable, again, by the lack of strategic reserves to tilt the balance in India's favour and the tying down of armour advance to the pace of Indian infantry. The Indian thrust into Sind was inhibited by the constraint of weak logistic support for long-distance advances.

What was achieved by way of inter-service coordination was largely determined by the operational requirements of the Army plan, with the Navy and the Air Force structuring their operational plans accordingly. Air force support for ground operations showed a marked improvement. Operationally, this was facilitated by the induction of specialized ground-support aircraft and very favourable interception capability for local air superiority. However, the initial attempt at achieving strategic air superiority suffered from the lack of deep penetration strike aircraft. Organizationally, the introduction of Advance Air Command Headquarters at command level and Tactical Air Centre Organization at corps level improved air support for ground operations. However, any assessment of inter-service coordination in this war has to be qualified by the relatively low intensity battle-fields in the East, both in density and mobility of Pak forces, and the relative low depth of battle-fields in the West. Modern warfare demands that inter-service coordination be judged by more exacting criteria.

War as Purposive Violence: Political Consequences of Use of Military Force

1965

At the end of the war, India and Pakistan made exaggerated claims of territory captured and attrition inflicted on the other side./1/ General J.N. Chaudhuri, however, was to concede that Pakistan, at the end of the war, retained a substantial capability for future combat./2/ This was amply demonstrated in the large number of ceasefire violations between September and December 1965. These occurred mostly in Jammu and Kashmir, Sialkot and Lahore sectors./3/ With both forces face to face along the entire stretch there was little room for tactical manoeuvre for occupation of more territory. For the Indian Army tactical improvements effected in the last days of the war paid rich dividends.

However, in Rajasthan the opportunity offered by vast empty spaces led to a significant number of Pakistani attempts to occupy border positions on the sly. India was in occupation of a total of 740 sq. miles of Pakistan territory while Pakistan

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1. See Appendix E, for a compilation of these claims.
 2. The Statesman, 25th September 1965.
 3. Pak violations were as follows: 21,206 in Jammu and Kashmir; 1,423 in Punjab and 209 in Rajasthan. For a detailed description, see Aisan Recorder, vol. 11, No. 5, 10-16 December 1965, pp. 6814-15.

occupied 210 sq. miles. Ability to stabilize on favourable ground and maintain tactical balance against low-level military pressure from Pakistani forces helped India to deny Pakistan any advantage other than already gained before the ceasefire. Therefore, by the time of the Tashkent meeting Pakistan had not been able to gain any more military advantages while it lost substantial diplomatic mileage in the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 5 November 1965. In spite of the lack of any substantial bargaining chips at its disposal, Pakistan was able to count on the diplomatic process itself, sponsored as it was by the Soviet Union to pressurize India to concede on Kashmir. Pakistan insisted at Tashkent on a reference to Kashmir, while India wanted a 'No-War Declaration'. The final document reflected a balance of interests effected not so much by bilateral bargaining as by Soviet mediation. On Kashmir the agreement said /4/ : "The interests of people of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tensions between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed and each of the sides set forth its respective positions." Instead of a 'no-war declaration', India secured inclusion of a 'no force declaration' which fell short of a total Pakistani renunciation of the use of force./5/

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4. The full text of the Tashkent agreement is given in Appendix F.
 5. President Ayub Khan was to state later: "This obligation means that nations will not resort to force unless they have
(contd..

India withdrew from occupied territories and from Kargil and military defences constructed in occupied territory were also demolished. The return to status-quo-ante was nearly total.

The 1965 war had far-reaching repercussions on Pakistan's foreign and domestic policy as they related to its adversary relations with India. The war brought into sharp focus, for Pakistan, the security utility of its relations with the United States and the two alliances, SEATO and CENTO, of which Pakistan was a member./6/ President Ayub Khan personally identified with the strengthening of US-Pakistan relations, was later to suffer eclipse, the discredited nature of US-Pakistan relations playing a major role in his downfall./7/ Pakistan moved towards China for arms supplies but at the same time was able to entice the Soviet Union to balance its relations in South Asia - between a

(f.n. contd..)

explored all avenues of peaceful settlement". Quoted by G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966 (London, 1968), p. 301.

6. "After 1965, it was only diplomatic inertia which kept Pakistan within SEATO" Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy (Singapore, 1983), p. 114. Indonesia supported Pakistan and Malaysia supported India. For a detailed analysis, see, V. Suryanarayan, "Attitude of Malaysia and Indonesia" in Surendra Chopra (ed.), Perspective on Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Amritsar, 1983).
7. Shirin Tahir Kheli in Alvin Z. Rubenstein, The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia (New York, 1983), pp. 196-97. For the impact of the war on Pakistani politics, see Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan: 1958-1969 (Syracuse, 1971), pp. 45-66.

smaller aligned state that Pakistan was and a larger non-aligned India./8/

For India and Pakistan, the 1965 war was their first experience of battle, conducted along regular lines on a large scale involving populated areas. For Pakistan the economic consequences of the war devetailed into the more general political crisis in the country;/9/ President Ayub Khan's fall in 1968 led to another spell of martial law and then to crisis in East Pakistan in 1971. The 1965 war also led directly to the Awami League's Six Point Formula for autonomy for East Pakistan./10/

In India, the 1965 war did not disrupt the defence plan initiated in 1964 nor the broad contours of Indian economic planning. This in essence is the best indication of Indian military success in 1965; the ultimate purpose of any military force is to act as a shield within whose protection the ability of the state to determine its own socio-economic pattern of development is maintained. The tangible demonstration in 1965 of this ability must have surely acted as a deterrent to any

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8. This period, 1966-1969, saw considerable Indian consternation about emerging Soviet-Pakistan ties, a narration, in, Robert C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence (New York, 1982), pp. 22-27.
 9. For a detailed discussion, see, Gavin Kennedy, The Military in the Third World (London, 1974), p. 227.
 10. It is interesting to note that in historical terms the strategic repercussions of the 1965 war was felt most where India did not use military force at all.

secessionist forces in Jammu and Kashmir ever since. In fact, one analysis states that the Indian war effort in 1965 was to spur additional resource mobilization thereafter at an increased rate./11/

1971

Indian territorial and material gains in the 1971 war were impressive. It held more than 3,600 sq.miles of Pakistani territory while Pakistan held about 125 sq. kilometres of Indian territory, mostly in the Chamb sector. India held about 2,653 Pakistani prisoners of war captured on the Western front, while Pakistan held 639 prisoners. In Bangladesh, 91,596 Pakistani personnel and Civil administration officials surrendered to the Indian Army./12/ Besides, India had the tremendous psychological advantage of having demonstrated Pakistan's military weakness and its ability to preside over the creation of the new state of Bangladesh in South Asia. However, the post-war settlement in the region demonstrated, for India, that the translation of

11. Between 1961-62 and 1966-67, the revenue ratio mobilized by the Government rose from 6.4% to 7.7%. V.P. Gandhi, "India's Self Inflicted Defence Burden", Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), vol. 19, No. 35, 31 Aug. 1974, p. 1491. Also see Andre Gunder Frank, "Arms Economy and Warfare in the Third World", Third World Quarterly (London), vol. 2, No. 2, April 1980, pp. 228-50. India is reported to have spent about Rs. 500 crores worth of equipment and sustained Rs. 200 crores in noncombat damage. B.M. Kaul, Confrontation with Pakistan, p. 18; S.S. Khera, India's Defence Problem, (Bombay, 1968), p. 114.
12. Aisan Recorder, vol. 18, No.3, 15-21 January 1972, p. 10565.

military gains on the battlefield into political goal-consolidation can at best be partial and requires the continuing application of the instrument of diplomacy.

The disgrace in the 1971 War of the military paved the way for the restoration of civilian rule in Pakistan. The advent to power of a civilian President in Pakistan presented opportunities as well as liabilities for Indian policy. A civilian President in Pakistan responsive to popular needs would be less adventuristic towards India. On the other hand, the same civilian President could use popular pressure as a lever in interstate diplomacy. Between the end of the war and the Simla Agreement in June 1972, President Bhutto endeavoured to progressively reduce India's ability to extract concessions from his vanquished country. He sought to bring about Sino-American pressure on India; direct negotiations with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman were sought but the Sheikh refused to talk without prior recognition of Bangladesh. Bhutto undertook journeys to the Soviet Union and 14 African and West Asian states, the thrust of his efforts being to use diplomacy to secure international endorsement of Pakistan position on return of Pakistani POWs and occupied territory./13/

13. A Pakistani account is given by S.M. Burke, "The Post-War Diplomacy of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971", Asian Survey, vol. 13, No. 11, November 1973, pp. 1036-49.

For India, the central plank of its post-war policy for the region was the exclusion of external powers in formalising the new structure of peace in the subcontinent. The Simla Agreement of June 1972 had two important implications, one short-term and the other long-term (a) withdrawal of forces and (b) renunciation of the use of force and adherence to bilateral settlement of disputes./14/

The withdrawal of forces was to be effected all along the international border. However, in Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17th, 1971 was to be maintained superceding the ceasefire line operative under the Karachi Agreement of 1949. The implications of this were (a) military retention of border posts especially in the Kargil sector, resulting in a vastly improved tactical defensive posture; (b) diplomatic: since the new line of control was a result of bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan, the locus standi of the United Nations in the most important aspect of the Kashmir dispute - monitoring the ceasefire line - was eliminated.

Indian attempts to bring Pakistan within a framework of obligations settle differences by peaceful means secured explicit

14. An account of Indian diplomatic objectives is given in Mohammed Ayooob, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (New Delhi, 1975). The Simla Agreement is reproduced in Appendix G.

recognition in the Simla Agreement. Pakistan could no longer resort to use of force for its revisionist political ends in the subcontinent and its acceptance of this principle was an admission of a fundamental change in its foreign policy since 1947.

The Simla Agreement is a prime example of the limited utility of the gains of military victory in the present international system. While India was successful in gaining its secondary objectives of Pakistani acceptance of the new line of control and renunciation of the use of force, it could not get a final settlement of the Kashmir issue. The repatriation of the POWs to Pakistan was linked to Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh, which, in turn, threatened to put Pakistan Army personnel on trial for war crimes. India also linked the withdrawal of forces to the international border and delineation of the line of actual control in Jammu and Kashmir. This linkage was not explicitly mentioned in the Simla Agreement. The continued detention of Pakistani POWs enabled India to use it as a bargaining point in post-Simla diplomacy. The delineation process was completed by 11th December, 1972; the repatriation of prisoners of the war continued in stages ending on 29th April, 1974. /15/

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15. A Tripartite Agreement signed on 9 April 1974 between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh paved the way for the return to Pakistan of 195 Pakistani prisoners indicted for war crimes by Bangladesh. Text is reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record vol. 20, No. 4, April 1974, pp. 149-51.

The 1971 war completed the process of Pakistani disenchantment with alliances - the war provided yet another occasion to prove the futility of alliance membership. On 9 November, 1972, Pakistan officially withdrew from SEATO. It, however, decided to continue with the membership of CENTO as that alliance provided a point of access to West Asian politics - a region with which Pakistan sought increased identification.

For India, the war had the dual effect of reducing the potential threat from a humbled Pakistan while at the same time holding out the possibility of a victorious military canvass for enhanced budgetary allocations. Indian defence spending in 1972-73 reached 3.9% of the GNP, the highest since 1963-64. This increase arose from the need to pay for post-war benefits and allowances and to replace combat damage. Defence spending fell to 2.7 per cent of the GNP by 1974, the lowest since 1963. India is perhaps one among a few examples in the post-war period where a victorious limited war and an incomplete peace settlement was followed by a decrease in defence spending./16/

16. For a discussion see Raju G.C. Thomas, The Defence of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics (Delhi, 1978), pp. 220-22.

Higher Direction of War1965

Among the major domestic issues faced by the Shastri Government between April and September 1965, were the food shortage crisis, the border demarcation issues between Mysore and Maharashtra, the demand for a Punjabi Suba by Sant Fateh Singh and opposition to the Kutch Agreement. Criticism of Government policy came from within the Congress Party and from the opposition parties./17/ Although the Congress Party had a comfortable majority in Parliament /18/ the position of the Government on crucial issue of Kashmir was not consistent nor based on a long term perspective./19/ By the time the Kashmir infiltration was underway, the Shastri Government was still dealing with the aftermath of the Kutch Agreement. Domestic problems were sought to be diffused by linkage with the emerging threat from Pakistan./20/

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17. The AIIC Session in Bangalore in the third week of July 1965 adopted no formal resolution on the contentious issues - avoiding public airing of divergent views, The Statesman, 24 July 1965.
 18. A censure motion against the Government in the Lok Sabha was defeated 318 against and 66 for. The Statesman, 26 August 1965.
 19. See in particular editorial comment in The Statesman, 14 May 1965.
 20. Prime Minister Shastri appealed to Sant Fateh Singh that in view of the Pakistani threat he should not press for a separate state. The Sant relented. The Statesman, 9 August 1965.

These 'distractions' had two implications for security threat assessment. They impeded;

(a) Timely action - the security threat from Pakistan was left undefined until its manifest materialization. Intelligence failure contributed to delayed action and reduced the effectiveness of reactive action thereafter.

(b) Measured action - The failure to define political objectives left no standard by which military responses to be obtaining threat could be judged. In the event, the 'grammar' of Indian military action tended to overshadow the logic for which India was going to war with Pakistan. Inherent in any such scheme of things is the problem of deciding when to stop fighting. It stands to reason that the 1965 war could not have been very different in its consequences had the ceasefire come into effect a week earlier./21/

The situational determinants of the 1965 war effected the structural factors responsible for its conduct. General J.N. Chaudhuri testifies to the rudimentary nature of the evolutionary stage of higher direction of war in India./22/

21. Some evidence of civil-military differences over the ceasefire timing is presented in Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict, p. 367.

22. "In 1965, somehow in a rather unconventional unplanned way, a series of informal meetings started between the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister and myself.... No formal notes were kept for often it was only a clearing of minds...", J.N. Chaudhuri, India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies, pp. 44-45.

Pre-war coordination between the political and military leaderships appears to have been minimal; intra-war coordination followed not a previously established pattern, but a course charted out by the exigencies of the developing situation. It is important to note that organizational change was effected not by policy decision but by the weight of events which demanded newer and higher forms of civil-military coordination. The Chief of Army Staff, combining as he did the twin responsibilities of Chief of Staff and Chief of Service, found the demands of wartime responsibilities an "unbearable burden"./23/ Coordination was effected between the Army and Air Force because the process of escalation, since the Kutch crisis, required such coordination of services responsible for fire power, holding capacity, mobility and flexibility. Since the operational plan, being Army-dominated, did not envisage organic integration, coordination was sought and affected only at the top echelons of the staff levels of the two services. The Navy had the unenviable position of being left out of the process of higher direction of war since the reactive process of escalation did not envisage a role for that service./24/

23. Ibid., p. 49. Gen. Chaudhuri, therefore, underlined the need for a Chief of Defence Staff to free the Chief of Army Staff to deal with operational problems. Ibid., p. 50.

24. Throughout the war the Chief of Naval Staff was only informed of the situation, he was not consulted. Ibid., p. 45.

1971

The Congress (R) Party's massive victory in the mid-term General Elections of March 1971 drastically reduced the size of the opposition and consolidated Mrs. Gandhi's position within the ruling party./25/ The stabilization of the domestic political scene, especially as contrasted with the turbulent days of uncertainty since 1967, provided the most important backdrop to India's international posture during the Bangladesh crisis. It is essential to note that the political assertion of the Indian State preceeded its marked demonstration in the 1971 war and thereafter./26/

The most pertinent example is the case of West Bengal. This state was rocked by left wing violence since late 1969 and led to the massive deployment of Indian military and paramilitary forces. Elections to the state Assembly led to the formation of a coalition ministry; however with continuing political instability President's rule was reimposed in June 1971./27/ In spite of markedly disturbed conditions, the Central Government

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25. Congress (R) Party won 43.05% of the popular vote and secured 350 of the 518 Lok Sabha seats. Asian Recorder, vol. 17, No. 16, 16-22 April 1971, p. 10101.
26. For a contrary viewpoint see David H. Bayley, "India: War and Political Assertion", Asian Survey, vol. 12, No. 2 February 1972, pp. 987-96.
27. A six-party democratic front headed by Ajoy Mukherjee, consisting of the Congress (R) and five other parties, supported by the CPI, Forward Block and Congress (O) formed a coalition ministry. The Statesman, 2 April 1971.

succeeded in establishing a stable system of reception and accommodation of East Pakistan refugees. The very fact that there was no serious outbreak of epidemics, like cholera, which would have had far-reaching implications for inflow of refugees and organization of the resistance movement, is testimony to the organizational capacity and political resilience of the Indian State. This capacity opened up options for Indian policy which would not otherwise have been available.

Between March and December 1971, pointed references were made to policy differences in Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet, especially between the Prime Minister, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh./28/ It is true that as individual ministers Jagjivan Ram was more vociferous /29/ and Swaran Singh more moderate /30/ than the line taken by Mrs. Gandhi herself as leader of her government. However, no indicators point to

28. See Pran Chopra, India's Second Liberation, p. 78.
29. At a mammoth public rally held on 9th August 1971, the day the Indo-Soviet treaty of Friendship was signed, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram declared that "the refugees would go back to Mujibur Rahman's independent Bangladesh and not to Yahya Khan's Pakistan". This was in marked contrast to Mrs. Gandhi's line at the same meeting. See The Statesman, 10 August 1971.
30. As late as 8 October 1971, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh was to state that sovereign independence to Bangladesh was not necessarily the only solution to the East Pakistan crisis. Times of India, 9 October 1971. For a retraction of this position by Mrs. Gandhi, see Times of India, 15 October 1971.

differences in policy implementation, where a remarkable unity of purpose was demonstrated. The policy debate in the country, itself facilitated by the long gestation period available for evolution of national policy, and the differences of opinion articulated by members of Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet may have contributed to a posture of ambiguity the result of which is amply evident in Pakistan's confused strategic responses before the outbreak of war.

The most concrete evidence of the clarity of the definition of the objectives to be sought and the method for their achievement is to be found in the way the civil and military bureaucracy were geared up for meeting the situational demands of the East Pakistan crisis. It hardly needs mention that a bureaucratic organization is, as a rule, more attuned to routine policy processes and functions./31/ The fact that East Pakistan as an issue in India's policy was sui generis and the fact that the situational factors compelled structural coordination is testimony to the weight of authority of the political directions originating from the political leadership downwards, which indeed brought about such coordination.

31. "... till this country was overtaken by a security crisis of unprecedented dimensions our policy making processes and structures appeared to have functioned in a routine way". K. Subramanyam, Perspectives in Defence Planning (New Delhi, 1972), p. 178.

The highest decision-making body was the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet (PAC) presided over by the Prime Minister and including ministers of Defence, Home, External Affairs and Finance. This body, concerned with national security defined in the broadest political terms, had the benefit of the advice of the Service Chiefs who attended its meetings on invitation. The highest decision making body on operational matters was the Chiefs of Staff committee assisted by the Joint Planning Committee in charge of inter-service coordination of operational plans. Intelligence coordination was facilitated by a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), under the Chairmanship of Vice Chief of Army Staff consisting of representatives of the Research and Analysis Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat, the Intelligence Bureau, and Directors of Intelligence of the three services./32/ The Ministry of External Affairs had the Policy Planning and Review Committee (PPRC) in charge of politico-military and politico-economic aspects of foreign policy./33/ A Secretaries' Committee consisting of the Secretaries of Defence, Home, Finance and External Affairs and the Director Generals of

32. For a description, see, Sukhwant Singh, India's Wars, vol. I, pp. 54-55.
33. For a discussion on the weakness of Indian Foreign Policy bureaucracy regarding politico-military analysis, see, Jeffrey Benner, Structure of Decision: The Indian Foreign Policy Bureaucracy (New Delhi, 1984), pp. 152-53. The establishment of the PPRC only partially covered this weakness.

the Border Security Force and Civil Defence, was set up to coordinate policy implementation.

Any assessment of the higher direction of war in 1971 should start with the admission of the point that India had moved a long way since 1962 when organizational structures, guidelines and procedures for outlining the responsibilities of those who make assessments of threats to national security proved to be grossly inadequate. The 1971 war demonstrated India's ability to orchestrate its political and military objectives. Comprehensive coordination was achieved between the strategic and diplomatic aspects of statecraft; operational planning closely followed intelligence assessment of the evolving security environment. These standards of performance were achieved inspite of the absence of a body wholly devoted to comprehensive security threat assessment and analysis. The PCA did not have institutionalized participation of the military leadership; likewise the Chiefs of Staff Committee lacked integral political participation; the PPRC and the JIC lacked specialist staff for comprehensive assessment of the broader spectrum of politico-military threats; the Secretaries' Committee was wholly bureaucratic in composition and only largely concerned with policy implementation./34/

 34. For a discussion on proposals for modification, see, P.R. Chari in James H. Roherty (ed), Defence Policy Formulation: Towards Comparative Analysis (Dernham, 1980), pp. 142-44; K. Subramanyam, Perspectives in Defence Planning, pp. 119-38; S.K. Sinha, Higher Defence Organization in India (New Delhi, 1980).

India's success in 1971 is explainable by the following reasons:

(a) Personality: Prime Minister Gandhi, assisted by her Secretariat headed by P.N. Haksar, Chief of Army Staff Manekshaw and PPRC Chairman, D.P. Dhar contributed immensely to Indian policy formulation and implementation which cut across organizational and procedural barriers. Compatibility of personalities, weight of authority commanded in their respective spheres and mutual accessibility of the three compensated for organizational deficiencies.

(b) Nature of Threat: The long gestation period of the crisis facilitated evolution of procedures by trial and error. Over a period of time bureaucratic procedures bend under the weight of political directives.

(c) Nature of Operational Strategy and Performance: Indian operational strategy was largely pre-planned, the possibilities and limits and the time frame were largely predetermined, obviating the necessity for civil-military consultations on intra-war change of plans. The operational plan of the Army took pride of place; therefore, the need for inter-service coordination did not extend from compoundite coordination to organic integration. The overwhelming supremacy of Army/ground objectives precluded the possibility of a credible, competitive claim from the other two services, thereby obviating the need for

elaborate competition-mediation procedures on the part of the political leadership. The test of any system of decision making is best demonstrated in moments of crisis and the appearance of unexpected threats. Task Force 74 was one such stress factor for Indian decision making but its long approach schedule, its anticipated limited utility for American interests in the war and Soviet support reduced the quantum of strain that could have developed on Indian decision making bodies.

In sum, the success of the 1971 war may have been due to reasons which by their nature were transitory and ad hoc, more to do with personality and circumstance rather than institutions and procedures.

CONCLUSION

The two case studies demonstrate a dialectical relationship at two levels :

(a) At the operational level between political objectives and military means. Wars are shaped not only by the political objectives to be sought but also by the military means available to achieve them. Just as military means affect political calculations so does the definition of political objectives influence the efficacy of the use of military force;

(b) At the conceptual level : Diplomacy and strategy are mutually and continuously interactive processes. Their contribution to the efficacy of the use of military force is determined by the extent to which these processes are structured in the light of political objectives sought to be achieved by the use of military force.

In sum, it may be stated that, in 1965, Indian diplomacy that was reactive in character led to a strategy of necessity. In 1971, Indian diplomacy that was anticipatory in character contributed to and accompanied a strategy of choice.

APPENDIX A

INDIA-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT FOR CEASEFIRE IN THE RANN OF KUTCH

Whereas both the Government of India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire and to restoration of the status quo as at January 1, 1965, in the area of the Gujarat-West Pakistan border in the confidence that this will also contribute to a reduction of the present tension along the entire Indo-Pakistan border:

Whereas it is necessary that after the status quo has been established in the aforesaid Gujarat, West Pakistan border area, arrangements should be made for determination and demarcation of the border in that area:

The Articles

Now, therefore, the two Governments agree that the following action shall be taken in regard to the said area;

Article 1

There shall be an immediate ceasefire with effect from 0030 hrs, GMT, July 1, 1965.

Article 2

On the ceasefire :

- (i) All troops on both sides will immediately begin to withdraw;
- (ii) This process shall be completed within seven days;

- (iii) Indian police may then reoccupy the post at Chhadbet in strength no greater than that employed at the post on December 31, 1964;
- (iv) Indian and Pakistan police may patrol on the tracks on which were patrolling prior to January 1, 1965 provided that their patrolling will not intensify beyond that which they were doing prior to January 1, 1965 and during the monsoon period will not exceed in intensity than done during the monsoon period of 1964;
- (v) If patrols of Indian and Pakistan police should come into contact they will not interfere with each other and in particular will act in accordance with West Pakistan, India border ground rules agreed to in January 1960;
- (vi) Officials of the two Governments will meet immediately after the ceasefire and from time to time thereafter as may prove desirable in order to consider whether any problems arise in the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs (iii) to (iv) above and agree on the settlement of any such problem.

Article 3

- (I) In view of the fact that :
 - (a) India claims that there is no territorial dispute as there is a well established boundary roughly along the northern

edge of the Rann of Kutch as shown in the prepartition maps, which needs to be demarcated on the ground;

- (b) Pakistan claims that the border between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch runs roughly along the 24th Parallel as is clear from several pre-partition and post-partition documents and therefore the dispute involves some 3,500 sq. miles of territory;
- (c) At discussions in January 1960, it was agreed by Ministers of the two Governments that they would each collect further data regarding the Kutch-Sind boundary and that further discussion would be held later with a view to arriving at a settlement of this dispute;
- (d) As soon as officials have finished the task referred to in Article 2(iv) which in any case will not be later than one month after the ceasefire, Ministers of the two Governments will meet in order to agree on the determination of the border in the light of their respective claims and the arrangements for its demarcation. At this meeting and at any proceeding before the tribunal referred to in Article 3(ii) and (iv) below, each Government will be free to present and develop their case in full;
- (e) In the event of no agreement between the Ministers of the two Governments on the determination of the border being

reached within two months of ceasefire, the two Governments shall, as contemplated in the joint communique of October 24, 1959, have recourse to the Tribunal referred to in (iii) below for the determination of the border in the light of their respective claims and evidence produced before it and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding on both parties;

- (f) For this purpose there shall be constituted within four months of the ceasefire, a tribunal consisting of three persons none of whom would be a national of either India or Pakistan. One member shall be nominated by each Government and the third member who will be the Chairman, shall be jointly selected by the two Governments. In the event of the two Governments failing to agree on the selection of the Chairman within three months of the ceasefire they shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to nominate the Chairman.
- (g) The decision of the Tribunal referred to in (iii) above shall be binding on both Governments and shall not be questioned on any ground whatsoever. Both Governments undertake to implement the findings of the tribunal in full as quickly as possible and shall refer to the tribunal for decision any difficulties which may arise between them in the implementation of these findings. For that purpose the

Tribunal shall remain in being until its findings have been implemented in full.

[Source: Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi, Government of India) vol. 11, No. 6, June 1965, pp. 130-31.]

APPENDIX B

MILITARY BALANCE 1965-1966INDIA

<u>General</u>	<u>1965-1966</u>
Population	470,000,000
Voluntary Military Service	Yes
Total Armed Forces	869,000
Defence Estimates	Rs. 9,952,000,000
	\$ 2,110,000,000

Army

Total Sanctioned Strength 825,000

16 full strength divisions including 9 mountain divisions and the armoured division. In addition 4 Infantry division on a reduced establishment have been sanctioned. It will take about eighteen months to bring the army upto its full strength. Armoured Forces before the fighting Pakistan Armoured division equipped with centurions, armoured brigade with Shermans 2 light tank requirement with Stuarts

Territorial Army 47,000

Casualties: men 4000-6000;

Tanks captured: 300.

Air Force

Total Strength

28,000

(strength sanctioned 45 squadrons)

4 HF-24 Marut fighter Bombers
 4 Interceptor squadrons with
 25 Mystere IVs each
 4 Interceptor squadrons with
 25 Gnats each

12 MIG-21 Jet Fighters

4 Bomber squadrons with 20 Canberras each

6 Fighter bomber with 25 Hunters each

Several Ouragan and Vampire fighter
bomber squadrons

1 recce Sqn. with 8 Canberras

Transport sqn. including

80 C-119s

24 An 12

50 C-47s

2 Ilyushion 14s

some DH Otters

Viscounts 723/730

Avro 778s and Caribous are being acquired

The Auxillary Air Force
 Squadrons chiefly fly
 Harvard and Vampire trainers.

Navy

Total strength

16,000

1,16,000 ton carrier

2 Cruisers, 3 destroyers

5 anti-submarine frigates

3 anti-aircraft frigates

6 other escort ships

6 minesweepers,
 13 light coastguard,
 24 Sea Hawk Strike Interceptors,
 15 Alize ASW planes.

Pakistan 1965-66

General:

Population	101,000,000
Military Service	Voluntary
Total Armed Forces	188,000 - 208,000 (excluding paramilitary force)
Defence Estimates	Rs. 1,382,000,000 \$ 289,000,000

Pakistan Army

1965-66

Strength 160,000 - 180,000

6 infantry divisions (one in East Pakistan). The Armoured forces (before September 1965) included about 10 regiments with M-47/48 Patton and M-4 Shermans Medium Tanks and two to three regiments with M-24 Chaffee light tanks. These probably formed one armoured division of two brigades and separate armoured brigade

Casualties in the 1965 War:

Men: 3000 - 5000

Tanks : 250

Paramilitary Forces:

Total Strength : 70,000
 Frontier Corps : 25,000

West Pakistan

Rangers : 10,000
 East Pakistan Rifles : 10,000
 Azad Kashmir troops: 25,000

Air Force

Total Strength 20,000
 Total Aircraft 200 Aircrafts

Composition

Canberra B-57B	2 squadrons
F-86F Sabre	4 Squadrons
F-104A Starfighter	1 Squadron (a second is to be formed)
RT-33A (Tactical Reconnaissance)	Unspecified
Transport	4C-130 B Hercules + 10 Bristol Mark 21 and Mark 31 tactical freighters.
Trainers	T-6, T-33, T-37B jet trainers.

Casualties : Upto 50 aircrafts.

Navy

Total Strength	8,000
Composition of Fleet	1 Light cruiser (training ship)
	5 Destroyers

2 ASW frigates

8 Minesweepers

1 submarine

4 motor launchers

8 other ships.

There is a coast guard of 1,500 men
Naval aircraft include Albatros and
UH-19 helicopters for air-sea rescue.

[Source: Military Balance 1965-1966 (London, The Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1965)].

APPENDIX C

TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION, BETWEEN THE
REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Desirous of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere friendship between them,

Believing that the further development of friendship and co-operation meets the basic national interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world,

Determined to promote the consolidation of universal peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of international tensions and the final eliminations of the remnants of colonialism,

Upholding their firm faith in the principles of peaceful co-existence and co-operation between States with different political and social systems,

Convinced that in the world today international problems can only be solved by co-operation and not by conflict,

Reaffirming their determination to abide by the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter,

The Republic of India on the one side, and the Union of Soviet Republics on the other side,

Have decided to conclude the present treaty, for which purposes the following plenipotentiaries have been appointed:

On behalf of the Republic of India: Sardar Swaran Singh,
Minister of External Affairs,

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. A.
A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Who, having each presented their credentials, which are found to be in proper form and due order, have agreed as follows:

(ARTICLE I)

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their peoples. Each party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. The High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and comprehensive co-operation existing between them on the basis of the aforesaid principles as well as those of equality and mutual benefit.

(ARTICLE II)

Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the High

Contracting Parties declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.

(ARTICLE III)

Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other States to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

(ARTICLE IV)

The Republic of India respects the peace-loving policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all nations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal

peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world.

(ARTICLE V)

Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, attaching great importance to their mutual co-operation in the international field for achieving these aims, the High Contracting Parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both the States by means of meetings, and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.

(ARTICLE VI)

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological co-operation between them, the High Contracting Parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet trade agreement of 26 December 1970.

(ARTICLE VII)

The High Contracting Parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

(ARTICLE VIII)

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other Party.

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other Party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other High Contracting Party.

(ARTICLE IX)

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third country that engages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event of either being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

(ARTICLE X)

Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more States, which is incompatible with this Treaty. Each High Contracting Party further declares that no obligation be entered into, between itself and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other Party.

(ARTICLE XI)

This Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either High Contracting Party declares its desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other High Contracting Party twelve months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

(ARTICLE XII)

Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of this Treaty which may arise between the High Contracting Parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The said Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all text being equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in New Delhi on the Ninth day of August in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy One.

ON BEHALF OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(Sd.) A. A. Gromyko,
Minister of External Affairs,

ON BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA,

(Sd.) Swaran Singh,
Minister of External Affairs.

[Source: Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi, Government of India), vol. 17, No. 8, August 1971, pp. 160-62.]



APPENDIX D

MILITARY BALANCE : 1971-72PAKISTAN

Population: 126,300,000

2 years Selective Military Service

Total Armed Forces: 392,000

Est. GNP 1970: \$ 16 billion

Defence budget 1971-72: 3,400 million rupees (\$ 714,000,000)
[4.76 rupees = \$ 1]

Army 365,000 (including 25,000 Azad Kashmir troops)

2 Armoured Divisions

12 Infantry Divisions (2 more being raised)

1 Ind. Armoured Brigades

1 Air Defence Brigades.

100 M-47, 100 M-48, 100 T-54, 50 T-55 and 225 T-59 medium tanks;

200 M-24, 75 M-41 and 20 PT-76 tanks, 300 M-113 APC, about 900

25-Pounder guns, Cobra ATGW, 20 H-13 helicopters.

Navy 10,000

4 submarines

1 light cruiser/training ship

2 Destroyers

3 Destroyer escorts

2 fast frigates

4 patrol boats
 8 coastal mine sweepers
 2 small patrol boats (less than 100 tons)
 2 UH-19 airsea rescuer helicopters.

Air Force : 17,000; 285 Combat aircraft.

1 light bomber squadron with K-28
 2 light bomber squadrons with B-57B
 2 fighter bomber squadrons with Mirage 111E
 8 fighter bomber interceptor squadrons F-86
 4 Interceptor squadrons with MIG-19
 1 Interceptor squadron with 6F-104A
 1 recce squadron 4 RT-33A and 2RB-57

[Note: With the exceptions noted, Combat Squadrons have 16 aircrafts)

Transports

Aircraft: 8 C-130B
 1 F-27

Helicopters: 40 Sioux
 Huskie
 Allouette III

MI-8 helicopters

Paramilitary Forces : 280,000

30,000 frontier corps; 250,000 militia, a new force is being raised, the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force.

INDIA

Population: 557,000,000

Voluntary Military Service

Total Armed Forces : 980,000

Estimated GNP 1970: \$ 49 billion

Defence Budget, 1971-72: 12,420 million rupees (\$ 1,656 million)
 (7.5 rupees = \$ 1)

Army : 860,000

1 Armoured Division

2 Ind. Armoured Brigades

13 Infantry Divisions

10 Mountain Divisions

6 Independent Infantry Brigades

2 Para Brigades

22 AA Artillery units.

200 Centurian MK 5/7, 250 Sherman, 450 T-54 and T-55 and 300 Vijanta medium tanks; 150 PT-76 and 100 AMX-13 tanks; OT-62 and MK 2/4A APC; about 3,000 art pieces mostly 25 pounders, but including about 350, 160 mm and 140, 130 mm guns; SS-11 and Entac ATGW.

Navy : 40,000

1 16,000 ton aircraft carrier

4 Submarines (ex-Soviet F-class)

2 Cruisers

3 Destroyers

- 9 Destroyer escorts
(including 5 ex-Soviet Petya class)
- 1 General purpose frigate
- 5 Anti-submarine frigates
- 3 Anti-aircraft frigates
- 10 Patrol Boats (4 less than 100 tons)
- 4 Coastal mine sweepers
- 4 Inshore mine sweepers
- 1 landing ship
- 2 Landing craft
- 9 Seaward defence boats (6 less than 100 tons)

Naval Airforce :

Carrying capacity of Vikrant:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------|
| 35 Sea Hawk attack aircraft | 10 Sea hawks |
| 12 Alize maritime patrollers | 5 Alizes |
| 2 Sea King helicopters | 2 Alonettes |
| 10 Alouettes III helicopters. | |

Air Force : 80,000; 625 combat aircrafts.

- 3 light bomber squadrons with Canberra B-(1)
- 5 Fighter bomber squadrons with SU-7
- 2 Fighter bomber squadrons with HF-24 Marut IA
- 6 Fighter bomber squadrons with Hunter F-56
- 2 Fighthter bomber squadrons with Mystere-IV
- 7 Interceptor squadons with MIG-21
- 8 Interceptor squadrons with Gnat

- 1 Reconnaissance squadron with Canberra PR-57
- 1 Maritime recce squadron with L-1049 super constellation

(Note: 8-25 aircraft in a Combat Squadron)

Transports

55 C-47
 60 C-119
 20 IL-14
 30 AN-12
 25 Otters
 12 HS-748
 15 Caribou

SAM Capability

50 SA - 2 SAM Com.

Helicopters

80 MI-4
 150 Allouette III
 10 Bell-47
 A few MI-8

BSF: 100,000 in Border
 Security Force

[Source: Military Balance 1971-72 (London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971).

APPENDIX E

PAK GOVERNMENT ESTIMATE FOR LOSSES IN MEN/MATERIAL

	<u>Pakistan</u>	<u>India</u>
Men Killed	1033	9500
Tanks lost	165	475
Aircraft Destroyed	14	110

[Source: Statement of the Defence Ministry of Pakistan - 4 December 1966, Quoted in Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol. 18, No. 4, 1965, p.3471.]

INDIAN GOVERNMENT ESTIMATE OF LOSS

	<u>India</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>
Men Killed	1333	4802
Tanks Lost	128	475
Aircraft Destroyed	35	73

[Source: Statement of the Defence Ministry of India, 25 September 1965. Quoted in Keessing's Archives, vol. 15, 4-11 December 1965, p. 211081.]

PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES OF TERRITORIAL GAINS AND LOSSES

<u>Sectors</u>	<u>Indian Territory Captured</u> <u>(sq. Miles)</u>
Chamb	340
Lahore	1
Khem Karan	36
Fazilka	40
Rajasthan	1200

	1617

Pakistani Territory captured by India

Kargil	10
Tithwal	2
Uri Poonch	170
Lahore	140
Sialkot	100
Rajasthan	24

	446

[Pakistan Government Statement on 24 September 1965, quoted in Pakistan Horizon, vol.18, No. 4, 1965, pp. 348-491.]

INDIAN GOVERNMENT ESTIMATESPakistani Territory captured in Sq. Miles

Sialkot	180
Lahore	140
Sind	150
Uri Poonch	230
Tithwal	70
Kargil	70

	740

Indian Territory Captured (sq. Miles)

Chamb	190
Khem Karan and Post Manabao	70

	210

[Source: Indian Government Statement, 7 October 1965, Quoted in Keessing's Archives, vol.15, 4-11 December 1965, p. 211081.]

APPENDIX F

TASHKENT DECLARATION

The following is the text of the Declaration signed in Tashkent on January 10, 1966 by the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan :

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relation between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.

I

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent and indeed the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that

Jammu and Kashmir was discussed and each of the sides set forth its respective position.

II

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn, not later than 25 Feb. 1966, to the positions they held prior to 5 August, 1965, and both sides shall observe the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line.

III

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

IV

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

V

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and

the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse.

VI

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.

VII

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

VIII

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the sides will continue the discussion of questions relating to the problems of refugees and evictions/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.

IX

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint India-Pakistan bodies which will report to their Governments in order what further steps should be taken.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan record their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan, their sincere thankfulness for their over-whelming reception and generous hospitality.

They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to witness this Declaration.

(Source: Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi, Government of India) vol. 12, No. 1, January 1966, pp. 9-101.)

APPENDIX G

AGREEMENT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The following is the text of the Agreement on Bilateral Relations between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan signed at Simla, July 2, 1972 :

1. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred the relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples.

In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows :

i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries.

ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the

situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peace and harmonious relations.

iii) That the prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful coexistence, respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each others internal affairs on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means.

v) That they shall always respect each others national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality.

vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

2. Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propoganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissimulation of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.

3. In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that :

i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications - postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border posts and airlines including overflights.

ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.

iii) Trade and cooperation in economic and agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.

iv) Exchange in the fields of Science and culture will be promoted. In this connection, delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.

4. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agreed that :

i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.

ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 shall be respected by both sides, without prejudice to the recognised position of the other side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further

undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

iii) The withdrawal shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of 20 days thereafter.

5. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures and will come into effect from the date on which the instruments of Ratification are exchanged.

6. Both Governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Indira Gandhi
Prime Minister
Republic of India

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
President
Islamic Republic of Pakistan

(Source: Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi, Government of India), vol. 18, No. 7, July 1972, pp.192-931.

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