

INDIA AND WEST ASIAN CRISIS
(1967)

DISSERTATION

1968

By

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PREFACE

As the title of this dissertation suggests it deals with West Asian Crisis as it developed last year with special reference to the manner in which India reacted to the Crisis. It is not a full length study of the Crisis as such but an attempt to high-light the main points.

Of India's policy towards the countries in the region of West Asia and their conflicts since the State of Israel came into being in 1948. The study also takes into account the reactions of some major powers of the world.

I am thankful to Dr. S.P. Varma, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Rajasthan Jaipur, for having permitted me to offer dissertation on the topic "India and West Asian Crisis (1967)".

I am more conscious of my limitations that whatever little I have been able to accomplish. I would therefore seek the indulgence of the readers for errors of omission and commission, and also for weakness of treatment and analysis of problem.

I am deeply indebted to Dr. K.P. Misra my guide and supervisor, who kindly agreed to supervise my work. He suggested me the topic and scheme of the dissertation, guided me all through. His academic objectivity, self effacing and solicitous care, his enobling words of cheer

inspired me and made me work harder. I am however personally responsible for all the shortcomings of the venture.

I also acknowledge my gratitude to Shri B.R. Kudiwal who has taken all interest and pains in typing my dissertation so well.

I would like to say that the dissertation has all the limitations of a pioneering academic venture and would entreat the readers to take kindly to it.

Chitra Tikku.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL ATTITUDE OF INDIA TOWARDS WEST ASIA.

India occupied for more than a century before independence a pivotal position in the imperial system that was carved out by the European powers in Asia. Having acquired firm control over India, the British were induced to safe-guard the prime position by creating a chain of protective out ports in the west asian region. In the process Afghanistan and Iren were turned into buffers between India and Russia and the rest of the area was transferred into an "insulating layer"¹ guarding the western land and sea approaches to India. Beginning with the occupation of Aden in 1839 the British search for the security of their position in India ended up in the acquisition of League of Nations mandates of Iraq and Palestine in the wake of the I World War. In between Britain occupied Egypt and established a series of protectorates along the coast of the Persian Gulf.

If the subjugation of Indian spelled political disaster for the peoples of West Asia it was also from India that the most emphatic and the well organized protest against European dominance of Asia first arose. It became the fore-runner of similar movements in West Asia. The intensification of the freedom struggles in India and West Asia

1. International Studies - July-Oct. 1966, p. 112
(Sapru House New Delhi) Editor M.S.Rajan.

during the interwar years created a deep sense of fellowship and unity of purpose among the peoples of the two areas. They realised that their destinies were linked together by facts of geography, culture and past history no less than by the grim realities of contemporary international politics. While a struggle in India sympathised with the aspirations of the west Asian people, the latter realised that their own emancipation was tied up with the outcome of the Indian struggle.

It was against this backdrop that many of the west Asian nations, in particular the Arabs, viewed with anxiety and dismay the Indian-Muslim League demand for the partition of India, this was precisely the mood of the Egyptians, when Mohamad Ali Jinnah made a brief halt in Cairo in 1946 on his return from London. The Egyptian believed that the separatist demand was delaying the prospect of British withdrawal from India and eventually from the Arab lands.

The Arab world experienced a sharp clash between territorial and pan-Arab loyalties but Islam as the basis of regional or international politics alliance had clearly receded into the background.

The Egyptian position was summarised by Azzam pasha the first Secretary of Arab League "We are Egyptians first, Arab second and Muslim third". It is significant that the League was Arab not the Muslim. Arab world was fiercely opposed to also British interest in West Asia. Hence in the conflict between the Arab national aspirations and British interests, the Arabs found that Pakistan notwithstanding its professed championship of Muslim causes everywhere was in fact in the

enemy camp. But what created a flare up in a already tense Arab world was the manoeuvring of Iraq into the military grouping. The autocratic regime of Muri Pasha as said led Iraq into what came to be known as the Bagdad Pact in the teeth of stiff opposition at home and neighbouring Arab States. The Arab nationalist opinion led by Egypt's Gamel-Al-Nasser fiercely opposed the pact which came to be regarded as a serious set back to the Arab struggle for independence. India too protested against the alliance on the ground that it inducted the cold war into the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. This brought the Arab world and India politically closer to each other. On the other hand Pakistan's energetic role in the forging of the alliance exacerbated its conflict with Arab nationalism. Nasser described the pact as the "Conspiracy against the Arabs". Even the conservative Saudi Arabia spoke of the pact as a "stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim States".

The Suez crisis brought into sharp focus the marked differences between the attitudes of India and Pakistan to the vital question of the Arab peoples to determine their own destiny. India took the stand that the Egyptian government's decision to nationalize canal. Company without prejudice to the legitimate claims of its share holders was perfectly legal and warned U.K. and France in no ambiguous terms that "threats to settle this dispute or to enforce their views in this matter by display or use of force were wrong and did not belong to this age". Prime Minister Nehru also condemned the armed action against Egypt as nothing short of "naked aggression". What Pakistan lost in term of reputation in

West Asia as a result of its undisguised obsequiousness to western interests it tried to restore, by lending unqualified support to Arab against Israel. It also tried to run down India in the eyes of Arabs by playing up India's recognition of Israel. But India's position is well known. As a member of Palestine Commission India persistently opposed the proposal to partition Palestine. And when thanks to the manoeuvres of big powers partition was eventually effected, India offered all support to the lawful rights of Palestine. India further backed the just claims of the Arabs in the dispute over the waters of Jordan which Israel intends to direct unilaterally for its own exclusive benefit. Beside the overriding consideration of strengthening its power position and winning allies. Pakistan's west Asian policy has been conditioned by the urge to gain support for its claim to Kashmir. Affinity of religion indeed tempted Pakistan to regard West Asia as an area of great promise for conveying moral and material sympathy for itself in the issue. But admitted Pakistan persistence, well organised and single minded in regard havenot gone wholly ~~and~~ unregarded but it owed not so much to religious ties. When Kashmir issue was referred to the U.N. most West Asian States took the view that it was a quarrel between the two successor States of the British Raj in India, and should be resolved peacefully by the parties concerned. In the region of West Asia relations between India and Afghanistan continued to be friendly and cordial, during the Indo-Pak conflict. Afghanistan maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality. The Afghan foreign office

categorically assured the Indian ambassador that the Pakistan foreign Minister's reference in the U.N. General Assembly debate to assurance of support given by the king of Afghanistan to President Ayub Khan were without foundation. Otherwise also Indo Afghan relations developed satisfactorily. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan Mohamad Yusef paid a State visit to India. Instruments of ratification of Indo-Afghan cultural agreement were exchanged in New Delhi.² As in the past India participated in the Afghan independence celebrations in August 1965.

India's partisan attitude during the Indo-Pak conflict affected the satisfactory development of Indo-Iranian relations subsequently, these were indications that Iran differences, including the question of Kashmir, could best be resolved if the two countries were left to themselves. In consonance with the traditional friendly relations between India and the Arab world the League of the Arab States was permitted to open an independent office in New Delhi in July 1965. At the time of Indo-Pak conflict Jordan took a completely partisan attitude. This was however counter balanced by the sympathy and understanding of other friendly Arab countries especially the U.A.R. The official publication of the U.A.R. embassy in New Delhi. The U.A.R. News commenting on the meeting between President Radhakrishnan and President Nasser of U.A.R.'s stand on Kashmir and other issues and assured the Indian President that the U.A.R. held fast to these views and

2. India 1966, 'India & West Asia', p. 490 (Publ:- by the Director, Publication Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi 6, printed Government of India Press, Faridabad).

there was no change in them. President Nasser expressed full support for India's case and cause.³

An Indian parliamentary good will delegation visited countries in west Asia and north Africa including Morocco Tunisia Algeria Lebanon Jordan Kuwait Iraq and Iran.

The Tashkent declaration was hailed by the countries of the region as a step toward peace and normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. The west has, throughout the cold war regarded the Middle-East as an important area with a power vacuum⁴ in same times advanced as if the removal of the influence of some great powers must necessarily be filled in by some other powers. It is an extraordinary appraisal of the situation which does not recognise the effect of Arab nationalism which become such a dominant force. We are convinced that any effective solution of the problems of west Asia must be based on the recognition of the dominant urge and force of Arab nationalism. Any settlement must have the goodwill and co-operation of the Arab nations.

The need of the European countries for oil is patent, but there should be no difficulty in arriving at a friendly arrangement which ensures the supply of oil. However the presence of foreign forces of any kind in this area will be a constant irritant leading to trouble. Peace in this area will come only if the area is removed from the orbit of cold war. Every one of the Arab countries has tremendous problems of development to face. If the threat of war is removed from them, they will apply themselves to these problems and become a source of strength to the forces of peace.

3. India 1966 - p. 491.

4. Jawaharlal Nehru - "Rise of Arab nationalism" India's Foreign Policy, p. 283.

When on July 26, 1956 President Nasser announced in a speech at Alexandria that the nationalisation of the Suez Canal company had been effected in this crisis the government of India had to take a decision in the situation as it confronted them. India was not then a disinterested party. She was the principal user of the water way and the economic life and development of her was affected by the dispute. India said that she is passionately interested in averting conflict. She is in friendly relations with Egypt and is associated with her in the acceptance of the Bandung declaration and the five principles.⁵ India has also good relations with the principle western countries involved. They are held in great esteem by us. So at that time also India's government cleared her positions and worked for restoring a abiding peace in west Asia.

Another important problem of west Asia which could not be ignored is the continuing element of danger in the relation between the Arab countries and Israel. Ever since Israel came into existence it has been a source of constant irritation to the Arab countries. The Arab countries have looked upon Israel as an out post from which their freedom might at any time be threatened. Israel on the other hand fears the Arab countries which surround it. There can be no real peace in the area till this difficult problem is settled in a satisfactory way. Naturally a settlement can be reached only with the goodwill of the countries of this area. The war is no settlement it can become a major war.

5. Jawaharlal Nehru - India's Foreign Policy , p. 531.

INDIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL

Israel is a republic of south west Asia proclaimed on May 1948 bounded by north Lebanon East by Syria and Jordan south west by mediterranean. The territory includes all the area of formerly mandated Palestine.

In 1950 the U.S., U.K. and France issued a tripartite declaration that they would maintain a balance of arms between Israel and Arab States and would check any aggression where by either side attempted to change the frontiers fixed by armistice agreement. In 1952 the relation deteriorated. In 1955 the supply by the U.S.S.R. of air craft and heavy armament to Egypt increased tension and the efforts of the secretary general of the U.N. in 1956 to obtain an unconditional cease-fire had only a brief success. In 5 days Israelies conquered Gaza, Rafan, Al-Arish and post of peninsula east of Suez. To what the extent Israel was acting in collaboration with U.K. and France in this action has not been established, although it appears that at least with the French government there was some understanding. As far as Israel was concerned, the objective of the Sinai Peninsula apart from destruction of hostile basis were to open sea communications via the Gulf of Aqaba and to put pressure on Egypt, to negotiate peace. After U.N. pressure the Israeli forces from Egyptian territory was completed in March 1957. For two years they were quiet in 1957 the tension again increased because of the seizure by Egypt of vessels in Suez Canal carrying Cargo to and from Israel.⁶ There were also

6. Encyclopedia of Social Sciences - p. 209.

violent incidents along the northern borders. The blockade of the Canal against Israel shipping was persisted. The U.N. continued to watch its borders by the early 1960s a remarkable feature of foreign relations was the development of economic and cultural links between Israel and the new States of Africa and the far East, with mutual agreements for technical help.

"India's slightly belated recognition and non establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel has been a subject of criticism. Uninformed quarters have attributed India's attitude to her opposition to the partition of Palestine. Some critics have a mistaken idea that India's policy is somewhat similar to that of Arab countries. But it is not the case. In fact since the creation of Israel in 1948 her policy has been and remains to-day basically different from that of the Arabs. Soon after the inauguration of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948 a communication was addressed by her provisional government to foreign governments hoping that they will recognise and would welcome Israel into the community of nation. The reaction of most of the countries including India except for a few muslims countries was almost identical.⁷

It was the bare fact that the State of Israel has come into being. And the fact have to be recognised without hesitation, it was another thing whether it could be considered a proper solution of the problem of Palestine. Keeping in view this fact many countries accordingly announced their recognition.

7. K.P.Misra (Reader in International Law University of Rajasthan) India's Policy of Recognition of States and governments, p. 51-52

Some of them gave the recognition immediately - as U.S.A. who recognised it the same day. The recognition was defacto, which was made de-jure afterwards on January 1949. This was considered as a traditional recognition policy of U.S.A. which was once more followed in the same manner.

United Kingdom gave its recognition on January 29, 1949 though she considered that Israel did not conform the basic criteria.

Soviet Union on May 17, 1948 officially recognised the State of Israel without muddling in the question of defacto or de-jure recognition.

Like most other governments the government of India was also asked to give her recognition by the State of Israel. But for a long time government of India was not able to give the recognition. It was delayed for a long time. Delay was due to certain national and international factors. The government of India was more conscious about these factors though the problem of Israel to some of Indians did not involve any complication.

The main factors were (1) that the Muslims constituted the main minority community in India which were holding official political positions and thus were very influential. An example of how India's muslims felt about the recognition of Israel has been cited very nicely in the book - by K.P. Misra.⁸

It was in the form of a question by a Muslim lady member of the Indian legislature. She asked - "Will the

8. K.P.Misra - 'India's Policy of recognition of States and governments, p. 54-55.

Honourable Prime Minister keep in mind the fact, there are a large number of people living in the Indian dominion "as it was then" whose wishes and sentiments in this regard should be kept in view regarding the recognition of state of Israel. And they are definitely opposed to it." Prime Minister Nehru's reply to it was: "Of course the government have to keep in mind all the factors governing a particular situation.⁹ Although it is clear that this reply was little evasive and was certainly tactful reply also. This ~~was~~^{also} indicated and elaborated that this factor exercised some influence on the Government of India.

Whatever may be the real situation and facts about it can be interpreted that Government of India was thinking to adopt such a policy so that it may not be injuring the sentiments of Muslim minority in the country.

Another factor of delaying recognition which was also equally important in this context was the attitude of Arabs towards the State of Israel. India was very friendly with Arabs and ~~was~~ so their uncompromising attitude pressed India to withhold recognition. In this somewhat grave situation India was trying to create an atmosphere in which its recognition would not be treated as an unfriendly act towards Arab States. Though this argument pleased less people they regarded it not a just act on the part of India.

Here an important fact can not be ignored. It is that at the first after the emergence of Israel as a State - Government of India was not clear, but as time passed and the State

9. K.P.Misra - India's policy of recognition of states and governments - p. 58.

functioned normally India then had and was clear in her views.

So after the time the Government acknowledged that the State of Israel was functioning normally so it was natural to recognise her. Indian Government also believed that their delay would help their representatives in bringing about a settlement to the satisfaction of the both parties.

The decision of the Government to recognise the State was welcomed by the people of India.

Here one point is of an equal importance related to the recognition. Government of India considered and also explained on various occasions that she is not concerned with any legal policy of recognition as defacto or dejure. But by recognising Israel though not establishing any diplomatic ties with her, the Government of India has proved weighty reasons for thinking that ~~it~~ she distinguishes between "recognition as a legal act and the establishment of diplomatic relations as purely political act."¹⁰

10. K.P.Misra - India's Policy of recognition of States and Governments, p. 60.

CHAPTER TWO

THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE CONFLICT

INDIA and the U.N. Emergency force.

In 1917 to gain support for the war effort from Zionist faction in England the British government had issued the Balfour Declaration favouring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for Jewish people. By 1922 the League of Nations finally approved the British mandate for Transjordan and Palestine which incorporated the tenets of the Balfour declaration for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

In 1929, however, the first major Arab protest to the rising Jewish immigration took place in the wailing wall riots. After the initial inquiry U.K. limited immigration despite Jewish protests.

In 1937 the Peel Commission recommended for the first time a scheme of partitioning the area into three units (1) a Jewish State of one third the area, (2) A British mandated territory of Jaffa and Jerusalem with the connecting railway strip between them, (3) An Arab State to be joined to Transjordan. The report was accepted with conditions by the world Jewish Congress and by the League of Nations, but a Pan-Arab Congress of some 400 non-official representatives from the Arab world voted against it.

Two months later the British plan was published (1) an independent state of Palestine was to be set up in ten years

(2) Arabs and Jews were to share with government as to safeguard their respective rights (3) During the transition both groups would administer the area with British and in 5 years a constitutional assembly would be called (4) Immigration would end after 5 years at which time Jewish population would equalise one third of the total.

Although both sides continued to denounce the plan the outbreak of II war immediately brought the Zoinist organization into solid line with United Kingdom. In 1945 President Truman requested special immigration be granted to absorb the one millian displaced Jews in Europe. By 1945 both groups in Palestine maintained military organizations built up during the war efforts and as the year continued they became more active. But the uneasy truce persisted.

The U.N. approves.

Great Britain referred the issue to the U.N. By the end of 1947 General Assembly had accepted the majority report of the U.N. special commission on Palestine favouring partition with economic union. The Arab members however rejected it. A Provisional Jewish Government headed by Ben Gurion and Chain Weizmann was set up immediately on May 14 and within two days it was recognised by United States and Soviet Union. War broke out between Israel and the Arab League and it was not brought to a truce by the U.N. until July 1949. The frictions continued.

Since 1949 thou had been tension between Israel and Arab countries the major conflicts broke out in 1956 and on June 1967

on massive scale. In 1956 U.A.R. President nationalized Suez Canal but Israel was given the right of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1967 the immediate cause of conflict was Gulf of Aqaba.

President Nasser declared in May 1967 that it was his sovereign right to decide who would and who would not use it for shipping.

On the other hand the gulf had since 1956 been used by the Israelis as a legitimate waterway for their shipping without any challenge or question. President Nasser asked the United Nations Secretary General to withdraw U.N.E.F. from the Gaza strip and the forces were withdrawn. Later on U.A.R. blockaded the Gulf. All these circumstances were responsible for the conflict between Israel on the one hand and Arab countries on the other.

For more than 10 years the U.N.E.F. had been deployed in Gaza and Sinai separating the armies of Israel and the U.A.R. On 16 May General Fawzy the U.A.R. Chief of staff requested General Rikhye the Commander of U.N.E.F. to withdraw the troops from their boarder observation posts in Sinai, so as to ensure their safty. In view of preparaties being undertaken for possible war with Israel. General Rikhye replied that he had no authority to redevelop his troops except on orders from the Secretary General and immediately requested instructions from New York. The Secretary General sought clarification from Cairo specifically as to whether of not the government wanted complete withdrawl from Gaza and Sinai. He said he would

comply immediately with a request for complete withdrawal but would not allow U.N.E.F. to be placed in the position of having to stand aside in order to enable the two sides to resume fighting.

The following day U.A.R. troops began to occupy areas around U.N.E.F. positions in Sinai and General Rikhye was requested by General Fawzy to withdraw all of the Yugoslav units from Sinai within 24 hours except for the detachment at Sharm-El-Sheikh which would be allowed 48 hours. The same afternoon the Secretary General met informally with representatives of the member states supplying troops for U.N.E.F. Two members urged that the assembly be asked to consider the situation and that the Secretary General appeal to U.A.R. not to demand withdrawal of the force. Two other representatives emphasized that the force would have to be withdrawn on request regardless of the assembly's view, and indicated that they will put out their troops if this was not done.

Secretary General informed Cairo that if the U.A.R. nevertheless decided to deploy its forces in front of the U.N.E.F. observation posts he would have "no choice but to order the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. from Gaza and Sinai as expeditiously as possible. On 18th May the Secretary General received a formal request from Cairo to withdraw the entire force. Accordingly the Secretary General gave orders for withdrawal of the force.

Criticisms of Secretary General's prompt action were heard from various quarters. Some maintained that greater delay might have contributed to a reduction of tension, in

the area. Others argued that in any case, the assembly should have been consulted before such an important decision was taken. The Secretary General argued that any peace keeping operations were dependent both in law and in fact. On the consent of the host state whose sovereignty over its own territory could not be challenged. He emphasized the distinctions between a peace keeping operation and an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. He also pointed out that he was only obliged to consult the assembly if requested to do so by advisory committee which had declined to make such a request. No special emergency session could have been called since the issue "was not then before the security council and therefore the condition of lack of minority did not exist".

India's Government decision and attitude towards the withdrawal was somewhat on the favour of the Secretary General action. It was said that having refused to allow the stationing of a U.N. force on her soil and having later enjoyed the full benefits of its presence on Egyptian territory for more than 10 years. Israel has now proceeded to defame the U.N. and to criticise Secretary General Uthant on the ground that he did not first consult Israel.

The acquiescence in the request of the U.A.R. for the withdrawal of the force after ten and a half years on U.A.R. soil was likewise a recognition of the sovereign authority of the U.A.R. The Secretary General recognised that any U.N. force could remain on the territory of a member state as long as

this consent continued with which India is completely in agreement both on legal and practical grounds.

Thus the Government of India was reluctant towards Israel and supported the Secretary U.Thant decision to withdraw the U.N. force from West Asia. But some other members states were very much opposed to the decision.

On June 3 Thant defended his decision to withdraw the U.N. force. Speaking at a meeting of the U.N. association of Canada where the audience included some of his principal Canadian critics, U.Thant said that the force had gone to Egypt as a voluntary operations. Any suggestion that it should cease to be so could be fatal to the whole idea of U.N. peace keeping.¹

Ironically the extreme seriousness of the situation we are now facing in west asia is a measure of the U.N.E.F. success. He said, "But we must face the fact that the world is not yet altogether ready for such sophisticated and reasonable concepts and methods."²

He went on, "In the world debate on the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. there is a agreement on one thing that the U.N. force did an essential job for more than ten years and did it extraordinarily well. I cannot therefore share the view of those who proclaim that the present crisis desperately serious though it is, is a great defeat for the concept of peace keeping. On the contrary, we now see all too clearly the true

1. Indian Express 'U.N.E.F. a voluntary operation' June 3 (1967) page 8.
2. Indian Express - June 4 (1967), page 6.

value and importance of the idea.

But we also have had a grim reminder of the difficulties still to be overcome and of the essential limitations of the U.N. in a world still dominated by rigid concepts of national sovereignty by power politics and by acute nationalistic feelings. These are the basic problems we have to face. We ignore them at our peril, he said.

Addressing a press conference in Washington after five hours of talks with Mr. Johnson, British Premier Mr. Wilson said the U.S. and Britain were seeking a "peaceful solution through actions in the U.N. security council and through issuance of declaration affirming free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba.

When he said the declaration would make no threat he was asked if it would have any use unless backed by force. It might not be of much use he conceded.

They should have to consider other things, but they should not press that approach too much - unless we came to it. Mr. Wilson said - "had the declaration would not had included any special arrangement on Israel as a concession to President Nasser," - "It would be a general assertion of the right of free passage". But he said there would have to be negotiation after the declaration was issued. Asked about the reinstatement of a U.N. presence in the area, Mr. Wilson said it was something to which the British government attached great importance as part of a long term solution. The decision to withdraw the

U.N.E.F. he said was regrettable and Britain would like to see some form of U.N. presence restored, "But it is fair I think, that it should be stationed on the Israeli as well as the Arab side of the frontiers" in questions he answered.

Thus the Secretary General defended his action and explained that his actions were in accordance to reason and also were logical on his side to perform these actions.

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CHAPTER THREE

INDIA'S REACTION TOWARDS CONFLICT

On June 5, 1967 India planned to ask security council to give a call for a ceasefire in west Asia and to demand the withdrawal of all forces to positions held by them on 4 June. The Soviet Union and Afro-Asian countries were reported to be backing the Indian draft for a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. Describing war as a calamity for Israel the U.A.R. and the whole world Mr. Chagla said, "India as a peace loving country would do its best to restore peace in the area!"¹ Later in the evening Mr. Chagla told an emergency meeting of the congress parliamentary party executive that the situation in west Asia was very serious Peace in the region was a paramount necessity and India would use its influence for the cessation of hostilities.²

During informal consultations India put forth a draft which would have the council say.

"The security council,

"Having received grave news of widespread armed clashes between Arab states and Israel

"Having heard a statement of the Secretary General on the developments in the area

1. Patriot, (New Delhi), June 6, 1967, p. 1.

2. Patriot, June 6 (1967), p. 1.

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"Determines that there has been a breach of peace in West Asia

"Calls upon all the Governments concerned to take all the steps necessary to effect a cease fire forthwith and withdraw their armed forces immediately to posts they occupied on 4 June when hostilities began

"Requests the Secretary General informed of implementations".³

The big four powers were also reported ready to support the security council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in West Asia. President Johnson condemned the war as "needless and destructive"⁴ and gave first priority to trying to end it through the security council.

On 18th June Chagla left for the United Nations. Talking of the immediate objective at the U.N. assembly meeting on West Asia was said to be to mobilise opinion for withdrawal of Israeli forces to 4 June positions without prejudice. It was felt that the efforts may not be to push them back it would not meet fully the Arab demand, but it can be a first step and can create conditions for further talks. Mr. Chagla before leaving said that India was interested in having peace in West Asia "It must be peace based on justice." Only a just peace can be enduring. Mr. Chagla said that his efforts at the U.N. would be

3. Patriot - June 6 (1967), p. 1.

4. Patriot - June 18, 1967, p. 1.

"to help bring about a fair and just solution of the problem of West Asia".

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi commenting on the security council call for a ceasefire in West Asia expressed the hope that the question of withdrawal of troops to the positions they held on 4 June would be pursued vigorously.⁵ In a statement in Rajya Sabha, she welcomed the security council resolution and added it might prove to be the first step towards restoration of peace.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said that the U.A.R. had been wringed.⁶ If Israel wanted to live in peace it must keep pace with its neighbours. She said "people say the U.A.R. never helped us when China and Pakistan attacked us. It is not correct to say that U.A.R. has not helped India. It was President Nasser who prevented many countries from going against India? Mrs. Gandhi said "the Western powers do not appreciate our view point. It is only those with identical views and common problems that will understand each other."⁷ Later talking she described Nasser "a force for progress she said! President Nasser stood for certain ideas and she had always lent her weight to them.

She held that "Israel was responsible for escalating the situation in West Asia into an armed conflict which has

5. Patriot - June 8 (1967), p. 1.

6. Patriot - June 12 (1967), p. 1.

7. Patriot - June 12 (1967), p. 1.

now acquired the proportions of full scale war.⁸ If not stopped is likely to expand into a much wider one drawing into its vortex other countries and developing perhaps into a world war. World peace is in grave peril," said Mrs. Gandhi, Mrs. Gandhi told in the Lok Sabha that Israel had escalated Her choice of words she pointed out was due to the desire not to be harsh but there are occasions when its best to call a spade a spade. If one does not do so the impression that firmness of opinion is lacking may be created.

Mr. Chagla took the same position in the U.N. General Assembly. He declared that, "the first thing to be insisted upon and implemented, has to be withdrawls total and unqualified, immediate and unconditional withdrawls of all Israeli forces from all Arab territory. He said "If we acquiesce today in the proposition that a victor can defy the U.N. then we might as well tear up the charter and admit to ourselves that peace is only a dream and the reality is that might is right".⁹ Concentrating on legal principles behind the West Asian war Mr. Chagla quoted the American Secretary of States letter of Jan. 1963 noting that the exacte status of the Gulf of Aqaba was still a matter open to controversy. Noting that a ceasefire was now in force due to the efforts of the security council, Mr. Chagla said, that the return to the peace should be such as to guarantee that there would be

8. Patriot, June 6 (1967), p. 1.

9. Patriot, June 23, (1967), p. 1-5

no recurrence of a war again. India was committed to the principle of settlement of International disputes through peaceful means, the right of all nations to live ~~in~~ in the freedom and enjoy the fruits of freedom. "Where peace is threatened or aggression is committed we find it impossible to remain silent or passive. We have therefore voiced our sincere and whole hearted sympathy for all and the solidarity with the Arab peoples, in their hour of trial and tribulations."¹⁰

Despite reports from New York of the U.N. General Assembly having a dead lock on the West Asia issue and despite Latin American insistence that the Arabs should first agree to end the "State of belligerency in the region, New Delhi at that time was hopeful that General Assembly would agree to give a call for withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territory."¹¹ It is recalled that equally sharp differences existed in the security council, an Indian move condemning ceasefire violations, New Delhi regarded it unjustified the insistence by the Latin American backed by the U.S.A. on "ending belligerency" as a condition for Israeli withdrawals. The purpose can be served by non aligned suggestions calling for a ban on the use of force and threats of use of force. It had the additional advantage being acceptable to both Arabs and Soviet Block. Where the question of recognition of Israel is concerned it is an

10. Patriot - June 23 (1967), p. 5.

11. Patriot - July 15 (1967), p. 1.

emotional issue with the Arabs. It is recalled that none of the Arab leaders who signed 1949 ceasefire agreements are in power now.

The U.N. assembly plunged into a phase of intense diplomatic negotiations and canvassing. While speeches continued on West Asian debate.¹² Activity was centred on getting the assembly recommendations on a simple withdrawal of Israeli forces. U.S.A. and the west was working to prevent the adoption of non-aligned draft by getting it blocked by securing the one third negative votes. Yugoslav representative Mr. Lekic said it was the view of the non aligned nation that the questions of withdrawal of Israeli forces was the most important issue, before the General Assembly. Emphasizing the urgency and importance of the resolution Mr. Lekic noted Israel's annexation of the Jordanian portion of the Jerusalem city.

External affairs Minister Chagla said that U.N. General Assembly rejected the non-aligned resolution on West Asia "Most unfortunate".¹³ Mr. Chagla said that the matter would have to go back to security council and "I hope there at least the major powers will not take up completely irreconcilable positions and some way will be found to end the crisis."

He said that the non-aligned resolution was "the only logical step" which the U.N. could have taken, "It was a

12. Patriot - June 30 (1967), p.3.

13. Patriot - July 6 (1967), p. 1.

simple resolution calling upon Israel to withdraw from the territories which it has acquired as a result of military conquest. Describing the failure of the non-aligned resolution as "a very bad precedent," Mr. Chagla said, "there are disputes with regard to boundaries and territories in many countries and if the Israeli precedent is to be accepted all that a country has got to do is to seize hold of territories of another country sit tight it and insist on negotiations without vacating its aggression.

He said that after the security council for a ceasefire resolution the next step had to be the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories. It was most unrealistic to expect that the Arabs would negotiate with the Israelis while the latter continued to be in occupations of Arab territories. "If some one is sitting on the chest of another person one does not expect the other person to talk to him unless he first gets off his chest."¹⁴

The non-aligned resolution expressly provided for discussion for a permanent peace settlement and this can be done when withdrawals have taken place. He said "the emergency session has now ended without achieving any tangible results. Mr. Chagla emphasises how vitally important to India was the necessity for a settlement between the two contending parties.

Thus the imperialist powers have not won a diplomatic victory by getting the non-aligned nations resolution demanding vacation of Israeli aggression rejected by the U.N. Assembly.

What they have achieved is only the defeat of the world organisation to which no people will hereafter look for justice or action inspired by the spirits of peace. The non-aligned resolution was unexceptionable. Israeli aggression is not denied even by U.S.A. and Great Britain. The U.N. was founded on an agreement among its members that aggression shall not be committed. If this fundamental question is valid it should follow that negotiations for preservation of alleged rights and privileges can be undertaken only after the aggressor is made to disgorge the fruits of aggression.

On July 15 the meeting of General Assembly was also completely deadlocked. Non-aligned rejected the Latin American Draft. It was deadlocked on political issues arising out of the war in West Asia - as negotiations between the Latin American Nations and non-aligned countries for a compromise, broke down.¹⁵

Even the Pakistani resolutions reaffirming the assembly's earlier resolution on Jerusalem was in trouble as the Western Block was trying to defeat the key paragraph asking the Security Council to ensure Israel's compliance with the resolutions and compel it to withdraw from Jordanian Jerusalem. The Latin Americans had earlier given a draft which in two key paragraphs said: withdrawals of Israeli forces to their original positions is expected and then said, the countries of West Asia were entitled to "freedom from the threat of belligerency".¹⁶ Pakistani delegate Mr. Agha Shahi

15. Indian Express - July 15, (1967), p. 3.

16. Patriot - July 15, 1967, p. 3.

answered Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban's charge that Pakistan was supporting Arab countries blindly. He said Pakistan could not be blind to the violation of the human rights of the Palestine Arab refugees of Israel for 20 years. We are concerned with the security of states that are militarily weak. It is not we who are blind." He also said his country did not recognise Israel because it did not fulfil its International obligation under the U.N. charter.

Thus the delegates to the U.N. General Assembly could not bring the solutions to the West Asian problem any nearer. Nor did the summit meeting at Glassboro between President Johnson and Prime Minister Kosygin despite all the cordiality and good-will lead to a meeting of minds. Mr. Kosygin apparently failed to persuade Mr. Johnson that a withdrawal of Israeli forces without any precondition is necessary if peace to be established in West Asia. In Cairo Nasser maintained silence but there was the reason that he will accept a U.S.Soviet agreement leading to an honourable settlement of the West Asian crisis. Anthony Nutting Conservative Minister who resigned over near after a visit to Cairo wrote in the Sunday Times that the U.A.R. has recognised the impossibility of a military solution.¹⁷ The Arab have also realised that their call for the destruction of Israel was a political mistake of the first magnitude; it alienated the West and neither the Socialist countries nor

17. Patriot - July 2, 1967, p. 9

the non-aligned countries have accepted the Arab position. Thus it follows that on West Asia mover and counter mover were but no considerable solutions can be brought of. let's

Although the emergency session of the General Assembly failed to pass any substantive resolution on West Asia - barring two minor resolutions on Jerusalem - the record of its debates which will be transmitted to the Security Council are expected to charge the tone of the council debates. In place of the old hymus of hate the council will have something concrete as a starting point. In the immediate post war period Israelis talked of permanent annexation not only of Jerusalem but also of the Gaza strip and the Syrian Hills and a creation of a satellite Palestinian Arab state on the west bank of the Jordan. Arab extremists conceived of the recent war as but one chapter of a long struggle which had to end in the liquidation of the Israeli state.

What has emerged out of the five weeks of public debate and private negotiation in the General Assembly is that the International Commity including the two super powers cannot permit any Israeli annexation of the conquered Arab territory. However there will be no pressures on Israel to withdraw unless the Arabs are prepared to tolerate Israel's continued existence. The result thus represents a set back to the hawks on both sides. Although the Soviet Union decided not to press its compromise resolution in the face of Arab opposition, the terms of the Goldberg-Gromyko draft

became widely known. This draft would have linked Israeli withdrawal with the right of every people to establish an independent national state of its own.

In an effort to reach a settlement with the Russians Mr. Goldberg offered to accept Mr. Kosygin's own formulation in preference to the language of the Latin American draft which would have called upon the Arabs specifically to give up any "right to claim to belligerency".¹⁸

The emergency session marks the end of one chapter in the U.N. history. No nation can be confident here after that the assembly will automatically issue a call to belligerents to withdraw to pre war borders and try to settle their disputes peacefully. This old attitude favoured the status quo powers. The frustrations of the Assembly in this respect are fraught with the gravest perils to countries like India with territories, which its neighbours dispute. We have now to survive in a jungle and prepare ourselves accordingly. Fortunately our size and improving technology are in our favour. As a shield to the militarily weak powers the United Nations is finished.

Another lesson which not only India but many other countries can learn from the experience of the emergency session is that U.S. and soviet policies are too flexible to constitute an anchor. In the beginning it looked as if

¹⁸. Indian Express - August 1, 1967, p. 5.

U.S. would insist on a resolution which explicitly demanded Arab abandonment of belligerency. The non-aligned powers consciously or unconsciously followed the initial Arab-Soviet line. At a press briefing after a meeting of the non-aligned powers including India the Yugoslav Ambassador as chairman announced that the non-aligned powers would demand a condemnation of Israel restitutions to the Arabs and an unconditional withdrawal of Israelis from conquered Arab territory. If the Goldberg-Gromyko draft had been put to vote no doubt both the Latins and the non-aligned powers would have swallowed everything they had said previously and dutifully voted for. Many observers ask whether, in the light of India's own principles she could not have acted more independently what harm would have been fallen. Indira for instance if while asking for Israeli withdrawal, she had made it clear that she would expect the Arabs not to resort to force to settle their ~~disputes~~ disputes with Israel.

The debates on Jerusalem showed none territorial disputes could easily degenerate into religious fanaticism with which a secular state like India can have no truck.

Here after even if we cannot avoid voting with those who flaunt the tattered banner of religion, India's spokesmen must have no hesitations in denouncing their arguments. The Arabs in their present plight must take support wherever it is available. But nothing prevents India from clarifying her position that Arab nationalism is not in her understanding synonymous with Muslim revivalism which the Islamic Pact countries seek to exploit for their own selfish ends.

India's Government stand was cleared further in the speech of M.C. Chagla in the General Assembly on Tuesday 30th June 1967. He said that it would be an understatement to say that peace in west Asia was in peril.

He further said that for "centuries people have lived in India who practised all the major religions of the world. To us therefore peace and co-existence is natural and the ideas of violence and war repugnant. He said "Settlement of international disputes through peaceful means respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of states, the right of all nations to live in freedom and enjoy fruits of freedom are all cherished articles of faith with us, where peace is threatened or aggression committed, we find it impossible to remain silent or passive. We have therefore voiced our sincere and whole hearted sympathy for an solidarity with the Arab peoples in their hour of trial and tribulation."¹⁹ Chagla explained that during the weeks of hostilities, our efforts were to counsel restraint to all parties and that we hoped for a peace in West Asia. And that is why India stood solidly behind U.Thant's noble and successful effort to gain breathing which spelled during the crisis. But Chagla said that "We adhere to our belief that the ceasefire cannot be considered complete as long as an alien armed force occupies large areas of land belonging to its neighbours and as large masses of Arab peoples live and suffer in subjugation in these occupied areas."

He also cleared that "What Israel has done was to confront the world with a fait accompli to attempt to impose

a new flatgued to achieve a new balance of power in that region."²⁰ She has also violated the General armistice agreements which was ignored by security council.

He also supported the stand of U.Thant to withdraw U.N.E.F.

Then~~M~~ Mr. Chagla considering the situation talked of 5 basic points they were -

- (i) The U.A.R. is not a party to any agreement recognizing the Gulf of Aqaba as an International water way or guaranteeing freedom of passage to Israeli sháps.
- (ii) There is no universally recognized rule of International law on freedom of navigation applicable to such bodies of water as Aqaba.
- (iii) The status of this body of water is still a matter of controversy.~~and~~ will like to refer to the recent publication of the U.S. state department the Digest of International Law released by the department of state ~~xxxx~~ in April 1965 (Vol. IV page 233) containing a letter ~~frs~~ from the Secretary of State dated January 15, 1965 to the Attorney General setting forth the views of the ~~h~~ department regarding the extent of territorial waters and the closing width of bays. On Aqaba the letter states as follows: "The Gulf of Aqaba: the exact status of this body of water is still a matter open to controversy".

- (iv) Even under Geneva convention which is being quoted often innocent passage of foreign strips through the territorial water of another state is not a absolute right but remains subject to security requirements of that state.
- (v) The General Assembly did not recognize much less accept the condition which Israel attempted to attach in 1957 to its with-drawl from Shariu-el-Sheikh.²¹

Mr. Chagla then went on to refer to what we called the "Sorry record" of Israel in defying the armistice agreements in adding Arab territory to its area and in expelling Arabs from their lands and houses. Mr. Chagla also reiterated India's four point plan in the security council. He said India was committed to the principle of settlement of international disputes through peaceful means and the right of all nations to live in freedom, and where peace is threatened or aggression is committed we find it impossible to remain silent or passive.

Lastly Mr. Chagla denied that the withdrawl of U.N.E.F. had precipitated the conflict and U.A.R. was not the party of agreement recognizing Gulf of Aqaba as an International water way or guaranteeing the freedom of passage to Israeli ships.

Therefore it was not established under International Law that there was the right of free passage through the strait of Joran. There was no warrent for asserting this right which could be enforced by arbitrament of arms.

Thus Mr. Chagla defended the U.Thant's actions.

21. Patriot - June 30 (1967), p. 7.

CHAPTER FOUR

POST CONFLICT PERIOD

It took a little time after the ceasefire for the world to realize, that Israel had become the strongest power in the Near and Middle East. Israel had shown that she had the most effective Air force and army in that area. With a population of 2½ million as against 40 million, in the actively belligerent Arab nations this was a staggering achievement. It is clear that Israeli supremacy will be the dominating factor in Middle Eastern politics for a long time to come. Only the overt intervention of Russia or the U.S.A. the two super powers could alter the balance.

Israel's victory represents a massive defeat not only for the Arab world but for the Soviet Union. For the past 20 years the Soviet has been playing politics in the Middle East with the answering objective of removing the military, political and economic influence of U.K., France and the U.S.A. and, replacing it by her own. Ironically this was the reason why the Soviet Union had been one of the first countries to recognize the state of Israel.¹ Since 1955 when she began the Middle East arms race with its deal with Nasser she has made colossal, economic but principally military investments through out the entire area including Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yaman and Samalra.

1. Churchill Reudolphs Winstons - The Six Day War, p. 92.

The Israeli victory represents a set back to the Soviet Union far graver even than the Cuban missile crisis. The main question hanging over the Middle East today is whether the Soviet Union will accept the situation or whether like the ties three years before in Vietnam, she will feel that her vital interests are involved and will seek to reverse it. After the war the period was most irritating there was a difference of opinion among the major powers and other countries. De Gaulle refused to condemn Egypt for its action in closing the Gulf of Aqaba and declared in a special emergency cabinet session that "the problems raised by free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba the situation of the Palestinian refugees and the relation among the neighbouring countries in the region should be settled by international discussions leading to an agreement among the permanent members of security council. The French Government explicitly rejected the idea of the common action by the Maritime powers" to force open the Gulf of Aqaba,² and stated that "the first to open fire would be considered as the aggressor."

The U.S. played a more or less undeviating course based on 5 points laid down by Johnson on June 19th. The basic aim was withdrawal of Israel's troops from the areas conquered in the fighting in return for an Arab agreement to drop the claims to be at war with Israel. The Americans looked a bit

2. Mainstream - July 24 (1967) p. 12.

lonely when they abstained in the two recent votes in which U.N. General Assembly overwhelmingly denounced Israel's annexation of the Jordanian part of the Jerusalem. The U.S. had taken the stand that the full annexation has not happened and that now any how a U.N. resolution is not the best way of dealing with it.³ If the Israeli Arab episode has no lesson more than any other that, no nation can expect third parties specially big powers to be more concerned about peace in its region than those directly there. Moreover, governments that showed little interests in the rights and wrongs of a conflict, display the greatest anxiety in ceasefires and subsequent adjustments. Tashkent was possible because for one thing Soviet Russia kept one step ahead of the U.N. and several diplomatic moves beyond the west and for another the two leading powers the U.S.A. and Russia were agreed broadly on the terms of a settlement between India and Pakistan. No one knows whether President Johnson and Mr. Kosygin were able to reach an agreement but one thing is clear that now, as in the Pre-Tashkent manoeuvres, Communist China's obstructive attitude has not influenced events.⁴

Whatever may be the different attitudes of the major powers towards Middle East problem in post conflict period. Indian Government's attitude was not influenced so much by them as it has been in the past.

The military convulsion that rocked West Asia left an

3. Mainstream - July 22 (1967), p. 4.

4. Mainstream - July 16 (1967), p. 9.

indelible mark on New Delhi. No section of opinion was left untouched or unaffected by this overpowering experience.⁵ There was hardly any one who could be found expressing publication at the Israel's victory. Even among the swatantra back benchers and a good section of the Jana Sangh there was no gloating over Arab defeat in the manner in which Sardar Patel's son was found to be indulging in it. This was particularly noted by the socialist of the both brands - the S.S.P. and the P.S.P.

Though they were the severest critics of the governments west Asian Policy. They were far from happy over the disaster that have nor taken the Arab world. This is in a very large measure due to the innate anti-imperialistic trait that is in the very marrow of this nation. "Nasser in the Indian mind has come to represent the spirit of national self respect unbending to western pressure. That was why one could find and notice in New Delhi in the last few days a deep sense of hurt that such a leadership has had to suffer humiliation at the hands of those who were backed by the West."⁶ It is a matter of robust patriotism of this nation that few would applaud a pro-west triumph.

In New Delhi circles it was recognised that the Israel's must have fought as a determined people with all the thoughtness and discipline born of Jewish fortitude. And yet there is hardly any applause in the capital for Israel's lightning military

5. Mainstream - June 17 (1967) p. 20

6. Ibid - June 17 (1967) p. 11.

exploits. This is mainly because of the awareness that Israel in this context was really playing some body's else game. The impression has been inforce by official sources that only a little over a week before the flare up Israel received as many as 500 air crafts from the western powers there by more than doubling of her air force strength thanks to the U.S. attitude in security council for Israel has been treated by Mr. Goldberg more as a client state than as a young ally of Washington.⁷

It will take a long time for the progressive forces of the world to assess the losses they have suffered as the result of the amazing success of the Israeli imperialistic combine in the west Asian war - said the paper Mainstream talking about the Musing on west Asian war.

DIFFERENT VIEWS IN INDIA.

The stand of the Government of India on the crisis was severely criticized and termed as 'pro Arab' more than Arabs themselves. It was also discriked as contrary to the concept of non-alignment. This "biassed stand" was according to critics hampering her in playing any mediatory role between Israel and Arab to resolve the tangle, which she was otherwise capable of. But it cannot be viewed only in relevant in this point. So first of all India's government statements should have to be elaborated.

On July 22 the General Assembly wound up a frustrated

7. Mainstream - June 11 (1967) p. 4-5.

five week emergency session with a decision to adjourn and leave the search for west Asian settlement to the security council.

Indian foreign Minister M.C.Chagla expressed his conviction that the security council would find a lasting solution on the west Asian crisis. He added that India would press in the security council for adoption of the principles of the non-aligned nations. He told a news conference that he has certain the security council would give priority to withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories. Mr. Chagla said "the aggressor must not be allowed to enjoy the fruits of aggression"⁸ If a solution of conflicts by arms is tolerated this would mean violation of the U.N. charter. The importance of the policy of non-alignment and the links of non-aligned countries among themselves had been strengthened after west Asian crisis. The non-aligned countries should set up a common platform for solving major world problems which would "greatly contribute to sage guarding preece in the world."⁹ Radio Belgrade in a commentary on Mr. Chagla's said Mr. Chagla talks could be associated with possible new efforts of non-aligned nations to find a solution to the problem.

Government of India's stand was pro-Arab. They said that India is backing Arab countries against Israel because we have vital economic relations with those countries. The argument was in support of Indo Arab friendship that we should

8. The Hindustan Times - July 23 (1967) p. 4

9. The Hindustan Times - July 23 (1967) p. 1.

back.¹⁰ Arabs because we partly share Islam with them. It condemned in strong and unequivocal terms the Israeli aggression against her neighbours. The more formidable of these was understood to have been put up by Morarji Desai who was reluctant to come out in support of U.A.R. and to brand Israel for escalating the war. Sri Ashok Mehta figured among the cabinet ministers who were afraid of Johnson's annoyance. Apart from this Government of India generally stated that he feel that approval should not be shown of the way in which Israel was created and is functioning unlike the other Afro-Asian countries which have liberated themselves from foreign rule. Israel is the result of an act of imposition from outside the creation of this New State is not in line with the general trend of the Afro-Asian resurgence. The Government's stand is in fact that the state of Israel is essentially a foreign creation.¹¹ After an hour and a half meeting with the Prime Minister Mr. Kosygin on sep in the Indian defence Minister Mr. Swaran Singh completed his talks with the Soviet leaders on the West Asian crisis the two countries share the basic approach that the most urgent need is to restore the status quo in the area as it was before Israeli attack on the Arabs. When the issue comes up before the U.N. General Assembly India and the Soviet Union will be working closely. On 18 July Mr. Chagla explained the Government's West Asia policy which come under fire from several congress and opposition members. He based his

10. Organizer - July 2 (1967) p. 2.

11. Indian Express - June 10 (1967) p.5.

defence on the "justice of the Arab cause,"¹² and the country's "national interests". He still laid the utmost importance on the withdrawal of the Israeli troops. It was "absolutely necessary that India should have a friendly West Asia. Mr. Chagla said, it had trade to the tune of Rs.100 crores a year with those countries. Half a lakh Indian were living there. It was essential for India that the Suez should be in friendly hands and that oil should come from countries which were friendly to India. Also India "must support" certain forces in the Arab world,- progressive, socialistic, non-aligned and secular. *Li*

Thus to end the state of war India and five other non-permanent members of the Security council evolved a resolution to be placed before the council early next week on 28th Oct., which seeks to reconcile Arab and Israeli view points and the resolve the west Asian dead lock.

The most important feature of the resolution, was that it called upon all states in the area "to terminate the state of belligerency and underlines the right of every state to live in peace and free from threats or acts of war."¹³ Informed sources here express the hope that the U.S. would persuade Israel to accept the formula as it goes a long way to meet the Israeli point of view. The resolution will call upon the U.N. to send a special representative to west Asia "to contact the parties considered and co-ordinate efforts to achieve the purposes of

12. Indian Express - July 19, (1967), p. 1.

13. Indian Express - Oct. 28, (By a political correspondent)p.5.

the resolution and to submit the report to the Secretary General U-Thant within 30 days. India took the initiative in the matter because some other non-permanent members requested it to make another sincere effort to break the deadlock and also because the big powers were unable to find a compromise formula acceptable to all parties. Even otherwise India's interests demand that the deadlock should be ended soon so that the Suez canal can be re-opened for free inter-national traffic. The Indian draft points out that conquest of territory by force is impermissible under the U.N. charter and Israel should therefore withdraw to the positions it had held on June 4, 1967.¹⁴

While the proposed resolutions is stated to be acceptable to Arabs, Israel is understood to be opposed to any reference to withdrawal to the June 4 position, but India and other non-permanent members felt that any concession to Israel in the regard would amount to violation of the U.N. Charter itself and U.N. would have more problems to resolve instead of ending the west Asia crisis. India has further pointed out to other members of the Security Council during informal discussions that both India and Pakistan had agreed to the U.N. demand to pull their respective forces back to the positions held by them before the commencement of the conflict in 1965. The resolution drafted by India and five

14. Indian Express - 28 Oct., 1967, p. 5.

other non-permanent members states that the Security council decides further (1) that there should be a just settlement of the question of Palestine refugees having regard to U.N. resolutions on the subject and (2) the freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area should be guaranteed in accordance with international law and practice. Israel may possibly object to the reference about the settlement of the refugees in accordance with the U.N. resolutions but informed sources point out that the Arabs having been persuaded to make the major concession of ending the state of belligerency and settling all differences with Israel by peaceful means. Israel too should be prepared to meet the Arab point of view which is equally strong on this point. What is more significant in that Arabs. Under the draft resolution not only accept the principle of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Israel, but also endorse the principle of freedom of navigation through International water ways in the region. I.H

An analysis of the sponsors of the Indian draft shows that they include Afro-Asian and Latin American members of the Security Council. The sponsors were India, Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Mali and Nigeria. In fact the Indian draft is stated to be a compromise formula hammered out of informal discussions held among Latin American and Afro-Asian members since the last emergency session of the U.N. Assembly. In the circumstances many U.N. members are stated to feel that Israel

has no more excuse for not accepting the proposed compromise and withdrawing to the position it occupied on June 4, 1967.

The position of U.S. appears to be to support the Danish more to table another draft resolution which sets out certain regularly formulated principles and leaves it to the special representative to work out practical solutions through discussion with the parties concerned. It is feared by India and other sponsors of their draft as well as many other members of the U.K. that any such vague formula however nice it may look on paper would not only perpetuate the existing tensions for would also be exploited by interested parties for delaying a settlement.

Thus the Government of India tried its best and its attitude towards the solving the problem of west Asia war by peaceful means and that is why the crux of the Indian draft was for the ending the state of war in west Asia.

But these attitudes were not reconciled by the opposition political parties. The Government of India's statement was severely criticised by the different political parties in their own colour and in their own set of principles.

The General political parties was Anti Government. Most of them were not satisfied with by the Government of India's policy towards the west Asian crisis. The governments reaction towards the west Asian crisis was called as an "Undiplomatic Diplomacy".¹⁵ New Delhi's reactions to the Israeli aide memoire expressing regret over the incidents during the Arab-Israeli war in which Indian troops serving under U.N.E.F. were

15. Indian Express - August 4, (1967), p.6.

killed or wounded is to say the least, ungenerous and undiplomatic :
 too. New Delhi refers in its side memoire to the fact that at
 the U.N. debate Mr. Parthasarathy "condemned the treacherous
 and brutal attacks on Indian personnel by Israeli action.
 What was even more worrying about New Delhi's attitude to
 Israel is the fact that the Israeli side. Memoire expressing
 regret was kept back from the public after its arrival. Nor
 have its contents been revealed even now though its reply was
 delivered with all the sense of occasion reserved for protest
 notes exchanged with unfriendly nations. In cavithing at
 Israels apology and ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ maintaining, despite its expression of
 regret its posture of unnecessary hostility the Government of
 India seemed concerned with justifying its earlier stand, even
 at the expend of antagonising a nation that has made per sistent
 efforts to win our friendship.¹⁶ It was cited in an editorial
 that - "By every criterion of International law Israel's right
 to exist is at least as clearly established as that of any
 other nations state."¹⁷ Israel exercises effective territorial
 control, enjoys normal diplomatic relations with other states
 is a member of major International organizations including the
 U.N., is a signatory to major treaties and so on. The list of
 critéria could be extended indefinitely and Israel satisfied
 every one of them to the same extend as India or any other state.

16. Indian Express - August 4 (1967), p. 6.

17. Indian Express - "Israel right to exist," August 9 (1967)
 p. 6.

However or at least two counts, Israel's International status seems to have additional sanction from the International community. The League of Nations mandate held by Great Britain after world war I specifically referred to the purpose of establishing a Jewish National home in Palestine, and the U.N. approved and recommended the setting up of a Jewish state in Palestine by two-thirds majority in 1947. Secondly the ^{port} ~~israeli~~ of riat was included in the Jewish state under the U.N. partitions scheme of 1947. The territory of riat was also included in the Israeli part of Palestine under the Armistice agreements of 1949 and has been constantly under Israeli effective control. The use of force to open the Bochaded Gulf of Aqaba in 1956 had nothing to do with the occupation of the port of Eilat by Israel as Eilat lies at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba while the blockade by Egypt was at the southern entrance ~~the~~ to the Gulf. According to the most competent international lawyers including such world authorities as Professor of Myres McDougal of Yale University the Gulf of Aqaba is clearly an international waterway and thus the blockade of the Gulf was in violation of International Law.¹⁹

Thirdly the principles on which Israel's political system rests are more similar to those of India than any other. Israel is not a theocracy and all the religious committees have official status, in this respect Israel maintains the system in force under the British mandate. In

18. Indian Express - August 9, (1967), p. 6.

19. Perry Meyer - "Israel's right to exist", Indian Express, August 9 (1967), p. 6.

certain areas religious tribunals of the Muslim, Christian and Jewish authorities continue to exercise concurrent and equal jurisdiction. Apart from this fact, Israel is a secular state with the visual problems caused by religious pressure groups, fix just as in India and elsewhere. But the extent of religious influence in Israel is merely akin to the problem of the slaughter of cows in India, except that in Israel's case the religious problems do not have the immense social consequences that they have in India.^{19A} To state that Israel is a theocracy like Pakistan is to show complete ignorance of the actual facts.

In the view of Perry Meyer the man in faculty of law, in Hebilla University in Canada Israel does not claim to be the home land of world Jewry. To him there is a distinct difference between Israeli nationality and Judaism as a religion. It is true he says that immigration procedures are simpler for Jews than non-Jews under the law of the return but this was a special measure resulting from the Nazi holocaust. Israeli nationality is enjoyed by a large number of nationals many of whom occupy significant positions in the State. The position of religious minorities he observes in Israel is not significantly different from that of minorities in other secular democracies.

But this view was reluctantly criticised by an Indian scholar Yogendra Singh²⁰ - He was of the view that there is

19A. Ibid.

20. Baldev Raj Nayar, "West Asian War" (As-associate prof of political Science McGill University Montreal (Canada) August 25 (1967), p. 7, Indian Express.

no International statute book. No nation is bound by an International law except as it chooses to do so and it can charge its mind.^{20A} And for any action of nations, including war and aggression there can always be found later the proper doctrines and precedent to support it. This applies to the war in Vietnam the blockade of Cuba, the Pearl Harbour type of attack of Israel on the Arab countries in 1967 and the invasion of Suez in 1956. Mr. Nagar does not regard the question of West Asia as a point of International law but right or just for one party in collaboration with a second party to deprive through violence and forcibly their ~~own~~ home land and property. He regards all Mayer's point legal sophistry. Thus the both points of view are elaborated so nicely that it is difficult to find out the right answer but it cannot be denied that according to International law Israel has the right to exist.

P. Dasgupta the special correspondent of 'The Hindustan Times' criticised the Government's policy of West Asia. He said, "We have been told by responsible Indians that in sheer self interest to secure our line of communication through Suez canal and preserve a sizable market for ourselves, we cannot afford to alienate President Nasser. These considerations clearly amount to a special planning for."²¹ Economic considerations have not dictated our policy towards

20A. Ibid.

21. P. Das Gupta - "Nasser Resists Arab Pressure" The Hindustan Times, August 11 (1967), p. 9.

crisis. Other important countries Suez remains closed inspite of perhaps partly because of our total support to president Nasser. Even if it passed into the hands of an obscurantist regime allwed to Pakistan why must we assume that we would be the one's instantly to be denied use of it. This is not the only instance of our policy becoming merely an exercise in polemics. Why should we be so much concerned to disapprove Israel's origins and legitimacy when the facts of its full maturity is already established.

While generally supporting the policy of friendship with Arab states several members in the congress parliamentary party's executive committee urged that Government policy statements on west Asia should be "blanced". Some of them said that Indra should play a "mediatory role" to bring about an end of the conflict, and statements which diminished India's effectiveness should be avoided. In particular members said that one sentence in the Mr. Chagla's recent statement that the "Creation of Israel has given rise to tension" in the area could have been avoided.²² Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who presided is reported to have remarked "We are not against the existence of Israel." Mr. Chagla earlier informed the members that the situation in west Asia was "serious". Peace in in this region is the paramount consideration. Mr. K. Hanumanthaiya said while being friendly with the Arabs India should observe "complete neutrality" India's effort should be to

22. Patriot - "Peace Effort Stressed" June 6 (1967), p. 3.

mediate. He suggested that the Prime Minister should take the initiative of convening a conference of other powers who might be helpful in bringing about ceasefire in the area. Mrs. Tarakashwari Sinha said the Prime Minister's statement on the subject made in the congress parliamentary party some days ago was very balanced "The statement of external affairs Minister could have been "more balanced."²³ For instance, the references to newspaper or radio version of the threat to attack Syria could have been avoided. Without including such things, India could have supported the Arab world.

Mrs. Sharda Mukherjee though supported the Government of India's statement, but he said that the first sentence in Mr. Chagla's recent statement that the creation of Israel had given rise to tensions could have been avoided. Saint Bux Singh convener of the party's standing committee on foreign affairs, who was a special invitee, and Mr. Chandra Shekhar, shared this view. Saint Bux Singh suggested that the government should have consulted with the opposition on the West Asian developments.

Mr. P. Venkatasubbiah said India should have cordial relations with the U.A.R. and other Arab countries, but India should strictly adhere to neutrality so as to play the role of a mediator. Statements which diminished India's effectiveness must be avoided.

23. Patriot - June 6 (1967) p. 3.

Mr. Bibhuti Misra said India should have friendship with the Arabs "but we must look to our own interests also and there should be restraint in our talk" Mr. Mishra also made reference to the Arab role during the Pakistani aggression on India.

Mr. R.S. Panjhzari said India should play the same role in the present conflict as the U.A.R. played during the Indo-Pakistani struggle.

Mr. S.N. Mishra said that members agreed with government's policy. The difference was on style and was not on substance.

Thus we see the differences among the congress members was regarding style and not on substance.

The argument that India is backing Arab countries against Israel, because we have vital economic relations with those countries was welcomed. But it does not mean that we should lose one to gain the other. And the dispute is between Israel and Arab. India need not take sides in. The main point is that India need not to interfere.

M.M. Sankhdher's view was that 'A cultural ideological orientations of foreign policy can bring greater politico economic dividends than we have so far been able to get.' He said that our central idea of policy towards west Asia seems to draw on the Arab injured feeling of the British creation of Israel, within their heart land. Was not Pakistan similarly created?²⁴ We go out of the way to establish normal relations with Pakistan but

24. Organizer, 'M.M.Sankhdher, (Lecturer in Politics, Hindu College), July 2, (1967), p. 5.

not with Israel. They are as patriotic as Pakistanis. But Arabs have not reconciled themselves to the existence of Israel though we have fully and officially reconciled to the creation of Pakistan. This analogy had some repercussion on our foreign policy, but the sympathy for Arabs remains as inexplicable as our anti west attitude on most international question. Some ponderables have been appeared to which government has ignored in the - India verses Israel Pakistan equation. Arab for however they might pamper India, politically and ideologically, they find greater affinity with Pakistan. This truth was conformed by the attitude of Jordan and ^{other} Arab States on the Kashmir issue. We have ignored the Muslim world support for Pakistan. Secondly Pakistan's formation owed more to internal politics, the Israel was result of International developments during the war.

While in the Arab Israel conflict the whole world has chosen to maintain an attitude of ganded reserve, only India and Soviet Russia are not. India has thrown common sense to the winds and blindly espoused one side, without recognising other side at all. In the case of Russia it was not stupidity of the kind that has branded our policy, it was shrewed calculation and part of the tacit of keeping a vulnerable area of the world in fitters.²⁵ The reason is that, area has a actual and potential values for western world, and so any disruption of it would suit the Russian books. An important factor is, Arab defeat has betrayed - Many Russian or say Soviet differences out of gear.

25. Organiser - (Delhi, published by Shri Brij Ehusan, editor K.R. Malkani) July 30 (1967), p. 2.

When Mr. Chagla said that the government stood by its policy explained by him and Prime Minister during the current crisis as it represented India's national interest and of the Indian people, Jana Sangh leader Balraj Madhok got up to question the statement. Mr. Madhok challenged Mr. Chagla to hold a public meeting and elicit the views of the people.²⁶ Mr. Madhok was sore over India being the first country to accord diplomatic recognition to the Arab league representative in India. Though India's foreign Minister had repeatedly announced that India believed in peaceful co-existence, no notice was taken of the speeches of President Nasser in which he had threatened to wipe out Israel from the world map, the Jana Sang leader said.²⁷ He said that a country's foreign policy, "should be based on reciprocity with an eye on national interests and there should be no room for sentiments."²⁸

The Swatantra party leader C.Rajgopalachari stated with a question "who is the aggressor"? The use of force instead of argument or diplomacy is the essence of aggression, Nasser wished to block Israel's navigational facilities. He did this by the use of guns. This is aggression said the Israelies "No" say Nasser's friends, "Israel should have contended herself with arguing about it, and should not have deemed to have an act of war entitling."²⁹

26. Patriot, - (Delhi) June 9 (1967), p. 1.

27. Patriot, July 12 (1967), page 8.

28. Ibid.

29. Swarajya, (Madras, Editor) July 8 (1967) p.1.

The German chancellor under the Kaiser called an International treaty a scrap of paper, when in world war I German army wanted to march through neutral Belgium the world was then horrified at this breach of treaty. Today the position is worse. No one can trust the promises of Great Powers, whether written on paper or on stronger material. The thing to be done is to ensure Israel's safety where it has been placed. The Great powers should forget their own interests in that region and unitedly help Israel without injuring the Arab States. The Arabs should give up the notion that the very presence of Israel among them is an injury and that her prosperity is an intolerable evil. Though not elucidating swatantra view point though not a member of swatantra party K. Santharam in his article "India's foreign policy" said the objective of foreign policy is also justice. Here we have failed grievously in the dispute between Israel and the Arab Nations. It is certainly a good thing for us to be friendly with the U.A.R. and other Arab nations but it was altogether immoral and unjust to encourage them in their attempt to annihilate Israel.³⁰ The manner in which we have defended the aggressive action of Egypt in closing the sea outlets for Israel and our angry out burst against Israel, when it tried to defend itself against this aggression is something of which all Indians have to feel ashamed. It is good that Shri S.K. Patil has come out boldly and openly against this disastrous

30. Swarajya, July 22 (1967), p. 4.

policy. It may be recalled that neither U.S.S.R. nor any Arab nation condemned Pakistan's aggression against India in 1965. It was not their fault but wise on their part to be neutral, as partisanship could not have helped either country. Likewise we should have kept strictly neutral in this dispute between Arab and Israel and directed all our influence and efforts towards the prevention of hostilities.³¹ Now that Israel has obtained a responding victory, we are calling upon that small country to renounce all her conquests without any guarantee of her future existence. We have no means of compelling Israel to go back nor any strength to get the Arabs to recognize the State of Israel and assure her for peaceful existence. The only honest policy is to leave the matter to those who have the power to take initiative and use our utmost efforts to bring to adopt a common policy.

The opinion held was that the crisis in west Asia obviously called for India taking some sort of a stand on the issue. But it only helped to reveal once more the archaic and muddled state of our foreign policy.³² And the Arab League made capital of this situation by issuing a statement that they were sure of India's support. As if India's support could be had for the asking or taken for granted. The Prime Minister made matters worse by repeating to the executive of the congress

31. Swarajya, July 22 (1967) p.5.

32. Swarajya, S.K.Rau "The end of Non-Alignment", June 10 (1967)p.4.

Parliamentary party the repeated and hactineyed references to the abiding and strong U.A.R. friendship. Something much more positive was expected of a nation which had assigned to itself the role of the custodian of world peace, and which had played so useful a role in Suez canal crisis. In a desperate bid to maintain the myth of the Arab countries being useful to India, the Government had sought to take cover under certain legal issues involved in the conflict. Here it is a simple case of a small country and circled by nations which are bent upon crushing her. And even though India does not recognize Israel by contributing her troops to the emergency force she has accepted the basic principle of maintaing pece in the Middle East. Government of India has silently noded its head at Nasser declaration that the Gulf is territorial waters. Whether Nasser in sealing of the Gulf has the sanction of Inter-national law behind him is rather doubtful. At any rete it seems to be a violation of all cautious of equity that a small country should be denied access to the sea just because the Gulf is under foreign control. India's role in the world as a crusader for peace and non-alignment has meant nothing more than being bossed by the Arab countries. But when India was the victim of China and Pakistani aggression Arabs adopted a neutral stand.³³

The Prime Minister's statement did not carry the full support of Parliament was evident from the reactions it

33. Swarajya, June 10 (1967), p. 4.

provoked in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. Barring the communist and other opposition parties were unable to share the Government's view that it was Israel that had escalated the conflict with a view to avoid controversial statement opposition leaders, took the initiative to meet the Prime minister. But she was reluctant to change the draft that she had prepared, she would not disclose the basis for her conclusion, that Israel had escalated the conflict. All members agreed that India should play a positive role in bringing about cessation of hostilities they agitated over the haste shown by government spokesmen including Prime Minister, in coming to conclusion when even the security council and Secretary General had not been able to form a definite idea. This blaming without full information on one side India did not contribute to the lessening of the tensions.³⁴

The Prime Minister had no answer to this argument and she had little to say, when Prakash Vir Shastri asked her, if President Nasser and his counterparts in the Arab Kingdoms had not been proclaiming openly that they had decided to obliterate Israel and in furtherance of their objective, Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli and other shipping claiming the Gulf as an inland water way. And what was worse Egypt had mounted guns on one side of the Gulf to blockade Israeli shipping.

President Nasser has declared that he will never accept co-existence with Israel. According to him Israel is a child

34. Swarajya, June 17 (1967), p. 2.

of U.S.A. and had been nurtured with the enormous wealth and power given by that country - He has proclaimed that if war breaks out between the Arabs and Israel the war will exterminate Israel and no other country will have the right to intervene and save it. It seems President Nasser has overlooked the fact that he cannot tolerate the existence of Israel, he cannot also claim to be a leader of the non-aligned country which advocates his peaceful co-existence.³⁵ Just as the Vietnam war clearly shows that communist North Vietnam cannot tolerate the existence of a non-communist South Vietnam as its neighbour, so also the anti Israel stand of the Arab countries led by Nasser shows that they cannot tolerate the existence of a Jews State as their neighbour. But in the case of Vietnam there is no inconsistency because all the Communists proclaiming co-existence as a temporary measure do not hide their belief that non-Communist must ultimately be exterminated in some way or other. In the case of Arab countries some of them claiming to be votaries of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, there is grave inconsistency if they maintain that Israel has no right to exist as a nation. Peaceful co-existence with Israel is a test case for the Arab Profession of peaceful co-existence.³⁶ No doubt Israel also has the duty to remain a peace loving country by giving up any of her policy that smack of expansionism unfortunately India Israeli relations have been a weak point in the foreign policy of the congress government.

35. Swarajya, S.G.Manipilli "Arabs & Co-existence" June 17, (1967), p. 6.

36. Swarajya, June 17 (1967), p. 6.

Indian Anti-Israeli foreign policy seems to be based on two considerations (1) Israel is a Jewish State which does not believe in secularism and deserves no encouragement from India (2) In the context of Indo-Pakistani enmity India should take an Anti-Israeli attitude in order to retain Arab countries. If only this, she has aligned herself with Anti-Israeli Arab States she has only betrayed inconsistency with her professed policy of peaceful co-existence. It is not too late for India to make a slight change in her attitude to Israel. A generous attempt should be made by our leaders to make the Arabs respect the right of existence of the Jewish State in West Asia. It will prove our policy of co-existence peacefully and will produce useful international results. India as a member of U.N. is bound by the charter not to do anything that would thwart the practice of tolerance among nations. Moreover under Article 51 of our Constitution we as a nation should endeavour to promote international peace and security by maintaining just and honorable relations between nations. If President Nasser means what he says about the extermination of Israel, India which claims to follow Gandhism in International Affairs cannot support him in his vilest venture if it is conceded that Israel has expentions desires and the remedy for it is given in the U.N. charter - regional actions. The initial mistake of the non-aligned countries is that they do not give any importance to regional arrangements and so in India. Arab and non-Arab States could have defended any of the neighbours of Israel from aggression. That would have been better way

of facing west Asian problem than the present policy of professing peaceful coexistence, and at the same time denying the right of existence of Israel by threatening to interminate it.

In a novel 1984 by George Orwell the tyrant feeling unreasonable hamper by the unvarying precision of words ordered in a new language, tailored to his personal requirements. The result was "Newspeak" a language where words could be given any meaning at will but 1984 is still 17 years away and that for Mrs. Gandhi not soon enough so 'Newspeak' or something similar has been pressed into service to lend the semblance of justification to a stand that is the direct contradiction of all the ideals that the Government of India has so loudly professed.³⁷ The unthinking support to the Egyptian claim to the right to seal international water ways on the plea that they constitute her territorial waters is unfortunate. Assuming that U.A.R. claim is valid in International Law - and this is far from certain - the principle of selective closure of water ways one dislike its fraught with danger to International commerce and peace. In such an event one feels sense. Mrs. Gandhi would not be in such a hurry to device specious justification. The one single shred of justification for the aggressive acts of the U.A.R. is the reported threat of Israel to take military actions against

37. Swarajya, 'Our Middle East Policy', A.K.Sen, June 24 (1967), p. 6.

Syria in reprisal for sabotage raids by Arab gurillas from Syria. For identical acts of coverst infiltration and aggression in Kashmir, Government of India sent its army to the gates of Lahore. Pakistan then had for more reasons than Syria non to complain of aggression.³⁸ Pakistan had not aspired to destroy India nor attempted to blockade the Indian coastline. How the Government of India's present stand in the Middle East crisis can be quared with its attitude in the Kashmir. War is something that is inexplicable in any language of 'Newspeak'.

According to the Communist Party of India once again President Nasser has challenged the full might of with one stroke electrified the whole Arab scene to such an extent that even the reactionary regims of Saudi Arabia Kuwait, Jordan have to line up in a common Arab front. They declared it a imperialist intervention. This way Nassef has raised the struggle of the Palestine liberation army to a new level and underlined the urgency of doing justice to the legitimate demands of the Palestine Arab refugees, but by choosng directly to confront Israel and its imperial bakers he has smashed in one blow. The imperialist conspiracy of trying to divide the Arabs by providing military aid to the most reactionary feudal regimes in the region, in order to set them up as a military alliance to stand against the force of Arab nationalism.³⁹

38. Swarajya, June 24, (1967), p. 6.

39. New Age, "West Asian Crisis" (New Delhi) June 4 (1967) p.2.

The Islamic pact which embodies the western conspiracy has received its unceremonious burial. The 1967 is no longer 1956. The ignominious defeat which met the very first attempt by the NATO members to make Security Council as a platform to condemn the U.A.R. testifies to the increased strength of Afro-Asian Solidarity and of the forces of freedom and peace. As far as the Gulf of Aqaba India has always held that it is an Arab inland sea under the joint sovereignty of U.A.R. Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the Israeli presence at the end of the Gulf is the result of ferontorial aggression, and is an open violation of U.N. resolutions. Israel with Arab countries having a war from last 11 years has never complied with U.N. resolutions. The imperialist want to hang or to their plunder in west Asia and this is the reason that they more build up all these years Israel as their gendarmerie in this region.⁴⁰ We in India can only hail our Arab brothers for their flaming patriotism and courage. And Prime Minister has done well to take a firm stand on the war. Not India's mission in world affairs but over our national interest also demand this stand. It is however antagonism that even the S.S.P. and the P.S.P. Swatantra and Jane Sang have taken exceptions to India's stand. We fully endorse India's Government stand to restore peace in West Asia.⁴¹ Israel's formal acceptance of ceasefire does not mean that it has resiled from aggression continues in very presence. The aggression has left no doubt that he will now

40. New Age, June 11 (1967), p.6.

41. New Age, June 11, 1967, page 6.

make another foul bid under the cover of ceasefire and "negotiations".⁴² This territorial expansion wholly illegal has the full backing of U.S.A. and other imperialist because what passes into Israel possessions becomes indirectly possession of Anglo U.S. imperialism. They have also made it known that Arab countries must recognise Israel before any settlement.

The Rightist circles are wing not only to pressurize the Indian Government to give up its present stand but also to down-grade Soviet Union's friendship towards India. They are pressing to that India must take what they call 'a neutral stand'. What is not always seen is that in 1956 it was imperialist powers Great Britain, France who directly invaded U.A.R. and long Israel was a belligerent accomplice and that the U.A.R. was weak to face an open aggression. Great responsibilities have devolved on India whose friendship with the U.A.R. has more than once stood on test fire. It is gratifying that India is being acclaimed in Arab countries for her firm stand during the crisis. Deputy leader C.P.I. Hiren M Mukherji C.P.I. extended full support to the governments efforts to secure the with-drawl of combatant forces to the 4th June position and to stand by the Arabs in this hour of their need.⁴³ He was very critical of suggestions that the Government should abandon its policy of friendship for the Arabs because of the temporary military success of Israel.

42. New Age, June 18, (1967), p. 1.

43. Patriot, June 9, (1967), p. 1.

He warned the Government against being bamboozled by military strength and allow the strategically important area of West Asia to pass under the control of imperialist powers.

GOVERNMENT'S STAND

External affairs minister M.C. Chagla defended India's policy of non-alignment and the Government attitude to the West Asian crisis. Mr. Chagla expressed a sense of pride at the contributions which India had been making in International affairs in the 20 years after independence and referred to the raising of the *apartheid* issue at the U.N. He said I heard Mr. Nathpai speech I admired the eloquence the barked wit, the poisoned dagger with which he tried to stab the prime minister and my humble self, and I said to myself that these great qualities might have been used for worthier causes. He should have used these qualities to praise his country to fight the enemies of this country to point out the world how very often India had been misunderstood. Mr. Chagla said India was almost the first country to propound the doctrine of non-alignment "I think that the greatest contribution that J.Z.N. made to political thought was the contribution in regard to the doctrine of non-alignment. At that time ours was a voice in wilderness. Now the polarization of the world between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. was causing to an end. Mr. Nath Pai had said that India's influence was at its vaster at present Mr. Chagla added "I want to assure that India can feel proud of the honour and respect in which she is held." Other non-aligned countries

worked up to India for guidance and leadership.⁴⁴

AT THE U.N. -

Mr. Chagla also that the U.N. had been "reduced to impotence" because of India's action. "No country has tried to uphold the dignity and the prestige of the U.N. more than India. Even in last crisis U.N. showed the greatest confidence in India."⁴⁵ Mr. Chagla added that he can prove from documentary evidence the propriety of the steps taken by India from time to time "in the West Asian crisis that all along we were trying to ask both parties to exercise restraint." Referring to the forthcoming visit to the U.A.R. and Yugoslavia he said he was not resentful of the "unflattering things," said by Nath Pai about it because he expected it of the member. But he was surprised that Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit shall have said the same things. "I am really surprised and pained that she, with her vast knowledge of diplomacy of International affairs should have said that I should not go to gather wisdom from President Nasser and President Tito, but they should come here to gather wisdom from us."

We have often been told why don't we keep quiet. Mr. Chagla added "Let us not forget that India is a member of the Security Council it has got to review and pass judgments on world events. ~~Is it~~ Is it suggested that as a member of the Security Council it should take no notice of what is happening in different parts of the world?"

44. Patriot, July 19 (1967), page 5.

45. Patriot, July 19 (1967), page 5.

Mr. Chagla disputed the argument of Mr. Masani, that India was isolated and had lost its influence because of its West Asian policy, and said - a large body of world public opinion had supported the non-alignment resolutions before U.N. General Assembly on West Asia. He also ridiculed the comparison of the Arab Israel with Indo-Pak hostilities and said it would mean accepting Pakistan propaganda that India committed aggression on it.

He also took the opportunity of defending his much criticized first statement in Parliament in which he had said "The creation of Israel has given rise to tension between Israel and the Arabs." Mr. Chagla said this was the factual statement and any one who knew the history of Middle East and the feelings of Arabs roused by creation of Israel would realize it. But that did not mean India did not recognize Israel.⁴⁶ Mr. Chagla said it was not India's view that other matters like navigation of the Suez canal, the Gulf of Aqaba and recognition of Israel should not be discussed but "first things come first."⁴⁷ Mr. Chagla reiterated that it was of utmost importance that there should be withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories. Mr. Chagla maintained that India's policy was on West Asia - both in consonance with what was right, with justice and with our national interests.

Mr. Chagla said it was wrong also to suggest that our foreign policy was evolved on the basis of personal friendship

46. Patriot, July 19, (1967) p. 5.

47. Ibid.

for instance the friendship between Nehru and Nasser.

The reason why India stood by Nasser and "stands by him" was that he represented the forces of progress, socialism, non-alignment and Natpai question that are Saudi Arabia and Jordan progressive to this Chagla says that the axis formed against India by Saudi Arabia, Jordan Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan. President Nasser is opposed to Muslim fanaticalism. Therefore it is in interest of India to support and strengthen the cause of which President Nasser stands.

Thus giving answers to oppositions. He said that though there are many mis-understandings in actually government stand was based on reason and right judgment.

CHAPTER FIVE

WORLD RE-ACTION

On Monday June 5 the world awoke to find Israel at war with her Arab neighbours. Across the Atlantic the news broke at a less convenient hour for those involved in the crisis. It was 2.50 a.m. when Walt Rostow President Johnson's special Assistant for national security affairs was roused by the white house duty officer. At 4.30 a.m. Rostow by then established in the situations room at the white house woke the President.

Soon after the dawn the Russian teletype machine in the pentagon began to chatter printing out cyrillic characters which were immediately translated and relayed to the White House situations room on another machine. It was a message from the Kremlin. Officials were taken by surprise - for this was the first use of the hot line since its installation in August 1963 following the Cuban missile crisis. During the course of the week a dozen messages were to be exchanged. Kossygin wanted Johnson to know that Russia was against war in the Middle East and would not intervene if the U.S. acted similarly; and Kossygin hinted that the two super powers might work together to restore peace.

At 5.55 am press secretary George Christian released the first white house statement on the war: It said -

"The U.S. will devote all its energies to bring about an end to the fighting and a new beginning of progress to assure the peace and development of the entire area. We call

upon all parties to support the security council in bringing about an immediate ceasefire." At 8.15 a.m. Rusk, McNamara Rostow and Christian were present with Johnson at the first policy meeting. They discussed the possibility of co-operating with the Soviet Union to bring about a cease-fire.

At a mid-day briefing the state department press Secretary Robert Medoskey declared that the U.S. would be "neutral in thought word and deed". The statement was inspired by Rusk and Rostow and he checked with both ^{of} them before he made it. But it violently antagonized the Jewish community and many U.S. politicians; and Johnson soon realized that a political blunder had been made. Later in the afternoon of the first day, reporters were asking whether McCloskey's statement on neutrality meant an abandonment of Israel. Johnson called in Rusk briefed him and sent him to make a fresh declaration describing the U.S. as "non-belligerent" Rusk stated - "I want to emphasize that any use of this word "neutral" which is a great concept of international law, is not an expression of indifference and indeed. Indifference is not permitted to us because we have a very heavy obligation under the U.N. Charter, and especially as one of the permanent members of the security council to do every thing we can to maintain international peace and security."

Of course from the start to the finish everyone including Russia, Egypt and Israel knew that the U.S. would

never sit idly by if it were to be a question of the destruction of Israel.

Thus in the U.S.A. where the media of mass communication and particularly the big chains of newspapers form a powerful pressure group because of their economic and political position the press was by and large pro-Israel. For the highly combustible situation that erupted suddenly in the Middle East, the "Arab provocation" in general and President Nasser's 'aggressive' attitude in particular, was held responsible by the American press. Although it did not condemn President Nasser as a warmonger, he was, however held responsible for the withdrawal of UNEF and the Aquaba blockage. According to it, the President was in search of bogeys to ~~divert~~ divert the attention of his people and it was toward off the criticism of his domestic and international policies that he launched upon such an adventurous course spot lighting the situation in the U.A.R. on the eve of the current crisis The New York Times (weekly review) wrote on May 25, 1967 that Nasser.

".....was acting from weakness. His political edifice had been crumbling around him, his domestic economy was in shambles his troops were tied down in a seemingly endless war in Yemen and his prestige had deteriorated in the Arab world to the point where his foes in the Arab world taunted him about hiding behind the U.N....."

The U.S. press could not remain oblivious of the U.S. interests in the Middle East fully aware of her stakes in

the survival of Israel as a faithful ally, the press in the U.S. followed a cautious approach, trying to counsel moderation so that status quo in the region could be maintained. The reason for this approach was that the U.S. was already having her hands full with the Vietnam war and therefore was not in a position to intervene decisively in the West Asian crisis. The press for this reason urged the necessity of "delicate diplomacy directed towards the twin objectives of protecting vital interests while saving the faces all around."¹ To achieve these objectives the American press suggested two alternatives. First was to get the security council adopt a strong resolution asking the U.A.R. to lift the blockage of Aqaba. If such a resolution or its implementation failed as was feared in view of the Soviet Union's stand and Nasser's non-cooperation the second alternative could be the direct intervention by the maritime powers including the U.S. to achieve that objective. A sense of urgency was also demanded because "an Israeli action would be inevitable unless the U.N. or the world's major maritime powers prevent the closing of the gulf."² Meanwhile Israel was praised for the restraint she was displaying and was asked to maintain it.

Provocation by the Arabs and the Russian "miscalculations" were held mainly responsible for war that eventually

1. The Washington Post quoted in "International Herald Tribune" (I.H.T.I.) June 9 (1967).

2. The New York Time, I.H.T. May 27-28, 1967.

broke out Israel was assured that her destruction would not be permitted in any case³ but at the same time she was asked to stop fighting as early as possible. It was feared that too much of the Arab humiliation at the hands of Israel would only worsen the situation. Arab charges about the Anglo-American intervention in the form of air cover for Israel's attack were forcefully rebutted. Oil embargo against the western countries by the Arabs and also shapping of diplomatic ties with the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom were referred to as evidence to substantiate the contention.

American press counselled moderation to Israel which had come decisively victorious out of the war and tried to appear reasonable to Arabs.⁴ It asked Israel to accommodate the justifiable and understandable anxieties, frustrations and humiliations of the Arab past⁵ It told the Arabs to recognise Israel's existense before demanding complete withdrawl of the letter's forces.⁶ The Washington Post however approved the Israeli idea of an autonomous "Arabs Palestine" on the west bank of the Jordan river. The press also asked Arabs to be united not to fight Israel but accept it as a fact of life and work for mutual development and prosperity⁷ in the interest of permanent peace in the region.

3. Washington Evening Star, I.H.T., June 7, 1967.

4. Washington Daily News, I.H.T., June 12, 1967.

5. Washington Post, I.H.T., June 9, 1967.

6. Atlanta Constitution, June 12, 1967.

7. New York Times, June 3-4, 1967.

For the disturbance of the peace in the region the partial responsibility was laid on the U.N. Its mistakes in withdrawing U.N.E.F. was deplored and its inaction and weakness in dealing with Aquaba blockade was criticised. However its utility as a forum for 'private' and 'delicate diplomacy' was not questioned.

As regards the reaction of U.S.S.R., in Moscow the news of the war broke at 10.47 a.m. Moscow time. All day after the momentous announcement. The Soviet Radio and news agencies were accusing Israel of aggression against U.A.R. Later that night Tass reported that the "Soviet government had condemned Israeli aggression and had demanded that Israel cease hostilities."⁸ It said that the Soviet Government reserves the right to take all the steps that may be necessitated by the situation.⁹ American press was of the opinion that "Kremlin wants to avoid war & so close to its door steps"¹⁰ Even then it was the Russian arms aid and moral support which enabled the Arabs to misunderstand and miscalculate the whole situation, nevertheless in the opinion of the western press the crisis in west Asia short of actual war was in Russian interest. According to Minneapolis Tribune: "The prefabricated crisis is just what Russia wants. It puts the U.S. over a barrel in the Middle East at a time when its attention has been concentrated on Vietnam, it

8. Rudolphs Winston's Churchill, The Six Day War,

9. Ibid, page 149.

10. I.H.T., June 2, 1967.

embarrasses the French and further weakens British influence in the area and it puts Egypt in a strong position to convert the Red sea into a Russian Lake."

Soviet Union's attempt to save the situation for the Arabs in the wake of the June events by convening the special emergency session of the U.N. General assembly came under heavy fire. Mr. C.L. Suez berger in his analysis of the Foreign affairs of June 19, 1967 called this as an attempt to come. Out of the self dig pit". The Chicago Tribune described Mr. Kosygin's speech in general Assembly Emergency session as "Sterile and pedestrian performance unleashing garbage can full of typical soviet hypocrisy propoganda, sour grapes and pure invention."¹¹

The question "who lost as a result of the war; the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A.? The majority held that it was U.S.S.R. which lost in the crisis of her own creation. Suggestions were thrown to the effect that it was high time for her to review her Middle East policy. Some of the News papers like Baltimore Sun however thought that after the war it was America which was "being vilified by the Arab states, whose friendship and goodwill it was tried to cultivate (and has earned a measure of Akepticism if not mistrust"¹² in Israel.

The British Government's reaction of the situation in the Middle East was very close to its american counterpart.

11. Washington Post, June 10-11, 1967.

12. I.H.T., June 14, 1967.

Dealing with the forces that were operating behind the smoke screen of crisis, the Guardian carried an article by Victor Zora on June 1, 1967, according to which:

"The conflicting interests in the Middle East involving the nationalist powers and the monarchies the oil companies, the Arab refugees, the Suez canal, western leases and the like make a highly inflammable mixture."

The withdrawal of the U.N.E.F. and the 'Gulf Blockage' were viewed as a calculated piece of 'Nasserite intransigence' by British press.¹³ It however advocated a policy of delicate diplomacy including the involvement of the International court of justice and an adequate action by the maritime powers in order to open the gulf. In pursuance of the latter the British press went a head and asked the western powers to test the blockade by a physical demonstration and even the show of strength if need be.¹⁴ Israel's restraint was appreciated and she was asked to maintain it. In case she failed the press warned that Israel would "take on the responsibility of aggression and lose the diplomatic support they now rely on."¹⁵

The British reaction was to defend Israel. They defended even after the actual war broke out on 5th June. The daily Telegraph (6 June) held the "original act of belligerence ... and ... no help in countering that act either from the U.N. or from the west" solely responsible for the war. The Times

13. "Insight, The war gave that went wrong" The Sunday Times, (London) 28 May, 1967.

14. The Times, (London) 1 June 1967.

15. Ibid.

was little objective to include "the war plans of Israel" besides the Arab intransigence arms sale by the great powers and the ineffectiveness of the U.N.," to share the responsibility. The Arab charges of Anglo American intervention were promptly refuted and the "Oil blackmail" was strongly condemned. It was thought that the oil stoppage would not have any immediate effect on Britain and U.S.A. rather it would cause a positive loss of revenue to the Arab states themselves though its long term implications might make Britain and U.S.A. uneasy.¹⁶ In the interest of permanent peace in the region the British press demanded a definite international guarantee that Arabs would let Israel exist. A sort of Arab Israel peace treaty prior to the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Arab territory was considered as the best solution by the Guardian of 8 June. For the same objective of stabilizing peace in the region, The Times in the f.n. demanded an amicable solution of the refugee problem and asked Israel and the international community as a whole to accommodate genuine Arab anxieties regarding Jordan.

At the U.N. Russia sought to condemn Israel as the aggressor while Britain and U.S. preferred to make a straight forward and urgent call for cease-fire. But although the three major powers moved along predictable lines of policy, the fourth major power France surprised all the political pundits for the first time in recent years.¹⁷

16. Guardian (Manchester) 7 June 1967.

17. Churchill R.S.W.S., The Six Day War, p. 150.
The Times (London), 7 June 1967.

It was expected that she would support Israel. In the past she has done No: in fact Israel's Air Force was composed of french-built air craft. When the news of the war reached Paris. French public opinion reacted with spontaneous expressions of sympathy with Israel. Even the traditionally anti-Semitic extreme right became passionate Zoinist overnight. Veterans of the "Keep Algeria French" Campaign paraded boulevard charting "Israel will vanquish" to the same rhythmic beat as they once shouted "Algerie Francaise". In spite of these demonstrations for Israel the french government decided to preserve a studied silence. De Gaulle announced that 'France's ties with Israel were less important than France's long term and carefully nurtured interests in the Middle East.¹⁸ If these were not to be endangered France had to make a display of neutrality. In fact De Gaulle was displeased because Eban on his way through Paris had disregarded De-Gaulle's advice not to take initiative.

The french position was ably summed up in the BBC-TV programme, The World Today, by Edward Sablier, a leading french political commentator on June 7.

"There is no doubt that there is nothing in common now between the position adopted by the present Government and the Mollet. government in 1956..... there is a growing difference between the cold-blooded position adopted by the De Gaulle government and the very passionate position adopted

18. Ibid, p. 150

by 90% of the french people in favour of the freedom to line of Israel."¹⁹

In effect de-Gaulle's neutrality was modified by the proviso that he would oppose the country which had attacked first. As it was not then clear who had fired the first shot this declaration was on a par with many others that have fallen from the enigmatic lips of the President. French action was criticised by the New Statesmen which termed General de-Gaulle's stand as an expression of "utmost cynicism".²⁰ There was some criticism of the attempts by the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union to by-pass Europe and particularly U.K. in their anxiety to solve the West Asian crisis within the realm of their hegemony in the region. Ronald Payer wrote in the Sunday Telegraph (25 June) that "America and Russia really rule the world. While they go on with the game of trying to force the other's arm down on the table the rest of us can do nothing but hope and talk."

Contrary to the official French policy of strict neutrality in the crisis the large section of the french press followed the attitude adopted by the British and U.S. press. Nevertheless the pro-Gaullist view was also represented. The former section termed the official policy of neutrality as the "policy of rupture with the west."²¹

Another paper La Figaro (Paris) published an article

19. Ibid.

20. I.H.T., 24-25 June 1967.

21. L' Aurore (Paris) 27^H June 1967.

by Raymond Aron wherein he described de-Gaulle's policy as a policy of "indifference to the ideologies and to the internal regional regimes of the states ... and said that "the reversal of alliances was anachronistic."²² Taking cudgels on behalf of De-Gaulle Jean Claude servan schreibre replying to Joseph Alsops article which criticised french policy in Middle East wrote on 28 June that it was in France's national interest to adopt a neutral attitude in the crisis. He held that "relations between underdeveloped oil producing countries and the West will not be improved stubbornly keeping to a colonial style policy." The La Nation (Paris) also saw the "efficacy of France's role in the bringing of a peace settlement in the Middle East."²³ The European papers were divided in their attitude on West Asia.²⁴ Accordingly the french policy was viewed differently by them. A Danish paper The Information held that France was the only major western nation that had the trust of the new countries.²⁵ The Italian paper "Corriere della Sera" (Milan) described Nasser as the "Creature of fire and mud" like Hitler.

One thing which was worth noticing in the European Press was that it was more European than Western. It deplored the game of super powers in Middle East in which both Europe

22. I.H.T., July 8-9, 1967.

23. I.H.T., July 1-2, 1967.

24. Article by Frank Giles in The Sunday Times, 25 June, p.6.

25. I.H.T. 23 June 1967.

and the U.N. were left unconsulted. Whereas the 'La Nation' only demanded the inclusion of Europe, the Middle east and China" in the super power consultations on Middle East". The Combat (Paris) emphatically asserted that U.K. and France with their superior knowledge of the problems of the Near East were bound to play a more significant role in the West Asian crisis.²⁶ The L' Osservatore Romano of vatican in its classical prophetic style conveyed the biblical message of peace which has "universal value and significance" to all the direct and indirect victims of the war. The West German was pro-Israel because of "its own particular guilt feelings about the Jews" except one right wing Munch paper.²⁷

There was complete unity and singleness of purpose in Soviet press's approach towards West Asian Crisis. According to it the developments in West Asia were largely due to the desire on the part of the U.S.A. and U.K. to extend and strengthen imperialism and neo-colonialism in the region. Oil and other interests were the force behind the desire.²⁸ To achieve these objectives wrote Paravada "The U.S. imperialists ruling circles of Israel and Arab reaction are staging a new plot to suppress national liberation struggle of Arab people. This the paper thought was evident from Washington's doctrine of 'Local conflicts' and small wars of which in Vietnam was a parallel."²⁹

26. I.H.T., July 1-2, 1967.

27. Ibid, June 22, 1967.

28. 'Pravada' Commentary by Viktor Mayersky: New & Views from Soviet Union, Vol. XXVI, No.115, June 5.

29. Ibid. 23 May. 1967.

To substantiate these contentions, the Russian press quoted the presense of the American sixth fleet in the Mediterranean and its "movements towards East as an Evidence.³⁰ The efforts to open the Gulf blockage by the U.S. & U.K. in co-operation with the maritime powers were criticised.³¹ The American draft resolution in security council for an appeal to all sides to display "special restraint" was described as 'hypocrisy'. The press held the view that Israel was a party in this imperialist conspiracy and was working in coalition with her U.S. and British masters. On their behalf and to fulfil her own similar objectives Israel indulged in "provocative military parade, and "bellicose statements" directed against Arabs.³² For this reason the Russian Press was more critical of the U.S.A. & U.K. than Israel. The stand of the Arabs against this 'imperialist conspiracy' was just and moral according to the Soviet press. The content analysis of the Soviet Press's opinion on Middle East indicates two types of Soviet interests in the area declared and the other implicit. The implicit interests can be traced into the repeated mention in the Press of a link between U.S. action in Vietnam and her designs in Middle East. Perhaps the Soviet Union wanted to force the U.S.A. by thus embarrassing it before the world public opinion, thus to relent her on the Vietnam issue.

30. Izvestia Commentary by Nikolai Polyganov, June 2, 1967.

31. Pravda, News & Views , 5 June 1967.

32. Izvestia, 'Dangerous course', News & Views, 19 May 1967.

The Soviet Press in view of these interests reminded Arabs of Russian's earlier friendly gestures and emphatically assured the same in the future. The need for this assertion became imperative with the emergence of a feeling after the war among the Arabs that Russia had let them down, Izvestia warned before the war broke out that "those who commit an aggression will meet not only with the United strength of the Arab states but also the resolute resistance from the Soviet Union and all peace loving countries. After that the "treacherous attack of Israel's armed forces" was condemned by Pravda as absolutely unjustified and predatory and of piratic nature". Israel was accused as the "permanent violater of peace in the Middle East."³³ It was asked where are Israel and its patrons going? How will the State of Israel line in future with a more populous resourceful but hostile world around it.³⁴

Besides criticizing the U.S. imperialism, words were not minced to condemn the "petty burgeois adventurism" and 'big power chauvinism" of Red China. Chinese offer of arms and other assistance to the Arabs was interpreted by the Russian Press as an utter absurdity"and the Arabs were asked not to take seriously.³⁵ The Soviet Press supported the stand of the French President De Gaulle who was trying to free the Western Europe from American tutelage. And for

33. Izvestia, on the decision of the C.P.S.U. 25 June 1967.

34. Izvestia, News & Views, 11 June, 1967.

35. Izvestia, Commentary by V. Petrov, 23 June 1967.

this France was assured a sincere and friendly understanding from the Russian people.³⁶

President Tito happened to be in Vienna on June 5. He was an old friend of Colonel Nasser and he made it plain that he regarded Israel as the aggressor. He was the first Communist statesman to comment on the out break of hostilities. He pledged full support for the Arab countries in their 'just confrontation' with Israel. His past friendship with Nasser stemmed from the mid 50's when an attempt was made to form an alliance of non-aligned powers including India, Yugoslavia and Egypt.

Eleven other Arab countries rallied to Nasser's support that Monday: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen, Sudan and Tunisia. Of these countries the only one which from the out set vigorously joined battle with Israel was Jordan. Drawn into conflict against his will by the pressures of the Arab world King Hussain and his army played an honourable part. He fought promptly and with tenacity. Syria the most malevolent towards Israel of all the Arab countries, did little in the first two or three days apart from firing across the border; but a fierce vengeance was inflicted on her at the end.³⁷ King Teisal of Saudi Arabia sent a message of support to Nasser. Mecca Radio said that Saudi Arabian troops had entered Jordan

36. Pravda, (editorial) 29 June 1967, I.H.T.

37. Churchill, R.S./Winston's, The Six Day War, page 151.

"to fight on the side of our Arab brothers".³⁸ In Kuwait the Amir Shaikh Sabah proclaimed a 'defensive war between Kuwait and Zionist gangs in occupied Palestine. The Amir said 'The hour of sacrifice has come'. Before the out break of war he had already sent a detachment to Egypt which had been posted for the special defence of Dharm-el-Sheikh.

A review of the Indian press shows that by and large the press opinion was against the official stand of the government of India. Besides the realization that Egypt would deliberately provoke Israel. The Indian Press disapproved former's demand to withdraw the U.N.E.F. and the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. It was held that the demand for the withdrawal of the U.N.E.F. not only indicated President Nasser's desire to vindicate his theoretical right but behind it was the understanding of the situation that his solemn pledge to go to war with Israel in retaliation against an attack on Syria by Israel would not be fully credible as long as the U.N.E.F. was around. The Hindu (Madras, 19 May 1967) therefore described U.A.R.'s request as "fraught with grave consequences" and the view was endorsed by most of the Indian press. The legal aspect of the Aqaba blockade was not discussed in details in the Indian Press. Nevertheless the importance of the gulf blockage in respect to the Israel's economy especially its oil imports and trade with rest African and Asian countries was fully emphasised.³⁹ In

38. Ibid., page 152.

39. The Hindu, 20 May, Times of India, 23 May 1967.

view of this the question whether it was in the interest of peace and stability in the region to close the Gulf in emphatic No.1. Writing on this aspect of the 'Gulf issue' the 'Times of India' wrote on 8 June "whether or not U.A.R. claims to sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba are finally sustained the obligation in peace to maintain it as a free waterway is undeniable." When war started in West Asia these two acts of President Nasser - the U.N.E.F. withdrawal and the Gulf blockade were singled out as provocation to Israel which forced the latter to open fire.⁴⁰ Considerably vocal opposition was raised against the closure of the Suez canal by the U.A.R. Resentments were voiced that the closure was causing hardship to India Pakistan and Ceylon. India was the worst sufferer because the closure delayed the food shipments bound for India. In view of this the U.N. security council's resolution for stationing the U.N. observers in the area was welcomed as it was beginning towards the opening of the canal and lessening the tension in the area.⁴¹ The Indian reaction towards crisis was pro-Arab more than Arabs themselves. Patriot, which earlier justified Nasser's demand for the U.N.E.F. withdrawal and Blockage held 'Anglo American conspiracy' and the imperialist ambitions of Israel responsible for out break of war.⁴² Pakistan reaction towards crisis was pro-Arab. The Pakistan Times writes "Pakistan and Muslims all over the world have supported the Arabs not because they are

40. Indian Express, 10 July 1967.

41. Indian Express, 12 July 1967.

42. Patriot, (New Delhi), 8 June 1967.

Arabs or because Russia and China are supporting them but because they are Muslims." The tendency of describing the whole affair as a tunnel between the western and eastern blocks and between this race and that is deplorable this will not lead the Arabs anywhere".

As every crisis does, the West Asian Crisis polarised varied economic and political interests of the world community. Though it is difficult to analyse the motives of these reactions two trends were clearly visible. The support for Israel came from rich industrialised non-communist world and Arab stand was backed by non-capitalists, socialists non-aligned and poor emerging nations. Frictions were, however, there and the two of them - France and Rumania were glaring examples of non-conformism. Thus according to their inherent political systems each country reacted towards the crisis in its own way.

CONCLUSION

Keeping in view the Indian stand towards West Asian Crisis, it can be concluded, that the relationship of the interwar years which created a deep sense of fellowship and unity of purpose among the peoples of the two areas is still continuing. Since independence India and the leading Arab countries realized that their destinies were linked together by facts of Geography, Culture and past history, no less than by the grim realities of International politics.

When in July 26, 1956 President Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, many Western Governments reacted unfavourably to the decision. The Government of India declared that it was not a disinterested party, because it is a user of the water way and its economic life and development was also affected by the dispute. Hence the Government was then interested in averting a conflict. India said that the settlement of the problem could be only on the basis of the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt.

In the recent crisis the stand of the Government of India aroused opposition and criticism in the country and abroad. The Government's policy was opposed by many political parties and individuals. It was natural because of several developments in the West Asia in particular and the World in general in the year preceding the 1967 conflict. The world balance of power underwent a certain change; the relationship

between the countries of West Asia also witnessed some change. India's relations with the parties to the conflict are concerned, could not remain constant. Since the last conflict in 1956, India herself had been a party to Indo-Pakistan and Indo-China conflict. While determining India's policy toward the Arab countries many Indian's wanted to consider the attitude of the Arab countries towards conflicts to which India was a party. In short though the attitude of the government of India towards the 1967 conflict remained more or less the same as in 1956, the attitude of a large section of public opinion became less sympathetic towards the Arab and thus more helpful to Israel.

As we have seen, in the initial phase of the conflict India tried to solve the problem. And for this purpose she spoke on behalf of non-aligned nations and puted many resolutions. Six point peace plan and non aligned countries resolution was put before the security council. When on the request of U.A.R. the Secretary General gave orders for withdrwl of the U.N.E.F., criticism of Secretary General's p rompt action were heard from various quarters. They maintained that greater delay might have contributed to a reduction of tension in the area, Secretary General defended his actions and argued that any peace keeping operations were dependent both in law and infact on the consent of the host state, he also emphasized the distinction between a

peace keeping operation and an enforcement action under chapter VII of the Charter. Government of India's stand and attitude towards the withdrawal was somewhat on the side of the Secretary General, India was completely in agreement, both on legal and practical grounds, with U.Thant. India stood for the restoring of peace. India also planned to ask security council to give a call for cease fire. Indian delegate Mr. Chagla went to represent India in U.N. General Assembly. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held that Israel was responsible for escalating the situation and was responsible to keep world peace in a grave peril. Here India did not favour the actions of Israel. India supported Arabs but, it can be said that India's efforts were towards a solution of peace in West Asia.

Mr. Chagla's speech in the U.N. Assembly cleared further India's views. He made known India's view regarding ceasefire U.N.E.F. withdrawal and the legal status of Gulf of Aqaba. Here also the attempt was to defend the action of Secretary General.

In the post conflict period, India took the view that after ceasefire it took a little time to realize that Israel had become the strongest power in Near Middle East. It was said that the victory of Israel, not only represent a massive defeat of Arab world but also of the Arab world. Here Nasser in Indian mind came to represent the spirit of national self respect unbending to western pressure. But

India's stand was severely criticized by opposition parties and was termed 'Pro Arab'. It was stated that the choice of words were not proper, they could have been avoided. Here Arabs attitude towards Pakistani war was also brought into account and it was demanded, that we ought to adopt the same line of action.

In this context world reaction was also taken into account. How the western and eastern, the two blocks reacted. How they realized that they have to take into account the fact that Israel had become the strong power in Middle East. But their efforts were also to bring about a permanent solution of the problem. Thus it can be said that India criticised the action of Israel as aggressive, but the effort of India was towards relaxing tension and bringing about a peaceful solutions of the West Asian problem.

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