

**POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY:
A CRITIQUE AND AN EVALUATION.**

1976

**INDRA JUNG THAPPA
CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHAR LAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI 57**

D E C L A R A T I O N

This dissertation entitled "Political Development Theory: A Critique and an Evaluation", written in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the award of the M.Phil. Degree, has not been submitted previously in any University for the award of this or any other Degree.

Indra Thappa

INDRA JUNG THAPPA
Centre of Political Studies,
School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi-110057.

Shri Imtiaz Ahmad
Shri Imtiaz Ahmad (Adviser)
Centre of Political Studies,
School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi-110057.

Prof. C.P. Bhambhri
Prof. C.P. Bhambhri (Chairman)
Centre of Political Studies,
School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi-110057.

A_C_K_N_O_W_L_E_D_G_E_M_E_N_T_S

I am grateful to my adviser Shri Intiaz Ahmad whose suggestions made possible the preparation of this work. I am also grateful to Shri Sudipto Kaviraj of Political Studies whose opinions expressed at a recent seminar have opened up horizons for future work. Last but not least I would like to express my thanks to Shri Deepak Talwar of Life Sciences who helped me to locate and conceptualize aspects of theory that are based largely in the natural sciences.

June 1976.

Indra Jung Thappa

C O N T E N T S

	Page
1. INTRODUCTION	I
2. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION	14
3. MODELS: THE CONCEPT OF SYSTEM	18
4. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH	36
5. A CRITIQUE AND AN EVALUATION	65
6. EMERGING ALTERNATIVES: THE LATIN AMERICAN VIEW	100
7. CONCLUSION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS	120
8. NOTES	129
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY	134

INTRODUCTION

The question of development has in recent times acquired special significance largely because the liberation of the hitherto colonial possessions of Asia, Africa and Latin America has served to indicate their underdevelopment, as compared to the development in Western Europe and the U.S.A. This has called for the need for the former to catch up with the latter. With independence they have been confronted by two alternative paths to development i.e. the "first world" of development epitomized by the U.S. and Western Europe, and the "second world" that is the Soviet Union. In reality the problem is far more complex because along side the problem of international stratification exists the fact that economically backward societies are characterized by uneven development of the different sectors of economic activity i.e. the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America have multistructural societies where pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production exist side by side. While today, the problem of pre-capitalist structures has to be solved in an entirely different world economic context, the underdeveloped countries can no longer repeat the performances of 18th and 19th century Europe in the co-ordinates of today's time and space.

Within the context of uneven development, the

developing nations define themselves as being involved in a race with the most advanced nations. Economically and socially they are experimental and tend to choose a "mix" rather than a "pure" system. They are defined further as having the potential to catch up with the advanced nations in less time than it took the presently advanced nations to arrive at their present levels.

This essay is a preliminary exercise in analysing an aspect of this problem concerning political changes which accompany the process of economic development. The study which involves a survey of existing literature does not suggest recommendations to bring about changes but is an analysis of the social scientists perception of it. It is a limited work in so far as it does not deal with political development in general, but with political development Theory in particular. At the very onset I shall make this distinction. Political development Theory is a very special approach to the study of political systems which stresses the general desirability of system stability and integration. Development is postulated as a non-reversible movement between two poles on a continuum and the economic, social and political structure toward which all systems are seen to develop is the western democratic type. Political development theory drew its guidelines from structural - functionalism and the corresponding economic thought prevalent in the

U.S. in the 1920s and the 1930s which addressed itself to the problem of economic reconstruction and system maintenance. Furthermore, in this paper, the Marxist models of change and development have been deliberately kept out of the mainstream. However the core of the main arguments offered by the Marxists have been incorporated in the discussions. The problem has been analysed under seven major headings:

- A. An introduction determining the scope and limits of this discussion.
- B. The growth of development theory and the major influences thereof.
- C. An explanation of the diverse use of models as explanatory instruments in Political Development theory/ The concept of "system".
- D. The Political System: The contribution to Political Development Theory by the different writers on the field.
- E. An assessment and criticism of the purely theoretical base of the theory dealing mainly with the conception that societies are systems in equilibrium and its evaluation against social reality.
- F. A presentation of an alternative view of change as is being progressively realised in developing countries with a mention of the type of research currently being carried out in Latin America.
- G. Conclusion: A summation of problems and prospects.

As in any scientific exercise, definitions are important. The use of terms such as development, change and modernization serve largely to confuse. How do

Political Development theories define them? Reinhard Bendix defines modernization as changes which occurred after the 18th century as a result of the industrial revolution in "advanced" capitalist societies with subsequent changes in "follower" societies.¹ In the adoption of new structures there is a distinction made between modernization and modernity, between static and dynamic forms of modernisation. Erich Fromm defines static adaptation as the adoption of a new habit leaving the whole character structure unchanged and dynamic adaptation as the response to certain external circumstances which arouses new drives and leads to a basic change in the character structure as a result of adaptation.² Bendix and Betelle in distinguishing between modernizing and modernistic elites state that to the extent that an elite has acquired merely the symbols and styles of life, or even the skills of high status groups in more advanced societies, it is modernistic. It becomes modernizing only when it succeeds in utilizing these skills in a socially significant way.³ Further, is modernization synonymous with economic development? Wilbert Moore suggests that modernisation is related to a special form of economic change which emphasises bureaucratic innovation and a host of mending processes such as education and legal reform.⁴ In contrast a rival school of thought holds that the

process of development calls for smashing even more than mending, an overhaul in social relations as in industrial productivity. In practice it would appear that this would contradict the opinion held by Moore, as indeed it does. Moore's failure to grapple with this problem leads him to reject as inappropriate the options offered by the structuralists.

Public attitudes are divided on the issue of development not only on its worth but also on its facts. The distinction between change and progress brings this out more clearly. In considering human development, a distinction has to be made between social development from change in the physical sense of movement in time and space and from growth taken to denote alteration in the nature of an organism in a biological sense. In this sense changes do not constitute development because they cannot be altered by human choices and will. Human development involves culture and consciousness and alternative forms of social structure are not only possible but are inevitably governed by the execution of human decisions. In arriving at conclusions about the nature of human development the social scientist attempts to effect some kind of a balance between "facts" and "values". The separation of facts and values in society should serve to avoid undue subjectivity but not to arrive at a scientific statement

of human development. However this is easier said than done for social facts are largely conditioned by values to the extent that it is largely impossible to maintain the separation.⁵ An inadequate conclusion on the nature of human development hinders the social scientists conceptualisation of development in terms of various methods, rates, directions and consequences.

Further, are modernization and industrialization equivalent processes? The fact that neither modernization and industrialization are full-scale developments is demonstrated by Latin America. The three-hundred year history of Latin America's subservience to North America and Europe indicates that both modernization and industrialization have been taking place rapidly. However they have occurred in a developmental vacuum because there have not been corresponding changes in the social relations. On the other hand to equate development with rapid industrialism neglects a number of major issues. In the first place industrialism does not indicate the social relations best suited to a particular social system. And secondly, it may add to rather than minimize the deformities of national development by putting a strain on the various popular classes.

In so far as development is taken to be a question of public policy planning, Political Development Theory can be placed in perspective. It formulates that

optimum conditions for economic development can be attained by regulating the inputs and outputs in the political and social systems. The cybernetic capacities that are increasingly available to societies offer an increasing range of options resulting in self-sustained and self-propelled development which implies a consumer oriented society with a Western democratic type of polity.

Political Development Theory is based on the assumptions of structural - functionalism which derives its major conceptions from earlier theories which tended to look upon society as an organism. In anthropology structure was defined as the network of actually existing social relations, function as the contribution of the part to the maintenance and continuity of the whole and organization as that aspect of the structure through which societies underwent change without disrupting the structure. A model had thereby been provided to study how societies maintained themselves and underwent changes.

The type of orientation which in the American intellectual tradition resulted in the heavy reliance on "cybernetics" coincides historically with the growth of the functionalist school of thought during the 1920s. The concept was operationalized in currents styled as

- (A) Systems theory (Merton, Parsons, Almond Katz and Kahn)
- (B) General Systems theory (Kenneth Boulding)
- (C) Cyberne-

tics (Karl Deutsch, David Easton). The concern for visualizing society as a system in which the components contributed to the whole can be related factually to the depression of the 1930s and the heavy economic burden imposed by World War II. Thus the entire field from Talcott Parsons Pattern Variables, to Eastons input-output functions, show a consistency in approach to problems of (A) Systemic reconstruction and (B) Systemic equilibrium. This intellectual tradition complemented the conception of social evolution as a non-reversible movement between two poles on a continuum. Societies were visualized as passing from a traditional stage to a modern stage through a transitional stage. They were broadly characterized as under-developed-developed; follower - advanced societies. The evolution of societies to the modern state was equated with the modern democratic epitomized in particular by the United States and western Europe.

This theory has come under severe criticism on methodological and empirical grounds. Broadly, Political Development refers to certain pre-requisites for self-sustained and self-propelled development requiring new social, economic and political structures; that the history of the advanced industrial countries shows to the backward countries the image of their future. However,

the development of an underdeveloped country may differ by virtue of its backwardness from that of an advanced nation. It could therefore be argued that modernity is not located anywhere in the world and that no archetype exists to which underdeveloped nations must aspire; that any nation, whatever its contemporary configuration contains its own possibilities for development, the implementation of which could be hindered by attempts to fit it to a model extrinsic to these possibilities. Theoretically, we may explain social processes as continuously resulting from a dialectical tension between determinism and freedom. Political Development Theory displays an equation of mere correlation with necessary relations of cause and effect. The pattern variables have also lost their utility in the dichotomisation of societies because they are observed to have contradictory functional consequences. The approach to development from the standpoint of the nation state and the consequent explanation of changes in a society "by virtue of its own forces and properties" (Sorokin 1928) no longer remains valid because the conception of development is predicated on the effective working of the world super system that has penetrated every society. So when societies arrive at similar stages through independent changes a different frame work of analysis has to be developed. To explain the practical operation of a

system as an inevitable process tends to freeze as a normative model something that is only one among a number of objective possibilities of development. Development in its practical aspects demands that societies learn and discover in situations, shortcuts, that is to say a strategic orientation to problems.

Adopting this framework we can visualize contemporary capitalist societies as evolving towards a technocracy, a pluralist Democracy or towards Communism; the development might be unpredictable since choices and decisions may provide alternative courses to social change depending upon environmental constraints. Determinism and human choices are reciprocally related; determinism cannot be equated with immanent fatalism. The sides of the argument can be summed up as follows: (A) Political Development Theory holds that the determinate course of events result from the interplay of absolutely necessary causes. Thus a comprehensive rational knowledge of this course is attainable (Comte, Mills). Interests, prejudices and distortions obscure knowledge. Participation in the process of reality is a disturbing condition for the working of reason. (B) As against this it may be argued that there are no necessary causes. Human choices are in interplay with objective conditions resulting in events. The understanding of reality is limited by contextual restraints

11

i.e. trial and error and the increase of accuracy through a dialectic of conjectures which are tried, altered and tried in their altered forms, altered again and so forth, thus moving back and forth between the concrete and the abstract. Inherent in this understanding of social reality is the participation of individuals in social processes.

Recently, scholars have pointed out that the theories of development are largely behind the contemporary stage of world history, because they are designed from the standpoint of the nation state. However, the critical issues of development are unthinkable within the confines of the category, nation. The emergence of a planetary system has subjected the underdeveloped nations to the (A) Demonstration effect - that is the population of peripheral nations are exposed to the standards of living current in hegemonic nations effecting a rise in the aspiration level. (B) the domination effect - some nations condition the working of other national economies. The history of any state therefore, must be viewed according to its relationship with the international system. Contrary to the framework provided by the Princeton school it is held that dichotomies such as developed/underdeveloped, pioneering/follower have a strong ideological flavour and are attempts to view changes within a society within a framework of

stability. Thus Gunder Frank points out that no country was in an original state of underdevelopment although it may have been undeveloped. The process of development and underdevelopment began when the European nations began their world wide expansion. It was then that the developing metropolises and underdeveloping satellites evolved connecting parts of the world system from its centres in Europe and later U.S.A. to its peripheries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The development of a satellite, the Latin Americans maintain, is therefore, an underdeveloped development. This argument rejects the foundations of political development theory i.e.

(1) That underdevelopment is an original state characterised by backwardness or traditionalism; that they have no long history of change. (2) That such societies are dual - one modern, urban and integrated, the other, rural, backward and isolated, that the rural section constitutes an abstacle to modernization. (3) That industrialization and development occur when capital and culture are diffused from the developed capitalist countries. (4) That the pre-capitalist sectors of society account for underdevelopment (5) That import - substitution is the generator of economic development.

It is generally believed that economic development is to a large extent a question of political imperatives is being realized in most underdeveloped countries.

Further, the goal of "active politics" cannot be realized until there is a correspondence between the social and economic cleavages on the one hand and political cleavages on the other remains of secondary concern as long as the structural deformities of a given system are not fully comprehended. The continued organizational and structural backwardness and the unchanging social relations, which exists in most underdeveloped societies shows that modernizing societies are not necessarily developing. As long as development is considered atomistically in terms of autonomous nations undergoing autonomous changes writers will continue suggesting that development will come by way of evolution, education and enlightenment. Alternative solutions to problems are available but the optimum measure of consensus and control at the political level are determined by the peculiarities of individual socio-cultural environment.

ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

The approach in contemporary social science to the study of development has by and large drawn inspiration from theories of the past. The conceptions of progressivism, gradualism, continuity, uniformism and differentiation were not in fact Darwinian in origin as is commonly believed but appeared much earlier in the theories of Marx, Comte and Spencer. The four steps in studying development i.e (1) The Search for Origins (2) The building of patterns and stages of development from the origin to the end (3) The identification of the goals of the process (4) The location of factors causing development, dates back to Aristotle who postulated that to arrive at a clear idea of the present state of development it was necessary to consider the first growth and origin of things.¹

The traditional developmental theory was based on the principle of "immanent causation"; Development was the function of the system itself. Comte and Marx thought that Positivism and Socialism respectively were necessary because each was the result of processes internal to and constitutive of the system. Development was continuous. The study of social dynamics then consisted in conceiving of each of these consecutive social states as necessarily resulting from the preceding and the cause of the following.

The object of science was to discover the laws which governed this continuity, the totality of which determined the course of social development.² Social change was also considered to be a uniform process, that like effects are produced by like causes. Hence causes operating today are the same as those which operated in the past. This simplified the conception of historical time in social development. In this respect Marx did exactly what Comte had done and that was to assign a single cause working uniformly in all areas for all time. Just as Comte formulated that changes were the result of the innate desire in man to make his condition better, Marx believed that changes in the structure of society were brought about by the class struggle.

Another conception in developmental theory was the preoccupation with differentiation, i.e. what is homogeneous today becomes progressively more complex as the latent rudimentary forces of social reality become mature. This was expressed in the theories of Comte, Marx and Spencer.³ Conversely, the more highly differentiated a system, the later in time it must be and thereby more developed. Thus, this principle made time-devices coterminous with the logical order of increasing complexity. The development tradition showed a

complete disregard for precise place and debatable time. In Comte's division of history into past and present corresponding to the Theological, Metaphysical and Positive stages, history was not significant. He was merely concerned with the processes of change within society.

Inherent in the study of development was the use of the comparative method which synchronized three identifiable orders of fact; (i) the relationships of a coexisting logico-series (ii) of a selected temporal series with an emphasis on before and after time and, (iii) an evolutionary or developmental series that is held to denote "normal" or "true" development of a type. Comte's use of the comparative method consisted of a continuous, progressive, uniform and immanent development that was exhibited in all social systems. He discussed the method on two planes: (A) The comparison of different types of human societies distributed all over the world, the development of which was independent of each other (B) The comparison of consecutive states that are to be found in the development of humanity as a whole. The term he used to describe this was the "historical method" but he was interested in history in the abstract alone.

The traditional concept of development was carried

over into the twentieth century in the structural - functional theory in which the emphasis on change as a process inherent in a structure and on the elements of differentiation, and the capacity to deal with the problems of change formed the pivot. The only major difference was that the focus of enquiry shifted from the larger vistas of change to the study of changes in a more restricted universe that may be observed in processes in the short run in comparatively smaller units of interaction such as social systems. In fact, the drastic change in the line of enquiry from Macro to Micro analysis was evident even in the works of Durkheim. The focus of enquiry in the Division of Labour as compared to his later works, The Elementary forms of Religious life and The Rules of Sociological Method indicates clearly, the change.⁴

In the theories of Parsons, Merton, Nacel and others, change was located in roles, status and functions. "Though functional analysis has often focussed on the statics of social structure rather than the dynamics of social change, this is not intrinsic to that system of analysis. By focusing on Dysfunctions as well as Functions, this approach can assess not only the basis of social stability, but the potential sources of change" (Merton: 1957)⁵. In structural-functionalism the elements of change are derived from within the social structure.

MODELS : THE CONCEPT OF
' SYSTEM '

In social science theories models are used extensively in the exposition of the developmental process. The term 'model' however continues to be a slippery concept to the extent that different scholars attribute different meanings to it.

A) The term is used to indicate levels. Here, the concept extends from personality development to the international development i.e. how international agencies evolve to solve the problems that transcend the nation - state. But it also often refers to intermediary levels, from the little community to the nation - state. It becomes essential therefore to devise a precise spatial definition of the term 'model' in order that the area of research can be bounded and legitimized.

B) Models also connate strategies for development or the pragmatics of change. It is directly linked to an indicator or a set of indicators which, as a system is said to provide a foundation for rapid development. This is also referred to as the index method.

C) Models are used as a surrogate for theory, the purpose of which is not so much to guide the evolution of societies as it is to comprehend the mechanisms that are involved in the development process as a part of a more general socio-economic system. It is an

understanding which starts with the model and therefore creates certain structural tensions because of the rigid framework. What is often involved is not just explanation of social change but an insistence that change take place in a certain way.

The paradigms of Political Development Theory are based on the concept of Structure, Function¹ and Organization. Structure refers to the network of actually existing relationships, Function to the contribution of the part to the maintenance and continuity of the whole and Organization denotes the group process which implies the objective fulfillment of a task by planned action. It constitutes a social process which involves the arrangement of action in sequences, in conformity with selected social ends. Organization was that aspect of the structure through which societies underwent changes. Structure, Function² and Organization constituted the paradigms for the explanation of social stability and social change.

Broadly, change is explained in terms of social organization. There are structural elements in all forms of social behaviour and these comprise the anatomical form or structure of a society which is the repetition of behavioural patterns; this is what accounts for the continuity in social life. The apparent paradox

that has to be reconciled is *the* account on one hand of continuity and on the other hand of change. The persistence of a system may be explained in terms of the social structure, descriptively as a set of relationships (which account for social stability) which serve as guides for future action based on experience. Examples of such institutions are the family and kinship systems, class relations, occupation, distribution and so forth. Correspondingly, every social system must accommodate a degree of elasticity and divergence and an explanation for change. In social organizations this is done by ordering social relations by acts of choice and decision. The time factor enters here, for the needs of the present may not be adequately met by institutions that fulfilled similar requirements in the past. Potential avenues for meeting the demands have therefore to be given a specific orientation. Time is also significant in the development of the implications of decision-making and consequent action. Structural forms limit the range of alternatives. The possibility of adopting an alternative accounts for the possibility of change for whether executive decision is manifest or latent, the structural form will be altered. Social structure embodies the principle of continuity, while social organization allows room for change according to the evaluation of a situation or issue, the exercise of

free choice so that the issues of changing events are met. In the description of the social structure a level of constancy within certain limits is assumed. The description is done in quasi-static terms as if the positions were fixed and timeless and the relationship simply continuous. The time dimension is not only implicit in the social structure but constitutes an explicit condition of it. Positions and processes are defined in terms of earlier and later stages and composed of phases and timed procedures.

Once the time dimension is incorporated, allowances must be made for a certain degree of discontinuity and instability. S.F. Nadel maintains that the social structure has dynamic properties containing within it the internal shifts and fluctuations that go with displacement and replacement: Levi - Strauss postulates two types of time scales A) Micro-Time which provides the time scale for events described a moment ago, and B) Macro-Time which contains the kinds of events that change the pre-existing structural alignment. Events in Micro-time do not invalidate a structural schema, while events in macro-time are unproblematic. A similar distinction is made between Evolutionary time and Transitory Time. Evolutionary Time refers to major changes in configuration and is normally not experienced by the individual except under special conditions. In Transitory Time, variations in the components take place; the sum total of these changes lead to evolutionary changes (development)




W: (Y; 1: 5)
G- 39357

NISS
DISS
320.91724
T3295 Po
G39357

Theoretically, open systems (social systems included) may attain under certain conditions, a time independent state which is called a steady state. Steady states are equifinal i.e. the same time - independent state may be reached from different initial conditions and in different ways. In the steady state, the composition of the system remains constant inspite of continuous exchange of components.

The assumption in Structural-Functionalism that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts assumes its own theoretical limitations in comprehending reality: Totality can be understood or defined by the inequality i.e. Totality (Reality, V) is greater than the sum of vertical and Lateral totality:



If all the facets of V and T (a, b, c, d, etc.) could be incorporated approximating infinity (∞) i.e. if $n = \infty$ and $m = \infty$, the closest we can get to Reality which by definition incorporates completely both the lateral and vertical series, is in terms of successive approximations. Hence, the whole can never be totally comprehended.

Social change has been conceptualized by such scholars as Toennies, Redfield and Maine as a non-reversible movement between two poles on a continuum. In Political Development Theory dichotomies of various types have been employed to define, demarcate and explain the stages through which societies pass, from a traditional through a transitional to a modern stage. Typologies of societies have been built up on follower - referent, agraria-industria, Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, rural-urban and secular-theocratic frameworks. The goal of all social systems that is self-propelled, self-regulated and self-sustained development equated with the application of capital - intensive techniques a consumer orientation, consequent high mass consumption (W.W. Rostow: 1960) re-orientation in attitudes and behaviour patterns³ (Talcott Parsons, 1951), Bert Hozelitz 1953) at the individual and societal level, and changes in the political and social forms, is founded upon "pre-requisites".

Levi Strauss and Simone de Beauvoir represent

traditional societies as clock work systems ('closed') with low input, low output and a low level of entropy. Modern societies are characterized as Thermodynamic ('open') with greater input, greater output, and consequent higher level of entropy. While clock work systems have no natural potentialities to grow by themselves, in Thermodynamic systems the physical processes are so 'ordered' as to allow the living system to persist, to grow, to develop etc. The critical distinction is the self-repairing and self-regulating attributes of the latter.

The structural-functional approach to social change and development was operationalized in current styled as A) Systems Theory (Princeton - organic model etc.) Parsons Merton, Almond, Katz and Kahn B) General Systems Theory - Kenneth Boulding and C) Cybernetics - David Easton and Karl Deutech.

(To provide a background into what is to follow a section exposing the nature of theory and method employed for analysis by these theorists must be added. I propose therefore to present the two main theories that have been applied in comparative politics - Systems Analysis and Cybernetics.)

Systems Analysis:

Systems analysis represents perhaps one of the

first interdisciplinary approaches in comparative political science. The concept of system was employed to provide the political scientist with certain evaluative criteria upon which could be based the comparison of changes in different political structures on the one hand, and the measurement of changes within the same system.

The application of systems theory was undertaken principally because of discoveries made in modelling the growth processes of corporations. It had become clear that complex systems were counter - intuitive i.e. they give indications that suggest corrective action which will often be ineffective or even adverse in its results. Often the policies that have been adopted for correcting a difficulty are actually intensifying it rather than producing a solution. A complex system (e.g. Government) behaves in many ways opposite of simple systems.

Most of our intuitive responses have been developed in the context of what are technically called "negative feedback loops". (Forrester, 1969) For example if we take the act of warming hands on a stove we see that cause and effect are related in time and space. But in complex systems this relation may not exist. The structure of a complex system cannot be represented in a simple feedback loop where one system


state dominates behaviour. The complex system has a multiplicity of interacting feedback loops. Its internal rate of flow are controlled by non-linear relationships. The complex system is of high order i.e. that there are many system states (or levels). It usually contains positive feedback loops describing growth processes as well as negative goal seeking loops. In the complex system the cause of a difficulty may lie far back in time from the symptoms or in a completely different and remote part of the system. In fact causes are usually found not in prior events but in the structures and policies of the system. Another difficulty is that the high degree of time correlation between variables in complex systems lead us to make cause and effect associations between variables that are simply moving together as part of the dynamic behaviour of the system. The result is that often the symptoms and not the causes are treated.

Contributing to the selection of ineffective programmes, is the nature of the conflict between short term and long term considerations in complex systems. Very often the actions that seem easiest and most promising in the immediate future can produce even greater problems at a later time. Humanitarian impulses coupled with short term political pressures lead to programmes

whose benefits evaporate quickly leaving behind a system that is unimproved or in worst condition.


Cybernetics:

Cybernetics attempts an understanding of social variables by relating structure, function process and stability in a single conceptual framework. Social dynamics is conceptualized as a consequence of the interaction of processes and variables. This is represented as circular reactive structures, that is, feedback loops. Growth and decline result from the cycling of positive feedback loops. Morgan (1966) suggests that economic developments and achievement attitudes reinforce each other in a cumulative dynamic fashion, thus:



This positive feedback loop can go into a reverse decline phase turning economic growth into backwardness. Consider protracted military conflict and economic

instability in an underdeveloped country, thus:




In such a situation, unless the economy is reinforced from outside in terms of economic and military aid, the regime is apt to collapse. Positive feedback loops operate in many social situations where policies adopted to tackle a problem tend in fact to worsen it (Forrester 1969).

Stability and stagnation are seen to be the outcomes of the operation of negative feedback loops. An example of this is the failure to raise living standards even after a decade of developmental activity,

thus:

Investment in economic development



Negative loops are concerned with correcting deviations from a given end state. Loop structures disclose a basic pattern of interaction concerning a phenomenon, irrespective of its space and time variations.

But social phenomena are manifested through the interaction of hundreds of variables. In cybernetics the variables may be compressed in a manner corresponding to lumped parameters in control system theory. Conversely they may be disaggregated for a micro analysis of a particular phenomena. Complexity is represented in multiloop formations. An interlinked structure of negative and positive feedback loops account for the complex process dynamics within the time frame of a system.

Closed loop representations are basic to the understanding of social phenomena in cybernetic terms. The feedback loops are deemed to be ubiquitous and the events of interest take place within the loop boundaries. Exogenous variables may, however, affect the operation of the loop and thus change the output or outcome. Social systems are deemed analysable cybernetically through the concepts of self organizing and goal seeking organisms i.e. entities possessing organization.

Structure, Function and Process: Social systems are complex, non-linear, adaptive and goal-seeking. Structure and function are two aspects of the same entity. The functional categories outline the basic pre-requisite for a systems existence. The systems adaptation, growth and survival is adversely affected if there is a malfunctioning. There are critical thresholds associated with the systems functioning beyond which the system may undergo dissolution. The ability of a government to maintain a basic semblance of law and order is an example of this. These functional blocks underlie the logic of a system structure. In so far as the elements of the structure subserve the functional requirements, they may be relevant and adequate. The location of feedback points and communication channels, the delays in information flows and decision-making, the requisite variety of

control system and the status of memory facility are some of the criteria against which a system structure and design may be assessed. The pattern of integration behind the system structure and function is related at a higher level of abstraction. The cybernetic approach claims to lead towards a convergence of the concept of structure and function and provides a set of standards for assessing our organization. Social institutions can thus be classified along a scale of organized complexity and their performance assessed in accordance with their pre-stated goals and the logic of their system structure. The structure of a system is dynamically exercised through the feedback processes. The nature of processes is governed by functional requirements of a system. These requirements at a macro level are represented by functional blocks. At a micro level they are specifiable as activities and tasks for the maintenance of the system and the achievement of the goals. These determine the direction of social processes which are mediated through system variables whose values change as a consequence of process dynamics. The changes in the values of variables correspond to changes in the system states. The nature of the variables is determined by the nature of the system and the delineation of its boundary. The following sources of system variation may be observed. (1) Environment of the system (2) The structure of the System. (3) The functional elements of the system (4) The goals of the

system which are affected by responses from the super-system outside the system boundary and influenced by learning (5) The nature of the systems constituent structural elements which in the case of social systems would include human beings, their perception, motivations etc.

Initially, it could not have been predicted that the 'systems' concept would play an important role in the social sciences in structuralism and Functionalism. In classical science the elements of the observed universe were isolated, it was governed by the principle of one way or linear causality which constituted a simple reduction to the fundamental particles and the conventional laws of physics. The concept of system constituted a new paradigm contrasting the blind laws of nature of the machanistic world view to the conception of reality as a hierarchy of organized wholes. The study of organized wholes required new categories of interaction, transaction, organization, teleology, with many problems arising for mathematical models and techniques. Until the appearance of the system concept, 'wholeness' was considered a metaphysical notion transcending the boundaries of science. While systems have been studied in the past, the analysis of systems as entities rather than a sum of parts constitutes a new paradigm which corresponds to the study of interactions rather than of phenomena isolated in narrow contexts. Since the crucial

problem today is that of 'organized complexity', questions related to organization, wholeness, directiveness, teleology, and differentiation arise everywhere in biological, behavioural and social sciences. Systems theory aims at a general theory of organization.

Pitirim Sorokin (1928, 1966) maintained that social phenomena must be considered as systems. Systems research provides a foundation for analysing the complexities and the dynamic elements of the socio-cultural system (Buckley, 1967) Sociology (formal and informal) accepts that the only way to study organization is to study it as a system where organization is treated as a complexity of mutually dependent variables. But while models of adjustment, homeostasis and equilibrium are suitable for the maintenance and integration of systems, they are incapable of handling issues of change, differentiation, evolution, production of improbable states and so forth.⁴ It has its dangers when it is made an ultimate reality. Psychotherapist Reusch (1967) maintains that the new Cybernetic world makes man a replaceable entity since it is concerned with systems and not people. In the systems concept it is the human element that is the unreliable factor. Sorokin (1966, p.558) reflecting on problems of control and standardization concludes that increasing mechanization makes the individual a pawn in the hands of those who pursue their interests behind

ideologies. It has also been argued that it is misleading because superficial analogies of the society as an organism tend to obscure basic contradictions and consequently lead to false conclusions. But objectively, the criticisms missed the point which was that systems theory represented a new method for studying processes that could be identified beyond doubt as self regulating and self-orienting and personalities that were self-directing. It was designed initially as a theory of control mechanisms in nature and technology. It is largely concerned with problems of optimality attempting maximum efficiency at minimal cost in a complex network of interactions (linear programming). It also aims at deriving problems of organization common to several levels in a hierarchy which may be transferred from one to another and at determining which are not. The question arises, can societies and civilizations be considered as systems?



The concept of a political system is based on certain common features derived from the observation of different political structures.

- A) All political systems have political structures. Chance and occasion are left out in solving problems which are handled by institutional arrangements.
- B) The same functions are performed in all political

systems.

- C) All political structures are multi-functional
- D) All political systems are culturally mixed types.

<u>INPUT</u>	<u>DEMANDS</u>		<u>DECISIONS</u>	<u>OUTPUT</u>
<u>FUNCTIONS</u>	<u>SUPPORT</u>	POWER	<u>POLICIES</u>	<u>FUNCTIONS</u>
		STRUCTURE		

INPUT FUNCTIONS:

- A) Political socialization and recruitment
- B) Interest articulation
- C) Interest aggregation
- D) Political communication

OUTPUT FUNCTIONS:

- A) Rule making
- B) Rule application
- C) Rule adjudication

In the next section attempts will be made to show how variables fit themselves in the basic model of the political system indicated above.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

The functional approach to political systems is based upon a comparison of all political systems ranging from tribal organizations, traditional oligarchies, to transitional and modern systems. The functional interaction of the components of the political system and its relation with the other social systems may not present themselves when we study modern political systems alone. It is also essential to know if variations in other social systems also produce variations in the political system and vice versa. Comparison calls for the need to establish common properties. There are four properties that are common to all political systems.

- A) All political systems including the simplest ones have a political structure. In fact, all the structures present in modern ones are also to be found in the most primitive. Comparisons may be made regarding the degree of structural specialization.
- B) Although the frequency of performance of functions and the kinds of structures performing them may differ, All political systems perform the same functions. Systems may be compared according to the frequency of the performance of the functions; the kinds of structures performing them, and the style of their performance.
- C) All political structures are multi-functional. Poli-

tical systems may be compared according to the specificity of the functions. However even the most specialised structures are highly multi-functional.

D) All systems are culturally "mixed". No system is entirely rational or completely traditional. They may be compared as regards the predominance of the one as against the other and on the pattern of mixture of the traditional and rational elements.

All societies that maintain external and internal order have political structures, or else the performance of the political functions would be random. Apart from a visible specialised structure there are diffused structures such as the kinship and lineage structures which perform the articulative, aggregative and communicative functions. These functions must be located and characterised. It has been the concern only with the executive, legislative and judicial functions that has led to the conception of traditional societies as primitive. If there are functions then there must be structures even if they are in other social systems. In other words, a structural comparison of systems is useless if it is not preceded by a functional one.

Harold Lasswell, accepting the multi-functionality of all political structures devised seven categories:

A) Intelligence - information, prediction, planning.

- B) Recommendation - promoting policy alternatives.
- C) Prescription - the enactment of general rules.
- D) Invocation - provisional characterization of conduct according to prescriptions.
- E) Application - the final characterization of conduct according to prescriptions.
- F) Appraisal - the assessment of the success or failure of the policy.
- G) Termination - the ending of prescriptions and of arrangements entered into within their framework.

These were designed primarily for governmental and judicial comparison. The political (input) functions are thus handled in two formal categories:

A) Intelligence, and B) Recommendation. The functional categories have to be used and adapted to the particular aspects of the political system with which one is concerned. Almond and Coleman developed their functional categories for comparing whole systems, particularly the modern with the transitional and traditional. Their categories were derived from the observation of those systems in which structural differentiation and functional specialization have taken place to the highest extent. They maintain that the political, rather than the governmental, the input rather than the output would be most useful for characterizing non-western political systems and in discerning the types and stages of political development among them. They postulate the

following functional categories:

A) Input functions: 1. Political Socialization and Recruitment. 2. Interest articulation 3. Interest aggregation 4. Political Communication.

B) Output functions: 1. Rule making 2. Rule application 3. Rule adjudication.

The characterization of western institutions as functionally specific and structurally differentiated and traditional as diffused and un-differentiated has been over emphasized. In fact modern political institutions too are multifunctional. By specialization is meant primarily the functional distinctiveness of certain structures which perform a regulatory role corresponding to that function within the political system viewed as a whole. In modern political systems there is a relatively high level of structural differentiation. Thus, the emergence of specialized associational interest groups reflects the tendency to articulate interests by such structures as legislatures, bureaucracies, lineages and status groupings, churches and so forth to be processed by associational interest groups before they emerge as acts of interest articulation. While intermittency characterises traditional, primitive and transitional societies, it exists in modern political systems which however seek to regulate and control it. In modern political systems structures of interest

articulation (interest groups) aggregation (political parties) and communication (mass media) may exist alongside non-specific structures which may be conditioned by the former without necessarily being incorporated into them.

The "rational" versus "traditional" framework embodied in Weberian "cultural dualism" and the Parsonian "Pattern Variables" needs to be modified to account for the interrelations between the differentiated, specialized structures of parliaments, bureaucracies, courts, political parties, interest groups, communication media and the "pre-modern" structures which have significant political value. Cultural dualism characterises both modern and primitive systems.

Recruitment: The process of recruitment from particular sub-cultures begins where the process of socialization ends. The recruitment function consists of the special political role-socialization which takes place at the final end of the general socialization. It is a process of orientation to the special role and the political system and the political outputs and inputs. The "styles" of performance of this function may be compared in terms of A) Ascriptive - Particularistic B) Achievement - Universalistic criteria. In Recruitment there is a structural and cultural dualism.

Interest Articulation: In determining the attributes of the interest articulation function and in comparing its performance in different political systems two facts have to be determined A) the kind of structures performing the function, and B) the style of their performance. Four main types of structures perform the Interest Articulation function A) Institutional interest groups B) Non-Associational interest groups C) Anomic interest groups and D) Associational interest groups. The performance of this function is distinguished in terms of whether it is manifest or latent, Specific or Diffuse, General or Particular and Instrumental or Affective in Style. The structure and style of Interest Articulation define the type and character of distinction between the polity and society and within the political system between the various constituting elements. If the style of interest articulation is latent diffuse, particularistic and affective it is relatively difficult to aggregate it and convert it into authoritative decisions and policies. If it is manifest, specific, general and instrumental it is easier to retain the distinction between polity and society and consequently the aggregation of demands into the political system is better formulated.

Aggregation: This function involves the combination of interests in the framework of general policies by personal recruited, and committed to a particular pattern of policy.

Just as the functions of aggregation, articulation and rule-making overlap so do those of aggregation and articulation. In certain political structures the functions of articulation, aggregation and rule-making may be undifferentiated. In modern western systems boundaries are maintained between the different functions. The aggregative function may be performed by the different sub-systems of the political system in the sense of formulating alternative public policy or by supporting changes in political personnel. The performance of this function is compared in terms of its style. Three different types of parties may be distinguished which perform this function A) Secular, pragmatic or bargaining parties B) absolute value oriented, Wiltanschauung or ideological parties C) Particularistic or traditional parties. The manner of performance of this function is essential to the performance of the political system as a whole.

Political Communication: All functions performed in the political system are dependent upon communication and are performed by means of it. An essential factor in the characterization of the political system is the analysis of the performance of the communicative function. Comparisons in different political systems may be made according to the structures performing it and the style of its performance. In the modern political system the specia-

lized communication structures are more elaborate and penetrate the unspecialized structure of political communication. Comparison may be made on the basis of the style by which communication is combined. Styles may be differentiated within the manifest - latent, specific - diffuse, universalist-particular or generalist and affective neutral-affective frameworks. Comparisons may be made in four respects: A) The homogeneity of political information B) the mobility of information C) the direction of the flow of information D) the volume of information.

In the section above attempts were made to present the broad functional categories within which political development theory can be placed. The theories are elusive to the extent that different writers have given different weightages to different criteria and process variables. In the following pages, the analysis of political change and economic development by various writers will be presented with the primary aim of providing a representative sample of political Development Theory.

Perhaps the most crucial elements in the consideration of political systems were the conceptions of structure and function. The functions of political systems were listed as A) Political Socialization that is the participation of an individual of governments,

institutions, unions etc. plus the norms of political orientation. It was also concerned about the legitimacy and effectiveness of political systems. B) Recruitment that is the participation of the majority in the political system. C) Interest Articulation that is the satisfaction of the different interest groups. Related to the plans and schemes of the party based upon its resources it was deemed to effect a proper allocation of manpower in a system of party politics and represent the conflicts of interests. Since the concept of Power was crucial it was essential that each individual should express his will within the system and lead to greater participation. D) Interest Aggregation. Since the interest of each individual cannot be represented individually aggregation of interests becomes essential for the proper operation of the system; so individuals combine to form interest groups and pressure groups combine to form political parties. A neat system is created where group interests are represented in a well defined way. E) Political Communication between individuals and groups are aided by mass media like the Radio, T.V., newspapers and informally through the representatives in the party. It is held that all political systems perform these functions. The difference however between political systems lies in the style or mode of their performance.

Style (functions):

<u>MODERN</u>	<u>TRADITIONAL</u>
1) Universalistic-specific	1) Particularistic-diffuse
2) Achievement	2) Ascriptive
3) Performed through association groups (voluntary organizations based on secular interests. Interest articulation is manifest, specific general and instrumental.	3) Performed by non-associational groups, tribes, castes/anomic group, interest. Articulation is latent diffused particularistic affective, emotional.
4) The tasks performed are of a universal kind	4) The tasks performed are particularistic.
5) The functions are performed by secular pragmatic bargaining parties based on an ideology.	5) The functions are performed by traditional groups.
6) The functions are manifest, specific, generalistic and affective-neutral.	6) The functions are latent, diffused and affective.

According to Almonds (1966) formulation the modern political system is distinguished from the traditional on two major dimensions (1) Structural differentiation/Structural non-differentiation (2) Secular-Theocratic. When he refers to structural differentiation he is not concerned with the sheer multiplication of government agencies. According to his theory structural differentiation exists when there are structures in political systems that have a "functional distinctiveness and tend to perform a regulatory role in relation to that function within the political system as a whole".

(G. Almond and Coleman J; 1966: 18). Almond divides the functions of Political Systems into two main categories - input and outputs. The first consists of (A) Political Socialization and Recruitment (B) Interest Articulation (C) Interest Aggregation (D) Political Communication. The second consists of (A) Rule making (B) Rule Application (C) Rule Adjudication. He distinguishes modern systems from traditional ones on the basis of the style in which these functions are performed:

A) Political socialization-specific and universalistic vs. diffused and particularistic.

B) Political recruitment - achievement and universalistic vs. ascriptive and particularistic.

Interests are articulated by four types of interest groups (1) Institutional (2) Non-Associational (3) Anomic (4) Associational. It is only when the interest group system is dominated by the associational interest groups that interest structures regulate the performance of the articulate function. The style of articulation is increased on four dimensions (1) Manifest-latent (2) Specific-diffused (3) general-particular (4) Instrumental-affective.

Interest aggregation can be a function of many different structures such as legislatures, executives, governments, bureaucracies, interest groups or political parties. Only a party system of a certain type however

is able to regulate this function for the political system as a whole. But the style of interest aggregation is defined in a way in which types of parties (not party systems) perform their aggregating functions. There are three types identified by Almond:

- A) Secular, pragmatic bargaining parties.
- B) Absolute value oriented, Weltanschauung or ideological parties.
- C) Particularistic or traditional parties.

The modern style of interest aggregation is associated with secularism, pragmatism and bargaining.

According to David Apter (1965) and Lucian Pye (1966) political systems are those systems of interactions which are found in all independent societies which perform the functions of integration and adaptation by means of the employment or threat of employment of more or less legitimate physical compulsion. They adopt and change the elements of the kinship, religious and economic systems, protecting and integrity of political systems from outside threats, or expanding into and attacking other societies. The political system is the legitimate order maintaining or transforming agency in the society (this includes totalitarian, revolutionary and non-western systems also).

Political systems are systems of inter-dependence and are characterized by the existence of boundaries and comprehensiveness by which is meant that they include not just the structures based on law, like parliaments, executives, bureaucracies and courts, or just the associational or formally organized units like parties, interest groups and media of communication but all of the structures in their political aspects including undifferentiated ones like kinship and lineage, status and caste groups as well as anomic phenomenon like riots and street demonstrations. So, if the functions are present then the structures must be even though they may be in other social systems.

David Easton (1965) characterises the functions of political systems in terms of inputs and outputs. The first consists primarily of demands and supports while the second consists of authoritative decisions and policies. In this respect what is peculiar to modern political systems is a relatively high degree of structural-differentiation i.e. the emergence of legislatures political executives, bureaucracies, courts, electoral systems, parties, interest groups, media of communication, with each structure tending to perform a regulatory role for that function within the political system as a whole.

Confronting the fact that some features of a modern political system might develop as a consequence of political problems that are created by a rapidly growing economy and that some of the aspects of a modern economy may require certain political forms if they are to evolve, some writers attempt to evolve functions of government and the procedure of governing that are with a high probability required for economic growth and the various stages of economic development. Approaching the problem from this standpoint Rostow demarcates the "stages" of economic growth (1965). According to him, societies move along a non-reversible continuum from the (A) traditional stage to (B) pre-conditions for take off, to (C) take off, to (D) drive to maturity to (E) high mass consumption. The brink of development is the take-off stage which he identifies with the presence in a society of three factors:

- (1) Rise in the rate of productive investment from say 5% or less, to over 10% of the national income (or net national product)
- (2) The development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors with a high rate of growth.
- (3) The existence or quick emergence of a political, social and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the

potential external economy effects of the take-off, and gives to growth an on-going character.

The take-off is defined as an industrial revolution tied directly to radical changes in methods of production, having their decisive consequences over a relatively short period of time. The essential question however is what kind of political, social and institutional framework is necessary if such startling growth rates are to be achieved? The conception of economic growth as defined by Simon Kuznetz involves basically a sustained and substantial rise in product per capita and in almost all cases a sustained and substantial rise in population. But the achievement of growth involves certain "preconditions" (Rowtew 1965) or "requisites" (Holt and Turner 1968). Inherent in this conception is the idea that the traditional economy is characterized by limited production, and functions are based on pre-Newtonian science and Technology and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world. Holt and Turner (1966) postulate that any economy that has not yet reached Take-off is a traditional economy. The most significant distinction is between those societies that have in a traditional stage met the pre-requisites for take-off and those that have not. Modern economies on the other hand are defined in terms of industry and in terms of inter-regional

dependence. The stage of "maturity" is reached when a society has effectively applied the range of its modern technology to the bulk of its resources (Rostow 1965). Holt and Turner conceive of a modern stage in which high mass consumption may, but not necessarily will develop. The drive to maturity begins when that modern technology is spread from the leading sector to the others and it is concluded when modern technology is applied to all significant industries.

In attempting a solution of the problems of underdevelopment in the "Third World" countries Holt and Turner made case studies of England, Japan, France and China which according to him represented the entire syndrome of development and "decay". They concluded that at the Take-off stage certain political functional pre-requisites had to be met: (A) Rise in the rate of investment to 10% of the national income and (B) a sharp increase in the political, social and institutional activities to exploit the rapid development. They posed the question thus: When there is a sudden rise in economic development is it true that political, social and institutional activity also increases?

They concluded that:

- 1) A government that does not contribute to the satisfaction of (A) adaptation and (B) goal attainment is a pre-requisite for take-off.

- 2) A government that does contribute to the satisfaction (A) Pattern maintenance and (B) Integration is again a pre-requisite for take-off.

From their comparative case studies they maintain that before take-off:

- A) Britain and Japan were characterized by low adaptation and goal attainment high pattern maintenance and integration.
- B) France and China were characterized by high adaptation and goal attainment low pattern maintenance and integration.

From this he concluded that in France and China process of take-off was slowed down.

In their analysis they identify the periods in which the various countries underwent the pre-take-off stage: France (1600-1789); China (1694-1911); Japan (1603-1868); England (1558-1780).

The political systems were in all the cases traditional. In their analysis of the governmental (output) authority structure and Bureaucracy they argued that although differing in certain details, the governments of France and China had many structural and procedural characteristics in common. In both, the authority structure of policy making was well resolved: policy was formulated in each instance by the monarch with the assistance of a small well co-ordinated group of advisers. No competing group held the power of veto; there was an

institutionalized system of "checks and balances". Moreover the central government in each country possessed a reliable bureaucracy for the enforcement of its decisions throughout the countryside and the agents of the central authority had at their disposal a wide range of techniques to secure compliance to official directives. They could for example, gently persuade the potential dissidents or more severely tax the communities that did not comply, or, even call into operation the instruments of violence held in reserve by the state.

Japan and England on the other hand display some marked contrasts with France and China. In neither government was there a resolved authority structure and policy making bodies and checks and balances were built into each system. Furthermore, neither government possessed a bureaucratic administration to enforce throughout its territory the policies that were formulated at the centre. Even if an agent of the central government felt the need for enforcing a given policy, he often did not have available techniques needed to secure compliance from a population which resisted the decisions of the central policy makers.

Many writers on the field relate the non-economic indicators of modernity such as demographic changes, urbanization (urbanism), the rise and growth of enter-

preneurship (Hagen) and Bureaucratization to economic growth in traditional societies. Everett Hagen(1962), for instance in facing the problem of raising creativity and improving labour calls for the need for achievement, the need for order and the need for autonomy (self reliance).

In addressing themselves to problems of building institutional structures corresponding to the need of economic growth, Lucien Pye (study of the Burmese administration) directs his line of enquiry to five main indicators.

1. Equality: Considered comprehensively to cover legal, social and economic aspects. Accordingly the key indicator is the Rule of Law by which all citizens are subjected to law, equally. Pye states that the rule of law indicates the level of liberalism and the constitutional powers and limitations of government.

2. Role Differentiation:

3. Capacity: The political system must be capable of performing its political functions (effectiveness of government). The capacity of a political system may in fact go against individual freedom. Equality and capacity need not therefore go together. According to Pye, however, the west has successfully combined the two.

4. Political Participation: in considering which he also includes non-legitimate, violent participation. Political participation therefore can also lead to anomie.

5. Institution building (Huntington)

When can a political system be considered developed? Almond (1966) answers that development is indicated when the system acquires new capabilities, develops a specialized and differentiated role structure and responds efficiently and continuously to new problems. He outlines the capabilities of a system as:

1. Integrative - i.e. promoting national unity and a centralized bureaucracy.
2. International accommodative capability.
3. Participative capabilities - i.e. civil obligation and democratic political culture.
4. Welfare or distribution capability.

The different problems related to the above capabilities require different strategic orientations on the part of the government.

Elisinstadt (1968 & 1969) and Alfred Diamant discussing the problem in the same vein state that the development of a political system requires a high degree of differentiation, unification and centralization i.e. the creation of specific roles and institutions and a centralized polity with specific goals. (2) continuous develop-

ment of a high level of generalized political power by which is meant the territorial and functional extension of the scope of central, legal, administrative and political activities and their permeation into all sphere and regions of the society. (3) The continuous spread of political power to wider groups and ultimately to all groups and individuals. (4) The weakening of traditional elites and their replacement by modernizing elites. The ability to deal with continuous changes in political demands is the crucial test and focus of political modernization. A political system is developing when there is an increase in its ability to sustain successfully and continuously new types of social goals, and in the creation of new types of organizations.

Karl Deutsch 1961 approaches the question from the standpoint of changing values. Modernization begins when traditional values in economic, social and psychological fields are broken and people readily accept new values. Deutsch proposes two sets of indicators:

- A. (1) exposure to modernity (technology)
- (2) exposure to mass media
- (3) increase in participation
- (4) increase in literacy
- (5) change in residence.
- B. (1) occupational shift out of agriculture

- (2) change from rural to urban
- (3) linguistic, cultural and political assimilation
- (4) income growth (national)
- (5) income growth per capita.

The thrust towards modernization indicated above, manifests itself in various political consequences. The scope of government activity increases (greater controls are desired because of the increasing complexity of social and economic life (Etzioni; 1968) and there is an increase in bureaucratic activity (Riggs: 1971), because the need for specialized institutions increases; The society experiences pressures for the transformation of political elites; political participation leads to greater freedom and the modern elite may use illegitimate means if it sees obstacles in its path, leading to a promotion or disruption of national unity. Unity is promoted through language culture and social institutions. Deutsch feels that India is at the brink of disruption because mobilization is localized and unity is regional. National unity depends also on the performance of the government on the one hand and the responsiveness of the people on the other.

Samuel Huntington (1970) writes that modernization may lead to political decay instead of political development. Political Development has to be separated from

modernization and social mobilization. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased. Inherent in the achievement of equality is a loss of individuality and degeneration into general mediocrity, creating the danger of weak individuals as opposed to a mighty government. So individuals must be organized into associations that act as intermediaries between the individuals and the government. Thus social pluralism is required to protect the weak individual against the strong government. Freedom must be protected by creating proper institutions for representing the individuals and also limiting the powers of the government by their organized force. What takes place is a high level of mobilization and a low level of institutionalization. The conflict between the two is the crux of politics. Rapid increases in mobilization and participation which are the principal political aspects of modernization undermine political institutions. Rapid modernization, in brief, therefore leads to political decay and not development.

Most political development theorists consider social mobilization as a key indicator of modernization. Edward Shils (1962) for instance, states that development begins when societies arrive at (A) the stage of

uprooting or breaking away from old settings, habits or commitments and when the (B) mobilized can be induced into passing into some relatively stable new patterns or group membership organizations and commitments. Karl Mannheim suggests an image of large numbers of people moving away from a life of isolation, traditionalism and political apathy and into a different life of broader and deeper involvement in the vast complexities of modern life including potential and actual involvement in mass politics.

In whatever country it occurs, social mobilization brings with it an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population. This strata is a broader group than the elite, and includes all the persons which must be taken account of in politics. The growth in the number of these people produces mounting pressures for the transformation of political practices and institutions. Social mobilization also brings about a change in the quality of politics by changing the range of human needs that impinge upon the political process. Hence, the range and amount of government services is increased. A greater scope of governmental services and functioning requires ordinarily an increase in the capabilities of governments. A rapid process of social mobilization thus tends to generate major pressures for political and administrative

reform (Deutsch 1961) Social mobilization may also generate pressures for the transformation of the elite and elite functions, of elite recruitment and communication. An increase in social mobilization with an increase in the need for political decisions are translated ultimately into political participation. The process of social mobilization also shifts the emphasis from parochialism inherent in many traditional cultures to a preoccupation with more comprehensive social units.

Other things assumed equal, the stage of rapid social mobilization may be expected to promote the consolidation of states whose people already share the same language, culture, and major social institutions, while the same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or ways of life (East Bengalis vs. West Bengalis^A). The popular acceptance of a government in a period of social mobilization is largely a matter of its capabilities and the manner in which they are used. If a government proves persistently incapable or unresponsive, some or many of its subjects will cease to identify themselves with it and it will be compelled to rule by force where it can no longer rule by consensus, and if a political alternative to it appears, it will eventually be replaced.

in the hope that the new order will respond more effectively to the needs and expectations of the people.

David Apter (1963) holds that all approaches that have till now been used to study the relationship between government and economy can be termed as either "Behavioral" or "ad hoc". He suggests an alternative: structural analysis utilizing the comparative method. The concrete units of analysis are society and government; economic development is a problem both of government and of members of society. To deal with these units of interaction with respect to technological change and economic development, a theory is required to indicate the properties of a system upon which the relationship between the two units is based. It is also necessary to indicate the processes which will result from action between systems when confronted with problems of economic development and technological changes. In the new nations, Apter identifies, three developmental types of authority systems that have appeared; (a) Mobilization System (b) Reconciliation System (c) Modernizing Autocracy. Each type manifests characteristic mechanisms for determining goals and for applying and using available technological and other resources. We have to determine the processes of change within each type of system. Having enlarged on the qualities of each type we determine which processes are characteristic in each.

(A) Mali, Guinea and Ghana have chosen to mobilize their political energies and resources for a grand assault on poverty, ignorance and backwardness. In a more extreme form this is also true of U.S.S.R. and China.

(B) They seek in political unity a common denominator to serve all the main groups within the country. This is true of Nigeria and the U.S.A. and other federal systems.

(C) In them change is filtered through the medium of traditionalized and rendered compatible with traditional institutions. (Ethiopia, Morocco and Japan especially after the Meji Restoration) Each type comprises five categories: (1) Patterns of legitimacy (2) Loyalty (3) Decisional Autonomy (4) Distribution of Authority and (5) Ideological expression. The essential point is to examine each type according to its capacity to absorb technological change and in addition to generate new political forms. Apter lays down the characteristics of the (A) Mobilization System, (B) Reconciliation System and Modernizing Autocracy as follows:

(A) Hierarchical authority, total allegiance, tactical flexibility, unitarism and ideological specialization. Here the party or government becomes the central instrument of change.

(B) Pyramidal authority, multiple loyalties, necessity for compromise, pluralism, ideological diffuseness.

(C) Hierarchical authority, exclusivism, strategic flexibility, unitarism, neo-traditionalism.

One typical feature of the modernizing autocracy is its ability to absorb change as long as the system of authority is not affected by it. The role of a government in a country's economic development varies according to the goals of development, the level of technology and available resources and the degree of outside support which the country is willing and able to enlist.

In the mobilization system the emphasis is mainly upon discipline and hard work for the achievement of economic development. It is implied that development will finally lead to a restructuring of societies in terms of which the tasks and roles relevant, and functional for the establishment will become dominant while those pertaining to the traditional order will atrophy. In so far as the reconciliation type is limited in its decision-making process by the need to find some lowest common denominator, relevant for its units, its progress towards the goals of economic development will be moderate.

In the mobilization system the problem of control is central. In contrast, the spontaneous development of new groups is an essential feature of reconciliation systems. Each type exhibits two characteristic decisional outputs: (1) Developmental decisions (2) System maintenance.

Apter also attempts an analysis of the developmental process by setting forth a set of what he terms "process variables".

- (A) GOALS: defined as operative purposes of governments including economic and social development.
- (B) COSTS: which are the allocations of real income which must be made for the achievement of such goals.
- (C) GOERCION: Or government action to ensure some specific level of conformity, and,
- (D) INFORMATION: or the knowledge available to decision-makers on the basis of which future decisions may be made.

Autocratic mobilization systems can be regarded as more efficient than totalitarian mobilization systems (African countries and China). Rapid economic development is possible in a reconciliation system only if there exists extensive self-discipline, popular participation and civic devotion. In the new nations, these preconditions are rarely present.

The explanation of political life in terms of its systemic properties attempts largely to prove the non-reversible development of political systems from traditional to modern. Inherent in these theories is the belief that the modern democratic is the most developed form; consequently all systems must aspire towards it. The underlying assumptions, however, are theoretically unsound and are not supported by empirical reality.

A CRITIQUE AND AN EVALUATION

Political Development Theory (in its various manifestations) presented above, has in recent times been criticised on methodological and empirical grounds. This is related largely to the fact that the structural-functional approach and the equilibrium model therein, tends to grossly simplify social reality and leave it by and large unexplained.

Perhaps the largest stumbling block for the structural functionalists has been the problem of social change. The model deals only with the disruption of the structure, the role of balancing mechanisms and the restoration as far as possible, of the earlier form.¹ This continuous process can deal with only those disturbances which can be contained by the structure. It does not deal with those forces that act from without and cannot be accommodated by the system.² It may therefore be able to indicate how a particular social system maintains itself by a process of integration and disintegration but it cannot show how one structural form changes into another.

Edmund Leach pointed out that social systems cannot be treated as natural entities. The facts of history cannot be visualized as being ordered in a systematic way within a framework of equilibrium with the implication that disturbances have the ultimate

effect of increased solidarity. It may be true at the level of ideas but false at the level of facts. In an equilibrium model of social change, the time span is an important factor. The devising of verbal categories and the fitting of facts to form a system does not explain the relations between facts.

We may ask therefore: What is meant by continuity and change in social systems? When can we say that neighbouring societies A and B have similar social structures while C and D do not? If the concept of social structure is taken as a category for comparing societies that exist in equilibrium, can we also use the same sociological category to describe societies that are not assumed to be in equilibrium. Leach observes that models are equilibrium systems while real societies are never so. The representation of the social structure is imprecise compared with that given by the exact categories which the social scientist would like to employ. Different systems present alternatives and it is the inconsistencies which help the observer to understand social change. Structural change comes about as individuals manipulate these alternatives as a means of social advancement. When we speak of structural change we do not refer to changes in the positions of individuals within an ideal system of relations, as the structural-functionalists have tried

to do, but the ideal system itself. Hitherto, social scientists have followed Durkheim rather than Pareto and have shown a greater preference for integration and equilibrium as a consequence of which societies in conflict have been assumed to be decadent. Terms such as "Anomie" and "Pathology" have been used to describe these states. The preference for equilibrium has arisen out of the conditions under which the social scientist works and there has been a marked disregard for time and space. Descriptions of social structure has been accomplished under the assumptions that systems were "now as for ever".

Real societies are processes in time which involve two types of changes (a) that which is consistent with the continuity of the existing formal order (b) that which calls for an alteration of the formal structure itself. The attempted description of a social system is only a "model" of social reality, a hypothesis about how the social system works. Working under this assumption the parts of the model can be seen to cohere in equilibrium in a system. But social reality does not cohere in this way. It is by analysing the inconsistencies that an observer can understand change. The structural-functionalists conceive of facts as being fitted to the ideal model of human society at a particular stage of development, obtained by observing social systems, defined as being in an unreal static condition. They have

not explained what in fact happened when a society in state (A) changed to a society in stage (B). They assumed that the latter must somehow have emerged from the former and to verify their conclusions they chose societies that were not inter-dependent. If the social systems were contemporary, they were spatially remote. If they were contiguous, they were not contemporary. When (B) happens after (A), (A) is used to explain (B) in terms of a necessary happening that supposes the world as continuous. In fact, the continuum does not exist. For instance, it is just as likely that (b) might result instead of (B). Hence a cause (A) only determines the path of an event, but the direction of the event is determined by that which participates in it. So, when a social scientist constructs a model he must leave room for the pattern of events that can emerge from the present not "necessarily", but if certain tendencies are encouraged. We thus observe an event as becoming and not necessary - it is in this form, only from the interplay of various possibilities; the development might indeed be unpredictable because the process of social change is possible by making and implementing strategic decisions.

By and large, a morphological concept of institutions makes the pattern of change immeasurable and unobservable not only when we speak of change from one pattern to another but changes within a given pattern.

The development of concepts that make concrete events of social situations which enable us to represent the pattern statistically is called form. Social form is a pattern of distribution of behaviour by different persons on different occasions. When we make a structural comparison and say that one system changes to another we have adopted a convenient method but in fact have not accounted for the series of events that have taken place. The development model in this way implies a mechanical and simplistic view of continuity. To analyse fully the implications of social change (A) one must account for the continuity of agreement between people about the distribution of roles - that is the location of rights and statuses in the population, and (B) one must account for the strategic constraints of social life which also affect behaviour, such as the competition and cooperation among people for valued goods that affect their activities. By being forced to specify the nature of continuity, we specify the forces that generate a particular form. Change cannot be understood by comparing its various courses.

The main bulk of the criticism of Political Development Theory deals with its inability to explain social reality and the changes necessary in bringing about a system of "active politics and a developed economy in the underdeveloped states of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Political Development Theory is a unidirectional theory of change based on the historical experiences of Western Europe and the United States and has been interpreted by a number of scholars as the outcome of the tension between the Democratic and Communist models. One of the fundamental flaws has been the near total neglect of the historical experiences of societies for whom the models have been built. The relation of time and speed of change to progress has been ignored. The possibility that ancient political systems may possess their own models based upon the knowledge and needs thrown up by their individual civilizations has not occurred to any of the theorists; that societies which are technologically underdeveloped today may not be devoid of culture.

The unilinear view of history and progress is attended by the corrupt colonial view that civilized man is not found randomly, and is in fact to be seen only in Western Europe. Lucien Pyes conception of progress as a question of cultural "relativism" has found its expression in political development theory. Theorists like Gellner identify development with Nationalism and industrialism. Instead of developing concepts that would apply to the growth of all societies ancient and modern they start with the assumption that it is only after the 18th century that development took place. Accordingly

Reinhard Bendix defines Political Modernization and Development in terms of the economic and political advance of some pioneering societies in the 18th century and subsequent changes in follower societies. Inherent in such definitions is the belief that the Revolution in France and the Industrial Revolution in England were the only land marks. Since definitions are necessarily bound in time and space, the implications of modernization and progress may change in the future? In view of Harold Laski's formulation that every theory is relevant only in the context of its time we may point out that in the 19th century modernization implied the growth of Nationality and Secularism; in the 20th century it has come to mean (in the developing countries) the "age of high mass consumption" (W.W. Rostow: 1965); in 1985 we may speculate that the symbols of modernity may be associated with the consequences of economic development, rather than with the creation of more of it; in the 21st century modernization may imply man's ability to transcend time and space intellectually? Under these conditions the "now as for ever" definition of Reinhard Bendix is of little utility.

The view of history and progress based on the traditional-transitional-modern spectrum, associates the countries of Asia, Africa and South America with the first condition, and the Western nations, especially the

U.S.A. and Great Britain with the condition towards which all the developing states must aspire. James Coleman states, for instance, that the Anglo-American type of polity most closely approximates to the model of a modern political system. The key to success seems to be a shift from the achievement of civilization to the achievement of development.

At another level, the criteria offered for the assessment of progress are of no purpose. About political participation, (a key variable in political development), there is no agreement between the theorists. However they are agreed upon some aspects of it; (1) That universal suffrage is one criterion by which one can judge democratic societies. In reality this turns out to be of scant use. Are societies which allow their citizens to vote at the age of 18 are more developed than those that do at 21, or vice versa? And then, how does the development of Democracy in these societies compare with that in Switzerland where till recently women did not vote? (2) That the percentage of qualified voters who exercise their power of vote is an indication of the level of Democracy. A.Y. Vyshinsky and K. Gorshenin point out that the voting turnout in the Soviet Union is always around 99%. Can this be taken as an indicator of democracy, independent of other related factors. (3) Phillip Cuthright suggests that the number of years the Chief Executive has stayed in power is an indicator of a developed Democracy. He has

obviously ignored the unrepresentative manner in which delegates are elected to the National Party Congress in America. (4) Voting turnout has been suggested as another criteria. But the fact that the illiterate population of underdeveloped countries may exhibit a larger turnout seems to invalidate this. Besides, how useful is this criterion when voters in both underdeveloped India and advanced U.S.A. are often coerced.⁵ Both James Coleman and Phillip Cuthright arrange underdeveloped societies along the scale ranging from competitive to semi-competitive to authoritarian asserting that the level of democracy is indicated by the degree of competition allowed to citizens to become participants in the political process. However, no indication as regards the desirable level of competition, optimum correlate with the highest level of political development is indicated.

Inherent in political development theory is the concern for stability. Lipset and Cuthright uphold the uninterrupted continuation of Democracy; Karl Von Vorep states that the duty of development is to establish the long time persistence of institutions; David Easton calls for the need for system maintenance; Ithiel Sala Pool lauds the achievement of democratic ends even through undemocratic means and so on. These propositions overlook the possibility that where a difference occurs in the

distribution of responsibilities, it might involve the radical change of a political structure.

In the analyses of political power, it is accepted at face value that the government is the legitimate authority for exercising it. Lucian Pye goes a step further to specify that the government must control resources in order to control outputs. On the contrary it would seem that the ultimate aim of development would be to do away with the use of compulsion in society. Power, in Pye's formulation, is to be used, not only for the development of a society, but should develop as an end in itself. In this connection it is interesting to note how the problem of power has been handled by a large group of theorists, past and present, within the frame of the value-loaded term "legitimacy". The discussion does not seem to have developed much further than the Social Contract theory of Hobbes. Accordingly governments, irrespective of form and content and nature may use "legitimate physical compulsion" to achieve whatever ends they may see fit. Contrarywise the use of force by a dissident group (even a majority) is termed "illegitimate". The status-quo determines the exercise of authority. However, a government may come to power by unfair means, or may in the course of its tenure degenerate. Can the physical force a government exercises then be considered legitimate? The concept

of legitimacy breaks down at this point. The principle of legitimacy institutionalised in International Law as codified in the Charter of Nuremberg and elsewhere demonstrates a similar bias. The principles were formulated by representatives of established governments without the participation of the representative of mass based popular movements. The themes discussed are of special interest; According to Richard Falk "From the perspective of international order the capacity to govern is certainly an element in claiming political legitimacy".⁴ Thomas J. Farer speaks of "the dangerous ambiguity of just when the insurgency has received sufficient status to require equal treatment".⁵ Telford Taylor claims accordingly that in 1962 the United States was engaged in an "aggression checking" enterprise in Vietnam.⁶ This view however fails to hold if the "capacity to govern" is taken as a criterion. In that year it was estimated by officials in Saigon that more than half the population supported the National Liberation Front. Noam Chomsky raises the question: Suppose one were to hold that governments recognised by the big powers were allowed to call in outside help to stamp out mass movements, while the insurgents were not: Suppose further that this rule applies where the insurgents constitute the only effective government in large areas and the only mass-based political organization in a state

from which they have been arbitrarily separated by the intervention and subversion of the big powers, then international law as we know it, seems a device for upholding imperialist programmes and thereby has no moral force. Accordingly, in Vietnam it has branded a peoples war, illegal and has "legitimized" the use of the technology of the industrial powers to suppress it.

The political development theorists limit the discussion of economic development to the growth of industry to produce output. The attitudes generated by an industrial order are seen to eradicate backwardness. The human treatment of economic development linked with the correlation of urbanization with development has neglected the fact that the movement to urban centres has led to social instability in almost all the areas in which it has occurred. Samuel P. Huntington has been one of the major supporters of urbanization as a primary vehicle of development. The policy implications are however brutal. Noam Chomsky (1973) points out that the American policy in Vietnam of bombing the rural civilian population in suspected communist areas to deprive the enemy of the population resource and forcing villagers to migrate to the slums of Saigon was blandly termed as "urbanization" by Huntington. In Vietnam terms such as urbanization served to camouflage horrors perpetrated by "search and destroy missions", "Aerial and artillery" bombardment and

the forceful movement of people to "strategic hamlets". Further, since manpower existed in the slums it was suggested that army discipline should facilitate the transition from the attitudes of a traditional society to the needs of an industrial one after the war had been fought and won.

And what of the post war development of Vietnam? Economist Smithies speculates that the war will have served a positive function by laying some of the "pre-conditions" for development. The traditional society and culture will have been demolished and this coupled with an ideal labour market and harbours, airfields and communications systems will provide a base for an industrial society with modern skills and attitudes. These positive contributions of the war evidenced in terms of profound economic changes will remain while with the new generations the horrors of war will fade as in Japan and Korea. With substantial foreign investment, aid and sound domestic policies, Smithies paints an encouraging picture.

Most Political Development theorists subscribe to the view that mass communication plays an important role in development, in that it tends to bring about a smoother relationship between the centre and the states. The danger lies however, in the fact that the communication

can be one sided. It is held that if the government does not monopolise the means of communication, the results can be disruptive. It must be able to evoke a meaningful response in the minds of the people, and the existence of an efficient communications network can solve the problem of geographic extensiveness. But the correlation of Political Development with mass communications is too simplistic. Assuming that an efficient communication system operates in a geographically extensive area, two polar situations can be visualized: At best, the system of communications may be utilized by an efficient and popular government to mobilize human resources for nation-building. At worst, the communications system may be used by an unpopular regime, to inform itself of discontent, and to take speedy measures to stifle it. In the new states the second possibility has been most evident. In political development theory one sees an almost Skinnerian response to the problem of control. It consists of a set of recommendations to a decrepit government as regards how best to maintain the status quo.

Lipsets and Lerner's theories of modernization and development, and Karl Deutsch's indicator of social mobilization with respect to developing countries display an equation of more correlation with necessary relations of cause and effect. Pre-requisite theories are based on

this confusion. For example, the capacity for entrepreneurship or the need for achievement is positively correlated with development. It is falsely inferred that the reason for the backwardness of a nation is the lack of this characteristic in the population; hence this is considered a pre-requisite for development.

As regards the growth of Rationality to which the theorists attribute a great deal, it is debatable whether a substantial Rationality input will bring about the desired output in the states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. According to the rationality principle the individual places his interests over that of others. Contrary to this belief, studies on the growth of industrialism in Japan indicate that it was by stressing familial values and team work that efficiency was achieved in the economic and administrative system (Abegglen: 1958).

Theorists like Talcott Parsons perceive Christianity as most favourable to economic development. Religion is ranked independent of socio-economic criteria and the Asian religions of today are seen to be same as the Christianity of the Middle Ages. Theorists like Gellner go a step further in saying that colonialism was in fact good for backward countries. According to him the Colonialism-struggle-independence continuum had the effect of demonstrating to a lazy people the importance of work,

and thereby of laying the foundations of a developmental attitude. He ignores the negative effect of colonialism on development and that mainly vagabonds were allowed to settle in colonies.

It seems that the political development theorists first drew their conclusions and then set out to gather empirical data to corroborate them. Paradoxically, while the criteria devised for assessing modernization and development have aroused disagreement among the different writers. The results of the studies have been suspiciously uniform.

Some writers have conditioned economic development on Political Development stating that all modern political systems initiate programmes of economic growth; modern political systems tend to stabilize all spheres of collective life by devising mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power (it is generally true that economic development cannot take place in an unstable socio-political environment) and modern governments are the only agents capable of mobilizing resources for national programmes of growth. Other writers posit Political Development as a consequence of economic development. These formulations however, leave serious theoretical gaps which cannot be easily filled. Are the consequences of economic development always uniform? We can, visualize

an economic system in various political forms; the development might be unpredictable because strategic decisions can alter the course of change by providing alternative channels. Determinism and human choices are reciprocally related.⁷

What is the exact nature of the relationship between Political Development and Economic growth?

Writers in this field state that economic development leads to a development of the polity evidenced in terms of better administration. It leads to the growth of rationality and creates the need for an efficient bureaucracy. One of the problems that arises is that the quantification of economic development (unlike political change) is possible in terms of such criteria as Gross National Product, Per Capital Income and other like indexes. Any rise in the G.N.P. is (a) measurable, and (b) desirable. In assessing Political Development, however, universals of assessment such as G.N.P. and P.C.I. do not exist. How then can we (1) quantify and assess the level of changes in the political structure (2) causally relate them with changes in the economic structure. At what level can one account for both the "magnitude" and "direction" of change? Can we also assess the desirability of changes in the Political Structure? The problem becomes clear when we examine the criteria provided to us by development theorists by posing some of the key questions.

Criteria for assessing Political Development & Modernization:

(1) A) PARTICIPATION: How effectively can people participate at both the regional and national levels?
How are interests articulated.

B) MOBILIZATION: The party is the mobilizing agent.
Is it the elite or the party system which performs this function?

(2) A) Bureaucratic efficiency

B) The growth of Rationality

Developmentalists have argued that excessive bureaucratic rationality tends to be dysfunctional in times of routinized activity if not in times of change. Does the caste system in India help political development? The answer to this is paradoxical for while in terms of mobility and participation it may help, in terms of rational bureaucracy it seems to hinder progress. Further, is the role of caste increasing? And does caste play a positive or a negative role? Caste has played a tremendous role in mobilizing the masses, especially in the earlier phases (consider the rise of the D.M.K.).⁸ Within the traditional Indian Political structure (which was in no concrete way like it is today) it was not possible for the individual to participate in politics at the state and national levels. The political activities of the individual were confined within the

village, or group of villages and within the loyalties imposed upon him by caste and kinship. The new political order demanded the immediate breakdown of the loyalties of caste, kinship and village and sought to link the individual directly to political life at the state and national levels. In actual practice, however, linking the individual to the larger universe was conceptually too abstract, to produce concrete results and it was the caste system that acted as an intermediary agency for mobilizing the people. In this sense, it played a positive role. It has been pointed out already that caste in mobilization led to equalization, but this is only a partial truth when we relate it to other spheres of political life. The caste system, in administration has led to corruption and nepotism. It is evident therefore that in concrete social systems each variable has contradictory functional consequences.

Focussing his attention upon some of the practical problems of development Fred Riggs pointed out that democratization was fraught with paradoxes. In India, the development towards democracy demanded the centralization and concentration of power in the hands of the government so that a framework of new roles and identifications could be created. Thus, the central authority had to be invested with the power to mobilize national resources for economic development. At the same time,

the thrust towards a developed democratic polity demanded a simultaneous decentralization of power in order to permit wider mass-participation in decision-making, considered essential for democratic government. One sees a direct confrontation here between participation and mobilization. Consider also the need for specialization within the framework of nation-building. It has been pointed out that too much specialization leads to the appropriation of political power by specialists. What then happens to participation? In his study of American democracy, C. Wright Mills observed that a large part of the legislation passed by the American Congress was in fact made by a handful of experts and not even handed over to the legislature for ratification before being executed.⁹ Martin Seymour Lipset demonstrated how laws formulated at the Legislative level are either stopped outright from being executed at the bureaucratic level or are deliberately reformulated by specialists in such a way that they retain no part of their original nature, form and content and thereby become ineffective. To what extent, then can specialization be considered a positive factor in Political and Economic development? In view of the consistent and environmental factors, it is not easy to devise criteria for judging and measuring the political development process of a system.

It had been mentioned earlier that the theory of development that we have inherited from the West subsumes the entire subject to three approaches:

(A) the index method (B) the acculturation method and (C) the analysis of the processes of change that are currently taking place in underdeveloped countries. Manning Nash goes further to claim that these modes exhaust the possibilities of attacking the problem.

The index method is based largely on Max Webers ideal type and the Parsonian Pattern Variables. Accordingly Hozelitz argues that the developed countries are characterized by universalism, achievement orientation and specificity (functional) while the underdeveloped countries exhibit the opposite set of variables i.e. particularism, ascription and functional diffuseness. A shift from the latter characteristics to the former in the underdeveloped countries would lead to Economic development. This suggestion would indeed be welcome if it was as true as it was simplistic. Studies of Japan, France and Europe in general demonstrate the existence of particularism in both upper and lower classes. Regarding achievement-orientation, we may for analytical purposes break social roles into three parts: (A) reward (B) recruitment and (C) motivation. While reward is based largely on achievement recruitment which may again

be based on achievement in the middle class is ascriptive in both the upper and lower sectors of business (David Granick: The Red Executive). Michael Harrington indicates that American society at both the extreme levels is becoming progressively more ascriptive. James Abegglen's (1958) study reveals that while achievement determines role recruitment the rewards within the role are determined to a great extent by ascriptive factors such as age and family obligations. In discussions of ascription and achievement the analytical separation between recruitment and reward is seldom made; the obvious discrepancies between the Japanese and the American systems indicates the sterility of the criteria. Further, when theorists claim that developed societies are characterised by functional specificity we may ask how important is the difference between role specificity and diffuseness when one individual may take up several socially significant roles in quick and institutionalized succession. The structure of interaction between alter and ego may vary between the functionally diffuse father-son relationship to the functionally specific general-soldier relationship. Yet, conversely the under-developed countries are substantially universalist, as political strikes and militant nationalism would seem to indicate. But while at a superficial level observers profess a support for anti-colonial and anti-neo-colonial movements, they

from upon strikes and militancy as being opposed to the universal good. The propaganda about freedom and the defence of universalism (for the common good) by the developed countries in Congo, Vietnam, The Dominican Republic, Malaysia and elsewhere demonstrates the point.

The political development theorists further assert that political roles in underdeveloped countries are distributed exclusively on ascriptive considerations. This leads them to postulate that political power rests in the hands of either a traditional landed elite, or a feudal oligarchy. This contradicts facts because in all capitalist underdeveloped countries, political power (military or civil) lies in the hands of those who occupy the highest positions in the economic organization, especially those who have commercial ties with the developed metropolis, which is increasingly the United States. In the ascriptive underdeveloped nations, the present incumbents of the top positions have "achieved" their positions, often more than in the achievement-oriented developed countries of Europe and North America. Conversely, this is also true with the lower positions in the underdeveloped countries primarily because the mercantilist and capitalist penetration not only brought with it the social organization of the dominant world system but integrated the underdeveloped countries within the international system. Even the distribution of

rewards in high level roles in underdeveloped countries is determined by achievement. The nature of their economies being monopolistic (more than in the developed ones) financial success, based largely on speculation and extortion results in income disparities of the severest type. So it would seem that given the nature of the economy the distribution of rewards is based more on achievement factors.

Regarding the functional diffuseness of roles in backward countries, it is true that the poor therein practice several professions at the same time. However, the roles at the other end are equally diffuse. In monopoly control in the underdeveloped countries the controlling roles are diffuse and economic roles predominate in that control. Conversely, the middle class (mainly salaried officials of the government) occupy roles that are functionally specific. They serve the specific function of making the system operate in the diffuse but particular interests of those who have achieved control. It is precisely the middle class in which the universalist values are predominant.

The treatment of roles is largely unsatisfactory for according to Hozelitz and others a change in the character of roles from particularistic, ascriptive and

diffuse to universalist, achievement based and functionally specific leads to corresponding development. They do not account for the fact that placed in the developmental perspective different roles have different weight, some having a greater consequence for development than others. From this, it would logically follow that when the different roles do not carry the same weight in actual development it is illogical to give them the same weight in theory. The examination of the top Political and economic roles is systematically avoided. If, however, they were given the importance they clearly deserve then it would be difficult to characterise as universalist, achievement-based and functionally-specific, a system in which the military-industrial complex pursues particularistic aims.

It had been stated earlier that the term "model" has been used variously by social scientists in accordance with the needs of their research objectives. Thus models were conceived of as (A) levels (B) as strategies and as (C) a surrogate for theory. Of the political development theorists we may ask: What is the level at which their theories are operative or what is the social universe that they have in mind since the conception of "level" extends from the small community to the international system? Theorists like Hozelitz in

employing the pattern variables associate the negative variables with the extended family, the primitive tribe, the folk community and the traditional sectors of the dual society. They do not define the universe where the shift from one set of variables to another would affect development in a positive direction. How then does it claim to explain reality in terms of the entire system structure? In the analysis of roles, attention is directed only to the sum of the roles in society in general while the economic, social and political structure of the society under study is largely ignored. In short, the causes of development and underdevelopment are located in the summation of roles. To pass from the latter state to the former calls only for a modification of some systemic functions. This formulation does not relate to facts. The existence of ascription and diffuseness in the top levels of the military - industrial complex has not turned the United States into an underdeveloped country; not has the specificity and universality in the top circles of business and government turned the underdeveloped countries into developed ones.

Political development theorists suggest also that the rise in the income of the middle classes is a definite indicator of development. Available evidence however indicates that in the underdeveloped countries when the income of the middle classes rises it does so not at the expense of the upper but at that of the lower

classes whose absolute and relative income is forced even lower.

In Rostow's "stages" of development it is implicit that underdevelopment is an original stage; that there were no stages before the present stage of underdevelopment. This denies the backward countries of any history so that they are today the way they were centuries ago. It is explicit that the developed societies of today were once underdeveloped. Both formulations have no grounds in reality. An alternative view suggests that the political and economic expansion of Europe since the fifteenth century, and the consequent incorporation of the presently backward into the international system has caused the states that we now term as developed and underdeveloped. Any theory of development must therefore account for the history of the presently backward states and for the historical process that caused this backwardness. Rostow's formulation falls short on both counts. The structure of underdevelopment is precisely the social, political and economic system that the colonial powers imposed upon the colonized societies. The stages he postulates are absent and it is amazing that after centuries of colonisation none of the underdeveloped countries have developed or even arrived at the "take off" stage. Contrary to the popularly held view, the connection with the metropolis not only hinders development but even increases underdevelopment.¹⁰

While Rostow identifies the stages of development he does not indicate how societies pass from one stage to the next. If we accept his theory and place it alongside the history of colonialism, it would follow that in order to develop, the backward countries of today would have to find other people to exploit just as the now developed societies did years ago.

The theories of those who prescribe the diffusion of capital and technology from the advanced states to the backward ones is based on an even worse misinterpretation of under-development than the previous method. It is implicit that people from poor countries should not examine and ascertain the causes of their poverty and arrive at remedies; rather they should wait for the diffusion of aid from the advanced states. This apparent one-way flow of capital and know-how is misleading because the largest part of the capital owned by the developed states in the backward ones was never sent from the latter. The initial investments have long been covered. On the other hand Latin American observers testify that over the years the capital outflow to the United States is rapidly increasing coupled with the decline in their relative participation in world trade and the deteriorating terms of trade (Prebisch:1964). The expansion of operations by the foreign corporations

has not only led to increasing profits that are sent back but has influenced in a decisive way the political and social life of Latin America. It is a well documented fact that U.S. capital in Latin America has allied itself with the conservative oligarchy, and those who are tied to foreign capital. In Guatemala's case, aid from such bodies as the I.M.F. and A.I.D. depended upon whether or not, a government protected the United Fruit Co.¹¹ As regards the diffusion of technology it may be noted that far from diffusing technology, new technology is used as the basis of capitalist metropolis monopoly control over the underdeveloped countries.

Yet another export from the developed to the backward countries, is political and economic and social liberalism. In the economic field, it takes the form of "free trade" which has been used as a substitute for protection. The diffusion of political liberalism may be assessed in terms of the relation between economic and political power, so succinctly discussed by C.W. Mills (1970). The relation is even more close in the underdeveloped states. Social liberalism aims at promoting largely the middle classes in the backward countries. At the expense of the poor, causing thereby greater disparities in incomes. The conception of duality (modern and traditional) is contrary to

reality; the diffusionists base their conceptions on this misunderstanding. Economic growth is based upon the integration of the pre-modern sectors by the modern sector. The inadequacy of this formulation lies in dealing with the relationships that creates the differences within a society and between societies. They recommend changes in the structures of societies which gave rise to those relationships in the first place; they deal with societies irrespective of time and space and as isolate units. On the contrary development and underdevelopment can be visualized as functions of the social structure of the country in which they occur in particular and the international system in general. It would follow that changes in the international system would have to precede changes in the parts of the domestic system.

Political Development Theory seems by and large, an effort to come to grips with, and provide a barrier against, the dominant currents prevailing in the underdeveloped countries today i.e. that inequalities in incomes arise from the institution of private property which manifests itself at the political level in the state which is the institutionalized political mechanism for the domination of one social class by another; that there is a fundamental relationship

between economy, society and the state and that types of state, democratic, authoritarian populist and so on are determined by the class relations within a state; that the fundamental problem of politics is to destroy the relations of exploitation.

The basic problems in the dimension of political power in the underdeveloped countries are wished away by providing the pluralist model or improved versions of it. Raymond Aron offers the representative form where the fear of usurpation of power by a single organization is forestalled by introducing the rule of a collectivity of organizations. Hannah Arendt sees the solution in the "Council System" where the structural dehierarchization of political power is achieved by introducing decision-making organs and check-and-balance mechanisms at each intermediary stage. Amitai Etzioni offers the solution of problems of power in the maximum activation of political systems, till the optimum of the balancing forces i.e. consensus and control are arrived at. But fundamentally, the suggestions offered are of a secondary nature. In the context of the developing countries it shows concern not in the causes but in the symptoms. Gabriel Almond hence limits political activity to the confines of interest articulation and aggregation.

While, on the one hand, they deny that economic

disparity arises out of certain class relations, on the other they seek to prove that it results from other factors such as the growth in the population in rural areas (a project currently being sponsored by the World Bank in six countries in Asia and Africa). They recommend to the backward countries that when economic problems become insurmountable, the solution lies in aid from the developed capitalist states to check spiralling economic problems. In this way the need for changing the total structure of the system is checked. But the consequences of aid itself are well documented. Teresa Hayter (1971) after studying the I.M.F. and the World Bank reports that aid to the developing countries has the ultimate effect of making them more dependent upon the capitalist states headed by the U.S. Gabriel Valdez, ex-foreign minister of Chile in his statement to President Nixon in 1969 stated that aid, in terms of private investment has meant that the amounts taken out of Latin America are many times greater than those invested; potential capital declines and the benefits of invested capital multiply abroad and leaves the recipient in payment of huge external debts.

What indeed would have happened if Latin America was never colonized by the Spaniards in the 18th century, the British in the 19th and the Americans in the 20th? The "feudalistic" aspects could be viewed as attributes

of colonization, as a lingering consequence of feudalism, Catholicism, geography or the other factors used to explain the backwardness of the region. The model of development disguises the role of foreign intervention and subversion.

The developmental strategy offered by political development theorists is linked to the policy, needs of the United States. Complementing the opinion expressed by "Engine Charley" Wilson that what's good for General Motors is good for the country, economists such as Rostow build up cases for the adoption of capital intensive techniques by the developing countries on the assumption that something that works well for the United States can be both simulated and assimilated successfully, elsewhere in the world.

The Monetarists and the Structuralists propose to understand the mechanisms involved in the developmental process as part of a more general socio-economic system. However what is involved is not simply an explanation of change, but an insistence that it take place in a certain way. The inadequacy of such theories lie in the fact that while the models builders start with arbitrary polarization they end with false synthesis. Further, the models (of the political development theorists) examine social reality within structural and empirical constraints; Never has a "revolution-making" (instead of a "nation-building") model been accepted as even a vague possibility.

Nor has any mention been made of the "explosive model" of development where the change of the structure of a system by revolutionary forces is seen as a prelude to development rather than the result of underdevelopment. The concepts of equilibrium and consensus have become ends in themselves.

Contrary to the model of active politics as equivalent to the optimal level of consensus and control (Etzioni: 1968), and as against the reduction of party politics to interest-articulation and aggregation (Almond etc.), a model of "active politics" would, in fact, appear to have a different meaning in structurally backward nations. Given that backward countries are characterized by severe socio-economic disparities which are immanently reflected at the political level, an active political system would be one in which the dominant social and economic cleavages correspond to the political cleavages.

But in practice the solution is not as simple. A model of this type assumes a reasonable level of education which leads to a high level of political consciousness correlate with active political participation. In the context of underdevelopment and backwardness, defined in part by a high level of illiteracy, this remains an almost circular argument: Development is dependent upon political participation which depends on education

which to an extent depends on development. The underlying structural characteristics necessary for this model of politics depends largely upon the role of political parties in creating consciousness. As it stands, this model at best remains a criterion for evaluating electoral politics in a very general sense.

**EMERGING ALTERNATIVES :
THE LATIN AMERICAN VIEW**

Contrary to the Political Development Theory it is progressively being realized by the developing countries that modernity is not located anywhere in the world i.e. no archetype exists to which underdeveloped nations must aspire and that any nation, whatever its contemporary configuration contains its own possibilities for modernization and development, the implementation of which could be hindered by attempts to fit it to a model extrinsic to those possibilities. This runs counter to the contemporary conception of industrialization in backward countries which is dominated by the Marxian generalization that it is the history of the advanced or established industrial countries which traces out the role of development for the more backward countries. In actual fact, the development of a backward country may differ by virtue of its backwardness from an advanced nation. Hence when societies choose a course of action in a given situation they do so under certain constraints. The subject of a choice in a process of change can only be successful if he behaves according to the limits of his choice. A constant tension between objective possibilities and human choices is visualized as determinants in all courses of action. In contrast to the development theory postulated hitherto that sees the world as continuous, it is proposed that social reality is better comprehended thus:

1. Condition of things - explosive factor - another condition.
2. Precarious arrangement - disrupted by some precipitant factor emerging from within and without.

According to this formulation there is always an interval between a condition or factor considered as a cause and its admitted effect. If the interval is considerable, three possible things might happen:

- A. Events that prevent the consummation of cause-effect
- B. Events not favourable to the effect
- C. Indifferent events that neither favour nor hinder the effect.

An active agent might take advantage of the interval and by behaving strategically avoid what would metaphysically be expected as a necessary outcome. Developing countries find themselves in a series of conjectures which are tried, altered, tried again in their altered forms, altered again and so forth, involving a constant movement between the concrete and the abstract. It is possible that the potential for passing to the next stage is smaller, the more specialized and complex a form in a given evolutionary stage is. Accordingly, the more backward societies would have an evolutionary potential for an original stage, that the more advanced societies lacked. Development today is intrinsically related to the effective working of the world super

system that has penetrated every society today creating a planetary society and a planetary man. The emergence of a planetary society has had two effects.

A. The Demonstration effect. The aspirations of peripheral nations are moulded largely by the type of consumption current in the hegemonic nations because of the growth of communications on the one hand, and the pressure of hegemonic nations to market their goods. The populations of backward nations are exposed to the standards of living in the hegemonic nations towards which they tend to aspire. Consequently there is an imbalance between the level of aspirations and the productive capacity available to satisfy them. By definition peripheral nations are those that are unable to fulfill the basic needs of life. In recent times the stress has been to eradicate poverty by the pooling in of resources by all nations, the application of which has been hindered by institutional obstacles.¹

B. The Domination effect (Francois Perroux). Early in the 1950s Perroux postulated that the working of certain national economies were decisively conditioned by a few. Weaker nations were subjected to a kind of "cosmic bombardment". In a situation of this type all that the weaker economies could do was adjust actively or passively. The successful cases of development such as in Japan represents an active adjustment in which the

role of the government was the decisive factor in affecting social and economic changes.

"no business like the foreign aid business"

KOJI NAKANURA "The Okinawa Pay-off", Far Eastern Economic Review Aug 21, 1971 -

In recent years there has appeared a body of literature on the questions of development and under development. The work has been accomplished largely in Latin America and provides an alternative set of postulates to that proposed by classical theory, and is based on the link between society, economy and politics both at the domestic and the international level.

The development of the Latin American theory of backwardness can be visualized at two levels: A) a philosophical and psychological explanation of the phenomenon, and B) the conception of imperialist exploitation.² The analysis of Jose Carlos Mariategui in the 1920s of the comparative states of the crisis of capitalism in the USA and Europe can be taken as the starting point of the present theory of underdevelopment that has come from Latin America. He postulated (A) that industrial development in the US depended upon a corresponding level of consumption by the native population, and (B) that when production exceeded consumption it would seek external markets. By the late 1920s, Mariategui

predicted, the USA would launch an imperialist plan accepting the inevitability of a global capitalistic commitment.

In Latin America, till 1929 growth was predicted upon policies of desarollo hacia afuera i.e. an outward oriented development path which emphasized the role of exports as a vehicle of growth. After 1929 most Latin American writers postulated desarollo hacia adentro i.e. an inward looking developmental path. This ideology which gained prominence mainly after World War II came from the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and avoided the realities of the class struggle and the role of the U.S. in it. It explained structural "underdevelopment as arising from different structures each characterised by a specific type of behaviour.

In the 1950s, Raul Prebisch formulated that the world is comprised with the centre and the periphery: the advanced industrial and the backward agricultural. Contrary to classical theory, he postulated that given a dynamic setting when there is an accelerated rate of technological advancement in the centre, the terms of trade move in favour of the centre although at their face value both experience an increase in output. Further, the periphery has two sectors, the external (export) and the domestic

(production) and the rate of return is always greater in the former. He studied specifically the long term decline in the terms of trade of Latin America's primary products exports. He observed that the income elasticity of demand for these products fell in the centre and rose in the periphery which led to an increase in exports from the centre. This resulted in a balance of payments crisis and the unequal distribution of productivity gains. While in the Centre productivity gains led to higher wages, in the periphery the decline in commodity prices resulted in lower wages. He suggested that peripheral governments will have to protect their economies by balancing the rates of return in the two sectors by extending aid to the domestic sector. In his final analysis Prebisch recommended import substitution as the key to development.³

However, Raul Prebisch who attributed under-development partly to liberal capitalist economic policies was a scion of the anti-imperialist, anti-Marxist tradition and substituted politically stronger and more precise expressions of the problem with his misleading conception of centre-periphery relations. It was misleading to the extent that the class content of imperialist theory was dissolved. By the 1960s his import substitution theory was in crisis since it had not lessened dependence. Income distribution was more unequal and large segments of the population was still marginal.

National policies of industrialisation had succumbed to the Multinational Corporations evidenced in terms of foreign investment and the establishment of military dictatorships. It was at this point that the theory of Dependency responded to the failure of the theory of import substitution industrialization.

Dependency theories can be classified as belonging to three broad types: (A) that stems from the ECLA structuralist perspective (B) the Marxist perspective and (C) that which incorporates both Marxian and structuralist analysis. The theory of dependence is a hypothesis which aims to define the problem of interest, to show how lower level more specific hypotheses fit within this framework in order to make lower level abstractions more clearer. It is a framework within which heterogeneous phenomena are analysed to see how they link and interact with each other to form a total system.

In dependence theories the foundations of classical theories are inverted. Andre Gunder Frank argues that the backward societies of today were not originally underdeveloped though they may have been "undeveloped". The process of under-development began with the mercantilist and capitalist expansion in the 15th century.⁴ He distinguished between the state of undevelopment as

the historical condition in which societies found themselves before modern capitalism and the process of underdevelopment which the periphery experienced after it came into contact with aggressive capitalism characteristic of the centre. He concludes that underdevelopment is a process in which there is a regression in economic conditions sustained by the institutional structure of society within which no positive development can be expected. By dependence is meant, a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the expansion of others. The result is that certain countries become self sustaining while others become dependent on them (Theotonio dos Santos).

Frank rejects the traditional "dualist" model of underdevelopment proposed by economist Lewis and others which divides backward societies into a traditional (agricultural) and a modern dynamic (industrial) sector. Lewis recommended that the modern sector should be developed to absorb the surplus labour in the agricultural sector. Frank, on the other hand argues that the law of uneven development in capitalism applies its own efficiency criteria to build upon the most profitable elements of the system to the exclusion of others. The consequent disparities increase with time and

constantly change their form. Dualism is one manifestation of this phenomenon and the states and processes of underdevelopment in the two sectors are in fact intrinsically related. In the context of the expropriation of surplus in a world wide framework the centre-periphery relations are established at various levels and local centres come up which in a more general setting are peripheries. Frank maintains that as long as an area occupies a peripheral position its development is necessarily a limited one; that when the links between the centre and periphery are the weakest, the periphery experiences its greatest period of growth; that if the links are restored the impetus for growth disappears; that the most underdeveloped regions of today are those that were linked closest to the centres; that the latifundias were capitalist enterprises to cope with the demand situation, by increasing their capital aggregate, land, and labour, in order to increase productivity; that those units of production which today engage in producing for local demands, were not isolated in the past, but have become what they are today because of a decrease in the demand for their products at the domestic and international level. Frank concludes that the national bourgeoisie is the immediate enemy because it is inextricably linked to metropolitan interests and

through which exploitation at the domestic and international level is sustained and administered. Consequently it has no role to play in the process of development. The diffusion technique which is postulated as the key to growth by political development theorists and economists is conceived by Frank to result in the development of underdevelopment, continuities in change which leaves intact the basic structures.

Writing along the theme of comparative advantage, Paul. A. Samuelson maintains that American technology, management know-how and capital can be most efficiently utilized to employ foreign labour. In an environment of free trade and floating exchange rates he sees the U.S. becoming the centre of a world wide economic system in which the less developed nations become inextricably dependent upon its know-how. He, however has nothing to say on the fact that this would be negative to the real interests of the developing nations. According to the principle of comparative advantage, the trade relations between any two nations would be equal and clearly inter-dependent. The theory presented above however suggests that the dependence arising from the economic bombardment of the satellite by the metropolis is the dynamic of international capitalism and necessarily manifests itself in a relation of exploitation.

The Latin American theory has been derived from Marx's formulation of the political-economy of Capital accumulation and the relevance of power politics. He divided the process of capital accumulation into two inter-related parts: (1) The unit of surplus value production where appropriation was an economic function concerning the contract between the capitalist and the wage earner resulting in the conversion of equality into class rule and commodity exchange into exploitation; (2) The relation between the capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production at the international level characterised by colonialism, a world wide loan system, the global division into spheres of influence and consequent war.⁵ He maintains that bourgeois theory separates the two and postulates that on the contrary political power is a means whereby the economic system is sustained by the application of sanctions. The history of capitalism, according to Marx cannot be comprehended without a consideration of political power as a vehicle of economic interests. The recent history of the Latin American countries bears the historical validity of this formulation very clearly.

This relationship is demonstrated by the dynamics of foreign aid and the institutionalization of the Multinational Corporations. Assuming that by 1975 the U.S. aided Saigon government in Vietnam will have won a victory, Emile Benoit, an economist working for the

|||

Asian Development Bank suggests that the agricultural labour force could be diverted to the production of components of assembled goods to be marketed by multinational corporations. Vietnam and South East Asia in general would serve as a source of raw materials complementing the Japan based industrial economy, while producing some finished or semi-finished manufactured goods for domestic consumption and export. He further suggests that state intervention should be minimum while the private sector encouraged. Local capitalism should be encouraged and wage costs should be kept down. Jacques Decernoy commenting upon the report states: "the South East Asia of the future appears as a kind of paradise for international bankers and investors, besides providing an inexhaustible supply of wood, petroleum and minerals for Japans expanding economy."⁶ The Nixon Plan proposed to make private direct investment by Multinational Corporations the centre of American foreign aid in the 1970s and the U.S. government role being primarily to provide "political risk insurance" for private investment. The underlying idea was to convert the area into an American-Japanese Co-prosperity sphere by utilizing cheap labour (in the face of growing labour problems at home) and raw material, with the Multinational Corporations playing the key role. Assessing the

functions of the corporations, the researchers at the Ford Motor Company stated that "the company has the resources to act as a stabilizing economic force in the third world and should that prove insufficient, the international firm can supply Pentagon with the means of stabilizing the third world's markets by force."⁷

Given the nature of Multinational Corporations and the example provided by the role of the I.T.T. in Chile's political and economic life we may infer the motives behind foreign investments elsewhere. The role of the United Fruit Company in the political life of the Banana Republics is well documented;"..... it established the comic opera: abolished the independencies, presented crowns of caesar, unsheathed envy, attracted the dictatorship of the flies, Trujillo flies, Tacho flies, Garias flies, Martinez flies, Ubico flies....wise flies, well trained in tyranny."⁷

In an economic sense the Multinational Corporations satisfy the internal market demands of a select section of the population, the middle class; but in the long run their activities tend to be labour displacing. But economic dependence has political implications, for aid brings with it the right of donors to take part in policy making. Sunkel observes that the multinational corporations are socially destabilising and that stability is imposed externally through military dictatorships as in Brazil.

Traditional theories have visualized underdevelopment as a result of a shortage of capital and technology which has to be diffused from the advanced nations. Furthermore the study of history is given prime importance since the presently backward countries will have to repeat the developmental processes of the presently advanced nations. It is also argued that the system of private property is the only source of future progress.

The Latin American theories reject the characterization of the world as a harmonic system and contend that disharmonic relations and conflicts of interests is essentially the nature of the world super system. The underdeveloped countries can no longer repeat the developmental processes of Europe and the U.S. in the coordinates of present time and space.

Paul Baran, by establishing a historical perspective in understanding existing structure of underdevelopment and examining the interaction between underdeveloped and developed countries postulates that the process began with the subordination of pre-capitalist by capitalist structures. The contact dissolved pre-capitalist structures, laid the foundation for rapid development, but extracted the surplus, prevented the possibilities for industrialization conditioned class

formations and distorted the developmental process to suit the needs of the developed nations. In summing up the implications of development today, Baran calls for a structural overhaul of social and economic relations and the corresponding organization of production, distribution and consumption. He argues that the impetus for Economic, Political and Social changes or the contrary desire for maintaining the status quo is intrinsically rooted in class interests. Both development and underdevelopment are holistic phenomena and are the consequences of the process of capitalist growth.⁹

In handling the political perspectives Sunkel observed in Latin America, the replacement of the class struggle by a sectorial struggle between those connected with the internationalized sector and those marginal to it. Theotonio dos Santos and Sunkel call for the transformation of existing structures to create a capacity for autonomous growth in which the participation of marginal groups is essential.

Cardoso maintains that in order to achieve national development, sovereignty, internal cohesion and progressive social integration, and awareness of inequalities and national dependency and the organization of unstructured masses and marginal groups must be posed as an alter-

native to dependent capitalist development through the Multinational Corporation.

The Latin American political economists reject the Pluralist model offered by Robert Dahl and others to the underdeveloped countries. Maintaining a separation between the economic and the political, the pluralists claim that their model creates the rule of minorities and not of the minority. While accepting that economic power inevitably concentrates in the hands of a few, they deny that this obstructs the egalitarian distribution of political power. They conclude that the balancing mechanisms in the form of the veto of the middle and working classes check the appropriation of political power by any single group. In contrast the Latin Americans argue that the existing dominant class necessarily uses the organisation and the technological capacity of the society to maximize productivity in order to bring about a correlation between their political power and economic power. Arguing along the premise that power is balanced in society for all practical purposes i.e. while the rich have money, the poor have numbers, the pluralists suggest that what is needed in underdeveloped countries is simply more civic participation by low status groups. The diffusion of power permits a commitment to developmental goals. The Latin Americans

on the contrary maintain that in the pluralist system groups compete not over developmental goals but over the distribution of the social product.

The Latin Americans submit that a theory of politics in a developmental context must examine the following:

I. The fundamental characteristics of capitalist societies institutionalized in private property, private initiative and inequalities in wealth and income manifested in class structures and antagonistic relations between classes.

II. The vehicle of economic power in a capitalist society is the state. The major issue is to identify in what manner the economic power of the dominant classes is institutionalized into political power.

III. There is a relation between economy, society and the state. The developmental activities of the state operate under certain structural constraints imposed by the nature of capitalism.

IV. The type of state in any society is determined by class relations and economic transformations in different countries and regions.

V. Development involves a transformation of social relations, the liberation and of man from

exploitation and oppression. This is achieved through politics.¹⁰

There are various areas however in the theory of dependence that have been criticised and need to be improved upon. Barans assumption that capitalism in an underdeveloped country is a framework for economic stagnation is too simplistic. Frank, on the other hand has insufficiently analysed two areas: (A) The problem of the structure and the range of variation of the relationships ruling between metropolitan centres and satellites (B) The problem of "continuity in change." He has provided no clue for the interpretation of micro-level ethnographic data. He has also been criticised for not recognising that the process of under development is not one of satellitization but one of formation of a certain type of internal structure conditioned by inter-national relations of dependency. This criticism is not fair because Frank emphasises the relationship to the international economy. Cardoso attacks the "development of underdevelopment" (Frank) on the grounds that it ignores the structural dynamism of industrialization now carried on by the Multinational Corporation. He observes that it is a "dependent development" evidenced in terms of reforms in the old oligarchic structures, for example, the reform of land tenure and traditional patterns of underdevelopment. But Frank does

not deny "dependent development"; he denies independent autonomous industrialization. Underdevelopment necessarily sinks the majority of the people to even greater poverty. If Cardoso maintains that reforms would elevate the masses then he is denying the development of underdevelopment. The differences are however not clear.

The essential characteristics of dependency are not spelt out. One is often faced with the circular argument that dependent countries are those which lack the capacity for autonomous growth; they lack this because their structures are dependent. It has been further criticized on the grounds that it offers no testable hypothesis that may be quantified.

The main policy advocated is that of changing the internal structure of society to obtain national development. Cardoso and Dos Santos advocate socialism as a precondition for this change. Sankel and Furtado adopt a reformist ECLA stand. National development without class struggle, independence without revolution. Most dependency literature gives the impression of the desirability of an anti-imperialist populist leader uniting the people in a technocratic state.

However, sufficient work has not been done along the lines suggested by the dependency theorists. But

the theory has indicated that the fallacious character of the sociology of development resulted from the separation within academic disciplines of the social, political and psychological, from the concrete historical and economic aspects of change. To that extent, it has also suggested that research on the problems of underdevelopment must provide an alternative view of change to the one that has hitherto been followed.

CONCLUSION :
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

It is apparent that today, questions of modernization and development cannot be approached from the standpoint of the nation state. It is precisely because of this approach that the study of political development and modernization have lagged behind the contemporary stage of world history. Changes within a society can today no longer be explained "by virtue of its own forces and properties," to use Pitirim Sorokin's phrase. Nation states can no longer be considered as bounded and independent units. The 20th century has shown the major historical trend of linking the nation to the world supersystem through cultural, economic and political ties. When societies therefore arrive at similar stages through the effectuation of independent changes, we must develop a dynamic theory at a higher level of abstraction which leaves sufficient room for strategic leverages for alternatives. At this level distinctions such as "follower" - "referent" (Bendix), and designations such as "Third world", "Second world" and "First world" tend to confuse rather than clarify the fundamental questions.

The problem that social scientists choose to study are a function of their values, and their observations are a function of their problems. We cannot rid social enquiry of subjectivity. Given the particularity

of objects and interests of concern to social scientists, how is it possible to prove the existence of a casual relation and certain features of a given historical individual situation, and certain empirical facts which have existed prior to it? Since social scientists have diverse interests, the same concrete material will give rise, not to one historical individual, but as many as there are points of view to study it.

The historical analysis of change has been the subject of debate. Historians accept the study of social change but dispute whether any abstract theory of social change can be made. Certain historians oppose any attempt at correlating the study of changes in one country with those in another so as to draw general patterns according to which social change occurs. They disagree with the view that the factors that have caused social change in one area can cause the same changes elsewhere. That history repeats itself is only a half-truth, the other half of which is that it never repeats itself or does so with new features. History is not a process of repetition but of creation. If historical processes are unique the social scientist must recognize the play of the contingent and the unforeseen. Karl Popper observes that "we cannot hope to test a universal hypothesis nor to find a natural law acceptable to science if we are for ever confined to the observation of

one unique process". We cannot speak of a theory of evolution because evolution is itself a process of divergent development and it is doubtful if history will provide us with examples where the evolutionary experiences of one state will repeat itself identically in another. Change can occur in diverse ways in the framework of different types of institutions. The variables involved in social change are heterogeneous; we have on the one hand, the growth of material culture where the development is cumulative; on the other hand, in the development of non-material culture the process of development is divergent. While it is possible to quantify the material aspects, and quantitatively compare processes of development in different societies it is not simple to compare the development patterns in the non-material aspects of change. This acquires prime importance because when social scientists speak of political development and modernization, it is precisely the problem of quantifying the non material aspects that they are confronted with. And then change does not take place in a uniform manner. In studying change some problems confront us such as, what institutions do we require for growth? Are all institutions equally relevant for economic development? Classification is indeed a primary question in the social sciences. Looking at the process of growth from the point of view of

cumulative causation, Gunnar Myrdal (1968) observes that the important question is not whether factors affecting growth are economic or non-economic, but whether they are relevant, less relevant and non relevant within the total perspective.

The postulates of the development tradition that we have inherited from the West (outlined at the beginning of this essay) according to which what we attempt to develop today would develop automatically if we allowed history to follow its own course has proved debatable when we place it in the context of contemporary developmental ideology which focuses primarily upon induced changes rather than gradual change. The structural functional analysis of change as a process that takes place from within has proven a-historical. The belief that changes within a given social structure results after a period in the total transformation of that structure as maintained by the structural functionalists and the systems theorists again proves insufficient as a working hypothesis when contemporary social processes manifest themselves in the form of discontinuous and accelerated changes. That processes of changes are continuous in character and essential in the very nature of systems, that the causes of change may be divided from the structure of the system are not supported by evidence. On the contrary

it is the inconsistency in social reality that creates changes. Structural-functionalism has unsuccessfully attempted to contain both the statics and dynamics in a single theory.

The fundamental need in social theory is to understand how changes have taken place with a specific spatial and temporal dimension with the aim of identifying the sources, and their effect on human lives. But changes within a given spatial - temporal dimension need to be understood in relation to the totality at the final level. In studying social change one must specify the level at which we are analysing social processes (the local community or the nation state), the elements that are developing and those that are not, definitions of development and the yardsticks for measuring the rate and direction of development. We may ask whether there are significant differences in changes that are induced externally from those that are induced internally. When development begins, which are the institutions that absorb the changes and capacities, most efficiently and quickly. The absorption of changes, say industrialisation, would differ from one society to another depending upon the social structures, in which event the need for a typology of the underdeveloped societies becomes inevitable. We have not in the social sciences been able so far to establish in a given series

of events a relation of cause and effect. All we can observe experimentally is a series of changes among which a causal bond does not exist. The antecedent state does not produce the subsequent one but the relation between them is exclusively chronological.

The type of developmental theory that we have inherited has been relevant only within a certain socio-cultural situation. Within the Almond-Coleman type of conception of a political system the logical necessity of the various functional units has to be assumed. The necessity is proven for the simple reason that they can be observed in certain western democracies. When scholars continue to merely reaffirm each others formulations on certain research fields, it is doubtful that relevant frames of references can be developed for the backward countries. The criteria developed so far, have (even for analysis at the smallest level) been culturally determined. We cannot speak of inter-culturally relevant universals for assessing social change. The fact that scholars in backward countries take upon themselves the task of proving a theory postulated in the United States in their own countries does not indicate the validity of that theory but points rather to the fact that these scholars continue to be dominated by a game, the rules of which are determined elsewhere. So we may ask: Where does the contribution of the scholars from backward countries lie? At the 1965 conference

in Rajasthan University, Yogendra Singh concluded that the Indian social scientist is faced with questions different than those faced by his colleagues in the developed countries. However, attempts should be directed to develop a single set of criteria to answer both types of questions. This attitude had changed by 1970 when J.P.S. Oberoi observed that "until we can concentrate on decolonization, learn to nationalize our problems, and take our poverty seriously, we shall continue to be both colonial and unoriginal. A national school, avowed and conscious can perhaps add relevance, meaning and potency to our science, continued assent to the international system cannot." It is perhaps in this context that the Latin American view serves its purpose best by indicating the need in backward countries to develop indigenous frames of analyses. The concept of "Indigenismo" or "Indianism" which developed in the Political thought of Latin America over the years served to indicate that the cultural history of South America is significantly continuous with that of pre-conquest civilization. This conception of indigenous culture introduced cultural value concepts to condition the very science which attempts to analyse and solve these twentieth century problems. Although it has been argued against "Indigenismo" and Afro-Americanism (another cultural conception in Latin American thought)

that they search for an identity on the basis of race while seeking paradoxically to eliminate racial distinction it may be pointed out that they have in fact levelled the focus of social inquiry upon the poor majority, the Indians and the Negroes. Jose Vasconcellos saw the emergence in Latin America of a new cultural being that combined Indian, African and European elements. The influence of indigenismo can be seen in the fact that it was expressed in the programs of the Mexican Revolution, the Peruvian APRA, in the Guatemalan Revolution under Jose Arevalo, in the Bolivian Revolution party (M.N.R.) and so on. This indicates that when scientific inquiry deals only with practical questions, the concepts that are developed are used to serve the sociology of the industrial countries against the challenges of a new set of socio-cultural data. The social scientific traditions in the developing countries should however deal not only with practical but theoretical problems also so that the relevance of inquiry upon a certain social problem is visualized not only within a select spatial dimension but within social science in general. Inter-culturally valid frames should be developed in the sense that the study of "advanced" and "backward" societies should not develop as mutually exclusive disciplines. The frame work that has hitherto been developed must be evaluated against a new set of socio-cultural data.

which the need to develop individual frames of analysis as a first step, based upon the social, political and historical experiences of a select universe rather than work upon abstract frames borrowed from another society depicting changes in a different system at another period in time. This has to an extent been realized and there has been growing resentment against "scientific colonialism" serving the interests of western nations. The emphasis is upon the development of concepts and tools of analysis that serve the interests of the backward nations. In the developing countries the mutually reinforcing role of pure academics and decision-making has been emphasized. The role of academics is being progressively posited as the systematic analysis of those areas that are relevant for political decision-making.

NOTES

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Bendix Reinhard: "What is Modernization?" in Developing Nations: A Quest for a Model, 1970, p.4.
2. Selznick, Philip: Leadership in Administration, p.33.
3. Beteille, Andre: Castes: Old and New p.227.
4. Moore, Wilbert E.: The Conduct of Corporations, Random House, 1962. In this book Moore has dealt in length with his concept of the fully modernized society.
5. See Horowitz, L.I.: 1966, p.47.

B. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION

1. See Sabine, G.A. (1960) 113-115 for a discussion of Aristotles concept of growth and origin.
2. See Auguste Comte: Positive Philosophy. translated from the original French by Martineau. See also Raymond Aron, (1965) Vol. I.
3. This School of thought originated in Aristotle who postulated a correlation between the level of growth and the level of complexity (Sabine 1960: 113).
4. Refer also to the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences Vol. IV.
5. Merton's concept of functions and his focus on dysfunctions were elaborated later in Social Theory and Social Structure, 1951. However as early as 1929 Cannon had stressed the need to develop theories of "heterostasis" as apart from "homeostasis".

C. MODELS AND PARADIGMS/THE CONCEPT OF SYSTEM

1. Economist, Kenneth Boulding (1965) distinguishes between structure and function by referring to them as the "order of parts" and the "order of processes" in a part-whole relationship.

2. According to Sociologist, Robert K. Merton (1957) the term Function refers to the standpoint of the observer and not that of the participant. Functions are "observable objective consequences" and not "subjective dispositions" (aims, motives, purposes). From a functional standpoint any institution is said to have "Manifest" or "Latent" functions. Manifest functions are those objective consequences which are deliberate and are responsible for increasing the adaptability of a system. Latent functions are correlatively those unintended and unrecognized functions which decrease the adaptability of a system.
3. Talcott Parsons characterized attitudes and behaviour patterns in backward and advanced societies in terms of "Pattern Variables" postulating that development involved a shift in societies from one set to another from:
- A) Affectivity to Affective Neutrality
 - B) Diffuseness to Specificity
 - C) Particularism to Universalism
 - D) Ascription to Achievement Orientation (quality to performance) and
 - E) Self-orientation to Collectivity orientation. This was largely a systematization of Webers Ideal Types and were later applied by Bert Hozelitz (1960) to the study of Economic Development and Cultural Change.
4. Max Gluckman (1963) postulates societies as basically homeostatic. He maintains that cooperation and conflict balance each other to create an equilibrium in society. Any disruptive tendency is immediately countered by redressal mechanisms.

E. A CRITIQUE AND AN EVALUATION

1. See Max Gluckman, 1963, 1968, for a discussion of this view. In Anthropology, this view was expressed earlier by Sir Edward Evans Pritihard in his study of the Nuer tribe of Sudan, 1935. He characterized conflict and harmony in all segmentary systems as being based upon the principles of fission and fussion with the final consequence of increased

cohesion. Gluckman 1968 stresses the analyses of changes within the "structural duration" of institutions i.e. how institutions would operate if there were no inconsistencies. Changes for him imply repetitive or/and recurrent changes of personnel through limited to radical structural changes. A.R. Radcliff-Browne 1952, 1957 characterises social systems as naturally existing real entities immanently characterized by equilibrium.

- 2. This has been the contention of the Marxists who postulate social progress as resulting from the resolution of contradictions with the implication that societies constantly progress towards a higher stage. A similar view is expressed by the conflict theorists (See Ralph Dahrendorf, 1959).
- 3. See Hans Gerth and C.W. Mills, 1948, and Reinhard Bendix, 1962. Max Weber identified legitimate authority in three pure types: Rational, Traditional and Charismatic. The first was equated with a model of modernity, the second with pre-industrial society and the third with transitional phases. This model of legitimacy has been widely used for classification purposes.
- 4. See Richard A. Falk, "International Law and United States Role in Vietnam: A Response to Professor Moore," "Yale Law Journal, Vol. 76, 1967.
- 5. Quoted from Thomas. J. Farer, "Intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal," Columbia Law Review, Vol. 67, 1967.
- 6. See Telford Taylor "Nuremburg and Vietnam. An American Tragedy," Yale Law Journal Vol. 80, June 1971.
- 7. Determinism may on the contrary be apposed to immanent fatalism.
- 8. See Andre Beteille, 1965. In his analysis of the Backward Classes Movement he shows how in Tanjore, property was acquired by the lower castes. Subsequently political power also came into their hands and the traditional rural elite, the Brahmins, were ousted. See also M.N. Srinivas, Social Change in Modern India and Other Essays.

Caste associations such as the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha and the Shir Sewak Samaj (Delhi) while contributing to the economic upliftment of their communities attempt to mobilize their members for political purposes.

9. C. Wright Mills, 1970, showed how power in the U.S. accumulated interchangeably in the hands of a few politicians, military commanders and industrialists with the consequence of making the role of the electorate in decision-making an illusion.
10. Paul Baran, 1958, develops this view as against that which attributes under development to isolation from the industrial nations (This is discussed in the following chapter).
11. According to Thomas and Marjorie Melville, 1971, Ubicos government, during which time the company first came to Guatemala, was extended unlimited aid by the I.M.F. and U.S.A.I.D. On the other hand, the succeeding regimes of Arevalo and Arbenz were denied finances because they advocated the nationalization of the properties of the company and all large latifundias in the country. The final overthrow of Arbenz and the establishment of a puppet government under Castillo Armas (who re-instated the company) demonstrates the general attitude of the U.S. Government towards regimes in the third world as being based upon U.S. Commercial interests. In fact the countries in which the United Fruit Company operated were christened "The Banana Republics".

B. EMERGING ALTERNATIVES/THE LATIN AMERICAN VIEW

1. In recent years Yugoslavia under the leadership of J.B. Tito has supported the creation of a "third force" in international politics as a defence mechanism against the superior industrial and military capabilities of the major power blocks. It grows largely out of the fear that neo-colonialism and economic exploitation can come at a new nation from several directions.

2. Haya de la Torre was perhaps the first to adopt an anti-imperialist stand. But it is significant that he was also anti-Marxist and did not put the blame on Capitalism. This type of ideology was widely espoused by Post World War II leaders in Latin America.
3. Raul Prebisch 1971.
4. Classical theory on the contrary characterises underdevelopment as an original state.
5. Rosa Luxemburg (1913) had brought these formulations of Marx to the forefront. But they were ignored by economists at the time since they were concerned with problems of optimality in resource allocation while she wrote about the crises of capitalism.
6. Jacques Decornoy: "Le Monde Weekly" (English) Feb. 24, 1971. This is also discussed by David Francis in the Christian Science Monitor Jan 12, 1971.
7. Michigan Brain Mistrust Collective, "Southeast Asia: American Power vs. Regionalism," American Report, Dec. 10, 1971.
8. Pablo Neruda: "The United Fruit Co.," Penguin Book of Modern Socialist Verse.
9. Paul. A. Baran, 1957.
10. "Development" as opposed to "Modernization" and "Industrialization" has come to acquire this specific meaning. In Latin America Modernization and Industrialization are ongoing processes but they exist in a developmental vacuum. Further the continued organizational and structural backwardness of these societies indicates that a "modernizing" society is not necessarily a "developing" one.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Abegglen, James, *the Japanese Factory*, Glencoe ILL: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958.
2. Ackoff, R.L., "Systems, Organizations and Interdisciplinary Research", *General Systems* 5(1960), 1-8.
3. Achinstein, P., "Theoretical Models" *British Journal of the Philosophy of Science*, 1965.
4. Ackoff, R.L., "Games, Decisions and Organization," *General Systems*, 4(1959), 145-50.
5. Almond, G.A., et. al. *Freedom and Development. ASIA. Publishing House*, 1974.
6. _____, "Comparative Political Systems", *Journal of Politics*, 17, 1956.
7. _____, *Political Development Essays in Heuristic Theory*, E. LITTLE 1970.
8. _____, *Crisis, Choice and Change; Historical Studies of Political Development*, LITTLE, 1973.
9. Almond Gabriel and Verba Sydney, *Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Countries*. Boston, Little Brown, 1965.
10. Almond Gabriel and Coleman James, *The Politics of Developing Areas*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.
11. Almond G.A. and Powell G.B., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, New Delhi; Amerind, 1966.
12. Apter, D. "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda", *World Politics*, 13(1960).
13. _____, *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965.

14. Apter, David, Systems, Process and the Politics of Economic Development.
15. _____, Ghana in transition. Ed. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972.
16. Aron Raymond, Main Currents of Sociological Thought Vol. I. London: Widenfeld and Nicholson, 1965.
17. _____, 18 Lectures on Industrial Society London: Widenfeld and Nicholson, 1967.
18. Arora, S.K. "Pre-empted Future? Notes on Theories of Political Development", Behavioural Sciences and Community Development, 2(2), 1968.
19. Baran, Paul, "Political Economy of Growth" 1957. Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1958.
20. Barry Farrel R. (ed) 1966, Approaches to Comparative and International Politics.
21. Barker, Ernest, The Politics of Aristotle Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1952.
22. Barth, F. "Models of Social Organization", Occasional Paper No. 23, London, Royal Anthropological Institute, 1966.
23. _____, "On the Study of Social Change" American Anthropologist, 69, 1967.
24. Beling and Totten, Developing Nations: Quest for a Model, (New Perspectives in Political Science) Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970.
25. Bellah Robert, Tokugawa Religion: The values of Pre-industrial Japan, New York; Free Press, 1969.
26. Bendix, Reinhard, Max Weber: An intellectual Portrait, Garden City, Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1962.

27. Bendix, Reinhard, *Nation Building and Citizenship: Studies of our changing Social Order*, New Delhi, Wiley Eastern, 1969.
28. Berlin, I., *Historical Inevitability*, Oxford University Press, 1955.
29. Bershad, Harold J., *Ideology and Social Knowledge*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1973.
30. Beteille, Andre, *'Caste, Class and Power'*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965.
31. _____, *Castes: Old and New*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1969.
32. Blau, P. Scott, F. (1962) *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach*. London; Routledge and Regan Daul, 1970.
33. Boulding, K.E., *The Organizational Revolution* NY, Sarper and Row, 1953.
34. _____, "Toward a General Theory of Growth" *General Systems* I(1965) 66-75.
35. Buckley, W., *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory*, Prentice-Hall, 1967.
36. _____, (ed.), *Modern Systems Research for the Behavioural Scientists*. Aldine, 1968.
37. Cannon, W.B., "Organization for Physiological Homeostasis", *Physiological Review*, 9(1929), 397.
38. Chodak, Szymon, *Societal Development: Five Approaches with C onclusions from Comparative Analysis* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.
39. Chomsky, Noam, *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom*, London: Fontana, 1972.

40. Chomsky Noam, 'For Reasons of State', London: Fontana, 1973.
41. Dahl, R., Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (Studies in Political Science) Yale University Press, 1961.
42. _____, A Preface to Democratic Theory, University of Chicago Press, 1956.
43. Dahrendorf, R., Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1959.
44. Davis, Harold Eugene, Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction. Free Press, 1974.
45. Deutsch, K.W., Nationalism and Social Communication: An inquiry into the foundations of nationality, M.I.T. Press, 1953.
46. _____, 1968, "External Influences on the Internal Behaviour of States" in R. Barry (ed.) Approach to Comparative and International Politics.
47. _____, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review 55(Sept. 1961).
48. Deutsch, K.W. and Foltz W.I. (eds.) Nation-Building. Aldine, 1966.
49. Dos Santos, Theotonio, "The Structure of Dependence" in American Economic Review, May, 1970.
50. Durkheim, E., The Rules of Sociological Method, Glencoe; The Free Press, 1958.
51. Easton, D., A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Wiley, 1965.
52. _____, Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 1965.
53. EssinStadt, S.N. "The Need for Achievement" EDCC, Vol. 11, No. 4 (July 1963).

54. Eisenstadt, S.N., Protestant Ethic and Modernization: A Comparative View, New York: Basic Books, 1968.
55. _____, Modernization: Protest and Change, New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 1969.
56. _____, Readings in Social Evolution and Development, Pergamon, 1970.
57. _____, Tradition, Change and Modernity, New York, John Wiley, 1973.
58. Etzioni, A., The Active Society. A Thoery of Societal and Political Processes, New York: The Free Press, 1968.
59. _____, Modern Organizations, New Delhi; Prentice-Hall of India, 1972,
60. _____, Complex Organizations, New York; Free Press, 1971.
61. Evans-Pritchard E.E., The Nuer, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.
62. Finkle, Jason L. and Gable, Richard, W., Political Development and Social Change, Wiley, 1971.
63. Forrester, Jay, 1969, Urban Dynamics. Cambridge, M.I.T., 1969.
64. Frank, A.G., Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Monthly Review, 1969.
65. Friedland W.H., Modernization by Design. A Sociological Approach to Modernization.
66. Fromm, Erich, Man for Himself NY: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1947.
67. Gale, R.M., The Philosophy of Time. London: Macmillan and Co., 1968.
68. Geertz Clifford (ed) Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, Free Press, 1963.

69. Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W., (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London, Routledge and Regan, Paul, 1948.
70. Gluckman, Max, Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa, London: Cohen and West, 1963.
71. _____, "Utility of the Equilibrium Model in Study of Social Change" American Anthropologist, 70, 1968.
72. Granick David, The Red Executive: A Study of the Organization man in Russian Industry, Greenwood, 1974.
73. Hagen, E., On the Theory of Social Change, How Economic Growth begins, London, Tavistock, Publishers, 1964.
74. Hayter, T., Aid as Imperialism, Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1971.
75. Hetzler, S.A., Technological Growth and Social Change, Achieving Modernization, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
76. Horowitz, I.L. Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification, New York; Oxford University Press, 1966.
77. Hold, R. and Turner, J. The Political Basis of Economic Development: An explanation in Comparative Political Analysis, Princeton, NJ: D Van Nosterand Co., 1966.
78. _____, The Methodology of Comparative Research New York, The Free Press, 1970.
79. Hoselitz, B.F. and Moore, W.E. (eds) Industrialization and Society, Paris: UNESCO, 1970.
80. Hoselitz, B.F. Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960.

81. Huntington, S. *Political Order in Changing societies* New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1970.
82. Kuznetz S. Moore W.E. and Spengler J.J., *Economic Growth: Brazil, India and Japan*, Durham; Duke University Press, 1967.
83. La Palombara, J. and Weiner, M. (eds) *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
84. Lambert, R.D. *Workers, Factories and Social Change in India*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963.
85. Leach, E.R. *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (2nd Edition) London: G. Bell and Sons, 1964.
86. Leclau, E. "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America". In New Left Review, 1971.
87. Lerner, D. *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe Ill, Free Press, 1958.
88. Levy Marion J. Jr. "Contrasting factors in the modernization of China and Japan EDCC, Vol. 2 No. 3, (Oct. 1953).
89. _____, *Modernization and the Structure of Societies*. Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1966.
90. Lewis, Arthur, *The Theory of Economic Growth*. Homewood, Ill. Richard D. Irvin, 1955.
91. Lipset, S.M. "Political Sociology", in N.J. Smelser(ed). *Sociology: An Introduction*, New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Pvt. Ltd., 1970.
92. Luxemburg, Rosa, *The Accumulation of Capital*, (1913) Translated from German by Agner Schwarzchild, London. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971.
93. MacClelland D. "A psychological approach to Economic Development" EDDCC Vol. 12 No. 3 (April 1964);

94. MacClelland David "The Achieving Society". Rvington Books, 1961.
95. Meleish, J, The Theory of Social Change: Four views considered. Schocken, 1969.
96. Meir, Richard L. "The Metropolis as a Transaction Maximizing System" in Daedalus.
97. Melville, Thomas and Marjorie, Guatemala - Another Vietnam, Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1971.
98. Merton, R.K. Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951.
99. Metraux G .S. and Crouzet F. (eds.) The New Asia, New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1965.
100. Mills C. Wright, The Power Elite, London, Oxford, 1970.
101. Moore Wilbert and Feldman D. (eds) , Labour Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960.
102. Morgan J.N., Productive Americans: A Study of How Individuals Contribute to Economic Progress, University of Michigan Social Research, 1966.
103. Morris, M.D., "Values as an obstacle to Economic Growth in South Asia: A Historical Servey" The Journal of Economic History, 27(4), 1967.
104. Morse C. and Ashford, D.E. Modernization by Design, Social Change in the Twentieth Century, Ithaca; Cornell. 1969.
105. Nadel, S.F. Theory of Social Structure, London, Cohen and West, 1957.
106. Nagel, Ernest, The Structure of Science, London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
107. _____, "Determinism and Development"; in Harris, D.B. (ed) The Concept of Development: An Issue in the Study of Human Behavior. University of Minnesota Press, 1957.

108. Nash, Manning, *Machine Age Maya: The Industrialization of a Guatemalan Community*. University of Chicago Press, 1967.
109. _____, "Introduction, Approaches to the Study of Economic Growth" in **Psycho-Cultural Factors in Asian Economic Growth*" (Leave EIs: Manning Nash and Robert Chin) *Journal of Social Sciences* Vol. 29 No. 1 (Jan. 1963) p.5.
110. Nieuwenhuijze Van, C.A.O., *Social Scientists in Pursuit of Social Change*. Humanities, 1966.
111. Parsons, T., *The Social System*. Glencoe; Free Press, 1952.
112. _____, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*. New York; Free Press, 1960.
113. Parsons, T. and Neil J. S., *Economy and Society*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957.
114. Parsons, T. and E.A. Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Action*, New York: Harper and Row 1962.
115. Polsby, N.W. *Community Power and Political Theory*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963.
116. Popper, Karl, *Poverty of Historicism*. Torchbooks; Harper - Row, 1974.
117. Prebisch, R., *Towards a New Trade Policy for Development* NY, United Nations Publications, 1964.
118. _____, *Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America* N.Y. United Nations Publication, 1963.
119. Pye, L. and Verba, S. (eds) *Political Culture and Political Development* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965.
120. Pye, L.W. *Aspects of Political Development*, Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Co. 1966.

121. Pye, L. *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burmas search for identity*. New Haven; Yale 1968, 1969.
122. Radcliffe-Brown A.R., *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*, London; Cahen and West, 1952.
123. _____, *A Natural Science of Society*, Glencoe; The Free Press, 1957.
124. Redfield, R., *The Folk Culture of Yucatan*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968.
125. _____, *The Little Community*, Chicago; University of Chicago Press. 1969.
126. Riggs, F.W., *Frontiers of Development Administration* Duke, 1971.
127. Rostow, Walt Whitman, *The Stages of Economic Growth, A non-Communist Manifesto*, London, Cambridge University Press. 1965.
128. Rostow D.A. and Ward R.E. (eds) *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*. Princeton University Press, 1964.
129. Said, A.A. *Protagonists of Change: Sub-Cultures in Development and Revolution* Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1971.
130. Seers D. and Joy L. (eds) *Development in a Divided World*. Harmondsworth. Penguin, 1970.
131. Service, E.R., *Primitive Social Organization*, Random House, 1971.
132. _____, *Cultural Evolutionism: Theory in Practice*. Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1971.
133. Shils, Edward A., *Political Development in the New States*, The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1962.
134. Smelser, N.J. *Sociology of Economic Life*, New Delhi, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
135. Sorokin, P.A. *Contemporary Sociological Theories (1928)*, Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

136. Sorokin, P.A. Society, Culture and Personality, Cooper Sq., 1962.

137. Srinivas, M.N., Social Change in Modern India (Babindra Nath Tagore Memorial Lectures) University of California Press, 1966.

138. Taber, R. The War of the Flea, Paladin, London, W.R. BP, 1972.

139. Tullis La Mond. F. Politics and Social Change in Third World Countries. John Wiley, 1973.

140. VonDer Mehden, F. The Politics of the Developing Nations. Prentice-Hall, 1969.

141. Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Allen and Unwin, 1950.

142. Wittfogel, Karl, A. Oriental Despotism, A Comparative Study of Total Power, New Haven; Yale University Press, 1970.

143. Zollichan, Walter Hirsch and George K. Exploration in Social Change. Distributed by Halsted. Schenkman, 1975.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

1. Blackburn, Robin: Explosion in a Subcontinent, Harmondsworth Penguin, 1975.

2. Cuthright, Phillips, "National Political Development", American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 1963 pp. 253-64.

3. Dahrendorf, R., "Social Structure, Class Interests and Social Conflict", Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. 3, London:1956.

4. Firth, R., "Social Organization and Social Change" Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 84, 1955.

5. Galbraith John Kenneth, "Economics and the Quality of Life," Science, Vol. 145, No. 3628, July 10, 1964, pp. 117-123.

6. Levi-Strauss, C., Structural Anthropology, New York: Basic Books, 1963.
7. Magdoff, H. and Sweezy P.M., Dynamics of U.S. Capitalism: Corporate Structure, Inflation, Credit, Gold and the Dollar. N.Y.: Monthly Review, 1972.
8. Myrdal Gunnar, Challenge to Affluence. New York Pantheon Books, 1963.
9. _____, Rich Lands and Poor. The Road to World Prosperity: New York: 1957.
10. Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., A Natural Science of Society, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957.
11. Samuelson Paul A., "Freud, Fear and Foreign Trade", The New York Times, July 30, 1972.
12. Ulyanovsky, R. and Povlov, V. Asian Dilemma: A Soviet View and Myrdal's Concept, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973.