

INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: FROM LAHORE TO AGRA

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: FROM LAHORE TO AGRA" submitted by K.N.TENNYSON in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university. This work is the result of his own research.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	I-II
CHAPTER - ONE: India-Pakistan Relations From 1947 to 1998	1-28
India-Pakistan Relations After Partition.	
India-Pakistan Relations During the Cold War.	
1965 War and After.	
1974 Indian Nuclear Explosion.	
Military Exercise.	
End of Cold War and its Impact.	
India-Pakistan Relation after the Cold War.	
CHAPTER - TWO: The Lahore Summit	31-47
Post-Nuclear Explosion Developments	
Foreign Secretaries Talks	
Lahore Declaration	
CHAPTER - THREE: Kargil War	48-67
Pakistani Military's Game plan	
Operation Vijay	
Kargil and International Reaction	
India's Military Preparedness	
CHAPTER - FOUR: The Agra Summit	69-87
India-Pakistan Relations Prior to the Agra Summit	
Musharraf Become President	
India's Unilateral Measures	
The Summit	
Agra Summit and Its Impact	
Role of Media in the Agra Summit	
CHAPTER- FIVE: Conclusion	88-92
Bibliography	
Appendices	

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PREFACE

The politics of South Asian region is mainly influenced by the politics of India and Pakistan. However, India-Pakistan relations have never been stable, rather they have fluctuated from acrimony to co-operation and vice versa. Since partition, cordial relations between the two countries have been defined by a host of post partition problems, Kashmir being one of the important one. Pakistani leaders have not reconciled to their distrust towards India. And this feeling continues to exist in their policy towards India, even after the end of the Cold War.

The politics of the world underwent a tremendous change after the Cold War. South Asia also felt the undercurrent. India-Pakistan relations witnessed significant changes in this period. Acrimony and mutual distrust continue to dominate in the foreign policy of Pakistan. The politics of the South Asian region witnessed a sea change after the May 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. The nuclear tests were conducted by India on May 11 and 13, 1998, and by Pakistan on May 28 and 30, 1998. The West actually overplayed this new development. Thus, it generates lot of heat and tension in the region. The world community showed negative reaction. By this time it was well known that both India and Pakistan had this capability. What the tests did was to declare a hitherto well-known fact cliched as "come out of closet."

The May 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan have drastically changed the South Asia strategic and security environment. These nuclear tests brought about worldwide criticism and condemnation, especially by the developed countries. The developed countries not only criticised but also pressured the two countries to start a meaningful dialogue. After two years of strained relations, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan initiated a dialogue to mitigate the tensions in the region. Subsequently, "Lahore Declaration" was signed in February 1999, ending the speculations of a nuclear race in the region. The chapter on Lahore Declaration analyzed the causes and the outcome of the 'Bus Diplomacy'.

India - Pakistan relations has never been stable, rather it often fluctuate from hostility to friendship. The much-expected Lahore Declarations is discussed in chapter-II, which was aborted by the Pakistani-backed militant's intrusion in the Kargil sector. Chapter 3 analyses the real causes of the Kargil War and its impacts on the relations of the two countries. It also focuses on the civil-military relations of Pakistan and its effects on the relations with India.

The chapter on Agra Summit focuses on the sudden changes that came about in the relations of the two perennial acrimonious neighbouring states-India and Pakistan. This chapter highlights the effects of the Agra Summit in the sub-continent and its outcome. This chapter also studied the relations of India with the Pakistani military regime.

The Lahore peace process did raise much-needed hope for peace and stability in the region amidst nuclear tensions and mutual distrust. The hope for peace was short-lived, as Pakistan once again embarked upon its dangerous policy of intrusion into Indian territory. Its misadventure into Kargil in the summer of 1999 and the subsequent retaliation by the Indian army shattered the short lived, fragile peace process in the subcontinent. However, a semblance of peace was sought to be restored through the Agra Summit, again much hyped by India. Although, after the latter, things were back to square one as it ended. What happens from Lahore to Agra is the focus of this research. Lahore Declaration did set a benchmark for stability and peace. But, the journey from Kargil to Agra Summit tells a different story. It is the aim of this research to analyse the tumultuous process of peace and war from Lahore to Agra.

K.N.Tennyson

CHAPTER – ONE

INDIA –PAKISTAN RELATION FROM 1947 TO 1998

India-Pakistan Relations After Partition
India-Pakistan Relations During the Cold War
1965 War and After
1974 Indian Nuclear Explosion
Military Exercise
End of Cold War and its Impact
India-Pakistan Relation after the Cold War

India-Pakistan Relations After Partition

The artificial bifurcation of the sub-continent by the British at the time of withdrawal from the region had sown the seeds of acrimony between India and Pakistan. The post-independence period witnessed a lot of troubles and chaos in the region due to historical legacies, improper demarcation of boundaries and post-partition political developments. The problems of border dispute, water dispute, migrations, sharing of finance and question on the status of those independent princely states of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir became the bone of contention.

After independence, Indian leaders followed the policy of friendly relations with the neighbours and believed in the peaceful co-existence and peaceful settlement of disputes. Keeping in view of its foreign policy, the Indian government repeatedly urged Pakistan since 1947 to “sign a joint no-war declaration and peaceful settlement of disputes. But these efforts have been in vain” due to lukewarm response from Pakistan.¹ On the other hand, “Pakistan’s foreign policy has been mostly concerned with India and the general tenor of that policy for most of the period at least could hardly be called friendly.”² So its policy with India has never been cordial. Pakistan never trusted India and there is a fear psychosis in the mind of Pakistan rulers that India has not “reconciled” to the establishment of Pakistan and has “pursued” a policy to weaken the defence of Pakistan.³ Former Pakistan President Mr. Z.A. Bhutto reflected this fear when he said, “throughout these years the Hindu majority bitterly resisted the concept of Pakistan. Its leaders resorted to every device to ensure the defeat of a scheme that would have made the Muslims the master of their own fate. The reason was the same old one: the desire to continue the economic, political and cultural enslavement of the Muslims.”⁴

The post-partition period witnessed a number of problems and crises between the two states.

¹ M.S.Rajan, *Studies On India’s Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1993), p.79.

² Ibid.

³ Khan Zaman Mirza, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in 1990s with reference to Kashmir dispute”, in Varinder Grover and Ranjana Arora (Ed.), *Partition of India, Indo-Pak Wars and the U.N.O.*, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1999), p.119.

⁴ *President of Pakistan, Z.A. Bhutto’s Speeches and Statements, April 1, 1972-June 30, 1972* (Karachi: Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan), p.22.

The Indus Water Dispute: The partition of India left three rivers called eastern rivers flowing in India- Ravi, Sutlej and Beas and three western rivers called Indus, Jhelum and Chenab flowing in Pakistan. Under the standstill agreement, India agreed to supply water to the canals to Pakistan from the headworks against payment. The agreement lapsed on March 3, 1948, and Pakistan refused to renew it. A fresh agreement was signed in May 1948; once again Pakistan refused to honour its obligation arising from this agreement in mid-1950, resulting to deadlock for some time.⁵ In 1952, Eugene Black, the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, initiated an attempt to resolve the on-going dispute. After a long negotiation, which spanned over eight years the Indus Water Treaty and the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement were signed at Karachi between Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan in September 1960.⁶ Under this agreement, after an interim period of 10 years, which could be extended for another three years, on Pakistan's request, water of three eastern rivers would be used by India and that of western rivers by Pakistan. But, during the interim period India would supply water in progressive diminution from its three rivers-Ravi, Sutlej and Beas. India also gave Pakistan money for the construction of link canals. The agreement was implemented with effect from January 12, 1961. The Indus water has stood testing of times and was observed as such even during the wartime between the two countries.

Border dispute: The loosely demarcated border of India and Pakistan often led to clashes along the border at a number of places. The border along the Punjab-West Pakistan border, Rajasthan-West Pakistan border, West Bengal-East Pakistan border and Tripura-East Pakistan border were some of the contentious areas between India and Pakistan.⁷ Disputes due to difference of opinion often result in clashes on the bordering states, more so by Pakistan's unprovoked firing and killing of innocent peoples. Several rounds of talks were held to solve the dispute; yet it could not find any amicable solution to the dispute. The years long India-Pakistan border crisis was brought to a negotiating table and discussed, leading to the signing of the "Nehru-Noon Border Agreement of

⁵ A.Appadorai and V.K.Arora, *India In World Affairs: 1957-58*, (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1975), p.32.

⁶ *Ibid.*,p.33.

⁷ A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*, (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1988), p. 68-71.

1958.”⁸ However, the border dispute still exists, partly due to the rugged geographical locations and also partly for hawkish stand Pakistan takes in dealing with India. The roughly delineated boundary of Sir Creek, which is about 60 km. Long estuaries in the Rann of Kutch had become another bone of contention. Sir Creek boundary like those of Siachen was not precisely defined, this let the two countries to interpret the boundary line in their own right. India claimed that the boundary line run through the middle of the Creek, while Pakistan insists on the eastern bank of the Creek as its boundary. Because of this divergence of views, India and Pakistan were unable to solve the problem. The India-Pakistan Western Boundary Tribunal’s Award of 1968 did not include Sir Creek, making the matter more complicated.⁹

Problems of Minorities: The religious minority groups of both the countries mostly felt the immediate effect of the partition. Although the Inter-Dominion Agreement of 1948 had clearly provided that the responsibility for the protection of minorities rested on the government of the two countries. Large scale migration about 10,000 per month was reportedly taking place from East Pakistan to India in early 1950.¹⁰ However, these numbers had declined after the agreement signed on April 8, 1950 between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Two members of Indian Cabinet, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukerji and K.C. Neogi, resigned in protest against the agreement. In Pakistan, the only Hindu member of the Cabinet, Jogender Nath Mandal did the same on grounds of ill treatment to Hindus. Despite the agreement the migration took place due to recurring communal violence and riots. According to Rehabilitation Ministry reports of 1956 as many as 35,000 migrations were said to have recorded.¹¹ Though the problems of migration have drastically decreased, problems of minorities continue to exist till date.

Evacuee Property Problems: The fleeing of millions of people in haste from India to Pakistan and vice versa in search of a new settlement at the time of partition resulted leaving behind all their unmovable and other properties. These created a great problem to both the governments for the disposal. It was reported that the non-Muslim refugees

⁸ See Text of “Nehru-Noon Border Agreement of 1958”, for details.

⁹ <http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/154-ip-suba.html>

¹⁰ A. Appadarai and M.S. Rajan, n.7, pp.62-63.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 63.

vacated 67,29,000 acres of land in West Punjab (Pakistan) alone of which 4,30,700 were canal-irrigated.¹² Besides these, there were huge quantity of raw materials, machineries, factories and houses left behind. However, after endless negotiations after partition, a moveable property agreement was signed in June 1950.¹³ And finally the problem of evacuee property was settled with the ratification by both the government of India and Pakistan on November 1, 1955. With this all outstanding issue relating to movable property of evacuees and other relating issues were solved.

The Princely states: At the time of partition, there were around 567 Princely states in the subcontinent. By August 15, 1947, almost all these states acceded to either “India or Pakistan on the same basis as the principle underlying the partition of British India, namely non-Muslim majority states joined India and Muslim majority states chose Pakistan.”¹⁴ But there were three Princely states, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir, which had not decided to joint either of the two.

Junagadh: Junagadh was a state ruled by a Muslim King, Nawab while most of his subjects were Hindus. The problem over the state of Junagadh was that the Nawab in connivance with Pakistan leaders announced willingness to accede to Pakistan against the wishes of the majority of the people on August 15,1947. Expectedly Pakistan made a formal declaration of inducting the princely state to its fold. However, India was not pleased over the development, since the Nawab in utter disregard of his people’s aspiration and sentiment not to mention his Kingly duties colluded with the Pakistani communal forces for his own selfish gains. Lord Mountbatten the then Governor-General of India also expressed his displeasure to Governor-General Jinnah of Pakistan stating, “Accepting Junagadh was in utter violation of the principles on which partition of India was agreed upon and affected”.¹⁵ Anarchic situation developed in the state, so the Indian Cabinet on September 17,1947, decided to deploy troops around Junagadh for the security of the country and to maintain law and order in Kathiawar.¹⁶ Indian troops took control of the state administration and plebiscite was held in which the people of Junagadh

¹² Ibid., p.71.

¹³ For detail analysis of evacuation of property see, *ibid.*, pp.71-74.

¹⁴ S.M.Burke, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*,(London: Oxford University Press,1973), p.17

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

overwhelmingly voted in favour of India. Thus, this state came under Indian administration.

Hyderabad: Hyderabad was a princely state having a population of 16 million and annual revenue of Rs.26 crores. Like the state of Junagadh the King was a Muslim although 85 per cent of the population were Hindu. The King, however, wanted to assume independence or to join Pakistan. Lord Mounbatten, apprehending the decision could backfire and cause irreparable damage to the King from his subjects should he adopt either of the courses, dissuaded the Nizam from taking that extreme step. Sardar Patel, the then minister of State for Home, fearing such undesirable events cropping up, under communal line also pleaded him to join India. The Nizam was blinded by his own selfish motive and his soldiers "Razakars" spread communal disorder in the state. Finally, India launched "Operation Polo" under the direct control of Sardar Patel. The army operation took 24 hours to control the situation, but the restoration task was completed in five days. Accepting Nizam's request for accession, India agreed to pay Rs.50 lakh per year as purse to the Nizam. According to S.M.Burke, "On August 24,1947, the Nawab of Hyderabad, fearing India's aggression appealed to the Security Council."¹⁷ Even before the Security Council could decide and give its verdict, Indian troops entered into the state and took over the state on September 13,1947 for fear of communal disorders spreading over Hyderabad, which Indian government felt would spread to the rest of India. Pakistan protested strongly on the Indian action and condemned it as "naked aggression."¹⁸

Kashmir: The Kashmir dispute has been one of the most controversial in the history of India and Pakistan relations. Except 1971 it is responsible for all the wars between the two states. Pakistan places this issue as the basic axis for conducting any bilateral relations with India. Pakistan, which was founded and recognized as a separate sovereign state in 1947, sought to provide a "home land" for the Muslims from the domination of the Hindu majority of the region. The British at the time of withdrawal asked the Maharaja of Kashmir to decide which of the two succeeding dominions he would join.¹⁹ The Maharaja firmly decided to remain sovereign and refused to join either of the two states. He instead requested India and Pakistan to sign a Standstill Agreement.

¹⁷ Ibid, p.17-18.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ K.M.Teng and Santosh Kaul, *Kashmir's Special Status*, (Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1975), p.26.

Pakistan readily signed the Standstill Agreement, but India refused to sign it. Yet, Pakistan in violation of this agreement mobilized and organized unruly and warring tribesmen and the Pathans to raid Kashmir on October 22, 1947, to prevent the Maharaja from taking any independent decision. In all, around 60,000 Pathans infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir along with Pakistan organized army.²⁰ The raiders marched onward to Baramulla on October 27, 1947, and seized it. Thereafter, they crossed the frontier from Garhi Habibullah and attacked Muzaffarabad, Dogra and Domel.²¹ The merciless tribesmen completely destroyed, plundered and looted whatever came on their way. The Maharaja of Kashmir fled to Jammu to save himself from being captured, and on reaching Jammu sought India's help to save Kashmir from Pakistan's aggression. He signed the Instrument of Accession on October 26, 1947 committing his state to accede to the union of India. Following this urgent appeal, India sent its troops to Kashmir. This led to the first war between India and Pakistan. Pakistan continued its policy of aggression in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. After months of futile negotiations between the leaders of India and Pakistan, India requested to the Security Council on January 1, 1948 to prevent Pakistan army personnel from taking part in the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir, and to deny to the invaders access to and use of its territory for operations against the state of Jammu and Kashmir.²² The United Nations Security Council discussed the Kashmir issue in January 1948. And on January 20, the Security Council came out with a resolution which established a commission: the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), to investigate the facts of the dispute and carry out plan for the settlement of the emerging problems.²³ Another resolution was adopted on April 21, 1948, urging Pakistan to withdraw its troops and tribesmen from Jammu and Kashmir. It also called upon India to reduce its armed forces to the minimum strength, so that an atmosphere of peace could be established to hold plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir.²⁴ However, this resolution was rejected by both India and Pakistan. Finally a cease-fire resolution was passed and it came into force on January 1, 1949. Following the January 1949 cease-fire resolution under the aegis of the United Nations, India promised to hold a plebiscite in

²⁰ Dina Nath Raina, *Unhappy Kashmir-The Hidden Story*, (New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1990), pp.57-58.

²¹ Ibid.

²² B.L.Panagariya, *Kashmir: Paradise in Turmoil*, (Jaipur: National Publishing House, 1994), p.36.

²³ Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir In The Crossfire*, (New Delhi: Viva Books, 1997), p.160

²⁴ Ibid., p.161.

Kashmir on the condition that Pakistani troops withdraw from the occupied territories.²⁵ However, the Pakistani troops refused to withdraw. Though the cease-fire agreement was passed, the UNCIP had failed to solve the problems of demilitarisation in the region. The Security Council on December 17, 1949 appointed Gen. Mc-Naughton of Canada as the informal mediator for resolving the demilitarisation issue. Gen. Mc-Naughton suggested for reduction of armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line and disbanding of the armed forces and militants in the state.²⁶ This proposal too failed to reach unanimous agreement between the two countries. The Security Council then appointed an Australian jurist, Sir Owen Dixon as United Nations representative. Mr. Dixon after discussion with India and Pakistan leaders came to a conclusion that Pakistan had violated the norms of International law. However, he requested for the withdrawal of the Indian forces and disbandment of the Jammu and Kashmir State forces simultaneously with the withdrawal of Pakistan forces and disbandment of the Azad forces and the northern scouts. Mr. Dixon also suggested for a coalition government in Kashmir.²⁷ India refused to accept this proposal, thus, Mr. Dixon commission too had failed. Having failed to bring any amicable solution Mr. Dixon resigned and in its place again Dr. Frank Graham was appointed as United Nations representative. Dr. Graham proposal of demilitarisation and appointment of a plebiscite had mixed respond in the Security Council. Dr. Graham also in one of his proposal had suggested for direct talks between the two countries. Both India and Pakistan welcomed this suggestion. In the midst of this development, Prime Minister Nehru and Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra met in London in June 1953 at the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II and held informal talks.²⁸ Later, they met at Karachi on July 25, 1953, and discussed bilateral problems. However, Nehru and Bogra mission failed to yield any substantive result. In course of time, in 1954 Pakistan entered into bilateral military pact with America, complicating the existing situation. Subsequently a new significant development took place in Kashmir, Mr. Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference came out in support of the treaty of accession, which was signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947. The treaty was further legitimized with the ratification by the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir in February 1954. And finally the controversy on the status of Kashmir was banished with the formal approval by the people of Kashmir

²⁵ Kalim Bahadur, "India-Pakistan Relations", *World Focus*, Vol.14, No.11-12, November-December 1993, pp.41-43.

²⁶ B.L. Panagariya, n.22, p.39.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.40

²⁸ *Ibid.* p.42.

through their democratically elected Constituent Assembly in November 1956.²⁹ Thus, the question of the status of Kashmir was resolved as far as India and Kashmir were concerned. The Indian policy on Kashmir crystallised since is (a) It is an integral part of India, (b) Any disputes that Pakistan claims are to be solved bilaterally. In other words, it has no room for international or third party mediation.

Trade Problem: The economy of both the countries could be described as complementary. Pakistan has surplus in agriculture products such as jute, food grains, hides and skin and unfinished products like raw jute, raw wool and tobacco, while India has commodities like coal and manufactured goods like rubber, iron and steel, which Pakistan requires.³⁰ Immediately after the partition, the two countries signed a standstill agreement, under which goods moving from one country to the other would be exempted from customs duty. However, this agreement was short lived, differences of view began to develop and soon the two countries became locked in a prolonged tariff war. On November 14, 1947, Pakistan government declared India to be a foreign country for the purpose of levying customs and excise duty. India responded on December 23, 1947, declaring Pakistan to be foreign territory for the purpose of levying customs duty on the export of raw jute and jute manufactures from India to Pakistan ending the standstill agreement.³¹ Short-term agreements were signed on May 26, 1948, June 24, 1949 and August 18, 1949, yet it did not work out satisfactorily due to Pakistan's lukewarm responses in implementing them.³² India-Pakistan economic relations created fresh complications in late 1949 when Pakistan refused to devalue its rupee. Excepting a few ups, the trade relations between India-Pakistan have been heading downhill since then, as Table 1 indicates. Moreover, with military clashes and the perpetual strained relations between the two countries, the potential of economic relations has been adversely affected.

²⁹ A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, n.7, p.74.

³⁰ Ibid., p.74

³¹ Ibid., pp.74-75.

³² Ibid.

Table 1.1 India-Pakistan Trades: (in lakhs of rupee).

Year	Main exports to Pakistan	Main imports to Pakistan
1948-49	7,700	10,929
1949-50	4,330	4,406
1950-51	3,058	4,387
1951-52	4,530	8,750
1952-53	3,114	2,188
1953-54	800	1,930

Source; A.Appadarai and M.S.Rajan, *India's Foreign Policy and Relations*, (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1988), p.76.

Table 1.2 India-Pakistan Trades:

Year	Imports	Exports(millionRs.)
1980-81	22	962
1981-82	79	602
1982-83	60	340
1983-84	148	313
1984-85	261	498
1985-86	198	465
1986-87	166	342

Source; Rashid Ahmad Khan, "India- Pakistan Trade: Prospects and Constraints", in, Varinder Grover and Ranjana Arora (ed), *50 Years of India-Pakistan Relations*, Vol.2, p.205.

Although tradeable items between India and Pakistan have increased from 42 in 1982 to 570 in 1989, Pakistan's exports to India were just a paltry 0.93 percentage of its

trade and India's an even dismal 0.17 of its overall trade percentage.³³ This condition persists despite the agreement between the business leaders of the two countries that informal trade through third party between the two countries accounts for about \$1 billion and bilateral trade has the potential to reach up to \$ 10 billion. The constraint on economic relations between the two countries is also due to the size and superior economic infrastructure of India. Many traders and business firms expressed apprehensions that trade with India would not only jeopardize their fate but also deepen Pakistan's dependency on India, in which case Pakistan's sovereignty would also be reduced to absurdity.³⁴ More vocal and active in their protests over trade relations with India are the religious and inward-looking groups who view good relations with India as an affront to their religion and a compromise to their stand on Kashmir.

India-Pakistan Relations During The Cold War

To counter its inferiority complex, Pakistan felt the need to have powerful allies to support and strengthen its country if not in economy, on military weapons. As a result, it searched for "security against" or "power parity" with India.³⁵ It sought security through close alignment with the West, especially the U.S. and the Muslim world.³⁶ Pakistan's enmity with India and the need to get support for Kashmir issue made Pakistan diversify its foreign policy towards the West. And on several occasions, it talked of Islamic unity among Muslim countries.

The emergence of cold war in the South Asian region further entangled the acrimonious relations between India and Pakistan. South Asia as a region did not occupy significant place in the foreign policy of America until 1949. However, the growing power of Russia after Stalin and the Communist China's expansion in the South East Asia and Central Asia made the policy makers of America to shift its foreign policy towards the South Asia region. Pakistan has anyway always been keen to build up its arm and

³³ Rashid Ahmad Khan, "Indo-Pakistan Trade: Prospects and Constrains," in, Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora(ed), *Fifty Years of India-Pakistan Relations*, Vol.II,(New Delhi: Deep and Deep publications,1998),p.196.

³⁴ N.R. Jafri,"Pakistan's Trade with India", in, Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora (ed), *World Community and Indo-Pak Relations*, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1998), p.192.

³⁵ P.K. Mishra, *India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh*, (Delhi: Sandeep Parkashan, 1979), p.1.

³⁶ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan and the Post-Cold War environment", in, Craig Baxler and Charles Kennedy, *Pakistan 1977*, (India: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998), p.39.

technology to have power parity with India. The superpower rivalry of the 1950s and 1960s made it possible for Pakistan to fulfill its objective. Pakistan cautiously helped America in the Korean War; this brought the two states a step closer together. After 1950, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was invited by both the USSR and USA. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, “cast the die in favour of the latter,” partly because Pakistan had developed greater affinity with America during the Korean War.³⁷ Subsequently, America decided to give military assistance to Pakistan provided Pakistan and Turkey agreed for a pact to jointly defend them against Soviet aggression.³⁸ In May 1954, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with America. Later, in the same year, Pakistan became a member of South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). With these alliances, Washington offered considerable economic aid to Pakistan. The US-Pakistan relations not only helped America to curtail Soviet expansion, but it also helped America to have influence over the oil-rich Middle East countries through Pakistan. India objected to Pakistan’s alliance with the Western military groups. Prime Minister, Nehru expressed the fear that Pakistan would use US military technology against India and escalates arm race in the region, American assurance that it would not allow using America’s weapons against India notwithstanding.³⁹

Taking cognizance of US-Pakistan alignment, India looked out for co-operative relations with other stronger countries, which could meet India’s political, military, international and economic interests.⁴⁰ The US-Pakistan alliance compelled India to move towards the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet Union became the supplier of military hardware to India, while Pakistan depended on America during the cold war. The emergence of cold war in the region made the relations between India and Pakistan more complicated. This search for alliance and counter alliance led the relations of India and Pakistan to the lowest ebb in the 60s and 70s.

India-China relations were peaceful since the latter had become a republic. India not only gave official recognition to the People Republic of China when the latter proclaimed itself a Republic, it also backed China’s membership to the United Nations.

³⁷ S.M.Burke, n.13, p.148.

³⁸ Ibid.,p.163.

³⁹ M.S.Rajan, n.1, p. 90.

⁴⁰ Col.Ravi Nanda, *Kashmir: Indo-Pak Relations*, (New Delhi: Lancers Book, 2001) , pp.67-68.

An Agreement on Trade and Commerce was signed between the two, on April 29, 1954.⁴¹ However, India-China relations developed some rift in the late 1950s. The Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, was not happy with the map of China, which had some portion of Indian territory in it. Mr. Nehru, brought it to the notice of the Chinese government, but the Chinese officials ignored the Indian protest by giving excuses. A year later, the Indian public raised its voice against China for its high-handedness on the revolutionaries of Tibet. This caused great resentments in China. What hurt China most was India's providing sanctuary to Dalai Lama after he fled from Lhasa. The development of these problems at the end of 1950s made China hostile towards India's foreign policy. China attacked India in 1962, and defeated the unprepared India.

The 1962 war not only humiliated India, but also challenged its security and stability, and its international prestige suffered badly. Much against its declared principle, India was forced to ask for military aid from the U.S. since the USSR in its commitment to communism was unable to provide any help and remained neutral. America was more than willing to oblige due to the convergence of interest between the U.S. and India. America came to India's help, as "the victory of communist China was [also] detrimental to U.S. interest."⁴² The US within three days of Nehru's request for help, sent its C-125 jet transport fighter planes; it also dispatched an aircraft carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal, and in December 1962, the US President Mr. J.F. Kennedy, and the British Prime Minister Mr. Harold Macmillan, agreed to give India military equipment worth \$120 million.⁴³ Pakistan expressed dissatisfaction with the U.S. military aid to India during the India-China war. The India-China war provided Pakistan new opportunity to join hands with China. This war had a positive effect on Pakistan-China relations, as it enabled the Chinese to follow an uninhibited pro-Pakistan policy in matters involving India. Thereafter, China openly supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue even in the Security Council and has been pursuing military and technological aid to Pakistan. On

⁴¹ A.Appadorai and V.K.Arora, n.5, p.50.

⁴² Deepak Gosain, " Changing U.S. Equations with Pakistan and India", in, Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora (Ed.), *World Community and India-Pak Relations*, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1999), p.13.

⁴³ Norman D. Palmer, *The United States and India: The dimensions of Influence*, (New York: Praeger Publishshers, 1984), pp.186-187.

March 2, 1963, Pakistan and China signed a border agreement in which “Pakistan ceded to China 10,000 sq. km. of territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.”⁴⁴

The 1965 War and After

Cultivating friendship with China further strengthened Pakistan. Pakistan was able to acquire huge military and economic subsidy from China and US during the 1950s and 1960s much larger than it could imagine. The US military assistance to Pakistan between 1954-65 amounted to about \$1.5 billion.⁴⁵ After strengthening its armed forces, Pakistan advocated hostilities with India with a view to capture Kashmir. In 1965 India and Pakistan fought over the Rann of Kutch. Both India and Pakistan claimed the Kutch area, as the Radcliffe line that divided the boundary of the two countries was not properly drawn. India sent additional forces to counter the intrusion. Fighting broke out in January 1965, deteriorating the relations of India and Pakistan. Pakistan also sent additional reinforcement and pushed the Indian post out of the area. “On April 9, 1965, Pakistan attacked in force with its regular Army and captured the Sardar post near Kanjarkot. Later, on April 24, 1965, Pakistan attacked again four other Indian posts simultaneously, using Patton tanks and heavy artillery.”⁴⁶ Intense fighting continued for some days, Pakistan planned to capture the regions by force. However, it failed in its mission and in the backdrop of this development, India-Pakistan Ceasefire Agreement on the Rann of Kutch was signed on June 30, 1965.

The intrusion in the Kutch area by the Pakistan Army was the beginning of the larger war that took place later in September. Few months later, even before the ink on the Kutch Agreement dried out, Pakistan Army frustrated by the failure to grab Kashmir once again started conducting a military operation under the code-name *Operation Gibraltar* in the region of Jammu and Kashmir. They came in a groups of two and three to avoid detection by the Indian Army and intelligence and managed to hold strategic heights all along the border. Hostile activities along the ceasefire line built up day-by-day. Pakistan had carefully planned the operation, the infiltrators were especially trained and

⁴⁴ Aabha Dixit, “India, Pakistan and the great powers”, in, Air Com. Jasjit Singh, *India and Pakistan: Crisis of Relationship*, (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1990), p.20.

⁴⁵ Norman D. Palmer, n.43 , p.81.

⁴⁶ Lt.Gen. K.K.Nanda, *Conquering Kashmir: A Pakistani Obsession*, (New Delhi: Lancers Book, 1994), p.148.

equipped to face any harsh geographical conditions and difficulties. "A number of task forces were raised, each comprising three to six companies. A company consisted of 35 to 40 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) soldiers."⁴⁷ Pakistan Army along with the trained soldiers of PoK and the local guerilla fighters recruited from local areas of PoK using American military equipment like Patton tanks infiltrated on the India side of the border to siege the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan propagated that the operation was a "Holy War"(Jihad) for the liberation of the Kashmiris people. However, the Indian Army defeated them, and the war came to an end with the signing of the *Tashkent Declaration* (January 1966) between India and Pakistan. The two countries agreed to work in accordance with the United Nations Charter and solve their dispute through peaceful means. The two leaders also agreed to withdraw their armed personnel from the disputed areas, non-interference in each other internal affairs, to observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic relations, restoration of trade relations, communications as well as cultural exchange programmes. India and Pakistan also agreed to continue with the discussions on the problems of refugees and evictions. This treaty was signed with the view to bring stability and normalcy in the region. China did not directly intervene in the war, but provided Pakistan an emergency aid of \$ 28 million as arm supply.⁴⁸

After the death of Stalin, India-Soviet Union relations had improved. In 1971, to develop and foster better ties and understanding between the two countries, a *Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation* was signed in August 9, between the two countries. This treaty was the result of many years of friendships and co-operation between the two countries. India and Soviet Union agreed to respect each other's sovereignty and not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other. The treaty further agreed to co-operate and develop in the field of scientific, economic and technical co-operation, besides social and cultural activities. And the two countries also agreed to abstain from indulging in activities, which would harm the security and integrity of each other.

At this point of time, a new development had occurred in the subcontinent. The election, which was held in December 1970 in Pakistan, had gone in favour of the Awami League Party. The Awami League under the leadership of Mr. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.153.

⁴⁸ B.M. Jain, *Nuclear Politics in South Asia: In Search of an Alternative Paradigm*, (New Delhi: Rawat Publishers, 1994), p.123

captured 167 out of 313 seats in the National Assembly and 298 out of 310 in the East Bengal Assembly. However, Gen. Yahya Khan, the then military ruler of Pakistan, refused to accept the verdict of the East Pakistan people. And millions of people who voted for their democratic rights were massacred and 10 million people were forced to leave their country. These people who were pushed out of East Pakistan entered India, posing a great danger to the security and stability of India.⁴⁹ The East Pakistan people revolted against the brutal actions of the military ruler, evolving into a guerrilla resistance and finally formed a liberation army (Mukti Bahini). Pakistan government, instead of finding a political solution to the problems, intensified terror against the people. India intervened in the liberation struggle of Bangladesh to save the people from the treacherous hand of the Gen. Yahya Khan. Pakistani Air force bombarded some Indian aerodromes at Chhamb and Poonch in Jammu and Kashmir in retaliation to India's intervention; this action of Pakistan heightened the tensions in the region.⁵⁰ Indian Army and Air Force retaliated leading to India-Pakistan war of 1971. After days of fierce fighting, Dacca fell into the hands of the Indian forces. Indian forces along with the "Mukti Bahini" of Bangladesh defeated Pakistani forces, despite being heavily equipped with modernised and sophisticated American fighter planes and weapons. The defeat of Pakistan led to the formation of Bangladesh. The war came to an end with the surrender of the Pakistan Army. The victory enhanced India's power and prestige in the region while the Pakistani Army leaders were shattered and demoralized. The historic *Shimla Agreement* signed in 1972, according to which India and Pakistan resolved to put an end to all the conflict and confrontation that impinged upon India and Pakistan relations, and to establish an atmosphere of peace in the subcontinent. They also agreed to abide by the principles and purposes of the chapter of the United Nations, resolving all conflicts by peaceful means, respecting each other's sovereignty and territory. India and Pakistan also agreed to settle all outstanding disputes and differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations and mutual understanding. The agreement further added, to built better relations in the fields of economic and cultural activities.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Sita Ram Sharma, *Liquidation of Pakistan: An Analysis of the Political Future of Pakistan*, (New Delhi: Raaj Prakashan, 1983), p.54.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ For text of Shimla Agreement see, Appendix-II

1974 Indian Nuclear Explosion

India conducted its first nuclear test at Pokhran on May 18, 1974, under the leadership of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi. India was opposed to any nuclear development till 1950's. The position changed after the Chinese explosion in 1964, Nehru's never a bomb policy change to Shastri's not now a bomb policy. The then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, was compelled to send special envoys to the then superpowers the United States and Soviet Union, in its effort to obtain a nuclear guarantee from the nuclear weapons states particularly from China.⁵² The lukewarm security assurance as offered to India was by no means convincing. This compelled India to pursue the nuclear programme more actively. A test was conducted in 1974, although it had begun its search for the weapon as early as 1972. The Indian government declared the 1974 explosion a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). Pakistan condemned India's explosions and tried to show this as the reason to develop nuclear weapons to counter India's nuclear hegemony in the region, although it had began its search for the weapon as early as 1972.

The attempt to produce the proposed "Islamic bomb" was vigorously pursued by Mr. Z.A. Bhutto. The reason for Mr. Bhutto's active campaign for such a venture is not far to locate. He saw the convergence of Pakistan's national interest in bringing out such a project into reality. He also knew by calling it an Islamic bomb, the West Asian countries such as Saudi Arabia and Libya could support financially to this venture.⁵³ Pakistani leaders also came to realise that depending on external power for security and defence would not guarantee their security. Thus, to develop and sustain their military and technology, President Z.A. Bhutto "put the nuclear establishment under his personal control and supervision. He [also] organised the well-known meeting at Multan in January 1972, in which a historic decision was taken to build an Atom bomb."⁵⁴ This disproves the "Western argument that Pakistan's quest for weapon capability was

⁵² Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran-II", *International Security*, Spring 1999, Vol.23, No.4, p.153.

⁵³ Maj. Gen. D.K. Palik and P.K.S. Namboodiri, *Pakistan's Islamic Bomb*, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), pp. 3-22.

⁵⁴ The origin of "Islamic Bomb" has been elaborated in, Steve Weissman and Victor Krosney, *Islamic Bomb*, (New York, 1981).

instigated by the explosion in 1974,” since this crucial development took place prior to the nuclear explosion conducted by India.⁵⁵

The Indian subcontinent witnessed lot of crisis and tension in the 1970s. The political turmoil in Afghanistan and the subsequent Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 brought about the US intervention in the region. Pakistan came to be seen as a “frontline state”, as the US supplies arms and weapons to Afghanistan rebels were sent through Pakistan. From 1985-1990, Pakistan was reported to have received approximately \$ 3.3 billion of America aid, including \$ 2 billion in weaponry.⁵⁶ According to another report, the US supplied 4 lakh Kalashnikov assault rifles to Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence and 900-stinger shoulder fired surface to air missiles to the Afghan mujahideens.⁵⁷ The US became the major supplier of weapons to the mujahideen resistance against the Soviet Union backed regime in Kabul. The Soviet Union was said to have spent around \$3 billion a year from 1979-1992.⁵⁸ The Afghan crisis opened a new avenue for Pakistan leaders to obtain and develop their defence equipment. With a large stock of arms and military equipment received from America and some Muslim countries, Pakistan’s military technology was well built and safeguarded. The Afghan crisis altered the regional setting wholly out of shape offering a providential opportunity to Pakistani leadership to reassert some of its dormant aspirations, the most significant among these being to be able to play a major if not leading role in the Islamic world.⁵⁹ Thus, Pakistan’s militarizations and weaponisation became a threat to India’s security.

India and Pakistan were engaged in another border dispute over the 74 km long undelineated Siachen Glacier. This undelineated glacier had become a new bone of contentions, leading to open conflict between the two countries. India and Pakistan had interpreted cease-fire line of 1949 in their own rights. Taking advantage of the loopholes in the March cease-fire agreement of 1949, Pakistan had encroached the

⁵⁵ Savita Pande, *Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy*, (New Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1991), p.32.

⁵⁶ Quoted in, Thom A. Travis, *India, Pakistan and The Third World: In The Post Cold War System*, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1997), p.61.

⁵⁷ Jasjit Singh, “Cross-border terrorism in South Asia: Some Core Issue,” in, Nancy Jetley (ed.), *Regional Security in South Asia*, (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1999), p.364.

⁵⁸ Tara Kartha, “The Weaponisations of Afghanistan”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. xix, No. 10-11, Jan.-Feb. 1997, p. 1393

⁵⁹ P.M. Pasricha, “Military Balance between India and Pakistan”, in, V.D. Chopra, *Studies in Indo-Pak relations*, (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1984), p.136.

area.⁶⁰ In 1984, Indian army launched *Operation Meghdoot* to contain further Pakistani encroachment, leading to armed clashes between the two countries. Since then, armed clashes in the region had become a regular feature. Thus, to normalise the situation and bring amicable solution a defence secretary level talks on Siachen issue was agreed upon between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistan President Zai-ul-Haq in New Delhi. Subsequently, the first round of defence secretary level talks was held in January 1986, only to end in disagreement.⁶¹ Since then, several rounds of talks were held between the defence secretaries of India and Pakistan, foreign secretaries and other high officials on Siachen. Yet, the two countries were not able to bring out any solutions to the contentious issue. This tense relation between two countries was followed by another crisis, the Tulbul navigation project. The problem of Tulbul navigation was also due to disagreement, on the demarcation on the Jhelum river. This problem has been lingering between the two countries since 1987. India started the construction of a barrier on the river Jhelum, to make the river navigable during the off-season. Pakistan objected to this construction of 440ft. structure, which was started by India in 1984 on the Jhelum river, arguing that India has violated Article-I (2) of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. Several rounds of talks were held to solve the problem, however, things remain strained for most of the year.⁶²

Military Exercises

India and Pakistan relations during this period have gone through a period of severe political turmoil. Once again, both the countries were engaged in a war-like situation during late 1986 and early 1987. India conducted a series of military exercise in Rajasthan under the code-name *Brasstacks*. The Indian Army “to test [India’s] military readiness on a large scale”, conducted these military exercise. It was carried out under the leadership of the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. K. Sundarji.⁶³ Pakistan moved in its armoured forces along the border, resulting in heightening tensions in the region. The

⁶⁰ Ashutosh Misra, “Beyond Kashmir: The Siachen, Sir Creek and Tulbul dispute”, in, Kanti Bajpai, et al., *Kargil and After: Challenges for India policy*. (New Delhi: Her-Anand Publications, 2000), pp.196-217.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.210.

⁶² Mallika Joseph A., “Tulbul Navigation Project”, <http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/162-ip-mqllika.html>

⁶³ Kanti Bajpai, et al., *Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia*, (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 1995), p.2.

crisis was dissipated as a result of direct contact between Pakistan President, Mr. Zia-ul-Haq, Prime Minister Mr. Junejo and Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. The two sides negotiated for the withdrawal of India forces from the border and brought the crisis to an end.⁶⁴ The Brasstracks crisis was followed by another military exercise code-name, "Checkerboard" carried out by the Indian Army in the northeast India along the disputed border of India and China in July 1987.⁶⁵

Once again, relations between India and Pakistan retrograded in the winter of 1989 due to Pakistan's largest military exercise conducted by Pakistan under the code-name, *Zarb-e-momin* (Sword of the Faithful). Islamabad deployed its troops along the international border and on the line of control and placed its nuclear-armed F-16s on high alert. India was threatened by these actions of Pakistan and reciprocated by moving "three divisions of its troops from the eastern to the western sector, partly as reinforcements and partly to counter a marked increase in cross-border activity in Punjab and Kashmir."⁶⁶ The Western countries especially America was cognizant of the development-taking place in the Indian subcontinent and so sent its Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Robert Gates, to defuse the tension.

India-Pakistan relations have recorded more failure than success since its inception. However, Hasan-Askari Rizvi, remarked that there were two sets of positive developments between India and Pakistan in the late 1980s to 1994, which includes signing of a number of confidence building measures in the fields of military and other nuclear protection: non-attack of each others nuclear installation; advance notification of military movement; joint military operation; exchange of defence personnel and exchange of boundary maps; cooperation for controlling drug trafficking and smuggling; limited direct trade; and cooperation for various South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation programmes.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.10.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.11.

⁶⁷ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, n.36, p.42.

End of Cold War and Its Impact

The Cold War came to an end with the disintegration of the Soviet Union; America came out victorious, which subsequently changed the international politics. General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in 1991, "We have seen our implacable enemy of forty years vaporize before our eyes."⁶⁸ Similarly, in 1992 President George Bush declared that the cold war had ended and the U.S. and its allies had "won" the conflict.⁶⁹

The end of the Cold War has drastically altered the foreign policy of America worldwide. South Asia is not exception to this changing approach. Immediately after the war and prior to September 11, 2001 attacked on Twin Towers in New York, South Asia as a region did not enjoy its due share of significance like that of the Cold War days.⁷⁰ It has altered the setting of United States-Pakistan and United States-India relations. Pakistan relations with the United States have undergone a sea change. The disappearance of Soviet Union from the region had resulted to downgrading of Pakistan from "frontline" position. The United States in 1990 suspended all its economic and military aid to Pakistan, including the delivery of 28 F-16s fighter plane for which Pakistan had already paid. These greatly effected the ongoing modernisation and technological development of Pakistan. Despite the change of relations between Pakistan and United States, the relationship did not completely breakdown. Both sides continue to engage with each other in many respects even if limited. However, by 1995, the US once again, moved closer towards Pakistan. The passage of the Hank Brown Amendment in the US congress on September 21, 1995, for the transfer of the US \$368 million military package that has been blocked by the Pressler Amendment, was a new beginning in the relations of Pakistan and US after the Cold War.⁷¹ Under this Amendment, the Congress allowed the sale of the F-16 fighter planes to another third party and reimburse the money to Pakistan. The Congress also unanimously decided to provide non-military aid to combat the spread

⁶⁸ Quoted in, Walter L. Hixson, "NATO and the Soviet Bloc: The Limits of Victory", in, S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss, *NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does it have a future*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), P.23.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Mahmudul Haque, "U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan: The Post Cold War Trends", *Regional Studies*, Vol.VX, No.2, Spring 1997, p. 67.

⁷¹ C. Uday Bhaskar, "Pakistan in New Post Cold War Strategic Context", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.xviii, No.10, January 1996,p. 1303.

of terrorism and narcotics. And the Congress for the first time agreed to provide Pakistan missiles and night fighting capability in the sea and air.⁷²

After the war, hundreds of Afghans were lured into the valley of Kashmir to fight for Jihad. It was reported, the first batch of these foreign mercenaries entered the valley in 1991. They belong to the Hizb-i-Islami later they got inducted into the ranks of the Hizb-i-Mujahideen, a Kashmiri militants outfit raised and trained by the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.⁷³ "The ISI [was reported to have] channeled these terrorists through a front organisation of Markez-Dawat-ul-Arshad (MDA) and Lahskar-e-Taiba."⁷⁴

India-Pakistan Relations After the Cold War

With the change in international politics after the cold war, the politics of South Asia has also undergone a tremendous change. However, India-Pakistan relations have not improved, in spite of the changes in the international environment. It was reported that, Pakistan had signed military contract with French to purchase three diesel power Agosta 90B-Submarines for \$964 million in September 1994. And another agreement was made in 1995 with French for the purchase of 32 used the French Mirage-2000 fighters worth \$3billions. Pakistan also had brought 300 T-80 Russian built tanks from Ukraine in June 1996 at a cost of \$600 million. Besides, importing Chinese arms and military technology worth \$ 1.93 billion, between 1988-1992.⁷⁵


Pakistan had intensified militants activities in the Kashmir valley creating law and order problems in the state. In the midst of all these crisis and problems, Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan and I.K.Gujral met at the Foreign Minister meeting at New York and discussed to reduce the military tensions in the region. After the informal talks, the two leaders agreed to exercise restrain and keep the channels of communications open at all level and agreed for a direct consultation between the Director General of Military Operation of India and Pakistan. In course of the talks Mr. Gujral asked Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism. Pakistan denied India's charges of

⁷² *Asian Recorder*, September 17-23, 1995, Vol. XXXXI, No. 38, pp.25143-25144.

⁷³ P. Stobdan, "Kashmir: The Key Issue", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XIX, No.1, April 1996, p.111.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.113.

⁷⁵ B.M. Jain, *Nuclear Politics in South Asia: In Search of an Alternative Paradigm*, (New Delhi: Rawat Publishers, 1994), P.



TH 9969

Pakistan's support to the militant activities. And it reiterated its stand that Kashmir is not a part of India and further stated that India should allowed self-determination of the Kashmiris.⁷⁶

Few months later a foreign secretary level talks was held in August 1990. The talks began with a note of disagreement on the troop withdrawal from the border. Pakistan's request for discussion on the troops withdrawal was rejected by India, as Pakistan continuously voiced for the Kashmiris, but at the same time denied the Indian charge of its support to the militant activities in Kashmir. Nevertheless, talks continued for the second day focusing on the confidence building measures (CBMs), like advance notification on the troop movements and military exercise, exchange of military officials, check on the trans-border movement and right of hot pursuit. Besides, a MoU on the prevention of airspace violation, communication link between military commanders and the stoppage on the support of terrorism were tabled. But the talks vaporized into thin air, as Mr. Tanvir Ahmad Khan the foreign secretary of Pakistan repudiated the proposed CBMs, stating that the troops should be removed from the disturbed area or else nothing will work.⁷⁷

Despite the mistrusts and ill felling, the India Prime Minister Mr. Chandra Shekhar and Pakistan Premier Mr. Nawaz Sharif met at the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) Summit at Maldives in 1990. They agreed to establish a hot line between the two countries and to continue with the foreign secretary level dialogue between them.

As agreed and discussed by the two Prime Minister, the two foreign secretaries Mr. Muchkund Dubey and Mr. Shaharya Khan, resumed their talks on December 18, 1990, at Islamabad and concluded with some important confidence building measures. The most significant step that was taken by the two leaders was the agreement for the Surveyor General of both the countries to meet in later time, to solve out the border disputes in Sir Creek for the first time. They also agreed to establish a hot line between the Director General of Military Operation to share informations on military exercise and

⁷⁶ *Indian Express*, April 26, 1990,

⁷⁷ *The Times of India*, August 17, 1990.

airspace violation. In this meeting Indian has shown openness to discuss on any matter and further indicated its willingness to move forward for better relations even if the issue of proxy war remain unsolved. Thereafter, on April 16,1991 India and Pakistan signed two separate accords on the advance notifications of military exercise maneuvers and troops movements, along the border in peacetime and allowing each other's aircraft to fly over and land in their territories through specific corridors. Both the sides also agreed to discuss the issues pertaining to disarmament and banning of weapons of mass destruction.⁷⁸

Another foreign secretary level talks were held at Islamabad in October 1991, between Mr. Muchkund Dubey and Shahryar Khan. Both of them deliberated on various topics ranging from Sir Creek to Siachen, Kashmir, Wular Barrage and terrorism. After hours long discussion, the two leaders came out with an agreement on the Tulbul navigation project. In this agreement, the two countries agreed that India would keep 6.2 metres of the barrage water ungated with a crest level at EL1574.90m (5167ft.), and would forgo storage capacity of 300,000 acre feet out of the provision permitted to it on the Jhelum. In return, the water level in the barrage would be allowed to attain the full operational level of 5177.90ft.⁷⁹ The two foreign secretaries further agreed to continue the dialogue between them to bring out possible solution to the on going problems.

To mitigate the tension on the border, talks were held on Siachen between the two defence secretaries Mr. N.N. Vohra and Mr. S.A.Jilani at Islamabad from November 2-3, 1992. In the course of the talks, Pakistan asked India to reduce its troops in Siachen. India put up the proposal that the Saltoro ridge to be consider as the Line of Control, which runs north from NJ Point 9842 on the map of the Shaksaram area of Pakistan occupied Kashmir, which Pakistan had gifted to China in 1963.⁸⁰ The two leaders concluded their talk with an agreement to hold another round of talks at Islamabad in the later period.

The cloud of acrimony resurfaces on the subcontinent once again at the end of the year 1992. The demolition of Babri Mosque at Ayodhya by some Hindu fundamentalist

⁷⁸ *Indian Express*, April 7, 1991.

⁷⁹ Mallika Joseph A., "Tulbul Navigation Project", <http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/162-ip-mallika.html>

⁸⁰ *Hindustan Times*, November 5, 1992.

evoked communal riots in various parts of India leading to hundreds of people being killed and rendered homeless. This action of the majority community has completely alienated Indian Muslims. The communal riot not only disturbed the communal harmony in India, but had also spread across the border especially to Pakistan and Bangladesh. Pakistan condemned Indian government for failing to take appropriate steps to control the riots and asked the Indian government to safeguard the life and interest of the Muslims in India. Pakistan taking advantage of the political problems in India sought to exploit it to their advantage. In April 1993, Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue at the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference at New Delhi seeking international intervention. Pakistan strongly condemned India's military actions in Jammu and Kashmir, and argued India's action was a fake encounter to suppress the Kashmir's rights to self-determination. It sought for the intervention of the international body like the Inter Parliamentary Union, Amnesty International and other organizations to carry out the act in Kashmir.⁸¹

The political dialogue between the two countries had remained dormant for some time, after a series of stray incidents in India. However, with the reinstallation of Ms. Benazir Bhutto government in Pakistan, a new hope of friendship came to light in the relations of the two perennial antagonistic South Asian neighbours. The India and Pakistan secretary level talks were once again initiated after a gap of 15 months, in January 1994, at Islamabad. These talks took place in the backdrop of the Hazratbal crisis. Yet, even before the talks began Pakistan foreign official brought out the minimum agenda for the talk, jeopardising the talk. The minimum agenda which the Pakistani brought out were: immediate stoppage of the human rights violation in Kashmir, lifting of the siege of Hazratbal, visible reduction of the strength of Indian troops station at the border, allowing human right organisation to visit the valley for monitoring of human rights in Kashmir.⁸²

Sharp disagreement occurred on the details of their agenda to be discussed, especially on the Kashmir issue. India wanted the dialogue to focus on Siachen, maritime boundaries, Sir Creek and Wular barrage. Whereas Pakistan insisted on sole focus on Kashmir, and asked India to reduce its troops in the valley, releasing of all political prisoners, removal of restricted laws which impinged upon human rights and demanded

⁸¹ *The Hindustan Times*, April 16, 1993.

for international human right observer in Kashmir. India flatly rejected Pakistan demands. Indian officials were let down by the insurgent activities in Kashmir and accused Pakistan of masterminding the insurgent activities. Pakistan denied these charges and instead blamed Indian Army and the police force for repressive acts and human rights violations in Kashmir. After seventh round of official level talks, the high levels bilateral finally broke down leaving their relations as cool as ever before. Pakistan's adamant and rigid stand on Kashmir has once again let to the failure of the talks. Having failed in the bilateral talks, Pakistan foreign ministry official argued to approach international community for mediation on Kashmir issue. It stated, "we will henceforth stress on our friends, interested in normalisation of relations in the subcontinent, that involvement of international mediation was necessary for making any progress."⁸³ At this crucial period, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr. Ahmad Ali, on a visit to Uzbekistan, "warned of nuclear war in South Asia if Kashmir issue is not solved at earliest".⁸⁴

Pakistan adhering to its old foreign policy raised its concerned over the Indian army actions in Kashmir at the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meet at Cairo in June 1994. Once again Pakistan alleged that India was using all kind of excesses to avoid discussions on the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan and therefore, urged NAM to set up mechanism to find a solution to solve the problem of Kashmir. India dismissed Pakistan's allegation and instead accused Pakistan for creating law and order problem in the state, through their sponsored militants which has caused enormous suffering to the people of Kashmir.⁸⁵ The Indian troops destroyed the Charar-e-Shareif shrine in a counter insurgency operation. Pakistan strongly protested the action of the Indian Army and observed black day throughout their country on May 19, 1995. Indian government reacted strongly to the Pakistan support to the militants and had even gone to the extend of adopting a resolution condemning Pakistan in the parliament. The Minister of Home Affairs Mr.S.B.Chavan in replay to the parliament discussion stated, "Indian parliament is unanimous in its opinion that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, whatever the attempts made by any country."⁸⁶

⁸² *The Muslim*, January 2, 1994.

⁸³ *The Pioneer*, January 6, 1994.

⁸⁴ *The Times of India*, January , 1994.

⁸⁵ *Pioneer*, June 2, 1994.

⁸⁶ *Parliament Debates Rajya Sabha official reports*, Vol.CLXXV, No.6, December 1995, pp.239-240.

The enthusiasm that came about after Mr. Bhutto came to power evaporated following hostile and provocative policy adopted by her towards India. She openly tried to internationalise the Kashmir issue, despite the lukewarm response by the international community. Mrs. Bhutto also deliberately stayed away from the SAARC meet held at New Delhi in May 1995 to avoid meeting Indian leaders.⁸⁷ This attitude of Mrs. Bhutto finally put to an end the hope of improving relations between the two. In 1996, India had a new government at the centre, under the Prime Ministership of Mr. Deve Gowda. Mr. I.K. Gujral became the new foreign minister. Mr. Gujral adopted a new foreign policy to bring friendly relation with all its neighbours based on the principle of non-reciprocal, later known as “Gujral doctrine”. However, the Bhutto government was not impressed by this doctrine of Indian government. She continued to respond coolly and cautiously as ever before.

Pakistan witnessed a change of guard towards the end of the year 1996. Ms. Bhutto was defeated and once again Mr. Nawaz Sharif came to power. One positive development of Mr. Sharif government has been the willingness to continue the dialogue with India and develop friendly relations. Prime Minister Mr. Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Mr. Gujral met at the SAARC summit at Male in May 1997 and agree to continue secretary level talks. With the change of government in Pakistan, the foreign secretary level talks started at New Delhi, on March 1997. At this meeting, a number of confidence-building measures were proposed by India. This includes, forming a joint working group for studying various Kashmir issues, reviewing the 1992 agreement on Siachen, reviewing the Indo-Pak joint commission to oversee progress in trade and commerce, no first strike on each other nuclear installation and resuming of foreign secretary levels talks and dialogue.⁸⁸ Even though no political breakthrough could be made, Pakistan had expressed its willingness to set up joint working groups on all outstanding issues, softening its stand from previous policy.

Subsequently, the foreign secretary of India Mr. Salman Haider, and his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, met in Islamabad on June 19-23, 1997. At this

⁸⁷ *The Observer*, May 10, 1995.

⁸⁸ *The Telegraph*, March 30, 1997.

meeting the foreign secretaries agreed to develop positive relations with the objective of promoting a friendly and harmonious relationship between Pakistan and India. They agreed to address all outstanding issues of concern to both sides including, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Wular Barrage, Tulbul navigation project, Sir Creek, Terrorism and drug-trafficking, Economic and commercial cooperation, Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields.

The Foreign Secretary of India and Pakistan also agreed to set up a mechanism to address these issues in a composite manner. And further decided to consider the matter through diplomatic channels. The talks concluded by agreeing to meet again in Delhi in September 1997.⁸⁹

The year 1998 brought about a new government in India. The Bharatiya Janata Party with a cluster of other smaller political parties came to power. The BJP-led government conducted the nuclear tests in May 1998 at Pokhran. The world community reacted strongly against India's nuclear tests. Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif remarked, "Pakistan has the right to take any steps which are essential for its security. This is our job and we alone have to decide about it." Ms. Bhutto who sought, "mature, and balance response... Bullet for bullet and not knee jerk."⁹⁰ The world community especially America feared of nuclear escalation in the region and sent its Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Strobe Talbott to Islamabad urging it not to react to India's nuclear explosion and avoid any nuclear race in the region. America assured Pakistan of relieving the Pressler Amendment which had been in force since 1990 and the delivery of F-16 fighter planes which Washington had refused to deliver earlier if it complied with the U.S' wish to abstain from carrying out its nuclear tests.⁹¹

Pakistan, ignoring international warning and pressure, conducted its nuclear tests at Chagai on May 30, 1998. "Pokhran was a gift to Mr. Sharif as the Afghan war had

⁸⁹ For detail analysis of the Foreign Secretaries meeting see, S.R.Khan, "Indo-Pak talks: Reactions in Kashmir", in, Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora, *Partition of India, Indo-Pak Wars, the UNO*, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1999), p.136.

⁹⁰ *The Times of India*, May 13, 1998.

⁹¹ Tehmina Mahmood, "India and Pakistan's Nuclear Explosions: An Analysis", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.52, No.1, January 1999, p.45.

been for Gen. Zia-ul-Haq”, remarks Jatin Desai, added, “Since 1971, Pakistan had been trying unsuccessfully, to overcome its strategic inferiority in conventional warfare.”⁹²

With the cloud of uncertainty hanging in the air, Indo-Pak relations have reached the lowest ebb. The world community pressured India and Pakistan to resume dialogue and ease the nuclear tension in the region. Having faced severe criticism and economic constraints due to embargo by different countries in the aftermath of nuclear tests. India and Pakistan initiated dialogue at the 10th SAARC summit at Colombo. The two leaders Mr. Sharif and Mr. Vajpayee met at the Colombo; however, it could ^{not} come out with any concrete agenda, even though Mr. Sharif described their meeting as fruitful. The Foreign Secretary of both the countries also meets and had informal talks on July 26, 1998. India offered a “no -first -use” pact on nuclear weapons, Pakistan bluntly rejected this offer.⁹³

The Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Raghunath, and his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. Shamshad Ahmed held talks at Durban on the sidelines of a preparatory session of the NAM summit to prepare for the resumption of talks. In a major breakthrough, India Prime Minister Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee and his counterpart Mr. Nawaz Sharif agreed to form modalities for further talks. It stated, “peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir essential for durable peace and security in the region” and their foreign secretaries to meet in Islamabad from 15 to 18 October 1998.⁹⁴ With this the ice had finally broken and (peace) normal relations were established leading to the signing of the Lahore Declaration on 21st February 1999, which is discussed in the next chapter.

⁹² Jatin Desai, *Kargil and Pakistan Politics*, (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 2000).

⁹³ *TheHindu*, July 27, 1998.

⁹⁴ *News Times*, September 24, 1998.

CHAPTER – TWO

THE LAHORE SUMMIT

Post-Nuclear Explosion Developments
Foreign Secretaries Talks
Lahore Declaration

Post-Nuclear Explosions Developments

The politics of South Asian region underwent a tremendous change after the nuclear tests conducted by India at Pokhran (Rajasthan) on May 11 and 13, 1998 and closely followed by Pakistan on May 30, at Chagai in Baluchistan. These nuclear tests created a political uproar and global condemnation around the world. It was reported that around 152 countries, along with other numerous international organisations like the Groups of eight industrialised countries (G-8), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organisation of American States (OAS), the Nordic Council of Ministers and Organisations of Islamic Countries (OIC), voiced their opposition to the nuclear tests.¹ India's insistence over its nuclear detonations for peaceful purpose did not impress the world communities nor were they any less forgiving for igniting a dangerous race for nuclearization in the subcontinent. Economic and military sanctions were imposed on both the countries, more importantly by industrialized countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and Canada.² International monetary funding and foreign aids were withdrawn in line with the sanctions. Germany froze all developmental aid to India, except on those aids that were in the pipeline. Japan also suspended the annual grant of \$26 million, while the US withheld \$143 million aid to India, thus on the whole, more than \$1 billion worth of loans for India were reported to have been withheld.³

The impact of the sanctions was disastrous, particularly to Pakistan, as it has been reeling under economic crises for multiple reasons of which disproportionate spending on military weapons is one of them. The public debt of Pakistan was equal to 85 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1996-1997. At the same time, it was reported that the defence and interest rates took up 70 per cent of the total federal expenditures.⁴ The problem was made more complicated by the sanctions imposed by international monetary funding agencies and developed countries. The International

¹ Strobe Talbott, "Dealing with the bomb in South Asia", *Foreign Affairs*, March /April 1999, Vol.78, No.2, p.110.

² For detailed account of sanctions by different countries, see, Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Pakistan: The Post Chagai challenges," *Strategic Analysis*, September 1998, Vol. XXII, No.6, pp.886-896,

³ P.M. Kamath, "Indian nuclear strategy: A perspective for 2020", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.22, No.12, March 19,1999, p. 1934.

⁴ "Public Opinion Trends and Analysis and News Services," *POT*, (Pakistan series), Vol.XXVII, No.53, February 23, 1999,pp.654-655.

Monetary Fund held back \$1.6 billion financial package to Pakistan. US, Japan and others also had ceased all its military and economic aid to Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan's economy was greatly hampered by these developments. International pressure, through economic and military sanctions compelled the policy makers of both the countries to heed the bidding of the world community and start confidence building measures to ease the tense relations.

Pressure was mounted by developed countries and international bodies on both the countries to start dialogue to ease the tension in the region. The United Nations even went to the extent of adopting a resolution in the Security Council condemning India and Pakistan for conducting nuclear tests. The resolution 1172 was passed in the Security Council urging India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security in order to remove the tensions between them, and encourage them to find mutually acceptable solutions that would address the root cause of the tensions, including Kashmir.⁵ The five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5), G-8 and the European Union also endorsed the clamour for bilateral dialogue subsequently. As a result of the mounting international pressure, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan simultaneously made efforts to start a dialogue. Thereafter, the Prime Ministers of both the countries along with their foreign secretaries held several one-to-one meeting on the sidelines of various international summits and conferences.

Prime Minister Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee in an interview to *The Week*, on the eve of his departure for the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) annual summit, expressed his desire to meet Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif and discuss the newly generated tension and crisis between the two countries, including those of Kashmir. However, he rejected any third party intervention in the process when he specifically stated, "we are of the firm view that there is no role for any third party in our bilateral relationship."⁶

⁵ *The Hindu*, October 14, 1998.

⁶ *News Time*, July 26, 1998.

Foreign Secretaries Talks

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan held informal and unstructured discussions on all matters of bilateral interest to work out the modalities of resuming the bilateral dialogue on the sidelines of the Standing Committee of SAARC at Colombo. The proposed meeting between Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif was awaited with much anticipation as the two countries were engaged in acrimonious relations after the nuclear tests. The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, as expected, met at the sideline of the SAARC annual summit in Colombo in July 1998 and held an informal one-to-one meeting, breaking the ice of the newly generated tension in the region. The two leaders agreed to resume dialogue and directed their foreign secretaries to find out modalities for the talks to proceed.⁷ The Foreign Secretaries as directed by their respective Prime Minister held an intensive discussion to set up a mechanism for the two countries to bring the differences to the negotiating table. In the course of the talks, Pakistan distributed a "non paper" on confidence building measures (CBMs) in Jammu and Kashmir which stated "removal of Indian army picket in Srinagar and other parts of Kashmir, stationing of Red-Cross and UN human rights monitors in the state and granting UN observers authority to patrol the Indian side of LoC."⁸ The Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr.K. Raghunath, claiming it was based on fantasy blankly rejected this non-paper issued by Pakistan on CBMs in Jammu and Kashmir. The Colombo talks failed to make a breakthrough. Neither the Foreign Secretaries' nor the Foreign Ministers' talks could come out with any agreed formula on the issue of Kashmir. The talks failed due to Pakistan's insistence on discussing the Kashmir issue first, while India pressed for the commencement of the negotiation process on the basis of a broad-based and composite approach. After the failure of the Foreign Secretaries talks, Mr. Sharif, who earlier described his talks with Mr. Vajpayee as "good" changed his posture and said "the result of the talks was zero."⁹

Once again, war of words began between the two countries with the breakdown of the talks. India blamed Pakistan's "neurotic" and "obsessive" focus on Kashmir for the failure, while Pakistan accused India's "rigid and inflexible" stand as the factor for

⁷ *New Strait Times*, July 31, 1998.

⁸ *Indian Express*, August 1, 1998.

⁹ *Ibid.*

the derailment of the talk.¹⁰ Despite the negative outcome of the talk, Prime Minister Vajpayee optimistically said, “my meeting with Pakistan Prime Minister has started the process of resumption of dialogue”.¹¹ Indeed, it was the first meeting between the two leaders after the nuclear tests conducted by both the countries.¹² Nevertheless, the dark side of ground reality was the intensification of militant activities in Jammu and Kashmir by the Pakistan sponsored militants groups. These activities have been intensified with the objective to hinder the ongoing India-Pakistan dialogue. The Pakistani army also reactivated its cross-border firing from across the line of control into Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in the killing of 21 persons including 5 soldiers and wounding 18 others during the course of the talks.¹²

Despite this negative fallout, another round of talks were held at Durban during the Non-Aligned summit in early September 1998.¹³ India’s Minister of State for External Affairs, Ms. Vasundhara Raje Scindia, and the Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, had an informal discussion on September 3, 1998 and deliberated on their strained relations and various other issues affecting the two countries. In a significant development, Mr. Sartaj Aziz in contrast to the usual rigid stand adopted by Islamabad told newsmen that, India and Pakistan should do away with modalities, which proved to be stumbling block in resumption of official level talks to discuss the entire gamut of bilateral issues.¹³ In this Durban meeting, various Indian and Pakistani officials interacted with each other, which gave rise to optimism that India-Pakistan relations would move in the right direction, though no specific solution emerged from the talks.

The subsequent top official level meetings between the two countries at various international forums had diluted some of the misunderstanding and ill-feeling that existed in the minds of the leaders of the two states. But a new turn in the relations of India and Pakistan came about only after the 1998 September United Nations General Assembly session. At this meeting the Prime Ministers of both the countries and their foreign secretaries held extensive discussion and finally an agreement was hammered out to resume the dialogue under a “two plus six formula of the agenda”. In this two plus six formula the issue of Kashmir and peace and security were separated from the

¹⁰ *Indian Express*, August 1, 1998.

¹¹ *The Times of India*, August 1, 1998.

¹² *Ibid*,

¹³ *The Times of India*, September 3, 1998.

other six issues, which are Wular Barrage or Tulbul Navigation project, Sir Creek, Siachen, Trade, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking and Cultural exchanges. The two leaders also agreed to restore the hot line between the two countries, increase trade facilities and enhance people to people contacts. However, the most important outcome of the summit was the agreement to start bus services between Delhi and Lahore, opening a new chapter in the history of India and Pakistan relations.¹⁴ Expressing optimism of the talks, Prime Minister Vajpayee after meeting with Mr. Sharif remarked, "a new chapter in India-Pakistan co-operation is being opened. We are serious a beginning has to be made and that is what we have decided on here." Besides the two Prime Ministers, foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan also met side by side and a joint statement was issued, which stated a joint commitment to reaffirm their belief that "an environment of durable peace and securities is in the supreme interest of both India and Pakistan". Further it added that, "peaceful settlement of all issues including Jammu and Kashmir is essential for this [peace and security] purpose".¹⁵)

(However, Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Sharif within few days of the UN summit meeting deviated from its commitment and exposed its double talk, when he told the Arabic daily *Al-Khaleej*, "I recently met the Indian Prime Minister, but nothing resulted from our meeting. India is still intransigent and ignored the two most important questions, for us both peace security and Jammu and Kashmir... The question of Kashmir is the root of the problems and without it there can never be peace."¹⁶ Similar voices were expressed by Shamshad Ahmed, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan a week after the New York meeting that, "Pakistan is in fact negotiating on behalf of Kashmir people and at a later stage when a decision on the future of Kashmir will be taken, the Kashmir people will be involved in the talks." He continued, "what we are doing is on behalf of the people of Kashmir and we are not in a position to take a decision on the future of Kashmir, we will have to associate the people of Kashmir."¹⁷)

(Talks between Foreign Secretary-level began under the "two plus six" formula between October and November 1998. On October 16-18, 1998 Foreign Secretary-level

¹⁴ Sukumar Muralidharan, "A not so smooth ride", *Frontline*, Vol.16, No. 4, February 13-26, 1999, p.14

¹⁵ *New Strait Times*, September 25, 1998.

¹⁶ *The Statesman*, October 5, 1998.

¹⁷ *Indian Express*, October 18, 1998.

talks were held at Islamabad mainly focusing on Kashmir, peace and security and the confidence- building measures. The two camps began the talks with strong differences of opinion on Kashmir. India, while agreeing to talk with Pakistan, was reluctant to negotiate on the status of Kashmir. On the other hand, Pakistan's main emphasis was on Kashmir's self-determination. India's proposal on "no first use" of nuclear weapons and safety packages to prevent unauthorized nuclear war had little impact as Pakistan linked everything to Kashmir issue. India too bluntly rejected Pakistan suggestion to a "strategic restraint regime", mutual and balance force reduction and an agreement to freeze the missile development programme.¹⁸ Both sides reiterated their respective stands on Kashmir and the security concerns; as a result the Islamabad talks could not produce any concrete result. In the meantime, the Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif announced that, all Indian fishermen and boats captured by Pakistan would be released. India's Foreign Secretary assured of positive response to Pakistan's good gesture. Despite the failure of the talks, India's Foreign Secretary described the talks as "frank and peaceful". While, Pakistan's Information Minister, Mr. Mushahid Hussain, refused to accept the talks as a failure and stated, "In India-Pakistan talks, there can be no great leap forward it will have to be just small steps forward."¹⁹ In another significant move, Mr. Shamsahad Ahmed also had stated, "we are more than ready for a composite and integrated dialogue, to solve the Kashmir problem."²⁰

A month later, another round of talks was carried out at New Delhi, which focused on the remaining six issues: Wullar barrage or Tulbul navigation project,

Sir Creek, Siachen, Trade Terrorism and Drug Trafficking and Cultural Exchanges. These issues had been left out at the Islamabad talks for further discussion. Talks on the Wullar barrage and Tulbul navigation project developed some rifts between the two water resources secretary Mr. Syed Shehid Hussain and Mr. Z. Hasan. The main argument during the New Delhi talks was that India wanted the talks to resume the dialogue in continuation with draft agreement of 1992 talks. Pakistan suggested for a

¹⁸ Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Indo-Pak relations: Need for a pragmatic approach", *Strategic Analysis*, April 1999, Vol. XXIII, No.1, p.87

¹⁹ *The Times of India*, October 18, 1998.

²⁰ *Deccan Herald*, October 18, 1998.

fresh start, as the 1992 talks could not lead to any agreement.²¹ However, the talks proved to be inconclusive as both sides stuck to their rigid position on the issue of the Wullar barrage.

Prior to the New Delhi talks, as many as eight round of talks had been held on Siachen glacier dispute between India and Pakistan. Yet, the issue of Siachen could not be solved due to Pakistan's attribution of the "Siachen problem to the non-resolutions of the Kashmir question as per the United Nations resolutions" and mutual suspicions.²² At the New Delhi talks, India was reported to have proposed a package of confidence building measures, which would led to "comprehensive ceasefire" in Saltoro range, and to immediately defuse tension and ease the atmosphere of confrontation in the area.²³ (Pakistan rejected India's suggestion of ceasefire in Siachen, and instead it proposed for troops withdrawal from the region based on the 1989 agreement. India argued that the 1989 agreement on Siachen does not hold, as both the countries did not agree upon any modalities. India again proposed for bilateral monitoring mechanism for the implementation of ceasefire. Pakistan refused India's proposal and demanded for international monitoring.²⁴ The talks on Siachen broke down without any agreement due to mutual suspicion of each other.)

The talks on Siachen were followed by detailed discussion on Sir Creek. Till date, as many as seven rounds of talks have been held on Sir Creek, but it too had failed to come out with any amicable solution due to disagreement of the boundary line. In the New Delhi talks, India proposed a seaward approach, Pakistan rejected India's proposal stating that such an agreement could be considered only after the determination of the boundary line in Sir Creek. Pakistan requested for international arbitration, India rejected any third party involvement. Thus, once again talks on Sir creek could not be materialized for lacked of agreement on the nature of its boundary line.²⁵

²¹ Mallika Joseph A, " Delhi round of Indo-Pak talks: Tulbul navigation project / Wular Barrage", *Http://ipcs.org/issues/articles/162-ip-mallika.Htm*.

²² Ibid., p.88

²³ Quoted in, Ibid, and see details of India- Pakistan talks on Siachin at Rawalpindi in June 1989, Robert Wirsing, "the Siachen glacier dispute: Can diplomacy untangle it?" *Indian Defence Review*, July 1991, p.99

²⁴ Col. Ravi Nanda, *Kashmir and Indo-Pak Relations*, (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 2001), pp.130-131.

²⁵ <http://www.org/issues/articles/154-suba.htm>

Trade, which formed an important component of India-Pakistan relations, was tabled after a gap of nine years at the New Delhi Secretary level talks. Though inter-trade relations could be beneficial to both the countries, trade opportunities between India and Pakistan are little taken advantage of due to political apathy. Thus, trade relations between the two countries moved at a dismal rate. It was reported that India-Pakistan trade formed less than one per cent of world trade. Under the South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), India has granted 10 per cent tariff concession for a total of 383 items to Pakistan, while Pakistan has extended 10 per cent tariff concession to India only on 265 items.²⁶ In the New Delhi talks, India demanded for most favoured status from Pakistan, in accordance with World Trade Organisation (WTO) provisions, which India had granted to Pakistan in the 1970s. Pakistan did not completely rule out considering the proposal, but at the same time it did not agree in the interim period to increase the list of commodities importable from India. It merely stated that it would consider the proposal, only after detailed study of the likely impact of such a move on its domestic industries.²⁷ India-Pakistan talks on economic co-operation also had taken a backseat as Pakistan linked the progress of the dialogue to resolution of Kashmir issue. Though the talks had failed, India's Commerce Secretary, Mr. P.P.Prabhu described the talks as good and progressive. But, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mr. Tariq Attaf had different view; he stated, "there are unlimited possibilities of co-operation between the two countries provided an environment of peace and security is created. Sky is the limit, but peace and security is the bottom line, otherwise it is very difficult to carry out unfettered trade."²⁸

In these talks, discussions were also held on cross-border terrorism, which is one of the most contentious issues between the two countries for the first time in New Delhi in the secretary level talks. This agenda formed part of the composite dialogue agreed to in June 1997.²⁹ India took strong exception to Pakistan policy of pursuing cross-border terrorism and militant activities in Kashmir. India handed lists of terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir and demanded the closure of these camps. Pakistan turned down India's charges and stated that the militants in Kashmir were freedom fighters and it only gives moral and political support to it. Pakistan proposed

²⁶ *The Times of India*, November 10, 1998.

²⁷ Col. Ravi Nanda, n.24, p.131.

²⁸ *The Times of India*, November 11, 1998.

the involvement of United Nations Military Observer Groups for India and Pakistan or other international observers along the border in Jammu and Kashmir to verify India's allegations.³⁰ India rejected this proposal of Pakistan, thus the talks on terrorism failed as both the countries accused and counter-accused each other in the talks.

Besides terrorism, India and Pakistan also discussed the problems of drug trafficking, which had directly affected both the countries and agreed to set up a mechanism for regular meetings and exchange of operational information between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Pakistan and Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in India to combat crimes such as drug trafficking and strengthening bilateral cooperation between the Narcotics Control Board (NBC) of India and Anti Narcotics Force (ANF) of Pakistan to combat drug trafficking³¹.

Despite nine day long talks held between various secretaries and officials of India and Pakistan, it could not bring out any amicable solution.

The New Delhi talks could not make much progress as Pakistan linked every issue to the resolution of Kashmir. This led to accusation and counter-accusation during the talks, finally leading to an unsuccessful end. Though the New Delhi talks came to an unsuccessful end, it brought about a sea change in the relations between the two countries as the scope of dialogue was widened for the first time, bringing into account important issues like terrorism, trade and cultural issues for bilateral discussion. Nevertheless, the two countries also agreed on some important issues in the course of their talks. The two countries had agreed on the supply of power from Pakistan to India, exports of sugar to India, elimination of double taxation, exchange of information between CBI and FIA of Pakistan for combating crimes and counterfeit currency, releasing of fishermen in each other's custody and concretising the process of establishing the bus service between the two countries.³² However, Mr. R.V.V. Ayyer, the then Pakistan's Cultural Secretary disappointed with the outcome of the talks

²⁹ Smruti S. Pattanaik, n.18, p. 89.

³⁰ D. Suba Chandran, "Delhi round of Indo-Pak talks: Terrorism and Drug trafficking", <http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/159-ip-suba.htm>

³¹ Ibid.

³² Col. Ravi Nanda, n.24, pp.131-132.

remarked, "we had come to India with high hopes and are returning disappointed. Friendly exchange can only flourish when disputes are resolved."³²

According to Shirin Tahir-Kheli (Convenor Belusa Group devoted to Track-II diplomacy on India-Pakistan relations) talks entirely at the bureaucrats level would not work. She said, " The dialogue requires political person in charge not just bureaucrats, political persons can make the consultations between the two government virtually to a situation when hitches can be worked out at the level of the Prime Ministers of the two countries."³³ Once again Mr. Sharif charged India of derailing the bilateral talks. Mr. Sharif, while addressing the Command and Staff College in Quetta stated, "the Indians are not ready for meaningful dialogue...their primary objectives is to deflect international pressure and prevent involvement of third parties in the process. No real progress towards normalisation of relations can be possible without resolution of the Kashmir issue."³⁴

Few months later, as proposed and agreed in a bilateral talks at New York, a dry run bus service with 13 officials and 7 crew members started from Delhi and reached Lahore on January 7, 1999. The dry run began amidst protests and objections by the hard-core fundamentalist groups of both the countries. The Shiv Sena chief, Jai Bhagwan Goel, strongly protested and voiced against the proposed daily bus service. He remarked, "we will not allow any regular bus service between India and Pakistan, till the latter stop aiding and abetting terrorist activities in the country."³⁵

However, despite the heat generated by hard-liners on both sides, a positive and optimistic if not durable relation was on the anvil. In an exclusive interview to *The Indian Express*, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, conveyed his willingness to talk with India without the involvement of a third party. Mr. Sharif also expressed that "he would like very much if Vapayee decided to visit Lahore on the inaugural bus service and promised hospitality that will be remembered for a long time," a statement that marked a deviation from their earlier stands.³⁶

³² *The Times of India*, November 14, 1998.

³³ *The Hindustan Times*, November 7, 1998.

³⁴ *The Times of India*, November 20, 1998.

³⁵ *The Statesman*, January 9, 1999.

³⁶ *Indian Express*, February 3, 1999.

In a deft and diplomatic manoeuvre, Prime Minister Vajpayee seized the opportunity and made an unprecedented announcement that he would travel all the way to Lahore to meet his counterpart. Announcing the official decision to visit Lahore, Mr. K.C. Singh, the External Affairs Ministry spokesman said, “ he (Vajpayee) looks forward to meeting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and other Pakistani leaders as well as the people of Pakistan. This visit will be one more manifestation of India’s abiding desire to build peaceful, friendly and co-operative relations with Pakistan”.³⁷ Welcoming Mr. Vajpayee’s plan to visit Pakistan in the inaugural bus service, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr. Sartaz Aziz, expressed optimism and warm appreciation when he said, “this is a welcome step and would go a long way in establishing good ties with India. We will give him a warm welcome if he comes to Pakistan”.³⁸

There were mixed feelings in both the countries. In Pakistan, sections of Jehadi groups like the Lashkar-i-Toiba, Al-Akhwan and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen opposed Mr. Vajpayee’s proposed visit strongly.³⁹ However, the common man waited for the visit with cautious optimism. Similar reactions were noticed in India, with the Shiv Sena and some other sections of people strongly voicing against the Lahore bus service. Excepting these hiccups, however, majority of the people of India awaited the visit’s outcome with abated anticipation.

Lahore Declaration

The Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, along with some of his cabinet colleagues and other dignitaries reached Wagah border on February 20, 1999 on the inaugural bus service introduced between Delhi and Lahore. Prime Minister Vajpayee was received by his Pakistan counter-part, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, with lot of enthusiasm and anticipation. Mutual distrust and suspicion was replaced with the peace process, with the introduction of the bus service between India and Pakistan. Much hope and expectation was raised about the improvement of relations and removal of distrust. However, the absence of the three service chiefs raised some doubt about the commitment of Pakistani leaders. Mr. Vajpayee, speaking to the electronic media on reaching the border, described their journey as a “defining moment in South Asian history”, and added, “I

³⁷ *The Times of India*, February 4, 1999.

³⁸ *The Statesman*, February 5, 1999.

hope we will be able to rise to the challenge”.⁴⁰ From Wagah, Mr. Sharif and Mr. Vajpayee flew to Lahore.

The Islamic Jehadi groups greeted Mr. Vajpayee with bandh and protest in Lahore, particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami, which protested throughout Lahore city and created law and order problems in the city. They not only protested but also tried to disrupt the dinner hosted at the Lahore Fort. Several diplomats’ vehicles on the way to Lahore fort were reported to have been damaged by the Islamic activists.⁴¹ Policemen had to use tear gas to disperse those activists from the fort and about 200 men were learned to have been arrested for instigating violent protests.⁴²

Mr. Vajpayee while speaking at a reception hosted in his honour by the Governor of Punjab commented that the distance between Delhi and Lahore has become nearer. He also promised a no first-use of nuclear weapons and further clarified that India’s nuclear test was “not aggressive but defensive”. Later in the banquet speech Mr. Sharif diplomatically brought the Kashmir issue into limelight when he stated, “Kashmir issue could not be wished away and had to be resolved consistent with international obligations, justice and equity”. He also reiterated that Kashmir was the core issue, and needed to be resolved for better relations in the future between the two countries.⁴³ This statement of Mr. Sharif was a reiteration Pakistan’s strategy, which is aimed at internationalizing the Kashmir issue.

Mr. Vajpayee went to Lahore to create an atmosphere of peace and goodwill towards its neighbour, Pakistan. His statement at the banquet speech at Lahore fort reflected this spirit when he stated, “I have brought but one message from India. There can be no greater legacy that we can leave behind than to do away with mistrust, to abjure and eliminate conflict, to erect an edifice of durable peace, amity, harmony and co-operation. I am confident that through our combined efforts we will succeed in doing so, no matter how hard we have to work in achieving it”⁴⁴

³⁹ *The Times of India*, February 20, 1999.

⁴⁰ *The Hindu*, February 21, 1999

⁴¹ *The Statesman* February 21, 1999.

⁴² *Indian Express*, February 21, 1999.

⁴³ *The Hindu*, February 22, 1999.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

In spite of all their differences and ill feelings, the Prime Minister of India and Pakistan urged restraint in the use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Vajpayee argued that the utility of nuclear does not exist in the present environment and asked for “an end to all nuclear weapons.” Mr. Sharif too echoed a similar view when he stated, “tension between the two countries has assumed dangerous proportion. In this unstable environment, it is incumbent on both our countries to work towards restraint and stabilization in spheres of nuclear and conventional armament.”⁴⁵

Many voices of resentment were heard in Pakistan against Mr. Vajpayee’s visit. The leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Mr. Qazi Hassain Ahmed accused Mr. Sharif of being “a friend of Hindus” and called him a “traitor” for inviting India’s Prime Minister to Lahore and stated, “We will chase Vajpayee out of Pakistan”.⁴⁶ The Editor of Pakistan’s daily, *The News* Mr. Imtiaz Alam, shared a similar feeling when he wrote, “it was a coup by the Prime Minister against the foreign office.”⁴⁷

Similar feelings were felt in India too. The Shiv Sena, Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad were not enthusiastic of the Lahore summit. These groups even went to the extent of disrupting the Asian test championship cricket matches played at Delhi and Calcutta between India and Pakistan. The Calcutta and Delhi cricket tests earned a bad name for India within the international community. This action of Shiv Sena activists led Mr. Wasim Akram, the captain of the Pakistan cricket team, to remark; “hopefully what happened will never happen again in cricket history”.⁴⁸ While addressing an opening session of the three day 15th biennial general meeting of an All India Local Running Staff Association at Jalpaiguri railway stadium, the then West Bengal Chief Minister, Mr. Jyoti Basu expressed reservation of the likely outcome of the Lahore summit meeting. He remarked, “Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee’s much publicized bus trip to Pakistan would hardly produce any result”.⁴⁹

In spite of the protest and tension in Lahore, Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration on February 21, 1999. Besides the declaration, the leaders of both

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ John Cherian, “Lahore and beyond,” *Frontline*, Vol.16, No.4, February 13-26, 1999, p.10.

⁴⁸ *Indian Express*, February 21, 1999.

⁴⁹ *The Hindu*, February 22, 1999

the countries also issued a joint statement and the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan at Lahore signed a memorandum of understanding. The Lahore Declaration, the joint statement and the memorandum of understanding that they signed and issued at Lahore on February 21, 1999.⁵⁰

The Lahore Declaration lays its basic objective in promoting peaceful and cordial relations between India and Pakistan. It indicates the willingness of both the countries to move forward to a settlement of the decades long disputes and crises through the principles and purposes of the United Nations charter and reiterated to abide by the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence. The Prime Minister of India and Pakistan “realized and underlined the fact that nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two neighbours added to their responsibility of avoidance of conflict between them and reiterated their determination to implement the Shimla agreement (1972) in letter and spirit”.⁵¹ It also expressed the obligation to fulfill the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Lahore Declaration also includes basic policy principle including mutual understanding and consulting, confidence building measures like, resolving all issues including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, non-interference and intervention of each other’s internal affairs, implementation of reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons that could create the risk of nuclear war and its measure for such action, strive for the promotion of all forms of human rights and fundamental freedoms, condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and reiteration of dedication to the goals and objectives of South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and agreed to work for the fulfillment and realization of the SAARC vision for the year 2000. The Lahore Declaration envisages peace and stability between India and Pakistan.⁵²

The Lahore Declaration no doubt had laid down some of the basic issues for building better relations between India and Pakistan, but the more important document that came about during the summit meeting was the Memorandum of Understanding

⁵⁰ *Pioneer*, February 22, 1999.

⁵¹ Surender Nath Kaushik, “The Sharif regime and the military take over”, in , Ramakant et al., (ed), *Contemporary Pakistan : Trends and Issues*, Vol. II, (New Delhi : Kalinga Publications, 2001), p .288

⁵² Text of the “Lahore Declaration”. *The Hindu*, February 22, 1999, also see, Appendix.

(MoU) signed by the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan. The MoU looked significant, theoretically, as it addressed some core issues like nuclear, which are vital for peace and security in the region. The memorandum contained a number of confidence building measures to build better relations and peaceful co-existence in the region, which includes advance notification of ballistic missile flight tests, prevention of incidents at sea and to review existing communication links, bilateral consultation on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to inform each other if any such accident occurred.

Further, the two countries agreed to abide by their respective unilateral moratoria on conducting nuclear test unless circumstances compelled, threatening their sovereign national interests. The memorandum also agreed to periodically review the implementation of existing confidence building measures and to check the effectiveness of it, by setting up proposed consultative mechanism.⁵³

This joint statement manifested an effort between the two Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to defuse tension between the two countries. Besides, it focused on a range of bilateral relations, regional co-operation and issues of international concern. In the joint statement, it was resolved that the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan would meet periodically and discuss on all issues of mutual concern including nuclear issues, undertake consultations on world trade organization related issues and establish area of co-operation in information technology specially in tackling the problem of Y2K. The Joint Statement added that, “the two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalize the visa and travel regime, and, shall appoint a two member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to civilian detainees and the missing prisoners of war”.⁵⁴

The people of South Asia in particular and the rest of the world welcomed Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore with anticipation in general. The Lahore declaration was signed between Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif with a sense of urgency to calm down the danger that had emerged in the region after the nuclear test. It also indicated a realization by both the leaders about the need to create an atmosphere of peace in the

⁵³ Text of the “Memorandum of Understanding,” Ibid.

⁵⁴ Text of the “Joint Statement”, Ibid

region. And despite the two leaders felt the need to engage with each other for peaceful and harmonious relations, the summit meeting could only take place after a series of bilateral dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad. Even then, it had failed to take appropriate steps to “address the security problems that have emerged after the May 1998 nuclear tests.”⁵⁵

Many developed and developing countries alike hailed the Lahore Declaration. Welcoming the successful outcome of the Lahore summit White House spokesman, Mr. P.J. Crowley said, “We warmly welcome the successful outcome of meeting between Pakistan Prime Minister Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee”. He further added, “The U.S hoped that the broad new agreement signed between India and Pakistan would improve ties and decrease chances of war.”⁵⁶ The Japanese Premier, Mr. Keizo Obuchi, also expressed similar feeling and said, “ I hope the agreement in the summit will turn out to be fruitful”. This optimism was also shared among the South Asian leaders. The Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry spokesman remarked, “The improvement in relations between India and Pakistan was a welcome sign for the region”.⁵⁷ France, Russia, Iran and Australia also echoed similar voice.

Despite the two-leader engagement in a peaceful bilateral dialogue, Pakistan continues to shell from across the border, resulting to loss of innocent lives. The militant activities in Jammu and Kashmir also did not witness any sign of relief. While Prime Minister Vajpayee and Sharif signed the much-acclaimed Lahore Declaration, the army of Pakistan was preparing for a misadventure in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir. The Lahore Declaration was found wanting in many other aspects. It did not bring about any significant change in the visa system as the previous system of city-specific visas continues to hinder the free movement of people.⁵⁸ Besides, the declaration also does not deal with the other issues, cross-border terrorism and border disputes (Sir Creek/Siachen). In hindsight, the Lahore Declaration seems to have been aimed at an eyewash done to minimize the pressure of the developed world.

⁵⁵ John Cherian, n.47,p.9.

⁵⁶ *The Hindu*, February 24, 1999.

⁵⁷ *The Hindu*, February 23, 1999.

⁵⁸ Amit Baruah, “The Bus to Pakistan”, *Frontline*, February 13-26,1999, Vol.16, No.4, p. 8.

Though the declaration and joint statement mentioned the needs to take “immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons”, nothing of the non-deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles was mentioned in the declaration. It also did not impose any restriction on further testing of nuclear weapons and missiles, the testing of Agni-II and the Ghauri-II are indication of such loopholes of the Declaration.⁵⁹ Mere unilateral nuclear moratoria are insufficient as both the countries are keen on deploying nuclear weapons for their political gain. Therefore, some analysts felt that “the confident building measures agreed upon failed to address the nuclear issue”.⁶⁰ The bus diplomacy and the subsequent Lahore Declaration turned out to be a futile exercise, as it was soon, hijacked by entrenched extremist elements in the Pakistan military establishment. The “call of the border” (sada-e-sarhad), which was initiated, by Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Sharif was subsequently replied by “call of the gun” by the Pakistani Army. Thus, K.K. Katyal had rightly stated, “the euphoria was short-lived, as the massive intrusion of Pakistani troops into Kargil and the subsequent armed conflict ashed away he gains, so painstakingly achieved” by the leaders of India and Pakistan.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Zia Main and M.V. Ramana, “Beyond Lahore: From transparency to arms control”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, April 17-24, 1999, Vol. XXXIV, Numbers 16-17, p. 938.

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ K.K. Katyal, ‘India-Pakistan relations’, *The Hindu*, January 17, 2000.

CHAPTER – THREE

KARGIL WAR

Pakistani Military's Game plan

Operation Vijay

Kargil and International Reaction

India's Military Preparedness

Pakistan has been involved in low intensity conflict with India through cross-border terrorism since 1989. These are Pakistan's plans to destabilise the Indian State. The Kargil war was the continuation of this state (Pakistan) policy. It was fought in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) mainly in the Drass, Batalik and Kargil sectors. The Kargil intrusions not only aimed to create law and order problems but also were planned by Pakistan "to seize" the Kargil region and "take control of it physically." This war was the result of the concerted effort made by Pakistan to seize the state of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of religious affinity. Pakistan had adopted this policy since partition.)

In 1947, when the British left the subcontinent Maharaja Hari Singh did not opt to join either of the two-dominion states, India and Pakistan. Having decided to remain independent, Maharaja Hari Singh sought to enter into a standstill agreement with India and Pakistan. India did not sign it, but Pakistan signed without any conditions.¹ However, within a week of signing the agreement, Pakistan began to use pressure tactics to force the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. Pakistan suspended all its economic relations with Kashmir, as an ongoing effort to bend or break the Maharaja's decision. Nevertheless, Maharaja was not bowed down by it. Pakistan again adopted more violent means to seize Kashmir. Pakistan sent from across the border thousands of tribesmen along with its armed forces to take over the state. The tribesmen after taking over Uri, marched towards Baramulla on October 24, 1947, plundering and looting on their way.² The poorly equipped Kashmiri army was overpowered and defeated by the invaders. The Maharaja, unable to control the deteriorating situation, fled from Srinagar to Jammu. On reaching Jammu, the Maharaja appealed for India's help and on October 26, 1947, signed the "Instrument of Accession" with India committing his state to accede to the Union of India. The Indian government after accepting the Instrument of Accession, airlifted its soldiers to Srinagar in the early hours of October 27, and saved Kashmir from being captured. This subsequent arm conflict between the invaders and Indian army led to the first India-Pakistan war on Kashmir. The Indian army defeated the Pakistani

¹ Prem Shankar Jha, *Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.2.

² Dina Nath Raina, *Unhappy Kashmir: The Hidden Story*, (New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1990), pp. 57-71

backed unruly and warring tribesmen defeating the very objectives of Pakistan to seize the state of Kashmir by covert actions.

However, Pakistan refused to recognise the accession of Kashmir to India. Pakistan considered the “Instrument of Accession” signed between the Maharaja of Kashmir and India on October 26, 1947 as an illegal treaty. In fact, leader after leader has tried to internationalise the Kashmir issue and sought international help to liberate Jammu and Kashmir from India. The former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, once stated in one of his speech at the U.N. Security Council that, “Jammu and Kashmir is not an integral part of India and has never been an integral part of India. Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory between India and Pakistan. It is more a part of Pakistan than it can ever be of India, despite India’s eloquence and all its extravagance with words.”³

The trouble over Kashmir arose from the fact that the region has geo-strategic importance to both the countries. The three major rivers, the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, which flow into western Punjab, the breadbasket of (west) Punjab, originate from the hills in the Kashmir region. With this and other interest in mind, Pakistan has always tried to capture Kashmir.⁴ The geographical area has an important place in the security of India; the state is strategically located in the north of India and is bound by Tibet in the east and Sinkiang (Xingjiang) province of China in the north. To the west is Afghanistan’s small mountainous stretch bordering USSR and to the southwest is Pakistan. Thus, “To secure Kashmir has become an important foreign policy of the Pakistani rulers, as the failure to secure Kashmir’s accession was a failure of the Pakistan ideal, which left the country incomplete”⁵. Besides accession of Kashmir was a rejection of the Muslim League’s two-nation theory, which underpinned the partition and led to the secular national repository of the subcontinent political identity.⁶

³ Z.A. Bhutto: Speech in the U.N. Security Council New York, Cited in, Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan (ed.), *Z.A. Bhutto, Reshaping Foreign Policy: 1948-1966*, Vol. 1, (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications), p.224.

⁴ Michael Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p.2

⁵ S. Mohammad Ali, *Cold War in the high Himalayas: The U.S.A., China and South Asia in the 1950s*, (Great Britain: Curzon Press, 1999), p.48.

⁶ Ibid.

In 1965, Pakistan once again launched an armed aggression in the Kashmir region under the code name “*Operation Gibraltar*”. Pakistan having acquired modern military technology and weapons from China and US renewed its effort to seize Kashmir by force.⁷ Pakistan sent thousands of its trained special task forces across the ceasefire line into Kashmir in two’s and three’s in August 1965, with the objective to sabotage, disrupt, distribute arms and initiate a guerilla uprising. The infiltrators occupied strategic height in the Kargil-Drass sector overlooking the Srinagar road. Pakistan aimed at capturing the valley through large-scale infiltrations of trained-armed guerrillas commanded by Pakistani army officers. “A Company each of 110 men was sneaked into Jammu and Kashmir for achieving this task in Kargil, Gurais and Tithwal areas in the Northwest and Mendhar, Darhal-thanamandi in the south and into Srinagar, Gulmarg and Uri in the valley.”⁸) They planned to destabilise the state machinery and to instigate the Kashmiris to revolt against the state government. Indian troops retaliated by crossing the international border from Sailkot to Kasur and suppressed their motives. Pakistan’s plan of annexing Kashmir was once again aborted as its troops sent to initiate a civil uprising miserably failed. After days of incessant fighting, Pakistani infiltrators were defeated and the war came to an end with the cease-fire on September 23, 1965. Five years later, in 1971 India and Pakistan were once again engaged in another war due to India’s involvement in the liberation struggle of the East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Pakistan was defeated leading to the break-up of East Pakistan into a new state Bangladesh.

Pakistan Military’s Game Plan (Operation Topac)

The ignominious defeat of the Pakistani army in 1971 war from the hands of the Indian army made them thirst for revenge. With this deep ill-feelings, General, Zia-ul-Haq who came to power after dethroning Mr. Z.A. Bhutto in a military coup, initiated an action plan called “*Operation Topac*” to “liberate” the Kashmir Valley. “*Operation Topac*” was named after “Topac Amin” an Inca prince, who fought a non-conventional war against the Spanish rule in the 18th century in Uruguay. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq believed it to be his final

⁷ R.N. Sharma, et al, *The Kargil War: A Saga of Patriotism*, (New Delhi, Shurbhi Publications, 2000), p.39.

⁸ S.D.S.Charak and Anita K. Billawaria, *The Kargil Combat*, (Jammu: Jay Kay Book House, 2001), p.32.

weapon, to overpower Jammu and Kashmir with full scale terrorism, subversion, insurrection and insurgency all at a time, which he thought would be far more effective than the formal war Pakistan had been fighting to capture Jammu and Kashmir.⁹ Having failed to snatch Jammu and Kashmir by force, Pakistan military leaders changed track and decided to initiate insurgency on the mujahideen pattern and inflict a “low intensity conflict.”¹⁰ A low intensity conflict, according to D.P.Kumar, “is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographical area, is often characterized by constraints on weaponry, tactics and level of violence.”¹¹ They planned to carry out the operation in three phases.

Phase I: Plans to create low-level insurgency against the ruling regime (J&K) and to seize it.

Phase II: Exert maximum pressure on the Siachen, Kargil and Rajouri-Poonch sectors to force the Indian Army to deploy reserve formations outside the main Kashmir valley, attack and destroy base depots and headquarter at Srinagar, Pattan, Kupwara, Baramulla, Bandipur and Chowkiwala, by covert action at a given time.

*Phase III: Plans to liberate Kashmir Valley by laying out detail plan after the success of the first two phases and establish an independent Islamic state in Kashmir.*¹²

The state Jammu and Kashmir machinery had broken down and had become ineffective in the late 1980s. Taking advantage of the ineffectiveness of the state government, Pakistan-sponsored militants became active in the state. By the middle of 1988, militants' activities had taken deep root in the Kashmir valley. The Kashmiris became discontent with the state government for its failure to control the situation and the central government's apathetic attitude towards them. This made way for Pakistani army the right environment to

⁹ D.P.Kumar, *Kashmir: Pakistan's Proxy War*, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1993), p.127.

¹⁰ Lt.Gen.K.K.Nanda, *Conquering Kashmir: A Pakistani Obsession*, (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1994), p.294

¹¹ Kumar, n.9, p.127.

¹² For detail explanation of *Operation Topac*, see, Lt. Gen.K.K.Nanda, n.10, p. 294-303.

launch phase I of “Operation Topac. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq did not live to see his mission fulfilled, as he was killed in an air crash in August 1988. However, Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) carried its plan forward. In fact, his death made all concerned perform their task with greater enthusiasm.¹³

Military played an important role in the state politics of Pakistan. They held high positions in the political set up and continued to dominate the state machinery. Political stability of the civilian government depended on the relation it had with the military leaders. Ms. Benazir Bhutto came to power with the victory of the Pakistan People’s Party in 1988. However, military continued to hold prominent place in the politics of Pakistan. Pakistan Army took independent charge of the Afghan policy and on the implementation of Zia’s plan in Kashmir. Pakistani Army and ISI carried out terrorist activities and proxy war in Kashmir by infiltrating militant groups in the region. It also provided arms and ammunition to the militants.

The year 1989 witnessed a scene of chaos and violence in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which resulted in frequent agitation and bandh. The Governor, Mr Jag Mohan, complained of the deteriorating law and order situation in the state. Instead of compliance with the Governor, the central government recalled him on 12 July 1989. This action of the central government boosted the morale of the militants. Violence, intimidation, subversion and terrorism became rampant, and amid all these problems and chaos election was held, adding more fuel to the fire.¹⁴ Phase 1 of “Operation Topac” seemed to be on the verge of completion by December 1989. With the dangerous escalation in terrorism, a “low-level insurgency” against the state regime was in full swing and the state was “under siege.” Pakistan-trained militants were infiltrated into the Kashmir valley to wage a holy war. They ran a parallel government and carried out various subversive activities in the valley. However, it was never a grassroots movement as the brutal un-Islamic terror tactics of the militants soon disillusioned Kashmiris.¹⁵ However, by the beginning of the 1990s, Indian military and police force had managed to curtail the activities of the militants to a large extent.

¹³ Col. Ravi Nanda, *Kashmir and Indo-Pak Relations*, (New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 2001), p.97.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.103.

¹⁵ “Ten years of proxy war”, *Seminar* 479, July 1999, p.19.

Pakistani Army establishment was unable to come to terms with the fact that ten years of its concerted effort to destabilise India through its proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir ^{was unsuccessful}. It was becoming increasingly frustrated for its failure to militarize the Kashmiris, since the people of Kashmir openly expressed their preference for returning to normal life. It undermined, all their hopes and desires “to bleed” India through a strategy of “thousand cuts.”¹⁶ This led them to seek new ways to re-activate militants activities in Kashmir.

In a desperate bid to revitalise militancy and boost the sagging moral of militants, Pakistan decided to send infiltrators in the Kargil region in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, planning for this operation had started in early 1997, when Gen. Musharraf was the Corp Commander, the troop movements and the logistic build-up were gradually and discretely carried out so as to avoid drawing the attention of the Indian Army and intelligence. Kashmiri militants were trained within shorter period with the programmes streamlined to make it more effective.¹⁷ The main objectives of Pakistan intrusion were;

1. *To interdict National Highway-1A (NH-1A) in order to deny India winter stocking of Kargil and Leh garrison.*
2. *To question the validity of the LOC as per the Simla Agreement by realigning it in Drass and Kargil sectors with a view to obtain direct domination of the NH-1A for a distance of 100 k.m. In so doing cut off the Indian troops in Leh.*
3. *To isolate the Indian army in Siachen Glacier and to capture the heights in the Chugh Valley, Battalik and Turtuk.*
4. *To find a fresh and safer route for infiltration by the mujahideen through Mushkoh Valley, along the nullah, while holding all the heights along the Drass Kargil region.*¹⁸

¹⁶ S.D.S.Charak and Anita K. Billawaria, op.cit., n.8, p.77

¹⁷ Col. Ravi Nanda, n.13, p.142.

¹⁸ Col. Ravi Nanda, n.13, pp.141-142, also see, *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 89-90 and *The Pioneer*, June 16, 1999

The importance of the Kargil sector could not be ignored. Pakistan in all the three wars fought with India initiated from this region. Kargil formed part of Ladakh proper traditionally. It was then formed as a separate district. Charak and Anita write, "Kargil sector consists of the area from Mushkoh valley in the Drass near Zojila Pass to Turtuk along the line of Control (LoC) towards the Siachen Glacier, approximately some 150 km in spread. The whole area is riddled with lofty rugged mountains with hardly any track and no logistic installation and much of it is covered with snow for most of the year. This area, however, is vital for defence and transport of civil and military traffic and goods, through the National Highway linking Srinagar and Leh.... The area has also gained importance as a number of hill features like Tololing height, Tiger Hill near Drass, Kaksar near Kargil and Batalik height dominate this only road from Srinagar to Leh on the south side and Siachen Glacier on the north east".¹⁹ The average heights of these Hills were above 12000 feet. "It was from and on these forbidden heights that the Kargil war was fought through May and July 1999, from Muskhoh, Kaksar, Batalik, Yaldar, Turtuk and then the Saltoro Ridge, marking the western flank Siachen Glacier...of the majestic snowfields of the high Karakoram," reports, Kargil Review Committee.²⁰

The Kargil Operation was a well-conceived plan kept secret until the war started. Pakistani generals carried out intensive study of the topography of the regions, climatic conditions and intensity of the snowfalls prior to their operations. This area had been chosen for its strategic importance. Its contemporary importance is that it set astride the main high way linking India to Ladakh at a point so proximately to the LoC, that Pakistan Howitzers were able to bombard the town in 1997 and 1998.²¹ Besides, the Peak 4875, which gave a 30 km. long uninterrupted birds eyeview over the Srinagar-Leh highway, was located in this region. Taking advantage of the locations and negligence by Indian army in the region, Pakistan planned to occupy those vacated regions during the winter and moved down the slopes to seize the Drass-Kargil-Leh NH-1A highway, once the snow melted, thus cutting off

¹⁹ S.D.S.Charak and Anita Billawaria, n.8, p.47-48.

²⁰ *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), p.16.

²¹ Manoj Joshi, "The Kargil War: The Fourth Round", in, Kanti Bajpai, et al. (ed.) *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy*, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2001), pp.32-33.

Ladakh from Kashmir. Subsequently, “in the spring of 1999 around 800 to 1000 officers and men of Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI) and the Special Service Group (SSG) crossed the Line of Control into the Kargil sector and occupied strategic heights all along the ridgelines.”²² As in 1965, Pakistan began massive infiltration of its soldiers disguised as mujahideen along with foreign mercenaries into the Kargil sectors. They came in groups of two’s and three’s to avoid detection by Indian intelligence and held up strategic positions all along the ridgelines of Kargil. Helipads and roads were built connecting to the Line of Control for further reinforcement and better communications. Pakistan transports supplies and armaments on the border using its aircraft. Besides, remote control piloted vehicles and air borne surveillance platforms were also used to monitor the Leh-Kargil area.²³ Maj.Gen. J.J. Singh, the Indian army military operations additional director stated that the military equipment of the infiltrators included missiles, radars, snowmobiles, mortars, sophisticated military communication equipment and automatic weapons.²⁴

The Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan Army backed the Kargil-Drass offensive. One each battalion of Special Services Groups and Gilgit Scouts had also been roped in.²⁵ The 10 corps artillery comprised 20 pounders, 105 mm. field guns, and 155 mm. medium launchers. Gun locating radars for accurate counter bombardment were also available. The long-range artillery was deployed to interdict the NH-1A.²⁶

In Drass, a few months’ ahead Pakistani generals had very strategically placed their troops and guns at Tololing Peak. “To defend and sustain Tololing more troops and guns were placed at Peak 5140 and all along the three spurs leading to it.”²⁷ The topography of the region also gives Pakistan advantage over India as the depth of the ridgeline north of the LoC and their gradients, along with nullah approaches enabled the Pakistani army to provide crucial logistical and administrative support to their troops.²⁸

²² Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “Of myths and realities: The Kargil experience” in Kanti Bajpai, et al., (ed), *ibid*, p.109.

²³ Jatin Desai, *Kargil and Pakistan Politics*, (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 2000), p.232.

²⁴ *The Times of India*, May 7, 1999.

²⁵ M.K.Akbar, *Kargil: Cross Border Terrorism*, (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1999), p.116.

²⁶ Col. Ravi Nanda, n.13, p.143.

²⁷ Gaurav C. Sawant, *Dateline Kargil*, (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2000), p.3.

²⁸ Jatin Desia, n.23, p.1.

The Pakistan's armed intruders were first spotted by the shepherds, who went up the Batalik Hill for hunting, and that was reported to the army authorities on May 6, 1999.²⁹ Subsequently, a patrol team was sent to monitor the intrusions. This patrol team was ambushed and killed by heavily armed Pakistani-backed militants. On May 7 1999, the 3rd Punjab patrol team confirmed the presence of the intruders in the region. Immediately thereafter, one company each of 10 Garhwal Rifles (GR) and 16 Grenadiers was moved in to contain the intrusion. Further reinforcement was carried out in the Batalik sector on May 9, with two battalions of 1/11 Gurkha Rifles and 12 Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (JAKLI). The Indian Army detected more intrusions in the Drass and Mushkoh sectors on May 12 and 14, 1999. The 1st Naga Regiment was put into service to contain the infiltration in the Drass sector. Two days later 8 Sikhs Regiment and 12 Rashtriyas Rifles (RR) were moved in to reinforce the Indian troops.³⁰

Pakistan resorted to heavy infiltrations and artillery shelling from across the border destroying underground ammunition dump at Kargil, television relay center and local residential houses. This was subsequently followed by heavy exchange of fire in Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir, leading to the death of the "eight Indians including seven army men and around 15 Pakistani militants" on May 15, 1999.³¹ Pakistan's provocative action had compelled Indian Army to launch a firm but measured military operation to flush out the intruders from the Indian Territory.³² Indian army suffered a serious setback in the initial stage of counterinsurgency. As the Indian government and army were caught unawares, they could not frame specific plan and policies to tackle the situation. Moreover, the Indian Army was ill equipped and inexperienced in mountain warfare. The climatic conditions and geographical areas also did not suit the Indian army.

Thus, Harinder Baweja remarked on the summoning of the 1st Naga Regiment who were sent to contain Drass sector from infiltrators: "They were ordered to move to Drass almost overnight. The unit was rushed into an operation within hours of their arrival without

²⁹ A.K. Chakraborty, *Kargil: Inside Story*, (Noida: Trishul Publications, 2000), p.11.

³⁰ *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report*, (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1999), p.99.

³¹ *Indian Express*, May 16, 1999.

³² Gurmeet Kanwal, "Kargil", *Seminar* 479, July 1999, p.15.

a single day of acclimatization, without time to get used to the rarefied atmosphere and above all, not equipped for high altitude warfare. They had no snowshoes; and hardly any special clothing required for heights above 12000 feet. They did not have a single medium gun and were issued INSAS rifles, a weapon they were totally unfamiliar with. For counter-insurgency operation they were given AK-47s, which Naga Regiment had never been use to it.”³³

In spite of various constraints and difficulties, the Indian Army fought with great zeal and determination to evict the intruders. Heavy exchange of firing continued from all sides of the Kargil sectors, resulting in enormous casualty and loss of life on both sides. Indian troops who were trying to scale up the dangerous barren in Kaksar, Drass and Batalik regions were confronted with the Pakistani-backed infiltrators. Being at a vantagepoint, well-armed infiltrators continuously fired at the Indian Army.³⁴ Reinforcement of infiltrators in large number came from across the border under the cover of heavy shelling. The militants had crossed over to Indian side disguised as local shepherds.

Operation Vijay

The apex Cabinet Committee on Security took the decision to use air power on May 24, 1999, to evict the intruders. This decision to use air combat was taken to curtail further infiltration and to contain their operations. Subsequently, on May 26, 1999, Indian Army launched “*Operations Vijay*” by conducting two rounds of combat air strikes in support of the Army’s counter-infiltration operations in the high altitude Drass and Kargil sectors.³⁵ With the launch of “*Operation Vijay*”, Indian Air Force put into operation its top-of-the-line fighter plane Mig-21, Mig-23, Mig-27, Jaguar and Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft along with Cheetah helicopter to pound on the positions held by the infiltrators.³⁶

³³ Harinder Baweja, *A Soldier’s Dairy: Kargil the Inside Story*, (New Delhi: Books Today, 2000), p. 29.

³⁴ Grija Shankar Kaura, “Troops in No Win Situation,” *Tribune*, May 23, 1999.

³⁵ *Indian Express*, May 27, 1999.

³⁶ *Tribune*, May 27, 1999.

Within days of launching Operation Vijay, India lost two fighters Aircraft. Flt. Lt. K. Nachiketa was taken as prisoner and Pakistani army killed Sqn. Ldr. A. Ahuja. Further on May 28,1999 militants brought down Indian Air Force (IAF) MI-17 helicopter killing all crewmembers. With the loss of three aircraft in action, two pilots killed, another taken into Pakistan custody and many missing, Operation Vijay has run into rough weather.³⁷ IAF initial failure has been attributed to number of factors; IAF pilots are mostly trained for radar-evading, low-level strikes in the plains and semi-hilly terrain. The IAF has never seriously oriented its fighter pilots to carry out air strike in high attitude terrain.³⁸ And since the infiltrators were at the height of 15000 to 18000 feet all along the ridgelines, they were difficult to spot and target.

Pakistan eventually moved two brigades of troops close to the borders. Indian armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir were also put on high alert. Pakistan artillery shelling continued from across the border. This led to eviction of civilian population to Sankoo valley from Drass and Kargil sub sectors to avoid loss of human life. On May 29, the Indian Army made a break-through in the Drass-Batalik sub-sector and evicted intruders occupied positions. In the ensuing operation, the Indian Army recovered one Pakistani Army body, who was later identified as Sepoy Abdul Ayub of 4th Northern Light Infantry.³⁹ Pakistan intensified heavy bombing along the NH-1A to disrupt reinforcements and supplies for Indian troops engaged in battling infiltrators. With firing escalating in the Drass-Kargil sector, the Indian Navy was put on high alert on May 30.⁴⁰ The Indian Army faced tough resistance from infiltrators while trying to recapture the Batalik sub-sector. Inclement weather and rough terrain further hindered Indian movements. Nevertheless, Indian troops backed by fighter jets made major gains against the infiltrators.

The Batalik sector was captured by Indian Army backed by air strikes after days of fierce battle, causing heavy casualty and lost of life. By June 3,1999 Indian troops won back 9 positions in Batalik. However, the success of Batalik was tinged with a new and potentially

³⁷ *The Hindu*, May 29, 1999

³⁸ R.N. Sharma, et al, n.7, p. 56

³⁹ *Indian Express*, May 30, 1999

⁴⁰ *The Hindu*, May 31,1999.

dangerous development. "The Pakistanis, dropping all pretence, started sending in reinforcements, drawn from regular troops of Northern Light Infantry and attacked positions the Indian troops had captured over the past three-weeks. As a result of intensified fighting in all sectors, casualties have mounted on both sides."⁴¹ After recapturing many key positions in the Batalik sub-sector, Indian army fought hand-to-hand combat in many other occupied Drass-Batalik and Kargil sectors.

By the first week of June, as India and Pakistan locked horns in the Kargil sector and with no sight of retracting back, the international bodies, especially the U.S. expressed serious concern over the crisis in the region. The American President, Mr. Bill Clinton, taking personal initiative wrote to both the Prime Ministers, asking to restrain and respect the Line of Control on June 5, 1999. In spite of the International pressure, India and Pakistan continued to engage in heavy exchange of fire. Pakistan playing the real politics denied involvement and masterminding the large-scale intrusion in the Kargil episode and instead accused New Delhi of escalating tensions in Kashmir. As of June 7, 1999, it was reported that Indian soldiers has lost 63 men, 217 wounded and 14 missing.⁴²

In a bid to expose the involvement of Pakistan Army in the Kargil, Indian Army had released the transcript of telephone conversation between General Pervez Musharraf and Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz, Chief of General Staff.⁴³ This led to the exposure of Pakistani army involvement in the Kargil intrusion, which Pakistan officials had been denying since the beginning of the Kargil war. Reeling under international pressure, Pakistan sent its Foreign Minister Mr Sartaj Aziz to India for talks. Mr Aziz held talks with the Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr Jaswant Singh, on June 12, 1999 in New Delhi, which ended in a deadlock. India reiterated that Pakistan must fully stop the armed aggression from the Indian territory and restore the Line of Control. However, the talks ended in failure, as Pakistan demanded for the ceasing of air strikes and shelling by India first. India also

⁴¹ Sanjay Dutt, *War and Peace in Kargil Sector*, (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, 2000), p.73.

⁴² *The Hindu*, June 9, 1999.

⁴³ "Pakistan Army Chief Gets a Briefing", *The Hindu*, June 12, 1998.

demanded that the perpetrators of the torture of the Indian soldiers be punished. Once again Pakistan denied its involvement.⁴⁴

The crucial Totoling peak fell on June 13, after hours of nightlong operation. Indian Army was enlightened by the success of this operation. Pakistan in its defence started to position its forces all along the Line of Control and on the border along the Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Subsequently, Indian Army, Navy, Air force and the Coast Guard were all put in a state of high alert following Pakistan troops movement along the Line of Control and on the border of Pakistan occupied Kashmir.⁴⁵ In the midst of the Kargil war, the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh toured to China on June 14, 1999 and signed various agreement with the Chinese government, agreed to hold a security dialogue, clarify positions along the LoC, enhance mutual exchange of visits at various levels and boost bilateral trade and economic co-operation.⁴⁶

The Indian Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandez, while addressing the gathering at the Centenary celebration of the first Mahavir Chakra decorated officer Brigadier Rajendra Singh in Samba, warned the infiltrators “either surrender to the Indian Army or get killed”.⁴⁷ The American President, Mr. Bill Clinton, phoned to Mr Sharif to start a dialogue with India and stop the infiltration. Many resenting voices heard in Pakistan, fundamentalist groups expressed resentment with Mr. Clinton statement. The Lashkar-i-Toiba spokesman, Mr. Umar Farooq, remarked, “They (militants) do not obey the order of US President Bill Clinton, they only obey the orders of Allah.” Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz expressed similar voice, when he stated, “They are not under our control.”⁴⁸

As Operation Vijay entered 25th day of its operation, the Indian Army was able to recapture one post after another slowly but successfully. After much struggle and with great difficulties, the Indian army recaptured Point 5140 on June 20, the highest point along the

⁴⁴ *Indian Express*, June 13, 1999.

⁴⁵ Dinesh Kumar, “forces put on high alert”, *Times of India*, June 15, 1999

⁴⁶ *The Hindu*, June 15, 1999.

⁴⁷ *The Hindustan Times*, June 16, 1999.

⁴⁸ *Indian Express*, June 17, 1999.

Totoling ridge from the infiltrators in the Drass sector. With the capture of this strategic point, the advantage of shelling on the Srinagar-Leh highway had been denied to the infiltrators. The Indian Army describes the recapture of this location as “unparalleled in the history of mountainous warfare.”⁴⁹ The recapture of this strategic height was followed with the capture of almost all the major post in the Kargil–Batalik sector. Another strategically important Tiger Hill has also been encircled and the army has driven back the intruders to within 2-5 km of the LOC in Mushkoh valley and cut off their supply lines in the Tiger Hill. Indian Army and Air Force carried out intensive operation firing round the clock in the region using Mirage 2000 fighters along with laser-guided bombs destroying the highly fortified bunkers of the intruders in the Drass sub-sector, who were atop 16000 feet height. The highly armed intruders retaliated using heavy anti-aircraft fire and surface-to-surface stringer missiles.⁵⁰

Indian air force and army intensified their operation, leading to heavy casualty of the infiltrators, which became a major source of concern for Pakistan. Pakistan continued massive reinforcement from across the border. It was reported on June 21, 1999 some 5000 mercenaries were stationed at various camps across the Line of Control to infiltrate into India.⁵¹ In response to the intensive firing by the Indian air force, Pakistan also carried out intense shelling and firing on Indian positions from across, along the international border and the LoC in Jammu Division.

Pakistan-backed militants stepped up militant’s activities in the valley to divert the attention of Indian Army. The militant and Pakistani Army shelling continued heavily from across the border, on the NH-1A linking the Kargil sector to stop further reinforcement and communications links to the Indian army. However, reinforcements and supply continued by air and alternative route, defeating the motives of Pakistan.

⁴⁹ *Indian Express*, June 21, 1999.

⁵⁰ *The Hindustan Times*, June 25, 1999.

⁵¹ *News Time*, June 22, 1999.

Indian troops continued to recapture certain strategic peak of Tiger Hill. But, on July 7 and 8 the troops of 8 Sikh regiment and 18 Grenadiers who were holding the base and top of Tiger Hill encountered a fierce attack from the intruders. The 17 Jat and 13 JAK Rifles also had to dig in and launch fresh attacks on Point 4875 and Twin Bumps to defeat incursion. The Tiger Hill was well defended, thus by July 10,1999, Army cleared almost the entire Batalik sub-sector. As of July 9, 1999, it was reported that India has lost 321 army personnel, 476 wounded and 10 missing, while Pakistan was reported to have lost 634 regulars.⁵²

Pakistan continued to support the infiltrators by rushing in reinforcements into the Drass sector. Fierce fighting escalated resulting in loss of many lives. Indian army had captured almost every position held by infiltrators with the regain of Tiger Hill in the Drass sector on July 11,1999, and Batalik Sector on July 13,1999. India asked Pakistan to pull back its infiltrators by July 16. Pakistan was finally left with no option but to pull back. As a result, by July 16,1999, it withdrew its infiltrators bringing the war to end.

Kargil and International Reaction

The Kargil war might be considered another plot of Pakistan to internationalise the Kashmir issue and to bring international intervention in its favour and put Kashmir on the United Nations agenda.⁵³ Pakistan infiltrated its troops along with trained mercenaries across the international border into the Kargil sector to conceal its identity from the international community. Pakistan continuously denied India's charges of masterminding large-scale intrusion and involvement of its army in the intrusion. Instead, it propagated that the Kargil misadventures was a liberation movement initiated by the mujahideen freedom fighters and accused New Delhi of escalating tension by launching air and ground offensive against "freedom fighters."⁵⁴ The international community watched cautiously the counter

⁵² Nitin A. Gokhale, "It isn't over till..", *Outlook*, July 19, 1999.pp.18-19.

⁵³ *The Times of India*, June 16, 1999.

⁵⁴ "Kashmir Diplomacy Skits," *The Jerusalem Post*, June 6, 1999.

infiltration campaign carried out by Indian army and air force involving highly innovative air strikes, fierce artillery encounters vicious mortar exchanges and the inevitable hand to hand infantry combat on mountain tops finally led to the eviction of the intruders. However, at the end of the day, Pakistan's perfidy had been exposed to the whole world one more time through its misadventure and miscalculation.⁵⁵

As it turned out, Pakistan having been exposed of its regular's involvement in the Kargil War, the international body pressured Pakistan to stop infiltration and to resume talk with India. The Western countries especially the US asked Pakistan to cease its aggression and to withdraw from Indian Territory. The White House issued a statement urging Pakistan to restrain and to reaffirm the sanctity of the LoC. The statement reads, " We (America) think that the LoC has been demarcated over the years. The two parties have not previously had significant differences about where the LoC ...in practice the forces, which have crossed the line, should withdraw to where they come from. The urgent step that we need here is to restrain exercised and a returned to the LoC."⁵⁶ Russia also urged Pakistan to restore the LoC and maintain status quo. A senior Russian Foreign Minister Official said, on Jan 6,1999, "New Delhi's military action to flush out infiltrators in the Kargil sector is fully in accordance with India's sovereign right to defend its territorial integrity."⁵⁷ Japan, E.U. and Britain too asked, Pakistan to terminate its aggression and to respect and restore the LoC and not to disrupt peace in the region. Reeling under international pressure, Pakistan sent its Special Emissary, Mr. Munir Akram, Envoy in Geneva to the G-8 leaders meeting to brief the leaders about Indian military action, its continued war efforts and Islamabad's peace oriented approach.⁵⁸ However, the G-8 leaders, contrary to Pakistan's expectation, condemned Pakistan military actions and called to respect and maintain the status of the Line of Control. The G-8 leaders asked India and Pakistan to cease tension in the region to maintain the status quo of the LOC and to start a dialogue to solve the issue. The G-8 leaders after the Cologne meeting issued a joint statement, which stated, "We regard any military action to change the status quo as irresponsible. We therefore call for the immediate end of

⁵⁵ Kapil Kak, "International Responses," in, Air Com., Jagjit Singh(ed), *Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir*, (New Delhi: Knowledge World,1999), p. 190.

⁵⁶ C. Raja Mohan, "The US and Kargil," *The Hindu*, June 10, 1999.

⁵⁷ "Russia for status quo in LoC," *The Hindu*, June 7, 1999.

⁵⁸ Amit Baruah, "Sharif writes to G-8 seeking support," *The Hindu*, June, 1999.

these actions, restoration of the LoC and for the parties to work for an immediate cessation of the fighting, full respect in the future for the LoC and the full resumption of the dialogue between India and Pakistan in the spirit of Lahore Declaration.”⁵⁹

On June 23, Chief of Army Staff, Gen. V.P. Malik threatened to cross the LoC, if Pakistan did not end the proxy war.⁶⁰ At this curtail period, Washington Special Envoy, Gen. Anthony Zinni U.S. Commander in Chief, Central Command and Mr. Gibson Lampher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State held various talks with Pakistani Military and Political leaders on the on going tension in the region, on June 24 and June 25. However, the talks could not bring out any amicable solution. And on June 26, 1999, Mr Lampher came to India and discussed with Indian officials resolution of the ongoing crisis between India and Pakistan. In spite of all these international pressures and diplomacy, fighting continued in the Kargil region. India continued to evict the infiltrators and managed to seize Point 4700 held by Pakistani backed infiltrators on June 28. By June 1999, Pakistan was isolated internationally and had not succeeded much in garnering support on the Kargil issue. Having failed to convince the world community, Islamabad turned to Beijing. The Prime Minister Mr. Sharif, toured China to seek its help. However, Chinese support was not forthcoming on the issue. Rather, the Chinese Premier, Mr. Zhu Rongji, emphasized the need to hold talks with India when he said, “We hope to see Pakistan and India quietly resolve the issue through a dialogue in order to ease the current tense situation and return South Asia to peace and stability.”⁶¹ Mr. Sharif unable to convince China cut short his trip and came back to Islamabad.

Pakistan was caught in the crossroad. Contrary to Pakistan’s expectation, the international body condemned Pakistan for the Kargil misadventure and was asked to pull back its infiltrators. Thus, to break the impasse, Mr. Sharif rushed to Washington and held a meeting with the US President Mr. Bill Clinton on July 4, 1999. The Washington talks turned out to be a setback to Pakistan. In course of the talks, Pakistan agreed to withdraw from Kargil and to return to the Line of Control. Pakistan also agreed that concrete steps would be

⁵⁹ *Indian Express*, June 21, 1999.

⁶⁰ *The Times of India*, June 24, 1999.

⁶¹ *Indian Express*, June 29, 1999.

taken for the restoration of the Line of Control in accordance with the “1972 Shimla Accord.”⁶² This sudden change of Mr. Sharif foreign policy had invited severe criticism from within the country. The Jamaat-i-Islami acting chief, Syed Munawar Hussain, strongly reacted against the Washing declaration and remarked, “The Army is fully supporting them.” While its chief Mr. Qazi Hussain Ahmed came out sternly against the declaration saying, “Those who sabotaged the success of Mujahideen will meet ^{the same} fate of Mujib-ur-Rehman.” Similar voices were expressed by the chairman of the United Jihad Council based at Muzaffarabad (POK) who said, “Mujahideen did not seek permission from Pakistan to capture Kargil height nor would they vacate it by asking Pakistan. We will not act upon their instruction.”⁶³

India’s Military Preparedness

India won the Kargil war but at a very heavy price. The Kargil war has exposed some of the serious lapses and negligence in the defence system of India. Being at the strategic location, the Indian armed forces had five divisions in the Kashmir Valley alone and one in Ladakh, along with over 150 battalions of various paramilitary forces as well as multiple layered intelligence network from RAW, MI, BSF, SSB, SSF to satellite/ electronic monitoring facilities along the international border in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.⁶⁴ Besides, RAW had at its disposal a fleet of aircraft for aerial photography, reconnaissance and electronic interception. Its fleet of Boeing 707, Gulfstream and Gates Learjet is supposed to produce electronic and photo intelligence at regular intervals.⁶⁵ However, in spite of all these well-established military and intelligence system, the army and the intelligence could not provide information of Pakistan intrusion nor prevent it. The saddest part of the intelligence system was that the intruders were first sighted and reported by the local children who went up the hill for hunting. Thus, A.K.Chakraborty remarks, “it is a sad commentary

⁶² Tara Kartha, Chronology, in, Air Com. Jasjit Singh (ed), *Kargil 1999: Pakistan’s Fourth War for Kashmir*, (New Delhi: knowledge world, 1999), p.279, also see for detail chronology, R.N. Sharma, et.al.,n.7, pp. 77-200.

⁶³ Sati Sahni, *Kashmir Underground*, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2000), pp.444-445.

⁶⁴ Gautam Navlakha, “Kargil: Cost and Consequences,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 27, July 3, 1999, p. 1748

⁶⁵ A.K. Chakraborty, *Kargil: Inside story*, (Noida: Trisul Publications, 2000), p.16

on the intelligence set up that the first information of the presence of Pakistan regular troops in Kargil in brigade strength was a shepherd, who reported what he saw on May 6, 1999. In a sense, the Kargil bungling is a repeat of 1962 humiliation at the hand of the Chinese in the Northeast when political and military leadership was caught napping.”⁶⁶ R.S. Bedi made a similar remark, “It is almost impossible to trudge 20 to 30 ft. of snow and established posts at heights of 15000 to 17000 feet’s. In this age of satellite intelligence, how RAW failed to monitor the obvious is incomprehensible.”⁶⁷

Another serious problems with the defense system were the lack of co-ordination. According to Kargil committee reports, it is stated that the 15 Corps had become clear of the intruders positions at a number of places in the Batalik sector by May 11,1999. Yet, it was by May 17,1999 a day after receiving its first aerial photographs taken by the Aviation Research Centre the presence of the intruders were confirmed.⁶⁸ Air service was put into service after days of heavy casualty and loss of life. Another report said that throughout the winter RAW’s Aviation Research Centre did not carry out regular surveillance flights along the Kargil sector, nor did the IAF send up aircraft for high-altitude reconnaissance on the snow-bound mountains.⁶⁹ Had these things been carried out earlier, the infiltrators could have been detected earlier and India might have averted a major disaster. The intelligence, defence, army and Indian government were caught napping by the intruders. India has not learned lesson from its mistake of 1962.

The army did not have proper dress for high snow covered terrain and modernised weapons to fight the intruders. These led to serious drawback and difficulties in the counter insurgency operation like Kargil. The Kargil victory was due to gallant and heroic sacrifices of the Indian soldiers. “Had the soldiers been provided better equipment and dress, the number of casualties could have been reduced a lot if not all for too long has the nations been depended on the indomitable courage of infantryman to keep peace on the borders,” says Gurmeet Kanwal. He Further adds, “While the battle will continue to be ultimately won by

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ R.S. Bedi, “Intelligence failure: perils of reactive mood,” *Tribune*, May 29, 1999.

⁶⁸ *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report*, (New Delhi: Sage publications, 1999),p.79.

infantry...the time has come to employ state of the art military technology to reduce dependence on the supreme sacrifice of hundreds of young men to defend India.”⁷⁰ However, Harinder Baweja felt that the Kargil war was a lesson taught to the Indian army. She states that, “the Kargil operation was a plus. Not in term of the victory but because of crucial lessons that come out of it. Army Headquarter and the Defense Ministry realized just how ill prepared we were and just how vulnerable the lack of proper equipment left us.”⁷¹ India has paid a heavy prize in the Kargil War. India could not ignore the security of the state any longer. Lesson has to be learnt from the past experience: “If the military and political establishment had not left a crucial 200 km stretch along the line of control, from Mushkoh valley to Turtuk, bereft of the surveillance and protection it required, the present imbroglio at the border may never have happen” writes Gurmet Kanwal.⁷²

However, Pakistan repeated the history. “In 1965 even before the drying of the ink of the Rann of Kutch agreement between India and Pakistan, Pakistan had attacked India in Kashmir,” says Kalim Bahadur.⁷³ Similar action was repeated in 1999 by Pakistan even while the Lahore Declaration had yet to be implemented.

⁶⁹ Jatin Desai, n.23, p.232.

⁷⁰ Gurmet Kanwal, “Not by lives alone,” *Indian Express*, June 23, 1999.

⁷¹ Harinder Beweja, n.33, p.163.

⁷² *Indian Express*, June 28, 1999.

⁷³ Kalim Bahadur, “India and Pakistan fifty three years of Conflicts and tension,” in, N.K. Jha (ed) *India's foreign policy in the changing world*, (New Delhi: South Asia Publisher, 2000), p. 160.

CHAPTER - FOUR

THE AGRA SUMMIT

India-Pakistan Relations Prior to the Agra Summit
Musharraf Become President
India's Unilateral Measures
The Summit
Agra Summit and Its Impact
Role of Media in the Agra Summit

India-Pakistan Relations Prior to the Agra Summit

According to Surendra Chopra, India-Pakistan relations undulate between conflict and de-escalation, but rarely tilt towards co-operation¹. India and Pakistan could not develop cordial relations even after a period of 53 years as sovereign neighbour states. The same mistrust and imagined threat especially on the part of Pakistan still continues to dominate the mindset of the ruling elite, albeit manifestation in new and more devastating strategy to destabilize India. Peace pacts and treaties, which have been a routine affair between the two countries, have hardly mattered when it comes to the issue of Kashmir. Each time India and Pakistan tried to solve their dispute, crisis in one form or the other followed suit. This process continues even in the post-cold war era.

Any pretension in their diplomatic neighbourly relations was on the verge of collapse in the late 1990s. This period was characterized by a number of crises and problems like the nuclear tests (May 1998), military coup (October 1999) and the hijacking of the Indian Airline (December 1999). The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 generated much heat in the region, thanks to the hype the west gave to the development. However, this newly generated tension was normalised to some extent with the signing of the Lahore Declaration between the two countries. The Lahore Declaration was signed to bridge the gap that had existed for quite some time. Yet, this declaration was nipped in the bud even before the process could be carried forward by the Kargil war. The Kargil war had overturned the anticipation of good and co-operative relations between India and Pakistan. This crisis was further worsened by the military coup in Pakistan and the hijacking of an Indian Airline IC 814 allegedly by the Pakistan backed Mujahideen. All these developments brought the relations of India and Pakistan into open hostility. The hijacking of the Indian Airlines flights IC 814 from Kathmandu allegedly by the Pakistan-backed mujahideen was a deliberate attempt to sabotage the image of the Indian government and to release the leaders of the militant groups

¹ Surendra Chopra, "India-Pakistan Relations in the 1990s", in , R.S. Yadav (ed), *India's Foreign Policy Towards 2000 AD*, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1993), p.62

linguishing in various Indian jails.² The backing of the Pakistani government in the hijacking was no secret as the demands of the release of those 35 militants by the hijackers were mostly Pakistani nationals. The hijacked aircraft had also stopped over at Lahore for refueling en-route to Kandahar via Dubai.

After landing at Kandahar and having secured their safety, the hijackers pressured and demanded the release of Harkat-ul-Ansar general secretary, Maulana Masood Azhar and 35 other militants. Besides, they also demanded the return of the remains of a dead terrorist, Sajjad Afghani and the payment of a lump sum amount of \$200 million.³ The hijacking of the aircraft was a serious setback for the government of India. The militants were able to bring the Kashmir issues into limelight once again and put tremendous pressure on the Indian government. The government of India had great difficulty in dealing with the demands of the hijackers. The militants with the support of the Taliban regime and Pakistan were able to achieve their objective. The Indian government after initial refusal reverted its stand and gave in to the demands of the militants. Finally on December 31, 1999, the India government released three hard-core militants, Maulana Masood Azhar, Mushtaq Ahmed Zarger and Ahmed Umar Syed in exchange for the release of 150 passengers and crews on board.⁴ Indian government had reluctantly agreed to the release of the militants to safeguard the interest of the country and for the safety of those passengers of the ill-fated aircraft. However, A.K.Verma former cabinet secretary remarked, “foreign minister Jaswant Singh’s visit to Kandahar, escorting the militants was disastrous as a diplomatic move.”⁵

Gen. Pervez Musharraf came to power after dethroning the civilian government in a bloodless coup on October 12,1999. The coup was the result of acrimony that developed between the military leader Gen. Musharraf and the democratically elected Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif. Civil-military relations had reached its lowest ebb during the Kargil war. With the failure of the Kargil operation, Pakistan civilian leaders

² “Defeat at Kandahar”, *Frontline*, January 21, 2000, p.10.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Amit Baruah, “Warning signals”, *Frontline*, January 21, 2000, p.11.

blamed Pakistani military leaders for the Kargil misadventure. Mr. Niaz Niak, former foreign secretary, stated, "Sharif had come to know about the intrusion in Kargil only on April 26, 1999." General Musharraf irked by this statement of Mr. Niaz, promptly replied "everyone was on board," arguing Mr. Sharif had pre-knowledge of the Kargil operation.⁶ These tense relations were further complicated by Mr. Sharif and Mr. Bill Clinton Washington Declaration, in which Islamabad agreed to withdraw from the Line of Control. The military establishment was demoralised and angry at Mr. Sharif's actions. With this development, the relations between Gen. Musharraf and Mr. Sharif reached to a state of no return. Thereafter, Mr. Sharif wanted to remove Gen. Musharraf and appoint his loyal military official in place of him. Finally, Mr. Sharif set the stage for a civil coup against the Gen. Musharraf on October 12, 1999 when the general was away to Sri Lanka.⁷

Within hours of announcing the dismissal of Gen. Musharraf, the military leader loyalist launched a coup and brought the country into military rule. On assuming power, Gen. Musharraf proclaimed himself as the Chief Executive and issued the Provincial Constitutional Order (PCO) Number 1 of 1999, after he returned from Colombo. General Pervez Musharraf like those of his predecessor Gen. Zia-ul-Haq after the coup "promised to restore economic and social stability and return Pakistan to democracy. He also made a commitment to end Pakistan's international isolation over its nuclear weapons dispute with India and its support of the Taliban in Afghanistan."⁸ Despite the promise of bringing Pakistan to an early return to democracy, Gen. Musharraf found it hard to surrender power to the civilian and kept the country under military regime by adopting an apolitical posture. Pakistan was politically isolated after the coup from the international community. And there were tremendous pressure especially from the US and other countries to return to democracy and start a dialogue with India. Thus, Gen. Musharraf on

⁵ Sushil J. Aaron and Sonika Gupta, "The hijacking and after", [Http:// www.ipcs.org/ issues/ articles/308-ip-seminar. html](http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/308-ip-seminar.html)

⁶ Amit Baruah, "A face-off averted", *Frontline*, November 5, 1999.

⁷ Najam Sathi, "For a new spark-plug", *Outlook*, October 25, 1999, p.62.

⁸ Amin Saikel, "Pakistan ruler has little to offer India", *International Herald Tribune*, June 21, 2001.

several occasions expressed his readiness to hold talks with Indian leaders, “any time, any where and any level” to deviate foreign pressures.

Indian Government had repudiated all its relations with Pakistan after the coup and negated the possibility of immediate talks with the military regime. Prime Minister, Vajpayee sent strong signal across the border expressing its unwillingness to continue further dialogue with the military regime, unless “cross-border terrorism” is stopped and democracy is restored in Pakistan. The main reason for India shunning to continue its relations with Pakistan may be stated as: outrage with Gen.Musharraf, for the role he played during the Kargil war, to pressure Pakistan to cease its support to cross-border terrorism, political uncertainty and crisis in Pakistan.⁹

However, after two years of strained relations with Pakistan, Prime Minister Vajpayee surprised the world community by inviting Gen. Musharraf the Chief Executive of Pakistan for talks on May 24, 2001 with a view to engage Pakistan. In his letter to Gen. Musharraf, Prime Minister Vajpayee reflected his concern when he wrote, “For the welfare of our people, there is no other recourse but a pursuit of the path of reconciliation of engaging in productive dialogue and by building trust and confidence. I invite you to walk this high road with us.”¹⁰ Gen. Musharraf promptly accepted the proposal. In fact, he had been waiting for such an invitation ever since he had assumed power in the bloodless coup.¹¹ This invitation came as a blessing to Gen. Musharraf for two reasons. The first was the invitation itself that was construed to mean the recognition of his regime by India, which is very crucial for him. And the second was the mounting international pressure for him to start a dialogue with India.

Mr.Vajpayee’s invitation to Gen.Musharaff was immediately followed by the withdrawing of the six months long unilateral ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir. This sudden change of Mr.Vajpayee’s government policies had brought the Ramzan peace

⁹ J.N. Roy, “The Agra summit: A balance sheet”, *Dialogue Quarterly*, Vol.3, No.1, July-September 2002, p.48, and, Ajay Ahmad, “To Agra with hope”, *Frontline*, July 20, 200, p.16

¹⁰ *The Times of India*, May 26, 2001.

¹¹ B.Muralidhar Reddy, “The message from Musharraf”. *Frontline*, June 22, 2002, p.27.

initiative to a dead end. The irony of the ceasefire was that, instead of normalising the situation, the militants' activities had increased in the state. It was reported that from November 2000 to May 2001, the number of terrorist related incidents increased from 1672 to 2142, while the security personnel killed were reported to have increased from 223 to 266 and civilian killed had increased from 461 to 543.¹²

The problems of the sub-continent have been closely watched by many Western countries especially America. They were concerned over the developments taking place in the subcontinent and kept on sending its officials to the region, putting pressure on India and Pakistan to start a dialogue. The overwhelming opinion of the Western countries clearly favoured India and Pakistan engage in continuous dialogue, as a result Mr. Vajpayee's invitation to Gen. Musharraf was welcomed by them. Expressing happiness over the proposed summit, Mr. Larry Pressler, former US Senator commented, "Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee's willingness to hold talks with the Pakistan's Chief Executive, Gen. Pervez Musharraf was a positive step towards resolving the outstanding issue," Mr. Robin Cook, British Foreign Secretary, echoed similar views when he said, "I applaud India's initiative and Pakistan's constructive response, such a meeting will be a significant positive development in India-Pakistan relations and will serve to build confidence on both sides."¹³ The Canadian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. John Manley, too welcomed the proposed summit and said; "it is an important step in the right direction." However, Russia expressed cautious optimism about the outcome of the summit.¹⁴ Japan too hailed the invitation as a positive step towards building a peaceful regional order.

However, there were mixed responses in Pakistan on the invitation of Gen. Musharraf to India. The Jamaat-e-Islami extended unconditional support to Gen. Musharraf's summit meeting with Mr. Vajpayee. Mr. Imran Khan welcomed and termed it as a "very big breakthrough" in the relations and further continued "there is no other way

¹² *The Hindustan Times*, July 17, 2002, also see, *Frontline*, Ibid., p.25

¹³ *The Hindu*, June 2, 2001.

¹⁴ *The Hindu*, June 23, 2001.

except through talks” to solve the problems between the two countries.¹⁵ Whereas the Jamaat voiced against the proposed visit and vowed to continue their holy war, they criticized India’s invitation as a conspiracy of America and warned Gen. Musharraf not to compromise on Kashmir.

Musharraf Becomes President

It is ironic that Mr. Vapayee who initially expressed strong resentment over the military coup in Pakistan had suddenly changed its policy and invited Gen. Musharraf for talks. With the invitation for talks, Gen. Musharraf had gained legitimacy of his position. As pointed out earlier, lot of speculation and euphoria was created on the proposed summit meeting. In the midst of all this political drama in the subcontinent, New Delhi announced the date and venue for the summit. Taking advantage of the situation, Gen. Musharraf violating Supreme Court order to restore democracy in three years, which validated the October 12, 1999 coup, removed President Muhammad Rafiq Tarar and appointed himself as the President of Pakistan by amending the Provisional Constitutional Order. He also dissolved the suspended National and Provincial assemblies.¹⁶

The world community was outraged by this action of Gen. Musharraf and reacted strongly against his unconstitutional and illegitimate action. The Commonwealth Secretary Gen. Don Mc Kinnon remarked that it was a disappointing and “unfortunate step”. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw also expressed resentment and stated, “There is bound to be widespread anxiety that this represents a setback in the transition to elected democracy”, and voiced his deep concern for the dismissed President.¹⁷ Similar feelings were felt in Pakistan too. The Jamaat-i-Islami Amir, Qazi Hussain Ahmed questioned Gen. Musharraf actions and said, “Gen. Musharraf had violated the Supreme Court judgement, which gave him three years to restore democracy in Pakistan.” Incidentally, Jamaat happens to be the most active group extending materials support and training with

¹⁵ *The Hindu*, May 27, 2001.

¹⁶ *The Hindustan Times*, June 21, 2001.

¹⁷ *The Times of India*, June 21, 2001.

the full backing of the Pakistan regime to Jehadi forces in Kashmir.¹⁸ While the world community was angered over the development in Pakistan, Indian leaders looked the other way round. They praised and congratulated Gen. Musharraf, going back from its earlier position of no talks with the military regime. Significantly, even before Gen. Musharraf took over as the President of Pakistan, Prime Minister Vajpayee phoned and addressed General as President of Pakistan.¹⁹

The architect of the Kargil war, Gen. Musharraf became more powerful and more secured after appointing himself President. So, prior to his departure for the summit he held an all-party meeting to get their support and backing for the summit. However, it turned out to be an unsuccessful exercise as many in Pakistan showed resentment over his actions and boycotted the meeting. Gen. Musharraf suffered a severe blow as the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) the opposition conglomerate of 18 parties, including the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and Pakistan People Party (PPP) did not attend the said meeting.²⁰

Pakistani leaders on several occasions raised the issue of Kashmir prior to the summit jeopardizing the proposed summit. Mr. Shaukat Aziz Pakistan's Finance Minister in an interview with the *Indian Express* said, "We should look forward to the talks which the President will go for in a week's time, with cautious optimism. Once issues like Kashmir is discussed, other things could follow." Mr. Aziz also categorically stated that the Kashmir issue should be settled first before any enhancement of relations including trade could take place between the two countries.²¹ Gen. Musharraf made similar statement in an interview with Dileep Padgaonkar, Executive Editor of *The Times of India* a week prior to the summit. Gen. Musharraf underlined the need for the involvement of the Kashmiris in the settlement of Kashmir issue and reiterated that Kashmir formed the core issue of dispute between the two countries. He stated that his

¹⁸ *The Hindustan Times* June 21, 2001.

¹⁹ Telephone conversation between Mr. Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf, see Quoted in, *Tribune*, June 23, 2001.

²⁰ *Indian Express*, July 6, 2001.

²¹ *Ibid.*

main objective for the summit was talks on Kashmir issue. While answering to question on terrorism, Gen. Musharraf unhesitatingly said no such terrorist activities were going on in Kashmir, it was an indigenous freedom struggle. He said that that Pakistan supported it politically, morally and diplomatically, at the same time denied that Pakistan was abetting and aiding the militants activities in Kashmir.²²

India's Unilateral Measures

These subsequent statements made by President Gen. Musharraf had clearly demonstrated that he was not going to reconcile on the Kashmir issue. The entire objectives of Pakistan is to internationalise the Kashmir issue and pressure India to compromise on Kashmir and relegate other issues to the back seat. A week before the summit meeting, Mr. Vajpayee announced a number of unilateral confidence building measures (CBM): releasing of civilian prisoners from Indian jail, reduction of tariffs on the import of 50 Pakistani items, releasing of 224 Pakistani fishermen, non-arrest of fisherman straying into Indian waters, and cultural exchange programme. India also offered 20 scholarships to Pakistan students in Indian technical institutions such as IIT, besides student exchange programmes.²³ In another significant development, Indian government took a historic decision to make easier for intra-Kashmiri's travel by relaxing the barrier at specific locations along the Line of Control. Indian government had also proposed to allow easy entry into Jammu and Kashmir from Chakoti in Pakistan and Uri on the Indian side of Line of Control to those Kashmiris living in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and those holding Pakistani passports. India further proposed to open the rail link between Munaboo in Rajasthan on the Indian side to Kaokraphar in Sind on the Pakistan border. Besides, visas on arrival at Attari checkpost in Punjab.²⁴

India had announced a number of confidence building measures prior to the summit. Whereas Pakistan charged Indian forces of repression and oppression in the Kashmir valley and urged India to end repression in the valley. Pakistan military regime also had

²² *The Times of India*, July 5, 2001

²³ *Indian Express*, July 5, 2001

²⁴ *The Hindu*, July 10, 2002

confirmed of the decision to invite the leaders of the All party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) for the tea party against the wishes of Indian government.²⁵

As the day drew nearer for the summit, Pakistan's stand became harder each passing day. Difference of opinion became wider and wider between the countries. Pakistan strongly emphasised on Kashmir as the core issue, it also insisted on meeting the Hurriyat leaders, snubbed India's proposal for Director General Military Operations (DGMO) talks between the two countries and it did not take into account the confidence building measures offered by India. India, on the other hand clearly stated that Kashmir was one among several issues, it rules out Hurriyat as representative of the Kashmir people and objected to Pakistan's invitation of Hurriyat leaders to tea party, wanted DGMO to talk and solve disputes like Siachin and nuclear issues and favoured CBMs to restore the conflicting issues through dialogue.²⁶

The Agra Summit

Prime Minister Vajpayee on the eve of the Agra summit expressed his hope that Gen.Musharraf will come out and move ahead with renewed spirit and goodwill. However, President Musharraf in an interview to Dubai based daily, on the eve of his departure for Agra summit told, "Anyone, any leadership in Pakistan that makes any agreement any deals where Kashmir is sidelined, I can say with full certainty that declaration or that treaty will never go forward because the people won't let it go forward. And that is why the Shimla Agreement and Lahore Declaration did not move forward." Nevertheless, this statement was denied by Pakistan at Agra.²⁷

Gen.Musharraf met various political and other officials in Delhi. India's Home Minister, Mr.L.K.Advani, raised India's concern over the cross border terrorism and the need for India and Pakistan to agree on the extradition treaty to the visiting President.

²⁵ *The Hindu*, July 7, 2001.

²⁶ *The Hindustan Times*, July 10,2001

²⁷ *The Statesman*, July 14, 1999.

Mr. Advani's request for most wanted man in India; Dawood Ibrahim was dismissed by denying that he was in Pakistan.²⁸ Gen. Musharraf reiterated Pakistan's old stand that Kashmir was the core issue and that the problem between India and Pakistan arose from it, when met at the Rashtrapati Bhavan.

Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha, impressed upon the visiting president the need to take appropriate measures to safeguard the nuclear weapons and to work for peace in the interest of the people of both the countries when Gen. Musharraf called on her. She reiterated her party's support for the summit meeting, and called for comprehensive dialogue and not to focus on Kashmir alone. She also emphasized that "the Shimla and Lahore accords must form the basis of bilateral dialogue". India's Foreign Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, cautioned against selective rejection of bilateral agreement to the visiting President and stressed the need for dialogue to continue without interruption.²⁹

President, Mr. K.R. Narayanan speaking at the banquet held in honour of Gen. Musharraf called for "structured dialogue" and urged General Musharraf to develop better relations with India through co-operation and implementation of confidence building measures. President Narayanan also underlined the need to work together for the fulfillment of what he called the "unfinished agenda" i.e. **eradication** of poverty, illiteracy, poor health and other social and humanitarian issues in the region. The President of India stated, "it is our conviction that on the basis of this principles, India and Pakistan could regulate their relationship to one of genuine peace, friendship and co-operation." In the banquet speech, Gen. Musharraf surprisingly stated, "that there could not be a military solution" to the ongoing dispute adding, "Blood has been spilt, precious lives have been lost....We owe it to our future generations to do our utmost to open a new chapter of goodwill and cooperation".³⁰ However, the rhetoric aside, Gen. Musharraf was not willing to compromise on Kashmir. While interacting with a select group of Indian

²⁸ *The Hindustan Times*, July 15, 2001.

²⁹ *The Hindu*, July 15, 2002.

³⁰ *The Hindustan Times*, July 15, 2001.

academicians, policy experts and journalists, he stated that he was willing to discuss on any issue with India but only after the Kashmir issue is solved.

Breaking all diplomatic norms Gen. Musharraf had a meeting with the Hurriyat leaders at the tea party hosted by the Pakistan High Commissioner, Mr. Ashraf Jahangir Qazi, in the honour of President Gen. Musharraf, despite reservation by Indian government. Gen. Musharraf acknowledged them as the sole representatives of the people of Kashmir and assured them of support in every-possible way be could. The ruling NDA government boycotted the tea party expressing unhappiness over it.

Gen. Musharraf proceeded to Agra for the summit meeting with Mr. Vajpayee on 15th July 2001. Unlike the Shimla and Lahore Summit, the Agra Summit began without any concrete and specific agenda causing lots of speculation and publicity and creating lots of hype and euphoria in the sub-continent. Amidst all this fanfare, Gen. Musharraf arrived at Agra. The Agra Summit began by Prime Minister Vajpayee's address calling for a "broad-based approach" in the relations between India and Pakistan. Mr. Vajpayee while admitting the existence of vast differences of opinion and policies between the two countries argued Pakistan to create a conducive atmosphere by establishing CBMs, so that India and Pakistan could develop cordial relations. He demanded release of Indian prisoners of war that are languishing in various Pakistani jails and also requested to hand over those criminals wanted by India. Prime Minister Vajpayee also expressed India's willingness to address all bilateral differences with Pakistan.³¹ One-to-one meeting subsequently followed this address between Mr. Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf. The first round of meeting began with divergent views. Conflict emerged even before the talks could proceed. Prime Minister Vajpayee stressed at length on the need for the curtailment of cross-border terrorism for peace and security in the region. President Musharraf however denied any cross-border terrorism activities in the valley and argued that the militant activities in the valley were the result of the freedom struggle, and rejected India's proposal of discussing the issue of cross-border terrorism in the talks. Pakistan

³¹ *The Hindustan Times*, July 17, 2002.

strongly emphasised on the need to solve Kashmir issue for better relations in the region.³²

Later, a delegation level meeting was held led by Gen. Musharraf and Mr. Vajpayee, yet, even in this meeting not much progress was made. Though the Summit could not make any break-through, there emerged some hope in the relations between India and Pakistan. In the course of the meeting, Gen. Musharraf had invited Mr. Vajpayee to visit Islamabad, Mr. Vajpayee gladly accepted the invitation. This understanding between the two leaders had opened a new chapter after the relations cooled down following the Kargil war. In the course of the day, a new development came about from Pakistan's delegation. Pakistani's Foreign Secretary, Mr. Iman-ul-Haq, had denied the report that Gen. Musharraf had disowned the Lahore and Shimla agreement. He stated Gen. Musharraf speech was "misquoted" by the media, and clarified that Gen. Musharraf had only mean to say that the two agreements had not been as effective as expected.³³

The Pressmen were left without any news briefing for many hours. As the officials of both the countries were reluctant to disclose the nature and progress of the dialogue. It was only in the later part of the day the pressmen had some relief, when India's information and Broadcasting Minister, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, addressed a brief press conference in which she remarked, " the two men had discussed cross-border terrorism, reduction of nuclear risk, trade relations and prisoners of war."³⁴ However, this statement of Mrs. Sushma Swaraj created lot of controversy, causing deep resentment in Pakistan for deliberately omitting the word Kashmir from her speech Pakistan reacted strongly and condemned her.

Hours later, the Indian spokeswoman, Mrs. Nirupama Rao, described the talks as "cordial, frank and constructive", without going into the detail of the progress of the

³² *The Hindustan Times*, July 16, 2001.

³³ *The Statesman*, July 15, 1999.

³⁴ Stephen Farrell and Zahid Hussain, "Pak Upset by Kashmir's Lack of Priority, *Times*, July 16, 2001.

discussion.³⁵ Mrs. Rao was manhandled by angry Pakistani pressmen for refusing to take questions. The first day of the summit meeting witnessed some stray incident protesting of the early release by relatives and families of Indian prisoners of war.

In Agra, Gen. Musharraf had diplomatically manipulated the media to his advantage. He was able to address to the senior editors at a breakfast meeting, which was broadcasted by Pakistani television and later by Star Television on July 16, in the midst of the summit meeting, in the telecast Gen. Musharraf made four *points*: *Kashmir is the main issue and India must recognize this reality before we can move forward on other issues, Kashmir has to be addressed in a structural framework within a time frame, People of Kashmir had to be involved in the dialogue process sometime or other, the Kashmir issue had to be resolved in terms of the UN resolutions, which gave the people of the state the right of self determination.*³⁶

Gen. Musharraf while interacting with the senior editors indicated that even if the talks failed, he was willing to continue the dialogue process. When asked about his views on the aggression in Kargil, Gen. Musharraf remarked that Pakistan's actions in Kargil were in response to India's support to the liberation struggle of Bangladesh and India's action in Siachen. Gen. Musharraf reacted strongly at Mrs. Sushma Swaraj speech and criticised her for misinformation and misleading the public. He remarked, "Most of the time was spent discussing Kashmiryou say confidence building measures, Siachen, nuclear.....if these are main issues, why are we killing each other ?"³⁷ When asked about the possible solution for the Kashmir issue, he stated the first step was the invitation for dialogue by Mr. Vajpayee and the second step would be acceptance of Kashmir as the main issue by India and then only other things will follow.

The second day of the Summit, meeting between the two leaders began with a note of optimism. But, as the dialogue continued these optimism slowly diminished, and finally led to the breakdown of the summit due to divergence of views and opinion put

³⁵ *International Herald Tribune*, July 16, 2001.

³⁶ *Dialogue Quarterly*, n.9, p.55

³⁷ *The Times of India*, July 17, 1999.

forward by both the leaders. The main source of conflict between India and Pakistan was the old rigid stand taken by Pakistan-Kashmir as the core issue of the agenda. India regards Kashmir as part and parcel of Indian State, but Pakistan refuses to accept it. Sources stated that Pakistan insisted all issues to be linked to Kashmir, however, India wanted to have a broad-based approach to discussion. It wanted to include liberalised trade relations, people-to-people contact and confidence-building measures. Pakistan wanted the Hurriyat to be involvement in the dialogue process at an appropriate time, but India flatly rejected third party involved in the bilateral discussion. On the other hand, India raised the Kashmiri Pandit's issue, which Pakistan did not take into account.³⁸ Thus, the two leaders could not come to any agreement, in spite of all their effort to settle the crisis and dispute.

The final one-to-one meeting was taken up after canceling many of their appointed programmes and schedule. It was reported that a controversial draft of a joint declaration was prepared, but it could not be declared due to major disagreement on the inclusion of cross-border terrorism and Kashmir. Relying on the information issued from the Pakistani side, *The Hindustan Times* reported the first draft of the joint statement stated, "A solution to the Kashmir issue would pave for normalisation of ties between the two countries. It also decided that annual summit, would be held and the foreign minister of the two countries would meet biannually to discuss peace, security and confidence building measures, Kashmir and narcotics and terrorism."³⁹ As reported, India insisted on the inclusion of the curtailment of cross-border terrorism in the joint declaration, but Pakistan was reluctant to make any specific reference to cross-border terrorism with Kashmir. Pakistan then proposed for the inclusion of the solution of Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmir people. However, it was reported that India had agreed to drop the specific reference to cross-border terrorism in exchange for dropping the reference to the aspiration of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Even then, things failed to move smoothly; thus the two leaders were left at the end without any declaration. Pakistan blamed Mr. Jaswant Singh for the failure to produce the joint

³⁸ *The Times of India*, July 16, 2001.

³⁹ *The Hindustan Times* July 17, 2001.

declaration and said, "A three separate drafts were agreed by the two sides only to be rejected by Jaswant Singh."⁴⁰ In the course of the talks, India had demanded to hand over those criminal wanted by India in the Mumbai bomb blast, hijackers of Indian Airline IC 814. India also asked to release the prisoners of war, protection of Sikh and Hindus shrines and enhancement of trade between the two countries. And to respond to the confidence building measures India's had offered to Pakistan.⁴¹

The Agra summit was held in most secrecy and confidentiality. Right from the start till the end, nothing of the progress and nature of the talks was made known to the media due to its complicated and intensive nature of the ongoing dialogue. Various views were speculated and propagated without any detail information of the talks. Amidst all these chaos and confusion, the summit was finally sealed with Gen. Musharraf departing from Agra in the late hour of the day. "The high road to peace", which started with lots of hope and enthusiasm, had failed to reach its destination. It is ironic that the Kashmir issue had once again become a stumbling block to the conciliatory gesture taken by India. Pakistani leaders often used Kashmir as a political weapon to legitimize its rule and power, and Gen. Musharraf is no exception to it. The Agra summit, like those of the other summit meetings, is another story of failure. However, even though the summit has failed, it legitimized Gen. Musharraf to consolidate his position and power, when India had to acknowledge him as the representative of Pakistan for the summit.

Agra Summit and its Impact

The much-celebrated Agra Summit had finally ended without any positive outcome. In spite of all hope and hype generated by the media, this summit had turned out to be one of the most unsuccessful top level meeting in the history of India and Pakistan relations. The failure of the summit indicates that, there exist a wide gap of opinion and policies between the two countries. It was not surprising that the Agra Summit had failed to come up with a joint declaration because Gen. Musharraf had made

⁴⁰ *The Times of India*, July 17, 2001.

⁴¹ *The Hindu*, July 17, 2001.

his point clear prior to the Summit that talks other than Kashmir will not bear fruit. Despite, this harsh statement Mr.Vajpayee had invited Gen.Musharraf with some hope of ironing out the differences. But, Gen.Musharraf refused to give up his one and only stand, the Kashmir issue leading to breakdown of the Summit.

War of words continued after the summit between the two countries. Mr.Vajpayee blamed Gen.Musharraf's rigid unifocal agenda for the failure, while Gen.Musharraf blamed India for its non-acceptance of the Kashmir issue. A day after the summit, the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, at a press conference stated that India was "disappointed but not disheartened." He also pointed out that the summit had brought the two countries a step closer and refused to acknowledge it as a failure. Mr.Jaswant Singh commented that "the caravan of peace" would move on despite the differences of views and opinion. He made a point that Gen. Musharraf breakfast meeting with the senior Editor and Pakistan's refusal to acknowledge India's position that cross-border terrorism has led to derailment of the talks. However, he clarified that the inability to finalise the Agra declaration was due to difficulty in reconciling the basic approach to bilateral relations between the two countries.⁴² Likewise, Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr.Abdul Sattar refused to accept the summit as a failure rather he described the even as "inconclusive talks". Mr.Sattar once again reiterated in his speech that, the Hurriyat's are the sole representatives of Kashmir and stated that for any further negotiation the Hurriyat ought to be included for any dialogue. Mr.Abdul Sattar while speaking on the failure of the Summit said, a joint declaration was agreed upon, but failed due to constrain of times to deliberate on major issues. However, he optimistically remarked the draft, which was considered during the summit, would act as a bridge for better relations. Mr. Sattar also said that "valuable progress" was made in the Agra summit on the core issue like Jammu and Kashmir, peace and security and terrorism and drug trafficking.⁴³

Three days later, Gen. Musharraf speaking at the post summit press conference, categorically brought out Pakistan's view on the failure of the summit. He reiterated

⁴² *The Hindu* July 18, 2001.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

Pakistan's stand that there was no border between the two states, but only a Line of Control. He also refused to accept that cross-border terrorism does exist, as there was no bordering line between the two. Gen. Musharraf, while praising Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Jaswant Singh for their sincerity and understanding during the summit, blamed some Indian leaders without naming for derailing the talks. Indian government rejected Gen. Musharraf statement and assertion. Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh reacting to Gen. Musharraf's press conference said, "the thesis advanced by Gen. Musharraf that the state of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed state is totally not accepted". He further continued "Jammu and Kashmir lies at the core of Indian nationhood."⁴⁴ The greatest hurdle of India-Pakistan talks was that Pakistan does not accept the integration of Kashmir with India and continuously voices its support for the militants activities in the state as freedom struggle.

There was a mixed reaction both in India and Pakistan. The opposition Congress Party of India strongly rebutted Mr. Vajpayee and accused him for his shortsightedness and lack of preparation for the summit. Mr. Jaipal Reddy, the congress spokesperson lashed out at the failure of the summit in the following words; "The pre summit phase was characterized by lack of preparation, the summit phase was confusion and now in the post-summit period the government was issuing contradictory statements."⁴⁵ The Vishwa Hindu Parishad described the summit as "unsuccessful" as it did not live up to the expectations. While the Bhartiya Janata Party blamed General Musharraf for the failure, but praised Mr. Vajpayee and argued that the Summit was a success, because if it failed, they added, Mr. Vajpayee would not have accepted the invitation to visit Islamabad.

Similar reactions were voiced in Pakistan. The Pakistani based militants like Lashkar-i-Toiba, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen blamed India for the failure of the summit and praised Gen. Musharraf for his stunt stand on Kashmir. With the breakdown of the Summit, these militants group threatened to continue militants' activities across the border for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir. While, the two main

⁴⁴ *The Hindu* July 21, 2001.

⁴⁵ *The Hindustan Times*, July 21, 2001.

opposition parties in Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party and the Muslim League accused Gen.Musharraf for going to India without the people's mandate and using Agra Summit to build his image. Mr.Nawaz Sharif former Primer Minister of Pakistan, remarked, "the failure was bound to happen and we warned about it several times. Gen.Mushrraf did not hold any representation of the Pakistani nation." Another former Prime Minister of Pakistan Mrs.Benazir Bhutto echoed similar voice, when she said; "He made key errors in this trip. He failed to build and internal consensus of legitimate political focus....Gen.Musharraf relied on inefficient team, which failed him previously."⁴⁶

Many foreign countries hailed the summit even though it failed to produce any positive development. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, described the summit as a step forward towards mutual co-operation, it stated,, "We assess the very fact the two leaders meet had a frank discussion as a step forward that testifies to their mutual desire to channel the existing differences between India and Pakistan into dialogue in the spirit of the Shimla accord and Lahore declaration."⁴⁷

The United States, State Department deputy spokesperson, remarked, "We want to just encourage a sustained engagement at a senior level. We think that the agreement of the Prime Minister of India to visit Islamabad for further discussion is itself a positive step." But, British government described the failure of the Agra Summit as "unfortunate".⁴⁸

The Role of Media in the Agra Summit

The Agra Summit is a unique top-level meeting in the history of India and Pakistan. Never had any meeting ever held in such an atmosphere, where media and press have broadcast every minute of the meeting. Both the press and visual media propagated various views and opinions about the proposed Summit, creating lots of enthusiasm and

⁴⁶ *The Hindu*, July 19, 2001

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

hope to the laymen. The media has indeed created public awareness, where even the far off villagers knew of what was going on in the subcontinent. But, as far as the Agra Summit is concerned, the role that the media played was not very encouraging. The media had speculated divergent views without correctly interpreting the various statements made by the leaders of both the countries. Thus, J.N.Dixit remarked, "The media coverage in fact distorted the objective perspective in which the summit discussion were held."⁴⁹ In the course of the summit, media had also brought out conflicting reports creating mixed feeling both in Pakistan and India. Much emphasis was laid on "body language". President Gen. Musharraf used Indian media to his advantage, especially ~~breakfast~~ the breakfast meeting with the senior editors.

⁴⁹ J.N.Dixit, "Indo-Pak Relations", in, *India Quarterly*, Vol. LVII, No.2. April-June :2001 .p.1.

CHAPTER – FIVE

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

The fluctuating India-Pakistan relations, more often on the stormy side for the last 54 years need no perusal to capture the essence. In effect, the colossal challenge confronting both countries' policy makers is no less daunting. Born out of distrust and suspicions, the relations between the "two nations" saw every peace effort thwarted even before it could be tested. Many research scholars and social scientists have been trying to find means to a lasting peace in the region by stressing on the ethnic, cultural and historical similarities. Others harp on the need to initiate confidence building measures, economic cooperation and conducting high level talk, people to people interaction, disarmament and reduction of troops in the Kashmir valley and so on. However all these strategies have come to a naught. The fact that the intervening variable (Kashmir) that have differently shape the perspective of both countries' leaders is manifested in their policy formulation and pursuance. Thus, ethno-cultural affinity and similarity, which provide intellectual, emotional and social impetus to regional co-operation, have instead become a stumbling block for the two countries.

Therefore, developing cordial relation has become a difficult task for the two countries. In fact, antagonism is deeply rooted in Pakistan's foreign policy due to the anti-India intellectual and emotional mindset nurtured from generation to generation. Pakistani leaders have never reconciled its grievances of the post-partition problems and crises, especially on Kashmir. The armed force form core authorities in the hierarchical political system of Pakistan. Since the first military take over in 1958, with possible exception of Bhutto period the civilian political rulers have depended on the support and consent of the military for their survival. It is no secret in Pakistan that the military frequently intervenes in the politics of the states whenever it felt that its power is threatened and does not hesitate to seize power when the state machinery breaks down. Thus, Pakistan has been under military rule for more than half of its existence as a sovereign state. This political instability within Pakistan often affects the relations between the two countries due to the change in the political set-up. Economic relations that help to foster growth of a nation's wealth and development have been overridden by political interest. The imagined fears in the minds of

Pakistani leaders of being influenced or eliminated by India's market also contribute to the dismal economic cooperation between the two countries. This fear is reflected by Dr. S.M.Koreshi, a former ambassador in his book *Contemporary Power and Politics in Pakistan: An Ambassador's Reflections* when he writes, "Opening floodgates to import of cheap and sub-standard Indian goods into Pakistan is a far more serious matter than even agreeing to Indian terms of nuclear programmes. It will cause mass closure of Pakistani industries, employment and giving up into defence production and self reliance programme."¹ This has seriously undermined the commonalities in linguistic, ethnic, religion and cultural affiliations, which could have provided for a platform to open and bond their relations quite profitably.

One major factor contributing to the India-Pakistan war 1947, 1965 and 1999 has to be viewed from the historical perspective, which has its roots in the post-partition problems regarding the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The antagonistic approach adopted by the Pakistani army can be attributed to the outbreak of wars. Beginning with the launching of intrusion of 1947 and the subsequent "Operation Gibraltar" of 1965 to the "Operation Kargil" of 1999, which was part of Gen. Zia's "Operation Topac", Pakistan has tried to capture the state of Jammu and Kashmir from India through the use of force. The war that resulted due to the Pakistani army intrusion into Indian soil. However, these military defeats have not daunted the spirit of the Pakistani army. The Pakistan ISI recruits foreign mercenaries to attack the Indian army and eminent people with a view to demoralise and destabilise the state. This strategy of cross border terrorism and proxy war adopted by the Pakistani army clearly shows its evil design to harm India. This conflictual posture aside, the race for arms and defence system has proved costly to the nation's coffer. Over the years, Pakistan has sought to internationalise the issue of Kashmir by bringing it before the United Nations and other bodies based on so called human rights violation by Indian army. However, this plan of Pakistan has never been successful due to its involvement in terrorist activities, which contradict the allegation, levelled against India of human right violations.

¹ Dr. S.M. Koreshi, *Contemporary Power in Pakistan: An Ambassador's Reflections*, (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1991), p.93.

Contrary to its popular expectation of smearing the image of India, the plan exposed Pakistan to the world communities of its nefarious activities and intents. Thus by successfully internationalising the Kashmir issue, Pakistan not only failed to nail India but also ironically brought India's restrained approach to dealing with Pakistan's provocative posture in good light. Despite all these problems and crises between the two countries, there were periods transient, though they may be, of renewed hope over the future relations. The Tashkent Accord, the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration were examples of such enthusiastic highs in the relations. However, if the much awaited and euphoric Agra Summit came to an anticlimax without any substantial outcome, the precedent accords and declarations were not much different. They all had a disappointing end. The cause for the failure to implement the agreement stemmed from Pakistan lack of sincerity and commitment. This was largely due to the internal politics of Pakistan. Pakistani leaders, be it military or civilian always try to exploit and legitimise their rule by raising anti-Indian issues and statement which is related to the state of Jammu and Kashmir problems. Normalising the relations between the two countries would mean in this case losing political legitimacy. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met this fate after signing the Lahore Declaration. Therefore, the failure of the talks can be ascribed to this particular factor. However, this does not absolve India from any blame. India, on its part, has its own faults in treating and addressing the problem in its own state of Jammu and Kashmir. However, major problem continuous to be cross-border terrorism.

Despite this gloomy scene, the problem besetting India-Pakistan relations could not be wished away. As two neighbouring states, it is in the interest of both countries to find ways to normalize the situation by focusing on future without losing sight of the present. In an interview to the Times of India, Sandeep Waslekar the founder of the Mumbai based International Centre for Peace Initiatives express his apprehension that there is a possibility of atleast three more "Kargil type" conflicts between the two countries during the next decade, which ironically will not be over Kashmir but on economic and water problems². This does not however, imply the inevitability of war as a solution to the problems besetting

² Sandeep Waslekar, "General Mess", *The Times of India*, May 28, 2002.

the two countries. But what it indicates is the necessity and urgency to rectify and address the problem areas through mutual understanding and sincere cooperation if ever event as the costly Kargil war is to be averted. Problems confronting both the countries are serious and need immediate action. They are already deep rooted and interlinked with social, cultural and historical values

While India's insistence on political and diplomatic correctness may score high point, it will not solve the problem. On the other hand, Pakistan's persistent claim of the terrorist groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir as indigenous freedom fighters has not impressed the international communities. This was precisely the reason why talks after talks between the two countries did not bear fruit. It is, no doubt a daunting challenge for the two leaders of India and Pakistan to find a breakthrough in the intricate web of maze.

We have seen the two South Asian perennial antagonistic neighbours were put into political turmoil after the nuclear tests. The tension between the two countries had reached its zenith. The greatest challenge that the two countries continue to face after the nuclear tests is the pressure from the developed countries to resume talks so as to deescalate the risk of nuclear showdown. Reeling under international pressure and domestic compulsion, the two leaders initiated the Lahore peace process. Subsequently, the leaders of both the countries signed the Lahore Declaration on February 21, 1999. The Lahore Declaration aimed to ease the strained relations between them. It also agreed to co-operate and restore peace in the region. However, the peace process fail to fulfill its objective, as the much-awaited Lahore Declaration was thwarted by Pakistani-backed infiltrator intrusion into the Kargil sector.

Pakistani leaders, especially those of the military were not enthusiastic to have cordial relations with India. The abortion of the Lahore peace process by the Pakistani Army was one such indication. The Kargil misadventure was the continuous Pakistan military design to sabotage the Indian State. India and Pakistan had fought four wars due to such policy of Pakistan.

Peace talks and the subsequent failure has become a common feature in the history of India and Pakistan. Various agreement and treaties were signed and declared, yet, these treaty and agreement never reached its destinations. The strong dislike by Pakistani leaders towards India was

one of the main reasons for such failure. The strategic and security environment of the world has undergone a tremendous change after the Cold War, but India-Pakistan relations continue to remain strained as ever before. India-Pakistan relations have failed in the past, and the trend is not different as the development discussed in the study brings out.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

*Tashkent Declaration, January 10 1996**

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.

1

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both side will exert all efforts to create good-neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.

II

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than February 25 1966, to the position they held prior to August 5 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease fire line.

* Source : *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXV, No.7, October 2001.

III

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

IV

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country, and will encourage propaganda, which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

V

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic intercourse.

VI

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.

VII

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

VIII

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue the discussions of questions relating to the problems of refugees and evictions/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.

IX

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognised the need to set up joint India-Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan record their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality.

They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to witness this declaration.

Prime Minister of India

Lal Bahadur Shastri

Tashkent, January 10 1966

President of Pakistan

Mohammed Ayub Khan

Appendix 2

*Simla Agreement, 1972 Agreement on Bilateral Relations
between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan**

1. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples.

In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows;

(i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries;

(ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations;

(iii) That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit;

(iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means;

* Source : *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXV, No.7, October 2001.

(v) That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty equality;

(vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

2. Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.

3. In order progressively to restore and normalise relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that:

(i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border posts, and air links including overflights.

(ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.

(iii) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.

(iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.

In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.

4. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the Government agree that:

(i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.

(ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force

in violation of this Line.

(iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.

5. This Agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged.

6. Both Governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

(Indira Gandhi)

Prime Minister

Republic of India

Simla, the 2nd July 1972

(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)

President

Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Appendix 3

*The Lahore Declaration, February 21 1999**

The following is the text of the Lahore Declaration:

The Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples;

Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future;

Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;

Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment;

Recalling their agreement of 23rd September, 1998, that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interests of both sides and that the resolution of all

* Source: *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXV, No.7, October 2001.

outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose; Have agreed that their respective Governments.

— shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.

— shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.

— shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.

— shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.

— reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development.

— reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.

— shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Signed at Lahore on the 21st day of February 1999

Atal Behari Vajpayee—Prime Minister of the Republic of India

Appendix 4

*Joint Statement**

The following is the text of the Joint Statement issued at the end of the Prime Minister, Mr A.B. Vajpayee's visit to Lahore:

In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan from 20-21 February 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service.

2. The Prime Minister of Pakistan received the Indian Prime Minister at the Wagah border on 20th February 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Minar-e-Pakistan, Mausoleum of Allama Iqbal, Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor's House.

3. The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that:

(a) The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues.

(b) The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions.

(c) The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology, in particular for tackling the problems of Y2K.

* Source: *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXV, No.7, October 2001.

(d) The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalising the visa and travel regime.

(e) The two sides shall appoint a two-member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWs.

4. They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a Bus Service between Lahore and New Delhi, the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports.

5. Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries.

6. The two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.

7. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee extended an invitation to Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, to visit India on mutually convenient dates.

8. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, thanked Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit.

Lahore, February 21 1999.

Appendix 5

*Memorandum of Understanding**

The following is the text of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. K Raghunath, and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, in Lahore on Sunday:

Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purpose of the UN Charter;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23rd September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries;

Have on this day, agreed to the following:-

1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The

* Source: *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXV, No.7, October 2001.

two sides further undertake to notify each, other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.

4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.

5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.

6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.

7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors-General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.

8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral for a

Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid 1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements.

Done at Lahore on 21st February 1999 in the presence of Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

(K Raghunath)

Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India.

(Shamshad Ahmad)

*Foreign Secretary of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan.*