

**INNOVATION IN THIRD WORLD DIPLOMACY :
A CASE STUDY OF LIBYA SINCE 1969**

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PREFACE

The focus of the dissertation is on the innovations in diplomatic strategies and style of the Third World countries in general and Libya in particular. The study examines the Libyan diplomatic innovations and style pursued by Col. Qathafi.

The First chapter deals with the emergence and development of the Third World diplomacy after briefly examining the determinants of the Third World diplomacy.

In the Second chapter attempt has been made to assess and analyse the main diplomatic tools employed by Col. Qathafi. The main instruments of Libyan diplomacy namely Arab nationalism, Pan-Islamism is used both as end and mean. As a compliment to Arab nationalism the Libyan leader has used Islam as a strategy. Oil is the only

credible capability of Libya. The credit for achieving just price for its oil which is followed by the other OPEC members and then nationalisation of the oil industry in the name of participation and finally the use of oil as a political weapon, solely goes to Libyan diplomacy.

The Third chapter deals with the innovations in the Libyan style of diplomacy. The Libyan leader enunciated his Third Theory, which is shrewdly framed to have an universal appeal. To render all possible help to the oppressed and exploited people in the world is a principle which is enthusiastically and overtly followed by the colonel. He is determined to export his revolution for which he adopts all conventional and unconventional ways. He used his image of the supporter of international terrorism to gain international status.

The study concludes that for a Third World country like Libya which is a rentier state and does not have any inherent power, it is difficult to follow independent diplomacy. It shows how the colonel who was determined to follow an independent activist diplomacy viewing America and the Soviet Union with equal contempt, was forced to be a dependent ally of the Soviet Union. Keeping in view the limitation of time and space, it was not possible to incorporate all the informations available on Libyan diplomacy. But no information which was important for understanding the Libyan diplomacy and foreign policy has been left.

I owe profound debt of gratitude to my supervisor Mr. V.K.H. Jambholkar for his scholarly guidance. I am highly grateful

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New Delhi
Date:

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CHAPTER - I

DETERMINANTS OF THIRD WORLD DIPLOMACY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO LIBYA.

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the Third World has been one of the most significant phenomenon of the post World War II period. The Third World is considered as a slippery concept. because it is difficult to difine. It is certainly a less homogenous body than the so-called First and Second Worlds. Broadly speaking, it encompasses everything outside those two more easily identifiable groups of states. It was coined to describe those parts of the world which had once been colonies of the Western powers.¹ Practically all newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America came to be lumped together in the late 1940's as the under-developed world, and thereafter known successively as the Less Developed World the Non-aligned World, the Developing World, the Third World and now the South.

1. Gordon Johnson, 'What is Third World History'
History Today (London). Vol, 35, September 1985
P. 43

The Third World countries include ~~extrem~~ radical countries like Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam and extreme conservative countries like Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the Philippines. Some of them are close allies of the United States of America and some follow the Soviet Union. They also differ in their political and economic systems, ideology and culture.

The meaning of the term 'third world' has varied among states which constitute it. Despite their differences, they do share certain characteristics and, more important, certain attitudes.² They share a common past of domination by the industrialised states, a linked history of struggle for independence and a common present struggle against poverty. Their history as colonies has provided them with new allegiances that formerly did not exist.³ They share the same intellectual baggage: nationalism, anti-colonialism, non-alignment, socialism. They also share the problems of deprivation and resentment against the developed countries of West.

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2. J.A. Ferguson, 'The Third World' in R.J. Vincent Foreign Policy and Human Rights : Issues and Responses (London, 1986) P.203
 3. Peter Worsely, The Third World (London, 1967), p.-232

They regard the West as being directly or indirectly responsible for their under development. So they are continuously demanding reforms the present international system based towards the developed countries. They are also unanimous in their opposition to domination of any kind of racism. Such characteristics and attitude provide enough common ground for one to talk of a Third World, which is a term merely of convenience.⁴

Lloyd Reynolds, argues that all the underdeveloped countries have some common characteristics. They are : The dominance of subsistence production and self-employment, low per capital incomes and unequal distribution of incomes, imperfect markets, low productivity, dependence on export earnings and foreign capital flows and small public sectors and minimal modern industrial sector.⁵ In addition to these features of their economics most of them are overpopulated with high birth rate, low standards of social welfare and education services. The political scientists would, of course, provide a different list of characteristics,

4 Gwyeth Williams, Third World Political Organisation: A Review of Developments (London 1981), P XII.

5. Lloyd G. Reynolds, The Three Worlds of Economics (New Haven, 1971) PP. 97-98

including a tendency towards single party states, a low level of social mobilisation, the development of bureaucratic organisation, and the persistence and transformation of important traditional institutions.⁶

THIRD WORLD DIPLOMATIC POSTURES

Weak states never have had much to say in world politics. Accordingly, the developing states of Asia, Africa and Latin America have been mere objects than subjects in the international system. Until quite recently, to speak of the Third World in international politics was to identify it as an area of great power competition and not as an actor. However, in the 1970s their collective efforts gave them an active role in international affairs. The coalition of over one hundred and twenty countries was unlikely as it is unprecedented. It defies the enormous diversity of its constituent members. Many have been caught up in intense regional rivalries and even armed conflicts.⁷

The Third World[†] coalition began to take form in 1955 in the Indonesian resort city of Bandung. Although the twenty six participants of Bandung were recognizable as the core

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6. Such a list is given in S.N. Eisenstadt, Social Change and Modernisation in Africa A societies South of Sahara, and in Marion Doro and Newell M. Slantz, ed., Governing in Black Africa - Perspectives of New States (Prentice Hall), 1970, PP- 236-50
 7. India-Pakistan, Ethiopia-Somalia, Algeria-Morocco, Libya-Egypt, Angola-Azire, Vietnam-Kampucha etc. suffice it to illustrate that local tensions: abounds.
 8. Robert A. Martimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (New York, 1980)P.6

Group of the future Third World coalition, they were destined to a lengthy search for a more effective organizing principle than the elementary solidarity of geography. Bandung communique pointed to become the symbol of a goal. Further more, the Bandung communique pointed to two principles that have remained the foundation of Third World solidarity viz. decolonization and economic development.

The intensification of cold war hostilities in 1960-61 further gave *an impetus* to the developing countries to act against the block system, leading ultimately to the convening of the first Non-Aligned summit at Belgrade with year 1961. As interpreted at the inaugural Belgrade Conference Non-Alignment was considered a classic application of the organisational strategem of reducing ranks in order to produce a more politically homogeneous grouping.⁹ With the backing of such figures as Tito, Nehru, Nasser, Sukarto, Castro, N.Krumah, Bourguiba, Bandarnaik, the concept of non-alignment was securely established as a rallying point for Third World diplomacy.

A part from the Non-alignment forum United Nations General Assembly has always been an important forum for the developing countries to interact and evolve broad consensus on issues concerning the third world. Without the United

9. Ibid. P. 12

Nations. There would in fact be no Third World at at least no Non-aligned Movement or Group of 77 (G-77)¹⁰ since early 1960's when the Western hold on the Assembly was broken by the admission of so many new members it has become increasingly the preserve of the Third World states. The Third World presence at the United Nations is in fact a phenomenal one.¹¹

During the General Assembly session immediately after the Belgrade conference, the developing states followed up an idea that Tito had advanced at the conference—the convocation of a world trade conference and establishment of a global economic organisation devoted to development. The convening of the United Nations conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was a success for the enormous efforts of the third World countries and could be considered a vital break through diplomatic strategies.

The Geneva Conference, or UNCTAD I, which met from March through June 1964, was the first major forum of North/South politics. The bargain that was finally

10. Kenneth L. Adelman and Marc F. Plattner, "Third World Voting Patterns at the United Nations", in W. Scoot Thompson, ed., The Third World: Premises of US Policy (San Francisco, 1983), p. 141.

11. J.D.B. Miller, "The Role of the Third World in International Relations", The Non-Aligned World (New Delhi) Vol. 1, no.2. April-June, 1983, p.212.

struck at Geneva reflected the economic power of the North and the numerical weight of the new group of 77.¹² The emergence of the G-77, like the founding of the Non-aligned Movement three years earlier, implied a new framework for collective action.

Strategies and style of Third World Diplomacy

The diplomatic strategies and style of the third World differ in many respects. But on broader perspective and questions, they seem to possess unity.¹³ A display of unity by Third World states enables them to improve their position in bargaining with the industrial world. Even before most of them became independent. Third World leaders were quick to recognise the advantages which they could gain from a united front in dealing with the industrial world.

In demanding the liberation of territories still under colonial rule, they would combine their own anti-colonialism with the common interest they all had in increasing the number and weight of fellow Third World states in the global political system.¹⁴ Unity itself has become so powerful a symbol within the Third World that increasingly strenuous and difficult efforts are made to

12. Martimer, n.7, p.17.

13. Robert Rothestein, The Weak in the World of Strong The Developing Countries in the International System (New York, 1977), p.129.

14. Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics : An Introduction (London & Sydney, 1985), p. 115.

overcome conflicting interest -- usually by simply adding together everyone's demands or by complex measures designed to compensate potential potential losers.¹⁵

The ultimate objective of Third World diplomacy is the redistribution of political and economic power in the international system. The other important goal is to work for global peace and security through support for disarmament negotiations between the Soviet and American governments.¹⁶ In the early 1970s, the Non-alignment Movement and the Group of 77, began to provide a credible capacity for joint diplomatic action. The non-aligned countries have not only consistently supported the group of 77 in its negotiations with the developed countries, but also have set the direction at key moments of the Group's evolution.¹⁷

Another strategy adopted by the Third World countries against the first world is the strategy of cartel. Petroleum is the life line of the industrialised west which is in abundant quantity in Arab world and some other regions. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established in 1960 for securing the just rights of the producing countries. Soaring demand of oil made the producing countries conscious of their power.

^{15.} Rothstein, n.16, p.50.

16. Chisepo J.J.Mphaisa, "Diplomacy by Conference: Principles, Goals and Problems of NAM", India Quarterly (New Delhi) vol.34, no.1, January-March 1983, pp. 23-40.
17. P.Karl Sauvart, "Nonaligned Movement and the Group of 77: Towards Joint Cooperation", Nonaligned World, vol.1, no.1, January-March 1983, p.53.

As a result of sustained negotiations with the companies they achieved control over production, marketing and price. The power to withhold oil, analogous to the power to strike of trade unions was exercised by the Arab oil producing states in October 1973 Arab-Israel war. The embargo set the stage for the quadrupling of oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in December 1973. By taking this action, OPEC ushered in the politics of New International Economic Order (NIEO) This was the first time that a group of Third World states significantly altered the course of international economic relations. The exercise of oil power was at once a symbol of Third World assertion and a model of collective action. 18

Apart from collective bargaining and multilateral diplomacy the Third World countries has followed the principle of regionalism in the spirit of South-South cooperation and collective self-reliance for greater economic cooperation. They have formed regional organisations in different geographical regions of the Third World for greater economic interaction and cooperation. Regional cooperation usually involved trade liberalisation, the removal of discrimination

18. Martimer, n.7, p.130.

between the member of the arrangements, removal of tax duplication, installation of industries, exchange of delegation, development of transportation and communication routes.¹⁹

The largest and the most important regional organisation the organization of African Unity (OAU). The formation of OAU at least temporarily closed the split of African states into competing blocs.²⁰ Although the OAU has never been able fully to transcend Africa's political division, the formation of a single continental organisation did improve Africa's capacity to present a common front on such broad issues as economic development.

Some of the Third World countries are considered radical in their approach towards various problems, and it is visible in their extreme posture in Third World organisations, regional groupings and even bilaterally with the West. Most prominent among such states are Libya, Cuba and Iran. The unconventional diplomatic behaviour of these states has created provocation in the western world. Sometimes conflict like situation might have arisen. ~~Keeping in view~~ the broad contours of the third

19. Rothstein, n.18, p. 97.

20. Martimer, n.7, p.16

world diplomatic behaviour an attempt is made in the dissertation to examine and assess the diplomatic behaviour style and innovations in the Libiyian diplomacy. The study also seeks to examine the extreme non-confirnist approach of Libya towards west, particularly the United States of America, the chief protector of the status quo in the international system, the reform of which is the accepted goal of the Third World diplomacy.

Libya: The country/people: *Land*

Libya which is officially known as 'the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya' from April 1986, ²¹ is bounded on the north by Mediterranean sea, on the east by Egypt and Sudan, on the south and south west by Chad and Niger, on the west by Algeria, and on the north-west by Tunisia. Libya is 1,760,000 sq.kms/ 680,000 sq.miles in area.²² Libya forms part of the North-African plateau extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. The chief geographical areas are Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, the Sirte Desert, and Fezzan. The Greek geographer Strabo compared Libya

21. After American bombing the official word 'great' was added to the earlier name 'The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya' because according to Col. Qathafi she deserves to be called the great Jamahiriya since it repulse the American attack. Guardian Weekly (Manchester), April 12, 1987.

22. George Thomas Kurian Encycloedua if the Third World (London) vol.11, 1983, p.1087.

to a leopard skin whose spots represented the settlements scattered in the desert. If population alone were the criteria, Libya, with its mere two million people, might be only one more small state of minor political importance in a world dominated by what Henry Kissinger has characterised as the 'super power condominium'.²³ The population is homogeneous with Arab Muslims of mixed Arab-Baber ancestry constituting ninety percent of the nation.

For thousands of years the inhabitant of Libya were Babers. Successive invasions and occupation of the coastal region by Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals and Byzantines had little impact ethnologically. Arabs started arriving in the seventh century A.D. displacing or assimilating their Baber predecessors.²⁴ The Ottoman Turks occupied the coastal regions in 1551 ruling the country until 1773, when Ahmad Qaramanlis of Turkish origin wrested semi autonomous status from Istanbul. The Qaramanlis ruled until 1935, when the Ottoman again assumed control. Libya remained part of the Ottoman empire upto 1911, when Italians succeeded them.

23. Carrey Andrew, "Libya: International Relations and Political purposes", International Journal (Toronto), vol. 28, no. 4, 1973, p. 707.

24. World Mark Encyclopedia of the Nations (New York) vol. 2, p. 166.

In September 1911 the Italians invaded Libya, meeting fierce resistance from both Turks and indigenous Libyan. A peace treaty of 17 October, 1912, between Turkey and Italy placed Libyan formally under Italian rule, but the Libyans continued their resistance led by a Muslim religious brotherhood, the Samusi.²⁵ By 1922 the new Fascist government in Italy decided to forego negotiation going on after World War I between Italians and the Samusi leader Idris and it undertook the military conquest of the Libyan territory. Mussolini adopted the policy of demographic colonization with an ambition to turn Libya into fourth shore of Italy. The settlement of Italians was initiated and encouraged. Libyans were second rate citizen in their own country. In course of fighting, large portion of the Libyan population were interned in concentration camps to prevent civilian cooperation with the resistance. Wells were poisoned, civil settlements bombed and captured resistance fighters hanged on the spot.²⁶

25. Ibid., p. 166.

26. Lisa Anderson, "Libya and American Foreign Policy", The Middle East Journal (Washington, 1982), vol 36., no. 4 Autumn, p. 516.

In World War II, Libya became a main battleground for allied and axis forces, until it was occupied by victorious British and French troops. The treaty of 1947 between Italy and the Allied powers ended the Italian rule in Libya.²⁷ Cyrenaica and Tripolitania put under British military occupation and Fizzan was under French forces. Thereafter, until 1950, the country was administered by France and Britain with the greatest economy on a care and maintenance basis.²⁸ When the allied powers could not decide the country's future, Libya's fate was left to the United Nations. On 21 November, 1949 the United Nations General Assembly voted that Libya should become an independent state. On 24 December, 1951 Libya was declared an independent United Kingdom with a federal constitution under King Idris the former Amir Mohammed Idris-al-Kahdi al-Sanusi.²⁹

LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY: INDEPENDENCE ERA:

A member of the UN mission of Technical Assistance in 1952, wrote that the balance of trade was deficient in all

27. World Bank, n. 27, p. 166.

28. The Middle East and North Africa 1987 (New York) 1976
vol. 2., p. 598.

29. World Bank, n. 27, p. 166.

three provinces, whether in commodities alone or in commodities and services combined. The only remedy, it was suggested would be significant and continued foreign aid. This indeed was what happened.³⁰ Until the 1950s Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world. At this time, its strategic position was all Libya had to sell. No major powers could ignore that its 4200 miles of coastline and the vast emptiness of its interior made the country a natural base for the command of the entire mediterranean.³¹ The first important development in the sphere of foreign policies was the admission of Libya to the Arab League in March, 1953 and conclusion of a twenty year treaty with Britain in July, 1953. The treaty consisted of two separate agreements, signed on the same day, which granted Britain facilities within the territory of Libya for military purposes and in exchange undertook to pay annual subsidies to the Libyan budget.³² On September 1954 a similar agreement was signed with the United States. By the agreement the United States got Wealus base.

30. J.G. Farley, "Libya", World Survey (London) no 79. July 1975 p. 2.

31. Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville, Hilton Assignment, (London, 1973) p 34.

32. Ruth First, Libya: The Elusive Revolution (London, 1974) p. 88.

Libya also consolidated relations with France and Italy, signing a 'friendship and good neighbourliness' pact with France in 1955 and a trade and financial agreement with Italy in 1957. Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established in 1955 but economic aid was rejected due to the fear of communist influence.³³ In March 1957 the government accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. In January 1959 Libya signed a treaty of friendship with Tunisia for 20 years as a political counter weight to Egyptian influence in North Africa.

Libya fully supported Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July, 1956, and at the end of October, 1956 sought and obtained a British guarantee that bases and troops would not be used against Egypt. During ~~the~~ Six Day War in 1967 Libya together with the other Arab States shut off oil production, although briefly and threatened to expel the Americans from Wheelus military base. At the Arab summit in Khartoum at the end of August 1967 Libya found an Arab role as an aid-donor to Egypt and Jordan.³⁴

33. John Wright, Libya: A Modern History (London 1982) p. 85

34. Wright n. 22. p. 103.

The September Revolution: 1969

A small group of junior army officers under the leadership of Muammar-Al-Qathafi/ of the Libyan armed forces staged a bloodless coup and deposed the seventy nine year old King Idris, who was in Turkey for medical treatment and declared Libya a republic. The actual seizure of power on the night of 31 August/1 September of 1969 was accomplished within four hours. The coup was remarkable for the absence of any opposition and virtually no fighting took place. 36 By September 7 the republic was firmly entrenched and was formally recognised by all the major countries of the world. /35

A revolutionary Command Council (RCC) consisting of twelve members of the free officers group was formed

35 Guardian, 22 May 1973, carried a leading article that discussed the many ways of transliterating 'Qathafi' from Arabic into Roman script, and came to the conclusion that there were 442 possible permutations. Actually there are more, at least 648, and that does not include the exotic 'Kazafuy' (New Middle East, July 1970, p.29). Qathafi is used here and throughout since it is used in all official Libyan publications, n.37, p.124.

36 Middle East and North Africa, n.30, p.600

for the administration of the country. A new constitution was announced by the RCC on 11 December 1969. The constitution proclaimed Libya to be an Arab, democratic and free Republic which constitutes part of the Arab nation.

Foreign policy:

Oil and the unique political vision of Muammer Qathafi were the forces driving Libya's new revolutionary policy.³⁷ Libya is one of the few countries in the world that can have any foreign policy it likes. Most governments have to take innumerable intractable factors into account, but Libya is free of almost all restraints.³⁸ Col. Qathafi has no worry on home front, having provided every facilities to the people, which in its return provide him legitimacy to do whatever he likes. A member of the RCC was quoted on the new regime's foreign policy.

"With regards to foreign policy we will follow a policy of absolute neutrality without partiality towards East or West... We are on the side of neither the Americans nor the Russians.

37. Wright, n.37, p.154

38. Charles Holley, 'Libyan Foreign Policy: Consistent objectives and priorities but...', The Middle East (London), no.23, 1975, p.25.

He who supports the palestine cause is a friend to the Arabs and he who supports Israel is an enemy to them. The Arabs who are sincere in working for the palestine cause must build their relations with other states on the basis of their position on this very cause. 39.

The new regime banned alcohol, night clubs and other sign of western style of life. In his zeal to restore independence Qaddafi completely evacuated British and American bases, dispossessed and repatriated the whole Italian community including the bones of its dead. Sign boards in Roman script were removed and replaced by Arabic sign boards all over the country.

The isolationism of the previous regime was replaced by a more vibrant foreign policy by Col. Qathafi. Closer identification and solidarity with Africa, Asia, and Latin America became part of an overall policy. 40. The Libyan government adopted the policy to fight colonialism and neo-colonialism overtly and vocally in the name of freedom. Col. Qathafi believes that the Arab nation is not only capable of taking the leadership of the Third World, non-alignment and of socialism, but that it is its duty to do so. 41.

39. Lisa Anderson, "The Libyan Revolution in the Words of its Leaders", The Middle East Journal, vol. 20, no. 2 Spring 1970, p. 212.

40. Henri Habib, Libya: Past and Present (Tripoli, 1979) p. 220.

41. Mirella Bianco, Qathafi: Voice from the Desert, (London, 1975), p. 155.

Libya participated in each of the non-aligned summit from Belgrade. At Algiers non-aligned summit. He openly challenged the conference on the true meaning of non-alignment. After the American attack on Libya (1986) and the movements failure to provide any positive help to Libya shattered his confidence in non-alignment. At Harare summit of the non-aligned ~~at~~ Movement he stated:

I will say goodbye with slogan that the world has two camps, liberation camp and imperialist camp and there is no place for naturals and non-aligned. 42.

LIBYA - USA RELATIONS:

In the initial years Libya's relations with the United States were ambiguous. Ambassador Joseph Palmer's despatches to Washington prophesied that Colonel Qathafi would be a heaven sent champion of United States interests and the scourge of communism. 43. In the early three years after the revolution the United States had regarded, Col. Qathafi certified Libyan patriot and definitely an anti-communist. He enjoyed the protection of an American shield. 44. Patrick Seale and Moureen Mc Conville in their book "The Hilton Assignment" 45 relate one story in full, how Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with *the*

42. From Col. Qathafi's speech at the Harare NAM summit.

43. First, n. 35 p. 243.

44. John K. Colley, "Libya Sandstorm: The complete account of Qathafi's Revolution" (New York, 1982), p. 80.

45. Seale and McConville, n. 34, pp. 9. 219.

Italian and British intelligence thwarted an elaborate well planned plot to over throw Colonel Gadhafi.


His dislike of communism and the Soviet Union is visible in his early speeches. He denounced the Soviets role in the 1971 Indo-Pak war, criticised the 1972 Soviet-Iraq Treaty, approved the Egyptian expulsion of the Soviet experts from Egypt in July, 1972. He also helped President Numeiri of Sudan in crushing the communist coup and assisted Sultan Qabus of Oman in efforts to wipe out communist led insurgency.

The marriage of expediency was short lived. Because their national interests were contradictory to each other.

A serious stumbling in their relations was America's total and unconditional support to Israel and Libya's categorical refusal to acknowledge its existence as a state.⁴⁶ Another conflicting issue between Libya and America is their perceptions of anti-establishment and secessionist movements all over the world. What is perceived by Libya as assistance for a just cause of liberation appeared in Washington as blatant support to international terrorism.

46. Mihailo V. Stercut, "American Aggression against Libya Causes and Effect", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade) vol. 37 no. 866, 5 May, 1986 p. 6.

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During carter and Reagan administrations, relations grew strained and antagonistic.⁴⁷ Upto Carter administration, the economic interests of USA deterred any military provocation to colonel Qathafi and avoid stimulating them to move closer towards Moscow. The high points in the existing cold war ~~between~~ the two countries came when as embargo on American arms shipment to Libya was put and later 1980 when American embassy in Tripoli was closed.⁴⁸

President Reagan launched a campaign to isolate Libya internationally and promote the downfall ~~of~~ the regime. Because the Administration felt that, "Libya's diplomacy of subversion in Africa and in the Arab World constituted an unprecedented obstruction to their own interests and objectives."⁴⁹ The American effort has been

47. Colley, n.52, p.83

48. Cye Ogunberdejo, "Qathafi's North Africa Design", International Security (NEW YORK) vol.8, Summer 1983, p.165.

49. Chester Crocker, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, cited in Du Bois, "The OAU : Dollar Black Mail" The African Communist (London), no.92, First Quarter, 1983, p.69.

has been formidable.⁵⁰ The diplomatic, economic, military and media measures taken by the Reagan administration to isolate, overthrow, assassinate Col. Qathafi upto 1983 are elaborated by Aftab Kamal Pasha.⁵¹

The campaign culminated in 15 April 1986 bombing of Tripoli by American planes. The national security adviser John Poindexter once again 'dealt' with Libya by organising disinformation campaign, outlined in August 1986.

Libya's Relations with the Soviet Union

During the early years of Col. Qathafi's rule, prerequisites of any future Soviet-Libyan relations hardly looked propitious. His distrust of both super powers, his Islamic Zealotry and his visceral dislike of communism all militated against

~~any leaning~~

50. Claudia Wright, "Libya and the West: Head long into Confrontation?" International Affairs (London), vol.56, no.1, winter 1981-82, p.13.
51. Aftab Kamal Pasha, Libya and the United States, Qathafi's Response to Reagan's Challenge (New Delhi, 1984), pp.2-11.

any leanings toward the Soviet Union.⁵² During this period, Soviet diplomats worked patiently for an improvement of the situation and for a rapprochement with Qadhafi, their efforts seemed to be getting results when Prime Minister Major Jalloud, visited Moscow in 1972, and signed a technical and economic agreement. But Soviet proposals for industrialisation was not accepted.⁵³

President Sadat's rapprochement with the United States and the beginning of his journey toward peace with Israel was the crucial turning point in Col. Qadhafi's slow but seemingly inexorable course toward a future strategies links with Moscow. Libya and the Soviet Union discovered a mutual interest in undermining western positions and influence in the Middle East, Africa, the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Although the ultimate geo-political objectives of Tripoli and Moscow were not necessarily at all the same.⁵⁴

52. Colley, n. 52, p. 245.

53. First, n. 35, p. 241.

54. Wright, n. 36, p. 216.

Major Jalloud visited Moscow again in 1974, that trip saw the first of a series major of major arms deals that have amounted to about \$12 billion, the largest purchases ever made by Libya from the Soviet Union. On 1976 Soviet-Libyan Friendship Society was formed in Moscow and Libya-Soviet Friendship society in Tripoli.⁵⁵

Col. Qathafi visited the Soviet Union in 1976 and again 1981, and Soviet leaders have made repeated offers of military and technical assistance. By the end of 1980, Soviet arms deliveries to Libya, gave Libya's 55,000 men armed forces the highest ratio of military equipment to manpower in the developing world.⁵⁶ With the exception of military supplies, the level of Soviet trade with Libya has been relatively low, compared to Libyan trade with the west of

55. Y. Glukhov, "Libya : Time of Change and Renewal", International Affairs (Moscow) Feb. 21, 1977, p.119.

56. Ronald Bruce S.T. John, "Libya's Foreign and Domestic Policies", Current History (Philadelphia), vol.80, no.470, December 1981, p.427.

several other east European countries. Libys's relationship with the Soviet Union has always been characterised more by cautious co-operation than by friendship. An estimated 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet military advisers and an equal numbers of East Europeans are strategically spread through the Libyan armed forces.⁵⁷

The battle with Egypt in 1977 provided the Libyans with a rationale for further military build up, and anew military agreement with the Soviets. During this period, and particularly after the signing of the September 1978 Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, Qathafi began to move away publicly from his earlier strict adherence to non-alignment.

Both the soviet Union and Libya believed that the relationship is not much more than a marriage of convenience based on expediency and

57. Edward Schumacher, "The United States and Libya", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. no. Winter 1986-87, p.345.

opportunism. Soviet leadership told Major Jalloud during his 1982 visit that, "We see the unity of our two countries goals in the anti-imperialist struggle and in the noble cause of defending the freedom and Independence of people as the firm basis of our relations.... we salute Libyan people's courageous struggle against American imperialism....⁵⁸ Col. Qathafi had expressed desire and endeavoured to get Warsaw Pact membership. But the Soviet Union is cool on its part, because they know that the relations are based on mutual interests not on ideological identity, prime condition for the membership.

Libya's Africa Policy

One of the major interests area of Libyan foreign policy is Africa. Libya is con-

58. The Story was firstly published in Pravada, trns. in Current Digest of Soviet Press(CDSP), June 23, 1982.

sidered a gateway to Africa and is an important part of the African continent. It is linked between Europe and Africa, the Maghreb and the Mashrek.⁵⁹ The importance of Libya's geographic position goes back into history. Under the two Turkish regimes, as well as the Karamalès administration trade with Africa from the Arab East and from Europe passed through Libya. It was only after 1884 when the imperial forces divided Africa into European spheres of influence that Libya's role of the gate way to Africa has ended.

There was deep concern in Tripoli over Israeli influence in at least thirty four African states that have established diplomatic relations with Israel. The later had more diplomatic missions in Africa than all the Arab states combined.⁶⁰ Israel has sent to Africa some 3,000 experts, that is more than sixty percent

59. Habib, n. 43, p.298.

60. Ibid., p.299.

of the experts which Israel assigned to the Third World countries. With the determined efforts of Col. Qathafi Libya was able to blunt Israel's carefully cultivated African Policy.⁶¹ A forward campaign mounted and sustained from Tripoli in support of a common Arab objective had, by the end of 1973 included nearly thirty black African states to break off relations with Israel.⁶² In May, 1973 the OAU adopted the United Nations resolution urging Israel to withdraw from occupied territories which was till then neutral on the Arab-Israel conflict.

To the South, in the neighbouring Central African Republic/French interests were challenged by Col. Qathafi. In September 1979 when 'Emperor' Bokassa was in Tripoli negotiating Libyan co-operation, his regime

61. Andrew, n.27, p.718.

62. Ibid. p.212.

was overthrown in a coup organised with french military help.⁶³

But Libyan troops supply could not save General Amin, and eventually he fled and got asylum in Libya, but was later asked to leave. Thus, the uncritical Libyan support for Bokassa and Idi Amin could not sustain both the personalities and its policy came under severe attack from many corners of the Third World.

Col. Gathafi was gradually getting isolated in Africa after his tremendous success in early seventies, on account of (1) his decision to intervene in Uganda on behalf of General Amin, (2) his support to the Polisario movement (3) his decision to send Libyan troops into Chad (4) his support for the opposition movements in

63. Ibid., p.212.

different African states. He could not become OAU Chairman in 1982 and 1983 due to lack of quorum engineered by the Reagan Administration through its allies in Africa.⁶⁴ Col. Qadhafi realised the need for rapprochement with the African countries and started working towards that direction, by giving financial aid and free oil supply.

Libya-Malta Relations.

Everything concerning the security of the Mediterranean region is firmly linked with the security of Libya and other Arab countries as at with the Europe. Libya has taken keen interest to influence the small islands like Malta, Sicily, Crete. Libya succeeded in evacuating British forces from Malta in March 1979. It maintains a useful working relationship with Yugoslavia,

64. Pasha n.59, p.58.

Greece and Turkey. It had specially good relations with Malta during the Socialist Party regime from 1971 to May 1987. The socialist government in Malta had made common cause with Colonel Qathafi on key issues including the Middle East and European and Mediterranean security. In December 1984 Libya and Malta signed a five year security and economic cooperation treaty.⁶⁵ In the recent election held in May 1987 the Socialist Party lost power to pro-western Nationalist Party.⁶⁶ It is a great loss for Col. Qathafi. He is endeavouring to maintain good relations with the new regime.⁶⁷

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65. "Malta's testing time" The World Today (London), vol, 43, n.1, January 1987, p.15.
66. Indian Express (New Delhi) 14 May 1987. references to the Indian Express in this dissertation are to the New Delhi edition of that newspaper.
67. He sent a Libyan delegation to congratulate the victory of the Nationalist Party. The Maltese leader reiterated his country's commitment to the continued relations of friendship and cooperation between the Great Jamahiriya and Malta SWB/ME/85/3/A 18, 21 May 1987.

Libya's Involvement in Chad.

Libya has old historical ethnic, tribal, commercial, religious and political ties with the people of northern Chad.⁶⁸ The Saharan territory of the north (Barkou, Ennedi and Tibeti - BET) is by tradition difficult to govern. The area remained under French military administration upto 1964 due to the incapability of the Chadian government to govern it. After the french withdrawal the Chadian army committed mistakes and atrocities which deeply wounded the self esteem of the proud and independent populace of BET.⁶⁹ The Chad National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) was formed in Sudan which spearheaded civil war against Fort Lamy. (later N'djamena)

Libya supported FROLINAT both under monarchy and after the republic, but the first official claim of Libyan involvement was made in August 1971.

68. Wright, n.36, p.167.

69. Barnard Laune, Africa South of Sahara, 1987 (London, 1986), p.352.

Diplomatic relations were broken with Chad and Libya formally recognised FROLINAT. As a result of the mediation of Niger's President, Hemani Diory approved by France, Libya and Chad renewed relations in April 1972. President Tombalbaye broke relations with Israel and in return Libya withdrew official support for FROLINAT.

Libyan forces moved into the Aozou strip an area of some 69,960 sq.km. (27,000 sq.mile) believed to contain substantial iron ore and Uranium deposits at about the end of 1972.⁷⁰ Libya based its claim over the strip through a treaty signed between French Chad and Italian Libya in 1935 that assigned the Auzou strip to Libya. But the agreement was never ratified and was later denounced by the Italian government following the deterioration of French-Italian relations. After Libyan independence, unfixed

70. P. Biarnes, "Ichad: Entre Paris et Tripoli" Revue Iran Caise d'Etudes Mai Politiques Africaners, n.13, 1975, cited in Wright, n.36, p.168.

frontiers with French territories were defined, but the southern frontier with French Chad seems to have been left as it was.^{71.}

President Tombalbaye had been 'persuaded' to accept the occupation in exchange of Tripoli's removal of FROLINAT headquarter from its territory. But General Felix Malloum, who overthrew him in a military coup in April 1975 had not accepted the Libyan position. By 1972, Tripoli Protege Goukouni Ouddi had gained control over most factions within the FROLINAT.

In 1976, however, a faction led by Hissene Habre' split with FROLINAT and formed the Armed forces of the North (FAN).^{72.} In a government reshuffle, President Malloum named Habre' Prime Minister in 1978. But he broke in early 1979 as antagonism between north and south intensified. President Malloum resigned and fled the country, after Habre's FAN seized control of the capital.

71. I. Brownlie, Africa Boundaries (London, 1979), Ibid., p.174.

72. Ogubendeyo, n.56, p.162.

In a coalition government formed in April 1979 Habre' became defence minister and Ouddi interior minister. On November 1979 a transitional government was set up by the eleven warring factions under Ouddi presidency.^{73.}

Habre' was dismissed from the cabinet in April 1980, when fighting broke out between FAN and government forces. In June 1980 President Ouddi signed a mutual defence pact with Col. Qathafi.⁷⁴

Libyan forces entered Chad and reached N'djamena in December. Habre' fled with his followers to Sudan where he built up his forces by foreign aid particularly USA. In January 1981, Radio Tripoli announced the intended merger of the two countries.⁷⁵ The announcement caused widespread alarm in Africa.

Under OAU, American and French Pressure and threatened by Col. Qathafi ambitions Ouddi

73. Wright, n.36, p.211

74. Davis S. Yost, "French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge", Orbis, vol.24, n.4, Winter 1983, p.959.

75. Wright, n.36, p.212.

requested the departure of the Libyan troops on 30 October 1981 and Col. Qathafi withdrew his troops. OAU peace keeping force replaced Libyan troop-s. These troop-s did nothing, however, to halt the FAN's subsequent advance from the eastern Sudan. On 7 June 1982, Habre's forces occupied the capital, a-nd Ouddi fled to Algeria.⁷⁶ Habre' declared himself President of Chad on 19 October.

Col. Qathafi helped Ouddi to re-group in Libya and establish a rival government at Barddi, south of the Libyan occupied Aozou strip.⁷⁷ By December 1982, forces under Ouddi and FROLINAT had begun a guerrilla war in the massive desert region of BET. Instead of direct intervention, as in the past, Libya offered both the Ouddi government and FROLINAT Sanctuary mainly in the south western oasis of Sebha, and logistic support.

76. World Mark, n. 28, p. 56.

77. George Henderson, "Behind the Libya Scare" Middle East International (London), n. 195, 4 March 1983, p. 14.

France and the US rushed with supplies to President Habre'. In January 1984, President Habre's forces drove the rebels from several key points in Central Chad. In an interview with Newsweek Col. Qathafi said, "It is not true that we are preparing a new intervention in Chad. We are not disposed to playing the role of the eternal policemen in Chad. But we also refuse to see another foreign power intervene in Chad. The situation in Chad affects Libya's security and its frontiers more than any other country in the world."⁷⁸

The French troops have been stationed south of the 16th parallel, the dividing line between Libyan and rebel held sanctuary and government areas. Their tasks are limited to providing logistic support for the Chadians and deterring Libya from lunging at targets in

78. Newsweek, vol. CI, N.5, 31 January, 1983, p.37.

the south of the country. Congo's President Davis Sassou Nguesso and OAU Chairman Ab dou Diouf of Senegal played mediatory roles between Habre' and Ouddi in 1986. When Ouddi made overtures for talks with Habre', he was ousted from leadership by Libya.⁷⁹ Acheikh Ibn Oumar, leader of the Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR) was installed as the new Leader of the exiled government. But he could muster only a few hundred tribal followers to support him.⁸⁰

Ouddi's troops switched side in October 1986 towards President Habre'. In early January 1987 the armies were officially merged into one force. France and the US have accelerated and increased their military aid to the Chadian government over the past several months. In December the Reagan administration awarded \$15 million worth of

79. Franziska James, "Habre's Push North", Africa Report (New York, vol.32, n.2, March April 1987, p.43.

80. The Economist (London), vol.302, n.7485, 14 February 1987, p.25.

military assistance to Chad in addition to the \$5 million already allotted for the current fiscal year. France remains Chad's main supporter, providing substantial military and economic assistance. They have given Jaguar and Mirage Fighter planes and a variety of sophisticated radar and other military equipment.⁸¹ Apart from these two Western powers, Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko, openly supports President Habre's Government. Chadian soldiers receive military training in Zaire.

As a result of Ouddi's withdrawal from the exiled government and changing over of his troops from anti-government rebels to pro-government patriotic forces and enhanced foreign assistance, President Habre's position has strengthened vis-a-vis the rebel forces. Libyan troops launched an all out onslaught on the towns of Bardai, Zour and Wour held by Ouddi troops.⁸² Chadian government forces

81. James, n.85, p.42.

82. The Hindu, (Gurgaon), 21 December 1986. All references to the Hindu in this dissertation are to the Gurgaon edition of that newspaper.

launched a counter offensive, killing four hundred Libyan troops in December 1986.⁸³

In January 1987 Chadian troops attacked the strategic northeastern oasis of Fada and took it from Libyans and rebel control within a day. The battle at Fada, in fact, set a pattern which was to demoralise the Libyans increasingly. At Wadi Doum, some 1,200 of the Colonel men, almost half of the garrison died in a furious battle that lasted barely for ninety minutes.⁸⁴ Faya Largeau, the home town of President Habre⁸⁵ was captured by Chadian forces without any resistance.⁸⁵ With the capture of these regions, the entire Borkou and Ennedi tract- that is Chad's central and eastern part north of 16th parallel is

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83. The Statesman, (New Delhi), 22 December 1986. All references to the Statesman in this dissertation are to the New Delhi edition of that newspaper.
84. Wadi Doum was the Libyan's main forward base in northern Chad boasted with landmines, radar, Soviet built tanks, SAM missiles and 4,000 troops. The most important gain to the Chadians is the arms and equipment which they got as booty.
85. The Statesman, 27 May, 1987. The fall of Faya Largeau meant the virtual end to Col. Qadhafi's three years occupation of the norther Chad.

now under N'djamena's control.⁸⁶ Libya and allied rebel forces still have control over the rugged mountaneous region of Tibesti and Aozou strip.

Libyan forces in the Tibesti region are directly supported from bases in southern Libya. Col. Qadhafi's stakes in Chad are very high. He cannot afford a defeat in Chad, not without losing face at home and influence in Africa and the entire Third World. He is unlikely to simply withdraw from Chad, especially from the north-eastern area, the Aozou strip.

86. Guardian Weekly, April 5, 1987, p.11.

CHAPTER II

Diplomatic strategies of Libya under Colonel Qathafi :

Diplomatic strategies of any state for achieving foreign policy goals and objectives depends upon the capabilities and constraints of the state, nature of goals and objectives. Since they are adopted by the leader or leaders of the state, the personality, ideology and ambition of the leader(s) determine their diplomatic strategies. In the Libyan case, the highly ambitious revolutionary leadership and personality of Colonel Muammar al-Qathafi plays a key role in pursuing Libyan diplomatic postures.

Colonel Qathafis foreign policy objective mainly focus on the concepts of Arab unity, restoration of Palestunian homeland and destruction of Israeel as state and aims at hezalding radical cultural and social revolution all over the world based on his 'Third Universal Theory' for the emanicipation of humanity.¹ The chief strategies ~~are~~ are Arab Nationalism, Pan-Islamism and oil.

1. Mohamed A. El. Khawas, Qathafi Ideology of The Theory and Practice, (Tripoli) March 1984, p.5

Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity

Emerging on the international stage in 1970,¹ Colonel Qathafi has a unique credential as representative of two hitherto mutually antagonistic interests in Arab ~~worlds~~ one led by the moneyed oil power states and the other by dedicated Arab nationalists, i.e. Pan-Arabists. While Arab oil wealth has largely been privilege of the 'reactionary' Kingdoms and sheikhdoms of the Arabian peninsula, Pan-Arabism had been monopolised by the politically and socially advanced but almost oil-less states such as Egypt and Syria.²

It is suggested that "Arab nationalism is the central element of Colonel Qathafi's ideology and indeed is Colonel Qathafi probably his primordial value"³ Colonel Qathafi is considered 'spiritual son' of President Nasser. He is deeply influenced by the speeches and writing of President Nasser and considered the Egyptian revolution as 'mother resolution'. President Nasser's speeches and the Cairo Radio. *an* played important role in inculcating, nursing and doctrinising him, in boundless dignity of Arabs and their past. *the*

² John Wright, Libya : A Modern History (London, 1982), p. 156

³ Ronald Bruce, St. John, "The Ideology of Muammar al Qathafi: Theory and Practice" International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (New York Vol. 15 no. 4, November, 1983) p. 473

His concept of Arab nationalism is based on a glorification of Arab History and culture which conceives of the Arabic speaking world as the Arab nation. The backwardness of the Arab nation is the result of four centuries of stagnation under Ottoman rule, the subjugation and exploitation of first colonialism and then imperialism and the repression and corruption of monarchical rule. He opines that the Arab nations and the Arab land is one, and must be unified under a single flag. The physical boundaries are created arbitrarily by imperial powers, and they are artificial.

Col. Qathafi is also of the opinion that the vested interests of the ruling regimes are to subserve the interests of foreign powers, and put down the nationalist outbursts with a heavy hand. The physical divisions in the Arab world is created by the elites of the Arab States is on the basis of local patriotism. Col. Qathafi firmly believes that the Arab masses have to be enlightened to break these imposed barriers. The only way to wipe out is the cultural ^{lit} revolution.⁵

The Zionists have been the main beneficiaries of Arab disunity and Palestinians are the greatest losers.

4. Jagmohan Singh, "Mummar Al-Qathafi: The Bulwark of Arab Unity" (New Delhi, 1981), p.22.

5. Ibid., p.24

For getting back Palestine and attaining the past glory and a definite role in international world, Arab unity must be attained. Col. Qathafi regards Libya as the 'Prussia' of the Arab world.⁶ He believes that the best way to regain Palestine was first to free the Arabs from foreign alliances and domination and to remove poverty. He strongly believes that if the Arabs combined together and form one nation, Israel would not be in existence for a month.⁷

His commitment to Arab Unity appears in this statement. "We are unshaken in our belief in unity. We believe in unity long before we held power, long before we entered the army... Had it not been for unity we would not have created our own organisation, nor would we have undertaken our revolution. The RCC is determined to realise unity even if it involves bloodshed. Our whole existence is limited to unity."⁸

In his temporary constitutional proclamation issued by the RCC on 11 December 1969, the preamble stated that the regimes intention is to fight reactionary forces and colonialism and to eliminate the obstacles to Arab unity.⁹

6. Henri Habib, Libya : Past and Present (Tripoli, 1979) p.3.

7. Ibid., p.276.

8. Excerpt from Col Qathafi's speech delivered at Nasser camp for volunteers, 23 July 1972, cited by Mirella Bianco, Qathafi: Voice from the Desert (London, 1975), p.136.

9. John, n. 3, p.473.

About the strategies of unity, he states "We are men with a cause. We move towards unity in all direction... We try every possibility... There are many doors and opening through which Arab unity may be achieved. There are systems which you can only deal with by means of violence and revolution. We deal with other systems by means of negotiations and dialogue".¹⁰

During the September Revolution, Col. Qathafi used 'Al-Kuds' (Jerusalem) as the Code word, indicating that from its birth, the revolution considered Palestine to be the first problem for the Arab world. Nearly everything Qathafi has stated, written, or done since his classroom days in Sehha can be explained in terms of the dreams of the unification of all Arabic speaking people. Anything that contributes to those causes is right and just and anything that works against them must be circumvented or eradicated.¹¹

Arab unity is the only issue on which he is not ready to make any compromise:

"Even if all Libyans repudicated the Arab unity I myself would fight for it, alone. There is only one point on which I would remain on one side while the whole Libyan people were on the other, that is Arab."

¹⁰ Excerptts from an interview by Al-Ahram Newspaper (Cairo); Thus spoke Colonel Mumar Qathafi, (Beirut, 1974), p. 146.

¹¹ John Colley, Libya Sandstrom: The Complete Account of Qathafi's Revolution, (New York, 1982) p.10.

In other words, if the Libyan people have ceased to be unionist I should ~~have~~ leave them, for I am unionist with all my being". 12

His attitude towards Israel and Zionism is conditioned by proclaimed support for the concept of Arab unity and Arab nations. He makes a clear distinction between Judaism and Zionism, and Jews and Zionists. He regards Judaism as the ancient monotheistic religion and does not have any ill feeling towards it. In fact, he proposes a novel plan of unity among the three revealed religions. But he has all contempt for Zionism, the movement which created Israel and is carrying its expansionist policy. He regards all emigrant Jews in Palestine as foreigners and they must return to their own countries. Israel is a Zionist state which must be wiped out and Palestine must be established as a state with the native Muslims, Jews and Christians. On Israel, he said "Israel's existence conflicts with the presence of the Arab nation. Either we stay or Israel stays, anything else is nonsense". 13

Strategy of War with Israel

Col. Qathafi has utter hostility towards Israel, and he believes that the Arab-Israel dispute could only be resolved by war. When asked about War, he stated that:

The Arab revolutionary forces must change the Arab

12. Excerpt from Col. Qathafi Speech at Nasser Camp for Volunteers, 23 July 1972, cited in Bianco, No. 8, p. 136.

13. Richard Dentsch, "Dealing with Qathafi" Africa Report, Vol. 27 no. 2, March-April 1982, p. 47.

Status quo to make war a national war involving the whole Arab nation... The Arab nation must unite and employ all its powers in the War." 14

By mid- 1970 Col. Qadhafi was ready to prepare the Arab world for the annihilation of Israel. 15 In May and June he and Foreign Minister Busair visited Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt to propose a grand strategic plan for co-ordinated military action. Busair also visited Qatar, Kuwait and the Yemens. According to the Libyan Plan, the Arab states were to make specific financial and military commitments. Palestinian government-in-exile was to be formed from representatives of all the resistance groups. Although the tour was not successful due to the lukewarm response of some of the Arab regimes, Col. Qadhafi was not disheartened.

He pursued his efforts with to remost dedication to Arab unity vigorously but he could not succeed in his endeavour. He unilaterally initiated unity moves with neighbouring countries like Egypt, Sudan and Morocco, but they lacked his enthusiasm and vigour. Instead of being

14. Excerpt from an interview by A-Ahram, n.10, p.133.

15. Wright, n.2, p. 157.

Discouraged by the fiasco, his failure made him more rigid and desperate in his belief.

He skillfully used the symbols and slogans of Arab nationalism to gather legitimacy within Libya and outside. He said 'During the process of change, you must create the slogan that all the people can understand. The slogan that moves them. For instance, 'Arab Nationalism', Arab Arabism etc., Those are Slogans that anyone in the desert can understand.¹⁶

Libyan attempts towards Arab Unity:

His first unity move was a tripartite Pact with Egypt and Sudan. In December 1969, President Nasser and the formation of an Arab formative Revolutionary Front to consolidate three progressive revolutions¹⁷. Before completion of one year of the unity pact President Nasser died. In the November 1970 summit meeting of Libya, Egypt and Sudan translated their projected merger into a written union. Syria's request to join the new federation was negotiated on the telephone the same month by General Hafiz-Al-Assad, One April 1971 of month union of

16. Excerpt from an interview by Amin Aawar, n.1, p.54

17. Ruth First, Libya: The Elusive Revolution, (London, 1974) p. 214

Arab Republics of Egypt, Libya and Syria was founded. The Sudan could not join the merger plan due to its internal problem.¹⁸ President Numeiry after gaining stability with the help of Libya and Egypt later, did not join the union, instead Sudan threw itself towards the other Arab axis that had formed between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, under the United States protection.¹⁹ Libyan relations with Morocco were in continuous state of radio war, especially after Colonel Qathafi's premature jubilation at the palace coup that failed. As a monarchy Morocco was an outcast to the Arab Federation, Algeria was also approached more than one to join, but it declined.²⁰ Algeria's approach to Arab unity differed from that of Libya Tunisia's approach also did not confirm to Qathafi's ideas and was different with the Libyan thinking. President Bourguiba believes that unity is the culmination of co-operation among unity by political decision.²¹

18. Ibid., p. 219

19. President Numeiry was ousted in a communist led coup. But the coup was foiled and, he was reinstalled by Libyan and Egyptian help. Since there was a provision in the Pact to help any party in trouble by the other parties, even when he does not ask for help.

20. First, n^o. 17, p. 229

21. Ibid., p. 219

It was in the two Yemens that Qathafi was free to play of his notion of unity. Two Yemini delegation arrived in Tripoli to solicit Libyan support. Col. Qathafi made aid conditional on their achieving a unified state, however distant the purposes of the two regimes. Col. Qathafi was as usual inclined to recognise either ideology or internal social structure. In Tripoli, a conference of both Yemen, hammered out the ten bases for single Yemani state and appointed a joint committee to draft the basic law for a political organisation guided by Libyan Arab socialist Union.²² While with Jordan, Col. Qathafi was not on good terms, there was bitter enmity with Jordan. At meeting of the Arab Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff Conference, in Cairo, Col. Qathafi repeatedly urged Free Officers in Jordan to topple the throne of King Hussain. Iraq was also seen with suspicion due to Baathism. There were policy differences between Egypt, Syria and Libya. The Federation had produced little more than a liaison of the superstructures of the government.

21. Wright, n. 2, p. 156.

22. First, n. 17, p. 230.

So in July 1972 on the twentieth anniversary of Egypt's revolution, Col. Qathafi called for an immediate merger of Egypt and Libya 23. After a week the Egyptian delegation was closeted in Benghazi with Col Qathafi and eight of his RCC members and later it was announced that the merger was agreed upon and both the countries would go to referendum in September 1973. 24

He was the first Arab leader who publicly criticised Palestinians for lack of unity and military effectiveness. He had originally tried to reconcile the main Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the leftwing, 'Popular Front for the liberation of Palestines (PFLP) led by George Habbash. But when he could not succeed, he expelled the PFLP from Libya on the grounds that its members were neither fighters nor liberators, and representative of other 'unworthy' groups were similarly expelled. 25

Thereafter, Yasser Arafts Al-Fatah - the strongest best organised and most active Palestinian guerrilla force - became the main recipient of Libyan support.

23. Ibid, p. 233.

24. Mohammad Hassan Haikal, 'The Road to Ramadan', Dehradun, Matroj Publication 1981, p. 70

25. Wright, n. 21, p. 157.

26. On Feb. 1973, A Boeing 727 airliner of Libyan Arab Airlines on a regular flight from Benghazi to Cairo, was shot down by Israeli fighter aircraft after straying 170 kilometers off over Israeli occupied Sinai. More than a hundred people died in the crash. Passions were so high that demonstrators attacked the Egyptian Consulate and other Egyptian properties for its failure to protect the airliner.

The Boeing incident of Feb 1973 further harmed already deteriorating Libyan-Egyptian relations.²⁶ As a retaliation Col. Qathafi organised a mission to sink Queen Elizabeth II, which was stopped by President Sadat.²⁷ On the failure of the mission Col. Qathafi's sense of frustration mounted. He resigned from the RCC the resignation was not accepted by his colleagues. So he flew to Cairo on 22 June, where President Sadat suggested him to go round the country explaining his ideas on Arab unity to the people. As he went around, the volume of opposition he encountered by Westernised section of Egyptians shocked him.²⁸ He returned to Libya in disgust and forced himself in seclusion, which he ended when crowds of Libyans trooped out to plead with him to return.

27. Wealthy Jews and other supporters of Israel from the United States and Europe had booked passage on a special sailing of the Queen Elizabeth II to reach Israel to participate in the independence day celebration of Israel. Col. Qathafi wanted to sink the ship by a Egyptian submarine stationed in Libya under the joint defence agreement which he made with President Nasser. The commander of the submarine consulted Egyptian naval base at Alexandria and described Col. Qathafi order. President Sadat forbade to attack the ship. He notified Col. Qathafi that the Queen could not be ~~sunk~~ spotted.

28. Haikal, n. 24, p. 194.

This strange episode led to another unique press tactic 'the Libyan march on Cairo'. It looked like a real demonstration of political consciousness, to get 40,000 Libyans, out of a population of little more than 1,500,000, marching 1,500 miles to ask for unity would be commendable achievement.²⁹ But many people in Egypt took fright at the idea. It was treated not as a political happening, but purely as a security problem. The progress march was halted and a small delegation was allowed to meet President Sadat. As he talked of his hopes for unity many of them wept.³⁰

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On the twenty first anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, Col. Qathafi publicly revealed his deep disagreements with President Sadat declaring that union was imperative and inevitable even at the cost of civil war.³¹ The referendum planned for September was not held, and the October war dashed all short-term prospects of making Libya and Egypt one state. President Sadat always had reservations about the unity plan, but he accepted it uneasily to get legitimacy. The position was changed after the war and President Sadat pushed aside Col. Qathafi's bid for unity.³²

29. Ibid, p. 195

30. Ibid, p. 195

31. Wright, no. 2, p. 163

32. Faud Azami, "The End of Pan Arabism", Foreign Affairs (New York, Vol. 57, no. 2, Winter 1978-78) p. 363

Post - 1973 War Unity Moves

Col. Qathafi tried again in late 1973 to have a merger with Tunisia. President Bourguiba and Col. Qathafi met on Jan. 12, 1974 to proclaim Arab Islamic Republic subject to referendum by Tunisia. The plan was thwarted by the Tunisia Premier Hedi Nouira, who was against it. Thus within four months, the two plans of merger with Egypt and then with Tunisia failed which were so close to this heart.³³

President Sadat moved closer to Saudi Arabia and America. He moved away from Libya. The suspicions between the two countries increased leading to serious verbal war. In July 1977 relations between the two countries reached a critical stage over renewed Egyptian charges of Libyan subversions, and increasing concern in Cairo over Tripoli's Russian arms build-up. Border incidents led to a four day war. The fighting was ended largely through the mediation of President Boudienne of Algeria.³⁴

33. J.G. Farley, "Libya" World Survey, (London, no. 79, July 1975) p. 8.

34. Wright, n. 2, p. 205.

President Sadat's decision to visit Jerusalem in November 1977 and then to undertake a serious peace talk-making process with Israel leading to the Camp David agreement of September 1978, caused new alignments in the Arab world. In December 1977, representatives of Libya, Algeria, Syria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the PLO and Iraq met in Tripoli to set up a front of steadfastness and resistance but Iraq declined to join. 35

Relations with Rabat were restored at the beginning of 1975 when Tripoli applauded Morocco's policy on the Spanish Sahara and offered Morocco and Mauritania troops to help free the territory from Spain. Polisario became the chief irritant between them. Libya was one of the first supporters of the Polisario. But he is opposed to the creation of an independent Sahara state. Instead he appeared to favour the incorporation of the whole territory into Mauritania. The Sahara Arab Democratic Republic government in-exile was proclaimed in 1976, but Col. Qadhafi recognised it in 1980. After mediation by Arafat they renewed diplomatic relations in July 1981. 36

35. Ibid., p. 207.

36. W. Lewis, "Western Sahara-Compromises or Conflict", Current History, (Vol. 80, no. 470 December 1981) pp. 410-14.

On August 1984, Morocco and Libya concluded a unity agreement on King Hussain's initiative.³⁷ The treaty was abrogated in August 1986 by the king,³⁸ following violent criticism from Col Qathafi of his meeting in July with Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres.³⁸

Col. Qathafi visited Khartoum in May 1985.³⁹ He called on the rebels in southern Sudan,⁴⁰ whom he had supported,⁴¹ to lay down arms and talk to the new government. Diplomatic relations between Libya and Sudan were restored in April and a military protocol,⁴² under which Libya was to aid Sudan in training its armed forces and supplying equipment was signed in Tripoli in July.³⁹ On June 11, 1985, Col Qathafi proposed the establishment of an Arab Union to be composed of all Arab countries. The remarkable thing about this proposal was his stress that no country would be obliged to alter its forms of government in order to belong to the Union.⁴⁰ But even this plan could not succeed.⁴³

37. Lisa Anderson, "Assessing Libya's Qathafi" Current History (Vol. 84, no. 502, May 1985) p. 226

38. Middle East and North Africa, n.31, p.605

39. Ibid., p. 605

40. Contemporary Archives, Vol. 32, no.2, p.34199.

Col. Qathafi has remained a lone crusader against Israel and follower of Arab Unity. His consistent efforts to forge unity/merger with the neighbouring Arab States proved fertile and his dream of Arab unity still remains to be fulfilled. Col. Qathafi has been alienated from the majority of the Arab States, who due to various constraints and restraints, could not support him. The gap between moder and extremist regimes has increased which has benefitted Israel indirectly.

Pan-Islamism

Libya overwhelmingly constitutes a community of sunni Muslim of Maliki School of Jurisprudence.⁴¹ They have strong attachment to Islam cultivated by Sanusism.⁴² The order lost its zeal under the shadow of political power.

41. Zaheet Masood Buraisi, 'Islam and Revolution in Libya' in Islam and Revolution, ed. by Asghar Ali Engineer, (Delhi 1984), p. 110.

42. Sanusism is a Islamic Revivalist movement started in the middle of nineteenth century under the inspiration of Wakabi fundamentalism of the Arabian Peninsula in the form of Sanusi Sufi Order. Founded by Muhammad bil Ali al-Sanusi, the ~~brotherhood~~ brotherhood had invoked the purity of Islamic doctrine on a strategy to combat laxity which had gripped the community. The fraternity was able to infiltrate in all sections of the society.

In the monarchical regime, corruption was rampant and people had serious grievances against the political system. But the monarch still commanded reverence and respect among the masses due to his religious authority.

No revolution against the monarchy would have attained success and popular support, irrespective of its honesty and sincerity without Islamic credentials.⁴³ Col. Qathafi who himself is a sincere Muslim with strict austerity and unparalleled xenophobia was acceptable to the people. He is well read in Islam and he profusely quotes from the Holy Quran, the precedents of Islamic history, acts of the prophet and his companions to prove his policy and decisions. He is very conscious of the strategic value of Islam in the Arab world. "Go to any place in the Arab World and shout 'God'. You will find people repeating your appeal with you".⁴⁴ The very first broadcast of Tripoli Radio written and read on 1 September 1969 by Col. Qathafi after the coup his consciousness of Islam as the legitimizing force. The proclamation was passionate.

43. Lisa Anderson, "Libya and American Foreign Policy " The Middle East Journal, (Washington) Vol. 36, no. 4, Autumn, 1982), p. 519

44. Excerpt from an interview by Amin Aswar, n. 10, p. 56.

In the name of God, the compassionate, the Merciful, the great Libyan people, ... With one blow from your heroic army, the idols collapsed and the graven images shattered. Extend your hands open your hearts, forget your rancours, and stand together against the enemy of the Arab nation, the enemy of Islam, the enemy of humanity, who burned our holy places and shattered our honour. 45

In the constitutional proclamation of 11 December 1969, Islam was described as the state religion in Article II. The Preamble and Article I deal with Arab nationalism. It clearly expressed that under his scheme of things, Islam comes second after Arab nationalism. The Libyan government termed the revolution as Islamic Al-Fatah Revolution and Col. Qathafi acquired the title of the Modern Revolutionary Leader of the World Islamic Revolution. 46

45. The analogy of the act of overthrowing King Idris regime with a blow to collapse idols and shatter images has great appeal to the people viewing their religiosity. His appeal for support against Israel the enemy of the Arab nation the enemy of Islam, the enemy of humanity, who burned our holy places (Al-Agsa Mosque) and shattered our honour) has immediate appeal to the emotions.

46. Risalat Al-Jihad, (Tripoli, no. 47, October 1986) pp. 10-22. After the establishment of his regime he changed the name of his country three times giving the small country a long name, but never even as a gesture, he used the term 'Islamic' in the long name. So the claim of Islamic Fateh Revolution is a tactical design.

As soon as Col. Gathafi carried out the revolution, he appointed a supervisor for the remaining Sanusi property mainly educational centres and merged the Sanusi sponsored Islamic University with the University of Libya. These decisions were taken to discourage Sanusi Order. He instituted a body called "The Supreme Council for National Guidance" under his chairmanship. On this body, multi from many corners of the Arab world joined Libyans, in a search for a philosophy of the revolution and a universal theory. Till 1970's the Sharia had been gradually replaced by civil and commercial legal orders on the western model and later was concerned only with the matters of personal status and institutions. Laws of 1973 and 1974 integrated Sharia law and Sharia courts into what had been a secular legal system and at the same time simplified the complex traditional code.

World Islamic Call Society

Libya organised an Islamic conference in December 1970. According to a decision taken in the conference a General Committee for the Islamic Call was established which acquired in 1971 legal independent status in 1972. The purpose of Islamic Call Society was to propagate Islam and strive for the unity of Muslims. Its activities were spread in Asia, Africa, Europe, North and South America and Australia. 47 The Second conference was concerned in

Tripoli in August 1982, in which 139 Islamic societies, centres and committees took part. The third conference of societies was organised in September 1986 in which representative of eighty countries participated. While inaugurating the third conference, Col. Qathafi stated :

"For the first time a world movement is established to preach Islam in all the continent of the world... This has been the dream of Muslims since Islam stopped its conquest and advance... Now, we continue the struggle, the fighting, and the new world movement of Islam." Libya got the Quran translated in as many languages as possible so that its message is accessible to non-Arabs. Risalat-Al-Jihad is a cultural Islamic monthly published by Islamic Call Society in three languages, Arabic, English and French. The Libyan Government has opened Quranic schools, built mosques, recruited teachers of Arabic and Islamic history, and started institutes of Islamic studies in different African states like Mauritania, Nigeria, Mali etc. 48

Col. Qathafi Concepts of Jihad

If Arab nationalism is the central element of Col. Qathafi's ideology, the concept of Jihad is the action element of that Arab nationalism. In a broader sense, Col. Qathafi sees 'Jihad' as means to achieve social

48.

E. Scarcia Amoretti, 'Libyan Lonliness in Facing the World : the challenge of Islam, in Islam in Foreign Policy - Ed. A deed Damisha, (London 1983), p. 63.

justice in and out of Libya. In the beginning, imperialism and communism both were considered equal threat to Islam, however as the 1970's progressed, imperialism was increasingly identified as the prime target of Jihad. So any contribution to liberate the world from imperialism should be considered an integral part of Jihad.⁴⁹

In January 1970 the RCC created 'Jihad Fund' to support the armed struggle for the liberation of usurped Arab territories from Zionist control. Initially it was funded from public and private contributions, including the Zakat, but later on a 'Jihad Tax' on profit and income was established to increase the financial strength of the fund.⁵⁰

Major Jalloud proposed in the third Islamic Call Conference that 'in the coming years instead of going to the pilgrimage with million, to commerce, we should go in a struggling movement to liberate

49. M uammer Al-Qathafi, Concept of Jihad, p.53, cited by John., no.3, p.477.

50. Ibid., p.453.

Jerusalem and Palestine.⁵¹ Col. Qathafi justify his support to dissident, movements everywhere on the basis of his concept of 'Jihad'. He said:

"We must remember that the true Islam advocates the protection of all the weak, even if they are not Muslims. Wherever they ask for help they must be given help. Should we limit our protection to Muslims only, we would prove ourselves both fanatics and egoistics. Islam is for the protection of everyone so we give help to christians, even pagan countries in Africa as well as in Libya."⁵²

The Unity of the Muslim Ummah

Col. Qathafi does not, only want unity of the Arab nations but also unity of the Muslim Ummah. He regards that the various sects and groups existing in Muslims are heretical, anti-Islamic because the Quran contains no sect, groups or parties. The division presently existing among the Muslims is the result of historical sabotage operations which occurred

51. Except from Major Jalloud speech in the Third Islamic Call Conference. Risalt-al-Jihad, n.44, p.26.

52. Amoretti, n.47.

in Islam. "These all appeared after the death of the prophet, so they must be denied." He categorically proclaims, "Every new sect is a heresy and every heresy is a delusion and the person who carries such heresy shall go to hell."⁵³

The Green Book and the New Islam

Since the publication of the three parts of the Green Book in 1976, Col. Qathafi has concentrated the efforts on publicizing and implementing the Green Book. He does not regard that the Green book has any contradiction or conflicts with the Quran or any other religious book. He declared that the appropriate function of the Quran was as a source of personal ethics and general moral principles, and not a detailed social prescription. The Green Book, instead, was held to embody a more authentic application of the Sunnah to social life, and in defence of this claim, new interpretations of the Quran and hadith quite at variance with traditional orthodoxy, were put forth.⁵⁴

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53. Excerpt from Col. Qathafi, speech in Third World Islamic Call Conference, n. 44, p.18
54. Raymond A. Hinbusch, "Charisma, revolution and state formation: Qathafi and Libya, " Third World Quarterly (London, vol. 6 n.1, January, 1984), P.70.

He admits that since he wants the Green Book to find an audience beyond the Muslim world, he has played down the Islamic character of his concepts, to make the book more palatable to non-Muslims. In the Green Book's discussion of the law to govern the new society, there is no reference to the Quran or Sunnah. In 1977 Libyan new constitution's, Article II stated that the Quran was Shariat-mujtama-with the clear implication that both the Sunnah of the Prophet and the vast corpus of Sharia laws contained in the works of fight were excluded from Col. Qathafi's definition of the word Sharia.⁵⁵

He denounced the institution of 'Caliph' to prove his theory of government 'Jamahiriya'. He said, "We do not believe in Caliphs, Kings, nor presidents The people would govern themselves and there would be no need of a Caliph."⁵⁶ He believes that his political theory of Congresses and

55. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamic Resurgence or New Prophethood : The Role of Islam in Qathafi's ideology" in The Islamic Resurgence in the Arab world, ed. Ali E.Hillal Dessouki, (New York, 1982), p.200.

56. Excerpts from Col. Qathafi's speech in Third World Economic Call Conference, n.44, p.20.

committees is the real interpretation of the Quaranic phrase, "and whose affairs are a matter of counsel...."

In a speech delivered on February 19, 1978 in a Tripoli mosque on the occasion of the birth anniversary of the Prophet, he levelled different charges against Christians, then he turned to Muslims. He charged that Muslims were guilty of shirk as their christian counterparts. Among the proofs he offered was their obedience to the Sunnah. "Muslims should not seek guidance from the Prophet but rather from their own scripture, the Quran."⁵⁷ He also stated that there should be no intermediaries between the Quran and the believers. He regarded his interpretation of Islam and the Quran as divine interpretation, whereas other interpretation might be affected by human shortcomings.⁵⁸ Not only does Col. Qathafi reject the authoritative character of the learning of contemporary Ulema, ering threat

57. Muammar- al-Qathafi, "Al-Sijil al qawmi, bayanat wa khutabwa ahadith al-aqid Muammer-al-Qathafi (Tripoli, 1978), pp.466-83, cited by Mayer, n.61, p.200.

58. First, n.35, pp.106-7.

them of dire consequences if they will oppose his interpretation but also dismissed as irrelevant the writings of the medieval savants of the figh.⁵⁹

Qathafi delivered his second noteworthy speech on July 3, 1978, in the same Tripoli mosque again in the context of a religious festivity. He made it clear that outside the sphere of what he defined as being the concern of religion, the Green Book should be applied. Although he has not made any claim of prophethood, many of his positions regarding the Sharia are intelligible only if one accepts the premise of his prophethood. It cannot be coincidence that Col. Qathafi choose a celebration of the Prophet's birthday in a mosque to make his speech dismissing the Sunnah of the prophet as not binding on today's Muslims. As proponent of a rival scheme of values, the Prophet had to be reduced to a marginal figure to make room

59. He expressly denied the authorities of Ibn Hanbal, Malik, and al-Shafil, each of whom founded a school of law, and the medieval philosophers Al-Ghazali and Ibn Sina, on the ground that they were non-Arab, so they had introduced, he claimed alien and ul-Islamic ideas in the Figh.

for Col. Qathafi and his Green Book.⁶⁰

One Nation One Religion

He has conviction that his Third Theory will sweep the world at the expense of all other theories. By denigrating the importance of the Prophet and his message, he also serves the ends of his Pan-Arab and regional diplomacy.⁶¹ The recalcitrant and prime considered aim of Col. Qathafi is unification of Arab land by merger. His numerous merger and unity agreement has been failed. In many of these attempts he had to face the wariness of Christian minorities, or in the case of Malta, a Christian majority. Thus he has political reasons for distorting Islam to conciliate christians in Malta, Egypt, and Syria. He insists that Islam is an Arab religion, so it is anomolous to have non-Muslim Arabs, and that Islam- atleast in its early stages was not really intended

60. Mayer, n.54, p.214.

61. Ibid., p.216.

for a non-Arab audience.⁶² All people in the Arab land are Muslims (the people of the Book), they should be called so, since they are one nation, they must have one religion. It is of least consideration whether one prays in synagogue, church or mosque.⁶³

He also stated that Muslim Calender should be revised and should start not with the Prophet's flight from Mecca or Hijra, as it had for fourteen centuries but ten years later, with the Prophet's death. After this speech the calender in Libya has been changed from Hijra to 'from the death of the Prophet.' This was a calculated move to express identity with the Christianity.⁶⁴

A Muslim-Christian Dialogue was organized in Tripoli in 1976 with great public fanfare, which was exploited as an occasion to bring home to the Christian participants their errors and to indulge in heavy-handed proselytizing. Despite the failure

62. Al-Fajr-al-Jadid, March 10, 1979, quoted in Mayer, n.54, p.216.

63. Bianco, n.8, p.104.

64. Wright, n.2, p.275.

of his proselytizing at the dialogue, Col. Qathafi persisted in his propaganda efforts directed towards Christians and designed to demonstrate the oneness of the two faiths. However, instead of demanding that all the concessions be made by Christians, he began to attack facets of Islamic doctrine on the ground, that they were not part of the original, true version of Islam.⁶⁵ Col. Qathafi's speech evoked implications in the minds of the people and Islam suddenly gained in appeal so that mass conversions from Christianity ensued. Col. Qathafi's prestige and influence stood to be immeasurably enhanced.

Col. Qathafi responded to the criticism from religious quarters, of his innovations in Islam by instructing the masses to seize the mosques' declaring that Islam did not require a superfluous class of intermediaries between the individual and God.⁶⁶ He ordered to clear the blocks of buildings in the centre of Tripoli including a mosque that my-

65. Mayer, no 61, p.207.

66. Lisa Anderson, "Qathafi and his opposition", Middle East Journal, (vol.40, no.2, Spring 1986), p.231.

steriously 'fell down' one night which was actually dynamitted.⁶⁷ In the same place, he made a 'Green Square' for public meetings and rallies several times larger than the spaces Mussolini or Balbo had needed for their public ceremonies.

Attitude towards other Islamic Groups

Col. Qathafi views any party or group be it communist, Baathist or Islamic in Libya or outside as a threat to revolution and an impediment to Arab unity, therefore he has banned all parties in Libya, anybody found guilty of violation will be punished to death. He denounces all Islamic groups as innovations because they add to Islam something which is not a part of it. He called 'Muslim brothers' the largest among the Islamic groups as "Muslim Traitors" and the 'Islamic Liberation party' as a 'dirty group' which is created by the American, British and Israeli intelligence.⁶⁸ He accused Muslims brothers as 'agents, spies, hired peoples and sabo-

67. Nathan Alexander, "Libya : The Continuous Revolution", Middle Eastern Studies, (London) vol.17, no.2, April 1981), p.839.

68. Excerpts from Col. Qathafi's speech in Third World Islamic Call Conference, Risalat-Al-Jehad, n.44, p.20.

teurs, infiltrators into Islam.⁶⁹

Islam and Islamic Groups :
Instrument of Foreign Policy

Col. Qathafi has sought to make Islam a domestic and international instrument in support of the revolution.⁷⁰ Islam comes in the motivation of almost all Libya's position in foreign policy. Islam is complementary to Arab nationalism.

He is conscious of the self imposed image of "Revolutionary Muslim Leader of World Islamic Revolution". Colley has described an incident of Col. Qathafi with President Nasser and Haikal. Col. Qathafi refused to eat gampari, a type of fish caught in Mediterranean, because it has not ~~X~~ been killed according to Islamic ritual.⁷¹ This was self-imposed restriction. Muslims every where eat fish. A second image building incident was noted by Clandia Wright, when he visited Moscow in April, 1981. Issues concerning fresh Soviet arms, an agreement

69. Ibid., p.19.

70. Maris K. Deeb and Mary Jane Deeb, "Libya Since the Revolution : Aspects of Social and Political Development (New York, 1982), pp. 93-108.

71. Colley, n.11, p.102.

on transfer of nuclear technology, assistance in the Libyan oil fields, and public commitment to support Libya in case of a foreign attack, were to be discussed. But instead of negotiating directly on these issues, Col. Qathafi and the Russians bickered over whether he could pray in the shattered Grand Mosque of Moscow and whether the prayers would be broadcasted from the minaret. The Russians agreed to both demands. The Libyan press agency celebrated the visit as a triumph of the faithful over the non-believers. But none of the key issues were decided.⁷²

Col. Qathafi depicts Libya as the land of Islam which is struggling against a tenth crusader campaign headed by America and the new Crusader-Zionist alliance. He organised the third Conference of his Islamic Call Society in September 1986, after the American attack. This was a grand strategy to use Islam together support of the Muslims *world* in his confrontation against America and Israel. He declared in the conference, "We Muslims, are forced to

72. Claudia Wright, "Libya and the West : Headlong into confrontation ?" International Affairs (London, vol. 58, no. 1, Winter 1981-82), pp. 58-39.

declare the call to struggle once again. We might head the world into a religious war in which the Zionist and Crusaders are on one side and the Muslims and their allies on the other".⁷³

He said, "Its (Libyan regime's) down fall will be a calamity to Islam, to Islamic religion, to the heritage of Islam and to all the peoples around the Islamic world, who are fighting for freedom."⁷⁴ He declared that the defence of Libya is an Islamic duty which is imposed on every Muslim male and female. He expressed his readiness to accept groups of Muslim Volunteers from all parts of the world on Libyan land, to defend the targeted 'Islamic fortress!' He also suggested Collection of money from all Muslims and invest it to finance the struggle movement.⁷⁵

Although he is intolerant of any group as a threat to his regime, but he used them against his enemies. When relations between Col. Qathafi and President Sadat deteriorated, Col. Qathafi used every means available to strike at him, particularly, he

73. RISALAT-AR- Tehad, n. 14, p. 22

74. Ibid., p. 16.

75. Ibid., p. 21.

worked through the extremist Muslim groups in Egypt. He openly called for overthrowing President Sadat in December 1973, and funds were given to the Islamic Liberation Party, Mohammad's Youth, the Army of God, the Society for Holy War and other groups. He also used his most hated, Muslim brothers as a weapon against President Sadat.⁷⁶

Oil

The third strategy adopted by Col. Qathafi is oil which is the chief capability of Libyan diplomacy. His courageous negotiations with the oil companies which tilted the balance of power from the oil companies to the producer countries, gave him recognition as a great strategist. Further after achieving its right position from the oil companies, he used oil itself as an instrument of his foreign policy.

In 1957, oil had been found in Libya. The story of modern Libya is the story of oil.⁷⁷ In the ten years from the beginning of oil export in 1959 to Col. Qathafi's coup in 1969, Libya transformed

76. Daniel Piper, "Oil Wealth and Islamic Resurgence" in "The Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World", ed. Ali-E. Hillal Dessouki, (New York, 1982) p.48.

77. Colley, n.11, p.42.

from one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the most dynamic in Arab and Mediterranean politics. It was the fastest and biggest boom in world history.⁷⁸ Oil has the far reaching effects on history and economy, as well as on people and politics.

Libya's position and oil policy differed in several respects from the policies of other oil rich states. Unlike the governments in the Gulf, Libya had not awarded all its acreage to a single group. Some of the largest fields lay in concessions held by American independent companies. This gives Libya high bargaining position vis.a.vis to/ the oil companies. Libyan oil yielded a high proportion of high value products such as gasoline and heating oil, and had a low sulphur content. The country's position gave its crude a big freight advantage over Gulf crudes, which was enhanced by the closer of the Suez canal in 1967.⁷⁹ Libya's own needs were limited,

78. Patrick Seale & Maureen Melonville, Hilton Assignment, (London, 1973), p.39.

79. The Middle East and North Africa 1987(London, 1986), p. 217.

thus enabling her to reduce her oil production at will without incurring adverse consequences to her economy. Libya's international standing stemmed from its oil. The continued production and export of crude earned the revenues to finance an extraordinarily ambitious, forward, and sometimes alarming, foreign policy.⁸⁰ It was the importance of maintaining his apparently vital flow that inhibited many exasperated governments from taking a firm attitude towards a state whose policies were widely regarded as a disruptive, if not downright dangerous. Tunisian Secretary General for Foreign Affairs Mahmood Mestiri was quoted as saying early in 1981, 'Libya's strength is not her own power but the weakness of others.'⁸¹

Libya is the western Europe's largest source of oil. The bureaucratic consensus in America will give an estimation of the Libyan power. It says:

80. Wright, n.2, p.117.

81. Ibid., p.217.

"Our present strategy is to seek to establish satisfactory relations with the new regime. The return to our balance of payments and the security of US investments in oil are considered our primary interests. We seek to retain our military facilities, but not at the expense of threatening our economic return. We also wish to protect European dependence on Libyan oil; it is literally the only implasable oil in the world, from the point of view both of quality and geographic location."⁸²

The quality of the oil, the strategic location of the country, nature of management, tanker shortage, increasing demand, decreasing supply, closer of the Suez canal these were the internal and external factors which provided an ideal bargaining position. The only lackness was the person to exploit the situation, which came in the form of Col. Qathafi's fevolution. It must be stressed that the price explosion was not a personal decision; one way or another, market conditions would have produced a price explosion, though perhaps over a longer period of time.⁸³ This was expediated by Col. Qathafi.

82. A Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (New Delhi, 1982), p.859

83. Ibid., p.859.

An avowed radical he set out to challenge western influence. Although the young officers of the RCC were completely unscholled in economics or negotiation. They are competent men in strong position. They could not be corrupted or convinced.⁸⁴

After the revolution the new regime kept the flow of oil uninterrupted. Early statements on oil were cautious. The government of the United States, Britain and France were notified that Libya would respect all agreements in force. The Libyan revolutionaries handled the oil companies gingerly. The humiliation of Iran between 1951 and 1954 was a standing warning of the power of the companies. In 1970 the Libyan leadership was in a position to bluff the companies. They had accumulated currency resources of \$ 4000 million enough to maintain current imports and spending for four years.⁸⁵ Such was the financial backing behind Col. Qathafi that he declared:

84. James E. Akins, "The Oil Crisis : This Time the Wolf is Here," Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 3, April 1973, pp. 471-72.

85. Ibid. p. 473.

"The Libyans Arab people have existed for hundred of years without oil, are capable if necessary of living without it for many centuries."

First Phase of the Oil Revolution:
Struggle for Price Hike:

Col. Qathafi made his first move against the companies in January 1970. Before that, he sought out allies for practical help if needed in the oil struggle and also to demonstrate that any manhandling of Libya would create trouble from one end of the mediterranean to the other. In January 1970, before his only appearance prior the western oil executives, in Tripoli, he sent his oil attaches to Baghdad to meet with delegations from Iraq, Algeria and Egypt (lately became a bonafide modest oil producing state) to form a radical Arab oil bloc. On May, 1970 before opening of the militant phase of his oil negotiations, the ministers of Libyan, Algeria and Iraq met and produced an accord for a unified strategy for waging their separate confrontation with

oil companies.⁸⁶

The agreement called for (1) ending the companies tactic of lengthy and fruitless negotiations, by setting a time limit; (2) raising oil prices unilaterally if oil companies negotiations were not forthcoming; (3) pledging financial aid to any of the three who were sighted out by oil companies to cut off production and hence revenue.

The first move was a simple request in line with the royal government, earlier efforts to raise the tax reference price of Libyan crude by about 10 to 20 percent. The companies at first dragged their feet and did not reply. The Libyans in the meantime sought new advisers from every part of the world. After making allies for his struggle and equipping with experts, he toughened his attitude towards the companies. He had painstakingly searched out the least provocative, most plausible and justifiable acts he could take. He was in the posture of one who, fearful

86. Jack Anderson, Oil, (New York, 1984), p.244.

87. Ibid., p.236.

of the enemy's overwhelming but unmobilised strength, minces forward as far as he can while prepared to retreat at the first sign of counter attack.⁸⁷

He has confused the real issue by invoking conservation. In May, Occidental (oil company) was ordered to cut back its oil production by 300,000 barrel per day as a conservation measure. This was the first time that ever happened in the Middle East or North Africa.⁸⁸ The benefit of choosing Occidental as their first target was its vulnerability, which accounted for nearly one third of Libya's output. Occidental was not too popular with ~~the~~ the majors for them to initiate an industry wide shut down on its behalf. As the negotiations got underway, the trans, Arabian pipeline was blocked by a syrian bulldozer 'accident'. Syria refused to allow a one-day repair job. Half a million barrels a day were thereby kept away from European markets by the

87. Ibid., p.236.

88. Colley, n.11, p.62.

rupture. The loss of transit revenue to Syria was reportedly being subsidised by Col. Qathafi.⁸⁹ The cutback and closure of the pipeline was small, but large enough to affect tanker rates.

On September 4, 1970 Qathafi celebrated the revolution's first anniversary three days later by announcing what western oil experts gloomingly predicted would bring the first major rise in crude oil prices in thirteen years.⁹⁰ Libya struck at the companies one by one. Occidental came first, and capitulated.⁹¹ Oasis was called in next, but shell, which had one sixth interest in the consortium, refused to take part in the settlement. The series of ultimatums split the companies. British Petroleum (BP) raised the prices of Libyan and Iraqi crude but insisted she was not influenced by the events in Tripoli, in an attempt to reassert that the sole responsibility for price fixing lies with the companies. In the meanwhile BPs partner Bunker Hunt, Gellen-

89. Anderson, n.85, p.237.

90. Colley, n.11, p.64.

91. First, n.17, p.201.

burg of West Germany and another American Independents were ready for settlement, when she found herself the alone company, standing out, it settle too.

The new Libyan price at \$2.53 a barrel was the highest outside the United States.⁹² Libya announced that she regarded it as a rectification of past injustices' for the price paid until then, and not a new price. Col. Qathafi had by late summer 1970 had shown that he was upto far more than commercial haggling over oil prices. He was striking all four of the central devices by which the oil Majors upto now had maintained western oil security viz. control of production, controll of transportation, control of international market and control of price.⁹³

Initiator of the Offensive Position of OPEC

The Libyan settlement of a higher posting and a new range of tax rates upto fifty eight percent,

92. Ibid., p.201.

93. Anderson, n.86, p.244.

which the government described as a retrospective payment for unduly low prices in the past, set a precedent that other producers were eager to follow. Libyan government audacity towards the oil companies had a 'bandwagon' effect amongst the other oil producers.⁹⁴ The immediate result was an increase of twenty percent barrel in postings of Iraqi and Saudi crudes at Mediterranean terminals, while Nigeria and Iran soon won themselves increased benefits as well. At the oil ministers meeting of OPEC held in Caracas in December 1970, Libya emerged as the clear pace-setter. The organisation passed a resolution calling for a fifty-five percent minimum tax rate and making other demands reflecting the main features of the September 1970 settlement.

At the beginning of January 1971, between OPEC's Caracas and Teheran meetings, Major Jalloud put new demands to the companies for a tax increase alongwith a freight and proximity allowance. The

94. Farley, n.33, p.14.

oil companies were prepared to fight the 1971 round collectively.⁹⁵ For the first time an underlying political motive was acknowledged when it was made clear that one purpose of these new demands was to pressurize the United States government into changing its Middle East Policy.⁹⁶

Four days after the Teheran agreement by the six Gulf producers, new talks opened in Tripoli since it was unacceptable to Libya. The demands has been presented in January 1975. Representating the government throughout the talks was Major Jalloud, who worked himself up into convincing displays of rage as the occasion demanded, and insisted on dealing with the companies one by one, even if the final agreement was to be binding on them all. OPEC was solidly behind Tripoli.⁹⁷

95. The companies concluded a secret 'Libyan Producers Agreement'. The companies agreed among themselves that it must be "all for one and one for all. Each company promised to sign no agreement with the regime without the consent of all the others." If Col. Qathafi required one company to cut back its production each company would contribute a quota of oil in certain specific proportion for which the company under pressure would pay.

96. Wright, n.2, p.241.

97. Ibid., p.242.

Occidental was singled out once again, but so was Bunker Hunt, in a carry move to embarrass its BP partner and prevent the Majors from achieving their united front. During the negotiations Libya announced that she was studying a project to sell oil directly to foreign state companies. She also called a conference of the four producer states whose oil is exported through the Mediterranean terminals -- Libya and Algeria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The other three, although ambiguous in their statements, declared that they would jointly embargo their oil if the companies did not agree to the Libyan terms. Libya's master-stroke was to call Amoseas in for early negotiation. Though by definition Amoseas is an independent company existing only in Libya, but it comprised two Majors, Standard California and Taxaco, and this was the Majors soft underbelly.⁹⁸

A few weeks later a settlement emerged. Libya moderated her demands under Egyptian pressure,

98. First, n.35, p.203.

Under the new agreement the oil companies accepted to retroactive payments, and committed themselves to re-investing some of their profits.⁹⁹ The Teheran-Tripoli agreements of early 1971, the direct outcome of Libya's politically and economically motivated sole confrontation of the previous year with the companies - marked a watershed in the history of the international oil industry.¹⁰⁰ The power of the companies had been visibly curtailed. This was a major break in the historical pattern of individual deals between countries and cartels.¹⁰¹

Libya's revenue from oil grew spectacularly, although her annual production dropped after the cut backs ordered from 1970 when she decided of conservation.¹⁰² Libya's gold and foreign reserves have

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99. For a full account of the oil negotiation by Libya, see "Tripoli 33 day Dramatics", Arab Oil Review, March-April 1972.
100. Wright, n. 2, p. 243.
101. First, n. 35, (Chapt. I), p. 204.
102. From 1971 to 1972 there was a 20 percent reduction in production. Cut backs were ordered during critical rounds of negotiations with the companies. But as part of a longer term conservation policy, in April 1971 the government began to implement an amendment to the Petroleum law to prohibit the burning of hydro carbon resources and excessive flaring of gas.

grown from \$917 million at the end of 1969 to \$1,590 million in 1970, \$2,665 million in 1971, and \$2,929 million in 1972.

Second Phase of the Oil Revolution:
Struggle for Participation

On 7 December 1971, Arab oil producers meeting in Abu Dhabi passed a resolution calling for host government participation in oil company's capital and management, with 20 percent initial target. The participation policy means a change from the idea of 'control from without' to 'control from within'.¹⁰³ Before that by September Libya has announced that she would shortly demand for changing of concession agreements into participation. OPEC might ask for 20 percent but Libya would demand at least 51 percent.

Nationalisation of BP : A Firm Political Reaction

That same evening of the OPEC meeting, Libya took the lead on the resolution and announced full

103. Matsumura Seljiro, "Participation policy of the producing countries in the International Oil Industry", Developing Economics (Tokyo, vol.10, no.1, March 1972), p.34.

nationalisation of all BP's rights and assets in concession 65, and primarily its half shares in the Sarir Field.¹⁰⁴ The take over was combined with the withdrawal of Libya Sterling balances in London, came without warning. It was represented as a purely political act, reprisal for the failure of the British government (owner of nearly half of BP's shares) to prevent Iran's occupation of three strategic islands at the entrance to the Persian Gulf on the eve of British withdrawal from the area. BP and British Foreign Office resolved to fight the action tooth and nail, and soon brought test cases to block the marketing of the 'hot' or 'stolen' oil.¹⁰⁵ Libya thwarted the attempt to block the marketing and sold the Sarir crude to the Soviet Union for two years until outstanding differences had been settled through negotiations.

On 11 ~~th~~ June 1972 referring to the BP nationalisation Col. Qathafi said, "What they (the English)

104. Wright, n. 36 (Chap.I), p.244.

105. Colley, n.11, p.71.

would like now would be for oil nationalisation to remain a dead letter. But this is our contention and we declare it to the whole world; nationalisation has become a reality in spite of them, and spite of all the great oil empires. Let it be known that 1972 has nothing in common with 1951."¹⁰⁶ By this action Col. Qathafi proved that oil was indeed a political weapon, and that he would successfully use it, especially when it was to his commercial advantage to do so.¹⁰⁷

Spree of 'Participation' as an Economic and Political Instruments

'Participation' was now in the air of Libya and through out OPEC. The Italian state, oil company AGIP which was ready to start commercial production after heavy investment in exploration and in production

106. Excerpts from Col. Qathafi speech on the occasion of the second anniversary of the withdrawal of American troops from Libyan territory, Bianco, n.8, p.162.

107. Colley, n.11, p.72.

facilities, was the next object of Tripoli's continuing strategy of pressuring the currently most vulnerable companies for revised operating terms. The government withheld permission to start production and demanded majority participation. Since Italy was heavily dependent upon Libyan oil and had to consider other vulnerable commercial interests in the country, so the company was hard pressed to give half-share in its two concessions.¹⁰⁸

Libya demanded half the assets of Bunker Hunt and half of its profit, since the nationalisation of BP some ten months earlier. Hunt, who marketed nationalised BP oil, in spite of all government's requested and pressures, resisted strongly. Libya reinforced its campaign by pressing Oasis (still the largest producer) Amoseas (socal/Texaco) and Occidental for immediate full participation in exchange for compensation based on 'net book value' and the 'right'

108. Wright, n. 2, p. 245.

to buy oil at market prices. In May 1973, the government halted Hunt's tanker loadings, and the company was told that its right to produce and export oil would cease on 1 June 1973. Speaking at a rally on 11 June 1973 Col. Qathafi announced the nationalisation of Hunt's assets to deal the United States 'a big hard slap on its cold, insolent face.'¹⁰⁹

The Hunt nationalisation was held as a warning to other companies to accept the government's terms, and to the United States 'to end its recklessness and hostility to the Arab nation.' In August 1973, first Occidental and then the three independents in the Oasis group agreed to 51 per cent participation on their Libyan operation. In September the government announced 51 percent take over of the Major companies interests, which they refused to accept. On February 1974 the government made an example by complete nationalisation of Socal/Texaco's Amoseas and the Libyan

109. Excerpts from Col. Qathafi's speech on the third anniversary of the evacuation of American base. Ibid., p.246.

American oil company (an Atlantic Richfield subsidiary) By May Esso and Mobil had agreed to the governments terms, while Shell's one sixth interest in Oasis had been nationalised.¹¹⁰

From 1970 to 1974, the great international oil companies lost control over world oil prices and production in the main oil-exporting regions of North and West Africa, the Middle East and Far East, and Latin America. The swift revolution in company-Government relations was due primarily to Libyan initiative, which showed the other producers that toughness, boldness and timing were of the essence in securing recognition of 'right' that other producers had long claimed but had been unable or unwilling to achieve.

Although Libya lead the spree of price hike and participation, but she was conscious of its absence of advance technology and management skill, crucial for the oil industry. So she had kept oil industry manage-

110. Ibid., p.247.

ment untouched and even after nationalisation the companies have been able to retain over all ownership of about 30 percent equity in their Libyan operation.¹¹¹ It appears generous when compared with the total nationalisations invoked by Iraq, Algeria and Syria. This generosity has given good credit of the Libyan regime to the oil companies which the regime has used for rapprochement with the US.

The October 1973 War and the Oil Weapon:

Col. Qathafi was not agreeable with the strategy of territorial war with Israel instead he aspired a total confrontation collectively by the Arab nation. He was kept in dark about the 1973 war preparations by President Sadat. His volunteers were denied access to Israel by Egypt and the adjacent countries.¹¹² In spite of this he whole heartedly supported President Sadat and joined other Arab producers in the use of oil as a political weapon. Libyan output was reduced

111. John K. Cobley, "The Libyan Menace", Foreign Policy (New York), n.42, Spring 1981, p.84.

112. George Lenczowski, "Popular Revolution in Libya", Current History, vol.66, no.390, 1974, p.60.

from an average of 2.38 million b/d in October to about 1.77 million in November.¹¹³

Decline of Libyan OPEC Leadership

Libya's role as a spearhead of price militancy in OPEC began slowly to decline in 1974.¹¹⁴ Over-priced oil and the world recession, tankers availability which decreased its geographic advantage greatly affected the demand of the Libyan oil. Libyan crude in 1974 could no longer compete with the Gulf Provinces that were cheaper to produce. Nevertheless, the country remained one of the recognised 'hawks' within OPEC, with prices continuing to reflect high quality and transportation advantages.

The oil glut which begins in 1981 brings host of problems for Col. Qathafi. This has affected highly the ambitious domestic and foreign policy.¹¹⁵ Libyan oil income has dropped from a high of \$22.0 billion a year in 1980 to an estimated \$5 billion in 1986. More than 99 percent export earnings come from oil. The

114. Colley, n.11, p.79.

115. Newsweek, 16 August 1982, p.39.

trade deficit for 1985 was \$1,833 million. Libya has fallen in arrears on its imported arms and construction contracts by an estimated \$8 to \$12 million, much over two years old.¹¹⁶ Approximately 300 'non-essential' foreign contracts were suspended in February 1985. The cash shortage resulted in the Army being paid between two and three months in arrears.¹¹⁷ The impact of oil glut on foreign policy is difficult to measure.

116. Edward Schumacher, "The United States and Libya," Foreign Affairs (New York, vol.57, no.2, winter 1986-87) p.342.

117. Keesings Contemporary Archives, vol.32, no.2, p.34200.

CHAPTER III

Innovations in Diplomatic Style :

The Libyan Revolution of Col. Muammer Qathafi is perhaps the most exemplary contemporary case of charismatic leadership and personality. Col. Qathafi's regime exhibits all the classic symptoms and faces all the characteristic dilemmas of charismatic authority adumbrated by Weber.¹

Col. Qathafi is an idiosyncratic man. His regime can be described as a regime of continuous revolution.² Bianco rightly says "one admires him or, more often, one dislikes him; one can not remain indifferent".³

He is a man of great conviction and commitment with high zeal and morale to pursue whatever he thinks right for his country, for the Arab nation and for the whole world. He has denounced all

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1. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, (New York, 1964), pp. 353-92.
 2. Mirella Bianco, Qamafi Voice from the Desert (London, 1975), p. 167
 3. Nalhan Alexander, "Libya - The continuous Revolution", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 19, n. 2, April 1981, p. 834.

prevailing political and economic systems in the world, and advanced his own 'third universal theory'. Three times he changed the name of his country— firstly from the Kingdom of Libya to the 'Libyan Arab Republic' in September 1969 after revolution, then to 'The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriye' in March 1977 and to "The Great Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya' in April 1986 after the American attack.

He ordered the seizure of power in Libya by the masses when he abolished the conventional system of government in 1977 and seizure of Libyan embassies in foreign countries by Libyans because 'representation is fraud'.⁴ He ordered seizure of one mosque by the Libyan people when his innovations in Islam were opposed by the Ulema.⁵ He abdicated from authority in early 1979 stumping all titles and preferred to be addressed as 'Brother Muammer'. In 1987 he hastened the 'decentralisation of political

4. Muammer Al Qalhafi, The Green Book, P. 9

5. All the seizures were actually done by his zealous supporters basically students organised in the name of 'revolutionary committees'.

and economic institutions'. The Army GHQ had already been transferred to the Al-Jufrah Oasis, 350 Kilometers South of Surt, where other ministries will also shift. He declared that Tripoli had ceased to be Libya's capital.⁶

Col. Qadafi is a complex personality. His admirers regard him a world leader, beacon of international liberation movements, and herald of a new era. Those who dislike him, call him as "a vicious criminal", hundred percent sick and possessed of a demon", 'a split personality both evil'. He is the first paramount and truly independent Libyan leader of the Libyan people. He reflects many of the Libyan characteristics - fundamental simplicity, dignity and egalitarianism, puritanism and introverted xenophobia, extreme narrowness of cultural, historical and political experience.⁷

Two people and two backgrounds combined to make Col. Qadhafi the man he is.⁸

6. Guardian Weekly, (Manchester), vol.136, no.15
12 April 1987, P.12

7. John Wright, Libya A Modern History (London 1982), P.278

8. Mohammad Hasnain Haikal, The Road to Ramadan, (Dehradun, 1981) p.185.
(Dehradun, 1981) p.185.

The two were, the prophet Muhammad and President Gamal Abdel Nasser. His thinking was an amalgam of the ideas of Islam at the time of the prophet and the doctrine, of President Nasser, particularly as expounded, during the formative period of Col. Qathafi's life, when as a school boy and as a young soldier, he first became aware of what was going on in the world around him that is, between the Liez War in 1956 and the June War in 1967. Other elements which influenced his personality were the army career and the desert. It was in the army that he first really found himself as a soldier and it was to the desert that he would return for solace, because he considers himself as a son of desert.³

'I like a *desert* man, he could change in a movement from one position to a completely opposite one, which makes him highly unpredictable.'

He has high estimation his own intellectual for prowess and perhaps an evolving mystical conviction that he has super human inspiration. He apparently believed that, his status as a virtual international outlaw confirms the righteousness of his cause as an

opponent of injustice and exploitation.¹⁰ He is an adroit manipulator of international media and is concerned with his public image to point of vanity.

Style of Speech

Col. Qadhafi is one of one most realistic, frank, candid and spontaneous speakers. He always speaks his mind in national and international gathering, no matter even if some one thinks he is mad, or matter if half the 'civilised' world thinks that he is mad. The important thing is he speaks what he thinks, not what other people think he ought to think.¹¹ He does not hesitate to express his opinions freely on many subjects and particularly at decisive crucial movements, when most other leaders escape or avoid any firm position.¹² He is a skilled orator, always having patience and he

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10. Lisa Anderson, "Assessing Libya's Qadhafi" Current History, Vol. 84, n.502, May 1985 P.197.
11. Sunday Observer, (Delhi), vol.1 n.5, 7 September, P.4
12. "Thus Spoke Colonel Moammer Qadhafi", (Beirut, 1974), p.13.
(Beirut, 1974), P.13

usually speaks in low-key hysterical tone. But his speeches are capable of promoting unexpected attention with his eloquence and his facility with Koranic verses and folk proverbs. He is capable of speaking painful and unpalatable truths. He has candidly stated that Arab regimes are rotten, Arab states have betrayed the Palestinian cause, and Arab unity is hollow, Arab summit meetings, are a waste of time. "If you want something to die, send it to be buried in Arab League's files in the skyscraper in Cairo", he stated.¹³ In his first hour long interview after American bombing, he spoke in his same old slow and even tone. If at all was under pressure, he did not show it. The entire conversation was in studied, moderate tones. The expression throughout was a sort of ponderous thoughtfulness; interrupted occasionally by something midway between a spontaneous smile and laughter.¹⁴

13. Ruth First, Libya: The Elusive Revolution, (London, 1974).

14. Times of India, Delhi 27 April 1987.

In December 1969 at the Rabat Arab Conference which was his first public appearance on the international stage he expressed his dislike of some actions by the Royalty of Morocco and said "Do we still stick to these rules of feudalism and slavery". He addressed the president as Brother Hassan and King faizal on Brother Faizal which caused further embarrassment.¹⁵

In the September 1970, peace conference at Cairo the Colonel shouted, "If we are faced with a madman like Hassan who wants to kill his people, we must send someone to seize him, stop him from doing what he is doing, and take him off to any asylum."¹⁶

At the Harare Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries summit he delivered his seventy-minute speech without notes and without circulating in advance, or submitting a copy of it to the summit

15. Haikal, n.81, p.766

16. Ibid, p.79

authorities. No one seemed to know what he would speak. During his speech he would stop for a while and his one man and four pretty girls bodyguards lined up like cheerleaders would break out in Arabic slogans in praise of the Jamahiriya and say down USA, 'down, USA'.¹⁷

He presents very simple and fantastic solutions to complex problems. At the Harare summit he proposed to form an international world force to fight American Imperialism. "These soldiers cannot be reached by America whose empire I can defeat and destroy their existence every where".¹⁸

Third Universal Theory

The Third propounded by Col. Qathafi first emerged towards the end of 1972. It was firmly expounded at a Tripoli Conference of European and Arab Youths in May 1973. It became the official philosophy of the cultural revolution which had been launched a month earlier. It was especially

17. Sunday Oberver, p.4

18. Ibid, p.4

propounded observing the need and sentiments of one Arab nation, but shrewdly organised to have universal appeal, particularly to the Third World countries where ~~nationalism is~~ a universal value and religion is the traditional legacy. The theory is both comprehensive and simplestic in that it seeks to address all aspects of life-social, political, economic and metaphysical - but often confines its observation on complex issues to only one or two paragraphs or sentences.

The theory consists of three *small* parts, compiled in the name of 'The Green Book', in green cover. The theory has been applied in Libya and all out efforts are being made to export the theory abroad. The 'Green Book' is freely distributed from Libyan People's Bureaus and 'Green Book Research Centres' in foreign countries. Seminars, ~~symposiums~~, essay writing competitions and other methods are being applied by the Green Book Research Centre to articulate people in the Green Book Ideology. Col. Qadafi organized three international conferences at

Benghazi, Madrid and Caracas between 1979 and 1981 on the Green Book.

The Green book programme is very radical which calls for the eventual abolition of government, private profit, currency, mandatory schooling, representative democracy and the likes to achieve a utopian society.¹⁹ The theory is based on religion and nationalism. These are two essential factors that more history. Marx's economic interpretation of history, he said, had been caused by the condition of poverty in which he and his children lived in London.²⁰

Col. Qadafi rejects Capitalism and Communism because they failed to tackle many pressing problems that face the world today. This is primarily because, through representation or deputation, they have deprived the masses from authority and have concen-

19. Edward Schumacher, "The United States and Libya", Foreign Affairs, (New York), vol.57 no.2, Winter 1986-87, p.332

20. Wright, n. 7, p. 183.

trated power in the hands of a privileged class of group.²¹ His international theory is called third theory because it adopted a middle way between capitalism and communism, to correct the shortcomings of both.

The first part of the Green Book which presents the solution of the problem of Democracy as 'the Authority of the People' rejects all other systems. Popular Congresses are the only means to achieve popular democracy. Any system of government other than popular Congresses is undemocratic. He proclaimed on 2 March 1977 at Sabah that Libya will be the first country to adopt the system of popular democracy. Part two of the Green Book provides a solution to the economic problems in the form of socialism. He seeks to establish a new brand of soci-

21. Mohammed A. El-Khawas, Qathafi's Ideology
the Theory and Practice, (Tripoli, 1984)
P. 7.

alism *that* does not away with the 'vertical ownership' of capitalism and with the state monopoly under communism. He wants horizontal ownership, where ownership is jointly shared by a broad base of people.²²

The third part deals with the social basis of the third theory in which he presents his ideas about family, tribe, women, minorities, the blacks education, melodies and arts, sports etc. His social basis, particularly ideas about woman, is based in Islam. He concedes the biological differences between man and woman (viz. menstruation, pregnancy, miscarriage, delivery etc.). Conception and breast feeding is the biological function of women, which is natural and neither voluntary nor compulsey. If a woman is forced to abandon her natural role for work, 'She falls victim to coercion and dictatorship.'²³

22. Ibd, p. 31

23. The Green Book, p.82

On the occasion of the anniversary of the revolution on 1 September 1981 he presented to his nation and the world the graduates of a girl military academy in Tripoli that had been opened in 1978. He denounced the American army where 1,50,000 women were enrolled not for combat but for the recreational purposes, and European women who were in reality being bought and sold.²⁴ He made an emotional appeal for the liberation of women from the (Atlantic) ocean to the (Arab) Gulf. His troop of body guards consist of young beautiful women especially trained by the East German contingent in armed and unarmed combat and the use of light weapons. He explains this uniqueness due to more loyal and trust worthy nature of women.

Innovations in Diplomatic Conventions

The Libyan leader is not satisfied with 'Third *the* International Theory' and its implementation in Libya.

24. John K. Colley, A Libya Sandstrom: The Complete Account of Qathafi's Revolution, (New York, 1982) pp. 151-54.

where he is unquestionable authority. He has adopted ^{the} all conventional and unconventional means to export his revolution. He had reorganised his embassies in foreign countries, and foreign ministry in Libya with two objectives of eliminating his opponents and making more and more people sympathetic to himself and his theory. ~~He~~ He has shown that he deeply distrusts the professional diplomat, (and foreign ministry bureaucrat, who run conventional embassies abroad) as well as staff of the regional, legal, economic and technical co-operation directorates of the old establishment, since, by training and experience, they are unfit for the jobs which he wants them to perform.²⁵

He has little respect for the conventional norms of international behaviour, which still restrain more orthodox radical regimes of the Arab World

25. Clander Wright, "Libya Comes in From the Cold" Middle East, (London) ~~Vol~~ 82, August, 1931, p. 29.

from taking open actions against governments they disapprove of.²⁶ On 1 September 1979, he called on Libyans living abroad to organise popular marches to seize Libyan embassies because the latter continued to represent government bodies when the government had been abolished in Libya and replaced by the power of the people. In response to this call, embassies were taken over and renamed as People's Bureaus' in Arab countries. This was a great challenge to international norms accepted by the community of nations through Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, 1961. The new Committee members were persons whom Col. Qadhafi considered personally loyal, mostly, students.²⁷ Very few of them have had diplomatic experience.

In February 1980, addressing students of the

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26. Charles Holley, "Libyan Foreign Policy: Consistent Objectives and Pointies but....." The Middle East, no. 23, September, 1976, p. 26.
27. Clandia Wright, "Libya and the West: Headlong into Confrontation?" International Affairs vol. 58, no. 1, Winter 1981-82, p. 28

Military College in Tripoli, he issued a final warning to the remnants of the former regime and elements of the defeated society of exploiters currently living abroad'. In an ultimatum, he called them to return to Al-Jamahiriyah before 11 June, 1980 or they were doomed wherever they might be. "Those who don't take heed to this warning have only themselves to blame." 28 There were several attacks and killings of the dissident, in the European cities and in Beirut. The well organised campaign of intimidation and assassination of political opponents was made possible after the conversion of the embassies.

Reorganization of Foreign Ministry

Libya announced on 9 January, 1981 that it had abolished its Foreign Ministry,²⁹ and handed over its

28. Africa Diary vol. 20, no. 29, (New Delhi),
15 July, 1980, p. 10103.

29. Ibid, 19 March 1981, pp.253-58 vol.XXII, No.212.

functions to the Foreign Liaison Bureau which is concerned with the People's Bureaus and the Arab Liaison Bureau which is concerned with Brotherhood Bureaus.³⁰ One of the functions of the Liaison Bureau was to handle relations between Libya and Non-governmental groups, political parties, Liberation movements, and guerilla armies, as well as to foster friendship societies of the kind that first brought Billy Carter the brother of the American President, to Libya.³¹ Both Arab Liaison and Foreign Liaison Bureaus have other functions as well as recruiting agents of influence and propaganda, subversion, and sabotage and to send arms, munitions, and sabotage devices through Libyan diplomatic pouches to overseas destinations.³²

30. Wright, n.27, p.27

31. Col Qathafi, cultivated relationship with Billy Carter Brother of President Carter through a friendship society. The main role was performed by Ahmed al-Shahati, who was in charge of the Liaison Bureau: Billy Carter visited Libya and got money. The story is narrated in Colley, no.24, pp. 253-58

32. Ibid, p.187

Bureau for the Export of the Revolution

Covering both the Arab and the Foreign Liaison Bureaus, and working in close concert with Col. Qadhafi's military intelligence and security services, is 'the Bureau for the Export of the Revolution'. It is composed of the top associates of Col. Qadhafi's ideologues wholly devoted to him and to the principles of the Green Book. Their duty is to scan through the words and actions of statesmen, parliamentary congressmen, newsmen, editors, commentators, businessmen, and academicians all over the world for signs of sympathy towards Col. Qadhafi's personality and towards the Libyan revolution in general. After that they try to cultivate the most pro-Col. Qadhafi elements among them.³³

Assault on foreign Embassies

In December 1979, a mob attacked and set fire for the US Embassy in Tripoli. Col. Qadhafi had affirmed that embassies were under the protection

33. Ibid, p.188

of the host-nation. But two months later in February 1980 the French Embassy was partly ransacked. The assault that led even the sober-minded 'Le Monde' daily to call Libyan diplomacy the planet's most singular and most adventurist.³⁴ In June, 1983 the Jordanian Embassy was burnt and ransacked. In spite of all American provocation, the regime or his masses have neither molested or abused the 2,000 US workers nor ransacked the properties of the mostly American Oil companies.³⁵

Set-backs due to Idiosyncracies in Diplomacy

The violence promoted by the revolutionary committees, have provoked more defection than they were able to stop. Several Libyan diplomats have resigned and made statements in support of the opposition

34. Wright, n.7, p.210

35. Time, (New York), vol. 118, no. 16,
19 October, 1981, p.19

in Exile.³⁶ Subsequent break down in relations are now blamed on the inexperience and ignorance of local conditions which is common in the People's Committee's members who constitute the People's Bureau. Libya's foreign policy machinery is badly short of reliable, skilled and experienced personnel.³⁷

Libyan Style of Oil Negotiations

During oil negotiation the representatives of companies were being subjected to unfamiliar usages. They were continually rebuked threatened and insulted.³⁸ Sometimes their laboriously drafted proposals, without being studied, were instantly rejected. Pennis Bonney who represented Standard California in the negotiations

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36. Munammad al-Magrif Lamgarief (at former auditor general and ambassador to India), Ahmad Hwas (ex-army instructor, charged affairs in Ghdams), Ezzedin Ghdams (ambassador to Austria), Abassalam Ali Aylah (Charged affairs in New Delhi); Ibrahim Sahr (Charged affairs in Argentina); Mansor Rashid al-Kikhia, (The Libya ambassador to the UN and former foreign minister), wright, n.27, p.28
37. Wright, n. 25, p.24
38. Jack Anderson, oil, (New York, 1984), p.281.

described to Senator Frank Church's Investigating sub-Committee in 1974, how Major Jalloud repeatedly summoned the Companymen to late-night meetings, handed them written demands or proposals, then sent them home, only to phone them later in their hotel rooms and, on one occasion, even threaten them with nationalisation that same night if they did not give in.³⁹ Intimidations of all kinds were used against them. They were followed by police everywhere, and their residences were surrounded by guards. At times, they were denied visas to fly home, thus becoming in a sense prisoners.

Col. Qadhafi's Image as the supporter of World Terrorism

Col. Qadhafi is regarded as the Indiscriminate supporter of international terrorism. US Under secretary of State David Hemsman, said, "apart from helping' Palestinian groups, the Libyans have provided money, training and in some cases arms for virtually every group in the world with revolutionary credentials".⁴⁰ He has been accused of

39 Testemoney before the church sub : committee to investigate the world oil, US senate, 31 January, 1974.

40. Newsweek, Vol. XCVII, n. 10, 7 March, 1981, p.16.

supporting the Japanese United Red Army, Italian Red Brigades, German Baader-Meinhof groups, apart from his connection from Moro Muslim Insurgents in Philippines and British Revolutionary Army, and the Black Americans.

Whenever any major insurgency occurs in the Western World, he is the Prime suspect. True, all the accusations are not false. But there remained rarely any definite evidence of his complicity particularly when the insurgency occurred in a third country. Even the West place Libya third in rank after Syria and Iran which are much larger and more effective sponsors of Arab-related insurgency. Thus US administration sought to avoid political fall out of a confrontation with Iran or Syria would entail. The administration exploited both Col. Qathafi's bad image and his relative political isolation.⁴¹ His role in international terrorism is that of a bit player. The lion's share of his terror abroad is carried out against leading figures of the Libyan opposition in exile. On the Libyan supported terrorism it is suggested.

41. News-Week. vol. XCVII, no. 10, 7 March 1981. p.16



Much has been written and reported about Qathafi and terrorism. What can finally be separated from one mass of heavy, second-and third hand accounts, propaganda and disinformation, are a few generalities. Qathafi, like other world leaders of our time, has not hesitated to use Libyans or hired foreigners to eliminate upon occasion, his enemies at home and abroad, often by violent means." 42.

Reasons for the Image

Col. Qathafi himself is most important cause of this image. On the early days of revolution, when he was highly idealist, with soaring financial position, he made little distinction between 'bad' terrorist and 'good' freedom fighters which other countries make. While other states particularly, great powers take into consideration all positive and negative effects of any support given to any insurgent movement. They use it generally as a surrogate warfare. But Co. Qathafi who regards himself as the self-proclaimed leader of the third world, felt duty bound to help whosoever came for help. Since they did not

42. Andrew Breslau, "Democratising Qathafi"

Africa Report , vol. 32 no. 2, March-April
1987, p. 47.

have anywhere else to go, except Libya. This policy to help all sorts of liberation movements made him an easy prey of international information media which is constantly in search of a villain, due to their news value. Sometimes the media men deliberately, distort the news or create fake stories to suit the interest which they represent.⁴³ The unproved charges in December 1981 that Col. Qathafi's hit squads' had penetrated into the US to kill President Reagan and other American leaders did little to change the minds of his friends and foes. The charge of Libyan involvement in a bomb explosion in West Germany night club on 5 April, 1986, which provided the rationality of American air attack on Libya is still unproved.⁴⁴

43. The Hindu, 29 October 1986, p.8.

44. Manfred Ganshow, Chief of the Berlin Statsschutz and head of the 100 person team which investigated the disco bombing told 'Stars and Stripes' on April 23. "(I have) no more evidence that Libya was connected to the bombing than I have when you first called me two days after the act which is none". Breslau n.41, p.46

His generosity with money and outspokenness created the embarrassing situation for him. He does not only candidly express his support to insurgents and antagonism to unfriendly regimes, but often make tall claims and promises which he is incapable to fulfill. Laqueur appears right when he says, "giving support and shelter to terrorists enhanced the international status of otherwise not very important countries! it made their rulers feel influential and it seemed worth the expense of these foreign ventures".⁴⁵ Since Egypt and Libya has very hostile relations, the Egyptian media flows all sorts of stories about the Libyan involvement in insurgency in different parts of the World.

Col. Qathafi's View on Terrorism:

Col. Qathafi believe that every insurgent group has some genuine grievance behind. To check insurgency permanently, the world must have to give a just solution

45. Watter Laqueru, Terrorism , (Boston, 1977),
p.295.

to their problems. The insurgents resort to insurgency out of frustration and also because other peaceful means are not effective to draw the world attention to their problems.

"The Palestinian, who hijacks, a plane wants to express that he has a cause and that his land is occupied. As long as the world does not recognise that he is a refugee and homeless, he will continue to resort to such means to draw world attention to his cause."⁴⁶

Libya signed the anti-aircraft convention in 1976 and it has been ratified by the People's Congress. Since then he has apparently abided by that. No hijacked planes have been allowed to land in Libya and there is no publicly recorded cases, since then, of hijackers taking refuge in Libya. Answering a question about Reagan administration's charge of his backing international terrorism generally and, more specifically that it backs terrorist Palestinian groups, the IRA, the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction, the ETA (Basque Separatists) and others, he said, "the American Government is not entitled to talk about terrorism, since

46. Excerpt from Col. Qathafi speech to the first Arab American People to people dialogue Conference, 1978.

it practices the highest degree of terrorism in the world. Furthermore, the American government is not a police man. It ought to correct its own behaviour before it talks, about the behaviour of others. Secondly there is big difference between supporting liberation movements, the just cause of people fighting for freedom, and supporting terrorism. We had emphasised many times that we are opposed to real terrorism.⁴⁷

He regards America as the master of terrorism, "constantly accusing others of terrorism, when they are innocents is in itself exercising terrorism in the full meaning of the word."⁴⁸ His list of terrorist acts include foreign bases in other countries, nuclear weapons, starvation, economic warfare, naval fleets, hijacking of planes, the holding of hostages for ransom, and the killing of innocent people.

Libyan Support of insurgency against Israel.

Destruction of Israel and establishment of Palestinian home land is the chief objective of his foreign policy. This is his supreme and most sacro-

47. Time (vol. 117, no.23), 8 June 1981, p.31.

48. Excerpt from Col. Qathofi's Speech on the 11th Anniversary of the Evacuation of American bases.

sant end, for which every means in justified. In early 1970's he had close relations with "Black September" an acknowledged off-shoot of Al-Fatah.⁴⁹ After the killings of Israeli athletes in the Munich Olympic Games in September 1972, the bodies of the five 'black september' men also killed in the operation, were flown in Libya for ceremonial funerals by 1973, the Libyan government was becoming disillusioned with the poor performance of the moderate Palestinian guerrilla movement. On July, the PLO claimed that guerilla training camps in Cyrenaica had been closed and that many Palestinian residents had lost their jobs.

Col. Qathafi formed his own Palestinian guerrilla group called National Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (NAYIP), composed mainly of discontented militants of different Palestinian groups and of Black September.⁵⁰ Its leader was a Lebanese Ahmad-Al-Ghaffour, a former close associate of Arafat and sent by him as a PLO representative to Libya. NAYALP's squads threw two thermite bombs in a

49. First, n.14, p.177.

50. Colley, n.24, p.179.

Pan American World Airways plane at Rome Airport on 17 December 1973, killing thirty two people and wounding eighteen.⁵¹ They hijacked another plane to Kuwait, and surrendered there. They told the Kuwait police that Col. Qathafi himself had ordered the attack as a substitute for another plan to assassinate Secretary of state Henry Kissinger. Eventually NAYLP splited and its members moved into different groups.

His relations with the PLO however, continued to be troubled. Largely ignoring the mainstream leadership, he gave money and arms to the PFLP and the Democratic front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and to other guerrilla groups. The Palestinian take Col. Qudhafi's money but look on him with same disdain, as an armchair soldier far from the Israeli front.⁵³

International Centre for Insurgents Training:

In his Evacuation Day speech on June 11, 1972, Col. Qathafi announced the opening of a centre for

51. Ibid. p.179.

52. Ibid, p.180.

53. Anderson, n.10, p.342.

equipping and training guerrillas in the struggle against Israel. Earlier, on April 17, 1972 the first national congress of the Libyan Arab Socialist Union had proclaimed its supports for all liberation movements and revolutions throughout the world.⁵⁴ He also inaugurated the first Nasseite volunteers centre on July 23, 1973. Col. Qathafi regarded Libya as a centre of international resistance against imperialism, colonialism, and racism in all its forms.⁵⁵

After the Sirte shooting incident, Libya hastily convened a World Conference of Solidarity with the Libyan people. It was attended by more than 600 delegates from 86 countries representing 260 organisations including political parties, liberation movements, trade unions and international bodies.⁵⁶

All Guerrilla trainees from abroad were checked in and out of the Libyan Capital by computer.⁵⁷ The reception centre in the Palace of the People, was run by Arab Liaison Bureau, and the Libyan Secret

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54. Nathan Alexander, "The Foreign Policy of Libya's Inflexibility a mid Change", Orbis, (vol. 24, no. 4, winter, 1981) p. 83
55. Mohammad Mazali, "Libya Builds an anti-American Front" The Middle East, (no. 841, October 1981), p. 24
56. Ronald Brauce St. John. "Libya's 'new' Foreign Policy" Contemporary Review, (London, vol. 2 & 3, no. 1410, July 1983), p. 16.
57. News Week, 7 March 1981, vol. XCII, no. 10, p. 16.

services. After graduation the trainee gets passports, pocket money for the home trip and one or two weapons.⁵⁸ For Europeans, it also includes the addresses of Libyan back-up committees in Rome, Brussels and Frankfurt.

Libya organised a meeting of friendly radical Arab groups in March 1985 in which Col. Qadhafi announced the formation of 'Pan-Arab Command' which would assume responsibility for the command of revolutionary forces in the Arab homeland. The meeting also decided to adopt "revolutionary violence and armed struggle" as a measure of achieving the aims of the component movements.⁵⁹

Support to non-Arab insurgent groups

Col. Qadhafi regards his sacred duty to help the oppressed people in different countries. There is no definite evidence to show the number of insurgent groups who have links with Libya and the extent of support they get. Libyan support to radical movements, has been notoriously erratic, a fact that has contributed to the decline of his reputation in radical

58. Ibid, p.16.

59. Time, vol.129, no.17, 27 April 1987, p.20.

circles and has made concrete estimates of the libyan role in promoting instability impossible.⁶⁰

Its relations with IRA and Muslim insurgents of the Philipines are established facts.

About his support to IRA he said, "If we assist the Irish people it is simply because here we see a small people still under the yoke of Great Britain and fighting to free themselves from it. And it must also be remembered that the revolutionaries of the Irish republican Army are striking and striking hard, at the power which has *humiliated* the Arabs for centuries."⁶¹ According to Col. Qathafi, his aid to IRA enables him to kill two birds in one stone. When British authorities seized *cladia*, a ship loaded with arms for provisional IRA, Col. Qathafi stopped his direct arms aid and confined himself to moral and political support. But after the Tripoli bombing the material support has been renewed. "Because the British government had declared war on us by letting the American planes take off from its territory to bomb Libya."⁶²

Since 1971 a fairly well organised Muslim guerrilla movement, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has been conducting guerrilla warfare

60. Anderson, no.10, p.200

61. Bianco, n.2, p.154.

62. Indian Express, 13 April, 1987, p.10.

and at times, fullscale military operations to end the control of Manila and attain self-rules of the thirteen southern provinces of the Philippines. On the basis of all the evidence available to him in November 1976. President Marcos seems to have concluded that Col. Qathafi was the main source of arms, fund and incitement and that the key to a solution might be in Tripoli. Mrs. Imelda Marcos visited Libya on a special diplomatic mission to settle the insurgency problem.⁶³ After a month of the visit talks took place in Tripoli, half a world away from the scene of the Moro conflict, between the Philippines government emissaries, Islamic Conference envoys and MNLF representatives. A preliminary peace accord was signed on December 30, 1976 in Tripoli, which failed to work. In the meantime MNLF splitd firstly into two and finally into three factions, each with a separate lost country. The division led to the decline of Col. Qathafi's interest in MNLF.⁶⁴

63. Colley, n.24, p.224.

64. Ibid, p.224.

He also maintained good relations with the Marxist leaders from Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. He promised them, Libyan Oil in generous terms if they had managed to seize power from the pro-US regimes in their respective countries. He supports the anti-American groups for "carrying the fight against USA, Israel's main supporter, into the enemy's camp".⁶⁵

It is not only Libya supporting insurgency and instability against enemy regimes. But the enemy regimes also support the dissident movements based in Egypt and other countries. Various Libyan opposition leaders and movements are actively supported by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Western powers particularly America, supported by Britain and France, has tried and attempted to overthrow Col. Qathafi regime.⁶⁶

65. Bianco, n. 3, p. 154.

66. A well organised plan to overthrowing Col. Qathafi by military Corp which failed is narrated in Paligot Roga, "The Plot to Unsent Qathafi", The Middle East, no. 82, August 1981, p. 34.

CONCLUSION

The majority of the Third World countries emerged as modern states after the establishment of the United Nations system. Their representation in the deliberations for the creation of the international system was inadequate. The small number of states of the Third World who attended the discussions could not take an independent line from the two main contending parties due to their political and technical handicaps. The inequitable system combined with the political and economic disabilities of the Third World made them ideal grounds for the competition of the two super powers. *In* other words the Third World countries became objects in international politics rather than subjects. However, they have been striving gradually to modify the international system in a manner that would be more responsible to their needs and serve their interests.

The leaders of the Third World Countries realised that they had a common past of servitude and a broad commonality of interests in their post-independent period. So they have adopted common strategies to secure justice and independent status. The Non-aligned Movement gave them the first instrument of collective bargaining which is their most effective strategy. This was due to their numerical strength which was their only capability. Collective bargaining and multilateral diplomacy further developed in the form of UNCTAD in 1964 and other multilateral forums.

The Third World countries are still dependent upon the Western world for their economic development. The trade relations are heavily in favour of the West. The aid and loans which they get bilaterally from the Western countries have trapped them in vicious circles of debt. The West headed

by the United States is the principal opponent of any genuine reform in the international economic system demanded by the Third World countries. The Second World headed by the Soviet Union is sympathetic to the Third World countries, since they have nothing to lose from the economic reform in the international system. So, for all practical purposes the North is synonymous with the West, in particular the U.S.

The South has not achieved much from the negotiations with the North. For progressive growth of their economics and indirectly their strength, these countries have developed the strategy of South-South co-operation as a supplement to North-South negotiations. Cartel diplomacy in the most successful strategy of Third World diplomacy in addition to multilateral diplomacy and regionalism.

Some Third World countries had have the audacity to challenge the Western interests even at the bilateral level. They have done

this, not because they have capabilities like the great powers but due to their leadership and ideological convictions. At different times countries like Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, Syria and Iran have challenged Western powers and their interests. In particular, Libya has challenged American interests in West Asia and French interest in Sub-Saharan Africa and all NATO members' interests in the Mediterranean Sea. The Libyan Leader Muammer-al-Qathafi has openly declared the 'Jamahiriya' as the leader of the struggle against imperialism, racism and reaction. Material, Political and moral support to all 'revolutionary forces' in the World is the accepted value of Libyan diplomacy.

Col. Qathafi is a real independent Leader of Libya. He was visible attributes of his masses. His integrity, honesty and commitment to his people and causes have given him a position in their hearts. He is probably the only Third World leader who strived and enunciated a distinct line non-conversing with the two

ruling ideology. His failure to make a place for the ideology is not due to its shortcomings, but it is the limited capabilities of Libya.

The most important goal of Col. Qathafi's diplomacy is to regain the past glory of the Arab nation by merger or unity of all Arab states and to establish a Palestinian homeland after annihilating Israel as a state. It was only to achieve this goal that he staged a coup with the help of his associates in the army. All his plans and policies, initiatives and decisions revolve around this aim.

In the early years, he tried to follow an independent foreign policy believing that the super powers cannot be a real friend of the Arab nation, because their interests was to bring the Arab states under their influence. Although he removed the British and the American bases, his vehement criticism of communalism and communists in the region, and actions against the Soviet interests made the US think of Libya as a potential ally.

The US intelligence provided an security umbrella to Col. Qathafi against rival conspiracies. He had commercial and economic relations with the West and the Socialist bloc, without any compromise at the political level.

^{NSA} The vested interests of the ruling elites of different Arab states was challenged by the merger plans of Col. Qathafi. Consequently their response lacked enthusiasm and all his plans of merger and unity failed. A new power equation emerged in the Middle East after the October 1973 war which gave a severe jolt to the independent foreign policy of Libya. Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia formed a group supported by the United States. Egyptian policy of rapprochement with Israel alienated and frustrated Col. Qathafi. The Country which was his source of inspiration now became his chief enemy. As the hostility between Libya and Egypt intensified, Libya's ~~tilt~~ tilt towards the Soviet Union increased.

Opposition to the US and Western influence, in the region provided Libya and the Soviet Union a common interest which became the basis of Libya-Soviet relations. Libya accumulated a disproportionate quantity of sophisticated arms, which it could not use. With the Soviet arms came the Soviet experts and East German security men. The Libyan leader who did not want to see any remnant of foreign influence when he came to power, was forced by the situation to compromise the hard won independence with the Soviet Union. In early 1980's the Soviet naval ships started paying visits to Libyan ports. Now, Col. Qathafi is even trying to become a member of the Warsaw Pact.

In spite of convergence of interests Col. Qathafi never compromised with his ideology. He is fully confident about the superiority of his Third Theory over Communism. Libya made all possible efforts to export the theory to the outside world. For instance he tried to

woo Nicaragua through aid with the intention of replacing communism in that country with the Third Theory. He reorganised the Libyan embassies and Foreign Ministry for the export of his resolution. For achieving Arab unity he distorted Islam to make room for Christians and Jews, because he believes that one nation should have one religion. For realising this end any means was justified.

The only substantial resource which Libya has is the Oil. It provides money for development of Libya and its external involvement. In the early 1970's Libya spearheaded the OPEC radicalism. The boldness and determination with which the regime undertook Oil negotiations at the appropriate time with apt strategy of selecting most vulnerable oil company changed the balance of power in the Oil industry. The Multinational companies lost their control over price determination, production and marketing management at different phases

of negotiation to the producing countries. In the final phase of oil diplomacy Libya along with other Arab states used its oil as a political instrument against their adversaries. The innovative style of Libyan oil diplomacy played a major role in achieving a dominant position for the Arab states vis-a-vis the multinationals.

The glut in the oil market has created problems for Libya. Its national income has fallen sharply. So various austerity measures have been taken on the domestic front. The financial constraints have affected its support to dissident and anti-establishment movements. However the Libyan Leader has not completely given up this policy. For instance, he organised a conference of the 'revolutionary and progressive peace

movements' of the Pacific region in April 1987 at Tripoli. The representatives of the Australian aboriginals also participated in the conference. Australia regarded it as the interference in its domestic affairs and severed diplomatic relations with Libya in May 1987. In June 1987 meeting of the South Pacific leaders, the 'Libyan threat' was an issue of the agenda. This shows that Libya despite the financial constraints is still making efforts to help the revolutionary and progressive movements in the world.

Though it is true that to some extent Col. Qathafi supports 'terrorism' it has been blown out of proportion by the Western media. He is neither the sole nor the predominant designer and propagator of 'terrorism'. There was 'terrorism' in the region and

in the West before Col. Qathafi came to power and it is bound to be there until the Arab-Israeli problem is solved permanently in a just manner acceptable to all parties. The regimes (moderate Arab and neighbouring African countries), who charge him with subversion or interference in their internal affairs do the same against the colonel by supporting dissident groups working against him. After all neither revolution nor destabilisation can be exported in a suitcase. There are grievances in these societies, which lure outside powers to fish in troubled waters. These regimes who failed in resolving their internal problems got an easy scapegoat in the name of Col. Qathafi who is too eager to support or at least make all claims of support. Libyan involvement in Chad is a very

complex problem. Dissension and civil war is inherent in the country's social and political structure. There was never peace in the country after independence in 1960. Libya cannot remain blind and unaffected by the happenings of a neighbouring country with which it has close historical, ethnic, religious and cultural ties. The close relations between southern Libya and northern Chad cannot be ignored. The arbitrarily drawn borders among different states in Africa are a legacy, to which the present states have been clinging which in turn breeds hostility and sometimes clashes between them.

The analytical study of Libyan diplomacy shows that if a Third World Country has high aspiration in its region outside, it

has to compromise its independence with one super power or the other. This is because the super powers have all interests in every region of the world. The aspirations of any regional power is bound to clash with one of the two super powers. To face that super power, the regional power will have to converge its interests with the other. The anti-communist policies of Libya in its early years converged with the anti-communism of America. In the later years Libyan anti-Americanism due to its unconditional support to Israel, converged with the Soviet interests in the region and its anti-Americanism. As the libyan hostility with America and its regional ally Egypt

intensified, Libya's dependence upon the Soviet Union has increased. The best course for a Third World country is to channalise all its resources to achieve the goal of social, political and economic development and to create a homogenous society free from major conflicts and crises. The participation in international politics should be through the UN system, the NAM and the regional organisations. At the bilateral level, it should pursue its diplomacy tactfully and avoid any direct conflict with a super power if it wants to maintain its independence and achieve the goal of all round development.

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