

**INSURGENCY IN NAGALAND:
POST SHILLONG ACCORD PHASE**

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partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of**

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

T. NAVIN

**CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067,
INDIA
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JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067, INDIA

CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "INSURGENCY IN NAGALAND: POST SHILLONG ACCORD PHASE" submitted by T. Navin in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of **Master of Philosophy (M.Phil)** of the University, is his own work and has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this University or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROF. KIRAN SAXENA
(CHAIRPERSON)

PROF. RAKESH GUPTA
(SUPERVISOR)

CHAIRPERSON
Centre for Political Studies
School of Social Sciences-II
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

DEDICATED TO MY PARENTS...

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Navin
T.NAVIN

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INTRODUCTION

With regard to the processes of nation-building broadly there are two different trends. One that stresses homogenisation and the other heterogenisation. The dominant trend favours homogenisation. It may be through assimilation or integration.

Assimilationists want the total merger of all national groups into the Mainstream. For them Mainstream is the dominant culture and other cultures are to be dissolved into it. Assimilation into mainstream is the authentic measure of patriotism of the minorities. The idea is distinct ethnics will disappear and melt out in wider society, the unified nation. Their strategy is to create only one group by assimilating all the groups with distinct identities. They suggest the use of both force and repression. First the groups must be persuaded by giving concessions to merge into what they call mainstream. But if this does not succeed, they must be forced to assimilate.

The integrationists believe in the existence of diverse groups. For them since socio cultural identities are particularistic and therefore divisive, they must be eliminated by forging new identities based on secular, universal principles. The focus of the strategy of integrationist is on political integration of the diverse groups within the state through the process of modernisation, industrialisation,

urbanisation, communication and through democratic institutions and structures. They expect that modernisation will integrate diverse groups in one political entity and create loyalty towards the state. The integrationists believe that the diverse groups with the passage of time and modernisation while retaining their identity will get integrated. Older identities will gradually disappear and a new man (multi racial, multi linguistic) with new political identity would emerge where all citizens would have the same relationship with the state, in accordance with composite culture.

The concept of nation based on the principle of shared and distinctive origin, tradition language and culture was evolved by the smaller states of Europe in the beginning of eighteenth century. The notion that every sovereign state is a national society or ought to be a national society was developed by them and transmitted to their former colonies.¹

Since for the west, states have to be nation-states they began studying 'nation-building' process. Several theories and models of nation-building' came up. In the comparative politics literature Karl Deutsch, Gabriel Almond developed models. These theories tried to show that through the process of social mobilisation into new activities by the forces of modernisation in terms of urbanisation, education and industrialisation, parochial identities would vanish to give way to a national homogenous society. For them the process of

nation-building was a simple process of homogenisation of the people within a state.²

In the context of India, the dominant trend is the acceptance of the western premise that states have to be nation-states and therefore that India should be a nation. India is a nation-in-the making in terms of caste, linguistic, class, cultural and market solidarities. The process of this state nation formation has the social dynamic of the middle class and democratic institutions. The state comes at the national and international intersection. Rajni Kothari explains his theory in terms of centre-periphery framework. He observed that 'there is a need for institutionalising the state in terms of a national community, the establishment of a centre, its permeation outwards to the periphery and its handling of the issues of legitimacy through the process of democratic participation, political conflict and intellectual dissent. The response of the periphery to these processes is the progressive mobilisation of its own structure and moving inwards towards the centre.'³ This extension of the 'nuclear areas' is in continuation of the historical processes. Class and cultural solidarities with ideological solidarities and splits play a role in this process.

Therefore, the process of nation-building would be to create a political centre, its consolidation, expansion by involving other centres

through coalition making and its assimilation of diverse identities and structures into a national political community.

Kothari perceives the crystallisation of a dominant political centre in the midst of plural identities and segmented distances that had characterised Indian civilisation for centuries. He argued that this centre was established only with the emergence of an all India elite in the colonial period. He is of the opinion that this elite has created a nation-wide organisation with a membership that encompassed segmental differentiations of all kinds. It is supposed to have consolidated the process with closely identifying with an enacted structures and institutions and the ideology inherent in the structures. Kothari believes that imaginative penetration of this ideology into different sections has given the Indian political system its identity.

Kothari saw two processes of nation-building going on in India. One the administrative governmental processes aiming at maximisation, co-ordination, uniformity in planned effort. The other is the political processes leading on the one hand to the establishment of dominant political centre and diversification and activation of new centre of institutions and group activity.¹

Kothari's model emphasises on the political aspects of nation-building. Cultural aspects are ignored. Culturally speaking it demands ultimate allegiance to the nation-state.

Even if the distinct cultural identity is recognised by those favouring nation-state theory, and give slogans like unity in diversity, refuse to recognise the small communities as nationalities. Rasheeduddin Khan though accepts the idea of India being a society with distinct socio-cultural groups, he rejects the idea of recognising them as ethnic communities or nationalities. He considers that the concept of ethnic communities or nationalities to be relevant only to countries like U.S.A. and former Soviet Union.⁵

The said model was adopted by most of the states in the post-second world war period including India. But the post-second world war period has witnessed a series of ethnic upheavals. In every system and regime ethno-cultural resurgence has put to question the very basis of the nation-state. The upsurge in ethno-nationalism has made it clear that the assumptions about nation-building have been proved facile. This is true even in the case of India. India's North-eastern part is a witness to the rise of ethnic movements. Many of them have resorted to insurgency as the Naga insurgency. To put it in other words, different sections of the middle class, which split in early 20th century on reformist and revivalist basis, are trying out the constitutional and culturalist models of integration.⁶

In the present study on Naga Insurgency my contention is that the rise of Naga insurgency is a reflection of this split in the post-independent India. My basic focus is on Naga insurgency during the post-Shillong accord period. Hence my purpose is two fold. One to broadly analyse the problem in the present nation-building model which in combination with regional factors gives rise to ethnic movements. Secondly, to examine the genesis, structure, strategies and politics of the Naga Insurgency.

The study has been divided in to four chapters. The first chapter gives a historical background upto the period preceding 1975 when the Shillong accord was signed.

The second chapter has explored the contemporaneous factors contributing to the rise and division of NSCN. Apart from that the activities of the NSCN before the split and its manifesto are examined. It argues that, tribalism, misunderstanding, personality clashes led to the division of NSCN into two groups namely NSCN (Muivah) and NSCN (Khaplang)

The third chapter focusses on Naga insurgency in the post NSCN division period i.e. 1988. It gives an overview of the Naga insurgent groups currently operating namely that of NSCN(M), NSCN(K) and NNC, their social base, areas of influence funds, regional links and politics are examined

The fourth chapter analyses the causation at the level of nation-building model. Finally, in the conclusion it pleads for an alternative model of nation-building, with internal self-determination as the guiding principle where different ethnic groups will retain control over their own economic, social and cultural development while adjusting to larger society of India.

NOTES

- ¹ A.C. Talukdar "Nation-building process of India: A reflexive analysis of the North-Eastern experience" in Girin Phukan and N.L. Dutta (ed.), *Politics of identity and Nation-building in India* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, Pvt. Ltd. 1997), p. 59.
- ² See Karl Deutsch "Social mobilisation and political development", *American political science review*, September 1961.
- ³ Rajni Kothari *State and Nation-building: A third World perspective*, Bombay, Allied, 1976, p. 2.
- ⁴ Rajni Kothari., *Politics in India*, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1970), pp. 9-10.
- ⁵ For details see Rasheeduddin Khan *Federal India: A design for change* (Delhi:, Vikas, 1992).
- ⁶⁶ B. B. Mishra., *Indian Middle Class : Their Growth in Modern Times* (London Oxford University Press, 1961).

CHAPTER - I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Nagaland is located in the North-Eastern part of India between 93.20° and 95.13° east and 25.6° and 27.4° north of equator. It is bounded by Assam in the West and North, and flanked by Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh in the North-East. The Southern boundary is marked by the state of Manipur, while the Eastern limits consists of the International boundary between India and Myanmar.

The area of Nagaland is 16,579 sq.km. Nagaland is a mountainous state characterised with elevated ridges, spurs and peaks of Naga and patkoi hills which are a south ward extension of the Himalayan folded mountain system. Barring a few kilometers of plains around Dimapur, along the foothills and along the river beds, the state is hilly and mountainous.

The population of Nagaland as per the 1991 census is 1,209,546. Sex ratio is recorded as 61.30%. Religionwise, the Christians constitute the majority with a population of 87.47%. Hindus constitute 10.1%, Muslims 1.71% and others 0.70%.

Nagaland is almost a totally tribal state with more than 90% constituting the tribes. There are 32 Naga tribes out of which 16 are found in Nagaland. They are Angamis, Aos, Chakhesang, Chang,

Khiamungan, Konyaks, Lotha, Phom, Pochuri, Rengma, Mao, Sema, Sangtam, Yimchunger and Zeliangs. Naga tribes are also found in other. North-Eastern states of India namely Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur and North-Western region of Myanmar. Other Naga tribes include Aimol, Anal, Cheril, Chothe, Kharam, Koireng, Kom, Lainung, Tangkhul, Tangsa, Tarao, Thangal and Tikhir. The non-Naga tribes in Nagaland include Kacharis, Kukis, Mikirs, Garos.

The official language of Nagaland is English. Although different tribes have different languages, Nagamese which is a mixture of Assamese, Nepali, Bengalee is developing into a link language.

Economy - The economy of Nagaland is basically agrarian with over 70% of the populations dependent on it. According to the 1991 census 75.26% of the populations were dependent on the primary sector (agricultural), 3.48% on secondary sector (industrial) and 21.26% on Tertiary sector (service sector). There is a trend towards declining importance of agricultural sector and increasing importance of industrial and service sector as shown below.

Table - I.1

Sectoral distribution

Sector	1961	1971	1981	1991
Primary Sector	89.60%	79.46%	79.38%	75.26%
Secondary Sector	0.49%	2.39%	2.29%	3.48%
Tertiary Sector	9.91%	18.14%	18.32%	21.26%

Sources: Census of India 1971
Census of India 1981
Census of India 1991

The two methods of cultivation followed by the Naga tribes are jhuming and terrace cultivation. Jhuming is the dominant mode of cultivation. The main crops produced include rice, millet, maize and pulses. Cash crops include sugarcane and potato. An important feature of the agrarian economy is the absence of the class of absentee landlords and landless peasants. Land is communally owned. There is a system of communal labour. All the benefits are shared.

There are some large and medium level industries. Nagaland sugar mill is located at Dimapur. There is a pulp and paper mill at Tuli and plywood factory at Tizit. A mechanised brickplant was established at Dimapur in 1988. There are also some cottage and small scale industries related to soap making, weaving, shoe making etc.

There has been growth in the level of urbanisation. In 1991 it was recorded at 17.21% of the total population as shown in the following table.

Table I.2
Urbanisation

Period	1931	1944	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991
Urban population	1.54%	1.85%	1.94%	5.19%	9.95%	15.52%	17.21%

Sources: Census of India 1971
Census of India 1981
Census of India 1991

Historical background

Naga-Ahom relations:

The Nagas came to their present habitat from different parts of Indo-China or South-East Asia, through Myanmar and in different periods. The earliest known history of the Nagas is only with the establishment of the Ahom rule in 1226 A.D. The history of the Naga relations with the Ahoms is a curious blend of hostility and friendship. The Ahom rulers never had any intention for the conquest and annexation of the Naga territories. There used to be frequent raids by the eastern Nagas.¹ When there were raids, they used to be punished by Ahom kings who sent expeditions. Once subdued the Nagas used to pay tribute to the Ahom kings.²

The Ahom kings considered it enough to receive the submission of the Nagas and to allow them to enjoy their tribal autonomy.³ This acknowledgement of non-interference in the Naga affairs resulted in a cordiality and understanding between the Nagas and the Assamese living on the borders of the Naga hills and an active border trade flourished.⁴

With the beginning of the 19th century, the Ahom kingdom slowly started declining with the Moamaria rebellion and the Burmese invasion. After signing the treaty of Yandaboo the British became the master of the whole of Assam.

British Period:

The British relations with the Ahoms may be divided into three periods. The first period from 1832 to 1850 was one in which the British undertook 'Military promenades' into the Naga hills. During the second period, from 1851 to 1865, the Britishers followed the policy of non-intervention with the Naga tribes. This was later abandoned and in the third period which began from 1866, British steadily extended and established their control over the entire Naga hills.⁵

The British were brought into contact with the Nagas over the issue of opening up of communication, between Assam and Manipur. In January 1832, Captian Jenkins led an expedition of seven hundred Manipuri troops and marched through Angami hills. From 1835 to 1851 as many as 10 punitive expeditions were carried out by the British, mainly directed to put an end to the Angami raids on the plains of Assam. After the expedition in December 1850, a policy of non-interference was clearly laid down, and the troops withdrawn.⁶

Policy was shifted from that of possession to that of non-interference. It was felt that possession would bring no profit, instead would prove counter-productive. This was not, as the British later conveniently claimed, to protect the hilly people from being exploited by the unscrupulous plainsmen, but because the annexation of the hill people was not considered profitable.

However, the raids and ravages on the plains continued unabated compelling the local administration to think in terms of abandoning North Cachar, as they found no other means to effectively check the Naga raids.

As the things appeared to be beyond control, the Government decided to occupy Samaguting in the Angami foothills. Later two villages were taken over on the basis of payment of revenue in 1874. A "Forward policy" was resolved upon culminating in the British occupation of Kohima in 1878 followed by speedy consolidation of the British rule in the Naga hills. The Naga hills district was established in 1881. The last fierce resistance offered by the Nagas was by the Angamis in 1879-80 when they held siege of Kohima for eleven days.

In spite of establishment of regular system of administration, the British took good care not to disturb the tribal pattern of administration and more particularly traditional system of land tenure.⁷ As a result substantial changes could not take place in the Naga social set up.

While the tribal system of administration continued, the land pattern remained the same. Basically two systems of cultivation were followed by the Nagas. The more advanced tribes like Angamis followed terrace cultivation. Others followed shifting cultivation.

There were also two systems of land-ownership. Among Angamis who followed terrace cultivation individualistic rights over land existed. Among the majority of the tribes, who followed shifting cultivation land ownership was communal. Even where there was individual ownership of land, the general tendency of property right in land was still at a formative stage.* Under the British, the break-up of the tribal society and the development of feudal relationships of production did not take place. The Naga hills continued to live in tribal isolation with no economic benefits flowing to the inhabitants. As the Inner Line Regulation of 1873 gave the tribal councils right over village land and the inhabitants absolute right over the lands and also prevented the unrestricted entry of outsiders, there was very limited scope for substantial change.

Emergence of middle class -

Some changes certainly started taking place in Nagaland. Inter-tribal warfare and headhunting came to an end. Nagas were introduced to currency, western education and Christianity. The introduction of currency gave birth to a money economy, on a very limited scale, which affected the social life of the tribes. Christianity and western education brought in new values based on individualism which posed a direct challenge to the collective life pattern of the people."

There was gradual growth of the money economy. Opportunities for Government service and small contract works arose in the wake of administration and education. Flow of money started into this area. During first world war some Nagas went to Europe as labourers and returned with good amount of money. People became money-conscious and monetary economy started making its impact on the non-monetary economy. During Second World War many Nagas earned money as labourers, guides, contractors and Government employees in Nagaland itself.

Missionaries whose primary objective was to spread teachings of Christian religion in order to reach people and win their hearts introduced education. While Christianity preached the principle of universal love, Western education introduced them to social and political beliefs of western liberalism. All these helped the new Naga man to look beyond the tribal boundaries.

An important consequence of the introduction of western education was the growth of a middle class. This middle class had its roots neither in the landed aristocracy nor did it evolve through commercial development. This was because, due to an egalitarian built up of Naga tribal society, land as a factor for political power did not prevail. At the same time there was absence of commercial development. Hence, the growth of this class in Nagaland was linked up with the growth of western education and later to the rise of

professions ranging from teaching to law and medicine. The base of this class expanded vastly during the post-independence period. It was this class that threw up a political elite which articulated the Naga nationalism.

Evolution of Naga political consciousness

The evolution of the Naga political consciousness was not an abrupt event. It evolved over a period of time. Under the impact of the western education and Christianity, there was a gradual change in the outlook of the Nagas. This new awakening became more profound during the dawn of the present century when the world had seen rapid changes; the Naga society was also exposed to such changes.¹⁰ By this time, the new class which had emerged in the Naga social hierarchy was quite different in profession and outlook.¹¹

During the first world war, 4000 Nagas were recruited for combat and non-combat duties and were sent to France to perform labour work in the British camps. These men during their stay in Europe came into contact with the advanced nations of the west and returned not only with sufficient money but with a new consciousness that their interest and outlook should go beyond the limits of their clan, village and tribe.¹² The different Naga tribes also came into contact with each other and developed a sense of mutual harmony and co-operation. This resulted in a sense of political unity among the Nagas.

However, it is with the formation of Naga club in 1918, the first organisation in Naga hills that the political consciousness took an organised form. Naga club had its branch at Kohima and Mokakchung. Its membership consisted of newly emerged elites that consisted of Naga Government officials. It provided a forum to the different Naga tribes to gather and discuss about various matters. Initially, it discussed about the social and administrative problems of the Nagas, but gradually it developed a political outlook.

When the Simon Commission visited Naga hills in 1929, a delegation of the Naga club represented by different Naga tribes submitted a memorandum requesting the commission to exclude the Naga hills from the proposed scheme of reforms and to be directly brought under the British. The Naga elders expressed their apprehension of the introduction of foreign laws and customs to supersede their customary laws and desired to be left alone to determine for themselves as in ancient times.¹³

According to Asuso Yanuo, the request for exclusion had considerable political significance as it pointed out to the obvious desire of the Nagas for restoration of their independence that the Britishers had snatched from them. The desire for political emancipation and the idea of freedom awakened the minds of Naga intelligentsia.

The second world war which was fought in the heart of the Naga hills had a tremendous impact on the Nagas. The Naga isolation was broken and suddenly they were exposed to the modern world. Their social, political, moral and cultural life was transformed as they came in contact with outside world as a result of development of communication facilities by road, railway and air developed during the war.

All these kindled a new awakening among them. It brought to them new ideas of living and new concepts of freedom. Their social outlook underwent a change. It all generated a mental ferment and restlessness among the post-war generations of Nagas.¹⁴ They came to recognise the importance of Naga unity which gave birth to a powerful political commotion amongst the educated middle class Nagas. The Naga nationalism was developed.

This Naga nationalism was a product of the evolution of Naga political consciousness which gave birth to the Naga National Council (NNC) later. In this long process many of the inter-Naga differences were forgotten and for the first time the importance of Naga unity was recognised based on common features.

Birth of the Naga National Council (NNC) -

In order to reconstruct the Naga hills from the post-war ruination C. L. Pawsey the then Deputy Commissioner replaced the

Naga club with Naga hills district tribal council in 1945 with a view to uniting the Nagas and organising the tribal councils on modern lines. As its meeting at wokha in 1946, it was renamed as Naga National Council (NNC).

The birth of the NNC as the political forum of the Naga tribes set the stage for the beginning of the modern phase of the Naga movement. It gave a sense of political unity to the Naga tribes and it introduced the concept of Naga nationhood.¹⁵

In the beginning, the political objective of the Naga national council was the solidarity of all Nagas including those of the unadministered areas and the inclusion of their hills within the province of Assam in a free India with local autonomy and adequate safeguards for the interests of the Nagas.¹⁶

The British in 1946 conceived a plan to carve out a trust territory which was to include the Naga Hills, the then NEFA area and part of Burma, as a Crown colony to be controlled from London as a deal to the Nagas. Sir Coupland, proposed the Joint responsibility of the British, the Burmese and the Indian Governments for their territory after transfer of power from the British. The educated Nagas in the NNC quickly opposed the idea. They declared that the British must quit when they quit India.

In its memoranda of February and May 1947, NNC appealed to the last Governor General, Lord Mountbatten and the Indian Government and reiterated to the tribal advisory committee on 20 May, 1947 that an interim Government for the Naga people should be set up for ten years under the guardian power of the Indian Government with full legislative, judicial and executive powers, except defence, after which they would chose their own Government. They expressed doubt that thrown among 40 crores of Indians, the one million Nagas with their unique system of life will be wiped out because the constitution of India would be framed by people who had no knowledge of the Naga people. This was a very genuine fear. This fear of being "wiped out" was one of the factors for the beginning of Naga insurgency later.

In June 1947, a nine point agreement known as Hydari agreement was arrived at between Government of India represented by Sir Akbar Hydari, Governor of Assam and the NNC. This agreement promised protection from land alienation, certain administrative autonomy and the special responsibility of the Indian Government for their implementation. This was a turning point because the extremist leadership had emerged within the NNC, which wanted the recognition of their absolute right to chart out a future course and opt for a sovereign state. As no understanding was reached between the Nagas and the Government, they declared themselves independent on 14th August 1947.


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Radicalization of the NNC and the major unifying factors in Naga politics and philosophy was due to the rise of a personality namely A.Z. Phizo. Phizo was born in 1900 at Khonoma. He belonged to the Angam tribe. He was a man of indomitable spirit, inexhaustible energy, sharp intelligence, deep conviction. In 1933 Phizo went to Burma and earned his livelihood doing all sorts of jobs. Japanese invasion of Kohima in 1942 changed his course of life. He joined the Indian National Army (INA) of Subhas Chandra Bose with the hope of achieving free Nagaland, after India gets independence. After the reoccupation of Burma Phizo was imprisoned. After his release he returned to Nagaland with his mind full of unwavering determination and revolutionary ideas to achieve independence.

Phizo joined the NNC and very soon rose up in the organisation. With the emergence of Phizo, the extremist section got strengthened and NNC leaned more towards extremism.

Emergence of Naga Insurgency

Towards the end of 1949, the Naga national council changed its goal favouring independence. At the time when Indian political leadership was supposed to behave very sensitively, it started making arrogant claims that their decision to make Nagas part of India was more representative of Naga opinion. To prove the point that the desire for independence enjoyed mass support, NNC held a plebiscite



in 1951 under Phizo. In this 99.9% are said to have voted in favour of independence. This was followed by the boycott of the first general elections in 1952.

Due to certain instances, the animosity between the Government of India and the NNC grew. In 1952, when a Naga delegation met Nehru he is said to have thumped the table and scolded the delegation at the mention of sovereignty. The Naga delegation received a bitter insult to their innermost feelings. In 1953, when Nehru along with Burmese Prime Minister Thakin Unu visited Kohima, some Nagas who wanted to submit a memorandum to Nehru were denied the opportunity to appeal either in speech or in writing by the deputy Commissioner. In turn Nagas boycotted the meeting. However, the worst came when rumours spread, that Police raided the house of the NNC, secretary Sakhrie. Khonoma village was searched. All the important members of the NNC went underground. As mentioned in the introduction the Indian political elite with its model of nation-building remained blind to the aspirations of the ethnic communities which could have been accommodated if it had been sensitive to this aspect. However, what happened was it only alienated the Nagas, forcing them to take the course of insurgency.

As a result of above mentioned instances there was perpetual growth of fear and distrust among the Nagas towards the Indian Government. Subsequently they launched a civil disobedience

movement against the Indian Government servants refusing to pay house-tax, boycotting Government staff and schools, and setting up Naga national schools.

A twelve member Naga goodwill mission was sent to Assam, to secure understanding friendship and peace. In spite of the visit being marked by utmost friendliness, cordiality and hospitality the goodwill mission produced little goodwill as talks of army atrocities were round the corner.

Formation of underground Government

In 1954, Phizo announced the formation of the Hongkin Government called "Khunak Kautang Ngeukhum", meaning People's Sovereign Republic of Free Nagaland. In 1956 it was substituted by the Naga Central Government (later re-fashioned as Naga Federal Government in 1959.) Constituted at Phensinyu in the Rengma area, a document issued on the occasion declared Nagaland to be a sovereign republic, and it was claimed that this has been from time immemorial.

A formidable organisation was built up. It maintained all the trappings of a democratic pattern of Government with a Kethage (President), Ato-Kilonser (Prime-Minister), 15 kilonsers (Ministers). 'Hongkin' was to induct leaders from various tribes. A guerilla force was also built up. 'Naga home guards' (NHG) headed by Thungti

chang and 'Naga safeguards' headed by Kaito sema was merged to form 'Naga country guards.' In 1964 the armed wing was re-named as 'Naga home guards.' In 1964 the armed wing was further re-organised and designated as Naga army. There was also to be a Tatar Hoho (Parliament).

In order to mobilise women and youth, there was Naga women's society (NWS) and Naga Youth Society (NYS). Thus a formidable organisation was built up with a political wing, a military wing, a parliament and two mass organisations.

The first serious schism in the Phizo camp occurred in 1955. When Phizo decided to launch a full fledged war upon the Government, the moderates among his followers disagreed with his policy. They moved away from the NNC. The defectors held a meeting in Khonoma and resigned from the NNC.¹⁷ The chief defectors were General Secretary T. Sakhrie, who was also theoretician - propagandist and J.D. Jasokie publicity secretary. This angered the extremists. T. Sakhrie was perceived to be dangerous to the Naga movement. He was murdered in 1956.

Due to the intense political activity that was going on the polarisation between the extremists and the moderates went deep by 1957. The moderate section moved away from the NNC. Because of the polarisation, the centre found it useful to encourage the moderate

section by accepting its demands. Therefore, when Nehru was approached after the first Naga people's convention under Presidentship of Dr. Imkongliba Ao with the request for the formation of a union territory he immediately agreed to the formation of Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA) as a Union Territory.

With the widening conflict between the underground Nagas and the Naga People's convention (NPC) we witness a clear emergence of a third group namely the NPC itself.¹⁸

The second NPC convention held at Ungma in 1958 formed a liaison committee which drew up a draft of sixteen point memorandum for the formation of a state to be called Nagaland within the Indian union. The third convention held at Mokakchung in 1959, passed the sixteen point draft. The prime minister met the delegation led by Imkongliba Ao. After a number of modifications and amendments on 1 August 1960, the Prime minister announced the decision to make Nagaland the 16th state of the Indian Union. Accordingly Nagaland state was inaugurated in December 1963. Meanwhile the 16 point agreement was not accepted by the underground Nagas and they branded the newly created Nagaland state as the Puppet state of India.

With the state formation, over ground leadership emerged in the Naga society. The Naga leaders who had negotiated with India for the

formation of state, formed the Naga Nationalist Organisation (NNO). There also emerged Democratic Party of Nagaland which was considered pro-underground, but which Nibedon Nirmal calls middle ground (The night of the Guerillas). With the state formation the division between extremists and moderates finally culminated in the formation of underground and overground.

Meanwhile Naga insurgency had begin with the establishment of a formidable underground set up. In 1959 Phizo slipped to London with the aim to give publicity to the Naga case. On his advice the NNC recruited more and more to its guerilla wing. They got arms through raids on security forces and from foreign countries notably from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and China.

By early 1960's the Naga insurgents established their contact with the Burmese insurgents in upper Burma. They had close links with Kachin independence army (KIA) and Eastern Naga revolutionary council (ENRC).

One of the important feature of the Naga politics is the element of tribalism both in the underground and overground. In the overground, no political leader or chief-minister in the assembly can keep his place for long without the backing of the tribe to which he belongs. The miasma of tribalism is felt in the underground organisation as well, a movement intended to unite all Nagas in

common cause has at times proved to be adios as it is constantly dragged by tribal pulls.¹⁹

Tribal cliques, as the ranging of two or more tribes against another clique similarly formed has been the bane of Naga politics and the main cause of confrontations especially among the underground leaders.²⁰ Therefore, inspite of a strong element of Naga identity, at the same time there was also an element of tribalism which at times led to rivalries in the underground and even divisions.

After the exit of Phizo to London, the role of the Angamis in the underground set up got weakened. The underground leadership passed from the hands of the Angami Naga tribe to the Sema Naga tribe. All the important posts in the federal set up came to be occupied by the Semas. Kughato Sukhai till then the Ahng (provincial governor), in 1960 became the Ato-Kilonser (Prime Minister) of the "National Federal Government" (NFG). In 1961, his brother Scato Swu Sema became the president of the NFG, displacing Khrisanira Angami. Kaito sema, Sukhai's brother-in-law became the Defence Minister. Isak Swu,²¹ was appointed foreign Minister and Kevichusa Information minister.

The underground Nagas rejected the 16-point agreement and branded Nagaland state as the puppet state of India. By 1963 Underground Nagas became very active. In view of the disturbances,

disturbance act was re-imposed. Vigorous army patrolling and re-grouping of villages began. The grouping of villages caused the underground Nagas to brand the move as putting innocent villagers in the concentration camps.²²

Naga Baptist Church council took the initiative and formed peace mission consisting of Jayaprakash Narayan, Bimala Prasad Chaliha and Rev. Michael Scott, a European. Under the initiative of the peace mission cease-fire was arrived at between Government of India and the underground in 1964. This was with the aim of creating a conducive atmosphere for the holding of peace talks. Security forces agreed not to undertake jungle operations, raids on camps of hostile aerial action and search of villages. The Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) was to refrain from sniping and ambushing, imposing fines on villagers, kidnapping and recruiting of villagers, sabotage activities, raiding and firing on security posts, towns and administrative centres moving with arms or in uniform in towns, villages and administrative centers. Both were to follow the principle "No firing unless fired upon"

During September, 1964 to May 1965, there were totally nine secretary level meetings in Chedema (Kohima district) and Khensa (Mokakchung district). The Government of India delegation was composed of Y.D.Gundevia, Foreign secretary, Shilu Ao the then Chief Minister of Nagaland (whose inclusion was objected by the

underground) N.G. Santak Deputy secretary external affairs Ministry and U.N.Sharma chief Secretary, Nagaland Government. The underground delegation was led by Zashie Hurie Governor (Ahng) of Japhu province, and Isak swu Foreign minister of the NFG. The secretary level talks failed to produce any acceptable result and it seemed more likely that a settlement on the ticklish question could be worked decisively at the Prime-minister level in the last analysis.²³

Six rounds of talks were held between government delegation and the Naga delegation. The talks at the Prime-minister level was led by Ato Kilonser Kugato Sukhai. The six rounds of talks during 1966-67 between the underground and the government of India failed to produce any tangible result.

The Naga delegation returned. With the return of the Naga delegation to their jungle headquarters, drastic changes shook the underground setup. These changes were sudden, far-reaching and definitely for the worse as far as the Naga cause was concerned. Divisions in the underground occurred due to professional, ideological and tribal rivalry.

Professional rivalism combined with tribalism to bring a schism. There were Sema and Angami tribal lobbies in the underground setup. Kaito was one of the best in the armed wing and Kughato (who spearheaded the talks with Prime- minister) were brothers. It was a powerful combination further galvanized by Kedhage (President) Scato

Swu who was their brother-in-law. Only the Angamis led by Thinsuille and Mowu in the armed wing and Kevi yallay in the political wing could effectively offset the Sema hegemony.

Phizo group brought down Scato Swu as President (Kedhage). Rev.G.Mhiasi was made the president. The Sema hegemony in Naga politics was destroyed and power passed on to the Angami groups. The new president, appointed Z. Ramyo a Tangkhul Naga as home minister of the Federal Government. Muivah²⁴ a Tangkhul was appointed General Secretary.

Tribalism combined with professional rivalism. It was decided by the underground leadership to send a trip to China. Thinsuille (and later Muivah) were chosen. Kaito Sema was left out of China trip. Kaito was offended, as he was not included for the trip to China. Kaito Sema was unhappy as he was by passed and that the Angamis were dominating.

At the 10-11 July 1967 Chedema conference General Kaito strongly opposed Phizo's participation in the talks with the Indian Government. He demanded that either solution should be brought out immediately or the Federal Government should hand over all powers to an army government headed by himself. The crises foretold the imminent clash-armed clash between the two factions, which was luckily averted at the moment by Kughato's conciliatory talks with Gen. Kaito.

In October 1967 Tatar Hoho was convened in which Kughato was blamed for hobnobbing with Indian government and abetting his brother, former general Kaito to undertake traitor-like activities. On account of the growing criticism, Kughato decided to resign. He along with Scato and Kaito decided to end Phizo's hegemony.

In January 1968 Kaito formalized split by forming the army Government Kaito consolidated his position and became rallying point of those opposed to Phizoites. This threatened the Position of Mhiasseiu's Government. Kaito therefore was killed in late evening in the main market of Kohima in August 1968.

Kaito's death deepened the tribal feud between the Angamis and Semas. Sema group announced the formation of "Council of Naga people" as a rival to NNC. Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (RGN) was to be a rival to Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN). Scato Swu and Kughato Sukhai were elected as president and Prime minister respectively. Semas were back in the roles but in a different set up.

Therefore, by 1968 the Naga underground Movement was a house divided itself with splinter groups i.e. RGN, joining forces sleuthing for capture of federal army men.²⁵ RGN was charged as renegades and traitors and branded as puppets of the Indian Government by FGN.

Prior to this, the first dissenting voice was raised by Thongdi Chang (Convenor of Tuensang in Mhiasi's Government). He announced the separation of his group from the FGN in April 1968. He announced his underground unit would have nothing to do until a political settlement was found within the Indian union and "illegal contacts" with the foreign powers were stopped. This section opposed to the China connection came out with a resolution to find a solution within the framework of the Indian union. They condemned the FGN's hobnobbing with China. Apart from these dissenting voices, the death of Kaito Sema and formation of RGN resulted in weakening the capacity of underground Nagas to put pressure on the Indian Government. It was split into three rival groups,

While Thongdi Chang's group wanted a peaceful settlement of the Naga issue and denied the move to seek help from China, the Phizoists believed that through Chinese assistance and armed struggle the desired goal of independent Nagaland could be achieved. The Revolutionary Government with whom Kughato Sukhai was associated wanted the independence of Nagaland, no doubt, but it still believed in a negotiated settlement.²⁰

In January 1968 Mowu, Thinsuille returned to Nagaland from China with a huge stock of arms and ammunition. Security forces were instructed to keep watch on the rebel Naga gangs crossing the borders. Frequent clashes between Indian troops and rebel Nagas

soon followed. On 1 February, 1968, the regional head quarters at Tolloi in Ukhrul sub-division of Manipur was captured.

On 7 June, 1968, a major clash occurred at Jostoma which was eight miles from Kohima when a group of Chinese trained rebel Nagas tried to re-enter into Nagaland. Nearly 200 rebels were either killed or injured in the clash while 90 Indian security personnel also suffered casualties. After the Jostoma incident security forces intensified patrolling of the borders. Soon arrest of important Naga leaders followed.

On 2 December, 1968 a heavily guarded underground camp at Mozema was destroyed. In March 1968 a number of hostile Nagas returning from China were captured. However, Isak Swu the leader of the gang escaped. On 16th March 1969, commander-in-chief of underground army Mowu Angami was captured along with another 200 armed men in the Tuensang area.

The arrest of Mowu Angami was a blow to the FGN. With Mowu's capture many in the underground started thinking freshly about the policy of confrontation. Subsequently surrendering of many underground Nagas followed. In 1968, 578 underground Nagas surrendered. In 1969, 1, 949 surrendered.

Along with the division in the under ground and the arrests and surrender of many under ground Nagas, the liberation of Bangladesh

came as death blow to the NNC. Bangladesh helped India in arresting two important Naga rebels Thinsuillie Angami who was the commander in chief and Brigadier Nidilip Angami.

On 8 August, 1972, Hokishe Sema, the Chief Minister of Nagaland, was ambushed on the road while he was coming back to Kohima from Shillong along with his sixteen year old daughter. Sema escaped but his daughter was injured and driver killed. After this incident, on 30 August, 1972, the Naga National Council and the Naga Federal Government were outlawed under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The cease-fire which was in operation since 1964 was also lifted from 1 September 1972.

Soon intensive military operations began. Underground got weakened because of increased military pressure. Many of them either decided to surrender or to go underground. Kughato Sukhai's group and Thongdi Chang's group decided to surrender. On 16 August, 1973, the Revolutionary Government of Kughato's men was orally dissolved at a parade held at Zunheboto in Mokakchung district in the presence of B.K. Nehru, the Governor of Assam and Nagaland. Three hundred and thirty armed underground Nagas including Lessumo, Scato Swu, Zeheto, the president, the prime-minister and the commander-in-chief respectively of the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland surrendered.²⁷ Later they met the Indian Prime Minister

and decided to work within the framework of the Indian constitution. In 1973 Thongdi Chang's group also surrendered along with 200 men.

The surrender of important Naga leaders encouraged the members in Phizo's group to do the same. Many from Phizo's group too surrendered. Saniba Ao, Major General in the NFG along with Mepyandant, Vice-President of the NNC, and his secretary Tajen Ao surrendered in 1975. Saniba Ao appealed the others also to do the same. Between April and August 1975 1,214 underground Nagas surrendered, 634 were arrested.

By mid 1975 the underground had got considerably weakened. The factors responsible for it were firstly, due to infighting and inner conflict. This was because of professional, tribal and ideological rivalry. Infighting and inner conflict had resulted in the division of the underground into Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (RGN) and Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN). Secondly, many underground Nagas came to perceive that it was futile to carry armed struggle and hence surrendered and came overground. Thirdly, because of the military pressure and intense patrolling by security forces many underground Nagas were arrested. Fourthly, with the emergence of Bangladesh, the underground Nagas lost an important escape route.

Shillong accord

With the underground receiving setbacks and getting weakened, it was felt that by winning over the remaining underground Nagas the peace can be finally restored. Longri Ao, the chairman of the Nagaland Peace Council, took the initiative and contacted a few underground leaders including Kevi Yallay, the brother of Phizo, about negotiating with the Government for resolving issue²⁸ Kevi Yallay acted as the contact man between the underground Naga leaders and the liaison committee of the peace council which consisted of Longri Ao, Kenneth Kerhug L. Lungalang, M. Aram and Lungshim Saiza. It was decided that six members from the underground would be chosen to negotiate with the representatives of Government. Finally Kevi Yallay, Z. Ramyo, M. Assa, Sanyi Darhu, I Temlenta and Veniyi Rahakha were chosen for the purpose.

The underground representatives went to Shillong for talks. Four rounds of talks were held between the underground representatives and the Governor L.P. Singh. A three-point agreement was concluded on 11 November 1975, between the Governor and the underground representatives which came to be known as Shillong accord.²⁹

It was decided by the representatives "of their own volition, to accept without condition, the constitution of India." Underground

arms were to be “deposited at appointed places.” Finally, the representatives were given a “reasonable time to formulate other issues for discussions.” A five-point agreement, supplementary to the Shillong accord, was concluded on 5 January, 1976. Collections of arms were to commence early and completed by 25 January, 1976. Initial places of collections were to be decided through discussion. The collected arms were to “be handed over to the Peace Council. Peace Council was to arrange transportation of arms “to Chedema Peace Camp.” Similar arrangements were to be made in Manipur.

The aim of the supplementary arrangement was to disarm the Nagas. After the signing of the accord Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was suspended. In accordance with the supplementary agreement the former underground leaders surrendered the arms at Chedema Peace Camp.

Those among the prisoners who accepted the Shillong accord were released. Sentences of those who had been convicted were remitted. Cases against industrial prisoners were withdrawn and cases pending in investigation were closed. All collective fines imposed on the Naga villages since 1972, were repudiated.⁴⁰

It was felt that with the Shillong accord, peace had arrived. However, that assessment proved wrong as the later events proved. The rivalry and split in the underground movement, the formation of

political organisation of overground Nagas and Government of India's talks with the moderate section led to the Shillong accord and created legitimate illusion that Naga insurgency has come to a close. This raises a theoretical question: can restructuring of democratic institutions provide a solution to the insurgency in North-east? Subsequent chapters look at this dimension in the post-Shillong accord phase.

NOTES

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- 16.V. Elwin., *Nagaland*, (Shillong, P.S. Dutta for the research department, 1961), p. 51.
- 17.Mankekar., *Op.cit*, p. 59.
- 18.Dr. M. Horam., *Naga Insurgency-The last thirty years* (New Delhi, Cosmo Publications, 1988), p. 84.
19. *Ibid*, p. 35.
- 20.*Ibid*, p. 26.
- 21.Isak Swu., the foreign minister of NFG later went to form National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) along with Muivah and Khaplang in 1980. Swu is the president of the NSCN (IM).
- 22.Horam., *Op.cit*, pp. 97-98.
- 23.Asoso Yonuo., *The rising Nagas: A historical and political study* (Delhi, Manas, 1984), p. 283.
- 24.Muivah., along with Swu and Khaplang formed NSCN. He is the General Secretary of the NSCN.
- 25.Horam., *Op.cit.*, p. 146.
- 26.Prakash Singh., *Political evolution of Nagaland* (New Delhi, Lancers, 1981), p. 141-142.
- 27.*Ibid.*, p. 151.
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CHAPTER – II

Post-Shillong Accord: Naga Insurgency – I (1975-88)

The period subsequent to the signing of the 'Shillong Accord' was a period of brief silence in the rank and file of the Nagas. For the section of the underground which was opposed to the accord it was a time to re-think the strategy, rebuild the underground set up and carry forward the Naga movement which was facing a setback. For the surrendered section, this was a period, when they began overground life. For them it was time to think in terms of settling the Naga problem through further negotiations; for the peace-agencies it was a success story. They wanted all the remaining underground Nagas too to accept the Shillong Accord and hence continued their efforts. For the Indian Government, it was all a happy ending.

This was a period of assessment for Nagas of all shades of political opinions and loyalties so that they might pool their efforts towards the final settlement keeping always before them that any settlement was doomed to collapse if it was not accepted by the NNC.¹

Defects of Shillong Accord- One thing was quite clear. Not all the Nagas were happy with the Shillong accord. Certain dissenting voices were also heard. It was considered as a surrender. Hence it was

opposed by the important NNC leaders. The Shillong accord suffered from certain defects.

The accord was signed by those Naga leaders who were virtually prisoners of the Government. The accord offered nothing new to the Nagas. Besides the signatories to the accord did not consult A.Z. Phizo, President of the NNC Isak-Swu and Th. Muivah, General Secretary of the NNC who were camping in the Eastern Naga hills, Burma. The accord was seen as a surrender pact and not surprisingly Phizo refused to lend his support. The other leaders of the NNC, Isak-Swu and Muivah, denounced it outright.² The chief defect of the Shillong accord as noted by Bendangashi was that the agreement was not signed by the underground leaders as representatives of the NNC or FGN but merely in their personal capacities.³ The surrendered section failed to secure any sort of political concessions to satisfy the aspirations of the Nagas.

The only positive outcome and in fact the sole redeeming feature of the agreement... was that the captured underground men after languishing in jails for months and years, were released at last as a direct result of the accord.⁴ They got an opportunity to re-join their families. The released men were given Rs. 1,000 each to facilitate their rehabilitation. Mowu was, however, given Rs. 4,000. The underground, on their part deposited over a hundred arms and about

four thousand rounds of ammunition at Chedema on 12 February 1976.⁵

Shillong accord was variously described as an act of “diplomacy”, “expediency” and “helplessness”. It was also said that the act in itself does not constitute a final settlement. That the beleaguered leadership badly needed breathing to re-coup and that it was time the Naga issue was retrieved from the battlefield to the conference table. Whatever may be the reason, the initiative was back with Phizo in London.

This was the period when the issue of the solution of the Naga problem moved from the field of armed confrontation to political confrontation. It was increasingly felt by the former underground Nagas who had signed the Shillong accord, that in any sort of final political settlement with the Indian Government Phizo should be involved. Accordingly attempts were made to bring Phizo into the picture.

A four-member Naga delegation comprising Keviyallay, Ramyo, Pukrove and Kenneth, which went to London in early 1977, prepared the groundwork for a meeting between the Prime minister and Phizo. The meeting took place on 14 June 1977 in London where Morarji Desai had gone to attend the Commonwealth Prime-Minister's conference.⁶ The meeting was not a cordial one. One of the most

disturbing aspects of the conversation was the extreme aggressiveness shown by Morarji Desai. The utterly negative attitude shown by the Prime-Minister was as striking as the harsh language he had used. When Phizo told the Prime-Minister that the Nagas were suffering since a long time, Desai argued that Nagas were not suffering. When Desai was asked by Phizo, whether he will exterminate the Nagas, the Prime-Minister replied that he would certainly exterminate the Naga rebels. (For details see appendix III). The conversation was recorded by Phizo and the cassette distributed. Desai stated that the cassette circulated was a "garbled" version. However, his own statements about his meeting with Phizo more or less confirmed about his remarks. Such a remark was certainly hurtful to Naga sentiments. One of the resolutions passed by Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) in its December 15, 1978 Kohima rally was to condemn Mr. Morarji Desai statement 'Exterminate the Nagas and I will not have any compunction in it'.

In spite of the meeting between the Prime-Minister and Phizo not being cordial it was said that this was only a bad beginning. And that Phizo should continue in the picture and should be prepared for any future negotiation. By the end of 1977 men like Mowu Angami and Thinoselie were backing the peace process. Attempts were also being made by the Peace agencies to convince Muivah to accept the Shillong accord and to return back with his squad.

The Federal activities had shifted from the Indian side of Naga-inhabited areas to Myanmar side more specifically to the Kachin area of Myanmar. The other Naga leaders, who were there, included Isak Swu, T. Pushu Venuh, the emissary of the Oking (Head quarter, Mao-N-Lorho Secretary of Kadhage [President] Zashie Huire. There was "colonel" Vedayi Moire of the Chakesang tribe, and "Lt. Col." Pamrei of the Tangkhul Nagas of Manipur. And there was Eastern Naga Revolutionary Council (ENRC) headed by Khaplang. This group of underground Naga leaders had visited China a number of times and they were well experienced in organisational and tactical moves. They were closely watching the political developments in Nagaland.

As far as the overground politics was concerned United Democratic Front (UDF) which had come to power under the leadership of Vizol in 1974, was again voted back to power in 1977. One of the major objectives of the UDF was to act as a bridge between the underground and overground. It had played a vital role in bringing a section of the underground to the overground and in their signing of Shillong accord. In 1977, it was again on the slogan "the party might not survive but peace should" it came back to power.

A two day session of the Naga National Council (NNC) was held at Khonoma on (11-12 May 1978). It was attended by Naga leaders who had taken different paths. It was attended by Kughato Sukhai, Thungti Chang, Mowu Angami, Thinoselie, Mhiasi, Kevi Yallay,

Biseto Medam etc. It adopted two resolutions: one, re-affirming its full confidence in the leadership of the “incumbent office bearers” and urging that early negotiation should take place between the Government of India and the NNC for a “peaceful political solution” and the second that “It was resolved that contact should be made with those who are outside for which an early implementation is required”. In the two day session extremist views were dominant. Shillong accord was treated with cynical disregard.

Nagaland Peace Council (NPC) organised an “All Naga People’s Conference” at Kohima on May 18 at which the failure of the NNC at Khonoma to endorse the Shillong agreement was sought to be made good. NPC was under fire by the young radicals. Resolutions could be passed only after they staged a walk out. The resolutions re-affirmed Naga people’s desire for lasting peace, appreciated Government of India and FGN efforts for ushering in an era of peace through the Shillong accord and entrust FGN/NNC leaders and NPC to organise delegates to contact political leaders who are outside.

Formation of NSCN - With the Shillong accord a division occurred within the NNC with a section that supported the accord and the other that opposed it. The Indian forces did not want to take chances and intensified its operations with heavy deployment of forces in the region, particularly in Kohima. The Indian forces did not want any unfavourable reaction from the opponents of the accord who might

either attack the Security Forces or the signatories of the accord Phizo, for the reasons unknown, did not accept the accord as also failed to condemn it.

Meanwhile, a National Hoho was convened by Muivah at Siphao in August 1976. It re-affirmed the decision of the 1951 plebiscite (where 99.0 percent of the Nagas are said to have voted in favour of Nagaland sovereignty). The Hoho condemned the Shillong accord as well as the ministry of Zashie Huire. It also elected Isak Swu as Vice-President of the NNC as the post became vacant because of Mr. Imkongmeren's arrest.

The signing of the accord was viewed by several underground members as the seed sown for internal clashes of various groups of the underground members in the region.⁷ The trouble in the party—rather the clashes among various groups or members of the organisation—started when those underground representatives who had signed the Shillong accord supported their argument. This infuriated the supporters of the accord. The chasm between the supporters and opponents of the accord reached to an extent that there was no sign of bridging the gap. This ultimately led to the fierce clashes between the two groups. The internal feud, it was felt, could have been solved, had Phizo intervened. That time, top leaders—Muivah, Isak Chisi Swu, SS. Khaplang and others were in Eastern

Nagaland (Naga-inhabited areas in Myanmar) and wanted Phizo to guide them.*

There was no puzzle as to why the Naga underground members were fighting among themselves. A deep misunderstanding had penetrated into the minds of several underground members over the signing of the accord and it led to a situation where the two opposing sides (a group supporting the accord and the other opposing it) would find it difficult to patch up differences. A group was led by Isak Chisi Swu (a Sema tribal) and Muivah (a Tangkhul Naga from Manipur), and the other group was formed mainly by the underground members who are understood to have extended tacit support to those who had signed the Accord at Shillong."

As Swu, Muivah, Khaplang and others were pondering over what should be their next course of action a coup took place at the underground headquarters in eastern Nagaland. The military coup d'etat¹⁰ was launched under the leadership of "Ma.j.Lt.Col. Supong who declared Martial law. The "Military Junta" arrested the top leaders Isak Swu, Muivah, "Chaplee Kilonser" (Finance Minister) Lorho, Education Kilonser (Minister) Kheasui, "Commander-in-chief" Brig. Vedai and "Major" Pruning on account of criticising and condemning the Shillong accord and criticising Phizo. Supong declared that all the State power was usurped by him and that there is no longer NNC and the Federal Government.

After the coup d'e'tat the military Junta began holding regular meetings with the signatories of the Shillong Accord. Many of those who opposed the Shillong accord and martial law were said to have been ruthlessly executed. But, finally, the martial law administrators called a meeting at Lao in the Konyak region. In the meeting S.S. Khaplang was elected as the president of the underground government formed by the military personnel who had launched the coup. Khaplang took over the leadership and started running the government. But Khaplang was in line with Isak Swu and Muivah. Armed confrontation took place between the supporters and opponents of Shillong Accord. In another coup de'tat those persons responsible for the imposition of Martial law were eliminated.

A Tatar Hoho (National parliament) was then convened by Khaplang at Nokpa in the Pangmi region on 26 January 1980. Isak and Muivah were released. Khaplang declared that the Government of Military junta does not represent the people and hence he resigned. It was said that since NNC had failed to uphold the "National Trust", it had become necessary to form a new political organisation if the struggle is to continue.

Subsequently National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was formed on 31 January 1980 that was to "fight to a finish for one's nation's freedom". NSCN released a manifesto where it declared its policy, objectives, principles and strategy.

Manifesto of the NSCN - The uniqueness of the NSCN manifesto is that it uses Marxist and Maoist jargon defending its own ethnic philosophy. This was natural in a tribal society where class contradictions had not yet emerged as major contradictions and where ethnic realities were pre-dominant. However, it takes a critical look at the elite which had emerged within the Naga society.

To begin with it states that in a world of constant change “the forces that defend the righteous cause of sovereign national existence and further the just cause of the people along the inevitable course are alone patriots and revolutionaries. All forces standing in opposition to this are reactionaries and traitors”. It declared that the historic role was performed by the NNC till the “treason of 1975”. It described the Shillong accord as “the most ignominious sell out in the history of the Naga people”. It pointed out that NNC failed to officially condemn the accord and “has turned out to be treacherous and reactionary”.

Taking a critical look at the earlier leadership it declared “leadership acted, in the past... independently of the actual conditions and in total isolation from the people”. It reiterated “we are revolutionaries, we do not believe in fantasy and absurdity... We shall not fly in the air; we shall walk on the ground and work with the people”.

NSCN leaders did not agree with the NNC leaders that it was impossible to resist “the colossal invading might of India and Burma”. It stated that “the issue isn’t of a contest of strength but it is that of upholding our historical right against the aggressive forces. ... It is perseverance and the act of undaunted confrontation with the eventuality of death for the truth one knows that win the war in the long run.” Therefore, according to them, the logic that the strong win the weak was not correct without taking into consideration the other side of the experience of history. It cites US-Vietnamese war outcome as an example.

NSCN expressed its ethnic fear that influx of Indian nationals into Nagaland would result in “constant threat of eventual submersion”. Along with this “The massive exploitation of mineral resources by the Government of India with the bureaucrats and exploiting reactionary traitors in the puppet state power... will in a short period of time completely overwhelm and uproot Nagaland.” It also expressed the view that attempts were being made to assimilate them. It declared that Indians and Burmese knowing fully well that force alone cannot subjugate the Nagas are resorting to assimilation through “massive introduction of decadent Hindu culture and literature and those of the Burmese, in the social and individual life of the Naga people through public institutions and mass-media” creating a possibility of “the precious varieties of the Naga people in jeopardy of eventual extinction”. “The forces of Hinduism” in the form of “Indian

troops, the retail and wholesale traders, the teachers and the instructors, the intelligentsia, the prophets of non-violence, the gamblers and the snake-charmers, Hindi songs and Hindi films, the Rasogula makers and the Gita are all arrayed for the mission of supplanting the Christian faith". A war of such nature does not admit of a shallow approach but demands a thorough combat, it declared.

It asserted that "We shall in no case meet invasion of our country with non-violence ... Force to force, reason to reason. It is your aggression on us that has given rise to this spell of armed conflict, it is your killing of us that had touched off bitter retaliation. The problem is with you, not with the Nagas". The NSCN leaders reiterated that the problem was basically political and which required a political solution. "But India and Burma seek military solution and this is the crux of the problem. Our freedom is forced into the battlement; we have to pick it up with a gun". It reiterated that so long India and Burma continued "their occupation of our homeland" that long the Nagas were bound to fight.

Regarding its strategy the manifesto stated that its policy would be policy of self-reliance. "The most dangerous harm affecting our politics is that ab-initio the people were made to believe in foreign help for their survival. ... It is hard to consolidate ourselves on foreign assistance. There could be no consolidation of our position without the practice of self-reliance, and without consolidation, it is idle to

think of final victory". It emphasised the importance of a "United Front". "to stand against the common enemy".

The manifesto gave importance to its own brand of socialism which was in retaining Naga People's ancient classless society in Nagaland. According to it in the present system. "The exploiting class consists mainly of the reactionary traitors, the bureaucrats, a handful of rich men and the Indian vermin".

The NSCN leaders were of the view that "to achieve the salvation of the people in socialism the dictatorship of the people through or revolutionary organisation is indispensable". They promised, to achieve the objective by a revolutionary council and at the same time, declared that they stood for individual freedom of religion inspite of endorsing the old slogan "Nagaland for Christ".

It promised the people a future free from the "forces of domination, exploitation and assimilation. Bertil Lintner has described the NSCN ideology "as a mixture of evangelical Christianity and revolutionary socialism."¹¹

Leadership – The period subsequent to the signing of the Shillong accord, a new generation of Nagas were coming up in the hills who had totally different ideas and outlook. They were the new generation of leaders coming up in a fast changing landscape. Their thinking was different and who held their own uncompromising views on

matters. They were the result of the guerilla tradition that was sown by Phizo in the 1950's. Isak Swu and Muivah belonged to this new younger generation of leaders. With the Shillong accord, there was decline of older generations in the NNC-FGN. It provided an opportunity for the growth of this new younger generation. The new leadership had a worldwide "outlook, immense wisdom, dynamism, intellect and consistent in approach to the problem".

There was also a change in the tribal equations. The role of the Angamis, Aos and Semas (Isak Swu was an exception) who had played a model role in the beginning of the Naga Insurgency, declined as far as the underground politics was concerned. They opted for the overground regional politics. The centre of gravity shifted from the area dominated by these tribes to those dominated across international borders and areas, constituting Konyaks and Tangkuls.

Organisation – The NSCN was formed in the thick jungles of Eastern Naga hills (i.e. in upper Myanmar area). This was a very remote and backward area. It was consciously established there. The need to establish a base there was born out of the strategic necessity "since consolidation of their position was indispensable for what they called "protracted confrontations". In this part of the world, the Nagas were hardly exposed to the outside world. Head hunting tradition was very much prevalent. The first and foremost task was to demonstrate through fighting battles that they were a force in themselves.

Imparting of primary education and better way of life became real necessities to mobilise the masses. Therefore the twin purpose for establishing base here was firstly out of strategic necessity and secondly to mobilise the Naga masses from this region and to induct them in the movement.

An underground parallel Government known as the Government of People's Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) was established on March 26 1980. NSCN was to be the political wing. There were a 'civil' and 'military' wing. In the GPRN Isak Swu (Sema) was made the Yaruiwo (President). Khaplang (a Pangmi Naga of Upper Myanmar) the Vice-President (Woshino), and Muivah (a Tangkhul Naga from Manipur) the Ato-Kilonser (Prime Minister). In the political wing i.e., NSCN Isak Swu was the chairman, Khaplang Vice-Chairman and Muivah General Secretary. Several Kilonser (ministers) were appointed and areas divided into different regions with a senior underground member in charge of each regional unit.

A civil head quarter (CHQ) and General Headquarter (GHQ) was also established. While the CHQ was responsible for all types of civil activities, the GHQ functioned only as an "army wing."¹² CHQ was located at Chalam in Eastern Naga hills in the unadministered upper Myanmar GHQ was located at Longkai which takes about 6 day's trek down south from Chalam. While the top leaders of the organisation were based at CHQ and GHQ senior leaders and commandos operated

in Manipur and Nagaland at the order and command of the regional leaders who kept in touch with the CHQ and GHQ.¹³ The NSCN triumvirate-Swu, Khaplang and Muivah-who all operated from CHQ and GHQ hardly ever entered the Nagaland and Manipur regions.¹⁴

There were three battalions of the NSCN. The first battalion was stationed near Phinung at Nagaland border. The “Commander-in-chief” was “Brigadier” Kholi while his deputy was “colonel” Kakiho. While Kholi was a Konyak Naga, Kakiho was a Sema Naga.¹⁵

Many of the senior NSCN members operating in Manipur region were from the state’s Ukhrul district. They included former “Foreign Secretary” Angelous Shimray Tangkul, “Captain” Livingstone, Sergeant Ramkathing and Lt. Mark.¹⁶

In 1980, T. Muivah’s group captured most of the weapons from Phizo’s FGN. It ousted Phizo’s groups from positions and areas held for many years. It also gained control of many Naga speaking areas of western Myanmar.¹⁷ The NSCN to begin with was formed with an initial strength of approximately 150 cadres and rose to around 3,000 with Konyaks and Tangkhuls forming the main recruits. Other tribes in lesser number included Semas, Kukis, Yumchungus and Mons. Initially being formed in Eastern Naga hills, the NSCN’s influence got extended to southern Myanmar, Ukhrul and Senapati districts in

Manipur, Tirap district in Arunachal Pradesh and Mon, Tuensang districts in Nagaland.

Activities of NSCN – With the NSCN's formation, the NNC members were taken as opponents close to those who signed the Shillong accord, as it had failed to condemn the accord officially. It was because of this reason that NNC and NSCN started killing each other. Life in the CHQ and GHQ was very difficult. The newly recruited members had to remain highly alert as there were constant attacks by the Myanmar army and the FGN. In spite of the sporadic attacks on it, it emerged as the “most powerful and well-knit” guerilla organisation. It had close ties with Kachin Independent Army (KIA), a Myanmarese insurgent outfit. NSCN came to be looked upon as the “big brother” to different insurgent outfits in Northeast India. The NSCN imparted arms training and handling of arms to different insurgent outfits in Northeast. They included United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur and United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) of Assam.

Apart from giving military training to the different insurgent outfits, the NSCN also carried on social activities towards the local inhabitants. Massive political mobilisations, social reforms and religious preaching were carried out side by side. Volunteer Gospel teams, carrying bibles preached the Messiah everywhere with armed squads standing guard throughout, encountering many a time

dangerous attacks. Thousands were converted to Christian faith. Churches sprang up at villages and hymns chanted. By 1985, the converts reached around 40 thousand. Old ways started giving way to new one of hope. Schools were opened and the progress of the people was considerable. The main aim and objective of the schools was to impart training to change the old tradition of head hunting and other wild traditions which were still in practice in the Eastern Naga hills. Conferences were organised for the welfare of the students. Campaigns were also conducted from village to village which contributed much to the well-being of the people. Social reforms were carried out with much success. Head-hunting was totally stopped. Unlike in the past, poppy-cultivation, opium-taking and smoking, selling and buying were strictly prohibited. Through education (many of the) harmful traditions were abolished and immoral practices taught to be abhorred.¹⁸ The NSCN also abolished the “village headmanship” system and appointed what they called “Ranapiyu” for every village to handle all the village affairs. All the village administration was looked after by the Ranapiyu who would also collect taxes, rations and other items for the underground members. Bathing was not known to the inhabitants and proper method of cooking was also unknown.¹⁹ It was only after the opening of the NSCN that head-hunting was stopped and proper cultivation system introduced. The inhabitants also later learnt to cover their naked

bodies with proper dress.²⁰ The NSCN was popular among the masses who felt the underground organisation cared for them.

Code of Behaviour – In order to uphold the integrity of the NSCN, the members were to follow a certain code of behaviour. To this end a resolution was adopted in 1987 NSCN house. The resolutions were: a) Hence forth national workers shall abstain from smoking tobacco and from taking all kinds of narcotic stimulants, b) Drinking alcohol is prohibited c) Stealing, misappropriation and defalcation of Government funds are strictly forbidden. D) Immorality in sex is prohibited.²¹

One of the important features of the insurgency scene in the 1980s' in the North-East was that the different insurgent groups seemed to have come to the conclusion that their movements have not been successful because they have fought their battles in isolation from each other. It was being realised that in order to face a stronger military adversary it was necessary to establish unity between different outfits. It was out of this realisation that attempts to establish unity were made. As far as the NSCN was concerned, one of its strategy as stated in its manifesto was to form "United front". NSCN already had good relations with Kachins (KIA) of Myanmar. After a brief interlude, three under ground outfits, The NSCN, the PLA of Manipur and UNLF also of Manipur joined hands to start a struggle... NSCN also established a rapport with ULFA.²² It also

established its link with Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) of Tripura. The brain behind the unity move was T. Muivah. It was done with the help of "Foreign Secretary" Angelous Shimray. Links with NSCN were important for other outfits because any insurgent willing to go to China had to take permission from the NSCN because they first had to go to KIA and then to China via these areas.

Peace Attempts – In the early years of its existence everything went well for the NSCN. It carried out attacks against the Security forces in both Manipur and Nagaland. Between the period 1980 to 1987 300 Security Forces are said to have lost lives. On 19 February 1982 an army convoy was ambushed in which 22 army Jawans were killed at Namthilok area on Imphal-Ukhrul road. Several arms including stenguns, automatic rifles and light machine guns were taken over by the activists. In 1987 in an ambush on the camp of Assam rifles nine Jawans were killed. Huge number of arms were snatched.

Attacks on Security forces was viewed with concern by the Indian Government and it took the matter to Myanmar Government. It lobbied for a joint operation against the NSCN. The Myanmarese authorities complied. Joint operations were carried out. While the Myanmarese forces launched attacks against the NSCN members who controlled a narrow strip of Myanmar territory adjacent to the Indian border, Indian forces launched attacks along the border in Manipur

and Nagaland. Though initially, because of the military pressure exerted, the underground Nagas were on the run they soon regrouped.

In spite of the military pressure the Indian and Myanmarese political establishment could not achieve their aim. Attempts were also made by the Government to initiating peace talks from time to time by taking the help of the Church and the social organisations. The use of military force could not solve the decades old problem. Hence it decided to initiate peace talks. Several peace missions were sent to the NSCN leadership but there was no concrete response from NSCN. The NSCN wanted the peace talks without any pre-conditions while the Indian Government wanted it within the framework of the Indian constitution. Hence not much headway could be made.

NSCN SPLIT - The latest initiative for the peace talks came by the Government of India in 1987. This proved to be disastrous and brought internal conflict within organisation. Apart from the misunderstanding that it created, ego and tribal factors combined to bring a split in the NSCN.

In 1987, Rev. Y. Chingang Konyak was sent as a mediator by the Indian Government to initiate peace talks. Konyak reached the Council head quarters (CHQ) which was described by underground as shifted to Hangshen village (because of attacks by Myanmarese

troops). Konyak conveyed the message of the Indian Government “to hold talks within the framework of the Indian Constitution”, which was a deliberate back out from the unconditional approach of Indira Gandhi. A message was sent to Khaplang about a ‘joint consultation’ as Khaplang’s view was considered important. Khaplang didn’t turn up. As the nature of the matter needed prompt response Konyak was informed that “NSCN would have no talks whatever with the Indian Government on any conditions and that he should not take the risk of reaching (CHQ) for information of conditional talks”. Although the offer was rejected, misunderstanding had cropped up in the NSCN and rumours spread.

To clear the misunderstanding an emergency session of the NSCN was called. Message was sent to all the important functionaries including Khaplang. Khaplang and the NSCN leaders stationed outside did not turn up. The meeting was to discuss apart from other matters the stand to be taken by the NSCN in case of “actual political talks with India”. Although Konyak had been informed that there wouldn’t be a talk. In the meeting Muivah reiterated the NSCN decision, of 1984 about not to hold talks unless on equal terms. The house also decided to send a foreign command headed by Isak before February 1988 to deal with other foreign countries. On 30th January 1988, Isak along with 29 others left for “abroad”. After Isak left the situation took another turn.

Another rumour that Swu and Muivah “were prepared to eliminate all the Konyak and Pangmi national Workers” added a tribal dimension to the conflict. “Brigadier” Kholi also felt that Isak and Muivah were prepared to enter into an agreement with India. It was also charged that Muivah had accepted a huge amount of money from India. A situation was reached where difference would not be patched up. In reply to a letter by Muivah, Khaplang omitted the earlier issue and charged Muivah for attempting to hatch a secret to oust him (Khaplang) from vice-chairmanship. As the situation was turning from bad to worse UNLF and ULFA intervened in the internal matter of the NSCN and approached both the leaders to settle their differences peacefully.

Mainly four charges were made by Khaplang and his supporters towards Muivah which were rejected by Muivah. Firstly, it was charged that Isak Swu with 29 others had flown to New Delhi to work out a settlement within Indian Union. The response of Muivah was that, Isak and the team were sent towards east for ‘some political missions’. The second charge was that Isak, Muivah and Hanong (minister in GPRN) were prepared to accept uncle Suisa’s proposal (that is to have a political settlement within the Indian Union). To this Muivah argued that they never had mediated uncle Suisa’s proposal either separately or together. To the third charge that Muivah was determined to eliminate Konyak and Pangmi national workers, Muivah said that he had never contemplated to hurt or displease or

eliminate Konyak and Pangmi national workers and then seize and lay arms at India's feet. The fourth charge was that Muivah wanted to oust Khaplang, promote himself as chairman and degrade chairman Isak to vice-chairmanship. Muivah termed Khaplang's charges a "sheer desperate concoction of pretext for his ulterior design."

As differences could not be patched up trouble was expected. But it came too early. In a pre-emptive strike, Muivah's group was attacked by Khaplang's men and Myanmarese troops at dawn on April 30, 1988. Myanmar troops and Khaplang who were warring groups, the Myanmar army smelling the differences between NSCN leaders attacked the underground headquarters after Khaplang's supporter's had gunned down several former colleagues and comrades. About 140 of Muivah's men mostly Tangkhuls were killed. Those killed included "Col." Ashiho Chaomai, deputy chief, Naga army with his two year son. Other important leaders killed included minister Hanong, Deputy minister Beyao, "Col." Pruning, Commander of CHQ, "Lt. Col." Luita Tanghkul, Section officer Stone, CHQ adjutant, Ramrak, etc., It was the worst ever internal clash. It was the bloodiest internal clash in the history of Naga insurgency. The incidents took place around areas near CHQ i.e. Taka, Kako and Lhasa areas.

230 people of Muivah's group which included women and children escaped to the Jungle. They faced food shortage. On the

other hand they were also chased by the Burmese forces. The survivors scattered in groups but many perished in the Jungle. Muivah with 33 others managed to join up with Isak Swu and started moving homeward to Nagaland. Further attacks reduced their numbers with finally Muivah and seven others reached the safety of the lower Konyak area. Some elements are said to have accused Khaplang and Tali (Dalley Mungro, his second-in-command) of having spread the canards about Muivah and Swu's "treachery" at the behest of Indian agents and some Konyak underground cadres who had been penetrated.²³

The massacre of the Muivah group was "a horrible setback to the Naga struggle for sovereignty" resulting in a vertical split into the Khaplang (Hemi and Konyak) and Muivah-Swu (Tangkhul-Sema) NSCN factions.²⁴

NSCN was built after the post-Shillong accord period. Very soon it was able to emerge as the most-well knit guerilla organisation. With its rise though the NNC-FGN continued, their influence waned. NSCN developed as the big brother of the different insurgent outfits in the North-East. It was able to survive the extreme military pressure of India and Myanmarese forces. But once it had to face the internal enemy in the form of egoism, misunderstanding, tribalism it started crumbling finally leading to the split. Once again tribalism along with clash of leadership, misunderstanding was to undo what Naga nationalism had done after years of toil and bloodshed.

NOTES

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CHAPTER III

Post-Shillong Accord: Naga Insurgency - II

The period that immediately followed the internal conflict in NSCN witnessed the split of NSCN into two groups. One group led by Isak and Muivah and the other by Khaplang. However, each group claiming to be the real both the groups expelled members of opposite group from their respective NSCN's. Thereafter regrouping of the organization through consolidation by establishing new base areas followed. Subsequently three important features were witnessed in the insurgent political scenario of Nagas. Firstly, Conglomerations of organisations came to be established on the concept of 'coordinated insurgency'. Secondly, there was raise of ethnic conflict in the form of Naga-Kuki clashes. Thirdly Naga political problem attracted attention at international forums such as Unrepresented Nations People's Organisation (UNPO).

In March 1988 the NSCN was split following sharp differences between vice-chairman S.S. Khaplang and General Secretary Thuingaleng Muivah. Muivah and his supporters were expelled from the region by Khaplang and his followers and they (Khaplang group) set up the headquarters at the place near the former CHQ with similar equipments and materials.¹

With the split in the NSCN, the first major task of the NSCN led by Isak and Muivah was to consolidate itself for which it needed

arms as well as money, and establishment of a new GHQ. Therefore they were compelled to relocate all its offices from Eastern Naga Hills (i.e. in Myanmar) where Khaplang was still dominant to South-eastern part of Nagaland bordering Manipur and Myanmar. NSCN (IM) set up their GHQ for the first time in Indian territory at Yang Khunao in Manipur near its border with Nagaland.² Soon after the split, they were actively engaged in massive recruitment drive and enrolled hundreds of youths mostly from Manipur's Ukhrul, Chandel and Senapati districts, all Naga inhabited areas in the rank and file of the NSCN (Isak and Muivah). Besides several Naga youths from Nagaland also joined the group.³ It was able to secure arms through an ambush of security party of CRPF on April 19, 1988 at Selungpham area in Manipur's Jamenglong district. It also secured eighty lakh rupees along with arms. Earlier it had secured arms through ambush of security post and looted a number of weapons along with ammunitions at Oinam in Manipur's Senapati district (before NSCN split by Muivah's supporters).

A national Hoho of the NSCN (IM) was convened and held at Jordan camp on 7th November 1989. The Hoho condemned S.S. Khaplang as national criminal and expelled him from the party once and for all. The Hoho on the other hand, re-affirmed the leadership of Isak Swu and Thuinglong Muivah.⁴

At present there are three Naga insurgent groups:

NSCN (IM) – This group has established itself as the most well-knit guerilla set up in North-East India. It has emerged as the most well organised of the insurgent groups. In Nagaland its main base is in the Sema dominated areas of Zunheboto, Dimapur, parts of Tuensang and Wokha districts. In Manipur, the NSCN (IM) is very active in Ukhrul district. It has also influence in Senapati, Tamenglong and Chandel districts. NSCN (IM) has its main base in southern Nagaland and Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur. It has the support of Tangkhuls, Semas, Changs and Aos.

Following its establishment of GHQ in the Indian territory at Yangkhunao in Manipur, when Assam Rifles busted the NSCN GHQ in August 1990, it was forced to set up its next GHQ at Palomi area in Nagaland. This too was rooted out in 1992 forcing it to set up camps in the Cachar district of Assam adjoining Nagaland and Manipur. NSCN (IM)'s strength is said to be over 3,000.

Isak Swu is the chairman of the NSCN (IM). Khodao Yanthan is the vice-chairman and Thuinlong Muivah is the General Secretary. As far as the Government of People's Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) an underground parallel government of NSCN (IM) is concerned Isak Swu is the Yaruiwo (President), Khodao Yanthan, the Washino Yaruiwo (vice president), and Thuiglang Muivah the Ato-Kilonser (Prime Minister). Angelus Shimray is the Alee Kilonser (Foreign Minister), A.Z. Jami Lotha is the Minister for Law and Justice, Rh. Raisang the Kilo-Kilosner (Home Minister), Quebeve Quishi Swu the Chaplee Kilonser (Finance Minister).

As far as the armed wing is concerned Loagwipu (commander-in-chief) is Brigadier Atem. Deputy commander-in-chief Hagnshi Tangkhul was arrested recently. There are over 10 battalions in the N.S.C.N. (I.M) with a strength of between 200-250 in each battalion. They are Zasiaboto battalion at Zunheboto, Hevuto Sumi battalion at Dimapur, security task force (STF) battalion at Intanki, Ashiho Chaoma battalion at Ukhrul (Manipur), Vephotso Chakesang battalion for Kohima and Phek district at Kohima, Jacob Tangkhul battalion, Nagamping Zealingrong battalion, Mao battalion, GH Q battalion etc.

The NSCN (IM) has close links with other insurgent groups in the North-east, that includes Revolutionary Joint Committee (RJC) that consists of three insurgent groups of Manipur namely People's Liberation Army (PLA), People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), Bodo Security Force (BDSF) and Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF) of Assam, Hmar People's Convention (HPC) of Mizoram and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) of Tripura. It benefits from its links with ULFA and HPC as the latter helps in overcoming all difficulties in return for their insurgent training by the NSCN. The NSCN has spread its influence across the southern belt of Assam. Here it has established training and co-operation programmes with ULFA and HPC.

N.S.C.N.(Khaplang) – While the N.S.C.N. (IM) has its main base in southern Nagaland and Naga inhabited areas of Manipur, N.S.C.N (K)'s presence is in the northern part of Nagaland. The Khaplang group is supported by Konyaks of both India and Myanmar, the Pangmeis and Hemis of Myanmar, Aos of Mokakchung district and Yimchungers of Tuensang district, pachuris of Phek district and sections of Semas and Lothas. The strength of this group is said to be around 1,500. In terms of potential this group is far inferior to NSCN(IM). Areawise its influence extends to whole Mon district, Eastern Nagas in Myanmar, part of Tuensang district, part of Dimapur town, Mokakchung town, western and northern Angami district in Kohima district and parts of Zunheboto and few pockets of Phek district. Its propaganda and operational activities are confined.

S.S. Khaplang (a Hemi Naga of Myanmar) is the chairman of the NSCN(K) Dally Mungro (an Ao) is the General secretary. In the GPRN Khaplang is the Yaruiwo (President) and Dally Mungro the Ato Kilonser (the Prime-Minister). Their armed Force is headed by commander-in-chief Khole Konyak.

NSCN(K) has strong links with ULFA of Assam, United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and to some extent People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur. It has also links with United People's Volunteers of Arunachal Pradesh (UPVA) and Achik Liberation Matgrik Army (now defunct) of Arunchal Pradesh, Kachin independence Army (KIA) of Myanmar but which has now

come to terms with State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) Government in Myanmar.

NNC/FGN – With the death of Phizoh in 1990 the NNC has got divided into two factions namely NNC (Adino) and NNC (Khodao Yanthan). However Khodao went on to recognise the NSCN(IM) as the only true group protecting Naga interests. He condemned the Shillong accord. He joined the NSCN (IM) and was accommodated in it as Vice-President. Hence now there is only one NNC/FGN. However it is losing its influence and its influence is very limited. The FGN is generally dominated by Khemungans with influence over areas in Tuensang district adjacent to Myanmar-India border. It enjoys limited influence in Phek and Kohima district. Its president is Ms. Adino Phizoh daughter of A.Z. Phizo. Its strength was estimated to be around 300. Their activities included procurement of supply for their cadres in Myanmar, small scale extortions, tax collections. Their efforts seem to be to keep the cause of independence alive by making appeals to various human rights organisations.

Funds – The Naga rebels have devised an elaborate system of ‘tax collections’ in their areas of influence. Funds are collected through the village headman openly. Money is also raised from the Government servants and there are instances of departmental heads making payments to the insurgents. Ordinary families in Nagaland are said to have been paying atleast Rupees. 200 annually, the rates for others have varied from Rs. 500 for

Government officials to Rs. 50,000 for industrialists. Funds for the rebels also come from sympathisers⁵ in different political parties including regional groups and even the Congress Party. Collections have been even made from police officials, educational institutions, Government Media organisations, tea gardens. Extortions are made from transport agencies that operate in their areas of influence. Trucks that pass through their areas of influence are to pay an annual tax. On the payment a receipt is issued on behalf of the Ministry of revenue of the particular underground organisation collecting them. Lottery money is also said to have been diverted for the purpose of funding.

In recent years NSCN-IM has emerged as the strongest section of the militant Naga nationalist movement.⁶ It has become the main spring of all the North-eastern insurgency movements. In the capital town Kohima, the NSCN(I.M.) has infiltrated everywhere. It has informants in the police force, political spheres, sympathisers in the press and other important and strategic places.⁷

The character of the insurgency has changed over the past few years. What was a pre-dominantly rural-based guerilla movement has come to town. Earlier it was confined to wooded areas. NSCN(M) has mastered urban insurgency by infiltrating urban areas. Of late it has spread its tentacles in Kohima, Zunheboto and Mokakchung districts in Nagaland. Though there is

a large overground this has been penetrated at the political, administrative and intellectual levels.⁸

Over the years one observes that the struggles led by organisation like NSCN have changed character from mass based insurgent movement to one which is increasingly taking to political terrorism.⁹ The honour and dignity shown by earlier rebels of not picking innocent targets has been discarded and guerillas have turned on one another and on unarmed men.¹⁰

Following allegations of links with ULFA, the Union Home Ministry banned NSCN in 1990. Earlier attempt had been made on the life of Chief Minister S.C. Jamir. On September 23, 1992, Charlie Kevichusa, a top Naga leader was shot dead at Dimapur. He was president at Nagaland People's Council (NPC) who severed his links with the party and formed Democratic labour party.

The tactic of the NSCN(M) has been to gain the ground in Nagaland on the one hand and to internationalise the issue. Muivah preferred to first unite all Naga tribes and chiefly the Konyak and the Ao tribes which were at present opposed to the Sema and the Tangkhul tribes.

The Naga rebellion was undergoing (has undergone) an unmistakable metamorphosis. From a well oiled fighting machine, it was turning into a ground of antagonistic factions which were used against each other by local politicians in order to settle rivalries, armed factions have been set upon specific targets.¹¹

Underground-Overground Connection – Despite being perennially splintered insurgency movement in the region tends to thrive on political patronage. There seems to be a symbiotic relationship between politicians and militants both drawing strength from each other. Strong allegations have been made about both NSCN factions enjoying political patronage at the highest levels. NSCN (IM) which is led by Tangkhuls of Manipur is said to have the backing of Manipur Chief Minister Rishang Keishing. S.C. Jamir's name has been linked up with Khaplang's group. Former chief minister Vamuzo was accused of supporting NNC.¹²

No ministry can aspire to survive without the clandestine support of powerful group of militants. There has been gainful understanding between the ministers and militants, politicians and insurgents. Politicians of all parties keep the insurgent groups alive to strengthen their own position vis-à-vis the centre. People seem to be getting increasingly disillusioned with continuing insurgency though there are strong vested interests at all levels to keep the status-quo-alive. Today, the required amount of insurgent activity is being carried out in a way that suits the politician and the contractor. If there is no insurgency, the huge funds pounded into the region would dry up. These funds largely not subject to audit go to line the pockets of the main 'players' in the industry. It has been said that no body, right from the centre to the state to the insurgent at the ground level, wants the insurgency to end.¹³

Formation of Conglomerations- One of the features of the insurgent political scenario in the 1980s was the evolution of the

idea that in order to confront a “common enemy” there is a need for a “United Front”. Though this concept of “United Front” could not take shape, there existed co-ordination between different insurgent groups in North-east. However, it was in the late 80’s and 90’s that conglomerations of insurgent activities came to be established. “Revolutionary United Front” was formed by NSCN(K) in 1989. Other groups in it included are ULFA of Assam, PREPAK, PLA of Manipur and TNV of Tripura. This however could not take off. “Revolutionary Joint Committee” (RJC) was established to co-ordinate insurgent activities in Manipur by three outfits namely PLA, PREPAK and KCP.

However, the breakthrough came in the middle of 1990. Around the middle of 1990, the underground leaders in the North-eastern region of India had realised that the time had come to “gather”. They decided to join hands with “all the like minded revolutionaries in the region”. It was mainly because of this new trend that the Indo-Burma revolutionary Front (IBRF) was formed on 22 May 1990 by the NSCN(K), UNLF and ULFA. The IBRF’s main intention was to “build up a united struggle for independence of Indo-Myanmar.” This it was said to be against the colonial rule of Delhi and Rangoon. “So far, the long struggles for national independence of various ethnic groups in the region have not been able to make much headway, “said the declaration jointly signed by the NSCN(K) chariman S.S. Khaplang, ULFA chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa and UNLF General Secretary Sana Yaima.¹⁴ On the occasion, the formation of this front was described to be of “historic

necessity.” A statement of the GPRN of NSCN(K) said that “From our armed struggle for over thirty years and the frailty of Indo-Burma we must realise that a united struggle of all the nationalities of the region is necessary in order to defeat the common enemy”. A 1992 IBRF statement declared that “IBRF shall never compromise on the question of sovereignty and independence”. It extended invitation “to all other revolutionary forces in the region to join the IBRF and for” achieving their “common goal”.

Although the three IBRF constituents had not been as active as the NSCN(IM) in Manipur and Nagaland region, the formation of IBRF has caused “considerable” anxieties as it appears that the IBRF is determined to build up a united struggle of all the nationalities in Indo-Burma. The chairman of the IBRF is S.S. Khaplang, A. Rajkhowa the vice-chairman and Sana Yaima the General Secretary.

NSCN(IM) setup a parrallel organisation known as “Self-Defence United Front of South-East Himalayan Region” (SDUFSEHR). It was established in a joint meeting convened by Muivah, General Secretary, NSCN in November 1994, to fight and resist “Indian expansionism”, and Indian “State terrorism against south-east Himalayan region.” They also pledged “to stand up against Indian occupation of the region until people are set free”.¹⁵ It was to fight against “Indianisation of indigenous people’s” through methods interalia “the policy of allowing massive influx of

Indian nationals in the region". The insurgents believe that the region is under "Forced Indian occupation since 1947" and the people of these regions therefore had no option but to fight against "Indian domination, exploitation, assimilation and suppression".¹⁶

The different groups that signed the declaration included leaders of Kanglei Yawal Kanna Lup (KYKL) of Manipur, Hyneirutrap A'Chick Liberation Council (HALC) of Meghalaya, National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) of Tripura, Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) of Assam, Hmar People's Convention (HPC) of Mizoram and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) of Assam.¹⁷ This conglomeration supports the "Freedom Struggle" of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, Khalistan and the other movements that of Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Gorkhaland. Muivah is the Chairman of this conglomeration.

Another Major development in Naga insurgency in the 90's has been that "the movement for Naga nationalism has entered the arena of international forums." NSCN (IM) met the UN-Sub-Commission on human rights at Geneva in August 1992 and managed to get membership of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) in January 1993. The NSCN (M) has been able to internationalise its cause by opening its offices in a number of countries in South-east Asia, Europe and North-America by getting membership in UNPO, a non-Government organisation based in the Hague a parallel organisation of UN. NSCN (M) has attended a number of international conferences and addressed its case. It has been attending UN conference on

indigenous people at Geneva, UNPO conferences UN Sub-Commission of the prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities.

In these conferences it has been raising issues such as right violation, assimilation policies of India and Myanmar, influx of outsiders and economic exploitation of the Nagas etc and arguing its own case of an independent Nagaland. UNPO conference of 1995 adopted a resolution supporting "the struggle of the Naga people in their resistance against invasion". United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1995 acknowledged the human rights situation in Nagaland and appealed the "Sub-commission on prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities to send a Fact finding mission to Nagaland to see the conditions there in the right perspective."

NSCN (M) has opened offices at Bangkok and Geneva. It has retained a public-relations firm "Caxton publicity limited", based in Kent U.K., to handle its publicity and lobbying in various international forums to educate the "international fora" about the independence struggle waged so that it can attract attention of international organisations¹⁸ towards the repression by the Indian Government on the Nagas.

Naga-Kuki Conflict:

Another dimension that has emerged in the 90's has been the emergence of ethnic conflict in the form of Naga-Kuki clashes and its use as a Insurgency and counter Insurgency Strategy.

By late 1992, the NSCN (M) had established itself as the most powerful guerilla set up in the North-east India. The trouble started with Kukis not willing to pay loyalty tax to NSCN (M) at Moreh. On June 3, 1992, on Khalet, Hao Kip, a Kuki tribesman was killed in a shoot out between the Kuki National Army (KNA) and NSCN (M) near Moreh town. The KNA claimed that he was KNA volunteer. After the incident many Nagas living in and around Moreh town are said to have been abducted and tortured by the KNA. The Naga-Kuki feud is not new but has traditional, historical and geographical factors. The Kukis in Manipur and Nagaland migrated hundreds of years ago from their homelands and have been regarded with suspicion for long by ethnic Nagas, who see them as land grabbers and outsiders.

The trouble erupted first in 1987 with a new outfit, the KNA, demanding an autonomous State in Myanmar. This group is based in Myanmar. But the Nagas were troubled and suspicious and even more so when another group, the Kuki National Front (KNF) demanded a Kukiland comprising parts of Manipur and Myanmar. In turn, the NSCN of Thuingaleng Muivah called for a "Greater Nagaland" comprising 'Eastern Nagaland' in Myanmar as well as parts of Manipur and the present state of Nagaland.¹⁹ KNF developed a striking arm Kuki National Army (KNA) which decided to take on the NSCN (M). The NSCN said that the Kukis were in league with the State and Central Governments and planned to drive out Nagas out of their native lands.²⁰

The KNA is backed by Kukis in Manipur bureaucracy and by Congress leaders from the State. They see it as a way of undermining the growing Naga influence in the State's politics and also of hitting at Muivah. The Myanmar Government which is inimical to the Kukis because of their demand for a state, is apparently prepared to go easy on Muivah's bases, indirectly helping the NSCN. This has enabled the NSCN to re-organise movement of its forces between Bangladesh and Myanmar after years of pressure followed its break with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).²¹

The NSCN accuses Kukis of assisting Indian troops, especially members of the paramilitary Assam rifles, with information about their movements and bases.²² It is also alleged that "the army and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) are using the Kuki militants in their counter insurgency against NSCN (M)."²³ According to another version, other than ethnic rivalry, the struggle between the KNA and the NSCN (M) has a great deal to do with the control over Moreh, a trading town located on Indo-Myanmar border which has proved to be lucrative for smuggling and hence which ever group has access, will have ready access to cash and other facilities to carry out insurgency. However this is said to be only a propaganda. Whatever, it may be, but it is true that antagonism with the Kukis has strengthened the NSCN(M).

Peace Talks -

The latest initiative for peace talks came when Deve Gowda the then Prime minister in his trip to North East during October 1996 made an offer for in conditional talks to all the underground elements in the North-East. NSCN(M) responded to the call. Three terms of understanding were reached between the government of India and the NSCN (M). They were (1) the talks shall be unconditional from both sides; (2) at the highest level; that is at the Prime minister level; (3) the venue of the talks shall be anywhere in the world, outside India.

Cease-fire has been in operation since August 1, 1997. The problem that came up was that in any sort of possible 'political settlement' whether only NSCN (M) should involve or all the underground groups i.e. NSCN (M), NSCN (K) and NNC should unite. Naga Hoho an apex body of NGO's and tribal bodies, Church leaders and women's groups have urged all the underground groups to unite particularly considering the fact that in the past agreements entered with particular sections of the underground had never brought peace. However this seems unlikely since sharp political differences exist between the underground groups. Muivah, in an interview recently said that "there cannot be unity between revolutionaries and traitors" (referring to Khaplang). Khaplang too has refused to sit down for talks along with the Muivah faction.

To sum up, the period that followed the split in the NSCN, the faction led by Isak and Muivah emerged as the most well-knit guerilla organisation in the North-east. Under the NSCN (I-M), the Naga issue entered the international forums as it was raised at conferences of Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO), UN Conference on indigenous people etc., In line with their policy of "United Front", both the NSCN factions formed Conglomerations of insurgent outfits. While Khaplang formed Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF), Muivah Formed Self-Defence United Front of South-East Himalayan Region (SDUFSEHR). A new dimension was added to Naga insurgency due to ethnic clashes between the Nagas and the Kukis. While the Nagas accused the Kuki militants being propped up by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Manipur establishment for its counter-insurgency against NSCN (M), the Naga-Kuki clashes to some extent helped in the consolidation process of NSCN (M). As it was being recognised, that military solution cannot prove to be an answer to the insurgency problem, an offer for unconditional talks was made by Deve Gowda, the then Prime Minister. NSCN (M) accepted the offer and entered into a dialogue with the Government.

NOTES

1. Phanjoubam Tarapot., *The Nagas Rebel and Insurgency in the North East* (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House ltd., 1996), p. 53.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 130-31.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
4. Tajem Ao., *British Occupation of Naga country* (Mokakchung, Naga literature society, 1995) p. 306.
5. Prakash Singh., *Nagaland*, (New Delhi, National Book Trust, 1995), p. 182.
6. Gam Shimray and other., *An introduction to the ethnic problem in Manipur* (New Delhi, Solidarity group in support of the restoration of civil and democratic rights in the North-East n.d.), p. 11.
7. Kiranshankar Maitra, *The Nagas rebel and Insurgency in the North-East*, (New Delhi, Vikas publishing house pvt. Ltd., 1998), p. 181.
8. B.G.Vergheese *India's North-East resurgent: Ethnicity, insurgency, Governance, and Development*, (New Delhi, Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1997), p. 98.
9. Mentabuddin Ahemd., *The turbulent North-East* (New Delhi, Akbar Publications, 1996), p. 118.
10. Sanjay Hazarika., *Strangers of the Mist: Tales of war and peace from India's North-East*, (New Delhi, Viking, 1994), p. 240.
11. *Ibid.*,
12. For details See B.G. Vergheese *Op.cit*, pp. 104-5, Newstime 13 April 1995.
13. For details See Indian Express 2nd September 1994.
14. Tarapot., *Op.cit*, p. 69.
15. Maitra., *Op.cit*, p. 183.
16. Pakem., ed., *Insurgency in North-East India* (New Delhi, Omsons Publications, 1997), p. 322.
17. Maitra., *Op.cit*, p. 184.
18. *Ibid.*,
19. Hazarika., *Op.cit*, p. 243.
20. *Ibid.*,

21. *Ibid.*, p. 244.

22. *Ibid.*,

23. Shimray., *Op.cit*, p.16.

CHAPTER-IV

Post-Shillong Accord: Naga Insurgency-Analysis

Since the inception of Naga insurgency, certain strategies have been adopted to deal with this phenomenon. These strategies have been adopted taking into account only the external manifestations of the problem. And in the process, the very basis of the problem that is the ethnic basis has been neglected. It is the contention of the chapter that the failure of the nation-building model adopted in post-independence period which failed to resolve the ethnic-nationality question has given rise to Naga insurgency. And before going into that an attempt has been made to take a critical look at the theories of political violence. In the end, consequences of the strategies adopted to counter Naga insurgency flowing from nation-building model on the Naga Society has been made.

Insurgency today has become a world wide phenomenon, more than true to the sensitive part of the North Eastern region. In its general usage an insurgent is defined as a person who rises in active revolt, and insurgency is thus an uprising or a rebellion. In over 50 countries that have had to face this type of warfare, insurgency has been described in various terms, depending upon the complexion and intensity. Insurgency is a complex politico-military process whose content and meaning are susceptible to varying interpretations on account of changing environment,

sudden developments, and the polemical requirements of the forces involved.¹ Some of the terminologies used are the insurrection, popular warfare, partisan war, people's war, revolutionary warfare and uprising.

V.K. Anand gives the most acceptable definition of Insurgency. According to him, "Insurgency is an extra-constitutional, competitively progressive and variegated struggle launched against the incumbent authority by the consciously mobilized sections of indigenous masses for the fulfillment of certain conceptual goals."² Therefore on all accounts it alludes to the efforts by an organized and indigenous group, using protracted irregular warfare to obtain political goals.

Insurgency requires support and sympathy of a sizeable section of the population in varying degrees of shifting intensity on some grounds which the concerned population consider to be rooted in social ethics of one order or the other.³ One difference has to be noted between insurgency and terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic of violence used by small groups that fail to become a mass movement or move the masses.⁴ On the other hand, insurgency is a phenomenon that has a mass base. However, it is not to deny, that certain of its acts can be terroristic.

All insurgencies have a cause, whether it is genuine, imaginary or aggravated by various factors. The "cause" must find favour with a majority of the population. Economic and social

discrimination are important causes, apart from political neglect. Sometimes a number of these causes can act in concert to heighten the level of disenchantment. Insurgency can also have an ethnic and/or regional basis as the case of Naga insurgency and the other insurgencies in the North-East.

Unresolved contradictions of class, ethnicity, nationality and of social stratification could singly together be a cause of revolt. It is when groups feel aggrieved and oppressed and cannot achieve their aims by peaceful means, and also when the resultant resentment become more widespread and better organized a situation of insurgency may arise. Apart from the social, psychological factors are equally important and contribute to revolt.

There are a number of theories which try to explain the causes of revolt. Some of them take into consideration psychological dimension, international factors etc.

Relative Deprivation Theory:-

Relative deprivation is the most important of the psychological theories. It is a theory which tries to explain why people resort to political violence. T.D. Gurr is the most prominent of the relative deprivation theorists. In his colossal study "Why Men Rebel," Gurr tries to explain why civil conflict or political violence takes place. This he explains through the concept of relative deprivation.

The standard definition of Relative deprivation as offered by Gurr is as follows:-

... the necessary condition for violent civil conflict is Relative deprivation, defined as actors perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they're justifiably entitled. The deference of value capabilities are to be found largely in the social and physical environment : they are the conditions that determine people's perceived chances of getting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain.⁵ ”

The definition flows from the frustration-aggression hypothesis which states that the occurrence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression. Thus, just as people are likely to react in an aggressive manner when they feel frustrated, the occurrence of civil violence pre-supposes the likelihood of relative deprivation among substantial members of individuals in a society; concomitantly the more severe is Relative deprivation, the greater are the likelihood and intensity of civil violence.⁶

When this definition is extended to ethnic question then it is the feeling of being relatively deprived among ethnic groups which gives rise to mobilization on ethnic lines, other cultural symbols and resort to political violence. According to Ted Gurr and Harff ethnic groups have low social stratification. The middle

class in it assumes leadership. It struggles for power. For purposes of power it uses cultural symbols.

Gurr applies this to four case studies, viz, Turks in Germany, Kurds in Turkey, Chinese in Malaya and Indian in Nicaragua. He recognises that the success of a ethno political conflict depends upon international factors, viz standing of the state in international relations, and, further in the advancement of the democratic process.⁷

International Factor -

According to some, the prime mover of an insurgency movement is external support i.e. through arms, ammunition, explosives, training-including camps, funds, moral and political support for the ideology of the insurgents. Karl Deutsch, Thornton, Clare Sterling, Michael T.Klarke, Donald K. Hanley, Afsir, Marwah, Maheswari, Mriganka, Stohl, Anand and Ralph Peter⁸ subscribe to this view. It is pointed out that the use of a large number of small and medium weapons by the ethnic groups, the requiring of huge financial requirement for substance and mass-media exposure to their point of view cannot be explained, except in terms of external powers.⁹

It is pointed out that the external power have resorted to warfare through other means, i.e., support the ethnic groups against the state to "destabilize" it. It is said that the border States or regions of a country are most susceptible to insurgency and

propaganda instigated by an adversary. In the case of insurgency in North-East and Nagaland in particular it is pointed out to the theory of three C's .i.e. 'the theory of colonial conspiracy; 'the theory of Communist conspiracy in reference to China and even 'the theory of Christian conspiracy' by extreme right wing elements. With regard to the question of external factor according to A.S. Narang it should be noted that external factor can only provide sustenance and a moral boost to ethnicity. It cannot be in itself the main cause for its origin and existence. This arises from within the society and polity and has to be located into with reference to specific realities.¹⁰

Failure of the Nation Building Model:-

According to Narang (*Ethnic identities and Federalism, 1993*) 75% of the political conflicts in the world today are said to have an ethnic basis. Out of these some are resorting to insurgency. The rise of ethnicity all over the world during the post-second world war period points out that there is some very serious flaw in the present nation-building model. This is also true in the case of India. Hence it is necessary to take a look at the Nation-building model.

It was pointed out in the introduction that the model of nation-building adopted in post-independent India stressed on homogenization. It stressed the need to create a homogenous national political community. The very fact that a state may

contain within its boundaries a number of culturally distinctive identities was ignored. According to Talukdar the emphasis on homogenization "led to an attempt at subordinating certain social, cultural and ethnic identities to a broader and more general national identity. Replacing primordial loyalties with national ones assumed significance as a way of fostering stability and order."¹¹

Talukdar states that the overriding concern for building a monolithic nation meant intolerance for plurality. This was a discernible underlying perspective of incorporating the minority and peripheral ethnic groups into the so-called socio-cultural mainstream. In the fond hope of building a nation-state a large number of peoples, their cultures and value systems were ignored and the culture and values of the dominant communities were relentlessly pursued as mainstream culture. The notion of a composite nation and the composite culture got a back seat and no attempt was made to make all the cultures of the country common heritage.¹²

The model of nation-building failed to take note of the fact that a state may consist of several nationalities. According to Sajal Nag, the nationality formation process in India has been reflected itself in many ways in the growth of respective vernacular literature, agitation to establish particular areas, movement of backward nationalities to break away from an advanced nationality and earn recognition for themselves, the movement of a particular nationality and group, which has separated from parent nationality

and was living amidst a different cultural group as a result of administrative unitisation and movements of groups that are still at a tribal stage of development but have struggled against the exploitation and encroachment of outsiders to have a province of their own to minimize exploitation and encroachment.¹³

Coming to the context of North-East, according to John Samuel, the different phases of nationality formation in this region maybe broadly classified into four categories (a) well formed nationalities like Assamiya, Bengalee, and Manipuri with their own linguistic, literary and cultural base, (b) emerging nationalities like Mizo, Tripuri, Naga and Khasi-Garo, with different socio-cultural and political identities moving through different phases of nationality formation, (c) Sub-nationalism of satellite nationalities like Bodo, Hmar, Lakher etc., which normally develop in the shadow of surrounding nationalities, and (d) around 30 ethno-linguistic communities of Arunachal Pradesh, with their own distinctive languages and dialects and varied ethnic affiliations.¹⁴

Talukdar further states that the policies flowing from the nation-building model, do not provide a mechanism for gaining the confidence of hitherto neglected smaller nationalities and to restore their self-respect, and the government's technocratic and paternalistic programs are often cited as its concern for these so-called "little traditions". These programs are imposed upon the so-called beneficiaries without their consent or participation. They greatly ignore North-East who value their traditions and love their lands. They ignore their pride and preference for their internal self

determination. The programmes for socio-economic development and pumping in large amounts of money, thought to be an effective instrument of assimilation produced unbearable stress on the social fabric disturbing the age old equilibrium in the tribal societies in Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram or even equilibrium in the tribal societies in Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram or even Arunachal Pradesh.¹⁵

This gave rise to a strong resentment among a section of them. The sudden socio-cultural changes occurring in these societies disturbed the traditional tribal social and political equations. Thus the integrative and assimilative efforts pursued through modern developmental activities of the North-East became counter-productive. In spite of the protection professed by the constitution and the special provisions in the sixth schedule, land use pattern is fast changing and the concept of private ownership of land is fast replacing community ownership in the tribal areas of the North-East. Despite restrictions, affluent non-tribals are increasingly exploiting tribals and alienating tribal lands in their areas. The cumulative effect of all these is a creation of strong apprehension in the minds of the tribal population for loss of identity and culture. This gave rise to a spurt of ethnic movements in the North-Eastern region giving rise to a new political process.¹⁶

Ethnic movements in the North-East are mainly directed towards the recuperation of traditional rights maintaining their traditional right and maintaining their legitimate cultural, social,

linguistic and political rights. They are not products of parochialisation of social consciousness but a product of long years of political neglect, discrimination and misunderstanding and the consequence of an ill chosen strategy of development and nation-building which could not meet the requirements of a plural society like India.¹⁷

Hence ethnic movements in North-east India are the products of the homogenizing trend through the various policies that were followed during last five decades. They represent a defence mechanism by the ethnic groups against the assimilative policies threatening their identity from the culture of the dominant groups. Due to the unfit model of nation building any assertion on their part is viewed as law and order problem, considered as a threat to national integrity and viewed with suspicion. Due to the unsuitable model, they are dismissed as either a trivial matter or otherwise military strategy is resorted to viewing it as a law and order problem. Due to the short-sightedness of the nation-building process, many have resorted to adopt extra-legal options like insurgency. This is the case even with that of Naga problem. Having originated before independence, no serious attempt was made to find a political solution to it.

Strategies of Counter-Insurgency

Certain strategies were adopted to deal with the Naga insurgency. Political, military and economic strategies were

adopted. But these strategies instead of solving the Naga problem created more implications on the Naga society. This was because the very strategies adopted to deal with Naga insurgency flowed from the flawed model of nation-building.

By 1970 India developed a two pronged strategy to fight insurgents-(1) pour huge money to soften Nagas so that they become too comfortable to fight in the jungle again. (2) to keep the presence on politically and with the armed troops, so that the options of continuing the fight or joining the political process become starker.¹⁸

The results of the vast amounts of funds coming into Naga hills was staggering. It led to the break up of the fabric of society ,especially in the towns.¹⁹ It has promoted a 'get-rich-quick' attitude. Drug and alcohol abuse have become rampant, AIDS is growing as a menace not merely because of sexual promiscuity but because infected needles are used for injecting heroin.²⁰ A nouveau rich culture of sex and violence, drugs and music, bribery and corruption has come into existence. A new elite comprising politician, bureaucrats and contractor has come into being. Astronomical sums of money provided for development, find their way into the pockets of this elite.

In spite of the huge pumping of the money, there has hardly been any concrete achievement on the ground. The noted columnist Kuldip Nayar, has estimated that the centre has spent

about Rs 30,000 crore in Nagaland alone during 25 years. For a population of 12 Lakhs that means a colossal of Rupees 25 lakh per person on average. And considering the frugal life styles of the majority of Nagas that can only mean massive corruption at the upper echelons of the administration. It is a widely held view in the state that the liberal funds poured into the state by the Centre are a deliberate effort to corrupt their youth. Despite large outlays, there has been no effective monitoring of the channelisation of the money into constructive projects.

The economic policies and development programmes has led to fear of marginalisation and ultimately the threat of gradual disappearance of these nationalities or communities. Traders from outside the state have established their monopoly over business in the region and most of the consumer goods and food products are transported from the plains. The local Naga population is divorced from the commercial aspects of business as a result of which they are unable to profit fully from their enterprises. The system of trade and transportation are in the hands of those who have no social connection with or concern for the local Naga population.

The Naga movement was primarily treated as “law and order” problem. Several draconian laws were enacted and imposed in these areas with the aim of containing “insurgency”. Army has been given enormous powers under these laws. They include the Assam Maintenance of Public Order(Autonomous Districts) Act, 1953 which was introduced to enable the Assam armed police and

Assam Rifles, to execute their tasks unabated and openly, without legal constraints. Armed Forces(special powers) Act,1972 was extended to the whole of Nagaland in April, 1995 and the whole state was declared a "Disturbed Area".

The declaration of any area as 'Disturbed' is only ostensibly in aid of civil administration. However the armed forces are not responsible or accountable to the civil powers and act above the authority of the civil powers.

With the militarisation of Nagaland and extensive powers extended to the security forces several kind of human rights violations have taken place. Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) was formed on 9th September 1978 in response to the Naga people's long need for an organized movements to protect and further their human rights. Several kinds of human rights violation are identified by NPMHR. They are :- (1) Execution in public (2) Mass raping of both men and women (3) Deforming sex organ (4) motivating men and women (5) Electric shocks (6) Puncturing eyes (7) Hanging people upside down (8) Putting people in smoke filled rooms (9) Burning of village granaries and crops (10) Forced starvation and labour (11)Indiscriminate firing and bombing into civil residential areas etc.²¹

According to some Human rights organisations the militarisation of the region had its deep impact in civil society. The security forces in Nagaland have ravaged the physical, mental and emotional health of the people, they say. Permanent scars

and maiming, mental imbalance and psychological trauma are the fallout of army operations in this region according to some of them.²² They predicted that if this current state of affair continues, the future generation will not grow up to be normal. Most youngsters have 'black and white dreams' rather than 'colour dreams' disturbed sleep or insomnia. Any sudden noise, even the bursting of a balloon is enough to make them nervous.²³ Psychologists must confirm this, though.

Horam in his book (*Naga Insurgency: the last thirty years, 1988*) points out that in order to contain insurgency and to cut off their support base of underground "Village re-groupings" were followed and "collective fines" imposed. The entire operations were based on mistrust and vengeance and the Nagas recalled in naive manner. Villages were brutally broken up and regrouped the people of different villages together bringing complete strangers into new groupings. This policy prevented on the one hand to help the underground with food shelter etc., the village re-grouping policy destroyed the village unit and the tribal council and the very pattern of economy was changed.

As regards the political strategy to contain insurgency, it has been centred around winning over a section of the insurgent leadership and what has been described as 'divide and rule' policy. This kind of "divide and rule" policy has at times encouraged even ethnic clashes as in the case such as Naga -Kuki clashes (though the reason for the origin of clashes is different.) The problem of North-East lie in the failure of the ruling elites of India to recognize

and understand the culturally distinctiveness of the people of this region from others. The cultural distinctiveness of the North-East and unequal relationship of the two unequal interlocutors sought to be resolved through the principle of co-option (integration) of a section in the democratic model.

The policy of the Government of India to solve the Naga insurgency problem has failed. Military solution has failed because of the popular support for the issues raised by militants. Political solution has failed because the strategy has been revealed around winning over a section of the insurgent leadership (no matter how corrupt and inefficient it may be).

To conclude, the cause of Naga insurgency was a result of the nation-building model adopted in post-independence period which failed to take into consideration the ethnic/ nationality aspiration of the Nagas and could not accommodate them under the present model of nation-building. The homogenizing tendency of this model threatened the culture, created fears of eventual submersion. When the present model of nation-building model could not accommodate the ethnic aspiration of the Nagas through the normal means and could not gain their confidence, it eventually gave rise to Naga insurgency. But the political elite in India failed to recognise this and followed strategies to deal with the Naga insurgency which flowed from the flawed nation building model. As it flowed from the flawed model, the strategies for dealing with the insurgency failed. On the other hand it created more implications in Naga society.

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20. Ibid.
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CONCLUSION

Among the two models of nation- building the one stressing homogenization and the other stressing heterogenisation, the former is the dominant one. It has been accepted by most of the states including India. But this model proved to be a misfit model as those nations that adopted this model saw the rise of ethnic movements including India. In the Northeastern part of India, there was rise of ethnic movements some even resorting to insurgency, Naga insurgency being one of them.

The earliest known history of the Nagas began with the Ahom rule. Naga relations with the Ahoms was based on hostility and friendship. Towards the beginning of the 19th century Ahom rule declined and British established themselves. Britishers, who initially carried out military expedition, later gave it up by a policy of non-interference and finally started extending their administration resulting in the formation of Naga hills district in 1881.

Under the British administration the break up of the tribal society and formation of feudal relationships of production did not take place as the tribal pattern of administration and land tenure system based on communal ownership was not disturbed. However, with the introduction of Currency, Christianity and mainly education a middle class started emerging in the Naga society.

Outlook of Nagas began to change. Under the impact of the First World War, a new consciousness that their outlook should go beyond clan, village and tribe emerged. Naga club was formed in 1918. In 1929, it requested the Simon commission to exclude them from the proposed reforms. The Second World War which was fought in the Naga hills brought a political awakening in them. The importance of Naga unity was recognized and Naga nationalism born.

Naga national council (NNC) which was formed in 1946, introduced the concept of Naga nationhood. Initially it stood for solidarity of the Nagas and their inclusion as a province in Assam. It rejected the 'crown policy' of the British. It demanded an interim Government for ten years and expressed the ethnic apprehension of being wiped out. With the Hydari agreement in 1947, the extremist section gained an edge. As no proper understanding was reached, NNC declared independence on 14th August, 1947. With the entry of Phizoh NNC leaned more towards extremism.

In their zeal with the nation-building model, the Indian Political elite remained blind to the ethnic fears of Nagas and started making arrogant claims. As a result due to India's hard approach and arrests and raids on NNC members, the distrust perpetuated. And this resulted in the formation of an Underground Government in 1954. A formidable organization with President, Prime minister, ministers,

guerilla wing and mass organizations of women and youth was started. Naga insurgency began.

Schism occurred in the NNC with moderates resigning from the organisation. Due to intense political activity there was polarization between the extremists and moderates. This moderate section was encouraged as their initial demand for the formation of Naga Hills Tuensang area (NHT) and later demand for formation of state was accepted. Overground section came into being.

By 1963, NNC became active. It had established contacts with Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Eastern Naga Revolutionary Council (ENRC) insurgent group of Myanmar. As a result of NNC activity, Disturbance Act was imposed and re-grouping of villages and Army patrolling began. A peace mission was formed and ceasefire was arrived at between the Government of India and the NNC in 1964 to create conducive atmosphere for peace. There were six rounds of secretary level meetings at the prime-minister level. The talks failed.

With the return of the underground drastic changes shook it. Professional, tribal and ideological rivalry brought division within the NNC. Semas who had come to occupy the top leadership posts after the exit of Phizo, their hegemony was destroyed. Kaito Sema was left out of proposed China trip. His murder deepened tribal feud. Semas went on to form Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (RGN).

Thongdi Chang's group in Tuensang opposed to China connection and in favour of a solution within Indian constitution opted out. By 1968, there were three underground groups. After Jostoma incident in 1968 in which, 200 were killed, the arrest of important leaders followed, Mowu Angami being one among them. Liberation of Bangladesh also came as a Setback. With its assistance two important leaders were arrested and safe escaping route was lost. After imposition of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967, due to intense military operation many surrendered. In 1973 RGN and Thongdi Chang's group surrendered. This encouraged many in the NNC/ FGN too to surrender. By 1975 underground had got completely weakened.

It was in such an atmosphere that Shillong accord was signed on 11th November 1975. The representatives agreed to accept of their own volition Indian constitution and came overground. The defects of the Shillong accord were that it was signed by those Naga leaders who were prisoners of the Government. It wasn't signed in consultation with important NNC leaders. Nothing new was offered to the Nagas and they were signed merely in their personal capacities. The accord was rejected by Isak Swu and Muivah.

As it was felt that in any final political settlement, Phizoh should be involved a contact was established and a meeting was fixed with Morarji Desai the then Prime Minister in 1977 at London. Morarji Desai behaved aggressively and even went on to make irresponsible

remark like “exterminate the Nagas and I will have no compunction in it.

Federal activities shifted to the Naga inhabited areas of Myanmar. The Shillong accord brought a division between the opponents and the defenders of the Shillong accord. The internal clash reached a point where no patch up was possible. In a coup by defenders of the accord Swu and Muivah were arrested. Khaplang was made the President. Since he was in line with Swu and Muivah, after a counter-coup those responsible for Martial law were eliminated and both of them were released.”

NSCN was formed on 31 January 1980. A manifesto released on the occasion described Shillong accord as the most ignominious sell-out. It expressed the ethnic fear of “constant threat of eventual submersion”. It favoured a policy of self-reliance instead of depending on foreign powers and called for an “United Front” to stand against the “common enemy.” It emphasized its own brand of socialism by retaining classless society and retained the old slogan ‘Nagaland for Christ’.

NSCN was formed in the thick jungles of Naga hills in Myanmar. Government of People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) was formed on March 21,1980. There was also Civil Head Quarters (CHQ) meant for civil activities and General Head Quarters (GHQ) which

worked as an armed wing. NSCN rose up as the most formidable organization in North-East. It gave arms training to ULFA, KIA, UNLF, PLA. It's social activities towards the local inhabitants like opening schools etc, resulted in many of the traditional practices including head hunting being given up.

As the activities of the NSCN grew, India along with Myanmar launched joint operations to curb their activities. As it did not prove to be successful, many attempts for peace were made. One such effort in 1987 proved disastrous for the NSCN. Misunderstanding cropped within the NSCN and rumours spread. Though the offer was rejected rumour spread that Muivah was willing to negotiate within the Indian constitution. It was also alleged that he wanted to eliminate Konyaks and oust Khaplang from Vice-chairmanship. Khaplang couldn't be convinced and differences couldn't be patched up.

Soon 140 from Muivah's group, mostly Tangkhuls were killed. After the massacre a vertical split in the NSCN with Khaplang (Hemi and Konyak) and Muivah, Swu (Tangkhul-Sema) took place. Tribalism, along with leadership clash again brought division in the NSCN.

After the division, NSCN(M) established its new base at the southern part of Nagaland and Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur. It emerged as the most well-knit guerilla organization in the North-East.

In the 90s both the NSCN groups inline with their policy of United Fronts formed conglomerations. The Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) was formed by NSCN(K) alongwith UNLF and ULFA to build a united struggle to liberate Indo- Myanmar region . In 1994 NSCN(M) established Self - Defence United Front of South East Himalayan Region (SDUFSEHR) which sought to fight Indian expansionism. The Naga issue was internationalised by NSCN(M) in the 90's. It internationalised the cause by setting up offices at Bangkok and Geneva by presenting its case at the conferences of Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organ (UNPO) and UN conferences of indigenous peoples. Naga - Kuki clashes emerged in the 90's. It went on to claim many lives. The relation of Naga Kuki clashes to Naga insurgency is that Kuki. National Army (KNA) has the backing of Manipuri establishment who want to check the growth of NSCN(M) where as Myanmar goes easy with NSCN(M) as it is inimical towards Kukis for their demand of Kukiland. It has been alleged that KNA has been used by RAW and Indian army for its counter-insurgency operations. On the other hand antagonism with the Kukis helped the NSCN(M) to consolidate itself.

In the whole course of Naga insurgency the underground inspite of asserting Naga identity , they couldn't overcome their worst enemy i.e. tribalism. Tribalism along with the ego, misunderstandings, leadership clashes proved disastrous for the underground and

brought divisions within the underground . Worst kind of internecine fights and killings took place .

During the course of Naga insurgency certain strategies were adopted to deal with Naga insurgency. It proved to be a failure despite short term gains and in fact it created more implications for Naga society . This was because these strategies flowed from the flawed nation- building model . The nation building in its zeal to create a national homogenous society neglected the fact that there are many nationalities within state . It remained blind to the fact that India is a multi-national state and not a nation - state . In its zeal towards homogenising and creating a nation - state a large number of people , their cultures and value systems were ignored and culture of the dominant communities was projected as the mainstream culture and forced others to become a part of it . The very fact that a national mainstream should be a confluence of various cultures rather the culture of the dominant communities was forgotten , that the smaller streams too have their right place in creating it was forgotten .

The nation- building model showed a paternalistic attitude towards the problems of the north-East . The very sentiments of the tribal communities were ignored . Through pumping in of money it sought to assimilate them. In spite of professing sixth schedule to protect their interests the concept of private ownership is replacing community ownership, non-tribals are exploiting tribals. All these

created apprehensions among the ethnic communities about losing their identity and culture which gave a spurt to ethnic movements in the North-East including Naga insurgency . This view is evident in the NSCN Manifesto.

The ruling elite remaining oblivious to this fact pumped in money sent in military considering it to be a mere law and order problem. Pumping in of money has led to the break up of Naga society. Drug and alcohol abuse has become rampant, AIDS cases started rising due to injection of heroin. A nouveau culture of sex and violence, drugs and music, bribery and corruption came into existence . A new elite came up i.e politicians , bureaucrats and contractors who pocketed the funds poured in for development. Development only led to creative destruction of existing institutions and value patterns. In spite of the pouring of astronomical sums of money, the life styles of the majority of the Nagas remained backward.

The use of Military to create “law and order” has resulted in worst kinds of human rights violations . Permanent scars and maiming mental imbalance and psychological trauma are the fallout of the army operations in this region. The centre’s policy of “ divide and rule” has at times resulted in factional fights ,ethnic conflict like the Naga - Kuki clashes

To conclude the nation - building model and strategy adopted by India so far is unsuitable for a heterogeneous society like India . The need is to find an alternative model. The terms ethnic groups and nationalities should not be viewed negatively . To quote Pakem “A nation may consist of several nationalities within its boundaries . It is the capacity of the state to absorb and integrate the various nationalities within its boundaries that success in nation building could be achieved.” As Talukdar points out “Internal self - determination should constitute the guiding principle of this strategy where the ethnic groups will retain control over their own economic, social and cultural development while adjusting to larger society of India.”

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APPENDIX-I

SHILLONG ACCORD

THE SHILLONG ACCORD OF 11 NOVEMBER 1975 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE UNDERGROUND NAGAS

1. The following representatives of the underground organisations met the Governor of the Nagaland Shri L.P Singh, representing the Government of India, at Shillong on 10 and 11 November, 1975:
 1. Shri I. Temjenba
 2. Shri S. Dehru
 3. Shri Veeniyi Rhakhu
 4. Shri Z. Ramyo
 5. Shri M. Assa
 6. Shri Kevi Yallay
2. There was series of four discussions. Some of the discussions were held with the Governor alone; at others, Shri Ramunny and Shri H. Zopianga, and Shri M. L Kampani, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs. All the five members of the Liaison Committee namely Rev Longri Ao, Dr. M. Aram, Shri L. Lungalang, Shri Kenneth Kerhuo and Shri Lungshim Shaiza, participated in the discussions.
3. The following were the outcome of discussions:
 - (I) The representatives of the underground organisations conveyed their decision, of their own volition, to accept, without condition the Constitution of India;
 - (II) It was agreed that the arms, now underground, would be brought out and deposited at appointed places. Details for giving effect to this agreement will be worked out between them and representatives of the Govt., the security forces, and members of the Liaison Committee;

(III) It was agreed that the representatives of the underground organisations should have reasonable time to formulate other issues for discussion for final settlement.

Dated, Shillong

11 November 1975.

I Temjenba; S Dehru;
Z Ramyo; M Assa;
Kevi Yallay

LP Singh
On behalf of the
Government of India.

On behalf of the representatives
of underground organisations.

APPENDIX-II

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT TO THE SHILLONG ACCORD ON 5 JANUARY 1976

Implementation of Clause II of the Shillong Accord of 11 November 1975.

1. It was decided that the collection of arms initially at collection centres, would commence as early as possible, and will be completed by 25 January 1976. Initial places of collection to be decided through discussion between commissioner, representatives of underground organisations and the members of the Liaison committee.
2. Once all arms are collected, these will be handed over to the Peace Council team at the respective places of collection.
3. Peace council team will arrange to transport the arms from collection centers to Chedema Peace Camp and arrange guards, etc. for safe custody of arms.
4. Similar arrangement at agreed place/places will be made in Manipur with concurrence of the Manipur Government.
5. The underground may stay at Peace Camps to be established at suitable places, and their maintenance will be arranged only by the Peace council. Any voluntary contribution from any sources will be made to the Peace Council, who will utilise the fund according to necessity.

BESETO MEDOM KEYHO; PUKROVE NAKRU:

Z RAMYO, I TEMJENBA

L.P.SINGH
GOVERNOR

Dated, Shillong
5 January 1976

APPENDIX-III

Following is the conversation that took place between Morargi Desai and Phizo in London on June 14 1977

- Desai : What happened to your face?
- Phizo : It's paralysis.
- Desai : When it happened?
- Phizo : In 1942.
- Desai : Oh , so many years ago?
- Phizo : Yes .
- Desai : How it came about?
- Phizo : I was a war prisoner?
- Desai : Then this happened from prisoner?
- Phizo : Yes .I have come to meet the Prime minister of India and I have been waiting for an opportunity like this for a long time and I am glad that I could meet you today .
- Desai : Aram told me that you want to see me alone.
- Phizo : No, I did not say that.
- Desai : Have you met Aram?
- Phizo : No. I have not met him and I do not know him. I have come to meet the Prime Minister of India because my people have been suffering for a very long time. As you have become the Prime Minister of India for only about three months and I am not blaming you for our sufferings, that I want you to understand but I thought we could find a way out to bring about to an end on the matter.
- Desai : The Nagas are not suffering and of you talk about Nagaland I shall not talk with you . I told your niece Rano that I am prepared to meet you as a person but not about Nagaland .
- Phizo : In 1947 , when the British were about to leave their empire, a Naga delegation went to Delhi to meet Mahatma Gandhi because our situation may not have been understood by Indians . And we explained to Mahatma Gandhi that the Nagas are not Indians and Nagaland is not Indian is not Indian territory. We submitted the points of discussion to Mahatma Gandhi earlier as his secretary asked us to do so. I think his secretary was Pyarelal. We asked Gandhi if Indians will attack Nagaland when it became free. Gandhi said , if you say that Nagas are not Indians and Nagaland is not Indian territory then the matter must stop there . We also do not want the British and they are going . India will

not attack you. She has no right to do so and I will sacrifice my life for you before any Naga is shot.

- Desai : From where the meeting took place?
- Phizo : In Delhi at Bhangi colony . Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated so soon. If he had lived a few months longer the Naga problem would not have risen , but if we do what Mahatma Gandhi would have said were he alive there will be no difficulty.
- Desai : Why have you brought up Gandhi name ? I know him better than you . I know him better than you. I will not follow him . I will do everything what I consider it to be right . Now what more do you want to say?
- Phizo : I have come to meet the Prime Minister of India because the Nagas have suffering for a very long time and we must find a way out to end the trouble.
- Desai : I told you that the Nagas are not suffering. I know everything . And there is nothing to discuss . Nagaland became a state of India in 1960, before that it was in Assam .
- Phizo : How Nagaland could become a state in India?
- Desai : It was the Nagas who came and asked for a state and it was given to them.
- Phizo : But that is an argument and I don't come here to argue with you . The Government of India may claim something on their part and the Nagas uphold something on their part and there may be a wide gap between us. But the problem is more serious than an argument and I wish that find a way and go into the matter more deeply.
- Desai : No, I will not talk about Nagaland . And if you want to talk about Nagaland , this is the end of the meeting .
- Phizo : I am already 73, and you are older than me . How long are we going to be here? Even if you and I do not agree today that is not the end so we must find a way to solve our problem .And the sooner the better . Are you not as good as the British who gave freedom to India?
- Desai : Why you talk about the British now? Who are they! it is said the Aryans came to India and all that but what is the use of talking about the past ?We are already here and what else . You are a foreigner .You are staying in a foreign country. You receive reports and talk about it. I have all the reports and there is no problem . I know everything. I am the prime Minister of India . No body needs to tell me that there is a problem.
- Phizo : We the people of Asia fought against the white imperialists

and how could we Asians fight and kill each other ?

- Desai : Why bring up Asia , it is India.
- Phizo : Will the Primeminister of India exterminate all the Nagas?
- Desai : Yes , I will exterminate all the Naga rebels . There will be no mercy.
- Phizo : Is not that horrible?
- Desai : We are protecting our citizens. Only a few Nagas are giving trouble , harassing the people in the villages , that we cannot allow . We must protect our citizens. And I will exterminator all. There will be no mercy.
- Phizo : Whether we are few or many I thought we could go into the matter deeper .
- Desai : I told you that I shall not discuss about Nagaland and if you want to talk about Nagaland this is the end of the meeting . What more do you want to say?
- Phizo : Well , my meeting you today as it is more in their nature of making and acquaintance with you. As our is a long standing one which we cannot decide it in a day. Have some Naga colleagues with me including my daughter and my son. I want them to come and meet you and hear from you what you have said to me. Can I go bring them ?
- Desai : Yes.
- Phizo : I have told the Prime Minister of India that the Nagas are suffering terribly for so many years.
- Desai : The Nagas are suffering because they are persisting on Independence . You and all who are outside are welcome back to become Indians . But ,if you want to talk only about Naga independence , I won't talk to you.
- Khodao : When you were elected Prime Minister because all through your life you fought , the Nagas thought you will be the man for final settlement of the Naga problem.
- Desai : What is there to settle ? I will have absolutely no leniency on rebels . If you want to persist on independence I will have nothing to talk . **I will certainly exterminate the rebel Nagas .I have no compunction in that .**
- Phizo : Mr. Prime Minister , will there be further opportunity for discussion ?
- Desai : What discussion. There will be no discussion.