

**TERRORIST THREAT TO INDIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY:
A CASE STUDY OF PUNJAB (1992-1999)**

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation titled "Terrorist Threat to India's Internal Security: A Case Study of Punjab (1992-1999)" submitted by Sundara Babu N. is in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of this University. This dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university and is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated to
My Teacher Prof. Rakesh Gupta,
my beloved parents
and all my friends who helped me in this work.

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
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Preface

Our study is an attempt to assess the internal security environment both in term of military and non-military dimensions in the context of terrorist threat in Punjab. As the Punjab problem is the result of high - intensity party conflict, we try to analysis the role of party politics particularly Congress, Akali Dal and its leaderships. However, the Punjab problem is also the result of proxy war by Pakistan on India. So we attempt to understand the external aspects of Punjab problem by analyzing the role of State- sponsored / trans-border terrorism as well. With this background, we attempt to assess the threat perception of terrorism from 1992 -1999 in Punjab. The need for such a study arise from the fact that no such work has been undertaken to assess the scope of resurgence of terrorism in Punjab. The relevance of this study is based on the recent sporadic series of terrorist incidents in Punjab though it was officially terminated in 1993. The proposed study will be conducted with reference to historical analysis for evaluating the dynamics of present political relationships. In brief, the study will be based on descriptive and analytical approach. It is also proposed to examine all available primary and secondary sources of information. However, it is a necessity of the study to rely more on primary sources as the existing literature on terrorism in Punjab cover only until the period of 1993 -94. The researcher relies on sources like interviews, newspaper articles, expert comments, government documents, etc., to construct his assessment of terrorist threat in Punjab from 1992 -1999.

We begin our first chapter with an introduction on National Security and an analysis on its evolution in terms of domestic and international context. Then we try to understand the meaning of terrorism and its context to Punjab. We further attempt to briefly survey the literature on these areas for our basic understanding.

Our second chapter attempts to focus on the politics of identity, which is based on certain socio-political construction. We try to understand its role as an instrument of separatism and secession, especially the myth and reality of Sikh identity and martyrdom. Then we glance briefly on the historical background of Punjab politics, which gave rise to militancy and terrorism. In the internal factors, we limit our study to Akali and Congress politics and in the external context we look at the role of Pakistan in the political dynamics of Punjab. We focus our study particularly on the role of the elite in the whole problem. We also briefly look at the role of media in Punjab during the period of militancy.

Our third and fourth chapters deal with the strategies of conflict resolution mechanisms adopted by the Indian State in the context of Punjab. The third chapter deals with the co-operative dimensions particularly the role of elections in integrating the alienated people into the mainstream of the society. Our fourth chapter deals with the conflict dimensions of restoration process where the marginalized groups are integrated by the measures of counter- terrorism. This dimension is significant particularly when there are external factors involved. In the context of Punjab, it is Pakistan, which occupies that space as a sponsoring state. It is in this dimension that terrorism is understood as a warfare metaphor. We also look at

the drawbacks of these processes where issues like corruption and human rights play a crucial role.

Our fifth chapter deals with the limitations of the conflict resolution methods adopted by the Indian State. All pluralist-liberal societies in Post-Colonial democracies face the challenges of terrorism. These security threats are sometimes non-militancy as well. Therefore, we look at the role of arms trade, narco-terrorism, role of diaspora, etc. We also look at the contemporary domestic politics as well as continuing external influence from across the border in the context of Punjab.

Our sixth chapter is the conclusion that we arrive at, after assessing the domestic politics of Punjab, national politics as well as international factors. The period of 1992 -1999 was chosen for the very reason that it was in this decade, a determined attempt was made to resolve the problem of terrorism in Punjab. We end our study with the assessment of threat from terrorists in the context of Punjab.

Chapter-I

Introduction: National Security and Terrorism

There is a growing debate in International Relations, on the nature of National Security and changes in the security perceptions, after the end of the Cold War. Some analysts argue that the natures of threats are also changing from external to internal and from military to non-military ones. There are also views that the responses to security challenges are changing, that unilateral approaches are being replaced, by more co-operative forms of security. While some others maintain that this view is mistaken, and that expanding the definition of security is not helpful, and that unilateral measures are still the norm.

National Security:

National Security is a widely used term and thus has come to mean different things to different people at different times. However, the main objective of National Security is to protect and defend the 'national values'. Values constitute the essence of a nation and determine its basic character. There may be a disjunction between the 'values' held by the masses and the leaders. In such cases, usually it is the ruling group or the class, which determines the 'national values'.

The traditional view of National Security was militaristic in its assumptions of what constituted the security. Such a view saw the protection from external attacks as the primary role of security. However, such a view of National Security is extremely limited and narrow, and if pursued can led to a greater insecurity.

After 1940, the emphasis on National Security was more in terms of military dimensions alone. During the Second World War, Walter Lippman defined National Security in the following way, “a nation has security, when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests (core values) to avoid war and is able if challenged, to maintain them by war.”¹ Thus, the concept of National Security is directly linked with war, and ability of the nation to deter, defend, and attack. Similarly, Arnold Wolfers has proposed that “Security, in an objective sense, measures taken for the absence of threat to ‘acquired values’, and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such ‘values’ will be attacked.”²

The conceptual development of National Security began with the post-Second World War period. The shift from National Interest to National Security took place in USA during the Second World War when war became ‘total’ in its character, involving all aspects of economy, society and polity along with the unification of various services of the military. This intense focussing of the whole national effort on war led to the National Security Act 1947, which termed the United States as a National Security State. And specific institutions like the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) and the National Security Council (NSC) were created to deal with the issues of National Security.

The Cold War era inherited the military dominated concept of National Security. The Cold War structures of relations overshadowed the conceptual development of National Security. In other words, the bipolar world adopted the concept of ‘Alliance Security’, namely the NATO (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (1954) and its main thrust was on perceived external threats. In this security concept

war, aggression and nuclear deterrence were thought to be the main instruments of protecting a nation's 'core values'. In addition, Raymond Aron defined the concept of National Security in the following terms, "to want the maximum of security means, to want the maximum of power, which in turn means, the greatest number of allies and the fewest possible enemies."³ Thus to get maximum security, it is essential to make a strong alliance, which will promote and protect National Security.

A change began to come about during the US experience of the Vietnam War, which widened the concept of National Security. During this period, Robert McNamara categorized a nation's 'core values' in the form of developmental activities. For him "security is not military 'hardware', though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development, and without development there can be no security."⁴ Thus National Security cannot be maintained unless national economic growth is sustained.

In India, K.Subramanyam broadened the concept of National Security in the 1970s. According to him, "National Security does not merely mean safeguarding territorial integrity but also means ensuring that the country is industrialized rapidly, and has a cohesive egalitarian and technological society. Any thing which comes in the way of this development, internally or externally is a threat to National Security."⁵ Even though this was in reference to India, it is applicable to the post-Colonial countries in general.

In the Third World perspective, Caroline Thomas, stressed the economic dimensions of National Security. She not only defined security in terms of the

internal security of the state, but also in terms of food, health, money and trade as well as nuclear capabilities. She raised an important point that weak Third World states operate in an international economic order that favours the powerful ones.⁶

Many Third World states adopted the Western model of National Security, which was based on the Cold War alliance system where the purpose of the set up was to protect the alliance partners from perceived external threats. The alliance system was super-imposed on the Third World states directly or indirectly by the Super Powers in the name of balance of power. This imposition triggered conflicts within the Third World, which in turn aggravated the external security threat perceptions. This led the Third World states to neglect the internal threats and become pre-occupied with the external threats, which in turn led to the neglect of the essentials of 'State-making' or 'nation-making' in spite of military equipments and forces at disposal. The Third World situation is aptly described as the shortage of security 'software' and the abundance of 'hardware' accumulated by such states.⁷ Azar and Moon, thus stressed on 'state-legitimacy' (identification of the people with the state) and state-integration (identification of the people with each other within the state). Azar and Moon argue that Third World states were unable to solve both external and internal threats with the help of 'hardware' (military force) and they should concentrate on 'state-legitimacy' and 'state-integration' to deal with the internal threats.

The end of Cold War has opened up new debates on the concept of National Security. With the disintegration of the erstwhile USSR, the bipolar alliance security system has lost its relevance. In the emerging multipolar world the economic

dimension has gained considerable importance. In other words, economy has become an important ingredient in the concept of National Security in the post-Cold War era.

Thus, there are various determinants which constitute the concept of National Security in the post-Cold War period. Barry Buzan has captured this large conception in his formulation, "security is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. In the context of the international system, security means to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity."⁸ He advocates a definition of National Security which includes freedom from military, political, societal, economic and environmental threats.

Third World problems of state legitimacy, political stability, capital accumulation, demands for economic distribution and political participation, leading to major overloads on the political system is also captured in Mohammad Ayoob's definition of Third World security threats. Ayoob argues that "it is preferable to define security in relation to vulnerabilities that threaten or have the potential to bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, as well as the regimes that preside over these structures and profess to represent them internationally."⁹

The end of the Cold War has changed the security framework dramatically in global terms and its impact on India is even greater. India has been a major player in the international system since its inception in 1947. According to Raju G.C. Thomas, "The politics of the Great Powers on issues such as Kashmir, nuclear proliferation, human rights violation and other separatists insurgencies, have changed substantially

since the end of the Cold War. And India has therefore been compelled to re-examine, and re-adjust its traditional positions.»¹⁰

India has been grappling with several kinds security problems, since its independence in 1947. It has fought three conventional wars with Pakistan and one with China. Though India's external security policy has changed but it has become more volatile in the post-Cold War era. India had to deal with severe problems of internal security as well which has strong potentials to undermine the stability of the State. India's political, economic, and social conflicts have greatly changed the security environment since the 1980s. These conflicts are threatening the state boundaries, state institutions and governing regimes. Therefore, the threat to Indian security is multi-dimensional and multifarious.

The situation currently in J&K, is the most serious security concern for India. The J&K problem has both internal and external dimensions. Since the militancy escalated in late 80's, Pakistan has been engaging in regular proxy wars in J&K, as part of a larger plan to destabilize the Indian State. There has been a remarkable increase in ISI activism across the country as manifested in several bomb blasts and other acts of subversion in India. Pakistan is also involved in international propaganda against India on various issues.

The non-military dimension of security such as drug pedaling, smuggling and its nexus with arms trade had also begun to cause threat to India's National Security in recent years. Another non-military threat is that of Trans-border population movements. The inflow of population from neighbouring States into India has already made serious impacts on the political equations of the bordering states. The

displacement of local population and creation of new 'vote banks' has led to new communal and social tensions, which in turn has led to further complexities in the maintenance of internal security in India.

The Constitution of India stipulates two major aspects in the context of internal dimensions of National Security namely, democratic governance and egalitarian transformation. The democratic and societal changes in India have raised among various other issues, the question of self-determination. Through the operationalisation of adult suffrage, various types of socio-cultural groups identifiable around a number of primordial relationships have come to play an increasingly active role in Indian politics by their collective movements resulting in the 'crisis of governability'. Our concern is on the struggle for self-determinations, which has taken the form of political terrorism in areas like Punjab, J&K and North East.

Terrorism is both an act and a process. It involves politics of fear as an act. As a process, it is disruptive for the whole political system in liberal societies. Liberal societies as political communities have their specificity in the developed and developing world. A political approach to terrorism, from the perspective of political parties, defines terrorism as a 'high-intensity' party conflict, if one looks at the internal causes in an isolated manner. Otherwise it may be called as 'Low Intensity Conflict', as it is a proxy war as well. The cult of terrorism is on rise and it seeks to destroy the economic infrastructure of a country, disturb peace and destabilize a legitimate government.

Proxy War and Terrorism:

War has come to stay with humankind. It can be opposed effectively only by a counter-war. In this modern age where the threat of nuclear war looms large in front of humankind, political strategists think more in terms of achieving their aim by resorting to proxy wars and terrorism. Terrorism is one of the major problems facing the world at the end of the twentieth century. Though there has been terror throughout history, it acquired a new meaning only after end of Second World War. Modern democratic societies are extremely vulnerable to the problem of terrorism.

Terrorism is a political tactic intended to produce intimidation through the use or threatened use of violence. The basic purpose of terrorism is to produce terror in a target audience. The term 'Terrorism', is used by different people to describe different things, at different times.

In 1974, the UK government concluded that "for the purpose of legislation, terrorism is the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public in fear."¹¹

In 1975, the European Ministers of Justice and Interior deliberated on terrorism "that terrorism is defined as the use or the threatened use by a cohesive group of persons of violence (short of warfare) to effect political aims."¹²

The US Department of State in 1984, defined terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."¹³

Carl Wellman defined terrorism as "the use or attempted use of terror as a means of coercion."¹⁴

According to Paul Wilkinson, terrorism may be defined as “the systematic use or threat of murder, injury and destruction to create a climate of terror, to publicize a cause, and to coerce a wider target into submitting to the terrorist aims.”¹⁵

According to Walter Laquer, terrorism is defined as “the sub-state application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents and to bring about a political change.”¹⁶

Paul Wilkinson calls terrorism as “a special kind of violence in a weapon system that can be used on its own or as part of a whole repertoire of unconventional warfare.”¹⁷

Yonah Alexander’s definition of terrorism is “the use of violence against random civilian targets in order to intimidate or to create generalised pervasive fear for the purpose of achieving political goals.”¹⁸

For Brian Jenkins, “threat of violence, individual acts of violence or a campaign of violence designed primarily to instill fear is terrorism.”¹⁹

According to Martha Crenshaw, “terrorism is a means to accomplish certain political objectives with international support”; in other words “terrorism is a means to a political end.”²⁰

For Jay Mallin, “terrorism is a substitute for overt warfare.”²¹

In 1984 an analysis was made by Alex P. Schmid, of more than 100 existing definitions on terrorism and by 1988 he came out with a new definition on Terrorism. “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by clandestine individual groups or state actors, for idiosyncratic criminal or political reasons, whereby-in contrast to assassination-the direct targets of violence are not the

main targets. The immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly or selectively from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence based communication processes between terrorist's victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target, turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation coercion or propaganda is primarily sought."²²

According to Kshitij Prabha, terrorism could be defined as "an act or threat of an act of tactical violence by a group of trained individuals, having international linkage to achieve a political objective."²³

So far there has been no universally acceptable definition on terrorism, because "there is no such thing as terrorism pure and unadulterated, specific and unchanging, comparable to a chemical element, rather there are a great many terrorisms"²⁴ as the character of terrorist groups are subject to change.

According to Paul Wilkinson,²⁵ Terrorism has five major characteristics: "

- (a) It is premeditated and aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror .
- (b) It is directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate victims of the violence .
- (c) It inherently involves attacks on random and symbolic targets, including civilians .
- (d) The acts of violence committed are seen by the society in which they occur as extra-normal, in the literal sense that they breach the social norms, thus causing a sense of outrage .

- (e) And terrorism is generally used to try to influence political behaviour in some way. For example, to force opponents into conceding some or all of the perpetrators demands, to provoke an over reaction to serve as a catalyst for a more general conflict or to publicize a political or religious cause to inspire followers to emulate violent attacks, to give vent to deep hatred and the thirst for revenge, and to help undermine governments and institutions designated as enemies by the terrorists.”

The term terror was first used to indicate a general state of fear deliberately created for the political purposes during the French Revolution. It is particularly referred to as the “Reign of Terror” of 1793-94. In 1793, France’s Revolutionary Government found itself threatened by aristocratic emigrants who conspired with foreign rulers to invade the country. The Government suspected a possible treason from its own citizens for this plot. The French legislative – the National Convention – led by a radical faction, the Jacobins, under the leadership of Maximilien Robespierre, adopted a policy of terror and ordered mass execution of suspected traitors.

However terrorism attracted the global attention during the nineteenth century, when civil violence associated with revolutionary movements increased in frequency and visibility. The incidence of terrorism and other forms of political violence increased dramatically during the first half of the twentieth century. The terrible experiences of the Second World War set the scene for ‘modern terrorism’ in two major ways.²⁶ First, during the bitterly fought conflict, the notion emerged that the civilians could be legitimate targets of violence and terror. Second, the war also set

the scene in a way that it opened up much of Asia for nationalist and communist revolutions.

The wars of national liberation threw up varieties of theories and justification for the use of terror tactics within the context of armed struggles. Terrorism therefore was usually one method used in wider nationalist movements. Nationalism was perhaps the strongest motivations to take up the path of terrorism. Later ethnic, linguistic and religious differences became crucial to the majority of the secessionist-guerrilla movements of 1980's. These got reinforced when it was linked to political – social repression or lack of opportunity.

The psychological profiles of terrorists are often completely different from the popular perception or media portrayals. The overwhelming majority of terrorists are not mentally ill, abnormal, psychopathic or even predisposed to violence. Martha Crenshaw and Rubenstein support this point of view.²⁷ According to Michael Stohl²⁸ “to think that terrorists are psychologically deprived is also a myth”. Terrorists are committed individuals, prepared to carry out often-horrible acts, accepting that such deeds may have severe consequence for their personality. In analyzing the mindset of the terrorist, two factors stand out.²⁹ The first is that, terrorist usually have a very strong motivation, and the strength of this motivation is the principle key to why they are prepared to kill and maim. The second is that terrorists usually operate in close-knit groups that reinforce the motivation and encourage certain tendencies, particularly one that enables individual terrorists to escape the intense guilt, that they might otherwise feel for the consequence of their actions.

In its most common usage, terrorism refers to acts committed by individuals or groups against the state or other forms of authority such as economic institutions. This is some times referred as 'terrorism from below.'³⁰ The official or state terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence, by agents of the state or other authoritative institutions which is intended to produce changes in or to maintain, established pattern of behaviour. As a political tactic, terrorism is as old as society. People individually and in groups have sought through intimidation, to gain or refrain influence over one another in pursuit of their respective ends.

Terrorists are too weak to confront directly the instruments of state security such as the police or the military. Instead they attack citizens in order to create anxiety and weaken public support for the government or its policy process in individual countries. The foundations of such activities include ethnic, religious, tribal, and linguistic rivalries as well as other kinds of social differentiations. The purpose of such tensions is to gain or refrain, political or economic status. International terrorism is the involvement in terrorist activities by a group of people or government in one country, in the internal affairs of a group of people or government in another country. Terrorism also offers a possible alternative to open armed conflicts. For some nations unable to mount a conventional military challenge, terrorism is the only alternative or an equaliser.³¹

Growing number of Governments themselves use terrorist tactics, employing terrorist groups or exploiting terrorist incidents as a mode of surrogate warfare. These governments see in terrorism a useful capability, a weapon system and a cheap means of waging war. Thus a state-sponsored terrorism is one in which the government

controls a terrorist group abroad. They are intended to destabilize a hostile foreign government. State-sponsored terrorism occurs when, a government plans, directs and controls terrorist operations in another country.

According to Paul Wilkinson,³² 'international terrorism' is exported across international frontiers or used against foreign targets, in the terrorist's country of origin. There is no case of purely domestic terrorism but there are ,of course many campaigns in which the political violence is concentrated in a single national territory or region.

There is a view according to Walter Laquer³³ that the strategies and tactics of terrorism have recently become integral component in both the domestic and foreign political realms of the modern state. This development does not mean that the state has become oppressive, but state-sponsored terrorism has come to play an active role in international politics. Thus at one end of the scale, the lone terrorist has appeared and at the other, state-sponsored terrorism is quietly flourishing in these days when wars of aggression have become too expensive and too risky. As the century draws to a close, according to Walter Laquer,³⁴ "terrorism is becoming the substitute for the great wars of the 1800's and early 1900's".

Punjab:

As far as Punjab is concerned, it was a major internal security problem for India in early 1980s to early 1990s. The Akali party catering to Sikh communal interest launched a crusade soon after the independence, for the creation of a Punjabi province. The Congress party dominant both at the Center and in Punjab could not

provide a credible alternative to the communal arithmetic, which prevailed in the electoral politics of Punjab. Rather Congress leaders, including the Sikhs, routinely employed the communal card to their advantage as well. Communal peace prevailed however in the Punjab villages and towns notwithstanding the difference among politicians. The main beneficiary of the Green Revolution during the 1960's were the land owning Jat Sikhs. Having reaped considerable wealth by the Green Revolution, in the early 1970's the Sikhs began to look for better opportunities to invest their wealth. The Akali Party put a number of demands before the Government in 1973 , along with religious concessions and rights formulated in the name of Anandpur Sahib Resolution. But the government could not heed to it as it had other concerns. Its proximity with Pakistan prevented the planners at the Center from investing further on heavy industries and other infrastructures in Punjab. This fear arose basically from the experiences of the 1965 war with Pakistan. This resulted in building up of dissent among the rural peasantry. As even among the other sectors there were not enough opening for the newly emerging educated middle class youths. These people became particularly exposed to ideas and ideologies critical of the existing situation and the established political framework. This resentment among the masses were capitalized by two major actors of Indian politics , the Akali Dals and Pakistan. The Akalis generated the communal passion in the society and Pakistan fueled it with the sponsorship and there by giving birth of militancy and terrorism. The turmoil began in early 1980's and ended in early 1990's. Yet the problems of Punjab have not been completely resolved. Various incidents and acts of terrorism in recent years show the rising graph in the threat of terrorism in Punjab. It is widely

believed that terrorism in Punjab has been suppressed to a large extent. But its fires are far from dead as the killing of Beant Singh in 1995, the series of terrorist activities in 1997, and in the end of 1999 demonstrates.

Survey of Literature:

On National Security, one of most significant work is of Barry Buzan- People, States and Fear: The National Security problems in International Relations (1983). This book laid the foundation for much of the current thinking on security in the Third World. Buzan tries to conceptualize security at three levels of analysis, namely, the individual, the state and the international system and interplay among them.

Another important book is of Edward E. Azar and Chung In Moon (eds.) – National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats (1988). This book focuses on three dimension of National Security: “security environment”, “hardware” and “software”. The “security environment” indicates external threats and alliance patterns, the “hardware” includes physical capabilities, strategic doctrines, force structures and weapon choices, and the “software” refers to political legitimacy, integration and overall policy capacity. The Western concepts have been preoccupied with “security environment” and “hardware” But Third World Security problems exist on the “software” side of security, and Azar and Moon argue, that it has been neglected in the concept of National Security.

The other work, of Brian L. Job (ed.) The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (1992) is equally significant. This work emphasizes the necessity of re-examining the security of Third World states in the contemporary

international system. It under scores the importance of internal security in the Third World.

Barry Buzan's article "Rethinking Security after the Cold War" (1997) examines different approaches of security studies, i.e., traditional, widening and critical approaches. It analyses how the security agenda has widened since the Cold War period, which was dominated by the military dimensions, and also examines how various political issues have widened the scope of National Security.

On domestic aspect of security, Raju G.C. Thomas's book -Democracy, security and Development in India (1996) deals with the security pressures on democracy and development. The work basically explores the relationship between democracy, security and development .

Lt. Gen. V.K. Nayar's book -Threat from within India's Internal Security Environment (1992) is a factual account of events and developments in Punjab, Kashmir, Assam and the NorthEast, along with their implication for the future. The book suggests an approach to these security problems and identifies the ingredients of a possible solution.

Balraj Puri's book Kashmir Towards Insurgency (1993) tries to understand the nature and historical roots of the insurgency in Kashmir. It also attempts to analyze the logic of terrorism and secession and reflects on the ways in which such forces can be politically contained and the democratic process in Kashmir may be reintroduced.

B.G.Verghe's book India's North East Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency Governance and Development (1996) analyses the North East in a historical perspective and outline not only the social, political and economic dimensions of

every state in the region, but also attempts to take the reader through the region's raze of ethno-political movements, each with diverse orientations and aspirations.

S.D.Muni and L.R.Baral (ed.) book –Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia (1995) is one of the first studies on how refugee inflows have vitiated the security environment in South Asia at the national, bilateral and regional levels.

K.Subramanyam's article "Covert Operations Pose New Challenges for Indian Security" (1997) provides suggestions to meet the challenges to India's external and internal security. Subramanyam explains that India has been facing covert wars by neighbours over last fifteen years in Punjab, Kashmir and NorthEast. These threats include terrorism, narcotics trade, inflow of arms, smuggling both across the land and sea, organized crimes, violence, money laundering and funds mobilization linked up with external powers and their agencies targeting at political parties and decision makers in the country.

Ved Marwah - Uncivil Wars: Pathology of Terrorism in India (1995). Ved Marwah's study on terrorism gives an overall comprehensive historical overview of the phenomena in various states. It provides a vast first hand information on terrorists and provides a vast quantity of data. In the context of Punjab he provides with a good account of information on the terrorist organizations, their social composition and motivation of the terrorists, and possible solutions. He clarifies the much misunderstood Ribeiro's concept of "Bullet for Bullet", which according to Ved Marwah was used to reactivate the demoralized police rather than any ruthless suppressive campaign. He also insisted on the need to implement the Rajiv – Longowal Accord to resolve the real issues of Punjab. He also suggests need to

vitalize the intelligence units of police, and the significance of enlightened leadership in politics. He provides a detailed account on the terrorist violence in Punjab and other states. The most important contribution of his work is that it gives a lot of insight on the psychology of terrorists in Punjab, Kashmir and North East.

J.P.S. Uberoi – Religion, Civil Society and the State: A Study of Sikhism. (1999). The work gives a holistic and comprehensive picture of Sikhism on the basis of which one can understand its distinct identity, which distinguishes from other South Asian religions. It provides a fine account of the Sikh religion and history, particularly in the context of modernity. According to the author, the task of Indian modernity is to “fold up” inherited dualism; for instance, the dualism between the individual and the collective, man-in-the-world and Sanyasi, Hindu and Muslim, status and power. This interpretation of modernity is new as the existing literatures focus more on economic and political factors. In everyday life, Sikhism according to J.P.S. Uberoi overcomes the dualism between the asceticism and the world by arguing that an individual can achieve salvation by leading a disciplined life as a grhasti rather than a Sanyasi. Above all according to J.P.S. Uberoi Sikhism upholds pluralism and freedom of conscience through the practice of martyrdom. Martyrdom in Sikhism became a mode of non-violent resistance aimed at reforming the state and law. Example the Guru Arjun Dev, the fifth Guru, calmly provoked the arrogance of the State and compelled it to reform itself or to kill him.

K.P.S. Gill - Punjab: The Knights of Falsehood, (1997). The spate of terrorist activities in the year 1997 in Punjab had led K.P.S Gill to respond his anguish in the form of “The Knights of Falsehood”. The possibilities of resurgence of terrorism

according to Gill, is essentially due to the fact that “basic issues -the structures and patterns of politics – that gave rise to militancy in Punjab have not been addressed during the intervening years of peace. He says, with a certain minimal effort, peace can be made a permanent feature of the life of an average citizen in the state. But that requires intellectual honesty and moral courage, not the habitual cynicism that has been a feature of political discourse in the state over the past decades”. Though he has highly criticized the role of Pakistan in Punjab, in the major portion of the book he has heavily bombarded the myths constructed by the modern Sikh clergy. He had demystified the identity of “militant Sikhs”, and unmasked the faces of the radicals. He said, “Even today, a mythology of oppression, of torment and of martyrdom is being invented in the Punjab and around those who spoke only with Kalashnikov and the bomb. And while the Government scamper around to restore properties of the families of terrorists in order to heal the wounds, no one speaks of the wounds of tens of thousands who were victims of terror in the state”. On the Akali Parties he said, “the most vigorous advocates of this new mythology are the very leaders who stood at the center of the political structure and pattern of petty conspiracies and manipulation that culminated in terrorism. While terrorism has certainly been defeated, these leaders and structure not only survive but are once again in a position to control the destinies of Punjab.” He feels that the Akali’s have pygmified the once proud Sikh community.

Dipankar Gupta - The Context of Ethnicity: Sikh Identity in a Comparative Perspective (1996). According to Dipankar Gupta identities are dynamic and have to be understood as located within specific sociological coordinates. In the context of

Punjab the choices exercised were instrumental in creating ethnic and communal tension. He sites the example of "Operation Blue Star" and Anti-Sikh riots in Delhi, which became an instrument of mobilization by the extremists. He is also critical of the Congress and Akali Parties for the Punjab tragedy. According to him, the identity formation in Punjab was based on the experiences of freedom struggle and partition. He also dismisses the idea of secessionist demands based on economic or religious deprivation. For him the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was a secular demand for enhanced share in resource, which the Center failed, to address. He portrays the Hindu-Sikh relationship in terms of their practice and culture. According to him, Sikhism has been seen as the militant arm of Hinduism.. He explains the mix of region, religion and politics in terms of SGPC and Akali Dal politics.



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Chapter -II

Politics of Separatism

The Internal Dimension:

India is one of the rare countries in the world, with diverse lingual, religious, caste, tribal and regional groups with shared history. Recent years have witnessed a remarkable resurgence of these ethnic ties and sentiments leading to conflicts and tension, due to competition for greater access to power and resources. The ethnic mobilization assuming various forms has increasingly taken violent manifestations. The usage of the term "ethnic" for our purpose takes into account divisions based on all cultural markers, including linguistic, territorial, tribal, religious and communal identities. These ethnic identities are used by political leaders in various permutations and combinations to mobilize the communities to compete with perceived, real, temporary or artificially generated opponents to negotiate and bargain with the Center for political power, access to socio-economic resources and an enhanced status.

Politics of Identity:

An ethnic community becomes a self-conscious community only when its leadership selectively uses the ethnic symbols to attain specific goals. In this political competition, the dominant groups use ethnic mobilizations to consolidate their position and to counter threats from opposing actors, while the newly emerging groups uses ethnic sentiment to compete for a greater access to economic resources and political power. This competition some times manifests itself in terms of violent

conflicts. These conflicts can also arise as a result of the deliberate manipulation of communal differences by the dominant community or communities to divide the opposing force. Similarly ethnic leadership can also deliberately provoke ethnic conflict by emphasizing ethnic differences and cleavages so as to mobilize their particular community against potential rivals.¹ This tactic plays a crucial role in participatory democracies where ethnic politicization is used to mobilize votes during electoral process. The political actors (the state machinery, political parties, religio-political organizations and influential individuals) in reality or in popular perception appear to base their political strategy to enhance power and influence, on the utilization of ethnic connections.

Further people see this exploitation of ethnic ties not as occasional or aberrational one, but as an established practice. Despite the fact that the formal framework of legitimate politics may be based on democratic norms and values and backed by functioning institutions, and the political actors may also be employing democratic rhetoric in their normal discourses. Curiously enough this feeling is strongest at the time of elections. Politicians rarely shy away from invoking ethnic affiliation in an effort to maximize their political support. Ethnic demands are flexible in nature and the flexibility in the selection of ethnic symbols is reflected in the fluid transformation of ethnic group into self-conscious ethnic communities. Thus, one set of demands can replace another in response to socio-economic developments and the Center's response to pluralistic aspirations. In the case of Punjab, the stress on the markers of language and territory, providing for a common Punjabi identity, was replaced by the stress on religion, leading to the consolidation

of a distinct Sikh identity and the identification of Punjabi speaking Hindus and Muslims as rival ethnic groups.

Ethnic movements and leadership in the independent India were using linguistic ethnicity as one of the first strategies in their competition for greater access to power and resources through structural change. Hence the 1950's and the 1960's witnessed a number of ethnic movements demanding the re-alignment of state boundaries along linguistic lines. Later the tactics shifted to the sons-of-the soil theory (regional) and movements, particularly in Assam and Maharashtra. While the sons-of-the soil movements were restricted to local level, the politics of communalism entered the national arena. Religion by itself is never the cause of communal conflict but the religious sentiment can be successfully manipulated by the ethnic leadership to realize the political, economic and cultural aspirations.² Hence, religion is the "outer cover" of communalism while the inner core of the group conflict is to ensure secular power and dominance over the other group.³ The role of the State is particularly significant in determining the nature and directions of communal politics. The State can either act as a neutral arbiter between competing communities or it can assume a direct role by manipulating communal identities so as to divide the force of opposition and strengthen the status quo. The communal politics can be of separatist in nature when it insists on creating and maintaining the cultural specificity of a particular religious group. In Indian context most of the separatist do not want to disengage themselves from the polity and want to operate within the ambit of the Indian Constitution.⁴ There is what may be called as retaliatory communalism as well. As inter-group conflicts frequently find their way

into media reports, most of these conflicts emanate out of a sense of humiliation, insult or injury that one group perceives to suffer at the instances of another. Most of the communal riots in India are triggered by retaliatory communalism. In 50 years since independence about 5,000 communal riots occurred due to this retaliatory communalism by the Hindu dominant majority, predominantly. This is ironical but logically understandable since the secular Indian State did not side with either of the communalism, as far as the constitution and functioning of the institutions go. That left a large space for politics based on traditional idioms like casteism, communalism, tribalism to be exploited by all political parties. It allowed for professedly communal politics and communal parties to emerge as well.

Separatism and Secession:

Separatism as a tendency, is generally present among members of a cultural group who come to feel that their collective identity markers (race, language, religion, or some other such ascriptive factor) are the basis of routine discrimination practiced against them by the State. Although such a feeling may be present among several cultural groups in a country it is often the members of the cultural group, that are concentrated in substantial number in a particular region that can employ separatism as a political strategy to undo their perceived subordination, in a larger socio-political whole.

The State is usually blamed for arbitrary handling of the increasing volume and diversity of demands and expectations.⁵ Government actions and policies may provide substantial basis for such accusation. In a multi-cultural society with strong

regional concentration of different groups, cumulative grievances against the state tend to serve as the breeding ground for separatist ideas. Thus separatism can be seen as an organized movement belonging to the realm of politics.

The greater concentration of power and authority at the center of State power, an increasing sense of alienation and lack of influence in the dominated regions can accentuate separatism and politicize it among cultural groups concentrated in specific region. Separatist movement tends to acquire a lasting and unbending character only when the state resorts to massive repression with the aim of liquidating them. For it is from the experience of repression that the alienated cultural groups acquire a lasting memory of hatred and vengeance against the state, providing them a cause high enough to justify their own acts of terrorism.

Equally, an extremist group within the separatist movement may itself introduce violence with a view of accelerating the level of conflict to a point where peaceful compromises become less likely. The growth of separatism however is usually a gradual process. Only when the feeling of discrimination and loss of influence has become widespread among members of a disgruntled group do they adopt more daring and militant ways of resisting the power of the state.

Only thin line, which divides the separatists and secessionists, is the issue of National Self-determination when the secessionists aspire upon for an independent sovereign polity. However this mainly depends upon the choices of the political elite. Structural economic, political and social inequality, combined with “an amalgamated approach” will contribute to ethnic tension and polarization since they reduce the ethnic leadership's stake in the political system. An inability or unwillingness on the

part of the Central leadership to accommodate ethnic demand can result is the ethnic leadership adopting such extreme path of secession.⁶ In the context of Punjab one can trace from the chronology of events as how the movement for language changed to a movement for land and then had been manipulated into a religious one. In essence, the whole politics centered on the party ideology and leadership. According to McCord and McCord⁷ there are eight factors which may lead to separatism. They are:

1. when some group has a differential access to power at the political and economic centers of the state.
2. uneven economic development that encourages the population of some regions and aspire to the affluence enjoyed by others can also play a role in some separatist movements;
3. if a group that has been only partially assimilated into the mainstream or dominant society, finds its traditional culture dying.
4. requires leadership that can mobilize a population behind a cause. At times, the cause may have roots in mystic rather than objective reality.
5. must create the belief that the very survival of the group requires a radical solution, and that no other alternative exists.
6. when a tradition of hatred has been nourished for centuries and has been complimented by divisive, social, economic, political or ethnic lines the threat of separatism blossoms
7. hypothesize that relationship between the direction of economic growth and legitimacy granted to those in power is positive

8. if a political center arrogates to itself the greatest part of political power, but allows some voices of discontent from ethnic groups, then the probability that a cry for separation will be raised

Factors 1 and 4 appear to have some impact in Punjab. However, factor 2 on economic front is not applicable since the land of the Sikhs is prosperous one and the Sikhs have access to all round development. Factor 3 on assimilation may be applicable to Malwa and Doaba since the regions have traditions of mixed religions has opposed to the Majha region. Factor 6 is partially applicable in the context of history of Ranjit Singh's Kingdom in Punjab.

However, these factors do not take note of the external dimensions of separatism in regional and global contexts.

The Sikh Identity: Myth and Reality

The tenets of Sikhism are based on the teachings of the Ten Sikh Gurus. The definition of a Sikh given by the Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar is "a Sikh is any person who believes in one God and the Ten Sikh Gurus, the Guru Granth Sahib and other scriptures of the Sikh religion. Additionally, they must believe in the need and importance of Amrit (the Sikh Conformational Ceremony)." ⁸ Harmandar Sahib, the Golden Temple is the central place of worship for the Sikhs, they follow the Gurmukhi script in their texts, and their Holy Scripture is the Guru Granth Sahib.

Guru Nanak laid down the fundamentals of the Sikh religion based on the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. He set up the first institute for the

practice his teachings, Daram-Sal, a place for the practice of righteousness. Here people gathered for prayers and the sharing of meals (langar) together. Later on, Dharam-Sal was changed to Gurudwara – the Guru’s door or the Guru’s home. Guru Nanak simplified the worships and rejected all primitive austerities, rituals and omens. The ritual of fasting, pilgrimage, body mortification, physical exhaustion were forbidden and idol-worship was rejected. Prayer and hymn singing alone formed the daily worship of local Sangat (Congregations). The initiation ceremony started by Guru Nanak was called “Charan-Amrit”. It consisted of pouring water over the Guru’s toe and then drinking it by the disciples. The drinking of this “foot-nectar”, was considered as a proof of discipleship.

A Sikh family is a close – knit unit. It’s religion is the guiding principle for conduct and activity. Many Sikhs maintain a private room or other place in the home, where they install their Guru Granth Sahib, where all members of their family may join in prayer or hymn singing in morning and evening. Those who have no Darbar-Sahib (prayer room where Guru Granth Sahib is kept) will often go to the local Gurudwara for celebrations.

Guru Ramdas the fourth Guru, prescribed the daily routine of the Sikhs in his discourses, and Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth Guru completed the form of Sikhism by the creation of the Khalsa Panth. Daram Granth, the secondary scripture contains the composition of this last Sikh Guru. Guru Gobind Singh changed the mode of baptism by replacing the “charan-amrit” by "Khanday-di-pahul" in 1699. His new form of initiation was the amrit (nectar) prepared by stirring water and sugar crystals with a double-edged sword. It was accompanied by the maintenance of the Five K’s and

obedience to a code of discipline, the “Rahat-Maryada” as prescribed for the Khalsa (baptized Sikh). Khalsa is a Sikh, but all Sikhs are not Khalsa.

Khalsa is based on a concept of Brotherhood to fight against injustice, fanaticism and oppression. It was to build a force with the spirit of nationalism free from all socio-religious evils.⁹ One important aspect of Sikhism is its group-consciousness, its belief in Sangat (Congregation) and the presence of the Guru in the Sangat. The infringement of the code of discipline for the Khalsa, will call for a punishment by the Sangat. The maintenance of the Five K’s is very important for the Khalsa.

The first ‘K’ stands for the Keshas (unshornhair). It is kept as mark of dedication to group-loyalty. The second ‘K’ stands for the Kanga (comb) which implies tidiness. This also implies the normness of obedience and organized behaviour. The third ‘K’ stands for Kara (steel wristband). The steel holds an important place in Guru Gobind Singh’s thought, as God is called “Sarabloh” (All Steel). Amrit is prepared in a steel pot and stirred with a steel sword. Steel is seen as a symbol of strength and heroism. The Kara worn on the right wrist protects it from injury. The fourth ‘K’ represents “Kachh” (underwear) which symbolizes discipline. The fifth ‘K’ stands for “Kirpan” (Sword). The sword represents the power of defence. Its role is to destroy the wicked and arrogant. It is seen as the protector of the weak and a means to defend the helpless. It is the mark of dignity, courage and warriorhood.

The Five ‘K’s, supplemented by the turban, form the Khalsa Uniform. Guru Gobind Singh gave amrit to the five disciples who responded to his call for readiness

to sacrifice and he as well accepted the amrit from the disciples to symbolize that the Guru and the Khalsa were equal. He baptized them as Guru-Khalsa. "He obeyed the command of his five disciples at Chamkam and left the fortress much against his will."¹⁰ There after a Gurmatta (a resolution passed by the Five Beloved Disciples and later, the Congregation) became institutionalized for deciding all the important affairs of the Sikh Community since the crucial times, when the Mughal rulers had ordered the attacks on Sikhs. In the early nineteenth century, even Maharaja Ranjit Singh was not immune from obeying Gurumatta of the Khalsa panth. He was summoned to Akal Takht-Amritsar, to receive his punishment for certain misdemeanor. Similarly, the orders or proclamations issued by the Akal Takht, for the whole community, in the form of "Hukam-namas", are adhered by the Sikh community.

The concept of Sangat as espoused by Guru Gobind Singh was based on the philosophy of democracy.¹¹ The local Sangats were the representative body, which will organize the Sikhs. But over a period of time these sangats became the seat of oligarchy. While the tyranny of the Mughal rule was choking them, the Guru exhorted his disciples to be prepared for sacrificing themselves to the noble causes. The Gurus themselves led exemplary lives for their followers to emulate. Guru Arjun, Guru Tegh Bahadur and Guru Gobind Singh, all sacrificed their lives for their principles and so set a tradition of martyrdom for their beliefs. Guru Gobind Singh justified the use of force, after all other means have failed to prevent injustice and oppression. The Gurus believed that war was justified, to protect the rights, to fight against tyranny and to defend the practice of one's own religion. However, after

a whole century of persecution the Sikhs set up under Ranjit Singh sovereignty in the Punjab at the beginning of nineteenth century, they established relations of perfect amity with their former persecutors and made them partners in the root. This was the first secular administration in the Punjab which was broad based and liberal, guaranteeing freedom of religious beliefs and practices to all upholding their individual and civic rights. More recently, the Sikhs sort reforms of their religious shrines. In this process they came into conflict that the government, then in the hands of the British. For five years (1920 - 1925) these reformist Sikhs who were the original Akalis carried on their non- violent struggle through severe trials and suffering.¹² Gandhiji hailed the movement as an example of peaceful satyagraha and it's success as the first decisive step towards India's emancipation. It was much later that the nature and character of the Akali and their Politics changed.

The Institution of Martyrdom and its Manipulation:

The institution of Martyrdom, which symbolizes the principle of vicariousness of pain and sacrifice, has been sanctioned by many religions since ages. Martyrdom is projected as a second baptism, where baptism by blood is more pure than the one done with water. History of martyrdom can be traced back to the days of Semitic theology, where martyr's self-sacrifice was believed to atone in part for the whole community's sin. In Christian and Islamic faith, the people who die for the Christ's or Allah's sake, will gain eternal life. It is perceived by people as a remedy to mortality. Martyrdom is the belief that by voluntarily submitting to death, one over comes death itself.¹³ Thus a martyr is freed by his death from the guilt of all sins.

Though it can be seen as irrational or romantic glorification of death, many religions have constructed and promoted this metaphysical projection, through their historical experiences. As there is no universally acceptable scientific explanation to the mystery of life, death and “there-after”, the human imagination created various beliefs and faiths, and through religion and its laws, it explained this reality.

Martyrdom symbolizes the implicit obedience to the laws of the religion, as it is believed that martyr's who voluntarily suffered torment for and in the name of God, already possessed the status and dignity of priesthood, without ordination. Martyrs die in refusing to renounce their religious faith or in perseverance of their religious virtue. The true test of their faith is in the hour of suffering. Thus, a martyr is seen as a witness to truth (God) who suffers and one who seals his testimony with his blood.¹⁴ Symbols and metaphors play a vital role in the institution of Martyrdom. The sites of battles in Indian sub continent were named as Ganj-i-Shahidan (treasuries of martyrs), the main Gurudwara of Lahore was named Shahid-Ganj and similarly a Delhi Gurudwara at the place of martyrdom of the ninth Sikh guru is named as Sis-Ganj (treasury of life).¹⁵

Emile Durkheim¹⁶ provided a sociological interpretation to this behaviour by his study on suicides in 1897. He spoke of suicidal currents as collective tendencies that dominate some very susceptible individuals and catch them up in their sweep. The act of suicide at times, Durkheim believed was interpreted as product of these currents. Martyrdom is part of “altruistic suicide” which results from the over-integration of the individual into his social group. An individual's life is so rigorously governed by customs and habits that he takes his own life because of

higher commandments. Examples are legion: women throwing themselves at the funeral pyre of their husbands (Sati) or Danish warriors killing themselves in old age. As opposed to the obligatory altruistic suicides, there are optional varieties, which do not require suicide but praise self-sacrifice or ultimate self-renunciation as noble and praiseworthy act. Japanese Harakiri, self-immolation by Buddhist monks, self-homicide by army suicide squads, etc. prove that where ever altruistic suicide current is prevalent, man is always ready to sacrifice his life for a great cause, principle or value.

The first manifestation of martyrdom as an institution in the Sikh religion was when Guru Arjun was sentenced to death in 1606 with torture, by the order and judgement of the Emperor Jahangir, upon charges of blasphemy and high treason during the struggle for succession to the Mughal throne. The punishment termed Yara required the imperial executioners to make a public torture, but without shedding any drop of blood.

The second manifestation was during Aurangazeb's rule with similar method of execution by torture to death, in Delhi of Guru Tegh Bahadur, the ninth guru of Sikhs in 1675. Then the third important martyrdom was when Viceroy of Sirhind executed the two sons of Guru Gobind Singh in 1705.

On Baisaki day, Guru Gobind Singh, instituted the Khalsa for the Sikhs as a society for salvation or self-realization in 1699. For them, the God was the one who protected the saints, friends of the poor, destroyer of tyrants. Thus, the martyr-saints were to become stronger than one self unlike a soldier or a hero who is seen as being stronger than the other. This is the reason that the status of the martyrdom in Sikhism

is treated second only to that of the Guru and the "holy book." Guru Gobind Singh justified the use of force, if all other means failed. The Sikh may fight to protect the rights, to practice one's own religion and thereby, salvation for all human beings. This aspect of Sikh identity is manipulated by the radical Sikhs, particularly the Akali to arouse the communal passion of the Sikhs. However, they conveniently forget the history of the Sikhs before Guru Arjun and after Gobind Singh.

By identifying a temporal social struggle with the cosmic struggle of order and disorder, truth and evil, political actors are able to avail themselves of a way of thinking that justifies the use of violent means. Virtually every religious tradition including the Sikh's, applauds non- violence and proscribes the taking of human life. But the religious leaderships manages to manipulate that, the rule against killing may be abrogated under unusual circumstances when social or spiritual justice is at stake.¹⁷ Those who want their use of violence to be morally sanctioned but do not have the approval of an official recognized government, find it helpful to have access to a higher source: the meta-morality that religion provides. By elevating a temporal struggle to the level of the cosmic, they can bypass the usual moral restrictions on killing. By being dangerous, the young Sikh radicals have gained certain notoriety and by clothing their actions in the moral garb of religion, they have given their actions legitimacy. Sikhism is not the only tradition in which this link is forged between the external and internal arenas of cosmic struggle. One finds it in Christianity, Judaism and Islam as well.¹⁸

Rise and Growth of Sikh Militancy:

When the Gopichand Bhargawa ministry in 1948, declared Punjab as a bilingual state by giving Hindi and Punjabi equal status,¹⁹ the Sikhs especially the Akalis express wide protest. To add fuel to fire, during the 1951 census, the Hindus of Punjab by and large declared Hindi as their mother tongue which made the Akalis furious over it. They felt that it was an attempt by Hindus to dominate Sikhs in Punjab by denying Punjabi its rightful place. One of the crucial factors for the decision of Hindus is the role played by Jan Sangh in mobilizing them. In 1956 when the States were re-organized based on linguistic lines, the Akalis demanded for the reorganization of Punjab. But this was rejected by the Central Government on the grounds that Gurmukhi was not popular among the Punjabis. The tensions mounted further when the 1961 census recorded eleven million Hindi and eight million Punjabi speakers in Punjab. The Sikhs felt that the Punjabi Hindus have thus betrayed them by siding with the non-Punjabi Hindus. This led to the rise of politics of Punjabi Suba movement under the leadership of Master Tara Singh. He went on a fast-unto-death on 15, August 1961, but gave up after 43 days when Nehru did not yield. The movement was further led by Sant Fateh Singh, who tried to present the demand for Punjabi Suba as a purely linguistic demand, and therefore laid emphasis on Hindu-Muslim-Sikh unity. However, the Central Government under Nehru rejected this demand as it felt that the demand for a Punjabi Suba was not purely on a linguistic basis but was directed to the formation of a Sikh majority state. But later with Nehru's death, and responding to the role played by the Sikhs in 1965 Indo-Pak war the Government of India decided to redraw the boundaries of Punjab. On 3,

September 1966 Punjab Reorganization Bill was introduced in Parliament and Punjab was trifurcated into Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh with Chandigarh as the Union Territory.

Politics and religion had been going on together, hand-in-hand in Punjab since the days of Akali Movement in 1920-25, when the Gurudwaras were liberated from the exploitation of the Mahants. Through the Gurudwara Act of 1925, the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), the apex body of Sikhs with 160 elected members and the Akali Dal, the political outfit of the Sikhs, came into existence. Since then politics of Sikhs had been always centered around the Sikh faith. All parties and groups were forced to operate within the same religious – ideological framework. This virtually choked the space for other secular parties and ideas to emerge.

The internal dynamics within SGPC was governed by a symbolic relationship with Akali Dal. Similarly the Akal Takth was invoked whenever there was a need to settle factional disputes among the Akalis. Thus, both Akali Dal and SGPC were highly inter-linked. The funds, personnel and premises of the Gurudwaras and of SGPC were freely used for political purposes. The factional politics within other parties, particularly Congress (I) also played a crucial role in mixing religion and politics in Punjab. The nature of Punjab politics since then had been that of competitive extremism, in terms of religious orthodoxy, though in reality the decisions were made on rational choices to influence and win over the orthodox rural Sikh peasantry. To be more precise, the Punjab politics was one of gross opportunism and manipulation.

The Akalis particularly were going to all possible extent to use religion as an instrument to capture and stay in power. Thus, they followed the politics of convenience to attain the seat of power and authority. The Akali opposed the Unionist Party, but after the Sikander- Baldev Singh Pact, they became its allies. They opposed the Muslim League but they did nominate one of their own members for the Muslim League Cabinet in the NWFP. They passed resolutions in favour of a United India, but also bargained with the British for an independent Sikh State. After 1947, they many times denounced Congress and also allied with it. They criticized the communists and allied with them. They denounced Jan Sangh and allied with it. In spite of the radical Sikh rhetoric Akalis forged alliance with Jan Sangh in 1967 to form a coalition Government, and again a similar alliance was made in 1977-79. Though it is quite contradictory, the Akali Dal joined hands with Jan Sangh which was the junior partner in the coalition and as it suited the Akali quest for power.²⁰ Recently, after attacking BJP for long, they allied with it and formed the Government. The contradiction within Akali politics was explicit by its fragmentation into many factions, even during the peak of militancy in Punjab.

The Congress (I) was no less in such politics, when compared to the Akalis in Punjab. The Conflict between Zail Singh and Darbara Singh was one such hallmark of this politics. During his Chief Ministership from 1972 to 1977, Zail Singh went to the absurd extent of sponsoring religious gimmickry, hoping thereby to wean away the orthodox supporters of the Akali Dal and pull them to the fold of Congress (I). Zail Singh was also responsible for bringing down the Akali Government before him, using religious manipulations and defections. During his tenure, to influence the Sikh

psyche, Zail Singh named all major institutions after the Sikh gurus. Massive Road projects were undertaken to link all important Sikh Shrines in Punjab.

Meanwhile in October, 1973, the working committee of the Akali Dal adopted a policy resolution in a conference held at Anandpur demanding more autonomy to Punjab in terms of Center-State relations. Later the English version of this Anandpur Sahib Resolution was released by the Akali Party in 1978, authenticated by Harchand Singh Longowal, the president of Akali Dal. Among the items of the resolution two became most controversial, the ones which demanded changes related to Foreign Policy and FireArms licensing policy. This document was interpreted widely as a secessionist one and denounced by many observers.²¹ According to Dipankar Gupta it was a secular document to which the Congress government did not pay adequate attention.²² According to Satyapal Dang the demand of the Akalis in reality was for a Sikh theocratic state and therefore was unconstitutional.²³

Emergency was declared in 1974, and the Akali Dal was one of the firsts to protest it. Many leaders including P.S. Badal, G.S. Tohra, S.S. Mann and others were arrested. The arrests of Akali activists continued till the end of Emergency. When the emergency was revoked and elections held, the Congress(I) was routed completely in Punjab. The Akali Dal formed the government in Punjab with the support of Janata Party and Communist parties. At this juncture Zail Singh under the patronage of Sanjay Gandhi began to work on plans to bring down the Akali Government.²⁴ As he failed to engineer defections, he decided to play religious card and penetrate the Sikh religious organizations, to damage the Akali Dal. Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, head of Dam Dahmi Taksal, a little known Sikh orthodoxy sect,

was roped in. He was pushed to the forefront and was promoted to confront the liberal Nirankari Sect by the Zail Singh lobby.

The story of terrorism begun on 13 April 1978, when the Nirankaris and Akhanda Kirtani Jatha a fundamentalist Sikh group clashed, in which 18 people were killed. According to M.K.Dhar,²⁵ the permission to the Jatha and the Nirankaris to take out a procession at the same time and location was given by the political leadership in spite of clear warnings from the police. Bhindrawale publicly announced on Oath to take revenge for the killings. This was the beginning of Bhindranwale cult in politics of Punjab. During the same period in 1978 Zail Singh sponsored a new political outfit, the Dal Khalsa which later declared its objective as to lay foundation for a sovereign Sikh State.²⁶ At this juncture Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan arrived in India from England. In March 1979 he organised a procession from Anandpur Sahib to Amritsar and announced the formation of the National Council of Khalistan. This period marked the beginning of regular clashes between the Nirankaris and the Akalis, in many parts of Punjab.

Meanwhile the Janata Government at the Centre collapsed and fresh elections were announced and the Congress (I) swept the elections. Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister and made Zail Singh the Home Minister of India. A moderate Darbara Singh was thus made the Chief Minister of Punjab, in a move to please the Hindus in Punjab.

In April 1980, Bhindranwale's men killed the Guru of the Nirankari Sect in Delhi. No attempts were made to arrest Bhindranwale. And ironically the Home Minister of India denied the role of Bhindrawale, in the parliament. In 1981, Ganga S.

Dhillon a US based Sikh activist, at 54th Sikh Educational Conference, organised by Chief Khalsa Diwan, advocated the theory of Sikhs as a separate nation and passed resolutions demanding for Khalistan, and also seeking associate membership in the United Nations. Following this conference many factions started mooted the Sikh nation theory, especially by the faction led by Jagdev Singh Talwandi.

At this juncture on 9, September 1981 Bhindranwale's men killed Lala Jagat Narayanan an Arya Samajist, former Congress-I General Secretary and owner of Hind Samachar Group. The Darbara Singh Government issued orders to arrest him. Thus Bhindranwale was arrested but on his own terms and conditions. Soon he was released unconditionally. Again the Home Minister informed the parliament that Bhindranwale had no role in the killing. By this period Bhindranwale emerged as "giant of invincible destiny." In 1982, the Akalis announced that they would disrupt the holding of Asian Games in Delhi. Ironically this led to a great humiliation by the police on Sikhs, when they stopped every Sikh and searched him before allowing him to enter Delhi at various places in Haryana.²⁷ Many senior retired Armed Forces personnel, senior politicians and other prominent personalities were among those who were harassed. The Sikh community took this incident as a great insult to their dignity. Ironically, neither the Government nor the political leadership expressed regret for these incidents. These episodes fuelled the Hindu – Sikh tension in Punjab.

On the other side, Bhindranwale and his men were converting the Golden Temple into a fortress. On 23 April 1983, a DIG of police A.S. Atwal was shot dead at the entrance of Golden Temple Complex. No action was taken to arrest the killers, who along with Bhindranwale lived inside the Golden Temple. In October 1983, the

Darbara Singh Government was dismissed and President's Rule declared. As a result "Operation Blue Star" was launched to flush out the criminals and terrorists on 5 June 1984, on the martyrdom day of Guru Arjun who had laid the foundation of the Temple. This hurt the Sikh psyche severely. In this Operation the Sikh seat of authority, the Akal Takht was reduced to debris. The sacred place was reduced to a war zone, where the army used tanks and the terrorist used anti-tank rockets. Major General K.S. Brar led the operation.²⁸ The battle lasted for three days when finally Bhindranwale was killed with his associate Major General Shuhbeg Singh, Indo-Pak the 1971 War veteran. Roughly 700 Army personnel were killed in the operation, with civilian casualties crossing thousands and around 200 militants were killed.

The Sikh community world over rose against in protest and anger. There were around 2000 cases of desertion reported in Armed Forces of India, which was quickly brought under control. In October 1984 Indira Gandhi was killed by her own bodyguards who were Sikhs and anti-Sikh violence broke out on the streets of Delhi, Kanpur and some other parts of the country, which resulted in the killing of several hundred Sikhs. After the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India. The Congress (I) under his leadership won the December 1984 elections with an overwhelming majority. On the Republic Day of 1985 he announced his intention to resolve the Punjab Crisis. As a good will gesture many frontline Sikh leaders like G.S. Tohra, P.S. Badal and J.S. Talwandi who were arrested earlier were released. Once these leaders left the jails, they realized that their mass bases had eroded away. So they again resorted to inflammatory speeches, to arouse the communal passion among the Sikhs, particularly leaders like J.S. Talwandi

and S. Sukhjinder Singh. They started wearing yellow turbans as a symbol of extremism.

On the other hand leader like H.S. Longowal, S.S. Barnala and others took a moderate stand and propagated religious tolerance among the masses. Taking advantage of the situation Rajiv Gandhi and his ministry negotiated with H.S. Longowal. It resulted in signing of the historic Rajiv- Longowal Accord on 24 July 1985. This Accord changed the atmosphere in Punjab, as the masses and the leaders widely approved of it. Tragically on 20 August 1985 a Sikh militant assassinated H.S. Longowal. Yet he gained the fame of martyr for the noble cause of peace. S.S. Barnala took over as the President of Shiromani Akali Dal. Election was held for the Assembly on 25, September 1985. The Akali Dal (Longowal) won the election with thumping majority inspite of boycott call by the militant groups. The Akali Dal (Longowal) won 72 seats and S.S. Barnala became the Chief Minister of Punjab.

The implementation of the Rajiv-Longowal Accord was the main poll plank of the Akali Party. The verdict of the elections was seen as the indicator of support from the masses for the Accord and peace. But ironically the Central Government went back on its commitments. Chandigarh City as per the Accord was not transferred to Punjab on 26 January 1986. However, neither a restoration at the political process under an Akali government nor the application to the state of severe new measures to detain suspected terrorists under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) 1985 brought an end to terrorist actions and the killing of innocents in Punjab.²⁹

The Rajiv Gandhi Government was more pre-occupied in pleasing the Haryana and Rajasthan states as elections were due there. Meanwhile internal cracks started appearing in the ruling Akali function. P.S. Badal and G.S. Tohra began to drift apart from S.S. Barnala. And on the other hand, Barnala ministry's popularity was giving way to disappointment and frustration among the Sikh masses. The situation worked in favour of the extremists and terrorists. The militants convened a Sarbat Khalsa Congregation at the Akal Takhat and resolutions for creation of Khalistan were passed. Since then regular meetings were organised in support of Khalistan movement in Punjab, particularly inside the Golden Temple Complex. This resulted in Operation Black Thunder-I, which was conducted with the permission from the Barnala Government. Political consequence of this operation was the resignation of many leaders from the Barnala ministry and the formation of a new faction led by Badal.

Further militancy gained a boost when an attempt on the life of Rajiv Gandhi was made on 2 October 1986. The law and order condition in Punjab also was deteriorating further. The Government made several changes. S.S. Ray was sent as Governor and J.F. Ribiero was sent as police chief to Punjab. But the political climate worsened further. On 11 May 1987, President's Rule was imposed on Punjab. Absence of the democratic government further promoted and strengthened the militant's position. The militants again started building up their activities in the Golden Temple Complex. The Government again decided to flush out the militants from it.

On 9, May 1988 Operation Black Thunder II was launched. As a political tactic, the dethroned head priest of Akal Thakt, Bhai Jasbir Singh Rode was released from the Jail, before the Operation began. The Operation was conducted smoothly without any causality for the Armed Forces and in the preview of visual media.³⁰ Many terrorists were arrested. In the end of 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visited Punjab twice in an effort to win the support of the masses. Again Bhai J.S. Rode's assistance to mobilize the masses was sought. Covertly he was with the Central Government in a bid to take control of the Akal Takht again. In spite of his fiery speeches, he could not win over the confidence of Sikh masses.

In 1989 elections were held for the Lok Sabha and V.P. Singh became the new Prime Minister, and S.S. Mann became the focal point of Sikh leadership and politics. On 10 December 1989, Mann faction passed a Resolution demanding an autonomous Sikh region in North as an integral part of the Indian Union. But slowly with disappointment over the V.P. Singh Government, he tilted to a pro-militant politics. Meanwhile, the V.P. Singh Ministry fell in 1990 and Chandrasekhar took over as the Prime Minister of India. Taking advantage of the political crisis the militants played havoc in Punjab. They began to conduct Khalsa panchayats and a virtually parallel Government was run by the terrorists in Maaja region. To counter the deteriorating situation General O.P. Malhotra was sent as new Governor to Punjab. D.S. Mangat replaced K.P.S. Gill as the DGP of Punjab police. The Chandrasekhar Government opened up talks with the militants. Subodh Kant Sahay the Minister of State for Home Affairs tried to negotiate with All India Sikh Students Federation (Manjit) and

many other factions for a peaceful solution. But the process failed and the militants continued their terrorist strikes in length and breadth of Punjab.

Meanwhile the Chandrasekhar Government declared its intention to conduct elections in Punjab. This appeared as a positive sign in Punjab politics as most of the militant groups expressed their willingness to participate in the election. But at the behest of the Congress party, the elections were postponed in the last minute, on 21, June 1991. General O.P. Malhotra resigned from the Governorship of Punjab in dismay. Meanwhile after Lok Sabha elections of 1991, P.V. Narashima Rao became the Prime Minister of India. The Central Government appointed Surendra Nath as the Governor of Punjab, and KPS Gill was recalled as DGP. These political and administrative changes did not hamper the militancy and the terrorist strikes increased phenomenally.

The External Dimension:

Separatism however should also be considered in the context of external factors. Exploiting the ethnic divisions has been an effective way of gaining influence in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries. The regional balance of power, inter-state relations, the overall strategic interest of big powers, and the influence of irredentism and internationalist movements have a bearing on separatism.³¹ Given the fragile nature of many Third World states resulting from ethnic diversity, cultural plurality, widespread poverty, unequal development and the cumulative effect of bad governance, the exploitation of these problems has been means employed by rival neighbours and big powers to gain influence inside a Third

World state. Supporting separatism from without strengthens the politics of ethnicity from within.

Increasingly promoting terrorism and separatism in rival countries had become an instrument of state policy, to furtherance of one's national interest. Terrorism was being used as a calculated tool of foreign policy or in other words a warfare metaphor.³² Various studies made on international terrorism show a pattern of close nexus between foreign policy of one country and domestic variables (ethnicity, religion, ideological ferment, denial of popular participation in decision making, and economic discontent) of other.³³ These variables which cause domestic instability provide the rationale for terrorism and are prompted and fanned by interested powers and subsequently used to destabilize the target state. The result is that, as the support base and sponsorship of terrorism is outside the target state, efforts to contain terrorism within the boundaries of the target state often fails. The target state either tolerates the ill effects of international terrorism or escalates the proxy way into a conventional war. In its essentials, it is the deliberate employment of violence by a state to attain strategic, political, or religious objectives by criminal acts intended to create overwhelming fear in the targeted population. The general aim is to undermine the psycho-social stability and governance of pluralist representative states based on democracy.³⁴

Pakistan has been providing substantial covert help to the Sikh separatist during the days of militancy. Pakistan's assistance had been in the form of sponsoring the terrorist activities against India by its proxy war.

The Pakistan Factor:

Pakistan has played a prominent and successful role in promoting and encouraging terrorism in Punjab.³⁵ The type of assistance provided by Pakistan clearly proves that it was not meant to promote an ideology of self-determination or so, but supplement to sustain conflicts, terrorism, militancy and turmoil in India. It is unlikely that Pakistan will actually allow or support creation of a sovereign Sikh state on its borders because such claims may eventually extend beyond Lahore and to some other Pakistani areas sacred to the Sikhs. Therefore a friendly Sikh population, along its borders would be of strategic and tactical advantage. And the creation of Khalistan would mean to lose it. Some of the strategic,³⁶ political and foreign policy³⁷ objectives of Pakistan, in context of Punjab are (a) to promote Hindu-Sikh alienation through various actions of the terrorist groups with a view to establish a permanent hostile Sikh dominated and a 'pro-Pakistan' belt in this strategically important border state, which conversely would provide a friendly cushion in event of a conventional war. (b) To keep India under constant pressure, by the demands of "Khalistan" to discredit its secular credentials. (c) To keep Indian Armed Forces engaged in its internal commitments by promoting militancy. (d) To disrupt the lines of communication, and sabotage logistic support systems by terrorist means and methods, for a tactical advantage in break out of a conventional war.

Though India has repeatedly charged Pakistan for its role in terrorism in India, it has always denied it. The statements of Lal Singh, a dreaded terrorist arrested in July, 1992 in Bombay,³⁸ revealed Pakistan's plans to destabilize India with the assistance of certain fundamentalist groups. The killing of "hard core" terrorist,

Talwinder Singh Parmar, in Jalandhur on 15 October 1992, along with two Pakistani nationals conclusively proves the role of Pakistan. The Home Ministry released the draft White Paper on Pakistan's role in fomenting terrorism in India in 1998.³⁹ The draft said " in order to weaken India's potential strength and the "National Will", by hitting at it's perceived "fault lines", Pakistan wanted to pursue the "Qurban Ali Doctrine" of the inevitable Balkanization of India. This is operationalised by sending intensively trained - motivated terrorists and Pakistani agents to carry out the acts of Sabotage. The draft also talked of the factors that led to the growth of Pakistan's covert action programme, including operational linkages established by the ISI with drug syndicates in South Asia. It also expressed its concern on the availability of free of cost military hardware to the terrorists, and above all, Pakistan's political and military leadership slipping into the hands of "hawks". The modus operandi of this objective has been by promoting smuggling and dispersal of illegal weaponry, patronage to drug Mafia, developing links with the "under world", by pushing counterfeit currencies through various border points and use of Hawala means to finance the covert military action programme.⁴⁰

The Role of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI):

Pakistan had been involved in the internal affairs of India by fuelling and abetting terrorism, by its premier intelligence agency ISI, since four decades or so.⁴¹ ISI is the brainchild of Major General R. Cawthome, a British Army Officer, and the Deputy Chief of Staff in Pakistan Army in 1948. It was formulated as part of the military structure, intended to combine and co-ordinate intelligence set-ups of the

armed forces. The higher levels of the organisation were exclusively recruited from the military establishments and the Chiefs had always been chosen from the serving army Lieutenant Generals. ISI has a major say in the defence out lay of Pakistan and had never been accountable to any one including the Army, the Prime Minister and the President of Pakistan. Thus ISI became a state within a state. ISI has been sponsoring insurgency, militancy and terrorism in Indian soil⁴² since 1957. It started with its support to Nagas and Mizos insurgencies, later it extended it to Punjab and Kashmir. Recently, it has expanded to length and breath of the country, covering a whole lot of alienated groups.

After the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the ISI established contacts with Charanjit Singh Panchi of the UK and his associates. Charanjit Singh's group had been for some time actively engaged in expressing their dissent against the Indian Government's role in resolving their problems in Britain. They started projecting themselves at par with the Palestinians and others as country-less diaspora. They charged the Indian Government of treating Sikhs as second class citizens and slaves, as their grievances were never addressed. They mooted the movement for a separate Sikh homeland. In 1970 Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, a former minister in the United Front Government of 1967 in Punjab, migrated to London. He managed to take over the leadership of the Sikh Homeland movement and reorganized it as the free Khalistan movement. Dr. Chauhan visited Pakistan in 1971, before the Indo-Pak War and was overtly honoured by General Yahya Khan as "the father of Sikh Nation". Through ISI, Dr. Chauhan and his syndicate established links with the CIA and the US Government.

In 1977 with General Zia-ul-Haq coming to power in Pakistan the ISI earned a prominent role in the external affairs of Pakistan, particularly against India. General Zia initiated a three fold action plan to separate Kashmir from India, code-named as “Operation Topac”, after the earlier failure of “Operation Gibraltar.”⁴³ The designation of this Operation was derived from Topac Amru, the 18th century prince who led the war of liberation in Uruguay against the Spanish rule. At this juncture, the Pakistani strategists planned to exploit the Indian Union’s “fault line” particularly in Kashmir and Punjab, to achieve its obvious objectives, which among other factors included sowing seeds of dissent among the people of Punjab and Kashmir, against India.

ISI resumed its new project by encouraging many more activists of the Sikh community like Ganga Singh Dhillon of Nankana Sahib Foundation, USA and Gajendra Singh of the Dal Khalsa. According to A.P.Bhatnagar⁴⁴ by 1980, the ISI started training the Dal Khalsa activists in Pakistani camps and extended its assistance in subsequent years to many other organizations such as Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF). Between 1981 and 1984, the Sikh terrorists, were involved in five cases of hijacking Indian aircrafts.⁴⁵ In one case, when the hijack drama was terminated in Lahore, Pakistan instead of handing over the terrorists to India, allowed them to go scot-free and live in the Nankana Sahib Gurudwara in Lahore.

There had been seven hijacking cases of Indian Airlines flights by terrorist groups since 1971. All seven of them were carried out, when the army was in power in Pakistan, five under General Zia’s regime, one under General Yahya Khan’s rule

and one after General Musharraf took over. In all the cases Pakistan's role was clearly evident from the fact that the hijackers always preferred to force land the flight in Pakistani territory and weapons used by them had always been identified as acquired from the Government of Pakistan. After this matter was taken up seriously with the Regan Administration in 1984, the ISI temporarily abandoned its encouragement to the terrorists to hijack though it had resumed it, the latest being the December 1999 Kandhar episode.

The ISI stepped up its training and supply of weapons to the Sikh militants following "Operation Blue Star" in 1984. The "Operation Blue Star" provided the best opportunity to ISI, which it exploited thoroughly by fuelling the Sikh community's alienation with the Government and converting it into a communal fracas in Punjab. Though the initial game-plan of the ISI was a limited design, particularly to the supply of arms and providing sanctuary to militants and criminals hunted in India, it was further expanded and baptized as "Operation K-2",⁴⁶ which meant the separation of Khalistan and Kashmir from India.

The ISI apart from fuelling arms, ammunitions and money to the militants, conducted training and indoctrination programmes in specially created camps, and was highly successful in converting the estranged Sikh youths to a hardened and motivated terrorist, well versed in the use of sophisticated weapons, explosives and communication equipments. They acted in co-ordination with the militants in the Kashmir Valley and involved in terrorist acts both in India and abroad.⁴⁷ In the initial stages, the ISI used the infrastructure created for the "Afghanistan Mission", to help

the Kashmiri and Punjabi terrorists. According to A.P. Bhatnagar,⁴⁸ Dal Khalsa militants were given advanced training in Mujahedin camps in Afghanistan.

ISI resorted to this aggressive revanchist policy as result of the scar of 1971 Indo-Pak war which created Bangladesh. In the garb of pre-empting the moves from the Indian side, to further break up Pakistan, the ISI justified its activities of supporting the militant's in India, to its Government and people. Terrorism in India received further stimulation with the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984. After the "Operation Woodrose" (1985) and "Operation Black Thunder I-II" (1986-1988) many terrorist "chiefs" shifted their bases to Pakistan and co-ordinated their activities in Indian Punjab.

In 1989 the Pakistani premier Benazir Bhutto froze the ISI activities, particular in the context of support for the Sikh cause, at the behest of Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister. But within a year after the dismissal of Benazir Government in August 1990, the ISI resumed its training and arms supply to the Sikh militants, taking advantage of the political crisis in India. Since 1992, the ISI had been repeatedly pressing the Sikh terrorists to target prominent political leaderships, economic centres, and religious symbols outside Punjab particularly New Delhi.

In 1991, the P.V. Narashimha Rao government provided a detailed dossier to the US administration, about the Pakistani role in fuelling and abetting terrorism in India and sought its declaration that Pakistan as a "Sponsorer State of International Terrorism". But even after the testimony of the CIA director on 12, April 1993 before the Senate Judiciary in favour of the Indian claims, the US Administration did not heed. Pakistan's low intensity conflict with India in the form of cross-border

terrorism has been cost-effective compared to other conventional methods. Withdrawal of such activities would mean increase in defence outlay for Pakistan. So, for Pakistan terrorism is instrument of state policy by other means.⁴⁹ Pakistan looks upon terrorism as a political tool to frustrate India's potentials, from emerging as a major regional hegemonic power, due to the conventional superiority.

Beyond such designs, by making India pre occupied with internal security duties, its ambition is to weaken the State overall and finally Balkanize it. Though the UN Resolution and Declarations of various member states of the International Community recognize state-sponsored terrorism as indirect aggression, conventionally the means adopted to counter it has been through diplomatic pressures and interventions, than through economic means and through military or paramilitary relations against the sponsors. This can be seen as passive defence, where the main concern is the protection and insulation alone of the citizens from enemy attacks.

Role of Media:

Terrorism and the media are uneasy bedfellows.⁵⁰ Their relationship is one of mutual distrust and mutual need. Media is known as the "oxygen " of terrorism. The terrorists need publicity and the media needs audience ratings. Terrorism by its very nature is a weapon that depends on the communication of a threat to the public at large. Media has played a crucial role in publicizing causes and relaying threats to wider audiences.

In Punjab under the imposition of the terrorist rule, the media succumbed absolutely. Punjab's most popular regional language daily, *Ajit* acted as something of a fundamentalist mouthpiece during the period of militancy. Justifying the cause of a

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25. Dhar M.K., *Interview in Delhi on 11 March 2000*.
26. Kumar, Ram Narayan & Sieberer, George, *The Sikh Struggle : Origin Evolution and Present Phase* New Delhi: Chanakya Publication, 1991, p.254.
27. Bains, D.S.; *Interview in Chandigarh on 3rd June 2000*.
28. Marwah, Ved, *Uncivil War: Pathology of Terrorism*, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1995, p.175.
29. Brass, Paul, R., *The Politics of India Since Independence*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.196.
30. Marwah, Ved, *Ibid.*, p.193.
31. Ahemad, Istiaqh, *Ibid.*, p.47.
32. Gupta, Rakesh, "Terrorism as a Warfare Metaphor", *Strategic Analysis*, December 1993, vol.XVI, no.9.
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34. Kumar, Ashwini, "AK-47, Culture: How to tackle Terrorism", *World Affairs*, December 1993, p.16.
35. Sarkar, Bhaskar, *Tackling Insurgency and Terrorism: Blue Print for Action*, New Delhi: Vision Books 1998, p.47.
36. Raman B., Pakistan Sponsorship of Terrorism in Sondhi, M.L. (ed.) *Terrorism and Political Violence*, New Delhi: ICSSR 2000, p.66.
37. Prabha, Kshitij, *Ibid.*, p.99.
38. *Interogation Report of Lal Singh*.
39. *Times of India* 30, October 1998.
40. Refere to Appendix –7,8 and 9.
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separate Sikh state *Ajit* faithfully reproduced the terrorist propaganda. With the end of militancy, *Ajit* abandoned its fundamentalist platform and threw weight behind conventional moderate *Akali* politics.⁵¹ The lone exception of anti-terrorist position was from the *Punjab Kesari Group*. All other newspapers regularly carried out the press releases and notices, including the terrorist imposed "Panthic Code" for the people of Punjab and the threats that accompanied it. Reports on the "bhog" ceremonies of "martyrs" to the terrorist cause were also regular features.

The norms for reporting terrorist incidents slapped by the terrorist including ban on the use of word 'terrorist' or its Hindi equivalent "atankvadi" were adopted with promptness by the entire private and government-controlled media.⁵² The security forces were the major targets of media attacks during the peak of militancy. However, better situation emerged only after the democratic processes were established and counter-terrorist operations succeeded.

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Chapter-III

Politics of Integration : Co-operative Dimension

Political antagonism by their very nature tend to find expression in violence because they are concerned with fundamental questions. Therefore the tendency to revolve conflict by bloodshed is ever-present. Yet politics can also be defined as a constant effort to eliminate physical violence and to give social and individual conflicts outlets that are less harsh, brutal and violent. The elimination of violent methods can be divided into three stages. At a primitive stage authority is not strong enough to prevent determined opponents from confronting each other with physical force. It can only restrict its use by restraining and regulating it. At the second stage these brutal and barbarous rites are replaced by more civilized kinds of violence: pillage or massacre becomes strikes; forced labour or imprisonment became lock-out. Finally in the last stage, politics completely eliminates physical violence, replacing it by other modes of fighting: electoral battles, parliamentary debates, committee discussions. Thus democratic procedure is a more moderate, more gentle and less brutal means of expressing political controversies than physical violence.¹

Elections:

Election is the process through which modern democratic states create amongst its citizens a sense of involvement and participation in the affairs of the state. It is through this process a government gains legitimacy for its authority. The electoral process open up channels of communications between polity and society through which the political aspirations of the people are reflected to the Government.

Though the people are unable to make the distinction between myth and reality, and are prone to emotional mobilization, their voting act is not isolated from the socio-economic setting. In a pluralistic country like India, with diverse socio-cultural groups co-existing together, it may often lead to eruptions of differences and conflicts. Though there are many ways to resolve conflicts, the institution of election has proved to be a more effective and reliable one. It is through this process that peripheral groups transcend their regional and caste identities, and acquire over time a certain commonality of economic interest and political identification, which help establish a political framework to check conflict and open negotiation among divergent interests within the society. Granville Austin takes the position that adult suffrage has wrought more changes in Indian society and the way in which the country functions than anything else is by the constitution.² Yogendra Yadav suggests that the electoral system, though is a mix of tradition and modernity, has meant greater participation by both men and women.³

Though elections can be seen as one of the significant instruments of conflict resolution. It is the electoral process in which the terrorist is an actor, according to Harold Lasswell.⁴ The absence of popular trust on the electoral process may destroy the very fabric of democratic process in a society. Any attempt made to derail or sabotage the process of election, would alienate the people and would lead to strident sectarian politics like separatism and secession. In Punjab, no Akali Government was allowed or could not function for a full five years term. This was projected to the masses by many as a conspiracy against the Sikh community. This led to their perceived alienation and the leadership decided to either succumb or choose path of

militancy. Yet in an open and competitive system, election is the occasion and the instrument through which distortion in the system can be set right. Elections have many integrative features by which the dissent groups are pulled back to the mainstream. As most of the people have shown their ability to shift their attention and passions from one identity to another frequently and with great fluidity, the process of co-operations and co-option play a vital role in restoration of democracy. While the political process in Punjab had been marked by the phenomena of competitive militancy, the election provides a space to defuse such tendencies and provide a consensual basis of polity. Thus elections are central to any democratic system to survive, and pursue social revolution. In India, social revolution and democracy have gone hand in hand⁵ though the pace of that change has carried a price with it.⁶ The social developments have led to emergence of new social groups which have assisted against the old coalition of ruling castes, classes.⁷

Restoration Process:

The elections in Punjab were scheduled for 22, June 1991 along with the general elections. But the Chief Election Commissioner canceled them at the last minutes. But until the day before the P.V. Narashimha Rao Government took over, the Chief Election Commissioner T.N.Seshan was firm to hold elections at all cost. Finally he gave it up due to the Congress (I) pressure. The new poll date announced by the Election Commission was, 25 September 1991. But consequently, that too was not adhered again primarily because of the objections raised by the Congress (I) against some candidates who filed nominations. They went to the extent of declaring

a boycott of the polls. Eventually the commission without further announcement of any firm date revoked the notification itself. According to a Bhan Singh Baurah,⁸ this was done mainly due to the unpreparedness of the Congress. The Congress (I) anticipated defeat therefore boycott the elections as several Akali Dal groups were in the fray.⁹ But according to Gurucharan Singh¹⁰ Galib, the Congress boycott was a protest against the Akali factions and not against the electoral process. *They were only expressing their concern by this boycott, as the Akalis nominated many "Khalistani" terrorists as their candidates and were propagating that it was not merely an election, but referendum for a "Sikh land". Thereafter Parliament had to extend the president's rule by another term of six months. Later the Home Minister S.B.Chawan after a visit to Punjab, expressed the government's intention to hold elections by mid-February, 1992. Later the fresh date 13 February 1992 was fixed, and for technical reasons the Election Commission postponed it by another four days to 19, February 1992. Though the center's decision to hold elections in Punjab was made earlier in October 1991, the process gained momentum only in January 1992. As a part of restorations process additional deployment of armed forces were ordered in November 1991 and K.P.S. Gill took over as Director General of Punjab Police again. Nearly 100 Battalions of the Army, several hundred companies of paramilitary forces, were deployed to assist the Government in addition to the 53,000 strong, Punjab Police. However despite the Government's firmness to integrate the society by security cover for the people, the Killings by the terrorists increased as the elections drew near. Earlier in June 1991, 110 people were killed in two train massacres in Ludhiana district, a week before the election which was scheduled for 22, June. Now

three terrorists attacks, carried on 26, December 1991 and 8, January 1992 in Ludhiana, Sangrur and Ropar district with casualties around 75 people, resulted in a major shakeup in society. This was the message from the terrorists, in opposition to the proposed election and against democracy in Punjab. The Akali factions, which were under tremendous pressure, held a meeting at Chandigarh and subsequently announced their boycott of the elections. According to Tarlochan Singh Tur,¹¹ the elections could not have been held under the then prevailing circumstances in the state. The meeting was attended by five prominent factions namely, Akali Dal (Badal), Akali Dal (Baba Joginder Singh), Akali Dal (Mann), Akali Dal (Kartar Singh Narag) and All India Sikh Students Federation (Manjit Singh).

Already three main terrorist groups, the Babbar Khalsa International, the Khalistan Commando Force and the Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan had warned the political outfits against participating in the elections. The militants made it clear that any one who dared to take part in the election, to the Legislative body set up under the Indian constitution would do so, at his own risk. They called on the Sikhs for the renouncement of the Indian Constitution and dedicating themselves to the cause of "Khalistan". Akalis made no hesitation in abiding by the dictates of the militants, and thereby announced their boycott, until their demands were met by the state. They wanted a package of concessions first and elections later. Leaders of various national parties too wanted conditions to be created first for the participation of the Sikh organizations. They were of the opinion that without the involvement of the Akalis; the electoral verdict would lack credibility.¹² A package of proposals as solution to Punjab's long standing problems would have enabled the otherwise

moderate factions of Akalis to justify their participation, on the assurance that, an elected government would be able to conduct further meaningful negotiations. But the Congress (I) at the Center insisted that elections should be held first and all other decision on key issues should be dealt later. The Prime Minister too, ruled out any package until the elected representatives formed a government in the state.¹³

Through the Congress (I) boycott the proposed June 1991 elections earlier, it activated itself for the February 1992 elections under the leadership of Sardar Beant Singh. Most observers felt that this was exercise in futility. In late 1991 itself Beant Singh was busy selecting candidates to fight the election for following year. He pushed himself and his party ahead despite the fact that he lacked complete support from his own party workers in the state. In January 1992, the Union Minister for Internal Security Rajesh Pilot visited Taran Taran in Amritsar district, which was believed as the epicenter of the terrorist activities, to boost the morale of the rural masses for the elections. This visit was a significant event, in the sense, to counter the Akalis and the extremists' propaganda that if a non- Congress (I) government wins the election, it will be pulled down within next six months. The response from the BJP to the scheduled election was initially a wait and see approach, though later it decided to participate. The Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) decided to go ahead with its earlier decision to participate in the elections in full gear, to reinforce their long crusade against terrorism. Politically the Communist Parties were the major victims of terrorism because of their open and relentless fight against them since its ascendancy. The strongest bases of these parties were coincidentally the very places where the terrorist ruled later.

Meanwhile some procedural changes were made through ordinances to facilitate the electoral process. The first ordinance made it unnecessary to countermand the polls in a constituency on the death of a candidate who is not sponsored by a recognized political party. The second ordinance had reduced the time available between the notification and the polling date from 30 days to 25 days, and corresponding reduction was made in respect to the deadline for filing of nomination, scrutiny and withdrawal. These steps were taken primarily to save the electoral process from derailment as result of deaths of non-serious candidates. But this apparent lack of concern by the government for non-party candidates was widely critiqued by many. During the campaign phase of the aborted 1991 election, polling in number of constituencies had to be countermanded because of the deaths of candidates, who were killed by the terrorists and most of them happened to be independents. By the two new Ordinances the Government to some extent countered the terrorist attempts to sabotage the revival of democratic process in the state. The chances of the terrorist attacks on the independent candidates lowered and the candidates put up by the recognized parties were given adequate security. Each candidate was provided with a platoon of 30 men of security personnel as well as atleast two armoured vehicles. The enhanced risks they faced were obvious from the fact that in the 1985 elections each candidate was allotted with two police personnel who were ill trained for such risks. But this tight security itself was a hindrance in canvassing among the masses as they were intimidated by it.

Another major fear during this period was that with the boycott call the nexus between the Akalis and the underground terrorist would broaden the militant's base.

This also actually boosted their authority over the political process. While it was widely believed that the boycotting parties of Badal, Mann and others had been threatened earlier and their stance was born out of fear. They declared that they would not repeat the “mistake” they committed by participating in the 1989 elections.¹⁴ The Akali Dal (Kabul) was the only faction, which was going for the election.¹⁵ According to K.R.Malkani (BJP) and S.S.Minhas (Akali Dal - Badal) the indifferences towards the elections were largely due to the fear of possible rigging of the elections by Congress (I).¹⁶ And the other factor was that the Sikh psyche had been hurt over the years, because of the unfulfilled promises. No attempts were made to implement the agreed Punjab Accord.

Under these circumstances the situation in Punjab was quite bleak with uncertainties over the turnout and the legitimacy of the process in the people’s perception. According to Sube Singh,¹⁷ one of the three IG’s who were incharge of Army-Police security operations, a mere 35 to 40 percent turnout would be a great achievement. According to Satpal Dang¹⁸ this election was basically a confidence-building exercise among the masses. For the Congress (I) the first step to a solution of the Punjab problem was an elected government in the state. Elections they felt will help to restore peace and unity among different communities.

Seven factions of Akali Dal, which had a fair representation among the people, were boycotting the polls. The Congress (I) was the only party contesting all 13 Lok Sabha and 115 Assembly seats. The Akali Dal (Kabul) had fielded candidates for 74 Assembly seats, leaving 31 seats for its allies – CPI, CPI (M) and the Janata Dal.

The BJP's presence was confined more to urban constituencies and the Communist parties had fielded candidates in 40 constituencies. Under the prevailing situation the greatest advantage politically was to the pro-boycott groups. The seven Akali factions that had given call for boycott campaigned for it. The police arrested all top leaders of the Akali Dals on the fear of breach of peace. To give strength to the boycott call, the militants were also using their own means of propaganda. But for ordinary people voting became a question of life and death. Along with the fear, there was an element of distrust that the government may decide to call off the elections any moment. It was in this context that the National parties, especially the CPI (M) and the Janata Dal were critical of the Government for being responsible for hindering the return of normal conditions in Punjab by first putting off and later canceling the election in the state in June 1991. In their perception it was only through the electoral exercise that extremists could be isolated from the masses. The deployment of Army and further strengthening of the security forces by the government in the end of 1991 did not win the confidence of the people. It only reduced the number of killings by the militants and also made them flee to the neighbouring states. But the ambience of fear was high among the common people.

Under such circumstances, as a result of some informal arrangements, the Akali Dal (K) leader Captains Amrinder Singh and Congress (I) leader Dilbagh Singh Daleke were elected unopposed to the Assembly from Samana and Taran Taran constituencies. But both Congress (I) and Akali Dal (K) denied that they had forged any kind of agreement, though Beant Singh did not rule out a post-election agreement for a coalition government if the congress (I) failed to secure an absolute majority in

the Assembly. According to Beant Singh, Congress would not mind joining hands with the Akali Dal (K) or even BJP to form a government. The local BJP leaders were also airing their support for a coalition government if need arises. Meanwhile it was the pro-boycott groups, which launched the poll-related campaign first, with a rally on 2 February 1992 at Ludhiana. They were targeting the villages and small towns for their campaign for poll boycott. There was also fear of possible militant strikes during the election campaign, which may result in further lower turnout in polling. It was evident that even a terrorist attack in Haryana or Uttar Pradesh could affect the polling. While the fear was haunting all the parties in the fray, the electioneering went ahead with a low profile and high security campaign. There were only 81 candidates for the Lok Sabha seats and 582 for the Assembly seats in the fray. This was an all time low of candidates in the history of elections in Punjab.

Election Process:

Elections were held on 19, February 1992. The total turnout was 24.23 percent, much below than the initial claim by the Government of 30 per cent.¹⁹ It was the lowest ever polling in the history of the state. The previous low was in 1971 Lok Sabha elections – 59.9 per cent. The 1985 Assembly elections and the 1989 Lok Sabha elections had recorded 67.5 and 62.7 per cent polling.²⁰ There was a small discrepancy between the turnout figures for the Assembly and the Parliamentary elections as released by the Election Commission. The total turnout figures reported from the Lok Sabha results were 23.91 per cent.²¹ This turnout was again the lowest in the last four decades of elections in the All India context. Even the elections in

Assam in 1983 recorded 32.7 per cent turnout.²² The other worse situation was in Jammu and Kashmir in the 1989 parliamentary elections, where the state average was 31.6 per cent inspite of almost less than 6 per cent turnout in the Kashmir valley.

In Punjab ever since its formation in 1966, the average turnout for the Assembly elections had been 68.3 per cent, about 8 per cent higher than the average all-India turnout for Assembly elections in this period. Even if we take the moderate 67.5 per cent polling in the 1985 election as a yardstick, there is a drop of about 44 per cent in the turnout of 1992 election. Another striking factor in this polling was its unequal distribution of turnout, with some constituencies having polled a mere 2 per cent votes and with some other having polled up to 60 per cent votes. It was earlier speculated that polling would be lower in the Majha region, comprising of Amritsar and Gurdaspur districts, supposedly the birth place of Sikh militancy. Great hopes were placed on Doaba comprising of Jalandhar, Kapurthala and Hoshiarpur districts and on Malwa region which includes Patiala, Ferozepur, Sangrur, Ludhiana, Bhatinda, Rupnagar districts. To every body's surprise it was the Malwa region, which had the lowest turnouts and Gurdaspur in Majha region polled around a good 30 percent votes. In terms of urban-rural divide the pattern that emerged was that there was very less polling in rural areas and relatively better turnouts in Urban centres. According to Yogendra Yadav,²³ the areas which had a heavy turnout were ones dominated by Hindus or lower caste Sikhs and areas which had low polling were areas with predominantly high caste Sikh population in the state. The Hindu dominated constituencies in and around Pathankot and Jalandhar saw around 50 per cent polling. Many of the rural areas dominated by the higher caste Sikhs had almost

uniformly boycotted the elections.²⁴ The Jat Sikh dominated constituencies such as Attari, Bolath, Qila Raipur and Nashera Pannvah recorded less than 7 per cent polling, this was even after the Governmental personnel and vehicles were pressed to persuade and assist the voters.

The Congress party won 12 of the 13 Lok Sabha seats and 87 of the 117 Assembly seats. In terms of votes secured, its share was of 43.8 percent. But the division among the Oppositions parties helped it to get around 74 per cent of the seats, though there were many constituencies where the total votes polled by the fragmented opposition were more than those of the Congress party. The Congress (I) in terms of total electorate secured around 9.9 per cent which was 7.5 per cent less than in 1989 and 15.7 per cent less than in 1985. The BJP had the second largest vote share with 16.7 per cent but secured only 6 seats. On the other hand with 15.8 per cent votes the BSP emerged as the second largest party in the Assembly with 9 seats. It also won one Lok Sabha seat largely on the support of the backward caste and the Mazhabi Sikhs. The Akali Dal (Kabul) was rejected even in its traditional strong holds of the Malwa region. The party could win just two seats out of 59 it contested. The principal gainers from the 1992 elections were the Congress and the militants. This election essentially was a fight between the boycotting forces and the contesting ones and the former appeared to have won the second round also.²⁵ Earlier their first round victory was when they managed the mainstream Akali Dals by making them decide for a boycott in the elections. The counter measures of the administration and the Government to curtail the pro-boycott campaign of the Panthic Party Front also aggravated anti-election feeling in the villages, where these parties have a fair base.

The Akali leaders like S.S. Mann, P.S. Badal and G.S. Tohra were arrested and this definitely affected their pro-boycott campaign but the militants were able to carry-on with their propaganda. Almost every day in the villages and even in the cities pro-boycott posters appeared, which threatened annihilation if anybody went to vote.

Role of Army:

A virtual security blanket was thrown over the state by a number of Army formations for providing security cover to the political aspirants as well as the commons.²⁶ The Operation was called Rakshak. Army was assigned with three tasks:²⁷ First, to assist in preventing Trans-border movements of terrorists and arms. Second, assist civil authorities in anti-terrorist operations and increase the sense of security among the local people. Third, undertake civic actions²⁸ and enhance local contacts. Initially the deployment of army did not have any impact, in terms of security in the minds of the rural masses, but later it played a crucial role in building the confidence of the people. With the Army coming in the scene, the rate of civilian casualties dropped to half, and later to one-third in the following months. In November 1990, 364 civilian were killed, in 1991 it was 297, and the following months after the Army got going, the number dropped to 126 and in January 1992 it went further down to 108. The Army and the Sikhs have traditionally been great friends, but after the "Operation Blue Star" and the "Operation Wood Rose" the relationship had been poor. The Army took the prevailing situation, as a chance to rebuild a cordial relationship. One aspect of this was the civic action plans carried

out by the Army doctors and other personnel to reactivate the state health services in remote villages where it had stopped due to fear. Some regiments went to the extent of spending their own regimental funds for civic works. There were strong commands from the top brass to their subordinates that there was to be no complaints of partiality or harassment of civilians, and that they should fire only if they were fired upon. They declared that wherever innocents were in danger of being killed in cross fire, they would not fire. It was also made clear that Army would not claim any money as reward for killing terrorists, as it was not hunting for terrorists and does not solicit information from the villagers.²⁹ Its task was just to provide manpower to cordon areas searched by the police.

The "Army Net" covered an area of approximately 100 sq. kms. with three battalions or a brigade and was in position to reach any troubled spot anywhere in 30 minutes. The Army by itself was not keen in such kind of ancillary role for two reasons. Firstly they feared that the longer they stayed, the more were the chances of some incident or error affecting their image, secondly they did not want the people to get too dependent on them under such conditions. In total to protect the 1.3 crore voters in 115 Assembly seats, 53,000 Punjab Policemen, over 70,000 men of Paramilitary forces, 28,000 Home Guards and over 10,000 Special Police Officers recruited from among civilians were deployed. Along with this there were 1.15 lakh Armymen.³⁰ According to K.P.S.Gill,³¹ "overall the Army played a very silent and supportive role in Punjab during the elections."

Reprisal Attacks:

The post-election scenario in Punjab was marked by attacks on people who cast their votes. Most of the victims were the Mazhabi Sikhs who supported the BSP.³² The killing went as message to these communities who defied the dictat of the dominant Jat Sikhs who chose to boycott. In some villages this also resulted in increased caste tensions.³³ There was a method in the killing, unlike earlier cases when the terrorists used to fire randomly into a crowd or blow- up with bombs in public places. In these cases, the victims were identified after snooping around, verified and cross-examined that they had cast their vote and then they were done to death. These attacks were seen by many as a mockery of the Government and its security machinery. The terrorists continued their operation methodically, showing that nothing could deter them. And each of the incidents showed that behind it there were well thought out plans and a clear objective. The next targets for the terrorists were the industrial sector.

According to D.S.Bains³⁴ the killings at the India Acrylics Plant at Sangrur district, in March 1992, in which people from especially from the Southern states worked, were singled out and shot dead. With this they spread message across that outsiders were not welcome to work in the state.³⁵ This led to panicky situations among the industrialists. Many Industrialists of Ludhiana felt that the failures of the Government on the security front were resulting in further capital flight from the State. The Government from its side declared that it was to announce a special security package for the industries sooner. At this juncture the Babbar Khalsa International circulated a notice among the bureaucrats containing 10 directives,

which included warning to the officers not to cooperate with the Government. The “erring” officials and their families would face serious repercussions if they violate the dictats. The circular also ordered that officials and ministers should not participate in the Independence Day celebrations. Meanwhile, there were increasing charges against the police for its atrocities and excesses in the state. Under these difficult backdrop and challenging circumstances Sardar Beant Singh took over as the Chief Minister of Punjab.

Beant Singh Government:

The Beant Singh Ministry assumed office on a note of uncertainty. Many regarded it as “illegitimate” Government, and were convinced that it would not last long. Beant Singh declared that the thrust of his first programme would be on “popular contact”.³⁶ According to him people have been living in an alienated condition for a long time.³⁷ Each district was to be entrusted to two ministers for this purpose. They were to attend to the people’s grievance and look after the developmental works. His primary agenda in this context became restoration of law and order. He wanted to make the atmosphere comfortable by controlling terrorism. For this he believed that Intelligence agencies should fan out to different areas, so that the hideouts of the terrorists are identified and destroyed. He empowered the police with sufficient powers or what it was popularly known as “free hand”, to carry out its counter terrorist campaigns.³⁸ By the end of 1992, the monthly average killing of civilians and security personnel had fallen to almost half of what it was the year before. Other crime statistics also showed a healthy down ward trend. Consequently,

the majority of those who had fled their homes because of fear of the militants were able to return to safety. Among the most striking sign of normal life in Punjab was the resumption of political activities and the confidence the people showed in revival of democratic processes. As viewed from outside, Beant Singh's success was primarily due to his native earthiness. There was no frill about his style of functioning. He was not loud but had a straightforward approach to his target, which were two folds. First, to prove to the extremists that Khalistan was not a worthwhile proposition and second, restore to large sections of the masses, the confidence in power of the state, and in their own strength to survive under extreme adverse conditions. After a gap of 12 years, Deepawali was celebrated in the Golden Temple in November 1992 and Baisaki in April 1993 at a grand level.³⁹ Melas, travelling circuses, magic shows, etc. reappeared in every major village and towns in Punjab after a decade and so. The Jor Mela at Fatehgarh Sahib and Maghi Fair at Mukstar attracted unprecedented crowds.

After a hesitant start, partly due to the stunned mandate which gave power to the Congress (I) without a real contest, the Beant Singh Ministry emerged stronger than what most people even from his own party had expected. Beant Singh assured his people that the long pending issues of transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab, just distribution of river water issue and Punjabi getting its due status in Himachal and Haryana, etc. would be decided at the earliest. He also declared that he was for the construction of the SYL Canal, but first he wanted the distribution of waters to be decided. During the first year of Beant Singh as Chief Minister, there was a sea change in the law and order situation. Though he was never tired of saying, that

Punjab problem was largely a law and order issue, the political demand, he admitted were of course there. As people yearned for peace, he said, the extremists should follow peaceful methods for their goal. As a matter of fact restoration of law and order and an era of enduring peace were the important poll plank of his party's election campaign. That was why he accorded top priority to it. And he met with resounding success. One by one, the Beant Singh's administration proved what the Punjab problem actually was not. Firstly, that it was not a Hindu-Sikh Conflict, as no civil war or communal riots took place even after the infamous anti-Sikh riots. Secondly, that it was not a big mass movement for Khalistan as it never enjoyed the complete support of all Sikhs.⁴⁰ Thirdly, that it was not an identity crisis as there were no major changes in the Sikh religion even when the militants were dominating it. And fourthly, that it was not an organised campaign for a cause sanctioned by the religion and supported by the Sikh devotees, as all the principles of the terrorists were antithetical to the "Guru Granth Sahib".

According to Beant Singh, after a long spell of President's rule, the people wanted grassroots democracy. They were fed up with terrorism, given them a chance, they responded overwhelmingly. While it is true that one key factor was police work and the support given to the force by the Chief Minister, certain other broad political developments were also significant. Using a combination of incentives, pleading and coercion, Beant Singh managed to revive local democratic institution such as Block Samiti's and Panchayats, thus creating a line of patronage other than that operated by the "Khalistani" groups.

Restoration of Grassroots Democracy :

On 6 September 1992 elections were held to 95 municipalities in Punjab after 13 years.⁴¹ In this election the Congress (I) managed only 33.3 percent seats, winning in 434 of the 1,342 wards to which elections were held. In the February Assembly elections earlier, with a mere 23 percent polling the Congress managed to get 87 of the 115 seat, but this time polling was 70 percent and the party fared badly. Even in the Jalandhar district in which the Chief Minister's Assembly constituency falls, the Congress (I) won only 28 of the 109 wards. All over the state, the majority of the seats were captured by the independents. Claims and counter-claims were made about the affiliation of these independents, the Akali Dal factions reversed their earlier policy of boycotting the elections and claimed that the majority of the independents were from their fold, whereas the opposite was claimed by the Congress (I). The CPI (M) was able to win two seats in Taran Taran, the hotbed of militancy. This is quite significant in terms of understanding the pulse of situation as the Communist parties have been struggling against the terrorists for very long.

With the overwhelming participation of the people across the state the earlier speculated fear of communal divide in voting pattern faded away.⁴² The debacle of Congress Party in the municipal election led to doubts about Beant Singh's continuation of the programme to revive the democratic processes of the state. Ironically, it is the Government's success on the security front that led to the ruling party's defeat.⁴³ But the improved security atmosphere ensured the large turnout.⁴⁴ It is a fact that the elections were held in itself was a significant achievement for the Beant Singh Ministry in so far as it proves that people can still be brought back to

mainstream political activity. Political support from Delhi combined with the leaders own determination had made it possible for Beant Singh to achieve notable results in Punjab. The very fact that elected Government has functioned since the February 1992 with reasonable success was no small achievement at that juncture, given it's background. Beant Singh was seen as one of P.V. Narasimha Rao's most loyal regional chieftain. All is all; Beant Singh had fulfilled the immediate objectives for which, he was chosen by P.V. Narshima Rao, as Chief Minister of Punjab. Although he had already headed the Congress organisation in the state, he had still remained relatively low key regional leader. After taking over as Chief Minister, tackling law and order as well as restoring democracy at the grassroots were his two priorities, which he successfully accomplished.

As a result of the municipalities elections, three conclusions were drawn from it.⁴⁵ First, the people of the state still believed in the democratic process and mainstream politics. Second, with strong measures on security and political fronts, the state can be brought back to normalcy. And third, the Congress (I) was still a minority force in the state, and Beant Singh Government was perceived by the people as illegitimate. But K.P.S. Gill rejects the claim that Beant Singh did not have a mandate.⁴⁶ According to him police study of the situation in 1991 when the elections were cancelled, there was a clear mandate for Congress from the people as they were fed up of the Akali politicians. In 1992 Congress did manage to win, and whatever followed that were Beant Singh's own doing, in political front. If we look from the point of view of Constitution and legality, the elections were valid and legitimate. Even the low turnouts do not matter if these benchmarks were applied.

Beant Singh was one of the handful of politicians in Punjab who publicly condemned fascism and communalism in the state during the terrorist ascendancy. Further the Beant Singh Ministry went ahead and held the elections for 11,638 village Panchayats, after 12 year in January 1993. The elections once again proved that the common peoples verdict against the anti-democratic forces. The turnout was a record high of 82.6 per cent. Most significantly the whole process went off without any major violence. The new structure of power in the countryside were used to delegitimise the so called "insurgency" and to wean away its supporters. By early 1993 Beant Singh emerged highly successful. One important aspect of these elections is that it had helped the common man to shrug away the fear of militants and come out in favour of mainstream politics. Beyond the law and order factor, the success of these elections were also result of the Akali Dal's participation and the localized nature of the polls with the candidates coming from their own localities. Unlike the earlier cases the candidates were able to move freely amongst the masses during the campaign period.

The elections were fought on a non-party basis, though the majority of the candidates were affiliated to some party or other. The Congress party became the single largest party in the Panchayat election and the Opposition charged it for having used extra-constitutional and illegal methods against them. Top Akali leaders like P.S. Badal, G.S. Tohra and S.S. Mann were arrested on grounds that their campaign could lead to civil unrest. They were released just two days before the election and they could not do much. Beant Singh was widely criticized for adopting such confrontationist method against the Akalis rather than integrating them by giving

them space for dissent and differences. But Beant Singh rule accomplished two things. For the first time in nearly decade or so, the people got the feeling that they can rely on the government for their security. So they came out to vote in large numbers. It also showed that the alienation between the people and the administration could be removed through the presence of elected representative's at all socio-political levels, and democracy is the biggest solvent of dissent violence in society.

In general, the Punjab voters have always responded positively and overwhelmingly to the democratic processes. Both in 1985 and 1989 elections, political parties talked of violence and the "rule of gun", but the electorate turned up in huge numbers on both occasions. A corollary of that is the historically established fact that elections in Punjab since independence has always been free from poll-related crimes such as rigging, booth capturing, official manipulation, etc. The people of Punjab re-affirmed their faith in democracy and democratic institutions despite their fear and frustrations.⁴⁷ In the process they had given a rebuff to the terrorist organizations that had propagated that result could be achieved only through the "barrel of gun." This reaffirmation of faith in democratic working and rejection of violence and terror as means for achieving a goal is a development of tremendous significance in Punjab as well as some other parts of our country facing similar problems.

Those among the Sikh community who decided to keep aloof from these elections, either by choice or through pressure were not too pleased with themselves anymore. As for the Akalis in particular, most of them have really been sulking at the

sight of the Congress party at the head of the Administration and over their own failure in the past to get together on a common platform to assert themselves as a powerful force in electoral politics. This sea change in the attitude of all the Akali factions, barring the Mann group, is significant. Not only did the Akalis take an active part in local elections, but also they started to distance themselves from the extremist position, which they had adopted earlier. This was a sure sign of their desire to return to mainstream politics. The situation thrown up by the Panchayat elections has other special features as well.⁴⁸ First, the rural areas, which were considered to be the support-base of secessionist-militants, have voted for peace and economic development. Secondly, the popular set up thrown up by the elections will be used by the government to check any fresh resurgence of militancy. Thirdly, the security environment was vastly improved after the installation of the Beant Singh Government. Fourthly, the Congress has been able to make inroads into the countryside, which was so far considered, as rival party's bastion of an impregnable nature. The new scenario that emerged in the state following the Panchayat polls was such that Punjab people were able to resolve their own problems within the national and democratic framework. This is not to say that the so-called Punjab problem claimed by the Sikh radicals should be deemed to have been solved. But it should be seen as how the ruling party tried its best to create a conducive environment in the state. It won over large segments of people from the clutches of religious obscurantists, otherwise the election gambit would have been a lead in the dark.

Beant Singh was shrewd enough to see that his rival parties would undo themselves by their mutual squabbling in the eyes of the rural masses. In this process

a big say had to be given to the police. These abbreviations did not dampen the enthusiasm of the rural masses in participating in the Panchayat polls in a big way. As a sequel to these elections Beant Singh declared that Block Samities and Zila Parishads election would follow.⁴⁹

He said that, “grassroots democracy will be further strengthened by holding elections to the block and the district Parishads. Along with these we will put greater emphasis on developmental activities.” The Government also decided to further strengthen the Panchayati Raj institutions by giving more powers and functions to the ‘Sarpanchs’ and ‘Panchs.’ State planning according to Beant Singh was to be further decentralized to empower Panchayats to make plans for village development at village level itself. Beant Singh announced that all Sarpanchs would be accorded respect, dignity and honour in all the Government offices befitting with their status as the people's representatives. The Sarpanchs were given adequate powers to exercise control, supervision and vigil on the village level functioning of the Government. Their active co-operation was sought for restoration of complete normalcy, peace and containment of resurgence of militancy. Beant Singh also declared that his Government has also decided to enable the Panchayats to exercise the existing judicial powers more meaningfully and effectively and if need be more judicial powers were to be given to them for speedy administration. Less expenditure, justice to the people at their doorstep, he said was his goal.

In the 1994 elections to Panchayat Samities and Zilla Parishad the Congress party had a disappointing performance in the state. They did manage to secure victory, but only aided by a controversial State Act. The Act ensured that 60 per cent

of the new member were elected indirectly by the 9,000 Sarpanchs who took office in a somewhat controversial election of 1993. While these seats were won almost enbloc by the Congress (I), it fared badly in the case of the remaining 40 per cent elected directly by the people.⁵⁰

But on the other hand by the end of 1993 a circle of professional courtiers who had little to do with the fight against terrorism formed a durbar around the Chief Minister Beant Singh. This led to a kind of alienation. According to K.P.S. Gill,⁵¹ he had specifically warned Beant Singh about this. He had advised the Chief Minister to restrict himself with the administrative staffs for advice, as that situation needed professionalism. But Beant Singh, according to K.P.S. Gill,⁵² was falling for the pseudo-glorifications from people around him. Beant Singh's ministry failed to respond to the transformed political situations which was apparently unable to confront the social and economic challenges that were rapidly emerging.⁵³ The positive impression, the people had of the Government in the immediate aftermath of containing militancy in mid 1993 was giving way to frustrations in the face of difficulties in everyday life, with rising prices, corruption and administrative indifferences to the local problems. The control of law and order situation appeared as the over riding priority for the Beant Singh Government. The check on the number of killing can certainly be seen as ultimate achievement. And he had undoubtedly worked steady fast towards this goal. But on the other hand the important factors which had led to the rise of militant violence in the state a decade ago remained in the cold storage. Punjab's socio-economic infrastructure was virtually in shambles as during the past turbulent decade precious funds and Government attentions were

diverted to containing violence. There was no progress even in the basic demands pertaining to the issues of territory, water and language.

Political Corruption:

The Government was also increasingly battered by the charges of corruption, nepotism and mal-administration. Scandals followed scandals through out 1994, although the Chief Minister was never personally charged with corruption. According to A.P. Bhatnagar,⁵⁴ Beant Singh did have 'criminal charges' against him before he took over as the Chief Minister but Beant Singh, according to him had a good understanding of the psyche of these criminal-terrorists and thus co-operated with the police force in handling them. On the other hand the charges on the Beant Singh Ministry that jobs were being given to relatives of politicians without interviews or tests continued. It was believed, according to Pritinder Singh,⁵⁵ that an ordinary person could manage some kind of appointment in Government service for a monetary consideration. According to Dharshan Kumar⁵⁶ although the charges of corruption against the Government existed before, the malaise started growing rather than declining even with the presence of democratically elected government of Beant Singh. Surprisingly Beant Singh had never denied these facts. He admitted that corruption was present every where in the state since a long time. But according to him the problem for his ministry was that the people who some time talked of corruption were not able to give proofs for it.

Another charge on Beant Singh was his high handedness and interference of his family members in administrative functioning. As many instances of alleged

misconduct by the Chief Minister's family particularly, his grand sons emerged; the episodes became symbolic of the arrogance and corruption of the new political establishment in Punjab. Harassment against people who criticized developed into a new kind of fear psychosis i.e. the fear of ministers and leaders of ruling party.⁵⁷ Beant Singh also faced charges and attacks against him from dissidents within his own party, particularly J.S. Brar,⁵⁸ S. Buta Singh, and others.⁵⁹ According to some of them Beant Singh governed more like a feudal chieftain than a democratically elected leader. The hallmark of his actions was his arbitrariness.⁶⁰ There were frequent charges that his government and the ruling party had organised many events in such a way that only the Congress (I) that too a section of it, dominated. M.S. Bitta admitted this view as well. According to M.S. Bitta,⁶¹ the ministry of Beant Singh was slowly parting away from the real workers of the Congress party, who stood against the militant's bullets and re-build the party to victory.

Beant Singh was also criticized for not taking the opinions of his administrative colleagues. He was only accounting himself to the powers at the Center and the Police high command. According to K.P.S. Gill,⁶² the police never interfered with the administration and political activity of Beant Singh as he also never interfered in police activities in handling the counter-terrorist programmes. But one can understand that the real problem was that the success in fighting militancy has not been followed by any effort to win the peace. Creating employment opportunities, finding ways to control the consequences of the fragmentation of land holding in the countryside, and defending the civil rights were some of the challenges the Beant Singh Ministry was unable to handle. According to Tarlochan Singh Tur,⁶³

the roots of these issues were the rapidly growing population and the shrinking of the resources led to a series of chain reactions in the society. Beant Singh government according to former Home Minister Buta Singh, was one of the most corrupt ever in Punjab and even the outstanding issues were sidelined by him.⁶⁴ Beant Singh had proclaimed that his Government would treat the financial year 1994-95, as the year of development. But equally acute was Punjab's financial crisis. Though he requested the Prime Minister for a central aid, he also made efforts to raise his own resources.

The Beant Singh Government, shaken by repeated charges of corruption, scandals and unable to frame viable agenda for development, and the growing dissidents in his party, appeared as heading for a fiasco. He was not happy with the growing opposition in his party. He asked for the resignation of all his Ministers and they all rendered it immediately. But for 10 days Beant Singh was not able to make the changes he wanted. Finally, with the pressures from the head quarters he had to be contented with reshuffling the portfolios and not the ministers.⁶⁵ This according to M.S. Bitta⁶⁶ was because the Prime Minister though was close to Beant Singh; he was also equally close to other leaders in Punjab. He was also aware of the fact that the infighting in Congress (I) had done severe damage to the political processes in Punjab. In the meantime, as a sign of continuing commitment to restoration process and democracy, a resolution to revive the Upper House was proposed by Beant Singh. The Punjab Vidhan Sabha had strength of 117 members. Therefore the membership of the Vidhan Parishad would not exceed 40, as per the constitution. The Vidhan Parishad was abolished in 1969 by the then Gurnam Singh Ministry. Under the Article 169 of the Constitution, the Upper House can be created if the Vidhan Sabha

passes a resolution to that effect by a majority of the total membership of the Assembly and by a majority of not less than two-third of the members of the Assembly present and voting. In the Punjab Vidhan Sabha the Congress (I) commanded three-fourth majority.

The non-cooperation from the bureaucracy initially after the 1992 Assembly elections also played as a hindrance to Beant Singh's ministry. Long used to enjoying an unquestionable power and after having their own way of functioning, the bureaucracy could not initially reconcile itself to the presence of the elected representatives in the corridors of civil secretariat. Even orders from the ministers were either resisted or ignored or implemented in a half-hearted manner. Darshan Kumar⁶⁷ dismissed this charge on the bureaucrats. He said, the officers refused to cooperate with the ministers only under circumstances where the leaders were demanding for favouritism and partialities in various programmes of the Government. According to him the bureaucrats were not willing to give away the hard won peace to the same politics which led in first place, to rise of militancy. According to A.P. Bhatnagar,⁶⁸ there were complaints of administrative interference by politicians who were once associated with the militant- politics and the terrorists. This led to friction between the ministers and the bureaucrats. But on the other hand there were many charges that the ministerial bungalows had been occupied by officers and High Court judges who were reluctant to vacate, apparently in the belief that the Ministry of Beant Singh would not last long. The Chief Minister himself had to operate from the Punjab Congress Bhawan for quite sometime.⁶⁹ Even among the common people a few believed that Beant Singh's Government would last atleast six months when he

was sworn in as Chief Minister on 25 February, 1992. When this 69-year-old Congress (I) leader led his party to victory, the decade old militancy was showing no sign of abating, even after a 57-month-old President's rule.

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Chapter-IV

Politics of Integration – Conflict Dimension

Counter-Terrorism:

There have been two dominant strands in the response of governments to terror campaigns across the world. First, authorities have used conventional military formations, state security forces, and specialist anti-terrorist units to defeat the terrorist. This has been a policy pursued by governments of all political persuasions against both domestic and international terrorist organizations. The second strand has been the use of state-sponsored terror to destroy internal opposition groups and their supporters. Such phenomena usually take place in military regimes rather than democracies. This had been the pattern in many Latin American countries and many former European colonies. The regimes rely on their military forces, state-backed death squads, and networks of well paid informers to deal with any threats to their authority. Space to voice dissent is never permitted and rebels arrested by the authorities are usually tortured to death at some place or the other. Some times, the victim's bodies are then buried in secret mass graves or abandoned in public places to intimidate the masses.

Legitimate governments have undertaken a two-fold approach to neutralize the threat posed by terrorist groups.¹ Firstly, they employ conventional forces or elite counter-terrorist units to handle the operations, to minimize their impact when they take place. Secondly, they attempt to prevent the phenomena by denying the terrorists the means to wage their terror campaigns. The gathering of intelligence on

the terrorists and their intentions is an essential part of government's counter-terrorist strategy. The operatives of the intelligence agencies run networks of informers and deploy all forms of modern intelligence-gathering technology. By this means the authorities of law enforcement create a perfect image of the terrorist organisation, its strategies and plans. Counter-terrorist raids are carried out based on this information and the terrorists are either killed or arrested. Minimizing the effects of a terrorist attack can be achieved only through good planning and denying the terrorists the potential targets they look for. Many states across the world have now developed a number of specialist to deal with such attacks, which include commando units trained to launch hostage-rescue missions, bomb-disposal teams, psychologists, and expert negotiators. States equipped with such forces have experienced remarkable success in defeating the terrorists. In case of Punjab, according to K.P.S. Gill,² A.P. Bhatnagar³ and M.K. Dhar⁴ the secret behind their successful operations were their intelligence wing, which managed to penetrate almost all terrorist groups of Punjab. In the North east, according to K.V. Krishna Rao⁵ and V.K. Nayar,⁶ intelligence network has been useful to counter terrorism.

Police Role:

As a matter of fact the period from 1992 to early 1994 can be divided into two. First when the militants tried their best to destabilize the situation before the February election and subsequently after the installation of the popular government. And second during which the situation started improving, with terrorists beginning to suffer heavy losses, leading to an acute demoralization and disorganization in their

ranks. Never before had so many top terrorists been eliminated in such a systematic manner in such a short time. The Punjab police and the Beant Singh Ministry took up the challenge of combating terrorism and stuck to it, almost making it as the Governments' sole programme. And the result was the killing and arrest of over 1,000 militants, including militant chiefs. This one point programme saw the return of a period of relative peace in the state. Those who had fled their home and hearth for fear of militants were returning to resume their normal life by the end of 1992, even in areas such as Makhu, Zira, Jhabal, Bhikiwind and Monga located deep in the so called terrorist hot bed.

A complete transformation had taken place at the psychological level among the people. The Bandh calls, bhog ceremonies and other directives of the militants hardly evoked any response from the masses. The militant "codes" as regards the bureaucracy, media, industry, Panchayats, social reforms, etc. vanished. People especially in Punjab's countryside were able to move out of their home after dusk. Complimenting the State Government particularly the Chief Minister and the "Super Cop" K.P.S. Gill on the success in combating terrorism, the former Governor of Punjab, Surender Nath said that the results were "indeed virtually miraculous".⁷

The whole thrust of K.P.S. Gill, the architect of the Counter-insurgency, which crushed terrorism in Punjab, was to build a disciplined and organised force without which the fight could not have been won. In the pre-Bluestar period, the police was highly disorganized and unable to handle the crisis. Even their earlier experiences of counter-insurgency operations were not of much help. It was much later however efforts were made to build up a cohesive force, with clear operational

strategy. During the 1992 Assembly elections the Congress (I) victory was dependent on the support given to its candidates by the police, otherwise a few would have risked contesting without such protection. On the other hand, after the elections, the police gained legitimacy by the presence of a democratically elected government.

The two key figures of the state, Chief Minister Beant Singh and Director General of Police KPS Gill (who took office again in November 1991), had a symbiotic relationship, but also one which had a clearly defined hierarchy. Having joined the Indian Police Service in 1958, KPS Gill made a career in counter – insurgency operations. After serving in the North-East from March 1959 to December 1983, he was involved in Punjab, except for two brief breaks in Jammu and Delhi. If KPS Gill presided and executed the destruction of Khalistani militancy, it was Beant Singh who enabled it, by campaigning in even the most interior villages of the state against the terrorists. If the institution of civil society collapsed in the early 1980's unable to confront the Khalistani terrorism, the Indian State was able to re-establish its presence only by vesting the Punjab police with extraordinary powers. The police came to be not only an apparatus for the control of crime but also the sole arbiter of administration and politics. With Beant Singh coming to power, the police got the clear mandate they were looking for. Even though the Government that emerged from the 1992 election rested on the franchise of just 10 percent of Punjab's voters its driving factor was Beant Singh himself. His ministry consisted of an unusual amalgam of Congress members like people with records of fighting terrorism, some who were once "Khalistani" sympathizers and others who were outright opportunists. He untiringly proclaimed that he would crush terrorism, which

many believed impossible. According to former Chief Secretary A.S. Chatha,⁸ the Chief Minister had given clear policy directions, and the first among them was to restore law and order. Without a peaceful atmosphere democracy cannot survive and development can never be possible. "There was no hesitation or wavering on these orders" and they led to a strong, well-co-ordinated, well-directed, and ultimately very successful operation of the Punjab police and the paramilitary forces. According to KPS Gill,⁹ there was around 42 percent fall in the crimes committed by militants in 1993 compared to the year before.

Peace in Punjab was founded on three "Ps": (1) the restoration of political rule (2) the revival of local Panchayat bodies and (3) a determined, strong and tough police force. KPS Gill introduced night patrolling, to end the militants' rule in rural areas and it worked miracles. According to him it broke the backbone of militancy. An analysis of the pattern of terrorist activities showed that a maximum number of killings in rural areas took place in late nights and early mornings.¹⁰ "Operation Night Dominance" was therefore launched. Senior officers were assigned direct in-charge of the operations. Convoys of heavily armed police and paramilitary vehicles would sweep the countryside with searchlights trained on the lush fields flanking the rural roads. The police personnel were also equipped with the sophisticated night vision gadgets. This resulted in number of encounters with the terrorists. Two or three gunfights a night were common occurrence. Police carried out further cordon and search operations especially in the border districts along with joint units of the Army, the para-military and special commandos. According to M.K.Dhar¹¹ this kind of sustained policing pushed the surviving militants underground, and flee to Pakistan.

From their earlier experiences of the field, the Punjab police department was able to develop many improvised support systems. A separate Research and Development laboratory was created for this kind of need. Conversion of ordinary agricultural tractors into armored cars to track down the militants in the fields was the brainchild of KPS Gill. According to A.P. Bhatnagar,¹² the terrorist many times used the tubewell houses in the middle of the fields as safe houses in nights and it was difficult to reach them. In countering them, these improvised tractors played a crucial role. Many types of custom made bullet proof vehicles with high-powered engines and bulletproof tyres were also put in operations.¹³

The history of counter-terrorist offensive by the Punjab police, Army and Central Agencies began way back in 1984, when the Golden Temple was being converted into a fortress by the Khalistani militants with the help of Kinney -Mini Services, a group of experts retired from the British Special Air Services.¹⁴ Though the Central Government carried out the Operation Blue Star, there was no follow up for it to revive the local state apparatus. When the reprisal attacks from the militants began later, the local administration and the judiciary crumbled completely. Worst of all the state police too collapsed. Even the long-standing conventional methods of using "spotters" to identify terrorist were also failing, as secrecies were not maintained. The "Operation Woodrose," which followed "Operation Blue Star" also had a limited role.¹⁵ General Jamwal was put in charge of sealing the border and General R.S. Dayal was to oversee apprehension of militants within the state. This was a typical army operation with focus on arrests of activist and leaders who were already identified. This resulted in fleeing of hardcore terrorist to Pakistan.

When Julio F. Ribeiro took over as DGP on 29 March 1986 the Khalistan militants had consolidated their position. The “bullet for bullet” policy of Ribeiro was confronted with a jump in murder of civilians.¹⁶ The toll rose from 63 in 1985 to 520 in 1986 and 910 in 1987. According to K.P.S. Gill,¹⁷ the strategies of J.F. Ribeiro was not suitable for the kind of crisis, the Punjab was facing. He had dealt it in a way similar to that of dealing with urban Mafias. This was also done with a deeply demoralized force, which was disastrous. In his book, J.F. Ribeiro recalls that his policy was not an indiscriminate killing for the sake of revenge, but he was only trying to reactivate the Punjab police. But he also felt that the police could only fight against the terrorism and not resolve it.¹⁸ At this juncture when the police apparatus was increasingly becoming dysfunctional, the struggling officers getting choked, they resorted to extra-legal means. In 1985 itself, the then SSP of Amristar, Muhammad Ijaz Alam setup a force popularly known as the “Alam Sena”.¹⁹ They were assigned with the task of going out as bounty hunters and locate the militants and finally kill them. They were allowed to take what ever plunder, they could find. But soon the “Alam Sena”²⁰ had to be disbanded, primarily because it went out of hands of the authorities. The internal reason was its members started involving in plunder, extortion and sexual harassment, more than hunting for the militants.

In 1986, DIG, S.S. Virk formed a more organised unit called “CATS.”²¹ According to A.P. Bhatnagar²² the name originated with the secret coded language among the police personnel, where their operatives the “Cats” were to hunt for the “mice”. The assignments were to penetrate into the support system of the terrorists. Police officers masquerading as militants, as well as former militants, hunted the

farmhouses through the interiors of rural Punjab in search of safe houses and potential ambush sites. Reputation of this force grew as they created their own intelligence sources and vital information started pouring in. The field officers were given sufficient autonomy to deal with the crisis flexibly and locally, as each terrorist group generally operated only in a few villages. However even these Operations of the "Cats" were withdrawn as the operatives were charged with many cases of rape incidents and were involved in armed conflicts with the over-ground police force. But by 1989, the "Cats" had laid the foundation for a substantial police ascendancy. A strong and effective police intelligence network had come to stay. The police stations too were modified with improved infrastructure, and were made self-sufficient for rapid response. K.P.S. Gill who took over as DGP in April 1988 played a crucial role in mobilizing more financial resources and acquiring sophisticated gadgetry for the police personnel. Then the launching of the Operation Black Thunder-II²³ in May 1988 by the NSG Commandos took place under the direct supervision of New Delhi. Earlier the Operation Black Thunder I was carried out in April 1986, when Surjit Singh Barnalla was the Chief Minister. As the State Government collaborated with the militants, the mission was only partially successful. The preparation for the operation Black Thunder II began in early 1988 at Manesar in the Aravalli hills, some 40 km from Delhi. Carefully selected NSG commandos practiced their modus operandi in specially created models of the Golden Temple Complex. When the operation was actually carried out, it was regarded quite successful. The entire action was carried out in the full preview of the media.

By 1989 terrorism in Punjab was confined more or less to just 13 police stations.²⁴ Almost 76 per cent of all terrorist incidents in 1989 were contained within four out of fifteen police districts of the state along the border in Maaja region. Out of the 217 police stations in the entire state, nearly half the killing had taken place within the jurisdiction of just these 13 police stations. Out of 13,000 villages in Punjab about 200 villages provided approximately 75 percent of terrorists. But unfortunately the situation went out of hands and deteriorated when negotiations were opened with several militant groups during the Chandra Sekhar regime. According to M.K. Dhar,²⁵ the militancy at this juncture was at the verge of collapse. The terrorists were sending feelers to the Governmental Agencies for compromise on a mutually honourable settlement. It was at this juncture Pakistan came to the rescue of militants once again and bailed them out of the crisis. They pumped the militants with more sophisticated weapons, money and training, taking advantage of the political instability in India, where three Prime Ministers took over in quick successive periods. Terrorist attacks reached its peak in 1990-92.

But when the counter-terrorist offensive was launched again on a massive scale in 1992, after the Assembly election, the police once again retained their grip on the counter attack. One underlying factor for their profound success was their infiltration into the militant groups and support systems.²⁶ This became possible because large sums of money were at their disposal, to place "moles" at higher levels of terrorist structures. Sensitive and crucial informations about the armed bands began to flow towards the police all the time. Weapons dumps were discovered, modus operandi were disclosed, following it. The police used this device of

intelligence to the government's advantage though it cost a lot in terms of "prize money" for the state exchequer.²⁷ The state budget for security was Rs. 18-19 crores in 1980-81 and in 1992 it was nearly Rs. 300 crores. The results of this were startlingly successful with top terrorist leaders being killed in rapid succession. This shift in counter-terrorist operation based on specific hard intelligence from the earlier ~~method of cordon and search type raids made the terrorists to flee to far off places.~~²⁸ They feared that the same people who had earlier harbored them and their associates, may now betray them. These changes in strategies were made by the police essentially to counter the changing terrorist strategies. Earlier in 1992 the terrorists adopted a new strategy of attacking the urban industrial sectors. As the army returned to barracks the responsibility for dealing with this new trend of attacks fell on the shoulders of the police alone. Tactically the targeted areas were divided into many centres and a senior officer was assigned with the duty to handle four to five such centres. The centres were further divided in to different sectors and, manpower and vehicles were allocated accordingly for regular patrolling and "hot pursuit" duties along vantage points. This proved to be highly successful in checking further attacks. Then the terrorist shifted to another strategy to attack security personnel and their family members, and later it extended its attack on political leaders and government officials. According to K.P.S. Gill²⁹ the response to these attacks were made in a three-fold strategy. The first was based on the immediate identification of the perpetrators of the latest outrage, and the application of the fullest force to secure their arrest or elimination. As the terrorists themselves claimed responsibility of the attack, it facilitated their task in an easier way. The second strategy was targeted

towards the terrorist leaderships. Analysis of the terrorist strikes showed that militancy in majority of the cases was highly localized. Even the most important terrorist leaders were found to operate within a radius of less than 15-20 kilometers, from their respective villages. Eventually all manpower resources and infra-structural facilities were targeted against the leadership, the strategists and the ideologues of the movement. As a result many self-styled chiefs, like Rashpal Singh Chhandran of Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTFK), Gurjant Singh Budhsinghwala of Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF), Sukhdev Singh Babbar of Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), Gurbachan Singh Manochahal of Panthic Committee and many other “deputies” were killed in encounters. The third strategic answer to the terrorists was the earlier discussed “Operation Night Dominance,”³⁰ which according to K.P.S. Gill³¹ forced the terrorists to come out in open for day light attacks, which in turn incurred severe losses of men for the outfits.

There were also other factors which led to the collapse of militancy. The feed back from people through their elected representatives played a crucial role. People were fed up with the militants as they had to face the ire of the security forces because of the militants. Violent acts like rapes, forced marriages of their women with militants, arson, robberies, extortion, assaults etc also shattered the image of the militants. People did not hesitated any more to pass vital information about the militants to police.³² A detailed information on the number of terrorist killed and arrested is provided in the appendix of this work.

However as fresh recruitment to the militancy, virtually came to an end in 1992, the Government and the police thought, apart from using force against the

terrorists, a new strategy of peaceful means should be attempted. A “fourth option”³³ other than that of the possibilities of getting arrested, fleeing and encounter was offered. The Chief Minister announced a guarantee of safety and new employment opportunities for the militants and their associates, who surrendered to the Government.³⁴ It had an impact of considerable extent.³⁵ A surrender ceremony was organised at Chandigarh and Taran Taran on 12, August 1992 and 71 terrorist surrendered.³⁶ It included Gurdeep Singh Sibia, Chief organizer of the overseas operations of Babbar Khalsa International and six other area commanders of various militant organizations. By the end of 1992, around 540 terrorists surrendered among whom 6 were “hard core”.³⁷ According to A.P.Bhatnagar³⁸ some of the surrendered militants were provided bank loans to run private business and taxies. A detailed information on the number of terrorists who surrendered is provided in the appendix of this work.

Weapons Seizures:

The Punjab police claim that between 1987 and 1993, they had seized more than 2000 Kalashnikov – type rifles from the Sikh militants, all of which is from Pakistan.³⁹ The militants had free access to Pakistani territory without any hindrance from the Pakistani Rangers. Apart from the AK-type rifles, the police had seized Chinese stick grenades, antitank mines, Claymore-type anti-personnel landmines, etc. from the terrorists. The militants were also in possession of sophisticated gadgetry like Toyomoro FM transceivers, which permit the monitoring of telephone calls and radio messages. It was estimated in 1992 that the militants were still in the

possession of at least 1,500 AK 47s, 100 rocket launchers and 100 general purpose machine guns, at least 1,500 kilograms of RDX and PETN explosive capable of being set off by remote control devices.⁴⁰ A detailed account on the arms and ammunition recovered is provided in the appendix of this work.

Human Rights Violations:

While these conventional and unconventional methods of fighting the militants continued, there were reports about increasing frustrations building up among sections of masses who have faced the brunt of the excesses committed by the security forces.⁴¹ The political parties earlier overlooked allegations of these police excesses and repression in Punjab in its proxy war with Pakistan. But after the restoration of peaceful atmosphere, the Government was under pressure to do its best, to curb such tendencies on the part of the custodians of law. Another unfortunate aspect of this subject was the explicit casual approach of the Chief Minister Beant Singh towards the allegations of atrocities, torture and excesses committed by the security forces.⁴² He appeared to have taken for granted that such Operations would necessarily involve killings of innocents, though he always promised in many public forums that if specific cases were brought to his attention he would necessarily punish the guilty officials.

In the media, sections of the people began to express that the Fascist terror of the “Khalistanis” had merely been replaced with the terror of the state. No one, not even in the Government and Security forces, denied that innocent may have also been killed under the garb of “militants”. According to A.P. Bhatnagar,⁴³ it was never

deliberate. “Under rare cases were deliberate killing or excess had occurred, the guilty officers were punished”. But on the other hand many cases of mysterious disappearances of people appeared regularly in the media. There were cases where people believed to have been killed in staged encounters possibly following extortion attempts were reported.⁴⁴ The “Super Cop” icons of Punjab Police which crushed the terrorism, was replaced with caricatures of equally mindless psychopathic state terrorists of the “Maal Mandi”, the infamous interrogation center of Punjab Police, in media headlines.

There were many controversial cases like the Valtroha killing, where a young militant brought “dead” to a hospital by the police with bullet injuries after an encounter was later discovered to be alive, and the police went back to the hospital, dragged out and killed him. There were cases of lawyers and political activists reported “missing” after police took them for interrogation. There were even cases like that of Harjeet Singh in 1992 which attracted the attention of the Amnesty International and the then British Prime Minister John Mayor, who expressed his concern on it. The legal and international human rights pressure had profound impact on the Punjab Police. Its officers argue that their actions were made in a context when the state itself had ceased to function, and the police came to function as the sole institution of government. The ideological state apparatus collapsed and the police occupied the role played by it. Thus police acted not as a lumpen outfit, but in pursuance of the ideological objectives of the state and indeed it became a deeply ideological enterprise. Charged with the task of crushing the Khalistani militancy,

unaided by the judiciary or the civil administration, the police officials say they dealt with the situation in the only way they could.

K.P.S. Gill the then DGP was himself reprimanded by the Supreme Court for ignoring complaints of the police's illegal abduction of a family of seven. Many terrorist were killed after they were captured alive, because the police felt that bringing these terrorist elements to court of law, would have exposed their "moles" within major terrorist outfits. But these claims were rejected by the newly emerging assertive institution of legal justice. The Punjab and Haryana High Court ruled that families of those illegally eliminated by the police were entitled to the same compensations as victims of terrorism. In the spate of such human rights cases emerging from the police's ruthless assault on terrorism, the police began to get highly demoralized and confused. Further the Supreme Courts actions on the killing of a couple, whom police officials insisted were terrorists at Tiljala, West Bengal,⁴⁵ generated widespread resentment and many officials resorted by the simple expedient of refusing to work. The Punjab police which comprised of 80 percent of Sikhs which sacrificed the most in the crusade to stamp out terrorism was shaken up. They felt led down by the state for quite some time. It was this very police force which inspite of its ideological mooring earned a reputation for brutality and extortion. On 5, February 1993 the lawyers of the High Courts launched a strike, to protest against the killing of a Ropar lawyer Kulwant Singh, his wife and child, allegedly by the police.⁴⁶ The police excesses became the stumbling blocks for the Beant Singh ministry in enduring itself to the masses of Punjab.

While the tendency of the Akalis to exaggerate was understandable, there were several instances of investigation by “independent” civil rights groups, where innocent people have become the target of the security forces, by choice or chance. The police authorities were also slow in initiating any action on the plea that punitive steps against the security personnel would demoralize the security forces. The Government found its popularity eroding rapidly, particularly since it was unable to control the abuse of the police powers, especially in the border districts. Even leaders within the Congress (I) like J.S. Brar started issuing public statements on the alleged police atrocities under the Beant Singh Government. According to A.P.Bhatnagar⁴⁷ the human rights debate which emerged in Punjab state and emerging else where in the country was a precursor to the creation of a more democratic space. However, some people felt that unrestricted authority and power sanctioned to police during Beant Singh's rule led to gross human rights violations. Even the politicians, especially from the Congress party found their ability to manage local politics limited, since the people tended to go directly to the police, who held the actual power. Even during the earlier 1993 Panchayat polls, the Beant Singh ministry was forced to resort to police support to help them in winning the election. The police often overtly supported the prospective winning candidates. Evidently the first meeting of the Panchayats in Amritsar was held not under the auspicious of a Minister or an Administrator, but under an IGP.

Disenchantment surfaced among the people, by the failure of the Government to check the police excesses.⁴⁸ Despite the rule of democratically elected representatives, by and large the police force remained unaccountable to anybody till

1994. Cases of fake encounters and attack on innocent people in the name of fighting militancy continued unabated. The police dominance in an insurrectionary situation is no doubt necessary, but police unaccountability for its actions, and police postures of targeted hostility against a section of society can even turn alienation into resentment and anger with potential recrudescence of violence.

Corruption in Police:

Apart from the charges of excesses, the charges of corruption in the police force became a major challenge to the Beant Singh Government. The symbiotic relationship between middle level policemen and local politicians, broken during the decade long militancy started re-appearing. Complaints of increasing number of policemen having been involved in incidents related to extortion, harassment, land grabbing or intervention in civil disputes were recorded. It was primarily due to the fact that the police have transformed itself into the sole representative of the state. The field apparatus of the police itself was in disarray⁴⁹ from early 1994. Several officers who had led the fight against terrorism felt they had been marginalised by the durbar of corrupt people that began to evolve around the high command in the police and administration, after the restoration of peace.⁵⁰ The Jat Sikh landowners, the principal sponsors of the militants in the early years of the violence, were targets for police harassment and extortion. According to Darshan Kumar,⁵¹ one specific way of money-making by the police officers was to demand large sums of money from rich farmers for the release of their sons, locked up some times on a false charge or a petty crime. There were even cases reported where the local villagers preferred the army in

regards to police in fear of extortion. According to A.P. Bhatnagar,⁵² there were cases of alleged land grabbing by some police officials, but an enquiry on it only revealed that properties abandoned by the terrorists who fled to safety outside the state and abroad, were occupied by the police for its counter-terrorist operations. With peace coming to stay in Punjab, cracks began to emerge between the police and civil administration. According to media reports at least in three executive meetings of the State Government, KPS Gill was believed to have registered his complaint about increasing political interference in police work. And about the presence of politicians once linked to Khalistan terrorist groups, notably the then Information Minister Pratap Singh Bajwa⁵³ in the Beant Singh Cabinet.⁵⁴ Beant Singh in turn charged KPS Gill with being less than serious about his job and with using an imagined terrorist revival as a bargaining chip to secure his own interests. But acrimony over positions and transfers as well as over the handling of sexual assault charges pending against Beant Singh's grandson Gurkirat Singh⁵⁵ for his alleged molestation of a French tourist Katia Darnand and many other issues led to further frictions between KPS Gill and Beant Singh. Beant Singh even lobbied for KPS Gill's replacement by other officers. Beant Singh had argued that the restoration of peace in Punjab necessitated KPS Gill's removal, since the DGP's hard - line tactics were alienating the countryside. Critically, Beant Singh was believed to have been worried about his inability to seize effective power, which was still then held by the police. The inability to alter the structure of power that evolved during the anti-terrorist struggle was believed to have been the root of conflict between Beant Singh and KPS Gill. But on the other hand Beant Singh was highly defensive of the police department and the

contribution made by KPS Gill for peace, in all public function and in the media. Similarly KPS Gill too was very defensive of the role of Beant Singh in the whole process. According to KPS Gill, in his entire tenure under the Beant Singh Government, there was only one small instance of political recommendation routed to him, which he rejected and there was no subsequent attempt of interference in his duties. In any case, KPS Gill enjoyed the backing of the powerful Hindu business lobby in the Punjab Pradesh Congress (I) and the Union Home Ministry.

But on the whole, the role of Beant Singh and KPS Gill as a team⁵⁶ during the hour of crisis should bring solace not only to Punjab, but also to the people all over the country who have helplessly witnessed innumerable senseless killing by armed bands which were helped by one inimical neighbouring country Pakistan.

Role of Civil Defence:

Apart from the police role, the people also played crucial role in fighting terrorism. In 1989 Village Defence Scheme (VDS), and a system of appointing special Police Officers (SPOs) was devised.⁵⁷ The objective of this scheme was to recruit a committee of volunteers from the most vulnerable villages and arm them to resist the terrorist attacks at the local level itself. After initial hesitation many volunteers came forward. These volunteers were trained in weapon handling, and were provided with gun licenses for legal fulfillment. Detailed tactical plans were made for the defence of these villages. Accordingly bunkers were built. For some time police assistance were provided at night to support this local initiative. SPO's were recruited from army and police veterans and were assigned as in-charge of each village operation.

By April 1989 itself, 2350 weapons had been distributed in around 450 villages, and the VDS played a significant and crucial role, since then. Punjab witnessed an increasing and organised resistance from this people's army against terrorist violence. There were 1075 village defence committees. Despite the regular targeted attacks from the terrorist against them, the VDC's and SPO's stood their ground even at the end of 1991. Total desertions during the years 1990-92, when militancy went to its peak was barely 600, which includes VDCs, SPOs, PHGs, and the Punjab Police. This was after the terrorists sustained propaganda campaign to pressurize them to resign their job.

Border Management:

The length of the India Pakistan border in various sectors is as follows:-

(i)	Jammu (International Border only)	210 Kms.
(ii)	Punjab	554 Kms
(iii)	Rajasthan	1035 Kms.
(iv)	Gujarat	512 Kms.

As part of the strategy worked out by the Government of India for effective policing of the western Border with Pakistan and for curbing infiltration and ex-filtration of mercenaries/militants/drug traffickers from across the border, for combating effectively trans border terrorism emanating from the other side of the border, fencing/flood lighting of the Indo-Pak border in the states of Punjab and Rajasthan was take-up from 1988 onwards.⁵⁸ A total length of 451 Kms of flood lighting in the entire Punjab sector, except some gaps in riverine areas was completed in 1993. In Rajasthan sector, a length of 865 Kms was fenced/flood lit by 31, December 1997. The work of fencing/ flood lighting in the remaining 167.60 Kms in

Rajasthan sector was under execution and was to be completed by 31, December 1999. Fencing/Flood lighting of the international border in Jammu sector, taken up in June 1995 was suspended due to unwarranted and persistent firing from Pakistan, and in order to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. The sealing of Jammu International border by fencing/lighting and an intruder alarm system along the border was planned and the work was to be taken up at an appropriate time there. Erection of fencing/flood lighting on a raised embattlement along the Rann area of Gujarat was also being taken up in phases. Apart from these measures the number of Border Outposts (BOPs)⁵⁹ were increased to 156. Special police officers were appointed in the border villages to fight terrorism. They proved very useful for getting intelligence about the terrorist movements and activities.

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Chapter-V

Limitations in the Integration Processes: Restoration Vs Terrorism

The Domestic Scene:

On 31 August 1995 Beant Singh was killed in a bomb blast at the entrance of the Punjab Secretariat building at Chandigarh. The Union Cabinet Resolution mourning Beant Singh's killing described him as a man of exemplary courage, single-minded determination and exceptional devotion to duty. His role in putting down terrorism in Punjab, restoring faith in the democratic process and putting the state firmly on the path of progress and prosperity was recognized. Ironically shortly before his death, had announced a massive populist package of loan waivers, tax cuts and poverty alleviation schemes, targeting the urban and rural poor, in particular the Dalits. Loan Waivers and reduced fertilizer prices, alternatively targeted the traditional Akali Constituencies of large and medium farmers.¹ Beant Singh, it appeared, was at last preparing the Congress (I) to fight an election on post-insurgency issues. According to I.K. Gujral the unique feature of Beant Singh's rule was that he turned around the state economically and politically. He credited Beant Singh with making the Congress a working proposition in his state and ushering in an era of competitive politics. He ended the era of alienation and bridged the Hindu-Sikh chasm. BJP leader L.K. Advani described the assassination of Beant Singh as a warning that terrorism was still alive in Punjab and that there was no room for complacency.² Harcharan Singh Brar took over as the Chief Minister and he was seen more of a "consensus" politician than Beant Singh. He was a suave feudal patriarch

in the classic mould, and much more sensitive of the Akali role in the structure of Punjab politics than Beant Singh.³ One clear departure from Beant Singh's political platform was the Chief Minister's early flirtations with the Akalis and the Sikh religious establishments. On 10 September 1995, the Shiromani Gurudawara Parbandhak Committee honoured Brar with the presentation of a Saropa when he visited Golden Temple in Amritsar. The same religious honour was denied to Beant Singh, and the SGPC had boycotted his visit to the Golden Temple in February 1992.⁴ Brar differed with Beant Singh on the issue of terrorism, and was of the opinion that it should have been dealt with at a political level rather than treating it as law and order problem⁵. P.S. Badal issued a statement condemning the cult of violence and attended Beant Singh's cremation, a gesture of particular significance, since it was the first time since Harchand Singh Longowal's assassination in 1985, that a moderate Akali faction was condemning a terrorist action. For over a period, in 1995, there were reports in the media that the Khalistani terrorists were engaged in the process of regrouping and reorganizing the structure. The February 1995 kidnapping of Rajinder Mirdha⁶ (Son of former Union Minister Ram Niwas Mirdha) and subsequent search operation led to seizure of massive quantity of deadly explosive and weapons. Though such symptoms persisted, neither the Government nor the police saw it worth to launch a major crack down on terrorist revivalism. With peace continuing to sustain in Punjab the political sponsors of the theory that terrorism had been completely wiped out, had apparently begun to believe the very myth they had created. Some of the experts on terrorism had warned earlier that the strategy of terrorists may change to carry out targeted killing of prominent figures in Punjab and

outside through even bomb blasts.⁷ The revival of village level militancy was however ruled out in Punjab. While Beant Singh's Commitment on tackling terrorists was both firm and sincere, he lacked vision and understanding on terrorist politics. For him it was merely a law and order issue. While KPS Gill repeatedly lobbied for the revival of counter-terrorist missions against the regrouping terrorists, the Chief Minister Beant Singh was of the view that terrorist and terrorism were significant only if they created trouble. There were several warnings from different agencies, about infiltration of terrorist elements in the ruling party and the Government apparatus. There were also reports that ISI was stepping up its activities again in Punjab. However, all such signals were ignored. Despite the fact that the Babbar Khalsa International had claimed the responsibility for the assassination by circulating faxes to many offices, the Central Agencies believed that the Punjab Police Security was breached at the highest level.⁸ But according to AP Bhatnagar,⁹ there was no real basis for suspecting the integrity of the Punjab Police. The police force which had been on operations day and night under extreme conditions of danger, had relaxed a bit and the opportunity was seized by the terrorists. And another factor was that no replacement was done for the transferred DIG (Security) JP Virdhi who handled Beant Singh's protection. The first successor PM Das declined to accept the job and MM Kapoor the DIG (provisioning) who received orders to handle the task on 28, August had not taken over effectively.¹⁰ With H.S. Brar taking over the leadership, infighting within Congress(I) erupted. With the poor performance of Congress in the 1996 By-election he was replaced by Mrs. R. K. Bhattal as Chief Minister for few months. In the Assembly elections held on 7, February 1997 the

Akali Dal (Badal) and BJP alliance gained 93 of 117 seats. Parkash Singh Badal became the Chief Minister of Punjab.

Akali Politics:

The hard line stand taken by Beant Singh on the militants and the radicals not only destroyed them, but also silenced their friendly-enemies the moderate Sikhs. Beant Singh adopted a confrontationist method in dealing with all his adversaries including the the moderate Akali Dal factions. His Government arrested the leaders of Akali Dals on occasions of all important political event. He declared without any hesitation that the presence of Akali leaders on such occasions would be a threat to peace. Politically harassed within the state, the moderates shifting their activism outside the state particularly, Delhi. In the December 1993 election to the Delhi Assembly, moderate Akali leaders appealed the Sikh voters to vote for the anti-Congress Plank, i.e. the BJP.

The Bharatiya Janata Party's stand on the status of Punjabi language in neighbouring states of Punjab and it's open attack on the Congress(I) for not taking up the cases of 1984 Delhi anti-Sikh riots also played a crucial role in Sikh politics. Within the domestic Sikh politics in Punjab, the Beant Singh's method of restoring peace produced fruits for the moderate Sikh as well in long run. By bulldozing and sidelining the militant and radicals, the position of moderates got strengthened. The marginalised radical factions of Akali Dal forged a united political front in alliance with SGPC, under the patronage of the Jathedhar of Akal Takht in May 1994 and formed Akali Dal (Amritsar). This merger was followed by a resolution called the

Amritsar Declaration,¹¹ which called for the formation of an independent Sikh homeland¹² where in the community would be free to profess and propagate Sikhism without interference from any quarter. In these political developments the moderate Akali Dal (B) distanced itself and demonstrated its individual strength in May 1994, By-election to the Vidhan Sabha. A successful mandate for the Akali Dal (B) led to cleavages in the Akali Dal (Amritsar) and ultimately resulted in defections. In 1995 SGPC president G.S. Tohra and P.S. Badal the Akali Dal (B) President, reached a compromise with the former limiting his role to religious sphere and the latter taking charge of the political programmes. The hold of Akali Dal (B) further strengthened with its victory in the SGPC elections in 1996 and the Lok Sabha elections in May 1996.¹³ In this Eleventh Lok Sabha elections the BJP emerged as the single largest party. The Akali Dal (B) at this crucial juncture, when the BJP was aspiring to form a Government at Centre, declared its support to latter's claim. This further bloomed into an alliance in the 1997 Vidhan Sabha elections. The Akali Dal (B) – BJP alliance in Punjab proved the two already existing philosophy of power politics, firstly that there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, but only permanent interests, and secondly, that an enemy's enemy is one's friend. Though many political observers explained the alliance of being opportunistic and tactical one, in reality the alliance became obvious and inevitable as a result of the ideologically charged "politics of violent control" practiced by the Congress (I) government both at the local and the Central level. Though ideologically all three parties have different positions forming a triangular rivalry, the move to form an alliance between Akali Dal (B) and BJP was a well calculated one. The radical Sikhs

criticised the Akali Dal (Badal) for forging this alliance, particularly the Mann faction. Mann faction has always projected the Sikh cause at par with other religious minorities. But the BJP has always held that Sikhism was part of Hinduism and Sikhs are the defenders of Hinduism. Dipankar Gupta also vouches this view in his book by tracing the history of Sikhs and says that Sikhs were seen as the military arm of Hinduism and many religious Guru's had laid down their life for it. But in regards to the identity politics of the Akali Dals the BJP has always been supportive of it, as the foundation of its own is based on such politics. It was this vital factor, which the Akali Dal (B) calculated that this alliance would provide the maximum scope for preserving the Sikh identity and indeed advance the agenda for political autonomy.

When the Congress(I) suffered a humiliating defeat in 1996 Lok Sabha elections in Punjab, retaining only two of the 12 seats it had won in 1991, Sitaram Kesari, the Congress(I) president replaced H.S. Brar by Rajinder Kaur Bhattal as Chief Minister of Punjab. But Bhattal's plan to revive the fortunes of the Congress(I) by its populist 51 – point program on the eve of the elections got messed up with the Election Commission advancing the date of polls.¹⁴ The Akali Dal (B) slogan of Path, Punjab and Panjabiyat became the driving force of its campaign. The Akali Dal (B)'s manifesto and campaign was centered around the emphasis on old issues like the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, the Rajiv-Longowal Accord, river water dispute, transfer of Chandigarh and other Punjabi speaking areas, stalling the SYL project, etc. and new issue like setting up Human Rights Commission to evaluate the gross violation of rights and tribunals to enquire the police excesses. But the most important aspect of its campaign was its regular calls for Hindu-Sikh unity and

maintenance of peace in Punjab at all costs. The only major difference with BJP, for Akali Dal (B), was the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, which BJP perceived as a secessionist document. The BJP's position in this regard was that the decentralisation demand of the document should be replaced by devolution. But the difference did not deter the strength of the alliance or the campaign. The election campaign itself was limited to two weeks. Almost 70,000 police personnel and 1,00,000 paramilitary forces were deployed across the state to ensure a free and fair voting at 18,097 polling stations of which 1,057 were identified as "hyper-sensitive" and 2,744 as "sensitive".¹⁵ The Akali Dal (B) – BJP alliance won a land slide victory by capturing 93 of 117 Assembly seats and almost 48 per cent of the votes polled.¹⁶ The alliance virtually made a sweep in rural areas, especially in Malwa region. It fared very well in Majha and Doaba region also. The radical Akal Dals failed miserably as they could secure only one seat of the 29 which they contested. The biggest loser of the election was Congress(I), which won only 14 seats. Its performance in Maaja region was very poor, and even in Doaba region where the Congress(I) had a strong hold, the vote share fell considerably. In Malwa region, the replacement of H.S. Brar few months before the election caused widespread dissent, as he was in good command in that area. It was for the third time that Parkash Singh Badal was taking over as the Chief Minister of Punjab. His first term was in March 1970 following the mid-term polls of 1969, which lasted only for two years. Second in 1977 when the Akali Dal in alliance with BJP and Communists formed a Government, but again it lasted only for two years. So this time P.S. Badal was highly cautious of his politics and his attention obviously was on law and order first.¹⁷

Human Rights:

The Government of Punjab constituted the Punjab State Human Rights Commission on 17th March 1997 based on the Protection of Human Rights Acts, 1993. It took up various cases of Police excesses and other human rights violation and is playing a significant role in building in faith of the masses on the system of Justice. Initially the police saw this as an instrument against its as in some cases the commission ordered action against erring police offices. Later the police department reconciled itself to this new institution of justice and the necessity of its role.

Resurgence of Terrorism:

Though the issue of law and order was pushed to the forefront immediately after Badal took over, almost four years after the terrorist menace had been wiped out, there was a sudden eruption of terrorist incidents. Between March and July 1997, fifty-five persons lost their lives to the militant bombs and bullets in Punjab. The incidents took place in three different areas, first it was at Jalandhar railway station, the second was at Pathankot near a bus stand and the third was at Lehra Khanna, where 34 people were killed in a blast inside the Ganga Nagar – Ambala Train.¹⁸ The incidents caused a great concern and shake up for the security agencies. The Union Home Secretary K. Padmanabiah asked the State Government to hand over the probe to the CBI in view of the serious concern expressed by the Union Cabinet and other Security Agencies over the resurgence of militancy in Punjab. But the state Government rejected the move and claimed that the Punjab Police was competent enough to handle it.¹⁹ Incidentally a few months later the Punjab police reported that

it were the attacks from a little known terrorist organisation called Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF). It also arrested a few Sikhs from Poonch, J&K who were believed to be working in Punjab as “raagis” (hymn singers). Though there were no major shootout cases reported, sporadic cases involving bomb blasts continued in and around Punjab.

Over 200 listed terrorist including roughly about 30 in the “hard-core” category escaped the security net in Punjab, while most of them are comfortably lodged at a variety of safe houses abroad, some are still believed to be in India.²⁰ A small army of sympathisers comprising in a large part, the families of terrorist and a substantial force of professional criminals are still available to any group that can come up with a coherent and low-risk strategy for the revival of the terrorism.²¹ Any situation of acute political instability and of interference, weakness or lack of direction in the functioning of the security forces would immediately revive their motives. A significant proportion of the arsenal pumped into the state during the period of militancy still lied buried around the country side and can be swiftly recovered and redeployed if conditions once again became favourable to the terrorist activity.²² According to the police reports some of the low-lying extremists’ groups are Babbar Khalsa International, Khalistan Liberation Force (Sekhon), Khalistan Liberation Force (Panjwar), International Sikh Youth Federation (Rode) and Dal Khalsa.

External Factor : Role of Pakistan

The Punjab Police alleged that some of the militants arrested in recent years have confessed that they had close links with Pakistani agents and Pakistan sponsored

militant groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Aal-e-Hadir, Soura-e-Jihad and Hizbul Mujahideen. Intelligence agencies have reported that the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan had been putting pressure on the militant outfits to reactivate militant activities. It seemed determined to bring about unity among different militant organisations.

The signal intelligence wing of the ISI runs a chain of intercept stations, along the entire Indo-Pak border, besides providing communication support to the militants operating in the Kashmir Valley and Punjab. In 1992 it was estimated that there were about 200 clandestine radio stations operating on the Indian Soil near POK. The main support to the Khalistani terrorist in Punjab came from the border areas near Pakistan, which is referred to as Majha, comprising mainly the tract lying between the river Beas and the Pakistan border, and essentially covering only two districts-Amritsar and Gurdaspur.²³ The ISI even today runs a number of terrorist training camps around the borders and in POK including those in Bahawalpur, Sialkot and Lahore. The flow of the Sikh recruits to these camps from India has completely dried up. But there are evidence that the ISI is presently focusing on a recruitment drive on 'Khalistan' sympathisers in Europe and America for training.²⁴ Punjab, according to M.S. Bitta,²⁵ was the victim of Pakistan's strategic interest in the region. In October 1998, Lt. Gen. Nasir, intelligence adviser to Nawaz Shariff was appointed as the head of the Pakistan Sikh Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, which is responsible for the control of the gurudwaras in Pakistan.²⁶ These shrines have long been used by Pakistan for indoctrination and recruitment among the thousands of pilgrims who visit them from India each year. Lt. Gen. Nasir was earlier with ISI and then was

heading the Tablighi Jamaat, an Islamic extremist organisation that provides highly motivated recruits for various Islamic terrorist outfits across the world.

The danger of open conventional warfare between India and Pakistan is minimal. But support to the low intensity conflict in the form of trans-border terrorism will remain a part of Pakistan strategic objectives for a long time to come.²⁷ Gen. Musharraf told the Karachi branch of Pakistans English speaking Union on 12, April 1999 that even a bilaterally negotiated solution to the Kashmir issue might not normalize relations with India since Pakistan would continue to be a thorn on India's side by frustrating its hegemonistic ambitions and this would make India continue with its policy of weakening Pakistan.²⁸

Non-Military Dimensions : Arms trade

Most of the weapons obtained by the Sikh militants have been either from the members of ISI²⁹ or from the arms bazaar in the NWFP. The single most important factor for proliferation of light weaponry in the Indian sub-continent was supply of arms by U.S.A. to the Afghani resistance militia fighting against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan.³⁰ The US funnelled vast supplies of military hardware by a secret arms pipeline, through Pakistan since 1979, popularly known as "the Afghan pipeline."³¹ To conceal its covert support to the rebels in Afghanistan, the U.S. initially purchased large consignment of weapons from the communist countries, particularly from the Chinese, and later provided its own weaponry, including the surface-to-air Stinger missiles in 1986. In the whole process CIA played the role of supplier and ISI was the intermediary and distributor.³² As the reason for failure of U.S. in Vietnam was

excessive interference and micro-management, in Afghanistan affairs it reversed the strategy to macro-management and non-interference. However in absence of strict monitoring from CIA on ISI and due to covert nature, the Afghan pipeline begun to leak persistently and weapons from it found their way into commercial channels. In addition to it the commanders in the field often sold their weapons to raise funds for transportation, ammunitions, food, the evacuation of wounded militants, and also for personal profit. The black market of weapons and arms in the North West Frontier Province is flooded with the supplies leaked from the Afghan pipeline. The market also had arms from the Middle East and South East Asian routes; Soviet Stocks captured during the Afghan war and locally produced weapons.

Narco-terrorism:

According to Sudhir Sawant,³³ narco-terrorism is “the term employed to describe the close link between drug activities and political disturbances, represents an alliance between two of the most disruptive, divisive, and uncontrollable segments of society in the world today those involved in the illicit narcotics trade, and those perpetuating violence against the state.” According to Raehel Enrenfeld,³⁴ narco terrorism is “the use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of certain government and terrorist organisations.” In recent years, narcotics trade has come to become the foundation of organised crime along the borders of India with Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Burma. Strategically India is located between “the Golden Crescent” (Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan) and “the Golden Triangle” (Myanmar, Laos and Thailand).³⁵ The nexus between the smugglers, drug manufactures,

politicians, armed forces and terrorist groups in Pakistan, India and other neighbours facilitated the trade further. A report released by the Eco-political Drug watch in Brussels classified Pakistan as a “narco-state”, where drug traffickers, top political and military officials were entangled in an intricate web of activities. Drug cultivation and drug trafficking assumed alarming proportions in Pakistan in the late 1970s due to (a) the coming of the Khomeini regime in Iran, which imposed severe restrictions on drug trafficking (b) the entry of Soviet troops in Afghanistan preventing drug trade (c) the take over of military leader Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan. Since then, the heroin industry emerged stronger particularly due to the support of the ISI, the Army and the Air Force of Pakistan. Pakistan is both a major producer and a transit state for drug industry. The nexus between army and the drug barons is based on the logic that the army needed money for its low intensity operations against India and on the other hand, the drug mafia needed its patronage for the safe passage of drugs. The drug money generated by the ISI has been for a long used to fuel the proxy wars in Kashmir and Punjab. Thus the narco-terrorism of ISI assumed the source of finance for its “K-2 project.”³⁶ After the advent of Sikh militancy in Punjab, number of smugglers came out into the open to amass large amounts of money by trafficking in drugs, weapons and ammunition needed by the terrorists. From various interrogation reports of terrorists like Gurdeep Singh Sivia (Babbar Khalsa International) and Manjit Singh (Khalistan Liberation Force), it was established that Pakistan played a crucial role in narco-terrorism. Many Sikh terrorist worked for Haji Iqbal Beg who was referred as “the king of Indian Route” in Pakistan.³⁷ They smuggled heroin into India for return for money and weapons. The

basic chemical needed for the conversion of opium into heroin, acetyl anhydride, was also smuggle by them from India to Pakistan, through the same routes by which the drugs and weapons were smuggled out. The drugs smuggled into Indian Territory along the borders of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and J&K, were transported to Delhi, Mumbai Chennai and Nepal, further from where it was couriered to USA and Europe, via Africa.³⁸ Militant leaders of Punjab like Wadhawa Singh Babbar and Wassan Singh Zaffarwal first utilised the services of Pakistani smugglers to induct arms and ammunitions into Punjab. Subsequently, these militants recruited couriers from border districts, which gradually joined the ranks of the terrorists. The primary source of finance for the Sikh terrorists was also from Mumbai underworld.

By involving itself in the State-Sponsored narcotic-terrorism, Pakistan has gained a lot, (a) as it was self financing (b) it created instability in Indian (c) diplomatically it was safe, as it was very difficult to prove its hand in fuelling terrorism. However, in September 1996, Nawaz Sharif made a statement in the Washington Post that in 1991 General Afzal Beg, Chief of the Army staff and General Durrani, Director General of ISI had together sought an official permission from him to smuggle drugs for financing the “covert military operations” in Punjab and Kashmir.³⁹ This proved beyond doubt, that the basis of terrorist activity in India was not only political violence but also organised crime and narcotic trade. The line that separated terrorist smugglers and criminals had thus disappeared. Though India was not the only state to have confronted the powerful combination of terrorism and narcotics it has done a severe security damage to its internal security.

Role of Nepal:

Nepal's liberal immigration policy and a porous border with India, is serving not only as a transit for those on the run⁴⁰ but also a haven for the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist activity.⁴¹ Nepal is also a transit route for smuggling of arms and drugs for ISI activities in India.⁴² In August 1997, Bhupinder Singh Bhuda of the KCF (Panjwar) was arrested by Nepal police and handed over to Indian authorities. Islamabad's diplomatic contingent is the only one whose official baggage is searched at the Kathmandu Airport, after the Nepal Police detected 30kg RDX in diplomatic bags bound for the Pakistan Embassy in 1997. In 1999 again the ISI backed hijackers sneaked into the Indian Airlines flight at Kathmandu airport with weapons and hijacked it to Kandhar. Government of India had been expressing its deep concern, about the misuse of Nepali territory for anti-Indian activities, to its Government.

Role of Sikh Diaspora:

Diaspora communities by their very nature are reluctant to seek assimilation in their host countries. The Sikh diaspora community based in Europe, America and elsewhere have been noted to be quite prosperous and there are enough evidences to suggest that economic assistance and help with supplies of illegal weapons play a crucial role in rising a militant movement. The general international publicity by these diaspora groups significantly damage or supplement the diplomatic activities of a country. Even now after the extremists in Punjab have been marginalized by the moderates of Akali Dal, a section among the Sikh diaspora continues to fund and propagate to keep the issues of "Khalistan" alive. They play a significant role in

bringing about solidarity among its community by regularly organizing festivals and meetings, thereby invoking the perceived or real experiences of pain, trauma etc.

These propaganda activities have two primary objectives: (a) to malign the Indian State and its democracy (b) mobilize for an inevitable need of a separate state. They campaign that the activities of the Indian State are inimical to Sikh interests and that the Sikh culture and community can be saved from Hindu assimilation only in a separate state of their own. Their another important role is fund raising for the cause of "Khalistan". They had cultivated an army of sympathizers among the political elite of their host countries. In USA the Congressmen like Dan Burton and Edolphus Towns put forward some resolutions or other regularly in the American Senate against India. These activities have caused severe damage to Indian diplomacy in the West. The Sikh diaspora community is also involved in funding the politician in Punjab. Therefore, many Sikh politicians take stands dictated by these diaspora leaderships. This politics play a vital role in the context of National Security as a whole.

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Chapter-VI

Conclusion

A Chronology of recent acts of terrorism in Punjab and its neighbouring states shows the raising graph of terrorist threat the India's Internal Security.

- 24, January 1999- The Punjab Police nabs a four-member gang of BKI militants, along with 12 Kgs of RDX at the Delhi-Amritsar highway near Phillaur. Two of them, with no earlier police records, had recently returned from Pakistan after a two-month training to hit VIP targets.¹
- 8, February 1999- An assembled time bomb with 12 Kg RDX detected on a rail bridge in Punjab on Delhi-Chandigarh route.²
- 27 February 1999- Police recovers a powerful bomb, fitted with a timer device and containing 9.5 kg RDX on the Amritsar-Delhi rail track near Shambhu in Patiala district.³
- 16, April 1999- An explosion inside train in the Holambi Kalan area of North West Delhi.⁴
- 3, June 1999- A bomb blast in Chandni Chowk, Delhi which injured 27 persons.⁵
- 25, Jan 2000 - The Punjab police arrested two Babbar Khalsa International terrorist and seized 10 kgs RDX and two AK-47 assault rifles in Batala area in North-Eastern Punjab. The police had failed the attempt of these militants to strike at the Republic Day function planned for the next day.⁶

- 27 February 2000- An explosion occurred at Paharganj area of Central Delhi. The police estimated that atleast 4 kgs of plastic explosives (RDX or PETN) was used in it.⁷
- 17 March 2000- Three Punjab militants were held for the Paharganj blast. The terrorist belonged to Khalistan Zindabad Force. Besides 32 Kgs of RDX, the police seized a Pakistan made 7.62 bore Pistol and one extra magazine, 63 live cartridges, four hand grenades, 15 detonators, three pencil-timers and four 9V batteries.⁸

The police admitted that there were strong and disturbing undercurrents in the State which indicated that the militants were regrouping, and a stepped-up flow of explosives and weapons from Pakistan indicated that militants were upto to some kind of a showdown. The Punjab Police launched two Operations, "Operation Khoj" and "Operation Pehchan" to identify militants from various out fits.⁹ In all, 65 terrorists were arrested during the year 1999, and another 5 surrendered. Many of the arrests were made outside Punjab.

In the most significant of these arrests, three militants of the BKI were arrested near Ludhiana with 20 slabs of RDX, 1.5 Kgs of PETN as well as other arms, and some heroin. Another BKI militant was arrested on 28, March 1999 and 32 kgs of RDX was recovered from him.¹⁰ In 1999, in total the police seized 147Kgs of explosive materials including 135 kgs of RDX, 9 revolvers, 19 pistols, 8 AK-type rifles, 1 sten gun, 11 hand grenades, 19 bombs, 3 rocket launchers, etc. These seizures indicate that a substantial militant threat continues to persist in Punjab.

Another important incident was the surrender of former KLF chief Manjinder Singh Issi¹¹ and his brother Sukhjinder Singh Lila. Issi had been held responsible for the kidnapping of a Romanian diplomat and attack on the former SGPC Chief G.S. Tohra as well as former Punjab Police Chief, D.S. Mangat. He was also wanted by the police for the murder of a former Punjab Finance Minister, Balwant Singh. He had been among the longest surviving “pro-Khalistani” militant and had been “missing” since 1991. Issi and his accomplices kidnapped the Romanian diplomat Mr. Liviu Radu from Delhi in October 1991 to seek the release of Sukhdev Singh Sukha and Harjinder Singh Jinda who were later hanged for the charges of assassination of former Chief of Army Staff, Gen. A.S. Vaidya.

In July 1999, 12 Babbar Khalsa men were arrested over two weeks from different locations. Some of these arrests were made even from, far off places like Baroda and Ahemadabad in Gujrat. This break-through proved the emerging link between criminal groups operating in Western India and the militants in Punjab. Among the various incidents of sporadic violence in the State, the explosion at the Chakki Bank station on 11, November 1999 was suspected to be the result of a joint venture between various militant out fits.

Earlier on 30, June 1999 a bomb blast occurred in the State capital Chandigarh, but no one was hurt. The blast was linked to Rattan Preet Singh of the KCF (Panjwar group).¹² There were other couple of blasts linked to Punjab militants in the neighbouring states of Haryana and Delhi, as well. As the pressure on militants was high within Punjab, a new axis appeared to emerge in neighbouring areas, centred somewhere around Shahabad in Haryana, where significant quantities of

RDX have been recovered. A blast had also taken place in a train near Panipat in Haryana.

In recent months Haryana too became the target of Pakistan's ISI sponsored terrorist activities.¹³ The spate of incidents in February and April 1999, particularly recoveries of explosive devices from this State was the basis for this theory. One reason for this development according to Kapil Dev¹⁴ was, the Sikh terrorist organisations were reluctant to create trouble in Punjab at a time when an Akali government was in power. Haryana's proximity to Delhi and Punjab and also the borders of Nepal in U.P., which is being used to smuggle arms and explosives, were considered a fit place for terrorists hide outs.

In all the bomb explosion cases in north India the Delhi police as well as the Punjab Police suspected the role of Punjab terrorists. The Punjab Police drew few conclusions from its intelligence sources:¹⁵

- (a) The Babbar Khalsa International and the Khalistan Zindabad Force are spear heading the bid to revive dormant terrorist groups.
- (b) Funds for arms and explosives were coming from Sikh organisations abroad.
- (c) Pakistan's ISI is again active in training youth recruits.

There have been continuous efforts from across the border to revive terrorism, which resulted in an occasional incidents of random and aimless terrorist violence. Pakistan's ISI continues to pursue its vigorous hands-on policy in the Indian Punjab. Several smugglers and criminals close to that agency have been apprehended trying to develop new routes into Punjab for the use of militant groups at a later stage.

Crucially, Pakistan appointed a former chief of the ISI as the head of the Pakistan Gurudwara Parbanshak Committee. A meeting was also organised recently at a Lahore hotel to commemorate the 15th anniversary of Operation Blue Star.¹⁶ Many militants belonging to various factions, including the Dal Khalsa, the Babbar Khalsa International and the International Sikh Youth Federation attended the meeting. The chief of the Lahore unit of Jammāt-I-Islami Farid Piracha addressed the Sang Sabha and told the Sikhs that the Pakistan was with them.

Apart from arms and explosives being pushed into Punjab from across the border, some nearly defunct terrorist outfits have now begun inducting fresh blood into their ranks. A crucial feature of this exercise is that they targeting the youngsters with no past criminal records, making it difficult for the police to track them down.¹⁷ The new recruits are mainly religious zealots who are sent to Pakistan for training. The militant strategy is to create a “pool of fresh hitmen” for future strikes. The militant ideologues now do not believe in number, but in quality. Attempts were also being made to recruit kins of slain or absconding militants. The ISI has a three pronged strategy¹⁸ (a) select devout Sikhs from among illegal migrants and indoctrinate them (b) send them to India via Nepal or Kashmir and (c) flush them with sufficient money. A detailed account of foreign money flow into India in the form fake currencies is provided in the appendix of this work. At least 500 expatriate Sikh youths had been trained in Pakistan and kept as a “reserve pool”. The pro-militant elements among the illegal immigrants constitute a major threat since there are no specific details available on them.

A serious threat to the law and order situation is from the pro-Khalistan ideologues in foreign countries, with over 4000 Sikh youths staying abroad illegally.¹⁹ The Foreign based pro-Khalistan leaders are trying to organise militants who had fled to the US and Europe after the crack down on terrorism in the early 90's. The police records show that atleast a dozen "hardcore" terrorists, some of them heading banned outfits, are currently hiding there. The operational key to the attempt to reorganise Punjab militants is with them, as they are the major fund raisers for these activities. Though the militants have been trying to regroup for some time the effort gathered momentum only after the Akali Dal came to power in February 1997.

A strong 'active defence' policy is needed for a sustained era of peace in Punjab.²⁰ The politics of the state should be isolated from the religious bigotaries in response to the issue of terrorism. The strategy of "active defence" is based on the fact and understanding of the need that one should not only prevent success to the enemy, but also inflict damage and continue hurting the sponsorer politically, economically, para-militarily and militarily till it abandons its sponsorship. This pro-active strategy of counter-terrorism through a strong intelligence network can effectively paralyse the backbone of the State sponsored terrorism.

Apart from the Pakistan factor the domestic political churnings also play a crucial role in the realm of internal security. The "crisis of governance" in India has led to serious concerns in the internal security front. The emergence of new socio-political groups as result of the democratic social revolution in India, through the process of universal adult suffrage, had created new tensions and conflicts in society.

The inability of the state to fulfill the aspirations of the new class has led to serious political turmoil. These political crisis in many cases have been resulted from mobilisation based on ethnic identities and in the name of self-determination. The Indian State's policy of carrot and stick, was aimed at converting secessionist to sub-national movements, but it unfortunately ended up in converting secessionism into insurgency. It is significant to note that secessionist demand never arose from any of the dominant communities of India, but always from marginal and peripheral ones.

Apart from these general features Punjab has faced certain specific problems as well, which includes the aggressive competition for the political power among the new social classes in the State and the Centre, the neglect of genuine demands of Punjab, short sightedness of the ruling elite at the Centre, faulty development strategies, etc. As a solution to these crisis, an able charismatic leadership with vision and the agenda of good governance through the institutions of democracy can effectively restore normalcy.

However the greater danger in Punjab today is the character of its politics itself. The continuous regimes of bad governance, the financial mismanagement, nepotism, parochial interest and corruption has brought the State government to the brink of bankruptcy. The strong under currents of struggle for power and more resources has led to an intense churning among the moderates and radicals of the Akali factions. The continuing polarization and widening gulf among the Sikh clergy, moderates and extremists, have substantial potential for violence.²¹ The changed power equation between groups of former SGPC chief G.S. Tohra and Chief Minister P.S. Badal, by installation of Bibi Jagir Kaur as the head of SGPC, through communal

mobilisation could again encourage militancy. G.S. Tohra openly warned in mid 1999 of bloodshed if Badal continued in office. The tension between the two leaders pose a larger threat to peace in the State. In a situation where even moderate Akali's are dangerously turning to the religious arena to maximise their power base and vote banks, militant politics is likely to resurface in Punjab.²² However, Badal as well as many Police Officials discount the fear of revival of militancy in the state, possibly banking on the lack of any widespread public support for the militant cause.²³ The immense suffering of the Sikh masses during the militancy phase are still fresh in their minds and constitute the biggest guarantee against large scale revival of militant activities.

However, Badal's pre occupation with the infighting in the Akali Dal, his Government's inability to deliver, and the plight of small farmers in the state, etc have the perfect breeding ground for the militants.

The nature of the terrorist movement has also undergone a change in recent times. This was result of the strong counter terrorist measures in the early 1990's. The terrorists as well, can not use the same methods of operation for long and hope to succeed.²⁴ They always think of new methods, to surprise their adversaries. The threat of selective terrorist strikes, now looms at large. The militants activity in Punjab is also no longer limited to the territory of the State. The new face of terrorism in Punjab will be the targeted killing of politicians and police officers by trained and committed groups within the State as well as outside.²⁵ There has been a change over, from the use of weapons to sophisticated explosives, as demonstrated in the assassination of former Chief Minister Beant Singh. The future terrorist actions

mostly will be based, mainly on explosives and not on armed groups terrorism. The interpretation on the data available shows that since 1995 the recovery of RDX/PETN explosives had been high and steady, over the years. This is one of the major security concerns in terms of terrorist strikes, though it is not merely limited to Punjab alone. As terrorism in Punjab had been contained and not eliminated, the vigilance on the part of security forces and agencies at all times and in all directions is essential.²⁶ The conditions being sensitive, the terrorist will look forward to utilize any opportunity when the security is weak and not alert, in other words they would strike at the first given opportunity.

Our study thus shows that in spite of various measures against militancy, the terrorist threat to India's Internal Security continues to persist, as a result of both local as well as international politics. It is in this context terrorism is seen as a high intensity party conflict and a warfare metaphor. However as there is nothing called a terrorist personality, the phenomenon of terrorism is also not a permanent feature of a particular polity. The new elites which resorted to militancy and terrorism in Punjab can be integrated permanently when the logic or the causes which gave rise to such political mobilizations are addressed by the State. By neutralizing these issues which gave rise to dissent in the society, the problem of state legitimacy, the problem of state integration, separatism and militancy can be addressed.

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Appendix – 1

EXTREMIST/TERRORIST CRIME IN PUNJAB FROM 1981-1990

Category of Crime

Number of Cases registered

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
1. Murder/Shootout Cases	7	5	54	275	64	357	791	1124	846	2116
2. Explosives Act.	11	24	49	81	55	26	56	89	73	188
3. Arson Damage to property	6	15	16	184	39	26	100	29	18	59
4. Bank Robberies	-	1	26	22	12	43	39	34	26	111
5. Other Robberies	-	-	72	263	49	212	599	519	203	400
6. Attacks on Nirankaries	3	9	22	11	2	6	4	1	1	3
7. Assault on Govt. Servant	2	21	29	39	4	2	3	10	7	1
8. Seditious Activities	-	6	9	194	49	77	202	81	21	14
9. Act on Sacrilege	1	53	30	27	8	5	3	2	-	-
10. Arms. Act	-	13	17	52	64	441	1378	1268	1153	849
11. Police Encounters	-	5	3	80	20	109	410	461	582	746
12. Other Misc. Cases	34	61	59	82	89	362	1274	1413	798	778
Total	64	213	386	1310	455	1666	4859	5031	3728	5265
No. of persons killed including policemen	13	13	75	359	63	520	910	1949	1168	2467
No. of policemen/PMF/PHG/killed	2	2	20	20	8	42	95	110	201	506
No. of extremists/terrorists killed.	14	7	13	77	2	78	328	373	703	1320
No. of extremists/Terrorists arrested	84	178	296	1630	491	1581	3750	3882	2466	1759
No. of terrorists surrendered	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4

Source: Punjab Police

Appendix – 2

EXTREMIST/TERRORIST CRIME IN PUNJAB FROM 1991-2000 MAY

Category of Crime

Number of Cases registered

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Grand Total 1981-2000
1. Murder/Shootout Cases	2107	979	47	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	8774
2. Explosives Act.	187	147	78	18	9	14	21	10	23	4	1163
3. Arson Damage to property	43	15	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	552
4. Bank Robberies	21	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	338
5. Other Robberies	319	128	14	4	2	2	-	-	-	-	2786
6. Attacks on Nirankaries	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	65
7. Assault on Govt. Servant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	118
8. Seditious Activities	23	24	4	3	1	-	-	1	-	-	709
9. Act on Sacrilege	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	129
10. Arms. Act	976	750	636	189	77	67	12	48	33	10	8033
11. Police Encounters	1282	1399	571	79	27	8	-	-	-	-	5782
12. Other Misc. Cases	884	393	191	15	4	8	1	6	4	1	6457
Total	5845	3838	1543	308	120	99	35	65	60	15	34903
No. of persons killed including policemen	2591	1518	48	2	-	-	56	-	1	9	11762
No. of policemen/PMF/PHG/killed	497	252	25	1	-	-	2	-	-	1	1784
No. of extremists/terrorists killed.	2177	2113	798	76	11	3	1	-	-	-	8094
No. of extremists/Terrorists arrested	1977	1502	996	310	123	86	32	75	65	17	21300
No. of terrorists surrendered	61	537	379	70	-	-	3	5	5	-	1066

Source: Punjab Police

Appendix – 3A

DISTRICT & YEAR WISE DETAILS OF CIVILIANS (INCLUDING POLICEMEN, PMF)/ TERRORISTS KILLED FROM THE YEAR 1981 TO 1990

DISTRICT YEAR	ASR	MJA	TT	GSP	BTL	JAL	HPR	KPT	BTI	MNS	FDK	PTL	FGS	SGR	LDH	RPR	BNL	FZR	JGN	KHN	MGA	GRAND TOTAL
1981	1/14	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	4/-	-/-	3/-	1/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	3/-	1/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	13/14
1982	8/3	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/1	1/-	-/1	1/-	-/-	2/2	1/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	13/7
1983	44/5	-/-	-/-	2/-	-/-	1/7	1/-	18/-	-/-	-/-	2/-	1/-	-/-	1/-	4/1	-/-	-/-	1/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	75/13
1984	132/ 28	-/-	-/-	66/5	-/-	22/4	14/4	12/4	15/-	-/-	32/ 10	17/3	-/-	3/1	16/4	1/1	-/-	29/ 13	-/-	-/-	-/-	359/77
1985	16/-	-/-	-/-	14/-	-/-	5/1	8/-	2/-	1/-	-/-	1/-	4/-	-/-	3/1	5/-	-/-	-/-	4/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	63/2
1986	209/ 32	-/-	-/-	87/ 25	-/-	47/4	28/-	26/1	2/-	-/-	41/1	8/3	-/-	3/3	39/1	-/1	-/-	30/7	-/-	-/-	-/-	520/78
1987	421/ 151	-/-	-/-	126/ 34	-/-	100/ 28	52/12	16/2	11/-	-/-	65/ 40	58/8	-/-	3/7	27/ 17	9/1	-/-	22/ 28	-/-	-/-	-/-	910/328
1988	583/ 89	144/ 14	166/ 81	162/ 14	118/ 31	186/ 35	81/12	74/ 14	28/3	-/-	77/18	94/ 17	-/-	21/-	84/ 33	46/-	-/-	85/ 12	-/-	-/-	-/-	1949/ 373
1989	42/ 21	213/ 102	309/ 250	18/9	125/ 58	45/ 56	28/16	12/ 25	23/5	-/-	81/ 38	53/ 16	-/-	8/3	58/ 37	25/ 12	-/-	133/ 55	-/-	-/-	-/-	1168/ 703
1990	170/ 98	302/ 198	453/ 405	102/ 28	342/ 168	92/ 33	63/12	39/42	65/15	-/-	168/ 110	97/21	-/-	45/7	152/ 22	115/ 32	-/-	262/ 129	-/-	-/-	-/-	2467/ 1320

Source: Punjab Police

Appendix – 3B

DISTRICT & YEAR WISE DETAILS OF CIVILIANS (INCLUDING POLICEMEN, PMF)/ TERRORISTS KILLED FROM THE YEAR 1991 TO 2000 May

Dt. Yr.	ASR	MJA	TT	GSP	BTL	JAL	HPR	KPT	BTI	MNS	FDK	PTL	FGS	SGR	LDH	RPR	BNL	FZR	JGN	KHN	MGA	GRAND TOTAL
1991	179/ 187	241/ 298	292/ 483	29/ 47	203/ 187	126/ 55	81/43	32/32	142/ 149	-/-	132/ 135	113/ 90	-/-	260/81	529/ 163	109/ 68	-/-	123/ 159	-/-	-/-	-/-	2591/ 2177
1992	98/ 145	177/ 273	71/ 444	25/ 39	103/ 153	80/ 89	17/35	16/48	90/95	52/39	50/91	65/41	16/21	127/ 119	99/71	70/78	149/ 59	13/ 102	143/ 131	57/40	-/-	1518/ 2113
1993	-/20	2/71	2/128	-/24	2/45	4/27	2/8	1/33	3/23	1/24	1/58	1/24	5/12	-/50	4/24	2/43	7/31	-/23	9/ 106	2/24	-/-	48/798
1994	1/1	-/-	-/7	1/4	1/8	-/2	-/5	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/1	-/4	-/4	-/2	-/-	-/15	-/5	-/1	-/15	-/2	-/-	2/76
1995	-/-	-/4	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/1	-/-	-/-	-/2	-/-	-/-	-/3	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/1	-/-	-/-	-/11
1996	-/-	-/2	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/1	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/3
1997	-/-	-/-	-/-	10/-	-/-	7/-	-/-	-/-	36/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/1	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	3/-	56/1
1998	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
1999	1/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	1/-
2000 May	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	9/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-	9/-

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Source: Punjab Police

Appendix – 4

DISTRICT WISE DETAILS OF CIVILIANS (INCLUDING POLICEMEN, PMF) / TERRORISTS KILLED FROM THE YEAR 1981 TO 2000MAY

DIST.	ASR	MJA	TT	GSP	BTL	JAL	HPR	KPT	BTI	MNS	FDK	PTL	FGS	SGR	LDH	RPR	BNL	FZR	JGN	KHN	MGA	GRAND TOTAL
1981 to 2000 May	1905/ 794	1079/ 962	1293/ 1798	641/ 229	894/ 650	719/ 343	371/ 147	251/ 202	418/ 292	53/63	652/ 504	512/ 230	30/37	474/ 274	1020/ 374	378/ 252	156/ 95	702/ 529	152/ 253	59/66	3/-	11762/ 8094

Appendix - 5
DETAILS OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION RECOVERED FROM EXTREMISTS/TERRORISTS IN PUNJAB

Period	Revolver	Pistol	Rifle AK-47/ 54/56 74/94	Other Rifle	Guns	Sten-guns	Carbines.	LMG/ SMG/ MMG GPMG	Hand Grenades	Bombs	Rockets	Rocket Launchers	Rocket Chargers	Mousers	Missiles	Catgs.	Explosive Material	Mine
From 12.5.87	198	873	36	43	232	17	17	5	75	12	-	-	-	2	-	11797	34.600 KG	-
Year 88	278	963	328	108	330	14	24	13	159	96	126	21	18	10	16	86137	54.300 kg	-
Year 89	243	910	314	118	286	16	14	14	317	82	237	36	4	35	-	89475	163.500 kg	-
Year 90	224	643	553	129	291	12	4	55	265	179	107	40	17	64	-	105736	494.280 kg	-
Year 91	335	735	524	447	614	35	11	30	180	228	107	12	-	119	-	75245	268.075 kg	-
Year 92	247	705	565	397	471	23	44	35	268	266	108	48	22	119	-	56618	178 5.860 kg	-
Year 93	141	451	285	213	246	18	6	41	381	163	78	24	1	75	-	54981	2768.220 kg	9
Year 94	41	138	69	23	50	3	4	2	38	34	5	4	-	7	-	5803	88.500 kg	1
Year 95	67	65	33	14	8	1	4	3	17	29	-	1	-	13	-	4125	124.500 kg (Inc.95 KG RDX)	-
Year 96	14	51	24	4	12	2	-	1	115	92	-	2	-	5	-	2358	238.000 kg (Inc.105 kg.RDX)	10
Year 97	8	9	5	2	-	-	-	1	11	16	2	-	-	5	-	2028	177.500 kg (Inc.138 kg RDX)	1
Year 98	15	36	19	6	9	2	1	-	67	33	71	-	-	3	-	2035	169.500 kg (Inc.130kg RDX)	-
Year 99	9	19	8	-	3	1	-	-	11	19	-	3	-	17	-	987	147.420 kg (Inc.135.070 kg RDX)	-
2000 till May	5	6	4	1	-	-	-	-	10	6	-	3	-	1	-	591	33.970RDX (INC.28.970KG RDX)	-
Grand Total (1981- 2000)	1825	5604	2764	1505	2552	144	129	200	1914	1255	841	191	62	475	16	497576	7519.325 KG. (INC.618.040 KG RDX)	21

Source: Punjab Police

Appendix - 6

STATISTICS ON THE SEIZURES OF NARCOTICS DRUGS FROM 1985 TO 1999

YEAR	OPIUM QTL. KGS. GMS	CHARAS/HASHISH QTL. KGS. GMS	POPPY HUSK QTL. KGS. GMS	HEROIN/SMACK QTL. KGS. GMS	CASES REGISTERED UNDER NDPS ACT.
1985	70-03-965	03-73-490	1133-63-980	0-64-000	8644
1986	21-38-828	01-37-044	961-26-470	4-03-450	3941
1987	03-61-555	00-86-624	993-27-650	3-16-810	1633
1988	40-31-960	05-82-240	2282-61-800	2-38-005	1496
1989	33-33-949	03-52-825	1075-18-160	5-51-100	1592
1990	03-20-855	00-11-777	1042-88-410	1-97-000	1340
1991	02-42-257	00-23-238	1127-86-225	0-00-620	1303
1992	03-21-073	00-37-126	2057-16-157	0-00-000	1231
1993	06-12-219	00-64-286	1652-23-435	0-12-182	1658
1994	06-36-807	00-20-139	1390-91-940	0-00-865	1740
1995	04-06-810	00-53-228	475-55-300	0-83-310	1488
1996	04-40-510	00-21-905	669-63-300	1-08-145 & 18 Pipers mixed	1559
1997	04-17-019	00-25-230	1020-53-790	2-75-857	1924
1998	04-47-405	00-37-109	0773-86-450	0-16-813	1809
1999	03-93-290	00-29-663	0904-19-530	0-04-763	1741
TOTAL:-	211-08-502	01-55-924	17560-82-597	22-72-920 & 18 Pipers mixed	33199

Source: Punjab Police

Appendix - 7

RECOVERY OF FAKE CURRENCY DURING THE YEAR 1998.

SNO.	DATE	DISTT.	AMOUNT	DENOMINATION	NAME OF PERSONS INVOLVED
1.	28-2-98	LDH	4600/-	100/-	Fake currency recovered in the area of PS Div. No. 6 LDH.
2.	29-3-98	BTL	3500/-	500/-	Fake currency recovered in the area of PS Fatehgarh Churian (BTL).
3.	20-7-98	JAL	600 FAKE (U.S. DOLLARS)	-	Arrested Davinder Singh Saini, Narinder Singh and Nachhater Singh.
4.	25-9-98	T.T.	65500/-	500/-	Arrested Mukhtiar Singh, Major Singh, Kabul Singh and Ajit Singh.
5.	15-11-98	ASR	183000/-	-	Arrested Kewal Singh Sarpanch, Harpal Singh, Appar Singh, Kuldip Singh and Kulwant Singh.
6.	-	ASR	14100/-	-	Rs.14100/- Fake currency recovered in two cases in the area of PS Kotwali (ASR).
7.	April 98	FGS	500/-	500/-	Rs.500/- Fake currency recovered in the area of PS Khanna (FGS).
8.	June 10	LDH	500/-	500/-	-do- PS Div. No.6 LDH.
9.	Sept-2	LDH	34,300/-	500&100	-do-
10.	Oct-2	LDH	-	-	Fake currency recovered in the area of PS Div. No.5 LDH.
11.	Nov-98	KPT	35,000/-	-	Rs. 35000/- Fake currency recovered in the area of PS Kot. (KPT).

Source: Punjab Police

Appendix – 8

RECOVERY OF FAKE CURRENCY DURING THE YEAR 1998.

SNO.	DATE	DISTT.	AMOUNT	DENOMINATION	NAME OF PERSONS INVOLVED
1.	6-1-99	LDH	20,000/-	500/-	Arrested Manju Jain, Sanjay Jain, Ram Singh, Rajinder Singh and Sanjiv Jain
2.	24-1-99	GSP	15,000/-	100/50	Fake currency received & case regd. PS city Pathankot.
3.	20-2-99	RPR	1,00,000/-	-	Arrested Karnail Singh, Jaspal Singh Darshan Singh and Ashwani Kumar
4.	15-3-99	FZR	12,00,000/-	-	Two Scooter borne persons managed to ran away
5.	5-4-99	FZR	10,000/-	-	Rs. 10,000/- Fake currency recovered in the area of PS Dharm Kot (FZR)
6.	8-4-99	JAL	39,200/-	500/- & 100	Arrested Chander Shekhar and Robin
7.	29-4-99	LDH	3300/-	100/-	Fake currency recovered in area of PS Div. No.3 LDH.
8.	15-5-99	MJA	19,50,000/-	-	Two unidentified intruder entered in India and ran away towards Pak. Side leaving behind fake currency.
9.	23-6-99	ASR	1,100/-	500/- & 50	Arrested Gurdev Singh @ Happy, Gurlal Singh # @ Lali and Paramjit Singh in the area of PS C Div. ASR.
10.	-	ASR	-/-	-	Casre regd. In PS Kotwali ASR regd. Fake currency
11.	5-7-99	LDH	14,500/-	500/-	Fake currency recovered in the area of PS Model Town
12.	19-7-99	JAL	1,33,000/-	500/-	Arrested Raj Pal singh @ Raju, Kushal Kumar and Buta Singh
13.	-	ASR	200/-	-	Rs. 200 Fake currency recovered in the area of Raja Sansi (ASR).
14.	14-9-99	JAL	4,00,000/-	500/-	Arrested Balbir Singh, Gurnaik Singh, Labh Singh, Rajinder Kumar and Pal Chand.
15.	-	ASR	1000/-	-	Rs. 1000/- Fake currency recovered in area of PS S.A. Khan (ASR).

Source: Punjab Police

Appendix – 9
RECOVERY OF FAKE CURRENCY DURING THE YEAR 2000 (MAY).

SNO.	DATE	DISTT.	AMOUNT	DENOMINATION	NAME OF PERSONS INVOLVED
1.	30-1-2000	KPT	41300/-	-	Arrested Sukhwinder Ram
2.	3-2-2000	ASR	4500/-	-	Arrested Buta Ram
3.	21-2-2000	FZR	230000/-	100/-	Arrested Karnail Singh, Lakhwinder Singh, Piara Singh and Boor Singh in the area of PS Mallanwala (FZR)
4.	21-2-2000	KPT	15000/-	-	Arrested Gurdial Chand & Mohinder Singh in the area of PS Sdr. KPT.
5.	24-2-2000	GRP/ASR	3600/-	-	Arrested Surinder Singh & Kulbir Singh
6.	15-3-2000	FZR	10000/-	100/-	Arrested Joginder Singh and recovered fake currency notes of Rs.10000/-
7.	20-3-2000	JAL	300000/-	-	Arrested Bhawan Kumar and Surinder Singh
8.	28-3-2000	JAL	870000/-	-	Arrested Surinder Kumar along with 6 other recovered Rs. 870000/- fake currency
9.	3-4-2000	TT	1500/-	-	Arrested Partap Singh, Gurpreet Singh and Harpal Singh Rs.1500/- fake currency one car No.PB-63-1578 were recovered.
10.	11-4-2000	JAL	1050000/-	-	Arrested Sarbjit Singh, Surinder Kaur, Devinder Singh, Sanjeev Dogra and Jaspal Singh and recovered Rs. 1050000/- fake currency.
11.	2-5-2000	KPT	31,70,000/-	-	Arrested Vinod Kumar @ Samarjit Singh & recovered Rs. 31,70,000/- fake currency & one 32 Bore Revolver/-
12.	12-5-2000	GSP	1650/-	50/-	Arrested Subhash Chander, & Bashti and Naresh Kumar & recovered Rs.88300/-, computer-1, Two fake police I/Card, two stamps of SSP/JAP & SSP/GSP.
13.	26-5-2000	BTL	3800/-	-	Arrested Apar Singh & recovered fake currency note of Rs.3800/-


Source: Punjab Police

GRAPH - I

Graph of No. of cases registered on Arms Act (source: Punjab Police)

156


No. of cases



Year 1981 - 1999

GRAPH-II


Graph of No. of Terrorists Arrested (source: Punjab Police)



Year 1981 -1999

GRAPH - III


Graph of No. of cases registered on Explosives Act



Year 1981 - 1999

GRAPH - IV


Graph of recovery of Explosive Materials (source: Punjab Police)



Year 1988 -1999

GRAPH - V

Graph on Recovery of RDX/ PENT in Kg. (source: Punjab Police)



Year 1995 - 1999

Annexure

MEMORANDUM OF SETTLEMENT BETWEEN RAJIV GANDHI AND SANT HARCHAND SINGH LONGOWAL

1. **Compensation to innocent persons killed**
 - 1.1 Along with exgratia payment to those innocent killed in agitation or any action after 1.8.82, compensation for property damaged will also be paid.

2. **Army recruitment**
 - 2.1 All citizens of the country have the right to enroll in the Army and merit will remain the criterion for selection.

3. **Enquiry into November incidents**
 - 3.1 The jurisdiction of Shri Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission enquiring into the November riots of Delhi would be extended to cover the disturbances at Bokaro and Kanpur also.

4. **Rehabilitation of those discharged from the Army**
 - 4.1 For all those discharged, efforts will be made to rehabilitate and provide gainful employment.

5. **All India Gurudwara Act**
 - 5.1 The Government of India agrees to consider the formulation of an All India Gurudwara Bill. Legislation will be brought forward for this purpose in consultation with Shiromani Akali Dal, others concerned and after fulfilling all relevant constitutional requirements.

6. **Disposal of Pending Cases**
 - 6.1 The notifications applying the Armed Forces special Powers Act to Punjab will be withdrawn.

Existing Special Courts will try only cases relating to the following type of offences:

- a. Waging war
- b. Hijacking

6.2 All other cases will be transferred to ordinary courts and enabling Legislation if needed will be brought forward in this session of Parliament.

7. Territorial Claims

7.1 The Capital Project Area of Chandigarh will go to Punjab. Some adjoining areas which were previously part of Hindi or the Punjabi regions were included in the Union Territory. With the capital region going to Punjab the areas which were added to the Union Territory from the Punjabi region of the erstwhile State of Punjab will be transferred to Punjab and those from Hindi region to Haryana. The entire Sukhna lake will be kept as part of Chandigarh and will thus go to Punjab.

7.2 It had always been maintained by Smt. Indira Gandhi that when Chandigarh is to go to Punjab some Hindi-speaking territories in Punjab will go to Haryana. A Commission will be constituted to determine the specific Hindi-speaking areas of Punjab which should go to Haryana, in lieu of Chandigarh.

The principle of contiguity and linguistic affinity with a village as a unit will be the basis of such determination. The Commission will be required to give its findings by 31st December 1986 and these will be binding on both sides. The work of the Commission will be limited to this aspect and will be distinct from the general boundary claims which the other Commission referred to in para 7.4 will handle.

7.3 The actual transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and areas in lieu thereof to Haryana will take place simultaneously on 26th January 1986.

7.4 There are other claims and counter-claims for readjustment of the existing Punjab-Haryana boundaries. The Government will appoint another commission to consider these matters and give the findings. Such findings will be binding on the concerned States. The terms of reference will be based on village as a unit, linguistic affinity and contiguity.

8. Centre-State Relations

8.1 Shiromani Akali Dal state that the Anandpur Sahib Resolution is entirely within the framework of the Indian constitution; that it attempts to define the concept of Centre-State relations in a manner which may bring out the true federal characteristics of our Unitary Constitution; and that the purpose of the Resolution is to provide greater autonomy to the State with a view to strengthening the unity

and integrity of the country, since unity in diversity forms the corner stone of our national entity.

8.2 In view of the above, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, in so far as it deals with Centre-state relations, stands referred to the Sarkaria Commission.

9. Sharing of River Waters

9.1 The farmers of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan will continue to get water not less than what they are using from the Ravi-Beas system as on 1.7.1985. Waters used for consumptive purposes will also remain unaffected. Quantum of usage claimed shall be verified by the Tribunal referred to in para 9.2 below.

9.2 The claims of Punjab and Haryana regarding the shares in their remaining waters will be referred for adjudication to a Tribunal to be presided over by a Supreme Court Judge. The decision of this Tribunal will be rendered within six months and would be binding on both parties. All legal and constitutional steps required in this respect be taken expeditiously.

9.3 The construction of the SYL canal shall continue. The canal shall be completed by 15th August 1986.

10. Representation of Minorities

10.1 Existing instruction regarding protection of interest of minorities will be recirculated to the State Chief Ministers. (PM will write to all Chief Ministers).

11. Promotion of Punjabi Language

11.1 The Central Government may take some steps for the promotion of Punjabi language.

This settlement brings to a end a period of confrontation and ushers in an era of amity, goodwill and cooperation, which will promote and strengthen the unity and integrity of India.

RAJIV GANDHI
Prime Minister of India

SANT HARCHAND SINGH LONGOWAL
President,
Shiromani Akali Dal

Dated, 24th July, 1985

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