

ETHNICITY, CONFLICT AND PEACE : A CASE STUDY OF KURDS

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "ETHNICITY, CONFLICT AND PEACE : A CASE STUDY OF KURDS" submitted by MS. R. BHRAMARA SREE in partial requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university and is her own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

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To My

Brother

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I am alone responsible for any shortcomings in the dissertation.

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Preface

The aim of this study is to arrive at an understanding of how the theory and practice of conflict resolution through peaceful methods can ultimately lead to an enduring peace. Through a theoretical approach an attempt is made to understand ethnic conflicts, with special reference to the Kurds problem.

In Chapter I a theoretical understanding of conflict and its peaceful resolution has been made.

Chapter II reviews various theories of ethnic conflict. In addition, a paradigm for peaceful conflict resolution has been framed.

In Chapter III, the Kurdish problem has been elaborated in the context of a generalised model of conflict and peace.

The consequences of internationalisation of ethnic relations and the challenges to the international community in the future have been dealt in Chapter IV.

The study concludes with an attempt to create a better world in the future by de-conflictualising ethnic conflict. The achievement of peace has to proceed via a multi-pronged approach to understand ethnic conflicts and hence to identify the factors that can be utilised in peace-building.

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INTRODUCTION

The resurgence of ethnicity in the post-Cold War era is important for the academic study of conflict and peace and for better understanding of the dynamics of the new global order. The post Cold War milieu calls for a research orientation in peace research which should focus on links between consensus formation among people and the trends which dominate national, regional and global systems. For a number of reasons it would seem obvious that "Ethnicity, Conflict and Peace" must be studied to develop principles and guidelines which can help to integrate national, regional and international interests.

The end of the cold war is identified with the changes in Soviet-American relations in a benign direction. This does not mean that political, ideological, diplomatic, economic, technological or military rivalry among nations is over. The struggle for power and influence has not come to an end. The world has entered an era of increased instability, unpredictability and violence and there is considerable ambivalence about the promised "long era of peace".

The resurgence of nationalist elements with accelerating political and economic activities during the eighties, became one of the important expressions of the international system in transition. There is also a growing

awareness towards regional, technical and functional cooperation, and global regimes in areas such as debt, trade and environment (e.g. global climate change, the ozone layer). These have come to occupy political space against policies of confrontation developed in the field of strategic thinking.

The security dimension of the international system is related to the resurgence of the United Nations as an important actor. Since the sources of international stability remain diffused, political decision-makers have to cope with manifold sources of inter-state conflict, transnational violence, terrorism and large scale disturbances outside the development of strategic doctrines of the cold war days.

Francis Fukuyama identifies the present moment in international relations, as "The End of History". For him, "the end of the cold war... is the end of history ... that is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."¹

The end of the cold war has significantly contributed to a change in perception. Earlier sources of conflict no

1. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History"?, The National Interest (New York), no.16, Summer 1989, p.4.

longer dominate the international agenda, and in place of the East-West conflict, the root focus is shifting to the causes of other conflicts: poverty, terrorism, human rights, militarism etc.

The formula for peace is equal rights, equity, cooperation and not subjugation, exploitation, state terrorism and the like. Peace theory, peace building and peace-processes should help in conflict resolution and developing approaches to conflict avoidance. The rise of ethnic and nationalist movements after the end of cold war, demand a new thinking process and a challenge to the paradigmatic base of traditional "cold war" analysis.

Ronald Barston distinguishes the international system of late eighties and nineties by five characteristics.

- (1) the significant changes in the nature and form of East-West relations.
- (2) the collapse of socialism, particularly in Eastern Europe, has not only profoundly affected East-West relations but had a number of consequences for other actors and processes in international politics.
- (3) the rise of nationalism and the articulation of nationalistic aspirations within the international system by sub-national and other actors.

- (4) the limitations on the extent to which international regimes have been developed in major issue areas such as debt or revised and modified in the case of the GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), Uruguay Round.
- (5) Lastly, the resurgence of national, international violence, highlighted the selectivity of collective-enforcement action and the phenomenon of 'forgotten' wars which cannot command international attention.²

If conflict is inherent in the international system, to understand the prospects for conflict resolution, one must look at the shape of the system rather than at the specific character of the nations and regimes that constitute it. There are conceivably high and perhaps rising levels of ethnic and nationalist violence, since these are impulses incompletely played out even in those areas which have a historical pattern of ethnic cooperation. Palestinians and Kurds; Tamils; Irish Protestants and Irish Catholics; Walloons; Armenians and Azerbaijanians, will continue to have their unresolved grievances. We cannot a priori assume that the end of the cold war will provide

2. Ronald Barston, "International System in Transition", in Ronald Barston, ed., International Politics since 1945 - Key Issues in the Making of the Modern World (London, 1991), pp.311-12.

automatic answers at the international level or that politics of national security can handle actual ethnic situations effectively.

The Middle East region constituting most of the world's oil resources increasingly resorts to war and violence. A genuine peace process requires cooperative-associative peace measures, not only for the Arab-Israel issue but also for a wide spectrum of ethnic sentiments.

The war in the Persian Gulf changed the strategic map of the Middle East, but did little to resolve the basic causes of regional conflict. The allied victory, while decisive in military terms, left in its wake many unresolved problems of regional security. The war brought to the surface, many of the region's long-standing sources of tension including the conflict between Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq and the forces of fundamentalism and nationalism in the key Arab countries. A cooperative-associative peace system will help in bringing peace to the Middle East.

There can be no peace in the Middle East "as long as the Kurds are not given the most elementary of all collective rights, the right of self-determination. With more than twenty million Kurds split among five countries, this war has once again proven how important that issue

is".³ Let alone independence, a never -to-die issue has been precipitated. In the Middle East, peace can be achieved if there is a consensus - seeking dynamic evident in the landscape of Kurdistan, and other areas which have been left out of the peace discussions, which are currently taking place.

Challenges of Ethnic Pluralism: After the decline of East-West ideological conflict, it has become clear from the examination of the major elements shaping the security environments of several regions throughout the world that ethnic pluralism plays a major role. Even when there is no aspiration for full sovereignty, the traditional structures and organizations have to take into account the intensity of interaction which is being produced by multi-cultural diversity. The power, resources, interests, values and needs of ethnic groups like the Kurds cannot be ignored if regional instability and conflict are to be controlled.

Traditional international political analysis suffers from a number of constraints, and often proves meaningless in its prescriptions. The fundamental challenge of ethnic pluralism lies in the area of societal concerns and democratic principles. Fortunately, peace research has

3. Johan Galtung, "What Would Peace in the Middle East Be Like - and Is it Possible?", Bulletin of Peace Proposals (London), vol.22, no.3, Sept 1991, pp.243-44.

not limit its concern to extreme cases. It is necessary, therefore, for policy makers to study the mobilisation and articulation of ethnic interests and to take account of competing claims in examining prospects for establishing stable regional security regimes. States cannot adjust to each other's security requirements if ethnic factors having disruptive potential for inter-state relations are ignored.

Decline of Hegemonic conceptions of International politics

The movement of the international system away from crude hegemonic conceptions represents a profound transformation, although its influence is not uniform everywhere. It is evident that the claims of ethnic identity can be more easily suppressed in an international milieu in which structural ambiguities and pluralism are controlled by theories and images built with hegemonic conceptions. Without a strong adherence to such principles after the decline of the bi-polar contest, a pre-disposition towards the recognition of ethno-nationalism is created. This creates windows of opportunity for ethnic groups to act independently in the political world. Since international politics no longer stresses the peripheral position of ethnic actors, it rather helps to transmit tensions. In the emerging international scenario, patterns of action gravitate towards power-political postures by ethno-

nationalist groups. A concrete indication of this changing context is to be found in the attention being paid in the early nineties to the Kurdish political and military activities.

Ethnicity as a source of power and enforcement

It is only a new level of interest in foreign policy that is occasioned by ethnicity. But, a number of factors have contributed to making ethnicity an important source of power and enforcement. It is no longer possible to keep foreign and domestic policies in water-tight compartments owing to the emerging developments in international communications, economic, social and environmental relations. Efforts by ethnic groups in the domestic arena spill over into the sphere of international relations. Ethnic groups profit not only from their own resource mobilisation but also from exchanges of information between government, business and community organisations.

Even when arrangements are made by states to exclude a ethnicity-related issues, they are unable to improve more explicit controls through national unilateral action without inviting international censure. In many contemporary issues the allocation of power takes place in a "distributive" atmosphere, and this certainly applies to ethnically-related issues.

There is of course no comprehensive code reflecting a consensus on ethnic issues, but there is a substantive international dialogue which is interested in upgrading the political role of different ethnic groups in different stages of peace processes. Ethnic groups are sometimes able to make significant gains at the expense of nation-states by becoming central elements in the negotiating process, without even having a de jure status.

Ethnic pluralism and policy interdependence

Steven Krasner has defined international regimes as "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area".⁴

These regimes point to the interdependent world of today in which policy formulation takes place in the process of negotiation-distributive bargaining. This growing interdependence and policy response also creates new strategic opportunities for ethno-nationalist groups. Systems of international observation, inspection and monitoring make searching inquiries into rights and obligations of states and detract from the sovereignty-oriented discourse. Given the existing trends, it is likely

4. Steven Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences", International Organization (MIT Press), vol.36, no.2, Spring 1982, pp.281-82.

that traditional notions of territorial sovereignty will not be fortified but will be moderated in favour of ethnic groups through harmonisation of views on ethnic pluralism. The Kurdish issue underwent a process of reassessment in the aftermath of the Gulf war not because it was a mainstream issue, but because the search for compromise, cooperation and negotiation are assigned a predominant function in policy development.

The actual and potential role of Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism:

This study aims at examining the causes and consequences of Kurdish ethnicity and to consider the contrast between the actual and potential role of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in the context of conflict-resolution and peace-building. While, recognising the limitation of the present stage of the Kurdish issue, it claims that it is possible to provide an important perspective on peaceful change and the peaceful transformation of self-determination movements and ethnic conflicts.

By exploring both the conflict and cooperation patterns in ethnic conflicts, the study focusses on measures to prevent escalation of ethnic hostility through innovative peace policies. The unprecedented situation in the Kurdish context in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria calls for new solutions which can deal with both dangers and opportunities of Kurdish ethnic nationalism.

The emergence of a new perspective at the multilateral level on ethnic issues, symbolised by U.N. Resolution 688 passed on April 5, 1991 for protection of Kurdish refugees inside Iraq provides the explicit point of departure for the present study. While there are different points of view on the prospects of the realisation of the demand for Kurdistan, concerned scholars agree that the United Nations decision to provide humanitarian assistance to Kurds inside the sovereign state of Iraq has widened the options for the Kurds by changing the status quo.

It is ofcourse difficult to provide a prescription for the future except to emphasize the need of the Kurds to be cautious and to proceed from one firm base to another. In the light of their tragic history there is fundamental wisdom in the rationale for a strategy which enables the Iraqi Kurds to consolidate their autonomy. The strategy would include assuring Iran, Turkey and Syria that they have no intentions of eroding the state stability in these countries by encouraging ethnic demands by their respective Kurdish communities. At the same time if the Kurdish issue is to move from the periphery to the core of international politics, ethno-territorial dimension of the Kurdish problem in its entirety must be viewed with clarity. This study aims at providing a few insights into the forces of integration which can gradually unite all the Kurds, albeit

at varying paces. The development of this case study may also provide the opportunity to build a more complete theory of ethnicity, conflict, and peace which would attempt to exhibit arguments for resolving ethnic conflicts through processes which can re-examine perceived goals and costs.

John Burton's, "World Society" (1987) has provided key definitions of the subject matter relating to conflict resolution and has introduced elements to "transform conflict from violence and coercion" to a "problem-solving exercise"⁵, which can provide new policy aims to the Kurds.

Peace theory does not offer a panacea for all Kurdish ills. But, it can place the focus on domestic and international forces which can become important motivators of political change favourable to a lasting and peaceful settlement of the Kurdish ethnic problem.

The application of peace research to the Kurdish problem would rest on four related premises:

(1) Kurdish efforts should build on substantial gains made in Iraq after the Gulf War rather than attempt to revive long-standing tribal traditions of rebellion and resistance. An important moral and intellectual shift has

5. John W. Burton, World Society (New York, 1987), p.148.

occurred in favour of the Kurds which should be made irreversible. It is, therefore important for the Kurds to realise that they can ill afford to underestimate the threat posed by atavistic tendencies which may recreate the situation as in 1975 when after Kurdish rebellion was promoted, it was abandoned by the Shah of Iran and the C.I.A. The essence of the new situation demands that Kurdish elites should examine their efforts in the light of both moral developments and projected trends. Having gained unparalleled political legitimacy the Kurdish leadership must develop carefully crafted guidelines which can illuminate moral issues which influence world public opinion rather than merely engaging in activities that centre around civil war and militarism.

(2) Kurdish leaders have to equip themselves to avoid untold suffering and to increase the possibility of positive-sum outcomes. This involves examining the opportunities in each specific situation - Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, and examining the feasibility of a role for "third-parties" who enforce the application of international standards to the respective conflict situation.

(3) In order to reduce the ongoing violence, negotiating skills have to focus on substantive solution. Past norms and practices embedded in factional struggles have to be replaced by both short term and long term commitment to

providing the foundation for future consensus consistent with new world order precepts.

(4) Lastly, efforts should be made to improve regional security arrangements rather than presage developments which will entail the collapse of security arrangements. Security imperatives play a vital role in shaping a regional peace process, and in situations where states have to lose a measure of traditional sovereignty, the transformation will be acceptable only if the tendency towards general breakdown and disorder is avoided.

Without diminishing the normative importance of self-determination, the articulation of the Kurdish case should be built on the norm of participation in and contribution to common security. In other words Kurdish self-determination in the historical context should be related to the willingness to establish stable borders in the future and to play a constructive and peaceful role in international affairs.

CHAPTER - I

CONFLICT AND PEACE THEORY

Before delving into conflict and peace theory, and the peace process itself, it would be useful to take note of what Anatol Rapoport has to say on the analysis of a process:

A process can be analysed on the level of events and on the level of perceptions. The former analysis is an inquiry into what happened, the latter into how what happened was perceived or interpreted by specific individuals or groups Analysis of human affairs cannot be confined to the level of events. In any process involving human affairs, perceptions and interpretations of events by human beings are themselves events, sometimes of prime importance to the process.¹

Although ethnic mobilization of the Kurds is inspired by a number of issues, the perceptions and interpretations are now fixed in a stratified system of inter-ethnic relations in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. The function of a "peace process" is to organise participation in such a manner that "imperative" procedures are relegated to lesser importance and an opening towards collective management of procedures of peaceful change is achieved. The broadening of participation in the peace process in a stable and institutionalised form transforms expectations. The confrontation between ethnic groups can be ameliorated by giving the victimised ethnic group a "voice in the course of history."

1. Anatol Rapoport, Peace : An Idea Whose time has come (Ann Arbor, 1992), P.187.

It is worth noting in this connection that the problems of the peace process is made topical by the fact that many ethnic conflicts have reached the stage of development where a realistic way of looking at feasible alternatives requires a broad spectrum analysis of the components and dynamics of ethnic claims, the interplay between state aspirations, cultural claims and the international environment together with an overall differentiation of "secession" and "irredentism".

Noami Chazan perceptively observes,

the need to explore the intricacies of the issues surrounding irredentism is particularly urgent today as the global order, once again, is undergoing profound processes of readjustment that, as the 1990 Gulf crisis demonstrates, inevitably raises essential questions about the criteria for the demarcation of the boundaries of political units and the principles guiding their interaction. The elucidation of the options and difficulties inherent in the redefinition of the bases and frameworks of self-determination in the contemporary world assists in informing choices and delineating² alternatives in a climate of uncertainty and change.

A peace process can ill afford the economic and human costs of civil war or inter-state warfare. The organising of peace requires that seemingly contradictory imperatives should be examined in terms of collateral or systemic consequences.

2. Naomi Chazan, ed., Irredentism and International Politics (Colorado/London, 1991), P. 139.

Donald Horowitz tried to formulate a general theory which could account for whether ethno territorial separatism would take a secessionist or irredentist course. He assesses critically the conceptual polarities between secessionist and irredentist movements by examining three sets of issues:

1. Convertibility of the two types of movements;
2. Relative frequency of secessions and irredentas;
and
3. Relative strength of secessionist and irredentist movements.³

Horowitz is percipient of the "convertibility of claims" & summarises the Kurdish situation:

The flexibility extends to irredentism. It is no secret that many Kurds advocate the creation of a Kurdistan out of portions of several independent states. During most of the post-World War II period, however, regional autonomy and secession, rather than irredentism have been stated Kurdish objectives. There is an obvious reason for this. Kurds in Iraq have required assistance from Iran to make any claim effective. From time to time, Iran has provided substantial aid. Without any doubt, no such aid could be expected for a movement that pursued the irredentist objective of unification of all Kurds, including those in Iran.⁴

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3. Donald L. Horowitz, "Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connection" in Naomi Chazan, ed., Irredentism and International politics (Colorado/London, 1991), P.12.
 4. *ibid*, P.13.

Is a new momentum to gather and maintain international support for the Kurds sustainable? It is simply too early to give a definitive answer and it is likely that if Kurds embark on a conflict simultaneously against Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, they would confront overriding geo-political and strategic interests in opposition to their cause. But, it will be quite a different scenario if the Kurds stress the need to effect changes in the framework of existing international order to prevent the escalation of conflict and exclude the possibility of war.

A peace process is essentially a controlled process of modification of international relations. It is no longer Utopian to prescribe a transition from conflict to peace process. The ethnic sources of Kurdish nationalism need not be denied by the international community, but the peace process should ensure that the competing claims of national self-determination and the values of multi-ethnic states would be placed on the agenda in the highest level of diplomatic dialogues.

If war begins in the minds of men and women, then peace too must begin in the minds of men and women. The present international system in the aftermath of the cold war is the greatest opportunity that mankind can avail to build up a world society by transforming the national security state and international order through the civil society. "All of

us have lost the cold war"⁵ according to Bjorn Moller. In spite of plans for improving world organisation, we now have a militarized world in which all states have access to weapons of mass destruction and an inability to break the vicious circle of malfunctioning of social and economic institutions and incipient social violence and war.

The present century has been more conflict prone than the preceding eras. The cost of war in terms of lives, property damage, social dislocation and the staggering refugee problem is destructive of national and global prosperity. The greatest threat to the functioning of peace is inequality and injustice perpetrated by parochial decision - makers who fail to realise that their actions are destructive of world order.

Traditionally, in international relations, power was considered to be an important variable in conducting international relations. To resolve disputes, power balances and defensive deterrent strategies were adopted. They failed to provide a basis for conflict resolution, which requires an "analysis of the human needs and particular interests of those concerned in a particular

5. Bjorn Moller, Common Security and Non Offensive Defense - A Neo Realist Perspective (Colorado/London, 1992), P.4.

conflict situations."⁶ This is possible, only if there is a shift from the study of power approach in International Relations to Conflict Resolution.

This is consistent with the analytic strategy advanced by Seyom Brown for a normatively oriented theory of world polity:

We also have a basis for bringing normative consideration centrally into the theoretical enterprise: assessing the extent to which and how the present and alternative configurations of the world's political system are conducive to, or inhibit, the realisation of certain morally consequential conditions and outcomes; and in the light of such assessments, indicating where in the world's political system (at the general or particular subsystem levels) reform would be more desirable and feasible.⁷

Conflict Theory should be concerned with issues that have significant implications for the changing world society and should contribute to flexible political adjustment for global peace. All the conflicts in general are closely related to inherent needs of the social groups or individuals, who are prepared to defy social norms in the pursuit of their goals.

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6. John W. Burton, "World Society and Human Needs", in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom eds., International Relations - A hand Book of Current Theory (London, 1985), P.46.
 7. Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System (Colorado, 1992), P.170.

The subject will be examined in detail by considering the following:

1. Conflict
2. Conflict Theory
3. Conflict Situation
4. Conflict Resolution
 - a) Third Party Intervention
 - b) Conflict Management
 - c) Institutionalised Management
 - d) Traditional Methods
 - e) Quiet Diplomacy
 - f) Non-violence

1. **Conflict:** John Burton's definition of conflict helps to place our discussion in line with policy initiatives and institutional developments necessary for shaping the contemporary world polity with the rising tide of ethnic politics.

He sees 'conflict', as a "social phenomenon challenging authorities, institutions and traditionally held values."⁸ The existence of a flow of conflict is the only guarantee that the aspirations of the society will be attained. Instrumentalities and policies for conflict control cannot be developed within rigid forms; the ability of decision-makers will be tested by their capacity to evolve new structures.

8. John Burton, World Society (New York/London, 1987) P.138.

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2. **Conflict Theory:** The phenomena of conflict necessitates theoretical work on the basic concepts of analysis so that different perspectives and different observations can be brought together. For this we have to develop early warning indicators for various forms of conflict, and find non-violent means of acting during conflict situation and resolving them.

3. **Conflict Situation:** A conflict situation can be said to exist if it generates 'incompatible goals' or 'values' among different parties or social groups. Peter Wallensteen sees "conflict as a social situation in which a minimum of two parties strive at the same moment to acquire the same set of scarce resources."⁹

Conflict management, institutionalization of conflicts, third party intervention, conflict resolution, negotiation and bargaining are some of the methods helpful in a conflict situation.

4. **Conflict Resolution:** Ramesh Thakur sees conflict resolution as a -

9. Peter Wallensteen, "Understanding Conflict Resolution : A Frame Work", in Peter Wallensteen, ed., Peace Research Achievements and Challenges (London, 1988), P.120.

process which helps the parties in dispute to confront the fact that in some sense their definition of the problem may need to be revised and that they may have misunderstood the perceptions of understanding the problem. Conflict resolution helps to convert conflicts into problems involving a search for alternative futures and accommodation.¹⁰

Conflict resolution focusses on conflict behaviour and looks for removable causes. Conflict resolution generally consists of changing realities, meeting the demand of the actors, distribution of values, etc. Generally the traditional methods of negotiations are third party intervention, bargaining and negotiation, non-violence, quiet diplomacy and lastly peaceful resolution.

(a) Third Party Intervention

"Third party is someone, who is external to a conflict and interposes between the conflict parties in order to help them, with their conflict management."¹¹ It is voluntary since, the pacific intervention of a third party is by traditional means such as isolating the parties or adjusting and accommodating their differences.

10. Ramesh Thakur, "International peace keeping", in Ramesh Thakur, ed., International Conflict resolution (Newzealand, 1988), pp.216-17.

11. Jacob Bercovitch, Social conflicts and Third Parties : Strategies of Conflict Resolution (Colorado, 1984), p.13.

(b) Conflict Management

This involves efforts to create "structures", rules and processes to avoid or channel conflict into acceptable ways of arriving at a solution to form part of the general field of conflict management. This can be through prevention of war/conflict before it arises or management, once it has become overt.

(c) Institutionalised Management

According to Deutsch, "conflicts can be managed through institutional forms like (i) collective bargaining, (ii) social roles and (iii) social norms."¹²

(d) Traditional Approach

Burton identifies (i) Judicial settlements (ii) Arbitration (iii) Mediation (iv) Conciliation¹³, and (v) Negotiation through international bodies and mediation between countries as methods in conflict resolution.¹⁴

12. *ibid*, p.12.

13. Burton, n.8,P.151.

14. *ibid*, P. 152.

(e) Quiet Diplomacy

This has evolved as a "natural method" with the United Nations as a conflict manager in the international system. In the post-cold war era with the increasing number of peace keeping operations, its role has been enhanced and the UN Secretary General has been called upon to exercise critical judgment in the resolution of conflicting demands. In his Report entitled, "Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peace Keeping", the UN Secretary General, Dr. Boutros Ghali has argued that "the UN has emerged as the central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace."¹⁵

UN operations in areas of crisis have generally been limited to the post-conflict period. The dominant perspective of the United Nations has so far been unable to relate ethnic conflict to a conflict - free global order although a small beginning has been made with UN Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991.

(f) Non-violence

To make non-violence accepted by the society as a part of a group's culture, is the major option which merits

15. See "Secretary General's Agenda for Peace Keeping", in World Focus (New Delhi), no. 149, May 1992, P.21.

attention. "It means pursuing national policies for a fairer sharing of resources, markets, culture, knowledge etc., as insurance against future strife."¹⁶ This is possible if we build non-violent society step by step as Theodore Herman has suggested:

- (a) reconciliation with an adversary,
- (b) conflict resolution,
- (c) removing the causes of violent conflict,
- (d) non-violent struggle,
- (e) civilian based defense, and
- (f) developing a sound relationship with the earth.¹⁷

A conflict situation can be resolved, if the following related premises are taken into account:

- (1) analyse or resolve the conflict
- (2) be aware of the relevant theory and empirical work
- (3) the hypothesis and proposition that have been put forward should be tested
- (4) outcome must be acceptable to the parties which require no enforcement
- (5) create new options

16. Theodore Herman, "A conceptual Framework of Non-Violence For Peace Research", International Journal of Group Tensions (New York), Vol. 21, no. 1, spring 1991, p.4

17. *ibid*, P.5.

- view
- (6) bring the parties together, to ^{view} their conflict as a shared dilemma
 - (7) focus on changing perceptions, redefining goals and values
 - (8) help the parties to arrive at appropriate behavioural responses to the perceived challenges, and
 - (9) lastly, communication and discussion are important

Galtung defines peace research as "research into the conditions of realizing peace."¹⁸ Peace research concentrates on the problem of (a) peace and development and (b) on the analysis of conflict resolution and conflict. The need for a peace theory rests on the assumption that "peace cannot be approached directly, but is a product of a satisfactory organisation of the world."¹⁹ Peace action is a question of choice of appropriate strategies for a more peaceful world. Peace movement and peace research should progress simultaneously.

Anatol Rapoport has explained that although the institution of war enjoyed a long history and continues to be a policy option, yet it should fall into disuse because it has lost its relevance to modern life. It may destroy civilizations that practice it. He calls attention to ideas

18. Moller, n.5, P.4.

19. Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, 1959) P.1350.

that lie dormant until people's "ideational environment" becomes receptive to their germination.²⁰

In an age of unprecedented potential for political violence, the supreme task of political science is to create a non-violent approach. Peace research efforts are to explore how peace can be obtained through peaceful means.

There exists a 'societal-vacuum' in the society due to lack of civil space. This is leading to economic disparities, identity conflicts and ethno-nationalist struggle for autonomy etc. We have to create new differentiated/alternative forms of social interests to integrate the society.

Peace building theory is effective in working towards peace, and is capable of understanding the transition in the present era. Peace, thus as a common security for the world is an achievable goal as Richard Smoke suggests, provided it is implemented in phases:

- (a) complete peace,
- (b) operational peace, and
- (c) lastly, abolishing the threat of global nuclear holocaust.²¹

20. Rapoport, n.1, P.177.

21. Richard Smoke and Willis Harman, Paths to peace : Exploring the Feasibility of Sustainable Peace (USA, 1987), PP.2-3.

This is possible only through fresh scrutiny if normative premises are created for:

- (a) achieving world peace as a pre-requisite for the survival of mankind.
- (b) politically guaranteed world peace as a explicit criteria for the global order chiefly through solutions or permanent settlement of conflicts.
- (c) moral efforts to influence dominant norms of world polity and to change political consciousness for the establishment of peace and displacement of war as an institution.

Conditions for promoting peace building measures can therefore arise from the following propositions:

(1) **Creation of Trust:** The problem of legitimacy, trust and political authority are the major issues in political science. The Hobbessian problem arises from the assumption that anarchy, absence of enforcement leads to social distrust and social disintegration.²²

22. Ernest Gellner, " Trust, Cohesion and the Social Order", in Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust Making and Breaking of Cooperative Relations (New York, 1988), PP.142-3.

As E. Gellner rightly remarked,

Trust should coexist with any kind of social order. Absence of civil society is the reflection of the failure of cohesion and trust which are essential in the establishment of a social order. Distrust in the social order will lead to nefarious activities like the establishment of mafia gangs and terrorist activities.²³

Steps involved in achieving cooperative international relations involve building trust through:

- common goals useful for all countries
- adopting alternative style of international politics by changing individual perceptions
- create new ethic in international relations not governed by personal interests
- involve third parties through UN intervention
- expansion of social conscience to enhance national trust in the whole world.²⁴

2. Training of people in conflict resolution: This is possible if we evolve peaceful formulations, transform the

23. ibid, pp.155-156.

24. Robert Altinde, "Trust, Cooperation, Commitment and International Relationships", Current Research on Peace Violence (Finland), no. 1, 1987, PP.88-89.

conflicts, create institutional settings for professionalisation and standard setting in the area of conflict management. Professional conflict managers and institutions should provide training.

3. **Role of women in peace-building:** Peace built on the partnership model caring for life and enhancing the human values, should be built in enhancing the human values, in the society. Feminine values that nurture life and acknowledge the need for transcending competition and violence should guide the policy makers to avoid and abolish war.

4. **Negating the culture of militarism:** The responsibility of the whole society is to get rid of militarism and seek true cultural values of life. Presently, 'militaristic culture', 'military institutions' dominate the civil institutions.²⁵ Emotions and values help in creating positive values. Fear of being threatened, humiliated etc., should be replaced by peace education. This is one of the

25. Ritta Wahlstrom, "The Challenges of Peace Education: Replacing Cultures of Militarism", in Elise Boulding, ed., New Agendas For Peace Research Conflict and Security Re-examined ((London/Colorado, 1992), PP. 174-5.

powerful lines of thought to break the value and power structures of militaristic cultures in society.

5. **Peace education:** Peace education is a new value system to build a better world based on mutual respect for culture and harmony. Peace education helps in building a critical thinking and aims at developing individual thinking, so as to contemplate a better world.

The main purpose of peace education is preparing for a 'life of peace'.²⁶ It is a process in which education, science, culture, religion and the mass media play an important role. The pre-requisite for this is the effective participation of various social groups like, women, youth, professionals etc. To promote and maintain peace is the desire to create a more secure and equitable world for future generations. The process of preparation for life in peace reflects, the need for building peace through a long term commitment to the fostering of greater understanding, cooperation, dialogue and mutual trust among the peoples of the world. To reduce the risk of war and also to promote victory for our values we have to "fractionalise conflicts"²⁷ as Roger Fisher suggests.

26. B.G. Rancharan, Keeping Faith with the United Nations (Boston/Lancaster, 1987), PP.128-9.

27. Roger Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict", in JOan V. Bondurant and Margaret W. Fisher, eds., Conflict : Violence and Non Violence (New York, 1971),P.145.

The main task of the world community is to meet the challenge^{of} replacing the culture of 'militarism' by creating new 'problem-solving' 'peace-building' cultures. Peace research by recognising this permeation has to contribute for 'cultural conversion', which has to take place in every aspect of modern culture. A new society must be built with the partnership of men and women. Peace education will help develop the new ground rules, to build a world for the future.

CHAPTER - II

**PEACE AND SECURITY ALTERNATIVES IN THE
CONTEXT OF ETHNONATIONALISM**

The cauldron of ethnonationalism is likely to continue to simmer as long as the deadlock deepens among elites whose dominant motives are related to the persistence of ethnic conflicts. When ethnic conflicts move across national frontiers, they create political confrontations which invite the intervention of external actors, further deepening the complexities and uncertainties of ethnonational patterns intensifying the conflict. As ethnic conflict moves from the periphery to the centre of national, regional and international politics, a better understanding of the dynamics between the forces of ethnicity and the forces sustaining the multi-ethnic states is essential at both theoretical and pragmatic levels. Peace and security alternatives have to be formulated through a fundamental change in the mode of thinking which should reduce the escalation potential in the ethnic conflict and provide a convincing rationale for inter-ethnic cooperation. The types of solutions that would encompass peace and security alternatives require the construction of structures which are free from threats of dominance.

The structure of legitimacy which is being subject to widespread and unpredictable fluctuations can be examined in

the context of the need to transform images of the nation state in relation to the challenge of ethnic tensions. A realistic recognition of the link between security and development establishes a conceptual frame-work and a set of criteria for reversing ethnic marginalisation.

We are living at present in a world bristling with ethnic conflict as shown by the conflict in Bosnia and the depredations of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The immediate task is to check the almost unimaginable loss of human life. The question the Kurds face in the context of Saddam Hussain's campaign to eradicate them or in the context of the carrot-and-stick policy of Demirel's Turkish government, is whether, conditions can be created which are supportive of liberty but are also conducive to the development of non-offensive alternatives and in the process build up an international network of cooperation, which can work for a "transaction-integration balance".¹

Modes of Discourse on Ethnicity, Conflict and Peace:

It is plausible to argue that the internationalisation of ethnic conflict has challenged old conceptions of political space and political identity. And, new practices and relationships go beyond states as

1. Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (New York, 1954), p.39.

political subjects. The mode of discourse on ethnicity, conflict and peace can not remain limited to the rhetoric which fails to address ethnicisation of issues and conflicts.

Ralph R. Premdas investigates some of the arguments and policy options by taking the political discourse of state-centric political order. He is insistent on the necessity of rethinking thought patterns about the "permeable and open borders of the international state system" and concludes:

Soon every issue becomes ethnicised, whatever the future of the international system, it is clear these issues must be understood, contained locally and whenever possible interpreted not in symbolic ways but as pragmatic problems that can yield to compromise and practical solutions.²

The facilitating factors for domestic ethnic conflict to spread across borders are summarised by Premdas as:

- (1) The international dispersal and distribution of at least one of the ethnic groups in a conflict:

2. Ralph R. Premdas, "The Internationalisation of Ethnic Conflict: Some Theoretical Explorations", in K.M. de Silva and R.J. May, ed., Internationalisation of Ethnic Conflicts (London, 1991), p.23.

- (2) The strategic location of the strife-torn country in relation to international power rivalry;
- (3) The organisational and communication capabilities of their adversaries and their allies;
- (4) The ideological identification of any of the ethnic groups in conflict with one of the major international or regional power: and
- (5) The presence of the international organizations which are sensitive to the mass atrocities that tend to occur in communal conflict.³

He also points out that the consequences of the internationalisation of ethnic conflict vary considerably from case to case and at least five patterns are discernible:

- (a) Exacerbation
- (b) Prolongation
- (c) Moderation
- (d) Conciliation
- (e) Supercession⁴

The internationalisation of ethnic conflict changes the entire discursive apparatus of security, conflict and

3. ibid, p.16.

4. ibid, p.18.

peace building and extends the possibilities of political subjectivity. It is no longer possible in the case of the Kurds for instance, to ignore the importance of the effective roles played by Kurdish diaspora groups in Germany, France and the United States. The outcome in the contemporary plural world of policy making is overwhelmingly determined by the international social relations in an era of instant communication. The logic of thinking on the Kurdish question will be increasingly shaped by non-state actors, which would include organisations like Amnesty International, International Commission of Jurists, France Libertes, Minority Rights Group and the United Nations Centre for Human Rights.

This is not to suggest that conventional national security themes will recede from the centre stage. In fact the most interesting and controversial aspects of the internationalisation of ethnic conflicts will unfold in juxtaposition to geopolitical rivalry and military power. There will be consequently, different institutions sharing risks of security burdens and responsibilities. The long term chances for any new world order to come to life will depend on policies which are worked out to cope with the

increasing internationalisation of ethnic conflict. It is fair to remember that "The majority of ethnic problems are still unresolved and theory building on conflict resolution is still in its beginning".⁵

Ethnic conflict is a major source of tension both at the domestic and international level. The resurgence of ethnic conflicts in the post cold war era is a reminder to the scholars of peace and conflict to pay more attention to the problem. Ethnic conflict can be said to exist, when there are social, political and economic conflicts between groups of people. In other words 'ethnic conflict' usually occurs when the goals or objectives of the parties in conflict tend to be mutually exclusive or incompatible and more difficult to resolve.

Devos, defines ethnicity as consisting of the 'subjective, symbolic or emblematic' use by "a group of people ... of any aspect of culture in order to differentiate themselves from other groups".⁶ At the theoretical level, "ethnic conflict cannot easily find a place in the usual analytical models of conflict studies or in the sociological

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5. Kumar Rupe Singhe, "Theories of Conflict Resolution and Their Applicability to Protracted Ethnic Conflicts", in Kumar Rupe Singhe, ed., Ethnic Conflict and Human Rights (Oslo, 1988), p.37.
 6. Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi, 1990), p.19.

models of change and development,"⁷ opines Rodolfo Stavenhagen.

For decades the 'modernization' paradigm dominated thinking in the social sciences. According to this point of view the process of societal change leads from the traditional to the modern, 'simple,' to 'complex,' from 'particularism', to 'universalism', as developed by Parson. Within this framework ethnic issues pertain to the 'particularistic' or pre-modern world and are swept aside by the modernization process, as 'obstacles to change' or as the consequences of incomplete 'modernization'. Theories of 'nation-building' emphasised the comprehensive nature of the transformation of sub-national institutions and loyalties into a wider polity. Here again, ethnic issues were considered as stumbling blocks in more general processes of a change.

Other approaches relate ethnic conflict basically to economic interests in which the group actors tend to be

7. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Ethnic Conflicts and Their Impact on International Society", International Social Science Journal (UNESCO, Paris), no.127, Feb 1991, p.1.

"social classes".⁸ And, still others treated ethnic nationalism as "imagined political communities,"⁹ All these theories have a limited utility for 'resolving' the ethnic conflicts.

Joane Nagel and Bradwhorton analysed domestic ethnic conflicts from the perspective of world system and dependency theory as follows:-

- (1) Military dependency is the result of a triple alliance among foreign military powers, local, political and military contenders;
- (2) Support by competing foreign military powers fractionalize local, political and military contenders, pitting them against one another and against the local state; and
- (3) Military dependency enacts a toll on peripheral states in terms of domestic, often ethnic conflict.¹⁰

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8. For elaboration on Primordialist, Cultural Pluralists, Modernizing and Development, Marxist and Neo-Marxist approaches. See Urmila Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia (New Delhi, 1989), pp.16-19.
 9. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983), p.15.
 10. Joane Nagel and Bradwhorton, "Ethnic conflict and the World System: International Competition in Iraq (1961-1991) and Angola (1974-1991)", Journal of Political and Military Sociology (De Kalb, IL, USA), vol.20, Summer 1992, p.6.

This approach takes into account only military and economic dependency. At the same time it ignores 'cultural identities' and the role of peoples movements against cultural imperialism.

To develop an adequate analytical framework for understanding ethnic conflicts, and to investigate ways of using that knowledge in concrete situations for more competent peace-making initiatives greater comparative knowledge on ethnic conflicts is necessary to identify common patterns and structures in conflict escalation. Ethnic conflicts continue to be of international concern since state violence and counter violence result in exacerbating cleavages and produce a vicious cycle of 'violence' and terror.

The assertion of ethnic claims after the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East and in the former Soviet Union suggests that the "overall international climate has been very favourable lately to secessionist ventures." The struggle for status by an ethnic/religious group/community is a powerful, contemporary form of struggle for this equity, based on culture, language, religious autonomy, recognition and its respect by others, in the exercise of 'economic' and 'political' power.

As Myron Weiner recommends, "We have to create new political institutions to satisfy their (ethnic/religious/minority group) needs and new political power within the institutions. Failure to meet their arrangements or resist their demands may lead to fleeing across regional and national boundaries."¹¹

An Ethnic Approach to Peace and Security:

Academic analyses has taken inordinate time to note the impact of ethnic conflict on the far reaching transformation of turmoil in the world. The most pressing security concerns now and in the foreseeable future arise out of the sweeping processes of change in the ethnic landscape. Again, ethnic issues are too complex or too technical to be dealt with scholarly assistance. Security institutions have hitherto dealt with areas where the domains of expertise related to political and strategic vocabularies. The articulation of normative orders which encompass goals of ethnic nationalist movements require security specialists to approach their task with greater humility. It also means relating ethnicity research and analysis to a wider range of diplomatic vision which prepares for negotiations extending to "secessionists",

11. Myron Weiner, "Peoples and States in a New Ethnic Order", Third World Quarterly (London), vol.13, no.2, 1992, pp.317-18.

"irredenta" or ethnic representatives in third world countries. Peace and Security have to be developed now with a chain of linkages from the basic premise of ethno nationalism, to institutionalised values at a regional and global level which are not determined by blocs or by "imposed" identities. A viable and ethnically-satisfying future need not lead to unpleasant confrontations if the process for peaceful settlement of ethnic disputes can produce impressive achievements through negotiation, mutual consent and cooperation.

The following discussion is intended to sketch a general outline which would help to develop fair and stable settlements for resolving ethnic animosities and developing the parameters of an ethnic approach to peace and security.

Anthony D. Smith, attributes the rise of ethnicity to the acceptance of nationalist ideologies in the modern world which gives rise to self-conscious nationalist movements. He traces the ethnic revival from late 1950s, when it first made its appearance in Breton, Basque, Welsh etc. In the developing world it was due to the rise of new states, spurring a wave of ethnic unrest in Somalia, Lunda, Yoruba, Ibo, Eritreans, and Kurds to mention a few.¹²

12. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (New York, 1981), pp.19-20.

Dawa Norbu uses techniques and examples from the third world countries to emphasise careful systematic thinking about nationalism and ethnicity and offers an excellent overview in the following terms:

- (a) polyethnic system in the contemporary societies in which the state apparatus is being captured by the dominant ethnic groups;
- (b) international factors and state power structure in most post industrial societies,¹³
- (c) the basic contradiction between the monoethnic state and polyethnic social system;
- (d) the incessant state system that negates and denies particular ethnic identities;
- (e) state's nation-building activities in post colonial phase, that tends to dislocate the indigenous authority structures in peripheral ethnic societies.¹⁴

We can identify some general and particular causes like economic conditions, cultural policy, regime changes which will influence different scenarios for the future of ethnic conflicts.

13. Dawa Norbu, Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism (London, 1992), p.181.

14. *ibid*, p.197.

James G.Kellas in "The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity" (1991), offers various explanations for the rise of ethnic conflicts.

(a) Political Explanation:

(1) General-Rise in democratic expectations and capabilities throughout the world, threatening multi-national states.

(2) Particular - Events controlling, the politics of ethnic nationalism like war, change of regime, change of government will release expectations and capabilities, cause and resistance.

(b) Economic:

Territorial distribution of economic resources in a state and its link with nationalism. When the resources between 'dejure' and 'defacto' resources do not correspond it will lead to conflict.¹⁵

(c) Cultural:

The rise of ethnic and social nationalism, in opposition to state nationalism or cosmopolitanism, 'cultural deprivation' in the social sphere. "Exclusive 'nationalism like Turkish, Tamil were intolerant to the nationalist policies".¹⁶

15. James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London, 1991), pp.62,63.

16. *ibid*, p.74.

(d) Regime Changes:

The USSR, Spain, Yugoslavia and Quebec provide examples of sudden regime changes leading to the sudden emergence of strong nationalist movements. The wider change is part of the explanation for regime change. The former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia witnessed serious economic decline. On the contrary, Catalonia, Quebec, and Scotland witnessed sudden economic resurgence.¹⁷

The causes of ethno-religious resurgence and inter-ethnic tensions in Soviet Central Asia have been explained by K. Warikoo, as "Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika and Glasnost ushered in a new era of press freedom, political democratization and decentralization of decision - making process. This gave the people of Central Asia, a new confidence to assert their national and religious identity".¹⁸ Other, factors like unemployment, low productivity in agriculture and industry are responsible for heightened inter-ethnic tension.

Non - State Nations & Quasi -States :

17. ibid, p.132.

18. K. Warikoo, "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, eds., Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia (New Delhi, 1992), p.67.

Ethnic groups which are incapable of establishing a 'nation-state', but still fight for it fall under the above category.

Judy S. Bertelsen calls them 'Non-Nation States', defined as "any entity, that operates in a manner normally associated, with a nation-state but isn't generally recognized nation-state."¹⁹ The defining characteristic of the Non State Nation is its assertion, creation, implying sovereignty, while not being generally recognized as a sovereign entity in international politics. Kurds, Welsh, Basques, Walloons fall under the above category.

Somewhat, similarly, Robert H. Jackson makes another categorisation, "Quasi -States". They are "deficient in the political will, institutional authority and organized power to protect Human Rights. These States, are primarily juridical, far from complete and empirical statehood in large measure still remains to be built,"²⁰

19. Judy S. Bertelsen, ed., Non-State Nations in International Politics: Comparative System Analyses (USA, 1977), p.2.

20. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (New York, 1990), p.21.

Minorityism

Ethnic problem is almost similar to minority problem. There is a continuous pressure on the members of the minority nations to conform to the customs and cultures of the majority. If the majority people enjoy rights, then the minority also demands on its own behalf. The existence of rights depends on the prior creation of a community of interests. A minority permanently, excluded from the enjoyment of equal rights will threaten this sense of community.

Gerard Chaliand has identified five discriminatory policies aimed at wiping out the minority people. They are as follows:-

- (a) Discrimination : rejection precipitated by membership of a particular group.
- (b) Cultural Oppression : prohibition on studying one's own languages in school or using it in publications or audio-visual material.
- (c) Economic oppression : when the interests of the minorities are systematically disadvantaged.
- (d) Physical Oppression : massive settlement by the majority ethnic group or occupation of the territory of the minority by population transfer.

(e) Genocide : a policy to eliminate the whole of a community. ²¹

" National-cultural autonomy" should be set up, when territorial continuity is interpreted, and when minority nationalities cannot lay claim to 'national independence'. ²²

The right to self-determination remains primarily an expression of moral and empirical appeal for the simple reason that many of the countries in the world are 'multi-ethnic societies. In order to reconcile the claims for self-determination with the sovereign claims of states that their borders remain sacrosanct, the concept of what Hurst Hannum calls "less-than sovereign self-determination" ²³ has been developed.

The response of the international community to the call of the minorities, ethnic groups and cultural groups includes the following:

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21. Gerard Chaliand, ed., Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States, Tony Berrett, trans. (India, 1981), p.8.
 22. Richard Marienstras, "On the Notion of Diaspora", in Gerard Chaliand, ed., Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States, Tony Berrett, trans. (India, 1989), p.123.
 23. Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (Philadelphia, 1990), p.469.

(a) United Nations Charter :

(1) The provisions under Article 73 refer to 'respect' for the cultures of peoples, 'their political aspiration, and the development of free political institutions according to the particular circumstances.' This refers to only 'non-self governing territories', and excludes minorities within the state.

(2) The UN Charter under Article 27 states, 'in which religious, ethnic or linguistic minorities exist, shall not be denied the rights to enjoy their own culture, language,' etc.

(b) Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948

This declaration was adopted in 1948, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, national origin and other factors.

(c) International Alert Commission 1985

This is a Standing International Forum on Ethnic conflict Development, Human Rights and Genocide established in 1985 which is directly a fallout of the ethnocide and genocide policies adopted by various countries.²⁴

24. See Martin Ennals, "Ethnic Conflict Resolution and the Protection of Minorities: The Quest for NGO Competence Building", in Kumar Rupe Singhe, ed., Ethnic Conflict and Human Rights(Oslo, 1988), p.15.

Broadly, the below conditions for an ethnic group to assert its status as a 'nation' can be identified :-

- (1) Institutions of power/authority in mediating, mitigating,escalating such conflict:
- (2) Autonomist - secessionist manifestations of ethno - nationalism;
- (3) External dimension of secessionist movement;
- (4) Relationship between government, society and economy;
- (5) Failure of federal principle of accommodation:
- (6) Ethnic group which have been engaged in conflict with others during its early history has stronger identities; and
- (7) Uncompromising, nature of the nationalist and ethnic groups.

Some ethnic minorities and indigenous tribal people are fighting for autonomy since the inception of the League of Nations, the Kurds for independence, the Blacks of South Africa for deliverance from complete apartheid problems and the Palestinians for a homeland. All these problems are a result of more complex historical situations and require more imaginative and innovative solution. We have variegated degrees of ethnic problem in the present world. There have to be as many as alternatives as the problems do exist.

Horowitz, in "Ethnic groups in Conflict" (1985) sums up his preferred aims of policy with regard to ethnic groups as "fragmentation, moderation, coalition fluidity and proportionality".²⁵ Still, other widely adopted policies include accommodation, federalism, cultural pluralism, referendum, ethnic separatism, consociational model, ethno-development, peaceful direct action.

The theory of 'consociated democracy' of Lijphart basically deals with the continuation of multi-ethnic societies. "The idea behind 'consociated democracy' is to guarantee all ethnic groups, a reasonable degree of influence in the political system".²⁶ This model has been developed keeping in view 'pluralistic societies'.

All the above approaches towards the ethnic problem, are limited to the management, or rather, the continuation of ethnic conflict in the future.

25. D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (California, 1985), p.646.

26. Kumar Rupe Singhe, n.5, p.43.

Our understanding should include a shift in the paradigm of conflict research in international relations, by building:

- (a) sound comparative experience in internal conflict resolution;
- (b) identifying the actors involved within the state ethnic groups/religious groups and enhancing their role in conflict resolution; and
- (c) lastly, conflict resolution policy should be effective, to work for economic and social development, for the promotion and protection of human rights to lessen conflicts and to build peace and extend to the whole international community.

Rotschild proposed a model which satisfactorily answers the impending ethnic problem. His approach is at stratifying ethnic groups and the balance of power between the ethnic groups and the centre. Attempts are made to understand the dynamics of mobilisation process which aim at political autonomy and secessionist solution. We have to analyse the relationship of ethnic groups to the centre and the form of relationship. This is reflected in demographic conditions, differences between various ethnic groups, resource bases, economic power and functional specialisation. We have to see if, ethnic group enjoys a

contiguous resource base, and also, if the ethnic stratification has a cross border or regional dimension.²⁷

He has classified seven different outcomes of stratification from 'conflict resolution perspective':

- (a) dominating majority;
- (b) dominating minority,;
- (c) balanced relation with nation-building people and several ethnic groups.
- (d) division of power between politics and economy,
- (e) division of power between territorial based and functional groups.
- (f) oppressed but economically strong minority.
- (g) many small groups in balance.²⁸

The above model helps us to discuss more clearly the types of conflict resolution mechanism possible within each given model, so that we may delineate and draw boundaries between different types of conflicts which are likely to be generated given different types of structures.

Before very long most ethno-nationalists movements settle for what can be regarded as "acceptable-option" in the ethnic conflict, there is the possibility of negotiated

27. ibid, p.44.

28. ibid, pp.44-45.

peace settlement. What can be seen as an "acceptable-option," on the part of the ethnic insurgents tends to be dismissed by the state as a "denial" "non-negotiable" solution. This is a crucial stage for resolving conflict. Whether it is the Kurdish, Tamils, or Eritreans problem, all of them have been denied the "acceptable-option" leading to protracted ethnic problem.

To overcome this, Alexis Heraclides suggests distinguishing between (a) genuine acceptance-negotiable policies and (b) covert or denial policies. These adopted initially, have to be identified so as to help in conflict resolution.

This stage can be reached if we take care to note the following:

- (a) context in which resolution is possible:
- (b) context of the proposed resolution:
- (c) aims of the ethnic insurgents:
- (d) attitudes of the ethnic insurgents. to the government proposals.²⁹

We should identify ethnic problem and resolve them by looking at the consequences in the future. We could devise

29. Alexis Heraclides, "Conflict Resolution, Ethno-Nationalism and the Middle-East Impasse", Journal of Peace Research(London), vol.26, May 1989, p.201.

autonomy arrangements for ethnic groups that are short of state-sovereignty, which assure communities of greater self-governance within their own boundaries. By providing institutional arrangements for mitigating ethnic conflict like cultural autonomy, federalism and self-government without redrawing 'national-boundaries', ethnic groups short of state sovereignty, should be given perhaps, representation within regional and international organisation.

There can also be alternative 'comprehensive policy prescriptions', depending on the nature of problem.

(a) Majority rule- acceptable policy in revolutionary movements of ethnic majorities or for movements against settler colonization:

(b) Minority protection- acceptable policy for secessionist irredentist movements of small, weak or dispersed communal groups;

(c) Secessionist irredentist movement- extended autonomy, federation, partition etc;

(d) Consociational democracy- appropriate negotiable solution for revolutionary movements, against settler colonization, anti- occupation movements; and

(e) Federal schemes- movements suitable for all kinds of separate as well as revolutionary movements that aren't seeking autonomy or independence.³⁰

Joseph Rothschild has developed the outline of a new theory of Ethno- politics, that helps to place conflicts like the Kurdish ethnic conflict in a wider peace- building context of "legitimacy"³¹ which can reorient the conduct of regional actors.

Looking at the Kurdish objectives in the more general terms of ethnopolitics, it is hard to overstate the significance of the establishment of safe-haven for Kurds in Northern Iraq and the acceptance of the U.N. operated relief centres, paving the way for the acceptance of the principle of international supervision for the protection of Kurdish rights. "Realists" may argue that the events in the wake of Operation Desert Storm could not lead to effective autonomy for the Kurds and if there is drastic change in the world it not signals, "new thinking" as far as independent statehood for the kurds is concerned. Such a view misses an important part of the distinction between a "balance of power" paradigm and a "peace process" paradigm. There are, of

30. ibid, pp.199-200.

31. Joseph Rothschild, Ethno-Politics: A Conceptual Framework (New York, 1981), pp.28-29.

course, innumerable obstacles to the initiation of a peace process on the Kurdish problem but as the Madrid Peace Process has shown, some of the barriers may disappear and the pessimistic prognosis may have to be revised. An ethnic approach to peace and security in the context of the Kurdish question would envisage measures like establishment of autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq to total independence and ultimate union with Kurds in Syria, Iran and Turkey. Based on sophisticated geo-political conditions, a combination of humanitarian relief, political commitment to autonomy, bilateral and multilateral negotiations have to be evolved. A comprehensive and accepted settlement of the Kurdish issue cannot be dismissed on theoretical grounds. In fact Kurdish separatism in Iraq now requires legitimate and proportional strategies which can adjust to changing domestic, regional and global conditions so that they do not suffer from "benign neglect" and continue the process of both broadening their political consciousness and authority through creative diplomatic skills.

Ethnic factor has always been an important factor in the building of a nation. If the political revolution is successful a nation-state can form, if not, an ethnic group. Nationalism always persists through the cultural and ethnic dimension in a state. Failure to co-opt through constitutional provision in the mono-ethnic state have

provoked ethnic nationalism. The Aborigines in Ethiopia, the Kurds in West Asia, the Berbers in North Africa, the Basques in Western Europe, and the Hungarian minority in Romania, struggling for land still exist as a disadvantaged group. In the coming decades these problems may become worse, if not handled carefully by the whole world community.

Conflict management should include:

- (a) the nature of demands;
- (b) affirmative discrimination;
- (c) greater autonomy and power without questioning the systemic sanctity; and
- (d) autonomy related to systemic change.

The challenge to civilisation working to the twenty-first century, is to strike a balance between economic imperatives, the state's function and a pluralist society, in which 'intermediate-community structures', 'local-cultures' and environments are sustained. The rights of a national minority, shall include recognising its own culture and providing institutional mechanisms to exercise political and economic power.

CHAPTER - III

**KURDISH ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT: AUTONOMY,
PLURALISM AND PEACE ORDER**

The end of the cold war has contributed to several conflict resolution processes, characteristically in South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia and Afghanistan all of which went through highly militaristic phases earlier. The end of the cold war and the aftermath of the Persian Gulf crisis raised expectations that the Middle East conflicts were ripe for the development of effective peace-making measures. However, the sources of regional antagonism, run deep and have defied solutions for decades. The accumulation of high-tech weapons, combined with the inconsistencies and inequities inherent in unresolved Middle Eastern conflicts continue to threaten regional security and stability. The factors responsible for the lack of progress towards a peace order include:

(1) oil is still a vital strategic resource and the threat of disruption in its supply generates attitudes conducive to war.

(2) the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to polarize the region, and its long run effect is to augment causes of war between the West and the Islamic world.

(3) the spread of weapons including weapons of mass destruction is an expression of the mobilization of human and economic resources for military purposes.

The Gulf War of 1991 has underlined the continuing significance of the regional arms race and the relevance of military policy and high-tech operations for global security after the cold war. The Middle East afflicted with protracted conflicts has not achieved either military or political equilibrium, and the struggle for power generates tension and turmoil. The defeat of Iraq in the Gulf war has not created conditions for changing perceptions conducive to peace, stability or a system of collective security. Iraq continues to find political issues and hostilities. "Peace" to Saddam Hussain is only a "final option" which has been postponed on amount of lack of receptivity. As Hazim T. Mushtak has rightly pointed out "The Iraqi strategy in this respect is determined to a large measure by its geographic position, being landlocked and surrounded by six states."¹

Proposals which do not conform to the optimum utilization of its territory and resources for developments only increase the intensity of the crisis. Any government in Baghdad is likely to resort to force and aggression as long as its internal structure and environmental conditions are not radically transformed.

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1. Hazim T. Mushtak, "Arms control and the Proliferation of High-Technology Weapons in the Middle East", in Shelley A. Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Control and the Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia (London, 1992), p.114.

Internal aggression in the context of the Kurdish problem can be understood as the conflict between the Real Politik of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria and the demand for political independence by the Kurds resulting in a lot of suffering. There seems little hope in the future that this "internal aggression" will cease to play a central role. The question of self-determination to the Kurds clearly creates anxieties. And the response of central authorities in the name of pacification and consolidation actually takes on the pace and urgency of a transition to internal war.

The damage and destruction which the Pariah regime of Saddam Hussein continues to impose on the Kurds even in the aftermath of the Gulf War goes beyond the deployment of bureaucratized military power. With the prolongation of the ethnic conflict, military realities will be placed on agenda schemes of warfare involving a high level of combat forces and weaponry. The vertical level of internal aggression leads to a total collision of the strategic purposes of the central power with the domestic interests of the Kurds. The horizontal dimension of internal aggression creates a level of dependence on external help which in turn produces contradiction. This has happened in the case of the help obtained by Iraqi Kurds from the Shah of Iran.

One might thus in general argue that given the formidable military machines deployed against them, the

Kurds have to develop policy - constructs within a larger back drop of arms control diplomacy, covert political actions, satellite observation and other innovative substitutes for armed action to transcend the purely military considerations inherent in "internal aggression."

In drawing new strength and seeking to avoid the pitfalls of their existing strategies, and to answer internal aggression, the Kurds have to negate the impact of political and military challenges through a "grand strategy", which incorporates professionalism in the context of non-provocative defence, civilian defence and confidence and security-building measures.

Our line of argument points to the fact that once the Kurds show a willingness to broaden their perspective on internal aggression, there will be a relative decline of the action-reaction syndrome. Besides, a greater planning of professional and pragmatic responses to the deployment of war and military organization against the Kurds.

Empirical evidence shows that the Kurds have reduced their chance of gaining widespread international support after the Gulf War because they could not come up with an answer to Turkey's claim to play a vital role in promoting stability and security. For the West, Turkey is an old and trusted ally. Ultimately, the Kurds have to overcome this

resistance by some generalised logic of the modernity of their ethno-nationalism and their range of manoeuvre in peace building diplomacy.

Peri Pamir suggests that the prevention of war is feasible and can be accomplished in two stages: "Conflict termination" and "peace-building". Peace building scenarios seek to identify long term goals and mechanisms for the purpose of constructing a durable post war peace and stable structure.²

There can be no peace in the Middle East, as long as the Kurds and the Palestinians are not given the opportunity to meet their political responsibilities through peaceful change consonant with accepted standards of justice. The Kurds constituting a population of more than twenty millions are part of "world-wide ethnic assertiveness" but they find themselves within a complicated labyrinth of crossing interests.

2. Peri Pamir, "Peace-building scenarios after the Gulf War", Third World Quarterly (London), vol.13, no.2, 1992, p.283-4.

Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish leader has called his people, "the orphans of the universe."³ The Kurds have lost many opportunities in the past. Their revolts have always ended the same way in defeat and catastrophe.

The Kurds are the fourth biggest national group in the Middle East after Arabs, Persians and Turks, without a state of their own. They have arguably, as much or more right to a statehood as the Palestinians.

Iran under the Shah declared that it had no 'Kurdish problem'. The Turkish government denied the very existence of the Kurds and called them 'Mountain Turks'. Iraq initially granted some cultural autonomy but later on adopted a repressive policy. Thus, the Kurds emerged as a "people oppressed by the oppressed",⁴ according to Gerard Chaliand.

During the post-Gulf War period; the Kurds rebelled against Saddam Hussein bringing international attention towards their plight. They rose in revolt only to be ruthlessly suppressed by forces loyal to Saddam Hussein.

3. David Bradshaw, "After the Gulf War: The Kurds", The World Today (London), vol.47, 5th May 1991, p.78.

4. Gerard Chaliand, ed., People without a country - The Kurds and the Kurdistan, by Michael Pollis, trans. (London, 1980), p.8.

Simultaneously rebellions took place in Iraq led by the Shiis in the South and the Kurds in the North. This was followed by a mass exodus of Kurdish refugees from Iraq, entering the cities of Turkey and Iran.⁵

It was in such extraordinary circumstances that, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688 and took practical steps to alleviate aggressive Iraqi tendencies against the Kurds.

Later, on April 18th, the Iraqi government signed an agreement with the UN to distribute relief aid to Kurdish refugees. Finally in order to get the foreign troops from the Northern part of Iraq Saddam Hussain reached a 15 point agreement with the Kurdish leaders.⁶

This key geographical position in the Middle East gives the Kurds political importance. However, their homeland has been partitioned among the regional powers. And consequently, their ethnic political assertiveness has been contained by the political pressures of authoritarian regimes.

5. Gazi Ibdewi Abdulghafour, United Nation's Role in the Gulf crisis (New Delhi, 1992), p.78.

6. *ibid*, pp.79-80.

"In modern times they (Kurds) achieved two short-lived semi-independent entities. The kingdom of Kurdistan in Iraqi Kurdistan under Sheikh Mahmoud (1922-1924) and the Mahabad Republic under Qazi Mohammed (Jan-Dec.1946), in the Iranian Kurdistan."⁷ Finally, the 'safe-haven', was created on April 1991 which may be considered as a 'defacto state' partially.

The following analysis will illuminate the nature of the hegemonical traditions under which the Kurds have been denied their aspirations:

Turkey

Soon after coming to power in 1920, the government of Mustafa Kemal began to adopt a policy of Turkification and assimilation. Turkey is one of the poorest of the three countries that have large Kurdish minorities. Unlike Iran and Iraq it had no oil. Economic conditions of the Turkish Kurds deteriorated as the government tended to channel its funds for aid and development into the more Westerly provinces. Thus, Turkish citizens, regardless of their specific ethnic identity have been unified constitutionally to serve the hegemonic aspirations of the Turkish ruling classes.

7. James M. Prince "A Kurdish state in Iraq?", Current History (Philadelphia), Jan. 1993, p.17.

As S.D. Salamone pointed out "ethnic enclaves still determine Turkey's own national self-perception and its struggle to incorporate a majority ethnic Turkish identity consonant with its statist ideology of social, cultural, and - crucial to the boundary maintenance of the non-Turkic minorities - linguistic homogenization."⁸

The Turkish government found that cultural assimilation led to the emergence of violent Kurdish workers party (or PKK), which sought to create an independent state in South-Eastern Turkey. The PKK leader Apo-Uncle Abdullah Ocalan has been supported by Lebanese Kurds and the Marxist Kurdistan workers party. They operate from the encampments in the notorious Bekka valley. Here, the PKK operates under Syrian protection, carrying on a guerrilla war against Turkey. In the unofficial Turkish Kurdistan capital Diyarbakir, Kurds can nurture mode of social praxis which enable the Turkish government to earn a modicum of international respect by a combination of "modernizing" and "assimilating" policies.

"In the early 1990s, ... language and publishing laws were eased in Turkey. In January 1991, the Turkish

8. S.D. Salamone, "The Dialectics of Turkish National Identity: Ethnic Boundary Maintenance and State Ideology", East European Quarterly (Colorado), vol.xxiii, no.2, summer 1989, p.225.

government abrogated the law forbidding the speaking of Kurdish language in public and there was even talk of creating a Kurdish Institute."⁹ It should be noted that this "window dressing" does not impede the overall hegemonic construction of the Turkish state to the detriment of bonafide Kurdish rights.

Iraq:

The Iraqi government provided more cultural autonomy, to the Kurds than either Turkey or Iran. The Treaty of Ankara¹⁰ signed in 1926 awarded Mosul Vilayet to Iraq on the condition by the League of Nations that the local rights of the Kurds would be protected.

The importance of the Kurdish region to Iraq is that it controls the country's vital natural resources of oil and water, i.e., the main oil fields in Kirkuk, together with the river Tigris and Euphrates. To modify, the Kurdish natural advantage on the ground, the Iraqi government has deported Kurds from sensitive areas and created Arab colonies around Kirkuk.

9. Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geo-political and Geo-strategic changes in the Middle East", Third World Quarterly (London), vol.13, no.3, 1992, p.476.

10. Refer to chronology of events.

The 1958 Iraqi constitution recognized Arabs and Kurds as equals. Later on during Abdul Karim Kasseem governance the Kurdish Democratic Party was legalised. During 1961 to 1968 the failure to secure an autonomous republic prompted the Kurds to launch an armed struggle.

Soon, after the Baa'th party came into power under General Al Bakr and Saddam Hussain, attention was paid to the Kurdish problem. The government promised to carry census in the region but this was never implemented. The nine year war ended on 11th March 1970¹¹, with the signing of a peace agreement.

Iranians and Americans got actively involved in the Kurdish ethno-nationalism, since 1972, immediately after Iraq signed the Friendship Treaty with Soviet Union. The Shah of Iran provided military aid to the Kurds in order to weaken the Iraqi government. For the Shah, Kurds became a bargaining chip against Iraq on the question of Shatt'al Arab. The American C.I.A. provided covert support.

The 1975 Agreement signed between Iran and Iraq also known as the Algier Agreement however led to an understanding on the Kurdish problem. Soon, after the

11. Alfred B. Prados, "Kurdish Separatism in Iraq: Development and Implications for the United States", Congressional Research Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.), 6th May 1991, pp.40-41.

agreement, the Iraqi forces came down heavily on Kurds destroying their poorly armed military forces. A prisoner of their own alliances, the Kurdish movement led by Barzani opted for surrender.

This highlighted the intrusive weakness of the Kurds and proved that the popular phrase 'Kurds have no friends' was more than true.

The use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in 1987 and 1988 led to criticism from the international community. Nerve gas cyanide and mustard gas were used against the town of Halabja. The town was almost obliterated by bombs and its people were savaged by nerve gas and other poison agents on March 16, 1988.¹²

Iran

Soon after the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution on January 16th, 1979, there was a resurgence of powerful ethnic and linguistic demands by the Kurds, Arabs, Azers, Baluchis and Turkomans. The Kurds were perceived as a major political and military challenge to the integrity of Iran. The Iranians blamed Iraq and Turkish Kurds, and the USSR and the USA for encouraging Kurdish resistance. The Teheran

12. Christopher Hitchens, "Struggle of the Kurds", National Geographics (Washington, DC), vol.182, no.2, Aug.1992, p.46.

regime sent nearly 45,000 Revolutionary Guards to regain the land for Teheran. Nearly 45,000 Kurds died in fighting between 1980 and 1983, thus crushing Kurdish hopes for autonomy in Iran.

Syria

Kurdish nationalism has not been a potent force in Syrian affairs. Kurds and Syrians had a close relationship. However, events elsewhere in the Kurdish world were causing a reappraisal of ethnic identity. In 1957 a socially broad based body of Kurds founded the Kurdish Democratic party in Syria on the model of the Kurdistan Democratic party of Iraq seeking greater cultural rights. With the discovery of oil in Qartchnok in Kurdish territory, the "Arab Belt Plan",¹³ was implemented. Kurds living together along the Turkish border were deported and dispersed in the Arab South. Presently, the Syrian Kurds are giving support to PKK and helping in military training.

The "denial" policies adopted by Iraq, Iran and Turkey left the Kurds with no other option, but to take resort to arms. Moreover, the division of Kurdistan weakened the national movement. Kurdistan was divided

13. Richard Sim, "Kurdish movement strongly sustained in Iraq", Conflict Studies (London), no.124, July 1990, p.19.

among states whose governments were autocratic. They were opposed to democratic ideas and institutions. Therefore, no political reconciliation was possible within that framework.¹⁴

The Kurds have been formidable antagonists. But, their policies and strategies have not grown out of careful and subtle calculus of the relationship of forces. The images and the perceptions about the Kurds are based on assumptions which were relevant to the exploits of Mulla Mustafa Barzani. The nature and provenance of the cognitive environment of the Kurds was deeply influenced by the Barzani tribe. There has been tension between the radicals and the traditionalists. But, there has been no conscious construction of policy and statecraft outside the basic problematics of hereditary tribal politics.

From a socio-psychological perspective, we have to point out that the Kurdish movement will have to be demystified and reconstituted. In terms of the experience and awareness of the social circumstances which transform the way people in the Middle East perceive political possibilities and the cumulative of a new cognitive environment. This should reinforce Kurdish cultural

14. Edgar O'Ballance, *The Kurdish Revolt 1961-70* (London, 1973), p.74.

considerations not in tribal terms but in terms of public virtue which could be the foundation of the future Kurdish Republic.

The efforts of the Kurdish leaders to create a state in the aftermath of the Iraq government's defeat in the Gulf War and in particular the convening of the Vienna meeting followed by the July 1992 meetings in Washington are of great importance. The resiliency of the Kurdish movement has demonstrated a quantitative and qualitative change.

The images and perceptions of those involved in the post-Gulf War mobilization and politicisation can be examined by extending logically Alexis Heraclides's theoretical formulation of conflict resolution and ethno-nationalism:

- 1) conflict resolution process can be initiated if we move away from tangible material values, such as territory, and unravel the non-material values behind them. 'Super-Ordinate' values such as security, survival, development and distributive justice are to be considered.
- 2) focus on 'universal social needs', and culturally determined values.
- 3) identify the values or needs that cannot be fulfilled so long as the conflict persists unabated.

- 4) move away from the conventional wisdom and power politics' to 'problem-solving', and 'peace-thinking' process i.e. to build a new paradigm for intergroup and inter-state relation.¹⁵

The end of the cold war represents a fundamental alteration in regional tensions. It remains to be seen how far the Kurdish leaders can develop steering mechanisms, limit expenditure on arms and develop pragmatic views on greater democratization and protection of human rights in the whole region. The disparity in the distribution of wealth and natural resources especially, oil revenues are major sources of disequilibrium. The Kurdish problem has been effected by the existence of rich oil resources in Mosul and Vilayet region. It will be an uphill struggle for the Kurds to secure a fundamental shift in state practice. They can take advantage of the new environment favourable to the protection of collective human rights of peoples who are suffering under repressive rule.

The protection of cultural rights of all minorities, the Sunnis, Shiis and Kurds is of vital importance if the illegalities of the status quo are to be remedied. The 'unanswered and perhaps, unanswerable questions' about

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15. Alexis Heraclides, "Conflict Resolution, Ethno-Nationalism and the Middle East Impasse", Journal of Peace Research (London), vol.26, no.2, May 1989, p.206.

economic and ethnic governance increasingly influence the "unmapped territory of the new world order."

The proposed Kurdistan would extend from South Eastern Turkey and North Eastern Iraq to North Western Iran, spilling over slightly into Northern Syria and the Southern edge of the former Soviet Union (See map in the Appendix). Its important river systems would include much of the upper courses of the Tigris and the Euphrates and all of the great and little Zab rivers, Kirkuk and Mosul work in Iraq, the South Western edge of the area. With its highly mountainous region it would have identity and unity and conditions for successful integration.¹⁶

According to Christopher Hitchens, the strategic location of Kurdistan deserves special attention. A positive interdependence between Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Kurdish nationalism can be developed on the basis of both strategic calculus and enlightened self-interests.¹⁷

The traumatic events in the Kurdish ethnic conflict have produced a realignment of forces and it would seem

16. Arthur Campbell Turner, "Kurdish Nationalism", in Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger eds., Ideology and Power in the Middle East - Studies in Honour of George Lenezowski (London/Colardo, 1984), pp.382-3.

17. Hitchens, n.12, p.49.

appropriate to emphasise that the next decade seems more likely than ever to see a more sophisticated development of Kurdish separatism.

The States involved, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey cannot ignore the continuing ethnicization of their international relations. Besides, they cannot possibly regard set backs in the Kurdish resistance as an everlasting phenomenon.

If we consider that political responses of the central government will evolve dynamically, it is unlikely that they will be in solid array against the Kurds. The Kurdish "democratic challenge" will necessarily influence the social agenda of democratisation where the central government are at a disadvantage.

It will be wishful thinking even for Turkey to suggest that they have eliminated the Kurdish issue from Turkish politics by committing a carnage in the border villages. Similarly the Iraqi government must understand that the shedding of the Kurdish blood is an exercise in futility. "Of all sections of Iraqi opposition, none are likely to be more crucial in Iraq's future reconstruction than the country's Kurdish community. Not only do they represent a sizeable proportion of Iraqi, public opinion, but they also have the capacity to disrupt any national

fundamentalist favour cannot gain by their highly publicised reiteration of the position that the Kurdish problem does not exist.

The controlled and repressive societies of Iraq and Iran invoke stereotype images and suggest that security crackdowns are the only answers to Kurdish demands. Whoever, thinks, it is a fantasy to imagine that there is a constellation of factors which can compel the central states to reach an accommodation with the Kurds. There are various examples in history when states were compelled to defuse the mobilisation of discontent by offering accommodation.

The formation of Iraqi Kurdistan Front merging eight major parties to represent Kurdish interests is an important development. The Iraqi Kurdistan Front, quickly reacted to the 1991 rebellion and filled the political, civil and administrative vacuum created by the central government. Presently, in the elected Iraqi Kurdish parliament, political leadership is in the hands of the IKF supreme body made up of two members of each party and chaired by the leaders of the two main parties.

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18. Munir Morad, "The Situation of Kurds in Iraq and Turkey: Current Trends and Prospects", in Philip G. G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl eds., The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview (London, 1992), p.117.

Jalal Talabani of the partriotic union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdistan Socialist Party demanded an independent state¹⁹, indicating that the idea of independence now functions as an organising principle of both domestic Kurdish politics and their participation in international relations. The founder and the Secretary General of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Mahmoud Sani, Abdul Rahman however, called for a 'federate state system' in Iraq, and for self-determination rather than autonomy.²⁰

The Kurdish Socialist Party (KSP), the Party of Socialism in Kurdistan(PASOK), the Islamic Party of Kurdistan (IPK), the Kurdish Communists, the Kurdish Tribe Society who were eclipsed at the polls, are thus, not significant participants in the political dialogue.

Some of the 75 lesser tribes advocate the establishment of the historical Mosul Vilayet with Iraq becoming a UN Trust Territory. The tribes supported the parliament of Kurds, but seek, through the Vilayet to restore their lost prestige and authority.²¹

19. Prince, n.7, p.18.

20. . ibid, p.19.

21. ibid, p.20.

The scope for accommodation with the various central governments is determined by the wider issues of systemic transformation. To a limited extent Kurdish options bear some resemblance to the options available to the Baltic States prior to independence. Various proposals can be advanced which would derive strength from reference to the Kurdish areas as a "gateway" and would firmly establish Kurdistan as a "peaceful actor" in the international arena. The broader horizons have been indicated by Dr. Fuad Mohammad, a prominent Kurdish nationalist, who has indicated the prospects for the formation of integrated political space made up of: (1) the democratic idea (2) the Marxist-Leninist ideas (3) socialism and nationalism²². This joint political space of the Kurdish struggle could be developed in a modernist sense and would assume pluralist and flexible points of departure relevant to a post-ideological and non-polarised environment.

Arieh Shmuelevitz, perceives unprecedented opportunities for Kurdish political and economic actions provided there is creativity in finding new roles and functioning postures. The Kurdish "dispersal and regional

22. Anthony Hyman, "Elusive Kurdistan - The Struggle for Recognition", Conflict Studies (London), no.214, July 1988, p.12.

chemistry²³, however come in the way of creation of networks and infrastructures engulfing the whole Kurdish area.

In general there is little doubt that as time passes the Kurdish region will gain in importance as regional interests take the place of previously dominant considerations. The mode of conflict resolution for Kurdish ethno-nationalism will not remain limited to devising instruments of confidence building which is all that can be done with present denial policies. Alexis Heraclides's comment and conclusion with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict helps in a more general conceptualization of the external environment in which Kurdish choices of autonomy could develop in a concentric manner.

The resolution of a revolutionary ethnic conflict ... cannot come about by the magic stroke of the traditional diplomatic mediation and other such deus ex machina, and even less so by irredentism and denial policies that can do nothing more than prolong the conflict indefinitely.²⁴

He points out that the task of conflict resolution in such cases is to fulfil the national identity, security and sense of justice of the parties to the conflict. In the

23. Danny Gur-Arieh, "Kurds: The Elusive Quest", New Outlook (New York), Apr/May 1991, pp.7-8.

24. Heraclides, n.17, p.209.

Kurdish case the consensus required would have to include the Kurds, the Turks, the Iraqis, the Iranians, the Syrians and the power which legitimises options within the new world order.

Ethno-nationalists movements and acceptance modes of conflict resolution provided by Heraclides is a useful analytical tool since it provides a schematic presentation of acceptance by ethno-nationalists movements (See Table-1). Within such a setting the Kurdish movement has Pan-irredentist characteristics and has been enclosed in a determination of "autonomy" and "partition". In this connection it is proper to realise that there is an untapped potential and vital interest for moving towards an open ended peace process if key strands in different modes of conflict resolution are identified and related to denial-acceptance solutions. The Kurds have to address themselves to old question by comprehending the complex set of emerging identities and activities of other ethno-nationalist movements.

TABLE - 1

Ethnonationalist Movements and Acceptance Modes
of Conflict Resolution

Type of Revolutionary Ethnonationalist Movements	Examples	Policies of Acceptance by the State	Policies of Acceptance by the Movement
Revolutionary Ethnonationalist Simplifier of Majority	ANC (South Africa) FIM (Taiwan)	Consociational democracy, majority rule	Minority protection, disproportional representation
Revolutionary Ethnonationalist Simplifier of Minority	SPLA (Southern Sudan)	Consociational democracy, autonomy, federation	Democratic rule, minority protection, autonomy, federation, consociational-democracy
Classical Anti-Colonial	FLN (Algeria), MPLA (Portuguese Angola), FRELIMO (Portuguese Mozambique), SWAPO (Namibia).	Independence	Independence
Against 2nd Settler Colonization	ZANU, ZAPU (S. Rhodesia)	Independence, consociational democracy	Independence, consociational democracy
Anti-Occupation (Anti-Annexation)	POLISARIO (Western Sahara), FRETILIN (East Timor), al-Fatah, PLO (1974-)	Independence	Independence
Classical Irredentist	WZO (Zionists 1896-1948), PLO (1965-74) PFLP (1968-)	-	-

Type of Revolutionary Ethno-nationalist Movements	Examples	Policies of Acceptance by the State	Policies of Acceptance by the Movement
Pan-Irredentist	pan-Kurdish, pan-Ewe, pan-Ba-Kongo, pan-Azande movements	(Multiple autonomies or partitions)	(Autonomy, partition)
Irredentist-Merger	EOKA-B (Cyprus)	-	-
Settler-Irredentist	OAS (Algeria), UDI (S. Rhodesia-Zimbabwe)	-	-
Limited Separatist	Awami League (East Pakistan), KDP (Iraqi Kurdistan), NAP, BPLF (Baluchis, Pakistan), SANU, SSLM (Southern Sudan), OLF (Oromos, Ethiopia)	(Consociational democracy), autonomy, federation.	Consociational democracy, autonomy, federation
Secessionist	Biafra (1967-January 1970), Katanga (1960-January 1963). Bangladesh (April-December 1971), ELF, EPLF (Eritrea, Ethiopia), TPLF (Tigray, Ethiopia), LTTE (Tamils, Sri Lanka), Sikhs (India), NNC (Nagas, India).	(Extended autonomy). loose federation, independence	Extended autonomy, federation (independence)
Secessionist-Merger	TMT (Turkish Cypriots), WSLF (Somalis, Ethiopia), IRA (N. Ireland), Kashmir (India)	(Extended autonomy), loose federation, partition	Extended autonomy, federation (partition)

Type of Revolutionary Ethno-nationalist Movements	Examples	Policies of Acceptance by the State	Policies of Acceptance by the Movement
Secessionist-Irredentist	ASALA (Armenians for Turkish Armenia)	Extended autonomy, federation, partition	Extended autonomy (federation)
Settler Secessionist	USA, 1776, South American States, 1820s.	Independence	Independence

Source: Alexis Heraclides, "Conflict Resolution, Ethno-nationalism and the Middle East Impasse", Journal of Peace Research (London), vol.26, no.2, May 1989, pp.199-200.

Ultimately, Kurdish group should open a dialogue and overcome the following barriers in peace process:

1) There has been many peace agreements and promises of reform, but without a third-party arbiter that both sides could trust, it has not been possible to apportion blame when things went wrong.

(2) The psychological barrier is perhaps the most serious impediment of all.

(3) Kurdish movement should present itself as a united front and guarantee consistency among all groups. A Kurdish consensus has not yet been achieved despite the many transient and fragile alliances between the major Kurdish opposition of groups.²⁵

We can differentiate the Kurdish movement in the post-1975 period from earlier movements as pointed out by A. Sherzad:

From a social perspective, urban-bred elements provided most of the newly leadership. Similarly, the upper levels of the military hierarchy within the movement mainly consisted of urban elements, such as school teachers, students, medical personnel. Compromises with religious and tribal elements were made only at relatively low levels in the political, military and social organization of the movement ... the break with the earlier social structure is clear.²⁶

25. Morad, n.20, p.118.

26. A. Sherzad, "The Kurdish movement in Iraq: 1975-88", in Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, eds., The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview (London, 1992), p.137.

If the minimum degree of confidence and reassurance could develop as a result of the peace process initiated at Madrid, the possibility of using restraining rules and norms for the furtherance of Kurdish autonomy will undoubtedly be strengthened. In practical terms, the Kurds can take advantage of a horizontal-vertical reciprocity by developing a basic political framework for Kurdistan and complement it with strategic relationships with key members of the international community. At a conceptual level the evolution of the Kurdish political independence concept can be briefly summarised as follows:

a) promise of statehood (b) improvement of political mobilization through "revolution", "negotiations" and setting new priorities (c) political importance of the problem in the post-Gulf war period and (d) lastly, elaboration of alternative scenarios for consolidation of Kurdish power through overview of conceptual standpoints of different groups.

CHAPTER - IV

**INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND
ETHNIC CONFLICT**

The current need for co-ordinated problem solving approach on a global scale in matters of security, economics, ecology are greater than ever before. At the same time the global institutional capabilities are seen less
Stockholm Initiative for Global Security and Governance is a major step towards legitimizing the collective security system and resolving conflicts.

The argument, that ethnic conflict doesn't constitute a major source of international conflict doesn't hold any more. Globalisation of information, technology and economic system have transformed the international system. Conflicts which were exclusively under the domain of the 'sovereign-nations', have 'spilled' over to the International System. These in turn fester in the International System taking various forms like terrorism, secessionism, irredentism causing grave violation of human rights and vast movements of population.

Disappearance of Boundaries between internal and external conflicts

Kumar Rupe Singhe observes "the disappearing internal and external boundaries due to the widespread internal violence that keeps spilling across national boundaries is a

strong indicator to the extent of which states have not met the needs of national grouping within their borders".¹

Internal conflicts that are deep and divisive, tend to attract external predators and opportunists. External forces generally, enter the fray to advance their national self-interest. Thus, ethnic contestants engaged with external allies, risk a level of dependence that can be turned against them'.

The norms of international system and the concept of 'inviolability of frontiers' has been governing the problem of self-determination. Alexis Heraclides identifies four factors which lead to self-determination movements:

(a) a pattern of systematic discrimination or exploitation against a sizable, self-defined minority;

(b) the existence of a distinct, self-defined community or society within a state; compactly inhabiting a region, which overwhelmingly supports separatism;

(c) a realistic prospect of conflict resolution and peace within and between the new and old state as a result of the envisaged self-rule or partition; and

1. Elise Boulding ed., New Agendas For Peace Research, Conflict and Security Re-examined (London/Colorado, 1992), p.2.

(d) the rejection of compromise solution on the part of the central government.²

In view of the fact that the frontiers of colonization were with a few exceptions, not based on ethnic boundaries, the 'supposed peoples' were reduced to stray ethnic groups, cut off from their kin. The concept of self-determination has been extended to only 'non-self governing entities'. In the case of multi-ethnic independent states, self-determination is applied to reinforce non-interference and sovereignty over one's territory as well as the right of peoples to a government and socio-political system of their own choice. Ethnically related problems have to be resolved within the federal context failing which, the present trend is to grant political independence and simultaneously try to maintain the economic relations as is the case in the former Soviet Union after the creation of Common Wealth of Independent states.

Ethnicity as a major issue in international politics involves the following aspects:

- (1) Irredentism
- (2) Diaspora communities

2. Alexis Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention: In Quest of a Normative Symbolism", Journal of International Affairs (New York), vol.45, no.2, Winter 1991, p.9.

- (3) Terrorism
- (4) Minority Rights
- (5) Human Rights
- (6) Refugees and
- (7) Conflict Resolution

(1) Irredentism

Nation-state will be a legal territorial concept where national and political frontiers coincide. When the boundaries of existing states don't precisely coincide with those groups who perceive themselves as culturally cohesive units, then the demands for separatist movements arise making irredentist claims. These are made by states or ethnic groups to retrieve ethnic kin and their territories from neighbouring states.

D.L. Horowitz traces two types of irredentist movements:

- (a) the attempt to detach land and people from state in order to incorporate them in another. ex: Somalia's recurrent irredenta against Ethiopia
- (b) the attempt to detach land and peoples divided among more than one state in order to incorporate

them in a single new state. ex: the creation of "Kurdistan" composed of Kurds now living in Iraq, Iran and Syria.³

(2) Diaspora Communities

The role of 'Diaspora communities', like Jews, Kurds, Tamils, Basques in the international system is different from that of the resident ethnic groups. The responsibility of the international community towards ethnic issues is reinforced by the moral and physical support of the diaspora communities.

3. Terrorism

The enormous growth of terrorist activities in the past two decades is reflected in the increasing number of political assassinations, incidents of bombing, hijacking, causing terror among the public. Conflicts which remain unresolved, fester in the international system causing a full-scale violence. "Separatist conflicts of this kind

3. D.L. Horowitz, "Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections", in Naomi Chazan, ed., Irredentism and International Politics (Colarado/London, 1991), p.9.

rage fiercely in many parts of the world from Northern Ireland, Spain and Corsica, to the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union, to the Punjab, Sri Lanka and the Philippines"⁴ making the peace process 'non-negotiable'. The most important task in the future would be to break the nexus between the violent terrorist group and their activities through common efforts by all states. More importantly, conflicts should be resolved before they spread to neighbouring countries.

4. Minority Rights

The protection of Minority Rights through the guarantee of human rights and the passive tolerance of differences appears to be, less a humanitarian pressure than a condition for the betterment of the international society. By declaring the year 1993, as the 'International Year for the World's Indigenous People', the United Nations Organization, is rightly working, for the protection of minority rights.

At its Forty-Fourth session in August, 1992 at Geneva, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of

4. Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorist Targets and Tactics: New Risks to World Order", Conflict Studies (London), no.236, December 1990, p.3

issues like racial discrimination, rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, economic, social and cultural rights. It has rightly recommended to give priority to the question of discrimination against women and to strengthen human rights.

Rights do not exist where the power to enforce these rights is absent. Michael Keating argues, the creation and enforcement of rights are more important than mere declarations. He says, "The power to enforce rights is essential for the existence of rights."⁶ Many nationalists Palestinians, Basques, Irish, Welsh people in Northern Ireland have come to the conclusion that there are no rights without 'political power'. Minority treaties should be signed to protect the interests of the groups and to give stability to the political settlements established by Peace Treaties.

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5. To know the proceedings see, UN Chronicle (New York), Vol.XXIX, no.4, December 1992, p.72.
 6. Michael Keating, "Minority Nationalism and the State: The European Case", in Michael Watson, ed., Contemporary Minority Nationalism (London, 1990), p.176.

5. Human Rights

Immanuel Kant was the first to recognize the close relationship between respect for Human Rights and Peace in his "Essay on Perpetual Peace." "If there is to be perpetual peace in a world of nation-states, the individuals who live in them must be free, their human rights might be respected."⁷

R.J. Vincent attempts to define human rights as, "rights that everyone has and everyone equally by virtue of their very humanity ... are grounded in an appeal to our human nature."⁸

Evolution of human rights differ in various countries. There is a disagreement between East and West countries on the above issue. Analysis of the state of human rights, particularly, regarding their massive violations, figure prominently in crisis areas such as the Middle East, South Africa, Central America to mention a few. Non-Governmental organizations and the world public opinion are increasingly engaged in promoting these rights in

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7. John P. Humphery, "Human Rights, The Necessary Conditions of Peace", International Relations, (London, The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies), vol.10, no.2, p.118.
8. R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge, 1986), p.13.

discovering the causes of and responsibilities for their violations.

Preparations to adopt the Declaration on the Rights of persons belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious Minorities at the world conference on Human Rights to be held in 1993 are on. This would be an important legal document, to the world community paving the way towards strengthening the international protection of the rights of minorities, and for overcoming negative historical experiences derived from ethnic persecution in different countries.

6. Refugees

There is an unprecedented number of world's citizens who are being made refugees as a result of ethnic conflicts, environmental disasters, hunger and poverty. The end of the cold war has brought refugees from Eastern European countries. The Gulf war had displaced thousands and left others homeless, their cities destroyed. Ethnic conflicts lead to the vast movements of population. In the Gulf war, an estimated 5 million became refugees according to UN sources. Anne-Christine d'Adesky calls the Gulf region, as the "fastest growing refugee situation in modern history."⁹

9. Anne-Christine d'Adesky, "Facing the Refugee Challenge", UN Chronicle (New York), vol. XXVIII, no.3, p.47.

All this is of great human concern since these 'new dimensions of migration' are causing, million worldwide to flee and suffer from hunger, poverty or political persecution. The need for reducing this 'population flow' demands an urgent need to restore civil rights and overcome the impact of dividing factors.

7. Conflict Resolution: The process of conflict resolution has gained a new momentum in recent years. The following principles are of primary significance in dialogue and cooperation between states:

- a) The principle of building up of the civil society.
- b) The principle of containing secessionist movements
- c) The principle of strengthening regional organisations to resolve issues.
- d) The principle of strengthening the UN.

(a) The principle of building up of the civil society

The concept of 'civil society' may be regarded as containing elements essential for the development of the liberal -democratic basis of modern or 'post-modern', socio-economic life.¹⁰

10. Robert F. Miller, ed., The Development of Civil Society in Communist Systems (Australia, 1992), p.2.

Habermasian conceptualizes civil society as,

the realm of society, lying outside the institutionalized political and administrative mechanism of the state, and the state-regulated part of the economy where people carry on their public oriented, social and economic activities. What makes it 'civil' is the fact that, individuals, citizens may freely organise themselves into smaller or larger groups/associations at various levels in order to pressurize the formal bodies of the state.¹¹

This is a primary step to achieve a civil society and transform the international political environment. Lack of civil society in the former Communist state produced destabilising factors which lead to the break down of the state.

(b) The principle of containing secessionist movement:

The international system can react to internal wars including secessionist war, in one of the three ways:

- i) by diffusion and encouragement
- ii) by reconciliation
- iii) by isolation and suppression.¹²

(c) The principle of strengthening regional organizations :

Javier Perez de Cuel'lar, in the Secretary General's Report on the working of the UN (Sep. 1990) said, "For

11. ibid, p.8.

12. Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement" International Organization (MIT Press), vol.44, no.3, Summer 1990, pp.345-6.

dealing with new kinds of security challenges, regional arrangements or agencies can render assistance of great value."¹³

All these days, the cold war prevented the development of a close relation between the Security Council and existing regional arrangements. The Security Council was paralyzed by the veto, and regional arrangements were used in the words of Inis Claude as "jurisdictional refugees providing pretexts for keeping disputes out of UN hands."¹⁴

The Stockholm Initiative for Global Security and Governance suggested a role for regionalism in collective security, and felt that an important contribution would be made by regional arrangements for collective security. Regional activity at the institutionalised level would be aimed at making practical arrangements and encourage new initiatives for economic and political cooperation, which

13. Benjamin Rivlin, "Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective Security and Conflict Resolution: A New Road Ahead"?, International Relations (London, The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies), vol.11, no.2, August 1992, p.97.

14. *ibid*, pp.95-96.

would harmonise different historical, ethnic, religious, and linguistic backgrounds.

(d) The principle of strengthening the U.N.:

The task of resolving the relationship of the state system with international organisation is obviously pressing and demanding in view of the changes in the beginning of the 1990s. There is a disparity in the global changes, peoples initiatives and the 'international institutions' where the conceptualization of independence, sovereignty and world order are called into question. Values, preferences and standards of behaviour have to be modified so as to manage future conflicts in a general situation of overwhelming interdependence and globalisation.

Rodolfo Stavenhagen has pointed to the shift in discourse which is occasioned by the impact on international society of Kurdish and other ethnic conflicts:

As the major ideological conflicts of the twentieth century fade into the background, conflicts of identity and values, that is protracted ethnic conflicts, will surely become more salient and more virulent. New focus of conflict management and resolution must be found. Ethnically defined non-state peoples (like the Kurds) are becoming new international actors as the traditional functions of the state become transformed. Third parties (whether

states or non-governmental organisations) become involved in ethnic conflicts. The international community and particularly, the regional are universal multilateral organisations, must rise to meet the challenge posed by ethnic groups in conflict.¹⁵

Conflict resolution and confidence building measures have now to cope with 'social conflict', arising out of diversification of ethnic identities that can threaten the future. Internationalisation of ethnic conflicts can be minimised only by negotiating in the beginning of the conflict before it develops external linkages. The international system cannot offer simple solutions once internationalisation of ethnic conflicts has been accomplished. Political actors on the international arena have to elaborate new ethnological doctrines and refine conceptual issues. This in turn requires the generation of new foreign and security policy options and a general movement towards "negotiable acceptance policies."

15. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Ethnic Conflicts and their Impact on International Society", International Social Science Journal (UNESCO, Paris), no.129, February 1991, p.130.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

The end of the cold war offers a unique opportunity to the Kurds for a progressive advance towards a historical change. Ever since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, in the name of political realism there has been a refusal to discard old concepts in relation to Kurdish demands for autonomy independence and sovereignty. The Great Powers have sought to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran and relegated the Kurdish programme of political change and transformation to the scarp heap of history. A powerful stimulus that may break fundamentally with the logic of historical pessimism has come from the Gulf war.

Although, the Kurds were promised their homeland by the Treaty of Sevres, their present situation exemplifies the difficulties associated with achieving political goals of national independence which challenges the existing ethnic stratification system in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. The political relevance of the Kurdish problem after the Gulf war leads to discarding particularistic approaches. The evolution of the Kurdish problem can be summarised as follows: (a) promise of statehood (b) improvement of political mobilisation through "revolution", "negotiations" and setting new priorities (c) relevance of the conflict in

the post-Gulf war period and (d) lastly, consolidation of Kurdish power through an overview of conceptual standpoints of different groups.

The practical inadequacy of present outcomes are ofcourse, recognised by different Kurdish parties and groups. In terms of Real Politik , the Kurds cannot overcome the pronounced military or power-political perspectives of Iraq or Turkey. If, however they adopt a model which takes advantage of systemic developments, they would be able to pursue a more coherent and common strategy for becoming a key element in the future peace structures in the Middle East. The extension and deepening of the electoral mechanism which the Kurds used on May 19, 1992 can go a long way towards strengthening legitimacy and extending grass root democracy in the region.

There might be serious problems and set backs but the challenge before the Kurdish leadership is to find a political solution that ensures their security by making optimum use of the leverage they have collectively.

Kurdish conflict can be made more functional if we maximize the benefits and minimize the costs. In the past, the conflict has been accompanied by dysfunctional costs: hostility, rigidity, violence and destruction. Severe injustice has been meted out by the exclusion of suffering peoples from participation in the political process.

Kurdish international perceptions and conflict behaviour in the past decades reflect a mixture of diverse tendencies. They have received both dire punishments and rewards from their host governments. The basic question after the Gulf war has to do with the American/western perceptions of the situation in Iraq. American scholarly and policy oriented discussion on the Kurdish issue is based on short range expectations and suggests that American policy will be based on the balance of opportunities and risks rather than on any conceptual scheme for supporting Kurdish ethno-nationalism.

Ultimately, the Kurdish leaders have to cope with the parameters of intense conflict relationships among Kurdish parties and groups. They have to relate themselves to the legitimising values of global and regional powers. Only then is it possible for a strong Kurdish ethnic group to emerge. The most striking aspect of the process of ethnic change in the post-Cold War world is a new sense of historical mission of the ethnic elites to promote their interests. Some general reflections on the prospects for Kurdish ethnic integration are in order: (1) The exacerbated security dilemma for the Kurds in Iraq after the Gulf war has challenged the "realist" wisdom which has prevailed earlier with many world powers including the United States. The historical record so far was that the "risks" of

addressing Kurdish rights effectively used to check and retard political action. The success of the effort to secure the withdrawal of Saddam Hussain from Kuwait, also helped to forge accountability obligations in favour of the Iraqi Kurds. This helped to locate the Kurdish problem outside the prevailing political and legal norms which has ignored the modus operandi for bringing the Kurdish polity into congruence with contemporary democratic accountability.

With the de ideologisation of international politics, issues like the Kurdish struggle have gained from what has been described as an "internal consensus ideology". The dynamics of Kurdish ethnic integration is not only helped by the overall defence self-determination, it is also aided by the present period of re-evaluation of civil society against the power-political postures and dogmas of state-centric policies.

In the face of tyrannical attacks on them in Iraq, Turkey or Iran, the Kurds were the earliest victims of what has now come to be known as "ethnic cleansing" in the context of the situation in Bosnia. The circumstantial determinants and daunting problems of poison gas attacks and destruction of villages may not have changed but there is a contingent factor which will affect the problematic fortune of the Kurds in a more hopeful direction.

With the end of ideological conflicts, conflicts of identity and values, that is protracted ethnic conflicts, will surely become more salient and more virulent. New forms of conflict management and resolution must be found. Since ethnically defined non-state peoples are becoming new international actors the functions of the state have to undergo accommodative changes. The international community should evolve a multi-pronged strategy which will involve regional and universal multilateral organisations to meet the challenges posed by ethnic groups in conflict.

The coercive relations imposed on the Kurds will increasingly come up against the "new regime of truth" which will challenge the insecurity and magnitude of destruction imposed on Kurdish civilians. It is possible to be cynical about the efforts of the United States in response to Iraq's aggression. But, it can be hardly denied that a profound transformation of political subjectivity took place when the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 688 on Iraqi territory for humanitarian help to the Kurds.

Legal principles which prohibit interference in the internal affairs of member states have hitherto prevented the U.N. system from extending support to 'non-state nations' like the Kurds. The efforts to create a 'safe-haven' for the Kurds in order to reverse the exodus, led to the emergence of a broader perspective and also societal

concerns. This has certainly contributed to the support of the international community for monitoring of the situation in order to minimise the use of coercive tactics against them.

The Kurdish movement as a form of popular mobilisation has primarily drawn upon charismatic leaders and militarisation with the help of regional rival states. The prolonged resistance in Iraq during the sixties and upto the mid-seventies had a highly uneven character. During this period on several occasions it seemed that the Kurds would achieve a measure of success which would have transformed the political terrain.

The inability of Iraq's Kurds to unify into a single organisation, under proper leadership continually undermined Kurdish military efforts and the group's ability to present a coherent and stable face to the outside world. It is essential to have a complete awareness of their history. This would lead to a realization of the fundamental need to strengthen the Kurdish national movement. The encouragement of accommodation and adjustment in inter-Kurdish issues would strengthen the appeal to international public opinion for support. Moreover, the Kurdish groups often confront the classic prisoner's dilemma, from which they find it difficult to extricate themselves.

A new deliberative process could however, help even a group like the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) led by Abdullah Ocalan. It is hard to envisage international and particularly western support for the PKK as long as it defines itself as Marxist-Leninist.

Besides, the support of Syria's President Asad, will become difficult given the new scenario of legitimization of the peace process in the Middle East.

There would be a real politik justification for Ocalan to develop a new axis of political alignment which would compensate for ideological obsolescence. A creative praxis for Kurdish independence must:

- (a) foster community values and shift the emphasis away from ideological values,
- (b) ensure that democratisation of political systems and processes is realised through concrete moves,
- (c) utilise to the maximum extent possible, the human rights issue to challenge the legitimacy of their antagonists while simultaneously projecting the Kurdish societal model as one which provides the opportunity for more extensive democratic control over all aspects of social life.
- (d) project Kurdistan as a "society of the future". For this, the Kurdish movement should move away from the ethos suggested by the "frustration-

aggression" hypothesis to the enhancement of the international conflict management processes and institutions.

Influential actors (leaders, political parties) among the Kurds will have to commit themselves normatively to the principles of non-violence and conciliation. In the post-Cold War period the operating consensus is in favour of pluralisation and democratisation. The Kurds must take advantage of the expansion of the international consultative process by being on the side of law-enforcement and peace-building at the regional and global level.

Presently, it would be inexpedient for the Kurdish movement to continue to formulate its demand for "Kurdistan" to be carved out of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. If they develop an explicitly normative theory, then a creative praxis for independence would provide autonomy of local and regional government in all Kurdish areas.

After the election in mid-May in the provinces of Northern Iraq, there would be little doubt in the minds of the Turkish authorities that the policies of Europe, USA, Russian and Japan was to support an independent Kurdish state whenever political circumstance permitted. This is bound to exacerbate the conflict within theory and the Middle East. It will also provide an impetus to the Kurdish national movement in Europe.

This may compel Turkey to become further involved in the political, military and economic affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan and in the state of Iraq itself.

Turkey's involvement in the Gulf War of 1991 with the approval of the West, Russia and Japan is one of the important changes in the Post-World War I history of the Middle East. It is the most profound geo-political and geo-strategic change in the Middle East brought about as a result of the Gulf War. If present developments continue, the Kurdish movement will have to reckon with the unravelling of the old political and ideological structures. Turkey is not only central to the new Kurdish scenario, but also unique in its relationship to the changes which have taken place in what was formerly called Soviet Central Asia.

Instead of extending past structures and concepts into the future, Kurdish priorities can be best achieved by a pragmatic school of thought which reduces military adventurism and uses negotiations in both bilateral and multilateral forums.

It is necessary to emphasise the relativity of ethnic conflict to the international environment and to what is considered expedient and just in the existing circumstances. Both the Kurdish "Pesh Merga" and the Urban Kurds have taken advantage of legal, cultural and psychological factors

to interact with concerned organisations (both official and non-official) to explore possibilities of mediation and conflict resolution.

Although the overall situation is unclear, it is not unreasonable to expect that sympathy expressed for the Kurds during 'Operation Desert Storm' or the 'new thinking' produced by Kurdish scholars from abroad (Institut Kurde in Paris) have led social scientists to develop an impressive research agenda on the Kurdish question.

Any discussion on the theoretical possibilities of mediation and conflict resolution should focus on the 'cultural specificities' and 'grass root participation'. It would be too optimistic to expect that an analytical model can be translated into recognisable mediatory procedures. There is, however, evidence that new approaches to peace-making can be built around the idea that negotiations can be successful when conflicts are "ripe" for resolution. It is here that analytical discussion provides an understanding of the parties' position in ethnicity-related conflicts and helps evolve suggestions for mediation and conflict-resolution.

Values and resources of peace-building, without strong ideological pronouncements would suggest that a balanced perspective can be achieved only in terms of

reciprocal restraint, security and cooperation. A political solution to ethnic conflict cannot be achieved in the absence of an atmosphere conducive to equitable political participation. There is always a 'security dilemma', in ethnic conflicts which is aggravated by the tendency to blame each other. The answers to the security dilemma are not obvious. It is only through, reciprocal restraint that the commitment to the standards of international behaviour can be maintained. In dealing with ethnic conflicts, the Question of national self-determination and accommodation of genuine demands of the long suppressed ethnic minorities have to be carefully considered.

An evolutionary approach, should take into account the problems of multi-ethnic states, which have to proceed with a decolonisation process and work out a new kind of relationship after recognising the validity and legitimacy of ethnic demands. The multitude of issues relating to the Kurdish programme of freedom cannot be addressed by aggressive stratagems if ethnic nationalism is not to destroy the vision of international harmony.

During the cold war, a spurious element in human rights enforcement has been the arbitrary response of the two blocks. Fortunately today, effective measures for promoting observance of human rights can be taken through shared leadership roles and by promoting an international

climate for pursuing human rights negotiations. The monitoring of human rights should not be recognised as a process which inevitably leads to the 'use of force'. The idealisation and implementation of human rights norms is a means of overcoming the pariah status of the Kurds. If ethnic conflicts are to lead to genuine devolutionary politics, both normative and empirical perspectives for the protection of human rights, are essential. This alone can reduce destructive violence which is overshadowing contemporary ethno-nationalist struggle.

The premise of human rights activism is consistent with the peace strategy which has been advanced in this study. With the improved world communication and information systems, the increasing recognition of political and cultural diversities ensure that 'human rights' is no longer an exclusively domestic issue.

The starting point for making decisions about policy concerning an ethno-nationalist movement is necessarily the demand to remedy injustice. It is easy to define and clarify the demand for justice. But, it is equally important to pool resources to advance the opportunities for influencing important regional and international actors. Both realism and idealism have to be combined in order to address policy priorities and agenda for negotiations in terms which reflect the realities of international

relations. A strident and aggressive Kurdish ethnic nationalism may generate socio-psychological forces which may outrun the elements of organisation and the capacity of governance of Kurdish society.

There are various factors upon which the possibility of peaceful modification of the status-quo depends. Peaceful change should include three types of changes which are basic to the peace process:

- (1) peaceful change in order to avoid war.
- (2) peaceful change to provide justice.
- (3) peaceful change for building a better world.

There seems to be very little probability that the Kurds will be able to eschew all violent manifestations. It is, however, possible to increase the sentiment in favour of peaceful change by inculcating values that exclude large scale violence.

The answer to the question whether it is realistic to develop a peace strategy for Kurdish ethnic nationalism may lie in details of feedbacks from other peace processes and the changes in domestic power structures in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria.

The delegitimation of genocidal policies, the control of regional arms races, modification in

international law and establishing relationships with ethnic movements are some ways in which international society can help preserve language and cultural identity of ethnic groups threatened by nation-states.

The conflicts in Bosnia, Cambodia, and South Africa suggest that the immediate task is to check the almost unimaginable loss of human life. We have to create conditions which will help in developing non-offensive alternatives. In the process we build up an international net work of cooperation.

The conclusions of our analysis unequivocally should strengthen the case for a "peace-strategy." The options open to the Kurds at the present historical point are limited. Public accountability and democratic participation can be used towards minimization of the impediments. The contemporary Kurdish movement is confused disorganised for it to strike a distinctive note of 'peaceful change' in its attitude to the outside world. The recent growth and gathering strength of the forces of democratic reform and the fact that the Middle East is no longer the arena for bloc-oriented, rival ideologies represents something entirely new. The Kurds can be beneficiaries of the new patterns and shapes that have begun to emerge on the international landscape.

In the light of the new found interest of the world community on the Kurdish issue, the success of a peaceful approach to the resolution of this (Kurdish) protracted conflict could serve as a great fillip to an orientation towards peace research among the social scientists as also an impetus to policy makers to find peaceful solutions to even complicated problems.

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APPENDICES

CHRONOLOGY

1. The Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10th August, 1920. The participants were Britain, the USA (observer), France, Italy, Armenia, Japan, Belgium, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Turkish and Kurdish delegations were accorded observer status. Under Article 62 of the treaty, local autonomy was to be accorded in Kurdish majority areas of Eastern Anatolia.
2. The Lausanne Treaty was signed on 21st July, 1923. The signatories were Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and Rumania. The emergence of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the defeat of the Greeks led to the signing of the above treaty. Kurdistan was divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the USSR.
3. The Royal Air Force in Iraq crushed Barzani's revolt in 1923 in the Kurdish north, most part of the province.
4. On 3rd March, 1924, the Turkish government banned all Kurdish schools, associations and public organizations.
5. In 1925 the League of Nations set a commission in favour of the Union of the three vilayets (Mosul, Baghdad and Basra) on historical and economic

grounds. The League of Nations sanctioned, the possession of Kurdish region to Iraq for a period of twenty five years with the recommendation, that the Kurds be granted cultural rights and a degree of autonomy.

6. In 1925 a major Kurdish revolt was launched against Kemal Ataturk's government.
7. The Treaty of Ankara was signed in 1926 by Britain, Iraq and Turkey. This has settled the frontier on a line that corresponded closely to that of the old Mosul Vilayet.
8. On 8th January, 1926, Mosul was attached to Iraq and came under British mandate against the wishes of local people.
9. The first Kurdish nationalist organisation the Keroyboun (Independence) Party was formed in Iran in the year 1927.
10. Turkey, Iran and Iraq signed the Saadabad Treaty on 8th July, 1937. Under Article 7, the formation of associations, organised or armed bands seeking to overthrow established institutions was banned.
11. The Democratic party of Kurdistan of Iran (KDPI) was founded by the Barzani family in August 1945.

12. The Kurdish Democratic party of Iraq (KDP) formed in the Kurdish Territory of Iraq in 1946.
13. The first Kurdish Republic proclaimed at Mahabad in Iran in 1946 under the Presidency of Qazi Mohammad. Kurdish National flag was hoisted in the town of Mahabad on 11th December 1945. Kurdish independence was proclaimed on 22nd January, 1946.
14. Iranian organisation Komala emerged in 1943 which then controlled Northern Iran. Under Soviet guidance, Komala was transformed into a new political party the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran in 1945.
15. In 1957 the Kurds of Syria formed the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria.
16. New government in Iraq came into power in 1958, under the leadership of Abdul Karim Kassen. He defined Kurds under the new constitution of Iraq as a country made of two peoples, the Arabs & Kurds. Kurds were given national rights within the constitution and the Democratic Party of Iraq was legalised.
17. Kurds revolt as the Ba'ath Party came into power in Iraqi Kurdistan. New offensive began on the Kurds. On 10th June, 1963, the Arabization programme began which was extended in the Kirkuk area of Iraqi

Kurdistan, followed by the expulsion of Kurds by Iraqi government.

18. The democratic party of Turkish Kurdistan was founded by Faik Daccak and Sait Elci in 1966.
19. Mr. Talabani breaks away from the KDP in 1967.
20. The nine year Kurdish war of independence ends on 11th March, 1970 in Iraq, with the signing of a peace agreement.
21. In the 1970 election manifesto, the Baath Party has recognised the Kurdish movement and provided for autonomy. A plebiscite to declare Kurdish areas was proposed to be held in October 1970, which was never held.
22. On 11th March, 1974 Iraqi government announced autonomy law for Iraqi Kurdistan.
23. On 6th March, 1975, President Boumedienne of Algeria announced the truce between Iran and Iraq. Iran and Iraq signed an agreement (known as Algier Treaty) that completely eliminated the conflict between the two countries. Iran suspends aid to Kurdish rebellions.
24. Jalal Talabani, a member of the former KDP, forms the patriotic union of Kurdistan in Damscus in June 1975.

25. On 2nd March, 1979 the KDPI called for a public meeting, reaffirming the demands that Kurdish be made an official language, and a Kurdish parliament to be set up. However, negotiations between Iran and the Kurds broke down.
26. Iran-Iraq war ends in 1988. Iraq expels tens of thousands of Kurds in 1988. On March 16th, 1988 the town of Halabjah was obliterated by Iraqi army.
27. The Iraqi Kurdistan Front to represent Kurdish interests was formed in May 1988. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Kurdistan Democratic party, The Kurdish Socialist Party, The Party of Socialism in Kurdistan, The Islamic Party of Kurdistan, The Communist Party and lastly, the Kurdish Tribe society joined the front.
28. Iraqi Kurds numbering 60,000 sought refugee in Turkey following the Iraqi attacks that destroyed more than 3,000 mountain villages and killed nearly 5,000 people in a poisonous gas attack in 1988.
29. On 5th April, 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 688 expressing grave concern at the repression of the Iraqi civilian population following the revolt.

30. Iraq signed an agreement with UN to distribute relief aid to Kurdish refugees on 18th April, 1991. Later on, a 15-point agreement was reached between Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish leaders.
31. Under Operation Provide Comfort a 'safe-haven' for the Kurds in Northern Iraq was proposed. This was supported by USA, Britain, France and the Netherlands. The proposed safe haven was created North of the thirty-sixth parallel.
32. In January 1991, the Turkish government, abrogated the law forbidding the speaking of the Kurdish language.
33. On May 19th, 1992 elections were conducted in the autonomous provinces for the first time in Iraqi Kurdistan. Nearly one million Kurds participated in the election. All the political parties including the tribal leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan Front participated. They had to elect four candidates as leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan and 105 members for the National Assembly.
34. Results show, the Kurdish Democratic Party polled 45.5% and the patriotic union of Kurdistan polled 43.8%.

35. A meeting was convened in Vienna in 1992 to discuss Kurds problem. This was followed by the July 1992 meetings in Washington.

TABLE - 1

ESTIMATED KURDISH POPULATION IN 1990

Country	Population	After Gulf War
1. Turkey	10-12 million	4,00,000 refugees arrived
2. Iran	4 million	7,00,000 refugees arrived
3. Iraq	3 million	Upto 2 million flee
4. Syria	7 lakhs	Border closed
5. Soviet Union	1 lakh	-

Source: Times (London), 15th April 1991.


TABLE - 2
ELECTIONS FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN NORTHERN IRAQ
 (May 18th, 1992)

Party	Votes
1. Kurdish Democratic Party	4.55%
2. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	43.8%
3. Kurdish Socialist Party + Party of Socialism in Kurdistan	2.6%
4. Islamic Party of Kurdistan	5.1%
5. Kurdish Communist Party	2.2%
6. Assyrian Democratic Movement	Five Seats Allotted
7. The Kurdish Tribes Society	Not available

Minimum percentage of votes for presentation is 7% of the total votes polled.


Source: Current History (Philadelphia), January 1993.

KURDISTAN



SOURCE : NATIONAL GEOGRAPHICS (NEW YORK),
AUGUST 1992.

ESTIMATED APPROXIMATE
DISTRIBUTION OF KURDS.



SOURCE: MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP
The Hindu (HYDERABAD),
May 31, 1992.

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