

**TINANMEN SQUARE MASSACRE AND THE ISSUE
OF HUMAN RIGHTS : U. S. PERCEPTION**

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DECLARATION

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "Tinanmen Square Massacre And the Issue of Human Rights : U.S. Perception" Submitted by Mr. Uday Pratap Singh in Partial fulfilment of the **Master of Philosophy (M.phil.)** in Jawaharlal Nehru University, is a product of the student's own work, carried out by him under my supervision and guidance.

It is hereby certified that this work has not been presented for the award of any other degree or diploma by any University in or outside India and may be forwarded to the examiners for evaluation.


(R.P. Kaushik)
Chairperson


(R.P. Kaushik)
Supervisor

For my mother

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PREFACE

The havoc played by the First and Second World War brought about a change as to how the world thought of Individual in the International System.

The United Nations charter explicitly listed human rights as a principle concern of the new organization. In 1946, the U.N. commission on Human Rights was established, and in 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights treats civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights in a single document without categorical distinctions. But the Cold War rivalry broke down the consensus. The US criticized violations of civil and political rights in Soviet-bloc countries, while condoning violations of the same right in countries friendly to US. The Soviet Union emphasized the denial of economic, social and cultural rights in the West, but denigrated the importance of civil and political rights at home. One observes, that during cold war, states lost their traditional immunity from international scrutiny of their human rights practices.

American concern for human rights on a global scale was first expressed soon after the second World War, when the U.S. played a major role in the development of human rights program for the United Nations. President Franklin Roosevelt in his January 6, 1941 State of the Union Message said that he looked forward to a world order founded upon "four essential freedoms", such as, freedom of speech and expression, from want and freedom, from fear of aggression and that these freedoms were to prevail every-where

in the world. President Truman named Eleanor Roosevelt the member of American delegation at the first organizing session of the UN General Assembly. Later she was elected as Chairperson of the newly established permanent "UN Commission on Human Rights". She was instrumental in formulating UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. But with the commencement of Cold War, US human rights policy remained limited to the containment of Soviet Union and its allies. During the cold war years US did not ratify any major human rights treaties.

The Vietnam War, as it dragged into the 1970's, brought the change in US perception of human rights. The tragic war helped produce a decoupling of human rights from security policy in U.S. foreign policy. The issue of Watergate when added to the trauma of Vietnam, caused the congress to assert itself on foreign policy. The result was a renewed interest in internationally recognized human rights as a separate issue. In the following years congress enacted a number of legislations in the field of human rights and foreign policy. During the presidency of Carter the issue of human rights moved to the centre stage of American foreign policy. But during the presidency of Ronald Reagan the issue of human rights became secondary to the US security interests which seemed threatened by the growing influence of Soviet Union. But the issue of human rights has once again bounced back on the main agenda of US foreign policy in the 1990's.

US ignored the chinese violations of human rights, whereas it was more vocal about the violations of human rights in Soviet Union and other communist countries. China was considered by the US as an important ally in the containment of Soviet Union. But with

the end of cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union as a formidable challenge to American power, the importance of China also suffered a set back. The brutal suppression of democracy movement in China, in the spring of 1989, sharply changed the American views of Chinese human rights. The US took a number of harsh steps to show its displeasure of the Chinese conduct of their human rights. The Tinanmen incident raised a lot of hue and cry in the American public and congress. But the US administration under President Bush, though took some harsh steps to show its displeasure, tried to maintain friendly relations with China. The US administration thinks that China is still important to US in the post Cold War World. It is a nuclear power and has a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. It is also important to US interests in the Asia/Pacific region. Moreover, US has also got vital economic interests in China. US is the largest foreign investor in China; the Chinese economy is very closely linked to that of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong; it is also important to US in counter balancing Japanese influence in Asia. Finally, we find that US national interest took a precedence over human rights in its relations with China.

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CHAPTER - 1

INTRODUCTION - UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE BACKGROUND

This issue of Human rights has been an abiding concern for the US people and their government. However, the use of this issue in the specific area of foreign policy, has generated a substantial degree of controversy over the placing of moral principles, including respect for human rights, in the process of decision making.

Before the Second World War, human rights were not considered a legitimate subject for international action. How states treated their own nationals in their own territory was considered a prerogative of national sovereignty and thus "the business of no one else".¹ Human rights were not even mentioned in the covenant of the League of Nations. In the inter-war period, human rights practices of states were officially discussed only in a few international forums such as the, International Labour Organisation. Post war thinking reflected the concern over the horrors of the Holocaust and led to significant changes in the international response.

For instance, the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials prosecuted individuals on the unprecedented charge of "crimes against humanity". The United Nations Charter explicitly listed human rights as a principal concern of the new organisation.

In the US, the years 1940-1948, were identified with the

1. Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights in the New World Order" World Policy Journal (New York), Spring 1992, p. 250.

proclamation of four freedoms in 1941 by President Roosevelt. The idealistic mood persisted in a diminished form for several years after Roosevelt's death in 1944. American concern for human rights on a global scale was first expressed soon after World War II, when the United States played a major role in the development of a human rights program for the United Nations. As a member of the American delegation to the United Nations, Eleanor Roosevelt was a significant contributor to the substance of United States human rights policy and an effective executor of it in the United Nations.² As the first Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Mrs. Roosevelt was instrumental in formulating that body's strong human rights declaration in the 1940's. When the final draft of the Universal Declaration came out in June 1948, it closely paralleled the thinking of the United States government, of thirty nine positions advocated by the United States at the last session, dealing with thirty three proposed articles, twenty seven were accepted completely and two in part.³ On the other hand the year 1948 also initiated a waning phase in the human rights cycle as it was the year that marked the beginning of the cold war in earnest epitomised by the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, which offered economic and military aid to the Greek and Turkish governments to support their struggles against communist encroachment.

2. A. Glenn Mower, Jr., The United States, The United Nations, and Human Rights: The Eleanor Roosevelt and Jimmy Carter Eras (Connecticut, 1979), p. 1.

3. Ibid., p. 47.

The period from 1948 to 1960, consisting of four Truman years and eight Eisenhower years, was dominated by cold war stridency. An important domestic backlash to the liberal international outlook of the "New Deal" occurred during this time. One aspect of this backlash was its attack on any abridgements of American sovereignty. Human rights obligations were seen as encroaching upon the United States constitution and upon the "residual sovereignty" of the forty eight years. Senator John Bricker, a conservative Republican from Ohio, working in conjunction with various pressure groups, led a fight to prevent the Ratification of human rights treaties, including the "Genocide Convention". The Bricker efforts were so successful that by 1953, the Eisenhower administration abandoned any effort to increase the promotion of human rights by the United States, and indeed until 1960 no further efforts to strengthen international human rights by way of treaty obligation were made by either the President or the Congress.⁴

Secretary of State Dulles was the most characteristic figure of the period, devoting his energies to building a global network of anti-communist treaty arrangements and abandoning any serious effort to promote human rights except in the ideological sense of claiming that the anticommunist group of states constituted the "free world" in distinction to the totalitarian realm constituted by the Soviet bloc, which was assumed in that period to be a monolithic system completely

4. Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York, 1981), p. 12.

subject to the will of the Kremlin. In such an adversary climate, the stress on geopolitics and military approaches to security dominated the foreign policy process.⁵

Kennedy presidency was a period of expansive international liberalism typified by the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress, and global involvement in the internal affairs of foreign societies. The United States under Kennedy was perceived as an "idealistic force" in international society, despite such contradictory features as anti-Castro interventionary tactics and the escalating involvement in the Vietnam War. After Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon Johnson pressed forward on civil rights for blacks, although such developments as the Dominican intervention of 1965 and government moves to intimidate domestic antiwar activities tarnished the Johnson image. Nevertheless, the Kennedy-Johnson period from 1960 to 1968, can be viewed as a positive period in terms of support for human rights.⁶

The inauguration of Richard Nixon as president in 1968 brought a reversal of mood in American foreign policy that was also expressed as a downward turning point in human rights.⁷

5. Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights, The United States, and World Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

6. Robert A. Pakenhan, Liberal America and The Third World (Princeton, 1973), p. 24.

7. Arthur Scheslinger, Jr., "Human Rights and The American Tradition" Foreign Affairs (New York), No. 57, 1978, p. 506.

According to some scholars the Nixon years premised on inter-governmental relations that generally accepted the legitimacy of territorial sovereignty and exhibited a notable insensitivity to the rights of the citizens whether at home or abroad. The pursuit of human rights, even in the communist countries, was largely ignored in this period, which is exemplified by Nixon's China initiative and his coordinated effort to achieve detente in relations with the Soviet Union. Kissinger, the dominant presence in American foreign policy during the Nixon-Ford years, was openly scornful of introducing human rights concerns into serious diplomacy, treating such concerns as moralistic encumbrances upon the serious business of negotiating stable arrangements of state power⁸. This was evident in the United Nations, where the United States, during Patrick Moynihan's tenure as ambassador, stridently used human rights as an ideological tool against the Third World in an effort to dilute the anti apartheid campaign. Minor counter currents were evident even during this time, such as Nixon's support, although quite bland for the ratification of the Genocide convention as well as moves to protect individuals and societies from unofficial international terrorism.

But despite this adverse trend at the presidential level, an important counter trend took hold in Congress during the 1970's. David P. Forsythe remarked that "the concern for the -----

8. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New York, 1969), p. 6.

place of human rights in United States foreign policy was only part of a growing assertiveness by the Congress about many aspects of the foreign policy."⁹ From 1970 to 1975, Congress ended United States involvement in the Vietnam war, passed the War Powers Act over the presidential veto, blocked CIA's involvement in Angola, instigated an arms embargo against Turkey for its policies in Cyprus, established some control over intelligence activities, and moved in other ways to legislate foreign policy in opposition to an unwilling President. The Watergate scandal further emboldened the legislature. Human rights lay at the centre of its renewed concern. Reawakened consciousness for human rights was due to the hearings chaired by Donald Fraser, chairman of the subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs committee to examine the role of the United States government in the protection of international human rights. He was moved perhaps by a sense of moral destitution resulting from American involvement in Vietnam and Chile, by the amorality of the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford administration.¹⁰ Of special merit was the report entitled "Human Rights and the World Community: A call for United States leadership," which resulted from the original hearings on human rights and United States foreign policy

9. David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy : Congress Reconsidered (Gainsville, 1988), p. 11.

10. Laurie S. Wiseberg and Harry M. Scoble, "Monitoring Human Rights Violators: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations" in Donald P. Kommers and Gilbert D. Loescher, ed; Human Rights and American Foreign Policy (Notre Dame, 1979), p. 178.

held by Congressmen Donald Fraser's House Subcommittee on International Organization in 1974. This report contained recommendations for increasing the priority given to human rights in United States foreign policy and for strengthening the United Nations and other international organizations working in the field of human rights. The congressional mood also reflected the conviction arising in response to the Vietnam experience. That it was not sensible foreign policy to support foreign governments just because they were anti-communists and that in an era of detente, it was again possible to insist upon some moral content in American foreign policy. In the view of many, such an insistence was in part an aspect of Congressional assertiveness in the foreign policy domain after a decade of relative passivity in deference to the prerogatives of the imperial presidency during the Vietnam war.¹¹

The US Congress from 1973, moved slowly but steadily to interject human rights into United States foreign policy considerations. Congress enacted legislation in the field of human rights and foreign policy. Through a series of statutes linking foreign assistance or trade benefits to the status of human rights in foreign countries, congress laid the basis for the future human rights policy. Thus in 1973, Foreign Assistance Act, Section 32, declared in the "sense of the Congress" that the economic and military assistance should be denied to foreign governments which imprison their citizens

11. Richard Falk, N. 4, p. 14.

for political reasons.¹² In 1974, section 502B to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was added, which declared the "sense of the Congress that no security assistance would be given to regimes displaying a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights, unless president certifies extraordinary circumstances so required" it applied to military training, to transfer of crime control equipment and to economic support funds. But due to the reluctance of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to acknowledge congressional signals on this subject, and despite the election of Jimmy Carter, Congress made this linkage legally binding in 1978 by revising the long and complex act.¹³ According to Donald Fraser "Congress has placed especially stringent standards on military aid because of the symbolic and sometimes practical importance of such assistance in carrying out repressive policy in numerous countries."¹⁴

It also passed Harkin amendment on section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended) which again declared a "sense of congress that, no economic assistance to regimes displaying a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized human rights would be given,

12. Foreign Relations and Intercourse, United States Code Annotated (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company), Title 22, 17th December, 1973, p. 321.
13. United States Code Annotated, N. 12, p. 2304.
14. Donald M. Fraser, "Congress Role in the Making of International Human Rights Policy "in Donald P. Kommers and Evilburt S. Loescher, ed., Human Rights and American Foreign Policy (Notre Dame, 1978).

unless assistance will directly benefit needy people. It also applies to OPIC insurance and to PL480 and transfer of agricultural commodities.¹⁵ Congress enacted this legislation under the Nixon and Ford administration because of the belief that in certain nations, particularly Chile and South Korea, the administration was using economic aid to prolong the staying power of regimes more than to provide help to the needy people.

In 1974, at the peak of congressional assertiveness in foreign policy, it passed what is generally referred to as the "Jackson-Vanik amendment" to the Trade Reform Act of 1974, which prohibits, inter alia, the granting of most favoured nation treatment to non-market economy countries that deny or restrict the right of their citizens to emigrate.¹⁶

One important human rights provision was inserted in the International Financial Institution Act (PL 95 - 118) in 1977. The United States delegates to the various international financial institutions were instructed to oppose any loan to government engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, unless the loan will provide for the basic human needs of citizens of that country.¹⁷ Fraser says "The

15. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.; Congress Quarterly Inc.), 31 Annual, 1975, p. 335-343.

16. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, N. 15, 1974, p. 16, 557-559.

17. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, N. 15, 1977, p. 22.

amendment was a compromise between those who wanted certain automatic negative votes by the United States delegates to repressive governments unless the aid was directly beneficial to needy people and those who wanted to provide greater flexibility to the administration and not require negative voting."¹⁸

The revised section 502B of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 made the promotion of human rights standards an explicit goal of United States foreign policy. It instructed the president to formulate military and economic aid programs to promote human rights and to avoid identification with repressive regimes. It provided for the termination or the restriction of security assistance to governments which consistently violate the human rights of their citizens. It also made it mandatory for the State Department to file complete reports on the human rights situation in every country receiving US security assistance.

United States Export-Import Bank was also to take human rights considerations into account in its policies when such action clearly advanced United States interests.

The Congress also enacted legislation concerning specific countries. Such legislations were enacted during the Ford administration and continued under later administrations. In

18. Donald M. Fraser, N. 14, p. 248.

1975, a one year ceiling was placed on military aid to South Korea. In 1976, Congress renewed the ban and ceiling on security and economic assistance to Chile, and it prohibited military aid to Uruguay in the same year. President Ford refused to cut aid to such human rights violators as Argentina, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Peru and the Philippines, however.

It should be noted that this considerable congressional interest did not lead toward stronger role by the United States for promoting and protecting human rights. For instance, according to one study, no human rights treaties were ratified during this time, no voluntary funds were voted for special United Nations protection efforts, the Inter American Commission on Human Rights was not strengthened. Nevertheless the Congress passed both general and country's specific legislation on human rights.

As a result of Congressional pressure, the State Department requested its embassies in countries receiving United States aid, to prepare reports on human rights conditions in accordance with the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act. In addition, it instructed its ambassadors to explain the new prohibitions to government guilty of violations of human rights. It also set up rudimentary machinery to strengthen human rights organisation in the department. It promoted the lone occupant of the human rights desk to Deputy Director for Human Rights Affairs; assigned a second officer in the Intelligence Organisation Bureau to human rights issues; and

appointed an Assistant Legal Advisor for human rights. Significantly, the department designated human rights officers in each regional or geographic bureau who were to be responsible for bilateral relations, and in some functional bureaus, such as policy planning, security assistance, congressional relations and the Agency for International Development or AID. Finally in 1975, the department created the office of coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, with overall responsibility for human rights and refugee matters.¹⁹

Several researchers concluded however that the impact of this new machinery on foreign policy had turned out to be minimal. Two main obstacles impeded its influence. For example, none of the human rights officers designated were senior level officers, who could guarantee that human rights factors would be given adequate consideration in policy planning. Further others in regional bureaus were not even expected to devote full time to human rights.²⁰ Though the most powerful obstacle was the low priority given to human rights by the Secretary of State. A most dramatic example is when the Secretary publicly rebuked the United States Ambassador to Chile for raising human rights issue in private military aid

19. Foreign Affairs Manual Circular, Organizations and Functions. Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, vol. 1, no. 700, 24 June, 1975, p. 45. also, J. Salzberg and D.D. Young, "The Parliamentary International Human Rights: A U.S. Example" Texas International Law Journal Spring/Summer 1977, p. 270.

20. D. Fraser, "Freedom and Foreign Policy" Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.), No. 2, Spring 1977.

discussions with Chilean officials.²¹ Nevertheless, the predominant initiatives for advancing human rights originated with and were carried out by the Congress. It was Congress which reduced United States military assistance to Chile, Uruguay and South Korea on human rights grounds.

The passage of human rights legislation in the mid 1970's indicated growing popularity with human rights measures. Jimmy Carter played on that swing in mood in his successful 1976 campaign. President Carter distinguished himself immediately from his predecessors by making the human rights policy the most visible and vocal aspect of his foreign policy. He repudiated the arguments put forward by previous administrations to justify their non action on human rights issues. He argued that United States has both a legal right and responsibility under the United Nations Charter and international law, to speak out against human rights violations. He told the United Nations that "no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business ... All signatories of the United Nations Charter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights."²²

Carter also rejected the Kissinger argument of realpolitik by affirming that his administration would press for human rights goals simultaneously with and independent efforts to -----

21. New York Times, 27 September, 1974.

22. New York Times, Text of the President's Commencement address at the University of Notre Dame, 18 March, 1977.

meet political, economic, and military goals. The most striking manifestation of his position was the President's human rights offensive against the Soviet Union while preparations were in progress for US-Soviet talks on Strategic Arms Limitations. President Carter also made it clear that even if the human rights commitment strains bilateral relations the United States will not back down on its pledge.²³

President Carter also asserted that a foreign policy based on what he called the "Fundamental American Values" will serve the United States' national interests. In an abrupt departure from the past, the state department denounced the communist government in Czechoslovakia for harassing intellectuals agitating for liberal reforms. It also sent a series of sharp protests to Moscow on behalf of Soviet dissidents. The President and Secretary of State publicly condemned human rights abuses in Cuba, the U.S.S.R., Uganda and South Korea. The administration announced military aid cuts to Argentina, Uruguay and Ethiopia on human rights issues. The State department released human rights reports on eighty two countries receiving United States military aid. The President announced his intention to seek Senate ratification of United Nations and Organization of American States human rights treaties and made proposals before each body to further human rights.²⁴

23. Ibid, 2 February; 1977.

24. Ibid, "Text of President Carter's Address to the Permanent Council of the Organisation of American States," 15 April, 1977.

An explicit claim was made that relations with both allies and adversaries would be shaped by human rights considerations. But as one study observed, "From the Outset the tension between human rights aspirations and geopolitical goals was evident, with the latter normally given priority".²⁵

A retrospective look at the Carter administration however seemed to denote a double standard, one for the countries with strategic and economic importance to the United States and the other for countries of more marginal interests to the United States.²⁶ While United States had cut aid to Argentina, Uruguay and Ethiopia, pursued the issue of human rights violations in Brazil, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, it did not recommend reductions for South Korea, Philippines and Iran or Saudi Arabia, where the United States had obvious economic interests of major proportions. It also did not press the subject of human rights in places like China, Rumania, Yugoslavia, countries which were important to United States for the containment of Soviet influence.

Strong objections were voiced by those governments against whom the power was directed. Brazil cancelled its mutual defense agreement with the United States, while other Latin American countries repudiated future United States military aid. The USSR warned that continued human rights criticism

25. Robert A. Pakenhan, N.6, p.24. also Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices : Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York, 1983), p. 33.

26. Time, 7 March, 1977.

would jeopardize the SALT talks. Uganda threatened the safety of resident Americans after the United States condemned Ugandan human rights practices.

In 1977 the Carter administration made it a top priority to "role back" the Byrd amendment, which permitted the importation of Rhodesian chromium and placed the United States in violation of United Nations mandatory sanctions on white minority rule in that former British colony. But the Congress through its voting showed a desire to return to economic sanctions in support of human rights. Also while Carter accepted the abstract idea of socio-economic human rights and signed the United Nations treaty on the subject, he opposed Congress when it sought to link human rights to loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.²⁷

Congress during Carter period prohibited all forms of military aid, including military training to Argentina during the early period of Carter administration. Three other countries in addition to Argentina were prohibited from receiving military aid by the Congress following their government's decisions to renounce military aid, namely Guatemala, El Salvador and Brazil. Congress also cut back the military grant and aid intended for the Phillipines.

On the other hand, at the initiative of the President and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, human rights machinery was established in the Executive branch to institutionalise and -----

27. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, N. 15, 1977, p. 22.

implement human rights. Staff members in the White House and National Security Council were assigned human rights issues. National Security Advisor Brzezinski had directed a staff member in the Council's office of "global issues" to focus on human rights. In the White House, a public relations officer was appointed as liaison with non-government groups and the public. The President appointed the first Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Patricia Derian, in August 1977. The policy planning staff in the Department of State was directed to formulate broad human rights, while geographic bureaus were instructed to develop strategy papers on the key human rights problems in their areas. An Inter agency Committee on Human rights and Foreign Assistance was created within the State Department, and the office of the coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was enlarged and upgraded. Responsible to the Deputy Secretary of State, it consisted of representatives at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level from all regional and functional bureaus whose work related to human rights. The Committee examined the human rights aspects of all Agency for International Development's budgetary program decisions and the United States position on loans awaiting action in the international financial institutions. A working group co-chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights reported to this committee. The bureau also participated in the work of the Arms Exports Control Board, which made recommendations on security assistance overseas. The Foreign Service Institute began its first human rights training

course. Finally, human rights officers were dispatched to embassies abroad.

While there was concern that, "In some ways Congressional Presidential differences were reduced during the Carter years concerning what to do about human rights",²⁸ yet the zig zag nature of Carter's foreign policy confused his potential supporters and alarmed his opponents who thought he was sacrificing vital security interests in Latin America, the Persian Gulf and East Asia. The seizure of American hostages in Iran and the Soviets' involvement in Afghanistan gave political ammunition to Carter's critics. The mood in America at that time laid emphasis on the American power and security as traditionally understood.²⁹

Reagan came to power in the wake of the second cold war and changed US overall policy drastically, wanting to increase security assistance to anticommunist countries. Reagan's policy was supportive of the following points—firstly, the focus of evil in the world is the Soviet Union and the United States must keep that idea central in every phase of its central policy; secondly, all communist totalitarian regimes are worse than merely authoritarian regimes because the latter can evolve in a humane direction whereas the former

28. David P. Forsythe "Human Rights : Realism, Radicalism Reform," in American Foreign Policy in an Uncertain World (Lincoln, Nebraska : University of Nebraska, 1984), p. 286.

29. Sandy Vogelgesang, American Dream, Global Nightmare (New York, Norton, 1980).

cannot; thirdly, all human rights violations will be opposed, but authoritarian allies of the United States will be shown special consideration and will be dealt with quietly in the light of communist threats; finally, that there are no such things as socio-economic rights.³⁰ For instance, it was the only government in 1981 to vote against non-binding guidelines on the marketing of infant formula; it seemed as if the right of the Nestle Corporation to seek profits took precedence over any attempt by the World Health Organization to protect children in the third world.

From 1981 to 1984, Congress repeatedly passed legislation requiring the President to make a certification every 180 days that progress was being made on specific human rights matters if economic and security assistance was to continue to El Salvador.³¹ But El Salvador was not the only Country targeted for country specific legislation by Congress. When in the 1980's the Reagan administration asked Congress to repeal the ban on arms sales to authoritarian Chile, Congress consented after much acrimonious debate. But it again required the president to certify progress on specific human rights matters. Congress also voted for presidential certification of progress on specific human rights matters regarding Nicaragua, Haiti and Argentina. It seemed that the

30. Thomas J. Farer, "Exaggerating the Communist Menace" in Abdul S. Said, ed., Human Rights and World Order (New Brunswick : Transaction Books, 1978), p. 136-143.

31. U.S. Foreign Policy The Reagan Imprint (Washington D.C; Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986), p. 9-10.

diplomacy of the Reagan administration would emphasize the importance of any progressive steps taken by the authoritarian allies of the United States. On the other hand the administration tended to overlook progressive steps in leftist Nicaragua. This double standard seemed clear when Reagan enlisted Turkey, then under martial law, to help criticize communist martial law in Poland.³²

But one of the more controversial positive approaches to human rights development was Project Democracy. Congress approved in 1983 a program to promote democracy around the world. The purpose of the project was to help build the infra-structure for democracy but not to support particular political parties or candidates and not to try to affect the outcome of any particular election. A bipartisan board, technically private in nature, dispensed funds to private groups in a supposed public process. Project Democracy funds were administered separately from AID funds, which went for essentially the same cause under section 116(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act.³³

Three Communist countries had achieved most favoured nation trade status by the mid 1980's. Rumania was named by Ford administration, and the Carter administration added Hungary and China to the list of non-market economies with reasonable

32. David P. Forsythe, American Foreign Policy in an Uncertain World, N. 28, p. 283.

33. Congressional Records (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1983).

emigrations. Waivers for all these three countries were renewed by Reagan administration.

The second Reagan administration resembled the Carter administration, it moved incrementally toward more balanced position on human rights.³⁴

It was obvious that the broad human rights had not disappeared along with Jimmy Carter's administration. The Reagan administration entered Washington with the view that human rights should be treated almost exclusively as an issue of the East-West struggle. Both the Democratic and the Republican Senate continued to show strong interest in human rights around the world, not just in Communist states. Private human rights groups were active, and the interest of the public was also aroused. Popular support for intervention was noticeably less where the government was not democratic.

Bush administration's handling of human rights was very much similar to that of Reagan's. Though the cold war had ended and there was no excuse to support the authoritarian regimes which were violators of human rights, the Bush administration did not give much support to the human rights; political, strategic and economic importance out weighed human rights as the central issue in the foreign policy. The irony of the Gulf War is an obvious example: the United States was

34. Patricia Derian, "How to Make Dictators Look Good" The Nation (Washington, D.C.), 9 February 1985, p. 148.



perfectly willing for political expediency, to join an alliance with an old enemy and human rights abuser, Syria, in order to liberate the personal kingdom of the Al-Sabah family.³⁵ Another example, is of states such as Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Phillipines, Kenya and Guatemala which receive or have received millions of dollars in aid from the United States and their human rights conditions were as bad or worse than those in Syria.³⁶

One observer commented that "Like his predecessors, Bush administration has failed to translate an abstract verbal commitment to human rights into a coherent human rights policy."³⁷ Beneath the fine sounding rhetoric, Bush in practice combined vilification of the latest American enemy (Saddam Hussein having replaced Ayatollah Khomeini and the Soviets) with embarrassing docility towards countries such as Syria and China, which are perceived to be strategically significant. In the opinion of some, collective action by the international body against tyrants such as Saddam Hussein cannot compensate for years of international indifference to such a regime's rampant human rights abuses, or undo massive transfers of military equipment by western powers. Nor does

35. Christopher P. Carney, "Human Rights, China and U.S. Foreign Policy: Is a New Standard Needed?" Asian Affairs (Washington), Vol. 19, No. 3, Fall 1992, p. 123.

36. United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices For 1989, 90, 91 (Washington, D.C.)

37. Jack Donnelly, N. 1, p. 250.

American pressure to take military action against Saddam Hussein in any way excuse the Reagan and Bush administrations for providing billions of dollars worth of economic support to the dictator or their shockingly indulgent diplomatic relations with the regime.³⁸

Washington was Sudan's major backer from 1969 through 1985, viewing it as a counterweight to Libya and Soviet backed Ethiopia. Between 1975 and 1985, the U.S. provided \$ 1.5 billion in economic and military aid. Non humanitarian assistance to the government of Sudan was halted only in February 1990. In fact, some critics have charged that the Bush administration acted only after, and in large measure because Sudan backed Iraq in the Gulf War. On the other hand in the United States' intervention in northern Iraq, United States has gone to extraordinary lengths on behalf of Iraq's Kurds. Though far more Sudanese have perished and are at risk than Kurds. The security zone in northern Iraq owes its existence largely to political and not to humanitarian or human rights considerations.³⁹

In the case of China, which is engaged in dangerous activities, like selling nuclear material essential to the creation of weapons of mass destruction to dangerous and abusive regimes in the world like Iran, Syria and Pakistan,

38. Holly Burkhalter, "Moving Human Rights to Center Stage" World Policy Journal (New York), Summer 1992, p. 420-421.

39. Michael Clough, Free At Last? U.S. Policy Towards Africa and the End of the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992).

Burma and Cambodia flaunting international efforts to isolate and stigmatize them.⁴⁰ Further, it repressed the movement at Tiananmen Square and continued the same policy. But despite such grave violations of human rights by China, the Bush administration vetoed the legislation of the Congress to attach human rights conditions to the renewal of most - favoured - nation trade status of China.

In Africa throughout the 1980's, the top five recipients of United States' foreign assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa-Zaire, Kenya, Somalia, Liberia and the Sudan have been countries where human rights violations have continued to rise. Yet U.S. has failed to claim any responsibility for human rights violations. United States has been reluctant to intervene in Yugoslavia to protect human rights whereas this was not the case with Iraq.

Currently after a decade of Republican presidencies, the democrats under Bill Clinton have to come to power, Clinton, is expected to follow Carter's human rights approach in foreign policy. His secretary of State Warren Christopher was Deputy Secretary of State under Jimmy Carter. During his election campaign, Clinton laid emphasis on human rights and criticised the manner in which Bush handled the Communist China. But it is too early to evaluate the human rights policy as there is a great difference between rhetoric and reality.

40. Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Document, 1990, p. 696.

CHAPTER-2

TINANMEN SQUARE MASSACRE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

US had long overlooked the violations of human rights in China, whereas it had used all its machinery to criticise human rights violations in the Soviet Union. China was considered by the US administration as an important bulwark against Soviet Russia since 1971, which was its (US) main enemy during the cold war years. But with the coming of Gorbachev and the detente, China lost its strategic importance to the US to some extent. At such a critical time when the whole of the communist world was experiencing a wave of democratic movements inspired by the Soviet President Gorbachev's policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, Communist China also faced the democratic upsurge. The events that took place from March to June 1989, shook the Chinese government, which retaliated with brutal force. This time the action was watched by millions of viewers on television and a wave of resentment against Chinese authorities was felt all over the world. The military crackdown was on unarmed peaceful demonstrators (mostly students) who had come out to Tiananmen Square demanding political reforms and protesting against the rampant corruption in the Communist Party. Tiananmen Square became the focal point of the protest movement and a symbol of people's aspirations for democratic rights, and on the other hand, a symbol of brutal force to suppress any dissent. China had launched bold economic reforms after 1978 that went far beyond anything being attempted in the Soviet Union or

Eastern Europe. Rural Collectivization was initiated; the role of the state sector and central planning was reduced; the country was opened to foreign investment and tourism; students were sent abroad for training; special export processing zones were set up; and experiments with private enterprise and stock markets were initiated.¹ But China's reformers under Deng Xiaoping pursued economic reforms but were blocking political ones. "China in early 1989 was a tinderbox of suppressed anger, mounting despair and corrosive envy."² Many Chinese were highly skeptical that the current leadership was capable of leading the nation out of its morass of corruption, double digit inflation, stalled economic reform and a perceived breakdown in social order. Nowhere was this potent combination of dissatisfaction and despair more evident than on China's University campuses.

New York Times had reported that "limited form of democracy appears to be sprouting again in China, drawing impetus from new class wealthy entrepreneurs and communist party itself."³ there appeared to be growing support for political liberalisation modelled somewhat on Soviet reforms. In a gathering in February 1989, at Beijing, young artists and

1. Martin King Whyte, "Prospects For Democratization in China" Problems of Communism (Washington D.C.) No. June 1992, P. 58.
2. Han Minzhu, ed., Cries For Democracy : Writings And Speeches From The 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey, 1990), p.5.
3. New York Times, February 29, 1989.

dissidents openly discussed human rights and signed petition for the release of political prisoners.⁴

The movement for the release of political prisoners was started by Fanglizhi, a well known dissident and well-known worker of the democratic movement when he started the movement in January, 1989 by writing an open letter to DengXiaoping requesting an amnesty for Wei Jingshang and other political prisoners of the democracy wall movement of 1979. As expected, China's official media attacked dissidents petition drive for amnesty of China's political prisoners. But dissidents reacted by organising news conference to respond to govt. charges and announced the establishment of a working group called "Amnesty 1989". The issue was further complicated when Chinese authorities prevented Fang Lizhi, from attending the banquet given by President Bush in Beijing.⁵ The hopes and aspirations of people were now centered on National People's Congress (China's legislature), which was to begin its annual session on March 20, 1989. Though dubbed by many as a rubber stamp, in the last few years it had raised embarrassing questions and revealed disagreements. Dwindling public confidence in the Communist Party and the economy were cited to be the causes.

4. United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989 (Washington, D.C.), p. 811.
5. Ibid., also Keesings Record of World Events (Cambridge, U.K.), Vol. 35, No. 2, February 1989, p. 3845 and, Asian Recorder (New Delhi), Vol. 35, No. 17, 23-29 April, p. 203539.

In his speech to National People's Congress on March 20, Prime Minister Li Peng cautioned that China had altered its economy too quickly. He called for more reliance on central planning rather than market economics and warned of austerity in next few years, though some market oriented changes such as stock market were still supported.⁶ A veiled power struggle in China at this stage could be seen between Chinese Communist Party head Zhao Ziyang (who was a liberal and was in favour of economic reforms and a more open market policy) and Prime Minister Li Peng who was a conservative and a hard-liner. On April 5, the final voting of National People's Congress included several displays of discontentment particularly with inflation and the privileges accorded to top officials and their children.

On April 15, 1989, Ho Yaobang the former general secretary of Chinese Communist Party died; whose mourning became a symbol (as the mourning for Zhou Enlai had become earlier in 1976) for a popular struggle against party corruption and lack of political freedom. Ho Yaobang had helped navigate China away from Orthodox Marxism and the Communist party for six years until he was asked to resign in January 1987. He stood firm behind China's move towards market economy and a more open political system. His associates in the party and in the military criticized him for moving "too fast" towards the market economy, and he was forced to resign in January,

6. Asian Recorder (New Delhi), Vol. 35, No. 21, 21-27 May, 1989, p. 20584-85.

1987, on account of nationwide student demonstrations. He came to be seen as a symbol of democracy and change.⁷

Hundreds of students in Beijing, saddened and angered at the death of Ho Yaobang, gathered at the University to put up illegal posters and discuss the future of Chinese liberalisation. Over the next few days, many more processions of students spontaneously formed and marched from their campuses in the north west district of Beijing to Tiananmen Square. During these marches, they not only carried mourning wreaths and banners, but also shouted slogans and waved signs calling for an end to corruption in the government, and for the introduction of democratic reforms. The student response to Ho's death quickly moved beyond mourning to heated protests for democracy and an end to corruption in the party and freedom of the Press. The most active and vocal students were those at Beijing University. In the dawn hours of May 18, 1989, they attempted to deliver a petition containing seven student demands to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and to meet with a representative of the Standing Committee. The demands called for the government to: re-evaluate Ho Yaobang and his achievements; renounce the (1987) anti-Bourgeois liberalisation campaign and the (1983) anti-spiritual pollution; allow citizens to publish non-official newspapers and end censorship of the press; reveal the salaries and other wealth of party and

7. Keesing's Record of World Events, N.5, April 1989, p. 36587, also, Beijing Review, 8-14 May 1989, p. 5.

government leaders and their families; rescind the Beijing municipal governments' "ten Provisional Articles Regulating Public Marches and Demonstrations,"; provide objective news coverage of the students' demonstrations. But to the students' frustration and anger, no representative of the Standing Committee came out to meet them, and they were forced to leave their petition with an office functionary.⁸

From then on, the movement gained momentum, on April 20-21, tens of thousands of people poured into Beijing's Central Square in defiance of ban on political protests, to demand for more democracy in China. Thousands of students camped all night in Beijing's central square, foiling government plans to close off the area to prevent further mass rallies. Chinese Communist Party's policy of economic revolution and political repression seemed to be totally flawed, what began as student discontent seemed to have picked up wider support. Citizens' backing of the student protests, which began as sympathy, evolved into active support and finally became outright defiance of the government.⁹ It grew out of anger at the corruption and special privileges enjoyed by party and government officials, inflation, nepotism and indifference of the government to the wishes and needs of the people. The student movement snowballed into a mass upsurge in Beijing.

8. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 April 1989.

9. *New York Times*, April 22, 1989.

Communist Party was split over the response to the developing situation and rocked by a power struggle at the highest echelons of the Party. One faction headed by the aging communist leaders and supporting Prime Minister Li Peng both in the power struggle and in his hardline attitude towards the demonstrations, was vociferously demanding suppression of the mass movement. While the other faction led by Zhao Ziyang, felt more sympathy for the students' demands and advocated a more reasoned and persuasive approach. It virtually amounted to a three level struggle, a struggle for power, a struggle for a policy at the top and a mass struggle at the bottom.¹⁰

Student demonstrations with thousands of participants had broken out in other major cities, including Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan and Xian, though they were considerably smaller than the protests in Beijing. But they were indication of widespread student disenchantment with the nation's leadership. Anti-government, pro-democracy protests in China grew violent for the first time in Central Chinese of Xian.¹¹ This incident strengthened the hardliners' resolve to use force in the riots of Changsha in Hunan and Xian in Shanxi province.

At this stage one thing which is worth noticing is that from

10. Gargi Dutt and V.P. Dutt, China After Mao (New Delhi, 1991), p. 2.

11. Keesing's Record of World Events N.5, April 1989, p. 36587. Also Beijing Review, 8-14 May 1989, p. 5.

its inception till the government's declaration of martial law on May 20, the student movement did not seek to challenge the authority of the Party or the government. On the contrary, students went out of their way to show the authorities and the populace that they supported the party and were seeking change within it only.¹² The students talked only about freedom of expression, independent press, free elections and strict application of law to prevent corruption by relatives of those in power. A very significant point to be noted is that the call some people had given was against individual leaders like Li Peng and even Deng Xiaoping but the mass movement itself had not given any call against the leadership of the communist Party as such or for the western style multi party democracy or for the replacement of socialism by capitalism. No Pro-US or Pro - Capitalist slogans were shouted at Tinanmen. In fact if any slogans were shouted they were raised in favour of "glasnost" and it was Gorbachev who ruled the minds of the students participating in the movement. But this is not to imply that no one in the mass movement harboured the idea of restoration of a capitalist style democracy. In such a vast movement inevitably there would be people nurturing different ideas. But the movement confined itself to the basics of democracy and corruption.

In Shanghai, the orthodox faction had the upper hand and led by the Shanghai Party Secretary, Jian Zemin (who was later

12. Han Minzhu, N. 2, p. 18.

rewarded with the post of Secretary General of the Party succeeding ZhaoZiyang) moved in to confiscate a particularly controversial issue of April 24, 1989, of the World Economic Herald. It was China's most liberal and boldest newspaper published from Shanghai, for carrying sensitive comments made by Beijing intellectuals at a meeting held on April 19, 1989 to mourn Hu Yaobang. Its editor Qin Benli was also suspended and a 'work team' was dispatched to oversee the readjustment of the paper.¹³

On April 24, 1989, meeting in a special session to discuss the unrest, the standing Committee of the Politburo resolved to take decisive action to prevent students from organizing further. Deng Xiaoping said to Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, President of the Republic and Vice Chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission, "This is no ordinary student movement," he declared, "but an episode of turmoil. We must take a firm stand and take effective measures in opposing and ending this turmoil." He further said "...their goal is to overthrow the leadership of the communist party. They will cause the country and the Chinese people to have no future. We must take measures and act quickly without losing any time."¹⁴ It was followed by a harsh editorial in the People's Daily denouncing the demonstrations and strikes. The death of Hu Yaobang it alleged was being used by "a handful of -----"

13. United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989, N. 4, p. 812.

14. Excerpt of Deng Xiaoping's speech quoted in Keesing's Record of World Events, N. 10, p. 36587.

people" to create turmoil and to poison people's minds and sabotage the nation's stability.¹⁵

More and more Chinese were no longer content to follow government policies and orders unquestioningly. The development of private economic interests, loosening of work and travel restrictions, exposure to western societies, and even the Party's campaign to instill legal knowledge had nurtured a growing sense of individual rights. The attempt to describe the student movement as counter revolutionary incensed the students and many others, and further aggravated the situation. But undoubtedly there was another group also in the party which was not averse to talking to the students and finding a way out - this delayed the crackdown on demonstrators. On April 27, 1989, about 100,000 people took out a procession towards Tiananmen Square to protest against People's Daily editorial, openly defying official warnings and concentration of troops, and marched through Beijing for 14 hours. On at least one occasion thousands of workers surrounded the soldiers and prevented them from approaching student marchers.¹⁶ The government responded by agreeing conditionally to students' demand for discussion with officials. New York Times described the April 25 procession as the biggest display of dissatisfaction in 40 years of communist rule.

15. Asian Recorder, N. 6, No. 26, 25 June-1 July, 1989, p. 20640-42.

16. New York Times, April 28, 1989.

On April 29, 1989, government representatives led by Yuan Mu, spokesman for the state council, sat down to three hour long dialogue with the students, which was televised. Students raised several sensitive questions about corruption, beatings, deployment of troops and isolation of nation's top leaders.¹⁷ Broadcast of informal talks between government officials and student leaders was seen as clear signs of influence that students had gained through their demonstrations. On May 4, 1989, defiant and enthusiastic crowds of more than 1,00,000 workers and students forced its way through police cordons in Beijing to demand more democracy. Smaller demonstrations were held in other cities of China. The occasion for these marches was the 70th anniversary of famous nationalist demonstrations that led to May 4, 1919, movement which led generation of Chinese intellectuals to seek major re-examination of Chinese society. Most workers appeared angry enough to join students, but not so bitter that they would stage their own demonstrations or strikes of their own.

Zhao Ziyang who had gone to Korea returned on May 1, and decided to distance himself from the hard line of the People's Daily editorial. Though Zhao was known for being relatively flexible and sympathetic to the demand of intellectuals for change, he was no political liberal. He had never aggressively pushed for political reform as he had for

17. Keesing's Record of World Events, N. 10.

the economic experimentation. Zhao thought that probably he could use the student movement to bolster his weak position in the Party.¹⁸ Since mid-1988, blamed for double digit inflation and the country's other economic woes, Zhao had seen his power eclipsed by Li Peng's. Zhao probably expected that success in resolving the unrest with his tactics of moderation would shift the balance of power in the Party back to him and his moderate supporters.

Beijing and its universities were quiet for several days following the May 4 demonstration. More than 1000 Chinese journalists submitted a petition on May 9 with over one thousand signatures of journalists to the All-China Journalistic Association, the official body representing journalists. It asked for talks with government leaders on press independence, broader coverage of events such as student demonstrations and recent dismissal of Shanghai newspaper editor Qin Benli.

Before the much publicized Sino-Soviet summit, students decided to go on hunger strike in the Gandhian style of Satyagrah . About 2000 students commenced a hunger strike at Tiananmen, which soon gained momentum. Beijing Review wrote that over a thousand students from every major university in the city had fasted for almost 50 hours in one of world's largest hunger strikes since the day of the Gandhi.¹⁹

18. David Strand, "Protest in Beijing : Civil Society and the Public Sphere in China" Problems of Communism (Washington D.C.), May-June 1990, p. 1-19.

19. Beijing Review; 22-28 May, 1989, p. 7.

Gorbachev was visiting China on May 15 for the summit meeting, and there was fear all round that government would forcibly remove the protesters. Crowds in Tiananmen had grown to over half a million by the afternoon of May 15, to protect students from being forcibly carried away by the police. The hunger strike was a turning point in the democracy movement, a crisis fusing together idealistic students and a citizenry previously noted for its lack of public spirit and for an aversion to risk learned from the bitter lessons of political campaigns in the past.

The first worrisome indications for the government that a Beijing conferred student protest was turning into a nationwide popular protest, came on May 15 and May 16. On those days vast crowds of citizens had gathered in Tiananmen in a show of solidarity with the students. University students from nearly all of China's provinces had also begun to pour into the capital to join the tens of thousands of students already encamped in the square. This was only a prelude to the mass outpouring of support for students that completely paralyzed Beijing on May 17 and May 19. The protests also spread to Shanghai and other cities. A televised meeting was held between Prime Minister Li Peng and leaders of student movements, with no concrete results.²⁰

20. Keesing's Record of World Events, N. 10, May 1989, p. 36640.

Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev who was in Beijing during those days, sharply distanced himself from demonstrations. The Sino-Soviet summit which was intended as an elaborate celebration of China's assured and independent standing and the Soviet Union's new civility in the international arena became incidental beside the pro-democracy demonstrations. During a meeting with Zhao Ziyang, Gorbachev remarked off handedly that "we also have hot heads who would like to renovate socialism overnight."²¹ But later, well before leaving, he carefully pointed out that a "reasonable balance" had to be struck between the enthusiasm of the young and wisdom of the old.

The Chinese government called troops into Beijing and imposed martial law. Tens of thousands rushed out of their homes to block troops from reaching student demonstrators in Central Square. Many observing supposed that Zhao Ziyang was stripped of all power and that Deng Xiaoping had put Li Peng in charge of party as well as the government. Beijing municipal authorities further imposed strict limits on the activities of foreign journalists. Chinese officials ordered television networks to cease transmitting pictures and commentary from portable stations set up in Beijing. Officials contended that news restrictions were legitimate because American networks were in China to cover the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev and that visit was over now. Though the hunger strikers⁵ as a

21. Ibid, p. 36642.

group declared at 9 P.M. on the 19th May, that the hunger strike had been converted into a sit-in protest, it did little to alleviate government fear of losing control of the capital. The citizens' resistance to martial law had arose spontaneously out of anger and shock that the government would resort to military force to regain control of the capital from the peaceful demonstrators. Beijing residents were determined to protect the students and well into the beginning of the next week acted as if their city was under siege from their own government's army.²² Tiananmen, once the symbol of protest became the last stand of the 1989 democracy movement.

In the capital and its suburbs army convoys turned back, some disappeared to unknown sites, others to camp on the outskirts of the city, where they settled down, apparently to await orders. They could not get in Beijing in the face of strong opposition from the people of Beijing and they had not yet resorted to force. One hundred thousand people turned out on May 23, for anti Li Peng and anti martial law protest march organized by intellectuals, students and journalists. One observer noted that "it is evident that this period of relative passivity was, in fact, witnessing a furious struggle within the party and army leadership."²³ Around May 25

22. United States Department of State, N. 4, p. 814.

23. Gargi Dutt and V.P. Dutt, N.10, p. 10, also, Chu-Yuah Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre : Social Political and Economic Ferment In China (Boulder, Columbia : Westview Press, 1990).

hardliners under Li Peng gained the army support and consolidated the control over news media. Evidently Zhao Ziyang, though he lost in the power struggle, continued to remain the party's General Secretary.

A significant development took place at this stage; students from outside universities now dominated in numbers the occupation of the square. On May 27, China's student leaders called for an end to their two week occupation of Tiananmen Square in Beijing, but promised to continue to hold large scale demonstrations to press for greater democracy and resignation of Prime Minister Li Peng. But on the morning of the 28th, a joint conference of the "Protect Tiananmen Headquarters" consisting of students, workers and citizen organisations announced that unless an emergency session of the National People's Conference was convened immediately, the occupation of the Tiananmen Square would continue at least until June 20, when the Congress was scheduled to meet in regular session.²⁴ But by the last week of May, the number of students in the square continued to decline. On the other hand fresh initiatives by enthusiasts of democracy reinvigorated the fading movement. On May 30, students from the Central Academy of Fine Arts in Beijing unveiled in Tiananmen Square the "Goddess of Democracy". The statue was hastily constructed from plaster and *styrofoam*. Though it was far from beautiful, it attracted thousands of spectators to

24. Asian Recorder, No. 5, No. 30, 23-29 July, 1989, p. 20683-89.

the square and angered the authorities, who condemned it as an illegal structure that would have to be struck down.

One of the first signals of the impending military crackdown was the May 30 detention of at least three members of the capital's Workers' Autonomous Union by the Beijing security police. Han Minzhu opined that "Worker activists were the government's first targets, probably because it feared that the struggle for democracy would find a reincarnation in the form of worker unrest, which it feared even more than student restiveness."²⁵ Though many Chinese foresaw the inevitability of bloodshed if the students refused to yield Tiananmen, but none was prepared for the carnage and destruction of the army takeover of Tiananmen on June 3 and 4. Chinese troops attacked crowds of protesters with AK-47's truncheons, teargas, tanks and armoured personal carriers. The citizens in a bid to stop them, fought with locks, steelbars, crude barricades and Molotov cocktails, and anything found in the streets that could be hurled at the soldiers. New York Times reported that, thousands of Chinese troops retook the center of Beijing from pro-democracy protesters, killing scores of students and workers and wounding hundreds more.²⁶

Time, in a bid to be more objective, estimated that 5,000 citizens died in only a few hours between Saturday night and Sunday morning. It admitted, however, that the exact number of -----

25. Han Minzhu, N. 10, p. 342.

26. New York Times, 5 June, 1989.

victims may never be known.²⁷ US Department of State also said in its report that hundreds had died and thousands were arrested.²⁸ Another source quoted that between 2000 and 5000 civilians and soldiers had died.²⁹ By Tuesday, June 6, the resistance had collapsed in the face of the army's overwhelming force.

Deng Xiaoping appeared on television on June 9 saying, "subsequently the situation developed into a counter-revolutionary rebellion.... They had primarily two fundamental slogans. Overthrow the communist party and do away with the socialist system....- We never will forget how savage and ruthless our enemies were. We should not show them an iota of forgiveness."³⁰ Deng honoured the soldiers who died in fighting, but expressed no remorse for killing of hundreds, or thousands of civilians. Deng's speech in effect marked the end of the 1989 democracy movement. The unrest in other Chinese cities also declined by June 9.

In the aftermath of the Beijing massacre China's disregard for Universally accepted rights became increasingly evident. Reports were compiled to show that detailed violations of personal integrity, including extra-judicial killings,

27. Time, 19 June, 1989.

28. United States Department of State, N. 4, p. 810.

29. Keesing's Record of World Events, No. 10, June 1989, p. 36721.

30. Ibid, also, Beijing Review, 10-16 July, 1989, p. 15.

disappearances, torture arbitrary arrests and interference with personal privacy.³¹ Civil rights guaranteed by China's 1982 constitution - freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion and freedom of movement, all suffered severely in the crackdown period. Political rights were also curtailed. In the months of June and July 1989, nationwide hunt for protesters was undertaken, complete with a "most wanted list" of the Chief Organisers of the demonstrations at Tiananmen Square. Although the authorities eventually admitted to taking 6,000 people in custody, unofficial sources estimated that as many as 10,000 were arrested in Beijing alone and at least twice as many in other parts of China.³² On the other hand, estimates by US State Department placed the total number of persons arrested after the military crackdown between twenty and forty thousand for advocating "bourgeoise liberalisation" - the Chinese Communist Party's codeword for western democratic ideas of individual rights, freedom of speech, political pluralism and human rights.³³ In the ensuing crackdown, which persisted well into 1990, tens of thousands of democracy movement participants, supporters and sympathisers were rounded up, held without charge and interrogated. Some were released after a brief period, but others remained in detention.

31. James v. Feinerman, "Deteriorating Human Rights in China" Current History (Philadelphia), p. 266.

32. Amnesty International Report for 1989 (London).

33. United States Department of State, N. 28.

The Communist Party Central Committee met from June 23 to 24. It endorsed the army action and praised the role of People's Liberation Army, the Armed Police and the Public Security Police in quelling the counter revolutionary rebellion in the capital. The meeting dismissed Zhao Ziyang as Secretary General of the Central Committee, from the Standing Committee and from the Politburo as well as from the vice Chairmanship of the Military Commission and decided to look further into his case. His supporters were also stripped of their power. The resolution reassured the outside world that the open door policy would be continued. China, after June 4, 1989, once again returned to the state of stability and unity desired by its rulers.

Chapter 3

US PERCEPTION OF TINANMEN MASSACRE

After almost a decade of relative neglect a new scrutiny of China's human rights practices emerged as a salient feature of bilateral relations between China and many nations of the world. American policy has also treated the issue of human rights in China as a secondary issue during the cold war. For the most part, Chinese human rights violations were simply ignored. Winston Lord, former Ambassador to China had said that "Indeed there has been a rising chorus of complaints in the US about an alleged double standard between our vigorous espousal of human rights in the Soviet Union and our more muted approach towards China".¹ The source of this new interest in human rights in China was the suppression of the 1989 democracy movement in 3-4 June, by troops of the People's Liberation Army. A decade of seeming progress towards the rule of law and greater respect for individual civil and political rights in the People's Republic of China was reversed overnight in the bloody massacre in Tinanmen Square. The Tinanmen massacre sharply changed the American view about China. Instead of pursuing policies of political and economic reform, the leaders in Beijing were widely seen as following policies anti-thetical to American values and therefore unworthy of American support.

1. Winston Lord, "China and America : Beyond The Big Chill" Foreign Affairs (New York), Fall 1989, P.23.

Previously, the US administration and the public were indulgent towards China. China seemed to be a thriving economy with a cultural renaissance underway, further, Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms were well ahead of Gorbachev's in the Soviet Union. Yet many experts expected that the transformation of Communist system into a market oriented system would not be easy. However, critics charged that specialists in the region did not foresee the massive setback that occurred².

Significantly, China was transformed from the US's valued partner in the socialist world to a problematic one. Addressing a hastily called press conference on June 5, President George Bush said the US "cannot ignore the consequences (of the violent and bloody attack on the demonstrators) for our relationship with China."³ Former President Richard Nixon - architect of the opening to China, a close friend of Communist leaders described the crackdown as not only "shockingly cruel" but also "incredibly stupid."⁴ It was the most serious setback in the Sino-US relations since 1971. The Bush administration was given no choice but to express national outrage and halt co-operation in various fields. Both American values and

2. News Week, June 19, 1989.

3. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 15, 1989, also Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents, Document No. 312, 5 June 1989, p.517.

4. New York Times, 11 June, 1989.

practical considerations dictated the US response. Michel Oksenberg, a noted China observer wrote that "China's leaders must understand that how they treat their people has global consequence and hence is of legitimate universal concern. The leaders of China must be told directly and repeatedly that the nature of their rule and of American rule are appropriate subjects of international scrutiny."⁵

After assuming the office, President Bush went to China in February 1989, presumably to assure Chinese leaders of the new administration's keenness to keep closer relations with China. According to one expert "the message was the desire to keep a strong link with China in the context of the global situation"⁶.

Fang Lizhi incident during Bush's visit was an indication of China's mood. Chinese leaders told Bush in blunt terms that US must not raise human rights issue in China. The US administration kept itself away from the democracy movement in China which had gathered momentum after the death of Ho Yaobang on April 15, 1989. It was more concerned about the Sino-Soviet Summit meeting which was held in May 1989. When Gorbachev visited China US greeted Sino-Soviet reconciliation, convinced that both nations are most in

5. Michel Oksenberg, "The China Problem" Foreign Affairs (New York), Summer 1991, P.14.

6. Gargi Dutt and V P Dutt, China After Mao (New Delhi, 1991) - p.266 also, Department of State, N.3, Document No. 306, 25 February 1989, p.513-14.

need of good economic relations with the West. It was on May 20, 1989 that the US State Department issued a statement (for the first time since the movement began in April) expressing regret that China had sent troops to restore order after a month of students demonstrations.⁷ Bush administration officials had earlier refrained from any open expression of support for wave of protest.

After May 20, Bush administration adopted a cautious approach towards pro-democracy movement in China. State Department recommended Americans planning to visit China to delay their trips because of political unrest there. Though the US administration was more cautious in its approach, American experts were more vocal in blaming the Chinese authorities for the present crisis. According to them the crisis in China could have been averted, had officials met some of the students' original demands for greater democracy instead of trying to suppress the demonstrations. Secretary of State James Baker in a news conference said that Bush administration was increasingly concerned about China's political crisis and that US backs freedom and democracy, but does not welcome instability.⁸ Meanwhile President Bush discussed about events in China with visiting French President

7. ibid, Document No.310, p.516.

8. New York Times, May 21, 1989.

Francois Mitterand. President Bush urged Chinese demonstrators to keep the campaign peaceful, he refrained from criticising Chinese Government in the hopes of maintaining friendly relations which were cultivated over two decades. Wan Li, leader of China's legislature met Vice President Dan Quayle and Secretary of State James Baker in Washington and assured that there will be no blood shed in Beijing if demonstrators continued to exercise restraint. On May 23, 1989 he met President Bush who counseled him to be non-violent and show restraint in face of massive student demonstrations.

Meanwhile in the US the public opinion was turning more in favour of the student demonstrators in China. The events in China at this time were covered by the foreign TV media, which was there to cover the Sino-Soviet meeting and had remained there. Millions of viewers all over America sympathised with the peaceful pro-democracy demonstrations in China. They felt that the protests by Chinese students underscored the need for more open politics in China. Chinese students in USA also tried to mobilise US public support by holding rallies in support of pro-democracy demonstrators in their homeland.

The military crackdown on the peaceful demonstrators came from 3 June onwards. President Bush responded by saying that he deeply deplored the shootings of protestors by

9. New York Times, May 23, 1989

Chinese troops, and that, US has been urging and continues to urge non-violence, restraint and dialogue. The reaction of American people was one of shock and moral outrage. Lord Bette Bao, a noted China watcher, said that legitimacy of China's communist party has been destroyed by its crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in T¹⁰inamen Square. Both Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress joined forces to demand that Bush punish China. On June 5, President Bush suspended US military sales to China in reaction to violent and bloody crackdown against student demonstrations in Beijing. He also said that he would not impose economic sanctions or withdraw US ambassador at this time hoping to avoid what he called a total break with China. He emphasized the need to consider long-term American interests and the complex situation within China.¹¹ President Bush succeeded initially in preserving a domestic consensus about US-China policy when he announced on 5 June, the steps US¹² would take in response to the Tinanmen incident on 5 June. The President suspended all government to government sales and commercial exports of weapons; visits between US and Chinese military leaders were also suspended, and the sympathetic review of requests by Chinese students.

10. New York Times, June 4, 1989 in the US to extend their stay among other measures.

11. U.S. Department of State, N.3, Document No.312, 5 June 1989, p.517.

12. Robert G.Sutter, "Sino-American Relations in Adversity" Current History (Philadelphia), No.89 (548) September 1990, P.272.

As one Critic wrote, "In response to the events of June, President Bush correctly singled out the military relationship as the leading area in which to halt Sino-US Cooperation. This action was appropriate symbolically, because of the PLA's (People's Liberation Army) role in suppressing the demonstrators .

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For the US, the question focused on how to strike an appropriate balance in suspending ties, issuing critical statements and otherwise showing disapproval for Chinese reversal of reforms, while sustaining US interests in continuing relations with China. As a writer commented, "The crisis at Tiananmen Square in June 1989, demonstrated how rash expectations were that Chinese-American relations had matured beyond dangerous misperceptions. Americans saw the crowds in the square and assumed, incorrectly, that they were witnessing a vast popular uprising demanding immediate implementation of American style multiparty democracy . The conviction that the Chinese people yearned to be more like Americans magnified American repugnance for the Beijing regime and unprecedented concern for human rights in China. The scene in Beijing became dramatized as it dragged on

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13. Carol Lee Hamrin, China and the Challenge of the Future : Changing Political Patterns (Boulder, Coloumbia: Westview Press, 1989).
 14. Nancy Kernkopf Tucker, "China And America : 1941-1991" Foreign Affairs (New York) Vol.107, no. 4, Winter 1991-92, p.88-89.

from April to the beginning of June. In fact, some even suggested that a short quick repression at the very beginning might have averted the virtual universal
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condemnation. The dramatic clippings shown on American television of the Army's attack on the peaceful demonstrators shocked the American public opinion and made any attempt at covering up an impossibility. The American embassy in Beijing, moreover, became a direct participant when it gave refuge to the dissident astrophysicist Fang
16
Lizhi and his wife.

In a discerning say, one scholar noted that Americans generally believe that history is erratically moving in the direction of a pluralist forms of governance, and that a world of democracies is safer than a world in which democracies must co-exist with more authorita~~y~~
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neighbour . They also believe that economic and social modernisation will eventually produce political liberalisation. To quote US ambassador James R Lilley, " We believed that double digit growth spurred by economic

15. Gargi Dutt and V P Dutt, N.6, P.267.

16. Keesing's Record of World Events (Cambridge, U.K.), Vol.35, No.7-8 July and August 1989, p.36815.

17. David M Lampton, "America's China Policy : Developing a Fifth Strategy" in Frank J Macchairola and Robert B.Oxnam, ed., The China Challenge : American Policies in East Asia (New York, 1991), P.155.

reforms would eventually broaden genuine popular participation in the political process. The assumption that economic reform will ultimately liberalise society is still valid. If this is peaceful evolution so be it." ¹⁸

In the wake of the Tinanmen massacre, several large US corporations withdrew their non-Chinese employees from Beijing or closed their offices as a result of the violence there. US - China Business Council President Roger W. Sullivan said that situation in China for US businesses is potentially disastrous and that China realistically will not be able to maintain or expand its current levels of foreign investments. Though President Bush expressed his desire to have normal relations with China, his administration dismissed forty Chinese nationals, mostly engineers, from jobs at Grumman Plant on Long Island as US suspended military dealings with China. This group was working on project to modernise electronics in Chinese fighter planes ¹⁹.

But the US public was not satisfied with the steps taken by President Bush. About 12000 people in New York staged a day of protests against Chinese Government, and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, speaker at the rally, was booed off the stage when he sought to praise President Bush for his

18. New York Times, October 27, 1990.

19. Keesing's Record of World Events, N.16, June 1989, P.36722.

efforts to built constructive relationship with China . Rallies were also held in other US cities in support of China's battered Pro-democracy movement. People started linking the Goddess of Democracy constructed by the Chinese demonstrators in Beijing to the statue of liberty in New York. US Congressional opinion was also on the hardline and was further inflamed by the executions in China, after the military crackdown. Uproar in the media and among the public pressed the US administration further on the road to imposing more sanctions. Dissident Fang Lizhi trapped in the US embassy in Beijing would serve as reminder that relations between US and China should not be normalized until China made amends for its barbarity or fell from power, critics asserted. ²¹ Bush's China policy was also criticized by asserting that Bush should express American respect for all the Chinese and not just for a conservative leadership whose survival was subject to grave internal stresses.

Washington's difficulty was that President Bush had to contend on the one hand with enraged public opinion at home and on the other hand with an ~~adamant~~ Chinese leadership that had its compulsions as not to appear to be yielding. The process of redressal therefore had necessarily to be slow and hesitant. On June 21, 1989 Bush administration suspended participation of all high level exchanges of

20. New york Times, June 10, 1989.

21. Washington Post, June 10, 1989.

Government officials with China and directed the American representatives at various international financial institutions to seek to postpone consideration of new loans for China.²² Chinese ambassador Han Xu was summoned to the State department and was handed a formal petition from Bush administration appealing for clemency for demonstrators in Shanghai and Beijing, who had been sentenced to death, and to pardon for those who had been sentenced to jail.

But perhaps the most surprising turn of events had been the emergence of China's human rights situation as a domestic political issue in the US.²³ An early bipartisan consensus condemning the savagery of the Beijing massacre and extending the stay of Chinese nationals in the US began to disintegrate, over question about the extent and level at which limited relations might be maintained. The most surprising repercussion of the Beijing massacre was the acrimonious debate between the executive and the legislative branches of the US Government and in academic and journalistic circles. US Congress was disappointed with Bush administration's measured response.²⁴ President Bush on the other hand, under pressure from members of Congress to take sterner steps against China, asked leading senators to

22. United States Department of State, N.3, Document No. 317, 20 June 1989, p.522.

23. James V. Feinerman, "Deteriorating Human Rights in China" Current History (Philadelphia), no. 89, September 1990, p.265.

24 Keesing's Record of World Events, N.16, July and August 1989, p.36815.

show patience in assessing his actions in response to the suppression of pro-democracy movement. But on June 27, President Bush in an interview said that he will not yield to congressional pressure for more sanctions against China, in hopes of preserving US relationship. Former President Richard Nixon also openly supported Bush's policy towards China saying US must not drive China back into shadows of Soviet Union and Oppressive economic system.

In response to Bush's mild reactions towards China, Democrats and Republicans in the House of Representatives joined forces to press reluctant President Bush and his administration to accept tougher sanctions against China. House of Representatives voted, 418 to 0 to impose new sanctions on China and condemn Beijing's suppression of human rights.²⁵ Bush administration did not endorse the House move but indicated that there will be no veto on it. Measures approved in the House suspended financial support of overseas Private Investment Corporation in China, halt expenditure of previously authorised funds for trade and development, mandate American opposition for six months to liberalisation of export controls and banned export of crime control equipment and nuclear equipment that could be used for military purposes; the measures stopped short of rescinding China's trade status as most favoured nation.²⁶

25. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1989).

26. *ibid.*

US Senate voted 81 to 10 and joined the House of Representatives in voting to impose new economic sanctions against China. In the lengthy amendment on China to the State Department's authorization bill, which the Senate passed in late July, it codified sanctions already imposed by the President and added the following actions: it suspended new programs to guarantee US investment in China; suspended licenses for Crime control and detection equipment; suspended export licenses for US satellites scheduled for launch on Chinese launch vehicles; suspended peaceful nuclear cooperation with China and required the president to negotiate with the coordinating committee for multilateral export controls on technology for China.²⁷ The House and Senate passed~~d~~ respectively in August the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act which made it possible for chinese students in the US to extend their stay up to four years.

The Bush administration, in the interest of preserving US-China relations, granted waivers in July 1989 to the suspension of military sales to allow the sale of four Boeing Commercial jets with navigation systems that could be converted to military use. In October 1989, the administration permitted Chinese military officers to return to work at US facilities where they had been assisting US engineers in upgrading China's F-8 fighter with American

27. *ibid.*

avionics. On November 80, the President announced that he would "pocket veto" the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act, maintaining that the bill was unnecessary since he was ordering into practice many of its provisions. In September 1989, the administration decided to continue GATT talks with China.²⁸

There was considerable "grumbling" in Congress and the media over the President's "soft" approach towards China. The debate over China policy reached a fever pitch after the December 9-10, 1989 visit to Beijing by a US delegation led by National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger. The disclosure a few days later, that a similar US delegation had secretly visited Beijing in July, 1989, one month after the ban on all high level exchanges of Government officials with China revived comment.²⁹

The administration gave several arguments for its initiative towards China. It said that because China and the world are in a period of major transition, US needs to sustain a productive dialogue with China to deal with relevant issues, excessive US pressure against China was adverse to US economic interests in China, and that strong measures against China will only weaken the forces of democracy in

28. United States State Department, N.3, Document No. 320, September 1989, p.526.

29. Department of State, N.3, Document No. 322, 19 December 1989, p.528.

that country and would adversely affect the Chinese people. It also said that though the Chinese threat to the US no longer exists, China is still important to US, strategically and economically. It believed that Scowcroft's visits would provide a face saving means for the beleaguered leadership in Beijing to pull back from its recent repressive policies.³⁰

On the other hand the critics in Congress, media and elsewhere denounced the President's actions and asked Congress to take stronger actions when it convened again in January 1990. Critics of the administration said that political repression in China was continuing despite easing of martial law in Beijing; resuming high-level contact and other business with Chinese leaders disassociated the US from Chinese proponents of greater political reform and democracy; and that exempting China from usual US treatment regarding human rights served only to solidify the grip of hardliners in Beijing, and that special US consideration of China was no longer needed in order to ensure Chinese cooperation against the international danger posed by Soviet expansion.³¹ They believed that China was likely to remain preoccupied internally and unlikely to disrupt the Asian stability.

But despite the severe criticism of his soft policy towards

30. *ibid*, Document No.324, 21 December 1989, p.530.

31. Ann Scot Tyson, "Tiananmen Nightmare Lingers" Christian Science Monitor (New York), November 30, 1989.

China, President Bush continued his moderate approach well into the 90s. On December 19, 1989 he waived restrictions prohibiting export licences for three US communication satellites to be launched on Chinese launch vehicles, and he also announced that he would not impose the new restrictions on Export Import Bank Funding for China - that Congress had enacted earlier ³² .

The Tiananmen Square massacre and US perception had a political fallout of consequence which sharply brought into focus the policy divisions between the US administration and the Congress, but these dissensions were quietly buried in the US national interest as defined by the Bush administration. It also brought into fore the rhetoric and actual practice of human rights in US policy.

32. New York Times, December 20, 1989.

CHAPTER IV

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS SINCE

In June 1989, after the Tiananmen incident, the Sino-American relations experienced the most serious setback since their establishment in 1971. Not since the arguments over recognition of China or perhaps the earlier arguments about "who lost China?" during the McCarthy era, had emotions over China run so high in the United States. But if we take a closer look at the events, we find that, even before the dramatic events of Spring 1989, a quite crisis was brewing in China's relations with the United States.

Sino-American relations had long rested on a common strategic interest, the political and military containment of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, beginning in 1982, a steady progress towards the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations had gradually eroded this strategic foundation. While Sino-American economic and cultural relations were increasing, divergent perspectives on several regional issues and Beijing's irritation at American criticism of China's policies towards Tibet and Chinese human rights practices frayed tempers on both sides. But still Chinese-American relations were seen as strategically important over the long term. In December, 1988, Beijing and Washington celebrated the tenth anniversary of their establishment of diplomatic relations in a generally positive atmosphere. China's ongoing economic reforms attracted increasing world

attention and support among developed countries and the international financial institutions supported by them. Beijing also looked forward to fruitful economic interaction, technology transfer and training in China's relations with the United States and other western aligned countries.¹ U.S. policy makers on their part pursued the steady development of a multifaceted relationship with China. Sino-American trade in 1988, exceeded 13 billion US dollars. The United States was the largest foreign investor in China.² Political ties continued to grow with frequent high-level official visits, including representatives of the US and the Chinese armed forces. US technology transfer to China was an important element in Chinese modernization plans, and there were 40,000 students from China studying at US universities.

The Tiananmen Massacre and subsequent Chinese government's efforts to exert tighter control over political and economic developments in China affected American leaders and popular opinion. US government's reaction in the form of official criticism and limited sanctions promoted strong Chinese government protests.³ There was downward trend in Sino-US

1. Robert G. Sutter, "Sino-American Relations in Adversity" Current History (Philadelphia), no.89 (548), September 1990, p.241.
2. Steven I. Levine, "The Uncertain Future of Chinese Foreign Policy" Current History (Philadelphia), no.88, September, 1989, p.262.
3. Beijing Review, 3-9 July, 1989, p.9-10.

relations, though President George Bush with a view to serve long-term US interest tried to strike a balance in showing disapproval for the actions of the Chinese government, while sustaining US interests in continuing relations with China. At this time, changes in the Soviet bloc also attracted positive attention from the developed countries of the West and Japan, including the international financial institutions.⁴ Thus, China's crackdown alienated foreign interest and capital and at the same time, the positive prospects in East Europe served as a magnet in attracting these resources towards East Europe and Soviet Union. The threat to Sino-American relations induced President Bush to publicly chide the Chinese government but privately to try to "bridge troubled waters." Twice in the months following the Tinanmen square massacre, secret missions headed by National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft travelled to Beijing to maintain contacts, provide briefings and avert a deterioration of strained relations. The President laboured to avoid the worst the Congress sought to impose on Beijing, particularly, the withdrawal of most favoured nation trade status.⁵

To explain the apparent coldness in US-China relations after the Tinanmen square massacre, one commentator suggested that

4. Steven I. Levine, N.2, p.242.

5. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "China And America " Foreign Affairs (New York) Vol.107, no.4, Winter 1991-92, p.89.

before the 1989-91 collapse of communism in East Europe and Soviet Union, the United States' foreign policy towards China was based on two assumptions - first, that communist regimes cannot be fundamentally reformed or overthrown, and secondly, that the Chinese communist government was firmly in control and that it enjoyed the support of the Chinese people.⁶ Events in East Europe and the Soviet Union had done much more to undercut these assumptions than was the massacre at Tinnanmen. Tinnanmen was only the "alarm bell" that made Americans think whether their Chinese policy still made sense.⁷ It was not so much that China had changed, but rather that the world had changed. Reforms in the Soviet Union and radical changes in Eastern Europe during 1989 posed a question mark on China's strategic importance to the US. The US administration argued that China's strategic value to the US has not been reduced but merely transformed. The US administration assumed that it can simply bring in new issues such as bilateral trade, the proliferation of missile and Nuclear weapons technologies, the peace settlement in Cambodia and stability on Korean peninsula to replace the old anti-Soviet emphasis while maintaining the old policy paradigm.⁸ Earlier to be of value to the US in

6. Roger W Sullivan, "Discarding the China Card" Foreign policy (Washington), Spring 1992, p.8.

7. ibid, p.3.

8. Carol Lee Hamrin, China And the Challenge of The Future : Changing Political Patterns (Coloumbia, 1989) p.7.

detering Soviet Union, China did not have much to do. As former National Security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski once put it, that China was "a key force for global peace simply by being China."⁹ But China could no longer be of value to America on the new issue simply by "being China", it has to change its policies, by cooperating on these and other issues productively.

Beijing, on the other hand, accused the US of blatant interference in its internal affairs and rejected its right to impose its decision on China. It also charged US with breaking basic principles of international law by providing asylum in the US Embassy to Fang Lizhi and his wife. Chinese media portrayed Fang as the backstage director of the popular uprising. Many articles in Chinese publications asserted that the 1989 upheaval in the people' republic, the subsequent Western sanctions, and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe were all part of a long-range US global strategy to subvert socialism.¹⁰

At the June 30, 1989, meeting of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, Deng declared that the counter-revolution was caused by the confluence of external and

9. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle : Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1991 (New York, 1985).

10. John W Garver, "Chinese Foreign Policy: The Diplomacy of Damage Control" Current History (Philadelphia), n.90, September 91, p.243, also Beijing Review, 3-9 July, 1989.

internal factors. Critics of the US policy charged that however, what followed in China did not serve to formulate a new theory to guide the post-Tiananmen square foreign policy, but recalled political fundamentalism. This fundamentalism took the form of attacks on the so-called "peaceful evolution co-optation strategy" of the capitalist West in general and capitalist America in particular. The tactics the West employed in the implementation of the peaceful evolution strategy included everything short of a direct military invasion. Economic means, like tariff concessions, technology transfers and economic aid were used to coax socialist countries into the capitalist world system and to force socialist countries to make political and ideological concessions.¹¹ The Western communications media (broadcast, newspapers, magazines and books) were being manipulated to spread rumours and control people, to undermine socialist order, and to "peddle bourgeois concepts and values." 'Human Rights' and 'democratization' serve as another set of ideological weapons with which Western world interferes in the domestic affairs of socialist countries and aids the dissident groups. The peace corps, the Fulbright program and other 'Non-government' academic and cultural exchange programs also function as carriers of the Western ideology for the ideological and cultural infiltration of socialist countries.

11. Samuel S Kim, "Chinese Foreign Policy : After Tiananmen" Current History(Philadelphia) no.89 (548), September 1990, p.247.

Chinese academic and diplomatic circles gave a separate Chinese or, in some cases, socialist position about human rights issue.¹² They claimed that governments dealing with its own citizens are its 'internal affairs' in which foreigners have no right to criticise, and that human rights are always subject to limitations, which governments may legitimately impose, and that Nations with different social system may choose to emphasize certain rights in keeping with dictates of their ideologies.¹³

But there was a virtual consensus in the Chinese leadership that a pre-1978 isolation would be a severe blow to China's scientific, technological and hence industrial and military progress. The Chinese leadership believed that if China is to be a modern nation by early in the next century, it must draw heavily on Western scientific and technological achievements.¹⁴ The difficulty was in assimilating Western science and technology without importing Western political ideas that undermine the party's strength. Post Tiananmen

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12. James V Feinerman, "Deteriorating Human Rights in China" Current History (Philadelphia) no.89, September 1990, p.269.
 13. Xie Xide, "A Chinese Educator's View of China - United States Relations" in Frank J Macchiarola and Robert B. Osnam, ed., The China Challenge : American Policies in East Asia (New York 1991) p.180.
 14. David M.Lamptorn, "China's Main Danger" Christian Science Monitor(New York), November 1990, p.244.

China's relationship with the US was thus in a trap, as Beijing could neither fully embrace (for ideological reasons) nor completely reject (for economic reasons) the United States. Irrespective of its like or dislike, the US remains the only country that can decisively help or hurt China in its modernization quest.¹⁵ In June 1989, China mounted high pressure campaign to lure back foreign businessmen who fled after military crackdown on democracy movement. Chinese government agencies made many phone calls to offices in Hongkong, where many executives of 175 American companies that have offices in China had fled.¹⁶ The appointment of Jiang Zemin as new communist party chief and naming of a new set of leaders who were considered likely to pursue economic relations with outside world and follow aggressive economic development was seen by US as a positive gesture, which meant that China would not go back from its path of economic liberalization. Though Jiang Zemin, was a political hardliner in favour of a planned economy rather than a market economy, and yet favoured economic modernization and openness with the west. When President Bush responded to Tinnanmen incident by suspending military sales to China; withholding support for world Bank loans and suspending high level official visits, the message was clear to the Americans. To the Chinese

15. Samuel S Kim, N.11, P.247.

16. New York Times, June 21, 1989.

however, it conveyed that, in effect nothing has changed, "US administration despite its own publicly announced ban on high level official visits, sent National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger on their secret trip to Beijing in July 1989 and again in December 1989. It was the message when, on the latter occasion, they toasted Chinese leaders and called for "bold measures" to "overcome the negative forces" in both countries who seek to frustrate US-Chinese Cooperation"¹⁷. The pressure which US tried to exert on the Chinese government probably remained less effective as the Chinese officials calculated that Bush understood them and would save them from their American critics. Deng is reported to have said after Tinanmen, that China is "too big a piece of meat", and that if the Chinese wait, relations will return to normal.¹⁸ Diplomacy and exchanges continued in the aftermath of Tinanmen massacre, even as the two countries criticised each other publicly. Chinese officials regarded President Bush as making good faith efforts to rebuild relations within the constraints of American public opinion. Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen said Chinese US relations are at crossroads and could improve if US accepts¹⁹ that Chinese political system is not to be criticized .

17. Roger W Sullivan, N.5, p11.

18. *ibid*, p.21.

19. New York Times October 3, 1989.

In November, former President Richard Nixon made a six day trip to China. He gave the Chinese leaders one of the toughest assessments of the military crackdown, but also made a plea to move towards rebuilding Chinese - American relations.²⁰ When on December 22, 1989 US invaded Panama, China got a chance to comment on the double standards of US policy and condemned US military action in Panama as violation of international law. Chinese government in January 1990, released 573 people who had been imprisoned for taking part in democracy movement.²¹ This action and the lifting of martial law in Beijing was seen in the US as attempts to improve China's international image and reduce possibility of new sanctions before US congress reconvened.

The US State department released a human rights report which asserted that there were pervasive, severe violation of human rights in Beijing, Tibet and other parts of China in 1989, it also said that 'massacre' in Tiananmen Square and subsequent crackdown on independent political activity violated almost every internationally recognized human rights.²² This report was a sharp departure from Bush administration's cautious public statements of China. China retaliated by warning US that any further State department

20. Keessing's Record of World Events, (Cambridge, U.K.), Vol.35, No.10, October 1989, p.36974.

21. ibid, Vol.36, No.1, January 1990, p.37185.

22. US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C., 1990), p.845-866.

attacks on its human rights record could impair US - China ties. At a news conference on February 12, 1990, President Bush criticised China for imposing stringent rules on Chinese who wish to study abroad. The US administration was also disappointed with failure of China's hard liners to respond constructively to Bush administration's friendly overtures. In an attempt to improve relations with the West, China announced the further release of 211 people²³ jailed for taking part in democracy movement in 1989 .

During the winter of 1989 and spring of 1990, congressional leaders did not go out of their way to challenge President Bush's China Policy as long as President Bush avoided major initiatives or exceptions in dealing with China. But the annual process of renewing non-discriminatory (or the most-favoured nation) tariff treatment for China became the outlet for congressional frustration and the vehicle for engaging the administration in a general policy debate. Each year since 1980, ratifications of the Sino- American trade agreement, the President has had to decide whether China, as a non-market economy, meets the legal requirements of the Jackson - Vanik amendments concerning its immigration practices and, more generally its human rights record. Granting of most favoured nation status to China was a major

23. Keesing's Record of World Events, N.20, Vol.36, June 1990, p.37531, also New York Times, March 11,1989.

part of the normalization of Sino-American relations in the late 1970s. It was a centerpiece of the talks between President Carter and Vice Premier Deng in February 1979, and the prospects of expanded Sino-American trade probably helped moderate China's response to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979²⁴. Until the Tiananmen tragedy, extension of most favoured nation status was routine. Since then it has turned into a perennial political battle, fueled by China's human rights abuses and its trade surplus. Sino-American relations are thus becoming regular aspect of a bruising debate over most favoured nation status between the Congress and the President.

In 1990, when congress saw no change in administration's China policy, despite the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the clear evidence that China was becoming more repressive, congressional opposition to China's MFN status mounted. Congress questioned the double standard that denied MFN treatment to a reforming Soviet Union while extending it to an increasingly repressive China²⁵. Critics of China's human rights record in the US hoped to use the state department's country Reports on human rights practices for 1989, for denying an extension of MFN trade status for China.

24. Michel Oksenberg, "The China Problem" Foreign Affairs (New York) Vol.70, No.1, Summer 1991, p.3.

25. Roger W. Sullivan, N.5, p.11.

But on 24 May 1990, President Bush renewed China's MFN status, he said that his decision was based on concern about American exports to China, and should not be seen as a reward to Beijing; concluded that potential harm to American companies and to reform-minded Chinese outweighs the desire to register disapproval of Beijing's human rights records. Bush also reasoned that the denial of MFN would cost capitalist Hong Kong 20,000 jobs and 8.5 billion US dollars in export of Chinese made goods processed in Hong Kong, and an increase of 40 percent of the prices American customers must pay for the Chinese exports .

In 1991, after a brief period of cooperation and warmth before the Gulf War, US-China relations took a turn for the worse. Tension built up in the areas of human rights, weapons proliferation and trade. Last year trade was considered among the few bright aspects of the strained Sino-US relationship and China's retention of MFN status was advocated on the ground that trade was a liberalising influence. But, with the trade deficit with China jumping from 6.2 billion US dollars in 1989 to 10.4 billion US dollars in 1990, the third largest deficit after Japan and Taiwan . The criticism against granting MFN status to China began to mount. US administration also accused Beijing

26. Department of State, American Foreign Policy Documents for 1990, Document No.483, 24 May 1990, p.696.

27. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2, 1991.

of various unfair trade practices, including import controls, dumping falsifying origin information in order to cheat on Quotas and violations of Intellectual Property Rights. This was coupled with intelligence reports that China transferred nuclear technology to Algeria without adequate safeguards against atomic proliferation; Chinese refusal to join the Missile Technology Control Regime; revelation of Chinese classified documents discussing exports of textiles manufactured in labour camps, arms sales to Burma and its confirmed support to Khmer Rouge and continued trials of the political activists who participated in the 1989 demonstrations . The April 1991 visit to Washington by the Dalai Lama turned Congressional attention to China's oppression of Tibetans. A resolution passed in the US house of representatives in April 1991 declared congressional support for Tibetan independence, which China saw as a direct challenge to its territorial integrity. Implicitly, the US administration's unhappiness with China's conduct became clear when President Bush became the first US President to meet Dalai Lama, though the White House officials stressed that US policy had not changed and that Dalai Lama was received as a spiritual leader and not as a political one. On April 15, human rights Group, "Asia watch" released the news that China is systematically using

28. Michel Oksenberg, N.22, p.3.

29. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington D.C. Congress Quarterly Inc., 1990), p.330.

prisoners in forced labour camps to produce cheap labour
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goods for exports .

But on May 30, 1991 President Bush notified Congress that he would renew MFN trade benefits for China despite Beijing's hard line policies. Earlier, in his speech at Yale University on May 27, President Bush said that he could continue trading privileges for another year and that he sought to lessen political effect of his decision by imposing new restrictions on missile technology exports to
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China .

The president was able to retain MFN status for China by the threat of his veto. One third of the Senate supported the administration position that conditional renewal would be tantamount to withdrawing MFN status because Beijing would refuse to comply with the conditions, and that withdrawal
32
would be too costly.

If there was any doubt in the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre about the commitment of the Chinese leadership to economic reform, it was definitely dispelled in 1992. The year began with a much publicised visit of Deng to the special Economic zone of Shenzhen. He announced that economic reforms and the open door policy remained top

30. Asia Watch(New York), May 2, 1991.

31. New York Times, May 27, 1989.

32. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, No.29, p.360.

priorities and warned that anyone who opposed them would be forced out of office³³. (In February 1992, President Bush vetoed the congress effort to put conditions on renewal of China's favourable trade status with US in response to China's human rights record, soaring trade surplus and contained arms exports to middle east. On the eve of annual US congressional hearings on China's MFN trading status in a politically charged presidential election year, Beijing took some steps to win western public opinion. A Washington Post reporter charged with receiving "Secret documents", was let off with a stiff warning, rather than expulsion. Also three septuagenarian catholic priests were released from prisons, where they had been kept for years for professing loyalty to the Vatican rather than the collaborationist, "patriotic" church in China.) A western diplomat mused, "for this, we're expected to be grateful, its like inviting you to praise somebody for no longer beating his wife³⁴." On 1st June, the human rights advocacy group, Asia watch³⁵, released a major report highlighting repression of pro-democracy activists in China's Human province, it provided extra ammunition to Congress' 'China critics'. (But President Bush on June 3, 1992, issued a statement that preferential

33. Elizabeth J Perry, "China in 1992 : An Experiment in New Authoritarianism" Asian Survey (Berkeley), Vol. XXXIII, no.1, January 1993, p.12.

34. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 4, 1992.

35. Asia Watch(New York), June 1, 1992.

trade benefits to China would be extended for one more year and that is was the best way to support economic and political reform there).

Clearly, the annual threat to withdraw MFN status has produced a few small concessions and cosmetic developments in China. Chinese leaders did not compromise in any substantial way to secure continued MFN status. They seem to be convinced that compromise and reform brought down the communist parties in Eastern Europe, and they have no intention of suffering the same fate. The Chinese leadership, also, does not believe compromise is necessary because it thinks that MFN threat is a bluff. In such circumstances, by continuing China's MFN trading status US strengthens the market-oriented South, introduces new ideas, and undermines the communist system.

By mid-1990, there was a distinct possibility that Sino-American relations might fall to a new low as a result of a US refusal to renew MFN tariff treatment for Chinese imports and Beijing's warnings of probable Chinese retaliation. But the leaders of both sides, were anxious to sustain a basic framework of relations that would serve their respective interests - Chinese leaders still regarded relations with the US as a critical element in their efforts to modernize China.

36. Roger W. Sullivan, N.6, p.12.

American leaders were also reluctant to allow their revulsion with the Tinnanmen massacre to isolate China in ways that could jeopardize stability in Asia and hoped for revival of reform in China. President Bush saw the prospect of a gradually changing China, a country whose growing economic interaction with the US and the industrialized world would inevitably lead to a greater economic and political benefits and improved human rights conditions for the Chinese people³⁷. The President believed that the United States must be constructively involved with this process because of China's size, location, and its strategic importance in world affairs, and its economic potential.

Chinese leaders avoided unduly harsher responses to foreign criticisms and took few tangible steps to serve their basic interests. In 1990, Chinese leaders took a few postures in mid year - notably, permitting Fang Lizhi to leave China after he had spent a year in the US embassy. Fang Lizhi criticised US policy saying that it has double standards for human rights that is tougher on Soviet Union than on China³⁸. Samuel S Kim says, Fang Lizhi "became China's carrot to pressure the United States to remove international sanctions³⁹". One of China's "original" condition for

37. Robert G Sutter, "Tinnanmen's Lingering Fallout on Sino-American Relations" Current History (Philadelphia), no.90, September 1991, p.248.

38. New York Times, July 7, 1990.

39. Samuel S. Kim, N.11, p.248.

releasing Fang was the resumption of some World Bank loans. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 provided a respite to the downward trend in the Sino-American relations. Beijing skillfully used the Gulf crisis to restore some of its image as a responsible member of the community of nations. But by criticizing Iraq and the war to expel Iraq from Kuwait, China preserved its Third World identity as well. Despite Iraqi lobbying and a visit to Beijing by Iraqi officials, China did not use its veto power to block security council actions against Iraq, or join Cuba and Yemen in voting against some of the sanctions. In 1990, China was eager to break out of its own "pariah status" in the wake of 1989 Tiananmen massacre⁴⁰. Going along with the west or Iraq seemed one way to get out of the dialogue. The US administration praised in August, 1990, China's "constructive role" in the UN-backed peace plan for Cambodia. In spite of the suspension of high level visits, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was invited to Washington in November 1990 and there he met the President, Secretary of State James Baker and other Congressmen. The Bush administration followed up its meeting with Qian Qichen by arranging for Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Richard Schifter to travel⁴¹ to China for talks in December, 1990.

40. Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 June 1992, p.27.

41. Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol.36, No.11, November 1990, p.37341.

The Chinese government's acceptance in December of a visit by a high level US human rights official was cautiously welcomed by Washington as signalling an implicit reversal of Peking's insistence that Chinese human rights were strictly an internal affair of China. Observers in Beijing were not optimistic that Schifter's visit will mark any substantial change in Beijing's policies on human rights. The official Chinese Press reference to Schifter's visit was, "an exchange of opinion on bilateral relations and other matters of interest," reflecting perhaps that Beijing may be willing to hear out foreign views for the sake of its foreign relations, but will continue to adhere to its own yardsticks in dealing with human rights internally.⁴² Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter, said that he pressed for the release of political prisoners with the Chinese officials in 16 hours of discussion, but the talks ended with no Commitment from Chinese.⁴³

Assistant Secretary of State for East Africa and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon travelled to China in March, 1991 to discuss the peace process in Cambodia and other issues. Arms Control specialist, US under Secretary of State for Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew visited China in June 1991, to solve the issue of Chinese arms sales, in particular those involving missiles and other weapons of

42. Beijing Review, December 16, 1990.

43. Department of State, American Foreign Policy Documents, Document No. 487, 19 December 1990, p.699.

mass destruction to the middle east. This produced little apart from well known Chinese reassurances that they will act in a "prudent and possible manner". But in a conciliatory move, Beijing agreed in early June to participate in a US sponsored conference to get the world's top arms suppliers to establish guidelines limiting the sale of arms and nuclear related technology to the middle east⁴⁴. Beijing's decision was perceived as an attempt by the Chinese to be seen to be cooperating with Washington at a time when US public and congressional anger at China focused on missile proliferation and human rights abuses, had put the renewal of China's most favoured nation trading status in doubt. In November 1991, Secretary of State James Baker visited China. He was the most senior American official to visit China since the 1989 military crackdown on Tiananmen democracy movement. Baker in his visit asked Chinese authorities to cease any transfer of nuclear weapons technology to countries like Algeria and Iran, and that China should release some of the pro-democracy political prisoners⁴⁵. The three-day talks of Baker with Chinese leaders ended with limited Chinese gestures to curb Missile sales, but with little progress towards easing China's suppressions of human rights.

44. *ibid.*

45. New York Times, November 16, 1991.

China was named in June 1991 by the US administration in the 'Super 301' section of the 1988 Trade Act. On November 26, 1991, US Trade Representative Carla Hills announced that China's proposals had turned out to be "insufficient" and that negotiations to avert imposition of punitive tariffs against China under "Super 301" had collapsed. An agreement was however reached in January 1992, but dropping of China off the "Super 301" depended on the fulfillment of the Chinese promises. In October, 1992 US and China reached an agreement under which Beijing would bring down barriers to American imports. Accord among other things gave American made computers, chemical and telecommunication equipment greater access to China's huge markets.

US President Bush met Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, January 31, 1992, who had come to attend UN summit conference. American intelligence reports indicated that China continued to sell missile technology to Syria and Pakistan despite statements by Chinese leaders that they are willing to curb missile exports. The issue was important because US was ready to lift sanctions on sale of American satellite parts and high speed computers that were imposed in the spring of 1991 after US learned that China had secretly delivered launchers for M-11 missiles to Pakistan. President Bush who favoured the lifting of sanctions raised the issue with Prime Minister Li Peng.

46 New York Times, May 1, 1991.

China criticised US State Department's annual human rights report for 1992 (which was released when Deng was visiting US), that had described Beijing as repressive Government that routinely violates human rights. China accused US of interfering in its internal affairs. In February, 1992 Bush administration lifted sanctions against China's transfer of high technology after accepting pledge to abide by restriction on missile sales to middle east.

In May 1992, the Los Angeles riots sparked a spate of "America bashing" in Chinese official media. Official People's Daily pronounced that "China is better than the US in many kinds of human rights." It contrasted China's low official Crime figures with US "World leadership" in murder, robbery, rape, drug abuse, unemployment and racial discrimination⁴⁷. The Beijing Review cited the Rodney King verdict as proof that the US legal system offered no justice for minority.

During Bush's tenure as President Sino-US relation evidenced modest gains⁴⁸. Beijing did protest strongly on the US Bush administration's decision to sell fighter planes to Taiwan in October 1992. But on the most important issue of Trade, a memorandum of understanding on market access was concluded

47. Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 May, 1992, p.26.

48. Elizabeth J Perry, N.33, p.19.

on October 14, after nine rounds of negotiations. In the memorandum, the US pledged to promote China's participation in GATT as well as to loosen controls over the export of high technology.

During the Presidential campaign President Bill Clinton spoke sharply about China-envisioning "an America that will not coddle tyrants from Baghdad to Beijing". Eventually however, he extended China's MFN Status for one more year in June 1993. He was dictated by two concerns in this decision. On the one hand by deteriorating links with China, US would lose the chance to remain engaged in China's modernization and to profit from the trade and investment there. Further, US would lose the prospect of working jointly with China on mutual concerns in the Asia/Pacific region and beyond. On the other hand, US had serious human rights concerns about China⁴⁹. On conclusion it may be said that US policy towards China has been caught up in and shaped by American domestic priorities rather than international human rights commitment.

49. Robert B Oxnam, "Asia/Pacific Challenges" Foreign Affairs Vol.72, no.1, Winter 1993, p.64.

CONCLUSION

The Americans' espousal for the human rights rhetoric has presented two fundamental problems in foreign policy. It has faced the traditional conflict between commitment to human values and exercise of power for other interests. Secondly, US has discovered that the American and international versions of human rights are not the same.

Human rights in American foreign policy became important in 1973, when Congress asserted itself in the American foreign policy. Before that, with the commencement of cold war, human rights was subsumed under the problem of containment of Soviet Union. The trauma of Vietnam and Watergate aroused the Congress to assert itself on the foreign policy. The result was a renewed interest in internationally recognized human rights as a separate issue. The Vietnam tragedy brought home to the Americans the disturbing truth that resisting communism was not always the same as protecting human rights. Thus three general statutes linked human rights to US security assistance, economic assistance and voting in the international financial institutions. All the three acts from 1970's contained the stipulation that US foreign policy was to be affected by "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights" in recipient states. By the 1970's Congress reacted to a perceived immoral tilt in the US foreign policy by legislating human rights into foreign policy via general, country specific and function specific statutes.

From that time onwards there has been a clash on the place of human rights in US foreign policy. US congress has always given much importance to human rights whereas administration has always been moved by the US national interests. Kissinger resisted the congressional pressures to the end of his tenure under President Gerald Ford. The Carter administration did move, somewhat in the direction desired by the congress. It gave human rights great rhetorical prominence as a separate issue and supported some multilateral diplomacy on human rights. A trend which can be noticed is that the pressure for human rights has always been more during the years of detente. From the signing of SALT-I treaty in 1972 to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, human rights had moved to centre stage in American foreign policy. It was a much talked about issue in the public, congress and the executive. But with the commencement of the second cold war in 1979, the issue of human rights once again became subservient to the US goal of checking the growing influence of Soviet Union in the world.

The early Reagan orientation towards human rights was personified by Ernest Lefever, whose nomination to the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was withdrawn in the face of bipartisan opposition from the congress. Lefever had criticised Carter for "trivializing" human rights by not seeing the subject as part of the cold war. He had also stated that he was in favour of "rolling back" human rights legislation passed by

congress because of the same reasons. Another example is that President Reagan could stay in the power even after the Irangate scandal, mainly because he could play on the fear of the people of a more dominant and assertive Soviet Union.

At another level, it seems clear that the US has always adopted double standards in dealing with countries violating human rights. It has been insistently critical in examining the violation of human rights in communist countries and more lenient in assessing the human rights violations of its allies, for example, Chile and Guatemala or China till the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. The State department's annual report on the human rights practices of most other countries, while reports on its own practices to international monitoring bodies is unavailable. The US, however, has had problems with police brutality, civil rights, homelessness, and health care crisis which can be considered human rights violations. These problems are treated as being qualitatively different from torture, racial discrimination, of the right to education, shelter, and health care in other countries.

US developed cordial relations with communist China after President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1971. Since then, China has been considered strategically important to US in containing Soviet Union. Chinese violations of human rights were largely ignored by the US. But the military crackdown on the peaceful demonstrators demanding democracy

raised harsh criticism' by the American media and subsequently influenced the American public opinion. The US administration came to realize that it could no longer avoid the issue of violations of human rights in China, and imposed some serious sanctions against China. The reasons for this change in the United State's behaviour were that the successful democracy movement which had started in the Soviet Union and other east block countries raised hopes in the Western world of establishing democratic regimes in the world. But the crushing of democracy movement by the Chinese authorities came as a rude shock. Secondly, the coverage of the military crackdown by the western media for the first time brought the picture of the events and the violations of human rights in China to the houses of people in US and other western countries. The public opinion in the US expressed outrage and pressed its government to terminate all ties with a government which so brutally crushed the un- armed peaceful demonstrators. Thirdly, with the detente in US-Soviet relations the strategic importance of China was also reduced in the eyes of the US. As one commentator put it "when their national security is at stake, Americans have been prepared to ally with the devil; in the absence of such a threat, they prefer to associate with nations that share their values". But in a new world order in which threats are not as dire or neatly defined as the erstwhile challenge from Moscow, the US does not need China as much and will be both less generous and less forgiving. What role would China play in the new world

order was not clear. However, Chinese cooperation during the Gulf Crisis made US-China relation on an even plane again. The importance of China was also clear in other areas of Asia-Pacific region. China is the major arms supplier to the Middle East, Pakistan and other Third World countries. China is also accused of proliferating missile technology in that region. It is needed by the US to counter the growing influence of India in South Asia. Its support to Khmer Rouge in Cambodia makes it important in the Indo-China region and in any effort to establish peace in that region. China also supplies arms to the military government of Myanmar. It is important in checking North Korea's quest for a nuclear capability and reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. China is also important in the Central Asian Region, which has become very volatile with the break-up of former Soviet Union into many independent states with nuclear capabilities. China's nuclear power and permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council is another consideration. Economically, China is valuable to the US, US is the second largest investor in China after Japan. The economy of China is closely tied to that of Taiwan, Hongkong and South Korea. It is also useful to counter the growing influence of Japan in Asia.

These long-term benefits forced US administration to not to sever its ties with China, after the military crackdown in China, and the gross violations of human rights there inspite of the heavy criticism of its policies by the US

public, media and the Congress. President Bush personally took charge of US policy towards China after the Tinanmen massacre in June 1989. US did not want to alienate China because of its new strategic importance to US and because of the fear of reversal of the process of economic liberalisation which was started in 1979. US was guided in its policies towards China by its national interest, which took a precedence over human rights in its relations with China. As a critic put it, "At any rate one must wonder if the US or the world would have reacted so sharply against China if the people killed at Tinanmen Square were crying out for more food rather than more democracy."

Lastly, there is also a difference on the definition of human rights as they are perceived in US and China. Chinese definition of human rights falls into three categories: that a government's dealings with its own citizens are its "internal affairs" which foreigners have no right to criticize; that human rights are always subject to limitations, which government from time to time impose; and that nations with different social systems may choose to emphasize (or to derogate) certain rights in keeping with the dictates of their ideologies.

But US asserts that such arguments overlook important consideration of China's membership of the United Nations and its participation in international human rights agreements, not mention its own criticism of other violators

(i.e. South Africa and Israel), compel it to accept the legitimacy of international criticism. The developments during the past years in Eastern Europe, along with the votes against China at the UN Human Rights Commission by Hungary and Bulgaria, undercut claims of socialist exceptionalism in the field of human rights.

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