

**BALUCH ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN
PAKISTAN AFTER 1973**

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in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

RAGHAVENDRA NARAYAN SINGH



**South Asian Studies Division
Centre for South, Central, South East Asian and
South West Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067
India
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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “BALOCH ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN AFTER 1973”, submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my original work. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

I shall be responsible for the mistakes and ~~weaknesses~~ ^{inaccuracies} in my work.

Raghavendra Narayan Singh

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. P. S. Sastry
 (Chairperson)
 Centre for South, Central, South East
 Asian and South West Pacific Studies
 School of International Studies
 Jawaharlal Nehru University
 New Delhi-110067

Prof. Uma Singh
 (Supervisor)
 Centre for South, Central, South East
 Asian and South West Pacific Studies
 School of International Studies
 Jawaharlal Nehru University
 New Delhi-110067

To
My Journalist Friend
Aditya Vikram Singh

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Raghavendra Narayan Singh

PREFACE

Nationalism is the most powerful concept in the modern world. Nationalism is both an ideology and a form of behaviour. The ideology of nationalism builds on people's awareness of a nation (national self-consciousness) to give a set of attitudes and a programme of action. These may be cultural, economic, or political. Since nation can be defined in 'ethnic', 'social' or 'official' senses, so nationalism can take these forms also.

Today, nationalism is "the world's major ideological 'legitimator' and 'deligitimator' of states, regimes, and governments" (Rothschild, 1981: 14). In all cases, nationalism seeks to defend and promote the interests of the nation. The political aspect of nationalism is seen most clearly in the demand for 'national-self determination or 'home rule'. For states 'official nationalism means patriotism and the defence of 'national sovereignty' in international relations. Patriotism focuses loyalty on the state, while 'social' and 'ethnic' nationalism may seek the disintegration of the state.

The context in which nationalism flourishes is determined by a complex interaction of political, economic and cultural developments in history. While the ideology of nationalism has spread throughout the world, the differing contexts of time and place have given nationalism and ethnicity differing political forms. A particularly strong explanation of nationalist behaviour is that which relates it to perceptions of 'uneven economic development, affecting different nations and ethnic groups, coupled with a 'Cultural Division of Labour'. But the political aspirations for democracy and cultural changes (e.g., widespread education and a desire for cultural status) are as important. The democratic alternative to nationalist ideology is cultural pluralism and consociationalism, based on a multi-national or multi-ethnic 'consensus' state (Kellas, 1998).

It is general perception that whenever, there is ethnic violence it is regarded as something 'primitive and uncivilised'. State tries to suppress the ethnic violence in the name of law and order problem. The role of state in suppressing the regional and ethnic aspirations of people has become crucial. Since nationalism is inconceivable without the

state and vice-versa, all the ethnic and nationalist struggles are centred around the state. All for the state and nothing against it.

Pakistan came into being in 1947 on the basis of Muslim League's 'two nation' theory. Ever since its creation, the ineluctable dilemma facing the nation has been to create a viable national identity out of diverse ethno-linguistic and regional loyalties. Pakistan is world's one of the most ethnically and linguistically complex state. The most serious threat to Pakistan since its inception has been from the ethnic front, which is still in official parlance referred to as provincialism, or 'regionalism'.

After partition, Pakistan could not integrate the disparate social, economic, ethnic and geographic elements into a single nation state. The ethno-cultural identities of various regional entities inhabiting Pakistan are order and deeper than the six decade old Pakistani identity. They are apparently conscious of their distinct ethno-cultural identities and politico-economic interests which they don't wish to be relegated to secondary priorities and sacrifice on the rehabilitation of Islam as the sole factor and the national ideology of Pakistan (Miller, 1968: 1-20).

In Pakistan, Punjab's domination in every sphere of administration continues, and this has caused much anger among other ethnic minorities. Out of initial five- Bengalis, Pashtun, Baloch, Sindhis and Punjabis, four have already contested the legitimacy of the state, with one (Bengali) finally succeeding in breaking away in 1971 (emergence of Bangladesh). After partition another group was added to the already existing five, in the shape of Indian Muslim migrants, the Mohajirs. Even before partition, the two provinces NWFP and Balochistan had opposed their accession to the new Pakistani state.

Baloch nationalism is the most fierce as compared to other three ethnic nationalism. Balochistan has been a saga of treachery first by the British and later by the new Pakistani state. The British deliberately neglected this geo-strategically important province for their politics of 'Great Game' of 'routes and anti-routes'. They deliberately divided the Baloch population among Baloch people as well as in the neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan. After the partition, the new Pakistan state treated the region worse than its predecessors. The new state always treated the Baloch people as tribal and unfit to be ruled by themselves. The Central Government neglected their demands for provincial

autonomy and greater share in province's revenue. But these demands have been denied by the Pakistani Government. The exploitation of Baloch's natural resources by the Central Government has led to the alienation of Baloch. That is why the Baloch have revolted four times. Viz in 1948, 1958-60, 1963 and 1973-77, the fifth low level insurgency is going on since 2005.

The Baloch nationalism has steadily developed. Every time, after being crushed, the national movement arose more forcefully than ever before. Starting with 500 to 700 rebels under prince Karim in 1948 to 55000 Baloch guerrillas during 1973-77 insurgency. The death of Nawab Akbar Bugti by the military has created unrest among the Baloch. Once again, the state is trying to crush the nationalist movement as it did in the past. What emerges from the history of Baloch nationalism is that despite its regional and ethnic assertion, it has always been more concerned about its political power than about some primordial identity. Nationalism is not really about identity, culture or traditions, but about political power. Since Baloch nationalism has always been directly linked with the state, its future also depends more than everything else on what turn the Pakistani state takes (Khan, 2005).

Thus it is certain that even in the near future the tension between the Baloch nationalists and Pakistani state will continue. The never say die spirit of Baloch ethnic and political consciousness will continue to haunt the Pakistani state in order to achieve its nationalist goal. The focus of my dissertation is on all these issues concerning the Baloch nationalism.

Structure of the Dissertation

Having discussed the relationship between ethnicity, nationalism and the state as well as theories of nationalism in this first chapter, chapter 2 will examine the problems of national integration in Pakistan. Chapter 3 will focus on the emergence of Baloch nationalism in Pakistan after 1973, chapter 4 will examine the socio-economic and cultural factors for Baloch alienation and finally chapter 5 will sum up these four chapters and give a conclusion of the dissertation.

Rationale and Scope of Study

Balochistan is geo-politically and strategically the most important province of Pakistan: were it not for its strategic location, long coastal line at the mouth of gulf and potential for discoveries of oil, gas, and other minerals, it may not have assumed the importance it currently enjoys. Besides the Chagai nuclear testing range, Balochistan is the main base for space programmes and rocket experimentation facilities. The proposed Iran -Pakistan –India gas pipeline will pass through this crucial province. The Gwadar port and port Qasim are in this province. Quetta does not need any introduction, Pakistan's strategic road head to Kandhar in Afghanistan. The presence of two great powers China because of Gwadar Seaport and mega development projects and USA because of Iran and influence of Russia in CAR countries is quite significant: The main problems in Balochistan are: firstly, the so-called nationalist movement acts on behalf of exploitative and vested tribal leaders who have kept the people illiterate and the province under-developed. The second problem lies with the successive authoritarian regimes of Pakistan who do not believe in the diversity and federal system of the country. With so much of strategic, economic and geopolitical factors at stake, Pakistan, cannot afford to have a roaring insurgency in Balochistan. It is supreme irony of fate that such a strategic province is the most backward and least developed province. Due to all round governmental neglect and economic exploitation by the centre this province is economically deprived, socially backward and politically alienated. The main focus of the proposed research work will be on the Baloch ethnic nationalism after 1973. This research study will focus on economic exploitation by successive central governments and disassociation of the local people from the modernization and mega development projects. Due to the presence of two great powers in this province, the focus will be on Chinese and American presence and finally this research study will also focus on the role of military in the ethnic problem of this crucial province.

Methodology

Descriptive and analytical method will be used. Relevant information and data published will be interpreted both qualitatively and quantitatively. The study will be based on primary and secondary sources. For the primary sources the government documents,

reports, surveys, conducted by various national and international organizations will be used. Existing literature, published journals, news paper would be explored and it will form the secondary sources. To enrich the study the relevant materials from the internet and working paper by research institute will also be used.

***Note:** I have used word 'Baloch' in my dissertation. Prior to 1990, the ethonym Baloch was spelled differently by several authors, like Baluch, Baloch, Baloches, Belooch and Biloch. In 1990, the provincial government of Balochistan declared that the official English spelling was to be 'Baloch'. I, however, have not changed the spelling of other scholars who have used different spellings.

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

“Nationalism is not the awakening of the nation to self-consciousness, it invents nations where they do not exist”. (Gellener, 1964:169)

No single political doctrine has played a more prominent role in shaping the face of the modern world than nationalism. Nationalism and ethnicity are central to the subject of politics, whether in the world of action or in the realm of study. Countless wars, revolts and conflicts have been the result of passions which nation and ‘kith and kin’, have aroused in human beings. Millions of people (Horowitz, 1985) around the world have willingly laid down their lives for their ‘father lands’ and this almost ritualistic mass-self sacrifice continues unabated whether in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America or the developed countries of North America and Europe. Nationalist passions are probably the strongest in whole political spectrum, and are generally stronger today than those aroused by religion, class, individual or group interest. We confront at the dawn of twenty-first century a ‘globalised’ world of economic interdependence, of mass-media and extensive networks of nearly instantaneous and non-governmental organizations that criss-cross state borders. At the same time we observe fierce nationalisms, fragmented and collapsed states, warlordism, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and attempted genocides (William Jr., 2003:1). In the last decade of the twentieth century, in country after country, millions of men, women, and children were tortured and slaughtered, their homes burned, their lives totally disrupted. Millions of individuals are refugees from state terror and communal fighting; they live in camps and flimsy shelters, they trudge through snowy hills carrying a few meagre possessions. Today’s civil wars and state-sponsored mass killing are ‘dirty’ wars. It has been well said that “they are deep-rooted, highly internationalized, fought ruthlessly with enormous human suffering, and difficult to resolve (Ganguli and Taras: 1998:184)

These passions are not all negative, however. Nationalism has been considered essential to the establishment of a modern industrial society. (Gellner, 1983). It gives legitimacy to the state, and inspires its citizens to feel an emotional attachment towards it. It can be a source of creativity in the arts, and enterprise in the economy. Its power to

mobilise political activity is unsurpassed, especially in the vital activity of nation-building.

One is faced with many problems when tackling this subject. The manifestations of nationalism and ethnicity are not only widespread and complex, but there is also a very large and contradictory literature in this field. Anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers and historians as well as political scientists have tried their best to understand ethnicity and nationalism; given the universal scope and significance of the subject.

While ethnicity and ethnic conflict may be as old as human societies, their intensity, which has recently touched monstrous proportions, is something new, something modern that is related to modernity and its most powerful manifestation the modern state. In fact, state sponsored violence has caused some of the most brutal ethnic violence, which has led to the death of million people, as was the case in Nazi Germany during Second World War or more recently in Yugoslavia.

Nationalism and ethnic politics are related to the state and the struggle for control of political resources. Ethnic and nationalist violence generally occurs in two-forms: Either by the state or for the state. On the one hand, the state regards any voice of dissent and demand for autonomy or self-determination as 'provincial', tribal' and 'disruptive', on the other hand, ethnic, linguistic and religious group feel alienated and see the state as not their own, and therefore, struggle either to make it more responsive to their demands or if that is not possible, to create their own state.

It does not mean that the important factors such as 'industrialism, communication and market economy are considered less important-far from it. It means that seeing the interventionist role of the state and its penetration of almost every aspect of individual life make it the focal point of all struggles. All these struggles might not be just political, but may also be economic, cultural, regional, ethnic and religious. But seeing the pivotal role of the state in all these struggles it is looked up to for reparation.

National movements arise in many different forms, in many guises and in many different circumstances. Nationalist sentiments are not strongest only among deprived groups but also among privileged groups like the Basques and Catalans in Spain or Sikhs in India. Once again, the state is the main issue.

The modern state as an instrument of capitalist expansion has played the most important role in the global spread of economy. It was the European colonial state which introduced colonies to a centralized bureaucratic state system. Unlike Europe, in most Asian and African countries modernity did not come about via market economy but through politico-military means (Mouzelis, 1998: 160). We all know that anti-colonial nationalism was without any doubt anti-state. It united the colonialisèd people against a common enemy, the colonial state. The major preoccupation of the post-colonial elite has been the formation of the state and nation building through the state machinery. In the West, it was just the opposite. The nationalism in the West, identified it self with the state from the beginning. That is why most of the third world countries after the end of foreign rule turned into militaristic, authoritarian regimes that imposed a kind of 'native' colonialism on the deprived groups.

Given the prevalence of ethnic conflict in contemporary domestic and international affairs, it is essential for us to understand the significance of dynamics of relationship between ethnicity, nationalism and the state as well as theories of nationalism with special reference to Baloch ethnic nationalism and the role of the state in Pakistan: This first chapter will focus on these important topics.

The Concept of Ethnicity

The term ethnicity first appeared in 1950s in the English language. It is first recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary of 1953 and one of the earliest compilations or articles under that heading states: - Ethnicity seems to be a new term (Glazer and Meynihan, 1975:1). The English adjective 'ethnic' in turn derives from the ancient Greek term 'Ethnos'. In French, the Greek noun survives as *Ethnie*, with an associated adjective *ethnique* (John Hutchinson and A.D. Smith, 1996:4). The word 'Ethny' was proposed by van den Berghe (1981, 22; cf, Dutter 1990) and used routinely by A.D Smith (1989).

Although scholarly definition of 'Ethnic' or ethnicity are numerous and some time quite divergent, a common core of identifying markers does exist and is recognized: However, a comprehensive understanding of ethnicity requires an integration of perspectives from sociology, cultural studies, sociological analyses of relationship and groups and social psychology.

Most perhaps all, serious definitions of ethnicity are ‘range’, definitions. They specify a number of characteristics that identify, in combination, the referent. Thus the three most central characteristics include.

1. Cultural distinctiveness (a range itself, including language, food preferences and taboos, songs, dances, literature, games and so on.
2. Membership by birth (descent), endogamy (in-group marriage)
3. A population larger than small kinship units or face to face groups. Once given these three different criteria, ethnics may be further specified by any one or a combination of the following.
4. Geographical concentration segregation.
5. Historic homeland – father land and mother land.
6. Distinctive occupations.
7. Differential treatment by other ethnics.
8. Historical memories of a common past.
9. Strong sentiments of mutual obligation (solidarity).
10. Claims for autonomy resistance to outsiders’.
11. Demonstrated capability for concerted action to defend advance common interests.

(Williams Jr. 2003:13:14)

Ethnie is defined as ‘a name unit of population with common ancestry myths and shared historical memories, elements of shared culture, a link with a historic territory, and some measure of solidarity, at least among the elites. (A.D. Smith 1995: 57).

Michael Banton describes ethnicity as a variety of nationalism, in which the leaders “seek to make their fellow constituent conscious of a shared attribute” and to persuade those constituents that the attribute is more important than the group members previously realized (Banton, 1986: 14).

According to Raymond Hall, the difference between ethnicity and nationalism are merely of timing. He says that before the impact of European organization on non-European people, they were ethnic minorities. These groups, which remained autonomous from the newer, larger political states, were transformed to national minorities (Hall, 1979).

Ethnicity is a kind of consciousness about the status and problems of an ethnic group (Brass: 1991: 19). It also connotes mobilization of an ethnic group in order to assert for its share in economic resources and the power structure which they consider to have been denied due to the discriminatory policies followed by the state (Robertson, 1985: 111-112).

It can be said that ethnicity is the manipulation and mobilization of group identity against structured inequalities, induced discriminations or power politics.

Ethnic Group: In contemporary political usage, the term 'ethnic group' is frequently used to describe a quasi-national kind of 'minority group' within the state, which has somehow not achieved the status of a 'nation' Ethnic groups are essentially 'exclusive' or 'ascriptive', meaning that membership in such groups is confined to those who share certain inborn attributes. (Riggs: 1985: *INTERCOTA* Glossary).

Ethnic Mobilisation

In any country, it is very difficult to satisfy all sections of people. So a first requirement for mobilization must be some actual or potential shared grievances, without some sense of grievances, people don't mobilize. Yet grievances can be created. Small groupings of the disaffected and rebellious can articulate and spread conceptions of deprivation, discrimination and unjust policies. Thus, ethnic mobilization consists of joint action by members of an ethny to seek shared goals through claims for common interests.

Further, to understand the extent and character of ethnic conflict today requires close and detailed analysis of the internal social structure and dynamics of ethnics, the relationship between different ethnies within a particular territorial polity, and the relations between ethnies and the states that attempt to encompass and rule them.

Primordial, Constructionist and Structuralist Theory

Ethnicity has long been a basis of political as well as social association defying both the predictions of the Marxists who century and a half ago foresaw social class replacing such primordial bases of political association as ethnicity and language and the

post doctrinal theorists of the mid 20th century, who saw such concerns being eclipsed by the quality of life issues.

Theories of ethnicity suggested interaction between cultural groups, vertically structured with their own ranking systems as a more reliable measure of social behaviour than social class in post industrial mass consumption societies: The study of ethnic and national identity, ethnic mobilization and nationalism, and the interaction of these forces with political processes has perhaps not been sufficiently segmented.

1. 'Primordial' theory which views ethnicity as a natural trait rooted in the individual's birth into ancestral gene pool or shared cultural network centres on the origin and durability of ethnic identity, as such it is akin to but not entirely dependent on the narrow biological definition of ethnicity.
2. 'Constructionist theory' is more about the adaptability of ethnic identity as a means of explaining its disability. Related to the broad definition of Ethnicity we are employing here, constructionist treats ethnicity as an evolving concept in which overtime and space, economic, political and religious structures emerge with specific configurations that may be labelled ethnic.
3. In contrast to both above theories, 'Instrumentalist theory' focuses on the utility of ethnic identity as tool of politics, used in a similar fashion by both individual and groups in order to achieve their personal agendas. Here, the emphasis is on political leaders. Political leaders and demagogues who mobilize communities around perhaps latent or forgotten ethnic identities and grievances-not the group themselves and the area of concern is political process, not historical origin of the group or the changing environment in which it exists or defines it self. (Rudolph: 2006:4,5)

Nation, Nationalism and the State

According to Renan's definition: 'A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one is in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present day consent, the desire to live together' (Ernest Renan, quoted in Bhabha: 1990: 8-22).

According Brass, when objectively distinct groups (i.e. these sharing common ethnic characteristics) become aware subjectively of their separate identity and organize themselves politically for the attainment of autonomy or independent state hood they become a nationality or nation (Brass, 1974: 8-9).

He emphasizes the role of elite competition as the basis for ethnic group developing subjective consciousness and making political demands (Brass, 1991, 23-26).

Anderson considers the nation to be an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is limited because it borders on other nations. It is sovereign in the sense that the nation derives legitimacy from the people not from the God. It is imagined in the sense that most of the members of nation do not, or will not, ever know each other.

For Deutsch, the nation is that group of people for whom it is easier to communicate amongst themselves than with others outside the group (Deutsch: 1966: 86-106). He stresses on communication as the chief factor in the modernization process.

A nation is a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound together by the ties of history, culture, and common ancestry. Nations have 'objective' characteristics which may include, a territory, a language, a religion, or common descent (though not all these are always present), and subjective characteristics, essentially a people's awareness of its nationality and affection for it. In the last resort it is the 'the supreme loyalty, for the people who are prepared to die for their nation.

The term nation is also commonly applied to the states as in the United Nations. While many states share the features of nations and can be called nation-states: There are also nations within states and such states are called multinational states (Riggs, 1985 *INTERCOTA* Glossary).

Nationalism is an ideology, a political strategy and a type of social movement that developed following the French revolution. As an ideology nationalism encompasses the idea that a social group (a nation or nation-state) has the right to create its own institutions, that each nation is unique, and that the world is composed of these nation-states. As a political strategy and social movement, nationalism has been a major force for the organization of the world into 200 nations that exist today (David Levinson, 1994: 81-82).

In order to examine nationalism and nation-ness there can be two approaches: subjective and objective: The subjective approach is the one adopted by the nationalists, for whom nation-ness is an eternal reality and nationalism is an awareness of that reality. The objective approach is the one taken by students of nationalism, who believe that nation-ness is a modern phenomenon created by nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1990, 5-8, Anderson, 1991:5).

The former approach requires faith, whereas the latter demands the negation of that faith. For the nationalist it is a simple issue, the fact that they feel and think that they are a nation is enough. But historians insist on more solid a basis than the nationalists feeling and thinking. It is the historians who ultimately face the paradoxes and complexities; There are, therefore, many different approaches to nationalism, like modernist, primordialist, Marxist and functionalist. To quote Anderson in this regard 'the historians' irritation begins the moment they start brooding over the objective modernity of nations and their subjective antiquity, the formal universality of nation alism and the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations, and of course, the political power of nationalism and their philosophical poverty (Anderson: 1991:5).

According to Smith, 'Nationalism is born among the intelligentsia when the messianic' assimilationists try to realize their former vision by adopting the ethnicity solution of the defensive reforming revivalists (Smith: 1983: 255).

According to Breuilly, nationalism is above all and beyond else, about politics, and that politics is about power, power in the modern world is about control of the state (Breuilly, 1993:1).

Gellener's definition of nationalism as 'primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (Gellener, 1983:1). This definition is important in that it explains both official nationalism as well as national movements which are launched against the encroachment of the state. For as Gellener adds:- 'Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. Thus, a group or groups who have control over the state and its resources are satisfied and those who do not have any control over the state, are dissatisfied. The Marxist concept views nationalism as a historical phenomenon whose appearance coincides with the epoch of

capitalism. This school divides the nations into two categories: 'oppressed nationalities and oppressor nationalities; a division supposed to disappear of capitalism when replaced by socialism.

Influenced by Marxist nationalist ideology, in 1960s and 70s, Baloch nationalist also termed Pakistan as divided into 'oppressed' and 'oppressor', while Punjabi were termed as oppressor, the rest (Pushtun, Sindhi, Baloch) as oppressed.

The difference between state nationalism and ethnic nationalism is that the former belongs exclusively to the political sphere, whereas the latter is essentially founded in sociological sphere, and only takes a political form in the process of its struggle. State nationalism is programmatic from start to finish and is imposed from the top through ideological engineering whereas ethnic nationalism arises from below, essentially from a non-programmatic base and in the process may or may not espouse a programme and become political (Hobsbawm, 1996: 257)

But the most important difference between state nationalism is that former has a state whereas the latter strives to have a share in state power or if that is not possible, to have a state of its own.

In most cases state nationalism before the establishment of the state is but ethnic nationalism. However, after acquiring the state, the character and the ideology of ethnic nationalism become unrecognisably different. Indeed, it adopts the same methods, the ideology and the policies against which it once struggled. Renan was right when he said that the basis of national identity is not memory but amnesia (cited in Gellener, 1994: 192) But he was most certainly thinking of a national identity that comes with a state. But the same cannot be said about ethnic identity. The basis of ethnic identity is memory, not amnesia. It is refusal to forget, despite the state nationalism's insistence on forgetting that politicizes ethnicity.

Role of the State

There is hardly any aspect of human activity be it social, cultural, economic or even private which is one way or another is not monitored by the powerful as well as watchful eyes of the state through its elaborate system of record keeping, policing and surveillance. No doubt, the state has assumed the all important role that God is presumed

to play, watchfull all the time seeing through every individual and keeping tabs on their activities. And also like God, the state is impersonal and claims to be neutral and impartial. Weber defines the state as a 'societal organization' which claims authority over a given population in a specific territory. It imposes its will through a system of administration and law modifiable by statute. The executive staff can legitimately use force on behalf of the state, within limits permitted or prescribed by its regulations. (Weber, 1978: 41)

Walker Connor describes the state as legal concept describing a social group that occupies a defined territory is organized under common political institutions and an effective government (Connor, 1972).

The idea of legitimate use of force implies that people habitually accept the authority of the state, and that it does not have to resort to force routinely to compel people to obey (Easton, 1965: 270-90)

The above definitions of state clearly show that the state is the most ubiquitous, massive, powerful and violent container of political power because of its omnipresence, it seems as if the state has always been there. But it has not been so. "Most of the human history has not been graced by the presence of the states" (Hall and Ikenberry: 1989:16) it is only during the last two centuries that the state has spread its tentacles to every nook and corner of the planet Earth. As Gellener puts it in Hegelian way "once none had the state, then some had it and finally all have it (Gellener, 1983:5)

Today, every state is a nation state: every human being is a citizen of one state or another, not only a citizen but also a national. In the nation state system, every one has an officially certified identity whether one likes it or not. In most cases this identity is internalized and adored but in many other cases it is resented and rejected: Hence, many of the most intractable conflicts in the world are either ethno-national or possess a strong nationalist movement (A.D. Smith, 1999: 37), whatever the actual reason behind them might be, they, are predicated on the issues of identity be it cultural, linguistic, ethnic religious, regional or nation al, etc.

To use Adorno's useful neologism, the state as a manifestation of political power is the arena of all 'identitarian thought' and all 'identitarian' struggles. (Said, 1993: 182). That is why all ethnic struggles are either against the state, for the state or by the state.

Theda Skocpol emphasizes the autonomy of the state in relation to social classes and the international system. She writes:-

“The state properly conceived is no mere arena in which socio-economic struggles are fought. It is rather a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create & support coercive and administrative organizations. Of course, these basic state organizations are built up and must operate within the context of class divided socio-economic relations, as well as within the context of national and international economic dynamics (Theda Skocpol 1979: 29).

In order to explain the role of the state it would be better to define the forms of social power. Bobbio has defined three forms: economic, ideological and political or put in other words: The powers of production, persuasion and persecution.

- (1) Economic power is about the possession of certain rare or held to be rare goods, which empower a person or a group to force those who don't possess them to adopt a certain conduct, to perform a certain kind of labour.
- (2) Ideological powers belong to those who have a certain cultural, economic or political authority to formulate the rules of social conduct.
- (3) Political power rests with those who possess the means with which physical violence can be exerted (cited in Poggi, 1990:4)

The state, most massive container of political power that claims monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber: 1991: 78), its significance, its paramountcy, its ultimacy and its functional priority over other bases of power in today's societies cannot be overemphasised. In this age of globalisation, the modern state is not only a container of political power but also as a manager of economy, health, education and social welfare.

During the fifteenth and sixteenth century some very important changes took place in Europe which led to the emergence of a different kind of society, with different set of requirements. The capitalist mode of production gave birth to a new form of power relations. Thus came forth a modern form of political power in the name of an absolute state. The emergence of the absolute state was a decisive rupture with the pyramidal, par

cellised sovereignty of the medieval social formations, with their estates and liege systems'. (Anderson; 1983: 137)

The main characteristics of the absolute state were: 'standing armies, a permanent bureaucracy, national taxation, a codified law and the beginnings of unified market' (Anderson, 1983; 137).

In the eighteenth century, with the all round development of infra-structure and bureaucratic penetration of the society, the administrative state was transformed into a nation-state and the subject into a 'citizen' (Mouzelis: 1998; 159).

Foucault has given three great forms and economies of political power in the West:-

- (1) The state of justice, a political dispensation in the feudal type of territorial regime based on laws, either customs or written laws with a whole reciprocal play of obligations and litigations.
- (2) The administrative state, a regime of regulation discipline that was born in the territoriality of national boundaries, in the fifteenth and sixteenth century.
- (3) The governmental state, the state we live in where the emphasis shifts from its territoriality to the mass of its population, its volume and density, though territory continues to figure as one of its component elements: The governmental state while referring to and making use of the instrumentation economic savoir, rules the population by apparatuses of security (Foucault 1991: 104)

With the change in the role of state, its relationship with the individual has also changed. In the pre modern states there was no direct relationship between the ruler and the ruled. But the individual's relationship with their labour, their produce and their community was direct, real and personal. In the new regime of capital individuals lose their direct link with their labour, their produce, and their community and are required to replace it with a direct but impersonal link with the state, and an abstract and anonymous bond with the nation.

The state has monopolized the means of violence and coercion. No other institution or individual can lay claims to these means. This has led to immense centralisation of political power. The modern state, which is also a nation state, thrives

on the concept of similarity and difference, unity and differentiation and inclusiveness and exclusivity. Internally, it prefers to have one language, one culture and one nation. At the same time, it imposes the concept of difference, which is manifested in the categories of good, law abiding and productive citizens and 'bad, anti-social and parasitic ones'. Externally, the modern state excludes everyone beyond its borders as the other, foreign, or alien. To quote: Adorno and Horkheimer "it recognises as being and occurrence only what can be apprehended in unity: its ideal is the system from which all and every thing flows' (Adorno and Horkheimer 1986: 7).

Social Bases of Nationalism

Nationalism is obviously a form of politics that aims at the acquisition of power through control over the state (Breuilly, 1996: 146 – 148). But nationalism speaks the language of culture and identity to achieve power. This makes nationalism a populist rather than elitist form of politics. Populism is the mobilization of the people as individuals rather than as members of a particular socio-economic group (Marshall, 1994: 404). Nationalist populism requires mobilization of individuals as members of a particular ethnic, regional or religious groups regardless of their socio-economic background. That is why nationalist movements are culture based rather than class-based. They appeal in the name of ethnic and national identity and rights, to people belonging to all classes. Whereas the modern state as a major employer for its large standing armies and permanent bureaucracies, was the first institution that gave rise to large and differentiated status groups, it was industrial capitalism that gave rise to classes.

Theoretically, industrial capital encourages equal rights and opportunities, but in practice it introduces uneven development and unequal access to resources. With uneven development being a basic feature of industrial capitalism, a regional competition involving regional communities is encouraged. As a consequence, competition-based 'identitarian' struggles at individual as well as collective level ensue.

Under these circumstances: - two kinds of individual and two kinds of collectivities are affected by the same kind of processes in two diametrically different directions. (1) Those who benefit from the modern state and industrial capitalism.

(2) There who are adversely affected by state intervention and uneven development. And it is here that Gellener's emphasis on nationalism as an effect of industrial social organization becomes problematic (Gellener, 1983: 40).

In the some regions of Europe, like the Balkans and in the colonialised regions of Asia and Africa, the modern state came long before industrialism. Some of the most radical national movements, like those of Pukhtuns and Baloch in Pakistan arose in these regions which were not touched even by the indirect effects of industrial social organization.

The Role of the State in Pakistan

There is a tendency among the so-called liberals in Pakistan to suggest that Pakistan is not a nation-state but a state-nation, so much so that even scholars like Hamza Alavi calls it 'an overdeveloped state' Alavi's thesis of an over developed state is based on the assumption that the state is over developed because it has excessively enlarged its power of control and regulation. (Alavi, 1983: 42)

In a state like Pakistan, which suffers from the inability to expand its writ, violence is norm. such a state might be called 'fierce' rather than strong because the expression of interests here is not mediated, as Alavi believes, but direct, and relations between the state and society are contradictory rather than complimentary (Ayubi, 1995; 399-400).

The military and bureaucracy are no doubt the two most powerful institution of modern world, but they are not the state. But in Pakistan these two institutions presume that they themselves are state and other institutions of the state like political parties, legislative assemblies and the judiciary are redundant. But the irony is that no state can claim effective control over society through the military and bureaucratic alone, because the effectiveness and strength of a state depends on its capacity to penetrate and organize society. For that state needs many more actors than just the military and bureaucracy:- It needs a well-developed infrastructure and an institutionalized system through which it can expand its authority. By that standard, Pakistan can be called a fragile state; a state that can make laws but lacks the ability to implement them.

In a fierce state like Pakistan, any voice of disaffection from the ethnic groups is treated by ruling elite as a challenge to the stability and sovereignty of the state. This siege mentality of power elites forces them to concentrate on strengthening the security agencies at the expense of social and economic sectors.

In a state like Pakistan, however, the weakness of institutions gives excessive powers to the individual power holders and they are for all practical purpose above the law. Loyalty to individual rather than institutions has so far been the norm. What emerges from a situation like this is a captive state, held together through compulsion, nepotism, cronyism and ultimately the barrel of gun (Khan, 2005, 80).

The Concept of Ethnic and Nation: The Baloch Ethnic Nationalism

In order to discuss the Baloch Ethnic nationalism, it would be better to know whether the Baloch bear the characteristics of a nation or not. A nation described earlier is a group of people from the same region of origin who share a common history, common culture, tradition and language. So far as the Baloch are concerned, they possess all these characteristics. In this sense they may be regarded as a nation. It should be remembered that the Baloch had their own state, the 'Khanate of Kalat' until 1948.

As far as Baloch ethnic nationalism is concerned both Pakistan and Iran ignore the emergence of Baloch nationalism. They tend to think of Baluch society solely in terms of its traditional tribal character and organization patterns (Harrison, 1996: 298). Smith views nationalism as a link in an unbroken chain, both logical and historical which binds it inextricably to the nation and cultural history. Rooted in myths and legends the common ethnic bond forms the most important component of the Baloch nation. Myths and memories have formed the cohesive bases of the Baloch resistance for the last 150 years to the colonial and post colonial rulers (Slimbach: 1996: 140).

In order to assess the potential of Baloch nationalism, it is first necessary to understand how the Baloch view the large panorama of their embattled earlier history (Harrison: 1981: 5). The Baloch have developed a sense of common identity over the past 2000 years (Baluch, Sardar Khan: 1984: 26). Since the Mir Jalal Han's first confederacy in 12th century to the Khanate of the 17th century, Baloch rulers united and merged all the Baloch tribes at different times.

Apart from the above factors nationalism is also about voicing views and expression of hopes and dreams of the nation with which they are associated. Music, dances and songs are not only cultural vehicles for expressing Baloch romance, heroism and the love of independence but also potent forms of what Fanon called a 'literature of combat' (Fanon: 1963: 240).

Nation has a strong attachment to territory, seeking to exercise absolute control over tracks of country regarded as vital living space. 'A nation without its homeland is almost unthinkable' (Smith, 1981: 63). That is why millions of people have laid down their lives for their 'motherland and fatherland' and this ritualistic mass-self sacrifice continues unabated. The territorial dimension is the most powerful element in national incongruity, reflected in such mental image as *die Heimat* for Germans, *Matka Rossiya* for the Russians or the Baloch's *Mulk Balochi* (Breseeg, 2004).

According to Benedict Anderson language plays a significant role amongst many cultural markers that differentiate one ethnic group from another (Anderson, 1991). For A.D Smith 'one of nationalism's abiding myths is the identification of nationality with language (Smith, 1981). The Balochi language, despite Pakistan & Iran's politics of assimilation and hindering of the growth of Balochi culture and despite the lack of modern publications and their meager circulation and the great intercourse between the Baloch and their neighbours, has preserved a striking and admiring purity and the Balochi purity is still in daily circulation. This purity is especially evident in the speech of illiterate who form the majority of the people (Breseeg: 2004). People speaking Brahui at home in Balochistan are integrated in every respect, including clan organization, with those speaking Balochi alone and have considered them nothing but Baloch. It is the myth of common origin which constitutes the central symbol of Baloch nationalism and not language (Rehman, 1996, Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies).

Now comes the importance of the role of religion: In every religion there is some sort of friction. Frictions within the Christianity like Catholicism and Protestantism are well known in history. Similarly, Muslims are also divided between Shia and Sunni. This also left a deep impression on the mind set of Baloch nationalists. Iran is a Shia majority and Pakistan is a Sunni majority. Due to the imposition of Shiism on Baloch at the

behest of Safavid Empire of Persia many Baloch who belong to orthodox Sunni sect, turned to their Sunni faith in order to reinforce their Baloch identity.

Marxists stress more on economy rather than on religion. This is true because secession of East Pakistan in 1971 is a case in point. The Islamic bond could not keep the two wings united and the two nation theory lost its rationale. For Walker Connor, the collective character is important feature of the nation. The essence of nation is psychological, a vivid sense of sameness or oneness of kind, which from the perspective of the group sets it off from all other groups in almost vital way.

Environment too has played its role in shaping the destiny of the Baloch people, influencing its culture, socio-economic structure, institutions and its political psychology, the Baloch environment and circumstances shaped the Baloch own peculiar collective character or psychological make-up in the course of time (Field: 1955: 17 and Harrison, 181: 7-8). It is in this sense that the Baloch collective character is different from their neighbours.

According to Anderson; It would be truer to say that the concept of pure race is fictitious (Anderson: 1991). Due to invasion of different people at different time like Arab, Turk, Persian etc. the present day Baloch are not a single race but are people of mixed origins very often nationalism derives from some real or felt sense of deprivation and denial (Cashmore, E, 1988: 97-102).

The British always resorted to oppressive rule in Balochistan. They did not pay heed to Baloch aspirations. They totally neglected the development of Balochistan. This resulted in Baloch alienation from the British. During the war against the British, the Baloch national consciousness grew stronger under the impact (Baloch, 1987: 126-145).

A.D Smith attaches lesser importance to the socio-economic factors, as he says 'My claim is not that (such) factors play little part in the genesis and course of nationalisms. Clearly they do, if only in the form of catalysts' (Smith: 1995: 73). Balochistan is Pakistan's least developed province by any yard stick. One of the main contributing elements of Baloch ethnic nationalism is the exploitation of their resources by the central government (Punjabi dominated) Punjab's predominance in Pakistan's every sphere of life is no hidden fact. The strong centre vs backward periphery has resulted in the alienation of the Baloch from the mainstream of country.

According to Anderson, the nation is an imagined community. According to him what makes possible the emigration of nation is modernity, particularly print capitalism. But Balochistan lagged far behind in cultural developments as compared to other provinces in Pakistan. During the British rule, the print industry was missing later in the course of time. The opening of western style schools in early 20th century, which reached a total number of 24 by 1902, served as another channel of new awareness (Moulai Shaidai quoted in Breseeg: 2004). Despite the problems, the 1960s saw for the first time a relatively large number of the Baloch receiving high school and university education and becoming involved in pioneering Baloch literati and nationalist activities (Nek Buzdar cited in Breseeg: 2004).

According to Adeel Khan; the emergence of nationalism in Balochistan was not the effect of industrial social organization which Gellner regards as the cause of nationalism (Gellner, 1983). It was not caused by print capitalism, which Anderson believes is a trigger for nationalist sentiment (Anderson, 1991). Rather it was the Baloch nationalists who first introduced Baloch society to print media (Khan: 2005: 114).

Paul Brass emphasizes the role of elite as the basis for group consciousness. Brass believes that the group's keeper of identity, the elite, transmits ethnic consciousness and makes political demands. According to Hamid Ahmad, the Baloch nationalism is the invention of the Baloch elite. He argues that the Baloch elite, when deprived from their privileges and power by Reza shah after 1928, organized the Baloch people on ethnic lines (Hamid, Ahmad cited in Breseeg: 2004).

The Baloch possess a group identity. But their group identity is inferior to the superior Punjabi and Persian groups. The Baloch intelligentsia are prevented from achieving their goals because of their Baloch background. That is why they organize resistance to the government by convincing the mass that by only supporting their movement can Baloch corporate interests be protected and achieved.

The Right of Self Determination

In international politics, the issue of right to self determination is a much debated matter. According to the scholars of nationalism, it means that each nationality has the right to decide for itself, how it shall be governed and by whom (Smith, 1991: 73-44).

Generally speaking, the self-determination movement was used by the third world countries to liberate themselves from the colonial rule. According to Amitai Etzioni, it served well those who sought to dissolve empires (Etzioni, Foreign Policy: 1992-93: 21). Today, ethnic groups use the right of self-determination to acquire a sovereign independent nations state in a multiethnic state.

It was Woodrow Wilson the president of America from 1913-21 and head of the League of Nations, who popularized the term self-determination. The League existed from 1919-1946 and later became the basis for United Nations. The idea of self-determination was first expounded in the League of Nations and was later taken up by the UN. According to UN declaration of Human Rights all the peoples are entitled to self-determination. Since term 'peoples' looked ambiguous, the UN subsequently provided a cogent definition, it defined, the 'people entitled to self-determination' as those living under colonial rule (per Achlin, cited in Breseeg: 2004).

Why the question of the right of self-determination is raised for the Baloch. The British occupied the Balochistan in 1839 and the forced merger of Balochistan with Iran (1928) and Pakistan (1948). That is why Baloch demand for self-determination is propagated to acquire a sovereign independent nation. Thus the people in sovereign states which were democratically elected were not entitled for self-determination. Infact, the UN General Assembly's two rulings clearly set aside the matter once for all. The UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples (1960) and the UN General Assembly Declaration of Principle of International law concerning friendly relations among states" (1970) are the two important rulings (per Aclin cited in Breneeg. 2004). These two declaration affirmed the territorial unity of sovereign states. Now the right to self-determination can be used as a weapon against a country who is democratically ruled without any distinction of race, creed or colour.

Nationalists commonly claim that the individuals of a population cannot realize their personal freedom unless the population is free in the sense of political determination, and simultaneously demand that the members of a putative nation adhere to some common standard of culture and behaviour (Meinecke: 1970: 89). Often a nation's rights in the international community are compared to those of individuals in the

society. If individuals have a right to autonomy, then by analogy nations have the right to self-determination (B. Wittcock, cited in Breseeg: 2004). Nationality is understood precisely as an attribute of the individual, not of the intermediate associations. According to Michel Foucault nationality is understood as inscribed in the very body of modern individual (Foucault: 1977). A person without a country must therefore be understood to lack not only a place in the external world but a proper self (Bloom: 1990).

Nationalism as a political doctrine of self-determination was extensively used in Europe rather late in history: In the late 19th century and the early 20th century. Woodrow Wilson and V-I Lenin came out forcefully in support of the right of national self-determination for linguistic and colonized peoples (Hobsbawm: 1992:31). The First World War resulted in the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian, Czarist, German and Ottoman empire and emergence of many independent states. By the 1922, many independent nations came into being in central Eastern Europe. The Congress of Berlin was replaced by the League of Nations. After the Second World War, the process of decolonization began in earnest. The period 1945 to 1960 saw the emergence of many countries of Asia and Africa by various peaceful and violent means. Since then the number of independent states grew by nearly 50 percent, from approximately 120 to 190 in the mid – 1990s (Greerups cited in Breseeg: 2004).

Autonomy is central to the concept of nationalism and its affirmation of national cultural specificity. Baloch are a social group which shares objective elements such as a common language and which has acquired a subjective political consciousness of oneness, by its life within a relatively well-defined territory and by its struggle against alien domination (Breseeg: 2004: 50).

Prior to annexation of Balochistan by the British in 1839, it was an independent state ruled by the Khans of Kalat. The borders of the Balochistan were demarcated in the 19th century without the consent of the people who objected and revolted against the colonial decisions. In 1928, Reza Shah of Iran forcibly occupied the western Balochistan and in 1948, Pakistan also forcefully managed the accession much against the popular consent of the Baloch people.

Nationalism is a powerful modern concept. Today nationalism is the world's major ideological 'legitimator' and 'deligitimator' of state regimes and governments

(Roths child, 1981: 14). When the British divided the Balochistan into two neighbouring countries Iran and Afghanistan and its people among themselves, the Baloch began to consider the concept of nationalism. since then, the Baloch nationalists have been fighting and trying to establish by appeals to nationalism and the right of self-determination. Therefore, the nationalist principle of national self-determination asserts the right of every nation to consolidate it self within the structures of a state – every nation should have a state (per Achlin, 1990 cited in Berseeg: 2004).

Conclusion


Ethnicity has been one of the major factors affecting the state-society relationship. Ethnic conflict is not a recent phenomenon and has regional and global implications beyond the countries in which it originates. There is no evidence that it will change in the foreseeable future nor is there any evidence that the ethnic conflicts that will undoubtedly occur in the future will be less devastating than those of the past, or that they will be prevented.

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In order to assess ethnicity and its junior partner nationalism, it would be better to take a look at the state's role. The pressures for state unification and state expansion have come into headlong collision with the multiple forces making for claims to autonomy and separation. When state dominance ceased to be overwhelming, disaffected ethnies often sought political access (voice), greater autonomy or secession (exit) or outright 'rebellion. States donot merely deal with a legacy of historical non-state identities, "infact virtually all states are deeply implicated in the perpetual reinvention of categories that organize, hierarchise and divide their populations" (Boyarin 1991: 387). States that base their legitimacy upon ethnic or religious affiliations typically discriminate against and/or attempt to assimilate minorities or to force cultural uniformity. In contrast, the civic, secular state bases its legitimacy upon popular sovereignty and the rule of law, granting citizenship without stipulation as to ethnicity, 'race' or religion. Such 'citizenship' rights (and applicable duties) create a 'domain of the people'. In democratic polities, this domain creates the ground for common, values, access to opportunities, and numerous specific integrative public policies. So, in the context of ethnicity and nationalism, by adopting consociational democracy and other mechanisms like genuine federalism we can allow more than one nation or ethnic group in the state.

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CHAPTER – II

THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN PAKISTAN

“Pakistan was an idea before it became a country whether it is a nation remains doubtful even today” (Edward Mortimer 1982: 191).

Introduction

Pakistan came into existence in 1947 on the basis of Jinnah’s ‘two nation’ theory articulated at Lahore in 1940 at convention of the Muslim League. Ever since its creation, the ineluctable dilemma facing the nation has been to create a viable national identity out of diverse ethno-linguistic and regional loyalties. Pakistan is one of the world’s most ethnically and linguistically complex state. Each of its province is named after special ethnic group associated with the province viz., Punjab with Punjabis, Sindh with Sindhis, Balochistan with Baloch and the NWFP with Pashtoons. The most serious threat to Pakistan since its inception has been from the ethnic front, which is still in official parlance referred to as ‘provincialism’ or ‘regionalism’. By dismissing ethnic heterogeneity and demands for provincial autonomy, devolution of power, decentralization and equitable policies governing relation with the centre, the ruling elite has sought refuge in administrative, ad-hoc measures and no comprehensive plan has been undertaken to co-opt such plural forces through bargaining and appropriate politico-economic measures (Malik, 1997: 168). Ironically in the 60year of its political history, Pakistan has failed to resolve the manifold challenges of nation building and national integration.

Pakistani leaders, whether civilian or military from M.A. Jinnah to the current military ruler Pervez Musharaff can not claim to have resolved the manifold challenges of regionalism in Pakistan. Ironically, it was owing to the politics of regionalism that Pakistan became a reality and it was also due to the forces of regionalism that Pakistan disintegrated in 1971 (emergence of Bangladesh). The ‘two nation’ theory advocated by the Pakistani rulers lost its rationale following the breakup of Eastern wing.

The ethno-cultural identities of various regional entities inhabiting Pakistan are older and deeper than the six decade old Pakistani identity. They are apparently

conscious of their distinct ethno – cultural identities and politico-economic interests which they don't wish to be relegated to secondary priorities and sacrifice on the pretext of rehabilitation of Islam as the sole factor and the national ideology of Pakistan. (Miller, 1968: 1-20).

Out of the initial five groups-Bengalis, Punjabis, Pukhtuns, Sindhis and Baloch-four have actively contested the legitimacy of the administrative structures of the state, with one, the Bengalis succeeding in breaking away and creating their own state, Bangladesh in 1971. Even before partition, Balochistan and NWFP had opposed their accession to the new Pakistani state. After partition, yet another ethnic group was added to the already five indigenous groups, in the shape of the Indian Muslim migrants, the Mohajirs. The only ethnic group which has been content with the Pakistani state structure are the Punjabis (Khan, 2005: 15).

The concept of integration involves the amalgamation of disparate social, economic, ethnic and geographic elements into a single nation-state. This kind of national integration implies both the capacity of a government to control and penetrate the territory under its jurisdiction as well as a set of popular attitudes towards the nation generally described as loyalty allegiance and a willingness to place national above local concerns. From another point of view, one that is more crucial for the current analysis – Integration means the regularization of structures and processes whereby the discrete elements in a given national territory are brought into meaningful participation in the political system. The methods by which these processes are regularized and understood by participants to be legitimate can be defined as “process integration” (Gopinath, 1975: 9).

In developed countries, the state evolved out of a developed nation, while in the post-colonial developing countries, both the state and the nation had to be carved out simultaneously. In Pakistan, both state and the nation had to be consciously and deliberately built almost from scratch after independence (Jahan: 1972: 5). State building implies refurbishing the administrative machinery and the centralization of authority, whereas nation building stipulates dispersion of powers, cooption of peripheral groups and decentralization (Easton, 1965, Kautsky, 1962).

In Pakistan, the process of national integration was ill-planned, officious and injudicious, with central and centrifugal forces battling within the very corpus of state which, true to its proto-colonial character, either choose to adopt the role of an indifferent observer or turned partisan.


The failure to establish a viable, all-encompassing political culture despite positive idealism is at the root cause of Pakistan's inability to develop an integrated national cohesion or to guarantee its territorial integrity and economic development (Malik, 1997: 12-13).

Ironically, in these sixty years Pakistan has failed to resolve the problems of nation-building and national integration. Pakistan is still the story of a nation grappling with problems of nation-building with unresolved political and institutional issues such as the role of Islam in a nation intentionally formed as a religious homeland, of sharing of power between the centre and provinces, of the stronghold of feudalism, of the intermittent imposition of martial law, of a culture of divisive tribal, ethnic and regional loyalties and factional politics, of the reestablishment of democratic institutions, of the Kashmir dispute and relationship with Big Brother India and of a sub-culture of sectarian violence and corruption and last but not the least, the problem of religious extremism and terrorism. These are serious challenges to the problem of national integration. This chapter will examine the challenges faced by the Pakistani state from its vast regional and ethno-cultural diversity which pose threat to national integration.

Crisis of Integration: Phase I-1947-71: East Pakistan Vs West Pakistan (Punjabi-Mohajir Nexus against Bengalis)

The new state of Pakistan had to struggle in order to build a cohesive and integrated state. In fact, Pakistan was unstable from the outset. Most of the problems were structural. The new Pakistani state created on the basis of 'two-nation' theory choose to adopt Urdu as the national language of the country which was not the mother tongue of any Pakistani living in the province that became Pakistan, but of the Mohajirs who came from Northern India. The superimposition of centripetal Islamic identity on the centrifugal ethno-linguistic and regional identity by the bureaucratic – military establishment created a lot of hue and cry in Pakistan. In Pakistan ethnic heterogeneity

and cultural pluralism were viewed as threats to the whole country and rhetorical emphasis was placed on religious commonality. It is worth stating here that ethnicity is not merely a fall-out of state-centric politics, it embodies the intricacies of cultural traditions, political economy, modernization, urbanization and development, the multi-tiered forces interlinked with both the state and society at large (Malik: 1997: 168).



Map -1: Showing West and East Pakistan-Adapted from 'The Idea Pakistan', Stephen Cohen (2005)

A number of factors were responsible for the shaky new state of Pakistan. Firstly, immediately after independence, Pakistan suffered a leadership crisis following the death of M.A. Jinnah on September 11, 1948 and his chief lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination on October 16, 1951. Secondly, the Muslim League virtually became defunct, It had no presence in East Pakistan and even in West Pakistan, its leaders, newly arrived from India lacked a political base in the provinces of West Pakistan. Thirdly, the newly arrived Mohajirs from India favoured a more or less secular state, laissez-fair economy and liberal politics. By contrast, Muslim Leaguers from the NWFP, Punjab, Balochistan and Sindh tended to favour Islamisation, a state managed economy, and a go slow policy toward land reform (Cohen, 2005: 54).

Fourthly, East Pakistan, 1200 mile away, the Muslim League in East Pakistan lost its influence when it was ousted in the provincial elections of 1954. Fifthly, there were deep differences between the population of East and West wing. While East Pakistan constituted 54% of the total population of Pakistan and was generally homogenous people, West Pakistan's population was heterogenous.

The sheer distance of 1200 miles between the two former wings of the country, as well as their distinct demographic, cultural, economic and political differences have been held responsible for the divisiveness within the polity. Before the evolution of Bangladesh, both wing were typical of countries that were not yet nations in being but only nations in hope, (Emerson, 1960: 94).

Both prior to and post 1971 politics in Pakistan, as defined by Geertz entails the dilemma of 'old societies and new states' and as in many other developing societies, region based 'primordial sentiments' are yet to be transformed into trans-regional civil sentiments (Geertz, 1963: 109). The two wings presented altogether a different picture. While East Pakistan presented a homogenous 'political' society, West Pakistan appeared 'governmental; the bane of the civil and military bureaucracy. The common religious ethos was the only common denominator in the two regions other than a belated desire for self-determination and this made the process of integration almost impossible, with official efforts being divested mainly to government building. Given the contemporary emphasis on the state as a vehicle of change, in Pakistan, the state (with no legitimacy and no mandate) took upon itself the role of 'deliverer' to bring about modernization and

development, which were both considered essential for national integration (Malik, 1997: 14).

Table -1: Some Economic Indicators

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Area (Square miles)	54,501	3,10,236
Population (1970 estimates)	70 million	60 million
1 st Plan allocation of expenditure	32%	68%
2 nd Plan allocation of expenditure	32%	68%
3 rd Plan allocation of expenditure	36%	64%
Foreign aid allocation	20-30%	70-80%
Export earning	50-70%	30-50%
Import expenditures	25-30%	70-75%
Industrial assets owned by Bengalis	11%	-
Civil Service Jobs	16-20%	80-84%
Military Jobs	10%	90%
Resources transferred from east to west between 1948-49	Rs.31,120 million	
Per capita income, official		
1964-65	Rs.285.5	419.0
1968-69	Rs.291.5	473.4
Regional difference in per capita income, official		
1959-60	32%	
1964-65	47%	
1968-69	62%	
Real difference in per capita income		
1968-69	95%	
Real difference in average standard of living, 1968-69	126%	

Sources: Pakistan Statistical Yearbooks and Pakistan Economic Survey for the various years, Government of East Pakistan (1963), Papanek (1967) A.R.Khan (1970), Interim Reports (May 1970), and Forum (27 Feb. 1971). Adapted from Surendra Singh's 'Politics of Regionalism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Sindh Province' (2003)

Table -2: Leading Groups and Issues of Regionalism

Period	Leading Groups	Regional Issues
1947-54 Muslim League Dominant	Landlords, lawyers, students	Language, provincial autonomy, allocation of resources, higher jute prices for development by the centre.
1954-58 Changing coalition regional parties	Lawyers, students, workers, Bengali businessmen.	Economic disparities, maximum provincial autonomy, larger allocation of resources, parity of representation in the services.
1958-59 Centralised polity Ayub Khan and Frustration of regional elites	Lawyers, teachers, students, workers organized peasants, Bengali businessmen.	Economic disparities, Bengali language & culture, regional participation, full regional autonomy symbolized in the six point demand, eleven point demand of the students
1969-71 Mass-movement, election, aggregation crisis and disintegration of Pakistan	Students, workers, peasants, guerrillas, armed personnel, Bengali civil servants, teachers, lawyers, businessmen.	Economic disparity, maximum autonomy, complete independence for East Bengal, Bangladesh movement.

Sources: M.Rashiduzzaman in *The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration*, ed. A.Jeyaratnam Wilson, Dennis Dalton, Vikas, 1982. Adapted from Surendra Singh's 'Politics of Regionalism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Sindh Province (2003).

Immediately after partition, the new state of Pakistan, came to be dominated by Punjabi-Mohajir nexus which alienated Bengalis from the decision making process. The Punjabi-Mohajir ruling elite had two main concerns: the perceived Indian threat to the survival of the new state and the Bengali majority challenge to their control of the state power. The external threat required a strong military and internal threat required that the electoral representative should be avoided because Bengali posed a serious threat to their domination. The 54% strong Bengalis would have been the virtual ruler of Pakistan had the new state of Pakistan adopted democratic representation. When the expatriate Muslim elites in Pakistan set up the triple forces of Urdu, Pakistan and Islam, as the cornerstones of the infantile Pakistani nationalism, the process of alienation began – largely in Muslim Bengal and to a limited extent in other – smaller provinces. Lingual commonalities in a given territory helped to politicize ethnicity. Demographic and historic claims and counter claims were postulated on all sides to air the antagonistic feelings and in a political vacuum with a thinly based state structure, relations between the ‘core and periphery’ turned increasingly sour (Malik, 1997: 15).

The most daunting task of nation building after the state’s inception was the integration of Bengali sub-nation. I would like to discuss in detail the problem of integration in pre-1971 period:

After the death of Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, his successor proved incapable to tackle the socio-cultural harmony under the banner of Islam. In Pakistan, the political factor has played crucial role in politics of regionalism, though other factors have also contributed to the development of regionalism like geo-physical, socio-cultural and economic. The man who probably laid the foundation or the demise of United Pakistan was the – then Governor General Ghulam Mohammad. Being a Punjabi, he tried to establish Punjabi hegemony in the national politics of Pakistan. He was also responsible for the introduction of army into national politics. Field Marshall General Ayub Khan was appointed as minister of defence during the tenure of Governor General Ghulam Mohammad (Feldman, 1975:1-9).

In order to counterpoise, Bengali majority, the ruling elite in West Pakistan implemented in 1955 One Unit Scheme which united the West Wing. The East Pakistan

condemned the One Unit Scheme as Punjabi elite move to establish hegemony over the entire Pakistan. According to 1970 estimate, East Pakistan's population was 70 million as against 60 million of West Pakistan. With her geographical abnormality, Pakistan has been described as a 'double country' (Weeks quoted in Rounak Jahn, 1972). The locations of East and West Pakistan also gave rise to different political geographical perspectives. From Dhaka, the states of South-East Asia drifted naturally into view, whereas from Karachi it was the states of the Middle East which stood on the horizon. Only India was visible from both cities (Mahnaz, 1989:53).

With the emergence of the Pakistan army as the preponderant political force and with the acceleration of capitalist mode of development, the onslaught against Bengali culture and simultaneous attempts at 'Islamisation and' Pakistanisation also got momentum.

The West Pakistan's ruling elite (Punjabi-Mohajir) was never serious about the integrated national perspective of Pakistan. In Pakistan, nationalism was always confused with Islamism which was unacceptable to the culturally conscious Bengali. The ruling elite never took the realistic account of the multi-ethnic society of Pakistan.

The ruling elite never took serious steps in making a constitution taking aspirations of regional units. The constitution makers always favoured unitary character. They justified strong centre in the name of national cohesion and stability. They never gave a federal form of government ensuring greater regional autonomy. The East Wing was also opposed to recommendations of the interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee 1950 (Feldman: 1975: 4).

The Basic Principles Committee was constituted by the first Constituent Assembly in March in 1949. When central government imposed Urdu on the Bengalis, they vociferously opposed and they demanded their mother tongue Bangla – to be accepted as one of the national languages of Pakistan which resulted in 1952 language riots in East Pakistan. Following the victory of the Jukto Front (United Front) in 1954 provincial elections and the defeat of Muslim League in the election, East Pakistani ethnic nationalism took a new turn. The United Front Government of East Pakistan demanded more regional autonomy in socio-economic and political affairs on the basis

of “21 point programme” of the United Front (Awami League led by Suharwardy, Moulana Bhasani and the Krishak Sramik Party led by Fazlul Huq).

The ruling elite of Pakistan did not like United Front government which was quite assertive on the regional issue. Consequently, the central government dismissed the UF government within less than two months rule and was placed under central rule under the governorship of the then Defence Secretary, Iskandar Mirza.

The first constitution of Pakistan came into force in 1956, which gave little relief to the diverse regional entities (Sayeed, 1967: 73). It contained both the unitary features as well federal and adopted a parliamentary frame work. Within two year, in 1958, the then Army Chief-General Ayub Khan staged a coup and took over power. General Ayub Khan frequently remarked that the Bengalis should be free from the ‘evil’ influence of Hindu culture. He even banned the Rabindra Nath Tagore’s songs on Radio Pakistan. Tagore was a national poet of Bengalis, loved and admired by both Hindu and Muslim communities of East Pakistan. This was opposed by the Bengalis. They regarded it as an assault on their culture.

There was also an economic disparity between the two wings. Despite their sound economic contribution through their agricultural products, the Bengalis were subjected to ruthless exploitation by the West Wing’s ruling elite. East Pakistan’s major crops like jute, tea and sugarcane fulfilled the requirement of West Pakistan. Especially, two important crops, jute and tea of East Pakistan contributed substantially to the foreign exchange of Pakistan.

Ayub gave second constitution in 1962 which adopted a presidential framework. Though the 1962 constitution had described Pakistan as a federation, there was no explicit reference of being a federal system. There was no division of power between the centre and provinces as was the case with the first constitution of 1956. General Ayub’s constitution also encouraged centripetal tendencies and made the central government strong and powerful in its own right (Kaushik, 1980, South Asian Studies 92-96). With the emergence of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in 1966 on the political horizon of East Pakistan, regionalism took a radical turn in the East Wing. Soon after assuming the leadership of Awami League, Sheikh Mujib imparted a radical thrust to his party through ‘six point’ programme. Mujib launched a frontal attack on the leadership of ruling elite

of West Pakistan. He not only insisted on regional autonomy but also demanded restoration of civil democracy in Pakistan. In view of deteriorating national and regional instability, General Ayub handed over power to Yahyakhhan. But Yahya proved to be a weak ruler to meet the growing challenges of national integration and regionalism. Under growing pressure, Yahya Khan abolished the One Unit Scheme in 1969 and declared the schedules for general elections in 1970.

The first general election held in 1970 was the only election in Pakistan's history which could be described as free and fair. It strengthened the roots of regionalism in East Pakistan. Mujib's Awami Party swept the elections and got the absolute majority winning 160 of 300 seats, receiving all but two of the 162 seats in East Pakistan. In the provincial elections also it won 288 out of 300 seats. Bhutto's Pakistan People Party won 81 seats in National Assembly, in West Pakistan.

The election results of 1970 gave a stunning blow to ruling elite in West Pakistan. Z.A. Bhutto, instead of accepting Mujib's victory, aligned with the military ruler Yahya Khan and suggested for the continuance of Martial law. Yahya Khan, in connivance with Bhutto's PPP, launched a massive military 'crackdown' on the East Pakistanis. The Bengali nationalist led by Mujib converted their autonomy movement into a full fledged national liberation movement. With the help of India, they accomplished their aim and finally won their separate state Bangladesh on 16 December 1971. The military stepped down and Bhutto assumed the power of the residual West Pakistan on December 20, 1971.

Thus if one looks at the politics of the period 1947-71 one finds that East-West conflict in Pakistan during this period provided evidence of a patron-client relationship among the political actors in the former East-Pakistan. The erstwhile East Pakistan asserted its sub-national and distinct ethno-cultural identity against the imposed religion based national identity coupled with economic exploitation of West Pakistan. The 1970 election also showed that no party could claim its 'Pan-Pakistan stature'.

Problem of Integration: The Post – 1971 period (Punjab vs rest of all)

With the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, the 'two nation' theory lost its rationale. It was believed in some circles that with the eradication of geographical

incongruence, the truncated 'new Pakistan' would be more cohesive and integrated. After 1971, Z.A. Bhutto emerged as an undisputed leader of Pakistan. He was the first democratically elected leader who enjoyed widespread support in Pakistan. The people of Pakistan had a lot of expectation from him. Seeing his charismatic personality, it was expected that he would try to redress the grievances of various regional units. Bhutto could have evolved a viable and integrated Pakistan. Initially, he was successful, but in the long run, he succumbed to the pressures of traditional bureaucratic and military elite. Bhutto gave the third constitution to Pakistan. In 1973 it was the first unanimous constitution signed by the elected representatives including religious ones. This constitution was overflowing with religious measures. For the first time, Islam was declared the official religion of the state. It was during Bhutto's regime that for the first time, the post of minister of religious affairs was created in the cabinet. He also declared Ahmadiyas as non-Muslims under the pressure of religious body. It is ironical that the man who was the first elected prime minister of country and by all standard one of the most modern westernized of Pakistani rulers used Islam the most.

Throughout Bhutto's regime it was Punjab which remained in superior bargaining position with the centre. Whenever he tried to assert his independent position, his leadership came into direct confrontation with the traditional leadership of the army and bureaucracy (Kaushik, 1980, *South Asian Studies*: 98). Due to the pressures of Punjabi elite, Bhutto could not integrate the two tribal regions the NWFP and Balochistan into the mainstream of Pakistan.


Bhutto tried to tackle the regional problem in Punjab and Sindh and he was to some extent successful. However, he totally failed in the other two underdeveloped provinces of the NWFP and Balochistan. It was during his regime, that 1973-77 insurgency in Balochistan took place. He suppressed the insurgency with the help of Shah of Iran. The High Treason Act of 1973 and the Private Organization (the Abolition, Prohibition and prevention of Anti-national activities) ordinance were adopted for this purpose. He also created FSF (Federal Security Force) in order to suppress his opponents and to some extent to control military also. The Punjabi bureaucratic and military elite did not allow the political leadership to integrate diverse regional entities into a cohesive

national whole. Bhutto's removal from the power and his consequent execution was, infact, the obvious symbol of Punjab's hegemony in Pakistan's power politics.

Table -3: Ethnonationalist Movements: Patterns of Conflict

Group	Period	Location	Description
Bengali	1960s-70	East Pakistan	Language riots, 1952; dismissal of elected governments, regional disparities, army behaviour, Indian intervention, 1971
Sindhi	1950s-90s	Rural Sindh	Opposition to Punjabi settlers, 1940s-50s; Son of the Soil movement against Mohajirs; demographic nationalism, suppression of Sindhi language, Indian patronage
Mohajir	1985-2003	Urban Sindh	Loss of preeminence in politics, bureaucracy, and industry; absence of presence in army; loss of identity after migration of Pakistan; abandonment of Biharis; punjabization of central government; declining role in army and civil service, Indian support.
Pashtun	1947-58 1973-77	NWFP	Reaction to dismissal/ resignation of elected governments, 1947 and 1973; Afghan irredentist movement
Baluch	1947, 1958, 1963, 1973-77	Baluchistan	Antiannexation, 1974, and assertion of separate statehood; dismissal of elected governments, 1973, 1988; received Soviet and Afghan support

- a. Mohammed Waseem, "The Political Ethnicity and the State of Pakistan", paper presented to the International Conference on the "Nation-State" and Transnational Forces in South Asia, Kyoto, December 9-10, 2000; cited with permission of the author. Adapted from Stephen Cohen's 'The Idea of Pakistan' (2005)



Map -2: Pakistan after Separation of East Pakistan - Adapted from ‘The Idea Pakistan’, Stephen Cohen (2005)

On July 4, 1977 army stepped in and two years later executed him. During his trial in the court, Bhutto said “I appointed a chief of staff General Zia belonging to the Jamaat-i-Islami (a fundamentalist Islamic group) and the result is before all of us” (Nasr, 1994: 72).

General Zia 'military rule was an unadulterated Punjabi rule. He tried to rule with ironfist. He islamised the country. He resorted to tough Islamic measures in order to contain his opponents. He suspended the 1973 constitution and then brought in drastic changes. During his 11 year regime, Zia dwelt more on the religious unity of nation rather than devising a realistic approach toward socio-cultural integration. Being a Punjabi, he always took care of Punjab at the cost of other three provinces. The Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) was Zia's brain-child. Zia always preferred to use MQM as a shield against the challenge posed by the Jiye Sindh Movement' led by G.M. Syed. Infact Zia's main game plan was to frustrate the non-Punjabi ethnic groups and weaken their ethnic movements through a divide and rule policy. Zia died in a plane crash in 1988.

The democratic decade of 1990s saw the elected governments in Pakistan. During this period four government assumed office (twice each Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) but none of them could complete the full term. Benazir Bhutto was in dilemma whether to adopt anti-India posture or to solve the ever rising problems at home. She failed in both. Her successor Nawaz Sharif; a Punjabi, tried to suppress the ethnic and regional aspirations with the help of army. It was during Nawaz Sharif regime that Kargil war took place which ultimately resulted in the ouster of Nawaz Sharif by the military General Pervez Musharaff on 12 October 1999 in a bloodless coup.

During Musharaff regime, in 2002 general elections took place. But it was a military controlled election. Musharaff has tried to suppress the various regional aspirations by military mean. The 9/11 attack on the USA, made Pakistan, a front line state of USA against its war on terrorism. The growth and rise of 6 party religious alliance MMA (Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal) has created problems for Musharaff. Musharaff is caught in a dilemma. On the one hand he is supporting the USA against terrorism, on the other hand, he is under pressure of religious fundamentalist. How to contain Al-Quaida and Taliban militants is a posing a serious challenge to his authority. The FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area) has become citadel of terrorists. The rise of Madarassas in Pakistan during his regime has also created problems. The recent case of Lal Masjid in Islamabad where over 100 people including security forces were killed is a case in point. In Balochistan also, the killing of Nawab Bugti by the military

has also created unrest in the province and a low level insurgency since 2005 is going on. Thus, the current military regime of Musharaff has tried to suppress regional demands by means of force. He has also tried to suppress independence of judiciary, by dismissing the chief of Supreme Court, Justice Iftikhar Chaudhari, though reinstated by the Supreme Court.

Autonomism and Separatism Today

According to Stephen Cohen in the 1960s, the deepest fault line had an east-west orientation, as the Bengalis came to regard the Punjabi-Mohajir Establishment and the Military as stifling. Since 1971 the fault lines have become more diffuse, with the autonomist – separatist movements draw their energy from Baluch, Pushtun. Mohajir and Sindhi resentment of the dominant Punjab, some times in coalition with other minorities (Cohen, 2005, 206-208). The creation of Bangladesh strengthened several existing separatist autonomist groups.

Although Pakistanis sub-national and ethno-linguistic groups have some common features, they also differ in significant ways.

1. All have different connections to the land, some have histories that can be traced back to one or two millennia and others such as the Mohajirs are new comers to Pakistan. In several cases, notably Karachi; internal migration has changed ethnic and cultural balances, destabilizing local political and administrative patterns.
2. Their narratives regarding their ties to the idea of Pakistan vary widely. The Mohajirs were in the forefront of the Pakistan movement others were disinterested or marginal to it.
3. All of these groups have a different relationship with the dominant Punjab. Some are fairly close, such as the Pushtuns, others such as, the Baluch were alienated to the point of open warfare, with the Sindhis and Mohajirs having a mixed history.
4. Some of these groups are entangled in mutual enmity, usually involving Punjabis as the third side of triangle. Sindhis like Bengalis, resent the Punjabi-Mohajir nexus but are also pressed upon by the Baluch; the

Baluch have been subjected to in-migration from Pushtuns and the Mohajirs have come to regard Sindhis and Punjabis as threats to their identity and prosperity.

Sindh

Sindh was brought into the Raj in 1843 by General Charles Napier who seized the province without authorisation. Legend has it that he sent the message (in Latin) to Calcutta, Peccavi (I have sinned it). (Cited in Cohen; 2005: 211). Four years later Sindh was absorbed into the Bombay Presidency. Sindh was separated from Bombay in 1936. Despite its Muslim majority population, Sindh was not an ethnically pure region. There were large Punjabi and Baloch communities in Sindh, and the ruling family, the famous Talpur tribe had Baloch origins, although its members and many other migrants had assimilated into Sindhi culture. As the independence loomed, the Sindh elite had to choose between, the Congress and Muslim League. The former posed a threat to Sindhi feudal landlords because of Congress liberal policies and to a greater extent the fear of Hindu domination over province's commercial and professional life. Since Muslim League was more elitist than Congress, it naturally attracted the feudal elite towards Muslim League.

Seventy three percents of migrants to the new state of Pakistan were Punjabis and most of them settled in Pakistan's Punjab. The problem of Sindh presented a different scenario. Sindh received only 20% of the Indian migrants. The bulk of the migrants to Sindh were the Urdu speaking Muslims from Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Hyderabad and Bihar and they moved to Karachi, Hyderabad and other cities where they made little efforts to mingle with the local population. When the Urdu was declared as the official national language of Pakistan, their Mohajir identity strengthened. When Karachi became capital on July 27, 1948, which had been Sindh's largest and most affluent city, it changed the demographic composition of Sindh province. By 1957, the Sindhi speaking population of province had declined from a pre-partition level of 87% to about 67% (Ahmed, 1998 – 44-45). Sindhis had also become a minority in Karachi, where 57% of its population was now Mohajir. Therefore, while partition had strengthened the ethnic homogeneity of

Punjab and NWFP, it had created a new ethnic divide in Sindh and sown the seeds for fresh Sindhi grievances.

A Sindhi nationalist Allah Bux Soomro, who was a staunch opponent of Pakistan and was killed before partition, is reported to have said to G.M.Sayed, a separatist Sindhi nationalist who had once supported Pakistan:

“You will get to know that our difficulties will begin after Pakistan has come into being At present the Hindu trader and money lender’s plunder is worrying you but later you will have to face the Punjabi bureaucracy and soldiery and the mind of U.P. After the creation of this aberration (Pakistan) you will have to struggle to fight its concomitant evils (Sayed, 1995: 46).

And this prophetic warning has come true. The legendary G.M. Sayed, who once supported the Pakistan movement and two nation theory, was stabbed in the back by Jinnah. He tried to revive the Sindhi aspiration by his-Jiye Sind Movement till his death in 1995. He called for a separate Sindhi nation. He had not been a Muslim nationalist, but a Sindhi. In 1948, the fledgling Sindhi nationalist movement joined with Bengalis, Baloch and Pushtuns to form the People’s Organisation. It was succeeded by Pakistan Oppressed National Movement (PONAM) but both stopped short of openly calling for the dissolution of Pakistan. (Bennet Jones cited in Cohen: 2005: 212).

The One Unit Scheme of 1955 which was imposed to counterpoise Bengali majority, put Sindh at a disadvantage. When Ayub allotted newly irrigated primelands to non-Sindhis particularly to military officers and bureaucrats, it virtually affected the Sindhis materially. Even today 40% of Sindh’s prime-agricultural land is held by non-Sindhis mostly Punjabis or Mohajirs. (Ahmad, 1998: 71) The water dispute between Punjab and Sindh remains a live issue and the subject of widespread Sindhi agitation. So far as representation in civil services is concerned, Sindhis were unrepresented in military and civil services. According to 1981 census: Sindhis were 11.7% Pakistan’s population, but their representation in the senior ranks of civil service was a mere 3.6% in 1974, rising after reforms in the Quota System to 6.8% in 1983 (Kennedy, 2003).

With the emergence of Z.A Bhutto on the political horizon of Pakistan, Sindh acquired special significance. It might be recalled that Z.A. Bhutto’s father Shahnawaz Bhutto had acquired the reputation of being a staunch spokesman of distinct identity of

Sindh during the British rule. He was also primarily responsible for the separation of Sindh from Bombay in 1936. The Sindh United Party led by Shanawaz Khan fought for the recognition of distinct socio-cultural interests of Sindh during the British rule. (Modi, 1977: 14-15).

The issue of Old vs New Sindhis became more prominent during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto. The sons of soil pressurized the central government for the recognition of Sindhi as the official language of the province. The Old Sindhis were not happy with pro-Urdu and pro-Mohajir stand of central government. Violent clashes took place between the Old and the New Sindhis. In view of the growing linguistic violence the then Chief Minister of Sindh province Mumtaz Ali (Cousin of Z.A. Bhutto) agreed to the demands of the Old Sindhis. The Sindh Assembly on July 8, 1972 passed a language Bill declaring Sindhi as the official language of Sindh, which caused enormous violence. The new Sindhis (Mohajirs) violently protested against the passage of Sindhi as the official language and ultimately pressurized Bhutto for retaining Urdu as the official language of Pakistan vis-à-vis Sindh.

Though Bhutto tried his best to appease both the Old and the New Sindhis, he could not tackle the problem of regionalism. The New Sindhis threatened Bhutto regime with their call for a separate *Karachi* province within Sindh province.

The Old Sindhis charged Bhutto of having more soft attitude towards Mohajir. Their bitterness against Bhutto became so intense that during anti-Bhutto PNA movement (March, 1977) the old Sindhis led by veteran G.M. Sayed gave open support to Pakistan National Alliance a collation of opposition parties in order to topple the Bhutto government. They also justified Bhutto's deportment and his death sentence passed by the Lahore High Court.

Table -4: Provincial Population Data Percent Unless Otherwise Indicated

Feature	Pakistan	NWFP	FATA	Punjab	Sindh	Baluchistan	Islamabad
Area (km ²)	796,096 (100)	74,521 (9.4)	27,220 (0.034)	205,345 (25.8)	140,914 (17.7)	347,190 (43.6)	906 (0.001)
Population (thousands)	132,352 (100)	17,744 (13.4)	3,176 (0.02)	73,621 (57.7)	30,440 (23.0)	6,566 (0.05)	805 (0.006)
Male	52.03	51.22	52.01	51.74	52.88	53.4	53.93
Female	47.97	48.78	47.99	48.26	47.12	46.6	46.07
Male/ Female ratio	108.5	105	108.4	107.2	112.2	114.6	117
Under 15 years	43.4	41.3	25.9	42.5	42.76	46.67	37.9
15-64 years	53.09	53.9	24.3	53.5	54.47	50.81	59.4
65 years and older	3.5	4.8	1.8	4	2.77	2.52	2.7
Economically active	22.24	19.4	...	22.6	22.75	24.05	23
Unemployed	20.19	26.8	...	19.1	14.43	33.48	15.7
Urban	32.5	16.9	2.7	31.3	48.8	23.9	65.7
Density (person per km ²)	166.3	238.1	116.7	358.5	216	18.9	880.8
Average annual growth, 1981-98	2.69	2.82	2.19	2.64	2.8	2.47	5.19
Age-dependency ratio	88.34	85.6	114	86.9	83.58	96.79	68.4
Literacy ratio	43.92	35.4	17.4	46.6	45.3	24.83	72.4
Male	54.81	51.4	29.5	57.2	54.5	34.03	80.6
Female	32.02	18.8	3	35.1	34.78	14.09	62.4
School enrollment ratio	35.98	41	...	39.4	32.78	23.53	57.5
Male	41.19	5.2	...	43.8	37.35	29.49	57.7
Female	30.25	21.3	...	34.6	27.7	60.4	57.3

Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division.

- a. Figures in parentheses are percentages of the national total.
Adapted from Stephen Cohen's 'The Idea of Pakistan', (2005).

The emergence of M.Q.M (Mohajir Qaumi Movement) in 1984, championing the interests of the Urdu speaking Mohajirs has changed the political scenario in Sindh after 1984. Infact, MQ M was the brain child of Zia to balance Sindhis. Initially, it formed alliances with other non-Sindhi groups (such as Punjabis and Pashtoon) living in the Urban Sindh. However, the alliance could not last long and in 1986 there was a communal clash between Pashtuns and Mohajirs. The MQM joined the Benazir Bhutto government after 1988 elections. But its alliance with Bhutto could not last long because Benazir refused to entertain the regional demands of M.Q.M. Its leader Altaf Hussain switched over his loyalty to Nawaz Sharif. Again, the relationship between the M.Q.M and PML could not last long. Altaf Hussain now lives an exiled life in London and supports the MQM from there.

Thus if one looks at politics of Sindh province one finds that even today the province continues to be divided along ethnic lines. The growing ethnic divide between the two legitimate ethnic communities of the province has resulted in the benefit of the non-Sindhi/ Mohajir communities such as Punjabi and Pashtun. The MQM also started raising the slogan of 'fifth nationality' in order to have a distinct Mohajir ethnic group which has its own culture and language Urdu like other four ethnic groups Punjabis, Pashtun, Baloch and Sindhis.

NWFP: North West Frontier Province

In 1929, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan launched a peasant movement, Khudai Khidmatgar. It was a reformist movement claimed to struggle for social justice. In 1900, when the NWFP was still part of Punjab province, reforms in the form of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act were introduced. Although the act helped to relieve the Punjabi peasants from the grip of voracious Hindu money-lenders, it did not disentangle them from the grip of land lords and pirs. (Sayeed 1968a: 283). Gaffar Khan's two main sources of influence were Amanullah and his nationalist politics and Gandhi and his non-violent anti-colonial movement (Gaffar Khan, cited in Sayeed: 1980. p. 18).

His Khudai Khitnatgar was an anti-colonial nationalist movement which professed to awaken Pakhtuns and to unite them against colonial rule by reminding them of their glorious past. (Gaffar Khan, Quoted in Easwaran, 1984. 25). Gaffar Khan was a man of great integrity and perseverance. He was not famous for his intellect. His main weakness was his lack of understanding of the complex social and political changes that were occurring in his society. (Khan: 2005: 93).

Abdul Gaffar's main reason for his alliance with the Congress was the Congress's anti British politics. Another important reason, which forced him to align with the Congress was that Congress could never have popular support in a province that had highest percentage of Muslim population and therefore, Congress would have to depend on his support. In the 1937 provincial elections, Congress with the support of Khudai Khidmatgar won 17 out of 50 seats. Muslim League could not won even a single seat.

The British authorities and the Muslim League soon realized that the only way to divert popular support form the Congress and its ally Khudai Khidmatgar was to project the image of Congress as a Hindu Organisation. The Muslim League with help of the British, started taking support of Mullahs and other religious leaders. At the same time the Muslim League was launched in the non-Pakhtun district of Hazara by one Maulana Shakimullah, President of Jamait-ul-Ulama, who became the first president of the Muslim League, assisted by the secretary of Jamait-ul-Ulema as the secretary of the Muslim League. (Khan, Wali, 1987: 55-70).

Despite all these efforts, Muslim League could not muster the support of Pakhtuns. In the 1946 elections, many big Khans were Muslim League candidates (Talbot: 1988: 17). The Congress again won 30 out of 50 seats. In the Pukhtun dominated areas its performance was impressive, with 16 out of 22 seats.

According to the British and Muslim League plan, the NWFP contained a Muslim majority province, which would later become part of the future Pakistan. Gaffar Khan, being a staunch Congress ally, did not believe in the idea of Pakistan and could not even think of the NWFP becoming part of Pakistan. When the creation of Pakistan became reality and the Congress accepted the division, Khan Abdul Gaffarkhan was completely stunned and for several minutes he could not utter a word, as for him it was

an act of treachery on the part of Congress which had thrown Khudai Khidmatgar to the wolves (Azad, 1988: 210).

The very demand for a new independent Pukhtun state, Afghanistan already existed became a confrontation of the British division of Pukhtuns (Anwar, 1988: 30). Pakhtun nationalists demanded an independent state because they could see that in a future Pakistan they would be dominated by the Punjabis, whereas if they became part of Afghanistan they would have to give up their demand for Pukhtun nationalism. Thus a new identity was imagined and constructed which shared a past with Afghanistan but did not want a future with it. Afghanistan's support for the idea of a new state was acceptable but not Afghanistan itself (Ibid.: 31). To quote Gaffar Khan about Afghans, "we do not want to be one with those naked people" (Quoted in *ibid*: 31).

There was difference over the question of plebiscite whether NWFP should remain part of India or become a part of Pakistan. The Khan brothers demanded that the question should be whether the NWFP be declared an independent state of Pakhtunistan or become a part of Pakistan. But Lord Mountbatten refused to put the third option of independence on the ballot and Gaffar Khan boycotted the vote. While NWFP voted for Pakistan, the Khan brothers were left with no option but to change their strategy according to the new situation.

The Pashtun movement went into slow decline and was virtually non-existent even before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979. Gaffar Khan's Red Shirts and its successor National Awam Party (MAP) led by his son, Wali Khan were strong in just four out of six settled districts in NWFP-Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Mardan and had little reach among Pashtuns in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) or elsewhere (Jones cited in Cohen, 2005: 217).

The demand for Pakhtoonistan lacked significant middle and lower middle class support in urban areas. In the rural areas, lower middle class Pashtuns were tied to the Pakistani through a long and chequered history of military service and an even higher percentage of soldiers than the Punjab. Also a number of retired officials, especially retired generals were Pashtuns. Ayub Khan was a Pashtun general. Furthermore, the NWFP economy was closely integrated with that of Punjab and Karachi became a favorite destination for Pashtuns. Pashtuns came to dominate Pakistan's trucking industry

and they have found an important niche in Pakistan's legal and illegal economies (Cohen, 2005: 218).

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 put an end to the demand for Pakhtunistan once and for all. Pakistan used Taliban as a perfect weapon to end once for all the idea of Pakhtunistan. Talibans were trained in Pakistan's Madarassas with the help of ISI and indirectly through political parties notably Jamait Ulema-e-Islam one of the Taliban's mentors. The 9/11 attack on the USA led to the destruction of Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2002, by the US forces. Taliban regime was the first friendly government for Islamabad in Afghanistan.

During democratic interlude (1988-1999) secular and national parties had edged out the separatists and irredentist movements including the Islamists and the NAP. But the elections of 2002 reversed the trend and witnessed the emergence of six party alliance MMA (Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal).

The emergence of an Islamist government in NWFP (and as a coalition partner in Baluchistan) raises the possibility of a very different kind of separatist nationalist movement in the NWFP one based on the religious symbols and alliances. This is bound to create clash within the new government of Afghanistan which is hostile to the Islamists in NWFP and Balochistan. The Islamists continue to protect Taliban and Al-Qaida extremists. Afghanistan can also support ethno-nationalist sentiments against Pakistan by supporting Pakthunistan movement in order to counter balance Taliban and Islamist's threat. Thus a Pakhtoonistan movement may yet emerge, but it is difficult to predict whether the sponsors will be Pakistani Pashtuns in the guise of the MMA, or, Afghanistan seeking to counter balance Islamabad by encouraging separation in Pakistan itself (Cohen: 2005: 219).

Balochistan

Balochistan has posed insurmountable challenge to the Pakistani state since its inception. Of all ethnic nationalism, Baloch ethnic nationalism is the most fierce one. Like NWFP Balochistan was also not in favour of joining the new state of Pakistan. The Baloch opposed their accession to the new state. So far, they have rebelled four times in the Pakistan's troubled political history of 60 years in 1948, 1958, 1963-68 and 1973-77

and a low level fifth insurgency is going on since 2005. Ethnic alienation in Pakistan is mainly due to the centre's i.e. economic policies which has so far favoured development of Punjab and urban Sindh at the expense of erstwhile East Pakistan, rural Sindh NWFP and Balochistan widening the socio-economic disparities.

Balochistan is by any yardstick Pakistan's least developed province. with a small population of 5% of Pakistan's total population and largest area 43% of total area of Pakistan. It is rich in oil, gas and coal and mineral resources like iron ore copper, uranium sulphur etc. Balochistan's history has been a saga of treachery from the British rule to the new Pakistani state. The British tried to exploit the routes of Balochistan in order to contain Russia in its great game of 'routes and anti routes'. Infact the British developed only roads and they did not take care of development of the province in other important sectors. From Jalal Han in the 12th Century to the great Nasir Khan the 6th Khan of Kalat, in 18th Century Balochistan's political history has seen many ups and downs. The emergence of Baloch nationalism can be traced back to British era, when after the First World War under the influence of Russian Revolution and Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination Baloch started to form association. Balochistan's occupation by Iran in 1928 and Eastern Balochistan's occupation by the new Pakistani state in 1948 created a lot of furore. Like NWFP, Balochistan was also not interested in joining new state of Pakistan. But Pakistan by military force annexed it in 1948. After merger of the province with Pakistan, Pakistan tried to impose centralised modern state system on the Baloch. Infact, the Pakistani state's intervention in the province is more menacing than its colonial predecessor. Due to the governmental neglect and economic exploitation of its resources by the successive central governments has led to the alienation of Baloch. The One Unit Scheme of 1955 was vociferously opposed by the Baloch. It was in 1969 when Yahya Khan abolished One Unit Scheme and finally in 1970 Balochistan got the status of a province. In 1948, prince Karim rebelled, in 1958 rebellion was led by Nauroz Khan of Zehri tribe in 1963 Parari movement was led by Sher Mohammad Marri, and finally during 1973-77 insurgency entire province got engulfed.

Bhutto suppressed the (1973-77) insurgency with the help of Iran. General Zia tried to co-opt the Baloch. He released 6000 prisoners and gave general amnesty to

guerrillas. But on the question of autonomy, he backtracked as did his predecessors. During the democratic period of 1988-99 Balochistan was relatively peaceful barring few inter tribal and intra-tribal clashes. This decade also saw the emergence of Nawab Akbar Bugti as prominent figure.

He became Chief Minister after 1989 elections. General Musharaff took the rein in 1999 in a bloodless coup. Since then he has been trying to crush the ethnic aspirations of Baloch. He had clash with Bugti over the gas royalty (Suigas field is in his area). Nawab Bugti became the victim of the military on 26th August, 2006. But the project which has created much furore is Gwadardeep seaport built by Chinese assistance. People of Balochistan are opposing the Gwadardeep seaport as they fear that they will not benefit from this project and outsiders will outnumber them in their own province. There are already 1 million Afghan refugees in the province which has caused fear of ethnic marginalisation of the Baloch in their own province. Baloch are also underrepresented in job. Most of the province is living under poverty. The military is taking interest in only Gwadar and other cantonment building activities. They are not adequately investing in social sector like water, school, electrification and eradication of poverty. Thus, Balochistan is a perfect example of strong centre vs backward periphery. The state has tried to suppress the political and ethnic consciousness of the Baloch people. I have discussed in detail the problems of Balochistan in Chapter 3 & 4.

The Mohajirs

Although Indian Muslim migrants were from various ethnic groups like Punjabis, Gujaratis, Memons etc, it was the Urdu speaking people from north India, especially from U.P. (United Province) and Bihar who migrated to Pakistan after the partition of British India. The main reason was that the Urdu was not the mother tongue of the people of any province that formed the new state of Pakistan. The number of Punjabi Muslim migrants were easily assimilated into the Punjab province. Till 1970, the Mohajirs were the harbinger of Muslim nationalism and the most ardent supporter of the official nationalism of Pakistan and strong opponent of ethnic dissent and cultural diversity. Ironically, the Pakhtuns who opposed the creation of Pakistan have been

integrated into system and Mohajirs who supported creation of Pakistan have been sidelined.

In the late 1970s, however, they began to think of their separate ethnic identity which resulted in the formation of their own political group, the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM). By the end of the 1980s, the MQM got not only the support of Mohajirs especially in Urban Sindh (Karachi and Hyderabad) but also became an increasingly organised and violent political group, turning the major towns into the most dangerous places in Pakistan.

The main difference between the MQM politics and other ethnic groups is that unlike other ethnic groups that have been fighting for their rights, the Mohajirs have been a privileged group. Infact, when they thought that they were loosing their privileges during 1970s & 1980s they began to assert their separate ethnic identity. Till 1970s, they aligned with the Punjabi to form a nexus to counter balance the majority Bengali. Generally, support of MQM political base is urban middle class in urban Sindh province.

The United Provinces (U.P.) of India, from where most of the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs had migrated to Pakistan, was the traditional power base of the Muslim landed gentry of the Mughal Empire since the 12th century. When the British administration took over power from the Mughal King in 1857, the Muslim elite of U.P. who were associated with the Mughal king court maintained their position of privileges by continuing to serve the colonial administration. Their share in land holding too was not radically affected under colonialism (Page, 1987: 8).

However, when the colonial state began to establish itself as a modern bureaucratic rule bound state/ administrative system and to expand its writ, its requirement for employment changed (Mishra, 1977). The change in modern-style education with special emphasis on training rather than social and cultural refinement became a pre-requisite for state employment. The challenge was so serious that the elite Muslim U.P.'ites share in the high ranking subordinate judicial and executive jobs declined from 63.9% in 1857 to 45.1% in 1886-87 and was further reduced to 34.7% by 1913. (Sarkar, 1989: 77)

Although the Muslims, being only 13-14% of the province population, had an unjustifiably large share, even then, they developed a sense of insecurity and resentment as a community losing out some of its privileges (Alavi, 1988: 72).

Syed Ahmad, an aristocrat from Delhi was the leading personality behind the Muslim reformist, educational as well communal movement. He was arguably the most significant contributor to the politics, culture and psyche of the Mohajirs of the Pakistan. Syed Ahmad was socially and religiously liberal but politically conservative and looked at any change in the existing order or any opposition to British rule with suspicion. Syed Ahmad was a representative of the Muslim landlords and what Alavi has called salariat – a group of individuals equipped with modern education to serve as scribes and functionaries in the colonial administration (Alavi, 1988: 68). He changed his minds on many of issues that he had so far so vehemently supported or began to oppose them with same vigour. Later, he became a formidable communalist, he demanded special quota for Muslims in the Indian Civil Service and favoured communal rather than joint electorates. (Smith, Wilfred, 1946: 26) Thus Syed Ahmad is rightly regarded as the instigator of the two-nation theory.

The All India Muslim League, which led Muslims to the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan, was not only founded by the Muslims from U.P. (United Provinces and other Muslim minority provinces but also was dominated by them before as well as after partition. Prior to partition, in 1946-47 only 10 out of 23 members of the Muslim League Working Committee were from the future Pakistan areas. After partition, in 1947, at the Muslim League Council meeting, 160 out of 300 members were immigrants. (Waseem, 1989: 106-07). After Jinnah's death in 1948, Chaudhari Khaliqzaman an aristocrat from Lucknow became the President of the Muslim League. Between 1947 to 1958, some of the most important posts like Prime-Ministership, the ministerial portfolios of education, information and refugee rehabilitation and various provincial governorships were all held by Mohajirs (Callard, 1957: 342-45 and Ahmed, Feroz, 1988: 132).

It is interesting to note that only 2% of the millions of Indian Muslims who migrated to Pakistan were from U.P. During the same period Mohajirs on the whole, were only 3% of the total population of Pakistan. (Waseem 1989: 110, 114). But due to

their over representation in high ranking jobs in the colonial administration, they came to dominate the administrative structure of the new state. At the time of partition, there were 101 Muslim officers in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the IPS. Of these 95 (83 ICS & 12 IPS) opted for Pakistan. (Braibanti, 1963: 366-67). Out of 83 ICS Officers, 49 were Urdu speakers from minority provinces. (Sayeed: 1987: 132, 156).

The first Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali, introduced the quota system for the civil service in September 1948. But it did not affect the over-representation of Mohajirs and Punjabis. For instance, East Bengal accounted for 56.75 of total population of Pakistan, but its share in quota was 42% whereas West Punjab had 24% quota with 28% population like wise, Karachi, where large number of Mohajirs settled received a 2% share though its population was 1.5%. Furthermore, an additional 15% allocation was made exclusively for potential migrants from India (Waseem, 1997: 227).

The One Unit Scheme of 1955 was introduced to amalgamate the provinces of West Pakistan into one unit to counterpoise Bengali majority. Urdu language of Mohajir was made the national language of Pakistan. Ethnic languages and cultures were not only discouraged but also suppressed. Any protest against these homogenizing moves and any demands for regional autonomy, representational rule and equitable distribution of resources were translated as direct threat to the integrity of the state.

In terms of economic development both Karachi and Hyderabad became the centre of economic activities. The Karachi based industrial houses controlled 96% of Muslim owned private industries, over 80% of assets of private commercial banks and almost 80% of insurance companies (Maniruzzman, 1966: 85 and Amjad, 1983: 247-48). The conflict between Mohajirs and Sindhis took a new turn after the Z.A. Bhutto became Prime-Minister of Pakistan.

In July 1972, the ruling Pakistan People Party introduced a bill in the assembly to reintroduce the Sindhi language as the medium of instruction which it had earlier enjoyed for more than 100 years (1851-1958). Even before the bill was passed, the Mohajir reacted violently and riots broke out in urban centres of Sindh, forcing the government to call in the Army to restore law and order (Ahmad Feroz 1998: 41 and Sayeed 1980: 155).

By the 1970s Mohajir's jobs and privileges had become a target from many quarters. Ayub Khan's 'decade of development' had widened the gap between the rich and poor. During Bhutto's period (1971-77), industrial growth which stood at 13% during the 1960s witnessed a 10% drop, coming down to a mere 3% (Hussain & Hussain 1993: 3). By 1977 the urban middle class which formed the backbone of Mohajir support base were under severe economic stress.

Bhutto's period is noticeable for one important aspect that led to the major change in Mohajir politics. Unlike the 1947-71 period during which Mohajir bureaucrats ruled and the Karachi based industrialists prospered; the Bhutto's period had weakened the bureaucrat's hold over state power and deprived the industrialists of official patronage which resulted in the ascendancy of the Army.

General Zia's rule was the first truly military and also the first unadulterated Punjabi rule in Pakistan. By 1983, almost all top positions in the military administration were headed by the Punjabis (Noman, 1990: 41). During the same period Mohajir witnessed a gradual decline in their share in government jobs and increase in the Sindhi's share. The Mohajir share of 46.8% in the senior positions in 1974 came down to 31.5% in 1983. In the same category, Sindhis share almost doubled, jumping from 3.6% in 1974 to 6.8% in 1983. Moreover, between 1974 to 1989 Mohajirs lost over 50% of their share in the officer level posts, when their share of 30.2% dropped to 14.8% (Kennedy: 1984: 943).

In March 1984, a group of young Mohajirs, led by Altaf Hussain converted the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation (APMSO) which they had formed in 1978 into the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM). At present Altaf Hussain lives in exile in London. He has been controlling the Mohajir politics from abroad.

It is strange irony of Mohajir politics that they are pitted against a state system which they played the most significant role in building. So far as the conflict between Mohajirs and Sindhis is concerned. It is a confrontation between the most privileged and the most marginalised groups in Pakistan. In 1998 nationalist groups formed an alliance. Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM) in 1998 for provincial autonomy. For the first time, MQM has made provincial autonomy rather than Mohajir rights the main

issue. The Pakistan government may have been successful in breaking the organisaiton structure MQM, but not its support base.

Punjab

With 56% population of Pakistan's total population, Punjab is the only province which is content with the State. After the emergence of Bangladesh, Punjab became a majority province in post 1971 Pakistan. Punjab's domination in all walks of life is matter of fact. In Pakistan it is Punjab vs. rest of all: put in other words all against one and one against all. The Punjab, being the oldest and the most prosperous of all the present federal units has played a more visible role in the economy and in services. Such was the dominance of Punjab that the former East Pakistan despite its numerical preponderance and socio-cultural homogeniety found itself relegated to a diminished status.

Punjab is Pakistan's wealthiest province and most populous, with a commanding position in Pakistan's core political and military institutions. Indeed, the nation's army remains by and large a Punjabi Army with regard to both the officer corps and other ranks. Punjabis can best be described as a cross between Texans and New Yorkers. They exude a brashness and zest for life (reflected through rich stock of Punjabi jokes) and also include some of Pakistan's best educated and cultured elites, all of which can be irritating to non Punjabis. For Punjabis only the Pashtun can compare in martial qualities and valor, attitude towards Baluch are dismissive and towards Sindhis, contemptuous. (Cohen, 2005: 224)

The focal point of Punjabi domination was and remains the army (Cohen, 1998). Seventy-five percent of the army is drawn from three Punjab districts (Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Campbellpur) and two adjacent districts in the NWFP (Kohat & Mardan). These districts contain only 9% of Pakistanis male population. The officer crop is drawn from a wider, more urban base but is still predominantly Punjabi, often the sons of the junior commissioned officers. Pakistanis air force and navy are drawn from a much wider base (Cohen, 2005: 224).

Z.A.Bhutto, could not have ruled for five and half years without the support of Punjab. The military ruler General Zia-Ul-Haq by the same logic derived considerable

sustenance from the same elite of Punjab. Z.A.Bhutto tried to control Punjabi regionalism through political strategy of compromises. He never ignored Punjab's predominant position in national politics. Despite their privileges, the Punjabi elite, from time to time accused Bhutto of giving undue importance to his home province Sindh. By the end of 1975, Bhutto's PPP came across insurmountable challenges in Punjab. Bhutto's erstwhile staunch Punjabi supporters, Mohammad Mia Ali Kasuri, Ahmad Reza Kasuri, Ghulam Mustafa Kher and others deserted. Expressing their discontent with Bhutto's authoritarian rule, these former PPP members launched 'Save Punjab Movement' for greater regional autonomy. The Muslim League, Jammat-I-Islami and Tehrik-e-Istulal were the three major opposition parties which time and again accused Bhutto of neglecting the interests of Punjab. In order to please Mullahs, Bhutto had to declare 40,00000 Ahmadyas (Qadianis) as non-muslim minority. The problem of Ahmadiya sect was an important sectarian issue in Punjab. (Kaushik: 1996) Similarly the inhabitants of Bahawalpur and Multan divisions of Punjab demanded a separate Seraiki province, on the basis of their distinct linguistic identity. It might be recalled that in the mid-1975, the demand of Seraiki Suba became so challenging that Bhutto had to appoint the ex-ruler of Bahawalpur, Abbas Abbasi as the governor of Punjab in place of a seasoned politicians Ghulam Mustafa Khan (Link , 10 August, 1975 p.21).

There is also conflict between the indigenous Punjabi and immigrant Punjabi. In the sixties, the local Punjabis launched a movement for revival of Punjabi culture and language. They have discarded 'Urdu' as the official language of Punjab. Throughout the Bhutto regime the regional leaders demanded recognition of Punjabi as official language as well as medium of instruction in educational institutions. Z.A.Bhutto could not protect his democratic rule and he was finally ousted by a Punjabi Military dictator.

Zia's rule was an unadulterated Punjabi rule. In any sphere of administration, Punjabi dominated. With his demise, once again power went into hands of a Sindhi, Benazir Bhutto. She was also disliked by the Punjabi elite like her father Z.A.Bhutto. She was dismissed by the powerful trio of army, feudal lords and bureaucracy. Mian Nawaz Sharif's assumption of power provided a great relief to the Punjabis. In 1999, Sharif was ousted by military general Pervez Musharaff in a bloodless coup. Thus came

to an end the decade of democracy in Pakistani politics. Once again, army asserted its powers by dislodging democratic leaders from power.

This if one look at predominance of Punjab one finds that Punjab's dominance in the national power politics will continue to haunt smaller units of federation. There seems to be no alternative to curb the dominance of Punjab's. Punjab's domination since 1947 continues unabated, whether be it civilian rule or military rule.

The Sub-Ethnic Identities

After having discussed the three major minority ethnic groups, it would be better to discuss another language based identity which is slowly emerging in Punjab province of Pakistan. The much publicized Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM), which was established in 1998, has brought together the nationalist groups from Balochistan, NWFP and Sindh against the hegemony of the Punjabi ruling class, has admitted a new important constituent the Seraiki National Party (SNP) into its fold. The Seraiki speaking people of the less developed southern Punjab comprising Bahawalpur, Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Rahim Yar Khan have presence in Northern Sindh and South Western NWFP as well have demanded separate Seraiki province within Punjab. In 2003 and early 2004, Abdul Nazed Kanjoo, president of Seraiki National Party was seen to be pitching his demands for recognizing Seraiki as another important ethnic identity and granting it political autonomy within Pakistan. Seraikis claim that they constitute about 60% of population of Punjab. In February, 2004, the leader of the SNP went so far as to say that only the establishment of 'Seraikistan' in Pakistan would curb Punjabi expansionism and unify the sub-continent. Similarly the Potwari-speaking, people of Rawalpindi and Jhelum demanded for a separate province within Punjab,

The Hindko speaking people (2.8% of entire population of Pakistan and 18.1% of the NWFP population) concentrated in Hazara division and Kohat and Bannu districts have a strong bond of unity among them. Because of their common biological ancestry, and a history of economic ties and political cooperation, they are regarded by most outsiders as Pathans. However, they have the potential to blossom into yet another ethnic group in Pakistan. The 1998 census had considered Hindko as a separate language.


The Kalash and Khowar speaking tribals in the northern region of NWFP in Dir and Swat deserve mention as a separate and distinct ethnic group. Brohis of Sindh and Balochistan demand for a separate ethnic group Persian speaking Hazaras of Balochistan also form separate ethnic group. The tribal identities in Chitral Gilgit Hunza, Nagar as well as the Pahari and Kashmiri ethnic identities are comparatively underdiscussed in Pakistan because of their negligible role in Pakistani polity. Yet they are distinct by any yardstick. There are also suggestions to include the isolated Ahmadis as a separate group in view of their official isolation as a social group and the consequent ethnicisation. The fact that the group has a territorial presence in Rahwah lends credence to such arguments.

The Role of Languages

Regional identities in Pakistan are inevitably based on language (Tariq Rahman: 1996). It is well known that language is perhaps the most important mark of group identification. One of the most convincing definitions of an ethnic group has been 'a community in communication with itself'. In fact, without language it is almost impossible to imagine the formation of an ethnic identity. Language is precisely more discriminating than either colour or race. The latter may get over ridden by other forces and as such these may prefer to any distinct interacting community, while the former usually survives the wear and tear of time and continues to serve as a cohesive means of communication. Linguistic homogeneity strengthens regionalism both in positive and negative senses: in the former, in terms of strength of unity and in the latter through emotional frenzy. Linguistic identity played a key role in formation of Bangladesh in 1971. The culturally conscious Bengali speaking people of East Pakistan never identified with the Urdu which was perceived by them as the imposed national language.

Nothing perhaps illustrates this better than the language riots in Sindh in July 1972; where economic grievances and demands would triumph over consideration of linguistic homogeneity. The Urdu speaking Mohajirs of Urban Sindh remained alienated from the Sindhi nationalism: that is why the Urdu speaking Mohajirs have put forward their demand of 'Fifth Nationality'. The very fact that language helps a group to forge an

emotional identity also tends to make it highly inflammable, as shown by the linguistic tensions in Sindh between the Sindhi and Mohajirs.



Map -3: Distribution of Languages in Pakistan - Adapted from 'The Idea Pakistan', Stephen Cohen (2005)

Table -5: Language Distribution in Pakistan's Main Districts As a Percent of Total

District	Language (Percent)	District	Language (Percent)
Northwest Frontier Province		Sindh	
Peshawar	Hindko (6.85) Pashto (87.54)	Karachi	Pashto (8.7) Punjabi (13.6) Urdu (54.3)
Abbotabad	Hindko (92.32) Pashto (3.68)	Hyderabad	Sindhi (56.48) Urdu (28.10)
Swat	Kohistani (8.67) Pashto (90.28)	Larkana	Baluchi (6.98) Brahvi (5.92) Sindhi (78.43) Siraiki (5.04)
Mardan	Pashto (97.17)	Jacobabad	Baluchi (21.34) Sindhi (69.13)
Punjab		Sukkur	Punjabi (6.37) Sindhi (73.54) Urdu (12.66)
Lahore	Punjabi (84.0) Urdu (13.4)	Baluchistan	
Rawalpindi	Punjabi (85.0) Urdu (7.5)	Quetta	Brahvi (17.13) Pashto (36.47) Punjabi (18.85) Urdu (11.17)
Faisalabad	Punjabi (98.2)	Chagai	Baluchi (57.08) Brahvi (34.80)
Multan	Punjabi (43.8) Siraiki (44.7) Urdu (10.5)	Sibi	Baluchi (15.09) Pashto (49.77) Sindh (20.12)
Gujranwala	Punjabi (97.6)	Gwadar	Baluchi (98.25)
Jhelum	Punjabi (97.5)		
Jhang	Punjabi (96.5)		

Source: Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Oxford University Press, 1996), appendix F., pp.265-66.

- a. National data are not available, but these are Pakistan's largest districts. Data based on the 1981 census reports on districts. Minor languages have been ignored. Adapted from Stephen Cohen's 'The Idea of Pakistan', (2005).

G. A. Allama calls Pakistan 'a cradle of languages and cultures' (G.A. Allama: 2003: 19). As per a survey of the existing linguistic communities in Pakistan in 2003, the people of Pakistan speak in at least 69 dialects (Ethnologue: 2003). These separate languages/dialects had given rise to distinct national literatures: The major languages like Sindhi, Punjabi, Seraikis, Brahui, Balochi, Pushtu and Hindko have sought to depict separate national consciousness throughout history. In the rural hinter land of Pakistan in Sindh, Punjab, the Seraiki speaking belt in Southern Punjab and Northern Sindh, the Sarawan and Jhalawan regions of Balochistan, children grew up learning the highly philosophical verses of local legendary poets like Baba Farid Ganj, Baba Bulleh Shah, Sultan Bahu, Sakhi Sarwar and Gul Naseer. The most popular poets in the Pathan hinter land are Rahman Baba and Kughal Khan Khattak.

Social and Economic Factors

In any nation, economic component is the crux of regionalism. The allocation of resources to different regions also evokes popular anger and discontent among the people: In Pakistan, in the absence of any land reforms the strangle hold of the feudal landlords, Sardars, Malik, Waderas and Chaudharies could not be removed to allow for the demands of development. Agrarian reforms that were under taken during the Ayub regime and later by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were half hearted and, therefore, they could not promote the democratization of society. The industrial development of Pakistan was almost entirely spearheaded by the Memons, the Bohras and the Khojas, most of whom came from Bombay or their ancestral homes in Gujarat, Kathiawar and Kutch, places which are fairly close to Karachi. These business communities and the local Waderas and Zamindars control over half of Pakistan's industrial and agricultural wealth (Sayeed: 1967: 27). Punjabis because of their dominant position both in civil resources in the form of industrial and infrastructural development. The scramble for the location of steel plant and other heavy industries and charges of partisanship levied against the central government in this regard is another case in point. The tensions between the 'sons of the soil' and 'migrants' are still another manifestation of the economic component of regionalism.

The Absence of National Leadership

One of the agonizing legacy for the Pakistani polity, in the 60 year of its political history, obstructing the evolution of consensus based political culture and national integration, has been the absence of national leadership. Pakistani people bemoan the absence of an honest and capable national leadership with the necessary diligence, tolerance and foresight to cement the disparate politico-geographic regions and traditions into a mainstream national consciousness (Malik: 1997: 25). After partition, the new Pakistani state suffered an immediate leadership crisis. Jinnah died on September 11, 1948 and his chief lieutenant, Liaquat Ali was assassinated on October 16, 1951. The Muslim League in the absence of an able leadership fractured. Its leader, newly arrived from India, lacked a political base in the provinces that became West Pakistan. In the absence of a national leadership, the army and bureaucracy became powerful and captured the political power in 1958. General Ayub took over the charge in 1958 by imposing martial law in Pakistan. The military rule from 1958 to 1970 badly affected the democratic institutions of the East and West Pakistan. It was only in the late 1960s when the two leader came on the political horizon of West and East Pakistan namely Z.A. Bhutto, and Mujibur Rahman respectively. But both leaders lacked a Pan-Pakistan stature. Z.A. Bhutto was popular in West & Mujib in the East Pakistan. People of East Pakistan finally got independence under the able leadership of Mujib. In West Pakistan, Bhutto despite being a popular leader could not solve the problem of national integration. Peoples of Pakistan had a lot of expectation from him but he rally disappointed and resorted to repressive and undemocratic measures. He used military in Balochistan. He could not solve the manifold regional problems of Pakistan. The two democratically elected leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif badly failed in solving the regional problems of Pakistan. The result is that most of its 60 years history, Pakistan has been under military rule.

The Absence of National Parties

The main reason that Pakistan has not been able to steer its way to a stable, consensus based political culture leading to national harmony is the absence of national parties (Afzal, 1986: 79). According to Khalid B. Sayeed 'A parliamentary form of

government only works well among homogenous societies and that Pakistan, which is heterogeneous both physically and culturally, could not sustain the unity that had developed from the Indian Muslims' resistance to being absorbed into the wider Hindu culture (Khalid Bin Sayeed Quoted in Malik 1997).

Prior to partition, the All India Muslim League was the main party. The Muslim League was a party of elites. It did not enjoy much rapport among the common people. When the partition neared, people who had formerly been critics of Muslim League, joined the Party out of self-interest. After partition, when time came to transform Muslim League into a full fledged party the AIML, now Pakistani Muslim League failed to provide a national agenda. After the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali, the Party became defunct by 1954. In East Pakistan, Awami League (formed in 1949) did better to lead the aspirations of the Bengali people. By 1966 when Mujib emerged as a powerful politician on the horizon of East Pakistan's politics, the Awami League had firmly established as Pan-East Pakistan Party.

In West Pakistan, Z.A. Bhutto formed Pakistan's People Party. But both Awami League and PPP were regional parties in respective provinces. Zia's military rule crushed the political parties in the name of Islamisation. The rise and growth of religious parties has also badly affected the prospect of a national party. In the provinces, regional parties are quite strong. Though PPP is better as compared to Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif, but it has failed to transformation into an all Pakistan party.

Disregard for Constitutionalism

Pakistan's constitutional problems stem from the dearth of a political consensus, weak political parties and a state structure that hindered evolution of a constitution at a formative stage in the country's 60 years life (Chaudhary, 1969). Various constitutional reports, schemes, (including one unit to bring party between the two wing), basic democracies through limited franchise, frequent martial laws and unilateral amendments have persistently dented and delayed politico-constitutional processes and eroded official respect for constitutionalism. It is not surprising then that after almost 60 years of its political history, the country still awaits basic constitutional guidelines and has yet to

decide between a parliamentary and a presidential form of government (Kamal Azfar Quoted in Burki and Baxter, 1991).

Prolonged and futile discussions intended to serve executive interests on non-serious issues such as Shoorra-based Khilafat, trans-territorial Pan Islamic remedies and democracy vs Islam, all blurred the real issue of an efficient and accountable government elected by universal adult suffrage and with an independent judiciary and free press (Malik, 1997: 35). After independence, Pakistan could not get a good constitution. It took 9 years for Pakistan to make its constitution in 1956, that too without being implemented. The Ayub's 1962 failed to give any democratic measures in the constitution. The Bhutto's 1973 which is still in existence, did not talk of taking care of all groups. Federalism in 1973 constitution is only in the name. All these 3 constitutions have been violated and suspended by the military generals. The constitution has been frequently amended to serve the government's interests. The politicians of Pakistan have no regard for constitution. The governments both central as well provincial have been dismissed by misusing constitutional power. Democracy in Pakistan has been strangled by the military. The frequent elections between 1988 to 1999 have shown disregard for the constitution. Both politician as well as military generals are responsible for constitutional disregard. The need of the hour is to evolve a good constitution taking in account aspiration of all people.

Conclusion

Having discussed in detail, the problems of national integration, it is clear from preceding analysis that in these 60 years of her existence, Pakistan has not been able to resolve the manifold dilemmas of nation-building.

In retrospect, it might be inferred that regionalism in Pakistan was a product of no one singular factor, but rather a cumulative outcome of multiple factors, ranging from the unviable geo-physical context in the beginning and the fanaticism of religious national ideology, to increasing regional economic imbalances and the politics of coercion followed by both the authoritarian democrats and dictators. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the ruling elite whether coming from military or bureaucracy or being the elected representatives of the people heightened the regional imbalance in a

calculated effort by pitching one community against other to ensure their won political survival. So far as the power-structure itself is concerned, neither the democratic leaders such as Z.A Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif nor the military Generals like Zia-ul-Huq or Parvez Musharaff seem to have learnt any lessons from Bangladesh.

Punjab's demographic, cultural, economic and sociological predominance is a fact of life in Pakistan. Despite such internal divisions that threaten to weaken the influence of Punjab, this all powerful community still has a visible numerical strength by virtue of which it will continue to dominate and determine the political future of Pakistan. As an observer of Punjabi elite classically comments "Punjabi elite lacks generosity, yet caving into minority demands may diminish the capability of the Pakistani state. (Ian Talbot: cited in *Strategic Analysis*, Jan-March 2005)

If we look at the almost 60 years history of Pakistan's ethnic cum-regional issues, we find that the central problem in Pakistan is the positive correlation between asymmetries in power and asymmetries in size, coupled with a negative correlation with asymmetries in resources. As Punjab is too big and too powerful but covets the resources of Sindh and Balochistan agricultural lands, minerals, ports, industries, commerce and employment opportunities.

The 9/11 attack on USA in 2001, forced Pakistan to become a frontline state against terrorism: Today the most internal threat comes from the terrorists, whom Pakistan once supported: Now it has been forced to take strict actions against Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists. The recent case of Lal Masjid in Islamabad where more than hundred people were killed clearly points out that Pakistan has become citadel of religious extremism and terrorism. The situation in tribal areas of Waziristan and Sawat is very volatile: Under US pressure, Pakistan is forced to take strict actions against the Jihadis of Islam: The rise of MMA in Pakistan is also a threat to its security: The rising cases of Shia-Sunni clashes in Pakistan is posing a serious threat to its Islamic identity. The Musharaff administration seems to have recognized the sectarian violence, but the assertion from ethnic quarters has not yet been accepted by Musharaff. The manner in which Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed is clearly a case of military role in suppressing ethnic discontent by force. The current insurgency in Balochistan is mainly

due to military's high handedness in dealing with the province. In order to solve the multi ethnic problems of Pakistan, the over centralized state has to develop a tolerance for provincial demands. The state has to accommodate rather than try to forcibly assimilate diverse regional and sub-regional identities, adopt a consociational approach, foster their growth and development and stop treating them as competing for influence at the national level. At the same time, the state should try to take tough measures against the disruptive tendency of the diverse militant Islamic groups vying for influence in the socio-political landscape within Pakistan. In order to search for an ideological basis of the Pakistani state or nation, it has to go beyond Islamic universalism and 'two nation theory' concept and look for a non-coercive territorial Pakistani identity born out of the free interplay of diverse ethnic identities that crowd the Pakistani socio-cultural universe. But seeing the current attitude of Pakistani state under the regime of President Musharaff, this task seems to be very difficult.

Now, it is high time for Pakistani rulers, to play, once again, a positive role in accomplishment of national integration and regional autonomy. The immediate task for the rulers of Pakistan is to restore the civil liberties, democracy and the recognition of multi-national reality of Pakistan. The federal framework needs to be operationalised with commitment in real sense of the term. There is also a need for reformulation of economic strategy with a view to reducing the parity among various regions. Last but not the least, it is the indigenous foundations that need to be strengthened in terms of both socio-economic factors and politico-economic priorities.

CHAPTER - III

THE EMERGENCE OF BALOCH NATIONALISM AND ITS DEVELOPMENT AFTER 1973

“Nationalism is above all and beyond all else, about politics, and that politics is about power. Power in the modern world is primarily about control of the state” (Breuilly, 1993:1).

Introduction

Baloch nationalism is one of those phenomena which defy theories that see nationalism as an effect of industrial social formation or print capitalism. (Khan: 2005: 109). The Baloch have posed the most serious organized threat to the stability of Pakistan. For all practical purpose, Balochistan is the most underdeveloped province of Pakistan. After partition Pakistan’s treatment of the region was at par with the colonial administration. Infact, Pakistani treatment has been worse than the British rule. Baloch nationalism emerged in a tribal set-up well before the partition of India and was fiercely opposed to Balochistan’s accession to Pakistan in 1948. After partition due to the shabby treatment of region by the Pakistani state, Baloch nationalism turned itself into a reckoning force, which attracted wide international attention following the 1973-77 insurgency which culminated into a bloody conflict with Pakistan Army.

Since Pakistan’s creation in 1947, the Baloch have rebelled four times viz in 1948, 1958-60, 1963-67 and 1973-77. After a hiatus of three decades, a low level insurgency since 2004 challenges central control over the province. After almost seven years of military rule, deprived of representative participatory institutions and with their natural resources exploited by Islamabad, Baloch alienation at present is an all time high. The current insurgency is due to social and economic factors. In Pakistan’s almost sixty years of political history, Balochistan has been neglected and exploited by the successive central governments. The latest recrudescence of ethnic nationalism after a gap of three decades following the two unfortunate incidents viz, the gang rape case of Dr. Shazia Khalid by a captain and three personnel of the Defence Security Guards (DSG) in Sui on 2 January, 2005 and killing of septuagenarian Nawab Akbar Bugti *Tumandar* of Bugti

tribe and chief of Jamhoori Watan Party by the military on the 26th August, 2006 and its attempted cover-up by concerned authorities has forced the 'forgotten Balochistan' to revive itself into public consciousness in Pakistan with a vengeance. Nationalism has too often been interpreted in terms of good and bad, tribal and modern, civic and ethnic etc., which blurs the most important aspect of nationalism that in today's nation state system, nationalism is either about share in the existing state power structure or if that is not possible, about creating its own state (Khan: 2005:109).

This chapter will focus on the emergence of Baloch nationalism and its development especially after 1973 insurgency as well the role of the state in suppressing the nationalism.

Historical Background

Balochistan is geopolitically and strategically the most important province of Pakistan. With over 222,000 square kilometers area, the province covers 42.9% of the total area of Pakistan. Its population of 6.5 million (According to 1998 census) is just 5% of Pakistan's total population. It commands nearly the country's entire coast 470 miles of Arabian Sea. It is the most impoverished province of Pakistan with the lowest per capita income as compared to the other three provinces. Ethnically and linguistically it is the most diverse province of Pakistan. The Baloch are largest ethnic group in their province, but don't constitute a majority. They are closely followed by Pukhtuns. The third largest ethnic group is Brahui, followed by a substantial number of Sindhis and Punjabis. Interestingly, the majority of Baloch live outside Balochistan, mostly in Sindh and Punjab (Khan 2005:110). There are around two millions Baloch in Iran.

The province is rich in mineral resources like oil, gas, coal, gold, copper, silver, platinum, aluminium, iron ore, marble, sulphur and uranium. Balochistan is the driest province of Pakistan and there is, therefore, very little irrigation and farming. Because of inhospitable terrain, severe weather and scarcity of fertile land, the social mode of Balochistan has predominantly been nomadic pastoralism, complemented by patches of settled agriculture. It was around these patches that tribal life was organized. The livelihood of people has been dependent on myriad economic activities, such as growing crops on small plots of land, tending pasture land, cattle breeding, sheep and goat

breeding, trade and work in mines. The social organization of the province continues to be based on tribalism to this day (Qasir, 1991: 26).

Since majority of Baloch belong to moderate Hanafi Sunni sect, Baloch ethnic nationalism is grounded in secular principles, with tribal and clan loyalties also historically playing a significant role in determining identity. Political identity co-exists with narrower tribal and clan loyalties; the two are not necessarily at cross-purposes. However, Baloch nationalism is at odds with Islamabad's attempt to create a monolithic state and impose a top-downward concept of national identity which has become a constant source of tension between the centre and the smaller federating units in the multi ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-regional state.

Before the colonial rule, Balochistan was a highly fragmented society. The concept of state authority did not figure very prominently in the tribal mode of localized social life. Although various conquering armies like the Persians, Afghans, Sindhis and Sikhs continuously overran the region, all avoided permanent control of the tribes (Wirsing: 1981:4).

Who are the Baloch and where they came from, are shrouded in myth and speculation. According to Daptar Shaar (Chronicle of genealogies), an ancient ballad popular among all 17 major Baloch tribes, the Baloch and Kurds were kindred branches of a tribe that migrated eastward from Aleppo, in what is now Syria, shortly before the time of Christ in search of fresh pasturelands and water sources. One school of Baloch nationalist historians attempt to link this tribe ethnically with the Semitic Chaldean rulers of Babylon, another with the early Arabs, still others with Aryan tribes originally from Asia Minor. In any case, there is agreement among these historians that the Kurds headed toward Iraq, Turkey, and North-West Persia, while the Baloch moved into the coastal areas along the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, later migrating into what are now Iranian Balochistan and Pakistani Balochistan between the 6th and 14th centuries (cited in Harrison's 'In Afghanistan's Shadow', 1981:10).

In the 12th century Mir Jalal Han founded the first Baloch confederacy in Balochistan. The Baloch nationalists writers and poets consider Mir Jalal Han (12th century) as the founding father of the Baloch nation and the founder of the first 'Baloch confederacy' in Balochistan (Baloch, Inayatullah: 1987: 95). Mir Chaker Rind headed a

tribal confederacy, referred to by historians as the 'Rind-Lashari Union emerged in 1485 (Janmahmad: 1989:157-163). The Rind-Lashari confederacy was one of the largest Baloch tribal confederacies. This confederacy united for the first time all the Baloch areas into the late 15th century. In 1666 A.D. Ahmad Khan of the Ahmadzai tribe, established the 'Khanate' of Balochistan or the second important Baloch confederacy. The sixth Khan of Kalat, Nasir Khan I (1749-1795) was the greatest and most powerful Khan among all the rulers of the Khanate. He reunified the vast Baloch territory into a single political entity.

Nasir Khan established a unified Baloch army of 25,000 men and 1000 camels and organized the major Baloch tribes under an agreed military and administrative system (Harrison: 1981: 16). The Baloch nationalist nostalgically remember the heyday of his period. His period has rightly been lauded as 'The Augustan Age' of Khanate (Spooner: 1978). He is sometimes compared to the 'Peter the Great of Russia' (Shah Mohammad Marri cited in Breseeg 2004:153).

In 1839, the British forces killed the Mehrab Khan and captured Kalat. In 1841 Nasir Khan II (1830-1857) was recognized by the British and 13 years later (1854) Kalat signed its first twenty year treaty. In a new treaty with Kalat, which was rectified at end of 1876, it was arranged that the British troops might be stationed there. The Balochistan Agency with its colonial head quarters at Quetta was established in 1877. In the same year, Robert Sandeman was appointed Agent to the Governor General (A.G.G), Chief Commissioner and put incharge of the Agency for Balochistan (R. Hughes Buller, cited in Breseeg, 2004, 160). Sandeman devised his Forward Policy for which he is known as the real 'conqueror of Balochistan' by the British chroniclers (Tucker: 1979: 6). He introduced a new system, 'the Sandeman system by changing the traditional character of the Old Jirgas altogether. This system established direct relations with the Sardars and tribal chiefs, ignoring the Khan.

The Sandeman system treated Balochistan as a political agency ruled in directly through the political agent of the Governor General. The Sandeman system gave the British a powerful weapon to control rebellions against themselves and broke the last remaining institution of a purely tribal character (Baloch, Inayatullah: 1987: 141).

The colonial administration began its divide and rule practices, playing off rival chiefs against each other. Balochistan was divided into seven parts. In the far west, the Goldsmid line assigned roughly ¼ of the area of Balochistan to Persia in 1871 and in the north the Durand line resulted in handing over a small strip to Afghanistan in 1893. Part of the Balochistan was named British Balochistan, to be centrally administered by British India, where as the rest of it was divided into a truncated remnant of the Kalat state and three puppet principalities (Harrison: 1981: 19).

Causes of Baloch Nationalism

Several factors may be attributed to the cause of Baloch nationalism. Firstly, the British deliberately kept Balochistan as a backward periphery. British neglected the economic development of Balochistan. It was not only a case of neglect, but what might be called purposeful sidetracking, even suppression (Breseeg's interview with Baloch leaders, cited in Breseeg: 2004). During their 'Great Game' rivalry with Russia, the British took interest only in 'routes and anti-routes' politics. This kept the province backward. The British never invested in social sector. They thought that an economically and politically enervated Balochistan would lend itself to be used more easily. On the other hand, other 3 provinces received special attention from the British. The British also divided the Baloch territory into neighbouring countries Iran and Afghanistan to weaken their resistance to the colonial rule. This badly affected the prospects of Balochistan. Secondly after partition, the new Pakistani state treated the Baloch territory worse than its colonial predecessor. The new Pakistan state also suppressed the Baloch both politically and economically. Thirdly, the emasculation of democratic space by the Pakistani state, has badly affected the ethnic minorities in the country. Balochistan has been a worst sufferer in this sense. The Baloch feel cheated because they have never been allowed to rule their own people, in accordance with the democratic decision making process. Pakistani state always treats them as tribal people unfit to rule. This is also the main cause of nationalism.

Fourthly, the Baloch don't want autonomy in substance, but autonomy in feeling. Their persistent demand for autonomy has not been met by the Pakistani state. The Baloch are very possessive about their province, its natural resources and their tribal

identity. But all round governmental neglect and economic exploitation of their natural resources by the successive central governments have led to their alienation. The Baloch want to rule their province according to regional, ethnic and political aspirations of their people. The above mentioned factors are mainly responsible for the root causes of Baloch nationalism. That is why from time to time Baloch have rebelled and posed serious threat to the stability of Pakistan. The only way out is to initiate democratic measures so that the Baloch can rule the province according to the aspirations of their people.

The Emergence of Baloch Nationalism

The First World War and the 1917 Russian Revolution had repercussions on the remote Balochistan. The Marri tribes revolted against the recruitment of soldiers and mercenaries in 1917. Rebels fled to the Soviet Union and formed a delegation to the 'Baku Congress of the Peoples of East' in 1918, as Misri Khan Baloch its head. The rebel chief, Karim Khan Baloch, from Iranian Balochistan was also one of the delegates to the Baku Congress (Baloch, Inayatullah, 1987: 147-149).

The origin of the Baloch nationalist movement goes back to the forcible incorporation of the Baloch into Iran by Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1928 and later into the new state of Jinnah's Pakistan left behind by the British Raj in 1947. "The emergence of nationalism in Balochistan was not the effect of industrial social organization, which Gellner regards as the cause of the nationalism (Gellner, 1983). It was also not caused by print capitalism, which Anderson believes is a trigger for nationalist sentiment (Anderson, 1991). Rather it was the Baloch nationalists who first introduced Baloch society to print media". (Khan: 2005: 114).

Baloch nationalism emerged as a response to the intervention of the state. The first successful nationalist campaign was launched in 1929 against the state recruitment, which turned into an armed mutiny. The following year, 1930, several underground political groups were formed and an anti-colonial 'Quit Balochistan' movement was launched. In the 1930s an organization known as 'Anjuman-I-Ittihad' Balochistan founded by Aziz Kurd (Balochistan Unity Association), soon followed by the first nationalist party the Kalat National Party (formed in 1935), by Kurd, Yusuf Ali Magsi and other non communists started openly to promote reforms, including the objective of

achieving an 'independent' United Balochistan after the departure of the British. The British banned the Kalat National Party in 1939.

In 1933, on 20th August, a weekly paper 'Al-Baloch' from Karachi, published a map of independent Balochistan that included Iranian Balochistan, Kalat, Baloch principalities, British Balochistan and some parts of Punjab and Sindh (Siddqui, 1991; 25,31 and Harrison, 1981 pp.22-23).

On 15th August, 1947 one day after the official creation of Pakistan on 14th August, the Khan of Kalat declared independence and announced the establishment of two legislatures, with the Upper House reserved for Sardars. Elections were held in a short time and gave the majority in the Lower House to Baloch nationalists despite an official ban on KNP. Suspicion regarding Pakistan's designs grew during the two sessions of Kalat Assembly held in September and December in 1947. When the Punjab, Sindh and NWFP decided to merge with Pakistan, the majority in the Kalat Assembly expressed their preference for full independence, although the assembly did accept the special arrangements with the Pakistan on such issues as security and foreign policy. Pakistan had already refused to return the former British administered territories to Kalat and eventually made it clear that it would only accept as unconditional accession. The confederation of Baloch states were broken when three states Lasbela, Makran and Kharan joined Pakistan in March 1948. General Akbar Khan received the order to move from Quetta to Kalat and on 1 April, 1948 the Pakistan Army occupied the 'constitutional vacuum' of Balochistan.

To justify this blatant intervention, Pakistan claimed that body of tribal Sardars, the Shahi Jirza, meeting in the Quetta in June, 1947 had decided to join the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Pakistan did not mention that the electoral college had been appointed by British Authorities and that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss British Balochistan. The Kalat Lower House unanimously voted for a resolution against the merger with Pakistan. The imposition of accession and the surrender by the Khan triggered the first rebellion under Pakistani rule. Prince Abdul Karim, the Khan's brother and governor of Makran started an armed movement in the Jhalawan area with the backing of some nationalist leaders and the tacit approval of the Khan, who officially

declared him a rebel. Because of poor strategy and the lack of expected support from Afghanistan, the prince and his followers were forced to surrender.

The One Unit Scheme of 1955 was launched to counterpoise the Bengali majority in East Pakistan. But the actual physical resistance to the One Unit was more pronounced in Balochistan than any where else and at one point it seemed as if the province had seceded, because there was an open defiance of the central government's authority (Feldman; 1972: 203). First before the imposition of Martial Law for the first time in 1958, the army moved into Kalat and arrested the Khan, his retainers and Baloch political leaders in various parts of Balochistan. The Pakistani Army deployed tank and artillery, and resorted to bombing of villages. The chief of Zehritribe, Nauroz Khan, organized a guerrilla force to fight the army for the return of the Khan to power and later died in prison in 1964, whereas his son and others were hanged on treason charges (Harrison, 1981, 27-28).

The 1960s also witnessed an armed Baloch revolt, with left leaning militants, mainly from Marri, Mengal and Bugti tribes, led by Sher Mohammad Marri who founded the *Parari* guerilla movement in 1963 and operating under an umbrella organization, the Baloch People's Liberation Front which formally got its name and structure in 1976. The army's response then as now was indiscriminate force, including aerial attacks, which more often than not killed civilians. Then as now, the military also expanded its presence through the establishment of cantonments (military garrisons) alienating the Baloch further.

Yahaya Khan dissolved One Unit Scheme in 1969. It took Pakistan 23 years after its creation to grant Balochistan the status of Province in 1970. The demarcation of the new province also contained seeds of ethnic discord. Pashtun majority districts of Loralai, Zhob and Pishin were included, while despite local opposition, adjoining Baloch majority districts in Sindh and Punjab, such as Jacobabad and Dera Ghazikhan were excluded.

Thus if one looks at the history of Balochistan one finds that the use of force, combined with the centre's denial of political and administrative autonomy, planted the seeds of the conflict that now engulfs the province, as did the centre's exploitation of Balochistan's natural resources while the Baloch were deprived of the income their

province provided to the federal exchequer, Baloch areas remained underdeveloped, lacking even the most basic amenities. And when development schemes were initiated, outsiders benefited; for instance, Punjabis were given the most arable lands created by the construction of the Pat-Feeder Canal. Top-downwards attempt at nation- building also deliberately neglected regional languages such as Balochi in an attempt to promote Urdu; the mother tongue of less than 10% of Pakistan's population, as the national language. Balochistan's history has been a saga of treachery from the British politics of 'land routes' to the Pakistani state's exploitation of natural resources.

The 1973-77 Insurgency

The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 with the dismemberment of Pakistan changed the position Balochistan occupied on the mental maps of Pakistani and regional officials. As Balochistan became difficult to manage domestically and prominent strategically, its changing status encouraged development projects. New pressures favoured what might be called security propelled development and a high level of military and economic transitions between the centre and periphery. Progress in Balochistan was spurred by a combination of events, interests and personalities: the rash of internal and regional security concerns that emerged with the 1971 dismemberment of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's notions of his place in Pakistan and Pakistan's place in the region, and the newly acquired power and old fears of Shah of Iran. To this potpourri of concerns were added Afghan and Soviet dabbling in the affairs of Baloch. (Mahnaz: 1989: 52;53).

The years from 1973-77 saw an emergency born of contradictions between Bhutto's urge to control the provinces and the political aspirations of some Baloch tribal, youth and military organization. In these year land routes played an important role both at the tactical level of the evolution of the insurgency and at the consequential level of the conflict between the political centre and its periphery. The crux of the legal, political and ultimately military confrontation between Bhutto and the elected representatives of Balochistan was the tense relation between the former's efforts to create a centralized administration in a unitary state and Baloch demands for a measure of distance from the political centre (Mahnaz: 1989:60).

In the 1970 elections, the National Awami Party and the Jamiat Ulama-I-Islam (JUI) which won a majority, were called upon by Z.A. Bhutto to form the government in province. The NAP constituted the largest single group in the provincial assemblies of NWFP and Balochistan (8 out of 20 in the latter). With help of JUI, the government was formed in April, 1972 and federal government appointed, the Baloch nationalist leader Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, as governor of Balochistan and Attatullah Mengal became chief minister and Khair Bux Marri became the chairperson of NAP parliamentary party. The government commanded 13-7 majority in the Balochistan Assembly. Different interpretations have been made of the sudden decision by Z.A Bhutto to dismiss provincial government on 12 February, 1973. The official pretext was that Soviet arms and ammunition ordered by Baloch leaders had been found in the Iraq embassy in Islamabad, although evidence of the conspiracy was never revealed. As the insurgency gained momentum between 1973 and 1975, Bhutto made three offers of amnesty but no agreement was reached on ending the war. On 2 August, 1974, for example, he asked for surrender of tribal irregulars and threatened that if it were not forth coming, he could blow the mountains to bits (Quoted in Keesings contemporary archives, 1975 cited in, Mahnaz, 1989: 61).

Direct federal rule was imposed in December 1975 and January 1976. On 8 April, 1976, Bhutto announced the abolition of the Sardari System. He officially divested the tribal chiefs of their traditional over lordship and of all the wealth and privilege to which they had been entitled. This attack on the traditional rights of the Sardars only increased Baloch intransigence. When the first clashes between guerrillas and army troops occurred in April, 1973 Z A. Bhutto flew to Tehran where he immediately received US \$ 200 million in military aid. The war in Balochistan was bloody. By the late, 1974 Selig Harrison estimates; about 80,000 soldiers of the Pakistani army were fighting in Balochistan and about 55,000 Baloch had entered the field. Casualties were high: close to 8-9000 combatants as well as hundreds of women and children were killed in four years of heavy fighting. Although the guerrillas relatively untrained and disorganized suffered heavy losses, the army was unable to win a victory on the ground. Air power, using first Chinook and then Huei-Cobra-helicopters (30 helicopters, gifts of Shah of Iran, these helicopters were developed by America during Vietnam War) was more effective. In a

bloody round of battles in the fall of 1974 the Baloch insurgents suffered heavy losses, and many of them dispersed to protected sites inside Afghanistan (Harrison, 1981: 97).

Ironically, the Pakistani state's brutal use of superior fire power, less than subtle portrayal of ethnic interests as feudal and tribal interests and attack on the so-called feudal relations, antagonized almost every Baloch tribe and, therefore, reunited the warring tribal factions against the centre (Hewitt, 1996:59).

The Baloch crisis of 1973-1977 was not a war aimed to create a separatist Baloch state, it was merely an attempt to hold the centre to a commitment on federalism. Certainly the struggle contained elements of recession. In the early 1980s, one activist remarked 'patriotism pervades the entire Baluch socio-cultural identity. A deep national consciousness is beginning to emerge among the Balochi masses, lead by their first generation of intellectuals (cited in Hewitt, 1996: 58).

General Zia-ul-Haq dismissed the Bhutto government in 1977 and the first actions of the military junta after it took power were the declaration of a cease fire, the release of NAP leaders jailed in Hyderabad and nearly 6000 prisoners and the opening of negotiations. Although Zia-ul-Haq's emphasis on Islam and Pakistani nationalism had little attraction for Baloch nationalist, they had realized that it was not possible for them to achieve their objectives by fighting massive and well-equipped modern army of Pakistan. While nationalists might have been considering their next strategy, political developments in the region took the initiative away from them and made the future more dependent on the what was happening across the border in Afghanistan.

In 1978 communist rule was imposed on Afghanistan. In 1979 factional fighting led to the instability of the communist regime which forced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to help the shaky government. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan led to unprecedented military aid to the region, through the military regime of Pakistan for the next decade or so, the NWFP and Balochistan became an arena for the combined efforts of Afghan resistance groups, Pakistan army and western defence and intelligence personnel to fight against the Soviet forces.

Due to the geo-strategic location of Balochistan massive western aid poured in. In 1982, the military regime launched a Special Development Programme (SDP) funded by the US, the European Economic Council (EEC), Japan and Arab states (Noman,

1990:202). The extent of infrastructural development was such that five new airports, one naval harbour and three fishing harbours were built. The objective behind these projects is well explained by a RAND corporation trip report, which while recommending the US assistance, said that it would be politically less provocative because while it would have a clear cut military utility, it could be disguised as economic aid (Noman, 1990:202-3).

Then as now, the military opted to empower Pashtun Islamist parties in Balochistan with two goals in mind: to counter the nationalists and to promote the military's agenda in neighbouring Afghanistan, then engulfed in a US led Pakistan supported anti-Soviet Jihad. Thousands of Deobandi *Madarassas*, run by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and supported by the Pakistani state, supplied recruits for the Afghan Jihad and after Soviet withdrawal, for the Mujahidin parties during Afghanistan's bloody civil war. These *Madarassas* provided the leadership and foot soldiers for the Taliban in the 1990s and still contributes recruits to the Taliban cause.

Since the Zia era, Baloch nationalist leaders as well as Pushtun moderate parties such as Pashtoon Khwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) and Awami National Party (ANP) have had to face two adversaries: an overbearing central government and closer to home, the military backed Pashtun Islamists.

During the democratic decade of 1990s, despite the military's constant intervention, ethnic tension subsided because of representative participatory institutions. Nationalist parties such as Sardar Ataulah Mengal's Balochistan National Party (BNP), Nawab Akbar Bugti's Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) emerged as major political forces. The Pashtun Islamist JUI performed reasonably well in more conservative Pashtun belt. Baloch leaders were also represented in or aligned to the two national parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party and Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif that dominated the democratic transition, in government or opposition.

After the 1988 elections, Mengal's BNP emerged as the largest party and eventually formed government in alliance with Nawab Akbar Bugti who became chief minister. After the 1990 elections Taj Mohammad Jamali formed a coalition government with JUI to be replaced, following the 1993 elections, by Nawab Zulfikar Ali Magsi, who had the support of the PML-N and ANP. The Baloch nationalist parties dominated

the 1997 elections with BNP's Sardar Akhtar Mengal appointed as chief minister. During democratic decade (1988 to 1998), although there were stresses and strains in the relationship with Islamabad, the Baloch nationalist struggle, represented by parties and given the opportunity to articulate grievances and demands through the national and provincial legislatures moved from the militant to the political realm. This period also saw Baloch politics within province and at national level, focused on demands for regional autonomy: political, administrative, social and economic. Yet, differences with successive governments led by Benazir or Nawaz Sharif over issues such as royalties and employment did not degenerate into conflict in 1990s, even after prime ministers reneged on pledges of autonomy and dissolved nationalist led provincial governments. It was again with the return of military rule that the ethnic competition and bargaining in Balochistan transformed into conflict.

The democratic decade (1988-1998) saw fierce inter-tribal and intra-tribal clashes. Clashes between Pashtuns and Balochs, between Ghaibizai and Hameedzai of Achakzai tribe, between the Bugti tribe and the Kalpar sub tribe, Magsi's intra tribal clashes, between the Raisani and the Bugti. The scheduled, 23 October, 1994 census could not take place due to the conflictual nature of society in Pakistan.

Balochistan during Musharaff's Regime

In a military coup, General Musharaff on 12 October, 1999 dismissed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Justifying his coup on the grounds of democratic reform including the removal of provincial grievances through the devolution of power. Instead, the Punjabi dominated military government, bent on regime survival and consolidation moved quickly to concentrate all power in its hands. By manipulating the constitution, he made the president, the symbolic head of the federation, all powerful, reducing the national assembly to a mere rubber stamp and depriving the Baloch of the voice they had gained in the democratic forums of 1990s. With Musharaffwearing the dual hats of president and army chief, his centralized authoritarian rule also deprived the provinces of the rights, imperfect as they were, guaranteed by the 1973 constitution. Following the foot steps of other military rulers (like Ayub Khan's Basic Democracy), Musharaff set up a façade of local government (in the form of District Nazims), the centerpiece of his

reform. Ostensibly meant to devolve the power, the local government scheme bypasses the provinces and has created a clientele for the military at the local levels that depends on the regime for the survival.


But Baloch nationalists have rejected this kind of devolution plan as mechanism to impose a unitary form of government in the name of decentralization, and a negation of provincial autonomy. The national elections took place in 2002. By rigging the 2002 elections to counter its civilian opponents, the military also reinvigorated its long standing alliance with the Mullahs, helping the six party religious alliance Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) to gain power in NWFP. Since then this Military-Mullah alliance has been ruling the Pakistan. In Balochistan too, the elections were rigged to sideline Baloch as well as Pashtun Nationalist Party. Although a Baloch, Jam Mohammad Yusuf was appointed Chief Minister, he had little control over a cabinet in which prime posts were given to Fazlur Rahman's JUI. With Pashtun Islamists running the province at the military behest, marginalized at the centre and in their own province, Baloch nationalists rejected the military's electoral, political and constitutional manipulations. Baloch and Pashtun nationalist parties in Balochistan were and remain, divided in their approaches to ethnic rights. Mahmood Khan's Achakzai's Pashtoon Khwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP), for example, supports either the creation of a separate province for Balochistan's Pashtun majority districts, called Pashtoon Khwa Southern (based on the former chief commissioners province) or their merger with NWFP. It demands equal rights for both Baloch and Pashtuns till the restricting of the boundaries. But in order to check the growing power of Islamist parties, the moderate Pashtun parties joined their Baloch counterparts in challenging Musharaff's political order. The Baloch also closed ranks, across regional, tribal and class lines, against the Military-Mullah alliance.

Since 2005, a low level insurgency in the entire province is going on unabated. The rape of Dr. Shazia Khalid, a company doctor at the Sui gas plant, on 2 January, 2005 has forced the 'forgotten Balochistan' to revive itself into public consciousness in Pakistan with a vengeance. The army's belated attempt to cover up the whole issue has sparked violence in the province. Spearheaded by JWP leader, Nawab Akbar, Bugti, Bugti tribesmen and Baloch militants attacked the Sui-gas installation, security forces and gas pipelines, disrupting the supply of gas country wide. Military's retaliatory

measures claimed several civilian lives in Dera Bugti district. Peace was temporarily restored after the ruling party officials, including PML-Q president Shujaat Hussain and Secretary General Mushahid Hussain began talks with Bugti. But Musharaff's attitude was inflexible, blaming Bugti for unrest. "Who has given Bugti the authority to speak on behalf of Balochistan". He said (the News, 26 march, 2006). With stalemated talks, tensions again ran high and the crisis took on an even more serious dimension after an attack by Baloch militants on general Musharaff's public meeting in Kohlu on 14 December, 2005. The army chief had provided the provocation by laying the foundation of a cantonment in Kohlu. According to Musharaff, some 1,000 army personnel are merely assisting the para-military and other security forces there. U.S intelligence sources put the numbers at six army brigades, plus para-military troops, some 25,000 in all. (Dawn, 21 July, 2006).

As the military has expanded its operations, the militants and nationalists, too have escalated their attacks. The insurgency has spread almost province wide, with the exception of the northern Pashtun area, with frequent attacks on gas pipelines, electricity grids and railways tracks, as well as government installations and personnel in almost all Baloch majority areas from Chagai bordering on Iran and Gwadar on Balochistan's southern coast, to Hub, the industrial city that borders on Sindh. With the insurgency also spilling over into Sindh and Punjab, which have significant Baloch populations.

Although the tensions could have easily been solved with the Baloch leadership, the military, it seems, believes in only one solution: to enforce the writ of the state by force. And it was this logic that led to the unfortunate event of 26th August, 2006 military operation that killed 79 year old JWP leader Nawab Akbar Bugti. Bugti has become a martyr and become a symbol of Baloch resistance. Since Bugti's death, insurgency is going on unabated.




Map -4: Balochistan (Political), Adapted from International Crisis Group, Asia Report, 14 September 2006




Map -5: Adapted from Selig Harrison's *In Afghanistan's Shadow-Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (1981)

NATURAL RESOURCES

- Baluch majority
- - - Baluch claimed
- ⊗ Sui gas field
- Sui gas pipeline
- ⋯ Projected extension of Sui gas pipeline
- Oil exploration:
- ▨ Murphy
- ▨ Marathon
- A Amoco (relinquished)
- TREND Trend (relinquished)
- ▲ Drilling sites
- Coal
- ⊗ Iron ore
- ▨ Limestone
- Sulphur
- ▲ Manganese
- ⊗ Chromium
- ◆ Copper
- ▨ Sar Cheshmeh - Saindak copper belt
- ⊗ Uranium
- Barite
- Fluorite



Map -6: Adapted from Selig Harrison's *In Afghanistan's Shadow-Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (1981)



Map -7: Adapted from Selig Harrison's *In Afghanistan's Shadow-Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (1981)

The Causes for the Baloch Alienation

Governmental neglect coupled with economic exploitation of their natural resources by successive central governments has alienated the Baloch people. In Balochistan, politics has played more role than in any other province. Socio-economic, cultural and political factors are all responsible for the current situation in Balochistan. The Baloch have certain grievances not of their own making but rather it has been thrust upon them by the central government. As far as Baloch grievances are concerned, ethnicity intertwined with a sense of political isolation and relative economic deprivation continues to be potent force in evoking Baloch mobilization. Such a feeling is more intense amongst the Baloch as compared to other ethnic groups in Pakistan for historical and economic reasons.

1. **Denial of Representation in Government:** There are scarcely any Baloch personnel in the Pakistani Army, civil service or diplomatic corps. Punjabi and Pashtun representation in armed forces is estimated at 87 to 95%, although their combined share of the population is closer to 75%. It is even higher in the military's senior ranks. Baloch representation is far less in percentage terms. By official accounts, there are 15,000 Baloch in the 550,000 strong army (excluding the para-military forces). (Dawn, 5 September, 2006).

In 2002, out of a total 180 faculty members, only 30 were Baloch (Weaver 2002, pp.105-06). According to Baloch M.P Abdul Rauf Mengal, as on March, 2005, there were few government servants from Balochistan in Islamabad and not a single Baloch in foreign missions abroad. (Pakistan Times, March 1, 2005).

2. **Economic Exploitation of Natural Resources:** The Baloch feel that their natural assets are being exploited by the central government without giving them anything in return. Balochistan is responsible for 36% of Pakistan's total gas production, but it consumes only 17% of its own production, with 83% of its natural gas provided to the rest of the country for industrial and household use (Grare Report: 2006: 5). Piped gas is available to only four of Balochistan 28 districts, 46.6 percent of household have no electricity

(Federal Bureau of Statistics: Government of Pakistan, 2005:64). Even today 6% of the population has a gas connection. Infact, had the Zia regime not decided to set up an army corps head quarter in Quetta, there would still be no gas supplies to people there (The Herald, September 2004:52).

3. **Fear of Ethnic Marginalization:** The Baloch fear that due to rising influx of Pashtun and other Pakistan, they are being mariginatised in their own province. The influx of a large number of Afghan refugees of Pakhtoon origin has created an abrupt and disruptive imbalance in the numerical strength of the two communities. (Cohen: 2005:220). The northern districts of Balochistan are overwhelmingly Pashtoons. This feeling of being reduced to a minority status has also led them to oppose the mega development projects being undertaken in Balochistan. The Baloch perceive that these measures will not result in greater economic opportunities and will be used by the outsiders to colonise their land and reduce them to minority in their own province. The project that has caused much furore is Gwadar deep sea port as the Pakistani Authorities have been propagating that it will be another Karachi. In 1992, when Nawaz Sharif government decided to build a deep seaport at Gwadar on Balochistan's Makran Coast, 624 nautical miles from the Straits of Hormuz, the locals at that time had welcomed it. Now, the situation has drastically changed. Since the Baloch are not stakeholders or beneficiaries, they strongly oppose it, perceiving the project as yet another central government's scheme to exploit the natural resources, while also altering the province's demographic composition. Because the Gwadar project provides little in terms of employment and development to locals.
4. **Absence of Genuine Federalism:** The 1973 constitution of Pakistan is federalism in the name only. It has given more powers to centre than provinces. That is why Baloch are demanding provincial autonomy. Under president Musharaff's political dispensation, Balochistan's provincial government is, far all practical purposes a subsidiary arm of centre, working at its behest and following its directives. So provincial autonomy is a genuine

demand of the Baloch for taking any worthwhile decision making for the future of their province.

Baloch and Pashtun Rivalry

The differences between the Baloch and Pashtuns are rooted in history. Pashtuns dominate the province's social and economic life. In order to control the resources of province, Baloch and Pushtuns compete with each other. The British deliberately divided Balochistan into the British Balochistan which contained mainly the Pashtu speaking north-eastern regions. Due to geo-strategic reasons of this region relatively modern infrastructure was built, while Balochistan remained backward and neglected. According to Talbot "colonial inheritance for the region was the favouring of the Pushtun population in competition with the Baloch for resources and power (Talbot: 1998: 58).

When Balochistan got the status of a province in 1970, the differences between the two communities widened. Owing to their numerical superiority, the Baloch took control of the provincial government. Many Pashtuns did not like domination of Baloch. The rise of Khan Samad and his faction of NAP was direct response to this development. Moreover, the armed insurgency in Balochistan from 1973 to 77 and government ban on NAP accelerated the process of alienation between the two communities which resulted in the formation of Baloch's own party the Pakistan National Party (PNP) on 1st June 1979. There is also a territorial separation between the two communities. Geographically, both Baloch and Pashtun inhabit fairly exclusive ethno-territories. There is a cultural boundary, to the north are Pashtuns and to the south, the Baloch. It was in the second half of the 17th century that the Baloch Khanate consolidated Baloch tribes into a sort of proto-nation state and the Afghan state did the same for Pashtun tribes when it was established one hundred years later by Ahmad Shah Durrani (Baloch, 1987: 101-105).

The Pathan territory within Balochistan is mainly the result of Gandamak Treaty of 1879 AD and Durand Agreement of 1894 A.D. The total area covered by the Pashtun tribes is 23000 square miles of Pakistan's Balochistan. According to the 1972 census of Pakistan, the Pushtun population was 5 Lacs out of 25,00,000 (Baloch, Mir Khuda: 1985: 291).

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to the massive influx of Afghan refugees during 1980-81, majority of whom were Pushtuns from the Afghanistan eastern provinces. This disturbed the ethno-political balance of Balochistan. In 1979, The Baloch nationalist leader Gaus Bux Bizenjo blamed the government for turning Balochistan into a Mohajiristan.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the conflict between the two communities remained a hot issue. At present there are around one million Afghan refugees in Balochistan. The northern region of Balochistan is flooded with Afghan refugees. This has created apprehension among Baloch who fear that they are being marginalized in their own province. The central government has been playing its cards well. It has often used one community against the other in order to weaken the Baloch nationalist movement.

External Linkage

The presence of two great powers China and the USA in Balochistan has created a new Great Game rivalry. China because of Gwadar deep sea port and the USA because of its war against terrorism in order to contain Al-Quaida and Taliban extremists. The Urdu press in Pakistan visualises the insurgency to be conspiracy aimed at making Balochistan secede from the federation, with motive being the huge oil reserves that are likely to be discovered in the province. External powers want this resource to be governed by an independent Balochistan rather than Pakistan. (Mahmood: The International News: Jan 21, 2005). The presence of external influences in Balochistan is no hidden secret. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in large part has been funded by external interests who have sought to maintain some clout in the affairs of the province (Yusuf, Friday Times, Jan 21-26, 2005).

According to a well-known commentator, Shireen Mazari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, who represents the establishment's views "A pattern can be discerned which points to a deliberate targeting of communication systems and national assets, impacting the country across provincial boundaries. With more sophisticated explosives, which demonstrate a greater access to external sources of weapons and money, the so-called BLA has moved away from targeting soft civil society targets to installations, military setups and communication links. The acts of sabotage are

not clearly random but have careful planning behind them as well as certain level of technical sophistication. And, of course, there is the very financial aspect. All these indicators prove the strong external linkages to what is happening in Pakistan (Mazari, The International News, Feb 2, 2005).

Let me discuss the involvement of foreign powers in the Baloch nationalist movement: The countries contiguous to Balochistan are Iran and Afghanistan. The most probable arms supply to the BLA appears to be Afghanistan. In the early, 1970s, when Z.A. Bhutto was forced to take military actions in Balochistan, Afghanistan was the sole source of arms and ammunitions for the insurgents. But the situation is different from the 1970s: Firstly, president Hamid Karzai has neither any reason nor any resources to stir trouble in Balochistan. Secondly, the American presence in Afghanistan will not allow the government to indulge in activities opposed to its policies (Rahman, The International News, Jan 5, 2005). The silence of USA and the Western power over the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti clearly indicates that USA is not involved in Balochistan. As regards, Tehran, Islamabad believes that Iran is an opponent of Gwadar deep seaport because this port would compete with Iran's newly built Chahbahar port on Balochistan's coast (Khan, The Herald, Karachi, 2004: 58), being built by India to emerge as a gateway to Central Asia. Pakistan Intelligence Agencies believe that India and Iran are providing financial support and arms to insurgents, as they are not happy with the construction of the Gwadar port (Hussian, News line, Feb, 2005:25).

But this seems quite unlikely, as Iran also has 2 millions Baloch Population. The Sistan province is primarily inhabited by the Baloch. Any insurgency that espouses the cause of a separate Baloch homeland is bound to generate unrest in Baloch dominated areas of Iran. That is why the Shah of Iran, during 1973-77 insurgency provided military support to Pakistan.

As usual, some Pakistani politicians and journalists have yet again blamed India for the current insurgency. Balochistan's Chief Minister stated that RAW was running at least 40 camps in the province. They also feel that with an Indian presence on the Pak-Afghan border and in Zahidan, the opportunities for sponsoring low intensity conflict have multiplied for India (Mazari, The International News, no.53). But Pakistan's allegation to blame India seems absurd because India's border with Balochistan is not

contiguous. Secondly, Indo-Pak relations are on the upswing and several confidence building measures have been taken to resolve the bilateral disputes between the two countries. So it is wrong to blame India for what is happening in Balochistan.

The Russian origin of the weapons being used by the BLA has led some people in Pakistan to speculate a Russian hand in fomenting insurgency in Balochistan. Russian familiarity with Balochistan on account of their previous insurgency and the reports that they are peeved with Pakistan for humiliating them in Afghanistan by supporting the USA and for the wide spread support to Chechan rebels, may lend some credence to this speculation. But Russia is too preoccupied with its own domestic problems. China has good relations with Pakistan. The possibility of the involvement of the USA, the sole superpower, which is today occupying Afghanistan and has direct access to Balochistan. But it would appear preposterous that the US could foment a trouble in Balochistan. We all know that Pakistan is an important ally of USA's war on terrorism. However, America is not happy with the Chinese presence at Gwadar, which is uncomfortably close to the main US overseas base in the Gulf. The US has not hidden its discomfort with the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline which will pass through Balochistan. Balochistan's geo-strategic location has increased in the eyes of the US, as the area lies along the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, the two most strategic points for the US military in the Persian Gulf. The latest US –Iran dispute over Iran's nuclear programme has further increased the geographical importance of Balochistan in the eyes of US. The Chinese presence in Gwadar is matter of anxiety for the US, as it doesnot want China to be any where near its military bases in the Gulf area (The International News, March 4, 2005):

Baloch Nationalism In Iran

During the 1973-77 insurgency, the Shah of Iran openly supported the Pakistan, government in suppressing the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan. Had Iran not supported Pakistan, it would have been impossible for Pakistan to crush the insurgency. Iran supported Pakistan with help of money as well as supplying 30 Huei-Cobra helicopters with Iranian pilots. So it is relevant here to discuss the Baloch nationalism in Iran as well.

In 1973, Bhutto went to Iran to get necessary help from the Shah. The Shah declared in a public declaration that what happens to Pakistan is vitally important to US, and should another event befall that country we could not tolerate it. The reason for this is not only fraternal affection for you as a Muslim Nation, but of Iranian interests, we would not be able to tolerate other changes or difficulties in Pakistan.... We will not close our eyes to any secessionist movement – God forbid – in your country (New York Times 15th May, 1973). In 1977, Bhutto told Selig Harrison that the Shah of Iran had been very insistent, even threatening and had promised Pakistan all sorts of economic and military help. He felt strongly that letting the Baloch have provincial self-government was not only dangerous in itself, for Pakistan, but would give his Baloch dangerous ideas (Harrison: 1981: 97).

In 1978-79, Ayatollah Khomeini led a revolution to overthrow the monarchical regime of Shah of Iran. Majority of the population of Iran supported the revolution. Since the visions of future Iran were diverse, ranging from an Islamic regime to a democratic and socialist state, activists among the non Persian peoples, especially in Kurdistan, Balochistan, Turkmen – Sahra and Khuzistan sought a secular, democratic, federal state allowing extensive autonomy in administration, language, culture and economy (Akherdad Baloch cited in Breese: 2004). When on 11, February, 1979 revolutionaries announced the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Baloch nationalists got the opportunity to take advantage of the power vacuum to press their cause.

There was total breakdown of the government machinery in Balochistan. The provincial government of Mehdi Bazargan responded favourably to the Baloch demands. This resulted in the appointment of Danish Narui, professor of mathematics at the University of Balochistan to the post of governor general of Sistanwa Balochistan. He was the first Baloch who was appointed to that position since the incorporation of Balochistan into Iran in 1928. Similarly several top posts were occupied by Baloch.

Since, this revolution gave some leeway to Baloch, the first Baloch open political organizations were formed in Iran. The Sazeman Demokratik Mardom Balochistan, the Balochistan Raji Zrombesh (here after called Zrombesh) and the Hezb Ittehad ul-Muslimeen started their activities in public. Sazeman Demokratik was the more

organized and more vocal organization in its demand for autonomy. The Sazeman Demokratik was a nationalist leftist front.

Zrombesh formed in 1971 was an armed guerrilla movement. Since the Iranian constitution of 1979 did not provide for the kind of local autonomy for which the Baloch were calling, Iranian authorities accused the Sazeman to be secessionist and refused direct talks with its leaders (cited in Breseeg: 2004).

Since the Zrombesh was an Iraqi supported guerilla group, it failed to get support from Iraq when the Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq in 1975 took place. Zrombesh stands for an autonomous Balochistan with a sovereign legislature within the framework of a federal Iran. In March 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini met a Baloch delegation headed by Maulavi Abdul Aziz Mollazadeh and reportedly promised them to give equal treatment to both Shia and Sunni branches of Islam in the projected constitution. (Breseeg's interview with Habibullah Malik, cited in Breseeg: 2004). Despite strong opposition by the national minorities and the secular opposition, Khomeini won the referendum of April, 1979 with a thumping majority. The original draft constitution was released on 18 June, 1979 which stated inter alia, Article 5 stated that the minorities would have equal rights with Persians. Article 13 gave Muslims the right to follow their own school of thought and Article 21 authorised the use of local languages in schools and press. The common language and script of Iran was in Persian.

However, the revised draft, recognized Shiism as the only state religion and the Farsi as the only official language in Articles 13 and 15 respectively (constitution of Iran). The Baloch along with most minorities demonstrated against it. Soon clashes occurred between the Baloch and Revolutionary Gaurds of Iran. In 1981, all the political activities of the Baloch nationalists were banned. The Sazemam Demokratik was declared illegal. Like their Brethren from eastern Balochistan, the Afghan revolutionaries in Kabul welcomed the Iranian Baloch. The Zrombesh maintained its office till 1992. Thus Islamic regime crushed the Baloch movement in Iran. During the Iran-Iraq war during 80s, Baghdad recruited lightly armed Baloch militia, headed by the traditional tribal leaders. The largest of these were the 'Wahdat-e-Baloch' (the Baloch unity) headed by Mir Maoladad Sardarzai, a royalist Sardar and the 'Jonbesh-e-Mojahideen-e-Baloch, headed by Mohammad-Khan Mir-Lashari a member of the last Majlis of the Shah. At

present, the Baloch ethnic nationalism in Iran has been defeated. In order to win the confidence of the Baloch, the Islamic Republic of Iran has offered a large number of concessions including material rewards. For instance, in rural areas, electrification, construction of roads and bridges and in urban areas expansion of streets and constructions of parks have taken place. However, most of these projects have military significance. The concessions are also being given in Higher Education to High School graduates.

Political Parties

Pakistani president blames three Sardars for the current situation. “We will not let them (the Sardars) flourish and challenge the government’s writ, said Musharaff” the government’s writ will be established in Balochistan (Dawn, 4 February, 2006).

The Baloch, however, are adamant that the centre’s denial of democratic rights and exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources have sparked the conflict. The unrest in Balochistan is the result of injustices. Opposition is the result of injustices. Opposition leaders also blame that centre was responsible for perpetuating the Sardari System, relying on divide and rule policies and using pliable Sardars to consolidate its hold over the province. The insurgency extends for beyond the tribal belt into non-tribal belt such as the southern Makran belt. And its political support goes for beyond the Bugti, Marri and Mengal tribes. Baloch politician Abdul Rauf Mengal said (in an interview to International Crisis Group, 2006). It is not just the three tribes but all Baloch people are fighting (for their rights) and most of them are ordinary Baloch”. I would like to discuss in short, the main political parties in Balochistan.

The Balochistan National Party

Formed by Sardar Ataullah Mengal, the head of the Mengal tribe, the second largest in the province, the left leaning BNP resulted from the merger of Mengal’s Balochistan National Movement and and Ghaus Bux Bizenjo’s Pakistan National Party. Now Akhtar Mengal, Atatullah Mengal’s son leads the party. The BNP’s central executive committee has very few Sardars. The party’s main demands are: maximum

provincial autonomy, limiting the federal government's authority to four subjects, defence, foreign affairs, currency and communications.

The Jamhoori Watan Party

Nawab Akbar Bugti headed the party formed in 1990, with a long career in government (as interior minister in the 1950s, governor of Balochistan under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and chief minister of Balochistan in 1988). He was also chief of the Bugti tribe: Nawab Bugti's importance was not only in his hereditary title but because his home base of Dera Bugti contained the Sui gas fields (discovered in 1952), which provide Pakistan most of its natural gas. He had also tension with central government over the royalties paid to him. After the Bugti's death at the hands of military, he is honoured as a martyr. His party JWP will remain a major political player in Balochistan.

Baloch Haqtwar

Nawab Khair Bux Marri's Baloch Haqtwar is also like JWP of Bugti, largely tribal in its membership and structures. The Marri tribe is at the forefront of the resistance to military rule. His son Nawabzada Balach Marri is leading the insurgency through his Balochistan Liberation Army.

The National Party

Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch's National Party has a substantial popular base in the Makran division and coastal areas formed out of a merger of the Balochistan National Movement and the Balochistan National Democratic Party. It strongly opposes the central government's projects in the Makran belt such as Gwadar port, demanding that the Baloch should have the right to control their own resources and to determine their own priorities, political and economic. This party is also opposed to the Sardari System.

Balochistan Students Organization

Formed in 1967, this organization represents the educated Baloch middle class and students and has emerged as an independent political force, with its demands

including jobs for the Baloch youth and recognition of Balochi as a medium of instruction in the province.

If the vast majority of Baloch support the demand for a democratic, federal polity, and provincial rights, the Pashtuns are divided among the Pashtun nationalist parties such as Mahmood Khan's Achakzai's (PKMAP) and Pashtun dominated Islamist parties such as Fazlur Rehman's Jamait Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F). The largest party in MMA and Musharaff's coalition partner in the provincial government.

The Pashtoon Khwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP)

Formed in 1989, it advocates a democratic parliamentary federation in which all nationalities are politically and economically empowered. It believes that the present constitutional arrangements work against the Pashtuns in Balochistan. Except for the (PKMAP)'s view that Pakistan is a Punjabi empire subjugating other nationalities (Mohmud Khan Achakzai, cited in Khan 2005), which is in line with the feelings of the Baloch and other nationalists in Pakistan, the demands of the PKMAP go directly against the interests and aspirations of Baloch nationalists. The PKMAP believes that it has three options (1) Balochistan should be declared as a two-nation province comprising the Baloch and Pukhtuns, or (2) a new province for Pakhtuns of Balochistan should be established or (3) Pukhtun areas of Balochistan should be made part of the NWFP (Ibid).

The Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM)

Formed in 1998 and currently headed by Mehmood Khan Achkazai, the PONAM is an alliance of Baloch, Pashtun, Sindhi and Seraiki nationalist parties, seeks complete autonomy for the federal units, with the centres's power restricted to defence, foreign affairs and currency.

Baloch Militant Organization: Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)

In the ongoing insuregency, the BLA has claimed credit for most attacks on government installations and personnel and on communication links and energy grids province wide. There is a speculation that the two other militant groups Balochistan Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) might have

merged into it. Other observers believe that BLF operates mainly in southern Balochistan but coordinates its activities with BLA. Nawab Bugti in an interview with Haroon Rashid published in the Newsline, February, 2005 described the BLA, the BLF and the BPLF as different groups or organizations.

Reportedly Marri as well Baloch tribesmen form the bulk of BLA's cadre, some of whom participated in the 1970s insurgency and others who have taken arms for the first time (The Economist, 5 May, 2005). Although the government as well as BLA spokesperson attributes all militant activity to it, very little information is available about its leadership, command structures or manpower. On 9 April, 2006, the Musharraf government banned the BLA as a terror organization.

Today, BLA has an estimated 14000-15000 men in its rank. Though the identity of its leadership remains secret, the BLA is reportedly led by a man known as 'Ballach' a Moscow University graduate and the younger son of tribal leader Khair Bux Marri. In addition to having its own flag and national anthem, the BLA also operates a website which carries reports of its activities. Due to the porous Afghan and Iranian border, the BLA men face little trouble in getting sanctuary and weapons ranging from sophisticated pistols to anti-aircraft guns and missiles. The BLA is well trained and well armed, with machine guns, rocket launchers, Motorola wireless sets and Thuraya Satellite phones receiving information about the movement of government troops. Pakistan accused India, Afghanistan and Iran for fuelling this insurgency in Baluchistan. The BLA has its offices in seven countries now they call its embassies and also planning to open three more in Asia. Basically the BLA is fighting against the denial of their natural resources by the Punjabis.

If the insurgency is the product of the resentment against centralized authoritarian rule and the centre's refusal to respect constitutionally guaranteed provincial autonomy and democratic freedoms, the military's heavy handed response has made matters worse. In January, 2006, Nawab Bugti had said, "The denial of democratic rights and economic deprivation have compelled people to take up arms. It is war now" (News Week, 16 January, 2006). With his sudden death, the Baloch, political opposition and militants, will almost certainly harden stance.

Conclusion

A cursory investigation into Balochistan's political history clearly shows a series of complex interactions taking place within a wide spectrum of cultural, linguistic and religious practices. Out of this complexity, a whole series of ethnic identities emerge. I have attempted to show that any given identity is in large part determined by state itself, and the way state seeks to accommodate or oppose particular ethnic aspirations through a construction of national identity. Nationalism is inconceivable without state and vice-versa. Some of the ethnic constructs of the Baloch could have easily been accommodated within a state structure capable of a significant degree of federal devolution, and a state leadership committed to the holding of regular national and provincial elections. Since Independence the failure of successive Pakistani leaders whether civil or military to assist in the construction of what one might call a 'provincial ethnicity' has made Baloch ethnicity problematic, a serious point of contention for almost every central government. By using force against the most backward province, they have shown that they have learnt nothing from the 1971 dismemberment of Pakistan. The military regime of Pakistan tried to suppress the culturally conscious Bengali by force resulting in the creation of new state Bangladesh.

Even after 1971, Pakistan military leaders have been using the same repressing measures to solve the diverse ethnic problem of Pakistan. The strong centre vs backward periphery syndrome still haunts the Pakistani state. The problem with Baloch nationalists and government is that both mutually suspect each other. So there is a need for confidence building measures between Baloch nationalists and government. Pakistan ought to know that it is a multi ethnic nation. Instead of creating monolithic state, Pakistan should take cause of all provinces and try to co-opt the diverse ethnic unity into mainstream.

True federalism is the only option to tackle the problems of regional aspirations. Musharaff should know that by eliminating Bugti, or one or two more Sardars from Balochistan cannot tackle the regional problem of Pakistan in general and Balochistan in particular. The ruling establishment must ensure that the political problems should be solved by negotiations and discussion and not by force. The Baloch nationalists by rising to insurgency only want to demonstrate that they want provincial autonomy at any cost.

They know that they cannot fight a strong modern army of Pakistan. In the absence of any foreign support, the Baloch can best ensure that they get maximum autonomy to decide the future of their province. If the proposed elections in 2007 are held, the Baloch nationalist parties will likely to sweep the polls, if free and fair elections are held. With the representative institution restored, the Baloch would once again have political avenues and mechanisms to voice their grievances and demands. In the absence of military support for the Pashtun Islamists, Pashtun moderate forces in Balochistan too would be empowered. It is now up to international community to ensure that 2007 elections is indeed democratic, free, fair and transparent. Instability in Balochistan not only damages the Pakistani polity but also adversely affects the stability of its immediate region and beyond.

In order to be reworked Pakistani leaders must prove capable of both creating and co-opting 'ethnic interests' broad enough to support the Pakistani state to bring about the economic and social development of provinces, particularly backward provinces. At the same time, these interests must be able to construct a Pakistani nationalism that is accountable to all sections of its people, and their differing and differentiating cultural aspirations. But seeing the current attitude of president Musharaff and American support to him in its so-called war against terrorism, the future seems to be bleak.

CHAPTER - IV

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FACTORS FOR THE BALOCH ALIENATION

“To protect and articulate their social, cultural and economic interests, grievances, claims, anxieties and aspirations, ethnic groups must enter the political arena ... This means, in effect, that they (ethnic groups) must bid for exclusive or participant political control over and/or in a state ... And if an ethnic group’s bid for an adequate share of political power and control within an extant multi-ethnic state proves unproductive, is repudiated as non-negotiable, or the like, it may then well make a secessionist bid for a state of its own” (Rothschild: 1981: 232).

Introduction:

Balochistan’s geo-strategic location has played an important role in shaping the destiny of the province. It is obvious that environment itself powerfully shapes the history, mores and character of the nation. The formidable geography and the harsh climate of Balochistan has left its marks on all aspects of Baloch society, influencing its culture, history, socio-economic structure and institutions and its political psychology and has led to the creation of its own psychological make-up or national character (Field, 1955, 17).

The social and cultural division within Baloch society have adversely affected the unity among Baloch people. There are 17 major tribes, each tribe both Balochi speaking or Brahui speaking is headed by its own ‘*Tumandar*’ popularly known as ‘Sardar’. He symbolizes the Baloch custom and tribal tradition and is expected to display honour, hospitality and bravery in his behaviour. His word is law and his authority total. The Baloch have a saying ‘The Baloch will swear on the Holy Quran but never on the head of the Sardar’. Each tribe is further divided into various sub-clans (approximately 400) that are headed by their own Waderas. In Baloch tribal set-up, each tribe’s loyalty is to clan and Sardar. The ‘Sandeman system’ which legitimized the Sardari System (the system of tribal chief developed in 17th century during Mughal period) has also perpetuated the woes of the Baloch. It gave a free hand to Sardars to deal with their respective tribes.

Culturally also, Baloch are divided into Balochi & Brahui, one group places Mir Chakar Rind on the highest pedestal among national heroes. Another group Brahuis, regards Nasir Khan as the principal symbol of Baloch nationalism. Still a third group, consisting primarily of tribes associated with Lasharis deify both Mir Chakar and Nasir Khan, while putting forward a few additional heroes of its own. So Baloch are also culturally divided over the symbolism to be adopted by them.

So far as the economic factors are concerned, Balochistan lacks factories and modern industries. Balochistan was a perfect illustration of what the economist William Easterly has described as 'growth without development'. British economic policies contributed to the economic deterioration and pauperization of the province. Within the first decade of the 20th century the settled population in Balochistan increased from less than 5% to 50%. Heavy taxation imposed by the British resulted in number of peasants selling their land, as a result in a state where there were few tenants and hardly any agricultural labour, their number increased considerably. Even today the economic exploitation of Balochistan continues. A province which is so rich in national resources is lagging behind as compared to other three provinces of Pakistan.

The main source of conflict between the Baloch and Federal Government is that the latter does not bother about Baloch feelings when it uses the soil and natural resources of Balochistan. Governmental neglect and exploitation by successive central governments have led to the Baloch alienation. Infact, Balochistan's problems are primarily socio-cultural and politico-economic in content but things have taken a new turn due to the overconfidence of the Pakistani army to quell the movement by force. This has brought about distrust as well as broken promises in the past. By using force against Balochs who are demanding their long over due democratic, political, social and economic rights, Musharaff has shown that he will deal the current insurgency with iron hand.

This chapter will examine the social and cultural foundations of Baloch nationalism as well as economic development / exploitation of Baloch areas.

Demographic Problems

Before discussing, the socio-economic and cultural factors, it would be better to first discuss, the demographic muddle in Balochistan. First of all, the most serious problem is the widespread dispersion of Baloch population. The diverse population of original Baloch homeland is divided territorially among three countries, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan; in addition, many Baloch have been compelled by the lack of development in Balochistan itself to seek work elsewhere, most of them in other parts of Pakistan and Iran, but in some places as far away as the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and East Africa (Harrison: 1981: 176). During the 1973-77 insurgency, many of Baloch who live in Pakistan were forced to migrate from Balochistan to Sindh and the Punjab after loosing their flocks and home.

There is a great discrepancy between the nationalist estimates of Baloch population and official census figures. According to last ruler of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan Baloch (1975), the figure is 30 million, 15 million by Mir Khuda Bux Marri (1985). By the contrast the official Pakistani census of 1981 showed a Baloch population of 3.5 million. The latest census of 1998 showed 6.5 million just 5% of Pakistan's total population. And at present it stands around 7 millions. The 1961 Pakistani census, which was the last one that included linguistic data listed 1.594 millions members of Baloch tribes identified through language, including those living in the Sindh and the Punjab. The census in Pakistan is a highly politicised one, given the dynamics of ethnic politics in that country. Thus it is very difficult to estimate the total number of the Baloch population because official statistics often ignore ethnic affiliation.

Whatever, the precise figure of the Baloch population in Balochistan itself, it should be emphasized that nearly as many Baloch live in the Sindh and the Punjab. The 1891, British Indian census, showed 935,000 Baloch in these two provinces. In 1941, the British data indicated 725,000 in the Sindh alone (Selig Harrison: 1981: 176). Chief Justice Mir Khuda Bux Marri cited the 1941 figure in support of his contention that there are 3 millions Baloch in Sindh today given the three fold increase in the overall population of Sindh shown in 1972 census, Marri argued that there is no reason why a comparable increase should not be assumed for the Baloch (Marri, 1985: 15-25). Speaking with Selig Harrison, the defence minister in Zia's regime, Mir Ahmad Talpur

criticised Marri's figure for Sindh and said that it might be too low. However, he distinguished between 1.4 million who spoke Balochi, more than half of them in Karachi and some 2 million more who were Baloch by ethnic origin but no longer spoke the language. He supported his estimates by pointing to the fact that 13 out of 27 members elected to the Sindh Provincial Assembly in 1970 were Baloch (quoted in Harrison's 1981: 177).

The percentage of Baloch population in Sindh that is 'Sindhi Baloch' is sometimes put as high as 50% (cited in Breseeg's: 2004: 68). For example, the 1961 census reported that Balochi was spoken by only 34% of the population of Jacobabad district, one of the four Sindhi districts adjoining Balochistan, but acknowledged that the Baloch constituted 60% of the population (Census of Pakistan 1961: 1/11, cited in Breseeg's 2004: 68). The situation in Punjab is similar to the Sindh. For example, it was reported in 1961 census that in Dera Ghazi Khan district of Punjab bordering directly on Balochistan, Balochi was spoken by less than 6% of the population. But the same census report acknowledged that the inhabitants of the district, which includes a large separately administered tribal belt where presumably no census was taken, were predominantly Baloch (1961 census of Pakistan, 1/16 cited in Breseeg's: 2004: 68). According to 1998 census, Baloch is spoken by 54.8% of people in Balochistan (Census of Pakistan, 1998).

In 1980, the Baloch population of Afghanistan was estimated around 300,000 (Dupree, 1980: 62). In early 1900, according to exiled Baloch nationalist leader, Syed Mohammad Shiranzai, the total population of the Baloch in Afghanistan was approximately 500,000 (cited in Breseeg's 2004: 68). The main settlement area of Baloch is Valayat-e-Nimruz (Nimruz province). Other Baloch groups of some numerical significance live in the neighbouring Helmand province and in the Western Afghan provinces of Herat and Badghiz, scattered groups are also found in other provinces, namely Farah, Faryab, Samangan, Takhar, Kunduz, Badakhshan, Jauzan and Kandhar as well as in the capital Kabul. In Badghiz and Herat the Baloch population in 1975 were 30,000 – 40,000 people (Orywal, 1996: 85). According to official statistics the population of Nimruz province was 122,000 in 1975. Like Iran and Afghanistan there is no official figure about the Baloch population in the Arabian Peninsula (mainly in Oman, the UAE and Kuwait). However, Elfenbein refers to 'various estimates from 1979' and

estimates a figure of 500,000 (cited in Brereeg's 2004: 69). The discrepancy between official census figures and nationalist claim in Iran is comparable to that in Pakistan. The 1978 official population estimate of 659,297 people in the province of Sistan Wa Balochistan includes some 217,000 ethnic Sistanis and excludes many Baloch living in gerrymandered districts attached to other provinces. Shah Bakhsh, a leader of Shah Bakhsh tribe, claimed that there are more than 2 million Baloch scattered throughout Iran. But this seems to be exaggerated. Selig Harrison, after talking to various groups and their response to his queries estimated the Iranian Baloch number at least one million. In 1981, Selig Harrison estimated the total number of the Baloch speakers in the countries of Iran (one million), Pakistan (3.65 million) Persian gulf countries (350,000), Afghanistan (90,000) and Soviet Union 13,000, at around 5 million (Harrison 1981: 177-178).

This figure, however, excludes the Brahuys, who are ethnically Baloch, but linguistically speak Brahui. If his (Harrison) estimation was based on ethnic, rather than language it could conceivably double or triple the number as Mir Khuda Bux Marri Baloch did. In Pakistan's census of 1981, the Balochi was given the mother tongue of 379,148 households in Pakistan; a figure that was 3% of total population. Brahui was given as the mother tongue of an additional 151,958 households (1.2%). Together, the Balochi and Brahui speaking groups thus accounted for 4.2% Pakistan's households. Extrapolating from the figure, Pakistan with a 1981 population officially placed at 84.3 million had a Baloch population 3.5 million (Census of Pakistan, 1981). The last census of 1998 placed the Baloch population at 6.5 million out of Pakistan's estimated population at 132.352 million (1998 Census of Pakistan). According to 1998 population 3.6% people of total Pakistani population speak Balochi. And 6.56 million population of Balochistan out of which 54.8 speak Balochi language.

The fact that around half of Baloch population currently are living outside Balochistan. The Baloch nationalists blame the main reason for the Baloch diaspora is attributed to the economic impoverishment of the Baloch homeland. The presence of large number of Baloch population in Sindh has led to intermittent collaboration between Sindhi and Baloch leaders. But the problem which has most alienated the Baloch is the large number of Afghan refugees in the Pashtun dominated northern Balochistan, which

has created a keen tussle between two ethnic tribes. The British deliberately split the Pasthun areas and attached some of them to Balochistan as part of their divide and rule policy. The Baloch and Pasthuns have a troubled relationship, marked by a Baloch sense of inferiority in economic competition. The Pasthun tribal system, with its egalitarian ethos, allows more scope for individual enterprise than the hierarchical Baloch system (Barth: 1964), and many Pasthun have become moneylender, contractors and farmers. Some of the most productive agricultural areas of Balochistan are in the northern part of the province where Pasthun tribes have increasingly encroached on what were formerly Baloch lands.

Although there is strong anti-Punjabi sentiment among the Pasthuns, the sense of alienation from Pakistan and urge for independent state hood is not as strong among the Pasthuns as among the Baluch for a variety of reasons (Harrison, 1978: 153). “The Pasthun are after a share of the cake” explained a perceptive Sindhi nationalist observer, political scientist Hamida Khurro, “They talk of independence for bargaining purposes. But the Baloch want something more – identity, self-respect, real autonomy” (cited in Harrison’s 1981: 1817).

G.M. Barozai, a Pasthun, who became chief-minister of Balochistan, following the ouster of Bizenjo and Mengal in 1973, did not claim that Pasthuns constitute a majority in the province; suggesting a figure of 40% for Pasthuns, 53% for Baloch and 5% Punjabi and others. Bizenjo, however, said that 40% was an inflated figure. He suggested 20 to 25% for the Pasthuns (cited in Harrison’s 1981: 181).

Impact of the Demographic Imbalance on the Baloch

The demographic imbalance has adversely affected the Baloch’s nationalist movement. The British deliberately divided the Baloch territory into Afghanistan and Iran in order to weaken the Baloch resistance. Since the British believed in keeping the province backward, they divided Balochistan into 7 parts mainly into Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.

The British thought that a unified Baloch territory would pose a serious nationalist threat to their hegemony. This division of Balochistan gave a serious blow to the nationalist aspirations. Baloch are socially and culturally divided people. Their

loyalty to their clan and tribal chief is a major hindrance to Pan Baloch Identity. At present Balochistan's total population is around 7 million and around two millions are in Iran. Interestingly more than half of Baloch live in other provinces like Sindh and Punjab. Balochistan despite its homogenous name is heterogeneous like other provinces in the country, with every third Sindhi and every fifth Punjabi claiming a Baloch descent. Pashtun-Baloch rivalries and inter tribal dissensions among the two don't allow a well defined, cogent, distinct Baloch (Balochistani) ethno-nationalism especially as there are more Balochs in Karachi than in the other province itself. The Baloch Diaspora cannot overlook the parallel existence of the three Balochi national identities in three sovereign countries Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. The dispersion of Baloch population into several countries has badly affected the prospect for unified Baloch resistance and a cohesive nationalist aspiration. Since most of the migrated population has settled in their respective countries, it would be very difficult to bring back their loyalty to Baloch nationalist feelings. Thus if one look at the demographic imbalance, one finds that the British who divided the Baloch population into 3 countries to thwart any unified Baloch resistance has badly marred the prospect for a unified Baloch nationalist sentiments. Had the British not divided Baloch population, the fate of today's Balochistan would have been different altogether. Today one finds a politically, economically and demographically enervated Balochistan. Demographic imbalance is also one of the causes for Baloch alienation as it has adversely affected the social, political and economic condition of the Baloch.

Social Factors

In Balochistan, the informal paternalistic patterns of control through tribalism continue to have relevance particularly since tribal support or lack of support has been crucial to the success or failure of nationalist movements. Dr. Nek Buzdar, a specialist on international economic development, has written about the Baloch society which by and large, adheres to traditional ways of life. He believes that despite the emergence of political parties in Balochistan, tribal organization and political leadership still play a dominant role in local and provincial administration (Buzdar, 2000, p.82 cited in Breseeg, 2004: 89).

Tribes in Balochistan are divided into Shahri (sedentary) and nomadic units. The Shahris were the backbone of the feudal order, which was predominant in central, and Southern Balochistan (Makran), while the nomads were the cornerstones of the tribal order prevailing mainly in the northern tribal areas. Both groups, however, were bound together by a set of historically evolved relationships based on economic, social, political, military and lingual interactions (Swidler, 1996: 176-177).

The Baloch tribalism is segmentary. Describing this system, Salzman wrote ‘by segmentary system’ we mean a set of equal lineages allied relatively and contingently for political action, decision being made by assemblies and councils with no officer and hierarchy of authority and thus no top” (Salzman: 1983: 267). Thus centralized authority is absent in such a system. They are recruited from a number of kindred groups. It has many sub divisions or clans who claim to have blood relations with one another through common ancestors. Kinship, which has its characteristic form in clan and family structure, provides the basic ordering mechanism for society. Thus it is a major factor in regulating and systemizing individual behaviour, which in turn influences the formation and sustenance of the socio-political organization of the entire tribe (Breseeg, 2004: 90).

The British colonial government exercised control over Baloch tribes. The British in return for Sardars (chieftains) loyalty gave them a free hand to keep the tribal mode of life unchanged. But in the last decades of British Raj position began to change, the change got momentum with the creation of the new state of Pakistan in 1947 and annexation of western part of Balochistan to Iran. In addition, the growth of education, market forces and electoral politics has drawn the Baloch into regional and national networks both in Pakistan and Iran. However, it is the tribal power structure that counts in Baloch rural society. Each of the 17 major tribal groupings in Balochistan is headed by a Sardar (chieftain) and there are some 400 tribal sub groupings headed by lesser chieftains (Harrison, 1981: 9).

For Baloch nationalists, the problem of tribalism goes beyond the division of Baloch society into 17 distinct tribes, each continually jockeying for position in economic and political life. What makes Baloch tribalism potentially troublesome in political terms is the lack of agreement among rival tribal groups over the symbolism to be adopted by the nationalist movement. One group claiming descent from the ancient

Rinds places Mir Chakar Rind on the highest pedestal among nationalist heroes. Another group of tribes known as Brahuis, regards Nasir Khan as the principal symbol of Baloch nationalism. Still a third group, consisting primarily of tribes linked with the ancient Lasharis, revere both Mir Chakar and Nasir Khan, while putting forward a few additional heroes of its own (Harrison: 1981: 183).

The smallest of these groups, the Brahuis have historically wielded disproportionate influence in Baloch affair because the great Nasir Khan and most other leaders of Kalat were Brahuis. Non-Brahui Baloch elements resent what they consider as an elitist attitude on the part of the Brahui minority. While grudgingly acknowledging Nasir Khan's role in establishing a unified Baloch state, they blame the failures of Kalat dynasty as a whole for the present position of the Baloch. Thus, extolling the memory of Mir Chakar Rind Mohammad Khan Baloch, a Rind, bemoans the strife between the Rinds and the Lasharis that resulted in Brahui control of the Kalat highlands an 'irreversible national misfortune'. With their 'narrow and begottd spirit and their view of the Kalat state as 'a Brahui monopoly', he wrote, the Brahuis excluded other Baloch from political life and treated non-Brahuis tribes as second class citizens in their own domain (Harrison 1981: 183).

There is also cleavage between the Sunni majority Baloch and Zikri Baloch, who live in the coastal Makran area and in Karachi. The Zikris believe in Messiah Nur Pak, whose teachings supersede those of the Prophet Mohammad himself. This heresy has led to intermittent Sunni repression of the Zikris ever since the sect originated during the 15th century. Nasir Khan launched a brutal and sustained crusade against the Zikris, driving most of them from the interior regions of Balochistan to the coast (Partner, 1978: 32-34).

The Zikris have generally been allied with the Baloch nationalists cause in contemporary Pakistani politics. Religious riots broke out between Zikri Baloch and Sunni Baloch in various parts of Makran on several occasions in the late 1970s. Nationalist leaders blamed Pakistani agents for these incidents.

Jirga and Sardari System

The most widely known and generally loathed features of Baloch society are the Sardari Jirga systems of tribal organization and leadership. Under the traditional

administrative setup of Baloch tribes, every tribe had its Jirga (council of elders), which acted as a court of law (Hassan, 1976). Then this system presented itself at the all administrative tiers of tribe. Jirga at the tribe's level operated under the leadership of Sardar. All other personalities of the tribe's administration like Muqaddam, Wadera and Motaber were its members. Besides, at all the administrative tiers of the tribe, Jirga also functioned over the head of the tribe. Jirga at this level dealt with important matter concerning the tribes and disputes arising among them, the election of a new Khan or the eventual external threats. The head of the Confederacy himself was the head of this Jirga (Hassan, 1976).

After the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti, the grand Baloch National Jirga was held under the chairmanship of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Suleman Dawood in Kalat in 2006. Around 80 tribal chiefs, mostly from Balochistan, attended the Jirga, raising serious doubts about the claims of the federal government of support from all except three major Baloch Sardars (Late Bugti, Mengal and Marri). The Jirga passed several important resolutions like, approaching International Court of Justice for uniting the divided Baloch areas into one entity, demanding an investigation into Nawab Bugti's death and an immediate halt to the military operation in Balochistan (Wahab, Newslite, October, 2006). But the well established and the most famous institution in the Baloch society is the Sardari System.

The Sardari System in Balochistan originated during the Mughal rule but developed to its present position during the British colonial period. With the appointment of Sir Col. Robert Sandeman as AGG (Agent to Governor General) in Balochistan in 1877, he introduced a new system known as Sandeman System. This system was aimed at establishing direct relations with the Sardars and tribal chiefs, by passing the Khan. Sandeman managed the loyalty of Sardars by granting them allowances 'The Sandeman System gave the British a powerful weapon to control rebellions against themselves and broke the last remaining institution of a purely tribal character (Baloch, 1987: 191). In contrast to the relative egalitarianism of the tribal society that is characteristic of the Frontier tribes Pathans the Sardari System is highly centralized and hierarchical (Barth, 1969: 117-134). At the apex of the system is Sardar, the hereditary central chief from whom power flows downward to Waderas, the section chiefs, and beyond them to the

subordinate clan and sub clan leaders of the lesser tribal units. The Sardar's extraordinary authority within this structure probably stems from the essentially military character of early Baloch tribal society (Ahmad, 41, cited in Breseeg's 2004: 92).

Modernization has changed much of the tribal system. It was first challenged by the setting of international boundaries at the end of the 19th century. The new frontiers partitioned Balochistan between three states, dividing some of the large tribes between countries and prohibiting the traditional summer and winter migrations of nomads and semi-nomads. The Naruis, the Sanjranis, the Rikis and the Brahuis were divided among Iran, Afghanistan and British Balochistan. The second challenge occurred between the world wars, when the British and Persians largely pacified Balochistan. From 1928, Tehran used its army to forcibly subdue the Baloch, often exterminating whole tribes in process (Salzman, 1983: 281).

The termination of the traditional nomadic system diverted the tribes. In Iranian Balochistan, Reza Shah introduced land registration to force sedentarisation. Land which had previously been considered the property of tribe as a whole, became the sole property of the tribal chief in whose name the land was registered. The chiefs, with income from rents, could now move into cities and towns. This increased their distance from the tribe. The sedentary farmers, tied to the land through debts and contracts, could no longer align themselves with rival chieftains. This increased the landlords control over the peasant, but the peasants loyalty to the landlord decreased as monetary ties replaced ties of sanguinity or of mutual self interest. Baloch society lost its cohesiveness and both landlord and rentier turned to the central government of protection of their rights (Breseeg, 2004: 93).

Parallel to the decline and disintegration of tribalism in Iranian Balochistan, the Sardars have also lost their base of power and influence there. This happened during the periods of 1960s and 1970s, as the rapid growth in urbanisation, expansion of modern means of communications, spread of modern education and economic modernization in the province began to drastically undermine the tribal socio-economic structure. These changes in turn brought with them a new Baloch elite identified with middle class. The cooperation of the Sardars with the Shah's regime representing "Shiite Gajars" also

served to undermine their traditional legitimacy among their peasant and nomadic followers politically (Breseeg: 2004: 93).

The traditional Baloch social organization, over the course of time, has changed to a significant extent. There is now a widespread Baloch national consciousness that cuts across tribal divisions (Harrison, 1981, 21-22). The problem with Tehran and Islamabad is that both tend to think of Baloch society solely in terms of its traditional tribal character and organizational patterns by ignoring the emergence of Baloch nationalism.

The Baloch society is not static. In spite of the stagnation and deprivation the society remained backward and hold of the Sardars persisted because of the tribal and feudal mores. However, the social organization in Balochistan is slowly changing. Sardars are aware of the growing national and democratic consciousness which would jeopardize their privileges. That is why Sardar don't identify themselves with the nationalist causes but in the case of open confrontation with the central authorities many of them would side with the popular movement as happened during the 1973-77 insurgency. Similarly, the Iranian revolution of 1979 inflicted the most significant blow to the influence of Sardars in Western Balochistan.

In a traditional tribal society political ideology like Baloch nationalism would not get support because loyalties of the tribal members donot extend to entities rather than individual tribes. Within the tribes, an individual's identity is based on his belonging to a larger group. This larger group is not the nation but the tribe. However, the importance of the rise of a non tribal movement over more tribal structures should not be underestimated. In this respect, the Baloch movements of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s provide us a good example.

In the period after independence, some basic changes began to take place in the Baloch society partly because of detribalization and the land reforms introduced by General Ayub Khan and later by Prime-Minister Z.A. Bhutto. The late Z.A Bhutto had abolished the Sardari System in 1976 by a law titled the 'System of Sardari (Abolition) Act'. General Zia -ul-Haq in the late 1970s wanted to depoliticise the system and therefore, he revived the Sardari System. A small working class also was formed in the

mine industry, construction and new factories. A new middle class also emerged. Large numbers of migrants went to Gulf states.

Thus, with the emergence of Baloch middle class, though small in number and the decrease of traditional role of Sardars, the modern Baloch Intelligentsia seems to be eager to assume a new political role of its own. Highlighting these new changes in Baloch society, a specialist on South Asia, Mohammad Ali, in 1993 commented “In the absence of traditional leaders, the dynamic of socio-economic change has precipitated a new kind of leader younger men of ‘common’, i.e. non-sardari, descent” (Ali, 1993: 153). We all know that the Baloch have devised a nationalist ideology, but at the same time they also realize that the tribal support is a must for any potential success of a national movement in the future. But by accepting the support of the tribes the nationalist fall vulnerable to tribal rivalries.

Cultural Factors

Before discussing the rich cultural traditions of the Baloch I would like to discuss language of the Baloch. The Khan, Ahmad Yar Khan on 15 August, 1947, day of Independence, declared “I am proud to address you in Balochi today. I will address you in future, it will be in Balochi because it is the language of the Baluch nation” (cited in Breseeg’s: 2004: 70).

The Baloch’s consciousness of their common language and cultural heritage constitutes another significant foundation of their nationalism. As manifested in a set of shared social norms, value systems, traditions and folk-lore, the Balochi cultural values, together with their cultural environment is the focus of the nationalist appeals for broader popular support for their overall demands of which cultural autonomy is only one. The Baloch see themselves as the heirs to an ancient culture, which has served as a strong unifying force, giving them the sense of a distinctive identity and enabling them to counter the ever present threat of absorption and assimilation into the surrounding cultures. So they have successfully preserved their cultural traditions throughout recorded history (Breseeg, 2004: 70). As Selig Harrison wrote: “To a great extent, it is the vitality of this ancient cultural heritage that explains the tenacity of the present demand for the political recognition of Baloch identity (Harrison: 1981: 11).

Language plays an important and powerful role in the struggle of Baloch people for their right to self-determination. Language, culture and perception are intimately intertwined. Pointing out the importance of the Balochi language as a unifying factor between the numerous groups nowadays, Spooner wrote “Baloch identity in Balochistan has been closely tied to the use of the Balochi language in inter-tribal relations (Spooner, 1989: 589-632). Despite, harsh oppression and brutal assimilation policy by both Iran and Pakistan, the Baloch people have managed to retain their cultural identity and their oral tradition of story telling. The Balochi language is both proof and symbol of the separate identity of the Baloch and impressive efforts are made to preserve and develop it (Jahani, 1989: 110 cited in Breseeg’s 2004: 71). Thus having realized the significance of the Balochi language as the most determinant factor for Baloch identity, the Persian and Punjab dominated states of Iran and Pakistan have sought to assimilate’ the Baloch by all possible means (Harrison: 1901: 95-96).

The Balochi, generally classified as a north western Iranian language is divided into two major dialect groups, namely Eastern Balochi & Western Balochi (Mahmudzai, 59 cited in Breseeg’s 2004 : 71). Eastern Baloch is spoken mainly in north eastern areas of Balochistan and in neighbouring areas of Punjab and Sindh. Western Balochi is spoken in southern and western areas of Balochistan as well Karachi and other parts of Sindh, the Arabian gulf states, Iran, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. There are an estimated six to seven million speakers of Balochi, most of whom speak western Balochi Josef Elfenbein has suggested that the eastern dialect speakers ‘form a very small and isolated group (Elfenbein, 1966:10). According to 1981 census of Pakistan, about one third of all Balochi speakers use Eastern Balochi. In, addition to this, socio-economic division of Iranian Balochistan in to a north vs a central and southern part corresponds the main dialect division within Western Balochistan, namely the northern (Rakhshani) versus the southern (Makkorani). There are, however, according to Elfenbein and Spooner, some dialects that their own very distinct feature don’t necessarily fit into one of the two groups mentioned above. One such is Sarawani. (Elfenbein, 1966 :19-20 and Spooner 1967 : 51-71).

Elfenbein, the most authoritative student of the Balochi language divides Balochi into six regional dialects. The Eastern Hill, Rakhshani, Sarawani, Kachhi, Lotuni, and

Coastal. Elfenbein 1966,p9,10). Most leading Baloch nationalist historians notably Mir Khuda Bux Marri and Nasir Khan echo the view that the Brahuīs were among the early Baloch tribes who came from Iran, Stressing the identity between Brahuīs and other Balochi.(Cited in Harrison's 1981 :1984). For the most part, the Brahuīs have been assimilated into the larger cultural, social and political stream of Baloch life and think of them as Baloch. Warren Swiddler, an anthropologist , stressed the 'many similarities in culture, tradition political organization between Brahui & Balochi. (Swiddler: 1968: 29). Nina Swidler also found the distinction between Brahui and other Balochi to be problematic (Swidler, 1977: 112). Marri maintains that only 25% of the words in the Brahui language are of Dravidian origin (Marri: 1974: 110). Murray B. Emenau, a Harvard linguist argues that syntactically, Brahui should be classified as a Dravidian language, albeit that one has been "Swamped by borrowing from surrounding non-Dravidian language.

The problems of standardization are aggravated by the lack of a universally accepted alphabet for Balochi. The first attempts to develop a Balochi script were not made until 150 years ago. When M. Longworth Dames compiled his definitive anthology of Baloch literature in 1907, he used the Roman alphabet to render Balochi words. By 1969, however, when a Balochi text book was prepared at Mc Gill University, a distinctive anthology of Balochi alphabet consisting of 37 letters plus diacritics and special symbols had evolved as an outgrowth of the nationalist movement. The authors of textbooks described it as a modified form of the Persianised *Nastaliq* style of the Arabic Alphabet (Harrison, 1981:186). *Nastaliq* is an elaborate, calligraphic script that does not lend it self readily to use in movable type. The *Nastaliq* is not universally accepted by the Baloch writer and many Baloch nationalist works have been written in Urdu or English. The Baloch nationalist have long advocated the use of Roman letters for Balochi as a natural accompaniment to the standardization of the Balochi language and as the best way of spreading a knowledge of Balochi. The Balochi Academy spearheaded this effort and, in the 1971-72 NAP regime pushed Romanisation during its brief tenure.

The Baloch have many interesting characteristics in their culture. They have a different perception about religion than other nations in Middle East. It is important to

note that before succumbing to Sunni (Hanafi) Islam, the Baloch were mostly Zoroastrians. The remnants of some Zoroastrian tradition are still evident among some Baloch tribes (Baloch, 1987: 75).

While most Baloch are Sunni Muslims, there are two non-Hanafite communities among them. The Bameri community centred on Dalgan West of Bampur are Shiite, and a relatively large community in Makran who called themselves Zigri' (Zikri). (Breseeg, 2004 : 74)

According to Dr Inyatullah Baloch "Sunni Islam forms an important factor in preserving Baloch identity against Iranian nationalism, which is expressly Shia and Persian'(Baloch: 1996 :240). By contrast, however, the Baloch of Pakistan province of Balochistan face no such threat from Shia community and as a result secular forces have historically dominated the Baloch national movement in that country. As rightly observed by Nina Swidler 'religion does not distinguish Baloch identity' (Swidler 1996: 196).

Contemporay to the rise of Shiism in Persia, a new religion, Zikrism emerged in Balochistan in the mid 15th century. As the Safavid rulers of Persia adopted Shiism, so the Boleidai rulers of Makkoran adopted Zikrism as their state religion. (Baloch, 1996 : 230). Under Zikri rule, the Balochi culture flourished.

Historically, it is believed that Zigris (Zikris) are the followers of Syed Mohammad (C.1442-1505 A.D). Originally from Jaunpur, (Uttar Pradesh) in India who is considered to be the Mehdi. According to Zigri tradition, he came to Makkron and took abode at "Kon-e-Morad" a holy place in the suburb of Turbat, preached his doctrine, converted the whole of Makkron and then disappeared. As estimated by Harrison in 1980, the Zikri Baloch population was estimated around 500,000 to 700,000 living in the coastal Makran area and in Karachi (Harrison: 1981: 187).

The Baloch culture is a rich body of folklore which is manifest in Balochi proverbs, common sayings, puzzles, songs and stories. Baloch folklore is full of its strong national sentiments, its frequent references to the Baloch and Balochistan. Describing the common characteristics of the Baloch Literature, the Swedish scholar, Carina Jahani Wrote "Much of the literature that has been produced in Baloch is explicitly nationalist in content. Common themes are the glorification of deserts and

mountains of Balochistan and the bravery, pride and honour of the Baloch people often exemplified by semi-mythic heroes such as Mir Chakar and Mir Hammal. (Jahani, 1996,114).

Over the centuries, the Balochi oral literature has been a significant vehicle for transmitting Balochi language, culture and national feeling. Badal Khan explains that this form of expression is part of the common Baloch cultural heritage. (Badalkhan : 1999 : 83-85 cited in Breseeg's, 2004 : 78)

Giving the inspiration of Balochness to the Baloch youth, the best known folk tale in Balochistan is that of 'Shaih Moreed and Hani'. This is love story whose hero Shaih Moreed and heroine Hani have become in Balochistan symbols of pure and tragic love, like Romeo and Juliet.

One of the most important mediums that have been very effective in preserving and transmitting the Balochi language and culture over generations is music (Badal Khan: cited in Breseeg, 2004). Music has always been a cultural link and a means of expression to the Baloch history, poetry etc, were all transmitted through music and songs. Epic songs transmit the Balochi history, talk about Baloch customs and traditions, and remind people of the values, such as courage and honour , that a warrior should have in order to become a hero (Badal Khan, cited in Breseeg, 2004).

The exact date of Balochi literature is suspect, however, as the Baloch have a hankering after to grant a greater antiquity to their tradition than they warrant. For instance, Kamalan Gichki in the mid 19th century supposedly authored the Balochi epic Labz-e-Baloch (Jahani, 1996: 23). In 1948, Balochistan became part of Pakistan since then, a more favourable ambience led to the growth of such cultural institutions as the Balochi Literary Society and the Balochi Language Associations. In 1951, the first monthly periodical, Ouman in Balochi appeared. The Baloch Educational Society (BES) published this in Karachi (Jahani,1996 : 25). Ouman ceased publication in 1962 due to pressure from Shah. (cited in Breseeg's 2004 : 79). The BES was formed in Karachi in 1948 to promote Balochi language and culture. Karachi being the capital city and the major Baloch residence became the hub of intellectual activities. The Liari Adabi Board, the Balochi Academy and the Fazol Academy were all established in Karachi after 1947. (Hashimi, Daily Jang, Jan 9, 1973, cited in Breseeg's 2004: 80). The Balochi Academy

was established in 1961 in Quetta. Radio Pakistan started its broadcast in Balochi on 25 December 1949 from Karachi and on the 17th October, 1956 from Quetta. In 1959, Radio Iran also started relaying programmes in Balochi from Zahidan. (Jahani, 1996 : 86). In both countries, western Balochi was the dominant language. This had a great effect towards homogenizing the Balochi. Later on, instead of Karachi, Quetta became the centre of intellectual activities.

In Iran, Shah's educational programmes are worth-mentioning. In the beginning the educational policy of the Iranian authorities in Balochistan first and foremost was not to give the necessary education to the Baloch children, but was based on de-Balochistanisation and the creation of Persian speaking citizens. (cited in Breseeg's 2004 : 81). To prevent them speaking Balochi in the school with Baloch children, the few Baloch teachers were compelled to work in the other provinces of Iran. In their place non-Baloch and Persian teachers were encouraged to teach in Balochistan.

Since the Shah's White Revolution in 1962, each year the percentage of the population which was literate increased throughout Balochistan. For instance, In 1971-72, the total number of literate population of 7 years and over was listed at 73,000 for the province: (Iran's Yearbook; 1977: 547 cited in Breseeg's 2004: 82). By comparison in 1978-79, the number of students of all ages enrolled in different provincial schools at various level alone totaled, 28,274. Still more impressive was the growth in the field of higher education in the 1970s as compared to 1960s. As observed by the Iranian writer Naser Askari, up to 1955, no single Baloch student was enrolled in any institution of higher education throughout Iran. Between 1965 and 1967 only 12 Baloch students were admitted. Fearful of the mounting guerrilla activities of Baloch nationalist in Iranian Balochistan and subsequent breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and the rise of Baloch nationalists in eastern Balochistan, the Shah's government, in addition to military pressure to suppress the nationalists, initiated a series of economic and educational measures to win over the Baloch population in the early 1970s (Breseeg: 2004: 82).

The 1970s saw the establishment of the first institutions of higher education in the province, namely, the Teacher Training College of Zahidan and the University of Balochistan in 1972 and 73 respectively. This increased the number of students. For instance, in the academic year of 1972-73, there were 1901 students enrolled in the

Teacher Training College (Harrison: 1981: 102) by 1978, the University of Balochistan had a student body of 450. Although, Persian students were in dominant number, the total Baloch students were around 60 to 100 during the period 1972 to 1979 (Harrison: 1981: 101-102).

Despite this progress in provincial educational programmes, the illiteracy rate remained much higher than the national average. In 1955-56 the literacy rate in the province's population of 7 years of age and over was 16% as compared with the national literacy average of 29.4%. By 1972, the national literacy average for the same age group rose to 36.9% as compared with the estimated provincial average of 21%. With the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, however, tremendous cultural development took place. Despite being short lived, this period gave birth to numerous Balochi publication in Iran (cited in Breseeg's 2004: 84).

The bulk of the Baloch literature is poetry which is transmitted orally (Fanon: 1963: 240). A great number of them are about Rind-Lashari Confederacy in 15th & 16th centuries. Among the Baloch, the memory of poets such as Gul Khan Nasir, Syed Zahur Shah Hashomi and Atta Shad arouses deep feeling. The work of such poets as Basheer Beedar, Atta Shad, Mubarak Qazi, G.R Mulla and Maulavi Abdullah Rawanbod reaches people through recitals held at public marriage ceremonies, at the meeting of community associations and as entertainment in private homes. These public recitals often seek to strengthen nationalistic sentiments and cultural pride both in Iranian & Pakistan Balochistan. Gul Khan Nasir's (1914-1903) poetry is the greatest manifestation and the most profound expression of the Baloch political and social approach since the early thirties. His exhortation to the Baloch to uphold their tradition is a clear sign of the deep-rooted hatred felt towards the new rulers and strong disapproval of the new political dispensation. With the Nauroz Khan's rebellion in late 50s, the nationalistic feeling became deeper and was expressed more clearly in the Balochi literature. In the 1970s, during the insurgency 1973-77, those who lost their lives are depicted in the Balochi poetry as national heroes. One among these notable heroes was Luang Khan, the elder brother of Gul Khan Nasir, who fought the army instead of submitting to search (Harrison 1981: 38-39). However, the triumvirate of Khair Bux Marri, Mengal and Bizenjo also emerged as national heroes: Now Akbar Bugti has also become a martyr. In Iran Maulavi

Abdullah Rawanbod was the most famous poet known for his admiration of his motherland. Legends like Gazi Sher Jan who fought against British hegemony in Nimruz and Helmand (Sistan) are as famous as Dad Shah in Iranian Balochistan (cited in Breseeg's 2004: 06).

In Afghanistan, the Baloch remained largely, isolated from the events of Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan. Compared with Iranian & Pakistani Baloch, they are mostly backward. Even though; the first school was inaugurated in 1922 during Amanullah Khan's reign there was little development in the education of field. In 1979, there was only 20 persons who had university education. (cited in Breseeg's 2004 : 07). In fact, as stated by the Baloch writer, Syed Mohammad Shiranzai from Nimruz, the process of politicizing of the Afghanistan Baloch started in 1964, when Afghanistan adopted a new constitution, changing the country from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy.

However, the pro-Soviet coup of 1978 brought a dramatic change in formal cultural policy in Afghanistan. In contrast with Iran, the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan adopted an unusually accommodative 'nationalities model' akin to that of the Soviet Union. In 1978, only months after the April coup, Balochi and three others languages (Uzbek, Turkmen and Nuristani) were singled out for recognition in addition to Pashtu and Dari as official language Afghanistan. Facilities for propagation were pledged and steps were taken to implement new policy in four areas: participation in government, education, publication of periodicals and cultural expression.

Economic Factors

It is this factor which has alienated the Baloch most. In the absence of democratic institutions, Baloch anger over central control and exploitation of the province's economic resources and its development schemes, with little or no input from province, has reached new heights. In an interview to Shamim-ur-Rehman of Dawn newspaper, National Party leader Hasil Bizenjo said. "It is totally wrong that we oppose development. The basic question is about the nature and modalities of development. That is why the basic demand of Balochistan's political parties is that provinces must be given

maximum autonomy. Trust them and give them the authority to undertake development projects” (Dawn, 12 February, 2006).

Describing the Baloch economy in early 1980s, Selig Harrison wrote, ‘Instead of relying solely on either nomadic pastoralism or on settled agriculture, most Baloch practice a mixture of the two in order to survive. (Harrison’s 1981: 8). Way back in 1892, Lord Curzon stated that by the greater part of Balochistan, were sedentary and pastoral (Curzon 1892: 260-61, cited in Breseeg’s 2004: 95).

The history of economic grievances of Baloch can be traced back to British era. As the British developed industries and agriculture in Sindh, Punjab and NWFP, they completely ignored Balochistan for the politics of ‘Great Game’ of ‘land routes’. Perhaps it was not merely a case of neglect but what might be called purposeful side tracking, even suppression (Breseeg, 2004: 95). The British imperialist interest in Balochistan was not primarily economic, rather it was of a military and geopolitical nature (Ahmad, 1975, 20). According to Syed Iqbal Ahmad, ‘Balochistan was the chess board on which the Great Game was played’ (Ahmed, 1992 : 70-85). The British rulers probably thought that an economically and politically enervated Balochistan would lend it self to be used more easily, on the other hand a prosperous and united Balochistan could become recalcitrant and forge relations with undependable principalities in the neighbourhood. (Mansergh: 1947 : 480, cited in Breseeg’s 2004 :96).

Despite this neglect, in the course of time, the British brought about some changes. Balochistan was connected with British India, Iran & Afghanistan. At the beginning of the 20th century, the total length of the railways was 481 miles. In 1903, the total mileage of roads and path was 1128 (Baloch: 1987: 23). Thus, this helped in increasing the trade and commerce. The new education system required teachers, the new medicine required physicians. All this gave rise to a middle class. The introduction of railways facilitated early and quick movement and the introduction of modern postal and telegraph services shortened distances and helped in exchange of ideas. All these gradual developments led finally to the rise of Baloch national consciousness and nationalism in eastern Balochistan in the 1920s. (Gankovsky, 1971: 203-208).

With Balochistan’s forcible annexation in 1948, it remained economically deprived. After 1950, the Pashtuns took control of most of commercial activities

previously controlled by Sindhi Hindus. Since the provincial administration was predominantly Panjabi and few of the higher civil servants were Baloch, Punjabi moved in and bought some of the best arable land, for instance, in the Pat Feeder Canal area near Kalat where land was distributed among military and civil bureaucrats under Ayub Khan. Similarly, the majority of the entrepreneurial class was non-Baloch, except for a few sectors like marble quarrying and ship breaking. According to preliminary surveys, underground water as well as mineral natural resources were available in large quantities in Balochistan (Harrison, 1981: 162-66).

The census of 1901 included only six towns. Balochistan's total urban population was 40,000 or just 5% of the total population. Quetta was the largest with a population of 25,000. During the next 80 years, the urban population rose to 670,000 or 16% of the population. The number of large towns had increased to 16 by 1981. However, the bulk of (43%) population was still found in Quetta (285000), Loralai (11,000), Fort Sandeman, (Zhob) (33000) Turbat (52000), Pasni (18000) Mustang (17000), Gwadar (17000), Chaman (30000) and Sibi (23000): (Government of Pakistan, 1997: 6).

By any yardstick, Balochistan is clearly Pakistan's most impoverished province. In 1976, its per capita income was only \$54 per year, compared to \$80 for the Punjab, \$78 for the Sindh and \$60 for the NWFP. (Burki, 1980: 54). Its literacy rate was only 6 to 9%, while the national average was 16%. (Wirsing: 1981: 18). Even today literacy rate is 24% and low 5% for women. (Cohen, 2005, 220).

Balochistan is rich in mineral resources like-coal, natural, gas, copper, uranium, marble etc. (Marri: 1974: 269-81). Balochistan produced more than 70, 000 metric tonnes of marine fish annually, saving foreign exchange to the tune of 500 million dollars. The federal government had an income of more than 10,426 million rupees as in 1976-1977 (Brailvi, 1984). Among other grievances, the most significant focus of controversy has been the natural gas discovered at Sui in 1952-53. Natural gas is a very important source of energy in Pakistan, supplying 49% of Pakistan's energy needs according to the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural resources. Disputes over sharing the revenues from Sui gas field, the largest gas field in Pakistan, have long soured relations between the Baloch and the centre. Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) operates Sui (PPL's largest producing field) and five other gas fields in Balochistan and Sindh, with

federal government holding 78% of PPL stake with new gas discoveries and higher prices charged and earned for natural gas, Balochistan's natural gas fields are a major revenue earner for the federal government. But the Baloch benefit little from the natural gas or its resources.

According to article 158 of Pakistani constitution, "The province in which well head of natural gas is situated shall have precedence over other parts of Pakistan in meeting the requirements from that well head". Balochistan is responsible for 36% of Pakistan's total gas production, but it consumes only 17% of its own production, with 83% of its natural gas provided to the rest of the country for industrial and household use. (Grare Report, 2006: 5). Piped gas is available to only four of Balochistan's 28 districts. Balochistan receives a 12.4 percent royalty is based on a well head price that is for lower than that of other provinces. In Balochistan, the well head price for natural gas is \$0.38 per thousand cubic-feet, some sites in Punjab and Sindh gets \$3 and \$2 respectively. (Haider, Dawn, 21 August, 2006). Natural gas generates 1.4 billion US dollar for Pakistan annually but in return, Balochistan gets only 116 million dollar as royalty. (Reuter Foundation, 1 march, 2007).

Similarly, when another gas field was discovered at Pirkoh in 1977, Pakistani officials promptly announced plans for piping it to already developed industrial centres in the Punjab and Sindh ignoring Balochistan's interests altogether.

Because Pakistan's currently exploited gas resources will likely to be depleted by 2012, the central government is keen on developing Balochistan's unexplored oil and gas reserves. By some estimates, Balochistan has 19 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves and 6 trillion barrel of off-shore and on-shore oil reserves (Grare report, 2006: 4). The government also plans to sell 51% of shares in PPL, Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited and Sui Southern Gas Limited, but again without consulting Baloch Stakeholders (Khaleeq Kiani, Dawn, 17 July, 2006). Furthermore, another Rs 10000 million saved from minerals and also Gaddani Ship Breaking Yard saved Rs 400 million in foreign exchanged in 1975 (Dawn, Karachi, 25 April, 1975 cited in Breseeg's 2004: 99). In 1977, BPLF alleged that Pakistan considered the Baloch country 'a vast estate for plunder, an arid desert floating in oil and minerals'. According to Baloch nationalists the

people of Balochistan are not the real beneficiaries of the huge resources and the income the province provide to the federal exchequer.

Next to natural gas, the most important mineral resource so far developed in Balochistan is coal. Discovered during the British period, the ten principal mines of Balochistan, all of them now owned by non-Baloch operators, yielded an estimated annual value of \$25 million in 1980. As on the case of Gas, most of the coal produced goes to fuel industries elsewhere (Harrison 1981: 163).

In contrast to the coal, industry, the Marble monopoly in Balochistan is held by a Baloch entrepreneur, Nabi Bux Zehri, who has supported successive Islamabad regimes politically in exchange for government licenses and credits. For the most part, however, the leading private entrepreneurs in Balochistan in 1980 were non-Baloch.

There is general agreement that the Baloch are grossly under represented in civil service jobs and thus have little or no say in governmental decisions. In 1979, out of 830 higher civil service posts in Balochistan, only 181 were held by Baloch. There was one Baloch among the 20 state officials holding the rank of departmental secretary, and one Baloch enjoyed the rank of director. There were no Baloch among the four local commissioners and only one among the sixteen deputy commissioners. The Inspector general of police and his four deputies were non-Baloch, as were 70% of the police force (cited in Harrison's 1981: 164). According to latest census (1998), the unemployment rate in Balochistan was 33.48% as against the over all unemployment of 19% for entire Pakistan. In 2002, out of a total 14 provisional government secretaries in Quetta only 4 were Baloch. out of the 32,00 students of Balochistan University only 50 were Baloch, of the 180 faculty members only 30 were Balochs (Weaver: 2002: 105-106). According to M.P., Rauf Mengal, as on March, 2005 there were few government servants from Balochistan in Islamabad, not a single in foreign missions. Since 1947, 23 governors have been appointed, only 10 were Baloch (Pakistan Times: 1 March, 2005). Out of 33,275 personnel of frontier constabulary in Balochistan only 900 are Baloch. Of 12,000 coast guard only 90 Balochs are deployed in Sindh and Balochistan. 85% of Balochistan population don't have access to safe drinking water, 80% live without electricity, 63% live below poverty line and 70% children are deprived of education.

There are only a small number of Baloch in the armed forces, mostly detribalized Baloch from Karachi. Stephen Cohen, who studied the Pakistani army in 1980, said there were very few Baloch or Sindhis in its ranks. This trend more or less continues.

Under Zia's regime, a Special Development Plan (SDP) worth \$ 1.97 billion for Balochistan was unveiled in the late 1980 as evidence that Zia was more interested in the development of Balochistan. The plan envisaged \$765 million in road constructions, \$147 million in rail road constriction, a \$ 300 million copper-mining project at Saindak in the north-west corner of the state near the Iranian border; a \$200 million iron mine at Chagai, a \$67 millions, 210 mile natural gas pipeline from the Sui gas field to Quetta and a variety of smaller projects embracing education, dams, irrigation and rural electrification. Out of the \$1.97 billion total, \$472 million would be required in foreign exchange, including \$250 million for Saindak project and \$33 million for Quetta gas pipeline (Harrison: 1981: 165).

The emphasis on road construction in the SDP is consistent with Islamabad's past approach to Balochistan. While grudgingly acknowledging the economic impact of Islamabad's road construction, Baloch nationalists argue that the location of many of new roads was not determined in accordance with economic priorities. Instead, they say, the army puts its road where they were needed to penetrate the inaccessible guerrilla strongholds. It is true that instead of road construction, it would have been better had they invested in water resources, electricity, education and poverty alleviation programmes.

The continued negligence by successive central government has deepened the sense of deprivation and feeling of hatred against Islamabad. In 1997, Dr. Abdul Hayee, Senator and the head of Balochistan National Movement complained that Balochistan shares around 43% of the total road length of Pakistan, but its share in the Budget allocated for building of roads is less than 5% (cited in Breseeg's 2004: 103). The Baloch had voiced their strong grievances about their lack of representation in bureaucracy and armed forces or in the provincial administration of Balochistan. The provincial quota for recruitment to the civil posts under federal government was determined to 5.2% of total vacancies in Pakistan. But it remained on paper only and was never implemented. In 1997, Kachkool Ali Baloch, complained that despite having 750

kilometres coast out of total 1100 kilometers in Pakistan, not a single seaman in the navy belongs to Balochistan (Quoted in Breseeg's 2004: 103). Islamabad has chosen to militarise the entire province. Of the four naval bases in Pakistan three are in Balochistan. The military has established 4 major cantonments, 59 mini cantonments, 6 missile testing sites, 3 nuclear testing sites and hundreds of military and paramilitary posts in this province.

Punjab's domination in the administration has created a lot of discontent and anger among the Baloch people. For example, according to a study, of the 179 persons who were named to central cabinets in Pakistan from 1947 to 1977, only four (2.2%) were Baloch and only one of them was named prior to the 1970s (Shaheen, 1980, cited in Breseeg's 2004: 103).

According to Newyork Times of 15th February, 1980, of the roughly 40000 civil employees of all kinds in Balochistan in 1972, at the outset of the NAP period, only about 2000 (5%) were Baloch. They generally held inferior posts.

Like the Baloch in eastern Balochistan, the economic grievances of the Iranian Baloch are deep-rooted. As concluded by Selig Harrison, The Shah did little to develop, copper, uranium, or other mineral resources in Balochistan, fearing that to do so would only whet the Baloch appetite for independence.

So far as the distribution of resources is concerned, The National Finance Commission (NFC) the mechanism used by the centre to distribute federal grants to provinces, is contentious because it is controlled by the federal government and in the context of Balochistan, because of the main criterion for NFC awards is population. Under the current system, 37,% of the Budget is divided among Pakistan's provinces on the basis of population size, with Punjab taking over half of the total, and Balochistan's current population is 6.5 million, a mere 5% (Asian Affairs, February, 2006). The NFC has only been constituted seven times and has only finalized its recommendations on three occasions, in 1974, 1990 and 1996. In 1979 and 1985, the NFC did not finalise its recommendations because of provincial disagreements over the allocation of fund. Under President Musharaff, too, the NFC failed to make any recommendations in 2000 & 2005, thereby delaying the transfer of payments to the provinces. The award should be determined through consensus among provinces and on an equitable basis.

But the project which has caused much heart burns is the Gwadar deep sea port that does not benefit locals but raise fears that the resulting influx of economic migrants could make the Baloch a minority in their homeland.


Gwadar

The word Gwadar is a combination of two Balochi words 'Guad' and 'Dar' meaning the gate of wind. Surrounded by Dasht and Kolanch valleys Gwadar is situated between the Makran ports of Pasni and Jiwani. It is located at the entrance of Persian Gulf. Its 600 km long coastline is one of the most beautiful coastline of the world with shining blue water and marble white sand. Gwadar stands as the new heart line, a new commercial hub for the world. Gwadar was repurchased from the Sultan of Oman on 8th September 1957 (<http://www.visiongwadar.com/historical.htm>).


Gwadar is the largest and has the finest natural harbours (with a sea depth of 32 feet). The Soviets in 1969 suggested they would be happy to assist Pakistan in a five year project for the expansion and improvement of Gwadar (Miller: 1970: 16).

It clearly showed Russian interest in its advancement towards 'warm waters'. Writing in 1980, Thomas Moorer called for the establishment of a naval base at Gwadar. Referring to Gwadar as an excellent if underdeveloped", potential navy facility, Moorer and Alvin Cottrell argued that the harbour was much better suited topographically and financially to be a naval base than other possibilities in the vicinity of Gulf of Oman. According to these writers, Bhutto had offered the use of Gwadar to the USA in 1973-74, in exchange for a lifting of the US embargo then in effect (Moorer and Cottrell, *Strategic Review*, 8 spring 1980: 36).


In 1992, when the Nawaz Sharif government decided to build a deep sea port at Gwadar on Balochistan's Makran coast, 624 nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz, the locals had welcomed it. Now the situation has drastically changed. President Musharaff insists that the Gwadar project demonstrates his governments commitment to developing Balochistan (The Nation, 15 December, 2005). Since the Baloch are not stakeholders or beneficiaries, they strongly oppose it, perceiving the project as yet another central government plan to exploit natural resources, while also altering the province's demographic composition to their disadvantage.



Map -8: Map of the proposed Gwadar Deep Seaport adapted from Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, vol.13., no.2, August, 2005.



Map -9: Map of Gwadar Deep Seaport showing development of Phase I and Phase II adapted from Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, vol.13., no.2, August, 2005.



Map -10: Map of Balochistan showing road connectivity of Gwadar with important places adapted from Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, vol.13., no.2, August, 2005.

Conceived as a regional hub for transit and transshipment of goods for Afghanistan, Central Asia and Middle East, the port has been a priority for the Musharaff government, due to be completed in 2010 (work on Gwadar port began on 22 March 2002). The total cost of the project is estimated to be \$1.16 billion. The first phase was completed in March 2005 (with three functioning berths), with China providing \$198 million and Pakistan \$50 million of the \$248 million for its construction and employing 450 Chinese engineers and workers. The second phase, which will cost \$865 million, of which China will contribute \$500 million will entail the construction of 9 more berths and terminals (Dawn, 1 June, 2005). The government also intends to make Gwadar a focus for investment, encouraging the establishment of export-oriented petro-chemical and other industries (Gwadar, Board of investment: Govt. of Pakistan). The port would serve the proposed \$4 billion, 1700 miles Pakistan, Iran, India gas pipeline from the South Parsfield in Iran to India and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipelines, should they be built. It is also expected to bolster Pakistan's strategic defensives by providing an alternative port to Karachi which was blockaded by Indian navy in previous wars.

The Gwadar port is connected by the newly constructed Makran Coastal Highway (653 km long) from Sheikh Raj, approximately 105 km North of Karachi of Gwad near Pak-Iran border. This highway links the ports at Ormara, Pasni, Gwadar and Jiwani with Karachi and has the potential to boost trade between Iran and Pakistan. Another road link in the pipeline is the Gwardar-Ratto Dero motorway which would join the Indus highway through, Turbat, Awaran and Khuzdar. A rail link is also being planned to connect Gwadar to Quetta and Zahidant (The Kashmir Times: 8 Feb, 2005). The port due to its location at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, some 460 km from Karachi has immense geo-strategic and geo-economic significance. The southern most point of Gulf of Oman, Ras-al-Hadd is only 190 nautical miles from Gwadar. Seeing the importance of Gwadar, the government of Pakistan has designated the port area as a sensitive defence zone. The government plans to construct a \$1.67 billion road network which it says would link Balochistan to the rest of the country and make Gwadar port the hub of regional trade with China and Central Asia (Akbar, Friday Times: 4 April, 2006).

China also hopes to link Gwadar with its Xin-Jiang province through Karakoram highway passing through Northern Areas.

Besides its geo-strategic importance, the project is the cornerstone of Pakistan and Balochistan and it could change the landscape of the region and fortune of the people. Pakistan government with aim of attracting foreign investment in the region has permitted China and South Korea to setup tax free special development zones. Land around the port is being grabbed by real estate mafia from Karachi. The cost of land in Gwadar has skyrocketed with the price of a 500 square yard plot reportedly having risen from \$ 130 to \$ 7000. Gwadar's lands have been seized by state agencies, the coast guards, the navy and the paramilitaries. Every general has a plot in Gwadar. More than 80% of the locals rely on fishing for a livelihood. They have lost their prime fishing grounds. Because the Gwadar projects provide little in terms of employment and development to the locals, there is immense resistance. Gwadar still has only one intermediate college and not a single technical school. The locals could also lose their homes if Gwadar's master plan which was prepared with no local consultation, is implemented. The Baloch are equally concerned about the demographic impact of the influx of non-Baloch workers to man and run the port if and when it becomes functional. In the absence of economic opportunities in Balochistan which lacks industries, the means of livelihood remain fishing, subsistence agriculture and horticulture and animal husbandry. As a result, there is constant out-migration with only 56% of Pakistan's total Baloch population residing within the province. The influx of millions of Afghans during the Afghan civil war has also already strained the delicate demographic balance between the Baloch and Pashtuns. The Baloch are well aware of the history of Karachi, Sindh's capital. With a Sindhi population of 0.5 million at Pakistan's independence, it now has more than 14 million people. Almost 90% of them are non-Sindhis.

Conclusion

A cursory investigation into Baloch's socio-economic and cultural factors clearly shows that the Baloch nationalism is mainly based on ethnic, cultural, historical and territorial claims. It was accelerated by the modern socio-economic changes of 1960s and 1970s. In Balochistan political identity co-exists with narrower tribal and clan loyalties.

The two are not at cross-purposes. However, Baloch nationalism is at odds with Islamabad's attempt to create and impose top-down ward concept of national identity which has become a source of tension between the centre and the smaller federation units in multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-regional state.

To build a national movement on the uncertain social and cultural foundations of a fragmented society with scattered Baloch population and miniscule middle class, low literacy level, a relatively undeveloped literature with three competing systems of transliteration, a narrow, albeit, growing nationalist activists and the absence of democratic institutions is really a Herculean task.

Tribal system plays an important role in Baloch society. It is a major factor in regulation and systemizing individual behaviour, which in turn influences the formation and sustenance of the socio-politico organization of the entire tribe. The social organization of the Baloch tribes is based on the principal of patrilineal descent. It is a widely held view that apart from the governmental neglect, one major reason for the backwardness of the province is the Sardari system. Sardar's word is law and his authority total. The Baloch have a saying 'The Baloch will swear on the Holy Quran but never on the head of the Sardar'. This Sardari System has perpetuated the backwardness of the people and province. The Sardari System has become anachronistic and should be abolished. Language plays an important role in the formation of identity. The division of people in Balochi, Brahui and Zikri has also hampered the cohesiveness among Baloch people. Culture has also played an important role in the formation of identity. Culturally also the Baloch are divided among intertribal and intratribal loyalties like their social organization. Baloch don't want to change their rich cultural tradition. They still stick to their primordial loyalty to their culture. So, the Baloch nationalists must overcome their tribally based social and cultural division. This has also affected in a way, their alienation from the mainland. Now the most important factor of all is the economic factor. It is in the economic field that the Baloch have most grievances. Their charge of neglect and exploitation by successive central governments is genuinely true. Their main grievances are exploitation of Balochistan's natural resources without giving the province its due share, construction of further military garrisons to strengthen an already extensive network of military bases and centrally driven and controlled economic

projects such as Gwadar deep sea port, that don't benefit the locals but raise fears that rising influx of economic migrants could make the Baloch a minority.

Pakistan's government apathy towards the development of Balochistan is no hidden fact. Instead of developing in social sectors like, education, hospitals, electrification, water supplies and other basic amenities, Pakistan government is busy in building roads, ports and cantonments. The problem with the Baloch also is that they want development but not at the cost of their tribal identity.

So, the failure of the government to accept the legitimacy of grievances lies at the heart of an increasingly intractable conflict, as does Islamabad's reliance on coercion and indiscriminate force to silence dissent. The only way to redress the alienation is to give regional autonomy to Baloch – Political, administrative, social, economic and cultural, in a true federation. Thus, the latest explosion of anger in Pakistan's poorest province is the tip of iceberg of Baloch nationalist resentment at the state's attitude of aggressive, forced modernization of a tribal society without reference to its peculiarities, sensitivities derived from the past conflicts between the Baloch and central authority, or even a nod in the direction of local participation or a share in the claimed benefits of such modernization.

CONCLUSION

“It is no accident that the smallest of the minorities (in Pakistan), the Baloch who see no hope for achieving significant power in Pakistani politics even under a democratic dispensation as a result of their numerical weakness, is the most alienated from Islamabad and the responsible to secessionist appeals” (Harrison, 1996: 295).

The twentieth century has been witness to the rise and growth of ethnic and nationalist violence resulting in death of millions of people and hundreds still continue to die everyday. Though it is more widespread in developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, its intensity and destructiveness is by no means less menacing in developed countries of Europe and North America. It was nationalism which led to the independence of most of the countries of Asia and Africa from the colonial rule. Many of these new states have spent more resources and energies on fighting inter state and intra-state conflicts than on facing the challenges of a complex, interdependent and asymmetrical world economic system. In the 21st century, in a globalised world in which national and ethnic diversity have become more visible than ever before, the intensification of globalization process has weakened the classical nation-state by breaking its monopoly over the economy, defence, the media and culture, among many aspects and functions.

It is general perception that whenever there is ethnic violence it is regarded as something ‘primitive and uncivilised’. Nationalism is inconceivable without the state and vice-versa. All the ethnic and nationalist struggles are centred around the state. The central nationalist goal is autonomy (usually meaning establishment of a sovereign state in national territory) justified in the name of nation. Movements demanding national self-determination are modern as is their apparent realization the nation-state. The state sees any voice of dissent and demand for autonomy or self-determination as provincial, tribal and disruptive. On the other hand, ethnic, linguistic and religious groups feel alienated and see the state as not their own and therefore struggle to either make it more responsive to their demands or if that is not possible, to create their own state.

While it is difficult to reconcile the view that human nature leads to nationalism with the view that nationalism arose in a specific period in history, it is possible to show that nationalist behaviour has both cultural and economic determinants. This reconciles

some linguistic studies of nationalism with certain Marxist writers. For political scientists, focus is on the state and political power. Nationalism and ethnic politics are related to the state and the struggle for control of political resources. Thus the agendas stretches to constitutions, parties, groups, leaders and voters. These interact with the cultural and economic forces and may explain nationalism is successful and when it is not.

There are two ways to define nationalism, by ethnic or civic criteria. While ethnic nationalism is based on the consciousness of a shared identity, culture, belief in common ancestors and history, civic nationalism is based on a geographically defined territory. In practice, however, ethnic nationalism has had an edge over territorial or civic nationalism because the former appears as a natural continuation of a pre-existing ethnicity. The nationalists believe that their corporate interests are best protected by possession of their own state in the international system.

The period between 13th century and the end of 15th century was the most important in the development of the Baloch ethno-linguistic community. The process was complex and fundamental. Internally the Baloch society, moved from the smaller unit of clan to the larger one of tribe and territorial differentiation Externally it began to assimilate vast segments of other ethnic groups: Iranians, Indo-Aryans of Punjab and Sindh, Arabs, Pashtuns etc.

A strong sense of ethnicity has existed among the Baloch for a long time. The Baloch's ethnic background, social organization, culture, history and a sense of territoriality are proof of an age old Baloch nation. The ethnic element constitutes the salient feature of Baloch nationalism. The weakness of ethnicity, however, is its inability to maintain the terminal loyalty of the masses at the national level. Subnational-rivalry, based on tribal loyalties, divides the Baloch national movement. These rivalries are then used by the central governments to weaken the Baloch; in both Iran and Pakistan. Thus the Baloch movement, in contrast to other national liberation movements has experienced a persistent contradiction between its traditional leadership and the relatively developed society its seeks to liberate. The Baloch may be divided into two major groups. The largest and the most extensive of these are the Baloch who speak Balochi. The second group consist of the various non-Balochi speaking groups, among them are

the Baloch of Sindh and Punjab and the Brahuis of eastern Balochistan who speak Sindhi, Seraiki and Brahui respectively. Though Baloch and Brahui are linguistically different from each other, ethnically they are the same people. Despite the heterogeneous composition of Baloch, in some cases attested in traditions pursued by the tribes they believe themselves to have a common ancestry. The spread of the modern doctrines of nationalism among the Baloch and the resulting active participation of the Baloch intellectuals in nationalist activities was in large measure a reaction against the British and Persian supremacy and later in the post colonial Pakistan. As I have already discussed in chapter 3 that Baloch nationalism came as a response to the intervention of the state. The First World War and its aftermath marks an important stage in growth of Baloch nationalism. The extent and intensity of nationalist feeling among the Baloch was profoundly influenced by the impact of the Russian Revolution of 1917, the defeat and break-up of the Ottoman and the abolition of the Caliphate, the anti imperialist movements of the Afghans and the Indians, and the revolutionary ideas set in motion by these events, as well as by the propagation of the Wilsonian principles of national self-determination.

The Baloch today are a trans-state nation. Since the 1920s their coherence and unity have been growing steadily and it is directed to the establishment of an independent greater Balochistan which consists mainly the three regions: the Pakistani province of Balochistan the Iranian province of Sistanwa Balochistan and the contiguous areas of southern Afghanistan.

Having persistently denied their right to self rule, the Punjabi and Persian dominated states, Pakistan (1948) and Iran (1928) have always claimed that the Baloch are not a nation, but a tribal society with traditional tribal characteristics, thus lacking legitimacy for the right to self rule and self determination (Harrison, 1996: 228). The Baloch nationalists on the contrary reject these claims, and argue that they constitute, a national community, in the fullest sense of the word and occupy a relatively well defined territory (Baloch, 2000).

The Baloch nationalism by having its origin in the Baloch's distinct geography, ecology, history and culture, emerged as an ideology in the early 1920s. Representing a popular movement against alien domination, its principal goal is the Baloch national self-

rule in their homeland, to preserve their national and cultural identity, thus advocated and pursued universally by the Baloch of all classes and social strata.

Balochistan's geo-strategic cum geo-economic location has played an important role in shaping the destiny of the province. With a long coast line on the Gulf and its function as one of the gateways from and to central Asia and Afghanistan and as the most important check-point of the Gulf's oil, that has placed it in a pivotal position in the sub continent's and since the post colonial years in Pakistan's and Iran's history.

The most important element out of the various elements that go into forming of the Baloch national identity is a common social and economic organization. While many racial strains have contributed to the making of the Baloch people and while there are varying degrees of differences in language and dialect among the various groups, a particular type of social and economic organization, comprising what has been described as a tribal culture is common to them all. It is loyalty to their culture, which makes Baloch tribal identity something special. This particular tribal culture is the product of environment, geographical and historical forces which have combined together to shape the general configuration of Baloch life and institutions.

The aforementioned characteristics not only unite the Baloch but also separate them from the dominant neighbouring cultures. This recognition of their ethnic separateness is reinforced by the separation of the Baloch from the Pakistani and Iranian national economies. It doesnot matter whether this non-participation is based on the difference between core and peripheri, urban versus rural, industrial versus agricultural or intentional discrimination. Despite having rich mineral resources like, gas, coal, oil, copper, sulpher, uranium and other resources, Balochistan lacks modern factories and industries. It has shared in neither the development of these countries's infrastructure nor in the rewards of their economic development. Balochistan was a perfect illustration of what the economist William Easterly has described as 'growth without development'.

The Baloch history, tradition, culture, language, sense of territoriality and their common ethnic background form the cohesive bases of Baloch nationalism. The historical experiences have played an important role in the formation of the Baloch national identity. It should be noted that the history of the Baloch people over the past 100 years has been a history of evolution, from traditional society to a more modern one.

while the reliance on tribal criteria is stronger in the earlier movements, the reliance on nationalism is stronger in the later ones. Similarly, the organizing elements in the early movements are the tribes, the political parties gradually replace the tribes as mass-mobilisation is channeled into political institutions.

Sardari System has also played a very crucial role in the perpetuation of Baloch's woes. The British exploited the Baloch tribal system. Sir Robert Sademan, first agent to Governor General, advocated a new socio-political system known as the 'Sandeman System' or Sardari Nizam for developing the authority of the tribal chiefs. The treaty of 1876 gave birth to new political forces in Baloch society, the decline of the powerful feudal overlord (the Khan) and rise of a new feudal elite (Sardars). The Sandeman system granted complete autonomy to the tribal areas. The status of the Sardar (the first among equal) was changed into that of a feudal lord and the tribesmen were declared subjects.

Frequent internal social and cultural divisions of the tribe have also marked the development of Baloch nationalism since its emergence in 1920s. National boundaries have also fragmented the Baloch nationalist groups and made it difficult to present a coherent and united front to governments. Governments too have become adept at exploiting Baloch's internal bickerings.

In the early 1920s, Magasi, the first apostle of the Baloch ethnic nationalism, along with his friends established the Anjuman-e-Ittehad Balochan (organization for the unity of Baloch), an underground political organisation, for the liberation of Balochistan from the British. From 1931, the Anjuman with Magasi as its president started to work openly. Having lived in his youth in the cosmopolitan city of Lahore, he was familiar with the anti-imperialist struggle and the material advancement of modern nations.

The Baloch has vociferously resisted all attempts at encroachment upon their independent status, be it the British or the Iranian governments. It appears that the British reversed their policy in Balochistan following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. In order to check the aftermath of October Revolution, they assisted Iran and Pakistan to incorporate the Balochistan in 1928 and 1948 respectively. Hence forth the Baloch and their homeland were divided against their will between three states. This super-imposed division in turn, has provoked the rise of Baloch nationalism and their

sense of irredentism. The partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 on the basis of Jinnah's Muslim League's two nation theory, created Pakistan. In 1947, the Baloch nationalists faced a new situation due to the lapse of paramountcy. The disintegration of the British Empire gave the Baloch an opportunity to regain their freedom from the British. In 1948, while the nationalists were struggling for independence, the Sardars made an alliance with the Muslim League. The reactionary tribal elite could not join the Khan who wanted to introduce modern institutions instead of protecting the tribal and feudal system. Thus the annexation of Balochistan into Pakistan in 1948, contrary to the agreement of August 1947, was a result of the old and dying tribal and feudal system, represented by the Baloch tribal chiefs. The Anjuman (1920-33) and Kalat State National Party (1937-48) represented the Baloch masses opposed to the Sardari System.

As discussed in chapter 2 under the topic 'problems of national integration in Pakistan', ever since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the ineluctable dilemma facing the nation has been to create a viable national identity out of diverse, regional and ethno-linguistic loyalties. The ethno-cultural identities of various regional entities inhabiting Pakistan are since time immemorial older and deeper than the six decade old Pakistani identity. It has been confronting the self-assertion of various ethnic groups. Out of the initial five groups – Bengalis, Punjabis, Pukhtuns, Sindhis and Balochs – four have actively contested the legitimacy of the administrative structure of the state with one, the Bengalis succeeding in breaking away and creating their own state, Bangladesh in 1971. After partition, yet another group was added to the already five indigenous groups, in the shape of the Indian Muslim migrants the Mohajir. The only ethnic group which is content with the Pakistani state is the Punjabis. The most serious threat to Pakistan since its inception has been from the ethnic front which is still in official parlance referred to as provincialism or regionalism. In the sixty years of Pakistan's political history, the Pakistani establishment has remained reluctant to accept the plural composition of society and has reduced it to a law and order threat. Curiously, the religious elites have frowned upon ethnic diversity in exactly the same way that they were dismissive of the concepts of nationalism and the nation-state regarding them as transplanted conspiracies to shatter an inter-Muslim, trans-regional unity. It is worth mentioning here that ethnicity is not merely a fall out of state centric politics, it embodies the intricacies of cultural

traditions, political economy, modernization, urbanization and development, the multi-linked forces interlinked with both the state and society at large (Malik: 1997:168).

Ethnic heterogeneity and cultural pluralism were viewed as threats to the whole country and rhetorical emphasis was placed on religious commonality under the constant supervision of a bureaucratic military establishment. By dismissing ethnic heterogeneity and demands for provincial autonomy, devolution of power, decentralization and equitable policies governing relations with the centre, the ruling elites have sought refuge in administrative, ad-hoc measures and no comprehensive plan has been taken to co-opt such plural forces through bargaining and appropriate politico-economic measures. The separation of the former East Pakistan in 1971 is the best example. The West Pakistan tried to impose Urdu on the culturally conscious Bengali. As Bengalis formed the majority (54% of Pakistan's population), they opposed the imposition of Urdu on them. The west wing also exploited the national resources of East-Pakistan. This also alienated the Bengalis. In order to counter poise Bengali majority, the ruling elite resorted to One Unit Scheme in 1955, which unified the western wing as a single unit. Later under Mujib's leadership, the Eastern wing swept the 1970 elections but, he was denied to form the government which ultimately resulted in the separation of east wing of Pakistan with the help of India. Even in Balochistan, the period 1947-71 is regarded as the period of political integration and governmental neglect. The rebellion under prince Karim took place in 1948. The One Unit scheme was vociferously opposed by the Baloch. The period also saw rebellion in 1958, led by Nauroz Khan of Zehri tribe. In 1963, the *Parari* movement was launched by Sher Mohammad Marri. The period 1958 to 70 saw two military dictators, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan abolished the One Unit Scheme 1969 and in 1970, Balochistan got the status of a province.

Thus, if one look at sixty years of political history of Pakistan, one finds that ethnic politics in Pakistan is a story of ambiguous, often turbulent relations between the centre and provinces, and also the net result of political, economic and cultural alienation. At another level, it is a saga of majority-minority bickering, exacerbated by rapid demographic changes propelling new economic forces and contestations over census statistics, quotas and jobs. Ethnic politics in Pakistan, despite a shared belief in lingual, territorial and cultural commonalities is a complex phenomenon with strong

prospects for a positive pluralism leading to national integration and acculturation but only if unevenness in state led policies is removed and fully empowered democratic institutions are allowed to function in the country (Malik: 1997: 171). But it is supreme irony of fate that it has not happened yet.

As my dissertation is on 'Baloch nationalism after 1973', I would like to summarise the main events after this period. The years (1971-77) were the period of reckoning for the Baloch. After the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, the 1973-77 insurgency in Balochistan posed a serious threat to the national stability of Pakistan. Despite a new constitution in 1973, which guaranteed a degree of provincial autonomy, in a less than a year, the Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto dismissed the Baloch government on 12th February, 1973. In justifying, the dismissal, the centre charged the provincial government with responsibility for several cases of law less ness in Balochistan and alleged its support, in collusion with foreign governments, for Baloch and Pashtun separatists. In practice, however, Bhutto acted against the NAP because, having provincial governments led by a party other than his own limited his personal authority and because of the pressure from Shah of Iran.

The 1973-77 insurgency intensified the ever widening gap of distrust and mistrust between the Baloch and the central government. After the dismissal of Z.A. Bhutto, General Zia took the rein. He released 6000 Baloch nationalists from the jail and declared an amnesty for guerrillas. However, on the substantive issues relating to autonomy for Balochistan in a restructured Pakistani constitutional system, Zia proved to be as unresponsive to Baloch demands as previous Pakistani leaders had been. The year 1979 saw Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. While Z. A Bhutto had timed a mixture of suppression, social mobilization and populist rhetoric to defeat Baloch nationalist movement, Zia mixed more repression with Islamic rhetoric and a skillful foreign policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan which resulted in considerable amounts of US foreign aid. The Baloch on the contrary did not find a foreign mentor. Zia's apathy towards Baloch continued which resulted in the formation of an organization named Sindh, Baloch, Pakhtun Front (SBPF) in 1985 in London by the leaders of sub nationality in self-imposed exile to demand of a confederation in Pakistan. During the democratic interlude (1988-99) the province has been relatively peaceful following elected governments both

in the province as well as centre. However, symptoms of simmering discontent had been visible in the form of demands by Baloch nationalists for the protection of their identity, rights and interests. In the 1988 elections, the BNA (Balochistan National Alliance) won the victory in the province. Nawab Akbar Bugti who headed the alliance became the chief minister, while PPP formed government at the centre. This democratic decade also saw the emergence of Nawab Akbar Bugti as prominent figure in Balochistan, breaking his earlier pro-centre image. The General Zia-ul-Haq, era, as indicated above, was a disaster in many respects for the Baloch nationalists and it created doubts about the credentials of their leaders and even workers, it fragmented the nationalist forces badly (Baloch quoted in Breseeg, 2004: 344). Repeated efforts by the Baloch leaders in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 failed to reunite the nationalists. However, as a result of Attaullah Mengal's efforts the BNP (Balochistan National Party) emerged as the single most powerful nationalist party in the 1997s elections. This decade also saw the inter tribal and intra-tribal rivalries. This 11 years period of democracy (1988-1999) was marred by the dismissal of four elected governments and the installation of a similar number of interim un-elected governments in between. This period has also been described as one of 'controlled democracy' where the president empowered by the 8th amendment of the 1985, could dismiss the elected governments at will. Thus the so-called democratic period of Pakistan's existence, like that of its military rule has led to further alienation of Baloch from the central government.

It would be better here to discuss in brief the role of Iranian rulers in tackling Baloch nationalism. In Iranian Balochistan, Reza Shah and subsequently his son Mohammad Reza adopted an iron fist policy towards the Baloch. The official Iranian policy reflects their determination to suppress any nationalist movement in their country and they have never hesitated to use their military might to silence the Baloch's voice. It was due to this background that the Baloch national movement in Iran was less vocal than its Pakistani counterpart in the 1960s and 1970s.

During the whole Pahlavi's era, the Persian resorted to their assimilation and Persianisation policies in the Western Balochistan. In 1957-59 and again in 1967-73, the Pahlavi administration used military power to crush Baloch resistance in its attempts to enforce assimilation. The Shah of Iran gave due importance to the area which he always

considered very important for the security of his country. Iran and Pakistan collaborated due to their joint fear of Baloch national consciousness. It was argued that one of the reasons, why Z.A. Bhutto dismissed the nationalist government in the province was because Iranian government thought the Baloch nationalists in Eastern Balochistan, might encourage dissidents in Western Balochistan.

The monarchical regime of Iran collapsed in 1979. The Baloch began their political activities openly. The 'Sazeman Demokratik,' the 'Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen' the Zrombesh, and many other political and cultural organizations were formed in Balochistan. This period, however, lasted for brief period. The new regime pursued a policy of Persian ethnic supremacy toward Balochistan, a continuation of the policies of the monarchy. By comparison, however, like the Baloch political parties in Pakistani Balochistan, the major nationalist organization, which came into existence during or after the Iranian revolution, concentrated their demand on self-autonomy for Balochistan within Iran. In the early, 1980s the clerical regime ordered to disband the Baloch parties to be replaced with Islamic Komitehs (committees) and Revolutionary Guards controlled by the central government.

Comparatively, the conditions of the Baloch in Pakistan are slightly better than those of Iran and Afghanistan. But they are still far from satisfactory. The Baloch of Pakistan have consistently fought to improve them economically, culturally and politically as discussed in chapter 4 under 'social, economic and cultural factors'.

On 12 October, 1999, General Musharaff dismissed the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup, justifying his coup on the grounds of democratic reform, including the removal of provincial grievances through the devolution of power. Pakistan is one of those unhappy countries that have some hope only when a new government comes to power, but it is strange irony that the hope never lasts more than a few months. That is why General Musharaff talked about the prevailing darkness when he came to power, only to imply that a new era shall dawn, now that he has dismissed a corrupt prime-minister. But nothing has changed since then and once again the hope is lost. After the coup, the Punjabi dominated military government, bent on regime survival and consolidation moved quickly to concentrate all power in its hands. Musharaff's constitutional manipulations made the president, the symbolic head

of the federation, all powerful, reducing the national parliament to a mere rubber stamp and depriving the Baloch of the voice they had gained in the democratic forums of 1990s. With Musharaff wearing the dual hats of president and army chief, centralized authoritarian rule also deprived the provinces of the rights, imperfect as they were guaranteed by the 1973 constitution. Following the footsteps of other military dictators, Musharaff setup a façade of local government, the centre piece of his reform. Unsurprisingly, the Baloch nationalists have rejected Musharaff's devolution plan as a mechanism to impose a unitary form of government in the name of decentralization and a negation of provincial autonomy. Rigging the election in 2002 to counter its civilian adversaries, the military also reinvigorated its long standing alliance with the Mullahas, helping the six party religious alliance, the MMA to gain power in the NWFP. In Balochistan too, the elections were rigged to sideline Baloch. The military regime is also using one ethnic group against other. Pitching Pashtun against the Baloch to set-off the score. Even in the past, Zia used M. Q. M to counter the PPP. This also has resulted in a growing rivalries between the ethnic groups in the province. The two unfortunate incidents viz the rape of Dr. Shazia Khalid, a company doctor at Sui Gas Plant on 2 January, 2005 and the killing of Nawab Bugti on 26th August 2006 caused large scale violence in the province. Nawab Bugti had dispute over the gas royalty with the central government as Sui gas field is in Bugti's area. The military it seems, believes in only one solution; to enforce the writ of the state by force. At present, a low level insurgency is already on since 2004. The BLA (Baloch Liberation Army) has been responsible for attacks on government installation. There is a talk of secession, like that of 1971 Bangladesh. But it would be unfair to compare the 1971 again. The chief of Balochistan's largest tribe Marri, Khair Bux Marri, told BBC Urdu service on August 31, 2006, that Baloch did not want provincial autonomy or jobs for their youths; they wanted liberation from Pakistan.

Can Balochistan go the East Pakistan way? Let me compare the two; first of all the demography. East Pakistan's population was 54% of the total Pakistan's population as compared to Balochistan 5% of total population. Bengalis were a homogenous society as compared to heterogonous society of Baloch. Secondly, the literacy rate was highest in East Pakistan. The Baloch literacy rate for men is 25 per each and only 5% for

women. The intellectual class in East Pakistan was of high quality. There were news papers in Bengali, English and Urdu. Political leadership in East Pakistan rose from the middle class. There was no leadership crisis. Mujib was their undisputed leader, on the contrary; the intellectual classes is as good as non-existent in Balochistan . The political leadership is divided among Sardars (Marri, Mengal and Bugti). The East Pakistani also got the crucial support of Indian forces during their fight with West Pakistan army. The Baloch are deprived of any foreign support in t heir struggle against the Pakistani state.

Thus taking into account, the above comparative analysis, it seems difficult that the Baloch nationalist will be able to secede from the Pakistani state. The Baloch nationalists know that they cannot fight with a well equipped modern Pakistani Army.

Now coming to the 4th chapter, social, economic and cultural factors. I think these three factors are primarily responsible for the Baloch alienation. First of all let me assess the social factors. The Baloch are mainly a tribal people. Due to the lack of education and economic development, they are unable to rise above their tribal and clan loyalty. They are socially divided into several tribes and clan. Their loyalty to their tribe and its chief (Sardar) is still a major obstacle to their plight. The Sardari System has kept the province divided along tribal loyalty.

Culturally, they are also divided between Brahui and Balochi symbolism. Though ethnically Balochi and Brahui are the same, linguistically they are different. Like their social division, cultural division of society has also adversely affected the unity among Baloch. The problems in Balochistan are mainly: firstly, the so called nationalist movement acts on behalf of exploitative and vested tribal leaders who have worked in their own way to deliberately keep the people illiterate and the province under developed. The second problem lies with the successive authoritarian regimes of Pakistan, which don't believe in the diversity and federal system of the country. Such regimes prefer to do business with tribal leaders instead of democratic forces that could bring the Baloch youth into the national mainstream and encourage them to develop a stake in the country's political system. So Baloch nationalists must over come their social and cultural division because tribally based social and cultural conflicts are more problematic. So in order to have a unified Baloch nationalist movement, Baloch will

have to rise above narrow tribal and clan loyalty and should bridge the social and cultural gap.

Economically, Baloch have been most exploited by successive Central Governments. Islamabad's exploitation of Balochistan's natural resources and neglect of the province's development are responsible for the Baloch alienation. The military government's refusal to negotiate the demands for provincial autonomy is primarily responsible for the conflict. But the project which has caused much furore among the Baloch is the Chinese funded Gwadar project, which has been launched without taking even the provincial assembly into confidence. The Baloch Sardars see it as a threat to their community in this development. Sardars resent the control of province's resources by outsiders and further construction of already existing military posts and cantonments.

Having discussed the political history of Balochistan in general and socio-economic and cultural factors in particular, I would like to sum up my dissertation with following observations.

Firstly, Pakistani rulers be it civilian or military are not going to give any autonomy as did their predecessors because there are so much strategic and economic interests involved in Balochistan. The Baloch's homeland is strategically important to Pakistan both from the stand points of military and economic interests. Bangladesh was not a strategic outpost of Pakistan. It was a raw material extraction tract for the Punjabi and assorted money market controllers of Pakistan. It was an extension of the fallacious two nation theory that still recognizes the centrality of religion in the making of a nation. The important sites in Balochistan from the military's point of view are: Chagai (nuclear testing range) and Quetta Pakistan's strategic road head to Kandhar in Afghanistan besides Gwadar, Ormara, Pasni and Jiwani sea ports. Important air ports are in Balochistan. The province is the main base for space programme and rocket experimentation facilities. Economic interests also lie in the presence of oil, coal, gas and other natural resources. Thus Pakistani rulers are not going to give any autonomy or leeway to the Baloch people in the decision making policy of province.

Secondly, the Baloch cannot secede from Pakistan simply because they cannot fight with well equipped modern Pakistani Army. And in the absence of any great power support, this task has become more difficult. The best they can demand and achieve is

provincial autonomy in a democratic setup. But this possibility seems remote under current military regime of Parvez Musharaff. All in all, Balochistan is an unlikely candidate for a successful separatist movement, even if there are grievances, real or imagined, against the Punjab dominated state of Pakistan (Cohen, 2005:221).

Prof. Kalim Bahadur has suggested following measures to solve some of the main issues of social, economic and political situation prevailing in the province (Kalim Bahadur *World Focus*: October 2006).

- (1) The Sardari System which is relic of the feudal system has become anachronistic, hence it should be abolished, though some Sardars support the nationalist demands of the Baloch people.
- (2) The implementation of the 1973 constitution's provisions regarding centre-province relations.
- (3) Announcement of the recommendations of the National Finance Commission award.
- (4) Implementation of the resolutions of the Provincial Assembly.
- (5) Restoration of the right of Provincial Assembly to legislate on the local government laws.
- (6) Balochs must be given the administration and control of mega projects in their province.
- (7) Jobs for Balochs in accordance with the constitutional job quota.
- (8) Concurrent list should be abolished and provinces be given right to legislate in provincial matters.
- (9) Gas royalty formula should be worked out on the basis of equity for all provinces.
- (10) No voting rights for refugees/migrants for at least 10 years.

With so much of strategic, economic and geographical factors at stake, Pakistan cannot afford to have a roaring insurgency in Balochistan. In its 60 years of political history, Pakistan has failed to assimilate the non-pareil Baloch identity. The need of hour is accommodation, not assimilation. The Bengali Pakistani fought a single war of independence. The Baloch have fought four so far. Baloch leaders say there are ready to

fight another four to five to achieve their nationalist goal. So what emerges from the history of Baloch ethnic nationalism is that despite its regional and ethnic assertion, it has always been more concerned about its political power than about some primordial identity. Nationalism is not really about identity, culture and traditions, but about political power. Since Baloch nationalism has always been directly linked with the state, its future also depends more than any thing else on what turn the Pakistani state takes (Khan, 2005). Thus it is certain that even in the near future the tension between the Baloch nationalists and Pakistani state will continue. The never say die spirit of Baloch consciousness will continue to haunt the Pakistani state.

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