

RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES' MISSILE DEFENCE PLAN

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MAHENDRA KUMAR SINGH



**CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN, CENTRAL ASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
2002**



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
NEW DELHI - 110067, INDIA

Tel. : 6107676, 6167557
Extn. 2365
Fax : (+91)-11-6165886
(+91)-11-6198234
Cable : JAYENU

Centre for Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies

Date : 22 July 2002

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES’ MISSILE DEFENCE PLAN” submitted by MAHENDRA KUMAR SINGH in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY, is his own work and has not been submitted for the award of any degree of this or any other university.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. Shashikant Jha
(Chairperson)

Prof. Nirmala Joshi
(Supervisor)

Dedicated
to
Amma and Papa

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
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ABBREVIATIONS

| | | |
|-------|---|--|
| ABM | - | Anti-Ballistic Missile |
| BMD | - | Ballistic Missile Defence |
| CPSU | - | Communist Party of Soviet Union. |
| CTBT | - | Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty |
| EU | - | European Union |
| GPS | - | Global Positioning System |
| ICBM | - | Intercontinental Ballistic Missile |
| MAD | - | Mutual Assured Destruction |
| MIRV | - | Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle |
| NATO | - | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NMD | - | National Missile Defence |
| NPT | - | Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty |
| NRC | - | NATO-Russia Council |
| SALT | - | Strategic Arms Limitation Talks |
| SDI | - | Strategic Defence Initiative |
| START | - | Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty |
| TMD | - | Theatre Missile Defence |

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Cold War and the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 was, one of the most conspicuous events of the Twentieth Century. It has had far reaching consequences for the world. It has influenced and transformed the world politics and economics in a most profound manner. The previously bi-polar world characterized by an ideological divide was no longer there. The New World Order is inexcusably unipolar, dominated by the USA. Globalisation is yet another remarkable trend of the emerging order, which calls for an increasing inter-connectedness of individuals, groups and countries. The Impact of the complex process of globalisation on societies across the world, both at the micro and macro-level is certainly a relevant issue of current debate in academia and among policy-makers. Along with the integrating process of globalisation, the political trend of forging regional alliances and groupings based on convergence of political and economic interests is also growing. This undoubtedly is part of the ongoing efforts to strive for a more viable state of multi-centred international politics. The best example is formation of the European Union (EU). The other regional groupings such as Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been taking care of regional interests.

The New World Order, marked by US' overwhelming presence in international affairs and its growing unilateralism, coupled with the pressures and imbalances of rapid globalisation, is also witness to the growth of negative

tendencies such as the rise of religious extremism, separatism, aggressive nationalism, increasing primordial identities and virulent international terrorism. The non-state actors, indirect conflict with the established order, are indubitably at the center state of world politics. The new phenomena is well-evident after the infamous September 11 episode. It is against this backdrop that US' National Missile Defence (NMD) plan and Russian reponse to it will be studied.

Although Russia, the successor of former Soviet Union ceased to be a super power, it still continues to be a nuclear power at par with United States. After the breakup of Soviet Union in to fifteen Sovereign entities, the United States went ahead with its plan of building a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). This plan had sought revision or abrogation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. In the Cold War period the ABM Treaty played an important role in maintaining strategic stability between the Soviet Union and the United States. So the American missile defence plan has potential to distort the balance of power between Russia and United States and hence has potential to distort the global strategic stability.

According to the USA, the missile defence plan is designed to deal with the immediate potential threat to the USA, its allies and its forces deployed overseas, from short range ballistic missiles, as well as future proliferation threats of long range ballistic missiles to the continental USA. It has three

states¹: 1) National Missile Defence (NMD): It is an anti-missile system. The program involves the development and testing of an integrated system to defend the continental USA, against Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBMs) carrying chemical, biological and nuclear warheads launched, accidentally or intentionally by 'rogue states' (or 'state of concern') like North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya etc. 2) Theatre Missile Defence (TMD): It is meant for the theater of operations of battle. The system will be deployed in battlefield where US troops may be engaged. It is to defend US troops operating outside USA and also allied forces, against short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missile attack. 3) This involves the development of a robust technology base, which would enable the deployment of more advanced missile defence system over time as the threat from ballistic missile evolves.

The US missile defence program in one or other way seeks modification or nullification of the ABM Treaty. Russia, the successor of former Soviet Union is a party to ABM Treaty. This Treaty gives Russia a strategic parity with United States, and the former would not like to disturb this parity.

The ABM Treaty is the most profound agreement reached between the two superpowers in past 30 years. The treaty banned nation-wide defences against ballistic missiles and was intended to prevent the development of an offence/defence arms race. The close link between strategic offences and defences was recognized by the treaty, as was the fact, the deployment of

¹ Dean A. Wilkening, "Ballistic Missile Defence and Strategic Stability" *Adelphi Paper* (New York): no. 334, May 2000, pp.6-7.

defences would only encourage increase and improvement in offensive forces in order to overcome them.

In the chapter II the focus is on in-depth study of how, ABM Treaty acted as main force in containing dangerous arms race between defence and offence and hence maintaining global strategic stability. This chapter also deal with Soviet interests in signing ABM Treaty at the most dangerous phase of Cold War. The soviets believed (and the Russian still believe) that signing of an ABM treaty reflected political wisdom and courage on both sides by openly admitting before the world that efforts to ban the development of national ballistic defense systems was the best way to achieve security in nuclear age. The principle rationale was that if no country deployed a national missile defense system even a weak retaliatory nuclear strike would guarantee unacceptable damage to whichever country first employed nuclear weaponry. Thus, no country would resort to nuclear war against another or even launch conventional war against another if no national missile defense exist².

The Soviet Union wanted to implement the policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries including USA in 1960s to overcome the international isolation. Soviet leaders viewed that; this will help in reviving their stagnant economy and help in to bring scientific and technological revolution in industrial sector in the modern era³. The Soviet Union (like

² Victor Gobarev, "The Early Development of Russia's Ballistic Missile Defence System", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* (London) vol. 14, no.2, June 2001, p.39.

³ Thomas W. Wolf, "Soviet Interest in SALT", in William R. Kinter and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. Jr. (ed.), "*SALT Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s*", (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), p.21.

Russia) viewed ABM Treaty (as part of strategic arms limitation talks) as an acceptance of their principle of strategic parity, equality and equal security. The Soviets were of the view that dangerous war of nuclear age will cause great damage to both sides involved. And any costly arms race in defensive weapons will lead to competition between shield and sword, which will further heighten the chances of war and make arms race more unpredictable. This will destabilise the balance of power between Soviets and Americans.

The primary political-military purpose of the Soviet Union in signing ABM Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I Interim agreement was probably to ratify Soviet super power status and nuclear 'parity' with the west – which it has achieved as a result of costly arms race⁴.

The chapter also discusses Ballistic missile defence research and development by Soviet Union with passing reference to America's program since 1940s. The first theoretical research into the feasibility of creating an anti-ballistic missile defence began in the Soviet Ministry of Defence's Scientific Research Institute NO. 885, which was tasked with developing control system for ballistic missiles, began similar research on the creation of a missile defence system from 1948 through 1951. In 1953-54 for the first time Soviet authorities acknowledged the task of ballistic missile defense as a high national priority in defence realm⁵. Since then both sides continued their BMD and development till 1972. But there was no major success on both sides. The

⁴ David Holloway, *"The Soviet Union and the Arms Race"*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p.45.

⁵ Gobarev, n.2, p.29.

conclusion of the ABM Treaty cut short the emerging competition in defensive strategic armaments, forestalling it from further whipping up the competition in offensive strategic arms. Furthermore, by preventing any party from the creation of a nation-wide ABM defence and from obtaining overwhelming superiority in both offensive and defensive strategic armament, the treaty is conducive to maintenance of global strategic balance and strategic stability.

The debate on ABM Treaty and missile defense again came to light when on 23 March 1983, President Ronald Reagan delivered his so called “Star wars” speech, calling for a national effort to move from a strategic deterrence policy based on defense system⁶. This was an attempt to enforce American superiority. In late 1980s, it was realised that Soviet threat was diminishing due to the launch of Perestroika and Glasnost by the more liberal Soviet President Gorbachev, the INF Treaty and the reduction of forces in Europe. By this the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the US had begun to change radically. In December 1989, the East Germans, with support from the Soviets opened the Berlin wall. This was a sign that the Soviet empire was crumbling and the cold war was ending. It was also in late 1989 that US initiated a review of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. But the present debate on missile defence system started during Clinton administration when in 1995 US congress passed legislation mandating the deployment of a NMD system by 2003. However, President Clinton was not supportive of deployment

⁶ Ronald Reagan, “Landing the SDI” in Zbigview, Brezzinski (ed.) “*Promise or Peril: The Strategic Defence Initiative*”, (Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1986), pp..47-50.

of the NMD system rather he confined this program only to research and development⁷. The Clinton administration has declared the ABM Treaty to be “a corner-stone of strategic stability” while disowning the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine that served as the treaty’s underlying premise. Secretary of Defence in Clinton administration, William Perry said:” We now have an opportunity to create a new relationship, based not on MAD, but rather on another acronym, MAS or Mutual Assured Safety.”⁸ During the US Presidential election itself Bush made his priorities clear to alter or abrogate ABM Treaty and move forward with US NMD program. It reflected a move of US unilateralism on international politics.

Chapter III, made an in-depth analysis of changing world order, emergence of US as only superpower in the unipolar world, and US assertion of unilateralism by moving forward with its NMD plan. This chapter also focus on Russian response to the ongoing changes in world scenario due to US NMD plan. Russia view that the deployment of NMD will disturb the global strategic stability and it will lead to worldwide arms race. They are also of the view that NMD plan is part of a strategy to maintain America’s global strategic superiority. They view that although NMD plan has been virtually proclaimed to counter rogue states but the hidden agenda could be to extend it to Russia.

⁷ John Cherian, “Missile and Politics; *Frontline*, (Chennai), August 4, 2001, p.16.

⁸ Kim Holmer, ‘Alternative Approaches to the ABM Treaty’, in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (ed.) “Arms Control and Missile Defence options: Contending perspective”, *Security Strategy and Missile Defence*, (Tufts University Brasseys, Inc 1996), p.48.

American President Bush is moving his agenda of American domination on world politics. While his administration has declared strong support for non-proliferation efforts, its action appears contradictory. Its adamant opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) undercuts the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Its rejection of draft protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) weakens BWC monitoring and verification efforts. The NPT, almost alone among international treaties, should actually appeal to radicals in Bush administration since it is discriminatory. They doubt efficacy of any treaty and so avoid mutuality of legal obligation⁹. So the assaults on international law and treaties in general, and the ABM Treaty in particular is assertion of American hegemony on world scene. Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the US senate foreign Relations committee, said that the US was not bound by an arms control treaty with Russia. He said, the ABM Treaty expired when Soviet Union dissolved and should not be an impediment to a US missile shield. This argument is highly regrettable. Today NMD project seriously contradict the NPT agreement of 2000. NMD is the single largest obstacle to continued progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and threaten to re ignite a global nuclear arms race¹⁰.

According to many observers Russian strategic forces by 2010 can be expected to have shrunk to fewer than 500 ground and sea-based missiles with fewer than 1000 warheads. The US's formidable offensive forces and

⁹ John B. Rhineland, "US and Russia – Bound to cooperate on BMD", accessed over internet.

¹⁰ New Bush administration – new arms race.
<http://www.cnduk.org/briefing/bushnmd.htm>

multiplayer missile defence will present a serious challenge to Russian retaliatory capability¹¹.

So to overwhelm an NMD shield Russia's countermeasures could be firstly, a slow-down of the planned reduction of Russian missile forces by prolonging their operational capacity; secondly, an acceleration of the development of the new TOPOL-M missiles; thirdly, installing more than one warhead on the remaining Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), in particular on the TOPOL-M (SS-27) in violation of the START II agreement; and finally, deployment of ICBMs in Belarus. So NMD has potential for global arm race and make the world a dangerous place to live.

Due to its economic constraints Russia countered US NMD program with proposal of European BMD, which Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeev gave to NATO Secretary General on February 20, 2001, as proposed by Russian President Putin in 2000. This was viewed in US as an attempt to divide its European allies. Putin's proposal of Joint US-NATO-Russian missile defence system to protect Europe made it clear that instead of "grand bargain" (an expected trade-off between START III which Russia sought, and amendments to the ABM Treaty, which were sought by US) the first place on the US-Russia agenda now belonged to a "grand National Missile Defense game¹²."

¹¹ Sergey Rogov, 'The case against a National Missile Defence System', Financial Times, March 21, 2000 <http://iskran.iip.net/russ/Rogov/ft21.00.html>.

¹² Nikolai Sokov, "Russian Missile Defence for Europe" accessed Over internet

Russia also tried to forge an alliance with China to counter US NMD. There has been talk about Joint Sino-Russian missile defence to counter the US NMD system. Both countries signed “The Good Neighbourlyhood Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.” On 16 July 2001 in which they retreated their commitment to the ABM Treaty. Russia also committed to China to provide strategic and military technology to strengthen its retaliatory capacity against US NMD plan¹³.

Russian also signed a military and defense treaty with North Korea in 2000 and again on August 4, 2000 both countries signed the Moscow Declaration. According to it North Korea pledged for moratorium on ballistic missile launch until 2003. This was used by Russia to pressurize US not to alter ABM Treaty.¹⁴ Russia also threatened to start arms sales to Iran, if US moves unilaterally in abrogation of the ABM Treaty¹⁵.

Russia, after its new birth has adopted a pro-west policy to overcome its transition and economic problems. Russia lookout for western investments and more trade and entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The Jackson-Vanik amendment passed by congress in 1974 restricts the extent of US trade with Russia. The law was passed in order to arm-twist the erstwhile Soviet Union to allow Jewish people of Russian origin to immigrate to Israel. But the Jackson-Vanik Amendment remains, despite recent exertions by the Bush

¹³ Mikhail L. Titarenko, “Russia and China: Partners for Peace”, *World Affairs*, (New Delhi), vol. 5, no.4, October/December 2001, p.39.

¹⁴ “Putin, North Korea’s Kim Jin in ‘Moscow Declaration” *The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no.32, September 5, 2001, p.1.

¹⁵ Edward N. Luttwak, “Fighting Over the Wheel Derails Bush Team’s Foreign Policy”, *International Herald Tribune*, March, 02 2001.

administration to get it removed. Russian President Putin also wants the Bush administration to certify that Russia now has a “market economy”¹⁶. These economic considerations prompted Russia for a compromise with US. Russia realised that US will move forward with its NMD program and will alter or abrogate ABM Treaty. Russia view ABM Treaty as a symbol of its strategic parity and equality and hope that it will maintain its status in international politics. These consideration prompted Russia for a compromise with US to alter ABM Treaty not to abrogate it.

But on December 13, 2001 US unilaterally announced abrogation of ABM Treaty and gave six-month notice to Russia for its withdrawal. Russia reacted with calm. Russian President Putin in a statement declared that it is a mistake on the part of the US, but this is not going to affect US-Russia cooperation.¹⁷ However in unofficial circles Russians view this decision with distaste. They are of the opinion that Russia will react once their economic stabilizes they’ll have a greater say in strategic partnership with the US. Russians have strongly reacted to President Putin’s concession to US without any substantive gain.

Even in some quarters of official circles the US decision to withdraw from ABM Treaty is received with distaste. As it is evidence from this statement by Russian defence minister. Sergeyev Ivanov who has said, ‘Russia wants to maintain the strategic missile forces as a political-military instrument

¹⁶ John Cherian, “Changing Course”, *Frontline*, June 21, 2002, p.51.

¹⁷ Celeste A Wallander, ‘Russia’s Strategic Priorities’, *Arms Control Today*, (Washington), vol.30, no.1, January/February 2002, p.4.

as the main lever for pressure on the US and NATO”. These hands have been strengthened by the new US’ robust military signals and “new realism” in international reaction¹⁸.

Though Russian anger is accommodated by US by signing new arms reduction treaty in May 2002 and admitting Russia in newly created NATO-Russia Council (NRC) with some reasonable status. But Russian foreign Ministry statement on June 14, 2002 said that Russia no longer feel bound by the START II. The main implication of this statement was viewed by analysts as Moscow setting itself free from a START II ban on having land-based strategic missiles with multiple war heads¹⁹. Also on June 15, 2002, Russian Duma criticizing the new arms reduction treaty, said it, “reserve the right to add provisions to the federal ratification bill to ensure the predictability of credible reductions of the US strategic nuclear forces”. The state Duma called on Russia and the US to work out “a realistic time table for the agreed arms reductions and “additional agreements” to ensure their “transparency and predictability” So Duma wanting to correct on arm reduction in particular and US hegomonism in general²⁰.

So it is dangerous to believe that Moscow is so weak it will accept any terms, whatever they are. The American unilateralism will make Russian President Putin, who is pro-west, ineffective. It is worth considering that an ineffective President Putin might prove even more dangerous than an angry

¹⁸ “Moscow delays Military revamp”, *The Russian Journal online.htm*, May 22, 2002.

¹⁹ Vladimir Radyuhin, ‘Russia leaves pack’, *The Hindu*, June 14, 2002.

Putin in present world security challenges of this new century²¹. So in few years to come Russia might cope up with its economic problems and put a strong reaction before Americans because Russian have not forgotten its superpower status. Russian identity and its sense of dignity is very strong which can over come any obstacles to erase their humiliation and rise as power to be reckon with again.

Chapter IV deals with aroused international reaction to US NMD plan with special focus on Europe and China. The US NMD has aroused reactions all over the world. Even America's European allies are not very happy with US NMD plan. They firstly contradict the American assessment or the interpretation of the potential threat. They even question the capabilities of so called "rouge states" and whether those states would ever have the intention of using such capabilities against the west.

Europeans also want to preserve the arms control and non-proliferation treaties and also believes in multilateralism as basis of governing international relations. They fears that US NMD which need alteration and abrogation of ABM Treaty will prove a death knell to all international security and strategic infrastructure and lead to worldwide arms race.

Europeans also feared that US NMD plan will have a "decoupling effect" They are of the view that if US successfully implements its NMD

²⁰ Vladimir Radyuhim, "Russian 'terms' for arms pact", *The Hindu*, June 15, 2002.

²¹ Bridget Kendall, "Look west", *The World Today* (London), vol. 58, no.5, May 2002, p.20.

program then it will be less motivated in defence of Europe as part of NATO and will leave Europe more vulnerable to any hostile attacks²².

They also fear that a hostile or weakened Russia will be more dangerous to them. Russia's large landmass and proximity to Europe means that its control of territory and policing of borders is critical for Europe's security. Apart from threat of hostile Russian nuclear missiles, terrorism, drugs and weapons smuggling, environmental disasters, the spread of AIDS and other disease- all these modern dangers become far greater when Russia fails to function properly²³.

The reaction of US' European allies, are very important because United Kingdom and Denmark is part of US NMD plan. Taking seriously the reaction of its allies, US put forward "global missile defence" plan incorporating Europeans also. But they are not happy with it because they too are not interested in costly arms race which will make world more dangerous.

Europeans have made their reservations clear against any unilateral abrogation of ABM Treaty and US NMD plan. But so far US have not shown any willingness on its part to address European concern. Finally US announced its unilateral abrogation of ABM Treaty. But new arms agreement between US and Russia to reduce offensive strategic weapons and formation of NATO-Russia council have made European to swell the bitter pills. But still Europeans

²² William Drozdiak, "Possible US Missile Shield Alarms Europe", *Washington Post*, November 6, 1999.

²³ Kendall, no.21, p.20.

believe that US NMD plan will spark of new arms race from Russia, China to South Asia.

China is well aware that strong American perception on NMD and ABM Treaty will erode the effectiveness of Beijing's existing weapons. Observers argue that US decision to move forward with NMD threatens China's small nuclear deterrent of 20 ICBMs and would discourage China from joining international arms control regimes, while expanding its nuclear arsenals to compensate loss of China's official news agencies, which reflects the views of Chinese government, have constantly lashed out at US missile defence plan. Chinese government officials for long have consistently opposed any such plan for its future destabilizing influences on the world strategic peace and stability²⁴.

China is the only major power disadvantaged by the limited anti-ICBM national missile defence plan and has threaten to increase its nuclear missiles to 200 and install multiple war heads and countermeasures device to overwhelm the defence shield. Russia currently has sufficient missiles to easily overwhelm the US NMD, as does Britain and France. China wants to ensure the continuation of its own nuclear deterrent capability to limit US influence over Taiwan and the regional balance of power. China, even more than Russia, is thus strongly opposed to US NMD plan.²⁵ China warn that US arms sale to Taiwan violate the spirit of the 1982 Shanghai communiqué and force China

²⁴ Rajesh Kumar Mishra, "China in Post-September 11 World: Posturing mixed responses", *South Asia Analysis Group Paper*, no.371, December 7, 2001, accessed over Internet.

towards more hostile stance in the region²⁶. China is particularly sensitive to the participation of Japan, for fear it might increase its regional military role. Since modern Chinese nationalism developed mainly in reaction to Japanese aggression and invasion, China is particularly sensitive to any military move by Japan. It is worried about US TMD to be placed in Japan and Taiwan²⁷. Chinese defence commentators openly assert that their ballistic missile forces are already targeted on Japan. China fears that the provisions of BMD technology to Taiwan is especially designed to provide protection to the island nation so it can declare independence. So US' BMD plan will result in a step up of China's force modernization efforts. This could trigger a regional arms race²⁸.

In 1998 India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests. Both the countries have developed ballistic missile technology and it is only a matter of time before it is mated to nuclear weapons. India is developing a "minimum credible nuclear deterrent" against Pakistan and China, eventually deploying 130 to 165 warheads. Due to US NMD plan any increase in China's nuclear arsenal will have to increase in Indian nuclear arsenal.²⁹ This will motivate Pakistan for an arms race. Pakistan views American and Russian offer of missile shield to India and India's wholehearted support to US's NMD plan as a matter of grave concern. President Putin's November 2001 visit to New Delhi was

²⁵ Frank Langdon, "American North East Asian Strategy", *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver) vol. 74, no.2, Summer 2001, p.182.

²⁶ Michael J. Green, "The US and East Asia in Unipolar Era", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, (London) vol. 24, no.4, December 2001, p.37.

²⁷ Drozdiak, no.24, p.182.

²⁸ Carlyle Thayer, "It's Not an Arms Race yet" *Asia Week*, vol. 29, no.22, June 9, 2000, p.1 <../../asiaweek/magazine/2000/0609/>

²⁹ Ibid.

significant because of nuclear cooperation includes the Russian offer of SR 300 series anti-ballistic defence system which will provide “limited missile shield” to India. Richard Armitage the US under Secretary of Defence also offered a tailor made NMD system to India. Indian NMD will further strengthen by acquisition of Arrow missile intercept system from Israel. Pakistan view India getting missile defence shield from these sources as a threat to its deterrence capability³⁰ So US NMD will trigger a dangerous arms race in South Asia.

So there is a possibility that US NMD programme will reignite dangerous arms race in the world and it will severely hamper non-proliferation efforts worldwide.

³⁰ Air Marshal (Retd.) A-yaz Ahmed Khan, “Threat of Nuclear-Missile Shields”. <http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/january/threat.htm>

CHAPTER - II

ABM TREATY AND GLOBAL STRATEGIC STABILITY

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is the most fundamental arms agreement ever reached between the former Soviet Union and the United States. In the Cold War period, the ABM Treaty played an important role in maintaining strategic stability between the two super powers. The ABM Treaty has been the principal bilateral agreement limiting the armaments of the two countries. It is the linchpin of a thirty years effort to limit the strategic weapons of the super powers. The chief purpose and effect of the treaty was to eliminate defensive, that is, anti-ballistic missiles system from the arsenals of the two countries.¹

The ABM Treaty was signed on May 26, 1972, after about two and a half years of negotiation between the USA and the Soviet Union. However, it came into force on October 3 of the same year. The treaty was amended in a protocol in 1974, which came into force in May 1976.²

The 1972 ABM Treaty put restraint on further development of BMD system. Though it permitted only single ABM system deployment area (after July 1974 protocol) at any one time. The Soviet Union chooses the deployment area to protect Moscow, while the US chose the deployment area to protect its ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) silo launchers in North Dakota. The ABM Treaty also put the limit on the quantity of ABM weapon systems.

¹ Franklin A Long, Jeffrey Bootwell and Donald Hafner (ed.), *Weapon in Space* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1986), p. 197.

² W. Stitzle, B. Jonson and R. Cowren, *The ABM Treaty: To Defend or Not To Defend?* (SIPRI, London: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 203.

According to the treaty, a party may deploy no more than one hundred interceptor missiles and no more than the same amount of launches within a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers. The ABM system to protect a party's ICBM silo launchers may have two large phased-array radar sets, plus no more than eighteen other radar sets, each having a potential less than that of the above-mentioned phased-array radar.

The ABM Treaty also limits the potential of ABM weapon systems. The parties are not allowed to obtain interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead or rapid reload launchers. The treaty also limits the improvement of ABM weapon systems. The parties were not allowed to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. Each party undertakes not to give ordinary air defence system capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements and not to test them in an ABM Mode. The treaty also prohibits the transfer of ABM weapon systems to other states and not to deploy outside its national territory³.

The successful negotiation of the ABM treaty as a part of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) helped to strengthen Soviet - US relations in the early 1970s. It can be argued that the treaty helped restrain the deterioration in the

³ H.U. Yumin, "Preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Maintain Strategic Stability", *Foreign Affairs Journal*, (Beijing), no.55, March, 2000, p.34.

superpower relations in the 1980s.⁴ Thus, to an extent it did succeed in maintaining unrestrained relationship between the two superpowers.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the vast majority of the Soviet Union's ABM facilities and most of its strategic offensive nuclear forces. Consequently, Russia appeared as the logical successor of the former Soviet Union for the ABM treaty.⁵ However, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia, the successor state of the former Soviet Union, ceased to be a superpower. Soon after the end of Cold War, the USA launched its National Missile Defense (NMD) program and sought revision of the past strategic treaties so very indispensable for maintaining the balance of power between the nuclear Russia and the nuclear USA. Any unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty has the potential to distort the global strategic stability and the overall Russia - American relationship.

The ABM treaty of 1972 acted as the corner-stone of global security and arms-control between the former Soviet Union and the USA. The treaty, aimed at banning nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles, prevented an expensive and dangerous arms race between the two superpowers. It thus provided the essential foundation for a negotiated limits on offensive strategic arms. Though the search for an effective defence against possible nuclear strikes was never completely abandoned either by the Soviet Union or the USA, but the

⁴ George Scheneiter, The ABM treaty Today in David N. Schwartz and Ashotn B Carter (ed.), *Ballistic Missile Defense*, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 243.

⁵ Amy F Woolf, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues", *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington), May 22, 1998, p.4.

ABM treaty's precisely defined limitations on missile definitions codified the recognition by both sides that the defence technology then available or in foreseeable future cannot provide genuine protection from the awesome destructive power of the nuclear weapons. Instead, a widespread deployment of missile defences by one would only force the other to increase and improve its offensive forces to overcome the lag, which would, in turn, lead to a renewed arms competition. Also, the combination of partial missile defences and accurate, quick-strike offensive forces could increase each side's incentive to strike first in an intense crisis, thus heightening the risk of nuclear war.⁶ The major premise of the treaty was stated in the preamble, "that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile system would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms". The Soviet Union and the US had Calculated that, despite the enormous power of their thermonuclear forces, defensive deployment by one side could shake the other's confidence in its retaliatory capacity. This in turn would lead to an increase in offensive weaponry to ensure that retaliatory mission could still be performed effectively. The linkage between defense and offense remains a fact of life.⁷ Both superpowers recognized this fact. Notwithstanding traditional and continuing Soviet interests in defense of their home land, the Soviet leaders by 1969 had decided to accept limitations on Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) deployment. The ABM treaty of indefinite duration was

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Kalpana Chittaranjan, "The ABM Treaty and US NMD" *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), vol. XXII no. 2, May 1998, p. 209.

Anotonia H Charyes and Paul Doty, "Introduction and Scope of Study" in Antonia H Chayes and Paul Doty (ed.), *Defending deterrence, Managing the ABM treaty regime into the 21st Century*, (Washington: Pergamon - Brassey's International Defense Publisher Inc., 1989), p.1.

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the product of the Soviet as well as the US desire to curb strategic defenses that could have placed deterrence in question through challenging strategic offensive missile forces. The Soviet Union was even prepared to consider giving up its Moscow defence altogether, but the possibility of negotiating a "zero ABM" agreement was prejudiced by an early US proposal and a prompt Soviet acceptance of a limitation to ABM defense of the National Command Authorities in the national Capitals.⁸

Soviet Interest In Signing ABM Treaty

The ABM treaty as a part of SALT agreement, reflects the prevailing condition of Soviet - American relations, their political, economic and military interests which forced both superpowers to reach at this historical arms control agreement at that period of history. In this study the focus is mainly on Soviet interests during the then prevailing international situation in signing the ABM treaty.

The Soviet foreign policy in 1970s was the result of the changing pattern of international politics. The period of attempted post Cold War containment of Soviet Union had come to an end, but the rules of engagement under which the Soviet Union and the United States will look after their overlapping global interests in an increasingly multipolar environment were still in the process of being defined. The SALT was basically a part of this process of redefining the overall power relationship. With respect to Soviet Union there has been a broad

⁸ Raymond L Garthoff, "East-West Relations" in David N Schivartz and Ashton B Carter (ed.), *Ballistic Missile Defense*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 243.

trend towards globalism in Soviet foreign policy, accompanied by a tendency to generate a military posture to support a wide range of Soviet interests abroad.⁹ In the Soviet Union's foreign policy, firm resistance to the aggressive scheme was combined organically with a constructive approach towards pressing international problems, and implacability in ideological struggle was combined with readiness to develop mutually advantageous relations with States of opposite social systems.¹⁰ L I Brezhnev emphasized in the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee's Report to the 26th party congress that "our principled line with respect to the capitalist countries, including USA is consistently and fully to implement in practice the principle of peaceful coexistence, to develop mutually advantageous ties and - with those states that are ready to do so - to cooperate in the field of strengthening peace, making mutual relations with these states as stable as possible."¹¹

But few important internal reservations in one way or the other hindered the image of Soviet Union as a rising force in global affairs. It also helped in improving its relations with United States, which forced the Soviet Union for the SALT negotiations. It had been increasingly evident that while Soviet military technology and defense production sector of economy have managed to compete quite successfully with the west, the Soviet Union was encountering many

⁹ Thomas W. Wolf, "Soviet Interests in SALT" in William R. Kinter and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (ed.), *SALT Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s*, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), p. 21.

¹⁰ See S. Vishnevsky, "From Position of Realism", *Pravda* in "US-Soviet relations Before the Summit", *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Ohio) vol. XXIV, No. 20, 1971, p.5.

¹¹ *The Current Digest of Soviet Press*, vol. XXII, no. 12, 1972, pp. 12-13.

difficulties in adapting the civilian sectors of its industrial systems to the scientific and technical revolution of modern era.¹² So the economic factors had a compelling influence in leading the Kremlin to seek a genuine halt via SALT in the strategic arms competition. The Soviet need for growth in investment for meeting rising consumer demands and for technological innovation in the non-defense sectors of the economy, would make it difficult for the Soviet Union to match the pace of a new round of strategic arms procurement, especially since this would place a heavy strain on the kind of advanced technical and economic resources in which the United States retain a lead. The increasing emphasis in the late sixties on working out new methodologies to ensure optimum use of resources for military purposes, the apparent increase in defence expenditure during this period at a rate higher than the growth rate of the Soviet GNP, the necessity for a downward revision of economic goals for the eighth five-year plan (1966-70) and the long delay in drawing up the next plan (1971-75), as well as Breznev's caustic criticism of Soviet economic performance at the close of 1969 when the SALT came into force suggests that the Soviet economy was under tremendous strain due to the strategic arms build-up and other expanded military programmes of the sixties. This further suggests the readiness of the Soviet leadership to welcome a treaty like SALT.¹³ Hence, there was a growing realization in the Soviet political leadership of the limited political utility of strategic weapons and of the futility and high cost of an unregulated strategic

¹² Wolf, no.9, p. 22.

¹³ Ibid, p. 24.

competition.¹⁴ The economic consequences of a continuing strategic competition as against the opportunity for a repair of the technological lag at home were starkly evident.¹⁵

In the Soviet Union a clear primacy was given to the need for upgrading science and technology as a key requirement for a strong economic base. It was understood that a foreign policy of low-tension was required to facilitate trade and emphasized technology transfer. A policy of peaceful coexistence was adopted by Brezhnev to bridge the technological lag and to facilitate the flow of grains, goods and management techniques from abroad as a way of dealing with the economic shortcomings in the country. This change in the Soviet foreign policy is well reflected in the statement made by the CPSU General Secretary, Brezhnev, at the 26th CPSU congress "we are engaged in negotiations with the USA on limitation of strategic armaments. Their favourable outcome would make it possible to avoid another round in the missile arms race and to release considerable resources for constructive purposes."¹⁶

Apart from certain compulsive internal factors there were also certain constraining external factors which tended to influence the conduct of Soviet foreign policy leading to the SALT negotiations. Two important factors were - one long operative in the Soviet case has been its awareness of the destructiveness of a nuclear conflict, and hence need to avoid confrontation that might escalate

¹⁴ Marshall D Shulman, "SALT and the Soviet Union" in Mason Willrich and John B Rhineland (ed.), *SALT The Moscow Agreements and Beyond*. (New York: The Free Press, Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1974), p. 102.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 103-104.

¹⁶ Nikolai Arkadejev, "Big Contribution to Curbing the Arms Race", *Newstimes* (Moscow) no. 23, June 1972, p.4.

into a nuclear showdown. Another grew out of the deep-seated differences between the Soviet Union and China. In a military sense, the Chinese problem means that an increasing share of Soviet military resources had to be tied down in the far-east, with planning obliged to take into account a two-front threat - at the Soviet front door in Europe and at its back door in Asia.¹⁷ Later, the development of US relations with China and the emergence of China from its diplomatic isolation appears to stimulate Soviet interest in SALT.¹⁸

The Soviet readiness to hold a summit and to begin concrete SALT talks came precisely at a time when agreement was finally reached on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On 1 July, 1968, the day NPT was opened for signature, an agreement was announced by the Soviet Union and the US to enter into bilateral discussions on the "limitation and reduction of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapons delivery system and system of defense against ballistic missiles."¹⁹ From the Soviet stand point, the accession to the NPT of west Germany was the ideal example of a political solution to a potential military problem as its removal of one important requirement for Soviet Union to possess anti-missile capability. It was, as the Russians like to say, not by accident that west Germany signed the NPT and the SALT talks began within the same 24-hours period.²⁰

The new challenges posed by politico-economic changes in world politics got reflected in Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet policy underwent profound

¹⁷ Wolf, no.9, p. 23.

¹⁸ Shulaman, no.14, p. 104.

¹⁹ *The UN and Disarmament 1945-1970*. (Newyork: 1970), p. 163.

²⁰ Garthoff, no.8, p.301.

changes and was reoriented. In his key note speech at the opening banquet President Nikolai Podgorny said, "we stand for a radical turn toward relaxation of the existing tension in all continents of the world, for freeing the people from the heavy arms burden, for a peaceful political settlement of problems through negotiations".²¹

The Soviet agreement to the ABM treaty involved acceptance of a condition of mutual deterrence based on mutual vulnerability and not in terms of a condition of the US doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) based on assured counter-value denominated in percentage of industry and population. It is not only a question of inferring a Soviet view from the fact of the Soviet Union's acceptance of the ABM treaty with its implied mutual vulnerability, but of the actual record of the Soviet definition of its own interests.²² Ideologically, Soviet Union viewed it as an acceptance of their principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union's public position, both during the negotiation of the ABM treaty and afterward, can better be captured in the view that mutual annihilation in a nuclear war is an inescapable fact of life and that it is a dangerous illusion to think otherwise instead of engaging in a costly arms race in defensive weapons that might lead one side to think it could stave off the effects of relation, it is preferable to agree not to deploy those weapons extensively.²³

²¹ Richard C Hottelet, "After the Summit-1 Edging Toward Normality", *New Leader* (New York), vol. IV, No. 13, June 26, 1972, p.10.

²² Garthoff, no.8, p.300.

²³ Alan B Sherr, *The Other side of Arms Control Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era*, (London: Unwin Hayman Inc., 1988), p. 213.

However, the Mutually Assured Destruction - the ability of either side, the Soviet Union and the United States, to destroy the other in response to an attack - is not a chosen policy, but an unavoidable reality. The Soviet Union and the USA are, in the words of atom bomb developer Robert Oppenheimer, "two scorpions in a bottle", each capable of destroying the other, each deterred from doing so by the fear of retaliation. It was this harsh reality which formed the fundamental basis for the ABM treaty.

The discussions in the Soviet military press on the eve of SALT showed a clear awareness on both sides of their vulnerability to massive retaliatory strikes in the event of a war between them. It was further recognized that this nuclear balance could get upset with the attainment of superiority in offensive weapons or missile defences by either of the two sides. A leading Soviet theorist, Major General Zemskov, wrote in 1969 that the degree of probability of a particular type of war at each historical segment of course, does not remain the same, and changes under the influence of a number of political and military technical factors. Of special importance here can be the disruption of the 'nuclear balance of power'. This is possible, for example, in case of further increase in the nuclear potential or the creation by one of the sides of highly effective means of protection from a nuclear attack of the enemy in conditions when the other side lags considerably in resolution of these missions. Any change in the 'nuclear balance of power' in favour of imperialist countries will increase the danger of a nuclear war manifold. Zemskov's article reflected the changing Soviet view of ABM systems. It was now accepted that these could play an offensive as well as

defensive role, and that an effective American ABM system would disrupt the nuclear balance by enabling the United States to lessen the effectiveness of a Soviet nuclear strike.²⁴

There is a view that the primary political - military purpose of the Soviet Union in signing the ABM treaty, the SALT I interim agreement, and the simultaneous statement on the Basic principles of US - Soviet Relations was probably to get its superpower status and nuclear 'parity' recognized by the west. Thus, "closing the book" on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and securing a greater legitimacy for its international activism. During the session in the Supreme Soviet Presidium devoted to the ABM treaty, high level Soviet officials and party leader declared repeatedly that the SALT treaties were "the result of the increase in might of the Soviet Union and the change in the correlation of forces in the world arena to the advantage of socialism".²⁵ Soviet Union insisted on the principle of 'equal security' probably to emphasize that it would not let slip from its grasp the parity it has achieved with the US at such a great cost.²⁶ Therefore, the SALT agreements became a benchmark of strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States.

To many, Soviet Union has since with continued its policy of peaceful coexistence, not going back in any way on its fundamental foreign policy line. It consistently adhered to its position, consonant with long-term interests of both the Soviet people and the people of other socialist and peace-loving countries and

²⁴ David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p.45-46.

²⁵ David S Yost, *Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence and the Western Alliance*, (London: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 92.

also the liberation fighters. It was noted by Rude' Pravo, the Czechoslovak Communist Newspaper, that at the Moscow talks "the Soviet Union negotiated from both its own position and those of forces of socialism and progress. The Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy inherently combines the country's own interest with those of the world communist movement and peace loving mankind."²⁷

It was noted that the world must have changed a good deal, and the socialist system and Soviet Union must have gained vastly in prestige and might, to induce the head of the White House to say in the Kremlin: The only way to enter Moscow is to enter it in peace.²⁸

The proponents of this view hold that there is some thing more to the acceptance of the US principle of strategic stability by the Soviet Union for severe limitations on the deployment of BMD meant that both sides had implicitly chosen to leave their population vulnerable to ballistic missile attacks. The assumption of a similarity in Soviet and US motives was rather simplistic in their view. They view these agreements a result of a significant shift in the balance of power against imperialism and in favour of forces of peace, democracy and socialism. According to them the resounding defeat inflicted on Nixon's Vietnam policy the growing crisis, monetary and economic in the world capitalist

²⁶ Holloway, no. 24, p. 46.

²⁷ Jan Prazsky, "The Significance of the Moscow Talks", *Peace, Freedom and Socialism* (Prague), vol. 15, No. 7, July 1972, p. 43.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 43.

system and the tremendous impact of 26th CPSU congress's peace programme, symbolizes a significant change in the world situation.²⁹

To others, Soviet disarmament policy has been traditionally a part and parcel of a bigger political propaganda to bolster the peace-loving image of the Soviet Union and to undermine the military challenges posed by its American adversary. The unprecedented interest displayed by the Soviet Union towards arms control was possible only when the Soviet Union has reached a position of approximate military-strategic parity with the United States. Having finally attained nuclear parity with the US, Moscow could now afford to contemplate over such important issues of concern as: the likely utility of an arms limitation accord which would stabilize the US and Soviet strategic offensive capabilities, formal ratification of the Soviet parity with the US and more importantly explicit American acknowledgement of that parity before the world; adequately proceeds for the continued security needs of the Soviet state and reducing down the possibility of a new round of costly arms competition.

A Pravda correspondent, writing shortly after Foreign Minister Gromyko's 1968 supreme Soviet speech, directly admitted that such reasoning underlines Moscow's SALT policy when he approvingly quoted a Washington post editorial to the effect that

It is possible to maintain that one of these rare moment of history has come when both sides are ready to admit equality in the broadest sense and to view this as an initial position for

²⁹ The Moscow Summit Achievements and New Prospects, *New Age* (New Delhi), vol. XX, No. 23, New Delhi, June 4, 1972, p. 1.

reaching agreement concerning the freezing and subsequent reduction of arms... it is the politician's task not to let this change slip away.³⁰

The Soviet Union and the USA thus entered and left the negotiations on the ABM treaty with different perspectives on the doctrinal underpinnings of the agreement. This is not to deny that there were important common elements, not only in the military but also in the broader areas of economics and politics. Perhaps, the strongest common element was the shared perception about the futility and economic wastefulness of a strategic-defensive arms race and dangers of a misperceived invulnerability.³¹

By the end of the 1960s the basic principle of Soviet policy was neither to accept the nuclear superiority of any other power nor to seek such superiority for itself. The classical expression this Soviet way of thinking is not only public statement. The first official expression of Soviet rationale for SALT lies in a private remark made by the chief negotiator, Vladimir Semenov, in November 1969. According to Gerald C Smith:

Semenov began by stating that both sides recognized the importance of curbing the strategic arms race. It could only contribute to a general increase in the threat of war. Mountains of weapons were growing, still yet security was not improving but diminishing as a result. A situation of mutual deterrence existed. Even in the event that one of the sides was the first to be subjected to attack, it would undoubtedly retain the ability to inflict a retaliatory blow of destructive force. It would be

³⁰ Benjamin S Lambeth, "Moscow and the Missile Race", *Current History* (Philadelphia), vol. 61, no. 362, October, 1971, pp. 220-221.

tantamount to suicide for the one who decided to start war. Each side has its own understanding and interpretation of numerous factors and complex interactions of the evolving military political situation. This could leave to major miscalculations. The strategic situation by no means excluded the risk of a nuclear conflict arising from unauthorized use of nuclear missiles or from a provocation on the part of the some third power possessing nuclear weapons.

Semenov went on to make a point he would often repeat. According to him, it was obvious that mutually acceptable solution should be sought along lines that would ensure the security of each side equally rather than through efforts to obtain unilateral military advantages. He rejected the idea of linking arms limitation with other issues. He stated that while concrete results would contribute to the improvement of relations between the two countries, but the subject matter of this deliberation is so complex in itself that to link it to other international problems would mean directing the matter into a blind valley.³² Noteworthy in Semenov statement is the concern about risk of war even in a regime of mutual deterrence and joint effort to avoid nuclear war.

Andrei Gromyko former foreign minister of Soviet Era said, in July 1969, in the Supreme Soviet setting forth the Soviet interest in SALT talks, that it is linked to a considerable extent with the fact that the systems of weapon control and direction are becoming increasingly autonomous, if one can put it this way,

³¹ Sherr, no.23, p. 214.

³² Philip J Farley, "Strategic Arms Control, 1967-87" in Alexander L George, Philip J Farley and Alexander Dalhin (ed.), *US-Soviet Security Cooperation, Achievement, Failures, Lessons*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 226.

from the people who create them. Human capacity to hear and see are incapable of reacting at modern speeds. The human brains is no longer capable of assessing at sufficient speed the result of the multitude of instruments. The decision adopted by man depend in the last analysis upon the conclusions provided by computers. Governments must do everything possible to determine the development of events and not to find themselves in the role of captives of events.

Semenov also noted the ambiguous character of the term 'offensive' or 'defensive' weapons. It was not the weapons themselves that were offensive or defensive, but how they were used. Offensive weapon could in fact be defensive if they were used to make clear that nuclear war would be profitless, and these to deter its outbreak. "Defensive" weapon would be offensive if they were used to make a nuclear attack feasible by frustrating a retaliatory response. Neither side would ofcourse permit such frustration to prevent it.

The rationale of the preambular clauses of the ABM treaty is "that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile system... would contribute to... further negotiation on limiting strategic arms. And similarly, the interim offensive agreement takes into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms.³³ So the Soviet defence policy in 1970s also included as an important element the establishment of parity with the United States. The US acknowledgment of its strategic parity with the Soviet Union as reflected in SALT, was part of a broader Soviet objective to gain political parity. The ABM

³³ Ibid., p. 227.

treaty was seen as a key contribution toward stabilizing a strategic deterrent balance.³⁴

The ABM treaty and continuing negotiations on strategic issues in SALT were also the result of a serious debate (not universally shared in the Soviet military establishment) regarding arms control as an important element in political military strategy.³⁵ Soviet leaders saw the ABM treaty as a very significant agreement which would preclude at least for the time being - the possibility of a competition with the US over the ABM system. Marshal Grechko, the Defence Minister, claimed that the treaty prevented 'the development of a competition between offensive and defensive rocket-nuclear weapon'.³⁶

The Soviet strategic technical motive in endorsing the ABM treaty could also be to slow down and hamper US BMD research and development efforts and thus gaining time for Soviet BMD technology to catch up with that of the United States. With enough time on its side, US can make a much more judicious expenditure on its BMD program than what it would be in case of continuous intense competition with the US.³⁷ Soviet Union's acceptance of a restrained BMD program was certainly facilitated by the fact that the US had a much superior BMD technology and a better capability for deployment in the 1970s.³⁸ So, probably the fact that the Soviet BMD of that Era was not effective enough to protect the Soviet Union against possible American missile offense led to US

³⁴ Garthoff, no.8, p. 287.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 286.

³⁶ Prazsky, no.27, p. 43.

³⁷ Thomas W Wolf, *SALT Experience*, (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1979), p. 110-113.

³⁸ Garthoff, no.8, pp. 286-287.

signing the ABM treaty, rather than any approbation of mutual vulnerability as a desirable state of affair.

The ABM treaty could also have been perceived by the soviets as a way for 'arms race management'. It might also influence the perception of the western public regarding the nature of their strategic situation and its political military intentions. In both the US and west Europe, strategic ethnocentrism - a tendency to ascribe western view on deterrence to the Soviet Union - may have been encouraged by the ABM treaty. The fact that the Soviet Union has agreed to the ABM treaty's limitations was widely interpreted as a Soviet acceptance of mutual vulnerability equivalent to that of West.³⁹ If the soviets had in fact approved the ABM treaty for purpose of strategic expediency the wide spread western assumptions about a Soviet - US identity of views on stability through mutual vulnerability would amount to wishful thinking and self-deception encourage by Soviet discretion. This perpetual situation would facilitate the Soviet build up of inter continental capabilities as well as the development and nuclear forces directed against western Europe in the post 1972 period.⁴⁰

Another possible consideration in the Soviet calculus of interests in approving the ABM treaty and its 1974 protocol may have been the fact that the Soviet Union would be able to retain and modernize the BMD site around Moscow. This would furnish some protection against possible ballistic missile attack by China or by such European powers as Britain and France. While it

³⁹ Yost, no.25, p. 95.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 96.

would also provide some protection against small or accidental attacks, the BMD deployment around Moscow would be perhaps even more important as a justification for continuing BMD research and development, and also as a base for operational experience for a wider BMD deployment.⁴¹ Infact, in actual practice both sides had continued with R&D for developing effective BMD, especially the Soviet Union.

In the history of war fare there has been a continuous contest for supremacy between offensive and defensive weapons. Advances in technology or the military art have at various times made either the offense or the defense temporarily dominant, but sooner or later the pendulum has swing back the other way. The destructive power of nuclear weapons is so enormous and their means of delivery so swift and effective, that various doctrines have postulated a virtually permanent advantage for the offense.⁴² So, with the beginning of atomic age, the oscillation between offense and defense, that had typified previous periods of warfare, appeared to be the thing of past: There could be no defense against "the bomb".⁴³ This leads to acceptance of mutual assured destruction as a strategic policy in one way or other by both Soviet Union and USA. But neither side has been entirely happy with the idea that the survival is dependent on retaliatory forces, that there is no such thing as adequate defense. This concept was especially unsuitable for the Soviet Union, which was surrounded by hostile

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 96.

⁴² Alexander Flax, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Concept and History", in Franklin A Long, Donald Hafner and Jeffery Boutwell (ed.), *Weapon in Space* (Newyork: WW Norton & Company Inc., 1986), p. 33.

⁴³ Robert M Lawrence, *Strategic Defence Initiative: Bibliography and Research Guide*, (Colorado: West View Press, 1987), p. 2.

neighbours and had suffered repeated devastating attacks through out its history. It was not surprising that a strong bias towards defense permeated the Soviet military and political doctrine.⁴⁴

Soviet and American BMD Program and ABM Treaty

Since the dawn of nuclear age both the Soviet Union and the US have searched without success for an effective defense against nuclear attacks. Through the 1940s and 1950s, bombers posed the primary strategic nuclear threat. Both the super powers responded with large-scale air-defense system, including thousands of radar-guided missiles and hundreds of fighter aircrafts. In this study the focus will be mainly on Soviet BMD research and development with passing reference to American BMD.

The Soviet Union first began its research on BMD shortly after the end of world war-II, and the work on specific BMD development program must have been initiated by the mid 1950s.⁴⁵ Their first operational anti-aircraft system, the SA-I (western designation) began to be deployed around Moscow in the mid 1950s. Similar to the US system, the Nike Ajax, it was effective only against world war-II raids.⁴⁶ The first clear official indications of SU's missile defence programme came in defence Minister Marshal Malinovsky's address to Soviet officers in 1957, in which he demanded that more emphasis be placed on air and missile defense. In 1958 American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft discovered a

⁴⁴ Flax, no.42, p. 34.

⁴⁵ Sayre Stevens, "The Soviet BMD Programme", in Ashton B Carter and David N Schwatz (ed.), *Ballistic Missile Defence* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 189-191.

⁴⁶ Flax, no. 42. p. 37.

major test installation near sary-shagon in Kazakhstan⁴⁷ and showed 'primitive' BMD radars under construction.⁴⁸

In June 1960, Khrushchev declared that the United States would try to catch up with the Soviet Union in the production of missiles by 1965. But the Soviet Union, he said, would use the time it had gained to develop rocket weapons and occupy a leading position in this field until an international agreement is reached.⁴⁹

Khrushchev viewed ABM as a tool of international diplomacy. He himself declared that he wanted to give enemy a pause by saying that we have anti-missile weapons. I exaggerated a little that we had the capability of shooting a fly in the outer space with our missiles, the deployment of strategic weapons by the US and the NATO and the American research into developing a missile defense technology during the Khrushchev period provided the Soviet Union with compelling reasons to develop an effective of its own.⁵⁰ In 1960 U-2 imagery established that a major programme was underway and that a considerable amount of progress toward the development of BMD components by the Soviet Union had already taken place.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Hans Ruhle, "Gorbachev's Star Wars", in Zbigview Brezezinski (ed.), *Promise or Peril the Strategic Defence Initiative*, (Washington: Ethics & Public Policy Centre, 1986), p. 240.

⁴⁸ Yost, no. 25, p. 25.

⁴⁹ Holloway, no.24, p. 43.

⁵⁰ Jennifer G Mathews, "A Fly in Outerspace: Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence during Khrushchev Period", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 21, No. 2, June 1998, p. 34-35.

⁵¹ Steven, no. 45, pp. 191-192.

In September 1961, the Soviet Union conducted nuclear tests at high altitude about the radar system of sary-shagon in order to investigate the effects of the electromagnetic pulse on electronic components.⁵² This was followed immediately by several tests of the surface-to-air missile system capable of interception at much higher altitude and longer ranges than in SA-I. Of these, the one that could be intercepted as having at least some ABM capability was the "Griffon" missile system that began to be deployed around Leningrad in 1960.⁵³

The Soviets began deploying the SA-5, another new surface-to-air missile, in 1963.⁵⁴ This missile was given the name of the town near which first elements were discovered: Tallim.⁵⁵ Unlike the earlier missiles, it was estimated to have a long range, high-altitude interception capability. Features of SA-5 suggested at least some ABM capability, although it clearly had long-range capability against high altitude supersonic aircraft of the US. However, with more information on the system, the expert opinion swung away from crediting the SA-5 system with significant ABM capabilities.

The Soviets started deploying new ABM systems around Moscow which came to be ABM-I system or Moscow ABM system. The nuclear armed interceptor missile Galosh, was first publicly displayed in 1964. It was designed for long-range and high altitude interception.⁵⁶ So Khrushchev's boastful assertion that the Soviet Union was capable of "intercepting a fly in space" now seemed to

⁵² Hans Ruhle, no. 47, p. 240.

⁵³ Flax, no. 42, pp. 37-38.

⁵⁴ Yost, no. 25, p. 27.

⁵⁵ Ruhle, no. 47, p. 241.

⁵⁶ Flax, no. 42, p. 38.

contain at least some grain of truth.⁵⁷ The ABM deployment around Moscow was capable of defending a large area of the western Soviet Union. However, being a high altitude interception system, it was vulnerable to counter measure such as Chaff and light weight decoys. Frequencies of the system's radar was low and subject to black out from nuclear blast either offensive or defensive. Further, the ABM-I system was itself limited by the ABM treaty to no more than 100 launches, it could be easily exhausted in a counter attack.

The US had built a safeguard site at Grand Fisk, North Dakota, but dismantled it in 1975-76 and reduced the funding for BMD activities. However, the Soviet Union retained its Moscow BMD system.⁵⁸

The Soviet ABM research and development efforts after 1972 ABM treaty was perceived in the US as being much more oriented to working toward engineering prototypes and final production model. It included improvement in high altitude interceptor missiles as well as development of a new high acceleration interceptor, broadly similar to US Sprint, for lower altitude kills. Extensive R&D on phased array radar technology was conducted. Prototypes of transportable ABM radars were tested. The Soviet components under development were regarded by the US as providing not only the potential for upgrading the Moscow ABM system, but also for the rapid deployment of a nationwide system. In addition to extensive R&D on conventional ABM system,

⁵⁷ Ruhle, no. 47, p. 241.

⁵⁸ Yost, no. 25, p. 29.

the Soviets appeared to have carried out large-scale and costly investigation into directed energy weapon technology, including both lasers and particle beams.⁵⁹

Then in early 1980s a start was finally made for modernizing the Moscow Galosh system. A large multi-face phased array radar - commonly referred to as the Pushkino radar - began to be installed in the original Moscow ring. It was similar to, but larger than, the missile site radar once deployed by US as part of sentines/safeguard system. Since then the SH-8 or Gazelle has become available. It is a new rapid reloading, Silo-bunkered guided missile that would provide the Moscow system with second layer of defense. A system for defense against tactical (and possibly also sea-based strategic) missiles was also tested for the first time in the shape of SA-X-12.⁶⁰

In mid 1983 a major radar installation was found to be under construction at Abalakova in central Siberia, also known as Krasnoyarsk radar⁶¹, one of the new large phased-array radars (LPAR). These radars could perform some battle management function as well as provide redundant ballistic missile early warning coverage. It was revealed that a total of nine such LPARs were under construction. United States considered the deployment of such radars "almost certainly" a violation of the ABM treaty. US officials had disputed the Soviet contention that the Krasnoyarsk radar was intended to track satellites in space.⁶²

The united states' new ballistic missile early warning radars known as Pave Paws,

⁵⁹ Flax, no. 42, p. 47.

⁶⁰ Ruhle, no. 47, p. 244.

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 245.

⁶² Yost, no. 25, p. 47.

were described as "much less capable" than the new Soviet LPARs network.⁶³ However, after the announcement of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) program, popularly known as 'star wars' by the US in 1983, it appears that the Soviet Union was probably most concerned with the development of fixed land-based system - whether using conventional or advanced technologies. Soviet Union was, therefore, more concerned with terminal defense, rather than with those ideas in SDI programme, which suggested space-based weapon to catch up with the inter-continental ballistic missiles in their boost phase.

Soviet Union argued that the combination of offensive and defensive missiles was part of a long-term strategy of USA to establish a first strike capability and a defensive system adequate to deal with the Soviet missiles that were left over after a first strike. It is important to note that mutual accusations that the other side is preparing a first strike was part of the stock-in-trade of super power exchanges. More generally - and perhaps with more justification - the Soviet Union saw this move as an attempt to re-establish US strategic superiority.⁶⁴

Despite continued research and development on BMD by both super powers, the success of the ABM treaty cannot be doubted. While there were genuine compliance issues on both sides, the ABM treaty has clearly been a major restraint on the ABM programs of both the US and the Soviet Union. The only Soviet violation of the accord - Krasnoyarsk radar - was dismantled and

⁶³ Ibid, p. 54.

⁶⁴ Frank Blackaby, "Space Weapons and Security", SIPRI Year Book, 1986. "The Strategic Defence Initiative and its Implications" in Marek Thee (ed.), *Arms and Disarmament SIPRI Findings* (Newyork: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 62.

even otherwise it was ill-suited for the ABM role. Its dismantlement clearly demonstrated the treaty's relevance in limiting the Soviet program. Today America's NMD program requires scraping of ABM treaty which is being vigorously opposed by the international community, including America's own allies. This reflects the continuing importance of the ABM treaty even today even though Russia is no longer a super power.

In order to appreciate the significance of ABM treaty in a better way, it is in place to take a cursory look at the trends manifested in arms drive over the past few years. The last few years have seen the development of different generations of land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles, sub-marines and bombers with each generation an improvement on and less vulnerable than the previous. The creation of new offensive weapons brought in its trail the development of new means of combating them, and this in turn could not but give added impetus to the modernization of the offensive means. If the deployment of anti-ballistic missile system - and this to all interest and purpose has already begun - could not be stopped now, then the immediate future in all probability would witness a chain reaction between offensive and defensive weapons as was the case of one time between armour and artillery projectiles. What such a race could lead to is difficult to visualize. It is not by chance that leading military experts and scientist have warned against the disastrous consequences of a race between "shield and sword". For instance, the study by Federation of American Scientist published in 1970, noted that the discontinuation of ABM systems would remove the stimulus to the inclusion in national armoures of many offensive weapons and would break

the "action-counteraction" cycle.⁶⁵ This recognition of the objective interrelationship between offensive and defensive strategic system, of the role of large-scale ABM systems in provoking an arms race and of the impossibility of gaining advantages over the other side in this race led, the two sides, during the SALT-I negotiations, to the common view that the prime necessity was to focus efforts on the drafting of an accord on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. This made it possible for the Soviet Union and the USA to conclude two important agreements: ABM treaty and the limitation of strategic offensive arms treaty.⁶⁶ Thus, the limitations of the AMB system, a matter of fundamental importance to all intent and purpose, accepted by both the sides formed the very basis of the SALT talks and was an integral part of further talks between the Soviet Union and the USA.⁶⁷

This inter-relationship between offense and defense is thus one of the most important basic premise for restraining further development and deployment of missile defences. Infact, without the ABM treaty's strict limitation on missile defences, neither SALT-I nor SALT-II would have been possible. Today the ABM treaty is more crucial as negotiation shifts from limitation to reduction in strategic arms. It is clear that there would have been no START-I and START-II agreements without the ABM treaty.

A semblance of predictability is essential for both sensible military planning and negotiated arms control. The ABM treaty fostered a predictable

⁶⁵ *News Times* (Moscow), no. 23, June 1972.

⁶⁶ *The Current Digest of Soviet Press* (Ohio), vol. XXIV, no. 22, 1972, p. 16.

⁶⁷ *The Current Digest of Soviet Press* (Ohio), vol. XXXVII, no. 22, 1985, pp. 1-2..

strategic balance by moderating the fear of widespread missile defenses and allowing each side to plan its strategic forces knowing that the other side cannot put even a limited nation wide missile defense in place for atleast several years.

Without the ABM treaty the inevitable element of uncertainty involved in predicting the course of a technological competition between ballistic missiles and missile defenses would have necessitated a highly complicated military planning. In case of inability to accurately predict what mix of offensive and defensive technologies the other side might develop in the coming years, each side would have been forced to increase strategic forces in order to meet possible 'worst case' future threats. Thus intensifying the likely offense - defense race. Such a race between measures and counter measures would inevitably increase the pace of technological changes and thereby further complicating the military planning and increasing the cost of preparedness. In contrast, the ABM treaty's limit on missile defences have allowed the basic technology involved in ballistic missiles to remain more or less the same with little change for nearly three decade.

An offense-defense arms competition would undoubtedly be fraught with risk. The combination of rapid-strike offensive missiles and wide spread missile defenses could increase the dangers of nuclear fist-strike attacks. For the possibility that defenses could limit any retaliation from an offensive blow could increase the incentive to strike in an intense crisis. Because any defense could be more effective against a relatively small disorganized retaliatory strike against a

massive well coordinated first blow, missile defense could increase the advantages of being the first to strike in a future nuclear war.

Missile defences, in short, could paradoxically increase the danger of an offensive nuclear attack, fostering the illusion that a nuclear war could be fought, survived and won. As former President of USA Nixon once put it, They could 'provide a shield so that you could used the sword'.

So the ABM treaty has contributed substantially to the stability and predictability of the strategic balance between superpower in the cold war era and continues to function as a critical agreement restricting the arms race and maintaining global strategic stability in the post-cold was period. The American notice to withdraw from the ABM treaty has been received with strong criticism from all quarters of the world, including Russia, China and even America's own European allies. So US' Missile Defence Plan has the potential to distort the much needed global strategic balance and provoke the strategic arms competition, with a renewed vigous. Thereby, threatening the global strategic stability.

CHAPTER - III

RUSSIA AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE

At the end of negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons (latter called as "SALT-I") Henry Kissinger noted: "Few critics (of this agreement) addressed a question I raised at Moscow Summit's briefing on May 1972. The issue was not what situation (agreement) perpetuates, but what situation it prevents. The question is where we would be without freeze (i.e. of strategic weapons)". "The Soviets", Kissinger concluded, "were giving up an additional offensive capability, we were not".¹

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement and its twin brother Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in American views were a double success: firstly in relation to the concept of arms control, and secondly, as a confirmation of the American view of 'balance of power' and 'equality'. For Soviets in turn these agreements implied the much sought-after recognition of its strategic equality with the rival United States.² Thus, equality was reached after a dangerous and costly armament.

Though both countries continued their research on missile defense technology covertly, but it was still somewhere constrained by the ABM Treaty. Notably, in 1983 US President Regan reacted to the growing global ambitions of the Soviet Union with "Star Wars" i.e. the project of strategic missile defense called as Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This new use of star war techniques represented the crisis in Soviet-

¹ J.I. Coffey, "American Interests in limitation of Strategic Armaments" in William R. Kinter and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, JR. (ed.), *SALT Implications for Arms Control in 1970s*. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), p. 53.

² Marshall D. Shulman, "SALT and the Soviet Union" in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhineland (ed.) *SALT - The Moscow Agreements and Beyond*, (New York: The Free Press, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974) p. 100.

American relations.³ However, later in 1991 Soviet Union collapsed and the very idea of 'balance of power' vanished from the international politics. Subsequently, United States emerged, in terms of strategic capability; technological leadership and economic might, as the sole superpower in the post Cold War international order. According to the London Institute of Strategic Studies annual report on balance of forces in 1996-97, the "US unquestionably dominates the military and political spheres". The US has the incontestable superiority of forces. The end of the "Cold War" does not only, as is usually conveyed, marked the disintegration of the end of union of states headed by the Soviet Union and with it the Soviet communism. It also marks the birth of a unipolar world with US hegemony prevailing over the existing world political and economic order.⁴

After Soviet disintegration, the Russian Federation, its principal inheritor, took over the huge stocks of Soviet military arsenal where maintenance turned out to be a very costly affair. The upkeep and modernization of old Soviet military armaments is problematic due to heavy economic constraints. The Russian President Vladimir Putin said in Russian Duma, while discussing Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-II (START-II) treaty, "to preserve the current size of strategic nuclear force, we will have to spend a total of 950 billion Rubles on maintenance and development between now and 2010 under the terms of START I, under START II we would have 3000 to 3500 war heads and spend 750 billion and in START III we would have 2000 to 2500 warheads and

³ C. Raja Mohan, "The Tregedy of Nuclear Deterrence and Star Wars", in Rakesh Gupta (ed.) *SDI Aims, Implications and Responses*, (New Delhi: Panchsheel Publishers, 1988) p. 20.

⁴ Karen Brutents, "In Pursuit of Pax Americana (I) *Russian Social Science Review* (New York), vol. 41, No.3, May-June 2000, p. 36.

spend 400 billion rubles.⁵ This is not affordable to Russia due to its poor economic condition. Russia is so broke that it even can't maintain the massive military forces built by old Soviet Union. It currently spends just \$5.1 billion on defense compared to \$ 290 billion in the US.⁶ It is against this background - very different from the time of the ABM negotiation and outcome almost thirty years ago - there is a need to evaluate Russia's position and policy with regard to the reviewed American plan for nation-wide missile defense. The present chapter focuses on this question

Russia and National Missile Defence

In the present changed circumstances Russia is a strategic player of consequence. Russia is still the biggest country on the world map. It prides itself for having a strategic - nuclear arsenal second only to that of the US. Its natural resources seems to be almost unlimited and her scientific community, though seriously humiliated and diminished, remains both highly competent and capable of technological innovations.

Russia has been insistent on preserving the ABM treaty as the cornerstone of the global strategic balance.⁷ Since the current debate on NMD started especially after the passing of the NMD Act of 1999 by the US Congress during the Clinton administration. This Act empowered US executive to move forward with NMD by removing restrictions imposed by ABM Treaty. But it did not receive much response from the otherside of the Atlantic.

⁵ See, "Putin to Duma: Russia can't afford another ruinous Arms Race", in *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press* (Ohio), vol. 52, no. 16, May 17, 2000.

⁶ Gwynne Dyer, "NMD: How Washington Will Work, *Bangladesh Observer* (Dhaka) 21 November, 2000.

⁷ Steven Fetter, "Overview: Desirability and Feasibility of Ballistic Missile Defences", in Joseph Cirincione and Frank Von Hippel (ed.) *The Last 15 Minutes Ballistic Missile Defence in Perspective*, (Washington: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, 1996), p. 12.

The basic arguments presented by Russia against the NMD is that its development will disturb the global strategic stability by upsetting the strategic balance.⁸ Russia, it is thought, could retaliate against US' NMD programme by refusing to reduce its nuclear arsenals; by retaining its existing multiple warhead missiles; (banned under START II) by building new ones; and by putting its existing nuclear force on higher alert, there by increasing the chance of accidental launch. Russia might also retaliate by suspending work on bilateral programme designed to keep Russian nuclear materials secure and by selling nuclear and ballistic-missile technologies to 'rogue' states.

Russia would view US' extensive NMD system together with its decision to scrap the ABM treaty, as a signal of an emerging American bias towards reliance on defense, rather than deterrence.⁹ US' NMD has the potential to destroy the global strategic stability based on the concept of "mutually assured destruction" (MAD) which in turn is based on the deterrence capability of the major players in the world. The Americans knew the logic of MAD, which is the central organizing principle in strategic relations, as irrelevant in the post- Cold War scenario.¹⁰

Russia further views the American NMD as undermining not only the ABM treaty but also the confidence in the retaliatory capability of its current strategic force. Though Russia has made it clear that the NMD does not constitute a threat to its nuclear shield but its implementation would sound the death-knell for the ABM treaty.¹¹ Unites States always tried either to amend or abrogate the ABM treaty in order to put forth its

⁸ George Lewis, Lisberth Gronlund, and David Wright, "National Missile Defence: An Indefensible System", *Foreign Policy* (Washington), no. 117, Winter 1999-2000, p. 130.

⁹ John Newhouse, "The Missile Defence Debate", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), vol. 80, no. 4, July-Aug. 2000, p. 106.

¹⁰ Michael Krepon, "Moving Away from MAD", *Survival* (London), vol. 43, no. 2, Summer 2001, p. 81.

missile defense plan. They argue that the US and the Soviet Union negotiated the ABM treaty in a hostile strategic context. Neither side trusted the other's intentions. Both feared that the other would seek to exploit any military advantage. The end of Cold War changed those assessments, and US-Russian relations became more cooperative and less antagonistic. Russia and the US may not be allies, but they no longer are immutable enemies.¹² US exerts that the 1972 treaty was the product of an age when superpower arms race was out of control. Perceptions of nuclear advantage mattered much more then, and worst-case military analysis was so prevalent that deployment of even mediocre defenses might have provoked unchecked competition. Deployment of NMD was therefore prohibited not because it was believed to inherently bad, but because of specific political and technological circumstances of the day. Those circumstances have now changed. The ABM treaty no longer has any bearing, since one of its original signatory states has now dissolved.¹³ This is a poor argument put up by NMD enthusiasts, the same reason would absolve Russia of Soviet Union's other international obligations, debts and such important commitments as towards the non-proliferation of weapons.

Moscow views the ABM treaty as the basis for strategic stability and a necessary condition for maintaining the broad array of agreements on controlling weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov referred to these agreements as the "modern architecture of international serving with the

¹¹ John Cherian, "A Dangerous Gambit", *Frontline* (Chennai), March 30, 2001, p. 50.

¹² Ivo H Daalder, James M Goldglie and James M Lindsay, "Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How", *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, p. 8.

¹³ Michael O' Hanlon, "Star War Strikes Back", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 6, November/December 1999, p. 71.

ABM treaty serving as foundation. If the foundation is destroyed, this interconnected system will collapse, nullifying 30 years of efforts by the world community.¹⁴

Russia views the American rationale for developing NMD - that the US is threatened by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology by certain "state of Concern" - as implausible. Russian analysts consider only North Korea a credible threat in technological terms for a time frame of 10 years or less and relegate potential threat from Middle East (Iran and Iraq) to a 20 to 25 years period. They further argue that the US can rely on existing Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) systems or can develop Theater High Altitude Area Defense to deal with any missile launched by the aforesaid countries. The American reluctance to rely upon boost-phase TMD to cope up with potential missile threats from 'rogue' states instead of developing NMD, is seen by Russia as an attempt by the US to undermine and possibly neutralize Russia's nuclear retaliatory capability.¹⁵ However, the Bush administration continued to emphasize on the perceived irrelevance of the ABM treaty in the given post Cold War realities. Richard Perle, Advisor to Bush's Defense Department, stated that "as long as ABM treaty is regarded as the fundamental to the security of Russia and the US, it continues the contest of the cold war".

In the view of Russia though US' NMD plan has been virtually proclaimed to counter 'rogue' states but the hidden agenda could be to extend it to Russia and China. Russian President Putin said that Moscow knows fully well that Washington's missile defense plans are aimed at neutralizing the nuclear missile potential of Russia and China

¹⁴ Igor Ivanov, "The Missile Defense Mistake: Undermining Strategic Stability and the ABM treaty", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 5, September/October 2000, p. 15.

¹⁵ Celeste A Wallander, "Russia's New Security Policy and the Ballistic Missile Defence Debate", *Current History* (Philadelphia), vol. 99, no. 639, October 2000, p. 339.

and not those of North Korea and Iran. And that is why Russian diplomats in consultation with their American counterparts, have long been proposing that American concerns be addressed in other ways that would not violate the ABM treaty. They especially suggested the creation of a global control system to monitor the spread of missiles and missile technologies, combined with cooperation on non-strategic missile defense or TMD, which the ABM treaty permits.¹⁶ While placing START II treaty before Duma, Putin said that ratification will affirm and reinforce the indissoluble link between the START II and the 1972 ABM treaty. Ratifying START II treaty on the condition that it will take effect only if ABM treaty is maintained intact and strictly observed will confront the US with a choice: Either that country assumes the blame in the eyes of the whole world for destroying the foundation of strategic stability, in the form of the treaty-based system of strategic arms limitation and control or it abandons its pursuit of a NMD system.¹⁷ By attaching such strategic conditionalities to the ratification of START II Russia has sought to deal with US' hidden agenda.

Russia fears that the US' envisioned missile defense is part of a conscious strategy to maintain global strategic superiority. They disagree with the US threat assessment, doubting that developing countries can deploy long-range missiles before 2010 and that such missiles would never be used against the US in any event. Russian leaders believe that the ABM Treaty still serves their strategic interests. Firstly, it limits the threat, which US' NMD would pose to the Russian strategic missile force. It would force a cash strapped Russia to start a missile defence race. Secondly it limits the area of strategic

¹⁶ See, "Berlin Essentially Backs Moscow in its dispute with Washington" in *Nezavismiyad Gazeta, The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 52, no. 23, July 5, 2000, p. 2.

competition in which Russia is ill-prepared to compete - namely hit to kill interceptors and advanced radar and infrared detection and tracking system. However, even if US decided to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM treaty to deploy such a defense, Russia would like to play it to its political advantage as it seeks partnership with other states (such as China) to check US' growing influence world wide, and also as it seeks to enhance the role of nuclear weapons for its own defense.¹⁸ At the political level, Russia would like to have a multi-polar international order to put an effective check on US' rising hegemonistic tendencies characteristic of a unipolar world order..

Russia is further opposed to the American missile defense plan as it would unleash yet another new arms race, including one in outer space.¹⁹ If the US unilaterally pulls out of the ABM Treaty. It would seriously impede the nuclear disarmament process. Interim Agreements On Certain measure with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms in 1970 and the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I & II) in 1990, all between US and Russia, are crucially dependent on the ABM treaty.

Nuclear disarmament is a necessary condition for mustering the popular support of non-nuclear weapons states for enhancing international arms control and non-proliferation regime. Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995, the conclusion of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the understanding among the parties to the conference on disarmament in Geneva on the negotiation of the

¹⁷ See, "Putin's address to Duma for radification of START II Treaty in *The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 52, no. 16, May 17, 2000.

¹⁸ Dean A Wilkening, "Amending the ABM Treaty", *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, p. 36.

¹⁹ Cf. Charles L Glaser and Steve Fetter, "National Missile Defence and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy", *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 1, (Summer 2001), p. 73.

convention on prohibition of Fissile Material for weapon use were results of disarmament process. US' NMD programme, which calls for US' withdrawal from the ABM treaty, will damage the international arms control and non proliferation regime. It would also trigger off the race in both offensive and defensive strategic arms.²⁰

USA's unilateral withdrawal from ABM treaty could be costly, however, US - Russian strategic nuclear arms control probably would come to an end and trigger off arms race.²¹ The abrogation of ABM treaty may cause Russia to become less cooperative on a wide range of security issues, especially those involving proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, like the ratification of CTBT, not much ratifying negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) cooperation with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that froze North Korea's nuclear program, continent cooperation on Fissile material protection, control and accountability in Russia and other non-proliferation efforts aimed at chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.²²

There is a fear that US' missile defense plan may put pressure on Russia to expand and modernize its strategic force. The last thing Russia would like to see is a competition in strategic arms. They find their increasingly worn-down offensive forces shrinking to low levels and have little appetite or resources for a new arms race. They certainly want to focus on arms race stability, not crisis stability. They are more reliant on nuclear weapons which requires an effective command and control structure. It is

²⁰ H.U. Yumin, "Preserve the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty and Maintain Strategic Stability", *Foreign Affairs Journal* (Beijing), no.55, March 2000, p. 39.

²¹ Prakash Chandra, "Trick or Threat?", *Hindustan Times* (Delhi), 23 Feb. 2002.

²² Wilkening, no.18, p. 29.

important to note that their control over weapons through a chain of command is believed by some specialists to be deteriorating.²³

Russia may no longer be a great power, but is well aware of the fact that its politico-military status rests on its nuclear assets. Fear of losing the remaining military assets can be a powerful motivator for resource-mobilization and allocation. Notably, in August 1945, Josef Stalin despaired that his victorious Red Army would become impotent and obsolete in the face of America's nuclear monopoly. He therefore embarked on crash programme to address his country's short comings. Many experts in Russia's fear that US' technological power will leave them with no claim to global standing. Their concern about the effectiveness of their nuclear deterrent is heightened because Russia relies almost entirely on ballistic missiles to deliver its nuclear weapons.²⁴ Russian scientists are of the view that their countermeasures are effective enough to deal with America's NMD system. But Russian policy makers do not exude such confidence and instead wonder as to why the US would pour billions of dollars into an ineffective system.²⁵ Russia still maintains a quick launch posture for its Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBMs) and keeps missile submarines on dockyard alert. Its missiles system, like those of the US, could be launched within a few minutes of receiving the launch command.²⁶ So in some way Russia may have a level of preparedness to counter American missile defense plan. Building upon claims about the impending demise of decades of disarmament negotiations, critics predict that Russia

²³ Newhouse, no.9, p. 104.

²⁴ Daalder, Goldgeier, and Lindsay, no.12, p. 17.

²⁵ George Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David Wright, "National Missile Defence: An Indefensible System", *Foreign Policy*, no. 117, Winter 1999-2000, p. 130.

²⁶ Newhouse, no.9, p. 99.

and China will respond to NMD with a major built up and deployment of more sophisticated weapons as they attempt to regain their security by re-establishing (or in case of China, strengthening) their second-strike capability.²⁷

Russia's Countermeasures

The large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense deployments by the US will almost certainly force Russia and China as well to take steps to bolster their strategic offensive nuclear forces. Russia may refuse to reduce its nuclear arsenal below a certain level - say 2000 warheads - to retain the capability to overwhelm any major threat defenses. Then it can increase the number of its missiles with multiple warheads. It can also rely more on mobile survivable missile launchers, such as those mounted on trucks or submarines or deploy more air- and sea - launched cruise missile to fly underneath the missile defense radars system. It can further develop and deploy more "countermeasures" or sophisticated decoys to travel along with the real war heads to confuse or blind the sensors.²⁸

Russia and China could respond to US' NMD system by producing, deploying and probably selling missile defense countermeasures and decoys to America's potential adversaries. Russia can sell weapons to Iran and China to Iraq.²⁹ A spiraling race of countermeasures and counter-countermeasures could then ensue which would undermine the global non-proliferation regime and would lead to an arms race.³⁰

²⁷ Frank P. Harvey, "International Politics of National Missile Defence", *International Journal*, vol. LU, no. 4, Autumn 2000, p. 550.

²⁸ Jack Mendelson, "America, Russia and the Future of Arms Control", *Current History*, vol. 100, no. 648, p. 325.

²⁹ Edward N Luttwak, "Fighting Over the Wheel Derails Bush Team's Foreign Policy", *International Herald Tribune*, 02 March 2001.

³⁰ Carl Levin, "A Debate Deferred: Missile Defence After the September 11 Attacks", *Arms Control Today*, vol. 31, no. 9, Nov. 2001, p. 5.s

Russia may slow-down the planned reduction of Russian missile force by prolonging their operational capacity. Russian Duma has ratified the START II treaty with a condition to maintain ABM treaty. Therefore, any harm to the ABM treaty would automatically slow down the reduction process of the Russian missile force.³¹

So to overwhelm an NMD shield Russia may plan to launch massively and quickly in a crisis, either firing on warning from a deteriorating network of early warning satellites of an incoming missile strike. Thus, in response to NMD, the alert rates of missile submarines at sea and road-mobile rockets on land might be increased. Russia's SS-18 force might increase its readiness to launch on warning even if it means breaching the 1994 Clinton Yeltsin de-targeting Pact. In striving to ensure that its missile forces in silos and on dockyard alert can be launched before incoming US missiles strike them, Russia might heighten the readiness of its remaining functional early warning radars and nuclear command posts. Such increased emphasis upon accident prone quick launch options would be virtually certain if the US deploys a national missile defence. To deal with this contingency, Russia would likely to deploy multiple warheads on its new land-based TOPOL-M strategic missile and might even consider extreme responses including the fielding of space mines designed to disabled the NMD's space based sensor system in the event of US – Russian hostilities. So Russia would respond in ways that increase US-Russian nuclear tensions and the risk of accidental nuclear launch because Russia

³¹ Ivan Safranchuk, "Russian view on Missile Defence", *Pergwash Occasional Paper* (Cambridge), vol. 2, no. 2, March 2001, p. 1.

views the US NMD plan as a real threat to its nuclear deterrent forces and thus to its national security³².

So, Russia may accelerate the development of the new TOPOL-M (SS-27) ICBMs which can carry up to three war heads. While deployment of this missile in a Multiple Independently Targeted Recently Vehicles (MIRVs) version will require a new series of tests and additional design work, the price of doing so is not substantial and would certainly be seen as affordable by Russian leadership.³³ Russia can install more than one warhead on the remaining ICBMs, in particular on TOPOL-M (SS-27) in violation of the START II agreement. It is noteworthy that Russia has already deployed advanced weapons designed to circumvent missile defense system. The new SS-X-27 ballistic missiles, few example, has an accelerated boost phase of 100 seconds (down from 100 sec making it harder to detect or launch). It can carry three warheads and is highly maneuverable. It is particularly interesting that this combination of technologies serves as an effective countermeasure not only to NMD but to the alternative system that Russian President Putin offered to Europe in June 2000.³⁴ As a countermeasure, Russia can also think of deploying ICBMs in Belarus.

All these countermeasures which Russia might put against American missile defense plan will certainly heighten the offensive defensive arms race between Russia and the US.

³² Dr. Bruce Blair, "The Impact of national missile Defence or Russia and Nuclear Security", *The Defence Monitor*. Center for Defence Information, Vol. XXIX, no.8, June 14, 2000. <http://www.cdi.org/dm/2000/issue8/nmdrussia.htm>

³³ Safranchuk, no.31, p. 36.

³⁴ Harvey, no. 27, p. 551.

Any attempt by China, in response to America's NMD Plan to increase its nuclear forces will pressurize India to add to its arms capability to counter any threat from China. This in turn will inspire Pakistan to procure more of strategic weapons.³⁵ Thus, America's NMD plan has the potential to lead to a global arms race, including south Asia. NMD's defining trait resides in the harm it is capable of inflicting upon global arms control, especially an arms control regime that is seen to be tottering ever more on the brink of obsolescence and whose fall must usher in a new sinister phase of 'arms-racing'.³⁶

A major concern for Russia which it shares with China is the growing militarization of space by the US - of missile defense turning space into an arena of competition. They have taken note of the American Airforce space Command's website which talks about American domination of space and about space as the fourth frontier of warfare. They have also taken note of what is called "Joint Vision 2020", a document produced by the Joint Chief of Staff, that advocates "full spectrum dominance - a capacity of US forces... to conduct prompt, sustained and synchronized operations... with access and freedom to operate in all domains - space, sea, land, air and information."³⁷

Thus, American missile defense plan, has the potential to militarize the outerspace as well and any countermeasure by Russia or China will further heighten the arms race and could lead to arms competition in space.

³⁵ Kanti Bajpai, "India, Missile Defense, and Asian Security", Presentation at "National Missile Defense: Some Indian and French Perspectives", a Seminar organised by Centre De Sciences Humaines and India International Center, 9 November 2001.

³⁶ David G Hagland, "Yesterday's Issue? NMD, Canada and the allies, *International Journal* (Toronto) vol. LV I, no. 4, Autumn 2001, p. 686.

³⁷ Newhouse, no. 9, p. 106.

All the Russian countermeasures against NMD are bound to be very costly which the present Russian economy is not in a position to bear. Keeping in view the critical condition of Russian economy some scholars argue that there can be no offence - defense arms race while it is undoubtedly true that the financial constraints will somewhere restrict Russia's ability to make a proportionate response to the US' NMD plan, still it would not be prudent to assume that Russia's current financial problems will persist through out the ten-to-twenty years time-frame set by US for its missile defense plan. Moreover, this view also underestimates Russia's current ability to maintain substantial nuclear forces if given the motivation to do so.³⁸

On the international front, Russia has repeatedly indicated that it would seek alliance of common interest with China and/or India. Russia is also trying to convince America's European allies against the negative outcomes of the US' missile defense plan.

Just as Western European leaders worry about Russia's reaction to the American missile defense, Russia too worries about China's reaction (or overreaction). If Russia fails to take up the challenge, China will claim the moral high ground in international politics.³⁹

Russia as well as China feel threatened by possible US motives in overplaying threats from 'rogue' states to build a NMD that would eventually be used to further blunt their military capability and thereby undermining what they consider as their legitimate role in international relations. There has been some talks about forming a Joint Sino-Russian missile defense as one of the several possible counter measures against an

³⁸ Steven E Miller, "The Flawed Case for Missile Defence", *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 102.

³⁹ Newhouse, no. 9, p. 106.

American NMD. Under the joint defense, Russia will allow China to use its space based navigation system (GLONASS) for military purposes which could enhance China's defense capability.⁴⁰

China also needs Russian armaments and military technologies to reinforce its incipient status as a super power, and in particular to strengthen its position in the delicate equation of US-Chinese relations, which are strained over Taiwan.⁴¹

Moscow warned Washington that if the latter repudiates the ABM treaty, then Russia and China may go in for the joint production of weapons capable of effectively evading the US' ABM Shield and successfully targeting its air, ground and space based elements. Among the projects reportedly short-listed are the joint production of different anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons (laser and interceptor missiles) and improving the quality of Chinese missiles by linking them up with Russian military satellite systems. In addition to it, Russia has promised China the 949 and 971 class nuclear submarines armed with long-range cruise missile.⁴²

Meanwhile, on 16 July 2001, Russia and China signed in Moscow "The Good Neighbourly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation". Russia and China shared the same perspective on the ABM treaty. Both sides stressed "the basic importance of the ABM treaty, which is a cornerstone of strategic stability and the basis for reducing offensive weapons."⁴³ President Jiang Zemin, speaking about the strategic dimension of the treaty, said that increased cooperation between Moscow and Beijing would improve global

⁴⁰ Manpreet Sethi, "US National Missile Defense: A Case of Misplaced Logic", *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), vol. XXIII, no. 12, March 2000, p. 2168.

⁴¹ See, Vladimir Ganshin, 'Restrained but justifiable optimism in *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 29. August 15, 2001, p. 2

⁴² John Cherian, "A dangerous gambit", *Frontline*, March 30, 2001, p. 51.

⁴³ John Cherian, "A historic accord", *Frontline*, August 17, 2001, p. 61.

stability. "We believe in discussing missile defense and disarmament will enhance our efforts at building multipolar world and establish a fair, rational international order",⁴⁴

Russian proposal for an alliance with India can't be materialized because India has supported the US missile defense plan whole heartedly. Not only this, India and United States have also decided to work together in building a missile shield to counter the threat of a missile attack from Pakistan.

To counter America's NMD programme, Russia has also signed a military and defense treaty with North Korea in 2000.⁴⁵ Again on August 4, 2001, both countries signed the Moscow Declaration according to which North Korea would adhere to the "moratorium it has declared on ballistic missile launch until 2003. The declaration also refers to the 1972 ABM treaty as "the cornerstone of the strategic stability offensive arms". Moscow presumed that this will strengthen its hand in its dispute with US over the need to preserve the ABM treaty. Russia thought that North Korea's willingness to maintain its moratorium on ballistic missiles launches until 2003 would create a two year window opportunity during which Russia can attempt to resolve its disagreements with the US over approaches to "new threats" and the fate of the ABM treaty. Moscow did not rule out the possibility of a direct US - North Korea dialogue as one possible avenue for resolving their disagreements.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 62

⁴⁵ See, Vladimir Skosyrev, 'Brothers forever II' in Vremya MN, on Russian-Chinese Treaty of Good – Neighbourhood in *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 29, August 15, 2001, p. 1.

⁴⁶ See, Gennady Sysoyav, "North Korea will help Russia to cut a deal with the US", in Kommersant, on Moscow Declaration between Russian and North Korea in *The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 32, September 5, 2001, p. 1.

Russia also tried to put a common front with Europe who has serious reservations about NMD in general, particularly with regard to its consequence for strategic stability and parity symbolized primarily by the ABM and SALT treaties. European leaders like German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac have characterised the NMD as an "invitation to proliferation". The German government has said that international treaties like the ABM should continue to remain the foundation for international security.⁴⁷ France too is apprehensive of the fact that if Russia builds more ICBMs as a result of American missile defense plans, the French deterrent would become weaker. It also fears that once put in place, a US missile shield could decouple the US from Europe by leading to a mindset that feels secure in "Fortress America", leaving Europe to its plight.⁴⁸ It is important to note that none of US' European NATO allies are seen as strongly supporting the American proposal although some of them are known to have expressed their willingness to host US' early warning radar installations on their territory. There is a general feeling widespread in Europe that the US tend to exaggerate the threat to it, and that the eventual deployment of NMD would result in US getting hesitant to involve itself in European conflicts, thus leaving Europe vulnerable to any possible threat.⁴⁹

Assessing the common interest in opposing US' NMD plan with Europe, Russian President Putin proposed that Russia and NATO can jointly examine the prospects for a

⁴⁷ John Cherian, "A Dangerous Gambit", *Frontline*, March 30, 2001, p. 51.

⁴⁸ Sethi, no. 40, p. 2168.

⁴⁹ David Fauquet, EV - Asia News US Missile Defence Plan Pre-occupies Europe and Asia. Accessed through internet.

pan-European missile defense against non-strategic missiles. This is seen in Washington as an effort to divide America from Europe.⁵⁰

Russia has, met some disappointment, on this score. It has realized that too much hope on setting up anything like a "common front" with China or Europe may not materialize . Even if it could, there seems little hope of any possible change in the American policy of unilateralism in enforcing its missile defense plan especially after Bush came to power.⁵¹

Moving Towards Compromise

There seems to be no hope for any concession on or a complete abandonment of NMD plan by United States. Along with this, domestic and financial constraints has further led President Putin to show some willingness for arriving at some compromise formula with United States.

Russia, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, has adopted a pro-west policy in the hope of integrating itself with a broader Euro-Atlantic community. This factor has somewhere forced Russia to compromise with the US and its NMD plan. President Putin from the very beginning has been trying to reconcile Russia's political and economic interests with US' unilateralism. After meeting with the then American President Bill Clinton in 2000, President Putin announced during an interview on NBC Television that Russia has no objection in principle to forging a missile shield against non-strategic missiles in partnership with US.⁵² At the same time, while reiterating Russia's firm

⁵⁰ Newhouse, no.9, p. 105.

⁵¹ Sridhar Krishnaswami, "Bush bombshell", *Frontline*, May 25, 2001, p. 114.

⁵² See, Oleg Odnokolenko, "Jab with a Nuclear Umbrella", *Sevodnya on Moscow summit between Putin and Clinton in The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 52, no. 23, July 5, 2000, p. 1.

commitment to the ABM treaty and opposition to the US NMD President Putin said that, "Russian and American point of reference concerning the emergence of new threat is same, but we are against the cure that is worse than the disease".⁵³ An early indication of Russia's reluctant submission to the US' diktat on the future of ABM treaty came on July 22, 2001 with American President Bush and Russian President Putin reaching on agreement, which could be regarded as the beginning of a practical process of modifying the ABM treaty. Not once in the President's joint statement the term 'corner stone', so often emphasized till recently as signifying the key essence of the ABM treaty, was mentioned President Bush confirmed that the two sides have agreed to link the discussion on offensive weapon systems with defensive systems and he also expressed the US intention of signing a new treaty with Russia replacing the existing one. President Putin on the other hand, also said that the two sides have agreed to examine the problem in a comprehensive fashion - linking the ABM treaty with the issue of further cut in strategic arms.⁵⁴

So Russia agreed, at least in part, to link a modification of the anti-ballistic missile regime with cuts in offensive weapons.

It was assessed that President Putin took advantage of one of his few remaining possibilities for inflating the situation in future. A few more months of diehard opposition from Russia, and the US would simply inform Russia of its withdrawal from the treaty, concentrating on bilateral consultations with dissenting European countries. Thus, in opting to modify the treaty, Russia was able to secure a political space in a

⁵³ Ibid, p. 4.

⁵⁴ See, "Bush, Putin in Geneva: An Arms control Breakthrough?" in *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 30, august 22, 2001, p. 1.

process of multilevel and multilateral consultations on international issues. Russia also hoped that after Genoa meeting US will soften its position on Russia's negotiations with World Trade Organisation (WTO). After this meeting, President Bush did agree for the creation of a bilateral business forum of business circles intended to promote economic contacts among enterprises and vowed to "promote economic reforms and transparent and predictable investment climate".⁵⁵

President Putin said in his address to Russian Duma while putting proposal to ratify START II treaty that Russia should not be expected to return to the dark days of Cold War. The President thus opted not to militarize the economy. After all, competing with the US which accounts for one-fourth of the world industrial output (Russia accounts for less than one-thirtieth) would not only be a folly but a down right tragedy for a country that occupies one-sixth of the earth's land mass.⁵⁶

The two leaders again met in Shanghai on October 22, 2001 at APEC Summit. Observers unanimously noted the new degree of flexibility that Putin showed in describing the current status of the dialogue on missile defense. They particularly highlighted the comments Putin made at a joint Press Conference about the need to "think about the future" and "respond appropriately to possible future threats". Putin's statement about the possibility of "reacting on agreement that takes into account the national interest of Russia and the US and the need to enhance international stability" was taken by observers as a sign of Moscow's willingness to agree to an acceptable modification of the ABM treaty in conjunction with radical cuts in strategic ballistic

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 3.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 4.

missiles on both sides. It is possible that President Putin was implying the tragedy of September 11 and the threat that arose from religious fundamentalism.

Another important looking development was that, besides expressing uncompromising support for the American military action priority for Russia to build relation of long term partnership with America based on common values of world civilization.⁵⁷

The Russian decision to close its electronic intelligence gathering radar in the Cuban town Lourdes and its pledge to shut down its naval and air base at Cam Ranh in Vietnam was presented to the world as yet another peace initiative demonstrating the US-Russian desire for relations based on the greatest possible trust.⁵⁸ However, the American response to the Russian peace initiatives and confidence building measures do not seem to be very encouraging. The biggest irritant to Russian military is the Globus II station built by the US in 1999 near the Norwegian town of Vardo. Russia maintains that the station is being used to track missile launches from its Plesetsk Space Center and from its nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea. So Pentagon is already getting a head start on building missile-defense infrastructure along the perimeter of Russia. And, after another Globus has been erected in the Alentian Islands, the Americans will be able to intercept data through out the flight trajectory of Russia's new ICBMs, from their launching in Arkhangelsk province or the Barents Sea till they come down at the Kura test range in Kamchataka.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ See, "Putin's New Policy Towards US Spark Controversy" in *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 43, November 21, 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁸ Putin face some had bargaining in US. *The Hindu*, November 10, 2001.

⁵⁹ See, Vladimir Urban, "But Globus Keeps on Spinning", *Naviye Izvestia, The Current Digest of Post - Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 43, November 21, 2000, p. 4.

On November 3, 2001, American Defense Minister Rumsfeld visited Moscow. On the eve of his visit, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said, "The ABM treaty is an important but not the only component of strategic stability". He further said that, "I would agree, to an extent, that the ABM treaty is a relic of Cold War. But then all Russian-American agreements are to a certain extent - relic of Cold War. In fact, NATO itself is a relic of Cold War". These statements from the Russian Defense Minister were certainly indicative of the softening of Russian stand over the issue of modifying or abrogating the ABM treaty as desired by the US.⁶⁰ Again on November 8, Putin hinted on compromise when he remarked that the ABM treaty already has a potential for creating or developing defensive system.⁶¹ On November 16, 2001, both Presidents met in Texas but failed to strike a deal on US missile defense plan. Yet The American President, "continued to believe he has got to move forward with the testing program in a robust way", despite President Putin's reservations about it. Further President Bush said that the US considers ABM treaty a relic of Cold War and will walk away from it if necessary. Meanwhile, Pentagon hopes to begin construction on command and testing center for NMD system next spring in Alaska.⁶² Thus, Russia has time and again hinted on its readiness to compromise on NMD with the main objective of overcoming its economic problems by integrating with the Western economies and also to play a decisive role in world politics, against heavy odds of its transition problems after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But, United States has not shown any indication for making any concession on the issue of NMD. However, no concrete steps were taken by

⁶⁰ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Russia soften stand on ABM treaty". *The Hindu* (New Delhi) November 4, 2001.

⁶¹ Putin Hints at compromise, *The Hindu*, November 9, 2001.

⁶² Bush, Putin fail to strike deal on US NMD, *The Hindu*, November 17, 2001.

America to address the Russian economic problems, like those concerning Soviet debts, access of Russian goods to American markets and helping Russia to join WTO.

It is to be noted that Russian society has started becoming increasingly dissatisfied with its President's actions. People are talking more and more about the growing "Gorbachemism" and "Kozyrevism", meaning a policy of unilateral concession to the west to the detriment of Russia's interest.⁶³

From the beginning Bush administration has been pursuing unilateral foreign policy of Jacksonian model. It was adopted when US declared its intention to construct a "new strategic framework" that according to its "Missile Defense Papers", reflects the realities of the post-cold war world and is founded on common interests and cooperation. It will be premised on openness, mutual confidence, and real opportunities for cooperation. It will reflect a clean and clear break away from the Cold War, and will not be based on ABM Treaty. The new framework will also include substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces, cooperation on missile defense, enhanced non- and counter-proliferation efforts. But it is unclear as to how the US expects Russia or any other nation to endorse the new framework when its foundation seems to be mainly theoretical, its design uncertain and its purpose highly suspect. As Russian President Putin said in August 2001, Russia requires specifics, time table and understanding - "in essence detailed and formal negotiation".⁶⁴ The American Secretary of Defense, Runsfeld, had defined the new framework as "a new foundation for world peace and security in the Twenty First century" as if in today's world only America knows and is

⁶³ See, "Political Scientists give Putin instructions, Nezavisimaya Gazeta in *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 43, November 21, 2001, p. 4.

⁶⁴ Mendelson, no.28, p. 329.

solely responsible for laying the foundation of peace and security in the world. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, said that, "the missile defense we deploy will be precisely that - defenses. They will threaten no one. They will, however, deter those who would threaten us with ballistic missile attack. So new framework will involve the deployment of defenses to deter opponents". However, this does not confirm to any known concept of deterrence. Indeed, deterrence by definition work via threats of retaliation where as defenses seek to defeat an attack to neutralize the deterrence threat of others.⁶⁵

Undoubtedly, there is one thing very clear about the new strategic framework: it requires the elimination of the ABM treaty. The US National Security Advisor Rice puts the point plainly: the ABM treaty "is an impediment to getting to a new foundation for security in modern era".⁶⁶

The 1972 ABM Treaty ceased to exist from 13 December 2001 and that with it US' global dominance was complete. Proliferator-in-chief (as termed by Guardian newspaper, London) Bush announced on December 13, 2001 that the United States would unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty⁶⁷. Russian President Vladimir Putin mildly responded to the decision by calling it merely a "mistake" and said that it will not hamper the improving US-Russian relations.⁶⁸ He claimed that Russia like US - and in contrast to the other nuclear powers - has long had an effective system to defeat

⁶⁵ Miller, no.38, p. 103.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 104.

⁶⁷ See the document of US President Bush speech on December 13, 2001, "US Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty" *Arms Control Today*, vol. 32, no. 1, January/February 2002, p. 21.

⁶⁸ Celeste A Wallander, "Russia's Strategic Priorities", *Arms Control Today*, vol. 32, no. 1, January/February 2002, p. 4.

missile defense. He went on to say with complete certainty that the US' decision did not pose any threat to the national security of Russia. At the same time President Putin said that Russia did not agree to withdraw from the ABM treaty jointly, and did everything in its power to preserve the treaty intact. Russia has been guided in this regard primarily by concern for preserving and strengthening fundamental international legal principles in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The ABM treaty is one of the load-bearing structures of the legal system in this sphere. Along with the problem of missile defense, the formal codification of agreements reached on further irreversible and verifiable reduction in strategic offensive arms take on special importance under these conditions.⁶⁹

President Putin also responded to American President's proposal to cut nuclear warheads, proclaiming Russia's readiness to bring the number of its warheads down to 1500 to 2200. He pushed for these cuts to be written into a formal treaty. Something Bush has opposed.⁷⁰

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that, "the Defense Ministry will not make any radical moves, either public or discrete, in retaliation to the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty. This statement marks a U-turn in Russia's position on the issue. Earlier Moscow threatened to walk out of all or most arms control pacts the Soviet Union signed with US if the latter unilaterally dumped the ABM treaty."⁷¹

⁶⁹ See Putin's address to the nation on US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, "US Quits ABM Treaty, Russia Responds", in *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 50, January 9, 2002, p. 3.

⁷⁰ "US withdrawal from ABM treaty" *The Hindu*, December 14, 2001.

⁷¹ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Russia Won't Hit Back", *The Hindu*, December 18, 2001.

It was viewed that the US withdrawal from the treaty will unnecessarily antagonize the Russians and may lead to unintended consequences as Russia takes measures to safeguard its national security interests. Hard-liners in the Russian establishment responded to the US's decision to unilaterally withdrawal from the ABM Treaty by immediately calling for retaining more land-based ICBMs than had been planned and fitting them with multiple warheads in contravention of START II. Some even suggested the scrapping of all armed control agreements. The withdrawal could hamper the ongoing joint Russia-US efforts to safeguarding Russia's ill-maintained stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. Some in Russia have characterised the US withdrawal from ABM treaty as a "slap in the face" and a calculated move to offend Russia.⁷²

The US' unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has forced Russia to respond against the proposed cut off in its armed forces. The Russian reaction is evident when Kremlin put off its plan to cut and restructure the Russians armed forces radically, a decision seen by many analysts as Russian first concrete response to the American decision to press ahead with the "son of star wars" NMD system. In November 2001, President Putin ordered reduction of 1.2 million armed forces by 36,000 in the next five years. He also ordered a shift in emphasis from strategic nuclear missiles to conventional forces. Washington has also accused Moscow of covertly deploying battlefield nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad. While President Putin described this allegation as "total rubbish".⁷³

⁷² Charles Pena and Ivan Eland, "Withdrawal Is Premature", *Arms Control Today*, vol. 32, no. 1, January/February, 2002, p. 10.

⁷³ "Moscow delays military revamp", *The Russian Journal online.htm*, May 22, 2002.

Some observers feel that US' unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty would undermine the position of President Putin within the country. Hard-liners in military and security establishments and members of Duma who are not persuaded by the President's perceived pro-western tilt are likely to be severely critical of Putin's government. Vladimir Lukin, a Duma leader was quoted in Washington post as expressing his strong concern over Russia going out of the way to cooperate with US in its war in Afghanistan. He went on to express his doubts about US' reciprocity to Russia's unflinching support to it in such crucial times.⁷⁴

People's patriotic Union of Russia and Russian communist party criticized what they say Putin's surrender to US ignoring Russian interests . They questioned Putin's intention behind his agreeing to drastic cuts in Russia's nuclear forces which will increase the effectiveness of US' NMD. They demanded a radical revision of national strategy which according to them should seek to reestablish an independent Russian policy and restore Russians' sense of dignity. Even the Russian Duma, which had already defended the treaty, tried in vain to convince and appeal to the US congress to block the withdrawal of US from the ABM treaty.⁷⁵

However, the Bush administration reoriented a semblance of the not so old Soviet era military capability. It has a level of preparedness to counter the US' NMD plan. President Putin has clearly said that Russia's decision on MIRVing of ICBMs will depend upon the quality of the US-Russia relationship. However, Putin It seems has

⁷⁴ Joseph Cirincione, "ABM Treaty withdrawal: Neither Necessary nor Prudent. An Arms Control Association Press Conference. *Arm Control Today*, vol. 32, no. 1, January/February 2001, p. 13.

⁷⁵ See, "Accountable for Russia" in *Sovetskaya Rossia* in *The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 50, January 9 2002, p. 5.

decided to avoid a confrontationist attitude and is instead looking forward to a new arms agreement with US; US' support for Russia's WTO membership and a closer NATO - Russia relationship.⁷⁶

Russia ultimately signed a new arms agreement with the US in the last week of May 2002. The "Treaty of Moscow" commits both sides to steep cuts in ready-to-use nuclear warheads. By the year 2012, 1700 to 2200 warheads deployed by both the sides are suppose to be removed.⁷⁷ The agreement is essentially a face-saving gesture for President Putin, who insisted on a formal accord. Putin, eager to integrate his economy with the west and to give Russians a sense of national dignity that comes with a formal agreements, yielded to almost all of American President's demands. The treaty contains no requirement to destroy warheads that are taken out of service. It puts no prohibition on the US plan to build missile defense system. The Treaty's expires in 10 years allows either side to return to any level it desires, and even before the 10 year expiration it allows the ability to pull out with 90 days notice.⁷⁸

On May 28, 2002 Russia and NATO signed an agreement which heralds a new era of post Cold War cooperation. Under the new arrangement, Russia will have more authority in the new NATO-Russia council (NRC). The new arrangement grants Russia a non-voting seat in the new organization. On the occasion, American President Bush stated that, "the two former foes are now joined as partners overcoming 50 years of

⁷⁶ Wallander, no.58, p. 6.

⁷⁷ John Cherian, "Changing Course", *Frontline*, June 21, 2002, p. 50.

⁷⁸ Dana Milbank and Sharon La Franiere, "US, Russia Agree to Arms Pact". *Washington Post*, May 14, 2002, p. 2.

division and decades of uncertainty".⁷⁹ All this happened in the background of the new arms agreement signed between Russia and America.

The Russian government thus reacted very cautiously to the US withdrawal from the treaty. As noted above, Russia also signed a new arms treaty with US. In the meantime, Russia also joined NATO-Russia council, "19+1" order. But these agreements are certainly not indicative of Russian state's abject surrender to the US or the west. Some where west too need Russia.

However, Some observers feel that Russia has vast military and economic potential on the basis of which Russia will be able to regain her strength and position in international politics in general and against US' missile defense plan in particular. They opine that it is extremely doubtful that the US will actually begin deploying a missile defense system by 2004. Though it is possible that the testing of ground, air and naval components of the system may be completed by the second half of this decade, but the research and development on space-based system cannot be completed before the next decade. So the deployment of a full-scale multi-tiered missile defense system will take many years. In other words, no threat to Russia's nuclear potential will arise until 2010 or 2012 at the earliest. During this time, Russia can modernize its strategic nuclear force without compromising with its economic and military reform programmes. Most importantly, Russia can move quickly to begin the testing of TOPOL-M ICBM, with MIRV. In the given circumstances, Russia should not strive for a quantitative parity with the US but for a truly asymmetrical response.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ "NATO accepts former foe into its fold". *The Hindu*, May 29, 2002.

⁸⁰ See, "Does US Ending of ABM pact Bode Ill for Russia?" *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 2, Dec. 2001, p. 5.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's statement on 28th March 2002 somewhat reflects the aforesaid view. He stated that Russia is taking "Technological and scientific" measures to counter a planned US missile defense shield. Sergei Ivanov quoted by ITAR-TASS said that, "I want to understand that US' shield does not yet exist, and so it is difficult to speak of a retaliatory measure. But this is not to say that we are not thinking about or taking about technological and scientific measures. We are going to do every thing to counter threats when they take shape, which is to say not before 2015-2020". He further said that Russia's strategic forces were the "basis for the effectiveness of our army", which is due to undergo a thorough modernization over the next 15 years.⁸¹

Thus it can be said with a modest degree of certainty that Russia will continue to compromise with American unilateralism as the Russian economy is in dire need of western aid and also to preserve a semblance of its role in world politics. Once the financial condition improves over the next decade Russia will probably once again emerge as a player of consequence in world politics. Among the Russians, their national identity and sense of dignity is quite strong which would not allow Russia to keep yielding ground to the US or the west for a long time. Their Russia identity is sooner or later bound to assert itself. It is also said that in Russia a new second line of leadership is emerging which is more nationalistic and democratic in outlook. They value the democratic principles and rule of law. It is said that Russia will again emerge as a leading world by the time the current second line of leadership takes over the reins of Russia. Given the growing anti-American sentiments in Russian society, it seems that in

⁸¹ *CNN.com News*, March 28, 2002.

the not too distant a future Russia would be able to respond vigorously to the challenges of international politics. It would certainly like to counter the growing US hegemony by playing a key role in creating a multi-polar international order. With vast resources at its disposal Russia would strive hard to overcome its internal weaknesses and regain its position of influence in world politics.

CHAPTER - IV

INTERNATIONAL REACTION OVER US' NMD PLAN

The dissolution of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, so very crucial for global arms control and a sustainable balance of power, especially in the light of US' NMD Plan, has led to a cautious reaction from different quarters of the world. The perceived susceptibility and state of political ambiguity in the post-ABM scenario elicited response even from Europe and China, apart from Russia. The European Union (EU) is the most powerful regional grouping and also comprises of two nuclear powers namely, the United Kingdom and France. China on the other hand another nuclear power is perceived as a future resurgent power. Therefore their reaction besides that of Russia is necessary to understand the problem. The chapter seeks to analyze the response and perceptions shared by regions and major countries, other than Russia about US' unilateral withdrawal from the strategically important ABM treaty and its plans to develop and deploy a missile defense.

Europe

The American determination to proceed with missile defense poses a central dilemma for the Europeans: should they acquiesce and support a policy they believe to be counter-productive for the sake of helping to make it work and maintaining transatlantic harmony? Or should they oppose it?

In addition to the substantive differences over the merits of deployment of National Missile Defence (NMD), Europeans have also voiced procedural complaints. They felt that the Russians were briefed more extensively on the

NMD plan by the USA than they were. European officials complained that President Bush's consultation with allies appeared largely a show.¹

The first and most fundamental factor for disagreement of the European countries seems to be the assessment or the interpretation of the potential threat put up by US in favour of its NMD plan. National histories of US and Europeans are different: Europeans are accustomed to living and coping with threatening environment while US has not suffered a foreign invasion of its territory since 1812. Neither the methodologies of threat assessment are same. Where US policies are elaborated in reference to long turn forecasts, European analysts are more inclined to wait and see whether projected technical capabilities are tested and proven. Europe relies less on anticipated capabilities and more on combined assessment of capabilities and intent than Americans do. European - American difference become more sharply delineated when it comes to ways of dealing with threats. Firstly, the US strives to enhance its scope and capabilities for military action. The European Union (EU) is also moving in that direction, but its emerging capability to handle the task in and around Europe is small in comparison. It reflects a stronger European belief in political, economic and diplomatic means of responding to threats.² Reaction of European leaders show the difference of assessment about the growing ballistic and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability of potentially hostile states. They even question whether those states would ever have the intention of using such capabilities

¹ David E Sanger, "US Will Quit ABM Treaty at 'Convenient Time' Bush Vows", *International Herald Tribune*, August 25, 2001.

² Sverre Logaard, "European views of the US NMD Program", *Pugwash Occasional Paper* (Cambridge), vol. 2, no. 2, March 2001, p. 57.

against the West. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine argued that it is 'not very serious' to claim that states like North Korea, Iran, Iraq or Libya could threaten a nuclear power like the US and called these threats 'microscopic or theoretic'. The British House of Common's Foreign Affairs Committee has also argued that the American focus on "Capability rather than Intention" makes the threat which NMD is intended to counter less credible.³ Here Europe's perception is quite similar to Russia. As Russia is also of the view that the US is exaggerating the capabilities and threat posed by so called rouge states to pursue its unilateral agenda of NMD.

A second important factor in the transatlantic NMD divergence results from difference in European and American attitude towards arms control, and multilateralism. Here Europe is more close to Russia. Modern Russian state today also focus on arms control regimes and multilateralism as a principle governing international relations in world politics. European nation-states, overshadowed by the superpowers during the post-war period, developed a strong conviction that their interests were best preserved by the development of rules to govern international behaviour - in the EU, United Nations (UN) and other multilateral fora.⁴ Recent experience of constant negotiations within the EU has made West European countries accustomed to a decidedly diplomatic and multilateral approach towards outside actors. Hence, in contrast to the containment approach of the US, most EU states have undertaken an engagement strategy or "critical

³ Philip H. Gordon, "Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance" *Survival* (London), vol. 43, no. 1, Spring 2001, p. 23.

⁴ Ibid, p. 24.

dialogue" with Iran, while some have carefully improved relations with Iraq also.⁵ Therefore, things like arms control, providing economic incentives, and encouraging cooperative programmes and policies such as security assurances are held in higher repute in Europe than the US. The European allies of US have been wary of US' NMD proposal and are quite skeptical about the technical viability of NMD. This worry lead us towards isolationism rather than involvement in European security. Europe fears that one developed NMD may leave Europe as the principal target of attacks. US NMD plan is too expensive and may stimulate arms race with Russia and China which could further increase the cost of maintaining security. They could even lead to Russia deploying comparable defenses, which would undermine the independent nuclear deterrents of France and U.K.⁶

The most important factor which is often sighted by Europeans against US' NMD is the "decoupling argument", whereby some Europeans fear that US' Anti-Ballistic Missile Protection would reduce the United States commitment to fulfil its NATO obligations for the defense of its European partners devoid of missile defense. It was remarked by Javier Solana, EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, that the "decoupling" argument is in psycho-political thinking in Europe, with missile defense seen as American step to insulate itself further from the complexity and the nastiness of the rest of the

⁵ Justin Bernier and Daniel Keohane, "European Aversion to National Missile Defence", *Strategic Review* (Boston), vol. XXIX, No. 1, Winter 2001, p. 45.

⁶ Dean A Wilkenning, "Ballistic Missile Defence and Strategic Stability", *Adelphi Paper* (Oxford), no.334. 2000, p. 17.

world.⁷ The fear of "strategic decoupling" has been also voiced by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher, who argued that 'there is not doubt that NMD deployment would lead to split security standard within the NATO alliance'. This split could undermine Europe's trust that US would protect our interests that the US as the leading nuclear power could guarantee some sort of order.⁸ Therefore, the strategic decoupling of the two sides of the Atlantic has been a major concern for NATO strategic planners. US and Europe have already begun something of a strategic and political separation. It is viewed that after Kosovo war in 1999, US's strategic thinking began to focus on the unilateral protection offered by NMD, while Europeans, after the French-British summit in St. Malo and the EU summit in Helsinki in 2000, decided to work towards an autonomous European defense policy aimed at enhancing Europeans' projection capabilities. If Europe is vulnerable while US is not, then the two partners are likely to have different objectives and concern in crisis.⁹

Europeans are worried about US' decision to develop NMD, thus creating a "fortress America", which could lead to divergent security systems within NATO. They were aware, even before Bush came to power as President, that he could and probably would create major rifts, firstly, by gutting or killing the ABM treaty, secondly, by ignoring or trashing the comprehensive Test Ban

⁷ Francois Heisbourg, "American Missile Defence: Its Potential Impact on Transatlantic Co-operation" Presented at Seminar organised by Centre de Sciences Humaines and India International Centre, Nov. 2001, p. 4.

⁸ William Drozdiak, "Possible US Missile Shield Alarms Europe", *Washington Post*, Nov. 6, 1999.

⁹ Camille Grand, "Missile Defence: The view from the other side of the Atlantic", *Arms Control Today* (Washington), vol. 30, no. 7, September 2000, p. 15.

Treaty (CTBT) and thirdly, by mishandling the complicated Russian account. And that is what actually happened. For Europeans, missile defense is to a large degree Russian problem. They did not want to be seen in Moscow as complicit in the death of the ABM treaty or in creation of NMD. And one of Europe's apparent options in the early going would have amounted to taking up President Putin's suggestion of a joint approach to missile defense involving Russia and NATO members, including the US put forward in February 2001. European leaders wondered for a time whether they should oppose that US rejection of Putin's proposal that is consistent with language in the NATO - Russia Founding Act of 1997. They reckon that America should understand the importance of having Russia on board.¹⁰

The US-Russia Missile Defence interaction figured as a major factor in transatlantic cooperation on missile defense. European countries want Russia and the US to come to terms on the future of the ABM regime, in a manner which does not sacrifice European interests. Whether such a understanding is in the form of an ABM treaty revision or whether it comes under the guise of a more formal "new framework" understanding is relatively immaterial. Neither the French nor the British nuclear deterrents would be threatened by anything less than a massive strategic missile defense build up, an option achieved by both Moscow and Washington. What counts for the Europeans as a whole is the

¹⁰ John Newhouse, "The Missile Defence Debate", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), vol. 80, no. 4, July/August 2001, pp. 107-108.

absence of a missile defense - prompted deterioration of relations with their Russian neighbour and the preservation of US - Russian dialogue.¹¹

The European countries fear that the deployment of NMD by the US, especially without prior Russian agreement to modify the ABM treaty, could lead to a new arms race with Russia and China and a further break down of global arms control and multilateral cooperation. The French President Jacques Chirac warned of a destabilizing counter - reaction to NMD deployment. He aptly remarked that, 'If you look at world history, ever since men began waging war, you will see that there is a permanent race between sword and shield. The sword always wins. The more improvements are made in the shield, the more improvements are made to the sword. We think that with these systems we are just going to spur sword makers to intensify their efforts". Chirac concluded by mentioning not just Russia but also China and India as countries to worry about.¹²

When the Cold War came to an end, there was general agreement throughout Europe that Russia must be integrated into European affairs, security affairs not least. But little has been delivered on that promise. On the contrary, Russian have has to face some western initiative that they regard as offensive, like the eastward expansion of NATO, NATO attack on Yugoslavia without seeking the approval of the UN Security Council where Russia could defend its interests, and further enlargement on board to accommodate Baltic States and Ukraine. Europeans wanting to treat Russia as an equal partner's the US look at

¹¹ Heisbourg, no. 7, p. 4.

¹² Craig Whitney, "With a Don't be Vexed Attitude, Chirac Assesses US", *New York Times*, December 17, 1999.

Russia as a couple of rungs down in the international hierarchy. Europeans further believe that if US withdraws from the ABM treaty and pursues its missile defense plan then Russia will build more ICBMs which will make their deterrence weaker. This will further the arms race worldwide.

It was this fear of strategic decoupling, which in November 1999 at the Franco-British summit led to a serious consideration of the establishment of a rapid reaction force of some 50-60,000 personnel, deployable within 60 days to undertake the full range of crisis management operations in Europe. The EU High Representative for a common Foreign and security policy apprised NATO foreign Ministers a month later, on the European plans to develop an autonomous capability to conduct response operations. Whether these plans materialize or not it is amply evident that each of the international players are bracing itself against the proposed American action and are piling up its bargaining chips of strike the right deal when the moment of truth arrives.¹³

European countries believed that Russia has no intention of agreeing to revise the ABM treaty and if US withdraws from it unilaterally, Russia will withdraw from existing treaties on nuclear arms limitation and reduction. This was stated in the law ratifying the START II by the Russian parliament. President of Russian Federation Putin has also hinted at Moscow's possible withdrawal from the treaty on medium and shorter-range missile. For Europeans this means that Moscow would once again have missile that one threatened Western Europe

¹³ Manpreet Sethi, "US National Missile Defence: A Case of Misplaced Logic", *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), vol. XXIII, no. 12, p. 2169.

during the Cold War. Naturally Germany and France will find this prospect most unsettling. This is one of the reasons why Europe is opposing US's NMD. Reporting on German - American Summit, the German Press Agency reported that Schroeder, the German President, expressed serious concern over American Missile Defense shield.¹⁴

NMD enthusiasts put the argument in other way. They say European fear that if America develop an effective missile defense America will be less concerned with Europe and will "decouple". They say however, since Europe will face a missile - capable Libya or Iraq long before America do, therefore, Europe should be more concerned than they are. China feels that, "for that matter strategists are already contemplating scenario of nukearmed madman threatening the US by hitting one of our friends, or threatening to 'Frighten the monkey by killing the chicken".¹⁵

Due to the fear of arms race by Russia and China and potential threat by Russian counter measure against NMD, European elicited a favourable response to President Putin's proposal of alternative ways to eliminate the threat of nuclear attack on US, like global control system to monitor the spread of missiles and missile technology, combined with cooperation on non-strategic missile defense or Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).¹⁶

¹⁴ See, "Putin, Clinton Can't Agree on Missile Defence" in *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press* (Ohio), vol. 53, no. 23, 2000, p. 3.

¹⁵ John Train, "Facing The Risks: A Realistic Look at Missile Defence", *Strategic Review*, vol. XXVIII, no. 3, Summer 2000, p. 8.

¹⁶ See, "Putin, Clinton Can't Agree on Missile Defence" in *The Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, vol. 53, no. 23, 2000, p. 3.

Seeing Europeans' uneasiness to US' NMD, Russia tried to reach to the European powers by offering NATO's European members a form of protection against ballistic- missile attack that complies with the ABM treaty. In February 2001, Russia provided NATO's Secretary General, George Robertson, and several European governments, with paper detailing President Putin's vague June 2000 proposal for a pan - European non-strategic missile defense system. The plan called for a joint European - Russian cooperation to proceed in three phases: a joint assessment of the non-strategic ballistic missile threat to Europe; joint development of a conceptual framework for the proposed Russian system; and the determination of timing and modalities for deployment.¹⁷

The fear of US' European allies gravitating towards Russia led the Bush administration to pledge that its missile defense system will protect America's allies and friends. In this context, it is noteworthy that senior US government officials no longer talk about a 'national' missile defense, but rather about 'allied' and 'global' missile defense. The logic of including America's European allies in this defense arrangement is compelling. Any vulnerability to missile attack could deter Europe from supporting or participating with the US in military interventions during any regional crisis. Thus, a missile defense system that is unable to provide of defense cover to Europe could have the effect of 'decoupling' transatlantic ties, because NATO countries exposed to missile attack might opt out of joint defense of western interests.¹⁸

¹⁷ Richard Sokolsky, "Imagining European Missile Defences", *Survival* (London), vol. 43, no. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 121.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 111.

Europeans oppose US' NMD as it will have far-reaching consequences for 30 years of arm control efforts. Jacques Chirac stated that NMD is 'of a nature to retrigger a proliferation of weapons, notably nuclear missiles'. Schroeder too categorically stated that, "neither economically nor politically can we afford a new round of arms race". It is believed that if ABM treaty is violated or scraped, Russia will withdraw from INF Treaty, START treaty and other disarmament treaties. China would also block further arms control efforts and can increase the expansion of its nuclear force. Russia and China would relax their already weak export controls and would deliberately accelerate missile and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) technology proliferation. And if NMD were to trigger an arms race between Russia, US and China, it would also certainly make further reduction of nuclear arsenals by France and Britain a difficult proposition and would also affect the ability of the two European nuclear weapon states to become more deeply engaged in international nuclear arms control measures and treaties. Infact, British Prime Minister clearly stated in the House of Common that the US concern should be met, "in a worry that does not put at risk the substantial progress that has been made on nuclear disarmament over the past few years". Most of the European countries do not oppose amending the ABM treaty in principle, but they are worry of the effect of any unilateral withdrawal from the treaty. As the French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine declared that, "I think this project (NMD) takes the risk of provoking hostile and dangerous reaction by some countries within the world". He drew a distinction between the two scenarios, "if the US does go ahead in spite of Russia's refusal, then France and

other EU countries will have to have strong reaction. The reaction will be different if Russia agrees to ABM treaty". The British House of Commons Committee also urged the government to impress upon the US administration that, "it can't necessarily assume unqualified UK cooperation with US plan to deploy NMD in the event of unilateral US abrogation of ABM treaty". Coming from the parliament of a strong European ally of the US, and a country that hosts two key facilities for the NMD architecture (Fyling dales and Menmith Hill), the statement is worth noting. Greenland's Prime Minister has warned that Greenland would refuse to upgrade the Thule radar facilities, "if it resulted in increased tension and world destabilization".¹⁹

UK and Denmark are in an awkward position for they have asked to offer parts of their territory for forward-based radars for a system that would not protect them yet might make them more appealing targets to a potential adversary. France, which has few decades based its ultimate defense on national nuclear deterrent worries that pursuit of NMD will create a self-fulfilling prophecy: by admitting concern that traditional deterrent might fail, the US pursuit of NMD will help to ensure that it will fail.²⁰

In yet another response to US' NMD program Europe too, is working for a ballistic missile defense, but only at theater threat, level. Netherlands and Germany for example have decided to buy the "PAC-3", a newer version of the patriot theater missile system, while Germany's Daimler Chrysler Aerospace and

¹⁹ Grand, no.9, pp. 16-17.

²⁰ Philip. H. Gordan, "Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance", *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 1, Spring 2001, p. 24.

Italy's Alenia take part in a lock head Martin-led consortium to build the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADs) to counter short-range ballistic missile threats.²¹ Some strategic analysts believe that there are indications of factors that might lead European NATO members to favour a territorial missile defense. There is currently a clear interest in developing a TMD system to intercept missiles with a sub-intermediate range, and it may be that, in accepting the existence of threat to their forces, European states are at least part of the way to accepting the possibility of longer-range threats.²²

It seems that EU is unlikely to take any major diplomatic counter initiatives right now. However, they are becoming clearer about what they do not want to see happen and what could be more acceptable. They now certainly expect to be consulted before further steps are taken.

To play down the European fears with regard to US' NMD plan, Bush visited Europe. However, the reality is that the main line of US missile defense policy have been determined and there is no evident willingness to reconsider the basic objectives. For his trip to Europe, Bush openly boasted that his position remains unchanged. In a revealing interview with The Wall Street Journal, Bush commented that, "with all due modestly, I think Regan would have been proud of how I conducted myself. I went to Europe a humble leader of a great country, and stood my ground. I was not going to yield".²³

²¹ Bernier and Keohane, no.5, p. 43.

²² Mark Smith, "European Perspective of Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Missile Defense", Centre for non-proliferation Studies, *Occasional Paper* (California), no. 7, May 2001, p. 76.

²³ Steven E Miller, "The Flawed Case for Missile Defense", *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 103.

Ignoring all apprehensions about its NMD program United States of America decided to abrogate ABM treaty unilaterally on December 13, 2001. US allies are disappointed that the United States is not turning around and embracing multilateralism, as it appeared it would after September 11. Instead, the US appears to be pursuing what is called as "unilateral multilateralism". That is, Washington wants international cooperation on its terms.²⁴

US' allies have been alarmed by the prospect of US withdrawal from the ABM treaty. But the steps taken by US, like helping in the formation of NATO-Russia council²⁵ and signing of the new arms reduction treaty²⁶ have made Europeans to accept the 'US hegemonism' with some ease. But still, European fear that the abrogation of the ABM treaty could threaten the existing web of treaties controlling nuclear weapons and its proliferation which might touch off an arms race that could spread from Russia to China, South Asia and beyond.²⁷

China

The Chinese response to US' NMD and TMD deployments is of considerable importance despite the fact that Beijing is not a signatory to the ABM treaty. Chinese leaders view the US' missile - defense programme as part of a strategy to maintain America's global strategic superiority. China believes that US leaders are exaggerating the threat posed by ballistic - missile proliferation, and that the US is not particularly vulnerable because it can retaliate

²⁴ 'ABM treaty withdrawal: Neither Necessary nor Prudent' An ACA Press Conference. *Arms Control Today*, vol. 43, no. 1, January/ February 2002, p. 14.

²⁵ For detail see Biswajit Chaudhary, "Unequal Partnership", *The Frontline* (Chennai), July 5, 2002, p. 53.

²⁶ For details see US Russia arms control discussion ([../docs/0201/doco7.htm](#))

²⁷ "Beyond the ABM treaty", *International Herald Tribune*, December 15, 2001.

against any attack with devastating force. The view is widely held in Beijing that Washington will act unilaterally to pursue its interests without any regard for the UN charter, or for Chinese sovereignty. This opinion was reinforced by the US - led NATO bombing in Kosovo, accidental bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Kosovo war and US' rhetorical and military support for Taiwan. The revision in September 1997 of the US - Japanese Defense cooperation guidelines, which gives Japan greater leeways to support US military operations in the event of regional conflict, is frequently portrayed as an attempt to contain Beijing, rather than to reassure Tokyo.

Chinese leaders view the anti-Chinese rhetoric made by US leaders from time to time as an attempt to portray China as their next enemy. The 1999 Cox Report accuses China of spying the US' nuclear assets. China is further perturbed by the passage of Taiwan Security Enhancement Act by the US Congress and US' frequent allegations of widespread human rights violations in China. Chinese leaders fear that US' missile defense is aimed at them, and that the US is emerging as the main threat to Chinese security.²⁸ During his presidential election Bush clearly stated that he considered China a "strategic competitor" of US.²⁹ Bush's statement further substantiates the Chinese fear.

Bush administration probably believes that US' missile defense would have a salutary impact on potential proliferation and that there will be no meaningful adverse reaction from China and Russia. Beijing is apparently

²⁸ Wilkenning, no. 6, p. 18.

²⁹ Robert Kagan, "The World and President Bush", *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 1, Spring 2001, p. 12.

regarded by the Bush administration as strategically autistic, bent on its ways and unresponsive to the behaviour of the US. As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld puts it, "China is going to do what it is going to do. What we do with respect to missile defense is not going to affect one whit what the People's Republic of China does". Presumably, Rumsfeld was referring to China's long standing slow-motion strategic modernization programme, which was put in place well before Bush administration came in office. But this interpretation is contrary to the explicit position of the Chinese government and simply ignores the possibility that US' missile defense efforts will affect the scale, pace and character of China's nuclear modernization.³⁰

The constraints on China's security policy, once imposed by its poor economic condition and the Cold War, have diminished substantially since the first half of the 1990s. China's economic growth has coincided with, and facilitated an increase in its military capability. In terms of conventional forces, the improvement in Chinese capability has been modest, but if sustained China will possess formidable force-projection power by 2010 - well beyond the scope of most of the states. The completion of a nuclear test series prior to signing the CTBT in September 1996 and development of the new ballistic missile of all ranges means that within a decade China will have a modern strategic and theatre nuclear capability. Observers have yet to agree on China's intention beyond recognizing that it will no longer allow itself to be treated as anything other than a great power. China's insistence that US' NMD would destabilize US-Chinese

³⁰ Miller, no. 23, p. 101.

Strategic relationship suggests that China sees the credibility of its ballistic missile force as essential to its great power status.³¹

It seems that US has an ambiguous strategic relationship with China. Today mutual deterrence applies, however, asymmetrical. It is not far-fetched to think, that an NMD consisting of 100 interceptors with an estimated one in four effectiveness would be able to negate the warheads launched by China's approximately 20 long range ballistic missiles (especially of NMD is called upon to destroy the remaining warheads launched by Chinese missiles that survived a US first strike). US believes that even if the 'State of Special Concern' disappear entirely, China is still there and only NMD can undermine its ability to deter and retaliate. Many observers believe that China is in fact the main rationale for NMD. Therefore, it is not surprising that the stiffest opposition to the NMD programme comes from Beijing.³²

Deeply conscious of its vulnerability, China believes that a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system would wholly neutralize China's small strategic force and could therefore threaten China's security. Though, China considers North Korean strategic weapons as non-existent and conjectural, but as far as US is concerned its leadership assumes that a US missile defense would actually be directed against Chinese forces.

For China, even a limited US missile defense potentially threatens its nuclear deterrent of just 20 ICBMs. Chinese military chiefs feel that even limited

³¹ Stephen A Combone, "The United States and Theatre Missile Defense in North-East Asia", *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 67.

³² Lodgaard, no.2, p. 54.

US NMD will substantially undermine the country's deterrent, potentially removing one means by which China can influence US intervention in case of a military conflict across Taiwan strait. China's greatest concern is US' TMD cooperation with Taiwan and its possible deployment in territories around its periphery. Although designated as 'theatre' missile defense, upper-tier TMD system can cover the entire territory of US' regional allies. This effectively makes them 'national' defenses for these countries. The degree of China's concern depends on the country in question.³³ According to London based International Institute for Strategic Studies May 2000 studies US' TMD deployment in South Korea would cause little concern in Beijing because of the clear need to protect south Korea from attacks by North Korea and also because China's relation with South Korea is improving. However, deployment in Japan poses a long-term problem for China. China's concern about US' TMD system is linked to its ability to dissuade the US from regional intervention, especially in defense of Taiwan. China places a 'special emphasis' on Taiwan and view US' military cooperation with Taipei as interference in China's sovereign affairs. China fears that improvement in Taiwan's military capability, especially ballistic missile defense, will encourage further moves by Taiwan towards independence. This could bring war between China and Taiwan, possibly involving the US.³⁴

China specifically opposes Japanese TMD because they believe that this will shift military balance in Northeast Asia against Beijing as Japanese defense

³³ Wilkening, no.6, p. 19.

³⁴ David Fouquet, "US Missile Defense Plan Pre-occupies Europe and Asia", EU-Asia News, access over internet.

budget is roughly equal to China's and that its high technology commercial and military sector is superior and it also has a capable air and naval defenses. China fears that, given the political will to do so, Japan could develop nuclear weapon at a short notice. This would give Japan 'a sword and a shield' if missile defense are also deployed.³⁵ China further believes that US' missile defense program will also harm its regional interests. Beijing feels that the US-led TMD effort will expand America's influence in East Asia and will also glint China's short-range ballistic missile which helps China to compensate for its poor navy and airforce.³⁶

Surprisingly, China is not seen in Washington as a member of the 'club' in the same way as Russia is. Infact, there is a considerable potential for further misunderstanding between the two. This is partly because China looked non-deterrable from Washington in relation to Taiwan and partly because China has consistently threatened to proliferate strategic weapons its views are not taken into account. Therefore, a wider deployment of ballistic missile defense in Asia could lead to a more adversial relationship between Beijing and Washington, the consequences of which would be felt region-wide.³⁷

To meet the given challenges China has taken a certain stand on the concerned issue. Firstly, China emphasis on the centrality of the ABM treaty. Although this treaty is essentially a bilateral treaty, Beijing considers it crucial in maintaining "strategic balance" not only between superpowers but also among the

³⁵ Wilkenning, no.6, p. 20.

³⁶ Greg May, "Beijing Factor into Missile Defence Equations", access over internet.

³⁷ Rod Lyon and David Dellit, "Ballistic Missile Defense: An Australian Perspective", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (Hant) vol. 55, no. 3, 2001, p. 449.

second tier powers. Secondly, since China fears that missile defense poses a "great threat" to international security, as it threatens not only the ABM treaty but also the global strategic stability, it therefore, is opposed to a unilateral approach on these issues and argues in favour of a multilateral negotiation.³⁸

China was thus seriously concerned of any damage to the ABM treaty - a treaty which has ensured the vitality of its strategic deterrence for several decades. It feels that ABM treaty's abrogation could derail other international arms control efforts at a time when China is placing greater emphasis on arms control to help shape the international environment to its liking.³⁹ Many strategic analysts feel that it is actually the reaction of China that will be the decisive factor in determining whether a missile defense system will ultimately improve the US security or lead to a new arms race.⁴⁰ This is well reflected in US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's repeated statement that the US should concentrate less on Europe and more on the Pacific where he expressed his concern about the military potential of China.⁴¹

China's strategy to counter US' NMD focuses on enhancement of its nuclear capability through military modernization, alignment with like-minded countries, and by increasing its bargaining power by holding out threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and sensitive arms technology to

³⁸ Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "The implications for posture and capabilities in South Asia", Centre for Proliferation Studies *Occasional Paper* (California), no. 7, May 2001, p. 63.

³⁹ Wilkenning, no.6, p. 19.

⁴⁰ Greg May, "Beijing Must Factor in Missile Defense Equations", Access over Internet.

⁴¹ Guardian Unlimited Report, "US lets China in on Missile Defense Plan", <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Bush/story/0,7369,545911,00.html>.

countries perceived as "state of concern" by US. China's military establishment is engaged in an ambitious programme of nuclear and missile modernization. Apart from this research and development is on to produce a new generation of solid fueled, multiple warhead and road-mobile missiles. The first of these new missiles, the Dong Feng 31, was tested in July 1999, and efforts are being concentrated in this direction to improve the chances of survivability of the missile. A US National Intelligence Estimate revealed in August 2000 that China could decide to deploy upto 200 ICBMs by 2015. China is also believed to be using Global Positioning System (GPS) to make significant improvement in the accuracy of its missiles. It has also reached an agreement with Russia to share the space based Global Navigation Satellite System. Russia's arms sale to China has increased and so has bilateral trade. Some analysts believes that the actual motive of the NMD may be to pull China into arms race that would bring upon it economic ruin as happened in case of former Soviet Union. However, there appear to be some broad factors that might restrict a full-fledged and an open arms race between the two. Firstly, Chinese shrewdness and understanding of international relations, and secondly, the \$100 billion worth trade with the USA. But China for now had hinted at becoming more belligerent and less cooperative on a range of non-proliferation and arms control issues. The development of sophisticated counter-measures or an NMD resistant system would call for a substantial influx of finance that would impose a strain on the country's economy. In order to recover some of these costs, China could see economic as well as

strategic sense in selling older technology to other countries.⁴² Russia is already selling modern arms to China. The deployment of NMD could well lead to a more active common Russian-Chinese effort to counter America's growing military power. The Cox Committee reported in 1999 that China has stolen a ballistic missile guidance technology, and provided it to North Korea, Libya, Iran and Pakistan. China is further alleged to have stolen America's latest thermonuclear weapons, which could be adopted to China's next generation ICBMs. China has sold over 100 CSS-8 intermediate missile to Middle Eastern countries and China's ten-story high CSS-4 with a range of 8,000 miles is already deployed.⁴³ If this is true, then US' NMD will only accelerate the process of further arms race and proliferation of arms.

Unlike Russia, which has more than enough missiles to overwhelm a limited NMD system, China has around 20 ICBMs, all DF-5s, capable of hitting North America. A liquid fueled, silo-based behemoth with single nuclear warhead, the DF-5, takes several hours to prepare for flight. In the event of a preemptive nuclear strike, China would be lucky to get any of its DF-5s in the air when an NMD system is added to the mix, China worries that even its minimal deterrent capability will be rendered invalid. Hence, in such a case China may deploy its DF-41 missile, a new solid-fueled and road mobile missile capable of reaching most parts of US, sometime between 2005 and 2010. Regardless of US' decision about NMD, China has good reason to replace its sitting ducks DF-5s.

⁴² Manpreet Sethi, "Ballistic Missile Defence: Implications for India", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. XXV, no. 6, September 2001, pp. 745-746.

⁴³ Train, no. 15, p. 7.

NMD, however, is likely to prompt China to increase its total number of ICBMs and to equip them with countermeasures designed to defeat missile interceptors in order to maintain minimum deterrent.⁴⁴ China fears that if minimum deterrent is not maintained then Americans may become less cautious during any crisis involving China. China's arms control representative, Sha Zukang, has said that, it is evident that the US' NMD will seriously undermine the effectiveness of China's limited nuclear capability from the first day of deployment. This can not but cause grave concern to China. According to some analysts, China may make some technical preparations to deal with a stronger missile defense. It is said that there are four possible ways by which China can counter US' NMD. The first broad way could be by overwhelming the US defense by building more ICBMs, placing MIRVs on existing ICBMs to multiply the number of warheads, releasing decoys from the missiles or dispersing chaffs to deceive the sensors on interceptors. Secondly, by lowering the observability of warheads by applying radars of infrared stealth technology. Thirdly, group creates a rivalry between the warheads and interceptors during flight by making warheads maneuver or through other means. Fourthly, by raising the survivability of ICBMs, by deploying mobile ICBMs or SLBMs, building a missile defense or putting nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.⁴⁵ If China moves to counter NMD on the above-mentioned lines then an offence-defense race will start which will destabilize the global strategic stability. However, here it is important to note that

⁴⁴ Greg May, "Beijing Must Factor into Missile Defense Equations", Accessed over internet.

⁴⁵ Dr. Li bin, "The Effect of NMD on Chinese Strategy", accessed over internet.

China's strategic thinking has never had an American focus. Its forces have a largely regional focus, with many of them reserved for Russia. China is willing to become a superpower and does maintain a minimum deterrent, which will be undermined by NMD. In this case, China's upgrade is most unlikely to alter that pattern by creating a force that is more than a deterrent - one that might actually threaten its American counterpart. Still Washington, as in the past, could over react to whatever China does and set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy. It used to be called the "action-reaction" cycle. A similar cycle could beget a nuclear arms build up in South Asia. Washington tends to see Pakistan as India's major concern, even through China too, which has been the main supplier of nuclear technology to Pakistan, is the abiding source of India's insecurity. Indeed, India has more than ample retaliatory capacity against Pakistan but has almost no such ability to strike the Chinese heartland. And, if China's upgrade enlarges its threat to India, as it probably will, India will expand its focus accordingly. Pakistan will inevitably follow suit. The world will indeed become a more dangerous place. NMD has the potential to produce this scenario. Among the parties most concerned with Washington's decision are Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. For them US-China relations are much more than a bilateral affair. They are uncomfortable whenever the two are seen as being close, but more so when they are fending. Treating China as a threat places Japan, for example, squarely between its principal ally and its mighty neighbour.⁴⁶ Interestingly, while China cautious that "offence and defense" capabilities are closely intertwined, it makes a

⁴⁶ Newhouse, no. 10, pp. 106-107.

distinction between NMD and TMD and is relatively open to negotiating on TMD. Beijing does not categorically oppose limited theatre missile defense and, in fact, has indicated its willingness to talk about it with US. This position could be rationalized on the grounds that since China itself may be seeking similar capability it may not want to close this option. And it may also be confident that it will be able to overwhelm a limited theatre missile defense.⁴⁷ Thus, US' NMD has the potential to renew the offence-defense race. As many observers have pointed out, "the only thing that stands between China and a large strategic nuclear arsenal is motivation and that could be deeply affected by the decision that the US makes about NMD and perhaps even by TMD.

Finally, US announced its withdrawal from the ABM treaty unilaterally which put to rest the global alliance against terrorism rhetoric of consultation and cooperation between major powers in the world after September 11. China has repeatedly opposed the American action. Chinese President, Ziang Zemin, said it was of "great important" to maintain the international arms control and disarmament regime. In Beijing, a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said that "China is not in favour of missile defense system. China worries about the negative impact... we think the relevant sides should seek through a constructive dialogue a solution that safeguard the global strategic balance". China's official People's Daily wrote that, "The spread of news about withdrawing from the ABM treaty has stunned the world. This not only represents the US withdrawal from an important international agreement for the first time since the end of World War II,

⁴⁷ *Los Angeles Times*, February 24, 2001.

but also implies the disintegration of the international mechanism for prohibiting strategic defense that has continued for almost 30 years". The paper further said that, "This cannot but once again generates a deep impression on the people about the US international behaviour which is full of hegemonism."⁴⁸

There is no doubt that China is emerging as a major player on the global stage due to its healthy economic conditions. As its economic clout grows, so will its desire to play a bigger role in strategic affairs. Given the fact that Chinese are major trading partners of US, it remains to be seen whether there will be a real collision between their interests. American unilateralism, its growing clout and the new assertiveness in general and its missile defense plan in particular has the potential to make a long-term clash between US and China inevitable. Unites States and China enter into a post-ABM treaty world in which their strategic relationship will be fundamentally different than what they have known in the past, and many sensitive and complicated uncertainties is likely persist through this transition period.⁴⁹

Any Chinese reaction to US' NMD plan will lead to an arms race and is certainly going to affect the strategic stability in South Asian region. India sensitive towards China is certainly going to increase its strategic and nuclear power if China do it in response to US' NMD. And any Indian move towards arms race will force Pakistan to develop its countermeasures against India. So US' NMD has potential to reignite reaction-counter reaction in South Asia also.

⁴⁸ Amit Baruah, "Wary Dragon", *The Hindu*, December 23, 2001.

⁴⁹ Bates Gill, "Can China's Tolerance Last?", *Arms Control Today*, vol. 43, no. 1, January/February 2002, p. 9.

Russian, European and Chinese reaction to US' NMD plan has many commonalities. They all are of the view that US is exaggerating the capabilities as well as the threats posed to it by so-called rouge states. Instead, they all favour for arms control and multilateralism in the present unipolar world dominated by US. They are of the view that US' NMD plan has the potential to unleash a global arms race which will disturb the global strategic stability. They consider US' NMD move as an attempt to maintain US' global strategic superiority.

Europe, the traditional ally of US, fears that a destabilized Russia is more dangerous to them as they share common boundaries with Russia. So they are in dilemma to accommodate both Russia and the United States of America. They first insisted against any unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty by US. and emphasized on mutual alternation of the ABM Treaty for a non-strategic missile defence. But when US unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty, Europe emphasized on accommodating Russia in NATO and also called for a new arms agreement as 'Treaty of Moscow' between the US and the Russia.

Today, Russia shares a more common front with China than Europe. China, a emerging power, is most threatened by US' NMD because of its limited deterrence capabilities. Russia too is loosing its standing in international negotiation. Both Russia and china threatened by US' unilateralism, are coming together. The creation of Shanghai Cooperation Council (SCC) as a regional grouping, the signing of 'Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good neighbourhood' in July 2001, and Russian military and technological assistance to China can be seen as a step forward in this direction. Thus it can be seen that

Russia and China are getting closer to put up a joint front against US' NMD, as they can't do it all alone because of Russia's economic constraints and China's technological lag.

CONCLUSION

The post-Second World War era saw the beginning of Cold War between two inimical ideological systems – the capitalist West led by the America and the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union. Both the systems were interested in expanding their ideology. This heightened the intense competition between them in every realm, including defence. This also led to a competition to gain an upper hand in the means of modern warfare. Both increased their efforts in research and development for upgrading arms and improving delivery systems. They strived to acquire dominance on sea, air and land warfare capabilities. Two major developments during 1940s changed the meaning of modern warfare. First, the development of nuclear bomb. Secondly, the space research and development particularly launching of rockets. The space research efforts were directed in developing effective weapon delivery technology. This led to the birth of missile technology and the development of ballistic missiles, especially long range missiles (ICBM/SLBM/Long Range Bombers). Thus evolved the concept of strategic weapons.

The Cold War animosity resulted in an arms race in strategic offensive weapons between the two superpowers in an intensely bipolar world. Ignoring the realities of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, which were fresh in the minds of the whole world after Second World War, the US and the Soviet Union started an irreversible chain reaction. At the height of Cold War in 1970s, the US and the Soviet Union diverted their focus to developing defensive capabilities against nuclear attacks. But fortunately, at the same time

saner thought prevailed among the political leadership of both the countries. The linkage between offense and defence was recognized. It was realised that building defence capabilities would inevitably lead to a race in strategic offensive arms, for a better shield would require a sharper sword.

It was this thought that prevailed in the historic Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement. And the result was the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Though both sides had their own interests and compulsions in materialising this comprehensive treaty, the underlying concern was the same. For Soviets it was that mutual annihilation is an inescapable fact of life in a nuclear world. They accepted the treaty on the doctrine of mutual deterrence on the basis of mutual vulnerability. For Americans it was destruction of other in response of an attack is an unavoidable reality. Their doctrine was Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Thus the ABM Treaty signified the vulnerability of both sides of massive retaliatory attacks. It was nothing but nuclear "Balance of Terror", based on mutual nuclear deterrence.

The importance of ABM Treaty lies in arms control along with the maintenance of a strategic balance. By putting limitations on development and deployment of ABM systems the stimulus to vertically and horizontally upgrade offensive weaponry was removed. The reduction of strategic arms would help in reducing threat perception. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and II were result of this treaty. Further, there were a number of treaties strongly linked to ABM Treaty that would prevent historical proliferation of nuclear arms, development and stockpiling of weapons of mass

destruction, and militarisation of outer space. Thus the ABM Treaty went on to become a corner stone of strategic stability for next three decades.

Though covertly there were programmes on both sides to develop some sort of missile defence system and some effort in arms escalation, but it was predictable and restrained.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the end of a bi-polar world dominated by two diverse ideological systems. The world saw the emergence of US as sole superpower. The superiority which eluded either of the two in the earlier phase now went to the US. Some scholars like Fukiyama termed it as “end of history” and dominance of capitalist social system led by US on world map.

Russia, the successor state of the former Soviet Union, was no longer a match to the American might. US took advantage of the circumstances and asserted global dominance in every realm of world politics, especially in the field of strategic defence. The US unilaterally announced its decision to move forward with its ballistic missile defence plan to counter the threats posed by the so called rogue states i.e. Iran, Iraq, Libya North Korea etc. Global leadership and the reinforcement of America’s position as the only superpower, is the core of current American Foreign policy and the principal reference point in Washington’s interpretation of American national interest. US’ NMD today is an instrument of the American foreign policy of Unilateralism.

Russia, only next to America in nuclear power status, vehemently opposed the American initiative to alter or abrogate the ABM Treaty

unilaterally in pursuance of its NMD plan. Russia view the ABM Treaty as the modern architecture of international security which prevented worldwide arms competition between offence and defence in a nuclear era. Russia wanted to maintain the ABM Treaty in any form as it provided Russia a much sought after strategic parity with US. ABM Treaty also gave Russia a legal international standing in all arms control negotiations. Russia is of the view that US' NMD plan is part of a strategy to maintain America's global strategic superiority. Although the plan has been virtually proclaimed to counter 'rogue states', but the hidden agenda could be to extend it to Russia. Russia disagrees with the assessment or the interpretation of the potential threat from rouge states put up by US in favour of its NMD plan. They even question whether these states would ever have the intention of using such capabilities against USA due to the fear of massive retaliation. They view that the deployment of NMD will disturb the global strategic stability and lead to a world wide arms race. Russia was severely constrained on economic front and was not as powerful a strategic power as erstwhile Soviet Union, it is still a strategic player of consequence. It did not want to loose the strategic parity which it enjoys with the US. In hope of economic gains Russia initially adopted a pro-West policy and agreed for possible alternations in the ABM Treaty for non-strategic defences, which it did propose to the US, the NATO, and the Europeans. America's European allies also disagree over the given rationale behind US' NMD plan. They argue that US' threat perception is based on the anticipated capabilities of certain potentially hostile states. The fear of

decoupling of Europe in NATO due to US' focus on its own defence. They are also of the view that US' NMD will lead to a dangerous and a costly arms race.

On the other hand, China's major concern is over US' decision to deploy Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) over Taiwan and Japan which would threaten its small nuclear deterrence. China has responded in strong terms by threatening to escalate its offensive capability to maintain its regional superiority and to fulfil its superpower ambitions. It further threatens to proliferate weapons of mass destruction to the 'rogue states'.

Any such Chinese move will have a direct impact on India, which may intensify its minimum credible nuclear deterrence programme. It would turn inspire Pakistan to upgrade its offensive capacity. Therefore, US' NMD has the potential to unleash a reckless arms race in this part of the world. Without the development of a reliable nuclear command and control structure, the region is likely to remain a nuclear flashpoint.

The European Union share some of the Russia's concern over the US' NMD plan. As far as China is concerned it has a practically identical view with Russia over the issue. US' hawkish perusal of NMD plan and an abject abrogation of ABM Treaty reflected its superpowerism. The Russian President Putin's perceived pro-West policies and unilateral concessions to the US on issues considered to be detrimental to Russia's security and the sovereignty, evoked a strong reaction with within Russia. Russian society has been highly critical of US' indifference to Russia's view on the ABM Treaty and its concerns over the former's missile defence plan. Hardliners in Russia are

calling for a new realism in defence policy. They want Russia to maintain its strategic missile force as a political – military instrument to pressurise the US. Russia is reviving its hitherto suppressed desire to regain its superpower status, a status of strategic equality and parity with US.

Thus, US' NMD plan and its unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is likely to unfold a process of renewed arms race which will have a chain reaction. It is propelled when states increase their military capabilities to offset the expected growth of their adversaries' capabilities, which in turn prompts other states to increase their capabilities in self-defence. It is an interaction that produces an upward spiral in weaponry but reduces every state's security.

The US' missile defence plan is based on the illusion that a nuclear war could be fought, survived and won; that with an invincible shield, sword can be used. US is quite unmindful of the limitations of the missile defence plan.

The strategic balance based on the Balance of Terror (mutual nuclear deterrence) between the two superpowers during the Cold War era, continued till the end of the twentieth century. But the dawn of Twenty first century is witnessing this balance being disturbed by the hawkiness of US to dominate the globe and to maintain its hegemony.

Russia is spearheading the efforts being made to create a multilateral and a multipolar world and is striving hard to regain its position of equilibrium. There are two ways in which this phase can be traversed. One is by competitive

arms race. Second is by aiming to re-search global strategic stability based on balance of power.

The first path is full of futility and is a path of positive entropy. It would rather help in horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and also in unpredictability of their use. Ironically, this was the main issue of concern during SALT talks – when it was remarked that, “The Governments should be in a position to control events and not be controlled by events of their own creation”.

The second path requires revolution in strategic planning and warfare. It requires foremost the reduction of arms leading to disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. It thus requires a revolution in military affairs. It is to seek the goal of increasing military capabilities and effectiveness with new technology that does not rely on weapons of mass destruction. It is in this direction that Russia has to move. Russian response to US’ NMD is basically political. It intends to maintain multipolarity against American’s growing unilateral dominance in world politics. In the present context, due to economic constraints there is less possibility of any radical military response from Russia. However, it is possible that Russia may continue with its research and development work on missile defence, while taking care of its economic problems. If the Russian economy stabilizes, along with political and social stability, it may be able to reach the stage of strategic equilibrium with US. The onus lies on with Russia to establish the global strategic stability based on “balance of power” in a multipolar world order.

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