

**CONFLICT RESOLUTION
ISSUES OF PEACE, REUNIFICATION AND JUSTICE
IN KOREA**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY*

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Dedicated to


My Father



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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the present dissertation
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consideration for the award of M.Phil degree
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

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PREFACE

After the end of second world war two superpowers emerged on the international scene. Although there were many victors there was no doubt in anybody's mind that the U.S.A. and USSR were in a class all by themselves. Of course there were also Great Britain France and China who had done enough to be present among the Postdam Powers.

Defeated countries left the war deeply humiliated and the defeat was indeed a major traumatic experience. They were seriously punished. After the war the defeated countries accepted the agendas of their victors and had to give up their old programmes. The conflict between the superpowers with their super ideologies was transmitted to defeated countries who then learned to express their world views in line with their victors. Some kind of peace with one victorious country was gained at the expense of ever deeping conflict with the other victor and his defeated countries.

The two elements, the missionary calling of the programmes and the emerging conflict were whipped into shape as an ideology. The ideology took both positive and negative forms. In the positive aspect it was a model of development and in the negative aspect it was an anti communist or anti imperialist, crusade

A particular nasty component that was brought into the recipe for the cold war was the division of Nations. Nations were not only divided but were enrolled in different camps. People in the divided countries took opposite sides and the conflict was fanned by emotional factors to the point of being fratricidal. Outstanding examples were divided Germany with divided Berlin in it midst and divided Korea places where the cold war become extremely tense and approached the flash point.

Of the multitude of factors that explain the persistence of the Korean division, the absence of mutual trust or the intensity of mutual distrust between the two Korean states is the most important. Two unification plans one by DPRK and the other by ROK been put forward. The most important feature of the D.C.R.K. plan was the establishment of Confederation as a transitional step towards reunification, The two regional Governments will have the power to enact and implement independent policies as long as they are consistent with demands of the whole nation.

The KNCF plan was made public by President Roh Toe Woo in speech to R.O.K. (Republic of Korea) national assembly on Sep. 11, 1989. It envisaged that the two Koreans must first resolve and strengthen a sense of national community before they could forge national unity. It envisaged an interim

stage in which north and south would form a loose union to be known as the Korean Commonwealth.

Peace Research has offered a challenge to orthodox security policies and has attempted to address the legitimacy of views about divided nations. The focus of enquiry has been how divided nations should disassociate themselves from superpower even to the point of neutrality, get rid of offensive arms and go in only for defensive military preparedness, and should avoid nuclearisation.

Objective of the Study

1. Korea offers an unusual insight into the development of the Cold War and the interaction of Soviet and American foreign policies during both the ascendance and decline of the "East-West confrontation". In his essay "The Cold War, Peace and Development", Johan Galtung suggests: "And this (Korea) is where the Cold War became hot, already in 1950. Even thirty years after the armistice in 1953 nothing basic has changed. The Koreans may rightly draw the conclusion that their obligation is to stay divided to maintain conflict energy and not rock the boat, that the present abnormal situation is actually the normal situation and that nobody cares much, essentially for racist reasons." When Galtung wrote the article in 1985 the events of

1989, and 1990, which opened new windows of opportunity for new patterns of conflict resolution on a global scale were still far off. It would be wrong to draw facile parallel of Korea with Germany, but still it is a valid enquiry to relate the actual problems and phenomena of a divided Korea to the process of winding down the Cold War.

2. The geo-strategic importance of Korea is an important factor in the foreign policies of China, Japan, Russia (Previously The Soviet Union) and China. Under the the existing circumstances there is absence of stable relations between North and South Korea. It is worth examining whether new advances in regional cooperation and security can open the way to overall prospects for peace making and conflict resolution.
3. It has been suggested that the Kuwait invasion is a test case of the post Cold War Order. It merits serious examination whether the ideological and military confrontation between North and South Korea can be continued at the existing level. Under the new approach to the post Cold War World what steps are feasible to reduce the dangers of escalation of conflict, including nuclear, in Third World situations e.g. Korea.

4. Third world peacemaking should not be considered in isolation from issues of national reunification and social and economic justice. This is also linked to the question of arms reduction and controls. It is necessary, therefore to examine different concepts peace building in Korea and to discuss the possible role of Korean unification as a step towards a truly new international order.

This study is divided into four chapters followed by a concluding one. Chapter 1 deals with the beginning of the cold war and the subsequent changes in the post world war II international relations. Chapter second concerns with the U.S. response to the then emerging challenge under the aegis of the Soviet bloc. It describes and analyse the containment policy as propounded by George Kennan. It also reflects the division of Korea in the context of U.S. Soviet ideological and strategic military divide. The Soviet policy approaches to the the Korean division marks the theme of Chapter III. Chapter IV relates conflict dynamics in Korea to the themes of peace, reunification and justice. It attempts to highlight the prospect of peace in the region as emerging from unification and its impact in the overall context of justice in post Cold War Era. In the concluding chapter attempts have been made to identify remedial

measures to go beyond the rigid political structure imposed on an area like the Korean peninsula by the Cold War political organisation.

This study has involved the use of both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include the U.N. documents on Korean affairs, Reports from the committee on Foreign relations of the United States Congress and official documents of the government of the U.S.A., the Soviet Union and North and South Korea. Secondary sources include the newspaper, magazines periodicals and books.


I am unable to find words to express my deepest gratitude to my guide Professor M.L. Sondhi who supervised this work with zeal and interest. Without his valuable guidance and constant encouragement this work would have been impossible. I am also the thankful to Professor R.C. Sharma for bringing for me very useful material from Korea. I am also grateful to Professor R.R. Krishnan for his kind and worthy advice.

I am greatful to my mother for encouraging me and having borne with me patiently during my work at Jawaharlal Nehru university. I must extend my sincere thanks to all my friends who rendered me substantial assistance in completing my dissertation. I specially want to thank Mr. Jyoti Prakash

Handique M.Tech. my very close friend in the campus, for rendering me great help both moral and material. He was always there to assist me whenever I faced any problem of a theoretical or a practical nature. I also thank the various members of the staff of the libraries of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Indian Council of World Affairs, Teen Murti and other libraries in Delhi.

Finally, I acknowledge, the responsibilities for all errors and omissions, if any.

JULY 2 1992



LAKHVINDER SINGH

CHAPTER - I

THE COLD WAR AND KOREA

The focus of our study is on conflict resolution and we shall look at examples of international action in order to reconceptualise attitudes and values which may offer realistic possibilities for peace, unification and justice in Korea. The people of Korea suffered war and militarisation together with structural inequalities in their national economic and political relations because of the Cold War tensions between the Super Powers. The origin of the Cold War was in the European Division and the objective conditions and specificity of Korea, as an Asian nation were submerged in the encounter of two occidental ideologies: Western Liberalism and Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology. The humanistic element in Korean culture was overshadowed by the clouds of mistrust, suspicion and antagonism which were generated by the East-West encounter. Like the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49, the Korean War had far reaching effects on the ideological and political perspectives of the Super Powers and this in turn affected technological, and socio-cultural choices and preferences for many nations round the world. We shall examine the basis of division of Korea, and the effects of U.S.

Containment and Soviet ideology on Korea in order to examine the trend of significance in the four decades of Korean conflict.

DEFINING THE COLD WAR

The term 'Cold War' taken as it is from the jargon of journalists and politicians eludes precise definition. Most people are of the view that the Cold War was something that occurred in Atlantic area between the United States and Western Europe on the one hand and Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the other with some neutral countries interspersed. But this perception does not project the Cold War with its tremendous scope and domain covering so much of the World, as a source of pervasive fragmentation and explosive contradiction in far flung areas.

In his classic "Histoire de guerre froide",¹ Andre Fontaine goes back as far as to the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the military intervention by the Western States. He appears therefore to define the Cold War in terms of basic and permanent hostilities, between the Soviet Union and the West consequent upon the nature of the Soviet regime and the capitalist or liberal State's fear of it and

1 Andre Fontain, Histoere de le quere froide Paris (Fayard 1965-67), p.2.

exacerbated by the global missions assumed by Marxism-Leninism and American democracy alike.

Secondly, it has been defined as a conflict that could become so virulent in time of peace that States employed against each other means normally or traditionally reserved for time of war. Hans Morgenthau wrote that what distinguishes the Cold War from many hostile confrontations between States in the past are two factors: the IMPOSSIBILITY for all concerned, given the interest at stake and the positions taken, to pursue conciliatory policies with the instruments of give and take and compromise might have led to settlement of the outstanding issues and the consequent NECESSITY for all concerned to protect and promote their interest through unilateral direct pressure on the opponent's will by all means available, diplomatic military, economic, subversive, short of the actual use of force.² This definition reflects the commonest concept of the Cold War. WAR because the diplomats were neither able nor willing to settle their disputes by negotiation, COLD because they were neither able nor willing to settle them by force.

2 Hans Morgenthau, Arguing about the Cold War, Encounter, May 1967, p.5.

Thirdly, some scholars like Raymond Aron take Cold War to mean the phase of extreme tension beginning as far back as the period of a War waged simultaneously rather than jointly against the Third Reich and becoming clearly evident in March 1947 with the Truman Doctrine or a few months later at the Paris Conference to discuss the Marshall plan for American aid.³

After the end of second World War though there were many victors there was no doubt in anybody's mind that United States of America and Union of Soviet Social Republics were in a class by themselves, the former having contributed materially in an predominant sense, the later with human sacrifice and material destruction on a scale almost unheard of.⁴

John Galtung has given four reasons why only two powers, subsequently each to be known as a Super Power, emerged as the important player in the Cold War drama. Firstly he mention the traumatic experience with which both have entered the War, the operation Barbossa, 22nd June

3 Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic, The United States and the World 1945-1973, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p.2.

4 John Galtung, The Cold War, Peace and Development: A Comparison of the Atlantic and Pacific Theaters, Current Research Peace and Violence, (Finland), Vol.III, 1959, p.101.

1941 for the Soviet Union and Pearl Harbour, 7th December 1941 for the United States.

Secondly both powers came out of the War with a very high level of self righteousness. They both regarded their own contribution to the defeat of axis as not only necessary, but to large extent sufficient. Thirdly, both powers were new on the world scene essentially creation of the first World War. Both of them were strongly in their world outlooks, Liberal-Conservative-Capitalist versus Marxist Socialist. In short both of them had programmes, both of them knew what would be good for the world. Fourthly, they both knew perfectly well that their ideologies were incompatible in terms of values and interests. Incompatibility of values and the clash of interest in a global contest spelt deep conflict.⁵

Defeated countries were deeply humiliated and were punished very strongly. Berlin was destroyed and Germany was dismembered and plundered. Japan was subjected to nuclear genocide. Because war had some ideological elements the peace it brought about was to some extent ideological, although in ambiguous forms. Defeated countries were made to confess their sins, discredit their past and abandon

5 Ibid, p.102.

their ideologies and submit themselves to wishes and dictates of the victors. In doing so conflict was inbuilt in the hegemonic dominance. The conflict between two Super Powers with two antagonistic ideologies was transmitted to the defeated countries with an intensification of distrust and fear.

The most important factor which played an important part in producing the conflict structure was ideology. The emerging conflict were whipped into shape as an ideology. That ideology took both positive and negative forms. In the positive aspect there was already a model of development Liberal-Capitalist versus Marxist-Socialist, the models of Super Powers. In the negative form on one side it was anti-communist in general and anti-Soviet Union in particular and on the other side it was being anti-Imperialist and anti-capitalist in general and anti-United States in particular.⁶

Another important fact which completed the process of Cold War was the division of countries. Countries were not only divided but enrolled into two different camps, one part of the nation being in one camp and the other part in the other. People in two parts of divided countries took opposite side and the conflict was fanned by emotional

6 Ibid, p.103

factors to the point of unleashing fratricidal energies associated with internal wars. Two such countries became particularly important, divided Germany with divided Berlin in its midst, and divided Korea.

AMERICAN-SOVIET RIVALRY IN KOREA

Before Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, Korea's position in the international arena was in a straitjacket. More or less all major countries regarded Korea as a colony of Japan. However, there developed a slight change in the attitude of Chinese Government after 1937. The Chinese Government started giving financial and political encouragement to Korean Provisional Government, which had been set up in exile in 1919.

From late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Korean history has been profoundly influenced by three powerful neighbours. Russia, Japan and China. The Sino-Japanese rivalry for the control of Korea came to climax in 1894. After the Sino-Japanese war 1894-95 China accepted Korea as an independent sovereign state, by the treaty of Shimenoseki 17 April 1895.⁷

7 Hardd M. Vinache: A History of the Far East in Modern Times, (New York: Appleton Century Crafts Inc, 1950), pp.140-44

In 1910 when a Korean patriot assassinated its President General Prince Ito in Manchuria, Japan went further and turned the "Hermit Kingdom" into a colony.

War Diplomacy and Partition of Korea

The Atlantic Charter of August 1941, incorporating the basic principle of future peace asserted the right of national self-determination without defining the geographical areas affected.⁸ The Charter increased the hopes of the Korean leaders in exile that their country will get the right to choose their own government in the near future. The question of making a statement concerning the future independence of Korea and of granting some sort of recognition to the Korean provisional government was informally discussed in Washington in early 1942 by members of Pacific War Council. The Council decided not to recognise the Korean Provisional Government on the grounds "as it was the policy of their government in dealing with groups such as the Korean provisional government' to avoid taking action with might, when the victory of the United Nations is achieved, tend to compromise the right of Korean

8 For the text of the Atlantic Charter see US Department of State, Co-operative War Effort, Department of State Publication, 1732, Executive Agreement Series 236, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942), p.4

people to choose the ultimate form and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish.⁹

The first serious policy decision concerning Korea was made at the Cairo Conference by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and General Chiang Kai-Shek. In their joint declaration released on December 1, 1943, the allies in the Pacific War said, "the aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."¹⁰ However, the phrase, "in due course left the nature of this commitment vague.¹¹ The powers signatory to the Cairo declaration were in agreement in principle that Korea was to become independent in due course, but there was still a question as to attitude of the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill held discussion with Marshall Joseph V. Stalin at a separate

9 Statement by acting Secretary of State. Joseph C. Grew Press Release, Washington D.C., June 8th, 1945

10 For detailed meeting, see Herbert Feir, Churchill, Roosevelt-Stalin, The War They Waged and Peace They Sought, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951), p.237

11 For the text of communique see, US Department of State, In Quest of Peace and Security: Selected Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1941-45, (Washington Government Press, 1951), p.10

conference held at Tehran from 28 November to December 1, 1943. Marshall Stalin agreed with the Cairo declaration.¹²

The leaders of the United States government had felt that the co-operation of the Soviet armies was indispensable to further the American war aims. In a meeting with Marshall Stalin on 8th February 1945, the U.S. President brought up the subject of Korea. He told Stalin that he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship council composed of a Soviet and American and a Chinese representative. In the light of the Philippines experience where it took fifty years to prepare the people for self rule, the U.S. suggested for Korea a period of trusteeship extending from twenty to thirty years. Stalin told the President, that a shorter period was preferable and when assured there would be no foreign troops stationed in Korea he gave his approval.¹³

On July 17, 1945 President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin met at Potsdam and agreed for a boundary line in Korea for air and sea operation, running from Cape Battina on the coast of Korea to a point 4°N, 35°E then to a point 45°N 14°E and then along the parallel 45°N

12 Robert E Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkin: An Intimate History, pp.761-92

13 Department of State, American Foreign Relation, The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945, (Washington D.C., 1950), p.770

to the line connected Cape Crillon on the Southern tip of Kokkrdo. The American forces were to operate to the South of and the Soviet forces to the east of this line.¹⁴

CONFUSION IN TRANSITION

When Japan surrendered on August 14, 1945, Russian forces had already landed in north-east Korea and were rapidly moving southward. The sudden Japanese surrender caught the United States unprepared to deal with the Korean problems. The Soviet Union had declared war on Japan just six days before its surrender. American had not reached any final agreement with Soviets regarding Korea. In an all night meeting in the Pentagon on August 10-11, it was proposed that the Soviet accept the surrender of Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel and that US forces accept the surrender in the south.¹⁵ The proposal was accepted and conveyed to the Russians which they accepted for reasons best known to them.

14 Truman: Memoirs, Years of Decision, p.383. Also see Applemman US Army in Korean War, p.3

15 Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of Vote, (Cambridge: Harward University Press, 1968), p.89

The circumstances surrounding the division of Korea are by no means clear.¹⁶ But the Korean partition was clearly the result of external forces expressed through the great power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Korean people were naturally distressed over the callousness with which the wartime agreement was reached by great powers to partition their country into two halves. In this regard the Korean people's distrustful sentiment towards outside powers was clearly expressed by a popular Korean saying right after the World War II.

Don't be deceived by the Soviets
Don't count on the Americans
The Japanese will soon rise again
so Korean, look out for yourself.¹⁷

The first mission of Soviet and US forces entering Korea was to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces and repatriate both the military and the civilian Japanese. Thus the intrusion of allies, not only divided Korea, but also severed the important economic links between Korea and Japan.

16 For a discussion of circumstances surrounding Korean partition see Bruce G. Cunnings, The Origins of the Korean War Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-47, (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1981), pp.101-131

17 As quoted in Hwang, The Neutralised Unification of Korea, (Cambridge Mass Schemkanom Publishing Co., 1980), p.1

Divided into two at the 38th parallel neither part could by itself demonstrate convincing potentiality for economic independence. The greater part of the country's mineral wealth was in the north as was the heavy industry. The major consumer goods and processing industries were concentrated in the south along with a large share of the agriculture. But the mineral resources and heavy industries of North Korea were almost valueless to the North Koreans, because there was no means of converting the raw material into consumer goods, nor were there export markets where they could be traded. Furthermore, most of the heavy industries were dependent upon certain raw material which were no longer available.

In South Korea, on the other hand, there were many manufacturing plants, but most of them needed the raw material from North Korea. The rice fields needed synthetic fertilizer and the railways needed coal. The blockade at the 38th parallel denied these commodities to South Korea.¹⁸

The economic consequences of the division of Korea were serious and immediate, for the two areas had been heavily inter-independent. In order to overcome the highly damaging

18 A detailed account of the way the 38th parallel cut across Korea consequences of this division is given by Shanon M.C. Tune, Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries, Far Eastern Quarterly, May 1946, pp.272-88

consequences of the continued division of the country and to specify defined plans for the future of Korea, the foreign Minister of Britain, Soviet Union and United States met together at Moscow from 16 December to 26 December 1945.

At Moscow the allies agreed at a concrete plan for the future Korean unification through a trusteeship system. The Moscow agreement came to be known as the basic document governing the future development of an independent Korean state. It was decided to establish a Joint Commission "to work out measures for helping and assisting the political economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self government and the establishment of national Independence of Korea."¹⁹ People of Korea received the Moscow agreement with a rising tide of disappointment charged with anger and finally violence.²⁰ The Korean communist party in the South after initially opposing trusteeship along with other political parties soon reversed itself and lined up with the Soviet dominated communist party in the North. As a result of having taken this unpopular position the communist lost ground in the South and the polarization of politics there hardened. In

19 US Department of State, Moscow Meetings of Foreign Minister, December 16-26, 1945, (Washington Government Printing Office), pp.14-16

20 The New York Times, December 28, 1945

the North the refusal of Chio Min-Shek the leader of non-communist nationalist to support trusteeship led to his arrest and disappearance.

To coordinate the economies of the two zones the representative of the two commands could not do much. The United States wanted broad agreements, a unified operation of railroads, electric power, a single currency and free interflow of goods between zones. The Soviet Union wanted only to negotiate specific exchanges of production in particular the exchange of electricity, raw materials and chemical products for rice. But their proposals came to nothing because of shortage of rice in the South.

During 1946 and 1947 the meeting of the Joint Commission could not succeed in setting up a provisional Korean government. By January 1946 each occupying power had established a firm group on the part of Korea it occupied. Two leaders Kim II Sung in the North and Syngman Rhee, who had emerged strong in their respective parts were deadly enemies and bitter rivals for dominance in a unified Korea. US and Soviet representatives failed to agree on the political groups to be consulted. Confrontations elsewhere in the world cooled relations between Washington and Moscow causing each to become more determined to hold on to its foothold in Korea.

By September 1947, US government concluded that the deadlock between two countries could not be solved and proposed that the Korean question to be referred to General Assembly. The American government informed the Soviet Union about the proposal.²¹ In November 1947 the General Assembly over riding Soviet opposition voted to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea to observe free elections by secret ballot to choose a national assembly. The temporary commission, refused admission to the northern part of the country decided that it would observe election in that part of Korea accessible to it, which contained two thirds of the population.

The Soviets and Kim II Sung condemned the proposed UN action as a scheme instigated by the United States to dismember Korea.²² The election held in May 1948, were certified by the temporary commission as a valid expression of the freewill of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessibly to the commission. The election resulted in the victory of overwhelming number of rightists. The representative elected in the election on 10th May met as the National assembly for the first time on 31st May 1948

21 US Department of Statement Bulletin, 28, 1947, p.694

22 Leland M Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US Policy in th United Nations, 1956, p.60

and elected Syngman Rhee as chairman. The national assembly adopted a constitution for the Republic of Korea on 17th July 1948 and it was promulgated on 17th July 1948. On 15th August 1948 the new Republic was formally inaugurated in Seoul and was soon accorded diplomatic recognition by the United States.

Parallel actions occurred in the North Korea during the autumn of 1968 free from the scrutiny of the United Nations. The North Korean Radio declared that election had been held secretly in the South to choose 360 South Korean representatives for the 572 members supreme people's assembly of North Korea.²³ The announcement claimed that 77.52 per cent of the 8,68,785 eligible voters in the South Korea participated in this secret election while 99.97 per cent of total number of votes in North exercised franchise. It has been pointed out that these figures are obviously false since they exceeded by 650,000 the votes polled in the South Korea in the election on 10th May which was held under conditioning of official encouragement.²⁴ The supreme people's assembly for Korea held its first meeting in Pyongyang and ratified the constitution of the Democratic

23 Department of State Bulletin, August 22, 1945, p.242

24 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Vol.1, pp.390-93

Peoples Republic of Korea on 3rd September 1948. Kim II Sung was appointed premier of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.

Thus within three years after Korea had been liberated from Japanese control it had been formally divided into two separate states each supported by one of the Super Powers. The 38th parallel had become without anyone having planned it one of the main lines of confrontation in the developing Cold War.

THE KOREAN WAR

The clash of the conflicting legitimacy claims by North Korea's DPR and the South Korea's ROK resulted in numerous skirmishes and armed clashes along the 38th parallel. It was one such conflict that led to the onset of the Korean War on June 25th 1950.

Satisfied that North Korea was bound firmly to the Soviet camp the Soviets had withdrawn their forces in December 1948 and demanded that United States do the same. From very beginning the objective of the DPRK was to extend its power over the South. By 1950 the Korean peoples' army had gained rapidly in strength. Equipped by the Soviets with heavy artillery and medium tanks and supported by the

fighter aircrafts and attack bombers, the 150,000 strong KPA was becoming a formidable fighting force.²⁵

The USA was not gaining much by keeping forces in the South Korea. The public opinion in United States was also not in favour in keeping forces there. From the military viewpoint also Korea was a exposed salient difficult to hold in a general conflict and the forces deployed there were needed elsewhere. Although the USA wanted to withdraw its forces from South Korea, it adopted a three pronged strategy to reduce the risk. It persuaded the United Nations to assume a long term responsibility for the future of Korea, it sought to strengthen the South Korean economy through economic aid and it continued equipping and training a South Korean military force.

As early as 1945 General Hodge had advised Washington for the establishment of Korean military force as Korean Police would not be able to preserve peace and order in the country and security against North Korea.²⁶ After the withdrawal of US forces a military group of 500 men remained

25 Cunnings, The Origin of the Korean War, (Princeton University Press, 1981), p.140

26 National Security Council, NSC/812 approved by President Truman 23, 1949. It was revised version of the statement of Policy on Korea in NSC 8th of April 2, 1948. See Frus, 1949 Vol.7, Far East and Australia Pact 2, pp.969-975

in South Korea to train South Korean armed forces. By 1950 the ROK army had 98,000 men under arms.

The rationale for the withdrawing of US forces were spelt out in a top secret decision for the National Security Council.²⁷ The joint chiefs of staff approved a department of the army study of June 1949 rejecting US military intervention in Korea in the event of North Korean attack. They were of the opinion, "that Korea is of little strategic value to the US and that any commitment to United State's use of military force in Korea would be ill advised and impracticable in view of the over all world situation and our heavy international obligation as compared to our certain military strength."²⁸

The question of interpreting the Korean War is very tentative and controversial.²⁹ There is disagreement among the historians as to who was responsible for the tragedy of internecine war between North and South Korea. The question

27 On the controversy over the character of War as it started in 1950, See J.F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, (New York Monthly Review, 1952)

28 FRUS, 1950, Vol.7, Korea, p.79

29 On the question of who started the war, See Noble, Embassy at War, pp.219-23. For a more sympathetic view on North Korea's Attack see John, Halliday, The Korean War, Some notes on Evidence and Solidarity, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 11, 3rd July-September 1979, p.28

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of who fired the first shot however important remains in
conclusive unless the character of the war is accounted for.
The 1950 Korean war, above all else was a civil and local
war between two halves of a divided nation, which as a
result of intervention by outside powers became a full blown
international war. This tragedy brought about great sorrow
and destruction to the Korean people yet in retrospect the
war taught an invaluable lesson to the Korean people that
peace and unification by force were incompatible and that
reunification of the country had to be pursued by peaceful
means.

Based on US actions and statements, Kim II Sung's
apparent conclusion that the United States would not
intervent if his army moved South is understandable.³⁰
President Truman reversed his administration's earlier
decision and authorised General Mac Arthur US Commander in
Chief Far East on June 30th, 1950 to bomb specific military
targets in Northern Korea, use ground forces and establish a
naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.

30. Stalin if not Kim II Sung may even have known of
statements in highly classified US documents US forces
would not intervene in the events of a North Korean
attack as the Soviet spies Briton Kim Philby and Guy
Burgess had access to a large quantity of US classified
materials.

Moscow's tactical error in absenting itself from the Security Council in protest over the exclusion of the people's Republic of China made possible the Security Council resolution calling on UN members to assist in repelling the armed attack on South Korea and setting up a UN Command with a commander to be designated by the United States.

North Korea had achieved substantial initial success in war. For some time it appeared that it would be very difficult to contain the North Korea. But by 1950 General Mac Arthur was able to secure hold on the southern part of Korea.

With the return of the Soviet delegate to the Security Council and assuming presidency for a month a direct verbal battle between two super-powers started. Soviet Union did everything possible to prevent further United Nation action in North Korea.

After some initial set back the United Nations forces started a big offensive in September 1950, with a daring amphibious landing at Inchon and was soon able to regain most of the territory of the Republic of Korea and in the process largely destroyed the effectiveness of the fighting ability of North Korean Army. By the end of September they came back to the 38th parallel and on 29th September 1950 the city of Seoul was back in their possession.

The original UN objective to push the invading forces of out South Korea having been achieved the UN assembly called for UN supervised election to establish a united independent and democratic regime in the sovereign state of Korea.³¹

The Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru declared that every attempt should be made for the peaceful settlement before the UN forces cross the 38th parallel. India was convinced that purpose of the Security Council resolution was not to widen the conflict but only to defeat the aggressor to Republic of Korea and re-establish the peace.

America did not listen to Indian advise and on 1st October the forces of Republic of Korea crossed the 38th parallel despite warnings from the Beijing that China would not tolerate invasion of neighbouring states. On October 8th the South Korean forces were joined by UN forces and next day General Mac Arthur called for the surrender of the communist forces in North Korea.³²

31 Rees, Korea: The Limited War, pp.32-33

32 Text of the message included as a annexure to Unified Command, Seventh Report of the Security Council, 3rd November 1950, United Nations Documents, S1, 1883.

As UN forces advanced towards the Yalu River meeting little resistance the victorious allies discounted warnings from Chinese that they could not stand idly by in the face of an advance menacing this security.

In Mac Arthur's words, the United Nations faced an 'entirely new war' with the Chinese in the Korean war. The hopes of unification of Korea were shattered. The Chinese forces pushed the South Korean forces deep inside into the South. President Truman rejected Mac Arthur's proposal to carry the war into China and started truce negotiation in July 1951, which were finally concluded on July 27th, 1953.

With the end of the war the hopes of the Korean people for a unified independent nation had been destroyed for decades perhaps for generations. The Korean war marked a new stage in the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and when it ended, each part of Korean had become inextricably attached to one of the two contending camps.

CHAPTER - II

UNITED STATES CONTAINMENT AND KOREA

With the 8000 word long telegram from George F. Kennan from Russian embassy the American policy of containment took a definite form. During the war the pessimistic assessments of prospects for post War co-operation with the Moscow evoked little sympathy. But after the war the recognition of Kennan's view increased as the increasing Soviet hostility towards the West perplexed t#e many in the department of state.

The long telegram advanced the arguments that Soviet hostility sprang from nothing the west had done, but from the need the Russian leaders felt for a hostile outside world as a means of justifying their own autocratic rule. According to Kennan the communist ideology reinforced such tendencies but did not primarily motivate them. To contain the Soviet expansion, he argued the best means did not lie in direct confrontation but by building viable societies through out the non-socialist world which through strength and self confidence, would eventually become insensitive to Moscow's influence.¹

1. See, "George F. Kennan, Memoris 1925-1950 Boston: Little Brown, 1967, pp.292-95.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

Before 1945 the American interest and involvement in Korea was minimal. China dwarfed what little popular interest there was in Korea. The long Japanese occupation diminished the small diplomatic, economic and missionary interest that had existed. World War II dramatically changed the nature of U.S. involvement in Korea. The Cairo Declaration of December 1943 declared that Korea should be liberated from Japan and should be made a free country with the passage of time. With this declaration started the U.S. involvement in Korean Affairs. After the defeat of Japan and the physical overthrow of Japanese domination the United States further inserted itself as the paramount power in the area. Moreover by committing itself politically to Korea's independence the U.S. became the sponsor and final arbiter of Korea's political development. In the process the U.S. assumed a position in Korea that contrasted markedly with her traditional orientation.

After the war the U.S.A. demonstrated a clear awareness of the linkage between the competition for influence in Korea and stability in East Asia. As Soviet American relations deteriorated following the World War II this awareness even became more stronger. This is reflected in the policy towards Korea drafted in the state department in

May-June, 1946 and concurred in by both the war and navy departments. Designed to determine the basic objectives of the United States with regard to Korea and how best to achieve these objectives, the policy stated -

"The fundamental United objectives with regard to Korea simply stated is the independence of Korea. This the United States has promised in Cairo Declaration and subsequent statements. Korean independence is important not only for the sake of Korean themselves but also as a means of strengthening political stability, through out the far east. For the demination of Korea either by Japan on the Soviet Union would further endanger Chinese control of Manchuria and would thus lessen the prospect of the creation of a strong and stable China without which there can be no permanent political stability in the Far East".²

This basic policy was gradually undermined however by doubts about Korea's strategic importance yet the south Korean problem remained an acute one for the United States government. The American committment has not only been indispensable to survival of South Korea, it has also incorporated a fundamental moral dimension which derives from two separate yet related concerns. First underlying the

2. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VIII (United State Government Prining Office, 1971), p.693.

opposition to communism has been the determination to keep the values of the "free world". Secondly United States having virutally created South Korea thereby assumed moral obligation to its people. Thus America's policy towards South Korea has been motivated by realities of global rivalary with the communist great powers as well as by politico-moral concern for the divided country. But fundamentally it is the former which has sustained the validity of the latter and also provided the rationale for the U.S. maintaining a security alliance with the South Korea.

The equivocal attitude to Korea's strategic importance affected not only the U.S. military presence but its assistance programmes as well. Most seriously affected was U.S. military aid. In addition to inherent problem of higher aid priority and limited funding resources, this aid was plagued by the low estimates of Korea's strategic value and continued concern with a possible South Korea attack north ward. Accordingly despite official endorsement of Korean independence the U.S.A. restricted its military objectives through out this period towards the creations of minimal internal security.³ While military assistance was most

3. The most authoritative accounts remains of sawyee Robert Military advises in Korea KAMG in Peace and War pp.7-45 and 96-104.

seriously hurt by ambivalence concerning Korea's importance, economic aid was also affected. This can be seen in the short range quality of U.S. aid objectives. The government appropriation for relief in occupied area program which accompanied the U.S. military government in Korea for example was oriented almost exclusively to relief programs.

The Korean war dramatically reversed U.S. security policy to Korea both by creating awareness of the strategic importance of Korea of U.S. "containment" objectives and by instilling a general stimulus to arms build up. As a result of the North Korean invasion, South Korea become not only central part of U.S. "forward defense zone" but also a trusted and valued ally. In the decade and half there after the U.S. assumed a dominant role in Korean economic and political development, a relationship characterized as much by closeness as by its fundamental assymetry.⁴

After the Korean war the U.S. military presence was the most visible symbol of American involvement in Korea. A large group of military officials was maintained to assist South Korean forces and improve their organisational, training, and maintenance skills as well as their

4. Han Sung Zoo, The Republic of Korea and the United States: A nation in transition The changing alliance in Kim Skang (ed.) A nation in Transition (Research centre for peace and unification, Seoul 1978), pp.56-82.

operational abilities. Throughout the sixties South Korea was almost totally dependent upon U.S. military presence for its security despite the improvement in its capabilities.⁵

Alongwith U.S. acceptance of responsibility for South Korea's economic reconstruction come American intervention in ROK's domestic political process. In the immediate post war years for example U.S. clashed repeatedly with the South Korean government over the mobilization and allocation of resources and exerted strong pressure on behalf of devaluation. U.S. intervention in South Korea was not confined however to the economic sphere. The U.S. frequently intervened into more strictly, "political" areas as well. The United States played an obviously central role for example in the decision of President Rhee to accept the armistice arrangement ending the Korean war in 1953, It played a similar role, if less well known, in the resignation of Rhee in 1960 and the establishment of a another regime three years later.⁶

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5. hjan Sung Zoo South Korea and the United States: The Allice Survives Asian Survey November 1980, p.10-75.
 6. Han: The Republic of Korea and the United States: Thje changing alliance (Research centre for peace and unification, Seoul 1978). pp.60-62.

The decade from 1969-1979 represented a period of growing ambivalence in U.S. security policy toward Korea, sowing the seeds of the doubt regarding the American commitment to South Korea's defense. This ambivalence can be traced in part to changes in the international environment. Among the changes with the implication for U.S. policy towards Korea were the decline of the Cold War, the rise of detente and the emergence of a multipolar international system. Particularly important in regard were the Sino-Soviet split and the emerging Sino-American approachment. These changes altered the way American policy makers perceived international relations and made reassessment of U.S. policy in East Asia inevitable. In line with this new orientation the United States reduced its authorised level of military personnel in East Asia from 740,000 in January 1969 to less than 420,000 in June 1971 while the bulk of this reduction come from Vietnam, it also involved over 50,000 troops from other Asian countries.⁷

Alongwith the new American posture and emphasis upon a greater role by U.S. allies in their own defense, the United States elevated the importance of military assistance programmes. Expanding security assistance would not only

7. US Department of State: United State Foreign Policy 1969-70 A Report of Secretary State (US government printing office 1971), p.32.

"enable nation whose security is important to us to deal with the threats against them and to help each other to do so", it would also enable the US "in some instances to reduce the likelihood of the engagement of the American forces in future local conflicts. In this sense, the U.S. saw military assistance programs as the key instrument in the implementation of the "Nixon Doctrine".

This growing new departure in doctrine fully expressed however only late in the 1970's and led to a serious American effort to restructure relation with the South Korea. Under the broad principles of the "Nixon Doctrine" the United States remained firmly committed to its basic pre 1975 security commitments. Strains in bilateral relationship related more to South Korea's difficulties with the U.S. Congress than it did to any fundamental wavering within U.S. administration. With the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 however came a U.S. president pledged to withdraw U.S. ground troops from Korea to reduce U.S. weapon exports and to make "human rights" a principal U.S. policy concern. These issues raised serious problems for the bilateral relationship.

Congress reacted negatively to the Carter proposals and brought increasing pressure on the administration to end or modify the troop withdrawal proposed. Congress showed its

growing interest and opposition in series of Congressional hearing reports and legislation. In the face of this opposition he agreed to leave two third of the divisions in Korea untill 1981-82. Congress began during this period to pay an increasing attention to the incidence of human right violations which was not a principal component of earlier U.S. Korean relations.

The relation between South Korea and United States took an increasingly more complex dimension as the U.S. policy makers in Congress faced in the mid 1980s a series of often interrelated economic, security and political policy questions. The rising economic strature of South Korea in the international economy and commerce but particularly in relation to its tarde with the United States raised searching question concerning the justification of the unilateral cost assumption by the United States of the miitary operation in Korea. The abated threat from North Korea as perceived in the context of growing relaxed political ambience in the region raised a set of new questions concerning the U.S. troop strength stationed in Korea. In addition the tempestuous domestic policies surrounding the Chun regime of the 1980's diminished the usual fervour with which the security issue of Korea was defended in Korea. Finally the increasing anti American sentiments manifested in numerous student demonstration

increased the sense of trepidation on the part of Congressional friends of Korea when it come to the question of assistance, military otherwise.

POLITICAL RELATIONS

One of the fundamental difficulties in understanding American foreign policy towards Korea grew out of the variety of interests American had in the area. Moreover these interests are to a considerable extent interrelated and it is difficult to establish a clear hierarchy among them.

The first and probably the most important is the maintenance of peace in Korean peninsula that contributes to the continuance of balance of power in East Asia. The second involves the security of South Korea. The third is interest of the United States in normalization of relation between north and south and alternatively in Korean unification. The fourth is the development of political institutions in South Korea which could provide reasonable stability, popular participation and respect for basic human rights. The fifth involves the concern of the United States over South Korea's economic development and the continued expansion of trade and economic relations between Korea and the United States.

The relations between the United States and South Korea although based predominantly on security interest and the

mutual advantages of expanding trade and financial transactions cannot be defined in these terms alone. The total relationship comprises also the perception of the two governments in global policies and the interaction of the two reflected U.S. interest in societal changes in the East Asian region.

The most contentious issue in this political area has been the political system in South Korea. The restriction on democratic freedom imposed by South Korean leaders placed a strain on relation between the two allies. The U.S. government has expressed support in principle for the evolution of South Korea into a more fully democratic country with fewer curbs on human rights. At the same time, it has recognized the importance of political stability to South Korea's security.

Official U.S. action to encourage progress toward democracy in South Korea has been hampered by the difficulty of judging the appropriate pace of progress for a country with South Korea's culture, political tradition, stage of economic and social development and external threat. U.S. officials have differed among themselves on this question as well as on the extent of the U.S. government's capability to influence South Korea's domestic affairs. The Carter administration was most outspoken on issues of human rights

and democratization which the Reagan administration favoured quiet diplomatic efforts behind the scenes. But neither could claim democratic successes.

The U.S. government in recent years have been cautious and restrained in furthering democracy in South Korea. They have claimed that they have acted from a genuine conviction that orderly processes toward more democratic system would produce more stable condition than efforts for spectacular progress.

Some private U.S. citizens and Congressional leaders impatient with the slow progress and frequent setbacks of the democratic movement in Korea have urged the U.S. government to do more. Not to intervene on behalf of Korean democracy they asserted, would be tantamount to U.S., intervention in support of the authoritarian regimes on government trying to suppress human freedom.⁸

In the mid 1970's Korean relations with the United States suffered a severe strain from an attempt by the Korean government to cultivate support among members of Congress through financial contributions. The influence buying

8. Heraing, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs 99th Cong 1st see, March 17, 1985, pp.357-358.

campaign dubbed as Koreagate by the U.S. grew out of concern felt by Park Chung Lee and senior Korea officials that the Nixon Doctrine portended a serious weakening in U.S. backing of the ROK. Ironically this effort to drum up support badly damaged the image of the ROK in the eyes of the U.S. public.

Beyond furthering the Korean interest in ensuring consistent and favourable policies from the United States the scheme that produced the Korean-gate scandals was launched to blunt the growing U.S criticism of President Park's repressive policy and human rights violation. Not only the Congress but the whole White House advisers, the media business, religious groups and the Korean community in the U.S. were evidently targetted for South Korean penetration manipulation and monetary influence. In the opinion of the Senate Select Committee on Ethics -

"The government of the Republic of Korea went well beyond the practices ordinarily used by friendly foreign nations and adopted a scheme to influence the U.S. government that relied expressly upon improper and illegal method"⁹

9. Senate Select committee on Ethics, Korean Influence Enquiry Report (Washington DC, USGPO, 1978) p.1

Added to the far reaching effects of the Koreagate controversies were the human rights disputes which strained Washington Seoul diplomatic relation notably during the Carter administration while the United States directly or indirectly attempted to influence Seoul's domestic policies so that human rights would be respected or political prisoners would be freed. The South Korean government resisted such an attempt as an unfair interference in sovereign domestic affairs. Although the Nixon and Ford Administration were reluctantly reticent about this issue, the Carter administration choose South Korea and the Philippines as the major Asian targets of its highly visible human rights diplomacy. President Park faced growing criticism in the United States of his domestic political repression. An outspoken Congressional critic Representative. Fraser labeled Park's government as a 'Police state' practising execution, torture and arbitrary arrests and detention. He suggested that because the South Korean government is increasingly oppressive and pays little heed to internationally recognised human rights to the Korean people the military assistance to South Korea should be reduced or eliminated.¹⁰

10. See house Committee on Foreign Affairs: Human Rights in South Korea: Implications US Policy (Washington, DC USGPO 1974), pp.2-3.

The dissident leader Kim Dar Jung advocated a more active policy for the United States. For example he suggested the U.S. could exert pressure for democratic reforms by grating or withholding trade and economic aid.¹¹

Unlike his predecessors Nixon and Ford president Carter attached a top policy priority to the human rights issue and his persistence was as an additional challenge to South Korean foreign policy. Already in June 1976 Carter as presidential candidate had stated that it should be made clear to the South Korean government that its external oppression is repugnant to our people and undermines the support for our commitment there.¹² At the televised presidential debate in October 1976 Carter had significantly pointed out the failure of Ford's human rights policy in South Korea.¹³

The acceleration of President Carter's determined public criticism of South Korea's violation of universal human rights made President Park' order gradual release of

11. Kim Dar Jung, "The Korean Peninsula, Peace, reunification and the Role of the United States" (May 1 1984) in Kim Das Jung in America, 2nd ed (Alexendriava: Koreans institute of Human Rights, undated), p.73.

12. As quoted in Frank Gibbney, "The Ripple Effect in Korea", Foreign Affairs October 1977, p.160.

13. See New York Times Oct 8, 1976.

political prisoners, but he presented all kinds of excuses to drag his feet over the promised reforms.

When President Carter visited Seoul at the end of June 1979 he made a special personal effort to meet with South Korean political dissidents and insisted on including the human rights issue in the agenda for his summit talks with President Park. In the Joint communique, despite Park's earlier objection, Carter emphasized the importance of universal human rights.¹⁴

After the assassination of President Park in October 1979 the U.S. optimism for South Korea's democratization increased, but the rapid political ascendancy of military strongman Genreal Chun Dum Hwan subdued this premature optimism. He staged successful coup defeat in December 1979, suppressed the Kwongja uprising and arrested a large number of democratic leaders including Kim Dar Jing in May and took over the presidency himself in August. The record of the Carter administration's human right policy toward Chun's harsh action was replete with confusion, inconsistency and ineffectiveness

In reviewing the relationship between U.S. military aid and human rights in South Korea. Patrica M. Derian,

14. See the Joint Communique in Department of State Bulletin, August 1979, pp.16-17.

Assistant Secretary of state human rights and humanitarian affairs observed:

"The dilemma is that if we continue to supply this aid inspite of waring signals, we risk prehaps equally drastic and demaging consequences in the longrun if we so support a military government that has jailed its opposition imposed full martial law and heavily censored the nation's press. We appear not just to condone but to reward these violation of basic human rights. If some of South Korea's generals are determined to establish a dictatorship, economic and moral pressure may not be sufficient to dissuade them from this goal. They have presumably appraised the situation and may have decided that we are exclusively concerned with the national security. If we do not remain true to our ideals we risk a strong anti-American backlash".

The immediate human right issue faced by the outgoing Carter administration and the new Regon Administration was Kim Dar Jung's death sentence which was based on his alleged incitation of the Kwangju incident. As the United Sttaes joined Japan in exerting political and economic pressure on behalf of Kim's survival, the Chan government decided to commute his Death Sentence to life imprisonment. Once this nagging issue was at least temporarily disposed of president Regon promptly embraced President Chon's rule and invited

him to Washington toward the end of January 1981. The issue of human rights was conspicuously absent in the Reagon - Chun summit discussion and in this joint communique.

The Reagon administration brought major policy adjustments after initially supporting the authoritarian regime of Chun Do Hwan. After years of quiet diplomacy in the face of student protests military, crack down and alleged human rights abuses the Reagon administration switched to the policy of public warnings against martial law, meeting with the opposition leaders and calling for democratic reforms. Chun faced with the nation wide street protest and knowing he did not have American backing for martial law, give in to all key opposition demands on July 1 setting the stage for direct presidential election and the first peaceful transfer of power since the country was established after World War II.

The Reagon Policy was couched in term of support of democracy, but which was really being guarded were U.S. interest in the area. Stephen Solarz pointed out that the United States maintained 41,000 troops in South Korea, their strategic role went beyond defense of the Korea peninsula. South Korea was also a major U.S. trading partner and its growing middle class was a valuable market. The shift simply was a recognition of "realities", "The administration has

come to understand the best way to create stability was by the establishment of democracy rather than continuation of oppression.

More recently, the popular election of President Roh in 1980 and the national assembly election held in 1988 were followed by significant relaxation of past restrictions on press and individual freedom. The Korea opposition leaders criticised what they saw as a resurgence of human rights abuse and as a result over 40 members of United States Congress sent a letter to president Bush in September 1989 asking him to raise human right situation with President Roh during the later's visit to Washington in October 1989.

MILITARY RELATION

In the period following the Korean war the most visible symbol of U.S. involvement in Korea was the pervasive American military presence. Throughout this period, the United States maintained roughly 60,000 troops in two divisions backed up by air and logistic support to deter and repel another invasion. Moreover since the senior American military commander also served as the commander of all U.N. forces the U.S. retained the defacto operational control over the Korean armed forces. The U.S. also maintained a large group of military advisors to assist South Korean forces in improving their organizational training and

maintenance skills as well as their operational abilities. Although ROK military capabilities gradually improved over the course of the 1960's South Korea remained almost totally dependent militarily upon the U.S. presence.¹⁵

Among the justifications for the American presence in South Korea important were that the US/ROK mutual Defense Treaty remains the central element of the mutual security effort on the Korean peninsula, that US troops presence and guarantees of military support contribute to the stability of South Korea that in the event of North Korean aggression additional US combat forces could be sent to assist the South Korean armed forces, that in addition to security goals, the U.S. presence in South Korea helped achieve other important U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as the development of an expanding relationship encouragement of a more democratic system of government and fostering of an improved human rights climate.

The American commitment has been indispensable to the survival of South Korea. United States after having virtually created the South Korea had the "moral obligation" to the people of South Korea to protect them from the

15. Han Sung Zo; "South Korea and the United States, the Alliance Survives" Asian Surveys, Nov. 1980, p.1075.

communist aggression of North Korea, supported by Soviet Union. Thus America's policy towards South Korea has been motivated by the realities of global rivalry with the communist great powers as well as politico-moral concern for the divided country. But fundamentally it is the former which has undermined the validity of the latter and also provided the rationale for the United States maintaining a security alliance with the South Korea. As the Korean experience of 1950-53 illustrated the cold war and balance of power consideration primarily motivated the extension of the U.S. security commitment to South Korea.

In response to the major public debate on Vietnam and related defense issues that took place in the United States in later 1960's President Nixon ordered an overall review of U.S. defense policy shortly after his inauguration.

In so far as Asia was concerned the review was motivated by a desire to bring U.S. deployments in line with actual capability. The hope was to thereby enable the U.S. to remain committed in ways that "we can sustain". The review was also dictated by the political pressures to avoid, if possible future involvement in a land war in Asia. In the words of President Nixon the review reflected in a basic sense that "U.S. must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent on us that we are

dragged into a conflict such as the one we have in Vietnam. Together these motivations precipitated the first fundamental review of U.S. security in Asia since the Korean war.¹⁶

In line with this new orientation the United States reduced its authorized level of military personnel in East Asia from 740,000 in January 1969 to less than 420,000 in June 1971, while the bulk of this reduction came from Vietnam it also involved over 50,000 troops from other Asian countries. The problem of the U.S. and ROK security relationship during the seventies was rooted in the sense of asymmetry between the American conception of national interest at stake in Korea and the cost it estimated to be necessary in honoring its commitment in the event of war. The task of achieving U.S. credibility in South Korea was dependent upon the most fundamental question regarding the nature and importance of American interest in sustaining an unequal security alliance with South Korea in a pluralistic world. Did the U.S. commitment match American interest ?

President Nixon's unilateral security decision greatly upset President Park, who thought he had secured special relations with the United States by South Korea's military participation in the Vietnam war. The timing of this

16. Quoted in Kissinger, Henry, "White House Years", p.224.

decision was particularly disturbing to Park because he expected to face a tough re-election campaign in 1971 and because the People's Republic of China and north Korea reaffirmed their military solidarity. President Park told Ambassador Lillian Porter that the United States had no rights to remove its troops from South Korea.¹⁷ The South Korean protest went to an extraordinary degree. While Prime Minister Chung II Kwon threatened to leave a portion of the DMZ unmanned and Ambassador Kim Dong Jo hinted at South Korea's disengagement from Vietnam, Defense Minister Jwung Nae-Hyok brought out on advertisement against U.S. withdrawal in the Washington Post Sept. 25, 1970. The South Korea requested a compensation package of 84 billion but obtained a few years promise of only \$ 1.5 billion.¹⁸ The United States quickly withdrew its seventh Infantry Division (20,000 men) out of South Korea by the end of March 1971. But it took seven years for the United States to deliver its \$ 1.5 billion military aid for South Korea. Meanwhile Defense Secretary Milvin Laird issued in August 1971 a program Decision memorandum to reduce the Second Infantry

17. Investigation of Korean American Relation: Hearings Before the committee on international organisation, pt4, p.41.

18. See House Committee on Interantional Relations Human Rights in Korea and Philippines: Implication for US Policy: Hearings Washington DC USG PO, 1975, p.41.

Division to one brigade by the end of the fiscal year 1974, a year later, the target date was extended to the end of 1975.¹⁹ However Laird's plan was thwarted by the opposition of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissenger and others.

Shortly after taking office President Carter, decided to withdraw all U.S. ground combat troops from Korea. The withdrawal was to be carried out in three phases and to be completed over a period of four to five years. Initially, one brigade of the second division were to be withdrawn in 1978-79.

To compensate for the removal of U.S. ground troops, the U.S. planned a major expansion of arms transfer to South Korea. In tandem with the withdrawal plan U.S. pledged to provide \$ 275 million in FMS credits in the fiscal year 1979. An amount, over the succeeding years of the withdrawal, of 800 million worth of selected equipment from the withdrawing troops on a cost free basis and roughly 825 million worth of technical training to the ROK armed forces for operation of the newly acquired defense equipment were also promised. As a result of this commitment the quantity

19. For Lairdisplan, See House Committee on Armed Services Hearings and Review of the Policy Decision to withdraw United States ground forces from Korea (Washington DC USGPO, 1978), p.89.

and quality of arms transferred to South Korea in the initial years of the Carter administration exceeded that of any previous administration in a comparable period.

Over the course of 1978-79 a number of developments contributed to halt in trends of the previous years, one related to strong opposition to the administration's withdrawal decision. This opposition, practically from America's Asian allies led by Japan and increasingly from the U.S. Congress and foreign policy community reflected the wide spread concern precipitated by the withdrawal decision regarding American willingness to risk a new military involvement in Korea or even else where in Asia. In the face of this strong opposition, President Carter agreed to leave third of the division in Korea till 1982. A number of factor beside the strong opposition were important in convincing president Carter to reverse his position on withdrawal. Clearly the critical factor was the re-evaluation of North Korean military strength conducted by the U.S. intelligence community in 1978-79. This re-evaluation revealed not only that the North Korean armed forces were significantly larger and stronger in terms of arms and fire power than previously believed but were also offensively equipped and deployed.²⁰

20. J.C.S. Chairman David C Jone's testimony, See Impact of Intelligence Reassessment, pp.16-17.

After President Ronald W. Regon's inauguration in January 1981, he quickly moved to demonstrate the United State's strong military commitment for South Korea's anti communist stand. The joint communique issued by President Regon and Chun Due Hwon declared

"President Regon affirmed that united as a Pacific power will seek to ensure the peace and security of the region and assured President Chun that the United States has no plans to withdraw ground forces from the South Korea peninsula.²¹

As the Cold War ended the Bush administration considered the possibility of removing U.S. nuclear war heads from South Korea as parts of concrete efforts to get North Korea to halt continuing development of its own nuclear program. Many U.S. military specialists outside the administration have began to argue the South Korea's security no longer depends on the presense of American nulcear weapon in that country. In three stage troop reduction plan as pact of the East Asia strategy initiative described in the Num Warmer Report 7,000 out of 43000 U.S. forces were to be pulled out early in 1993 and om phase II 6000 to 7000 U.S. troops were to be withdrawn from South Korea between 1993 to 1995. It was planned that the third

21. See Department of State Bulletin, March 1981, pp.14-15.

phase pull out will be largely determined by the situation in the North Korean peninsula, depending on North Korea War threats against the South. It was however believed that even the first and second phases of the reduction scheduled may need to be modified according to the North Korea's disposition to obtain a nuclear weapon.

The South government has argued that any withdrawal of U.S. troops and warheads from South Korea would be wrong because it would amount to rewarding North Korea for development of North Korea nuclear and other military programmes and for refusing so far to honour its legal obligation to allow international inspection at its nuclear complex. On November 23, 1991 South Korea and U.S. agreed to postpone withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea as long as North Korea refuses to drop its nuclear arms programs. Both countries demanded North Korea to give up its nuclear arms programs and open its nuclear facility to international inspection. Concerning the postponement of the U.S. troop reduction plan U.S. secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said that means that once Phase I is completed we will postpone any further reduction of U.S. troops in pursuance of the three stage plan to cut U.S. deployment.

The cut in U.S. nuclear weapons announced by President Bush in October 1991 will affect South Korea but the country will remain under the nuclear umbrella of the United States through its long range ballistic missiles. The New U.S. initiative was stability oriented and will not seriously modify U.S. motivations, military goals and perceptions in Korea.

Table

Military Crises in the Korean Peninsula

Years	Date	Crises event
1950s	1958 2.16	Hijacking KAL DC-3 with 32 presons
1960s	1967 1.19	ROK Vessel PCE-56 Sunk by North Korean Gun Boats
	1968 1.21	31 Armed North Korean Agents's Infiltration into Presidential Residence
	1968 1.23	Pueblo Captured by North Korean Boats and MIG Jets
	1968 11.13	120 North Korean Guerrillas Infiltration into Ulchin and Samchok Areas
	1969 12.11	Skyjacking of KAL Plane
1970s	1970 6.22	North Korean Agents Attempts to blow up National Cemetery
	1974 8.15	Mrs. Park show down by a North Korean Agent
	1974 11.15	The First Tunnel Discovered
	1976 8.18	Two US Army Officers Murdered by Axes
1980s	1983 10.9	North Korean Agents provoked Bomb Attack to President Chun in Burma
	1986 10.21	North Korea Attempt to Build a Strategic Dam
	1987 11.29	Two North Korean Agents Bombed a Korean Airplane

Source : Ministry of National Defense, *The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces*, 1986, pp.73-84.

As quoted by Min Yong Lee in Reconsidering the context and Formation of South Korea's Security Policy, in Korea Observer, vol. XXII, no.3, Autumn 1991, p.420.

CHAPTER - III

SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND KOREA

As a Eurassian power, the Soviet Union was historically concerned with Asia. The problem of peace and security in Asia have always occupied a central place in the Soviet foreign policy. The Soviets as every other Asian power had geo strategic needs, ambitions and goals in that part of the world. Soviet Union's objectives included the development of East Asia's natural resources, to project Soviet power and influence to the entire pacific region, to establish a strong naval presence in order to gain easy access through the strategically vital straits near Japan and Korea and to contain and limit Chinese influence by improving relation with other Asian power including North Korea.

The original interest of Russia in Korea can be traced to the 1860 Sino-Russian treaty of Peking delimiting the Tumen border and the 1885. Treaty of Shinanscki which marked the establishment of Russia's power and China's decline. The 1905. Treaty of Poirsmount signalled levelling of Russian powers and the rise of Japan. But in 1945 the defeat of Japanese forces by the Soviet Union and the agreement with the United States temporarily spilt the Korean peninsula and heralded yet another Chinese role in the power-play of great

powers in the Korean peninsula. After the Korean war Moscow was treaty bound to defend the Pyongyang regime against any external attack. Moscow was burdoned with an additional requirement of ensuring that Pyongyang does not move too far into Peking's orbit and attempted to improve its own control over the North Korean regime.

Korea's strategic position at the cross roads of East Asian politics has earned it the title of the Palestine of East Asia. Korea had long been a prime example of a homogeneous nation state but also a focus of great powers' concern, not because of its intensive value, but more because it was on the road to China, Japan and Manchuria. From an early date the Koreans learnt how to play foreign powers against each other but inevitably Korea has also been a place, where the complex webs of international politics were often woven.

North Korea's foreign policy towards its communist allies, Soviet Union and China for over first 30 years were marked by bargaining with threats and promises, and represented a profile fundamentally different from other socialist block regions. North Korea's relation towards its communist allies can be viewed in terms of both long and short term foreign policy objectives and goals.

Its long term goal was to maintain close ties with the Soviet Union and the people's Republic of China in order to ensure their continuing support for Pyongyang's reunification policies and struggle against South Korea. In the short term while officially maintaining an equidistant policy towards both of these communist super power, North Korea continued to capitalize on the vacillating relations between the two. North Korea has sought its own national interest by playing one super power off against the other in this strong courtship.

SOVIET UNION IN DILEMMA

The Soviet Union's lightning campaign in Manchuria, and Korea in 1945 left Moscow's troops in control of nearly all the Korean Peninsula. One month after when the U.S. forces landed in Korea the Russian forces agreed to withdraw to a line arbitrarily laid down by the United States and accepted by the Soviet at the 38th parallel.¹ Soviet forces had succeeded in capturing Korea with the U.S. connivance. The paradoxical situation of super power agreements combined with simultaneous rivalry, led to the first and most obvious of the U.S.S.R.'s predicaments of power. Should U.S. power

1. Stephen Kaplon, Diplomacy of Power (Washington: Brooking Institution, 1981) p.68 and Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War Newyork Vintage, 1968) pp.601-4.

and presence in Korea be vigorously opposed ? On the one hand Washington's presence was licensed by the same law as Moscow's presence on the other hand, an absent United States would give the Soviet Union more say in Korean affairs.

The acceptance by the United States of the Soviet presence on North side of the 38th parallel also meant the acceptance of communist rule on that side of the line. Kim II Sung, the communist strong man entered Korea in Soviet military uniform and by 1948 had assumed full control by purging much of his Chinese supported opposition.² By 1950 Kim II Sung has become strong enough to act independently of Soviet Union. In 1950 he invaded the South Korea.

From the Soviet Union's point of view as a super power the Korean war was a well managed crisis. Sino-Soviet and South Korean relation were strained in the course of the combat³ but Washington and Moscow avoided a direct clash in the still formative and dangerous period of the Cold War. By the late 1960's the Soviet Union was more concerned with rival China than with a rival United States in the region.

2. Ibid, Chin Ching, Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow (Mountgomery, Ala, University of Alabama Press 1978) and R Summons Strained Alliance.

3. Kim II gung's request for increased Soviet aid fell on unsympathetic ears as Stalin called, Kim 'Mr' instead of comrade in confidential correspondence See Zimmernom;s Korea and Vietnam and R Summons, Strained Alliance.

The shift in Soviet priorities was most evident in the formation of Brzhnev's 1969 Asian collective security scheme. This attempt to build a containment wall around China in Asia involved Korea in the Sino-Soviet conflict and maintained the status quo on U.S.-Soviet relation in Korea.

On 23 January 1968 DPRK forces seized the U.S. intelligence ship, Pueblo.⁴ The Soviet Union was once again put in a dilemma. Not to aid Kim would be to lose DPRK support, assist China and miss an opportunity of embarrassing the United States. On the other hand to play down the crisis would be to assist nascent super power detente and avoid needless tension in a dangerous super power crisis. When the United States responded to the DPRK piracy by assembling the largest naval task force since the Cuban missile crisis, Moscow reacted with only as much as was required to deter U.S. punishment of Korea, but not enough to raise the crisis fever.⁵

On 15 April, 1969 DPRK fighters shot down a U.S. EC 121 reconnaissance aircraft over the sea of Japan. The new

4. Jane Sharp, Soviet Policy towards North Korea and Korean Unification, Pacific Affairs, Vol.48, No.3, (Fall 1975), pp.348-51.

5. All crisis detail from Abram Shilsky (ed.), Coercive Naval Diplomacy, 1967,-1974 (Bradford Dismukes and James McConnel) 1974.

U.S. administration responded with even larger naval task force than that which summoned for the Pueblo, but the Soviet Union acted even less forthcomingly in Kim's II Sung, defence. Moscow offered verbal support for Kim, but Soviet destroyers helped the U.S. search for survivors.

The third Korean crisis reinforced this trend on August 18, 1976 when two U.S. soldiers were hacked to death by DPRK soldiers in the demilitarized zone. Washington responded by sending former a small naval task force and altering various troop deployments in the area. The Soviet response this time was limited to a mild verbal response with no additional military movement. Apparently the Kremlin was getting fed up with the DPRK's provocations especially when Moscow was unable to strengthen seriously its own ambivalent status in Pyongyang.

China in Soviet and North Korean Relation

Chinese involvement in Korea preceded that of the Soviet Union and even before Soviet troops occupied northern Korea, Chinese and Soviet faction were fighting for the leadership of the Korean communist party, while it would be an error to 'read back' deep conflict when none existed during the Sino-Soviet honeymoon, it is important to take

note of the fact that tensions between the communist giants over Korea have deep roots.⁶

During the Korean war the Chinese troops crossed the Yalu river to help Kim II Sung and save the revolution from American aggression. Sino-Korean relations emerged from the war much warmer than Soviet-Korean ties. However as all were member of the same bloc this seemed a price worth paying for the Soviet Union's broad foreign policy objectives.

Although north Korea now complains about low level of assistance provided by Soviets during and after the Korean war, strategic differences over policy toward the U.S. rather than the bilateral relation, would seem to have been primarily responsible for the friction that developed between the two countries in early 1960's. Krushchev's effort to improve relation with the U.S. cut across Kim's determined "anti imperialist" stand. The later's strong support for Cuba and the other countries in fore-front of the struggle against imperialism was politically embarrassing to Moscow. Taking a page from his China book Krushchev abruptly cut off military and economic aid to North Korea in 1962 in an attempt to force Kim to toe the line. Although the two sides refrained from open polemics the split was

6. R. Summons, Strained Alliance, p.32.

evident Under Khruchev, the Soviets had finally decided to stop the predictment of competing with China for Korean favours.⁷

An independent foreign policy was to cost North Korea three years of Soviet aid, in retrospect, Kim probably managed fairly well in keeping his loss to the minimum. On the matter of pride he could console himself with the knowledge that he had kept the legitimacy of his foreign policy inspite of Soviet economic sanctions. Of great significance he had set the precedent for accepting bilateral consequences of differences with the Soviet over the policy toward the U.S. without allowing these bilateral differences to assume a momentum of their own as the Chinese had done in their public outcry over Sino-Soviet differences.

Initially, Kim II Sung was successful in standing firm against U.S.S.R. economic sanctions. Later a new situation dominated the political Russian panaroma and they approached Kim with economic aid in return for north Korea's co-operation in developing a United front in support of Hanoi. Kim frightened by the U.S. military supplies to South Korea

7. For example. B. Mikhailov's '35 years' and Yognev 'The Problem of strengthening Peace in the Korean Peninsula', Far Eastern Affairs, Moscow No. 1 (1980).

agreed to support the Soviet in the United front in support of Honai in return for aid in military hardware, which included ground to air missiles and advanced electronic equipment.

The cultural Revolution in China in late 60's brought a sudden change in relation between China and North Korea. Engulfed in a social and political upheaval of gigantic proportion, the Chinese were in no position to help North Korea economically or military. This sudden development was reflected in the strengthening of Soviet Union's key role in North Korea's military build up as well as its economic development.

The DPRK's ability to balance Beijing and Moscow improved with the emergence of China from the cultural revolution and Zhou Enlai's visit to Pyongyang in April 1970. From then on the Soviet and Chinese had ups and downs in their relations with the Korea. But neither seemed able to remove the influence of the other and both seemed prepared to tolerate the unsatisfactory state of affairs.

The Soviet North-Korean relations were seriously strained after 1972 by Moscow's dropping of north Korea from the list of selected group of countries receiving advanced Soviet military equipment. In late 1976 a new economic

dimension was added to the dispute at the time of the heightened tension over the most contentions of all issues in dispute, namely policy toward the U.S. In 1976 North Korean soldiers killed two American soldiers in the demilitarized zone. The Soviets were in no mood to defend Pyongyang's policies. Once again, a U.S. north Korean confrontation had brought a deterioration in Soviet, North Korean relation exacerbated by Soviet economic reappraisal.

The Soviets have been quick to sense the change in Sino-North Korean relation. Beginning in June 1979 a few months after the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, they began to show a new interest in improving relations with Pyongyang - witness their stepped up support for the key, North Korean policy objectives including a U.S. troop withdrawal and North South talks. Despite the negative fall out from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Kim responded to Soviet overturn positively. For the first time in years the north Korean ranked the Chinese revolution second to the Soviet revolution. In 1979, while the Chinese boycotted Soviet army day in February 1980, Pyongyang's celebration of it included a salute to the "militant friendship" between the two armies. Similarly the mid march anniversary of the first DKPRK-U.S.S.R. economic and cultural agreement was hailed, no reference to the unbreakable friendship between the two countries, a toast not heard in Pyongyang for many years.

All this inspite of Afghanistan, which had initially caused great concern in North Korea.

Destalinisation and Korea

Khunschev's speech at the 20th Party congress of the CPSU about many roads to socialism signalled a redefinition of relation in the socialist composition. The speech emphasized that all socialist countries were free to decide their policies based on consideration of local situation. But, Russian leadership decided not to apply this policy to north Korea. Brezhnev then secretry of the central committee of the C.P.S.U. made a speech at the third party congress of the Korean Worker's party which was nothing less than the position of the Soviet view of issues on north Korea.⁸ Brezhnev urged the North Korean to study all aspects of the decision of the 20th congress of the C.P.S.U. Brezhnev made no reference to Kim II Sung's leadership.

Because Kim wanted to strengthen his own position and wanted to secure the economic aid for North Korea he accepted the Soviet proposal of peaceful co-existence and also supported the Soviet resolution on the German issue. By showing support to the principal of peaceful co-existence Kim II

8. Breghnev's speech at the third party congress of the KWP Pravada April 26, 1956.

Sung wanted to remain close to Russia so that U.S. and Soviet Union did not come very close to each other, at his expense.

After the Khueschev era the Soviets changed their stand on Korean leadership and stoped praising Kim II Sung. The Soviet continued their support for the more positive role of the K.W.P. as a mobilising force for the economic development. Soviet Union also supported the changes in Socio-economic system of north Korea. In North Korea Kim II Sung consolidated his authority and defined the situation in international environment as one capitalist encirclement.⁹ The North Korean leadership predicted that the Soviet principles of peaceful co-existence with the U.S.A. was bound to fail and would not bring good results.

In the post Khueschev era Vietnam become the central issue in Socialist-bloc unity. The Soviet Union in order to win the support of China and North Korea adopted a competitive posture in relation to the U.S. The Soviet idea of assistance to Vietnam attracted the North Korean leadership especially when the South Korea was also helping Saigon. The new Soviet proposals for bringing the Unity in

9. Kim IIs welcome speech to welcome Kosygin, Pravada March 31, 1961.

the socialist composition also emphasized that the autonomy of the communist party in the respective countries.¹⁰

In the 1965 the Soviet Union endorsed the leadership of Kim II Sung. Kosygin during his 1965 visit to North Korea called Kim II Sung as the faithful son of the land and praised his policies for economic development.

The Soviet efforts to establish a new type of relationship with Asian socialist countries were not very successful. The North Korean leadership continued to follow what they call 'independent line' in international affairs, adopted a very aggressive posture toward the South Korea and U.S. All this was an embarrassment for the Soviet leadership.

By 1967 all Soviet support for North Korean leadership disappeared but they still maintain this resupport for the K.W.P. as the leading force in the country. In dealing with the international situation, however, the Soviets tried to accomodate the North Korea. The themes of ant imperialism and opposition to Japanese militarism were given strong emphasis. More important the Soviets directly related this to the situation faced by the North Korea.¹¹

10. Kosygin's Speech in Pyongyang.

11. N. Lebedev Izvestia August 15, 1969 Klyuchakey, Pravada August 15, 1969.

There remained wide differences between Soviets and North Korea regarding national and international issues. In its policy statements the Soviet Union emphasized, economic aid, improvement in trade and support for peaceful unification. On the other hand the North Korea stressed anti-imperialism and unity among the Socialist countries.¹²

For some time north Korea was significantly absent in Soviet foreign policy writings and official documents. Soviet foreign policy text books after 1975 offer only formal rather than substantive references in support of the socialistic system established by the Soviets after the liberation of Korea in 1945.¹³ The official policy statement made by the secretary General to 25th Party congress of the communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1976 and the 20th party congress in 1981 made no references to North Korea and the Soviet news media also appeared to be extremely reluctant to give more likeworm support to Kim II Sung.¹⁴

12. Izvestia, July 6, 1971 Izvestia March 17, 1971.

13. Kovlenko Jvaned, Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security (Moscow Progress Publisher 1979), pp.72-78.

14. David Steven R, "Third World Intervention" Problem of Communism, May June 1984, p.66.

The Soviet Union viewed the North Korea as a industrial developed state, but foresaw that rapid growth would stop if science and technology not introduced in industry. After 1976 Soviet Union stepped their efforts for peaceful unification of the country to reduce the tensions which was gathering in North Korea.

Since 1950 Kim II Sung made many proposals for the unification of the motherland. But till 1976 he did not abandon the use of force in unifying the country. But with the tremendous change in international environment in early 70's the Kim was put into a dilemma. To what extent should the domestic revolutionary task should be fused to the long held revolutionary goals?

By 1975 north and south Korean were deadlocked. The North Korean returned to their original position and defined the unification of the country as one of the revolutionary task in building socialism in the country Kim II Sung advanced higher revolutionary goals such as cultural and ideological revolution which earned him the displeasure of Soviet leadership. They made clear their dislikes for Kim's goal when they omitted reference to the goal to the ideological revolution in their commentary over North Korea.

In 1980 the Soviets were quick to sense the change in Sino-Korean relation. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam

in 1979 they showed a new interest in improving relation with the Pyongyang. They extended their support to key north Korea Policy objectives, including a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea and north south talks.

The turning point in Moscow and north Korean relation come with Kim II Sung's visit to Moscow in May 1984. A summit between two fraternal socialist state should not be extraordinary but the visit of Kim II Sung to Moscow was just that for many reasons.

During the visit both leaders agreed that the tremendous changes has taken place in international situation since the last summit between the two countries in 1961. They agreed that the proposed alliance between Seoul Tokyo and Washington could pose a serious threat to North Korean security. However, there were some real differences between the two countries. Important areas of differences were Kim Jong II's succession, the Kampuchea issue and the importance of ideology in building communism. Soviets rejected the idea of three way talk between North, South Korea and the Washington on the unification. Soviet Union insisted to be part in any unification talks in which Washington going to be a party.

In November 1984 deputy foreign Minister M.S. Kapitsa visited Pyongyang. He indicated the change in Soviet view regarding Kim Jung II succession. On the 10th anniversary of liberation of Korea the Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R council of minister G. Ahivey in his speech mentioned the Kim Jong II's name, the first time that his name was mentioned in Soviet article on a speech.¹⁵

By the middle of 1985, both the countries has come very close to each other. The military alliance between the two countries was reaffirmed in a meeting between Gromyko and Kim Yong Nam the foreign minister of north Korea in April 1985. The Soviets provided MIG 23 and surface to air missiles to North Korea.¹⁶ The Soviet Union also agreed to provide assistance in various projects such as building power plants, modernizing earlier built factories and providing scientific know how to Korean industries.¹⁷

With Gorbachev coming to power in 1985 there come a big change in Soviet foreign policy toward North and South Korea. Gorbachev wanted to avail of the fresh opportunities

15. For G. Aliyev's speech, See Nodong Shinmen, August 15, 1985.

16. For example, Kong song san's speech Nodang Shinmen, August 15, 1985 also Kim II Sung's Victory day message to the Soviet Union, Pravada May 9, 1985.

17. Nodong Shinmen, August, 1985.

available in the South Korea to save his country's already ailing economy. But at the same time he also wanted to fulfil all the pact obligations to the Pyongyang. Gorbachev had incorporated new thinking in the Soviet Foreign policy. The heart of the Gorbachev's new thinking was the nuclear disarmament. Gorbachev warned that there would be no second Noah's ark for a nuclear deluge and a nuclear tornado would sweep away socialist and the capitalist, the just and the sinner alike.

Gorbachev's new thinking posed a serious problem for Pyongyang. Glasnost and Perestroika could create a serious problem for the Stalinist hierarchy in North Korea. In the past Khrushchev's Destalinisation and Chinese cultural revolution has posed a threat to the north Korean communist hierarchy. But the challenge from the Gorbachev new thinking was more serious and soon North Korean leadership started criticising the policies of the Gorbachev. The fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe was a very serious setback for North Korean communism and Pyongyang blamed Moscow the downfall of East European communist regimes due to wrong interpretation of communist ideology.

It expressed its full faith in its Juche ideology (Ideology of self reliance) and declared that it would continue to follow the path of communism against all odds.

With the fall of communism and disintegration of Soviet Union, the whole international scenario has changed. The cold war rivalry had ended and the military blocks lost their significance. The Russian assumed all the obligation and responsibility of the ex-Soviet Union in international affairs, but moved away from traditional communist values.

On January 20, 1992 President Yelstin of Russian Federation sent his special envoy first vice minister of foreign affairs Igor Rogchev to North Korea for talks with the Korean leadership. Igor Rogchev expressed Russia's desire to continue the friendship and co-operation between the two countries, but wanted to end the treaty of friendship and co-operation between the two countries which was drawn during the cold war. Rogchev tried to persuade the North Korean leadership of the inevitability of revising the provisions, which do not conform to the current situation. In particular the article on military affairs stipulating that one side will automatically intervene on behalf of the other side if war broke out is in reality impossible to implement, after Russia has abandoned the path of East-West confrontation.

THE SOVIET UNION AND SOUTH KOREA

South Korea and the Soviet Union discovered each other after the years of animosity and suspicious. The Soviet

Union had been a military threat to the South Korea, having encouraged North Korea in its southward ambitions. With the passage of time the tension between Moscow and the Seoul declined and by the early 80 the trade between the two countries has started though it was indirect yet. But when the volume of trade increased they established direct links. By 1987 the volume of trade between the Soviet Union and Korea increased from \$ 240 million to one billion dollars.

On March 24, 1990 the co-leader of the ruling democratic party Kim Young Som met President Gorbachev. The meeting accelerated the substantial progress made in relation between Seoul and Moscow. The South Korean leaders hailed the President Gorbachev's Perestroika and Glasnost to world peace. Kim underscored the need for earlier signing were of the accords of friendship and co-operation which he said vital for the smooth business activities of Korean interests in the Soviet Union.

This unprecedented meeting between the Soviet and South Korean leaders gave a gigantic boost to Seoul-Moscow relation. The meeting was seen as a signal that the communist nation began to depart from the principle of ideological confrontation so far as the Korean division was concerned.

At the official level, the most important boost to Moscow Seoul relation came with Gorbachev's meeting with President Roh on June 4, 1990 in Sanfrancisco. The historic meeting was culmination of Seoul's effort to improve relation with the communist super power and as an effort to reduce the tension between the two halves of the Korean peninsula.

The economic prosperity of the South Korea was the main attraction for the Soviet Union which was facing the severiest crisis in it economy since the Russian Revolution. On September 1990 the Soviet Union and Moscow established full diplomatic relation ending the four decades of distrust. The communique declared that the relation between the Soviet Union and the Seoul will be based on principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity non-interference in the internal affairs of each other's full equality and mutual benefit in accordance with the U.N. Charter.¹⁸

Shevardnadze the foreign minister of the Soviet Union described the event as absolutely a turning point in South Korean, Soviet relations. But he said the relation between the Seoul and Moscow would not affect its close ties with

18. Koreans News Review October 6, 1990, p.4.

the North Korea which he said would continue on the basis of good neighbourliness and friendship.

In December 1990 President Roh visited Moscow. In the Joint declaration issued after the summit both the leaders pledged their support for the elimination of the cold war in Asia, relaxation in the Korean peninsula and eventual reunification of the South and North Korea. Gorbachev supported the continuation of inter-Korean talks Roh emphasized the success of the Soviet reform policy as a major factor in future of international, improvement of the situation in Northeast Asia and progress in Korea Soviet relations.

Edward Shverndze's visit to Seoul on December 15 1990, provided one more opportunity to strengthen the relation between the Seoul and Moscow. Shverndze's described as unfortunate the Korean war (1950-50) and made appropriate reference the shooting down of in September 1982 by Soviet fighters of a Korean passengers plane, considering the particular situations at the times of the mishaps. He expressed regret at the fact that the tragedies cost many innocent lives.

The two presidents got another opportunities to strengthen the relation between the two countries when President Gorbachev visited the resort island of Chegu in

South Korea on April, 20 1991. The visit marked the first one ever by a Soviet head of state to any part of the divided Korea in history. During the visit the South Korean president suggested a treaty of co-operation and friendship between the two countries. Soviet President also expressed his support for Seoul's bid for the U.N. membership.

Gorbachev seemed to favour reconciliation between Seoul and Pyongyang and wanted to play a major role in unifying Korea. Both president argued that in light of new imperative of openness and reconciliation in this era of global change the legacies of the cold war such as tension and confrontation should be removed from the Korean peninsula.

During the coup in Soviet Union against President Gorbachev in August 1991 the South Korea supported the President Gorbachev and called for the reinstatement of the President Gorbachev. When the coup collapsed, South Korea called it the victory of the freedom and democracy for the Soviet people.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 there come a sudden change in the Soviet scenario. Instead of one country South Korea now has to deal with 15 independent countries. South Korea expressed its desire to

continue the discussion with Russia on the signing of the treaty of good neighbourly co-operative relations.¹⁹

In the end of January 1992 the Russian Federation has unofficially informed South Korea of its intention to service its amity pact with the North Korean in a way that suit changes in international affairs. Russia has assumed the treaty in accordance of its decision to interact with parties signatories to external pacts and to accept libailities left by the former Soviet Union.

On March 19, 1992 the ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Korea held talks with the heads of the foreign department of Russia in Seoul. Yi Song and Andrew Kzreiv discussed the complex problem of bilateral relations and exchanged impressions on the issues of current significance in the Korean peninsula and in the Asian pacific region.²⁰

South Korea wanted Russia to play an important role in resolving the issue of north Korea's nuclear development and to abstain from military co-operation with the north. It also wanted Russia's co-operation in enouraging North Korea to put into practice the inter Korean Agreement on

19. S.W.B.B.B.C., 4 Jan 1992 Part 3 Far East.

20. S.W.B.B.B.C., 19 March 1992 Part 3 Far East.

Reconciliation, Non-aggrarian and exchange and co-operation.
The ministers also agreed in principal on President Russian
President Yeltsin visit to South Korea in early September
and to work out a bilateral treaty on good neighbourly and
co-operative relation by August for formal signing by their
presidents during Yeltsin's visit to Seoul in September
1992.

CHAPTER - IV

ISSUES AND PEACE, REUNIFICATION AND JUSTICE

It would be appropriate to recall the analysis set down by Peter Nailor on the Korean conflict in delineating an approach to the concept of Military Strategy: "The Korean War had a general effect of disappointing expectations that had been aroused that the development of nuclear weapons would make war obsolete between great power, and emphasized three trends; the first was the alignment of many states into a bipolar pattern of hostility that highlighted the new role of leadership by the United States; the second was the need to establish a rational base for a long term policy the long haul of the Eisenhower administration - and the third was to come to grips with the problem of a rapidly developing military technology in a way that would secure deterrence and enhance cohesion in the alliances which were formed somewhat precipitately in the period between 1948 and 1955, to offset the physical and material advantages of the Soviet geopolitical position".¹

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1. Peter Nailor "Military Strategy" in Trevor Taylor: (ed) Approaches and Theory in International Relations (London) 1978 p.171, 172.

Military strategy indeed provided the focal point for understanding peace and conflict issues from the Korean War till the end of the 1970s. But an altered stress can be detected in the beginning of the 1980s. The bipolar pattern of hostility and the role of deterrence were still the key basis for identification of the problems and prospects for peace and security in the Korean peninsula, but new processes were at work which provided fresh challenges to the existing equilibrium.

The North Korean leadership could no longer persuasively argue that their economy was on par or even ahead of the South Korean economy. The South had taken a major step in the transition to an advanced industrial economy and its innovations in utilising a range of technological options gave it pre-eminence as an economic power. The increased economic visibility and accompanying political stature of South Korea was also accompanied by strengthening of its military power. An arms race now appeared as a source of regional conflict and instability and both Northern and Southern military budgets crossed the four billion dollar mark. The eighties also saw the Southern GDP (Gross Domestic Product) cross eighty billion dollars. The advantage which the North had in terms of military buildup in the sixties and seventies was now being offset by

the upgrading of the South through its Force Improvement Plans.

As the eighties progressed it was also no longer possible to overlook the internal changes that were transforming accepted political paradigms in both South and North Korea with consequences for conflict control and resolution. In the South both the transition from Park Chung Hee to Chun Doo Hwan and the national indignation at the Kwangju massacre created a climate in which challenges to the historical validity and viability of the existing South Korean political experience surfaced. By the time Toh Tae Woo took over, no one in the decision-making elite in the South could overlook the broader peace issues which could only be resolved through inter-Korean dialogue. With the Seoul Olympics in 1988, the centre of gravity in South Korea's foreign policy shifted towards exploration of prospects of stable peace in the region through increased contacts with the Soviet bloc and China. On the domestic scene there were complex factors which shaped continuities and changes in the South Korean framework. The rising middle class anxious to make its contribution to the political ideological transformation of the country was now asserting itself in opposition to the military rule which had provided the bedrock of politics and policy for a quarter of a century. The underlying anxieties of the people in respect

of political, military and strategic pressures in inter-Korean relations were expressed in the demand for political moves away from the blind alley of confrontation. The clamour for a more democratic rule in South Korea was accompanied by a search for ways for more harmonisation on an inter-Korean basis and to progress in the direction of mutually assured security.

North Korea which had never favoured bilateral or multilateral cooperation in terms of the Juche ideology, now found itself at a historical crossroads on account of the new constellation around question of "political succession". From the mid-seventies the compelling vision of Kim Il Sung's domination has been affected by the political discourse of the succession process which has percolated to surface of North Korean political life. The new discourse can be connected to the proposals advanced by Pyongyang for dialogue with South Korea. It has also provided political value and significance to proposals for "tripartite talks with United States and South Korea. Kim Il Sung's proposal of a Korean Confederation advanced in 1980 won only a luke warm response from Moscow and Beijing, and both have viewed problematic areas of peace and conflict in the Korean peninsula as essentially those which require direct negotiating between Pyongrang and Seoul.

As far as Moscow was concerned with the thrust of changes, its main fear was with the threat of a United States. China-Japan combine of military cooperation against it. The Korean Airlines (K.A.L.) incident of 1983, as well as the United States supply of F-16s to South Korea provided the larger context in which Soviet North Korean relations moved to the foreground. The increased Soviet deployment in the Sea of Okhotsk as part of the augmentation of Soviet forces in the neighbourhood of the Korean peninsula in the eighties had the potential to disrupt and undermine the stability of relationship between the two superpowers and Japan and China in N.E. Asia.

The great power dynamics as well as the confrontation between Seoul and Pyongyang have undergone significant changes since the transition in the eighties referred to above. In the nineties there are still two diametrically opposed political systems in the Korean peninsula and much attention and energy is still directed to confrontational activities. North Korea still remains a society with tight control and relatively speaking still keeps its doors closed to the outside world. There are the beginnings of a serious conflict resolution process but the "mirror-image" which results in conflict settlement procedure being used for hostile propagandas and "cold war" mentality in inter-state relations still creates new and tense political situations.

On the hand there is evidence that the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and North is a major turning point" in Korean conflict resolution since both sides have pledged "to remove the state of political and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation, to avoid armed aggression and hostilities, to reduce tension and ensure peace, and to realise multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to advance common national interests and prosperity", on the other hand strategic considerations and security fears still dominate the mind sets conditioned by the confrontation which erupted on June 25, 1950. To deal with the interaction between the two sides and their environments in the contemporary setting it would be useful to examine the political, societal and systemic variables affecting the peace issues in Korea:

POLITICAL VARIABLES OF PEACE

There is need for a new and enlarged conception of peace-building in the Korean peninsula which has eluded contemporary institutions and practices both in the North and in the South. The basis for a new relationship can only be found by transcending the conflict producing institutions and practices and in the first instance evaluating and political variables of peace which affect national strategy and foreign policy in the two Koreas.

Dieter Senghass and Karl Deutsch have examined the major internal structural elements and feedback processes that in their interplay could determine the alternatives of war or peace and they identify six major subsystems:

1. Human nature and personality, as developed within the prevailing general culture i.e. model personality and the distribution of personality types in different social strata and levels of influence;
2. The main large social groups and interest groups in the country;
3. The main elites, leading these interest groups but sometimes with distinctive backgrounds and interests of their own;
4. The mass media of communications;
5. The national political system of political culture; and
6. The civil and military government and bureaucracy, their institutional organisations and behaviour.²

2. Karl W. Deutsch: "Peace, Violence and War" in Raimo Vayrynen, (ed) The Quest for Peace, (Sage Publications, London 1987), p.187.

The political structures in both Koreas are interlocked with the "national strategic doctrine" as formulated and accepted by the "interplay of the domestic elements and salient experiences in foreign affairs". It is fair to conclude that what has happened in both the North and the South is that the political structures have been adversely affected by the "Search of each state for 'escalation dominance' that is, for a more intense level of conflict at which it hopes to gain some significant advantage over its rival". The revival of the legislative process and the strengthening of the media in South Korea have modified the political culture away from the the antagonistic South versus North image. Although the political structure in the North has remained highly centralized and has not been affected by a reform oriented regime, yet a revision of priorities has occurred within the parameters of North Korea's continuing rigid stance.

North Korean politics is of course so far unaffected by the sweeping process of change in political and strategic landscape of Russia Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Yet in certain areas the North Korean regime is pursuing its interests in more realistic and flexible ways. Behind the scenes there has been movement in a constructive direction in North Korean United States relations. The gesture of returning the remains of American servicemen killed in the

Korean war is an example of less ideological and more pragmatic policy-making.

It cannot be predicted that the process of political succession in North Korea will be smooth. However, the effort of winning support for Kim Jong II reveals pressure and the limitations of existing policies. The changes in the political situation in North Korea and the variations in the mentality of the North Korean leadership can be inferred from the range of issues in the rapprochement talks and the "international responsiveness" shown by North Korean negotiators.

The role of North Korea's nuclear programme is a significant issue and all current indications are that South and North Korea have the political resources to develop a policy of mutual nuclear inspections. The security relations between North and South and the security perceptions of their respective elites are currently experiencing a sharp break with the past. The post-Cold War system and the global trends which it has generated have improved the opportunities for rewarding peace initiatives, even though institutionalization of new cooperative structures is hampered by inadvertent escalation. In contrast with the new East-West relationship which has transformed the structure of the international system, there are still political

constraints which impede efforts to achieve cooperative international structures governing the North and South Korean adversarial relationship. The political variables of peace will ultimately be determined by the development of legitimacy of political power and the common objective of overcoming the legacies of mistrust and ideological hatred through rational and interest-oriented policies. The disappearance of the "enemy image" will ofcourse be a protracted process, but if the political elites give up self-righteous interventionism against the other side, human contacts and cultural interaction will fortify stabilising factors. The Korean peninsula is still described as one of the most heavily militarized areas on the globe, hence the urgent need to achieve cooperative security in place of conflictual security. The East-West confrontation which created the major threat to international security in this region no longer exists; the confrontation between the rival political elements in the Korean peninsula can only be resolved by reciprocal concessions to make the political variables of peace operational. Axelrod and Keohane have emphasised the need for active effort to achieve cooperative international structures. The strategy suggested by them has four components which would be relevant to security cooperation in the Korean peninsula:

1. How to provide incentives for cooperation.
2. How to monitor behaviour in order to identify cooperators and defectors;
3. How to focus rewards on cooperators and retaliation punishment on defectors;
4. How to link issues with each other in productive rather than self-defeating ways and how to play multilevel games without tripping over their own strategies.³

From the conceptual point of view, political measures which enhance security cooperation can develop a wider picture in which the probability of the use of force decreases and collective rationality of the entire Korean people becomes effective in dismantling the last remaining Cold War structure and thereby opens the way to the recreation of a unified nation.

Societal Variables of Peace

Both North Korea and South Korea face political storm-clouds which have their origins in societal change. In the case of South Korea the symbols, values and sentiments of

3. Robert Alexrod & Robert O. Keohane: "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy" Strategies and Institutions" World Politics vol.38, No.1, page 249.

the political elites have experienced far reaching changes as a result of the modernisation of society and the rapid rate of economic growth. Needless to say the restrictions on the articulation of grievances in North Korea have resulted in a certain measure of political apathy. There is, however, every reason to believe that competition in modern high tech will sooner or later compel North Korea to provide a measure of openness in the economic and social sphere. Pyongyang would not like to loose control of events like happened in the case of the Soviet Union and would strive to place itself closer to the situational circumstances of China where the wind of freedom from Eastern Europe has not been allowed to determine the basic dynamics of politics. The "deformities" of the domestic systems had earlier attracted the intrusion of the two super powers in the Korean peninsula. These are no longer the major hurdle to the resolution of conflict situations, which now require analytical problem solving processes which can be directed to the causes and correlates of societal change.

John Burton in his excellent analysis of "interests and needs" has pointed out that it is impossible to socialise people into behaviours that run counter to their pursuit of security, identity and other ontological aspects of development. he also asserts that conflicts are protracted unnecessarily just because inalienable values are translated

into interests merely to fit into traditional processes of bargaining and negotiation. Hence the need for other conflict resolution process by which the hidden motives would be revealed and could be dealt with. Although the economic miracle of South Korea has been an embarrassment to the advocates of the Juche experiment, it does not help to deal with the complexity of conflict-resolution in a simplistic way by focussing on capitalism versus communism. Contest and the effect of its outcome on the shifting policy parameters. More central to our understanding of the societal variables of peace in Korea is the core meaning of facilitated conflict resolution provided by John Burton :

"The evolving conflict resolution processes are effective only to the extent that parties to disputes are helped to cost accurately the consequences of change and the resistance to change. In this sense the processes of facilitated conflict resolution are designed to cut down to the delays and upheavals that occur in change and to speed up the evolutionary process towards greater fulfillment of societal needs"⁴

The task of helping North and South Korea to arrive at "a common definition of their relationship, define their separate goals clearly and through facilitated analysis

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1. J. Burton , "The Theory of Conflict Resolution", Current Research on Peace and Violence (Tampere) 3/1986, p.129.

discover options which meet the needs of all" lies at the heart of the problem of ensuring peace during a period of transition. As the rapprochement talks progress there can be little doubt that interactive models of decision-making will have to be evolved and social mechanisms and processes will have to be emphasised in order to focus on "the political consequences of human needs and behaviour" and not merely the application of existing legal norms.

Lee Dong-bok, the Southern Co-chairman of the South-North Political Committee presented on March 9, 1992 the ontological foundations of Korean reconciliation perceptively:

"Our mutual pledge to achieve reconciliation, promote cooperation and secure peaceful coexistence has very great significance for our quest for national reunification - a goal that must be achieved without fail. Since the Korean people are now entering a new era of reconciliation and cooperation, it is no longer necessary to waste our national energies and resources on hostility and confrontation and instead we can devote them to national economic development and improvement of all Koreans. All of us are thus charged with heavy responsibilities to successfully shape such an era of reconciliation and cooperation." This implies that the societal variable of peace can be discovered only through a distinctive and coherent alternative to both the prevailing systems.

It is necessary to address the issue of systemic variables of peace albeit briefly, since the building of peace between North and South Korea will not take place in a vacuum. This is particularly important because of the regional nature of the contemporary global system. With the entry of both South and North Korea into the United Nations system, it is inevitable that both the states will move away from exclusive concern with "traditional actor-oriented perception of threats of national security" to new rules of the game for the solution of conflicts in multilateral negotiating frameworks. Regional integration and economic interdependence may require de-ideologisation of foreign policy which the North Koreans may not be prepared for in the foreseeable future; however, the mechanisms of constraint operate for both the Koreans much in the way in which Ernst B. Hass described it:

"Yet a series of episodes involving conflict and its abatement through the UN can also be expected to to constraints other than their relative weakness vis-a-vis their opponents. Such constraints include the need to justify themselves when attacked in a ostracism, to be made the subject of peacekeeping against their will. The constraints also include the recognition that persistence in unilateral behaviour can result in eventual isolation and even defeat".⁵

5. Ernst B. Hass: War, Inter-dependence and Functionalism" in R. Vaynen: The Quest for Peace, (Sage Publications, London, 1987), p.124.

ISSUES OF REUNIFICATION

Korean unity would suggest a change in the political and strategic landscape which would signify the end of the post-war system much in the same way in which German unity has countermanded the decisions taken at Yalta and Possdam on the division of Germany. The development of new strategic concepts during the Cold War intensified the division of Korea and extended far beyond the rationale which was evolved as a result of the sequence of events which commenced from Kim Il sung ordering his troops to cross parallel, followed by the U.N. troops (chiefly American) also crossing the same line leading to the Communist Chinese entry into the war and frustrating the U.N. goal of unifying Korea. Since the ceasefire in July 1953 a demilitarised zone was created at the 38th parallel the security order in the peninsula was determined by the military alignment of the United States and South Korea on one side and Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and North Korea on the other side. Even after Nixon-Kissinger's breakthrough to China in 1970s there were no serious efforts towards inter-Korean rapprochement. It is clear that a movement towards unification and a new security order in the Korean peninsula was impossible without preliminary steps towards easing of tension. The North's basic policy of "liberation of the South" had dangerous and disquieting aspects which continued

to fuel suspicion and mistrust. The Southern perceptions of the Unification issue also had built-in tension on account of the instrumental use of the theme for infighting between different political factions.

Much has happened since the beginning of the nineties on the Korea's regional diplomatic scene which has led to intensified reassessment in decision-making circles and in the media of the multi-dimensionality of unification. Although the northern and southern postures retain important differences, there is a growing sensitization of both sides to lowering confrontationist stances and taking advantage step by step of opportunities and openings for change. New agenda issues have been created by jointly defining problems as for example when President Roh of South Korea announced his "Proposal for Unifying the Community of Korean People" and incorporated the North Korean concept of a "Federation of Koryo Democratic Republics. At the same time there is now a conscious effort on both sides to refrain from situations which would make unification a contentious issue.

Self determination

The one fact that stands out when considering the question of "self determination" is that the people of Korea have been a "self-determined national community for 1300

years and have been a potent element in the politics of Asia. The unification of Korea will indeed change the face of the Asian continent, and will predispose the modalities through which Asian problems are defined and resolved. The political importance of Korea in the Asian balance can not be underestimated once the country is truly reunited. There is a certain ambivalence about notion of Korean self-determination since the cold war political language used by North and South Korea took on a life of its own. However, as attention shifts from bipolar anxieties to the basic dynamics of the "new tide of history" the basic conceptualization and mode of thinking about Korean self-determination will not create conflicting expectations.

National Values and Common Institutions

The dynamic developments in international politics have created new opportunities for North and South Korea to transcend their ideological difference and use the lodestar of national values for making a significant contribution to bring to an end the conflict situations on the Korean peninsula. The parallel membership of both Koreas in the United Nations can be used to provide a unique opportunity to break of political patterns if their respective diplomacies become catalysts for cooperation for projecting common national values.

At home, both governments will have to redefine the role of the State, modify legal frameworks, and create social safety nets for the period of transition to unification. In setting up new common institutions, the long term perspective will have to be kept in mind and narrow choices and controversies over inherited dogmatisms would have to be avoided. The successful management of complexity in transition towards unification will demand flexible and selective orchestration of communicative images and concepts based on Korean national values and culture.

ISSUE OF JUSTICE

In his seminal study "A Theory of Justice" Rawls indicates that "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity".⁶ This approach derived from a major theory of economic justice may help us to comprehend the meaning and nature of issues of justice in negotiations for Korean reconciliation, peace and a new and just dispensation in the post-Cold War world. The success of the rapprochement talks

6. John Rawls : A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1971), p.83.

cannot be ensured merely ending existing conflicts or by achieving arms control. The establishment of common institutions must serve as "models of reconstruction". Conflict resolution in the Korean peninsula has been too long regarded as a political chess game. The fundamental factors which will contribute to the success of the restructuring of both North and South Korea must take into account the socio-political and economic fragilities of both the existing systems.

Economics Justice

From a historical perspective the cause of North Korea is unique. The hegemonial rule of Kim Il Sung is built on the basis of Juche which uses a theoretical framework to throw light on the issue of economic justice in national development as part of what is intended to be an effort by the Korean to take their fate into their own hands. Although it give many universalistic definitions, in practice the paradigm which North Korea presented failed to provide an attractive blueprint for future economic, political and social relations. The rhetoric of South Korea has appealed to the western world which would like to see the restructuring of the political and economic map of Korea in the same way as has happened in the case of Eastern Europe. Yet if we have to objectively discern the content and extent

of restructuring in Korea there should be a correct appreciation of the issue of economic justice in the larger context of economic democracy. We may not accept the method and teleology of Juche but we would do well to point to decision which will shape a new phase of economic justice and democracy in both North and South Korea. In his important work "A preface to Economic Democracy", Robert A Dahl emphasises: "If democracy is justified in governing the state, then it is also justified in governing economic enterprises. What is more, if it cannot be justified in governing economic enterprises, we do not quite see how it can be justified in governing the state".⁷

The South Korean government has been over-optimistic in putting question-marks only against the economic and political model of North Korea. Perhaps a warning from the German experience would be in order where the unification of East and West Germany with started with a good deal of euphoria has now proved to be "pregnant with conflict". A genuine reform programme has to dismantle the rigidities of state control and unlike the creativity of the market forces, but it also necessary for the establishment of a new economic "architecture" in Korea that the inadequacies of

7. Robert A. Dahl : A Preface to Economic Democracy. Berkeley, CA 1985, pp.134-5. (University of California Press)

the Southern economic system be examined in the light of Dahl's injunction: "we have a right to govern ourselves democratically within our economic enterprises."

Distribution Justice

The issue of distributive justice in a changed dispensation in Korea implies more than lip service to the slogan of economic justice. Jacques Attali, has crystallised the issue as an answer to conceptions which are associated with the "global economic culture of choice":

"Well known problems have arisen that are of a global nature and that cannot be dealt with through existing malnutrition of children in many parts of the world, world wide pollution and deforestation, genetic manipulation arms proliferation and drugs. Freedom and the market have brought to mankind extraordinary technological achievements, but they carry within themselves the seeds of destruction, because they threaten to transform life itself into merchandise. An ephemeral civilization that thrives on commercial evanescence cannot be a sound basis of survival because it neglects the future in the name of the self-absorbed present."⁸

8. Jacques Attali: "The Central and East European Markets. Foreign Policy Association, New York, March 5, 1991.

As prospective partners in a common undertaking, neither side can afford to be misguided by false assumptions about the nature of Inter-Korean economic cooperation, and closer investigation will reveal that the issue of distributive justice is crucial for a country which may play the role of a mediator between the developed and the developing world. J.K. You has documented the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the economies of the North and the South. It is clear that Gross National Product (GNP) alone is not an accurate index to gauge economic well being of North and South Korea. "As South Korea readily admits achievement of a higher GNP has been accompanied with many serious social and economic ills, be it severe pollution, the extreme polarisation of cities or extreme disparity in income distribution".⁹

The preferred route to distributive justice and also reciprocity in national policy will lie less in the area of cosmetic change and more in the area of structural changes. Roh Tae Woo's U.N. speech offered a new formulation of policy response when he said that "the Republic of Korea is prepared to active by pursue economic cooperation with the

9. J.K. You: "Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation: A Whale's approach to Whale of a Problem: Paper Presented at Third International Conference of Asia Experts. (Porland State Univerisity April 1991).

DPRK in all areas, including trade, tourism, joint exploration of underground resources and establishment of joint venture plants".

The imperative of structural changes would require "new thinking" which can only proceed on the basis of equality and reciprocity between north and South Korea. Carol C. Gould has noted:

"Thus the requirements of justice include not only extensional equality, in terms of an external standard of distribution, but also an intentional social relation among agents, which entails a shared understanding and a mutual consciousness of each other's equal rights... such mutual recognition constitutes the relation of reciprocity which is thus required by justice."¹⁰

10. Carol C. Gould : Rethinking Democracy, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), pp,157-8.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSIONS

The disintegration of the Soviet "empire" and the unification of Germany have been watershed events. It would appear that political currents in the world are working in favour of pluralism where political constructs had been imposed with military and ideological power and at the same time political trends favour unification where political and social elites and the general mass refuse to accede to "cold war ideological straight jackets."

The division of Europe was based on military power and likewise the division of the Korean peninsula had a self-perpetuating military dimension. Both the North Korean and South Korean regimes were in one form or the other militarised regimes, although they provided divergent answers to economic, political and ideological problems. George Konrad's essay on "Antipolitics" provides an insight into the problematique of "division" of nations compelled by the military dimension of super power relations. The inherent harm to the people of Korea and the spreading of the clouds of war and destruction over the Korean peninsula represents "the petrification of an exceptional state of

postwar occupation."¹ Since the division rests ultimately on the power of military preparations, the issue of unification is essentially related to the re-emergence of "civil society" which rejects the cold-war effort to construct the political community in terms of geopolitical blocs, military alliances and imposed political arrangements.² The issues of peace, unification and justice in Korea, therefore, transcend the "strategic logic of alliance and bloc politics" and involve the reconstruction of a political community on the Korean peninsula which rests on the consent of the entire Korean people. The bipolar political identities imposed on Koreans have little relevance for the future dynamics in domestic and international affairs. The role of Soviet ideology (and Maoist ideology) was intended to be counter-hegemonic in theory, but the process of global militarisation which it generated produced bitter experience of pressure and control. The United States containment policy created a hegemony of security thinking leading to a chain of conflicts, including the long drawn out confrontation expressed in the Korean division based on containment and "extended deterrence."

1 George Konrad: "Antipolitics", New York, (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984), pp.1-2

2 J. Keene: Democracy and Civil Society, (London, Verso, 1988)

It is possible to identify remedial measures to go beyond the rigid political structures imposed on areas like the Korean peninsula by the cold war political organisation:³

- 1 Dealignment
- 2 Denuclearisation
- 3 Demilitarisation
- 4 Depolarisation
- 5 Democratisation
- 6 Development

South and North Korea stand at the threshold of a new era. This study has traced the militarisation of political relations as result of the prime competition for influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. Anatol Rapoport's excursion into the theoretical analysis of "fights, games and debates" suggests that post-Cold war understanding of conflict resolution in Korea requires the opening of a "debate" on the new possibilities and constraints based on both domestic concerns and a changed Korean role in relation with other nations.⁴

The following questions can be posed:

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- 3 Simon Dalby, Dealignment Discourse: Thinking Beyond Blocks, Current Research on Peace and Violence, (Tampere) 3/1990-91, pp.147-49
 - 4 Anatol Rapoport, The Origins of Violence, (New York, Paragon House, 1989), pp.510-36

- 1 What are the costs of the Korean conflict syndrome and how can these be minimised?
- 2 What are the operational criteria for a meaningful Korean Sovereignty in an emerging peace order?
- 3 What are the international ramifications of de-alignment, denuclearisation, demilitarisation, democratisation and development in Korea in the post-Cold War era?
- 4 What special effects will Korean unification have on regional politics and what choices have to be exercised for a constructive engagement?
- 5 Learning from the past, what are the policy instruments which can be effectively employed for Conflict Resolution?
- 6 In the light of the analysis of the complex of issues surrounding the subject of peace, unification and justice, is Korea in search of a new role in world peace and development?

THE COSTS OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT SYNDROME

The costs of four decades of conflict in the Korean peninsula have been heavy and the most negative results have

been in depriving the Korean people as a whole of their rights for a free and open discussion on their future destiny. In addition there continues till today the grave risk of escalation under existing security arrangements of military confrontation which may prove more devastating than anything that took place in the fifties. The financial and economic costs for North Korea are evident in the continued stagnation of its economy and its external debt which has crossed the four billion dollars mark. Even in the case of South Korea with its economic miracle, the costs of the conflict syndrome can be discerned in its failure to optimise its economic well-being by tackling the severe problems of environmental pollution, lacunae in urban infrastructure and in the severe social tensions over income disparities.

The question of nuclear reprocessing capability of North Korea (which is a prerequisite for producing nuclear warheads) points to the continuing risk of destruction through nuclear war, and imposes a burden both on domestic and foreign policy.

The first step to a reduction of the costs of conflict is to work seriously for eradicating misperception and mistrust which have been generated over the years. Moral issues have been ignored by both sides and in the name of

realpolitik there had been concentration on short term perspectives. In order to adjust to the end of the Cold War, both the Koreas have to move away from militarised geopolitics and develop some basic guidelines which can address geopolitical realities on the basis of a societal consensus of the two existing regimes. Instead of developing doctrinal justifications for incurring high costs of confrontationist options, the post Cold War situation demands both countries to express their diplomatic strength for common activity in global settings. As the rapprochement talks progress, there should be a shift from the primacy of defence policy on either side to an alternative emphasis on demilitarised foreign policies.

KOREAN SOVEREIGNTY

The issues of peace, unification and justice on which we have focussed suggest that significant macro-political changes are on the horizon in Korea. The challenge to undertake structural change as an appropriate response to the end of the Cold War should not be obscured by the development of new myths and misconceptions about the nature of sovereignty in a unified Korean state. The operational criteria for a meaningful Korean sovereignty should be developed in the context of the emerging peace order. If sovereignty is defined in the traditional manner a unified

Korea will not be able to pay adequate attention to the problems of peace or justice. If a unified Korea is to develop cooperative attitudes to international relations, Korean sovereignty has not to be pitted against other sovereignties but has to evolved beyond "the static presumptions of the Cold War". The new avenues for interaction between North and South Korea do not require the image of Korean chauvinism to fulfill the agenda of the future.

INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS

During the Cold War the two Super Powers created the major thrust towards the alliance system and militarisation (including nuclearisation) of different regions. Taking Korea as a whole, the dangerous spiral of defensive and offensive measures were kept under control by bipolar arrangements. In the context of de-alignment, there is need to enhance crisis stability and develop rules of the game appropriate to the new situation. Apart from the internal dynamics in the Korean peninsula it will be important for both the Koreas and ultimately for a unified Korea to contribute to the maintenance of stability and security. While giving priority to the pursuit of Korean interests, vast areas of institutionalised cooperation would open up in various world fora, including the United Nations. Korean

decision makers would find it meaningful to agree with both littoral and hinterland states to undertake measures of de-nuclearisation and demilitarisation. Since the economic superpower Japan is deeply involved with Korea in social, ecological and cultural problems, finding an appropriate balance in Japanese-Korean relations will affect the full range of economic and social policy concerns in the 1990s.

REGIONAL INTERESTS

The North-East Asian region in the post Cold War world is reflecting many fundamental changes in political and strategic areas. If a unified Korea is to be constructively engaged with countries like Japan, China, Taiwan and Hongkong, it has to exercise its choices in a manner which takes advantage of the economic trends in the region which make it a "major engine of world economic growth."

In an increasingly interdependent world economy it is difficult to believe that the global trend may be towards a tripolar arrangement with three economic blocs dominated by the United States, Europe and Japan. Any unified regime in Korea will be faced with the problem of coping with political, strategic and economic uncertainties in a tripolar world where it would find itself in a bloc led by Japan. Even the normalisation of Japan-North Korea relationship gives cause for concern that North Korea "may

be subjugated under Japan's great economic power". A unified Korea is likely to work for a liberal and open global economic environment in order to take full advantage of both economic opportunities in the region and elsewhere.

POLICY INSTRUMENTS: NEGOTIATION, MUTUAL CONSENT, COOPERATION

This study would suggest that the policy instruments for conflict resolution in Korea are not insignificant provided the norms for peace, unification and justice are adhered to. It must be stressed that the greater responsibility is on Seoul to take advantage of the principles of negotiation, mutual consent and cooperation to find a realistic common ground with North Korea. North Korea is gradually moving towards "Open door and realistic utilitarian diplomacy" and it will be important for South Korea to contribute to widening its policy options and not over-react to provocative actions which reflect North Korea's ritualistic belief in "the final victory of socialism". Taking the cue from the southern coastal provinces of China which have surmounted the ideological divide to form an emerging area of economic growth with Hongkong and Taiwan, a flexible diplomacy can diminish ideological rivalry, build strong economic ties and negotiate a solution to the Northern threat to communise the Peninsula through a mutual interest in maintaining a viable

Korean presence globally and regionally in the post Cold War World.

PERSPECTIVES ON KOREA'S FUTURE ROLE IN WORLD PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

Oran Young has emphasised the importance of "role-playing" by states which may not necessarily adhere to short run utility maximisation or status maximisation, but find it possible to achieve organised security integration because they may not "violate the rules or conventions of a practice once they have become participants in it".⁵ Taking into account the future shape of Asian Pacific economic developments, the only realist response by Korea can be in terms of a behavioural model which gives the Peninsula a new role in world peace and development. Both the Koreas have experimented with the military instruments of national influence and the results have been the perpetuation of violent scenarios. In order to derive a conclusion about Korea's future which ensures to all the Korean people an acceptable level of peace and security, unification and long-term prospects in national, regional and global terms and prosperity and justice, the imperatives of conflict resolution and national reconciliation in Korea demand the enrichment of a Korean identity with freedom and pluralism. This will enable a unified Korea to assume its full responsibility in the future new world order.

5 Oran Young, International Regimes, World Politics, Vol.39, No.1, pp.117-20.

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