MUSLIM SEPARATISM IN THE PREPARTITION PUNJAB: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ROOTS

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

GURUSHARAN SINGH

SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES DIVISION
CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH EAST ASIAN
AND SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
INDIA
1994

जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

Centre for South, Central,
South East Asian and South
West Pacific Studies,
School of International Studies

21 July 1994

CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation titled MUSLIM SEPARATISM IN THE PREPARTITION PUNJAB : THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ROOTS submitted by Mr. GURUSHARAN SINGH in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university. He is however solely responsible for any errors or omissions in the draft.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Uma Singh

Dr. UMA SINGH
(Supervisor)

Supervisor
Centre for South, Central Southeast
Asian and South West Pecific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110097

Kalim Bahadur

Prof. KALIM BAHADUR
(Chairperson)

Chairperson
Centre for South, Central Southeast
Asian and South West Pecific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110097

CONTENTS

PREFACE

There is a flood of literature on the political movement of Muslim separatism. This is as true of Punjab, as of All-India studies. However what was the role of the social and economic factors in this political movement? In the case of Punjab, literature on this aspect is very limited, partial and incidental.

This study will attempt to delineate the specific social and economic factors that facilitated Muslim separatism on one hand and how they determined the `Pakistan Movement' from the 1940s on the other. This would be examined by studying the social and economic changes introduced by the Raj, which spurred separatism from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s. Subsequently, in the final chapter, the cumulative effect of these changes in shaping and determining the `Pakistan Movement' from 1937 to 1947 will be highlighted.

More specifically, Chapter I will lay out the groundwork by firstly examining the issues vis-a-vis the various theoretical debates. It will then analyse the demographic profile of Punjab's major religious groups in terms of their numerical, geographical, class and cultural aspects. Chap-

ter II will study the agrarian structure and subsequent changes wrought on it by the British in relation to the effects this had on Hindu-Muslim relations. Chapter III will examine the links between education, government jobs and early Muslim politics paralleling the Hindu-Muslim divide. The fourth chapter will highlight the effects of the revivalist movements both in the urban as well as the rural areas in terms of heightening communal tensions, and their impinging on the political movement (the role of the Pirs, especially). The last chapter will study the rise of the Muslim League in terms of these social and economic factors and will determine to what extent these aspects played a crucial role.

I express my thanks to Dr. Uma Singh without whom this work would not have been accomplished. I am also thankful to my friends and colleagues.

I would like to thank the staff of the National Archives of India, New Delhi, the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi and the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, for their patience and support in material collection.

JNU, New Delhi,
20th July, 1994.

GURUSHARAN SINGH

INTRODUCTION

Punjab formed the very first syllable of the new Muslim state `Pakistan'. The Muslim majority Punjab, the `corner-stone of Pakistan', in Jinnah's own words, was, in fact outside the pale of Muslim League influence as late as 1946. At its helm instead, for over two decades was a loyalist, intercommunal Unionist Party[1] composed of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. This was strongly underpinned in the 1937 Punjab elections, when the Muslim League was able to secure only one out of eighty six Muslim seats. However, in a remarkable short period, in the very next elections of 1946, the separatist agenda of the Muslim League found a resounding support; in the 1946 Punjab elections it secured an overwhelming seventy five of the eighty six Muslim seats. What were the reasons behind this sea-change among the Punjabi Muslims? Had they suddenly woken up to Islamic solidarity? Was it merely a top-level political game? Or were there deeper social and ecoonomic factors involved?

Pakistani historians have explained Muslim separatism

---

1. The Unionist Party was formed in 1923.

as logically flowing from the `Two Nation Theory', in that the Muslims had always constituted a separate natioon. "There has never taken place a confluence of the two civilizations in India - the Hindu and the Muslim... on the whole the two have flowed their separate courses."[2]

A more sophisticated variation of this interpretation is Farzana Shaikh's[3]; she talks of a `clash of two wholly irreconcilable sets of political norms' - Islamic notion of communal representation versus non-ascriptive individualism of liberal democracy. However this is inapplicable to the Punjab, which showed intercommunal alliance of the Unionists and the struggle of the Muslim League to secure a foothold there till as late as 1945.

The Nationalist historians attributed Muslim separatism to the policies of divide and rule, in particular separate electorates as promoting deliberate division between commu-

---

2. K.B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase,1857-1948 (London, 1968), p.12.

3. Farzana Shaikh, `Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan', Modern Asian Studies, 20, 3, 1986, p.556.

nities.[4] However this too remains at best a partial explanation limited to urban Punjab.[5] In rural Punjab, tribal and kinship networks and syncretic religious practice dominated which cut across the communal divide.

All-India explanations of Muslim separatism fail, when applied to Muslim-majority Punjab. This is because Muslim separation was led by an entrenched elite in the Muslim minority United Provinces, who were safeguarding their threatened class interests.[6] However, in the Punjab the Muslims were in a majority and had no such insecurities. The inapplicability of general, all-India accounts is also seen in Paul Brass's study of Muslim separatism.[7] He talks of an elite manipulating separatist symbols to serve their own power interests and a socially mobilized Muslim community responding to the sense of communal identification. But his model is limited to urbanized, literate community not

---

4. Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India, (New Delhi, 1987), Reprint, pp.125-7.

5. Satya M. Rai, The Partition of the Punjab, (New Delhi, 1965), p.7.

6. Francis Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims, The Politics of UP Muslims (New Delhi, 1975), p.6.

7. Paul Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (Cambridge, 1974), p.178.

applicable to the predominantly rural Punjab countryside.

Penderel Moon (an ex-ICS man in the Punjab) finds the fortuitous event of the death of Fazl-i-Hussain and the irressistible appeal of the Pakistan cry as being responsible for change in Punjab.[8] But this does not explain much by way of themeaning conveyed to the Muslims, and in what social and economic aspects the separatist cry proved appealing. Peter Hardy's suggestion that the Muslim League in the PUnjab made an appeal over the heads of the professional Unionist politicians[9] lacks substance, for as Ian Talboot successfully establishes that many of the League's candidates in the 1946 elections were experienced politicians who had only very recently defected from the Unionist Party.[10]

Ian Talbot himself attributes Muslim separatism in the Punjab to the fraying of the patron-client relationship between the British and the Unionists due to the exigencies

---

8. P. Moon, `A Failure of Statesmanship' in T. Wallbank (ed.), The Partition of India (Boston, 1966), p.96.

9. Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge, 1972), p.238.

10. Ian Talbot, `The 1946 Punjab Elections', Modern Asian Studies, 14, 1, 1980, p.72.

of the World War II and British decision to leave India.[11] This break, and the subsequent shift to an all India focus in politics, led to Unionist defections to the Muslim League paving the way for the 1946 turnaround. Talbot's is a major work, filling up many of the gaps in Punjab's history but as with others (as above) his study too remains essentially a political explanation. It does not adequately explain the change at the level of the people notwithstanding Talbot's recent attempt at this area.[12] The focus is on elite politics giving only a reactive role to the people or even worse they are shown as were pawns in consummate political manoeuvrings. Moreover the wider social and economic aspects are studied incidentally to political factors.

This is not to say that there is no study highlighting the social and economics aspects exclusively. Two studies on these very aspects are noteworthy. Richard G. Fox has studied the communal consciousness in colonial urban Punjab

---

11. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj 1849-1947 (New Delhi, 1988), p.239.

12. Ian Talbot, `The Role of the Crowd in the Muslim League Struggle for Pakistan', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.21, No.2, p.311.

as `products of class forces and class oppositions'.[13] He shows how `class' leads to `communal consciousness'. A valuable addition but no one to one relation between class and community can exclusively explain Muslim separatism in the Punjab. David Gilmartin stresses the importance of `folk Islam of shrine and holy lineage' in rural Punjab which was syncretic as opposed to the urban, more orthodox ulema.[14] In particular he asserts that the native support of the pirs of the Chishti revivalist shrines of Taunsa, Golra, Sial and Jalalpur (the most influential) to the Muslim League ultimately titled the scales in the League's favour in 1946. However Talbot points out that the Qadiri order exerted far greater influence in some districts, as too did old established Chishtis elsewhere. Moreover, biraderi loyalties too were important as among the Jats of Eastern Punjab.[15] Despite this lacunae, the study is an important contribution in that it highlights the role of

---

13. Richard G. Fox, `Urban Class and Communal Consciousness in Colonial Punjab: The Genesis of India's International Regime', Modern Asian Studies, 18, 3, 1984, p.460.

14. David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, (New Delhi, 1989), p.5.

15. Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North West and North East India, 1937-47 (Karachi, 1988), p.97.

religious leadership in the rise of the Muslim League. However religious appeals alone were not sufficient to mobilize Muslim support, though the demand for Pakistan was certainly legitimized in the minds of Punjabi Muslims by its religious appeals especially as it was delivered by the pirs and sajjada nashins. Yet its potency lay in the fact that it was a systematic expression of Muslim peasant interests.[16] Thus an adequate analysis of Punjabi Muslim separatism requires an overall understanding of the social and economic aspects that underpinned the political movement. Studies so far have stressed on political aspects only or laid exclusive and one-sided focus on social or economic roots (as among the Pakistani historians). A more comprehensive and cohesive study is therefore needed.

This study will analyse the social and economic factors which led to Muslim separatism in the the preparation Punjab at three levels. The economic factors will be analysed between the major communities, in particular how economic disparities led to communal opposition. The role of the

---

16. Talbot, n.7, p.90.

British in furthering this divide via safeguarding the interests of one community (Muslim) or one class (the landed elite), will be highlighted. In studying the urban divide, the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims over education and its corollary-government jobs, will be seen. The focus will be on the competition subsequently engendered over government jobs by British consent on communal lines (given British decision to recruit civil servants on religious lines) and how this further heightened communal tensions in urban Punjab. The third major area will be the study of the religious divide in the form of the revivalist movements among the two major the two major communities. In the urban areas the role of the Arya Samaj and Muslim countermovements in exacerbating Hindu-Muslim tensions, resulting in riots, will be stressed. In the rural areas, the role of the Pirs and especially the Chishti revivalists will be seen in terms of political alliances; initially contributing to Unionist ascendancy and subsequently how it was won over to the Muslim League cause. Finally, these social and economic factors at these three levels will be related to the rise of the Muslim League between 1937-1947. More specifically, how in the 1940's the Muslim League succeeded only when it

addressed these social and economic issues in the Punjabi context and how, in turn, these issues shaped the Muslim League programme and strategy in the Punjab.

In analysing these social and economic roots of Muslim separatism in the Punjab, it is first necessary to study the demographic profile. This entails a study of the major religious groups - the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in terms of their numerical, geographical, class and cultural aspects.

The Muslims constituted more than half of the total Punjabi population but this belied important regional variations.[17] In the Western districts as Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan, Mianwali, Attock, Rawalpindi and Jhelum, upwards of 80 per cent of the population was Muslim, whereas in the Eastern and Central districs, they formed between 15 to 45 per cent of the total inhabitants.[18] Conversely the Hindus, East of the Ravi, everywhere represented at least 40 per cent of the population (with the exception of the Sikh

---

17. According to the 1931 Census they made up over 56% of the population Census of India, 1931, Vol.17 (Punjab), pt.1, pp.319-20.

18. Census of Punjab 1921 (Lahore, 1923), Subsidiary Table 2, p.121.

dominated areas of Jullundur, Ludhiana and Ferozepur).[19] Further the West one went, lesser were the number of Hindus- Dera Ghazi Khan (12 per cent), Attock (5 per cent). Despite the large numbers in the South East and NorthEast however, the Hindus formed only over 1/4 of the total Punjabi population.

To this basically East-West divide was added the rural-urban division. In most of the districts west of Lahore the Muslim population was overwhelmingly rural, as high as 80 per cent (in the North-West Dry Area), whereas in most of the East and Central Punjab (the Indo-Gangetic Plain) the rural population was only 38 per cent.[20] Conversely the Muslim population in the eastern and central parts were far more urbanized than those in the West. Whilst 1 in 6 Muslims dwelt in towns in the East, in the West this proportion fell to 1 in 20.[21] This was significant with regard to Hindu representation. In the West, Hindu populaton was overwhelmingly urban-traders and shopkeepers, although in

---

19. Talbot, n.8, p.17.

20. Census of India, 1931, n.14, pp.319-20.

21. Census of Punjab 1921, n.15, p.121.

the East the majority of Hindus were Jat peasants. This led to a situation where, throughout Punjab, a high percentage of urban Hindus was found in association with very low overall Hindu and very high Muslim population percentages. The Hindu urban population, most of whom were merchant-moneylenders, was most concentrated in areas where it preyed on a non-Hindu (predominantly Muslim) rural population.[22] Significantly, the Arya Samaj was strongest in those districts of the Punjab where the rural Hindu population was small and the rural Muslim and Sikh population was high and the urban Hindu population was high.[23]

The ratio of population of the three main communities underwent change from 1901 to 1941.[24] The Muslims had

---

22. Fox, n.10, pp.470-471.

23. Ibid., p.472.

24. Quoted in B.S. Saini, The Social and Economic History of the Punjab, 1901-1939 (Delhi, 1975), p.19.

PROPORTION PER 10,000 OF POPULATION ACCORDING TO

Community	Census				
	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941
Muslims	4,961	5,107	5,105	5,340	5,322
Hindus	4,127	3,579	3,506	3,018	2,911
Sikhs	863	1,211	1,238	1,429	1,491
Christians	27	82	133	148	149

increased from 49.6 per cent to 53.22 per cent. This added grist to the communal mill of the Hindus as apparently their population had declined from 41.2 per cent to 29.1 per cent respectively. However the reason for this was not conversion to Muslim or higher fertility rate among Muslims but due to the absorption of many members of the low-caste who adopted Sikhism to "escape the inferiority complex" as too conversions to Sikhism from amongst Hindu agriculturist castes and changed instructions issued in the 1911 census about the definition of Sikhism.[25] Thus the Sikhs increased from 8.6% in 1901 to 14.9% in 1941.

Notwithstanding the population distribution, what was more important was the social organization and social interaction among the communities. The Muslim society was organized on tribal and kinship basis. This was further subdivided into clans consisting of kinship groups (biradris).[26] This organization was patronized by the British and successfully exploited by the Unionists and later by the Muslim League. The weakness of the Brahmanical class (the Pirs and

---

25. Saini, n.21, p.20.

26. Gilmartin, n.11, p.4.

Sikh Gurus were more popular) meant that Hindu leadership developed on the communal castes of Khatris, Aroras and Banians, though challenged by the emergence of a rich Jat peasantry.[27] What was significant however was that the Hindu Jats from Rohtak had far more in common with the Muslim cultivators than with Hindu banians and Khatris. The latter looked down upon the Jats as they practiced widow emarriage. Thus there was no simple communal divide in the Punjab. Indeed among the masses and especially in the countryside there was much interaction and interborrowing.

Ideally Islam recognized no caste system, yet lower caste converts to Islam were recognized as such and differentiated. The rural Hindus borrowed Muslim customs and beliefs - purdah among Hindu women for example in Hoshiarpur.[28] The Hindus commonly celebrated festivals along with the Muslims. Language issues too were not the concern of the masses - Punjabi and Urdu serving as excellent intercommunal languages. The predominant religous ethos too did not brook with communal identities.

---

27. Talbot, n.8, p.23.

28. Talbot, n.8, p.23.

It was not the Islam of the ulema but the "folk Islam of shrine and holy lineage" as represented by the Pirs and hereditary sajjada nashins that characterised the Punjabi countryside.[29] These pirs had followrs amongst both the communities and the annual Urs (festivals commemorating the older Pirs) saw intercommunal congregations.[30] A large number of Hindus in the district of Rohtak and Jullundur were followers of a Muslim saint called Sultan Sakhi Sarwar.[31] Yet this mainstream composite culture was under threat in the colonial context in the wake of revivalist movements among both the communities. Ultimately this sharpening of identities was able to make an impact in the urban centres given certain unique social and economic features. Herein also lay the roots of two contrasting political traditions - the urban and the rural.

There were four main Sufi orders - Qadiri (centred in

---

29. Gilmartin, n.1, p.5.

30. Multitudes flocked to the Shahpur shrine for spiritual and material blessings as too toothache cure. Shahpur District Gazetteer (Lahore, 1918), p.127. As quoted in Talbot, n.8, p.22.

31. Ibid., p.23.

Lahore and Multan) with closer links to Islamic orthodoxy than the others, Naqshbandi, Suhrawardy with a major shrine in Multan and the indigenous Chishti order which had its greatest influence in East Punjab. Its Baba Farid was acknowledged by the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims as Punjab's leading Sufi saint. The Pirs, as spiritual leaders and large landowners were ideally suited to play a leading role in rural politics. They were inducted as useful allies by the British and the Unionists.

The reformist Islamic tradition following the collapse of the Mughals challenged the Pir's social and religious influence. This Ahl-i-Hadith[32] stressed upon pristine Islam: the Quran and the Hadith, rather than its subsequent interpretations. They rejected popular religion in the Punjab. However they were not able to spread beyond the towns and cities, where it was able to provide an Islamic justification for the efforts of the emerging Muslim middle class to wrest political leadership from the rural clan

---

32. David Gilmartin, "Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.13, No.3 (1979), p.491.

leaders and their close Sufi allies.[33]

This religious ferment had triggered the revival of Chishtis in the Punjab countryside.[34] They stressed Islamic piety and learning, adherence to Sharia instead of popular devotionalism. They created an entire network of Chishti revivalist shrines throughout the western areas of Punjab. They were able to form a link between rural Sufism and urban orthodoxy. The used this to help bring about the momentary merging of the urban and rural regions, religions and political institutions during the crucial final days of the Pakistan movement. According to David Gilmartin they "were to play a pivotal role in the developing relationship between religious leaders and Muslim politics" and ultimately swing the balance in favour of the Muslim League.[35]

Apart from the population distribution of the communities, their social organization, religious practice and interaction, the economic conditions too need to be

---

33. This will be discussed in Chapter Four.

34. M. Zameeruddin Siddiqi, `The Resurgence of the Chisti Silslah in the 18th Century Punjab', The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XI (1971), p.258.

35. Gilmartin, n.29, p.493 and 516.

studied. The Punjab was overwhelmingly rural and political power depended on the control of land. The British raj introducing economic changes had fostered a new urban educated elite, whose outlook and interests were at variance with the traditional holders of powers. This dichotomy was to prove significant.

The landholding structure varied considerably between the Eastern and the Western parts of Punjab.[36] In the Eastern districts, such as Rohtak and Gurgaon communal landholding remained prevalent and tenants hardly existed. Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Jullundur were exceptions (around half of the land was cultivated by tenants). In the West in contrast to the diffused landlord power in Eastern Punjab, there were landowners with greater powers. Their powers also rested on the fact that they were also tribal chiefs. Their tenants (well over half the total cultivated area was tilled by occupancy tenants) were the lesser members of their own tribe. This status underpinned their political leadership - a fact which determined their alliance with the British and the Unionists. It also circumscribed the Muslim

---

36. Talbot, n.8, p.35.

League strategy to win over the countryside.

By the time of the British rule, Muslims controlled over 95% of the land in such districts as Gujarat, Jhang, Jhelum and Attock.[37] Even in the Eastern districts where the Hindu and Sikh landowning position was much stronger, Muslims still owned substantial amounts of land. In fact in the Punjab, the Musims were generally agriculturists and soldiers. They formed 60 per cent of the agriculturists as opposed to 25 per cent of the Hindus and 70 per cent of the Sikhs.[38] Thus the Census of 1921 showed 7.8 million Muslims as dependents on pasture and agriculture as compared to 4.8 million Hindus and 2.8 million Sikhs.[39]

The source of confrontation was the moneylenders. Though composed of another landed class, moneylending was mainly a Hindu and Sikh domain, usury being forbidden in Islam. They were essentially Aroras in the western districts, Khatris in the central and Banians in the southern

---

37. Ibid., p.37.

38. S.M. Rai, The Partition of the Punjab (New Delhi, 1965), p.28.

39. Census of India, 1921, n.15, pp.366-67.

districts.[40] The Muslim peasants of the western Punjab were as a body heavily indebted to the Hindu and Sikh moneylenders of the Multan and Rawalpindi Division.[41] This economic clash could easily be lent a religious colour and would prove potentially dangerous. Moreover the moneylending classes in these areas were an insecure lot, given the highhanded treatment meted out from the frontier tribesmen. Even in the Eastern districts they had the traumatic experience of losing many of their lower caste members to Sikhism.[42] Christian missionaries further increased their fears given their attacks on Hinduism. It is not surprising thus that the main bulk of the Arya Samajis were from these castes.[43]

Moneylenders often took no interest in cash, but extoorted a full quota in service or kind. The latter was generally secured through land in mortgage with possession

---

40. S.S. Thorburn, Mussalmans and Moneylenders in the Punjab (London, 1886), p.36.

41. The Punjab Administrative Report, 1922-23, p.3.

42. Talbot, n.8, p.45.

43. G.S. Chhabra, Social and Economic History of the Punjab, 1849-1901, (New Delhi, 1962), p.121.

and this was freely done. Service meant cutting the creditor's fodder, milking his cattle, cutting crops and sometimes even ploughing the land.[44] Some moneylenders differentiated between Hindu and Muhammadan and used to take interest from the former but not from the latter. South of the Sutlej, where the Mohammadan peasant was generally a convert from Hinduism, cash was freely taken.[45] The general rate of interest of 75 per cent was exceeded when possible. The fact that these economic distinctions fell along religious lines - the moneylenders being mostly Hindus and the interest payers mostly Muslim made it easy to foment communalism over relatively simple agrarian disputes.

Apart from the landed and moneylending classes, the trading and industrial classes too were dominated by the Hindus. Pax Brittanica meant security of life and property thus fostering trade. This was further facilitated by road and railway network. The new opportunities that were now opened up were however made use of by the Hindus and the Sikhs first. They took to modern capitalist commerce and

---

44. M.L. Darling, Rusticus Loquitur: The Old Light and the New in the Punjab Village, (London, 1930), p.186.

45. Ibid., p.332.

trade and developed into a new trading class. Thorburn included Aroras, Khatris, Bhatias and Banians in the class of traders.[46] Muslim traders - Khojas and Pirachas formed only few among the Muslims as a whole. With the exception of these, the whole trade was in hands of the Hindu trading class, notwithstanding the petty Muslim traders of live-stock, vegetables, meat, liquor. In contrast to the numerical strength of the communities, the number of Hindu traders were more than six lakhs among the Hindus and 73,000 among the Sikhs.[47] Subsequently their number increased further. The fact was that trade was well organized on non-Muslim lines so that the Muslims could not withstand their competition even if they attempted to establish themselves.[48] All the trading and industrial concerns were owned by predominantly Hindus who professed to borrow capital for industrial and trade purposes from Hindu insurance companies and banks which meant in effect that there was no chance for the Muslim insurance companies and banks to flourish.

---

46. Thorburn, n.37, p.36.

47. Census of India, 1911, Vol.XIV, Punjab Part II, Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1913, p.390. Such figures are unavailable in subsequent census reports.

48. A. Punjabi, Confederacy of India, Lahore, 1939, p.129.

Given this situation, even in the Western districts, where Muslims predominated, the traders were Hindus, composing the bulk of the urban population. According to Thorburn some three lakh Hindus lived in the western towns and carried on trade, an occupation which was looked down upon by the Muslims.[49]

The Hindus, who formed the bulk of the trading and urban population demanded patronage for industry to gainfully utilize their cash capital. Moreover, given their enterprising spirit as merchants, they were also the principal financiers and accountants of the province. As for industry, it was still at an incipient stage and those serving local needs or providing raw material were established. In this field too the non-Muslims (essentially Hindus) owned more than half of the total number of industrial establishments in the whole of the Punjab.[50] The Hindus were the middlemen selling the foreign goods or the millowners marketing their finished products in the North-

---

49. Thornburn, n.37, p.17.

50. Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab (Patiala, 1972), p.5.

West Muslim Block,[51] while the Muslims were the consumers. As the non-Muslims dominated the markets overwhelmingly, the goods of a Muslim manufacturing company would either not be purchased at all or if they were purchased would not sell on account of the competition provided by the Hindus.[52]

An example of the provincial capital, Lahore highlights this preponderance. The non-Muslims here owned more than 58 per cent of the registered factories, paid eights times as much sales tax and owned more than 75 per cent of trade and commerce than the Muslim traders.[53] The Muslims thus were generally poor and deprived of the opportunities to improve their lot. This condemned them to eke out their living in the lower positions of business as well as other petty tasks. Thus this situation of economic deprivation could easily be interpreted (as it was by the Muslim League) and believed to be (as it was by the Punjabi Muslims, ultimately) a Hindu exploitation of the Muslim and leading credence

---

51. Punjabi, n.45, p.74.

52. M.A.H. Ispahani, "Factors Leading to the Partition of British India", The Partition of India, Policies and Perspective, 1935-47, C.H. Philips (ed.) (London, 1970), p.357.

53. Kirpal Singh, n.47, p.4.

to the fear that the future India would be a Hindu India too.[54]

The third economic class was composed of the professional group. Quick to uptake western education, the Hindus emerged as the new emergent middle class composed of lawyers, doctors and government employees. The Muslims however were hit by the language criteria (English instead of Persian) as too imposition of Western system of law and medicine. As a result the once ruling class of Muslims (unlike the Hindus) developed an aversion to the European system of education, a feeling which kept Muslims out of the new professions. This was as true of bureaucracy as of law and medicine.

There were attempts to reform this orthodoxy but the orthodox Muslims scotched these efforts.[55] Indeed British system of law as against Islamic Law and Kazi system, the exclusion of Quran and stress on secular values instead, substitution of Persian by English, the European system of

---

54. Ispahani, n.49, p.357.

55. Chhabra, n.43, p.131.

medicine as against the tabif, Hakim and Jurrah, the teaching of European sciences and arts, only offended the sensibilities of the Muslim elite, who had a chance to take its benefit.

The Hindus were however quick to adapt, especially the urban Aroras, Banians and Khatris. Given their economic development and as products of the new system in many ways, they were more inclined to participate in it. And once they had established themselves, the Muslims found it hard to compete. This early start was to prove damning to the Muslims. Failing thus, the Muslims therefore resorted to loyalist leanings and fighting for the recognition of the claims of their community to a proper share in state patronage.[56]

These dissimilarities produced class tensions, which given the religious parallels - as among moneylenders and peasants, traders and consumers, professionals and the Muslims - meant that colonial communal compartmentalisation (separate electorates for example), sharpening identities

---

56. Ibid., p.131.

via the revivalist movements and resultant riots could turn the basic issues of economic and social issues into a seething cauldron of communal outburst to culminate into the bloody holocaust of 1947. Thus these social and economic aspects made the conditions favourable to the growth of Muslim separatism. It was not as if the Hindu peasantry suffered any less at the hands of the Hindu traders and moneylenders, but it was in the interests of the Muslim middle class to use communalism through the slogans of Islamic solidarity to safeguard their own class interests.[57] The urban Hindus similarly raised the cry of their religion in danger to essentially protect their own interests. This was initially targetted at only securing patronage for one's own community. Thus till the British transformed Jinnah's status[58] and undermined that of the Unionists after the Second World War, `Muslim separatism' in the Punjab (separate mobilization for benefits, etc.) still functioned within an overall, intercommunal framework of the Unionists. Only when this system broke down, after the Second World

---

57. Rai, n.35, p.10.

58. This fact is corroborated from the study of Linlithgow and Zetland papers in Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism (New Delhi, 1977), pp.169-70.

War, did the focus became a separate nation. Until the Muslim League faced an uphill task in the Punjab. The social and economic bearings of Muslim separatism were to prove crucial in this whole orientation. In the end, Punjab held the key to Pakistan, because were it not for the support of the Punjabi Muslims, the birth of the new Muslim nation of Pakistan was not possible.[59]

---

59. Talbot, n.12, p.82.

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC DIVIDE
Moneylenders, Landlords and Peasants

As noted in the previous chapter, it was only when Jinnah's status was transformed by British design and the Unionist base undermined after the onset of the Second World War, that the Quaid-i-Azam could make an independent impact on Punjabi politics. In the 1940s then, the Muslim League made skilful use of the economic tensions and fears of the Muslims (over Hindu domination in trade and commerce for example). The roots of these economic fissures can be traced to the distorting effects of colonial policies on the Punjab, notwithstanding the Unionists at the helm from 1923 to March 1947. As economic disparities fell along religious lines - moneylenders (Hindus) versus the peasants (predominantly Muslims) for example, as British solutions only exacerbated tensions - by favouring of one community (Muslim) or one class (agriculturists), and given revivalist sweep from the late nineteenth century itself, it was not long before economic adversities began to be associated with religious divisions. Muslim landlords themselves `used' communalism to safeguard their class interests by diverting

the discontent of their Muslim tenants by branding the Hindu moneylender as the culprit.[1] It was probably in recognition of the primacy of the economic factor as being potentially explosive that Malcolm Darling wrote, "Nowhere is communal feeling potentially so dangerous and so dangerous as in the Punjab,".[2] It was dangerous because the Muslims, who constituted a narrow majority (55 per cent according to the 1921 Census and 57 per cent according to the 1941 Census) were otherwise reduced to a minority in the fields of industry, commerce, trade and banking. Notwithstanding the large Muslim landowners, especially in the West, most Muslims otherwise were poor and indebted to non-Muslims. Measures to check this gulf invariably hurt the `other' community. This situation was significant as communal consciousness was ultimately the outcome of material conditions in the context of particular social structures and histories.[3]

---

1. S.M. Rai, The Partition of the Punjab (New Delhi, 1965), p.29.

2. M.L. Darling, At Freedom's Door (London, 1949), p.xii.

3. Richard G. Fox, `Urban Class and Communal Consciousness in Colonial Punjab: The Genesis of India's Intermediate Regime", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.18, No.3, 1984, p.485.

Prepartition Punjab economy in the this regard had two aspects. On the one hand was the contradictory impact of the British rule and on the other the rural political elite structure that the British set up as a buffer to its own rule. In the first case, ostensibly fostering intercommuncal solidarity by patronising the rural elite in the Punjab[4] (the landlords and the Pirs), the colonial government actually only papered over internal rural divisions[5], excluded the other rural bulwark - the moneylender (sahukar), and widened the rural-urban divide.[6] These policies proved counterproductive and dangerous as they hit along communal lines. At the other level, in the overwhelmingly rural Punjab, political power rested with those who had control over the land. The British protected and patronised the rural elite who eventually formed themselves into a loyalist Unionist Party in 1923. The rural elites interests were

---

4. Ian Talbot, `British Rule in the Punjab, 1849-1947: Characteristics and Consequences', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.XIX, No.2, 1991, p.209.

5. Prem Choudhry, `Rural Relations Prevailing in the Punjab at the time of Enactment of the so-called `Golden Laws' or the Agrarian Legislation of the late 30's', The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.X, Part II, Oct. 1976, p.463.

6. N.G. Barrier, The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900 (Durham, N.C., 1966), p.82.

further protected by the fact that the bulk of the voters resided in the countryside, the British making sure that the non-agriculturists were excluded from contesting in the rural constituencies.[7] Moreover, despite legislative reforms, the landlords continued to dominate the restricted electorate even after the 1935 Government of India Act.[8] Given this reality, Muslim League's success ultimately depended on its ability to penetrate the countryside and present its appeal in the rural idiom.

The rural population consisted of five main groups.[9] The landlords owned substantial amounts of land which they let out to tenants to cultivate. The peasant cultivators owned and worked their landholdings. They were especially dominant in the central part of Punjab. Tenants, the third main group, could often be quite wealthy and own small parcels of land himself. The village servant class consist-

---

7. Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in the North West and North East India, 1937-47 (Karachi, 1988), p.86.

8. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj 1849-1947 (New Delhi, 1988), p.96.

9. Talbot, n.7, p.15.

ed of barbers, potters, washermen who provided goods and services to the landlords for share of the crop. The landless labour depended on landlords for employment. There were broad differences territorially and along communal lines between the East and the West which had considerable bearing on communal consciousness. The landholding structure varied from communal landholding in the Eastern districts such as Rohtak and Gurgaon (and thus in these parts tenants hardly existed), to peasant proprietors in the Central Punjab to the great landlords of Western Punjab.[10] In the latter well over half of the total cultivated area was tilled by occupancy tenants-at-will who paid either cash rent or *batai*, rent in kind.[11] The political leadership of their tribe underpinned their status as landlords. This made them valuable allies for the British and consequently they were assiduously cultivated. It is significant that all the Unionist Council and Assembly members were substantial landowners.[12] The key to Muslim League's success in

---

10. M.L. Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (New Delhi, 1977), p.116 (Reprinted)

11. Talbot, n.7, p.17.

12. Ibid., p.83.

the vital 1946 Provincial Elections hinged on the support it could obtain from this rural elite.[13]

Pax Britannica stimulated the growth of capitalism in agriculture. This was especially fostered by the development of the canals from the 1880s to the early two decades of the twentieth century. The total as well as the per capita agricultural production as a result, in the Western Punjab was more than its eastern part, by the end of the British rule.[14] These new canal colonies, as they came to be called, also attracted migrants from the central and submontane districts leading to changes in communal distribution - it was on this basis that the Hindus and Sikhs demanded the inclusion of Lyallpur, Montgomery and Shaikhupura in the East Punjab in 1947.[15]

The development of the canal colonies also had other consequences. The rights in land were first recognised in

---

13. Ibid., p.95.

14. Sukhwant Singh, `The Socio-Economic Effects of the Canal Colonies on the Punjab (1886-1947)', The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XXI, Part II, Oct. 1987, pp.336-337.

15. S.M. Rai, Partition of the Punjab (New Delhi, 1965), p.3.

these colonies as well as cash payments at stipulated periods. Proprietory rights in particular were alien to historical Punjab.[16] These dramatic changes enhanced the role of the other bulwark in the rural scene - the moneylender. The relative prosperity, cash payments, proprietory rights, sale, mortgage, famines and even the civil courts[17] all were to the benefit of the moneylender. Septimus Smet Thornburn classified the urban moneylenders into Bania, Khatri, Arora and Bhatia but he did not include the agriculturist moneylender.[18] Himadri Banerjee gives a more comprehensive classification of the sahukars, the agriculturist moneylenders and the new credit groups which came up due to the commercialisation of agriculture.[19] Among the major sahukars were the banians who were largely spread over the Eastern and the south-eastern parts of the Punjab, the Khatris concentrated in and around central Punjab and Aroras

---

16. H. Calvert, The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab (Lahore, 1936), p.269.

17. Darling, n.9, p.171. The *munsiffs* were more often linked to the moneylender by caste, if not actual relationship.

18. S.S. Thornburn, Musalmans and Moneylenders in the Punjab (Delhi, 1983), pp.35-36 (Reprint).

19. Himadri Banerjee, Agrarian Society of the Punjab, 1849-1901 (New Delhi, 1982), p.211.

who were found "everywhere down the Indus and the lower reaches of the Jhelum, Chenab and the Sutlej, amidst the rude, primitive conditions of the Western Punjab."[20] Significantly "their harsh treatment towards their Muslim clients made them very unpopular".[21] These included initially physical exactions and ultimately the swallowing up of their lands. They were branded as kirars (cowards) by these Muslims.

Even otherwise frictions arose from the fact that the moneylenders were overwhelmingly Hindu and Sikhs (the Muslims being forbidden usury) while the major bulk of those indebted were Muslims. According to Malcolm Darling, the total agricultural debt of the Punjab in 1920 was about nineteen times the land revenue and the Punjab agriculturist was more indebted than any other agriculturist in India and more than half of the debt was incurred by the Muslim rural population.[22] "The Muhammadan community is shackled with the chains of debt... this debt is almost entirely owed to

---

20. Ibid., p.112.

21. Ibid., p.112.

22. Darling, n.9, pp.9-10.

Hindus and Sikhs, a fact which is not calculated to improve the relationship between Hindu and Muhammadan".[23] In Muzaffargarh for example only 39 per cent of the Muslim zamindars were free from debt.[24] It is not therefore surprising to note that when most of the Hindus left Multan on account of a severe plague epidemic in September 1922, the Muslim peasants who were in debt looted their grains and burnt their account books which recorded their debts.[25]

A related feature was the increased land sales as the commercial value of the land shot up. What caught the authority's attention, in particular, was the mounting transfer of land by sale and mortgage, generally at the cost of the landowner especially Muslim. S.S. Thorburn, the Deputy Commissioner in Dera Ghazi Khan, wrote on the issue to draw attention to this problem.[26] He warned of "antagonism of creeds" and political danger in the land loss by the Muhammadans in the frontier district, at the hands of the

---

23. Ibid., p.xvi.

24. Banerjee, n.18, p.108.

25. Kirpal Singh, `Genesis of the Partition of the Punjab, 1947', The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part II, Oct. 1971, p.393.

26. Thorburn, n.17.

moneylenders.[27] Quantifying the land sales in Muzaffargarh, for example, it was noted that although 90 per cent of the population was Muslim, the absentee Hindu moneylender owned a quarter of the cultivated area by 1920.[28] By late nineteenth century it became clear that the government had to do something about the alarming increase in indebtedness and alienation of land from agriculturists to the moneylenders both through mortgage and outright sale.

On 8 June 1901, the Punjab Alienation of Land Act came into effect[29] which was primarily aimed at safeguarding the landowners interests by preventing the moneylenders from permanently acquiring land and limiting land mortgages. This Act divided Punjab's population into putative agrcultural and non-agricultural tribes (castes) in terms of traditional occupation and therefore presumed traditional rural or urban residence. It stipulated that non-agricultural tribes (read moneylenders) could not purchase

---

27. Thorburn, n.17, p.22.

28. Talbot, n.7, as quoted on p.54.

29. N.G. Barrier, `The Formulation and Enactment of the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill', Indian Economic and Social History Review, No.2, Apr. 1965, pp.145-65.

land from agricultural ones, and it limited the length of time for which non-agricultural tribes could hold mortgages over rural lands. The target of the Act was the urban lower middle class, mainly comprised of the traditional Hindu moneylending and merchant castes. Because non-agricultural status was determined by caste membership, the Land Alienation Act attacked the entire lower-middle class not just those engaged in commerce and banking. Given the exclusion of this class as a whole (which was mainly Hindu) it was felt that the Act favoured the Muslims.[30] In this regard it needs to be highlighted that the Congress' blundering attitude to the 1901 Act (at first opposing before hastily changing its mind) made the moneylenders and traders feel that it had betrayed its interests, who instead formed the Hindu Mahasabha to orchestrate their opposition to the Act.[31]

Although the process of expropriation of the hereditary landowners was largely stopped with the disability placed upon the sahukars, the weaker agricultural tribes instead of

---

30. Rai, n.14, p.27.

31. Talbot, n.7, p.87.

being swallowed up by the professional moneylenders were now faced with a similar process of expropriation at the hands of the agriculturist moneylenders.[32] Thus a species of monster fish was actually encourged by law to swallow the smaller fish.[33] The sahukar was affected no doubt but these changes were concenrated in the central Punjab, some parts of the eastern Punjab and in the canal colonies; in much of western and southwestern Punjab, the sahukars continued to be the dominant credit agency.[34] Even otherwise, *benami* transactions adequately bypassed the new legislation.[35] Yet the whole legislation was seen as being pro-Muslim and embittered Hindu trading and business classes became not only more anti-Muslim and more strident of their own community's claims, but as too anti-government, lending support

---

32. Banerjee, n.18, p.92.

33. Home (Political B) Department, Government of India Proceedings, October 1912, File no.2-3.

34. Mridula Mukherjee, `Rural Indebtedness in Colonial Punjab', The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XXIII, Part I, Apr. 1989, p.176.

35. Talbot, n.3, pp.212 and 219. The urban moneylenders acquired land by appointing agents in the village who were agriculturist tribes and asked their debtors to transfer land in the name of agent.

to national agitation.[36] Moreover, the Act did not reduce indebtedness, it led to an increase in mortgage debt and thus to an increase in the alienation of land. It only changed the agent of exploitation (sahukar to the agricultural moneylender) and restricted and thus embittered the moneylender and the urban interests.[37]

The Punjab government's decision to amend the Land Alienation Act so that urban mercantile capital would be even further distanced from the rural areas only provoked active resistance in the urban areas, especially in Lahore.[38] The innocuously named 1907 Disturbances, actually entailed mass protest meetings, street violence, government suppression, official ban on public meetings, troops into cities, mass arrests and political trials. The intensity, duration and the attempt at urban (lower middle class)-rural (canal colonists) alliance scared the government into with-

---

36. S.D. Gajrani, `Agrarian Unrest in British Punjab', The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XX, No.1, Apr. 1986, p.166.

37. Mukherjee, n.32, p.176.

38. N.G. Barrier, `The Punjab Disturbances of 1907: the response of the British Government of India to Agrarian Unrest', The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.III, Part II, Oct. 1974, pp.364-368.

drawing the rural legislation and according to the canal colonists the proprietory rights and control over production they demanded, and the alliance soon fell apart.[39] It is significant that by 1909 the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs had all evolved All Punjab organisations - the Punjab Muslim League, the Punjab Hindu Sabha and Chief Khalsa Diwan, all of which represented the urban interests and were linked to communal identity formations.[40]

Some moneylenders in response to the 1901 Act started moving towards the towns. They diversified their cash capital investments by purchasing of town lands, distribution of produce, establishing industrial enterprises. The Hindus consequently became more and more urbanised and came to constitute the mercantile community in the cities apart from the other professions which they had already taken up. Thus the Muslims and the Hindus were divided not only on the basis of religion but also between agriculturists and non-agriculturists and rural and urban.[41] In the towns the

---

39. Ibid., p.380.

40. Gajrani, n.34, p.172.

41. Rai, n.14, p.29. Talbot, n.7, p.77 quotes the rural to urban ratios: for Muslims it was 7:1, while for Hindus the rural to urban ratio was 3:1 Significant.

Hindus boycotted the Muslim traders, causing communal discord.[42] At the other end, Muslim landlords diverted the discontent of their tenants by blaming the Hindu moneylender, lulling the tenant into a false sense of Muslim solidarity with him.[43]

There was debate over whether the moneylender could be further controlled through legislation. The Usurious Loan Act was passed in 1918 in which old legislations were reopned and interest charges reduced. The flaw in fixing a maximum rate of interest besides the risk of evasion was that the practice and precept varied considerably.[44] Although the Usurious Land Act gave powers to the courts to regulate interest, it practically remained a dead letter due to the ignorance of debtor.

Further friction was raised over the issue of the prohibition of wheat export by the Punjab Agriculture Minister, Lala Harkishan Lal. He was himself an owner of a large

---

42. Home (Political) Department, Government of India, August 1910, F.No.66/68.

43. Rai, n.14, p.28.

44. Darling, n.9, p.200.

flour mill which required plentiful supplies of cheap wheat for its successful working.[45] The prohibition compelled the cultivating classes, the majority of whom were Muslims, to dispose off their wheat cheaply to the Hindu millowners. Hardships were accentuated in 1922 when a series of bad harvests yielded to a bumper crop in excess of current needs. Although the prohibition was withdrawn, the muslim discontent had come to a flashpoint; there were fierce riots at Multan where owing to the low prices of wheat the Hindu moneylenders had restricted credit and endeavoured to recover their loans through the civil courts.[46]

In the meanwhile, the Punjabi peasant however had continued to fall deeper and deeper into debt. In 1921 the total debt was calculated at 90 crores. By 1929 this had arisen to 135 crores.[47] The Punjab Provisional Banking Enquiry Commission had found that moneylending to agriculturists had become Punjab's largest industry.[48] The agrar-

---

45. H.K. Trevaskis, The Punjab of Today, Vol.I, Civil and Military Gazette Press (Lahore, 1931), p.136.

46. Ibid., p.137.

47. Talbot, n.7, p.93.

48. Choudhary, n.4, p.472.

ian landscape of Punjab showed disturbing distortions. Although known as the land of `peasant proprietors', in fact 15.5 per cent of the landowners possessed 61.3 per cent of the total cultivated land, and the bottom 58.3 per cent possessed 12 per cent of the land.[49] In actual fact thus the greater part of the cultivated province was owned by a very small number of landowners. Ironically what was termed a `Zamindar' was a misnomer, for among the persons declared as `Agricultural Tribes' under the 1901 Act, only 26.4 per cent were owners of land. A stupendous 71.6 per cent so-called `Zamindars' had no land of their own![50] The landless peasants were actually as worse off as the agricultural labourers belonging to the lower castes.[51] This led to clashes as between the Odes and the `Zamindars' in 1928, noted by Fazl-i-Hussain. Although due to economic reasons (which killed 32 zamindars) some newspapers tried to give communal colour to these confrontations.[52] Clearly there were deep divisions between the rich landlords and poor

---

49. Ibid., p.463.

50. Ibid., p.464.

51. Ibid., p.464.

52. Ibid., p.466.

peasants. These were made worse by the increasing gravity of indebtedness of small zamindars who, indebted to their own rich brothers were being rapidly reduced to the position of either tenants or agricultural labourers. The Punjab of 1930's showed a substantial increase in the numbers of the economically poorer sections of the agricultural classes, like the tenants and the labourers. The alienation of land mostly to the increasing number of agriculturist moneylenders especially after the 1901 Act, on account of debt, mortgage or sale succeeded in crippling many a small cultivating owner. Not surprisingly, there was much conflict on this account - many landlords and agriculturist moneylenders were murdered by their smaller compatriots.[53] This was to have significant repercussions and be a notable factor in the riots.[54]

Despite the strengthening of the agriculturist moneylender and the rise in mortgage debt (from which the

---

53. Ibid., p.461.

54. Ian Talbot, `The Role of the Crowd in the Muslim League Struggle for Pakistan', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.4, No.2, pp.307-333, Details of riots discussed later.

sahukar was excluded) the basic understanding that the cause of the problem was the rapacity of the moneylenders continued to inform the series of legislation that was passed in the 1930s. This included the Punjab Registration of Accounts Act 1930, the Indebtedness Act 1934, the Debtors Protection Act 1936, amendments of the Land Alienation Act 1931, 1936, 1938, Registration of the Moneylenders Act 1938 and the Restitution of the Mortaged Lands Act 1939.[55] This was the final assault on the stark, disturbing facts like the number of moneylenders, who had more than tripled from 1917 to 1930s, the increased sales and mortgage indicating the progressive increase in the acreage of land to them all inflating the number of tenants and agricultural labourers.[56]

In almost all these legislations, including the so-called `Golden Laws' of the late 1930s, further restrictions were placed on the urban moneylender. His accounts were registered a copy of which was to be provided to the debtor, his interest rates were curbed, he was asked to take out a

---

55. Mukherjee, n.32, p.177 and Choudhary, n.4, p.477.

56. Choudhry, n.4, pp.471-472.

license. Little was done to curb the power of the agricultural moneylender in his role as mortgage, except that an amendment was introduced in the Land Alienation Act to the effect that a creditor could not buy the land of his debtor until three years after the satisfaction of the debt in full. Similar restrictions on the non-agriculturist moneylender had been successfully evaded and there is little reason to believe that agriculturist moneylender would have more difficulty in making benami transfers to another member of the landowning community.[57] Moreover the legislation could only be effective if alternative sources of credit were available to the peasants. The failure of the cooperative and government credit institutions reduced and even nullified the impact of protective legislation.[58] The dependence on the moneylender, both agriculturist and non-agriculturist continued and so did the invidious effects of the dependence.

Much was made of the `sacrificial spirit' of the Acts and the Unionist Government proclaimed that the poor zamin-

---

57. Mukherjee, n.32, p.177.

58. Ibid., p.181.

dar was being benefitted,[59] in fact the gains were to the agriculturist moneylender and the rich landlords. Restitution of lands, mortgaged with `benamis' helped the rich agriculturists and moneylenders as did the `Benami' Act (Act X of 1938). The Registration of Moneylenders Act was struck down and the amended bill of 1943 has no account of its working.[60] Even the 3rd amendment to the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, known as the Zamindar Sahukar Act intended to check all permanent alienation of land to the agricultural moneylenders by their debtors in fact placed no practical curb on the agriculturist moneylender. The restriction on sale would only add to the number of tenants. The poor mortgager would be reduced to the status of a tenant as he would now mortgage with possession for an indefinite time and would to that extent, become landless until the repayment of the loan. The exploitation of the agricultural labourers, tenants and small zamindars by the landlords and the agriculturist moneylenders, continued apace.[61]

---

59. Choudhry, n.4, p.479.

60. Ibid., p.479.

61. Ibid., p.480.

The upshot of these and the general policy as a whole was the protection of the leading men of the rural communities who became the legitimizing principle of British rule. To this end the various agrarian measures, whether the 1901 Act or the 1930s legislation had faithfully adhered to. Political conservatism on part of the British also ensured that they made no effort to tax agricultural profits - land revenues were in fact lower in the region than elsewhere, land was assessed only every 20 years and the `blip' of the depression years was weathered by the government by further reducing the land revenue.[62] This unashamed catering to the interests of the landed elite had a disastrous impact at least at two different levels, both ultimately playing a significant part in communal consciousness and active support of Muslim separatism and alignment with the Muslim League.

At the altar of this artificial construct of the `agriculturist tribe' were sacrificed brutally the urban interests and the division between the cities and villages was institutionalised. From the 1901 Act to the legisla-

---

62. Talbot, n.3, pp.208 and 212.

tions of the 1930s they were segregated economically and because political power was linked to a landed base and an agriculturist status, they were in effect locked out of power.[63] This was partially responsible for pushing them to separatist representative organisations - in effect communalism. The Punjab Hindu Sabha was thus initially formed to more effectively project the Hindu urban interests.[64] Such bodies were formed among the Sikhs and the Muslims too and easily leant themselves to communalism. It is not surprising the towns come to be dubbed the `ulster' of India due to intense communal rivalry.[65] Talbot praises the British attempt to check this urban flow of communalism into the countryside by electoral manipulation (ensuring agriculturist dominance but he ignores the fact that this segregation in itself shoved the urban interest to separatist formations.

Even within the agrarian classes the impact was no less dangerous. Again the interests of the rural notables were

---

63. Talbot, n.7, p.86.

64. Ibid., p.87.

65. Ibid., p.67.

unashamedly advanced to the neglect of the poor peasant who was in fact was no better than the agricultural labourer.[66] Indebtedness, which continued apace, exploitation and an increase in their numbers made them a highly discontended mass--ready material to the propaganda of the Muslim League and the communal riots that sparked so consistently in the 1930s and the 1940s. Analysing the pattern of communal riots in late 40's, Talbot notes that the Muslim tribesmen's preferred target appears to have been property rather than people, which is significant to say the least. This is noted in regard to communal riots at Tonk, Dera Ismail Khan in April 1947. Even the so-called `communal war of succession' in Lahore in the spring of 1947 were Muslim attacks largely on property.[67] Hartals played an increasingly vital role during the Pakistan movement. They mattered most in the Muslim League campaigns in the Punjab and the Frontier. A large number of successful hartals during 1946-47 shows support of casual labourers, industrial workers, shopkeepers

---

66. Choudhry, n.4, p.464.

67. Talbot, n.52, p.325.

and artisans, as well as professional classes.[68] The urban interests had proved combustible; these hartals were highly disciplined and orchestrated protest movmeents. Both the excluded urban interests as well as the neglected, exploited, poor rural sections lent the Muslim League valuable support. In fact the growing supporty for the Pakistan movement amongst the tenants and labourers led their landowners to support the Muslim League.[69]

The economic roots to Muslim separatism proved crucial underpinnings to the success of the Muslim League in the crucial victory at the 1946 Elections in the Punjab. Prior to the elections the Muslim League had stepped up rural propaganda. Most of all it linked the solution of peasants' economic and social problems with the successful establishment of the Pakistan. In fact Jinnah declared that the already `economically bankrupt and financially zero' Muslim would be further shackled under an independent Hindu India. Only a separate state could provide, he declared, adequate protection against further economic degradation of the

---

68. Ibid., p.321.

69. Talbot, n.6, p.106 (footnote).

Muslim community.[70] In 1946 the Muslim League had successfully manipulated the rural idiom to its advantage - the way to 1947 was already paved.

---

70. Prabha Dixit, Communalism - A Struggle for Power (New Delhi, 1974), pp.92-93.

CHAPTER III

THE URBAN DIVIDE
Education and Government Service

The relative intercommunal harmony of the countryside, notwithstanding the economic tensions, was in stark contrast to the intense communal competition and rivalry in the cities, earning them the dubious distinction of being the `Ulster' of India.[1] This was not only due to the British government's deliberate policy of economic exclusion of the emerging urban interests from the countryside[2] but also due to the British yielding to communal competition in government jobs.

Government servants were the most powerful group in the Punjab. Comprising of provincial civil service, the subordinate judges, munsifs, deputy collectors and tahsildars, it was this class among the Muslims which was most conscious

---

1. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj (New Delhi, 1988), p.67.

2. The economic exclusion of the urban interests was effected through the legislations from 1900 to the late 1930s, as discussed in Chapter 2. While excluding the urban interests from the countryside, the latter (the agriculturists) were, on the other hand, given reserved seats in non-agriculturist professions!

about their share in the state patronage.[3] Thus it was a matter of grave concern that Muslim representation in the services was very low and falling, leading Fazl-i-Hussain to despair that the Muslims were "a majority only in name... not in services."[4] Instead, both in education and government jobs, the Hindu commercial castes were increasingly coming to predominate. Initial attempts were towards educational upliftment of the Muslims through the reactivated Anjumans (Muslim cultural organizations) but as this proved too slow and difficult, there were attempts to seek preferential treatment or reservations in government jobs. It is not surprising to note that early Muslim political activity (1906-1920) was geared to secure better representation in the services for themselves. On the top of agenda of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League was safeguarding Muslim interest in various branches of administration.[5] However as

---

3. J.S. Rakkar, Muslim Politics in the Punjab (New Delhi, 1985), p.31.

4. Fazl-i-Husain, "Punjab Politics", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part I, April 1971, p.143. Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain, the prominent Unionist was writing this in February 1936.

5. Rakkar, n.3, p.94. They decided to submit a memorial to the Lieutenant-Governor on the subject and also decided to open a register of Muslim candidates for service.

these divides (in the education and government jobs) fell along religious lines, mobilisation to secure special treatment from the British, ultimately proved to the detriment of the `other' community, who too mobilised along separatist lines. It is significant thus that the same Hindu class (the commercial class) who stole a march over the Muslims in the services were also the strongest votaries of the Arya Samaj.[6] This `new arena for conflict among Punjab's urban communities' and `greater communal awareness' was provided b the British.[7]

The British restructured the Punjab education system to produce Punjabi employees as it was not possible to run the whole bureaucratic apparatus through British officers. While the primary schools were basically left to the missionaries or private school, middle and the higher schools

---

6. Richard G. Fox, "Urban Class and Communal Consciousness in Colonial Punjab: The Genesis of India's Intermediate Regime", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.18, No.3, (1984), pp.472-73. In fact there was a conjunction of trading caste status, urban residence, literacy and hence government jobs, Hindu religious identity and the existing pattern of class or communal oppositions which is seen as the reason for the rising consciousness of the emergent lower middle-class in terms of a reformist Hinduism.

7. Talbot, n.1, p.70.

received heavy subsidies.[8] Another aspect was that given the difficulty of learning English which kept many students away from continuing their education the use of English was minimized prior to the matriculation stage.

In the late nineteenth century, the Government and the Muslims increasingly found that the Hindu commercial castes and the Brahmins were outpacing them in the race for education, which consequently meant also, government jobs.[9] The Hindus were the first to take to English education while the muslims remained unresponsive and suspicious of the British system of education. They feared that this was a ploy to ultimately proselytise them to Christianity.[10] There were also other factors involved which kept the Muslims shackled to their traditional system. This was related in particular to their poverty and attitude to religion and education. In the west Punjab, the majority of Muslims tended to be poor

---

8. B.S. Nijjar, Punjab Under the British Rule, Vol.I, (New Delhi, 1974), p.64.

9. This was especially true in the James Lyall government who reversed the policy of strict imartiality of Lawrence's time. N.G. Barrier, "The Punjab Government and Communal Politics", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.XXVIII, No.3, May 1968, p.525.

10. B.S. Saini, The Social and Economic History of the Punjab (Delhi, 1975), p.169.

agriculturists who could not afford to send their sons to the government schools let alone colleges, which were non-existent in the rural tracts. Their views on education also served to hamper their response in that the Muslim children received instructions in the Koran at the local mosque as religious education was considered an integral part of the Islamic faith. The orthodox ulema were against it and the few who dared to partake of English education were ostracised by the ulema and branded as *kafirs* (infidel).[11] Thus the new system was avoided and the Muslim children continued in the traditional maktab and madrassah. Here religious learning predominated instead of western sciences and English, making these students at most qualified to get posts of the lower rung (and of low salary). The higher jobs (positions paying over Rs.75) required English proficiency. Thus the replacement of Persian (the erstwhile bureaucratic lingua franca) by English had a catastrophic effect upon Muslim employment in government service. The Muslims thus deprived themselves of material progress while the Hindu

---

11. Rafiq Zakaria, Rise of Muslims in Indian Politics: an Analysis of Development from 1885 to 1906 (Bombay, 1970), p.25.

commercial class gained an initial advantage in the race for government posts. Muslim representation in the services deteriorated and went on plummeting in late nineteenth century for about twenty to twenty five years reaching its lowerst limit till the British government decided to take action.[12]

In the higher covenanted civil services the percentage of Muslim employees was much less than the Hindu and Sikh employees. Among the civil appointments on Rs.1,000 and over in the Punjab on 1 April 1913, the Muslim representation was 1 per cent, while the Hindus and Sikhs had their share of 5 per cent.[13] Again, of the civil appointments on Rs.200 a month and over in the provincial civil services (both executive and judicial) the Muslims held 71 posts and the Hindus and Sikhs occupied 87 posts.[14] In the lower grades of services the Muslims were also under represented. Of the appointments on Rs.75 and above in 1903 the Muslims held less than half the posts than the Hindus whereby the

---

12. Husain,n.4, p.129.

13. Royal Commission on the Public Services in India. Report of the Commissioners (Calcutta, 1916), Ch:8382, Vol.I, Appendix V, p.498. Quoted in Rakkar, n.3, p.31.

14. Rakkar, n.3, p.31.

Muslims representation to the total employed came to only 21 per cent.[15] Thus the Muslim representation in the government services was very low than their population proportion and far less than the Hindu representation. The Muslims were well represented only in the police force of the Punjab, as too the military.

It is also important to note that Muslim representation in the government services throughout the Punjab was uneven. The Muslims of the East Punjab were better represented in the services than that of the West Punjab. The Muslims of fifteen districts excluding towns and cantonments of the West Punjab formed 87 per cent of the population, but held only about 41 per cent of the gazetted appointments under deputy commissioners and district judges.[16] However the Muslims of the remaining districts of the East Punjab made up 36 per cent of the population and held 37 per cent of these posts. Thus in the western districts the Muslims were inadequately represented in the government services. More-

---

15. The Muslims held 577 posts while the Hindus occupied 1,202 posts, ibid., p.31.

16. Ibid., p.32.

over here it were some prominent `castes', like the Sheikh, Pathan and Sayed, who monopolised the services.[17] The main reason for poor representation was illiteracy and especially English illiteracy. Here too figures serve to highlight the disparity. The proportion of literate Muslims was about 23 per cent in the Punjab, while that of the Hindu and Sikh literates was about 72 per cent.[18] Again the proportion of literate Muslims was greater in those districts where they were few of them than there were relatively more Muslims.[19] As regards English education the Punjab Muslims were even lower at 21 per cent of the total population of Punjab who were literate in English.[20] Again the percentage of Muslims

---

17. Ibid., p.32.

18. 1911 Census, Punjab, Part II, Table VIII, pp.10-11.

Total Literates	Hindu & Sikh LIterates	Muslim Literates	% of Total Literates
7,74,845	5,60,103	1,76,704	22.8

19. Rakkar, n.3, p.33.

20. 1911 Census, Punjab, Part II, Table VIII, pp.110-24.

	Total Literates	Total Hindus & Sikhs	Total Muslims	% of Muslims to Total Literates
Punjab	1,09,101	52,329	22,820	20.9
Delhi, Jullundhur and Lahore	78,828		17,071	21.9

who were English literate was lowest in the Western Punjab than the Eastern Punjab.[21] This educational backwardness hampered the Muslim community in bringing it to the level of other communities, both socially and economically. This preponderance of Hindus and Sikhs, in the meantime was to lend colour to the Muslim contention that they were in danger of economic exploitation by the Hindus and Sikhs. The educated community responded to the new challenges by opening colleges for community education, reactivating Anjumans, founding political associations to advance the Muslim community and subsequently seeking reservations through British indulgence. Thus not surprisingly education and especially bureaucracy soon became the focus of religious antagonism and rivalry between Hindus and Muslims.

Following in the tradition of Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan and

...Continued...

Divisions				
Rawalpindi & Multan Divisions	50,273	-	5,749	18.9

21. Rakkar, n.3, p.33.

Amir Ali, the Punjab Muslims made efforts at reform.[22] They worked within their Anjumans. These societies, such as the Delhi and Lahore Anjuman-i-Islamia, were initially concerned with guarding Muslim endowments and stemming apostasy.[23] As the Muslims became aware of their falling proportions in the services, (none the less serious for official posts could be manipulated to support communal claims and to attack religious opponents[24]) they began to convert the existing anjumans into organs of reform and revival, a process typified by the Lahore Anjuman-i-Islamia.

The Anjuman-i-Islamia was patronised by conservative aristocrats, chiefly supervising endowments. From late nineteenth century itself it began to approach the provincial government to reserve at least half of the posts for the Muslim in rough proportion to their numerical status.

---

22. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan founded the Muslim Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875 to bring Islam and Muslims in harmony with western learning especially English. He toured Punjab urging reform. Amir Ali in 1877 formed the Central National Mohammedan Association with a branch in Punjab among its total 53 in other parts.

23. Edward D. Churchill, "Muslim Societies of the PUnjab 1860-1890", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.VIII, Part I, April 1974, p.77.

24. N.G. Barrier, "Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1870-1890", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part I, April 1971, p.86.

Initially, the government refused to yield on this ground. Barkat Ali (secretary and a supporter of Syed Ahmed Khan) transformed the Anjuman, building schools, establishing a newspaper and enhancing its outreach.

The middle class Muslims dissatisfied with the conservatively inclned Ainjuman-i-Islamia, revived the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam (Society for the Defence of Islam) and carried out their own reforms. This Anjuman was led by government officials and two barristers, influenced by Syed Ahmed Khan, Muhammad Shafi and Shah Din. The Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam made English compulsory in Anjuman high schools so that Muslims would acquire more government posts.[25]

Given the slow progress and continued deterioration, systematic representations were made to the government and the various commissions. The Hunter Commission in 1881 was the first occasion. The significance was in the fact that each major community, Mulim and Hindu, mobilized in the hope that they could influence the commission's decisions. The

---

25. Ibid., p.87.

Muslims hoped for special advantages in education and employment while the Punjabi Hindus saw these as anti-Hindu demands and wanted a change to Hindi language, replacing Urdu.[26] Hindus and Muslims prepared petitions and held public meetings, local Anjumans sponsored Muslim rallies, while the Indian Association and Hindu reform societies were behind the effort to arouse Hindu public opinion.[27] Thus both communities fought for their `secular' interests on separatist lines. This divide and the resultant clashes were now to become an invariant feature of Punjabi urban life.

The cumulative effect of all this was the division of the Punjabi educated class along religious lines. This became apparent as early as 1884 during the communal strug-

---

26. Kenneth Jones, Arya Dharm, Hindu Consciousness in Nineteenth Century Punjab (New Delhi, 1976), p.64. This demand was spearheaded by the Arya Samaj and henceforth became an aspect of Hindu-Muslim communal conflict. It is significant to note that Syed Ahmed Khan was not strained by the resurgent HIndu revivalism but for the question of Hindi. The Punjabi Muslims supported Aligarh over the question of Nagri Resolution on Hindi. Hafeez Malik, "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's contribution to the Development of Muslim Nationalism in India", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.4, No.2, (1970), pp.138-39.

27. Zakaria, n.1, p.297.

gle over the control of the Municipal Committees and more dramatically three years later, during the agitation sparked by the calling of the Aitchison Commission to study native employment in the Public Services.[28] Muslim concerns were over simultaneous examinations (they would only mean Hindu benefit), and reservatons and the exertions of other Muslim organisations[29] made the resulting demonstrations more bitter and hotly contested than the earlier ones.[30]

The delegates from the Anjuman-i-Islamia and the Muhammedan Assocaition met James Lyall requesting a proportional share of the posts to the Muslims upon his refusal, the Muhammedan Association demonstrated. However, Syed Ahmed Khan still pressed upon Muslims loyalty and British patronage as the sole panacea. His Punjabi followers called on all `respectable' Muslims to abandon political agitation and follow Sir Syed's example.

Subsequently in 1895 the Punjab government under James

---

28. Rakkar, n.3, pp.36-7.

29. The organization was the Central Muhammedan Association of Bengal.

30. Barrier, n.24, p.93.

Lyall decided to reverse its earlier policy of impartiality. It decided to check the growing dominance of educated Hindus in government and by favouring Muslim recruitment, to create some balance between the two religious communities.[31] In April 1900, S.S. Thornburn, the financial commissioner, in a circular to all the commissioners in the province dictated that caste and religion should be employed as criteria in recruitment to break Hindu monopoly. He urged changes in the education policy and recruitment to secure better Muslim representation. The final outcome of the discussion raised by Thornburn was the issuance of a circular in May 1901, directing that in all districts, except Simla and Kangra, no less than 30 per cent of the ministerial appointments be filled by Muslims.[32] Yet this policy undertaken to redress an imbalance ultimately proved disastrous. Soon every government appointment from the lowliest village patwari to the most exalted Hindu Court Judge, was keenly scrutinised for its effect on the communal balance of power within the services.[33] Lyall's action meant that agitaton could influ-

---

31. Jones, n.26, p.183.

32. Rakkar, n.3, p.36.

33. Talbot, n.1, p.68.

ence government decisions - it encouraged petitioning and discussion of communal issues which served only to inflame the situation.

Although encouraging communalism on one hand, ironically, the British efforts to check nepotism and redress the `Hindu-Muslim imbalance' in the bureaucracy on the other hand, met with little success. The manipulation of posts continued despite official scrutiny, and the issue remained a favourite theme of newspapers and politicians.[34] In addition, persistent Muslim backwardness in education kept the government from quickly adjusting the composition of public services. Moreover the disclosure of employment circulars after 1904 intensified Muslim agitation for patronage and widened the rift between the Hindus and the Muslims. The Muslim agitation which formerly had been sporadic and tied to specific events, new became regularised.[35] Inevitably the continued under-representation of Muslims in the government services made them think exclusively of their own community. The Muslim leaders continu-

---

34. Rakkar, n.3, p.37.

35. Barrier, n.9, p.539.

ally impressed upon the educated Muslims that their economic betterment depended upon the British. In consequence the educated Muslims looked to the government for official favour.

The Anjumans materially contributed towards the general awakening of the Punjab Muslims and the increased attention that was being paid to the educational needs of the community in the beginning of the twentieth century. The anniversary sessions of the Anjuman developed into an annual event and formed perhaps the biggest Muslim gathering in the country. This imparted a vigorous impulse to the dormant capacities of a hitherto lethargic community.[36] Significantly at these anniversaries, Islamic songs and poems were coupled withlong discourses on the glorious past of Islam, delivered by eminent scholars and divines,[37] like Syed Ahmed Khan and Dr. Muhammad Iqbal. In fact it was here that Dr. Iqbal made his national debut with his famous poem `Nala-i-Yatim' where he likened the Muslims to its title (The Cry of the Orphan). By early twentieth century, the

---

36. Rakkar, n.3, p.41.

37. Zakaria, n.11, p.258.

more westernised, Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam had emerged as the most powerful Muslim organisation of its kind throughout the country. Before the establishment of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League in 1907 it was the only organisation to draw the support of the middle class Muslims.[38] It not only enhanced modern education but brought about a general awakening among the Muslims. Yet the Anjumans ultimately exacerbated separatist mobilisation and institutionalised differences. Significantly the anti-Congress Muslim majority in the Anjuman-i-Islama, led by Muhammad Shafi and Shah Din helped in forming the All India Muslim League.[39] Thus the emergence of Muslim anjumans helped in forming the separate communal identity of the Punjab Muslims.[40] As the Muslims educated class emerged by the turn of the twentieth century, it was seen that they were foremost in forcible assertion of their position and `Muslim rights'.[41]

The Punjabi Muslims sent eight delegates including

---

38. Rakkar, n.3, p.42.

39. Ibid., p.77.

40. Ibid., p.43.

41. Paisa Akhbar, 28 September 1901. Quoted, ibid., p.43.

Muhammad Shafi and Shah Din to represent them on the famous Muslim deputation to Lord Minto, the new Viceroy. The deputation had been called to request special consideration for Muslims in employment. These Muslims organised the Muslim League to safeguard their interests. This was not to the liking of the Hindus. Their counter organization was the Hindu Sabha in the Punjab.

The Muslim League put forth its demands at its Amritsar session held in 1908 revealing its communal and its upper and middle class character. The resolutions passed at the session asked for Muslim reprsentation on the local borads and the Privy Council and a percentage in the services which was granted them in the subsequent Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909. The League had thus successfully expressed the interests of the Muslim professional classes for jobs and posts.[42] These developments resulted in the Hindu classes recoiling even more strongly to their own communal body, the Punjab Hindu Sabha in this case, and identifying with it, to the exclusion of Muslims. The Muslim defense to Hindu accusation of bias and sediton, remained that despite con-

---

42. A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism (Bombay, 1948), p.398.

siderable progress in education, the Muslims remained way behind in top civilian posts. It was thus pointed out that Muslims accounted for only 32.6 per cent of the Deputy Collectors, 18.1 per cent of the Superintendents of Post Offices, 32.8 per cent Tahsildars, 9.3 per cent Engineers and 50 per cent of the sub-judges.[43]

In the 1916 Lucknow Pact, the percentage of jobs in Muslim majority provinces like Bengal and Punjab were drastically revised. As much as 60 per cent of the jobs were reserved for the Muslims in both these provinces. Such a state of affairs could never ba palatable to the Hindu community and it was one of the reasons for the inception of the Hindu Mahasabha.[44]

---

43. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.), Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents, 1906-47, Vol.I, (Karachi, 1969), p.211.

    The figures actually given:

	Muslims	Total No.
Deputy Collectors	47	144
Superintendents of Post Offices	18	99
Tahsildars	43	131
Engineers	3	32
Sub-judges	12	24

44. Prabha Dixit, Communalism - A Struggle for Power, (New Delhi, 1974), p.154.

The 1919 Montague-Chelmsford Act opened up fresh avenues of employment and offices and led to a scramble between the educated classes of two major communities for a bigger share in the `loaves and fishes' available. The policy of the government to open non-agriculturist professions to the agriculture after the report of the Maynard Commission of 1918 added to the grievances to the Hindu commercial classes.[45] In his evidence before the Reform Enquiry Committee of 1924 Barkat Ali endorsed Sir Shafi's view that the `acute phase of communal feeling' existed mainly in the bigger towns between the educated section of the two communities who were dependent on service for maintenance.[46]

All this activity led to charges and countercharges. Thus in the 1920s the Muslims complained that Hindus had deliberately timed their protest at a time when Fazl-i-Husain was attempting proportional employment to them. Fazl-i-Husain bitterly complained that whenever a Hindu had been the departmental head, he had carefully excluded the Muslims

---

45. Talbot, n.1, p.57.

46. Dixit, n.44, p.70.

from government posts.[47] In 1924 there was a further change in the government policy. The recruitment policy for the government servants was based on religion with definite quotas being assigned to religious communities. This practice was accorded statutory sanction by a resolution published in the Gazette of India, Part 1st 7th July, 1934 for services recruited on an All India basis. According to the rules, 25 per cent of all vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment of Indians would be earmarked for the Muslims and 1/3rd for the other minority communities.[48] This principle was valid in the All-India and the Provincial Services. The introduction of this practice in 1924 strengthened the ministers by placing a greater powers of patronage at their disposal. Inevitably communal recruitment to public services challenged the Hindu monopoly of government services. Given this they naturally equated the preferential treatment to Muslims as being tantamount to an attack on their merited achievement. Bitterness was not the least of the results.

---

47. Mahatma Gandhi, Communal Unity, (Ahmedabad, 1949), p.44.

48. Inder Mohan, Hindustan and Pakistan and their Communal Problem (Lahore, 1947), p.37.

The communal quotas that were drawn up ultimately catered to the educated middle classes. The Government service became the most coveted prize to secure. The result was that the educated people among the various communities were envigorated into a mad, divisive race to capture as many of the government jobs as they could. Efforts were redoubled to give an impetus to the spread of education in Muslim community.

In the 1930s the issue continued to be sensitive and an emotional one, as the proceedings of the Round Table Conferences were to show. There was a bitter contention regarding the number of seats that minorities should be given in the legislatures.[49] All this led a disgusted Nehru to exclaim, "It was all jobbery... jobs for the Hindus, the Muslims."[50] The Act of 1935 further raised Muslim hopes and as the exigencies of the World War II limited the free hand which the Unionists had earlier enjoyed in distributing patronage,

---

49. Muhammad Shafi asked for $3^1/3$ per cent representation for Muslims in the central legislature of British India. He was strongly for Muslim majority representation in the Punjab given the imminent provincial autonomy.

50. Mohan, n.48, p.41.

the `Pakistan cry' struck an immediate emotional cord among the servicemen and the service-seekers. Pakistan seemed to promise jobs to all the Muslims who were educated. They were already inured to separate mobilisation and recruitment drive in terms of government jobs - Pakistan was just a further step in the same direction. It was the ultimate panacea.

The whole agitation over education and government jobs among the Muslims, especially as the British government yielded to it, on the one hand encouraged separatist agitation and mobilisation of `secular' issues, while on the other hand it institutionalised these differences. As any favouritism harmed Hindu interests, they vehemently protested. It of course did not help that they were also votaries of Arya Samaj, which had thrown a spanner into Hindu-Muslim relations. Hindu opposition, in turn convinced the Muslims that their interests could be better promoted through communal solidarity and not through collaoration with the Hindus. Given British allowances, the similarities of class aspirations and furstrations did not place the educated Punjabis in opposition to the British but in commu-

nal opposition to each other.[51] By 1911 the educated Hindus of Punjab sharing the same economic interests had similar communal orientation in form of the Arya Samaj. The Anjumans and organizations apart, the Muslim League had "natural constituencies of support... in the Punjab's towns."[52] While the Hindu Sabha had a similar function among the Hindus. All along mobilised, recruited and sustained on separatist lines, these classes emerged as the strongest defenders of Pakistan especially after the wartime years.

---

51. Jones, n.26, p.185. Jones attributes this mutual animosity despite common grievances of Hindu and Muslim classes to communal consciousness alone in which the Arya Samaj led. He fails to take into account the primary reason - British yielding to communal representation in the first place. In fact this encouraged communal agitation for government jobs. Communal organisations legitimised this activity.

52. Ian Talbot, "British Rule in the Punjab, 1849-1947: Characteristics and Consequences", The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.XIX, No.2, (1941), p.209.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELIGIOUS DIVIDE
Revivalist Movements

The economic tensions between the Hindus and the Muslims, the communal rivalries over government jobs, the communal political functioning (separate electorates) - all products of the colonial era - were underpinned by the religious divide in form of religious revivalism among both the major communities. This `identity-formation' on the basis of religion produced a sense of `deep horizontal comradeship'.[1] It fixed the political existence of a `community' of equal and like-minded Muslims in the minds of many Indian Muslims, paving the way for the definition of an `imagined' political community -a nation-whose presence justified the emergence of an independent state.[2] However, this concept of a `community' gained force and credibility in the cities in late 19th and 20th centuries.[3] For most

---

1. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983), p.16.

2. David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (New Delhi, 1989), p.4.

3. Ibid.

rural Muslims (the overwhelming majority in the Punjab), the concept of Islamic `community' was not centred on the alim and the mosque but on the pir and the shrine.[4]

Along with the economic divide, the political structure and the professional rivalry, there was an urban-rural divide in the sweep of religious revival too. The cities reverberated with the clash of the Arya Samaj versus the Ahmediyas,[5] and their countermovements (Shuddhi and Sangathan versus the Tabligh and Tanzim,[6] the revival movements among Muslims (like the Ahl-e-Madis, the Deobandis, the Ahl-e-Sunnat-o-Jamaat)[7] and subequently riots.[8] In the country-

---

4. Ian Talbot, "The 1946 Punjab Elections", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.14, No.1, 1980, p.79.

5. Spencer Lavan, "Communalism in the Punjab: The Ahmadiyah Versus The Arya Samaj During the Lifetime of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part II, Oct.1971, p.326.

6. R.K. Ghai, "Tabligh and Shuddhi Movements in the Nineteen Twenties", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XX, Part I, April 1986, p.224; "J.S Dhanki, Lala Lajpat Rai and Communal Politics in India", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XXIII, Part I, April 1989, pp.190-91.

7. David Gilmartin, "Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.13, No.3, 1979, pp.490-91.

8. N.G. Barrier, "Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1870-1890, The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part I, April 1971, pp.90-91; Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj (New Delhi, 1988), p.76.

side however the Pirs presided over multitudes[9] belonging to eiher religion and in general the canker of communalism did not hold sway. This split had its political repercussions as well. The urban movements were allied to urban upcoming middle class interests which the Muslim League had been representing till the 1937 Elections.[10] In the countryside the "structure of religious leadership mirrored the structure of political authority", for the Pirs were closely tied to the local political structures of rural society[11] largely outside the current ambit of Muslim League influence. The support of these Pirs was crucial to victory in the crucial 1946 elections for the Muslim League.[12]

Christian missionary activity (there was a fortyfold rise in Christian community since 1881 to 1911) spurred Hindus to revitalize Hinduism, which in turn also stirred

---

9. Ibid., Talbot, p.22.

10. This was in fact Muslim League's greatest weakness - urban adherence without picking up rural support. In the latter the landlords and the Pirs were crucial to any electoral victory in the countryside. Talbot, n.8, p.86.

11. Gilmartin, n.7, p.488. Given the structural position of Pirs as, often, large landlrods, their political interests were allied to the loyalist, landlord-dominated Unionist Party.

12. Talbot, n.4, p.84.

urban Muslims, both against the Christians and the Hindus.[13] Hindu religious revivalism in the Punjab was spearheaded by the Arya Samaj. Occasioned by missionary attacks on Hinduism, the Arya Samaj under Dayanand Saraswati combined sharp criticism of many Hindu practices (like idolatory) with an aggressive assertion of superiority over all other faiths, including Islam. In fact `Satyarth Prakash' (The Light of Truth) devoted more space to the refutation of Islam than to any other religion.[14] Hinduism was to be reformed and purified by going `Back to the Vedas' and by extirpating foreign religions as Islam.[15] By the 1880s, the Arya Samaj spread rapidly with a network of local branches throughout the whole of Punjab (except Montgomery). Membership rose even more spectacularly afterwards, more than doubling between 1891 to 1901 (40,000 to 92,000) and further rising five fold and more, with half a million members by 1921.[16] Yet it made little progress among Hindu agriculturists of

---

13. Talbot, n.8, p.70.

14. Kenneth Jones, Arya Dharm, Hindu Consciousness in the Nineteenth Century Punjab (New Delhi, 1976), p.145.

15. J.N. Farquhar, "Arya Samaj", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.VII, Part I, April 1973, p.214.

16. Sumit Sarkar, Modern India (Delhi, 1983), p.74.

Rohtak and Hissar districts. The Samaj's greatest support was among the urban Hindus of Lahore, Amritsar, Rawalpindi and Multan. They looked to it to defend their economic and political power under attack from the Muslims.[17] Dayanand's anti-Islamic postures were limited to scriptural exegesis but later Samajists (Dayanand passed away in 1883) tied both the Islamic doctrines and historical conflict, relating both finally to communal tensions in late nineteenth century. Anti-Islamic postures,[18] coupled with militant Gaurakshni Sabhas (cow-protection societies, begun in 1882 by Dayanand Saraswati) ultimately led to the first major riots between the two communities in Punjab. In fact between 1883 and 1891 more than fifteen major riots took place over kine slaughter or related issues such as playing instruments in front of religious institutions.[19] The Arya samaj was primarily responsible; there was forcible interference with the sale or slaughter of cows and sabha courts punished sale

---

17. Talbot, n.8, p.72.

18. Rival street cover preachers in Lahore's Anarkali bazaar heightened tensions to such a pitch that they were denounced for `breach of peace'. Jones, n.14, p.129.

19. Barrier, n.8, p.90.

to butchers by fine or social boycott. Kine slaughter had been practised in India since Muslim conquest, the current agitations were due to Arya militancy.[20] Rather than limiting slaughter it only led to a hardening of attitudes with the Islamic revivalist trends simultaneously insisting on the necessity of Bakr-Id sacrifice. It also did not help matters that Ramlila (between 1885 to 1887) - a Hindu festival of merry-making fell in the same period as Muharram - where a Muslim funeral procession is led, while on the other hand the press played rumour and fact, further heightening tensions.[21]

Militant anti-Islamism was also related to ideological and personal rivalries within the Arya Samaj (The Arya Samaj split in 1893 between the moderate `College' faction and the `Gurukul' faction). The latter faction of Lekh Ram, Guru Datta, Munshi Ram hoped that their beligerence would cut the ground from under the feet of the `College' and more secular group led by Lala Hans Raj and Lala Lajpat Rai.[22] Nothing

---

20. Jones, n.14, p.153. Quoted from Punjabi Akhbar, Sep. 14, 1889.

21. Ibid., p.91.

22. Talbot, n.8, p.72.

typified Hindu-Muslim tensions more than the communal, ideological and bitter personal rivalry between Lekh Ram (Gurukul Arya Samaji) and Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (the founder and the chief spokesman of the Ahmediyas) which not only spawned hatred but spread riots. Lekh Ram wrote a series of tracts in which he attacked Islam and especially the anti-Arya writings of Ahmad. This pamphlet Risala-i-Jihad-ya'ri Din-i-Muhammadi ki Buniyad (A treatise on waging Holy War, or the foundation of the Muhammadan Religion) caused considerable outcry and was especially offensive to Muslims of all shades.[23] Lekh Ram followed it up by setting up an Arya Samaj branch in Qadian (Ahmad's base). Mirza Ghulam Ahmad attacked the Arya Samajis in similar vein. Lekh Ram continued to attack Islam, highlighting past atrocities. His book in 1896 Takzib-i-Barahin used the most offensive and insulting language towards Islam pitching communal hatred even higher. In 1897 the tensions climaxed in the murder of Lekh Ram by an unknown Muslim. The Press and the pamphlets further exacerbated tensions, made worse by reports that

---

23. Lavan, n.5, pp.327-28.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmed had already prophesised the event.[24] Consequently, communal tensions in Punjabi cities reached their highest point in nineteenth century Punjab. Serious Hindu-Muslim tensions involving both the Arya Samajis and the Ahmadiyas continued into the next decade of the twentieth century upto Ahmad's death in 1908.[25]

The `moderate' (`College') faction of the Arya Samaj too could not relieve communal tensions urging Hindu unity and solidarity, they simultaneously began to participate in the Congress from 1899 onwards. They, in fact, finally came to dominate the Punjab Congress reinforcing its Hindu character which strengthened Muslim suspicion and made effective Muslim participation more remote.[26] They remained involved in Congress activities until 1908. After the 1907 Disturbances, Lala Lajpat Rai left Congress for London leading to a decline of the Punjab Congress. Punjab politics assumed a communal character with a sharp rise in Hindu-Muslim tension and a renewal of Arya interest in organizations to defend

---

24. Ibid., pp.331-32 and 334-39.

25. Ibid., pp.340-41.

26. N.G. Barrier, "The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part II, October 1971, pp.343-44, 348-49.

themselves and the larger Hindu community. Already the 1907 Disturbances had aroused communal tensions driving Aryas to militant defence and establishment of two communal organizations, the Shuddhi Sabhas and the Hindu Sabhas. These were to "remove any possibility of permanent political rapprochement between Hindu and Muslim Punjabis".[27] Moreover, Lala Lajpat Rai founded the communalist Hindu Mahasabha to uphold Hindu interests more vigorously than the Congress, while never breaking with the Congress, hoping to win it over to his side.[28]

The first two decades of the twentieth century saw an intensification of Arya Samaj activities. The 1907 Morley-Minto reform and the forming of the Muslim League to put pressure upon the government for special grants and additional seats in the legislative council led the Arya Samaj to convert the Hindu Sabhas (Hindu cultural organizations formed in 1906 to promote "brotherly feelings among" the divergent Hindu sects) to avowedly communal organizations determined to protect Hinduism at any cost. They

---

27. Ibid., pp.362-63 and 358.

28. Dhanki, n.6, pp.187-88.

moved into the political arena displacing the district associations as spokesman for Punjabi Hindus so that by the summer of 1908 each district had a Hindu Sabha affiliated with the Punjab Hindu Sabha in Lahore. They served as rallying point for a multitude of Hindu protests. Having left the Congress, the Aryas threw themselves into communal organizations - they led the new Sabhas - dominating the pro-Hindu Sabha by the time the All India Hindu Sabha was formed in 1909.[29]

The most controversial facet of Arya Samaj and of which the Muslims bitterly complained as "ripping open old sores"[30] was its emphasis on reconversions. This was potentially explosive - as the `Regenerator of Arya Varta' wrote, "only 5 to 10 per cent of the so-called Mohammedans are the descendants of the original invaders... all the rest are sons and grandsons of those who changed their religion" and again, "millions of our brethren... have turned into deadly

---

29. Barrier, n.26, pp.366-67.

30. Weekly Report of the Political Situation in the Punjab, 7 August 1909, India Office Records, Position 3094. Quoted in Talbot, n.8, p.73.

foes"[31] (by becoming Muslims!). These people were to be reconverted - a dangerous task. Although in the 1890s the Arya Samaj had brought a few outcastes and converts back into the Hindu fold, only after the 1907 Disturbances did it actually make widespread conversions, intensifying attacks on Islam by reclaiming Muslims and Christian converts. In 1909 at Agra the All-India Shuddhi Sabha was founded, primarily led by Punjabi Aryas with close connections with the Hindu Sabha. Their active proselytism aroused Muslim anger and accelerated Muslim organization of their own defence organizations.[32]

In August 1909 there were a series of meetings in Jullundhur district to convert low caste Rahtias and Mazhabis which led the Aryas into conflict with the Singh Sabha (of the Sikhs). The greatest conflict over Shuddhi arose however on the effort to reconvert Muslim Rajput community, the Malkana Rajputs of South East Punjab during the early 1920s. The Shuddhi movement was able to secure the conversion of about 30,000 malkanas. Swami Shradhanand also fol-

---

31. Jones, n.14, pp.130 and 132.

32. Barrier, n.26, p.367.

lowed up with a campaign of reclaiming the Gujjar Mussalmans of Karnal, Ambala, Rohtak and Hissar.[33] All these activities (which were actually spread all the way to the United Provinces) created a stir among the Muslims particularly Punjabi Muslims. Serious disturbances broke out in 1923 in Amritsar, Rawalpindi and subsequently Lahore, following Muslims' retaliatory social and economic boycott of the Hindu community.[34]

Thus the Arya Samaj was primarily responsible for worsening the communal tensions in Punjabi cities, which often led to open riots from the late nineteenth century. Its anti-Islamic postures, Gaurakshini Sabhas, and spearheading of Hindi (instead of Urdu) brought the two major communities into a headlong collision. However nothing proved so diabolical as the Shuddhi. As Sir Abdur Rahim in his presidential address of the All India Muslim League on 1st December 1925 pointed out, "The Muslim regard these movements...led by...Lal Lajpat Rai and Swami Shradhanand, as the most serious challenge to their religion that they

---

33. Ghai, n.6, pp.220-23.

34. Ibid., p.224 and Talbot, n.8, p.74.

ever had to meet as a grave menace to their political status."[35] Although the movement did not succeed in bringing a large number of Muslims and Christians into the Hindu fold, it did create apprehensions in the minds of ordinary Muslims, worsening the communal tangle. MUtual antagonisms acrimonious debate, and riots appeared with a disturbing frequency. Hindus and Muslism alike began to give up many practices which they had mutually imbibed, which had formed a bridge beween the two communities as a the composite culture. Instead, now they started to define themselves sharply to each other, withdrew from each others' festivals, asserting a distinctive, exclusivist and cocooned communal identity.[36]

In 1923 the political ideas underlying the work of Shuddhi found expression in the Sangathan movement which was founded in order to strengthen the internal organization of the Hindu community. Some of its advocates preferred to describe it as a movement for the freedom of India from

---

35. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundation of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents, 1906-47, Vol.II, (New Delhi, 1982), p.42.

36. Beni Prasad, The Hindu-Muslim Question (Allahabad, 1941), p.26.

foreign yoke. The Hindu Sabha took up this work with full approval of ardent Arya Samaj and nationalist leaders, Lajpat Rai and Bhai Parmanand.[37] The Mahabir Dals which were created began to train Hindu youth in wrestling and physical exercises.

Muslim defence and separate identities came in form of new institutions to defend attacks on Islam in general and specific countermovements, like the Tabligh and the Tanzim in answer to Shuddhi and Sangathan movements. The Anjuman-i-Islamia and Anjuman-i-Mujahidin-i-Islam (Socieety of the Soldiers of Islam), both were founded in the wake of Arya Samaj and although its original purpose was not to counter it, it became embroiled in it.[38] Tabligh was started to oppose the Shuddhi movement. In the Sialkot district, the Jamait-i-Dawatt-o-Tabligh-i-Islam started work on the Batwals causing a certain amount of local excitement. The Ahmadias founded Jamiat-i-Tabligh-ul-Islam in Ambala to

---

37. Home (Political) Department Proceedings, 1925, File No.45/1/1925.

38. Thus the Anjuman-i-Islamia was formed to restore Lahore's Badshahi mosque originally. Talbot, n.8, p.74.

counteract Shuddhi.[39] Given that the Hindu and Muslim counterparts were working against each other, it is not surprising that in the 1920s there were Hindu-Muslim clashes in Punjab (Rawalpindi, Lahore and Amritsar).[40]

In 1924, Punjabi Congressman, Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew formed the Jamiat-i-Tanzim movement partly with the aim of achieving Swaraj but mainly to counteract Arya Samaj activities. This movement was a Muslim counterpart of Hindu Sangathan which laid emphasis on the economic independence of the community. It organized Muslim volunteer corps, engaged in social work and educational activities. However the movement did not secure a great deal of adherence on account of the distrust of moderate Muslims of the Khilafat Committee under whose auspices the scheme was launched.[41] Although the Tanzim was not anti-Hindu, it however aroused apprehensions of the Hindus - C.R. Das, Madan Mohan Malviya and Moti Lal Nehru wrote, asking Kitchlew to stop the movement. The net result of Arya Samaj and Muslim countermove-

---

39. Home (Political) Department, Proceedings, 1925, File No.140/1925.

40. Ghai, n.6, p.224.

41. Home (Political) Department, Proceedings, 1925, File No.140/1925 and Talbot, n.8, p.75.

ments however was to grieviously damage the communal relations in the Punjabi cities. Although the Tabligh and the Shuddhi movement petered out by the end of 1920s, they left a lasting legacy of hatred - hatred which would dramatically blind the political activity in the late 1940s.

The Sahidgunj episode in 1937 showed that communal rancour was as active in the 1930s, after the 1920 riots. The controversy was between the Muslims and the Sikhs over demolition of the Sahidgunj mosque site in Lahore. The agitation to secure the land from the Sikhs was led by a clique of self-seekers, institutionalised as a body known as Itihadi-millat.[42] Rumours of Sikh demolition led to serious disturbances in Lahore forcing the calling of the police and the military. While the issue was in the courts, the Ahrar party[43] started agitation for restoration of the mosque to

---

42. Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims - a Political History (New Delhi, 1964), Reprint, p.280.

43. Formed in 1930 as a nationalist, Muslim group, the Ahrar Party was a movement of the urban, middle classes, former Congress and Khilafat members. Shahidgunj was its attempt to unite urban and rural Muslim politics, the first attempt to wean the Pirs away from the Unionists, which the Muslim League succeeded in doing, a decade later. W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India (London, 1946), pp.214-15, Talbot, n.8, p.94.

the Muslims at all costs. They undertook a law-breaking course by marching in defiance of the Governor's orders, leading to some antagonism.

The growth of revivalism led to the development of new schools of thought among the Muslims of Punjabi cities in contrast to the tradition of Pirs among the rural Punjabis. In the tradition of Shah Waliullah, who sought to develop new forms of organization to produce an independent class of ulama which could set religious standards for the community, developed the Ahl-e-Hadis and the ulama of Deoband. The Ahl-e-Hadis emphasised the study of the original Koran and hadis over its subsequent interpretations. The ulama of Deoband, also rejected most of the organizational forms which had come to dominate popular religion in the Punjab. Both were alike in their rejection of the common forms of religious influence centred on the shrines.[44]

In response to such attacks, another distinct perspective developed among those ulama who approved of the forms of popular Islam. The Ahl-e-Sunnat-o-Jamaat legitimized the

---

44. Gilmartin, n.7, pp.490-92.

traditional forms of religious leadership associated with the shrines according to the standards of religious education and debate developed by the reformers. They formed a bridge with religious leadership in the countryside and were distinctive (from the other two) in its ties to rural religious leaders associated with the shrines. Several of the Chisti revivalists took a close interest in its organization - Dar-ul-ulum Naumania at Lahore.[45]

In the twentieth century, although the traditional forms of religious leadership of the shrines had been challenged in the cities, it remained overwhelmingly dominant in rural Punjab. The focus of religious authority continued to be diffused among numerous shrines which were in many ways, tied closely to the local political structures of rural society. Religious leaderlship at these shrines was provided by a sajjada nashin, normally a descendant of the original saint. The hereditary religious authority of the sajjada was based on the transmission of baraka (religious charisma) providing access to religious benefits to a large circle of worshippers. "The hospices...became the foci of

---

45. Ibid., p.492.

the religious aspirations of the ordinary men who sought the baraka of the saint."[46] The Sajjada nashins and baraka were dramatised annually in a ceremony marking the death anniversary of the Saint - Urs. The Sajjada Nashin as religious intermediary was commonly formalized by the tie of pir and murid (master and disciple). The development of this form of hereditary religious leadership was of considerable significance, not only because it spread widely throughout the Punjab, but also because it facilitated a close relationship between religious and political authority. Networks of shrines grew up loosely linked together within the sufi orders, in many cases a large and well-known shrine became the center of a network of much smaller shrines which were monuments to the disciples and descendants of the more well known saint. Many such shrines had their own lines of sajjada nashins who served as pirs for large circles of these disciples, and the extent of their influence can be gauged from the report of one district gazetteer that `practically every Muhammadan in the district has his

---

46. J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford, 1971), p.27.

pir.'[47] This dominant religious authority was combined with economic power - the Pirs were large landowners - and political role - they were as a class linked to the landlord based, loyalist Unionist Party and were encouraged by the British to play a leading role in local life. They were appointed zaildars, honorary magistrates and later as district board members to coopt them as rural allies.[48] In the Land Alienation Act, the Syeds and Qureshis, the `tribes' to which most sajada nashins belonged, were recognized as `agriculture tribes' in most districts. They were also favoured in distribution of canal colony land grants and recognised as `landed gentry'. "It was this recognition as landed rural leaders which provided the basis for the support of many of these sajjada nashins for the Unionist Party."[49] Given the link and their powers, they played an important role in both local and provincial politics both in endorsing candidates and instanding as representatives themselves. The Unionist victory in the 1937 elections owed

---

47. Multan District Gazetteer, 1923-24, p.1290. Quoted in Gilmartin, n.7, pp.486-488.

48. Talbot, n.8, pp.22-24, and p.59.

49. Gilmartin, n.7, p.495.

much to the support it had gained from the leading pirs of the province as also the leading Sufi Shrine at Ajmer.[50]

A significant feature of Punjabi rural Muslim religious life was the Chisti revival which brought a greater emphasis on the definition of Muslim identity according to the Shari-at to the appeal of Muslim religious leaders in Western Punjab, without at the same time challenging the forms of religious influence based on the shrines. They sought to transform the dargahs from being the foci of popular devo-tionalism into centres of Islamic piety and learning. Adherence to the Sharia was made a vital part of their tariqa (teaching).[51] So they tried to bring the Sufis and the ulama together (Khwaja Muhammad Suleman's dar-ul-ulum at Taunsa had numerous madrasas). A network of Chisti revival-ist shrines developed throughout the Western areas of the Punjab. Given Chistis' lack of historical links to the government and because its authority was more religious than economic, it was less responsive to state patronage. They

---

50. Talbot, n.4, p.81.

51. M.Z. Siddiqi, "The Resurgence of the Chisti Silsilah in 18th Century Punjab", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.11, Part II, 1971, p.258.

were able to form a link between rural Sufism and urban orthodoxy. They used this to help bring about the momentary merging of the regions' urban and rural political traditions during the crucial final days of the Pakistan movement.[52]

The most important shrines of the Chisti revival were at Taunsa (Dera Ghazi Khan), Sial Sharif (Shahpur District), Jalapur (Jhelum) and Golra (Rawalpindin). Although concerned with the religious identity of the Muslims these revivalist sajjada nashins did not define politically a set of religious interests independently of the unionist position. This was because they relied, equally with the landed sajjada nashins, for their religious following and usually for financial support on the leaders of rural society, who were overwhelmingly Unionist supporters. Moreover the political alternative for them was alliance with urban politicians who opposed the pro-rural Unionist policy (which would have provided a convenient platform for religious criticism of the Unionists) also putting them in the same camp with the urban reformist ulama, whose attack covered

---

52. Talbot, n.8, p.25.

the whole structure of rural religion.[53] Though unhappy with the religious position of the Unionists, in such circumstances, the revivalist sajjada nashins were unlikely to join in a concerted attack which threatened their own position in rural society. The conflict between religious urges and social position was graphically dramatized in the Shahidganj agitation of 1935-36 which produced the largest response from the sajjada nashins of Punjab of any religious cause before the movement for Pakistan but given its social position and connections, they could not take too strong an anti-Government stand.[54] The revivalist sajjada nashins thus failed to develop effectively a religious attack on the Government and the Unionist Party. The Unionists therefore swept the elections of 1937 without any general religious opposition to their position. For the rural revivalists the Unionists offered no special religious appeal but the tacit support of most was won either indirectly through their personal ties to landed Unionist politicians in the localities) or else by reason of the lack of an aceptable religious alternative which did not threaten the structural and

---

53. Gilmartin, n.7, pp.496-7.

54. Ibid., p.503.

administrative bases of their position in rural society. The active religious support of such pirs was not required; their failure to join opposition was enough to ensure Unionist success. As one local Unionist analysed in 1936, `Villagers, you know, follow these "Pirs" blindly.... Take care of the "Pirs". Ask them only to keep silent on the matter of elections. We don't require their help but they should not oppose us....'[55] In 1937, very few pirs opposed the Unionists but the significant development in Punjab politics after 1937 was the emergence of the Muslim League as a political party transcending the rural-urban distinction. According to David Gilmartin this gave the revivalist sajjada nashins the opportunity which the League offered of infusing a greater religious influence into the politics of the countryside.[56]

The urban-rural distinction which characterised Punjabi religious life reflected in the political style too. The avowedly and antagonistically communal Hindu-Muslim organi-

---

55. Letter, Mohammad Bashir of Gurdaspur to Unionist Party headquarters, 9 May 1936, Unionist Party Papers, File D-17. Quoted in ibid., p.504.

56. Ibid., p.509.

zations set the scene for riots from the late nineteenth century to 1920s to 1930s to the bloody Partition riots. Here separatist organizations among both the organizations held sway at religious, socio-economic and political levels. In the countryside the more syncretic and `secular' Pirs engaged a popular religion closely linked economically and politically to the pro-landlord unionists. Here too however Chisti revivalism laid the seeds for religious "essentialism" which was to transform the countrywide political socio-economic links by the Muslim League. Religious divisions in all played a crucial role in Muslim separatism and in the Muslim League coming to power through the acid test of the 1946 elections.[57]

---

57. Even though the Muslim League did not form the government after its victory in the 1946 elections, they had defeated the Unionists and won.

CHAPTER V

THE RISE OF MUSLIM LEAGUE 1937-1947

In the 1937 elections the Muslim League was only able to secure a derisory 1.2 per cent of the total Muslim seats while the unionists had captured about 90 per cent of the Muslim seats.[1] The success of the Unionist Party showed that Punjabi Muslim electorates still thought in terms of `provincial' or `local' considerations, were not moved by all-India issues and that the Muslim League could not claim to represent them.[2] At the all India level too, the Muslim League had won only 22 per cent of the Muslim seats and only 4.8 per cent of the total Muslim votes. On the other hand the Congress had formed Ministries in seven of the eleven provinces, while the Muslim League could form none. It was thus imperative to penetrate the Muslim majority areas, if only to justify its claim as the sole representative of the

---

1. Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana, ed., Craig Baxter, "The 937 Election and the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.X, Part II, p.366.

2. Deepak Pandey, "Congress-Muslim League Relations 1937-39, `The Parting of the Ways'", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.12, No.4, 1978, p.629.

Indian Muslims. In a dramatic turnaround, in the 1946 elections, the Muslim League swept to a spectacular capture of 87.2 per cent of the Muslim seats while the Unionists were reduced to only 21 members of whom only about half were from Muslim constituency (11 out of 21).[3] How was this sea-change achieved by the Muslim League? This was primarily due to the British role in elevating Jinnah's stature at the all-India level and the targeting by the Muslim League of the same socio-economic and political base that had been hithertofore been the monopoly of the Unionists in the Punjab. As Gilmartin perceptively notes, "the power of the Muslim League rested largely on the same base as had the Unionist Party."[4]

This base was determined by rural interests - out of a total of 86 Muslim seats in the Punjab, 77 (around 90 per cent) were in the rural constituencies and 9 were urban.[5]

---

3. Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement, The Growth of the Muslim League in the North West and North East India 1937-47 (Karachi, 1988), p.100.

4. David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (New Delhi, 1989), p.227.

5. Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan, The Formative Phase 1857-1948 (London, 1968), 2nd Edition, p.216.

This meant that the Muslim League had to present its appeal in the rural idiom. It entailed not merely political manoeuvrings - defections of the landed elite (as was no doubt done towards the 1946 elections),[6] but, more crucially, addressing the socio-economic base that lay behind these local notables. Thus `Pakistan' could only evoke a response when it was creatively linked to current socio-economic problems by rural propagandists, the subsequent wartime socio-economic discontent was effectively exploited, the Pirs were actively wooed by the formation of the Masha'ikh Committee and biraderi ties in the East and ties of economic dependency in the West all marshalled to their support. Thus in the rise of the Muslim League the social and economic factors were crucial, apart from the larger political developments, both within the province and at the all-India level.

The Muslim League's attempt to penetrate the Punjabi countryside and choke off Unionist ascendancy took three main stages.[7] In the first, which began soon after the

---

6. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj (New Delhi, 1988), pp.238-39.

7. Talbot, n.3, p.88.

elections and was brought to an abrupt halt by the Pact between Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Unionist Premier, and Jinnah in October 1937, the League attempted to build a mass organizational base in the countryside. In the second, which lasted from 1937 until the collapse of the Jinnah-Khizr Talks in April 1944, the League was effectively under Unionist control, and had to rely on the efforts of the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation and on urban religious leaders to popularize its demand for Pakistan amongst the rural voters. The final phase, which really began after the collapse of the Simla Conference in August 1945, saw an intensification of the process of attacking the Unionists for wartime dislocation. At the same time, the League made a major effort to win over the support of the leading land-lords and pirs. This strategy enabled it to turn the tables on the Unionists Party in the 1946 elections. It still took, however, a campaign of direct action to finally unseat the Unionists in March 1947.[8]

In 1936 itself, Jinnah had tried to resuscitate the

---

8. Syed Nur Ahmed, edited by Craig Baxter, From Martial Law to Martial Law, Politics in the Punjab 1919-1958 (Lahore, 1985), pp.224-25.

Muslim League in the Punjab. However Fazl-i-Husain was determined to keep his province insulated from central control, indeed he wished to dislodge Jinnah, who then came to Lahore, saying he was going to smash Fazl-i-Husain.[9] However, the Unionist monopoly frustrated his attempts and he disgustedly left saying, "I shall never come to the Punjab ... it such a hopeless place."[10] In the aftermath of the 1937 drubbing, the League was determined to build a mass base of support in the countryside. During the summer months, it launched a vigorous rural propaganda campaign - workers were sent into the villages to form primary League branches and the membership fee was reduced to only four annas. It claimed substantial increase in membership.[11] A number of Provincial League leaders toured the rural areas to whip up membership drive, but it failed, given the Union-

---

9. Ayesha Jalal and Anil Seal, "Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics Between the Wars", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.15, No.3, 1981, pp.450-51.

10. Ibid., p.451.

11. Sayeed, n.5, p.178.

ist ascendancy and the success of its agrarian reforms.[12] These faltering attempts were brought to an end by the Pact which was signed between Jinnah and Sikandar at the October 1937 Lucknow Session of the All India Muslim League.

The October 1937 Pact enabled the Muslim League to reestablish its effectiveness as an instrument of safeguarding the interests of the all-India Muslims in the tussle with Congress, by the full support of the Unionists on all-India issues.[13] This dependency on Unionist's support in all-India politics was counterpoised by the complete subordination of the Punjab Muslim League at the hands of the Unionists.[14] The Pact's immediate effect was to greatly strengthen Jinnah's hand in All-India politics. It was hailed by Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman as an `historic

---

12. The 1930s agrarian legislations further sealed the agriculturists against the urban moneylenders, as discussed in chapter 2. Early in September 1938, more than 150,000 cultivators attended the zamindara conference which Chhotu Ram held at Lyallpur to demonstrate the support for these reforms.

13. In 1937 the Congress formed Ministries in 7 out of 11 provinces. The Muslim League was stranded and had to rely on the support of the Premiers of Punjab and Bengal.

14. Tiwana, n.1, p.370.

event for Muslim India' and a `tremendous gain for them'.[15] Significantly this step too was not without British encouragement.[16] However Sikandir too gained for the effect of the Pact was to seal off the Punjab countryside from League influence. Sikander in fact only acquiesced in the Pact on the understanding that the Punjab Muslim League would be reorganized afterwards. This wish was granted in March 1938 when it was refused reaffirmation to the All-India League on the controversial grounds that its constitution was irregular.[17] Both in formation of the Organizing Committee and the new provincial organization - a new Punjab League - the officials were loyal Unionists much to Punjabi Leaguer's protests. The total Unionist predominance was further underpinned by the Committee of Enquiry (sent by the All

---

15. Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, (Karachi, 1961), p.171 and p.290.

16. Tiwana, n.1, p.370. Sir Henry Craik, an old Punjab civilian and a colleague of Sir Sikandar in the provincial Executive Council had emphasized to Sikander that without strengthening the all India front, the Government of India would find it difficult to withstand the Congress demands. Similarly, Fazl's influence in the 1930s (Communal Award, the 1935 Act) and Jinnah's in 1940s was due to considerable spurring on part of Viceroy Willingdon and Viceroy Linlithgow respectively. D.A. Low, "Introduction: Provincial Histories and the History of Pakistan" in D.A. Low (ed.), The Political Inheritance of Pakistan (Houndmill, 1991), p.7.

17. Talbot, n.3, p.90.

India leadership) which endorsed Unionist roughshod overriding of the interests of provincial Leaguers. In return for All India ascendancy, the price was the virtual halt in League's organizational activities in the Punjab countryside. These were not to begin in earnest until the Second World War which elevated Jinnah's status thus enabling him to dispense with unionist backing.

In 1940 the All India Muslim League passed the historic `Pakistan Resolution' on March 23rd. Although originally drafted by Sikander, the final version had moved away from his confederal emphasis - a loose all India federation of zones including provinces and states.[18] Although the word `Pakistan' was not used, the notorious provision of `territorial readjustments' was clearly a hold-all for additions to, as well as reductions of, existing provinces. Its separatist emphasis marked firm rejection of Sikander's federation.[19] The Resolution increased Punjab's importance further but Sikander increasingly distanced himself from the

---

18. R.J. Moore, "Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.17, No.4, 1983, p.541 and Sayeed, n.5, p.113.

19. Ibid., p.543.

Pakistan scheme. It not only threatened his carefully crafted all-India federal solution but their extensive provincial powers as well. Moreover it entailed the risk that they would lose control over the Hindu half of the state, besides submission to all-`Pakistan' Muslim leadership which may not be in accordance with the interests of the `agriculturists'.[20] Sikander did not want to alienate the Hindu and Sikh allies and reiterated concern for a united Punjab in March 1941. Significantly, Jinnah's deliberate vagueness about the Lahore resolution's implications camouflaged this fact from less farsighted Punjabi politicians.[21] Given this dichotomy of ultimate interests, the Pact was becoming a liability for the Muslim League and moreover Jinnah's increasing stature at all-India level meant that the Pact had also lost its raison d'etre. Thus in the spring of 1944 Jinnah effected the collapse of the

---

20. Low, n.16, pp.10 and 13.

21. Ian Talbot, "The Unionist and Punjab Politics, 1937-1947", in D.A. Low (ed.), The Political Inheritance of Pakistan (Houndmills, 1991), p.94.

Jinnah-Sikander Pact.[22] It led to a massive increase in Muslim League activity in the Punjab.

The little work that was carried out in these `Pact years' was the `unofficial' work of the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation. At its Pakistan Conference in March 1941, a Pakistan Rural Propaganda Committee was created. The following May it visited fifty villages in the Sheikhupura district, opening Primary League branches in each of them. At the end of the year the Punjab League could still boast of a total membership of 15,000 only and in ten districts still lacked any local organization. The collapse of the Pact led to renewed activity but even so, its own probably inflated membership figures stood at only 150,000 in the Spring of 1945. This represented under 1 per cent of the Muslim population.[23]

However by 1944, especially after the Pact collapsed, a

---

22. Jinnah insisted on changing the `Unionist Coalition Ministry' into a `League Coalition Ministry' with its attendent implication of interference in provicial affairs. Declaring that the Pact was not binding, when the Khizr-Noon talks collapsed, the Pact was anulled and Khizr expelled from the League. Tiwana, n.1, pp.380-81.

23. Talbot, n.21, p.95.

definite change had been effected in the Punjab province. This was on account of various socio-economic as well as political factors at provincial as well as at the All-India level. The upshot of this change was that for once the Unionists were at the wrong side of the change and the League was actively exploiting the situation to its benefit. The Unionists' close identification with the British meant that the exigencies of the war in the form of wartime exactions, including foodgrain requisitioning and economic discontent on account of shortages and price fluctuations, all recoiled back to the detriment of the Unionists. In effect the war cut at the socio-economic base of the Unionists, so assiduously cultivated as it was, till now by political alignment with the British.[24] There were also other broad political factors at work to upset the pre-war balance - at the provincial level, after the death of Sikander in 1942, factional divisions racked Khizr's Ministry, leading to defections. At the all-India level the British promise in March 1942 to concede Indian independence after the Second World War and Congress's readiness to make the

---

24. Talbot, n.3, p.94.

British `quit India' without taking the interests of the Muslims into account, led to a shift in focus to all-India stage and also to the increase in the stature of Jinnah. Consequently, the attitude of a great many Muslims began to shift.[25] In these circumstances the Pakistan movement began to spread more extensively from its original core support in the Muslim-minority provinces to the Muslim-majority provinces like Punjab. The Muslim League began to exploit the economic conditions and presented Pakistan as a panacea,[26] they began to actively suffuse their activities with Islamic doctrines and symbolisms,[27] and actively cultivated the landlords and the Pirs. It was this targeting that was to be ultimately crucial, though it coopted the Unionist socio-economic base rather than effecting a change in structure.[28]

---

25. Low, n.16, p.10.

26. Satya M. Rai, Punjab Since Partition (Delhi, 1986), p.14.

27. David Gilmartin, "`Divide Displeasure' and Muslim Elections: The Shaping of Community in Twentieth-Century Punjab" in D.A. Low, The Political Inheritance of Pakistan 1(Houndmills, 1991), pp.120-121 and 124-125. The contest was widely portrayed as between haq o batil (right and wrong), between Islam and Kufar (infidel).

28. Gilmartin, n.4, p.227. This was to have a lasting effect on Pakistan, till recent Pakistani political history.

The impact of the wartime economic dislocations made the Unionist Party unpopular amongst many of its petty zamindar, Jat and Asian supporters in the eastern districts of the province. Although the war's demands on the province's manpower and produce had initially removed the low agricultural prices which had plagued the 1930's, it brought with it a new range of economic difficulties, including shortages of consumer and capital goods, high prices and inflation.[29] The worst effects were borne by the wage earners and fixed income earners in the towns. However the Unionist Party's zamindar supporters also became increasingly affected for though they obtained high prices for their produce throughout most of the war, but they too suffered shortages of vital commodities such as cloth, sugar and kerosene. When rationing was introduced into the Ambala District there were constant complaints from the villagers that they received smaller quotas than the urban population. Most kerosene never in fact found its way into the villages.[30] More disturbing were the fluctuations in agri-

---

29. Talbot, n.3, p.94.

30. Ian Talbot, "The 1946 Elections", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.14, No.1, 1980, pp.72-73.

cultural prices; until 1944 the high prices which the zamindars gained for their wheat and other agricultural produce outweighed the increased prices and shortages of consumer products. But in the same autumn (1944) there was a substantial fall in agricultural prices. The Unionists were under pressure from its supporters to alleviate but their hands were tied by the British,[31] who continued to ban free movement of grain between Punjab and the United Provinces. Despite grain price recovery in the first few months of 1945 the zamindars hoarded. As a result by December 1945 wheat, maize and gram had virtually disappeared from the open market. Many towns in the province, even in the Canal Colony areas, began to experience a wheat famine. The Unionist Government was therefore forced to requisition grain from the villages of East Punjab, arousing considerable opposition.[32] Disturbances in fact broke out as a result in Ludhiana, Hoshiarpur, and Ferozepur districts

---

31. Ibid., p.73.

32. Glancy, the Governor, had backed the Ministers but Wavell's reply was a clear rejection, "the procurement of the necessary surplus wheat from the Punjab is more important than any interests of the Ministers." This was to prove damning - both landlords and tenants were affected.

right in the middle of the elections.[33]

The Muslim league thoroughly exploited the situation and gained much political mileage. They organized protest meetings about alleged communal favouritism in rationing. Even more important was its policy of seeking political support in the villages by helping the peasants to overcome their economic peasants. League propagandists took medical supplies (increasingly expensive and difficult to obtain), distributed cloth there and endeavoured to obtain increased ration allowances for the villagers. They enjoined Pakistan to the peasants not only as a religious imperative but as a panacea for their social and economic problems.[34]

This economic fallout, which the Unionists could not prevent, and further developments at the centre reinforced the growing conviction that the Unionist Party no longer provided the best security for local notables. After the Simla Conferences of June 1945 it was clear that the Muslim

---

33. Talbot, n.30, p.74.

34. Ibid., p.75. Propagandists were directed when visiting a village, "Find out its social problems and difficulties to tell them that the main cause of their problems was the Unionists (and) give them the solution - Pakistan.

League, rather than the Unionist Party, offered the Punjabi landowners the most reliable access to patronage and power. This prompted large scale defections from the Unionists. Already, factional rivalries had divested Khizr of Shaukat Hayat (the decreased Sikander's son), Mir Maqboool Mahmod along with Mian Mumtaz Daultana form the influential Multani landowning family. These landlords (and later defectors) wielded immense social and economic power in their home districts and amongst their biraderi throughout the province and from whom the Unionists had traditionally drawn their leadership. Instead now they toured all the five Provinces divisions, addressed Muslim League Conferences, and opened primary League branches. Chhotu Ram's death at the end of 1944 dealt a further blow to the Unionists, his successor - Chaudhari Tikka Ram was unable to halt Congress's erosion of Unionists' traditional support in South East Punjab[35] mirroring Muslim League's inroads in the West. By the end of 1945 the Muslim League had captured the support of a third of the Unionist Party's Assembly members including the leading landlords. This led the Statesman to observe that

---

35. Chhotu Ram's death was that of the third prominent Unionist's after Fazl-i-Husain and Sikandar Hayat Khan representing Unionists steady decline.

it was the sons of the old Unionist leaders, who having deserted the party of their fathers, were now leading the Muslim League in the Punjab.[36] Landlord support was crucial because "In many constituencies the voting... (was) along tribal or personal lines and not according to political convictions."[37] This was as true in 1937 as in the 1946 Elections.[38] On polling day, the landlords marshalled their tenants and used their economic resources to ensure that votes were cast for the League.[39]

Apart from exploitation of the wartime economic grievances, the wooing of the landlords, the other major thrust of the League was the use of Islamic appeals and symbolisms. Mosques were used to spread League propaganda (propagandists were advised to join prayers at the local mosque and then

---

36. The Statesman, 12 April 1945, p.5. Quoted in Stephen Oren, "The Sikhs, Congress, and the Unionists, 1937-1945", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.8, No.3, 1974, p.417.

37. Punjab Fortnightly Report for 2nd half of November 1936, 18/11/36, Home Political File, National Archives of India (NAI).

38. As noted, moreover of the 86 Muslim seats, some ninety per cent were in the rural constituencies. The All India Muslim Council too reflected this; landlords represented the largest single group there, Punjab contributing the highest. Sayeed, n.5, pp.207 and 216.

39. Talbot, n.21, p.98.

hold meetings there), the Quran was used as League's symbol and Islam with its symbols and slogans figured prominently in speeches, including that of the Quaid-i-Azam, Jinnah.[40] The students who played an important part in the League's election campaign had in particular been trained to appeal along religious lines. At its peak (1945 Christmas vacation) there were 1550 members of the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation and 250 Aligarh students working on League's behalf.[41] Exaggerated accounts of Hindu atrocities, based on the Pirpur and Shareef Reports were circulated to whip up communal passions.[42] In 1943 the Punjab Muslim Students Federation wrecked the Lyallpur Jat Mahasabha Conference removing the threat of intercommunal Jat support for the League.[43]

The Unionists too reacted by introducing a religious content into its own propaganda - Khizr highlighted that in

---

40. Sayeed, n.5, pp.197-199.

41. Mushirul Hasan, "Nationalist and separatist trends in Aligarh, 1915-47", The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.22, No.1, 1985, pp.19-20.

42. Ibid., p.20.

43. Talbot, n.21, p.78.

the Quran, Allah is described as Rabb-ul Alameen (of every-one) and not of only the Muslims.[44] They also flew an identical Islamic flag. Apart from raising doubts among its non-Muslim supporters, with dwindling landlord support and with no student volunteers, it only feebly imitated the League. Thus this attempt backfired.

However popular peasant religious life was represented by the Pirs. The Unionists also lost the support of many of the provinces' leading pirs and sajjada nashins towards the 1946 elections. These Pirs played an important in the League's success because of their immense spiritual and temporal sway over their numerous followers in the villages.[45] The Muslim League endeavoured to repeat the Unionist formula for victory in 1946, when it created the Masha'ikh Committee to marshal Sufi support behind its cause.[46] According to Gilmartin, the most vital support for Pakistan came from the Chishti revivalists who "had long

---

44. The point was that in this light the Unionist Party's non-communalism was more Islamic than League's avowed communalism.

45. David Gilmartin, "Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.13, No.3, 1979, pp.487-488.

46. Sayeed, n.5, p.203.

sought an outlet for expressing there religious concerns in the political arena". The timing was mainly decided by the independent position that the league was able to establish transcending the rural-urban distinction, and therefore these revivalist sajjada nashins by aligning with the League did not risk associating with their adversaries - the reformist ulema.[47] That had been the situation in 1937, in 1946 these religious families, "injected a religious fervour... which upset most traditional alignments on which Unionist political strength had rested.[48] However Talbot points out[49] that older Chisti shrines as too the pirs of the Qadiri order in some districts (like Shakargarh) also exerted an important influence in the League's success in 1946. The Chisti pirs, according to him, were more significant in that they were taking an active part in politics for the first time.[50] Most significantly however, the League achieved its greatest electoral success in such districts as Multan, Jhang, Jhelum and Karnal, where it had obtained the

---

47. Gilmartin, n.45, pp.504-9.

48. Ibid., p.513.

49. Talbot, n.21, pp.85-86.

50. Ibid., p.87.

support of the leading pirs and sajjada nashins.[51] These pirs issued `fatwas' (religious judgements) to their disciples in the League's favour, the consequence of its disobeyance would invite `Divine Displeasure' it was said.[52]

The election results of 1946 revealed the Unionist Party's rapid decline and the Muslim League's success in having coopted the socio-economic base of the former.[53] It captured 75 of the 86 Muslim seats, winning all 11 of the urban and 64 of the 75 rural constituencies. The Unionist Party was reduced to a rump of 18 members in the 175-strong Assembly. The League's victory paved the way for Pakistan. It was not able, however, to form a Ministry being short of an absolute majority. Instead a coalition of the Unionists, Akalis and the Congress was installed, with Khizr as the

---

51. Ibid., p.69.

52. Gilmartin, n.27, p.124.

53. Kirpal Singh,"Genesis of the Partition of the Punjab - 1947", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part II, p.407. He gives the relative strength of the various parties just after elections of 1945-46.:
Muslim League - 73 seats Akalis - 21 seats
Unionist - 19 seats Independent - 11 seats
Congress - 51 seats Total seats -175 seats.

Premier.[54] At the beginning of 1947 the League used Khizr's banning of the para military Muslim League National Guards as a pretext to bring down his government. A direct action campaign was launched which gained widespread Muslim support in the wake of polarisation of opinion following the Calcutta killings of August 1946. Continuous hartals, demonstrations and processions compelled Khizr to resign on 2 March 1947.[55] The Punjab therefore entered the final months of British control under Governor's rule. The Spring of 1947 had led both the Congress and the Akali Dal to demand the Punjab's partition. Astonishingly thus no Muslim League government ever held office in the Punjab - the crucial area without which an independent Pakistan could never have been created - until independence and partition had actually been achieved. Nonetheless the 1946 elections was an important milestone that indicated that the Muslims were solidly behind the Muslim League and its `Pakistan' programme.[56] However Talbot believes the elections did not reflect a vote for Pakistan but "the regions war-weariness and the Muslim

---

54. Ahmed, n.8, p.179.

55. Ibid., pp.224-25.

56. Singh, n.53, p.408.

League's capture of the rural notables support."[57] Undoubtedly the landlords and the pirs were crucial to League's victory but more important was the targeting of the socio-economic base that these political elite represented. Thus the League's identification with the villager's wartime economic difficulties, its ability to provide answers to the economic dislocation of the countryside caused by the war was the key to its success in winning over the Punjabi villagers. Religious appeals or ideas alone were insufficient rather the importance of interests was more crucial in mobilizing support. The League's demand for Pakistan was certainly legitimized in the minds of the Muslim voters by its religious appeal, especially as this was delivered by the pirs and sajjada nashins, but its potency lay in the fact that it was a systematic expression of the Muslim peasants' interests. The social and economic factors thus underpinned Muslim separatism and ultimately the Muslim League's breakthrough in the 1946 elections. However it needs reiteration that these factors did not preordain the partition of the Punjab; they only helped the Muslim

---

57. Talbot, n.21, p.100.

League's ascendancy when Jinnah's status was boosted by the British as a counterweight to the Congress on the one hand,[58] and Unionists social, economic and political base undermined by the British on the other (after the onset of the Second World War).

---

58. This is corroborated from the study of Linlithgow and Zetland papers by Dr. Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism (New Delhi, 1977), pp.169-70.

CONCLUSION

In 1947, India was partitioned and a new state of Pakistan came into being. Without the support of the Punjabi Muslims, this could not have been achieved - in fact, Punjab was to be its heartland, the `cornerstone' in Jinnah's own words. However the Muslim League till the 1946 Elections was a clear outsider in Punjabi politics and could never in fact form a ministry there before the Partition. Yet these stark facts hid important social and economic differences, which under British rule had come to be competitively aligned along religions lines. These factors fed Muslim separatism in the Punjab on the one hand, and determined the ultimate success of the Muslim League on the other. It is to be noted that Muslim separatism got linked to the rise of the Muslim League ultimately, because the only other dominant alternative in the 1940s -- that of the intercommunal, loyalist framework provided by the Unionists was undermined by the British after the Second World War

began.[1] Once the Unionist framework was threatened by the British priority commitments to the war-effort and their imminent withdrawal, the Muslim League could coopt the Unionist base. The primacy of the social and economic factors is highlighted by the fact that despite British desertion of their allies, the Muslim League's rise, was critically determined by their addressing the same socio-economic base as that of the Unionists. In the 1940s they targeted the social and economic frictions which had assumed communal overtones over the preparation years in the Punjab.

The economic factors contributed to Muslim separatism mainly because econmic disparities fell along religious lines, with the Muslims falling at the worse half of the divide. The first economic divide here was that between the moneylenders (mainly Hindus) and the peasants (mainly Muslims) centred mainly on the fact that the predominantly poor, Muslim peasants were perennially indebted to the predominantly Hindu, rich moneylenders. In this spectre of

---

1. After the 1935 Government of India Act to the 1940 `Pakistan' Resolution and thereafter till 1946, Punjabi intercommunal provincialism coupled to a loose federation competed with Jinnah's `self determinism' for the Muslims in form of a separate state.

exploitation the moneylender also embroiled the rich agriculturists (largely Muslim landlords in the western Punjab) to the extent that soon there was a wholesale transfer of land from the landlords to the moneylender. Given this situation, the Hindu moneylender became the common economic enemy of the peasants as well as the landlords. As this divide was economic cum religions, communal passions could always be aroused to serve their interests, as they were by the big Muslim landlords. Despite legislation to the contrary, the moneylenders continued to thrive especially in western Punjab. In this background it is not surprising that in the 1940s Muslim League propaganda of Hindu economic explitation of the Muslims struck a responsive cord among the Punjabi Muslims. Afterall, Hindu dominance extended to the fields of trade, industry, commerce and banking as well.

Apart from this moneylender-agriculturist divide, there was also the differentiation within the oversweeping category of `zamindars' as determined by the British. In fact over 70 per cent of these so-called `zamindars' (literally *landlords*) had no land of their own! Moreover more and more of these `zamindars' were being pushed in the 1930's to the status of tenants and agricultural labourers. This fact was

papered over by the landlord-unionists. The wartime exactions, shortages and price fluctuations hit out at these poorer sections the most harshly. In fact it made them into a highly combustible `material' in the events leading upto the Partition. Although no substantial work has been done on the `crowds' or the mobs supporting the League through protests, demonstrations, even riots, Talbot's attempt[2] highlights that these classes were at the forefront in these agitations. There had already been violence against the landlords by this discontented class, which had led these landlords to use communalism even more stoutly, raising the cries of `Islam in danger' to divert the discontent of these subaltern classes to serve their (landlords) class interests.

The third crucial economic divide was between the agriculturist versus the non-agriculturist which institutionalised the rural-urban divide. The 1901 Legislation to the legislation in the 1930s, including the so-called `Golden Laws' insulated the ascendancy of the agriculturist class

---

2. Ian Talbot, "The Role of the Crowd in the Muslim League Struggle for Pakistan", The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.21, No.2, May 1993.

(again, notably the actual landlords) from any outside interest (urban upcoming classes). This too aroused communal discord because this agriculturist legislation was seen as essentially anti-Hindu for the non-agriculturists it excluded from power were predominantly Hindus. In fact it was the bane of the economic structure that given its parallel religious reflection as well, any measure taken would necessarily be to the detriment of the `other' community. Thus these excluded elements readily aligned themselves to communal organisations in the urban areas, where not surprisingly, the canker of communalism led Punjabi cities to be dubbed - the `Ulster' of India.

This conservative policy of legitimising the landlords was mirrored in their political ascendancy. Political equations were contrived to ensure this candidacy and voting considerations served the rural, agriculturist interests by active British consent. Until the Muslim League addressed itself directly to this socio-economic base that translated itself into the political arena, they were not able to penetrate the overwhelmingly rural-constituency Punjab (around 90 per cent of the seats were there). Thus it was

not the Muslim League's organization (weak even in 1945) or even its ideology in itself but winning over these landlords cum politicians that was to prove crucial in the 1946 elections..

Apart from these economic divides at these three levels, there was another divide within urban Punjab in the form of the scramble over government jobs, which proved equally explosive. The British system effected changes in the education system and its corollary, the professions. Western and especially English education was readily lapped up by the emerging Hindu urban interests, while the more economically adverse and religiously constrained Muslims (Quran was the leitmotif of Muslim education) kept a distance from this education. The result was that government jobs, one of the most powerful group and a most conscious status symbol among urban Muslims, progressively became an urban Hindu domain. Again `secular' divisions had fallen along communal lines. Given this, the efforts that were activated to bridge this gap naturally too fell along religious lines. Initially Muslim efforts were to reorient the Anjumans to improve Muslim education and hence government representation, but given its slow progress activities were

channelled into political demands for Muslim `rights' in terms of preferential treatment or reservations. When the British conceded on the point, they merely encouraged separate mobilization, separate agitations, all fuelling the communal divide. The first political organizations among both the communities had government jobs at the helm of its agenda. It is not surprising that these educated classes among either communities, were at the forefront among the communal organizations. Thus the same urban Hindu clases who monopolised education and government jobs were also representatives of the Arya Samaj. The urban Muslims similarly were allied to the Muslim League, which was till the 1930s representing mainly urban Muslim interests. The Muslim League could present `Pakistan' in the 1940s in the idiom of jobs for all educated Muslims which created a response among these classes.

This economic and urban divide was legitimised by the increasing religious divide, in the form of the religious revival movements which swept both the main communities in urban as well as (to a lesser extent) rural Punjab. In the urban areas the tone was set in the last decade of the

nineeenth century itself when the Arya Samaj activities unleashed the first riots in Punjabi cities. Subsequently by pitting itself with the equaly aggressive Ahmediyas leading to the murder of Lekh Ram, a disturbing legacy of communal tensions was carried over to early twentieth centtury. Shuddhi movement generated riots in the 1920s. This militant avowal of Hindu reigious identity was counterpoised by an equally combative Muslim countermovements - the Tabligh and the Tanzim, apart from other Muslim revivalist movements like the Ahl-e-hadis. Given Arya Samaj dominance in the Congress in 1900s, it made effective Muslim participation remote. The result was that the revivalist assault on Punjabi cities bred exclusivism in the form of separate identity formation, attack on syncretic cults and withdrawal from mutually attended festivals - in short a serious breakdown of mainstream composite culture. Given the anti-Islamic postures of the Hindu organizations, Muslim League's propaganda found a `ready soil' in the 1940s.

This revivalism was however limited to the cities. Rural Punjab was presided over by the syncretic Pirs to whom both Muslims and Hindus flocked. There `folk Islam of the Shrine' was the dominant religious ethos and not that of the

alim and the mosque. Although revivalism in the form of Chishti revivalists (whlo emphasised the Shariat and greater definition of Muslim identity) had penetrated the rural areas, it is significant that they had to compromise by not challenging the authority of the shrines. More important was the fact that the socio-economic base of these Pirs was allied to the landlords, given class affinity and hence politically they were similarly aligned (unionists). The Muslim League had to address this towards the 1946 elections. It was only when the Unionist framework was encroached upon by British withdrawal (imminent) and the shift to an all-India level, that the Pirs responded to systematic Muslim League wooing (the Masha'ikh Committee) and not due to vague Islamic appeals. Undoubtedly for the Chistis who were not compromised by government links, the religious factor was more important.

Ultimately therefore the Muslim League succeeded in the crucial 1945-6 elections not because of Islamic slogans - they had been there in the 1937 elections too, when the Muslim League captured only one out of eighty six Muslim seats. Nor had the Muslims suddenly woken up to Islamic

solidarity in the 1940s. It was not due to political manoeuvrings alone for they cannot explain the drastic change in 1946 at the level of the people. It was also not due to changes at the all-India level alone, for despite British withdrawal promise and subseuent shift to all-India where Jinnah was being bolstered up by the British (as a counterweight to the Congress), capturing Punjab thereafter did not become a given thing. What underpinned the Muslim League's 1946 turnaround was its systematic thrust on the social and economic base that the unionists had once commanded. The targeting of the landlords, Pirs, the educated classes, the current economic problems, and Islamic symbolisms attests to this fact. Pakistan was then presented as a panacea to all these social and economic problems.

In the 1946 Elections thus the Muslim League secured the highest seats (above 87 per cent in the Muslim seats) and although they could not still form the ministry owing to a lack of absolute majority, Punjabi Muslims had been won over. With the success at the 1946 Elections Jinnah could justify himself as the `Sole Spokesman' and in effect the 1946 Elections paved the way for Pakistan.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES:

Unpublished:

National Archives of India, New Delhi.

Government of India Proceedings.

Home Department (Political A), August 1910, File No.66/68;
(Political B), October 1912, File No.2-3.
(Political), 1925, File No.45/1/1925.
(Political), 1925, File No.140/1925.
(Political), Punjab Fortnightly Report for 2nd half of November 1936, File No.18/11/36.

Published:

Rose, H.D., Census of India 1901, Vol.XVII, The Punjab and N.W.F.P., Government Printing Office, Simla, 1902.

Kaul, Pandit, Harikishan, Census of India, 1911 (Punjab), Vol.XIV, Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1912.

Middleton, L.W. and Jacob, S.M., Census of India 1921, Vol.XV, Punjab and Delhi, Civil and Military Press, Lahore, 1923.

Khan, Ahmad Khan, Census of India, 1931, Punjab and its Feudatories, Vol.I, Part, Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1933.

Books:

Ahmad, Syed Nur, From Martial Law to Martial Law, Politics in the Punjab, 1919-1958 (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1985).

Ali, Imran, The Punjab under Imperialism 1885-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988).

Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983).

Aziz, K.K., The History of the Idea of Pakistan, Vol.3 (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1987).

Banerjee, Himadri, Agrarian Society of the Punjab, 1849-1901 (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1982).

Barrier, N.G., The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900 (Durham: Duke University, N.C., 1966).

Chandra, Bipan, Communalism in Modern India (New Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1987).

Chaudhari, Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakisttan (Longmans Pakistan Branch, 1961).

Chhabra, G.S., Social and Economic History of the Panjab 1849-1901 (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1962).

Calvert, H., The Wealth & Welfare of the Punjab (Lahore: The Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1936).

Darling, M.L., The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (London: Oxford University Press, 1925).

_____, Rusticus Loquitor or the Old Light and the New in the Punjab Village (London: Oxford University, 1930).

_____, At Freedom's Door (London: Oxford Univesitty Press, 1949).

Desai, A.R., Social Background of Indian Nationalism (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1948).

Dixit, Prabha, Communalism - A Struggle for Power (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1974).

Gilmartin, David, Empire and Islam, Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Hardy, Peter, Muslims of British India (Cambridge University Press, 1972).

Hunter, W.W., The Indian Mussalmans (London: Premier Book House, 1964).

Jalal, Ayesha, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Jones, Kenneth, Arya Dharm, Hindu Consciousness in Nineteenth Century Punjab (New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1976).

Kaura, Uma, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, The Emergence for the Demand of India's Partition (New Delhi: Manohar, 1977).

Low, D.A. (ed.), The Political Inheritance of Pakistan (Houndmills: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991).

Mohan, Inder, Hindustan and Pakistan and their Communal Problem (Lahore: Modern Publication, 1947).

Nijjar, B.S., Punjab under the British Rule, Vol.I (New Delhi: K.B. Publications, 1974).

Pandey, Gyanendra, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Philips, C.H. and Wainright, M.D. (eds.), The Partition of India, Policies and Perspectives 1935-1947 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970).

Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin (ed.), Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents, 1906-1947, Vol.I (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1969).

Prasad, Beni, The Hindu-Muslim Question (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1941).

Rai, Satya M., Partition of the Punjab (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1965).

Rakkar, J.S., Muslim Politics in the Punjab (New Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1985).

Robinson, Francis, Separatism Among Indian Muslims (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1975).

Saini, B.S., The Social and Economic History of the Punjab 1901-1939 (Delhi: ESS ESS Publications, 1975).

Singh, Anita I., The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-47 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Singh, Kirpal, The Partition of the Punjab (Patiala: Punjabi Universtiy, 1972).

Smith, W.C., Modern Islam in India (London: Victor Gollancy, 1946).

Sayeed, Khalid B., Pakistan, The Formative Phase, 1857-1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

Siddiqui, Kalim, Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan (London: Macmillan Press, 1972).

Talbot, Ian, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in the North West and North East India, 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988).

_____, Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishing, 1988).

Thorburn, S.S., Musalmans and Moneylenders in the Punjab (Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1983).

Trevaskis, H.K., The Punjab of Today, Vol.1 (Lahore: Civil & Military Gazette, 1931).

Zakaria, Rafiq, Rise of Muslims in Indian Politics: an Analysis of Development from 1885 to 1906 (Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1970).

Articles:

Abbasi, Yusuf, "A Tussle for the Punjab Leadership", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.IX, Part II, October 1975, pp.399-47.

Ahmad, Shaghir, "Social Stratification in a Punjabi Village", Contribution to Indian Sociology, New Series, No.4, 1970, pp.105-25.

Alavi, Hamza, "Kinship in Western Punjab Villages", Contributions to Indian Sociology, New Series, No.6, 1972, pp.1-28.

_____, "Politics of Dependence: A Village in West Punjab", South Asia Review, IV:2, 1972, pp.111-128.

Ali, Imran, "Relations between the Muslim League and Punjabi Nationalist Unionist Party, 1937-47", South Asia, No.6, 1976, pp.51-65.

`A Punjabee' (Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain), Punjab Politics, The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part I, April, 1971, pp.128-160.

Aziz, K.K., "The Political Factor in the Making of Pakistan", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part II, October 1976, pp.403-424.

Barrier, N.G., "The Formulation and Enactment of the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill", The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.II, No.2, April 1965, pp.145-65.

_____, "The Punjab Disturbances of 1907: The Response of the British Government in India to Agrarian Unrest", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.1, No.4, 1967, pp.353-83.

_____, "Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1870-1890", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part I, April 1971, pp.84-127.

_____, "The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab 1894-1908", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part II, October 1971, pp.343-367.

Baily, Chris, "The Prehistory of `Communalism' Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.19, No.2, 1985, pp.302-335.

Bhattacharya, Neeladri, "The Logic of Tenancy Cultivation: Central and South-East Punjab", The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.20, No.2, 1983, pp.121-169.

Brennan, Lance, "The Illusion of Security: The Background to Muslim Separatism in the United Provinces", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.18, No.2, 1984, pp.237-72.

Chander, Sunil, "Congress-Raj Conflict and the Rise of the Muslim League in the Ministry Period, 1937-39", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.21, No.2, 1987, pp.303-328.

Chandra, Sudhir, "Communal Elements in 19th Century Hindi Literature", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22, 4, October 1980, pp.42-78.

Choudhry, Prem, "Rural Relations Prevailing in the Punjab at the Time of Enactment of the so-called `Golden Laws' or Agrarian Legislation of the Late 30's", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.X, Part II, October 1976, pp.461-480.

_____, "Social Support Base and Electoral Politics: The Congress in Colonial Southeast Punjab", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.25, No.4, 1991, pp.811-831.

Edward D. Churchill, "Muslim Societies of the Punjab 1860-1890", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.VIII, Part I, April 1974, pp.69-74.

Dhanki, J.S., "Lala Lajpat Rai and Communal Politics in India", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XXIII, No.I, Apr. 1989, pp.184-199.

Farquhar, J.N., "The Arya Samaj", The Punjab Past & Present, Vol.VII, Part I, April 1973, pp.206-232.

Fox, Richard G., "Urban Class and Communal Consciousness in Colonial Punjab: The Genesis of India's Intermediate Regime", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.18, No.3, 1985, pp.459-89.

Freitag, Sandra, "Sacred Symbol as Mobilising Ideology: The North Indian Search for a `Hindu' Community", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22, 4 October 1980, pp.79-102.

Gajrani, S.D., "Agrarian Unrest in British Punjab", The Punjab Present and Past, Vol.XX, No.1, April 1986, pp.165-187.

Ghai, R.K., "Tabligh and Shuddhi Movement in the Nineteen Twenties", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XX, No.I, April 1986, pp.217-225.

Gilmartin, David, "Religious Leadelrship and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.13, No.3, 1979, pp.485-517.

Hasan, Mushirul, "Nationalist and Separatist Trends in Aligarh 1915-47", The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.22, No.1, 1985, pp.1-33.

Heegar, G.A., "The Growth of the Congress Movement in the Punjab 1920-40", The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.XXXII, No.1, November 1972, pp.39-52.

Islam, Zafar-ul, "Muslim Political Consciousness in Indo-Pakistan", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.X, Part II, October 1976, pp.386-397.

Islam, M.M., "Irrigation and Punjab Agriculture, 1906-45: Some Preliminary Notes", South Asia, New Series, 1:1, 1978, pp.29-57.

Jalal, Ayesha and Anil Seal, "Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics Between the Wars", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.15, No.3, 1981, pp.415-54.

Jones, W.H. Morris, "The Transfer of Power, 1947", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.16, No.1, 1982, pp.1-32.

Kaur, Mandeep, "The Partition of India: A Case Study", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.21, Part II, October 1987, pp.388-98.

Krishan, Gopal, "Religion in Politics", Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.8, Nos.1-4, 1971, pp.362-94.

Lavan, Spencer, "Communalism in the Punjab: The Ahmadiyah Versus the Arya Samaj During the Lifetime of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad", The Punjab Past and Present, Oct. 1971, Vol.V, Part II, pp.320-42.

Maclane, "Peasants, Moneylenders and Nationalists at the end of Nineteenth Century:, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.1, No.1, July-September 1983, pp.66-73.

Malik, Hafeez, "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Contribution to the Development of Muslim Nationalism in India", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.4, No.2 (1970), p.129-47.

Moore, R.J., "Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.17, No. , 1983, pp.529-561.

Mukherjee, Mridula, "Rural Indebtedness in Colonial Punjab", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XXIII, Part I, April 1989, pp.154-183.

_____, "Some Aspects of Agrarian Structure of Punjab, 1925-47", Economic and Political Weekly, XV:26, 1980, pp.A46-A58.

Oren, Stephen, "The Sikhs, Congress, and the Unionists in British Punjab, 1937-1945", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.8, No.3, 1974, pp.397-418.

Pandey, Deepak, "Congress-Muslim League Relations 1937-39, `The Parting of Ways'", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.12, No.4, 1978, pp.629-54.

Shaikh, Farzana, "Muslim and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.20, No.3, 1986, pp.539-57.

Siddiqi, M. Zameeruddin, "The Resurgence of the Chisti Silsilah in the 19th Century Punjab", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XI, Part II, October 1971, pp.342-77.

Singh, Tarlok, "Social Attitudes in Rural Punjab Forty Years Ago", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XVI, Part 2, October 1982, pp.314-16.

Singh, Kirpal, "Genesis of the Partition of the Punjab - 1947", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.V, Part II, October 1971, pp.391-409.

_____, "Interviews Relating to Partition of Punjab 1947", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XVI, Part I, April 1982, pp.216-32.

Singh, Satwant, "Jinnah and the Punjab Muslims, 1937-47", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XXI, Part II, October 1987, pp.372-76.

Singh, Sukhwant, "The Socio-Economic Effects of the Canal Colonies in the Punjab 1886-1947", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.XXI, Part II, October 1987, pp.332-42.

Smith, W.C., "The Ahmadiyah Movement", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.VII, Part I, April 1973, pp.250-55.

Talbot, Ian, "British Rule in the Punjab, 1849-1947: Characteristics and Consequences", The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.XIX, No.2, 1991, pp.203-221.

_____, "The Role of the Crowd in the Muslim League Struggle for Pakistan", The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.21, No.2, pp.307-333.

_____, "The 1946 Punjab Elections", Modern Asian Studies, 14, 1(1980), pp.65-91.

Tinker, Hugh, "Jawaharlal Nehru at Simnla, May 1947, A Moment of Truth", Modern Asian Studies, 4, 4, 1970, pp.349-58.

Tiwana, Khizr Hayat Khan, Ed. Craig Baxter, "The 1937 Election and the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact", The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.X, Part II, October 1976, pp.356-85.