

**PAKISTAN AND THE INDIAN OCEAN
AS A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE //**

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PREFACE

The Indian Ocean which was virtually a 'British lake' two decades ago, is fast becoming the hotbed of big power rivalry. The increasing tension and the militarization of the area has been viewed by the countries of this region as a threat to their national security and independence. With the endemic political instability, economic backwardness and low solidarity, the Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states became easily vulnerable to the interventionist policies and pressure tactics of the Great powers. It is only natural therefore, that the peace zone concept emerged primarily as a reaction to big power presence in the Indian Ocean. It has been now nearly two decades since the littoral states have been agitating against the presence of external foreign powers in the Indian Ocean area. The twenty-sixth session of the UN General Assembly (1971), adopted a resolution, 2832, declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

The concept of 'Peace Zone' has evolved over the years through perceptible changes. While the Peace Zone concept showed the common threat perception from great power military rivalry in the Indian Ocean region, it also reflected the mute fears of the smaller nations about their immediate big neighbours. Thus, the divergence of Indian and Pakistani

views was mainly due to their differences in strategic perceptions, alliances and regional conflicts and economic considerations. While India has been critical of the power vacuum theory and the balance of force approach and maintains that prior attention should be given to the elimination of external foreign power presence from the Indian Ocean area, Pakistan has taken a different view. Pakistan feels that the regional states be assured against threats from both within and outside the region, and a political regime and a code of conduct for governing the relations among the Indian Ocean states. She proposed to include the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean area to the peace zone concept. And, the 'Peace Zone Concept' has become more complicated with Pakistan's Nuclear Weapon Free Zone proposal (NWFZ) in the sub-continent.

Here our objective is to analyse in depth the approaches, perceptions and strategies of Pakistan in establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Indian Ocean area. Since the existing literature on this subject has not given adequate attention to the political, strategic and economic considerations that govern Pakistan's attitude towards Indian Ocean as Nuclear Free Zone. It will be our endeavour to study this particular aspect, while at the same time taking into account the present developments in the region.

The period taken for the study, is mainly from 1970 to 1980.

The first chapter deals with the geo-strategic significance of the Indian Ocean, the evolution of the concepts of 'Peace Zone' and the nuclear weapon free zone. We will analyse the chronological evolution of the idea of the Peace Zone since the Cold War days, with particular emphasis on the political and strategic development in the Indian Ocean area.

In the second chapter, we will try to show how the policies of Pakistan have been guided mainly by her historical experience, domestic constraints and foreign relations. The relations of Pakistan is a direct outcome of her regional conflicts and strategic perception. Since its inception Pakistan has not been able to accept India's pre-eminence in the region. We have also discussed the change in Pakistan's strategic perception after Bangladesh crisis and subsequently after India's nuclear explosion.

The third chapter shall analyse the background, objectives and goals of Pakistan's introduction of the Nuclear Free Zone to the Indian Ocean area. We will study how the regional and world outlook of Pakistan has influenced her Indian Ocean policy. Pakistan has asked the littoral states to permanently renounce nuclear option which has resulted in diverting the main focuss from great power military presence in the area to

the demuclearization of the region, which can be seen in the twenty-ninth and thirtieth sessions of the UN General Assembly. She has objected India's peaceful nuclear programmes while seeking a nuclear umbrella from one of the great powers.

The last chapter deals with Pakistan's perception and response to the major actors in the Indian Ocean. Here we will analyse the reasons as to why India has objected to Pakistan's move to confine the concept of Nuclear Free Zone to only South Asian states, and underplay the presence of the external foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean area.

In the final analysis, we examine the feasibility of Pakistan's proposal for Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Indian Ocean.

Here I would like to express my deep sense of gratitude to my Supervisor Dr. S.D. Muni for his guidance and valuable suggestions in writing this dissertation. I am greatly indebted to my parents who have constantly inspired me throughout my work. I am also thankful to my friends for their co-operation and encouragement.

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Chapter I

THE GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AND EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTS OF THE 'PEACE ZONE' AND 'NUCLEAR FREE ZONE'

The Geo-Strategic Importance of the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean region has become the focus of great power interest because of the Cold War rivalry and its strategic-nuclear and politico-economic dimensions.¹ In 1974, the Secretary General of the United Nations offered a definition of the Indian Ocean area in his report to the UN on Declaration of Indian Ocean as a peace zone. According to this report the Northern limits of the Ocean are well-defined. It fixed 60 degree 0min. South latitude as the line separating it from the Antarctic Ocean. The dividing line between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean is to be the meridian South-East Cape of Tasmania (147 degree 0min E), the Western exit of the Bass strait and the meridian line between North-West Australia and the peninsula of Malay (the Cape of Talbot through Timor, Sumba, Flores and Sunda Islands, upto Sumatra). The meridian of Cape Agulhas (20 degree 0min E) was to separate the Indian

1. U.S. Bajpai, ed., India's Security: The Politico-Strategic Environment (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1982), p.105.

Ocean from the Atlantic'.² This has been accepted broadly as the definition of the Indian Ocean area.

Historically, the Ocean has played a significant role in the development of the countries surrounding its shores and also in the strategies of the leading powers of the world. Covering a little more than twenty percent of the total ocean surface, it has remained the hub of sea-faring for a long period of time.³ In fact, the art of sailing is supposed to have originated in these waters.⁴

The Indian Ocean became a focal point of Western power rivalry towards the end of the seventeenth century. The extension of the European rivalry for prominence came to link the Indian Ocean with the developments in Europe.⁵ The Treaty of Vienna of 1815 established the British supremacy in the

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2. The United Nations' definition of the Indian Ocean and its physical features is provided in U.N. Document, A/AG. 159/1, Annex IV/1974, p.1.
 3. M. Carry & E.H. Warmington, The Ancient Explorers (London: Penguin Books, 1963), p.74.
 4. Ibid.; also see K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (London: Allen & Unwin, 1945), p.22; The Europa Year Book, 1980 (London: Europa Publications, 1980), p.9.
 5. Manoranjan Bezbourah, U.S. Strategy in the Indian Ocean (New York, London: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p.4.

waters of the Indian Ocean.⁶ Later, the Suez Canal link of 1869 brought the European countries still closer to this region.

The post Second World War produced widespread changes in the nature of international politics. Britain's economy and military power was severely depleted due to the war effort. The emergence of two super powers, namely United States and the Soviet Union, relegated Britain to the position of a second grade power. Later, the decision of Britain to withdraw from the East of Suez in 1968 clearly revealed that she had come to accept a lesser role in the international affairs.⁷

The end of the War also saw the growth of nationalism and anti-colonial movement which finally led to the independence of many states in the Indian Ocean region. Today, there are more than forty independent countries around the littoral and

6. K.M. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959), p.94.

7. For details, see Roy E. Jones, The Changing Structure of British Foreign Policy (London: Longman, 1974), pp.69-70; also see Peter Calvocoressi, The British Experience: 1945-75 (London: The Bodley Head, 1978), pp.213-17.

immediate hinterlands of the Indian Ocean.⁸ They form a large group in the United Nations. More than one quarter of the world's population lives here and one-fifth of the world's arable land lies in the Indian Ocean area. The countries of this region share several common or intertwined political and security problems that have the potential for affecting the entire mankind. The once "British Lake", on which the very existence of the British empire depended, has now become a very important zone for the security of all the countries bordering its shores.

In the modern times there are two important factors which have given added importance to the Indian Ocean. First, the region offers certain vital mineral resources, and second, its growing military importance.

The single most important item which the region provides is petroleum. The Middle East oil has attracted the interest

8. The United Nations General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee Report listed the following 36 States in the year 1971, as littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean: Afghanistan, Australia, Bahrain, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malwai, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Quatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swasiland, Thailand, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia. The list is meant to include coastal States directly bordering the Indian Ocean or any of its natural extension, as well as hinterland States whose main access to the Sea is the Indian Ocean. To this we may add newly independent States like, for example, Bangladesh, Sychelles.

of the outside powers into the area. The economic progress and industrial development of the developed and non-oil producing developing countries is crucially dependent upon the oil supply from the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsular. Apart from oil, the Indian Ocean area supplies natural resources of considerable importance. Some of the major items of strategic importance that are found in this area are gold, uranium, thorium, coal, iron, copper, manganese, bauxite, mica, antimony, etc.⁹ The latest discovery of rich mineral nodules from the Indian Ocean sea-bed has further increased the importance of the Ocean area.¹⁰

The sea approaches to the ocean have retained their earlier importance, because the Indian Ocean states have comparatively more trade with countries outside the region

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9. For details, see Joe Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1975); S.H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); The U.N. Statistical Year Book.
10. According to a well-known oceanographic scientist S.Z. Quasim, Director of the National Institute of Oceanography, Goa, India, the Indian Ocean seabed would yield three to four kilograms of mineral packed nodules, per square meter. This discovery was made in March 1981 by India and has drawn considerable attention of the external foreign powers like U.S.A., who possess deep sea mining technology. Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, News Review on South Asia and the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Sapru House, April 1981), p.175; Also see Financial Express, 5 April 1981, and The Statesman, 17 March 1981, New Delhi.

than within. They mostly export raw materials and import finished industrial goods and technology. Due to the geographical peculiarities, the region does not provide good overland routes and the nature of trade which mostly favours bulk carriers makes the waterways of ^{the} ocean important for the littoral states.¹¹

An important politico-strategic dimension in the Indian Ocean area is that, none of the littoral states have a powerful navy. India, Australia and Indonesia do have large navies but they are very small in comparison to the naval force of the great powers. Even collectively the littoral states of the Indian Ocean do not command a naval force which can keep the Indian Ocean entirely under its control.¹² The economically weak and militarily vulnerable area of the Indian Ocean does certainly offer an opportunity to the major outside powers to influence the course of events in a manner that will improve their position in this region and their role in world politics.

The geo-political features of the Indian Ocean make it susceptible to control at five places called the 'choke points'.

11. Anthony Harrigan, "The Afro-Asian World", The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 90, May 1964, p.50. Cited in Sea Power, 14 March 1971, p.11.

12. For details, see Raju G.C. Thomas, Defence of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics (Delhi: Macmillan, 1978).

They are the Cape of Good Hope, the Bab-el-Mandeb, the strait of Hormuz, the Straits of Malacca, and the Sundra strait.¹³ The first of these overlooks the shipping route around Africa; the second is the southern tip of Suez; the third stands sentinel over the oil flow by sea from the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsular and the fourth and fifth control the sea borne traffic from the Western Pacific Ocean.

The Indian Ocean's proximity to at least two major powers, namely, the Soviet Union and China, enhances its importance for the Western military strategists. The defensive and offensive possibilities of the deep sea floor has added importance to the Indian Ocean. To cite an example, the ninety east ridges of the Bay of Bengal, one of the straightest undersea mountain range, provide an ideal place for deploying strategic nuclear devices. It is widely expected that in the future the missile system will be deployed in the sea-bed.¹⁴ The numerous islands and the coral atolls have also become handy for the outside powers to establish their military bases in the area. The Anglo-America military base at Diego Gracia provides a good example. The deployment

13. Cited in M. Bezbourah, n.5, p.2.

14. Arvid Pardo, "Who will control the Sea Bed", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.46, October 1968, p.129.

of long-range SLBMs by the Western powers in the Indian Ocean has made the Southern regions of the Soviet Union more vulnerable and the USSR in response to this development has increased her naval presence in this region.¹⁵ Moreover, the Persian Gulf region also provides bases to the West, for direct hit on all vital Soviet installation.¹⁶ The presence of France, China and Britain have also increased in the recent times.¹⁷

Another factor which makes the situation in the Indian Ocean area more complex is the endemic political instability, economic backwardness and low solidarity among the Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states, which makes them very vulnerable to the interventionist policies and pressure tactics of the great powers. The level of intra-regional co-operation amongst them have been at best bilateral or sub-regional.¹⁸

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15. K.R. Singh, The Indian Ocean: Big Power Presence and Local Response (New Delhi: Manohar, 1977), p.58.
16. For details, see Mohammed Mughisudin, ed., Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp.13-28.
17. SIPRI YEAR BOOK - 1975 (Stockholm), pp.64-73; see the map in appendix-I p.115.
18. H.E. Mr. Justin Siriwardene, "Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean (A Position Paper)", in T.T. Poullose, ed., Indian Ocean Power Rivalry (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1974), pp.88-95.

Thus the strategic importance of The Indian Ocean in terms of geography, raw materials and military potential is immense. Hence, no country of this region, and the other powers whose vital interests are involved, can afford to ignore this area. It has been aptly pointed out that, "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia; this Ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the twentyfirst century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters".¹⁹ The inability of the regional powers to effectively protect this area is one of the basic reasons behind the move to turn this area into a zone of Peace. But before we analyse how the concept of Peace Zone came to be applied to the Indian Ocean, it is necessary to examine the evolution of the idea of the Peace Zone and its application in other parts of the world.

The Evolution of the Concept of the Peace Zone

The tense political and military situation which the cold war rivalry produced was sought to be countered through the policy of disarmament. But the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations at the global level led to regional approaches. The concepts of a zone of Peace and a Nuclear Free Zone were an integral part of such regional strategies.

19. Alfred Nlahan, Will the Indian Ocean become a Soviet Pond", Atlas (New York, 19 November 1970), p.20.

A zone of peace presumes a "geographical area from which the danger of war has been eliminated or within which that danger has been reduced or contained. It implies, on the one hand, measures to insulate the concerned area from the dangers of war originating from powers external to the zone and, on the other, measures to promote peaceful relations among zonal powers themselves".²⁰ The idea of a peace zone is a broader concept and embraces within its scope the concept of a Nuclear Free Zone.²¹ The emergence of the concept of a Nuclear Free Zone has to be understood in the context of the danger posed by nuclear weapons. It is generally accepted as "any zone recognised as such by the United Nations General Assembly, by which any group of states in free exercise of their sovereignty have established by virtue of a treaty or convention totally prohibiting nuclear weapons, with adequate international system of verification. It also involves guarantees from nuclear weapons powers as not to use such weapons against the countries comprising such zones or threaten to use or deploy nuclear weapons in this area".²²

20. Hedley Bull, "The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", in Poulouze, ed., n.14, p.178.

21. Mrs. Bandaranaike's speech at the Second Non-Aligned Conference, Cairo, 1964; Cited in Singh, n.15, p.217.

22. For further details regarding the evolution of the definition of the Nuclear Free Zone, see SIPRI Year Book 1976, "Disarmament Negotiations in 1975", pp.297-302; Also see William Epstein, The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (New York, 1976), p.209.

However, the above mentioned definitions are not universally accepted. It is a much debated subject as to whether the peace zone should mean excluding super powers rivalry or also include reduction in the nuclear and conventional armed forces. Some states assert that the Peace Zone area should be completely denuclearized. All these aspects have not been clearly resolved mainly because of differences among the states regarding the methods and scope of the peace zone.

The attention on the peace zone concept in the post-Second World War period was first drawn in the year 1957, when the Rapacki Plan for Central Europe was put forward which sought to remove nuclear weapons from the area. But a treaty to this effect could not be signed because of the opposition of the United States and its West European allies. / However, after two years in 1959 the Antarctic Zone Treaty was signed, which banned the use of nuclear weapons from this practically uninhabited continent. In January 1967, the Outer Space Treaty prohibited the stationing of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in space and on celestial bodies.

/ In February 1967, the Latin American countries agreed to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only and a ban

was put as testing, production, storage, installation and development of nuclear weapons by parties concerned or any one else on their behalf. The nuclear weapon powers were asked to respect this treaty, which came to be known as the / Treaty of Tlatelolco.²³ This treaty was referred to as a model for establishing nuclear free zones in other parts of the world.²⁴

The desire for such a zone for Africa was expressed as early as in July 1964 at Cairo session of the Organisation of African Unity. The United Nations General Assembly has also passed a resolution on 9 December 1974, for denuclearization of Africa.²⁵ In the same year the United Nations passed a resolution, sponsored by the League of Arab States, to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in West Asia.²⁶ The Kekkonen Plan initiated by Finland for a nuclear weapon free zone in North Europe was also reiterated in 1974.²⁷

23. SIPRI Year Book 1975, pp.489-90.

24. U.N. Document, Resolution A/3261 F(XIX), 9 December 1974; Also see K. Subramaniam, "Super Power Behaviour: Acting in Concept", World Focus: (New Delhi), vol.I, No.7, July 1980, pp.8-13.

25. U.N. Document, Resolution, A/3261 E(XIX).

26. U.N. Document, Resolution, A/3263 (XIX).

27. SIPRI Year Book 1975.

However, the objective of most of these treaties have neither been fully realized nor have they offered long-term or permanent solutions. The Antarctic Treaty has banned the introduction of nuclear weapons and tests but the economic potentials of the area have led many states to make territorial claims in this area. The treaty has eighteen signatories only and the territorial claims of any party may jeopardize the whole treaty seeking the denuclearized status of Antarctica. Similarly the Treaty of Tlatelolco suffers from many shortcomings. Assurances given by external powers have not been unconditional. The U.S.A. and U.K. have reserved the right to reconsider their obligation to a state in the nuclear weapon free zone in the event of any act of aggression or armed attack by the state carried out with support or assistance of a nuclear weapon power. The U.S.S.R. has also made similar reservations. Argentina, Brazil and Nicaragua do not recognise restrictions on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. There is also absence of a clause prohibiting the transit of nuclear weapons through the territories of the contracting parties.²⁸

The characteristic feature of most of the proposals for nuclear weapon free zone is that they concern regions where

28. Ibid., pp.438-44.

the countries have not even fulfilled the requirement, that is to forego the manufacture of nuclear weapons or their acquisition by any other means. Moreover, it presupposes that negotiations will be conducted and agreements will be signed by all the parties concerned providing, among other things, some measure of reciprocal control. This under the circumstances existing in conflict areas does not seem feasible. The proposals for nuclear weapon free zone has also not materialized due to the big power politics. Each of these power# is more interested in gaining an edge over its rival powers and resist any step which will reduce its power and influence.

However, the above mentioned moves to establish a peace zone can be interpreted as the wishes of various states in different regions of the world to eliminate the dangers of nuclear conflict from the area. The same has been the motivating factor, which has led the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean to demand for the establishment of a peace zone in this area.

Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone

The move for a peace zone in the Indian Ocean arose on account of the activities of external foreign powers in the region. With the onset of detente in Europe, the focus

of the Cold War rivalry shifted to Asia. This was noticeable from the growing great powers presence in this region. The U.S.A. entered the Indian Ocean in 1964 and the Soviet Union in 1968. Though in 1967 Great Britain decided to withdraw from the East of Suez, she however maintained her naval presence in the Indian Ocean.²⁹ France also maintains a naval task force in the Indian Ocean area. The naval forces of these countries include both conventional and nuclear weapons.

Besides the Cold War rivalry, the development of new weapon systems like the Polaris, Poseidon and Trident missiles, ~~SSBNs~~ and the growing importance of the Gulf oil, accorded the Indian Ocean region high priority in the global strategy of the great powers.³⁰ The growing military presence of the external foreign powers came to be viewed with suspicion by the Indian Ocean states.³¹ Moreover, the Cold War rivalry

29. Britain still maintains her presence with U.S.A. at Diego Garcia and in the British Indian Ocean Territories (a group of islands). For details, see K.P. Mishra, Quest for International Order in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1977), pp.30-31.

30. Singh, n.12, pp.12-18.

31. There is a general view among the Indian Ocean States that they suffered colonial domination due to the consequences of great power rivalry.

carried to the high seas, offered very little chance to the countries of this region to influence any crisis situation.

The move to establish a Nuclear Free Zone in one of the oceans is a new development. So far attempts have been made to create such zones as land territories and in space. Moreover, the existing Nuclear Free Zone treaties declares illegal the acquisition and deployment of Nuclear Weapons in the regions where it does not exist. The proposal for the Indian Ocean seeks also to remove the presence of external foreign powers' military presence from the area.

The need for establishing a peace zone in the Indian Ocean region was influenced by two main reasons. Firstly, the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964 and the subsequent Chinese policy of rapid development of nuclear armaments. Secondly, the proposal for the withdrawal of the British from the East of Suez in 1968 that coincided with the Soviet navy's entry into the Indian Ocean and increased Western powers' military presence. These developments were viewed by the littoral and hinterland states as a threat to their security, and they put forward proposals for the establishment of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean area.³²

32. Mishra, n.29, p.52.

The evolution of the idea of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace goes back to 1964, Second Summit of the Non-aligned Conference which demanded the removal of great power military presence from the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka's Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike urged that the concept of Nuclear Free Zone should be applied to the oceans, especially to one like the Indian Ocean which had remained till that period of time free from the presence of nuclear weapons. Here suggestions were incorporated in the Cairo declaration, known as 'the Programme for Peace and International Cooperation'.³³

The Third Non-aligned Summit Conference held at Lusaka in 1970 demanded the establishment of a 'Peace Zone' in the Indian Ocean. The participating states expressed the desire to do away with great power rivalries in the Indian Ocean by calling for an elimination of all bases, whether of army, navy or airforce, from the region.³⁴ In September 1970, the United Nations declared the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. It urged the great powers to halt further expansion of their military presence and the base facilities, either army, navy or airforce. The area was also to be free of nuclear weapons. It urged all the states to respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.³⁵

33. For further details, see Singh, n.15, p.217.

34. For details, see Review of International Affairs, vol.XXI, No.491, 20 September 1970, Moscow, p.27.

35. Ibid., p.33.

The idea of establishing a peace zone in the Indian Ocean also figured prominently in the Commonwealth meetings. There are nearly fifteen Commonwealth members who are either states bordering the Indian Ocean, or are located in the immediate hinterland. The Singapore Conference of the Commonwealth Heads of State held in January 1971 formulated a programme of action for the Indian Ocean community. It asked for the reversal of the trend towards militarization of the Indian Ocean and promote economic, technical and social cooperation among the Indian Ocean states which are members of the Commonwealth.³⁶ The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Bandaranaike, expressed her desire for the early evolution of a formula acceptable to everybody on the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a peace zone and a nuclear free zone.³⁷

At the initiative of Sri Lanka,³⁸ the twenty-sixth U.N. General Assembly, in 1971, discussed the question of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The declaration which the Assembly adopted can be broadly divided into two parts. The first part provides the reasons for the Indian Ocean to be

36. Misra, op. cit., p.68.

37. Devendra Kaushik, The Indian Ocean: towards a peace zone (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1971, Appendix-II), p.188.

38. U.N. Document, A/8492 and Add 1.

declared a zone of peace, and the second part suggests measures as to how the concept of the peace zone can be implemented. The resolution starts with the support for the people of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to resolve their political, economic and social problems under conditions of peace and tranquility.³⁹ It also viewed that the great power rivalries and establishment of military bases will lead to increasing tension, arms race, and divert the scarce resources urgently needed for development and socio-economic reconstruction. The resolution expressed its concern at the extension of arms race in the area and showed conviction that 'the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would contribute towards arresting of such development, relaxing international tension and strengthening international peace and security', which will be in accordance with the purposes and principle of the Charter of the UN.⁴⁰ It also urged that the area be free from nuclear weapons.

In the later part, the resolution declared that 'the air space above and ocean floor subjacent thereto is designated

39. U.N. Document, A/Resolution/2832 (XXVI), December 16, 1971. This resolution was adopted on the Reports of the First Committee.

40. Ibid.

for all times as a zone of peace'.⁴¹ The great powers were asked to enter into immediate consultation with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean for (a) halting further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean; (b) Elimination of military bases, installations, and logistical supply facilities; (c) finally, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of the great power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of the great power rivalry.⁴² The resolution which was initiated by Sri Lanka, however, does not object to the right to free and unimpeded passage by the vessels of all nations. This freedom was not given in absolute term, and was tampered by an earlier provision of the resolution, which said that vessels of all nations can freely use the Indian Ocean waters, but the warships and aircrafts carrying nuclear and conventional weapons or related materials should not stop in the Indian Ocean except in an emergency.⁴³

An important implication of the Peace Zone was that the countries of the Indian Ocean region would have to renounce

41. Ibid.

42. U.N. Document, A/C I/PV.1834, 23 November 1971, p.77.

43. U.N. Document, A/C.1/L590.

the nuclear weapon option and would not permit the deployment of nuclear weapons of other states on their territories. The advocates of the peace zone claimed that their's is an international security approach.⁴⁴ However, the proposal of denuclearization of the area was met with some reservation by some countries like India who viewed the peace zone and the demuclearization as not mutually dependent. According to them, while the peace zone aims at preventing super power rivalry, the process of denuclearization is a wider question of disarmament at the global level.⁴⁵

Pakistan proposed to include the clause on denuclearization of the Indian Ocean area to the peace zone concept after ~~the~~ Indian's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. Some of the exponents of the denuclearization as a condition for the establishment of a peace zone included (besides Pakistan) Sri Lanka, Indonesia and external great powers like the USA, Britain and France. The great powers who were dragging their feet over the issue of elimination of great power military presence in the region showed a lot more enthusiasm over the issue of denuclearization of the Indian Ocean area. The

44. K.P. Mishra, "International Politics in the Indian Ocean", ORBIS, 1975, No.4, pp.90-91.

45. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, vol.18, Winter 1975, ibid., p.92.

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Pakistani suggestion to confine the nuclear weapon free zone to South Asia amounted to the creation of such a zone to embarrass India, which suited China's strategic objectives.⁴⁶ The external great powers also found it helpful to achieve their aim of nuclear non-proliferation and at the same time maintain their military presence in the Indian Ocean region.

To study the implications of Indian Ocean as a peace zone the twenty-seventh U.N. General Assembly ^{meeting} set up an Ad Hoc Committee in 1972. It had representatives from fifty nations and held over eleven meetings. The report produced by the committee provided information about the issues raised but contained no recommendations as to how the growing military build up by the great powers can be checked. Compared to the year 1971, the number of states voting in favour of the resolution, in 1972 increased from sixty-one to ninety-five, and included almost all the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, as some had previously abstained. However, this trend must be understood as an endorsement of a general concept rather than any specific undertakings. The twenty-eighth ^{meeting of the} U.N. General Assembly did not debate in details, and in the sessions held later, resolutions were adopted calling for an international conference ^{on} ~~as~~ the Indian Ocean.

46. Dawn, Karachi, 29 October 1974; also see SIPRI Year Book 1975, p.438.

The evolution of the peace zone concept has also changed qualitatively over the years. From the initial objective of establishing a peace zone by eliminating external foreign power military presence it has now come to include the denuclearization of the states surrounding this area. Moreover, application of peace zone to the ocean area has now been sought to be emphasized in relation to the South Asian region, especially on the insistence of Pakistan since 1974.

Besides discussing the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal at the U.N. level, each succeeding Summits of the non-aligned countries at Algiers in 1973, Colombo in 1976 and at Havana in 1979, resolutions were adopted demanding the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. It also figured quite regularly in meetings of prominent leaders. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, had rejected the theory of 'power vacuum' advocated by some great powers.⁴⁷ Thus, it is now nearly two decades since the littoral countries had been voicing their concern for the Indian Ocean to be freed from big power military presence.

47. The advocates of the power vacuum theory maintain that the British naval hegemony till 1960s had given stability to the Indian Ocean region. But after the withdrawal of Britain from the East of Suez, a power vacuum has been created. This is because no regional power had a navy large enough to police the region. Hence it should be done by some other powers now. This theory has been rejected by the Indian Ocean states like India. The Times of India, New Delhi, 29 April 1973.

The Indian Ocean peace zone concept which has now acquired a fairly long history is, however, still faced with the difficulty of the lack of a common understanding on the basic principles. The external foreign powers first objected to the implementation of the idea of the peace zone without defining the precise limits of the area. This objection was turned down by the Ad Hoc Committee's first report which said that the "need for such accurate definition was not necessary at the initial stage".⁴⁸ Another objection of the great powers was that the peace zone contravenes the principle of freedom on the high seas. As mentioned earlier, this is not true in reality. Moreover, the freedom of the high seas, which was devised to secure free commerce and other peaceful activities, have been abused as a cover up for unrestrained military activities and for intervention and domination by powerful maritime nations.⁴⁹ They also asserted that such regional efforts may undermine the global disarmament measures that are being pursued at the U.N. level. The great powers also expressed doubts regarding the method and mechanism of regulating and checking the presence of foreign military forces. Both the Socialist and Western power blocs defended

48. For details, see the U.N. General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee Report, 1972.

49. For details, see the U.N. General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee Report, 1972.

and tried to justify their military build-ups on the pretext of other's presence.⁵⁰

Further, there was a lack of agreement among the Indian Ocean states on the modalities of establishing the peace zone.⁵¹ Pakistan and India adopted different strategies to the Nuclear Free Zone concept although they accepted the peace zone concept in principle. Pakistan and Sri Lanka proposed that along with the withdrawal of the external foreign powers from the region, the states of the Indian Ocean should also renounce the nuclear weapon option permanently and the peace zone concept should be extended to the landmass.⁵² Hence, the lack of a unified approach as well as the existence of local rivalries has made the Indian Ocean Peace Zone concept even more complex. Despite all these differences in approaches and methods, there exists a broad set of objectives, shared commonly by Indian Ocean states. They are, first, prohibition of power rivalry and all forms of militarization. Second, to

50. Ibid., 1975, p.648.

51. For further details, refer the U.N. Document, A/8492 and Add 1, A/C1/L590/Rev 2, A/C 1/31/PV:42, 1976, 31st Session.

52. Refer to Sri Lanka's memorandum, submitted to the Singapore Conference of Commonwealth Prime Minister in January 1971, cited in Misra, n.29, p.

do away from this area all weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons. Finally, all forms of arms race and arms build up to be prohibited from the peace zone area. A common driving force behind the desire for a peace zone is still the deep seated suspicion (which the countries of the Indian Ocean share) of the activities of the external great powers in the region.⁵³

53. Norman D. Palmer, "South Asia and the Great Powers", ORBIS, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, vol.17, Fall 1973, No.3, p.1004.

Chapter II

INDIAN OCEAN IN PAKISTAN'S DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC PERCEPTION

Pakistan's perception of the Indian Ocean is a product of her defence strategy and foreign policy objectives. This in turn is closely linked with her historical experience, domestic constraints and external relations. Hence it is necessary to briefly analyse these factors before examining the position of Indian Ocean in Pakistan's strategic calculation.

Historical Factors

When Pakistan was formed in 1947, she had neither a common language of culture, nor prior geographical existence. In 1906, the Muslim League was formed and by 1930 it demanded a separate state for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent on the basis of a two-nation theory.¹ This ideally suited the British policy of divide and rule, and they introduced a separate electorate for the Muslims in 1909. By equating the League with the Congress they created a sense of loyalty in the minds of the Muslim League leaders. This went a long

1. For details, see Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan (London: Faber and Faber, 1950).

way in influencing Pakistan's foreign policy.

In the struggle for Pakistan the League tacitly assumed parity of importance with the Indian National Congress. This notion was also carried to the post-independence era and Pakistani leaders tried to assume parity with India in sub-continental matters, whether it was in the field of economic, political or military sphere. Initially, it consisted of two geographical units separated by more than a thousand miles of Indian territory. Islam was expected to play an important role in uniting the different sections of people who were otherwise divided geographically, culturally and economically. Pakistan has occasionally voiced her concern about the welfare of the Muslims staying in India in order to give credibility to the two-nation theory. To deny this would lead to the denial of the two-nation theory and question the very existence of Pakistan. Thus, because of its ideology,² based solely on religion, Pakistan's nationalism was laid on weak foundations. This was proved in 1971 with the secession of the Eastern wing of Pakistan and its emergence as the independent state of Bangladesh.³ However, Islam

2. For details, see Arif Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy (London, 1966), p.91; Sharif-Al-Mujahid, Ideological Orientation of Pakistan (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 1976), p.139.

3. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The New Balance of Power in Asia", Pacific Community (Tokyo, July 1972), vol.3, No.4, p.699.

still continues to play an important role in Pakistan's national life and foreign policy, as it can be seen now in President Zia's policies aimed at reviving the Islamic thrust.

The division of the sub-continent into India and Pakistan also had a great psychological impact on the people of both the countries. The traumatic days of the partition undoubtedly left behind deep scars on both sides.⁴ The problems which arose after the independence gave rise to many conflicts and armed clashes between the two countries. Among the major problems which confronted the two countries were border disputes, sharing of river waters, minorities, refugee problems, and the Kashmir issue.

There were conflicting claims regarding territorial boundaries and accession of princely states. The ones which figured prominently in the dispute were Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. The former two states finally joined India but the Kashmir issue has proved to be the most intractable of the lot, and question regarding the states legitimacy still figures in the Indo-Pak relations.⁵

4. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.4.

5. For further details, see Sisir Gupta, Kashmir a study of India-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966).

The continuing nature of the Kashmir issue, however, shows that it is not just a simple case of border dispute.⁶ Due to the initial military action taken by Pakistan and the subsequent resistance and rescue operation of India, has also made it a question of prestige and status. Kashmir's strategic location was central to the interest of both the parties to the conflict. Initially for Pakistan and later for India, Kashmir also held some economic interest.⁷ Moreover, the Pakistani leaders considered Kashmir as a part of Pakistan "both territorially and ideologically", and "without which it would amount to the acceptance of India's superemacy in the region."⁸

Pakistan had no disputes with her Western neighbour Iran; and in the North with China, the matter was solved with the signing of a border agreement on 2 March 1963. However, her relations with Afghanistan have not been very cordial. When Pakistan came into existence in 1947, Afghanistan laid claims to many parts of Pakistan's territory and refused to

6. For a detailed analysis, see S.D. Muni, "South Asia", in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), Conflict and Intervention in the Third World (London: Croom Helm Ltd. Publishers, 1980), pp.531-58.

7. Ibid., p.55.

8. Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.180.

recognise the Durand Line. In fact, it was the only country which voted against Pakistan's entry to the U.N. But Pakistan had never viewed any serious threat to her security from Afghanistan till the recent Russian intervention and military presence in 1980.

One of the off-shoots of the domestic compulsions in emphasising the Islamic character of the state has been Pakistan's anti-communist attitude. This was chiefly directed against the Soviet Union and it fulfilled Pakistan's desire for closer relations with the Western powers.

Domestic Constraints

Of the various factors which have conditioned Pakistan's foreign policy, the internal factors are most significant. This is because internal affairs in many ways have a bearing on foreign relations, their relationship being that of cause and effect. "The crux of the problem was that, there was a basic contradiction between the manner in which its nationhood was conceived and the efforts its made to keep itself going".⁹

After the independence the leadership in Pakistan was provided by Muslim migrants from India. With the early death of Jimmah

9. Sisir Gupta, India and International System, in M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (ed.) (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1981), p.192.

and assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, there was no leader left, who could command the respect of the entire nation. The lack of a viable political system and the failure to build up a sound economic infrastructure led to many social, economic and political crises. In order to face this complex and dangerous situation, the ruling elite of Pakistan resorted to two means. First, they tried to divert the attention of the people from the domestic problems by conjuring up an image of India, that is bent upon destroying their newly created state. Considering India's size, population and resource potential Pakistan had genuine reasons to be apprehensive of India. Moreover, this feeling was further strengthened due to the hostilities following the partition. Therefore, their policy of 'India-baiting', mixed with their sense of insecurity led the foreign policy of Pakistan to be "dominated by the consideration of security and independence from its neighbour, i.e. India".¹⁰ The second method which it resorted to was the search for strong and powerful allies who could help Pakistan in both internal and external spheres.

External Relations

Besides the domestic and regional situation, the growing cold war developments also influenced Pakistan's foreign

10. K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nation (New York), pp.49-50.

Policy. The western powers, in their bid to contain communism, wooed Pakistan to their side. The East-West conflict placed Pakistan in a very ideal position in strategic terms. Pakistan joined the Western military alliance due to a number of reasons.

When Pakistan got her independence she was in a tight economic situation. Repeated crop failures and drop in export earnings led to inflationary conditions at home and depletion in foreign exchange reserve. Against this background the U.S. was seen as the only big power, with enormous military and economic resources and political influence which could aid Pakistan.¹¹ Since the weak political and economic infrastructure within the country could not guarantee an effective security system, Pakistan joined the Western sponsored military alliances. She joined the CENTO in September 1954 and SEATO in July 1955.

India's unwillingness to become a camp-follower of the West and Pakistan's eagerness in turn drove the US to cultivate closer relations with her. Pakistan joined the Western alliance not because of her concern regarding the Soviet Union, but to use it in her regional conflict with India. The formation

11. G.S. Bhargava, Pakistan in Crisis (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969), p.128.

of such an alliance was viewed by the Soviet Union as a threat to her security. "This in fact pushed the Soviet Union nearer to India and made it indifferent if not hostile towards Pakistan".¹² Due to the convergence of Soviet Union's and India's strategic and foreign policy objectives the relations between them gained strength gradually. Pakistan then came to view this development with apprehension. Moreover, the Soviet efforts to establish close relations with Afghanistan, with whom Pakistan's relations have not been cordial, strengthened Pakistan's anxiety. Afghanistan's claim for the formation of a Pathan state within the borders of Pakistan had found sympathy of the Soviet Union.¹³ Because of the close economic, political and military cooperation between Afghanistan and Russia, she viewed this as a plot against her security.¹⁴ Pakistan was also very critical and apprehensive of Soviet support for India on the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union ^{has} have been far from cordial. The strategic importance of Pakistan has

12. Muni, n.6, p.63.

13. Sukha Ranjan Chakravarty, "International Aspect of Pashtoon National Movement", Foreign Affairs Report (New Delhi, May 1976), vol.25, pp.

14. Aslam Siddique, Pakistan Seeks Security (Pakistan Branch: Longmans and Green & Co., 1960), p.24.

been apparent to the Soviet Union. Pakistan's close relations with the Western countries have been viewed with great suspicion by the Soviet leaders. The ruling elite of Pakistan also believes that the Russians are determined to acquire a warm water port in the South. In a report of the Morning News, Karachi, 24 March 1960, Ayub Khan had observed that one of the objectives of Soviet Union towards this region (South Asia) was to 'pave the way for the age-old attempt of the North (USSR) to dominate the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent'. He was echoing the warm water policy of the Soviet Union that led her to continued advance southwards.¹⁵ Beside the reasons mentioned above, there was an element of ideological difference between the two countries.¹⁶

Geo-Strategic Location

Strategically, Pakistan occupies a very important place in global power politics, being situated at the crossroad of South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. Pakistan's proximity to the Persian Gulf region gives her the added advantage of being able to influence the developments in this region. In

15. S. Irtiza Hussain, "The Politico-Strategic Balance in South Asia", Strategic Studies (Islamabad), July-September 1977, p.30.

16. Aslam Siddique, n.14, p.25.

fact, after 1971 Pakistan has tried to identify herself more as a West Asian power. The coast of Karachi assumes increased importance because the oil routes from the Middle East pass very close to her coast line. With the fall of the Shah of Iran, Pakistan's importance has gone up greatly in the strategic consideration of the Western powers.¹⁷ Pakistan's geo-strategic classification has been summed up well by Prof. Stephen Cohen who said that "Pakistan belongs to that class of states whose very survival is uncertain, whose legitimacy is doubted and whose security related resources is inadequate. Yet (like Taiwan, South Korea, Israel and South Africa) has the capacity to fight, to go nuclear, to influence the global strategic balance (if only by collapsing), and lastly, is in a strategic geographical location, surrounded by three largest states in the world and adjacent to the mouth of the Persian Gulf...".¹⁸

17. During the reign of the Shah of Iran the United States and her allies enjoyed close political and military relations. This included base facilities and monitoring stations to keep a watch on Soviet military activity. But with the success of Iranian revolution and overthrow of the Shah, the Western Powers lost this privilege. Now Pakistan is viewed as one of the alternatives to augment the loss. Asia Year Book (Honkong, 1982), p.44.

18. For details, see Stephen Philip Cohen, Nuclear Issues and Security Policy in Pakistan, a paper prepared for the 1980 Annual Meeting of the Association for the Asian Studies, Washington, March 1980.

The factors mentioned so far show how Pakistan's domestic constraints, external relations and geo-strategic position have influenced her foreign policy. From the very beginning of her independence she has paid greater attention to defence and security. "The interaction of various forces which gave rise to the sense of insecurity in the minds of Pakistani leaders resulted in giving more emphasis on defence over development".¹⁹ Keeping this in view now we will analyse Pakistan's defence policy with particular emphasis on the importance of Indian Ocean on Pakistan's strategic perception.

Initially, Pakistan's defence problems were enormous and intricate.²⁰ The two wings were separated by nearly three thousand miles of sea and over a thousand miles of Indian territory. Jinnah's demand for a eighty miles wide corridor connecting the two wings was turned down by British due to the strong Indian opposition. Since Pakistan was once a part of India it could be easily approached by land, sea and air. There was no natural barrier of defence. This was indeed a serious security concern for Pakistan. "To escape the

19. Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.152.

20. Samuel Baid and Sreedhar, "Pakistan's defence potential", Foreign Affairs Report (New Delhi, April 1976), vol.25, pp.53-66.

consequences of this axiomatic development, Pakistan put up the shield of Islam, the very basis on which the partition took place.²¹

Till 1971, the maintenance of a strong navy was vital for the sake of keeping the lines of communication open between the two wings and also the shipping lines connecting her to the other parts of the world. This implied protecting the national merchant ships, harbours, coastlines and sea-communications. It also meant the duty of transporting troops and supplies to the theater of operation and to give the troops support in action.²²

Eminent scholars of Pakistan's defence policy had warned that it is necessary to have some control over the seas. In their opinion the decline of the Indian Ocean states started with their losing control over the seas. "These countries have fought land powers and survived defeats. But on the seas they never got a second chance".²³ Sea power is therefore extremely important. Since Pakistan could not build a strong navy on her own resources, she depended heavily on the joint

21. Siddique, n.14, p.15.

22. Ibid., p.44.

23. Ibid., p.54.

efforts and cooperation of the other Persian Gulf powers and on her Western allies of GENTO and SEATO. Prior to 1971, they felt that the defence of the East lied in the West, and hence more emphasis was laid on land forces to protect the Western wing which led to the neglect of the navy's requirements.

From the point of trade and commerce the Indian Ocean occupies a very important place in her strategic calculation. The sea route provides the main channel for the bulk of her exports and imports. The closure of the Suez canal had made Pakistan very anxious, because it caused not only delays but also increase in the prices of goods which affected her economy substantially.²⁴

Pakistan's external trade is worth more that two thousand crores every year, and most of it is carried on through the sea routes. It imports 80 percent to 84 percent of its oil requirements. Other vital imports on which the country's survival depends are metals including steel and minerals and machineries of all varieties. The biggest foreign exchange corner for the country are cotton, cotton yarn and rice. Being all bulk carriers, the relevance of

24. Bhutto, n.19, p.162.

the merchant shipping and the need to protect the sea routes are obvious.²⁵ Pakistan has also taken note of the economic potentialities of the Indian Ocean sea bed. Although it is aware of the mineral rich nodules present in this area, she, is at present, not in a position to exploit it because of the technological and infrastructural deficiencies.

However, in the calculations of Pakistan's military strategists, neither the navy nor the airforce can finally decide the outcome of the battle. It is for the armies to consolidate the gains and inflict defeats. "Pakistan sees a threat to her security and independence mainly from the land and not from the seas".²⁶ The concept of the continental type of strategy has affected the growth of Pakistan navy. The decision-makers felt that the main battles would be fought in the land and hence gave greater priority to the army and the airforce. The ocean assumes importance only when the war will be long drawn. The military experts of Pakistan believe that in case of armed clashes, especially with her neighbours, it will be short in duration; therefore, the early preparation

25. Asia Year Book (Hongkong, 1982), pp.217-28.
R. Caves, Trade and Economic Structure (Cambridge: Mass, 1960); Nafis Ahmed, An Economic Geography of Pakistan (London, 1958).

26. Aslam Siddique, n.14, pp.49-50.

and stockpiling of weapons and the initial advantage of war will prove decisive.

The post-1971, period saw a radical change in sub-continental power structure, with the emergence of Bangladesh.²⁷ The loss of her Eastern wing led to the lessening of the burden of the navy also. Because Pakistan had no longer any strategic interest in the Bay of Bengal. Its task was now reduced to the protection of the Western wing only. However, she has in no way put the role of the navy into oblivion.

Pakistan has more than made up her losses it suffered in 1971 war. Its present naval strength comprises 18 major surface warships and nine underwater craft. Besides, she has a large number of support vessels, like coastal Patrol boats and mines sweepers, tanks, tugs, etc.²⁸ The strengthened

27. For details, see Kalim Bhadur, "Indo-Pakistan", India's Foreign Policy, Dr. Bimal Prasad, ed. (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1974), p.140; Bangladesh Documents, vol.II, External Affairs Ministry, India Madras; S.K. Chakrabarti, The Evolution of Politics in Bangladesh 1947-1978 (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1978).

28. For details, regarding Pakistan's navy, see Jane's Fighting Ships: 1980-81, ed. by Captain John Moore, (London: Jane's Publishing Co. Ltd.), p.351; Also see "Gains by Navy", Asian Recorder (New Delhi), vol.XVIII, No.1, pp.105-43; The Military Balance 1981-82 (London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982), pp.79 & 86.

navy of Pakistan is at present capable of playing an important role in any conflict situation that may arise in the Indian Ocean region. For example, she can pose serious security problems to India's Kathiawar coast which is becoming highly industrialised in the coastal region. Added to this, the vulnerability of the off-shore oil platforms of India, the growing fishing fleet and the merchant navy, and protection of the sea-lanes between India and the Persian Gulf may pose a complex security problem. ⁽²⁹⁾

In order to integrate the navy closely with the other two wings of the armed forces, Pakistan has transferred the naval Headquarters from Karachi to Islamabad. The naval dockyard in Karachi has been converted into a naval base comprising a dock repair, maintenance unit and fitting out birth. ³⁰

Pakistan is militarily an important power in the region, but she is not capable of protecting herself from any great power interference. Since she lacked the domestic economic infrastructure to build up and support a powerful military

29. Major General Sikhwant Singh, India's Wars Since Independence - Defence of the Western Border (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1981), vol.II, pp.340-41.

30. Ibid., p.342.

and naval force, Pakistan entered into alliances with external foreign powers to augment such deficiencies.³¹ Pakistan did not view the alliance with great powers as detrimental to her national interest, but found western military presence as a source of security from her perceived threat from India.³² Pakistan's alignment with the West, and the U.S. in particular, enabled her to acquire "economic and military subsidy much larger than her size would otherwise warrant."³³ Although Pakistan has accepted in principle the establishment of peace zone in the Indian Ocean, she has not been very enthusiastic in asking for the elimination of great powers from this area, which was emphasized in General Assembly Resolution of 16 December 1971.³⁴ She has persistently tried to link the issue of the elimination of external foreign power military presence with three broad principles. First, a system of security in

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31. Pakistan signed a bilateral defence treaty with U.S.A. in 1959, and became a member of the CENTO in 1954 and SEATO in 1955.
32. For a detailed insight, regarding Pakistani thinking, see Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
33. Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbours", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.43, 1964-65, p.322.
34. See the General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI), Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, provided in the Appendix II, PP 116-119

the region based on a code of conducts, which would include the implementation of UN resolutions in solving inter-state disputes. Second, an accord to balance the military and the naval strength between major littoral powers and weaker regional-states. Third, agreements regarding the renunciation of nuclear weapons by all littoral states.³⁵ Pakistan also feels that the exit of external great powers from the Indian Ocean area will lead to the establishment of the Indian naval supremacy in the area, since the Indian navy is more powerful than the navies of the regional states.³⁶

During the peak of the Diego Gracia controversy Pakistan's late Prime Minister, Mr. Bhutto, had said in a radio interview that, ^{although} his country was in favour of the Indian Ocean being declared as a zone of peace, he added that Pakistan had, in fact, "no objection to the establishment of an American base in the Indian Ocean".³⁷

The proposal for denuclearization of the Indian Ocean area was initiated by Pakistan. It was aimed primarily at undermining and stalling the nuclear progress of India, even though India had declared that her nuclear programmes were

35. Times of India, New Delhi, 16 December 1979.

36. Refer the Chart provided in the Appendix. IV, pp 24-28.

37. Pakistan Times, 27 April 1974.

meant only for peaceful use.³⁸ After the successful nuclear test carried out by India in 1974, Pakistan pursued her plan with greater vigour. She asked for the extension of the nuclear weapon free zone to the South Asian region.³⁹

India has naturally rejected the Pakistani proposal. India has insisted that the regional security pact is quite inadequate for this purpose, and that the Indian Ocean and the South Asian region "cannot be divided or isolated Eurasian security environment".⁴⁰ Pakistan's perception of her strategic environment and the Indian Ocean can thus be seen as a reflection of her India-centered view and acute concern for her security mainly vis-a-vis India.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 has come to be viewed by the West as a threat to the Persian Gulf region. In this context, Pakistan is seen as a regional power which can help them to safeguard their interest in the

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38. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (London), 1960, p.37; For details, see K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980), Ch.1, 2, & 3.
39. For text, see Pakistan Horizon, Second Quarter, 1976, pp.174-76; Also see K.R. Singh, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia", India Quarterly, July-September 1976, p.301.
40. Times of India, 16 February 1979.

region. The increase in Pakistan's importance in the Western strategy can be perceived from the US Defence Secretary's statement:

"The umbilical cord of the free world runs through the Strait of Hormus into the Persian Gulf. Some sixteen million barrels of oil each day flow through there and as the Soviets themselves become oil importers, this will be an increasingly tempting target. A Soviet invasion of Iran and Pakistan is something we must plan to resist".⁴¹

A two-part plan has been evolved by the US to counter the Soviet threat. The first part of the plan is based on an effort to forge a 'strategic consensus' extending from Egypt to Pakistan. The second part provides for a multi-national naval responsibility coupled with the USA's own Rapid Deployment Force which is to use a number of base facilities in the region. The induction of Pakistan has to be seen in the context of the new strategic thinking in the light of Afghanistan crisis.

It was also argued that, it was being helped by the US and the oil-rich Gulf because it had become a frontline state exposed to the risk of increased Soviet hostility, including military attack by Soviet-backed Afghan forces.⁴²

41. Asia Year Book (Honkong, 1982), p.44.

42. Ibid.

Chapter III

PAKISTAN'S RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A PEACE ZONE: BACKGROUND & OBJECTIVES

The geo-strategic location has accorded Pakistan an important place in the international politics and has shaped her policy towards the region and outside. As noted in the previous chapter, the most important element which has dominated the minds of her policy makers has been their perceived threat to their security and integrity of the nation from India.

On the eastern front, Pakistan's relations with India has been marred by crises and conflicts from the very beginning. In the recent years the three thousand kilometers of the western border has also acquired a new dimension because of involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Pakistan has revealed her concern at the prospect of sharing her border with a country which is under strong Soviet influence.¹ It is indeed strange that while Pakistan expresses her deep concern at the growing superpower involvement along her land

1. Mr. Rahamat Ali Khan, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Defence Studies, Pakistan expressed this concern at a seminar held on 27 January 1982, in School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

frontier, she seems to be less concerned regarding similar happenings in the Indian Ocean. This is perhaps due to her strategic perception which does not regard the presence of external great powers in the Indian Ocean as detrimental to her national interest. In other words, Pakistan does not feel threatened from the sea as much as she does from across the land frontier. ✓

However, Pakistan has not entirely kept quiet regarding the growing military presence of external powers in the Indian Ocean region. Speaking at Conference of the Commonwealth Heads of Government at Singapore on 15 January 1971, the leader of the Pakistani delegation, Commerce Minister Ahsanul Haque, said that "...we are opposed to any development, regional or non-regional, that may pose a threat directly or indirectly to the sea routes and to our internal and external trade and commerce".² But Pakistan's emphasis for the removal of external foreign powers from this region has undergone changes with the developments within the region and outside, as are seen below. ✓

Factors Responsible for the Change in
Pakistan's Indian Ocean Policy in 1974

One of the most important event that influenced Pakistan's

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2. Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, 1st Quarter, p.107;
Dawn, Karachi, 22 January 1971.

Indian Ocean policy in the early seventies was India's peaceful nuclear test of 18 May 1974. This was strongly criticised by Pakistani leaders, and the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said that Pakistan would never succumb to nuclear blackmail by India.³ He announced that Pakistan would seek assurance from various quarters to ward-off any nuclear threat from India.⁴ He also tried to use India's nuclear test in 1974 to augment Pakistan's military strength saying that the alternative to this was to go nuclear.⁵

Bhutto had been an ardent advocate of the nuclear bomb for Pakistan. It was perhaps Bhutto who was responsible for the formulation of Pakistan's nuclear policy.⁶ Bhutto, like General Zia now, in his public statements had sought to justify the reprocessing plant on the grounds of future energy

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3. On 7 June 1974, Bhutto said, "A more grave and serious event....has not taken place in the history of Pakistan. The explosion has introduced a qualitative change in the situation". D. Mukherjee, "India's Nuclear Test and Pakistan", India Quarterly (New Delhi, 1974), vol.30, p.262.
 4. Pakistan Times, Karachi, 19 May 1974.
 5. Radio Pakistan, 19 December 1974, quoted by P.K.S. Namboodri, "A Pakistani Bomb", India Backgrounders, (New Delhi, 9 April 1979).
 6. Z.A. Bhutto, If I am Assassinated (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p.137.

needs of Pakistan.⁷ But it never accepted the rationale for peaceful use of nuclear energy before 1975. As a matter of fact, it was during Ayub's regime that special stress was laid on the development of nuclear energy in the country and the work picked up speed.⁸ The development in the nuclear field progressed rapidly under Bhutto and is still continuing at a rapid pace, as seen from Gen. Zia's statements that "...no power can keep Pakistan deprived of its right to acquire nuclear technology....our determination indicates our national aspiration".⁹

Pakistan's policy seems to have been formulated as a response to India's nuclear policy. India's opposition to the N.P.T. gave an incentive to Pakistan to have a nuclear policy that pleaded for keeping the option open. Pakistan's opposition to nuclear weapons can be seen from its policy on nuclear non-proliferation. Pakistan did not sign the

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7. Ibid., p.193; Also see Brij Mohan Kaushik and O.N. Mehrotra, Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: Sopan Publishing House, 1980), pp.52-58; "Energy Requirements of Pakistan for the next twenty years", paper presented to the UN Conference on Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy, vol.I, p.218; See UN Document 19.
8. S.B. Guha, "Pakistan's Atomic Energy Programme" (New Delhi: IDSA Journal, July 1970), vol.3, No.1, pp.119-20.
9. Times of India, New Delhi, 9 December 1979.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty because India did not sign it.¹⁰ However, Bhutto wanted to obtain the nuclear bomb before India acquired such a weapon to pressurise Pakistan.¹¹

Although Pakistan was aware of India's nuclear progress, her reaction to the nuclear test by India in 1974 was not unexpected. The Secretary General of U.N. was formally approached and briefed on the matter. Foreign Secretary, Aga Shahi, toured the capitals of all the five great powers and the Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed, was instructed to raise the matter at the CENTO meeting at Washington on 19 May 1974. All the diplomatic efforts of Pakistan were devoted to seek security guarantee from the nuclear weapon powers against India. Bhutto dismissed the assurance given by the Indian Prime Minister that the test had no military or political implications.¹²

There could be three possible objectives behind Pakistan's reaction. First, she wanted to seek neighbouring countries' support by injecting a sense of fear in their

10. B.M. Kaushik, "Nuclear Arms Control: A study with reference to South Asia", South Asian Studies (Jaipur, January 1969), vol.4, no.1, p.123.

11. Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.153.

12. See Mukerjee, n.3, p.262.

minds saying that India's nuclear experiment would trigger of a nuclear arms race in the sub-continent and endanger her security.¹³ The second aim of Pakistan was to plead before the nations assisting India's economic development to re-examine the premises on which aid was being offered. Thirdly, it aimed at bringing pressure on India to put her nuclear installations under international safeguard, like those of the International Atomic Energy Agency.¹⁴

In order to bring further pressure on India, Pakistan proposed in the United Nations in 1974 for the denuclearization of South Asia. Prior to this, on the question of progressive denuclearization of various other regions, both Pakistan and India had followed a broadly similar policies and advocated the creation of such zones, provided that political and security conditions permitted.¹⁵ But while Pakistan had favoured the creation of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) everywhere in the world without attaching any conditions, the Indian approach had been more cautious.¹⁶

13. Times of India, New Delhi, 31 May 1974.

14. IDSAs News Review on South Asia (New Delhi, November 1975), p.771.

15. U.N. Document A/CONF.35/10, Annex IV, Report of Committee-I, Item 12, p.17.

16. Kaushik, n.10, pp.117-18; Also see Hindustan Times New Delhi, 20 November 1977.

Pakistan's Stand in the UN

The twenty-sixth session of the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution on 16 December 1971 on Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Pakistan voted for the Resolution. Through Resolution 2992 (XXVII) at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Pakistan was named one of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. During the Ad Hoc Committee's meeting in 1973 and onwards, Pakistan expressed her concern about India's hegemonical designs.¹⁷

During the 1973 General Assembly session, a working paper was circulated by Sri Lanka, calling upon the Secretary General to prepare a report on the naval presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan supported the move. Its delegate voted in favour of the Resolution 3080 (XXVIII) adopted by the General Assembly on 6 December 1973, which asked the Secretary General to prepare a factual statement on the military presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean.¹⁸

17. S.P. Seth, "The Indian Ocean and Indo-American Relations", Asian Survey (California, August 1975), p.653; Also see Hassan Akhtar, "Pakistan against big power or littoral states hegemony", Morning News (Karachi, 17 March 1974).

18. Year Book of the United Nations, 1973, p.36; see appendix V, for major bases of external Great Powers in the Indian Ocean, pp.129-34.

In late August 1974, a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in South Asia was put forward by Pakistan. The General Assembly's Steering Committee on 19 September 1974 formally approved its inclusion on the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. On 28 October the same year, Pakistan introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly a resolution which sought to endorse in principle the concept of South Asia as a nuclear free zone. The Secretary General was also requested to convene a conference of the South Asian states. Speaking in favour of the resolution 3265B (XXIX) the Pakistani representative said that his country's prime concern was to seek the security of the non-nuclear states in view of the spiralling nuclear proliferation.¹⁹

To counter the Pakistani proposal India moved another resolution which wanted that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear free zone in the appropriate region of South Asia should come from the states of the region after prior consultations and agreements.²⁰ Pakistan's first draft failed to gain acceptance in the sense that General Assembly adopted the Pakistani motion as well as the parallel one proposed by

19. U.N. Document A/3263 (XXIX); see appendix-III, pp 119-23.

20. Ibid.

India. The Indian resolution got ninety votes in favour while Pakistan's got eightysix.²¹

Pakistan's initiative for a nuclear free zone in South Asia resulted from Prime Minister Bhutto's declared intentions to pursue political means to avert a Indian nuclear threat.²² Pakistan argued that the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia would provide stability to a strategically important region of the Indian Ocean, and hence, would supplement the Indian Ocean peace zone concept.²³

During the 1975 session the Ad Hoc Committee expressed its view in favour of a conference of the littoral and hinterland states and other major powers on the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal. Pakistan wanted that the agenda of the Conference should include a code of conduct for relations among the Indian Ocean states and the elimination of external foreign powers from the area.²⁴

The 1976 General Assembly resolution 3188(XXXI) reiterated its plea for continued consultation among Indian Ocean littoral

21. Ibid.; also see The Times of India, New Delhi, 8 November 1974.

22. IDSA News Report on South Asia, New Delhi, June 1974, p.553.

23. Dawn, Karachi, 30 September 1974.

24. United Nations Monthly Chronicles, July 1975, p.35.

and hinterland states and for convening a conference on the region. Pakistan abstained on this resolution.²⁵ However, on 12 December 1977, Pakistan voted for the resolution 3286(XXXII) which called for the convening of a preliminary meeting on the Indian Ocean of all interested parties.²⁶ Pakistan also supported the recommendation of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee in 1978 for a meeting of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean at the U.N. headquarters.²⁷

In 1979 at the UN Ad Hoc Committee meeting, Pakistan urged that before the elimination of external foreign powers, three conditions must be fulfilled. First, establishment of a system of security in the region based on a code of conduct. Second, agreements to balance the military and naval strength between the major littoral powers and the weaker regional states. Third, renunciation of nuclear weapons by all littoral states of the Indian Ocean.²⁸ However, this was not acceptable to India. Rejecting Pakistan's proposal the Indian representative envisaged that "the Asian part of the Indian Ocean cannot be divided or isolated from its Eurasian security

25. SIPRI Year Book 1978, World Armament and Disarmament, Stockholm, p.473.

26. Ibid., p.474.

27. Dawn, Karachi, 6 October 1978.

28. The Times of India, New Delhi, 16 February 1979.

environment...". and regarding the code of conduct he added "we have already have one in the UN Charter and in the relevant General Assembly resolutions".²⁹

The initial hopes of Pakistan of making quick progress on her desired objective of establishing a nuclear free zone in South Asia did not mature. Her representative admitted in the UN that consultations had revealed differences of a fundamental nature that remained to be resolved before a peace zone could be established. Pakistan failed in her renewed bid in the UN Political Committee to make India accept the creation of such a zone in South Asia based on collective security system and total renunciation of nuclear weapons. The Committee, which had earlier heard both India and Pakistan, adopted without vote two rival resolutions proposed by them. While the Pakistani draft urged the states of South Asia to continue their efforts on creating a nuclear free zones the Indian draft would have the General Assembly consider any proposal for such a zone in any appropriate region of Asia, only after it was agreed to by the countries of the region.³⁰

At the United Nations a draft resolution was circulated in the political and security committee of the General Assembly

29. Ibid.

30. For details, see IDSAs News Review on South Asia, New Delhi, December 1975, p.1212.

to press for the establishment and preservation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The resolution urged the littoral and the hinterland states of the Indian Ocean, the five big powers and other users of the Ocean to support the proposal.³¹ It called upon the great powers to stop increasing their military presence in the region as an essential step to relax tension in the region. The resolution was unanimously recommended by the fifteen-nation Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which had been studying the proposal since 1972.³²

In analysing Pakistan's objective of establishing a nuclear free zone in South Asia, it must be mentioned that the Pakistani proposal was in violation of the principle three of the UN Study Report which categorically refers to the need for obtaining a regional consensus before such proposals are brought before the United Nations.³³ However, Pakistan strongly advocated the involvement of the United Nations in creating such a zone. This proposal was pressed before the United Nations as a contribution to world's search for security.³⁴

31. United Nations' Monthly Chronicle, January 1975, p.38.

32. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 9 October 1974; The members of the Ad Hoc Committee were Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Malagasy, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.

33. P.R. Chari, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture and India's Option", Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay, January 1980), vol.XV, no.3

34. Ibid.

Pakistan's Efforts Outside the United Nations

Pakistan did not confine her bid to establish a nuclear free zone in South Asia to the United Nations only. She raised the matter in the Islamic conferences. In May 1976, she urged the forty-two-member Islamic conference of Foreign Ministers in Istanbul to call for an early establishment of a nuclear free zone in South Asia. The proposal was formally put on the agenda of the conference.³⁵ However, it should be noted that with the help of the Arab states, Pakistan has been able to bolster her conventional armed forces and develop her nuclear facilities to obtain nuclear arms capability.³⁶ Bhutto had said that "the Christian, Jews and Hindu civilisation have this capability. Only Islamic civilisation was without it".³⁷ He indicated that this position was about to change. The coming into light of the clandestine activities of Pakistani scientists to obtain secret informations regarding the production of vital components belies Pakistan's claims of the peaceful nature of her nuclear programme.³⁸

35. IDSA News Review on South Asia, May 1976, p.319.

36. P.B. Sinha and R.R. Subramanian, Nuclear Pakistan: Atomic Threat to South Asia (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1980), p.137; also see The Hindu, , 14 April 1979.

37. Bhutto, n.6, p.138.

38. For details regarding Pakistan's nuclear progress, see Brij Mohan Kaushik and O.N. Mehrotra, Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: Sopan Publishing House, 1980), p.33; D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Namboodiri, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb (Delhi, 1979); Also see P.B. Sinha and R.R. Subramanian, Nuclear Pakistan: Atomic threat to South Asia (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1980).

Pakistan took up the issue^cof nuclear free zone in the Indian Ocean region at the Law of the Sea Conference and also in the non-aligned meetings.³⁹ While she has followed the policy of rising the issue directly in international forums, India has insisted such issues are better solved first at a bilateral or regional level, because in the world bodies it gives the vested interests and the big powers ample scope for manipulation. As a result, vital issues get bogged down due to rival power politics.

On 6 December 1977, Pakistan told the political and security committee of the UN that a treaty to ban the use of force could be effective only if it provides safeguard against the resort to force by large and more powerful states. The General Assembly on 12 December 1977 stamped its approval on two resolutions initiated by Pakistan concerning the establishment of a nuclear free zone in South Asia, and the security for the non-nuclear weapon states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Under the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Indian Ocean region, the Assembly reaffirmed its endorsement, in

39. See the IDSANews Review on South Asia, New Delhi, June 1976, p.377; and Times of India, New Delhi, 17 August 1976, respectively.

principle, of the concept of nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia. It is important to note here that the original aims of Pakistan for a denuclearized zone,⁴⁰ which was advocated in 1974 after the Indian nuclear explosion, has gradually changed to the demand for a nuclear weapon free zone ^{in South Asia.} This change has helped Pakistan, first, to carry on with her nuclear programme. Second, it has offered scope to her western allies to legitimize the presence of their armed forces in the Indian Ocean area.

To win support of the regional power for her proposal to establish a nuclear free zone, Pakistan also tried through bilateral efforts. As it has been noted earlier, it secured the support of Shri Lanka for her proposal.⁴¹ In order to gain Nepal's support, Pakistan has supported the Nepalese demand that their state be declared a peace zone.⁴² Pakistan also joined with Bangladesh in calling for a consultation among the littoral states in declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Gen. Zia conveyed to Bangladesh his deep

40. SIPRI Year Book 1975, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zone", p.438.

41. The Tribune, Chandigarh, 6 July 1975; News Review on Science and Technology, August 1975, p.548.

42. Kapileshwar Labha, "India and Nepal's zone of peace proposal", Foreign Affairs Report (New Delhi, October 1978), pp.172-74.

appreciation for the Bangladesh government's support to Pakistan's proposal.⁴³ Pakistan had also proposed a meeting of the South Asian nations to convert India's unilateral assurance for using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes into a multilateral guarantee.⁴⁴

An Analysis of Pakistan's Response and Strategies

Pakistan's major objective seemed to obtain security guarantees. Her delegate to the UN, Mohammad Yunus, said that the hope that the countries would not use nuclear bombs in anger "hangs by the threat of peaceful intentions" and these intentions were not immune from policy changes. He also said that although Pakistan welcomed India's assurance that it would use nuclear technology for peaceful proliferation.⁴⁵ Pakistan also proposed a meeting of the South Asian nations which included India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka to convert India's unilateral assurance for using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, into a multilateral guarantee.⁴⁶ Further, in the joint communique issued in

43. The Statesman, New Delhi, 25 December 1977.

44. IDSA News Review on South Asia, New Delhi, June 1975, p.401; also see Patriot, New Delhi, May 18, 1975.

45. Patriot, New Delhi, 15 March 1975.

46. Patriot, New Delhi, 13 May 1975; For text, see Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, Islamabad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 1975, p.22.

Colombo on 5 July 1975, during the visit of Aga Shahi, the two countries urged that the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean region to permanently renounce the nuclear weapon option.⁴⁷

The question of creating a nuclear free zone in South Asia was complicated by linking it to two major international issues. First, the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in non-nuclear region as a part of general nuclear disarmament. The second, the linking of peace zone in the Indian Ocean to the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the area. It was argued by Pakistan that if the Indian Ocean states gave up their option to acquire nuclear weapon and set up an appropriate regime to guarantee it, only then the external foreign power could be pressurized to leave the area.⁴⁸ Pakistan stressed repeatedly that "the acceptance of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia is the most feasible way in which the non-nuclear states of this region can give their commitment to the non-proliferation objectives, and enhance the security of all the states in the region."⁴⁹ The

47. The Tribune, Chandigarh, 6 July 1975; Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Review on Science and Technology, 1975, p.548; Ted Morello, "Pakistan for regional talks on Peace Zone", Pakistan Times, Karachi, 7 July 1975.

48. K.R. Singh, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia", India Quarterly, New Delhi, vol.32, 1976, p.290.

49. For details, see Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan's speech at the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly 1976, U.N. Document A/C 1/31/P.V 42.

Association of South East Asian Nations agreed in principle to support Pakistan's proposal for the creation of a nuclear free zone in South Asia. India opposed Pakistan's proposal and declared that she would never agree to any international inspection of her plants. She was of the opinion that it was improper on the part of the General Assembly to declare any region a nuclear free zone without the consent of the countries in the area. To break the impasse the UN Ad Hoc Committee on 20 September 1974 decided to set up a working group to formulate a draft resolution on its own for consideration by the General Assembly.⁵⁰

Although Pakistan's proposal showed concern about the dangers of nuclear proliferation and viewed the entry of India into the nuclear club as a threat to her own national security, ~~it~~ actually lowered her status in her bid to gain parity with India at all levels. She hoped to put a blanket ban on India's further activities by trying to force India to open up her nuclear installations to inspection by an international body. This is perhaps one of the reasons why Pakistan insisted on the inclusion of the Secretary General

50. Times of India (New Delhi) and Indian Express (New Delhi), 9 October 1974. Shirley Amarsinghe was the Chairman and the group initially included Australia, Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia, Malagasy, Zambia and Sri Lanka.

in establishing a nuclear free zone in South Asia.

In 1974, the Anglo-American base in Diego Gracia in the Indian Ocean was sought to be expanded to provide better military facilities.⁵¹ They argued that such a step was necessary because of the increasing Soviet military activities in the Indian Ocean. There was protest from most of the littoral states against the U.S. decision, but they went ahead to expand the base facilities. Testifying before the House Sub-Committee on Near East and South Asia, State Department's Director of Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Seymour Weiss, said that while many nations in the Indian Ocean area had protested against the U.S. move over Diego Gracia base, the U.S.A. had received some private assurance that some of the countries were not as concerned as they indicated in their public statements. Pakistan figured prominently among the names of the countries mentioned by him.⁵²

Reacting to the expansion of the Diego Gracia base, Pakistan's late Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, said that his

51. For details, see T.T. Poulouse, "Facts about Diego-Gracia", Foreign Affairs Report (New Delhi: Indian Council for World Affairs, Sapru House, April 1974), vol. XXIII.

52. Tribune, Chandigarh, 8 March 1974.

country had no objection to the establishment of the U.S. base in the Indian Ocean area. In an interview in Rawalpindi, Bhutto pointed out that "while it would be ideal for the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace, small countries could not dictate to the great powers".⁵³

Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear free zone in South Asia has not evoked adequate response from the countries of the Indian Ocean region. This could be seen in the policy statements made during the general debates in the U.N. Assembly. A few of them agreed in principle with the idea of establishing a nuclear free zone, and expressed concern at nuclear proliferation; but everyone avoided reference to Pakistan's proposal. Vigorous support for Pakistan came only from China.⁵⁴ Mr. Hsu of China fully supported the peace zone proposal and criticized the two super powers for increasing the tension in the region.

Pakistan's half-hearted support for feally establishing a peace zone in the Indian Ocean was amply proved in November 1974, when she hosted the CENTO maritime exercise in the

53. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 27 April 1974; Pakistan Times, Karachi, 27 April 1979.

54. UN General Assembly Official Records, 31st Session, November 1976.

Arabian sea. Code-named Midlink-74 it was held fifteen to thirty miles off the Karachi port under the overall command of Vice-Admiral H.H. Ahmed.⁵⁵ A CENTO statement issued in Karachi at the conclusions of the naval exercise pointed out that, "it was held to practise modern techniques of keeping open free world's sea lanes". Many Indian Ocean littoral states viewed this exercise as an attempt to overawe the littoral states by show of force.⁵⁶

Later, regarding the big power rivalry, Pakistan's minister of state for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, said that Pakistan was not particularly alarmed by the U.S. and Soviet naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean, given the state of the modern nuclear warfare. The Soviets, he said, had their ships in the area for a long time and since then have been joined by the Americans, British and the French. He further said that "if one super power comes to the Indian Ocean inevitably the other will follow".⁵⁷

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55. Taking part in the naval manoeuvres were task forces from U.S.A., U.K., Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Some fifty ships and 25,000 persons took part in the exercise, and this included two nuclear submarines. For details, see IDSA News Review on South Asia, New Delhi, December 1974, "CENTO Maritime Exercise", p.1054.
56. The Statesman (New Delhi) and Times of India (New Delhi), 19 and 20 November 1974.
57. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 10 December 1974.

In view of the growing militarization of the Indian Ocean, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the great powers to refrain from increasing their military presence in the Indian Ocean. There were 103 votes in favour and none against. But 26 countries abstained from voting. The U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Britain and France were among the abstainers, while China voted for the resolution.⁵⁸

Although Pakistan has denounced the great power rivalry in the region and has advocated the elimination of great power presence, however, her stand has differed on this issue because it has felt that small nations cannot dictate terms to the great powers, and more importantly their rivalry or the presence of more than one big power is better than the presence of only one big power. In other words, "more the number, the greater the neutralization of the presence..."⁵⁹

Pakistan has stressed the need for proper conditions of security and self-restraint at regional level in order to pave the way for the establishment of a peace zone in the

58. For further details, see IDSA News Review on South Asia, New Delhi, December 1974.

59. Late Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto's interview to Asahi Shinbun, Tokyo on 8 February 1976; For text, see Pakistan's Foreign Affairs, February 1976, pp.12-25.

Indian Ocean. According to her view, the elimination of great power presence and military build up could only be brought about if the littoral and hinterland states put their houses in order and take steps to ensure an atmosphere of security in the region.⁶⁰ Pakistan advocates the establishment of a political regime and expressed in the form of a code of conduct to guide the relations among the Indian Ocean states. An important element as envisaged by Pakistan was an arrangement among the major littoral states to maintain a reasonable ratio in their naval and military forces, as well as undertakings as not to acquire or introduce nuclear weapons in the region.⁶¹ Pakistan's chief objective was to safeguard her territory and integrity within the region rather than give primacy to the elimination of external great powers presence from the region.

The recent Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has added a new dimension to the problem of establishing a peace zone in Indian Ocean region. For Pakistan the Soviet move has cast a dark shadow on the prospect of establishing a nuclear

60. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 6 December 1975.

61. Samina Ahmed, "Indian Ocean Peace Zone Proposal", Pakistan Horizon, vol.32, Nos 1 & 2, First and Second Quarters, Focus on Asia; M. Masood, ed., Karachi, pp.136-37.

free zone in the area. Pakistan's U.N. ambassador, Niaz A. Naik said in the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean that, "this has become the root-cause of the escalation of tension and will inevitably lead to the intensification of great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean area". He held the Soviet Union responsible for causing a setback to the endeavour of the international community in establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. He stressed that unless the foreign troops are withdrawn from the territories of Afghanistan the objective of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean will remain elusive. Pakistan declared that she would not agree to oppose the establishment of military bases by the U.S. and her allies in the Indian Ocean region as long as the Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan.⁶² Thus the new threat, which Pakistan sees due to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, has made Pakistan all the more dependent on the support of her Western allies and justify their naval presence in the Indian Ocean region.

In analysing Pakistan's policy and objectives regarding the Indian Ocean it can be seen that it was based mainly on

62. IDSAs News Review on South Asia, New Delhi, "Pakistan - Soviet move blocked Peace Zone implementation", March 1980, p.1330.

her security perception vis-a-vis India. The Indian factor in Pakistani thinking can be further understood by recalling that ever/since 1947, Pakistan had consistently struggled to project an image of parity with India. India's size, geographical location and industrial development being overwhelmingly disproportionate, Pakistan from its very inception sought to counter this by aligning herself closely with the Western Powers economically, politically and militarily.⁶³ The 1971 war established India's superiority in the sub-continent beyond any doubts. Further, India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 widened the gap between the two countries. All these had the effect of increasing the perceived threat to her security in the minds of Pakistan's policy-makers and forced her leadership to strive for a nuclear free zone in the region.

At the UN Ad Hoc Committee, on June 1980, Pakistan again pointed out that the security of the states of the Indian Ocean region had two aspects - non-regional and regional. The non-regional aspect included the presence of external great powers, and Pakistan included the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan as an example of danger threatening

63. P.S. Jayaramu, "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Non-Proliferation Treaty and South Asia", ISDA Journal (New Delhi: Sapru House, July-September 1980), vol.23, No.1, p.140.

the security of the Indian Ocean states. The second aspect included localised arms build-up and policies of regional predominance, and in this Pakistan had India in mind.⁶⁴

Pakistan does not regard the presence of external great power in the Indian Ocean region as detrimental to her national interest.⁶⁵ In other words, Pakistan does not feel threatened from the sea as much as she does from across the land border. Pakistan's Indian Ocean policy is intimately linked with her overall policy towards India, and any change in policies ~~towards~~^{of} one nation may lead to a change in the policies ~~toward~~^{of the} others. This is in keeping with the South Asian politics which has close connection with intra-regional as well as extraneous developments.

64. SIPRI Year Book - 1981.

65. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 10 December 1974. Regarding the Big power rivalry, Pakistan's Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed said that "Pakistan was not particularly alarmed by the US-Soviet naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean....."

Chapter IV

MAJOR ACTORS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND PAKISTAN'S RESPONSE

Pakistan's Indian Ocean policy has been influenced by her security concern and her relations with the external powers.¹ The geo-strategic location of the country has placed her at the intersection of great power rivalries and politics. Since she shares her border with a number of important powers like Soviet Union, China, India and Iran, who have shown keen interest in the development of that country, it is not likely that the United States as the largest power in the world and a military ally of Pakistan will keep off.² In this chapter, we will examine in details the presence of major powers in the Indian Ocean, their attitude to the concepts of Peace Zone and Nuclear Free Zone and to what extent Pakistan's Indian Ocean policy is complementary or inimical to their strategic interest in the region. For the sake of convenience we will divide the chapter into three parts. The first part will focus on the presence of external

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1. For details, see Chapter II: "Indian Ocean in Pakistan's Security and Strategic perception"
 2. K. Subrahmanyam, "The Interests of External Power in Pakistan", ISDA Journal (New Delhi: Sapru House, 1972-73), vol.5, pp.417-33.

foreign power; the second will deal with the policies of regional big powers and the last part will analyse Pakistan's response, in the light of the policies of these major actors in the Indian Ocean area.

External Foreign Powers and the Indian Ocean

The continuing presence of great powers in the Indian Ocean has been a major obstacle to the achievement of the objective of the majority of the Indian Ocean regional states, i.e. the establishment of a peace zone. Each great power has its own motivating factors for continuing or increasing its influence in the region.³

The external great powers present in the Indian Ocean region can be grouped into two broad categories. The first category includes the presence of an alliance, namely the Western countries, Britain and France led by United States. The second category consists of independent actors of mainly two countries, Soviet Union and China.

3. For further details, see K.P. Mishra, Quest for International Order in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1977), pp.19-83.

Britain - After the decision to withdraw from the East of Suez,⁴ Britain has withdrawn considerably from the Indian Ocean region and has adopted a low-key policy but she still possess substantial interest in the region and intend to protect them by maintaining residual military forces and by actively supporting an increasing U.S. military presence there. They still exercise considerable diplomatic influence and their fleet continues to visit this area.

The reasons for continuing British interest are many. Britain is under obligation to honour a number of commitments with certain South and South East Asian countries. She has also to provide protection to the crown colony of Hongkong. Britain wants to maintain the line of communication with and across the Indian Ocean region to South East and the Far East. The staging-bases in this area provide her with strategic mobility. The British Indian Ocean Territory was created in 1965 including Chagos Archipelago (of Mauritius), islands of Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches (of Seychelles).⁵ This aroused the suspicion of the littoral states; and

4. For details regarding the British withdrawal from the East of Suez, see Dick Wilson, "The Indian Ocean Frontier", Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong, 14 September 1967), vol.57, No.11, pp.517-23.

5. Kessing's Contemporary Archives (London), 27 November-4 December 1965, p.21102.

subsequently the UN General Assembly passed a resolution expressing 'deep concern' at the detachment of 'certain islands from the territory of Mauritius for establishing military bases.'⁶ Finally, since its trade with the Indian Ocean countries amounts to approximately 22 percent of its overseas transactions and as 40 percent of its overseas investments are based in the region it has vital interest in protecting the trade routes and freedom of navigation on the Ocean.⁷

The British have assumed a negative attitude towards the proposal of peace zone and believe that it is 'unrealistic' and cannot be implemented. Britain has refrained from voting on the proposal of Peace Zone in the UN.⁸ She has also refused to attend the conference provided for by the 1974 UN General Assembly Resolution. She is of the opinion that the question of 'arms limitation' should be discussed between the US and the Soviet Union without undue interference on the

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6. UN Document A/Res/2066, passed on 4 January 1966.
 7. Ference A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: The Balance of Power (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp.201-03.
 8. For further details of Britain's view expressed in the United Nation, see UN Document Agenda Item-98, A/8492 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.590/Rev.2, "Declaration of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"; also see Dawn, Karachi, 2 February 1974.

part of littoral states.

France - The French continue to have a significant military presence in the Indian Ocean. In fact in 1974, it established a new naval command which extends over the entire Indian Ocean area as well as the Cape of Good Hope route leading to it. She also has a sizeable naval presence in this area.⁹

As a matter of prestige France supports a policy which would continue to grant it 'great power' stature in the Indian Ocean. Neither can it ignore the political advantage in exercise of flag showing in the Indian Ocean. Equally important is the necessity to protect French sea routes in the Indian Ocean, since it obtains its main oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.¹⁰ France also possesses a negative attitude concerning Indian Ocean peace zone proposal. Dismissing the scheme as impracticable and unacceptable, the French have steadily abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions

9. Vali, n.7, pp.203-04.

10. S.N. Kohli, Sea Power and the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill Publishing Co., 1978), p.132; Jacques Fremand, "Western Europe and the Indian Ocean", in Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, eds, The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance (New York, 1972), p.426.

concerning the concept of peace zone. France has also shown no interest in convening a conference on the issue.¹¹

U.S.A. - USA's main interest in maintaining an effective presence in the Indian Ocean is strategic. The strategic priorities of the US can be enumerated under three heads: political priorities, economic priorities and security priorities.

The prime motivating factor is to perpetuate the Western dominance in the region, especially after Britain's decision to withdraw from the East of Suez in 1968. She argued that a power vacuum has been created, which the Soviet Union is also trying to fill in.¹² A Soviet threat was sought to be generated by partrayals that the Soviet Union might soon 'own' the Indian Ocean.¹³

The second politico-strategic priority is to ensure freedom of navigation in high seas for the Western world. The peculiar nature of entry into this ocean with choke

11. UN Document A/8492 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.590/Rev.2 1842nd Meeting, 1 December 1971; also see Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, vol.32, 1979, p.126.

12. For details regarding Power Vacuum theory, see Misra, n.3, pp.14-17.

13. Guido Geroso, Atlas (New York, November 1970), p.21.

points demands America's attention to the region.

Lastly, the US is anxious to maintain stable relations with the littoral and hinterland states which have never been near the plain of an organic or transnational relations. Keeping this in view the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) was created in July 1964, between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan which aimed at achieving economic collaboration among the members. All the members were pro-West and anti-Communist in their outlook.¹⁴ Though US was not directly involved in it, it could depend upon the alliance to preserve its two primary interests in West Asia, i.e. the safeguard of oil investments and the political containment of the growing Soviet and to some extent Chinese influence.¹⁵ The alliance proved very weak and ultimately fell through. Recently in view of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the then President, Mr. Carter proposed a regional defence alliance. It envisaged a protective US umbrella over North Africa, the Persian Gulf and as far as Pakistan and Nepal.¹⁶ This also did not arouse positive response from the regional

14. K.R. Singh, The Indian Ocean: Big Power Presence and Local Response (New Delhi: Manohar, 1977), pp.29-30.

15. Ibid., pp.31-32.

16. "Carter Takes Charge", Time, 4 February 1980.

states. This makes the US presence all the more important to symbolize, what Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. called "a gesture of friendship, a note of assurance implication of threat, glimpse of world power..."¹⁷

But it is indeed the vital economic priorities the US has in this region that transforms the US quest for a strategy here from a purely military matter into a broad policy concern. Among them the most vital one is the purchase and safe transport of oil.¹⁸ In fact, statistics show how the West is cripplingly dependent on Gulf oil.¹⁹ The importance of this area can be easily realised from the Carter Doctrine which envisaged:

"Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an attempt will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force".²⁰

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17. Quoted in M. Bezboruah, US Strategy in the Indian Ocean: The International Response (Praeger Publisher, 1977), p.36.
18. Binaya R. Mishra, "US Strategy in the Indian Ocean: India's perception and response", Asia Pacific Community (Tokyo, Fall 1982), No.18, p.65.
19. See Table-1, p.135.
20. Carter's State of the Union Address, 1980, Times, 4 February 1980, p.6.

Besides oil, the Western nations are also interested in other rich natural resources like uranium, gold, tin, manganese, etc.²¹ The US has even threatened the Afro-Asian states, if they form Cartels and make the availability of these resources difficult to the Western countries.²²

Also the US has an enormous investment in the region which is estimated at \$ 10 billion. Further the region offers a good market for American products and the gulf in particular has become the most lucrative arms market of the decade.²³

From a strategic security perspective the US strategy in the Indian Ocean is 'offensive' while that of the Soviet Union is defensive. This has been achieved at two levels. Firstly, with the emergence of new weapon system, especially

21. For details, see Braw W. Norman, ed., United States and India and Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1967); John W. Spanier, ed., American Foreign Policy since World War II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960); Baldev Raj Nayar, American Geopolitics and India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1976); R.K. Ramazani, "Security in the Persian Gulf", National Herald, New Delhi, 8 May 1981; Foreign Affairs, New York, vol.57, No.4, Spring 1979, pp:821-35; see Table IV, p.137

22. Denzil Peiris, "The Strategy of Brinkmanship", Far Eastern Economic Review, Honkong, 6 May 1974.

23. See the Table II and III, p.136-137.

Polaris A-2 and A-3 and Poseidon missiles, have exposed USSR to attack from South, i.e. the Indian Ocean. Besides it also covers all the vital points of China. The deployment of missile^{launching} submarines in the Indian Ocean has achieved several strategic objectives for USA. Besides making the Southern areas of Soviet Union vulnerable, it has compelled her to devote a good part of its defence budget and production effort to the creation a maintenance of defensive systems. Further the need to provide for defence practically around 360° of arc could pose uncomfortable problems for Russia's strategic defence command.²⁴

Next at the level of regional powers, American naval deployment and bases would provide assurance to local powers allied to the USA, although from event in South East Asia (US withdrawal from Vietnam) and in South Asia (the US inability to prevent the severance of the Eastern wing of Pakistan now Bangladesh) it would be difficult for America's smaller allies to bank on America's unconditional support.²⁵ Moreover, the full development of Indian Ocean bases, for

24. For details, see Col. R. Rama Rao, "An Indian Ocean Strategy for India", in Poulouse, ed., Indian Ocean Power Rivalry (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1974), pp.69-74.

25. Ibid.

example, the development of Diego Gracia will make it eventually more difficult to forego the strategic option offered by the Indian Ocean.

Finally, since Russia has developed very high yield and reasonably accurate ICBMs, the US ICBM silos have become vulnerable. Hence the US strategic deterrence has to be moved out into the Ocean where the submerged nuclear submarines (Trident and Poseidon) could cover all strategic targets of the USSR and China.²⁶ In fact, all these strategic priorities have covered in the US naval strategy.

Since 1949, the US has maintained a nearly permanent naval presence in the Ocean through three ships assigned to its Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf. It intermittently despatches a carrier or a major surface unit task force from the Seventh Fleet to the Ocean. Since mid-1950, units of the US Pacific Fleet have joined in maritime manoeuvres, code-named 'Midlink' held annually in November in the North Arabian sea.²⁷

The US mainly utilizes the Subic Bay in Philippines to support its ships in the Indian Ocean. To a lesser extent

26. Ibid., pp.79-80.

27. J.P. Anand, "Big Powers and the Indian Ocean", IDSA Journal (New Delhi, April-June 1976), pp.585-86.

it relies on local ports.²⁸ The main US communication centres are at North-West Cape and Pine Gap in Australia and are supplemented by Diego Gracia base, and later's facilities are now more developed and has become the hub of the US strategy in the Indian Ocean.²⁹ Regarding the US quest for bases in the Indian Ocean the New York Times reported on 18 June 1973 after the inauguration of Diego Gracia base that "In the potential strategic competition between US and Soviet Union over the use of Indian Ocean, the United States has thus become the first to establish a military base on foreign territory in the region."³⁰

The Indian Ocean peace zone proposal has not received any tangible support from the US. The US refrained from endorsing the US General Assembly resolutions advocating the concept. It has also continued to resist the idea of

28. See the Map provided in the Appendix and also Strategic Digest, vol.IV, No.6, June 1974, published by IDSA, Sapru House, New Delhi; "Declaration of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace," Report of the UN Secretary General, p.10.

29. For details about Diego Gracia, see T.T. Poulouse, "Facts about Diego Gracia", Foreign Affairs Report, vol.XXIII, Indian Council for World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi, April 1974, p.64; also see Misra, n.3, pp.27-30.

30. New York Times, 18 June 1973, quoted in Misra, n.3, pp.41-42.

a conference on the subject.³¹

It has objected to the proposal as incompatible with the international law of the Sea, especially with regard to freedom of navigation on the high seas. This along with other arguments has been its stand both within and outside the UN. The Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, US State Department, Mr. Seymour Weiss, stated in March 1974, before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that:

"While we sympathize with the principles which motivate some of the nations in the area to promote concepts such as the 'Indian Ocean Peace Zone', all major maritime powers, including the United States and Soviet Union, have been doubtful about this initiative because of its implication that littoral states somehow have a special right to limit or control the use of the high seas by others. The US has long held the view that there must be unimpaired freedom of navigation on the high seas".³²

This has remained the US stand on the issue although subject to minor changes and variations.

Soviet Union - The geographical location of the Soviet Union in relation to the Indian Ocean is far different from that of the USA and also from that of the European powers. Though technically it is not an Asian power but a large part

31. United Nations Monthly Chronicle, July 1975, p.35.

32. Seymour Weiss, Statement of the US Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, US State Department, Pakistan Economist, Karachi, 1974, p.16.

of her territory fall within the Asian continent. Being a super power like the US, her objectives are also both strategic, politico and economic. "This can be also explained in the context of the growing super power interest in the Third World and the evolution of the Cold War strategy in the light of the newly emerging weapon system".³³

As for the Soviet Union the Indian Ocean is the only ice-free sea lane between the Eastern and the Western parts of the Soviet Union. It also needs to protect its crucial military industrial complexes and cities located in the Southern parts of the country from the US nuclear strike forces present in the North-Western parts of the Indian Ocean. It is an exceedingly important point that from the Indian Ocean, the USA can indulge in offensive deployment against the Soviet Union but the later cannot do so against the former.³⁴

The politico-economic motivations for increased Soviet interest include sizeable economic links with some of the important littoral countries. It has to protect its merchant shipping and fishing fleets. An important instrument of Soviet policy is the desire to 'show the flag' in the waters

33. Singh, n.15, p.58.

34. Poulouse, n.26, pp.74-75.

of this ocean and pay good-will visits to friendly countries in the region.³⁵ All these are compelling reasons for an active and vigilant Soviet naval policy.

The Soviets did not have any presence in this area, on the eve of the entry of the US naval task force in 1964. In March 1968, the Soviet Union entered the Indian Ocean with a small part of its Pacific fleet.³⁶ This gave the US an additional handle for pushing its plans in the area. A hue and cry was raised by the western countries upon the Soviet entry into the Indian Ocean.

Since 1968, the Soviets have maintained a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. They have established two fleet anchorages of Socotra and the other near Seychelles Islands. It has been reported that they enjoy port facilities in Hodeida in Yemen and were constructing oil tanks in Somalia. At Aden they have constructed a runway and improved harbour facilities.³⁷

It was also reported on 29 June 1969, from Rawalpindi that Pakistan also was hoping to improve its naval bases at Gwadar with Soviet assistance. The Western bloc support

35. Vali, n.7, p.182.

36. Miera, n.3, p.48.

37. Strategic Digest, n.29, pp.11-12.

for Gwadar naval base was withheld after 1965, probably because of Pakistan's growing friendship with China and Soviet Union.³⁸

The Soviet Union's close proximity to the Indian Ocean and its littoral and hinterland states gives it a strategic advantage over the US. The Soviet naval presence, although not very large is well calculated politically. It is large enough for its adversaries to take account of and small enough to permit latitude for propaganda against the Western power naval presence.³⁹

The change in the Soviet policy towards the non-aligned states since 1955 enabled it to develop friendly relation with countries like India, Burma, Indonesia. Soviet relations with the most important country in the region, i.e. India have been deepening and widening which has been facilitated since the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971. With Pakistan an important country which is an adversary of India, the Soviets have kept normal relations. Moreover the growing Sino-Soviet

38. Singh, n.15, p.61.

39. Hongkong Standard, Hongkong, 19 September 1976, cited in S. Irtiaz Hussain, "The Politico-Strategic balance in South Asia", Strategic Studies, Islamabad, July-September 1977, p.29.

rift also prompted the USSR to compete with China for influence among the Afro-Asian states.

The Soviet reaction to the proposal of the littoral states about establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean may appear to be the same as that of the USA in the sense that both the superpowers have abstained since 1971 whenever there was a vote either in the First Committee or in the UN General Assembly. But there is a difference in approach. During the very first year of its consideration, the Soviet representative in the First Committee, Roschin, declared that his country was 'interested in the implementation of that proposal, as it is a genuine measure for strengthening international peace and security'.⁴⁰

At the 25th Congress of the CPSU in 1976, the Soviet President, Leonid Brezhnev stated: "Pronouncements have been proliferating in many countries recently against any power setting up military bases in the region of the Indian Ocean. We are in sympathy with these pronouncements. The Soviet Union has never had, and has not now, any intention whatever of constructing military bases in the Indian Ocean. We call

40. UN Document A/C.1/PV.1841, 1 December 1971, p.46.

on the United States to take the same attitude....."⁴¹

The Soviet Union has also indicated its readiness to attend a conference of littoral countries and other concerned states on the issue. Yet it continues to abstain on resolutions concerning the implementation of the Indian Ocean peace zone concept in the UN.

China - The Chinese objectives in the Indian Ocean were not clearly defined in 1950s. It was more occupied with consolidation work at home. By the sixties China tried to be friend Burma, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan so as to isolate India. China also attempted to get some advantages by supporting one littoral state against another, in their regional conflicts (i.e., Pakistan against India, Indonesia against Malaysia).

But China lacked economic resources and military strength necessary to make their presence felt in the Indian Ocean. Her naval strength does not permit it to compete with either the Soviet Union or the United States. China has adopted a two-pronged policy towards the Indian Ocean area.⁴² It has

41. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, London, 1976, p.27733.

42. For a detailed analysis of China's policy towards this area, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia: Relations Among China, Pakistan and the USSR (New York: Pegasus, 1970), pp.93-140.

supported the zone of peace plan on the one hand and on the other hand has been trying to develop political, economic and military relations with the Indian Ocean countries. China is the only great power to extend support to the zone of peace plan.⁴³

China's rivalry with the Soviet Union and the growing convergence of Sino-US strategic objective in the Indian Ocean region has made her more critical of the increased Soviet threat. Reflecting on China's participation in the Indian Ocean by the end of this decade, Roy Werner pointed out at a workshop on the 'US-China military co-operation' sponsored by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that, "in the future (China's) naval expansion may include 'presence mission' to the South near the old tributary states (Malacca). Given the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and off Vietnam, the Chinese are likely to expand into this area".⁴⁴ Now that China is fast developing SLBMs, it will include the sea-based missiles against the Soviet Union and its other adversaries and the Indian Ocean will soon assume greater strategic importance for China.

43. UN Document A/C.1/P.1894.

44. U.S. Bajpai, ed., India's Security: The Politico-Strategic Environment (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1981), p.97.

Major Regional Powers: The Indian Ocean States have become increasingly conscious of their identity as Afro-Asian units and corresponding desire the elimination of great power rivalry in the region. However, despite their support of peace zone proposal, they differ on the manner and extent of the removal of the external military presence in the Indian Ocean. "No matter what the immediate state of their relations with particular countries, all of the South Asian countries share a deep seated suspicion and concern regarding the activities and intentions of all great powers...and continually sharpened by great power rivalries.... They fear that these powers will try to exploit their internal weakness and divisions and their intra-regional conflicts".⁴⁵ Among the *states* who have the power and capacity to influence the development in the region are India, Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan. Also there are countries like Sri Lanka who do not have the military strength but have played a major role in the proposal for establishing a zone of peace. Since the chapter seeks to analyse the role of major actors in the Indian Ocean we will confine our study to important countries like India, Indonesia and Iran.

45. Norman D. Palmer, "South Asia and the Great Powers", ORBIS (Pennsylvania, Fall 1973), vol.17, No.33, p.99.

India - As far back as 1960, reviewing the defence problem of India the late Sardar K.M. Panikkar wrote that, "If the mastery of the Indian seas is established by a hostile power its pressure could be relentless, since India's economic life is dependent on maritime trade".⁴⁶ India was late in bringing the Indian Ocean into the matrix of its strategic thinking. After independence India sought to secure maximum strategic interests by balancing the interests of the two super powers and denying by its non-aligned foreign policy, either a hegemony.⁴⁷ The Sino-Soviet conflict^{of the late 1950s} and the Sino-Indian war of 1962 frustrated this strategy. India and Pakistan had to make new adjustments. And the super powers because of their shared interest in 'containing' China helped India to build up her defence capabilities. Therefore, Nehru did not object to Gen. Maxwell Taylor's proposal for an Indian Ocean task force for the US Seventh Fleet. Dispelling various doubts, Nehru assured the Rajya Sabha that, "It would be quite wrong to suggest that a cruise by a few naval vessels in the Indian Ocean either threatens our freedom or imperils our policy of non-alignment".⁴⁸

46. K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (London: George Allen Unwin, 1961), p.83.

47. For further details, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The View from India", in Abbas Amirie, ed., The Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean in International Politics (Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1975), p.184.

48. Quoted in Devendra Kaushik, The Indian Ocean: Towards a Peace Zone (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972), p.111.

Later, India welcomed the British decision to withdraw from the East of Suez, but showed her suspicion regarding the creation of the British Indian Ocean Territory, and asking the US to share the burden. Though India made no formal protest to Britain it played an active part in getting the Anglo-American moves condemned by a resolution of the UN Trusteeship Council.⁴⁹

By 1970 India had a stable perspective of the development in the Indian Council. This rested on two premises: first the limitation of the Indian power, which was to be improved by augmenting its naval capability within its own resources and not by inviting foreign powers; second, it was vital for India's strategic interest to keep the Ocean free from power rivalry.⁵⁰

The Indo-Pak war of 1971 saw a radical change in the regional power structure. The US and Chinese support to Pakistan had resulted in initial shift in the balance of power in favour of Pakistan. But with the signing of Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971 and the emergence of Bangladesh (the erstwhile East Pakistan) resulted in making

49. The Statesman, New Delhi, 20 November 1965.

50. B.R. Mishra, n.19, p.74.

India the dominant power in the region. Moreover, India became fully aware of the threat of gun-boat diplomacy in the region (since the US had despatched the enterprise during the war in a gesture of support to Pakistan).⁵¹ India held the external foreign powers responsible for escalating power rivalry in this highly tension prone 'arc' and called for dismantling of foreign bases therein.

India had already taken up the issue in various international fora. In the Lusaka Conference of the non-aligned nations, Mrs. Gandhi demanded the elimination of military bases and great power rivalry from the region.⁵² India also pleaded at the Singapore Conference of the Commonwealth Heads of State to declare the Indian Ocean an area of peace and stability.⁵³ And ever since 1971, India has a matter of policy been advocating the peace zone proposal,⁵⁴ and her views have found wide acceptance. Moreover, every joint declaration of India with the Third World leaders has

51. See Kalim Bahadur, "India and Pakistan", in Bimal Prasad, ed., India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p.140.

52. Quoted in K.P. Mishra, "Indian Ocean Politics: An Afro-Asian Perspective", in Surendra Chopra, ed., Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, Amritsar, 1980, p.236.

53. *Ibid.*, p.240.

54. The Hindu, Madras, 15 November 1974.

been harping upon the theme of demilitarization and peace zone.⁵⁵

India has also actively supported the UN resolution of December 16, 1971 on Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. It has also made significant contribution within the 15-Member Ad Hoc Committee, set up by the UN since 1972. However, India has strongly opposed a proposal made by Pakistan in 1974 to the United Nation, declaring South Asia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. India's objection is based on three important factors. First the creation of such a zone makes sense only if they are conceived as a part of a credible programme for the urgent achievement of a nuclear disarmament. Secondly, the initiative for the creation of such a zone must come from the countries concerned and follow a process of mutual consultation among them. The present proposal does not meet these requirement in any of its aspect. Thirdly, South Asia is an integral part of the Asia-Pacific region and could not be isolated as a self-contained entity.⁵⁶

This proposal was put forward by Pakistan without prior prior consultations and the lack of a common perception and

55. For details, see B.R. Mishra, n.19, p.

56. UN Document A/8492 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.590/Rev.2; Patriot, New Delhi, 4 November 1981; and also see Times of India, New Delhi, 16 February 1979.

security concern has further complicated the situation. Although India has opposed the Pakistani proposal, still she has remained one of the staunch advocates of peace zone in the Indian Ocean area and elimination of external foreign powers.

Indonesia - Indonesia has the second largest navy among the states of the Indian Ocean littoral⁵⁷ and commands most of the major sea lanes between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean of which the Strait of Malacca and Sunda are very important. Indonesia has often expressed the wish to keep the Big powers out of South East Asia as well as the Indian Ocean. It would also like the defense and security of South East Asia to become the responsibility of the countries of the region and would not like to invite big powers to defend the region.⁵⁸ With its considerable resources and potentiality, it is natural for her to take a continuous interest in the affairs of the Indian Ocean.⁵⁹

Indonesia has supported the peace zone proposal of Sri Lanka. In the UN General Assembly it has asked for

57. Captain John Moore R.N., ed., Jane's Fighting Ships, 1980-81 (London: Jane's Publishing Co. Ltd.), p.228.

58. See Adam Malik's Statement in Straits Times, Jakarta, 9 March 1970.

59. For details, see Vishal Singh, "Indonesia and the Indian Ocean", in Polouse, n.26, pp.162-68.

elimination of foreign military bases and halt further expansion of military presence in the Indian Ocean. According to her the Indian Ocean should be declared a zone of peace and the area free of nuclear weapons other weapons of mass destruction. She has also for an early Conference of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean and other major maritime powers who use the ocean.⁶⁰

Iran - Iran is an important military and oil producing state which has vital interest in keeping the sea lanes open. Her Indian Ocean policy received an impetus with the 1968 British announcement to withdraw from the East of Suez and the Gulf. Iran under the Shah projected herself as the protector of the Gulf regimes, oil interests and oil routes in the Gulf. Iran joined the Western nation and participated in CENTO naval exercises code named MIDLINK.⁶¹ Now under the Ayotolloh Khomeini regime although Iran has withdrawn from Western military alliance but she continues to take a great interest in the developments of the region.

60. The Indonesian delegate expressed this view at the 1838th Meeting of the UN General Assembly, 29 November 1971, UN Document A/8492 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.590/Rev.2; also see Times of India, New Delhi, 17 December 1972.

61. See S. Chandra, "Iran's Role in Indian Ocean", Poñose, ed., n.26, pp.103-16.

Although Iran has supported the idea of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, she has had some reservations in this regard. According to her great power rivalries need not exacerbate local political conditions and a symmetrical great power withdrawal can worsen local conditions. She has also objected to the linking up of various strategies like neutralization, denuclearization and demilitarization to the concept of zone of peace. To her a general statement of intent would seem more appropriate than a specific and a detailed one.⁶²

It can be observed from the external great powers presence and policy towards the Indian Ocean region, that they have been guided by their broader global strategy, which is an outcome of their Cold War rivalry. They have been primarily motivated by their strategic-military and politico-economic consideration. In order to gain superiority over the other, they have sought to woo the Indian Ocean States through various means like economic aid, arms transfer, and security pacts. They have also resorted to covert or overt intervention in the area to attain their objective. Moreover, their military presence and support to one nation

62. Rouhola K. Ramzani, "Emerging Patterns of Regional Relations in Iranian Foreign Policy", Orbis, Pennsylvania, vol.13, No. 3&4, 1974, pp.1062-63.

against the other in regional disputes has increased tension in the Indian Ocean region.

Although the regional states do not like the great power military build up, yet due to their differing perception of their security and global politics, have not been able to present a unanimous approach to achieve their purpose of establishing a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. In the given circumstance we will now analyse how far Pakistan's Indian Ocean policy have been influenced by her ties with major powers and their subsequent presence in the region.

Pakistan's Policies

As noted earlier (in Chapter II) Pakistan policies towards external powers have been guided by security concern and the desire to establish parity with India. In order to achieve these objectives she joined the Western military alliance and depended on them for military, political and economic support.⁶³ This alignment served the purpose of both Pakistan and the Western powers.

The reason behind the pro-Pakistan attitude of the

63. M.V. Lakhi, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy under Ayub: Continuity and Change", South Asian Studies (Jaipur, January 1969), vol.4, No.1, pp.27-28.

Western power led by USA, was due to Pakistan's willingness to provide troops and other facilities to them in their strategy to defend West Asia from Soviet influence or intervention.⁶⁴ The Pakistani position was summed up thus at a meeting attended by State Department Officials and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 May 1951:

"Pakistan wants to play a role in West Asia... They would do anything if Kashmir problem is settled. Liaquat is strongly on our side.... With Pakistan West Asia can be defended".⁶⁵

However, India could not be mobilized behind the scheme to provide troops to defend West Asia. At one stage the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson was also disillusioned that it was not as strong as Nehru's neutralism.⁶⁶ This clearly reveals the US strategy of dividing the world between two hostile camps of the East and the West. It also reflects their inability to correctly appreciate the non-aligned policy of India. They accepted Pakistan to serve their purpose of using it as a frontline state in their confrontation with the Eastern Bloc led by Soviet Union. Pakistan has been consistently supported by several

64. The Statesman, New Delhi, December 12, 1982, "Genesis of US Pro-Pak tilt". The article deals with the secret US and British documents of the year 1951, declassified and released for publication.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

foreign powers, even when it was known that Pakistan's aim in joining the CENTO and SEATO was directed not so much against USSR or China, as against India.⁶⁷ This has created more tension and increased Pakistan's intransigence in setting her regional dispute with India. In return for their support to Pakistan the USA and China expected to obtain facilities which would permit them to operate more freely in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.⁶⁸

Local conflicts in the Indian Ocean area have been used by the external great powers to spread their presence to suit their local and strategic needs. Very often they have supported one side or the other and have accentuated the conflict, and forced these local states to seek temporary security by coming closer to some big power, which wished to maintain or increase its presence in the region. Indo-Pak conflict is a good example of this. Pakistan armed by USA, posed serious security threat to India in 1965 and 1971. During this time India was labelled as a Soviet ally. This was a shrewd political move to justify future American

67. Singh, n.15, p.115.

68. For further details regarding facilities that has been offered by Pakistan to USA and future possibilities, see Alvin J. Cottrell and Associates, Sea Power and Strategy in the Indian Ocean (London: Sage Publications, 1981), pp.129-32.

activities in the Indian Ocean. Any containment of India according to that logic would be containment of Soviet Union. This provided USA with a political platform which could justify its future actions in this region.⁶⁹

However, it should be noted that any instability in the Indian Sub-continent would have its impact upon the politics in the Indian Ocean area. It would greatly influence Pakistan's as well as India's participation, in the peace efforts.

India has argued that priority attention should be given to implementing the peace zone in the Indian Ocean by eliminating all military bases and removal of all external foreign powers from the region.⁷⁰ The Pakistani line of argument was very different. They insisted on regional arms balance; assurance against threats from within through the establishment of a political regime and code of conduct; and finally, permanent renunciation of nuclear weapon option by regional states.⁷¹ After 1974, India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, Pakistan has demanded that South Asia be declared

69. Singh, n.15, p.168.

70. The point was reiterated by Y.B. Chavan in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 1975, see UN Document A/PV.2364, 26 September 1975, p.81.

71. Samina Ahmed, "Indian Ocean Peace Zone Proposal", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Second Quarter, 1979), vol.32, Nos 1 & 2, p.137.

as a Nuclear Free Zone.⁷²

Thus Pakistan in keeping with its earlier policy, tried to project Indo-Pak rivalry and attempted to make the acceptance of the Pakistan's stand as well as the question of parity in conventional arms between India and Pakistan, a precondition for Pakistani support for the elimination of the great power presence from the Indian Ocean.⁷³

It would be interesting to note that while expressing concern about the hegemony of the regional powers, Pakistan has in mind only India. Similarly Pakistan makes a distinction between the super powers and chooses to issue special warnings to the Soviet Union only, as regards exclusion of big power build up from the Indian Ocean. Speaking at a public meeting at Pasni port on the Mekron Coast on 8 September 1973, the late Prime Minister Mr. Bhutto without naming the Soviet Union warned a foreign power "to keep her hands off the warm water of the Arabian sea...." Pointing out that Pakistan's coastal areas controlled the Persian Gulf region, Mr. Bhutto declared that "destiny has placed these coastal

72. UN Document A/3263(XIX).

73. Singh, n.15, p.237.

areas under the control of Pakistan and that we shall retain them free of outside influence".⁷⁴

In the final analysis, it is possible to indicate the major trends in Pakistan's policy towards the regional and external foreign powers. The first strand of Pakistan's thinking indicates that Pakistan wants the Indian Ocean to be free from militarization by big powers as well as by regional power, but would welcome arms build-up by any regional or external powers if it is friendly to Pakistan. Although the Pakistani leaders express dislike the American build-up in Diego-Gracia, but discreetly they encourage Americans to carry on. If the Soviets are moving with their warships in the Indian Ocean, so should the Americans to avoid the imbalance of forces.⁷⁵ This pro-American attitude found its expression in one of late Prime Minister Bhutto's statement that Pakistan had 'no objection to the establishment of an American base in the Indian Ocean.'⁷⁶ On the contrary Pakistan perceives the growing Soviet militarization as a threat to her security. As a result, the 'designs' of the

74. Cited in IDSA News Review on South Asia (New Delhi: Sapru House, September 1973), p.81.

75. Vali, n.7, p.99.

76. Pakistan Times, Karachi, 27 April 1974.

USSR in the sub-continent has been repeatedly harped upon by the Pakistan leaders.⁷⁷ As mentioned earlier Pakistan has, in many occasions, tried to justify the American presence in the Indian Ocean as a reaction "to the increased Soviet presence, although the Western countries enjoy considerable strategic advantage in the region. Further Pakistan also did not object to Iran's naval expansion in the Indian Ocean because of her close alliance with the Shah of Iran. Needless to say, that she has been a direct beneficiary from the rapid expansion of Iran's armed forces.

Secondly, it has been observed that Pakistan's Indian Ocean policy has been moulded by its security perception and parity syndrome vis-a-vis India. What displeases India pleases Pakistan. While India opposed big power presence in the Indian Ocean, Pakistan was rather tactical in its support. Hence she has not only tried to underplay the dangers posed by external military power but also has been a party to the vigorous reactivation of the Western military presence in the region. The pro-West attitude of the Pakistani leaders and their willingness to become a

77. See Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 196), p.157; also see M.V. Lakhī, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy under Ayub: Continuity and Change", South Asian Studies, Jaipur, January 1969, vol.4, no.1, pp.27-28.

member of the Western alliance facilitated Pakistan drift to the Western bloc. As early as 1951, the US Assistant Secretary of State declared that, "we do have a great incentive to help Pakistan for the reason that Pakistan is very cooperative with US and the Western countries. Pakistan has a very forthright attitude with respect to the basic cold war issues. Pakistan did not send troops to Korea but Pakistan has in other ways demonstrated her willingness to participate with us".⁷⁸ Even at the risk of repetition it may be pointed out that Pakistan entered into various defence treaties like CENTO and SEATO to strengthen her defense strategy against India.

This brings us to the conclusion that Pakistan's support to the idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace has been more superficial than real. Pakistan voted for the General Assembly. Resolution of 16th December 1971 on declaration of Indian Ocean as a zone of Peace. Pakistan was included as a member of the fifteen Nation Ad Hoc Committee set up by the General Assembly on 15 December 1972 to suggest practical measures to promote the concept of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. Formally speaking, thus Pakistan has

78. Cited by S.D. Muni, "South Asia", in Mohammad Ayoob, ed., Conflict and Intervention in the Third World (London: Croom Helm Ltd. Publishers, 1980), pp.62-63.

been on record as being a votary of the concept of a peace zone. But its policies has been contrary to the realisation of this concept, since it has been partial in denouncing the big power presence in the region and also partial in demanding curtailment of regional powers in the Indian Ocean.

At the same time, Pakistan's foreign policy formulators have felt that peace in the Indian Ocean could not be ensured by merely eliminating great power rivalry and presence. She feels that small nations cannot dictate terms to great powers, nor is it 'very practical to prevent the big powers from showing their presence in this strategic region. If that is the position, their rivalry or the presence of more than one big power is better than of only one big power'. In other words, more the numbers, the greater the neutralization of the presence....'⁷⁹

Again Pakistan's lack of conviction in her own policy of eliminating nuclear weapons from the area was clearly revealed when she threatened to go nuclear after her proposal for establishing a nuclear free zone in South Asia failed to get adequate response in the United Nations. Thus, Pakistan by linking up the Peace Zone concept and the nuclear free zone proposal has deliberately followed an ambivalent policy to suit its national interests.

79. Bhutto's interview to Asahi Shintun, Tokyo, on 8 February 1976. For text see Foreign Affairs Pakistan, February 1976, pp.12-25.

CONCLUSION

Pakistan's Indian Ocean policy has evolved over the years through significant changes. In an overall analysis, Pakistan's policies with regard to the zone of peace concept have been moulded by two basic considerations: (i) Security perception and parity syndrome vis-a-vis India; and (ii) a favourable policy towards its Western allies.

In the initial stage Pakistan supported the idea of declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting at Singapore in January 1971, Pakistan endorsed Sri Lanka's memorandum which said that the Peace Zone should not only cover the Indian Ocean proper but the land areas, air space and territorial waters of the Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states. Pakistan also voted for the UN General Assembly Resolution of 16 December 1971 on Declaration of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Till 1974 Pakistan's strategy included three main components. They were, first, the establishment of a political regime and the formulation of a code of conduct which will govern the relations among the Indian Ocean states. Secondly, an arrangement among the major littoral states to a reasonable ratio in their naval and military forces and, finally, an undertaking as not to acquire or introduce

nuclear weapons in the region.

There has been a perceptible change in Pakistan's Indian Ocean policy after the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. In this context, the proposal to make South Asia as a Nuclear Free Zone, primarily came as a reaction to India's nuclear experiment. Thus a new dimension was added to the concept of peace zone in the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, Pakistan wanted the littoral and hinterland states of the area to permanently renounce the nuclear weapon option and she specially wanted the South Asian region to be declared as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. She argued that her proposal will promote peace and stability in the region and hence is complementary to the idea of peace zone.

Pakistan formally approached the UN General Assembly on 19 September 1974 to declare the South Asian region as Nuclear Free Zone and also introduced the same in the First Committee of the United Nations. India opposed Pakistan's proposal on the principle that regional countries must have a consensus first before the matter was taken up at the UN level. It was also against her security perception and favoured China's strategy in the region. When Pakistan's proposal did not evoke adequate response from the littoral states, she strongly expressed her desire to acquire nuclear

weapons. This revealed her lack of sincerity in creating a nuclear free zone.

Pakistan's proposal is also manifestation of perceived threat to her security from India. It also showed her desire to achieve parity with her. In the sub-continent's power structure India occupies a pre-eminent position mainly because of her size and resource potential. This position has been greatly consolidated after 1971 when the Eastern wing of Pakistan emerged as an independent state of Bangladesh. But the Pakistani leaders since the independence have viewed the acceptance of this power structure as a threat to Pakistan's sovereign existence. The feeling of insecurity arising from this kind of a perception has motivated Pakistan to seek alliance with the Western powers and China. India viewed this move of Pakistan as an attempt to distort regional power hierarchy and hence a threat to her security. Hence their divergent security perception and self-images have got intricately mixed up to make them adopt different strategies towards Indian Ocean. This clearly explains as to why India has wanted the elimination of great power from the region as the primary condition of establishing a zone of peace and the subsequent Pakistani move to underplay the threat arising from the external great power presence.

Closely related to the above mentioned trend is the fact that Pakistan's Indian Ocean policy has not received much importance in her defence policy and strategic perception. It has been mainly a reaction to India's moves and aimed at challenging India's position in the world arena. Moreover, Pakistan views the threat to her security mainly from across the land border, and not so much from the Ocean. But India with her long coast line views that the threat to her security also emerges from the presence of hostile foreign power in the Indian Ocean area. She was convinced of this threat during the Indo-Pak war of 1971, when the US sent a part of her seventh fleet very near to the war-zone in the Bay of Bengal to intimidate India. Hence the differing emphasis on the Indian Ocean in the strategic thinking of both the countries has influenced their Indian Ocean policy.


Finally, Pakistan's policy is in keeping with the strategic interest of her allies, i.e. the Western powers and China. The great powers found the conflict relations in the region as a part of the regional manifestation of their global power rivalry. They got an opportunity to play a decisive role in the affairs of the sub-continent. By linking their specific economic, political and strategic interest to the region they have deeply involved themselves in the sub-continent's affairs. India greatly resented this

because her desire to play an active role in world politics specially as a member of the non-aligned movement and the third world cause, clashed with the strategies of the Western powers in this region. Hence while India advocated the elimination of external powers from this region, Pakistan was not very enthusiastic about it. Moreover, Pakistan was also partial in criticizing the military build up, chiefly blaming the Soviet presence in the region as the main cause of militarization of the Indian Ocean area, though the USSR entered only after the Western powers had established themselves and threatened her security from this area.

Inside the United Nations, Pakistan's proposal for the creation of a Nuclear Free Zone in the Indian Ocean has diverted the main issue of the elimination of external foreign power presence in the region to the regional de-nuclearization and the issue of nuclear proliferation. While Pakistan aimed at obstructing India's nuclear progress through this proposal, it also helped the external great powers in shifting the focus of the issue. The great powers who were so far very uncooperative on the proposal of establishing a Peace Zone and removal of external power military presence from the Indian Ocean, became very interested in Pakistan proposal to establish a Nuclear Free zone in South Asia.

Further encouragement to the Western powers have been provided by Pakistan by her acquiescence to their establishment of military bases in the region and her participation in joint naval exercises, like for example, Pakistan hosted the CENTO naval exercise code named 'MIDLINK' during 1974. All these moves have resulted in Pakistan getting herself well-integrated in to the Western powers' global strategy, much against India's regional security perception.

Pakistan's proposal could not make any headway because of India's strong opposition. Although both India and Pakistan have accepted in principle the concept of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, yet they have differed widely in their approaches. The conflict relations, that have existed between the two countries since their independence, were bound to make their approaches divergent and competitive. In this situation, prospect of establishing a Nuclear Free Zone in the Indian Ocean seems very bleak. Since the success of any such proposal also needs the support of these two regional powers, their non-acceptance will render it ineffective.



外国列强在印度洋的主要基地、舰队停泊处及系船浮筒

MAIN BASES, FLEET ANCHORAGES AND MOORING BUOYS OF EXTERNAL GREAT POWERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

GRANDES BASES ET PRINCIPAUX MOUILLAGES D'ESCADRE ET COFFRES

Appendix II

2832 (XXVI) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE

Date: 16 December 1971
Vote: A-61-0-55 (recorded)

Meeting: 2022
Report: A/8584

The General Assembly

Conscious of the determination of the peoples of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to resolve their political, economic and social problems under conditions of peace and tranquility,

Recalling the Declaration of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka in September 1970, calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great Power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition should be excluded, and declaring that the area should also be free of nuclear weapons,

Convinced of the desirability of ensuring the maintenance of such conditions in the area by means other than military alliance, as such alliances entail financial and other obligations that call for the diversion of the limited resources

of these States from the more compelling and productive task of economic and social reconstruction and could further involve them in the rivalries of power blocs in a manner prejudicial to their independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing international tensions,

Concerned at recent developments that portend the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean area, thereby posing a serious threat to the maintenance of such conditions in the area,

Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would contribute towards arresting such developments, relaxing international tensions and strengthening international peace and security,

Convinced further that the establishment of a zone of peace in an extensive geographical area in one region could have a beneficial influence on the establishment of permanent universal peace based on equal rights and justice for all, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Solemnly declares that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor adjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all time as a zone of peace;

2. Calls upon the great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:

(a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry;

3. Calls upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other co-operation to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:

(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected;

(c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to

any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at the twenty-seventh session on the progress that has been made with regard to the implementation of this Declaration;

5. Decides to include the item entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session.

Appendix III

3259 (XXIX) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE

Date: 9 December 1974

Vote: A-103-026 (recorded)
B-adopted without vote

Meeting: 2309
Report: A/9905

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also General Assembly resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972 and 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973.

Firmly convinced that further and continuous efforts are required to fulfil the objectives of the Declaration, and thus to contribute to the strengthening of regional and international peace and security,

Noting the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.¹

Further noting the factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great power rivalry,² prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of qualified experts pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3080 (XXVIII),

Deeply concerned that the competitive expansion of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean would constitute a serious intensification of the arms race, leading to an increase of tension in the area,

Considering that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires:

(a) The elimination of all manifestations of great Power military presence in the region conceived in the context of great Power rivalry,

1. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No.29(A/9629 and Add.1).

2. A/AC.159/Rev.1.

(b) Co-operation among the regional States to ensure conditions of security within the region as envisaged in the Declaration,

Further believing that for the realization of the objective of the Declaration it is necessary that the great Powers enter into immediate consultations with the States concerned, with a view to adopting positive measures for the elimination of all foreign bases and of all manifestations of great Power military presence in the region conceived in the context of great Power rivalry,

1. Urges the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to give tangible support to the establishment and preservation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace;

2. Calls upon the great Powers to refrain from increasing and strengthening their military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean as an essential first step towards the relaxation of tension and the promotion of peace and security in the area;

3. Endorses the recommendations for the future work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, as contained in paragraph 35 of the report of the Committee;

4. Requests the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter, as soon as possible, into consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean;

5. Invites all States, especially the great Powers, to co-operate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions;

6. Expresses its thanks to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the preparation of the factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean;

7. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work and consultations in accordance with its mandate and to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling the resolution 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972 by which it decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean consisting of not more than 15 members,

Noting that some littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean have expressed deep interest in becoming members of the Ad Hoc Committee in view of their geographical position and adherence to the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace,,

Noting further that since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee new States have been admitted to membership in the United Nations,

Recognizing that the establishment and preservation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is a matter that concerns all littoral and hinterland States,

Decides to enlarge the composition of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean by the addition of no more than three Member States.

Appendix IVNAVAL STRENGTH OF MAJOR LITTORAL
STATES OF THE INDIAN OCEANINDIA

Navy: 27,000, incl naval airforce.

8 ex-Sov F-class submarines.

1 ex-Br Majestic-class aircraft carrier (capacity 18 Sea Hawk, 4 Alize; converting to Sea Harrier).

1 ex-Br Fiji-class cruiser (trg).

2 ex-Sov Kashin-class destroyers with 4 Styx SSM; SA-N-1 SAM, 1 hel.

24 frigates; 6 Leander with Seacat SAM, 1 hel; 2 ex-Br Whitby with Styx SSM; 12 ex-Sov Petya II; 4 trg (3 ex-Br Leopard, 1 Black Swan).

3 ex-Sov Nanuchka corvettes with Styx SSM, SA-N-4 SAM.

16 ex-Sov Osa-1/II FAC(M) with Styx SSM.

1 Abhay, 3 SDB-2 large patrol craft.

6 ex-Sov Natya ocean, 4 ex-Br Ton coastal, 4 ex-Br Ham inshore minesweepers.

1 ex-Br, 6 ex-Sov Polnocny LCT, 6 LCU.

(On order; 4 SSK-1500 submarines, 2 Kashin-type destroyers, 5 Godevari (modified Leander) frigates, 4 Nanuchka corvettes, 6 Polnocny LCT.)

Bases: Western Fleet Bombay, Goa, Cochin, Eastern Fleet; Vishakapatnam, Calcutta, Port Blair.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (2,000); 33 combat aircraft, 27 armed hel.

2 attack sqns with 20 Sea Hawk (10 in carrier).

1 ASW sqn with 5 Alise 1050 (4 in carrier).

2 MR sqns with 5 Super Constellation, 3 II-38 May.

5 ASW hel sqns with 11 Sea King, 5 Ka-25, 11 Alouette III.

1 SAR/liaison hel sqn with 10 Alouette III.

3 trg/comms sqns with 7 HJT-16 Kiran, 4 Vampire T-55, 10 Islander, 1 Devon, 2 Seahawk ac; 4 Hughes 300 hel.

(On order, 8 Sea Harrier FGA, 3 11-38 MR, 6 Islander trg ac.)

INDONESIA

Navy: 52,000, incl Naval Air and Marines.

4 subs: 2 Type 209, 2 ex-Sov W-class (1 trg).

10 frigates: 3 Fatahilla with 4 Exocet SSM, 4 ex-US Jones, 3 ex-Sov Riga.

16 large patrol craft: 5 ex-Sov Kronshtadt, 1 ex-US PC-461, 5 ex-Yug Kraljevica, 2 Kelabang, 2 Attack, 1 ex-US PGM-39.

4 PSSM Mk 5 FAC (M) with 4 Exocet SSM.

4 Lurssen TNC-45 (FAC(T)).

8 coastal patrol craft : 2 Spear, 6 Aus Carpentaria.

4 ex-Sov T-43 ocean minesweepers.

1 cmd/spt ship.

11 LST, 5 LCU, 38 LCM.

(In reserve: 1 Pattimura frigate; 1 Kronshtadt, 2 PC-461, 1 Kelabang, 2 PGM-39 patrol craft; 1 R-class coastal minesweepers; 1 cmd/spr ship.)

(On order: 1 trg frigate, 2 LST)

Bases: Gorontalo, Jakarta, Surabaya.

NAVAL AIR: (1,000); 24 combat aircraft.

3 MR sqns; 2 with 18 Nomad, 1 with 6 CASA C-212.

Other ac incl 5 HU-16, 6 C-47, 3 Aero Commander ac; 4 Bell
47G, 6 Alouette II/III, 4 Bo-105 hel).

MARINES: (12,000)

2 mf regts (6 bns); 1 close spt regt; 3 amph assault, 1 any
bns.

Lt tks, APC, 40mm AA.

MALAYSIA

NAVY: 6,000 (being expanded).

2 frigates; 1 Yarrow with Seacat SAM, 1 Type-41.

8 FAC(M) with Exocet SSM: 4 SPica, 4 Perdana.

6 Jerong FAC(G).

22 large patrol craft; 4 Kedah, 4 Sabah, 14 Kris.

5 ex-Br Ton coastal minesweepers.

3 ex-US 511-1152 LST.

1 support ship.

(On order: 2 msl frigates, 6 FAC(P), 4 minehunters.)

Bases: Johore Straits, Labuan, Lumut Perak.

RESERVES: 1,000.

PAKISTAN

Navy: 3,000; 5 combat ac, 6 armed hel.

6 submarines: 2 Agosta, 4 Daphne.

5 SX-404 midget submarines.

1 ex-Br Dido cruiser (cadet trg ship).

8 destroyers: 4 ex-US Gearing with ASROC ASW; 4 ex-Br (1 Battle,
1 CH, 2 CR).

6 large patrol craft: 1 Town, 5 ex-CH Hainan.
 12 ex-CH Shanghai-II FAC(G).
 4 ex-CH Huchwan hydrofoil FAC(F)
 19 coastal patrol craft; 1 Spear, 18 M-55 Type.
 6 ex-US Adjutant and 268-class coastal MCM.
 1 ex-US Mission underway replenishment tanker.

NAVAL AIR

2 ASW/MR sqns with 3 Atlantic, 2 HU-16B with AM-39 ASM.
 2 ASW/SAR hel sqns with 6 Sea King ASW with AM-39, 4 Alouette III.
 ASM: AM-39 EXocet.
 Base: Karachi.
 RESERVES: 5,000.

THAILAND

NAVY: 35,000 incl naval air and marines.
 6 frigates: 1 Yarrow-type with SEacat SAM, 2 PF-103, 2 ex-US Tacoma, 1 Cannon.
 6 FAC(M): 3 50-metre with Exocet SSM, 3 45-metre with Gabriel SSM.
 21 ex-US large patrol craft: (10 PGM-71, 7 Liulom, 4 Cape).
 23 coastal patrol craft
 2 Bangrachan coastal minelayers.
 1 MCM ship.
 4 ex-US Bluebird coastal minesweepers, 10 minesweeping boats.
 5 LST, 3 LSM, 1 LSIL-351, 1 LCG, 6 LCU, 25 LCM (all ex-US),
 LCA, 8 LCVP.

3 trg ships: 2 ex-Br (1 Algerine, 1 Flower), 1 Maeklong.

(On order: 3 frigates, 3 450-ton FAG(G).)

NAVAL AIR: some 12 combat ac.

1 MR/ASW sqn with 10 S-2F MR.

1 MR/SAR sqn with 2 HU-16B, 2 CL-215, 10 C-47.

1 trg/SAR hel sqn with 8 Bell 212, 4 UH-1H.

1 observation sqn with 7 T-37B Skymaster, 7 U-17, 5 O-IG.

MARINES: (16,000).

1 div: 2 inf, 1 arty regt; 1 amph assault bn, 24 M-68
155mm guns/how, 40 LVTP-7 amph APC, support arms.

Bases: Bangkok, Sattahip, Songkla, Phangnga.

Source: The Military Balance 1981-1982, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Appendix VMAJOR BASES OF EXTERNAL GREAT POWERS IN INDIAN OCEAN

Base	Purpose	External Power concerned	Remarks
U.S. Naval Communications Station 'Harold E. Holt', North West Cape, West Australia	Defence Communications station in U.S. global communication systems	U.S.A.	The station is under the joint operational control of the US Navy and Australia. The station cannot be used for other than defence communication without the agreement of the Australian Government
Asmara, Ethiopia	Military Communications base, relay and satellite tracking station in US global communications network	U.S.A.	This base is now being run down
Diego Garcia, BIOT	Naval communications centre (part of global system) air field, naval facilities	USA/UK	Joint base. Plans are to expand the facilities into a permanent naval and air base
Berbera, Somalia	Communications Station	USSR	Function unknown
Joint Defence Space Communications Station, Woomera, South Australia	A ground terminal for defences space communications involving satellites	U.S.A.	The facility operationed jointly with Australia

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Joint Defence Space Research Facility, Alice Springs, Northern Territory	To carry out a variety of defence space research functions	U.S.A.	Jointly controlled by Australia and U.S.A.
Bahrain	Naval base for Mid-East Task Force, Communication Station	U.S.A.	U.S. under notice to leave
Massawa, Ethiopia	Port facilities for naval vessels	U.S.A.	Serves Asmara base
Vacaos, Mauritius	Tracking and telemetry, Naval Radio Station, Airfield Communications Station	USA/UK	Superstation observation post
Mahe, Seychelles	Airfield Communications Station	U.S.A.	Maintained by U.S.A.F.

UNITED KINGDOM, FRENCH AND CHINESE BASES IN INDIAN OCEAN

Base	Purpose	External Power concerned	Remarks
Gen Island, Maldives	Communications, Airfield, RAF staging post, naval fuel supplies	U.K.	Earth station for Skynet
Masirah Island	Communications, RAF staging post	U.K.	
Mahe, Seychelles	Airfield, harbour facilities	U.K.	
Mauritius	Harbour facilities	U.K.	

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Djibouti, Territory of the Afars and the Issas	Airfield, harbour, radio station, military base, naval forces, air forces	France	Of great strategic importance if Suez Canal open
Diego Suarez, Madagascar	Naval base	France	To be evacuated by 1977
Tananarive, Madagascar	Air base, troops	France	HQ of C-in-C French forces in the South Indian Ocean. To be evacuated in 1977
Zanzibar, Tanzania	Telemetry for missile terminal ballistics	China	Existence speculative

OTHER DEFENCE-RELATED ESTABLISHMENT OPERATED
BY EXTERNAL POWERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Base	Purpose	External Power concerned	Remarks
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Tracking Stations: Deep Space Station 41, Island Lagoon (Woomera), S.A.; Deep Space Station 42, Tidbinbilla, A.C.T. Carnarvon Tracking and Data Acquisition Station, Carnarvon, W.A.; Honeysuckle Creek, A.C.T.; Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network Station, Orroral Valley, A.C.T.;	Provide support for NASA's programme of space exploration	U.S.A.	Australia is responsible for the operation and management of the stations

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(Cont'd)

Applications
Technology Sat-
ellite Station,
Cooby Creek,
Qld; Baker-Nunn
Camera SC23,
Island Lagoon
(Woomera), S.A.

Tranet Track-
ing Station,
Smithfield,
South Australia

USAF Radio
Receiving
Station, Norfolk
Island

US Research
Station, RAAF
Base, Amberley,
Queensland

USAF Geological
and Geophysical
Research Stati-
on, Alice Sprin-
gs, Northern
Territory

Support for the U.S.
geodetic satellite
observation program-
me on behalf of U.S.
Navy Pacific Missile
Range

Temporary station
assisting the USAF
in a research
programme involving
the study of ionos-
pheric propagation
in relation to long-
range radio paths

Joint research pro-
gramme for the stu-
dy of physical eff-
cts of disturbances
in the atmosphere
or space, with par-
ticular emphasis on
radio communications

Long-term geological
and geophysical stu-
dies, including stu-
dies of earthquakes
and attendant
phenomena

U.S.A.

Australia is
responsible for
the operation
and management
of the station

U.S.A.

This station
is at present
operated by a
contractor to
the U.S.
Government.
Australia has
the entitlement
to participate
in the work of
the station.

U.S.A.

This station is
managed and ope-
rated by the
USAF, Australia
has the entitle-
ment to partici-
pate in the work
of the station

U.S.A.

This station is
managed and ope-
rated at present
by the USAF. Aus-
tralia has the
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<p>U.S. Geodetic Satellite Observation Programme. Optical Tracking Stations (BC4 Cameras) at Cullgoora, N.S.W., Perth, Cocos Island, Mawson and Casey. A Doppler Tracking System is in use at Smithfield, S.A., SECOR stations at Darwin, N.T. and Manus Island. A BC4 camera is planned for Thursday Island and a Doppler Tracking System is planned for Heard Island</p>	<p>Temporary stations operated as part of the U.S. geodetic satellite observation programme</p>	<p>U.S.A.</p>	<p>Operated by the U.S. Army</p>
<p>Trial Wing, Weapons Research Establishment, Salisbury, South Australia and missile Range and Support facilities, Woomera, South Australia</p>	<p>Plan and direct firings and launchings at Woomera of missiles and vehicles under development as part of the UK/Australia Joint Project or as mutually agreed for third parties, other countries or international organization</p>	<p>U.K.</p>	<p>The programme is mutually agreed by Australia and the U.K. Australia has sole control over the operation and management of the Trial Wing within the jointly approved programme</p>
<p>Joint Tropical Research Unit, Innisfail, Queensland</p>	<p>Exposure and storage of materials and selected military and other stores under tropical conditions, assessment of deterioration and research into causes and prevention</p>	<p>U.K.</p>	<p>The programme of the Unit is a joint responsibility with the U.K. Government. The Unit is under the operational direction of Australia</p>

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Isle Amsterdam	Meteorological Station	France	Naval station
Crozet	Meteorological Station	France	Naval station
Kerguelen	Meteorological Station	France	Naval station
La Reunion	Relay Radio Station	France	

Source: Strategic Digest (New Delhi, 1974).

TABLE 1: ^{*} INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES' DEPENDENCE ON GULF OIL (mn. \$)

	1979			
	U.S.	Japan	W. Europe	Total
Total Oil Imports	7.8	5.6	12.8	26.2
Imports from the Gulf	2.4	4.1	8.0	14.5
In percent	31	73	63	55
	1985 (estimated)			
	U.S.	Japan	W. Europe	Total
Total Oil Imports	8.2	6.3	12.5	27.0
Imports from the Gulf	2.9	4.6	7.8	15.3
In percent	34	73	62	56

* Courtesy: Namboodiri P.K.S., Anand J.P. and Sreedhar; Intervention in the Indian Ocean, p.111.

TABLE 2: * ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION (\$ mn)

Region	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Africa	85	185	160	225	240	325	690
West Asia	1060	1645	2415	3270	3230	4825	6365
South And South East Asia	400	515	555	445	415	680	680
Islands States	10	10	10	-	-	20	5
Australia	40	50	110	180	30	10	100
Hinterland States	25	50	105	130	150	105	90
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>							
Total	1625	2455	3355	4250	4065	5965	8130

* Courtesy: Namboodiri, Sreedhar and Anand;
Intervention in the Indian Ocean,
p.93.

TABLE 3*: ARMS TRANSFERS TO INDIAN OCEAN REGION:
SOURCEWISE : 1973-77 (\$ mn)

Region	U.S.	USSR	France	U.K.	West Germany	China	Others
Africa	123	650	470	45	20	70	325
West Asia	10735	4410	1215	1265	625	20	1845
South and South East Asia	627	1165	270	165	60	210	495
Island States	2	15	-	-	-	15	10
Australia	344	-	10	90	40	-	10
Hinterland States	-	410	10	10	10	20	55

Total	11831	6650	1975	1575	755	335	2740

* Source: Sreedhar; Arms transfers to the
Indian Ocean Region, IDSA Journal,
vol.XIII, No.2.

TABLE 4: WEST'S DEPENDENCE ON IMPORT OF IMPORTANT ITEMS

(Imports as share of consumption - as percentage)			
	E.E.C. 1974-76	U.S. 1976-78	Japan 1974
Aluminium	61	85	100
Copper	81	85	90
Lead	53	13	76
Nickel	100	72	100
Tin	87	83	98
Zinc	68	59	80
Iron Ore	79	36	99
Manganese	100	98	98
Phosphate	99	Exporter	100

* Source: Namboodiri; Sreedhar and Anand;
Intervention in the Indian Ocean,
p.201.

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