

UNITED NATIONS, NATURAL RESOURCES AND CIVIL WAR: A CASE-STUDY OF SIERRA LEONE

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Jawaharlal Nehru University for partial fulfilment of
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “United Nations, Natural Resources and Civil War: A Case-Study of Sierra Leone” submitted by me for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.


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We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	All Peoples' Congress
CDF	Civilian Defence Force
CNN	Cable News Network
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community West African States
EO	Executive Outcomes
GGDO	Government Gold and Diamond Office
HRC	Human Rights Council
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDP	Internally Displaced People
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IRA	Irish Republic Army
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
LDF	Lofa Defense Force
LPC	Liberia Peace Council
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONGC	Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
OSAA	Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
PCPB	Post- Conflict Peacebuilding
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SI	Sandline International
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLPIM	Sierra Leone Progressive Independence Movement
SLPP	Sierra Leone Peoples' Party
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNIOGBIS	UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNIOSIL	UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL	UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission to Sierra Leone
UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia
UNOWA	United Nations Office in West Asia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations is primarily responsible for maintenance of international peace and security. With the failure to implement collective security system, peacekeeping and imposition of sanctions have become the most prominent mechanisms to deal with the conflict situations. Most of the conflict situations addressed by the United Nations during the Cold War were of inter-state in nature. However, in the post-Cold War, most of the conflicts are of intra-state in nature. The major outbreak of civil wars throughout the globe in general, and in Africa in particular, could be observed in this period. The African continent itself witnessed as many as twenty five internal conflicts during the decade after the end of Cold war and the United Nations had played a role of peacemaker and/or peacekeeper in fourteen cases (Goulding 1999). Although, these civil wars are seen as ethnic, religious, factional conflicts on the one hand, or rebellion against authoritarian government on the other, the control over natural resources has been one of the major factors behind many of these civil wars. The 1990s witnessed a growth of ‘natural resource civil wars’ mostly in the African continent.

Natural resources are the gift of nature that could change the socio-economic condition of a country. On the converse, abundance of natural resources in some countries have become the source of conflict and also the source of war revenue that is responsible for sustaining and prolonging of the conflict. However, when the political structures of the countries are weak and the governments are not in a position to exert their control over their own territories, natural resources become the focal point of illegal exploitation and smuggling activities. Easy and illegal accessibility to lucrative natural resources and subsequent smuggling activities give rise to arms struggle against the state or other groups of people. However, these struggles and conflicts are given the form of ethnic and religious colour to mobilise the population to get easy rebel recruits. The resource extracting companies and international smuggling network play a key role in fuelling such conflicts. Ingrid Samset (2002) observed that there is interest in conflicts rather than conflict of interests so far as the role of natural resources in civil war is concerned. The interests in conflict tend to be contributing in the durability of conflict, as continuing conflict helps the rebel groups

in misappropriation of resources, thereby, benefitting different actors involved in the process of illegal exploitation of resources. As a result of the nexus between warring parties and the illegal mercantile networks, the states in such conflict-ridden areas are tend to become failed or weak states, and result in prolonging of conflict, deaths of thousands of innocent civilians, severe humanitarian crisis and mass violation of human rights norms.

As per the observation made in the United Nations Secretary General Report of 2005, a country having natural resources i.e. gold, diamond, oil and timber are more prone to civil war. The countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia are most affected by the illegal accessibility of natural resources by the warring groups. The civil war, which is an internal matter the concerned states, becomes a matter of concern of the international community as such high intensity conflict is not confined only to the country of its origin but spills over to the neighbouring countries and the whole region as well, posing serious threat to regional and international peace and security. The civil wars in general and the ‘natural resource civil wars’ in particular stand responsible for massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian norms, and also cause severe humanitarian crises in the conflicting region. Therefore, the international community, especially the United Nations, is playing a proactive role to curb this type of conflicts and to maintain regional and international peace and security. Many studies and expert panel reports undertaken by the United Nations and other international organizations such as World Bank have already cited the role of natural resources in fuelling and sustaining civil war in many of the war-torn countries.

For the last twenty years, United Nations has been responding to the major internal conflict situations with various measures. So far as the natural resource conflicts are concerned, the United Nations has responded with different preventive measures, regulatory measures, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian interventions, and peacebuilding measures to curb the menace of ‘natural resource civil wars’. The preventive measures, which are advanced in a pre-conflict or early stage of the conflict, include issuing early warnings, providing mediation, imposing sanctions on movement of arms and related materials that may fuel the conflict. The peacekeeping operations, which have been the major visible responses of the United Nations, are

deployed in a stage when there is some ceasefire agreement between the government and the rebel groups. The role of the Peacekeeping operations is however significant in maintaining peace and monitoring the situations. However, the peacekeeping operations are mostly of observer status resulting in their ineffectiveness in a major conflict situation. Nonetheless, the peacekeeping operations help to prevent the spreading and recurring of the conflict. The Regulative measures include setting up guidelines for establishment of regimes such as ‘Certification of Origin’ regime for diamond trade, sanctions regimes for regulation of trade in natural resources and restricting the movement of persons, freezing assets of individual and of groups and issuing other regulative guidelines. These regulatory measures help in containing the velocity of the conflict and standardizing the trade in natural resources. Moreover, peacebuilding measures have significant role in re-construction of the post-war societies. The UN peacebuilding activities include basically re-building the capacities of the state institution for ensuring good governance and effective management of the natural resources, which in turn result in peace in the long run. The capacity building activities have a wide range of tasks from maintaining law and order to save the life of the civilians and from assisting the government and building capabilities of local military, police, administrative and justice system. The capacity-building measures tend to re-construct the state institutions to bring into order the socio-political and economic life of the people, otherwise destroyed by the civil war.

The aim of this dissertation is to understand the linkage between natural resource and civil war in the post-Cold War and how the United Nations has responded to ‘natural resource civil wars’. The present research intensively focuses on the United Nations responses to the ‘natural resource civil wars’ and the effectiveness of those responses. This research analyses various connotations of ‘natural resource civil wars’ including different factors responsible for ‘resource curse’ and different actors that play crucial role in such civil war. To add an empirical aspect to the analysis of the role of United Nations responses to ‘natural resource civil wars’, the present study takes the civil war in Sierra Leone as the case-study.

Review of Literature

The review of literature has been carried out around three major themes: understanding civil war and the role of natural resources, the international

responsibility and the United Nations' responses to natural resource based civil war, and natural resource and civil war in Sierra Leone.

Understanding Civil War and the Role of Natural Resources

The literature on different conceptual issues of civil war and the role of natural resources in such civil war is vast. Many authors attempted to explain the nature of the link between civil war and natural resource. Some of them explained the civil war from 'opportunity in rebellion' perspective that civil war is an industry that generates profits from looting of resources and makes them undistinguishable from the bandits and pirates (Grossman 1991, 1999; Hirshleifer 1995, 2001; Collier 2000; Billon 2005; Collier et al 2005). Such rebellions are motivated by greed, and hence the incidence of rebellion is not explained by motive, but by the atypical circumstances that generate profitable opportunities.

Countries that are highly dependent on the export of primary commodities face a higher risk of civil war than resource-poor states and in such states natural resources tend to increase the geographical scope of the conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998 and 2002, Fearon and Laitin 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000 and Buhaug and Gates 2002). This explanation reads that resources like oil, gemstones (diamond) and narcotics make wars last for longer periods.

Other groups of author dealing with the natural resource and civil war link suggested that the presence of resource wealth might cause the onset of civil war in different ways. Funding for insurgents or the rebel groups mostly comes from the illegal export of natural resources. The rebel groups may extract and sell the resources or they may extort money from those who are involved in such activities. The rents from the natural resources are used to fund the initiating costs of the rebellion like buying arms and recruiting soldiers (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Keen 1998, Ross 2004a; Lujala et al 2005). Thus, primary commodities provided illegal accessibility by the rebel groups increase the probability of civil war that enables them to raise money either by extracting and selling the resources in illegal market or by extorting money from others such as extracting and exporting firms.

Different factors work in the prolonging of the civil war, which are not necessarily similar to those responsible for its onset. The size of the county, ethnic

diversity, geographical hazards or mountainous terrain, seem to be significant for the continuation of civil wars. But similar factors may not explain the beginning of civil wars. The external intervention with an independent goal may also prolong the conflict situation which is a different factor from that of its onset. The correlation between a civil war's onset and its continuation is different and may not be identical (Bremer 1992; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009; Blattman and Miguel 2009; Cunningham 2010; Bleaney and Dimico 2011)

Some authors are of the view that civil war is fuelled partly by the circumstances that account for the initial resort to large scale organised violence, and partly by the forces generated once violence has started and that tend to perpetuate it. They refer to the initial circumstances as the root causes and to the perpetuating forces as the conflict trap. Such conflict torn and violently divided societies are characterised by the traumatic impoverishment of economic, political and social relations between groups and individuals resulting in institutional breakdown such as weak or non-existent political institutions; and weak or non-existence of civil society institutions; limited government legitimacy and authority (Newman and Schnabel 2002; Collier et al. 2003; Deng 2010). These structural failures entertain civil conflict and create long lasting social trauma.

The impact of civil war on the social capital is determined by the insurgency and the counter-insurgency warfare in a state. Some of the authors distinguished between 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' counter insurgency warfare so far as the impact of civil war on social capital is concerned. There is no common understanding on the concept of 'zone of social capital deficiency'. In contrast to that they are of the view that endogenous counter-insurgency warfare experienced a loss of social capital but where exogenous violence dominated, there has been a deepening and strengthening of bonding of social capital among and within communities (Deng 2010, Newman and Schnabel 2002).

Studying the state's capacities in dealing with civil conflict may help in understanding its failures in the war-hit countries. The state capacities are measured on the grounds of military capacity, bureaucratic and administrative capacity and quality and coherence of political institutions. A country having capabilities with

strong state machinery to exert its control over territory and resources is unlikely to face a civil war (Hendrix 2010).

The nexus between resource extracting companies and rebel groups are also a determinant for sustaining the civil war. There are international corporate interests over the natural resources of conflict prone countries. The rebel groups either extort money from these companies or they completely own such company for resource extraction and exportation and thus they feed civil war and sustain for longer period (Samset 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Horst 2011).

The United Nations' Responses to the 'Natural Resource Civil War'

The literature on the responses from the international community and specially the United Nations in addressing the civil wars, where natural resources have played a major role in stimulating and sustaining the conflict, is very few. The primary literature from the United Nations gives a one-sided view of the problem and therefore lacks a critical assessment.

Natural resources have been shown to play a key role in the conflicts that have plagued a number of African countries by motivating and fuelling armed conflicts. The revenues from exploitation of natural resources are not only used for sustaining armies but also for personal enrichment and building political support. Natural resources have become obstacles to peace as leaders of armed groups involved in exploitation are unwilling to give up control over these resources. Control over natural resources and their revenues often stays in the hands of a small elite and does not contribute to the broader development of the country. The illegal exploitation of natural resources has been identified as factor fuelling conflict (United Nation 1998a; Billon and Nicholls 2007)

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has taken an unprecedented number of measures to tackle links between natural resources and armed conflicts over the past two decades. The Security Council used four main instruments: sanctions, expert panels, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The Security Council initiatives have two basic goals: limiting wartime resource exploitation to benefit the population after the conflict, rather than belligerents during the conflict; and

reforming resource sectors to prevent conflicts and consolidate peace (Billon 2007; Banon and Collier 2003).

The literature is mostly suggestive as to how the UN Security Council responses could be more effective as far as the natural resources and armed conflicts linkage is concerned. Consolidation of expert panel's initiatives, review of the role and behaviour of peacekeeping forces, articulation of commodity sanctions and peacebuilding initiatives need to be the primary concerns. There is a need to pursue debate on the links between resources and security, and potential international responses. Greater revenue transparency in the extractive sectors along with monitoring and certification schemes and fostering international collaboration on resource related peace and security are the areas that need proper attention from the UN Security Council (Billon 2007; Billon and Nicholls 2007; Banon and Collier 2003)

Some of the authors are critical of the role of the United Nations Sanctions. Shift from comprehensive sanctions to 'smart sanctions' have diluted the effectiveness of the sanctions regimes. Arms embargo received some positive impact in many conflict situations, although not a total success. The key to a successful embargo is political will on the part of the Security Council to implement and monitor the sanctions (Doxey 2007; Lopez and Cortright 2004; Vines 2007)

The conflict resources have been a major concern for international community in recent decades. The Kimberly Process shows the response from state actors as to prevent illegal diamond trade in the world. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) agreement though not legally binding on the state parties, has a positive effect in checking the illegal diamond trade and, in turn, addressing the civil wars which are funded by illegal extraction of resources (Wright 2004; United Nations 2002).

Natural Resource and Civil War in Sierra Leone

Some of authors and United Nations literature recognizes the civil war in Sierra Leone as one natural resource fuelled conflict where natural resources such as diamond, gold and timber played key role in stimulating and sustaining the civil war (Lujala et al 2005; Maconachie and Hilson 2011; Horst 2011; United Nations 2000a).

There are some authors who view the Sierra Leonean civil war as the manifestation of ethnic clash and bad political development in the country. Sierra Leone has 16 indigenous ethnic groups and two among them are prominent: Temne and Mende. The former has concentration in the north and the later has in the south. The Revolutionary United front (RUF) was also formed with ethnic line capturing the whole southern territory of the country to rebel against the dictatorial government (Abdullah 1998; Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003).

The RUF has been supported by bordering Liberia with all possible helps such as space, training, arms and immunities. Moreover, Liberia became the transit route for the illegal Sierra Leonean diamond export and illegal arms import (United Nations 2000a). The RUF started working and operating from Liberia. The Sierra Leonean elements within the rebel force did not seem to have come from any particular ethnic group, and also included politically and economically excluded intellectuals, many of whom were trained in Libya (Zack-Williams 1999; United Nations 2000a)

The civil conflict has been identified as ‘crisis of youth’ in Sierra Leone’ where it is argued that large numbers of socially marginalised young people embraced conflict in a desperate search for empowerment (Richards 1995). This argument highlights the intended destabilisation of some African states by post-Cold War neo-liberal reforms. According to some analysis, donor enforced cutbacks not only undermined the capacity of patrimonial elites to maintain political support through resource redistribution, but also threatened a domestic crisis of social reproduction. Collapsing public services left many young people unable to complete an education, find a job with paid salary, marry, and set up a family. Resource-starved elites tended to worsen this dilemma by abandoning patronage entirely in favour of self enrichment, thereby accelerating the degradation of state services and, in some cases, seriously undermining state security (O’Brien 1996; Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003; Keen 2005a; Fanthorpe and Maconachi 2010). The youth are always victimised in the process of perpetuating violence in collapsed states.

After the end of decade long civil war in Sierra Leone, attention has been paid in post-conflict capacity building activities. The democratic elections are being held with the assistance from the United Nations peace operations. The UN engagement in post-conflict Sierra Leone has been widened by its multifaceted tasks. The UN

peacebuilding engagement in Sierra Leone has adopted a joint vision to combine efforts of many agencies such as UN Integrated Peacebuilding missions (UNIPSIL), other UN agencies, Funds, Programmes working as the UN Country Team (UNTC). This approach to bring together the political, humanitarian and development mandate of the various UN Agencies, Funds and Programs for consolidating peace make the UN peacebuilding unique in Sierra Leone (United Nations 2008; Adebajo 2006; Meernik and Mason 2006).

The existing literature clearly shows that there is rich and valuable literature on civil war and related issues. Significant literature is also available on the relationship between natural resource and civil war. Significantly, there is no comprehensive literature available on the United Nations' responses to the 'natural resource civil wars' and a critical assessment of those responses. Thus, this study has filled that research gap.

Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

This study focuses on civil wars where lucrative natural resources play the key role in fuelling the outbreak of the conflict and its sustenance as well. The scholars have used different terms for the phenomena such as 'natural resource conflict', 'natural resource based conflict', 'natural resource based civil war', 'resource war', 'conflict over resources' and 'conflict resources'. This study uses the term "Natural Resource Civil War" for the purpose of defining any civil war that is linked with lucrative natural resources. Natural resources could play significant role in civil conflicts in two different ways. In the first instance, natural resources can be the major cause of civil war and secondly, this can be the source of war revenues which, in turn, are responsible for sustenance of the conflict. However, the 'natural resource civil war' will include both the aspects of natural resource and civil war.

This study deals with those civil wars which are linked with misappropriation of natural resources. The 'natural resource civil war' is a situation where natural resources are the root cause of the conflict or play a crucial role in stimulating and sustaining the conflict. The mismanagement of natural resources and inability of the governments to control over their resources lead to illegal accessibility of the resources by rebel groups and smuggling of those resources. Once the rebel groups could establish control over the natural resources, civil wars sustain for long as natural

resources can finance these wars. Conflict over natural resources has led to serious civil conflict, resulting in large scale bloodshed and violation of human rights and international humanitarian norms. As ‘natural resource civil wars’ cause major humanitarian crises, large-scale violation of human rights and also threat regional and international peace and security, it would be significant to understand why and how the United Nations responded and evaluated the effectiveness of those responses.

This study looks at ‘natural resource civil wars’ in the post-Cold War era. It takes the case-study of Sierra Leone to add empirical element to the study. The justifications of Sierra Leone as the case-study are as follows: firstly, the United Nations identified the link between natural resources and armed conflict so far as the eleven year (1991-2002) long civil war in Sierra Leone is concerned. Secondly, the peacekeepers themselves, specially the African peacekeepers, were reported to be facilitating the rebel group (Revolutionary United Front) and were also benefitting from illegal mining of diamonds. Thirdly, the United Nations has terminated all sanctions (1997-2010) and peace operations from Sierra Leone. As the United Nations’ major engagement in this country is over, it is appropriate to assess the overall performance of United Nations in addressing the ‘natural resource civil wars’.

Research Questions

This research seeks to answer the following basic questions:

1. Under what conditions do the natural resources stimulate civil war?
2. How do the actors involved in natural resource exploitation mobilise local communities to undermine the state authority or to rebel against state authority?
3. How effective have the responses of the United Nations been in addressing the ‘natural resource civil war’?
4. How did the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) organise itself to rebel against the state of Sierra Leone?
5. How did the United Nations respond to the ‘natural resource civil war’ in Sierra Leone?

Hypotheses:

This research tests the following hypotheses:

1. The defective UN mandates for peace operations and sanctions impede its efforts to control natural resource fuelled civil war.
2. The Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) illegal control over the diamond mining areas causes the prolonging of the civil war for a decade.

Methodology

The study has adopted descriptive-analytical method to study the role of natural resources in stimulating and sustaining civil wars. It has followed mainly inductive method for drawing up inferences from the series of measures undertaken by the United Nations to tackle the 'natural resource civil wars'. A case-study model is taken to add empirical element to the study.

Both primary and secondary sources have been used for the study. The primary sources such as the UN documents like statements, resolutions, reports, relating to natural resource and civil war have been consulted. The secondary sources such as books, articles published in academic journals, news papers reports and internet sources are also used in the study. The study has also used tabulation to project some of the data concerning 'natural resource civil wars'.

Chapterisation

This research work has been divided in five chapters. The first chapter contains the background of the study, literature review, the significance of the present study. Then it discusses the research design such as clarification of major concepts, relevance and scope of the study, the research questions to be answered, hypotheses to be tested and the methodology to be followed in this study. It ends with overview of the chapterisation.

The second chapter "*Civil War and Natural Resources: Nature, Trends and Issues*" explores the conceptual understanding of the link between natural resources and civil war. It analyses the interface of natural resources and civil war and how natural resources stimulate and sustain civil war situations. It discusses major trends and issues such as types of natural resources and actors involved in the conflict, impact of such conflict on neighbouring countries, the region as well as international.

The third chapter “*The United Nations’ Responses to ‘Natural Resource Civil Wars’*” explains why the United Nations felt the need to respond to the internal conflicts. Then it analyses the initiatives and actions taken up by the United Nations to address the ‘natural resource civil wars’. It explores the UN measures such as preventive measures, peacekeeping measures, regulatory measures, reports of the panels of experts, humanitarian intervention, and peacebuilding measures. The chapter analyses effectiveness of these various UN measures to address the ‘natural resource civil wars’.

The fourth chapter has been the “*Sierra Leone: The Case-Study*”. The chapter explores role of natural resources in sustaining the conflict in the Sierra Leone. It analyses the role of diamond in stimulating the civil war in the country and how different actors played various roles in prolonging of the civil war for nearly a decade. It critically examines the United Nations responses to ‘natural resource civil war’ in Sierra Leone.

The final chapter “*Conclusion*” contains summarisation of the major findings of the preceding chapters. It also provides a critical assessment of the United Nations’ responses and draws policy implications for future UN responses to similar situations.

CHAPTER TWO

CIVIL WAR AND NATURAL RESOURCES: NATURE, TRENDS AND ISSUES

Conflicts between countries or within a country have been associated with the history of nation states. After the end of the Cold War, well over 90 percent of all armed conflicts have been civil conflicts (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010). The rise of civil war in the post-Cold War era has been rooted in the geo-political developments during the Cold War. The end of Second World War and consequent decolonisation created many new sovereign states across the world and particularly in the colonies of Asia, Africa and South America. These newly independent countries which were created on different lines experienced the lack of administrative stability and governance failure, leading towards the emergence of popular discontents and subsequent violence, which left these countries prone to civil conflicts. Many of the situations remained silent during the Cold War and broke out in the post-Cold War period.

Civil conflict, as observed by Magnus Oberg and Kaare Strom, is an organised armed violence for political purposes between the government of a state and some organised opposition group. Sometimes, one or both of these parties are aided by outside parties such as the governments of other states or transnational armed groups (Oberg and Storm 2008:3). Thus civil war does not necessarily remain confined to the national boundary of a country. Rather, it may become an international war involving major power blocs, as seen during the Cold War. Besides the international dimension, a civil conflict takes the form of communal violence, that is, organised violence between non-state actors, and others such as, massacres or genocide in which a government or ruling group inflicts deadly violence on individuals that may not be armed, organised, or capable of resistance (Oberg and Storm 2008:3). The varied characteristics of civil war display different connotations, such as organised and armed violence, role of international actors, communal violence and the over the control of natural resources.

The scope of civil war situations during Cold War was limited because of the balance of power politics between the two power blocs. The very nature of civil war

was also contested during that period as major power blocs tended to be involved in such conflicts. The United States and the Soviet Union became involved in the conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique for Cold War reasons. However, Britain and France became involved in Nigeria and Congo to maintain or extend their influence from colonial past, and likewise the neighbouring countries became involved in the conflicts of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire, either in order to limit the spread of violence across borders into their own countries, or in support of the faction which most favoured their interests (Arnold 2008:xxx). There are examples where international actors or a second country intervene in the civil war in order to fulfil their vested interests over natural resources of the conflicting country. Chad, the African country experienced civil war from 1966 to 1990 and Libya intervened by supporting one party of the war with a vested interest to gain control of the uranium-rich Aozou Strip (Arnold 2008:xxix). The involvement of third party, major world powers or the neighbouring countries in a civil conflict paralysed the United Nations (UN) initiatives.

In the post-Cold War, natural resources have become the centre point of civil war. The link between lucrative natural resources and civil war has been the most vivid connotation of the civil war discourses over the past two decades. N.C. Narayanan observed that history of natural resource conflicts coincides with evolution of human societies with differential claims and control over resources (Narayanan 2008:15). The manifestations of conflicts start when competing interests claim to be in command of particular resource. Natural resources thus have always played key role in civil war situations either by causing the conflict or by extending its durability by providing financial backups. The ethnic and religious conflicts, administrative and governance failure, role of neighbouring countries, socio-economic health of the country are some of reasons that why and how natural resources instead of contributing to the national economy become a source of conflict or source of feeding a conflict.

The current chapter proposes to deal with the nature of civil wars, different issues, and trends of civil war where natural resources have contributed in either way such as the interface between civil war and natural resources, different actors involved in the natural resource based civil wars, types of natural resources involved in the

conflicts, and consequences of such conflicts at national, regional as well as international level.

Interface of Natural Resource and Civil War

The abundance of natural resources could bring out fortunes for some societies and miseries for others as the presence of natural resources could be seen as opportunity for development and also as misappropriation of the same for achieving personal and sectarian goals. As Billon observed a generous endowment of natural resources such as oil, diamonds or timber should, in theory, favour a country's rapid economic and social development but from the oil fields of Iraq to the diamond mines of the West Africa, millions of people in resource-rich countries have seen their lives devastated by the misuse of resource revenues (Billon 2005:1). Most of the resource-rich countries are less competently governed as compared to less well-endowed countries and they are governed by authoritarian and corrupt regimes (Billon 2005:1). Poor and incompetent governance has implications on the life of the people leaving them under severe conditions of poverty and inequality leading to the growth of popular disappointment against the government. In such countries the natural resources are subjected to misappropriation by the dissenting groups.

However, the type of natural resources and its cost of exploitation may have different picture of misappropriation or control over natural resources. There are some natural resources like oil whose exploitation requires heavy technology and other resources and therefore it is easier for the state authority to exercise control over the oil fields. On the other hand, the resources like diamond, gold and timber are vulnerable to illegal exploitation and smuggling as they can be easily accessible to the illegal actors and may cut off the revenues of the government. The control of over natural resources by the dissenting groups is the key to mould a rebel against the government or against another group. Natural resources thus become a source of conflict as different parties try to gain control over them. They are also linked to the financing of war and constraining development. Michael Klare was of the view that wars to control critical resources are becoming 'the most distinctive feature of the security environment (Klare 2001:213). Thus, the resource-abundant countries are vulnerable to the higher risk of war. Natural resource has been the primary factor that

causes civil war and fuels its durability. It is essential to examine why and how natural resources have become resource curse.

Natural Resources as Resource Curse

The natural resources are the gifts of nature having enormous potential for socio-economic development of states. However, due to many reasons, some resource rich societies could not prosper according to their prospects. The discovery of valuable natural resources in the context of poverty is much more paradoxical and contributed to the conflict trap and catalysing prosperity from the resource wealth has only been handful exceptions (Collier 2007:38). The high value natural resources despite its growth potential, could not emerge out as asset for the country. Rather they become a factor for non-growth. There are three reasons for non-growth of the countries having enormous natural resources. Firstly, the high value natural resources like diamond, gold, oil and timber could not catalyse national prosperity became a resource curse as different factors like lack of resources, technology and absence of effective regulation and governance of resources. Secondly, according to Paul Collier, if you have enough natural resources you can afford to forget about normal economic activity and surplus from natural resource export significantly reduces growth (Collier 2007:38-39). The rent theory (rent is the revenues and overall margin of profits) could simplify his argument that argues that over time, countries with large resource discoveries can end up poorer, with the lost growth more than offsetting the one-off gain in income provided by the rents and the whole society can live as rentiers, that is, on unearned income from wealth. Very few resource-rich rentiers could prosper as high income economy like some Arabian and Persian Gulf oil economies but most of the resource-rich societies could grow not beyond the middle income status. There is another group of resource-rich but small and poor economies where resources loom large but they could not even take up their societies to middle income status, has been categorised as resource-rich poverty (Collier 2007:38-42).

In the third category of states natural resources and wealth is becoming conflict trap. The governance challenge regarding natural resource use is to balance the need for economic growth with the demands and aspirations of the differentiated social structure, future generations and the environment (Narayanan 2008). But instead of that such countries are governed mostly by authoritarian and military

regimes leading towards political instability and mal-governance and human rights abuses. The governments in such countries do not enjoy total authority over whole of their territory due to lack of strong military and political legitimacy. Thus, there is a total failure of control and governance of natural resources in these resource-rich countries. In fact natural resources become a liability rather than an opportunity for the states as they contribute to create conducive context for formation of shadow, parallel or de-facto authority in the form of militia groups and other armed groups. Formation of armed groups aims at illegal access to the natural resources and resource revenues. This has been a contributing factor in stimulating, funding and sustaining armed conflicts and it went against the row of expectations which developed amongst the resource-rich countries that resource endowment would lift their countries out of poverty (Billon 2005:11).

Except a few resource-dependent countries, many of them provide experiences of resource curse. The resource curse could be understood in terms of poor economic growth, misappropriation of wealth and corruption, poor governance, and risk of civil war and generation of ethnic hatred. Natural Resources are meant for national asset and for the prosperity of the nations. But if they fail to do so, they becomes curse for the nation. In such societies where natural resources become a curse and liability, lead to following consequences:

Reverse Growth of Economy: The countries heavily dependent on the mineral exports have experienced on average a lower economic growth rate than resource-poor once over the past 30 years (Sachs and Warner 2001). The small economies that rely only on export of natural resources may collapse suddenly due to flexibility of prices of raw material products. Due to collapse of copper prices in the mid-seventies the economy of copper-exporting countries like Zambia suffered greatly (Billon 2005: 11). Down fall of economy has far-reaching impact on the society affecting standards of living, poverty, inequality and issues of livelihood. Thus ‘resource curse’ may be an outcome of heavy dependence on natural resources export.

Misappropriation of Wealth and Revenues: The abundance of natural resources may cause massive misappropriation of resource wealth and revenues in the hands of authoritarian and autocratic rulers. In the resource-dependent countries, the governments and the rulers tend to be more corrupt as a result of discretionary control

over large resource rents (Leite and Weidmann 1999). Late General Sani Abacha, reportedly embezzled an estimated \$2.2 billion over his four year rule of oil-rich Nigeria (Mason 2002). Similarly natural resources have significant effects on the institutional systems of the country especially countries with weak institutional infrastructure and cause institutional failures in terms of corruption, rent seeking and conflicts (Daniele 2011:549). In such a situation a country experiences resource curse.

Poor Governance and Lack of Democracy: The natural resources like oil and mineral wealth appear to inhibit democracy and worsen the quality of governance (Ross 2001; Karl 1997). Lack of democracy strengthens the unaccountability, non-transparency, non-participatory and irresponsive governance system and it lets autocracy to continue. The countries with high resource-rent tend to strengthen autocratic rule rather than promoting democratization (Billon 2005:12). The resource dependent countries are predominantly ruled by authoritarian regimes which led to centralised governance of natural resources with lack of transparency. The resource-rich Middle Eastern countries illustrate the relationship between political autocracy and poor governance of natural resources. However this correlation is equally applicable to other resource-dependent countries in other region (Billon 2005:12). Nevertheless, unlike the oil in the Middle East which requires proper corporate establishments for extraction activities other lucrative minerals such as diamond and gold involve much more poor governance leading towards communal conflicts specially for controlling over mining of these resources.

Risk of Civil War: The correlation between natural resource and civil war has already been established by scholars. According to the study of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, resource-dependent countries are more prone to civil war, the risk being highest when resource export represent about a third of GDP (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). The plenitudes of natural resources particularly, those which are vulnerable to illegal exploitation and smuggling activities also give rise to the onset of civil war in the resource-rich states. The illegal access to the high value natural resources may fund civil war or prolong its duration of a civil war. The rebel groups may take advantage of poor governance and lack of proper regulation to control over the natural resource fields and illegal the resource revenues may be used illegally for armament, recruitment of soldiers and for preparing war infrastructure. Thus, plenty of natural

resources have been becoming a curse for the societies rather being as asset for its prosperity.

The highly resource-dependent countries tend to buy social peace and buy off political opponents and build up security agencies to effectively deter a strong rebellion in the country with their sufficient rent collection from the natural resources (Billon 2005:12). However, abundance of natural resources particularly renewable resources in the poor countries and non-renewable resources in all countries tend to intensify the risk of armed conflict (Soysa 2000). However, the diverse examples such as Angola, Iraq and Papua New Guinea illustrate these relationships between resource abundance and civil conflict but may not be the same with the robust oil-rich countries (Ross 2004b). Merely the abundance of natural resources does not automatically lead to armed conflict but many internal factors contribute for outbreak of conflicts. Philippe Le Billon (2005) pointed that ‘a country’s political and economic history, its level of institutional development prior to resource discovery and exploitation, and the motivations and capacities of its leaders can all play a part’ in natural resources leading to armed conflicts (Billon 2005:13).

Ethnic Hatred: The ethnic hatred has become another consequence of the resource curse. The abundance of lucrative natural resources vulnerable to illegal exploitation leads to division of societies along ethnic and community lines for easier mobilisation of war recruits. The domination one ethnic group in the society increases the possibility of victimisation of other ethnic groups which may, in turn, lead to the formation of dissenting groups. The ethnic dominance mechanism may develop the risk of civil war by increasing the minority’s fear of victimisation or exclusion, particularly when ethnic divisions overlap with class divisions (Sambanis 2005). The predominant ethnic group may use the control over natural resources as a tool to establish its domination over others. The smaller and the victimised ethnic group may also reciprocate by forming rebel groups and challenge monopoly of control over natural resources. And, thus, the increasing ethnic hatred has become major factor for the onset of civil war.

However, ‘natural resource civil wars’ (natural resource as source of the conflict or as source of funding to the conflict) draw the attention on another crucial aspect of ethnic and religious fractionalisation in the society. Ethnicity has been

commonly referred as cause of violence and conflict (Kimenyi and Ndung'u 2005) though not always turns into a full-blown civil war. The greedy ethnic and religious leaders may also utilise the communal card on the basis of ethnicity and religion. Since natural resource is one of the major source of financing the rebel activities (Collier et al. 2005), rebel groups try to access those resources illegally or through extortion from extracting firms. The division of people in the line of ethnic and religious identity during civil wars has been very much inclined to control over natural resources. The ethnic division of the society may have two implications for the natural resource based civil war. Firstly, mobilising the people in the ethnic and religious line may legitimise the rebel activities and rebellion may get community support and solidarity. Secondly, illegal access or claim to natural resources or the resource revenue by an ethnic group as per the "son of the soil" explanation (Fearon and Laitin 2003), may result in stimulating ethno-religious conflicts. However, these conflicts end up with fulfilling personal greed and political aspirations of ethnic and religious leaders. They take the advantage of such sectarian identities to mobilise civilians to fight against the state authority. Paul Collier also observed that the tribe and kin groups are the most powerful levels of identity (Collier 2001). Therefore, leader of the rebel group colours up the conflict as ethnic or religious one so that they receive support and solidarity of all kind. The ethnic identification especially in Africa is very strong and this identification has been shown to be an important way of solving collective action problems but it can also have negative implications for non-members as violence is organised along ethnic lines, the interface is purely the result of 'ethnic hatred' (Kimenyi 1997, 1998; Kimenyi and Ndung'u 2005). The politics of 'ethnic hatred' results in mutual mistrust and hostility. However, this psyche of 'ethnic hatred' derived from the fear of being outplayed in the socio-economic and political share of the country. Kimenyi and Ndung'u have observed that conflicts do have an ethnic dimension. From their empirical analysis in Kenya they hold that most ethnically diverse districts in that country have had violent conflicts of one type or other (Kimenyi and Ndung'u 2005).

Mere ethnic division although may not lead to the risk of civil war. However, ethnic hatred may fuel up the possibility of civil war since it has become the motivating factor for joining or extending support to the rebel group. Thus, ethnic diversity leads to mobilisation of people along ethnic and community lines. Ethnic

mobilisation can be considered as both a mechanism and a process, and so can political identity formation. This identity formation has two fundamental implications. Firstly, it creates an ethnic solidarity inside the country and also the diasporas community. And secondly, it helps creating conducive opportunity for rebellion by providing social cohesion.

Mobilisation of people along the line of ethnic and religious identity gives a social cohesion into the rebel groups. Social cohesion in the rebel group is a significant motivation for their success as ethnic and religious diversity within the organisation tends to reduce their ability to function (Collier 2001; Easterly and Levine 1997). The social cohesion is also significant for a newly formed rebel group especially for recruitment and patronage limiting to single ethnic or religious group. Since diverse society have a propensity to dilute the rebel opportunity by restraining the recruitment pool (Collier et al. 2005), the community cohesion is seen to be identical with the shaping of a rebellion.

The colouring of a civil war as an ethnic and religious conflict could be a hidden tactic of rebel groups for easier mobilisation of people. In the resource-rich poor countries, the over coating of conflict has made the task easier as recruiting soldiers including child and women combatants, getting popular support and confidence are important milestones for the rebel group. Large scale poverty, hunger, illiteracy and unemployment left people with no choice but to join rebel groups in the line of community participation that may temporarily address their poverty and unemployment.

Although, the ethnic and religious diversities in the resource-rich societies play a key role in civil war onset, this notion however is widely contested in the academic discourse as whether civil war is a likely phenomenon in a multi-ethnic society. The constructivists hold the idea that although ethnic identities are constructed and fluid, they usually harden and solidify during wars (Kalyvas 2006). There has been a distinction of individual behaviour in an ethnic and a non-ethnic civil war. The social construction of ethnicity for a war against an opposite ethnic group may be different from that of a war against state authority. Social fractionalisation may however, result in peace or war considering the nature of conflict and opposition. Taking a different position, Collier and Hoeffler argue in their

model of civil war onset (CH model) that a mere ethnic diversity does not increase the risk of civil war (Sambanis 2005: 312). According to them higher fractionalisation need not make civil war more likely but ethnic dominance raises the risk of civil war. The social (ethnic and religious) fractionalisation can contribute to peace by increasing the cost of coordinating a rebellion against the government. However, migration of other ethnic groups is another mechanism that increases the risk of violent conflict. The political violence is likely to take place as the result of conflict between migrant communities and the “son of the soil” (autochthonous) populations in the peripheral regions of countries (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Further, the factors that explain countries having the risk for civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favour insurgency including poverty and slow growth, which favour rebel recruitment and mark financially and bureaucratically weak states, rough terrain, and large populations (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Natural Resources as Cause of Conflicts

Natural resources can also stimulate and cause a civil war. It is pertinent to review natural resources as the main cause of conflict. Three approaches have been developed to understand the stimulating factors of a ‘natural resource civil war’. As Charles-Philippe David and Jean-Francois Gagne observed, the environmental approach focusing on grievances created by the increasing scarcity of renewable resources, the secondly, the economic factors that regards the greedy motivations of individuals as the main driver of conflict and the third one concentrates on political factors and institutional weakness (David and Gagne 2007). However, a the contemporary natural resource conflicts could be understood in a shifting interplay between these various stimulating factors.

The natural resources are on increasing demand as the consumption level is growing day by day. And for this obvious reason the resource scarcity has become increasingly concerns for all. In 1972 the publication of *The Limits to growth* forecasted the world running quickly out of needed resources due to diminishing reserves and a mushrooming populations, provoked somewhat frenzied concern from both masses and elites in high consumption Western societies (Mandel 1988:3). Thus the scarcity of natural resources is a natural point of conflict in the current human

history. But the point that arrests our attention is when the abundance of natural resources becomes source of conflict. In the resource-rich poor countries, there have been inequalities regarding distribution of environmental resources. The disparities could also be noticed between rural and urban areas and even political leaders deny certain social groups access to environmental resources on ethnic, religious, or ideological grounds (David and Gagne 2007). This may result in creating grievances as marginalization of ethnic, religious, or economic communities and subsequent violent conflict. The desertification, hunger and poverty are also causal factor of some civil conflicts such as Darfur in Sudan. However, environmental scarcity does not correlate with the violent conflict except some low-intensity conflicts (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998).

There are many examples of natural resource induced conflicts. The conflict in Peru over natural resource mining is one of that. Peru exports various natural resources: copper, tin, silver, gold, zinc and, more recently, natural gas (Arellano-Yanguas 2011). During the 2004–2009, when commodity price boom, the Peruvian government decided to delegate the substantial revenues to sub-national governments, with a strong preference for mining areas. This action sparked subsequently and developed local conflicts in turn triggered a broader wave of conflict throughout the country. Thus these ‘natural resource civil wars’ can take place as grievance and counter grievance policies of government, local marginalized and the miners.

Oil has become central to the conflicts stimulated by natural resources. There is, however, greater consensus among most analysts that oil abundance is significantly correlated to the onset of civil war in less developed countries in the period 1945–99 (Di John 2007). Some analysts have estimated that oil exports are significantly correlated with the full set of civil war onsets (Soysa, 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003), while others find that oil export abundance is significantly associated with a subset of civil wars, namely, secessionist wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier et al. 2003). Michael Ross viewed that there is good quantitative evidence that oil exports are significantly associated with the onset of civil wars (Ross 2004b). However, in the oil rich countries, poor economic growth, massive corruption and authoritarian rule become focal point for conflicts over the resources.

The Collier and Hoeffler model of civil war onset provided that the ‘lootable’ resources are prone to motivate rebels to start off civil war as these resources generate economic incentives for violent rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). Mineral resource rents or revenues (such as from oil), provide both the motivation to try to capture the state and, potentially, the means to finance rebellions (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). Their so called ‘greed’ thesis is an application of rent-seeking theory, which, in its simple form, posits that the existence of a valuable ‘prize’ induces individuals to spend time and resources to appropriate the ‘prize’ (Di John 2007). However, ‘greed’ of a person will motivate more to kick off a rebellion when abundance natural resource provides opportunity for ‘looting’ and ‘rent-seeking’. Collier and Hoeffler proposed that mineral rents can lead to rebellion through a ‘looting’ mechanism. If rebel organisations have the opportunity to extract and sell resources (or extort money from those who do), then they are more likely to launch a civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). The natural resources may induce a civil war when there is enough space for looting the resources. In such conflict, personal greed works more than collective good. The resources like oil are more prone to be a source of conflict as the case of illicit diamond could be both a source of conflict and a source of war finance.

Natural Resources as Factor Sustaining and Prolonging a Civil War

This part analyses the role of natural resources in sustaining a civil war. A civil war tends to be last for longer period if there is a constant funding available to the warring parties. Natural resources have been one of the sources of funding many of the civil wars. Collier and Hoeffler identified natural resources as the most significant source of funding (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). There are some issues as to how natural resources become ‘the factor’ of prolonging or sustaining a civil war.

Illegal Accessibility of natural resources by the insurgent groups has made it the factor for sustaining and prolonging of a civil war. The insurgent groups may illegally access the natural resources by three means. Firstly, they could directly control the resource area (i.e. diamond field), secondly, they may collect revenues (i.e. through extortion) from the resource extracting companies and thirdly they may directly or indirectly control the export of resources (i.e. through smuggling). Thus illegal access to producing, exporting and extracting revenues may prolong the civil war.

Lucrative natural resources are prone to attract conflict by the inherent greed and grievances of the human being. Such resources like oil, diamond, gold, timber have been point of referring to the armed conflict over the years. However, all of these resources are not contaminated with conflict in similar way. Phillip De Billon pointed out the variations of vulnerability of resource sectors. The resources which require highly industrialized process like exploration of offshore oil, facilitates the concentration of rents by the governments and consolidates their rule unlike the resources such as diamond, gold, timber which are vulnerable to illicit exploitation and smuggling and resist fiscal control by governments (Billon 2005). The three ways of illegal accessibility of natural resources are discussed bellow.

Controlling Resource Area: The rebel groups aims to control over these resources to finance their war activities. They, the rebel groups try to capture the resource fields and then exploit them. For example the UNITA rebels captured the diamond field in Angola profiting an estimated \$500 million (Global Witness 1998) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone also established control over diamond mining areas which provided uninterrupted resource flow to the rebel group. Thus, once a rebel group could capture the resource fields, they earn revenues from these of illicit exploitation and can continue fighting for longer period. The controlling over diamond fields or any mining industry of any lucrative natural resources provide with smooth revenue pool contributing in sustaining and prolonging of the war.

Extortion: Extortion has been another way to control resource revenues by the rebel groups. The rebel groups demand revenues from the resource extracting companies by force. The rebel groups often resort to kidnapping and murdering of personnel of the companies left them with two options: leave that country or meet the rebel's demands. The conflict company personnel were kidnapped and killed during Sudanese civil war and Sudan in 2000 (NST 2000). The role and influence of international corporate in the civil war was highlighted by the UN in 2001 and also by the international NGOs. The international NGOs pointed the influence of corporations in the conflict-affected countries in connection with the 'blood diamonds' and 'scorched earth' of contemporary civil war (Global Witness 1998). It was also argued further that economic considerations, access to relief aid and indeed an abundance of natural resources were crucial in motivating warring groups (Jean and Rufin ed. 1996; Keen

1998). The emergence of a market-driven global economy saw the proliferation of MNCs throughout the world, further upsetting the socioeconomic and political stability of conflict-affected countries, altering the character and prolonging the length of civil wars (Patey 2007). Although a resource-rich environment tend to appear more favourable to financing and motivating rebellion, the specific characteristics of a resource, its location and its mode of exploitation can affect the dynamics of power of the confronting groups (Billon 2005:31). Phillip De Billon pointed out the alluvial diamonds in Angola and Namibia that facilitates the rebel group an easy access. However, all resources do not provide similar accessibility by the rebels. The *Table 1* reveals that alluvial gems and minerals are prone to higher accessibility by the rebel groups.

Table 2.1 Resource Accessibility by the Rebel Groups

Resources	Exploitation	Theft	Extortion	Price-range (\$/kg)
Alluvial gems and minerals	High	High	High	20,000-500,000
Timber	Medium	Medium	High	0.1
Agricultural commodities	Medium	Medium	Medium	1.5 (coffee)
Onshore oil	Low	Medium	High	0.12
Kimberlite diamonds	Low	Medium	Medium	500,000
Deep-shaft minerals	Low	Low	Medium	2 (copper)
Offshore oil	Low	Low	Low	0.12

Source: Auty 2004; Billon 2005:30

Smuggling and Accessing Black Markets: The access to black market by the insurgent groups is another important issue confronting the natural resource and civil war. This has increased the possibility of prolonging the civil war. The Table 2.1 also reveals that most of the resources except deep-shaft minerals and offshore oil in the conflict-ridden states are prone to theft and smuggling. The state as well as non-state actors involved in the looting of natural resources. UN panel of experts claimed that the Kabila government in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its external allies, especially Zimbabwe, shared responsibility for the looting of DRC's natural resources (Arnold 2008:103). The smuggling of natural resources and exporting to the illegal

markets by the rebels is also facilitated by third party such as neighbouring country (Liberia, Guinea in the case of diamond of Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe in the case of DRC), international mercantile, corporate and individual smugglers.

The accessibility of natural resources revenues can influence the prolonging of a civil war in different ways. Continuing access to resource wealth by the rebel groups allow it to continue fighting and thereby prolonging hostilities and in the case of separatist civil wars, it tends to prolong even for more years by making it unlikely that a government will adhere to a peace accord for a separation (Ross 2004). According to Ross (2004), resource wealth tends to increase the duration of civil wars by offering combatants a financial incentive to oppose a peace settlement. Moreover, the UN had pointed out that the various armed groups had little reason to lay down their arms since the war had allowed them to be self-financing and sustaining as they raped the country of its resources (Arnold 2008:103). The peace agreements and peace building efforts thus seem to be faced extra difficulties in the resource based civil wars (Stedman et al. 2002). Stephen John Stedmen, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (2002) find no peace agreement successfully implemented between 1987 and 2000 in places with valuable and easily marketable commodities. Access to resource revenues can have a significant impact on the organization and cohesion of armed movements, and thereby the course and duration of the conflict (Billon 2005:44). The natural resource based conflicts tend to sustain for long as the international players cannot easily reach at unified action. The rebel leaders may overlook to the economic sanctions and other international measure as they enjoy patronage from some states and its leaders. In the case of Angola, UNITA's diamonds not only allowed rebel movement to buy arms, but also attracted diplomatic and logistical support from regional political leaders such as Mobutu in Zaire, Lissouba in the Republic of Congo, and Eyadema in Togo (United Nations 2000a).

However, there are differences of views on the duration of civil war yet most of the literatures on civil war duration are of the view that causes of civil war onset may not be similar to the causes of its prolonging. The Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom view that the duration of civil war is determined by a substantially different set of variables than those determines their initiation. According to them the durations of the conflict increases substantially if the society is composed of a few large ethnic

groups, if there is extensive forest cover, if the conflict has commenced since 1980 (Collier et al. 2001). However, these determinants of increasing conflict duration do not cause conflict initiation.

Natural resources thus become ‘the factor’ for sustaining a civil war and also cause its prolonging. The illegal accessibility of resource revenue through controlling resource area, collecting extortion from resource miners and traders, looting and smuggling of resources allow the rebel groups to continue with fighting and warring. The rebel groups have got external patronage to carry forward the rebel activities by providing arms, training, access to black market for looted resources and other logistics and continuation of such patronage may cause furthering the conflict and its duration. The rebel group tends to continue the war until they receive finance to do so. Thus, natural resource based conflicts tend to last for longer periods.

Different Actors

Different actors play significant role in stimulating and sustaining a natural resource based civil war. Some of them are initiator of the conflict where as others come to the scene after outbreak of the conflict. The major actors are the rebel groups, neighbouring countries and other major world powers, international corporate, diasporas community, and the local communities. These actors have their own interests in the conflicts and they fuel up the conflicts with their different capacities.

The Rebel Groups: The rebel groups are the primary warring parties involved in the civil conflict. However, formation of an armed rebel group is mostly backed by political or military dissidents to carry forward the struggle for power through armed revolution. The formation of a rebel group, armament of the group and funding of the conflict needs to be examined.

The rebel groups are formed as armed group to fight against state authority or to exert control over some areas. They are formed in different lines. Some of them are formed along the ethnic or religious identity whereas others are formed across ethnicity. Some of them formed to struggle against the repressive, authoritarian, or military junta regime and others have the intension to control over the natural resources. The Liberia experienced of having more than six rebel groups such as the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the

Lofa Defence Force (LDF), the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and two factions of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), one faction led by Johnson and another faction by Kromah, formed across the country mostly along the regional and ethnic lines (Outram 1997). Formation of insurgent groups is the turning point of the civil war onset. However, rebel group formation tends to receive patronage from neighbouring countries as well as other countries having some vested interests in the conflict. Liberian rebels specially the NPFL which started civil war in Liberia (1989-2003) received training in Libya and shelter in Cote d'Ivoire (Arnold 2008:203).

The recruitment of soldiers and armament of the group is primary concern for the formation of a rebel group. Recruiting personnel can be drawn by providing incentives, appealing on the line of ethnic and religious identity, creating ideological appeals or the coercive recruitment (Gates 2002). Although youths are targeted for recruitment, women and children combatants are also become part of their warfare strategy. For armament and other logistics rebel groups have to depend on the collection of revenues through extortion and assistance from international allies (Libya and Cote d'Ivoire in the case of NPFL of Liberia, China and USA in the case of UNITA of Angola). Rebel groups received financial support and funding for their activities from different significant sources. Collier and Hoeffler pointed out the extortion of natural resources, donations from diasporas, and subventions from hostile governments as the three main sources of financing of a rebel group (Collier and Hoeffler 2001).

Controlling over natural resources has become focal point of rebel group formation especially in the war torn Africa. The rebel groups try to control the natural resource revenues through exerting illegal control over them or through collecting extortion from the resource extracting companies. There are examples of mutual assistance of rebel group and a neighbouring country where the bordering country provide military and logistical assistance to the rebel group in return of accessing illegal diamonds. Charles Taylor of Liberia was allowed smuggling of the conflict diamonds of the eastern Kono region of Sierra Leone in return of his support to the RUF militants (Wigglesworth 2008). Similarly, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) of Angola received support from China and United

States. Once the rebel group could exert its control over the natural resources areas they will tend to receive an uninterrupted pool of funding for their war activities.

Neighbouring Countries: The role of neighbouring countries is very crucial in breaking out of a civil war. They are significant third party to the conflict. They provide arms and other logistics to the rebel groups. However, the neighbouring countries extend help and assistance only when they see some vested interests into the conflict. There can be two reasons as to why do they show solidarity with the rebel groups. Firstly, the country might have interests in the natural resources of the conflicting country, and secondly, if the political regime in the conflicting country has a hostile relation with the political regime of the neighbouring country. The troubled and hostile neighbours always take the advantage of such incidents of rebel activities.

Third-party involvement supporting the rebel groups facilitates their ability to fight against the government. An opposition group supported by a third-party is more likely to challenge the government with a capable military threat, thereby increasing the cost to the government of confronting the opposition, as well as increasing the opposition group's chances of achieving victory (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008). By extending help to the rebel groups, third party or neighbouring country surpluses the rebel capacity and enable them to bid for popular support. This process hinders the government access to the state resources and increases the chances for strengthening of the rebel group. A neighbouring country may provide all necessary logistics including arms, shelter, communication facilities, intelligence service, smuggling routes, illegal markets for natural resources etc. to the rebel groups. The parties that share a border with a state experiencing domestic conflict have a number of reasons to be attracted to intervention (Kathman 2010). The intervention from a neighbouring country varies from state to state on the basis of the opportunity for intervention and willingness for that. Their interest in the conflict of neighbouring country is also depended on the existing relationship with the country. The involvement of neighbouring country is based on their previous experiences of friendly or hostile relationship. Additionally, the states governed by contradictory political institutions may be more likely to experience violence than a regional state governed by an institutionally consistent regime (Kathman 2010).

The neighbouring country may provide arms, shelter and training to rebel groups. Guinea is one of the affected countries that was victimised from the neighbourhood conflict. Later the president of Guinea extended help to the Guinea Bissau with arms and troops and he also backed the rebel movement against Charles Taylor in Liberia besides providing diplomatic and logistical support to the Cote d' Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo (Arieff 2009). Similarly, during Liberian civil war, Charles Taylor and his rebel group national Patriotic Forum of Liberia (NPFL) received support from the government of Cote d' Ivory and Burkina Faso. The neighbouring country becomes a hub for illegal market and transit route for the conflict resources.

Another aspect is victimization of neighbouring countries. Civil war analyses view that a civil war in one country significantly increases the likelihood that neighbouring states will experience similar conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). The neighbouring countries are becoming prone to civil war as a result of influx of refugees and rebel activists. Cote d'Ivoire was affected largely from the refugee influx from Liberia. Refugees put a great strain on their host countries, often hampering the economy, spreading diseases, and reducing living standards. Cross-border ethnic ties also create opportunities for wars to spread (Gleditsch 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). Thus, civil war may spill-over to the neighbouring countries.

Major World Powers: Apart from the neighbouring countries, the major world powers and especially Cold War geopolitics played significant role in conflict situations. They provided aids and assistance either to the dissident groups or to the government forces in order to play the Cold war rivalry. In post-Cold War period, many countries play crucial role in civil war situations and especially in the natural resource based civil war. There are three kinds of involvement from countries other the neighbouring countries. The first kind of involvement could be seen during the cold war politics. The second kind is from countries having corporate and foreign policy implications in the conflicting country and the third kind of involvement is from rival countries who try to overthrow the regime that was hostile to them. In the post-Second World War the Greek civil war (1946-49) saw the involvement of United States and USSR in bitter internal war resulting the defeat of the communist regime in Greece (Nachmani 1990:489). There are other examples that visualize the opposite stand of the power

blocs to show the sphere of influence in the matter of country's internal wars. Soviet involvement in Angola and its support for the MPLA strained Moscow's relations with the West and with Washington in particular which was the cause for the end of a so-called 'first détente' between the two 'superpowers' (Shubin and Tokarev 2001). The cold war geopolitics was played at the global forum such as at the United Nations by using veto to the any resolutions that goes against the allies of the power blocs as David Cunningham argues that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement in the global forum are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreement for such settlement (Cunningham 2006). The role of major power thus increases the duration of a conflict.

The external involvement in some cases could be understood from the corporate interests and foreign policy implications. The cases natural resource based civil war has always been subjected to external involvement especially the major powers. In the resource-rich rich conflict prone countries, the MNCs from developed world have engaged in the resource extraction and exploitation activities. Therefore, the home countries of such corporate have a natural stake in such conflict situations. As an operator Petronas (a Malaysian oil company) was directly influenced by the civil war in Sudan. During the conflict company personnel were kidnapped and killed and considered a Sudan posting to be a national service (National Straits Times 2000). Therefore, the foreign policy of the countries having ventures in the natural resource exploitation such as US, UK, China, Russia, and India could influence the civil war in the resource-rich countries. During the Sudanese civil war the Chevron and Talisman (American and Canadian energy companies) left the country as a result of deteriorating relations between the USA and Sudan, the host governments of MNCs such as CNPC (China), Petronas (Malaysia) and ONGC (India) directed their companies into the open arms of Khartoum (Patey 2007). Thus not only corporate relations but also the bilateral strategic relations of the countries influence the conflict.

There are some countries that provide arms and training to the rebel groups as to take revenge against the rival political regime ruling in the conflict ridden country. During the Liberian civil war the Libya extended its all possible assistance to the rebel group called National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor (Harris

1999; Ellis 1995). He got guerrilla warfare training and other warfare help from Libya and fought the Liberian civil war (1989-94). Likewise Nigeria also supported another rebel group of Liberia called United Liberation Movement of Liberia led by Roosevelt Johnson. Many UN resolutions have also pointed the alleged involvement of Libya in the conflicts and insurgency activities in Africa. Thus, policies of some countries other than neighbouring one influence a civil conflict.

The Corporate: The interests of the international corporate (Multinational Corporations, MNCs) especially the diamond industries and the resource extraction companies have very crucial role in a 'natural resource civil war'. The resource-rich poor countries are heavily dependent on the foreign corporations and firms for exploitation of natural resources as they lack resources and technological know-how. These corporations from the developed world have deepening the root in the resource-rich small and poor countries through not only exploitation of natural resources but also exporting and marketing them as the local firms could not compete in the global market. From Colombia, Sierra Leone, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Azerbaijan to Burma, international corporate engagement has aggravated conflict and fed pervasive corruption through the extraction of lucrative natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, timber, diamonds and other precious minerals (Patey 2007). They provide exporting hub for illegal resources and also technological know-how to the warring groups for illegal extraction of the resources. The role of international corporate in such natural resource exploitation has deadly consequences in the war torn countries.

The foreign companies provide extortion to the rebel groups in order to stay in the business. However, providing extortion to the rebel group and royalties and over taxes to the host government has been a common phenomenon in the conflict torn societies. Armed conflicts have become increasingly self-financing, as rebel groups, criminal networks, mercenaries, and predatory elites have increasingly relied on natural resource revenues and more accessible global markets to fund military activity (UN 2006). These groups received extortion from the extracting companies and the corporate houses. There has been a lack transparency in the MNCs regarding payments to the rebel groups as well as the repressive government. In Angola, when British Petroleum moved to disclose payments made to the Angolan government, it

was immediately faced with threats of losing its licence to operate in the oil-rich country from the ruling party (Global Witness 2002). Due to political pressure from the home country, the transparency in terms of payment of taxes and extortion cannot be maintained. The authority and power of governments is the essential factor opening and closing the doors for oil companies in conflict-affected countries (Patey 2007). And therefore, MNCs have to sustain the demand for overdue taxes in the conflict ridden countries as to carry on their business as well as to maintain favourable relations with the home political brass. For example, Chevron and Petronas (two of the oil companies) had to surrender to the Chad government's demand for payment of overdue taxes to avoid the risk of expulsion from the country despite their opposition to the claims (BBC 2006). Thus, providing over taxes to the government or providing extortion to the rebel groups are not voluntary decision of the companies rather it has been a resultant act of the pressure from the domestic and home government as well as the rebel groups. Although external pressure from human rights groups and internal corporate requirement for profit maximization were notable for western firms, it was the mix of demands of the domestic politics in the conflict ridden country and home politics of each company including influence of major world powers that dictate corporate behaviour to adopt conflict-sensitive practices and this has heightened the collective action problem obstructing the use of companies as lever to influence oppressive and corrupt governments (Patey 2007).

Apart from the misappropriation of resource revenues, the resource extracting companies involved in numerous questionable business dealing with corrupt and repressive governments who abscond with natural wealth and perpetrate massive human rights violations (United Nations 2006). The companies' resource extracting establishment in the remote and poorly governed region attracts the rebel groups and violence activities. The UN expert panel on the natural resources and conflict in Africa also pointed out the company financing of rebel groups. They observed that the some companies in the resource-rich and poorly governed countries make deal with the rebel groups what has been called as "booty future", that is the direct company financing of rebel groups in return for future exploitation rights once military victory is achieved (United Nations 2006).

The Diasporas: The Diasporas are also important part of a civil conflict. The Diasporas can play very significant role in financing an armed conflict and also in creating a public opinion outside the country or at the global level. They show strong solidarity with the rebel group if a particular ethnic community is a warring party. Collier and Hoeffler observed that the diasporas are the one of the sources of funding civil wars along with natural resource revenues and subventions from hostile governments (Collier at al. 2005). Collier & Hoeffler are the first to demonstrate in a systematic manner that rebellion activities or civil war in different countries get supports from the ethnic diasporas, such as the Tamil community in Canada supporting Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the American Irish supporting Irish Republican Army (IRA), German Albanian's support to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) etc. (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). They play a very crucial role in organizing and financing the rebel activities. The larger the size of diasporas, the greater should be the ability to organize and finance a rebellion (CH model of civil war onset).

The diaspoas can provide their support to the cause of civil war fundamentally by two ways. Firstly, by financing the rebel group and secondly they can also influence the foreign policy of their host countries (Sambanis 2005). The ethnic and cultural solidarity is the primary factors for the diasporas' involvement in the civil war situations. The Croatian ethnic lobby in Germany influenced the Germany's decision to recognize Croatia's Independence in 1991-1992 during the Yugoslav conflict (Woodward 1995). However, Diasporas' involvement becomes a complex issue in the multiethnic countries where Diasporas are also divided on the line of their ethnic and cultural identity. There have been scholarly interests to broadening the concept of Diasporas that influence the conflict situations. According to Nicholas Sambanis, the pattern of Diaspora influence can be determined with broader concept of Diaspora which may incorporate all shared transnational networks and cultural communities (Sambanis 2005). Whatsoever, Diasporas play a determinant role in civil war as larger the size of diasporas, the greater should be the ability to organize and finance a rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2001).

Local Communities: Participation of local communities is important so far as the lifespan of a civil war is concerned. The collective action or collective participation is

however not smooth and therefore, it needs some incentives to motivate the participation of the local communities. The classic solution to this collective action problem use 'selective incentives' to motivate people's participation with material and financial incentives (Grossman 1999). Such incentives include wages, opportunities to loot, promises of future reward, or physical protection from harm and also ending poverty (Blattman and Miguel 2009). The incentives model becomes effective as the people are largely fighting with extreme poverty, unemployment and economic inequality. Economic inequality provides a possible motive for conflict to the extent that seizure of the state brings material gains to the victors (Fearon 2007). These factors motivates participation in rebellion not for private gain, but because it generates frustration over inequality or the destabilization of traditional social systems (Gurr 1970). Thus poverty, income inequality, unemployment become easy means to achieve mass mobilization in the conflict situations. There are non-material incentives which could also be effective for mobilizing collective action. Along with others, Blattman and Miguel pointed out the role of leader's charisma, group ideology, and people's satisfaction in pursuing justice or revenge as an alternative mechanism for individual participation in rebellion (Blattman and Miguel 2009; Roemer 1985).

There are diverse models or mechanisms other than 'selective incentive' model, through which rebel groups mobilize local community to participate in the civil war. All rebel groups may not fulfil their incentive commitments and henceforth they use ethnic and religious appeals to motivate citizens to join and exert effort in the rebellion in order to meet the participation and incentive compatibility constraints (Gates 2002). To secure the cooperation of the local communities and to get a smooth recruitment pool, rebel groups tend offer such as loose supervision of the recruits by the leaders, material incentives like looting (Blattman and Miguel 2009). Thus, types of incentives and mode of recruitment may vary from case to case.

In most of the civil wars in Africa one can see the flow of coercion and punishment as tool for rebel recruitment. Coercive recruitment is especially common in African insurgencies where, in the absence of a shared social basis for mobilizing rural support, rebel leaders resort to the only tool at their disposal (Mkandawire 2002). The mass recruitment including women and children also explain the coercive recruitment. The rebel groups and recruiting agents provides the rationale for coerced

recruitment of the low productivity recruits especially the children (Blattman and Miguel 2009). Thus, rebel groups resort to different techniques for mobilizing popular support and recruiting personnel for the rebellion from incentives and rewards to punishment, and from leadership charisma to ethnic and religious emotions.

The participation of local communities and civilians in the rebel activities tends to legitimize the rebellion and their demands. This notion is especially significant in the civil war demanding a regime change and separate state. The Charles Taylor became President of Liberia in 1997 after fighting a long civil war signifying the legitimization of his rebel activities. The recent ouster of Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt and Maumood Gaddafi regime in Libya following massive popular uprising and subsequent recognition to the popular participation from the international actors represents the legitimacy of public participation. This ‘public sphere of influence depends on civilians as ‘a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres (Habermas 1996:367). However, the civilian’s participation in the violent rebel activities is not acceptable in the legitimization discourse.

Impact of ‘Natural Resource Civil Wars’

The civil war has been one of the troubling problems for the international community. This has been because of massive violation of human rights and humanitarian laws. Besides that it results in threat to domestic and international peace and security, economic and political instability, and social unrest. The most visible effect of civil war could be seen on the sufferings of civilians. The sufferings are not only confined the war period rather they experience much more miseries even years after war ceases (Ghobarah et al. 2003). The civil wars in general and the natural resource civil wars in particular continue to kill people however indirectly, well after the shooting stops (Ghobarah et al. 2003).

The personal victimization out of various atrocities committed on the civilian such as killing of family members, physical injuries, rape, forced recruitment of child, and women into the rebel group along with other form of victimization kill them at different level. Those who could escape from the violent atrocities are also victimized in the process. Aside from the tragic killing and injury of innocent civilians, violent

civil conflicts inspire lingering, seemingly intractable ills such as state collapse, corruption, dire poverty, rampant injustice, displacement, environmental degradation, and disease, all of which may in turn instigate renewed and spreading conflict, international crime, and terrorist activity (Howard 2008:1). Hence, we shall recast some issues of impact of civil war especially on the civilians.

Massive Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms: Civil war in general and natural resource based civil war endangers the basic human rights of right to life. Apart from killing of innocents, recruiting child and women into the armed combatants, smuggling in arms and narcotics, blocking international humanitarian assistance, civil war violates other international humanitarian norms as well.

The killings of civilians and other atrocities on them show the brutality of civil war. In some areas, notably Liberia (Ellis 1995), Sierra Leone (Human Rights Watch 1999), Rwanda (African Rights 1995; Human Rights Watch 1999), Mozambique (Nordstrom, 1997) and to a slightly lesser degree Angola (Human Rights Watch 1999) and Algeria (Human Rights Watch 1999), violence has taken appalling, barbarous forms. These have included violent rituals involving use of body parts or of ritual murder; mutilation and torture, including that of women and children; the forcible involvement of relatives, children and spouses in killing and rape (Allen 1999). All brutal, irrational and inhuman means were practiced by the warring parties. Random slaughter and a persistent practice of mutilation by chopping off hands, feet, ears etc. are common tactics of rebel groups in the natural resource based civil wars (Richards 1996; Human Rights Watch 1999). There are many more barbarous acts to take note from civil war history.

The United States department of State in a report identified some major hurdles of human rights in the conflicting African countries. These include security force abuse and use of excessive force with detainees, including juveniles, harsh conditions in prisons and jails, official impunity, arbitrary arrest and detention, prolonged detention, excessive bail, and insufficient legal representation, interference with freedom of speech and press, forcible dispersion of demonstrators, widespread official corruption, societal discrimination and violence against women, discrimination based on sexual orientation, female genital mutilation (FGM), child abuse, trafficking in persons, including children, and forced and child labour (US

Department of State 2011). This report shows the post-conflict human rights condition in the continent. The post conflict societies also experience the violation of basic human rights due state collapse and legacy of civil war.

The massive human rights violations and diminishing of international humanitarian norms threatens the peace and security in the world. Outbreak of civil war in a country tends to threat the peace and security in the country concerned by arresting all state resources into the insurgency and counter insurgency activities and by creating severe law and order situation. The risk of spill over effect also threatens the peace and security in the neighbouring country. Incidence of mass killing and genocide and violation of right to life pose a serious threat to the international peace and security that drew the attention of international community. Such grievance situations compel the international community to intervene and also extending humanitarian aid and assistance to the victims of civil war.

Retarded Economic Development: Natural resource based civil war handicaps the economic development of the countries due to misappropriation and illegal exploitation of natural resources. Civil war can have a proper negative influence on the economic fortunes of a country or its neighbours, owing to a loss of human capital, a destruction of infrastructure, and reduction in investment, trade, and daily market activities (Murdoch and Sandler 2002). They, Murdoch and Sandler through their empirical study provided that existence of the civil war in a country or in the neighbouring one has become relevant factor for explains the impact of civil war on long-run economic growth. The conflict torn countries experience higher rate of inflation, rampant corruption, reverse export growth and economic stagnation (Kang and Meernik 2005) and thus destroy the developmental prospects. The countries experiencing natural resource based civil wars are facing more developmental hazards as resource revenues are used for funding war and conflict activities. Vittorio Daniele (2011) observed that “higher dependence on mineral and ore exports tends to be associated with lower human development and institutional quality. The link between fuel exports and human development indicators does not appear robust, but a strong negative correlation is found in regressions that estimate the effect on institutional quality measures” (Daniele 2011: 24). The abundance of natural resources thus not

necessarily contribute in the economic development rather, if the natural resources become a curse, economic and human development tend to be retarded.

Destabilize State and Society: The conflict ridden societies are struck with different social and livelihood realities like poverty, hunger, illiteracy, unemployment etc. Although natural resource based civil war tends to meet temporarily the problem of unemployment, yet civil war furthers the hardship on civilians. Violent conflicts affect the economic status of individuals and households through the intensity and types of violence they set in motion (Kalyvas 2007). The individual hardship grows and their livelihood conditions are deteriorated from direct and indirect effect of civil wars. The state collapses and so the social apparatus resulting long run effect on the life of the people even in the aftermath of the conflict. Patricia Justino gives an account of such effects on civilians. The direct effect includes changes in household composition due to killings, injuries and recruitment of fighters, changes in the household economic status due to the destruction of assets and livelihoods and effects caused by forced displacement and migration (Justino 2009). The civil war destroys the social infrastructure of a community in general and individuals in particular. The indirect effects of civil war can take place at the local or community level and at the national level. Local indirect effects include changes in households' access to and relationship with local exchange, employment, credit and insurance markets, social relations and networks and political institutions and national level indirect channels consist of changes in economic growth and in distributional processes that impact on household welfare (Justino 2009). Not only the loss of economic and social infrastructure that cause the civilian hardship but also destruction of human capitals (death and disabilities) influences the individuals' life in the war-torn countries. It was estimated that over 269,000 people died and 8.44 million of years of healthy life were lost to death and disabilities in 1999 as direct and immediate effects of all wars-civil and international (World Health Organization 2000:168,174). Civil war thus left the civilians with extreme poverty, lack of livelihood avenues and social and economic insecurity.

Civilians in a war-torn society also victimized of strategic violence that committed against the civilian by the rebel groups. Reed Wood has given an outline of such strategic violence against civilians. Violence is a function of insurgent

capacity and it is manipulated by the insurgents as selective benefits to encourage support (Wood 2010). They, the rebels use violence as mode for recruitment where civilians are subjected to face violence from the rebel groups. Rebels resort to violence because it is cheaper than either selective repression or the provision of significant positive incentives (Kalyvas 2006:165). Insurgents may also target civilians to underscore the government's inability or unwillingness to protect its vulnerable civilians (Wood 2010). Thus civilians are victimised from a strategic violence of insurgents and as well as the counter-insurgency violence of government forces.

Conclusion

Natural resources have two distinct relationships with civil war instances. Firstly, natural resources cause the outbreak of the civil war and secondly, the natural resources have become the source of sustaining and prolonging of the war by uninterrupted flow of revenues. However, there may be overlapping of both in a single case of civil war. In the first case natural resource has been the end in itself and in second case it is the means to the end.

The interface of natural resource and civil war has multifaceted nature. Natural resource can become a resource curse if it could not accelerate the national growth and rather give rise to in conflicts and destruction. Once, a natural resource links with conflict, it ceases to contribute to national economy and societal development. Consequently, it becomes factor for reverse economic growth. The 'conflict resources' increase the potentials of misappropriation of wealth and revenues by the rulers under autocratic governance. The risk of civil war in a resource-rich country with poor governance system also reflects the resource curse. Moreover, natural resources have become resource curse when these cause spreading of ethnic hatred and sectarian interests.

The interface of natural resources and civil war can also be understood as in some of the civil wars are caused by natural resources and some others are sustained and prolonged by the revenues accumulated from natural resources. People and different groups fight over these natural resources and gradually the conflict grows to distract the prosperity of the resources. The scarcity of natural resources and its uneven distribution in the society led clash over resources. On other hand abundance

of natural resources increase the greed among some groups of people. The greed over natural resources led to outbreak of violent conflict in the society. The resource abundance also prolongs the conflict since the natural resources provide constant source of war revenues. Until natural resources continue providing war revenues to the conflicting parties, the civil war tends to last for longer period. The role of natural resources in sustaining and prolonging a civil war however is significant. The rebel groups use different means to collect revenues such as controlling the natural resource areas, extortion, and smuggling of lucrative natural resources.

In a 'natural resource civil war', different actors play crucial role directly or indirectly. However, the rebel groups are the primary actors of a civil war, there are many others to contribute to the civil war. Among others, the neighbouring countries, major world powers, international corporate, diasporas community and the local community play crucial role with different capacities. Nonetheless, all these actors have vested interests behind engaging in the conflict. The interests of most of the actors are however seem to be on the natural resources in the conflicting country. The rebel groups start confronting with the state in order to get access to the mining areas of natural resources. They accumulate strength mostly with the help of other actors such as a second country government or a rebel group in a second party. The outside actors tend to help the rebel groups in return of illicit natural resources and in some instances they provide assistance to the rebel groups because of their rival relations with the government in the conflicting country. On the other hand, rebel groups mobilize the local community in the line of ethnicity or religion although their sole motive remains the control over natural resources. Thus, rebel groups become the primary actors and others are supporting actors. However, multiplicity of actors makes the 'natural resource civil wars' a complex phenomenon.

The consequences of the 'natural resource civil wars' have been multi-dimensional. The life of civilians and their security has been endangered in a 'natural resource civil war'. It not only violates the basic human rights and international humanitarian norms but also causes severe humanitarian crises in home country and in the region as whole. The immediate consequence of a civil war can be observed killings of civilians and outflow of refugees into the neighbouring countries. Such developments cause further humanitarian crises in the region. Severe consequences

can also be observed in the retarded growth of national economy and development resulting suffering of the civilians. It destroys state infrastructure and the socio-political life of the people leading to paralyze the state and society. Moreover, the civilians in a war-torn society tend to be victimised not only from the brutal atrocities of the rebels but also from the counter-insurgency violence committed by the government forces. The consequences of ‘natural resource civil wars’ are not confined only to the period during the conflict but also affect the physical and psychological health of the people in the long run.

Henceforth, ‘natural resource civil war’ has become an issue of serious concern for the international communities and especially the United Nations. The following chapter will discuss the role played by the United Nations to tackle the ‘natural resource civil wars’ and to protect the life of civilians as well as to maintain international peace and security.

**UNITED NATIONS' RESPONSES TO 'NATURAL RESOURCE
CIVIL WAR'**

When a civil war exists within the territorial boundary of the concerned state, it is, in a sense, an internal matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. However, in post-Cold War, civil wars have been on the rise and cause severe violence resulting in large scale destruction and bloodshed. It shocked the conscience of the international community as it caused not only violation of human rights and humanitarian norms but also ethnic cleansing, genocide and other humanitarian crises such as large scale refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), food crisis and malnourishment, child abuses and others destroying the socio-economic and political infrastructure. Despite the sensitivity of the principle of sovereignty, the civil wars have become a concern of the international community on humanitarian grounds and also because of the consequent spill over effect upon international peace and security. In the post-Cold War, internal conflicts have been on the rise and are posing a threat to international peace and security and, thus, become a matter of concerns for the international community. The UN however, has maintained the importance of its Charter to uphold the principle sovereign equality, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States, and peaceful settlement of disputes. At the same time, UN has emphasized in strengthening its role in peacekeeping and in functioning of collective security system to maintain the international peace and security and for protection of human rights and rule of law in the world (United Nations 2000b).

The chapter examines why and how the internal conflicts and specially the natural resource civil wars have become a concern of the international community. It analyses the role of the United Nations, as the primary actor of international community, in addressing such type of conflict situations. The thrust area here is to explore the need for international intervention in civil war in general and 'natural resource civil wars', in particular. The chapter analyses the initiatives and actions taken up by the United Nations. It explores various UN measures such as preventive actions, regulatory measures and peacebuilding efforts. The chapter critically assesses the different UN responses such as targeted sanctions, 'certificate of origin' regime for diamond trade, peacekeeping and various capacity building activities. Apart from

these responses, it also discusses various the findings of the United Nations expert panels and sanctions committees and analyzes how their recommendations are incorporated in the subsequent UN policies and programmes to address ‘natural resource civil wars’.

Natural Resource Civil Wars: A Concern of International Community

The civil war in general and ‘natural resource civil war’ in particular arrested the attention of international community, especially the UN, and other international actors, in the later part of the twentieth century. The severity of the internal conflicts and particularly of the ‘natural resource civil war’ in terms of civilian casualty and human rights violation threatens the existence of international humanitarian norms and, in turn, the peace and security at the different levels i.e. local, regional and international. Since the United Nations has been entrusted the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, it has tried to initiate various measures to maintain peace and security and to protect human rights as well. However, there are limitations and constraints in so doing as the civil wars are internal matters of states and any act of international community may violate the principle of sovereignty and non-interference. However, international intervention is justified in order to protect the human rights and humanitarian norms in a country where state machinery has been unable to act upon or failed to act.

In post-Cold War, UN has revitalised its activism into the internal conflicts of the states. Discussing the UN activism in internal affairs of states, Richard Kareem Al-Qaq observed that “monitoring cease-fires and demobilising combatants; organising, overseeing and verifying democratic elections; establishing, advising and running international tribunals; and assuming, even if temporarily, executive authority over entire African and Asian states have become routine normal set of activities of the United Nations in post-Cold War (Al-Qaq 2009:1). Through these activities the UN has been trying to revive its role in civil war situations. A new thrust for protecting human rights and maintaining peace could be witnessed during the recent two decades. This trend is expected to lead to realisation of sacred purpose of the United Nations entrusted by the preamble to its 1945 Charter ‘We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’

The renewed interests of maintaining peace and securing international security derived from the end of bi-polar stagnant international political environment has written a new chapter of involvement of the international community, including the United Nations, in conflict resolution. The internal conflicts became the prime concern of the international community as numbers of such conflicts were posing challenge to peace and security and life of millions. The internal conflicts have been identified as one of the major hindrances for the realisation of human rights, peace and development in the world. Maximum numbers of UN peace missions were deployed into the internal conflicts during this period. “From the Agenda for Peace” in 1992 to “World Summit for Sustainable Development” in 2002 has emphasised the need for international initiatives for peace, development and maintenance of world order.

The severity of the civil conflicts, as discussed in the preceding chapter and especially that of the ‘natural resource civil war’, has become the concern of the international community on various grounds. The following parts have discussed various grounds as to why the natural resource civil wars have become a concern of international community.

Violation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms

Civil wars in general and ‘natural resource civil wars’ in particular have become a concern of international concern since these conflicts cause severe violation of fundamental human rights of the people and international humanitarian norms. The outbreak of civil war in a society reflects disrespect for human rights and humanitarian norms as it violates the right to life and other basic human rights conditions. The ‘natural resource civil wars’ cause even more violation of human rights since civilians are targeted in a systematic way. Civilians in a ‘natural resource civil war’ subjected to double suffering. Firstly, they are forcefully recruited to the rebel group and become slave soldiers or slave miners. Secondly, they are victimised by the counter-insurgency measures of the government forces. There are violations of the rights of the children and women particularly in a ‘natural resource civil war’. Moreover, the countries facing a civil war situation are mostly governed by autocratic and authoritarian regimes that rarely follow the human rights norms, even if they are party to international human rights treaties. The treaty ratification would rarely

improve the human rights situations in a country governed by autocratic regime (Neumayer 2005). The increasing of casualties in the civil wars led to seriousness of the issue that the international community cannot afford to be silent by not taking any preventive measures against such violations. Therefore, internal conflicts have become a concern of international community in the post-Cold war and the United Nations have advanced various measures in response to such human rights violations.

The respect for human rights became an international humanitarian norm since the inception of the United Nations. “Ever since the end of the Second World War, promoting the respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms everywhere in the world has been a major concern of the international community” (Boven 2010). The human right as a universal value has spread up vehemently in the post Second World War international relations. Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi observed that “the Speed with which human rights has penetrated every corner of the globe is astounding, compared to human rights, no other system of universal values has spread so far so fast” (Normand and Zaidi 2008). Similarly Richard Falk (2008) pointed out that “among the most improbable developments of the previous hundred years or so is the spectacular rise of human rights to a position of prominence in world politics. This rise cuts across the grain of both the structure of world order and the ‘realist’ outlook of most political leaders acting on behalf of sovereign states”.

Although the international bill of human rights has been brought into existence, the implementation of the values espoused is still a distant dream in the world even today. The absence of adequate mechanisms for implementation of human rights remains most serious and contrasts sharply with the more powerful legal tools that exist to enforce international economic law (Jolly et al. 2009:52). The human rights in the world today serve as both a source of universal values and an arena of ideological warfare (Normand and Zaidi 2008:2).

The international human rights norms face more challenges as various newer issues such as genocide, internal conflicts, ‘natural resource civil wars’, organized crimes demand the protection and promotion of human rights in different corner of the world. Moreover, in the post-Cold War, there has been a renewed interest on global peace and security and protection of human rights. Teresa Whitfield (2007) notes, “a host of small and ad hoc, informal, issue specific mini-coalitions of states or

intergovernmental organizations that become involved in and provide support for resolving conflicts and implementing peace agreements have become a critical element of an incipient system of post-Cold War global security governance” (Whitefield 2007:2-9). Despite of all measures for ensuring human rights across the globe, human rights violation such as genocide, racial and ethnic discrimination, forced and coercive recruitment to the armed groups are becoming issue of serious concern especially in the post-Cold War as civil wars and internal armed conflicts were getting momentum in different parts of the world. The African continent has been most affected by such internal armed conflicts that cost millions of life in the continent. After more than six decades that have been punctuated by at least 150 national or regional conflicts and wars that have caused at least 20 million deaths, one could easily conclude that the UN’s efforts in the areas of peace and human security have failed (Jolly et al. 2009:163).

The human rights violations which are common to the countries affected by civil wars such as death penalties, enforced disappearance and death by torture, political assassination are the violations committed by the government arrest the attention of the United Nations (United Nations 2000b). There are other challenges and concerns as well such as right to personal liberty, freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of association, right to enter and leave the country, right to due process, economic, social and cultural rights. Robert J. Rummel has estimated 217 million deaths in all wars in twentieth century (Rummel 1994). However, this figure does not include many more individuals who have lived diminished lives as refugees, internally displaced persons, detainees, widows or widowers, orphans, and paupers as the result of war (Slim 2008). Therefore, “human rights, human security and development have become the part of a broader and more interactive whole” (Jolly et al. 2009:164). The natural resource conflict has been identified as most deadly event since the cause of conflict is linked with grievances of the warlords. They aim not at the interests of the people but at the illegal access to the natural resource fields and therefore the civilian’s rights are subjected to sideline in the process. Thus, the massive violation of basic human rights and international humanitarian norms compels the international community to concern about the internal conflicts.

Humanitarian Crises and the ‘CNN Effect’

A civil war situation affects the normal life of the people destroying basic infrastructure of the state. It not only violates human rights but also cause severe humanitarian crises. It produces millions of refugees, denies basic amenities such as food, health services and educations. Millions of people die out of hunger and malnutrition on the one hand and a section of people are fighting for political interests or for controlling over natural resources on the other.

The ‘CNN effect’¹ was responsible for drawing the attention of the international community to various humanitarian crises situations. The media coverage of human suffering in a crisis situation through the Cable News Network (CNN) has greater effect on the global policy making so far as the humanitarian crises is concerned. A network of worldwide correspondents and the ability to transmit images instantly across the globe has meant that the media has become omnipresent in the development of major events (McSweeney 2011) and that create a global public opinion to pressurise different governments to take collective action to protect lives. The relationship between the media and the government, as observed by Steven McSweeney, is one of great intrigue. “On one hand the press relies heavily upon government documents to source many of the stories which it covers. On the other, bringing large amounts of attention to an issue of the editor’s choosing can raise social awareness and inform the public” (McSweeney 2011). The effect of media is so significant that governments have to respond to the issue rose upon, which otherwise harm their domestic political support bases. Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations builds upon this idea when he comments that “when there is a problem, and the policy has not been thought, there is a knee-jerk reaction and the governments have to do something or face a public relations disaster” (Gowing 1994). In a similar line, discussing the effect of media coverage, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeline Albright declared in 1993 that ‘television’s ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for immediate engagement in areas of international crisis and immediate disengagement when events do not go according to plan’ (Albright 1993:789). Thus,

¹ The ‘CNN Effect’ explains how media influence the decision making of governments and international organization. The 24 hours Cable News Network (CNN) creates public awareness and pressurise policy makers accordingly to response. The media coverage of conflict situations arrest speedy international actions.

the 'CNN effect' tends to help in speedy responses to the crises situations and also to ensure legitimate international engagement. The media attention into the Somalia crisis in 1992 resulted in speedy response from the United Nations that established a humanitarian relief operation under the banner of UN Operation in Somalia-UNOSOM (Stewart 2003). The media effect did not only influence the UN decision making but also various state parties to offer best possible relief assistance. Although, the US intervention in Somalia did not come out as a result of 'CNN effect' but the decision of Bush Administration to withdraw from Somalia in 1994 was come under pressure of public opinion created by the 'CNN effect' (Livingston and Eachus 1995; Bly 2002). The members of US Congress were influenced by the public pressure to force an early withdrawal of US troops.

Grave humanitarian crises that arise out of civil war and natural disaster have become a serious concern for the international community over the years. The media has been helping out in drawing significant attention of the international community and especially the United Nations, as Secretary General Boutros-Ghali reported to have said that "the CNN is the sixteenth member of the Security Council" (Minear et al. 1996). This concern grows when global civil society and media highlighted crises situations to create global public opinion and pressurise the international community to intervene with the humanitarian assistance to protect the affected people. The civil wars in general and 'natural resource civil war' in particular which cause severe humanitarian crises and human sufferings got media attention and thus have become a concern of international community.

Threat to International Peace and Security

Civil wars in general have threatened the international peace and security in various manners which led the international community and particularly the United Nations to intervene into such internal conflict situations. The civil wars fundamentally come under domestic jurisdiction of the states but following the large scale violation of international humanitarian norms and as potential threat to international peace and security, civil wars have become serious concern of the international community and therefore the United Nations has engaged with for the resolution of such civil conflicts. The UN charter also empowered the Security Council "to engage in the management of internal wars, when they constitute a threat to, or their continuance is

likely to endanger, the maintenance of international peace and security” (Cockayne et al. 2010). However, the United Nations has responded intensively into such internal conflicts which are become a prominent part of the work of the organization in the post-Cold War (Cockayne et al. 2010). A civil war and particularly ‘natural resource civil war’ tend to last for longer period that poses threat to existence of international norms. Although civil war operates within the territorial boundary of a country, there are many aspects that affect the neighbouring country and the whole region. At the domestic level, civil war causes severe violation of human rights and humanitarian norms and also creates humanitarian crises. However, at the international level, the consequences such as heavy influx of refugees and spill-over of conflict into neighbouring countries endanger the peace and security in the region. Therefore, it is the legitimate responsibility of the United Nations to prevent the conflict in order to maintain peace and security in the region. The West African example can be cited as to how ‘natural resource civil war’ affected the region as a whole. The intensity of violence and prolonging nature of such conflicts maximizes the threats to human rights and peace and security.

The UN Security Council maintained, while discussing about the conflicts in Africa and threat to international peace and security, that all member states are obliged to settle their disputes by peaceful means and at the same time the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the charter of the United Nations (United Nations 1998b). The UN Security Council is thus very much aware of the civil war situations in African region and tries to resolve such conflicts with the cooperation from the regional organization in the region. The Security Council has been serious about the need for strengthening the cooperation between the United Nations and its relevant bodies and specialised agencies on the one hand and the Organization of African Unity (now known as African Union) and sub-regional organizations in Africa on the other for effective resolution of conflicts and maintenance of peace and security in African region (United Nations 1998c)

Thus the consequences of civil war in general and ‘natural resource civil war in particular such as violations of human rights and humanitarian norms, humanitarian crises and the ‘CNN Effect’, and threat to international peace and security make the

United Nations and the international community to respond to such conflict situations. The following part discusses various UN responses to ‘natural resource civil war’.

The United Nations Responses to ‘Natural Resource Civil War’

The United Nations has been entrusted the responsibility to maintain international peace and security and therefore it is the primary actor to respond to any challenges threatening the peace and security in the world. Since the end of Cold War, the United Nations (UN) has moved to the centre of the regulation and management of conflict in especially in Asia and Africa (Al-Qaq 2009). This has seen the organisation take on new and varied tasks in the ordering and reordering of numerous societies, including: monitoring cease-fires and demobilising combatants; organising, overseeing and verifying democratic elections; establishing, advising and running international tribunals; and even assuming, albeit temporarily, executive authority over entire African and Asian states (Al-Qaq 2009). These varied roles are now routinely treated as a natural and normal set of activities of the United Nations. James Cockayne et al. (2010) observed that “civil wars have, since the end of Cold War, become a major focus of the work of the UN Security Council. With shackles of superpower rivalry removed as Cold War antagonisms faded, the Security Council became much more proactive in its engagement with civil war issues” (Cockayne et al. 2010).

The UN engagement in the internal state conflicts especially in the natural resource conflicts is remarkable. To maintain peace and security, and resolution of conflicts, the United Nations responses to the challenges of war and armed conflict with different ideas. Richard Jolly et al. (2009) describes four traditional ideas that have driven the UN responses to conflict situations such as replacing war and conflict with the rule of law and negotiations; using preventive diplomacy by the Secretary General and others to forestall conflicts; linking measures of disarmament to development in order to diminish the structural causes of war and conflict; and interposing international buffers and observer forces to keep the peace when belligerents consent to their presence” (Jolly et al. 2009:163). However, with the advent newer ideas such as ‘responsibility to protect’ the individuals, when their own governments are manifestly unwilling or unable to protect them, the concerns of the United Nations shifted to the idea of human security. The UN expert group on ‘natural resource and conflict in Africa: transforming a peace liability to a peace

asset' in its conference report in 2006 has identified the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic republic of Congo, Angola and Cote d'Ivoire as natural resource based conflict, where natural resources such as diamond, gold and timber cause the civil war and also the source of war revenue (United Nations 2006).

The United Nations has come up with various initiatives to address the natural resource civil war over the years. As observed by Marrak Goulding (1999), the United Nations has played a role as peacemaker and/or peacekeeper in fourteen out of 25 conflicts in Africa. The responses of the UN have not been exclusive one so far as the conflicts in Africa are concerned rather the UN has worked in partnership with other local actors. The regional organizations such as African Union (formerly known as Organization of African Unity) had been the major partner of UN during its different operations in Africa. Other sub-regional organization such as ECOWAS in case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, League of Arab States and Islamic Conference Organizations in case of Somalia, were also partner organizations in Africa. Such organizations have some significant advantages, especially their familiarity with the sub-region and its culture and their knowledge of the conflict and of the parties to it which will ease the peace process in a speedy manner. However, the relationship between the UN and that of the regional and sub-regional organizations can be stained due to three main reasons. According to Marrak Goulding (1999), firstly, "sub-regional organizations tend to be dominated by a sub-regional superpower with interests and friends of its own in the area". This makes the situations difficult as one can question the credibility of the sub-regional organization as being a neutral and impartial player. Secondly, "disparity between the equipment and living conditions of the UN and those of the sub-regional organization also strains the relationship between the two". In Liberia, The UN observers were provided star category accommodation where as the sub-regional peacekeepers were provided very primitive shelters. This was experienced by the Marrak Goulding, the under Secretary General for peacekeeping and political affairs from 1986 to 1997 during his visit to the country in 1997. Thirdly, "there can be status problems. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter gives the UN a kind of primacy over regional organizations where peace and security are concerned. But sometimes the UN has found itself being 'pushed around' by a sub-regional organization, especially if the latter has a large armed peacekeeping

force in theatre but the UN is represented only by civilians and unarmed military observers. This can be uncomfortable for those concerned” (Goulding 1999).

The responses of the United Nations to the internal conflicts especially in Africa has been reflected wide range of collaboration and partnership with the members of international community apart from the regional organizations in Africa. Sometimes an individual government has been the UN's main partner, United States in the case of Namibia, where in the late 1980s, the United States brought the Namibia negotiations to a successful conclusion and withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Portugal played a central role in mediating the Bicesse Accords between the Government of Angola and UNITA after the independence of Namibia. The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also played outstanding partnership role in conflict resolutions in Africa. The Rome-based NGO Sant' Egidio has taken the lead in negotiating the peace settlement in Mozambique. The UN has also worked with many individual statesmen. The archetypal mediator here is Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, with whom the UN has worked very closely in Burundi and President Jimmy Carter, who was much involved in efforts to prevent conflict in Liberia and, later on in the Great Lakes Region (Goulding 1999).

The United Nations has responded to ‘natural resource civil war’ in various ways such as preventive measures, peacekeeping operations, regulatory measures, humanitarian intervention, and peacebuilding measures.

Preventive Measures

The preventive measures are taken up to contain the conflict in the pre-occurrence stage or at the very early stage of the conflict. However, international organizations and especially the United Nations have limited scope so far as the jurisdiction and capacity in preventing internal conflicts is concerned (Schnabel 2002). Albrecht Schnabel (2002) further observed that, “there is limits to the international community’s commitment to prevent the emergence or re-emergence of internal violence since intrastate conflicts remain the primary responsibility of the state, and external actors have respect the supremacy of state sovereignty even when they feel morally compelled to act”. The former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali described conflict prevention as preventive diplomacy, an “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into

conflicts and limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). The preventive is however to work before breaking out of a conflict through different measures to ease an existing tension. The preventive diplomacy, needs “measures to create confidence, it needs early warning based on information gathering informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarised zones” (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

Michael Lund (1999) offers a comprehensive definition of preventive measures. According to him, “conflict prevention entails any structural or interactive means to keep intrastate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and to strengthen the capabilities to resolve such disputes peacefully as well as alleviating the underlying problems that produce them, including forestalling the spread of hostilities into new places. It comes into play both in places where conflicts have not occurred recently and where recent terminated conflicts could recur. Depending on how they are applied, it can include the particular means and method of any policy sector, whether labelled prevention or not (e.g. sanctions, conditional aid, mediation, structural adjustment, democratic institution building etc.), and they might be carried out by global, national, or local levels by any governmental or non-governmental actor” (Lund 1999). Applied conflict prevention consists of policies and institutions that are taken deliberately to keep particular states or organized groups within them from threatening or using organized violence, armed force, or related forms of coercion, such as repression, as the means to settle interstate or national political disputes, especially in situations where the existing means cannot peacefully manage the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change (Lund 1996: 379).

The sanction regimes and specially the targeted sanctions are such preventive measures imposed to contain the intensity of the conflict, specifically natural resource civil wars. Sanctions on the articles prone to intensify the conflicts are commonly used. The ‘arms embargo’ has been most common sanction to control the movement (import and export) of small arms as this is the key to the violence. Sanctions are also imposed on the movement of rough diamond and oil to root out the source of funding to the conflict. The travel ban on suspected persons and freezing of assets are also

used by the sanction regimes. The sanctions regimes are effective tools to contain the velocity of the conflict as it restricted the flow of resources to the warring parties.

Increasingly, the Council has turned to the use of targeted sanctions as a tool for conflict prevention and resolution, particularly in Africa. There have been some successes, particularly with regard to diamond sanctions imposed on national Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, and against Liberia to end Charles Taylor's support and facilitation of the RUF. The Table 3.1 has categorised various sanction regimes imposed by the UN on civil war situations in different countries. It reveals that in the post-Cold War, the UN has imposed sanctions in as many as fourteen cases of civil war. Out of these sanction regimes there are around four instances where sanctions were imposed on the natural resources that causes civil war and severe humanitarian crises. The civil wars in Libya, Liberia, Angola, and Sierra Leone are experienced with imposition of sanctions on natural resources. Moreover, sanctions are terminated and re-imposed in various cases which show the recurrence of the war. In the most cases of conflict recurrence it has been the 'natural resource civil war'. The civil war in the countries such as Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Cote d'Ivoire are 'natural resource civil wars' and the sanctions on them either continuing or re-imposed after terminating in some point of time.

Table 3.1 UN Sanctions in Civil War in Post-Cold War Era: A Categorization

Sl. No	State	UN Resolution(s)	Duration	Reasons behind imposition	Kinds of Sanctions imposed	Targeted Party	Remarks
1	Somalia*	S/Res/733, 1992	1992-	Civil war, lost life, HR violation	Arms embargo	State and individuals	continues
2.	Libya*	S/Res/748, 1992; S/Res/883, 1993; S/Res/1506, 2003; & S/Res/1970, 2011; S/Res/1973, 2011	1992-2003 2011-	Oppressive govt,	Aviation, arms embargo, travel, diplomatic, asset freeze, import of oil transporting equipments	State	Lifted in 2003; re-imposed in 2011
3.	Liberia*	S/Res/788, 1992; S/Res/1343, 2001;	1992-	Violation of ceasefire, civil war, failure of transitional	Arms embargo, asset freeze, travel/aviation	State, individuals, groups	Terminated some sanctions and re-

		S/Res/1478, 2003; S/Res/1521, 2003; S/Res/1532, 2004; S/Res/1903, 2009		government	ban, diamond embargo, called for certificate of origin scheme for diamond		imposed
4.	Haiti	S/Res/841, 1993; S/Res/917, 1994; S/Res/944, 1994	1993-1994	Oppressive regime	Comprehensive	State, ruler	Terminated on regime change
5.	Angola	S/Res/864, 1993; S/Res/1127, 1997; S/Res/1173, 1998; S/Res/1448, 2002	1993-2002	Conflict diamond, rebel groups	Arms, petroleum, travel, aviation, diplomatic, assets, financial, diamond imports	State, rebel group, UNITA	Lifted in 2002
6.	Rwanda	S/Res/918, 1994	1994	Civil conflicts, violence	Arms embargo	State, group	Lifted in 2009
7.	Sudan*	S/Res/1054, 1996; S/Res/1070, 1996; S/Res/1372, 2001 & S/Res/1556, 2004; S/Res/1591, 2005	1996-2001; 2004-	Civil war, humanitarian crisis	Diplomatic, travel, aviation, arms, asset freeze	Individuals, state	Terminated in 2001 and re-imposed in 2004
8.	Sierra Leon	S/Res/1132, 1997; S/Res/1156, 1998; S/Res/1171, 1998; S/Res/1306, 2000	1997-2010	Conflict over diamond, civil conflict	Oil, arms embargo, travel, diamond exports	State, groups	Lifted in 2010
9.	DRC*	S/Res/1493, 2003; S/Res/1596, 2005	2003-	Civil war, human rights violation	Arms embargo, travel, aviation, asset freeze, financial	State	Continues
10.	Cote d'Ivoire*	S/Res/1572, 2004	2004-	Violation of ceasefire, diamond conflict	Arms embargo, travel, assets freeze	State, individual	Continues

* sanctions currently under operation

Source: Cortright et al. 2007; UN Security Council Resolutions, www.un.org

However, the application of conflict prevention measures has to face numerous challenges. As Carment and Schnabel argue, the international community's track record in preventing outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict is not strong (Carment and Schnabel 2001). The following examples will reflect the fact of limitations of international preventive actions.

- The failure to prevent the relapse of 'successful' consolidation processes in Cambodia and Angola;
- The failure to prevent the slow collapse of states in Central and West Africa-despite clear understanding of when and where such events would occur and the availability of forecasts for predicting and explaining their causes and manifestations in Congo and Guinea;
- The failure to anticipate the moral hazards that are generated by the symptoms of conflict, such as refugee flows, ethnic cleansing and clan warfare in Rwanda and Somalia;
- The failure to understand how biased interventions can accelerate conflict between combatants in Kosovo and Sierra Leone;
- The failure of policy makers to understand how weak responses to warring factions can generate even greater conflict, and increase the likelihood of conflict in Rwanda and Bosnia;
- The failure to understand how values promoting conflict reduction mechanisms such as democracy and human rights lead to actions that might actually promote the risk of state failure in Bosnia, East Timor/Indonesia. (Lund 2000:23; Dorff 1996).

However, United Nations used to issue early warning to the countries where conflict has already taken place in order to prevent from severe consequences and spill-over effect to other countries. The peacekeeping operations are deployed to prevent spreading of the conflicts. The Security Council authorises the Secretary General to undertake good-will mission to the conflicting country to initiate peaceful and civilian effort to resolve a conflict. Thus, the preventive responses come in the form of sanctions, peacekeeping missions as well as the mediation, early warning and conditional aids.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

Another respond mechanism of the United Nations to deal with civil wars in general and 'natural resource civil wars' in particular is deployment of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). Traditionally, PKOs are deployed in inter-state conflicts but in the post-Cold War, the nature of conflicts have changed and so the nature of the UN

engagements. The UN peace operations are authorised by the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security, for a six months period subjected to renewal (Urquhart 2010; Diehl 2008:69). The main focus is to maintain peace and monitoring ceasefire between the conflicting states. Until the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were usually governed by Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”. “Such operations require impartiality and neutrality on the part of the UN peacekeepers, as well as the consent of all parties to the conflict. Additionally the soldiers and/or police officers of a Chapter VI-Peacekeeping Operation may use physical force only as a last resort in self-defence or to resist efforts to disrupt their mission. Peacekeepers are deployed in an area of conflict, often along lines of separation to serve as a buffer between former enemies” (Urquhart 2010).

However, in the post-Cold War, the nature and activism of peacekeeping have gone sea change. The new peacekeeping operations are very different nature from the earlier operations. Firstly, the new missions are deployed in a single country undergoing civil war to contain violence and restore order (Urquhart 2010). Unlike the earlier peacekeeping the peacekeeping operations deployed into civil war situations are mandated wide range of functions mostly related to civil affairs such as humanitarian assistance and electoral assistance, civil police work, monitoring human rights, and disarmament. Brian Urquhart (2010) pointed out the significance of UN peacekeeping in post-Cold War as “the majority of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s were quite successful, though their positive results often went unnoticed; e.g. the missions in Namibia, El Salvador or Mozambique” (Urquhart 2010). However, there are limitations in operating peacekeeping in a society which is unknown to the peacekeepers. However, deployment of peacekeeping missions does not automatically transform a conflict situation into peace as Paul F. Diehl maintained that “peace operations alone cannot halt future conflict or resolve longstanding conflicts” (Diehl 2008:123).

Different peace operations are mandated with different objectives. The UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia, one of the countries affected by deadly ‘natural resource civil war’, was established in 1993. The UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was mandated to support the ECOMOG (the regional peacekeeping

deployed by the ECOWAS) in implementing the peace agreement and to ensure impartial implementation of the agreement by all parties. The other missions in the countries undergoing 'natural resource civil war' are also mandated in similar line. However, peacekeeping operations are not able to check the illegal trade of natural resources because of lack clear mandates given to them.

Regulatory Measures

Another UN response to 'natural resource civil wars' is regulatory measures. Some initiatives and measures undertaken by the United Nations can be categorised as regulatory measures to tackle 'natural resource civil war'. These measures are taken once the causes of sustenance of the conflict were known to the international community. The standardized certification of natural resource product has been the foremost regulatory measure so far the UN has advanced. However, imposing various targeted sanctions also aim at regulating movement of natural resources and arms and other articles responsible for conflicts. So far the 'natural resource civil war' is concerned the movement of illicit natural resources needs to be controlled and therefore the UN initiated 'Certificate of Origin' regime to regulate the trade of rough diamonds in late 1990s. Following the move of the UN, the 'Kimberley Process Certification Scheme' (KPCS) was come up from a multilateral international initiative to regulate the international export and import of illicit diamonds.

The illicit trade in diamonds has fuelled a number of conflicts in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Angola (United Nations 2006). Studies on causes and prevention of conflicts have drawn attention to illicit exploitation of extractive natural resources as an important source of revenue for armed groups. The illicit diamond trade has been linked directly to the financing of arms and ammunition by rebel groups (United Nations 2006). Preventing the illicit exploitation of commodities in conflict situations thus became a priority for the international community. The Security Council recognised the need to establish the control over the trade of rough diamonds, beginning with the diamond sanctions on Angola in 1998 (United Nations 1998d). It has prohibited importation of rough diamonds from conflict states and urged them to establish 'Certificate of Origin' regimes for the trade in rough diamonds. The General Assembly, in of 1 December 2000, called on all concerned parties-including countries that produce, process, export or import

diamonds-to ‘find ways to break the link between diamonds and armed conflict’ (United Nations 2000a).

In the case of Angola, the sanctions against the UNITA were broadly supported by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In 2000 a number of initiatives were made in support of diamond sanctions. These included: efforts by the Belgian government to curb diamond sanctions and by the Diamond High Council (a non-profit diamond trade organisation) to make Angola diamond sanctions more effective; the African diamond-producing countries’ proposal to convene a conference of experts for the purpose of devising a system of controls to facilitate the implementation of the measures outlined by UN Security Council (UN 1998c). It was contemplated that the conference would develop arrangements allowing for increased transparency and accountability in the control of diamonds from point of origin and this conference finally led KPCS agreement.

The international initiative for the regulation of diamond trade ended up in the form of Kimberly Process of Certification Scheme (KPCS). The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which was adopted 5 November 2002 after almost two years of negotiations, went into effect January 2003. It requires governments to implement import- and export-control regimes that certify and control the trade in rough diamonds, and it creates a documentary trail from the extraction to the polishing of diamonds (UN 2006). The KPCS certification has made regulatory measures of international community more effective as the KPCS involves governments, international organizations, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) and corporats. The UN Security Council endorsed the KPCS initiatives describing the Certification Scheme as a valuable tool against the traffic in conflict diamonds (United Nations 2003). The Council’s subsequent approaches used its Chapter VII powers to require countries, including Liberia, to establish a Certificate of Origin regime in conformity with the requirements of the Certification Scheme and to adopt relevant laws and an effective administrative mechanism to become a member of the Kimberley Process. The Council adopted the KPCS as impose certification regime in all subsequent sanctions resolutions. In less than three years, the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme has been credited with reducing significantly the illicit trade in

diamonds and denied rebel groups the access to war revenue. This regulation process had a wholesome impact in containing and preventing the recurrence of conflict.

The KPCS, an international initiative comprising government, civil society and industry aimed at stemming the flow of rough diamonds used to finance wars (Hilson and Clifford 2010). However, the KPCS is “the first international agreement in global trade politics that has been adopted in consensus by governments, private industries and NGOs” (Kantz 2007). The Kimberley initiative was praised overwhelmingly for its effective implementation policies. For example, Ghana was accused of harbouring the conflict diamonds coming from Cote d’Ivoire. The KPCS review team was determined that the internal controls of Ghanaian authority to prevent diamond smuggling were ineffective which was endorsed by the UN report on Cote d’Ivoire maintaining that Ghana was potentially harbouring diamonds originating from the rebel-held territories of its neighbours (United Nations 2005a). Following this development, diamond exports from Ghana was banned which led to suffer Ghanaian diamond industry. Ghana gave strong commitment of KPCS in 2006 to stop the trade of ‘conflict diamond’. Thus, the KPCS regulatory system however has significant effect in standardization of diamond trade and reducing the ‘conflict diamonds’ in the market.

Reports of Panels of Expert and Impact on UN Resolutions

The Security Council has constituted various Panels of Expert in order to study the effectiveness of various sanctions and peacekeeping missions that are under operation in different ‘natural resource civil war’ affected countries. However, the Security Council forms such group of experts to study a particular issue confronting the peace and security. These empowered groups are called Panel of Experts, Expert Group or Advisory Group based on the tasks given to them. So far the ‘national resource civil war’ is concerned the role Panel of Experts has been significant. The Panel of Experts mandated to evaluate the effectiveness and to suggest modifications in the mandates of sanction regimes and peacekeeping. They study the situation and collect information on possible violations of the sanction regimes and the link between illegal trade of natural resources and trade in arms and related materials.

The Panel of Experts concerning Sierra Leone revealed the link between Liberian government and with the conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone in its 2000 report

(United Nations 2000a). Following a recommendation from Panel of Experts, the Security Council imposed a number of sanctions on the Liberian government and its senior government and military leaders. These included an embargo on importation of diamonds from Liberia whether or not originating from Liberia territory, a provision aimed specifically at prohibiting the illicit trade of Sierra Leone diamonds through Liberia (United Nations 2000d). The Council also urged the Liberian government to establish an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in rough diamonds, transparent and internationally verifiable and approved by the Sanctions Committee.

The Liberia Sanctions Panel of Experts confirmed that the Liberian government continued to breach the sanctions measures. However, under the new regime in the country, Liberia has improved the situations as reported by the Panel. The report noted that there was still much to be done in areas of technical and logistical capability, the implementation of internal controls and reforming procedural frameworks for the export of diamonds. The report also noted that illegal mining activities continued unabated. The Panel of Experts concluded that while most of the components for a credible, internationally accredited certification scheme are now available, the harmonisation of these components into a functioning mechanism was still some months away. The Panel emphasised the need for continued international assistance that was critical if Liberia is to make a successful application for participation in the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme. The Panel was also concerned about the 'natural resource civil war' in Cote d'Ivoire where illegal diamonds were being used for sponsoring conflict. Following the revelation by the Panel of Experts, the Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting in Moscow in November 2005 adopted a resolution setting out a series of measures to prevent the conflict diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire from the entry into the legal diamond market. Taking note of the decisions of the Kimberley Process Plenary, and recognising the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources linked to the conflict, the Security Council imposed a prohibition on the import of rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire (United Nations 2005a). The Security Council welcomed the measures agreed by the participants in the Kimberly Process and called upon all states in the region which are not participants in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to intensify their efforts to become members in order to increase the effectiveness of monitoring the import of diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire.

The Table 3.2 provides a picture of relationships between sanctions, panel of experts and peacekeeping in various natural resource civil war situations. It shows that in five cases out of six instances of ‘natural resources civil war’ where UN sanction regimes were under operation, the Security Council has formed Expert Panels. In four instances the peacekeeping missions were given mandates relating to natural resources. Moreover, in three instances, peacekeeping missions were mandated to assist Expert Panels.

Table 3.2 Relationships Between Sanctions, Expert Panels and Peacekeeping Mandates

Sl. No.	Country	Natural Resources Sanctions	UN Expert Panels	Peacekeeping mandate on natural resource	Peacekeeping mandate to assist Expert Panel
1.	Angola	Diamonds, Petroleum	Yes	No	No
2.	Cambodia	Logs	No	Yes. Take appropriate measures to secure the implementation of a moratorium on the export of logs.	N/A
3.	Cote d’Ivoire	Diamonds	Yes	No	Yes
4.	DRC	Minerals	Yes	Yes Use monitoring and inspection capacity capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources	Yes
5.	Liberia	Diamond, Timber	Yes	Yes Assist the transitional government in restoring proper administration of natural resources	Yes
6.	Sierra Leone	Diamond	Yes	Yes Patrol the border and diamond mining areas, including through joint planning and joint operations where appropriate	No

Source: UNEP 2012: 55

The Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) convened a meeting of Expert Group on ‘Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: Transforming a Peace Liability into a Peace Asset’ in 2006 in Cairo, Egypt. This Expert Group meeting has come up with significant outcomes so far as the ‘natural resource civil war’ especially in Africa. It has established the role of natural resources in the conflicts in Africa. The West African countries such as Angola, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire are the cases of ‘natural resource civil war’. The Expert Group recommended that the UN Peacekeeping needs to be mandated in governance of natural resources and capacity building of security sector to monitor the violation of sanctions in the country. Further, the group suggested for coordinated and partnership based approach from peacekeeping to development in the countries emerging from ‘natural resource civil war need’ (United Nations 2006). However, in the subsequent UN mandates, some peacekeeping missions were specifically given mandates on natural resources (table 3.2) and to assist in the capacity building of the governance of natural resources in such countries. The expert groups are thus assisting the UN system to deal effectively the ‘natural resource civil war’.

Humanitarian Intervention (Responsibility to Protect)

One of the most prominent UN responses to civil wars is humanitarian intervention and on the basis of principle of responsibility to protect. Witnessing the velocity of violence and human rights violations in the internal conflicts, the international community has come up with the idea of humanitarian intervention later termed as ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). The R2P has become a new international security and human rights norm to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the UN in the last few years is the idea of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (Weiss 2007). This idea was developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. The basic idea behind the R2P doctrine is that Human beings can count more than the sacrosanct sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter Article 2(7), which emphasises non-interference in domestic affairs (Jolly et al 2009:174). The interest of human life is a concern for international community more than that of state sovereignty.

The external military intervention for the purpose of human protection was done by the international community under the tag of humanitarian intervention. However, the idea of humanitarian intervention remains always controversial. The international community is divided and polarised on the question of protection of human beings and protection of state sovereignty. This polarization was witnessed in both when intervention was exercised as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo- and when it has failed to exercise in Rwanda (ICISS 2001). The inability to of the Security Council to act in two particular instances: the mass murders in Rwanda in 1994 and the Kosovo disaster in 1999 where more than 800,000 were died in genocide in the case of former and without Security Council approval the later faced 'humanitarian bombing' from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which facilitated the growth of activism of International Commission on State Sovereignty (ICISS) on the issue of R2P (Jolly et al. 2009). The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan once remarked on the criticism of humanitarian intervention, if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a situation like Rwanda or Srebrenica where gross and systematic violations of human rights affected every precept of our common humanity (ICISS 2001). In this backdrop, the new idea of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) came up to replace the controversial 'humanitarian intervention'.

“The R2P is the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe such as mass murder and rape, starvation etc. but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (ICISS 2001). There has always been a dilemma between the right to intervene on the ground of protection of human rights and state sovereignty. The R2P rhetoric is the way out of that dilemma as 'Responsibility to Protect' outplays the traditional terminology of humanitarian intervention. Turning the term intervention to protection has brought new light to the humanitarian debate. Using the term 'responsibility to protect' rather than 'right to intervene' has three advantages, as observed by Evan and Sahnoun (2002), “firstly, it implies evaluating the issues from the point of view of those needing support, rather than those who may be considering intervention. The searchlight is back where it should always be: on the duty to protect communities from mass killing, women from systematic rape, and children from starvation. Secondly, this formulation implies that the primary

responsibility rests with the states concerned. Only if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibility to protect, or is itself the perpetrator, should the international community take the responsibility to act in its place. Thirdly, ‘responsibility to protect’ is an umbrella concept, embracing not just ‘responsibility to react’ but the ‘responsibility to prevent’ and ‘responsibility to rebuild’ as well” (Evan and Sahnoun 2002). Thus, the R2P has widened the scope of international intervention from protect to prevent and rebuilding.

With the R2P, the UN has the legitimately empowered to respond to the ‘natural resource civil war’ which causes serious humanitarian crises and human rights violations as well as poses serious threat to international peace and security. The R2P has broadened the scope of UN engagement in the conflicting country with various responsibilities such as protecting civilians, maintaining order and post-conflict re-construction.

Peacebuilding Measures

Peacebuilding activities are prominent international responses to an internal conflict situation where civil war has devastated life of the people. However, peacebuilding measures are mostly taken up in post-war society to revamp the socio-political and economic infrastructure of country which otherwise destroyed by the civil war. The traumatic impoverishment of economic, political and social relations between groups and individuals create diverse consequences in the conflict torn societies. Once violence ceases to occur, it becomes extremely difficult to recreate a sense of identity and belonging among communities that have experienced a total breakdown of socio-political and economic relations (Newman and Schnabel 2002). The peace-building initiatives are advanced by the United Nations basically as post-conflict measures to restore the socio-political environment of the conflict affected society. These measures are to rebuild the state institutions such as national army, police, election, administrative and justice system, basic education and health service institutions. The basic aim of such initiatives is to reconstruct the capabilities of the state institutions by providing training and technical know-how, manning, monitoring and mobilizing people for sustaining peace. As Newman and Schnabel (2002), pointed out that “without strong institutions (judicial, political, economic, cultural) states cannot be rebuilt and outside actors have no legitimate internal partners to collaborate with.

However, “weak societies need strong and legitimate institutions to rebuild trust, confidence and to invest in a more stable future” (Newman and Schnabel 2002). The international organization especially the UN has been legitimately working to help out such societies in rebuilding their state institutions to produce a healthy and safe domestic environment for a mature civic culture. The United Nations has established a Peacebuilding Commission to coordinate various peacebuilding activities of different agencies.

The term peacebuilding was coined by Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace* in 1992 (Diehl 2008:50). Since 1990s, peacebuilding has become a part of UN peace operations as a measure to re-construct the post-conflict societies. Mark J. Mullenbach has defined peacebuilding as: “efforts by third-party actors during crisis phases or post-conflict phases of intrastate disputes which are initiated to deal with the underlying problems or basic needs of the parties to the dispute, to foster conditions that enhance the likelihood that the dispute will not escalate or re-escalate to military hostilities, and to enhance the likelihood that the dispute will be peacefully settled by the parties” (Mullenbach 2005). Through peacebuilding, the UN tries to promote various capacity building activities in post-conflict states. Restoring law and order, promoting the respect for human rights, rebuilding socio-political and economic institutions, election supervision are some peacebuilding initiatives taken forwarded by the UN in a post-conflict state. There are 13 such political and peacebuilding missions are going on in different countries emerging from conflict and out of which three missions are operating in the West African region, the most affected from ‘natural resource civil war’. The total number of personnel serving in these 13 missions is 4380 including 469 uniformed personnel, 1220 international civilian police, 2598 local civilian police and 93 UN volunteers (United Nations 2012b).

So far as the ‘natural resource civil wars’ are concerned, the United Nations has initiated various capacity building measure to strengthen the governance of the natural resources. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has come with various studies on the natural resource and conflict linkages and impact of such conflicts on environment. Taking an integrative view the UNEP has suggested to linkup peacebuilding initiatives with environmental protection. In the report of the

UNEP's *'Expert Advisory Group on Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding'* recommended various issues for integrating environment and natural resource issues into peacebuilding interventions and conflict prevention for the consideration of Peacebuilding Commission and wider international community. The major recommendations of the UNEP expert group are:

- a. "Further develop UN capacities for early warning and early action: The UN system needs to strengthen its capacity to deliver early warning and early action in countries that are vulnerable to conflicts over natural resources and environmental issues. At the same time, the effective governance of natural resources and the environment should be viewed as an investment in conflict prevention.
- b. Improve oversight and protection of natural resources during conflicts: The international community needs to increase oversight of "high-value" resources in international trade in order to minimize the potential for these resources to finance conflict. International sanctions should be the primary instrument dedicated to stopping the trade in conflict resources and the UN should require Member States to act against sanctions violators. At the same time, new legal instruments are required to protect natural resources and environmental services during violent conflict.
- c. Address natural resources and the environment as part of the peacemaking and peacekeeping process: During peace mediation processes, wealth-sharing is one of the fundamental issues that can "make or break" a peace agreement. In most cases, this includes the sharing of natural resources, including minerals, timber, land and water. It is therefore critical that parties to a peace mediation process are given sufficient technical information and training to make informed decisions on the sustainable use of natural resources. Subsequent peacekeeping operations need to be aligned with national efforts to improve natural resource and environmental governance.
- d. Include natural resources and environmental issues into integrated peacebuilding strategies: The UN often undertakes post-conflict operations with little or no prior knowledge of what natural resources exist in the affected country, or of what role they may have played in fuelling conflict. In many cases it is years into an intervention before the management of natural resources receives sufficient attention. A failure to respond to the environmental and natural resource needs of the population can complicate the task of fostering peace and even contribute to conflict relapse.
- e. Carefully harness natural resources for economic recovery: Natural resources can only help strengthen the post-war economy and contribute to economic recovery if they are managed well. The international community should be prepared to help national authorities manage the extraction process and revenues in ways that do not increase risk of further conflict, or are unsustainable in the longer term. This must go hand in hand with ensuring accountability, transparency, and environmental sustainability in their management.

- f. Capitalize on the potential for environmental cooperation to contribute to peacebuilding: Every state needs to use and protect vital natural resources such as forests, water, fertile land, energy and biodiversity. Environmental issues can thus serve as an effective platform or catalyst for enhancing dialogue, building confidence, exploiting shared interests and broadening cooperation between divided groups, as well as between states” (UNEP 2009).

There are many reasons as to why the UNEP recommendations are discussed here. Firstly, the UNEP advisory group has studied the link between natural resources and civil war and also understood the need for collective international effort to curb this menace of ‘natural resource civil war’. Secondly, the recommendations are not only stressing the need of linking the problem of ‘natural resource civil war’ with environmental issues but also emphasising integrating peacebuilding effort for both preventing further escalation of conflict and protection of natural resources. Thirdly, the recommendations emphasised the need of treating the natural resource and environment as core part of peacekeeping activities. The protection of the natural resources thus becomes a part of international peacebuilding activities.

The West Africa has been a region where ‘natural resource civil wars’ have destroyed socio-political stability in the region. The cross-border trafficking of natural resources especially rough diamond has become an issue of concern for the UN engagement in the region. Therefore the UN has initiated peacebuilding activities along in the region especially in four countries in the region such as Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone where the UN system as a whole is active in a wide range of political, development, human rights and humanitarian activities (United Nations 2012a). Till date there are three peacebuilding missions under operation in the West African region namely United Nations Office in West Africa (UNOWA) since 2002, UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) since 2006 and UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) since 2008. These missions are playing significant roles in capacity building and reconstruction in the region.

UNOWA was the first regional conflict prevention and peacebuilding office of the United Nations (United Nations 2012a). The UNOWA was mandated to enhance the contributions of the UN towards the achieving peace and security in West African region. Apart from harmonizing different UN activities in region, this mission is also mandated to address the cross-border illicit trafficking (United Nations 2012a).

However, cross-border illicit trafficking may also include the smuggling of natural resources. The UNIPSIL was also not given any specific mandate relating to checking the illegal trade of natural resources but the mission was mandated to “provide political assistance to national and local effort in identifying and resolving tensions and threats of conflicts, whatever the source” (United Nations 2008a). Similar the case of UNIOGBIS as no clear mandate has been given to check smuggling of natural resources.

Moreover, the Humanitarian agencies such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), Human Rights Council (HRC), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have also contributed in peacebuilding activities in countries underwent civil war situations including the ‘natural resource civil war’. They provide various assistances in different capacities to address humanitarian crises in the war-hit societies and also in the reconstruction and rebuilding of state institutions in post-conflict societies. The post-conflict peacebuilding (PCPB) indeed constitutes a major part of the international responses to the conflict situations. The PCPB is a collective activity of various actors playing different roles in assisting in the transition from war to peace (Tschirgi 2004). The international responses to peacebuilding come under a hybrid approach where the UN specialized agencies along with individual donor countries and INGOs work for a long-term of development assistance. The peacebuilding has been an integrative approach to coordinate and cooperate with different UN agencies and funds and programmes for integrate the post-conflict reconstruction in the country. An integrated and responsive engagement of all these actors makes the real venture of peace and stability in a war-hit society.

Effectiveness of the United Nations’ Responses

The United Nations has so far engaged with different capacities in 27 civil war situations during 1989 to 2006 across the globe (Cockayne et al. 2010). Among these there are many instances of ‘natural resource civil wars’ where the UN has responded during this period. Its engagements in the ‘natural resource civil war’ civil wars of Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Angola and Sierra Leone signify the prominence of the UN responses.

Since the end the Cold War, the Security Council has initiated diverse ways of strategies to respond to the civil war situations which otherwise refrained from responding to such internal conflict. James Cockayne et al. (2010) observed the trends of UN engagement in the civil war as follows:

- Movement away from non-engagement to engagement in active civil war;
- Increased engagement with post-conflict aspects of resolving civil war;
- Growth in the complexity in Security Council resolutions; and
- Increased engagement in the governance, internal political relations, and external relations of countries undergoing or emerging from civil war. (Cockayne et al. 2010).

The major responses of the United Nations come in the form of peacekeeping, and peacebuilding that signify ‘peace’ as the priority of the international community. So far the UN responses, as discussed above preventive responses, regulatory measures, peacekeeping operations, reports of expert groups, humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding measures are strategically developed to curb threats to international peace and security posing in the form of civil war. However, these various forms of engagements are not always been effective and successful in the resolving the conflict.

The preventive measures are to reduce the possibility conflict in a pre-war stage or to avoid recurrence of the conflict. In the preceding part different preventive measures are discussed especially ‘sanctions’ as tool of preventing conflict. The sanctions that are imposed on state or non-state actors or prohibiting the movement of arms and conflict resources are limited in nature due to various lacunas in the sanction mandates such as lack of effective monitoring system and enforcement mechanism. In some cases, the state parties violate the sanction mandates and in others rebel groups violate sanctions. However, in the case of Angola, after revelation of the violation of sanctions by the Panel of experts, the Security Council had gone for tougher restriction on Angolan conflict diamonds. Moreover, Security Council adopted provisions for penalties in case of such violations under the resolution 1295 of 2000 (United Nations 2000). The Security Council pointed out that violation of sanctions or non-compliance with sanctions would constitute a violation of the UN Charter (United Nations 2000e).

After the violation of sanctions and continuing illegal trade of ‘conflict diamond’ brought into light by the Panel of Experts, the UN directed concerned states to adopt effective system of ‘Certification of Origin’. The ‘Certificate of Origin’ regime for the trade of diamonds was initially could not check the flow of conflict diamond as the certification regime was meant for exporting countries. The illicit diamond continued to be smuggled out with help of other countries. Despite of being use of certification system, illicit diamond from Sierra Leonean continue to reach the market through the smuggling route of Liberia. Thus, the UN responses to check ‘conflict diamond’ were not effective. However, the Security Council resolution 1295 of 2000 established a monitoring mechanism to collect additional information and investigate relevant leads relating to violations of the sanctions measures (United Nations 2000c).

The regulation of diamond flow was initiated by the UN through the use of certificate of origin regimes. Following the tougher sanctions from the UN, Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia and later other West African diamond exporting countries adopted the certification system. The effectiveness of the certification however became visible after the Kimberley initiatives. The Kimberley Process of Certification System (KPCS) has come up as an effective mechanism to check the illicit diamond. Since the Kimberly process was endorsed by not only the international organizations but also the exporting and importing countries and the industries as well. The combined effort led to execution of strict certification schemes throughout the world and also the penalties for non-compliance of the certification scheme made it an effective international mechanism to check illicit diamond trade.

The peacekeeping operations have been the major responses of the UN to civil war situations. However, peacekeeping has become a routine activity of the UN today. The peacekeeping operations have been growing thoroughly in the post-Cold War to take on variety of new challenges. The tasks of peacekeeping has also been widened over the years, including: “monitoring cease-fires and demobilising combatants; organising, overseeing and verifying democratic elections; establishing, advising and running the International Tribunals; and even assuming, albeit temporarily, executive authority over entire African and Asian states” (Al Qaq 2009:1). The UN peace operations deployed in the ‘natural resource civil wars’ are

lacking specific mandate to monitor and supervise the movement of ‘conflict resources’ which often paralyses the peace objectives. After various group of expert identifying gap of mandates in the peacekeeping, the Security Council modified some of the mandates in three instances. The Peacekeeping mission in DRC was mandated to “use monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources. Similarly, the mission in Liberia was mandated to assist the transitional government in restoring proper administration of natural resources and in Sierra Leone, the task of patrolling of the border and diamond mining areas was given to peacekeeping mission’ (UNEP 2012:50). Conversely, in other ‘natural resource civil wars’ such as the Angola and Cote d’Ivoire, peacekeeping missions were not given any natural resource related mandates.

The peacebuilding missions of the UN have also pursuing the capacity-building and reconstruction activity in the war-hit countries. Out of 13 such mission, three are currently operating in countries emerging from ‘natural resource civil war’ in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and the West African Region. The peacebuilding missions are engaged in multifarious activity in the West African region such as assisting the government in monitoring and promoting human rights, supporting in building state institution to ensure good governance and corruption-free society (UN 2012). Although the peacebuilding missions are not directly given any mandate to the management or supervision of natural resources, yet through initiating capacity building measures they are preventing the recurrence of the conflict in the society.

Although the UN has achieved some successes in its engagement in the civil war situations and especially the ‘natural resource civil wars’ but the lasting of such conflicts for ten to fifteen years signifies the ineffectiveness of the UN measures.

Conclusion

The United Nations has been the sole international organization having legitimate authority and responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Initially the international peace and security was challenged by various inter-state war and conflicts. The Cold War politics had restrained the power of the UN from effective functioning for the maintenance of peace and security. In the post-Cold War, there has been a shift in the nature of conflicts which paved the way for revitalization of UN

activism. Civil wars have become a major focus of the United Nations in this period (Cockayne et al. 2010). There are various grounds could be observed for UN's proactive role in civil wars in 1990s and after. The civil wars in general and 'natural resource civil war' in particular were becoming serious threat to protection of human rights and international humanitarian norms. The large scale bloodshed and organised violence in the civil wars shocked the conscience of the international community especially of the United Nations. The civil wars linked with natural resources have deadly consequences producing serious humanitarian crises in the conflicting countries. The 'CNN Effect' that opened the eye of the international community by showing the grave situations of the country undergoing civil war. The media activism also created mass opinion in favour of prompt international response to such humanitarian crises and also influenced the individual state actor to make the UN intervene into such situations. Thus, the civil wars have become a primary concern of the United Nations. On the ground of humanitarian assistance and to save the life of millions of civilians, the international community and the United Nations have engaged in internal conflicts.

The concept of international peace and security has gone under change in the post-Cold War. The intra-state conflicts and especially the 'natural resource civil war' eventually breach the international peace and pose a serious threat to international peace and security. Although the 'natural resource civil war' originates in a single country yet there is every possibility to spill-over the conflict to the neighbouring countries. On the other hand, when there is civil war in one country, the refugee flow and other humanitarian crises situations take place not in the home country but also in the neighbouring countries which makes the international intervention necessary to maintain international peace and security. And thus due to these reasons, civil wars in general and 'natural resource civil wars' in particular have become a serious concern of the international community and especially the United Nations.

The major responses of the United Nations can be understood in the category of preventive diplomatic measures, peacekeeping operations, reports of the panels of experts, humanitarian intervention, and peacebuilding measures. The preventive measures are taken up to prevent the outbreak of a conflict or to prevent its spreading. The early warning, mediation, conditional aid, and sanctions are used as preventive

measures and among these sanctions are used as in most of the cases. So far the ‘natural resource civil wars’ are concerned, targeted sanctions are widely imposed on the trade and movement of natural resources. However, due to lack of effective monitoring system, sanction regimes are subjected to violation.

Peacekeeping missions are generally sent to the conflicting country only when there is some sort of peace agreement between the government and the rebel groups. Nevertheless, peacekeeping constitutes major UN responses but in most of the cases the peacekeeping missions are meant for observing and monitoring the peace agreement and assisting the normalization process in the country. One of the major concerns of effectiveness of the UN responses has been the mandates given to the peacekeepers. On the one hand the UN recognizes the conflict as natural resource conflict and does not give proper mandate to the peacekeeper to monitor and to effectively regulate the governance of the natural resources. However, the ‘certificate of origin’ regime that was suggested by the UN to the countries especially diamond exporting countries. The effects of such certification could be observed in adoption of global certification system in the Kimberley Process of Certification System (KPCS) which has reduced the flow of illicit diamond in the global market. So far as the regulation of the trade of conflict resources is concerned, the UN has to often rely on the Kimberly Process negotiation.

The last but most significant response of the UN has been the peacebuilding measures. In the post-war society the UN has been advancing various measures to reconstruct the socio-political and economic infrastructure of the country. peacebuilding activities also include building capacities of state institutions, domestic governance system, judiciary, and civil society activism for promotion of human rights and good governance. However, the peacebuilding measure does not include any issues relating to the governance of natural resources but it aims at establishing long-term peace by establishing good governance and participatory democratic culture to prevent recurrence of conflict in the long run.

The United Nation responses to ‘natural resource civil wars’ are not fully effective to check and prevent such type of conflicts. The UN activism in civil wars in general shows arms movement and security challenges have been the primary concern. However, natural resources have never been in the primary agenda of the

UN. Although it has taken up various responses to tackle the ‘natural resource civil wars’ but they are not effectively addressed the conflict resources due to lack of clear and proper mandates. The UN system, as observed by the UN Expert Group on the link between natural resources and conflict (2006), “needs to continue its effort to strengthen natural resource governance, corporate good governance, and issues of trade in natural resources and to bring these issues into the mainstream of post-conflict peacebuilding activities” and to take ‘conflict resources’ into its routine peace initiatives.

SIERRA LEONE: THE CASE-STUDY

There are number of countries which had and have been experiencing ‘natural resource civil wars’ such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire. The Sierra Leone civil war demonstrates itself as the best possible case-study of a ‘natural resource civil war’. There are various arguments that plead it to be worth-studying. Firstly, the United Nations identified the link between natural resources and armed conflict so far as the eleven year (1991-2002) long civil war in Sierra Leone is concerned. Secondly, the peacekeepers themselves, specially the African peacekeepers, were reported to be facilitating the rebel group, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and were also benefitting from illegal mining of diamonds. Thirdly, the United Nations has terminated all sanctions (1997-2010) and peace operations from Sierra Leone. As the United Nations major engagement in this country is over, it is appropriate to assess its overall performance of United Nations in addressing the civil war, fuelled and sustained by natural resources.

Sierra Leone is a tiny West African country with a geographical area of 71,740 sq. km and a population nearly of 5 million. A country which has promising mineral resources, experienced resource curse as ‘natural resource civil war’ during the 1990s, which has destroyed the physical and social infrastructure of the country. The rebellion against the state in 1990s was a result of cumulative anger and depression of certain population out of different socio-political factors. However, controlling the diamond rich areas was the prime stimulating factors of the civil war. The natural resources was the driving force behind the outbreak of the decade long conflict and also responsible for sustaining and prolonging of the conflict by becoming the source of war revenue. The longstanding bloody fight came to an end with international intervention in the form of military action under the authority of the United Nations. The United Nations has initiated various measures to root out the conflict in Sierra Leone mainly for two purposes, firstly, to ensure the protection of human rights, and secondly, to standardise the regulation of the movement of the natural resource products.

This chapter begins with tracing the socio-political background to the civil war and the role of natural resources in Sierra Leone conflict. It discusses the political

instability experienced since its independence,, and corrupt authoritarian regimes led to the formation of mass discontent especially in 1980s. The ethnic stratification in the country has also influenced the political development in the country. Then it describes the major events of the eleven year long civil war, highlighting the major actors involved in it. The central focus of this chapter is to critically analyse the measures taken by the United Nations to deal with the ‘natural resource civil war’.

Background

The political developments after independence and the social stratification of the country had been influencing factors behind the civil conflict in the 1990s. The political power formation in the country was divided mainly between two major political groups namely the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP) and All Peoples’ Congress (APC). However, both the political groups, initially promising for better governance of the country began to work in an authoritarian manner in the subsequent years leading to the destruction of the space enjoyed by the citizens. The well-started democratic practice was spoiled by the political ambitions of the leaders and their politics of ethnic affinities and sectarian political agenda. The two largest ethnic groups namely Mende and the Temne were dominating the politics along with smaller groups such as Limba and Creoles under the sectarian political agenda of the political parties (Alie 2000:15). As a result of that the other smaller ethnic groups were feeling isolated in the process of political participation of the country. The country had gained independence on 27th April, 1961 from the Great Britain and since then the country experienced a squandering of wealth, opportunities and goodwill like that of most other countries in Africa (Sessay et al. 2009:26). And, thus, the historical outlines of the society and politics of the post-colonial Sierra Leone stand for authoritarian regimes, military coups, ethnic discrimination, and rampant corruption. The post-colonial regimes under SLPP and APC could be witnessed as a breaking away from the democratic promises and misappropriation of political power. The ethnicity began its destructive inroad into the politics of the country during the Albert Margai regime (Sessay et al. 2009:27). This trend was, however, used by every political regime in the following years. The APC even went further to establish an authoritarian regime by destroying the democratic tenets and institutions in the country in 1968.

The SLPP seized political power under Dr. Milton Margai, the frontrunner of Sierra Leonean independence in 1961. He started working with a vision of a developed Sierra Leone by initiating 'open door' policy for investment and development resulting speeding up of a vision of economic nationalism (Cartwright 1978:74-75). However, after death of Dr Milton Margai, his son Albert Margai became the Leader of the country in 1964 and started the political monopolisation in the country. The Albert administration was moving towards establishment of a 'one party state' and containment of opposition parties especially the APC and Sierra Leone Progressive Independence Movement (SLPIM). He started advancing efforts for the centralisation of party organisation and suppressing the voice of opposition parties (Cartwright 1978:77). Although Albert, himself propagating for the needs of political opposition, was of the view that "when the time comes in Sierra Leone that Government lacks opposition, that will be the time that some of us will pack up our bags and baggage and quit politics" (Daily Mail 1964), yet he resorted to authoritarian tactics after becoming the Prime Minister. The idea of one party state could not materialise despite continuous attempts by the Albert administration which was clearly visible after the District Council elections of May 1966 (Cartwright 1978:79). The APC, the opposition party had managed to become dominant force in the election despite a massive effort by SLPP to secure unopposed candidates (Cartwright 1978:79). The use of violence against political opponents had become the common tactics of both the political parties, SLPP and APC. They used violence against each other whenever in power to contain the opposition. John Cartwright (1978:80) observed that "Albert's and the chiefs' (head of local administration) free use of violence against their opponents helped accustom both the public and the opposition to a degree of open physical force which the APC in turn were later to apply against their opponents with greater enthusiasm." Thus, the political violence was naturalised and deeply rooted in the Sierra Leone politics.

The 1967 election had witnessed significant consequences in the Sierra Leone politics. After a controversy over the election results, a military coup led to establishment of a 'National Reformation Council' and in the subsequent year Siaka Stevens of APC was restored to power with the SLPP in the opposition (Cartwright 1978:883). After seizing power, the APC regime had become even more authoritarian than the earlier SLPP regime and headed towards de-facto one-party state. The

Stevens regime was much more effective in the use of government power of coercion than the SLPP had been, preventing SLPP from contesting elections in 1972 and 1973 (Cartwright 1978:883). The politics of Sierra Leone underwent serious setback during the dictatorial regime under Siaka Stevens. As Amadu Sessay et al. (2009) observed,

“The road to dictatorship in Sierra Leone started at the highest level of political leadership, as it became increasingly apparent that Stevens did not have the temperament of a democrat. He blatantly assaulted the opposition in ways that deprived it of political space in the country. Stevens and the APC frontally and unabashedly undermined key democratic institutions, sparing none on the road to establishing the APC as the sole political party in the country. The judiciary, the institution of last resort for the common man, was among the first to be destroyed” (Sessay et al. 2009:28).

The APC and the Stevens regime were responsible for state failure in Sierra Leone as they destroyed the democratic institutions such as opposition parties, judiciary, press and civil society. The APC, perceived to be a populist party for the common masses as its leader Siaka Stevens was a leader of a trade union, which helped him win the 1967 election, became the killer of civil and political rights, including right to strike and protest (Sessay et al. 2009:30-31). The academic institutions, students and teachers were also not left unaffected. The APC and military surveillance over the activities of students and teachers led to intellectual discourses under the control of Stevens’s administration. Students participating in the anti-regime demonstration were expelled from colleges and teachers associated with radical student movement lost their jobs (Abdullah and Bangura 1997). These events under the APC dictatorship caused a massive brain drain from the country and subsequently stagnation in political, economic and social life. President Stevens established one-party polity of APC and ruled the country from 1968 to the era of civil war. During APC regimes, besides destroying the political and civil space of the countrymen, vital social sectors like education, health, water, roads and public transport, were allowed to become rancid (Fyle 1993). Stevens retired from presidency in 1985 and handed it over to his loyal Joseph Saidu Momoh, a former commander of Armed Forces who further deepened the country’s crisis of governance and leadership (Sessay et al. 2009:33). In 1987 Momoh declared a State of Economic Emergency under which the government assumed wide powers to crack down on corruption, gold and diamond smuggling, as well as the hoarding of essential commodities and local currency (Zack-Williams 1999). Thus, the dictatorial regimes

of APC and rampant corruption and misappropriation of political powers formed one of the major grounds for civil war in the country.

The Ethnic Politics

There are some authors who view the Sierra Leonean civil war as manifestation of ethnic clash and bad political development in the country. Sierra Leone has 16 indigenous ethnic groups, and two among them are prominent: Temne and Mende. The former has concentration in the north and the later has in the south. However, smaller communities such as the Creoles and the Limbas have significant influence in the politics of the country especially the political leadership. The SLPP had stronghold in the Mende areas and APC had a stronghold among the Temnes and other marginalised groups but its leader Siaka Stevens came from Limba group. The Creoles consider themselves as superior and maintaining that fact they asserted for separate state during colonial rule (Cartwright 1970:54). In a similar way ethnic nationalism surfaced amongst other groups such as the Konos, leading towards separatist and ethnic political assertion and creation of their own political platform SLPIM (Cartwright 1978:168).

The ethnic clashes in Sierra Leone rooted back to the colonial period. The Creoles-countrymen conflicts led to political awareness among the countrymen and they formed the SLPP. However, the pro-Mendes leadership caused a split in the SLPP and led to the creation of APC later on (Cartwright 1978:70-75). The ethnic polarisation has been constantly experienced in the country in the post-colonial politics as well. The Creoles, the ethnic group with only two percent of population took over most of the professional jobs and played a predominant role in the administrative sector, which led to ethnic friction with other underprivileged groups (Sesay 1996). The ethno-regional politics has divided the Sierra Leone into the Northern, with concentration of Temne, Limba, Susu and other groups, and the Southern mostly with Mende concentration (Bangura 2007). The ethnic division in the country also manifested in the power politics. The prominence of certain ethnic groups in the economy and politics of the country attracted hostility of other groups who were kept out of the process. However, as Abdul K Bangura (2007) observed that the ethnic dimension of Sierra Leonean civil war was an unclear proposition, although the Mende and Temne ethnic groups have had bitter and recurring wars

before the advent of colonialism. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel group of Sierra Leonean civil war, manifested in the representation from different ethnic groups, where the leader Foday Sankoh belonged to Temne of the North. But the Mendes accounted for greater majority of the RUF membership along with other smaller ethnic groups (Bangura 2007).

The political parties also played ethnic cards to achieve their political objectives. Siaka Stevens belonging to Limba ethnic group presented an image of a leader committed to the welfare of the ordinary people, who have been neglected by the SLPP administration, by manipulating his ethnic identity, thereby, giving an impression as if he belonged to the Creole/Mende tribes (Sesay et al. 2009:27-28). However, he directly or indirectly advanced the interests of the Limba ethnic group and openly professed his Limba root after becoming Prime Minister by bringing them into mainstream of national politics and culture, and advancing their interests in the areas of employment, the army, education, provision for scholarship and so forth; who once refused to be associated with any particular tribe or ethnic group (Sesay et al. 2009:27-28). The ethnic agenda of the Stevens government was so effective that it undermined the interests of the other ethnic groups resulting in popular discontent among non-Limba groups. Sesay observed that “to effectively pursue the Limba agenda, senior political office holders, civil servants, traditional and educated Limbas formed the Ekute Club and persistently peddled and executed the Limba agenda that embarrassed and frustrated the Mendes and Temnes, who once dominated the national politics and constituted more than half of the country’s population” (Sesay 1999). Although the rebellion of 1990s was not a direct outcome of ethnic conflict, the Temnes and Mendes constituted majority of the rebel recruits which was in turn against the pro-Limba APC dictatorship. The Revolutionary United front (RUF), who captured the whole southern territory of the country in due course of civil war, also used ethnic identities to mobilise people in ethnic lines to form a strong rebellion against the dictatorial government (Abdullah 1998; Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003).

However, ethnic politics of Sierra Leone cannot be ‘the factor’ of the civil war. Rather, it was the result of different cementing factors such as prolonged authoritarian regime, pro-Limba ethnic politics of Stevens government, popular anger against anti-people policies of the government and the rampant corruption that ruined

the country's economy (Zack-Williams 1999). The civil war in Sierra Leone also manifested the anger and frustration of the young generation. The collapse of public services such as education, health and social security left the young people in a crisis situation. Such situations left many young people unable to complete an education, find a paid job, marry, and set up a family and the resource-starved elites tended to worsen this dilemma by abandoning patronage entirely in favour of self enrichment, thereby accelerating the degradation of state services and, in some cases, seriously undermining state security (O'brien 1996; Ofuately-Kodjoe 2003; Keen 2005b; Fanthorpe and Maconachi 2010). The 'crisis of youth' in Sierra Leone led to the armed conflict. A large number of socially marginalized young people opted to embrace conflict in a desperate search for empowerment (Richards 1995). The youth are always victimised in the process of perpetuating violence in collapsed states and the victimised whole revert back to the more dangerous path of armed conflict. Thus, ethnic politics was not 'the factor' that caused the civil war.

Lootable Natural Resources

Sierra Leone has been blessed with various natural resources. The presence of invaluable natural resources such as Diamond, gold, timber, coffee and cocoa had become resource-curse for the country as these resources could not be appropriated for the national development rather these resources were been used for financing the deadly civil war.

The diamond has always been a point of dissent and conflict in Sierra Leone since the colonial period. Discontentment and annoyance over the administration of diamond rich areas surfaced during the constitutional development of the country in 1951. The 'diamond rush', a movement of people from other sector of employment to the diamond fields, became a force of social mobilisation in the mid 1950s. The number of people involved in the diamond digging increased from 5000 in 1952 to 70,000 in 1957 (Laan 1965: 65), which led to the social mobilisation process in the country. Major upheavals occurred in the diamond-digging areas of Kono and in the Northern Province against the existing social order which was being supported by the SLPP (Cartwright 1970:76), and that led to formation of radical and class oriented opposition party, the Sierra Leone Progressive Independence Movement (SLPIM). It also influenced the formation of All People's Congress (APC) in the later stage

(Cartwright 1970:68). The diamond rush was so great that the Director of Agriculture attributed a marked drop in rice production in 1955 to the fact that there were not enough people left to work the land (Department of Agriculture 1957). The rush to diamond mining was also significantly drawn on the ethnic solidarity as numbers of fellow tribal men were increasing. The miners from Temne, Limba tribes substantially increased during the rush and they outnumbered the Mende tribes by a 2:1 ratio (Cartwright 1970:70). Thus, ethnic clashes were rooted mostly in the control of diamond mining. During the first five years of independence, the predominantly Mende tribes in the diamond producing areas of the country's south-eastern region were neglected and remained isolated from the centre of power and economic development, despite their areas were contributing an overwhelming percentage of country's foreign exchange earnings (Richards 1996).

The clashes over diamond not only divided the power equation in the country but also increased the illegal trading of diamonds. The value of illegal exports was around £ 15,000,000 against the value of legal export £ 7,184,000 in 1958 (Minchinton 1966). The diamond smuggling was increasing due to a defective agreement between the government and the Diamond Corporation, the legal purchaser of diamond. The Diamond Corporation's margin of profit plus an export duty collected by the Sierra Leone government discouraged the legal diamond trade as the traders got lesser profit which encouraged the growth of a lively smuggler's market in Monrovia, which offered better prices (Cartwright 1970:71).

The abundance of natural resources, especially the lucrative diamonds, which were already subjected to smuggling and lack of better regulation, become a curse for the Sierra Leonean people as this profitable resource become the centre point of country's civil war. The diamond fields of Sierra Leone were its most valuable asset that provided the government with more than half of its revenue in the pre-civil war era (Meredith 2005:561). However, things had changed when Stevens's regime personalised the diamond industry. He formed a private network of Lebanese dealers and local traders to run the diamond business on his behalf which led him to build up personal assets estimated at \$ 500 million, at the cost of bankruptcy of Sierra Leone (Meredith 2005:562). Plundering of natural resources by the government sponsored agencies created annoyance among the helpless educated and pro-democratic Sierra

Leoneans. The bad governance and monolithic one party system under corrupt Siaka Stevens and his successor Joseph Momoh left diamond fields in the country less protective and more vulnerable to reach the hands of smuggler groups. The diamond fields remained in the hands of private entrepreneurs, producing a trade worth at least \$ 300 million a year, more of it smuggled out of the country, leaving the government with minimal income (Meredith 2005:562). The inefficient governance of diamond, the prime source of country's income had severe consequences in state services which led to rise of popular discontent in the country. If one has enough natural resources you can afford to forget about normal economic activity and surplus from natural resource export significantly reduces growth (Collier 2007: 38-39). In such a situation, natural resources become a curse rather than an asset. The corrupt and incompetent governance left diamonds in Sierra Leone vulnerable. Thus, the abundance of lucrative diamonds and its age-old linkages to the ethnic clashes has been one of the major causes of civil war in Sierra Leone.

The focus on conflict diamonds has neglected other aspects of natural resource funding war. There are other natural resources such as gold, timber, coffee and cocoa, which were also used as source of war revenue by the RUF. However, the involvement of natural resources other than diamond was negligible but significant. These resources were traded by RUF for arms and logistical support although these additional resources provide some degree of war revenues (Francis 2001). The civil war in Sierra Leone had become the 'natural resource civil war' as natural resources especially the diamonds were the point of conflicts in the country and the diamond along with other natural resources became the source of funding the civil war.

Civil War in Sierra Leone: A Brief Description

A group of dissident Sierra Leoneans under the leadership of Foday Sankoh, a dissident army corporal planned to start a civil war against the Sierra Leone government. The despotic and corrupt APC regime had dissatisfied the people leading towards the popular annoyance in the country and a civil war like situation was to easily take place. At the same time in the neighbouring Liberia, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under the leadership of Charles Taylor started off war against Liberian government that boosted the spirit of Sierra Leonean dissidents to start off a similar war against the government of Sierra Leone. The RUF group comprised of

Sierra Leonean dissidents, hardened NPFL units and mercenaries from Burkina Faso. The RUF and its leader Foday Sankoh, an ex- corporal of Sierra Leonean army sought help from Charles Taylor and his NPFL. He also reached out to the countries such as Burkina Faso, Libya with the help of Charles Taylor who promised to extend help to RUF in return of providing access to the diamond field to be captured by RUF. The RUF leadership got trained under the patronage of NPFL in Liberia and planned the war from the soil of Liberia. Although the agenda behind the civil war was to oust the APC regime and stop their plundering of country's natural resources, controlling the diamond fields of Eastern Sierra Leone was the actual motive of the RUF. The game plan of the civil war was decided by the duo namely Charles Taylor of NPFL and Foday Sankoh of RUF to exercise authority over the diamond fields for which they started eliminating the existing authority of village chiefs, local traders and government establishments in those areas (Meredith 2006:562-3).

Execution of the game-plan was carried out with targeted and forced recruitments to the RUF. On the one hand, the illegal miners voluntarily joined the RUF venture to get the advantage of rebel authority, but on the other hand, children were targeted for recruits. RUF forcibly abducted children mostly between the age group of eight to fourteen years from the villages during their violent raid and trained them to be killers,, who constituted more than half of the RUF combatants (Meredith 2006:563). The victims of the RUF plan for control of the diamond fields were mostly the innocent civilians. The elders were forced to slave at the mining areas, youths and children were to be the gunman and the ladies and the girls were forced to be sex slaves, anyone resisting were getting severe punishment; such as to be killed or to get their hands and feet hacked off (Meredith 2006:564). Due to RUF atrocities at least one quarter of Sierra Leone's total population of 4.4 million were displaced and many 'child soldiers' have been traumatised. There are many, somewhat familiar, claims that the RUF uses indoctrination, initiation rituals, and western 'horror video' showings to produce imitative violence (Riley et al. 1995). The use of the terror tactic led RUF to control over large parts of diamond fields and also bauxite and titanium mines, an alternative source of income for the government (Meredith 2006:565). The RUF was well ahead in the control over the natural resources in the country, leading the cutting off the government income. Apart from that, the situation was going out of

government control and the protection of the civilian and the diamond mines became serious concern for the Sierra Leone government.

In this backdrop, the Sierra Leone government started looking for better security option in the country to counter the RUF terror and maintain the security especially of the remaining diamond fields. It had advanced various counter-RUF strategies including special recruitment to the Sierra Leone Army, seeking help from the regional powers, extending assistance to form counter-RUF militia, hiring security firm etc. The President Momoh recruited more personnel to country's army without following much screening which provided opportunity for many dissidents into the state army (Meredith 2006:564). The Sierra Leone government also supported to form rebel group called United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) among the Liberian exiles to fight against NPFL-RUF front and also encouraged the Mende community to form their own militia called 'Kamajor' to defend against the RUF attack (Meredith 2006:564).

The Sierra Leone government approached a private security firm called 'Executive Outcomes' of South Africa to regain the authority over diamond fields. This private security group had a deal with the government that they will get to mine the diamonds in a concessional rate (Meredith 2006: 565). Accordingly by 1995, the Executive Outcomes freed many of the diamond fields from the control of RUF and also supported the national army and 'Kamajor', a government sponsored counter-RUF militia group. However, RUF was still controlling many of the diamond fields. Other mercenary security companies like the Gurkha Security Guards Ltd, and Sandline International were also hired during in Sierra Leone's civil war (Francis 1999).

Meanwhile, significant changes and developments were taking place during the civil war crisis. On 29th April 1992, a military coup was successful under the leadership of Valentine Strasser with a group of his fellow officers of Sierra Leone Army (SLA). They ousted out the APC President Momoh and formed National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). They started fighting against the RUF. However, despite their promises for a 'clean-up exercise' of the corrupt governance system, they themselves began to engage in scams and diamond trade for personal interests which made diamond fields the centre of struggle among mining gangs, rogue military

units, rebel warlords and criminal business interests (Meredith 2006:565). As the regime had become more authoritarian, it ran into difficulties with domestic and external critics of its human rights record, and pressure was built on it for an election and democratisation (Zack-Williams and Riley 1993). Subsequently, the SLPP voted back to power as Sierra Leone went for election in March, 1996 and party leader Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became the president.

The civilian government under Kabbah was removed by a faction of Sierra Leone Army (SLA) (later formed Armed Forces Revolutionary Council- AFRC) in alliance with the RUF on 25 May, 1997 (Zack-Williams 1999). The 1997 coup was a significant turn into the Sierra Leone crisis which had arrested the attention of the international community. The situation was worsening under the RUF-AFRC coalition as human rights situation kept on deteriorating. Human rights violations including extra-judicial killing, beatings, arbitrary arrest, detention, and illegal searches were become common to the AFRC rule (Zack-Williams 1999). Since the AFRC junta had suspended the constitution and judiciary, the situation further worsened. The increasing activism of the AFRC and RUF led to stronger confrontation with the other forces including ECOMOG peacekeepers.

After long fighting for more than eleven years for personal greed over natural resources that caused deaths of over 20,000 Sierra Leoneans and displacement of one third of the total country population, the civil war came to an end in 2002 with the help of military intervention from the United Nations.

Multiple Actors Involved in Sierra Leone Civil War

The civil war in Sierra Leone that started in 1991 and lasted till 2002 involved many actors. There are domestic actors as well as external actors who played crucial role in sustaining the conflict for eleven long years. The following are the major actors involved in the conflict.

Local Actors

There are different local actors involved in the Sierra Leonean civil war. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was the major local actor, while the two others were the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Kamajors Rural Militia.

Revolutionary United Front (RUF): The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was the prime rebel group that had started the civil war in Sierra Leone. The RUF was “created around 1982 by a small number of disenfranchised Sierra Leonean intellectuals with an ambiguous revolutionary ideology with a poorly articulated socialist agenda” (Solomon 2006). The RUF received training from Libya and material and logistical support from neighbouring Liberia. The RUF under the leadership of Foday Sankoh, a disgraced army man, received significant logistical, moral and financial support from Charles Taylor and his NPFL, who had also started a war in neighbouring Liberia (Sessay et al. 2009:33). The formation of RUF by some radical student backed by the Liberian rebels was originally to oppose the one party regime of All Peoples’ Congress (APC) in Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). However, they ended up with their lust for illicit diamonds.

The increase in RUF activity was largely due to both the fight for control of Sierra Leone’s mineral resources (a dominant factor driving the RUF for most of the war), and the impact of external influences, especially the spread of the Liberian civil war into Sierra Leone (Restoy 2006). Controlling the diamond fields in Sierra Leone by the RUF seemed to be the motivation behind their indulging in civil war. However, the promises made by the rebel groups to fight against the one-party system and ouster of the All People’s Congress (APC) dictatorship carried some popular support across ethnic and religious lines in the initial stage (Restoy 2006). The original ideology to free Sierra Leone from dictatorial and corrupt APC government and to establish a transparent democratic state was no longer visualised during their fight with the government. Much of the RUF’s original ideology was lost among RUF fighters themselves, since a large proportion of rebels were in fact Liberian (Restoy 2006). The Liberian soldiers were fighting only for their interest in the illegal diamond trade controlled by the RUF. The RUF’s leadership was personalised in its founder, Foday Sankoh, a former commander of Sierra Leone Army who controlled all RUF policies throughout the war. Although, the RUF was reportedly created by educated youths and intellectuals of a collapsed state, their course of action during war did not manifest such high-ended ideological ground.

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC): The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed in 1997 by Major John Koroma of a rebel faction of

Sierra Leone Army. The AFRC aimed at the overthrow of the democratically elected Kabbah government by establishing a military junta (Lehtinen and Ogumbor 2002). The Koroma and his fellow army men established a junta government after capturing Freetown and established a nexus with the RUF. The origin of AFRC can be incidental. During the Kabbah government, a group of Sierra Leone Army (SLA) under Koroma's leadership was disappointed when government started relying on the Kamajor Civilian Defense Force more than the national army (Evoe 2008). Thus, the dissident faction of the national army started taking anti-government stands. Soon after the establishment of junta government, the President Kabbah fled to Guinea and RUF started getting patronage of the junta government. For the first time the RUF fighters stroll into the Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone and major violence erupted in the capital resulting in humanitarian crises (Evoe 2008).

The event of taking over power by the AFRC, by overthrowing the democratic government opened the eyes of the international community. Until this event in 1997, no major international engagement can be observed so far the Sierra Leone civil war was concerned. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations and individual countries imposed sanctions and other diplomatic pressure on AFRC to reinstall the civilian government. However, AFRC had to step down after ECOWAS intervention through its peacekeeping mission ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in 1998 (Evoe 2008). The AFRC junta government was receiving logistical support from different countries. The countries such as Liberia, Ukraine and Libya extended support to the AFRC regime ((Lehtinen and Ogumbor 2002).

Kamajor Rural Militia: The Kamajor Rural Militia was formed as a reaction against the looting and brutal atrocities committed on civilians by the RUF militia. This anti-RUF group was constituted mostly by the Mende peoples and supported by the government forces (Lehtinen and Ogumbor 2002). It was started as a defensive force to resist the RUF violence against villagers.

Later this militia group was used as counter-RUF tactic by the government forces. This rural militia group was supported by the Sierra Leone government and the ECOMOG personnel. The hired mercenaries especially the Executive Outcomes (EO) were also supporting the Kamajor group with arms and weaponries (Shaw 2003). The

Kamajor group was already fighting with the RUF at the local level in a defensive mode against the RUF. However, after the coming over of the EO, Kamajor militia had got a momentum to change itself from a defensive group to an offensive armed group against the RUF with the help from the EO, Sierra Leone Army (SLA) with intelligence, training and strategic planning apart from arming (Howe 1998). The Kamajor militia group, also known as Kamajor Civilian Defense Force (CDF), fought effectively with the RUF and recaptured many of the diamond mining areas and pushed the RUF combatants to the Liberian border (Evoe 2008). This eventually led to the government reliability on the Kamajor militia. In the later stage, the Kamajor (CDF) was revitalised to fight against the military junta government and RUF by the ECOMOG forces and Sandline International, a British security firm.

Table 4.1: Different actors involved in Sierra Leone civil war

Sl.No.	Name	Estd./leader	Represents	Affiliation	Support	Conflict with
1	RUF	1991/ Foday Sankoh	Mostly the Nimbas, Makeni, Bikolo/ illicit diamond miners, marginalized youths	Breakaway faction of SL army, AFRC	Liberia, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Ukraine, France	SL govt, ECOMOG, Kamajors
2	AFRC	1997/ Major John Koroma	Koroma's loyalists in rebel faction of SL Army	RUF	Liberia, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Ukraine, France	SL govt, ECOMOG, Kamajors
3	Kamajor rural militia	1994	Mostly ethnic community	SL govt., ECOMOG, civilians	Sierra Leone government	RUF/AFRC
4	SLPP's government	1996	Mostly Mendes in Southern and Eastern part	Kamajors, ECOMOG	ECOMOG, UK, US, Mercenaries fro UK and South Africa	RUF/AFRC

Source: Lehtinen and Ogumbor 2002, p. 201

Other Countries' Involvements

There are many countries that contributed to the civil war in Sierra Leone in different point of time and with different capacities. The role of Liberia, the immediate

neighbouring country was very crucial in understanding the role of other countries in the Sierra Leone civil war. Apart from Liberia, other countries such as Libya, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ukraine, France and Britain had played significant role in Sierra Leone civil war at some point or the other. These countries reportedly provided the RUF with military equipment (Berman and Florquin 2005:370). The outside support to the rebel group RUF, however, was conditional and in most cases the access to illegal diamond was the condition behind such support.

Nonetheless, role of Liberia has intensely contributed to the civil war in Sierra Leone. The Liberian civil war that was started in 1989 under National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor was indeed a contributing factor of the Sierra Leonean civil war. In Liberia, the exclusion of native majority from its political-economy framed the basis for an armed rebellion. The minority Americo-Liberians, a group of only five percent of country's population have had control over the politics of Liberia for over an one hundred years to the total exclusion of the indigenous majority (Sesay 2009:20). Charles Taylor, therefore formed the rebel group called National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and started the rebellion which engaged in a reckless plundering of natural resources and wealth of the country to earn hard currencies to procure arms for the war (Sesay 2009:38). Charles Taylor became President of Liberia in 1996 by throwing out the minority-dominated government. Charles Taylor and his NPFL mentored the formation of Sierra Leonean rebel group RUF which started functioning from Liberian soil under the patronage of NPFL. However, Charles Taylor aimed at the diamond fields of Sierra Leone in return of his assistantship to the RUF. Taylor and his NPFL supported the RUF with manning, arming, training and all other logistical support (Sesay et al. 2009:33; Lehtinen and Ogumbor 2002). Taylor also facilitated RUF with military training in Libya and helped in getting external support from different countries. Moreover, Liberia became the transit route for the export of illegal diamond of Sierra Leone and illegal arms import (United Nations 2000a).

Apart from Liberia, Libya, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and France had also allegedly supported the RUF. Libya provided guerrilla training to the RUF leaders with the help of Charles Taylor. Burkina Faso provided with arms and logistical support to RUF. The Cote d'Ivoire was also providing also logistical support to the

RUF. The France had reportedly providing training to the rebels that stems from its historical competition with the Britain and the United States for the regional hegemony in the West African region (Africa Confidential 1998). However, the other countries' involvement was conditional and mostly it was for favouring access to the illicit diamond trade.

Private Security Firms

To fight the RUF rebels and to protect the diamond field in the country, the Sierra Leone government hired different private security firms during the civil war. Among these Executive Outcome (EO) of South Africa and Sandline International of Britain were significant so far. Similarly, mercenaries from Ukraine and some other eastern European countries fought on the side of RUF to provide security to the mining industries under rebel command (Africa Confidential 1998).

Sierra Leone government had hired 'Executive Outcomes' (EO), a South Africa based security agency in 1995 for the protection of diamond mining (Lehtinen and Ogumbor 2002). The Strasser government of Sierra Leone and the Branch Energy, a mining agency, came to an agreement that the Branch Energy will provide security assistance to Strasser government in return of concessional lease of diamond mining. The branch Energy arranged the Executive Outcome for a contract of \$15 million to fight against RUF rebels. However, the Strasser government didn't have enough government funds to pay the amount to the EO and therefore he granted special concessions to the 'Branch Energy' in lieu of cash payment (Howe 1998). The EO operation was successful in containing the RUF aggression in Sierra Leone. It had provided training and artilleries to the Sierra Leone Army as well as the Kamajor militias. During its eighteenth month long engagement in Sierra Leone before leaving in 1997, the EO could effectively bring an order in the situation that led to first ever ceasefire agreement known as Abidjan agreement and holding of democratic election in the country.

The Sandline International (SI), a British private security agency came into Sierra Leone to fight for the government forces in a similar contract in 1997. The SI was military advisor to the Branch Group which was also parent body of the Executive Outcome (Howe 1998). It had agreed to provide weapons and military assistance to the reinstalled Kabbah government in exchange of concessions in

diamond mining (Gberie 2005). The SI was reportedly influenced the British government in pressuring the United Nations for imposition of sanctions and eventually Britain had written and sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1132 of 1997 (Kampfner 2003). The involvement of the Sandline International and its nexus with the British government has however erected comprehensions over the British interests in Sierra Leone. The international speculation over the role of these private security agencies led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to warn the government of Sierra Leone about the expense of retaining the private security firms (Cornwell 1998). The Executive Outcome had to withdraw from Sierra Leone following such developments.

Resource Extraction Companies

The resource extracting companies especially the mining companies or the trading corporates were also significant actors, who have played critical in the Sierra Leone civil war. The major extracting companies were British, Canadian and Lebanese and however, the diamond mining in Sierra Leone was dominated by local artisanal miners and local community miners (Gberie 2002). In 2000, the *The Heart of the Matter* described the dubious role of junior mining firms in Sierra Leone. ‘Juniors’ are small prospecting and mining companies which work on the edge of the industry, exploring for new diamond fields, generating funds on international stock markets, sometimes mining diamonds but more often than not eventually selling out to larger companies if they are successful (Gberie 2002). Most of the junior firms such as Diamond Works, Branch Energy, had apparent and secret connections with two major international security firms, Executive Outcomes and Sandline during the 1990s. Through Branch Energy, Diamond Works holds a 25 year renewable mining lease in Kono District in Sierra Leone, granting the company exclusive rights to carry out exploration and mining activities in respect of diamonds, gold and associated minerals (Gberie 2002). These interests of mining corporate in the natural resources of the conflict-ridden countries prove the nexus between diamond smugglers and the mining corporate.

However, the mining companies and big trading houses work in confidence with the government yet some of them maintain secret connection with the rebel groups. The rebel groups used to receive extortion from these companies. In January

2000, the British Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain used parliamentary privilege, to name several alleged UNITA sanctions busters in Angola and one of those named was Teixeira, whom Hain said had been flying in diesel fuel to the rebel army (Gberie 2002). The diamond companies are also used by the government in its war against rebels. A Canadian firm operating in Sierra Leone during the war earned dishonour because its principals were involved in military sales to the government in its battle against the RUF (Gberie 2002).

The diamond corporate houses also adopt arms twisting policies so as to survive in the conflict-ridden country. Rex Diamond Mining Company, a Belgium-based diamond company had some disputes over its rights in Sierra Leone, but managed to appease the government, the RUF and its shareholders and received confirmation from all parties including the government and the RUF (Gberie 2002). The Rex Diamond's example portrays the nexus between the diamond companies and the rebel groups. The maintaining such nexus costs the companies huge loss in Sierra Leone. Similar case was with Mano River Resources Ltd., a Canadian diamond company. The transparency and accountability in the side of extraction companies has been a problem still remaining. However, it has been argued that the universal remedy for the resource curse is better governance: both governments and extractive industry companies operating in developing countries must commit to higher standards of transparency and accountability (Ocheje 2006; Labonne 1999).

The involvement of extraction companies in the civil war has in Sierra Leone has been a significant twist in favour of the rebel group. The extraction companies are contributing in the prolonging of the war since they provide one of the major sources of resource accumulation to the rebels. In Sierra Leone the RUF was getting support of many of the mining companies in the form of extortion and in accessing the international diamond market. Since, there is ban on the 'conflict diamond', the mining companies operates from the offices in neighbouring countries from where they access to the conflict resources. Sheryl Dickey observed that, 'illegal diamond traders in Sierra Leone smuggle diamonds out of the country and sell them in other African states in exchange for arms. Smugglers are able to use a system of offices and individuals in the neighboring countries such as Liberia and Guinea, as a channel for getting diamonds from Sierra Leone to the world market. These nations serve as key

routes for transferring diamonds on their way to Antwerp, Belgium, where nearly 90 percent of the world's rough diamonds are traded” (Dickey 2012). The diamond companies establish their offices in countries where no ban was imposed. There are two diamond companies namely, the De Beers and Central Selling organization based in South Africa and London respectively, dominate 50 percent of mining and 70 to 80 percent of sales international diamond industry (Dickey 2012). The De Beers however, maintained an office in Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone until 1980s. Although during the conflict, De Beers claims that it did not purchase Sierra Leone diamonds but on the other hand it had maintained a buying office in Guinea. It is likely that De Beers indirectly purchased conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone as many of the Sierra Leone diamonds pass through this country (Dickey 2012).

Thus, the involvement of different actors in the Sierra Leone civil war made it a special case of ‘natural resource civil war’. Moreover, involvement of illicit diamond trade and deteriorated human rights conditions made it internationally appealing, which led the United Nations to respond with various measures.

Responses from the United Nations and International Community

The international community has responded very late to the situations in Sierra Leone. Initially the civil war that started in 1991 was a low intensity event which did not attract the international community for intervening into the situation. The international community and especially the UN was cautious to intervene into such low key violence regarded to be the internal matter of a sovereign country following the principle of non-interference.

The United Nations was aware of the armed conflict that was underway in Sierra Leone and urged the conflicting parties to restrain violence and to sit in the negotiations for peaceful resolution of the conflicts. The UN served intermediary services as the Sierra Leone government requested the Secretary General Good Offices to bring the RUF to negotiations. The Secretary General under his practice of good offices sent one representative to Sierra Leone to explore the possibilities of dialogue between the Government and RUF (United Nations 1995). The representative of the Secretary General discussed multiple stakeholders including Government officials, prominent citizens, religious leaders, resident diplomats and representatives of all United Nations bodies and agencies in Sierra Leone however

could not reach out to the RUF because the RUF leadership did not reciprocate. The Security Council appreciated the initiative of Secretary General for his offer of good offices in Sierra Leone and urges the Revolutionary United Front to take advantage of that offer, thus enabling both parties to enter into negotiations” (United Nations 1995).

The United Nations was following the developments in Sierra Leone in very close interests. With the initial practice of good offices which led the conflicting parties to come for negotiations, the UN advanced the peace and reconciliation process in the country. The civilian government under Kabbah initiated negotiation with RUF as urged by the United Nations Security Council. The Kabbah government and RUF came for a negotiation and signed a peace agreement in Abidjan on 30 November 1996. The UN was not part of this agreement but it welcomed initiatives of the government. Although, the Abidjan agreement was seen as beginning of the peace in the country, it did not last for long as the RUF backed AFRC ousted out the democratically elected Kabbah government and established a junta regime in 1997.

The United Nations was a silent watchdog of the developments in Sierra Leone but immediately after the RUF backed military coup was successful on 25 May 1997, sharp reaction came from the UN Security Council. On 27 May 1997, concerning over the situation in Sierra Leone, the Security Council stated its deep concerns over the military coup in Sierra Leone, especially when the United Nations is assisting the process of reconciliation in that country. It strongly deplores this attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government and calls for an immediate restoration of constitutional order. The Council takes note of the “statement of the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of 26 May 1997, and underlines the imperative necessity of implementing the Abidjan Agreement which continues to serve as a viable framework for peace, stability and reconciliation in Sierra Leone” (United Nations 1997a). The Security Council also condemns the violence attacks on the civilians and on the personnel of the UN and other international agencies working in the country. In a similar statement the Security Council was deeply concerned about the severe crisis in Sierra Leone and the consequences of such situation in the peace and security not only in Sierra Leone but also in the whole region. The UN

Security Council statement reads, “the grave crisis in Sierra Leone has endangers the peace, security and stability of the whole region and, in particular, about its possible negative impact on the ongoing peace process in neighbouring Liberia” (United Nations 1997b).

Soon after seizing the power by the AFRC, the regional powers including Nigeria and other ECOWAS countries such as Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea, condemn the act of military coup and urged for restoration of the civilian government. Nigeria was taking the lead to impose individual sanctions and blockade against the military junta. The UN also responded with imposing a sanction regime against the Sierra Leone. Following strong diplomatic pressure from the international community, the Koroma regime agreed for talks with regional powers to restore the civilian government but Koroma did not keep his word (Evoe 2008). Meanwhile the ECOWAS decided to send its peacekeeping force called ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) under the leadership of Nigeria with an objective to replace the military junta with the civilian government. In early 1998, the forces of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) beat back the military regime and put the legitimate, exiled government back into power (Hayner 2007). The Sierra Leone version of ECOMOG was led by Nigerian troops and the UN had provided support to the ECOMOG in the country as a resolution of UN Security Council reads “the Council expresses its strong support for the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone and encourages it to continue to work for the peaceful restoration of the constitutional order, including through the resumption of negotiations” (United Nations 1997b). The ECOMOG was with full offensive with the help of Civilian Defense Force (CDF) against the AFRC and RUF and finally by April 1998 it could establish control over 90 percent of diamond mining areas in the country (Gberie 2002). The presence of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone however helped the government and RUF to come for negotiation table to take forward the resolution of conflict. While the Nigerians and their neighbours can be credited for engaging in Sierra Leone when the international community continued to ignore the conflict, it should also be noted that Nigerian ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone were accused of committing heinous atrocities against the civilian population, and some generals were accused of partaking in the illicit diamond trade (Palmer 2008). After the ceasefire agreement and following the regime

change in the home country, Nigeria proposed to withdraw its troops from Sierra Leone in a phased manner. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo told to press that his government would like to withdraw troops from Sierra Leone and Liberia without jeopardising the security of the two nations (IRIN Africa 2012). He also turned down the UN request to keep Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone to operate alongside a UN peacekeeping force as the United Nations would not provide Nigeria with sufficient financial support to maintain its dominant position in the ECOMOG force (Reuters 1999).

In the backdrop of that and declining strength and effectiveness of the ECOMOG, the UN had decided to take strong action against the country. It established a sanction regime prohibiting travel of junta government and the import of arms and petroleum products (Vines 2003). In 1998, the UN has decided to send an observer mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) which was supposed to assist the ECOMOG mission. After withdrawal of ECOWAS mission in 1999, the UN replaced the earlier mission into a full-fledged peacekeeping mission under the name of UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Meanwhile, the United Nations had been constantly favoured peace negotiation and restoration of civilian democratic government. The Lome Peace Process was initiated after strong international pressure on the government of Sierra Leone for negotiation with the RUF the Lome peace agreement was signed in 1999. Although, the agreement brought back the road to end the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone, the shadow of war was still there. The following part discusses various UN measures relating to Sierra Leone.

Sanctions

The UN had constituted different sanction regimes pertaining to Sierra Leone in different times. From the year 1997 onwards UN has imposed oil embargo, arms embargo, travel ban, ban on diamond exports among others which mandates were revised and extended till 2008 in different forms.

Sanctions were first imposed on Sierra Leone in response to the May 1997 overthrow of the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah by disaffected members of the armed forces, with subsequent backing from the Revolutionary United Front RUF (Vines 2003). The initial sanction regime was established to ban on the travel of the family members of the military junta and a ban on the movements of

arms, ammunition and petroleum products. The Table 4.2 reveals that the Security Council through its resolution 1132 of 1997 decides that all states would prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of members of the military junta and adult members of their families (United Nations 1997a). It further decided that all States would prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territory (United Nations 1997a). However, the sanctions were not so effective since the RUF backed military government were receiving help from Liberian leader Charles Taylor and his government. Nonetheless, the illicit trade of diamond was continuing with the help of diamond companies operating from neighbouring Liberia and Guinea.

In 1998, UN Security Council decided to re-impose the prohibition of the sale and supply of arms and related materiel to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone. the Security Council Resolution stated that that “all states shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, to Sierra Leone other than to the Government of Sierra Leone through named points of entry on a list to be supplied by that Government to the Secretary-General (United Nations 1998c). The prohibition on movement of arms and related materials was the significant step as arms and war equipments are crucial for the civil war. Since the non-state actors such as rebel groups, private mercenaries in various countries were also involved in providing arms and amenities to the RUF, the ban on the movement of small arms became mostly ineffective.

The ban on the export of ‘conflict diamonds’ was decided under UN Security Council resolution 1306 of 2000, when it expressed its deep concern over the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, and it reports that such diamonds transit through neighbouring countries, including the territory of Liberia (United Nations 2000a). The Security Council also decided to prohibit all diamond export from Sierra Leone without being certified by the

“Certificate of Origin Regime” of the Sierra Leone Government. The illegal control over the diamond fields in Sierra Leone has given RUF a constant source of war revenue and therefore, a ban diamond sale from the conflict areas was imposed. It is pertinent that the ban has reduced the revenue flow to the RUF, although not totally stopped. The sanction provides a useful entry-point for the international community as it is realistically a ‘do-able’ short-term response with an exit strategy (Francis 2001). The sanction regimes on conflict diamond have led to establish different mechanisms for international certification scheme to regulate the illegal diamond trade to check revenue flow to the RUF. The sanctions on the diamond export gained superficial result as it reduced the illegal exporting of the diamond. However, the access of safe transit route through Liberia the diamond smuggling was still continuing.

Table 4.2 Comparing Different Sanction Regimes in Sierra Leone

Sl No.	UN Resolutions	Date of Adoption	Major Issues Covered
1	S/RES/1132 (1997)	8 October 1997	Imposed petroleum and arms embargos, Travel ban on non-state forces, established sanctions committee
2	S/RES/1156 (1998)	16 March 1998	Lifts petroleum embargo
3	S/RES/1171 (1998)	5 June 1998	Reinforces arms embargo and travel ban on non-state forces
4	S/RES/1306 (2000)	5 July 2000	Direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone, Certificate of Origin Regime, establishment of Panel of Experts
5	S/RES/1385 (2001)	19 December 2001	Extension of eleven months of the prohibition of all import from Sierra Leone without certificate of origin process
6	S/RES/1446 (2002)	4 December 2002	Extension for six months the prohibition against Sierra Leonean diamond without certificate of origin process
7	S/RES/1793 (2007)	31 December 2007	Exemption from the travel ban imposed by the resolution 1171 (1998) the travel of any witnesses whose presence at trial before the Special Court for Sierra Leone is required
8	S/RES/1940 (2010)	29 September 2010	Terminate the measures set forth in the resolution 1171 of 1998 and 1132 of 1997

Source: URL: <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1132/index.shtml>, accessed on 15 June 2012

The Table 4.2 shows that the sanctions were aimed at containing of the conflict through use of targeted sanctions. The initial sanctions were targeted only the arms and weapons and related war materials. However, the sanction on natural resources, here the case is diamond, have come in a later stage only in 2000. The initial sanctions were not so effective due to non-compliance to the sanction regimes. However, provision for certification of origin along with the sanction regime increased its compliance. Movement of illicit arms and related materials has been prime concern of the United Nations which reflects in the sanction regimes. The major challenge before the UN has been lack proper enforcing mechanisms to implement its sanction regime.

Panel of Experts

The Security Council decided to constitute a ‘Panel of Expert’ under its resolution 1306 of 2000 to study the role of illicit diamond in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone and to recommend accordingly to the Security Council (United Nations 2000b). The establishment of the ‘panel of experts’ was mandated to report on the violations of the sanctions, and especially the links between the diamond trade and arms trafficking (Vines 2003). The five member panel submitted its report in December 2000 and confirmed that diamonds had played a central role in sustaining the civil war in Sierra Leone. In the report, the Panel reiterates the link between natural resources and civil war in the country. It observed the role of diamond in sustaining and advancing insurgent movement in Sierra Leone (United Nations 2000a).

The Panel was concerned about the decline of official diamond export resulting in increase of illegal diamond trade. The Panel reveals that,

“each year, over 250 million carats of diamonds are mined worldwide. Even in its peak years of production during the 1960s, Sierra Leone never produced more than 2 million carats annually. But a high proportion of Sierra Leone’s diamonds are gemstones of very high quality and value, and they are much sought after. During the 1970s and 1980s the Sierra Leone diamond industry became victim of corruption and mismanagement and many of the country’s diamonds were exported illegally. Between 1992 and 1996, the average annual exports were less than 200,000 carats and the value of per carat gemstone was significantly less than the country’s known run-of-mine average. Not only were the bulk of the country’s diamonds being smuggled out, but the emphasis in smuggling seemed to be on higher value diamonds” (United Nations 2000a).

The situation worsened when the legal export declined vehemently to 36,384 carats during 1997 and 1999. The illegal export and diamond smuggling was in peak during this period. The ongoing civil war was responsible for the illegal diamond trade as most of the diamond fields were under control of the rebel group.

Controlling of the diamond mining areas by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has become main fundraising source for the rebel group. The RUF who initiated the war in 1991 initially confined to diamond mining on a sporadic and individual basis. However, the panel observed that by 1995, the RUF and its patrons were clearly taking a much greater interest in the diamond fields of Kono District. Although the private military company especially the Executive Outcome, hired by the Sierra Leone government had forcibly removed the RUF from parts of the diamond mining fields of the Kono region. However, from 1997 onwards the illegal diamond mining by RUF was intensified and focussed in the areas of Kono and Tongo region.

The Panel was also vocal about the smuggling route of the conflict diamond of Sierra Leone. It observed that the diamonds have always been smuggled out of Sierra Leone, the bulk through Liberia. Historically, Liberia was the route of choice primarily because of its use of the United States dollar as its official currency. And diamonds also travelled further afield to other countries in the region, carried by Madingo and Senegalese traders, known as 'marakas'. The panel further reveals that, the

RUF also traded diamonds in Guinea. There are reports of one-off deals in which RUF commanders have traded diamonds for supplies, and sometimes for weapons, dealing with individual, mid-level Guinean military officers acting on their own account. One such arrangement in mid-2000 is said to have gone sour, resulting in an RUF attack on the Guinean border town of Pamelap when promised Guinean supplies were not forthcoming. There is no evidence, however, of any official Guinean collusion in such trade. A certain volume of RUF diamonds are being traded in Kenema and elsewhere in Sierra Leone which are sold to diamond dealers, many of them are Lebanese dealers. It is therefore possible that these diamonds could enter the official export system if there is a lack of probity and vigilance in the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), the Ministry of Mineral Resources and its branches (United Nations 2000a).

Thus, the illegal diamond trade was continuing through the neighbouring countries and this transit route through neighbouring countries gave RUF a free hand to continue the diamond smuggling. They traded the diamond for food supplies as well as for weapons. The UN panel of expert, thus successfully brought out the different contours of diamond smuggling in Sierra Leone.

The panel report recommended for a global certification system of diamond trade, as like that was adopted in Sierra Leone and Angola. Otherwise every process of tracking the illicit diamond trade would be futile. The panel further recommended that a complete embargo on the diamond trade in and from Liberia and Gambia until they demonstrate convincingly that are no longer trafficking arms and diamond from Sierra Leone. Observing at the violation of the sanctions, the panel recommended for an effective monitoring system and an integrated effort to avoid duplication (United Nations 2000).

The Panel of Expert visit to the country was coincided with a two-day conference on diamonds, organized by the Network Movement for Justice and Development, the Civil Society Movement of Sierra Leone and several other Sierra Leonean organizations. The recommendations of this conference were significant which were incorporated in the Panel report. The recommendations were based on widespread public frustration in Sierra Leone with the de-facto division of the country into two parts, one with diamonds controlled by the RUF, and one largely without diamonds controlled by the government. The conference was vocal in its criticism of UN Mission in Sierra Leone's (UNAMSIL) mandate and/or its inability to change this situation. UNAMSIL, the conference concluded, was actually complicit in dividing the country and in ensuring that the RUF can mine diamonds with impunity. The conference recommended the following:

- that the Government of Sierra Leone engage a private military/security firm to bring about a military solution to the problem as soon as possible;
- that the United Nations assume responsibility for the key diamond areas and manage them as a United Nations Trust Territory;
- that UNAMSIL be deployed to the diamond areas to protect them from future incursions and from illicit mining;
- that the Sierra Leone diamond industry be closed down completely for a period of five years in order to encourage non-Sierra Leoneans involved in the industry to leave, and to provide

the government and people with the time required to devise new investment codes and more open systems of transparency and accountability, so that the diamond industry can benefit the people of the country, rather than the few who have enjoyed its rewards over the past three decades. (United Nations 2000e).

These recommendations are significant because these are come from the local stakeholders such as civil society organization. These recommendations reflect widespread public concern in Sierra Leone about the connection between diamonds and the civil war, and about the lack of progress in resolving the conflict. The conference was equally concerned about the management of diamond industry in country and pleads for greater role to be played the UN in the country.

The Panel after going through the different issues relating to ‘natural resource civil war’ in Sierra Leone, offered the following recommendations concerning the regulation and management of illicit diamond in Sierra Leone to the Secretary-General

- In order to better regulate the flow of rough diamonds from producing countries, a global certification scheme based on the system now adopted in Sierra Leone is imperative. It will give added impetus to current discussions on this subject if the Security Council endorses the concept of a global certification system.
- In the short run, and in the absence of a global system, it is recommended that certification systems similar to that adopted by Sierra Leone, be required of all diamond exporting countries in West Africa, with special and immediate reference to Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, as a protective measure for their indigenous industries and to prevent their exposure to conflict diamonds. If this has not been completed within a period of six months, the Security Council should impose an international embargo on diamonds from these countries.
- The Panel further recommends a complete embargo on all diamonds from Liberia until Liberia demonstrates convincingly that it is no longer involved in the trafficking of arms to, or diamonds from, Sierra Leone. The embargo should not be lifted until this condition has been met, and until Liberia too has joined the proposed standardized certification system.
- The Security Council should place an immediate embargo on trade in all so-called Gambian diamonds until such time as its export of diamonds can be reconciled with imports.
- Other diamond exporting countries in the region have been designated by the Belgian government as ‘sensitive’ countries such as Namibia, Central African Republic and others where special attention to imports is required.
- The United Nations, the World Diamond Council and the import control authorities of all rough diamond importing countries should be vigilant for other exporting countries or for

countries in the future, where trade in diamonds has little to do with domestic production or legitimate trading.

- It is essential, and a matter of urgency, that major trading centres (Belgium, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, South Africa, India, the United States and Israel) come to a common agreement on the recording and public documentation of rough diamond imports that is consistent from one country to another, and that clearly designates the country of origin in addition to country of provenance.
- An annual statistical production report should be compiled by each exporting country and gathered into a central annual report, compiled by the World Diamond Council and/or by the certification body that is expected to emerge from the 'Kimberly Process' of intergovernmental negotiation. Countries of origin must be distinguished from countries of provenance.
- If diamonds are mixed and/or re-invoiced in a free trade zone, it is imperative that the government of that country take responsibility for verifying the bona-fides of the diamonds before they are re-exported. In other words, all countries importing rough diamonds must be part of the anticipated 'rough controls' system.
- Throughout its work, the Panel was struck by the widespread breaking of Security Council sanctions on both weapons and diamonds. If existing and future sanctions are to be effective, the Security Council will require an ongoing capacity to monitor their observance and conduct research. Where diamonds are concerned, there have been three Expert Panels examining many of the same issues concurrently. There has been useful collaboration, but there has also been overlap and duplication. Considering the complexity and the changing nature of the conflict diamond issue the Panel recommends that in future, it would serve the Security Council better to have an ongoing focal point within the United Nations to monitor adherence to sanctions, as well as progress towards the specific goals stated in General Assembly resolution 55/56 of 1 December 2000. (United Nations 2000a).

The Panel recommendations had considered various connotations of illegal diamond trade in Sierra Leone. These are of prime significance as it reveals the fact that the safe route of diamond smuggling through the neighbouring countries namely Liberia, Gambia and Guinea. However, the Panel urged for immediate action to take against the diamond exporting from these countries stating importance of a universal system of certification. It had also brought out the facts of diamond export from Gambia, a country never produces diamond. The major importing countries are also of prime significance and responsible for a transparent import deal. The panel urged the importing countries for a joint initiative to curb the illegal trade of diamonds. The violation of sanctions on the movement of diamond and arms were also reported recommended for proper monitoring of the sanction regimes. Moreover, the Panel

reported that, “there is reason to believe that a certain amount of diamonds have been traded by the RUF with officers of the former West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in return for cash or supplies. The Panel did not see this issue as part of its mandate and so did not examine it in any detail, but repeated accounts, many of them first-hand eyewitness reports, made the stories impossible to ignore. If the issue is thought to be important, it will require further investigation” (United Nations 2000).

The report of the panel had its immediate effect on the ongoing ‘Kimberly Process’ resulting in a global diamond certification system. The recommendations of the panel were also incorporated in the subsequent UN resolutions especially in extension of mandates of the sanction regimes and imposition of new sanctions on diamond trade in the West African region. In 2001, in response to the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, the Security Council decided to approve new sanctions on Liberia, the transit point for Sierra Leonean conflict diamond (Vines 2003).

Certificate of Origin Regime:

Another important UN response for ‘natural resource civil war’ in Sierra Leone is the Certificate of Origin regime. The ‘certificate of origin’ regime has been an approach to create a legally-binding trade assurance from the point of origin to the country of importation. The objective is to create trade documentation that, based upon verification by the authorities of an exporting country, validates the legal origin of diamonds (United Nations 2000a). Determining the legitimacy of commercial transactions of diamond and monitoring its movement has been the motivation behind such certification move. The approach relies on diamond importing countries to implement effective administrative processes and law enforcement procedures and adhere to shared regulatory procedures (United Nations 2000a). This certification approach underlies the various UN efforts.

On December 12, 2000, the 55th Session of the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution titled “The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts” (United Nations 2000a). It called for measures to end the conflict diamond trade and recommended that a simple and workable international certification scheme for rough diamonds be created

(United Nations 2000a). It was decided that certification scheme should be a transparent, consistent with international law, and based “primarily on national certification schemes,” that “meet internationally agreed minimum standards,” and should not “impede...legitimate trade in diamonds or impose an undue burden on Governments or industry...” or compromise nations’ sovereignty (United Nations 2000a).

The UN Security Council Resolution 1306 of 2000 requested the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure, as a matter of urgency, that an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in diamonds is in operation in Sierra Leone and also requested States, relevant international organizations and other bodies in a position to do so to offer assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to facilitate the full operation of an effective Certificate of Origin regime for Sierra Leone rough diamonds (United Nations 2000b). The diamonds which are to be traded with certificate of origin from competent government authority exempted from the sanction imposed on illicit diamond.

The governments of the Belgium, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and the Diamond High Council of Belgium provided necessary assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to design, and put into use the new export documentation and procedures. The ‘certificate of origin’, the centrepiece of new export procedure, established in Sierra Leone was modelled on the Angolan Certificate of Origin, developed for the Government of Angola. The Government of Sierra Leone presented the proposed new system to the UN at informal hearings on July 31 and August 1, 2000. An exemption under paragraph five of UN Resolution 1306 (2000) was granted in early October 2000 to permit the resumption of exports from Sierra Leone, if accompanied by the new Certificate of Origin issued by the Sierra Leone government. As of October 2000, when Sierra Leone was granted an exemption by UN Resolution 1306 (2000), all diamond exports must be accompanied by a Certificate of Origin. In order to obtain a Certificate of Origin for legal export, the diamonds must be legally mined. Legally mined means they come only from areas under government control, and are the product of a chain of legally authorized transactions, from use of the land, permission to mine, purchase by authorized dealers and agents, and export by licensed exporters. This chain does not differ substantially from the policies in effect before

sanctions. However there is more scrutiny on compliance with the Government of Sierra Leone regulations.

The Certificate of Origin regime set up in Sierra Leone has improved the government revenue although the ‘conflict diamonds continued to be traded in the black markets. The legal diamond trade figures after adoption of ‘certificate of origin’ regime shows the trend of increasing export of diamonds from Sierra Leone.

Table 4.3: Legal Diamond Export Figures under the Certification Scheme

Sl. NO.	Month	Total carats	Value (US\$)
1	October 2000	28,450.60	4,470,424.41
2	November 2000	12, 128.75	1, 079,695.58
3	December 2000	9,702.16	938,014.60
4	January 2001	13, 486.10	1,991,773.84
5	February 2001	15,384.67	1,909,276.29
6	March 2001	20,055.63	2,685,334.87
7	April 2001	14,440.58	1,821,237.48
8	May 2001	16,996.96	2,156,765.00
9	June 2001	15,652.29	2,154,917.36
10	July 2001	18,161.11	2,154,668.90
11	August 2001	16,509.67	2,280,402.42
12	September 2001(till 10 th)	6,397.27	827,898.47
	Total	187,335.79	24,470,409.22

Source: Government Gold and Diamond Office, Bank of Sierra Leone, Freetown; United Nations 2001

The Table 4.3 shows the volume of legal diamond exports from Sierra Leone after introduction of ‘certificate of origin’ regime by the Sierra Leone government following the sanctions from the UN. During the initial period of certification, there has been improvement of legal trade of diamond by decreasing the volume of illicit trade. The table shows that there was an immediate decrease of diamond trade volume in the country. It was 4,470,424.41 US \$ in October 2000 which slipped to 1,079,695.58 US \$ in November 2000 and 938,014.60 US \$ in December 2000. However, situation was improving as the legal volume of diamond started increasing in the subsequent months. It had reached to 2,280,402.42 US \$ in August 2001. This reveals that the adoption of Certification scheme reduced initially the legal export volume but it tends to increase the legal exports in subsequent period. The data reveal the fact of effectiveness of such certification scheme in terms of legalizing and standardising of diamond trade.

However, the certification regime had its own limitations in terms of its implementations. Although it had increased the legal export volume of the Sierra Leone government, the diamond mining areas were still under rebel control that challenged the existence of such certification system. The rebels were continuing diamond smuggling, as revealed by the UN Panel of Experts concerning Sierra Leone, with the help of diamond market of neighbouring Liberia and Guinea, where no such certification regime was under operation. Moreover, the certification of the exporting diamonds was left to the Sierra Leone government without a proper monitoring system. The sanctions committee had to receive the compliance report from the government of Sierra Leone. However, there was no compliance report sought from the importing countries, which eventually left the idea of ‘certificate of origin’ subject to manipulation and misappropriation.

Peace Operations

So far as the Sierra Leone crisis is concerned, UN had intervened in the later stage of the conflict. The UN intervention came to scene when the situation in Sierra Leone was further deteriorating. The civil war started as early as in 1991 and there were many experiments initiated before in the country for maintaining peace and security. At the beginning, hired mercenaries, state sponsored militias, were involved to fight with the RUF and to maintain law and order. Later the ECOWAS model of peacekeeping, the ECOMOG was brought into scene. However, UN peace operations become pertinent when all other peace initiatives became ineffective. The UN sent its first peace operation UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in 1998 with a limited mandates. The major and full-fledged operation to Sierra Leone was sent in 1999 as UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). After successful completion of the mandates of UNAMSIL in 2005, UN decided to send another mission, the UN Integrated office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) to coordinate and monitor the post-war capacity building activities in the country. In 2008, UNIOSIL was replaced by a new peacebuilding mission namely Integrated Peace-building Office Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) which is still working for the peacebuilding activities in the country. Each peace operations are critically discussed below:

UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL): The UNOMSIL was established in July 1998 to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone. The

disarmament and demobilization of former RUF combatants was the main task of this mission. It was also entrusted to assist in monitoring the respect for international humanitarian law in the country. According to Security Council resolution 1181 of 1998, the UNOMSIL would consist of both military wing and a civilian wing. Besides the monitoring of the military and security situations and disarmament activities of the military wing of the mission, the civilian part was to

“advise, in coordination with other international efforts, the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies, to advise on the planning of the reform and restructuring of the Sierra Leone police force, and to monitor progress in that regard and also to report on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Sierra Leone, and, in consultation with the relevant United Nations agencies, to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in its efforts to address the country's human rights needs” (United Nations 1998d).

The UNOMSIL was a tiny in size and limited in nature of mandates mission to assist the existing ECOMOG mission and to monitor the peace in the country. The primary objective of the UNOMSIL's engagement in Sierra Leone to keep a vigil on the security challenges in the country. The mission was highly concerned about the increasing rebel capabilities and resulting humanitarian crises. However, UNOMSIL could not do much due to lack of personnel and adequate mandates. On the other hand, the mission was blank in relation to the source of rebel capabilities. The control of natural resources by the RUF and movement of illicit diamond was neither observed nor monitored by the UN mission. Since July 1998, the 105 military observers of UNOMSIL have been monitoring the behaviour of ECOMOG, whose contingents, especially the Nigerian, had been widely accused of human rights violations, corruption, and ill-judged and undisciplined use of force (Findlay 2002). The UNOMSIL was credited with two aspects. It had created the background of the peace negotiations between the government and the rebels leading towards the Lome peace Agreement. And it facilitated the UN with necessary updates and recommendation for future UN course of action besides its support to the ECOMOG mission in the country.

UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL): The UNAMSIL was established in October 1999 by the Security Council to cooperate with the Government and other parties and

to monitor the implementation of the Lome Peace Agreement of 1999 and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan (United Nations 1999; United Nations 2000c). However, mandate of the mission was revised and extended in the subsequent years till its expiry in 2005.

The entry of a full-strength UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) opened the door of exit for the ECOMOG. The ECOMOG withdrawal was a long due because of its financial crisis and mismanagement. However, the UN was insisting the regional peacekeeping to take the lead. Initially the Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG was merged under the UNAMSIL command along with the UNOMSIL observers (Findlay 2002). It was a full-fledged peacekeeping force unlike the previous UNOMSIL which was strictly an observer mission, possessing significant military power (Woods and Reese 2008:55). UN Security Council ordered UNAMSIL to assist with the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process conducted in accordance with the terms of the Lome Agreement. However, the Lome peace agreement was not lasted for long as violation of peace agreement by RUF was on the fore and fresh violence was resurfaced between government forces and the rebels.

The civil war in Sierra Leone was financed by revenues accumulated from natural resources, in particular the illegal exploitation and trade of rough diamonds. It is estimated that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) sold between USD 25 million and USD 125 million of rough diamonds per year as a source of conflict financing (UNEP 2010). The UN peacekeeping mission UNAMSIL did not initially have a mandate from the Security Council to address the diamond trade, which continued to sustain ongoing conflict and undermine the peace process. “One of the main reasons was that the vice president and former head of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, actively lobbied to prevent the mandate of the peacekeeping mission from addressing the diamond trade by appealing to the protection of national sovereignty and the right to self-determination” (UNEP 2010). The non-mandate of UNAMSIL was reflected in the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in 2000 concerning the situations in Sierra Leone, that “UNAMSIL has neither the mandate nor the intention to stop or interfere with any economic activity” and that the responsibility for natural resource exploitation lay entirely with the government, in particular “the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, Reconstruction and Development

(CMSRRD) that is under the leadership of Mr Sankoh” (United Nations 2000e). This statement of the Secretary-General has two implications on the natural resource governance in the country. Firstly, Mr Sankoh the vice president and chair of the CMSRRD, continued to allow his RUF forces to exploit the diamond fields while violating human rights and national laws and secondly, the national government rather than the peacekeeping mission should address this threat to peace (UNEP 2012).

The UN position of not mandating the Peacekeeping forces to deal with natural resources was reportedly come after strong lobby of Foday Sankoh against such mandates. However, the situation changed following the sudden death of Mr. Sankoh in 2003. In 2004, the Security Council mandated UNAMSIL “to support the Sierra Leone armed forces in patrolling the border and diamond mining areas, including through joint planning and joint operations where appropriate” (United Nations 2004a). This historic decision to engage the UNAMSIL forces directly to monitor the diamond movement, the root cause of the civil war, strengthened the position of peacekeeping missions in the country. Under this mandate, the UNAMSIL delivered support and training to the Sierra Leone police on a number of topics, including illegal diamond mining. With the support of UNAMSIL, the police force in Sierra Leone established a diamonds crime intelligence and investigation unit, and initiated the recruitment of a UN civilian police diamond adviser. The newly trained police personnel were deployed to the provinces, focusing on areas vacated by UNAMSIL and the sensitive diamond-mining and border areas in the east of the country. Moreover, the UNAMSIL also provided advice to police in key specialized areas such as cross-border policing, airport security, criminal intelligence, policy and planning for diamond-related crimes (UNEP 2012). The significance of the peacekeeping activism in the natural resource governance in Sierra Leone could be seen as this increased government control over the diamond-mining sector and a sharp rise in the issue of diamond-mining licenses. The new regulation has contributed in significant progress of implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (UN 2004b).

The UN mission had many limitations and had to face many challenges as to function effectively. The five hundred member contingents arrived in different points of time and faced problems since there was insufficient logistical and accommodation

support. The mission faced issues of command and control as different members from different countries spoke different languages. Moreover, after withdrawing the ECOMOG mission from the country, the Nigerian contingent became part of the UN mission but they operated independently of the UN military commander (Wood and Reese 2008:57). This has led to the lack of cooperation among the different contingent of the UN mission.

In early 2000 the Sierra Leone crisis and engagement of UN peacekeeping landed in a new twist. A number of hundred UNAMSIL soldiers were attacked and taken hostage by the RUF in the diamond mining area of Kono region leading towards the collapse of the UNAMSIL. With this sudden development, a new military intervention was necessary to save UNAMSIL and the government of Sierra Leone and on 4 May 2000 the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan requested United Kingdom and other countries to intervene to save the UNAMSIL mission from collapse. In this backdrop, British government decided to send a military contingent of Special Air Service for rescue operation and launched 'Operation Palliser' which led to the eventuality of the release of the UN personnel from RUF. Similarly Indian Air Force joined the UNAMSIL forces and launched the 'Operation Khukri' to end another hostage crisis in 2000. However, the final victory over the RUF rebels was achieved in January 2002. The UNAMSIL restored its lost credibility and started act robustly only after it was strengthened by the deployment of a separate British force (Findlay 2002). The UNAMSIL happened to be a successful peace operation in the history of UN as it could completely disarm the rebel group and brought out the order in the country.

UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL): Following the termination of UNAMSIL in 2005, the UN Security Council established the UN Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), a peacebuilding mission to continue with the post-war reconstruction and capacity building in Sierra Leone. The Secretary-General emphasised in his report to the Security Council, the need for continuing effort of UN engagement in the country to prevent further recurrence of conflict and recommended for a peacebuilding mission in Sierra Leone (United Nations 2005a). The importance of the continued support of the United Nations and the international community for

the long-term security and development of Sierra Leone was considered in approving the mission.

The UNIOSIL was mandated with a wide range of activities in terms of assisting the government in different capacity building efforts. The major mandates are to building the capacity of state institutions, to develop and implement a strategy for addressing the root causes of the conflict, to accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, to develop a national plan of action for human rights and establishing a national human rights commission, to enhance good governance, transparency and accountability, to build the capacity of the National Electoral Commission to conduct a free, fair and credible electoral process in 2007, and to strengthen the security conditions and protection and well-being of youth, women and children, reflecting the post-war engagement of the UN in the country (United Nations 2005b).

Moreover, significantly, the Security Council also mandated “to coordinate with United Nations missions and offices and regional organizations in West Africa in dealing with cross-border challenges such as the illicit movement of small arms, human trafficking and smuggling and illegal trade in natural resources” (United Nations 2005b). Through this mandate, UN recognised the continuing threat from illegal trade in diamonds in Sierra Leone and the need for continuing effort to check it.

The work of UNIOSIL was highly commended in the UN literature. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in May 2007 viewed, “I am pleased to report that UNIOSIL has been effectively coordinating the activities of the United Nations system and other international partners in Sierra Leone. This collaboration has been instrumental in increasing the effectiveness of foreign assistance to help address the root causes of the conflict and in building the capacity of critical national institutions” (United Nations 2007a). However, although the work done by UNIOSIL is commended in New York, this approval must be set against the very real problems experienced on the ground in Sierra Leone, especially in the four areas of deficit such as youth unemployment and disempowerment, justice and security sector reform, democracy consolidation and good governance, and capacity-building (Curran and Woodhouse 2007; United

Nations 2007b:9). These issues are crucial to bring about lasting peace in Sierra Leone as well as to curb the root cause of the conflict, the illegal diamond trade.

UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL): The UN Security Council replaced the UNIOSIL with an extended peacebuilding version namely UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) in 2008 (UN 2008a). The need for another peacebuilding mission was felt as the existing UNIOSIL had to complete its mandate after conducting the local election in July 2008. The Security Council intended to close the UNIOSIL and requested the Secretary General to suggest a peacebuilding mission to carry forward the peacebuilding process, mobilising international donor support, supporting the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and Fund, and completing any residual tasks left over from the UNIOSIL mandate, in particular promoting national reconciliation and supporting the constitutional reform process (United Nations 2007c).

In the recommendation for UNIPSIL, the Secretary General was very keen to highlight natural resources as a probable threat to peace and security. In the recommendation, he suggested the mandate for UNIPSI, “Providing political support to national and local efforts for identifying and resolving tensions and threats of potential conflict, especially over political affiliation, ethnicity, and natural resources before the eruption of violence” (United Nations 2008b). In the Security Council resolution 1829 of 2008 establishing the UNIPSIL does carry the same language as recommended by the Secretary General. The Security Council Resolution reads, the UNIPSIL will support the government of Sierra Leone in “providing political support to national and local efforts for identifying and resolving tensions and threats of potential conflict, whatever the source” (United Nations 2008a). The Secretary General recommendation clearly favoured the inclusion of natural resources as one of the potential threats yet the Security Council resolution kept the potential threats open to any source. This shift however shows the lack of will on the part of the UN Security Council to take natural resources seriously as a potential threat to peace and security.

The UNIPSIL has been an integrating initiative to coordinate and cooperate with different UN agencies and funds, other international organizations in order to

achieve the goal of post-war reconstruction in the country. The UNIPSIL has been working as facilitator of various capacity building activities in the country. However, duplication of mandates of different actors involved in the post-war Sierra Leone, create confusion among them leading duplication of work and resources. On the other hand, the UNIPSIL has not been entrusted any specific mandates regarding the governance of natural resources in the country which has been the major source of instability in Sierra Leone.

Conclusion

Thus, the United Nations responded the ‘natural resource civil war’ in Sierra Leone in various ways. However, the major problems of these responses were regarding lack of clear mandate to deal with natural resources and ineffectiveness of these responses.

The civil war in Sierra Leone reflects various aspects of ‘natural resource civil war’. The current research finds that the authoritarian and anti-people political history, diverse ethnic stratification of the society and mal-governance of rich natural resources of the country constituted the foundation of one of the most destructive and longstanding ‘natural resource civil wars’ in Sierra Leone. The nature of the Sierra Leone civil war can better be understood in the words of Sierra Leonean President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, “Ours was not a civil war. It was not a war based on ideology, religion or ethnicity, nor was it a ‘class war’... It was a war of proxy aimed at permanent rebel control of our rich diamond fields for the benefit of outsiders” (Kabbah 2001).

The civil war in Sierra Leone, thus, cannot be regarded as ethnic conflict or conflict over political power. The RUF started the rebellion against the government stating the need of throwing out corrupt and authoritarian All Peoples’ Congress (APC) government and establishing a democratic regime. This initially carried mass support to the RUF. However, subsequently when RUF could establish their control over diamond mining areas they seemed to be forgetful of their promises and started brutal atrocities on civilians. The RUF rebellion, thus, could be regarded as the result of greed over natural resources, rather than establishing democratic political structure in the country.

The United Nations and the international community were well aware of the massive violation of human rights and international humanitarian norms in the country from the very beginning. However, the UN did not take any preventive measures during the initial years of the conflict. The UN was a silent watchdog of the developments in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, it was keeping constant vigilance over the development of conflict. The United Nations pleaded the African regional organizations such as Organization of African Unity, later known as African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to take necessary steps to prevent and contain the conflict in Sierra Leone. They have facilitated the peace agreement between the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone for ceasefire and establishing peace in the country. However, the peace initiative failed after the RUF-backed faction of Sierra Leone Army exerted power overthrowing the democratically elected government in 1997. This event had however been a turning point for the United Nations as well as for international intervention in Sierra Leone. The immediate reactions came from the ECOWAS who decided to intervene to restore the civilian government and sent its peacekeeping force ECOMOG. The UN, that was otherwise keeping quiet, responded with a sanction against the military government and the RUF. Since 1997 the UN have engaged constantly till date to establish peace in the country. It has responded with various measures such as sanctions, peacekeeping, constituting expert panels, setting norms for ‘certificate of origin’ regime, and post-war peacebuilding.

It had initiated three significant steps to address the role of natural resources in Sierra Leonean conflict. Firstly, it imposed prohibition on the export of diamond from Sierra Leone if not certified by the government authority. The Sierra Leonean government was directed to adopt a ‘certificate of origin’ regime to legalise the diamond trade. Secondly, following the recommendations from the panel of experts, it has mandated the UNAMSIL, the peacekeeping mission, very lately in 2004 to monitor and patrolling the diamond mining areas in Sierra Leone. Thirdly the peacebuilding mission UNIOSIL in 2006 was also mandated to assist the government in identifying potential threats to peace and security including that of natural resources. However, the UNIPSIL, the peacebuilding mission currently operating in the country has not been given any specific mandates related to natural resources.

The United Nations' responses to Sierra Leone were mostly concerned with security situations in the country. The security order and security of the life of civilians constituted most of the UN mandates. This notion of UN concerns could well be understood in various sanctions and peacekeeping measures. The current research, hence, finds that the mandates to any of the UN initiatives were not rigorously addressing the natural resource as the core cause of the civil war. Although, of late in 2000, the UN imposed prohibition on diamond exports from Sierra Leone, it had not issued any direction to the peacekeeping force, which was on in the field, to check and monitor the illegal diamond trade or to monitor implementation of the sanctions. The casual approach of the UN towards the role of diamonds in sustaining and prolonging of the Sierra Leonean civil war resulted firstly violations of sanctions as reported by the panel of experts, and secondly in diluting the UN responses especially addressing the 'natural resource civil wars'.

CONCLUSION

War and conflict are two dominant phenomena in the history of international relations. The twentieth century had experienced many devastating wars resulting in the formation of a universal international organization, in the name of the United Nations, to maintain international peace and security. However, the Cold War had threatened again the international peace and security. During the Cold War the interstate conflicts occupied the United Nations major engagements. But, on the other hand, at the end of the Cold War the internal conflicts and civil wars started getting attention of the international community. The end of Cold War has resulted in the decrease of interstate conflicts and an increase in the intrastate civil wars. This shift in the nature of the conflicts from interstate to intrastate has changed the nature of UN engagements in the arena of conflict resolution. However, the internal conflicts are matter of domestic concerns and the international community or the United Nations should not ideally interfere into such matters under domestic jurisdiction as per the chapter 1(7) of the UN Charter.

In the post-Cold War, however, the civil wars are increasingly threatening the international peace and security by causing serious humanitarian crises and human rights violations such as genocides, killing of civilians, increase of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). This had led the United Nations to step into the matter in order to save the life of the civilians and to maintain international peace and security. The increasing number of civil wars has compelled the United Nations to take internal conflicts in its priority agenda. Among all the civil wars, the ‘natural resource civil wars’ constitute a major challenge towards the international peace and security. A ‘natural resource civil war’ has not only involved large scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian norms in the origin country but also it has tended to be more precarious threat to the international peace and security as these conflicts involve many international dimensions such as international markets network; i.e. diamond market and arms supply, and regional effects such as trafficking and smuggling of natural resources through the neighbouring countries, refugee influx and other humanitarian consequences and the spillover of the conflict into the region. And henceforth ‘natural resource civil war’ has been a matter of

concern for the international community and, especially, the United Nations. The current research has concentrated in bringing out this arena of the United Nations engagement specifically in the 'natural resource civil war'. This dissertation has discussed the nature, trends and issues relating to the 'natural resource civil wars' and then analysed the effectiveness of the responses of the United Nations to these type of internal conflicts. To add an empirical analysis, this dissertation takes Sierra Leone as the case-study.

The relationship between the natural resources and civil wars has been multifaceted. The abundance of natural resources has become a curse in some societies despite its development potentials while a blessing in some others. The natural resources become 'resource curse' where the natural resources could not contribute to the national development and lead to the outbreak of civil wars in the society. However, governance deficit and political instability have also added the risk of 'natural resource civil war'. The effects of such resource curse could well be observed in the reverse growth of economy. The natural resources cause collapse of national economy because of illicit mining and smuggling of lucrative natural resources such as diamond and gold by the rebels. Once these lucrative natural resources are accessed to illicit traders and smugglers, the resources create the risk of civil war in the society. The civil wars in many countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Cambodia and many other countries are directly linked with natural resources in one way or the other.

The resource abundance leading towards the risk of civil war has been more feasible in the societies where ethnic stratification reflects diversity and especially where one or two majority ethnic groups have not been properly accommodated in the country's political leadership. The sense of deprivation and negligence and ethnic cohesion has significantly added to the risk of civil war in those resource-rich countries. The rebel recruitment has been the major task of a rebellion and therefore the ethnic cohesion helps out in getting through the rebel recruitment process and also helps in receiving mass support. However, in the process the rebel groups tend to create sense of ethnic hatred in order to smoothen the process mobilisation of the masses. The sense of ethnic hatred, on one hand, and the ethnic cohesion, on the

other, creates a ground for prolonging civil war. However, in most of the cases, the greed of the rebel leaders causes more risks of civil war rather than grievances of the masses. In such cases, the natural resources have become the cause of armed conflicts.

The interface of natural resources and civil war can also be extended to another two different connotations such as natural resource being the cause of the civil war, and the natural resources as the source of war revenue. The first category eventually reflects the conflicts over the scarcity of natural resources and, also, over the uneven distribution of natural resources in the resource-rich poor countries. The community ownership of natural resources or the claims of the local communities over the natural resources tend to cause ethnic clashes, in turn, leading to major civil conflicts. However, the greed of the rebel leaders instigates the local community to fight over the natural resources.

On the other hand, in most of the instances natural resources become source of war revenues reflecting both greed and grievances of the rebel groups. The ‘natural resource civil wars’, where the role of natural resources is confined to providing war revenues have tended to last for longer periods. The rebel groups in such civil wars use different techniques to accumulate revenues. The foremost has been the controlling of the mining areas of natural resources. Once they could exert their control over the mining areas they can sustain in the war. The extortion from the existing extraction companies also contributes in the revenue accumulation of the rebels. Nonetheless, smuggling of the natural resources in the international black market provides major chunk of illicit revenue to the rebel groups. Thus, natural resources have become ‘the factor’ for stimulating and prolonging of some of the civil wars.

So far the ‘natural resource civil wars’ are concerned, different actors play distinctive role in sustaining the conflict. The primary actor has been the rebel groups. Their acts have been highly visible during the war. On the other, there are other actors who act in the dark but continue to play their role in the conflict. The neighbouring countries, resource extraction companies, diaspora communities and the local communities are such significant actors. These actors provide support to the rebel group activities in different capacities. The role of neighbouring countries is very crucial for the rebel group activities. They extend all logistical support to the rebel

group in order to get access to the illicit mining of natural resources. They provide transit routes to the illicit trade in natural resources and also, in some instances, arms and military training to the rebel groups. The smuggling of lucrative natural resources such as diamonds is becoming easier with the help of the neighbouring countries. The role of international corporate entities, especially diamond industries, and resource extraction companies are equally crucial in 'natural resource civil war'. Due to lack of resources and technology, the resource-rich poor countries are heavily dependent on foreign corporations for resource extraction as well as exporting and marketing of natural resources. Taking this opportunity some of the international corporate houses indulge in illicit mining and trade of natural resources by extending their cooperation and extortion to the rebel groups. The diaspora communities also play an active part in many of the civil wars. They provide financial assistance to the rebel groups and also create a favourable public opinion in their host countries. The role of diasporas become crucial when the rebel group belongs to a particular ethnic community. The larger the size of diaspora, the greater the role they play in determining and sustaining a civil war. Apart from these actors, local communities play a very important role in the sustenance of a civil war. The participation of local people may determine the life of the civil war. Their participation however requires some incentives such as wages, protection from physical harm, and other economic incentives. On the other hand, in some instances, the participation of local communities comes from the coercive recruitment policies of the rebel groups. Although different actors play varied role in a 'natural resource civil war', the civilians are mostly victimised in the conflicts. It has vicious effects on the life of the civilians by causing massive violations of human rights and humanitarian crises, and by destabilizing state and society. It creates severe humanitarian crises not only in the country of the origin but also in the region. The sufferings of the civilians and massive violations of human rights and humanitarian norms compels the international community and especially the United Nations to respond to such internal conflict.

This dissertation intensively deals with the responses of the United Nations towards the matter of 'natural resource civil war'. The international community and especially the United Nations have become concerned over the growth of 'natural resource civil war' considering different humanitarian consequences of such conflicts. Various grounds are been considered while the United Nations have responded to

such internal conflicts that rather constitute a matter of state jurisdiction. The civil wars in general and the ‘natural resource civil wars’ in particular cause severe damage to the international humanitarian norms by violating basic human rights and endangering the life of the civilians in the conflicting countries. The consequences of such war cause various humanitarian crises in the society such as producing refugees, internally displaced persons, causing food crises, causing disruption of basic educational and medical services and more shockingly mass murders and genocides. The ‘CNN Effect’, the twenty four hours Cable News Network has opened the eyes of the international community and major world powers telecasting the graveness of these conflicts and humanitarian crises. And therefore, the United Nations and other international actors tended to intervene into such situations on humanitarian grounds. The ‘natural resource civil wars’ have also endangered the international peace and security as this type of civil wars have many international dimensions affecting life of the people not only in the country of its origin but also in the region as a whole. Since, the natural resources are accumulated at the cost of lives of millions of civilians and smuggled out of the conflicting country, enter in the international market questioning the commitment of the international community to maintain peace and security in the world. Moreover, the effects in the neighbouring region in terms of humanitarian crises such as refugee inflow and spillover effect of conflicts urged the United Nations to respond in order to maintain international peace and security by preventing further extension of the conflicts and containing the existing situations. Thus, the civil wars in general and ‘natural resources civil wars’ in particular have become a priority subject of the United Nations in the post-Cold War.

The United Nations have advanced various measures to respond to such internal conflicts during last two decades. This dissertation has analysed various UN measures in different categories of responses such as preventive measures, peacekeeping operations, regulative measures, constitution of expert groups, humanitarian intervention, and peacebuilding measures. The preventive measures include early warning, mediation, conditional aid, sanctions, and peacekeeping missions. Among all these preventive measures, sanctions and especially the targeted sanctions are widely used to prevent and contain a conflict situation. The United Nations however used to target the containment of arms flow into the conflict situation as free flow of arms and related materials intensifies the viability of

conflicts. The peacekeeping operations are also used to prevent the intensity of conflicts and also to monitor the ceasefire between the government and the rebels. However, a peacekeeping operation focuses on the maintenance of peace and monitoring the situation. Initially, the peacekeeping operations in ‘natural resource civil wars’ were not mandated to monitor the movement of illicit natural resources, but, of late, the United Nations has given a few responsibilities to the peacekeepers regarding the monitoring of natural resources along with the government forces. The regulative measures such as imposition of targeted sanctions and the ‘certificate of origin’ regimes are also initiated by the United Nations. So far as the ‘natural resource civil wars’ are concerned, sanctions on the trade of illicit diamonds have been imposed to regulate the movement of illicit natural resources. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the regulatory sanction regimes, the United Nations has initiated ‘certificate of origin’ regime. Moreover, the United Nations has advanced other measures such as formation of expert panel to study and monitor the developments in the situations, and peacebuilding measures for post-war capacity building. The UN engagement in post-conflict peacebuilding however aims at long term peace in the society by improving the capacities of the state institutions. The responses of the United Nations have been effective at large in terms of containing the intensity of the conflict but the mandates given to the specific measures such as to sanction regimes and peacekeeping missions are not so effective due to lack of proper monitoring system and lack of proper mandates relating to natural resources.

The current research takes up the civil war in Sierra Leone as the case-study to give an empirical idea of UN engagements in ‘natural resource civil wars’. The ‘natural resource civil war’ in Sierra Leone, one of the most brutal and destructive internal conflicts ever experienced in the history of civil wars fighting over diamonds, demonstrates natural resources as driving force for the outbreak of a longstanding civil war. The civil war in Sierra Leone was synonymous with the massive violation of human rights and international humanitarian norms. It has also created severe humanitarian crises in the region and posed a serious threat to the international peace and security, resulting in interventions from the United Nations and the international community.

The historical background of the society and politics of Sierra Leone reflect the lack of democracy and transparency in the country under the authoritarian All Peoples' Congress (APC) regime. The mass frustration over the malgovernance of the country's natural resources and public services led to the outbreak of civil war in the country. However, the ethnic stratification of Sierra Leone which shows the dominance of a few groups over others especially in political leadership also helped in ethnic cohesion during the conflicts in the country. Significantly, the Sierra Leone conflict was not started in an ethnic line as the main rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was represented by the different ethnic groups. However, in a later stage, the counter-RUF militia groups especially the Kamajor Rural Militia, were mostly formed by the Mende ethnic group of Northern Sierra Leone showing the ethnic cohesion in the counter-revolutionary activities.

The civil war in Sierra Leone is an outcome of mass anger against the authoritarian and corrupt regime of the All Peoples' Congress. However, in the subsequent years of the commencement of civil war, the orientation of the rebel leaders has changed to control over the natural resource-rich areas of the country, although they started the rebellion in name of overthrowing the corrupt and authoritarian regime and establishing democratic regime in the country. The Eastern part of the Sierra Leone is blessed with rich diamonds and once the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), rebel group of the Sierra Leonean civil war could exert its control over the region it forgot its entire commitments. The RUF offensive and its brutal acts were mostly confronted by the people of Northern provinces, mostly of the Mende ethnic groups. Thus, the civil war in the country grows with destruction of socio-political and economic infrastructure of the country as well as the damage to the human rights and humanitarian norms for eleven long years.

The peace initiatives of various actors of international actors especially the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations were ineffective as the RUF was continuing with their sole motive of illegal control over the diamond mining areas. However, the United Nations had responded to the Sierra Leone civil war only in 1997 after seven years of brutal conflict. The immediate needs of international intervention became crucial when a faction of Sierra Leone Army backed by the RUF successfully established a military junta regime

overthrowing the democratically elected government. The ECOWAS has been the major international actor to intervene into the Sierra Leone situations. It had decided to send ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a peacekeeping force to restore the democratic and civilian government. The ECOMOG stayed in the country till the signing of Lome Peace Accord in 1999 and then replaced by the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the UN peacekeeping mission. Thus UN had landed in the later stage of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

The first major response from the UN came in the form of sanctions in 1997. However, this sanction was on the movement of arms and petroleum products and not related to natural resources. The UNAMSIL was the second major response of the United Nations which had played a deciding role in resolving the Sierra Leone conflict. The 'Certification of Origin' regime has been another significant action taken by the United Nations. However, for the first time in the year 2000, the United Nations was responded directly to consider the illicit diamond trade as the major cause for continuation of the conflict. The sanction on illicit diamond trade was imposed late in 2000, leading towards the adoption of 'certificate of origin' regime. The sanction on illegal diamond trade was not so effective in checking the illegal trade following non-compliance of the importing parties. The post-war engagement of the UN can be observed in approving two peacebuilding missions into Sierra Leone namely, UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), and UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). These peacebuilding missions helped in conducting democratic elections and building capacities of the state institutions. The peacebuilding initiatives however aim at bringing long term peace by ensuring good governance and transparent administration. These peacebuilding missions have to cooperate and coordinate all the post-conflict reconstruction activities of different international agencies. Significantly, the UNIOSIL, the first peacebuilding mission in Sierra Leone was given a specific mandate to identify the sources of potential threats to peace and security including natural resources. However, the major peacebuilding mission which has been currently under operation in the country namely the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) has not been give any specific mandates relating to natural resources.

The responses of the United Nations so far as the ‘natural resource civil wars’ are concerned have not been so effective because of various loopholes in the mandates and the way it responded. One of the major drawbacks of the UN responses as the current research finds, is that there is a lack of political will within the UN community to categorically identify the natural resources as the root cause of many civil wars. It was only the panel of experts that has categorically identified the role of natural resources in civil war only in the year 2000. Moreover, the UN has very lately decided to mandate its peacekeeping missions to monitor the natural resources in the conflicting country. The Sanctions regimes in ‘natural resources civil war’ situations are subjected to be ineffective as there was no mechanism to check the amount of natural resources that have been smuggled out of the country and there was a non-requirement of compliance from the importing countries. The violation of the sanctions was widely reported in various reports of the panel of experts. The rebel groups kept on indulging in the illicit diamond trade with the help of neighbouring countries and some of the diamond companies. The transit route of Sierra Leone diamonds was reportedly through Liberia and through Liberia it reached to the Gambian diamond market from where it reached the international market. Therefore, the illicit diamond trade could not be checked under the measures taken up by the United Nations.

The United Nations’ responses to the Sierra Leone have, however, been a mixed outcome. The Sierra Leone civil war was not effectively handled by the United Nations. This research finds some of the loopholes and short comings that reflect and prove the ineffectiveness of the UN engagements. The United Nations was quiet for a long time and did not take any preventive measure in the initial stage of the conflict. It leads to draw the inference that the international body was not concerned about the massive human rights violations and humanitarian crises in the region but rather it was insisting upon the regional organizations to take appropriate measures. Nonetheless, the United Nations responded into the situations in Sierra Leone in 1997 with the imposition of sanctions. But, even then, it did not take seriously the natural resource aspect of the conflict, since the mandates of the sanctions did not include the ban on illicit diamond trade. Subsequently, the peacekeeping operation that was keen to respond effectively to save the life of the people and to contain the conflict was however handicapped as it had only observer status and not mandated with any

specific responsibility to check the diamond trade. On the other hand, the United Nations was dependent on the peacekeeping operations of the ECOWAS for maintaining peace and saving the life of the civilians. The Peacekeeping missions were initially not mandated to monitor the sanctions or check the illicit diamond trade, or even patrolling of the diamond mining areas although after the conflict was over, the UNAMSIL, was asked to monitor and patrol the diamond mining fields along with national police forces. Nonetheless, the 'certificate of origin' regime was also not very effective as there was lack of compliance mechanism for the diamond importing countries. The proper regulatory mechanism for the trade in diamonds was achieved only after the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme was agreed to by major exporting and importing countries along with diamond industries in the world. The current research takes the impression that most of the UN measures proved to be futile in order to check and contain effectively the 'natural resource civil wars'. However, the post-war engagements of the UN have been effectively working for the improvement of the governance system by assisting in the capacity-building of the state institutions. The peacebuilding initiatives of the UN reflect the long-term goal of peace that aims at establishing good governance and participatory democracy which would lead towards the proper governance and management of natural resources and would decrease the propensity of violent conflicts in such societies.

This research finds that the hypothesis of this study, defective mandates for peace operations and sanctions impede the effort to control 'natural resource civil war', stands valid. The mandates of various UN responses were defective to address the specific case of 'natural resource civil war'. No mandate of the UN categorically mentioned the natural resources as the root cause of the conflict in the initial period of its engagements. However, during the initial stage, what could be observed was the hesitation on the part of the UN to take up stronger actions against civil war situation in a sovereign country, which resulted in late responses of the United Nations. One reason for non-engagement of the UN in the West African region is the activism of ECOWAS in the region. This sub-regional organization has involved in resolving conflicts in the region. Nevertheless, the UN had been appreciating the ECOWAS engagement in the region during its non-engagement. So far as the Sierra Leone civil war is concerned, the ECOWAS was the first international organization to decide for an intervention which was even endorsed by the UN. Although, the UN had

responded with a sanction regime against the military junta and the RUF, it did not reflect any sense of curbing the major cause of such conflict, which happened to be the natural resources. The limited mandates reflected the lack of political will to contain a 'natural resource civil war'. The similar limited mandates could be observed in the other measures such as the subsequent sanctions, peacekeeping missions, certification schemes, and peacebuilding missions. Although the mandates for these measures did not properly address the aspect of natural resource management, however, ensuring security of the civilians, establishing good governance, and also taking actions for preventing the recurrence of the conflicts were included. Since the mandates to different measures did not categorically explain the natural resources, the root cause of the conflict impeded the UN efforts to control 'natural resource civil wars'.

The research further validates another hypothesis of the study that is, illegal control of the RUF over the diamond trade caused the prolonging of the civil war for a decade. The Sierra Leonean civil war which had been prolonged for eleven long years has many arguments to prove this assumption. The illicit diamond trade was giving enormous revenue to the RUF leaders and therefore they did not want to end the conflict. The current research finds that the non-interest of RUF to cease the violence was led by their interests in continuing control over the natural resources of the country. It did not follow any of the ceasefire and peace agreements which were signed during the conflict with the mediation from the ECOWAS and the United Nations. After signing Abidjan Treaty in 1995, democratic election was held in the country in 1996. However, the RUF did not follow the terms of peace and they resorted violence by overthrowing the democratically elected government with the help of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a faction of Sierra Leone Army. The RUF backed AFRC in overthrowing of democratic government in order to maintain and continue the control over natural resources. The second evidence was in 1999, when RUF violated the Lome Peace Agreement. According to this agreement peace was supposed to be achieved after ceasefire and disarmament and rehabilitation of the RUF cadres which was ensured for ending the violence. However, after signing the accord, the RUF re-engaged and resurrected violence to continue their control over the diamond mining areas in the country. This time the RUF went ahead with massive violence and it had taken hostage of UN peacekeepers that resulted in

military intervention in Sierra Leone. Thus, it could be observed that the sole motive of the RUF throughout the conflict period was to control the diamond mining areas which eventually resulted in prolonging the conflict. Henceforth, both of the hypotheses of this study stand valid with substantial evidences.

The ‘natural resource civil war’ has threatened the peace and security and the protection of human rights violations in the world. The enormity of the human suffering tends to be more intensified in the civil conflicts which have made the international humanitarian norms more precarious in the post-Cold War era. The eventual decrease of interstate conflicts and dramatic increase of civil wars compelled the international community to take a responsible stand on resolving the internal conflicts in order to protect the human life and find away out to the resultant humanitarian crises. As the legitimate actor of the international community, the United Nations has to take seriously the ‘natural resource civil wars’ which indeed threaten the human rights and international peace and security. Although there have been some drawbacks and loopholes in the way the UN responded to the ‘natural resource civil wars’ in recent years, in the future it has to take special considerations on the lessons learned from the earlier experiences and the recommendations of various panel of experts and academic studies. The current study finds that the United Nations needs to consider a robust view of the ‘natural resource civil war’ even with more proactive responses to tackle such conflicts in the days to come. The mandates of the sanction regimes and peacekeeping should more clearly state the aspect of natural resources. The identification of the root cause of the conflict is indeed helpful to take necessary measures accordingly. The sanction regimes should follow a powerful monitoring system and violation of such sanctions should be addressed with strong actions. The peacekeeping forces should be empowered with required mandates to monitor the sanctions, to protect the natural resource areas and to oversee the regulatory mechanisms of the trade in the conflict-resources. To wash out the possibility of the recurrence of such conflicts, the post-war capacity-building and peacebuilding agendas should clearly mandate the issue of natural resource governance. The primary concerns that the current research confronted so far as the responses of the United Nations are concerned, is the hesitation or lack of will to categorically identify some of the natural resources as the root cause of many of the civil wars in the world. Therefore, for an effective intervention to such ‘natural

resource civil wars', identification of the root cause and the source of war finance should be prioritised. Thus, if the civil war is identified as 'natural resource civil war', the effective responses could be advanced accordingly. The shortcomings and the challenges before the UN responses could well be overcome with a strong political will and a commitment of the international community.

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**Security Council**Distr.: General
5 July 2000

Resolution 1306 (2000)**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4168th meeting, on
5 July 2000***The Security Council,*

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the situation in Sierra Leone, and in particular its resolutions 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998 and 1299 (2000) of 19 May 2000,

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 19 May 2000 (S/2000/455), and in particular its paragraph 94,

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

A

Expressing its concern at the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, and at reports that such diamonds transit neighbouring countries, including the territory of Liberia,

Welcoming ongoing efforts by interested States, the International Diamond Manufacturers Association, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, the Diamond High Council, other representatives of the diamond industry and non-governmental experts to improve the transparency of the international diamond trade, and encouraging further action in this regard,

Emphasizing that the legitimate diamond trade is of great economic importance for many States, and can make a positive contribution to prosperity and stability and to the reconstruction of countries emerging from conflict, and *emphasizing further* that nothing in this resolution is intended to undermine the legitimate diamond trade or to diminish confidence in the integrity of the legitimate diamond industry,

Welcoming the decision taken by the member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at their Abuja summit on 28-29 May 2000 to undertake a regional inquiry into the illegal trade in diamonds,

Taking note of the letter of 29 June 2000 to its President from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations and of its enclosure (S/2000/641),

1. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory;

2. *Requests* the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure, as a matter of urgency, that an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in diamonds is in operation in Sierra Leone;

3. *Also requests* States, relevant international organizations and other bodies in a position to do so to offer assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to facilitate the full operation of an effective Certificate of Origin regime for Sierra Leone rough diamonds;

4. *Further requests* the Government of Sierra Leone to notify the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997) ("the Committee") of the details of such a Certificate of Origin regime when it is fully in operation;

5. *Decides* that rough diamonds controlled by the Government of Sierra Leone through the Certificate of Origin regime shall be exempt from the measures imposed in paragraph 1 above when the Committee has reported to the Council, taking into account expert advice obtained at the request of the Committee through the Secretary-General, that an effective regime is fully in operation;

6. *Decides* that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above are established for an initial period of 18 months, and *affirms* that, at the end of this period, it will review the situation in Sierra Leone, including the extent of the Government's authority over the diamond-producing areas, in order to decide whether to extend these measures for a further period and, if necessary, to modify them or adopt further measures;

7. *Further decides* that the Committee shall also undertake the following tasks:

(a) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

(b) To consider information brought to its attention concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

(c) To make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

(d) To promulgate such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

(e) To continue its cooperation with other relevant sanctions committees in particular that established pursuant to resolution 985 (1995) of 13 April 1995 concerning Liberia and that established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993 concerning the situation in Angola;

8. *Requests* all States to report to the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997), within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

9. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those through which rough diamonds from Sierra Leone are known to transit, and all relevant international and regional organizations to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of adoption of this resolution;

10. *Encourages* the International Diamond Manufacturers Association, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, the Diamond High Council and all other representatives of the diamond industry to work with the Government of Sierra Leone and the Committee to develop methods and working practices to facilitate the effective implementation of this resolution;

11. *Invites* States, international organizations, members of the diamond industry and other relevant entities in a position to do so to offer assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to contribute to the further development of a well-structured and well-regulated diamond industry that provides for the identification of the provenance of rough diamonds;

12. *Requests* the Committee to hold an exploratory hearing in New York no later than 31 July 2000 to assess the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict and the link between trade in Sierra Leone diamonds and trade in arms and related *materiel* in violation of resolution 1171 (1998), involving representatives of interested States and regional organizations, the diamond industry and other relevant experts, *requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary resources, and *further requests* the Committee to report on the hearing to the Council;

13. *Welcomes* the commitments made by certain members of the diamond industry not to trade in diamonds originating from conflict zones, including in Sierra Leone, *urges* all other companies and individuals involved in trading in rough diamonds to make similar declarations in respect of Sierra Leone diamonds, and *underlines* the importance of relevant financial institutions encouraging such companies to do so;

14. *Stresses* the need for the extension of government authority to the diamond-producing areas for a durable solution to the problem of illegal exploitation of diamonds in Sierra Leone;

15. *Decides* to conduct a first review on the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above no later than 15 September 2000, and further such reviews every six months after the date of adoption of the resolution, and to consider at those times what further measures may be necessary;

16. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and, as appropriate, other organizations and interested parties to report to the Committee information on possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

B

Stressing the need to ensure effective implementation of the measures concerning arms and related materiel imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998),

Stressing the obligation of all Member States, including those neighbouring Sierra Leone, to comply fully with the measures imposed by the Council,

Recalling the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa adopted in Abuja on 31 October 1998 (S/1998/1194, annex),

17. *Reminds* States of their obligation to implement fully the measures imposed by resolution 1171 (1998), and *calls upon* them, where they have not already done so, to enforce, strengthen or enact, as appropriate, legislation making it a criminal offence under domestic law for their nationals or other persons operating on their territory to act in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of that resolution, and to report to the Committee not later than 31 July 2000 on the implementation of those measures;

18. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and, as appropriate, other organizations and interested parties to report to the Committee information on possible violations of the measures imposed by the Council;

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, to establish a panel of experts, for an initial period of four months, consisting of no more than five members:

(a) To collect information on possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998) and the link between trade in diamonds and trade in arms and related materiel including through visits to Sierra Leone and other States as appropriate, and making contact with those they consider appropriate, including diplomatic missions;

(b) To consider the adequacy, for the purpose of detecting flights of aircraft suspected of carrying arms and related materiel across national borders in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998), of air traffic control systems in the region;

(c) To participate, if possible, in the hearing referred to in paragraph 12 above;

(d) To report to the Council through the Committee with observations and recommendations on strengthening the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998), and of those imposed by paragraph 1 above, no later than 31 October 2000;

and *further requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary resources;

20. *Expresses* its readiness, on the basis, *inter alia*, of the report produced pursuant to paragraph 19 (d) above, to consider appropriate action in relation to States that it determines to have violated the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998) and paragraph 1 above;

21. *Urges* all States to cooperate with the panel in the discharge of its mandate, and *underlines*, in this regard, the importance of the cooperation and technical expertise of the Secretariat and other parts of the United Nations system;

22. *Requests* the Committee to strengthen existing contacts with regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity, and relevant international organizations, including INTERPOL, with a view to identifying ways to improve effective implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1171 (1998);

23. *Requests* the Committee to make information it considers relevant publicly available through appropriate media, including through the improved use of information technology;

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to publicize the provisions of this resolution and the obligations imposed by it;

25. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General
17 September 2004

Resolution 1562 (2004)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5037th meeting, on
17 September 2004**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the situation in Sierra Leone,

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Commending the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States towards building peace in the subregion, and encouraging the Mano River Union member States to continue their dialogue aimed at building regional peace and security,

Encouraging the United Nations missions in the region to continue their efforts towards developing inter-mission cooperation, especially in the prevention of movements of arms and combatants across borders and in the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 10 September 2004 (S/2004/724),

Welcoming the further progress made towards the benchmarks for drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and commending UNAMSIL for the progress made to date in the adjustments to its size, composition and deployment,

Underlining the importance of additional efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Sierra Leone Police and armed forces to maintain security and stability effectively,

Underlining the importance of increasingly close collaboration between UNAMSIL and the United Nations country team in Sierra Leone, to ensure a smooth transition after the final departure of UNAMSIL,

Expressing its appreciation for the essential work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, noting its vital contribution to the establishment of the rule of law in Sierra Leone, and encouraging all States to cooperate fully with the Court,

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that the mandate of UNAMSIL shall be extended until 30 June 2005;

2. *Decides further* that the tasks of the residual UNAMSIL presence, which shall remain in Sierra Leone for an initial period of six months from 1 January 2005, as set out in paragraph 5 of resolution 1537 (2004) of 30 March 2004, shall be the following:

Military and civilian police tasks

- To monitor, in conjunction with district and provincial security committees, the overall security situation, to support the Sierra Leone armed forces and police in patrolling the border and diamond-mining areas, including through joint planning and joint operations where appropriate, and to monitor the growing capacity of the Sierra Leone security sector;
- To support the Sierra Leone Police in maintaining internal security, including security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone while UNAMSIL remains deployed in Sierra Leone;
- To assist the Sierra Leone Police with its programme of recruitment, training and mentoring designed to strengthen further the capacity and resources of the Police;
- To protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

Civilian tasks

- To monitor the repatriation, reception, resettlement and reintegration of Sierra Leonean ex-combatants from abroad;
- To monitor, investigate, report and promote the observance of human rights;
- To disseminate information on the mission's mandate and purpose and publicize the Government's primary responsibility for national security, including through United Nations radio;
- To monitor progress towards consolidation of State authority throughout the country;

3. *Authorizes* the residual UNAMSIL presence to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

4. *Expresses* its intention to review regularly the residual UNAMSIL presence against the following benchmarks:

- Strengthening the capacity of the Sierra Leone armed forces and police to maintain security and stability effectively throughout the country;
- Consolidating State authority throughout the country;
- Consolidating the deployment of UNMIL throughout Liberia;

5. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's assurance, as set out in paragraph 91 of his report of 19 March 2004 (S/2004/228), that where military observers, civil affairs officers, political affairs officers, human rights officers and civilian police personnel are co-deployed, they will function as integrated units and work in close collaboration with the United Nations country team;

6. *Urges* the Government of Sierra Leone to intensify its efforts to develop an effective and sustainable police force, armed forces, penal system and independent judiciary, so that the Government can take over from UNAMSIL as soon as possible full responsibility for maintaining law and order throughout Sierra Leone, including in the sensitive diamond-producing areas, and encourages donors and UNAMSIL, in accordance with its mandate, to continue to assist the Government in this regard, as well as to assist the Government in restoring public services throughout the country;

7. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's intention to keep the security, political, humanitarian and human rights situation in Sierra Leone under close review and to report regularly to the Council, after due consultations with troop-contributing countries and the Government of Sierra Leone;

8. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

**Security Council**Distr.: General
31 August 2005

Resolution 1620 (2005)**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5254th meeting, on
31 August 2005***The Security Council,**Recalling* its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the situation in Sierra Leone,*Commending* the valuable contribution the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has made to the recovery of Sierra Leone from conflict and to the country's peace, security and development,*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General of 26 April 2005 (S/2005/273), and its addendum of 28 July 2005 (S/2005/273/Add.2), and welcoming his recommendation that a United Nations integrated office be established in Sierra Leone, after the withdrawal of UNAMSIL at the end of 2005, in order to continue to assist the Government of Sierra Leone to consolidate peace by enhancing political and economic governance, building the national capacity for conflict prevention, and preparing for elections in 2007,*Noting* the letter of 21 June 2005 from the President of Sierra Leone to the Secretary-General (S/2005/419), that likewise emphasizes the need for an integrated United Nations office to support the above objectives,*Emphasizing* the importance of a smooth transition between UNAMSIL and the new United Nations integrated office, and of the effective and efficient operation of the office,*Emphasizing* the importance of the continued support of the United Nations and the international community for the long-term security and development of Sierra Leone, particularly in building the capacity of the Government of Sierra Leone,*Reiterating* its appreciation for the essential work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and its vital contribution to the establishment of rule of law in Sierra Leone and the subregion, underlining its expectation that the Court will finish its work in accordance with its Completion Strategy, and in this regard encouraging all States to cooperate fully with the Court and to provide it with the necessary financial resources,

Welcoming the publication of the report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and encouraging the Government of Sierra Leone to take further steps to implement its recommendations,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), as recommended in the addendum to his report (S/2005/273/Add.2), for an initial period of 12 months beginning on 1 January 2006, with the following key tasks:

(a) to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in:

(i) building the capacity of State institutions to address further the root causes of the conflict, provide basic services and accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals through poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth, including through the creation of an enabling framework for private investment and systematic efforts to address HIV/AIDS;

(ii) developing a national action plan for human rights and establishing the national human rights commission;

(iii) building the capacity of the National Electoral Commission to conduct a free, fair and credible electoral process in 2007;

(iv) enhancing good governance, transparency and accountability of public institutions, including through anti-corruption measures and improved fiscal management;

(v) strengthening the rule of law, including by developing the independence and capacity of the justice system and the capacity of the police and corrections system;

(vi) strengthening the Sierra Leonean security sector, in cooperation with the International Military Advisory and Training Team and other partners;

(vii) promoting a culture of peace, dialogue, and participation in critical national issues through a strategic approach to public information and communication, including through building an independent and capable public radio capacity;

(viii) developing initiatives for the protection and well-being of youth, women and children;

(b) to liaise with the Sierra Leonean security sector and other partners, to report on the security situation and make recommendations concerning external and internal security threats;

(c) to coordinate with United Nations missions and offices and regional organizations in West Africa in dealing with cross-border challenges such as the illicit movement of small arms, human trafficking and smuggling and illegal trade in natural resources;

(d) to coordinate with the Special Court for Sierra Leone;

2. *Emphasizes* the primary responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone for the consolidation of peace and security in the country, and urges continued support from international donors for the Government's efforts in this regard;

3. *Underlines* the importance of establishing a fully integrated office with effective coordination of strategy and programmes between the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Sierra Leone, between the United Nations and other international donors, and between the integrated office, the Economic Community of West African States and other United Nations missions in the region;

4. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's recommendation in the addendum to his report (S/2005/273/Add.2) that the integrated office should be headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and his intention that he/she should also serve as the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Resident Coordinator;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue planning for security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the basis outlined in paragraphs 15 to 24 of the addendum to his report (S/2005/273/Add.2), and *looks forward* to further details on the proposed arrangements;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of progress with establishing the United Nations integrated office in Sierra Leone, and thereafter with the implementation of this resolution;

7. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.
