

Arms Transfer to the Persian Gulf States in the Nineteen Seventies and Eighties.

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
C E R T I F I C A T E

Certified that the dissertation entitled "Arms Transfer to the Persian Gulf States in the Nineteen Seventies and Eighties" submitted by Mr. S. Saravanan in partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

Professor K.R. Singh
Supervisor


21 July 1989


Professor Vijay Gupta
Chairman

TO MY PARENTS

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

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CHAPTER - I

FACTORS INFLUENCING ARMS TRANSFER

Arms transfer to the Persian Gulf region is influenced by many factors like geo-strategic importance of the area, international environment at a given time, and political and economic leverage of the countries seeking to acquire arms. Also other factors influencing arms transfer are the super power strategy based upon strategic nuclear weapon system and crucial resources like oil. Domination or control of particular parts of Gulf region could give one power or device military advantage in case of a global war.

Of late, geo-Political importance of the region has further increased because of the Cold War confrontation and the strategies evolved over the years based on their dominant weapon system. The American policy in the 1950's rested on the doctrine of massive retaliation. It was based on bombers and nuclear weapons, promoted a greater Western interest in the region under the northern-tier strategy. Bilateral agreement was signed between USA and regional powers like Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, which led to the formation of Baghdad pact in 1955. After the Iraqi Coup d'etat of the July 1958, Baghdad Pact was changed into Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and in March 1959, USA signed series of bilateral agreements with Turkey, Iran

and Pakistan by which the West acquired facilities for intelligence-gathering, electronic monitoring and surveillance flights like the U-2 flights over the territories of Soviet Union, in return for US arms.¹

For Soviets, the picture was quite different. As the Gulf region was close to Soviet territory and far from United States. Yet, it was the latter which was forming blocs, sending arms and military missions and setting up military bases that could support attacks on the former. As a natural reaction Soviets could be expected to try to break American sponsored bloc and deny United States use of the area for military purposes. To that end they presumably worked to undermine governments which cooperated with Americans and also to encourage these forces which opposed them.

In the early sixties, the development of new weapon systems like ICBM and SLBM reduced the reliance on air bases on the periphery of Soviet Union, which led to the gradual drying up of flow of sophisticated weapons from United States to Iran and Pakistan. The Kennedy Administration, concluded that overseas Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases were no longer cost effective. On 12 April 1962, US base rights Dharan in Saudi Arabia came to an end.²

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1. Geoffery Kemp and Steven Miller, "The Arms Transfer Phenomenon", in Andrew J. Pierre (ed.), Arms Transfer and American Foreign Policy, (New York, 1979), p. 55.
 2. David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia : Ambivalent Allies, (Columbo, 1985), p. 39.

Strategic importance of the area increased in the second half of the sixties due to the official entry of US task force in the Indian ocean, proposals to establish an Anglo-American base in Diego Gracia and the low frequency communication based at North West Cape in Australia. The announcement of Britain's withdrawal from the East of Suez and the subsequent official entry of Soviet task force into the Indian Ocean projected Iran as a local bulwark of the Western interests in the area and attempts were made to arm Iran.

The Guam Doctrine that Nixon espoused in September 1969, envisaged that US would provide 'appropriate' military and economic assistance when necessary to aid a friendly nation against aggression, but leave the primary responsibility for defence of that nation.³ This new policy was reflected in the close bilateral military cooperation between USA and some important oil producing countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The United States also began to take active interest in the modernisation of Saudi armed forces. As early as 1970 Secretary of State, Rogers indicated that in Saudi Arabia, America would provide technical expertise in a variety of fields, including modernisation of armed forces.⁴

3. Kemp and Miller, n.l, p. 52.

4. Lewis Sorley, Arms Transfer Under Nixon : A Policy of Analysis (Kentucky, 1983), p. 126.

The Plan to modernise and expand the Saudi Navy was initiated in 1971 and was to be completed by 1983.⁵ It envisaged acquisition of ships and anti-ship missiles, upgrading of naval headquarters at Riyadh and improving naval facilities at Jiddah on the Red sea and Jubail in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait was made eligible for US Foreign Military sales in January 1971 and it approached the USA in 1972 for the modernisation of its armed forces.⁶ In May 1972, President Nixon visited Iran. It turned out to be an historic visit for the President made the decision to provide the Iranian armed forces virtually any equipment they needed.⁷ Apart from the Nixon Doctrine, two other factors influenced the flow of weapons from the west to the major powers in the Gulf. One was the new awareness of the region's oil resources and the other was the strategic importance of Iran in view of the radar and other electronic bases, and a new strategy based upon the newly introduced weapon system: Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM).⁸

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5. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on the Near East and South Asia, Hearings, New Perspective on the Persian Gulf, 93rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1973), p. 11.
 6. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Special Sub-Committee on Investigations, Hearings. The Persian Gulf, 1975: The Continuing Debates on Arms Sales, 96th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1976), p. 11.
 7. Sorley, n. 4, p. 114.
 8. K.R. Singh, The Persian Gulf : Arms and Arms Control (New Delhi, 1983), p. 11.

In the wake of Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, the OAPEC countries, including the Arab states of the Gulf, used oil as a political weapon to achieve definite goals. For the first time several highly industrialised western nations primarily depending on the oil supply from the Gulf region, realised the vulnerability to instant shortage of energy supplies. Two main considerations arising from the energy crisis were assured and adequate supply of oil. The surplus petro-dollars have forced United States to take greater interest in the Gulf. Arms Transfer also played a major role in pursuing the Western Policy in the light of the total impact of the energy crisis and to help recycle surplus petro-dollars.

In addition to oil, the area had increased importance for the west in terms of nuclear strategy based upon growing Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, the need to monitor the Soviet rocket tests with a radar network, the urgency for greater electronic surveillance, and the possibility of once again using the land frontier of USSR for the ALCM strategy.⁹ Iran provided various options that were useful to the USA to further its strategic nuclear interests in this area.

The USA operated two vital radar based in the northern part of Iran that could cover a large part of Soviet Central Asia and were useful in monitoring Soviet rocket tests.

9. Ibid., p. 13.

The United States started building a multibillion dollar electronic spy network and early warning system in Iran. The spy network, known as IBEX, was first made public in April 1975.¹⁰ It was built by Rockwell International and manned by former employees of the Super-Secret National Security Agency: the early warning system, code named 'Seek Sentry' incorporated long-range radar and communication links into a semiautomated national air defence system.¹¹ Both of these computer based network were designed, built, administered and operated by Americans, with Iranians playing a minor role.

The change of regime in Iran following the 1979 revolution has put serious constraints on American strategic planning in this region. The country now tied closely to the USA is Saudi Arabia. To demonstrate the solidarity with the Saudis a squadron of F-15 of US Air Force was sent on 15 January 1979.¹² In October 1979, the USS Midway carrier battle group was conducting exercise in the Indian Ocean with naval units from United Kingdom and Australia. Following Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in December 1979, a second aircraft carrier battle group from Western Pacific Command arrived in Arabian Sea. Since that time,

10. Ibid., p. 14.

11. Michael T. Klare, "Arms for the Shah", Nation, 222 (4), 13 January 1976, p. 114.

12. Sreedhar, Gulf : Scramble for Security (New Delhi, 1983), p. 20.

more than 150 carriers based tactical aircraft and 14 warships have been continuously available in the Persian Gulf and Arabian sea to maintain a visible US presence.¹³

Provoked by the Afghanistan crisis, United States saw the need for creating a stronger capability for military action in the region. It was to consist of greater naval power in the Indian Ocean, the building up of a 'Rapid Deployment Force' (RDF) that could be moved to where it was needed in case of crisis, and use of naval and air facilities in nearby states willing to cooperate. This capability was not yet in being at the time when President Carter declared, on 23 January 1980, that the United States would resist with all appropriate means, including military force, any Soviet move representing an assault on the vital interest of United States.¹⁴ The aim of the declaratory policy also known as the Carter Doctrine was deterrence, figuratively drawing a line on the map and letting Kremlin know that crossing it would mean conflict with United States, whether or not the latter was ready to contest every metre of territory.

Eight days after the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980, USA sent the Saudis four E-3A sentry, air borne early warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, at their request

13. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 80(2038), May 1980, p. 66.

14. Zbiginiew Brzezinski, Power and Principle : Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-81 (New York, 1983), p; 444

to help them to deal with a possible Iranian attack on their oil fields. The following year Saudi Arabia purchased five AWACS, so as to eventually replace the US AWACS with their own. The intelligence they collect is reportedly relayed to ground facilities - where it is analysed and transmitted to American, Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti commands.¹⁵

On 1 January 1983, the RDF was changed into US Central Command (CENTCOM) head quartered at MacDill Air Force base, Florida.¹⁶ Its establishment marked the maturation of and an increased US emphasis on structuring the necessary command and control arrangements to cover contingencies in the region. Much of what US CENTCOM is supposed to accomplish in the event of armed conflict depends on access to military facilities and over-flight rights, extended by nations in the regions. The Omani agreement could be the linchpin of US CENTCOM strategy. In return for \$ 210 million in direct military assistance, it has granted facilities to USA in several locations in the Sultanate.¹⁷ These include air base facilities at Masirah Island as well as

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15. Stephanie G. Neuman, "Arms, aid and the Super Powers," reproduced in Strategic Digest, 19(3), March 1989, p. 249.
 16. Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf: Threats from Within (Lexington, 1984), p. 1.
 17. Maxwell Orme Johnson, The Military as an Instrument of US Policy in South West Asia : The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1979-82, (Colorado, 1983), p. 20.

naval and air facilities at Muscat. There are in addition air base facilities at Salalah and naval and air facilities at Seeb.¹⁸

There have been some press reports of alleged US reliance on a 'trip-wire strategy' in which United States, by preference or necessity, quickly resorted to theatre nuclear weapons to defend against Soviet attack in the area. While addressing the Council on Foreign Relations on 16 March 1981, the Secretary of State, Harold Brown, said, "We cannot concede to the Soviets full choice of the area or the actions".¹⁹

For United States, an assured supply of oil is the primary consideration. The Iranian Revolution and subsequently the Iran-Iraq war has curtailed the flow of oil to the West. On 21 May 1981, President Reagan responded to the escalation of hostilities by sending a letter to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia that United States had prepared to use force if necessary to protect oil tankers in the Gulf.²⁰ About 60 per cent of the world's imported petroleum comes from this region, about 13 per cent for USA, 45 per cent for Germany, 75 per cent for Japan and France, and the loss of this oil to the economies of the West and Japan would be a

18. Martin, n. 16, p.129.

19. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 80(2038), May 1980, p. 65.

20. Ibid., p. 63.

blow of catastrophic proportions.²¹ The hard fact is that there is nothing that United States or its industrialised partners can do in the coming decade, or probably the next, that would save them severe damage if the oil supply from the Persian Gulf were cut off for a substantial period. The massive arms transfer, being cash and carry, help alleviate United States' balance of payments problem.

There is a significant correlation between French oil imports and its arms sale. Despite its ambitious civil nuclear programme, the nation is dependent for the two-thirds of its energy requirements upon oil from abroad. Major suppliers of oil are Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and those are precisely the states with which Paris has signed its largest contracts for arms since 1974. Although arms-for-oil is never officially acknowledged as a policy, the assurance of future supplies of oil is clearly an important motivation for French leaders. Nevertheless the income from the sale of weapons to the oil producing Middle Eastern states only covers a fraction, about one fifth, of the cost of oil imports.²² The signing of a massive arms deal in 1984 worth of \$ 4 billion between France and Saudi Arabia provided a fresh lease of life for the French arms industry which has been squeezed hard by the financial crunch in the Third World and intensified world wide competition.²³

22. Edward A. Kolodziej, "France and the Arms Trade", International Affairs, ^(London) 1 January 1980, pp. 62-63.

23. Telegraph, 21 January 1984.

In Britain, the existence of an autonomous arms manufacturing capability is not accorded the same degree of political significance as in France. Nor are arms transfer often discussed as important instrument of foreign policy in commercial terms, British industry has not become as dependent on armament exports as that of France. In case of Soviet's, interests was shown in selling arms to countries that could pay in cash from oil revenues; principally Libya and Iraq. As Soviet Union has sought hard currencies to pay for its import of Western technology and grain, it has placed higher reliance on weapon sales as a source of revenue.

One of the major contributing factors for the acquisition of arms in the region is the threat perception of ruling elite. The threat itself might be influenced by various factors such as regime and systemic security, as well as regional security. There are peculiar reasons for the acquisition of arms by the Persian Gulf states like commitment of some Arab states to the Palestine cause and their support to the Arabs in their confrontation with Israel. Also, an army equipped with modern and sophisticated weapon is considered as a symbol of prestige in some of the Arab States.

The arms transfer relationship with a great power helps to guarantee the regime security. The Shah of Iran was supported till the last and the flow of weapons refle-

cted the Western faith in the Shah. The Saudis expect that USA should protect the royal family in return for continued flow of oil. The sale of F-15 is the symbol for many Saudis of the implied US Security commitment to protect the country and royal family from stronger, potentially greedy neighbours and foes in the region.²⁴ After the Iranian revolution, American interest in the Gulf have been articulated in the Carter Doctrine of 1980 and Reagan's corollary to the same. Those interests can be expressed as a protection of Gulf oil supplies from threats within the gulf, particularly the threat of regime change in Saudi Arabia. In 1981, President Reagan said that USA will not allow another 'Iran in Saudi Arabia',²⁵ and the sale of five AWACS to Saudi Arabia during the year demonstrated the American support to them.

Since the political process was not allowed to evolve into liberal-democratic ways, coup d'état or insurgency, and civil war have become the norm of political change in some of these states. Arms were procured to counter that threat, also troops specially trained by USA and Britain, like Javidan of Iran, the White Army of Saudi Arabia and Arab region of Jordan were created as instruments of regime security. Thus, not only the system ic security, but even the national security is equated with regime security.

24. Singh, n. 8, p. 4.

25. Sreedhar, n. 12, p. 14.

The Arab-Israeli conflict, also influenced the arms acquisition programmes of the Arab states in the region. Iran has been actively engaged in the three major Arab-Israeli Wars. Military contingents from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, participated in the 1973 war. It has also been suggested the part of new arms, acquired by the Arab states after 1973, might have been funnelled directly to the confrontation states, especially Egypt. It was reported that Saudi Arabia paid for 38 Mirage III, 24 Westland commando helicopter and 6 Seaking anti-submarine helicopters, to be delivered directly to Egypt.²⁶

The other factor influencing arms transfer to the Gulf is the threat to their territorial integrity and to vital natural resources like oil. The intra-regional conflict that has influenced greater amount of flow of arms to the Gulf, especially to Iran, was the Iran-Iraq controversy after the Iraqi coup d'etat of 1958. The intra-regional conflicts also led to the involvement of outside powers either directly or by proxies. For example, Yemeni Civil war in the sixties, the insurgency in Oman and the confrontation between North and South Yemen in the seventies, and the Iran-Iraq War in the Eighties.

The factors underlying the Iraqi decision to invade Iran in September 1980 were manifold. The issue claimed by Iraq, to be most important, concerned the border between

26. Singh, n. 8, p. 8.

the two countries along the Shatt-al-Arab river and some near by territories. This river is a vital strategic and economic artery for both countries. It provides Iran with its only water-way access to the oil ports of Khorramshahr and Abadan, and it is Iraq's main life-line to the sea. Behind these Iraqi claims there was a broader aim, to destabilise and overthrow the fundamentalist Islamic government in Iran and to take the place of Iran as the predominant military power in the region.

The Iran-Iraq war became the prime motive factor for the arms purchase policy of the states in the region in the eighties. The Gulf countries shared common security concerns, for example, the fear of domestic unrest caused by a spreading Islamic revolution, fear of hegemonic aspirations of Iraq and Iran, and the fear of intervention by the major powers. The formation of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981²⁷ provided a formula to reconcile these security needs.

None of the GCC states can be considered to have a technological base as such. There is a total dependence on arms and skilled man power. Since most of the regimes are considered pro-west, regime survival calls for greater interaction with Western nations which provide most of the weapons and also the trained manpower for their maintenance and to repair them. Despite extensive training programme,

27. Martin, n. 16, p. 26.

some of the weapons acquired were not easily absorbed. Tens of thousands of foreign advisers help to maintain and repair the weapons.

The most spectacular spread of sophisticated weaponry occurred when the sharp increase in the price of crude oil after the 1973 war, brought the oil-exporting states in the region new wealth which, for a considerable part, was used to purchase highly modern arms. On the one hand this resulted in most advanced weapons becoming operational there, in some cases earlier than in the armed forces of the donor countries. On the other hand, these states also faced problems when they introduced modern weapons into their mostly unskilled armed forces. In 1976 staff report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that Iran was so heavily dependent on American personnel that it "could not go to war in the next five to ten years with its current and prospective training... of sophisticated weapons ... without US support on a day to day basis".²⁸ The report estimated that almost 20,000 Americans were in Iran in a training capacity and projected their number to increase, 50,000 to 60,000 by 1980.

In fact, although the number of defence related personnel in Iran grew considerably after 1973, by 1975 there

28. US Congress, Senate, Sub-Committee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Staff Report, United States Military Sales to Iran, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington, 1976), p. X.

was only 1,000 uniformed US military and 2,200 civilians working on Department of Defense related contracts and 531 civilians working on projects for which mutations control licenses were required, making a total of 3,831 US citizens in Iran employed under defence related contracts.²⁹ Of these, only a fraction of the 1,000 uniformed military could be advisors in the real sense, because the bulk worked in support positions. By 1978, 31,000 Americans resided in Iran of whom 1,200 were uniformed who, when added to the US civilians employed on defence related contracts, totalled 30 per cent of the American population in Iran.³⁰

In 1976, Saudi Arabia was having 300 US uniformed military and 900 civilian working on Department of Defense related contracts, accompanied by 2,250 dependents, comprising a total of 3,450 or 21 per cent of the 16,000 American citizens in Saudi Arabia.³¹ By 1978, 38,000 Americans resided in Saudi Arabia, of whom 200 were uniformed military and 3,000 were employed on defense related contracts, comprising less than eleven per cent of the American population in the state.³² In 1981 Saudi Arabia purchased five

29. U.S. Congress, House, n. 6, p. 33.

30. James, H. Noyes, The Clouded Lens : Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy, (California, 1982), p. 66.

31. U.S. Congress, n. 6, p. 67.

32. Noyes, m. 30, p. 67.

AWACS, the last of which was delivered in April 1987. Although the Saudi crew were supposed to fly five AWACS, reportedly only enough Saudis to crew one or two of the planes have been trained, so that US crew are expected to fly for the foreseeable future.³³ The lack of skilled manpower means that foreign military personnel will be entrusted even to operate the weapon system for operational requirements which would put great constraint on the use of these highly sophisticated system acquired at great cost by these Gulf states.

33. Neuman, n. 15, p. 249.

CHAPTER - II

THE BACKDROP : ARMS TRANSFER TO GULF UPTO 1973

The post World War II period witnessed the emergence of a bi-polar international system dominated by United States and Soviet Union. As part of its programme of containment, United States, with its allies, sought close cooperation with the Third World countries bordering on or geographically close to USSR. On 25 May, 1950, under the Tripartite declaration by the United States, France and Britain asserted their opposition to the development of an arms race between Arab states and Israel.¹ It ensured the safety of Israel, since these three countries had the total control of arms supplies to the Middle East.

Request for arms and equipment made by states in the area, willing to join in its defense, will be filled by them to the extent possible following the coordination of such request through Middle East Command.² This policy was reiterated in the four-power statement on a future Allied Middle East Command. Effectively this meant that only countries willing to accept a military alliance with the Western countries would receive the weapons. In 1951 Saudi Arabia signed a military assistance agreement with United States when it granted base rights in Dhahran.³

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1. SIPRI, Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm, 1971), p. 160.
 2. ibid.
 3. David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies, (Colorado, 1985), p. 40.

By the mid-1950's when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was assembling a chain of pacts and treaties to contain USSR, Washington signed a military aid agreement with Iraq, on 21 April 1954,⁴ on the understanding that it would join, what later became the Baghdad pact. The US programme was initially limited involving only eleven US advisers and \$ 9 million in assistance for the first year.⁵ Later Britain adhered to the Pact in April 1955, thus placing her military facilities in Iraq, of ambiguous status since the failure of the Portsmouth Treaty, on a regular footing. Finally, in October 1955, with the recruitment of Iran, recovered from the Mossadeq convulsion and engaged in military cooperation with United States, the 'northern-tier' was organised under the Baghdad Pact.

The membership of Iran, Iraq and Pakistan, in the Baghdad Pact does not seem to have resulted from their awareness of the 'Communist menace'. They joined in order to acquire weapons from United States. At that time, Iran was concerned with keeping down the rebellious groups and latter with its interests in the Persian Gulf. For Iraq, besides its commitment to the Arab cause, weapons

4. SIPRI, n. 1, p. 161.

5. Barry Rubin, United States-Iraq Relations : A Spring Thaw? in Timblock (ed.) Iraq: The Contemporary State (London, 1982), p. 111.

were needed—to cope with various internal problems like the Kurdish insurgency, as well as certain border disputes.

Egypt had been trying hard to acquire arms from the West, but was denied to acquire arms and yet to avoid membership in a Western alliance, Egypt concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia in 1955 which included payment for arms over a twelve-year period in the form of Egyptian cotton and rice.⁶ The entry of Soviet Union into the market marked the beginning of East-West competition in the region.

Egypt countered the Baghdad Pact with formation of series of security pacts with some Arab states in the area during 1955-56. Egypt formed a Joint Command with Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Syria; a separate defense treaty with Saudi Arabia; a unified Frontier Plan with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria; and a five-year Defense Pact with these states plus Yemen in April 1956.⁷ None of these alliances, however, helped in the face of Suez crisis in October and November 1956. Nor did the US support Britain and France in their Egyptian invasion.

In 1956, and 1957, the Soviet Union proposed an international embargo on arms supplies to the Middle East. These

6. Alfred L. Atherton, "The Soviet Role in the Middle East : An American View", Middle East Journal, 39(4) Autumn, 1985, p. 689.

7. Leonre G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf : Threats from Within, (Lexington, 1984), p. 21.

proposals were unacceptable to the Western Powers because they linked the embargo on arms supplies to the withdrawal of foreign troops and the liquidation of foreign bases; they would have involved the break up of the Baghdad Pact.

Once the Western arms monopoly was broken in 1955 the Western powers no longer exacted conditions in return for supplying arms. Instead, one of the main considerations was to ensure that a potential recipient did not acquire weapons from a socialist country. The blow to the power and prestige of Britain and France in the Suez war projected the US as the dominant Western power in the area. The first evidence of this new approach was the Eisenhower Doctrine of 5 January 1957. It proposed an increase in economic and military assistance and authorization to use US troops, "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism".⁸ Unlike previous offers of military assistance it did not require membership in military alliance.

From 1955 to 1958, Iraq received most of its equipment from Britain. Deliveries included 'Vampire', 'Hunter' and 'Venom' jets and 'Centurion' tanks. Iraq's relation with Britain were strained after the Suez crisis. Iraq

8. SIPRI, n. 1, p. 161.



received five 'Sabres' and 'M-24' tanks from United States. In March 1957, USA pledged \$ 12.5 million out of the funds available under the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact and in September 1957, US air-lifted supplies to Iraq during the Syrian crisis.⁹

The Iraqi Revolution of 1958 was a serious blow to the efforts by the West to maintain its Middle East defense system. Iraq became a recipient of Soviet arms and first load which arrived on 27 November 1958,¹⁰ included number of aircrafts like 'MIG-17s', 'YAK-11s' and 'IL-28s', Motor torpedo boats and light and medium tanks. The Iraqi Coup d'e tat of 1958 altered the situation drastically. It revealed the failure of Baghdad Pact to offer systemic security. Further, Iraq abandoned the pro-Western policy. On 24 March 1959, Gen. Qassem announced Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. RAF units stationed at Habbaniya in Iraq were withdrawn. In June 1959, Iraq informed United States that it rejected the US military aid.¹¹

The new Iraqi regime under Gen. Abdel Karim Qassem was not only 'radical' but also heightened, when it revived all the old disputes with Iran which were suppressed under

9. ibid., p. 555.

10. ibid., p. 556.

11. Rubin, n. 5, p. 111.

under the previous regime. In 1960, the dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab led to a large-scale military alert in Iran.¹² At the same time, Gen. Qassem began to take measure against Iraqi communist party. Also, he announced he no longer had any quarrel with the West.

Soviet aid, however, continued and in any case, the overriding objective of Soviet Policy was to prevent Iraq from moving towards the West. In February 1962, Gen. Qassem was overthrown and Gen. Bakr of the Ba'ath party assumed power. The new government was militantly anti-communist. He reopened contacts with the West and in May an agreement was reached with Britain for the supply of 'Saracen' armoured personnel carrier and medium artillery ammunition. Sixty-nine air force cadets were withdrawan from the Soviet Union and most of them were sent to Britain instead.¹³ In retaliation the Soviet government suspended aid, withdrew its technicians and also raised the Kurdish issue in the United Nations. In November 1963, in another coup, Gen. Bakr was replaced by Gen. Aref, Iraq once again re-aligned with Soviet Union. However Iraq continued to receive weapons from Britain and until the next coup in 1966, it purchased 23 'Hunters' and other equipment.

12. K.R. Singh, Iran : Quest for Security (New Delhi, 1981), p. 269.

13. SIPRI, n. 1, p. 557.

On March 1959, in an attempt to counter unease amongst the other pact members, Dulles and Eisenhower proposed a bilateral 'executive agreement' between each of the pact members and United States, which guaranteed the security of each state in the event of external threat.¹⁴ The CENTO, by which name the Baghdad Pact came to be known subsequently was at best a political umbrella against the threat from a superpower but no guarantee against the regional power. Iran considered the 1959 bilateral agreement as an inadequate protection against the combined threat from the USSR and Iraq, especially after Iraq began to acquire new and sophisticated weapon from USSR. Iran's effort to acquire more arms from the USA succeeded only to a limited extent because the new US administration under President Kennedy felt that what Iran had was adequate to safeguard its security.

When the Kennedy administration came to power in 1960, the doctrine of flexible response was evolved. It meant that the response should be appropriate to the threat, for example, conventional threat could be met by conventional response.¹⁵ In 1962 President Kennedy told US army cadets, "subversive insurgency is another type of war, new in its

14. C.D. Carr, "The United States-Iranian Relationship 1948-1978: A Study in Reverse Influence", in Hossein Amirsadeghii (ed.), The Security of Persian Gulf (London, 1981), p. 65.

15. SIPRI, n. 1, p. 21.

intensity, ancient in its origins".¹⁶ Beginning with the fiscal year 1963 Military Assistance Program (MAP), third world countries, which had signed mutual security pacts with United States, became eligible for grants or credits assisted sales of counter insurgency training. The USA scaled back its deliveries of heavy combat gear but increased its transfer of small arms, trucks and utility vehicle, anti-riot gear, and other systems suitable to internal security and counter-guerrilla operations. The supplies of major weapons to the forward defence areas fell. Also, the introduction of new strategic weapon system like ICBM and SLBM were partly responsible for the decline in the strategic importance of the northern ties. This affected the military aid programme to Iran as well as to Pakistan.

The outbreak of the Yemini Civil War in 1962 credited a security threat so serious to Saudi Arabia that for the first time, the need to develop a modern effective military force was seen by the Saudi leadership to outweigh the internal security risks inherent in creating such a force. Not only was Nasser's foreign policy militant, revolutionary and invective against Saudi regime, but his charismatic appeal to young Saudis was seen as a growing threat to stability.¹⁷ A number of Saudi pilots defected to the UAR

16. Michael T. Klare, "US Policy on Arms Transfer to the Third World", in Thomas Ohlson (ed.), Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security, (Oxford, 1988), p. 79.

17. Long, n. 3, p. 40.

and the Saudi government grounded the entire airforce for a short time.¹⁸ Apart from allowing the USA to train and donate equipment, the Saudi regime showed little interest in the regular armed forces. They preferred to rely on the White Army of tribesmen, which was renamed as National Guard in 1963.

By the end of 1962, the situation in Yemen had deteriorated rapidly. Saudi Arabia became actively engaged in supporting the Yemeni Royalist. The UAR was on the side of the Republican and had sent upto 83,000 troops to Yemen. Saudi Arabia not only supported the royalist in Yemen, but also permitted them to establish bases in border area. UAR aircraft bombed the border towns of Najran and Jiran in December 1962 and again in January 1963.¹⁹

Even though USA had recognised the new republican regime, in Yemen which was supported by Egypt and USSR, it dispatched a squadron of fighter aircraft to warn off the Egyptians. This offer ultimately became known as 'Operation Hardsurface'. It involved deployment of a squadron of United States Air Force (USAF) F-100s to Saudi Arabia on 6 July 1963 and lasted, with various extentions, until 30 January 1964.²⁰ In 1965, the Saudis

18. SIPRI, n. 1, p. 561.

19. Long, n. 3, p. 43.

20. *ibid.*, p. 44.

placed orders for an air defence system consisting of a radar network, HAWK SAMs and 'Lightening' interceptors as well as for the construction of a new air base at Khamis Mushayt.²¹ On 21 December 1965 the Parliamentary Secretary to the British Ministry of Aviation announced the joint US/UK deal. Besides 'HAWK SAM', it included 40 'Lightening' and 25 'Jet Provost' aircraft. The deal was for about \$ 450 million and about 1000 British and 800 US nationals were to participate in it.

In mid-1966, an emergency programme known as 'Operation Magic Carpet' was undertaken as an ad hoc arrangement since the full operation of air defense network was to take time. Intended to deter Egyptian attacks on Saudi supply lines to the Yemen's Royalist, it consisted of six second-hand Hunters, five ex-RAF 'Lightnings', 37 ex-army refurbished 'Thunderbird' missiles and radar. But it is not clear that operation Magic Carpet was really essential, because it followed the Jeddah Agreement on 24 August 1965 under which the Egyptian forces were to be withdrawn from Yemen, which commenced by February 1966, long before the new operation was set up.²²

The Yemeni Civil War introduced the Soviet Union into the area as an important supplier to the Republican regime.

21. K.R. Singh, The Persian Gulf : Arms and Arms Control, (New Delhi, 1983), p. 5.

22. *ibid.*, p. 48.

At the same time the interest of oil rich countries, such as Saudi Arabia, in acquiring arms provided a lucrative market in which the Europeans were able to compete with the United States. The reasons for these countries to diversify their sources is the cut in US grant aid from 1964 onwards. In 1965 France offered 'Mirage-III', but the offer was rejected on the grounds of language and political difficulties.²³ The French elimination from the competition can be interpreted as either a Saudi reaction to the French relations with Israel or as a US refusal to counterbalance a deal with France.

In 1964, the Iranians requested an air defence system to cover their installations on Kharag island in the Gulf and refinery at Abadan. The USA agreed in principle to supply them but hinted that the Iranians could not handle at that time the sophisticated weapon like the 'HAWK', and urged Iran to acquire more of F-5 aircrafts. Further the policy of replacing military aid by cash and credit sales was an additional irritant. From 1964, grant aid was drastically reduced and the USA had planned to terminate all grant aid by 1969.²⁴ At that juncture the Shah reportedly hinted that if thwarted by the USA, he might seek his weapons from the USSR, "there was no intention to wreck the alliance with the US but rather to use the Soviet deal

23. SIPRI, n. 1, p. 562.

24. *ibid.*, p. 577.

as a lever to acquire modern weapon from the United States".²⁵
 The end result was that Iran got the 'HAWK SAMs' by 1966.
 But on the whole, the Soviet-Iranian arms deal was a good
 example of arm-twisting by the Shah to get arms for Iran.

The Shah of Iran chose to buy Soviet weapons in 1966,
 when he was involved in a dispute with United States over
 oil and arms supplies. He also wanted the radical support
 for his land reform programme. The conclusion of an arms
 deal with Soviet Union was announced in February 1967.²⁶
 It consisted of \$ 110 million worth of 'non-sensitive'
 military equipment, armoured troop carriers, trucks and anti-
 aircraft guns. The loan was for eight years at 2.5 per cent
 and was to be repaid with primary products until 1969 and
 with natural gas after the completion of Soviet-built pipe-
 line.²⁷ The sale was a significant event because it was
 the first time a country actively participating in a Western
 alliance received Soviet arms.

Britain also concluded an arms deal with Iran in
 1967 which covered some advanced military equipment. In
 addition to destroyers and 4 'Corvettes' it included some
 short-range ship-to-air and surface-to-air missiles called
 'Sea Cat' and 'Tiger Cat'. When France agreed to supply

25. Singh, n. 12, p. 274.

26. Carr., m. 14, p. 73.

27. SIPRI, n.1, p. 578.

armoured cars to Saudi Arabia in 1968, a traditionally Anglo-American market it was hailed in France as a "Political and commercial success."²⁸ It was considered a great blow for the British who were confident that Saudi Arabia would buy 'Saladins'. Further, in 1969, Saudi Arabia ordered six 'Alouette' helicopters from France. Presumably it was the result of the deterioration in relation between the Arab states and Britain, and United States after the June War of 1967. In 1968 the French had become interested in Iraqi oil exploitation and sulphur concession for 'Mirage' deal. However, it failed because Iraq announced that it would exploit oil and sulphur itself with the aid of Soviet Union and Poland, respectively.

The British proclamation of intent to withdraw from the Gulf by 1971 came in 1968, virtually coinciding with the election of Richard Nixon to the Presidency. The vacuum that was created, the increasing importance of oil from the region to United States and its allies in Europe and Japan, concerns about the revolutionary activity in the region. The effect it might have on Western interests, and perhaps most important the necessity to block any Soviet attempts to establish dominance over the region served to reinforce the tenets of Nixon Doctrine with its emphasis on assistance rather than first-hand involvement and the obvious desire on the part of Americans to have

29. *ibid.*, p. 70

some help in carrying the burdens of international responsibility.

The Nixon Doctrine was well explained by former US Secretary of State Clark Clifford "clearly the overriding goal of our collective efforts in Asia must be to assist our allies in building a capacity to defend themselves".²⁹ In which the United States would no longer commit conventional troops for combat and would be prepared instead to rely on local forces. The Nixon 'Doctrine' expanded the reliance upon arms transfer by emphasizing the role of US weapons for indigenous forces as a replacement for the direct presence of American military personnel.

The 'Twin Pillar' policy was a fact explicitly recognised by USA towards the region after the 1968 announcement by the Britain that it would complete its withdrawal from the Gulf by 1971. As articulated by a senior American official, "In the spirit of Nixon Doctrine, we are willing to assist the Gulf states but we look to them to bear the main responsibility for their own defence and to cooperate among themselves to insure regional peace and stability. We especially look to the leading states of the area, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to cooperate for that purpose".³⁰

29. *ibid.*, p. 21.

30. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub Committee on the Near East and South Asia, Hearings, New Perspective on the Persian Gulf, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, 1973), p. 39.

The US Under Secretary Elliot Richardson during his visit to Iran, invoked the Nixon Doctrine of reliance on regional allies to defend regional security and hinted that Iran might play the role of the guardian of gulf security.³¹ The Nixon Doctrine provided one more rationale for US to transfer arms. Iran by taking upon itself the task of the guardian of the sea lanes in the Gulf, seemed to fulfil an important part in the US strategy. Iran by and large bought its new military equipment after 1964-65. Not only had its oil revenue increased but it no longer had to pay since 1954 as compensation to the oil company that was nationalised in 1951.³²

Iran's show of force in the region commenced on 22 April 1969, when the freighter 'Ebn-i-sina' sailed through the Shatt al Arab into the Persian Gulf. The 1,300 tonne merchant ship, escorted by the Iranian Navy and with an umbrella support of jet fighters was the first sizeable vessel to pass through the disputed waters under the Iranian flag, ever since Iraq claimed the border river as part of its territory. Within three days, on 25 April, the Iranian freighter 'Arya Far' sailed through Shatt-al-Arab carrying goods to Kuwait and Abu Dhabi and heavily escorted by Iranian gunboats.³³ It was the superiority of Iran's military might

31. Edmund Ghareeb, "Iraq : Emergent Gulf Power", in Hossein Amirsadeghi (ed.), The Security of the Persian Gulf, (London, 1981), p. 207.

32. Singh, n. 12, p. 275.

33. R.K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role (Charlottesville, 1972), p. 44.

that in 1969 permitted Shah unilaterally to abrogate the 1937 treaty between Iraq and Iran regulating navigation rights in the Shatt-al-Arab, the river which separates their two countries. On 30 November 1971, the Iranian troops landed on the three islands.³⁴ The landing in Abu Musa was peaceful since the Sharjah Sheikh agreed to transfer the authority over his island, Abu Musa to Iran. But the Ras al - Khaima police stationed in the Tumb islands fired at Iranians who had gone to occupy the island. Protest from other Arabs against the Persian invasion of Arab islands were only feeble.

In an interview on 15 January 1972, while justifying his occupation of Abu Musa and two tumb islands, Shah said that he did not want them to fall into 'irresponsible' hands, "A small motor boat armed with bazookas could cause trouble".³⁵ Iranian offshore oil installations, refinery at Abadan and oil terminals, both at Kharg island were open to naval attacks. The bulk of Iranian oil as well as other goods were being shipped through the Gulf. Even other oil producing states were dependent upon this sea lane. But, the other states in the Gulf were not in a position to compete with Iran in the arms acquisition programme. Kuwait was afraid of Iraq and was building its

34. Singh, n. 12, p. 275.

35. *ibid.*, p. 279.

armour and airforce to pose some resistance to the possible Iraqi drive into Kuwait. Saudi Arabia was worried about the presence of Egyptians in North Yemen. Neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia tried to create a functional navy to protect their oil lanes.

Iran supported Oman in crushing the Dhofar insurgency on the pretext that it was posing a threat to the safe passage of vessels through the straits of Hormuz.³⁶ The popular front for the Liberation of Oman, the anti-sultan movement was supported by South Yemen, Iraq, China (until 1972) and the USSR. The Sultanate was supported by Britain and also they were in charge of the over all command. Iran began to support Oman in 1972. Approximately 1500 Iranian troops with artillery and helicopters took part in Omani operations and the Iranian 'Phantoms' gave air cover wherever necessary.³⁷ The Arab states offered financial and military assistance. Abu Dhabi transferred some of its 'Saladin' armoured cars and Jordan its 'Hunter' ground-attack aircrafts to Oman.

Most of the weapons acquired by the Gulf states upto 1973 were only essential items. Iran and Iraq were the countries got sophisticated weapon after the Iraqi coup d'etat of 1958, from USA and Soviets respectively. Even

36. Sreedhar, Gulf : Scrumble for Security (New Delhi, 1983), p. 33.

37. Singh, n. 21, p. 8.

the Soviet-Iraq military relations was not very close except for a short period, 1958-60. The West was not keen on giving grant or aid from 1964 onwards. Though the oil revenue was sufficient, but not 'overflowing' for the Gulf states to purchase weapons. The situation was changed entirely after the 1973 oil crisis. It brought them surplus petro-dollars to purchase weapons. The West was willing to supply the arms, in order to recycle the surplus petro-dollars and for an assured supply of oil. The 'Twin Pillar' policy as envisaged by Nixon was put into operation. The Gulf region witnessed massive transfer of arms, even though the arms lobby in the USA became powerful to restrict the flow of arms.

CHAPTER - III

IMPACT OF PETRO-DOLLARS

Arabs had begun to think of using oil as a weapon even before the outbreak of hostilities between them and Israelis in October 1973. For the first time, all Arab oil Producing Countries had agreed that some action based on oil needed to be taken before the Arab-Israeli dispute exploded, because they feared that the explosion would not be limited to that area alone. In April 1973 Saudi Deputy Oil Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal sent a warning to Washington, that it was politically impossible for Saudi to expand production at the desired rate unless the US changed its policy towards Israel. In an interview in September, King Faisal himself made it clear that Saudi Arabia would use its oil to political advantage if United States continued to support Israel's policy of aggression against the Arab world.¹ But the Nixon administration ignored the warnings.

On 6 October 1973 Egypt and Syria launched full-scale military operations against Israel. Their declared aim was the liberation of Arab lands occupied by Israel during the 1967 war. Within two weeks, Arabs tightened their grip on oil production and the repercussions spread rapidly around the world. The war continued for only

1. Newsweek, 10 September 1973, p. 44.

three weeks before the United Nations arranged a ceasefire, it brought forward the complex network of international relations influencing the destiny of the Middle East, into sharp focus.

Arab Oil War was fought on three fronts, cutback in oil production, oil embargo on some states and steep rise in oil prices. On 17 October 1973 OAPEC members met in Kuwait and decided to cutback oil production and exports, by five per cent per month from the September levels.² For the first time in Arab history, the events surrounding the October War found Arab states in unanimous support of Arab political objectives. Under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, they decided to use the "Oil weapon" on behalf of the Arab cause. Of the ten members of OAPEC, only Iraq refused to abide by the Kuwaiti decision. Iraq favoured the nationalisation of American and Dutch Oil interests in line with its action of 6 June 1973.³

Initially, Saudi Arabia and the majority of OAPEC members believed that a gradual cutback in oil production would be more effective. At their second meeting in Kuwait on 4 November 1973 they decided to increase the cutback to twentyfive per cent as a means of increasing pressure to

2. Abdul Aziz al-Sowayegh, Arab Petro-Politics, (London, 1984), p. 127.

3. *ibid.*, p. 128.

achieve an Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories. However, countries considered friendly to the Arab cause to be given special treatment enabling them to maintain their current level of Arab oil consumption.⁴

Further to the cutback in oil production, a selective embargo was imposed upon countries which openly supported Israeli policy like United States, Netherlands and South Africa. Embargo against US was decided by the Arab Oil producing countries on 19 October 1973 when President Nixon asked the US Congress to approve \$ 2.2 billion in emergency military aid to Israel. As explained by Nixon, Israel needed military assistance "to maintain a balance of forces and thus achieve stability".⁵ The Arab countries were outraged by Nixon's declaration. The UAE was the first Arab Oil producing state to impose a total embargo on US. As stated by Sheikh Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, the UAE oil minister, "This measure will extend to any country which allows the same aggressive attitude towards the Arab nation in its battle of destiny".⁶ The Saudi government also announced that in view of the increase in American military aid to Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia declared an oil embargo

4. MEED, 17(42), 19 October 1973, p. 1214.

5. Al-Sowayegh, n. 2, p. 130.

6. *ibid.*, p. 132.

to USA for taking such a position".⁷ The Kuwaiti Ambassador to the US Salem Al-Sabah, told, "We will use oil as a means of putting pressure on countries that take a side with Israel, if we have any evidence of any country taking a side there will be an embargo. We'd make sure our oil didn't get to that country, either as a refined product or crude".⁸ The embargo dramatically highlighted the vulnerability of the industrialized nations of the West. As the weeks passed by, however, the price dimension came increasingly into prominence, as economists warned of the consequences of a new oil structure for national economies and international monetary system.

Negotiations began in the second week of October for price-hike, at which time the oil companies asked for a two-week recess to consult with major consumer governments. At this point the OPEC countries demanded a rise in posted prices between thirty-five per cent and fifty per cent. Refusing the postponement, OPEC scheduled a meeting for 16 October in Kuwait and it was then that the decision to increase oil prices by seventy per cent was taken.⁹ The motive behind the decision became clear only after receiving the statement made by the representatives of the

7. David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (Colorado, 1985), p. 118.

8. Newsweek, 22 October 1973, p. 51.

9. Newsweek, 29 October 1973, p. 43.

Gulf states. The six gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Iran and Qatar reversed the pricing system of the international oil business. Oil prices were no longer negotiated and, from then onwards producers unilaterally determined the prices. It was the first time that the oil producing states were able collectively to set their prices upon world market. This unprecedented move successfully increased the price from \$ 1.77 to \$ 3.05 and later to \$ 7.00 barrel. The companies had no choice but to accept the decision as production fell far short of demand as a direct result of the Arab oil cutback.

In their second meeting on 23 December, OPEC announced a 130 per cent increase in crude oil prices, raising the posted price from 1 November figure of \$ 5.17 per barrel to \$ 11.65 beginning 1 January 1974. In announcing the increase, the Shah of Iran declared, "The industrialized world will have to realise the end of the era of their terrific progress and even more terrific income and wealth based on cheap oil is finished. They must find alternate sources of energy. Eventually they have to tighten their belts".¹⁰ The Shah of Iran, however, promised that he would not cut oil supplies to the West, but said that petrol could be ten times its present price. In an interview he said, "I have got petroleum. I cannot drink it... I know that I can't exploit it without blackmailing the rest of

10. Al-Sowayegh, n. 2, p. 136.

the world. Therefore, I have chosen the policy of assuring the sale to everyone, without discrimination... it is necessary that the price of petrol should rise, there is no solution".¹¹

Nevertheless, the technique demonstrated an ability on the part of the Arab states to act collectively and decisively, and it had stimulated heightened recognition and knowledge of the Arab cause against Israel. The embargo was lifted in March 1974 primarily because OPEC considered that, on balance, the tactic had derived its probable maximum political benefits.¹² On balance, use of oil as a pressure mechanism yielded certain political benefits to the Gulf dynasties.

The four-fold increase in oil prices since 1973, accentuated the need to accelerate commercial exchanges to balance trade accounts and earn currency. The ties between arms and oil, for example, has been explicitly stated in French arms policy and implicitly in American sales to Arab states.¹³ These arms for oil enabled the arms exporters to offset the adverse short-term effects on the rising cost

11. MEED, 17(44), 2 November 1973, p. 1280.

12. John Duke Anthony, "The Persian Gulf in Regional and International Politics : The Arab side of the Gulf", in Hossen Amirsadeghi (ed.), The Security of the Persian Gulf, (London, 1981), p. 187.

13. Edward A. Kolodziej, "Arms Transfers and International Politics: The Interdependence of Independence", in Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (ed.) Arms Transfer in the Modern World, (New York, 1979), p.81.

of imported oil ~~on the~~ balance of payment of an arms manufacturing country and also to ensure a steady supply of oil. The sale of weapons yielded a higher value and more favourable exchange than less processed goods or raw materials.

The quantum jump in Arab state's military expenditure after oil crisis was seen in the US as a beneficial method of "recycling petro-dollars". It was reflected most clearly in the US desire to be responsive to Arab state's arms and military assistance requests. Moreover, it was also feared in some quarters that petro-dollars would be used by Arab producers to disrupt the world money markets for political purposes. In the US, in particular, there were fears that Arab petro-dollars would be used to buy US firms control segments of US economy, and possibly to inhibit Jewish financial interests.¹⁴

On the one hand US welcomed investment of petro-dollars. This policy was actually one of long standing with regard to all foreign investments and was in keeping with US open door economic philosophy. Moreover, it was adopted not to accommodate foreign investors or governments but because it provided substantial advantages for the US. Petro-dollar investments in particular were seen to work to the benefit of the US. Thus, the US's commercial policy

14. Long, n. 7, p. 81.

towards Saudi Arabia and other oil producing states, following the energy crisis, was no less ambivalent. It was quickly seen that, in order to offset the balance of payments deficit of growing oil imports as well as to recycle petro-dollars, USA would have to promote exports.

For the US, emergence of Saudi Arabia as a major oil power in 1973 greatly increased the desirability of seeking a special relationship with it. The US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, saw the special relationship with Saudi Arabia as a means to enlist moderate Arab support for the Arab-Israeli peace process, to insure the uninterrupted flow of technology and services to lessen the adverse balance of payments due to higher oil imports and higher prices. The alarmist view was expressed by Kissinger in his address on 11 February 1974, to the Washington Energy Conference. He said that unless immediate steps were taken to overcome the oil crisis, the world would be threatened of with "a vicious cycle of competition, autocracy, rivalry and depression such as led to collapse of the world order in the thirties".¹⁵

In 1974, a Saudi-American defense Commission was established and the motivations that had led US to serve as arms supplier to the Saudis caused it also to make "a determined effort to retain its position as the dominant

15. Dankwart A. Rustow and John F. Mugno, OPEC: Success and Prospects, (New York, 1976), p. 51.

supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia against competition from Britain, France and other Western nations".¹⁶ The task of the Commission was to review the programmes already under way for modernisation of Saudi Armed Forces; especially related to training. It suggested a reduction in overall strength, but an increase in greater mobility and fire-power. In April 1974, the Raytheon Company was granted a \$200 million contract for the modernisation of Saudi Arabia's air defense missile system.¹⁷

Western willingness in making arms available to Iran did not persuade the Shah to help keep oil price down. Iran was a consistent advocate within OPEC for higher oil prices - in part, to help pay for the weapons it was purchasing.¹⁸ During 1974 and 1975 alone the Shah ordered about 676 modern air crafts, 730 tanks, 18 warships and thousands of missiles. During the same period, Saudi Arabia ordered only 185 new aircrafts, 50 tanks and a handful of missiles, patrol boats. Iraq, usually considered Iran's principal antagonist in the area, acquired even fewer arms.

The sale of arms to the Gulf states was used by Congress to put constraints on what it considered to be the arbitrary powers of the President. Also, the Pro-Israel

16. Lewis Sorley, Arms Transfer Under Nixon: A Policy Analysis, (Kentucky, 1983), p. 129.

17. K.R. Singh, The Persian Gulf : Arms and Arms Control (New Delhi, 1983), p. 51.

18. Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton, 1982), p. 17.

lobby in the US, used its powerful contacts and pressure groups to make use of arms control arguments to limit the flow of sophisticated weapons to Arabs which might be directly or indirectly used against Israel. In December 1974, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Act was amended to require the President to report the total amount of FMS of each quarter and to submit all proposed FMS of more than \$ 25 million to the Congress, which could prevent the sale if both the Houses passed resolutions within thirty days.¹⁹

The Congress Committed itself to rectifying the perceived deficiencies. The first step to gain control over proposed FMS orders was a 1975 legislation requiring Department of Defense (DOD) to inform Congress of all proposed FMS transactions worth over \$ 25 million. The second and more important step was the introduction of international Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act in 1976. This brought together all legislation concerning US FMS programmes and commercial sale programmes. The main instrument in the Act for exercising control over arms sales is the right of the Congress to veto certain proposed transfers, be they commercial or government-to-government. Other important provisions include requirement for quarterly

19. Paul C. Warnke and Edward C. Luck, "American Arms Transfers : Policy and Process in the Exefutive Branch", in Andrew J. Pierre (ed) Arms Transfer and American Foreign Policy, (New York, 1979), p. 215.

and annual reports on military transfers from the President to the Congress, a scaling down of the arms sales activities of United States Military Assistance Groups (MAAGS) in foreign countries, reporting on agent fees and obligatory reporting on the perceived foreign policy net contributions from each major arms sales.²⁰

Senator Kennedy in 1975 proposed a six month moratorium on arms sales to the Persian Gulf states. It discounted the existence of any outside threat to the Persian Gulf and its oil. "The likelihood of a direct Soviet threat to Gulf nations is today sufficiently remote for that factor to be largely ruled out in the short term as a reason for western military or naval involvement in the Gulf states or the supply of substantial arms to local states".²¹ Kennedy was not opposed to the transfer of arms but wanted it only after assessing "genuine needs" of pro-west states. He argued that major sales of weapons to Gulf states had occurred "without a clear analysis of our interests, objectives, policies or of cost and benefits".²² The Shah in his reply said that the Persian Gulf states were not fighting each other. The only fighting in the area has

20. Michael Brozka and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-85, (Oxford, 1987), p. 50.

21. Edward M. Kennedy, "The Persian Gulf : Arms Race or Arms Control", Foreign Affairs, 14(1), October 1975, p. 21.

22. *ibid.*, pp 14-15.

been with the subversive revolutionary forces intent on overthrowing the western-oriented anti-communist rulers. He said that it was certainly not in America's interest to deny the Persian Gulf States weapons.²³

The record of debate which took place in the Committee on Foreign Relations over arms sales to the Persian Gulf during the closing days of the 94th Congress is particularly instructive in this regard. Members of the Committee were shocked when barely thirty days before the Congress adjourned, the executive branch gave notice of its intention to make sales offers totalling \$ 5.9 billion. Among the proposed transactions, two were seriously questioned; the sale of 'Maverick' air-to-surface missile and 'sidewinder' air-to-air missile to Saudi Arabia and the sale of \$ 3.8 billion worth of F-16 aircrafts to Iran.

Countering these arms control arguments the administration argued that disapproval of the sales to Saudi Arabia and Iran would result in extremely serious consequences to bilateral relations of the US with these nations. The goodwill of both governments was described as crucial to the maintenance of tolerable OPEC oil prices. Finally and inevitably, the administration witnesses in the Congressional Hearings argued that if the US did not sell, "One of our West Europeans allies would grab the business".²⁴

23. Sorley, n. 16, p. 115.

24. Richard M. Moose and Daniel L. Spiegel, "Congress and Arms Transfers", n. 19, p. 25.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) objected to the earlier figure of 1500 'Maverick' and 200 'Sidewinder' missiles that had been promised to Saudi Arabia on the ground that they went beyond the legitimate defence needs of Saudi Arabia. The figures were finally reduced to 650 'Maverick' and 850 'Sidewinder' missiles, which were accepted by the ACDA.²⁵

The proposed sale of F-16 aircrafts to Iran also evoked a great deal of opposition. The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hubert H. Humphery took strong exception to the fact that while the administration had asked for a debate on the transfer of 160 F-16 aircrafts, in fact, there was a letter from Gen. Toufanian, Iranian Vice-Minister of War for Armament, which showed Iranian government's intention to acquire 300 F-16 aircrafts, but that it had decided to obtain only 160 of these aircrafts at that time.²⁶ One of the major criticisms of the F-16 deal was that aircraft had not even been in the US Air Force service as yet and was not even in its inventory, but still the administration had decided to pass it on to Iran. The sale of F-16 was justified by the Deputy

25. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub Committee on Foreign Assistance, Hearings, US Arms Sales policy... On Proposed Sales of Arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia, 94th Congress, 2nd session, (Washington, 1977), p. 15 (Henceforth cited as US Arms Sales Policy 1977).

26. *ibid.*, p. 120.

Secretary, Department of Defense, Robert E. Ellsworth, that, "Our willingness in this case is evident of our continuing interest in them as a sovereign state with important national interests parallel to our own, a sign that we are concerned about their national integrity and an indicator that the US will not abandon its traditional friends while other countries continue to arm their allies".²⁷

On 19 May 1977, after much speculation and considerable bureaucratic infighting over Presidential Directive 13, President Carter unveiled the new administration's policy. Henceforth the arms transfers were to be viewed as an "exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can clearly demonstrate that transfer contributes to our national security".²⁸ Carter's conventional arms transfer policy aimed to bring about a slowing down of international arms trade through a unilateral policy of US restraint, which, in turn, might lead Soviet Union and other major suppliers to follow suit.

The directive established a dollar ceiling for total US FMS. Recognizing the lack of discrimination inherent in using monetary value as a control, the President invoked several criteria upon the nature of weapons and the circumstances surrounding their proposed transfer;

27. Singh, n. 17, p. 90.

28. Pierre, n. 18, p. 52.

like no first introduction into a region is permitted of advanced weapons creating a significantly higher combat capability, nor may any commitment be made for sale of weapons so new that they have not yet even been deployed with the US forces.²⁹ It also reaffirmed the link between Human Rights criteria and military assistance.

The policy of restricting sophisticated weapons seemed to have forced the US to turn down the sales of A-7 jets to Pakistan and F-18L fighters to Iran and refused Israel permission to sell 'Kfir' jets with American engine to Ecuador. The Carter administration decided against the sale of F-18L fighter aircraft to Iran, a decision consistent with its prohibition on the development of advanced weapon system solely for export. Tehran's request has also turned down later when it bid for 'wild weasel' 'F4-G' fighter/bombers equipped with highly advanced electronics designed to suppress radar because that would have introduced a new, sophisticated weapon system into the region.³⁰

The most controversial sale during the Carter administration was its \$ 4.8 billion aircraft package consisting of 60 F-15 aircrafts, the most advanced fighter in

29. US, Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Sub-Committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, Background Information, 95th Congress, 2nd session, (Washington D.C., 1978), pp. 43-44.

30. Pierre, n. 18, p. 55.

the US inventory,,to Saudi Arabia. The U.S. Administration went out of its way to push that sale through the Congress. Congressional opposition questioned its necessity and initially delayed the sale, but it eventually went through after assurances were given regarding the protection or exclusion of sensitive electronic equipment which could be of value if it fell into hostile hands.³¹

When the F-15 request was submitted to the Congress for approval in the spring of 1978, opponents of the sale sought to give the impression that it was an ad hoc request made for primarily political reasons having little military logic or justification in the light of the limited capability of Saudi Air Force.³² Thus, the Ford administration had approved sale of 60 F-15s provided no action be taken until after the 1976 Presidential election. The incoming Carter administration sought to overcome opponents by promising US arms sales to Israel to compensate for Saudi sale. The administration ensured superiority of the Israeli F-15s, by eliminating in Saudi aircrafts hard points in the air frame, making future upgrading for an attack mission virtually impossible.

The Israeli supporters mounted an unprecedented campaign to win congressional disapproval of the sale.

31. ibid., p. 56.

32. Long, n. 7, p. 59.

What finally enabled the administration to defeat the move was a letter to Congress from Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, on 9 May 1978, stating the built-in limitations in the proposed sale, including no capability for a data link to an early warning radar system, no long-range capability fuel pods, no bomb racks for ground attack capability, and only three, rather than five hard points to limit the future conversion to a ground-attack mission. The Saudis also accepted the standard US stipulation against transferring F-256 to a Third country without their consent. With the limitations assured, the Congress defeated a motion to deny sale on 15 May 1978.³³ Remarks to the press by Secretary Vance stated that F-15 package played a vital role in promoting a moderate Arab consensus on the difficult question of peace in the Middle East. He further added that, Saudi Arabia was a major stabilising force in international financial matters and in decisions affecting the price and supply of oil.³⁴

Even though no formal US-Saudi agreement exists committing the Saudis to buy US currency and keep the dollar strong in international markets, but the administration officials insist that a fall off in regular Saudi purchases of US Treasury Bonds would hurt dollars' standings.³⁵

33. ibid., p. 60.

34. US Department of State Bulletin, 78(2015), June 1978, p. 38.

35. Morton Kondracke, "Arms for Oil", New Republic, 178(8) 25 February 1978, p. 15.

Since Saudi Arabia has been a strong influence for price restraint within OPEC, US administration officials fear that deterioration in the US-Saudi relationship that led even to a slight letting up in the exercise of that influence in the future would have serious consequences for western inflation units.

The other controversial sale was the \$ 2.3 billion offer for seven sophisticated AWACS aircrafts to Iran. Though the US had said that it would not be the first to introduce the most sophisticated form of a weapon into a region, but the policy did allow weapon transfers where 'countries friendly to the United States must depend on advanced weaponry to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain regional balance'.³⁶ The sale of seven E-3A AWACS to Iran certainly violated Carter "restraint" if not being the first to introduce sophisticated weapon into an area. But, before it consumated, the deal was cancelled after the Revolution in Iran.

In 1968-69 Iran possessed several hundred medium tanks, a handful of small ships and some 200 combat aircrafts, a decade later her inventories included nearly 1900 light, medium and heavy tanks, 11 surface ships as well as hovercrafts and patrol boats and more than 450 combat aircrafts. Increase in the case of Saudi Arabia was also

36. Nicoli Ball and Milton Leitenberg, "The Foreign Arms Sales of Carter Administration", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 35(2), February 1979, p. 33.

significant, as it developed from a minimal force to two armoured brigades, a small navy and some 170 combat aircraft by 1978-79. In both the cases, quantitative increase were accompanied by qualitative increase too.

The Human Rights lobby supported arms control as a means of checking the misuse of weapons by dictatorial regimes. The group has been particularly active in the US and in 1976 amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and FMS act provided it with the constitutional leverage to put restraints on the transfer of arms to those countries that violated Human Rights. According to these amendments, no security could be provided to any country, the government which was engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognised Human Rights.³⁷ Iran came under heavy pressure from the US Human Rights lobby. The violation of Human Rights in Iran was discussed in the Congress where authoritarian rule of the monarchy, the absolute powers of the 'SAVAK' and single-party system in Iran were criticised.³⁸ But arms sales were not only justified but also entered into. In July 1976 staff report of the sub-committee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

37. US Arms Sales Policy, 1977, n. 25, pp. 40-41.

38. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Sub-Committee on International Organization, Hearings, Human Rights in Iran, 94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1976), p. 8.

stated, "the military threats to Iran's security seem to be sufficiently real and diverse to enable the Shah to justify major investments in military forces... In short, it is difficult to criticise Iran's perception that it needs a modern military forces".³⁹ Despite the Human Rights group, not only did arms continued to flow to Iran but the regime of the Shah continued to get full American support right up to the last moment, with disastrous consequences for both Iran and US.

In 1975 Shah was upset by the embargo by the Congress on arms to Turkey. Addressing a press conference Shah told that if the US was reluctant to supply arms Iran would diversify its sources of supply. "We are the only judge of what we need. If your sources are not available to us, there are many other sources in the world just waiting for the moment for us to go and shop with them".⁴⁰ When the American arms control group became very active in 1976, Iran made an arms deal with Soviet Union. Gen. Toufanian, who was largely responsible for the Iranian arms purchase programme, ordered large quantities of sophisticated arms from USSR.⁴¹ The deal included 6000 SA-7

39. US Arms Sales Policy, 1977, n. 25, p. 11.

40. Ralph Joseph, "Will Iran Diversify its Arms Supplies", Middle East, (24), October 1976, p. 18.

41. K.R. Singh, Iran : Quest for Security (New Delhi, 1981), p. 323.

shoulder fired SAMS, 6000 SA-9 SP SAMS, 200 ZSU-23-4 radar controlled SP anti-aircraft guns, 200 ASU-85 assault guns and 500 BMP-76 MICVs, delivered in 1977-78 period. Iran received weapons from Britain too, like 250 FV-101 'Scorpion', two 'Hengam' class landing ship and one 'Kharej' type support ship.

The Arab states in the Persian Gulf region have also sought to beat the arms embargo imposed by the arms control group in the US by diversifying their sources. Often, they approached France and Britain for arms which they could not obtain from the US. When Saudi Arabia could not obtain 'F-4s' in 1973, they bought 'Mirage' aircrafts from France. In 1976 Saudis ordered 38 'Mirage' IIEs, 350 AMX-10P MICV and 36 AMX-30 'Sahine' mobile SAMs. In 1976 Saudis put a further order of 'Mirage F-1' aircrafts and 359 AMX-30B MBT. Kuwait also ordered 20 'Mirage F-16' in 1974 from France. It also signed its first arms deal with the Soviet Union for SA-7 'Grail', SA-6 'Gainful' and 'FROG' land mobile SAM systems.

Iraq under the \$ 4 billion deals with the Soviets in 1976, ordered modern sophisticated weapons. Iraq received from USSR about 80 'MIG-23', 30 'SU-20', 10 'AN12/24' transport aircrafts 'MI-24' assault helicopters, about 390 'T-62/64' MBTs, 152mm self propelled guns, 'ZSU-23-4' and 'ZSU-57-2' self propelled anti-aircraft tanks, 'SA-6'

self propelled SAMs, 'SA-7' man-portable SAMs and 'FROG-7' and 'Scud' SSM missiles. The Iraqi navy obtained about 12-14 'OSA I/II' boats armed with 'Styx' SSMs, 5 mine sweepers and 4 landing craft. Though Iraq-Soviet relations were very good, Iraq obtained weapons from France also. It ordered 36 'Mirage F-1' aircrafts, 2 'Mystere' transport aircrafts, 20 'SA-324K, Gazelle' and 10 'Super Frelon' helicopters, 360 'HOT ATMs', 267 'R-530' AAMs and 534 'R-550 Magic' AAMs.

By 1973 the Gulf had already entered into an arms race due to intra-regional conflicts with Iran-Iraq, Saudi Arabia-Egypt (Yemen), Iraq and Kuwait etc. That arms race was fueled by the desire to recycle the petro-dollars and also to increase the political and strategic relations between the arms suppliers, and the recipient states like Iran and USA, Saudi Arabia and USA or Iraq and USSR. The arms control lobby in the US which also played in the hands of the pro-Israel lobby tried to hinder the arms sale. Often, to bypass that constraint, Gulf-states sought to diversify their sources of arms. Pro-western states sought arms not only from European states but, as in the case of Iran and Kuwait, even from USSR. Also Iraq too sought to diversify its arms supply by going to France.

Despite the arms control lobby there was a marked arms proliferation in the Gulf for which various explanations were given by the arms purchasers and also those who sold them. In all, by 1980, the Gulf was saturated with large quantity of modern arms. The Iranian Revolution and the Iraqi fear sparked a conflict that not only consumed these weapons and more but also hundreds of thousands of human lives and billions of dollars worth of material resources of all the states of the Gulf.

CHAPTER - IV

NEW PATTERNS OF ARMS TRANSFER IN THE EIGHTIES

Despite the Arab Gulf state's uneasiness with the Shah's emphasis on military power and increasingly grandiose pronouncements, both nationally and internationally, Iran had achieved the image of a stable and economically progressive state. The political upheaval in Iran was scarcely imagined until the later part of the 1978 when popular upsurge was uncontrollable. Even then the least likely of all scenarios was thought to be one in which the trained and elaborately equipped military forces of the Shah would fail to save the monarchy.

The Shah left Iran on 16 January 1979 and his downfall introduced above all a pervasive uncertainty. The revolutionary ideological force struck each Gulf state as an immediate threat to internal stability when Ayatollah Khomeini called for the replacement of the region's traditional monarchies as well as the Baathist ruling elite in Iraq. These Iranian attempts to spread subversion to neighbouring states became quickly apparent in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and in the lower Gulf states. Moreover, events were building in neighbouring Afghanistan that were to culminate by year's end in a coup by pro-Soviet faction of the Afghan armed forces. They were shortly supported by Soviet troops, whose

numbers increased to 80,000 within a few months.¹

The fragile truce achieved between Iraq and Iran under the Algiers Agreement of 1975, quickly deteriorated following the fall of the Shah. In September 1980, after a series of Iranian border incursions, Iraq launched a full-scale attack, and calculated that the internal chaos in Iran, following the revolution, would give it a temporary strategic advantage. However, Iraq's hope of quick victory soon evaporated. Once Iran had driven Iraq from its territory, the war settled into a stalemate, until the ceasefire by the UN mediation.

One of the many remarkable features of the war between Iraq and Iran, which began in September 1980, has been the inability of either Super Power to decisively influence the course of events. When the US Navy led the way into the Gulf, the war had not even begun. It was the revolution in Iran that brought extra US destroyers in January 1979 to reinforce those based at Bahrain. In February they evacuated American citizens and other foreigners from Iranian ports and in the March the aircraft carrier 'constellation' and her escorts were ordered to provide heavier presence in the region as a show of force. The US deployed 'E-3A AWACS' in Saudi Arabia, that were designed to track aircrafts and thus to provide

1. James H. Noyes, The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy, (California, 1982), p. 112.

additional warning for Saudi defences.²

Because of the rapid changes in Iran, the US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, proposed to President Carter in a memorandum on 28 February 1979, that a new security framework be established in the Persian Gulf region as the basis for a reassertion of American influence and power.³ The other event that prompted United States to increase its military presence in the Persian Gulf was the 'hostage crisis' that started from 4 November 1979, when Iranian militants held in captivity the American Embassy personnel in Teheran.⁴ The US retaliated by freezing Iranian assets in the American banks and also imposed an arms embargo on Iran.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and subsequently the Iran-Iraq War prompted President Carter to accept the idea of augmenting the U.S. military presence in the region. Oil and its price hike during that time was also a factor in favour of the US deployment. Harold Brown, US secretary of Defence, said, "We will take any action that is appropriate to safeguard production of oil

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2. David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (Colorado, 1985), p. 62.
 3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle : Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-81 (New York, 1983), pp. 446-47.
 4. For a good explanation of how the Carter Administration handled the hostage Crisis, see Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President (New York, 1982).

and its transportation to consumer nations without interference from hostile powers".⁵

On 23 January 1980, when planning for the rescue of hostages had already begun, President Carter proclaimed in his State of the Union Address to Congress, "... an attempt by any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interest of the United States and such an assault will be repulsed by any means, including military force".⁶ Moreover, the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine has been linked to the foundation, organisation and functioning of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF); The enforcement agent of the Carter Administration for South-West Asia.

From a broader perspective, the Carter Doctrine was a radical departure for the post-world war II American policy in the Gulf area. For the first time the US administration promised unilaterally military action in the region. The US had run out of major allies in the Gulf. Gone was the original Baghdad Pact, which later became the CENTO. Gone was the CENTO's successor, the Shah of Iran, whom the US, under Nixon Doctrine promoted as the Gulf's policeman after the British withdrawal. Though it has originally called "Twin Pillar" policy, it gradually became apparent that the Nixon Doctrine rested

5. James Cable, "Outside Naview in the Gulf", International Relations, 9(3), May 1988, p. 232.

6. Maxwell Orme Johnson, The Military as an Instrument of US Policy in South-West Asia: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1979-82 (Colorado, 1983), p.1.

on a single pillar with the Shah of Iran acting as the Western surrogate in the region.⁷

When President Reagan took office he and his principal foreign policy advisers firmly believed that the declaration of the Carter Doctrine had been a mistake. However, actions of Reagan Administration led to believe that basic objectives of the Carter Doctrine had not been abandoned. On the contrary, it appears that the Carter policy for South-West Asia had been refined, amended and expanded by the Reagan Administration. The RDF was upgraded into US Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1983, for conducting military operations in the Gulf. It had its peacetime headquarters in Florida. It became responsible for the area from Egypt to Pakistan. It had acquired bases in Egypt, Somalia, Oman and Kenya.

On 21 May 1981, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance James L. Buckley, announced that a new US arms transfer policy could serve as "a vital and constructive instrument of American Foreign policy".⁸ He denounced the 'arms restraint' policy of previous administration and declared that Reagan Administration was determined to enhance the self-defence capabilities of US friends and allies, including even those, cited for persistent

7. Herman F. Elits, "Security Considerations in the Persian Gulf", International Security, Fall 1980, p. 93.

8. Michael T. Khare, "Opening the Floodgates: The New US Arms Sales Policy", in Helena Tuomi and Raimo Vaymen (ed) Militarization and Arms Production, (London, 1983), p. 139.

Human Rights violations, by loosening the reins of US arms exports.

The Reagan arms transfer policy, presented in a White House document on 18 July 1981, had broad aims and principles. It emphasised that arms transfer decision-making should be flexible and based on case-by-case judgement of each transfer's net contribution to US security, rather than a specific set of rules. None of the restraining measures initiated by President Carter were kept. The basic idea was "to see the world as it is, rather than as we would like it to be".⁹ One thing was made clear, the Human Rights issue was dead.

In sharp contrast to its predecessor, which treated arms transfer as an 'exceptional foreign policy' instrument to be used only when it contributed to US national security interest, Reagan Administration viewed the transfer of arms and services as "an essential element of global defence posture and indispensable component of its foreign policy".¹⁰ Hence, as envisioned by the Reagan Administration, 'strategic consensus' entailed a set of policies aimed at generating a concern among moderate, pro-western nations in countering the threat of the Soviet expansion. The marked increase in arms sales to the so-called moderate

9. Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfer to the Third World, 1971-85, (Oxford, 1987), p. 58.

10. Caliborne Pell, "Problems in Security Assistance", Journal of International Affairs, 40(1), Summer, 1986, p. 35.

Arab-nations indicated that Reagan believed that the policy would enable the regional nations to contribute significantly to their own defence. Thus, by selling arms to these nations United States would enhance their nascent organisation for regional security, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as possibly increase the opportunity for greater American presence in the region. As one White House insider explained in 1981, "arms sales will no longer be regarded especially as something evil that has to be curbed".¹¹ Thus Reagan Administration, instead of viewing arms transfer as an exceptional foreign policy, considered it as a vital and constructive instrument of American foreign policy.

Not only arms transfers remained a key policy instrument but military aid and direct use of force was becoming increasingly important. Military aid was granted to countries of vital strategic or political importance to USA. One specific reason for granting military aid was to obtain base rights in exchange, like in Oman and Egypt. This new attitude was underlined by Secretary Weinberger in February 1983 when he said that their plans and programs must be focused on strengthening the ability to respond effectively, with military force necessary, in several strategically important areas, and in circumstances ranging from strategically important areas, and in circumstances ranging from small-scale incidents to major military opera-

11. Klare, n. 7, p. 142.

tions.¹² The notable Reagan guideline for US arms sales was the tendency to consider arms transfer almost exclusively in an East-West context.¹³ A typical example of that policy was the supply of arms to several mutually hostile parties in West Asia in an effort to contain Soviet penetration, like arms transfer to Pakistan.

The Iran-Iraq war became a matter of grave international concern, appalling human consequences in terms of casualties, physical destruction and social disruption. Since the War was taking place in a highly sensitive strategic and economically important area of the world, the war became an important test to the capacity of UN to maintain international peace and security. Peace initiatives were also taken by Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM).

On 22 September 1980 the Secretary-General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, appealed to both sides to seek a peaceful solution to the Iran-Iraq dispute and offered his personal good offices.¹⁴ He also requested an urgent Security Council meeting. Resolution 479 was adopted by the Council on 28 September 1980, which called for an

12. SIPRI, Year Book 1984, World Armament and Disarmament (Stockholm, 1984), p. 186.

13. Landgren Backstrom, "Global Arms Trade: Scope, Input, Restraining Action", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 13(3), 1982, p. 203.

14. Indian Express, 26 September 1980.

immediate end to the use of force and urged for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and to accept any appropriate offer of mediation.

Since July 1982, the Security Council passed seven resolutions and issued many presidential statements. Not all of these were call to end hostilities. Some of them referred to specific issues and in particular to the right of free navigation in the Gulf and to putting an end to attacks on merchant shipping. Until the summer of 1987, these resolutions were largely welcomed by Iraq and rejected or ignored by Iran, which boycotted Security Council discussions almost from the outset. By mid-1987, a new international dimension was added with the further involvement of outside powers, including the US and the USSR, in efforts to protect shipping in the Gulf.

The permanent members of the Council after intensive consultations, finally presented to the Council the text of Resolution 598, which was adopted unanimously on 20 July 1987.¹⁵ The resolution which cited Articles 39 and 40 of the charter of United Nations as relevant articles under which the council was acting, demanded as a first step towards a negotiated settlement, that the parties observe an internationally recognised boundaries without

15. SIPRI Year Book, 1988, World Armament and Disarmament (Stockholm, 1988), p. 510.

delay. Iran denounced the resolution and demanded that the Security Council should first condemn Iraq for starting the war before it would formally accept a ceasefire.

As a result, stalemate developed over the implementation of Resolution 598. At the same time the US, made efforts in the Security Council to discuss and adopt a resolution on arms embargo. Three of the permanent members of the Security Council, the USSR, France and China, refused to impose an arms embargo on Iran. That dealt a blow to their reputation and, more importantly to the credibility of the council. The reasons why the USSR and China went back on their earlier support of 598 are probably the same; a wish not to alienate themselves from Iran, so as to retain some presence and perhaps influences, in post-Khomeini Iran. For France, the main considerations would have been the fate of French hostages held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon.

The Gulf countries shared several common security concerns, for example, the fear of domestic unrest caused by the spreading Islamic revolution, fear of hegemonic aspirations of Iraq and Iran, and fear of intervention by major powers. The formation of GCC in 1981,¹⁶ provided the formula to reconcile these security needs. The focus, at first, was on economic, social and information coopera-

16. John Duke Anthony, "The Gulf Cooperation Council: A New Framework for policy coordination" in H. Richard Sindelar III and J.E. Peterson (ed.) Cross Currents in the Gulf (New York, 1988), p. 38.

tion. Later on with the intensification of the Iran-Iraq war the focus shifted to security matters. The GOC was established to keep the Gulf out of all forms of international conflict. It believed that the security of the Gulf was the responsibility of the local people.¹⁷ Officially the GCC's general stand is that regional security is purely a regional affair that brooks no interference from outside powers.

After the Iranian Revolution, various collective security arrangements have been discussed among the Gulf states. For example, after the new Iranian regime engaged in naval exercise in 1979, Oman reacted by proposing an international, mainly composed of the western nations, sophisticated surveillance equipment to counter superior Iranian naval forces, as well as to coordinate Gulf state's ground forces to respond to potential Iranian threats.¹⁸ Both Iraq and Saudi Arabia rejected Omani proposals. Kuwait strongly opposed the Omani proposal to coordinate Gulf defences with US assistance.

The Saudis through most of 1981 were sympathetic to the Kuwaiti objections. In fact, Saudis were reported to have offered substantial economic and military assistance, upto \$ 1.2 billion, to induce Oman to deny the US access

17. Johnson, n. 6, p. 47.

18. Lenore G. Martin, Unstable Gulf : Threats from within (Lexington, 1984), p. 26.

to military facilities.¹⁹ But Oman, while endorsing the GCC framework, had given naval and air facilities to USA. Kuwait was against any kind of external power's involvement in the region. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah in an interview said, "We are against the establishment of any foreign military bases on our territory, but we cannot prevent foreign intervention because the Gulf is an international waterway".²⁰

When the Iran-Iraq war broke out in September 1980, the Gulf states were concerned but not necessarily displeased to see the two traditional powers in the Gulf clip each other's wings. The Gulf states despite their subsequent aid to Iraq, were pleased to see a lessening of potential threat from Iraq in their northern borders. At the same time, by contributing to the Iraqi war effort, the Gulf states were helping to dampen the possibility that Iran would emerge as a dominating force in the Gulf. The war had led to a rapid expansion in size and complexity of armed forces of all Gulf states, producing a massive diversion of state revenues to defence.

The GCC members sought to pool their military resources in the light of the Iran-Iraq war and the possible threat to their security. Four chiefs of staff meetings were held

19. *ibid.*, p. 26.

20. Saudi Gazette, 1 March 1983.

by November 1983 to coordinate the military planning. In October 1983, a joint military exercise was held in the UAE involving 6,500 troops.²¹ The meeting of GCC chiefs of staff in Riyadh in June 1984, recognised that improvement of overall GCC security would necessitate progress on the establishment of a joint defence system, the development of a common military infrastructure, and joint policies on arms purchases and joint military manoeuvres. Subsequently, the GCC was ^amoted to implement each of these four pre-requisites of collective security. GCC military exercises collectively and bilaterally. The bilateral exercise include Saudi-Kuwait air manoeuvres in 1983 and 1984, joint naval exercises between UAE and Omani forces in 1984 and 1985, and additional full-scale exercises involving units from all six states in Saudi Arabia in September 1984 and in Oman in March 1987.²²

The GCC member states also sought external military-related assistance. In the first week of the war at the Saudi request, United States sent to Saudi Arabia four 'E-3A' Sentry AWACS aircraft to help them deal with a possible Iranian attack on them. In 1981 Saudi Arabia placed an order for five E-3 AWACS to replace the US operated aircrafts. The US AWACS have seen continual

21. Wayne E. White, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Challenge to the Arab Gulf States", n. 16, p. 102.

22. Roger F. Payak, "Soviet Designs and Dilemmas in the Gulf Region", n. 16, p. 55.

service in the region and the intelligence they gathered was reportedly shared between US, Saudi and Kuwaiti commands. By 1984, the US navy had a large force of 14 major warships in the Gulf or just outside the Strait of Hormuz. Also ships close to the Gulf, included a 10 ship battle group centred around the aircraft carrier 'Kitty Hawk' carrying 77 warplanes which was cruising off the South Coast of Oman.²³

Soon the Iran-Iraq war spilled over into the Gulf proper and the so called 'tanker war' began. The Iraqi 'Super Etendard' aircraft armed with 'Exocet' air-to-surface missiles, struck their first blow against the Iran's oil life line on 27 April 1984, when the tanker 'safina al-Arab' was struck and damaged by an Iraqi missile.²⁴ With Iran's, 13 May 1984, retaliatory attack on Kuwaiti vessel 'Omm Casbah', the so called 'tanker war' was formally launched. During the tanker war, all the vessels that were target of air or surface attacks were not necessarily tankers or ships belonging to Iran or Iraq. Both sides often hit neutral vessels that were engaged in lawful activity in the region. Between 18 April 1984 and 18 May 1987, 90 of the 227 ships, 150 of them oil tankers, attacked in the Gulf were supposed to have been the victims of Iranian aircrafts, helicopters, warships and fast Swedish 'Boghammer'

23. Times of India, 24 May 1984.

24. White, n. 22, p. 102.

boats operated by Revolutionary guards.²⁵ Iraqis largely depended upon air attacks and the use of air-to-surface guided missiles.

The Iranian strategy which became clear in the Summer and Autumn of 1986, aimed at attacking Kuwaiti oil shipping and inspiring terrorist attacks in Kuwait as pressure on it to stop its cooperation with Iraq. On 10 December 1986, the US coast-guard Headquarters received a telex from the Kuwait Oil Tanker Co., requesting it to reflag its tankers.²⁶ Initially the US was reluctant to accept Kuwait's request of reflagging tankers. Therefore, Kuwait chartered Russian ships, thereby persuading Americans to change their mind and to agree that a number of Kuwaiti tankers should be transferred to American registry and become entitled to the protection of US Navy. The Soviets chartered three tankers to Kuwait and the US allowed eleven Kuwaiti tankers to fly American flag.²⁷ The latter arrangement enabled an augmented US naval force in the Gulf to convey such reflagged Kuwaiti tankers between Kuwait and 'Khawr Fakhan' in the Gulf of Oman.

Re-registering of Kuwaiti tankers under the US flag did not contribute greatly to protecting commerce in the

25. Times, 22 June 1987.

26. Deccan Herald, 6 June 1987.

27. Hermann Frederick Eilts, "Foreign Policy Perspectives of the Gulf States", n. 14, p. 19.

Gulf . The US warships of course, did not interfere with the countries ships and the numerous attacks on civilian craft. Essentially, US policy created a privileged class of 11 tankers, a relatively small portion of Gulf oil exports. Only on 30 April 1988 did President Reagan gave the go ahead signal for US naval commanders in the Gulf to aid neutral ships under attack.²⁸

Iran responded to American convoy operations by sowing mines in the Western Gulf sea lanes and off the port of 'al-Fujayra' on the Gulf of Oman. The new and secret model of an ultra-silent American helicopter, code named "sea bat" carried out an extraordinary night time assault on 21 September 1987, on an Iranian naval vessel in the waterway.²⁹ The helicopter was launched from the US frigate 'Jarret'. This was the first attack on Iranian ships by the USA since its Gulf escort operation started. It was alleged to be laying mines at the mouth of the Gulf of Oman, which housed at that time a large US naval force.

Since the war erupted between Iran and Iraq, Britain had kept a couple of ships there, usually a destroyer and a frigate, known as 'Armilla Patrol'. French 'Corvettes' and other small vessels based on Djibouti were also frequent visitors. The British Ministry of Defence, stated that they sent the 'Armilla' Patrol to the Gulf because of the

28. Times of India, 1 May 1988.

29. New Times, 23 September 1987.

threat to free passage of merchant shipping. But the British naval assistance was offered to only ships under the British flag and not to ships owned in Britain, insured in Britain, carrying British cargoes, with British officers or partly British crews.³⁰

When the Reagan Administration began its military build up in the Gulf, its European allies refused to contribute forces and criticised the US policy as provocative and ill-advised. The turning point came on 10 August 1987, when US-operated tanker, 'Texaco Carribbean', was hit by a mine in the Gulf of Oman. The next day, France and Britain announced simultaneously that they were sending mine-sweepers, with support craft, to the Gulf of Oman. Within next few months, several West European governments despatched warships to join US forces in the region, taking part in a 70-ship concentration of allied power.³¹

Following the Iranian attack on the 'Gentle Beeze' the British registered tanker, Britain extended the patrol from Bahrain to the strait of Hormuz.³² Since January 1987, 'Broad sword' and two other British warships, a frigate and a destroyer, accompanied British tankers down the sea lanes from Hormuz to Dubai only. The news of Soviet naval presence in the region came in the wake of the

30. Cable, n. 4, p. 234.

31. Telegraph, , 5 October 1987.

32. The Times, , 25 September 1987.

seizure of Soviet freighter in September 1986, by the Iranian navy.³³ The Soviet freighter was released only after the high level discussion between the two countries. On May 16, 1987 Soviet tanker 'Marshal Cheykov' was damaged by a floating mine some 35 miles off the Kuwaiti coast.³⁴ The vessel was one of the three Soviet tankers chartered by Kuwait. Thereupon, Soviets increased their presence in the region, by adding three 'Natya' class minesweepers, armed with anti-aircraft missiles, just outside the Gulf.

The US Navy dealt Iran a punishing and humiliating blow in April 1988 when its aircrafts and warships destroyed two Iranian oil platforms, sank a patrol boat and left two frigates crippled in retaliatory attacks. What became a general naval battle started when the two US navy battle groups launched attacks against Iranian platforms at Sirri and Sassan in the southern Gulf, which the Pentagon claimed were used "as command and control radar systems, for the Iranian military".³⁵ That was also intended as a signal that US had the political will to defend its interests in the Gulf and to resort to direct military action against Iran in that process.

The Iranian Revolution, hostage crisis and subsequently the Afghanistan crisis were seen by the United States

33. The Hindu , 6 October 1986.

34. Patriot , 11 July 1987

35. The Times , 19 April 1988.

as a grave concern to its interest in the Persian Gulf. The only ally left, Saudi Arabia, was provided most sophisticated weapons to safeguard its interest in the region. While declaring the sale of munitions for F-5 planes to Saudi Arabia, which including 'sidewinder' and 'Maverick' missiles, laser-guided bombs and cluster bombs, the Under Secretary of State, Lucy Benson said, the decision of selling these weapons should be seen in an "increasingly unstable" situation in the Gulf.³⁶ The new Reagan Administration which took office after the Iran-Iraq war started, was also interested in arming Saudi Arabia. On 28 May 1981, Reagan invoked Article 36(B)(1) of the AECA to transfer 200 'Stinger' missiles to Saudi Arabia without submitting the sale to the Congress, on the grounds that national security was being threatened in the Gulf.³⁷

In 1981, USA signed an arms deal worth \$ 8.5 billion with Saudi Arabia.³⁸ It was one of the largest single deal ever concluded between these two states. The deal consisted of 5E-3A sentry, about 1200 'sidewinder' air-to-air missile (AAM), 6 KC-135 aerial refuelling tankers, long-range fuel tankers for F-15 and 22 ground-based radar installations. All these were to be integrated into a sophisticated air defence system in the Gulf.

36 Long, n. 2, p. 64.

37. ibid., p. 67.

38. Backstrom, n. 13, p. 201.

Sale of these weapons was the first major foreign policy show down with the Congress by the Reagan Administration. Senator Danieil Moynihan warned that would contribute to instability in the Middle East.³⁹ The package deal was also condemned by the Israeli Government which said that the proposed sale was a danger to the security and military balance in the area.⁴⁰ The Israelis were worried, because, in Saudi hands, the early warning planes could virtually erase Israel's element of surprise, a tactic that it had used with stunning success. The Reagan administration defended the sale of AWACS, because it provided the early warning without which there could be no successful defence of the oil facilities.⁴¹ The air defence package was perhaps, the most important US arms transfer ever in terms of money, technology and the implications involved.

As Iran-Iraq war continued, the Reagan Administration gradually developed good relation with Iraq. Both, the State and Defence Departments, worked to improve relations with Iraq by extending trade credits, and also sharing intelligence. In spite of its neutrality in the war, USA, since 1984, reportedly provided Iraq with data on Iranian troops movements and also to help defend Basra

39. "ABC's of the light of AWACS Sales to Saudi Arabia" US News and World Report, (10), 7 September 1981, p. 25.

40. ibid., p. 26.

41. US Department of State Bulletin, 81(2055), October 1981, p. 54.

in 1986 and to counter the Iranian offensive.⁴² The United States transferred 30 Model 500D and 24 Model 530MG helicopters in 1981, and 45 Model 214ST and 24 Model 530MG helicopters in 1985. USA also normalised its diplomatic ties with Iraq in 1985.⁴³

The continuation of French supplies to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, has led to much international and domestic criticism. Arms transfer from France to Iraq was linked to and also, over a number of years large Iraqi arms debt to France. As a result of mounting debts, the French government has been forced to ensure the military survival of the Iraqi regime. Otherwise France would have to write off its debts. President Mitterand was once quoted as saying that French assistance was really aimed at keeping Iraq from losing the war.⁴⁴ France, banking on Iraqi victory since the beginning of the war, supplied large amount of weapons to it. In November 1983, France loaned five 'Super Etendard' aircraft, capable of launching long-range air to surface anti-strip 'Exocet' missiles, to the Iraqi armed forces until newly built 'Mirage' fighters arrived.⁴⁵

42. Stephanie G. Neuman, "Arms, Aid and the Superpowers", Strategic Digest, 19(3), March 1989, p. 249.

43. Barry Rubin, "Drowning in the Gulf", Foreign Policy (69), Winter 1987-88, p. 122.

44. Talif Deen, "Iraqs battle for Arms", Janes Defence Weekly, 18(8), 29 August 1987, p. 396.

45. Brzoska and Ohlson, n. 9, p. 67.

These fighter was used by Iraq against oil tankers in the Gulf. They were returned to France in September 1985. Since 1977, France had contracted to sell a total of 113 'Mirage' F-1 fighters to Iraq. The final batch of 29 F-1s was ordered in September 1985 at the cost of more than \$500 million; part of which was paid in the form of crude oil.⁴⁶

The Soviet-Iraq relations were strained, after Iraq condemned Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, suppressed its communist movement and reduced trade with East European countries. Though Iraq was the largest recipient of Soviet weapons it diversified its source and went to France. In 1981 Iraq acquired 4 of the 6 'Mirage' F-1 fighters ordered in 1977. It was highlighted in the press in vivid contrast to the embargo on major arms shipment imposed by Soviet Union since the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980.⁴⁷ However, Soviet resumed its arms supply to Iraq from 1984 onwards. The arms deal in 1984 with Soviets was for \$ 2.5 billion. Iraq took deliveries of unspecified quantities of sophisticated SU-25 'Frogfoot' ground-attack aircraft.⁴⁸ In early 1987, the Soviets delivered a squadron of 24 MIG-29 'Fulcrums' to the Iraqis, considered to be the most advanced fighter in the Soviet arsenal. Currently the Iraqi's may owe as much as between \$ 8 billion to \$ 10 billion in

46. Deeb, n. 44, p. 396.

47. Roger F. Pajak, "Soviet Arms Transfer as an instrument of Influence, Middle East Journal, 37(1), 1984, p. 272.

48. Deen, n. 44, p. 397.

military debts to the Soviets.⁴⁷ Soviets also have heavy political investment in Iraq and they have no intention of losing Iraq to the Western world.

Soviet Union and Kuwait concluded an arms deal of \$ 327 million on 11 July 1984, during the visit of Kuwaiti Defence Minister, Shaykh Salim to Moscow.⁴⁹ The agreement include transfer of FROG-7 surface-to-surface missile(SSM), SA-6 Gecko Surface-to-air missile (SAM), and other types of military equipment. In addition, a limited number of Soviet military advisers were to be sent to Kuwait. They were no more than ten as reported by Kuwait's Defence Minister.⁵⁰ Kuwait's decision to buy weapons from the Soviets came after its request for American stringer air-defence missile was turned down.⁵¹

Americans had been assuring Kuwait that they need not worry about this security since the RDF was fully geared to counter any threat either from Iran or from Soviet. But Kuwait believed that even a minor arms deal with the USSR would make their traditional western suppliers more responsive to their requests. After the Soviet-Kuwait deal, Americans threatened to call off an \$ 82 million arms

49. *ibid.*, p. 397.

50. Rajan Menon, *Soviet Arms Transfer to the Third World*, *Journal of International Affairs*, 40(1), Summer 1986, p. 68.

51. "Arms Transfer as an Instrument of Soviet Policy", *Middle East Journal*, 39(4), Autumn, 1985, p. 763.

deal with Kuwait if it stationed Russian advisers.⁵² However, the US Defence Department announced two weeks after the Soviet-Kuwait arm deal that it agreed to train 150 Kuwaiti pilots in the United States.

Many countries in the region turned to France and Britain for their major equipment, rather than persist in their dependence on one or the other of the Super Powers. Saudi Arabia placed an order in January 1984 with France worth 35-40 billion francs.⁵³ Its contract included the development and delivery of ground radars and 'Shahine' SAM missile batteries for low-level air defence. It was the largest arms deal by France with any country. Saudi Arabia finally decided in 1985 to acquire 72 Tornando strike aircraft from Britain, valued of \$ 4 billion, rather than continue an uphill battle to gain US Congressional approval for the purchase of additional F-15s.⁵⁴ The diversification of weapon supplier became a matter of practical necessity, since Saudi Arabia's request for modern weapons regularly created political problems in the USA and delivery was not always guaranteed.

The outbreak of Iran-Iraq war in 1980 offered

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52. M.A. Siddiqui, "Arms deal with USSR : Wind of Change, Pakistan and Gulf Economist, 3(32), 11-17 August 1984, p. 39.
53. SIPRI, Year Book, 1984, p. 188.
54. Michael T. Khare, "Global Arms Transfer in the 1980s: The State of Trade", Journal of International Affairs No. (1) Summer 1986, p. 18.

opportunities to several Third World arms exporters. For most of the countries, arms trade is like any other trade, in which political or moral values are all but irrelevant. The Third World producers export arms mainly for economic reasons. As one State Department analyst said, "It's like Saturday-night special time world wide".⁵⁵ Though the second tier arms producers lack the comprehensive arms industries of major producers, but they are important suppliers of certain categories of munitions for which they have developed a reliable market. Both, Iran and Iraq, became highly dependent on imports from the second-tier suppliers to compensate for losses in ammunition and equipment.

Increasingly, barter deals are being struck vis-a-vis arms which puts more price pressure on an already soft arms market. Brazil, with more than 40 per cent of the export market among the Third World weapon producers, traded weapons for Iraqi oil. In return, Iraq bought ~~about one-third~~ of all the military material Brazil produced.⁵⁶ One of the strongest arguments in favour of the Brazilian equipment among the Third World suppliers is its reputation for being durable and effective yet technologically unsophisticated, easy to operate and relatively cheap.⁵⁷ Also, Brazil does not insist that

55. Robert A. Manning, "New Sellers in Arms Bazaar : Superpowers face competition from surprising corners of the world", US News and World Report, 100(4), 3 February 1986, pp 38.

56. Business Week, 22 October 1984, p. 36.

57. Thomas Ohlson, "Third World Arms Exporters: A New facet of the Global Arms Race", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 13(3), 1982, p. 218.

the arms it sells to one country be not resold or given to another. Thus, in one instance, weapons sold to Libya ended in Iranian hands.⁵⁸ Brazilian made 'Urutu' and 'Cascavel' armoured cars were used in the Gulf war by Iran, as well as by Iraq. President Luiz Whitaker of the Engesa, which manufactures half of the wheeled armoured cars, in the west said, "I sell to one country which resells to other that's a sovereign act that can't be controlled".⁵⁹ Saudi Arabia has long been an indirect buyer of Brazilian weapons since 1980 it has not only been funding Baghdad's purchases of armoured cars but also the development of 'Astros-2' mobile rocket launcher system, also for Iraq.⁶⁰

China would probably still be a minor player in the arms business were it not for the Iran-Iraq war, a fickle Soviet policy and the assistance of Egypt's late President Anwar Sadat. When Iraqi troops began running short of material, it was Sadat who reportedly put Iraq in touch with the Chinese.⁶¹ China initially supplied mostly mortars, and machine-gun ammunition and artillery shells. Big orders soon followed for APC, T-69 tanks, B-6 bombers (a

58. Manning, n. 55, p. 38.

59. "New Arms Bazaar", South (61), November 1985, p. 16.

60. ibid., p. 17.

61. Taimung Cheung, "China's Bargain Sale Bang's for a Buck", Far Eastern Economic Review, 140(22), 2 June 1968, p. 26.

copy of the Soviet TU-16) as well as for a number of F-6 and F-7 fighters (copies of the Soviet MIG-19 and MIG-21 respectively).⁶² Though the Chinese derived their country's arms deal with Iran, their weapons including F-7 aircraft, modelled on the Soviet MIG-21, and tanks and missiles, have reached Iran, allegedly through Pakistan.⁶³

Chinese sale of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) 'DF-3 East wind' to Saudi Arabia, caught Americans by surprise. Moreover, it was a heavy blow to an embargo on the export of long-range ballistic missiles, established in 1987 by major countries. Saudi's are expected to pay \$ 3-3.5 billions for 12 'East Wind' missiles. This money is also believed to be an enticement especially, to cut off Chinese sales to Iran. However, the Chinese had reasons other than money to want to court the Saudis.⁶⁵ As a result, by the end of February 1988, Riyadh asked Taiwan to withdraw its team of technical advisers from Saudi Arabia.⁶⁶

After the start of Iran-Iraq war secret arms supplies

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62. William Burger, "Why China sells Arms : Beijings Risky Quest for Influence and Profits", News Week 112(2), 11 July 1988, p. 8. There are no firm reports that B-6 bombers were in fact transferred to the Gulf.
63. South, 72, October 1986, p. 21.
64. Emly MacFarquhar and Rubin Knight, "China corners the copy cat arms market", US News and World Report 104(14), 11 April 1988, p. 45.
65. Cheung, n. 61, p. 26
66. Burger, n. 62, p. 8.

from Israel were sent to Iran. An Israeli businessmen, Ya'acov Nimrodi, arranged in 1981 a deal with Iran for \$135 million, consisting of 50 'Lance' SSM missiles, 68 'Hawk' SAM missiles, 3730 'Copperhead' anti-tank shells with laser guidance systems, 40 150 mm field guns and nearly 10,000 artillery shells.⁶⁷ Israel admitted its arms supplies to Iran only from 1984. For Israel, the motive for the arms supplies was obviously to continue its time-honoured policy of fuelling any conflict which could weaken Arab countries. These deliveries were justified by majority of the Israeli government since Iraq was seen as a greater enemy in the long run than Iran.⁶⁸

Iran built its new supply network because seizure of American embassy hostages in 1979 led to a US arms embargo. That move crippled the Iranian Army and Air Force which were equipped almost totally by the United States. During the Iran-Iraq war, to evade the arms embargo, Iran began looking for alternative sources of weapons and vital spare parts for US made arms. To halt the illicit flow of US arms to Iran, 'Operation Staunch' was launched in 1983 by the Reagan Administration.⁶⁹

67. Ali Azad, "USA-Iran Arms Deal : The Israeli Connection", Middle East, (146 & 147), December 1986-January 1987, p. 46.

68. Brozka and Ohlson, n. 9, .p. 114.

69. K.R. Timmerman, "Europes Arms Dipeline to Iran", Nation, 245(2), 18 July 1987, p. 47.

Ayatollah Khoemeini's representatives operated three procurement offices in Victoria Street, London. They were staffed by 70 Iranians and 200 locals. These offices handed out shopping lists that included everything from assault rifles to missiles.⁷⁰

One of the arms merchants who dealt with Iran at that time was the Swedish businessman Schmitz. To meet Iran's demand for artillery shells he first turned to South Africa, whose munition plants supplied him with the equivalent to 3,700 tons of gunpowder. But in June 1984 Pretoria cut off supply without explanation. In fact, South Africa's state-owned Armaments Corporation reportedly signed a top secret \$ 400 million contract to supply Iraq with long-range artillery pieces.⁷¹ One of the Iraq's conditions was an immediate end to delivery of ammunition from South Africa to Iran. Even then South Africa played a critical role in sustaining Iranian war effort.

Following the disclosure of the 'Iran-Contra' affair in late 1985 and early 1986, it came to be known that US government officials, including senior officials of National Security Council had established a secret arms pipeline to Iran.⁷² The person behind the arms deal was

70. William M. Chaze and Peter Cary, "Who Arms Iran? Almost Everyone", US News and World Report, 103(9) 31 August 1987, p. 27.

71. Timmerman, n. 69, p. 48.

72. Michael T. Klare, "Secret Operatives, Clandestine Trades: The Thriving Blackmarket for Weapons", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 44(3), April 1988, p. 16.

the Israeli businessmen Nirmodi who met Iranian Manucher Ghorbanifer in Geneva, who was said to be deputy to the Prime Minister, Hussain Musair.⁷³ As a result, there was a secret arms liftment from United States to Iran. On 4 November 1986 Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Iranian Majlis announced about the visit of the US National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane, to Iran and about the landing of twenty cargo planes full of US arms and spare parts at Qale Morghi air base near Mahrabad airport.⁷⁴

Denmark played an important role in many arms shipments to Iran. Its ships transported weapons from Eilat in Israel to Iran that were at least partially responsible for the release of American hostages in Lebanon. The Vice-President of Danish Seamen's Union, Henrick Berlan, said, "We know of 11 voyages during the 1986 from Israel to Iran and they form a curious pattern after each batch of voyage, an American hostage was released".⁷⁵ Nirmodi had himself confirmed that he was the intermediary, and that efforts in which he involved led to the release of an American (Rev. Weir), in Lebanon in September 1985.⁷⁶ The aim had been to secure first the release of William Buckley,

73. Azad, n. 67, p. 46.

74. Ali Azad, "USA-Iran Arms Deal : The Iranian Angle," Middle East, (147), January 1987, p. 48.

75. "Who Keeps the Gulf War Going", Business Week, (14) 29 December 1986, 5 January 1987, p. 30 (Henceforth cited as Business Week).

76. Azad, n. 67, p. 46.

the CIA man held in Lebabon, but he was apparently already dead.

The other major source of military equipment for Iran was North Korea. Iranians have reportedly swapped some 250,000 tons of crude oil for about \$1 billion worth of arms. North Koreans supplied about 150 T-59 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, 1000 mortars, 600 anti aircrafts batteries and 12,000 machine guns and rifles. Most of these weapons were of Chinese and Soviet origin.⁷⁷

Sweden was another exporter whose weapons reached Iran despite the Swedish laws prohibiting sales to any power engaged in an armed conflict. Schmitz, the person who acted as the broker in many of these deals faces prosecution by Swedish authorities as one of Iran's biggest European agent.⁷⁸ He bought weapons needed by Iran from Belgium, West Germany and Sweden and then sold them to Yugoslavia for eventual resale to Iran. Under the Swedish arms export law, all recipients are obliged to sign the end-use certificates; that is, they have to promise not to re-export the Swedish equipment to another country. By mid-1986 such cases were being investigated by Swedish police and customs, including the smuggling of Bofors RBS-70 missiles to Bahrain and Dubai via Singapore and covert

77. Talif Deen, "Iran-Meeting its Arms and Requirements" Janes Defence Weekly, 18(21), 28 November 1987, p. 1276.

78. Chaze and Cary, n. 75, p. 28.

deliveries of gun powder, chemicals and ammunition to countries in the Middle West.⁷⁹ Finally the RBS-70 missiles were transhipped to Iran from Baharain and Dubai, though the legitimate customer was Singapore.⁸⁰ In the mid-1980s the Nobel Kemi division of Sweden's Nobel industry also shipped an estimated 400 tons of military explosives to Iran in violation of Swedish export regulations banning the sale of arms and ammunition to countries in conflict-prone areas.⁸¹

Although most West European nations have pledged adherence to the embargo, a good number of them treated their vow with varied degrees of indifference. Indeed, so relaxed was the British adherence to the embargo that for seven years Iranian military maintained an arms procurement office in London. The centre was closed in September 1987 only after an Iranian attack on a British tanker in the Persian Gulf.⁸² When the US Congress began its hearings into Iranian arms sale scandal, Britain sold six radar system worth \$ 370 million to Iran.⁸³ Even though the

79. Brozsko and Ohlson, n. 9, p. 108.

80. Chaze and Cary, n. 75, p. 14.

81. Klare, n. 72, p. 17.

82. *ibid.*, p. 20.

83. Business Week, n. 75, p. 28.

British embargo on arms sales to Iran and Iraq had been in force since 1979, it banned only the sale of lethal equipment which could prolong or exacerbate the war.

In France, a former Defence Minister and other high ranking officials were accused of permitting the clandestine sale of some 450,000 artillery shell to Iran. It netted an estimated \$ 120 million between 1983-86, for the Luchaise company.⁸⁴ It was caught red-handed in February 1986 for shipping ammunition to Teheran.⁸⁵

Soviet weapons also arrived in Iran through several channels, especially via Syria and Libya. They had received massive quantities of Soviet weapons and had sided with Iran against Iraq and had shipped critically needed tanks and missiles to Iran.⁸⁶ Even the East European countries which were allies of Moscow and which manufacture their own version of Soviet weapons for export, were involved in sale of arms to Iraq and Iran.

Most of the Soviet arms supplies to Iran were delivered indirectly through the Soviet allies, namely Libya, Syria and North Korea. North Korean munitions supplied to Iran probably originated in the Soviet Union itself. Indeed a North Korean munition factory on the Soviet border is believed to exist "solely to put its stamp

84. Klare, n..72, p. 21.

85. Business Week, n. 75, p. 29.

86. ibid., p. 31.

on the Soviet made weapons".⁸⁷

One new feature of the Iraq-Iran war was the massive ^{use} air of surface-to-surface missile (SSM). Both Iran and Iraq used them in hundreds mainly against soft targets like the cities. Earlier both used the Soviet missiles like the FROG and the Sand with the range of 70 Km and 280 Km respectively. Subsequently, they began not only to modify these missiles but also to produce them indigeneously. Iran developed the 'Ughab' SSM and Iraq 'al-Husayn' and 'al-Abbas'. There were long-range missiles capable of hitting Tehran from Iraqi territory. These have prompted Israel to search for anti-ballistic missiles defence technology for short-range SSM. The Great Powers are also seeking to put controls on transfer of missiles technology to developing countries.

In the eighties, the Iran-Iraq war became the main factor for arms transfer to this region. Gone was the 'Twin-Pillar' policy with the Iranian Revolution. USA, instead of relying on the regional states to assume the security of the region, was willing to take the responsibility on its own through the Carter Doctrine. The Reagan Administration, which took office in 1981, cancelled earlier restriction on arms transfer that were put by the previous administration. Even direct military action was

87. Alef A. Gawad, "Moscow's Arms for Oil Diplomacy", Foreign Policy, (63), Summer 1986, p. 157.

taken by USA in 1987. It also, escorted oil tankers, when the tanker war was at its peak. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait diversified its source of supply, since both of them had to fight for every arms deal with the US Congress and began to depend more on France and Britain. The entry of Third World arms exporters like Brazil, North Korea etc. in the region, provided greater competition to the traditional suppliers. Even though the weapons supplied by them were not sophisticated, Iran and Iraq depended upon these suppliers for their ammunition, and spare parts. After the arms embargo by the West, Iran got its arms mostly clandestinely. In spite of the arms embargo by the Super Powers, both the belligerents, Iran and Iraq, received their arms from both the Super Powers. Because of the war time demands and direct and indirect restrictions, on sale of arms by major traditional arms suppliers, the Gulf became a 'buyers market' in the eighties as compared to the 'sellers market' in the seventies.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

One of the main trends in the arms trade since World War II is the gradual shift from near monopoly to increasing competition in the arms supply to the developing countries. In the fifties the West had the monopoly over arms transfer to the Persian Gulf region. Because of that monopoly and also due to Tripartite Agreement of 1950, which tried to balance the military capability of Israel and Arabs, the West even tried to impose an unilateral arms control over the area. This monopoly was broken after the Iraqi coup d'etat of 14 July 1958. It marked the Soviet entry as an arms supplier to the region.

Iraq's radical posture was seen by the pro-west Arab states and also by Iran, as a threat to their security. It also marked the beginning of the Iran-Iraq rivalry and it led to their arming by the Super Powers in the cold war context. Iraqi-Soviet military relations, however, were cordial only for a short period during 1958-60 and Iraq once again began its search for weapons from the West.

In the sixties, the West was not willing to extend military grant to this region. Even though the oil revenue of the Gulf states had increased gradually, it was not sufficient for them to acquire weapons they needed. The

British announced their East of Suez policy in 1967. The Nixon Doctrine was enunciated in 1969 to fill the vacuum. It relied on the regional states to assume the responsibility of security of the region. The USA, however, refused to be directly responsible for that and only promised to help the regional powers. Arms transfer to pro-Western states was a step in that direction. Though the 'Twin-Pillar' policy of USA relied on Saudi Arabia and Iran, the latter got more arms than the former, because the pro-Israel lobby in USA restricted the flow of arms to Saudi Arabia.

The OPEC oil price hike in 1973 brought enough money to the Gulf states. The flood-gate of arms transfer was opened. Despite the resistance of the arms control lobby in the United States, arms flowed freely to the Gulf states. The west, in order to recycle the surplus petro-dollar, was willing to supply even the latest weapons as is seen from the list of arms sold to Iran. Iran asserted its power as the guardian of the Persian Gulf security.

Arms control lobby once again began to assert itself during the Carter Administration. Thus, when USA was reluctant to supply arms, Kuwait and Iran, signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union. They believed that even a small deal with the socialist country would induce the traditional Western suppliers to transfer arms without any

hesitation. Iran had successfully adopted this tactics in 1966-67, when USA refused to supply supersonic aircraft and SAMs. It signed a \$ 110 million arms deal with the USSR. Promptly, the USA also promised to supply the desired weapons.

The fall of the Shah, hostage crisis and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, combined with the new Cold War, changed the entire scenario in the Gulf. The Carter Doctrine even went to the extent of USA threatening to use military force unilaterally to safeguard the security of the West. The subsequent Reagan Administration established the US CENTCOM in 1983. It reflected the US willingness to be militarily present in the region, the arms restriction policy of the previous Carter Administration was eased by the new Reagan Administration. Arms were transferred to friends and allies of United States to counter the Iranians and the Soviets in the Gulf.

Moreover, the entry of Third World arms exporters into the region, thanks to the demands of the Iran-Iraq War, changed the structure of the arms transfer pattern. With fierce competition from the new suppliers, prices became keen and fewer political strings were attached by the arms suppliers. That also offered the buyers opportunities to diversify their supply sources. Market become fiercely competitive with a large number of potential suppliers who were not bound by the normal constraints of Cold War

rivalry or regional political alliance relationship that had dominated arms transfer in the past.

Because of various reasons both the USA and USSR halted their arms supply to the belligerents when the war broke out in 1980. But, both the super powers found ways and means to supply arms to the belligerents during the war. That was done either through the clandestine arms deal as in the case of Iran-Contra affairs or through third party transfer via Israel, North Korea, Egypt, Syria and Libya. Thus, arms transfer in the eighties, unlike in the seventies, was marked by several scandals, use of unfair means and as a whole became vicious.

While arms transfer in the sixties and seventies were marked by Cold War rivalry and possibility of regional conflict, as in the case of Iran and Iraq, or because of the desire on the part of Iran for regional hegemony, arms transfer during the eighties were governed by two different considerations. The one was the need to fight the war. Arms procurements by Iraq and Iran were governed by that immediate need. Different considerations, however, governed the arms purchase by the countries of the GCC. They acquired arms to defend themselves from any possible fall-out of the Iran-Iraq War and threat to their security. Another facet of arms procurement policy of the GCC states was a close politico-military interaction between the GCC states and

the West, especially USA. Thus, the USA not only operated AWACS from Saudi Arabian bases but coordinated them with their naval forces in the Gulf. That nexus, became all the more important when the USA took direct military action against Iranian targets in the Gulf. Thus, arms transfer from the USA to some of the members of the GCC was directly and indirectly linked.

Though the Iran-Iraq war has ended, the present pattern of arms transfer to the Gulf states would continue for some more time. The pattern of global balance of power, despite the new detente, and also of the regional balance of power, has neither changed much nor is there any such likelihood. Iraq and Iran would continue to strengthen their military capability, in case the fragile cease-fire is broken. The GCC states would work towards a closer politico-military relationship among themselves and also keep their contact open with the west as a cushion vis-a-vis Iran and Iraq. Thus, bi-polarity at the global level and the triangular interaction between Iraq, Iran and the GCC at the regional level will continue to influence the arms transfer in the Gulf for some years to come.

APPENDIX

Transfer of Major Arms to the Persian Gulf States*

BAHRAIN

Supplier		1950-72	1973-79	1980-88
Tanks	USA	-	-	50 M-60-A3
Jet Frontline Aircraft	USA	-	-	4F-4E, 8 F-5E Tiger-2 12 F-16C, 12 F-16D
Fighting ships	Germany FR	-	-	2 TNC-45 FAC, 2 Type 62-001

IRAN

Tanks	Libya	-	-	60T-54, 65 T-55, 65 T-62
	China	-	-	500 T-59 (unconfirmed)
	North Korea	-	-	150 T-62
	U.K.	762 Chieftain-3 (ordered)	250 FV-101 Scorpion	
	USA	15 Sherman, 50 M-24 Chaffee, 400 M-47/ 48 Patton	460 M-60	
	Syria	-	-	129 T-55, 100 T-62

Source: *Tables prepared by using the data given in SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm:Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971), Brzoska, Michael and Ohlson, Thomas, Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). SIPRI, Year Book 1986-87, 88, World Armament and Disarmament, (Stockholm, 1986, 87, 88).

IRAN

Jet	China	-	-	104 F-6, 60 F-7 (un- Confirmed)
Frontline Aircraft	North Korea	-	-	60F-6 (unconfirmed)
	USA	75F-84G, 113 F-5, 68 F-4	138 F-4, 167 F-5 80F-14	
Fighting Ships	France	-	6 Missile Patrol boat	
	Germany FR	-	3 Patrol boat	6 Type-209, 3 sub- marine (ordered)
	South Korea	-	-	3 Hyundai Type
	U.K.	2 Seaward Defence vessel, 1 Destro- yer, 10 Hovercraft 4 Frigate	4 Hovercraft, 2 Hengam class	2 Hengam class, 1 Kharag type
	USA	7 Patrol vessel, 4 coastal Mine Sweepers, 4 Corvette.	2 Gearing class, 2 Sumner class	-

IRAQ

Tanks		-	-	
	China	-	-	T-59, T-69 (Unspeci- fied number delivered)

IRAQ

Supplier	1950-72	1973-79	1980-88
Egypt	-	-	450T -55
France	-	300 AMX-30B	
German DR	-	-	50T-55
Jordan	-	-	50 Khalid
Kuwait	-	-	50 Chieftain-5 (unconfirmed)
Poland	-	-	300 T-55
U.K.	110 Centurion	-	-
U.S.A.	40 M-24 Chaffe	-	-
USSR	300 T-54, 175 T-34.	300 T-55, 700 T-62	50 T-54, 300 T-55, 600 T-62, 600 T-72.
Jet Frontline Aircraft			
Egypt	-	-	80F-7, 40 F-6
France	-	60 Mirage F-1C	113 Mirage F-1C
Jordan	-	-	20 F-6 (unconfirmed)
Sudan	-	10 MIG-21MF	-
U.K.	28 Hawker Fury, 11 DH vampire MK 52, 6 DH Vampire, T-55, 5 NAF-86 Sanre, 20 Hawker Hunter T-6/69, 46 HS Hunter F-59.	-	-
Argentina			20 IA-58A Pucara (unconfirmed)

<u>IRAQ</u>	<u>Supplier</u>	<u>1950-72</u>	<u>1973-79</u>	<u>1980-88</u>
	USSR	19 MIG-15, 17 MIG-17 17 MIG-19, 98 MIG-21, IOTU-16, 50 SU-7	55 MIG-21, 70 MIG- BN, 25 MIG-25, 5SU-7, 80SU-20, Fitter C, 12 TU-22	61 MIG-21 bis, 50MIG- 23 BN, 30 MIG-25, 25 MIG- 29, 3 SU-7 Fitter, 30SU -20 Fitter C, 24 SU-25 Frog foot.
Fighting ships	Italy	-	-	4 Lupo class Frigate, 6 Wadi class Corvette
	UK	8 Patrol boat		
	USSR	12 Motor torpedo 3 Submarine class, 2 Missile boat	6 OSA-1 Class FAC, 8 OSA-2, Class FAC, 8 Polnoey Class LS, 3 yeugenia class MSC	-
<u>KUWAIT</u>				
Tanks	UK	50 Centurion, 50 Vickers, 70 MBT MK-1	160 Chieftain-5	100 Chieftain, 100 FV-101 Scorpion
Jet Frontline Aircraft	UK	9 HS HunterFGA, 2 HS Hunter T-67, 12 BAC Lightning F-33, 2 BAC Lightning T-55.	-	-
	USA	-	30 A-4M Skyhawk-2	-
	Argentina	-	-	20 IA-58A Pucara
	France	-	20 Mirage F-1	14 Mirage F-1

KUWAIT

	Supplier	1950-72	1973-79	1980-88
Fighting ships	UK	10 Patrol boat	-	-
	Singapore	-	6 Type 27M LC	-
	Germany FR	-	-	2 PB-57 Type PC, 6 TNC-45 FAC

OMAN

Tanks	UK	-	-	17 Chieftain, 30 FU-101 Scorpion
	USA	-	-	60 M-60 AI

Jet Frontline Aircraft	UK	4 HS Hunter FGA-78 2 HS Hunter T-59.	12-Jaguar	14 Jaguar, 8 Tornado ADV
	Jordan	-	31 Hunter FGA-74	-
	Kuwait	-	-	2 Hunter T-66

Fighting ships	UK	3 Fast Patrol craft	2-Type 37-5M FAC, 4-Type 37 M PC	1 Brookie Logistic(LS) 4 Province Class FAC
	Netherlands	-	-	2 Dokkum Class MSC
	Singapore	-	-	3 Saba al Bakr LC

QATAR

	Supplier	1950-72	1973-79	1980-88
Tanks	France	-	24 AMX-30B	-
Jet Frontline Aircraft	UK	7 HS-Hunter FGA-78, 3HS Hunter	-	-
	France	-	-	6 Alphajet, 28 Mirage F-1C
Fighting ships	UK	4 Fast Patrol boat	-	-
	France	-	-	3 Combattante Type FAC

SAUDI ARABIA

Tanks	France	30 AMX-30	359 AMX-30	-
	USA	55 M-47 Patton	150 M-6A1	3A-1 Abrams, 132 M-60A1/3
Jet Frontline Aircraft	UK	6 Hawker Hunter FGA-9, 2 Hawker Hunter, T-66, 39 BAC Lightning F.52/53, 8 BAC Lightining T-54.	-	24 Tornado ADV, 48 Tornado IDS

SAUDI ARABIA

	Supplier	1950-72	1973-79	1980-88
	USA	9 Douglas B-26 Invades, 20 NA F-86F Sabre, 20 Northtop F-5B	20 F-5B, 94 F-5E Tiger - 2	62 F-15D, Eagle, 4 F-SE Tiger - 2
Fighting ships	Germany FR	3 Fast Patrol boats	-	-
	France	-	-	4F-2000 class frigate
	UK	50 Patrol boats, 8 Hovercraft	-	-
	USA	1 Patrol boat	4 Adjutant MSC, 4 LCV 1610 class	9 Al Siddiq class FAC, 4 Badr class Corvette

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Tanks	Italy	-	-	39 OF-40
	UK	-	-	44 FV-101 Scorpion
	France	-	-	100 AMX-30B

Jet Frontline Aircraft	UK	-	12 Hunter FGA-9	-
	France	-	16 Mirage-5, 3 Mirage - 5DP	36 Mirage 2000

Supplier		1950-72	1973-79	1980-88
Fighting Ships	UK	-	-	16P-1101 Class PC
	Singapore	-	-	1 LC 40M LC

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