A CRITIQUE OF THE COGNITIVE PROCESS IN NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 1st ĀHNIKA OF NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ)

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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विशिष्टसंस्कृताध्ययनकेन्द्रम्
जवाहरलालनेहरूविश्वविद्यालयः
नवदेहली-११००६७

Special Centre for Sanskrit Studies
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July 25, 2011

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"A Critique of the Cognitive Process in Nyāya Philosophy (with Special Reference to the 1st Āhnika of Nyāyamañjarī)"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** is an original research work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree or diploma in any other institution/university.

(Devalina Saikia)

विशिष्टसंस्कृताध्ययनकेन्द्रम्
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CERTIFICATE

This dissertation entitled **"A Critique of the Cognitive Process in Nyāya Philosophy (with Special Reference to the 1st Āhnika of Nyāyamañjarī)"** submitted by **Devalina Saikia** to **Special Centre for Sanskrit Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-110067**, for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy**, is an original work and has not been submitted so far, in part or full, for any other degree or diploma of any University. This may be placed before the examiners for evaluation for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.

Prof. Shashiprabha Kumar
(Supervisor)

Prof. Vaishna Narang
(Chairperson)

Dedicated To

My Beloved

Maa & Deuta

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Ācāryātpādamādatte pādaṃ śiṣyasvmedhayā|

pādaṃ sabrahmacāribhyaḥ pādaṃ kālakrameṇa tu||

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4.4.6 Non- Cognition *(Anupalabdhi)*

4. 4.7 *Pramāṇa Saṃplava*

4.4.8 Validity of Cognition

Abbreviations

ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institution
AD	Aṣṭādhāyī
AS	Arthaśāstra
BDCRI	Bulletin of Deccan College Research Institute
BDM	Bauddha Darśana Mīmāṃsā
Bhā	Bhāmatī
BP	Bhāṣā Pariccheda
BPUF	Buddhists Philosophy of Universal Flux.
BWK	Basic Ways of Knowing
CCBMWD	Central conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"
CDIP	Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy
CIP	Classical Indian Philosphy
CIR	Critique of Indian Realism
CR	Calcutta Review
CS	Caraka-Saṃhitā
DhL	Dhvanyāloka
EB	Encyclopaedia Britannica
EBSPM	Epistemology of the Bhaṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā
EIP	Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies

ELTLB	Epistemology and Logics Taught by the Later Buddhists
HBNVL	History and Bibliography of Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika Literature
HCBE	Hindu Critique of Buddhists Epistemology
HIL	History of Indian Logic
HPPVT	Historical and Philological Papers on a Vedic Tradition
HSIL	Historical Survey of Indian Logic
IA	Indian Antiquary
IIP	Introduction to Indian Philosophy
IITK	Introduction to Indian Theory of Knowledge
IL	Indian Logic
ILA	Indian Logic and Atomism
ILES	Indian Logic in the early Schools
IPIHBT	Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhists Thought
ITK	Indian Theory of Knowledge
JAOS	Journal of American Oriental Society
JBBRAS	Journal of Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JBORI	Journal of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
JGJRI	Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute
JICPR	Journal of Indian Council for Philosophical Research
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy
JL	Jaina Lakṣaṇāvalī

JSK	Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa
KKS	Kādambarī Kathāsāra
KVa	Kiraṇāvalī
MK	Mīmāṃsākośa
MS	Mīmāṃsā Sūtra
MV	Māṭharavṛtti
NB	Nyāyabhāṣya
NBi	Nyāyabindu
ND	Nyāyadarśanam
NK	Nyāya Kośa
NKa	Nyāyakalikā
NKan	Nyāyakandalī
NKu	Nyāya Kusumāñjalī
NL	Nyāyalīlāvatī
NM	Nyāyamañjarī
NMG	Nyāyamañjarī Granthibhaṅga
NS	Nyāyasūtra
NSM	Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī
NTK	Nyāya Theory of Knowledge
NV	Nyāyavārttika
NVTT	Nyāya Vārttika Tātparya Ṭīkā
NVTTP	Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭikāpariśuddhi

PECITK	Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge
PEW	Philosophy East and West
PHISPC	Project on History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture
PIL	Primer of Indian Logic
PJNM	Philosophy of J.N. Mohanty
PO	Poona Orientalist
PP	Problems of Philosophy
PPB	Praśastapādabhāṣya
PPSLILCQ	Pāṇini: His Place in Sanskrit Literature: An Investigation of Some Literary and Chronological Questions
PS	Pramāṇasamuccaya
PSAH	Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus
PV	Pramāṇavārttika
SB	Śabara Bhāṣyam
SBIP	Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy
SD	Śāstradīpikā
SDS	Sarva Darśana Saṃgraha
SK	Sāṃkhyakārikā
SKD	Śabdakalpadruma
SLLE	Studies in Language Logic and Epistemology
SP	Saptapadārthī

STK	Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudi
SV	Śloka Vārttikam
SWK	Six Ways of Knowing
TB	Tarkabhāṣā
TR	Tārkikarakṣā
TS	Tarkasaṃgraha
TSD	Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā
VDPN	Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha Nirūpaṇa
VPDP	Vaiśeṣika Philosophy According to the Daśapadārthaśāstra
VS	Vaiśeṣika System
VSū	Vaiśeṣika Sūtra
YS	Yājñavalkyasmṛti

Transliteration key used in the dissertation

अ	=	a		आ	=	ā
इ	=	i		ई	=	ī
उ	=	u		ऊ	=	ū
ऋ	=	ṛ		ॠ	=	ṝ
ल्	=	ḷ		ए	=	e
ऐ	=	ai		ओ	=	o
औ	=	au		क्	=	k
ख्	=	kh		ग्	=	g
घ्	=	gh		ङ्	=	ṅ
च्	=	c		छ्	=	ch
ज्	=	j		झ्	=	jh
ञ्	=	ñ		ट्	=	ṭ
ठ्	=	ṭh		ड्	=	ḍ
ढ्	=	ḍh		ण्	=	ṇ
त्	=	t		थ्	=	th
द्	=	d		ध्	=	dh
न्	=	n		प्	=	p
फ्	=	ph		ब्	=	b
भ्	=	bh		म्	=	m
य्	=	y		र्	=	r
ल्	=	l		व्	=	v
श्	=	ś		ष्	=	ṣ
स्	=	s		ह्	=	h
क्ष्	=	kṣ		त्र्	=	tr
ज्ञ्	=	jñ		ऽ	=	'
ं (*Anusvāra*)	=	ṁ		: (*visarga*)	=	ḥ

INTRODUCTION

There are two fundamental procedures which are involved in any philosophical research i.e., analysis and synthesis. Both of these are reciprocal. As analysis without a subsequent synthesis is incomplete, likewise synthesis without previous analysis is baseless. According to Gautama no philosophical enquiry can begin without a doubt about the point at issue. Vātsyāyana also states that *"Tatra nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte 'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate, kiṃ tarhi, saṃśayite 'rthe |"*[1]

To quote Bertrand Russell:

> "Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good."[2]

Scope

The scope of the present research is restricted up to the first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī* in course of its delineation. This work is an attempt to present a critical analysis of the first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī* and making a comparison with the arguments of opponents which are frequently quoted and refuted by Jayantabhaṭṭa. The aim of this research is to present an in depth study of *pramāṇa* as a means of valid cognition. Although the present study is focused upon the first *āhnika*, it also deals with the other *āhnikas* as and when necessary.

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[1] *N.B.* 1/1/1
[2] Russell, Bertrand, *PP*, p. 54

Chapterization

This work is divided in four chapters, excluding the introduction and conclusion. In the **introduction**, it enumerates the scope and objectives of the present research. Simultaneously, it deals with the various problems faced in the study of this capacious and robust book by Jayantabhaṭṭa. Accordingly, in the introduction discusses the prior research done by a few scholars in this field. A brief note on the summary of each chapter is also given.

The **first chapter** is started with the history of Nyāya philosophy. It follows the methodology and subject-matter of Nyāya philosophy. It also deals with the life, date, and works of Jayanta. A list of available editions, commentaries and translations are also included here.

The **second chapter** is concerned with the study of the Pre-Jayanta views on cognitive process. This chapter elaborately deals with the nature of cognition, means of cognition, different types of cognition etc. This chapter is restricted to the view of old logicians, namely Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra and Udayana, concerning those topics. This chapter is basically descriptive in nature.

The **third chapter** is the chief part of this dissertation. It is solely based on the first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī* and presents a lucid and comparative analysis of the vital issues related to the cognitive process. It deals with the nature of cognition, Jayanta's definition of *pramāṇa*, numbers of *pramāṇa*, types of *prmāṇa* etc. Likewise, it also presents Jayanta's citation and refutation of other rival philosophical systems such as Buddhists, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Cārvāka etc. Thus, the third chapter presents a critical and in-depth study of the first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī*.

The **fourth chapter** is the critical assessment of the key concepts, viz., nature of cognition, means of cognition, validity of cognition etc. It also presents an inter-school and intra-school discussion of the key concepts.

In the **conclusion** some observations on the consequences of the present research are listed. It also suggests the scope of further research in this particular field.

The Problem

Jayantabhaṭṭa is one of the most prominent and important scholars among the old Nyāya philosophers who has made considerably significant contribution to Indian Philosophy. Although his monumental work *Nyāyamañjarī* should have been studied widely and discussed, it has not unfortunately attracted the attention of scholars as much as it deserves. It is to be noted that *Nyāyamañjarī* is looked down upon as a commentary without any constructive value in its time or even later. Such a precious book was discovered only towards the end of the 19th century A.D.

Jayanta's book is filled up with copious references from various philosophical texts both from the Nyāya system as well as from the other schools of Indian philosophy. He has a very comprehensive knowledge of each and every school. He was a sound Vedic scholar and, at the same time, he was aptly well versed and acquainted with Buddhist philosophy as well.

Nyāyamañjarī is not a mere commentary of *Nyāyasūtra*. It is in fact an encyclopaedia of logic, metaphysics, ethics, theology and what not, as observed by J.B. Bhattacharya in his introduction to the English translation of *Nyāyamañjarī*.[3]

It must be noted here that the real importance of *Nyāyamañjarī* lies in its refutation of the other philosophical doctrines. Jayanta, as a staunch follower of old Nyāya school, tries to uphold the philosophy of Gautama and Vātsyāyana.

Jayanta ably and aptly answers the opponents in the form of his profound arguments. At the time of explaining his predecessors view, he also introduces new issues, thoughts and innovative ideas.

Thus, for a thorough study of *Nyāyamañjarī* it is necessary to have the knowledge of other philosophical schools as well, so that one can critically examine the depth and completeness of the arguments of the opponents which are quoted and refuted by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.

The present research is a modest attempt to study the contribution of Jayanta to Nyāya philosophy in particular and Indian philosophy in general.

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[3] *N.M.*, (Motilal Banarsidass edn.), Introduction.

Various Issues Related To Cognitive Process

As already stated, the present research focuses upon various important issues related to cognition and the cognitive process. There are several questions that arise in the study of cognitive process such as follows:

1. What is the meaning of cognition?

2. What are its different forms?

3. What is the validity of cognition?

4. What are the factors of valid cognition?

Objectives

Since the present research is restricted to the 1ˢᵗ *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī*, there are also some vital textual questions related to the cognitive process that are to be taken account of. Following are some of the crucial points which are in fact the objectives of present research and will be:

- **To highlight the most innovative and comprehensive definition of *pramāṇa:***
  According to Jayantabhaṭṭa, *pramāṇa* is the collocation of all factors or *kārakas* which is both in the nature of knowledge as well as non-knowledge and produces undoubtful and valid knowledge.[4] With this Jayanta brings up some new thoughts regarding the definition of *pramāṇa* while simultaneously criticizing the other definitions given by the Buddhists, Mīmāṃsakas and Sāṃkhyas. Though opponents raise several questions, Jayanta refutes all the objections and proves his thesis. One important objection is that since the collocation of all the factors involved in the process of cognition the *prameya* (object of cognition) is also included therein. So for what should *pramāṇa* be operative? Similarly, *sāmagrī* also includes the *pramātā* (knower), then who will be the subject of cognition?

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[4] *Avyabhicāriṇīmasandigdhāmarthopalabddhiṃ vidadhatī bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇam',*
N.M., (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 36.

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Jayanta replies that by '*sāmagrī pramāṇam*' he does not mean that individual factors are to be ignored. What he means exactly is to emphasize that the process of cognition depends solely on the collection of factors of cognition. Thus only the collocation of factors can produce the cognition and so the cognizing agent is called *pramātā* and the object is *prameya*. Thus a lengthy debate continues for and against the definition of *pramāṇa* given by Jayantabhaṭṭa.

- **To discuss the number of *pramāṇas*:** Regarding the number of *pramāṇas*, Jayanta first states the Nyāya position, that there are only four means of cognition viz., perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. He establishes the Nyāya view quite firmly by criticizing Cārvāka who accepts *pratyakṣa* as the only mean of cognition, the Buddhist position that there are only two *pramāṇas*-*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, Kumārila and Prabhākara's view that *arthāpatti* is an additional *pramāṇa*, and again Kumārila's position that *abhāva* is a further additional *pramāṇa*.

- **To expound the theory of *pramāṇa-saṃplava* vs *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* :** There arises an important question, whether more than one means of cognition function to cognize one and the same object or each means has its own specific object. Buddhists uphold that the cognition of the particular object which is gained through perception cannot be grasped by inference. Similarly, which is grasped by inference cannot be got through perception. This theory is known as *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*. But the Naiyāyikas consider that the cognition of one and the same object could be possible through the co-operation of the different means of cognition. This theory is known as *pramāṇa-saṃplava*. Jayanta also upholds this theory and discusses it in detail.

- **To examine the two standpoints about *jñāna* as *sākāra* and *nirākāra:*** Jayanta presents two sides, one is of *nirākārajñānavādī*, i.e. Naiyāyikas and Vaibhāṣika, who consider knowledge is formless and takes its form from the knowable objects themselves. Another view is *sākārajñānavādī*, i.e. Sautrāntika and Vijñānavādī, who announce that knowledge also has its own form. The Naiyāyikas adopt that

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knowledge is formless. Here in *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayanta holds the Naiyāykas views.

- **To decide whether *jñāna* is *svaprakāśa* and *paraprakāśa*:** Jayanta presents the *purvapakṣa,* regarding the self –luminosity of cognition, who considers that cognition illuminates both the knowable objects and cognition itself. Accordingly, he supports the Nyāya view that knowledge is not self-luminous, rather it illuminates the knowable objects.

- **To discuss the view whether *jñāna* is *kriyā* or otherwise:** According to Mīmāṃsakas, knowledge is an act, i.e. *jñānakriyā*. But Jayanta refutes this view citing examples from *Śabarabhāṣya* where *jñāna* and *karma* are distinguished from each other.

- **To elaborate the *Nyāya* view on *jñāna-prāmāṇya*:** Jayanta in his dissertation, expresses the view of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who considers that the validity of cognition is self-evident. But for the Naiyāyikas, both validity and invalidity of cognition is not self-evident, rather it depends upon external factors.

- **To highlight the contribution** of Jayanta in refutation of other rival philosophical schools during his time, i.e. Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Jaina and Cārvāka, concerning various debatable points.

Thus, there are various issues regarding the study of cognitive process which have been discussed during the course of this research.

Survey of Existing Research

1. **C.D. Bijalwan:** In his *Indian Theory of Knowledge, based upon Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,* the author has presented different ideas on Indian theory of knowledge in a historical and broader way. This book is the result of research and comprehensive evaluation of various issues and views. Starting from the origin and development of

Indian theory of knowledge, he presents extensive insights regarding the nature and forms of knowledge, means of valid knowledge etc. He has also published a paper on the validity of knowledge.[5]

2. S. C. Chatterjee: In *the Nyāya Theory of Knowledge: A Critical Study of Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics,* the author has critically presented the various aspects of knowledge dealing with the whole *Nyāya* system. Though it is not a proper research work, yet it provides significant inputs to the Nyāya theory of knowledge.

3. Nagin J. Shah: The author has to be accredited with the Gujarati translation of *Nyāyamañjarī* upto the 9th *āhnika*. Besides this, he has prepared a chapter wise study of the same. In this way his unmitigated research is revealed through the book titled *A Study of Jayantbhatta's Nyayamanjari:A Mature Sanskrit Work on Indian Logic.* In the first part of this book he has elaborately discussed and critically highlighted the definition of *pramāna*, the twofold classification of it according to *Buddhists* and also on *arthāpatti* and *abhāva.*

Moreover, there are several published papers which cope with various aspects of cognition according to *Nyāya* philosophy. Scholars, namely H.G. Narahari,[6] R. D. Hegde,[7] Bimal Krishna Matilal[8], V. N. Jha[9] etc., have made valuable contributions in this area.

Throughout the survey it is reflected that though several research works have been done, but some of them are presented in a broad canvas sketching all the philosophical notions regarding the theory of knowledge. Others are constrained to some particular points only. But till date no independent research work has come to the knowledge of present

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[5] Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Theory of the Test of the Truth of a Knowledge, *JGJRI,* vol. 24, Nos.3-4, pp. 149-158
[6] *Nyāyamañjarī* Studies', *PO,* vol. 22, Nos. 1-2, vol. 26, Nos.3-4.
[7] The Definition and Nature of *Pramāna* According to Jayanatbhatta, *Sambodhī,* vol. 7, pp. 56-63.
_____, Number of *Pramānas, Sambodhī,* vol. 10, pp. 63-66.
[8] Indian Theories of knowledge and Truth, *PEW,* vol. 18,pp. 321-334.
_____. 'Knowledge, Truth and *Pramātva',* *PJNM,* ed. Daya Krishna and K.L. Sharma, New Delhi : 1991, pp.169-182.
[9]Jayanta's Critique of The Bhaṭṭa Theory of Knowledge, *ABORI,* vol. 68, pp. 581-588.
Jayanta's Concept of *Pramāna, SLLE,* pp. 26-35.

researcher, who has focused primarily on the first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī* with a view to explain the complete cognitive process *in Nyāya.* Thus the present research is significant as it is basically text-based since it is focused on the first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī* and to go deep into the analysis of cognitive process. Furthermore, it is an endeavor to contextualize the key concepts available in the text.

Last, but not the least, one would like to sum up in the words of Jayantabhaṭṭa himself:

Kuto vā nūtanaṃ vastu vayamutprekṣituṃ kṣamāḥ |

vacovinyāsavaicitryamātramatra vicāryatām || [10]

Research Methods

The method of exposition, which is adopted in this present research, is comparative as well as critical. The comparison and critical analysis is based upon inter and intra school debates within Indian philosophy. Analyzing the *pūrvapakṣas* in each and every point of view, a keen observation of the first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī* is examined. Simultaneously, a brief historical study of *Nyāya* philosophy has been done. Pre-Jayanta's views regarding cognitive process are also expounded in the following chapters. Along with this it also emphasizes the view of other rival philosophical schools considering cognitive process like Mīmāṃsā, Buddhists, Cārvāka etc.

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[10] *N.M.* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.) p.10.

CHAPTER- 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ

This chapter for the most part is based on the historical background of *Nyāyamañjarī*. But before going on to discuss this heading, it is necessary to look upon the historical scenario of the Nyāya philosophy that prevails before Jayanta. This is an endeavour to put the text into context.

1.1. Significance of the Term '*Nyāya*'

Nyāyavistaratu mūlasambhūtaḥ sarvavidyānaṃ,[1] as Jayantabhatta declares in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, that *Nyāyaśāstra* is the root of all the *vidyās*. Accordingly among the fourteen *vidyāsthānas*[2] *tarka* or *nyāya* occurs the prominent place. The Nyāya philosophy, propounded by Gautama, is basically concerned with the means of valid cognition i.e. the *pramāṇas*. It is the realistic school of philosophy as it deals with the external world through the sixteen categories. Accordingly, the knowledge of these categories leads to the world of deliverance.[3] Among the sixteen categories *pramāṇa* (means of cognition) stands first, then the *prameya* (object of cognition). As Vātsyāyana cognates both and says that, '*pramāṇairarthaparīkṣanam nyāyaḥ*'.[4] In order to understand *prameya, pramāṇa* has to be applied first according to the principle *mānādhīnā meyasiddhiḥ*. According to S.C. Vidyabhushana, "The *Nyāya* popularly signifies 'right' or 'justice'. The *Nyāyaśāstra* is therefore the science of right judgement and true reasoning."[5] Uddyotakara[6] elaborates the term Nyāya as, "Nyāya occurs when the *pramāṇas* are employed collectively in the establishment of an object. . . this (employment of the *pramāṇas* in unison) is the highest *nyāya*, as it demonstrates the truth (of one's position) to an opponent."[7]

The etymological meaning of the term *Nyāya* is *niyamena īyate*.[8] Pāṇini in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* shows the derivation of the term *Nyāya* from the root *iṇ*, adjoining the prefix *ni* and suffix *ghañ*.[9] Another derivation of this term is *niyamena prāpyante*

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[1] *N.M.*, (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 13.

[2] *Y.S.*, 1.3

[3] *N.S.*, 1.1.1

[4] *N.B.*, 1.1.1

[5] *HIL*, p. 40

[6] *N.V.*, 1.1.1

[7]   *Samasta-pramāṇa-vyāpārād-artha-adhigati   -nyāya   iti...so'yam   vipratipanna-puruṣa-pratipādakatvāt-paramo nyāya iti.*

[8] *S.K.D.*, p. 930

[9] *A.D.*, 3.3.37

vivakṣitārtho yeneti.[10] According to this derivation the word Nyāya is anomalous and is formed from the root *nī*, adjoining the suffix *ghañ*.[11] In the words of Goldstucker:

> "That *Nyāya* was known to Pāṇini in the sense of syllogism or logical reasoning or perhaps logical science, I conclude from the sutra III.3.122 where its affix conveys the sense of instrumentality i.e, that by which analysis [lit. enlarging] is effected for the some from Nyaya is made the subject of another rule III.3.37. Where Pāṇini gives as its meaning 'propriety, good conduct' which would lead to its later meaning 'policy'. Unless we draw this distinction between the two sutras named, the first sutra become superfluous, Nor is it probable that a civilization like that which is traceable in Panini's rules could have done without a word for syllogistic thought."[12]

1.2 Development of Nyāya Philosophy: A Historical Overview

The probability of the beginnings of the Nyāya philosophy in its early stage in the form of debate and disputation among the scholars cannot be ignored. The term *Ānvīkṣikī* is used in its first stage for dealing with the theory of reason. Kauṭilya, in his *Arthaśāstra*, has characterized *Ānvīkṣikī* as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions and the shelter of all virtues.[13] Vātsāyana, in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*, clearly identifies both *Nyāyavidyā* and *Ānvikṣikī*, but mentions the special discussion of some logical categories such as *saṃśaya* etc. by holding that unless these special categories were treated *nyāyavidyā*, they will merely serve as *adhyātmavidyā* like *Upaniṣadas*.[14] According to Kuppuswami Shastri,

> "Indian logic is *ānvīkṣikī* or *nyāyavistara* or *nyāyadarśana* in the sense that it is a philosophical system, of which methodical reasoning or investigation of knowledge got through observation or perception and trustworthy verbal testimony forms the central theme; it is pre-eminently the science of ratiocination or *tarkaśāstra;...*".[15]

The ancient school of Indian logic entered its new phase by introducing the word *Nyāya*. S.C. Vidyabhusana has pointed out three important stages of development of *Nyāya* as,

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[10] *S.K.D.*, p. 930
[11] *A.D.*, 3.3.122
[12] *PPSLILCQ*, p. 116.
[13] *A.S.*, p. 9
[14] *N.B.*, 1/1/1
[15] Shastri, Kuppuswami, *PIL*, Introduction, iv

1. Ancient period (650 B.C.-100 A.D.),

2. Medieval period (up to 1200 A.D.),

3. Modern period (from 900 A.D).[16]

Dharmendra Nath Shastri has divided the three stages of the history of Indian philosophy quite differently from that of S.C. Vidyabhusana's classification. He has divided periods as,

1. The period of origin or the pre Diṅnāga period,

2. Secondly the period of development or the period of conflict with the Digṅnāga School, and

3. At last the period of decay or the post-Buddhists period.[17]

Karl H. Potter has developed a theory of development of Eastern and Western philosophical school.[18] Professor V. Venkatachalam[19] in his comments on Potter's paper says: "I first take up Prof. Potter's basic concept of five stages for in-depth scrutiny. The five stages of development of philosophical schools-European or Indian-posed by Potter may be summarised as follows:

1. The *Discovery* stage.

2. The *Development* stage.

3. The *Polemical* stage.

4. The *Systematic* stage.

5. The stage of *Decline*."

These arguments are vividly discussed by Sibjiban Bhattacarya.[20]

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[16] Vidyabhushana, S.C., *HIL*, Introduction, xiii.

[17] Shastri, D.N., *CIR*, p.11

[18] *JICPR*, vol. IX, No. 2, January-April, 1992, pp. 135ff., quoted in *PHISPC*, p. 10.

[19] *JICPR*, vol. IX, NO.2, January-April, 1992, pp. 159ff, ibid.

[20] *PHISPC*, pp., 7-10.

itself the principles both of Logic and Philosophy. In *Nyāsūtra* sixteen categories have been recognized and defined by Akṣapāda.

Kaṇādena tu samproktaṃ śāstraṃ vaiśeṣikaṃ mahat|

Gautamena tathā nyāyaṃ sāṃkyantu kapilena vai||[35]

1.2.2 *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana

Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* is the first and the most significant commentary of *Nyāyasūtra*. He belonged to 400 A.D.[36] Vātsyāyana has preceded Dignāga and Vasubandhu and followed Nāgārjuna. He criticized the Mādhyamika doctrine of inter-relation: *apekṣā* or *pratyaya*, the Mādhyamika doctrine of voidness: *śūnyatā* , Nāgārjuna's logical theory of examples: *udāharaṇa*, the Yogācāra doctrine of knowledge: *vijñāna*, the doctrine of momentariness: *kṣaṇikavāda* etc. According to vātsyāyana:

Yo 'kṣapādamṛṣiṃ nyāyaḥ pratyagād vadatāṃ varaṃ|

Tasya vātsyāyana idaṃ bhāṣyaṃ jātamvarttayat||[37]

1.2.3 *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika* of Uddyotakara

Uddyotakara (About 635 A.D.)[38] has written *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika* to establish Nyāya views and criticise Dinnāga. He is about 200 houndred years after Vātsyāyana. (Potter) As Uddyotakara himself has remarked in his *Nyāyavārttika* that he wrote his great work "In order to dispel the darkness caused by pseudo philosophers (i.e. Dignnāga and others)"[39].

Yadaksapādapratimo bhāṣyaṃ vātsyāyanaṃ jagau|

Akāri mahatastasya bhāradvājena vārttikam||

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[35] *Padmapurāṇa, uttarakhaṇḍa, adhyāya-263*
[36] *HIL*, p. 115.
[37] *N.B.*, 5/2
[38] [38] *HIL*, p. 123.
[39] *Kutārkikajñānanivṛttihetuḥ ', N.V.*

1.2.4 *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra

Vācaspatimiśra (About 841 A.D.)[40] has written *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* to clear the meanings of *Vārttika*. There are several works attributed to him. Such as: *Nyāyakaṇikā, (Brahma) Tattvasamīkṣā, Tattvabindu, Nyāyasūcīnibandha, Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭikā, Tattvakaumudī, Tattvavaiśāradī* and *Bhāmatī*.

1.2.5 *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi* of *Udayana*

Udayana's (984 A.D.)[41] contributuion to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is most capacious. Udayana has been attributed with six works. Among them *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi* and *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa* belong to the Nyāya school. The *Kiraṇāvalī* and the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* belong to the Vaiśeṣika School. The remaining two works, viz., *Ātmatattvaviveka* and *Nyāyakusumāñjali* are independent treatises which belong to the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. He has written *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi* as the sub-commentary of Vācaspatimiśra's text. His *Nyāyakusumāñjali* is the first systematic account of theistic *Nyāya*. All his works seem to have been extremely popular because they have been extensively commented and sub-commented upon.

Thus several scholars have enriched the literature of *prācina- nyāya,* where Jayantabhaṭta is the last pillar.

Gangeśa Upādhyāya's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (12th century A.D.) is the first major treatise of the *Navya Nyāya* School. His son, Vardhamāna Upādhyāya's *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* (1225 A.D.), though a commentary on Udayana's *Nyāyatātparyapariśuddhi,* incorporated his father's views. Jayadeva has written a commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* known as *Āloka* (13th century A.D.). Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma's *Tattvacintāmaṇivyākhyā* (16th century A.D.) is the first great work of Navadvipa school of Navya- Nyāya. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti* and *Padārthakhaṇḍana* are the next important works of this school. Viśvanatha's *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* (17th century A.D.) is also a notable work. The

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[40] *HIL,* p. 133.
[41] Ibid., p. 141.

Commentaries on *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti* by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra (17th century A.D.) and Gadādhara Bhattachārya (17th century A.D.) are the last two remarkable works of this school.

Keśavamiśra (1275 A.D.) was the author of *Tarkabhāṣā*. It deals with the sixteen categories of the *Nyāyasūtra*. Annaṁbhaṭṭa (17th century CE) has tried to develop a consistent system by combining the ancient and the new schools, *Prācina-Nyāya* and *Navya-Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* to develop the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school. His *Tarkasaṁgraha* and *Dīpikā* are the popular manuals of this school.

1.3 Methodology and Concerned Subjects in *Nyāyaśāstra*

"In short, the Nyāya strategy is to appeal to our intuitions about knowledge, in order to learn something about reasoning and not vice versa."[42]

The most important contribution made by the Nyāya School to modern thought is its methodology. This methodology is based on a system of logic that, subsequently, has been adopted by the majority of the other Indian schools. The Nyāya is intended to supply a correct method of philosophical enquiry into all the objects and subjects of human knowledge, including the process of reasoning and laws of thought. The evidence of the senses is submitted to a critical enquiry. The methodology which is treated in *Nyāyaśāstra,* as pointed out by Vātsyāyana, as *uddeśa* (enunciation), *lakṣaṇa* (definition) and *parīkṣā* (examination).[43] *Uddeśa* is the mere mention of the name of the categories, *lakṣaṇa* is the citation of the definition of the categories which differentiates it from other categories and *parīkṣā* is the logical presentation of questions, i.e., whether the particular definition of a certain category is applicable or not.

The importance of Nyāya tradition in Indian philosophy is particularly in rational debate and clear, logical argumentation. Analysis of inferential reasoning was central in establishing the proper rules for scholastic debate. The hypothetical reasoning or rational critique *(tarka or tarka-vidyā)* is the exchange of arguments between the proponent and opponent with the objective of attaining valid knowledge. The purpose

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[42] Matilal, *PECITK,* p. 126
[43] *Uddeśo lakṣaṇaṃ parīkṣā ceti‖ N.B.,* 1/1/2

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is to test the validity of inferential reasoning by demonstrating the inappropriate consequences that follow from an opponent's position and therefore eliminate doubt in the mind of the enquirer.

Theory of knowledge, *pramāṇa-śāstra*, is a rich genre of Sanskrit literature, carried out in texts belonging to distinct schools of philosophy. Debate across school occurs especially on epistemological issues. Mainstream classical Indian epistemology is dominated by theories about cognitive processes, called *pramāṇa*.

This philosophy asserts that obtaining valid cognition of the external world and its relationship with the mind and self is the only way to attain liberation. Thus, the methods and conditions of determining true knowledge are not the final goal of Nyāya philosophy; logical criticism is viewed only as an instrument that enables one to discriminate valid from invalid knowledge. The ultimate goal of Nyāya philosophy, like that of the other systems of Indian philosophy, is liberation.

All six schools of Vedic philosophy aim to describe the nature of the external world and its relationship to the individual, to go beyond the world of appearances to ultimate reality, and to describe the goal of life and the means for attaining this goal. In Nyāya philosophy, realities are divided into sixteen major divisions, called *padārthas*. These sixteen philosophical divisions are: *pramāṇa*, the sources of knowledge; *prameya*, the object of knowledge; *saṃśaya*, doubt or the state of uncertainty; *prayojana*, the aim; *dṛṣṭānta*, example; *siddhānta*, doctrine; *ayayava*, the constituents of inference; *tarka*, hypothetical argument; *nirṇaya*, conclusion; *vāda*, discussion; *jalpa*, wrangling; *vitaṇḍā*, irrational argument; *hetvābhāsa*, specious reasoning; *chala*, unfair reply; *jāti*, generality based on a false analogy; and *nigrahsthāna*, the grounds for defeat. The true cognition of all these categories leads to the ultimate goal of the life, i.e., *niśreyasaḥ*. The subjects discussed under *pramāṇa*, the source of knowledge, are the most important and the most thoroughly and profoundly expounded of all the divisions. A brief outline of these sixteen categories as enumerated in the Nyāya philosophy is presented here:

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1. **Pramāṇa:** *artapariccchittisādhanāni pratyakṣādīdi pramāṇāni|*[44]

The *pramāṇas* such as *pratyakṣa* etc are means to know the objects.

2. **Prameya:** *tatpariccchedyamātmādi prameyam|*[45]

The soul etc. is to be known by that (*pratyakṣa* etc.).

3. **Saṃśaya:** *nānārthāvamarśaḥ saṃśayaḥ |*[46]

Doubt means the knowledge of various (contradictory) attributes (with reference to one and the same object).

4. **Prayojana:** *hitāhitaprāptiparihārau tatsādhanam ca prayojanam|*[47]

Purpose means attainment of good and removal of bad and the means for that.

5. **Dṛṣṭānta:** *hetoḥ pratibandhāvadhāraṇam dṛṣṭāntaḥ|*[48]

Example means that in which is determined the invariable concomitance of the probans or reasons.

6. **Siddhnāta:** *pramāṇato 'bhyupagamyamānaḥ|*[49]

Conclusion means that which is possessed of generality or specific feature and which is accepted on the basis of proof.

7. **Avayava:** *parārthānumānavākyaikadeśabhūtāḥ pratijñādayo 'vayavāḥ|*[50]

Members of syllogism are those such as *pratijñā* etc which constitute the sentences of Inference for others.

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[44] *N.M.*, (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p., 24
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.

8.   ***Tarka:***   *sandigdhe 'rthe 'nyatarapakṣānukūlakāraṇadarśanāt   tasmin sambhāvanāpratyastarkaḥ.*[51]

Tarka is the process of questioning and cross-questioning that leads to a particular conclusion.

9. ***Nirṇaya:*** *sādhanopalambhajanmā tattvāvabodhe nirṇayaḥ|*[52]

Nirṇaya, conclusion, is certain knowledge that is attained by using valid means.

10. ***Vāda:*** *vītarāgakathā vastunirṇayaphalā vādaḥ.*[53]

Vāda is the discussion of inference which reveals the truth through producing the knowledge of things by removing doubts.

11. ***Jalpa:*** *vijigīṣuākathā tu puruṣaśaktiparīkṣaṇaphalā jalpa .*[54]

Jalpa, or wrangling, is the process by which the exponent and opponent both try to attain victory over the other without making an honest attempt to come to the truth.

12. ***Vitaṇḍā:*** *tadviśeṣo vitaṇḍā.*[55]

Vitaṇḍā is irrational reasoning, aimed at refuting or destroying an opponent's position and that is not at all concerned with establishing or defending one's own position.

13. ***Hetvābhāsa:*** *ahetavo hetuvadabhāsamānāḥ hetvābhāsāḥ|*[56]

They are useful to inference by differentiate the real inference from the invalid one.

14. ***Chala:*** *arthavikalpairvachanavighātaḥ chalam|*[57]

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[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.

Dialectic quibbling means setting aside one's argument by altering the meaning of words.

15. *Jāti: hetupratibimbanaprāyaṃ pratyavasthānaṃ jātiḥ* |[58]

Futile respondence means taking objection for which the reason put forward is just a relaxation of reason and not a sound reason.

16. *Nigrahasthāna:* *satyavastvapratibhāsaḥ* *viparītapratibhāsaścha nigrahasthānam*|[59]

Vulnerable point means not revealing of the real object and revealing of the opposite one.

Although Gautama has accepted only the sixteen *padārthas,* he has also admitted that whatever is justified through *pramāṇa* is *padārtha.* Therefore the Nyāya philosophy is known as *'aniyatavādī',* that who does not consider invariable *padārthas.* As in *Nyāyalīlāvatī,* Vallabhācārya said,

"Naiyāyikānāmniyatapadārthavāditvena virodhābhāvāt|*"*[60]

Again Jayantabhaṭṭa said that "Thus, the sage Gautama shows the path of (obtaining) salvation by starting the sixteen *padārthas.* Even though there are some other *padārthas* they are not stated here because they are not useful for (ensuing) the path of salvation."[61]

1.4. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as Allied Systems

Though Nyāya- Vaiśeṣiaka was separate in the early stage of their development, still a link between the two schools seems to have existed. Vātsyāyana, in his *Bhāṣya* on the

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[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] *N.L.,* P.122
[61] *Ityeṣa ṣoḍaśapadārthanibandhanena*
Niḥśreyasasya muninā niradeśi panthā|"
Anyastu sannapi padārthagaṇopavarga
Mārgopayogavirahādiha nopadiṣṭaḥ| *N.M.,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p., 34

Nyāyasūtra (1.1.29), speaks of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya as *samānatantra*. The earliest indication of their alliance is found in the *Mahābhārata*, where Nārada is mentioned as proficient in the Nyāya. Although the Vaiśeṣika is not named, the subject of Nārada's proficiency in unity, plurality, conjunction and inherence, which belong to the Vaeśeṣika School, means that they were regarded as included in the Nyāya.[62]

There are a good number of *sūtras* in the Nyāya, relating to physical theories, which appear to have been borrowed from the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*.[63] On the other hand there are some *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* which seem to have been suggested by *Nyāyasūtras*.[64]

Later on Vātsyāyana also says that *manas* should be regarded as one of the senses in accordance with the theory of the other system (the Vaiśeṣika).[65] Furthermore, Vātsyāyana has quoted the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika system.[66] Uddyotaka, in his *Nyāyavārtika*, has introduced the Vaiśeṣika ideas into the Nyāya.[67] Vācaspatimiśra and Udayana also conceived the ideas of formally combining the two schools.

Jayantabhaṭṭa also says that the Vaiśeṣika system is the follower of *Nyāyavistara*.

"*Vaiśeṣikāḥ punarasmadanuyāyina|*"[68]

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika explore the significance of time, space, cause, matter, mind, soul and knowledge for experience, and give the results in the form of a theory of the universe. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are regarded as parts of one whole. The Vaiśeṣika is a supplement to the Nyāya. They are allied systems. They both believe in

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[62] *Nyāyavid dharmatattvajñaḥ ṣaḍaṅgavid anuttamaḥ | Aikya-saṃyoga-nānātva-samavāya-viśāradaḥ || Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva,* chap. 5.3. AS quoted in, *CIR,* p. 91.

[63] H. Ui has pointed out the following examples where the *Nyāya-sūtras* are based on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*:

    N.S. 3.1.36   = V.Sū. 4.1.8.
    N.S. 2.1.54   = V.Sū. 7.2.20.

Ui gives many other parallel *sūtras*. See H.Ui, p. 16.

[64] Bodas mentions that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras,* 3/2/4 (i.e., *prāṇāpānanimeṣa,* etc.) is clearly an amplification of the *Nyāyasūtra,* 1/1/10 (*icchā-dveṣa- prayanta,* etc.). HSIL, p. XXVIII.

[65] *Trantrāntara- samācārāc caitat pratyetavayam iti | N.B.* 1/1/4.

[66] *Astyanyadapi dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyāḥ prameyam |*Ibid. 1/1/9

[67] Phrases like '*saṃyukta-samavāya*' or '*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*' used by Uddyotakara in naming the six types of sense object contact clearly belong to the Vaiśeṣika system. *N.V.* 1/1/4.

[68] *N.M.,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p., 15

a personal God, a plurality of souls and an atomic universe. Further, they use many arguments in common.

S. Kuppuswami Sastri rightly says,

> ".....the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya have been treated as sister schools, fundamentally agreeing with each other in respect of important metaphysical and logical doctrines..."[69]

In this context, it should be noted that Bodas provides a strange view that in the first period (viz. of the *sūtras*) the two schools were allied. "In the second period, (viz., of the commentaries), however, they become somewhat antagonistic, partly owing to an accumulation of points of difference between the two, and partly on account of alliance of the Vaiśeṣika with the Buddhists. The third period saw the amalgamation of the two systems."[70]

Thus, the systems have a close relation since the very beginning and in course of their development they have come closer.

1.5. What is Cognitive Process?

The study of cognitive process is the most important part of the Nyāya system. It is primarily concerned with the means of acquiring a true cognition of objects. By cognitive process here is meant the study of various issues related with the process of cognition. Encyclopaedia Britannica defines cognition as:

> "The process involved in knowing, or the act of knowing, which in its completeness includes awareness and judgement. The nature of cognition and the relationship between the knowing mind and external reality have been exhaustively discussed by philosophers since antiquity."[71]

According to the Nyāya philosophy, four factors are involved in the cognitive process viz., *pramātā* (knower), *prameya* (object of cognition), *pramāṇa* (means of cognition)

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[69] *PIL*, introduction XXIV.
[70] *HSIL*, p. XXL.
[71] *E.B.*, vol II, p. 1042.

and *pramiti* or *pramā* (result of cognition). As in *Nyāyabhāsya* of Vāsyāyana says, '*chatasrsu caivamvidhāsvarthatattvam parisamāpyate*'.[72] Out of these the present research will be focused mainly on *pramāna,* (including *pramāna-vyāpāra)* and *pramā.* The Sanskrit synonym for 'cognition' is '*jñana*', and for 'knowledge' is '*prama.*' Theories of cognition, in the Indian tradition, are concerned, first, with (1) cognitions in general, (2) specifically, with true cognitions, and also (3) with false cognitions. The abstract noun 'truth' translates into '*pramātva* ', also into '*prāmānya*'. The instrumental cause of a true cognition is called '*pramāna*'. Thus in Nyāya philosophy cognition and cognitive process are the most important topics of discussion.

1.5.1 Divisions of Cognition

In Nyāya philosophy, cognition is divided into different forms. In *Tarkasamgraha,* cognition is divided into two types - *smrti* (memory) and *anubhava* (experiential cognition). *Smrti* or memory is the reproduction of previous knowledge which derived from the storehouse of one's own mind, but ultimately these memories also depend on experiential knowledge because no one can remember something that he has not experienced. *Anubhava* is the presentation of the original thing, which is received through the four *pramānas.* Each of these is further divided into *yathārtha* (valid) and *ayathārtha* (non-valid). In the language of the Nyāya philosophy, valid experiential cognition is called *pramā,* and non-valid experiential knowledge is called *apramā.* According to the Nyāya philosophy, *pramā* can be received through *pratyaksa, anumāna, upamāna* and *śabda. Apramā* is divided into *samśaya* (doubt), *viparyaya* (faulty cognition) and *tarka* (hypothetical argument). Memory is not original cognition because it is not experiential; it is a mere reproduction of experiential cognition. Cognition based on memory may be either valid or invalid, depending on the correctness of the recollection of the experiential cognition that occurred in the past. A doubtful cognition cannot be called valid (*pramā*) because it is not definite cognition. Faulty cognition likewise cannot be *pramā,* because it is not true to the nature of its object. *Tarka* (hypothetical argument) cannot be called *pramā* because in

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[72] *N.B.,* 1.1.1

itself it is not cognition, although it may help in drawing some conclusions about a fact.

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                              Buddhi
                                |
          ┌─────────────────────┴─────────────────────┐
          ▼                                            ▼
      Anubhava                                       Smṛti
          |                                            |
    ┌─────┴─────────────┐                   ┌──────────┴──────────┐
    ▼                   ▼                   ▼                     ▼
Pramā or yathartha   apramā or ayathartha  Yathartha          ayathārtha
    |                   |
  ├─► Pratyakṣa       ├─► saṃśaya
  ├─► anumiti         ├─► viparyaya
  ├─► upamiti         ├─► tarka
  ├─► śabda
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
Thus the importance of Nyāya philosophy within Indian philosophy cannot be overvalued. It thoroughly demonstrates the Indian logical and epistemological debate. As B.K. Matilal remarks:

> "Indian philosophical literature did not always deal exclusively with idealism, monism, subjectivism and mysticism. The Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika writers were, instead, critical and positive thinkers, and genuinely interested in logic, analysis of human knowledge and language and descriptive metaphysics."[73]

1.6 Jayantabhaṭṭa: Time and Life

Versatile scholar from Kashmir region, Jayantabhaṭṭa, has occupied a unique place in the history of Indian Philosophy. Regarding the date of Jayanta, there is not much controversy and difficulty. Most of the historians are almost unanimous in assigning the date of Jayanta in the latter part of 9th century A.D. The various dates as recorded by some reliable authorities are presented as follows:

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[73] Matilal, 1977: 112, as quoted in, *IPIHBT*, p. 130.

Name of the historians	Date of Jayanta	Reference
1. S.C. Vidyābhuṣaṇa	880 A.D.	History of Indian Logic. P.147.
2. D. N. Shastri	9th century A.D.	Critique of Indian Realism. P.114.
3. V. Rghavan	End of the 9th century A.D.	Āgamaḍambara of Jayantabhaṭṭa. Introduction.
4. B. K. Matilal	965 A.D.	The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation. P. 99.
5. A. K. Warder	Late 9th century A.D.	Outline of Indian Philosophy. P. 195.
6. Erich Frauwallner	2nd half of 9th century A.D.	History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. 2. p. 9.
7. S.N. Dasgupta	10th century A.D.	A history of Indian Philosophy. Vol. 2. P. 307.
8. K.H. Potter	870 A.D.	EIP. Vol. 2. p. 343.
9. C.D. Bijalwan	The first half of the 9th century A.D.	Indian Theory of Knowledge. P. 17.
10. Jwala Prasad	880 A.D.	History of Indian Epistemology. P. 254.
11. D. H. H. Ingalls	10th century A.D.	Materials for the Study of Navya- Nyāya Logic. P. 5.
12. Kuppuswami Shastri	The middle or later then 9th century A.D.	A primer of Indian Logic, Introduction
13. Gaurinath Shastri	10th century A.D.	A Concise History of Classical Sanskrit Literature. P. 175

Regarding Jayanta's personal life though, not much is known, but his son Abhinanda has left some evidences in the introduction of his *Kādambarī Kathāsāra*. From the introductory verses of the text we know that Jayanta's family hailed from Gauḍadeśa and belonged to the Bhāradvaja gotra.[74] Jayantat's remote ancestor Śakti migrated to Kashmir from Bengal and settled at a place called Dārvābhisāra.[75] He had a son

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[74] *Śaktināmābhavatgauḍo bhāradvāja kule dvijaḥ| KKS, sarga* I, *śloka-* 5-12. The *śloka* is reffered to by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on *Dhvanyāloka* III, *śloka-* 5.
[75] *HBNVL,* p. 19.

named Mitra who was very famous and respected by the people. The son of Mitra was Śaktisvāmin, who was well-versed in Veda, became a minister of king Muktāpiḍa of the Kārkoṭā family Kashmir. Kalyāṇasvāmin was the son of Śaktisvāmin, who was comparable to Yājñavalkya.[76] Kalyāṇasvāmin had a son named Candra who was a devotee of Lord Śiva and father of Jayantabhaṭṭa.[77] Jayanta himself says that he was a son of Candra.[78] Jayanta's son was Abhinanda.

Jayanta was a follower Veda. In his discussion of *Veda-prāmāṇya* in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayanta not only puts up an elaborate defence of the *atharvaveda* but even holds it as the foremost of the Vedas[79].Thus it may also be observed that Jayanta was belonged to *atharvaveda* and his great faith in the Vedas. Jayanta was also a follower of Lord Śiva and the benedictory verses in the beginning and the end of the *Nyāyamañjarī* prove it.[80] Abhinanda has considered his father as *Jagadguru.*[81] Jayanta, in his *Nyāyamañjarī* describes the king Śaṅkaravarman as *Dharmatattvajña* and performer of the *Nilambaravrata.*[82] One interesting thing is that Jayantabhaṭṭa himself admits that he has written his work when he was in jail.[83] But till now there is no suitable evidence regarding the reason of his imprisonment. Jayanta's family history is summarized in the following chart:[84]

1. Śakti	Gauḍa Brahmin of the Bhāradvājagotra who moved to Dārvābhisārā in Kashmir.
2. Mitra	
4. Kalyāṇasvāmin	Obtained the village of Gauramūlaka

[76] *Kalāṇyaswāminānamasya yājñavalkya iva abhavat|* KKS, sarga I, *śloka-* 8.
[77] Ibid, *sarga* I, *śloka-* 9-10
[78] *Sūnurvyāptadigantarasya yaśasā candrasya candratviṣā|* N.M., (Chowkhamba edn.), p. 208
[79] N.M., (Chowkhamba edn.), p. 237.
[80] *Namaḥ śāśvatikānandajñānaiśvaryamayātmane|*
saṃkalpasaphalabrahmastambārambhāya śambhave|| N.M., (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 9
Namaḥ śaśikalākoṭikalpyamāmāṅkuraśriye|
Prapanna janasaṃkalpakalpavṛkṣāya śambhave|| N.M., (Chowkhamba edn.), p. 208
[81] *Sarasāḥ sadalaṃkaraṇāḥ prasādamadhurāṃ giraḥ|*
Kāntāstāta jayantasya jayanti jagatāṃ guroḥ|| Quoted in N.M., (Kameswara Singh Sanskrit University edn.), Intro. P. 11.
[82] *Amitaikapaṭanivītaniyatastrīpuṃsavihitabahuceṣṭama*
nīlāmbaravratamidaṃ kila kalpitamāsīd viṭaiḥ kaiścit| Ibid. P. 10
[83] *Rājñā tu gahvare 'sminnaśabdake bandhane vinihato 'ham|*
Grantharachanāvinodādiha hi mayā vāsaraḥ gamitā| N.M., (Vizianagram Sankrit Series), p. 394.
[84] Kei, Kataoka, *HPPVT,* p., 313

5. Candra	Father of Jayanta
6. Jayanta	Minister of king Śankaravarmana (883-902)

1.7 Works of Jayantabhaṭṭa

1. 7.1. *Nyāyamañjarī*

The monumental work of Jayanta is *Nyāyamañjarī,* which is an exposition of the *sūtras* of Gautama. This is the most important work of the author. Though he states himself that he has no capacity to say something new in the field of logic, only the mode of expression is different.[85]

Jayanta describes his own work as the essence of the precious herbs of Nyāya and the butter of the milk of *Ānvīkṣikī.*[86] In the beginning and the end of the work, Jayanta expresses his reverence to Akṣapāda[87] and refers to his own effort in utmost modesty. In fact, in his dissertation, Jayanta tackles all the *śāstras,* namely, Mīmāṃsā, Buddhists, Veda, Vyākaraṇa, Dharmaśāstra, Sāhitya and Āgama.

But *Nyāyamañjarī* is the most matured one of his writings. As V.N. Jha says it as "an encyclopaedic exposition of the Prācina Nyāya."[88] Nagin J. Shah admits that[89]

"One find the triangular contest among the Naiyāyikas, the Mimāṃsakas and the Buddhists. Its study gives us a clear idea of the problems of Indian philosophy and their solutions offered by three main branches of Indian philosophy."

The unique style of *Nyāyamañjarī* deserves special mention. The attractive style of representation makes it distinctive. Simultaneously it is racy, humorous and brilliant.

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[85] *N.M.,* (Vidynidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 10.
[86] *Nyāyauṣadhivanebho 'yamāhṛtaḥ paramo rasaḥ|*
Idamānvikṣikīkṣīrānnavanītamivoddhṛtam|| Ibid., p. 9
[87] *Jayanti purajitddattasādhuvādapavitritāḥ|*
*Nidhānaṃ nyāyaratnānāṃ akṣapādamunergiraḥ||*Ibid
Prāptodāravarastataḥ sa jayati jñānāmṛtaprārthanā-
Nāmnā 'nekamaharṣimastakavalatpādo 'kṣapādo muniḥ| N.M., (Chowkhamba edn.), p. 208.
[88] *N.M,.* (Sri Garib Das Oriental Series), Introduction, p. v.
[89] *N.M.G.,* ed., N.J. Shah, Introduction, p. 3

It is eloquent in nature and equally mercilessly criticises the arguments of opponents such as Mimāṃsakas, Buddhists and Cārvākas. Satkari Mookerjee says that,

> "Among the intellectual giants that India Produced, *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa* is one occupying the forefront with *Kumārila* and *Dharmakīrti*, *Śāntarakṣita* and *Vācaspati Miśra*, to name only a few."[90]

Besides *Nyāyamañjarī,* Jayantabhaṭṭa is also credited with the authorship of *Nyāyapallava, Nyāyakalikā* and *Āgamḍambaram.*[91] Following is a brief note on each of them:

1.7.2 *Nyāyakalikā*

The second available but a small work of Jayantabhaṭṭa is *Nyāyakalikā. Nyāyakalikā* is the fundamental text for the student of Nyāya philosophy, since author discusses the sixteen categories of Nyāya philosophy in a very lucid and simple manner in this book. Simultaneously, here he presents the definitions of twenty two *nigrahasthānas.* In *Nyāyakalikā,* Jayantabhaṭṭa himself cites the purpose and characteristics of the particular text:

Ṣoḍaśapadārthatattvaṃ bālavyutpataye kathitam|

Ajātarasaniṣyandamanabhivyaktasaurabham|

Nyāyasya kalikāmātram jayantaḥ paryadīdṛśāt||[92]

There is controversy regarding the authorship of *Nyāyakalikā.* Karl H. Potter has presented some doubts and accordingly solutions regarding its authorship.[93] According to G. N. Kavirāja, Guṇaratna, in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamucchayabhāṣya* has mentioned *Nyāyakalikā* as the commentary on *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña.

1.7.3 *Nyāyapallava*

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[90] *CR*, p. 251.
[91] *N.M.,*(Sanskrit Book Depot edn.), p. ma.
[92] *N.Ka.,* p. 27
[93] *E.I.P.,* vol. 2. P. 394

The one unavailable commentary work of Jayanatabhatta is *Nyāyapallava*. In *Nyāyapallava*, Jayantabhatṭa presents metrical commentary upon *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama. The only evidence of this work is found in *Syādvādaratnākara* with the special mention about the name of *Nyāyapallava* and its author.[94]

1.7.4 *Āgamaḍambara*

Besides philosophy, Jayantabhatta has shown his eloquence in the field of literature also. The only drama written by Jayantabhatṭa is *Āgaḍambara*, which is also known as *Ṣaṇnāmanāṭaka*. It is basically a philosophical *rupaka*, where the author presents the theory of Buddhists, Jaina, Cārvāka, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāyapriyaśaiva and Āgama (Pāñcharātra Āgama) and thus the very name *Ṣaṇnāmanāṭaka* becomes appropriate. Here Jayantabhatṭa also briefly presents the viewpoints of Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Nīlāmbara schools. The whole drama is divided into four acts, where the characters are presented as the representatives of every philosophical system.

On the contribution of Jayanta to Indian Logic Prof. R.V. Joshi writes:

> "Jayanta's success was based upon his extraordinary power to elaborate his own point view in simple and lucid Sanskrit. The *Nyāyamañjarī* therefore, has virtually become an outstanding manual of all the schools of Indian Philosophy in general and Nyāya Philosophy in particular."[95]

In this connection, it may be useful to point out that out of these works the following have so far been recovered and published. They are *Nyāyakalikā, Āgamḍambara* and *Nyāyamañjarī*

> 1. *Nyāyakalikā* was edited by Ganganath Jha, Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana Texts 17, 1925.
>
> 2. *Āgamḍambara* was edited by V. Raghavan, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1964
>
> The editions and translation of *Nyāyamañjarī* will be given later.

1.8 Subject-Matter of *Nyāyamañjarī*

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[94] *Yathā cha samāchasṭa bhaṭṭajayantaḥ pallave, Syādvādaratnākara*
[95] *IITK*, p. XIII.

Nyāyamañjarī is divided into twelve *āhnikas,* where the sixteen categories of *Nyāya* philosophy are properly delineated.. Here presents a brief outline of the subject matter of each *āhnika*:

In the very starting of the 1st *āhnika,* Jayantabhaṭṭa has addressed a benedictory verse to Lord Śiva. It is followed by the fourteen *vidyāsthānas,* purpose of the sixteen categories. In the 1st *āhnika* the author stresses upon basically the means of cognition. He cites the views of others' regarding the definition of *pramāṇa* as *purvapakṣas* and later examines and establishes his own and *siddhāntapakṣas* view. He criticizes the Mimāsakas view regarding *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* and logically includes them in *anumāna pramāṇa.* Accordingly he also includes *sambhava* and *aitihya* in *anumāna* and *śabda.* Jayanatabhaṭṭa also presents his innovative and original arguments regarding various issues.

In the 2nd *āhnika,* Jayantabhaṭṭa explains the definition of perception, inference and comparison given by Gautama. He also opposes the *pūrvapakṣas* and cogently establishes his view.

In 3rd *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī,* he discusses the definition of *śabda pramāṇa,* and opposes the opponents' view that *śabda pramāṇa* is included into *anumāna pramāṇa.* He also establishes *khyātivāda* by refuting the *akhyāti* and *ātmakhyātivāda.* Jayantabhaṭṭa discusses the eternality of word in this particular *āhnika.*

The 4th *āhnika* deals with the Veda *pauruṣeya* and *apauruṣeya,* existence of God, the relation between word and meaning, *prāmāṇya* of Arthavaveda, establishment of Śaivapāñcharātra āgama etc.

In the 5th *āhnika,* Jayantabhaṭṭa puts emphasis on the refuting of *apohavāda, jatyashraya* and *bhāvana.* For this he first mentions the opponents and then sets up his own opinion.

The 6th *āhnika* deals with different topics as *sphoṭavāda,* the knowledge of the meaning of sentence, *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitāvidhānavāda* etc.

The 7th *āhnika* basically deals with the *prameyas*. He accordingly discusses the purposes and the divisions of *prameyas* and analyses the Cārvākas, Mīmāṃsakas view on *ātman*.

The other ten *prameyas*, viz. *śarīra, idriyārtha, buddhi, pravṛtti, doṣa, pretyabhāva, phala, dukha* and *sukha* are discussed in the 8th *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī*.

In the 9th *āhnika* Jayantabhaṭṭa focuses on the *apavarga*, i.e. emancipation.

Saṃśaya, prayojana, dṛṣṭānta, siddhanta, avayava are vividly discussed in the 10th *āhnika* of*Nyāyamañjarī*.

The 11th *āhnika* deals logically with *tarka, niṇaya, vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, hetvābhāsa and chala* with their definitions and divisions.

The last one which is the 12th *āhnika* deals with *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*.

Jayantabhaṭṭa is known as *vṛttikāra* to his contemporaries. In *Nyāyamañjarī*, he introduces himself as *Navavṛttikāra*.[96]

1.9 Editions and Translations of *Nyāyamañjarī*

The following are various available editions and translations of *Nyāyamañjarī:*

1. *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayantabhaṭṭa, ed. Gangadhar Shastri Tailanga.
2. *Nyāyamañjarī,*, ed. and trans. (Gujarati) Nagin J. Shah, (upto 9th *āhnikas*).
3. *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed, Pt. Suryanarayana Shukla,(2 vols).
4. *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. K.S. Varadacarya with *Ṭippaṇī Nyāyasaurabha,*(2 vols).
5. *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. Gaurinath Shastri with *Granthibhanga* of Cakradhara, 3 parts.
6. *Nyāyamañjarī* [The Compendium of Indian Speculative Logic], vol. 1, Janaki Ballabha Bhattacarya.
7. *Nyāyamañjarī*, trans. (English) V.N. Jha.
8. *Nyāyamañjarī,* trans. (Hindi) Siddheswar Bhatt and Shashiprabha Kumar.

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[96] *Vādeṣvāttajayo jayanta iti yaḥ khyātaḥ satāmagraṇīḥ| Anvartho navavṛttikāra iti yaṃ śaṃsanti nāmnā budhāḥ|* N.M., (Chowkhamba edn.), p. 208.

9. *Nyāyamañjarī*, trans. (Hindi) Pt. Anand Jha, ed. Kishornath Jha, (2 vols).

10. *Nyāyamañjarī, Ṭippaṇī* and trans.(Bengali), Sri Pañcānan Tarkavāgiśa, ed., Dr. Amit Bhattacarya.

Moreover there are some independent works based upon *Nyāyamañjarī*:

1. *A Study of Jayantbhatta's Nyayamanjari: A Mature Sanskrit Work on Indian Logic*, Nagin J. Shah.

2. *Indian Theory of knowledge Based upon Jayanta's Nyayamanjari,* C.D. Bijalwan.

Along with these, there are a good number of published papers on *Nyāyamañjarī* by Indian as well as foreign scholars which mark the popularity of this robust work of Jayantabhaṭṭa.

CHAPTER-2

PRE-JAYANTA VIEWS ON COGNITIVE PROCESS

2.1. Nature of Valid Cognition *(Tattvajñāna)*

Almost all the schools of Indian philosophy believe that the true cognition of the object leads to the ultimate goal of life, i.e., *niḥśreyasa*. The Sanskrit term for valid cognition is *pramājñāna* or simply *pramā*. *Apramā* stands for all cognitions that are not true. The word *pramā* is used to designate only true or valid cognition *(yathārthajñāna)* as distinct from a false or invalid cognition *(mithyājñāna)*. In *Nyāyasūtra*, the two main divisions of cognition are *tattvajñāna* and *mithyājñāna*.[1] In Nyāya philosophy three terms are used as synonyms for "Cognition", viz. *buddhi* (intellect), *upalabddhi* (apprehension) and *jñāna* (knowledge).[2]

There are several views regarding the trueness of cognition. According to one view a true cognition is that which reveals an object that serves some purpose *(artha or prayojana)* and leads to the achievement of some end,[3] or which favours a successful volition *(saṃvādipravṛtyanukūla)*.[4] This theory is mostly adopted by the Buddhists.

Another view chiefly held in the Nyāya works is that true cognition is that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists, or which gives us the real nature of an object.[5]

The third view refers to truth as a harmony of experience *(saṃvāda or saṃvāditva)*.[6]

The fourth view is that the truth of knowledge consists in its contradictedness.[7]

In the first *sūtra* of *Nyāyasūtra*, Gautama has enumerated that the true knowledge *(tattvajñāna)* is the cause of the attainment of the highest goal.[8] Now the question is that what is *tattvajñāna*? In *Nyāyabhāṣya*, Vātsyāyana has clarified the term as the right cognition of the nature of the existing and non-existing things is *tattvajñāna*.[9] He has also admitted that the ultimate goal, i.e. liberation, is to be attained through the

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[1] *N.S.*, 1/1/1-2
[2] Ibid., 1/1/15
[3] *Tataḥ artha-kriyā-samartha-vastu-padarśakaṃ samyag jñānam | N.Bi.*, ch. 1.
[4] , Datta, D.M., *SWK*, p.18.
[5] *Tadvati tatprakārakaḥ anubhavo yathārthaḥ | T.S.D.*, p. XIX
[6] S.*T.K* (on *kārikā* 51), '*saṃvādyate*'. Also *vide, Prāmāṇa-vārttika-bhāṣya*, pp. 3-4, " *Pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam.*" As quoted in, *SWK*, p. 18.
[7] *Vedānta-paribhāsā*, and *Advaitasiddhi*, "*Bādhitaviṣayatvena hi bhramatvam, na tu vyadhikaraṇa-prakāra-tvena, tasyāpi viṣaya-bādhaproyojyatvāt...*", Ibid, p. 19.
[8] *N.S.*, 1/1/1
[9] *Satsaditi gṛhyamāṇaṃ yathābhūtamaviparītaṃ tattvaṃ bhavati*
Asacchādaditi gṛhyamāṇaṃ yathābhūtamviparītaṃ tattvaṃ bhavati| N.B., 1/1/1

means of right knowledge, *tattvajñāna*.[10] In *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika,* Uddyotakara has vividly clarified the opinion of *Nyāyabhāṣya*. He remarks that the right knowledge of the categories is known as *tattvajñāna*. The real cognition is the path of attaining the highest goal. The erroneous knowledge (*mithyājñāna*) can be removed by pertaining *tattvajñāna*, the right knowledge. In *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika, tattvajñāna* is divided into two types- *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa*. The first one can be attained through the four *pramāṇas,* while the other is through the cognition of *prameyas,* i.e. the object of cognition. Thus the result of both is known as *dṛṣṭaphala* and *adṛṣṭaphala.*

2.2. Different views on Nature of Cognition (*Jñāna*)

The most vital question is that what is the nature of cognition? Regarding this point of view there are various issues emerging out from the different philosophical schools. It is either a quality of the self to which it belongs, or it is an act of the self, or it is a substance that is identical with the self.

1. Cognition is an Act of the Self

In Indian philosophy the Mādhyamika Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas refer to cognition as an activity.[11] According to the Buddhists, "knowledge is an existent fact that consists of the act of showing and leading to an object."[12] According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the *jñānakriyā* refers to an object. To Prābhākaras, *saṃvit* and *jñāna* are two different things rather than two names of the same things. According to the Bhāṭṭas knowledge is an act of the soul. However, this act theory of knowledge is elaborately presented in *Nyāyamañjarī* by Jayantabhaṭṭa.

2. Cognition is Self-Subsistent

The Yogācāras or Vijñānavādinas believe that consciousness is self-subsistent. They only accept the reality of *vijñāna* or consciousness and deny the reality of all other things. According to them the subject and the object of cognition are the modes of the *ālaya,* which is a continuously changing stream of consciousness. The *ālayavijñāna* is a whole containing within itself the knower and the known. This theory holds that

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[10] Ibid. 1/1/2.

[11] *Jñānakriyā sakarmikā | S.D.,* as quoted in, *ITK,* p.13.

[12] Chatterjee, S.C., *NTK,* p. 14.

there is no objective world independent of the perceiving mind. The Naiyāyikas refute this view. They believe in the distinctiveness of the self, cognition and the object cognized and deny consciousness as playing all the three roles.[13]

3. Cognition is a Substance

The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga systems consider cognition as a substantive mode of modification of *prakṛti*. It reflects the light or consciousness of the self in it. According to the Advaitins, cognition must have as one of its characteristics truth; and the truth of *pramā* consists in its content being uncontradicted (*abādhitārtha – viṣayakatva*).[14]

4. Cognition as a quality of the self

Lastly, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Rāmānuja and Jaina consider cognition as a quality of the self. Among them Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika treat cognition as the coming property of the self, while the rest look upon it as the permanent property of the self.

According to Nyāya philosophy, cognition is an accidental attribute of the self. The cognition occurs in the self when the soul is connected with the mind, mind with senses and the sense-organs with the objects. It is not permanent, rather an accidental property of the self. If cognition is considered as the permanent property of the self, then it should be present in the self anytime but in some conditions it is not present. Thus according to Nyāya, and also Prābhākaras, the self is essentially a pure substance and cognition is one of its essential natures.[15] For the Nyāya, cognition appears as the result of a relation between the soul and the body, which in themselves are not cognition. But when cognition appears, it has to exist as an attribute inhering in the soul substance.[16] Thus cognition is not an essential and inseparable attribute of the soul. The soul is, in itself, neither material nor mental, but a neutral substance which comes to have the attribute of intelligence or consciousness in its relation to the body.[17]

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[13] *ILA*, p. 44.

[14] *SWK*, p. 19

[15] Bhat, G.P., *BWK*, p.10.

[16] *NTK*, p. 12.

[17] *N.V.*, 1/1/22, *N.M.*, (Vizianagram Series), p. 432.

2.3. Means of Valid Cognition (*Pramāṇa*)

As the *Nyāya* philosophy is known as *pramāṇaśāstra*, it is likely to put emphasis on the means of cognition, i.e. the *pramāṇa*. The simple derivative meaning of *pramāṇa* is "*pramīyate 'nena tat pramāṇam*". It means, by which the true cognition of an object can be obtained. It is in the sense of *karaṇa* or *sādhana*. The term *pramāṇa* consists of the root '*mā*' with the prefix '*pra*' and suffix '*lyuṭ*', which generally stands for the means of valid cognition. In *Medinī Koṣa*, *pramāṇa* is defined as, '*pramāṇaṃ nityamaryādāśāstreṣu satyavādini| Iyattāyāñcha hetau cha klībaikatve pramātari |*'

In the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama there is not any definition of *pramāṇa*. Later, Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*, defines *pramāṇa* as the instrument of valid cognition.[18] Uddyotakara has defined *pramāṇa* as, '*arthopalabdhi hetuḥ pramāṇam*'[19], which means that *pramāṇa* is the means of cognition of the knowable objects. But the cognition of the object may not always be valid; sometimes it may be doubtful and illusory. At this point the opponent asks him, if the cause of cognition is called *pramāṇa*, then the *pramāta* and the *prameya* should also be known as *pramāṇa*, since these two are also the causes of cognition.[20]

Uddyotakara answers that the *pramāta* and the *prameya* produce the immediate cause of the cognition, i.e., the contact between the sense organ and the knowable object. But the *pramāṇa* is directly involved in the process of cognition. Therefore, *pramāṇa* differs from *prameya* and *pramāta*.[21]

Vācaspati Miśra, however, has faced several objections regarding Uddyotakara's definition of *pramāṇa*. The main objection is that if Uddyotakara's definition is accepted, then *saṃskāras* will also have to be accepted as the *pramāṇa*.[22] For it Vācaspati has defined the term as '*pramākaraṇaṃ pramāṇam.*'[23]

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[18] *Pramāṇataḥ artha-pratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyāt arthavat pramāṇam| Pramātā yenārthaṃ pramiṇoti tat| N.B.* 1/1/1

[19] *N.V.* 1/1/1

[20] *Yadyupalabddhihetuḥ pramāṇam, nanu pramātṛprameyayor api upalabdhihetutvāt pramāṇatvaṃ prasajyeta| Nyāyadarśanam* (Mithila Institute edn.), part. 1, p. 9.

[21] *Pramāṇe pramātṛprameyayoścaritārthatvāt| pramāṇa-pramātā-prameyaṃ ca caritārthaṃ, acaritārthaṃ tu pramāṇam |* ibid.

[22] *Smṛtihetor api prāmāṇyaprasaṃgaḥ |* Ibid, p.35.

[23] *Pramīyate 'nena ityasya vākyasyārthye pramāṇapadaprayogaḥ pramā ca smṛteranyāḥ aerthāvyabhicārī svatantraḥ paricchedaḥ | N.D.,* (West Bengal State Book Board edn.), Vol.1, p. 84.

Udayana, in his *Pariśuddhi,* has followed the same definition. In *Nyāyakusumāñjalī,* he has defined *pramāṇa* as the cause by which there is the relation between the knower and knowable objects-

Mitiḥ samyak paricchittistadvattā ca pramātṛtā |

Tadayogavyavacchedaḥ pramāṇyaṃ gautame mate ||[24]

It means that valid cognition is true experience and right knowing is the possession thereof. Authoritativeness, according to Gautama, consists of being devoid of all absence of cognition.

In this way, eyes and their contact with the object is the *pramāṇa* for the perceptual cognition, a probans will be *pramāṇa* for inferential cognition, the knowledge of similarity for the analogical cognition and words for the verbal cognition.

2.4. Number of *Pramāṇas*

There is a great debate regarding the number of *pramāṇas,* as the different philosophical schools uphold different viewpoints. The Cārvāka materialist admits perception as the only source of cognition. The Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists philosophy admit two- perception and inference. The Sāṃkhya admits three-perception, inference and verbal testimony. Gautama has admitted comparison in addition to these three. The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy admits five, the four sources of cognition mentioned before and postulation. The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā and Śaṃkara's Advaita school of Vedānta admit a sixth source, viz. non-cognition, in addition to these five. Some others also recognize unbroken tradition *(aitihya)* as well as possible probability *(sambhava)* as other sources of cognition.

In *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama it is distinctly mentioned that there are four types of *pramāṇas.*[25] Later the Nyāya scholars more or less agree with *Sūtrakāra's* view and accordingly describe the means of cognition. Thus the four means of cognition are: *pratyakṣa* (Perception), *anumāna* (Inference), *upamāna* (Comparison) and *śabda* (Verbal Testimony). To quote Radhakrishnan and Moore:

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[24] *N.Ku.,* IV.5
[25] *N.S.,* 1/1/3

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"The Nyāya Sutras define each of these methods as follows. Perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is determinate [well-defined], unnameable [not expressible in words], and non-erratic [unerring]. ... Inference is knowledge which is preceded by perception, and is of three kinds, viz., *a priori, a posteriori* and "commonly seen."...Comparison [analogy] is the knowledge of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously well-known. ... Word (verbal testimony) is the instructive assertion of a reliable person."[26]

2.4.1. Perception (*Pratyakṣa*)

The term '*pratyakṣa*' consists of two parts; '*prati*' means 'before' or 'near', and '*akṣa*' means the 'sense-organ eye', which conjointly means immediate knowledge or the cause of immediate knowledge. This may be translated in English as perception.

According to Gautama, the definition of perception is as follows—

Indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam[27] *jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri yavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam|*[28]

Perception is a cognition resulting from sense-object contact which is inexpressible by words, which is not erroneous and it is determinate i.e. - definite in character. Thus, the definition means that *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* is that from which arises the knowledge that is based upon sense-subject contact.

This definition of perception comes from the etymological meaning of the word *pratyakṣa*. The derivative meaning of *pratyakṣa* is the functioning or operation of the sense organs, each in relation to a particular object.[29] In *Nyābhāṣya*, Vātsyāyana has also considered *sannikarṣa* or relation as perception.[30] According to him the process for perception is the connection of the self (*ātman*) to mind and the mind (*manas*) to

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[26] Radhakrishnan.S. and C. A. Moore, *SBIP*, p. 359.

[27] The six kinds of *sannikarṣas* are (i) conjunction (*saṃyoga*), the connection between a sense faculty and an object; (ii) inherence in what is conjoined (*saṃyukta-samavāya*), the connection between a sense faculty and a property which inheres in an object; (iii) inherence in what inheres in what is conjoined (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*), the connection between a sense faculty and the universal which is instantiated in a property; (iv) inherence (*samavāya*), the kind of connection which makes auditory perception possible; (v) inherence in what inheres (*samaveta-samavāya*), the connection between the auditory faculty and a property-trope which inhere in a sound; (vi) qualifier-qualified relation (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇabhāva*), the connection which allows for the perception of inherence and absence in objects.

[28] *N.S.*, 1/1/4

[29] *Akṣasyākaṣasya prativiṣayam vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam| N.B.*, 1/1/3

[30] Ibid,

the sense organs (*indriyas*) and they are getting connected with the object. In this way, there is a relation between *ātman* and *manas* and the perceptual cognition arise in *ātman*.[31] For example, when the visual cognition of a pot is obtained, then the connection occurs between the self to mind, mind to eye and then eye to pot. So, in perception the cognition arises from the sense-object contact. Hence, perception gives us the cognition of what is directly present to sense and we do not require any inference or verbal testimony for its cognition.

Uddyotkara has defined perception as the type of cognition which is brought out by the sense-object contact. In this connection regarding the term *utpannam*, Vācaspatimiśra states that it is indicative of the fact that the contact of the 'sense' with the 'object' is instrumental in bringing about perceptual knowledge.[32] Uddyotakara on *N.V* 1.1.4: "perception is that cognition which follows and varies with the variations in the object and appears in a person who has not made use of, and does not yet know the (denotative) relation that the object may bear to any word or words."

Perception occupies the foremost position in the *Nyāya* epistemology. According to *Nyāya* philosophy, perception is not only the source of our cognition, but it is also the basis of the other sources or methods of cognition i.e. inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Hence it is said that all the other means of cognition accept perception and must be based on cognition derived from it.[33] For instance, inference as a mean of cognition depends on perception. The first step in inference is the observation of a mark or the middle term, i.e. *liṅgadarśana*, and the observation of the relation between middle (*hetu*) and major term (*sādhya*). Hence, inference is defined as the cognition which must be preceded by perception (*tatpūrvakam*).[34] Likewise, *upamāna* or comparison as a mean of naming depends on perception of the points of similarity between two objects. Similarly *śabda* or verbal testimony is dependent on perception. As the first step in the verbal testimony is the visual or auditory perception of written or spoken words, such words come from a person who has a direct knowledge of the truth. So, perceptual cognition is the ultimate ground of all other types of cognition.[35] Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara[36] add another reason:

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[31] Ibid. 1/1/4

[32] *Utpannagrahaṇena ca sannikarṣasya utpādakatvam sūcitam*| *N.V.T.T.*, 1/1/4

[33] *Sarvapramāṇānām pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt*| Ibid, 1/2/3

[34] *N.S.* and *N.B.*, 1/1/5

[35] *N.B.* and *N.V.*, 1/1/6-7

[36] Ibid., 1.1.3

perception tends to produce a higher level of conviction than other knowledge sources; the conviction it produces has a distinctive kind of authority.

Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam: Vātsyāyana maintains that in perception the self connects with the mind, the mind with the sense and the sense with the object. He makes it clear that sense – object contact is not the only cause of perception. The self – mind contact and the mind – sense contact is also necessary for it.[37] The *Vārttika* supplies elaborate explanation. He admits that the mind -organ contact is as good a distinctive feature of perception as the sense -object contact; this is what is meant by '*samānatvāt*'. In this regard he discusses six types of sense –object contacts.[38] Vācaspatimiśra states that the *Sūtrakāra* has introduced the term *sannikarṣa* instead of *saṃyoga* and *samavāya*. The term *utpanna* indicates the contact of the sense with the objects is instrumental in bringing about perceptual cognition.[39]

Avyapadeśyam: *Avyapadeśya* in the *sūtra* is understood in various ways by different logicians. According to Vātsyāyana, objects are associated with the words or names. By the help of these words the objects are properly cognized. Whatever comes to the framework of our cognition is subjected to verbal expression. The fact is that whatever is knowable is nameable. Therefore, while our sense-organs come in contact with the object, colour or taste, our perceptual cognitions of the objects are denoted by the words like colour, taste etc. Again this type of cognition arises due to the words naming the object, so one may doubt that the cognition is due to words and not a case of perception. Thus, to remove this difficulty, Gautama has used the word *avyapadeśya* in the *sūtra*.[40] Udyotakara supports this view of Vātsyāyana. Vācaspatimiśra takes the word *avyapadeśya* (non-verbal) and *vyavasāyātmaka* (definitie and determinate) as referring to the two kinds of perception, viz., *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* .According to him the one part of the *sūtra*, viz., *Indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyabhicāri* is the definition of perception and the rest two words indicate two types of perception. Regarding this interpretation of Vācaspatimiśra D.N. Shastri remarks that,

> "This interpretation does violence to the text of the *sūtra* where the word *avyabhicārin* (which, according to Vācaspatimiśra, is a part of the general definition) occurs in between the two words *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka*. Obviously, all

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[37] *N.B.*, 1/1/4
[38] *N.V.*, 1/1/4
[39] *N.V.T.T.*, p. 1/1/4
[40] *Nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyamānaṃ sat śabdaṃ prasajyate, atra āha avyapadeśyamiti|* *N.B.* 1/1/4

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the three are the attributes of perception. As the same knowledge which is held to be unnameable (free from verbal element) is also held to be *vyavasāyatmaka* definite or determinate, the former word can in no way suggest indeterminate perception."[41]

Avyabhicāri: The next term in the *sūtra* is *avyabhicāri* (non-erroneous). It blocks false cognitions, like the misperception that belies the inerrancy of *pramāns*. According to Vātsyāyana, during summer when your eyes come in contact with the sun rays, the glimmering of the sun rays along with the heat waves radiating from the hot surface of a desert appears as water. So in order to avoid this type of erroneous perception, *avyabhicāri* is used in the *sūtra*.[42] Uddyotakara takes the term in the same sense in which the *Bhāsyakāra* does. He adds that it is not the object, but its apprehension which is subject to error when we take the flickering rays of water. Vācaspatimiśra gives three interpretations of this term:

1. Though by the other characteristics erroneous forms have been excluded from the scope of perception, yet this term is mentioned to assign authoritative sanction to it.[43]

2. The term also implies that the cognition brought about by the other *pramānas* should be non- erroneous as well.[44]

3. The term *pratyaksa* refers to the resultant cognition, while the other *pramanas* refer to the form of the means of cognition. To bring out this distinction the *sūtrakāra* puts the term in the *sūtra*.[45]

Vyavasāyātmakam: The term *vyavasāyātmaka* has been mentioned in the *sūtra* to convey the sense of another perceptual cognition which is definite in nature. Vātsyāyana opines that the word is employed in the *sūtra* to exclude the doubtful apprehensions like "Is this smoke or is this dust?" from the scope of perception.[46]

Uddyotakara also considers that the term in the *sūtra* refers to exclude doubtful perceptual cognition. He says that both the mind- soul contact and the sense- object contact are responsible for producing a doubtful cognition.[47]

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the term refers to *savikalpa* perception. Vācaspati validates his interpretation by saying that Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara have not

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[41] *CIR*, p. 431.
[42] *Grīsme marīcayo bhaumenosmanā samsrstāh spandamānādūrasthasya caksusā sannikrsyante tatrendriyārthasannikarsādudakamiti Jñānamudpadyate........tadavyabhicāri| N.B.*, 1/1/4
[43] *Siddhe satvārambho niyamārthah| N.V.T.T*, 1/1/4
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] *N.B.*. 1/1/4
[47] *N.V.*, 1/1/4

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mentioned it since this interpretation, being very simple, does not need any explanation.[48]

2.4.1.1 Types of Perception *(Pratyakṣa)*

The Nyāya divides *pratyakṣa* in the following way:

The six types of *laukika pratyakṣa* refer to the senses concerned in perception. Another two types of *laukika pratyakṣa* are *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa*. The Nyāya holds that both of these are equally valid and based on reality.[49] This classification depends on the character of the perceptual cognition which arises from sense- object contact. The *nirvikalpaka* stage reveals the universal associated with the particular,

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[48] *Vyavasāyātmakaṃ sākṣāt vikalpasya vacakam- tadetadatisphuṭatvāt śiṣyairgamyat eveti bhāṣyavārtikābhyāmavyākhyātam|* N.V.T.T., 1/1/4

[49] It is said that distinction between *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa* is not recognised in *Nyāya- Sūtra, Bhāṣya* and *Vārttika*. Vācasspatimiśra for the first time in his *Tātparyaṭikā* makes the distinction to *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4. The two terms 'a*vyapadeśyam*' and '*vyavasāyātmakam*' in Gautama's *sūtra*, according to Vācaspatimiśra, mean respectively *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa perception*.

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but as there is no association of name at this stage, the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and attribute.[50]

Savikalpaka perception is the cognition of an object as possessing some character. *Nirvikalpaka* is an indeterminate apprehension and *savikalpaka* is a determinate judgement. There cannot be any *savikalpaka* perception without a previous *nirvikalpaka* perception of an object. It is a judgement in which certain attributes are related to the object by way of prediction, e.g., this is a cow.[51] Here the attribute cowness is predicted of the presented object.

From early on, Nyāya recognizes certain kinds of extraordinary perception. It is of three types: *sāmānyalakṣaṇā, jñānalakṣaṇā* and *yogaja*.[52] *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is the perception of a whole class of objects through *sāmānya* (generic property) found in any individual of that class. For example, when the knowledge of a pot is perceived the universal 'potness' is also perceived. The perception of 'potness' in the present pot serves the purpose of contact between sense and all other pots. The cognition of the universal is the medium of sense – object contact, by which the perception of all pots are possible.[53]

The second type is *jñānalakṣaṇā*, which is the perception of an object which is in contact with the sense – organs through a previous cognition of itself.[54] For example, when a man says 'I see a piece of fragrant sandalwood', the man not only has a perception of its fragrance by means of his eyes, but he also has the immediate perception of its fragrance. The Naiyāyikas say that our past olfactory perception is closely associated with the visual perception. The present perception of fragrance is due to the revived past cognition of fragrance. This can be explained only through *jñānalakṣaṇā*.

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[50] *Jātyādisvarūpāvagāhi na tu jātyādināṃ mitho viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvāvagāhīti yāvat*| *N.V.T.T.,* 1/1/4
[51] *Savikalpakaṃ nāmajātyādiyojanātmakaṃ*| *T.B.,* p. 49
[52] *Alaukikastu vyāpārastrividhaḥ parikīrtitaḥ*|
    Sāmānyalakṣaṇo jñānalakṣaṇo yogajastathā| *B.P.,* (Advaita Ashrama edn.), p. 99.
[53] *Āsattirāśrayāṇāṃ tu sāmānyajñānamiṣyate*| Ibid.,pp. 101-2.
[54] *Viṣayī yasya tasyaiva vyāpāro jñānalakṣaṇāḥ*| Ibid., p. 102.

The third type is *yogaja pratyakṣa*. It is the intuitive perception of all the objects-past, distant and future, because of some supernatural power. This power is generated in the mind by meditation (*yogābhyāsajanito dharmaviśesaḥ*).

2.4.2 Inference (*Anumāna*)

Except the Cārvākas, all the other schools of Indian philosophy hold that *anumāna* is a distinct means of cognition. The word *anumāna* is generally translated as inference. It is used in two senses:

1. *Anumiti*, i.e., inferential cognition.

2. *Anumiti-karaṇa*, i.e., the instrument of inferential cognition.

The word '*anumāna*' consists of two parts, viz., *anu* and *māna* which mean 'after' and 'cognition' respectively. Thus, '*anumāna*' in a general sense means the cognition coming into being after perception of *parāmarśa*.

Anumāna literally means such cognition which follows some other cognition. *Anumāna* is one of the most important contributions of *Nyāya*. While defining *anumāna*, Gautama says that,

> "*atha tatpūrvakaṃ trividhamanumānaṃ pūrvacchesavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ca|*"[55]

It indicates the sense of 'after proof', as Gautama has used the term '*tatpūrvakaṃ*'. It is 'after-proof' in the sense that it uses the knowledge derived from perception (*pratyakṣa*). *Bhāṣyakāra* discusses that the term '*tatpūrvakaṃ*' refers to *hetu* and *sādhya* and the relationship between the two, i.e. *vyāpti*. It also refers to *pratyakṣa*.[56] In this way, *Bhāṣyakāra* has defined it as "*te pūrve yasya*". He puts it as the equivalent of *anvīkṣā and* it depends upon *pratyakṣa*.[57] By these definitions it is distinctly proved that for the cognition of inference the prior cognition of perception is needed. For instance, when smoke in a hill is seen then it is understand that there is

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[55] *N.S.* 1/1/5
[56] *liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhayordarśanena liṅgasmṛtirabhisambadhyate| smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena cā'pratyokṣo'rtho'numīyate| N.B.*, 1/1/5
[57] *pratyakṣābhyāśritamevānumānaṃ| sā anvīkṣā|* ibid.

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fire. So, first through perception cognition of smoke occurs, followed by the inference about the fire.

According to Uddyotakara, there are three meanings of the term "*tat*":

> 1. *tāni te tatpūrvaṃ yasya tadidam tatpūrvakam|*

By this interpretation, the definition of *anumāna* presupposes *pratyakṣa*.

> 2. *tāni pūrvam yasya|*

By this etymology, *anumāna* is defined as presupposes to all *pramāṇas*, as "*tāni*" is in plural number.[58]

> 3. *te dve pūrvam yasya|*

This etymology shows that there are two types of perception occur before *anumāna*.[59]

According to Uddyotakara, *anumāna* is based upon relation between the *liṅga* and *parāmarśa* aided by a remembrance of that relation-"*smṛtyanugṛhīto liṅgaparāmarśo anumānam*".[60] For example, the cognition that the hill is fiery is based upon the relation between the smoke and fire and the remembrance of that relation.

Thus, inference is a process of reasoning in which we pass from the cognition of *liṅga* to that of something else, by a relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the two. To quote Dr. B.N. Seal:

> "Anumāna (inference) is the process of ascertaining, not by perception or direct observation, but through the instrumentality or medium of a mark, that a thing possesses a certain character."[61]

Vyāpti is the special relation between two facts which is universal in its nature. Literally, *vyāpti* is the state of pervasion; one of the facts pervades (*vyāpaka*) and the other is pervaded (*vyāpya*). For example, '*parvato vahnimān dhūmavattvāt*' here smoke is pervaded and fire is pervades. This special relationship is known by various synonyms such as: *liṅga- liṅgi- saṃbandha, gamyagamakabhāva* etc. The Nyāya method of ascertaining *vyāpti* consists of four stages. They are:

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[58] *Yadā tānīti vighrahaḥ tadāsamastapramāṇābhisambandhāt sarvapramāṇapūrvakatvamanumānasya varṇitam bhavati| N.V.,* 1/1/5

[59] Ibid, *N.V.T.T.* 1/1/5

[60] N.V., 1/1/5

[61] Seal, B. N., *PSAH,* p. 250

- The first is *anvaya*, or uniform agreement of two things together. For example, wherever there is smoke there is fire.

- The second type is the uniform agreement in absence (*vyatireka*). In this method, a negative universal relationship or invariable concomitance is observed. For example, wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke.

- The third kind of method is a combination of the first and second methods. In this method, known as uniform agreement in both presence and absence (*anvaya-vyatireka* or *vyabhicārāgraha*), both constituents of a relationship are always found together; neither is ever present without the other. For example, whenever smoke is present fire is also present and whenever fire is absent smoke is also absent.[62]

2.4.2.1 Classification of Inference *(Anumāna)*

The Nyaya provides four general classification systems for inference:

1. Firstly, inference is of two types- *svārtha* and *parātha*.[63]

2. Secondly, inference is of three kinds- *pūrvavat, śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.[64]

3. The third classification is − *kevalānvayi, kevalavyatireki* and *anvaya-vyatireki*.

4. The fourth classification is − *vīta* and *avīta*. *Vīta* includes *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* and *avīta* is *śeṣavat*. This particular type of taxonomy is given by Vācaspatimiśra.

Anumāna

→ *Svārtha*	→ *Pūrvavat*	→ *Kevalānvayi*	→*Vīta*
→ *Parārtha*	→ *Śeṣavat*	→*Kevalavyatireki*	→*Avīta*
	→ *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*	→ *Anvayavyatireki*	

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
[62] *T.S.,* XXVII

[63] *Taccānumānaṃ dvividham, svārthaṃ parārthaṃ ceti| T.B.,* p. 79.

[64] *N.S.* 1/1/5

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The *svārtha* means "for oneself," and *parārtha* means "for others." In *svartha*, the purpose of the inference is for one to gain correct knowledge by oneself and for him. In this kind of inference, one wants to obtain the inferential cognition for himself by relating it to the major (*sādhya*) and minor (*pakṣa*) premises. In *parārthānumāna*, on the other hand, the inference is meant for others. Here someone is trying to prove the truth of his view. For instance, a man who is convinced of the existence of fire on a hill would use *parārtha* when attempting to convince others of the fire's existence. It requires a systematic methodology of five steps.[65]

The second classification system divides inference into three categories: *purvavat, sesavat,* and *samanyatodrsta. Pūrvavat* means inferring an unperceived effect from a perceived cause,[66] *śeṣavat* means inferring an unperceived cause from a perceived effect and *sāmānyatodriṣta* refers to that type of inference when it is not based on causation but on uniformity of co-existence. A *pūrvavat* inference is that which is based on previous experience. For example, "It will rain because there are dark heavy clouds in the sky, and whenever there are dark heavy clouds, it rains." Here the future rain (effect) is inferred from the appearance of dark heavy clouds (cause).Uddyotakara criticizes this view holding that no sensible person could venture to cognize the effect simply on the basis of the perception of a cause.[67]

Śeṣavat is the reverse type of reasoning, in which an unperceived cause is inferred from a perceived effect, e. g., when it is seen that the water of the river is swollen, it can be inferred that there has been rain.[68]

The *Sāmānyatodrṣta* inference is that in which the inference is based upon a general observation. In this kind of reasoning, conclusions are based on direct experience and on generally known truths. For example, "We have observed in all cases that we see a thing in a place different from where we saw it before only when it has moved; and

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[65] *Anumānaṃ dvividhaṃ -svārthaṃ parārthaṃ ca| Svārthaṃ svānumitihetuḥ|.......yattu svaṃ dhūmāt agnim anumāya paraṃ prati bodhayituṃ pañcāvayavavākyaṃ prayujyate tat parārthānumānam| T.S., XXVI*

[66] *N.B.,* 1/1/5

[67] *N.V.,* 1/1/5

[68] *N.B.,* 1/1/5

from this fact of general observation we infer that the sun must be moving, even though we cannot perceive it."[69]

Uddyotakara is the first logician to introduce the third type of classification as: *kevalānvayi, kevalavyatireki* and *anvaya- vyatireki.*[70] In the first, *kevalānvayi,* the middle term is only positively related to the major term. For example: "Sound is non-eternal because it is a product." In the second, *kevalavyatireka,* the middle term is only negatively related to the major term. For example: "Whoever is dead has no pulse: this person has a pulse; therefore he is not dead." In the last category, *anvayavyatireki,* the middle term is both positively and negatively related to the major term. This is the joint method of both *anvaya* and *vyatireka.* For example: "All smoky objects are on fire: the hill is smoky; therefore, the hill is on fire."

The fourth classification is expounded by Vācaspatimiśra as *vīta* and *avīta.*[71] *Vīta* is based upon the universal agreement in presence, e.g., whatever is smoky is fiery, the hill is smoky and therefore the hill is fiery. The *avīta* is based upon the universal agreement in absence. For example, what is non- different from other elements has no smell. The earth has smell and therefore the earth is different from other elements. *Vīta* is sub-divided into two kinds- *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa;* and *avīta* is also termed as *śeṣavat* or *pariśeṣa.*[72]

2.4.2.2 Constituents of Inference *(Avayavas)*

The methodology of inference involves five steps,[73] as in the example shown:

- There is fire on the hill (called *Pratijñā,* required to be proved)
- Because there is smoke there (called *Hetu,* reason)
- Wherever there is fire, there is smoke (called *Udaharaṇa,* i.e., example)
- There is smoke on the hill (called *Upanaya,* reaffirmation)

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[69] Ibid.

[70] *Trividhamiti, anvayī, vyatirekī anvayavyatirekī ceti*| N.V., 1/1/5

[71] *Tatra prathaṃ tāvat dvividhaṃ vītamavītaṃ ca*| S.T.K..(Bengali Trans.) p.33

[72] *Anvayamukhena pravarttamānaṃ vidhāyakaṃ vītaṃ, vyatirekamukhena pravarttamānaṃ niṣedhakamavītaṃ*| *tatrāvītaṃ śeṣavat,...................vītañca dvedhā, pūrvavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭañca*| Ibid.
Though Vācaspatimiśra does not mention these two types of classification in the *Tātparyaṭīkā,* but it is mentioned in his *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī.*

[73] Potter discusses various *Nyāya* responses to the charge that the five- step argument pattern contains unnecessary redundancy. *EIP,* Vol. 2, p. 186.

- Therefore there is fire on the hill (called *Nigamana*, conclusion)

In *Nyāya* terminology for this example, the hill would be called as *pakṣa* (minor term), the fire is called as *sādhya* (major term), the smoke is called as *hetu*, and the relationship between the smoke and the fire is called as *vyāpti* (middle term). *Hetu* further has five characteristics: (1) It must be present in the *pakṣa*, (2) It must be present in all positive instances, (3) It must be absent in all negative instances, (4) It must not be incompatible with the minor term or *pakṣa* and (5) All other contradictions by other means of cognition should be absent. Gautama in *Nyāyasūtra* has mentioned these five types as:

"pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanyāyāvayavāḥ|"[74]

Vātsyāyana has admitted these five types of constituents as the *"parama nyāya"*[75]. He himself has also refuted the view of *Naiyāyikas*, who consider ten constituents of *Nyāya*, the five new ones added being *Jijñāsā, Saṁśaya, Śakyaprāptiḥ, Prayojana* and *Saṁśayavyudāsa*.[76] Though Gautama does not bother giving the general definition of *avayava*, instead gives the etymological meaning as, *"atra sādhyasya avadhāraṇāya yuvantī miśrībhavatī bhūyante miśrīkriyante vā ityavayavāḥ"*[77]

2.4.2.3 Fallacies of Reason or *Hetu* (*Hetvābhāsas*)

In Indian logic, especially in *Nyāya*, *hetvābhāsa* or fallacy has a vital role. Gautama does not provide us with any definition of *hetvābhāsa*. Rather he has mentioned that there are five kinds of fallacies of reasons. They are *savyabhicāra, viruddha, prakaraṇasama (satpratipakṣa), sādhyasama* and *kālātīta (bādhita)*.[78] According to Vātsyāyana the term *hetvābhāsa* means fallacious probans. They are so called because they do not possess all the characteristics of the true probans and yet they are adequately similar to the probans so as to appear as such.[79]

[74] *N.S*, 1/1/32
[75] *So 'yam paramo nyāya iti*| *N.B*, 1/1/1
[76] *Daśāvayavāneke naiyāyikā vākye sañcakṣate*| *jijñāsā saṁśayaḥ śaktiprāptiḥ prayojanam saṁśayavyudāsa iti. N.B.*, 1/1/32
[77] *Sādhakavākyaikadeśa iti.* Ibid.
[78] *Savyabhicāra-viruddha-prakaraṇasama-sādhyasama-kālātītā hetvābhāsāḥ* | *N.S.* 1/2/4 .
[79] *Hetulakṣaṇābhāvādahetavo hetusāmānyāt hetuvadābhāsamānāḥ* | *N.B.*, 1/2/4

In *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, it is defined as '*na tu sākṣād hetuḥ kintu tathā pratīyate.*'[80] It means that *hetvābhāsa* or the fallacious middle is one that appears as, but in truth, is not a valid reason or middle term for an inference. For the purpose of proof, an inference is made to consist of five members, namely *pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana*. Similarly, the validity of an inference is based on the validity of its five members. So, it can be said that the fallacies of *pratijñā* etc. come under the fallacy of inference (*nyāyābhāsa*). But it must be admitted that the validity of an inference depends ultimately on the validity of the *hetu* or the reason employed on it. So, the Naiyāyikas bring the fallacies of inference (*nyāyābhāsa*) under the fallacies of the reason (*hetvābhāsa*). There are five types of *hetvābhāsas* as enumerated by Nyāya logic. The fallacies in *anumāna* (*hetvābhāsa*) may occur due to the following:

1. *Asiddha:* It is also called *sādhyasama*.[81] This is the unproved *hetu* when a reason is supplied to prove the predicate but the reason itself requires to be proved like the predicate. Uddyotakara names it as *asiddha*. Vātsyāyana gives the example as, 'Shadow is a substance because it possesses motion.'[82] There are three types of the fallacy of *asiddha*: *āśrayāsiddha, svarūpāsiddha* and *vyāpyatvāsiddha*.

- *Āśrayāsiddha*: If *pakṣa* itself is unreal, then there cannot be locus of the *hetu*, e.g. the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it belongs to the class of lotus. Here the *pakṣa* 'sky – lotus' is unreal, therefore the *hetu* 'class of lotus' cannot exist in it.

- *Svarūpāsiddha*: In this type of fallacy the *hetu* cannot exist in *pakṣa* at all, e.g. sound is a quality, because it is visible.

- *Vyāpyatvāsiddha*: Here concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya* cannot be proved, e.g., all real are momentary; sound is a real, so sound is momentary. Here the major premise is false, because there is no universal concomitance between the 'real' and the 'momentary'.

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[80] *S.D.S.*, p. 470
[81] *Sādhyāviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyatvāt sādhyasamaḥ*| *N.S.* 1/2/8
[82] *Dravyaṃ chāyeti sādhyaṃ, gatimatvāditi hetuḥ*| *N.B.*, 1/2/8

2. *Anaikāntika* or *Savyabhichāra:*[83] Gautama says that it is an inconclusive *hetu* because it has variable concomitance with the predicate as well as the absence of the predicate. Vātsyāyana holds that if a reason presents in similar as well as dissimilar examples and thus raises the doubt or does not remove the doubt about the predicate, it is inconclusive and hence fallacious.[84] According to Vācaspatimiśra, the two terms *savyabhicāra* and *anaikāntika* are synonymous and one can be used as the definition of the other. It is of three types: *Sādhāraṇa, asādhāraṇa* and *anupasaṃhārī.*

- *Sādhāraṇa* or ordinary fallacy: It occurs when *hetu* is in some cases related to the *sādhya* and in the other cases related to the absence of it.[85]

- *Asādhāraṇa* or extraordinary fallacy: In this type of fallacy the *hetu* is neither related to things in which the *sādhya* exists nor to those in which it does not exist.[86]

- *Anupasaṃhārī* or the indefinite fallacy:[87] Here the *hetu* is related to a *pakṣa* that stands not for any definite individual or class, but indefinitely for all objects.

3. *Kālātīta* or *Bādhita*: It refers to the middle term which is vitiated by the lapse of time.[88] Vātsyāyana gives the following example, 'sound is durable because, it is manifested by conjunction by colour.' Here the reason is fallacious since in the case of colour the manifestation takes place simultaneously with the contact between light and the coloured object. However, the manifestation of sound is separated by a gap of time from the contact between two objects. So here the reason is not appropriate with the instance.[89] Uddyotakara gives the same interpretation. But Vācaspati takes it in the sense of *bādhita*. He maintains that the reason is contradicted by perception, inference and testimony.

4. *Viruddha*: According to Gautama, *"siddhāntamabhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ."*[90] It is the opposition of one doctrine to a previously accepted doctrine.

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[83] *Anekāntikaḥ savyabhicāraḥ| N.S.,* 1/2/5.

[84] *N.B.,* 1/2/5

[85] *Sādhāraṇaḥ sādhyavat tadanyavṛttiḥ| N.V.* 1/2/5

[86] *Asādhāraṇaḥ sapakṣavipakṣavyāvṛttaḥ|* Ibid.

[87] *Anvayavyatirekadṛṣṭāntarahito 'nupasaṃhārī| T.S.D.,* p. XXXIII

[88] *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ kālātītaḥ| N.S.,* 1/2/9

[89] *N.B.,* 1/2/9

[90] *N.S,* 1/2/6

Vātsyāyana cites two contradictory examples, world ceases from manifestation because it is not eternal, and that even then it exists because it cannot be destroyed.[91] According to Uddyotakara when *hetu* disproves the proposition which it is meant to prove then the *viruddha* fallacy occurs.[92]

5. *Prakaranasama:* According to Gautama when a reason is counterbalanced by another reason and does not lead to the conclusion, then it is called *prakaranasama*. Vātsyāyana interprets it as the alternation of mind between two contradictory characters of an object.[93] Vācaspatimiśra names it *satpratipakṣa*.

2.4.3. Comparison (*Upamāna*)

Upamāna or comparison is the third means of cognition accepted by the Nyāya philosophy. The term *upamāna* is derived from the words *upa* means *sādṛśya* or similarity and *māna* means cognition. Thus *upamāna* derivatively means the knowledge of the similarity between two things. *Upamāna* is another means of cognition. As a *pramāṇa*, *upamāna* is the cognition of the relationship between a word and the object denoted by the word (*saṃjñā-saṃjñisambandha*). It is produced by the cognition of resemblance or similarity, given some pre-description of the new object beforehand. The definition of *upamāna* as given by Gautama is:

Prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanamupamānam ||6||[94]

It means that the knowing of an unknown thing (*sādhya padārtha*) by virtue of its similarity to a known thing (*siddha padārtha*) is called *upamāna*. Here Gautama explains the instrumental cause of the *upamiti*, i.e., *upamāna*. Gautama defines *upamāna* as the instrumental cause (*kāraṇa*) of true cognition of an object which is cognized on the basis of similarity with an already well-known object. The process of acquitting the knowledge of *upamiti* may be described thus: A man who has never seen a *gavaya* and does not know about it, is told by a forester that *gavaya* is like a cow. He then goes to a forest and sees one unfamiliar animal. He then perceives in the animal some resemblance with a cow, which is known to him. This resemblance

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[91] *N.B.,* 1/2/6
[92] *Pratijñāhetvorvā virodhaḥ*| *N.V.,* 1/2/6
[93] *N.B.,* 1/2/7
[94] Ibid, 1/1/6.

reminds him of the former saying (*atideśa vākya*) of the forester and then he has the knowledge that 'this objects bears the name *gavaya*'. Besides the Naiyāyikas, the Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins accept *upamāna* as an independent source of valid knowledge, though the process of knowing is different from that of the Naiyāyikas. The Jainas, the Buddhists, the Saṃkhyas and even the Vaiśeṣikas deny admitting *upamāna* with some critical notes on them.

Vātsyāyana explains that the compound "*prasiddhasādharmya*" in the *sūtra* of Gautama means either whose similarity is known or which has similarity with other things. It means by which we have the cognition of an object that is very similar to that of previous object which is well –known to us. *Bhāṣyakāra* has enumerated that, having the earlier cognition of cow, we can recognize *gavaya,* which is of same property .For him *upamāna* is a way of cognition the denotation of words and solving the problem of identification.[95] Vātsyāyana states that the *upamāna* is the cognition of an unknown object by means of its resemblance to a known object. But he uses the term *samānadharma* in place of *sādharmya.*[96]

Uddyotakara analyses *upamāna* by splitting the compound *prasiddha sādharmya* as *prasiddham* and *sādharmyam yasya* or *prasiddhena vā sādharmyam yasya,* and says that the compound qualifies the term *gavaya.*[97] He also introduces *vaidharmya* and says that the term *sādharmya* in the *sūtra* is symbolic and it comprehends *vaidharmya* as well.[98]

Vācaspati Miśra, in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭikā* first mentions the opinion of the other philosophers who deny *upamāna* or comparison as an independent source of knowledge. The opponents say that when a southerner, who has not seen a camel, hears the description of a camel, that camel is such and such an animal, later on comes to the north and identifies an object as camel. Such identification cannot be considered to be comparison because the element of similarity is absent. This is not a separate source of cognition, rather a sequence of verbal testimony, perception and inference. So, the identification of *gavaya* through the similarity with a *gau* cannot be

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[95] *Yathā gaurevaṃ gavaya ityupamāne prayukte gavā samānadharmam artham indriyārthasannikarṣād upalabhamāno'sya gavayaśabdaḥ saṃjñeti saṃjñā saṃjñisambandhaṃ pratipadyate| N.B.* 1/1/6

[96] *Prajñātena sāmānyātprajñāpanīyasya prajñāpanam upamānam| N.B.,* 1/1/6

[97] *Yā'sau saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhapratipattiḥ sa upamānārthaḥ| N.V.,* 2/1/48

[98] *Prasiddhasādharmyasya vaidharmyasya sa upamānahetutvāt| N.V.* 2/1/45

comparison or *upamāna*. Vācaspati Miśra replies that the word 'similarity' in Gautam's *sūtra* (*N.S.* 1.1.6) means by *lakṣaṇā* properties in general and not just similar properties. He emphasizes that the value of cognition by similarity consists of a definite identification of an object by a certain name. The sense- perception cannot be achieved with comparing the object with another object. The definite cognition of the particular object *gavaya* depends upon the act of comparison with reference to some kind of similarity.[99]

2.4.4. Verbal Testimony (*Śabda*)

Verbal testimony or *śabda* is the last and the fourth means of cognition accepted by Naiyāyikas. Etymologically, *śabda* signifies 'sound'; literally it stands for 'word' and epistemologically it refers to a mean of cognition, viz., 'verbal testimony'. Apart from Cārvāka, Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist, all the other systems of Indian philosophy accept *śabda* as a distinct source of cognition. But considering the nature and forms of *śabda*, each of them differ from one another.

Gautama defines *śabda* as, "*āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ.*"[100] It consists of the assertion of a trustworthy person. It can be of two types according to Vātsyāyana: *dṛṣṭārtha* or that relating to perceptible objects, and *adṛṣṭārtha* or that relating to imperceptible objects.[101]

Vātsyāyana explains the term *āpta* as signifying a person who has immediate knowledge of *dharma*, who is accomplished with the real nature of the object and who communicates real knowledge to others out of compassion.[102] According to Vātsyāyana, *āpta* can be anyone, a ṛṣi, or a ārya or a mleccha.

Uddyotakara defines verbal testimony as the element of verbalisation which is important in this source of knowledge and which separates it from inference and perception.[103] He introduces a controversy over the interpretation of *āptopadeśa* in the

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[99] *Prajñāpanīyasya gavayaśabdavācyatayā pratyakṣadṛśyamānagosādṛśyasya gavayatvasāmānya viśeṣavataḥ piṇḍasya prajñāpanam upamānam* | *N.V.T.T.*, 1/1/6

[100] *N.S.* 1/1/7

[101] Ibid, 1/1/8

[102] *Āptaḥ kahlu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasya arthasya cikhyapayisayā prayukta upadeṣṭā* | *N.B.* 1/1/7.

[103] *Indriyasambaddhāsambaddheṣvartheṣu yā śabdollekhena pratipattiḥ sā*'*'gamārthaḥ* | *N.V.*, 1/1/7

Nyāya and refutes the theory of Diṅnāga that verbal testimony can be included either in inference or in perception.

Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭikā* says that the word *upadeśa* stands for words uttered for the benefit of others.

In the *Nyāyapariśuddhi* it is observed as follows: there are two kinds of persons-omniscient and not-omniscient; of these, the reliability can be proved from the fact that who is proved to be omniscient is also proved to be free from all defects of ignorance, love, hatred and the like. As for the not-omniscient person, his assertions can bear testimony to his being reliable, by reason of his being possessed of-(a) due knowledge of the thing spoken of, (b) desire to convey true information, (c) efficient faculty of right articulation etc.; and one can be sure of this only after having repeatedly found the man to be possessed of these qualities.[104]

2.4.5. Refutation of the other means of Cognition

It may be objected by the opponents that apart from these above mentioned means of cognition (perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony), there are also four other means of cognition, viz., *aitihya* or tradition, *arthāpatti* or presumption, *sambhava* or probability and *abhāva* or non-existence.

Na chatuṣṭam aitihyaarthāpati sambhāvābhāv prāmāṇyāt|[105]

2.4.5.1 Tradition (*Aitihya*)

Aitihya or tradition is defined by Vātsyāyana (under *N.B.*2.2.1)[106] as a testimony chain whose originator is unknown. In *Nyāyasūtra*[107] also *aitihya* is refuted as a valid means of cognition other than *pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna* and *śabda*. *Aitihya* is something which is carried on from one person to another without it being clear what the exact source is. For example one may hear that, 'ghosts live on *peepal* tree'. Nobody knows from where this rumour is emerging out, yet everyone keeps on telling one another that this is so.

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[104] *N.V.T.T.P.*, 1/1/7, Ganganath Jha translation.
[105] *N.S.*, 2/2/1
[106] *Hocurityanirdriṣṭapravaktṛkaṃ pravādapāramparyamaitihyam | N.B.*, 2/2/1
[107] *N.S.*, 2/2/2

2.4.5.2 Postulation (*Arthāpatti*)

According to J.N. Mohanty, this is a pattern of reasoning which has been compared to transcendental argument;[108] a standard example is as follows: Devadatta is getting increasingly fat, but no one sees him eat during the course of the day. Given these two facts, it postulates that he must eat at night when no one is around. That Devadatta eats at night is the content of the cognition generated by *arthāpatti*.

The Vedāntis and the Mīmāṃsakas consider *arthāpatti* as a separate source of valid cognition.

Gautama[109] does not consider presumption as the different source of cognition and reduces it to inference. In this way of cognition, there will be two objects related by pervasion. One object will be the *vyāpya* and the other will be the *vyāpaka*. Without the relation of pervasion there cannot be any presumption. Thus, this form of knowing can be included in inference. For example, *pakṣa* is Devadatta, the *sādhya* is 'eating at night,' and the *hetu* is 'growing fat, while not eating during the day.' The universal rule that is used is negative, or *vyatirekivyāpti*. Wherever there is absence of *sādhya* (i.e., absence of eating at night), there would be absence of *hetu* (i.e., absence of growing fat, if not eating during the day). The problem is, in that case, to come forward with an agreed example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in which that rule is instantiated.[110]

2.4.5.3 Probability (*Sambhava*)

Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*[111] said that, "*sambhava* is the grasping of the existence of another thing as the result of grasping the existence of a thing which in its *avinābhāvin*, i.e. does not exist without it."[112] For example, the existence of *āḍhaka* (a weight which is the quarter of a *droṇa*), can be understand from apprehending the existence of a *droṇa;* and of a *prastha* (which is the quarter of a *āḍhaka*) by understanding the existence of an *āḍhaka*. Thus:

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[108] *CIP*, p. 32.
[109] *N.S.* 2/2/2
[110] *CIP*, p. 32.
[111] *N.B.* 7-8 and 12-14, 2/2
[112] "The inclusive quantity is accurately called the *avinābhāvin*, as being that which cannot exist without the included quantity. The smaller of course can exist without the larger. A hundred can exist without a thousand, but a thousand cannot exist without a hundred." *ILES*, p.327.

"A quantity and its constituents being united by the relation of inseparable concomitance (*avinābhāvavṛttyāsambaddhayaoh samudāyasamudāyinoḥ*), the apprehension of the constituent by means of the aggregate (*samudāyena*) is 'inclusion.'"[113]

In most of Indian philosophical schools, *sambhava* and *aitihya* are not considered as the separate sources of cognition.

2.4.5.4 Non- Cognition *(Anupalabdhi)*

In Indian philosophy *anupalabdhi* is accepted as a distinct means of valid cognition by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedāntis. Their argument is that none of the recognized *pramāṇas* are able to generate the cognition of an absence. So a distinct *pramāna* is required.[114] All other philosophical schools oppose it. However, in Indian Philosophy *abhāva* has been discussed in two ways- as an ontological reality, and a means of cognition. In the first form it is mentioned as *asat* and in the second it is considered as *anupalabdhi*. A general epistemological notion of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regarding negation is that there is some reality known as *abhāva* and there is a way of ascertaining it which is known as *anupalabdhi.*[115]

The Naiyāyikas do not accept more than four means of true cognition. And for cognizing absence or *abhāva* they do not need a distinct *pramāna*. The Naiyāyikas reply that the cognition of absences is accounted for by means of the other sources of cognition.[116]

In Nyāya philosophy there is no object of true cognition like *abhāva*.[117] Vātsyāyana remarks that since absence is not found to be an object in many cases of true cognition, the argument that *abhava* is not a means of true cognition because there is no such object of true cognition as absence, is not proper.[118]

Vātsyāyana says that this absence is proved to be a *prameya* because when a person wants to bring a cloth which is not blue, the absence of blueness is a mark which will enable him to mark out the particular cloth he wants to bring and to exclude the other

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[113] Ibid, p. 327

[114] S.*V.*, *Abhāva.*

[115] *ITK*, p. 274.

[116] See *ITK*, pp., 275-6 for a summary of Jayanta's critique of the Bhāṭṭas' position.

[117] *Nābhāvaprāmāṇyam prameyasiddheḥ| N.S.* 2/2/7.

[118] *Abhāvasya bhūyasi prameye lokasiddhevaiyātyāhucyate |N.B.,* 2/:

cloths which are blue. Thus an object may be known through the non-existence of its mark. Here, the cognition of absence of mark is the cause of true cognition.[119]

Uddyotakara maintains that negative judgement denies whereas positive judgement asserts.[120] According to him *abhāva* is:

"*Abhāvo nāma pratyanīkasya grahaṇāt tadvirodhino grahaṇam|*" *N.V.T.T.* 2/2/1

According to Vātsyāyana (*N.B.* 2/2/12) there are twofold divisions of *abhāva-prāgabhāva* and *pradhvaṃsābhāva*.[121] But he does not mention the other varieties recognized by the later school. The fourfold classification of *abhāva* appears to be from the time of Kumārila:[122]

> *Kṣīre dadhyādi yannāsti prāgbhāvaḥ sa ucyate*
>
> *nāstitā payaso dadhni pradvaṃsābhāva iṣyate*
>
> *gavi yo 'śvādyabhāvas tu so 'nyonyābhāva ucyate*
>
> *śiraso 'vayavā nimnā vṛddhikāṭhinya- varjitaḥ*
>
> *śaśasṛṅgādirupeṇa so 'tyantābhāva ucyate|*[123]

Later, the three varieties- *prāgabhāva, pradhvaṃsābhāva and atyantābhāva*- are classed together under *saṃsargābhāva*.

Thus Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika School believes in the ontological reality of negation as an additional category,[124] but not as an independent means of cognition.

2.5. Validity of Cognition (*Jñānaprāmāṇya*)

Now the question arises whether the cognition obtained through the means of cognitions is valid or invalid. Two important questions regarding validity of cognition are:

1. Whether conditions which generate the validity of a perception or any other knowledge are intrinsic to the conditions that generate that knowledge.

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[119] *Pratipattihetuśca pramāṇamiti|* *N.B. 2/2/8*

[120] *Asattu paratantrapratiṣedhamukhena pratipadyate pradīpavat|* *N.V.*

[121] *Abhāvādvaitaṃ khalu bhavati , prāk cotpatter avidyamānatā, utpannasya cātmano hānād avidyamānatā|* *N.B.*

[122] *ILES,* p.330.

[123] *S.V., Abhāva,* 2-4
"The non- existence of curds in the milk is antecedent non- existence; the non- existence of milk in curds is non- existence after destruction; the negation of horse in the cow is mutual negation; absence on the slope of the head of hardness and excrescence is absolute non-existence- non- existence of such things as the horns of a hare." *ILES,* p.330.

[124] Mookherjee, Satkari, *BPUF,* p. 409. AS quoted in *VDPN,* p. 564.

2. Whether the validity of that cognition is known by the knowledge itself.

There are debates among the different philosophical systems. The extrinsic validity of Nyāya and the intrinsic validity of Mīmāṃsā are the two important views in this regard are discussed below.

2.5.1. Intrinsic Validity (*Svataḥ-Prāmāṇya*)

The structure of whole *Mīmāṃsa* philosophy is based upon the doctrine of the self-validity of cognition, i.e. the *svataḥ-prāmānyavāda*. Validity of cognition means the certitude of truth. Kumārilabhaṭṭa asserts that,

'*Svataḥ sarvapramānānāṃ prāmānyamiti gamyatām* |

Na hi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartumanyena śkyate ||[125]

The *Mimāṃsā* philosophy admits that all cognition excepting the memory (*smṛti*), is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other cognition for its validity. According to the *Mīmāṃsakas*:

1. All cognition is intrinsically valid.
2. All cognition is valid by itself, and does not need to be validated by any other cognition external to itself.
3. Its validity arises from the very causes from which it arises.

The nature of cognition is to reveal its object. Hence cognition requires no other conditions than itself in order to reveal its object. So, cognition must be true or valid in nature to reveal the true nature of an object. There is no external condition of cognition to reveal its object (*kārakātiriktatadgataguṇa*). So the Mīmāṃsakas say that the validity of cognition is due to the conditions of cognition itself (*svarūpasthitahetuja*), i.e., it is intrinsic to cognition.[126] This is best understood as the notion that the same causal conditions which give rise to the awareness of cognition also give rise to awareness of its high-grade positive epistemic status. Here, validity is conceived intrinsically because there is no source of the entitlement other than the fact of the cognition's occurrence itself.

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[125] S. *V.* Sūtra-2, Śloka-47.
[126] *S.D.*, pp. 20, 21, 48.

2.5.2. Extrinsic Validity *(Paratah-Prāmāṇya)*

The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣikas hold that both validity and invalidity of cognition is *paratah* or extrinsic. The term *paratah- prāmāṇya* is first used in *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭikā* by Vācaspatimiśra.[127] In *Nyāyamañjarī* we find,

"*Sthitimetadarthakriyājñānāt prāmāṇyaniścaya iti* | *Tadidamuktaṃ, 'pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pavṛttisāmarthyādarthavat pramāṇaṃ* |' *[N.B. p. 1] iti* | *tasmādaprāmāṇyamapi parokṣamityato dvayamapi parataḥ ityeṣaḥ eva pakṣaḥ śreyāniti* |"[128]

According to the Nyāya, the conditions of validity and invalidity of cognition must be different from and other than the conditions of the cognition itself. The Naiyāyikas admit that the validity and invalidity of cognitions are known by certain external conditions (*paratah prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyajñpti*). This is the view that the causal factors which give rise to a cognition are not sufficient to provide ultimate knowledge of its own validity. If the validity of cognition is known intrinsically by the cognition itself, then there can be no doubt with regard to the validity of any cognition. Besides, if cognition is invalid due to the conditions of cognition itself, there can be no wrong action.

The fact is that cognition must be accepted valid, for without it one cannot achieve practical objects. The Naiyāyikas hold that both validity and invalidity of cognition is known by inference. It is to be inferred from extrinsic conditions as its capacity or incapacity to produce successful activity (*pravṛttisāmarthya*).[129]

2.6. Result of Cognition (*Pramā*)

The result of cognition or *pramā* is defined as the absolute valid cognition of an object. As in *Tarkasaṃgraha,* '*yathārthānubhava pramā.*'[130] It is a definite and certain (*asaṃdigdha*) cognition of an object. In *Nyāyabhāṣya* also it is said that,

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[127] *N.V.T.T.,* 1/1/1
[128] *N.M.,* (Chowkhamba edn.), part- I, p. 160,
[129] *Prāmāṇyaṃ hi samarthapravṛttijanakatvādanumeyam| N.V.T.T.P.,* 1/1/1
[130] *T.S, pratyakṣa khaṇḍa*

Yathārthavijñānaṃ sā pramā.[131] Hence *pramā* excludes all kinds of non-valid cognition, such as, memory, doubt, error, hypothetical argument etc.

Now the question is what makes cognition *yathārtha* or true? The answer is that a cognition is true when it is not contradicted by its object (*arthāvyabhicāri*). The sense is that a cognition is true when it reveals its object with that nature and attributes which exist in the object, despite all changes of time, place and other conditions.[132]

According to the Naiyāyikas, *pramā* should be a presentational cognition (*anubhava*), otherwise memory will be considered as *pramā*. But memory is not a preventative cognition; rather it is representative, since it is only a reproduction of past experience, therefore other than presentational cognition (*anubhava*).[133] Udayana also says that "*Yathārthānubhavo mānamanapekṣatayeṣyate.*"[134]

Thus this chapter presents an outline of pre-Jayanta's view on cognitive process. It elucidates concisely various issues on cognitive process before Jayanta which helps to get the idea of Jayanta's own view discusses in the next chapter.

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[131] *N.B.*, 1/1/1
[132] *N.V.T.T.*, pp., 5, 21
[133] *N.M.*, (Vizianagram Series), p.23
[134] Quoted in, *N.D.*, (West Bengal State Book Board edn.), p. 84

CHAPTER- 3

JAYANTA'S EXPOSITION OF COGNITIVE PROCESS

This particular chapter is based on the first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī*. It discusses all the possible issues regarding the process of cognition as presented by Jayantabhaṭṭa. Likewise, it examines the views of the opponents and critically refutes them. It is the attempt to present a keen observation on Jayanta's theory on cognitive process.

3.1 Jayanta's Hypothesis on Cognition (*Jñāna*)

Jayanta considers that Gautama's use of the terms *'jñāna'* and *'upalabddhi'* as synonyms of *'buddhi'* is sufficient for understanding the nature of cognition.[1] Regarding Jayanta's hypothesis on *jñāna*, he argues against the contention of the Sāṃkhyas, who maintain that these three terms represent different concepts.[2] According to the Sāṃkhyas, cognition is a mode of *buddhi*. The *Puruṣa* for them is immutable and conscious. Pain, pleasure, etc. belong to *buddhi* which is evolutes of *prakṛti*. Cognition transforms itself into the shape of the object of cognition. Though the *puruṣa* is inactive, due to the intelligence of *buddhi, puruṣa* gets active and the phenomenon of cognition arises as an amalgamation. The reflection of the *buddhi* in the self is assumed to account for the cognition of *buddhi* modified into the forms of objects by the self.[3]

Now Jayanta repudiates the Sāṃkhyas' view on cognition. Although it is not an activity of any kind, is still a transient phenomenon as it appears from the three tenses of the verb 'to known'. It is to be regarded as quality and so can be perceived like physical qualities. Just as physical qualities are perceived by their special sense organs, the same way knowledge is perceived by the internal sense called *manas*.[4] Cognition is the property of the immaterial substance, i.e. the soul. Cognition is not an essential attribute of the soul. The soul has acquired this property in relation to a body. Jayanta points out that if the Sāṃkhyas hold *buddhi* and *puruṣa* as two different entities, then it is an error to impose the properties of *buddhi* on *puruṣa* and vice versa. According to him, the Sāṃkhyas have made this mistake due to their belief in *satkāryavāda*. As Jayanya writes:

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[1] *Paryāyaprayogasyaiva lakṣaṇakṣamatvāt| NM,* p. 486 (Vizianagram Series.).
[2] *Evaṃ hi sāṃkhyāḥ saṃgirante buddhiranyā jñānamanyadupalabdhiranyeti tadbhramāpanayanāyaivamucyate|* Ibid. p. 487.
[3] *Pratyabhijñānusandhānādivyavahāraprabandhanirvāhaṇakṣamā buddhiḥ |Jñānaṃ tu tasya vṛttiḥ| Upalabdhistu puṃso vṛttimadbuddhidarśānamiti naiṣāṃ paryāyaśabdatvamiti|* Ibid, p. 490
[4] *Astyeva nityamantaḥkataṇaṃ manaḥ, tena karaṇena karturātmano viṣayopalabdhikriyā nirvartyate saiva ca buddhirityākhyāyate na tvanyā nityā buddhirastīti, kiñca kasya kṛte paridṛśyamānamātmano jñānādikriyākartṛtvamupahsṛjya buddheradṛśyamānamupeyate, ko'trāsayc^ᵇ ¹ ᵗᵇⁱᵈ ₙ ⁴⁰ᶠ*

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"Api ca satkāryavādamūla eṣa tapasvināṃ vibhramah sarvaṃ sarvatrāstīti

tato 'nvayasiddhiṃ buddhyamānāste pradhānasiddhāvadhyavasitāḥ |"[5]

Furthermore, the Sāṃkhyas are of the view that cognition is a substantive mode of matter which makes cognition material, whereas the fact is that cognition is formless and matter is never without a form. So, according to Jayanta, cognition is a quality of the soul. It is not the instrument, as the Saṃkhyas hold it. *Buddhi* is cognition and not an instrument of cognition. Even in *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* the Sāṃkhya view is broadly is discussed and refuted.[6]

3.1.1 What is Valid Cognition (*Tattvajñāna*)?

Tattva is the true nature of *bhāvapadārtha* and *abhāvapadārtha* determined by different means of valid cognition.[7] Jayantabhaṭṭa mentions the derivative meaning of *tattva* as, "*tasya bhāvaḥ tattvam*", the nature of that (object) is *tattva*. It is determined by cognition.

'Tat paricchindyat jñānaṃ tattvajñānamtyuchyate| '[8]

The cognition which determines that *(tattva)* is called *tattvajñāna*. Now the question is how the true cognition of the sixteen categories of Gautama's logic leads up to the attainment of the highest goal, i.e., *niśreyasa*. The true cognition of the twelve objects beginning with the soul and ending with the *apavarga* is the direct means to the realization of the final state of freedom from all sufferings and that the true cognition of other objects is not helpful to the goal of life. When our erroneous cognition is chased away by the true cognition of the soul etc., our cycle of worldly existence based on errors comes to an end.

The compound word *'tattvajñāna'* has the sixth case ending. It is syntactical with the term *'tattva'*. It has the general relation in the expression *pramāṇādīnām tattvam* (The essence of *pramāṇas* etc). The two generative case endings, i.e. *tattvasya* and *niśreyasasya* in the expressions *tattvasya jñānam* (cognition of the real nature of the *padārtha*) and *nihśreyasasyādhigamaḥ*, are in generative case-endings because *tattva*

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[5] Ibid, p. 492.

[6] See, *N.S.M.*, (Chaukhamba Surabharati Prakashan edn.), pp. 259-71

[7] *Kiṃ punaridaṃ tattvaṃ nāma? Sato'sato vā vastunaḥ pramāṇapariniścitasvarūpaṃ śabdapravṛttinimittaṃ tadityucyate |* Ibid, (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.) p.27.

[8] Ibid, p.7.

and *niḥśreyasa* are objects since it is *tattva* which is to be known and it is *niḥśreyasa* which is to be attained.[9]

3.1.2 *Jñāna: Sākāra* or *Nirākāra*

Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī* discusses two views considering the *sākāra* and *nirākāra* nature of cognition. First, he mentions the Vaibhāṣika theory of *nirākārajñāna*. Then he proceeds to discuss the theory of *sākārajñāna* as propounded by the Sautrāntikas.

3.1.2.1 Jayanta's Account of the Vaibhāṣika Theory

Jayanta deals with the position of the Vaibhāṣika school as follows:

Cognition and object are two co-existent momentary entities, as they are originated by kindred cause-complex *(tūlyasāmagryadhina)*.[10] In the production of a cognition the preceding cognition is the material cause and the object is the accessory cause. Again in the production of an object the preceding object is the material cause and the preceding cognition is the accessory cause. Thus, the cognition is produced by a cognition and an object and similarly the object is produced by an object and a cognition. Hence a cognition is invariably produced by the same causes as an object.[11]

Thus, both cognition and object depend on *sāmagrī* and the cognition which rightly corresponds to the object is the *pramāṇa*.[12] In spite of the fact that cognition as well as object is of a momentary character.

Jayanta refutes the above view and says that if cognition alone is accepted as the only means, then there will be a possibility of taking even that cognition as *pramāṇa* which does not produce any result.[13] Cognition being of the nature of illumination is regarded as the knower or the subject *(grāhaka)*. The object being of the nature of insentience is regarded as the knowable *(grāhya)*.[14]

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[9] *Pramānādīnāṃ tattvamiti sambandhamātre ṣaṣṭhī | Tattvasya jñānaṃ, niḥśreyasyādhigama iti karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhyau, tattvasya jñāyamānatvena niḥśreyasasya cādhigamyamānatvena karmatvāt ||* Ibid., p.25.

[10] *Anye tu tulyasāmagryadhīnayoḥ jñānārthayoḥ grāhyagrāhakaṃ bhāvaṃ vadantaḥ bodhaṃ pramāṇamabhyupāgaman |* Ibid., p. 44.

[11] *Jñānaṃ ca jñānārthajanyam, arthaśca arthajñānajanyo|* Ibid., p. 45.

[12] *Bhavatītyevamekasāmagryadhīnatayā tamarthamavyabhicarato jñānasya tatra prāmāṇyami*

[13] *Tadidamanupapannam- aphalajanakasya pramāṇatvānupapatterityuktvāt |* Ibid.

[14] *Jñānaṃ svaprakāśasvabhāvamiti grāhakam artho jaḍātmeti grāhyam iti |* Ibid.

The *Siddhāntins* again question them that from where do the cognition and the object get their distinctness, i.e. one is *prakāśasvabhāva* and the other is *jaḍasvabhāva*, when both have the same causes? Jayanta says that if they argue that since there is a difference in the material cause and the accessory cause in the production of cognition and object, there is also a distinction in the cognition and the object. Hence, one is *grāhaka* and the other is *grāhya*.[15]

Regarding this explanation, D. N. shastri[16] remarks that,

> "This is indeed an ingenious explanation which postulates a simultaneously running double thread of causality to explain the relation of a cognition with its object. This kind of explanation becomes necessary in view of the Buddhists doctrine of momentariness and dependent origination. Although it seems difficult to point out the Buddhists source of this theory, there is little doubt that Jayanta, careful as he is setting forth the theories of his opponents, must have been taken it from some Buddhists source. It is not quite clear whether this is an alternative theory to, or amplification of, *sārūpya* theory of the *Abhidharma Kośa*."[17]

3.1.2.2 Jayanata's Account of the Sautrāntika Theory

Durgacharan Chatterji[18] remarks that the Sautrāntika school of the Buddhist philosophy does not recognise the perceptibility of the external objects like the Vaibhāṣikas. According to them the world of matter is not directly apprehended; nevertheless it has a real existence of its own. Objects can be cognised by inference. Cognition assumes the form of the object which itself cannot be intuited. So the

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[15] *Upādānasahakārikāraṇabhedāditi cet* | Ibid., p. 45

[16] *CIR*, p.59.

[17] The relation of a cognition with the external object has been one of the most refractory problems of the realist school, ancient and modern, eastern and western. The difficulty is not confined to the Vaibhāṣika School alone. Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is confronted with the same problem. According to it an external object is directly presented in its cognition which in itself is formless (*nirākāra*). Now, the question arises: how is it that the cognition of a jar refers to the jar, and not a cloth? In as much as the cognition is formless, and no specific change has been brought about in it by the jar or the cloth, it is equally unrelated to both. To this the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may reply that the cognition in question has been produced by the jar and not by the cloth, and that it refers, therefore, to the former and not the latter. But the opponent would retort that, so far as production is concerned, the sense of vision has also been equally instrumental in producing the cognition in question, and the cognition should, therefore, refer to the sense as much as to that jar. Ibid.

[18] *ABORI*, vol. XII, pp., 208-209.

object is to be inferred from the form it imprints on our cognition. Consciousness is, as it were, the mirror in which the external realities are reflected.[19]

According to Prof. Stcherbatsky, there is not much difference between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas on the interpretation of the origin of cognition. In their opinion cognition is a complex phenomenon in which several elements participate, interconnected, but separate, with the essential presence of the element of consciousness among them.[20]

Again, to quote Prof. Stcherbatsky:

> "The Sautrāntikas denied the reality of the past and the future in the direct sense, the admitted the reality only of the present."[21]

The Sautrāntikas admit that cognition is the form of the object. They think that the invariable association between cognition and the object is viable only when the cognition, i.e., the *pramāṇa,* has in it a reflexion of the object. Because if the nature of cognition is taken as *nirākārajñāna* or having no particular form, then it will be applicable to all kinds of cognition such as blue thing, yellow thing etc., and over-applicability will go to eyes etc., since the productive nature is also there.[22]

Since there is no *jñānakarmaniyama* possible, there is no way to tell that cognition would reveal particular objects distinctly. This *jñānakarmaniyama* is possible if *sākārajñāna* is taken as *pramāṇa*, because it reveals the object in its own fo

as such if we take *nirākārajñāna*, there would be the possibility of reve: objects at a time because cognition is without any form of any object.

To this the Naiyāyikas reply that object produces the cognition of it and there cognition would reveal only that object and as such *jñānakarmaniyama* intact. To this the Buddhists have opposed that for the Naiyāyikas the sens eye, etc. are also *janakas* and hence they should also be revealed by their cognition. Therefore over-application will occur.

Again the Naiyāyikas put objection on them that according to the Sautrān object itself does not exist. If it exists it should be either inferred or perceived

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[19] According to Prof. Stcherbatsky the Brāhmanic account of the Sautrāntika theory of cogi *bāhyārthānumeyatvavāda* (the theory that the external objective world is not directly ir cognised inferentially) is due to some confusion between the Sautrāntika and the Yogācara *CCBMWD*, p. 63, f. n. 5.

[20] Ibid, p. 63.

[21] Ibid, p. 42.

[22] *Ye 'pi nirākārasya bodhasvarūpasya nīlapītādyanekaviṣayasādhāraṇatvāt, janaka, cakṣurādāvapi bhāvenātiprasaṅgāt* |*N.M.,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p.46.

[23] *Arthastu sākārajñānavādino na samastyeva | sa hyanumeyo vā syāt? Pratyakṣo va ?* Ibid.

The object cannot be inferred as there is no invariable concomitance between the object which is outside and the *sākāra* cognition which is inside the mind. Cognition does not have any form until an object is presented to it, but as soon as the object is presented, it assumes the form of that object.[24]

Again the worldly object cannot be perceptible, since no body subscribes two forms at a time, i.e. one of the *sākāra* cognition which is the means and other is the object. If we consider the object as perceptible, it will cause *anavasthā* or infinite regression. The form of an object cannot be realised by the formless cognition. Now, the form of cognition of the object also becomes an object of some other cognition and it is to be realised by some other cognition having the form. This cognition also requires a cognition having form for its realisation. In this way it will cause *anavasthā*.

However in this regard, it is to be noticed that V.N. Jha in his English translation of the first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī* considers that it is the view of the Yogācārs. According to V.N.Jha, for Yogācāras neither there are objects outside nor there are different forms of knowledge inside the mind. Knowledge has only one form. This knowledge they call *ālayavijñāna*.[25] The basis of his hypothesis may be Jayanta's use of the word '*vijñānadvaita*' (subjective idealism), which belongs to the Yogācāras. Shashiprabha Kumar and Siddheswar Bhatt also admit that both the Yogācāras and the Sautrāntikas hold the view of *sākāra- jñānavāda*.[26] But Jayanta here intends to present only the Sautrāntika view.

3.1.3 *Jñāna: Svaprakāśa* or *Paraprakāśa*

In the process of cognition there are two important questions that arise, i.e., is cognition *svaprakāśa* or self-illuminated and is it *paraprakāśā* or illuminated by others? The first view is held by the Advaita Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhists. The second view is of the Naiyāyikas, who believe that cognition only illuminates its object, not itself. Cognition requires other cognitions to illuminate it. Here we will discuss only the Mīmāṃsakas view as presented by Jayantabhaṭṭa in his

Cognition consists simply in the manifestation (*prakāśa*) of objects.[27] All things are revealed to us when they become objects of cognition. Cognition is an attribute of the self. It always refers to objects beyond itself. Cognition is never self-manifested.[28] According to the Nyāya, it is a mere hypothesis of the Sāṃkhya, Vedānta and the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā that the capacity of self-manifestation is inside the cognition. Nyāya holds that while cognitions manifest (*prakāśaka*) their intentional objects, they rarely manifest themselves. When they are directly cognized, cognitions are grasped by other cognitions i.e. *anuvyavasāya*. This awareness reveals a cognition along with its object.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, cognition leads to the result of revealedness. Aiming at this function all the factors of cognition come together. In this way, soul gets connected with the mind, the mind with the sense organ, the sense organ with the object and finally the action of cognition comes into existence.

Soul ——→ *Mind* ——→ *Sense – organ* ——→ *Object* ——→ *Cognition*

According to Śabara, unless the object of cognition is known, the cognition is not known and after the object is known, one can grasp the cognition by inference. Thus, according to the Mīmāṃsakas the process of cognition is:

Existence of the object ——→ *contact with the object* ——→ *cognition* ——→
jñātatā

3.2 Means of Valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*)

Regarding the means of valid cognition, Jayantabhaṭṭa accomplishes his task by doing the following four things:

    a. Formulating his own definition of *pramāṇā* and criticising the Buddhists, Mīmāṃsakas and Sāṃkhyas.

3.2.1 Jayanta's Definition of *pramāṇa*

In the history of Nyāya philosophy, Jayanta is famous for his outright elimination of the whole approach regarding definition of *pramāṇa* prior to him. Jayanta puts forward a new thesis on the concept of *pramāṇa*. Thus he admits that the total causal aggregate of factors which are both of the nature of knowledge[29] and non-knowledge,[30] and also to be free from error and doubt, is known as *pramāṇa*.[31] His theory is that none of the *kārakas* alone can produce a result. Thus every cognition is the result of certain causal collocations i.e. *samagrasya bhāvaḥ*, and as such depends upon them for its production.

In this way, for the *savikalpa* perceptual knowledge of a pot, the factors concerned are the eyes, the pot, the soul, the mind, the contact of eyes with pot, and the *nirivikalpapratyakṣa* of it. Thus *nirivikalpapratyakṣa* is the nature of cognition and the rest are of non-knowledge.[32]

Likewise in the case of inference, the factors involved are: the smoke, the mountain, their contact, the cognition of smoke etc. Thus, here also the collocation is the nature of cognition and non-cognition.

Similarly, factors involved in *upamāna* and *śabda* are of the nature of knowledge and non-knowledge.

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[29] For example, the epistemological process of the perceptual knowledge will be as follows:
    (soul + mind + eyes + the pot + light)
    (indeterminate knowledge of pot)
    (determinate knowledge of pot)
Thus, one of the factors which produce the perceptual knowledge is of the nature of knowledge, namely, the indeterminate knowledge of an object.
Similarly, the factors generating the inferential cognition consist of knowledge also, namely, the *vyāptijñāna, parāmarśa* etc.
Likewise, *Upamiti* also requires *sādṛśyajñāna* as its generating factor which is of the nature of knowledge.
In the same matter, verbal knowledge also requires the knowledge of word, rememberance of the meaning.

[30] Eyes etc. in the case of perception and object etc. in the case of inferential knowledge, analogical knowledge and verbal knowledge are of the nature of non-knowledge.

[31] *avyabhicāriṇīmasandigdhāmarthopalabddhiṃ vidadhatī bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇaṃ ', NM,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan), p. 36.

[32] *C.f. , sāmagranupeaviṣṭo bodhaḥ viśeṣaṇajñānamiva kvacitpratyakṣe, liṅgajñānamiva liṅgapramitau, sārūpyadarśanamivopamāne śabdaśravaṇamiva tadarthajñāne pramāṇatāṃ pratipadyate |ata eva bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇamityuktam |* Ibid., p. 44
Also in *N.M.G., Bodhābodhasvabhāveti| Viśeṣaṇajñānāderbodhasvabhāvasya tatrānupeavesād bodhābodhasvabhāvetyuktam |* (Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyālaya edn.) p. 20.

Jayanta further clarifies that both the nature of knowledge and non-knowledge[33] and a collocation of factors which produces an undoubtful and valid cognition is called *pramāṇa*.[34]

C. D. Bijalwan says that Jayanta includes the term '*bodhābodhasvabhāvā*' just to neutralize the Buddhists' view on *pramāṇa* propounded by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, who maintain that cognition alone is *pramāṇa* and non-cognition does not constitute it.[35]

Although Jayanta has presented a new notion of *pramāṇa*, several objections are raised against his new thesis. Following are some of the important objections:

> a. The foremost objection from the side of opponents is that *pramāṇa* is in instrumental case (*pramīyate yene tat pramāṇam*) and Pāṇini has defined it as *sādhatamaṃ karaṇam*. Here the suffix *tamap* is used in the sense of 'excelling'. So, it is necessary to have more than two factors to accept one as the most 'excellent' *sādhaka* or instrument of a result. Since *sāmagri* or collocation is the single entity, there can be no other instrument or *sādhaka* of cognition. Then the definition of *karaṇakāraka* cannot be applied here. So, how can *sāmagri* be considered as the most vital factor?[36]

> b. The second objection is that since the collocation includes all the factors for the generation of cognition, undeniably the object of cognition or *prameya* is also included there. So, the question is that with reference to what object *pramāṇa* should function?[37]

> c. Likewise, since the knower is also included in the *sāmagrī* or collocation, there will be no *pramātā* or agent.[38]

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[33] *Bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī hi tasya svarūpam* | *N.M.*,(Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.) p. 36.

[34] *Avyabhicārādi viśeṣaṇārthopalabdhiṃ sādhanatvaṃ lakṣaṇam* | Ibid.

[35] *ITK*, p. 52.

[36] *Nanu ca pramīyate yena, tat pramāṇamiti karaṇasādhano'yaṃ pramāṇaśabdaḥ* | *karaṇaṃ ca sādhakatamam| tamabarthaścātiśayaḥ | sa cāpekṣikaḥ | sādhakāntarasambhave hi tadapekṣayā 'tiśayayogāt kiñcitsādhakatamamucyate | sāmagryāścaikatvāt tadatiriktasādhakāntarānupalambhāt kimapekṣamasyā atiśayaṃ brumaḥ || NM,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashana edn.), P.37.

[37] *Api ca kasmin viṣaye sāmagryāḥ pramāṇatvam*? Ibid.

[38] Ibid., p.37

By the second and the third objections opponents also show the direct disagreement with the statement of *Bhāṣyakāra* Vātsyāyana, '*pramātā pramāṇāṃ prameyaṃ pramitir iti cataṣriṣu vidhāsu tattvaṃ parisamāpyate*'.[39] Thus in the process of cognition there is a *pramātā* or knower, *pramāṇa* or the means of cognition, *prameya* or the object of cognition and *pramiti* or the right cognition of the knowable object. So, according to the opponents if we consider *sāmagrī* as *pramāṇa*, then the above statement will be objectionable.

d. The fourth objection is that if *sāmagrī* is considered as the *pramāṇa*, then people do use instrumental case-ending after the word *sāmagrī*. But instrumental case-ending is used generally after *cakṣus*, *dīpa* etc. In this way we find the use like *cakṣusā nirīkṣāmahe*, *dīpena paśyāmaḥ*. But nobody uses *sāmagryā paśyāmaḥ*. Thus *sāmagrī* cannot be taken as *pramāṇa*.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, systematically and carefully refutes these objections and proves his thesis.

a. To the first objection Jayantabhaṭṭa replies that the opponents do not understand the implication of his view. In this regard Jayanta considers three alternative senses in which a thing is called a chief cause and in all the three senses causal aggregate alone deserves to be *pramāṇa*.

1. Since *karaṇa* is defined as *sādhakatama* and the term *pramāṇa* has an instrumental derivation, *sāmagrī* fits properly with the idea of *pramāṇa*.[40]

2. The meaning of the *tamap* can be applicable only to the *sāmagrī* and not to the individual *kārakas*, because only *sāmagrī* can produce the result. Jayanta replies that if the necessary *kārakas* come together then the result can be obtained, and if any one of them is not present then the effect is not observed.[41]

3. If the *prameya* and the *pramātā* are not present in the process of cognition, there cannot be the perceptual cognition. Again the chief cause is that thing whose immediate presence brings into existence the effect. Jayanta tries to

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[39] *N.B.*, 1.1.1

[40] *Yata eva sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam, karaṇasādhanaśca pramāṇaśabdaḥ, tata eva sāmagrāḥ pramāṇatvaṃ yuktam* | *N.M.*, (Vidyanidhi prakashan edn.), p. 38.

[41] Ibid.

explain it with an example that if anybody wants to have the delightful perceptual cognition of a beautiful lady in the lightening in a dark night of rainy season, the lady must be present there. One can only get such cognition if the lady comes. Thus, in such a situation the object also becomes necessary. In this way no individual *kāraka* has the excellency. It is only the *sāmagrī* which can claim excellency. Therefore *sāmagrī* is *pramāṇa*.[42]

b. Regarding the second and the third objections Jayanta replies that when *sāmagrī* is considered as *pramāṇa*, it does not mean that the individual *kārakars* are destroyed.[43] The individual *kārakas* remain in the *sāmagrī* and so *pramātā* and *prameya* also remain there. So, to that *prameya*, *pramāṇa* will operate. Thus, the collocation of factors produce the cognition and once cognition has occurred the person is called *pramātā* and the object is called *prameya*.

In this point again opponents raise the question that whether the collocation is different from the each factor or the same? If collocation is different from the factors then how is it not realised separately?[44] If they are identical with the collocation, then there will be only one *kāraka*.

Jayanta replies that collocation can only be realised when all its elements are present. This can be ascertained by the process of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. In the presence of factors like the pot, the fireplace, water, rice etc., we get the knowledge of collocation and when they are separated we do not have such an idea.

c. To the fourth objection that people do use instrumental cause in *cakṣu* etc., not in *sāmagrī*. Jayanta says that *sāmagrī* is nothing but the collocation of the factors. Except in the case of togetherness, elsewhere the word *sāmagrī* is not used.[45] In the case of *dīpenapaśyamaḥ* etc. people superimpose the idea of *sāmagrī* on one *kāraka*. As for instance, in *sthyālyā pacati* we find that *sāmagrī* is superimposed on the *adhikaraṇakāraka*.[46]

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[42] Ibid, pp. 38-9.
[43] *Kārakāṇāṃ dharmaḥ sāmagrīḥ na svarūpahānāya teṣāṃ kalpate|* Ibid, p.40.
[44] *Nanu samagrebhyaḥ sāmagrī bhinnā cet kathaṃ pṛthaṅnopalabhyate?* Ibid.
[45] *Sāmagrī hi saṃhatiḥ sā hi saṃhanyamānāvyatirekeṇa navyavahārapadavīmavatarati |* Ibid., p. 41.
[46] Ibid.

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Having refuted all those objections, Jayanta now proceeds to criticise some other philosophers view (*apare punaḥ ācakṣate*). Following are their objections:

1. The opponents criticise the dual nature of the single thing, i.e., *sāmagrī*. The fact is that the same *kārakas* when gathered together become *karaṇa* and if they are separated they become known as *kartā, karma* etc. In spite of this, the opponents suggest that other than *kartā* and *karma kārakas,* a *kāraka* should be called as *pramāṇa.*[47]

Jayanta replies that it is accepted then there should only be three *kārakas.*[48]

2. Again the opponents reply that it happens in the process of cognition only. In this case there is no difference between the mind, the lamp or the eyes. So, they are to be taken as *karaṇakāraka* only. But in the case of other actions like *pāka* etc., one can justify the usage of *adhikaraṇa* etc.[49]

Jayanta then replies that which one of these three *kārakas* has to be considered as the most essential factor.

3. The opponents say that the people always use instrumental case- endings to the words like *dīpa, manas, cakṣus* etc, and since they are different from *kartā* and *karma,* we must imagine excellency in *dīpa, manas, cakṣuas* only. This discrimination by people itself we can take as their excellence.[50] We do not find any answer from the side of *Siddhāntins.*

In this regard, there is a problem in the last sentence of Jayanta. Scholars like Janakiballabha Bhattacharya[51] have taken this as the concluding remark of Jayanta

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[47] *sāmagrī nāma samuditāni kārakāṇi | teṣāṃ dvirupyamahṛdayaṅgamam | atha ca tānyeva pṛthagavasthitāni karmādibhāvaṃ bhajante, atha ca tānyeva samuditāni karaṇībhavantīti ko'yaṃ nayaḥ ? tasmāt kartṛkarmavyatiriktaṃ avyabhicārādiviśeṣaṇakārthapramājanakam kārakam karaṇamucyate* |Ibid., p. 42.

[48] *Trīṇyeva kārakāṇyasmin pakṣe bhaveyuḥ*| Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., p. 43.

[51] He translates the last sentence as follows: 'Therefore, we arrive at the final complete definition of a proof of true knowledge that is the collocation of all conditions other than a subject or an object partaking of the nature of consciousness and unconsciousness and productive of the knowledge of an object other than an error or a doubt is the instrumental cause of true knowledge.' *N.M.,* Eng. Trans., Janakiballabha Bhattacharya, p. 28.
c.f., Prof. Shashiprabha Kumar and Siddheswar Bhatt also consider it as '*siddhāntamata*'.

himself in favour of his theory, which is totally wrong according to V.N. Jha.[52] According to Jha, the fact is that Jayanta put his own view first and then refutes the entire objections raised by his opponents. After that he simply records criticism of his view by some philosophers which is known from '*apare tu*'. In the last sentence the word '*kartṛkarmavilakṣaṇā*' presents which is just against Jayanta's theory. He includes each and every *kāraka* to form his *sāmagrī*.

Cakradhara in his Granthibhaṅga[53] admits that Jayantabhaṭṭa has to adopt this course only to show the cogency between the beginning and the conclusion of the opponent's view. He would have been happy if he would have got a manuscript which contained the reading *kāraka* for *sāmagrī*. He further says,

> '*Etacca   yathopalabdhapāṭhānusārṇena   vyākhyātām |*
> *Spaṣṭagamanikāprāyaṃ cet pāṭhāntaraṃ kvacid bhavet, tat saiva gauravikā*
> *astu*

The fact is that Jayanta considers *sāmagrī* as the *karaṇa*. Individually the factors within *sāmagrī* are known as *kartā, karma* etc., but when they are collected they are known as *sāmagrī*.[54]

C.D. Bijalwan,[55] states that Jaynata's definition of *pramāṇa* has deeply influenced the later Naiyāyikas and the Syncretists. Śivāditya has adopted the term '*sāmagrī*' and explained it as the totality of causes without which the effect is never produced.[56] Varadārāja also has employed the term '*sāmagrī*' when he sums up the different views in his *Tārkikarakṣā*, and thus has given great importance to Jayanta.[57]

Thus, Jayanta with this innovation and novelty in the definition of *pramāṇa* introduces a new idea and platform in the history of Nyāya philosophy.

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[52] *SLLE*, p. 32.

[53] *Sāmagrīśabdaḥ samagra-pradhāno draṣṭavyaḥ. Kartṛkarmavyatiriktaṃ janakaṃ yat tat pramāṇam ityarthaḥ| Anyatha hi upakrame kartṛkarmavyatiriktasya kārakamātrasya udāharaṇapradaśanena pramāṇatvaṃ pratijñāya upasaṃhāre sāmagrāḥ tatpratipādanena upakramopasaṃhārayor virodhaḥ syāt |* Edited by Nagin J. Shah, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1972.

[54] *Atha ca tānyeva pṛthagavashitāni karmādibhāvaṃ bhajante, atha ca tānyeva samuditāni karaṇībhavanti..| N.M.,* (Vidyānidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 42.

[55] *ITK.* P. 51.

[56] *Kāryāyogavyavacchinnā sāmagrī| S.P.,* p. 137.

[57] *Pramāṇiyatasāmagrīṃ pramāṇamkecidūcire, T.R.,* p. 9.

3.2.2 Jayanta's Critique of *Jñānakriyā*

In *Nyāyamañjarī*, the act theory of cognition or *jñānakriyā* is highly criticised by Jayanta, particularly against the Mīmāṃsakas.

Before discussing the Bhāṭṭas' view on the nature of knowledge it is necessary to get the idea of the Bhāṭṭa School, who hold that cognition is *pramāṇa* and it is not an object of perception, rather it is inferred on the basis of *dṛṣṭatā* or *jñātatā*. The particular nature i.e. *dṛṣṭatā* or *jñātatā*, is produces in its object. In *Śābarabhāṣya* there is a supporting evidence as:

> *Nta hy ajñāte 'rthe kaścid buddhim upalabhate, jñāte tu anumānād avagacchati*[58]

Unless the content of cognition is known, the cognition is not known and after the content is known, one can grasp the cognition by inference. Quoting the view of Śabara, Jayanta says that "Those who hold that consciousness itself is *pramāṇa*, but has not distinct result" should be surely refuted.[59]

According to Śabara consciousness itself is *pramāṇa* and the result obtained through *pramāṇa* is distinct from *pramāṇa*.[60] Cognizedness belonging to the object of consciousness is the mark by means of which one infers consciousness. Consciousness is an act or function. All acts are inferred from their result. A knower cannot achieve a result if he does not perform an act. The causes get themselves united to generate an imperceptible act. If it is not postulated then why do they unite without a purpose? Without their collocation the result cannot be produced. A cause has a significant role only when it is related to an act.[61]

Similarly, in *Ślokavārttika* also Kumārila has admitted that:

> *Nānyathā hy arthasvabhāvo dṛṣṭah sann upapadyate|*
> *jñānaṃ cen nety atāh paścat pramāṇam upajāyate|*[62]

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[58] On *Jaiminisūtra* 1.1.4
[59] *Śabarāstu bruvate ya ete bodhaprāmāṇyavādino vijñānādabhinnameva phalamabhidadhati te bādhaṃ nirasanīyā bhavantyeva| N.M.*, (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn), p. 47
[60] *Vayaṃ tu vijñānāt bhinnameva phalamarthadṛṣṭatākhyam abhyupagacchāmaḥ|* ibid.
[61] *Tadanabhyupagame kimadhikṛtya kārakāṇi saṃsṛjeran| na cāsaṃsṛṣṭāni tāni phalavanti| kriyāveśavaśācca kārakaṃ kārakaṃ bhvati|* Ibid, p. 48.
[62] Ibid.

'Since it is not possible to account for the revealedness in the object of cognition, one must postulate the revealer cognition which is called *pramāṇa.*'

Kumārila holds that presumption establishes the existence of the act of consciousness. Both Śabara and Kumārila hold that no one is directly aware of his consciousness. Here, it should be noted that while Śabara accepts *anumāna* as the means of obtaining cognition, Kumārila takes it as *arthāpatti.*

Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* expounds the theory of *jñānakriyā* as proposed by the Bhāṭṭa school of *pūrvamīmāṃsā* and finally refutes it. The following issues will be discussed in this regard:

1. When the Bhaṭṭas consider *jñāna* as *kriyā,* they use it in the sense of root meaning (*dhātvartha*).

2. The root meaning is beyond the reach of perception. This idea is most probably borrowed from Patañjali's *Mahabhāṣya,* according to V.N. Jha.[63]

3. According to the Bhāṭṭas, a *kriyā,* which produces the result, has to be different from the individual *kriyā* of an individual *kāraka.*

4. Śabara uses *anumāna* or inference as *pramāṇa* by which the *kriyā* or cognition is known. Kumārila interprets this term *arthāpatti* or postulation as the reason of invisibility of the cognition.

5. Mīmāṃsakas try to establish that cognition is the meaning of the root *jñā,* hence a *kriyā* and any *kriyā* (root meaning) which produces the result is known from the effect it produces and not directly.

6. Naiyāyikas also uphold that *jñāna* is the meaning of the root *jñā,* but it is not *kriyā* in the sense of *vyāpāra.*

7. It is not necessary to postulate an invisible *kriyā* (root meaning) over and above the visible ones. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas do not accept the theory of Bhāṭṭas.

8. Finally the notion of *jñāna-kriyā* (act of knowing) should be distinct from that of *jñāna* or cognition.

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[63] *ABORI,* vol.68, p. 587.

Jayantabhaṭṭa states the whole idea of *jñānakriyā* as:

> *Jñānaṃ hi nāma kriyātmakam, kriyā ca phalānumeyā, jñātṛvyāpāram antareṇa phalāniṣpatteḥ.*[64]

The process of cognition according to the Bhāṭṭas is: when a person cognises some object, the object gets revealed to him and this revealedness is the result. The cognition is postulated as the *vyāpāra* to reveal the object, without it the result cannot come into existence.

To prove their point that cognition is an action which is invisible, Mīmāṃsakas give example that aiming at the action of cooking, *kārakas*, viz., Devadatta, rice, pot, water, fire etc. come together[65] and perform their own individual functions and thus the action of cooking is done and finally get the consequence of this action of cooking, i.e., *odana*. Although the individual actions of individual *kārakas* are visible, the action of cooking is invisible. So, above the individual functions of each *kārakas*, we must accept the action of cooking which produces result and which is invisible.

Similarly, cognition is also an action which leads to the result of revealedness. Aiming at this function all the factors of cognition come together. In this way, soul gets connected with the mind, the mind with the sense organ, the sense organ with the object and finally the action of knowledge come into existence.[66] Since the action of cooking is not perceivable, the function of cognition also not perceivable although it reveals its object.

Now, the opponents ask that what is *pāka*? It is not merely the action of a particular *kāraka*. It cannot be the collocation of individual actions, because it is impossible to collectively visualise them. But since the result *odana* is visible, we must accept an activity. Thus, as the Mīmāṃkas postulate *apurva* for the result of heaven, similarly an invisible action is postulated by them between the *kārakas* and the *phala*.

Kāraka ⟶ *vyāpāra* ⟶ *phala*

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[64] *N.M.,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn), p. 47.

[65] *Kārakāṇi taṇḍulasalilānalasthālyādīni siddhasvabhāvāni sādhyaṃ dhātvārthamekaṃ pākalakṣaṇamurarīkṛtya saṃsṛjyante, saṃsṛṣṭāni ca kriyāmutpādayanti|* Ibid., p. 48

[66] *Ātmendriya mano 'rthasaṃnnikarṣe sati jñānākhyo vyāpāra upajāyate|* Ibid.

The main issues involved in the theory of the Mīmāṃsakas are that an action produces the consequence and the action is the cognition. Again as the cognition is invisible, it is not perceptible.

The Naiyāyikas also hold the view that an action produces the result, i.e., the *pāka* produces *odana*. But the Naiyāyikas deny the two points of Mīmāṃsakas that the action which produces the result is invisible and the cognition is an action.

The first statement that the action which produces the result is invisible, which can be discussed by the following sentence:

Devadattaḥ odanaṃ pacati

Here the root *pac* signifies the action of cooking, which is visible. So, it is not necessary to postulate an invisible action as the meaning of root *pac*. Thus the action of all the *kārakas* can be visualised. In this way we find the sentences as the following:

Devadattaḥ pacati

Sthālī pacati

Kāṣṭhānī pacanti etc.

Therefore the root meaning is the collections of various actions performed by various factors. Thus the Naiyāyikas deny the invisibility of an action.[67]

V.N. Jha identifies that the Bhāṭṭas' view is quite similar to the view proposed by Patañjalī in his *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāsya*.[68]

The Mīmāṃsakas again strike out the definition of *kāraka*. They say that *kāraka* is that which does something (*karotīti kārakam*). Without being involved in action any factor cannot be called *kāraka*.[69] The Naiyāyikas' reply to this is that *karoti* denotes

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[67] *Na hi vayaṃ parispanātmakaṃ paridṛśyamānaṃ vyāpāraṃ apahnumahe, pratikārakaṃ vicitrasya jvalanādevyāpārasya pratykaṣāmupalambhāt| atīndriyastu vyāpāro nāstīti brūmahe|* N.M., (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn), p. 52.

[68] *Kriyā nāmeyam atyantāparidṛṣṭā, aśakyā kriyā piṇḍibhūtā nidarśayitum, yathā garbho nirluthitāḥ. Sāsāv anumānagamyā. Ko'sāv anumānaḥ? Iha sarveṣu sādhaneṣu samnihiteṣu kadācit pacatīty etad bhavati, kadācin na bhavati. Yasmin sādhane samnihite pacatīty etad bhavati sā nūnaṃ kriyā|* ABORI, vol. 68, p. 584

[69] *Kriyā''veśamantareṇa ca kārakatvānupapattiḥ* | N.M., (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn), p. 50.

the result and not the action.[70] The Mīmāṃsakas again say that in the example, *caitraḥ kaṭaṃ karoti*, the word *karoti* indicates the action of doing. Here the Nyaiyāyikas point out that *kāraka* is a *kāraka* not because it is related with the invisible action, but it is so when the *kāraka* is in the connection of all the factors involved in the production of the result.

Jayanta argues that if the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the soul has a distinct activity called *bhāvanā* and the *karoti* denotes it, then they can be refuted on the ground that no activity of the soul is ever noticed. Consciousness and other inner states of the soul are not actions but qualities because they are not creatures of the will.[71]

Further, Jayanta opines that the Mīmāṃsakas hold to this theory on account of their notion that '*jñā*' is a verb and therefore it denotes an action which belongs to the soul. Jayanta asserts that there is no rule that all verbs denote actions. For example, the verb '*gaḍi*' denotes one part of a face.[72] Likewise, if one analyses the sentence '*ghaṭamahaṃ jānāmi*', it finds that *ghaṭa* denotes the object of cognition; *ahaṃ* expresses 'the soul.' What appears from *jānāmi*? The answer is 'quality' and not 'action', since action is beyond the range of perception. Even if it is said that the result appears, the result itself should be denoted by the verb '*jñā*'.

In support of his argument Jayanta quotes *Bhāṣyakāra* that, "*Buddhikarmaṇī api hi pratyabhijñāyete, te api nitye prāpnutaḥ.*"[73] It means that he has mentioned '*buddhi*' and '*karma*' separately to consider them as two distinct entities. Jayanta here does not specify who is '*Bhāṣyakāra*'? Since, Patañjali, Vātsyāyana and Śabara are known as '*Bhāṣyakāra*'. In the translations of *Nyāyamañjarī*, there is no discussion on this specific issue. However, C.D. Bijalwan[74] considers it as Vātsyāyana's view. But he does not quote any reference in support of his view. But the present researcher finds that this reference is quite similar to the following one which is available in the Mīmāṃsā text, *Ṛjuvimalā as:*

"*Buddhikarmaṇī na pratyakṣe tasmānna te pratyabhijñāyete|*

Buddhikarmaṇoh kāryaikagamyayoh pratyabhijñā nāsti||"[75]

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[70] Ibid.

[71] *Na hi puruṣāavyāpāraḥ kaścidupalabhyate, viśiṣṭaguṇasamavāya evāsya kartṛtvam* | Ibid., p. 55.

[72] *Nāyaṃ niyamaḥ kriyāvacano dhāturiti, gaḍi vadanaikadeśe ityādi darśanāt* | Ibid.

[73]Ibid, p. 56.

[74] *ITK*, p. 14.

[75] Saraswati, Kevalananda, *M.K.*, p. 2974.

It is the style of Jayanta, that he rejects the Mīmāṃsakas' view in their language.

Thus, for the first time in the history of Indian philosophy, a clear and persuasive account of Nyāya position is found in *Nyāyamañjarī* regarding *jñānakriyā*. Jayanta entertains a great endeavour to this specific issue.

3.3 Nature of *pramāṇa*: An examination

All the other translations of *Nyāyamañjarī* (Janaki Ballabha Bhattacharya, Shashiprabha Kumar and Siddhesvara Bhatta, and Anand Jha) accept that *"bodhasyaiva pramāṇatvamācakṣate"* is the view of the Buddhists. However V. N. Jha, in his English translation, does not mention any specific school. But, in the Bengali translation, Panchanan Tarkavagish[76] admits that this particular view is adopted in Jaina school. According to him, the Jaina philosopher Siddhasen Divākara has explained the view on '*jñānaprāmāṇya*' in his *Nyāyāvatāra*. Later on, the Jaina philosopher Prabhācandrācāya has refuted '*sāmagrī*' as means of cognition in his book *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*. He has argued that every *pramāṇa* contradicts *ajñāna*. Hence *jñāna* is not different from that of *pramāṇa*. If one considers '*sāmagrī*' as *jñāna*, only then one can consider it as *pramāṇa*. Again if one does not consider *sāmagrī* as *jñāna* then it will not contradict *ajñāna*.

However, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya[77] also discusses this point and mentions Jayanta's hypothesis against Jaina theory.

Since there are several controversies regarding this particular point of view, here there is no mention of any particular philosophical school. To quote D.N. Shastri in favour of the Buddhists view:[78]

> "....According to the Buddhists, a *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) is always in the form of knowledge, and there is no difference between a *pramāṇa* and its resultant (*pramāṇa phala*) called *pramā* (knowledge); they are identical. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand at least from the time of Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta, maintains the difference between the two- one being the 'means', and the other, the 'resultant knowledge'. ..... The *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge), being different from *pramā* (the resultant knowledge), it was held by Jayanta, Vācaspatimiśra and the later

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[76] *N.M.*, (Sanskrit Book Depot edn.), pp. 93-4
[77] *PHISPC*, pp. 213-4
[78] *CIR*, p. 424.

writers that *pramāṇa* might be in the in the form of 'knowledge' or 'non-knowledge'."[79]

According to John Taber,

"According to Diṅnāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (1.1.8cd–10) the cognition is both *pramāṇa* and *phala* in an act of perception. It serves as *pramāṇa* insofar as it has the form of a particular object; it is the *phala* insofar as it is the awareness of that form. Thus *pramāṇa* and *phala* are simply the same cognition seen from different perspectives. This theory may have been motivated in part by a desire to provide for the possibility of idealism. To suggest that the cognition can assume the form of the object without there necessarily being any input from the external world clearly opens the way to eliminating the external world from consideration altogether."[80]

From the study of the prior researches it can be concluded that Jayanta most probably presents here the Buddhists' view in lieu of the Jainas. But the view that Panchanan Tarkavagisha and the eminent scholar Sibjiban Bhattcharya hold on, cannot be ignored in this regard. There must be some grounds behind their hypothesis.

Now the question is, whether *pramā* is identical to *pramāṇa* or different from it? Jayanta states that "*bodhaḥ khalu pramāṇya phalaṁ, na sākṣātpramāṇam.*"[81] He points out that the term '*pramāṇa*' etymologically signifies an instrument. So, *pramāṇa* is a means of cognition by which a true cognition of object is generated. The use of common parlance that "*pramāṇādavagacchāmaḥ*" (we know by means of *pramāṇa*) also supports the view that *pramāṇa* and *pramiti* are two different things. Considering the argument that a piece of cognition, if it is other than *saṁśaya* and *viparyaya*, produces another piece of cognition, then the first one will be considered as *pramāṇa* and in such a case *pramāṇa* and *pramiti* have to be regarded as identical. Jaynata says that in such a case where a cognition which produces another piece of cognition is included in the collocation of conditions, it is to be called *pramāṇa* and not *pramā.*[82] So, Jayanta defines *pramāṇa* in terms of the collocations of both knowledge and non-knowledge.

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[79] *Bodhābodha- svabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇam|* N.M., (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 43.
Tad eva jñānam ajñānaṁ vā upalabdhi-hetuḥ pramāṇam| N.V.T.T,
[80] *HCBE,* p. 79.
[81] *N.M.* ,(Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 43.
[82] *Viśiṣṭapramājananāt pramāṇatāṁ pratipadyate |* Ibid.

3.3.1 Buddhists' Definition of *pramāṇa*: An Examination

Jayanta in *Nyāyamañjarī* mentions Dharmakīrti's definition of *pramāṇa*, that a cognition which is not contradicted and which leads to the attainment of the object is a valid cognition.[83] Its capacity to lead to original obtainment consists of this, that it points out to the cause of obtaining an object which is capable of producing happiness and which is the cause of giving up an object which is capable of producing sorrow.[84] Thus, when an object is revealed by the cognition and when there is desire in man for the obtainment of the object, it is known as *pramāṇa*.

According to the Buddhists, both perception and inference have the nature of obtainment of an object. In case of perception, the object is the form of a thing in the first moment of its perception. The object which is revealed in the first moment cannot be obtained in the second moment, as it is momentary. But the object can be obtained in the continuous series of that momentary object. Therefore, perception causes an object to be obtained. The thing is that according to the Buddhists, objects are *svalakṣaṇa* or bare particular in perception. According to both Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools, what is perceived or postulated is the bare particular-e.g. blue. All the other elements (blueness, etc.) are added by the mind.[85] Such objects are momentary in nature but they produce second *svalakṣaṇa* before being destroyed, the second produces the third one. Thus, there is a continuous series of *svalakṣaṇas*. In technical terms this is known as *santāna*.

Inference is produced by the unbroken succession of basic momentary objects which causes that object to be obtained by inferential knowledge.[86] For example, a man sees the lustre of gem at a distance and mistakes it as a gem. If he proceeds to act with reference to the gem, he gets the real gem. Likewise a man who proceeds towards the imaginary object under the direction of inference attains a real object. Though the object of determinate knowledge is unreal, yet the source of imagination being real, the real object is attained through it.

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[83]   *Apareḥ   punaḥ   avisaṃvādakatvaṃ   pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇamācakṣate   taduktam pramāṇamavisaṃvādi jñānam|* Ibid., p. 63
c.f., *Pramāṇamavisaṃvādi jñānam; arthakriyāsthitiḥ|*
     avisaṃvādanaṃ; śābdepyapyabhiprāyanivedanāt| P.V., 2/1
[84] Ibid. p.64.
[85] Grims, John, *CDIP*, p. 318.
[86]   *Anumānasya   tvāropitārthaviṣayatve'pi   mūlabhūtavastukṣaṇapāramparya   prabhavatvāt maṇiprabhāmaṇibuddhivat tatprāptyayā prāpakatvam|* N.M., (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.) P. 64.
c.f. *Pramāṇatattvasiddhyarthaṃ anumāne'pyavāraṇāt*
Prayogadarśanād vā'sya yat kiñcidudayātmakaṃ| P.V.

Jayanta concludes that according to the Buddhistst, *pramāṇa* is a valid means cognition which leads to the attainment of the object which it is determined to be[87] and illusory cognitions are distinguished from valid cognition. Therefore a judgement such as the conch-shell is yellow, etc. are not *pramāṇas,* even though a man who proceeds to attain the object referred by the above illusory statement, gets conch-shell, but the same is not obtained. In fact, yellow conch-shell was determined but white conch-shell is obtained.

Therefore a valid means of knowledge is that which is not contradicted and which leads to the obtainment of the object revealed by the apprehension.[88]

Prāmāṇya   =   avisaṃvādakatā   =   prāpakatā   =yathāthajñāna

Jayanta refutes the Buddhists hypothesis of *pramāṇa* by critically analysing their position and arguments. Jayanta declares that the Buddhists' view on *pramāṇa* is not sound.[89] Jayanta asks whether *pramāṇa* means lead to the obtainment of the object of sense perception or does it lead to the obtainment of an object which is determined.[90] It means whether *pramāṇa* occurs in obtainable object or in the judgement. In case of perception the object is really and certainly shown, but it is not obtained, because it is momentary according to the Buddhists, hence it disappears in the subsequent moment. It cannot be made to wait and be present in existence.

In the case of an inference, the object is not based directly upon perception. There is no showing of the object at all because the object is to be inferred and we can directly contact with the probans only. Hence it is worthy of saying that inference leads to the obtainment of an object.[91]

Jayanta further points out that if it cannot be established that the object is a cognizable entity (*adhyavaseya*), then for the Buddhists the determined object is unreal and an unreal object cannot be gained.[92] It is not reality but a *kalpanā* and there is no obtainment of it.

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[87] *Adhyavasitaprāpakatvaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ adhyavasitasyāvastutve 'pi tanmūlavastuprāptayā nirvahati|* *N.M.,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.) P. 64.

[88] *Tasmādyathā 'vagatārthaprāpakatvaṃ-avisaṃvādakatvaṃ prāmāṇyamiti|* Ibid.

[89] *Tadetadanupannam* | *N.M.,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.) P. 65.

[90] *Kiṃ pradarśitaprāpakaṃ pramāṇam? utādhyavasitaprāpakaṃ|* Ibid.

[91] *Tatrānumāne pradarśanameva nāsti, kā kathā tatprāpanasya|* *Ibid.*

[92] Ibid.

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So according to Jayanta, unexpectedly (*Kākatālīya Nyāya*)[93] one man can obtain a momentary real object, but it is never an object of perception and inference. Hence, a knower cannot obtain the object by any valid means of cognition.

Jayanta comments that it is not appropriate to hold that the real object is obtained through the obtainment of the series or chain because the series itself cannot be logically maintained since it cannot be stated whether it is identical to or different from the constituents.[94] And the definition is applicable to the series which is only a supposition or a conceptual construction. There is only empirical reality which has only consciousness.[95] The *lokavyavahāra* is not possible regarding the momentary objects. Further he says if the series is conceived, still empirically, there is no reason, why the Buddhists should object to the concepts of the universal, the whole and the others.[96]

According to Jayanta, this definition of *pramāṇa* is too narrow to cover all cases of valid cognition.[97] Therefore the Buddhist definition of *pramāṇa* is absolutely unrealistic.

Now, according to the Buddhists, whatever is practically useful is true. Then the Nyāya replies that all cognitions related to the past and the future are untrue since it is not connected with any present practical activity. The same way also cognition is connected with no activity but the absence of all activity i.e. the lack of desire towards the object of cognition. Some cognition may involve an approach towards what is pleasurable and some a tendency away from what is painful. But there is also a kind of cognition which is known as neutral (*upekṣaṇīya*), with regard to which we remain indifferent.[98] Such indifferent cognition may be as valid as any other, although it is not connected with any other practical activity.

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[93] The maxim of a Crow and the Palm fruit. It takes its origin from the unexpected and sudden fall of a palm fruit upon the head of a crow at the very moment of his sitting on a branch of that tree. It is used to denote an unexpected and accidental occurrence, whether welcome or otherwise.

[94] *Santānaprāptyā tatprāptirityapi na yuktam- santānasya bhedābhedavikalpābhyāmanupapannatvāt|* N.M. (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 65.

[95] *Jñānamātramevedamiti....*| Ibid. 66

[96] *Sāṃvṛtta santānakalpanāyāṃ vā jātyavayaviprabhṛtayo'pi sāṃvṛttāḥ kimiti neṣyante*| N.M., (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 66.

[97] *Avyāpakaṃ cedaṃ lakṣaṇam*| Ibid.

[98] Ibid., p. 67.

3.3.2 Mīmāṃsakas' Definition of *Pramāṇa*: An Examination

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas define *pramāṇa* as the instrument by which a thing which is not known previously is made known.[99] The Naiyāyikas oppose it and say that it is not correct, because based on the same *jar* perceived already, a succession of cognition as 'this is a jar', 'this is a jar' the immediately preceding cognition arises and all these will have to be treated as valid cognition.

According to Kumārila, *pramāṇa* is a definite and certain cognition of object which does not require confirmation by other cognition.[100] The Bhāṭṭas state that a *pramāṇa* should be free from defects and contradictions. Cognition of the known objects should be excluded from the scope of *pramāṇa*. Thus, according to the Bhāṭṭas, *pramāṇa* is a method of cognition of an unknown object which is not liable to be experienced by subsequent method.

3.3.2.1 The Rejection of the Mīmāṃsakas' View

Regarding the Bhāṭṭas' argument that *pramāṇa* is that which gives us new cognition and does not apprehend the already known object, Jayanta maintains that whether a *pramāṇa* reveals new objects or already apprehended objects is irrelevant. Even if *pramana* is directed towards an already known object, it produces true cognition since the cognition is new, though the object revealed is old. Thus *pramāṇa* occurs in both the case of already known and not known object.[101]

3.3.2.2 Continuous Perception (*Dhārāvāhikajñāna*)

Regarding the Bhāṭṭas' definition of cognition, Jayanta asserts that it is too narrow because it is not applicable to *dhārāvāhikajñāna*. Here, although the succession of cognition though refers to the same thing that has been cognized before, it is still a valid cognition. Jayanta maintains that a continuous perception of a thing, i.e., a pot, does not reveal any new feature in it even if is observed several times.[102] Yet it is a

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[99]*Yattu anadhigatārthagantṛ pramāṇamiti lakṣaṇsṃ tanna | ekasminaiva ghaṭe ghaṭo'yamiti dhārāvāhikajñānāṃ gṛhītaghāhiṇāmaprāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt| T.B.*, p.39.

[100] *Tasmād dṛḍhaṃ yadutpannaṃ nāpi saṃvādamṛccati |*
   Jñānāntarena vijñānaṃ tatpramāṇaṃ pramīyatām || S.V., II-80.

[101] *Yadapi pramāṇaviśeṣaṇamanadhigatārthagrāhitvamabhidhīyate paraiḥ- tadapi na sāmpratam-pramāṇasya gṛhītaditaraviṣayapravṛttasya prāmāṇye viśeṣābhāvāt| N.M.*, (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn), p. 59.

[102] *Naivādhikaparicchedaḥ pramāṇairuttaraidhruvam |*

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valid cognition. But the Mīmāṃsakas say that if continuous cognition is accepted as valid, then memory will become a valid cognition.[103] Jayanta says that memory is not valid on the ground that it is not generated by the object that is remembered (*anarthajanyatā*), but by its impression left by a prior experience.

Again opponents raise question that on this ground inference of a past object will be invalid. For example, the cognition of the past rain by seeing the overflowing river is not produced by the rain itself. Jayanta replies that this type of cognition is not invalid. The past rain that is inferred is cognized as the qualification of the river in the form 'the river is one whose past is determined by the occurrence of rain'. Though this qualification is inferred, the river which is the qualified object is present and produces its cognition directly.[104]

The validity of *dhārāvāhika Jñāna* is discussed mostly in the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Buddhists and Jaina schools of Indian philosophy.

3.3.2.3 Intuitive Perception (*prātibhajñāna*)

In *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayantabhaṭṭa deals with *prātibhajñāna*, a type of supernormal perception or intuition of future events. Opinions have been given to establish *prātibhajñāna* as valid perception. Since it is produced by real objects, it is not doubtful, not contradicted and its causes are not vitiated by any defect.

Jayanta states that sometimes we predict future events, for example, when somebody says: 'my brother will come tomorrow' and it so happens that his or her brother comes and then this is called *prātibha –pramāṇa*.[105] Obviously this cannot be included in any of the other types of *pramāṇa*. Though this type of event which will occur tomorrow cannot be the direct cause of present cognition yet 'my brother', whose qualification is the event, exists now and gives rise to the cognition.

Dhārāvāhikabodheṣu ko 'dhiko 'rthaḥ prakāśate || Ibid, p. 60.
[103] Ibid., p. 62.
[104] *Nadyākhya eva dharmī vṛṣṭimaduparitanadeśasaṃsargalakṣaṇena dharmeṇa tadvānumīyate, viśiṣṭasalilapūrayogitvāt* | *sa cānumānagrāhyo dharmī vidyata eveti nānarthajamanumānam* | Ibid.
[105] *Api cānāgataṃ jñānamasmadāderapi kvacit* |
Pramāṇaṃ prātibhaṃ śvo me bhrātā ''ganteti dṛśyate|| *N.M.*,(Chowkhamba edn.), p. 98.

Thus Jayanta maintains that this *prātibha pramāṇa* should be treated as a piece of valid cognition, because it is neither meaningless, nor a doubt, it is not even negated by its contradictory judgement and its source is not a defective sense organ.[106]

3.3.3 Sāṃkhya Definition of *Pramāṇa*: An Examination

According to Sāṃkhya, *pramāṇa* is a modification of *buddhi*.[107] The modification of mind in the form of an object itself, which follows the revealment of the mere form of an object by the senses, the senses again take the form of that object through the close connection with the *puruṣa*, is called *pramāṇa*. Since *puruṣa* is closely associated with the modification of *buddhi*, it can see the object.[108] Though *buddhi* is unconscious, being an evolutes of *prakṛti*, but it attributes its modifications to the conscious *puruṣa*. Kapila states that *pramā* is a determinate cognition of an object not known before and *pramāṇa* is that which is most conducive to such a cognition. Iśvarakṛṣṇa simply maintains that *pramāṇa* is that which brings about the cognition of an object.[109]

Jayantabhaṭṭa rejects this view on the ground that *buddhi* is a material and unconscious principle and hence it could not become the locus of cognition.[110] The self alone has the capacity to cognize and the modification of unconscious matter is not competent to perform a role. Jayanta points out that the determinate knowledge is not a property of that which reveals an object.

Jayanta again points out that according to the Sāṃkhyas when the intellect evolves modes, it becomes transparent. It appears modelled as the *buddhivṛtti* or the *buddhivṛtti* appears being pervaded by the *puruṣa*.[111] But Jayanta states that if the Sāṃkhays posit to this position, their basic argument is jeopardised, since the property

[106] *Nānarthajaṃ na saṃdigdhaṃ na bādhavidhurīkṛtaṃ |*
Na duṣṭakāraṇaṃ cet I pramāṇamidamiṣyatām || Ibid.
[107] *Sāṃkhyāstu buddhivṛttiḥ pramāṇaṃ iti pratipannāḥ |* N.M., (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.).p. 70
[108] *Viṣayākārapariṇatendriyādivṛtyanupātinī buddhivṛttireva puruṣamuparañjayatiī pramāṇam |*
Taduparakto hi puruṣaḥ pratiniyataviṣayadraṣṭā saṃpadyate || Ibid.
c.f. *Tasmāttatsaṃyogādacetanaṃ cetanāvadiva liṅgam | Guṇakarttṛtve'pi tathā karttaeva bhavatudāsīnaḥ ||* S.K.20.
[109] *Prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi| S.K.,* 4
[110] *Acetanatvānmahataḥ |* N.M. p. 70 (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.)
c.f., N.M.G., *'Acetana'* means that which undergoes a change.
[111] *Atha svacchatayā puṃso buddhivṛtyanupātitā |*
Buddhervā cetanākārasaṃsparśa iva lakṣate || Ibid.

of *puruṣa* does not belong to *buddhi* or property of *buddhi* does not belong to *puruṣa*. According to Jayanta the Sāṃkhyas' hypothesis is identical to the Buddhists theory of representative consciousness.[112]

3.4 Number of *Pramāṇas*

After dealing with the problem of defining *pramāṇa*, Jayantabhaṭṭa proceeds to defend the Nyāya view that there are only four *pramāṇas*. Being a staunch follower of old *Nyāya* School, Jayantabhaṭṭa, in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, professes four *pramāṇas*, viz. *pratyakṣa* or perception, *anumāna* or inference, *upamāna* or comparison, and *śabda* or verbal testimony. There is however a marked difference of opinion regarding the exact nature of *pramāṇa* amongst the philosophers.[113] At the same time he is perfectly judicious in presenting the views of his opponents on other *pramāṇas*. He deals with *arthāpatti, abhāva, sambhava and aitihya,* which are accepted by Prabhākara, Bhaṭṭa, Vedāntina and Paurāṇika, in the form of separate means of valid cognition. Jayanta, however, seems primarily pre-occupied with his desire to refute the Buddhists' position and to bring home to them that the Nyāya view of four *pramāṇas* is unsurpassed.

The opponents ask that Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* has not indicated the number of *pramāṇas*, so how one can considers that there is only four *pramāṇas*?[114] The *siddhāntins* answer that the number four is known by the expressive power of word. As in the following sentences:

> 1. *Gargāṃstrīn bhojaya*[115] (Feed three *Brāhmins* belonging to the *Garga gotra*).
>
> 2. *Yajñadattadevadattāvānaya* (Bring Yajñadatta and Devadattāvānaya).

Gautama, according to Jayantabhaṭṭa, has performed two jobs by the single *sūtra*, i.e. the division of *pramāṇa* and the definition of *pramāṇa*.[116] Jayanata states that it is not

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[112] *Evaṃ sati svavācaiva mithyātvaṃ kathitaṃ bhavet|*
Ciddharmo hi mṛṣā buddho buddhidharmaścito mṛṣā|
Sākārajñānavādaśca nātīvaiṣa viśiṣyate| Ibid.
[113] *Tatra arthāpattyā saha pratyakṣādīni pañcha pramānāniti prabhākaraḥ||Abhāvena saha ṣaḍiti bhaṭṭāḥ||Sambhavaitihyābhyāmaṣṭāviti kecit||* Ibid., p.93
[114] *Nanu na catvāri prāmānānīti saṃkhyāvacanaḥ śabdaḥ śruyate, nāpi pratyakṣādīnyaevetyavadhāraṇaśrutirasti | tat kutaḥ iyattāniyamāvagamaḥ?* ibid. p.72
[115] *Pāṭhabhedaḥ-* 'gargān bhojaya' | Ibid.
[116] *Ekenānena sūtreṇa dvayaṃ cāha mahāmuniḥ|*
Pramāṇeṣu catursaṃkhyaṃ tathā sāmānyalakṣaṇam || ibid.

necessary that a *sūtra* should serve a single meaning. It is rather the quality of the *sūtrakāras* that they yield more than one meaning.[117] To refer *Bhāmati:*

"*Sūrtaṃ ca bahvarthasūcanāt bhavati | yathāhuḥ-*

Laghūni sūcitārthāni svalpākṣarapadāni ca |

Sarvataḥ sārabhūtāni sūtrāṇyāhurmanīṣiṇaḥ || iti ||"[118]

Thus there cannot be any dispute that Gautama has accepted only four means of cognition.

Jayanta analyses and criticizes the views of his opponents like Mīmāṃsakas and Paurāṇikas, views who have accepted more than four *pramāṇas*.

3.4.1 The Two-Fold Division of *Pramāṇas*

According to the Buddhists there are only two means of valid cognition, viz., perception and inference. In their opinion there are only two types of knowable objects, namely, perceptible or particular, and imperceptible or universal.[119]
According to D. N. Shastri,

> "There being two kinds of objects, the *pramāṇas* are also only two, each having its separate and distinctive sphere."[120]

Following the logic "*Meyādhīnā mānasiddhiaḥ*", the Buddhists consider two types of *pramāṇa* "*Mānaṃ dvaividhyam, meya dvaividhyāt.*"[121] According to the Buddhists the external reality, which is in the form of the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), is transcendental. It has no time; space limit is devoid of all attributes, determinations or relations. It can be obtained through pure sensation. But it is followed by *adhyavasāya* or determinate cognition which is of the form of the universal (*sāmānya lakṣaṇā*). The scope of the perception is limited to the generalized form (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), i.e., the empirical. According to the Buddhists, perception is the

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[117] *Anekārthasūcanādeva sūtramucyate | etadeva sūtrakārāṇāṃ paraṃ kauśalaṃ yadekenaiva vākyena svalpairekākṣarairanekavastūsamarpaṇaṃ |* ibid. p.74
[118] *Bhā,* p.64.
[119] *Te hi prameyadvaividhyāt pramāṇaṃ dvividhaṃ jaguḥ|*
Nānyaḥ pramāṇabhedasya heturviṣayabhedataḥ|| *N.M.,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashanedn.), p. 76.
[120] *CIR,* p. 421.
[121] *Mānaṃ dvividhaṃ viṣayadvaividhyācchattayaśaktitaḥ| P.V.,* 3/1
Pramāṇadvayasiddhe ca viṣayadvayavedane|
Vada kasyānurodhena tṛtīye mānamiṣyatām| N.M., (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 80.

type of cognition that is *kalpanāpoḍha* or *nirvikalpaka* (both meaning 'devoid of thought').[122] These two types of objects mutually exclude each other. The Buddhists maintain that the third type of object is not possible. The idea that what is cognized by the perception of a blue object is blue and it is also realized that it is not not-blue. There is no such object which is neither blue nor non-blue. Thus perception determines its own object, excludes its negative, and suggests the absence of a third kind.[123] If we do not accept this view, the practical utility of cognition will be nothing; because we cannot attain an object unless we know that it is other than avoidable.

Jayanta says that simple perception might decide whether a thing is blue or not-blue, but it cannot decide whether it is sense cognized or not.[124] The Buddhists' view that perception and inference is competent enough to exclude the third type of object and therefore to deny the existence of any other means of proof apart from perception and inference is not logical.[125] He declares that indeterminate perception is free from thought and concepts and unable to co- relate the previous and later. So perception cannot perform the function of definition, exclusion and rejection.[126] According to the Buddhists' view determination is based on imagination, so that they can have any role to play in the ordering of the objects.

Even if it is considered that perception has the capacity of excluding the middle in the case of the perception of blue and thus it excludes the non- blue, it does not hold good when we try to know the object as being perceived or as being inferred. Further, perception exposes the objects as they are in themselves, and not the direct perceptibility thereof.[127]

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[122] *C.f., kalpanāpoḍhābhrāntapratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam | Sa hi sannihitaḥ san grāhyakāraṃ sphuṭatayā abhivyañjati | Pratyakṣāyogya- dūradeśāvasthitastu grāhyakāramsphuṭatayā abhivyañjayati |Svalakṣaṇībhūtaviṣayaśca anāropitatayā arthakriyākāritayā ca paramārthaḥ san yasyārthasya sannidhānāsannidhānābhyāṃ grāhyakārabhedastat svalakṣaṇam |*
Tadbhinnaṃ sāmānyaṃ tacca dūratvanikaṭatvavaśād grāhyakārabhedaṃ sādhayituṃ na samartham| Nyāyabindu. As quoted in *N.M.* (Sanskrit Book Depot edn.), p.162.
[123] *Nīle pravartamānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ nīle nīlatayā pariccinattīti tāvadvivāda eva |Tadeva pratyakṣamanīlamapi vyavaccinatti. nīlasaṃvidiḥ tasyāpratibhāsāt | Nīlajñānapratibhāsyaṃ hi nīlaṃ iti taditaradanīlameva bhavati || N.M.* (Vidyanidhi Prakhan edn.), p. 76.
[124] Ibid, p. 82-3.
[125] *Yattāvadidamākhyāyi rāśyantaranirakṛtau |*
Pratyakṣasyaiva sāmarthye ityetannopapadyate|| Ibid., p.82
[126] Ibid.
[127] *Pratyakṣaṃ viṣayasvarūpameva paricchinatti |*
na punastasya pratyakṣatāmapi. Ibid.

Jayanta refers to Kumārila in this regard and says that the Bhāṭṭas also accept the contention of the Naiyāikas that *pratyakṣatva* is not known directly.[128] That a sound is an object of auditory perception is never directly grasped. It is a case of inference.[129]

So, Jayanta concludes that perception is not a proof of the existence of only two types of objects. Inference is also unable to prove the presence of two categories only since inference is based upon perception.[130]

3.4.2 *Pramāṇa-samplava* vs *Pramāṇa-vyavasthā*

The question is that whether more than one means of cognition operated with regard to one and the same object or each mean has its own specific knowledge? The *pramāṇa vyavasthā,* as propounded by the Buddhist, is that each *pramāṇa* has its own exclusive and distinct jurisdiction. This theory is opposed by the Naiyāyikas which hold the theory of *pramāṇa samplava*.[131] Besides Jayanta, Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra and other Naiyāyikas argue against the Buddhists.

Jayanta, against the Buddhists' view, points out that if it is accepted that each *pramāṇa* exclusively functions in his own sphere, then inference cannot be valid means of knowledge.[132] For an inferential cognition both perception and inference have to be present. Here two *pramāṇas* function to know a single object. The characteristic feature (*liṅga*) indicates the probandun when the two are invariably concomitance.

Further Jayanta states that it cannot be derived from another inference, because that leads to the fault of infinite regress.

An object becomes directly perceptible or indirectly cognisable according to the situation and place. An object which can be directly known in one time, or place, may be known only indirectly by a person belonging to a different time or place.[133]

The Buddhists' opposed this application on the ground that an assumption like this contradicts other assumptions and is superfluous.[134] There is a chance of the *pramāṇa* producing contradictory knowledge because it does not produce the successive

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[128] *Anye eva hi sāmagrīphale pratyakṣaliṅgayoḥ |*
   Aknye eva ca sāmagrīphale śabdopamānayoḥ| Ibid.
[129] *Na hi śravanatā nāma pratyakṣeṇāvagamyate|*
   nānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ jñāyate badhirādiṣu| Ibid.
[130] *Vastu svalakṣaṇaṃ tāvat pratyakṣeṇaiva mudritam|*
   Tato 'nyadanumānena sambandhāpekṣavṛttinā| Ibid., p. 81
[131] *Ekasmin viṣaye anekapramāṇapravṛttiḥ samplavaḥ|* Ibid., p.80
[132] *Asati samplave anumānaprāmāṇyapratiṣṭhāpanānupapatteḥ |*Ibid., p. 87.
[133] *Pratyakṣatvaṃ parokṣo 'pi pratyakṣo 'pi parokṣatām|*
   Deśakālādibhedena viṣayaḥ pratipadyate|| Ibid., p. 90.
[134] *Virodhavaiphalyābhyāṃ na samplava|* N.M, (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p.91.

knowledge contrary to the antecedent judgement like the negative judgement that 'this is not silver'.[135]

Therefore Jayanta concludes that the *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* does not occur in the majority of cases, but there are few cases in which a particular proof has an exclusive object of its own.[136] Jayanta quotes Vātsyāyana as:

1. "*Agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*" *ityasmāderāgamādeva jñānaṃ, na pratyakṣānumānābhyām* |

2. *Stanayitnuśabdaśravaṇāt tadhetuparijñānamanumānādeva, na pratyakṣāgamābhyām* |

3. *Svahastādau pratyakṣādeva pratītiḥ, na śabdānumānābhyāmiti* |

To sum up, Jayanta has no objection for *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*, so far as a specific object is concerned.

3.4.3 Refutation of the Cārvākas' View

At the very end of the first *āhnika* of his *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayantabhaṭṭa strongly criticises the Cārvākas' view on numbers of *pramāṇa*. The Cārvākas admit that it is impossible to restrict the number and the definition of the means of valid cognition.[137] Jayanta refutes Cārvākas in a strong voice that the poor materialist logician does not know the character of perception and inference.[138] Jaynata establishes his view by questioning the Cārvākas that is there any kind of knowledge which does not depend upon the four types of cognition?[139] Thus, the Cārvākas have tried in vain to ascertain that the number of sources of valid cognition cannot be fixed up.

3.5. Nature of Perception (*Pratyakṣa*)

According to Jayanta, the term '*pratyakṣa*' signifies a particular species of cognition. C.D. Bijalwan,[140] states that Jayanta is perhaps the first philosopher to state that the etymological meaning of the term does not convey the required meaning. The term '*pratyakṣa*' is composed of two parts '*akṣam*' and '*prati*', and thus it refers to 'cognition' which depends upon sense organ. Jayanta admits that the term *pratyakṣa*

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[135] *Virodho 'pi nāsti; pūrvajñānopamardena 'nedaṃ rajatam' itivat uttaravijñānutpādāt|* Ibid.
[136] Ibid., p. 92.
[137] *Jñāya pramāṇaprameyasaṃkhyāniyamāśakya......|* ibid, p. 164.
[138] *Rūpaṃ tapasvī jānāti na pratyakṣānumānayoh| |* Ibid, p. 165
[139] *Kā khalu matirmānāntarāpekṣiṇī|* Ibid, p. 164.
[140] *ITK*, p. 67

takes the masculine, feminine and neuter form according to the gender of the noun it qualifies.[141]

Jayanta formulates his theory of perception on the basis of his predecessors. Jayanta opines that if the term '*yatah*' is supplied to Gautama's definition, then it will be a flawless definition.[142] By adding this term Jayanta, like Vācaspatimiśra, differentiates between the source of cognition (*pramāna*) and cognition (*pramā*), and thus interprets the aphorism of Gautama as '*pratyakṣa pramāna*', from which the cognition based upon sense-object contact arises. According to Jayanta, he does not twist the meaning of the *sūtra* by inserting the term '*yatah*'[143]

Jayanta vividly discusses each and every word of Gautama's *sūtra*, i.e., '*idriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam*.[144] Let us analyse the meaning of the terms according to Jayanta:

__Idriyārthasannikarsotpannam__: According to Jayanta the sense organs, i.e., smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing, come into contact with the objects in six ways.[145] The objects are odour, flavour, etc. Jayanta further enumerates that the existence of sense-object contact is proved by the fact that the sense cannot take hold of the veiled objects.[146] Therefore it is necessary that the sense organs, as the instrumental cause of perception, are in contact with the object for the process of perception. The term '*utpannam*' in the *sūtra* suggests that both the sense organ and the objects condition the perception of an object.

Avyapadeśya: Jayanta has given as many as six alternative interpretations of the term *avyapadeśya*; which shows that the meaning of that key-word in the definition of perception was doubtful even then.[147] Jayantabhaṭṭa takes *avyapadeśya* in the sense of *aśabda* (non-verbal) and would explain its purpose of consisting in saving determinate perception (*savikalpaka*) from being merged in verbal cognition (*śadba*) on the ground that the cognitive process involved in such perception invariably results

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[141] *N.M., (*Chowkhamba edn.), part, I, p.61.

[142] *Yata evam yadviśeṣanaviśiṣṭam jñānākhyam phalam bhavati,tatpratyakṣamiti sūtrāthah|* Ibid.

[143] *Na kvacit kliṣṭakalpanā |* Ibid., p. 104

[144] *N.S.,* 1/1/4

[145] *Sannikarṣastu idriyānāmarthaih saha ṣatprakārah |* *N.M.,* (Chowkhamba edn.), Part. I, p.68

[146] *Vyayahitānupaladdhi iti brumah |* *Ibid.*

[147] Ibid, 73-83

through the operation of a sense-organ in association with the recollection of a scheme of words with which the knower happens to be familiar.

Avyabhicāri: For Jayanta, the term *avyabhicāri* is included in the *sūtra* to eliminate erroneous perception from the range of it. For instance, the perception of a mirage is erroneous since what is presented to consciousness does not correspond to the reality.

Vyavasāyātmaka: According to Jayanta, the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is incorporated in the *sūtra* to exclude doubt from the scope of perception. He maintains that the 'sense – object contact' is not enough for cognition since doubt is grasped by the mind which is not an external sense organ. Jayanta says that doubt expressed in the form 'It is either a pole or a man' is produced by the external sense organ. However, doubts regarding two astrologers' predictions are subjective since the inner sense organ is their sole case.[148]

3.5.1 Types of Perception (*Pratyakṣa*)

Jayanta refers to only two types of perception, *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa*. According to him *nirvikalpa* is a type of perception which is devoid of word element and thus is vague and indefinite.

Savikalpa is that form of perception which is determinate. According to Jayanta, "The very life of the followers of the Nyāya consists in the theory of determinate perception."[149]

3.5.2 Nature of Transcendental Perception (*Yogaja pratyakṣa*)

The transcendental perception or *yogaja pratykṣa* is accepted by all the schools of Indian philosophy. In various systems the transcendental perception is known by different names, viz., the Jainas considers it as *kevalajñāna*, for Buddhist it is *buddhi*, *kavivalya* for Sāṃkhya, and *Brahma sākṣātkāra* etc.

In *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayantabhaṭṭa observes *yogaja pratyakṣa* only to review the Mīmāṃsā view on the viability of the yogic ascertainment of *dharma*.

The Mīmāṃsakas enquire about the positive proof in favour of transcendental perception which apprehends *dharma*. To this question, Jayanta answers that the

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[148] For detail see, Ibid., pp. 61-100.
[149] *Naiyāyikānāṃ ca savikalpa- pratyakṣamayāḥ prāṇaḥ*| Ibid., p. 81.

perfection of this perception lies in its superior quality.[150] Those whose perception reaches the highest degree of apprehension are called 'sages'. Therefore the most excellent perfection of perception is constituted by the cognition of subtle, remote, past and future objects.[151]

3.6 Nature of Inference (*Anumāna*)

Jayantabhaṭṭa discusses the problem of *anumāna* or inference from the standpoint of old logicians. Though Jayantabhaṭṭa does not provide us the distinct definition of *anumāna*, he analyses the *Sūtrakāra's* definition in a comprehensive way. The *Sūtrakāra's* definition is:

"*tatpūrvakaṃ trividham anumānaṃ pūrvavaccheṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca.*"[152]

Jayanta, following the footsteps of Vātsyāyana, opines that the word '*tatpūrvaka*' suffices for *lakṣaṇa* of which *anumāna* stands as the *lakṣya*. *Pratykṣa* as a cause of *anumāna* has been defined in the rule[153] which immediately precedes the *anumānasūtra*. He holds that the portion '*tatpūrvakam*' constitutes the definition. '*Tat*' signifies perception which is implied from the context. He states that with the initial pronoun '*tat*' in dual number, the definition would become too wide to comprise *upamāna* etc.

Jayantabhaṭṭa opens his actual discussion on *anumāna* by quoting Uddyotakara that the knowledge of probandum is itself a means of cognition and that is called *anumāna*.[154]

Anumāna, i.e., inference, is the cognition of an unperceived probandum, i.e., *sādhya* or *liṅgin*, produced through an inferential mark or probans, i.e., *liṅga*. This acts as the reason with five characteristics, which is ascertained through the remembrance of the invariable relation of the probans with the probandum- the relation which amounts to

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[150] *Darśanātiśeya eva pramāṇam* | Ibid., p. 95.
[151] For detail, see ibid., pp. 95-7
[152] *N.S.*, 1/1/5
[153] Ibid, 1/1/4
[154] *Anumānamiti lakṣyanirdeśaḥ tatpūrvakamiti lakṣaṇam* | *N.M.*, (Chowkhamba edn.), Part., I, p. 113

pervasion of *liṅga* by *sādhya*.[155] For example: 'the hill is fiery, since it is smoky (*parvataḥ vahnimān dhūmat*).' Here fire belonging to the hill is not yet perceived by the person who infers. But he has perceived smoke in that substratum and also knows the invariable relation that smoke is pervaded by fire. Smoke which is pervaded by fire leads to the knowledge of unperceived fire which pervades it.

However, Jayanta's observation is more a description than a definition of *anumāna*. Jayanta's above mentioned remark cannot be looked upon as a proper definition of *anumāna*. In the very introductory statement Jayanta himself admits explicitly that first he is going to describe *anumāna*, i.e., not to define it.[156]

The characteristic features probans are as follows:[157]

    1. The presence of the reason in the subject.[158]

    2. The presence of the reason in the positive example.[159]

    3. The absence of the reason from the negative example.[160]

    4. The reason not being contradicted by other sources of true knowledge.[161]

    5. The reason not being counter- balanced by another knowledge.[162]

The knowledge of these reasons having five-fold characteristics is the proximate cause of the inference of consequence.[163]

3.6.1 Classification of Inference (*Anumāna*)

Following the views of his predecessors, Jayantabhaṭṭa supplies us with a threefold division of *anumāna* or inference. It as follows:

Pūrvavat: It is the type of inference where one infers the effect from a cause, e.g., the inference of raining from the towering mass of clouds.

[155] *Pañca lakṣaṇakālliṅgād gṛhītānniyame smṛte* |
    Parokṣe liṅgini jñānamanumānaṃ pracakṣate| Ibid., p. 101
[156] *Tatrānumānasvarūpaṃ brūmahe* | Ibid.
[157] *Pakṣadharmatvaṃ, sapakṣadharmatvaṃ, vipakṣādvyāvṛttiḥ, abādhita viṣayatvam,asatpratipakṣatvañceti* | ibid. p.164.
[158] *Siṣādhayiṣitadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī pakṣaḥ taddharmatvaṃ tadāśritatvamityarthaḥ* | Iibid. p.101.
[159] *Sādhyadharmayogena nirjñātaṃ dharmyantaraṃ sapakṣaḥ tatrāstitvam* |Ibid. p. 101
[160] *Sādhyadharmasaṃsparśaśūnyo dharmī vipakṣaḥ tato vyāvṛtti* | Ibid. p. 101.
[161] *Anumeyasyārthasya pratyakṣenāgamena vā 'napaharaṇamabādhitaviṣayatvam* | Ibid. p. 101.
[162] *Saṃśayabījabhūtenārthena pratyanumānatayā prayujyamānenānupahatatvamasatpratipakṣatvam* | Ibid.
[163] *Etaiḥ pañcabhirlakṣaṇairupapannaṃ liṅgamanumāpakaṃ bhavati* | Ibid.

Śeṣavat: Jayanta gives two types of interpretations of the term *śeṣavat* also. He refers to it as the inference of cause from the effect and quotes the same example that Vātsyāyana gives.[164] But Jayanta says that it is not really the cause (rain), but the up – country which have heavy shower of rain, which is inferred from the abnormal swelling of the river; or a particular country may be the subject of inference instead of the river, holding that this country is in contact with another country which has heavy shower because it has a river with a swollen stream. [165]

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa: Jayanta asserts that when we infer the following from the prior which is neither a cause nor an effect, it is known as *sāmānyatodṛṣṭaḥ.* For example, the taste of a *kapittha* is inferred from its colour. Colour and taste of a *kapittha* are not causally related to each other.

Jaynta does deal with the *vīta* and *avīta* and *kevalānvayi, kevalavyatireki* and *anvayavyatireki* types of *anumāna.* He however has the credit of clearly introducing the *svārtha* and *parārtha* types of *anumāna.*

3.6.2 Constituents of Inference (*Avayavas*)

According to Jayantabhaṭṭa, the collocation of words by which one can convey the knowledge for others, which is obtained through *svārthānumāna,* is known as *parārthānumāna.*[166]

Jayanat defines *avayavas* as the one part of the constituents used for apprehension of desirable meaning.[167] Jayanta accepts five constituents of *anumāna* following the path of his prior logicians as *pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya* and *nigamana.*

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[164] *Supra*, 2nd chapter, *f.n.* 60.

[165] *Iyaṃ vācoyuktiḥ kāryeṇa kāraṇamanumīyate iti paramārthastu dharmo dharmavatvena dharmavānanumīyate iti sthitiḥ| N.M.,* (Chowkhamba edn.), P. 118.

[166] *Iha hi svayamavagatamarthamanumānena parasmai pratipādayatā sādhanīyasyārthasya yāvati śabdasamūhe siddhiḥ parisamāpyate tāvānprayoktavyaḥ, tameva ca parārthānumānamācakṣate nītividaḥ | N.M. Prameya, avayavaḥ|*

[167] *Sādhanīvārthapratipattiparyantavacanakalāpaikadeśatvamavayavānāṃ sāmānyalakṣamācaṣṭe |* Ibid.

3.6.3 Fallacies of Reason or *Hetu* *(Hetvābhāsas)*

Jayanta follows Gautama in naming the fallacies of reason as *savyabhicāra, viruddha, prakaraṇasama, sādhyasama* and *kālātīta.*[168]

Asiddhaa and sādhyasama: Jayanta refers to the fallacy by both the names. He says that a predicate is called *sādhya* if it stands in need of proof. In the same way if the reason stands in need of proof it will be fallacious.

Viruddha: If a reason fails to establish the existence of predicate and rather contradicts it, then it becomes fallacious.

Anaikāntika or savyabhicāra: Jayanta maintains that if a reason does not belong to similar examples, it is faulty and known as *anaikāntika* or inconclusive.

Kālātīta or Vādhita: Jayanta says that in this type of fallacy reason refers to more than one event which succeeds one another in time. The event constituting the reason should be simultaneous for establishing the predicate. If it is not so, the reason will be fallacious and known as *kālatīta* or *vādhita.*

Prakaraṇasama: Jayanta maintains that if the reason is faced with the existence of an equally strong counter reason, it is fallacious since the both the reasons counteract each other and fail to establish the conclusion.

3.7 Nature of Comparison *(Upamāna)*

Jayanta's study of *upamāna* or comparison is quite long. First he refutes the Mīmāṃsakas regarding *upamāna* and later he proves that *upamāna* is a distinct source of cognition but not an inference. *Upamāna* is not a type of indirect knowledge based upon analogy. Instead it is the ascertainment of the meaning of an unknown word based upon analogy. Jayanta considers *upamāna* as a distinct way of knowing. He opposes the inclusion of *upamāna* in any of the other *pramāṇas* on the ground that in *upamāna* the mode of production of cognition is different from the other means of knowledge.[169]

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[168] For detail, see Ibid, (Chowkhamba edn.), II, pp. 153-68.

[169] *Sāmagrībhedāt phalabhedācca pramāṇabhedaḥ | anye eva ca sāmagrīphale śabdopamānayoḥ | N.M.,* (Chaowkhamba, edn.), part I, p. 130.

Jayantabhaṭṭa finds a difference of opinion among predecessors regading the nature of *upamāna*. He presents the opinion of the early Naiyāyikas and the contemporary Naiyāyikas. According to Jayanta, the earlier Naiyāyikas define *upamāna* as the *atideśavākya* of a reliable person and similarity between a known and an unknown object and resulting in the cognition of the relation of a name with the named.[170] For example, the citizen who, on perceiving an animal resembles the cow, and cognizes it as *gavaya* by recollecting prior instruction that *gavaya* is like a cow. The knowledge of the relation between the term and the object denoted by it presupposes the term, and this is *gavaya*, which is called *pramiti* and cause of this cognition is called *upamāna*.

According to the contemporaries, *upamāna* is sensuous cognition by a man of an unfamiliar object resembling a certain other object familiar to him.[171] For instance, the knower who has heard the instruction given by the forester directly perceives that the unknown particular bears a close resembles to the known particular. This sensuous perception of resemblance is called *upamāna*. It generates the cognition of the relation between the term and the object denoted by it.[172]

3.8 Nature of Verbal Testimony (*Śabda*)

Following the path of predecessors Jayanta also tries to establish that *śabda* or verbal testimony is a distinct source of *pramāṇa*. Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* contains a long discussion on it. In this context, Jayanta mainly tackles with the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists.

Jayanta's hypothesis of verbal testimony chiefly deals with the introduction and the elucidation of various views on Gautama's definition of *śabda*. According to Gautama *śabda* is the instruction of reliable person.[173] Jayanta interprets the term *āpta* in two viewpoints:

- First he discusses why this particular term has been included in the definition.

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[170]   *Atra   vṛddhanaiyāyikāstāvadevam   upamānasvarūpam   ācakṣate, saṃjñāsaṃjñisaṃbandhapratītiphalaṃ   prasiddhetarayoḥ   sārūpyapratipādakam   atideśavākyam upamānam* | Ibid., p. 128.

[171]   *Adyatanāstu   vyācakṣate   śrutādideśavākyasya   pramāturaprasiddhe   piṇḍe prasiddhapiṇḍasārūpyajñānam idriyajaṃ saṃjñāsaṃjñisaṃbandhapratipattiphalam upamānam* | *N.M.*, (Chowkhamba edn), part, I, p. 129.

[172] For detail see, Ibid., pp. 128-36

[173] *Āptopsdeśaḥ śabdaḥ, N.S.* 1/7/1.

- Secondly, who is to be considered as *āpta*.

To the first point Jayanta states that if Gautama did not include the term *āpta* then the definition will become too wide. Then the *aitihya* or tradition would not be distinct from verbal testimony, since the element of assertion or *upadeśa* is presented in both the cases. Otherwise it can be said that the validity of *upadeśa* is justified with the incorporation of the term *āpta* and consequently *aitihya* is excluded from the scope of verbal testimony.[174]

Secondly, Jayanta discusses the characteristics of *āpta*. In this regard Jayanta first quotes Vātsyāyana and admits that the two terms *cikhyāpayiṣā and upadeṣṭā in the bhāṣya* have special significance. The first one indicates one who is not partially deposed (*vītarāga*) and the second one indicates that he should be skilled in teaching.[175] Jayanta further states that *āpta* may be a *ṛṣi, a ārya or a mlecca*, but he should have the perfect knowledge of the subject.[176]

The etymological meaning of '*upadeśa*' is '*abhidhānakriyā*', i.e., by which the knowledge of something is conveyed. The term *upadeśa* differentiates verbal testimony from the remaining means of cognition.[177]

3.9 Enumeration of the Other *Pramāṇas*

It is already mentioned that regarding the number of *pramāṇas* all schools of Indian philosophy adopt divergent views. Jayanta specifically rejects *sambhava, aitihya, arthāpatti* and *abhāva* as distinct sources of cognition and establishes the Nyāya view that there are only four means of cognition.

3.9.1 Nature of Postulation (*Arthāpatti*)

Jayanta follows the old logicians and rejects *arthāpatti* as a distinct means of cognition. Still he discusses about it with a great zest. First he presents the Bhaṭṭas' view as:

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[174] *Evaṃ hi aitihyasya na prāmāṇāntaratā bhaviṣyati upapdeśarūpatvāviśeṣāt, N.M.,* (Chowkhamba edn.), p. 137.

[175] *Cikhyāpayiṣayā yukta ityuktā vītarāgatā|*
Upadeṣṭetyanenoktaṃ pratipādanakauśalam | Ibid., p. 138.

[176] *Ṛṣyāryamlecchasāmānyaṃ vaktavyaṃ cāptalakṣaṇam|* Ibid., p. 138.

[177] Ibid.
For detail see, ibid., pp. 137-46.

The Bhāṭṭas say that whenever a fact is known to us or learnt from a verbal source and seems to be apparently observed and requires the assumption of some other fact to explain, it is known as *arthāpatti* or presumption. [178] According to Kumārila, the two words '*dṛṣṭo śruto vā*' in the *Śabarabhāṣya*, refer to two kinds of *arthāpatti*-*dṛṣṭārthapatti* and *śrutārthapatti*. According to him the word *dṛṣṭa* stands for all the six means of cognition, i.e., perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and negation and the word *śruta* refers to the presumption of a fact. "Devadatta who is fat, does not take meal during the day.' On hearing such assertion, the idea of 'his eating at night' can be obtained. Kumārila admits it as *śrutārthapatti*.

3.9.1.1 *Arthāpatti* is Included in *Anumāna*

The Naiyāyikas hold that *arthāpatti* is reducible to inference. They put forth the example that 'the living Caitra is not present in his house' in the form of the following syllogism:

- The living Caitra exists outside the house,
- Because he is living and is not found in the house,
- Like myself.

Here,

- Living Citra is the *pakṣa,*
- Exists outside is the *sādhya,*
- Non- existence in the house is the *hetu.*

Kumārila quotes the same examples and proves that *arthāpatti* cannot be reduced through inference. Thus he provides the following arguments:

- Caitra's *abhāva* in the house cannot be considered as the *hetu*. Because the house, as qualified by Caitra's absence, does not fulfil the conditions of the *hetu* since it should be the property of the *sādhya*. But here *abhāva* is not the property of Caitra.

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[178]   *Tatra   bhāṭṭāstāvadiṭṭhamarthāpattimācakṣate   dṛṣṭaḥ   śruto   vā'nyathā   nopapadyata ityṛthāntarakalpanā arthāpatti | N.M. (Vidyanidhi Prakashan), P. 94.*

- They hold that living man's absence in the house cannot be accepted as true, unless the knowledge of his existence outside. Till then the former proposition appears as absurd. In the case of inference the means of proof should be prior to the conclusion, but in the above case the matter to be proved comes first and the means of proof comes later on.[179]

- The Mīmāṃsakas hold that *arthāpatti* is different from *anumāna* in the sense that it corroborates the findings of the two independent *pramāṇas*- testimony and non- perception, which grasp the existence and non- existence of the same object, i.e., Caitra.[180] But in the case of *anumāna*, the relation of invariable concomitance between fire and smoke is grasped by a single means.[181]

- Regarding the Naiyāyikas' suggestion that the relation of invariable concomitance is obtained by means of a hypothetical argument, which is based on a subsequent agreement in absence, the Mīmāṃsakas reply that in this case even the major premise is obtained through *arthāpatti*.

- *Arthāpatti* arises when there is a doubt in the mind, and one tries to clear the mind by making an assumption. But there is no such situation in the case of inference.

Jayanta refutes their views on the following grounds:

- A thing cannot indicate another thing unless it is in invariable concomitance with the thing.[182]

- Unless the cognition of invariable concomitance, it cannot be the cause of inference.[183]

- Where the invariable concomitance of a particular probans is impossible to get, there the knowledge of that concomitance can be taken in a general way.[184]

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[179] *Na hi gṛhaṃ vā caitro vā tadabhāvo tadadarśanaṃ vā caitrasya dharmaḥ tad bahirbhāvasya vetyapakṣadharmatvādanyatamasyāpi na liṅgatvam|* Ibid., p. 96.
Jīvataśca gṛhābhāvaḥ pakṣadharmo 'tra kalpyate|
tadsaṃvittirbahribhāvaṃ na cābuddhvopajāyate| S.V. (Arthāpatti), śloka. 19
[180] *Prameyānupraveśaprasaṃgādapi nedamanumānam| N.M.,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 97.
[181] *Pramāṇadvayasamarpitaikavastuviṣayābhāvabhāvasamarthanārthamarthāpattiḥ, pravartamānā prameyadvaṃ parāmṛṣatyeva anyathā tatsaṃghaṭanāyogāt|* Ibid., pp. 97-8
[182] *Pratibandhādvinā vastu na vastvantarabodhakam|* Ibid., p. 105.
[183] *Pratibandho 'pi nājñātaḥ prayāti matihetutām|* Ibid.
[184] *Na viśeṣātmanā yatra sambandhajñānasambhavaḥ|*
Tatrāpyastyeva sāmānyarūpeṇa tadupagrahaḥ|| Ibid., 106

- Moreover, the fatness of the person who does not eat during day is not possible without eating at night is *arthāpatti*.[185] It the negative reasoning and once it is known, it postulates the positive reasoning as: where there eating at night there is fatness of one who does not eat during day. However, it is an established fact that both positive and negative reasoning are the properties of the probans, so it is proved that *arthāpatti* is nothing but *anumāna*.[186]

3.9.1.2 Refutation of Power (*Śakti*)

The Naiyāyikas reject *śakti* as a distinct category on the ground that there is nothing like imperceptible power in this world.[187] According to them, the Mīmāṃsakas describe *pratyakṣapūrvikā arthāpatti*[188] in order to postulate *śakti* as a separate entity. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, without *śakti* a *kāraka* cannot be considered as *kāraka*. For example, a person who wants to cut a tree picks up the axe instead of the shoe. Therefore, it is clear that the axe alone has the power to cut.

The Naiyāyikas reject this view and say that in the case of cutting a tree one can understand the relationship with positive and negative reasoning. Accordingly, on the basis of the activities of the elderly persons also one can understand that the axe alone is the cause of cutting the tree.[189]

3.9.1.3 Jayantabhaṭṭa's Refutation of Prābhākaras' View

The Prābhākaras accept *arthāpatti* or presumption as a distinct source of cognition. The Naiyāyikas include it in inference. But according to the Prābhākaras the cognition which is obtained through *arthāpatti* cannot be known by inference. Because all the conditions of inference like *vyāpti, pakṣadharmatā,* etc. cannot be fulfilled in the case of *arthāpatti*. They say that in inference the conclusion is drawn from a known relation between the probans and the probandum, while in *arthāpatti* there is no

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[185] *Tena vinā nopapadyata iti kalpanamarthāpattiḥ*| Ibid.

[186] *Anvayavyatirekau ca gamakasya liṅgasya dharma iti kathamarthāpattuḥ nānumānam*| Ibid.

[187] *Na hi kalpayituṃ śaktaṃ śaktimanyāmatīndriyām*| Ibid.

[188] *Pratyakṣāvagatadahanasaṃsargodgatadāhākhyakāryānyathā 'nupapattyā tasya tajjñānagrāhyatvaśaktikalpanā iti*| Ibid., p. 95.

[189] *Tatra chedanādāvanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ vā vṛddhavyavahārādvā paraśvadhādereva kāraṇatvamadhyavagacchāma iti* | *N.M.,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan), p. 108.

For detail see, Ibid., pp. 106-113.

N.S.M., on *Kārikā*-2

N.Ku., stavaka-2

N.L., (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series), p. 21.

knowledge of such a relation.[190] Though the Prābhākaras don't posit their own views, but they try to make clear the view of Śabara as:

"Dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārthaḥ arthakalpanā, anyathā nopapadyate iti|"

Interpreting the Śabara's definition, the Prābhākaras say that in *arthāpatti* a seen or heard fact is the means of cognition, another fact which is inexplicable without the former. According to the Prābhākaras the two words *dṛṣṭa* and *śruta* mean the same thing. *Dṛṣṭa* means well- known and *śruta* means the same thing in the common usage.

Both Kumārila and Prabhākara consider *arthāpatti* as a means of cognition, but they put different views regarding the nature of *arthāpatti*.

Jayanta rejects the Prābhākaras view and says that Caitra's outside existence is produced by his absence in his house is impossible. If his absence in the house is known before, his outside existence should be produced after a moment. A cause which exists before the effect is capable of producing the effect. Therefore, both the absence in the house and his outside existence cannot be simultaneous.[191]

3.9.1.4 *Śrutārthāpatti* Refuted by Prābhākaras

The Prābhākaras refuse to accept *śrutārthapatti* as one of the two distinct types of *arthāpatti*. They criticize the Bhāṭṭas' views regarding the two forms *arthāpatti*. The Prābhākaras hold that the *dṛṣṭa* and *śruta* are in the sense of object that is known (*upalabddho 'rthaḥ*).[192]

Words have short and unlimited denotative range. The function of a word to conveying its meaning continues as long as the knowledge of its meaning arises in our mind. The Pragmatic experience plays a great role in determining the meaning of a word. Implicit words also contribute in determining the meaning. If the nature of conditions which regulate the meaning of the sentences is observed then it is seen that there are some cases which show that understood words determine meaning of sentences. For example, in the injunction *viśvajitā yajeta*, the compound word

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[190] *N.M.*, (Vidyanidhi Prakashan), P-115.
[191] *Utpattistu gṛhābhāvāt barhibhāvasya durbharṇā|*
 Prāksiddhe he gṛhābhāve tadutpādaḥ kṣaṇāntare|| Ibid., p. 117
[192] *Dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārthaḥ arthakalpanā; arthāntaraṃ kalpayatītyarthaḥ|* Ibid., p. 116.

svargakāmaḥ is not given. Still, the implicit word gives the complete meaning of the injunction.[193]

Occasionally the given words in the sentence do not even supply the meaning. There are some examples of Vedic injunctions where given words are given up since they do not help to get the complete meanings of injunctions. For example in *ubhyaṃ havirārtimārcchet*, the word *ubhābhāym* has been discarded since it is not capable of expressing the complete meaning of the injunction.[194]

In some cases the subordinate clause has no role in the meaning of the main injunction. For example *prayājaśeṣeṇa haviṃsyabhidhāryati* (one sprinkles the articles with such purified butter which remains after the completion of *prayāja* sacrifice); here the clause *prayājaśeṣeṇa* refers to the procedure of sacrificing the animal in *Vājapeya* sacrifice. There is no rule regarding the preservation of clarified butter and provision of a pot which contains it.[195]

Thus Prābhākaras finally conclude that *śrutārthapatti* cannot be treated as a variety of *arthāpatti*. Moreover, if it is accepted then the authenticity of Veda will be doubtful. Because the sentence postulated will be the common people's sentence whose authenticity is always doubtful.

3.9.1.5 *Śrutārthapatti* vs *Anumāna*

The presumption of unuttered words is not an inference, since they are even known when concomitance is absent.[196] For example, if the sentence 'he eats at night' is the probandum and 'Devadatta is flabby and does not take meal during the day' is the probans, then the probans in question does not belong to the subject, i.e., the speaker of the sentence, but belongs to such a locus which contains the negation of the probandum and hence it is not an invariable mark.

According to Kumārila, in *śrutārthapatti*, the sentence which is being heard implies a syntactical relation with its own unheard part. So, a portion of sentence is presumed to complete the meaning of the sentence. The opponents raise question that there is no

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[193] *Naimittikānukūlvaparyālocanayā kvacidaśrūyamāṇānyapi tāni nimittatāṃ bhajante- viśvajidādau svargakāmādipadavat||* Ibid., p. 122.

[194] *Kvacit śruyamāṇyāpi tadanukūlatvāt parityajyante- yashobhyaṃ havirārtimārcchet itivat|* Ibid.

[195] *Kvacidanyathāshitāni tadanurodhādanyathaiva sthāpyante- prayājaśeṣeṇa haviṃsyabhidhāryati itivat| Ibid.*

[196] *Na ca sākāṃkṣapratītikāriṇastasya prāmāṇyam|* Ibid. 119

point in presuming portion of the sentence since this objective could also be achieved through the presumption of the complementary meaning by the existing meaning. The sentence 'flabby Devadatta does not eat in day' could lead to presume the complementary meaning, i.e., the natural food, in the same way in which smoke leads to the inference of fire.[197] Further, a portion of the sentence which is presumed is not meant for invisible merit but for understanding the relevant meaning and it is not wrong in this case if one holds that the complementary meaning is presumed and not the complementary sentence. Thus *arthāpatti* relates to the fact and not to the clause.[198]

The Bhāṭṭas refute the above objections in the following ways:

- A sentence which does not convey a complete meaning but produces an imperfect knowledge of objects is not a source of valid knowledge.[199]

- If each and every constituent of a sentence tends to convey the meaning of sentence, then a sentence is considered as a complete one.

- A sentence which expresses a complete meaning is a source of knowledge. So, when we hear a portion of a sentence we fill up the gap, supplying the understood portion by our imagination.

In many cases the Vedic injunctions are incomplete. By means of *arthāpatti*, based upon verbal testimony they are made complete. The Vedic injunction 'one should perform *viśvajita* sacrifice' is an example of an incomplete Vedic injunction. Hence it should be supplemented by the word '*svargakāmaḥ*' to get the complete meaning of the injunction as 'one who is desirous of heaven should perform *viśvajita* sacrifice.'

3.9.1.6 Jayanta's View on *Śrutārthāpatti*

The problem of *śrutārthapatti* is presented by Jayanta quite exhaustively. According to Jayanta, *śrutārthapatti* is reducible to inference.[200] It is absurd to presume the part of a sentence since the meaning of the absent part can be inferred from its effect which serves as a mark. Since fire is inferred from smoke, the same way one can

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[197] *Avagamanairākāṃkṣyasiddhaye tadarthakalpanameva yuktam|* Ibid., 120.
[198] *Vacanaikadeśakalpanamapyārthāvagatisiddhyarthameveti tatkalpanamevāstu kiṃ sopānāntareṇa|* Ibid.
[199] *Nanu vacanamaparipūrṇamiti pratītimeva yathocitāṃ janayitumasamartham|* Ibid, p.119
[200] *Śrutārthapattirapi varākī nānumānād bhidyate|* N.M., (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 119.

infer the taking of meal as the mark of flabbiness on the basis of noticing the great bulk of a person. There is no difference in these two examples.

The Bhāṭṭas say that an incomplete sentence cannot complete its full meaning. The sentence 'flabby Devadatta does not take meal during the day' fails to convey that he is flabby and it requires a complement, i.e., 'he takes food at night'. So, the Bhāṭṭas presume the complementary portion of the sentence and call it *śrutārthapatti*. Jayanta questions them that which of the constituents of the given sentence require a complement; is it a word or meaning or knowledge?[201]

The Bhāṭṭas reply that a word requires a complement and then it is said that as no inarticulate sound requires a complement, so no word requires it. If the Bhāṭṭas say that meaning of the given sentence require a complement then it can be fulfilled by complementary meaning. There is no point in presuming a portion of the sentence.[202]

The Bhāṭṭas state that the presumption of the object and not of the referents themselves would render the Vedic sentence non- Vedic. But Jayanta states that if the sentence is presumed, the meaning would become non-Vedic with the same logic since the presumed portion of the sentence is non-Vedic.[203]

Jayanta again refutes the view that 'flabbiness' is sensuous and taking food is super-sensuous and the relation of concomitance holding between them cannot be ascertained. Jayanta propounds that if one portion of a logical whole is ascertained, the remaining part could be inferred.

3.9.1.7 Refutation of *Dhvani*

The Naiyāyikas refute the notion of *dvani*, where one gets the meaning by accepting *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjana* power of words. The thing is that rhetoricians accept *vastudvani* which does not give the direct meaning. Here in this type of *dvani* sometimes one can get the negative meaning from a positive statement.[204] For example:

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[201] *Kasyātra sākāṅkṣatvam? kiṃ śabdasya? kiṃ vā tadarthasya? Uta svittadavagamasya iti*| Ibid., p. 120.

[202] Ibid.

[203] *Tatra vacanakalpanāpakṣe sutarāmavaidikaḥ so'rthaḥ syāt kalpyamānasya vacanasya vedādanvatvāt*|| Ibid.

[204] *Yathā tathā hyādyastāvatprabhedo vācyād dūraṃ vibhedavān*| *Kadācidvācye vidhirūpe pratiṣedharūpaḥ*| *Dh.L.,* (Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan edn.) , p. 25.
Vidherniṣedhāvagatirvidhibuddhirniṣedhataḥ| *N.M.,* (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 126.

"Bhrama dhārmika vīsrabddho sa śunako 'dya māritastena|

Godāvarī nadīkūlalatāgahanavāsinā dṛptasiṃhena||"

"O pious man, you wander freely. That dog is killed by the ferocious lion that lives in the bush on the bank of the river Godāvarī."

Here the positive sense is 'wander freely' because the dog is killed by the lion. But because of the presence of the lion, it is not possible to wander freely. Thus it gives the negative sense that one should not wander here, he may be killed.

Again, the positive meaning from the negative statement:

"Na ko 'pyasti gṛhe rātririyaṃ gāḍhā ca vārṣikī|

Ekākinyahamapyasmi mā sma pāntha gṛhaṃ viśa||"

"There is no one in the house and the night is also dark, I am also alone in my house, so, O passer- by please do not enter into my house." The sense is that do enter my house.

Jayanta opposes this view and says that there is no need to accept *dhvani*. It is due to the capacity of words only which express the nature of things, which could be known through other means.[205]

Lastly, Jayanta concludes that there is no difference of *arthāpatti* from *anumāna*.[206]

3.9.2 Nature and Problem of Negation (*Abhāva*)

Jayanta deals with and answers the following questions on the problem of *abhāva* and *anupalabdhi*:

1) Is *anupalabdhi* to be accepted as a means of true cognition?

2) Is *anupalabdhi* a distinct source of valid cognition?

3) How is an *abhāva* of something cognized?

4) How many kinds of *abhāva* are there?

Jayantabhaṭṭa does not give any general definition of *abhāva* in his *Nyāyamañjarī*. But when he is refuting the Buddhists' view he states that there are two types of

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[205] *Śabdānāmeva sāmarthyaṃ tatra tatra yathā tathā| N.M.*, (Vidyanidhi Prakashan), p. 126.
[206] Ibid., p. 127.

cognition- positive and negative. When refuting the Mīmāṃsakas' view, he states that a negative fact is to be objectively real and distinct, but there is no need of another proof for its cognition; because it is revealed by perception and the other means of cognition. So, according to Jayanta, though *abhāva* is a reality, it can be cognized through perception and therefore there is no need to accept *anupalabdhi* as a distinct means of cognition.[207]

Jayanta admits that there are only two divisions of *abhāva*, viz., *pradhvaṃsābhāva* and *prāgabhāva*. He refers that the other types are merely depending on particular conditions.[208] The negative fact is a distinct kind of object of knowledge and it is perceived by our sense-organs. Jayanta thinks that *anyonābhāva* and *atyantābhāva* are included in the *prāgabhāva*.[209]

3.9.2.1 Jayanta's criticism of the Bhāṭṭas' view

Jayanata starts his discussion on *abhāva* citing the view of Kumārila. According to the Bhāṭṭas, *anupalabdhi* is a distinct source of valid cognition. Kumārila analyses the metaphysical as well as epistemological aspects of *abhāva* and formulates the theory of negation as a distinct way of knowing.[210]

The Bhāṭṭas believe that every object has two forms- one is existence and the other is non- existence.[211] When there is a jar in a room, it can be cognized by means of perception or by other means of cognition. When no such means give any cognition of the object, it is judged by *anupalabdhi*. The negative facts are cognized through *anupalabdhi*. Thus *anupalabdhi* is different from other means of cognition. In perception, sense organs and *manas* act in some positive way and there is a corresponding change in the self, but in the cognition of the negative aspects of things there is no sense- activity and corresponding modification of the self. Whatever activity is there, it pertains to the present locus and not to the object negated.[212]

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[207] *Satymabhāvaḥ prameyamabhyupagamyate, pratyakṣādyavasīyamānasvarūpatvāttu na pramāṇāntaramātmaparicchittaye mṛgayate|* Ibid., p. 132

[208] *Utpannasya vināśo vā tadanutpāda eva vā |*
Abhāvastattvataḥ anye tu bhedāstvaupādhikca matāḥ || Ibid., P-163.

[209] *Na pragabhāvādanye tu bhidyante paramārthataḥ |* Ibid.

[210] *Pramāṇapañcakaṃ yatra vasturūpe na jāyate |*
vastusattvāvabodhārtham tatrābhāvapramāṇatā || S.V. (Abhāva)

[211] *Sarvaṃ hi vastu sadasadātmanā dvividham|* Ibid.

[212] EBSPM, p.344

Kumārila admits that the word *pramāṇābhāva* in the Śabara- *Bhāṣya* means the non-occurrence of sense- perception and other means of cognition.[213] He holds that the negative is always some positive entity in some positive locus. So far the positive locus of the jar is concerned, it is perceptual cognition and as far as the counter-correlate of cognition, i.e., the jar, is concerned, the knowing factor is memory, but *abhāva* cannot be known either through perception or memory, but through the *manas*.[214]

The Bhāṭṭas assert that there must be similarity between the means of cognition and the object. Positive objects are grasped by the positive means and negative objects by the negative means. Jayanta criticises it and says that the negative facts are also known by the positive means. Sometimes a negative fact constitutes a probans which gives the inferential cognition of a positive probandum. The absence of rainfall leads to the inference of the blowing away of the clouds by a storm. So, it is wrong to hold that a negative fact is known by negative means of cognition.[215]

Regarding the Bhāṭṭas' contention that the negation cannot qualify the ground in the case of the *abhāva* of a jar, since it has neither conjunction nor inherence with the locus, Jayanta asserts that there is a third type of relation of the qualifying and qualified (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya bhāva*) which is capable of perceiving *abhāva*.

Considering one point, Jayanta agrees with Kumārila that *abhāva* within the range of vision has no need to be inferred. Jayanta makes it clear that *abhāva* of an object outside the scope of vision is the case of inference and verbal testimony.

Jayanta concludes that Bhāṭṭas should either hold that *abhāva* is absolutely unreal or they should accept the Nyāya view that it is perceived.[216]

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[213] *Abhāvo 'pi pramāṇābhāvonāstītyarthasyāsannikṛṣṭasya|* S.B., 1/1/5
  S.V., (*Abhāva, śloka* 10).
  N.M. (Vidyanidhi Prakashan), p. 128
[214] *Gṛhītvā vastusadbhāvaṃ smṛtvā ca pratiyoginam| Mānasaṃ nāstitājñānaṃ jāyate 'kṣānapekṣayā|*
  S.V. (*Abhāva, śloka* 27).
  N.M. (Vidyanidhi Prakashan), p. 130
[215] *Sāmagryantargatāttasmādbhāvādapi bhāvadhīḥ|* Ibid. p. 140
[216] *Sarvopākhyāviyuktatvānnāstyevetyeṣa vocyatām|*
  Abhāvaścākṣuṣajñānaviṣayo vābhyupeyatām| Ibid. p. 137

3.10.2 Jayanta's criticism of the Prābhākaras' view

The Prābhākaras think that *abhāva* is the non-existence of an object in a specific place. But unlike the Bhāṭṭas, Prābhākaras do not maintain that non-existence requires an independent mean of knowing. Rather Prābhākars feel that it can be cognized by perception. According to Prābhākaras, non-existence is nothing but existence and non-perception is nothing but mere perception. The Prābhākaras declare that when the *abhāva* of a jar on the ground (*bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ*) is experienced, it is nothing but the experience of the vacant condition of the ground and not the positive reality like the *abhāva* of a jar. According to the Prābhākaras, the jar is not apprehended and the *abhāva* is also not apprehended.[217] Jaynata refutes them on the following ground:

According to Jayanta, perception and non-perception respectively determine the presence and absence of an object. But the presence and absence of an object does not determine its reality or unreality. For example, the non-perception of water hidden under the ground does not make the negative proposition that water does not exist. Moreover, if the Prābhākaras deny objective existence to *abhāva*, all the positive objects which are negated by their corresponding negation would be eternal, as the Prābhākaras do not regard them as transitory.[218] Jayanta reminds the Prābhākaras that in denying the reality of non-existence they are going against the theory of Śabara.[219]

3.9.2.3 Jayanta's criticism of the Buddhists' view

Jayanta is the only philosopher who cites the Buddhists' argument against the reality of *abhāva*. According to Diṅnāga School, *abhāva* is a mere mental construction (*vikalpa*) and not an external reality. Jayanta says that *abhāva* cannot be considered as a pure imagination because 'like the mental construction, of a positive reality (*vidhi-vikalpa*), it also follows in the wake of a pure sensation.'[220] Therefore, if external reality is considered as the source of positive mental constructions, then a corresponding reality should be accepted in the case of negative mental constructions as well. The Buddhists point out that non-existence is not cognized as an independent entity like positive objects, but it is conditioned by space, time and its counter-reality.

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[217] *Ghaṭo hi na pratīyate, na tu tadabhāvaḥ pratīyate* | Ibid. P-159.

[218] Ibid., p. 161.

[219] *Upekṣitaśca bhāṣyārthaḥ, ityaho nayanaipuṇam* || Ibid, p. 162.

[220] *Darśanānantara- pravṛttatvena vidhi- vikalpa – tulyatvāt* . Ibid., P-141.

For instance, our experience takes the form of 'non-existence of a jar on the ground at a particular time.' The non-existence can have no relation with the ground because the two relations *saṃyoga* and *samavāya* are not possible in this case. [221] For the same reason *abhāva* has no relation with the time. The relation of *abhāva* with the jar is more inconceivable because the two belong to two different times. If it is argued that the relation between the two may be *virodha*, then the question arises that what does *virodha* signify? If *abhāva* is supposed to already exist, should come and overcome the jar, then we may consider it as the opponent of the jar like a *mudgara*. But it is not possible because their times are different.[222] The destroyer (*mudgara*) and the destroyed (jar) should always exist in the same time. Secondly it may be asked, 'whether *abhāva* has the nature of coming into existence (*bhavanadharmā*) or not coming into existence (*abhavanadharmā*)?' In the first case it will be positive object (*bhāva*), like a jar. But it is not coming into existence and it will be an eternal entity. In that case, will *abhāva* be related to one object or to all objects?[223]

The Buddhists criticise the Nyāya contention regarding *anyonyābhāva*. They ask, "If positive objects are differentiated from other positive objects by non- existence called *anyonyābhāva*, how are the positive objects to be differentiated from the *anyonyābhāva* and other kinds of non- existence. If different kinds of *abhāva* become differentiated by themselves from one another and from positive objects, what is the fault of the positive objects that they are not held to be differentiated by themselves, and require *abhāva* called *anyonyābhāva* to differentiate one from the other?"[224] The Buddhists say that all types of *abhāva*, being identical in nature, are differentiated by positive things, i.e., by their counter – realities (*pratiyogin*) which are differentiated by themselves. Jayanta asks the Buddhists that, "If he does not accept the reality of *abhāva*, what would be the object denoted by the negative prefix *nañ*."[225] The Buddhists answer that, "We do not assume realities in accordance with mere word

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[221] Ibid.

[222] *Pratiyoginā saha natarāmabhāvasya sambandhaḥ , asamānakālatvāt* | Ibid, P-142.

[223] *Api cāyamabhāvo bhavanadharmā vā syāt? Abhavanadharmā vā? Bhavanadharmatve bhāvo'sau bhavet, ghaṭādivat| abhavanadharmā tu yadyabhāvo'sti, sa nitya evāsau tarhi bhavet| sa cāyamekapadārthasambandhī vā syāt ? sarvapadārthasambandhī vā|* Ibid. p. 144

[224] *Bhāvo bhāvādivānyasmāt abhāvāṃśādapi dhruvam|*
  asaṅkīrṇo 'bhupetavyaḥ sa kathaṃ vā bhaviṣyati?
  anyonyamapyabhāvānāṃ yadyasaṅkīrṇatā svataḥ|
  bhāvaiḥ kimaparāddhaṃ vaḥ, parataśceta, kuto nu sā? Ibid.

[225] *Nanvabhāvapratikṣepe nañ kiṃ vācyam? Ucyatām?*
  Naiva śabdānusāreṇa vācyasthitirūpeyete| Ibid. 145.

expressions". Because the Buddhists assume that the meanings of words are mere mental constructions.[226]

Jayanta first establishes the reality of *abhāva* in course of his answer to the Buddhists. There are two kind of cognitions viz., 'there is a jar here' and 'there is no jar here'. Now, according to the Buddhists if cognition is a mere mental construction (according to the Diṅnāga school) or a modification of the self (according to the Yogācāra school), the cognition will be similar in both the cases, irrespective of validity and invalidity of both these cognitions.[227]

Jayanta then answers to the Buddhists' argument that *abhāva* of a jar is nothing but the non- apprehension of a jar at the time when the ground is apprehended to be devoid of the jar. He posits a question, "What is the vacant condition of the ground which the Buddhists call devoid of the jar?" Is it identical to the ground or different from it? If it is identical to the ground it will be remaining the same and there will be the cognition of the *abhāva* of the jar, yet the jar is actually present there. If it is different from the ground then our dispute is reduced to mere name.[228] If in the case of 'there is no jar here', the vacant state of the ground without the jar is taken as *ālambana*, it is undoubted that *ālambana* of the cognition 'here' is the ground, because even at the time of a positive cognition (there is a jar here), cognition of the ground is admitted as the *ālambana* of the cognition 'here'. So, the cognition 'there is no jar here' cannot be merely the 'ground' because it is also cognized at the time of the cognition of the existence of the jar. Therefore there must be apprehension of

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[226] *Bauddhāḥ khalu vayaṃ loke sarvatra khyātakīrtayaḥ|*
   Vikalpamātraśabdārthaparikalpanapaṇḍitāḥ|| Ibid.

[227] *Idaṃ tāvat sakalaprāṇisākṣikaṃ saṃvedanadvayamupajāyamānaṃ dṛṣṭam| iha ghaṭo'sti iha nāstīti tatra vikalpamātrasaṃvedanamanālambanamātmāṃśāvalambanaṃ vetyādi yadabhilapyate, tat nāstitājñāna iva astitājñāne'pi samānam| ato dvayorapi prāmāṇyaṃ bhavatu, dvayorapi vā mā bhūt|* Ibid. p. 150
c.f., Ātmāṃśāvalambana = svākāralambana. According to the Buddhists a knower obtains the knowledge of the external objects in two ways, first is the cognition of the external object which is not really exists, e.g., the cognition of ghost etc. This is known as *anālambana* cognition. The second one is the cognition of such types of external objects which are nothing but the phenomenal appearance of the objects. This is the external appearance of the consciousness or *ātman*. Therefore it is known as *ātmāṃśāvalambana.*

[228] *Keyaṃ ghaṭa viviktatā? Sā bhūpradeśādabhinnāḥ? Bhinnā vā? Abhede bhūpradeśāviśeṣāt ghaṭasannidhāne'pi ghaṭo nāsti iti pratipattiejāyate| bhede tu nāmni vivādaḥ syāt|* Ibid. (Chowkhamba edn.), p. 54.
c.f., Pāṭhabhedaḥ: bhede'pi nāmni viṣādaḥ syāt| Ibid. (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn), p. 151.

something else, and it makes no difference whether something else is called 'the vacant state of the ground devoid of the jar' or 'the non- existence of the jar'.[229]

With regard to the Buddhists' argument that the *nañ* is mere mental construction, Jayanta argues that, "If it were contended that the positive constructions enable us to grasp the real object and therefore valid, we reply that the validity of the negative mental constructions may also be upheld on the same ground. If it is asked what the real objects are reached by the negative constructions, the same question may be asked for the positive one also. If it is said that the real thing like 'blue' is grasped by a positive mental constructions, a negative thing also obtained in the same way. When the 'blue' is grasped, it is grasped as differentiated (*vyavacchina*) from 'yellow' etc., which are invariably associated with the negation of the 'blue'. Thus the cognition of the 'blue' implies the cognition of the negation of those which are other than the 'blue'."[230] In this point D.N. Shastri remarks that:

> "It appears that in this context Jayanta has almost equated the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika theory of the negation of mutual identity (*anyonyābhāva*) with the Buddhists theory of *apoha* according to which the word 'blue' denotes nothing but the exclusion of the non- blue (*anīla- vyāvṛtti*).[231]

Regarding the Buddhists' objection that *abhāva* has no relation with time, place or counter reality; Jayanta says that in case of *abhāva* the *viśeṣya- viśeṣaṇa- bhāva*[232] relation is possible. The same relation also serves as the relation of time and the place with *abhāva*. Jayanta says that, "As for the relation with counter- reality, it is that of opposition, and the meaning of opposition is, that the two (*bhāva* and the *abhāva*) cannot subsist at the same place and at the same time, and that the destruction of one particular positive object cannot mean the destruction of all objects, because the *abhāva* of a jar has only the jar as its counter –reality."[233]

With regard to the Buddhists' question whether *abhāva* has the nature of coming into existence (*bhvanadhrmā*) or that of not coming onto existence (*abhavanadharmā*),

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[229] *Taditirikatam̐ tu pratibhāsamānam̐ ghaṭavaviviktaneti vā kathyatām̐, ghaṭābhāva iti vā, nātra vastuni viśeṣaḥ|* ibid. ,151

[230] *Vastuprāptyā vidhikalpanām̐...........anyathā hi nīlaprāptireva na syāditi|* ibid., p 152.

[231] *CIR*, p. 415.

[232] *Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva eva sambandhaḥ|* Ibid. f.n. 243, p. 141.

[233] *Pratiyoginā tu saha virodha 'sya sambandhaḥ |ayameva ca virodhārthaḥ, yadekatrobhayorasamāveśaḥ| ataścaikavināśe na sarvavināśaḥ, ghaṭābhāvasya gaṭaikapratiyogikatvāt|* ibid., p. 156

Jayanta replies that *abhāva* is the nature of coming into existence. But it does not mean that *abhāva* cannot be distinguished from positive existence, because it is pointed out that there is a difference between the two kinds of cognition (*pratibhāsa* produced by *bhāva* and *abhāva*), like that found in the case of colour and taste. Furthermore, *abhāva* follows like a positive object, the presence and absence (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) of its causes, i.e., it comes into existence in the presence of its causes, and does not come into existence in their absence. For example, a jar follows causes like clay; stick, etc. for coming into existence and it follows causes like *mudgara,* etc. for its destruction."[234]

The Naiyāyikas question them that if they are refuting *abhāva*, then what is the basis on which Dharmakīrti has accepted eleven types of *abhāva* in his *Nyāyabindu.* Jayanta presents the eleven types as:

- *Svabhāvānupalabdhi*- non- availability of the actual form of an object. For example: 'here there is no pot because it is not found here.'

- *Kāraṇānupalabdhi*: non-availability of cause. For example: 'here there is no smoke because there is fire here.'

- *Vyāpakānupalabdhi*: non-availability of the pervader. For example: 'here there is no *Śiṃśapā* because no tree is available here.'

- *Kāryānupalabdhi*: non- availability of effect. For example: 'here there is no proper cause of smoke because smoke in not found.'

- *Svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*: availability of contrary nature. For example: 'here there is no cold touch because fire is available here.'

- *Svabhāvavirudhakāryopalabdhi*: availability of effect opposed to the actual nature. For example: 'here is no cold touch because smoke is not available here.'

- *Viruddhavyāptopalabdhi*: availability of contrary concomitance between non eternality as opposed to eternality. For example: 'the destruction of the produced entity is not eternal because it requires some cause for its production.'

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[234]*Yattu bhavanadharmā? Abhavanadharmā vā?...................ghaṭo hi mṛtpiṇḍadaṇḍādīniva janmani, vināśe'pi mugarādīnanuvartate hetūn|* ibid., p. 157.

- *Kāryaviruddhopalabdhi*: availability of something opposed to the effect. For example: 'here there is no cause of cold the capacity of which is not obstructed because fire is available here.

- *Vyāpakaviroddhopalabdhi:* availability of something contrary. For example: 'here there is no cold touch because fire is available.

- *Kāranaviruddhopalabdhi*: availability of something opposed to its cause. For example: the person has got no effect of cold (such as striking of teeth etc.) because here is fire nearby.

- *Kāranaviruddhakāryopalabdhi*: availability of effect contrary to the cause. For example, 'this place is devoid of people who are striking their teeth etc. because here is smoke.[235]

The Buddhists say that these eleven types of *anupalabdhi* are not of the knowledge of absence.[236]

The Naiyāyikas refute the Buddhists and finally establish their *siddhānta* that there are only four means of cognition as enumerated by Gautama.[237]

3.10 Refutation of Probability *(Sambhava)* and Tradition *(Aitihya)*

In the first *āhnika* itself, Jayanta criticises the viability of *sambhava* and *aitihya* as the independent source of knowledge. It seems that the Paurāṇikas are the propounders of *Sambhava* as the independent source of cognition. The Paurāṇikas have given an example as, if we speak of 'a thousand'; the number 'hundred' is also included there. And when we say, '*khāryā*', the '*drona*' is also includes there. The Paurāṇikas have called this process of cognition as *Sambhava* and considered it as the independent means of cognition. Jayanta has explained it as the cognizance of a 'part' from the knowledge of the 'whole' with which it is inseparably connected.[238] From the above two examples, we cognise the number 'hundred' from the number 'thousand' and the small amount '*drona*' from the large amount '*khāryā*'. As both are the inseparable

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[235] *N.M.(* Vidyanidhi Prakashan), pp. 146-47.
For detail see, *N.Bi.*, pp. 31-6.
[236] *Satyam ekādaśavidhā 'nupalabdhirihesyate|*
   Sā tvasadvyavahārasya hetuh nābhāvasaṃvidah| *N.M.(* Vidyanidhi Prakashan), p. 146.
[237] *Atah pramāneṣu jagāda yuktaṃ catuṣṭavameṣāṃ munirakṣapādah|* Ibid., p. 163.
[238] *Sambhavo nāma-samudāyena samudāyino 'vagamah sambhavati khāryāṃ dronah, sambhavvati śate sahasramiti.* Ibid, P.163.

from each other, Jayanta states that it is nothing but inference since it is depended upon invariable concomitance between a probans and a probandum.[239]

Like *sambhava,* Jayanta also criticises the feasibility of *aitihya* as the independent source of cognition following the path of his predecessors like Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra, etc. Jayanta holds that *aitihya* is nothing but succession of rumours or traditional sayings spreading from generation to generation without the knowledge of the speaker.[240] For instance, there is a ghost in the tree. It cannot be taken as *āgama* as the authoritativeness is not depended upon *āpta.*[241]

Again Jayanta points out that if we consider *aitihya,* as a separate means of valid cognition, then it will be different from that of *āgama pramāṇa,* since the nature of both are *upadeśarūpa.*[242]

3.11 Jayanta's view on Validity of Cognition (*Jñāna-Prāmāṇya*)

Jayantabhaṭṭa, in his *Nyāyamañjarī,* discusses two views on *jñāna-prāmāṇya* or validity of cognition. In *Nyāyamañjarī* we find,

> "*Sthitimetadarthakriyājñānāt prāmāṇyaniścaya iti| Tadidamuktaṃ, 'pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pavṛttisāmarthyādarthavat pramāṇam|' [N.B. p. 1] iti | tasmādaprāmāṇyamapi parokṣamityato dvayamapi parataḥ ityeṣaḥ eva pakṣaḥ śreyāniti |* '[243]

3.11.1 Extrinsic Validity of Cognition (*Parataḥ-Prāmāṇya*)

According to Jayantabhaṭṭa, the validity and invalidity of cognition is based upon its object. A cognition is true when it corresponds to the real nature and relations to its object; if not it becomes false. No knowledge in itself is true or untrue. If a piece of knowledge correctly reveals an object, it is true. If not, it is untrue. Truth or untruth is an extrinsic property of knowledge but not intrinsic. Thus truth and falsity are characters that appear to be added to cognition which is indifferent to both, but may

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[239] *Bhinnaḥ saṃbhava eṣaḥ na hyanumiterākhyāti khāryāṃ khalu droṇaḥ saṃbhavatīti seyamavinābhāvāt matirlaiṅgikī|* ibid, p. 164.

[240] *Anirdiṣṭyapravaktṛkapravādaparaṃparā caitihyam|* ibid, p. 163

[241] *Na cāyamāgamaḥ, āptosyopadeṣṭuraniścayāditi|* Ibid, p. 163.

[242] *Satyamapi cāgamāt pṛthaṅnaitihyam, upadeśarūpatvāt|* Ibid, p. 164.

[243] Ibid., (Chowkhamba edn.), p. 160.

have either, according to special circumstances.[244] The truth and falsity of cognition is known after we have that cognition.[245]

3.11.2 Intrinsic Validity of Cognition (*Svataḥ-Prāmāṇya*)

Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* presents the theory of self validity of cognition by Mīmāṃsā as follows:

According to Mīmāṃsakas the validity of cognition is intrinsic. They opposed the Sāṃkhya view that both validity and invalidity of cognition is intrinsic.[246]

The Mīmāṃsakas also point out that the Naiyāyikas' view that the both validity and invalidity are extrinsic is not tenable, because a piece of cognition is true if it reveals an object in its true nature. The truth of cognition is its non-difference with the object referred by it. If validity has to be established in every case by a further proof, then there will always be doubt in the validity of everyday life. For example, "Even when embracing one's wife, a doubt may arise that the woman in question may be one's mother."[247] Further, the follower of Nyāya should always remind that even Vyāsa says, "One who always doubts is doomed to destruction."[248]

Kumarila further states that there are three or four judgements which are only required for the final solution of the truth of a judgement in the manner described above. No more judgements are necessary for this purpose. Thus,

> *Evaṃ tricaturjñānajanmano nādhikā matiḥ |*
>
> *Prāthyate tāvataivaikaṃ svataḥ prāmāṇyamaśnute ||*[249][

3.11.3 Jayanta's criticism of *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya*

Jayanta rejects the theory of self-validity of cognition of the Mīmāṃsakas. He first of all questions them that what is the meaning of the compound '*svataḥprāmāṇya*'?

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[244] *Yathārthetarasādhāraṇo dharmo bodharūpatvaṃ*, N.M., (Vizianagram Series.), p. 169.

[245] Ibid., p. 160.

[246] *Tatra dvayamapi svata iti tāvadasāmpratam* | N.M., (Chaukhamba edn.) , part. I, P. 147.

[247] *Sva- bhārya – parirambhe'pi bhaven mātari samaśyeḥ* | Ibid, p. 153.

[248] *Vināśī saṃsayātmeti pārāśaryo 'pya bhāṣate* | Ibid.

c.f., *Saṃsayātmā vinaśyati -Gītā*

[249] N.M. (Chaukhamba edn.), part I, p.153.

S.V., *sūtra*. 2, *śloka*. 60.

For detail see, N.M. (Chaukhamba edn.), part. I, pp.147-54.

Does the truth of a judgement come from the judgement itself? Does it imply that judgement reveals its own truth itself?[250]

Jayanta says that the first alternative is not acceptable, because it is not cogent.[251] For example, in perceptual cognition such as 'a blue object is blue', the judgement is true in the sense that it owes its existence to the sense-object contact.[252] The second alternative is also not logical because perception cannot reveal its own truth. The perceptual judgement is the knowing process of the knower.[253] It remains transcendental according to the Mīmāṃsakas. Therefore, it cannot grasp the truth on its own. The resulting form of perception, which is the illumination of an object, is not connected with the external sense-organ. So, validity of the illumination of an object is never perceived. The inner perception cannot be capable enough to perceive it. It is important to ascertain the validity of the resulting form of the perceptual process since the inner perception is absent when the illumination of the object takes place.[254] Thus the hypothesis that the validity of a judgement is self evident should not be acceptable, since perception fails to grasp it.[255]

Further Jayanta says that the truth of a judgement cannot be inferred through inference also.[256]

3.11.4. Jayanta's criticism of the Sāṃkhya view

According to Sāṃkhya, both validity and invalidity of cognition are inherent in cognition. The Sāṃkhya theory of intrinsic validity and invalidity rests on the theory of causation. According to this theory, the manifestation of the effect is possible when the potentiality of that effect pre-exists in the cause. A cause can produce only that effect which is inherent to it. Otherwise any cause will produce any effect. Hence the validity and invalidity of cognitions are causally ascertained by effect. This means

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[250] *Svataḥ prāmāṇyamiti ko'rthaḥ, kiṃ svataḥ eva pramāṇasya prāmāṇyaṃ bhavati uta svayameva tatpramāṇamātmanaḥ prāmāṇyaṃ gṛhṇātīti|* Ibid., P. 155

[251] *Aprāmāṇikatvāt |* Ibid

[252] *Tathā hi yadetatnnīlaprakāśane pravṛttaṃ pratykṣaṃ tannīlaṃ prati tāvatpratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ tāvadidriyāthasannikarṣotpannamiti |* Ibid.

[253] *Jñātṛvyāpārātmano jñānasya bhavanmate nityaparokṣatvāt pratyakṣataḥ paricchedānupapattau tatprāmāṇyasyāpi kathaṃ pratyakṣeṇa grahaṇam|* Ibid.

[254] *Na ca mānasamapi pratyakṣaṃ phalagatayathārthatā'vasāyasamarthamiti kathanīyaṃ tadānīmananubhūyamānatvāt| Ibid.*

[255] *Tasmānna pratyakṣasyeṣaḥ viṣayaḥ|* Ibid.

[256] *Anumānenāpi kasya prāmāṇyaṃ niścīyate|* Ibid.
For detail see, ibid., pp. 155-57.

that validity and invalidity are inherent in cognition itself. Thus the validity and invalidity of cognitions are self evident or *svataḥ*.[257]

Jayanta rejects the Sāṃkhya view on the ground that for the failure of practical activities (*pravṛttivisaṃvāda*), the theory of self validity and invalidity of cognition fails to account for it.[258] If the validity of cognition is self evident, there cannot be unsuccessful activity. If the invalidity of cognition is self evident, there cannot be any activity at all. The cognition of silver in the shell must be either valid or invalid. If it is valid and known to be valid by the cognition itself, then the act of taking it up cannot lead to disappointment. Again, if it is invalid and known to be invalid by the cognition itself, no one will go to pick it up. But illusions and disappointment are ordinary and frequent experiences of life. Therefore both validity and invalidity of cognition are not intrinsic or self evident.[259]

Thus the present chapter is a brief account of cognitive process as propounded by Jayantabhaṭṭa. The above delineation solely focused on Jayanta's presentation. It is the textual study with analysing the issues in a distinctive manner.

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[257] *Viñānānaṃ prāmāṇyamaprāmāṇyaṃ ceti dvayamapi svataḥ* | *N.M.* (Vizianagram Series.), p. 160.
[258] *Tatra dvayamapi svata iti tāvadasāṃpratam | pravṛttasya visaṃvāsadarśanāt* | Ibid.
[259] Ibid.

CHAPTER- 4

A CRITIQUE BASED ON INTER- SCHOOL AND INTRA- SCHOOL COMPARISON OF KEY CONCEPTS

4.1 Comparison of the Key Concepts

It is an essential feature of every philosophical school from the earliest time to equip itself with a great extent of the theory of cognition (*pramāṇa-vāda*). Especially the Nyāya theory of cognition discusses all the problems of logic and epistemology. S.C. Chatterjee remarks that the problems of knowledge in general and methods of valid knowledge in particular were brought home to Naiyāyikas by the Buddhists and other sceptical thinkers of ancient India in course of their criticism of the realistic philosophy of Gautama.[1] Till now various epistemological issues have generally been discussed from the Nyāya point of view and particularly from Jayanta's viewpoint. In the present chapter it has been tried to present a critical note by assimilating all the key concepts involved in the cognitive process.

4.2 Nature of Cognition

Regarding cognition of cognition itself there are divergent views. Such as:

- The Buddhists consider cognition to be self- luminous.[2]

- The Sāṃkhyas, Vedāntins, Prābhākaras and Jainas also hold that cognition is self- manifested.

- The Bhāṭṭas hold that cognition is known by inference from the knownness of its object.

- The Naiyāyikas hold that though cognition is perceptible, it is perceived by a cognition other than itself which is known as *anuvyavasāya*.[3]

The Nyāya view is criticised by Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka on the ground that if cognition is not self- luminous but requires another cognition to reveal itself, then it would be involved in an infinite regress. Thus all philosophers except the Bhāṭṭas and the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas hold that cognition is self- luminous. Jayanta holds the Nyāya view and criticises the Mīmāṃsakas view.[4]

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[1] *NTK*, p. 2.
[2] *Sarvacittacaittānāmātmavedanaṃ svavedanaṃ| N.Bi.*, 1/11
[3] Tasmāt jñānāntarasaṃvedyaṃ saṃvedanaṃ vedatvāt ghaṭādivat| *Vyomavatī*, quoted in *IL*, p. 123, note-44
[4] *Supra*, 3rd chapter, pp.66-7

4.3 Means of Valid Cognition (*Pramāṇa*)

The concept of *pramāṇa* has been discussed elaborately under the Nyāya,[5] the Buddhist, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and the Sāṃkhya view.[6]

According to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, *pramāṇa* as the cause of cognition should be free from defects.[7] Śrīdhara introduces a new word, i.e., *adhyavasāya,* in the definition of *pramāṇa* to signify that *vidyā* is a definite cognition.[8]

The Prābhākaras define valid cognition as immediate experience.[9]

There are different opinions amongst the Jaina philosophers regarding the nature of *pramāṇa*. Siddhasena states that *pramāṇa* is that type of cognition which illuminates itself and the object and which is without any barrier.[10] Akalaṅka refers to novelty and uncontradictness and *svaparābhāsa* as *pramāṇa*. Māṇikya Nandi defines *pramāṇa* as the knowledge which ascertains the nature of what was uncertain one's self.[11] In the Jaina tradition, Vidyānanda was the first philosopher to introduce the term *vyavasāyātmaka*.[12]

Vātsyāyana defines *pramāṇa* as a means of *upalabdhi*.[13] Vācaspati clearly explains the non- contradictory character of valid cognition.[14] The later Naiyāyikas follow him and observe that the cognition is that which presents an object with its real character.

Jayanta introduces the term '*sāmagrī*' in defining *pramāṇa*. With this he brings out the novelty in the notion of *pramāṇa*. Likewise, he rejects the Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya view of *pramāṇa*.[15]

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[5] *Supra*, 2nd chapter, pp. 35-6
[6] *Supra*, 3rd chapter, pp.79-87
[7] *Aduṣṭaṃ vidyā| V.S.*, 9/2/12
[8] *N.K.*, (Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya edn.), p. 442.
[9] *Anubhūtiśca naḥ pramāṇam| Bṛhatī*, 1.15, quoted in *IL*, p. 121, note- 6
[10] *Pramāṇaṃ svaparābhāsi jñānaṃ bādhavivarjitaṃ | Nyāyavatāra,*
[11] *HIL*, p. 189
[12] *ITK*, p. 45.
[13] *Upalabdhisādhanāni pramāṇāni| N.B.*, 1/1/3
[14] *Tathā hi pramāṇamarthavaditi nityayoge matup| nityatā ca avyabhicāritā| tena avyabhicārītyarthaḥ| iyameva cārthavyabhicāritā yad deśakālāntarāvasthāntarā visaṃvādo 'rthasvarūpaprakārayostadupadarśitayoḥ| N.V.T.T.*, 1/1/3
[15] *Supra,* 3rd chapter, pp. 68-73

4.4 Number of *Pramāṇas*

Different types of *pramāṇa* accepted by the schools of Indian philosophy are:

1. Cārvāka	*Pratyakṣa*
2. Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist	*Pratyakṣa, Anumāna*
3. Sāṃkhya and Yoga	*Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda*
4. Nyāya	*Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda*
5. Prabhākara	*Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti*
6. Bhāṭṭa and Vedānta	*Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti, Anupalabddhi*
7. Jaina	*Pratyakṣa, Parokṣa.*
8. Paurāṇika	*Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti, Anupalabddhi, Saṃbhava, Aitihya*

As Varadārāja admits:

> *Pratyakṣamekaṃ cārvākāḥ kaṇādasugatau punaḥ|*
>
> *Anumānaṃ ca taccātha sāṃkhyāḥ śabdaṃ ca te api||*
>
> *Nyāyaikadeśino 'pyevamupamānaṃ ca kecan|*
>
> *Arthāpattyā sahaitāni catvāryāha prabhākaraḥ||*
>
> *Abhāvaṣṣṭhānyetāni bhāṭṭā vedāntinastathā||*
>
> *Saṃbhavaitihyayuktāni tāni paurāṇikā jaguḥ|*[16]

According to the Nyāya philosophy, there are four kinds of valid cognition-perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Jayanta also agrees with this view and criticises the Buddhists' view on two fold classifications, Kumārila's position on *anupalabdhi* as an additional *pramāṇa* , the Mīmāṃsakas' view on *arthāpatti* as a distinct means of cognition, and also the Paurāṇikas' views on *saṃbhava* and *aitihya* as distinct means of cognition.[17]

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[16] *T.R.*, p. 35
[17] *Supra*, 3rd chapter, pp. 100-16

4.4.1 Perception (*Pratyakṣa*)

The Nyāya[18] view regarding *pratyakṣa* is that of the type of cognition which is derived from the contact of sense with the objects. It is highly accepted by the Vaiśeṣika,[19] Mīmāṃsā[20] and the others. All of them agree on this point but they put different views in details:

- **Buddhists:** According to the Buddhists, perception is an unerring cognition of the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) that is given directly through the senses. The name and the universal concept, through which we generally interpret the particular, should not be included in perception, as they are supplied by our imagination (*kalpanā*).[21] Perception deals with what Diṅnāga calls *svalakṣaṇas*, literally that which characterises itself, a particular characteristic or pure particular – something absolutely unique, singular and, most important, momentary (*kṣaṇika*). As *svalakṣaṇas* are ultimately real and inexpressible, to experience those means to experience reality as it is.

- **Mīmāṃsā:** Jaimini has defined perception as "The cognitions that is produced when there is contact of one's sense organs."[22] There are however several views regarding the interpretation of Jaimini's *sūtra*. Śabarasvāmin holds that the entire *sūtra* is simply a pointer to establish the fact that dharma cannot be known by perception.[23] So, according to Jaimini, though the definition of perception has no direct bearing upon the initial proposition, i.e., upon *dharma*, yet it has been given to indicate that perception has nothing to do with the illumination of *dharma*. According to the Prābhākaras, *pratyakṣa* is the direct apprehension which involves the cognition of the three factors- *meya*, *mātṛ* and *māna*.[24]

- **Sāṃkhya:** For the Sāṃkhyas, sense cognition is a definite cognition obtained through the sense organs.[25]

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[18] *Supra*, 2nd chapter, *pp.* 37-9

[19] *V.S.* and *P.P.B.* on *Pratyakṣanirūpaṇam.*

[20] *Sat-samprayoge puruṣendriyāṇām....*"| *S.V.*, 1/1/4

[21] *Pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ pratyakṣeṇaiva siddhyati*|
Pratyātmavedyaḥ sarveṣāṃ vikalpo nāmasaṃśryayaḥ| *P.V.*, 3/123

[22] *Satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittam vidyamānopalambhanatvāt*| *M.S.*, 1.1.4

[23] *Satīndriyārthasambandhe yā puruṣasya buddhirjāyate tatpratyakṣam*| *S.B.*, 1/1/4

[24] *Sākṣātpratītiḥ pratyakṣam.....meyamātṛpramāsu sā*| *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā*, quoted in *ITK*, p. 89.

[25] *Prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*| *S.K.*, 5

- **Vaiśeṣika:** In Vaiśeṣika philosophy no direct definition of perception is found. However in the *sūtra* 3.1.18, it is said that one form of cognition is regarded as the product of the contact of an object with the sense organs and the soul.[26] Praśastapāda says that the term *'pratyakṣa'* literally signifies the knowledge which is dependent upon the senses.[27]

- **Jaina:** The Jainas define perception in terms of its vividness (*viṣadaṃ pratyakṣam*).

- **Advaita Vedānta:** According to the Advaita Vedāntins, perceptual cognition is immediacy (*aparokṣa*). What is immediately apprehended is consciousness. Thus consciousness is perceptual.[28]

The old Naiyāyikas define perception as the definite cognition produced by sense object contact. There is no controversy among the old Nyāya scholars regarding the nature of cognition, but in Navya- Nyāya perception is defined as the immediate cognition or that which is not brought about by any antecedent cognition.[29] Jayanta follows the path of the old Naiyāyikas and says that the term *'pratyakṣa'* signifies a particular species of cognition, which depends upon sense organs. In his delineation, Jayanta criticises the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Buddhists and the Sāṃkhyas views in detail.[30]

4.4.1.1 Types of Perception (*Pratyakṣa*)

There are divergent views regarding the classifications of *pratyakṣa*:

- According to the Buddhists, *nirvikalpaka* is the only mode of *pratyakṣa* and there is no such thing as *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*.

- The Cārvākas admit that *savikalpaka* is the only division of *pratyakṣa*.

- According to the Jainas, *Pratyakṣa* is of two types- (1) *vyavahārika*, which is the knowledge acquired by the soul through the five senses, and (2)

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[26] *Ātmendriyārthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat* |

[27] *Akṣamakṣaṃ pratītyautpadyatai iti pratykaṣam* | *P.P.B,* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Sansthan edn.), p. 153

[28] *CIP,* p. 18

[29] *NTK,* p. 377.

[30] For detail see, *N.M.,* (Chowkhamba edn.), Part. I, pp. 61-100

pāramārthika, which is the knowledge which comes from the perfect enlighten of the soul.

- The majority view is that both the *nirvikalpaka* and the *savikalpaka* are the modes of perception. The majority view is accepted by mainly by Bhāṭṭas, Prābhākaras, Saṃkhyas Vedāntins and Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas.

It is probably Kumārila who initiated the problem of *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* in Indian philosophy.[31]

The Prābhākaras hold the same view as that of the Bhāṭṭas and accept two types of *anumāna*.

The Sāṃkhyas accept *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* as two types of *prtayakṣa*.

The Vedānta also refers to these two types of perception.[32]

In Vaiśeṣika tradition, Śrīdhara maintains that *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* are the two stages of *pratyakṣa*.

In Nyāya tradition, the distinction between *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* is not recognised in *Nyāyasūtra, Bhāṣya* and *Vārttika*. Vācasspatimiśra for the first time in his *Tātparyaṭikā* makes the distinction to *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4. The two terms 'avyapadeśyam' and 'vyavasāyātmakam' in Gautama's *sūtra,* according to Vācaspatimiśra, mean respectively *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* perception.[33] Jayanta also follows Vācaspatimiśra and distinguishes between two types of *pratyakṣa*. He also tries to link the division with the Nyāyasūtra itself.[34]

4.4.2 Inference (*Anumāna*)

Except the Cārvākas, all the Indian philosophical systems hold *anumāna* as a distinct means of cognition.

Kaṇāda has admitted that *anumāna* is the knowledge of probandum derived from the knowledge of the probans. Praśastapāda has defined *anumāna* as the knowledge

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[31] *Na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīmanubhūyate| tayorādhārabhūtā tu vyaktirevāvasīyate| S.V.,* IV-112.

[32] *Vedāntaparibhāṣa,* p. 64, quoted in *ITK,* p. 119.

[33] *Supra,* 2nd chapter, pp. 40-1

[34] *Nirvikalpakvattasmātpratyakṣaṃ savikalpakam|*
Samagrahīcca tadidaṃ padenānena sūtrakṛta| N.M., (Chowkhamba edn.), part I, p. 82

which results from the apprehension of a *liṅga*.[35] He has explained *liṅga* as that which is related to probandum and which is equally present and absent in the probandum.

Diṅnāga defines *anumāna* as the cognition of an object through its mark. Dharmakīrti defines *svārthānumāna* as a cognition which is produced indirectly through a mark consisting of a threefold aspect and referring to an inferred object.[36]

According to the Saṃkhya philosophy, knowledge based on the co- existence of a mark and that in which the mark inheres is called *anumāna*.[37]

The definition of *anumāna* as given by Śabara is, "*anumānaṃ jñātasambandhasya-ekadeśadarśanāt-ekadeśantare-asannikṛṣṭe arthe buddhiḥ*."[38] This is the basis of both Kumārila and Prabhākara's theory of *anumāna*.

In Nyāya tradition Gautama does not define *anumāna*. He only holds that *anumāna* presupposes *pratyakṣa*. Vātsyāyana deals with the etymological aspect of the term *anumāna*. The other Nyāya logicians also light upon *anumāna* in detail.[39] Jayanta says that *anumāna* is that form which the lying beyond the reach of the sense organs.[40] Jayanta in this connection refutes the views of the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā.[41]

4.4.2.1 Classification of Inference (*Anumāna*)

In Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika philosophy, *anumāna* is divided into two types: *dṛṣṭa* (*pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa*) and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*.

> *Tattu   dvividham| pratyakṣato   dṛṣṭasambandhaṃ   sāmānyato dṛṣṭasambandhaṃ ca|*[42]
>
> *Tattu dvividham| dṛṣṭaṃ sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ca |*[43]

The Sāṃkhyas admit three types of *anumāna*, as in *Sāṃkhyakārikā*:

> *Trividhamanumānamākhyātam|*[44]

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[35] *Liṅgadarśanāt sañjāyamānaṃ laiṅgikam| P.P.B.,* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Sansthan edn.), p. 162
[36] *Tatra svārthaṃ trirūpāllingād yadanumeye jñānaṃ tadanumānam| N.Bi.,* 2/3
[37] *Tallingalingipūrvakaṃ| S.K.,* 5.
[38] *S.B.* 1/1/5
[39] *Supra,* 2nd chapter
[40] *Pratyakṣapūrvakaṃ parokṣārthaṃ pratipattirūpaṃ phalaṃ yato bhavati tadanumānam| N.M.,* (Chowkhamba edn.), part. I, p. 115
[41] For detail see, Ibid., pp. 108-27
[42] Ibid.
[43] *P.P.B.,* (Chowkhamba Sanaskrit Sansthan edn.), p 169
[44] *S.K., 5.*

In *Māthavṛtti*[45] and *Carakasaṃhitā*[46] also there are the same references of three types of *anumāna* as, *"pratyakṣapūrvaṃ trividhaṃ trikālaṃ cānumīyate"*.

The Buddhists divide *anumāna* into two types- *svārtha* and *parārtha*.[47]

Gautama has divided *anumāna* as- *pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.[48] However, there are four general classifications of *anumāna* that are found in Nyāya philosophy.[49] Jayanta follows Gautama and enumerates three types of *anumāna* in detail. Jayanta has the credit of clearly introducing *svārtha* and *parārtha* types of *anumāna* in Nyāya and thereby initiating a new tradition has not been accepted so far in the Nyāya School. It is probably under the influence of Jayanta, Keśavamiśra and Annaṃbhaṭṭa[50] adopt these two types.[51]

4.4.2.2 Constituents of Inference (*Avayavas*)

The Nyāya – Vaiśeṣikas admit the similar numbers of constituents for *parāthānumāna*. But the names of these constituents in both the schools are different. The Nyāya uses the terms- *pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya* and *nigamana*. The Vaiśeṣika has named them as: *pratijñā, apadeśa, nidarśana, anusandhāna* and *prathyāmnnāya*.[52] In other philosophical schools there are differences in the number of *avayavas* as well:

1. In Buddhist philosophy only two *avayavas* are considered. They are: *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*.[53]

2. In Jaina philosophy the number of *avayavas* is not fixed, but in accordance with nature of *adhikārī* it may be more or less. Thus the Jaina philosophers accept one (*hetu*), two (*pakṣa* and *hetu*) and five *avayavas* for *parārthānumāna*.[54]

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[45] *M.V., S.K., Kārikā-5*
[46] *C.S., Sūtrasthāna* 21-2
[47] *Anumānaṃ dvidhā| svārthaṃ parthaṃ ca| N.Bi.*, p. 17
[48] *N.S.,* 1/1/5
[49] *Supra,* 2nd chapter
[50] *Supra,* 2nd chapter
[51] ITK, p. 143.
[52] *Avayavāḥ punaḥ pratijñāpadeśa- nirdarśanānusandhāna- pratyāmnāyāḥ| P.P.B.,* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Sansthan edn.), p. 186.
[53] *P.V.* 1/28
[54] For detail see, *ITK*, pp. 168-9

3. The Sāṃkhyas, Mīmāṃsakas[55] and Advaita Vedāntins consider three members.

Regarding the constituents of *parārthānumāna*, intra- school difference is also found. Some old Naiyāyikas refer to five more constituents in addition to these five and hold that *anumāna* consists of ten constituents. Vātsyāyana states and refutes them as well.[56]

Jayanta supports the Naiyāyikas' view of *pañcāvayavas*. He refutes the *tryavayava* theory of the Sāṃkhyas' and the Mīmāṃsakas', *dvyavayava* theory of the Jainas', and the *daśāvayava* theory of the old Nyāya logicians.[57]

4.4.2.3 Fallacies of Reason or *Hetu* (*Hetvābhāsas*)

The fallacies of reason have been variously named and classified by different logicians, e.g.,

Logicians	Hetvābhāsas
Gautama[58]	*Savyabhicāra, viruddha, prakaraṇasama (satpratipakṣa), sādhyasama* and *kālātīta (bādhita).*
Uddyotakara[59]	*Sādhyasama, savyabhicāra, prakaraṇasama, viruddha, kālātīta*
Bhāsarvajña[60]	*Asiddha, anaikāntika, anadhyavasita, satpratipakṣa, viruddha, kālātīta*
Gaṅgeśa	*sādhyasama, savyabhicāra, satpratipakṣa, viruddha, bādha*
Kaṇāda[61]	*Aprasiddha, saṃdigdha, asat*
Praśastapāda[62]	*Asiddha, saṃdigdha, anadhyavasita,*

N.D., (West Bengal State Book Board edn.), vol. I, p. 339

[55] *Vayaṃ trayaṃ| udāharaṇaparyantaṃ yadvodāharaṇādikaṃ|* As quoted in *N.D.*, (West Bengal State Book Board edn.), vol. I, p. 337

[56] *Supra*, 2ⁿᵈ chapter,pp. 47-8

[57] For detail see, N.M., (Chowkhamba edn.), *prameyapakaraṇa, Avayava*

[58] *Supra*, 2ⁿᵈ chapter, pp. 48-51

[59] Ibid.

[60] *EIP*, Vol. II, PP. 403-6

[61] *Aprasiddho 'napadeśo 'san sandigdhaścānapadeśa|* *V.S.*, 3/1/15

[62] *Etenāsiddhaviruddhdasandigdhānadhyavasitavacanānāmanapadeśatvamuktambhavati|* *P.P.B.*,(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Sansthan edn.), p. 189

	viruddha
Vallabhāchārya[63]	*Asiddha, viruddha, savyabhicāra, anadhyavasita*
Diṅnāga[64]	*Asiddha, aniṣṭa, viruddha*
Dharmakīrti[65]	*Asiddha, anaikāntika* and *viruddha*
Kumārila	*Asiddha, anaikāntika* and *viruddha*
Akalaṅka	*Asiddha, viruddha, saṃdigdha, akincitkara*
Prabhākara	*Asādhāraṇa, bādhita, sādhāraṇa* and *asiddha*
Keśavamiśra[66]	*Asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika, kālātyayāpadiṣṭa, prakaraṇasama.*
Viśanātha[67]	*Anaikāntika, viruddha, asiddha, pratipakṣita, kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*
Annaṃbhaṭṭa[68]	Follows Gautama.

It has been seen that except for a slight difference in taxonomy, the Naiyāyikas are unanimous in holding that the *hetvābhāsas* are five- fold. Jayanta follows Gautama in naming the fallacies of reason as *savyabhicāra, viruddha, prakaraṇasama, sādhyasama* and *kālātīta.*[69] Jaynata surpasses almost all his predecessors in giving a detailed account of these types and their sub- types.

4.4.3 Comparison (*Upamāna*)

The Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Buddhist and the Jaina philosophy do not accept *upamāna* or comparison as a distinct means of cognition. The Vaiśeṣika has reduced *upamāna* to inference.[70] According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the *atideśevākya* is the verbal cognition, the observation of similarity is perceptual cognition and the

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[63] *Tadābhāsāstv catvāraḥ| asiddhaviruddhasavyabhicārānadhyavasitāḥ| N.L.,* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edn.), p. 606.

[64] *Trirūpālliṅgādyadanumeye jñānaṃ tadanumānam| Nyāyapraveśa, quoted in N.D.,* (West Bengal State Book Board edn.), vol. I, p. 437

[65] *Asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikāstrayo hetvābhāsāḥ| N.Bi.,* p. 62

[66] *Asiddha-viruddha-anaikāntika-prakaraṇasama-kālātyayāpadiṣṭa-bhedāt pañcaiva| T.B.,* p. 246.

[67] *Anaikāntau viruddhaścāpyasiddhaḥ pratipakṣitaḥ|*
   Kālātyayāpadiṣṭaśca hetvābhāsāstu pañcadhā|| 71|| B.P. (Advaita Ashrama edn.), p. 129.

[68] *T.S.D,* p. XXX

[69] *N.M.,* (Chowkhamba edn.), II, pp. 153-68.
   Supra, 3rd chapter, p. 96

[70] *Upamānam anumānāvyatiriktam, N.Kṃ* p.530

ultimate cognition of identification is a case of inference based upon these two.[71] The Yoga agrees with the Sāṃkhya. The Buddhists identify *upamāna* with memory.[72] The Jainas recognized *upamāna* as a form of recognition *(pratyabhijñā)*[73] which is a form of the indirect sources of cognition.

Śabara[74] describes *upamāna* as a kind of analogical argument. He gives the example that one can know the existence of souls in other bodies on the analogy of our cognition of our own bodies having soul. But the later Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins point out that *upamāna* is cognition based on both *śabda* and *anumāna*. According to them the process of *upamāna* is: when a man observes a cow, and after it a *gavaya,* he judges, "This *gavaya* is like that cow." From this sense of similarity he passes to the cognition, "That cow is like the *gavaya*." The last cognition is not perceptual cognition because the cow is not present. It is not an inference because no universal premise is used to reach the conclusion.[75]

It is already stated that Gautama has defined *upamāna* as the knowing of an unknown thing by its similarity to a known thing.[76] However, as far as the Nyāya view is concerned, there are some differences in *Bhāṣya Vārttika* and the *Tātparyaṭikā*. Though there is no difference regarding the object of analogical cognition and the exact form of the cognition, as according to *Bhāṣya, Vārttika and Tātparyaṭīkā,* the object is the connection of the name with the another object i.e., *gavaya*, but there is a marked difference of opinion as to the means of the cognition. Again, *upamāna* being a means as the similarity between two objects is agreed by all; but according to the *Bhāṣya* the assertion that 'the *gavaya* is like a cow' is remembered at the time of seeing the animal resembling the cow; while according to the *Nyāyavārtika* and the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā,* it is the similarity that is actually seen when *gavaya* is seen to resemble the cow and thus the cognition of similarity perceived being aided by the remembrance of the similarity in the assertion 'the *gavaya* is like a cow'. In *Nyāyapariśuddhi* it is said that,

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[71] *S.K.*, p.40

[72] *Tattvasaṃgraha*, pp. 1547-9, quoted in *IL*, Nagin J. Shah, p. 125, note- 67.

[73] *Tadevedaṃ tatsadṛsam iti vā pratyabhijñā| Siddhivviniścaya,* quoted in *JL,* p. 752.

[74] *S.B,* 1/1/5

[75] *Dṛṣṭigoh puruṣasya tatsadṛśaṃ gavayaṃ paśyato yad goviṣayakaṃ gavayagatasādṛśyajñānam tadupamānam| S.B., 1/1/5*

[76] *Supra,* 2nd chapter, pp. 51-2

"sādṛśyasyaiva prajñāyamānasya karaṇatvamabhipraiti |"[77]

Vācaspati, in his *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭikā,* interprets the *bhāṣya* "*yathā gauḥ tathā gavayaḥ*" to mean that similarity should be one that is already known. This assertion is nothing but *upamāna.*

It seems that the view of *Nyāyavārtika* and *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭikā* is more logical. In *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭikā* it is rightly remarked that for the cognition of "this is the animal what is called *gavaya*" it is necessary to know the assertion "the *gavaya* is similar to cow". If the analogical cognition is depends upon its remembered similarity, then its validity would be doubtful as that of remembrance.

Therefore, obviously Jayantabhaṭṭa finds a difference of opinion among his predecessors about the nature of *upamāna.* He presents the opinion of the early Naiyāyikas as well as the contemporary Naiyāyikas.[78] Jayanta brings out the conflict between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas to the forefront.[79]

4.4.4 Verbal Testimony (*Śabda*)

Apart from the Cārvākas, Vaiśeṣika and Buddhists, all the other schools of Indian Philosophy accept verbal testimony as a distinct source of cognition. The Cārvākas do not consider verbal testimony as a means of cognition and it depends upon the statement of a reliable person.[80] They do not support it as a distinct source of cognition.   The Vaiśeṣika holds that verbal testimony is an inferential cognition based on the reliability of the authority.[81] In verbal testimony we know the unperceived object through the perception of words related to these objects. The Buddhists also reduce verbal testimony to inference as it is based upon the statement of a trustworthy person and to perception if it is used to prove that there are actual facts corresponding to a statement.[82]

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[77] N.V.T.T.P., 1/1/6

[78] *Supra,* 3rd chapter, pp. 97-8

[79] For detail see, *N.M.,* (Chowkhamba edn.), part- I, pp.128-33.

[80] S.D.S., p. 14

[81] Etena śābdaṃ vyākhyātam, V.S., 9/2/3

[82] Tatrānumānamevedaṃ baudhavaiśeṣikaiḥ śritam|
 Bhedaḥ sāṃkhyādibhistviṣṭo na tūktaṃ bhedakāraṇam| S.V., (Śabda), 15.
c.f., *HIL,* pp. 287-8

The Nyāya upholds the validity of *śabda* as a way of knowing.[83] According to Gautama, *śabda* is the instruction of a reliable person.[84] Jayanta elaborates the Nyāya position with esteem keenness by introducing the divergent views regarding the interpretation and implications of Gautama's definition. Jayanta justifies the acceptance of *śabda* as a distinct means of cognition. He mainly refutes the Mīmāṃsakas' and the Buddhists' views in this regard.

4.4.5 Postulation (*Arthāpatti*)

Arthāpatti is considered as an independent means of cognition by the Mīmāṃsakas[85] and the Advaita Vedāntins. The Buddhists reduce it to inference.[86] The Vaiśeṣikas also include it to inference. According to the Sāṃkhyas also *arthāpatti* is a [87]form of inference. The Jainas reduce it to inference.

Gautama and Vātsyāyana also admit that *arthāpatti* can be reduced to *anumāna*.[88] Udayana also criticises the Mīmāṃsakas' view that *arthāpatti* is an independent means of cognition.[89] Jayanta also discusses the problem or *arthāpatti* at length. He refutes the Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras regarding the nature of *arthāpatti* and also of the two types of it as *śrutārthāpatti* and *dṛṣṭārthapatti* as enumerated by the Bhāṭṭas.[90]

4.4.6 Non- Cognition *(Anupalabdhi)*

In Indian philosophy *anupalabdhi* is accepted as a distinct means of valid cognition by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedāntis. The Naiyāyikas refute *anupalabdhi* as a distinct *pramāṇa*.[91]

In Vaiśeṣika tradition, *abhāva* is introduced as an independent category in Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī*.[92] Regarding the method of cognizing *abhāva*, there is a difference of

[83] *Supra*, 2ⁿᵈ chapter, p. 53
[84] *N.S.*, 1/1/7
[85] *Supra*, 3ʳᵈ chapter
[86] *Evaṃ sati anumāne evāntarabhāvāt na pramāṇātaratvṃ syādityabhprāyaḥ| Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, quoted in *IL*, p. 125, note- 68.
[87] *S.T.K., Kārikā-5*
[88] *Vākyārthasaṃpratyayenānabhihitasyārthasya pratyanīkabhāvādgrahaṇamarthāpattiranumānameva| N.B.,*2/2/2
[89] *N.Ku.*, stavaka-3
For detail see, *N.D.*, (West Bengal State Book Board edn.), vol. 2, p. 372.
[90] *Supra*, 3ʳᵈ chapter, 100-6
[91] *Supra*, 2ⁿᵈ chapter, p. 55
[92] *Abhāvo 'pi padārthāntaram| K.Va.* on *N.S.M., Kārikā-2*

opinion between the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. The Naiyāyikas consider *abhāva* is an object of perception, but Vaiśeṣikas consider it as an object of inference.[93]

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins hold that *abhāva* is the non-existence of an object in a specific locus and it can be cognized through *anupalbdhi*.

The Prābhākaras hold that though *abhāva* has no reality, it can be cognized through perception. The Buddhists do not believe in the reality of *abhāva* and the way of knowing to ascertain *abhāva* is inference.[94]

The Sāṃkhyas' view is same as that of Prābhākaras. They admit that the *abhāva* of a jar in the ground is nothing but the bare ground. And the empty ground is nothing but the ground itself. Therefore the cognition of the *abhāva* of the jar on the ground is the cognition of the ground and it can be cognized through perception.[95] The Yoga also does not accept *anupalabdhi*.

Gautama considers *abhāva* as an object of cognition. Gautama and Vātsyāyana, without elaborating, agree that absences are known inferentially (*Nyāya-sūtra* 2.2.2). But Uddyotakara and the later tradition argue that the *abhāva* can be known sometimes perceptually.[96]

Thus Indian philosophers can be divided into four groups regarding the analysis of *abhāva*:

1. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins accept that *abhāva* is an entity and is cognized through *anpalabdhi*.

2. The Prābhākaras and the Sāṃkhyas hold that *abhāva* is not an entity and it can be obtained through perception.

3. The Naiyāyikas maintain that *abhāva* is a reality but it can be cognized through perception and there is no need of accepting *anupalabdhi* as a distinct means of cognition.

4. The Buddhists are opposed to accepting the ontological reality of *abhāva*.

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[93] *P.P.B.,* (Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya edn.), pp. 542.

[94] *Tathā hi prabhākarāḥ bhāvāntaram eva bhāvāntarāpekṣayā abhāva iti vyāvahriyate| S.P.,* quoted in *SWK,* p. 135.

[95] *Abhāvo'pi pratyakṣameva, nahibhūtalasya pariṇāmaviśeṣāt kaivalyalakṣaṇāt anyo ghaṭābhāvo nāma| S.T.K.,* (West Bengal State Book Board edn.), p. 36.

[96] *Abhāvapratyakṣasya ānubhavikatvāt anupalambho'pi na pramāṇāntaram| N.S.M.,* *Kārikā*-144

Jayanta gives a detailed account of the problem of *abhāva*. He examines the Bhaṭṭa theory of *abhāva* (Negation) and *anupalabdhi* (Non-Cognition), the Buddhists' view on the ontological aspect of *abhāva* and Prabhākara's refutation to accept *abhāva* as a reality.

4. 4.7 *Pramāṇa Saṃplava*

The full significance of disagreement between the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇa-saṃplava* and the Buddhists theory of *pramāṇa- vyavasthā* has been already suggested.[97] Buddhist philosophy does not recognise the validity of *pramanasamplava*. According to their theory, an object is in perpetual flux, it cannot last for more than a moment. One object cannot have two validities, simultaneously. Again they hold that perception and inference have their own special fields of action in as much as the former grasps the particulars only and the latter universals only.[98]

The Jainas are also appropriately called *Pramānnasamplavavādin*.[99] However, in some of the cases they also accept *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*. They accept momentarism from the viewpoint of modes. The sense is that a thing changes perpetually and so no source of cognition grasps what is grasped by another source. Thus according to the Jainas, *pramāṇa- samplava* is self evident. But they give equal importance to the view of substance. From the viewpoint of substance things are permanent. Hence it is possible for several different sources of cognition to help in the cognition of one and the same object.[100]

Gautama, in his *Nyāyasūtra* , seems to concede the possibility of *pramāṇa-samplava*. This is suggested by the term '*pramāṇataḥ*' used in the *sūtra*, "*pramāṇataśca arthapratipatteḥ*".[101] Vātsyāyana states that there are objects that could be grasped by all the sense organs of cognition while there are other objects that could be grasped by one organ only. For example, the objects of the first type are- soul and fire; they are cognised by *śabda, anumāna* and *pratyakṣa*. On the other hand, the knowledge of

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[97] *Supra*, 3rd chapter, pp. 90-1

[98] *Syānmatireṣā viśiṣṭaviṣayāni pramāṇāni| viśeṣaviṣayaṃ pratyakṣaṃ sāmānyaviṣayamanumānamiti| N.V.*, p.4.

[99] *Pramāṇasaṃplava ekatrārthaṃ pravṛttiranekapramāṇasva| J.L.*, p. 771

[100] As quoted in, *IL*, p. 120

[101] Ibid. p. 119.

heaven could be attained through *śabda* only, the knowledge of clouds could be obtained through *anumāna* only, after having heard the sound and the knowledge of one's own hand could be acquired through *pratyakṣa* only.[102] Uddyotakara also accepts both *pramāṇa- saṃplava* and *pramāṇa- vyavasthā*. He has stated that only the visual sense organ grasps the colour, only the auditory sense organ grasps sound and so on. Again he has observed that though only visual sense organ cognizes colour and the tactual organ cognizes touch, yet both these organs cognize the 'pot.'[103]

Jayantabhaṭṭa also fully agrees with the Naiyāyikas' view and accept *pramāṇa-saṃplava*. However, he also mentions the *Bhāṣayakāra's* view that there are few cases in which a particular means of cognition has an exclusive object of its own.[104]

4.4.8 Validity of Cognition

There are several controversies regarding the validity of cognition. The Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya views are broadly presented in the 2nd and 3rd chapters.[105] Following are the views regarding validity of cognition:

1. Saṃkhya: Both the *prāmāṇya* (validity) and *aprāmāṇya* (invalidity) of cognition are self-evident. In *sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, Mādhavācārya quotes:

   'Pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ sāṃkhyāḥ samāśritāḥ |[106]

2. Buddhist: All cognition is intrinsically invalid and becomes valid by extraneous conditions. Dharmakīrti holds that the validity of cognition is known through the subsequent successful activity.[107]

3. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: Both validity and invalidity are due to extraneous conditions.

4. Mīmāṃsā: Knowledge is intrinsically valid, though its invalidity is due to extraneous conditions.

5. Jaina: Both the validity and invalidity of cognition are self- evident in the case of repeated acquaintance, while they are known through subsequent successful activities in the case of first acquaintance.[108]

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[102] *N.B.*, 1/1/3

[103] *N.V.*, 1/1/3

[104] *Supra*, 3rd chapter, p., pp. 90-1

[105] *Supra*, 2nd chapter, pp., 56-9

[106] *S.D.S.* p. 476

[107] *Svarūpasya svato gatiḥ|Prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa| P.V.,* 1.

The Nyāya philosophers refute mainly the theory of intrinsic validity of cognition.[109] Jayantabhaṭṭa also opposes the Mīmāṃsakas' contention and refutes them. Likewise, he rejects the Sāṃkhya view that both validity and invalidity of cognition are intrinsic.[110]

From the above discussion it can be observed that there are divergent views available in Indian philosophy regarding the notion of *pramāṇa*. The study of the cognitive process has always attracted the philosophers from a very early date. The Nyāya philosophy enters into a new phase through the methodological study of the epistemological issues. Apart from Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, Jaina and Cārvāka also more or less deal with the cognitive process. But they are different from each other regarding their arguments, as is clear from the above brief elucidation presented in the light of *Nyāyamañjarī*.

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[108] *Tatprāmāṇyaṃ svataḥ parataśceti | Parikṣāmukha,* 1/13

Tadubhayamutpattau parata eva jñaptau tu svataḥ parataśceti| Pramāṇanayatattvāloka, 1/21, quoted in *IL,* p. 124, note- 59.
[109] *Supra,* 2nd chapter, pp. 59-60
[110] *Supra,* 3rd chapter, pp. 116-119

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the above brief delineation, it can be stated that this dissertation is an effort to study the cognitive process as presented by Jayantabhaṭṭa in the first *āhnika* of his *Nyāyamañjarī*. As it is obvious from the foregoing pages, it is tried to critically examine Jayanta's view regarding cognitive process in detail and to present a comparative study of the concepts on inter-school and intra-school school level.

To sum up, the first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī* is the preface to the other *āhnikas*. It is a concise compendium of all the schools of Indian philosophy. Though it is a book on the Nyāya philosophy, but here the author introduces almost all the logical problems that deal with other philosophical schools, such as the Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā, Sāmkhya, Cārvāka etc. So, though the first *āhika* is an introduction of Jayanta's work, still it covers a wide scope.

Jayanta's theory of cognition comprises of the set of systematic discussion of crucial points with maximum rigour. The whole discussion on cognitive process according to Jayanta can be summarised under the following points:

1. For Jayanta cognition is a quality of the soul, not an action like the Mīmāṃsakas' view (pp. 74-9).

2. According to Jayanta *buddhi* and *upalabddhi* are the definitive synonyms for *jñāna*. In this regard he criticizes the contention of the Sāmkhyas (pp.61-2)

3. Jayanta brings out novelty in his definition of *pramāṇa* as, "*sāmagrī pramaṇam*." He also introduces the word "*bodhābodhasvabhāvā*" which is not clearly stated by the logicians before Jayanta in the definition of *pramāṇa* (pp. 68-73)

4. Jayanta strongly argues in support of the ultimate viability of only four *pramāṇas* and accordingly excludes *abhāva, arthāpatti, sambhava and aitihya* from the domain of *pramāṇa* (pp. 87).

5. He goes up against the Buddhists' idea of *pramāṇavyavasthā* and supports *pramāṇasamplava* in majority of cases, except a few (pp.90-1). Jaynata is the first Nyāya philosopher to introduce the contention between *pramāṇasamplava* and *pramāṇa- vyavasthā*.

6. Many of the Buddhists' views are mentioned and refuted in *Nyāyamañjarī* by Jayantabhatta, such as: there are only two instruments of valid cognition; perception is conceptual construction which is free from determination by the imagination and is non-illusory, *pramā* is identical to *pramāṇa*, (pp.79-80) etc.

7. Likewise, several Mīmāṃsakas' views are also motioned and refuted, such as definition of *pramāṇa*, (pp.84) notion of *abhāva*, *arthāpatti* as a distinct means of cognition, etc.

8. Jayanta explains that though Gautama does not define the term *pramāṇa*, but we can presume his idea of *pramāṇa* from the expression '*sādhyasādhanam*' mentioned in the definition of *upamāna*. Thus it means that *pramāṇa* is that (*sādhana*) which produces the knowledge of the *sādhya*.[1]

9. Some of the *pāṭhabhedas* are also noticed in the Hindi translation by Shasiprabha Kumar and Siddheswar Bhatt with Panchanan Tarkavagisha's Bengali translation and Chowkhamba edition by Surayanarayana Shukla. In the third chapter some of those are mentioned (3rd chapter foot note-115, 228).

10. Jayanta in one place quotes *Bhāṣyakāra's* view as "*buddhikarmaṇī api hi pratyabhijñāyete, te api nitye prāpnutaḥ*", but he does not specify as to who is '*Bhāṣyakāra*'? In all the translations of *Nyāyamañjarī*, this specific ambiguity is totally skipped out. However, C.D. Bijalwan considers it as Vātsyāyana's view. According to the present researcher this seems objectionable. Since the reference of this quote is found in a Mīmāṃsā text.[2]

In this way Jayanta presents a penetrating insight in all the aspects of cognition. His detailed analysis of the four means of cognition and accordingly refutation of the opponents' views is quite impressive. Though he does not accept *arthāpatti* and *abhāva* as separate means of cognition, but he discusses them in depth. He is the first one to deal with the Buddhists contention that *abhāva* has no reality. Accordingly in the first *āhnika* he also deals with the various aspects of cognition. Thus Jayanta's treatment of the cognitive process is quite remarkable. Throughout the study of the

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[1] '*Prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanamupamānamiti*' *ca madhye sādhyasādhanagrahaṇamupādānaḥ sūtrakāraḥ sarvapramāṇasādhāraṇaṃ rūpamidaṃ paribhāṣate-yatsādhyasādhanasya pramākaraṇasya pramāṇatvamiti*| *N.M.*, (Vidyanidhi Prakashan edn.), p. 73.
[2] *Supra*, 3rd chapter, f.n. 75.

first *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī*, it can be said that in spite of some minor inadequacies he has made a great contribution to the area of cognition.

Though Jayanta is a staunch follower of Nyāya, but he is also an independent thinker and in some points he does not hesitate to criticise them.

1. Jayanta does not agree with Vātsyāyana's interpretation of the word '*pravṛttisāmarthya*' .

2. Jayanta does not concur with the four types of *abhāva* admitted by the Naiyāyikas. He considers two types of *abhāva- prāgbhāva* and *pradhvaṃsābhāva* and *atyantābhāva* and *anyonyābhāva* are included by him in the above two . However, Panchanan Tarkavagisha[3] remarks that Jayanta follows Vātsyāyana's[4] explanation of the *Nyāyasūtra* 2/2/12 and establishes two types of *abhāva*.

Scope for Further Research

It needs to be noted here that cognitive process is a relevant topic in the contemporary philosophical discourse. Therefore the present research has ample scope for further research in this area. Thus Russell observes that,

"Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions....... those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy."[5]

It is not possible to provide any definite answers to the numerous philosophical issues. Philosophical research always demands possibilities for the further research. In the present study, several problems regarding some vital problems are faced. This

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[3] *N.M.,* (Sanskrit Book Depot edn.), p. 334.
[4] *Abhāvadvaitaṃ khalu bhavati, prāk cotpatteravidyamānatā, utpannasya cātmano hānādavidyamānatā| Tatrālakṣiteṣu vāsassu prāgutpatteravidyamānatālakṣaṇo lakṣaṇānāmabhāvo netara iti| N.B.,* 2/2/12.
[5] *PP,* p. 52.

particular topic has tremendous potentiality in this particular field of study. Here some such points for the benefit of further researchers are being enlisted:

1. Regarding the nature of cognition Jayanta expounds two theories, i.e. *sākāra* and *nirākāra* cognition (pp.). He firstly refutes the *nirākāra* theory of Vaibhāṣikas. But in his refutation of *sākārajñānavāda*, it is problematic to distinguish between the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras. Some scholars hold that this particular view is of the Sautrāntikas and some others as of the Yogācāras. Jayanta himself does not distinctly mention the opponents' view. Therefore this particular issue needs further study to reach the conclusion.

However, in favour of *Sautrāntikas*, ample references have been quoted in the 3rd chapter of this dissertation (pp.). Here it is to be noted that among the Sautrāntikas also there are three different views regarding *sākārajñāna* and *nirākārajñāna*. These are as follows:[6]

- External objects have their own form.
- Cognition itself is in the form of an object.
- And both these together.

Now, in support of the Yogācāras also, it can be quoted that:

"*Ākārasahitā buddhiryogācārasya sammatā| *"[7]

So, it is problematic to justify Jayanta's view and needs further examination.

2. *Pramā* is identical with *pramāṇa* or different from it- regarding this point of view Jayanta repudiates the opponents, who hold that both are inseparable from each other. The main difficulty is that some scholars consider the opponents as the Buddhists, while some others as the Jainas. In support of the Buddhists, secondary references are already quoted in the 3rd chapter (pp.). Here some references in support of the Jaina view are being reproduced as below:

- *Tattvajñānaṃ pramāṇam- Āptamīmāṃsā*, 101.
- *Jñānaṃ pramāṇamātmādeḥ - Laghīyastraya*, 52.
- *Jñānaṃ pramāṇamityāhuḥ- Siddhiviniścaya,* 10-2

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[6] *B.D.M.*, p. 189.
[7] As quoted in *N.S.M.*, ed., Śrī Kṛṣaṇavallabhācārya, p. 168.

- *Nirbādhabodhaviśiṣṭaḥ ātmā pramāṇam- Dhavala.* 141.

- *Svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam- Parīkṣā,* 1-1.

- *Samyag jñānaṃ pramāṇam- Pramāṇapañcikā,* 51.

- *Samyag jñānaṃ pramāṇam- Nyāyadīpikā,* 9.

- *Pramāṇaṃ Samyag jñānaṃ - Pramālakṣaṇavṛhatī,* 395.

- *Pramāṇaṃ ca svaparābhāsi jñānaṃ -Syādvādamañjarī,* 17.

- *Sva paravyavasāyi jñānaṃ pramāṇam- Jaina Tarkabhāṣā,* 113.[8]

In all the above references it can be noticed that the Jaina scholars unanimously agree with "*jñānaṃ pramāṇam*". However, in *Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa*[9] it is said that sometimes *pramā* and *pramāṇa* are identical to each other and sometimes they are different from each other.

However, the present researcher would like to draw the scholars' attention to the following facts:

1. First, Jayanta starts the context of "*bodhaḥ pramāṇam*" with "*ye tu*" and in the very next paragraph he uses "*anye tu*". If Jayanta intends to continue with the Buddhists' view, he never refers to the later as "*anye tu*". Since the second view, i.e. "*anye tu tulyasāmagryadhīnayoḥ grāhyagrāhakabhāvaṃ vadantaḥ bodhaṃ pramāṇamabhyupāgaman*" is accepted by the scholars as the Buddhists' view without any controversy; hence it is possible that the first one is of the Jainas.

2. Since Jayanta is much more engaged with the refutation of the Buddhists' views in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, so, it might be that some scholars generally accept it as the Buddhists' view.

3. Jayanta in the first context does not use the term "*grāhyagrāhakabhāvaṃ*". If he continues with the Buddhists' view he should have used it earlier also.

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[8] *J.L.,* pp. 768-70
[9] Jinendra Varni, *JSK,* p. 144

4. If it is accepted that both the above are the Buddhists' view, then the fallacy of repetition (*punarukti*)[10] will occur.

In view of the above mentioned facts, it can be concluded that Jayanta presents and refutes the Jainas' view here.

These are some of the vital questions which are not brought out and discussed till now by any of the researchers. These issues are open for discussion and scholars' suggestions in this regard are solicited.

In brief, though the present research is based upon *Nyāyamañjarī*, but it has also made an effort to deal with the views of the Naiyāyikas prior to Jayanta. Simultaneously, it has also tried to present a historical overview of the Nyāya system. Like the other Indian philosophical systems, the Nyāya also follows the hierarchy of *sūtra, bhāsya, tikā* etc. throughout its development.

Last but not the least, a critique based on all the philosophical schools regarding the notion of cognition is also presented herein.

In this way the present research has tried to focus on all the possible issues on cognitive process, albeit in an elementary way. So it cannot be claimed that there are no shortcomings. But in conclusion we can remember Jayanta again:

"*Yadvā nirgunamapyartham abhinandanti sādhavah|*

Pranayiprārthanābhangasamvidhānāmasiksitāh||"

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[10] *Šabdārthayoh punarvacanam punaruktamanyatrānuvādāt|N.S.*, 5/2/14
Šabdādāksepato vāpi pratītasyiva kīrtanam|
prayojanavinābhūtam punarukamatishitih|| T.R., Kārikā- 12.

APPENDIX

Glossary of Technical Terms

Abhāva	Absence.
Abhavanadharmā	Coming into existence.
Abhidhā	Primary meaning.
Abhidheyatva	Denotable thing.
Adhikaraṇa	Locus, Substratum.
Adhikārī	The proper person for whom the book; a qualified person or one to whom the result accrues.
Adhyavasāya	Determinative knowledge.
Adṛṣṭa	Destiny.
Aitihya	Rumour, Tradition.
Alaulika (pratyakṣa)	Super-normal perception.
Anadhyavasāya	Non-Determination.
Anaikāntika	Uncertain reason.
Anavasthā	Endless Regression.
Antakaraṇa	Internal instrument.
Anubhava	Experience.
Anumāna	Inference.
Anumiti	Inferential Knowledge.
Anupalabdhi	Non- Cognition
Anupasaṃhārī	Non- exclusive.
Anusandhāna	Subsumtive correlation.

Anvaya- vyatireki	Concomitant in affirmation and negation.
Anvaya	Positive.
Anyathāsiddha	Pseudo-cause, Dispensable antecedents Accidental eirecumstance, Superfluous.
Anyonyābhāva	Mutual Negation.
Anyonyāśraya	Mutual dependence.
Apadeśa	Middle term.
Aparokṣa	Immediate.
Aparvarga	Emancipation.
Apekṣābhāva	The negation of an object confined to a limited space.
Apoha	Negation.
Apramā	False apprehension.
Apurva	Unseen potency.
Artha	Object, Purpose.
Arthāpatti	Presumption.
Asādhāraṇakāraṇa	Special Cause.
Asamavāyikāraṇa	Non-inherent Cause, Non-intimate Cause.
Asambhava	Impossibility.
Asiddha	Unknown Reason.
Atideśavākya	The assimilative proposition, statement of comparison.
Atīndriya	Super sensible.
Ativyāpti	Overpervasion.
Atyantābhāva	Absolute negation.

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Avayava	Constituent of a syllogism.
Avinābhāva	Invariable relation, inseparability.
Avisaṃvādakatā	Non-contradiction.
Avīta	A type of Inference.
Avyabhicāri	Invariable.
Avyapadeśa	Non-verbal, Unverbalisable.
Avyāpti	Non-pervasion.
Ayathārtha	Erroneous.
Ayathārthānubhava	Erroneous experience.
Ālambana	Support.
Ālayavijñāna	Store consciousness.
Āpta	Trust worthy person.
Ātman	Self, Soul.
Bād a	Discussion, To arrive at the truth, Argument for truth.
Bādhita	The stultified reason, Belated reason, Contradicted reason.
Bhāva	Existence, Positive entity.
Bhāvanā	Mental impression, Reminiscent impression.
Bheda	Difference.
Bhvanadhrmā	Not coming into existence.
Buddhi	Intellect.
Chala	Dialectic quibbling.
Cit	Spirit, Consciousness.
Darśana	Philosophy.
	Destructive" or disputation wrangling
Dhārāvāhikajñāna	Chain knowledge.

Doṣa	Fault.
Dṛṣṭa	Perceived resemblance.
Dṛṣṭānta	Example.
Dṛṣṭārthapatti	A type of postulation.
Duḥkha	Pain.
Dveṣa	Aversion, Dislike is ill-feeling.
Grāhaka	Revealer of cognition.
Grāhya	Object of cognition.
Guṇa	Quality.
Hāna	Detachment.
Hetu	Middle term, Reason.
Hetvābhāsa	Fallacies in reasoning.
Icchā	Desire.
Idriya	Sense-organ.
Idriyārtha	The object of the sense.
Idriyārthasannikarṣa	Relation between sense organ and object.
Jñāna	Cognition, Knowledge.
Jñānalakṣaṇā	Supernormal.
Jñātatā	Known-ness.
Jalpa	Argument "both constructive and destructive character.
Jāti	Unavailing or futile objection, Futility, Genus, Genetic Character.
Kālātīta	Mistimed reason.

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Kalpanā	Presumptive knowledge, factitious fabrication.
Kāraka	Case.
Kāraṇa	Cause, Mean.
Karaṇa	Efficient, Instrumental cause.
Karma	Action, Motion.
Kartā	Agent.
Kārya	Action, Effect.
Kevalānvayī	Concomitant in affirmation alone.
Kevalavyatirekī	Concomitant in negation alone.
Kriyā	Movement, action.
Kṣaṇabhaṇga	Momentariness.
Lakṣaṇa	Definition.
Lakṣaṇā	Implied meaning.
Laukika	Wordly.
Liṅga	Sign, Probans, Mark, Reason.
Liṅga-paramaeśa	Consideration of sign.
Mana	Mind.
Mānasapratyakṣa	Mental perception.
Mithyājñāna	False cognition.
Mukti	Liberation.
Nidarśana	Illustration.
Nigamana	Conclusion.
Nigrahasthāna	Fault in a syllogism or vulnerable point.
Nimittakāraṇa	Occasioning cause, Instrumental cause, cause in general.

Nirākāra	Formless.
Nirṇaya	Conclusion.
Nirvikalpaka	Indeterminate, Non-qualificative.
Nityatva	Eternal-ness.
Nivṛtti	Cessation.
Nyāya	Logic.
Pañcanyāyāvayavā	The five premises in a syllogism.
Padārtha	Category.
Pakṣa	Minor term, subject.
Pakṣadharmatā, Pakṣatā	Subject- adjunctness.
Parāmarśa	Subsumptive reflection, Consideration, Logical antecedent.
Paraprakāśā	Illuminate by others.
Parataḥ Prāmāṇya	Theory of Extrinsic validity.
Parāthānumāna	Inference of others.
Parīkṣā	Analysis.
Pariṇāma	Change.
Parokṣa	Indirect.
Pavṛttinimitta	Connotation, Cause of application of a word, the ground of application of a word.
Phala	Consequences.
Pradhvaṃsābhāva	Destruction negation, Subsequent or annihilative non-existence.
Prāgabhāvaḥ	Antecedent negation.
Prakaraṇasama	Balancing the controversy.
Prakāśa	Luminosity.

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Prakṛti	Primordial matter.
Pramā	Valid knowledge.
Pramāṇa	Means of true cognition.
Prāmāṇya	Validity.
Prāmānyavāda	Theory of validity of knowledge.
Pramātā	Knower.
Pramātva-prāmāṇya	Authoritativeness, Validity.
Prameya	Object of true cognition.
Pramiti	True knowledge.
Prāpakatā	Obtainment.
Prātibhajñāna	Intuitive cognition.
Pratibhāsa	Apparent.
Pratijñā	The thesis set down, Proposition, A proposition to be proved in logic, promise.
Pratyabhijñā	Recognition.
Pratyakṣa (Jñāna)	Sensory knowledge.
Pratyakṣam	Perception.
Pravṛtti	Activity.
Prayatna	Effort.
Prayojanam	Purpose.
Pretyabhāva	Transmigration.
Punarukti	Repetition.
Puruṣa	Intelligence.
Pūrvapakṣa	The primafacie position, Opponent's position.

Pūrvavat	The inference of the effect from the cause, Reasoning from cause to effect.
Sākāra	With form.
Sāmagrī	The whole cause apparatus, Casual complex.
Śūnyatā	Voidness.
Śabda	Sound, Proposition, Verbal testimony.
Sādhana	Middle term, Proban, Instrument.
Sadhetu	A probans becomes its positive it non-fails any five conditions.
Sādhya	Probandum, To be accomplished, Major term, Inferable property.
Sādhyasama	Balancing the reciprocity.
Sādṛśya	Similarity.
Sādṛśyajñāna	Knowledge of similarity is the efficient instrument of assimilative cognition.
Śakti	Significative potency, Expressive power of words, Power, Potentiality
Sāmānya	Generality, Universal, Generic property, Class character
Sāmānyalakṣaṇā nature.	Relation by generality or class
Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa	Induction, A form of inference
Sāmarthyābhāva	The negation of capacity.
Samavāya	Co-inherence, Inherence

Samavetasamavāya	Inherence with the inherent, Intimate union with intimately united.
Sambandha	Relation, Connection.
Sambhava	Probability, Inclusion.
Samsargābhāva	Relational negation, Relational absence.
Samśaya	Doubt, Dubiety.
Samskāra	Tendencies, Impression.
Samvit	Knowledge.
Samyoga	Contact.
Samyuktasamavāya	'Inherence with the contacted object, Intimate union with conjunction.
Samyuktasamavetasamavāya	Intimate union with intimately united with the conjunction, Inherence with the inherent in the contacted object.
Sannikarṣa	Sense-relation.
Santāna	Flux.
Sapakṣa	Similar instance, Positive instance.
Śarīra	Body, Form.
Sattā	Existence, Beingness, Reality.
Savikalpaka	Determinate knowledge.
Savyabhicāra	The reason that strays away, Discrepancy of reason, Straying reason.
Śeṣavat	Reasoning from effect to cause.
Siddhānta	Conclusion.
Sisādhayiṣā	The desire to prove the existence of the probandum.

Upekṣā	Indifference.
Utpatti	Production.
Vāda	Discussion, To arrive at the truth, Argument for truth.
Vaidharmyahetu	Heterogeneous, Negative reason.
Vidyā	Knowledge.
Vijñāna	Consciousness.
Vipakṣa	Negative instance, Counter example.
Viparyaya	Misapprehension, Opposition.
Viruddha	The adverse reason, Contradictory reason.
Viśeṣaṇa	Determinant, Differentiator, Adjunct, Qualifier.
Viśeṣya	Entity, Substantive, Qualificand.
Vīta	A type of Inference.
Vitaṇḍā	Mere destructive argument or wrangling, or form of debate.
Vṛtti	Transformation.
Vyañjanā	Suggested meaning.
Vyāpaka	Pervasive of greater extent, Widely extending, pervade.
Vyāpāra	Mediate activity, Activity, Intermediate cause, Operation with reference to a cause.
Vyāpta	Pervading.
Vyāpti	Invariable concomitance, Co-extension, Pervasion, Concomitance.
Vyāpya	Pervaded, of less extent, the Middle term of a syllogism.

Vyatirekasahacāra	Concomitance of negation.
Vyatirekavyāpti	Negative pervasion.
Vyavacchina	Differentiated.
Vyavasāya	Simple Cognition.
Yat	Relative pronoun.
Yathārthajñāna	Valid Knowledge.
Yogajaprtyakṣa	Extrasensory perception.
Yogyatā	Congruity, Compatibility.
Yuñjāna	Those who are on the road for extrasensory attainment.

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