

**A STUDY OF SATKĀRYAVĀDA
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PRAKṚTI PARINĀMAVĀDA**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SURAJ KUMAR SAHOO



CENTRE FOR PHILOSOPHY

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI-110067

INDIA

2013

DECLARATION

I, Suraj Kumar Sahoo, do hereby declare that the dissertation entitled “**A Study of *Satkāryavāda* with Special Reference to *Prakṛti Pariṇāmvāda***” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of **Jawaharlal Nehru University** is my original work and has not been submitted by me or by anyone else, in part or in full for any other degree or diploma for this university to the best of my knowledge.

Suraj Kumar Sahoo
SURAJ KUMAR SAHOO



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

Centre for the Philosophy


School of Social Sciences

New Delhi-110067

25th July, 2013

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the M.Phil. Dissertation entitled “A Study of *Satkāryavāda* with Special Reference to *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*” submitted by Suraj Kumar Sahoo, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University, is his original work and it has not been submitted in part or in full, for any other degree or diploma of this or any other University, to the best of our knowledge and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


26.07.13

Prof. S.P. GAUTAM

(Chairperson)


Centre for Philosophy

School of Social Sciences

JNU

New-Delhi- 110067
Chairperson
Centre for Philosophy
School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110067, INDIA




25.7.13

Prof. R.P. SINGH

(Supervisor)

Centre for Philosophy

School of Social Sciences

JNU

New-Delhi- 110067

SUPERVISOR
Centre for Philosophy
School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067



Contents

Acknowledgements	i-ii
Preface	iii
Introduction	1-10
Chapter I: Contending Positions on <i>Satkāryavāda</i>: An Outline	11-35
Introduction	
1.1 <i>Pariṇāma</i>	
1.1.2 <i>Prakṛti</i> as the Primordial or Ultimate Material Cause	
1.1.3 Kinds of <i>Pariṇāma</i>	
1.2 Theory of causation in <i>Advaita Vedānta</i>	
1.3 <i>Vivartavāda</i> of <i>Advaita Vedānta</i>	
1.4 <i>Brahma Vivartavāda</i>	
1.5 Causation in <i>Viśiṣṭādvaita</i> Philosophy	
1.6 Criticism of <i>Advaita Vedānta</i>	
1.7 Material Causality of <i>Brahman</i>	
Conclusion	
Chapter II: Sāṃkhya: Metaphysics (Cosmology) and Epistemology: An Exposition	36-67
Introduction	
2.1 Nature of <i>Prakṛti</i>	
2.1.1 Proof for the Existence of <i>Prakṛti</i>	

2.2 Nature of <i>Puruṣa</i>	
2.2.1 Proofs for the existence of <i>Puruṣa</i>	
2.2.2 Plurality of <i>Puruṣa</i>	
2.3 <i>Guṇas</i>	
2.3.1 Evolution or the Heterogeneous Change	
2.3.2 The Evolutes of <i>Prakṛti</i>	
2.4 The Sāṃkhya theory of Knowledge	
2.5 Perception (<i>Pratyakṣa</i>)	
2.5.1 Stages of Perception	
2.6 Inference (<i>Anumāna</i>)	
2.7 Verbal Testimony (<i>Āptavacana</i>)	
Conclusion	

Chapter III: Sāṃkhya on *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*: A Critical Examination

68-88

Introduction	
3.1 Stresses on Material Cause (<i>Upādāna Kāraṇa</i>)	
3.2 The Problem of Essence of Effect: Two Main Theories of Causation	
3.3 Arguments to Prove <i>Satkāryavāda</i> of Sāṃkhya	
3.4 <i>Asatkāryavāda</i> of Nyāya and Sāṃkhya defence of <i>Satkāryavāda</i>	
3.5 Nyāya Objection to the Identity Theory	
3.6 Objections Answered	
Conclusion	

Conclusion

89-93

Bibliography

94-99

Acknowledgement

I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciations and indebtedness to my supervisor Prof. Raghawendra Pratap Singh for all of his invaluable guidance, helpful discussions, continuous encouragement and unflinching support at the every stage of my research work. His liberal attitude and articulated views enabled me to complete my work.

I also express my profound gratitude to Prof. Satya P. Gautam, Dr. Manidipa Sen, Dr. Bhagat Oinam and Dr. Bhaskarjit Neog for their kind help and support. I would also like to thank all the staff members of the Centre for Philosophy for their kindness to help me.

I am really thankful to JNU Library, CP library and DU Library for availing me all the materials, those I need for the completion of my work. I wish to thank all the staff members of our central Library, JNU for their cooperation.

I feel myself unable to express my deep gratitude and love towards my Maa, Baba and my younger brother Kahna. It would have been impossible to even think of this work, had there not been strong support and unconditional co-operation from my family.

I would not forget a helping hand of Manoj Bhai, who is always with me from first day in JNU. I want to express my thankful to my dear senior brothers Mr. Dillip Majhi and Mr. Ashok Tarai for their unconditional co-operation and support.

I owe much thanks to Barad Bhai, Bharati Bhai, Subra Bhai, Chida Bhai, Samal Bhai, Amit Bhai, Jony, Munia, Sameer, Arun, Meghanad, Vikas, Sravan, Suri, Solomon, Muzzafer, Dillip Bhai (Katia) Dambu Da, Remo, Bijay Bhai, Sandeep Bhai, Dinesh Da, Sapu, Sudarshsan, Panda, Jaya, Subrat and Viru Bhai.

With deep gratitude I will cherish the help, support and care of my beloved senior and friends: Pragyan Didi, Rajshree Didi, Bikash Bhai, Padhi Bhai, Diru Anna, Dipak Bhai, Tapan Bihari Bhai, Prasant Bhai, Tapan Bhai, Raffiq Bhai, Jata Bhai, Ambika Bhai, Pandana, Rajib Bhai, Narendra Bhai, Bibhisan Bhai, Shakti Bhai, Surjeet Bhai, Dime Bhai, Bimal Bhai and my friends: Prabir, Bibhuti, Braj, Himansu, Keshab, Viko, Gyana, Subhashree, Mani, Sarathi, Priyanka, Aksara, Abhisek, Somba and Meren.

Lastly, but not least, I wish to thank my Maa (Mother) for her blessings. Because of her I have been able to complete my work. She is a living goddess, an uninterrupted source of perennial inspiration through all the ups and downs of my life.

Suraj Kumar Sahoo
Suraj Kumar Sahoo

PREFACE

I, in the present study, have discussed *Satkāryavāda* with special reference to *Prakṛti Parīṇamāvāda* of Sāṃkhya system. The basic question raised in the context of doctrine of causality is – Does the effect pre-exist in its material cause? There are only two possibilities with regard to the status of pre-existent of effect in its cause. If the effect pre-exists in its material cause, the effect is non-different from its cause. And if the effect does not pre-exist in its material cause, the effect is different from its cause. This is the basis for the division of causality into two kinds namely, *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*. *Satkāryavāda* maintains that an effect pre-exists in its material cause in a potential condition and it becomes manifest in the process of causal operation.

Sāṃkhya philosophy is primarily concerned with metaphysics (cosmology) and epistemology. Metaphysically, Sāṃkhya is dualistic recognizing two ultimate realities; namely, *Prakṛti* (the principle of matter, which is active) and *Puruṣa* (the principle of consciousness, which is inactive). On causality, Sāṃkhya proposes *Satkāryavāda* on the ground that which is non-existent that can't be brought into existence and what is existent that can't be made totally non-existent.

I am thankful to the authors whose works have directly or indirectly helped me. I have always tried to supply exact quotations and full references to original works, and in the footnotes, I have also furnished suggestions for further reading. In referring to the works of Sāṃkhya, Nyāya and Vedānta, I have used the most accurate available English translations. I am thankful to those translators of the texts.

Introduction

In the present dissertation, an effort has been made to discuss *Satkāryavāda* with special reference to *Prakṛti Pariṇamāvāda* of *Sāṃkhya* philosophy. *Satkāryavāda* is one of the theories of causality which have been propounded not only by *Sāṃkhya* philosophy but also by the two schools of Vedānta tradition i.e. *Advaita* Vedānta which accepts *Vivartavāda* and *Viśiṣṭādvaita* which accepts *Brahma Pariṇamāvāda*. Besides *Satkāryavāda*, there are other theories of causalities such as *Asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya and *Pratītyasamutpāda* of *Buddhism*. But the present research have been discussed *Satkāryavāda* especially *Prakṛti Pariṇamāvāda* as propounded by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (Fifth Century A.D.) in *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*.

Of the different systems of philosophical thought that evolved in ancient India, the *Sāṃkhya* appears undoubtedly one of the most important and a very old system of thought of Indian philosophy. Its doctrine could be traced in the early literature of ancient India including the *śrutis*, *smṛtis* and *purāṇas*. The references to the *Sāṃkhya*-Yoga doctrines can be found in some of the *Upaniṣads*, e.g. in the *Chhāndogya*, the *Prashna*, and the *Kaṭha* and particularly in the *Shvetāśhvatarā*; in the *Mahābhārata* and in the *Gīta*. Dr. T.G. Mainkar, in his *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* has remarked “Though the *Sāṃkhya* is mentioned in a late *Upaniṣad* like *Shvetāśhvatarā* yet the root ideas of the *Sāṃkhya* can be traced in the earlier *Upaniṣad*.”¹ “The origin of *Sāṃkhya* system also can be traced to the hymn of creation or *nāsadīyasūkta* of *Rg* Vedā.”²

The *Sāṃkhya* system derives its name from the root word ‘*khyā*’ together with prefix ‘*sam*’ which means meaning, number as well as right or perfect knowledge. *Sāṃkhya* philosophy talks about the philosophy of number (*Sāṃkhyā*), because it deals with the twenty-five principles of categories or elements or *tattvas*. This philosophy might have influenced the Pythagorean philosophy as per as its philosophy of number is concerned. However the term *Sāṃkhya* is also used in the sense of right knowledge (*samyak-jñāna*). Here right knowledge means the knowledge of discrimination or discernment of the difference between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. Prof. Nair has highlighted

¹ Mainkar, T.G., *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa* (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, 2004) p. 22

² *Rg. Veda. X-90*. Quotation taken from P.K.S. Nair, *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 1

on the meaning of term Sāṃkhya, “It also means the wisdom or knowledge which enables us to distinguish between spirit and matter which leads to salvation.”³

The Sāṃkhya and Yoga are the two important orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. It can also be regarded as Sāṃkhya tradition is theoretical enterprises whereas Yoga is practical enterprises. Prof. C.D. Sharma, in his *Indian Philosophy* has referred “Yoga as the counterpart of Sāṃkhya, means action or practice and tells us how the theoretical metaphysical teachings of Sāṃkhya might be realized in actual practice. Thus Sāṃkhya- Yoga forms one complete system, the former being the theoretical while the latter being the practical aspect of the same teaching.”⁴ This system is called Sāṃkhya, since it offers the right knowledge of *Puruṣa* which is quite distinct from *Prakṛti* and its products such as intellect (*buddhi*); egoism (*ahamkāra*); mind (*manas*) and sensory organs etc. Prof. J.N. Sinha has put on its historical claim, “There is no evidence for the suggestion that the system is called Sāṃkhya because it was founded by Sāṃkhya.”⁵

The work of the Sāṃkhya system named of a great sage of Kapila. This tradition regards the origin of the Sāṃkhya to Kapila. Prof. Nair has remarked on the historical account, “Tradition affirms that Kapila is called as a *muni* in *Bhagavad Gīta* and possessed supernatural power. The *Shvetāshvatara Upaniṣad* refers to the term Sāṃkhya as well as the seer Kapila who is held to be the reputed profounder of the Sāṃkhya doctrines.”⁶ This Sāṃkhya system is propounded by Kapila which has been considered as the most ancient of all philosophical systems in India. The first work of Sāṃkhya School is *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra* which is attributed to Kapila. But there is no clear evidence to justify or prove it. “Keith’s opinion is that Kapila was not a historical person. In the *Padmapurāṇa* and in the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* also we see that the founder of the Sāṃkhya system is one Kapila Vāsudeva who is the incarnation of *Viṣṇu*. Sage Kapila is universally accepted as the father of the Sāṃkhya system and he is mentioned in the *Shvetāshvatara Upaniṣad*. He is supposed to have lived in the 7th or 6th century B.C.”⁷ But its systematic presentation could be traced in the *Sāṃkhya-*

³ Nair, P.K.S., *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 19

⁴ Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, 1994) p. 150

⁵ Sihna, J. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2006) p. 2

⁶ Nair, P.K.S., *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 19

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2

Kārikā of Iṣvarakṛṣṇa. *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* of Iṣvarakṛṣṇa is the earliest available and authoritative book of Sāṃkhya philosophy. Sometimes this system of thought is understood as the ‘atheistic Sāṃkhya’ (*nirīśvara-sāṃkhya*), as distinguished from the Yoga which is known as ‘theistic Sāṃkhya’ (*śeśvara-sāṃkhya*). The reason behind for calling them is that Kapila did not accept the existence of God and also advocate that God’s existence could not be proved. But this seems to be a controversial point.⁸

We understand the tenets of this school such as Āsuri who is disciple of Kapila (i.e. the founder of the Sāṃkhya system) and Āsuri’s disciple is Pañcaśikha who has written some books which aimed at clear exposition of the Sāṃkhya system. But it seems probable that these works were historical personages whose works were lost in course of time and we have no information about their contents. Prof. C.D. Sharma has offered about its historicity, “Kapila certainly flourished before Buddha and he must have composed *Sāṃkhya-Sūtra* which works was unfortunately lost long ago.”⁹ However the earliest available and authentic systematically exposition of classical Sāṃkhya is found in Iṣvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*. Apart from that we have Gaudapāda’s *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā-bhāṣya*, Vācaspati Misra’s *Tattva Kaumudī*, Vijñana-bhikṣu’s *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya* and *Sāṃkhya-sāra* and Aniruddha’s *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra-vṛtti*. They constitute an important and authoritative work on the Sāṃkhya system.

Prof. J.N. Sinha has briefly attempted to give the historical period of this tradition, “The *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra* was probably composed in the fourteenth century. Mādhava, who wrote *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* about 1380 A.D., does not refer to it, but based his exposition of the Sāṃkhya system on *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*. Aniruddha (1500 A.D.) wrote a commentary on *Sāṃkhyappravacanasūtra* known as *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*. Vijñana-bhikṣu (1600 A.D.) wrote a commentary on it, named *Sāṃkhyappravacana Bhāṣya* with theistic bias. His exposition of the classical Sāṃkhya system is not so authoritative as that of Vācaspati Misra. But Vācaspati and Vijñana-bhikṣu are the two great expounders of the system.”¹⁰

⁸ Datta and Chatterjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 253

⁹ Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, 1994) p. 150

¹⁰ Sinha, J. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2006) p. 2

There is no evidence to prove or show the real nature of the original Sāṃkhya, though both philosophical and historical approaches will justify that there are two tendencies—an atheistic realism, dualism and pluralism spiritualism in the course of development of this system. About the origin of Sāṃkhya system; Prof. Dasgupta says, “There are two currents of thought in the Vedas and the Upanishads namely the conception of Brahman and the other which considered the world as having a reality as made of water, fire and earth. The former developed into the monistic Vedānta and the latter into the Sāṃkhya School.”¹¹

For the purpose of the study Sāṃkhya is primarily concerned with metaphysics (cosmology) and epistemology. Metaphysically, Sāṃkhya is dualistic recognizing the independent existence of the dual principle of *Prakṛti* (the principle of matter, which is active) and *Puruṣa* (the principle of consciousness, which is inactive). Actually, the nature of both *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* and their relationships host the central doctrine of philosophical thought of this system. Prof. J.N. Sinha has asserted in this context, “It is opposed to atomistic pluralism of the Vaiśeṣika, on the one hand and uncompromising monism of *Advaita* Vedānta, on the other, which regards the *Brahman* or Absolute Spirit alone as the ultimate reality and the individual souls and the world as its appearances.”¹² The Sāṃkhya system has taken up the task of illustrating how this world of multiplicity has brought into existence through the process of evolution from *Prakṛti*. Further this system has taken in their positions on the doctrine of causation (*Satkāryavāda*) and the evolution (*Parīṇāmavāda*). Sāṃkhya tradition also speaks up that there are three forms of *Parīṇāmā- Dharma, Lakṣaṇa* and *Avasthā*. These are also accepted in *Yoga-Sūtra*.

The present study focuses on the one of the important tenets of Sāṃkhya philosophy namely, its theory of causation. Its theory of causation came to be known the doctrine of pre-existence of effect (*Satkāryavāda*) in the material cause and the theory of evolution (*Parīṇāmavāda*). The entire metaphysical structure of Sāṃkhya philosophical thought is rooted in its doctrine according to which there is no production of the non-existent entity and destruction of existent entity. In my proposed dissertation, I shall discuss *Satkāryavāda* with special reference to *Prakṛti*

¹¹ *Bhagavad Gīta.*, v.5.4, 16.1. Quotation taken from P.K.S. Nair, *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 3.

¹² Sinha, J. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2006) p. 1

Pariṇāmavāda of Sāṃkhya philosophy. *Satkāryavāda* is one of the theories of causality which have been propounded not only by Sāṃkhya philosophy but also by the two schools of Vedānta tradition i.e. *Advaita Vedānta* which accepts *Vivartavāda* and *Viśiṣṭādvaita* which accepts *Brahma Pariṇāmavāda*. Besides *Satkāryavāda*, there are other theories of causalities such as *Asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya and *Pratītyasamutpāda* of Buddhism.

Causality implies a host of philosophical problems which are kept to different branches of philosophical studies. However my aim here is to expound the notion of cause as it is understood by different philosophical schools of classical India. I shall try to show that (a) the doctrine of causality is taken more seriously in some Indian philosophical schools of thought than it had been a different situation in western philosophical schools and (b) the notion of change is taken more serious consideration in the context of doctrine of causality. Here I am more focusing on the point (b) than the first one (a), because the notion of change is involved in the doctrine of causality and also offers as per my dissertation work is concerned which I am looking forward to its Indian philosophical disposition not rather than western philosophical schools.

To substantiate the second point (b), I shall first very briefly begin with the conceptual understanding of change. In our day to day life, we always perceive constant changes in the world. Some of them are seemingly automatic which means it occurs due to without the efforts of some perceptible agents. For e.g. the snows of the mountain melt into the water and run towards the river and sea. But it happens when the sun shines brightly and spread the heat. Here sun provides heat is automatic; there are no efforts of this perceptible agent. But sometimes the changes seem to be due to some efforts of perceptible active agent. For e.g. a potter turns the clay into a pot with help of his rod and wheel or a weaver turns the threads into a cloth with help of a loom, shuttle etc. All these changes sometimes occur so rapidly that we can see them happening, but sometimes they are very slow though we can only infer the change by seeing the objects changed after the lapse of a considerable time. But sooner and latter everything is found to be changed.¹³

¹³ M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 1

It has been clearly mentioned in the above explanation that we perceive constant changes in the world. But I would like to bring attention here about the blind persons. A blind man does not much bother about these changes, he takes it for granted. If someone may ask to him why there is a change, he will most probably answer that it occurred due to causes that suggests that some active agents do act on passive objects and change its form or shape into some other form or shape. Though it looks very easy to explain; but when we confront with this notion of change, we find some serious difficulties.

Before considering the theories accounting for the notion of change and its difficulties involved in the concept, it would be worthwhile to know the importance of causation. Causation constitutes an important doctrine in schools on Indian philosophy. What is the idea to bring the theory of causation in Indian philosophy which has been come an importance for philosophers. Or what the logic is behind of it to bring the doctrine of causality? Actually, the issue is- whether an effect is pre-existent in its material cause prior to its production or whether an effect is a new entity and it is non-existent in its material cause. We can put it in a different form- former suggests that, whether an effect is non-different from its cause and latter suggests that an effect is different from its cause. This is the basis for the division of the Indian theories of causality into two kinds namely, *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*. *Satkāryavāda* maintains that an effect pre-exists in its material cause in a potential condition and it becomes manifest in the process of causal operation. On the other hand, *Asatkāryavāda* maintains that an effect does not pre-exist in its material cause before the process of causal operation.

The followers of Sāṃkhya are committed to the doctrine of *Satkārya* which maintains that an effect is known as pre-hidden form in its material cause even before its production and hence it is non-different from its cause; whereas the followers of Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika holds an opposite view of doctrine of *Satkārya* i.e. known as *Asatkāryavāda* which advocates that an effect does not pre-existent in its material cause before the process of causal operation. There is a new beginning and a new creation of an effect. Thus these two schools are sharply divided on the issue of the relation between the material cause and its effect and they are so much convinced about their respective stands.

The Sāṃkhya in conformity with its theory of causation is mainly based on its doctrine of *Prakṛti* (i.e. one primordial principle). Sāṃkhya believes in *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*, which suggests that all the products of the world are contained implicitly in the bosom of *Prakṛti* and production would mean merely a modification (*Pariṇamā*) of an effect from its implicit condition to an explicit condition. But it is quite opposite to Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika with regard to the production of an effect. The followers of Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika in conformity with their doctrine of the origin of non-existence of effect (*asatkārya*) believe that the ultimate material cause of the world is not one but many atoms (*paramāṇus*). They are earth, water, fire and air. This doctrine tells us that an effect is said to be non-existent before its production and therefore an effect is also different from its respective material cause. “Production, according to the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika, is an instance of the many (atoms or parts) giving rise to the one (whole) and not the one *Prakṛti* becoming many as in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga. The one is not a development (*Pariṇamā*) of the many atoms but a creation (*Ārambha*) according to the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika.”¹⁴ Here I am not going to explain in details because third chapter of my present study reveals the situation between both Sāṃkhya and Nyāya.

The *Pariṇāmavāda* of Sāṃkhya system is an inevitable outcome of its doctrine of pre-existent effects (*Satkāryavāda*). *Pariṇāmavāda* is a doctrine which involves a real change in the cause in the process of production of an effect. *Pariṇamā* is understood by Sāṃkhya in terms of change, which means *Pariṇamā* stands for the change a thing from one condition or form to another condition as when a leaf undergoes a change, its colour is green state which changes to another condition i.e. yellow or when clay changes from its condition of lump into that of a pot. Sāṃkhya system recognizes the two kinds of *Pariṇamā*. There is a homogeneous change (*Sarūpa*) in *Prakṛti* when all three *guṇas* are in the state of equilibrium. The *guṇas* change within itself without disturbing the other. That is, *sāttva* changes into *sāttva*, *rājas* into *rājas* and *tāmas* into *tāmas*. The other kind of change takes place when one of the *guṇas* dominates over the others and equilibrium is disturbed and evolution takes place. Such change is called heterogeneous change (*Virūpa*). And when evolution takes place we have the production of particular objects and it is the starting point of world’s evolution. Prof.

¹⁴ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. xi

Nair has claimed that, “In classical Sāṃkhya we get as categories in the series of evolution, the object, the sense, the mind, the intellect the *avyakta* and *Puruṣa* as the twenty fifth principles. In *Upaniṣad* we can find the origin of this series of evolution.”¹⁵ Therefore *Prakṛti*, *Puruṣa*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, eleven sense organs, five *tanmātras* or subtle elements and five gross elements are called the twenty-five principles of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. Thus Sāṃkhya doctrine of *Parīṇamā* does not allow the origin of production of anything new. It is totally opposed to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of production of new entity (*Ārambha*). There are other schools of philosophical thought which do subscribe the doctrine of *Parīṇamā* such as *Viśiṣṭādvaita* of Ramanuja and the Jain. *Parīṇāmavāda* of Sāṃkhya differs from both the view of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and Jainism. “The *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and the Jainism understand *Parīṇamā* as involving a change wherein the substance remains the same, but its form to be different (i.e. they believe that the form is not pre-figured in its material cause and hence new). The Sāṃkhya-Yoga believes that the form is also not new, since it is also pre-figured in its material cause.”¹⁶

Pramā is valid knowledge of what was not known before. The method or source which leads up to such valid knowledge is called *Pramāṇa*. Sāṃkhya admits only three independent source of valid knowledge or *Pramāṇa* viz. perception (*Pratyakṣa*), inference (*Anumāna*) and verbal testimony (*Śabda*). All systems of classical Indian philosophy accept *Pratyakṣa* as the first *Pramāṇa* of all knowledge. In order to understand Sāṃkhya theory of causality, the present research has been made to discuss the epistemological position of Sāṃkhya philosophy. In this context, Dr. Radhakrishnan has remarked as “Knowledge produced through sense-activity is perception. When a thing like a jar comes within the range of vision, *buddhi* or intellect is so modified as to assume the form of the jar; the soul becomes aware of the existence of the jar”.¹⁷ All these doctrines of *Satkārya*, *Parīṇamā* and theory of knowledge of Sāṃkhya have provided a lot of analysis by comparing to different schools of Indian philosophy and we need to thoroughly discuss on these issues.

¹⁵ Nair, P.K.S., *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 4

¹⁶ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Parīṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. xii

¹⁷ Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, (New York: Oxford University, 1989) pp. 297-98

In order to study *Satkāryavāda*, I shall be dealing with the following three problematic issues about the notion of causality which have been dominant in discussions with regard to the *Satkāryavāda*. These three problems are:

1. *Satkāryavāda* as a theory of Causality is philosophically contested concept. *Pariṇāmavāda* has been contested by Sāṃkhya and Vedānta (*Advaita* and *iśiṣṭādvaita*). Whereas Sāṃkhya advocates *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*, *Advaita* Vedānta develops *Brahma Vivartavāda* and *iśiṣṭādvaita* proposes *Brahma Pariṇāmavāda*. I would like to develop the contending claims by these schools.
2. I'll discuss the basic problematic of Sāṃkhya metaphysics (cosmology) which is dualistic on the one hand and evolutionary with equilibrium on the other. The Sāṃkhya conceives of a certain state which is called *Avyakta* or unmanifested, where even the manifestation of mind is not present, but only the causes exist in *Mūla Prakṛti*. It is also called *Prakṛti*. Beyond this *Prakṛti*, and eternally separate from it, is the *Puruṣa*, the soul of the Sāṃkhya which is without attributes and omnipresent. The *Puruṣa* is not the doer but the witness.
3. Finally, I'll compare and contrast *Satkāryavāda* with *Ārabhavāda* on the one hand and *Asatkāryavāda* on the other. Whereas for Sāṃkhya the effect pre-exists in its material cause and for Nyāya the effect does not pre-exist in its material cause, but it is completely a new entity of its cause.

These debates will be discussed in the three respective chapters or we can put it as different manner; the present work is organised in three chapters:

In Chapter- I entitled "Contending Positions on *Satkāryavāda*: An Outline", I have presented a comparative picture of *Pariṇāmavāda* in the highlight of Sankara School of *Advaita* Vedānta and *Brahma Pariṇāmavāda* of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* Vedānta. Though Sāṃkhya subscribes *Satkāryavāda* which is not compatible with *Pariṇāmavāda*, but it is compatible with *Vivartavāda*. And then a thoroughgoing analysis made to show how *Satkāryavāda* is not compatible with *Pariṇāmavāda* and how *Pariṇāmavāda* leads to *Vivartavāda*. After that Sāṃkhya's explanation is attempted to study the *Brahma Vivartavāda*, where he explains the relation between *Brahman* and the world.

In Chapter- II entitled “Sāṃkhya: Metaphysics (Cosmology) and Epistemology: An Exposition”, I have offered an account of the dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. I am going to expound the Sāṃkhya account of the nature of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* and the philosophical arguments which were taken as an examination to prove the existence of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* by the Sāṃkhya system. And then it is followed by the discussion of the theory of *guṇas* and how the evolution takes place. And also the role of the three *guṇas* namely *sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas* which are constituents parts of *Prakṛti*. In the section of evolution, how the equilibrium state (*guṇānām sāmīyāvasthā*) is disturbed and leads to the process of evolution of the objects of the world.

In Chapter- III entitled “Sāṃkhya on *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*: A Critical Examination”, I have focused on the debate between *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*. This chapter also gives an account of the Sāṃkhya theory of *Satkārya* and the arguments that have been advanced by Iśvarakṛṣṇa in defence of this doctrine. And it is followed by a presentation of the Nyāya objections to doctrine of *Satkārya* and the Sāṃkhya defence of *Satkāryavāda* by refuting of these objections. Here the main questions will be dealt are those, does an effect pre-figure in its material cause? Or is an effect known as hidden form of pre-existence in its material cause? Or where does the effect derive its essence? What is the status of cause when an effect comes into existence? Is it totally removed or is it still to continue? I shall take up these issues to discuss in this proposed chapter. This chapter is a study in order to get a better picture of the two contesting doctrines of causation namely, *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*.

We shall adopt a method which is comparative, critical and analytic. It is comparative because I’ll compare and contrast Sāṃkhya and Nyāya. The philosophy of Sāṃkhya can never be understood in its totality without reference to contending theories of causation from rival schools of Indian philosophy. And I’ll critically evaluate Sāṃkhya’s position with that of Nyāya.

Chapter I

Contending Positions on *Satkāryavāda*: An Outline

Introduction

In this Chapter I am going to expound and examine the contending philosophical positions on *Satkāryavāda* with special reference to *Vivartavāda* of *Advaita* Vedānta and *Brahma Pariṇāmavāda* of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* Vedānta. Before going to highlight contending position on *Satkāryavāda*, it is necessary to understand *Satkāryavāda* as well as *Pariṇāmavāda*. *Satkāryavādins* advocate that an effect is known as pre-hidden form of pre-existence in its material cause in a potential condition and it becomes manifest in the process of causal operation.¹⁸ This also suggests that an effect is non- different from its cause. On the basis of 'an effect is non- different from its cause', we have two theories in respect of process of production of an effect in the cause. And the question arises- is the effect a real transformation or a modification of its cause? Or is the effect an unreal appearance of its cause? Those who maintain that the effect is a real modification of its cause are called *Pariṇāmavādin*; whereas those who maintain that the effect is an unreal appearance of its cause are called *Vivartavādin*. *Sāṃkhya* believes in *Pariṇāmavāda*. According to doctrine of *Pariṇāmavāda*, when an effect is being produced, there is a real modification of the cause into an effect, for e.g. milk gives rise to the production of curd. *Advaita* Vedānta believes in *Vivartavāda* and according to *Vivartavādin*, the production of an effect involves merely an apparent change in the cause, e.g. when we see a snake in a rope. That means, the rope is not really transformed into a snake; actually the rope only appears as a snake, but it is not really the case.

1.1 *Pariṇāma*

It is one of the basic features of *Satkāryavāda* in *Sāṃkhya* system. Basically, the notion of '*Pariṇāma*' is conceptually understood by different philosophical traditions of classical India. *Pariṇāma* has been defined by the *Yoga Bhāṣya* as "...

¹⁸Kar, B. *Analytical Studies in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy*, (Utkal University, 1977) p. 15

of the previous aspect (*dharma*) and the appearance of another aspect of a substance (*dharmi*), while the substance itself remains constant".¹⁹ The *Yukti Dīpikā* states the process of *Parīṇāma* as "just as *palasa* leaf under the impact of heat and such other efficient causes give up its greenness and becomes yellow and yet does not lose its identity of *palasa-hood*".²⁰ We can imply from above instances, when an object or any substance is undergoing of the process of *Parīṇāma*, it never loses its own identity. Here the concept of *Parīṇāma* is understood in terms of change or modification or transformation, or the same thing can be put in a different manner as the word '*Parīṇāma*' deliberately means a 'change'. First of all we have to understand, what do you mean by change? Here the 'change' has been discussed as the change of only aspects or qualities of substance, while the substance itself remains unchanged or unaffected; it means the existing qualities of an object disappear and different set of qualities appear instead of that place. When we are saying 'the existing qualities disappear', that does not necessarily mean that they are completely removed or have gone into nothing; rather it only means that they have gone out of our sight, they lapsed into their unmanifest state. When we are saying 'different set of qualities appear', that does not necessarily mean "the qualities that hitherto remained unmanifest and were not in our sight have become manifest and come into our sight".²¹ For example, clay is changed into a pot; the pot is not something outside clay, but the pot itself is an aspect of the clay which remains unmanifest in the clay even before its production and it becomes manifest at the time of causal operation by the potter with the help of other sufficient causes. Similarly when a pot is destroyed; that is rendered into pot-halves. It does not mean that pot is completely vanished or removed. Rather it only means that the pot is lapsed into its causal state of pot-halves. Therefore *Parīṇāma* does not allow totally a new production and the complete destruction of the existing one.

We have to understand Sāṃkhya view of *Prakṛti Parīṇāmavāda* in the light of its above position. *Sāṃkhya* is dualistic in nature. It is dualistic because of its doctrine of two ultimate realities. *Sāṃkhya* accepts two ultimate reals namely, *Prakṛti* (stands for

¹⁹Yoga- Bhāṣya, III. 13. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian*

Philosophy, Part. I (Ghaziabad: Vimal Prakashan, 1973) pp.50-51

²⁰Chakravarti, P. *Yukti-Dīpikā*, (Calcutta: Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. 23) p. 90

²¹Chandulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Parīṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan,

Chapter I

Contending Positions on *Satkāryavāda*: An Outline

Introduction

In this Chapter I am going to expound and examine the contending philosophical positions on *Satkāryavāda* with special reference to *Vivartavāda* of *Advaita* Vedānta and *Brahma Pariṇāmavāda* of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* Vedānta. Before going to highlight contending position on *Satkāryavāda*, it is necessary to understand *Satkāryavāda* as well as *Pariṇāmavāda*. *Satkāryavādins* advocate that an effect is known as pre-hidden form of pre-existence in its material cause in a potential condition and it becomes manifest in the process of causal operation.¹⁸ This also suggests that an effect is non- different from its cause. On the basis of ‘an effect is non- different from its cause’, we have two theories in respect of process of production of an effect in the cause. And the question arises- is the effect a real transformation or a modification of its cause? Or is the effect an unreal appearance of its cause? Those who maintain that the effect is a real modification of its cause are called *Pariṇāmavādin*; whereas those who maintain that the effect is an unreal appearance of its cause are called *Vivartavādin*. *Sāṃkhya* believes in *Pariṇāmavāda*. According to doctrine of *Pariṇāmavāda*, when an effect is being produced, there is a real modification of the cause into an effect, for e.g. milk gives rise to the production of curd. *Advaita* Vedānta believes in *Vivartavāda* and according to *Vivartavādin*, the production of an effect involves merely an apparent change in the cause, e.g. when we see a snake in a rope. That means, the rope is not really transformed into a snake; actually the rope only appears as a snake, but it is not really the case.

1.1 *Pariṇāma*

It is one of the basic features of *Satkāryavāda* in *Sāṃkhya* system. Basically, the notion of ‘*Pariṇāma*’ is conceptually understood by different philosophical traditions of classical India. *Pariṇāma* has been defined by the *Yoga Bhāṣya* as “disappearance

¹⁸Kar, B. *Analytical Studies in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy*, (Utkal University: P.G. Department of Philosophy, 1977) p. 15

of the previous aspect (*dharmā*) and the appearance of another aspect of a substance (*dharmi*), while the substance itself remains constant".¹⁹ The *Yukti Dīpikā* states the process of *Pariṇāma* as "just as *palasa* leaf under the impact of heat and such other efficient causes give up its greenness and becomes yellow and yet does not lose its identity of *palasa-hood*".²⁰ We can imply from above instances, when an object or any substance is undergoing of the process of *Pariṇāma*, it never loses its own identity. Here the concept of *Pariṇāma* is understood in terms of change or modification or transformation, or the same thing can be put in a different manner as the word '*Pariṇāma*' deliberately means a 'change'. First of all we have to understand, what do you mean by change? Here the 'change' has been discussed as the change of only aspects or qualities of substance, while the substance itself remains unchanged or unaffected; it means the existing qualities of an object disappear and different set of qualities appear instead of that place. When we are saying 'the existing qualities disappear', that does not necessarily mean that they are completely removed or have gone into nothing; rather it only means that they have gone out of our sight, they lapsed into their unmanifest state. When we are saying 'different set of qualities appear', that does not necessarily mean "the qualities that hitherto remained unmanifest and were not in our sight have become manifest and come into our sight".²¹ For example, clay is changed into a pot; the pot is not something outside clay, but the pot itself is an aspect of the clay which remains unmanifest in the clay even before its production and it becomes manifest at the time of causal operation by the potter with the help of other sufficient causes. Similarly when a pot is destroyed; that is rendered into pot-halves. It does not mean that pot is completely vanished or removed. Rather it only means that the pot is lapsed into its causal state of pot-halves. Therefore *Pariṇāma* does not allow totally a new production and the complete destruction of the existing one.

We have to understand Sāṃkhya view of *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda* in the light of its above position. *Sāṃkhya* is dualistic in nature. It is dualistic because of its doctrine of two ultimate realities. Sāṃkhya accepts two ultimate reals namely, *Prakṛti* (stands for

¹⁹*Yoga- Bhāṣya*, III. 13. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) pp.50-51

²⁰Chakravarti, P. *Yukti-Dīpikā*, (Calcutta: Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. 23) p. 90

²¹Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 57

the principle of primordial matter) and *Puruṣa* (stands for the principle of consciousness). *Puruṣa* is neither cause nor effect, whereas *Prakṛti* does the function as the ultimate material cause of all products in the world.

1.1.2 *Prakṛti* as the Primordial or Ultimate Material Cause

We all experience that the world as constituted of a manifold of objects. The Sāṃkhya tradition asks: what is the cause of these objects? The Sāṃkhyas answer by saying that *Prakṛti* is the ultimate (first) cause of all objects, including our body, mind, senses and intelligent.²² We observe that every object arises out of (is caused by) other objects. So curd is produced from milk and a pot is from clay. For Sāṃkhya, milk and clay are proximate causes of respective curd and pot, but not ultimate causes. So that Sāṃkhya tries to know how did they come to be? Or more generally the question is: what is the ultimate stuff or primordial cause of all products of the world? Sāṃkhya obtains to a single primordial material cause of the world, namely, *Prakṛti*. Actually, for Naiyayikas the ultimate material cause is not one but many atoms (*parmanus*). They are four kinds, namely, air, fire, water and earth. In fact, Sāṃkhya argues that there must be some finest and subtlest stuff underlying all phenomenal existence. *Prakṛti* is such a principle and it is both first and ultimate cause of all objects. *Prakṛti* is both material and efficient cause of all products. “The Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy never admits the causality of *Puruṣa*”.²³ *Puruṣa* can neither be the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) nor an efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) of the world. Dr. Anima Sen Gupta states that “the *Upaiṣad* have emphatically declared that *Puruṣa* is by nature immutable and non-attached (*asaṃga*). Admission of the non-causal nature of *Puruṣa* alone will keep intact the unchanged-ability and non-attachment of the spiritual principle.”²⁴ In the accordance of Sāṃkhya, a cause can never be *aparīṇami*, it must be *parīṇami*, and the category *Puruṣa* can never produce an effect. That is the reason Sāṃkhya has never been giving any statement about the causality of *Puruṣa*. In order to produce an effect the cause must either undergo change or it must provide active influence to bring about the effect. Therefore, the cause restricts to be immutable and it must have changeability. And

²²Puligandla, R. *Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1994) p. 120

²³*Sāṃkhya Pravacana Sūtra*, I. 75. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Parīṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 58

²⁴Sen Gupta, A. *Classical Sāṃkhya: A Critical Study*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1982) p. 119

Puruṣa has the quality of being immutable, cannot be the cause of the world. “The Sāṃkhya-Yoga is the first in the fold of orthodox systems to declare that immutability and causality cannot belong to one and the same *sattva*”.²⁵ But a query comes to our mind, why it should be stated that *Prakṛti* is the ultimate or primordial cause of the world? Why it cannot be any finite or limited entity among the evolutes of *Prakṛti* as the material cause? “The Sāṃkhya- Yoga replies that what is limited cannot be the material cause of all”.²⁶ This subject means that it can never be possible at all that any finite or limited entity can be the material (*upādāna*) for all entities. For example, oil-seed cannot be the material cause of a pot. Finite things such as wood, gold, clay etc. can be the material causes of their respective effects which are also finite and among of them cannot function as the material cause of all products in the world. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says, “Which is limited is perishable”.²⁷ On the other hand the Vedas declare “*Pradhāna* as the cause of the world”.²⁸ Here ‘*Pradhāna*’ is defined as the root cause of the world, since it does not evolve from any other thing. By accepting this principle, Sāṃkhya- Yoga philosophy named one imperishable ultimate cause known as *Prakṛti*, which is the primordial material cause for all products in the world. Anirudha says that there being no root, there is no cause; the *Mūla Prakṛti*, the cause which is root-less and the root of all products.²⁹

1.1.3 Kinds of *Pariṇāma*

We have already seen that the concept of *Pariṇāma* does not allow totally a new production and the complete destruction of the existing one, but it implies the manifestation of the unmanifest. Thus, Sāṃkhya defends that ‘*mahat*’ evolves from *Prakṛti*, the evolute ‘*mahat*’ is not foreign to its evolvent *Prakṛti*; it was already in *Prakṛti* in an unmanifest condition.³⁰ What was an unmanifest condition in its causal state becomes manifest in its effect state. Likely, when *mahat* evolves into *ahamkāra*;

²⁵Sāṃkhya *Pravacana Bhāṣya*, I.75. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 58

²⁶Sāṃkhya *Pravacana Sūtra*, I. 76. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 58

²⁷*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VII. 24.1. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 58

²⁸ It has been quoted in *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Sūtra*, I. 77, for details see K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 59

²⁹ *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Sūtra*, I. 67. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 60

³⁰ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 70

the *ahamkāra* must be known as pre-hidden form in its cause in an unmanifest form. From the above discussion, we can assume that an evolute can never be different from its evolvent, according to *Pariṇāmavāda*.

There are two kinds of *Pariṇāma* or changes in the process of evolution of *Prakṛti* into the objects of the world. (A) *Sarūpa* and *Virūpa Pariṇāma*, (B) *Tattvāntra Pariṇāma*

Sarūpa and Virūpa Pariṇāma :

We know that *guṇas* of *Prakṛti* are always dynamic. To say that they are dynamic, it means that they are undergoing change or these *guṇas* are said to be ever changing. They cannot remain static even for a moment. This change is of two kinds namely, *Sarūpa* and *Virūpa Pariṇāma*. When the *guṇas* are changing among themselves without inter-mixing and without giving rise to any new effect, it is called homogeneous change or *Sarūpa Pariṇāma (sadr̥sa-Pariṇāma)*. That is *sattva* changes into *sattva*. This kind of change does not disturb the equilibrium state of *guṇas*, because the *guṇas* cannot produce anything in this change; because they don't oppose with one another. No objects of the world can arise unless the equilibrium is disturbed and one predominates over other two. Thus the evolution cannot take place, but evolution takes place when there is heterogeneous change in the *guṇas*. When the *guṇas* are intermixing and giving rise to new effect, at that time the change is called heterogeneous change or *Virūpa Pariṇāma (visadr̥sa Pariṇāma)*. But in both kinds of *Pariṇāma* there is no replacement of the substance by a totally different substance, rather it is a manifestation of the same substance in a different form. "In *Sarūpa Pariṇāma*, a single *guṇas* e.g. *sattva* manifest itself in different forms while producing its kind, whereas in *Virūpa Pariṇāma*, the three *guṇas* jointly themselves in different forms with predominance of one over the other two."³¹

Tattvāntra Pariṇāma:

This kind of *Pariṇāma* states that one *tattva* gives rise to another *tattva*. It stands for the evolution of a different category of existence. For example, when *ahamkāra* is evolved from *buddhi*, or the *tanmātrās* are evolved from *ahamkāra*, or the five gross elements are evolved from the five *tanmātrās*. In this kind of *Pariṇāma*, the change or

³¹ Ibid., p. 71

transition is from the subtle to gross state. Vacaspati Misra observes that the difference between one *tattva* and another consists in the degree of their subtlety or grossness.³² Prof. Dasgupta highlights on this issue, “Though the *tanmātrās* are evolved from *ahamkāra*, the traces of *ahamkāra* are not easily traceable in them; they acquire proprieties which differ widely from those of *ahamkāra*. Similarly, the evolution of atoms from *tanmātrās*, as depicted in yoga, is a case of *tattvantra-Pariṇāma*, because the atoms acquire sensible properties which are absent in the *tanmātrās*.”³³ We can again distinguish this kind of *Pariṇāma* into three fold.

4. *Dharma-Pariṇāma*

5. *Lakṣaṇa-Pariṇāma*

6. *Avasthā-Pariṇāma*

Dharma-Pariṇāma

We generally differentiate between the substance (*dharmi*) and aspect (*dharmā*) of an object. The *Dharma-Pariṇāma* or the change of aspect is the change that an element undergoes through its various manifestations.³⁴ The change wherein the original substance (*dharmi*) remains unchanged while its aspects (*dharmas*) appear or disappear, for example, a leaf always remains a leaf in essence (*dharmi*) but its colour (*dharmā*) changes from green to yellow. The essence of an object is always constant but its properties are changed, which accounts for the identity of cause and the effect. Therefore *Dharma-Pariṇāma* stands “for the appearance and the disappearance of the qualities in or from a substance that abides.”³⁵

Lakṣaṇa-Pariṇāma

Lakṣaṇa-Pariṇāma or the change of mark refers to the change of an aspect (*dharmā*) in a time series. “All the aspects (*dharmas*) that an object presents at different times may be viewed as existing in the object as latent, actual and sublatent form which may

³² *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī, III*. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p.71

³³ Dasgupta, S.N. *Yoga as the Philosophy and Religion*, (London: Kegan Paul, Trubener and co. 1924) p. 40-41

³⁴ Bhartiya, M.C. and Shastri, D.N. *Causation in Indian Philosophy, Part.I* (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 51

³⁵ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 73

be termed as past, present and future.”³⁶ So the manifestation of an object has to be understood from the point of view of three stages- past, present and future. Before the operation of cause, an aspect exists in the material cause in a sublatent (future) form; after its production, it exists in its actual (present) form and it lapses into its latent (past) form, when it gets destruction. Sāṃkhya already stated that the view- there is no production of non-existent entity and destruction of existent entity. The *Yoga Bhasya* illustrates “it by smile of a passionate man, who, when attached to a particular woman, is not absolutely free from his passion towards other women.”³⁷ Actually what happens- his passion towards a particular woman becomes prominent at that time, while his passion becomes latent towards other women.

Avasthā-Pariṇāma

“*Avasthā-Pariṇāma* or change of state is the change that an aspect undergoes in every succeeding moment in any of its particular stages in time-series.”³⁸ Thus, an aspect exists in its present stage, which is generally regarded to be new. Its newness starts to decrease in every succeeding moment or its newness is changing in every succeeding moment. So what was brand new becomes new, from new it becomes old, from old it turns older and so on. Thus the aspect (*dharma*) remains same, but it undergoes change with reference to time series. This can be explained by the case of a man. A man passes through childhood, adolescence, youth and old age.³⁹ There is another explanation of a woman who becomes a daughter in relation to her parents, becomes mother in relation to her son and daughter, and becomes sister in relation to her brother.⁴⁰

The author of *Yoga-Bhāṣya* also states that ultimately there is only one change, which is differently described under different circumstances.⁴¹ So that when the earth material is giving rise to a pot, first of all earth material is turned into a lump and from the lump, it takes another form and then another shape. In this way it passes through

³⁶ Ibid., p. 73

³⁷ *Yoga- Bhāṣya.*, III. 13. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p.74

³⁸ Bhartiya, M.C and Shastri, D.N. *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 52

³⁹ Sihna, J. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II., (Calcutta: Central Book Agency, 1952) p. 115

⁴⁰ Chakrabarti, P. *Origin and Development of Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1975)p. 262

⁴¹ *Yoga- Bhāṣya.*, III. 13. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 74

different aspect till it is turned into a pot. What we call the change of aspect (*Dharma-Pariṇāma*). “The pot again, in its turn, reaches its present stage in a time series. This is a change of mark (*Lakṣaṇa-Pariṇāma*). Then again, the pot changes showing comparative oldness and newness in every succeeding moment, and this is called change of state (*Avasthā-Pariṇāma*).”⁴² All these changes do not change original substance, which remains unaffected or constant throughout.⁴³

For Sāṃkhya, change is only the appearance and disappearance of qualities or properties in or from an enduring substance. Change does not involve any replacement of one substance by another; rather it is only the change of form or shape, while the substance remains constant or unchanged. So the substance that remains unaffected is called *dharmi* while the varying aspects of substance are called *dharmas*. “So the different kinds of *Pariṇāma* are nothing but the modification of the same substance viewed from different standpoints.”⁴⁴

Sāṃkhya doctrine of *Pariṇāma* is very different from Buddhistic doctrine of universal flux. There should not be any confusion between them. According to Buddhistic doctrine of universal flux, there are only aspects of substance which appear and disappear at every moment and there is no such as substance as it appears and disappears. “Buddhism rejects the idea of dharma or abiding principle, apart from the *dharmas* that appear and disappear.”⁴⁵ There is a contrast between Sāṃkhya and Buddhism on ‘change’. For Buddhism, change involves only replacement of one entity by another entity, “a thing is not the same at the different moments or in different places. Every variation of time and place makes one thing ‘another’ thing.”⁴⁶ “One element of reality does not change or grow into another but gives rise to another. ‘The elements do not change, but disappear.’”⁴⁷ whereas for Sāṃkhya, change does not involve any replacement of on substance by another. In this context,

⁴² *Tattva-Vaisaradi on Yoga-Bhasya.*, III. 13. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part. I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 52

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 52

⁴⁴ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 75

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.75

⁴⁶ Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, (S. Gravenhage: Moutaon and Co. 1958) p.402

⁴⁷ Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, (Calcutta: Sushil Gupta Ltd. 1961) p. 32

Jainism also recognises the “reality of both permanence and change, it believes that whereas the ‘substance’ remains the same, its modes change.”⁴⁸

The notion of change as understood by Sāṃkhya is bit different from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view. For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, change implies only the production of something new and is neither appearance nor disappearance of qualities in an enduring substance. “According to Nyāya, all effects-substance are wholes (*avayavins*) made out of parts (*avayavas*).”⁴⁹ For instance – a table is a whole which is made out of wooden parts. And a necklace is a whole which is also made out of parts of gold. So, here ‘change’ can be understood as addition or subtraction of parts to the particular object like table or necklace. By addition or subtraction of parts to a particular object lead to the destruction of existing entity and origination of new entity. So change can be understood in Nyāya as “it involves either destruction of existing whole or the origination of a different whole.”⁵⁰ But Sāṃkhya conception of change suggests that the appearance and disappearance of qualities or properties in or from an enduring substance, though Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism reject the notion of change as understood by Sāṃkhya system. It is only Sāṃkhya system which explains the most intelligible notion of *Pariṇāma* (change). So far as *Advaita* Vedānta philosophy is concerned, it accepts only one immutable reality i.e. *Brahman*. For *Advaita* Vedāntins, all the changes are merely apparent illusory. Therefore, it makes clear that among all the orthodox Indian philosophical systems, the notion of *Pariṇāma* (change) belongs to exclusively to the Sāṃkhya system.⁵¹

To summarize the above illustration about the conceptual understanding of *Pariṇāmavāda*, that comes under the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*. First of all *Pariṇāma* is not a totally new entity and also the complete of existing one. And then it is followed by the description about *Prakṛti* as the primordial or ultimate material cause of the universe, where I discussed Sāṃkhya-yoga view of *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda* and then it is shown, how Sāṃkhya-Yoga admits the causality of *Prakṛti* and why not *Puruṣa*. And lastly, we proceeded to the different kinds of *Pariṇāma*, where we have shown how Sāṃkhya view of *Pariṇāma* is different from

⁴⁸ Hiriyana, M. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1951) pp.161-165

⁴⁹ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 76

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.76

⁵¹ Shastri, D.N. *Critique of Indian Realism*, (Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1976) pp. 246-247

Buddhistic doctrine of universal flux as well as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of *Parināma*. But the notion of *Parināma* is not acceptable to *Advaita Vedāntin* tradition as Sāṃkhya does. Though Sāṅkara admits the Sāṃkhya view of *Satkāryavāda* but he differs in their interpretation of production of the effect. That means, the production of an effect involves merely apparent change in the cause, e.g. we see a snake in a rope. This is called the philosophy *Vivartavāda*, which is advocated by Sāṅkara's *Advaita Vedānta*, which I shall be looking forward to take up the doctrine of *vivarta* in my next section.

1.2 Theory of causation in *Advaita Vedānta*

Sāṅkara's *Advaita Vedānta* subscribes to *Satkāryavāda* which is similar to Sāṃkhya philosophy. According to Sāṅkara, an effect must be pre-existent in its material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*), which suggests that an effect is non-different from its cause. If it does not pre-exist in its cause, then effect cannot be said being produced. For example, oil cannot be produced from sand. "The effect, being non-different from the cause prior to its production, is also non-different from its cause after production".⁵² "The effect is said to be non-existent in its cause because it exists an unmanifest condition in its cause and becomes manifest in the state of the effect".⁵³ But if Sāṅkara and Sāṃkhya both have supported *Satkāryavāda*, then what is the point of their difference in doctrine of causality. They only differ in their interpretation of production of the effect. *Sāṃkhya* does believe in *Parināmavāda*. According to this, when an effect is being produced, there is a real modification of the cause into an effect, e.g. the production of curd from milk. While *Advaita Vedānta* believes in *Vivartavāda* and according to *Vivartavādin*, the production of an effect involves merely an apparent change in the cause, e.g. when we see a snake in a rope.

Before taking up Sāṅkara's view on *Vivartavāda*, it will be worthwhile to point out how Sāṅkara advances his following arguments to prove *Satkāryavāda* in addition to arguments of Sāṃkhya.

⁵² *Sāṅkara-bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtras*, II, i. 16. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N.Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 64

⁵³ *Sāṅkara-bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtras*, II, i. 17. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N.Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 64

Sāṅkara refutes the doctrine of *Asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by attacking its category of inherent relation (*Samavāya Sambandh*). As we know that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits a kind of relation called inherent relation; in which two related entities can be inseparable and this occurs between cause and effect, substance and qualities etc. For Nyāya, cause and effect are different; their relation is based on inseparable relation called *Samavāya*. Sāṅkara argues if we accept the relation of inherent (*Samavāya Sambandh*) between cause and effect, then we will also have to adopt another *Samavāya* relation between the *Samavāya* and the two terms connected by the *Samavāya*; and again some other relation between this and terms and so on, which is leading to infinite regression, suppose if 'A' and 'B' are different but they are bound together by a relation of inherence, which we intend to designate as 'C' and then the relation going towards again and again. Therefore the result would posit an infinite series of inherence relation. "If we do not accept this another *Samavāya*, there will arise a position in which *Samavāya* will not be related to the terms related by it which will ultimately lead to the dissolution of the bond relating two terms of the *Samavāya* relation. If the opponent says that *Samavāya* (being itself of the form of relation) can be related to the two terms without the help of other relation, then, conjunction also (being of the form of a relation), can be related to the two terms related by it without the help of relation."⁵⁴ But this analysis goes against Nyāya view of conjunction which suggests that conjunction inheres in the two terms by it by the *Samavāya* relation.⁵⁵ Sāṅkara says the assumption of *Samavāya* relation is useless, since substance qualities etc. are apprehended as identical.⁵⁶

Sāṅkara strikes another objection against Nyāyikas doctrine of non-existent of effect in terms of the relation between cause and effect. For Nyāya, an effect is to be said non-existent before its origination. "A relation is possible only between two existing entities and not between an existing and a non-existing entity, or between two non-existing entities."⁵⁷ This subject states that, whenever entities are coming into a relation, they must be existent. But it can neither occur between an existing and non-

⁵⁴ Bhratiya M.C. and Shastri, D.N. *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 64

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.64

⁵⁶ *Sāṅkara-bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtras*, II, I. 18. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhratiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 64

⁵⁷ Ibid., II.i.18. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Parināma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 92

existing nor both non-existing entities. *Asatkāryavāda* maintains that an effect is said to be non-existent before its origination, “The origination will be without a substratum.... Origination is an action therefore it must have some substratum like motion etc. It will be contradictory position to call something an action and without a substratum. When the origination of jar is spoken of which is the substratum if it is not the jar? The origination will be naturally regarded to have some substratum other than jar”.⁵⁸ When we say ‘a jar originates’ it may mean that the operative causes or efficient causes such as potter etc. originate the jar itself is being non-existent, but here the action origination cannot exist in it; it will exist in other things which are existent i.e. the instrumental causes such as potter. The origination of the potter cannot be meant because it is already existent at the time of origination of jar. “If it is said that origination means the relation of the effect with existence of its cause and its obtaining existence itself. Sāṅkara asks how a thing which has not obtained existence itself can be related to something else.”⁵⁹ Relation can be possible only in two existing thing, not in any condition. To sum up the analysis, when we speak of the origination of jar, it is only possible when the jar is already existent.

When the *Asatkāryavādains* state that an effect does not exist in its cause before origination, they suggest a limit to an effect. But it would be not worthwhile. If we assign a limit to the non-existing entity before origination; because we cannot determine it at the time of origination. And one important thing is this- the notion of a ‘limit’ can apply to only real existing thing such as fields, houses etc. We can experience these real existing things, which also have limits; not non-existing things. “Non-existing is destitute of features, which would serve to distinguish it from other thing. Being literally nothing, it is an unreality and such an unreality cannot be spoken of as a limit.”⁶⁰

“If the effect were non-existent in its cause, the activity of the agent would be objectless, since a non-entity cannot be its object.”⁶¹ This subject means, if an effect is said to be non-existent before origination, the activity of the causal agent will be

⁵⁸Bhratiya, M.C. and Shastri, D.N. *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 66

⁵⁹Ibid. ,p. 66

⁶⁰ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) pp. 92-93

⁶¹*Sāṅkara-bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtras*,II, I. 18. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 93

objectless, because what is non-existent that cannot become an object of experience. If *Asatkāryavādain* says that the object of causal agent is the inherent cause, then it would not be Wright, because the object of the causal agent is different from the thing, which is being produced. A potter cannot make a gold pot out of clay with staff and wheel. "If it is said that the effect is only an extra power of the self of the causal agent it will amount to concede *Satkāryavāda*, Sāṅkara says."⁶²

Sāṅkara argues that cause and effect are identical, because when the cause exists then an effect has to be existent. This subject is explained by the example a jar; which cannot be said existent without its material substratum (that is clay) and a cloth exists when threads exist. So it is not very a common rule that one has to be existent, then other must be existent; because cause and effect are implicated each other. For example- A horse is very different from a cow. It is not the case that when a cow exists; a horse must be existent. "Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists, because in this case though the relation between the two is that of cause on effect, they are different. Therefore, the inseparability of cause and effect present a case for their non-difference."⁶³

To substantiate his view, Sāṅkara gives an explanation- a long piece of cloth is rolled up; Sāṅkara argues that we do not know whether it is a cloth or something else. But when the rolled cloth is unfolded, then we come to know that it is nothing but a piece of cloth. More or less when the cloth is rolled up, sometimes we can know that it is a cloth but sometimes we do not know what is the length and breadth of the cloth. When the rolled cloth is being unfolded; then we come to know these particulars about the cloth. We can link up this unrolled cloth is only manifested form of the rolled cloth. "Similarly, cause and effect are identical; the effect e.g., a cloth is only manifested form of the cause, namely, the yarn, the manifestation being done by the operation of the instrumental causes such as a shuttle, loom, weaver etc."⁶⁴

We have already seen that the *Satkāryavāda* is propounded by Sāṅkara, which is not different from that of Sāṅkhya. According to Sāṅkara, the one and only reality is *Brahman*. This *Brahman* is the ultimate cause of this world, which is effect. *Brahman*

⁶²Ibid., II, i. 18. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 69

⁶³Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 94

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 95

is conscious entity.⁶⁵ We know that many major parts of this world are unconscious. Thus *Brahman* and this creation or world belongs to different character of realm of reality. *Satkāryavāda* maintains that an effect is pre-existent in its cause prior to its production. This doctrine also implies that cause and effect should belong to the same character, or else how can the effect exist in its material cause? Sāṃkhya raises an objection by attacking against the view that conscious *Brahman* is the cause of this unconscious world. Sāṅkara replies to this objection and argues that in fact we see such difference of character between cause and effect. “Non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate from man who is acknowledged to be intelligent. Again, intelligent things such as scorpions, etc. are produced from the non-intelligent matter such as cowdung.”⁶⁶ This subject states that both non-intelligent thing and intelligent things are compatible to each other. But here the opponents raised an objection by saying- actually the real cause of the non-intelligent things such as nail and hair etc. is the human body which is itself non-intelligent and similarly, the real effect of the non-intelligent such as cowdung is the bodies of the scorpions which are themselves non-intelligent.⁶⁷ So that we can find there is no difference in character between cause and effect. But Sāṅkara still holds that there is a difference in character between cause and effect. “The non-intelligent matter of the scorpion’s body is the abode of an intelligent principle, the scorpion’s soul, while its cause, the cowdung is not so.... Sāṅkara says if absolute equality between the cause and effect is insisted on the relation of cause and effect would be annihilated.”⁶⁸ Sāṅkara also admits that there is a common characteristic to both cause and effect. e.g. the effect the ‘bodies of the scorpions’ are existent in the cause ‘cowdung’ and the effect hair, nails etc. are originated from the cause man’s body. It is quite sensible that what the theory of nature depicted, which suggests that it is very true in nature of earth. Similarly, in *Brahman* and its effect, this world, it is existence which is common to both.⁶⁹ The above explanation is about Sāṅkara’s view of causation in general. So there is a common characteristic as well as difference between cause and effect. Both difference and identity have equal importance to the relation of cause and effect. Where identity between cause and

⁶⁵ Bhratiya, M.C. and Shastri, D.N. *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 71

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.71

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.71

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.71-72

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 72

effect are emphasised on the accounts of the doctrine of causality in Sāṅkhya philosophy, which is known as *Satkāryavāda*, but this identity between cause and effect is not absolute identity; it is identity only with regard to which both are constituted and there is difference with regard to form or shape. In fact this is *Pariṇāmavāda* or the doctrine of real change. So, Sāṅkara keeps himself as a true *Pariṇāmavādin* on the phenomenal ground.⁷⁰

Again, for Sāṅkara the entire phenomenal existence is illusory and the only reality is Brahman. Whatever is included in this phenomenal existence must be considered as illusory or false from the point of supreme reality, which is Brahman. Now Vedas and their knowledge come under this complex of phenomenal existence. Then this also must be illusory. How can this illusory knowledge lead us true knowledge of Brahman?⁷¹ In other words, how can a real effect exist in an unreal cause? We never know from our ordinary experience that the real effects spring from the unreal causes. “A man bitten by a rope-snake (a rope is falsely taken to be a snake) certainly dies. Nor the water seen in mirage can be utilized for the purposes of drinking and bathing.”⁷² This objection is cleverly answered by Sāṅkara, by taking into the consideration of practical experience. In the practical experience, for Sāṅkara, we often see that the real effects can take place from the unreal causes. We witness that for sometimes death takes place when a man imagines himself to be bitten by a poisonous snake and a person who is in the dream, experiences that he is dying to be bitten by a snake or bathing in water. If it is objected that these effects of the both cases are themselves unreal, but Sāṅkara replies that though these effects of both cases are unreal; “but the consciousness which the dreaming person attains, is not unreal; it is real effect because it is not sublated by his waking consciousness.”⁷³ One may ask, is our dream real? Or dreaming experience of a person is real? To answer this query, may say that dreaming experiences are real till you are in the dream, because the consciousness of dreaming person is real due to he is not in the sphere of waking consciousness. But dreaming experiences could be unreal, when a man has risen after sleep, he does regard that what he had seen in the dreaming experience, is to be unreal. But the consciousness what he experienced of these effects of bitten by

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 72

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 72

⁷² Ibid., p. 72

⁷³ Ibid., p. 72

snake or bathing in the water, is not regarded to be unreal.⁷⁴ This proves that unreal causes can give rise to real effects.

1.3 *Vivartavāda* of *Advaita Vedānta*

Sāṅkara School of *Advaita Vedānta* completely agrees with Sāṅkhya view of *Satkāryavāda* and he states Sāṅkhya is not in correct explanation of production of effect as real. The analysis of *Satkāryavāda* explains that an effect is non-different from its material cause; which cannot be regarded the basis of Sāṅkhya doctrine of *Parināma* (which suggests that the production of an effect involves a real change). It is completely fine or there is no problem with Sāṅkhya's interpretation on 'the effect is non-different from its material cause', Sāṅkara argues. But it shows a weak understanding of implication of *Satkāryavāda*, when it advocates the production of effect involves a real change. *Advaita Vedāntins* were fully aware of this problem with Sāṅkhya explanation of *Satkāryavāda*. As we know Sāṅkara has made three different grades of existence of reality. Sāṅkara argues the illustration of *Satkāryavāda* as *Parināma* is true from the empirical point of view (*vyāvahārika-satta*), while explaining the production of an effect. But he also describes that it would be false or indefensible from the ultimate point of view (*pāramārthika-satta*). For this reason, "Sarvajnatman, a follower of the Sāṅkara school of *Advaita Vedānta* considers that *Parināmavāda* of Sāṅkhya is prelude to *Vivartavāda*."⁷⁵ *Parināmavadins* defend that an effect is identical with cause whereas *Ārabhavādin* advocates that cause and effect are different from each other; effect is totally a new entity. And also argues that if an effect is identical with cause, then there is no necessity for production; therefore there is no causation. If the effect is essentially different from its cause, then there cannot be any production. How can an entity produce something which is essentially different from itself, where the two entities are being unrelated? On the basis of this Sāṅkara keeps the doctrine of causality to the practical realm and upholds the doctrine of illusory change (*vivarta*) from the ultimate point of view or *pāramārthika-satta*. Before we enquire into the concept of *Vivartavāda*, we need to bring out the basic

⁷⁴ *Sāṅkara-bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtras*, II, i. 18. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 73.

⁷⁵ *Sāṅksepā Sāriraka*, II. 61. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Parināma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 95

difference between *Vivartavāda* and *Parināmavada*. Vidyaranya observes, “When an object attains a state which is different from its present one, it is known as real change (*Parināma*); but when an object merely appears to be different state. It is called transfiguration (*vivarta*).”⁷⁶ “Change which is of the same grade of reality is transformation (*Parināma*) and change which is not the same grade of reality is transfiguration (*vivarta*).”⁷⁷

Now coming to doctrine of *Vivartavāda* by taking the famous instance of rope appears as a snake. When rope appears as snake, it does not come under any change and yet it stands for the idea of snake. Moreover rope cannot be considered as the cause for the snake; though it appears for an illusory snake. But to be a cause of snake, the rope must be either material cause or efficient cause. As we know the notion of material cause stands for the matter and the matter always undergoes change. But it is not possible in the case of ‘rope appears as snake’. The rope does not come under any change at all and it remains as rope, which is giving the idea of illusory snake. So that it cannot be material cause for a snake; taking another the concept of the efficient cause which provides the external influence or effort to bring out changes in the material cause. But the rope cannot act any functional effort or active influence to the illusion of a snake. Therefore the rope is neither material nor efficient cause. It is fact that if there is no rope at all (that means the absence of rope), then we would not fall upon the idea of illusory snake. “Sāṅkara construes that it is more appropriate to consider the rope as substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for our experience of an illusory snake and not the cause because, the idea of a cause involves the notion of material causality or efficient causality and the rope is none of them. Yet if there is no rope, there is illusory snake-experience. But there would be a rope even in the absence of an illusory experience of a snake.”⁷⁸

The essential doctrine of identity of cause and effect, which has been already propounded, leads to *Vivartavāda*. According to Sāṅkara a jar is not different from clay, as it is everywhere same in nature as the clay. “The form of a jar is not different

⁷⁶Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Parināma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p.100

⁷⁷*Sidhānta Lesa Saṅgraha*. Vol. I. p. 153. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Parināma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 100

⁷⁸ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Parināma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) pp. 100-01

from a jar and a jar is not different from the clay. Then why do we call it a jar? It is fictitious, merely a fancied name.”⁷⁹ We cannot show the essence of a jar which is something other than the clay that it is made of. Sāṅkara says’ “jar is merely imagined through delusion; the only real entity in this respect is the clay.”⁸⁰ “Similarly, the whole universe, being the effect of the real *Brahman*, is in reality nothing but *Brahman*.”⁸¹ “That which is super-imposed has no separate existence from its substratum.”⁸² That is the reason Sāṅkara says, “The appearance of the world as different from *Brahman* is false. Therefore the world is not different from *Brahman*.”⁸³

1.4 *Brahma Vivartavāda*

We have already dealt with the conceptual analysis of *Vivartavāda*; but here we propose to explain how “*Brahman* transcends causality”⁸⁴, which is based on the scriptural authority. The scriptures claim that *Brahman* is the only one reality.⁸⁵ That is immutable and devoid of parts,⁸⁶ and it is unborn, great and firm.⁸⁷ It is a true fact that the world of plurality depends on this one reality called *Brahman*, for its existence. Suppose there is no *Brahman*, then there is no world at all. But *Brahman* cannot be regarded as the cause of the world.⁸⁸ Because it is known to us the principle of causality which suggests that to be a cause, it should be either material causality or efficient causality. But we cannot ascribe both material and efficient causality to

⁷⁹ Bhratiya, M.C. and Shastri, D.N. *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 75

⁸⁰ *Veveka-Cūdāmaṇi of Sāṅkaracarya.*, p. 229. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhratiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 75

⁸¹ *Veveka-Cūdāmaṇi of Sāṅkaracarya.*, p. 230. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhratiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 75

⁸² *Veveka-Cūdāmaṇi of Sāṅkaracarya.*, p. 231. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhratiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 75

⁸³ *Veveka-Cūdāmaṇi of Sāṅkaracarya.*, p. 231. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhratiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 75

⁸⁴ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 101

⁸⁵ *Chandogya Upaniṣhad*, . VI. i. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 101

⁸⁶ *Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṁgraha*, P. 204. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 101

⁸⁷ *Brhādaranyaka Upaniṣhad*. IV. iv. 20. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 101

⁸⁸ See for details Dr. Roma Chaudhari, ‘An objection against *Brahma-kāraṇa-Vada*’, PB, Vol. LXUX. Feb. 1964, p. 58-61

Brahman. *Brahman* cannot be considered as the material or transforming cause,⁸⁹ for being devoid of parts it cannot transform itself.⁹⁰ If *Brahman* were to undergo change, then either the whole or parts of *Brahman* would definitely undergo change. But if the whole of *Brahman* were to change, then it would lose its transcendence. If part of it is to change that means, it is divisible into parts. This analysis strikes against the scripture, which claims that *Brahman* is devoid of parts. Again change is symbol of imperfection and deficiency, but *Brahman* is perfect, “that which is full and perfect, adequate and independent, absolute and free, cannot undergo any change or transformation.”⁹¹ So *Brahman* cannot be considered as both material and efficient cause. Therefore it cannot be cause of the world. Then, how can we account for the existence of the world of plurality, which is also change. Or we can put it another way, what is the relation between *Brahman* (which is immutable) and the world (which is mutable)? We cannot assert that the world is different from the *Brahman*, because it may be a contradictory position, if we can see that the scriptural assertion upholds the non-difference of the world from *Brahman*.⁹² And it cannot be identical with *Brahman*, because identity is not possible between the *Brahman* and the world. So there cannot be two contradictory positions in one substance like difference and non-difference. Sāṅkara answers such compatible view by upholding the idea of non-difference of the world from the *Brahman*.⁹³ Moreover non-difference by meant it cannot be identity between them, as Sāṅkhya does believe in the non-difference of an effect from its cause and it means thereby identity. But it is very different from the *Vivartavādin’s* notion of non-difference of the world from *Brahman*, which suggests that “it implies the denial of difference or separate being of the effect from its cause and not identity with the cause.”⁹⁴ Vācaspati Mīśra observes that “the Advaitain merely denies the different of the effect from its cause, but never affirms identity

⁸⁹ For details see Max Nolan, ‘Sāṅkara and the causal concept’, PB, Vol. LXXII, No.11. Nov1967, p. 469-70.

⁹⁰ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 101

⁹¹ Brahma, N.K. *Causality and Science*, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948) p.90

⁹² *Chandogya Upaniṣhad*. VI. i. 4. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 102

⁹³ *Sāṅkara-bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtras*. II. i. 14. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 102

⁹⁴ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 103

between them.”⁹⁵ As we know the doctrine of *Brahman* of causality suggests that *Brahman* is the cause and the world is its effect. But they both belong to two different grades of reality. The former belongs to ultimately real (*pāramārthika-satta*) and the latter is only empirical reality (*vyāvahārika-satta*). But causal relation is only possible when the both belong to one phenomena and same grades of reality, not between phenomena and noumena. How can it be possible any causal relation between *Brahman* (which belongs to ultimately real) and the world (which is empirically real)? “According to all description, *Brahman* is sentient, ever pure, eternal and of the nature of knowledge and bliss, whereas the world is non-sentient, impure, changeable, of the nature ignorance, and full of misery and sorrow.”⁹⁶ This is the problem with *Brahma-kāraṇa-Vada*. Sāṅkara offers a logical explanation, not a causal explanation for this problem regarding the appearance of world besides the *Brahman*. “*Brahman* is not the cause of the world, but the ‘because’ (logical ground) of the world.”⁹⁷ N K Brahma highlights his observation in this issue. He says, “Cause is that which precedes the effect and effectuates its generation. But in this conception of the perfect and full, the free and independent ground, what is called effect is always contained in the cause.”⁹⁸ Or truly speaking, “there is not effectuation, no process of generation, no temporal relation, no antecedence or succession and hence there is neither any cause nor any effect.”⁹⁹ That is why Sāṅkara cannot accept the ultimacy of the causal category. Though *Brahman* constitutes the ground of the entire world of causes and effects, “*Brahman* transcends time, cause and every form of empirical characterisation.”¹⁰⁰ So that for Sāṅkara the notion of causation is phenomena and doctrine causality has no ultimate significance.

To summarize the above explanation about the conceptual comprehension of Sāṅkara’s notion of *vivartavāda* and it was followed by Sāṅkara’s acceptance of Sāṅkhya doctrine of *Satkārya*. Though he stated that an effect has to be known as pre-existent in its material cause, because an effect exists an unmanifest condition in

⁹⁵ *Bhamati*. II. i. 14. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 103

⁹⁶ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p.103

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 104

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* 104

⁹⁹ Brahma, N.K. *Causality and Science*, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948) p.77

¹⁰⁰ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan 2005) p. 104

its material cause. But Sāṅkara is slightly in difference to Sāṅkhya with regard to their interpretation of production of the effect. Sāṅkara believes in *vivartavāda* and according to this doctrine, the production of an effect involves an apparent change in the cause, like we see a snake in a rope. But *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy does not accept Sāṅkara's notion of *vivartavāda* rather he does accept the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *Parināmavāda*.

1.5 Causation in *Viśiṣṭādvaita* Philosophy

Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy does accept the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *Parināmavāda*. The author of this philosophical tradition regards that the world as the real transformation of the *Brahman* or theory *Brahman* as the ultimate material cause of universe. Dr. Chari highlights in this context,

“According to *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, the mere *svarūpa* of *Brahman* which is un-connected with *cit* and *acit* cannot be (*upādāna*) material cause of the world. Nor can the non-sentient *Prakṛti* by itself be the material cause of the universe as Sāṅkhyas believe. It is the *Brahman* as associated with the individual selves and the cosmic matter in their subtle state (*suksam-cit-acid-visista-Brahma*) that constitutes the material cause of the universe.”¹⁰¹

In the state of dissolution, the individual selves exist in *Brahman* as an unmanifest form which is devoid of name and form; but when the creation takes place they become unfolded and assume name and form. Here the modification happens to *cit* and *acit*; not to *Brahman*. *Brahman* is the ground or the basis for *cit* and *acit* and it is regarded as the material cause of the world.

The fundamental problem of Vedānta is to account for the causal relation between *Brahman* and the universe. How does one Absolute become the manifold universe with its infinite variety of names and forms? This is an important metaphysical query to which every Vedāntin seeks to provide their own answers. We have already briefly referred to the illustration provided by *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and *Advaita* Vedānta. In this chapter, we shall take up a detail account of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* theory that the universe is

¹⁰¹Srinivas Chari, S.M. *Fundamental of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2004) p. 246

an integral part of *Brahman*. Though we shall not treat *Viśiṣṭādvaita* in any great detail, but we will confine ourselves to a discussion of its main tenets, especially *Brahman* is the material cause of this universe. Or this may be regarded as a modified *Brahma-Parināmvāda*.

1.6 Criticism of *Advaita Vedānta*

The Sāṅkara School of *Advaita Vedānta* admits on the strength of the Scriptural text, that *Brahman* is the material cause of the universe. For Sāṅkara, *Brahman* is the only one reality and immutable. *Brahman* is pure being devoid of any differentiation which does not undergo any transformation or change into the universe. In order to account for the material causality of *Brahman*, Sāṅkara adopts the doctrine of *maya* or *avidya* which causes the world illusion. In this context, Dr. Chari suggested as, “According to *Advaita Vedānta*, it is owing to *avidya* that *Brahman* appears as the universe. *Avidya* is the cosmic principle which causes world illusion.”¹⁰² That means, *Brahman* illusorily appears as the universe due to the *maya* or *avidya* (i.e. cosmic principle). In other words, the phenomenal universe is superimposed on *Brahman* due to the *maya* or *avidya* like the snake in the rope. Dr. Chari also argued as, “*Brahman* is the substrate for *maya* which causes the appearance of the universe; it is regarded as *upādāna kāraṇa*. All changes in the form of evolution into various modifications apply not to *Brahman* but to *avidya*. *Brahman* thus unaffected by change as declared by the *śruti*, but at the same time, being the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for the cosmic illusion, it is regarded as the material cause of the universe.”¹⁰³

The above explanation is subjected to serve the criticism by the *Viśiṣṭādvaita*. The main point of criticism is that the doctrine of *maya* (*avidya*, which is the central doctrine of Sāṅkara School of *Advaita Vedānta*) is untenable. All the arguments advanced by *Advaita Vedānta* to prove the illusoriness of the universe and the rope as snake due to *avidya* is ruled out. For the present study, it may be noted that *Brahman* itself appears as the universe is shown to be untenable.

¹⁰² Srinivas Chari, S.M. *Fundamental of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasisiddh Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2004) p. 251

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 246

1.7 Material Causality of *Brahman*

With rejection of *Advaita's Vivartavāda*, *Viśiṣṭādvaita* is confronted with problem of finding research the causal relationship between *Brahman* and the universe. In fact, one of the major problems of Vedānta is to provide an explanation of material causality of *Brahman*. The *Upaniṣads* refer that '*Brahman* is the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) of the universe' is based on the analogy of the clay is the material cause of pot. Suppose the above cited explanation offered by the *Upaniṣads* is taken into consideration, then it would follow that *Brahman* and the universe are non-different. The author of *Vedānta-Sūtra* asserts on the strength of the *Upaniṣadic* text, "That the two are non-distinct."¹⁰⁴ In addition to it, Dr. Chari also argued, "...*Brahman* as the material cause and the universe as its effect are non-distinct."¹⁰⁵ But *Advaitins* argue that only cause is real, whereas the effect is illusory and the universe as the effect is illusory. For them, *Brahman* is the one and only reality, which is absolute and real. As against this argument, *Viśiṣṭādvaita* argues that cause and effect are identical and as well as real. For Ramanuja, they are two different states (*avastha*) of a same substance, or they are two sides of a same coin. Nothing new comes into existence in the causality but what is already existent in an unmanifest condition, which is made manifest form. The earlier state of causal substance is called as cause and the latter one of it is called effect. They are relative terms. The states or *Avasthas* are completely accidental, because they come and go.¹⁰⁶ For e.g. the clay which is (*upādāna*) material cause of the pot, becomes an effect; when the clay is transformed or changed into a pot. Dr. Chari has given his view on material causality, "*Upadantva* or material causality consists in the association of an entity with a different state. That serves as ground or the basis for the changed states is regarded as material cause."¹⁰⁷ Therefore clay is regarded as *upādāna - kāraṇa* for the pot and the pot is only made out of the basic substance i.e. clay. Or in better way one may articulate, when we are saying that a pot is made out of the clay that means a pot is only produced from the clay. Here the production means the modification of the cause into an effect. And destruction is reabsorption of the effect in the cause. Prof. J.N.

¹⁰⁴ *Vedānta-Sūtra*. II.I. 15. Quotation taken from Srinivas Chari, S.M. *Fundamental of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2004) p. 271.

¹⁰⁵ Srinivas Chari, S.M. *Fundamental of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2004) p. 271

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 247

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 247

Sinha has offered in this context, “Production and destruction are the different states of the causal substance. Production is modification (*vikāra*). Modification is rearrangement of the parts the causal substance (*samsthānaviśeṣa*).”¹⁰⁸ This above illustration can be explained by this example; a gold necklace is a modification of gold, which means there is a production of gold necklace from gold which also implies gold is transformed into a gold necklace and when it is turned into gold then there is a state of destruction which also implies a gold necklace is melted into gold. Likewise, clay is transformed into a pot and a pot is powered into clay. Dr. Chari used to say that, “Production, existence and destruction are the different states of the causal substance, even as childhood, youth and old age are the different states of a person.”¹⁰⁹ Now we have to understand the material causality of *Brahman* in the above light of this explanation. As we know that *Brahman* is the ground (*ādhāra*) for *cit* and *acit*; both *cit* and *acit* are modes (*prakāra*) of *Brahman*. He has argued, “*Brahman* as controller of *cit* is its *sariri* or *atman*. They are organically related to *Brahman* and such as *Brahman* is at all times associated with *cit* and *acit* both in the state of dissolution as well as the state of creation.”¹¹⁰ The only difference between these two states is that- as I have already mentioned in the above that, in the state of dissolution the *cit* and *acit* are an unmanifest form which is devoid of name and form; in the state of creation, they become unfolded and assume name and form. Or in other words, supreme *Brahman* is cause and the entire world (which is unconsciousness) and the individual selves (which is consciousness) are the effect. The effect is non-different from the cause. Matter and souls are inseparable and non-different from *Brahman*. “They are attributes (*viśeṣana*) of *Brahman*, which co-inhere in him. They have co-inherence (*sāmānādhikarānya*) in him. *Brahman* invested with subtle or causal matter and souls are the cause. *Brahman* invested with gross or effected matter and souls are the effect.”¹¹¹ So here *Brahman* is primary substance, whereas matter and souls (which constitute the universe) are its attributes or modes. In this context, Dr. Chari used to say, “Substance is the basis for attribute and the latter cannot exist by itself except as related to the former. Substance also cannot be conceived without

¹⁰⁸ Sinha, J. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2006) p. 676

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 676

¹¹⁰ *Ramanuja Bhāṣya on Vedānta-Sūtras*, II-3-18, p. 574. Quotation taken from Srinivas Chari, *Fundamental of Viśiṣṭadvaita Vedānta*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2004) p. 246

¹¹¹ Sinha, J. *Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2006) pp. 676-677

its essential characteristics.”¹¹² That means the primary substance (*Brahman*) and its attribute (matter and souls) are inherently related and also they are inseparable. So this universe of matter and souls are integral part of *Brahman*.

Brahman is one in the unmanifest state. He is manifold in the manifest or differentiated state. Subtle unconsciousness matter unmanifested in names and forms and subtle consciousness souls are the body of the causal *Brahman*. Gross unconsciousness matter manifested in names and forms or objects and individual selves with their manifest qualities are the body of the effected *Brahman*.¹¹³ *Brahman* is cause as well as effect. In the causal state he is invested with the body of *cit* and *acit*. In the effected state he is invested with the body of gross conscious souls and unconscious matter. So the effect is non-different from the cause. Though *Brahman* is partless, he himself transforms into the universe. One indivisible *Brahman* can transform himself into the manifold world of individual souls and matter, even as one partless universal can exist in many individuals without being divided.

Conclusion

To bring this chapter to a close, we can say that there are contending positions on *Satkāryavāda* with special reference to *Vivartavāda* of *Advaita Vedānta* and *Brahma Pariṇāmovāda* of *Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta*. It may be observed that *Vivartavāda* which is adopted to uphold the doctrine *maya* or *avidya* which causes the world illusion. And due to *maya*, *Brahman* appears as the universe. It seems as unsatisfactory solution to the ontological problem of one Absolute becoming the manifold universe or the causal relationship between *Brahman* and the universe. The only way to account for the causal relationship between *Brahman* and the universe is to accept the modified of *Brahma- Pariṇāmovāda* as explained by *Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta*.

¹¹² Srinivas Chari, S.M. *Fundamental of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2004) p. 272.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 67

Chapter II

Sāṃkhya: Metaphysics (Cosmology) and Epistemology: An Exposition

Introduction

In this chapter, I am going to expound and examine the Sāṃkhya metaphysics or cosmology and epistemology with regard to the instruments of valid knowledge on the one hand and highlight the relation between of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* on the other. In order to understand the doctrine of *Satkārya* in Sāṃkhya -Yoga philosophy, we need to understand its two ultimate reals, namely *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* and the relation between them. It has to be pointed out at the outset that an analysis of Sāṃkhya doctrine of *Prakṛti* involves an examination of *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*. We will mention *Pariṇāmavāda* briefly in this chapter but a comprehensive account of *Pariṇāmavāda* has been given in chapter I.

It is true that life is always is unstopped flow of experience. Being a reader of good philosophy, we are expected that good philosophy seeks to explain an importance of human life in relation to the whole universe and it must establish its claim by showing that it has formulated its theory on the basis of a thorough analysis of experience.¹¹⁴

Dr. Anima SenGupta has made a special study of the Sāṃkhya; a philosopher, being an interpreter of life, cannot keep his eyes away from the living experience of every moment. Otherwise he will create a system of thought, which is devoid of any touch of life and reality. The analysis of experience is the beginning point of Sāṃkhya philosophy and on the basis of that; this philosophical tradition has been developed. According to Sāṃkhya, the universe is composed of only two fundamental elements, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, both are real and eternally existent. *Prakṛti* stands for the principle of primordial matter and *Puruṣa* stands for the principle of consciousness. These two fundamental principles are not dogmatically postulated; but they are

¹¹⁴ Sen Gupta, A., *The Evolution of Sāṃkhya School of Thought*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1986) p. 12

accepted on the basis of thorough analysis of experience.¹¹⁵ Experience cannot be possible unless, there are objects of experience. But these objects of experience by themselves are not enough to bring about experience. Experience presupposes consciousness. Unless there is some principle of consciousness, which interprets our experience, objects by themselves are incapable of producing experience. So that, the need for the principle for consciousness, which the Sāṃkhya finds in *Puruṣa*. Therefore Sāṃkhya -Yoga logically accepts the fundamental principles of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. These two fundamental principles are not mythical in nature but they are at the very root of the possibility of experience or knowledge.¹¹⁶ *Prakṛti* is the root cause of all in the universe, which is also known as (*avyakta*) or unmanifest. As the first principle of the universe, it is called '*Pradhāna*'. '*Pradhāna*' is the term regularly used in Yoga-sūtras of Patanjali.¹¹⁷

2.1 Nature of *Prakṛti*

The Sāṃkhya theory upholds the task of explaining how the world of multiplicity has gradually come into existence through the process of evolutions from *Prakṛti*. Prof. Nair has attempted to give the meaning of *Prakṛti*, "The term *Prakṛti* is from root 'kr' together with prefix 'pra' meaning 'making or placing before at first'."¹¹⁸ "*Prakṛti* is one; root-less root of this universe with three attributes and evolving through these every kind of entity save the *Puruṣa*."¹¹⁹ *Prakṛti* is the root cause of this world of objects. All worldly effects are latent in this uncaused cause. It is regarded as 'uncaused cause principle': because infinite regress has to be avoided. All worldly objects, including our body and mind, senses and intellect are limited, finite and dependent things. Thus, we see that the world is a series of effects and it should have a cause. Then, what is the cause of this world? It is quite sure that the finite or limited thing cannot be the cause of the world, "the Sāṃkhya- Yoga states that what is limited

¹¹⁵ Sen Gupta, A., *The Evolution of Sāṃkhya School of Thought*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1986) p. 12

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.13

¹¹⁷ *Yoga- Bhāṣya*, III. 48. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Parināma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 2

¹¹⁸ Nair, P.K.S., *The Sāṃkhya System*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1986) p. 98

¹¹⁹ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, int. p. 28. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Parināma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 3

cannot be the material cause of all".¹²⁰ And it cannot be the *Puruṣa* or the self for the cause of the world, "the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy never admits the causality of *Puruṣa*".¹²¹ *Puruṣa* can neither be the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) nor an efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*). Dr. Anima Sen Gupta states that "the *Upaiṣad* have emphatically declared that *Puruṣa* is by nature immutable and non-attached (*asaṃga*). Admission of the non-causal nature of *Puruṣa* alone will keep intact the unchangeability and non-attachment of the spiritual principle."¹²² In the accordance of Sāṃkhya, a cause can never be *aparīṇami*, it must be *parīṇami*, and the category *Puruṣa* can never produce an effect. That is the reason Sāṃkhya has never been giving any statement about the causality of *Puruṣa*. So the cause of the world must be non-self, which is different from self or consciousness. Now a query arises here: can this non-self be the physical element or the material atoms?¹²³ It cannot be the physical elements, because I have already stated in the above that it can never be possible at all that any finite or limited entity can be the material (*upādāna*) for all entities. According to Carvakas or the materialist, the Buddha and Nyāya-Vaisesika, the ultimate material cause of the objects of the world is not one but many atoms (*parmanus*). They are four kinds, namely, air, fire, water and earth. But Sāṃkhya point of view is very different from them on this ground. So we find that this ground principle is to be supposed as unintelligent or unconsciousness principle which is uncaused, eternal and all pervading. This is the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya system. "This *Prakṛti* is the uncaused first cause of this vast and multifarious universe, it is unlimited, all-pervasive and infinite."¹²⁴ "Karika describes *Prakṛti* as *ahetumat, nityam, vyāpi, niṣkriyam, ekam, anāśritam, aliṅgam, niravayavam, svatantram, avyaktam triguṇam, aviveki, visaya, sāmānyam, acetanam, and prasavadharmi*."¹²⁵ In other words, Dr. Anima Sen Gupta defines as, "*Prakṛti* is uncaused, it is eternal and

¹²⁰ *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Sutra*, I. 76. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Parīṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 58

¹²¹ *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Sutra*, I. 75. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Parīṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 58

¹²² Sen Gupta, A. *Classical Sāṃkhya: A Critical Study*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1982) p. 119

¹²³ Data and Chattarjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 258

¹²⁴ *Sāṃkhya -Pravancca- Bhāṣya*, I, *sūtra*.76. Quotation taken from Sen Gupta, *The Evolution of Sāṃkhya School of Thought*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1986) p. 19

¹²⁵ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 10-11. Quotation taken from Sen Gupta, *The Evolution of Sāṃkhya School of Thought*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1986) p. 19

all-pervasive; it is immobile only in the sense that in this *avyakta* state or *Prakṛti* state, there is no manifestation of products like *mahat*, *ahamkāra* etc.”¹²⁶

Further *Prakṛti* is one, but the products of *Prakṛti* are many. The products or evolutes of *Prakṛti* are caused, non-eternal, non-pervasive, mobile, manifold, dependent, mergent, conjunct and heterogeneous.¹²⁷ *Prakṛti* is nothing but the composed of three *guṇas* in a state of potentiality. Being the cause of all worldly objects, *Prakṛti* supports all and it is not supported by anything else. *Prakṛti* is self-subsistent and independent, but the entire world of objects or individual effects is implicit in the bosom of *Prakṛti*. Unlike *Prakṛti*, its products take their shelter in the cause.¹²⁸ In the state of evolution, the world of objects is manifested from *Prakṛti*, which are implicitly contained in its bosom; while dissolution is the returning of this world to *Prakṛti*.

2.1.1 Proof for the Existence of *Prakṛti*

Sāṃkhya gives the following five proofs in support of the existence of *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* exists,

“Because of the finite nature of specific objects (*bhedānām parimaṇatvāt*),

Because of the homogenous nature (*samanvayāt*) of effect,

Because of its evolution being due to the efficacy of the cause (*saktitahh pravṛttes’ ca*),

Because of the separation between cause and its effect (*kāraṇakārya-vibhāgāt*)

And because of the merging of the whole world (of effects) (*avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya*).“¹²⁹

Before going to examine these arguments one after another, we need to make some preliminary clarification. In the verse VIII of *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, it is described that the

¹²⁶ Sen Gupta, *The Evolution of Sāṃkhya School of Thought*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1986) p. 13

¹²⁷ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 10. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 3

¹²⁸ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 10. Quotation Sen Gupta, *The Evolution of Sāṃkhya School of Thought*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1986) p. 13

¹²⁹ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 15. Quotation taken from T.G. Mainkar, *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa* (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, 2004) p. 87.

non-perception of *Prakṛti* is because of its subtlety, not because of its non-existence. Its apprehension is because of its effect, or in another words it is actually inferred through its effect.¹³⁰ This implies that *Prakṛti* is accepted something as unmanifest. It is naturally non-empirical and also it cannot be an object of perception, because it is too subtle to be so. But the knowledge of *Prakṛti* is to be attained through the inferential process of its effects. The sensory and the motor organs, all the material objects are its effects. From the perception of effect (*karya*) we can infer the cause (*karana*). In fact Vācaspati Miśra also mentions clearly by saying that, in order to establish the existence of *Prakṛti*, first the effect has to be 'existent' prior to its production.¹³¹

1. "In the first argument, '*parimāṇā*' stands for '*parimitatvāt*' meaning because of 'being measured', i.e. 'being finite'."¹³² All individual things in the world are limited, finite and dependent. The products of the world are being finite and dependent on their cause in which they exist in an unmanifest condition. These finite or limited things cannot be the cause of the universe. So logically, we have to proceed from finite to infinite, limited to unlimited and son on. The limited objects ultimately must have a cause, that is *Prakṛti* which is infinite, unlimited, eternal and all-pervading and also *Prakṛti* is the source of this universe. For instance- object like pot is found to have its cause, in which it exists in the clay in an unmanifest form. But the cause 'clay' is also being finite and pot also depends on its material cause in which it is supposed to be present in an unmanifest condition. So in this way we must have acceptance of an infinite cause which will not depend on any other cause. Sāṃkhya finds in *Prakṛti* which is infinite, independent, and uncaused cause and it is the ultimate material cause of all in this world.
2. The second argument in defence of the existence of *Prakṛti* is based on the homogenous nature of effects. All the worldly effects are commonly seen to be possession of three *guṇas* namely; *sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas*. According to

¹³⁰ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 8. Quotation taken from T.G. Mainkar, *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa* (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, 2004) p. 61

¹³¹ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, para- 62. Quotation taken from B. Kar, *Analytical Studies in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy*, (Utkal University: Post-Graduate Department of Philosophy, 1977) p. 34

¹³² Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 5

Sāṃkhya doctrine of *Satkārya*, the effect and cause are accepted as non-different. If the effect (evolute) like *mahat* possess *sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas*, there should be a common source composed of three *guṇas* from which all worldly effect arise. “The Sāṃkhya believes that this common source for the products of manifesting *sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas* in the universe is the same as *Prakṛti*, the composite of three *guṇas*.”¹³³

3. The third argument to prove the existence of *Prakṛti* is based on the principle of efficiency of the cause for the evolution of effects. This argument also states, the evolution of effect must be due to the efficacy of the cause, therefore a cause produces what it is capable of producing. The milk is change into the curd, because the milk has the potentiality to transform itself into the curd and the curd is contained in an unmanifest state in the milk; by the time of evolution milk is changed into curd which is the manifest state or explicit form of the milk.
4. A jar is competent to hold the water whereas the clay is incapable of holding the water, though jar and clay are effect and cause respectively. We can find a difference or separation between clay and a jar is not in terms of ‘essence’ rather their difference just lies on the practical purposes, which is clearly visible. In fact the cause and effect are related and the effect remains unmanifest condition in its material cause. For ex- oil is there in sesame and not in sand. Thus the products (effects) are taken as different from their cause. Prof. Nair has tried to put his ideas in this context, “A cause is a must for the evolvment of the principles and *Prakṛti* is this cause. Hence there is nothing wrong to assume *Prakṛti* as the cause of the world though the effect and cause differ as said.”¹³⁴ In other words, this argument suggests the separation and non-separation of cause and effect on which the existence of *Prakṛti* can be proved. That means an effect arises from its cause at the time of creation and again an effect is resolved into its cause at the time of dissolution or destruction. In this context, Prof. B. Kar has asserted, “the Sāṃkhyaitis, here, point out that already existing limbs of the Tortoise emerging out of its body, become distinguished from it. We say that this body of the Tortoise and these

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p.6

¹³⁴ Nair, P.K.S. *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 100

are its limbs and on again entering the body, the limbs become unmanifest and hidden.”¹³⁵ Similarly,

5. To some extent this third argument is overlapping with previous argument. Though, both arguments are considered to establish the pre-existent of effect in cause, but their approaches are different. While the fourth argument in support of the existence of *Prakṛti* is based on the principle that the effects (products) get separated from their respective causes. Whereas, the fifth argument proves in terms of supreme/ ultimate cause of the whole world. We have seen that *Prakṛti* has been described as root cause. It is the root of all evolutes. Suppose we don't accept this ultimate cause, then it will land us in the fallacy of infinite regress. If there is a cause of *Prakṛti*, then there must be a cause of that cause and so on. Or we stop it anywhere and say that here is the first cause, then the first cause will be *Prakṛti* which has been regarded as the root cause of the world.¹³⁶

I would like to summarize the above said arguments which were taken as an examination of the Sāṃkhya arguments for the existence of *Prakṛti*. There are four philosophical arguments to prove the existence of *Prakṛti*; namely, the finite nature of objects, of homogeneity, of evolution being due to efficiency of the cause, of separation between cause and its products and the merging of the whole world.

2.2 Nature of *Puruṣa*

Another ultimate reality is accepted by Sāṃkhya is *Puruṣa* (which stands for the principle of consciousness) or self. Prof. Nair also has given the meaning of *Puruṣa*, “The term *Puruṣa* has been used in Vedic literature to denote both atman which means the embodied being or personality and supreme creator.”¹³⁷ All human beings must admit the existence of self. Everybody feels that he or she is existent. It is very natural and indubitable experience to feel one's own existence and we all do have same kind of feeling. In fact any one cannot deny the existence of his or her own self.

¹³⁵ Kar, B. *Analytical Studies in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy*, (Utkal University: P.G. Department of Philosophy, 1977) p. 36

¹³⁶ Nair, P.K.S. *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 52

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 83

So there is a general agreement with regard to the existence of one's own self. But there is a wide divergence opinion about its nature in the context all schools of Indian philosophy. Carvaka or materialists identify the self with special combination of four gross elements. The Buddhists and some empiricists consider the self as identical with stream of consciousness. And the Nyāya-Vaisesika advocates that the self is unconscious substance which may acquire the attribute of consciousness. The *Advaita Vedāntin* maintains that the self is pure eternal consciousness which is a blissful existence (*saccidānda svarūpa*).¹³⁸ But it has been very different in Sāṃkhya tradition. For Sāṃkhya the self is different from the body and the sense organs, the mind and intellect. It cannot be anything of world of objects. The self is neither the brain nor the nervous system. *Puruṣa* is the soul, the self and conscious spirit which is always the subject of knowledge i.e. knower and not the object of knowledge. It is not a substance which possesses the attribute of consciousness. Consciousness is its very essence and not an attribute of it. It is pure and transcendental consciousness. The status of self's consciousness ever remains constant, although the objects of knowledge may change. *Puruṣa* is the ultimate knower which is the foundation of all knowledge or experience. The self is beyond the change and activity, because all changes and activities belong to matter and its product like body and the sensory organs, the mind and intellect. But the self is called, “*nistraiguṇya, udāsīnā, kartā, kevala, madhyatha, sāksī, draṣṭā, sadāparakāshasvarūpa* and *jñāta*.”¹³⁹

2.2.1 Proofs for the existence of *Puruṣa*

Sāṃkhya gives the following proofs for the existence of *Puruṣa*.

1. All composed objects are meant for some other being. The unconscious *Prakṛti* cannot make use of them; hence all these substances are for *Puruṣa* or self or exist for the sake of *Puruṣa*. The body, the sense organs, intellect and the mind are only means to realize the end of *Puruṣa*. The three *guṇas*, *Prakṛti* and subtle body- they all serve the purpose of the *Puruṣa*. Evolution is teleological or purposive; its purpose is to serve for the *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti*

¹³⁸ Datta and Chatterjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 264

¹³⁹ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 19. Quotation taken from D. Sharma, *Classical Indian Philosophy*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) p. 171

evolves itself in order to serve the *Puruṣa*'s end.¹⁴⁰ The aggregate of things must exist for sake of another. Even as a bed (which is a collection of different parts) is for the use of a man who sleeps on it. Likely, the world which is a collection of five elements for the use of another. There must be a self or spirit for whose enjoyments, this enjoyable body consisting of intellect, sense organs and the rest has been produced.¹⁴¹

2. The material objects are non-intelligent (*acetana*), objects of knowledge (*viśaya*), composed of three *guṇas*. Therefore they logically presuppose the existence of *Puruṣa*, which is intelligent (*sacetana*), subject of knowledge (*jñātr*), and devoid of three *guṇas* (*nīstraiguṇya*). As we know that all worldly objects are composed of three *guṇas* and are also the products of *Prakṛti*; for that we need an intelligent principle who guides them. Likely a car or machine does its work when put under the guidance of some person (may be a driver or mechanic).
3. Prof. C.D. Sharma has offered the argument infavour of *Puruṣa*, "There must be transcendental synthetic unity of pure consciousness to co-ordinate all experience."¹⁴² All experience necessarily presupposes the existence of the self or subject of experience (experiencer). The self is foundation (*adhiṣṭhānāt*) of all empirical experience. Experience would not be regarded as experience without the self or spirit or subject of experience.
4. *Prakṛti* cannot experience its products, since *Prakṛti* is non-intelligent (*acetana*) and becomes the object of knowledge (*viśaya*) not the subject of knowledge. So there must be an intelligent principle to experience the worldly products of *Prakṛti*. Prof. C.D. Sharma attempted to define the relationship between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, "*Prakṛti* is the enjoyed (*bhogyā*) and so there must be an enjoyer (*bhoktā*)."¹⁴³ All objects of the world are of the nature of characteristics of pleasure, pain and indifference. But pleasure and pain are

⁴⁰ Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasi Dass Publishers, 1994) p. 156

⁴¹ Sharma, R.N., *Indian Philosophy*, (Lucknow: Prakashan Kendra, 1970) p. 194 and see also P.K.S. Jair, *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 85

⁴² Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasi Dass Publishers, 1994) p. 156

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 156

said to be meaningful only when they are experienced by some conscious experiencer. Therefore *Puruṣa* must exist.

5. There are at least some people in this world, who try to make sincere endeavor to attain release from all sufferings; but it cannot be possible for any physical world, because by its very nature, the physical world causes suffering rather than lessen it. But, here the desire for liberation or salvation implies the existence of a person who can make an effort for and obtain liberation. Hence aspiration presupposes the aspirant. So *Puruṣa* exists.¹⁴⁴

In brief it can be said that the Sāṃkhya system provides the five philosophical arguments which were taken as an examination to prove the existence of *Puruṣa*. First of all we explained the nature of *Puruṣa* and then it was followed by the complete description of these above said arguments. And these arguments are namely, all composite objects are for another's use, of there must be absence of the three attributes and other properties, of there must be control, of there must be someone to experience and there is a tendency towards isolation or final beatitude. Therefore the Spirit must be there.

2.2.2 Plurality of *Puruṣa*

“The plurality of *Puruṣa* has to be established on the basis of diversity in the incidence of birth and death; difference in the endowment of instruments of cognition and action; and the difference in the action pursued by different persons.”¹⁴⁵ Unlike Advaita Vedanta, Sāṃkhya believes in the plurality of *Puruṣas* or reality of many selves. The other exponents of plurality of *Puruṣas* are Jainism and Mimamsa. Prof. C.D. Sharma argued, “...the Sāṃkhya *Puruṣas* are subject to qualitative monism and quantitative pluralism. The selves are essentially alike; only numerically are they different. Their essence is consciousness. Bliss is regarded as different from and is the

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p.156

¹⁴⁵ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 18. Quotation taken from D. Sharma, *Classical Indian Philosophy*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) p. 171 and for more details see T.G. Mainkar, *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Iṣvarakṛṣṇa* (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, 2004) p. 96

product of the *sāttvaguna*.”¹⁴⁶ Sāṃkhya offers the following arguments for proving the plurality of *Puruṣas*:

1. If there is one soul (*Puruṣa*), then the birth and death of one individual should lead to the birth and death of all other individuals. Since however it is not the case. The fact is that different persons take birth and die at different times, which shows that *Puruṣa* cannot be one but many. Blindness in one man does not imply the same for all men.
2. If there were one self for all living beings then the activity of one self would make all other active. As matter of fact, different persons are endowed with different sensory organs is an indication that *Puruṣa* is not one but many.
3. If *Puruṣa* is one, “it follows that a certain action on the part of one (person) should lead to the same activity on the part of others which is not the case. The differences in action on the part of different persons lead us to the conclusion that *Puruṣas* are many.”¹⁴⁷ So we find that there must be a plurality of selves, which are eternal, intelligent and subject of knowledge as different from *Prakṛti* which is non-intelligent and ground of the object of knowledge.

In this way Sāṃkhya gives three arguments to prove the plurality of *Puruṣa*; namely, of diversity in the incidence of birth and death, of difference in the endowment of instruments of cognition and action and the difference in the action pursued by different persons.

2.3 *Guṇas*

Prakṛti said to be the composed of three *guṇas* held in a state of equilibrium. The three *guṇas* are namely; *sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas*. The most distinguished characteristics of Sāṃkhya system is the *guṇas* theory. According to this theory, “all mental and material objects of this phenomenal world are combinations in different

¹⁴⁶ Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, 1994) p. 157

¹⁴⁷ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 12

proportions of the three ultimate reals which are technically known as *guṇas*.¹⁴⁸ Now the question arises here what do you mean by *guṇas* or in other words what are these *guṇas*? Prof. Nair has offered the meaning of *guṇas*, “In Sanskrit language *guṇas* has three meaning: quality, rope and primary.”¹⁴⁹ According to Bhagavad Gita, the *guṇas* are the products of the *Prakṛti* where the classical Sāṃkhya holds them to be constituents.¹⁵⁰ But *guṇas* here means a constituent element or component and it is not an attribute or quality. These *guṇas* are constitutive elements of *Prakṛti*; rather they are not parts of *Prakṛti* but they are identical with it, since Sāṃkhya-Yoga holds that *Prakṛti* is opposite of anything constituted of parts.¹⁵¹ They are called *guṇas* because, “either their being subservient to the ends of the *Puruṣa* which is other than themselves, or their being intertwined like the three strands of a rope which binds the soul (*Puruṣa*) to the world.”¹⁵² Datta and Chatterjee has argued. The *guṇas* of Sāṃkhya system are not the so-called qualities such as taught by *Vaisesika* system, because they themselves possess the characteristics of lightness (*sāttva*), movement (*rājas*) and heaviness (*tāmas*).

We cannot perceive the *guṇas* like we do perceive the physical objects such as, table, chair etc. The *guṇas* are imperceptible, but their existence is inferred from the objects of the world which are their effects. If their existence is inferred from their effects then it presuppose that we can know the nature of the *guṇas* from their nature of products and this implies an essential identity relation between the effect and its cause. All objects of the world including the ordinary objects of perception (table, chair and pot etc.) and intellect are found to be possession of three character of capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference. The same things are pleasure to some person whereas it is painful to other and neutral to another. It is like one substance has three dimensions and each dimension has its own importance to our practical life of all human beings. When an artist is playing flute, at that time he feels happy or it gives pleasure to him, it irritates to his sick friend, which he feels pain and it gives no pleasure or pain to the third one, which is indifference. Even we can

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 15

¹⁴⁹ Nair, P.K.S. *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p.103

¹⁵⁰ Bhagavad Gita., V. 147. Quotation taken from P.K.S. Nair, *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p.103

¹⁵¹ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 12. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Parināma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 16

¹⁵² Datta and Chatterjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 260

observe the co-existence of three components in everyday experience of our life. This can be explained by a well-known illustration of Sāṃkhya. Suppose 'W' is a wife and she is beautiful and she is endowed with all qualities of head and heart which are requirement of an ideal wife. These constitute pleasure element in her. Because of this she causes wife to rejoice to her husband. But she is the cause of jealousy in her co-wives 'X' and 'Y' and despair her neighbor 'Z' who could not have good fortune to get married to her. So here jealousy is pain and despair is indifference. These are due to the elements of pain and indifference in 'W' wife. They get active only in respect of the co-wives or neighbor. A beautiful woman is neither merely a collection of ideas in mind nor she is absolutely different from thoughts or feelings. Thus Sāṃkhya has satisfactorily explained the correspondence between the inner world and outer world.¹⁵³ Therefore we can infer the effect from its cause, since the effect is implicitly contained in its cause. So that we can infer that the ultimate cause of things must have been constituted by three elements of pleasure, pain and indifference. Sāṃkhya calls these three *sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas* respectively. They are constitutive elements of both *Prakṛti* i.e. the ultimate substance and the ordinary objects of the world.

Sāttva:

Sāttva is that *guṇas* of *Prakṛti* which is of the nature of pleasure, light (*laghu*) and bright or illuminating (*prakāśaka*). The manifestation of objects in consciousness, the luminosity of light, power of reflection, the tendency towards consciousness manifestation in the senses, the mind and intellect are because of the operation of component of *sāttva* in the constitution of things.¹⁵⁴ *Sāttva* called goodness and its color is white. Direction of *sāttva* is always upwards. All sorts of lightness in the sense of upward direction, like the blazing up of fire, heating motion of water and the winding motion of air are all due to the element of *sāttva* in the things. *Sāttva* produces pleasure; it is calm and the symbol of happiness. Apart from that its various forms are such as satisfaction, joy, bliss, contentment etc.

¹⁵³Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 17

¹⁵⁴Datta and Chatterjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 261

Rājas:

‘*Rājas*’ literally means foulness and it is the principle of activity in things. It always moves and makes the things move also. It is mobile (*cala*) and stimulating (*upaṣṭambahka*). Due to *rājas*, it is that fire spreads, the wind blows and mind becomes restless.¹⁵⁵ Prof. C.D. Sharma define in this context, “Restless activity, feverish effort and wild stimulation are its results.”¹⁵⁶ ‘*Rājas*’ is the nature of pain (*dukha*) and it is the cause of all painful experience in our life. Its color is red. It plays an instrument of principle of motion in the element of *sāttva* and *tāmas* which are inactive and motionless in themselves to perform their functions.

Tāmas:

‘*Tāmas*’ literally means darkness. It is passive as well as neutral and negative in things. By opposed to *sāttva*, ‘*tāmas*’ is of the nature of indifference and also it is heavy (*guru*). It produces ignorance and sloth which leads to confusion and bewilderment (*moha*) us. It is also opposed to *rājas* as it restrains the motion of things. “By obstructing the principle of activity in us induces sleep, drowsiness and laziness.”¹⁵⁷ It is the symbol of delusion and direction of *tāmas* is always downwards. Hence *sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas* have compared respectively to whiteness, redness and darkness. The *guṇas* are so-called qualities or attributes of Vaisesika system because; they themselves possess the characteristics of brightness or lightness, movement and heaviness.¹⁵⁸ One quality cannot be substratum of others. So these *guṇas* are substance (*dravyas*), since the qualities of lightness etc. subsist in them.¹⁵⁹

These three *guṇas* (*sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas*) which constitute *Prakṛti* are never separated from each other and always go together. We observe that they conflict as well as co-operate with one another with regard to the relation among the three *guṇas* which constitutes the world. Any one of them cannot produce anything without the help as well as the support of other two. They are found intermingled. Just as the oil,

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 261

¹⁵⁶ Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, 1994) p. 154

¹⁵⁷ Data and Chattarjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 262

¹⁵⁸ *Sāṃkhya-Pravacna-Bhāṣya*, 1.61. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 16

¹⁵⁹ *Sāṃkhya Pravacana vṛtti sara*, 1.61. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 16

the wick and the flame of lamp. Though they are relatively opposed to each other; yet they co-operate to produce the objects of the world. All objects of the world are the results of the composed of these three *guṇas* and their difference lies on the different combination of these *guṇas*. So all these *guṇas* are present in everything of the world; but each of them suppress and dominates the other. The nature of object is determined by the predominance of particular *guṇas*, while others are there in subordinate position. All worldly objects are classified into good, bad and indifferent; pure, impure and neutral; intelligent, active and sloth on the account of predominance of *sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas* respectively. “Each *guṇas* suppress other two to become manifest with its own characteristics or to perform its specific standing with support of each other.”¹⁶⁰

2.3.1 Evolution or the Heterogeneous Change

Prakṛti is regarded as the ultimate material cause of all in the world and it is said to be composed of three *guṇas* (*sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas*) held in equilibrium state (*guṇānām sāmīyāvasthā*). But the evolution starts when there is a disturbance in an equilibrium state. Therefore question arises how is the equilibrium disturbed? “The Sāṃkhya ascribes this to the proximity of *Puruṣa* to *Prakṛti*. The relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is crux of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.”¹⁶¹ The reason behind the disturbance of the equilibrium state (*guṇānām sāmīyāvasthā*) of *Prakṛti* is an intervene of *Puruṣa*. In other words, it is only when heterogeneous change takes place and ‘*rājas*’ vibrates and makes *sāttva* and *tāmas* vibrate that equilibrium is disturbed and evolution takes place. There can be no evolution unless *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* become related to each other. The evolution of the world cannot be due to the self (*Puruṣa*) one. *Puruṣa* is inactive and consciousness whereas *Prakṛti* is unconsciousness and active. So the activity of *Prakṛti* is guided by some intelligent principle i.e. *Puruṣa*. Evolution is only when *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* co-operate that there is a creation evolution of the world of objects. But question is how can such two different independent and opposed principles co-operate? The answer given by Sāṃkhya is that- “the utility of the

¹⁶⁰ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, XII. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 17

¹⁶¹ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 59

conjunction between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* by the simile of the ‘lame man and the blind one’.¹⁶² Though the lame is being capable of seeing the way but he cannot walk, while the blind man is being capable of walking but he cannot see the way. If they co-operate each other then they both can proceed ahead and reach their own destination. So it seems us that their joint activity can serve a common end which none of them can fulfill by himself, without the help of other. Similarly, non-intelligent *Prakṛti* and inactive *Puruṣa* combine and co-operate to serve an end their respective interests. Dr. Datta and Dr. Chatterjee has highlighted in this context, “*Prakṛti* requires the presence of *Puruṣa* in order to be known or appreciated by someone and *Puruṣa* requires the help of *Prakṛti* in order to discriminate itself from the latter and thereby attain liberation.”¹⁶³

Prakṛti evolves the world of objects when it comes into contact (*samyoga*) with *Puruṣa*. This contact (between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*) disturbs the original equilibrium of *guṇas* of *Prakṛti*. One of the *guṇas* namely, ‘*rājas*’ which is naturally active and first it gets disturbed, then through other *guṇas* start to vibrate and leads to the process of evolution of the objects of the world.

2.3.2 The Evolutes of *Prakṛti*

The Sāṃkhya-Yoga evolution involves the gradual development of the different categories of existence. As result, the various objects of the world originate due to their combination in different proportions. *Prakṛti* is transformed into *mahat* or cosmic intellect. *Mahat* is transformed into *ahamkāra* or ego. *Ahamkāra* is transformed into eleven sense organ and five *tanmātras* or subtle elements of sound, touch, color, taste and smell. The five *tanmātras* are transformed into the five gross elements or *mahābhūtas* of ether, air, fire, water and earth. These are 24 principles.¹⁶⁴ Including *Puruṣa*, we have 25 principles (*tattvas*) in Sāṃkhya-Yoga.¹⁶⁵ *Puruṣa* is

¹⁶² *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 21. Quotation taken from D. Sharma, *Classical Indian Philosophy*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) p. 171

¹⁶³ Datta and Chatterjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p.268

¹⁶⁴ *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Sūtra*, 1. 61. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 62

¹⁶⁵ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 22. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 62

neither cause nor an effect. *Prakṛti* is only cause and not an effect; but *mahat*, *ahamkāra* and five subtle elements are both cause and effect. While five sensory organs, five motor organs and five gross elements and mind are effects only.

Mahat:

The first product of evolution of *Prakṛti* is called *mahat* or the great cosmic principle. It has psychological aspect in which it is called *buddhi* or intellect, as it is held to be the cosmic matter of experience. P. Chakrabarti has tried to give the ideas of it, “the reason of calling it great (*mahat*) lies in the fact that it is great in space as well as in time; for there is no other evolved principle which is so extensive and durable as this.”¹⁶⁶ *Mahat* is the first principle which is manifest, since it is finite, plural, non-pervasive and it is caused.¹⁶⁷ The special functions of *buddhi* or intellect are said to be ascertainment and decision. *Buddhi* or intellect arises out of predominance of element of *sāttva* in *Prakṛti*. In its *sāttvika* form, it has original characteristics such as virtue (*dharma*), wisdom (*jñāna*) and detachment (*virāgya*) etc. When it gets vitiated by *tāmas* these characteristics or attributes are replaced by their opposite attributes as vice. ignorance, attachment and imperfection etc.

Ahamkāra:

Ahamkāra is the second product of *Prakṛti*. It is evolved out of *mahat*. It is the principle of individuation in the sense it is the individual ego. The function of *ahamkāra* is to generate self-assertion or *abhimāna*. It produces the notion of ‘I’ and ‘mine’. Due to *ahamkāra* or ego, *Puruṣa* considers wrongly itself to be the agent of actions and striver for end.¹⁶⁸ When an object comes into contact of our senses, the mind reflects on it and ascertains specifically it as; it is such as this or that. When *ahamkāra* determines towards our feeling towards the objects of the world, then we proceed to act in different ways in relation to them. For e.g. when the jeweler wants to make necklace; he admits it as one of his ends and resolve to attain it by saying himself, ‘let me make the necklace’.

¹⁶⁶ Chakrabarti, P., *Origin and Development of The Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975) pp. 238-239

¹⁶⁷ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 10. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 63

¹⁶⁸ Datta and Chattarjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 269

Sāṃkhya speaks of three-fold *ahamkāra*.

1. *Vaiṛta*
2. *Taijas*
3. *Bhūta*

P. Chakrabarti asserted in this context,

“The first one bounds in *sāttva*, the second in *rājas* and third in *tāmas*. This division has been planned with a view to explain the sixteen to evolutes of *ahamkāra* which are bifurcated into two series - subjective and objective. The former comprises the eleven sense organs.... The latter comprises the five subtle elements are called *tanmātras*.”¹⁶⁹

The first one is called *vaiṛta* or *sāttvika*, when an element of *sāttva* predominates in it; secondly when an element of *rājas* predominates in it and thirdly *tāmas* predominates in it. The *sāttvika ahamkāra* is producing the eleven sense organs namely, the five sensory organs (*jñānendriyas*), the five motor organs or organs of action and mind (*manas*). *Tāmsika ahamkāra* is producing the five subtle elements (*tanmātras*). And *rājasika ahamkāra* supplies the energy needed by which the *sāttva* and *tāmas* produce their respective products.

Sāṃkhya speaks of the ten *indriyas* or sense-organs, which are brought into two groups: *jñānendriyas* and *karmendryas*. Each organ has its own work or activity and does not encroach upon that of others. “Both sense organs and motor organs are called in the sense that they are the characteristics of *Indra*, spirit.”¹⁷⁰ These sensory organs termed as are five in number and the motor organs termed as *karmendryas* are also five number.

Jñānendriyas:

The five sensory organs are eye, ear, nose, tongue and the skin. The eye is for perceiving color etc. The ear is for hearing sound, the nose for smelling odour, the tongue for taste and the skin for feeling the touch. In fact, the senses are not perceptible energy which exists only in perceived organs and apprehends the object.

¹⁶⁹ Chakravarti, P. *Origin and Development of The Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975) p. 240

¹⁷⁰ Nair, P.K.S. *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 60

So in this way the sense or *indriya* is not the eye but its energy of visual perception. The senses are perceived, but it must be known by inference from the function that they perform. The five sensory organs are producing knowledge of touch, smell, color, sound and taste. All these are developed because of *Puruṣa* and the rest of the ego or *ahamkāra*.¹⁷¹

Karmendryas:

The five *karmendryas* or motor organs are mouth, hand, feet, the anus (the excretory organs) and the generative organs (sex organs).¹⁷² These perform respectively the function of speech, movement, excretion and reproduction. The mouth utters the words or gives speech, the hand works, the feet perform movement, the organs of excretion evacuation and the organs of generation produce pleasure.¹⁷³

Mind:

Mind (which arises from *sāttvika ahamkāra*) has been enumerated as an instrument of knowing, as an *indriya* or organ. Mind is of the nature of both organs of knowledge or cognitive and active. None of them can do function in relation to their object without the influence of *manas* (mind). *Manas* is described as *saṃkalpaka*, i.e. constructive, reflective and analytic etc.¹⁷⁴ Mind functions as a bridge between *mahat* and *ahamkāra* on one hand; the sensory organs and organs of action on the other. According to Sāṃkhya, mind or *manas* is neither eternal nor atomic. It is very subtle sense indeed, but made up of parts and so can come into contact with several senses. Prof. C.D. Sharma has tried to define the nature of mind as, “Sāṃkhya assigns to *manas* the important function synthesizing the sense-data into the determinate perceptions, passing them on to the ego, and carrying out the orders of the ego through the motor organs.”¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ Sharma, R.N., *An Indian philosophy*, (Lucknow: Prakashan Kendra, 1970) pp. 201-02

¹⁷² *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, V. 26. Quotation taken from P.K.S. Nair, *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p.61

¹⁷³ Max Muller, *The Six System of Indian Philosophy*, p. 252

¹⁷⁴ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 24. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 64

¹⁷⁵ Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, 1994) p. 161

Concept of *Antahakaraṇa*:

Buddhi, *ahamkāra* and *manas* represent the three psychological aspects of knowing, willing and feeling respectively. For Sāṃkhya, they are derived from *Prakṛti*. All these three *buddhi* (intellect), *ahamkāra* (ego) and *manas* (mind) constitute the internal organs (*antah-karaṇa*). “The circulation of vital airs, *prana*, *apana*, *udana*, *samana*, *vyana* is a common function of the internal organs. The internal organs function in the past, present and future, whereas the external organs function only in the present time.”¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, the five sensory and the five motor organs are together called the ten external organs or *bahyakaraṇa*. These three internal organs including the ten external organs are called the thirteen *karaṇas* or organs of the Sāṃkhya.

Tanmātras:

Tāmsika ahamkāra which dominates in *Tāmas* produces the five subtle elements (*Tanmātras*). These five *Tanmātras* are potential elements of sound, touch, color, taste and smell. These are called (1) *śabda tanmātra*, (2) *sparśa tanmātra*, (3) *rūpa tanmātra*, (4) *rasa tanmātra*, and (5) *gandha tanmātra* respectively. These five subtle elements are not derived from the gross elements; rather the gross elements are evolved out of these five *Tanmātras*. Prof. C.D. Sharma has defined the characteristics of *tanmātra*, “They are neither the qualities nor the differentia of the gross elements nor the functions which are the sensory organs, but the subtle essences which produce the gross elements as well as their qualities.”¹⁷⁷ These *Tanmātras* are very subtle and are also imperceptible to ordinary human beings, but they are said to be known by inference; although these five *Tanmātras* are apprehended by the highly elevated Yogins and such other superior beings. These *Tanmātras* are called as non-specific (*aviśeṣa*), because the different aspect *sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas* in them are not distinctively experienced by us.¹⁷⁸ “The reason for calling them *Tanmātras* lies in the fact that they do not reveal the specific (*viśeṣa*) characteristics of their inherent

¹⁷⁶ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 65

¹⁷⁷ Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, 1994) p. 161

¹⁷⁸ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, XXXVIII. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 66

properties.”¹⁷⁹ On the other hand, the *Tanmātras* are not eternal being the products of *Prakṛti*, they do not constitute the root cause of the universe.¹⁸⁰

Mahābhūtas

The five *mahābhūtas* or the gross elements arise out of the five subtle elements (*Tanmātras*). They are five in number such as- Ether, Air, Fire, Water and Earth. These *mahābhūtas* originate in the five subtle elements in the following manner:

1. Ether (*Ākāśa*) – the element ether (*Ākāśa*) arises from the essence of sound (*śabda tanmātra*). Sound is the quality of ether or (*Ākāśa*) and it can be perceived by ear.
2. Air (*Vāyu*) – the combination of essence of sound and touch (*sparsā tanmātra*) creates the element of air or (*Vāyu*) with qualities of sound and touch.
3. Fire (*Agni*) – the further mixing of the color *tanmātra* (*rūpa tanmātra*) with sound and touch *tanmātra* results in the creation of the elements of fire or light together with the properties of sound, touch and color.
4. Water (*Jala*) – the element water arises out of the taste *tanmātra* (*rasa tanmātra*) as mixed with those of sound, touch, color. It has the attributes of sound, touch, color and taste.
5. Earth (*Prthvī*) – when the smell *tanmātra* (*gandha tanmātra*) is added to those of sound, touch, color and taste creates the element of (*Prthvī*) or earth. The earth has all the five qualities of sound, touch, color, taste and smell. “The five physical elements of *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu*, *Agni*, *Jala*, and *Prthvī* have respectively the specific qualities of sound, touch, color, taste and smell. These are specific elements which are apprehended by ordinary human beings. “Among the gross elements like *Ākāśa* etc. abounding in the *sāttva* component, some are calm, happy, pleasant and buoyant; some abounding *rājas* component, are turbulent,

¹⁷⁹ Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 66

¹⁸⁰ Sen Gupta, A. *Classical Sāṃkhya: A Critical Study*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Ltd., 1982) p. 129

miserable and unstable; some abounding in the *tāmas* component are deluded despondent and sluggish.”¹⁸¹

The above mentioned process of evolution, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy may be illustrated the following chart:

			<i>Prakṛti</i>	
			<i>Mahat</i>	
			<i>Ahaṃkāra</i>	
<i>Manas</i>	Sensory organs	Motor organs	<i>Tanmātras</i>	<i>Mahābhūtas</i>
	Eyes	Mouth	<i>Rūpa</i>	Ether
	Ears	Hand	<i>Śabda</i>	Air
	Nose	Feet	<i>Gandha</i>	Fire
	Tongue	Anus	<i>Rasa</i>	Water
	Skin	Generative Organs	<i>Sparsā</i>	Earth ¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ Jha, R.N. *Sāṃkhyadarśana*, (Delhi: Vidyanidhi Prakashan, 2009) p. 33

¹⁸² Nair, P.K.S. *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 64

2.4 The Sāṃkhya Theory of Knowledge

Analysis:

In this section, I am intending to discuss of the comprehensive account of knowledge of Sāṃkhya system. After dealing with metaphysical side of this system, let us turn our attention towards its epistemological conceptions, for it Iśvarakṛṣṇa observes that object can be apprehended through the source or means of cognition. Or in other words, the attention of reliable of knowledge is based on determining the means of correct knowledge.¹⁸³ It is necessary to discuss the conceptions of valid knowledge (*pramā*) and the method of knowing (*pramāṇa*) because it underlies all epistemic discussion.

Before discussing the conception of *pramā* and *pramāṇa*, it would be worthwhile to enquire how Sāṃkhya doctrine of *Satkārya* is linked up with its epistemological disposition. That means, is there any relation or link between Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge and its doctrine of causality? Or in other words why do samkhyas suggest any relation between the doctrine of *Satkārya* and its theory of knowledge? In fact for Sāṃkhya, knowledge is produced through the sense-object-contact. But knowledge arises when the existence of any object or substance comes to our range of vision. Suppose there is an object like 'pot'. It comes with the range of vision, *buddhi* or intellect is so modified as to assume form of the pot and the self or soul becomes aware of the existence of a pot.¹⁸⁴ Thus the existence of 'pot' is played a significant role because a percipient being cannot perceive without a perceptual content.

Pramāṇa is that by which *pramā* or valid knowledge is acquired, which suggests that it is an instrument of means of valid cognition. In the Sāṃkhya system, it is the function of the intellect (*buddhi*) that is regarded as *pramāṇa* or specific cause of true knowledge. Valid knowledge is a definite and unerring cognition of an object through the modification of *buddhi* or the intellect which reflects the consciousness of self in it. What we call the mind or *manas* is an unconsciousness material product of *Prakṛti* in Sāṃkhya system; but consciousness or intelligence which really belongs to

¹⁸³ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 4. Quotation taken from Chakravarti, P. *Origin and Development of The Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975) p. 171.

¹⁸⁴ Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, (New York: Oxford University, 1989) pp. 297-298

the characteristics of self (*Puruṣa*). But the self cannot immediately apprehend the worldly objects. If it could, then we would know all the objects of the world.¹⁸⁵ In fact it is not the case. Actually, the self knows the objects through a mental modification that corresponds to apprehension produced in the sense organs by the object. Or other words, we have a true knowledge of objects through when the activity of external organs, the *manas* and their forms are apprehended on the intellect which in its turn, reflects the consciousness of the self.¹⁸⁶ In this context, Dr. Shiv Kumar highlights that “knowledge precisely means function of *Buddhi* or *Citta* which in turn means getting form the object known through the medium of internal and external organs in *Sāṃkhya*”¹⁸⁷

Pramā or valid knowledge is definite and unerring cognition of object. If we analyze this conception of *pramā*, we shall get three essential function involved in all valid knowledge. Knowledge as function implies a subject-object relation. On the other hand *Vijnana* Bhikṣu states that, knowledge is a synthesis of the two subject and object, since the subject requires an object to know and the object depends on the subject to be known.¹⁸⁸

The methods or sources of valid knowledge vary in number from school to school. The *Carvaka* accepts only one source of valid knowledge- perception. The *Buddhas* and *Vaisesikas* accept two sources- perception and inference. *Sāṃkhyas* admit three sources-perception, inference and authority or testimony. The other sources of valid knowledge are comparison, postulation, and non-cognition. But they are not recognized by *Sāṃkhya* School.

2.5 Perception (*Pratyakṣa*)

Nature

In the arena of epistemological enquiries perception has been accepted by all schools of Indian philosophy. Perception precedes (*pramāṇas*) all other means of knowledge,

¹⁸⁵ Datta and Chattarjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 274

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 275

¹⁸⁷ Kumar, S. *Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology*, (Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers, 1984) p. 1

¹⁸⁸ Radhakrisnan, S. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 304

because it is direct or immediate cognition of an object. It comes first and is most fundamental and the root of all other methods of knowledge. Dr. Shiv Kumar has asserted, “all systems utilizing epistemology to prove or to understand or to explain to others their metaphysical investigations support their theories through perception.”¹⁸⁹ Dr. D.M. Datta has offered the definition of perception (*pratykṣa*),

“The word *pratykṣa* etymologically consists of two elements *prati* (to, before, near) and *akṣa* (sense-organ), or *prati* and *akṣi* (eye). So in common parlance it has come to mean ‘present to or before the eyes or any other sense-organ’ and hence ‘direct’, ‘immediate’, etc. it is contrasted with the word *parokṣa*, which means ‘away from the eye or other sense organ’, ‘mediate’, ‘indirect’ etc. it is primarily used as an adjective.”¹⁹⁰

Perception is definite sense cognition. In other words perception arise only when there is a presentation of an object on the one hand and operation of one of the sense organs on the other. Perception always depends upon some sort of *sannikarṣa* between its object and a particular sense organ. So basically, perception is based on the sense-object-relationship. When an object like a pot comes within the range of your visual perception, there is a contact between the pot and your eyes. As a result of which there are certain *indriya- vṛttis* (impression) which are presented to the mind. Those *vṛttis* or impressions are analyzed and synthesized by the mind (*manas*) and presents to the intellect. Then through the activity of external senses, mind, *buddhi* or intellect becomes modified into the form of a pot. However the intellect being a consciousness principle of *Prakṛti* cannot know an object by itself, although the shape of the object is present in it. And finally, with reflection of self’s consciousness in it, the unconscious modification of the intellect or *buddhi* into the shape of a pot becomes revealed into a conscious state of perception. This is the perceptual knowledge of a pot.¹⁹¹ Dr. Datta and Dr. Chatterjee has highlighted in this context, “Just as a mirror reflects the light of a lamp and thereby manifests other things, so the material principle of *buddhi*, being transparent and bright (*sāttvika*), reflects the consciousness of the self and illuminates or cognizes the objects of knowledge.”¹⁹² In the opinion of

¹⁸⁹ Kumar, S. *Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology*, (Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers, 1984) p. 56

¹⁹⁰ Datta, D.M. *The Six Ways of Knowing*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1997) p. 30

¹⁹¹ Sen Gupta, A. *Classical Sāṃkhya: A Critical Study*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Ltd., 1982) p. 17

¹⁹² Datta and Chatterjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) pp. 275-276

Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Perception is defined as *prativīṣayadhyavasāya*.¹⁹³ *Prativīṣaya* signifies the *sannikarṣa* between the external sense-organs and its object. Thus perception is definite cognition of objects obtain through the sense-organs. Prof. Nair has also defined, “Perception according to the Sāṃkhya not only posits and presents a world but also constructs fine objects in it. It involves the activity of the attentive mind which enlarges the undifferentiated data into judgment of identity and is the distinctive cause of valid perception.”¹⁹⁴ External perception is caused by the combined operation of external sensory and internal organs whereas internal perception is caused by only the operation of the internal organs. So in both the cases, there must be *sannikarṣa* (sense-object relation). Dr. Anima Sen Gupta has made a study in this context,

“When the *sannikarṣa* happens to take place between an external sense-organ and its specific object, the intellect which is permeated with consciousness of *Puruṣa*, gets changed into the form of object. This change of *buddhi* into the form of object is what is known as *vṛtti*. This *vṛtti* or modification of the intellect in the form of object cause through the operation of the sense-organ is *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa*. And the reflection of *Puruṣa* in this modification is *Pratyakṣa-Pramā*.”¹⁹⁵

2.5.1 Stages of Perception

In this section, we shall discuss the two stage of perception. One is called intermediate perception or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* and other is called *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* or determination perception. Before going to elaborate the conceptual analysis of these two stages of perception, I want to highlight one point here is this- why this section is called as ‘stage of perception’, but why not as ‘kinds of perception’? I have found in many texts, the kinds of perception have been mentioned or written. But it could be better to articulate it as the stages of perception because they are inter- related to each other, we cannot separate one from another. But fact is that we can only distinguish them in thought and not in reality. They are two stages of same process of perception. That is why I have mentioned this section as stages of perception. According to

¹⁹³ *Sāṃkhya-Karika*, V. 1.5. Quotation taken from P.K.S. Nair, *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 75

¹⁹⁴ Nair, P.K.S. *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 75

¹⁹⁵ Sen Gupta, A. *Classical Sāṃkhya: A Critical Study*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Ltd., 1982) p. 20

Sāṃkhya *nirvikalpaka pratykṣa* and *savikalpaka pratykṣa* are two stages of knowledge. This distinction is made in terms of the function differences the external organs and internal organs. The external sense organs are first to operate in producing perceptual cognition of an object. As a result the awareness of perceptual cognition of an object from their operation is an indeterminate perception. Indeterminate perception is bare sensation of an object which is directly presented to us. That is why indeterminate perception is to be considered as primary stage or early stage of perception. The external produce non-relation apprehension of an object simply as indefinite only. Non-relation means when the perception occurs at the very first moment, we have the knowledge of indeterminate or *nirvikalpaka*, which means the knowledge of a thing is derived without any connection or predicate such as this is a cow or this is a blue. It provides the un-related element of an object such as cowness or blueness and also the bare sensation of an object which is directly presented to us. One can understand or articulate *nirvikalpaka pratykṣa* in terms of non –relational apprehension or in better way can put indeterminate perception as immediate apprehension, direct experiencing of object which is non -relational apprehension, which is free from assimilation, determination, analysis and synthesis. So the simple apprehension gives rise to change into the form determinate and qualified object, when mind comes into operation of conceptual cognition. It is because “mind or *manas* has the characteristics of power of determining the nature of object by making such discrimination as ‘*ayam guṇah*’ etc.”¹⁹⁶ Both discrimination and assimilation are the function of mind which is involved in the determinate perception. The second type of perception is the result of analysis, synthesis and interpretation of sense data by mind or *manas*. Dr. Datta and Dr. Chatterjee have highlighted the understanding of the determinate perception, “It is the determinate cognition of an object as a particular kind of thing having certain qualities and standing in certain relation to other things. The determinate perception of an object is expressed in the form of a subject-predicate proposition, e.g. ‘this is a cow’.”¹⁹⁷ Hence determination perception begins to emerge as soon as mind comes to operate.

For example, when we go from day light to dark conference hall to attend the seminar, at the very first moment we do not clearly see anything like, all the

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 24

¹⁹⁷ Datta and Chatterjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 277

participants, the speaker and the seats, but after some minute we can see everything in the conference Hall. Now where indeterminate perception in is this above said example, when we enter into conference Hall we cannot see anything clearly, but we are having the dim sense experience of objects which gradually manifest themselves to us. So here first primary stage of perception which is the dim sense experience of object is called *Nirvikalpaka pratykṣa* or indeterminate perception. While clear perception of them is *savikalpaka pratykṣa* or determinate perception.

To sum up the above discussion, we can imply that according to Sāṃkhya School, *Nirvikalpaka pratykṣa* and *Savikalpaka pratykṣa* are two stages in the perception of same fact. “Determinate perception is the cognition relatedness as in the case of ‘I recognize the pot and there is no relatedness in indeterminate perception but only the identity as in the cognition of the statement.’”¹⁹⁸ In addition to it, *Buddhi* comes into contact with external objects through sensory organs. At the first moment, there is an indeterminate perception (*Nirvikalpaka pratykṣa*) in which the particular features or natures of the objects are not being noticed. In fact indeterminate perception involves a direct or immediate perception of an object. But at the second moment, through the exercise of mental analysis and synthesis, the object is perceived as possessing a definite nature or features. And then we have the determinate perception (*Savikalpaka pratykṣa*).

2.6 Inference (*Anumāna*)

The second kind of method of valid cognition is Inference. It is defined as that cognition which pre-supposes some other cognition. It is mediate and indirect knowledge as it follows some other knowledge. It is only right, when it should be defined after perception. Inferential knowledge is that knowledge in which the modification of the intellect in the form of the inferred object occurs in the absence of *sannikarṣa* (the contact of sense organ with the object). Here the middle term (*linga*) is perceived and the major term is inferentially apprehended through its relation to the middle term.¹⁹⁹ According to Sāṃkhya, inference is defined as “the knowledge of

¹⁹⁸ Nair, P.K.S. *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 75

¹⁹⁹ Sen Gupta, A. *Classical Sāṃkhya: A Critical Study*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Ltd., 1982) p. 17

one term of a relation, which is not perceived, through the knowledge of the other term which is perceived and is explicitly understood as invariably related to the first term. In *anumāna* what is perceived leads us to the knowledge of a universal relation (*vyāpti*) between the two.”²⁰⁰

Perception and inference are both valid methods of knowledge. But perception is independent of any previous knowledge, whereas inference depends on previous knowledge. Inference depends on perception for the knowledge of the *linga* or middle term as subsisting in the *pakṣa* or the minor term. It depends on the perception also for the *vyāpti* or universal relation between the middle term and major term of inference. Inference is knowledge derived from some other knowledge, while perception is not derived from any other knowledge. So that inference is mediate and perception is immediate knowledge of an object. Both inference and perception form a continuous process for knowledge, but knowledge of imperceptible things is to be cognized by means of inference.²⁰¹ The Indian inference has three terms; the major term, the minor term and the middle term are called *sadhya*, *pakṣa*, *hetu* or *linga* respectively. Inference is the knowledge which arises after knowledge. Universal relation or invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the backbone of inference. The presence of middle term in the minor term is called *pakṣadharmatā*. The invariable association of the middle term with the major term is called *vyāpti*. The knowledge of *pakṣadharmatā* as qualified by *vyāpti* is called *parāmarśa*. Inference knowledge can be established as: (1) - the mountain has fire, (2) - because of the smoke, (3) – wherever there is smoke, there is fire, (4) – the mountain has smoke and (5) – therefore it has fire. Of the five proposition mentioned, the first one is logical statement which is to be proved. The second gives *hetu* or ‘reason’ which states the reason for the establishment of the first proposition. The third gives us the major premise and concrete illustration of *hetu* and *sadhya*. The fourth gives us the concomitance of the middle term and minor term. And the fifth is the conclusion drawn from preceding proposition. These above five mentioned propositions are regarded or called as ‘members’ or *avayavas*.²⁰² Inference is considered by the

²⁰⁰ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, 5. Quotation taken from S.C. Chattarjee, *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1978) p.234

²⁰¹ Nair, P.K.S. *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 78

²⁰² Sharma, C.D. *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, 1994) p. 198

logicians to be three kinds namely, *pūrvavat*, *sheṣavat* and *sāmānyatodrṣṭa*. With regard to the classification of inference, Sāṃkhya accepts the Nyāya view although in a slightly different. *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī* adopts a different classification as inference is divided into two namely, *vīta* and *avīta*. The *vīta* is based on the observed positive concomitance of the major term and middle term; *avīta* is based on their negative concomitance.²⁰³ Vita inference comprises into two varieties, namely *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodrṣṭa*, while avita is known as *sheṣavat*. So there are three kinds of inference namely, *pūrvavat*, *sheṣavat* and *sāmānyatodrṣṭa*. “The exact meaning of these terms in Indian logic is not altogether clear and the last is particularly uncertain.”²⁰⁴ *Pūrvavat* and *sheṣavat* types of inference are based on the causal relations. *Pūrvavat* inference takes place when there is an inference of unperceived effect from a perceived cause. This means it is an inference from the antecedent to the consequences, i.e. from cause to effect. In this inference, the middle term is related to the major term as its cause and the middle term is antecedent to it. For instance, we perceive the heavy dark clouds in the sky and at that time we make an inferential knowledge that there will be rainfall which is unperceived effect. A *sheṣavat* inference takes place when there is an inference of unperceived cause from a perceived effect. This means it is an inference from the consequence to the antecedent, i.e. from effect to cause. In this inference, the middle term is related to the major term as an effect and the middle term is consequent to it. For instance, we perceive that there is a swift muddy flooded water of a river and we make an inferential knowledge of past rain which is unperceived cause. *Sāmānyatodrṣṭa* inference is not based on a causal uniformity. In this inference, the *vyāpti* or the universal relation between the middle term and major term does not depend on a causal relation, because the middle term of the inference is related to the major term neither as a cause nor as an effect but find the middle term to be similar to objects which are related to the major term, for instance our inferential knowledge of sense-organs. How do we know that we have the visual sensory organ and other sense? It cannot be by means of perception. The senses are super-sensible. Therefore we have to know the existence of senses by means of inference. The knowledge of color or touch is possible only the act of seeing or touching which we infer as the means of sense

²⁰³ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, p. 25-26. Quotation taken from P.K.S. Nair, *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 78

²⁰⁴ Nair, P.K.S. *The Sāṃkhya System*, (Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005) p. 80

organ. So the knowledge of those objects which are beyond the reach of sensory organs is known through *Sāmānyatodrṣṭa* inference. In Sāṃkhya, *Prakṛti* is the super-sense entity. Its existence is proved through *Sāmānyatodrṣṭa* inference by knowing its manifest *mahat* etc. with three *guṇas* or constituents. In fact this inference lies beyond the range of sense-perception, as from the previous knowledge of the universal relation of smoke and fire in numerous instances; the existence of fire can be inferred from the smoke in the distant hill.

2.7 Verbal Testimony (*Āptavacana*):

The third kind of valid knowledge is *Śabda* or verbal testimony. It is constituted by authoritative statements. It is also known as *āptavacana*. It produces the knowledge of the objects which cannot be known by perception and inference. *Āptavacana* is defined by as the statement reliable or trustworthy person. A statement is a sentence which is made up of arrangement of words in a certain way. "A word is a sign which denotes something (*vācaka*), and its meaning (*artha*) is the thing denoted by it (*vācya*). That is, a word is a symbol which stands for some object."²⁰⁵ "A sentence is defined as a collection of words and a word is defined as that which is potent to convey its meaning."²⁰⁶ This subject suggests that the understanding of sentence is the requirement of the understanding of the meaning of its constituents of words. *Śabda* is of two kinds- *Laukika* and *Vaidika*. The first is the testimony of ordinary trustworthy persons. Testimony is always personal. It is the words of human beings who are liable to error, only the word of trustworthy persons (who always speak the truth) are valid. However this testimony is not recognized by Sāṃkhya as a separate *Pramāṇa*, since it depends on perception and inference. But *Vaidika* testimony is perfect and infallible, because it is the testimony of *Śruti* or Vedas, that is accepted as a third independent *Pramāṇa*, because Vedas provides us true knowledge about supra-sensuous entities which cannot be known through perception and inference. The Veda being independent of human authorship is free from all defects and is always regarded as valid and perfect. It is for this reason that the knowledge derived from *Smṛti*, *Itihas*,

²⁰⁵ Datta and Chatterjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 279

²⁰⁶ Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, 1994) p. 204

Purāṇa etc. which are based upon the Veda, is regarded as valid. “The Vedas embody the institutions of enlightened seers (*ṛṣis*). These institutions being universal and external experiences are not dependent on the will or consciousness of individual persons. As such the Vedas are impersonal (*apauruṣeya*). Yet they are not eternal since they arise out of the spiritual experiences of seers and saints, and are conserved by a continuous line of instruction from generation to generation.”²⁰⁷ Dr. Datta and Dr. Chatterjee argued.

Conclusion

To bring this chapter to a close, we can say, this section of the chapter is aiming towards discuss the epistemic aspect of this Sāṃkhya system. Knowledge briefly means taking the form of an object by *Buddhi* (intellect). That also suggests in the case of perceptual knowledge of a ‘pot’. The eye (visual senses) comes in contact with a pot as a result of which there are certain sensory organs which are presented to the mind. Then mind analyses and synthesises those presented sensory organs and presents them to the intellect (*Buddhi*). And then the intellect assumes the form of a pot through the functioning of mind and the sensory organs. Finally, the consciousness of the self is reflected in this process of perception and the object immediately revealed. This is the perceptual knowledge of a pot. The first section of this chapter gives an account of the dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. And highlight the relation between of them which is a central doctrine Sāṃkhya system.

²⁰⁷ Datta and Chatterjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984) p. 279

Chapter III

Sāṃkhya on *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*: A Critical Examination

Introduction

In this Chapter I am going to highlight and examine the Sāṃkhya view of *Satkāryavāda* with special reference to *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda* and the arguments of Iśvarakṛṣṇa in defence of doctrine of *Satkārya*. In Indian philosophy, *Satkāryavāda* of Sāṃkhya and *Asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya have been regarded as the two principle theories of causation, but they are opposed to each other. What is the subject matter of proposing of these two theories in the domain of philosophical studies? Actually, the fact is the relation between the material cause and its effect are the point of main crux between these two doctrines of causality. The whole idea of my aim on this chapter is to explain the notion of causality by comparing between two contesting theories namely, *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*.

3.1 Stresses on Material Cause (*Upādāna Kāraṇa*)

In Indian philosophy, the notion of causality treats mainly on the understanding of two categories namely, '*nimitta kāraṇa*' and '*upādāna kāraṇa*' than it had been a different situation in the west. Here the western treatment of causation has not been dealt, which is a different aspect of philosophical debate as per as my finding research is concerned. I am completely focusing on classical Indian thought with special reference to Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition. Prof. Radhakrishnan highlights in this context as, "The Sāṃkhya distinguishes two kinds of causes, efficient (*nimitta*) and material (*upādāna*)".²⁰⁸ I shall try to show, why has *upādāna kāraṇa* (material cause) been constituted an important issue for in Indian thinkers than efficient cause? In other words why Indian thinkers have been given more stress on material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) than efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*)?

²⁰⁸ Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, (New York: Oxford University, 1989) p. 257

To substantiate this question, let me first briefly start with the conceptual understanding between *upādāna* and *nimitta*. The Sanskrit definition for *upādāna kāraṇa* is – ‘*kāryanvittam kāraṇam*’ – the effect which is inherent in the cause and another definition for *upādāna kāraṇa* is – ‘*karyabhinam kāraṇam*’- the cause which is not different from the effect. Sanskrit definition for *nimitta kāraṇa* is ‘*Utpatti matra kāraṇam*’ – that which is the cause only for the origination of effect.²⁰⁹ For example: clay is *upādāna* for a pot. You need clay as material for making a pot, because pot is only made out of clay and also by virtue of its definition which suggests that clay is inherent to the pot, which is the effect. But a query can be raised in this context, how does it become a pot? Is it become a pot by itself? Or is it due to occur by somebody or object of any activity? Yes, it has to be made by a potter. So here the potter is efficient cause (*nimitta*). In other words, we can articulate material cause which occurs or happens due to something (note: here something can be any object of world), whereas efficient cause happens only due to any human beings or object of any activity. Here we can get to know one important thing between material and efficient cause is this – the material cause enters into the effect and the efficient cause gives an active influence from outside on the effect. “The material cause enters into the constitution of the effect.... The efficient cause exerts an extraneous influence on the effect; it co-operates with causal power inherent in the material cause...”²¹⁰ Prof. J.N. Sinha said.

3.2 The Problem of Essence of Effect: Two Main Theories of Causation

We have seen that the material cause and its relation to the effect are always played an important role in the doctrine of causality. Now on the account of conflicting status of effect in the doctrine of causality; the question arises weather an effect is already existing in its material cause or not. Whenever we are talking about the existence of an effect in its material cause; at the same moment many fundamental questions come to our mind that - Does an effect pre-figure in its material cause? Or is an effect known as hidden form of pre-existence in its material cause? Or where does the effect derive its essence? Is the essence derived from void? Or does the material cause

²⁰⁹ http://wordpress.arshavidyakendratrust.org/wp-content/themes/Larisa/Catuhstutri/Talk_028-Feb_20,%202009.pdf pp. 4-5. Accessed on 11/07/2013.

²¹⁰ Sinha, J. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd.,2006) p. 9

contribute any essence to an effect? What is the status of cause when an effect comes into existence? Is it totally removed or is it still to continue? I shall take up these issues to discuss in this proposed chapter. In fact the problem of essence of effect is the basic problem of Indian Philosophers on which other Indian theories of causation may be based on. There are only two ways with regard to the status of pre-existent of effect in its cause. If the effect pre-exists in its material cause that means the effect is non-different from its cause. And if the effect does not pre-exist in its material cause that means the effect is different from its cause. This is the basis for the division of the Indian theories of causality into two kinds namely, *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*. So, let me take first *Satkāryavāda*. Here, Sat means existent or real and *Karya* is known as effect. The doctrine of pre-existent effect or *Satkāryavāda* advocates that an effect pre-exists in its material cause even before its production and also an effect is present in a potential state or condition in the cause. And it becomes manifest in the process of causal operation. Since, it is found that it is the milk which gives rise to curd, but not the sand. *Satkāryavādin* defends that curd is already there in the milk in an unmanifested condition and it becomes manifest only when it assumes a shape which is different from that of milk. So *Satkāryavādins* mainly have emphasized on the pre-existence of effect in the material cause. The *Nāsadiya-Sūkta* of *Rg Veda* indicates “the pre-existence of the effect in its cause. The production of ‘sat’ from ‘asat’ suggests a causal relation between *vyakta* and *avykta*”.²¹¹ In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, it has been stated that “effect is non-different from its cause”.²¹² The same idea is found in *Bhagavad Gīta* is: “of the non-existent there is no coming to be; of the existent there is no ceasing to be”.²¹³ Therefore we can trace the root of *Satkāryavāda* in the ancient tradition which has been brought into a coherent theory by different schools of Indian philosophy.

On the other hand, *Asatkāryavāda* advocates that an effect does not pre-exist in its material cause before the process of causal operation and effect is not in there in the cause. If the effect already existed in its material cause before the process of causal operation, then there would be no sense to say that an effect is being produced. If the

²¹¹ *Rg Veda*. X. 129.1. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 25

²¹² *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. VI. i. 2,3. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 25

²¹³ *Bhagavad Gīta*. II. 16. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 25

curd already exists in the milk, then why should not milk taste like curd? So it would be meaningless of saying an effect already pre-exists in its material cause. There is a new beginning and a new creation of an effect. So it is called as *Ārabhavāda*. The main exponents of *Satkāryavāda* are Sāṃkhya-Yoga, *Advaita* and *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and of *Asatkāryavāda* is Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

3.3 Arguments to Prove *Satkāryavāda* of Sāṃkhya

The Sāṃkhya arguments to prove *Satkāryavāda* are propounded in the following verse of *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*:

*Asadkaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt shaktasya
shakyakaraṇāt karaṇabhāvāc ca satkāryam.*²¹⁴

The following arguments of Sāṃkhya for establishing of *Satkāryavāda* are given.

1. *Asadkaraṇād*: A thing which is non-existent that cannot be brought into existence.
2. *Upādānagrahaṇāt*: Every production requires an appropriate or specific material cause.
3. *Sarvasambhavābhāvāt* : Everything is not possible everywhere and all times
4. *Shaktasya shakyakaraṇāt* : The potent produces that, of what is capable.
5. *Kāraṇabhavat* : Cause and effect are identical

Here we need to clarify on the account of *Satkāryavāda*. What the logic behind of it, that Sāṃkhya philosophy has provided these five arguments for supporting the *Satkāryavāda*. First of all I would start from the conceptual understanding of *Satkāryavāda* or the doctrine of pre-existence of effect is this – the doctrine suggests that an effect pre-exists in its material cause even before its production and also an effect is present in a potential state or condition in the cause. And it becomes manifest in the process of causal operation. Fine, but what is the point of giving or proposing this idea as such *Satkāryavāda*. The point is to prove or justify the existence of effect

²¹⁴ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 9. Quotation taken from T.G. Mainkar, *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa* (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, 2004) p. 61

even before its manifestation or production in its material cause; not as such the mere existence of effect. This is the philosophy of *Satkāryavāda*.

The above said five reasons of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* are considered as the arguments of *Sāṃkhya* for establishing *Satkāryavāda*. Now we can explain them in details.

1. The first argument in favour of *Satkāryavāda* of *Sāṃkhya* is – “If the effect were really non-existent, no agency whatsoever could bring into existence”.²¹⁵ Commenting on this *Gauḍapāda* says- “we do not see that production of a non-existent object, as oil can’t be produced from sand”.²¹⁶ *Vācaspati Miśra*, in his commentary on *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* attempts to strengthen the argument of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*, that even a thousand artist cannot turn blue into yellow.²¹⁷ All these instances clearly seem to us that an effect pre-exists in the cause prior to its production. An effect is present in a latent or manifest condition in the cause. It becomes manifest in the process of causal operation, because manifestation is the nature of effect, since it exists. Suppose, if an effect doesn’t pre-exist in its cause then it will become a mere imagination like the horn of a man. In this world, there can be no production of non-existent, because non-existent is that which does not exist. So how can it be possible, if something which does not exist then how it is being produced? Thus, the effect has to be existent prior to its production. For e.g. sky flower which is a non-existent entity. It cannot be produced, because it does not exist; only existent object can be produced. In fact, what can be existent that can be produced and also that cannot be made totally non-existent; what can’t be existent that can’t be produced at all.
2. The Second argument in favor of *Satkāryavāda* of *Sāṃkhya* provides – every production requires an appropriate material cause. Only particular material cause is taken for a particular effect to be brought about. This suggests if someone wants to produce particular effect then he or she will seek an appropriate material cause for its production. For instance- if one who wants

²¹⁵ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 9. Quotation taken from T.G. Mainkar, *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa* (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, 2004) p. 63

²¹⁶ *Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya*, 9. . Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 27.

²¹⁷ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, 9. Quotation taken from T.G. Mainkar, *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa* (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, 2004) p. 64

to produce curd, and then he will seek milk which is an appropriate material cause for the production of Curd. But we cannot have curd from water. Likewise a pot can be produced out of clay only and a cloth can be produced out of threads only. These arguments reveal here that there is a restriction in search for certain cause alone for certain effect. It is because of the effect is invariably connected with its cause and it clearly shows that the pre-existence of effect in its cause. In this context, Vācaspati Miśra interprets it as meaning “because of relatedness to material cause”.²¹⁸ For instance oil is related to oil seeds and oil is produced or derived from only oil seeds not from water. Suppose the effect is said not to be pre-figured in its material cause even before its manifestation, then the relation of certain effects with causes cannot be established. Because the relation can exist only when both cause and effect are existent; certain effects are related to certain causes prior to causal operation. So we conclude that effect has to be existent in the material cause before the process of causal operation.

3. The third argument in favour of *Satkāryavda* is – everything is not possible everywhere and “it is also a matter of our experience that everything is not produced from anything”.²¹⁹ This argument suggests that only certain causes can produce certain effects. Certain cause such as Milk is seen to produce only certain effect as Curd. Suppose we do not accept the relation between the cause and effect, then every effect will arise from every cause. To some extent this third argument is overlapping with previous argument. Though, both arguments are considered to establish the pre-existent of effect in cause, but their approaches are different from each other. While, the second argument establishes the pre-existent of effect in terms of our search for certain effect in certain causes. Whereas, the third argument proves it in terms of the production of certain effect from certain cause. For instance – only certain effect curd is derived or produced from certain cause as milk. So the production of effect suggests that an effect is implicit in its material cause before its manifestation, because the effect already contained in the cause.

²¹⁸ *Sāmkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, 9. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 28

²¹⁹ Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 28

4. Particular effects are produced only from particular causes, because of possessing of potential of latter. The effect exists in its cause even before its production, “because the production of what is possible, can be only from what is competent of cause such possibilities manifest”.²²⁰ The potentiality is nothing but the not yet come to our undeveloped state of the effect. Hence, because that which is competent can produce the effect that is capable of being produced by it; production of a non-entity cannot take place. So material causality is nothing but the possession of potentiality to become an effect. But does this potentiality belong to that belongs to that which has potential? Or that which is devoid of this potential? If the potentiality belongs to that which is devoid of this potential, then there would be production of a water pot from yarn leading to the absurdity of anything being produced from anything. If it belongs to that which has potential, i.e. residing in the potent cause, is it operative on all effects or upon that effect only for which it is potent? “If it is operative on all effects, the same state of non-restriction will arise: this is operative only upon that for which it is potent, then it is to be explained as to how it can operate upon a non-existent effect. If it is said that particular potency is itself of the sort that it produces only certain effects, not all, then it may be asked ; is this particular potency related to the effect or not?”²²¹ In other words, the cause cannot have the potentiality for the effect unless the effect is already present in the cause in the form of potentiality.
5. The effect pre-exists in the cause prior to its productions since the effect is non-different from the cause. That means the effect is being identical with its cause. If the cause is existent then the effect can’t be non-existent and it must exist; because the existence of cause itself implies the existent of effects. Or we can put it better way that – the existence of effect can’t be possible without having the existent of cause.

Production is development or manifestation (*āvirbhāva*). Destruction is disappearance or dissolution (*tirobhāva*). Prof. J.N. Sinha has asserted, in his *Indian Philosophy* the suggestions as, “Production is transition from an implicit to an explicit condition.

²²⁰ *Sāṃkhya Pravaçana Sūtra*. 1.117. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 28

²²¹ Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 29

Destruction is transition from an explicit to implicit condition.... For instance – Gold is transformed into ornaments. Ornaments are melted into gold”.²²² “There is neither creation of the non-existent nor the destruction of the existent”.²²³ This view is supported by *Bhagavad Gīta*, which says: “there is no creation of the non-existent, there is no destruction of the existent”.²²⁴ So basically production is neither origination of a non-existent entity nor destruction of existent entity, rather it an explicit condition of effect, which is pre-existent in its cause.

Gaudapada says that, “the effect is of the same nature as of its cause, e.g. rice is produced from paddy”.²²⁵ If the effect were not existent in the cause, the rice could be produced from “*Mandia*”²²⁶ and since it is not the case, the effect must be regarded as to be existent in the cause prior to its production.

The last argument of Sāṃkhya to prove *Satkāryavāda* is based on the assumption that the effect is identical with the cause with regard to the ‘essence’. Cause and effect are identical in nature and they are not different. The Sāṃkhya gives the following arguments to prove the identity of the cause and the effect. Vācaspati Miśra adduces the following arguments to prove the identity of cause and effect.

- a. Effect is not different from its material cause, since it is a property of the cause which belongs to it. A jar is not different from the clay it is made of, because it is the property or attribute of the clay. “An object differing in its essence from another object can never be its property or attribute.”²²⁷ Suppose there are two object, jar and table. A jar is being the different from a table, because it can never be the attribute of the table. So the jar belongs to the clay so far as its attribute concerned.
- b. Causal relation can take place between clay and a pot. Clay and pot are not different object, because clay is the material cause for a pot and “there is a

²²² Sihna, J. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2006) pp. 6-7

²²³ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, 9. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 30

²²⁴ *Bhagavad Gīta*. II. 16. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 30

²²⁵ *Gaudapāda Bhāṣya*, 9. Quotation taken from K. Chenchulakshmi, *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 30

²²⁶ It is a kind of food, which is eaten by poor people of Odisha.

²²⁷ M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 40

relation of constituent and constituted between them.”²²⁸ Causal relation cannot exist between the objects which are essentially different, for e.g. in the case of pot and cow. The relation can subsist only between clay and pot, because they are essentially identical in nature and they are not different objects.

- c. “The two objects which are different in their very essence, they can be conjoined as a pool and a tree; disjointed like the Himalayas and Vindhys”.²²⁹ But the clay and a pot are not different, since they are not two entities differing from each other in essence. We do find that, “there is neither ‘conjunction’ nor ‘separation’ between them; they are not two different objects”.²³⁰
- d. Clay and pot are not different, because a pot does not itself give any room for any product which makes its weight different from the weight of the clay constituting it. An object different in essence from another object in essence always has a weight different from the weight of the other. For example, “the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing two *palas* is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing a single *pala*.”²³¹ But we find that there is no such difference between the clay and a pot. This proves that the effect, a pot is not different from its cause, the clay.²³²

The identity of cause and its effect have been accepted, the existence of the cause entails the existence of effect, which suggests that the effect already exists before the process of causal operation.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 40

²²⁹ Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 31

²³⁰ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, 9. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 40

²³¹ M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 40

²³² *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, 9. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 41

3.4 *Asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya and Sāṃkhya defence of *Satkāryavāda*

Asatkāryavāda is the causal view that an effect is not said to be pre-existent in its material cause before the process of causal operation and it is not there in the cause. According to the Nyāya, an effect is a new creation and fresh beginning. Effect is said to be produced out of its material cause as new entity. “The effect is defined as the counter-entity of its antecedent non-existence (*prāgābhāva-pratīyogī*). It means that the effect leaps into existence by putting an end to its previous non-existence.”²³³ To explain it as the effect table does not exist in any form in the wood before it is produced. It emerges from a state of non-existence into a state of existence. Antecedent non-existence has no beginning but it has an end. When the effect comes into the state of existence, it does by putting an end to its antecedent non-existence. Again, the effect is essentially different from its material cause. For instance, a pot has a character which its constituent parts but the two halves do not have constituent parts. The whole (i.e. effect) has a character of its own, though it is related to its parts (i.e. cause) in an inseparable way. The pot can be used to keep water but the two pot-halves by themselves do not have the same function. It is true that apart from the two pot-halves, the pot cannot come into existence. But it is also true that it is something over and above them.²³⁴ “Curd is non-existent in the milk, but it is produced from milk owing to the disintegration of parts and a fresh collocation of its parts.”²³⁵ Milk has a particular taste and smell and curd has a different smell and taste. Their difference is due to the peculiarity produced by heating. “Likewise, a sprout is produced from a seed owing to the rearrangement of its atoms due to heat. They produce first a peculiarity in the shape of the first swollen condition, then an intermediate swelling and then last peculiarity in the shape of germination.”²³⁶

Nyāya refutes the Sāṃkhya doctrine of Pre-existent effect in its cause and proposes its own theory of Causation which is known as *Asatkāryavāda*. *Asatkāryavāda* is the criticism of *Satkāryavāda*. According to the Nyāya, “an effect is a new creation (*Ārambha*). It is non-existent in its material cause and produced anew out of its

²³³ Iyer, M.K.V., *Advaita Vedanta According to Sankara*, (London: Asia Publishing House, 1964) p. 103

²³⁴ Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 32

²³⁵ *Nyāya Kusumāñjali*, p. 58

²³⁶ Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 32

material cause”.²³⁷ For Nyāya, *Asatkāryavāda* advocates an effect is non-existent in its material cause before the process of causal operation and the effect is a new creation. Since, it is found that the purpose of curd is not served by milk and *Asatkāryavādin* argues that curd is different from the milk and curd is not there in the milk prior to its origination. It is totally a new product. “Sridhara in his *Nyāya Kandalī* poses the question: If even before the operation of Cause the cloth is existent in the yarn, why is it not perceived even though all the conditions required for perception are present and there is also the desire to see it?”²³⁸ Entities like tables, chairs, pots and clothes are perceptible phenomena. We can perceive them because they are existent. They became imperceptible once they are destroyed. But when such perceptible objects are not perceived that imply on the question of existent of object. It is clear that they are perceived; when they exist and they are not perceived; when they are non-existent. The Naiyāyikas argue, the pot (being a perceptible phenomenon) does not exist in the clay, since it is not perceived in the clay prior to its production even though our eyes (visual senses) are in good condition.²³⁹ But Sāṃkhya asserts that we can ascertain the existence of effect through *anumāna*, though it is not amenable to perception and there is no such reason to deny the existence of an object.²⁴⁰

Gautama, the author of *Nyāya -Sūtras*, has established his own view that the effect is non-existent (*asat*) even before to its production. But there is a small query. Why should we admit the non-existence (*asat*) of an effect before its production. Gautama answers, “...the production and destruction of an effect are actually observed.”²⁴¹ In fact, it is nothing but only the matter of our observation towards an effect. For e.g. clay is transformed into jars. And jars are powered into clay. Here we can only observe the two different form or shape of an effect and they are distinct to each other. And moreover we can come to know each time anew effect of its cause. “Origination of the non-existent and destruction of the existent are a matter of our

²³⁷ For more details see Motilal, B.K. “Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School,” PEW, XXV, No.1 Jan, 1975: 41-48

²³⁸ Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 33

²³⁹ *Nyāya Kandalī*, p. 144. Quotation taken from Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 33.

²⁴⁰ *Nyāya Mañjarī*, p. 493

²⁴¹ *Nyāya -Sūtra*.4.i.49. Quotation taken from Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 35

experience.”²⁴² Here we can find a critique between Sāṃkhya and Nyāya is this: the words origination and destruction strike against the modification or transformation (*Parīṇamā*), we can understand the actual meaning of origination is this- the effect, which is coming into existence that was non-existent before in the cause? And destruction means what is going out of existence that was already existent in the cause. Here we can sum up the Nyāya theory of causation is this- *Asatkāryavāda* or the doctrine of the production of non-existent effect, which suggests that the effect is non-existent in the cause prior to its production.

The Nyāya criticizes the Sāṃkhya view of *Satkāryavāda* and upholds the following arguments.

1. Sāṃkhya had contended its first argument in support of pre-existence of the effect in its material cause is that – ‘what is non-existent that cannot be brought into existence’. That means what is non-existent that cannot be produced also and what is produced that must be accepted to be existent even before its causal operation. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika replies to it- there are things of different natures. The natures of sky flower and a pot are completely different. The sky flower is of the nature of absolute non-existence, while a pot is of the nature of both existence and non-existence. A pot is non-existent before it is produced and it is existent after its production. So that there is no such difficulty in doctrine of the production of non-existent of effects. But *Satkāryāvādins* bring the allegation against the Naiyāyikas that they (Naiyāyikas) are ascribing the contradictory features namely, non-existent and existent to one and same thing. However Sridhara observes that “no contradiction is involved, since the contradictory properties (non-existence and existence) characterize the effect successively and not simultaneously”.²⁴³ This subject suggests that there is no self-contradiction in it; they are existent at one time and non-existent at another time. Naiyāyikas stated that Sāṃkhya cannot make the distinction between absolute non-entity and non-existent before its production. An absolute non-entity like sky flower is always non-existent by its very nature and it is unproduced. On the contrary position to it,

²⁴² Ibid., 4.i.50. Quotation taken from Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Parīṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 35

²⁴³ *Nyāya -Kandālī*, p. 144. Quotation taken from Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Parīṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 37

an effect like a pot which is produced by a potter, but it is non-existent as long as it is unproduced. So basically it has the characteristics of both non-existence and existence.

Sāṃkhya argues that a fictitious entity like golden mountain, which can never be produced because it is a non-existent entity. Non-existent means which does not exist at all. But the Naiyāyikas replies to a fictitious entity golden mountain is not produced not because of it is non-existent; but because of there is no cause for it. Only that can be produced which has cause.²⁴⁴ And whatever can be produced that should be non-existent before its causal operation. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies to this argument by asserting that Sāṃkhya interpretation of non-production of non-existent entity is based on the wrong understanding of *Asatkāryāvada*. He observes that “*asatkāryāvada* does not suggest that anything non-existent including the absolute non-existents such as the sky-lotus (*atyantābhāva*) is produced, but it only means that which is produced is non-existent (*prāgābhāva*).”²⁴⁵

2. The second argument of Sāṃkhya in support of pre-existence of effect in its material cause is based on our dependence on particular material causes for particular effects. Only a particular material is granted to be produced for a particular effect. Anyone (Whosoever it may be he or she) wants to produce curd, he only can think of milk. Only milk is the appropriate material cause for producing the curd i.e. effect. Without the pre-existence of effect in its material cause, our assumption to the seeking of a particular material cause for a specific effect to produce cannot be explained and also it cannot be meaningful. In this context, Naiyāyikas accept that when they want to produce curd, they would also think of milk and not the water. But at the same moment they do not adopt the effect being pre-figured in its material cause. They contend that our search for particular effects in only particular causes alone could be meaningfully illustrated without accepting the doctrine of *satkāryā* (pre-existent of effects) which openly resists our all efforts to determine specific causes for certain effects. For Naiyāyikas, the restriction in

²⁴⁴ Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 37

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37

search for certain causes alone for certain effects are not only criteria to prove the existence of effect in the cause. For instance- the curd is produced from the milk. This knowledge does not arise before the production of curd from the milk.²⁴⁶ But it is a person or agent (i.e. *nimitta kāraṇa* or an instrumental cause) who selects for certain cause for certain effects, because he knows its capacity to produce the certain effect through his experience. Likewise, he knows that milk is being capable of producing curd only i.e. effect.²⁴⁷ Suppose we don't accept the effect being pre-figured in the material then the operation of the cause will be without any substratum and it would be aimless effort, if our search for certain cause for certain effect is based on the pre-supposition of prior existence of effect in its cause is not accepted. Thus Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argued our seeking "to certain material cause such as milk when we want curd, implies the prior existence curd in milk, for otherwise we would be engaged in a wild-goose chase."²⁴⁸ He again says, "According to *satkāryāvada*, the rule of taking a particular material for a particular effect will not be tenable because, according to Sāṃkhya-yoga, everything is everywhere. 'There is everything in everything' because, everything is only particular mixture of three *guṇas* and if obstruction is removed by proper efficient causes, everything can be produced from everything. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that, according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga all effects being transformations of *sāttva*, *rājas* and *tāmas*, there can be no particular cause for particular effect. Any effect can be expected from any cause. Thus, it is *satkāryāvada* that defies all our efforts to determine material cause for effect."²⁴⁹

3. Another argument stated by Sāṃkhya in defence of *satkāryāvada* is- there is a necessary relation between cause and effect. Suppose we do not accept this relation, then it would be absurdity that anything can produce anything i.e. every effect would arise from every cause, which is contrary to our experience. In the absence of a determinate relation between cause and effect, there can be no ground for restricting the process of causal operation to the

²⁴⁶ *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 50

²⁴⁷ *Nyāya Vārttika Tātparya Tikā*, p. 622

²⁴⁸ Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 38

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 39

manifestation of a particular. “When all effects are equally non-existent and unrelated to the cause, there is no reason why one particular effect rather than another should occur, whatever the cause may be.”²⁵⁰ This is against of law of causation. So it should be accepted that a particular cause produces a particular effect because of necessary relation between cause and effect. Any relation is not possible in the absence of “either of the relata, the things related as cause and effect must ‘exist together’.”²⁵¹ An existent cause cannot be thought of as having a real relation with non-existent. Therefore the effect must be supposed to be known as pre-hidden form in its material cause even before its causal operation.

Referring to Sāṃkhya contention that if we deny the prior existence of effects in their respective material causes, the restriction in production being absent, anything can be produced from everything; “Sridhara observes that there is no scope for such an anomaly if we understand the causal relation on its proper perspective. We need not have to assume the pre-existent of the effect in order to explain restriction in production.”²⁵² He also observes that the competence of cause ‘clay’ is restricted to the effect namely ‘pot’ alone. Our experience clearly shows that the competence of certain other class of things such as milk is restricted to the production of certain other class things such as curd. Causal relation must be understood with reference to the specific universals characterizing the particulars. Thus curd cannot be produced from anything and everything, but the form of a thing which is characterized by the specific universal ‘milkness’ alone. Hence there is no scope for production of anything from everything even if we do not subscribe to the doctrine of prior existent of effects in the cause.

4. Another argument of Sāṃkhya in support of *satkāryāvada* is – ‘the potent cause can produce only that for which it has power or potency’. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa asks: “what does Sāṃkhya-Yoga mean by power (*śakti*)? Is it different from

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 40

²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 40

²⁵² *Nyāya Kandalī*, p. 144. Quotation taken from Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Parināma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 42.

the object manifested (i.e. the effect)? Or identical with it (effect)?”²⁵³ If it is said that it is different, that means the effect is different from the power and it leads to the establishment of doctrine of *asatkāryāvada*. If it is said that it is identical with effect, then it leads to the futility of causal operation. But it could not be support by experience. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa tries to explain the real nature of power. For him, power is the nature of effect, which is characterized by its capacity (*yogata*) or ability and accompanied by the auxiliaries. This power is two types: one is existent and the other is accidental. We always witness that an effect is produced by the help of these two powers and for this if someone who wants to an effect, he will take up these two. This *yogata* or ability is not something which is different from the object. We cannot regard power is identical with an effect because power is itself established through apprehension that the nature of the effect is different from that of power. Suppose we take power itself to be the effect, then we have to admit that an effect is produced from the effect, which is baseless or absurd. Like, a pot is not produced from a pot.

5. Further argument of Sāṃkhya in support of *satkāryāvada* is – the pre-existence of effect in its material cause is dependent on the effect is non-different from the cause. The Naiyāyikas raise a series of objection against doctrine of non-difference of the cause and effect of Sāṃkhya. For them, the difference between cause and effect is directly perceived. If cause and effect are supposed to be identical, then nature of whole world is same as the nature of its effect. *Asatkāryāvains* argue there is no problem with that curd comes out of the milk. We can assert that the curd is produced from the milk and yet at the same time, they advocate that curd is not the same as the milk, but is something new and different. Thus, curd is not present in milk prior to its origination. It implies that there is a difference between curd and milk. And it indicates that curd is new entity and different. Here we propose to present the objection of Naiyāyikas against the doctrine of non-difference or identity of cause and effect of Sāṃkhya.

²⁵³ Chenchulakshmi, K., *The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005) p. 42

3.5 Nyāya Objection to the Identity Theory

Naiyāyikas have raised the objection on the production and the destruction of the effect in the cause. They stated that an effect is produced in the cause and is destroyed in the cause. The same cause can't be holding up two self-contradictory actions viz- production and destruction. It creates contradictory position of effect in the cause. When a piece of cloth is torn and reduced to threads, it involves an action of being destroyed on the part of the cloth and that of being produced on the part of the threads. Thus the identity of cloth and threads will mean that the same thing involves both the action of being destroyed and produced at the same time.

They have raised the objection on the relation between Cause and Effect. In this regards, there are two kinds of tensions which we are facing in the relation between cause and effect.

- a. The cause and effect is objects of different cognitions.
- b. The cause and effect are objects of different words.

In the point of 'a', they are being explained as two different cognitions for instance, the cloth and the threads. We have understanding of a cloth in the form of 'this is a cloth'. But we have understanding of the constituent threads in the form 'these are threads'. The followers of Sāṃkhya do not consider that differences in "cognitions" would necessarily lead to difference in the ontological status of an object. For instance; our cognition of 'Ram as the son of Dasaratha', which is the different from our cognition of 'Rama the husband of Sita'. But this does not prove that there are two different 'Ramas'. Likewise, in the point of 'b', they are being spoken of by different words. Take the same instance the cloth and the threads. But they are not essentially different to each other, though these are the two different words and we can use them in different ways, they are not different each other.

And another important objection is raised as- the cause and effect serve different purposes. Take the same instance – the cloth and the threads. The cloth has its different function and the threads also have. The function of threads is woven into a cloth, though it cannot cover a body. But a cloth can cover a body. Therefore they are different from each other and they serve different purposes.

3.6 Objections Answered

To answer the above objections, Vācasapti Miśra, argues that these arguments cannot prove the difference between cause and effect. For him, these differences can be understood in terms of appearance and disappearance of certain factors in the same substratum. He tries to answer this first objection by putting an example of a tortoise. He says the limbs of the tortoise disappear when it is entering its body and while it becomes appear when it is again emerging from its body. It does not mean that the limbs are produced one the one hand and destroyed on the other hand from the same substance called a tortoise. Similarly, the particular modification like a pot is coming out of the same clay. A pot is said to be appearing, when it is produced from clay and when it is said to be disappearing when it is destroyed. As a matter of fact, there is neither production of what is non-existent nor the destruction of what is existent. “There is no being for non-existent, nor non-being for existent.”²⁵⁴ Just as the tortoise is not different from its contracting and expanding limbs, similarly the pot is not different from the clay.

Sāṃkhya urges “these arguments of Naiyāyikas cannot prove the essential difference between the cause and the effect. There is essential identities between them; their difference is accidental due to manifestation and non-manifestation one and the same thing”.²⁵⁵ For instance we speak of a cloth in the thread, though they are not essentially different from each other, rather their difference in essence cannot be proved by looking at their difference of function and purposes. The Sāṃkhyas argue that the difference in function cannot prove difference in essence, since a single entity can have different functions. In this context Dr. Sinha said, “...since, a single substance can have different function, as the same fire can burn, cook food and give light, since the same substance can have different function, singly and collectively.”²⁵⁶ Similarly the threads by themselves cannot serve the purposing of cover the body singly but when it becomes into the form a cloth then it can cover the body.

²⁵⁴ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, 2. 16. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 42

²⁵⁵ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, 9. Quotation taken from Sinha, J. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: New Central Book Agency, 1987) p. 9

²⁵⁶ Sinha, J. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: New Central Book Agency, 1987) p. 9

There is a causal operation between the yarn and the cloth. They are not different from each other; rather they are different states of one and the same substance. So they are distinct from each other and their distinction depends on our practical purposes. "A jar can hold water, but a lump of clay cannot. They are distinct from each other, because they serve different purposes. But they are not different from each other in their essential nature".²⁵⁷ While the material cause and the effect are the fundamentally one, though they are practically different and they serve for different purposes.

Dr. N.L. Sinha has asserted in the context of effect, "The Sāṃkhya distinguishes two kinds of effects, simple manifestation and reproduction. When gold is modified into an ornament, there is causation by reproduction. When milk is transformed into cream, there is causation by simple manifestation".²⁵⁸ That means when an effect is in 'reproduction' condition then there is a possibility of an effect can change to its previous form or shape. Suppose Gold is transformed into ornaments. Ornaments are melted into gold. And when the effect is in 'simple manifestation' condition then there is no possibility of changing of an effect into its previous shape or form. So both these arguments reveal here that an effect must be accepted as pre-figured in its cause even before its production.

To provide a critical account we can take the views of opponent who strikes another crucial argument by raising an objection which exposes the weakness of Sāṃkhya. According to Sāṃkhya, an effect is said to be known as pre-figured in its material cause. Or in other words, it is already existent in its material cause and when it is produced; it supposed to be produced only when it becomes manifested. Now the opponent asks, "Was this manifestation of effect existent before the operation of the cause or was it non-existent?"²⁵⁹ If you accept the latter part of objection raised question, then you will accept the production of what is non-existent entity. And the moment you accept the former part of the objection, at the same time there is no necessity of the causal operation. As a matter of fact we do not see any use of the causal operation of effect. In fact it would be meaningless if we are asserting that an

²⁵⁷ *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 15. Quotation taken from Sinha, J. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: New Central Bok Agency, 1987) p. 9

²⁵⁸ Nanda Lal Sinha, *The Sāṃkhya Philosophy*, preface, p. iii

²⁵⁹ Bhartiya M.C. and Shastri, D.N. *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 43

effect is manifested or produced or we say the effect is already present there in the form of manifestation. “If it is said that though the manifestation is existent yet there is another manifestation – the manifestation of the manifestation – for which the operation of the cause is needed, then this would lead to *regressus ad infinitum*.”²⁶⁰ Thus it becomes an absurdity or baseless assertion that when a pot is produced what happens is that the clay becomes manifested in the form of the pot.²⁶¹

Vācaspati Miśra does not actually answer this objection but evades it by pointing out the same difficulty in *asatkāryāvada* also. “In your theory ‘a non-existent entity is produced’, he asks Naiyāyikas, ‘what is this production of non-existent’? Is it existent or non-existent?”²⁶² If it is existent, then there is no need of causes. And if it is non-existent, there should be another manifestation – the manifestation of manifestation, which will lead to the infinite regression.²⁶³

It is very interesting to see the answer which is given by *Sāṃkhya-Sūtra* of this objection. The objection raised there as: “Is manifestation existent or non-existent?” if it is existent, then the effect will be everlasting.²⁶⁴ If it is non-existent then the whole Sāṃkhya theory of causation is baseless and collapsed, because Sāṃkhya doctrine of causality has stressed on the pre-existence of effect in its material cause even before its production. “Therefore if we accept an existent manifestation, but say that there is another manifestation (towards which the causal process is directed and on the account of which the effect is not the everlasting), then we shall to admit a third manifestation for the second and so on. Thus it will lead to *regressus ad infinitum*.”²⁶⁵ To this *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* gives following answer: “(there is no fault in it) because these (manifestations) follow each other in a continuity as we see in the case of seed and plant.”²⁶⁶ “Even if there are thousands of manifestations (following each other), there is no fault, because they have no starting point as in the case with seed and plant. Just

²⁶⁰ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, 9. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 43

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 43

²⁶² Bhartiya M.C. and Shastri, D.N. *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 43

²⁶³ *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, 9

²⁶⁴ Bhartiya M.C. and Shastri, D.N. *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 43

²⁶⁵ *The Sāṃkhya Aphorism*, p. 143, fn. 1. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 43

²⁶⁶ *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, 122. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) p. 43

as there are thousands of seeds and trees following each other and there is no fault, similarly if there are thousands of manifestations involved in the process there is no fault. In another argument is put by *Sāṃkhya-Sūtra*, this objection to the theory of manifestation has been reported in the same manner as Vācaspati Mīśra had done by showing the infinite regression in the case of 'production' also"²⁶⁷

Conclusion

To close this chapter, we can articulate that both *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda* are propounded by their own respective stands in accordance to their school of thought. The view of causation in Sāṃkhya system is very reverse of that in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Both *Satkāryavādins* and *Asatkāryavādins* agree, it is the milk which gives rise to curd. Yet *Satkāryavādin* say that the curd is there in its material cause i.e. milk in latent form even prior to its production on one hand. On the other hand, *Asatkāryavādins* say that curd is not there before its origination. *Satkāryavādins* give more stress or emphasis on the similarities between the cause and the effect. They also explain by saying that effect is present in an unmanifest condition in the cause, whereas *Asatkāryavādins* give greater importance to the dissimilarities between the cause and effect. They also argue that the effect is a new entity and a fresh beginning. A number of arguments are offered in support of both the *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*. But we can consider that both *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda* have tried to define the term 'effect' in a particular way. *Satkāryavādins* has defined 'effect' in such way that an effect must be said to be pre-existent even prior to its production and is present in a potential condition in the material cause. Similarly, *Asatkāryavādins* has argued that an effect is not said to pre-exist in its material cause before its origination; it is a new creation and fresh beginning.

²⁶⁷ *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, 123. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) pp. 44-45

Conclusion

Satkāryavāda has been a rich and intense philosophical position on causation. Both Sāṃkhya system and *Vedāntins* (*Advaita* and *Viśiṣṭādvaita*) have tried to define and develop their respective philosophical positions in and around *Satkāryavāda*. In the foregoing chapters an analytical study has been attempted mainly on the basis of *Satkāryavāda* of Sāṃkhya philosophy with reference to its original work i.e. *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa. Among the different schools of Indian philosophy, the Sāṃkhya system holds a unique place, since it is one of the most theoretical enterprises. Sāṃkhya system has been a little room for metaphysical disposition but at the same time it has been giving an importance to the discriminative knowledge which will completely annihilate the three fold pain (*trividha dūkhā*) viz., *ādhyātmika*, *ādhidaivika* and *ādhibhautika*. *Satkāryavāda* of Sāṃkhya and its theory of evolution (*Pariṇāmavāda*) are among such recurrent themes which need to be investigated to assess their validity and efficacy.

There are contending positions on *Satkāryavāda*. The Sāṃkhya and the *Advaita Vedānta* have used *Satkāryavāda* as *Pariṇāmavāda* and *Vivartavāda* respectively. But they have differed from each other with regard to the process of production of an effect. Though Sāṅkara admits the Sāṃkhya view of *Satkāryavāda* but he differs in his interpretation of production of an effect. Sāṃkhya believes in *Pariṇāmavāda*, but the notion of *Pariṇāma* is not acceptable to *Advaita Vedānta*. One may pose a question that, Is there any real distinction between *Pariṇāmavāda* and *Vivartavāda*? The answer is very clear, though both *Pariṇāmavāda* and *Vivartavāda* acknowledge the changes in the cause in producing the effects, but for *Vivartavādins*, the changes are not real, but they are only appearances; whereas for *Pariṇāmavādins*, the changes are real.

We have seen that doctrine of *Pariṇāma* is an integral part of Sāṃkhya theory of causation termed as *Satkāryavāda* (theory of pre-existent effect) because when we are

trying to discuss doctrine of causality i.e. *Satkāryavāda*; more or less, at the same time we are also leaving a space for discussion regarding the some ideas about its process of production of an effect i.e. *Pariṇāmavāda*. You cannot distinguish them in thought as well as in reality. *Satkāryavāda* and *Pariṇāmavāda* both simultaneously go for the function of the doctrine of causality. In fact the word '*Pariṇāma*' stands for 'change'. 'Change' has been discussed in Sāṃkhya tradition as merely the change of form of an object or substance. Change is nothing but the process of transformation of 'from implicit condition into explicit condition' or 'from unmanifest state to manifest state'. For example- milk is transformed into curd. Curd is a manifest state of milk though it remained unmanifest state in the milk. But due to course of time curd comes to existence which is an explicitly contained in the milk. There is no problem with this understanding of conception. The question arises when change takes place then what about its substance? Does substance remain constant? Or is it totally changed? If the substance or object is changed then it cannot at all be *Pariṇāmavāda*, because *Pariṇāma* does not allow totally a new production and the complete destruction of the existing one. Therefore the substance or object remains unchanged or constant and also object does not lose its own identity. We can put the understanding of 'change' as different manner is that- change takes place only when the aspect or form of an object appear and disappear. *Pariṇāma* has been defined by the *Yoga Bhāṣya* as "disappearance of the previous aspect (*dharma*) and the appearance of another aspect of a substance (*dharmi*), while the substance itself remains constant".²⁶⁸

Sāṃkhya philosophy believes in *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*. For Samkhya, *Prakṛti* is single primordial or ultimate material cause of all products in the universe. If it is said then all products or objects of the world are modification of *Prakṛti*, which means they are produced out of *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* is accepted as the fundamental stuff which evolves the world out of itself. All determinate existence or the world of objects is implicitly contained in the bosom of *Prakṛti*. Therefore, *Prakṛti* is regarded as the only material cause of all phenomenal effects. According to Sāṃkhya, *Pariṇāma* stands for any type of change (i.e. *svarupa and virupa*) or in other words there are two kinds of changes in the process of evolution of *Prakṛti* into the objects of the world.

²⁶⁸*Yoga- Bhāṣya*, III. 13. Quotation taken from M.C. Bhartiya and D.N. Shastri, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Part.I (Ghaziabad : Vimal Prakashan, 1973) pp.50-51

Different from *Pariṇāmavāda*, there is Sāṅkara's conception of *Vivartavāda*. Though Sāṅkara did not admit the notion of *Pariṇāma* view of causation, but he offers an intelligible philosophical explanation for the doctrine of causality to us i.e. *Vivartavāda*. *Vivartavāda* advocates that the production of an effect involves merely an apparent change in the cause, e.g. when we see a snake in a rope. That means, the rope is not really transformed into a snake; actually the rope only appears as a snake, but it is not really the case. As a matter of fact, Sāṅkara has made three different grades of existence of reality. Sāṅkara argues the explanation of *Pariṇāma* view of causation is true from the empirical point of view or the world of experience (*vyāvahārika-satta*), while explaining the production of an effect. But he also describes that it would be indefensible from the ultimate point of view (*pāramārthika-satta*) to the doctrine of apparent change (*vivarta*). But Sāṅkhya system has not offered any commitment to such philosophical disposition based on the lines of distinction between *vyāvahārika-satta* and *pāramārthika-satta* made by the Sāṅkara school of *Advaita Vedānta*.

Satkāryavāda is primarily based on the principle- whatever is existent that can be produced and also that cannot be made totally non-existent; whatever is non-existent that can't be brought into existence and also can't be produced at all. But I am intending to elaborate those arguments in favour of *Satkāryavāda*, because these arguments have been already taken as the examination to prove the *Satkāryavāda*. Before going to make that assessment, first we need to have the conceptual understanding of *Satkāryavāda*. Or in other words we can articulate it by forming a query which is probable making a sense of it. Why Sāṅkhya system did think over *Satkāryavāda* as a central doctrine and also why are they proposing of *Satkāryavāda* or the doctrine of pre-existence of effect? This doctrine suggests that an effect is known as pre- existent form its material cause beforehand its production and an effect is present in a potential condition in the material cause; it becomes manifest in the process of causal operation. It is fine with its conceptual understanding of *Satkāryavāda*, but one may ask what is the point of proposing this idea such as *Satkāryavāda* or what the logic behind is of it. The point to be proved is the existence of an effect even before its production in its material cause and not the mere existence as such of the effect. From above explanation we can logically make an implication

that ‘an effect is produced from the cause’, which suggests that the effect is non-different from its cause. This is the principle as its basic underlying assumptions.

Further the treatment of causation in Indian philosophy is quite different from the western treatment of causation. In order to understand the notion of causality in Indian philosophy, we have to understand the two basic categories, namely “*nimitta kāraṇa*” and “*upādāna kāraṇa*” on which the whole Indian theories of causation may be conveniently formulated. In fact the present study has been shown in my third chapter that why Indian thinkers have been given more stress on material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) than efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*).

The doctrine of *Satkārya* is at root of the Sāṃkhya theory of *Pariṇāma*. *Pariṇāma* is nothing but the process of transformation of implicit into explicit. Like *ahamkāra* remains an implicit condition in the *mahat* and the *mahat* in the *Prakṛti* but when obstacles are removed and the *guṇas* are thrown out of the balance, then evolution process starts, like *Prakṛti* changes into *mahat*; *mahat* into *ahamkāra* and so on. Thus the transformation of matter from one form to another form seems to be the basis of Sāṃkhya theory of causation as well as its theory of *Pariṇāmavāda*. The effect is nothing but the cause, transformed or modified. So cause always produces effects. In this respect the Sāṃkhya theory of *Satkāryavāda* is very close to Aristotle’s view of causation, according to which causation is nothing but the transition from the potential being to actual being. And also a similar idea to the philosophy of Hegel who holds that causation is a passage from the implicit to the explicit.

Ārambhavāda of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika is an outcome of *Asatkāryavāda* just as *Pariṇāmavāda* of Sāṃkhya is an outcome of *Satkāryavāda* (doctrine of pre-existent effects). According to *Ārambhavāda*, the effect is a new entity and fresh beginning. The effect is said to be having not pre-existed before in the cause. In fact it is a totally different entity. But the philosophy of *Satkāryavāda* does not allow the effect to be new and different entity. Rather it advocates that an effect is non-different from its cause which means the effect is being identical with its cause. Suppose the cause exists, then an effect cannot be non-existent; but it has to be existent. Since, the effect is being identical with cause, the existence of cause implies the existence of the effect and there can be no identity between an existent entity and non-existent entity. Thus the doctrine of *Satkārya* is a theory of implication rather than a theory of causation.

According to this doctrine the relation between the cause and its effect is a logical relation of implication. An implication states that the premises imply the conclusion or the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. Similarly, it happens in the doctrine of *Satkārya* that an effect necessarily follows from its material cause. Sāṅkhya doctrine of *Satkārya* upholds that an effect is known as pre-hidden form in its material cause before the actual production and an effect is present in potential condition in the cause. And it becomes manifest in the process of causal operation. Here creation (*śr̥ṣṭi*) is only the process for the development of effect from its implicit to explicit form. Thus, Sāṅkhya doctrine of *Satkārya* not only offers an intelligible explanation of the law of causation, but also a comprehensive account of the doctrine of *Pariṇāma*.

Bibliography

Primary Sources: -

1. Aksapada Goutama; *Nyāya -Sūtra* Edited with Vatsyayan's *Nyāya Bhāṣya* by G. Jha. Poona: Oriental Series, 1939.
2. *Brahma-Sūtra with Sāṅkara Bhāṣya of Śaṅkarācārya*. New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, 1964.
3. *Brahmasūtra- Sāṅkara- Bhāṣyam* with the commentaries Bhamti, Kalpataru and Pramila edited with Notes by M.M. Ananta-kṛṣṇa. Bombay: Bhagrav Shastri and Nirnya sagara Press, 1938.
4. *Nyāya Kusumānjali of Udyana with Bodhini of Varadarāja, Prakāśa of Vardhmāna and others*, Sri Padmaprasad Upadhyaya and Dhundhiraja Shastri (eds). Benaras: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1957.
5. *Nyāya Bhāṣya of Vātaāyana*. Benaras: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1925.
6. *Nyāya Vārttika Tātparya Tikā (A Commentary on Nyāya Sūtra) Vācaspati Miśra*, M.M. Ganganadhra Shastri Tailanga (ed.). The Vijayanagaram Sanskrit Series, 1898.
7. Ramanuja, *Śri-Bhāṣyam* (2 vols), Edited by Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya, Madras, 1968.
8. Ramanuja, *Gītā-Bhāṣyam with Tātparya-Candrika*, Edited by Annangaracharya, Conjeevaram.
9. *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā with Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya*, Edited by Kantanath Sastri, Varanasi, 1953.
10. *Sāṃkhya Sūtra with Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya of Vijnana Bhikṣu*, edited by Ram Sankar Bhattcarya, Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidyaprakasana, 1966.
11. *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa with the Commentary of Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya*, translated into English by T.G. Mainkar, Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, 2004.

12. *Sāṃkhya-Sūtra with Aniruddha's Vṛtti*, Edited by Kalivara Vedantavagisa, Calcutta.
13. *Siddhāntaleśa Saṃgraha*, 1st edition, Achyuta Granthamala Karyalaya, Kasi, 1954.
14. *Śārīraka Bhāṣya with Bhāmatī of Vācaspati Miśra, Kalpataru of Amalānda and Parimala of Appaya Dīṣita*, Ananta Kṛṣṇa Sastri (ed.). Bombay: Nirnayasagar Press, 1917.
15. *The Sāṃkhya Aphorisms of Kapila*, translated by J.R. Ballantyne, Banaras: The Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Vol. XXXIV, 1963.
16. *The Sāṃkhya Pravacana Vṛtti*, Vol. I, II, edited by A. Esther Solomon, Ahmedabad: Gujarat University, 1973.
17. *The Tattva Kaumudī: Vācaspati Miśra's Commentary on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa*, translated into English, Prof. G. Jha, Poona: Poona Oriental Series No. 10, 1965.
18. *Viveka Cūdāmaṇi of Śaṅkarācārya*, Swami Madhavanada (ed.). Almora: The Adivata Ashram, 1921.
19. *Vedānta Sūtras with the commentary of Ramanuja*, Translated by G.Thibut. Delhi: Motila Banarasidass Publishers, 1962
20. *Yoga Sūtra of Patanjali with Bhāṣya of Vyāsa and Tattvavaiśārdī of Vācaspati Miśra*, Kalibar Vedantavagish (ed.), Calcutta, 1910.
21. *Yukti Dīpikā*, Pulinbihari Chakrabarti (ed.). Calcutta: Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. 23, 1938.

Secondary Sources:-

1. Bahdur, K.P. *The Wisdom of Vedanta*. Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1983.
2. Benrjee, S.C. *Sāṃkhya Philosophy*. Calcutta, 1898.
3. Bhartiya, M.C. and Shastri, D.N. *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, Ghaziabad: Vimal Prakashan, 1973.
4. Brahma, N.K. *Causality and Science*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948.
5. Chakravarti, P. *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya of Thought*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1975.
6. Chatterjee, S. and Datta, D.M. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984.
7. Chatterjee, S.C. *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1978.
8. Chattopadhyaya, L. *Self in Sāṃkhya Philosophy*. Calcutta: Row and Chowdhury, 1982.
9. Chenchulakshmi, K. *The Concept of Parīṇamā in Indian Philosophy*. New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005.
10. Das Gupta, S.N. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, II, III, IV. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922-55.
_____ *A Study of Patanjali*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1920.
_____ *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*. London: Kegan Paul Trubner and Co., 1924.
11. Hiriyanna, M. *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, 1st edition. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949.
_____ *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, 2nd edition. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1951.
12. Iyer, M.K.V. *Advaita Vedānta According to Sāṅkara*. London: Asia Publishing House, 1964.
13. Jha, R.N. *Sāṃkhyadārsana*. Delhi: Vidyandhi Prakashan, 2009.

14. Kar, B. *Analytical Studies in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy*. Utkal University: P.G. Department of Philosophy, 1977.
15. Kar, B. *Indian Philosophy: An Analytical Study*. Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1985.
16. Keith, A.B. *The Sāṃkhya System*. Calcutta: YMCA Publishing House, 1949.
17. Kaviraj Gopinath. *The Problem of Causality: Sāṃkhya-Yoga View*. Allahabad: Princes of Wales Sarasvati Bhavan Studies, Vol. IV.
18. Larson, G.J. *Classical Sāṃkhya*, 2nd revised edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1979.
19. Maitra, S.K. *Sāṃkhya Realism: A Comparative and Critical Study*. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1963.
20. Max Muller, F. *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*. Varanasi: The Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1971.
21. Mahadevan, T.M.P. *Śaṅkarācārya*. New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1968.
22. Nair, P.K.S. *The Sāṃkhya System*. Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2005.
23. Naulakha, R.S. *Śaṅkara's Brahmavāda*. Kanpur: Kitab Ghar, 1964.
24. Padhi, B. and Padhi, M. *Indian Philosophy and religion*. New-Delhi: D.K. Printworld, 1998.
25. Puligandla, R. *Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: D.K. Printworld (P), 2005.
26. Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy*, Vols I, II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
27. Sen Gupta, Anima. *Classical Sāṃkhya: A Critical Study*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1982.
 - *Essays on Sāṃkhya and Other Systems of Indian philosophy*, published by M. Sen, Kanpur, 1964
 - *The Evolution of Sāṃkhya School of Thought*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1986

— *Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta- A Comparative Study*. Lucknow, 1973.

28. Sharma, C.D. *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, 1994.
29. Sharma, D. *Classical Indian Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
30. Sharma, R.N. *An Indian Philosophy*. Lucknow: Prakashan Kendra, 1970.
31. Shastri, D.N. *Critique of Indian Realism*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1976.
32. Shastri, M.G. *An Examination of Sāṅkara's Refutation of the Sāṃkhya Theory*. Ahmadabad, 1925.
33. Shiv Kumar. *Sāṃkhya- Yoga Epistemology*. Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers, 1984.
34. Sinha, J. *Indian Philosophy Vol.1*. Calcutta: New Central Book Agency, 1987.
35. Sinha, N.L. *The Sāṃkhya Philosophy*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2003.
36. Sovani, V.V. *A Critical Study of the Sāṃkhya System*. Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1935.
37. Srinivas Chari, S.M. *Fundamental of Viśiṣṭadvaita Vedānta*, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2004.
38. Srinivas Chari, S.M. *Advaita and Viśiṣṭadvaita*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961.
39. Stcherbatsky, TH. *The Buddhist Logic*, Vols. I, II. S. Gravenhage: Mouton and Co., 1958.
40. Stcherbatsky, TH. *The Central Conception of Buddhism*. Calcutta: Sushil Gupta Ltd., 1961

Articles:-

1. Chaudhari, R. "An objection against *Brahma- Kāraṇa-Vāda*" , *PB*, Vol. LXUX. Feb. 1964, p. 58-61
2. Indula, H.J. "Process of *Pariṇamā* in Sāṃkhya- Yoga", *ABORI* 37, 1957: 300-07.
3. Kar, B. "An Examination of the Sāṃkhya arguments for the Existence of Purusa", *IPQ*, II, 3, 1975: 253-259.
_____ "Satkāryavāda and Asatkāryavāda", *JPA*, IX, Nos, 1962: 35-36, July-Oct. pp. 113-117
4. Kaviraj Gopinath. "The Problem of Cusality: The Sāṃkhya- Yoga View", *TPWSBS*, IV, Allahabad.
5. Ketkar, B.G. "An Examination of Sāṅkara's Theory of Causation", *JPA*, VIII, Nos. 1960: 21-28
6. Larson, G.J. "The Notion of *Satkārya* in Sāṃkhya: Towards : Philosophical Reconstruction", *PEW*, XXV.No1, Jan, 1975: 31-40.
7. Motilal, B.K. "Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School," *PEW*, XXV No.1 Jan, 1975: 41-48.
8. Mohan Chandra, Jitendra. "Can Cause and Effect be Contemporaneous?", *IPQ*, VII, 1979:81-92.
9. Nolan, Max. 'Sāṅkara and the causal concept', *PB*, Vol. LXXII, No.1 Nov1967, p. 469-70.
10. Radhakrishnan, S. "*The Sāṃkhya System: Some Critical Considerations*", *IPQ*, II. 1926.
11. Ray, R. "*Is Pariṇamāvāda a Doctrine of Causality?*" *JIP*10, 1982: 377-396.
12. Sen Gupta, Anima. "*In Defence of Sāṃkhya-Kārikā Definition of the Cause*", *PAS*, Vol. IX, Nos.3,4 July- Oct. 1974: 120.

Internet Sites: *Jstor, Google Search* etc.