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Colonialism and Class in Zimbabwe : Beyond the Pluralist Approach.

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We certify that the material for the dissertation entitled : "Colonialism and Class in Zimbabwe : Beyond the Pluralist Approach," has not been previously submitted, partially or wholly, for any other degree of this or any other University. We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for the degree of Master of Philosophy.

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Andries Matenda E. Rukobo

"...there can be no 'impartial' Social Science in a society based on class struggle. In one way or another all official and liberal social science defends wage slavery ..."
V.I.Lenin

"The principal obstacle...has probably been quite simply and quite discreditably a disinclination on the part of some Sociologists to look at race relations problems in ways that might be desturbing to the liberal political establishment."
John Rex

CHAPTER ONE

RACE RELATIONS : COLONIALISM AND THE PLURALIST APPROACH

Modern African states are political entities formed during the latter part of the nineteenth century, the 'Scramble for Africa', when various European powers struggled for territory and ~~need~~ vied for supremacy in different parts of Africa. The country now called Rhodesia by the whites (after its 'founder' and sponsor Cecil John Rhodes), and Zimbabwe by the Africans, become a political entity during that period. From the beginning, the relations between the Africans and the Europeans were affected by the policy of segregation and discrimination. As a result of monopolization of economic, political and military power by the whites, the relations between the racial groups have been characterised by conflict. One crucial result of the contact of racial groups, however, is the emergence of a 'multi-racial' society. In this respect, Zimbabwe shares common characteristics with other multi-ethnic societies - of a racially, ethnically, linguistically and culturally composite society.

Even after independence, the societies in countries once dominated by west European powers show the imprints of colonial rule. Conquest, usually by force of arms, was followed by the imposition of administrative, political, economic, social and cultural institutions

of the victor power. The impact of this was of far-reaching consequences and shook the indigenous social system. Both the victors and vanquished, however, adjusted. The level and degree of this adjustment depended primarily upon two factors : the level of social development of the indigenous society and the imperial policies of the conquering power. There are thus notable differences between 'tribal' and ' non-tribal' societies, or those societies with a long and established cultural tradition and those with short traditional histories. The impact of Christianity, for example, was more profound on simple societies than on relatively socially advanced societies where there were established religious organizations. There are also visible differences between societies influenced by Portuguese, Spanish, French and British rule. A comparison between the Portuguese and the British imperial policies will show this. Though the Portuguese had a policy of 'assimilado', which theoretically implied that the indigenous people could achieve the status of the colonials if they fulfilled certain conditions, in practice this was not usually the case. In reality, the Portuguese had a more brutal system of rule, and they were less concerned about developing their colonies. Though they held colonial possessions longer than any other European power in Africa, their erstwhile colonies are also some of the least developed. The British, on the other hand, had no policy of assimilation and racism was more overt in their colonies. Because of their 'liberal' policy, however, the British did create a relatively sizeable 'native' elite.

Apart from colonialism, slavery also led to the emerge of multiracial societies, which in crucial respects share many aspects of

these societies formed as a result of colonialism.

Sociologists have studied these societies, particularly in Brazil Mexico, the Caribbeans, the United States of America and South Africa where relations between racial majority and minority groups have at one stage or another been based upon subordination and superordination along racial or ethnic lines. This situation has been studied within the broad framework, of 'race relations'. In Africa, South Africa and Zimbabwe have been selected as typical cases of race relations situations, because the white minority dominate over the African majority. The concepts that have been used by sociologists are 'race' and 'ethnicity'. The approach which gained currency, especially in South Africa, is the 'Pluralist School', exemplified by Leo Kuper (1965 a; 1965b; 1965c; 1969a; etc.), and Van den Berghe (1965a, 1965b, 1967a, 1969a, 1975 etc.), who share a theoretical approach with M.G.Smith who has studied race relations in the Caribbeans (1965a; 1965b; 1969a; 1969c). Pioneer sociological studies during the colonial era in Central and Southern Africa were, however, undertaken by anthropologists, especially J.C. Mitchell (1960; 1969), A.L. Epstein (1958; 1961; 1967), Epstein and Mitchell (1959), Philip Mayer (1971), Gluckman (1940) and others.

Most of these scholars were concerned with 'race' and ethnicity' (Kuper 1965b, 1965c; Van den Berghe 1967b; 1970) or occupational prestige and social networks (A.L.Epstein 1961; Epstein and Mitchell 1959). Few studies, especially in Zimbabwe, on colonialism, its structure and relations were undertaken. Of late, scholars working in Zimbabwe have begun to study the structure and process of colonialism, analysing the factors of development and underdevelopment, labour exploitation and the African response (e.g., Arrighi 1967, 1973a, 1973b; Kosmin 1974;

Phimister 1974; Van Onselen 1973a, 1973b; Ranger 1968; 1969; 1970). Apart from these studies, there have been no systematic sociological studies of the colonial society in Zimbabwe. This paucity of literature has prompted me to undertake a macro-sociological analysis of race relations in Zimbabwe, from the perspective of class and colonialism.

This analysis draws from the insights of sociologists of various and often diverse persuasions, but notable among these are Banton (1967, 1970, 1972); Cox (1972); Rex (1970a, 1970b, 1974), Patterson (1965) and Zubaida (1970a, 1970b). The aim of the present analysis is four fold : firstly to appraise the dominant sociological trends in the study of race relations in general; secondly, to attempt a sociological study of race relations in Zimbabwe; thirdly, to study the structure and process of colonialism and its relations; and finally, to study the African response to colonial rule.

The major complaint against 'race relations' sociological studies is that they "have been a-theoretical and a-historical" (Zubaida 1970a : 1). Attention has been paid to <u>social</u> rather than to <u>sociological</u> problems. Sociological studies should, however, present the <u>totality</u> of the social structure, showing the relationship between the different components of the structure, and the way in which the social groups are located within this totality. There are also other determinants of group relations, for instance "ideology" or belief systems, which can be distinguished into deterministic and indeterministic belief systems (Rex 1970b : 48).

The development of racist ideology/notion is rooted in history, and this historical dimension must be taken into account in analysing race relations (Zubaida 1970a : 3). One of the historical

developments which led to racist doctrines is slavery (cf Banton 1967; Cox 1972; Franklin and Resnik 1973 : 7). After slavery, racism continued to fulfil the "socio-psychological needs" (Baran and Sweezy 1973 :) of justifying the exploitation of former slaves. As Cox (1972 : 211) pertinantly points out : "The ultimate purpose of all theories of white supremacy is not a demonstration that whites are in fact superior to all other human beings but rather to insist that whites must be supreme." It could thus be concluded that race relations "is the phenomenon of capitalist exploitation' of peoples and its complementary social attitude" (Cox 1972 : 207).

The other crucial historical development in the growth of racism is colonialism and its system of exploitation and oppression, and this system has been important in the formation of the relationship between the coloured (the formerly colonised) peoples and the white (the formerly colonising) peoples throughout the world. This ideology or "set of beliefs" (Van den Berghe 1967b : 11) served the purpose of legitimising exploitation. Racism is not the result of racial prejudice : it is purely a historical accident that capitalism first developed in Europe, and colonialism inevitably became a European phenomenon. By the same process, racism became a European phenomenon and, as Cox maintains; "it is probable that without capitalism, a cultural chance occurence among whites, the world might never have experienced race prejudice. Indeed, we should expect that under another form of economic organization, say socialism, the relationship between whites and peoples of colour would be significantly modified" (Cox 1972 : 212).

But the world created by colonialism, and its economic, social

and racial relationships persisted even after the collapse of colonialism and the independence of erstwhile colonies. This relationship influences the pattern of relations of former colonised peoples and the people in the metropolitan countries.

These factors should be taken into account in analysing race relations. As a colonial society, Zimbabwe fulfils some of the conditions enumerated above. The validity of the importance of the attitudes, race and ethnicity will be questioned in the light of the following questions :

(1) Is it sociologically revealing to analyse societies like the one in Zimbabwe, principally from the perspective of 'race' or 'ethnicity' ?

(2) Are racially-composite (or multi-ethnic) societies unique?

(3) Is the politically explosive situation in Zimbabwe primarily (and exclusively) racial? In other words, can we not go beyond the level of race in our analysis of the situation?

The Error of Colonial Social Science

Focus in studying multiracial (or multi-ethnic) societies has been singularly concentrated on the importance of race and ethnicity, as though all other factors involved were less crucial than these. Race relations studies seem to imply the uniqueness of the "race problem". The problem is taken to be one of cultural, social, and ethnic differences. Stress is then laid on "skin pigmentation" (Van den Berghe, 1967 a) and physical characteristics. While all these are important in day to day social interaction, our analysis

can not be complete without analysing the social structure.

An alternative would be to view the problem from the perspective of class and class cleavage in colonial societies. Such an approach would give primacy to the 'sociology of colonialism' and the overall inter-relationship between races, ethnic groups and "tribes" within one single, integrated economic and political entity, because social relations are rooted in the structure of the social system itself. Sociologists have generally tended to ignore certain crucial factors, by their focus on race and ethnicity and the uniqueness of the multiethnic situation. By shying away from economic and structural factors sociologists have produced stilted and static views of social reality. The "pluralists" have fallen victim to this 'puritanical tendency' of taking into account only the social; other factors being considered to be outside the ambit of sociology.

The "pluralist approach" is not being selected as a starting point because it is a good example of bad sociology, but primarily because any worthwhile academic attempt must necessarily be based upon critical selection. The "pluralists", besides, occupy a prominent position in the study of race relations. Moreover, Van den Berghe, and to a certain extent Leo Kuper, consider themselves to be "conflict pluralists". The term "conflict pluralists" has an ideological connotation : it implies that these scholars have moved from the "pluralists" and recognize "conflict" in multiethnic societies. Their work is an act in self-evaluation, and a reaction against certain sociological tendencies. It is only appropriate, therefore, to examine how far they have been successful in making a

break in the pluralist tradition.

I am further impelled by the moral duty to break the long-drawn out intellectual silence among indigenous scholars in Southern Africa, especially Zimbabwe, and to explode some of the intellectual myths that have, apparently, congealed into hard fact. Stated another way, social science in Africa during the colonial era suffered from what has been called the "colonial ethos" (Van den Berghe, 1965a : 1) because of the crucial function that social science served. It is not being claimed that social scientists served the interests of colonialism of their own volition ; but many of them like J.C.Mitchell and A.L.Epstein at one stage or the other worked for colonial research institutions. The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, at which the two anthropologists worked, was set up in 1938, and "was initially financed by a Trust constituted by the Government of Northern Rhodesia, to which various (colonial) African Governments and some mining companies contributed, and it was administered by a body on which government and other interests were represented" (Mair 1965 : 16). The other institutes were, the East African Institute of Social Research and the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research. The three institutes were "financed thirty percent from colonial research funds" (Mair 1965 : 17). The creation of these institutes served, among other aims, that of "the organization of studies of practical interest to governments and business firms" (Mair 1965 : 17).

Because of their social and economic position within the colonial system, these scholars could not have done work contrary to the wishes, expectations, aims and programmes of the colonial administration which gave them monetary sustenance. Consequently

they "did not question the colonial situation and the fact that they participated in it by investigating subjugated peoples" (Goddard 1972 : 61) from the angle of the colonial administration. They also took the colonial situation for granted and as given (Magubane 1971 : 440). Their analysis of urban situations, race and ethnic relations, culture contact and social change were thus limited in perspective and sometimes suffered from ethnocentric bias. According to Balandier, "Anthropological research devoted to social change, has almost never taken into account the colonial situation as a particular conjuncture imposing a certain orientation to agents and processes of transformation" (Balandier 1965 : 36). These processes, for example, the effects of the money economy and wage labour and spread of modern education have been considered separately : "They have not been considered as constituting a whole and bringing about the rise of a new and autonomous society" (Balandier 1965 : 36). Research, according to Balandier, has been aimed at practical results, obtained by means of limited inquiries, and within a framework of facile empiricism : but every <u>concrete</u> study of societies affected by a colonization, which aims to be holistic, can only be made with reference to the "colonial situation" (Ibid). Most of the colonial social scientists do not seem to meet this challenge.

It cannot be denied that these scholars did invaluable pioneer works which are the basis for the efforts of present and future Africanist scholars. Criticism is, however, based on the clear understanding that the function of all (good) scholarship is to criticise those tendencies which are unfortunate, but nonetheless real, occurences in intellectual history. Valuable studies must

offer perceptive and enduring analysis, or at least suggest relevant approaches which must stand the test of time, and not analysis which recedes into oblivion with time.

One point of fact which may be repeated is that scholars like Mithell, Epstein and their colleagues are prisoners of a historical period, having worked when the liberation of Africa seemed a forlon dream. They concerned themselves with studying the Africans, and conceptualised the Europeans as the reference group for the Africans (Magobane 1971 : 440). The political and economic entity to which both the Africans and the Europeans belonged was ignored. Epstein (1958), for instance, studies only one African community in the then Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and lamely claims that it might be possible to generalize. Micro-sociological studies are good provided they recognize their inherent limitations or place the limit (Unit) of study firmly into the social structure. Mitchell (1972 : 294) belatedly laments for not having found time to study the white communities. He admits that "a study of the white population might have been more rewarding" especially to understand the recent political events. At the risk of being accused of imputing motives or lack of intellectual integrity on others' scholarship, one would suspect that Mitchell's position in the colonial society blinded him to the reality of social dynamics and the inevitability of African liberation. The speed with which most of these scholars withdrew from the African scene after independence, or in Mitchell's case from Zimbabwe, when political tension was mounting is rather suspect. Other scholars (e.g., Franz and Roger 1962) only studied European "attitudes" towards Africans. There were other scholars, however, who defied the colonial administration and risked being thrown out, notably Ranger and Arrighi.

Challenge to "colonial scholarship" has begun to come from within and without Africa. Of late, a number of scholars have begun to 'rethink' and to boldly attempt incisive and radical critiques of this type of scholarship. Diane Lewis (1973; C.f. also Goddard 1972) maintains that anthropology emerged from the colonial expansion of Europe. Colonial relations determined the relations between the anthropologists and the people they studied. Crucially, maintains Lewis, anthropology has contributed to the widening gulf between western and non-western societies, by providing information which supported the ideas of the colonial rulers and amplified the differences between the western and non-western societies. The anthropologist considered himself to be a detached observer "objectively recording 'primitive' lifeways before they disappeared or became westernized...He rarely questioned or studied the process of confrontation itself or considered the way this milieu affected his 'laboratory conditions' " (Lewis 1973 : 582). Goddard (1972 : 61) says that anthropologists capitalized on colonialism "sometimes actively supporting it, they did not perceive that colonialism created a colonial people --' 'the native peoples'--under the economic, political and spiritual domination of an alien power which possessed and ruthlessly used the means of violence against them. Instead, they chose to see colonial peoples in terms of a 'primitive' concept denying in effect their colonized status".

It is not argued that scholars who worked at colonial research institutes only studied traditional societies, but they had the ethic of a "benevolently protective antiquarianism" (Vanden Berghe 1965a : 2). As Magubane (1969; 1971) observes, most of these

scholars suffered from paternalism towards their African subjects (or objects ?) that they studied, Magubane (1969:529) charges that most of the Africanist studies lack historical and conflict dimension : "the units of cleavage are treated as though they were innate and as though the structure of society were static". The "historical dimension" according to Zubaida (1970 a: 3) is essential for understanding race relations.

The Pluralist Theses

The origin of the term "pluralism" is traced to the Tocquevillean tradition in political theory, in which the term was applied to the stable integration of disparate ethnic groups in American society. Pluralism was regarded as a prerequisite for democratic integration. The current usage of the term distinguishes between plural society and the notion of pluralism (Kuper 1969a : 8; Bueraway 1974 : 521). The Tocquevillean term is much older in American political theory and is now being advanced by Edward Shils. The sociological tradition is of more recent origin, dating to Furnivall's 1937 and 1948 publications, and has found proponents in M.G. Smith, Leo Kuper, Van den Berghe and others. These scholars working in multi racial societies have employed the same term with variations--sometimes modified as "conflict pluralism" (Van den Berghe 1967b : 34; 1975: 3).

The development of "conflict pluralism" as a holistic approach to the study of multiethnic societies, can be seen chronologically in historical perspective, but taking into account that there are overlappings. Furnivall (1957) whose theoretical formulation is based

on studies made in Burma and the then Dutch East Indies, regards a plural society as a colonial dependency with no common "social will". The society consits of a dominant colonial elite and subordinate native and immigrant ethnic groups. Though a market economy is developed there is no development of a concomitant common culture. The plural society as a political unit is characterized by a common economy in which men compete individually without any commitments to the common nation or culture. Stability is explicable in terms of the relations of power and production; both networks being controlled by the colonial elite and the metropolitan power it represents. The natives and the subordinate emigrants are allocated subordinate roles on the basis of ascribed ethnic status.

Explains Furnivall (1957 : 304) :

> In Burma as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples--European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but seperately, within the same political unit".

The crucial result of the contact between the East and the West, argues Furnivall, has been the evolution of a plural society. A similar type of society also evolved in the colonial dependencies in tropical Africa. Within the native population itself a plural society develops between the westernized educated natives and the rest of the population, and also as a result of the interbreeding of races.

Importantly, outside the tropics the societies may have plural features as in South Africa, Canada and the United States without

qualifying to the plural societies. These societies have at least a racial origin, they meet on equal terms and their relations are not totally confined to the economic sphere" (Furnivall 1957 : 305). Tropical dependencies are plural societies because they have "no common social will".

Furnivall's formulation is highly questionable in the case of South Africa. It is hard to see any "common social will" between the Africans and the Europeans : instead, South Africa fulfils the conditions that Furnivall enumerates. The problem is that even while recognizing the importance of the economic sphere, he assigns undue importance to cultural factors. His general observation about lack of "common social will" is valid in nearly all colonial societies. It would seem to me, however, that the situation in colonial societies is primarily so because the social relationship of the 'colonized natives' and the 'colonials' is determined by their economic and social positions ; the dominant and the dominated are, correctly speaking, in a permanent situation of conflict, competing for the same goals, within a single political and economic system. Conflict arises from the monopolization of power by the dominant colonial elite, while the dominated are deprived of this power which they also strive to wield. This conflict is not an exclusive peculiarity of colonial dependencies, but a universal phenomenon.

M.G.Smith is one of the early disciples of Furnivall. His formulation, based upon studies undertaken in the West Indies, Madagascar and West Africa, attempts to loosen Furnivall's conception of plural society from its colonial context. He gives primacy to cultural differences rather than to economic forces which Furnivall consistently maintained in his formulation. His conceptions begins

with institutional analysis : society contains a complex network of social relations which can be analysed in terms of institutions as "standardized modes of activity". In multiethnic societies these institutions cluster and form corporate units which maintain their independence from each other, e.g., when one ethnic group practices polygamy while another one practices monogamy, though they may still be common institutions. Smith (1969a : 27) says :

> Pluralism is a condition in which members of a common society are internally distinguished by fundamental differences in their institutional practice. Where present, such differences are not distributed at random, they normally cluster, and by their clusters they simultaneously identify institutionally distinct aggregates or groups, and establish deep social divisions between them. The prevelance of such systematic dissociation between the members of internally distinct collectivities within a single society constitutes pluralism. Thus pluralism simultaneously connotes a social structure characterized by fundamental discontinuities and cleavages, and a cultural complex based on a systematic institutional diversity. (Emphasis added).

Smith (1965b) also distinguishes between social and cultural pluralism. In a more systematic definition he identifies three levels of pluralism in the following manner (Smith 1969c : 444).

> We thus must distinguish three levels of pluralism and three related models of incorporation. Structural pluralism consists in the differential incorporation of collectivities separated as social sections and characterized by institutional divergencies. Cultural pluralism consists in variable institutional diversity without corresponding collective segregation. Social pluralism involves the organisation of institutionally dissimilar collectivities as corporate sections or segments whose boundaries demarcate distinct communities and systems of social action.

Smith's formulation is the most rigid and the most mechanical of all pluralist formulations. The danger of such analysis is that it becomes "an enumeration of the differing cultural traits

of the superordinate corporate group and the subordinate categories". (Bekker 1975 : 12). Besides, Smith's type of analysis is static, lacking the power to reveal the dynamic and motive force of social processes. To divide societies into watertight compartments is to fail to see the actual underlying forces beneath social relations. Such analysis is also harnessed by an obsession with cultural factors almost to the exclusion of the economic and historical dimensions. Smith fails to view race from the perspective of stratification, which must be studied in the broad societal context (Burawoy 1974 : 522). He does not engage in analysing what Goddard (1972 :62) calls "the underlying structures of culture and society".

Leo Kuper, a sociologist familiar with Southern African (and South Africa particularly) white minority dominated societies through personal association, deals with "racial tension" (Kuper 1965b : 237-247) and "race, class and power" (Kuper 1975). Kuper differentiates between the 'equilibrium models' and the 'conflict model' of "pluralism" (Kuper 1969a: 7-8). However, both models focus on the consequences of the existence of a plurality of groups but in the equilibrium model independent groups mediate between the rulers and the ruled, promoting integration through balanced competition. The basis of cohesion is value consensus and multiple affiliations of the members. In the conflict model, on the other hand, the independence of plural groups implies intersectional conflict and disruption of societal cohesion. Coercion, rather than value consensus is the important integrative mechanism.

Relevantly, though the term plural society includes colonial societies that were/are dominated and ruled by people of

different cultures and races, the term is not simply a synonym for colonial societies and post colonial societies, but "denotes societies characterized by certain conditions of cultural diversity and social cleavage, in whatever way these conditions of social and cultural pluralism arise from the contact of different people and cultures within a single society" (Kuper 1969a : 7). Kuper considers the concept "plural society" to be "theoretically useful" in analysing African societies, since almost all of them are plural. According to him:

> The concept has reference to pronounced cleavages between social units. If the cleavages were complete, the social units would constitute distinct societies. A plural society thus implies that the units maintain at least a minimum of relations with each other, that there is a measure of integration, or binding together, even if mainly by governmental regulation and constraint. Plural societies vary in the extent and nature of cleavages, and in the modes of their social integration. (Kuper 1965 a: 113, emphasis added).

In most African societies, tribe and race are the primary bases for pluralism. There is usually an interaction between the two; and: "in the colonial situation, the policies of the colonial power may have been directed towards assimilation and hence, theoretically, to the ultimate fusion of tribal and racial groups; or towards the maintenance of the tribal unit through such mechanisms as indirect rule, segregation of tribal groups in work and urban situation, and support of the tribal authority" (Kuper 1965a : 119); Kuper's argument about tribal segregation finds added support in urban studies by Mayer (1961; 1965 : 305-323) in South Africa.

It is difficult to agree in toto that the "plural society" concept is "theoretically useful" in analysing African societies,

or that all African societies are plural. The dichotomies postulated by scholars like Mayer (1965; 1961), Mitchell (1960, 1969), Epstein (1961) and others, overlook the fact that these dichotomies are not peculiar to African societies. It would not be correct to argue that the dichotomy between the urban and the rural, the educated and the uneducated, is a unique feature of African societies. Indeed, habits of life differ between the middle class and the workers in England, for instance. What is called "tribalism" in Africa is manifested as linguistic or religious cleavages in many European countries. To reduce all African problems to "tribalism" is to reveal unjustified ethnocentric bias, as though Africans alone are plagued by interethnic bias.

Davidson (1971) refutes this kind of assertion that emanates from western anthropological writings. Goddard (1972 : 63) complains that the principal concern of many social scientists has been with the problem of social order. Consequently inter-'tribal' animosities are not explained in terms of the positions occupied by "tribal' groups in the social structure, but in terms of inherent animosities. Kuper may be right in pointing out the part played by colonical administrators in magnifying 'tribal' cleavages, but he does not take into account that Africans transcended these cleavages and rejected those tribal authorities who go along with the white administration as in Zimbabwe and Namibia, where traditional authorities have lost their respect because they were regarded as "puppets' of the government. Emphasis is laid on tribalism as an independent phenomenon, and not on the underlying causes and factors which lead to what is called "tribalism". The uneven

development of the economy during the colonial era often leads to interethnic squabbles and tribal jealousy; and the separation of one tribe as a result of artificial boundaries creates conditions conducive to irredentism.

Of all the pluralists, Van den Berghe (1965a ; 1965b; 1967a; 1967b; 1969a; 1969b; 1975) has been the one most responsible for popularizing the concept of pluralism, especially as a result his studies on South Africa. His contribution has been a consistent rejection of normative functionalism as "status quo ideology" (Van den Berghe 1975: 3). He equally rejects Marxism or what he calls the "monocausal theory" (Van den Berghe 1967b: 15) of the explanation of the origin of racism. He refutes the view that racism can be looked at simply as "bourgeois ideology" to rationalize the exploitation of nonwhite peoples : "Racist ideology thus becomes simply an epiphenomena sympotomatic of slavery and colonial exploitation" (Van den Berghe 1967b: 15)[1] He maintains that race is a special case of stratification and differentiation (1967b: 24). As an alternative to Marxism and functionalism Van den Berghe (1963) proposes a synthesis of functionalism and dialectics. He points out that "pluralism" and "conflict" are important in understanding multiracial societies (1967b: 34).

Like Kuper, Van den Berghe does not employ the term in the Tocquevillean sense (Van den Berghe 1967b: 34); but the term is "used more broadly to refer to societies exhibiting to a greater or lesser degree two basic features. Societies are pluralistic in

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1. See, Cox (1972) for a persuasive and convincing argument about racism being an ideological rationalisation or exploitation.

so far as they are segmented into corporate groups that frequently, although not necessarily, have different cultures or subcultures and in so far as their social structure is compartmentalized into analogous, noncomplementary but distinguishable sets of institutions" (Van den Berghe 1967b : 34; 1969a: 67). That is, there is institutional duplication or multiplication as distinct from differentiation; and there is cleavage between corporate groups.

Van den Berghe (1967b: 27-29) suggests two ideal types for stydying race relations : a) the 'paternalistic type', of the master-servant model in which a dominant group of less than ten per cent rationalizes its rule by an ideology of benevolent despotism, and denigrates the subordinate group as childish. This is characteristic of fairly complex, but pre-industrial societies; b) 'competetive' race relations: being the characteristic of industralized and urbanized societies with a complex division of labour and the manufacturing basis of production (as distinguished from the agricultural in the 'paternalistic'). The dominant group is usually the majority, or at least more than twenty to twenty-five per cent. Though colour bar still exists, class becomes a more salient feature. Van den Berghe (1967b; 1969) also talks of pluralism as a variable, and includes cases of stratification based upon race, caste and class as instance of pluralism. Race and class are based on invidious ascribed criteria like birth and individual physical characteristics, and implying hierarchical ranking of corporate groups in their society.

Van den Berghe's postulation, as must be obvious, is an intended ideological refutation of Marxism. His view denies the

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universality of social forces; but to argue that racially composite societies have a special form of stratification is to state the obvious. Clearly, nobody rejects the importance of 'race", but what Cox (1972), Magubane (1969; 1971); Buraway (1974), Wolpe (1970) and a host of other scholars are saying is that we do not gain much by focussing our attention on 'race' and 'ethnicity' per se. The question that Van den Berghe and his colleagues must answer is : What are the motive forces behind racial separation and exploitation (in Zimbabwe and South Africa)?

It is precisely because the white ruling class possesses the instruments of power and oppression that it successfully subjugates the nonwhite peoples in Zimbabwe. Racism and racial exploitation and oppression are obnoxious facts of life which ought to be condemned and opposed; but the analysis of the social structure on which the phenomenon of racism is based must be correct, identifying the actual causes, motives and underlying ideas making for racism. The whites do not oppress and exploit because of any inherent, in-born, instinctual fact. They base their rationalizations (implicitly) on the material benefits that accrue from practising racialism. It is to the analysis of these motive factors that our energies must by channelled. Looking at societies in terms of black and white leads to preoccupation with less crucial issues; the overriding importance of the struggle for economic and political power is missed in the process.

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Critical Comments

Colonial societies must be studied in historical perspective, taking into account what has been called the "colonial situation" (Balandier 1965) examining the interrelationship between "the colonial society" and "the colonised society". This must be done by recognizing the pervasiveness of colonialism, and the complex network of its social relations. Colonialism disturbed traditional institutions and denigrated the colonized peoples. Social Science analysis must realize the full implication of the socio-structural factors and must not be an exercise in abstraction. The 'pluralists' fail to meet this challenge in various respects.

One of the chief deficiencies of the "pluralist school" for instance, Van den Berghe, is that it reifies race and ethnicity and so fails "to explain the origins, type of development and direction of change, of such societies...In short pluralists do not explain what is happening in any meaningful sociological sense" (Bekker 1975:11). Burawoy (1974 :522) points out that the pluralists do not explain change, and fail to view stratification within the broad societal structure. Stratification must also be seen from the perspective of the different races in relation to economic and political advantages. Explanation of the cleavages and conflict in multiracial societies in purely racial terms may have its worth, but it must not be the end of all and everything. Lockwood (1970 :64) is right in claiming that "the concept of plural society is less of a novel contribution to social theory, and,... it poses less fundamental issues of sociological analysis." Whatever their good intentions, the pluralists cannot convincingly argue against the view that racism is

an ideology legitimizing exploitation of certain racial groups by others. This has amply been borne out by historical events like the slave trade (Xox 1972) and colonialism (Zubaida 1970). There is evidence in Zimbabwe that intensified attempts to evolve a systematic racist ideology were made in the 1930s and early 1940s, and again from the beginning of the 1960s when the white settlers wanted to consolidate and justify their economic and political positions in the country.

It is not correct to argue as does Van den Berghe (1967a: 267) that the relations to means of production, in the Marxian sense, are not meaningful social realities, or that, "Clearly, pigmentation, rather than the ownership of land or capital, is the most significant criterion of status in South Africa". Commenting on this, Wolpe (1970: 159) says that Van den Berghe makes class irrelevant, and socio-economic differentials are treated as the outcome of racial definitions (in explaining the relationship of, and between, social groups). Van den Berghe admits that economic dependence is a very important factor in inhibiting mass protestations such as general strikes (Van den Berghe 1967a; 1967b). But as Wolpe (1970: 160) relevantly observes :

> Thus having dismissed the relevance of 'Marxist classes', the analysis is forced to return to some such notion by the backdoor. This points to the inadequacy of attempting to separate race relations' from an analysis of the structures and processes that are relevant to an investigation of any aspect of society, and more specificially emphasizes the need <u>systematically</u> to investigate the interrelationship between race prejudice and political and economic structures.

Our analysis must take these various structures into account; and it is an intellectual folly to pretend that we can ignore the all-

embracive nature of capitalism, its relations, and the economic linkages between and within racial and ethnic groups within a given economic and political system. Van den Berghe misses the point in suggesting that economic dependence at starvation level is the inhibiting factor in utilization of mass protest actions. Instead, the inhibiting factor is the possession by the Apartheid regimes of the instruments of power and oppression.

At any rate, the potentiality for the outburst of a sustained and vigorous struggle in Southern Africa must not be minimized. The choice before the African masses is very clear and simple and the recent upheavels in Southern Africa point to the explosion of a violent conflict. A time will come when the masses of South Africa will defy the apertheid guns ! The riots that began in Soweto, Johannesburg, and spread all over South Africa, and the armed struggle being waged in Zimbabwe are living testimony to the revolutionary potential in Southern Africa.

An Alternative

The foregoing must persuade us that a new approach is long over-due in our analysis of the Southern African situation, specifically in Zimbabwe, which is our point of focus. I have already demonstrated my dissatisfaction with the dominant theoretical approach used in analysing situations in multi-racial societies. It is argued below that the perspective which can yield meaningful results is one which gives primacy to colonialism, class, exploitation, development and underdevelopments. Focus will be on socio-structural factors, which embrace the economic and political structures. Little is gained by limiting our analysis to the level of cultural or attitudinal

and instinctual factors. The problem at issue is deeply rooted in the colonial history of Zimbabwe : an understanding of that problem must, therefore, begin with an understanding of the history of the contact between the races. A historical resume' will, it is hoped, demonstrate that the issues involved in what is commonly called 'the Rhodesian problem' are not the consequence of any inherent racial animosities between the different races : the 'problem' is a struggle for power-economic and political. The whites are clear about the economic advantages of oppressing and exploiting the Africans : hence the enshrinement of acts into laws which ensure the economic supremacy of the whites.

By exposing the colonial base in historical perspective we shall be able to identify the different classes and interest groups that have been involved in the conflict in Zimbabwe, and by the same token demonstrate that race and class interact, and they should be analysed within the broad context of their colonial base. While race may be an important determinant in social relations between racial groups, the most important determinant is the positions that groups and classes occupy within a given system, and the privileges that arise from the strategic placement of those groups in the system.

An attempt will be made to demonstrate that the history of the contact of races in Zimbabwe has been a history of struggle to control these positions of power and privilege, and that at bottom, this struggle has been the single most important influencing factor in the formation of racial relationships. The alleged importance of race and ethnicity by the pluralists will consistently be refuted: in contrast the framework adopted may, for lack of a better term,

be called the 'colonial model'. The historical method which will help in explaining the development of 'race relations'.

CHAPTER TWO

THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER IN ZIMBABWE

The initial contact between races determines the formation of racial relations between racial groups. The resultant relations will depend on whether the original contact was peaceful or hostile. It is possible to distinguish several types of multiracial societies from the origin and nature of the contact and the resulting relationships.

a) There are countries like the United States of America Brazil, Mexico, and the Caribbeans, into which Negroes were imported from Africa to work in the mines and plantations. Race relations in contemporary societies in these countries are still linked to the history of slavery. There are, however, some variations as the difference between the Latin American countries and the United States. In the United States the whites are still the dominant group and the 'race problem' is still very much pronounced.

b) There are societies (e.g. Britain, France) which have what is commonly called the 'immigrant problem', into which 'coloured' immigrant workers from the former colonies come in search of better economic advantages. The 'coloured' workers come as a powerless minority group and are discriminated against by their hosts. The relationship between the immigrants and the hosts is coloured by the former colonial relations;

c) Another type of society is found in colonial dependencies or 'Protectorates', where the policy of 'indirect rule' was applied; the imperial power exercised control through its own agents. Alien groups which went to these dependencies were administrators, missionaries, traders ; for instance, in Malawi and Nigeria, There is no alien minority group sufficiently strong to develop interests seperate from those of the imperial authorities.

d) Societies into which groups from outside motivated by economic reasons settled. Here settler control preceded imperial rule, as in Zimbabwe. Because the settlers became economically powerful, they developed definite interests which were sometimes opposed to the interests of the imperial authority.

An examination of the colonial history of Zimbabwe demonstrates that the circumstances and nature of the initial contact between the Africans and the Europeans have been crucial determinants in the formation and shaping of race relations. A corollary to this statement would be that ; a) If the initial contact between the races was violent and hostile, the conquering and dominating alien minority may be permanently possessed by a 'sense' of insecurity and fear; this sense of insecurity may result in adoption of repressive measures aimed at controlling the conquered and the dominated. If the conquering group has economic and material motives, it may devise an ideological justification for its rule. As the subordinate majority group attains higher educational skills and expertise, race

relations may further deteriorate as the two competing groups struggle for economic and political control.[1] The nature of the response of the oppressed group may largely depend upon the extent to which they 'accepted' defeat. Overall, the relationship between the two groups may be characterised by a situation of permanent conflict and struggle for economic and political supremacy; b) If initial contact was peaceful, or with relatively little conflict, and depending upon the imperial policy of the colonial power, paternalistic[2] race relations may develop. Unlike in (a) where there may be permanent confrontation between the dominated majority and the dominant minority, and colour bar is strictly enforced, in (b) we have a relationship of "social avoidance" between the two groups. It is not suggested, however, that in (b) the dominated

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1. P.A.Baran and P.M.Sweey (1973 : 260) point out that ; "The gratification which whites derive from their socio-economic superiority to Negroes has its counterpart in alarm, anger, and even panic at the prospect of Negroes attaining equality. Status being a relative matter, whites inevitably interpret upward movement by Negroes as downward movement for themselves. This complex of attitudes, product of satisfaction and status consciousness in monopoly capitalist society, provides an important explanation why whites not only to refuse to help Negroes to rise but betterly resist their efforts to do so".

2. C.F. Van Den Berghe 1967b : 27-29); Banton (1967); Weinrich (1973 : Chapter 1). Van den Berghe differntiates between "Paternalistic" and "competative" race relations as ideal types in the Weberian sense.

The term "paternalistic" is not being employed in the sense in which Van den Berghe uses it : Van den Berghe's usage is more mechanistic. Impressive though his typology may be, one tends to be sceptical about its empirical applicability or (verifiability) in the case of Zimbabwe. In fact, as I argued, from the time of colonisation, the type of race relations that obtained in Zimbabwe have been based on hostile antagonistic competetive relations rather than on paternalism. One should, of course, recognise that Van den Berghe is using an ideal-type.

group acquiesces to alien rule.

A combination of factors led to the development of a type of "race relations" that exist in Zimbabwe today. The motives, circumstances and nature of colonial contact, the imperial policy of Britain towards the colony of Southern Rhodesia, the initial response of the indigenous people to white settlement and rule, the conflict and confrontation of the races, all made up a sum-total of a highly explosive political situation that has reached irrevocable proportions in Zimbabwe today. This historical dimensions must be taken into account in order to understand the situation, because race attitudes are historically based (Cox 1972:)

The Pre-Colonial Period.

Inspite of consistent attempts by the white settlers and colonial historians to deny a worthwhile African past in Zimbabwe, certain historians have begun to write favourably about African precolonial history. Notable among them are Davidson, T.O.Ranger and others. White settlers also assert that Africans have no right to claim ownership of Zimbabwe since, it is argued, the Bushmen arrived before the present African inhabitants of Zimbabwe. Davidson (1971, especially Chapters 2,3,6) refutes that Africans did not contribute anything to "civilization". He points out that when the whites came to Zimbabwe "they encountered men and women who were not at the beginning of a long period of civilized development, but, through times of painful dissolution, were perilously near the end of one" (Davidson 1958 : 45).

The Shona speaking people, characterized by Hilda Kuper (1951 : 9) as congeries of Bantu-speaking tribes[1] seem to have occupied the greater part of present day Rhodesia and Mozambique as early as the ninth century A.D. The Shonas were integrated into a single nation,[2] first under the Mononutaper dynasty and then from around the sixteenth century many of them were loosely united under the dominant Rozvi, with a sufficient cultural as well as linguistic uniformity to distinguish them from the people south of the Limpopo as well as from those north of the Zambezi. The Rozvi developed a strong military monarchy whose stability and prosperity was reinforced by possession of wealth in the form of

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1. The term tribe has lost its scientific meaning and has an invidious connotation in Africa, of backwardness and primitiveness Lucy Mair (1970 : 15) cautions that anyone intending to use 'tribe' as a technical and not a term of abuse, "should be clear that it simply means an independent political division of a population with a common culture".

2. Others might object to the use of the term nation to describe this situation; but Davidson (1971 : 22) complains that "isn't it merely mystification to describe a typical European people, with all their xenophobia, group-ambition and sense of exclusivist pride as a nation, while reserving the term tribe (primitive and barbarous being understood) for a people like the Yoruba? Such mystification, one can not help feeling, is in no small part the fault of anthropologists who have generally cultivated a habit, when writing about African societies, of creeping in at the backdoor of political reality instead of marching boldly up the front door".

cattle and the control of numerous gold mines. The country was organized into territorial fields whose rule was supported in the spiritual sphere by the priesthood of Mwari, the high-god of the Shona.[3]

The first ruling dynasty, the Monomutapa, seemed to have had his first capital and royal cemetry at the now world-famous Great Zimbabwe though by the sixteenth century the Rozvi dynasty seems to have been in control and the Monomutapa had moved further to the north of the country (Oliver and Fage 1975: 133). The people inhabiting the kingdom "seem to have been noted for their preminence in the 'arts of peace' - agriculture, weaving, pottery, carving and iron-smelting' (Mtshali 1967 :23).

Contact with the Europeans seems to have begun in the sixteenth century when the Portuguese government sent its national, Antonio Fernandez, in 1514 to investigate the source of gold which was reaching the east coast. The Portuguese acknowledged the Monomutapa as "the lord of an exceeding great country". Portuguese attempts to occupy the country met with little success, since the Shona successfully repulsed effective Portuguese penetration. There is indication that the Portuguese entered into bilateral agreements with the Monomutapa who maintained effective control over his kingdom (c.f. Vambe 1973; Ranger 1968). Contacts were for trade, but establishment of churches failed (Gann 1965). These early

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3. See Ranger(1967) and H. Kuper (1951) for interesting accounts of the Mwari-cult among the Shona. The Mwari priests played a leading role in the 1896-97 war of resistance against European settlement.

contacts, however, were of a "fleeting nature" (Weinrich 1973:9) and did not constitute race relations. In time, the Monomutapa's kingdom became too extensive, so it weakened. Besides, focus was now on agriculture, and not on defence.

In the nineteenth century the Ngunis invaded from the South, one group moving north to present day Tanzania and Zambia, but more importantly, a contingent under Mzilikazi settled in the western part of the country. Contrary to the claim of colonial historiography, the activities of the Nguni were confined to sporadic raids, mostly for cattle and grain, into certain parts of the country. They did not conquer or enslave the Shona people (C.f. Vambe 1973; Mtshali 1967:29). The Shona speaking people and the Ndebele (the descendents of the Nguni) coexisted and fused culturally; in time; they have become one people with little trace of their past.

The arrival of Europeans - missionaries, traders, hunters, prospectors and adventurers - in the 1880s was a turning point in the history of Zimbabwe. The now infamous Rudd concession was signed in 1888 between the representatives of Rhodes and Lobengula, King of the Ndebele. Interpretations of that concession have differed sharply;[1] the Europeans never fulfilled the terms of the concession. On the basis of that concession Rhodes obtained a Royal Charter from the British Crown under which Zimbabwe was forcibly occupied by settlers under the auspicies of the British South Africa Company,

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1. The African interpretation of the Rudd concession has been successfully presented by Sam'Kange (1965; 1969).

on September 12, 1890. The settlers named the country Rhodesia, in honour of Cecil John Rhodes the godfather of the British South Africa Company. Lobengula's protests to the British Crown and attempts to revoke the concession met with no success.

In 1893 the white settlers came into armed conflict with the Ndebele, but the latter were defeated. In 1896 the Shona and the Ndebele unitedly rose up in armed revolt against the white settlers, but were defeated by virtue of superior arms in 1897 though fighting went on intermittently in various parts of the country till the early 1900s.[1] The prominent and leading architects of the war were the religious priests of the Mwari cult. The Shona call the war 'Chimurenga' and the national armed revolutionary struggle being waged now has also sometimes been referred to as 'Chimurenga'

Settlement by the whites

a) Political Developments 1890-1969

From 1890 to 1923 the colony of Southern Rhodesia was administered by the British South Africa Company. In 1898 a Southern Rhodesia Order in Council established a legislative Council to govern the country. The settlers increased rapidly so that by about 1893 there were nearly 3,000 engaged mostly in prospecting, trading and in few cases clearing the land for farming.

The discovery of gold in Rhodesia in 1860 by the adventurous German schoolmaster, Karl Mauch, caused a lot of excitement in South

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1 See T.O. Ranger (1967) for an account of the 1893 and 1896 wars.

Africa, and subsequently in England when the news reached there in 1868. One major reason for this unfounded (speculative) excitement was the 'tropical treasure house' theory about Africa. Though the gold finds were of lower quality and involved more expenses than at the Rand in South Africa, the 'theory' had a deep impact on Victorian politicians (Gann 1969: 100-102; C.f. Gann 1965; Arrighi 1967; 1973b; Leys 1959). Cecil John Rhodes, one of the greatest nineteenth century imperialist financiers, was deeply convinced that empire, investment and profits would go together; "but he often had to use the strongest expedients to get his partners and stockholders to put more money into his chosen instrument in Rhodesia, the British South Africa Company, which from 1890 to 1923 never paid a single penny to its shareholders and was generally non profitable". (Gann 1969 : 102).

The economic motive determined the nature of economic and political developments (Arrighi 1973b: 336) and hence the development of race relations in Zimbabwe. Though the vision of an Elderado soon faded, Company principles of administration for the first one and a half decades reflected its belief, that the output of gold would justify a large outlay in administration and development. Joint-stock companies developed the mines and the company held half shares; in practice the Company acquired interest in the other half to maximize its profits and to promote as many such concerns as possible. As a corollary of this, the Company undertook a heavily ambitious programme of railway building.

The 1896 war, however, disrupted prospecting and mining and almost brought these activities to a standstill, with 372

settlers killed and 129 wounded (or ten per cent were casualities) (Leys 1959: 7: c.f. Gann 1965 : 140; Ranger 1968; 1970 :4). These figures exclude casualities among the forces used to suppress the "rebellion". This political interruption delayed the Company's realisation that its economic misfortunes were the result of its gross overevaluation of the mineral wealth of the country. Inevitably, the company fell into serious financial difficulties.

Meanwhile, the settlers were increasingly feeling that the Company was sacrificing their interests to those of the shareholders. Consequently, they began to challenge company rule and demand greater say in the political life of the country. Faced with financial difficulties the company was forced to rely on the settlers, who demanded greater political power in return for their cooperation. In time, the settlers seized power : "In this process, the institutional framework established by the Company was filled out and elaborated in a way which reflected the growing dominance of the settler community" (Leys 1959: 8). In response to mounting pressure, and in order to exploit all avenues to alleviate its financial problems, the company began to allow small working of mines on royalty basis around 1902.

In a radical change of policy, the company began to pay more attention to agriculture so that by 1907 the company had adopted a new policy of encouraging European settlement on land; and this became a crucial determinant to the future pattern of development of the country. The company had two aims: to bring revenue;

but it particularly wanted to put up the value of land. Additional capital was raised to provide services that would induce settlement on land. To attract settlers, the best available land and cheap and abundant African labor had to be provided. This meant creating artificial inducements to the Africans to leave their land, from which they were engaged in fairly prosperous and lucrative agriculture. In the early stages Africans supplied the growing mining and urban centres with food, milk and meat, they also had a successful tobacco industry and even provided tobacco curing know-how to the European farmers.[1]

The Native Pass Ordinance (No 10, 1902) which extended the Native Registration Ordinance (No 16, 1901) was introduced in 1902 to facilitate procuring African labour wherever it was wanted. The Company channelled all its energies into satisfying settler needs, following the methods and policies already developed in South Africa, thus laying the firm base for the policies of future governments. This was done by appointing personnel already seasoned in service, especially in the Cape Province of South Africa. By 1923 the Company had four main divisions; Administrators, Treasurers, Attorney Generals and Secretary of Mines and Works, comprehensively embracing all governmental administration. In the division of the Administrator was the Native Department to deal with African affairs.

Because of heavy administrative expenses being incurred by the Company and the imperial authority, Britain wanted the colony to be a part of the Union of South Africa, because this would alleviate

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1. See Arrighi (1967 ; 1973) and Phimister (1974) for authoritative accounts of the process of underdevelopment of African agriculture; and Kosmin (1984) for a well documented and convincing discussion on the Inyoka tobacco farming.

administrative expenses and Union would offer better economic prospects for the territory. The white workers and farmers, however, opposed Union because it was not in their interest: workers feared job competition from poor whites from South Africa, while the farmers feared that African wages would have to be raised to complete with higher African wages paid in South Africa (Loney 1975: 49). A larger number of whites also feared Afrikaner dominance which they had run away from in South Africa. There was also the apprehension that Rhodesia's development plans would be sacrificed to those of a larger Union. Some whites, however, preferred Union, especially the larger entrepreneurs who visualised economic advantages from Union.

The Company lost interest when the Privy Council ruled in 1918, that the land belonged to the Crown and not to the Company. A 1922 referendum voted in favour of 'responsible government', and on October 1,1923 the Company administration ended, and Responsible Government came into being.

Responsible Government meant in effect that the settlers could now exercise greater internal political autonomy with a fullfledged control over the state machinery. The interests which dominated were those of the white farmers and workers : for example, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Industrial Conciliation Act reflect this dominance.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasland which comprised of the territories of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was formed in 1953 but broke up in 1963 when Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) became independent. In 1965 the white settlers under the Rhodesian Front Party declared independence from Britain unilaterally, thus terminating Britain's

effective control over the territory. Meanwhile, in 1961, a constitution had been adopted which gave qualified franchise to the Africans. Under this constitution, 15 Africans could be elected to a Parliament of 65. The Rhodesia Front Government revoked this Constitution and introduced another one which sought to further entrench white interests.

It will become clear below that these political developments were deeply rooted in the economic realities of the situation ; at bottom the struggle has been a struggle between many interest groups.

b) The African Response to white settlement (1890-1957)

What was the response of the indigenous Zimbabweans to the conquest by and settlement of the whites, taking into account the successful repulsion that they had given to the Portuguese earlier? Immediately below, the way in which Africans immediately responded to white settlement at every stage is traced. Race relations in Zimbabwe can be correctly equated to the doctrine of racism and to the practice of racialism. The two are important determinants of social relationships between groups and limit a person's life chances. The analysis, however, will not be on the level of attitudes, as said before; it will be concerned more with the relations between the Africans and the Europeans in the context of their positions vis-a-vis economic and political power.

Since the whites who settled in Zimbabwe were economic adventurers, economic motives determined their attitudes to, and relations with the Africans. The defeat of the Africans in 1897 left them in a state of bewilderment and temporary shock. Consequently some *turned to the missionaries for a new solution. Others took to the

woods and the hills as followers of the diehard rebels who would not surrender. Most lapsed into a dull acceptance of defeat" (Ranger 1968: 215). Some, especially among the Shona, turned to history and their unity and prosperity under the Rozvi, and a sign "to keep alive the idea of a wider Shona unity" (Ranger 1968 :216). The old idea of resistance held on. A section of the Ndebele, under Nyamande, formed a Ndebele Home Movement to demand for Home Rule, but this failed.

There were also other more organized forms of protest: for example, on January 20, 1923 an African Bantu Voters' Association (BVA) was formed at Gwelo with the programme of land purchase, higher education for the Africans, exemption of voters from certain restrictions etc. (Ranger 1968:223; c.f. Ranger 1970). Though the BVA was an elitist organization and failed to exercise the influence it desired, it was "the first association to focus on politics at the centre and to concern itself with the territorial parliament" (Ranger 1968:224).

The test case for the RBVA and other African Associations like the Gwelo Native Welfare Association and the Rhodesian Native Association was the land question when the Carter Commission, appointed in 1923, heard evidence from people from all walks of life. Though the evidence varied, it was clear that the Africans wanted more land which the Europeans had already begun appropriating (Ranger 1968; c.f. especially 1970). The Carter Commission, however, recommended segregation and additional land to the reserves and the creation of the so-called Native Purchase Areas. The recommendation left the Africans bitterly disappointed.

In July 1929 the various African Associations in the country held a combined meeting in a temper of bitterness and a mood of disillusionment. The speakers spoke with one voice, urging unity. The meeting strongly voted against the 'Home Rule Trick', against separate or parallel development and those policies which denied the African life chances and rights in his own land; the meeting also unanimously voted against the Land Apportionment Bill. Inspite of this protest, the Bill was passed and became the Land Apportionment Act.

At the end of the 1920s attempts were also made to organize the African workers. Clemens Kadalie, an immigrant worker from Nyasaland based in South Africa, had already pioneered by forming the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) in South Africa. In 1927 he deputed one of his countrymen, Robert Sambo, to organize the African workers and form an ICU in Zimbabwe. Sambo did not confine himself to the urban workers, but also sought to mobilize the predominantly migrant workers from Nyasaland and Portuguese East Africa working on white farms. Though the authorities promptly banned Sambo, the ICU continued and branches sprung up in different urban centres, townships and mining compounds, and at weekend public meetings leaders exhorted the African workers to unite, to transcend ethnic divisions and nationality, while at the same time attacking the missionaries and the Government. The speakers appealed to international working class solidarity. According to Ranger, the ICU never developed into a mass movement, presumably because a substantial number of workers did not have roots in town, and too

many of them came from outside the country.[1] The ICU, however, was important as a forerunner of urban political parties and African unity.

Leadership of the protest movements was taken over by the educated elite in the 1930s: e.g., the African National Congress formed in 1934. Though the ANC did not make any specific gains, it became the main exponent of territorial constitutional politics; unlike the SVA, it did not limit its appeal to voters or potential voters, but attempted to organize the Africans more generally in the towns. The ANC is, in a way, the ancestor of modern African nationalism and was the first Congress movement in Central Africa.

Africans also responded in other ways: there was an eruption and development of independent Church movements, like Matthew Zvimba's 'Church of the White Bird', which tried to combine ideas of Christianity and old African beliefs. Some of these provided leadership to protest against white rule. There was also a sudden acceptance and commitment, especially by the Shona, to Movements from outside, like the Watch Tower Churches (Ranger 1968:231; c.f.1970).

However, these movements failed to offer effective challenge to white rule, because they were too many, uncoordinated, and with localized and diverse objectives. Underneath this, however, was a combination of factors which sharpened the conflict between the white and the black groups, and brought the various elements of the

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1. Van Onselen (1973) does not, however, share the view that African workers did not have "worker consciousness". He persuasively ~~black~~ argues, by examining mine workers, that there was consciousness in black workers as demonstrated by their avoidance of mines where living and working conditions were dehumanizing in the pre-1920 period.

African population together. Two important developments took place after World War II; first, a large influx of white immigrants at an average of 10,000 a year; and second, a rush for education by the Africans. Besides, African workers, as a result of proletarianization, were beginning to take greater initiative, and to use the strike as a weapon, as exemplified by the 1945 African railway workers' strike in Bulawayo and the 1948 general worker's strike in Bulawayo and Salisbury, which was joined by domestic servants. Benjamin Burombo seized the new mood by forming the African Voice Association to link this new confident discontent with the grievances of the rural masses.

At that stage a small section of the whites felt the need to create an African middle class divorced from the masses. The view found expression during the Federation of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Various multiracial associations like Capricorn Society were formed which a number of the African elite joined. Attempts were made to recruit some Africans into important positions. Creation of an African middle class, however, failed because certain sections of the white population were opposed to this.

As a result of frustration the African middle class joined hands with the masses in the late 1950s onwards. The mode of African protest thereafter will be discussed later (Chapter Six).

CHAPTER THREE

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND CONSOLIDATION OF WHITE POWER

Given the economic motives of the whites for occupying and settling in Zimbabwe, and their bearing on race relations, what then were the bases for the relationship between the races ? Or, in the light of my earlier postulation that race relations in Zimbabwe can be equated to the doctrine of racism and the practice of racialism, what was the basis of racial discrimination and exploitation?

Analysis of this will be done by tracing the process of the establishment and consolidation of white power, from the perspective of the cruciality of the economic interests of the white settlers, embracing the importance of land, mining and labour, and seeing their interdependence. The criticality of white economic interests resulted in race relations determined by the policy of racial discrimination and racial segregation. This, in turn, led to a pattern of economic development favourable to the white population at the expense of the African population, which in fact, became underdeveloped. On the macro-level, the emergence of a powerful settler community with defined economic interests led to the general prosperity of the whole country. Consequently, it can be argued that the policy of 'Apartheid' in South Africa and 'separate development' in Rhodesia, are compatible with capitalist exploitation and development. Wolpe (1970) has argued persuassively and shown that in South Africa, racial discrimination is compatible with the capitalist development of the country ; it is not, as has been argued by some scholars, an anomaly to the industrial and economic development of the country. The South

African economy thrives on the super-exploitation of the African workers, just like in any capitalist system.

The Economics of Racialism

After the failure of gold, there was a marked shift to base mineral mining and tobacco farming; but the expansion of these industries was remarkable after World War II, after a severe setback during the depression period in the early 1930s. The growth of European agriculture was given life by the internal demand for foodstuffs, and the foundation of a successful tobacco export industry: the creation of the Tobacco Board by the Government in 1930 stimulated the development of the industry. Introduction of other state enterprises after the depression boosted the development of industry : for example, the Electricity Supply Commission's Power Stations; the Cold Storage's Steel Commission's foundaries and mills, the Sugar Board's estates, and others were among some of the state enterprises created in the 1930s.

As a result of the development of industry, there was large scale immigration after World War II. The consequence of this, however, was that government services were expanded at the great cost of borrowing. In order to attract skilled personnel from abroad, they had to be offered exceedingly high wages, a practice which has continued upto now.

The Africans, on the other hand, had little to gain; they earned money either by selling surplus farm produce or by selling their labour. Evidence suggests that from the 1930s to 1950s there was no rise in African real wages; instead, in the 1939-1948 period there may actually have been a slight decline, and no general improvement

in African standards of living. At the heart of this are the economic, political and social policies of the white ruling class. And as Leys (1959 : 26-27) says : "...one can not but be struck by the extreme inequality between the living standards of the European and African populations, the one among the highest in the world, the other among the lowest,". This is a consequence of the contradictory policy of the government, which tends to measure economic progress by the extent to which the country can be made to absorb European immigrants at a living as high as for those who have already settled there, rather than by reference to the living standards of the entire population.

The social policies of the rulers, legalized as law, contribute to this situation; significant among these are Land apportionment, and legalised colour bar in employment and other measures which buttress the policy of "separate development".

I. Land Apportionment

Though farming was not the primary objective of the original settlers, land was distributed without any regard for indigenous tenure; grants were given to all who wanted them among the settlers. Each member of the so-called Pioneer Column was entitled to 1,500 morgen (c. 3,000 acres) to hold on 'military tenure', as soon as the company found itself in a position to do so, while the beneficiaries of the Victoria Agreement each received 3,000 morgen, and no occupation was required, apart from payment of ten shillings quit rent to the company. Mining and land companies also received extensive land.

Speculators, too, received land, and by 1912 a total of 7,884,160 acres had been granted to 23 companies with a total working capital of £7,522,000 (Gann 1965:162).

Since agriculture was not primary in the earlier period, most people did not develop the land, which changed hands rapidly : others, however, faced the challenge and began to break the ground in farming. Some engaged in maize growing, others in timber trade and sale of firewood, and still others in market gardening. Most of them were new to farming. Gann describes them in the following manner :

> Very few of these early pioneers were in any way specialists; they included people from all walks of life, soldiers and policemen, civil servants with a taste for outdoor existence, cattle traders who decided to raise their own beasts; but all had one thing in common; they were inveterate individualists and always willing to try something new.
> (Gann 1965 :163)

And one might add, aiming to get rich quickly. Apart from the English speaking whites, Afrikaners also came along in organized treks. The life of these early settlers was a bitter struggle with a new environment, failure of agriculture, plant and animal disease. This difficult experience has been well engrained in the minds of the early settlers and their descendants.

Things began to improve at the beginning of the twentieth century; with the growth of mine compounds markets became available, and the company began to pay attention to the needs of the farmers. The Company introduced extensive and progressive reforms in agriculture : agricultural specialists were hired to improve methods of agriculture and to deal with pests. Experimental stations were set up at Salisbury

and Gwebi, and local scientists went abroad to study better methods of tobacco growing and agriculture generally.

a) The Beginning of Land Alienation (1890-1930)

Most of the early settlers selected their land on the heavy red and black loams which had been favoured by the Africans, especially in the west and south west of the country (Matebeleland); in those parts where there was lighter granite soil there was not as much pressure yet. With the advent of tobacco farming, however, excessive pressure began to be felt in these areas too. Though at first the settlers only occupied small portions of their land, the Imperial Government insisted that additional land should be set aside, because of the living possibility of a further and continuing influx of settlers. A Land Commission set up in 1894, recommended setting aside of two blocks, the Shangani and Gwaai Reserves, estimated at 3,5000 and 3,000 square miles respectively and small reserves for Lobengula's surviving relatives. Africans preferred to stay on their ancestral land and the whites encouraged them to do so to work for them.

While drafting the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council in 1898, the Imperial Authority again considered the land question : under the new law Africans retained the constitutional right to buy land anywhere in the colony on the same terms as the Europeans. This was, however, a ridiculous proposal, since the Africans had neither the propensity nor the means to buy land. Clearly as Gann (1965:183-84) points out :

> But very few black people even managed to make use of this provision. A small number of black settlers from South Africa-'Alien natives' in the queer language of the day--managed to buy some land on individual tenure; these included some Fingoes(sic !) at Bembesi, and a few Basutos and a Shangaan in the Victoria District. Such people, however, remained quite exceptional, for the vast majority of Africans in the country possessed neither cash, knowledge nor inclination to buy land like whitemen, whilst neither white civil servants nor black chiefs would encourage them to abandon their traditional system of landholding.

The Order in Council placed a statutory obligation upon the Company to provide sufficient holdings, with a sufficient number of streams and springs; but even before the new law was passed the Chief Native Commissioner submitted a proposal for demarcating the reserves. The so-called Mashonaland Native Commissioners allocated between 15 and 20 acres per hut, while in the so-called Matebeleland the average was 9 acres; the average being based on the allocation made in the Cape Colony (under Glen Grey Act). But there was no clear policy on land allocation; Native Commissioners worked according to their whims and fancies, with no proper maps and surveys, so that the size, quality and arrangement of the reserves varied.

When the Europeans began to have a greater commitment to land, and to cultivate much more intensively, and when African stock began to compete for pasture with European animals, the demand for reserves became much more insistent. The Native Commissioners also supported the idea of territorial segregation, albeit in a benevolent and paternalistic tone. Their argument was that the Africans would learn corrupt ways of life from mines, towns and from living in close proximity with the whites. The missionaries also argued in similar vein, from the moral point of view, adding that the reserves provided

ample opportunities for experimentation, development of African traditional life and were strategically viable for spread of the gospel. The missionaries also had another worry: that African school teachers might be attracted by higher wages as clerks, storemen etc. in towns and mines. The Company, however, wanted liquidation of African tribal life, and was in favour of an open-ended policy which would enable the whites to have a free hand in the land.

Eventually, however, the Company yielded to pressure from the Colonial Office that a Commission be set up to investigate the reserve question. The Commission was set up in 1913 and submitted its final report in 1915 after extensive travel throughout the country. The conclusion of the Commission was that certain African areas needed enlarging, while others certainly needed to be reduced: their deep conviction was that comparatively, the Africans in the colony had got more land than those in any part of Southern Africa, except the drought-striken Bechuanaland (Gann 1965: 188; c.f. Leys 1959: 10).[1] They argued that the total area of the reserves should be reduced from 20,491,151 to 19,428,691 acres or about one fifth of the country's total extent. The Commissioners further argued that European immigration was inevitable, and the impact of the progressive white community was bound to dislocate the normal process of tribal development. The colonial office accepted the report.

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1. see next page.

The intention of the report clearly was to deprive the Africans of the better part of the land; yet, this was not the end.

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1. Gann (1965:188 fn.1) quotes the following comparative figures for Southern Rhodesia and other territories :

Territory	Acreage per head of population then on Reserves
Pondoland and Transkei	10.2
Bechuanaland and remaining Cape Province	14.4
Zululand and remainder of Natal	13.8
Transvaal	5.1
Orange Free State	2.1
Basutoland (Practically all reserve)	16.5
Southern Rhodesia	50.55

These figures, of course, give only a partial view of the picture; there was little justification for reducing African land. Comparison evades the issue of whether the company was justified in taking a free hand in land alienation, particularly when this land was alienated by force and with no compensation to the Africans, and whether allocation of 1/5 of the total area was commensurate with African needs.

b) The Land Apportionment Act and After.

A Morris Carter Commission was appointed in 1925 to allocate Crown lands not yet sold, between Africans and Europeans. It gave its recommendations in 1929, and the Land Apportionment Bill (1930) was passed, amidst bitter African opposition. The Bill became the Land Apportionment Act (1931). Some 7.5 million acres were allocated to what became known as 'Native Purchase Areas' and some 17.5 million to the European area with the remainder unassigned land. Some of the latter land, mostly sandy soil was later on assigned to the African area. There were subsequent adjustments, but the Europeans remained in a dominant position over the Africans. In 1955 the position of land allocation stood thus (Leys 1959:28) :

	Acres
Native Reserves	20,859,000
Native Purchase Areas	8,039,000
Special Native Areas	9,712,000
European Areas	48,065,000
Unassigned Areas	6,346,000
Undetermined Areas	63,000
Forest Areas	3,123,000
Total	96,213,000

The Native Purchase Areas were designed along the same lines as the reserves : most of them are in the middle and low Veld areas, with poor sandy soils, far from railways and markets or inadequate water supplies. The inequality of land distribution and

its effects on the two racial groups is evident from the fact that of the 250,000 whites only ten per cent are farmers, while the predominant majority of the more than 6 million Africans depend on land, directly or indirectly. Land apportionment lowered the African living standards, and led to the 'development of underdevelopment' of the African rural areas. Besides, as a result of the low wages paid to African workers in towns and mines, most of them were forced to depend on their kinsmen in the rural areas.

Under the Act, urban areas were designated European areas, so that Africans could not own land or property in the towns. The Africans in towns could reside in the premises of their employers or in African "Locations" or "townships". By provision of law, the municipality provides accomodation which employers may rent for their employees; consequently, employers find it cheaper to rent for single rather than family quarters. This arrangement has many disadvantages; the workers are forced to live a barrack life. As a result for some time, there was no stable labour force, and as Leys (1959 : 29) says : "for, although most Africans no longer come merely to earn their tax, their family life must usually be left behind in the Reserves, and naturally, it draws them back again".

Later, the Government adopted a new approach : under the Native Husbandry Act, 1951, it became official policy to work towards a complete system of individual land tenure, as opposed to communal ownership, in the African areas. This Act stipulated that those Africans who wished to own land must live on it and farm it.

The aim of the Act, ostensibly, according to official argument was to create a stable African labour force and also to ensure greater commitment to land by the Africans and to rationalise African agriculture by encouraging individual tenure. In this way, the government hoped to create an African agrarian elite. Because of the contradictions inherent in the policies of the ruling clique, rationalization of African agriculture failed, since differential prices were paid for farm produce, and the African had a limited market. As a result an African agrarian elite could not be created.

c) The Land Tenure Act 1969

Over the years, conflict of interests between the Africans and the Europeans has sharpened, particularly from 1962 onwards when the Rhodesian Front Party, a party committed to white supremacy for all time, came into power. One of the topmost items on the programme of the Rhodesian Front Party was change of land policy, tribalisation of African life and revival of the role of the traditional chiefs. The Government immediately implemented these on coming to power. The 1969 Constitution included the Land Tenure Act which divided the country along new lines, and was designed to replace the Land Apportionment Act.[1] Urban industrial and other areas were declared either European areas or national land, so that Africans in certain areas were physically evicted from their traditional lands, Some Africans refused to move from their land, inspite of incessant harassment by the Government.[2] On November, 1, 1972 an Act was

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1. The Land Divisions were as follows :

European Area	44,952,00 acres
African Area	44,944,500 acres
National Land	6,617,500 acres,

see, Mutiti (1974:275)

2. A very prominent and internationally publicised case is that of Chief Rekayi Tangwena and his people who indomitably defied Government orders to leave their traditional land.

passed in parliament to prevent Africans from patronizing bars and restaurants in white areas after 7.00 p.m. and on Saturday afternoons and Sundays.[1]

II. Labour Supplies

a) In Search of African Labour

The development of the mining industry created a demand for cheap African labour to work in the mines; but there was an acute shortage of African labour in the periods of rising demand, i.e., 1896-1903, 1905-1911, 1916-1919 "owing to the combination of a relatively sluggish response of indigenous Africans to wage employment opportunities and unrealiability of extra territorial sources of labour" (Arrighi 1973a: 183). In securing labour for the growing mining industry the administration had several alternatives : it could increase African wages and improve the working conditions to attract workers, and lure Africans from their lucrative agricultural activities; it could also demand taxes as a way of coercing the Africans to enter the labour market to earn their tax; or it could impose constraints on African agriculture to reduce its profitability and thus raise the economic advantage of entering the labour market; extraterritorial labour was also another alternative, and finally the administration could rely on forced labour (Loney 1975:61; c.f. Gann 1965:173; Arrighi 1967; 1973a and 1973b). All these methods were tried at various stages.

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1. In any case, hotels and restaurants in towns and cities are segregated. Those which are not, are apportioned into two, one for the whites and another one for the blacks. In most cases, however, Africans may be served snacks and soft drinks through slits, specially for them. The 1972 Bill, therefore, merely barred Africans from patronising these places at specified periods.

Native Commissioners used African messengers in a full scale campaign of recruiting labour in African villages. The Resident British commissioner, however, complained that the system was compulsory labour which he equated to slavery. Because of mounting pressure and the need to regularise labour supplies, the British South African Company set up a Native Labour Supply Bureau in 1903 charged with the responsibility of recruiting labour both inside and outside the colony, especially in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The element of compulsion, however, remained : for example, the 1901 Master Servant Act, which excluded white workers, stipulated that an African employee who deserted his employer was subject to fine or imprisonment of upto six months and was obliged to return to his employer after serving the prison sentence.

The labour problem, nevertheless, remained because the Africans were only prepared to take up employment during the dry season when there was no work on their own lands. The labour situation deteriorated when the African agriculturalists began to sell part of their crops in the growing markets: "...the growth of new townships and compounds had the unintended effect of creating a small market for African produce; mine owners, prospectors and even white farmers all bought native grain and meat, thereby helping to 'spoil' their own labour supplies" (Gann 1965:174). Besides, a woman cultivating 2 or 3 acres of land could make as much money as her husband in employment. When the Chamber of Mines recommended the imposition of a uniform poll tax of £2, and 10 shilling for each second wife and above, Milton of the Company argued that there was an undoubted improvement in the African conditions of living. The Imperial authorities, however, did not favour increased African taxation. A certain Catholic priest,

R.P.Richartz, pointed out that increased taxation would almost certainly give rise to African demand for increased wages.

The Company administration then turned to extra-territorial sources of supply of labour in Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Portuguese East Africa, where European enterprise was limited. Consequently, by 1903 3,000 to 4,000 immigrants had come to the country attracted by the exaggerated glorious tales of the whiteman's world, told by unscrupluleus labour recruiters. Writes Gann (1965 : 177)

> Some labour recruiters tried to cash in on rising demands for new commodities by employing unscrupluous characters, white and black, who went around the villages and glibly told the most wonderful tales about high wages, their stories of a new Eldorado down South sometimes resembling perhaps the romantic myths that attracted white pioneers beyond the Limpopo.

Employers also generally preferred workers from far off because they could not desert them easily and could sign for longer periods; but as long as traditional farming provided an alternative, labour instability persisted. Besides, poor working and living conditions discouraged many from entering the labour market.[1] The employers were looking for a working class which could entirely depend on wages, but

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1. Van Onselen (1973) argues that the reason behind labour shortage was "worker consciousness", and demonstrates that "from the very earliest years of capital-intensive industry Africans had a well-developed and demonstrable self-awareness of their positions as exploited workers" (p.238). Their consciousness should be sought in their strategy in the context of the overall functioning of the political ecology and in the day to day responses in work situations (p.39). The conditions in the mines were appalling so that: "For Africans living in the area between the Limpopo and the Zambezi this (worker consciousness and labour strategy) can be seen in their total avoidance of the Rhodesian mines. The 1901-11 Native Affairs Committee noted that in many instances African families would sell stock to meet tax obligations rather than allow kin to seek employment on the mines. Shona communities, in particular, sold grain to meet their legal

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there was no existence of such a proletariat. The only open option was to look far beyong for labour.

As early as 1899 an enterprising doctor had suggested the possibility of recruiting from the West Indies : "intelligent people but not over-fussy about their food, already used to working as far afield as Guiana and Central America, who could do a good day's job for 3/- or 4/-" (Garn 1965 : 177). Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, opposed the idea. Next, the authorities attempted to recruit Somalis and Abyssinians, but the scheme failed because of desertion: other recruits rioted abroad the steamer at Beira when rumours spread that they were to be sold as slaves. The Local British Resident Representative intervened against an attempt to recruit systematically labour from Aden and Southern Arabia. The Foreign Office backed him fully in his objections. In 1903, the Chamber of Mines suggested the recruitment of indentured Indian labourers : but this, too, did not materialise because the Colonial administration in India stipulated that its subjects could only go there on the same terms as the Europeans, and there was indication that the Indian community already in the country was being subjected to various forms of discrimination. The last alternative was to import indentured. labour from China. At a Special meeting, Colonel Raliegh Gray, Chairman of the Salisbury Chamber of Mines argued that Rhodesia lacked both labour and capital, and that the Rhodesian gold industry was to complete with the wealthier Witwatersrand (South Africa) which, too, was about to

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contd. from last page.../ obligations, and so avoided mine labour. It was not until well in the 1920s that Rhodesian Africans were sufficiently proletarianized for them to form a majority of black mine employees (Van Onselen 1973:241).

import indentured labour. He gave the assurance that the Chinese that the Chinese would be repatriated at the expiration of their contracts. According to him, the country might face starvation unless some action was taken to supplement the inadequate African labour supply.

But the European contractors and skilled artisans strongly opposed the recruitment of Chinese whom they feared would eventually take up their jobs. Consequently :

> A sharp class cleavage began to open up within the European population itself, the Rhodesian anti-Chinese campaign running parallel with a similar movement in South Africa which opposed the employment of industrial Chinese workmen on the Witwatersrand (Gann 1965 :176).[1]

Though the Chartered Company sympathised with the mine-owners the Resident British Commissioner opposed the entry of the Chinese, arguing that the conditions would improve with the completion of the railways, and when the Africans got used to mining.[2] The mine-owners were further urged to make conditions in the mines attractive since shortage of labour was more acute in some mines than in others.[3]

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1. See also, Arrighi (1967; 1973a) for a discussion of these alternatives and the reaction of the white artisans.

2. Labour recruitment from certain parts of the world to others was not confined to the colony of Southern Rhodesia alone; there were many other instances, e.g., indentured Indian labour was used on South African plantations, especially in Natal; in the construction of railways in East Africa; in rubber plantations in Malaya, and also in places like Mauritius etc. That recruitment of labour into Zimbabwe failed was a historical accident and should not be taken as the consistent rule of British imperial policy.

3. See, Van Onselen (1973) for a discussion of the reasons that led to labour shortage in some and not all mines.

The labour problem, however, persisted, and the authorities were compelled, willy-nilly to make some reforms. Two general opinions prevailed as solution; one of improving the recruiting conditions and the other of ameliorating the conditions of life of workers on the mines. Several laws were passed obliging labour agents to get proper licences, and attempts were made to set up a proper recruiting organisation. A Labour Board (1900) was set up to serve the whole country for procuring labour. The Board, however, ran into financial difficulties since it had to complete with recruiters from Transvaal who could offer better wages. Some improvement was achieved with the setting up of the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (1903) which received Government funds. Recruitment was extended to Northern Rhodesia and recruits were issued with food, blankets, jerseys and other facilities on the way, while the "rejected" workmen got sufficient ration and compensation. The Bureau got much of its labour from outside, with only a third being local recruits.[1]

Working and living conditions in the mines were bad, and

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1. Gann (1965 : 179 : 179 f.n. 3) quotes the following figures for 1919 :

Local (Rhodesia)		10,689
Portugues Territories		6,116
N.W.Rhodesia	Northern Rhodesia	4,436
N.W.Rhodesia		4,854
Nyasaland		5,074
Others		1,551
	Total	32,720

the incidence of disease and death starkingly high,[1] because the diet and welfare of the workers were ignored. At one time the mortality rate of the mine workers was as high as 7% : as a result, the mine authorities came under heavy attack from the chartered company headquarters in London as well as from the imperial authorities. Though certain measures were taken, it would be misleading to say that conditions improved, for in reality, the conditions remained unattractive with low wages and no regard for family life in the mine compunds.[2]

But because of sheer economic necessity, more and more Africans were forced to take up wage employment. In 1926 the total number of Africans in wage employment had risen to 172,000 and of this total 96,000 were from outside (Loney 1975 :63) which indicates

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1. Gann (1965 :150 f.n. 1 gives the following death figures for the period 1903-1904 during which period 282 Africans died on the mines :

Pneumonia	113
Scurvy	42
Malaria	24
Malaria and Scurvy	16
Peritonitis	2
Dysentry	24
dropsy	1
beriberi	3
peripheral neuritis	4
Senility	1
Other Cases	50

2. Bad working and living conditions were not a peculiarity of the mine and urban centres in Zimbabwe alone, but seem to have been also prevalent in South Africa and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). Doxey (1971) points out that the conditions in South African mine compounds were bad and the white artisan classes imported from abroad campaigned to keep a disparity between black and white wages.

the unpreparedness of the indigenous Africans to enter the labour market. In 1946 the number had risen to 363,000 and 203,000 were still migrant workers.

When the African workers began to enter the labour market, the white workers felt threatened and so they sought measures which would bar Africans from competing with them.

b) Discrimination Against African Workers.

Though the Government felt the great need to create a stable community of African workers, and an attempt was made to provide family accommodation, and in some cases it became possible for Africans to buy lease-hold on very long leases, there were, however, no age-old pensions and the differential wage structure left much to be desired. The colour bar received legal expression in the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1934 : this Act set up a machinery for settling disputes, and it provided that when agreements were reached between employers and employees they should become legally binding on the industry concerned. The Africans were specifically excluded from the definition of 'worker' under this Act which, in effect, barred them from available skilled employment and from enjoying the same salaries as white workers.

This policy created artificial scarcity of skilled labour which had to be employed from outside, rather than being recruited and trained from among the Africans. Immigrant white labour was/is attracted by exceedingly higher wages than can be earned in the countries from which it is imported. The European artisan consequently is brought into the country as a privileged worker and

guards his position against African workers. A Bill introduced in 1955 to establish recognized African Trade Unions met with stiff opposition from white Trade Unions, and it seemed for some time as though European Trade Unions might rather accept Africans into their own Trade Unions than tolerate African organizations. By 1958 this had failed.

The low wages paid to the Africans in the (pre 1950s) served to increase the profits of the white employers, and hence to create a surplus for investment as well as for keeping in operation many farms and businesses, which might have gone bankrupt with higher wages. Cheap labour was, infact, crucial to the economy of the country as a whole. Apart from the imposition of the hut tax and subsequently the poll tax, which forced Africans into the cash economy, whites gained substantially from the underdevelopment of African agriculture achieved by land alienation. Besides, the Africans were stimulated to join the labour market by the penetration of the African markets by "European products", for which they needed cash. The Africans also began to respond to the money economy, generally.

The low wages paid to the Africans were often defended on the grounds that Africans were only temporary residents in towns, and their wages were "pocket money" to supplement their kinsmen's subsistence farming in rural areas. Because the Africans were restricted to unskilled work, and because white artisans prevented African workers from competing with them, white wages were bolstered.

The educational system of the country, too, served to entrench white interests by training unskilled African workers. The

Government insisted that African school pupils be taught industrial work for at least 4 hours a day to prepare them to enter the labour market.

It can, then, be correctly argued that in Zimbabwe race relations and concomitant problems hinge on the economic : the Land Appertionment Act (1931), the Industrial Coçciliation Act, (1934) the Land Husbandry Act (1951) and the Land Tenure Act (1969) served to legalise and entrench a pattern of social and economic organisation already there. Legalisation of racial discrimination and segregation sought to protect and perpetuate white economic interests. On this, the policy of 'separate development' stands. The policy of "separate development' was buttressed by certain ideological rationalisations and stereotypes prevalent among the Europeans towards the Africans.

CHAPTER FOUR

IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF DISCRIMINATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

To understand the social reality in Zimbabwe, it is necessary to take into account the role of ideology in the formulation of the policy that has been called "separate development". The policies of racial discrimination are expressed by the Government as "seperate development"; and, informally, in the common stereotypes and attitudes[1] of the European community towards the Africans. This ideology, however, it must be emphasised again, is rooted in the economic base of society.

There is no doubt that some of the white settlers who had lived in South Africa for sometime prior to migrating to Zimbabwe brought with them certain attitudes and stereotypes about Africans. The missionary travellers, with their sensational stories, had also painted a distorted picture of the African. But also equally important is that the initial contact between the Africans and the whites was violent, culminating in the 1896-97 war in which the Africans suffered defeat. The initial reluctance of the Africans to enter the labour market evoked an adverse feeling of African laziness from the whites.

Though the chief source of quarrel was competetion for economic and political power ideas began to be expressed in other forms: those of cultural differences. At a point in time, the white

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1. I have decried the study of attitudes ! My main point was that we gain little by the study of attitudes; we can perhaps understand better the validity or invalidity of attitudes as manifestations of the crises of a system. We can understand these attitudes by studying the total situation. The scholars' task is to differentiate between myth and reality.

began to regard himself as materially and morally superior to the blackman: as a consequence, he derided the culture, religion and habits of life of the African and sought to superimpose his own. As the white Americans had obliterated any trace of the Negro slave's history and sense of the past, so too, did the white colonists attempt to do the same in Zimbabwe. This failed, however, because the African was still deeply rooted in his setting, history and ideas, and could easily fall back upon his past ; the level of social development of the Africans, besides, was not as low as the whites alleged. Though colonialism was followed by a period of temporary "shock" the African could not be completely uprooted unlike the Negro slaves who suffered a 'double shock' , of being transported from their homelands and being enslaved abroad. Though the African traditional order in Zimbabwe began to break, it could not be obliterated for the centre held on; the African synthesised his own experience with the European's experience.

Because the African did not totally yield to the alien system, he was regarded by the whites as incorrigible and uncivilised. When the African recovered from his stage of temporary shock, he began to reassert himself as an African ; and this became a chief source of moral consternation among the whites. I am emphesising this point because it is in no way insignificant to the understanding of race relations in Zimbabwe; because for quite sometime, whites justified their rule on the grounds of their alleged superiority. Even Imperial authorities usually argued in paternalistic tone, that the Africans were being prepared to rule themselves, and it would be tragic

to give them independence before they were prepared for it.

The Basis of European Attitudes and Ideas

The not too distant imperialist origin of 'Rhodesia' as a modern political entity shapes most ideas prevalent among the Europeans in the country : the picture of original settlers, the Pioneer Column and the conflicts of 1893 and 1896 are still very much alive among both Africans and the Europeans (Leys 1959; 241). The defeat of the Africans by the Europeans has opposite effects for the two groups ; for the Europeans it is a source of both pride and suspicion; while for the Africans it is one of fury and embitterment. Public attitudes among the Europeans are influenced by the original notion of the settlers, of displacing all existing African institutions and culture and replacing them with a modern state based on the west European model. Linked to this notion was the idea that the African was to be kept in his "proper place", by force if necessary: the African was only useful as a reservoir of cheap labour for the whiteman. Besides, the original vision of an Eldorado has never died down; Rhodesia was to be a great country in Africa, a shining example of western Christian civilisation, the standards of which had to be maintained at all costs. Till today, Rhodesian whites cling to these ideas with blind tenacity; for them, Rhodesia is their country, and they are there to stay.[1]

With the passage of time, however, purely racist attitudes towards the African have become obsolete ; no one any longer sustains

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1. White Rhodesians, especially the descendants of the pioneers, are prepared to shed their sweat and blood in equally the same way as the Zimbabweans are doing. Though this group is a minority, it is certainly a strong minority. The unreal world in which the whiteman lives is beginning to be broken by the forces of African liberation.

the argument that Africans are biologically inferior to the Europeans. The majority of Europeans have become consciously aware of what is at stake, though they still shield behind certain vague ideological beliefs.[1] At a certain point in time, however, European attitudes towards Africans were shaped by what was considered, then, to be the African's backwardness, measured by the degree to which they could not think, live and behave like Europeans.[2] The European pattern of life was conveniently equated with civilization, while the pattern of African life was considered to be uncivilised. These stereotypes, being more powerful than facts, helped to reinforce solidarity among the whites, against the Africans whom they collectively considered barbaric. For instance, in the 1950s the Citizen (24 February 1956) could argue that :

> Because the native African is not clean enough, physically, to make social intercourse with him pleasant or even hygienically safe ; because he does not possess the familiar attributes of the civilized which enable the civilized to acquire these useful powers which enable them to manipulate a knife and a fork or use a handkerchief; because he does not care enough about the scientific principles

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1. Today, however, when the Zimbabwe war of national liberation is regaining, whites no longer speak in racist or paternalistic terms, they are more blunt ; they want and must stay in the country. Though Ian Smith, the Premier of the Rhodesian Government repeatedly insists that the whites must safeguard the European standards of civilisation, he is painfully aware that what he in reality means is that whites must preserve their economic, political and social privileges.

2. C.f. P.A. Baran and P.M. Sweezy (1973).

> of common hygiene which would enable him to keep himself free of vermin; because he often has venereal disease (quoted by Leys 1959:261-62). (1).

Some other traits attributed to the Africans are laziness, idleness, irresponsibility and inefficiency. An obvious intention of such stereotypes is to provide a rationale for differential wages paid to the two groups, and to justify the use of the African primarily as a source of cheap labour, on which the prosperity of the economy rests. These stereotypes are meant to gratify the local whites and to convince the outside world of the rationality of the Rhodesian system . Such assertions, far removed from reality, do not take into account that the settler-colonial system obstructs African advancement at every stage: or that the Africans are not given the necessary facilities to train and acquire skills, and are not provided sufficient and healthy social amenities as incentives to make them good and efficient workers. Over a long period, the whites expected the African to accept this stereotype of his image.

As the African began to consciously break that image, the whites were petrified, and for a time, they regarded those Africans who voiced out as deviants, or spoiled children.[1] The African who

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1. Frankly, one finds it difficult to take such kind of arguments very seriously, for it is reflection of a sick mind and borders on the superstitious. The danger, however, is that such ideas which emanate from flimsy thinking, are institutionalised and become government policy. One notable point that must be made is that similar stereotypes were used by the upper classes against the working class in Britain, and probably elsewhere ; one can, thus, only conclude that such ideas are of middle class origin.

14. Paternalistic attitudes were, paradoxically, rife among the lower class whites, those whose positions were threatened by African advancement, because they had everything to lose from African competition.

had gone abroad or who had fought in the Second World War, began to see reality through the proper perespective.[1] A great store of energy was laid on stressing that the African must be taught to remain in his proper place and accept his subservient role. The first signs of incipient African political agitation produced embittered feelings; and when the African began to demand equal terms, white paternalism was deeply hurt. Take the following from the 1950s :

> The original good manners of the Black people are almost non existent in the present generation, and the state acting through the appropriate authorities must undertake a strong campaign to reestablish respect by insisting on good behaviour.

An M.P. had the following to say :

> We have not the respect from the African that we had 30 years ago when I came to this country. It may be inevitable: I do not know.

Feeling of antipathy sharpened further in the 1950s when the Federal Government, with its policy of "partnership" brought some Africans as M.Ps., into Parliament. In Parliament African M.Ps., were repeatedly told that complete integration was impossible, because the average African was primitive and uncultured, and that standards could not be lowered for the sake of uplifting the African. Clearly, what was at stake was defending the European's established position in the country against the emerging African and ,"this discrediting stereotype which he (the white) is apt to have of them (the Africans) is the same as that which previleged classes have had of leaders of the less privileged at other times and places" (Leys 1959 : 268).

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1. See, for instance, Ndabaningi Sithole (1957) for a telling discussion on the impact of the war on the Africans who went to fight.

There are also antipathetic feelings against Asians and coloureds.[1] The only mitigating factor in their case is that both Asians and coloureds are small minority groups, and whites do not feel threatened in speculating about the political future.[2] At one stage, however, bitterness was open expressed by the white public when a Pakistan Trade Commissioner, Squadron Leader Akram, wanted to send his son to a European school in the 1950s. Because of diplomatic embarassement, the federal Government had to intervene, and urge the school to override the objections of white parents (Leys 1959 : 278). Similar instances of embarassment took place in South Africa when Malawi sent its Ambassador, Kachingwe, to South Africa, and his children had to be sent to white schools.

The point is, the whites living in constant and permanent fear and suspicion, feel threatened by even a slight measure of

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1. Coloureds in Rhodesia and South Africa are people of mixed parentage; usually between a European man and an African woman and any member of a fairer race.

2. The confrontation in Zimbabwe is principally between the Africans and the Europeans; Asians and Coloureds have largely been left out of the conflict,. However, once in a while African nationalist parties have called upon the two minority groups to make their political choice; for instance, the Zimbabwe News (Vol 8, No. 9, Sept. 1974) called upon the Coloureds to decide their political future. In urban areas, Indian shops have also been targets of attack when there are riots. A small number of Asians and Coloureds have sided with the Africans, but the majority have remained apathetic, and even preferring the status quo, perhaps because of their business interests. This is unlike in South Africa where both Indians and Coloureds have contributed to the struggle. Curiously enough, in the queer terminology of Rhodesia, for political purposes Coloureds and Asians are called "Europeans".

concessions given to the Africans. They realise that any relaxation is bound to break the filimsy pillars upon which this irrational system supports itself.

When African advancement became a living reality, and the African had recovered from his period of temporary shock, a greater need to formalise segregation arose. After World War II there was a pretence of abandoning the policy of "separate development" in order to fit into the scheme of the proposed Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which came into being in 1953. The racial policy of Southern Rhodesia was causing much apprehension, and had hindred progress towards federation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland where the small European community practiced relatively little discrimination.

Even during the federation, however, a strong opinion still persisted that economic and material progress should come before political development ; or, that there should be economic advancement but not handing over of power to the Africans. Pronouncement of official policy were still made in Starkingly paternalistic tones. Consider Sir Godfrey Huggins' declaration in 1950 :

> We are anxious to build up this country on the basis of a partnership between the various races, not to use colour as a test of a man's ability and culture. We can only develop and hold this country as partners. In the present stage of development, it is difficult for some people to realise this, and because of the stage of development of the backward people it is not easy for outside observers to realise that we believe in such a policy and are attempting to carry it out. (Quoted in Leys 1959 : 272).

Undoubtedly, this was meant for external consumption, as a plea that the settlers meant good in the country. Huggins is notoriously

quoted to have advanced the view that "partnership" in his understanding meant that the Africans must begin as junior partners and sweat their way to the top: at certain times, "partnership" began to be interpreted as the relationship between the rider (the white) and the horse (the African). In the long run, partnership assumed different connotations and conveyed different impressions to different people, with an equally vague meaning : not implying "equality" and not implying "subordination" either. This indeed was the intention : one meaning for the outside world, and another for the people in the country, or the actual practice.

Equally important in the whiteman's view of good life is the notion of standards often used in conjunction with "civilisation". Successive European Governments have argued that African progress must be evaluated in the light of these principles. Even today, many of the politicians of the federation vintage woke these principles in asserting the justification of white rule. The term "standard" has its origin in the 1930s period when "standard" was used to justify economic segregation and discrimination on the grounds that African low-living standards should not be allowed to threaten those of the Europeans. The word has thus had continuous use, in justifying economic and political segregation; the Africans have not come of age, and can only be treated fairly when they satisfy the European standard of measure. The standards that must be fulfilled are "European standards" "standard of civilisation both in social life and in government", "knowledgeable government of justice and integrity" which are contrasted with demogogy, corruption, financial incompetence

and social stagnation which are alleged to be typified by countries north of the Zambezi river (Leys 1959 : 276).[1]

When the Rhodesian Front Party came into power at the end of 1962, it revived and implemented the idea of separate development along the lines of South African Apartheid. Completely barring Africans from most social amenities like hotels, swimming pools, schools and others which Europeans patronised except under special provision. Politically, the R.F. sought to revive the institution of the traditional chief, and drafted some of them into parliament under the 1969 Constitution; early in 1976 some of them were made cabinet ministers. Ironically, all the four 'senator chief' Cabinet ministers held the same portifolio of Minister of Tribal'Development' !

Arguments against social intercourse between the races are based on the ground that races have different customs and habits; and it is often argued that both the Africans and the Europeans do not favour mixing, and that if they did, this would be detrimental to the development of the cultures and lives of the races. "Separate development" as envisaged by the Rhodesian Front Party advocates that different races should be allowed to develop along their own lines; and that integration would not be conductive to this idea. The idea of "separate development" has been spread by the government with a lot of funfare and pomp, though its success has been limited primarily because the Africans are determined to share the wealth and amenities in the country equally.

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1. Smith, the Premier of Rhodesia, has taken pains to point out coups, political unrest and poverty in other African countries as evidence that handling over power to the Africans in Zimbabwe leads to anarchy and stagnation. Only recently, on Sept. 16, 1976, Frost, the Cheirman of the Rhodesian Front Party is quoted by BBC (The World Today) to have maintained that the whites are determined to preserve white Christian

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Discrimination and segregation, however, are successful in social relations between the races, since the races are physically segregates in residential, educational, health, religious and other social amenities. Social contacts are minimal, primarily confined to controlled situations like work and other business situations. An African comes into contact with Europeans either as a domestic servant, in which the relationship is of the master-servant type, or as an employee, in an office, factory of farm in which the manager or 'boss' is a European. Very little informal contact is ever possible. The Africans and Europeans, are born, grow up, live and die in segregated areas.[1] Even in national services like the army and the police force, there are separate residential health and social amenities. An African police sub-inspector, though senior in rank to a white constable, gets a lower salary and has less powers than a white constable. Clearly, segregation and discrimination pervade the entire social structure, top to bottom and cut across all social relations. Where chances to meet on equal terms arise, what is called "racial violence" flares up.[2]

The Consequences of White Rule on the Africans

a) The Rural scene

In Zimbabwe, like in the rest of Africa, as a result of the

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civilisation and not 'anarchy' as outside Rhodesia. This alarmist propaganda is meant to convince the western world that Rhodesia is fighting a war against "Communist influence" in Africa

1. See, Fanon (1972) for a discussion on discrimination in colonial societies.

2. "racial violence" is a common phenomenon of racially, segregated societies like the United States, South Africa and Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, one of the rare chances when Europeans and Africans meet is sport competitions, especially football, whenever

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biased policy of the colonial rulers the situation during the colonial period is marked by "acute and worsening poverty" (Davidson 1971 :83) which characterised colonial rule elsewhere. In previous chapters we discussed the Land Apportionment Act, the Land Husbandry Act and the Industrial and Conciliation Act from the historico-economic view point without actually looking at the human problems resulting from such legislations.

Overall, the plight of the African has progressively deteriorated, particularly because he has now been irrevocably drawn into the international capitalist economic system. In the rural areas, for instance, there are no longer any self-sufficient villages existing independently of the entire society. New needs, aspirations and problems have come about, which must be looked at, fulfilled and solved in terms of the modern world. Education, health services, tax obligations to the state and clothes must all the paid for in cash, and this demands the availability of money. Two alternatives to meet these demands present themselves before the individual : either to work the land which must be able to produce enough for subsistence and surplus for cash to meet the other obligations, or to sell one's labour in the labour markets. But in Zimbabwe these two alternatives are closely interlinked, and they are not alternatives,

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African and European teams are contesting, the chances of rioting are extremely high, and bitter frenzy finds expression in violence At the multi-racial University of Rhodesia, the relations between students of different races cannot be said to be cordial, especially because the majority of white students may support the government, while the Africans are unreservedly opposed to government. In such a situation, room for political discussion is absent.

in the final analysis: one seeks employment in the urban or mining centres in order to supplement one's means of livelihood. The majority of Africans cannot be regarded as gainfully employed; only the incipient elite of professionals earns enough to be entirely independent of the rural areas.[1]

As white interests became more entrenched the process of underdevelopment was set into motion, leading to the breakdown of the subsistence economy. As soon as mining failed and lost its initial attraction, white settlers gradually turned their attention to agriculture. Consequently, African land was appropriated and the African was moved to infertile land with poor rainfall and far away from the rail and road communication systems. As Davidson (1970 : 84) comments about Africa as a whole :

> "Devaluation of the rural economy, coupled with the migrant labour system, and the enclosure of land by Europeans had reached a point of continental crisis from which no colonial policy-maker could see a clear escape".

Life simply began to deteriorate in the villages, but the African could no longer see his life in any other terms except within the universe of the imposed colonial order.

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1. Even the elites still have kinship obligations to people most of whom live below subsistence level in the rural areas: these obligations are not the result of traditionalism, but economic imperatives, because one must educate one's brothers and sisters. The educated working man realises beyond doubt that he managed to be educated because of the sacrifice that others had to make to see him through school, in turn, he does the same. As a result, though earning a handsome salary, in economic terms this money is shared by many people.

Rural poverty and starvation were, besides, augmented by the type of economic priorities enforced by the white ruling class. Since the ruling class saw economic development in terms of international trade, their emphasis was on these agricultural products for export, and not for local consumption. Numerous African examples come to mind, but the ones that stand out clearly are cocoa in Ghana and tobacco in Zimbabwe. Tobacco and cotton did not, in fact, bring immediate benefit - if at all - to the African, except to those who were employed as poorly-paid wage labour.[1] Because of the contradictory policy, of land apportionment (and the consequences involved) on the one hand, and the aim of trying to create an African middle class on the other, the Government failed to rationalise African agriculture : the land apportionment achieved its intended effect, of forcing Africans to join the labour market, but an African middle class could not be created because of opposition from the white farmers (Loney 1975). Instead of creating the necessary incentive to make farming an attractive and profitable activity, or commercialising it, the government set differential price scales for African and European farm produce and gave the Africans poor land, thus foreclosing the possibility of profitable and viable African agriculture. At any rate, a good policy would have required that the Government advance intial capital to work and develop the land, buy high-yield seeds, fertilisers and farm implements to ensure

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1. It is not being argued that export products were not economically beneficial, for they were; the point is, an export-oriented economy in the long run stagnates since it fails to create an internal market which is one of the prerequistes for a self-generating economy and for development. A sound economic policy should also give priority to food production.

high productivity. In the absence of this willingness on the part of the government, the so-called African Purchase Areas deteriorated into subsistence farming. Agriculture in the African Purchase Areas could not expand, since it was noneconomic and the African farmer could not have any surplus to save for development of his land.

Rural poverty, coupled with the demands of the new economic order, led to an exodus from the villages to the towns and mines of many able-bodied men; the villages were thus left to the care of the very young and the old. Though this was initially the intention of the white rulers, the Government failed to cope with this migration when the Africans began to overflow into the towns. As has already been seen, it was not only the worer from Zimbabwe who flood employment centres in search of jobs, there were also workers from the northern territories as well as from Mozambique.[1] The movement of workers from one territory to another was almost continental in nature. Commente Davidson about the migrant labour system :

> Borders and frontiers, closed or open, made no difference to this ceaseless movement of men in search of wages : the sheer need to earn money (initially to pay taxes, afterwards to ensure survival of their families) drove them across every obstacle...This many sided movement, repeated year by year, has had profound social consequences; and none of them can be said to have been good. One has been to hasten the decline of rural areas where overpopulation had not been a cause of poverty.
> (Davidson 1971 : 87).

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1. The system of migrant labour had bad consequences : workers from the northern territories were prepared--in many cases--to receive lower wages then theindegenous Zimbabweans, because job opportunities were even fewer in the north. Generally, the majority of mine and farm working force is non-indigenous even today.

A Senior Youth Extension Officer in the Department of Conservation and Extension in the Rhodesian Government is forced to admit that :

> ...production in the tribal areas has dropped to such a low level that the majority of able-bodied men have been forced to seek employment in the towns and in the adjascent European areas in order to provide the necessities of life for their families. Management of land, therefore, in many cases, devolves on the aged, the infirm, the women and the youth. Little wonder that the Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia are, today in their present parlous state (Daviel White-Spunner 1969:2).

It might be added that the conditions have deteriorated so much that school leavers, boys and girls, go to the towns immediately they complete school, because the rural areas simply offer no prospects. An economist in the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Rhodesia, found it expedient to admit that one of the causes of the problems, inter alia, was

> "The African has no access to commercial credit because he cannot offer the recognized forms of security, he is too remote and his individual needs are too small. Thus, without the ability to purchase the raw materials necessary for good farming there exists a vicious circle of low yields, low income, no savings, inability to purchase the necessary requisites and hence low yields again. (Hunt : 1969:3).

Besides the poor economic situation in the rural areas, health, educational and other facilities are lacking. Consequently, disease is still rife in the rural areas; and there are many dropouts at the primary school level, and since the school leavers cannot be gainfully employed, and since they are not entitled to land of their own, the youth migrates to the towns.

The Urban Scene

The urban social order, imposed upon the African society, became another scene in which the African enacted his life. Men went there in search of employment and new opportunities, but the town and city were cold and grim. The differential wage structure discrimination in job opportunities, the unwillingness of the settler regime to train a skilled African personnel, segregated residential and recreational amenities and the overall inhuman conditions under which the Africans had to live, alienated the African. The money a man came in search of was simply not forthcoming. A townsman could not save enough to help his kinsmen in the villages. He could not life with his family in the towns or educate his children there. Such a man could work in town for months or years, but still retained living links with the village, at best he was "subsidizing rural poverty" or "merely surviving as individuals" (Davidson 1971:88). In many cases the rural areas subsidized a man working in the town.[1] In many cases the rural areas subsidized a man working in the town. The harshness of the situation rarely produced men who became components of the new industrial system,[2] these men simply became men of two

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1. In fact, many people go to get grain and other kinds of foodstuff from their wives or parents in the villages over the weekends, either because their salaries cannot sustain them, or because they can not sustain them if they have to send cash to their kinsmen.

2. In time, of course, the African has come to terms with his existence in the towns. The Land Husbandry Act 1951 dispossessed those Africans living away from the villages of their land, in a bid to create a permanent urban African population. The problem, however, could not be solved because African urban wages remained low.

worlds--literally speaking. They worked in the cities as long as they must, with no commitment to the social order.

Apart from low wages and discrimination, the conditions of living are poor in the African section of the town, which make living in the town not an alternative but a compulsion. Poor health facilities and congestion leads to disease like T.B., V.D., being common. Most of these diseases are often unattended until it was too late; and when they were finally attended the men had already become unfit to work in the mines and towns; so, he had to go back to his village where he died after spreading the disease.[1] Besides poor wages, there is acute shortage of accommodation. Since the authorities originally planned in terms of single men; the accommodation provided, thus, in many cases forbids men from living with their wives and children, and where they do, they live under conditions of extreme congestion. People are, then forced to live an imposed bachelor life in barrack conditions. The salaries were calculated on the basis of a single man, with no obligation to kin. Clearly, such conditions do not present a viable alternative to an African man (and woman) and he can not find roots and permanency with his family in the town. Chances of prosperity, progress and full expression in the urban order are

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1. This, inspite of the regime's pompous claim of having the best medical facilities in Africa, north of the Limpopo! The Rhodesian regime applies double-standards; one for the whites, another one for the Africans.

slim indeed.[1]

Apart from sheer economic imperatives, government laws prevent certain categories of people from living in the cities ; for instance, because all residents in the cities must be registered, an unregistered African child (normally resident in villages) is not entitled to live with his parents and is not entitled to educational and health facilities in the municipal areas. Except with special permission, a mother or father from the villages may not visit their son or daughter residing in the city.[2]

Prostitution, juvenile delinquency, drunkenness and a breakdown of the moral order are the result of such difficult social and economic conditions in the towns. The African thus lives an alienated life, in which he has no choice, and no power to effect changes except in terms of protesting, against the difficult conditions. But the Africans cannot be said to have accepted their situation.

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1. The number of permanent African residents in the urban areas has increased manyfold over the years, because of prevailing rural poverty and lack of alternatives. Yet practically all of the Africans in the cities and mining centres and underpaid workers, existing on the periphery of the poverty line; in any case, differential wage-scales cannot be defended on any ground. See Bettison (1959) for an authoritative discussion on the poverty-datum line in Central African urban areas, during the colonial period.

2. See 'Zimbabwe News' (vol.5 No.9, Sept. 1970:16-18) for a telling account from the African point of view, of the plight of the African in the city, especially the human problems involved. Because of the 'pass laws' which requires every male above 16 years of age to carry a Registration certificate, the regime is able to control the movement of Africans from one region to another. A person may not visit another area without the prior express permission of his employer or of the District Commissioner in the case of villagers.

The two factors, of European attitudes towards the Africans as destined to serve the whiteman and of the harsh conditions under which the Africans have had to live, have produced a potent political conflict, based upon racial group solidarity. To the extent that the Africans are and look at themselves as an oppressed group, and the whites consider themselves and are considered by the Africans as a privileged and oppressiong group, the two groups oppose each other in terms of racial feelings. Group solidarity is thus formed, and achieved, on the bases of race and interests. Since, however, the overriding factor is, according to my argument, economic, the economic interests of the different groups must be examined. Ideological justification of white rule is based on material facts, and the plight of Africans is the result of material deprivation; hence the material factor more than anything cuts across these relationships. This will become evident from the various classes and their interests.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE FRAME OF CLASS CONFRONTATION

Prior to European occupation and settlement, the social system in Zimbabwe was relatively undifferentiated. The colonial order imposed its own social structure, its system of stratification, and institutions upon the colonised people. The impact of the alien social order on the indigenous system has been of profound consequences. Though we have reviewed the historical-economic aspects of the colonial situation in Zimbabwe, certain questions remain unanswered.. The "pluralist thesis" postulates that a plural society is created out of the contact of different races, and cultures which produce "social and cultural pluralism" (Smith 1969). My contention has been that the "pluralists" state the obvious, and little that is of relevance is gained from their perspective. "Pluralists" skirt the real issues involved in what is called "culture contact", or in the colonial encounter, because their frame of reference are "race" and "culture". They do not raise the right questions, and therefore, do not offer valid analysis. It has consistently been maintained that colonialism should be the frame of reference, and not race or ethnicity which, admittedly, are important factors, but by no means the most important.

Since race relations are not a unique feature of colonial or settler societies, other categories must be introduced into the argument. The question is : whether what we are talking about is "Race" and "Ethnicity", or Colonialism and Class? Perspectives to this problem are as varied as there are ideological persuasions.

Apart from the "pluralist perepective", some other approaches use the framework of "social stratification", or the perspective of clase, development and underdevelopment. The latter perspective will imply adopting the "colonial-capitalist" model perspective, examining the relationship of the racial groups within the colonial social system.

Race Relations in Comparative Perspective

In relation to African populations there are three common types of "multi-racial" or "plural societies", all of which owe much for their formation to certain historical conditions. The first is the one in which "Negro" slaves were imported from Africa and introduced to work on plantation and mines e.g., in the West Indies, the United States and Brazil. Though the origin of these societies is the same, the type of race relations there have changed now because of different objective historical conditions. In the West Indies, for exemple, different ethnic groups are now living together harmoniously, enjoying almost the same status in which discrimination - economic and political - is almost absent. On the other hand, in the United States though the former slaves are now legally free the Black Americans are still at the bottom of society and are discriminated against in economic and political life. Being a powerless minority, however, the Black Americans have not been able up to now to bring about any change in their favour. Frustration in economic and political life leads to what is called "racial conflict" The underlying causes of this conflict are the material conditions

which result in the struggle for the control of economic and political resources. These conflicts are merely the reflection of the material conditions. Whether it is the separatist atavistic Black Muslim Movement which demands a "Black Nation" within White America or the Black Power Movement looking at issues in a broader and more enlightened way, the central issue is principally a struggle for power, a reflection of the crises in American Society.

The second type of "plural society" is the one in which former colonial subjects come to the former metropolitan/colonial country during and after the colonial era in pursuit of better economic chances, which are or they believe are not available in the former colony. Their aim is acquisition of wealth, with the possible intention of going back "home" to settle after making enough money. These minority immigrant groups meet with resistance from the 'native' population who feel deprived of their jobs by the outsiders. Patterson (1965) in a study of West Indian immigrants in London, found that most of them came to earn money and expected to go back to the West Indies. The relationship between the immigrants and their hosts is affected by the colonial history in which the black people were a subservient group and had been painted at home and abroad in unfavourable light.

The third type of "plural society" is the white settler societies like South Africa and Zimbabwe where a minority racial group conquered and settled amidst an overwhelming majority of natives. The motives behind settlement were economic and these

interests were reinforced in the political and social life. The struggle between the 'natives' and the settlers is primarily economic, though it sometimes assumes racial dimensions.

The central issue at the heart of the conflicts or struggles between racial groups is the economic factor. In any case, struggle for power has to do with the control and distribution of resources. Those who advocate racist ideas and effectively practice racialism are those who wield political and military power, the reverse has never been true. Study of the colonial situation must thus be validity based upon a thorough analysis of the power relations of the different groups in a given society. Ideology, attitudes and facts are not independent variables, they are rooted in the economic and historical conditions of a given society.[1] These societal conditions must form the framework on which analysis is based.

Social Stratification

A possible way of examining colonial relations is from the perspective of stratification. The most notable structural feature in Zimbabwe is racial stratification. There are two main distinct strata which generally coincide with the two main racial groups :

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1. My impression is not that 'ethnic problems' do not exist in countries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Kenya and etc., the argument is that the colonial history of these societies, the economic positions that groups hold during or after the colonial period, cause these 'ethnic problems'. The characteristic uneven development under colonialism for instance, led to the development of certain regions and sections of the society of the native population at the expense of others, and these privileged sections took over power after the demise of colonialism.

there are also intermediary strata, embracing racial groups - the Indian and coloureds. Within each racial group there may also be several strata, conforming to class, status and other social categories. In a study of black and white rural elites in Zimbabwe, Weinrich (1973) categorises different classes and their prestige ranks both among the Africans and among the Europeans, by examining the professional classes.

On the macro-level it would be interesting to compare 'race-stratification' with the caste system'. Superficially, there are some similarities between the two systems on several levels : for instance, the 'pure' and 'impure' approximates the 'white' and the 'black' groups. Social relations between the two racial groups are based on social avoidance : the Africans are considered the 'lower caste' destined to serve the Europeans. Besides, there are many social taboos, like sanctions against interracial marriages, interracial dinings and segregated residential areas. As in the caste system, the birth criterion is important; the African cannot hope to achieve the status attached to being white, and social mobility and life chances are determined by racial affliction .[1] Even if they acquired the necessary skills Africans cannot hope or expect to be recruited into certain jobs exclusively reserved for the whites. Mobility thus, depends primarily upon birth and ascription : or according to Fanon (1971) one is rich because one is white, and one is white because one is rich Job reservation for whites ensures white predominance, and

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1. Superficially, Portuguese imperial policy in its African territories differed markedly from the British policy. A 'native' could be 'assimilated' if he became 'civilized' and broke links with his original background. An 'assimiliated' person could have the same chances and could be treated on the same level as a Portuguese white. In practice very few Africans ever achieved the status of 'assimilado'. (c.f. Chapter one).

limits the economic and social advancement of Africans.

In reality, however, comparison of racial stratification with the caste system, ends here since social differentiation based on race is imposed and is reinforced through superstructural machinery like the legal apparatus of the state as 'separate development' Inspite of this, it is largely resisted by the African population. Though the oppressing group tries to evolve an ideology which legitimises racial discrimination, the African group opposes this.[1] Racial discrimination is, besides, a transitory one which can be changed by the mere overthrow of the white ruling class from power, and instituting an African government. The case system, on the other hand, is more complex and deeply entrenched, and can not easily be changed, having been developed through the ages.

What is remarkable about the type of social stratification in colonial/settler societies is that as a result of new social institutions, new value systems, statuses and power relations develop. These are visible in the occupational roles and status attached to them. In the traditional society where power and status were based on age, wealth and sex in the new social system power rests on social influence, wealth, occupation and education. By virtue of their control over economic and political power, the whites are also able to attain higher skills required to fill up certain occupational roles

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1. This is not to imply that caste differentiation is acceptable to the subordinate castes, but that caste is much more elaborate, and cannot easily be equated to racial stratification.

and also to monopolize economic power. It is not fruitful to examine the status criteria within each racial group since this is cancelled by the overriding importance of economic and political relations between the whites and the Africans. Though there may be social ranks within the different groups, on the macro-level the structural differences that exist are those between the Africans as a group and the whites as a group. It seems, therefore, that a possible way of looking at multiracial societies is the social stratification framework analysing the belief and value systems, status criteria, rank and the power relations : this approach has its own advantages, but it does not give due emphasis to the crucial components of colonial society. The social stratification approach may be an example of appearance and not reality.

The Class Structure and Relations

It would be more fruitful to "focus on the interaction between class and race, between the economic base and the institutional framework" (Burawoy 1974 : 523). The nature of economic-political developments from the time of white settlement and the change in the economic base after World War II have had a direct bearing on the type of race relations that have developed in Zimbabwe. Substantive data[1] have shown in historical perspective the different phases through which race relations have moved. The economic situation has had an overriding influence. Outstandingly, the following phases in

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1. C.f. Chapters 2 and 3.

the development of race relations can be noted ; the 1893, 1896-97 wars, the collapse of the expectation of gold finds, the creation of reserves in the pre World War I period, responsible government 1923, the Land Apportionment Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Federal period and "liberalization" of race relations and, finally the seizure of power by the Rhodesian Front Party in 1962.

Conflict took place on a number of levels throughout the period ; the first and most obvious one is between the Africans and the Europeans. The second conflict was intra-racial group conflict,[1] especially within the white group. Most important are the class conflicts within the white group or here for power and control of resources. The two classes that sought most to benefit from racial policies and discrimination were the white artisans and farmers. The coalition of these two classes and their on going conflict with other classes have been for the consolidation of white power and advancement of interests of these two classes. White industrialists and foreign enterprises, on the other hand, favoured the creation of an African middle class both in the urban and rural sector of the economy, because this was to the advantage of big capital. Predictably, this came into sharp conflict with the interests of the white land owning class and the working class, who had everything to lose by the advance of African classes.

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1. See, for instance, Richard Hodder Williams (1972) and Leys (1959, 93-97) for a discussion of the Afrikaner community.

This conflict of interests led to the polarisation of classes. A look at the classes will reveal this.

According to Arright (1973 : 339; c.f. 1967) there were five main classes in prewwar Zimbabwe. These were :

a) a white racial bourgeoisie operating in mining and agriculture, national in character;

b) large-scale international capitalism controlling transport (i.e., railways) and power (i.e., coal) and engaged in primary production and speculation in land;

c) a white working class whose entrance into the economy was after and not before capitalist development of the country;

d) a white petty-bourgeoisie involved in all sections of the economy but patticularly in trade;

e) the African peasantry and wage earners.

The interests of each of these classes in the country was determined by its economic position, and this in turn affected "race relations" or the "attitudes" of a particular group towards another. The white landowning class the - rural bourgeoisie - for instance, was interested in acquiring land for production and speculation . It was also interested in reducing or curtailing competition (real or potential) with the African peasantry. Measures aimed at curtailing the chances of the African peasantry, were championed by this class. Towards this end, the land owning class could support land apportionment and industrialisation; the latter because it could stimulate demand for

agricultural produce and limit the scope of competition with the Africans. But there were certain contradictions in this, since the proletarianisation of the peasantry could lead to "the emergence of a black agrarian bourgeoisie bound to compete in the markets of produce and of factors of production" (Arrighi 1973b: 340).

The white artisans by virtue of the way in which they were introduced into the economy, came into sharp conflict with the African workers. One of the factors that led to the importation of labour from abroad was the lack of a stable and skilled African working class: as a result, white artisans had to be attracted from abroad, and enjoyed higher wages than in South Africa and Britain. Because they were an imported labour force, and because there was no "reserve army" of white workers, the white artisans had an unusually strong bargaining power vis-a-vis their employers. They could effectively organize to obtain concessions from employers and protect their interests from African encroachment. In this respect their interests concided with those of the white farmers, who, too, were worried about African advancement.

The Africans, as a racial group on the other hand, had conflict of interests with the whites as a racial group : they had conflict of interests with the white landowning class, as employers who paid low wages, and as competitors in the market for agricultural produce, with the white workers and the "petty bourgeoisie" in trying to achieve economic equality and remove conditions on which different standards of living were based.

Conclusively, most European classes were characterised by a remarkably high degree of class consciousness, particularly during the depression period, vis-a-vis the African peasants and working force. The African peasantry, on the other hand, was scattered, unorganised and depended on kinship loyalities and the traditional mode of production. Because of its unstable nature, the African working class was not organised and strong enough to oppose the white working class or to bargain for better wages and fair treatment from the employers. Because the process of underdevelopment of the African rural economy was not yet complete, the conditions were not yet miserable enough to force Africans to be more vocal.

The division of the economy into noncompeting racial groups, however, led to a permanent situation of conflict between the racial groups, Notably, however, the conflict was based on definite economic interests ; the white landowning class stood versus the African peasantry; the white versus the black petty bourgeoisie in produce and labour markets; the white versus the black petty bourgeoisie in retail trade, and finally the white versus the black wage workers. This conflict of interests led each of the white classes to seek the introduction and implementation of measures to protect their interests against the African classes. Because of their skilled and skillful organisational experience the white artisans were able to achieve a coalition with the white land owning class, which made the two classes politically powerful. As a result, they were able to pass through a number of legislative acts and policies which entrenched their position, and were aimed at improving their social and economic position and perpetuating the

scarcity of skills on which their political and bargaining power were based. The wishes of the white workers and the farmers found expression in "parallel development" or "two pyramid" policies.

This type of policy had contradictions; it led to the decline in African peasant agriculture, but failed to produce an alternative to this. Though it may be true that many Africans became full-time wage-earners, the real wages of the African workers are reported to have declined progressively between 1901 and 1948. By gradual stages, an African proletariat began to emerge. At the same time, the economy of the country gradually changed from agriculture to manufacturing. This change demanded the creation of a stable working class and also the recruitment of a specialized labour force.

Consequently, there was a change in class structure and class interests. As a real African working class began to emerge political consciousness among the African masses and peasants increased. After world war II many Africans took a keen and committed interest in education and industrial training (Arrighi 1973b: 357 C.F. Ranger 1968:235); the government also began to invest more in training of Africans as a measure to create a stable labour force. African worker consciousness was revealed by the 1945 general workers' strike in Bulawayo and Salisbury, which was joined by domestic servants. Increasingly, the Africans began to attack the institutional framework. The interests of foreign enterprises which sought a stable labour force, however, conflicted with the interests of the white landowning class which relied on unskilled labour. For their own interests, the foreign enterprises sought to create an African middle class; because of this, foreign capital adopted the policy and ideology of the partnership of the races which found expression

during the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The policies of Godfrey Huggins, Todd and Whitehead fully endorsed the creation of a strong African middle class. Governments under the premiership of the three poured in money into African education, as exemplified by the rapid increase in expenditure of African education between 1956 and 1959 (Arrighi 1973b: 360).

In agriculture, the government wanted to increase competition between Africans and Europeans, so that expenditure in agriculture increased rapidly in the 1950s. To advance African agriculture, the Government encouraged growing of purely cash crops like cotton and Turkish tobacco. Inspite of these differential prices were paid between African and European producers: the argument, then, however, reports one scholar, was that "lower prices are now paid in order to accumulate funds for the improvement of African agriculture" (Arrighi 1973 b: 361). A 1961 Select Committee recommended purchase of European land for African use, and establishment of small unreserved areas where farmers of both races could buy land. Edgar Whitehead pledged at a party Congress in October 1962 that he would repeal the Land Apportionment Act if he won the elections.

The "reformist policies" of Huggins, Todd and Edgar Whitehead, however, came into sharp conflict with the interests of the white workers and the white landowning class. This was because there were a number of inconsistencies inherent in the reforms : for instance, the government ran into a lot of difficulties in trying to implement the reforms because it still relied on these classes for political and financial support. The workers and farmers hampered implementation

of these policies since they ran counter to their own interests. The government, therefore, could not carry out its plan of encouraging growth of a sizable African middle class and "bourgeoisie".

Increasingly frustrated by the action of white workers and farmers, the African middle class found its interests merging with those of the African working class and peasantry, in its opposition to the whites. The African middle class thus wily-nily joined hands with other oppressed African classes in opposing the white settlers as a whole, especially after 1957 when all illusions about "partnership" of races had faded. This development strengthened the nationalist movement, and brought the two racial groups into sharp conflicts[1]. The government was understandably alarmed by this and stopped implementing reforms, and began to suppress the African nationalist movement, instead.

On the other hand, the white workers, the landowning class, traders and businessmen were apprehensive of the new wave of African nationalism, and distrusted governments which talked of partnership. The coalition of white classes in the late 1950s to oppose

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1. The African middle class, workers and peasants were united by their incapacity vis-a-vis the European classes; their interests would, however, diverge on the type of furture envisaged for the country. It would seem, objectively, that the middle class would be prepared to accept a compromise "neocolonial" solution in alliance with international capitalism. The adamant attitude taken by the white working class and farmers, albeit, foreclosed the possibility of a 'neo-colonial' solution at that stage : this radicalised the African middle class. The question of crucial importance is, what attitude the middle class would adopt in future, if chances for a settlement presented themselves.

African nationalism and the 'liberal' policies of Todd and Edgar Whitehead became a potent factor, leading to the electoral victory of extremist white opinion under the leadership of the Rhodesian Front Party in December 1962. The Rhodesian Front Party Government made many reversals of policy, and adopted the policy of "parallel development" or "separate development" of the 1930s and 1940s. To achieve this, the government remodified many acts of parliament, especially in land holding. Instead of the Land Apportionment Act, the Government introduced the Land Tenure Act. The coming into power of the extremist Rhodesian Front Party removed the possibility of any alliance between any African class with any white class. The conflict became totally racial, and solidarity was sought within racial groups.

As a result of failing to achieve independence through constitutional methods, African nationalism shifted to the extra-legal methods of struggling for independence. When Africans espoused the armed struggle as a method of achieving their ends, the interests of international capitalism were seriously disturbed, because the future of foreign investments seemed to be more uncertain. At several stages attempts were made to avert a situation were the interests of foreign capital would be jeopardised but such attempts were thwarted by the obstinancy of the white working class and farmers. But from 1974 onwards, when African military victory became more imminent, concerted international effort was marshalled towards finding some form of solution. Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State's so-called Shuttle diplomacy in April and September 1976 sought to find an honourable solution which would ensure the security of white interests. It seems hazardous to presumptuously go into the

future, but one can guess that a lasting solution is not easy to come by. It seems that even if a solution is found, struggle against subtle foreign control will continue, transforming the movement into a genuinely class struggle.

Underdevelopment and Development:(Present and Future

From the above, it is clear that racial cleavages approximate class divisions, since they are rooted in the economic base. These class relations are important for the future pattern of economic development of the country. Any future development policy must take into account the crucial characteristics of the colonial economy relatively developed and industralised economy benefitting the minority, on the one hand, and a subsistence underdeveloped African economy on the other and the effects of the policy of "separate development". The white ruling class which relied on a privileged, immigrant white working class, which had a high degree of bargaining power before the government and which committedly sought to protect its own interests against Africans as a racial group. Equally importantly, because the government yielded to pressure from the landowners, it adopted measures which dispossessed the African peasantry thus making it an economically weak class.

On another level, this policy helped to maintain a very high European standard of living at the expense of the Africans who become poorer. The government, thus, adopted a double-pronged approach of dispossessing the Africans of land, consequently forcing them to join the labour market in search of economic opportunities and in order to earn a living. The policy kept African wages exceedingly low as a way

of barring them from becoming economically powerful.

What, then, is the implication of this, to the future development of the country ? And what strategy should a free and independent Zimbabwe adopt to ensure that a viable economy is generated, and levels of inequality are reduced? The colonial system seeks to perpetuate inequalities, and to retain economic control and power in the hands of a small section of the population. To ensure this, the settler community is bent on retaining political control. The system, however, leads to a polarisation of class interests, the interests of the minority against those of the African majority. African response to this situation is inevitably bound to be more radicalised at each stage. Transformation of the political outlook of the liberation movement is likely to determine the type of development programmes and policies that are adopted.

What strategy for development will be adopted in a free and independent Zimbabwe will, thus, depend primarily upon which African sections of society assume political control and power. Here we can only suggest what is likely to be, from objective evidence. Depending upon how power is achieved, it seems plausible to argue that there will still be many political problems to surmount before stability is achieved after independence. If, for instance, the African middle class is predominantly represented in a newly created Zimbabwe government, foreign investments might have an easier flow into the country. In this situation, the economic base will not change, and capitalism will flourish but certainly at the expense of uplifting the general masses and alleviating them from their life of underdevelopment

If the situation should be so, one can predict that an intense struggle between various African classes will ensue. This is necessarily so because the way in which the independence struggle of Zimbabwe has been waged has been qualitatively (and otherwise) different from African independence struggles elsewhere - except in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea - Bissau. The existence of an armed force of freedom fighters, painfully aware of what is at a stake in an independence struggle, introduces a new dimension into the independence movement in Zimbabwe.

If, on the other hand, a revolutionary government with a clear political programme about the future of the country, assumes power with the strong backing of the guerillas or wholly composed by the guerrillas, then it would seem that independence will immediately be followed by economic reforms ; land reforms, nationalisation of key agricultural enterprises, banks and education. Such a radical programme may, in the long run, reduce the levels of inequalities. Predictably, foreign capital will be hostile to such a government, and there may be a quick withdrawal of foreign capital. If the government is committed to its programme, it will have to turn, more and more, to socialist and Third world countries for assistance. A socialist economy will, on the whole, be beneficial to the entire population, though there may be pressure from Western countries[1]. Socialist measures will help to achieve an equitable redistribution of wealth and the minimisation of class conflicts. Such a system will, in fact, advance towards elimination of classes.

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1. See Stonemem (1976) for a discussion of these possibilities in future Zimbabwe.

The alternative open to Zimbabwe, thus, is socialism. A free enterprise economy is bound to aggravate the already existing inequalities, and intensify class conflicts. Experience elsewhere in independent Africa has demonstrated that social and economic inequalities cannot be reduced within the framework of an economic and political system directly linked to international capitalist interests. Apart from the conflicts and tensions that are inherent in such a system, the economy lacks viability and self-generation since it is tied to the interests of external economies. Under a neocolonial economy there is a tendency to rely on imports, and to tailor the economy towards exporting certain commodities. Innovativeness and self-reliance and hence, creation of internal markets are minimised. Logically, this problem must from part of the programme of any Liberation Movement.

Failure to develop a clear conception of what sort of programme should be adopted may lead to the dependency of a former colony on the metropolitan country. Consequently, the former colony becomes "a world without doctors, without engineers, and without administrators, confronting this world the European nations, sprawl, ostentatiously opulent. This European opulence is literally scandalous, for it has been founded on slavery, it has been nourshed with the blood of slaves and it comes directly from the subsoil of that underdeveloped world" (Fanon 1971:76). According to John Rex, colonial society, "confronts the first and second world from a position of economic weakeness" (Rex 1973 : 162).

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1. ~~See Stoneman (1976) for a discussion of these possibilities in future Zimbabwe.~~

The process of transfer of power itself is crucial; colonial powers usually grant independence to the elite of the colony on certain conditions. Private companies and multinational corporations also have their own conditions : for example, loans of money are usually given on condition that the money is used to buy manufactured goods and machinery from the donor country, which ensures that factories in the donor country keep running. Accepting such conditions has its own inherent dangers :

> "...even the politician who genuinely wants to develop his country ---will be tempted to take short cuts. He may achieve visible economic growth in the form of capital investment, but only by agreeing to an overflow of revenue which is ruinous to his country's future, and, politically speaking, he may find financial resources for strengthening his party's hold of power, but at the cost of true political independence". (Rex 1973 : 174).

Development, therefore, becomes part of the struggle for independence from the former colonial power. "Independence" embraces many aspects of national activity, and development, self-sufficiency and self-reliance are merely some of the facets of independence. Objective conditions for a struggle to gain political and economic power exist in Zimbabwe, and can be seen in the way the Africans have responded to colonial rule.

CHAPTER SIX

THE AFRICAN RESPONSE

What, then, was the mode of African protest against his position in Zimbabwe? The Africans responded differently at different times, and the process of that response cannot even end with the achievement of 'African majority rule' or the defeat of the white ruling class. It is likely to continue into the future. African response has thus been against colonialism and white settler rule, and also a struggle to achieve complete independence in all aspects of national life. In this response both the internal and external factors came into play : internally, the situation itself was ripe for a struggle, and externally, international events affected the internal situation Zimbabwe especially during the later stages of the liberation struggle.

There are three discernable phases in the history of the Zimbabwe independence movement, and each had its own consequences, depending upon the historical conditions at the particular time. These phases very briefly are :

1) The period between 1890-1957, the period of temporary shock. The horizon of the Africans in Zimbabwe did not extend beyond the country. Though there was general discontent among the Africans during this period, the African identified his problems within his immediate locale : the peasants had grievances against land apportionment and distocking, while the incipient African elite wanted equal

treatment with the whites. As yet there was no co-ordination of action against (or response to) these grievances. By the end of the 1940s, however, leaders who sought to combine the different grievances into a national grievance began to emerge.

ii) The period between 1957 and 1965. True nationalist movements emerged during this time, and their horizon had extended to the rest of the African continent. Many nationalist movements flourished elsewhere in Africa, and some African colonies were becoming independent during this period and this had a significant impact on the Zimbabwe movement. Leaders from different colonies meeting in international conferences and began to viewed their problems in the Pan-African context, culminating in the formation of the Organisation for African Unity on May 25, 1963. The Zimbabwe nationalist movement adopted the methods, tactics and strategy used elsewhere in Africa. Little attempt was made to asses the internal situation in historical perspective, and to appraise the strategy adopted in view of Britain's imperial policy towards the colony of Southern Rhodesia. The unyielding nature of the white ruling class in Zimbabwe, at a time when the rest of Africa was becoming free, radically changed the situation.

iii) The period between 1965 and 1975, Because the rest of Africa, with the exception of South Africa and the colonies

> under Portuguese administration, had become free, the Zimbabwe nationalists began to look beyond Africa. They began to make a thorough study of their own situation, and to appraise it in a wider framework. Most important was the socialist world in terms of unfluence and material aid.[1]

I concentrate on phases two and three, indicating the salient features of the process. First, given the difference in the nature of political developments in Zimbabwe with those to the north of country, and given the fairly developed colonial-capitalist base, and therefore the cruciality of Zimbabwe in the intereste of the Western countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, it is not possible (everything being constant) to achieve an easy and peaceful constitutional transfer of power. Second, whatever mistakes the nationalist movements committed, resulted from the limited perspective from which they viewed their situation. Ever since, however, the national liberation movement has undergone profound transformation in character and quality. It would be correct to conclude that this transformation will continue even after the defeat of the white ruling class.

History of the African Nationalist Movement

The beginnings of African nationalism in Zimbabwe in the 1920s with the emergence of the I.C.U., the S.V.A., and in 1930s

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1. It is not being argued that external influence was the single influencing factor; the internal situation itself is most important. External influence is useless unless the internal situation is ripe. Objective conditions must be such that external influence only helps to enhance the process. In Zimbabwe, political consciousness and the economic situation were mature for a revolutionary upsurge, Ranger (1968: 240) holds that the Zimbabwe movement should not be regarded as externally influenced.

with the African National Congress, have been discussed earlier (Chapter Two). The importance of the early phase, however, should not be minimised.

One remarkable event in the history of the African people in the African continent was the independence in 1957 of Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) under the leadership of the Pan-Africanist Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. That single event changed the face of Africa. Soon after, "black" African countries became independent one after another. The culmination of these events was the formation of the OAU in May 1963.

Other events which had a tremendous impact and upset the old imperialist order throughout the world were the emergence of the Soviet Union as a power after World War II, the independence of India in 1947 and the creation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. All these events, taken together, made nationalist and liberation movements a potent factor in international relations; more so because no region could any longer be insulated from the world. Ideas spread fast from one region to another. The oppressed people of the world now found reliable and formidable allies in socialist and newly independent states where there had been none before. Independence and freedom simply ceased to be dreams of the distant future ; they became urgent items on the agenda of the colonised people throughout the whole world, and events rapidly transformed these into reality.

In Zimbabwe, the Africans having already produced a skeleton political organisation in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s responded

readily to the demands of the new situation. A meeting of various African elements, notably the City Youth League formed in 1955[1] and the old (now almost dissipating) African National Congress, called on 12 September 1957, led to the formation of a united African National Congress on the same day. The aim of the new ANC was to fight for African rights and freedom.[2] The one feature that distinguishes the ANC from previous organizations is that its aim was nationalist: to rally and unite all people behind one programme and one leadership. It fought for both rural and urban grievances, and attacked the Land Apportionment Act and the Land Husbandry Act, particularly, and enlisted the support of the rural masses.

The ANC was formed at a time when the African elite was becoming disillusioned by the policy of partnership. As a result a number joined the ranks of the nationalist movement, from the multi-racial Capricorn Society and Todd's Central African Party, especially after Todd was ousted from power by the whites for what was considered to be his lenient and liberal views on racial issues.[3]

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1. The City Youth League was formed by, among others James Chikerema, George Nyandoro and Dunduza Chisiza in Salisbury. It aimed to challenge the old style of political work, and singled out principally the land grievance.

2. See Shamuyarira (1965) for an authoritative inside story of nationalist politics upto 1964, and Mugabe (1975) for the formation of the ANC on September 12, 1957.

3. A great deal, some of it exaggerated, has been said about Todd's liberal views and his role as a martyr of African cause. Regarded by the Rhodesian whites as a 'Nigger-lover' Todd had paid for this, over the years, by light restriction sentences. Undoubtedly he is a big liberal in the context of Southern Africa.

This development further alarmed those Africans who still thought that they could 'participate' and change the situation from within, or those who believed that partnership of races was workable. In no time the ANC had become the new hope for the African, symbolising African power and African self-determination. Edgar Whitehead, the man who succeeded Todd, was quick to realise the impact that the new mass movement was making and sought to make an example by banning it. When it was banned in February 1959 the leadership, both regional and national was arrested and detained for a period of four years, with the exception of Joshua Nkomo, who was in London at the time. Altogether 307 members were arrested (Day 1967 : 16).

In place of the ANC, the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed in January 1960. A new confidence was developing among the Africans. Ranger (1968 : 240) points out that :

> By 1960, then, a mass movement of a new and formidable kind was emerging. It retained the support of the landless youngmen, the trade unionists, the peasants, the rural traders, and added to it the support of the most highly educated, the schoolboys and the students".

The NDP, then, was a coalition of the various African groups, with the same principles as its successor, the ANC : to fight for African constitutional rights, land reforms, educational facilities and equality in social, political and economic life. The entire African population was enthused by the new form of expression.

Like elsewhere in Africa and Asia, the rallying point of the Africans was their hatred for colonial rule and the humiliation that it entailed. This general unity, however, was also a source of weakness in the Zimbabwe nationalist movement : at that stage

the leadership failed to produce a clear, viable, coherent and concrete ideology as a uniting factor especially during times of crises. Instead of entering into sober analysis and thorough discussion of the situation in political terms, leaders made issue-oriented explanations.[1] The NDP, too, concentrated on legal, constitutional methods of trying to achieve African objectives by peaceful means.[2] Yet even in these circumstances nationalism was becoming a force to reckon with. In spite of Government harassment, the NDP continued to grow.

Amidst mounting pressure from nationalists within Zimbabwe and from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the fate of the Central African Federation was in the balance. A constitutional conference on the future of Southern Rhodesia was held in Salisbury in early 1961 under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys. The Conference was attended by Britain,

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1. Most of the NDP and ZAPU speakers at public meetings relied on stirring up the emotions of the audience ; though this method worked, there was no strong ideological outlook produced; Few speakers realised the seriousness of the inevitability of the armed struggle. It is easy, however, to offer judgements in hindsight.

2. A note of caution, however, must be sounded ! A closer analysis will reveal that this phase was essential before the armed struggle could be espoused committedly. Political organizations should be seen as processes which grow and develop as a result of prevailing conditions ; an organization notes mistakes committed and draws lessons from them and proceed from there. The Zimbabwe movement could be no exception. During the time in question the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe was in the making, and whatever mistakes were committed were because of lack of experience.

Rhodesian Government officials the Dominion Party and an NDP delegation. What was agreed upon at the Conference has since become a source of controversy :[1] but as a result a 1961 Constitution which gave Africans fifteen seats representation in a parliament of sixty five was imposed amidst African protest (Gibson 1972 : 157). The Constitution produced a crisis within the white population itself, resulting in resurgence of white extremism. Giving Africans representation in parliament was viewed with grave misgivings by the Dominion Party which stood for white supremacy for all time and which had opposed the terms at the Conference.

Because of increasing radicalism, the Government banned the NDP in December 1961, accusing it of having "embarked on a campaign of Violence" (Gibson 1972 : 157). The Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) was formed in January 1962 as successor to NDP, but this too, was banned in September 1962 because of increased African militancy. In spite of Whitehead's stringent measures against African nationalism he lost the 1962 general elections, to the white supremacists who had successfully rallied support of the whites under the Rhodesian Front Party.

The most serious consequence of the banning of ZAPU was weakening of the nationalist movement which had no elaborate underground parallel to continue on. An immediate problem before the nationalists was whether to form another party or not :

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1. After allegedly agreeing to the Constitutional proposals, the NDP Leadership immediately rejected them as a result of pressure from the rank-and-file of the party. At the 1962 elections the nationalists urged successfully people to boycott the elections. It is possible that at the time of the conference the leadership did not realise the full implication of the terms : the rank and file, however, was not interested in constitutional niceties, but in "majority rule" now. But Joshua Nkomo, the President of the NDP and later of ZAPU, maintains that "We rejected the 1961 Constitution

Reportedly, Joshua Nkomo, the leader, was in favour of setting up a government-in-exile, he thus urged his executive to leave the country for the purpose. After what appears to have been some disagreement on this proposition, the executive left the country in April 1963 (c.f. Day 1967:21; Sithole 1970: 277; Shamuyariya 1965).

After some time Joshua Nkomo returned to the country. But the situation in the ZAPU executive was bad, and some members began to be openly critical of Nkomo. Writes Gibson (1972 : 162):

> In the executive, criticism against Nkomo came principally from Sithole (the national Chairman), Leopold Takawira Moton Malianga, and Robert Mugabe. Ironically, the actual split took place in Dar es Slaam after Nkomo's return to Salisbury, where he found that his critics on the executive had been in contact with local leaders and were broadcasting reports of his incapacity. Nkomo immediately denounced his opponents and sent a cable to Dar es Slaam to suspend the four rebellious executive members. They in turn, convened a meeting of seven executive members in Tanganyika, to depose Nkomo. The three members in loyal to Jkomo (J.Z. Moyo, C.M.Muchachi, and Joseph Msika) declared the meeting unconstitutional and left Sithole was elected president to replace him.

The split in ZAPU was complete. On 8th August, 1963 the group led by Ndabaningi Sithole announced the formation of a new party the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). As a reaction, Nkomo formed the peoples' Caretaker Council (PCC), technically not a party, but an African "interest group", though in reality it was a party and functioned very much like one.

This split into ZANU and PCC led to a bitter struggle among their supporters, with each group claiming to be the supreme representative of African aspirations. Interparty clashes became

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in no uncertain terms"(Jkomo 1970).[260]

a common occurrence, and for a time all attention was diverted from attacking the Government to physically annihilating each other and claiming party hegemony among the masses.[1]

Taking advantage of the division within the African freedom movement, the Rhodesian Front Government set up an elaborate oppression - apparatus, including an efficient informer system. In 1964 the Government banned ZANU and PCC, all political activity, the Daily News', a pro-African cause daily, and imposed strict control on movement of Africans National, regional, provincial and district leaders of the two organisations were arrested and detained : the ZAPU members were initially detained at Gonakudzingwa, then some of them elsewhere, and the ZANU members at Wha Wha, then the Central Executive at Sikombela, then Salisbury Maximum Prison and eventually Connemara. The banning of the organizations, in fact, meant the end of overt political activity upto today.

The Armed Struggle (1965-1976)

Without any effective political life inside the country ZAPU and ZANU sought to use another strategy : of the armed struggle. Party exiles abroad began to organise clandestine operations from Lusaka and Dar es Slaam. The imperativeness of the armed struggle

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1. The split into ZAPU and ZANU and subsequent clashes that took place in 1963-1964 period have been talked a great deal about both by the Rhodesian Government and outside observers : the Rhodesian Government gives these clashes as the major reason for banning the parties, and outsiders as reason why Zimbabweans have failed to get independence soon enough. The role of collaborators and Government informers in confusing the issue is often overlooked. Undoubtedly this was an unfortunate phase, but given the nature of the struggle in Zimbabwe it was necessary. It is also not correct to suggest that these clashes were tribally based since clashes took place thoughout the country even in places were one "tribe" was predominant.

became clear when Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Front Prime Minister of Rhodesia declared unilateral independence (UDI) for the white population of the country from Britain on November 11, 1965. The act demonstrated that little chances if at all - existed for compromise between the whites and the Africans. Instead, it became clear that the interests of the two groups were diametrically opposed. International pressure demanded that Britain use force to restore 'legality'. Britain, however, displayed its incapacity by being unprepared to use force; it suggested the imposition of economic sanctions and a total oil embargo in December 1965, as alternative to force, which the United Nations adopted. The wisdom of this proposal has since been proved wrong.

The Zimbabwe African National Union responded to UDI by an armed clash with the Rhodesian security forces on the night of April 28/29, 1966 at Sinoia, about ninety miles from Salisbury (Gibson 1972:164; M'gabe 1970:286-287). The following year 1967, ZAPU opened a front in the Wankie area (Gibson 1972 : 165; M8gabe 1970 : 288). The British Government condemned this as terrorism, and upheld that it condemned "all acts of terrorism, whatever their motives and by whomsoever committed" (Rhodesia : No R. 5864/70,7(d) : 7). These nationalist military operations marked a clear shift from a legal, constitutional and peaceful approach to the armed struggle. Sporadic fighting took place upto 1970.

Predictably, the Liberation Movements in Zimbabwe were faced by many problems - manpower, strategic, organizational and political. It took time before correct strategies could be evolved and the

African population in Zimbabwe could espouse the armed struggle whole-heartedly. Party cadres felt frustrated as a result of little visible progress or because some leaders did not live upto expectation.

One such difficulty was a major crisis which developed in ZAPU in 1970, and nearly tore the organisation apart. (Gibson 1972 :169-174). A confrontation between James Chikerema, the then Vice-President of the party and some of his colleagues in exile, led to an irreparable split. Many reasons have been given for this sudden eruption in ZAPU, but it seems plausible to attribute this to the party structure and its functioning. Unlike in ZANU where the principle of democratic centralism applied, and review conferences and party congresses of cadres abroad elected external leadership at regular intervals, in ZAPU similar meetings were not held (Mubako 1974). It seems that a number of cadres in the military wing of the party were dissatisfied with the bureaucratic functioning of the leadership.

Things came to a head when dissident members from ZAPU and ZANU announced the formation of a new party, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi) on October 1, 1971, in Lusaka, Zambia. Frolizi, ostensibly formed to unite ZAPU and ZANU, failed to achieve its objective; after sometime, the initial leadership of Frolizi left the movement, while others declared allegience to ZANU. At this time, many people also left ZAPU to join ZANU directly, while others completely disillusioned, temporarily left the liberation movement. Meanwhile, amidst mounting

pressure from the OAU, ZAPU and ZANU had to agree, to what later appears to have been a facade, to a unity accord, to thwart the recognition of "Frolizi" by the OAU. In March 1973 ZAPU and ZANU announced the formation of a joint military Command which, it was understood, would be followed by political unity. As events have proved, this never took off the ground.

In the meantime, ZANU had been able to evolve a viable and successful military strategy by creating what was called "a people's army" and applying the tactics of "peoples' war". The strategy was reportedly evolved after a thorough analysis of the internal situation in Zimbabwe, and after taking note of past mistakes. The years 1969-1971 were used by the military wing of ZANU, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), to acquire more skill and intensify training. In April 1974, the late H.W. Chitepo, the National Chairman of ZANU who led the organization in exile from 1965-1974 declared :

> The years 1970, 1971, 1972 were used by the party to prepare for the opening of the Northern, Northeastern and Eastern front. The lesson of the 1966-1969 (period) had been learnt and full advantage was taken of a more favourable terrain and presence right close to the border of large numbers of Zimbabweans. The three years saw wide-ranging programmes of political orientation among the masses in a large part of Zimbabwe .
> (Zimbabwe News, Vol. 8, No. 4, April 1974 :6).

In December 1972 members of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) clashed with the Rhodesian security forces commencing a sustained guerrilla campaign which has increased in temp and crescendo ever since. Newspapers confirmed reports that

rural people in the war front were giving full support to the guerrilles by supplying food, shelter, information, and transporting the war materials of the freedom fighters. Christopher Munnion (in the Daily Telegraph of 24 March 1974) for instance, reported from Bindura, Zimbabwe, that :

> "African labourers on tobacco farms in Rhodesia's northeastern border area are being screened by security forces following evidence of renewed subversion of the population by terrorists[1]. Farming communities in the Centenary, Mount Darwin and Bindura area fear that the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) are enlisting African workers to assist them---".

The "Rhodesia Herald", a Rhodesian daily from Salisbury, reported on April 5, 1974, that twenty-eight African villagers were sentenced to prison terms ranging from four to ten years because they "collaborated with or harboured" freedom fighters or for "failing to report their whereabouts to the police".

The Government tried to allay the fears and waving morale of the white population by hiding information or minimising its importance. There was, however, little to hide since whites were directly involved. In the 'Sunday Mail' (5 May 1974) a certain Margaret Juul of Bindura complained in a letter that her brother-in-law, Hugh Gundry, an animal husbandry officer, was stated to have been killed in the "border area" when he was actually killed at Bindura which according to her is "one hour's easy drive from Salisbury" (c.f. also to "Rand Daily Mail", 6 May 1974). In its bid to obtain information, the Government offered cash-rewards for

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1. The Rhodesian government refers to freedom fighters as terrorists in an attempt to discredit them.

information about presence of guerrillas. According to the Zambia Daily Mail (18 April, 1974) : "Not less than 5,000 Rhodesian dollars (K 5.000) would be paid for information leading to the capture or death of a senior guerrilla leader, and not less than 2,500 dollars (K2,500) for the same information about a guerrilla group leader". Newspaper reports also carried rising casualty figures for both freedom fighters and Rhodesian security men, though the Rhodesian Government painted a bright picture about its success in the war.

When the Rhodesian security units together with South African and western mercenary commandos had failed to contain the initial onslaught of the ZANLA members, they resorted to a number of moves against the rural population. In what was called a "search-and-kill" operation, the security forces hit hard at the peasants. The Government also announced imposition of "collective fines" on village communities suspected or established to have given any kind of assistance to the guerrillas, as a community, or if a member or members of the village were found guilty of this offence. "Collective fines" included confiscation of livestock and grain, aimed primarily at depriving freedom-fighters of food supplies. Security forces also destroyed fields, burned down grasslands and cleared forests to deprive freedom fighters of favourable landscape. As a last resort, the authorities took the extra-ordinary measure of setting up what was euphemistically called "protected villages" and "keeps" into which more than 70,000 villagers were herded by December 1974. The authorities

destroyed the houses of those put in "protected villages" to prevent guerrillas from using them. These measures, however, were counterproductive since they led to a deep hatred of the government from the rural masses. Instead, the villagers became more inclined to the armed struggle.

At that stage one event of far-reaching consequence took place : The april 1974 coup in Portugal and the fall of Caetano's regime. The new regime, committed to decolonisation quickly signed off its colonial empire to FRELIMO in Mozambique, and the Angolan liberation Movements in Angola. This situation suddenly altered the balance of power in Southern Africa. In strategic terms, the new African government in Mozambique, committedly anti-imperialist, made the ruling classes in South Africa and Zimbabwe uncomfortable.

South Africa, particularly, became much concerned about this development. Vorster, the Premier of South Africa, sent overtures of friendship with Black Africa, and declared publicly his opinion that the "Rhodesian problem" might, after all, be 'solved' peacefully. African states, particularly Zambia welcomed Vorster's call as the "voice of wisdom". After intensive diplomatic moves between South Africa and Zambia, the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU were suddenly temporarily released from their long period of detention to attend a meeting at Lusaka in November 1974 on possible constitutional settlement. At those meetings, which have since remained cryptic, the Presidents of Tanzania and Zambia as well as Presidents of ZANU, ZAPU and the African National Council were represented. Representatives of the Rhodesian government were reportedly present, though no direct contact between them and the

African nationalists seems to have taken place.

It seems that the opinion of the independent African states Presidents was that a new situation, which ought to be explored, had developed in Southern Africa. To attend a possible constitutional conference, it was argued, the Zimbabwe political parties must unite to enable them to negotiate as one group. There was a lot of confusion about the end to which talks would lead. ZANU, for instance, had a lot of misgivings about "talks" and asserted that "Direct Confrontation is the only answer" (Zimbabwe News, Vol.8, No. 11, 1974:4).

Talks about the unity of the various organisations nearly broke down because of lack of clear conception of what was to be achieved, and also because the Presidents of African states seized the initiative from the Liberation Movements.[1] After a thorough discussion among themselves the Zimbabwe Liberation Movements and the ANC were able to produce a unity accord, uniting under the umbrella of the ANC : the Chairman of the ANC, Bishop A.T.Muzorewa became the President of the United ANC. In the unity accord, among other things, it was stressed that : "The leaders

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1. For instance, ZANU in a memorandum to the OAU, on January 8, 1975 gave their own version of the story and complained that Presidents of Bostwana, Tanzania and Zambia "proceeded to arrange for Joshua Nkomo to head the united front, Sithole to be the Secretary General and Muzorewa Vice President. This was done without consulting the leadership of Zimbabwe..." According to the same version, this arrangement was welcomed by ZAPU and Frolizo (Zimbabwe News Vol. 9, No. 1, Jan. 1975 : 3).

recognize the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until total liberation of Zimbabwe" (Zimbabwe Review, Vol. 4, January-February, No. 1, 1975 : 15; Zimbabwe News, Vol. 8, No. 12, Dec. 1974 : 6). Varied interpretations to the situation followed, both from Rhodesian government sources and from the nationalists. Even the nationalists themselves gave emphasis to different aspects of the situation. However, the Africans were able to achieve some kind of unity, though it was beset by many problems from the beginning.[1]

What followed this was a period of political confusion and uncertainty. At one point it seemed as though the situation in Zimbabwe had lost direction. After a series of meetings between Rhodesian Government delegations and the united African National Council, which failed to yield any tangible result, a much publicised conference was held at Victoria Falls (on the border between Rhodesia and Zambia) on 25 August, 1975. Predictably, the Conference collapsed almost before it began. Delegations parted committed to solve the outstanding dispute in the battlefield.

In the country itself, thousands of young people left the country for military training in those countries supporting the African cause. Around January 1976 a well planned and extensive guerrilla campaign resumed. From March 1976 onwards, the warentered a decisive stage, though the Rhodesian authorities pretended to be successfully containing the war. To date, the war continues, and it is correct to guess that the war is likely to continue till victory is achieved.

Nature and Character of the Struggle

Two sets of intrinsically linked factors should be considered in the characterization of any movement, its problems and prospects of success; or rather the direction that the movement is to take. In summary, these are ; the composition of the movement and the level of social development of the society, and thus the classes that exist. A thorough analysis of these will lead to a scientific and objective assessment of any situation. The two sets of factors, which are complementary and not mutually exclusive, have several components.[1] The level of social development, for instance, will determine what classes and type of political party exist, while the relations of groups to means of production will determine class interests.

The struggle in Zimbabwe where there is a fairly advanced economic base, is primarily an economic struggle, reflected in the political struggle between the colonised native classes and colonial alien classes. The international economic and power structure, however, have a direct influence on the internal situation. The Zimbabwe struggle, thus is also a reflection of international economic relations and struggles between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' and the 'oppressed' and between capital and labour. In National Liberation Movements these conflicts take the form of a struggle between the colonised society and the colonial society. Though the

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1. In the scope of the present analysis it is possible to give only a summary view.

immediate objective of the colonised people is primarily to expel the colonising group from power, the nature of the struggle might be transformed depending with the social and economic classes represented in the movement and their long term interests.

In Zimbabwe there are both national and international dimensions of capitalism ; the national dimension is represented by the landed class, small business, professionals and artisans who are predominantly white, while the international dimension is represented by foreign investors and their agents. Africans, on the other hand, are either predominantly workers or peasants. Clearly economic classes concide with racial divisions. Since the interests of these classes conflict, a solution is only possible if the conflict is "resolved".

In political as well as in economic terms, the centrality of Zimbabwe in the context of Africa is an important factor to what is called the Rhodesian problem. According to Arrighi and Saul :

> Among what we might call the various "subtotalities" of Sub-Saharan Africa, characterized by different class and power structures, it is immediately apparent that the Southern Africa complex is also the most powerful. The development of an organic industrial base in South Africa and Rhodesia, which is a key dimension of the area's strength, must be traced to the presence in these countries of a national bourgeoisie (the settlers)sufficiently strong to uphold a 'national' interest vis-a-vis the metropolitan countries. This class, by promoting important structural changes in the economies in question, has in fact restrained that 'development of underdevelopment' which is a normal phenomenon in centre-periphery relations.
> (Arrighi and Saul : 1973b: 55).

The importance of this region as well as the presence of a strong national bourgeoisie in full control of the state machinery means

that the independence of Zimbabwe can not be easy to come by. It is unlikely that the ruling class will easily yield to constitutional peaceful pressure from the Africans. Indeed, a peaceful solution has been hard to achieve in the last twenty years. Alternatively, the ruling class is likely to yield to an increased guerrila onslaught : increased guerrilla campaigns have, in fact, seen the preparedness on the part of the ruling class to agree to a neocolonial solution.

The centrality of South Africa and Zimbabwe, therefore, has serious consequences for Africa. Inevitably, the struggle in Zimbabwe is bound to differ from struggles waged in other parts of Africa in the 1950s and the early 1960s. The Southern African struggles are likely to be"...qualitatively different from those which have been waged or are likely to be waged in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa...Given the central positions they occupy in the structure of international capitalist interest in Africa, their advanced stage of industrialization, and their abundant resources their seizure by revolutionary forces could have far reaching implications for the whole of Africa" (Arrighi and Saul 1973b: 64). But because of their "national" interest, the settlers have sometimes come into conflict with international capitalism. Whereas international capitalism has interests in a stable government in which its own interests would flourish, and may be prepared to accept neocolonial African Government capable to protect its interests rather than an unstable white government under increased pressure from the guerrilas, the settlers regard a neo-colonial solution as a sell-out of their interests. The "attitude" of Western countries, however, is dependent upon the effectiveness of the Liberation Movements, and

the implication of this. The Western countries are also guided by their fear of "communist influence". If a neo-colonial situation cannot be achieved, one can correctly guess that Western countries will covertly or overtly be involved in Zimbabwe.

Against this background, what are the African classes taking part in the struggle, and what are their interests? There are different levels on which the Africans are united : Initially the overwhelming majority of Africans have group solidarity as a racial group in their common interest to take over power from the whites. This unity includes the businessmen, traders, professionals, workers, peasants, the unemployed and students. Different African groups will, however, have different interests determined by their positions (real or potential) in the economy now or after independence. The period 1957 to 1962 in Zimbabwe seems to have been clearly characterised by a coalition of all African groups against the whites. Since class interests were not yet defined, there were no serious political debates.

It seems clear, however, that the commencement of the armed struggle marked a turning point in the political situation in Zimbabwe. As a result of the demands of the situation, it was no longer viable to rely on group solidarity, because intensive political debates began to be seriously undertaken. Those cadres who took part in waging the armed struggle began to visualise the future of Zimbabwe in terms of the transformation of the socio-economic system, and not merely the expulsion of foreigners from the

seat of power. As a result of the economic base, the groups which readily accepted the armed struggle were the two oppressed classes : the workers and the peasants. Since their interests coincided, the coalition of the two groups has been a potent factor in the struggle. In any case, even the majority of people in the rural areas are unemployed workers, who at one stage or another have worked in the towns. They thus identify their interests in terms of job opportunities which they are being denied under the present system. Given a choice most of these would prefer the role of workers in the towns.

However, the overriding imperative of anti-colonialism still united all the African groups during the period of armed struggle, though very clearly party cadres began to demand more progressive political programmes defined in clear economic-political terms. Increasingly, Liberation Movements ceased to view the situation as a conflict primarily between black and white, but as a struggle against an unjust political and economic system which thrived on the exploitation of the majority by the minority. There was now a clear recognition that the problem was essentially one of colonialism : the character of the Liberation Movements was thus changing from a nationalist one to a movement concerned about socio-economic issues. Fighters in the struggle began to accept the necessity of defining their present and future goals, in terms of class interests. It seems plausible to argue that prolongation of the struggle will transform the conflict into a class struggle, and bring into sharp focus the different classes.

Problems and Prospects of Liberation

Problems facing the Liberation Movements in Zimbabwe are inherent in the colonial history and hence the economic system of the country. Loney (1975 : 15) correctly points out that :

> The continuation of white domination in Rhodesia can only be understood in a historical context. The colonization of Rhodesia and its subsequent development were in crucial respects different from the pattern in other British colonies...Southern Rhodesia was unique in that as early as 1923 it became a self-governing colony, with its own parliament and its own police force and army.

In this case, the historical development of Southern Rhodesia approximated the history of South Africa. The crucial factor in the case of Zimbabwe as in South Africa, was that imperial administration was preceded by the dominance of white settlers who wielded both economic and political power, and were conscious that they must do so. Somewhat, the pattern was similar to the settlement of whites in Australia, Canada and the United States. But unlike in the latter countries, the whites in South Africa and Zimbabwe failed to engage in a campaign to terminate the native population. White settlers, however, managed to entrench themselves deeply and ahieve substantial economic development, which made them powerful vis-a-vis imperial authorities.

Because political changes in the rest of Africa were relatively peaceful, the Africans in Zimbabwe toyed with the false impression that they could alsoachieve political change and attain freedom through non-violent, peaceful, and constitutional methods. The history of the country, the strength of the ruling class and the role of Britain were not noted seriously ; it should have been clear

that the settlers, and not Britain, have been the de facto authorities in the country. This mistaken idea has at various stages been the stumbling block in taking decisive positions in negotiating. For quite sometime it was expected that Britain would discharge her duties as the de jure authority. With the passage of time, nationalist leaders came to accept the inevitability of the armed struggle.

A relatively advanced economic base, increased proletarianization of peasants, and a marked increase in social and political consciousness of the people also meant that loyalty of the followers could not be taken for granted. Unlike in somecther African countries, for instance, Zambia, Kenya, Malawi or Tanzania where during the struggle for national independence there was only one acknowledged leader at the top who successfully commanded support, from 1963 onwards there was no such "cheriematic authority" in Zimbabwe, who could claim to be the one and only spokesman. Instead, there has been a tendency towards schisms based on what the followers believed the leader stood for. Primarily, this was because followers began to question, weigh and consider a leader's pronouncements in the face of hard and grim political realities. Differences of opinion began to be solidly based on what a follower believed were his expectations of the situation. It can not, however, be denied that there were/are blind followers, who follow the leader rather than his beliefs.

Scholars and analysts either because they wanted to distort the situation or because they did not understand it, attributed divisions splits, factions and dissensions primarily to "tribalism" and personality. The untenability and shallowness of such analysis is not hard to see. Attributing divisions to tribalism can be accepted if the following

are proved true ; that the people in Southern Africa are inherently tribalistic and if tribalism is actually proved to be present in Zimbabwe. Even superficial investigation will reveal that none of the two have, so far, been proved. On the other hand it is true that divisions have been endemic in those regions where settlers did not yield to constitutional methods, and hence in those regions where various forms of struggle had to be utilized. Sociological analysis must thus seek the causes of these divisions in the situation itself.

Two factors seem to be at the heart of the problem: the intransigence of the ruling authorities and the deep interests of imperialism who have everything to lose by giving power to an untrusted people. Unlike in those regions where the imperial authority was in control, the Zimbabwe leaders were faced with certain problems : first, when overt political activity was allowed, they had to concretise their speeches by visible progress and gains, which they could not do because of the intransigience of the ruling authorities; second, because of failing to make any visible progress, emotional political speeches ceased to have any effect. But because political activity was banned in Zimbabwe, "mob psychology" could not be used as a weapon of gaining mass support; instead, intensive political campaigns took place behind the scenes. Thirdly and crucially, because political conditions were difficult, they demanded analyses, which led to disagreements on policy, approach, tactics and strategy, unlike in times and places where hatred of the European ruler could be expressed in overt mass mobilisation. These differences, in the long run, led to irreconciliable political (and sometimes ideological) differences.

These differences, definitely, are not a result of inherent tribal animosities or personality cult. Frank and deep analysis will reveal that "tribalism" has not been at the centre of these problems, but more importantly has been the question of approach and method to achieve the agreed goals. It is possible that there may be certain elements who, for political ends, might want to utilize "tribal affiliations", but overall the problems can not be characterized as "tribal". Different political groups of various ideological persuasions between and within political parties have differed sharply on characterization of the movement and the ultimate goals, more especially on the question of the political and economic future of Zimbabwe. Admittedly, these problems are not peculiar to Zimbabwe alone, but to many liberation movements and political parties throughout the world. Such differences have, for instance led to the bitterness between the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China, and the disagreements between the Soviet Communist Party and West European Communist Parties, inspite of their adherence to the same political philosophy.

The Western press and the Rhodesian government have tried to augment these divisions, because it is to their interests to have a divided African Movement. In spite of these divisions, however, ostensibly, the Africans are united by their common wish to rule themselves.

Many factors come into play in determining the prospects of Zimbabwe's liberation. From a long distance, the international

situation has drastically changed in the last few years, but more importantly the success of similar liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola has altered the balance of power in Southern Africa. As Arrighi and Saul (1973b: 64) say, the struggle in Mozambique and Angola "is structurally linked with the struggles in the centres of the Southern Africa complex: Rhodesia and South Africa". The liberation of Angola and Mozambique has been an overall advantage to the liberation Movements in Zimbabwe.

The question of unity still prevails. Political factions are likely to come and go, come again and go, until complete unity is achieved in thoughts and deeds. The process of national liberation itself may resolve some of the contradictions that exist within the liberation movements. Stability can not be achieved through what some scientists call "plural democracy". Instead, this can be achieved by a strong politico-military front with a clear vision of the problems, in present and future phases. The markedly increasing importance of the fighting cadres and their realisation and acceptance of their role of custodians of the wishes and aspirations of the population indicates this trend. Like in Mozambique and Angola the fighting cadres must be the nucleus of both Government and army. Inevitabily, this cadre must accept the inevitability of revolutionary transformation.

A relatively advanced economic base; an increasingly militant and committed working class and peasantry; the nature of, and classes involved in the conflict, point to a gradual, if not swift transformation. The battlefield itself, the act of paying for liberation

through suffering, (hopefully) become educative experiences which throw up new ideas, approaches and strategies to liberation.

The Zimbabwe struggle seems to fulfill all these conditions.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Dominant sociological studies of multi-racial societies take race as the frame of reference, and assign importance to racial and physical characteristics as determinants in formation of relationships between racial groups. Importance is also attached to racism as a system of beliefs. Race relations have been looked at from many perspectives : for instance, "inter-group relations" (e.g., Van den Berghe 1972); or "immigrant-host relations" (e.g., Patterson 1965); and "race" and "ethnicity" in general. Primacy in such analysis is given to "accommodation", "absorption" and "integration" (Patterson 1965 :13-35); or to discrimination and attitudes (Roger and Frantz 1962); or to "social and cultural pluralism" (Smith 1965); or to racial and ethnic cleavages (Van den Berghe 1967b; Kuper 1969a); or to minority-majority relations.

One of the most familiar approaches to the study of relations between racial groups is the "pluralist approach", particularly in the West Indies, Southern Africa and to some extent the immigrant "problem" in the United Kingdom. The categories and concepts that are adopted depend upon the peculiarities of the particular society being studied, but frequently "race" and ethnicity" have been accepted as being of overriding importance though Patterson (1965:32) decries what he calls the "prejudice--discrimination axis" and points out that :

"...what be have in Britain at the present stage is not or not yet basically a colour or a race situation, however much it may appear so to many colour-conscious migrants--it is an immigrant situation". (Patterson 1965 : 17).

The "pluralist approach" views multi-racial societies in terms of racial, ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic group. Writes Van den Berghe (1965 : 9):

> ....The colonial system created new lines of conflict and cleavage among Africans (e.g., between Christians and non-Christians, or between the Western-educated and the masses); it wittingly or unwittingly prepetuated traditional hostilities while at the same time preventing the violent expression thereof; and it denied politically ethnic groups which had hitherto been homogeneous, thereby sowing seeds of irredentist movements after independence.

The validity of the "pluralist thesis" has been questioned with specific reference to Zimbabwe, and it has been maintained that inspite of its theoretical worth the pluralist thesis is not a viable theoretical tool for unravelling the reality beneath colonial/capitalist societies. This has been questioned on a number of levels : adopting the "race/ethnic model" befogs the actual situation, creating the false impression that race is the cause of all and every thing. This inevitably leads to a principal preoccupation with race, attitudes, discrimination and racial antipathy. Important as these are, they can not be the basis, but are merely the manifestation of, the actual situation which must be sought in the motives behind racial antipathy. At any rate, our aim is to understand, evolve theories, perspectives and approaches. Concern with the obvious blocks our way into inner

reality. A meaningful approach will entail a study of the working of the system of apartheid in South Africa or "separate development" in Zimbabwe.[7] The structure, function and dynamics of racialism must be truly unravelled.

The "colonial situation" has sometimes been analysed from the culture-contact perspective, as in M.G. Smith's "social and cultural pluralism". Undeniably, colonialism also produced "social and cultural pluralism", but most importantly are the relations between racials groups, based on exploitation of labour and resources. Conflict in colonial societies consequently and necessarily centred around the control of resources and instruments of power. Difference in culture has not, apparently, played a decisive role in the conflict now taking place in Zimbabwe. Clearly, what has been at stake is the control of resources and political power.

If the white settlers in Zimbabwe sought to plunder and expropriate the natural wealth of the country, and used the human material to exploit it, clearly our attention should be focussed towards the resulting relationship between the Africans and the Europeans in their struggle for power to control these resources. Colonial society is the landscape or stage on which the two groups enact their life, each particular group influenced by its interests and intentions within this society. These relationships between the two groups are dependent on this landscape; they are not independent ; neither do individuals enact their life from instinctual and inexplicable motives. To understand the Zimbabwe

situation one must recognise the interdependence of groups - racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural - and not compartmentalise them into separate, independent, mutually exclusive entities. Superficial cleavages within and between groups do exist, but they are cancelled by the overwhelming importance of relations of a particular group vis-a-vis its position in the economic and political system of the society. The group in power uses force and oppression to carry out its programmes and protect and consolidate its own position.

The settlement of the whites and the pattern of the development of "race relations" in Zimbabwe is living testimony to the centrality of political power in maintaining economic and social privileges of one group over others. Importance of economic interests can be seen in the motive behind colonisation of the country; to exploit mineral resources, especially gold. When gold failed, the alternative was extensive acquisition of land. Since Africans resisted European penetration and settlement, the encounter between the races was bitter and hostile, culminating in the 1896 war. These two factors, economic motives and African resistance, determined the formation of race relations. The groups with vested interests and most vulnerable to threat by African advancement, the white workers and farmers, had an interest in laws which would minimise competetion between racial groups, hence passage of Masters-Servant Act (1901), Land Apportionment Act (1930), Industrial and Conciliation Act (1934) and Land Tenure Act.

Though international capital was interested and could gain from the creation of a powerful African middle class, the Government which relied for financial and political support on those classes ranged against the Africans, could not implement measures conducive to creation of an African middle class. In frustration, the African middle class joined the African peasants and workers in racial solidarity against the whites.

The policy of "seperate development" evolved in the 1930s based on differential prices of agricultural produce and wages led to the underdevelopment of African economic life on two fronts ; the peasants were reduced to subsistence agriculturists and workers could not achieve economic viability. The two classes therefore, remained economically powerless, even though the general economic situation in the country was improving.

Correct analysis of race relations in Zimbabwe must, thus, take account of labour exploitation, appropriation of land, differential structures of wages and prices of farm produce, the implication of this on the economic and social status of racial groups, and the interaction of this entire situation with the political superstructure (and power). In fact, the history of colonial Zimbabwe is the history of the development of relations between racial groups; a history of the consolidation of white power and deprivation of the African population. Economic interests were protected by an efficient and elaborate political system which institutionalised exploitation and economic, social and political inequalities. The effect of this is permanent conflict

between white and black groups, which has become progressively explosive with the rise in political consciousness and maturity of the Africans.

A frank analysis reveals that this conflict is not the result of racial antipathy or racial cleavage, per se, but rather more correctly, it is the result of a conflict of interests and a struggle for political dominance, not as an end in itself, but in order to control economic resources.

The "pluralist thesis", however, does not explain this situation, the approach is, in fact, a good example of misplaced emphasis.

It has been argued that an alternative is what could be called a "colonial-capitalist approach", one which, though recognising the element of race, gives due primacy to the process of development and underdevelopment, its contradictions, implications, in a colonial society; this approach must focus on the conflict of interests of different groups and classes within one single political and economic entity. Colonialism as a system, rather than race provides a viable approach; the conflict taking place in Zimbabwe is essentially economic, and this is rooted in the colonial relations of production, and the positions occupied by various groups (or classes) within the colonial system. Because economic classes coincide neatly with racial groups, the conflict may also assume a racial character; this, however, is merely a manifestation of the reality.

From the fields of competition of the groups it emerges that central to relations is economic control. Clearly, it is not 'racism' or 'prejudice' that lead to discrimination, but economic imperatives; 'racialism' (as a practice of racial discrimination of racism) is not pursued for its own sake, but as a means to an end, of controlling strategic positions of privilege and power, and limiting the life chances of the subordinate groups. Colonialism, at any rate, survives on subjugation and mental and physical violence; racism, as an ideological manifestation, and justification of exploitation, can clearly be understood within the framework of the nature of the colonial system. Ideology is primarily and essentially the manifestation of the social situation.

Future Political and Economic Trends

In view of the above, what then, is the future likely to be in Zimbabwe? An answer to this can be given on two levels : on the political level (i.e. the question of liberation), and on future trends of economic development. The latter depends primarily on the first. Analysis of this will be cast in the light of our entire argument.

The uniting element among the Africans in the late 1950s and 1960s was racial solidarity, based on shared deprivation by Europeans and a hatred for alien rule ; the movement, then, was nationalist on all counts. African opposition to alien rule was a massive, united and formidable movement. No dissension among the Africans was allowed at that stage ; any form of deviance was subject to severe punishment, usually one was called a "sell-out".

In time, however, political realities brought about discussion in the light of these realities; ideas about approach, strategy and tactics gradually began to differ. Unavoidably, splits, splinter groups and interest groups became a living reality, culminating in the existence of two separate parties, ZAPU and AZNU, from August 1963. Further splits took place which led to the formation of Frolizi in 1971. The African National Council (ANC) formed in 1971 as an ad hoc body, embracing all African elements, including ZAPU and ZANU, to oppose the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals of 1971, continued as a party after the Pearce Commission findings of 1972.

The existence of so many political organizations had both negative and positive effects. On the negative side, efforts were often diverted towards elimination of one political group by another, which left the whites stronger as a group, since they had a divided African group. Internationally, solidarity and material assistance accordingly divided since friendly countries supported one group and opposed another group. On the positive side, each party worked hard to concretise its claims to bring the true representative of Zimbabwe through political and military action.

Besides, no party could any longer rely on pure appeal to the sentiments of nationalism. Instead, this could only be done by political programmes concretised or being concretised in action. The folly of earlier conceptions of freedom and independence based on contemporaneous movements elsewhere in Africa began to be realised. Freedom, afterall, is an elusive word; it had to be defined and the implications fully recognised.

A new generation of Zimbabweans, who had grown up when nationalism was already a reality, acquired a new sense of confidence, because they grew up in a new setting when the mood was different. Because of the new confidence, and because of the injustice that they suffered, in school, in work and everywhere, this generation of younger cadres looked for something fundamental in independence. The cadres participating in the Liberation Movement began to read the works of Kwame NKrumah, Mao-tse Tung, Marx, Lenin, Che Geevara.

Notes Gibson (1972 :181)

> "---the revolutionary example of China grew to have more than a purely military and material meaning. Party cadres began to study the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and to treasure the Quotations of Chairman Mao more than the Bible. Naturally, this radicalization of leaders and rank and file was eagerly pointed to by the white regimes in Southern Africa and reactionaries elsewhere as proof of their hoary contention that the black revolutionary wave was all part of a communist plot hatched in Moscow or Peking."

These cadres began to make their analysis in revolutionary terms and to impatiently press for the adoption of revolutionary programmes, based on well defined principles and objectives. At times, cadres came into conflicts with the leadership, and if the situation was not well handled, it produced schisms in the movements.

It seems correct to preemptively argue, that, because of its nature, the Zimbabwe liberation struggle is likely to be bedevilled by these schisms, factions and intra-party conflicts. This is primarily because of two reasons ; One, when to compromise and when not to, and two, principles, programmes and the future.

If, in the event of the immence of military victory, a peace plan is offered, this may produce strains in the movement, and in the event of victory, a struggle for interests may follow. Unless a military unification of all parties, groups, elements and faction is achieved, an intense struggle for political power and hegemony is unavoidable before and after Zimbabwe's independence. A practical solution seems total military victory of one group : this group, with a firm grip of the situation, will have the task of solving political, economic and social problems. If no one group 'monopolises' power, it will be difficult to effect revolutionary programmes. Besides, the system of elections, political campaigns and multi-parties is inherently beset with many problems.

But if one group, depending upon its political orientation and programmes, assumes power, it will have the confidence to embark immediately on the path of reforms, political, economic and social. In this task, a future Zimbabwe government has two alternatives, based on the colonial system that is deeply entrenched in the society; either to perpetuate the existing economic, political and social system, or to change them. Decision about policies will depend upon an analysis of the social relations existing in the Zimbabwe society. Briefly, the first alternative, of adopting the colonial system as it is means that the relations of production, economic inequalities and property relations must remain intact; an alternative to this, however, would imply radical transformation of this system.

The first alternative, clearly, has several problems ; most important of these being that social, political and economic inequalities will remain or will be widened. A few Africans, those who had no fared so badly, or those will assume bureaucratic and administrative positions, the political and professional elite will fill up the position abandoned by the colonial elite. In the rural sector, some of them may acquire farms, this replacing a European landed class with an African one. The majority of the Africans will, however, simply remain where they were. New life styles and consumption patterns will emerge.

The second alternative, however, of a socialist system, has several implications ; in the first place the government must have a clear analysis of the situation and conception of measures required to bring about an equitable redistribution of wealth. This problem will have to be tackled on three levels ; the political, economic and the social. On the political front the government will have to undertake a serious and massive campaign of political mobilization and reeducation of the people about the political objectives of the government. Next, the government must seek political unification of elements with different political pursuasions and of varied political orientation. After decades of colonial rule, the people will need a new confidence of self-reliance. Economically, the economic system will need to be accordingly changed, in both the industrial and agricultural sectors. Very broadly, nationalisation of key industries and banks is an essential in economic reforms. Since land is owned by individuals, land reforms will involve redistribution of land to the peasants, creation of cooperatives and state farms.

To fulfill this, the government must take the iniative by providing implements and tools, fertilisers and seeds to individuals and the cooperative societies. Agricultural activity must be turned from subsistence to commercial agriculture in the peasant sector. The state farms must concentrate on essential activities like large scale irrigation schemes and the production of sugar, tea, coffee, timber, fruits and so on. It is only in this way that a viable economy, capable of self-generation, can be created.

Perpetuation of economic and social inequalities may have serious political consequences : for instance, those groups who have businesses like shops, though not making much profit, will be targets of attack. Such a situation may lead to racial and ethnic animosities. Harmonious race and ethnic relations, or removal of racial and ethnic antipathies can be possible by removal of economic and social inequalities, and involving the entire population in political process and nation-building, both in rural and urban areas. Unless the masses are made to participate in the political life of the country, they may either become apathetic or tend to attribute inequalities to race and ethnicity.

The necessity of a viable programme of transformation is amply demonstrated by social situations in many post-independence African societies where race and ethnic problems have persisted or have been accentuated after independence : for instance, what is called the "Asian problem" in East Africa, particularly in Kenya and Uganda, where the Asians are an alienated group. The mass expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972 may be an unfortunate but

real example of the persistence of ethnic problems. Because the Asians controlled most of the commercial and retail business, they were identified as exploiters. However, in spite of their explusion, problems of social and economic inequalities were not solved since the government took no adequate measures to place the economy in the hands of the people. What happened, eventually was that a few monied Africans, mostly from the army, took over the business. The masses remained where they were. In other words, the expulsion of Asians did not achieve the aim which was, hopefully, to reduce social and economic inequalities. Similar antipathy, of low key, was shown towards Syrians in Nigeria and Chinese in Malaysia.

Removing racial or ethnic hostilities will not be easy if a particular racial or ethnic group, by virtue of the advantageous position it occupied during the colonial era, monopolises certain aspects of the economy, high or low. It would not be correct, as is sometimes argued, that those groups which accumulated wealth during the colonial era did so because of hard work and possession of the ethic of business. Such an argument tends to overlook the fact that discriminatory laws often limited the chances of certain groups. For example, in Zimbabwe, Africans are not allowed to own retail shops or any kind of business in urban areas, whereas Asians and Europeans are allowed to. The effect of this is to limit the type of business Africans can undertake, mostly to retail, general dealers and transport business.

Superstructural conditions are in this case used to give one racial group or groups an advantage over another or other. If no structural changes are made, like nationalisation, redistribution

of land, reduction of salaries at the top and enhancement of bottom wages, inequalities will simply remain, since some groups start from a position of strength while others start from a position of weakness. Because of colonial heritage, where power and privilege depended on race, issues will be identified in terms of race. Besides, since the monied classes and the 'people of plenty' derive their strength from international capitalism, of which the local business, social and political elite are only agents, the situation cannot automatically radically transform on its own with African "majority rule". Even if a few Africans get rich, they are not immediately identified as exploiters since the alien rich groups may be numerically preponderate in economic life, or because the masses may have "false consciousness".

Inevitably the alien business elite will be looked upon as the source of all economic, social and political ills by the masses of people ; this "false consciousness" which fails to identify the real causes of problems will be hard to die, and may worsen race relations, as happened in Uganda, and to an extent in Malaysia against the Chinese, in Sri Lanka and Burma against the Indians. Instead of tackling the real causes of worsening poverty and deprivation, national politicians can draw support by pointing fingers at alien minority groups as the source of all evils, and insisting that their expulsion will solve problems of poverty, inequalities and underdevelopment. By adopting this posture, the politicians appear as progressive and nationalistic by putting all blame on an alien group. But no one pauses to think hard

how expulsion of an alien group from business and replacing it with a local elite will get to the heart of the problem. This simply results in what has euphemistically been called "Europeans in black skins" or black Europeans".

This class, economically weak during the colonial era, develops interests separate from and even opposed to those of the masses after independence. It develops life styles and consumption patterns which requires importation, at high cost to the country, of certain consumer goods, cars, tape recorders, record players, persian carpets or production of some of these. Essential commodites are ignored in economic priority ; usually, after the tradition of the colonial economy, the economy is export-oriented. This is often done with the advice of economic and donor countries or international agencies, without taking into account the local needs of the entire population. In order to divert the attention of the masses from the truth of worsening poverty, politicians use empty slogans, sentimental phrases of sons-of-the-soil, Africanisation and the like, while they themselves along with their kinsmen and friends go ahead with appropriation of the wealth of the country. For a time, a struggle may take place in the echelons of power, different groups vying to have a share or all of the cake. As a result, army coups, civil wars and separatist or irredentist movements may bedevil the nation ; in the end, reality may be faced, and progressive groups may emerge.

It is essential to emphasise this in the light of what has happened in Africa before : the civil war in Nigeria as a result

of Biafran separatism, border problems between Kenya and Somalia, the conflict between north and Southern Sudan, the Angolan conflict and a host of other similar problems. A close scrutiny of all these problems will reveal their origin in the uneven development of the economy under colonialism. To take specific cases, in Nigeria, for instance, the Northern part is relatively backward, while most of the educated elite came from what was called Biafra; in Sudan, the Southern parts was neglected during colonial rule with no schools, hospitals and industries, while the north was better off. Because of these apparent dissimilarities, conflicts arise after the withdrawal of colonial rulers.

It is difficult to say whether this grim picture fits the Zimbabwe situation ; however, these problems must not be minimised. If they are latent, they can easily be combatted by an intensive and extensive programme of political, economic and social reforms in order to uplift the living standard of the masses. A dynamic and full-blooded approach to the problem will, certainly, reduce possibilities of unnecessary upheavals. There are, however, certain positive factors which need repetition to show that the Zimbabwe case may not be as the one described immediately above. Firstly, the character of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle has been qualitatively different from that in most African countries. Consequently a struggle for political supremacy among the Africans preceded independence, and may not succeed independence as happened in the rest of Africa, except Guinea-Bisseau, Angola and Mozambique. Secondly, political, economic and social interests emerged during the course of the independence struggle, and are becoming clearer at every stage. Thirdly, harsh political reality has led to a more sober and realistic approach to the meaning and implication

of independence, at least at the level of the freedom-fighters. The experience of other independent African states has destroyed the idealistic and romantic notion of "independence", so that freedom and independence are now viewed in concrete socio-economic and political terms. As a result the future is defined in terms of what ought and must be done to realise desired and declared goals. Fourthly, the existence of a cadre of political fighters with clear vision and committed to certain principles means that vague political pronouncements can not be taken for granted.

The future, of course, still depends very much upon who goes into power and quite importantly too, under what circumstances. Two possibilities still exist : (a) either a political party with the full backing of the guerrillas assumes power, or the guerrillas themselves go into power after a protracted armed struggle in this case possibilities of stability and radical reforms are enhanced; (b) or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, in which elections are held, the possibilities for an intense struggle can certainly not be foreclosed. In Zimbabwe, the first alternative is the most viable. At any rate, the adamant attitude of the white ruling class so far, makes this the most likely possibility.

Reduced to the barest minimum, we have argued that the colonial history of Zimbabwe is the most important factor in understanding the social situation there. Though sociologists analysing multiracial societies suggest race as the frame of reference, evidence from this inquiry suggests otherwise : it has been argued consistently that the problem is not basically one of

race, but of colonialism and class. Admittedly, cleavages and conflicts are along ethnic or racial lines, but the causes and motives are not racial: our premises, then, must go beyond race to class and colonialism. Sociological analysis, then, must take note of and reveal the interaction between race and class and their relationship with the economic base. The "pluralist approach" fails to take into account the overriding importance of the total structure of colonialism and the relations that it creates.

Sociological analysis must, of necessity, help to unravel social reality, and move radically from meanings and interpretation that are given to situations by the layman. Colonialism, its structures, ideas and tendencies have lingered for so long. The struggle for national liberation, also involves a struggle against certain intellectual tendencies ; searching for new sociological perspectives to the problem is part of that struggle. We are just at the threshold of the beginning of a new era in the history of the people of Zimbabwe, social science must move along with and help to create that history.

Existing sociological analyses of multi-racial societies do not meet this challenge ; it would seem new approaches are long overdue.

Appendix : Sources

The material for this dissertation is drawn from numerous and diverse sources. That on the theoretical part (Chapter One) is almost self-explanatory, while the one on the substantive Chapters, however, calls for an explanation. There are many standard and easily available history books on the colonial history of Rhodesia. Each one of them gives emphasis to one or two aspects of the history. There are also many books on politics. Sociological studies, however, are conspicuous by their absence. In view of this situation, I relied mostly on historical studies.

In general, books on Rhodesia can be divided into two distincts groups : colonial historiography and liberal studies. In historical perspective, these two groups fall into the pre- 1960 and post 1960 periods. Of course, there are overlappings. Colonial historians were influenced by two factors; their desire to justify colonialism and their affiliation to a social and historical tendency of the "civilizing mission" of European rule. Notable among these scholars are Gann and Duignam, both of whom had intimate association with the Central African Archives as employed personnel of the Southern Rhodesia and federal Governments. Predictably, they worked within the framework of government plans. In later years, scholars like T.O. Ranger, Arrighi, Loney have tried, with significant success, to break this tendency by reconstructing the African story. Their sustained inquiries have revealed that the Africans did play a crucial role.

Most importantly, studies by Arrighi and other scholars like Phimister, Kosmin and Van Onselen have been contributions of valuable theoretical worth. It was Arrighi who first attempted a consistent theoretical exposition of the political economy of colonial Zimbabwe.

I also consulted, rather sketchily, the records of the Central African Federation and the Government of Rhodesia, merely to ascertain information contained in the books and articles I read.

For the historical development of the nationalist movement I consulted mainly the newsletters of the Liberation Movements themselves, especially ZAPU and ZANU, and international newspaper reports, from 1973 onwards. I also had the benefit to discuss the situation with friends, over the years. Apart from this, I was an eye witness to many political rallies during the early phases of the Zimbabwe nationalist movement (1960-1964).

My own contribution was to compare and synchronise the information from these diverse sources, and interpret it in the light of my entire theoretical framework. In spite of controversies and disagreements between and among authors, there is a certain factual consistency. Since the dissertation was not a historical treatise, my purpose was together the information and analyse it within the exigency of Sociology. Though I disagreed with many scholars, I had no liberty to enter into debate with them ; my analysis, however, is testimony to my approach.

Some of the books, for instance by Kenneth Young, are sensational journalistic accounts written for a particular audience.

Given the exigencies of an M.Phil dissertation, it cannot be claimed that I exhausted all the possible avenues of inquiry ; the aim, at any rate, was to attempt a micro-sociological study which could be the basis for future analysis. Space and time, only permitted a summary statement. Full length studies need to be done on labour exploitation, the land question, industrialisation or, more broadly, on development and underdevelopment. Recent studies indicate that new ground is being broken.

In the light of political events, however, there have been very few empirical studies undertaken in Zimbabwe. The field researcher, black or white, must be faced with many moral questions in undertaking any study ; and besides, he runs the risk of being branded as part of the hated colonial administration by the Africans.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA


ZIMBABWE
LAND DISTRIBUTION BY RACE
AFRICAN Lands are in Reserves called 'Tribal Trust Lands' Some buy their own small Farms in Special African Purchase Areas. Others in Search of jobs join relatives in congested segregated urban township
European LANDS Bloom with Ranches and Farms that average more than 5,000 acres and employ many Blacks, crops and livestock plus rich mineral deposits bouy the economy.
NATIONAL LANDS protect Zimbabwe's wildlife in more than 6,000,000 acres of national Parks and game reserves
ZAMBIA
L. KARIBA
KARIBA
Matusadona Game Reserve
Mukumbira
St. Albert's mission
Mt. Darwin
Centenary
Salisbury
Binga
CHIZARIRA Game Reserve
Fort Victoria Falls
Wankie
Wankie National Park
Lupane
Gwei
Redcliff
Que Que
Gwelo
Enkeldoorn
Umvuma
Umtali
Fort Victoria
Zimbabwe Ruins
Bulawayo
Plumtree
Chipinga
Chisumbanje
Chiredzi
Gwanda
West Nicholson
Gona-Re-Zhou Game Reserve
Beitbridge
SOUTH AFRICA
BOTSWANA
MOZAMBIQUE
0 500 Statute miles
Area: 150,332 sq mls.


ZIMBABWE
ZONES OF CONFLICT
Tete
chioco
Karoi
Centenary
St. Albert's mission
Sinoa
April 1966
1972 - 1976
Zinto
Makoka
Salisbury
Victoria Falls
Wankie
1967 - 76
Umtali
Gwelo
Bulawayo
Plumtree
1974 - 76
Nandi
mecome
Beitbridge
Rafari
Chiqualaqula
mapai
SOUTH AFRICA
Guerrilla movement
Infiltration
Guerrilla Activities