

INDO-US SECURITY RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
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
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CERTIFICATE

Certified that this dissertation entitled **INDO-US SECURITY RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR** submitted by **Srimat Roy** in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is his own work and has not been submitted to any other university for the award of any Degree.

We recommend that it should be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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*Dedicated with gratitude to my
'Grandpa'*

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
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Srimat Roy

Preface

India is the world's largest democracy. Like the United States, it is committed to the rule of law, free elections as a regulator of the political process, civil liberties, pluralist institutions, and improvement in the quality of life for its people through reforms and incremental changes. The two countries are distant from one another and neither poses a direct military threat to the other. Despite all of this and an ease of communication through the medium of the English language, the Indo-American relationship has been more troubled than tranquil, more competitive than cooperative, more characterised by misperceptions and misunderstanding than accurate and sensitive attention to the needs and concerns of the other.

After World War-II, U.S. policy was shaped by the realisation that conflict and rivalry with the Soviet Union would be endemic. India's policy was shaped by nonalignment in a polarised world. Very quickly, Pakistan became a prime catalyst in the off again, on again Indo-American friendship and it has remained so to this day. Strains are extensive and deep seated, particularly in key issue areas such as foreign aid, China, nuclear energy and non-proliferation, nuclear capacity, CTBT, missile technology and economic ties. Even at the best of times, Washington has shown no great concern or respect for New Delhi's preferences or sensibilities. The less than friendly orientation of U.S. policy makers towards India has been a product of a number of considerations :

strategically India has remained concerned and about the U.S. global policy of promoting the containment of the Soviet Union. It was perceived as being pro-Soviet on many international issues, especially those related to the Cold War: militarily India opted for self-reliance through licenced production rather than dependency on United States. With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, new strategic scenarios have offered new opportunities and new challenges in the bilateral relations. People are still sorting through the wreckage of the Cold War to come up with a new way of viewing international security. There are still issues that concern both and dialogues are continuing withing the framework of globalisaton vs. state sovereignty on issues such as war and peace, nuclear proliferation : horizontal & vertical, human rights, economic and ecological security, communication etc. I there is of course, an abiding myth that bilateral relations are good only when the two governments perceive them to be so. However, the outstanding feature of Indo-US relations is that the relations at the Government level have always remained zig-zagged. The present swing in the relations seems to have led the liberal optimists that the governments are catching up with the feelings of the peoples of the two countries. It is therefore, felt that the two societies, complex as they are, share a commitment to democracy and representative government and a pursuit of excellence in every form of expression. In a very important way this search is maintained in both the societies by a vital and sometimes disconcertingly critical and vocal opposition. But despite this, bilateral relations between India and United States continue to be dominated by the issues of

security rather than anything else. Here the neo-realist argument about the continuation of conflict as a historically proven phenomenon is quite noteworthy and of course, has an important and dominating place over liberalist's idea of interdependence.

In chapter 1 of the present exercise, an attempt has been made to analyse the Indo-US relations in three layers; global, regional and bilateral both in the Cold War and Post Cold War phase. Chapter-II deals with the theories of interdependence and neo-realism as a theoretical background to analyse the Indo-US relationship in terms of conflict and cooperation continuum rather than in either or terms. These two theories can explain Indo-US relationship of 'unfriendly friends'. Bush subscribed to one world order, while Rajiv Gandhi called the scenario as world disorder. This chapter contains a historical detour to focus on the Indo-US security and strategic relationship in the pre-1989 period. Chapter-III deals with the concept of security in a detailed manner to study further the security relations between India and U.S. in the Post Cold War period. In Chapter-IV an attempt has been made to lay out the different perceptions and images that both the countries have on each other in the post Cold War period. In Chapter V, the security relations between India and U.S. in the Post Cold War period has been dealt with extensively alongwith contentious issues like Kashmir, NPT, MTCR, CTBT in the context of the Pakistan factor. Chapter - VI is the chapter which concludes & summarises the whole of the argument.

1

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

No part of the world could claim to be insulated from the icy winds of the cold war. As a result, profound and exciting changes were marked all over the world in one form or the other. Despite, the Cold War system, which manifested itself in the form of military alliances, military aid, military bases, the arms race both conventional and nuclear, the cold war politicization of regional disputes, and even troop movements across the boundaries are still existing in some form or the other as the order of the day. As continual changes are marked in the global strategic environment, it would be difficult to comprehend the impact of it on the bilateral relations between India and United States. The replacement of the Cold War at the global level by a spirit of partnership between United States and the Russian Federation and the strategic extension of NATO in Europe was expected to have spilling over effect in other regions and have an impact on the policy strategies of United States towards the Third World in general & India and South Asia in particular. In these contexts it is worthwhile to study the relations between India and United States of America in three layers; global, regional and bilateral - both in the Cold War and Post Cold War phase. In the global context, within which states and other entities interact or in the structural level, changes are marked; i.e. governance, norms, rules, legal conventions and arrangements through which global conflict is processed and arrange this relation among states. The structure is thus marked by the asymmetrical relationship between the hegemon & the subordinates while

the process indicates that the relationship may be equalising. The collapse of the Second World is a collapse of the liberal socialist agenda, say some. The future anomalies that will be generated owing to the operation of the new conservative liberal principles, the temporary character of the unipolar moment and the neo-realist argument about the continuation of conflict as a historically proven phenomenon will render interdependence inadequate and so belie optimism about peace in regions. The issues of nuclearisation of other regions - in Europe and Asia - the instability of the multipolar world, the evolving military doctrines of states like China, Russia, Japan, the limits of cooperation between Russia and China, the incapacity of SAARC to talk of security, the fledgling attempt in ASEAN to start the dialogue on security, the rise of unified Germany as one of the most powerful nations, the reduction of US presence in Western Europe, the incapacity of UN, EC and the U.S. to prevent the ethnic blood bath in Bosnia will continue to dominate the international system even though the issues of women's rights, ecology and self determination may attract greater focus than they had earlier. Interdependence will still have to be a subterranean trend. Though economic integration and neo-liberal agenda of free market, fiscal austerity, civil liberties, less of political rights and social rights will continue to be the present pre-occupation among certain sections of national bureaucracies, it is the issue of security that will dominate the relations of states in the present decade. In the regional layer or level, the situation is no better; it is tensed as well as conflicting. The regional conflicts and associated problems such as nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile technology development, international terrorism, environmental degradation has emerged as the major considerations or

concerns for the world players. In this connection South Asia factor plays an important part in the foreign policies of big powers particularly United States.] From strategic point of view, the location of the South Asian region which dominates the vital communication line between Europe and Far East is very important. Besides, following the resolution of the Gulf crisis, the role of regional powers in the Middle East also holds a significance. That is why most of the developed nations particularly United States are very keenly concerned with South Asia. Now, the role of the India and the relations she maintains, being the most important and largest of the countries in the region is very crucial in shaping up of policies towards the entire region. In the region, however, India is the country whose relations with United States have been most baffling. India being a 'regional power' and U.S. being a 'global power' have always been marked by a discordant relationship. At the bilateral level, the U.S. has always tried to denigrate India and has tended to regard India as non-aligned on the side of Russia and to equate India with Pakistan, the regional rival in almost every respect. But after the formal end of Cold War, things have taken a different shape in the bilateral level in terms of economic interdependence and integration which is more apparent in the section of national bureaucracies, free market economy which is more advantageous to private sectors and similar kind of issues. In spite of that, the issues like NPT, CTBT, Kashmir, ballistic missile technology that have global & regional linkages, continue to be contentious in the bilateral relationship,) and that is why this is assumed, with considerable x degree of certainty that the issues of security will dominate the bilateral x relationship as being a basic goal of national interest through foreign policy. v

The post World War-II international relations were characterised by confrontations and antagonism between the NATO and WARSAW pact countries. India emerged in 1947 as an independent country with very definite ideas of how it wished to conduct its external relations. While it opted for a democratic form of government, it did not subscribe to the view that communist regions were evil and one should try militarily to counter them. Instead, it opted for a policy of Non-alignment (NAM), which permitted it to develop good relations with both the Eastern and Western Blocs. India's policy framework of NAM, which permitted it to develop good relations with both the Eastern and Western Blocs was highly suspected by US. The US started determining its foreign policy towards India on the basis of an understanding that India pursued a moral neutralism and later had tilted towards the Soviet Bloc of countries. As a result the Indo-US relations were based more on distrust and conflict. This was reflected on crucial issues concerning India's security during the whole Cold War phase of international relations, as a result, the internal peace and security was always remaining cautionary. So the security dimensions of Indo-US relationship is quite important and noteworthy. In pursuit of the national interest in security dimensions, the US had a low level of cooperation with India, during the 50's & 60's. Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was a very contentious issue between India and the US particularly during the 70's and less so in the 80's. But observers of international politics have preferred to look at the year 1989 as the end of the Cold War and consequently the debate in international relations shifted from bi-polarity to uni-polarity/multi-polarity.

Since then the world has changed considerably and rapidly as the Cold War order, dominated by the two Super Powers, gave way to the present period of transition. The shape of the future is not clear, but some trends can be discerned. Some are self-evident, others are merely possibilities as we look down a winding road. In this present phase of transition, the liberal optimists are of the view that the world is communicating more and is more interdependent rather than anything else. This communication and interdependence coupled with rapid transportation nets, makes the diffusion of information, ideas, and the movement of people and money, faster than at any time in history. The realists, however, differ from this view of the idealists as they mostly define this particular phase in terms of conflict scenarios rather than interdependence. The Cold War era, the age of two Superpowers is over now. Gone with it is the comfortable predictability and stability of its institutional structures. The withdrawal of USSR from Eastern Europe, the reduction of US presence in Western Europe and the rise of re-unified Germany as one of the most powerful states in the world are creating new "Correlation of forces", whose final configuration and impact are yet to be known and conflagration in Bosnia may be a pointer for things to come. At the same time Gulf Crisis shows that we continue to live in a world which cannot allow unchecked and blatant aggression to succeed. There is worldwide movement towards greater political & economic freedom. This trend will gather strength, reinforced by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from a position of confrontation and by the corresponding loosening of constraints on U.S. policies towards authoritarian or

corrupt regimes. In the shifting landscape of global power relations South Asia is emerging in its own right as a focal point of national interests. South Asia's location along the sealanes linking the unstable Middle East oil regions with the increasingly powerful Asia Pacific economies and trading Zones preclude its being overlooked in global strategic considerations. The two largest regional powers, India and Pakistan have the potential to become major economic forces in the larger Indian Ocean region and beyond. Both India and Pakistan could Play an important role in the Middle East following the resolution of the Gulf crisis. That is why the United States, the CIS and China are all actively involved in South Asia, especially with India and Pakistan.

The state of U.S. relations with India, the largest and most powerful state in the heart of South Asia, is a crucial element in shaping our policies towards the entire region. But, the outstanding feature of Indo-American relations has been their roller coaster character. Of all the major countries India is the one whose relations with United States have been the most baffling. The story since 1947 when India became independent, is one of mutual irritation and missed opportunities. Their relationship has been that of 'unfriendly friends' since the last four decades. There are, of course, certain fundamental differences between them, though both India and United States have many common interests and objectives. The United States is the most influential and powerful of the developed nations of the 'First World'; India is the largest and probably the most important (if not the most influential) of the many countries of the Third World. The United States is a global power, indeed a superpower; India may be variously, described as a 'regional power' a 'rising middle power, one of the

'new influential' in the international community. The United States is economically a highly developed 'post-industrial' nation, with the highest Gross National Product (GNP) in the world; India is a underdeveloped nation with a fairly advanced private sector but with the majority of its people at very low levels of development, with more of the poorest of the poor than any other country. The United States is the leader of various alliances, systems, notably NATO; India has been major founder, a leader, and the longest member of the nonaligned movement.

On the whole, India has not been a high priority area for the United States. It has become so only when developments in the subcontinent have directly affected the global or regional policies and interests of the United States (as in 1962, after the Chinese attack on India, or in 1971, during the crisis in South Asia, with heavy involvement by China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, or since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979). As seen from Washington, relations with India must be viewed to a considerable degree from the point of view of U.S. global policies - and occasionally of regional policies as well but seldom from the point of view of bilateral relations. From the perspective of New Delhi, the United States has subordinated bilateral relations and interests to regional and global considerations, has not given sufficient recognition to India's position and importance or adequate consideration of India's views and interests, has tried to downgrade and denigrate India and has tended to regard India as non-aligned on the side of Russia and to equate India with its sub-continental rival, Pakistan, a lesser power in almost every respect.

However, the changing world situation hints at an impact on how India and the United States view one another. The end of the Cold War and reduction of US-Soviet tensions take the Indo-US relations into more promising contexts. The United States sees India on its own terms and not as a factor in relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This of course, has pluses and minuses. In regional terms, United States will remain a player in Indo-Pakistan affairs. As current trends progress, hopefully it will be less of an irritant in the bilateral relationship. The United States' stance of continuing to urge restraint on both sides on Kashmir, however, has been appreciated by Pakistan but not by India. So, the American thrust to become a positive force for moderation in the sub-continent is only a lovely dream not a real hope. India's stand on indefinite extension of NPT, CTBT and ballistic missile technology development continues to be a contentious one between India and United States. Despite the continual pressure from United States, India's stand is crystal clear as has been before, not to become a signatory of it on the ground of discrimination. The key American goal, however, is to build meaningful regional arrangements to promote confidence and prevent a nuclear arms and missile race in South Asia.

Thus, anyone who examines the record of relations between the United States and India will find many more conspicuous examples of differences and disagreements than of cooperation. In the present transitory phase, however, the conflictive nature of the relations have been more apparent and has received greater publicity and attention than the cooperative possibilities. The present

study will focus on the security relations between India and United States in the post Cold War period, which will familiarise us with the various ups and downs of the overall relationship. Moreover, the bilateral relationship would further be interesting because of its asymmetrical nature and because of the external and internal forces and factors that impinge upon it.

2

THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE

THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

One of the most pertinent questions that has drawn the attention of scholars at least since the framing of international relations on the basis of states as units by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 till the present era through different phases and centuries of history, is to predict and forecast futures in international relations. In the post-World War-II phase, realists, neo-realists, behaviouralists and structuralists predicted the futures of international relations in terms of conflict scenarios. Morton Kaplan said, "My universal system is a non-cooperatively interdependent system. My balance of power and bipolar models depend heavily on conflict-elements, but also include interdependence elements."¹ Karl Deutsch, engaged in developing political world models in the 1970s said, "The model could not predict single events, such as fall of government or the outbreak of a war. At best it could show long term trends. But it could show in principles at least, about when and where situations are likely to arise in which - on the basis of past experience - such domestic or international disruptions seemed possible."² The realists from Carr through Morgenthau to Waltz, who do not engage in unit level analysis, but with the analysis of international structure focus on the elements of conflict rather than on cooperation, as predominant facts in the logic of history of international relations. Neo-realist, Kenneth N. Waltz's theory has the rigor to incorporate the realism of Morgenthau in his structuralist theory that helps us to focus on international system and not on units. It helps us to account for recurrence of

the balance of power in world politics. It also tells us how changing power configurations will give rise to patterns of alignments and conflict.³

Given the bipolarity of the post World War-II system, the development of a West European Strategic Community has led some liberal optimists to increasingly focus on values of cooperation at least among the liberal societies and more emphatically among the democratic countries. They have offered the perspective of interdependence and liberal institution-building as the guarantors of cooperation and peace. The proponents of this perspective argue that since the survival of human civilization is threatened by environmental and non-military dangers, conflicts of interests among states and people no longer need to lead to war. They, very emphatically argue that in the politics of interdependence, domestic and transnational as well as governmental interests are involved, as a result the behaviour of states and world politics in general are affected. However, it would be worthwhile to look at these two doctrines from a close quarter now. Both these doctrines, viz., realism and liberalism are sharply at odds with one another in several respects. The realist-liberal dispute focuses especially on the goals of actors in world politics and on the nature of their environment. Realism emphasizes state's demands for power and security and the dangers to state's survival. Military force is therefore, for realism, the most important power resource in world politics. States must rely ultimately in their own resources and must strive to maintain their relative positions in the system, even at high economic cost. Liberalism also examines state action but directs its attention to other groups as well. For liberal thinkers, economic incentives are important as well as concerns for security. Among republics, at any rate,

military threats may be insignificant, expanding the potential area for cooperation and reducing both the role of force and the emphasis states place on their relative power positions in the international system.⁴

It is necessary to mention here that contemporary world politics is not a seamless web; it is a rich tapestry of various distinct relationships. In such a world marked by both continuity and change, models of explanations have thus perforce to be varied. The secret of understanding lies in knowing which approach or combination of approaches is to be used in analysing a situation. Traditionally, classical theories of world politics, have portrayed a potential state of war in which state's behaviour was dominated by constant danger of military conflict. During Cold War, especially the first decade after the World War-II, the conception leveled 'political realism' by its proponents became widely accepted by students and practitioners of international relations in Europe and United States. From J.S. Mill to Eyre Crowe, world politics falsified the hope of peace in capitalist features and the philosophy of liberalism. This made the scholars on international relations view it as an area of conflict more than cooperation and underlined the value of balance of power and role of strategy.⁵ During the Cold War, 'security' was a slogan, American political leaders used to generate support for their policies. The rhetoric of national security justified strategies designed at considerable cost to bolster the economic, military and political structure of the 'free world.' It also provided a rationale for international cooperation and support for the United Nations, as well as justification for alliances, foreign aid, and extensive military involvement. 'National Security' became the favourite symbol of the internationalists who

favoured increased American involvement in world affairs. This symbolism thus was largely a product of the Cold War and the severe threat Americans then felt. Its persuasiveness was increased by realist analysis, which insisted that national security is the primary national goal and that in international politics security threats are permanent. National security symbolism and the realist mode of analysis that supported it, not only epitomized a certain way of reacting to events, but helped to codify a perspective in which some changes, particularly those towards radical regimes in Third World countries, seemed inimical to national security, while fundamental changes in economic relations among advanced countries seemed insignificant. As a result, the Cold War sense of security threat slackened and the descriptive accuracy of a view of national security dominated by military concerns declined, so did the term's symbolic power, as argued by the liberals. This decline reflected not only the increased ambiguity of the concept, but also American reaction to the Vietnam imbroglio, to the less hostile relationship with Russia and China summed up by the word 'detente' & national security had to share its position as the prime symbol in the internationalists lexicon with interdependence.⁶ Thus, the liberal thinkers tried to pose a challenge to the conception of international relations in terms of conflict scenarios and propounded the theory of interdependence which would assure peace and cooperation. It is in this sense, a detailed study of the politics of interdependence becomes imperative.

In common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. Interdependence, most simply defined means mutual dependence. The concept of interdependence defined in terms of

mutual dependence finds a clearcut expression in Herbert Spencer's (1890 - 1903) doctrine of social organism. Spencer tells us again and again that society in an organism closely resembles a biological organism, though differs from it in some respects. He takes pains to work out an elaborate parallel between the state and a physiological organism. The state is subject to the same laws of growth & decay as an organism is; it has its youth, its prime, its old age and death. Like the human organism it also has subsidiary organs. He also says that societies increase in mass as individual organisms do; commencing as small aggregations, they sometimes become thousands of times larger than what they originally were; e.g., the ancient Roman and the British empires. This increase in mass accompanied by an increasing complexity of structure shows that the present day states are much more complex in their structure and organisation than primitive societies as man is much more complex than an earthworm. Furthermore, as societies develop, they show increasing division of labour and the members come to be more and more interdependent, so much so that the life and activity of each part is made possible by the life and activity of other parts. Finally, Spencer notes that in a social organism overgrowth of one part means arrest of the growth of another part as happens in an individual organism.⁷ Thus, it is evident that the concept of interdependence has a close bearing or similarity with Spencer's doctrine of social organism. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. These effects often result from international transactions - flow of money, goods, people and messages across international boundaries. Such transactions have increased dramatically since World War-II:

"Recent decades reveal a general tendency for many forms of human interconnectedness across national boundaries to be doubling every ten years."⁸ Yet, this interconnectedness is not the same as interdependence. The effects of transactions on interdependence will depend on the constraints, or costs associated with them. A country that imports all of its oil is likely to be more dependent on a continual flow of petroleum than a country importing furs, jewellery, and perhaps (even of equivalent monetary value) will be on uninterrupted access to these luxury goods. Where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness.⁹ This distinction is absolutely vital, if we are to understand the politics of interdependence. Interdependent relationships will always involve costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy; but it is impossible to specify *apriori* whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed the costs. This will depend on the values of the actors as well as on the nature of the relationship. Nothing guarantees that relationships designated as interdependent will be characterised by mutual benefit. Two different perspectives can be adopted for analysing the costs and benefits of an interdependent relationship. The first focuses on the joint gains or joint losses to the parties involved. The other stresses relative gains and distributional issues. Classical liberal economists adopted the first approach in formulating their powerful insight about comparative advantage; that undistorted international trade will provide overall net benefits.¹⁰ This exclusive focus on joint gains by the liberal thinkers has given rise to one serious question i.e. how these gains are

divided? According to realists, states contemplating cooperation must consider how the profits or gains will be distributed among them. They can think about the division in two different ways. They can think in terms of absolute gains, which means each side focuses on maximising its own profit and cares little about how much the other side gains or loses in the deal. Each side cares about the other only to the extent that the other side's behaviour affects its own prospects for achieving maximum profits. Alternatively, states can think in terms of relative gains, which means each side not only considers its individual gain, but also how well it does compared to the other side. Because states in this realist world are concerned about the balance of power, they must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation. While each state wants to maximise its absolute gains, it is more important to make sure that it does better, or at least no worse, than the other state in any agreement. However, cooperation is more difficult to achieve when states are attuned to relative gains logic, rather than absolute gains logic. This is because states concerned about absolute gains need only make sure that the pie is expanding and that they are getting at least some portion of the increase, while states that worry about relative gains must care also about how the pie is divided which complicates cooperative efforts.¹¹ Joseph Grieco has made a significant contribution in this regard by focussing attention on the issue of relative gains, a subject that has been under emphasised, especially by liberal and neo-liberal commentators on the world economy, as acknowledged by the liberal thinkers.¹²

However, interdependence cannot be defined entirely in terms of situations of evenly balanced mutual dependence. It is asymmetries in

dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues. At the other extreme, from pure symmetry is pure dependence (sometimes disguised by calling the situation interdependence); but it too is rare. Most cases lie between these two extremes. And that is where the heart of the political bargaining process of interdependence lies. It is in this sense, that we have to take into consideration the role of power in interdependence.

Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor). Power can also be conceived in terms of control over outcomes. In either case, measurement is not simple. We can look at the initial power resources that give an actor a potential ability; or we can look at that actor's actual influence over patterns of outcomes. When we say that asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power, we are thinking of power as control over resources, or the potential to affect outcomes. A less dependent actor in a relationship often has a significant political resource, because changes in the relationship (which the actor may be able to initiate or threaten) will be less costly to that actor than to its partners. This advantage does not guarantee, however, that the political resources provided by favourable asymmetries in interdependence will lead to similar patterns of control over outcomes. There is rarely a one-to-one relationship between power measured by any type of resources and power measured by effects on outcomes. Political bargaining in the usual means of

translating potential into effects, and a lot is often lost in the translation. However, to understand the role of power in interdependence, we must distinguish between two dimensions, sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework - how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects? It is measured not merely by the volume it flows across borders but also by the costly effects of changes in transactions on the societies or governments. Sensitivity interdependence is created by interactions within a framework of policies. Sensitivity assumes that the framework remains unchanged. The fact that a set of policies remain constant may reflect the difficulty in formulating new policies within a short time, or it may reflect a commitment to a certain pattern of domestic and international rules. Sensitivity interdependence can be social or political as well as economic. In terms of the costs of dependence, sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation.¹³ Vulnerability can be defined as an actors liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered. Since it is usually difficult to change policies quickly, immediate effects at external changes generally reflect sensitive dependence. Vulnerability dependence can be measured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time. Vulnerability is particularly important for understanding the political structure of interdependence relationships. In a sense, it focuses on which actors are the definers or can set the rules of the game. Vulnerability is clearly more relevant than sensitivity, for example, in analysing the politics of raw materials such as

the supposed transformation of power after 1973. The key question for determining vulnerability is how effectively altered policies could bring into being sufficient quantities of this, or a comparable, raw materials and at what cost. Vulnerability applies to socio-political as well as politico-economic relationships. One basic question arises here is how does this distinction help us understand the relationship between interdependence and power? Clearly, it is understood that sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in providing power resources to actors. If one actor can reduce its costs by altering its policies, either domestically or internationally, the sensitivity patterns will not be a good guide to power resources. Vulnerability interdependence includes the strategic dimension that sensitivity interdependence omits, but this does not mean that sensitivity is politically unimportant. Rapidly rising sensitivity often leads to complaints about interdependence and political efforts to alter it, particularly in countries with pluralistic political system. Thus, a useful beginning in the political analysis of international interdependence can be made by thinking of asymmetrical interdependencies as sources of power among actors. Such a framework can be applied to relations between transnational actors (such as multinational corporations) and governments as well as interstate relations. Different types of interdependence lead to potential political influence, but under different constraints. Sensitivity interdependence can provide the basis for significant political influence only when the rules and norms in effect can be taken for granted, or when it would be prohibitively costly for dissatisfied states to change their policies quickly. If one set of rules puts an actor in disadvantageous

position, the actor will probably try to change those rules if it can do so at reasonable cost. Thus influence deriving from favourable asymmetries in sensitivity is very limited when the underlying asymmetries in vulnerability are unfavourable. Likewise, if a state changes at its economic vulnerability it may use military force to attempt to redress that situation as Japan did in 1941; or it may subtly threaten to use force, as did the United States in 1975, when facing the possibility of future oil boycotts. But in many contemporary situations, the use of force is so costly and its threats so difficult to make credible that a military strategy is an act of desperation. Thus, asymmetrical interdependence by itself cannot explain bargaining outcomes.¹⁴


The politics of interdependence, however, is inadequately analysed or represented in the assumptions of political realists, whose theories dominated the post war period. The realist assumptions about world politics can be seen as defining an extreme set of conditions or ideal type. Three assumptions are integral to the realist vision. First, states as coherent units are the dominant actors in world politics. This is a double assumption : states are predominant; and they act as coherent units. Second, realists assume that force is an usable and effective instrument of policy and other instruments may also be employed, but using or threatening force is the most effective means of wielding powers. Third, partly because of their second assumption, realists assume a hierarchy of issues in world politics, headed by questions of military security, the 'high politics' of military security dominating the 'low politics' of economic and social affairs. These realist assumptions define an ideal type of world politics. They allow us to imagine a world in which politics is continually characterised

by active or potential conflict among states with the use of force, possible at any time. Each state attempts to defend its territory and interests from real or perceived threats. Political integration among states is slight and lasts only as long as it serves the external interests of the most powerful states.¹⁵


The liberal thinkers, however, have imagined very different conditions to construct another ideal type, opposite to realism. They call it complex interdependence. This complex interdependence refers to a situation among a member of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies i.e. states do not monopolise these contacts; there is no hierarchy of issues and military force is not used by governments towards one another. It is of course an ideal type of international system deliberately constructed to contrast with a 'realist' ideal type that has been outlined on the basis of realist assumptions about the nature of international politics. It however, doesn't faithfully reflect the world political reality. Rather most situations of international politics will fall somewhere between the two extremes. This complex interdependence in world politics give rise to distinctive political processes which translate power resources into power as control of outcomes. These political processes could be Linkage strategies; Agenda setting; transnational and trans-governmental relations; Role of international organisations etc. Thus, complex interdependence yields different political patterns that does the realist conception of the world as well.

After getting a fair idea about the politics of interdependence, it seems that the perspective tries to create a new world order replacing the old one of international conflict. But one can never become sure and confident about that

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because the perspective never suggests that international conflict disappears when interdependence prevails. On the contrary, international conflicts or tensions will take new forms or may be concealed in a large number in this perspective of interdependence. Ironically, the trend towards interdependence has highlighted the virtues of historic values associated with independence, thereby giving rise to two different and powerful processes on global scene; an integrative process, where societies are becoming increasingly dependent on each other and a disintegrative process, where groups within societies are increasingly demanding autonomy for themselves. Though international conflicts are still there by the name of interdependence, the rhetoric of the concept seems to have come into being whatever the reason may be. So, basically the politics of interdependence is proposed by some liberal optimists and is an idea which gained ground after the World War-II, particularly in the bipolar model of international relations. It has been defined as a structure and as a process to suggest the initial subordination in the NATO alliance which has given way to increasing equality and this holds the future of peace and cooperation. Their argument has been that process in the structures depend upon the interactions of units who gain from trade and economic incentives and so modify their behaviour. The liberals, they believe suggest the significance of transnational experience, the impact of communication and the role of liberal institutions in modifying international anarchical behaviour. They therefore, suggest a synthesis of neorealist and liberal approach to understand the possibilities of cooperation and peace. Their propositions of the future have

been speculative and optimistic by breaking forth from their neo-realist initial perspectives.¹⁶

Interdependence doesn't necessarily lead to cooperation. For example, says K.J.Holsti that interdependence and globalisation have not created a political community. He says. " I have taken the position that the argument of a fundamental transformation of both structures and processes is not yet sufficiently persuasive to justify jettisoning large bodies of knowledge in our discipline."¹⁷ "There is too much evidence that issues of security, war, peace and order are still part of world's agenda. There is a definite trend towards globalisation of commerce, but its consequences remain problematic - certainly economic interdependence has not yet created a coincidental community."¹⁸ Michiel S. de. Vries maintained, on the basis of data from the western community, that interdependence intensifies not only processes of cooperation, but also conflictual processes.

Before the collapse of Cold War Holsti said, "the appropriate metaphor for the study of international relations is many rooms with many views. A single view - an authoritative model, theory or paradigm at world politics - would probably represent a stifling of intellectual inquiry, not breakthrough". It was, therefore, too early even in the 1980s to talk of either a world system based on cooperation, or of the normative value of liberalism as the basis of global political community or even the liberal international institutions as providing the way for participation of the world community in achievement of peace and prosperity. The metaphor of common home for both Asia and Europe in New Thinking of Mikhail Gorbachev was more metaphysical since the realpolitik after

the collapse of the Soviet Union and the post Cold War witnessed processes of local bush fires (Europe) and of animated suspension of conflict zones ready to erupt into the open in the near future as in Asia. This happens to be accompanying the processes of fragmentation in Europe.¹⁹

The Cold War era posed the issue of future of bipolarity. The ending of the Cold War poses the issues of the future of anarchic situation of international relations in contrast to the hierarchical structure of domestic equilibrium, the future of peace, the future of detente, the future of the communist world, the future of the liberal idea and the future of Third World conflicts. The exercise of prediction by almost every school in international relations has been quite off the mark as far as the collapse of the Cold War and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union is concerned. The basic feature of the post Cold War forecasting of world futures is plurality of perspectives determined by geographical location in the system, mixture of optimism and pessimism reflecting location in the theoretical debate and ideological struggle generated by the optimist assertion of the victory of the liberal idea. The optimistic assertion of the victory of liberal idea, however, have been thoroughly challenged by Immanuel Wallerstein who opined that the year 1989 represented the agonizing end of an era and the so-called defeat of antisystemic forces was infact a great liberation which removed the liberal socialist justification of the capitalist world economy and thus represented the collapse of dominant liberal ideology.²⁰ The invariable preoccupation of most of the exercises is with the future of peace and the regional peace dividends, that the end of the Cold War may offer to the various regions. In this intellectual pursuit of peace, the realists, the cultural

heterogeneity, neo-realist paradigm, the regional tensions and the liberal institution building gone in for examination as also the theme of the continuity or the discontinuity of the unipolar moment with the United States calling the shots in what has been erroneously perceived as the liberal agenda of world integration. The liberal integration or interdependence since the days of J.S. Mill has been, as brought out by the one world system theorists, only at the level of trade and commerce and out at the level of mode of production. As it has been true of the American social science, it is also true of the post Cold War scholarship that it pays hardly any attention to the complexity of the Marxist argument in terms of class theory of foreign relations or affairs where conflict is inevitable and interdependence is hardly present. Most of the predictions end up with policy prescriptions for the U.S.A. In other words, there is plurality of voices with the purpose of helping the United States to manage current international relations.²¹ Talking about the close connection between neorealism and the US management of international relations, Robert W.Cox observes "Neorealism, both in its Waltzian structuralist form and in its game theory interactionist form, appear ideologically to be a science at the service of big power arrangement of international system"²².

However, since most of the countries have not got out of the Cold War logic in an irreversible search for a renewed balance of power, the strategic thinking in terms of deterrence is still on, along with developments in military technology, dangers at the regional level around its borders, the gap between its force and the U.S. potential to take the burden of action in any part of the world. It has meant an accelerated pace of the military modernisation, development of

nuclear power, expansion of the naval clout, arms transfers and induction of new units formation for political warfare to have defensive offence. In addition to the persistence of old tensions, new tensions have led to a new awareness of increasing possibilities of limited, local, conventional and surgical wars that require small arms. The 73 hot spots of the world only add up to the gravity of new dimension. The failure of super strategic organisations like NATO and the European Community to stoking the ethnic strife in Europe²³ and the failure of the Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) troops to help out in Nagarno-Karabakh region or in Tajik - Afghan border show that old and new security mechanisms are yet inadequate to meet the challenge posed by Proliferation of local conflicts and small weapons. John Herz maintained that for peace to emerge, geography should cool off. But the greatest cause of wars is geography. The surest accompanying factor of international relations is strategy.²⁴

The discussion about the future role of strategy, in that of deterrence takes off from an analysis of the unipolar moment of US hegemony. An answer to this question divides scholars into optimists and pessimists. Invariably the discussion on the new world order involve the logic of realism and its combination with the rhetoric about values, particularly the values of liberalism and under Clinton, of multilateralism. The assumption of this view is that there is only one power that is geographical preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of an overwhelming balancing coalition against it. Russia, Germany and Japan are in no condition to match the global reach of the U.S.A. Russia under Yeltsin (as different from USSR) has a

foreign policy that aims to adjust to the policies and structures of the West. Heinz Timmerman says of the Yeltsin foreign policy, "clearly, the main aim of Yeltsin and of his government is to link Russia with the West by way of four Ds: democratisation, deglobalisation, deideolization and demilitarization."²⁵ Paul Kennedy who recognizes that in the evolution of the world, the Great Power's future will hold out for countries like Japan, says that the U.S.A. is currently the most powerful state militarily ²⁶ In terms of trade, economy and technology the U.S. has rivals but its preponderance is not questioned in the period of the 1990s.

From a cultural perspective, Samuel P Huntington forecasts the coming clash of civilizations. If one keeps in view the seizing and freezing of the unipolar moment till the cultural challenges are met then Huntington's cultural forecasts need to be viewed both as recognition at plurality of global existence as well as a critique of the optimism of the interdependence liberal bliss of the future. Huntington suggests that there are major global civilizations - western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Salvic-orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. Conflicts will occur in 'cultural faultlines' because differences in civilizations, and interaction among people propels them to civilization identity. Huntington suggests that religion is on the ascendance and so there are going to be conflicts between the 'west and the rest'. This will be the central axis of world politics.²⁷ Huntington suggests therefore that the arrival of the erstwhile colonies on the international scene will mean a challenge to the liberal idea. From the perspective of the limitations of the liberal idea being realised, the most pessimistic future is forecast by Emmanuel Wallerstein.

He suggests that the success of capitalism during 1450-1990 reached its decline. It was a dynamic system: "It has not been based on a stable equilibrium but on a pattern of cyclical swings wherein the 'animal spirits' of the entrepreneurial class, in pressing their own interests regularly and inevitably create mini crises of over production which lead to downturns or stagnation." Now this expansion is no longer possible and liberalism cannot help out. The liberal values of self-determination and development are in crisis.²⁸

The Huntington-Wallerstein forecast of continuation of the element of conflict in international affairs is supported by the realists and the neo-realists. Christopher Layne challenges the unipolar optimism from the structural realist point of view based on a discussion of unipolar moments in earlier history. Kenneth Waltz said, "in international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it."²⁹ Layne draws the following lessons from the two unipolar moments in history. Great power emergence is a structurally driven phenomena. Specifically it emerges from the interaction of two facts : (i) differential growth rates and (2) anarchy. The two lessons he offers are (1) Unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own demise because the hegemon's unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to the emergence of new great powers; and (2) the entry of new great powers into the international system erodes the hegemon's relative power and, ultimately, its preeminence. The two unipolar moments in history were in 1660-71 and 1860-1910. Each lasted for about 50 year only. In the first phase was the French hegemony and in the second phase was the British hegemony. French hegemony was negated by the rise of Britain and Australia. The British

hegemony was ended by the rise of Germany, Japan and United States. In both cases international system moved towards multipolarity. In case of the current unipolar moment the geopolitical backlash will produce multi-polarity. Germany will reemerge once US withdraws from Europe. If Japan begins to rearm it will pose a challenge in the Pacific. Further, China - despite all the collaborations that US has worked out in the field of economy, technology and military areas does not, at least at the rhetoric level, look very kindly to the proclamations of the 'New World Order'. There is bound to be great power rivalry in the multipolar setting.³⁰ Layne's forecast underlines the conflictual probabilities thus, "the impending structural shift from unipolarity to multi-polarity means that the security dilemma and the relative gains problem again dominate policy makers's concerns. As Japan and Germany become significantly more competitive, great power security rivalries and even war will be likely, and cooperation will correspondingly become more difficult"³¹ So war will be present.

If war is present than naturally strategy will be. Since nuclear weapons have meant a long post-war peace the future of nuclear deterrence is assured. In a tightly argued though abstractly treated subject, Mearsheimer carries forward the neo-realist argument to say that bipolarity rather than multipolarity is a safer structural condition to live in. The post Cold War world will be more dangerous to live in since there will be multipolarity. He takes a position both against the argument of a non-nuclear world and an interdependent world. He says that the departure of superpowers from the European continent would be followed by the rise of Germany, France, Britain, Italy and erstwhile USSR as great powers.

Power inequities will occur causing instability to a greater context. The withdrawal of the nuclear arsenals from Central Europe would also lead to at least four scenarios. First, Europe would become nuclear free, thus eliminating a central pillar of order in the Cold War era. Second, the European states do not expand their arsenals to compensate for the departure of the Superpowers weapons. Third, nuclear proliferation takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are taken to dampen dangers inherent in the proliferation process. These would raise the risk of war. The fourth alternative would be different. It will be the least dangerous since proliferation would be managed by the current nuclear powers. Yet it would "still be dangerous than the world of 1945 - 1990."³² He goes on to challenge the optimistic predictions of multipolar peace on grounds that their logic is flawed. Secondly, the conditions for long post war peace viz; bipolarity, rough equality of military power between these two polarities, and the appearance of nuclear weapons would be absent in the new world. The reason for multipolar world being more warlike are that in that situation local powers will go to war oftener, that these will escalate into something bigger and so may cause general conflict. Secondly, in a multipolar situation it is difficult to structure deterrence. Power balances are hard to maintain and so this may lead to wars in two ways: (a) aggression by two states; and (b) bullying of small state by a big power. The new order that is recommended is the one in which there is limited, and managed nuclear proliferation and the worst order would be a non-nuclear Europe. He suggests in the realist vein. "each state must always be concerned to ensure its own survival"³³ He concluded that the "demise of the Cold War order would increase the chances that war and major crisis will occur

in Europe"³⁴. As a remedy he suggests that the United States should encourage limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. In his argument, put bluntly, it means that Germany needs to be allowed to go nuclear; US. and Britain should retain forces that can be deployed in Europe to deter states that threaten to start a war. And finally concerted efforts should be made to keep hyper-nationalism at bay especially in Eastern Europe.³⁵

In this regard, Waltz explains that the proposition of the theory specify relationships between certain aspects of the system and actor behaviour. His formulation of structural realism as a systemic theory seeks to explain two elements of international structure as constant: (i) the international system is anarchic rather than hierarchic and (2) it is characterized by interaction among units with smaller functions. His third image realism or element of structure tries to draw corrections between the distribution of power in a system and the actions of states: small countries will behave differently from large ones, and in a balance of power system, alliances can be expected to shift in response to changes in power relationships. So the distribution of capabilities across the states in a system varies from system to system and over time. Since it is a variable, this element - the distribution of 'Power' - takes on particular importance in the theory. The most significant capabilities are those of the most powerful actors. He also says that structure is the principal determinant of outcomes at the systems level: structure encourages certain actions and discourages others. It may also lead to unintended consequences, as the ability of states to obtain their objections is constrained by the power of others. Basing

on these analysis, Waltz quite logically deduces the expected outcome namely the formation of balance of power.

He, as a systemic theorist deduces logically that multipolarity is structurally prone to instabilities, and the two major cases of this century illustrate his theory suitably. In multipolarity, argues Waltz, states are said to be structurally prone to either of two opposite errors that destabilize the balancing system. On the one hand, they may chain themselves unconditionally to reckless allied whose survival is seemed to be indispensable to the maintainance of the balance. This was the pattern of behaviour that led to world War-I. On the other hand, they may pass the buck, countering on third parties to bear the costs of stopping a rising hegemon. This was the pattern that preceded World War-II. So in creating a theory of international politics, Waltz is interested mainly in showing that a system of two is more stable than a system of many.³⁶ Thus the present transitory phase which is viewed either as unipolar moment or multipolar moment is needless to say, pretty unstable logically. Therefore, international realm is variously described as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, homogeneous, undirected, mutually adoptive and above all unstable. This neorealist position of Waltz has implied the continuation of balance of power between two opposed systems as a guarantee of peace. In his system there is need of only two powers to achieve the balance.

However, in the present era, the nature of conflict is not only military, which was used to be the most vital one. There are also economic, ecological, technological, and trade-related conflicts etc. Economic conflicts by the name of globalisation of commerce or interdependence is present most prominently in the

first world countries. There has been a trend, particularly among the most developed countries to sign trade related agreements in the present era, which has probably led the liberal optimists to put forth their theory of interdependence or argue in favour of it. Despite, conflicts or tensions are always involved in it in a concealed manner because foreign policies of different countries are determined according to the national interests respectively which tend to be varied from nation to nation and thus tensions will always be present. Besides, there are certain problems like the ecological problem, which is a problem of global concern, nations have to be interdependent to solve them out. But even then tensions are marked on the way different nations perceive this problems and the way they go about solving the problem individually. That is probably the reason why there has been north-south dialogue on environmental issue and even in the present ecological international summit, tension was more prominent than that of cooperation. Terrorism as an issue of global concern also invokes conflictual scenarios. These conflicts, however, arise out of different sources such as ineffective political processes, lack of proper strategies, narrow national interest, improper role of international organisation, lack of effective leadership etc. Thus, to explain the present international affairs liberal theory of interdependence seems inadequate.

Going on to explain the change in Soviet Foreign Policy, realists like Waltz said " In the 1970's the Soviet Union did not move to check its declining fortunes but tried only to fail in the 1980's. The US in the 80's concentrated on competing militarily and pointlessly with a moribund Soviet Union." International system according to Mearsheioner is on its way 'back to future.

Some others say that no fundamental change has occurred since international politics is still characterised by anarchy and bipolarity. Still some others say, the present system is unipolar but will inevitably lead towards multipolarity whatever the case is; the Soviet Union was the only other country that presented a serious threat to US's security when the US began its supportive moves and with its intercontinental nuclear missiles.³⁷ The South China sea is source of conflicts. ASEAN has no multilateral position on security. SAARC has no item of security on its agenda. Asia-Pacific Sea has the potential of future battle-field, for natural wealth resides here and military asserts can be hidden from satellites under water. Therefore, from Balkans to Asia-Pacific Sea the sources of varying form, intensity and duration of conflict are real. This could detract from the adequacy of the neo-liberal theory of interdependence.

In conclusion, it needs to be asserted that the current behaviour of the great powers is no different from the behaviour of the earlier powers in matters of restructuring the current world order through limited military actions, diplomacy, sanctions, advice, dialogue, exercise of diplomatic clout in matters that are not in accordance with the dominating wisdom of the omnipotent civilizational and military centre, the Judeau-Christian world. Geopolitics and strategy will remain strong as it has always persisted since the Treaty of Westphalia. Along with the desire for interdependence cooperation and peace, there shall be the compulsions of a balance of power, a strategy in the changed circumstances of the lack of the Russian capacity to dominate the Eurasian landmass and the predominance of the US Sea powers.³⁸

Thus states will continue to assert themselves in issues of national security even though the new liberal agenda of free market, fiscal austerity, civil liberties, less of political rights and social rights, transnational and subnational actors may claim its negation or its dilution. The continuation of the ad hoc international state(OECI) to police the advanced and the Third World on old principles of free market will lead to the growth of contradictions that are bound to create unsettling effects. However, the neo-liberal thinkers who have attempted to conceptualise the current moment as a moment of enlarged possibilities and a world of peace based on capitalism are definitely going to get a setback because their theory of interdependence is theoretically tentative and also is a critique of the realist and the neo-realist understanding of the dominance of international relations which emphasis on the continual chances of war. Their liberal optimism is reflected in looking at the emerging relations among states both as a process and as a structure. The structure is marked by the asymmetrical relationship between the hegemon and the subordinates and the process indicates that the relationship may be equalising. They underline the need of projecting subnational and transnational actors on the international stage more or less to the disadvantage of the state and state sovereignty. In so far as states regularly follow the rules and standards of institutions, they signal their willingness to continue patterns of cooperation and therefore reinforce patterns of nationality, interdependence, stability rather than national security and conflict. But the collapse of Second World is a collapse of the liberal socialist agenda. The future anomalies that will be generated owing to the operation of the new or conservative liberal principles, the temporary character of the

unipolar moment, and the neorealist argument about the continuation of conflict as a historically proven phenomenon will render interdependence inadequate. Issues like nuclearisation of other regions, instability of multipolar world, limits of cooperation among nations, and other similar issues will continue to dominate the international system. Interdependence have to be a subterranean trend and the issue of security will dominate the relations of states even though economic integration will continue to be the present pre-occupation among certain sections of national bureaucracies. Thus the world will not be a very different place to live in even in the present unipolar moment which may last two generation of fifty years if earlier history is any guide. Balance of power, strategy of difference, of nuclear deterrence, sea-space power consideration will determine the unit level actors even with the developing world's efforts to move for alternative restructuring of international relations.

Keeping all of this at the background, since the entire gamut of post World War-II relations among nations got directly or indirectly affected by the nature and intensity of relations between united States and Soviet Union, leaders and scholars of many a nation have begun to deliberate on and discuss the possible course of their relationship, particularly in the security and strategic dimension, with the two superpowers in the coming times. In this context, the security relations between India and United States in the pre-Cold War years is of prime importance, as a prelude to a discussion on the current bilateral relations.

SECTION - II

Indo-US relations since India's independence have been marked by a mix of continuities/discontinuities, similarities and dissimilarities, friendship/animosity and ups and downs. Washington's India policy in the early years of the post war period was targeted at preventing communist influence of any kind, especially closer relations between India and Soviet Union. Although India has all along maintained its democratic tradition and has even permitted communist parties to participate in democratic political process of the country, close relations between India and Soviet Union have been a political anathema to the US which were subsequently marked in issues like U.S.'s interpretation of NAM as neutralism, rejection of India's quest of industrialisation and mocking India's position in not joining military blocs, in the issues of Kashmir, Goa, PL-480 relationship etc. As the US policy makers were apparently disturbed at the growing Indo-Soviet cooperation over the years in various fields, the Indian rulers were clearly concerned about the US Policy towards Pakistan, and China. However, a marked improvement in Indo-US relations has been taken place, especially since the world began to witness rapid changes in the portico-security environment in the latter half of the 1980s. But what was the kind of security relations that India had with United States during the last 4 decades of the present century? In order to make a proper analysis, one perhaps ought to start with a brief journey into the past.

India is an old civilization but a new state. The United States of America is a new civilization, but an old state. The interaction between these new and

old civilisations at an intellectual and philosophical level predates the birth of an independent Indian State. But the relationship between these old and new states is of recent origin. As India achieved a decolonised democratic republic status in the aftermath of World War-II, the United States emerged from the same war as the most powerful nation in the world. That there will be divergence in the foreign policies and perceptions of a newly independent but potentially powerful state from that of a matured state with a newly acquired Superpower status, was clear. The soon mutual misperceptions of Indians and Americans that had existed before only exacerbated this divergence.³⁹ World War-II was still on when the strategic thinkers in the United States began to calculate how best to ensure the post war security interests in various parts of the world. Considerably confident of ultimate victory in the war and aware of the vital need of access to strategically located overseas bases for furtherance of US security interests, the strategic planners had began their study in the midst of the war. While occupying out their strategy in future, these planners had visualised the emergence of "militant Asia" or an "Asiatic -European coalition," that might hamper American interests in Pacific region.⁴⁰

At this time, uppermost in the minds of the Indian leaders was the massive task of nation-building, on the one hand, and the issues of colonialism and imperialism, on the other. Jawaharlal Nehru was clear in his mind that unless colonialism and imperialism ended and the newly independent countries stood on their own feet, no real progress in any field would be possible. In the first ever Asian political conference of the post-war period, known as the 'Asian Relations Conference', Pandit Nehru declared; "For too long have we of Asia

been petitioners in western courts and chancellors. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be playthings of others."⁴¹ After about two years, Nehru convened another conference of Asian countries to discuss the Dutch military action against the Indonesian nationalists. During this conference, partly as a reaction to the 'cooperative impulses' appearing in other parts of the world and partly with a view to minimising external influences, the Indian Prime Minister plotted a suggestion for the setting up of a machinery for Asian regional cooperation.⁴² An Indian proposal for the establishment of an 'Asian Cooperative Forum', surfacing at a time of consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and the imminent success of the Communist forces in the Chinese Civil War, perhaps created concern in Washington. The two conferences sponsored by India appeared as Pan-Asiatic tendencies to the Western eyes. These events strengthened further the apprehensions in Washington about the possible emergence of an unfriendly and 'militant Asia.' The added concern arose out of the fact that Asian (and later African) nationalism was primarily targeted against America's European allies whose cooperation in the ensuing Cold War against the Soviet Union and its allies was deemed essential. As a result, the role of Jawaharlal Nehru in the events that seemed to be harbingers of Pan-Asiaticism was bound to create strains in Indo-US security as well as political relations. With the intensification of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s and India's persistent policy of following a non-aligned path in international relations, Indo-US relations suffered many setbacks. New Delhi and Washington did not see eye to eye on a variety of

international issues such as the Japanese Peace Treaty, recognition of China and its membership in the United Nations, the Korean War, the Indo-China War, and the regional alliance systems like South-East Asia Treaty organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty organisation (CENTO).⁴³

While there was no meetings of minds on security and political issues between the Indian and American leaders, economic interaction between the two countries, along with the cultural ones continued throughout the Cold War period, the American economic assistance policy, in other words, had been designed to achieve certain politico-security goals. It was very difficult on part of America to ignore India, the large resource rich landmass with a massive population in South Asia sub-continent which 'dominates the vital communication lines between Europe and the Far East.'⁴⁴ A pro-western political and security orientation, if not on anti-communist one, of the people of this region was considered essential. Certain amount of economic aid to India which brought in the cooperation factor (in fields like agriculture infrastructure, nuclear plants, economic aid to private sector, food aid such as PL - 480 - the second grade hybrid wheat exported to India, as to many other countries) was granted to instill a pro-western orientation at best and to prevent a pro-soviet leaning in the least, of the government, as also the people at large. But in spite of the operation of the new or conservative liberal principles, the temporary character of the unipolar moment, the neo-realist argument about the continuations of conflict as a historically proven phenomenon will render interdependence inadequate. It is still the issue of security that will dominate the relations of the states in the present decade though economic integration will

continue to be the present pre-occupation among certain sections of national bureaucracies.

The most significant regional factor that was largely responsible for shaping the Indo-American mutual perceptions in the post-war period was, however, the ups and downs of US-Pakistan security cooperation. US was stepping into the British shoes now as elsewhere, at a time when the rising Cold War tension and the growing non-aligned movement stood as major obstacle in the development of a mutually beneficial trust between New Delhi and Washington, Pakistan was only too willing to align itself with the United States. The Pakistani ruling elites, otherwise unable to maintain a political identity of their country, had begun to perceive almost a perceptual threat emanating from New Delhi and seemed prepared to bear any political cost to strengthen Pakistan vis-a-vis India. While Washington viewed its security cooperation with Islamabad in Cold War terms, the latter, in spite of its membership in SEATO and CENTO, sought to give the impression that India, not the Soviet Union, was its principal enemy. The United States-Pakistan strategic relations have had a direct impact over the years on the state of Indo-American relations. New Delhi remained unconvinced of Washington's assurances that the US security cooperation with Pakistan was not targetted against India. However, during both the major wars fought between the two countries, Pakistan used all the weapons supplied to it by the United States. The US government did nothing to prevent the use of such weapons by Pakistan notwithstanding the assurance given earlier. However, the US government was very much aware of Pakistan's such intentions.⁴⁵ The United States took cautious steps during the Indo-Pakistan

wars and did not extend support to Pakistan's war efforts to the extent expected from an alliance partner. As a result, relations between United States and India never suffered a rift and continued through ups and downs. During the decade of the seventies, the socio-cultural relations and a modest degree of economic interaction went on between the two countries, but divergence of perceptions of political and security issues persisted, and now and then got accentuated. The Sino-Soviet rift, however, widened during this period with no signs of rapprochement. The Nixon Administration was cultivating China with the objective of using the latter as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. Pakistan, which had acted as the go-between in the process leading to Sino-American detente, was during this time, administering highly repressive policies in the erstwhile East-Pakistan. The crisis in East Pakistan had adversely affected India and a war climate was hanging over South Asia. The emergence of a hostile security environment in the region induced India and Soviet-Union to establish a stronger relationship to deal with the situation. Washington viewed with great suspicion India's closer relations with Soviet Union.⁴⁶

Thus, Indo-US security relations have never had a major defence component because the interests of United States in containing the USSR in South Asia always conflicted with those of India. It was during the decade 1979-89 that the Soviet presence and subsequent withdrawal from Afghanistan led to a fundamental restructuring of strategic relations in South Asia. Pakistan's geographical proximity to Afghanistan and its strong ties with the Islamic states of Middle East gave it an advantage vis-a-vis the United States that India did not have. Pakistan was perceived in 1981 by US Secretary of State,

Alexander Haig, as a strategic entity along with Iraq and Turkey. India, however, could not forge a defence relationship with USA, and hence, turned to the Soviet Union in 1963 for the Mig-21 aircraft for co-production. By contrast, the United States was unwilling to make available the F-104 aircraft. The United States defence department demands a General Security Military Information Agreement (GESOMIA) so that American weapons transferred to other countries do not leak to the USSR or any other country that is considered hostile to the US. India, till date, has not been able to accept GESOMIA as it conflicts with its policy of self-reliance in its defence production. For this reason, any future cooperation in defence between India and United States can only come about if the mutual conflicting positions on GESOMIA are clarified. These conflicting positions have somehow been ironed out in regard to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), aircraft that uses the general electric FE 404 engine. The policy of containment that Washington pursued in the past in regard to USSR has undergone a dramatic change. Gorbachev radically altered the policies in 1986, withdrawing the Soviet military forces from Afghanistan in February 1988. India's ambivalence on the role of the Soviets in Afghanistan guided by its own considerations of national interest caused irritants in the relations between Washington and New Delhi. The Indian national interests dictated that the continued presence of Soviet Military troops in Afghanistan would act as a pressure point on its adversary, Pakistan. The US perceived the need to contain the USSR so that it doesn't have designs beyond Afghanistan into the oil fields of the Gulf. For this reason, Pakistan was seen as playing a pivotal role.⁴⁷

A new dimension arose as a result of Iraq's intervention in Kuwait during Gulf War phase. The Gulf saw the rise of an autonomous semi-nuclear weapons power-Iraq. The Bush Administration choose to defuse the crisis in Gulf through military rather than diplomatic channels. A multinational military force with Pakistan cannot meet needs of the Arab's forces in the Gulf. Iraq as a secular modernised Islamic state threntened a conservative state like Saudi Arabia, Iraq has sided in the part with India rather than with Pakistan on Kashmir issue. For this reason, New Delhi as an independent non-aligned nation cannot have the same security perspective on the Gulf as Washington does, although the interim government of Chandra Sekhar allowed a refuelling of US aircrafts. However, Pakistan has sought to convert every regional crisis, be it Afghanistan or the Gulf, to military advantage through ties with the United States. Pakistan has not been able to get a security relationship with the United States akin to that of Israel, as yet. If it had, it would have got support in the event of a war with India. Instead, it has had to settle for two packages of military and economic aid, one for \$3.2 billion every five years (1986-90). It ties with Turkey for the third place in the list of countries that reveive aid from United States. However, of late, the winding down of the war in Afghanistan and the friction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme has caused some reaseament in Washington about the utility of Pakistan as a strategic actor in US foreign policy. The Bush Administration has not found it easy to overcome the Pressler Ammendment of 1985 in the Congress, which necessitates the annual ratification by the president that Pakistan has not developed a nuclear weapon.⁴⁸

The Pentagon's requirement of GESOMIA comes in the way of US military hardware transfer to India. India's desire for self-reliance has necessitated a policy for licensed production. It was towards the end of the seventies and beginning of the eighties, that cooperation in weapon technology became a facet of Indo-US relations. However, US perceptions of India, in certain influential quarters in the United States, have recognised the Indian capability to project its power beyond its shores, largely because of India's naval expansion. India has the largest navy among the Indian Ocean littoral states. An American military analyst once noted: "As part of India's overall military underpinning for India's claim of middle power status in the context of global interaction".⁴⁹ The former US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Fred Ikle was to observe some ten years ago: "India could be a power that contributes to world stability as the United States will see it, and went to shape it in 1995 and the year 2025, and a power with which we could work together with other major powers now to enhance our long term national security aims. And that, I think, is an exciting possibility that (opens) a new chapter in United States-India relations". Similarly, Richard Armitage, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, said at a briefing in advance of Secretary Weinberger's visit to India in 1986, "We recognise India as a regional power and a coming world power".⁵⁰ It was in recognition of this future potential that the US National Security Council (NSC) issued Decision Directive (NSDD) 147 on Oct-11, 1984. An inter agency department headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia and reviewed by a higher level group headed by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs made the first

formulation. NSDD 147 underlined to all concerned agencies the importance of building a better relationship with India, particularly by accommodating its request for sophisticated technology, subject to export controls. In the same month, the team went to New Delhi to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on technology transfer that had been under discussion between the two governments for quite some time. However, technology transfers under the MOU are still not problem free, subject as they are to delays because of interagency disputes in sensitive cases, with the result that all decisions are 'either expeditious or favourable'. A US Commerce Department Official concerned with the licensing process acknowledged that fears of leakage on account of India's Soviet connection remain a concern.⁵¹

When Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Washington in June 1985, he told reporters that India did not have sufficient confidence in the United States as an arms supplier because Washington could change its conditions retrospectively and there was no certainty about supply of spare parts. In an earlier interview with the 'Financial Times', London, on May 21, 1985, he had observed that "one or two defence items where we spent a long time talking to them (US), they put conditions that were just not acceptable to us".⁵²

A Pentagon team led by Talboll Lindstrom, Deputy Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, arrived in New Delhi in February 1981. This team went out at India's invitation to see for itself the country's capability to absorb military technology, and to discuss the possibilities for US cooperation in helping India develop an LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) for the 1990s. This team paved the way for former Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger and

his team to arrive in New Delhi in November 1986. New Delhi's interest in the LCA project stems from the American understanding that "some of the technology that India envisions is quite advanced, and it is certainly up with our F-16 and things of that nature".⁵³ India's own design and engineering capabilities are very limited when viewed in terms of the dimension of the task. For this reason, it needs an association with an experienced manufacturer of high performance fighters to advise on design problems and help in the evaluation of solutions for both the airframe and the gas turbine that is being developed at its power plant. India needs technology for subsystems because its military electronics industries are just getting into their stride. Washington has already taken an important step towards Indo-US defense cooperation by authorising General Electric to sell its F-404 engine, described as "the most recent Combat Aircraft Engine to go into full production". The United States became in the mid-eighties a major partner in the Indian defence programme in the sense that transfer of defence technology was no longer a problem, and would not create the same sense of alarm in Pakistan as the sale of complete ready-to-use weapons. However, it doesn't need stressing that the degree to which India should be accommodated is still an open question within the Pentagon. Amongst its bureaucrats still in Washington lurks the fear that India is a Soviet conduit for US technology. One influential editor of Washington Times, Amoud de Borchgrave, once argued that India's only aircraft manufacturer, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, with its division making Soviet MIGs has the potential of being Moscow's shopping cart.⁵⁴

The incipient military supply relationship between India and the United States will need to develop sufficiently to provide a basis for a broad political understanding. For this to happen, there must be an Indian willingness to take into account US strategic concerns with regard to South Asia. No longer is the Soviet threat going to be the guiding principle for the United States in this region but rather the utility of Pakistan in the military posturing in the Gulf. The Fahd family has used the Pakistan military in the past as a praetorian guard, as also for the massacre of Palestians at Tabuk on the Jordanian border. In 1980, Zbigniew Brezezinski, as the National Security Advisor to President Carter had aimed at an anti-Communist Islamic crescent that would thwart the USSR. In this crescent, Pakistan had a fundamental role to play. In 1981, Gen Alexander Heig, as US Secretary of State, envisioned a troika of Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan as a strategic consensus to strengthen US interest in the Gulf. All these concepts have since become defunct. The the then Army chief of Pakistan, General Mirza Beg, talked of a consensus involving Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Iraq has now become hostile to US interests. The United States has always valued the proximity of Pakistan to the 'wells of power' in the Persian Gulf (to use the phraseology of the late sir Olaf caroe). This concept of Pakistan has been a major determinant of US foreign Policies and several dictatorship in Islamabad manipulated both the executive (the President) & the legislature (the Congress) in the United States to circumvent the provisions of the Symington Amendment and thus obtain military and economic aid. Pakistan has, to date, not been able to overcome the provisions of the Pressler Amendment which makes it mandatory for the US President to clarify annually that Pakistan does not possess

a nuclear weapon. Only recently, the president had not been able to issue such clarification and, hence, military and economic aid to Pakistan has been held up. How far the need of US national security in the Gulf will override the Pressler Amendment remains to be seen.⁵⁵

Indo-US relations need no longer be subjected to the changing vicissitudes of Pakistan's and China's relations with Washington. There is clearly a need for establishing an autonomy in the relationship and this can come about only through trade and economic mutuality of interests. Recently, the Bush Administration had not taken a position on the Kashmir issue that may be considered hostile to Indian interests. Indian naval modernisation has not met with undue hostility from influential circles in Washington. The Reagan Administration Officials were to characterise India as a 'regional super power', a title that Indians themselves were not too keen to accept. Rather the kind of consumerism that Rajiv Gandhi's economic policies unleashed on India was more inclined towards seeking Washington's support for security loans from financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).⁵⁶ However, it needs to be stressed that the security and military dimension of foreign policy is one, that several institutions in the US, be it the Pentagon in the government or the Rand Corporation, have stressed. Precisely for this reason, India's image had become positive in the United States. The United States after the dawn of nuclear weapons and end of World War-II, has landed to stress coercive diplomacy in international relations. This was in evidence in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon or Granada, let alone the Southern Hemisphere. After the end of World War-II, the United States inherited the

mantle of the European Colonial Power. India, by contrast, took Nehru's policy, and hence, supported the process of decolonisation all across the globe. But Non-alignment was a movement that was not backed by virtual military force and hence, it remained an anathema to several US administrations until ironically, the Reagan Administration took over. However, the Regan Administration remained mired in its Cold Warrior policies whose sole objective was the containment of the USSR. The collapse of the monolithic ideology of Communism in the USSR has no rational basis, it came about due to historical necessity. However, the emergence of autonomous powers like Iraq with chemical and possibly nuclear weapons, has added to new rationale to US Cold Warriors who saw the demise of the USSR as a dream come true. Even though India has never been part of priority formulation for the United States, the ripples of Cold War confrontation were indeed felt in South Asia where India and Pakistan are the principal military actors. Now that Gorbachev by his unilateralist and dynamic foreign policy has changed the course of the world, there is left on the world stage a single Superpower-the United States-that remains committed to the use of force but is one that is deeply constrained from doing so because the world has changed dramatically and it no longer enjoys economic monopoly. Except Britain, no European nation was interested in getting involved in theatres "out of NATO". For this reason, the United States had to rely on militarily important states like Egypt, and Pakistan to advance its course in Gulf. Israel had a special security relationship with United States and is capable of acting quite autonomously.⁵⁷

Indo-US relations have not as yet faced any stresses as a result of the Gulf crisis inspite of India's interest in its citizens in Kuwait. The United States resorting to the bombing of the Iraq's has left no way for a Third World country to condone such an act. For this reason, there can never be any real security cooperation between India and United States. For there are fundamental constraints to Indo-American ties: (a) India's adherence to Nehruvian concepts of Non-alignment in its foreign policy and hence, a refusal to participate in a US sponsored security alliance; (b) US arming of Pakistan, in spite of its producing nuclear weapons. It needs stressing here that any US attempt to sell arms to India or engage with it in the co-production of weapons would provoke a strong reaction from Pakistan. Further more, the developments in the Gulf would mean that US would continue to rely on Pakistan, which in turn, would mean that the latter can effectively lobby through the Saudis in the Congress to stop the sale of US defence technology to India. If there had been no Gulf crisis, the Cold War and the containment of the USSR could no longer have been an issue for Pakistan to exploit against India. For this reason, so long as this crisis persists, India has to weigh its military options in so far as the modernisation of its weapons is concerned. The USSR will not in long run continue to supply weapons on terms and conditions favourable to India. In fact, in future deals it may well demand payments in foreign exchange.⁵⁸

The last four decades and more have witnessed many ups and downs in US-India relations. Now that the Cold War in the traditional sense of the term has come to an end, the scenario that is likely to emerge in the relations between the worlds two largest democracies possess significance. Though the Cold War

in the traditional sense is over, the left-over of the Cold War would perhaps remain for many more years to come. In a given regional set up like Indian sub-continent, the Cold War has left behind a very complex situation. An 'arms race culture' - a byproduct of the Cold War in the region has taken deep roots. Hence in the post Cold war years, the US will have to reconsider its notion of "traditional allies" or even "the most allied of allies in Asia". The days of making waivers of the Glenn and Symington Amendments cannot be logically repeated in the present political environment. Changing times and circumstances inevitably call for a process of retrospection.

Over the years, the Cold War at a larger level between the superpower has shown the seeds of regional Cold Wars in the sub-continent as a result there has been the Cold War politicization of regional bilateral disputes. But more than this, forging of a strategic military relationship between the United States and Pakistan in 1954 adversely affected the prospects of Indo-US relations. This particular event not only brought the Cold War to India's doorsteps but also demonstrated a firm commitment by the United States to Pakistan in its effort to gain military parity with India which complicated Indo-US relations to a great extent. It was also supplemented by event such as the decision of the US government in 50s and 60s to vote in favour of Pakistan in UN security council on Kashmir issue, U.S. tilt towards Pakistan in both 1965 & 1971 war, the transfer of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan by United States in the eighties after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the decision to waive the Symington Amendment, ignoring Pakistan's nuclear activities. Besides, the US policy towards the Indian Ocean from mid-sixties, beginning with the construction and

development of a military base in Diego Garcia and the decision to acquire a string of bases in Indian Ocean during the seventies, ran counter to India's geo-strategic interests in the region. US's Indian Ocean policy was perceived to be in conflict with India's geo-politics & security interest, which contributed to a deterioration in Indo-US bilateral relations. Differences in perception, strategy over different issues have also led to the divide in the bilateral relations. Another core area of friction since the 60s has been the question of nuclear proliferation. The US has been asking India to sign the NPT in some form or the other but India has been consistently opposing NPT being unequal & discriminatory & has refused to sign both the NPT treaty and even the recent CTBT. Indo-US relations during the last four decades have also differed because of India's leading role in the struggle against the forces of neo-colonialism in general and specifically over such issues as the leading policies of the World Bank and the role of American Multinationals in India's development Programme. The successful efforts of US Administration under Reagan in the eighties to shift the North-South dialogue from the UNCTAD (a forum which was to the advantage of India and the other Third World nations) to the GATT forum (where the North could pressurize the developing countries to concede to the Priorities of the North) added fresh inputs to an already vitiated atmosphere of Indo-US relations. However, after the end of Cold War, the evolution of Indo-US security will greatly depend on how Sino-Soviet relations will be with Pakistan whose ties with Islam are of great value for both the former antagonists. In the present stage of transition, India has the opportunity to practise genuine non-alignment and open defence and security ties with

Washington. Thus, before going on to examine the security ties between New Delhi and Washington in the post Cold War phase, i.e., 1989 onwards, one should have conceptual clarity about the very term security and the perceptions that both these countries have regarding the security dimension of each other respectively.

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3

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

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Contemporary international affairs are presently marked by dynamism, a process of decentralisation of power understood as the ability to influence other to act in a given way or to shape the course of international relations in general. There is also every indication that such a trend will continue in the foreseeable future. New centres of political, economic and even military power are springing up at a regional level, either as individual countries whose power and influence are growing, or as groups of countries presently undergoing integration. Such trends are particularly apparent in Western Europe, the European Community, in Asia & Pacific in general, while China, Japan & India could be cited as examples of countries whose political star is ascending. Prevailing politics - military doctrines in these countries have, if anything, intensified war and conflicts rather than restrain or restrict them. The strong linkage between these doctrines and military technology would tend to suggest that with the inevitable growth of technology and intensification of war, armed conflicts is likely to keep increasing. The industrialised countries have come to depend heavily on nuclear weapons and the concomitant doctrines of nuclear deterrence to provide security. The rationalization and perpetuation of the politico-military doctrines based on offensive capabilities inevitably tend to push them towards wider adoption and universalisation of the doctrines and capabilities supporting them. This has been the fundamental reason for proliferation of nuclear weapons since 1945; and increasing number of states seek to find security through the means and methods adopted by the industrialized states in general and nuclear weapon powers in specific.

Given the background of such developments, it has become very much necessary to understand the concept of security in a detailed manner. Although a

concept that is crucial to an understanding of international politics as is the case with most fundamental concepts, security is ambiguous and elastic in its meaning. In the most fundamental sense, to be secure is to feel free from threats, anxiety, or danger. Security is therefore, a state of mind in which an individual whether the highest political leader of the land or the average citizen, feels free from harm by others. Used in this way, a state (or its leaders and citizens) believes itself secure when it feels that nothing adverse can be done to it by other states or by other foreign non-state actors. To define security in this fashion is to see that it is a subjective state of mind, not an objective condition of being. It describes how people feel, not whether are justified in feeling the way they do. In this sense security depends on the perceptions people have of their position in their environment, not on an objective view of that environment.

This subjectivity explains why security can encompass so many things. What makes one individual feel secure may not be sufficient to make another feel so. Individuals differ in their tolerance for uncertainty, their ability to live with anxiety and their capacity to cope with pressure. One person's security can well be another's insecurity. Furthermore, although individuals differ in what makes them feel secure or insecure, most experience neither perfect security nor absolute insecurity. Rather, the subjective sense of security or insecurity varies along a continuum. Security therefore is not a matter of either or - either one has it or one does not; rather, it is a matter of degree, of feeling more or less secure, more or less insecure. What is true of individuals is true of states. States are not perfectly secure or completely insecure, but rather experience either condition in degrees. For both individuals and states then, security is a condition that comes in shades of gray not hues of black and white.

The concept of security binds together individuals, states and also international system, so closely that it demands to be treated in a holistic perspective. Although some sense can be made of an individual security,

national security and international security as ideas in their own right, a full understanding of each can only be gained if it is related to the other two. Attempts to treat security on any single level invite serious distortions of perspective. The security of an individual is locked into an unbreakable paradox in which it is partly dependent on, and partly threatened by, the state. Individuals can be threatened by their own state in a variety of ways, and they can also be threatened through their state as a result of developments in international system. The connections not only run from the higher level to the lower but also vice versa. Pressures from individual bear upwards strongly into national security and through their impact on the state also influence the international system. Individuals can pose threats to the state and if these are serious and numerous enough, they can corrode the existence of the state as a meaningful entity. Individuals constitute an important part of the amorphous referent object of national security at state level and as such play their role in general process of security policy making. The question of national security cannot be reduced to the individual level because each of the other levels has characteristics which make it more than the sum of its parts. For this reason the tension between individual level and other levels is a permanent feature.

National security makes only limited sense as an ideas confined to state level. The self-help image of the state as an actor trying to use its own resources to reduce its vulnerability in the face of threats provides only a narrow view of the national security problems. While such a view can accommodate much, though not all, of the interaction between individual and state, it heavily discounts the vital elements of the problem which lie between state and international system. To consider states as the prime focus of the national security problem is mainly useful because it concentrates attention on the principal sources of policy. But the problem which the policy seems to address can only be defined in terms of the state-system nexus as a whole. Patterns in

the structure and dynamics at the system level defined many essentials of the national security problem and hence patterns are largely conditioned by the character and behaviour of states. In the economic front however, both liberal and mercantilist economic structures generates conflict and insecurity and so substantial changes in the actors at state level is imperative to create alternative economic orders. In all these analyses it seems that the security problem of states cannot be properly assessed without reference to the system and the character and dynamics of the systems cannot be understood without reference to states.¹

However, we cannot expect the concept of national security to exhibit much unity of meaning in any general sense. The meaning of security will be nearly as diverse as the condition of the different states to which it applies which not only adds to our difficulties in analysing the concept but also adds a hazard to its use in any general sense at all.² Because of this diversity, the nature of security as a problem, necessarily differs substantially from state to state. All states are to some degree vulnerable to a military and economic threats and many also suffer from a fundamental political insecurity. The different components of the state appear vulnerable to different kinds of threat which makes national security a problem in many dimensions rather than just a matter of military defence. The idea of the state, its institutions and even its territory can all be threatened as much by the manipulation of ideas as by the wielding of military power. Since the ideas underpinning the state are themselves subject to evolution, the problem is not only difficult to solve but may even be hard to identify. The multi-layered nature of the state opens it to threats on many levels, particularly vulnerabilities abilities depending on the unique structure and circumstances of the state concerned. This diversity of states as referent objects for security makes clear the diversity of national security problems. It is also clear that states vary not only in respect of their status as powers but also in

respect of their weakness or strength as members of the category of states. When the idea and institutions of a state are both weak, that state is in a very real sense less of a state than one in which the idea and institutions are strong.

The argument here is that the external perspective distorts the view in relation to national security by covering over the domestic security dimension. National security cannot be considered apart from the internal structure of state and the view from within not infrequently explodes the superficial image of the state as a coherent object of security. A strong state defines itself from within and fills and gap between its neighbours with a solid political presence. A weak state may be defined more as the gap between its neighbours with little of political substance underlying the facade of internationally recognised statehood. Since the object itself is so tenuous, the concept of national security lacks among referents other than basic territoriality. So, behaviour within the state can be understood better in terms of individual and sub-group security than in terms of national security. National security properly refers to the relationship of the state to its environments & becomes profoundly confused to the extent that the state is insecure within itself. In other words, the concept of national security can only be applied sensibly to the external side of the states' Hobbesian security functions. Unless the internal dimension is relatively stable as a prior condition, the image of the state as a referent object for security fades into a meaningless blur.³

These internal and external dimensions of the state however, generates different kinds of threats to the concept of national security. Invasion and blockades clearly fall within the category, but there is a broad gray area between these obvious threats & the normal difficulties of international relations. Should threats to fish stocks or weak industries be considered threats to national security? or should illegal immigration, or the promulgation of unpopular political views? Unless the answers to these questions with clarity are got, it is

difficult to establish a firm basis on which national security policy can be assessed. The different character of the components which go to make up the state suggest that threats to the state can come in a variety of types. These types can be classified by sector as military, Political, economic and ecological.⁴

Military threats occupy the traditional heart of national security concerns. Military action can and usually does threaten all the components of the state. It subjects the physical base to strain, damage and dismemberment. It can result in the distortion or distraction of institutions, and it can repress, subvert or obliterate the idea of the state. Military actions not only strike at the very essence of the state's basic protective functions but also threaten damage deep down through the layers of social and individual interest which underlie and are more permanent than the states superstructures. Since, the state is more a social entity, an idea, than it is a physical being, the use of force threatens to overthrow a self-created rule by consent and replace it with an imposed rule by coercion. For all these reasons, and also because the use of force can wreak major undesired changes very swiftly, military threats have normally been accorded the highest priority in national security concerns. Military action can wreak the work of centuries in the political, economic and social sectors and as such stimulates not only a powerful concern to protect achievements in these sectors but also a sense of outrage at unfair play. Difficult accomplishments in politics, art and all human activities can be undone by the use of force. Human achievements in other words, are threatened in terms other than those in which they were created and the need to prevent such threats from being realised is a major underpinning of the state's military protection function. Military threats come in many types, not all quite as drastic as the picture sketched above. At the most extreme end are threats of invasion and occupation aimed at obliterating the state. Invasion and occupation may have less drastic objectives, merely loss of some territory or a change in idea and institutions, or both. In all such ones

the state is not destroyed and although its institutions, organising ideology and territory may be altered, its national identity, in the strict sense, may not be severely attacked. Military threats may also be in the form of punishment; the objective here usually being to force a change in government policy rather than to seize territory or to overturn institutions. Nuclear deterrence is built on this principle. The range of possible effects here is great; for threats of damage can be of nuclear obliteration at one end of the spectrum or the harassment of fishing boats at the other. Military threats can also be indirect in the sense of not being applied to the state itself but rather being directed at external interests. Threats to allies, shipping lanes or strategically-placed territories would all come under this heading and the current western concern over the security of oil supplies is a good illustration. Military threats occupy a special category precisely because they involve the use of force. The use or threat of force implies a breach of normal peaceful relations. In that sense, it involves the crossing of an important threshold which represents the normal interplay of political, economic and social sectors from the much less restrained competition of war. The existence of this threshold goes a long way towards explaining the disproportionate emphasis given to military security at a time when threats in other sectors appear to offer greater and more immediate danger.⁵

In the international system, as Robert Osgood points out, "the primary instrument of order-armed forces is also the primary threat to security."⁶ This paradox underpins the widely held view that military power lies at the heart of the national security problem. States in an anarchy⁷ require it both for their own security and for purposes of system arrangement. But once acquired, it generates a counter-security dynamic of its own which threatens both individual states and the system as a whole. Osgood argues that, "force must be as essential to international politics in an anarchy as election are to domestic politics in an organised democracy."⁸ Hedley Bull supports this view from a

different angle by arguing that "the international order is notoriously lacking in mechanisms of peaceful change, notoriously dependent on war as the agent of just change."⁹ Michael Howard draws the bottom line on the matter arguing that, "force is an ineluctable element in international relations not because of any inherent tendency on the part of man to use it but because the possibility of its use exists. It has thus to be deterred, controlled, and if all else fails, used with discrimination and restraint".¹⁰

Now, the deployment of military instruments by states give rise to the problem of war which is intimately related to the problem of national security. When one talks of the national security problem, one has to take into consideration the two important struggles which are central to its understanding. These two struggles are; one is the power struggle which is reflected in the realist view of international system and the other is the security struggle, reflected in a more moderate view of international system. Their dynamics and the power-security dilemma which their interaction creates, express the essence of the military dimension of the national security problem. Besides, another related dilemma which possesses a distinct logic of its own, is known as the defence dilemma.¹¹

The defence dilemma arises not from the dynamics of relations among states although these do contribute to it, but from the nature and dynamics of military means as they are developed and deployed by states. It arises from inconsistencies and contradictions that exist between military defence and national security. Armed forces are justified principally by their necessity for national security and it is often assumed, particularly for reasons of political expediency, that military might is positively correlated with national security. The defence dilemma can come in several forms but the most serious forms of defence dilemmas occur when military measures actually contradict security. These threats can take the forms of economic damage, or social & political

dislocation, caused by military mobilisation beyond the state's needs or capabilities. The whole system of nuclear deterrence is the clearest example of a defence dilemma arising from the risk assumed in an overall defence policy. The defence dilemma arises because technological developments have inflated military means to such an extent that a general threat of destruction is the only military logical means of providing national defence. The defence dilemma, in other words has paralysed military relations among the nuclear powers, thereby forcing them to find ways other than war to manage their rivalries.¹²

On the other hand, power-security dilemma is a combination of two extremes, viz. power and security and they represent completely different conceptualisations of how and why the international system functions as it does.¹³ The fundamental distinction requires us to treat the two struggles separately in relation to our central problem of national security. These two struggles can be distinguished by the different explanations of conflict on which they are based. The distinction is an important one and despite the fact that the security struggle originates from realist writers, it correlates closely with the difference in view between realists and idealist which has long divided the field of international relations. But idealists have mostly chosen not to orient their thinking around the idea of security, preparing instead the broader and more popular idea of peace. Just as realists have subsumed security under their preferred idea of power, idealists have subsumed it under peace. Despite the fact that idealist struggle fits closely with the Idealist pre-disposition to see conflict more as a structural, perceptual and resolvable problem than as the intentional and permanent feature which it is in the realist view. At its most extremes the choice is between two views of international relations: on the one hand, as a ceaseless struggle for survival and dominance among states motivated by the pursuit of power and on the other hand, as a tragic struggle for security by

states trapped in a system which distorts their legitimate efforts at self-protection into a seamless web of insecurity and conflicts.

These two resultant struggles are however, inseparably connected in a variety of ways and for this reason they must be considered as a single dilemma. At least three considerations link the power and security struggles together. First is the fact that both represent essentially political problems which underlies the defence dilemma. Second is the link created by the role which defence plays in both the struggles. A desire for defence can be imputed as a prime motive underlying the two, the problem being that defence can be interpreted to cover a wide range of activities. Third, and related to the previous point, is the link created between the two in the real world by the fact that the international system as a whole can seldom be characterised purely in terms of one or the other. While some relations within it will fit the power model, others will fit the security model. Neither model can safely be used to generate assumptions which are sound enough to serve as a basis for policy. These two models are frequently difficult to distinguish from one another in practice. Two useful approaches to this confusion are first, to look at the nature of the actors in the system in terms of the traditional distinction between status quo and revisionist states; and second, to examine the nature of weapons and the military balance. Both of these approaches offer insights into the power and security struggles which help to explain why, what appear to be so clear in theory becomes so murky in practice. These approaches illuminate why the power security dilemma is such a central component of the national security problem. The dilemma is between two choices or perspectives each of which implies a deeply rooted and persistent source of threat.¹⁵

Thus, military threats as we have seen above occupy the traditional heart of national security concerns. However, military threats usually have political objectives (seizure of territory, change of government or institutions,

manipulation of policy or behaviour), but some political objectives can also be pursued by political means. The idea of the state, particularly its organising ideology, and the institutions which express it, are the normal targets of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, it may fear political threats as much as military ones. This is particularly so where the ideas and institutions are internally contested, for in such cases the state is likely to be highly vulnerable to political penetration. Even when the state is both strong and powerful, political threats might still be a sources of concern. Political threats stem from the great battle of ideas, information and traditions which is the underlying justification for the international anarchy. In the 20th century, liberal, democratic, fascist and communist political ideas contradict each other in practice just as much as monarchic and republican ideas did in the 19th century. As these competition among ideologies is extraordinarily complex, it becomes very difficult to define exactly what should be considered a political threat. Because of this difficulty, political threats almost always involve the confusion between domestic and national security. Political threats can be intentional. It can also be structural, which is so say that they result more from the nature of the situations than from the particular intentions of one actor towards another. The structural political threats arise when the organising principles of two states contradict each other in a context, where the states cannot simply ignore each others existence. Their political systems thus play a zero-sum game with each other whether they will it or not. The achievements and successes of one, automatically erode the political structure of the other and this often leads naturally enough to more intentional forms of political threat.¹⁶ For example, India and Pakistan offer a particularly tragic case of structural political threat. Their historical, geographic and cultural ties do not allow them to ignore each other, but their organising principles pose a permanent threat to each other; a threat amplified by the fact that both states are politically

vulnerable. Thus, the political threats posed to each other by India and Pakistan clearly define a central element in the national security problem of each of them, and illustrate the extensive ground for confusion between internal politics and national security.¹⁷

Economic threats are more difficult to relate to national security than military and political ones, because the normal condition of actors in the economic domain is one of risk, competition and uncertainty. If insecurity in the economic domain is the normal condition, then it is difficult to locate the boundary at which issues acquire special status as threats to national security. Furthermore, the state is often only one among many levels of economic actor and its responsibilities and interest are not as clear in the economic sector as they are in the political and military ones. Economic threats are more narrowly bound than military ones, in that they operate only against the economy of the target state. However, a huge number and variety of economic threats exist which cannot reasonably be construed as threats to national security, rather they all fall within the merciless norms of competitive economic activity. Specific economic threats to national security are hard to distinguish from the pitfalls of normal economic competition, but two cases do stand out. The first involves the traditional links between economic factors and military capability. In a general sense, military capability rests on economic performance, but this level is too broad to deal with interest of economic threats. More specifically, military capability rests on the supply of key strategic materials and where these must be obtained outside the state, threats to security of supply can be classified as a national security concern. The second case is of more recent concern and involves what might loosely be called economic threats to domestic stability. These occur when states pursue economic strategies based on maximisation of welfare through extensive trade. However, economic threats do resemble an attack on the state in the sense that conscious external actions by others result in

materials loss and in strain on various institutions of the state. The parallel with a military attack cannot be sustained, however, because while a military attack crosses a clear boundary between peaceful and aggressive behaviour, an economic 'attack' does not. Economic threats might thus be seen not so much as emanating from the iniquitous acts of foreigners, but as steaming from inept play on the part of those responsible for managing the nation's economic affairs.¹⁸

Threats to national security might also come in ecological forms in the sense that environmental events, like military and economic ones, can damage the physical base of the state, perhaps to a sufficient extent to threaten its ideas and institutions. Traditionally ecological threats have been seen as natural and therefore, not part of national security concern. But with increases in the scale, diversity and pace of human activity, however, ecological threats to one state might well stem identifiably from activities within another. Trans-frontier pollution is an obvious example and attempts at whether modification is an example which may become of greater importance in the not too distant future. There is a substantial domestic side to this problem in the self-polluting activities of states, but this can usually be distinguished from external threats. Ecological threats may appear to deserve a relatively low priority compared with the other forms of threat, but some of the more extreme scenarios (greenhouse effects and melting polar caps, diminution of oxygen supply through ocean poisoning and deforestation) have enough plausibility to command attention. They raise interesting and important questions about how national security should be viewed, both in temporal terms and in terms of priorities.¹⁹

Threats to national security can also be differentiated along a number of other dimensions than the sector in which they come. It can vary as to source. They may come from an internal source as in case of secessionist movements, or more likely, they may come from one of a variety of external sources. But

these threats are all regarding set of conditions faced by any particular state. While this perspective is useful for illuminating one side of the national security policy problem, it largely ignores the deeper causes and dynamics of threat which lie beyond the state in the international system as a whole. Any sound security policy must address threats in both these ways: dealing with them as they come, like reducing vulnerability by preparing defence against invasion, on the one hand; and dealing with their causes, like seeking peaceful settlement of the dispute, on the other. For this reason, we must know about the security at international system level.

International security can only be understood in a narrow sense by reference to the system structure as an object of security. It is this sense which is meant when the balance of power is said to serve the security of the international anarchy. The balance of power can work to preserve the anarchic structure over all, without serving the security interests of any particular state. Those meanings of national and international security which are restricted tightly to states and system level respectively do have their uses. But it is in the nexus between them that we find the real substance of national security problem. Taken by themselves, they produce an image of the security problem that is so distorted as to be more misleading than helpful. In relation to the concept of security, strict observance of the levels of analysis, conventions weaken analysis because the space between the levels is as important as the levels themselves. To argue that the levels should not be treated in isolation, but instead be approached as different ends of a single phenomenon, is not to suggest that each level is merely the sum of its parts. The wholly laudable attempt to clarify the basis of theory by specifying the level of analysis should not be allowed to obscure the connections which range across the levels and bind them into a single phenomenon. The levels are worth identifying because they represent an analytical synthesis which expresses something more than the form of its parts.

The focus on the 'something more' and to discount or ignore the fact that it rests on 'the sum of its parts', is to risk a division of analysis which is at odds with the fundamental wholeness and continuity of events.

Thus, the concept of security can only be understood by reintegrating the levels. The individuals, states and the international system do not provide three distinct, separable categories of referent object for concept of national security. The full richness and meaning of the concept is to be faced in the inter play among them. Major security phenomena like terrorism, deterrence simply cannot be understood properly without a full appreciation of their sources, effects and dynamics at and among all three levels. The national security problem turns out to be a systematic security problem in which individuals, states and the system all play a part. From this reintegrated holistic perspective the three levels appear more useful as viewing platforms from which they appear as self contained areas for policy or analysis.²⁰

However, it is fundamental that each nation has its own security policy and its own interests. But the world as a whole has interests and as in any larger political entity constructed from lesser but self conscious units, the general interest supports some elements of each particular interest and opposes or confines others. It may be widely accepted that there is an international security interest, but there is little agreement about how it is to be discovered & implemented. However, the concern that states have for their security stems from the nature of the international political environment in which states exist. International politics is characterised by the absence of an effective government above states that has the authority and the power to make laws, to enforce them, and to resolve disputes among states. International politics is anarchic because there is no world government. In such an anarchic realm, states must be concerned first and foremost with their security - the extent to which they feel unthreatened by the actions of others. With no government to look to for

protection, they must rely on their own efforts. A concern for survival thus breeds a preoccupation with security. This scenario in international field has given rise to the balance of power system. However, the hypothesis of the effort behind an international security system should be that states do not want a war; and if they get into one they would soon enough want to be extricated from it; and that the business of international society is to give permanent, effective and practical life to the common interest.

Security can be used as an organising principle in international relations that combines the concern for national interests of the realists with the concern for global human interests of the idealists. Structural violence, the unintentional loss of life due to unjust social conditions has caused many more available deaths than wars and must be an important aspect of security studies. Greater security cannot be achieved by military defence alone, but must also address the underlying causes of conflicts and ways to reduce non-military dangers to security. International law, economics, sociology and many other disciplines offer important insights in addition to the more traditional fields concerned with security studies, such as strategic studies and international relations. True security cannot be achieved at the expense of security for others. Security is indivisible in a triple sense. First, if a state wishes to achieve lasting security, it must satisfy the human rights of its citizens, otherwise they may sooner or later revolt. second, it must seek to reassure other states that it poses no threat to their security, otherwise they may wish to eliminate that threat. Third, it must live in peace with nature, otherwise pollution and resource shortages will take their toll.²¹

At a minimum level, the ability to enjoy a reasonable degree of security requires that a state be certain either that it can dissuade other states from attacking it or that it can successfully defend itself if attacked. A Concern for security immediately gives rise to a focus on the military power, the state has

relative to that of others. In the pre war period military threats took pride of place in the hierarchy of national security priorities. In the real world, military threats posed the most direct, immediate and visible danger to state security, and military means have frequently proved useful against both military and non-military threats. State military forces provided protection against unfair threats of force and in the process, maintenance of an adequate military establishment itself became a national security interest. History is however, full of heroic examples of military force being used to save cultural, political and economic values from violent overthrows. Military factors had dominated national security considerations and national defence had, at least until later half of 80's been almost synonymous with national security. Trade was not crucial to national survival, and to a considerable extent could be protected by military means. External threats were primarily military in nature, and the available military technology meant that they were slow moving. Ideology and economic interdependence scarcely existed as issues of political significance. State's principal military need was to defend its domestic universe from disruption by external military attacks or internal disorder. In the national defence orientation, the emphasis was primarily on the state and its military capabilities, taking likely rivals into account, and on the balance of power dynamics of the international system.

But after 1945/ World War-II, advances in military technology had undercut the idea of national defence dramatically. The declining viability of national defence as a solution to the problem of national security produced very different experiences all over the world. Because of the marked contrast in their geostrategic attributes, the European Countries and United States faced quite different orders of threat from military action by their enemies. In Europe, the growing contradiction between national defence and national security had been made apparent by the World War-I and became increasingly obvious with new

weapons developments and of course, with the advent of nuclear weapons thereafter.²² Besides, the industrialisation of war had made society inclusive to the war and conflict paradigm. This has had far reaching consequences for human progress and peace. Coupled with the evolution of politic-military doctrines which are essentially offensive in nature, the threat to human society at large, especially with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, has been hanging like the "Sword of Damocles" during this period. So much so that the human race is virtually existing on the edge of cataclysmic disaster, where even a minor shift in technology, doctrine or human perception could unleash a global holocaust. There was a universally felt need to seek ways to step back from the precipice and evolve more durable and constructive paradigms of security. This can only be done by reshaping the politico-military doctrines to seek a positive relationship between the security of all states.

In recent years, however, the concept of national security has attracted attention of scholars and statesman from the Third World both as an analytical and as a management formulation. The body of literature on Third World national security is generally produced in the west and as a result they seem to rely on the western experience to understand and apply national policy and security. Though, the literature has focused chiefly on the military dimension, especially threat perception of contending elites, doctrinal responses, security resources, and capabilities to meet external threats to the state, it seems to have underestimated the salience and impact of domestic political structure and policy making, economic & technological aspect, domestic & social aspects as well as problems in the ever expanding populations and the severe eco-political pressure effecting the Third World. Most of the literature on Third World national security focuses on the fact that the superpowers and medium-sized powers establish the agenda of international issues & determine directly or indirectly the parameters and the type & intensity of interactions in the international system.

The rest of the world, including the Third World, is simply the backdrop for the competition of the superpowers and medium-sized powers and is relegated to the status of clients who benefit or suffer commensurately with their protectors. Consequently, it is essential to understand the dynamics of the general and local balances of power in order to describe, explain and prescribe the national security policies of developing countries.

In the conventional view, the stronger the military power, the better the security posture. Indeed, military strength often considered almost synonymous with national security in simplistic analyses. But in Third World, three factors can be cited which limit the application of the conventional approach. They are contextual differences, nation-state maturity and variation in national values. The contextual differences stem from a set of internal and external conditions unique to developing countries. Most Third World nations, trapped in a complex vortex of local, regional and above all superpower rivalry are faced with a lot of difficulties as far as external security environment is concerned. This situation is exacerbated by external weakness. Being exploited by developed countries and often small in size they are unable to accumulate the physical power needed to alter or protect themselves from external conditions. Such a setting makes Third World insecurity more real and pressing. External weakness is aggravated in part by economic backwardness. In short, the security environments and external weaknesses combined with economic backwardness clearly differentiate the Third World security context from that of the west. It is this difference that shapes the modalities by which national values are perceived and identified and policies determined and implemented. In most of the Third World countries, however, the link between state and nation is still in the process of formation, very few have completed the process of nation building in a single political & territorial entity. In this context, though national security concerns are dominated by conventional terms, several other values also

play a role in the security concerns of Third World such as economic well being, prosperity, national integrity, communal harmony, domestic order & tranquility & prestige etc.... These multiplicity of national values produce security dimension more diverse in the Third World than in the west. Though the conventional conception of national security has a face validity across most developing countries, other dimensions of national security also play a role such as the economic dimension, the growing ecological scarcity of resources and the implications of this phenomenon for the organic survival of a national population, organic survival as a national security concern, social & political or domestic integration as a concern etc. These multiple dimension of Third World national security needs to be dealt with carefully because of the threats associated with them such as the military threat or external threat, economic well-being threat, ecological threat, organic threat, socially produced threats, domestic threats etc. These threats, however, require varying types of capability and policy response because policy capacity reflects the perception, decision and implementation of security policies. It is through the policy capacity of a nation-state that national values are defined, threats and vulnerabilities are perceived and assessed, resources are allocated, and options are screened, selected and implemented. So, in trying to elucidate Third World security needs, one has to give special attention to effective policy capacity.²³

Now, we are witness to dynamic changes that are occurring in improved international relations. The changes are extensive and complex. The world's detente has been restored and revived. The easing of international tensions is reflected in positive developments of dialogues, negotiations and cooperation between rival sides. With the end of Cold War, there has been a growing interest in expanding the discussion about security to include non-military dangers. While military aggression remains a serious threat, as recent-events have again shown; it is only one among many dangers that cause human

suffering or pose a risk to human lives. Furthermore, a whole range of military approaches can be used to guard against both military and non-military dangers to security. In present era, the supporting conditions for the idea of national defence are deteriorating rapidly by the end of Cold War. Economic activity has expanded beyond national and empire boundaries to such an extent that military means could no longer protect all the main elements of the national economic interest. Not only does it reveal the extent of economic interdependence, but ariel bombing and maritime blockade shake the idea that the state can be protected behind the military lines.²⁴ Besides, improved international relations offer the possibility for nonaligned countries to dedicate themselves to economic development, to challenges of technology, ecology and other important fields, while simultaneously maintaining efforts in favour of disarmament, strengthening measures of confidence and safeguarding national independence. In that sense promoting regional cooperation, security perceptions are of course, matters of great importance.

Buzan's concept of 'security complex' explains the macro and micro linkages at the regional level. South Asia is no exception to this. The post Cold War security scenario has not invalidated the linkages. There are only new manifestations of the current unipolar moment. Indo- U.S. relations, that show a mix of cooperation and conflict become more conflictual when the dynamics of the security complex, in which China and Pakistan play a part, become significant.

End Notes

1. See Buzan, Barry. **People, States, & Fear : The National Security Problem in International Relations.** (Great Britain : Wheat Sheat, 1983). pp.245-8.
2. **Ibid.**, p.43.
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4

POST COLD WAR SECURITY
PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA AND U.S

POST COLD WAR SECURITY PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA AND U.S

There has been a considerable discussion on the emerging contours of the Indo-US relations in the post Cold War era. Shifts in alignments and security arrangements have come to characterise the strategic structure of the world. Involving both significant new regional powers and traditional global players, much of the interaction between nations has come to be seen in the light of what is perhaps optimistically termed as the "New World Order" : so far at an initial stage rather than a given condition. Further, most countries are seemingly poised at what could just be the beginning of 'new order and relations' For both India and United States, it is indeed on opportune time to reconsider, reappraise and evaluate a long term relationship under the present circumstances.¹

In the immediate post World War-II years, the US was more preoccupied with its relations with the Soviet Union and other communist states, its allies in Western Europe and its Latin American neighbours than with countries in Asia and Africa. However, its relations with the newly emergent nations began to assume increasing importance especially in the context of the ideological Cold War. Among these emerging nations, India occupied a particularly conspicuous position. The reasons, as one expert argued are 'obvious'. It was the giant of the developing nations of Asia and Africa, with nearly twice as many people as all other nations of South and South East Asia, and the Middle East ; its geographical and strategic position, its long historical experience and traditions

as well as its economic and human resources and potentialities to mention a few worthy factors, should have made the US choose to look closely at their mutual relationship. However, it did not happen. Curiously, it was the other Asian giant-China which had deliberately chosen the 'totalitarian way' that seemed to engage the entire diplomatic ventures from Washington. Yet, it should be remembered that India has always been a factor in the US foreign policy.

The end of the 80's have however, signaled new beginnings. Followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the world witnessed the end of the Cold War announced in 1989. Although the end of Cold War freed US-India relations from the constraints of a bipolar world, relations continued to be affected by the burdens of history, most notably the long standing India - Pakistan regional rivalry.² So, the US did not immediately upgrade its relations with India, but one notable feature was that with the end of Cold War at least the perception & thinking about the international affairs has been affected. Perception of international reality is dominated to a lesser degree now by the conceptual framework of the Cold War. Through that conceptual lens, scholars and diplomats, journalists and politicians, even ordinary observers, ordered their understanding of world events for more than forty years. Now that lens seems to have a scratch over it by a series of unprecedented and largely unpredicted events which call into question not only the assumptions of the Cold War but the very nature of understanding of world affairs.³

However, it is necessary and important here to recognise that perceptions and images play an important role in shaping the foreign policy/policies of

nations as well as the relations among them. Reality is no doubt important, but the perception of reality is, in a dynamic sense, almost as important as what may be called objective reality. This is so because one acts on the basis of what one perceives to be real.

Perceptions & thinking about the international affairs, have started becoming conditioned by the aftermath of Cold War to a great extent. Earlier it was simply taken for granted that the bipolar structure of the Cold War provided the framework in which foreign policies had to be made and analyses framed. This was true for most of the countries of the globe but it seemed especially true for India and United States. For United States, the Cold War both defined and justified its participation in global affairs. The United States became fully engaged, in world affairs only under the impetus of what was perceived as a global threat from an ideological hostility and militarily powerful Soviet Union. Sometimes, it is forgotten that, before the Cold War, US policy was traditionally one of aloofness from international political and security linkages and commitments. American involvement in global affairs was sporadic. Efforts to mold an activist foreign policy lacked sustained and sustaining domestic support from a public characterised by a persistent suspicion of internationalism. Only the Cold War, based on a perceived threat of global dimensions, inducted the US into a continuing internationalist role.⁴

However, after the end of Cold War, the debate in international relations shifted from issues related to bipolarism to "unipolarism/multipolarism", from 'containment of communism' to 'constructive cooperation', and from policies of Cold War to policies of detente as per the Idealists. Several rethinking studies

surfaced, concepts were revisited, calling for a redefinition of relationship between the main actors of international politics. These included discussions on South Asian issues and consequently, as obvious on Indo-US relations. The studies on Indo-US relations include : Congressional Records, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relation's Tarapur Nuclear Fuel Exports Report, Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade barriers, Carnegie Report, Rand Corporation Report, United Nations Publication Report, Maloff's Report, Reports on different issues by Pentagon, William Perry's Report, Raphael's Report to name a few.

Problems of peace and security in South Asia received a fresh look outside the Cold War parameters of the preceding years. Relations between India and United States were also discussed in this new framework. This was pretty obvious because India's national interests are tied to the South Asian regional status quo. This is of course, self evident because India comprises a huge area of South Asia, and her status quo interests in the region is a force for stability in a major political theatre of the world.⁵ The United States perception of India as a status quo power has not been uniformly consistent. The reference here is to contemporary perceptions. Thus the US adopted favourable attitudes to India's intervention in Sri Lanka and Maldives. However, it may be that the US, freed of its Cold War apprehensions, is able to perceive India's pursuit of a status quoist policy in South Asia, over four decades, with more detachment. For example, India's 'interventions' in South Asia have almost invariably been followed by withdrawal of armed capabilities from the region. This, of course, is not the only indicator of India's status quoism. So is the pronounced interests of all segments of the political leadership of the country to keep it united that

considering that India embraces a landscape teeming with myriad plural sub-regional identities, which have more often than not in history been subject to forces of disaggregation. Despite depredations on the political system, India has continued to represent, for over four decades, the most notable example of a functioning liberal democracy in the wide area of the developing world and in a hugely populated and differentiated geographical region with genuine, free regular elections, a still largely independent judiciary, an articulate and vociferous opposition, a vigorous and extensive free press and an administrative cadre very much in place. Besides, inter alia, our country can boast of a highly trained and disciplined military force, considered and reckoned the third largest in the world; a growing Blue Water Navy and a Combat Airforce, of some sophistication; notable advances in nuclear, space & missile technology; an able entrepreneurial business class now raring to go; a liberalised economic dispensation intended to enable India to participate with more impact in the global economy. Much of this make for stability and importance, which few if any areas of the world of comparable size are today able to provide. Yet, most, if not all, of such attributes were associated with India since independence. That today they seem particularly pertinent so much so as to bring about a virtual turnaround in the US's South Asia policy, towards two of the regions most conflictual neighbours, points to cogency of America's stability problematic, and the extent to which it catalyzes India's inhering strengths into influences in the international domain after the Cold War.⁶

Now, let us take up hard issues of security and see if there is any chance of ceremonial closure of the Cold War transforming the present South Asian

patterns of security. Indo-Pak relations remain in a fractured state on problems of state sponsored terrorism, clandestine nuclear programme of Pakistan and refusal to cooperate in SAARC on issues of trade. SAARC is still not a security arrangement. Arms race continues to accelerate. Indo-Pak dialogue at the level of secretaries has ended. Kashmir, nuclear option, terrorism remain the stick with which the administrators enter into hostility. Regional disputes have a character of their own. The irony is that at one time it was thought that global rivalry was stoking up regional fires and these were all proxy wars and the regional specificities were forgotten. We know, this resulted in the collapse of regional security systems formed as a part of global strategy. But now, we have a twist in the situation. Regional wars can attract global intervention. But more fundamentally without a broader security framework, regional tensions are not going to ease and here we have the specific situation of today. The Cold War has ended, but it has not been replaced by a modern, global security system keeping the regional imperatives in mind. Gorbachev's Vladivostok Proposal of Asia-Pacific Security System has not made any progress after the initial stage of germination. West Asia remains in the dangerous state as before. Arms trade progresses by leaps and bounds. We have thus a big void - the old system has collapsed, nothing new has come up. As the Chinese say, from bipolar to multipolar to unipolar. So we have now a unpolar world.⁷ It is in this context that one has to pause and ponder if any substantial change would be effected in terms of security in Indo-American relations.

While superpower confrontation has ceased in Europe with the rise of Central Europe as a strategic entity, this has not been repeated elsewhere. In the

regional military environment in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region, the old threat perceptions continue. Force deployments of extra regional powers remain. It is quite obvious that arms control in the Indian Ocean is linked to global arms control dialogue. In Afghanistan, Soviet compulsions to urge arms control and stop intervention was great.⁸ But the end of Cold War and bipolarity with a whimper and without an effective replacement to it signifies instability in terms of security framework. Indian perception of threat and presumptions about its role in South Asia show hardly any sign of change. On the American side, China's military modernization, military presence in the Indian Ocean, practical nuclear non-proliferation, arms transfer and security relations with Pakistan, non intent to solve the Civil War in Afghanistan, hardline Gulf policy, and finally controlling technology transfer, aid flow, demanding open market etc. are crucial areas which will be relentlessly followed and will be continuously opposed by Indian rulers. For example, U.S. may not regard China to be a threat to India; the latter does, despite its current up-heat relations with China on LAC. (Line of Actual Control) Thus, India will remain a persistent factor in US policy in Asia, and there is hardly any reason to assume that the divergence in the perceptions of the elites of two countries, of the rulers of two powers, one global another regional, will cease in the wake of the closure of the Cold War. Soviet Unions direct presence in Afghanistan is a thing of the past and China does not have a hawkish posture vis-a-vis India, despite the Tibet question, yet one can not claim that demilitarization has started either in India or Pakistan, or America's offers of arms and technological assistance to the region have stopped. There is no possibility of a viable trilateral or multilateral security

framework in this region. If 'Indo-Soviet-Axis' is no more the whipping horse for Americans, 'US-China-Pakistan Axis' may be replaced by China - Pakistan partnership, with the U.S. becoming a referee. This will still allow for arms trade and arms race. A new axis will guarantee it. It is here that knowledgeable American commentators of the scene have erred. They have been taken in by the formal appearance of relations when making forecasts on the evolution of relations in the future. However, anticipating changes with the changes in security considerations after the closure of Cold War involves another error. Ascribing an autonomous status to the security factor ignores the compulsions emanating from world military order and the international arms regime. Developing nations are often subjected to this order and regime. Arms producing, arms shipping and arms shopping are based together. Security doesn't dictate arms, often arms dictate security. In other words, arms find their legitimacy in the notions of security. For testing arms, nations contrive threats to security. The world military order and international arms regime are inextricably linked with industrial military production, diffusion of armament technology, and arms trade. Today, apart from the infantry, all other items in the military are part of some system or the other-tanks, missiles, rocketry, rapid development, force, air reconnaissance, naval supervision etc. The system devours individual necessities. The system involves heavy military spending - thus a deviant industrialisation, foreign dependence, inequality. Armaments do not only result from economic linkages. They have a logic and compulsions of their own. Being in the nature of regime, they compel international relations to adopt to certain exigencies. It is in this sense that independent and substantial

amount of change in security dimension of Indo-US relations are not foreseen.⁹ Thus the imperatives of armaments will ride over others, and the Third World citizens will be subjected to the angry outbursts over who gives arms to whom, against whom, for whom, or from whom to have arms, for what and against whom. An observation of an expert on the world military scene goes as follows :- "The use of new military technologies in the Third World has already caused unfold misery. Their transfer to local elites has provided the sophisticated wherewithal for repression and has served to mould patterns of development in such a way as to cause massive economic and social dislocation and to produce the necessity for authoritarian and militaristic forms of rule. The acceleration in the development of new military technologies and the pace of military transfers from rich to poor countries can only result in more of the same and worse."¹⁰

Thus, the ceremonial closure of the Cold War is too weak to effect any substantial change in Indo-US relations which is of the nature of a regime - a regime characterized by the imperatives of world military order, conflicting notions of security, unequal exchange, technological flow patterned according to 'new' international division of labour, a shrinkage in the claims of the Third World on the world aid basket with the entry of East European countries as new claimants and the gives of US foreign policy towards the Third World. In South Asia, U.S. has not declared Pakistan a terrorist state, as for China, despite the noises agaisnt it, it has not prevented China-Pakistan missile trade. U.S.-Pakistan arms sales are resumed.

The question of security, viewed a little more closely reminds us of India's traditional national security concerns despite the virtual withdrawal of

Russia's active support for India's security problematic in relation to Pakistan. Yeltsin establishment has not sent encouraging signals to India on Pakistan at the diplomatic level. India in effect, hoping for restructuring her relations with Russian Federation, working to reorienting her thinking towards the US on issue of defence and security, has to develop a long term, an intermediate and an immediate perspective in terms of 15, 10 and 2 to 5 years since both Russia and China are in the throes of change with the latter on an upswing and the former twirling on its own axis without much spiralling movement. The USA's diplomatic reorientation is welcome and India's need to bandwagon in economic and military times is underlined by many. Maneouverability with the U.S. has evaporated with the Russian foreign policy's westernisation. Its attempt to balance the tilt is not of much use yet, though while in Delhi, Yeltsin did say that Russian support on Kashmir to India's stand exists & is assured. US's reformulation of her foreign policy towards India does not imply smooth relations. Though Rao and Clinton shook hands in Washington and Rao said there was no arms twisting, the cryogenic deal of ISRO with Glavkosmos episode showed that the U.S. does through her weight around singularly both on India and Russia.

The Chinese threat, thought not imminent, has not disappeared, nor is it likely to do so through the nineties. With the virtual collapse of Sino-Soviet hostility, the incapacity now to obtain any kind of leverage through the successor states of the Soviet Union, with increasing American and western concerns and commitments to China, and the remarkable rapid growth of Chinese power under its modernisation programme, India's potential isolation in relation to

China is an ugly diplomatic fact of life for this country. Nevermind, if for the moment, China is quiescent, & too engrossed in her internal consolidation. Here too India must evolve a diplomacy with or without the U.S. and the west and move in the direction of taking steps towards normalising of relations with China and see if China-Pakistan factors is, really their 'bilateral' concern as the Chinese think. Regional relations continue to be of concern. None of the states of the South Asian region are likely to be disturbed by the diminution of Indian strength on the sub-continent; quite the contrary. They may of course, not as yet have any reason, as Pakistan has, of actively abetting such an eventuality. But should this transpire, none of them is likely either to want to be of any help, or be too displeased by it. Nor has India acquired such economic importance in the global economy to discomfit any power centre very much by the loss of a huge or influential economic market.¹¹ However, these international and regional susceptibility seem to be heightened by the increasing internal security challenges to India's political leadership to govern the country as well.

Within this rapidly changing diplomatic scene, no equation has fluctuated as rapidly as the Indo-US. The unwelcome equation of the Cold War decades is gone, which was as bad as it was steady, and despite the quick-changing ups and downs the net curve has been around upwards but of course, with concealed darker assessments. But who would have thought at the beginning of the 1990s that the equation would dip as low as it did in 1993, and that at the beginning of 1994 the equation would be as good as it has become. Even in the summer of 1994, Indo-US relations were being buffeted about the strong cross currents & no trend, let alone a reliable one, appeared on the horizon of this relationship.

On the one hand, rosy pictures were being held by those who saw the future through glasses tinted by economics, and on the other hand, were darkened assessments by those who read the more conventional signs of political and security policies. The former were encouraged by much that had happened in American domestic politics and in India's economic situation. The doubt of the foreign policy bureaucracy had declined in Washington resulting in a devaluation of the stock-in-trade of the Cold War world, the politics of alliances the grand security 'design', 'strategy', 'doctrine', all these had little use for India as India refused to fit into this kind of framework.

But simultaneously with the decline of the Cold War, America's bottomline is that India should forget about its nuclear option; should stop developing even medium range missiles, whether intended to carry nuclear heads or not, and should not deploy even the short range 'prithvi'. For more than forty years, in the name of sustaining Pakistan's integrity, America sustained Pakistan's ambition to achieve a hostile military parity with India. In the matter of Kashmir, which unlike Aksai Chin, is much more than only a territory for India, US enemies, not Pakistan, became the first to plant the idea in chosen Kashmiri minds that the valley at least, if not the whole state, should become independent. In the first decade of the UN debates on Kashmir, US made cynical misuse of its hold on the UN to thwart India for more legitimate case and to prop up Pakistan's baseless one in order to pay Pakistan for services rendered.

So powerful has been the drag of these controversies that they still distort the state of Indo-US relations. In the Indian perception, American diplomacy remains titled in favour of Kashmir seceding from India and becoming

'independent', questions being raised about the validity of the accession being one part of the process; another being the prolonged resistance to the Indian allegation of Pakistani support to terrorism in Kashmir. However, the weight of evidence proved too heavy to be ignored. And now, ignoring Pakistani misuse of American military support against India, America has offered to revive the security relationship we have had with Pakistan in the past. This is a far more serious matter than the proposed one-line exception to the Pressler Amendment to enable Pakistan to get some 40 odd F-16 warplanes.

The nuclear issue between the two countries not only remains as hot as in 1974, when India exploded a nuclear device at Pokhran, it has lately become a major controversy. General Aslam Beg, who was chief of Pakistan Army, has publicly confirmed that America looked the other way while Pakistan went ahead with its clandestine nuclear schemes (about which further information surfaced in Germany as recently as 13 June 1994). But America has not hesitated to pounce upon the Indian programme. Between them, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Lee Hamilton and the new American Ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, have delivered to India the 'cold and blunt warning' which a former US president, Jimmy Carter, threatened to deliver in 1977. At the same time the government of India has now officially stated what it and many others have suspected for long, that the issue of human rights and of Kashmir, is also being harnessed to corner India on nuclear issue.¹² More significantly, America has not only opposed India on these specifics but on what has always been the core of Indian defence & development philosophy and continues to be despite changes in India's economic strategy; that India should not only not

possess weapons but also the technology to produce them indigenously, and that key industries should be in the public sector. However, the earliest and the most seminal difference between the two countries arose precisely on these two issues. India turned to United States for Combat Aircraft and for a steel plant, she was rebuffed by America, and on the rebound was caught by the Soviet Union. America displayed a continuation of the same attitude only a year ago when it pressurised Russia to renege on an agreement made by the Soviet Union with India to supply cryogenic engine technology. India sees this as an attempt by America to deny it not only militarily, but all advanced technologies, a suspicion which had also arisen only a little while earlier when the United States prevented an American firm from supplying an advanced computer to India. So, these problems illustrate a long-term problem in India-US relations : that American policy towards India has always been a consequence of or a function of American policy towards something else, whether that 'something' be the Cold War with the Soviet Union or a desire to use Pakistan in its relation with China or the Islamic world. Or, as now, it's a function or a consequence of America's global policy on nuclear arms & missiles.¹³

India also faces a similar problem within the limits of the Asian scene. America's Asian horizon is so completely taken up by the problematic of its relations with China and Japan and security arrangements with ASEAN countries at the bilateral level that it determines all other factors, including relations with India. But America's long term relations with China & Japan will remain open-ended until these two countries decide whether they will be serious rivals or will cooperatively coexist, with China as the senior politico-military leader of

Asia and Japan as the economic counterpart. So long as this remains unsettled, America's relations with China and Japan will remain fluid, and so will its perspective on India in the Asian context. The Indo-US bilateral equation is heavily overlaid by at least three factors, each with its considerable non-Indian dimension and each weighed against the chances of America making a proper assessment of India's role; (i) the nuclear dimension, with all the complications which it causes on the bilateral level; (ii) America's interest in the world of Islam plus oil ; & (iii) American interest in Pakistan, an out growth of the second diminution. All these factors affect the question of Kashmir so deeply that they, overshadow the bilateral calculations in Indo-US relations, whether they incline American policy towards promoting independence for Kashmir or other ways of keeping Pakistan happy. The former adventure, creating a nominally independent Kashmir which would become dependent on America would create an interesting toehold for America in strategic juxtaposition to the oil, the Chinese and the Central Asian zones of the Islamic world. The later adventure would increase Pakistan's usefulness to America as an effective bridge head to the eastern half of the Islamic world, just as Turkey and Egypt have chosen to be to the western half.¹⁴

As the Indo-American relationship has become the most cardinal one, a good opportunity has been created by Prime Minister Rao's visit to United States for five basic things, four of them domestic and one bilateral. He succeeded, without giving up any essential Indian position, in restoring some calm to what had become a very disturbed bilateral relationship. (a) India should step up, and make more visible, those aspects of the Indian economy which have very rapidly

become a strong asset in Indo-US relations; (b) without sacrificing any essential Indian interest, make itself less vulnerable on Kashmir, whether regarding the curbing of terrorism (in which there must be no slackening but the means need to change) or fulfilling the political promises made to the state; (c) curb the Indian proclivity to get worked up on the political aspect of Indo-US relations, to the detriment of stronger economic relations; (d) India shouldn't hypothecate its security to anyone & should carefully review its nuclear policy to make sure that in chasing after some symbols we don't jeopardise the substance of security. In this context it should carefully reassess its present view that unlike the American nuclear arsenal, China's arsenal makes it necessary for India to acquire the bomb; (e) America shouldn't be viewed as a single hostile monolith. In that vast space there are very big names - the Washington Group - which are urging that country towards a global nuclear policy that can be a very useful basis for reassessing Indo-US relations on that front; and Lee Hamilton who joined Wisner in issuing a blunt warning on the nuclear issue has also advocated a policy on Kashmir division along the present 'cease-fire line' which India should Persuade, itself to live with.¹⁵

After looking at the security perceptions of post Cold War change: India & US, one can very well conclude that apart from differences on how best to approach a world free of nuclear weapons, the US seemed to be pulling out of its armoury to use against India the weapon of human rights at a time when this country was under siege from revanchist Pakistan stoking fundamentalism - inspired insurgency in Kashmir. Besides, while neither country has realised fundamentally from its basic understanding of international security issues, or

more specifically concerns pertaining to nuclear proliferation and missiles, the speed with which India - USA ties have progressed along a broad front since Rao's May 94 visit to America can only be described as impressive. It is even stunning, considering the deadlock on NPT & MTCR. Indeed, in this very period of burgeoning relations, the US has sought to penalise India on dual-use technology, but this seems not to have mattered very much to the rising confidence curve. The American position on Kashmir too has not undergone a basic shift in that the US continues to regard it as disputed territory, but the Clinton Administration has taken care to make the occasional soothing noises, abandoning its reckless pronouncements of not so long ago. This too has acted as a slave. Defence cooperation also appears to have looked up considerably, going well beyond the seminars, and workshops. Indeed, special force exercises involving marine commands of the two countries have taken place in Indian waters. On the economic front, it would be an understatement to say that America has, shown the greatest concrete interest in this country's liberalisation programme. However, justifiably or not, many in India believe that USA's attempt after the Cold War may be to ensure that there should remain no military entities which possess the will and capability to hinder the unfettered pursuit of American military, political and economic goals in the world of foreseeable future. That is why NATO has not been disbanded even after the Soviet & WARSAW pact collapse, and Washington pursues relentlessly its 'self-serving' non-proliferation agenda, which sometimes appears skewed and one-sided even to sympathetic observers.¹⁶

It must be acknowledged here that the neo-liberal agenda of free-market, fiscal austerity, civil liberties, less of political rights and social rights etc. has no doubt received a setback as states still continue to assert themselves on issues of national security. In the present decade, the relations of conflict would definitely be witnessed as the main trend. Anarchy of self-interest, balance of power, the growth of dependencies will still be carried out. Bandwagoning will lead to balancing and currently the elements of the two will remain. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union need to be seen not only as areas of increasing cooperation but also as areas of economic influence and preserve to begin with. The Russians may well be developing their own Monroe doctrine for the region of the erstwhile Soviet-Union. The world is moving towards multipolarity from the unipolar moment. Great powers are going to come up. New balance will be ordered.¹⁷ In such a scenario, the neo-realist argument about the continuation of conflict as a historically proven phenomenon will render interdependence inadequate. Interdependence will still have to be a subterranean trend. Through economic integration will continue to be the present pre-occupation among certain sections of national bureaucracies, it is the issues of security that will dominate the relations of states in the present decade. So, in neo-realist terms Indo-US relations may appear to be bandwagoning now but if India plays her cards during the present transitory moment with 10% of her GDP in next 15 years, it may move in the direction of balance of power. It is in this sense, that a closer look at the Indo-US security relations in the post Cold War period becomes necessary so as to give justification to people's belief and to see whether a jilted America is really worse

than an indifferent America or not and a disillusioned India is really worse than a suspicious India or not. Thus, it becomes imperative to look at the Indo-US security relations in the post Cold War period seriously.

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ISSUES IN INDO-U.S POST COLD
WAR SECURITY RELATIONS

ISSUES IN INDO-U.S POST COLD WAR SECURITY RELATIONS

There are strong continuities and less of discontinuities in security perceptions of the U.S. at the global and regional level. It has been difficult for it to give up Cold War security thinking even though Russian Federation ceased to be a threat at the global level. A brief survey of history of Indo-US relations proves it. From the perspective of U.S. national security, South Asia *per se*, has been a peripheral and relatively insignificant area. South Asia has been given a higher priority in American defence planning only after it emerged as a significant factor in the regional and global strategy and policies of the United States. For example, mainly during a few years in the middle and late 1950's when the United States and Pakistan were associated in bilateral and multilateral security arrangements, in the brief course and immediate aftermath of the Indo-China border war of late 1962, during the crisis in South Asia in 1971, and since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, all of which were perceived by the United States as directly affecting its overall security. Thus South Asia has figured significantly in the security perceptions and policies of the United States only and mainly when it has been perceived as involving itself in larger confrontations, especially embracing the Soviet Union and sometimes the Peoples Republic of China as well. US security relationships with India remained uneasy sometimes not even cordial and at times hostile. They have been complicated by the conflictive relations that have usually prevailed between India and Pakistan, India and China, Soviet Union and the United States. It is

hardly surprising therefore, that U.S security policies towards South Asia, and especially towards India, have been characterised by a relative lack of sustained and serious considerations, an unimpressive record of achievement and a high degree of ambivalence. In the opinion of many Indians, U.S security perceptions and policies have greatly complicated India's own defence efforts. As Raju G.C.Thomas has observed "the various threat issues in Southern Asia and the American security approach produce what may be called an American perceptual syndrome regarding the security problems of the region. The conduct of American policy in the region based on this syndrome cause certain serious security consequences for India".¹ Many Indian specialists on defence and security, including K. Subrahmanyam, former Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, believe that differences between the United States and India on security matters are perhaps greater and more serious than almost any other aspects of the complicated and variegated relationship. This feeling seems also to be shared by several Indian scholars who are living in other countries and are therefore looking at problems of India's security from a somewhat different vantage point. Raju G. C. Thomas, for example, has expressed the view that "basic problem of Indo-American relations lies in the divergent security interests of the two states in Southern Asia".² Baldev Raj Nayar, has taken a more critical and negative approach. "At the heart of the problem between the United States and India, he has argued, has been a fundamental strategic conflict, making them adversaries".³ He has, in fact, gone even further by charging that "the United States has attempted to make India a satellite and to check the rise of India as an independent centre of power".⁴

However, the complicated & variegated relationship between India & United States seems most pertinent from the fact that the United States has generally followed a policy of alignment and has been a central architect of a network of bilateral and multilateral alliances, whereas the most distinguishing feature of India's foreign policy or at least of its approach to foreign policy has been its consistent dedication in the theory and its more intermittent and selective dedication in practice to the approach commonly known as Nonalignment or NAM. But nevertheless, India has been concerned about relations among the United States, Russia & China and their conflicting involvement in South Asian affairs. Similarly, the United States has been concerned about the nature of India's relations with both Russia & China. That is why American global and sub continental interests and concerns overlap.⁵ This important point and its consequences are well described by Shivaji Ganguli:

"Despite the relative peripheral position of South Asia in the overall American security thinking, by the end of the 50's, this area emerged as a focus of intense struggle between the three major world powers. Presumably, it is the gap between American perception of the South Asia setting and the reality of the developing linkage between the 3-dimensional global rivalry and the 2-level intra-regional conflicts: Indo-Pakistan and Sino-India-that inevitably created a dilemma for the policy makers in Washington".⁶ From the U.S. perspective Raju G. C. Thomas has summarized what he calls the "American perceptual syndrome of security relationships in Southern Asia" in the following manner:

- 1) The core problem in South Asia was seen to be the threats Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India posed to each other;
- 2) The region carried no vital

economic, political, or strategic value to the United States; 3) The limited intrusive threats to India from China, & to Pakistan from Soviet Union, were seen to check one another; 4) Major hostilities on the subcontinent were likely to be confined to the core relationship between India and Pakistan with supporting military assistance from the Soviet Union and China, and direct military intervention by the intrusive powers was unlikely; 5) Only marginal role in the region was seen to be required of the U.S. so that whatever imbalances existed between the Sino-Pakistani and Indo-Soviet relationships could be corrected and 6) Since nuclear threats to India from China did not exist or was greatly exaggerated, there was no justification for India to embark on a nuclear weapons programme.⁷

As Thomas pointed out however, "some of these perceptions had been modified since 1979". "Developments in Iran and Afghanistan had all suddenly increased the importance of the sub-continent, and especially Pakistan, in the calculus of American global strategy to counter Soviet moves in the region". "Again enhanced American concern for South Asia was occasioned by external developments and global concerns with the focus on the Soviet Union more than on regional developments and impact". According to some American assessments, "Soviet backing of the Baluchi Separatist Movement would bring it within reach of the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan, while the continued subjugation of Afghanistan would facilitate a Soviet military thrust towards the oil fields of the Persian Gulf States".⁸

Indian political leaders and strategic planners obviously have a different "perceptual syndrome of security relationships in Southern Asia", although they

too were concerned with both intrusive threats and intra-regional relationships. Their threat perception was clearly different. In their view, the intrusive threats came from all of the great powers, but especially from the People's Republic of China and not so much from Russia. In fact, as has been noted many Indians including many in high political positions, seem to regard United States as a greater threat than Russia. It is important for Americans to recognise that this perception is widely held in India and not only by leftists and other anti-American groups. It is shaped by the following facts: for many years Russia has been regarded as more of a friend of India than United States; it has generally supported Indian policies and programmes in political, economic and strategic areas; it has provided India with substantial military assistance, whereas the United States has provided very little; and it has given Indians the impression that it regards India as a very important country, whereas the American approach seems to have been to neglect or even to downgrade and denigrate India. Many Indians feel that American security policies and programmes, especially those designed to enhance the security of Pakistan and to prevent further nuclear proliferation, have tended to "restrict and wider security concerns of India beyond the subcontinent and reduce India's pretensions as a major regional power".⁹

By late 1988, however, the Cold War was beginning to come to an end. In a remarkable policy series sponsored by American Talk Security (ATS), a majority of Americans said for the first time since world war-II-that they regarded the Soviet Union as either a minor threat or no threat at all.¹⁰ President Reagan, a conservative with unimpeachable anti-Communist credentials, could

laud Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost (Openness) and Perestroika (restructuring), could declare that the Soviets no longer felt "an obligation to expand" and conquer the world,¹¹ and could enter into an arms control agreement as significant as the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) accord, prompted many Americans to reevaluate the Soviet threat. The facts were clear. Contrary to four decades of behavior during the Cold War, the Soviets were withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan, distancing themselves from revolutionary clients in the Third World, encouraging independent and reformist policies in Eastern Europe, and casting aside offensive military strategies and weapons developments.

Yet, by August 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the United States was not prepared to discard its old security policies. Rather than recognizing that Saddam Hussein was a fundamentally different kind of threat in a fundamentally different kind of world, U.S. security planners clung to the same five principles that undergirded the Cold War:

- i) Gauge threats to security by focusing on military adversaries.
- ii) Respond to these adversaries by intimidating them through the acquisition and, if necessary, the use of fearsome weapons.
- iii) Emphasize tough military action ahead of 'soft' alternatives to prevent and resolve conflicts without the use of force.
- iv) Organise security policies unilaterally so that the United States can guarantee that international affairs are consistent with its own interests.

- v) Rely exclusively on foreign policy experts in the executive branch of government to craft security policies and leave Congress, state and local governments, and the rest of the public on the sidelines.

These principles helped the United States achieve a victory of sorts in the Cold War, but they proved inadequate as the nation dealt with the first post Cold War crisis.¹² They did not serve the nation's interest particularly well during the Persian Gulf War. Yes, the United States won the war with miraculously low casualties, but its long-term security interests in the Middle East and elsewhere were not strengthened. Moreover, future threats to world peace will not be as easy to defeat. Just as a mechanic equipped only with plumbing tools cannot fix a television set, security planners who continue to embrace Cold War principles and policies will find themselves ill equipped to deal with the foreign policy demands of the twenty first century.

Today, the Soviet Union is gone, split into fifteen new nations, and with it has gone the 'raison d'eter' of the U.S security system since World War-II. Soviet nuclear forces, which security analysts once feared could wipe out the U.S nuclear deterrent in a surprise attack, have been shorn of their most threatening capabilities. The WARSAW pact, which the Cold Warriors warned could threaten Blitzkrieg across Western Europe has dissolved. Soviet adventurism in the Third World, which once justified the United States investing hundreds or billions of dollars for bases, arms sales, cooperative agreements, and other foreign commitment has been discontinued. The national security experts who were most responsible for perpetuating the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s now concede that the world is changing radically. Zbigniew

Brzezinski, who as President Carter's National Security Adviser played a decisive role in sounding the alarm about the Soviet threat and launching a renewed arms race with the Soviet Union, says "we are quite literally in the early phases of what might be called the Post-Communist period. This is a massive, monumental transformation".¹³ Henry Kissinger argues, "The one thing that cannot occur is a continuation of the status quo. It will either disintegrate under the pressure of events or it will be reshaped by a constructive American policy".¹⁴ For the first time in two generations, foreign policy experts, politicians, and citizens are posing basic question about U.S. national security: what are the real threats to security? How can the United States meet these threats effectively and control the costs of doing so? What are viable alternatives to the use of force? How can the United States escape the burdens of unilateralism? Who in the United States should decide and carry out security policy? Now, keeping these basic questions in mind, if United States is to be secure from foreign threats, it must assess all these threats and address them with policies that emphasize nonprovocation conflict prevention, multilateralism, and democracy. The U.S. security planners should replace the five Cold War principles with an alternative set.¹⁵

From the Indian stand point the emerging security situation may be seen to be far more relaxed than that during the previous decade. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had worsened the security situation because the Cold War had been brought well into the region. Pakistan became the frontline state and receive a massive inflow of arms, security and security related aid, not only from the USA, but also from other countries, including China. Pakistan under

Zia had already started distancing itself from its commitments to, and under, the Simla Agreement. Pakistan spurned Indian efforts in early 1980 to coordinate policies to deal with the situation arising out of Soviet presence in Afghanistan. India was forced to respond by stepping up its defence capability which in turn generated misunderstanding and even apprehensions in some quarters, especially since India did not come forward to articulate its own concerns and rationale for its policies adequately. However, Indians became increasingly concerned with the growing Pakistani military might, especially when seen in the context of the historical experiences of US military aid to Pakistan and its employment against India, and the increasing Pakistani involvement in supporting separatism & terrorism in Punjab & Jammu & Kashmir. Of particular concern was the influx of high technology weapons like F-16s which provide a quantum jump in air power capabilities. US plans to provide AWACS (Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems) had posed special challenges. But the greatest significance of the developments was the indirect support to Pakistan's otherwise clandestine nuclear weapon programme. The US had opposed this during the 1970s even to the extent of threatening the state with dire consequences, if one believes late P.M. Z.A. Bhutto, or in more recent times, president Gulam Ishaq Khan. Pakistan has successfully managed to use the period of transition from Cold War to post Cold War situation to establish a credible nuclear weapon status. And this has changed the security situation in Southern Asia in a profound way.¹⁶

In a way, the Southern Asian security environment had already been nuclearised as far back as 1964, when China became a nuclear weapon state. Some movement towards nuclear disarmament has taken place with the signing of

the INF & START - I treaties, and agreements on START - II. But China is not a party to these and in fact, refuses to join in any nuclear disarmament processes. The US and (former) Soviet Union have withdrawn their non-strategic nuclear weapons, and most of them are slated for destruction. However, China has shown no indication to withdraw and eliminate its non-strategic nuclear weapons. This category of weapons has relevance only for China's immediate neighbours. From Indian stand point, this has been, and is likely to remain, the conditioning factor of security. Pakistan's going nuclear only adds to the nuclear asymmetry against India. Incidentally, Pakistan is the only state in the world, that has for all practical purposes, declared itself as a nuclear weapon state, besides the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states. India of course, has acquired the capability to become a nuclear weapon state in the process of development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It is this capability that provides it with a non-weaponised "recessed deterrence", obviating the need to weapons unless a greater urgency and intensity of threats to its national security demand otherwise. India is therefore, likely to continue to keep its nuclear option open while working for broadly based disarmament solutions.

Having lost the locus of threat with the end of the Cold War, the countries of the north (led by US) have been focussing on "proliferation" as the new threat. In this context, the India-Pakistan situation is increasingly referred to as the nuclear flash-point. This ignores some basic realities. Firstly, this approach indicates total lack of sensitivity to Indian security concerns. Secondly, it wrongly assumes that the countries of this region are not responsible enough.

This attitude may well have its roots in racial/civilisational prejudices. Thirdly, it ignores the ongoing efforts by the countries in the region to defuse tensions, avoid war, and improve relations, so that concentration on socio-economic development can continue uninterrupted. At last, not the least, it seems to be obvious of that mass thought of destruction (through strategic bombing, and use/threat of use of weapons of mass destruction) is a product the western civilisation without a corresponding parallel in the East. All the same, it is necessary that steps be taken to reduce the risk of use/threat of use of nuclear weapons in Southern Asia. This will need to be based on both confidence-building measures as well as nuclear disarmament in a broader context.¹⁷

The real threat to security in this region now arises not so much from a direct organised regular inter-state war, as from other forms of conflict including internal & externally supported irregular warfare. Afghanistan continues to be a battleground five years after the Soviet troops withdrew. In many ways the Civil War has intensified after the Najibullah regime (which in its last five year had brought about significant stability and reconciliation) was replaced by the Islamic government of the Mujahideen. The conflict has already spilled over the northern borders in the Tajikistan which itself has been going through turmoil. This has brought the Russian military forces once again into direct conflict and fighting. There seems to be no signs of conflict resolution in Afghanistan. The US & its G-7 partners seem to have lost interest. The OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) also appears to be more preoccupied with conflicts involving Muslim & non-Muslim entities. And the UN appears to be over-burdened with

other peace-keeping commitments. So, the nearly two-decades old war in Afghanistan and its Cold War dimensions have produced two fallout effects on the security situation which extend to the whole region and beyond; the phenomenal growth of drug trafficking and a monumental proliferation of small arms and minor weapons. As a result, what the U.S., Pakistan and their allies were doing in relation to Afghanistan, has been adopted by Pakistan as its strategy to destabilize India through trans-border training, infiltration, and support of militancy, violence and terrorism through the use of these weapons. The threat to the security of the state and civil society has been further exacerbated by the linkage of weapons proliferation with drug trafficking, money & patronage. However, the problem is as much domestic as transnational. In India, the terrorism & violence perpetrated in Punjab since 1984, and in Jammu & Kashmir since 1988 has been executed with Kalashnikovs and similar weaponry. There is irrefutable evidence of Pakistani support for infiltration, training, and command and control of militancy in India. There have been many sources in Pakistan who have claimed that this Jihad was started in Kashmir on 31st July 1988. In January 1993, the U.S. felt sufficiently concerned to place Pakistan on the watch list of states sponsoring terrorism. On the other hand, Southern Asia has one of the world's three largest drug growing areas, the Golden Crescent (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran border) at its centre, and a second the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Thailand and Laos border) at its edge which impact on the security situation in the region.¹⁸

China, India, Iran & Pakistan are the leading militarily significant powers of Southern Asia, with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) (Especially Saudi Arabia), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) abutting it. The Soviet intervention had caused severe degradation in the security environment in Southern Asia, and the full ramifications of the effects (& after effects) of the extension of the Cold War into the region are yet to play out, or be understood adequately. But the dynamics of change in the political relationships and the later trends have had an impact on the military power and posture of states in the region.

India, as part of the readjustments and restructuring of policies in the 1980s itself, has been cutting back its defence expenditure substantively. For the 25 year period after the Sino-Indian war, India's defence expenditure had remained at an average figure of around 3.6% of the GDP. The rapid deterioration in the security environment consequent to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan forced the pace of defence modernisation. The result was a rise in defence expenditure to a level at 4.06% of the GDP by 1986-87. However, the defence expenditure has been steadily coming down in real terms during the past 6 years, the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pakistan's launching of the proxy war against India since 1988, and the acquisition of nuclear capability by Pakistan notwithstanding. The defence expenditure had come down to 2.59% of GDP in 1992-93. This drastic change, nearly 38% reduction in defence expenditure during the last 6 years has not, unfortunately, been reciprocated by any other state in Southern Asia. China, according to its official data allocated yuan 37 billion (US \$ 6.76 billion) for its defence. Her official defence expenditure has been increasing by nearly 10-15 percent every year as per the official figures. In case of Pakistan, the defence expenditure has remained generally steady at

around 7.5% of the GDP, oblivious to the demise of the Cold War and the very substantive reduction of the Indian defence expenditure in real terms. Thus, the factors and issues impacting on security have become far more complex in modern times, and the need for durable peace has become a paramount necessity if socio-economic development of the people of the region is to be pursued with the required degree of importance. Southern Asia would need to move away from the competitive model of national security that has come to dominate the international system in recent centuries, and evolve a cooperative paradigm of security which harmonises the objectives and approaches to peace at all levels: global, regional national, societal and individual. Serious thought needs to be given to instrumentalities and mechanisms for building confidence, peace and security in the region. A conference on security and confidence building in Southern Asia would need to be called to initiate the process and build a framework of regional security which can meet the challenges of the future.¹⁹

Now, after getting a fair idea about the post Cold War security scenario in Southern Asia, it would be apt as well as easier to look at the security situation at a bilateral level, i.e. India and America, particularly in the post Cold War period.

Relations between India and the United States at a bilateral level appear to have entered a new era with the establishment of a 'commercial alliance' and the signing of the first post Cold War agreement on 'defence cooperation' between the two countries. Visiting in the 3rd week of January 1995, the Commerce Secretary of United States, Ronald H. Brown, signed a Memorandum Of Understanding with Indian Commerce Minister, Pranab Mukharjee to create an

Indo-US 'commercial alliance' a super forum for bilateral consultations aimed at forging closer business to business links. The alliance will ask its sponsors to submit a report to a board comprising the Indian Commerce Minister, the U.S Commerce Secretary and other appointees. The board will meet at the end of the first year and at the end of the second year "to determine whether the alliance has served its purpose or needs to be modified".²⁰ However, from a strategic perspective, the most significant and noteworthy remark made by Ronald Brown is that in today's world "commercial policies, domestic policies and foreign policies are all inter-linked".²¹ Brown, in fact, reportedly made it the running theme of his discussion with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao as well as Finance Minister Monomohan Singh. The intention behind that statement was to convey the foreign policy strategy of the Clinton Administration. During the election campaign itself, Bill Clinton had made it known that economic factors would dominate his foreign policy strategy. Apart from improving the country's economic competitiveness and productivity in American industry and agriculture, reduction of the US trade deficit has been a major goal in Clinton's foreign policy agenda. Keeping in view the political differences and the divergent strategic perceptions between Washington and New Delhi, it seems only logical that Brown's mission to India followed by US Secretary of Defence William Perry's path-breaking trip to South Asia. It was symbolic enough to indicate the need for political and strategic understanding before embarking upon a massive economic initiative. While economic ties do influence political relations, it is also true that political rivals with mutual suspicion can hardly indulge in free trade and other forms of economic interactions. To that extent,

Perry's trip to India has not only indicated the improving trend in Indo-US security understanding but has also contributed a great deal towards that goal.

Perry visited India in the backdrop of steady growth in Indo-US cooperation in various fields and increasing appreciation of each other's security requirements and strategic compulsions. It is, of course, important to recall that the year 1993, when Clinton entered the White House, breaking twelve years of continuous Republican Administration, was not a good year for Indo-US relations. Some Indian analysts who had predicted a friendlier White House were thoroughly disappointed when a Clinton Administration official quickly brandished the special and super 301 clauses; and at the same time, the pressure on nuclear proliferation issue was exerted by renewed noises over the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and by the efforts that went into scuttling of the Indo-Russian cryogenic rocket engine deal. The prompt recall of the US Ambassador to India for a different diplomatic assignment, undue delay in the appointment of a new Ambassador; the difficulty that the Indian Ambassador faced in getting an audience with the U.S President could not be convincingly justified when the political relations between India and United States reached an all time low with Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel's outrageous statements over the Kashmir issue and the Simla Agreement. Raphel's statement perhaps could have been ignored if the U.S President Bill Clinton himself had not equated the Kashmir issue with the ethnic movements in different areas of the globe, including in Somalia and Bosnia. The heat produced by Raphel's remarks had yet to be cooled when the American White House provided some influential Congressmen with a 'discussion draft' of a new Foreign Assistance

Act, indicating a new approach to foreign aid that would, among other things, lead to scrapping of the Pressler Amendment. This situation, however, began to change when Robin Raphel's immediate superior, Peter Tariff, Under Secretary of State, made the appropriate corrective remarks on the US position on the Kashmir issue & the second high ranking State Department Official, Strobe Talbot, visited India on a damage limitation mission,²² and with the Clinton Administration's threats, low key and symbolic though, of sanctions against the M-11 missile deal between China and Pakistan. The US reports establishing the Pakistani hand in aiding and abetting the terrorist elements in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir also elicited some warnings to Pakistan by Washington.²³

Apart from that, the recently passed Brown Amendment on 24/10/1995 has also caused turmoil in the Indian strategic community as well as South Block because the sudden shift in U.S regional equations has taken them by surprise. The Brown proposals do represent a definite shift in American policy because they were backed by President Clinton, the State Department as well as the Department of Defence. The proposed arms sales and the return of Pakistani deposit for the F-16s (likely to be concerted to the new French Mirage -2000 fighter planes) belie the American rethoric about nuclear weapons proliferation, missile technology transfer, sponsoring of terrorism, violation of human rights or for that matter, the supply of drugs. These are sins Pakistan is known to have committed. Though, there have been strong resentments against such step taken by U.S., we are almost helpless. Indeed seen at another level, the Clinton Administration facilitated the modest degree of military cooperation between India and United States-a policy that had its origin in the Kicklighter proposal

made during the Bush Administration for an enhanced level of defence cooperation between the two countries.²⁴ The Indian Army and US Army Pacific (USARPAC) co-hosted a multilateral conference on UN peace keeping operations in January 1993. The second Indo-US Army Steering Committee meeting took place in June 1993. The first ever Air Force Steering Committee meeting was held in Hawaii in August 1993.²⁵

However, one of the problem areas that has led to conflict of interests between India and United States has been the core security relationship between India and Pakistan. Early Cold War strategies had aimed at putting both countries in the front against communist expansion. In the seventies, however, this antagonism led to a potentially grouping of U.S, China & Pakistan on one side, and India & USSR on the other. The Afghan crisis in the eighties further crystallized this grouping in the form of a massive arms aid to Pakistan. The US Government, however, denied any need for a nuclear deterrent capacity for India²⁶ despite its knowledge concerning Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Incidentally, during the later part of the Carter Administration the United States remained deeply committed to its own non-proliferation policy, and this commitment was expressed in the cutting of aid to Pakistan by invoking the Symington Amendment in 1979. Subsequently, in the dialouge the US had with Pakistan in 1980, Pakistan gave two significant assurances concerning its nuclear programme; that it would not develop a nuclear weapon and that it would not transfer sensitive nuclear equipment, materials or technology to other countries. The US failed, however, to get any assurance on the issue of peaceful nuclear explosion.²⁷ In May, 1981, the Senate lifted the restriction placed on

Pakistan and cleared the arms sale and assistance package proposed by the Reagan Administration. The Administration adopted the argument that by increasing Pakistan's sense of security the US would be in better position to discourage its presumed nuclear efforts. Administration officials stressed the point that Pakistan was well aware that a nuclear explosion would probably result in the negation of the security relationship with the United States.²⁸ However, the American tactics vis-a-vis Pakistan's nuclear ambition did not appear to have achieved any significant success. Pakistan continued to acquire sensitive technology and materials from a variety of sources. Although US intelligence agencies cited numerous Pakistan actions inconsistent with the country's claim that it was not developing nuclear weapons, official US policy continued to maintain that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device and on the basis of such certification by the President, Congress continued to provide defence aid to Pakistan.

When the United States offered military and economic aid to Pakistan in 1981, the Congress bypassed the Symington Amendment which tied the issue of nuclear weapons to continued American aid. In late 1984, President Zia pledged apparently under US pressure, that Pakistan would not henceforth produce weapons grade material of its nuclear installations. The waiver of the 'Symington Amendment' expired in the summer of 1987, and Pakistan nuclear programme came under close Congressional scrutiny in the context of negotiations for a new economic-cum-military aid package to Pakistan. Military aid had been temporarily suspended till January 1988, after a Pakistani national had been arrested in the US for alleged involvement in smuggling of vital atomic

bomb components from that country. By the end of 1987, there were enough indications that Pakistan either possessed a nuclear weapon or had the capacity to assemble one at a very short notice. Despite these, the USA granted a new \$4.02 billion aid package to Pakistan (beginning from 1987), as the Reagan Administration informed the Congress that it had no proof of Islamabad's plans for manufacturing nuclear weapons²⁹ The US posture of turning a 'blind eye' towards Pakistan's efforts at acquiring a nuclear capability and the continued military aid to that country despite its violation of the provisions of the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (of 1978), had a direct bearing on India's security. Since the implosion of a nuclear device at Pokharan-which triggered the Pakistani quest for an 'Islamic Bomb', successive governments in New Delhi have proclaimed India's decision not to opt for a nuclear weapons programme. However, the acquisition for nuclear-weapon capability by Pakistan may call for a review of that policy. As the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said at a press conference on 5th June 1988. "We donot intend making nuclear weapons and we will hold ourselves back from developing a nuclear weapon. But the fact is, if Pakistan does have a nuclear weapon, it's going to cause very serious problems for US.³⁰ The implication of the US policy posture towards Pakistan's nuclear programme was that it could give rise to nuclear proliferation problems on the Indian sub-continent. It needs to be mentioned here that Pakistan always links the nuclear question with another security issue of Kashmir on which the entire foreign policy of Pakistan is concentrated. In this regard, Pakistani dependence on American support has become all the greater. And the Americans have not disappointed the Pakistanis. Often cynical statements as

well as opinions given by the Americans have made things go all the more difficult. The statements emanating from Washington do give tremendous encouragement to Pakistan and to the secessionists in Kashmir. There is good reason to believe that the US has steadily raised the ante on Kashmir primarily with a view to forcing India to accept American dictates on the nuclear issue. Even, quite a few of non-proliferation fundamentalists in America have said openly that the road to non-proliferation in South Asia lies through Kashmir. So, one of pertinent security problems is basically internal, though it has got inextricably intermixed with Pakistan's blatant and brazen attempts to give support and succor in every form to the merchants of secession and terror in the sensitive India state. Added to it is the encouragement the Pakistanis get from the international backing as they are able to muster in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) or elsewhere by such countries as the United States for her own reasons. All this brings back the key security issues vis-a-vis Pakistan and to what the Pakistanis call the core issue of Kashmir. This is not the place to go over the long, complex and mostly forgotten history of the Kashmir issue. The controversy whether Kashmir is the cause or the consequence of India-Pakistan hostility can also be left aside. Suffice it to say that today Pakistan has made Kashmir the be-all and end-all of the Indo-Pak relationship, as has become evident after the sterile seven rounds of talks between the foreign secretaries of the two countries. That Pakistan does not want to schedule any further talks with India at any level unless there is an end to or at least a visible reduction in Indian repression in Kashmir, is proof enough that it wants to shun bilateral talks and seeks again that UN resolutions must be implemented but forgets

conveniently that these resolutions, providing for a plebiscite eventually, had laid down that the first step in that direction was Pakistan's withdrawal from all parts of Kashmir including the so-called Azad Kashmir. It was because of the stubborn Pakistani refusal to fulfil this obligation that a plebiscite could not be held during the years when this could be feasible. However, the settlement along the existing line of control with some adjustments in the line almost entirely in Pakistan's favour-could perhaps have been obtained after 1971 war but unfortunately was never clinched. The heart of the matter is that Pakistan, which remained mum on Kashmir for close to two decade after the Simla Agreements, is today in a position to act so aggressively and talk to India so imperiously, as it has been doing in recent weeks and months.

State sponsored terrorist activities and violence by 130 militant groups continue to exist in the valley. The cross-border support from Pakistan makes things easier for the purveyors of murder and mayhem. Both in this country and abroad, there seem to have a vested interest in exaggerating the excesses of the hard pressed security forces in Kashmir or even in inventing such atrocities & some even lecture India on human rights.³¹

Another crucial dimension of Indo-US security relations has been the US-China linkage. A Sino-US accord was initiated in Beijing on April 30, 1984, at the time of President Reagan's visit to China and signed on July 23, 1985, when the Chinese President Li Xianman visited the United States. The delay of more than a year in finalising the agreement was due to some 'suspicious activity' indulged in by the Chinese. These included reports of China having given to Pakistan detailed nuclear weapons, designed information and help in

building a centrifuge Uranium enrichment plant to produce highly enriched Uranium, for atomic blasts.³² This obviously had implications for nuclear proliferation as well as India's security. India, moreover, was concerned about the US-China nuclear deal since the agreement had waived all the conditions that had killed the Tarapur Agreement. China refused to allow for any international inspection of its nuclear facilities and also refused to commit that it would not process the spent fuel. The state department overlooked these, citing substantial economic benefits to the US and its companies and its overall betterment of US-China relations. This exposed the selective implementation of US non-proliferation policy. Richard K. Betts, a noted analyst had remarked: "The United States appears to take South Asian Security concerns seriously only when they become a central element in global conflict between the superpowers. As a result US policy strikes the targets as not only erratic but also arrogant applying double standards".³³ It is the latter aspect which appears to have been largely responsible for vitiating Indo-US nuclear relations.

With India, however, Chinese relations have swung from one extreme to another: from Bhai-Bhai era to the bitter fighting on the bleak Himalayan heights; from the slanging match to the prolonged freeze; and from the slow thaw to the welcome warmth of the present. Pakistan, on the other hand, has always been remained as an important concern of China since 1960s. Even earlier, at the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955, when India-China relations were at their best and China was bitterly hostile to the United States, the Chinese leaders had told the most pro-American of Pakistani Prime Ministers, Mohammed Ali Bogra, that they "understood" Pakistan's reason to

join the patently anti-Chinese SEATO. Even in matters relating to Kashmir where the Pakistanis clamoured for a third party mediation keeping in view China, and the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Kashmiris, China's refusal to endorse the Pakistani proposal was a matter of great disappointment in Pakistan.³⁴

In the meantime, in the area of prolonged and contentious proliferation issues, better and somewhat more sympathetic understanding over each other's security concerns in Washington & New Delhi began to emerge with more official and non-official dialogues conducted between the two countries, following the security council declaration in Jan 1992 that the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international security.³⁵ But before we examine that, it is necessary or prerequisite to have a look at the Indo-US nuclear relations and of course, India's stand on the NPT in order to see the viable options before it vis-a-vis extension of the treaty, regarding the post Cold War security concerns of both the countries.

India's nuclear programme presented both an opportunity and challenge to US non-proliferation policy. Following India's detonation of a nuclear device at Pokharan in Rajasthan in May 1974 which India termed as a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE),³⁶ the United States became reluctant to supply fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Reactor Plant,³⁷ until she received satisfactory assurances regarding nuclear safeguards and the handling of spent fuel from the plant. During the initial agreement with the United States (General Electric Co.) in 1963 for the construction of two Light Water Reactors (LWR) at Tarapur, India had succeeded in preserving the safeguards-free status of LWR's in Tarapur. So

far as the question of the disposition of spent fuel from the reactors was concerned, it was agreed that India would reprocess the same in its own facilities subject to a joint determination that safeguards could be effectively applied. However, both these became contentious issues after Pokharan explosion. India's emphatic and repeated assertion that her detonation of a nuclear device was a 'peaceful' nuclear explosion,³⁸ and that she had no intention of producing the bombs or using nuclear energy for any other purpose did not succeed in allaying the fear at nuclear proliferation. The American Government, however was under pressure to stop the supply of Uranium to India unless she agreed to accept IAEA fullscope safeguards and throw open her nuclear facilities to international inspection. In fact, the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 made the supply of nuclear fuels to any non-nuclear weapon country conditional on its acceptance of IAEA safeguards. However, inspite of strong opposition from certain quarters, the US government authorised the sale of 38 tons of nuclear fuel to India for its Tarapur reactor in September 1980. President Carter, while recognising that the Indian failure to accept foolscap safeguards was a matter of serious concern, pointed out the need to maintain a dialogue with India. The exports, he said, would avoid the risk of a claim by India that the US had broken the existing agreement between the two governments. President Carter also drew attention on to the insecurity in South and Southwest Asia caused by the turmoil in Iran and Afghanistan and the need for the US to promote stability in the region. He further argued that withholding of exports would be prejudicial to the achievement of US non-proliferation objectives, and that the export fall within the grace period provided by law.³⁹ Senator Charles

Percy also defended the sale and warned that if the sale was cancelled, India would buy from the Soviet Union, and she would feel free to process the spent fuel if she wanted to.⁴⁰

However, before the resumption of supply could start, President Reagan, who won the Nov. 1980 elections, took a different view of the issue and was of the opinion that resumption of supply of nuclear fuel to India would encourage nuclear proliferation⁴¹ and would be an unwise acceptance of India's position on the controversy. As a matter of fact, the Reagan Administration showed no inclination to urge Congress to approve further sales of enriched Uranium to India. The Indian reaction was understandably very sharp and bitter. However, in July 1982, the United States and India agreed to invite France to assume American supply role under 1963 agreement and, following negotiations between France and India, an arrangement reconciled two potentially conflicting US policy objectives termination of US nuclear exports to India which had refused to accept fullscope safeguards on its nuclear programme as required by the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation ACT (NNPA) and avoidance of a confrontation on the fuel issue which would have put at risk the existing controls on the Tarapur reactors.⁴² On the latter issue India held that since the USA failed to honour the commitment to supply fuel for thirty years, it could no longer determine how the spent fuel which can be reprocessed into weapon grade Uranium was to be used. The United States on its parts maintained that India did not have that leeway and both sides agreed that differences on the issue persisted between them.

Now, as far as India's stand on NPT is concerned, interestingly, India was one of the co-sponsors of the resolutions which led to coming into existence of the NPT. In 1965, it put forward the following criteria for a non-proliferation treaty. An undertaking by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon technology to others; An undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against countries who do not possess them; An understanding through the UN to safeguard the security of countries which may be threatened by powers having a nuclear weapons capability; Tangible progress towards disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban treaty, a complete freeze on production of nuclear weapons & means of delivery as well as substantial reduction in the existing stocks; An undertaking by the non-nuclear powers not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.⁴³

India also supported the principles of non-proliferation laid down by the United Nations General Assembly in Nov. 1965: The treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form; The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities & obligations of the nuclear or non-nuclear powers; The treaty should be towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and more particularly nuclear disarmament; There should be acceptable & workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty; Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the rights of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.⁴⁴

From about 1966 the Indian attitude to the non-proliferation issue appreciably hardened, and India since then consistently criticised the US-Soviet draft treaty on three grounds: imbalance of obligations between the nuclear weapons powers and the non-nuclear weapons powers; inadequate security guarantees; and discrimination in the development of peaceful nuclear explosives.⁴⁵ Narasimha Rao as an External Affairs Minister in Mrs. Gandhi's Cabinet stated in the second special session on disarmament of the UN General Assembly, "History has demonstrated the efforts on restraining the emergence of the largest number of nuclear weapons will succeed only if the existing nuclear weapons powers themselves accept the same discipline as they demand of others. To us this is a matter of principle. Under Article VI of Treaty there are an obligation on nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals. In actual fact their arsenals have more then doubled. This has been the reason why the NPT has proved to be such a fragile instrument.⁴⁶ In 1988, explaining his three-stage disarmament plan, the first stage of which envisaged binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2010 latest which was chiefly in the Rajiv Gandhi plan Mr. N. Rao stated: "We propose, negotiations must commence in the first stage itself for a new treaty to replace the NPT."⁴⁷ In March 1992, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao said, "our position on the NPT is well known. We have not signed it and we do not propose to sign it".⁴⁸ In November 1993, the Indian delegate to the UN General Assembly repeated that India would not subscribe to a "treaty or an attitude that divides the world into nuclear haves and have nots".⁴⁹ More recently, India rejected the suggestions made in the wake of the Moscow Declaration seeking, among other

things, elimination of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and that it should accede to the NPT. The official response said that the treaty in its present form was discriminatory. There was a "need to alter the NPT on non-discriminatory lines, taking into account international developments over the last three decades and the imperative necessity for general and complete disarmament".⁵⁰ Even in the meeting for extension of the treaty in 1995 (which takes place in every 25 years), India's stand remained unchanged.

While there has been no change in the Indian response to the NPT, the policy so far as the weapon option is concerned has seen a slight shift, if one may use the words. The Nehruvian "never a bomb" policy was continued in his famous speech where he said, "No man can prophecy the future but I can say on behalf of any government and I think, I can say with some assurance on behalf of any future government of India, whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes."⁵¹ The Shastri policy was not so 'static'. He said, "I can not say the present policy is deep rooted, that it cannot be set aside and that it would not be changed. An individual may have a static policy but in the political field we cannot do so". Even though Shastri had said so and even though the Congress Parliamentary Party had urged preparedness to produce a bomb, if required vis-a-vis China, in essence the policy remained the same. The programme remained peaceful for all declared purposes.⁵² The peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974 during Mrs. Gandhi's tenure gave India's policy an ambiguous posture. In any case, nuclear capability is not a matter of intentions. The fuel problem at Tarapur, as a consequence of the explosion, demonstrates what an ill conceived policy can do.

Conducted, a little earlier, the explosion would have given India's stance on NPT a practical credibility or conducted a little later, after having achieved fuel sufficiency, the explosion would have boosted India's self-reliance claims. Even in 1974, the explosion should have been followed by a declared nuclear weapon status for India. Moraji, compounded confusion by expressing displeasure with the Pokharan explosion and at the same time "accepted the broad parameters of Indian posture of refusing to foreclose the nuclear weapon option."⁵³ The Policy continued to be so. No Indian government has ever acknowledged the initiation or existence of a nuclear weapon programme. The reports of Shastri having sanctioned a subterranean nuclear project have been produced in western sources.⁵⁴ The capability have grown but there is no evidence of any organised militarised nuclear programme. The ambiguity has been interpreted by Pakistanis observes as: " Nuclear ambiguity allows time for enlarging its existing capability".⁵⁵

However, as for as the options before India is concerned, nowhere it is implied that India has any *locus standi*. The country has not acceded to the NPT and, therefore, it has no role to play even after the extension conference, where it was decided to extend the treaty for an indefinite period without making it compulsory for all.

However, the Cold War rhetoric became a thing of the past in Indian remarks, both official and non-official & in this connection, certain recommendations made in a 1993 report entitled "India and America After the Cold War" are noteworthy:

a) "While acknowledging the dangers of continued nuclear development in the subcontinent, the study group distinguishes between US efforts to force India to give up its nuclear option, which would prove both ineffective and counterproductive to American interests and efforts to discourage and deter Indian programmes to produce and deploy nuclear weapons." b) "No Government in New Delhi could survive if it abandoned the nuclear option for India in a regional and global environment in which nuclear weapons continue to be the ultimate coin of power. Notwithstanding the significant steps taken by Washington and Moscow to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, the existing nuclear powers show no readiness to phase out nuclear weapons." c) "Instead of seeking to induce India to give up its nuclear option, the United States should shift from a focus on non-proliferation in South Asia to a policy designed to maintain nuclear restraints. Such a policy would seek to freeze the stockpiling of fissile material for weapons purposes; and the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan." d) "For the proposed five-power meeting to be productive, all participants would have to be prepared to accept restraints on their own nuclear posture as it affects South Asia. Chinese willingness to accept such restraints would be of special importance in encouraging India to participate. Similarly, American readiness to participate in a global test ban treaty, would enhance efforts to induce India and Pakistan to adopt a regional test ban agreement pending conclusion of a global test ban." e) "The United States should continue to deny licenses for the sale of US technology that would contribute directly to any Indian efforts to develop missile, capable of delivering nuclear weapons. At the same time, the study

Group recognizes that the 'Agni' and 'Prithivi' missile programmes are far advanced. They enjoy overwhelming domestic support and are not likely to be reversed by external political and economic pressures. The focus of US efforts, therefore, should be to persuade India not to transfer missile technology to others."⁵⁶

However, in the year 1993 an improvement was indicated in the security relations between the two countries. The on-going Light Combat Aircraft Project, with all its ups and downs, the naval exercises conducted by the Indian and the American Navies in the Indian Ocean, the rapid rise in the number of high-level exchange visits by the military officials and increased frequency of official and non-official dialogues to thrash out contentious issues are all indicative of that improvement. The 1993 executive report to the US Congress, made an example of the changing US perception of the security concerns of India. It points out: "India's latent security concerns about China are a major obstacle to gaining New Delhi's support for any required discussion in view of Indian belief that the Chinese nuclear and missile programme also must be taken into consideration.... consequently dealing successfully with nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia will require that the US and others take into account required security threat perceptions, including those extending beyond these two countries themselves"⁵⁷

Subsequently, the recommendation of a study mission, sponsored by the Asia Society, entitled, "South Asia and the United States After the Cold War", echoed similar views. It said that the United States should, "address India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities in the context of a global non

proliferation effort...re-examine present policy concerning nuclear energy cooperation with India and Pakistan....seek to engage India and Pakistan in bilateral and multilateral missile control initiative⁵⁸. Another significant example in this regard is the report on the bottom-up review 1993, prepared by Secretary of Defence William Perry's predecessor Les Aspin and accepted by Perry later, which did not include South Asia in the list of regional dangers of the post Cold War era.⁵⁹ In yet another significant development, John. R. Malott, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, in his speech at India International Center, New Delhi on May 19th 1993 said that "it is time to move beyond the rhetoric and start working to fulfill the potential of our new relationship, in terms of our bilateral dialogue on regional security and non proliferation where we look forward to holding the next round in near future and secondly, also in our military cooperation where we are not seeking a strategic relationship with India, nor do we want a relationship centered on arms sales. We want to build the same kind of cooperative relationship that we have with our other friendly non-aligned nations. This means continuing and perhaps expanding what we are doing-ship visits, joint training exercises, professional military exchanges, and so forth."⁶⁰

This is not to suggest that the United States closed its eyes on the South Asian nuclear and missile issues. In the wake of the scheduled trip to South Asia by Assistant Secretary to State Robin Raphel and Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, nuclear and missile proliferation issues in South Asia prominently figured in the media, policy analysis in the newspapers, and statements of the US government officials. There were views about offer of 38 F-16 fighter aircraft

to Pakistan in return for its agreeing to freeze its nuclear programme and for allowed international inspection of its nuclear facilities. Around the same time, views were also expressed that India would get 'incentives' in return for capping its fissile material programme. John Holum, Director of US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), when asked about this issue, replied:" As I understood this process, those issues are still being addressed. But I think there are incentives, and there would be incentives for India to take a similar step."⁶¹ India however, on more than one occasion, had conveyed its rejection of such proposals in no uncertain terms.

So strong has been the reaction against such iniquitous proposals in India that there was resistance in certain quarters in the country to Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's scheduled visit to the United States in May 1994. However, indications of growing understanding of India's position on nuclear issues in the United States had reduced the intensity of opposition to Rao's visit to Washington. By the Summer of 1994, while the White House, the state department and the Pentagon occasionally kept harping on the post Cold War dangers to international security emanating from the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the complexity of the Southern Asian nuclear tangle seemed to be targeted less and less in the American propaganda machine. The nuclear danger in the Korean peninsula, the 'unpredictable' Saddam Hussain regime's intentions in Iraq and Iran's suspected nuclear ambitions some how appeared to have overshadowed the nuclear programmes of Pakistan and India. In India too, soul searching had taken place to a considerable extent to meet the challenges posed by the end of the Cold War and specially the disintegration of Soviet

Union. (The collapse of communism in Europe and the ongoing economic reform programmes in the Peoples Republic of China appeared to have inspired a rethinking on the economic policy and the growth strategy in India. India's adoption of a policy of economic liberalisation in a changed security environment in the post Cold War era paved the way for smoother Indo-US relations.) A series of strategic symposiums, jointly conducted by the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis and Washington's National Defence University plus Indo-US dialogue at other official and non-official levels, at various levels contributed a great deal towards removal of some stereotype images and long-held mutual misunderstandings in both the capitals.

By Nov. 1993. three rounds of bilateral Indo-US dialogue by the officials on nuclear and other security issues had already taken place.⁶² In January 1994, the outcome of a Conference on Technology, Transfer and Weapons Proliferation, in Bangalore, hosted by India's National Institute of

Advanced Studies, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Mellon University, suggested greater US appreciation of India's commitment to non-proliferation goals.⁶³

In the backdrop of these developments, when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao landed in Washington in May 1994, he address to a joint meeting of the United States Congress on May 18, 1994, which was historic in its own way and said that "a nuclear 'no first use' agreement, indeed an agreement to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, is necessary in the short term by way of precaution, while serious multilateral negotiations are launched for nuclear disarmament, the objective being a nuclear free world."⁶⁴ His discussions with Bill Clinton

reflected in the joint statement issued on May 19. It says: "President Clinton and Prime Minister Rao offered their strong support for efforts towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and towards their progressive reduction with the goal of elimination of such weapons which are among the most pressing challenges to the security of states in post Cold War era...They pledged that their two governments would intensify their cooperative effort to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.⁶⁵ About two months after Rao's departure from Washington, a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement was released. While stating that United States "seeks to cap, reduce and ultimately eliminate the nuclear and missile capabilities of India and Pakistan," the report emphasises in a different section, "given its growing economic potential and already sizable military force, it's essential that China not become a security threat to the region. To that end, we are strongly promoting China's participation in regional security mechanisms to reassure its neighbours and assuage its own security concerns. And we are seeking to gain further cooperation from China in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."⁶⁶

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been on the world agenda since 1954 when India put it there. Until last year, the Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) resisted it, defying 80 UN resolutions. In the 139-page rolling text, part-I of the Treaty commands significant consensus and deals with measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, settlements of disputes, privileges and immunities, signature, ratification and

accession, depository, status of protocol and annexures, authentic text, national implementation measures and amendment procedures. Part-II is to be negotiated further and include most of the contentious issues which involve nearly 1200 wording in square brackets on which there is no agreement. The articles in part-II relate to preamble, scope, peaceful use of nuclear energy, peaceful nuclear explosion, the organisation for the comprehensive test ban including the conference of states and the executive council, the technical secretariat, entry into force of the treaty, duration & withdraw, periodic review, security assurances and relation to other international agreements. The entire section on verification is bracketed. There is even a proposal to entrust verification provision to the International Atomic Energy Agency,⁶⁷ However the CTBT is by definition not a disarmament but a restraint measure to prevent both vertical & horizontal proliferation-an eminently desirable objective according to New Delhi's own well established position. A CTBT will lead to a cessation of the nuclear arms race-less by inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons than by preventing the advancement of the NWS's capabilities. From the point of view of 178 non-nuclear weapon nations who are already members of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), renewed unconditionally and indefinitely in May, 1995, they are already committed not to test, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Therefore, CTBT doesnot make any difference to them. CTBT is for all practical purpose a totally redundant step, the enormous emphasis on the treaty by countries like the U.S., which opposed it till 1992 and thereafter had a sudden conversion to it, being an important factor. It's basically aimed at freezing the present technological status quo and prevent three undeclared

nuclear weapon states, Israel, Pakistan and India, from testing first generation weapons.⁶⁸ It's also aimed at freezing China at the present level of technology. The Nuclear Weapon States denounced the NPT and didnot join it for 23 years after it came into force. Now they have declared that they will continue to test till the CTBT comes into force. Unlike the case of NPT, India's accession to the treaty or staying out of it will make hardly any difference to the Indian deterrent posture. But a basic principle is involved. India didnot sign the NPT since it was discriminatory. The discrimination was not merely in the present monopolistic possession of weapons but also in lack of reciprocity of obligations. In that sense, CTBT not only continues to be discriminatory but also freezes it forever. This freeze should be taken into account along with the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT and the arrogant assertion before the World Court by the nuclear weapon powers of their right to commit nuclear holocaust. When India pressed for CTBT, it was primarily in the context of comprehensive disarmament and hence it featured in the Rajiv Gandhi plan which proposed a phased programme of total elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1993, India advocated CTBT when the world had not perpetuated the discriminate monopoly of nuclear weapons in the hands of the five most war-prone powers of the world and before they asserted their right to commit nuclear holocaust before the World Court.⁶⁹ So why should India sign the CTBT? After all, those who sponsored the Chemical Weapons Convention have not ratified it for three years. The U.S signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty with former USSR and didnot ratify if for next-14 years. Pakistan didnot ratify the Partial Test Ban Treaty for two decades. China and France didnot accede to the NPT for more than 20

years. The START-II has not been ratified for 5 years. The U.S didnot join the Geneva Protocol for nearly 50 years. The U.S delegation played a major role in drafting the law of the sea and yet it refused to accede to it after it was finalised. Keeping all these in view, the alternative option open to India is to stay out of signing and ratifying the treaty & make her intentions clear.⁷⁰

Now,the 61-member state conference on disarmament aimed to wrap up by 28th July 1996, its two-year negotiations on a CTBT which would prohibit nuclear explosions, being participated by all five declared nuclear powers and of course, the three states deemed close to having a nuclear capability-India, Israel & Pakistan, held at Geneva has come to an end. India rejected the draft CTBT, by calling it 'discriminatory' and "woefully inadequate" as expected. It emphasised that the world required nothing short of global nuclear disarmament, to which India remains committed. This is one welcome step that India has taken. This step has been maintained despite pressures of one sort or another. It's worth mentioning here that last year, dismay was expressed at the indefinite extension of Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) because, it sought to legitimise the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by five countries. Today the right to continue development and refinement of their arsenals is being sought to be legitimised through another flawed and eternal treaty. Such a treaty is not conceived as a measure towards universal nuclear disarmament and is not in India's national security interests. India therefore, cannot subscribe to its present form⁷¹ and that has rightly been done. The argument put forward by nuclear weapon powers that a nuclear test free world is a first step towards a nuclear-weapon free world, is cynical deception, since the only countries which

are likely to conduct nuclear tests are the nuclear weapon powers themselves and one does not need to drag in the more than 180 non-nuclear weapon states to sign a superfluous test ban treaty if they are sincere about not conducting nuclear tests.

Amongst the security concerns generated in the developed world by Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World, the Indian Ballistic Missile Programme also carries its share of myth and realities in its baggage. The proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities have introduced not only a dynamic in the Third World security equations, but also has significantly altered the relationships between the suppliers of advanced technologies and those Third World recipients who are developing ballistic missile systems. With convergences developing in US-Soviet relationships, the opportunities for patron client manipulations are likely to reduce as the Superpower's priorities shift from their political to commercial interests. In the emerging post Cold War global arms trade order, the major Third World actors are pursuing advanced weapons technologies not only to obtain sufficient levels of deterrence, but also for developing a greater element of self-reliance as well. But, on the contrary, a competitive pursuit of sophisticated technologies has contained them in the loop of dependence created by spiralling costs and pace of generational changes in conventional weaponry. On the other hand, nuclear, chemical and ballistic missile capabilities offer them opportunities to raise their deterrence potential without restoring to similar levels of dependency.

The debate on the new world order's transition from bipolarity to a unipolar dispensation also needs to examine the dynamics of foci of power

shifting towards nascent multipolarity. These include, amongst others, some of the larger Third World countries with significant military industrial capacities shaping them into influential players in their regions. With global proliferation of advanced weaponry and transfer of high technology, these emerging regional actors have developed large and effective security systems which although, may not be able to defeat a super power intervention, can nevertheless, seriously contest and impair the effects of sophisticated weaponry. In this regard, the penetrability, reach, accuracy, flexibility and speed of a ballistic missile is notable, not only in its counter-force ability, but capacities to pulverise and destroy value targets as well.. And when mated with a chemical or a nuclear warhead by a Third World state, it undermines the premises of techno-military advantages in the First World's pursuit of stratification of power and compels re-ordering the existing Superpower force projection calculus. Cass and Ras, who are regarding the American military inhibition and constraints in initiating action against Iraq as indications of decline in its power, need to note this factor, alongwith lessons of its Vietnam experience of going in too soon with too little.⁷²

The missile proliferation concerns amongst the US policy makers have compelled them to give the lead in formulation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This seven nation policy guideline on controlling sales and transfers of missile related technologies presumes transferability of satellite launch vehicle technologies for missile purposes. But difference in perceptions and priority amongst other partners of the regime, to block such technology sales is often in conflict with US interest. This hinders development of cooperative relationships in other areas since all the MTCR partners are

linked with the US technology control mechanisms through institutions like COCOM. The US arms transfers policies in the post war period assumed that the industrialised west would invariably maintain sufficient technological lead to counter the growth in military potential of the Third World countries. The main tenance of techno-industrial stratification was implicit in the concept of stability. As long as the Third World did not develop systems for which the First World had not developed counter-measures, there was permissibility in conventional arms transfers, irrespective of regional security imbalances contributed by the introduction of sophisticated weaponry. And this order does not favour or accept the development of nuclear and chemical weapons or ballistic missiles. Hence, the evolution of NPT, CWT, and MTCR and opposition to CTBT. On the other hand, proliferation of advanced weapons technology has also been contributed by (a) global proliferation of techno-economic developments which has had its share in the Third World; (b) international intellectual mobility; and (c) the natural diffusion of high tech, was given an impetus by the commercial interest of the arms industry of the developed world. Consequently, the military capabilities of developing countries continued to develop with implosions provided by their political and military interests. It economised on time and resources by bypassing some of the intermediate stages of technological developments that had to be traversed by the primary arms developers.⁷³ At the same time, there was a growing consciousness in the Third World on the need to extend their reach, resources and territorial rights, which in their perceptions, the decolonisation process had unjustifiably deprived them of. This led to two noticeable concerns. One, a need to develop strong military systems which

should have an ability not only to protect the boundaries inherited on de-colonisation, but also extend control over their traditional claims and perceived rights. Such developments led to the emergence of capabilities and values which frequently confronted and contested the established western interest. The second trend developed in the direction of pursuit of cost-efficient weaponry, that could provide deterrence through higher orders of sophistication and performance than that available in the region. Such procurements inevitably led to reciprocating concerns, which was noticeably stronger amongst the traditionally hostile societies, setting off an action-reaction procurement spiral in the regional security web. The choice before the resource-contained Third World belligerents was to tie themselves to the apron strings of one big power arms supplier or the other, to enable incremental accretions and modernisations to their conventional arsenals, or keep their options open to develop deterrent value systems like nuclear or chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. The later option also had the attraction of enhancing their political leverages vis-a-vis the super powers.⁷⁴

However, the changing East-West security equilibrium has left this world with only one Superpower with a will and ability to project its forces globally, this process is also being intersected by emerging regional players with an ability to exert their military influence beyond their peripheries. This attempt for extension of control will continue till it comes into conflict with a matching competitor, and then the dynamics of power will get diverted towards other opportunities offering lesser competition. It is in this connection that the US perception of Indian Ballistic Missile Programme makes sense. The American

concern over Indian development of 'Agni' and 'Prithvi' ballistic missiles should be viewed at two levels. The first level concern is with global proliferation of advanced weaponry and ballistic missiles and the effect or restraints it can impose on the US force projection interest; and more specifically, it looks at the impact of emerging Indian potential on the Indian Ocean region in general and the US regional clients in particular. The second level of concerns relate to a perceived future Indian capacity to graduate from an IRBM technology demonstrator to a nuclear capable ICBM. It's assumed that these developments will not only generate responses in China for improving its strategic preponderance vis-a-vis India,⁷⁵ but in turn may set off concerns in the Russian Federation with consequent effects on the existing international security equilibrium. To a large extent, the popular American perception is of a Russia tilted India (in spite of acknowledging that there is absence of any ideological disposition and such linkages have been cultivated by the Indian interests responding to a benign arms transfer programme). The logic of Indian military expansion is explained as subscribing to India's self image of a regional great power and its desire to be on par with China. The image of Indian expansionism, its hegemonistic desire to extend its reach upto the Indian Ocean littoral (certainly beyond the limits of South Asian region), may stir the soul of the Indian chauvinistic sentiment, and probably sounds a responsive chord amongst a stray opinion in the bureaucratic elite. But to assume that the expansionist Indian aspirants are the predominating national sentiment, amounts to wailful obfuscations of India's concerns and responsibilities towards its socio-economic priorities and its democratic practices.⁷⁶

A sense of injury accompanying the American accusation of West German (being an MTCR and COCOM partner) assistance to the Indian Argumented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV)⁷⁷ overlooks the German leadership given to the US peace and missile programme at the end of World War-II. These anomalies in the US policy towards India, which ascribe the Indian missile programme with similar motivations as that of the Libyan programme, when brought out by expert testimonies before the Congressional Special Committee, are lost in the din of stronger sentiments proscribing technologies, even for developmental purposes.⁷⁸ Such sentiments not only abound in literature on international relations published in US, but have found their way even to the cover of a popular weekly, Times.⁷⁹ And with inexorable output capacities that only the American information industry is capable of, which can turn any perception into 'fact', the myth of militaristic India on the march has also been manufactured into a fact. This serves the objectives of (a) South Asian management through highlighting Pakistani apprehensions (the cornerstone of the US arms aid and consequent downstream benefits); (b) relegates Indian concerns about China to invalidate the logic of its missile development, which if allowed its natural course can even skew the Sino-American equations; (c) generates doubts about the status and the intent of the Indian nuclear programme; and (d) justifies denial of western origin technology, which requires seeding apprehension not only amongst the COCOM partners but also in the vast bureaucracy serving the US administration, the Congressional staff and the thinktanks operating in Washington's inner circle of power.

The tunnel vision which ascribes that the Indian security planner's only obsession is with Pakistan, gets handicapped by a self-serving disinformation. Although the more objective western observers note that Indian interest in developing long range missiles steams more from its security concerns with China and Pakistan,⁸⁰ a contra opinion, nevertheless, does not carry one far enough. Seized by the Pygmalion syndrome, even quality research loses its objectivity while comparing India-Pakistan space launch capacities. "Pakistan has no space launch programme and, therefore, no space rockets to convert to military missiles", says the CRS report for the US Congress that was revised in February 1989.⁸¹

The Cold War nuclear doctrines had constructed a framework of deterrence through mutually assured destructive capabilities. While emerging technologies have developed missile accuracies, which when mated with conventional warheads will yield efficiencies equal to low yield nuclear weapons, the strategic analysts have yet to catch up with such vastly improved values of deterrence. According to a Presidential Commission Report on integrated long-term strategy for USA,⁸² the extraordinary missile accuracies that have been developed, make it possible to attack fixed targets at any ranges within one to three metres. The report goes on to add that "the precision associated with new technologies will enable us to use conventional weapons for many of the missions once assigned to nuclear weapons".

However, if deterrence is defensive in its philosophical interpretation, then medium range ballistic missile capability can also provide cost efficient deterrence against powers that could act inimically to the Indian interests.

Countries, who although, may not be a direct threat to the Indian security, but nevertheless, by allowing safe havens or temporary basing facilities to naval ships or aircraft against Indian security interests, would be deemed hostile. 'Agni' has a role in imposing a sense of caution or deterrence against such indirect but overt third party activities against India.⁸³

In matters of Defence Cooperation however, William Perry came to India on an official visit in January 1995. Upon his arrival, he remarked: "The ending of Cold War opened a new era in United States-India security relations. Old barriers to our cooperation have been replaced by new opportunities. We in the United States are excited by these opportunities and want to increase the security links between our two democratic nations. Doing so will allow us to better pursue our common security interests and provide a base of understanding for working out differences".⁸⁴ Having been aware of certain divergent strategic perceptions in India and US and determined to enhance security relations despite those differences, Perry reiterated several times that his visit to South Asia would not aim at raking up the NPT and other contentious issues. On the very first day of his arrival in New Delhi an "Agreed Minute on Defence Relations between the United States and India" was signed. The agreement said, "The Government of United States of America and India recognised the importance of enhancing our defence cooperating on as an important part of our overall bilateral relationship". It is an indication that such cooperation is necessary before embarking upon a bilateral "commercial alliance". The document further stated that the "growth of bilateral defence relations in new areas will be evolutionary and related to convergence on global and regional issues. The

enhanced defence cooperation between our two countries is designed to make a positive contribution to the security and stability of Asia. These measures will also promote the maintenance of international peace and security in the post Cold War world."⁸⁵

This broad formulation of strategic cooperation is a noteworthy development in view of intense involvement of United States in the Asia-Pacific region and growing involvement of India in the economic affairs of South-East Asia and the Far East. In addition to this, both sides have also agreed "that such defence cooperation will cover civilian-to-civilian cooperation, service-to-service cooperation and cooperation in defence production and research."⁸⁶ Although the agreement doesnot include arms transfer or joint development of technologies and exemplifies little more than a good beginning in bilateral cooperation, it still heralds a new era of cooperative relationship between the two countries which have been identified as "estranged democracies."

With a view to ward off any misperception and misapprehension in the neighbourhood, it has been made quite clear that Indo-US defence cooperation would not be at the cost of either Pakistan or China. Nonetheless, the China Factor did come up during discussions due to the fact that the Beijing's attitude and policy would constitute a significant aspect of the nuclear and missile non-proliferation/proliferation question in Southern Asia. During a less publicised but very important breakfast meeting with William Perry and other members of his team, Jasjit Singh, Director of IDSA said:

"China has the most powerful military system in Asia. Although it may not match up to American military power in terms of quality and technology, we

have to see its capabilities in terms of other Asian countries or its neighbours. It is modernising rapidly both its conventional forces and its nuclear forces..... we have a clear goal which serves our national interests to work for nuclear disarmament. And we also have a problem, a dilemma to deal with the interim period between now and then, (total nuclear disarmament) even if it takes many, many decades, as you (Perry) mention, to deal with existing realities, particularly when we know that China so far had shown no interest whatsoever in entering into any sort of checks or controls on its nuclear programme or posture".⁸⁷

In reply, Perry said, " I have followed the Chinese military closely since the early 60's and visited them in 1980....they had a very large military force but very poorly equipped, I would say, with 50's technology. From 1980 to about 1990, they only decreased the size of the military forces and the investment (in military). During the last two years, there has been a major turn about and they have started investing (in the military) again....My assessment at this time is, they do not pose any substantial military threat, not certainly at the global scale, not even to large neighbours like India".⁸⁸

However, the threat perceptions of India & US are not identical and rightly so. The overall capabilities of the two countries are largely uneven, they are located geographically in two different continents and thus perceptions are bound to be divergent at least in this regard. But Perry's remark indirectly suggests that China poses a military threat to smaller countries in the region, if not to "large neighbours like India" and not certainly on the global scale'. Perry's concluding remark, however perhaps would not conflict with the views

of several Indian analysts as well. He said, "there is a potential that they (Chinese) could develop their military capability by the end of this decade and that could be a problem".⁸⁹

Perry's trip to India has been assessed by Indian analysts in different ways. Jasjit Singh opines that the US "is increasingly cutting to listen carefully to India's core fundamental security concerns & give them the requisite importance in its strategic thinking."⁹⁰ In his assessment of the evolving Indo-US defence ties, he says that there "is no cause to be euphoric about the process of defence cooperation; nor does it call for cynicism. Both sides will have to work sincerely to give partnership a chance and not demand too much of each other too soon".⁹¹ K. Subramanyam, Defence Analyst & former Director IDSA, has also expressed optimism in his comments and analyses of US Defence Secretary's visit to India. He argues that Americans have "considerable commonality with our security concerns, though there are undoubtedly differences in translating these mutual security concerns into compatible national security policies".⁹² K. Srinivasan India's former Foreign Secretary, likewise observed that a national consensus on the Indo-US relationship is gradually emerging in India and the suspicions of the past are slowly giving way to mutual confidence on both sides.⁹³

There is little doubt that improving ties between India & the US in the economic sphere and the gradual emergence of a strategic consensus between the two countries not only constitutes a significant development in the post Cold War international relations but also exemplifies the birth of a new era of relations between the two democracies which were until recently interacting at a

level that was characterised as the "dialogues between the deaf". What is perhaps necessary to give a boost to the momentum of this novel development is a balanced and cautious blend of economic ties and strategic relationship. The contentious issues in the security areas, such as the missile & nuclear proliferation, are there to keep cropping up in the future. But an improving economic ties can also contribute considerably to the improvement of the security understanding between the two countries as well.

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6

CONCLUSION

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The current behaviour of the great powers is no different from the behaviour of the earlier powers in matters of restructuring the current world order. Geopolitics and strategy remains strong as it has always persisted since the treaty of Westphalia. The states will continue to assert themselves in issues of national security even though the new liberal agenda of free-market, fiscal austerity, civil liberties, less of political and social rights, transnational and subnational actors may claim its negation or its dilution. The liberal thinkers who have attempted to conceptualise the current moment as a moment of enlarged possibilities and a world of peace are definitely inadequate & the answer lies with the neo-realist understanding of international relations which emphasises on the conflict scenarios, as a historically proven phenomenon. So, the world won't be a very different place to live in even in the present transitory period which may last two generation of fifty years if earlier history is any guide. Balance of power, differences in strategy, nuclear difference, sea-space power considerations will determine the unit level actors even with the developing world efforts to move for alternative restructuring of international relations. So in a realistic new world order, marked more by conflict scenarios rather than cooperation, democratization will neither restrain all future leaders from waging war nor will more energy efficiency prevent all global competition for resources. International cooperation, norms, regimes and institutions may help patch up some disagreements, but nations must be militarily prepared for

the times when peaceful management of conflict resolution fails. The defence proposals given by different scholars may look good on paper but basing on that one can never really entrust the security of Europe, the Middle East and other hot spots to defensive weapons and new collective security arrangements. No single security plan can guarantee an end to war. The matter of concern is whether the proposals or suggestions as a system can work better than today's security system. The suggestions however, produce a peace sturdier than the mere absence of war, a peace in which conflicts can be eliminated and resolved, long before war becomes a possibility. One such proposal has been given by long time peace activist W.H.Ferry: "Peace is not just a condition but a continuing effort to discern and meet needs, to relieve strains, and to foresee, avert or diminish crises.¹ Thus, it's been proposed that in the system, military victory would be a symbol of defeat because it would mean that the most critical non-provocative policies, the tools of economics, democracy, diplomacy & law-had failed. But looking at the present order, a security system based on the principles of comprehensiveness, non-provocation, prevention, multilateralism and participation seems to be visionary and pragmatic. It rejects the technological utopianism of those who seek an impenetrable shield against nuclear bombs that will consume hundreds or billions of dollars and still probably not work. It also rejects the strategic utopianism or arms controllers who believe that the world can coexist forever with thousands of nuclear weapons under the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. What it offers, instead, is a comprehensive framework for preventing and resolving conflicts that renders nuclear bombs and other weapons of mass destruction less and less

relevant to national & global security. So, arms control which can work only with step-by-step agreements between nations does not carry any value, as far as the proposals are concerned. Rather, there are certain proposals which can be adopted independently. For example: the United States can substantially increase its own security and that of other nations by conserving energy, promoting sustainable Third World development, enhancing political participation at home and abroad, announcing and abiding by international norms of negotiation and nonintervention, subjecting itself to compulsory jurisdiction in the World Court, shifting to non-provocative defences in Europe & Asia, scrapping first-strike nuclear weapons, and closing all nuclear facilities. None of these policies endanger US national security or require the reciprocity of other nations. In some instances, such as nonprovocative defence, bilateral and multilateral agreements can be helpful, but even here, a strong case can be made for taking at least a few steps independently. Just as every decision to deploy weapons systems in the past was made independently, so too can decisions be made independently to trade offensive weapons for defensive ones or to renounce nuclear bombs and other inhuman weapons of mass destruction.²

However, all these proposals are lovely dreams and do not carry any value in real terms. Today's security system pays little attention to the roots of conflict and values the international norms and institutions in resolving conflicts and relies instead on managing 'inevitable conflicts' through the threat of war. To cite an example, the United States spends roughly twenty times more on its military programme than all non-military foreign programmes put together. Tilted so heavily towards provocative accumulations of arms and threats to use

force, the current system is extremely fragile. Any number of crises can escalate into a global war. In a world dominated by arms race and force, a crisis typically leads one side to ratchet the conflict upward to show its resolve, causing its adversary to ratchet another notch further, and so on. Conflicts get caught in a cycle that only extraordinary efforts can stop.³

Thus the present world order or the post Cold War world order, at a time when communications are difficult, tensions are high and offensive forces are on hair-trigger alert, has been variously described as "Unipolar", "bipolar", "multipolar" and it has also been described as 'new world disorder.'⁴ However, from the strategic studies perspective, the present world order has also been described as a 'Poly Centric World Order' and this seems much more credible.⁵ (This means that not one but many centres of power around the globe continue to balance each other and that similar checks and balances also constantly continue to operate within these various regions themselves. It is more like a multipolar world with one particular nation or grouping being ultimately more important compared to others.) This post Cold War world order, however, has neither come as a result of any violent military confrontation nor has it been a follow up of any international convention like those of the Congress of Vienna, Treaty at Versailles or Yalta Conference. Instead, it has come about in the form of a slow moving procession of certain related and unrelated events like the cascading collapse of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, disintegration of the Soviet Union, unification of Germany and rise of Germany and Japan as economic super powers and that of United States as the sole military superpower that have, all put together rather loosely heralded this new post Cold War era. However,

one major consequence of this loose-ended transition has been that whereas these new obsolete Cold War era structures and institutions, like the United Nations and its affiliate agencies have continued to manage world affairs, there has been great clamour for change, yet no new alternative arrangements have been either seriously discussed or tried by major world powers that have the wherewithal for effecting such a change. In fact, India has been one such country, which has put forward important proposals for further democratising these world organisations so as to obtain the necessary mandate from the new global actors to the post Cold War world. And India's views are shared and supported by most other developing countries, including also many other important nations around the world.⁶

More recently, this debate on the post Cold War world order has been confined to two major theses: one presented by Francis Fukuyama in his "The End of History and the Last Man" and the other called the "The Clash of Civilisation" by Samuel Huntington. So much has been published on these two treatises that there is no need to further expand the argument in this context. Broadly speaking, both believe that wars amongst developed nations have come to an end and that in future, war will remain confined primarily to the developing nations "mired in history".⁷ Scholars in the Third World or developing countries have been particularly critical of these theses and have generally described them as highly biased and myopic. Also among others, conflicts in Bosnia & Chechnya have clearly proved that international politics can never follow prescriptions.⁸ In this connection, it is worth mentioning here that the other extreme of the spectrum is the claim by leftwing thinkers such as

Immanuel Wallerstein that the world of liberalism has come to an end, seems most adequate.

This transition towards the post Cold War order continues even though it's been more than 5 years that Cold War has come to an end. And broadly, in this continuous and loosened transition into the post Cold War world order, there are six major shifts that have been affecting international security most thoroughly, which are as follows: a) From Geo-strategy to Geo-Economics: Economic Strength has emerged as an important element of overall national power. And this has led to the building of new power centres broadly like the North American Free Trade Agreement led by United States, the European Union led by Germany, and Aisa-Pacific region, the most important dynamic region for the 21st century. This has also been partly the result of increasing liberalisation of national economies and increasing inter-bloc interactions. b) From External Aggression to Internal Instability, the pattern of conflicts in the post Cold War era has clearly shifted from inter to intra-state, often with a large element of external involvement. Low intensity conflicts is both a covert and cheap option. This has partly been so effective because of the rising expectations from the 'New World Order' and the weaponisation of societies during those Cold War Years. Most of the current conflicts being sought today are low-intensity conflicts. c) From global to regional powers, the diffusion of power has given rise to regionalism with many new power centres obtaining credible capabilities to affect developments within their own neighbourhood. In the western literature these powers have often been generally reformed to as rogue states. There are various types and scales of power: these can be

cooperative or hegemonic though theoretically this concept of 'regional power' remains to be defined.⁹ d) Militarisation of Societies: during the last 50 Years, over one hundred million Kalashnikovs and over 115 million mines have been planted in various societies. These had been kept strictly under control by the impending threat of a Third World War. But with the collapse of one super power, these fast spreading military technologies have not only changed the way wars are thought and fought, this has also made violence much more imminent. e) Rise of Ethnicity and Religion: Also, most conflicts today are being fought around the globe for reasons rooted in ethnic and religious issues. This is so because the Cold War order which had kept these forces under control has disappeared. Secondly, with the absence of any serious threat to global powers, other issues like Islamic fundamentalism, environmental degradation, and human rights and nuclear proliferation by regional states have suddenly become the focus of world attention.¹⁰ f) From Competition to Cooperation: Putting an end to the Cold War concepts of 'deterrence' (that was continuing the conventional Westphalian World Order) had visualised national security in autonomous terms, measures like "Recess Deterrence",¹¹ Confidence Building Measures" (CBMs) and 'Constructive Engagement' have come to the fore. States are being forced by economic, technological and strategic realities of the post Cold War world order to seek cooperation even with their adversaries.¹²

These cascading changes of the post Cold War world have also seriously affected India's national security thinking. For instance, the policy makers today feel far more responsible to the public debate which has suddenly expanded during the last few years. Professional advice has also become increasingly

important. So much so that in 1990, the V.P Singh government had finally decided to set a fourth tier-the National Security Council-to India's National Security structures which we had inherited from the British and which, with some cosmetic changes here and there, had continued all these years. Also, following the foreign exchange crisis of 1991, economic security has gradually emerged as a significant component of India's national security perceptions. Liberalisation policies have further led to our defence sector seeking more cost effective participation from private industries at home and abroad. Government orders to Ordnance Factories (OFs) and Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) have fallen from Rs 2,500 crore in 1992-93 to 2,000 crore for 1995.¹³ As a result, our OFs and other DPSUs are finally beginning to commercialise their operations not only by making them competitive but also by launching new efforts for conversion towards producing civilian consumer products.¹⁴

Finally, the national security today is no longer seen in India barely in terms of physical defence of India's territorial integrity and sovereignty. And this less moralising and more outward looking perspective today enables India to participate in a wide range of new international undertakings, thereby, seeking security by building new collaborative equations and expanding its global role by strengthening the United Nations.¹⁵ The focus of our national security thinking has, in fact, markedly shifted from making decisions on the basis of high sounding moral principles towards defining and achieving hard core national interest. Be it participation in UN peace-keeping operations or arms-exports, our strategic and economic gains are increasingly becoming important in making

all decisions. As a result, India's arms exports have shown an impressive increase during the 1990s.¹⁶

Making full use of these new circumstances and openness of the post Cold War world, and also as a follow-up to its new national security thinking at home, India has been trying hard to build new security partnerships even with countries which were not so friendly towards us during the Cold War Years. This includes countries like China, Israel, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) like Indonesia and Malaysia. With these last two countries, India has recently signed agreements for providing servicing facilities for their newly acquired Russian defence equipment. Similarly, India has established diplomatic ties with Israel now and two countries are working hard toward building a fruitful defence cooperation. But all this has been partly possible due to India's improving equations with those powers in the erstwhile western blocs which were not so receptive to India during these Cold War years. And these changing equations with these important powers have a direct bearing on India's national security situation.¹⁷ One such country is none other than United States. For the first time, putting an end to confrontation on issues like nuclear non-proliferation, the United States and India have decided to build cooperation in areas where it is possible. As a result, beginning of the year 1995, four important Secretaries of Defence, Energy, Commerce and Industry have already visited New Delhi. Among various other agreements, the Defence Secretary, William Perry, signed the Indo-US Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for Defence Cooperation on January, 13,1995. Under this new MOU,

for the first time, the security component has clearly emerged as the most important aspect of post Cold War Indo-US ties.¹⁸

The present arrangement envisages a three-tier framework: between armed forces through joint exercises and training, etc; between senior civilian officials to review and guide the former and for policy planning; and at the research and development level through joint projects. The first meeting of this highest civilian group was scheduled for the spring 1995. It is this group which will be directing the steering committees of the three services and the Joint Technical Group in these two countries for implementing and monitoring the progress of Indo-US defence cooperation. On the actual ground level, various US companies have already been actively involved in 'India's Light Combat Aircraft Project' which was all ready to have its first test flight in June 1996. Besides, following our recent defence agreement, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) has shown great interest in India's high-altitude warfare expertise like our successful operations at Siachen glacier. Similarly, the US Pacific Command (PACCOM), which is responsible for all military strategy in the regions from India along the Pacific-Asia rim upto Japan, has already taken initiatives for undertaking joint naval exercises with the Indian Navy and the second such exercise was to be held in the summer 1995.¹⁹

India, of course, is interested in building strong defence ties with this sole military superpower of the post Cold War world and has shown visible interest in obtaining state-of-art technologies and participation of United States for India's showpiece projects like the Light Combat Aircraft, Main Battle Tank and Advanced Light Helicopter, so that these can be fast commissioned for use into

India's armed forces. Besides, Indo-US trade relations have also been expanding, raising the stakes of both these countries in the security and stability of each other.²⁰

In sum, therefore, the end of the Cold War has no doubt changed many things. With increasing inter-bloc interactions and changing power equations around the globe, it has also many new opportunities for India for building new alignments and partnerships. This thrust for building new alignments has also come partly from India's changing national security thinking in a broad and integrated manner by having a strong economy and stable policy to back our well equipped, informed, professional and committed armed forces. Nearer home, Pakistan continues, even in the post Cold War world, to constitute the most regular and imminent threat to India's national security, whereas China's emerging military and economic strength has also been growing at a rather fast pace and this is sure to make China, despite improving relations, an extremely overbearing factor in all the future threat perceptions in India's national security strategy. It is on the basis of these threat perceptions, that United States has a greater role to play at least to ascertain a friendly relationship with our country in the time to come. However, there is one thing which is absolutely clear that the world respects power. With a military posture, it is easily capable of, India can secure its rightful place in the South Asian region. It would also give the appropriate freedom of action for our foreign policy to function without having to worry too much about problems created by Pakistan and of course, China.

Thus, the record of relations between United States and India are marked more by conspicuous examples of differences, disagreements and dissimilarities,

than of cooperation. Even in the present transitory phase, the conflictive nature of the relations have been more apparent and has received greater publicity and attention than cooperation. In the asymmetrical nature of Indo-US bilateral relationship, the issues of security will dominate along with the continuation of unsettling conflicts. So the realist and neo-realist understanding of international relations will definitely have an edge over the neo-liberal understanding along with their theory of interdependence. The international structure which is marked by the asymmetrical relationship between the hegemon and the subordinates or the centre and periphery, complies with the neorealist argument about the continuation of conflict as a historical proven phenomenon. The neo-realist and neo-liberal mix of conflict and cooperation allows to have a more nuanced understanding of the Indo-U.S. relations than the thesis of Centre-Periphery for the simple reason that the former allows for a process in which the hegemon has to constantly adjust to the positions of the subordinates even though in the history of international relations its argument traditionally is a history of great powers.

End Notes

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3. **Ibid.**, pp.235-6.
4. Singh, Swaran. "Post Cold War World Order & India's National Security". **Strategic Analysis**. (New Delhi : IDSA, Vol.XVII, No.4, July 1995). p.523.
5. Singh, Jasjit. "Managing Regional Security", in Jasjit Singh (eds). **Asian Strategic Review 1992-93**. (New Delhi : IDSA, Aug-1993). p.7.
6. Singh, Swaran. **op.cit.**, p.522.
7. Francis Fukuyama. **The End of History & the Last Man**. (London : Penguin Books, 1992); and Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilisation". **Foreign Affairs**. (U.S.A. : Council on Foreign Relations, Sept-Oct.1993).
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9. Kahler, Miles. "A World of Blocs : Facts & Factoids". **World Policy Journal** (New York : World Policy Institute, Vol.XII, No.1, Spring 1995). p.19.
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11. Singh, Jasjit. "Post Cold War Security Situations in Southern Asia". **Strategic Analysis**. (New Delhi : IDSA, No.1-4, April-July, 1994). p.12.
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13. Das Gupta, Sunil. "Gunning for Profits". **India Study**. 15th March, 1995. p.112.
14. Singh, Swaran. **op.cit.**, p.526.
15. Gorden, Sandey. **India's Rise to Power**. (New York : St. Martin Press, 1995). p.351.

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17. **Ibid.**, p.527.
18. Singh, Swaran. "Indo-US Defence Ties : Post Perry Prospects". **Indian Defence Review**. (New Delhi : Lancer Publishing Hosue, Apr-June, 1995).
19. Singh, Swaran. "Post Cold War World Order & India's National Security". **Strategic Analysis**. (New Delhi : IDSA, Vol.XVII, No.4, July, 1995). p.528.
20. **Ibid.**, p.528.

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