THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENCE FORCES : MAJOR ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENT

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SOURAV ROY

DISARMAMENT STUDIES DIVISION
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ORGANISATION
AND DISARMAMENT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067
INDIA
1995

जवाहरलाल नेहरु विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

17 July, 1995

CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled **"The Japanese Self-Defence Forces - Major Issues and Development"**, submitted by **Mr. Sourav Roy** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy**, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. This is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROFESSOR M. ZUBERI
(SUPERVISOR)

PROFESSOR K.S. JAWATKAR
(CHAIRPERSON)

GRAM : JAYENU TEL. : 667676, 667557 TELEX : 031-73167 JNU IN

DEDICATED

TO

MY PARENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At the outset, I would like to convey my profound sense of gratitude and indebtedness to my supervisor Professor M. Zuberi for his precious suggestions, advice, encouragement and guidance throughout the preparation of this dissertation without which it could have never been completed. I would take this opportunity to acknowledge that it was a great pleasure, fortune and privilege to be his student. The intellectual stimulation derived from my interactions with him shall not only remain as fond memory but also guide me in my future life.

My sincere thanks to Air Commodore (Retd) N.B. Singh, Deputy Director of the United Services Institute for his immense help during the material collection for my dissertation. I shall also take this opportunity to thank all my friends, especially Suvendu, Gr. Cap. R.V. Phadke, Prabeer, Sanjay, Manish, Bibhu, Cherian, Shambhu and Kumool for their support and help at every stage of writing this dissertation.

Finally, my sincere thanks to Mr. Om Prakash to get this manuscript ready on time.

SOURAV ROY

THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENCE FORCES - MAJOR ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENT

CONTENTS

ANNEXURE **(pp.137-151)**

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Japan was defeated in the Second World War and surrendered to the Allied powers on August 15, 1945, through an announcement by the Japanese Emperor Hirohito. It was the most traumatic defeat for Japan in every way. At the initial stage of the Second World War in East Asia, the Japanese army was highly successful and won dramatic victories. However at the fag end of the war, not only the spoils were lost but the once dreaded military machine virtually collapsed in response to the massive onslaught by the Allied powers. The defeat was a great psychological shock as it happened to Japan for the first time. More than 2.3 million people died and one-third of the population became homeless. The Tokyo bombings ruined the city and virtually turned it into a vast wasteland. But the best symbol of the disaster, the most tragic chapter in twentieth century history and perhaps world history, was represented in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Little evidence of human civilization remained in these cities and the radioactive fallout affected generations of the Japanese people. The country was prostrate economically and near famine condi-

tions were created. The people suffered from abject poverty, total exhaustion and complete disillusionment.

Thus at the end of the Second World War Japan laid down her arms and submitted herself to the American authorities. In rapid succession, purges, land and *Zaibatsu* reforms, general reforms to democratize the state took place. A democratic constitution was also imposed which renounced war as an instrument of national policy and this clause became the basic and at the same time the most controversial factor guiding Japanese foreign and defence policy in the post-war era.

JAPANESE MILITARY TRADITION AND MILITARISM

A study of the post-war Japanese defence establishment shall remain incomplete without an introduction to the military tradition of Japan and also the brief spells of militarism in Japanese history.

The military class in Japan played a unique role throughout history. Feudal military government, institutionalized in the late twelfth century, was a wedding of Confucian concepts which provided the *Samurai* (warrior) with the parameters of his value system and individualistic Zen

Buddhism which guided his mode of action.[1] This was also the era of *bushido* spirit (the spirit of the Samurai) and *seppuku* (hara-kiri). The *samurai* spirit was based on selflessness and non-materialism. The *samurai* at this time consisted of 7% of the population, kept the peace and ruled by the sword. During the Tokugawa period (1600-1868), Japan experienced a long hiatus of peace and the *samurai*, no longer being able to practice their art, adjusted to supplementary roles such as teacher and moral preceptor to the other three classes in Japanese society - farmers, artisans and merchants. *Samurai* scholarship gave coherence to the traditional ideas and concepts of the conduct of military men, and these ideas permeated all aspects of Japanese society. Loyalty, service, austerity, frugality and development of personal traits of courage, sacrifice were the basic *Samurai* ethics. The influence of these norms was clearly evident in the late nineteenth century Japanese Imperial army. Over the years the Imperial Army and Navy built a military tradition based on the foundation of the old. Myths of invincibility which increased the confidence of the military were strengthened through successful mili-

---

1. James H. Buck, The Modern Japanese Military System (London, 1975), p.253.

tary campaigns against China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905). *Yamato dameshii* (the spirit of Yamato) and *Seishin* (spirit) became the most important attribute of the Japanese armies. The appreciation of the morale and courage of Japanese soldiers in combat by foreign military observers also enhanced their confidence. Thus the unique features of the *samurai* tradition gave the Japanese soldiers the strength to conquer all obstacles when in combat.

Japan's long isolation was broken when the first European, an Englishman named Will Adams, came to Japan in a Portuguese ship. The year was 1543 and the Japanese port was Tanageshima. A country ruled ruthlessly by the sword was introduced for the first time to firearms, a weapon which was to revolutionize Japanese military strategy.[2]

The Meiji period, which began in 1868, was a turning point in Japanese history since it brought the country into direct interaction with the West. However, Japan went for an independent policy, careful to avoid foreign domination. Lower and middle ranking *samurai* officers comprised the new regime, which controlled the Emperor, who was still a minor.

---

2. Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Rearmed (London, 1976), p.3.

But within nine years, the *samurai* soldiers lost their influential role and this was due to the Conscription Act of 1873. This act made military service universal modelled on the West and lifted all class biases.

Japan took the best of the West - the Napoleonic Code of France for its legal system, the British and German model for its Navy and Army. The Armed force conscripts also were used to suppress all kind of opposition and dissenting activities. This in turn led to the involvement of the military in governmental affairs. Many commentators see the rise of the military in this period as the beginning of the buildup upto the Second World War.[3] Despite restrictions regarding franchise, which were aimed at assuring the non-involvement of the military in domestic politics, the military gradually became entangled in not only internal but also external affairs of the government.

The military played a very significant part in guiding Japan's politics and shaping her path for industrialisation. The military managed to gain two cabinet seats in the new government. Soon links with the industry established a

---

3. Kenneth W. Colegrove, Militarism in Japan (New York, 1936), p.35.

military industrial complex which by 1940 became more developed than those in the U.S.A. or Britain. This line of development was perfectly in tune with making Japan a strong and rich country.

After the First World War, Japan attended the Peace Conferece at Versailles in 1919. As part of its share of the spoils of the war, Japan gained control of the Pacific islands previously under Germany and also parts of Chinese territory. Over the years, Japan had become an important partner in the international financial system and also an important actor in world trade. The leaders of Japanese big business known as `zaibatsu', led by Mitsui and Mitsubishi, were in favour of expanding the economy through peaceful measures rather than an aggressive role.

The `Wall Street Crash' of 1929 and the consequences from the `Great Depression' came as a disaster to the export-oriented economy of Japan. The immediate effect was felt in the countryside, mainly in the silk industry which employed a large number of women and children. Starvation and utter misery fell on the common people who were naturally attracted to socialist ideologies. Like Germany, the economic crisis led to resurgent nationalism in Japan.

Economic decline resulted in frustration which combined with the desire to remain free from external pressures, created a wave of nationalism, which swept the entire country. This also witnessed the beginning of militarism, which was reflected in the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931. The main objective of this invasion was to provide raw materials and territory for Japan's industrial machine.

The young officers of the army who were ultranationalist and anti-capital were the leaders of this military adventurism and they organised the *Kokoku Seinen Shoko Domei* (Imperial League of young officers). They became so popular among the masses that the Tokyo government felt threatened by its own army. Between the period, from 1932 to 1945, ultranationalism found expression in the curbing of all democratic or liberal ideas and thought and the banning of English language. A coup led by Captain Teruzo Amdo failed in February 1936 and in 1937 Japan became involved in a war with China. It is interesting to note that Japan faced in China both the armies of Mao Zedong and Chiang Kaishek.

The origin of Japan's entry into the Second World War lies in her war with China in 1937. Japan joined the Axis

powers, Germany and Italy, by signing the Tripartite Axis Pact in Berlin on 27th September 1940. Japan was in an expansionist phase and wanted to take the opportunity of turmoil in Europe in which the European powers were busy, to venture into Southeast Asia. Thus in 1941, Japan captured Saigon and marched further south to the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) with the objective of gaining access to oil. Till 1942, Japan's military adventure was a successful story, but after the bombing of the Pearl Harbour on 7 December, 1941, the tides of war began to change. Japan was bombarded with brutal ferocity by the Allied powers which culminated in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945.

Although Japan's military establishment was thoroughly discredited by defeat and occupation, Japanese society still reflects today the heritage of the feudal and military past in diverse ways reflected in films, literature, dramas etc. On November 25, 1970, Yukio Mishima, a famous intellectual conducted Harakiri in support of his desire to revive militarism.[4] However, because of certain factors, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (S.D.F.) even after so many years lack

---

4. Hakwan Harold Sunoo, Japanese Militarism - Past and Present (Chicago, 1975), p.1.

access to the very long national military tradition and have no specific useful tradition upon which to base their pride of service. Since the very beginning, Japan has kept a watchful eye on its new forces, insisting upon strict adherence to the principle of civilian control and being alert about the slightest tendency towards militarism.[5] Surveillance from the watchdog press and from hostile political liberals and radicals induces strict precautionary measures from the government and the ruling party, so that the S.D.F. enjoys little independence of action even though supported by government policy. The S.D.F. maintains a low profile, passively accepting its innocuous and completely apolitical role in the government bureaucracy, despite its numerical strength and a large budget.

Apart from some inconsequential vestiges of old traditions like the bayonet-training exercise (*jukenjutsu*) Imperial Army and Navy traditions are scarcely tolerated. Since the S.D.Fs are technically not an army, navy and airforce in the legal sense, they hold no punitive or coercive power over their members and thus there are no courts marshal in

---

5. Buck, n.1, p.37.

the S.D.F. The civil courts attend to all violations of law by the S.D.F. members.

Even the military language, ranks, branch of service names and unit designation have all been changed to prevent any sense of linkage to the old imperial structure. Part of the new military terminology derives from American military usage. Moreover, the S.D.F. like the government is a purely secular organisation. It is prohibited from forming any connection with the Shinto religious establishment which formed the spiritual backdrop for the Imperial Army and Navy. There is no way now that the S.D.Fs can officially identify their military service with service to the Emperor.

The humanistic pre-Meiji *samurai* spirit is in many ways outmoded and unsuitable to a modern materialistic society. The irrational ultranationalism and chauvinism of the 1930s and 1940s tainted with memories of defeat, imperialist outrages overseas, fascism at home, and the wasted lives of millions of Japanese people in a senseless war, does not hold any appeal in today's Japan. A martial tradition which is most acceptable is that of a modified version of the Meiji era's themes, which involved the bright promise of victory and security, comparative openness of military

leaders, close bonds between the people and the army etc.

As of today, Japan has no specific useful tradition upon which to base pride in service or training for combat. The S.D.F. in its efforts to get public acceptance is concerned very much about its image. This image is based on a relatively vague sense of national values for motivation, and, to some extent, on the material well being of its soldiers and their families for morale.

JAPAN IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

There are remarkable similarities in the international order between the 1930s and today.[6] The same three countries, the U.S., Germany and Japan dominate the global economic, political and military system. Despite problems, the U.S. still retains its superpower status by virtue of its huge military machine and its central place in the international trading system. Germany, despite the economic pains from its reunification programme, has turned out to be the most dominant player in Europe today and weilds worldwide influence. In the Asia Pacific region, Japan has reemerged as the centrifugal force radiating economic influence

---

6. Ron Mathews and Keisuke Matsuyama, Japan's Military Renaissance (London, 1993), p.1.

throughout the area. Japanese investment has not only penetrated this entire area but throughout the world.

Compared to Germany, Japan's success story and its politico-economic reemergence has been less well received by many Western analyst. One area which has consistently created friction between the West and Japan is trade. Unlike Germany, Japan's success and economic miracle has never easily been accommodated by the Western nations. The reasons for this are diverse. They include: Japan's alleged military geneology; its supposed sublimical pursuit of a `divine mission' in Asia; and classical mercantilist leanings coupled with a growing economic assertiveness. In the 1990s and for the coming years technology and economic power seem to be the key to status in the international arena. Japan's being in a comfortable position in both these factors has heightened Western apprehensions regarding its future course which seems to them to be world `economic control'.

Western sensitivities are again acute over the role of Japan's military. Japan is accused of taking advantage of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to develop its economy. It has also been criticized for avoiding politely international

responsibilities commensurate with its status as a world power. Japan was *criticized* severely for not contributing militarily to the coalition force against Iraq during the Gulf crisis, ignoring her huge financial contributions. But military participation would have certainly created other problems mainly with her Asian neighbours, to whom memories of Japanese militarism are still fresh. Thus the Japanese faces a dilemma - they are condemned whether they participate or not. This has caused what has been termed a `legitimacy deficit' where Japan's rightful claim to international leadership, based on economic strength, is judged on historical rather than contemporary considerations.[7]

Germany has been well accepted in NATO as an important member, while no effort has been made to incorporate Japan. Current growth of Japanese military power does not necessarily connote militarism and there are sufficient democratic and institutionalized mechanisms to check the emergence of any such phenomenon. To interpret rearmament with militarism is clearly a wrong step. Nevertheless, the fear persists. This `yellow peril' syndrome can perhaps be

---

7. Hideo Sata, `Japan's Role in the post-Cold War World", Current History, vol.90, no.555, April 1991, p.146.

traced to Japan's society - its culture, religion and social fabric which are entirely different from other countries. Consequently, the West is always apprehensive about Japanese intentions and thinking. This has been further encouraged by the contradiction within the Japanese system - that is the constitutional constraints on defence buildup and the reality. Thus the Japanese policymakers face a unique dilemma - how at U.S. behest to sponsor an increased military profile while at the same time maintaining the credibility of a benign foreign policy image.

CHANGES IN THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND JAPAN'S RESPONSE

In the last few years the accelerated improvement in Russian-American relations, the tangible progress in disarmament and arms control negotiations and the considerable steps taken towards the restoration of several regional conflicts have prompted scholars and policy makers alike to rethink traditional notions of security.[8]

International influences generally interacting with territorial disputes, ideological antagonisms and military competition between neighbouring states on the one hand and

---

8. Kevin Clements, ed., Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region (Tokyo, 1992), p.329.

with domestic socio-economic inequalities, ethnic conflicts and political instability on the other, are the geopolitical threats to security. But perhaps the main threat arise from the narrow military interests and capabilities of the so-called great powers. Transitional stages of international politics from a rigid bipolar to a complex multipolar world can also be an important source of threats to international security.

Security is a multifaceted concept and it should not be defined only in military terms. An effective security framework must promote comprehensive security. It must be sensitive to the way one type of threat (e.g. military threat) may contribute to reinforce another type (e.g. environmental threat). An appropriate response at one level should facilitate positive action at another.[9] The aim must be common security in the sense that the security (or insecurity) of each contributes to the security (or insecurity) of all.

The post-Cold War situation provides an opportune moment to move towards a fullfledged multilateral framework

---

9. Ibid., p.332.

which encompasses the U.S., the relevant republics of the former U.S.S.R., all the countries of East and Southeast Asia, Russia and the Pacific island states.[10] The aim of this new security framework would be to respond effectively to the shift from East-West confrontation to East-West cooperation, phase out obsolete military alliances which originated during the Cold War and provide a forum of common and comprehensive security.

Japan's initial response to the multilateral approach has been negative. The "US-Japan Security Treaty" is the foundation on which Japanese foreign policy is based. The U.S. is benefitted by this arrangement as it offers considerable freedom of action and a useful degree of ambiguity in dealing with allies and China. The U.S. security system along with its huge military machine serves as a guarantor of regional and subregional security and can also be used to explore and maintain access to resources, markets and technology. The Japanese government on the other hand goes for bilateral negotiations with Russia regarding the northern territories dispute and makes reduction of Russian forces in

---

10. P. Polanka, `Towards a Pacific House', Survival, vol.XXXIII, March/April 1991, pp.179-182.

the Far East a precondition for a multilateral security dialogue.

The negative response and reactions of the U.S. and Japan to multilateral security arrangements have to take account of the rapidly changing political realities sooner or later. Their unwillingness may encourage others to take the initiative in shaping a new security framework for this region. The proposed regional arrangements may find expression through two routes - (i) disarmament negotiations and (ii) agreement on "Confidence and Security Building Measures". Certain strategic principles, if followed, can help in the creation of durable peace, cutting across all kinds of political, military, economic, ethnic, religious and cultural differences. They are dealignment, demilitarisation, democratisation, economic security and regional cooperation.

Finally, a comprehensive regional security framework has to represent the aspirations of not only the states but civil society in general, keeping in mind local aspirations, human rights and ecological values. Social movements and non-governmental organisations could play a crucial role, setting political agendas, mobilising popular energies and

creating more durable cross national and cross cultural links.

JAPANESE THREAT PERCEPTION

Japan had never been successfully invaded till 1945 and the result was a curious mixture of exaggerated confidence about Japanese ability to defend their territory and remain aloof from the world. The defeat in 1945 was thus a shock to the Japanese people and the subsequent occupation by the Americans proved devastating. It was only the Japanese ability to hide real emotions behind an exterior of outward calm that masked the true resentment and shock caused by the defeat in the Second World War. In the course of having to live with the dual emotions of defeat and shame, Japanese attitudes to their island status seemed to change. The isolation gradually was no longer a cause for confidence about uniqueness and aloofness but a source of insecurity because Japan had come to depend on the U.S. for its place in the world.

The already existing sense of vulnerability as an island was enhanced by its small size, it crowded atmosphere and the development of a modern economy in a small space. Over the years, this sense of insecurity went on increasing

as Japan grew richer, despite the presence of U.S. security umbrella. Japan is totally dependent on the sea lanes for all kinds of commerce and they are the lifeline of the nation. It receives 60% of the Gulf oil via the Gulf of Hormuz and the narrow sealanes in Southeast Asia.[11] (See Annexure IX, X)

During the tense days of the Cold War era, the main focus of Japanese defence was the threat from the erstwhile U.S.S.R. The threats which Japan now faces can be broadly divided into three categories. The first is the global war; second, regional conflicts and finally low intensity conflicts in the third world, threatening access to markets and materials necessary for Japanese economy. With the end of the Cold War, the possibility and probability of war of global scale is almost nil. Nevertheless, defence capability to deal with limited attacks is necessary as a basic defence function of any modern nation.

Regional threats are taken seriously by Japan. Despite the end of the Cold War, instability resulting in military buildup in the Asia Pacific region remains undiminished.

---

11. S. Javed Masood, Japanese Defence - The Search for Political Power (London, 1990), p.79.

The defence expenditure of this region in 1990 was $ 86 billion, the highest regional total outside the NATO area. There are no institutionalised arrangements to deal with security threats. Northeast Asia remains tense as a region and is still caught between the Scylla of Cold War confrontation and the Charybdis of recent development.[12] Although the U.S.S.R. has disintegrated the Russian far eastern fleet and army are still veiwed as threats. Russia has in this region Oscar II nuclear powered cruise missile submarines, Slava class cruisers, T80 Main Battle Tanks and Tu 26 Backfire bombers.

The Korean peninsula until recently was an area in turmoil and instability still exists. Despite positive developments in the sphere of reconciliation between both the Koreas and the U.S., the potential for a conflict in the near future cannot be ignored altogether. North Korea has a huge standing army of one million which, added with its tendency to go nuclear, is a sufficiently grave threat. Japan watches Korea with quiet alarm. Historical animosity also exists between these two countries and this continues

---

12. Young Koo Cha, `The Changing Security Climate in North East Asia', International Defence Review, C/1991, p.616.

even today. At the official level, the possibility of a Korean reunification rekindles Japanese apprehensions. South Korea, interestingly, feels threatened by the growing Japanese military machine.

Again, certain military developments across the Asia Pacific have created an uncertain strategic environment. The withdrawal of the former U.S.S.R. from Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, the phased U.S. troop reductions from South Korea, Japan and the Philippines, the closure of the huge Subic naval base and Clark airfield - all these events have created a vacuum.[13] This has resulted in military buildups by local powers. South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and China have all gone for rapid procurements of military hardware and have increased their power projection capabilities. Japan cannot respond to this situation with a low military profile.

Moreover, there are potential trouble spots which increase tensions and uncertainty. The best example is the Spratley island dispute which involves Brunei, China, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, who all are interested in

---

13. Mathews and Matsuyama, n.6, p.14.

the probable oil and gas deposits. There is a similar dispute between China and Japan over the Paracel islands in the Gulf of Tonkin. Japan cannot be expected to remain silent in the face of such serious escalation of regional naval capability.

In this kind of threat environment military forces are however considered as contributing partially to the national security needs of Japan. The belief in the non-utilitarian nature of military power comes largely from the nature of the complex network of dependencies that exists between Japan and many nations. Japan's interests are so wide and its dependencies so deep that it is faced with the dilemma that use of military power in one region might well create an unacceptable reaction in another.[14] Thus, Japan finds its interests better served in an atmosphere of stability in the international arena, that can never be created by force.

Jagan views that only progress in certain areas, such as technological development, resource availability, assistance to third world states and a military force with

---

14. Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, The Defence Policies of Nations - A Comparative Study (Maryland, 1982), p.448.

minimum deterrent capability against external threat, can make Japan strong, secure and adequately competitive in the world approaching the twentyfirst century.

RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY - IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN

Japan is an unique country in many ways. The greatest achievement of Japan is perhaps recovering from the devastation and trauma of the war and within five decades placing itself in the forefront of world politics. Despite being the second most powerful nation in the world it does not have an offensive military capability. Its `Peace' Constitution is an exception which renounces war permanently and its defence budget is bound by a certain limitation. All these factors give Japan an enigmatic image in the arena of international relations.

After the end of the Cold War, Japan realised the need for going more `international' and thus is seeking a new role and place in today's global political scenario. Japan is eager to be a permanent member in the U.N. Security Council and its recent role in the area of peacekeeping is only one step in this regard. The need is being felt to have a political and military capability commensurate not only with its status as an economic superpower, but also to

counter the emerging global and regional challenges it is facing. Japan has a small but sophisticated defence force which is already among the most powerful in the Asia Pacific region. In the context of Japan entering the twentyfirst century as the world's most powerful economy, the future of Japan's military status becomes very crucial.

The Japanese Self-Defence Forces are unique in the constraints surrounding them. The evolution of the SD Forces through five decades was not very smooth and it has been one of the most controversial issues in Japanese politics. Since many years it has come under heavy criticism from the Socialists and has been characterized as a symbol of American imperialism. However, in recent times, many critics, mainly the socialists have changed their previous stand and accepted the role of the SD Forces. However, the S.D. Forces and Japanese defence policy still continue to be very controversial topics. Politically, a grasp of the quarter century hisory of the S.D. Forces, an understanding of the capabilities and the general nature of this unusual, if not unique force, and its role is essential to appreciate and understand its current and possible future roles as one

major component of Japan's foreign policy.[15]

The importance of Japan has been best described by Paul Kennedy in his landmark work, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. "Due to its immensely successful growth since 1945, the country enjoys a unique and very favourable position in the global economic and power political order. How powerful will be Japan in the early 21st century? Barring largescale war, or ecological disaster, or a return to the 1930s style world slump and protectionism, the consensus answer seems to be much more powerful. In computers, robotics, telecommunications, automobiles, trucks, ships, biotechnology, R&D and even aeropsace, Japan will be either the leading or the second nation. In finance it may by then be in a class of its own.... For a country which possesses only 3% of the world population and only 0.3% of its habitable land, it seems an almost unbelievable achievement.... Were Japan indeed to respond to pressures of the U.S. government and of other western critics and to increase its defence spending to the level allocated by the European NATO members - averaging around 3 to 4% of the G.N.P. - the transformation would be dramatic and would turn it (along with China) into

---

15. Buck, n.1, p.9.

the third largest military power in the world, with expenditures over defence of over $ 50 billion a year. Nor is there any doubt, given Japan's technological and productive resources, that it could build, for example, carrier task forces for its navy, or long range missiles as a deterrent."[16]

In this dissertation, an attempt has been made to study the major issues in the evolution of the Self-Defence Forces in the postwar period from 1945 till 1994. The last chapter focuses discussions on the strategic options for Japan, ending with an attempt to analyse the future possibilities. The nuclear issue has been deliberately avoided, apart from a brief reference to the official non-nuclear principles.

---

16. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers - Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1987), pp.591-602.

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST PHASE: 1945-1979

America and Japan - Beginning of a New Relationship

The great reversal in U.S. policy in East Asia, from an alliance with China in the war against Japan to a security pact with the latter in the post-war confrontation with the former, has generally been attributed to the impact of the European Cold War upon American diplomacy in Asia and the Pacific.[1] So the Cold war found an extension in Asia from 1947 onwards and in Japan, the U.S. found the best capitalist pro-U.S. ally. Thus within a few years, the original plans to create a economically limited, neutral state was rejected and Japan became an important pillar of the global containment policy of the U.S. The process of transformation started with the American occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 under General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific Region.

However, many American scholars do not regard the Cold War as the main causative factor for Japan's new role. They

---

1. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Tokyo, 1977), p.378.

attribute the shift in U.S. policy to the groundwork already laid down by policymakers and bureaucrats in Washington during 1941-45. They argue that detailed plans for the surrender, occupation and post-war orientation of Japan had already been prepared long before the war ended.

The Occupation authorities were convinced about the dominant role played by the Japanese military during the war. The demobilization of Japan's armed forces, the demilitarization of Japan and the introduction of `democratization' policies intended to prevent any future resurgence of Japanese militarism, became the major objectives of Occupation policy.[2] Demobilization of the military was done on a massive scale involving almost five million people. In Tokyo, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was formed to try war criminals and convicted top officials of the Japanese army. Similar trials took place on minor war crimes. The war industry was gradually dismantled. The military industrial complex and the Zaibatsu was systematically dislodged through anti-monopoly programmes. Land reforms changed the rural landscape creating

---

2. Janet E. Hunter, The Emergence of Modern Japan - An Introductory History Since 1853 (New York, 1989), p.282.

a new satisfied peasant class. There was a purge in the bureaucracy and political prisoners were released. Conscious moves were made to prevent the military access to political authority and this was done by immediately suspending the Meiji Constitution.

At the end of the war, the military was the most discredited institution in Japan and there was little protest from the people which came as a surprise to the occupational authorities. The people were also totally indifferent to the war crimes trials, which involved top military officials. Thus they offered little resistance to the permanent demilitarization, and in general took the view that failure was in itself proof of the inadequacy of the military, its policies and its conduct.[3] Their reaction was mixed involving a sense of guilt but not to the extent as mandated by the U.S. Occupation authorities. Thus, in the post-war period, the Japanese did not have to search for an alternative model upon which to base their recovery as they had in the Meiji era; the U.S. Occupational forces provided it for them.[4] This new model led to the rebirth of Japan's economy

---

3. ibid., p.283.

4. Edward A. Olsen, US-Japan Reciprocity - A Neo Internationalist View (California, 1985), p.3.

and the Japanese people welcomed the positive features of the liberal West.

Constitution

The single most important tool for preventing a revival of militaristic policies was the new Constitution of 1947, which provided for a new political system in which the military had no role.[5] The Americans regarded the Meiji Constitution "little more than window dressing", which was unsuccessful in protecting the common citizens from the pre-war excesses. The Japanese, when entrusted to draft their own Constitution in the initial years, felt no need for major changes in the Constitution. They wanted to retain the essentials of the earlier political system, including the institution of the monarchy, which had a special place in the ethos of the country. In February 1946, General Douglas MacArthur instructed his staff at general headquarters to prepare a new Constitution for Japan.[6] Within ten days, the Japanese government received a draft Constitution

---

5. Hunter, n.2, p.283.

6. Inone Kyoko, MacArthur's Japanese Constitution - A Linguistic and Cultural Study of its Making (Chicago, 1991), p.1.

in English, which was then discussed intensely for six months. Little changes were made and a Japanese text was prepared and accepted. The institution of monarchy was retained but sovereignty was transferred to the people. Article IX was the most important and perhaps ther most controversial elements in the Constitution. To the Japanese government, the Constitution was a substitute for the Potsdam declaration and a contract to save the Emperor. The preamble to the Constitution says: "We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world."[7] The official English version of the `Peace Clause' in Article IX says:

1. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

---

7. J. Douglas Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defence Policies of Nation: A Comparative Study (Maryland, 1982), p.469.

2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and airforces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

This Article committed to peace still remains one of the major issues of debate in Japan and the main impediment to overseas Japanese involvement. The new Constitution brought drastic changes in the political and socio-economic sphere. Based on the British parliamentary system, the new Constitution, went further in democratizing Japan and guarding against the violations of individual liberties. Similar to the American Constitution, basic freedoms and rights were clearly enshrined for all to see. Thus, the Constitution was an important landmark in the post-war Japanese history.

The U.S.-Japan Treaty 1951

The linchpin for Japan's security in economic and military dimensions was the U.S.-Japan security treaty, with the U.S. as the guarantor of its physical integrity in Northeast Asia, dominated by Russia and China.[8]

---

8. Simon Sheldon, The Future of Asia Pacific Security Collaboration (Massachusetts, 1988), p.177.

Japan's defeat in 1945 was catastrophic not only in militarily terms but also diplomatically as it destroyed all her diplomatic openings with the outside world, painstakenly built over the years. Isolationism was an impossible option in the new age of economic interdependence and nuclear weapons. Return to the independent diplomatic policies of the Meiji era was also not preferable. Wartime engagements with the British Commonwealth made it difficult to forge a new alliance with the earlier adversaries. Similarly, there was no possibility of renewed links with her erstwhile empire in Southeast Asia, with Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, China etc. Finally, there was little prospect of an opening with the defeated and occupied Germany and Italy. Thus, all these factors combined crated a painful international environment for Japan and she was forced to close all her embassies and consulates abroad, at least temporarily, by the U.S. occupational authorities. The aversion to rearmament and U.S. occupational policies had also an impact on Japanese thinking towards the U.S. The Communist revolution in China in 1949 and the beginning of the Cold War in Asia with the Korean war in 1950 was a turning point for Japan, as she moved towards an alliance with the U.S.

Hemmed in by these circumstances it was almost inevitable that Tokyo would base its post-war foreign policy on the closest of relations with her former enemy, the U.S.[9]

The equations in the relationship between the U.S. and Japan changed by 1948, from a conqueror and conquered relationship to one of much more complicated alliance. The American big business realised the importance of an resurgent Japanese economy which would benefit both Asia Pacific trade and enhance American profits. From the political angle, Japan could be a major pillar of free market economy against the expanding communism in East Asia. Similarly, the American leadership was excited about the prospects of stationing American bases in Japan and enhancing intelligence gathering capabilities regarding Russia and China, not only through the installation of electronic eavesdropping outposts but also from the expertise of the Japanese secret-service men. Lastly, there was a strong lobby of pro-Japanese American officials and intellectuals who were in favour of renewing their old links with Japan.

These political, commercial, military and cultural

---

9. Gordon Daniels and Reinhard Drifte, Europe and Japan - Changing Relationships since 1945 (Kent, 1986), p.13.

relations, which were symbolized by the Peace and Security Treaty of 8 September 1951, clearly brought many advantages; not only physical security but generous treatment of Japanese goods in the American markets.[10] Thus even after the Korean war, the economic growth of Japan went on in accordance with American plans. The Treaty obligated the United States to station forces in Japan for its defence and `the international peace and security of the Far East. So overnight the U.S. occupational forces became allies.

The alliance with the U.S. allowed Japan to manoeuvre between Moscow and Beijing and stabilize regional relations by supplementing its own limited defence capabilities. Thus, Japan came under the U.S. security umbrella which guaranteed the protection of her sea lanes, which were so vital for her commerce. The U.S. which became Japan's only ally by this treaty henceworth began playing a new role in the way of influencing Japanese defence policies. It is indeed a fact that the U.S. played a dominant role in Japanese defence establishment throughout the entire post-war years. Japan's basic strategy of defence against limited

---

10. ibid., p.17.

invasion was in coordination with U.S. strategic plans for the Asia Pacific. The U.S. not only provided the basics, but also provided the cohesiveness, constancy and continuity, which was so essential for Japanese defence policy in the post-war period.

Much touted as a herald of equality and independence, the San Francisco Peace Treaty created a temporary euphoria in Japan, after nearly seven years of military rule.[11] But it did create new alignments in Japanese domestic politics, by radicalising the Socialist Party and consolidating the Conservatives. These new developments in the long run again influenced Japanese foreign policy and developments in defence matters.

Similar to the 1951 treaties, another treaty named Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MDAA) was signed between the U.S. and Japan and it established the legal basis for providing equipment and technology to Japan. The MDAA provides for broad exchanges of defence "equipment, materi-

---

11. Tesuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending An Economic Superpower - Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (Boulder, 1989), p.14.

als, services or other assistance".[12]

Yoshida Strategy and the Formation of the Self-Defence Forces

Japan decided to align herself with the U.S. for national security purposes, to act as secure offshore base of the U.S. to keep any possible threat from China and Russia to a minimum. Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister of Japan from October 1948 to October 1954, was the political leader who opted for the strategy under which Japan would accept the new Pacifist Constitution and the security treaty, thus giving the country free reign to devote all its energies to economic development. This policy became the famous *Yoshida Strategy*. The 1951 treaty was formally equal but not in real terms, which for example authorized U.S. military intervention in the event of domestic disorder in Japan. Yoshida thus had to face criticism from the Socialists of selling Japan's sovereignty to the U.S. But he knew that Washington's occupational regime would remain in Japan for sometime and leasing bases was a fair price for U.S. security guarantee. Japan was already a vanquished power and thus according to him should turn the predicament to its advan-

---

12. Michael W. Chinworth, Inside Japan's Defence - Technology, Economics and Strategy (New York, 1992), p.188.

tage by concentrating on economic recovery.[13] Only this process could bring Japan with equal footing with the U.S. in the long run. Thus, he fought back all attempts by John Foster Dulles to rearm Japan, but ultimately succumbed partially to his pressure in 1954, when he agreed to a bill authorizing the establishment of the Self-Defence Forces, with 220,000 men in three services.

Within four years of the American occupation, a 75,000 strong National Police Reserve (*Keisatsu Yobitai*), designed to replace U.S. forces dispatched to Korea, was formed under the direct instructions of General MacArthur.[14] Originally the mission of this force was *Kuni no beiwa to chitsujo o iji* - `to maintain peace and order in the country - but later was altered to *Kokunai no beiwa to chitsiyo o iji* - `maintain peace and order within the country.[15] In 1952, NPR was renamed the `National Safety Force' (*Hoantai*) and a *Keibitai* (Maritime Safety force) was added and these came under the supervision of *Hoancho* (National Safety Agency).

---

13. Kataoka, n.11, p.13.

14. Savitri Vishwanathan, Japan - the New Challenges (Delhi, 1982), p.213.

15. J.W.M. Chapman, R. Drifte and I.T.M. Gow, Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security - Defence, Diplomacy and Dependence (London, 1983), p.21.

Finally, in 1954 the Hoancho was replaced by the *Boei-cho* (Defence Agency) headed by a Director General, who was a civilian minister of state. In the same year an airarm was added to the uniformed forces and the *Jeintai*, the Self-Defence Forces were formed on July 1. A national defence council was also established by the Self-Defence Forces Law and the Defence Agency Establishment Law. A new expanded mission involving the protection of Japan from both internal and external aggression was entrusted to the newly formed Self-Defence Forces.

The recreation of the Japanese army in the post-war period was from its inception closely linked with the American policy of containment and making Japan into an industrial base which would help the U.S. in fighting the war in Korea. Internally, Japanese troops were expected to maintain order and to that extent their policing role made them a weapon in the suppression of people's movements. The reformation of the armed forces also highlights the continuity of policies of the occupational authorities in the form of restoring a large part of the Japanese Imperial Army. Thus, by the end of 1960, pre-war leaders had begun dominating the defence establishment.

The First Policy Paper and the First Defence Plan

The Defence Council (*Kokubo Kaigi*) of Japan announced on May 20, 1957 the first and, so far only, Basic Policy of National Defence (BPND).[16] The paper emphasised the following points: (i) the deterrent function of a defence capability; (ii) support for U.N. activities; (iii) the need for a comprehensive national security policy; (iv) a `gradual buildup of an efficient defence capability' exclusively for the purpose of self-defence and finally; (v) argued that "the security system with the U.S. will be sufficient to deal with any external aggression".

Immediately after the publication of the BPND, the *first defence plan* was announced on *June 14, 1954*. There was neither any concrete strategic concept nor any concrete goal. It only justified the political purpose of acquiring minimum defence capability - "a quick buildup of the ground force to fill a possible vacuum that might be created by the withdrawal of U.S. troops."

---

16. Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley, 1977), p.346.

The One Per cent issue

The longstanding budgetary practice of limiting defence spending to a maximum of one per cent of GNP (Gross National Product), came about in the 1959 defence budget just as a happenstance[17] entirely unrelated to security considerations. There is no proof of it being a deliberate act. This statistical accident soon became a standard operating condition in Japanese budgetary politics followed by all sections of the government, bureaucracy and the ruling party. It suited their self-interests in their competition to get preferential access to budgetary resources.

On November 5, 1976, the ceiling of one percentage on defence expenditures was formally instituted by the Miki Takeo Cabinet, along with the introduction of the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO).[18] The influence of detente on both these policies was clearly evident. The need for new directions in defence planning, redressing imbalances in the force structure, establishing spending limits for the

---

17. Taketsugu Tsurutani, Japanese Policy and East Asian Security (New York, 1981), p.75.

18. Harrison Holland, Managing Defence: Japan's Dilemma (Boston, 1988), p.49.

Japan Defence Agency and overall perception that an invasion from Russia was a distant prospect, all these factors contributed to the policy of one per cent of the GNP allocated to defence.

This policy was popular as long as the economy was expanding at a rate of five or six per cent. But as the economy became sluggish and the government imposed austerity programme, friction began between the Japan Defence Agency and the Finance Ministry. The controversy took a political overtone under Suzuki's prime minstership.

This ceiling indeed had an impact on the programmes of the NDPO and the SDF. New plans had to be made after adjustments in weapons procurement programmes, which often became delayed. Each service faced the brunt of this policy and facilities were seriously affected. On May 12, 1984 the government officially admitted its inability to meet its timetable and proposed and approved an extension of three years of the defence development plan.

The widely accepted limitation was broken for the first time by prime minister Nakasone's cabinet in 1986 when it was increased to 1.004 per cent. Despite the relatively low ratio of military spending per GNP, Japan's defence budget

in U.S. dollar terms has been considerably increased to the same size as those of the larger European countries.[19] According to a survey by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Japan's defence budget is third largest in the world, despite its formal per cent ceiling policy. Thus due to its huge GNP, Japan's defence budget is now substantial as compared to the major world powers.

US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 1960

During 1958 and 1959, there were prolonged debates and negotiations in Tokyo and Washington, which finally culminated in the 1960s treaty. The new treaty superceded the 1951 treaty and permitted both the parties to terminate it, after ten years, after giving prior notice to the other. A new provision conferred on the U.S. an obligation of "prior consultation" with the Japanese government whenever it desired to make a major change in the deployment of its forces into or out of Japan, in their equipment and use of facilities and areas in Japan, or in combat operations to be undertaken from Japan for purposes other than the repelling

---

19. Masako Ikegami Andersson, The Military Industrial Complex - the Cases of Sweden and Japan (England, 1992), p.143.

of an armed attack against Japan itself or U.S. interest in Japan.

The mutuality clause of the treaty was only an official rhetoric. The obligation was on the U.S. to defend Japan but there was no reciprocal obligation on the latter. The basic framework of Japanese defence thinking changed little, as it continued to be that the U.S. would deter armed attack upon Japan and Japan would increasingly assume a defence responsibility, though always avoiding any armament that could constitute an offensive threat.[20] It is interesting to note that this delicately balanced defence arrangement was more or less accepted by both the countries. This was mainly because of their unique relationship.

This treaty produced mass demonstrations in Japan as popular feelings were channeled against militarism. The massive demonstrations were led by the Socialists, organized labour and other `progressive forces' in the society. This caused the cancellation of an official visit by President Eisenhower and the resignation of the then Prime minister. The major cause of the opposition was the fear that, allied

---

20. Viotti, n.7, p.445.

with the U.S., Japan might be dragged into war, perhaps involving Korea, Russia or China. However, most of those who opposed the treaty were sure of U.S. protection in case of a crisis even without a formal agreement. Over the years, however, the opposition to the treaty declined and thus there was no impediment to its renewal again in 1970. The rapproachement with China in the form of normalisation of diplomatic relations was an important factor which was again enhanced by renewed Peking-Washington diplomatic interactions. As a consequence, opposition to the treaty thereafter declined rapidly and support rose correspondingly to the point where, by the end of the 1970s, the latter outpaced the former [For details of the 1960s Treaty, see Annexure VII & VIII].

The Second and Third Defence Buildup Plans

The Second Plan, which was announced on July 18, 1961 for the five year period 1962-1966, was drafted on the basis of a strategic concept calling for Japan to remain "strategically defensive" and for the U.S. to carry out offensive operations.[21] The plan stressed the need to develop capa-

---

21. Scalapino, n.16, p.347.

bilities to counter a largescale invasion without initial U.S. help. The importance of missiles and the need to acquire them was emphasized in the overall attention given to the airforce in this plan.

The Third Plan announced on November 29, 1966 indicated a change in the SDF's role, from coping with aggression to deterring aggression through an qualitative arms buildup and an autonomous strategy. In this plan, both the navy and airforce was given attention in the context of Russian buildup in the Pacific. Purchasing of significant amount of sophisticated antisubmarine warfare (ASW) weapons was proposed keeping in line with the new policy.

Japan's Non-nuclear Principles

Japan holds fast to the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not manufacturing and not introducing nuclear weapons into Japan.[22] This policy was in accordance with Japan's commitment to international peace. The policy was originally stated by former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato on December 11, 1967, during Diet deliberations on the bill to approve the Japan-U.S. agreement on the reversion of Okinawa

---

22. Defence of Japan (Tokyo), 1982, p.71.

to Japanese jurisdiction.[23] These principles were adopted after extensive analysis of the country's defence needs, objectives and capabilities in the context of both domestic and international situation and after consultations with the U.S. Thus, there was little opposition when they were introduced. Instead they rapidly became very popular to all sections of the population. These non-nuclear principles became of one of the four components of Japan's nuclear policy, the others being utilization of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, promotion of nuclear disarmament and reliance on U.S. nuclear umbrella.[24]

These principles have come under wide criticism from many quarters. Firstly, many view them as an unnecessary burden on U.S.-Japan security arrangement, as it restricts U.S. naval mobility in the area. Secondly, these principles restrict Japan's future option for going nuclear. The credibility of this position has been questioned, again because of Japanese participation in SDI research, which

---

23. Tsuneo Akaha, `Japan's Non-nuclear Policy', Asian Survey, Vol.XXIV, No.8, August 1984, p.852.

24. Daniel I. Okimoto, "Chrysanthemum without the Sword: Japan's Non-nuclear Policy" in Martin E. Weinstein, ed., Northeast Asian Security After Vietnam (Illinois, 1982), p.29.

Tokyo justifies on the grounds that its contributions to the research is non-nuclear in nature.[25] Moreover, there is widespread suspicion in Japan that the non-introduction principle has been violated by U.S. nuclear arms-carrying vessels. Till date, Japan has never raised questions concerning the U.S. Navy's "neither confirm nor deny" policy on whether U.S. warships, which visit Japanese ports are armed with nuclear weapons.

Here the `prior consultation' agreement between both Japan and the U.S. becomes relevant. This agreement signed in 1960 requires consultation between the two governments if the U.S. contemplates taking combat action using bases in Japan or making `major changes' in the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan. Thus as long as both the parties maintain their standard position strictly, there won't be any change in the present state of affairs and logically there won't be any grounds for prior consultation regarding nuclear armed ships.

From August 1964, the Japanese government allowed the

---

25. Gregory P. Corning, `U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation in the 1990s - The Promise of Hi-tech Defence', Asian Survey, Vol.XXIX, No.3, March 1989, p.276.

U.S. nuclear submarines to use the naval facilities at Yokosuka and Sasebo. These ports became important during the Vietnam war. Not only submarines but nuclear-powered aircraft carriers like **Enterprise, Midway Carl Vinsen** and giant battleships like **New Jersey** also began using the port facilities. The return of the 75,700 tonne *Enterprise* to Sasebo on January 19, 1968 produced violent demonstrations. Again, both its opponents, the Socialists and Communists and their supporters and the ultra right groups[26] demonstrated when it came on March 21, 1983 to the same port.

The non-nuclear principles are going to stay as long as Japan remains under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. In the near future, nothing dramatic in this sensitive relationship is expected. But in case Japan takes an independent role in national security matters, it would automatically mean the end of the road for these policy guidelines.

Changes in the Yoshida Strategy

The Yoshida strategy worked successfully till the mid 1970s but after that there was a significant change mainly due to U.S. pressure on Japan under the Carter administra-

---

26. Asahi Shimbun, March 23, 1983.

tion to increase defence spending. Thus, the need for a more substantial Japanese defence effort was given a greater sense of urgency during the middle and late 1970s. The unexpected transitions in the Asia Pacific security environment also contributed to these changes. This period witnessed the marked decline of U.S. military power in the region and a simultaneous rise in Soviet power. During these years, American strategy concentrated on the defence of Western Europe and the Middle East and the Far East was a bit neglected. The result was withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and closure of U.S. bases in Thailand.

The same period also saw the conclusion of the 1978 Friendship Treaty between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet bankrolling of Vietnamese incursions into Kampuchea, increased Soviet military presence in the disputed northern territories and perhaps most threatening to Japan, a major military buildup in the Soviet Far East. By 1980, the Cam-Ranh Bay in Vietnam became a very important Soviet naval base from which both submarines and aircraft operated. In terms of strategic weapon systems, the Soviet deployment of advanced SS-18 land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and

SS-N-18 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and SS-20 International Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) was no less a threat to Japan. Despite the fact that the main targets of the U.S.S.R. were China and the U.S., Japan came into the scenario because of her special relationship with the U.S. and also due to her 1978 Friendship and Anti-hegemony treaty with China.

The Japanese were extremely concerned about their security at the end of the 1970s, because of the Soviet buildup and expressed doubts whether in a crisis situation, they would get timely help fro the U.S. The abortive rescue mission to release American hostages in Iran increases Japanese anxieties.

Until the mid-1970s, successive American administrations had generally accepted Japan's special situation with regard to defence. The U.S. saw the region as a major theatre of conflict but China's post-Mao pragmatism reduced U.S. anxieties about the region.[27] Japan, the stable Asian democracy which was the most dependent ally and trading partner of the U.S. by the end of the 1970s, became her main

---

27. Robert E. Bedeski, The Fragile Entente - The 1978 Japan China Peace Treaty in a Global Context (Colorado, 1983), p.200.

economic competitor.

The U.S. economy showed serious stress in the face of tough competition from Japan, which affected every sector. The Americans regarded this competition as unfair and discriminatory as Japanese invasion of U.S. domestic market was highly subsidized by Tokyo and dubious trade practices were resorted to by the Japanese big business. Thus the Americans began to see Japan as more a competitor than a partner needing special treatment. The Americans no longer wanted to listen to the official Japanese explanation that Japanese defence efforts could not be expanded due to constitutional, political and economic constraints. They accused Japan for taking them for a ride and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was unequal and one-sided. Top authorities of the U.S. administration expressed their dissatisfaction over Japan's reluctance to increase defence spending and reduce the burden on the United States.

The other factor which put pressure on the Japanese was domestic developments within the U.S. The U.S. economy from the 1960s began facing problems due to revolution of rising expectations. It soon reflected in the domestic politics in the form of political turmoil. This turmoil spread all over

the country and was quickly joined by a rapidly expanding antimilitary sentiment resulting from the frustration and disillusionment caused by the protracted and highly unsuccessful and unfair conflict in Vietnam. Massive student movements were witnessed all over America. Popular demands were raised to stop the violence in Vietnam, curtail military expenditure and divert the resource to social services. Strong resentment was expressed against future overseas involvement.

All these factors put considerable pressure on the U.S. administration to demand increase in Japanese expenditure on defence and this was precisely done by Nixon, Ford and the Carter administrations. Thus, Japan began a moderate arms expansion.

The First Defence Paper and the Fourth Defence Plan

The first Defence Paper was published on October 20, 1970 by the Cabinet of Nakasone. It stressed the need for autonomous defence capability, especially enough air and sea capability to deal with any emergency till American help came. It also estimated that there was little probability of a nuclear war involving Japan. For the first time empha-

sis was placed on internal problems which could invite foreign intervention. Nakasone introduced in this paper the new concept of "exclusively defensive posture" (*senshu boei*; a euphemism designed to restrict Japanese military efforts to defensive actions).[28]

The Fourth defence plan (1971-72) was announced on December 1, 1971 but it had to face many hurdles and thus revised several times due mainly to the constant changes of director-generals and opposition, both internal and external against an increase in defence expenditure. The new plan emphasised renovation and modernisation of equipment, increased expenditure on R&D, and also put forward measures to enhance the development of civil defence. Civilian control was also emphasised in this plan.

Massive inflation in Japan in the wake of world oil crisis and also the different controversies finally scaled down the plan considerably. Unlike the first three plans which were formulated by the Defence Agency, the Fourth Defence Plan showed a marked influence of the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) in defence policy making. By 1970, de-

---

28. Scalapino, n.16, p.347.

fence and national security no longer remained entirely in the hands of Defence Agency specialists.

The National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO/TAIKO)

The NDPO is the key pillar, the Charter for today's Japanese defence. It was formally established on October 19, 1976, and was significantly different from the earlier defence programmes. The process was initiated in 1972 which culminated finally in the inception of the NDPO. Growing public demand to curb defence spending was the key to all the discussions within the Japan Defence Agency (JDA). It finally came out with the original idea of the NDPO `defence power during peace time'. However, this concept was originally put forward by the Chief of the Policy Bureau of the JDA, Kubo Takuya. His idea was strongly supported by Sakata Michita, then Director General of the JDA and by Miki Takeo, the Prime Minister, and both exerted strong political leadership in formulating and adopting the NDPO.[29]

The NDPO which emphasized peace was built on the following premises. It assumed that Japan in case of an emergency would not get immediate assistance from the United

---

29. Holland, n.18, p.21.

States but despite this, the treaty between the two would remain steady as before. The detente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and the Sino-Soviet conflict would continue. Finally, due to NATO, turmoils in Eastern Europe and domestic economic constraints, Soviet expansion would be no more possible.

The NDPO began by stating that the broad objective for Japan's military forces was to safeguard Japan's security in cooperation with the U.S. and discussed Japan's basic defence concept which included prevention of armed invasion, posture of national defence, the posture of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces.[30]

The NDPO was born during detente and its underlying philosophy was to stress the importance of a peaceful SDF, capable of resisting small scale aggression. Modernization of weapons systems and the strengthening of logistic structure was given special attention and buildup targets were deliberately lowered to help the process. The basic force structure was not altered and attention was given to strengthening the surveillance capability.

---

30. ibid., p.22.

The NDPO concluded, by directing that, "(i) reasonable standards for personnel recruitment and consideration of measures aimed at securing quality personnel be established; (ii) that effective measures be established to maintain and improve defence facilities and harmonize such facilities with surrounding communities; (iii) that attention should be directed toward the effective implementation of equipment acquisition programmes with consideration given to swift emergency resupply and acceptable training and educational programmes; and (iv) that technical research and development systems for the maintenance and improvement of qualitative levels in the military forces be established." The NDPO also established personnel and equipment goals for the three forces.[31]

The NDPO was a watershed in the history of Japanese defence policy-making and unlike the rigid framework of the earlier defence plans, provided considerable independence to defence planners. Following the oil crisis, the Japanese economy was facing serious problems and the NDPO was a timely measure to reduce expenditure on defence thus helping

---

31. ibid., p.22.

the national economy. Finally, the power brokers and the financial managers and the Liberal Democratic party found it an opportunity to reduce defence spending and keeping away the security issue from becoming too controversial.

Japan's Basic Defence Concept

1) Prevention of Armed Invasion: to possess an adequate defence capability of its own while establishing a posture for the most effective operation of that capability to prevent aggression. In addition, a defence posture capable of dealing with any aggression should be constructed, through maintaining and ensuring the smooth functioning of the system. Against nuclear threat, Japan will rely on the nuclear deterrent capability of the U.S.[32]

2) Countering Aggression: Japan will take immediate responsive action in order to settle the situation at an early stage.

Posture of National Defence

In accordance with the basic defence concept, Japan

---

32. ibid., p.93.

will maintain capacity of the posture, spelled out below.

1) Set up warning and surveillance system for countering indirect aggression and unlawful actions by means of use of military power;
2) Set up for countering direct military aggression;
3) Set up of command, communications, transportation, and rear support services;
4) Set up of education and training of personnel;
5) Set up of disaster relief operations.

Posture of the three forces[33]

1) Ground Self-Defence Force: (i) In order to be capable of swift and effective systematic defence opeations, Japan must deploy its division and other units with a balance conforming to Japan's natural features; (ii) it must possess at least one tactical unit of each of the various types of forces used mainly for mobile operations; (iii) it must possess ground to air-missile units capable of undertaking low altitude air-defence of vital areas.

2) Maritime Self-Defence Force: (i) It must possess one

---

33. Defence of Japan (Tokyo), 1991, p.70.

fleet escort force as a mobile operating ship unit in order to quickly respond to aggressive action and such situations at sea. The fleet escort force must be able to maintain at least one escort flotilla on alert at all times; (ii) it must possess, as ship units assigned to coastal surveillance and defence, surface anti-submarine capability of at least one ship division in operational readiness at all times in each assigned sea districts; (iii) it must maintain fixed wing anti-submarine aircraft units to provide the capability of carrying out such missions as surveillance and patrol of the nearby seas and surface ship protection.

3) **Air Self-Defence Force:** (i) It must possess aircraft control and warning units capable of vigilance and surveillance throughout Japanese airspace on a continuous basis; (ii) it must possess fighter units and high altitude ground to air-missile units for air-defence, to provide the capability of continuous alert to take immediate and appropriate steps against violation of Japan's territorial airspace and air incursions; (iii) it must possess units capable of amphibious missions, air support, aerial reconnaissance, early warning against low altitude intrusion and airtransportation as the necessity arises.

Arms Export Guidelines and NPT Ratification

The policies towards arms export and nuclear weapons consist two important features of current defence policy. The 1976 articulation of policy towards weapons export came after defence contractors brought significant pressure on the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to review the restrictive no export policy that had been a feature of Japanese defence policy since 1967.[34] The argument put forward by the defence industries was that restrictions were having a negative impact on the economy in the wake of oil crisis and general business slump. But all efforts proved to be futile when the updated guidelines came in 1976, which not only restricted export of weapons but also banned export of such machineries with which weapons could be manufactured.

Similarly, in the same year Japan ratified the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in accordance with its strategy of dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, followed since the Second World War.

---

34. Viotti, n.7, p.525.

Japan's restrictive policy was officially broken in 1983, with regard to transactions with the U.S. and thus within three years Japan legally approved its first transfer of military technology relating to `KEIKO SAM' missiles.[35] Reports of illegal weapons exports have surfaced from time to time: for instance, the sale of Japanese mines and bombs to India and Taiwan.[36] Similarly, transfer of Sidewinder missle technology and navigation equipments for Phantom F-4 Jets to Iran by Japan created considerable tension in relations with the United States.

Finally, the export of dual-use items by Japan has also been criticized by the U.S. Although the U.S. itself benefits from this kind of exports, especially semiconductors, it still has to be ever vigilant regarding high-tech leakages. Japan had breached restrictions on exports to communist countries on several occasions, but the famous Toshiba Konsberg scandal in 1976, which involved the export of sensitive technology to the U.S.S.R. added a new dimension to it. Thus official policy has been violated often by the

---

35. Ron Mathews and Keisuke Matsuyama, eds., Japan's Military Renaissance (New York, 1993), p.251.

36. Bob Johnstone, `Spending Up in the Land of the Rising Sun', Far Eastern Economic Review, October 13, 1988.

Japanese government to suit national interests, more specifically economic interests.

RIMPAC Exercises

Japan participated in the RIMPAC (involving countries located in the Pacific Rim) military exercises in 1979, for the first time along with the navies of the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. For the first time the Japanese forces got an opportunity to test fire and manoeuvre in the vast expanse of the Pacific. MSDF ships test fired their missiles, ammunitions and antisubmarine torpedoes at full charges. The emphasis was on training the Japanese forces in new technique through the interaction with the other developed navies of the region. Electronic warfare got special priority in this exercise. Although Japan's participation was severely criticized by the opposition parties, the JDA defended it tooth and nail. The exercise served two specific purposes. Firstly, the isolated Japanese naval forces could be brought into the limelight and thus into the mainstream and, secondly, it proved Japan's growing interest in sharing the defence burden with the U.S.

Thus the end of the 1970s signalled the dawn of a new era in Japanese defence which indeed materialised during the Nakasone years. The important events and issues have been discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE SECOND PHASE: 1980-1989

The Beginning of the 1980s and Japan's Place in it

The evolving defence capabilities of Japan can be broadly divided into two major phases. The first, running from the creation of the SDF to the late 1970s or 1980, encompassed essentially a local defence of the Japanese islands, and a general dependence on the U.S. for strategic and conventional defence. This began to change around 1980, when Japan quietly moved away from local self-defence into an integrated role in overall U.S. defence plans against the Soviet Union in the Western Pacific. This transition was slow and was never officially highlighted. In the new setup, Japan went beyond its local self-defence to assume roles and missions far outside its territoriality and all this was done in the name of self-defence.

Japan's relations with the outside world were undergoing change by the end of the 1970s. The "1978 Blue Paper of Diplomacy", which advocated an "omnidirectional peace diplomacy", was based on interaction with all countries irrespective of their size, power and geographic location. The 1980

version of the same document shows a significant change to a position of protecting Japan's interests. The change is based upon an "underlying principle" of "a strong faith in defending freedom and democracy", which requires that "Western countries should unite to protect their common values", meaning that Japan has to fulfill some international responsibilities to that community.[1]

Japan's threat perception was upset by Russian behaviour in the disputed northern territories. In 1979 and 1980, Soviet buildup in the Kurile chain was significant and the discovery of a spy ring in the S.D.F. produced further alarm.[2] The other important events were the Afghanistan invasion, the Vietnamese conquest of Cambodia and increasing close ties between Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. All these changed Japanese views on defence and world politics in the early 1980s and was first reflected in the Comprehensive National Security papers.

---

1. Lee W. Farnsworth, `Japan in 1980: The Conservative Resurgence', Asian Survey, Vol.XXI, No.1, Jan. 1981, p.78.

2. Gordon Daniels and Reinhard Drifte, Europe and Japan Changing Relationships Since 1945 (Kent, 1986), p.18.

Comprehensive National Security (CNS)

In 1980, Japan began reframing its security framework in line with changes in world politics, namely decline in U.S. power and heightened cold war tensions. A study commissioned by the Japanese Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi, Report on Comprehensive National Security, noted fundamental changes in the systemic environment that made it no longer possible for the U.S. to provide its allies and friends with nearly full security.[3] The group which submitted its report on July 2, 1980, consisted of twenty members and was chaired by Inoki Masamichi, President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security at Tokyo.

The `CNS' as a national security policy was much more than just defence preparations and advocated the notion that, military power cannot be the sole guarantor of a nation's security but it depends greatly on the international environment. It recommended the implementation of the N.D.P.O. to strengthen Japanese defence. According to the Report, all security policies should be integrated into a common framework, with emphasis on three

---

3. Kevin Clements, ed., Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region (New Zealand, 1992), p.209.

areas, diplomacy, military defence and economic strategy. Self-reliance and greater coordination with the allies was to replace the earlier omnidirectional diplomacy.

The C.N.S. was the first step towards greater burden sharing with the U.S. Its immediate impact found concrete shape in the official announcement by the Suzuki government that henceforth the M.S.D.F. would patrol and control the crucial sea lanes till 1,000 nautical miles from Honshu. The new guidelines led to the procurement of advanced weapons systems, although no significant rise took place in the defence budget. The Nakasone government, which came to power in 1982, took special initiative in rearming Japan.

Nakasone Years - Mid Term Defence Programme (Chugyo)

The indivisibility of the Japanese and Western security remained the main pillar of Japanese defence despite emerging signs of changes and this was repeatedly emphasized in public proclamations by Japanese Prime Ministers since the days of Ohira. The U.S. on its part however made sure that such proclamations were accompanied by efforts towards defence self-sufficiency by the Japanese. This was made clear during an official talk in 1981, in the Consultative Committee on Science and Technology meeting where Japan was

asked by the U.S. to develop counterforce against Soviet forces, especially against the advanced Backfire bombers. Revisionist leaders like Suzuki and Nakasone tried hard to progress in this area but the pace was rather slow, mainly due to constitutional and cultural factors and also domestic politics. Thus, only limited success was achieved. The first step was taken by Prime Minister Suzuki, when he committed to buy more P-3C Orion antisubmarine planes (from 45 to 74) and F-15 Eagle fighters (from 100 to 155). However, the most significant step was taken by Prime Minister Nakasone in the form of Mid-Term Defence Programme (MDP) or Mid-Term Planning Estimate (Chugyo/MTPE).

The MTPE was the instrument which provided an incremental defence buildup plan to fulfill the broad objectives of the NDPO. It was approved on September 18, 1985 by the cabinet as official government policy. Before that it was almost like a "shopping list" for the three military services as it was a mere document which defined the cost and scope of all defence projects and buildup plans. The MTPE which became the MDP was not a fixed plan like the pre-1976 buildup programmes and covered a period of five years

and was subject to annual reviews.[4]

The new MDP (FY 1986-1990) laid down certain principles to guide Japanese defence capabilities and plans. They were: (i) to improve air-defence capabilities for the four main islands; (ii) to create a proper balance between operational and support elements including an improved C31 (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence); and (iii) to improve and make more efficient the operation of the Air Ground and Maritime SDF through their better coordination and cooperation.[5]

Missile defence was given special attention by the MDP. The mainstay of this defence was projected to be the SSM-1 Surface-to-Surface guided missile. The SSM-1 could within ten years achieve such capability by which it could stop any Soviet fleet moving into the Sea of Japan from their bases in Vladisvostok and Sovetskaya Gavan.[6] The other important events in defence matters during the Nakasone era were the

---

4. Holland M. Harrison, Managing Defence: Japan's Dilemma (Boston, 1988), p.134.

5. Gregory P. Corning, `Japanese Views on Security', Asian Survey, Vol.XXIX, No.3, March 1989, p.274.

6. John O'Connell, `Strategic Implications of the Japanese SSM-1 Cruise Missile', Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 6 (Summer, 1987), p.53.

extension of the maritime defence zone from 200 to 1,000 nautical miles southeast of Honshu, joint U.S.-Japan planning on SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication) defence; participation of the MSDF in the RIMPAC exercise and finally increasing the defence spending above 1% of the GNP, thus breaking a longstanding guideline. In June, 1988, a Peace Research Institute was founded in Tokyo with Nakasone as an influential member.

It is interesting to note here that Nakasone was influenced more by the Soviet threat rather than U.S. pressure for burden sharing. His revisionist views found expression since 1978, in his articles in Seiron, much before the Reagan administration used pressure tactics against Japan.

The MDP was criticized for its limited advances by known critics such as Reinhard Drifte and Edward A. Olsen. Showing statistical data they proved that the MDP was little more than an extension of the NDPO and that defence spending, despite breaking the one per cent barrier had raised very little in real terms. So all the criticism mainly focused attention on the issue of burden-sharing and viewed Japan's contribution into the common defence an insignificant.

U.S.-Japan Relations (1980 to 1990)

The relationship between the Reagan administration and the Nakasone cabinet was extremely cordial and complementary, witnessed in various concessions provided by the latter in defence matters. However, there was a gradual shift during this period of U.S. security initiatives towards Japan from the Pentagon to the more intense anti-Japanese lobby in Washington. The major concession given by the Nakasone government was in the spheres of defence spending and defence procurement, the first reflected in the breaking of the one per cent restrictions and the latter in the FS-X fighter deal (FS-X controversy is discussed separately later in this chapter).

The year 1987 was a significant one, in the way of changing Japanese perception about defence matters. Certain events created a situation which influenced the Japanese people to question the national security treaty. The Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty signed in December 1987, ushered new hope in the area of international disarmament. The lowering of Soviet threat reflected in the reduction of troops in Soviet Far East and the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia were clearly a positive signals to

Japan. The initial impact was in the form of questioning the utility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan in the changed international situation. However, the real impact was felt by the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA), in the form of pressures to curb defence spendings. Moreover, the arrival of the Socialists in the Upper House of the Diet also created impediments in the JDA's effort to increase the budget in the 1991-95 plan.

The end of the 1980s again witnessed the decline in U.S. economic power, which renewed pressures on Japanese defence budget. During 1988-89, high ranking U.S. officials openly declared their inability to maintain the existing military commitment in the Asia Pacific region. The U.S. troops stationed in Japan were immediately effected. The maintenance of U.S. bases in Japan became a political issue. In September 1990, the anti-Japanese lobby in the U.S. House of Representative, impatient with Japan's apparent reluctance to pay the full cost of U.S. bases in Japan, threatened to withdraw 5,000 troops annually from Japan.[7] The Japanese response was through a concession by the Kaifu

---

7. Clement, n.3, p.212.

cabinet, which in 1991 alloted an additional 90 billion yen for the maintenance of the U.S. bases. This raised the total Japanese contribution to 530.5 billion yen, which was almost half the total cost of stationing U.S. forces. Moreover, the additional fund brought in advance, increases already planned for 1992.

A new trend that caused serious friction in the delicate U.S.-Japan security relationship was in the way of competition in the area of defence related technology and defence procurement programmes. The Japanese research and development (R&D) programme became increasingly better than its counterpart in the U.S., mainly because of industrial and commercial support, while the latter was dependent on direct Pentagon patronage. So a great portion of all R and D efforts in Japan went into the defence sphere. In the later half of 1988, some of the major Japanese defence contractors, frustrated by government policy, abandoned their usual reticence and called for the lifting of the existing ban on the export of weapons. It proved to be an unsuccessful move, but it did reflect the seriousness of the supply side pressures that had accumulated over the years.

Japan reached the peak of weapons technology in the

late 1980s and this reduced her dependency on American military technology transfers. The situation was opposite in the U.S. where the defence contractors faced tough times mainly due to the rapidly shrinking Pentagon budget, a direct result of American economic decline. Thus, they were desperately in need of orders from Japan. Thus, Japan in 1989 and 1990 faced intense pressure from the U.S. to buy certain expensive systems. They were Boeing E3A AWAC aircraft, the AEGIS naval airdefence system, the multiple rocket launcher, McDonnell Douglas KC-10A refuelling tanker aircrafts, F-15 fighters, and finally, the Raytheon product, Patriot missiles. The government of Prime Minister Kaifu, which initially agreed to the procurement suddenly in July 1990, withdrew from its earlier position. Although the official explanation was changed threat perception and Socialist gains in the Diet, the actual reason was severe resource crunch in the SDF budget. The cost of the sudden withdrawal was compensated with the 90 billion additional yen provided by the Kaifu cabinet, already mentioned. So U.S. pressures came as a result of both these events at the same time. Thus, the U.S.-Japan defence relationship entered the 1990s in both friendly and competitive terms.

The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)

The U.S.-Japan defence cooperation entered into a new era in the later half of the 1980s, when Japan joined the U.S. in its `Star Wars' programme, known as the SDI. On September 9, 1986, the Japanese Cabinet agreed in principle that Japan could join the SDI programme, subject to negotiatins with the U.S. on conditions for participation.[8] Gradual consensus, regarding participation by private parties and research institutes, emerged among the Japanese policymakers.

The SDI was to be a highly advanced BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) system, involving kinetic energy and laser weapons, which would protect the U.S. and her allies from enemy missile attacks. The project needed not only huge sums of money but also a high degree of technological expertise. It was indeed a great technological challenge to the U.S. and her initial partners, West Germany and Britain. Japan's participation was important in both ways. Japan could contribute heavily in financial terms and technologically Japan's advances in supercomputers, lasers, electron-

---

8. Holland, n.4, p.67.

ics, rocket propulsion etc. was of significant value. From the Japanese viewpoint, it proved to be a good opportunity, especially for the private companies, to gather the latest western technological achievements in this field and also to smoothen their friendly ties with their allies, adversely affected due to increasing trade imbalances. On July 21, 1987, the governments of both the U.S. and Japan signed a formal agreement on Japan's participation in the SDI project. With this Japan became the fifth country after the U.S. FRG, Britain, Italy and Israel to join the programme. Japan was bound by the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement to maintain total secrecy regarding the project and Japanese companies were allowed to use research data only after official permission by the U.S. Department of Defence.

The FS-X Fighter Jet Controversy

The `Fighter Support Experiment (FS-X)' aircraft selection became the most controversial defence issue in Japan in the 1980s. It was controversial as the entire selection process passed through various stages of uncertainty and pressures from different quarters both in the U.S. and Japan. But before going into the controversy, its impor-

tance should be estimated. The FS-X selection was of extreme significance due to two reasons. Firstly, the existing fleet of fighters with the ASDF consisting of F-1S was about to become obsolete and needed an immediate replacement. Secondly, the project not only involved billions of dollars but had both domestic and external implications, in the area of indigenous industrial development and U.S.-Japan trade relations. Thus, the decision indeed involved high stakes in both the countries. However, it is interesting to note that it was only after 1986 that U.S involvement became a serious matter in the whole issue.

It was during Nakasone's Cabinet that the FS-X issue came into the forefront. There were three main options for the government. Firstly, indigenous development of the FS-X was put forward by a strong group in Tokyo, consisting not only of the defence industries, but also leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and officials of the Japan Defence Agency (JDA). Initially there were apprehensions among some in this circle regarding the viability of domestic development of the FS-X. It was feared that it would be too expensive and there were doubts about the ability of indigenous technology to produce such a high performance

aircraft. The problem was solved when in May, 1985, the `Technical Research and Development Institute' under the JDA came out with a study which reported in favour of indigenous production. The Report lowered earlier production cost estimates from around 200 billion yen per year to around 150 billion yen a year and also found that domestic technology was sufficient enough for production except in one field, that is the engine part. Once the technical problems were cleared, the advocates of domestic development put forwarded two lines of argument. Firstly, it was argued that only an indigenously produced aircraft can stick to all the typical specifications regarding performance strategically unique to the defence of Japan. The other line was purely economic as it showed the benefits which the domestic defence industries would be able to gain in two main fronts - monetarily and in technical development.

The other two options in the selection process were firstly, the conversion of F-4EJ of the ASDF as fighter support and finally, buying entirely new aircraft from abroad. There were few in Japan who supported these options mainly because the former was seen as a temporary solution and doubts were expressed about capabilities of an aircraft of foreign origin. The JDA was the dominant player in the

selection game till the U.S. interfered in late 1986. It was overall the changes in the international monetary environment with direct impact on the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance which influenced the U.S. military industries and their supporters in the Congress to pressurize Japan to buy an American FS-X. The deficiencies in the bilateral trade had to be compensated through defence purchases. This economy and defence link which was always an important factor in Japan-U.S. relations, again emerged during the selection of the FS-X and finally had the expected impact.

The involvement of the U.S. accelerated gradually and the first initiative was taken by the government in the way of official visits and talks in Tokyo by Caspar Weinberger, the U.S. Secretary of State and later by Nakasone in Washington. The initial U.S. suggestion was for joint production and development, which was opposed tooth and nail by the Japanese defence industries. The old rival Japanese companies were now suddenly united and formed a federation in February 1987, known as the `FS-X Minkan Godo Kenkyukai (FS-X Private Joint Study Group)' in order to submit a uni-

form plan for domestic production.[9]

The FS-X selection process was influenced by three events which finally determined its future course. In the first instance, the JDA officially began considering the McDonnell Douglas (MD) F-15 and F-18 fighters and General Dynamics (GD) F-16 fighters as a foreign FS-X option. Secondly, the Japanese defence industries softened their earlier stand and agreed on a joint U.S.-Japan venture in which they would have a larger role. The third event was the Toshiba incident in May, 1987. Violating Western export control guidelines, the Toshiba group had supplied sensitive submarine technologies to the Soviets and this became a big scandal, further weakening Japan's position to bargain with the U.S. The summer of 1987 witnessed intense U.S. pressure on Japan and demands for an apology from Japan on the Toshiba scandal.

On October 2, Kurihara, DirectorGeneral of JDA and Casper Weinburger agreed in Washington to a joint development of the FS-X by remodelling the designs of either the F-15 or the F-16. From 12th of the same month, final round of

---

9. Masaru Kohno, `Japanese Defence Policy Making: FS-X Selection (1985-1987)', Asian Survey, Vol.XXIX, No.5, May 1989, p.460.

technical talks started between defence officials from both sides and culminated in the selection of F-16 on October 13. The relative cost efficiency of F-16 proved to be the last decisive factor. On the same day, JDA's proposal was formally accepted by the Nakasone Cabinet and the three year long selection process came to an end.[10]

The FS-X controversy is important as it provides us the opportunity to analyze and understand the role of the U.S. in the Japanese defence decision-making process. This again comprises an important part of the overall U.S.-Japan relationship. The U.S. had the motive and used its capability to influence Japanese decisions in its favour, while the Japanese failed to transform their economic might into a diplomatic initiative and bargaining base. However, from another angle the Japanese lack of assertiveness might be seen as a deliberate move to preserve harmony and friendship with the U.S. rather than going for an unnecessary conflict.

American Military Forces in Japan

Japan's geostrategic position is crucial for both the

---

10. Yomiuri Shinbun (October 22, 1982).

U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy since she lies so near the Asian mainland. The U.S. can cover half of the world's surface in its operations from there. The Pacific fleet's patrol area stretches from the Aleutians to Australia, from Petrapavlovsk to Chile - 50 millin square miles.[11] The term "unsinkable aircraft carrier" was first used by General McArthur to Taiwan at the end of the World War II, but it is more appropriate to Japan.

The U.S. Far East Command was established in 1947 in Tokyo and had jurisdiction over the entire Western Pacific area, which included the Philippines, the Marianas and the Bonin islands. During the Korean war, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Far East Command became the Commander-in-Chief of the U.N. Command. This latter Command was finally removed to the Republic of Korea and the former was replaced in July 1957, by the U.S. Pacific Command. The new Command was served by the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Airforce in Japan. The headquarters of the U.S. Forces Japan, located earlier at the Fuchu Air Station, were shifted in 1974 to the Yokota Air base.[12]

---

11. Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Rearmed (London, 1986), p.109.

12. Defence of Japan (Tokyo, 1981), p.236.

The Japan-U.S. security arrangements are maintained by the presence of the U.S. forces in Japan. The Commander of U.S. Forces Japan, formulates policies related to the defence of Japan and controls the U.S. Army, Navy and Marine Forces. As representative of the U.S. Forces, he also negotiates with all Japanese government offices including the Japan Defence Agency and enforces the Status of Forces Agreement.

Japan's importance as a host to American military forces is signified by the presence of 47,262 troops at 120 bases and 19 electronic intelligence gathering centers. The U.S. bases its 5th Airforce in Japan, with headquarters in Yokota. Kadena is the largest Pacific Airforce base located at the Okinawa Prefecture and has F-15's, F-16's, RF-4C Reconnaissance aircraft, tankers, SR-71 Blackbird spy planes and E3A AWAC planes. It is also an emergency shuttle site operated by NASA. The 18th Tactical fighter wing is also located there. Atsugi and Iwakuni are used by American Navy electronic intelligence staging base for aircrafts covering the coast of Asia.

The Japanese part of the American 7th fleet is based in Yokosuka Kanagawa Prefecture. It has all kinds of support

and repair facilities and is a homeport of the aircraft carrier **U.S.S. Midway** and the flag ship **Blue Ridge**. Other naval facilities are in Sasebo, Nagasaki and White Beach area in Okinawa. The Navy's `Swing Strategy' is represented in Japan by 21,047 U.S. Marine Corps members. The 3rd Marine Amphibious is located at Camp Courtney, and the Marine Air Wing is headquartered at Zukeran, both in Okinawa.

The U.S. Army does not have any combat troops in Japan and its functions include general administration, communications, supply and support. It is headquartered in Camp Zama in Kanagawa. The U.S. Military Traffic Management Command is located at Naha Port and the main Army Ammunition Dump is in Kawakami in Hiroshima.

The cost to the Japanese of having American forces in their territory cannot be measured simply in the way of increased tension in the area or in the fact that they have become a nuclear target. There is a financial side, which has risen from US 280 million dollars in 1972 to US 1.05 billion in 1982 and more than US 3 billion after 1990.

The Economics of the SDF

The internal and external pressures make the management of the economics part of Japanese defence a complex task. The Japanese preference for a measured and slow defence buildup under the one per cent limitation acts as the internal constraint, while the U.S. puts pressure for an increase in Japan's share in the defence burden. The Japanese government has thus taken a middle path, which envisages a slow growth pattern, that does not alarm the Japanese public, and at the same time maintains the equilibrium in its partnership with the U.S.

Japan has not involved itself into any major or regional conflicts in the last five decades and instead has regained territory (Okinawa). It has gradually expanded its trade all over the globe and has over the years systematically developed a militarily relevant and highly sophisticated industrial technology base. Moreover, a rate of real growth in military spending greater than that of NATO has been sustained, lending itself to systematic defence planning more than the boom and bust pattern of the U.S. defence budget. The average annual military spending growth rate for the 1960s was 12%, that for 1970s was 16%. The compound

annual growth rate for 1980-85 was 4.2% compared to an average of 2.8% for the major NATO military powers (the U.S., Canada, the U.K., France, Italy and West Germany). Japan now has the world's third largest defence budget and even before the strong yen, it has consistently ranked among the top ten nations globally for many years.[13] Japan today has a highly sophisticated defence force and has enormous potential, should political circumstances change, to be a major global military power.

Japan has achieved the positive results associated with defence success and has carefully avoided the negatives. It has achieved significant defence capacity and a future option, at such an effort level, which has been economically insignificant in the context of its overall national capacity. Thus, there has been little negative impact on economic growth and the welfare sector.

Compared to the members of the NATO, the allocation of GNP or GDP to defence budget has been low - almost 1% for thirty years, while the NATO average has been 1.4%. However, if NATO's definition of military expenditure is taken,

---

13. Steve Chan and Alex Mintz, Defence, Welfare and Growth: Perspectives and Evidence (New York, 1992), p.249.

which includes pensions of military personnels, than Japan's total military expenditure amounts to be around 2% of its GNP.[14] Again, in spite of a fairly large population, Japan's percentage of population devoted to both the regular defence and reserve forces has been low, compared to NATO. Moreover, for at least thirty years, defence procurement as well as defence budget have been kept under 1% of the value of the total industrial production. However, the amount spent on R and D has been almost doubled in recent years.

Japan's successful policy has been positively influenced by both internal and external factors. The internal factors that enabled Japan to take advantage of its opportunities lie substantially in political legacies, institutions and conventions.[15] After the war Japan inherited four specific legacies which are still relevant today. Firstly, reliance primarily on the non-military instrument to achieve major domestic and external goals and, secondly, not letting the homeland to face another massive attack. The Peace

---

14. Masako Ikegami Andersson, The Military Industrial Complex - The Cases of Sweden and Japan (Darmonth, 1992), p.57.

15. Davis B. Bobrow and Stephen R. Hill, `Non-Military Determinants of Military Budgets: The Japanese Case', International Studies Quarterly, 35:1991, p.39.

Constitution and regulatory clauses and treaties maintain this part. The last two legacies were never again to allow the military elite to dominate the political institutions of the country and finally, be independent in advanced technology. The latter two also were maintained by deliberate institutional subordination of military institutions and rapid advance in technology.

Externally, Japan has immensely benefitted from an unique relationship with the U.S. The U.S. strategy in Asia Pacific has protected Japan as the main priority and provided Japan with not only a security umbrella but also crucial military technology and strategic intelligence. The U.S.has also allowed an unequal trade relationship to grow to an extreme level, despite its economic decline. The Soviet Union also indirectly helped Japan by keeping up the pressure on the U.S. in the ongoing cold war. Thus, the special ties with the U.S. enabled Japan to concentrate on defence, growth and welfare at a very low cost.

The steady growth of the defence forces due to the deliberate fiscal regulations has produced positive results to Japan in its relations with the neighbouring countries. The memory of Japanese imperialist expansion is still fresh

among the Asian neighbours and they keep a close watch on Japanese defence development. The Japanese defence forces have developed in such a manner that they cannot be regarded as projection forces, but only as an defensive instrument. Thus, not being regarded a threat, Japan could carry on its commercial relations normally and has gained considerably in its dealings with countries in East Asia.

The success story of Japan in regard to defence management, economic growth and welfare merits examination as a unique case, which can surely suggest and guide other countries as well. Japan has used the best wisdom of both the West and the East and the credit for this goes to the post-war Japanese elite. They have taken the best knowledge of the West, blended it with their own and used it after necessary modifications in accordance with national conditions.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Japan in the 1990s

The post-Cold War era has suddenly catapulted Japan into a global role. It is now a global power in its own right. Though the certitude of the Cold War is now part of recent history, Russia continue to be the *bete-noire* of the Japan Defence Agency. The splintering of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the reorganisation of the armed forces, Russian military presence in areas adjacent to Japan, the prickly issue of the northern territories and proposed arms sale by Russia to the Asia Pacific region have been highlighted as potentially destabilising factors in Tokyo-Moscow relationship. Also, Moscow's wanting to make a comeback to Cam-Ranh Bay in Vietnam from which its air and naval units pulled out only a year ago, is an important factor. These developments, it is concluded, warrant Japanese scrutiny and hence defence preparedness. While the Korean peninsula and its volatility have found adequate mention, the recent North Korean decision to withdraw from the NPT and the recent impasse in the U.N. Security Council only underscore Japa-

nese apprehensions on the subject.

The transformation in the Chinese economy and the military posture of Beijing remains a threat to Japan. An increased defence budget, a concerted military modernization programme, the maritime belligerence revealed in the Spratheys and the enactment of the 1992 Act are included in the Japanese perceptions about China. Thus in the first half of the 1990s Japan remains apprehensive about these destabilizing factors in the Asia Pacific region.

The future direction of Japanese foreign policy has been one of the most debatable issues in recent times, both inside and outside Japan. The liberalisation of the parameters of debate regarding Article 9 of the Constitution and the spirit of international pacifism, the present soul-searching provide an impetus to redefine Japan's international role. Her new security interests can be attributed to the changed international conditions. Replying to the criticisms against its growing military industrial complex, Japan suggests that it is strictly in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which speaks of the right to self-defence. It is no doubt a credible explanation considering Japan's record in defence matters. Japan's armed

forces are truly modest in size considering global standards and her enormous economic clout. However, the recent increase of 5.4% from 4.159 trillion Yen to 4.386 trillian yen in the new five-year defence plan indicates a new realism by Tokyo regarding Japan's responsibility for upholding `the new world order'.[1] As the Japanese defence grows, it acknowledges the remarkable changes in world politics. Thus, no factor like geo-strategic conditions etc. can singularly provide a proper explanation for the recent Japanese military efforts and initiatives.

With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Japan has suddenly emerged as a major economic power and has got an opportunity to play an active political role on the international stage. Japan's role is crucial in world peacekeeping and peacemaking today as it is one of the principal financier of U.N. activities. Japan contributed heavily to the recent Gulf operations and in 1992-1993 became the second biggest source of funds for the U.N.[2] Thus, it is very natural that Japan would demand

---

1. Kevin Clements, ed., Peace and Security in Asia Pacific Region (Tokyo, 1992), p.204.

2. Ron Mathews and Keisuke Matsuyama, eds., Japan's Military Renaissance (New York, 1993), p.86.

representation against its contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. However, till now it has never shown any signs of aggressive policy towards becoming a military power either at global or regional level. Japan's `cheque-book diplomacy' proved to be less effective during the Gulf War. The political establishment decided then, that it must surmount constitutional and psychological inhibitions to enable Japan to send troops abroad. Cambodia was the first testing ground for its new role. At the same time, Japanese foreign ministry staff became very active all over the world to lobby in favour of a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council. The effort still goes on.[3]

Only global peace and security can keep Japan a prosperous country. But global peace cannot come without regional peace and stability. At the regional level, Japan is taking initiatives to restore stability and peace and to develop confidence among the Asian neighbours. Japan is expected to play a larger role in the Asia Pacific region. Foreign Minister Nakayuna Toru, at the 1991 Asian Post-

---

3. Hindustan Times, 19 March 1995.

Ministerial Conference (PMC) proposed an expansion of the scope of the PMC to include security related issues.[4]

The Japanese objective of playing a global role can be achieved through the implementation of the following five principles. Firstly, the canon of Japanese post-cold war statecraft can be achieved through the pursuit of national information excellence.[5] The process is through the spread of education, creation of knowledgeable and effective individuals, development of a highly sophisticaed surveillance and intelligence collection system and sharing of information with others. Secondly, by taking systematic steps to prevent abrupt changes in the international system and to work for only planned transitions. Again, global role can succeed effectively through deep and omnidirectional economic interdependent measures, in the form of long-term joint development, technology transfers etc. Another important area is technology, where Japan's leadership can be crucial, not only to bring economic benefits, in the form of attracting economic relationships, but also providing military

---

4. Mathews, n.2, p.87.

5. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson, The Post-Cold War Order - Diagnoses and Prognoses (Australia, 1993), p.186.

deterrence and defence. Finally, the policy of military exceptionalism if continued, could go on producing rich dividends for Japan. Projection of force will have a negative influence, mainly at the regional level, which could effect its global role.

U.S.-Japan Security Relationship in the 1990s

The centrepiece of Japan's post-World War II policy is its relationship with the U.S. Japan's sole military ally by treaty. This unique relation has put the U.S. in a privileged position in influencing Japan's defence policies - which not only includes strategy, but also procurement and other matters. Japan's basic defence strategy has been possessing sufficient capability to repel a limited attack or invasion for a time long enough for the U.S. to move its Pacific forces to Japan. This strategy and the Security Treaty provide the basic framework for Japanese defence posture today.

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union has reduced the threat to Japan and so the overall security environment has improved. Despite this the importance of the U.S. in the Japanese defence parameters remains. Thus the U.S.-Japan security relationship which is

the bedrock of Japanese foreign policy retains its significance undiminished by reductions in the earlier threats.

From November 1991 to mid-April 1992, the U.S.-Japan relationship was in a severe downward phase witnessed in the cancellation of the U.S. President George Bush's trip to Japan, trade rivalry and also xenophobic and racial exchanges from both the sides. Even the U.S.-Japan Summit in January 1992 and the Tokyo Declaration, focussing on the coming global partnership between the U.S. and Japan, affirming the bilateral security treaty as a pillar were lost amidst such misunderstandings. However, when Hosokawa got elected as Japan's new Prime Minister on August 9, 1993, he immediately declared that relations with the U.S. were of crucial significance to Japanese foreign policy and he would try to make them more harmonious.[6] Again, Mr. Toimichi Murayama, the next Prime Minister on July 21, 1994 demolished his Socialist Party's longstanding pacifist platform by declaring the policy of unarmed neutrality as outdated. He pledged to maintain the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, thus overturning the basic tenets of his party. He also promised

---

6. Statesman (Calcutta), 24 August 1993.

to keep the SDF within the bounds of the Constitution.[7]

An important area of frequent frictions is in regard to technological transfers. Technology has been an integral part of this delicate relationship throughout the last five decades. Japanese defence needed advanced technology to act as the main pillar against the Soviets in the Far East and the U.S. provided it, despite the risks involved in the entire process. Massive amount of scientific and intelligence data has flowed from the U.S. over the years mainly through cooperative defence programmes. This has helped not only Japanese defence but also boosted Japanese indigenous industrial capabilities.

Leakage or theft of highly sophisticated defence-related technologies and their subsequent transfer to unfriendly foreign powers has been a serious U.S. concern in recent years. It hampers U.S. security interests and, given the uncertainties in the new world order, this is of extreme significance to the U.S. The Japanese companies had often flouted U.S. restrictions in passing of crucial technological secrets for monetary gains. Recently, the Japan Avia-

---

7. Statesman (Calcutta), 23 July 1994.

tion Electronics Inc., a subsidiary of the National Electronic Corporation group diverted technology from the U.S. fighter aircraft produced under license in Japan to Iran.[8]

As interdependency grows between the U.S. and Japan and as the U.S. declines economically, the enforcement of sanctions against violations becomes a serious problem. Unless both the countries shed their mutual suspicions, Japan may opt to get out of the U.S. trade restriction system. Thus both the countries are at a crossroad in their technology relations, and the future course could not only create problems regarding regional security issues but their delicate bilateral relationship as well.

From the U.S. side, it has to adjust to a more confident and assertive Japan and will have to accept limitations on its capacity to manoeuvre in Japanese waters. The process probably shall heighten with gradual economic decline. Japan could become a regional power only through a reduced military profile by the U.S. in the Asia Pacific region. The withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces will have several consequences. Regional peace and stability may be endan-

---

8. Mathews, n.2, p.191.

gered with the beginning of an arms race between the Asian neighbours, which would again accentuate Japanese defence efforts. Japan may surpass other nations in the process, and this would create new antagonisms.[9]

Thus, it would be a strategic mistake if the U.S. reduces its presence in a major way in the Asia Pacific region. In recent times, mainly due to economic reasons, the U.S. shut down its important bases in the Philippines and plans to withdraw from South Korea as soon as the situation gets stable. However, the U.S. forces and installations in Japan have been uneffected by such changes in the neighbourhood.

Joseph S. Nye and Ezra F. Vogel, two senior officials of the National Intelligence Council of the U.S. administration visited Tokyo separately in November, 1994 and had discussions with top officials of the Japan Defence Agency and other defence policymakers to redefine the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. According to them, it should be given a new identity and role that can better handle the globalization of security affairs in an increasingly interdependent

---

9. Jeffrey T. Berg ner, The New Superpowers: Germany, Japan and the U.S. and the New World Order (New York, 1991), p.207.

world, which might require a security framework. They assured that the U.S. shall maintain its forward deployment forces but Japan should accept more financial burden and play a global role in security activities, such as peace-keeping.[10]

Japan still remains heavily dependent on the U.S. to defend its sea-lanes, which are so crucial to her commerce. The U.S. spends billions of dollars to defend these sea-lanes. Japan on its part will gradually develop its military capability along with its economic growth. An American withdrawal and domestic pressures could result in Japan's emergence as a major military power in this region by the turn of this century. American policies can both hasten this process or retard it. Japan's regional security and political profile will heighten in harmony with its international responsibilities. This theory overtakes the `Fukuda doctrine', propagated by Prime Minister Fukuda in 1978, emphasising the need to promote Japanese political and diplomatic activity in the region falling short of a greater military presence. The geostrategic changes in the 1990s

---

10. Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 23 December, 1994.

and Japan's increasing regional influence have led to demands for more funds for the Self-Defence Forces. Till now, no policy framework has emerged from the Japanese foreign office in regard to this probable direction and thus an element of uncertainty prevails. This uncertainty is accentuated again by the continuing U.S. demand in regard to burden-sharing.

Japan is stepping up defence ties with Russia, China, South Korea and other Asia Pacific countries in a long-term bid to create a forum for regional security dialogue. It does not want to go for a collective security arrangement like NATO or to alter the existing pact with the U.S. Instead it aims to accumulate layers of defence ties on the bilateral and regional levels, to reassure its neighbours of no surprises and ensure that Tokyo has a bigger say than simple economics in how the area develops.[11]

Japan finds it increasingly difficult to adjust to the new friendship between the U.S. and Russia. However, it must remain as the strongest ally of the U.S. in Asia and take initiative in bringing together her Asian neighbours,

---

11. Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 23 November 1994.

in the interest of regional peace and stability. The U.S.-Japan relationship will sustain despite problems, at least due to their important economic implications. However, it has to adjust to the changing international conditions. An informal multilateral framework to discuss and resolve mutual security issues between Japan and the U.S. would go a long way in ensuring U.S. presence in the area and in sustaining and promoting their unique relationship. Many experts also recommend that both partners reassess their security alliance to facilitate Japan's new role to help the U.S. to protect the sea-lanes. A new cooperative agreement based on a NATO type arrangement to defend some 5,000 kms of sealanes has been suggested. The U.S. could also transfer to Japan part of its 7th Fleet and support units for an agreed upon sum. This new alliance would be a relation, with greater equivalence than that has existed in the past. Japan's management of its security would be upgraded and America's burden to provide for the Asia Pacific security system would be reduced. Japan and the U.S. by pooling their complementary strengths can assist Korean unification, the development of China and Siberia and provide the foundations for a multilateral regime, with minimal danger to themselves or threat to others. But a Japan and U.S. at

odds and unarmed (in case of a rupture) would again, in the second Pacific Century, press their necks to the cruel yoke of geopolitics.[12] A security relationship based upon mutual responsibility would be far superior to a security based upon dependency and growing ill will and deep mistrust.

The 1991 Gulf Crisis and Japan

The Gulf War in 1991 against Iraq was the most critical event in the beginning of the 1990s and a watershed occurrence in post-war Japanese history. The Gulf airwar started on January 17 and on the following 24th, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu announced a huge Japanese contribution of $ 9 billion in support of the Allied war efforts, responding to the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady's request for "in excess of $ 10 billion". Combined with Japan's $ 4 billion in the fall of 1990, the January gesture brought its total support for the Gulf War to $ 13 billion or 20% of the entire cost of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm.[13] Thus, by the end of 1991 Japan was the single biggest contributor to the war effort in the Gulf.

---

12. International Herald Tribune (Paris), 30 August 1993.

13. Kent E. Calder, 'Japan in 1991 - Uncertain Quest for a Global Role', Asian Survey, Vol.XXXII, No.1, Jan 1992, p.33.

Despite huge financial contribution Japan was slow in its response to other commitments in the Gulf War. On January 18, the Kaifu Cabinet announced a plan to send A.S.D.F. C-130s transport aircrafts to Cairo and Amman to evacuate the war refugees, but failed to materialise in the wake of stiff opposition in the Diet. Similar fate awaited the bill which proposed a major tax increase to cover the $ 9 billion contribution.

The vacillation in sending troops to the Gulf by Japan reflected the dilemma of the Japanese government in arriving at a consensus between different parties and interests. The two factors responsible for this was the strong antimilitarist post-war tradition in Japan reflected in the general public opinion and secondly, the lack of governmental institutions capable of producing an immediate response to such situations. For almost the entire post-war period, the great fear of the Socialists and others on the Left had been that the `Japan-U.S. Security Treaty' would drag Japan into a direct conflict. After Vietnam, the same situation prevailed with greater demands from Japan in terms of both finance and material. The opposition from anti-militarist tradition was supplemented by the Constitutional restric-

tions.

Again, Japanese policymakers faced a problem initially, when Japan was asked to join a force which was basically a U.S. force without any U.N. sanction. Participation in such a force would have invited violent opposition in Japan. However, the situation changed when the U.S. forces got U.N. sanction. The new controversy centred around whether Japan should participate in the fighting.

Again crisis management institutions were also either poorly developed or unused. Japan lacks a functional global intelligence agency and the Foreign Ministry is also understaffed.[14] However, once the Gulf War was over, opposition to foreign SDF deployment subsided somewhat and on April 27, MSDF minesweepers and associated supply ships left Yokosuka for the Gulf.[15] This was a historical event as it was the first informal deployment of Japanese military forces abroad since the Second World War.

---

14. Courtney Purrington and A.K., `Japanese Crisis Management During the Gulf Crisis', Asian Survey, April 1991, Vol.XXXI, No.4, p.309.

15. Inoguchi Takashi, `Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis - An Analytical Overview', Journal of Japanese Studies 17(2) Summer, 1991, p.259.

It is interesting to note that the substantial Japanese effort mainly in terms of providing an enormous sum for the Gulf War was hardly recognised by the international community and specifically the U.S. Congress and surprisingly by the newly liberated Kuwait government. Thus, the Japanese could not garner any major contract in the reconstruction boom in Kuwait, even in areas like desalinisation, in which they had specialised knowledge. This created resentment and many Japanese thus considered that Japan's reactive diplomacy entailing uncritical response to American demands was unproductive.

The problems Japan faced in despatching forces to the Gulf War became a key issue in not only Japan-U.S. relations but also Japan-U.N. relations. They also throw considerable light on the problem of consensus building over security issues within the Japanese Parliament.[16]

Japan and Peacekeeping Operations

The year 1992 was also a landmark year for Japan. Almost twenty months after the Gulf crisis, in June 1992,

---

16. Mathews, n.2, p.61.

the Japanese Parliament passed the `Peacekeeping Bill', approving for the first time after five decades, deployment of Japanese troops overseas in non-combat operations. However, the bill passed through intense debate and was rigorously opposed by the Social Democratic Party and the Japan Communist Party. Finally, the Liberal Democratic Party government of Prime Minister Miyazawa took the help of the Komeito Party and the Democratic Socialist Party and was successful in getting it passed. The Liberal Democratic Party's victory in the upper house of the Diet was taken by observers as a vote of confidence and a successful referendum on the peacekeeping bill.[17]

Apart from the debate between peacemaking and peacekeeping which was solved with the passing of the bill, another important issue which became prominent was regarding civilian or military control of these overseas forces. The Foreign Office and the SDF became involved in this fight, which was finally solved by the Diet. It was decided that the Japanese Peacekeeping forces would remain under the Prime Minister, that is under civilian direction but before sending them he would need the Diet's approval to be given

---

17. International Herald Tribune (Paris), July 27, 1992.

within twenty days. Such approval shall be needed in case of an extension of the despatch, and the Diet will also review the new law every two years.

According to the new law, Japanese troops can be sent abroad for peacekeeping activities under certain strict conditions. Japan will participate only in case of a clear invitation from the recipient country and no hostility should prevail in the latter's territory. In case of a violation of ceasefire, Japan shall immediately withdraw its troops. Japanese forces shall carry light weapons for defensive purposes. Finally, the troubled area would be first visited by an advanced party, whose recommendation to the government will be crucial in sanctioning the sending of the SDF.

The first batch of defence personnel was sent to Cambodia in late 1992 after passage of this bill and the team consisting of 600 military personnel and 75 police monitors and observers, worked under the U.N. auspices for over a year. This was followed by sending of troops to Vietnam, Laos, Mozambique and Zaire. Japan, however, refused in the case of Somalia and Yugoslavia as conflict conditions prevailed there.

The arguments put forwarded to justify Japan's earlier policy have always seemed highly contrived. Firstly, the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 and its later revised version of 1960 affirmed Japan's obligations to the UN Charter provisions, including Article 51, that is the right to individual or collective self-defence. In the second place, the postwar Constitution's Preamble which in part states, "we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peaceloving peoples of the world," could not possibly mean that, while Japan should rely on other nations to help it defend itself against attack and violence, it has no reciprocal obligations or that it should always remain a special case in the international community. Finally, Japan could modify its law, despite it being a difficult process, to participate in U.N. peacekeeping activities.

Why did Japan change its earlier stance? The answer can be found in the existing pattern of Japan's international behaviour. The real importance of this decision lies in the precedent it sets and the natural trajectory of Japan's international power that will almost inevitably follow such

a development.[18] Japan is going for a gradual entry into peacekeeping operations. Initially it will be at non-combat level, but in the long run will go for a combat role and extend its activities all over the globe. The latter active role shall involve monitoring the observance of ceasefires, patrolling buffer zones, inspecting weapons transport and collection and disposal of arms.

Before taking an international role, Japan desperately needs to shed its past image and its peacekeeping activities can help it by providing the desirable image of a clean, credible, responsible and non-aggressive power. However, the first test of its new leadership role would be in Asia and Japan is conscious about this fact.

Again, international peacekeeping provides Japan with an element of independence in its foreign policy making and a possibility of conducting better bilateral relations with certain selected countries and also the U.S., on equal terms. Japan will be more confident in international affairs with more and more of positive peacekeeping activities. Finally, as mentioned earlier Japan's new role is

---

18. Andrew K. Hanami, `The Emerging Military-Industrial Relationship in Japan and the U.S. Connection', Asian Survey, Vol.XXXIII, No.6, June 1993, p.571.

vital and closely linked with its desire to get a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council.

The SDF - Limitations and Capabilities

Japan today has the most modern non-nuclear conventional armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region.[19] Despite this, it suffers from certain limitations.

Firstly, Article 66 of the Constitution by making all ministers civilians, has established civilian control over the SDF. Japan does not have any national emergency and security laws and this inhibits effective planning for national security. Again, conscription is forbidden under Article 18, as it prohibits involuntary servitude and this has caused problems for the GSDF which are chronically in shortage of men. Similarly, security and disciplinary problems are created because of Article 76, which bans military court martial.

Japan's GSDF, consisting, of approximately 1,56,000 personnel and divided into five regional commando, ranks only twentyfifth in the world. The 2% of Japanese popula-

---

19. Richard Bowring and Peter Kornicki, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Japan (Cambridge, 1993), p.323.

tion who join these services have good schooling background but are not necessarily the best students in the country. Realistic and sustained training of the troops is absent due often to the lack of space. Test firing centres are few and long-range rockets are test fired in the U.S. Similarly, MSDF training is done in a limited way only in winter consisting of a few manoeuvres, because of widespread fishing activities in the local sea. The ASDF exercises are conducted far away from the main islands and are restricted by heavy commercial air-traffic. The Japanese F-15s are configured for air-to-air interdiction control over Japan's islands and do not have the capability for the kind of look down air-to-ground attack used by coalition aircrafts in the Gulf War.[20] Finally, the SDF are often used for civilian emergency duties by the political masters, which affects its fighting abilities.

Despite the limitations, the SDF have the most sophisticated weaponry in Asia.[21] The ASDF is the most modern service and has over 440 combat aircrafts mainly F-1S, F-4EJ (anti-ship), F-15J/DJ and F-4EJ. It has sophisticated mis-

---

20. Defence of Japan (Tokyo, 1991).

21. Daily Telegraph (London), 28 Sept. 1990.

siles like Sparrow and Sidewinder. The MSDF has 17 submarines and 64 highly sophisticated surface combat ships. This includes 6 Destroyers, and 58 Frigates, with advanced missiles like Harpoon. The MSDF has an air arm consisting of 99 combat aircrafts and 72 armed helicopters. The GSDF has all the regular weapon systems like Main Battle Tanks, Field Guns, Mortars etc. and also an air-wing comprising 18 aircrafts and 66 armed helicopters.[22] [For detail sof SDF Weaponry, see Annexture].

The SDF is gradually moving towards an increased ability for sustainable defence, monitoring and patrol missions. Japan has acquired the American `Global Positioning System (GPS)' NAVSTAR and is going for stealth technology, anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare and over the horizon radar technology. Special emphasis is being given to a project involving the building of large highspeed landing ships, capable of carrying tanks. Again, in order to improve its naval and air-defence system, Japan is introducing the American Aegis and AWAC system.[23] The new systems would certainly take the SDF to much higher level and could be

---

22. Military Balance 1992-1993 (London).

23. Hanami, n.18, p.598.

used to monitor activities in China and North Korea. Thus, in the mid-1990s the Japanese Self-Defence Forces stand as the most professional armed forces in Asia.[24]

The Constitutional Debate on Article 9

The Japanese Defence Minister, Keisnke Nakanishi resigned on 2 December 1993 after sparking a furore in Parliament by calling for amendments to the Constitution.[25] A Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ad hoc research panel headed by Ichiro Ozawa, a former LDP Secretary-General in a report submitted to the Japanese government in February, 1993 recommended "re-interpretation" of the pacifist principles from "passive to active" and described as "no longer valid" the government's traditional interpretation that Article 9 does not allow the use of force beyond self-defence of national territory.[26] These are not isolated incidents, but reflect the wide debate in Japan regarding the amendment of the `Pacifist Clauses" of the Constitution. The end of the Cold War and the creation of a new international environment

---

24. Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 27 June 1992.

25. Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 3 Dec. 1993.

26. The Japan Times (Tokyo), 4 Feb. 1993.

in which Japan wants to play a leading role, have brought this debate again into the forefront of Japanese politics.

The origin of the debate goes to the days of Yoshida, when an important leader of a LDP faction, Mr. Ichiro Hatoyama (later Prime Miniter) had advocated constitutional amendment.[27] However, in the subsequent years, the Yoshida strategy had such an influence that no effort was made in this direction by successive conservative LDP governments, despite arguing in favour of amendments. Throughout the last five decades, the Japanese Left consistently opposed any proposals for amendments, on the assumption that it would help the rise of militarism and shall drag Japan into another war. Despite some minor short-lived moves, none could develop into a sustained major campaign because every ardent pro-revision advocate failed to justify his or hers cause in the face of the deep-rooted, strong pacifism of Japan.[28] However, in recent times they have softened their earlier stands but are not ready to take any hasty move which would give wrong signals to the neighbours.

---

27. Rajaram Panda, `Controversy Over the Japanese Constitution', Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), April 1993, p.111.

28. The Japan Times (Tokyo), 22 Jan. 1993.

As mentioned earlier, fierce debate took place during the Gulf crisis, and demands were raised to scrap the entire Constitution, as it did not reflect the national ethos. Japan today understands that without a revision of the Constitution it cannot play the international role it so desires. Thus, it would prefer to approach the problem step by step and the Peace-Keeping bill should be seen in this context. In Japan, public opinion is still predominantly in favour of retaining the Pacifist Clauses and thus no consensus has emerged. Seen in this light, not much radical change can be expected in the near future and Japan would keep on manoeuvring under its constitutional restraints.

Strategic and Other Options for Japan

Japan, a country with only 142,726 square miles of landmass, is not only vulnerable geographically but also politically and psychologically. In view of these vulnerabilities, Japan's strategic options are necessarily limited, with its priorities placed on war avoidance, conflict limitation or quick termination. Japan has so far succeeded in the first through a combination of its alliance with the

U.S. and economic diplomacy.[29] The second part has not been put to test. In case of a failure of Japan's economic diplomacy and a possible attack from a belligerent power, apart from seeking help from its allies, Japan has to counter it on its own, at least in the initial stage. This will involve a forward interception capability, a strategic intelligence system and sophisticated sea and air denial weapons systems like guided missiles etc. Japan retains this capability today.

From the angle of overall security strategy, two options are advocated by the two major parties in Japan, the Socialist party and the LDP. Firstly, the Socialists advocate the isolationist line. This would involve abrogating the U.S.-Japan military alliance, scaling down the SDF, seeking peaceful contributions to the settling of international disputes and a new form of international cooperation for regional security, like the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe.[30]

---

29. Robert A. Scalapino, The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley, 1977), p.363.

30. Leaver, n.5, p.173.

The second approach advocated by the LDP see Japan in an active global role. This would again entail coming out of the U.S.-Japan Treaty's narrow confines, to a more independent role in international affairs, through greater participation of its military forces. With this aim in view, the LDP government passed the peacekeeping bill in 1992.

In evolving a long-term security policy, three areas are crucial for Japan. Firstly, the U.S.-Japan relationship, which has crucial importance not only to both the countries but also to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's strategic future depends to a great extent on the future design of this relationship. Beside this, the stability of the Asia-Pacific region through increasing regional cooperation is vital for not only the economy of Japan but also its national security. An area with great disparities in economic development, political ideology and historical animosities, if remains as it is, will be a permanent threat to Japan. Renewed friendship with Russia and solving the northern territories dispute is also of urgent necessity to bring peace in this area.

Finally, while approaching the next century, Japan must decide how to view its responsibilities in a world of growing interdependence and globalised security. The fact that it is an economic superpower means its policies will have a considerable impact on global politics and security, even if it tries to confine itself to economic areas. Thus, Japan's view of its own role would be of increasing importance.[31]

Concluding Remarks

"In the beginning, the heaven and earth were formed from chaos, and in the `Plain of High Heaven' dwelt a multitude of Gods. In the fifth generation of these heavenly deities, a brother and a sister, Izanagi and Izanami, were born. The celestial pair were united in marriage, and in celebration the other Gods gave them a jeweled spear. Standing together on the heavenly floating bridge, they dipped the spear into the ocean below. Sparkling droplets fell from the point of spear, forming an island. Izanagi and Izanami descended from the heavens to dwell on the new

---

31. Mathews, n.2, p.81.

land. Here Izanami gave birth to the islands of Japan."[32] This is the myth behind the creation of Japan.

Taewoo Kim has broadly divded the history of Japanese defence policy into four phases. The first phase he describes as "free ride" phase from 1945 to 1970, during which Japan was completely depended on the U.S. The second is the expansionist phase (1970 to 1990) during which both economic revitalization and defence expansion took place. The next phase he terms as "war liquidation" phase, when Japan breaks away from its postwar obligations through the nullification of Article 9 of the Constitution by the peace-keeping bill.[33] The fourth phase see Japan in a more active global role supported by its economic machine and technology factors. Adverse international situation can force Japan at this stage to go for a nuclear option too.[34]

Japan in the 1990s is no longer the Japan of the 1930s. Democracy has its deep-roots in today's Japan and it will

---

32. William H. Forbis, Japan Today - People, Place and Power (Tokyo, 1981), p.1.

33. Kim Taewoo, `A New Nuclear Policy for Japan: The Korea that Can say `No',' The Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol.XXV, No.2, Summer, 1994, p.212

34. Lawrence Freedman, `Nuclear Strategy and Asia', The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, 5-1 (Summer 1993), p.59.

take many years, if ever at all, for the military to play a substantial role in the nation's polity once again. But in its own sphere, the military will behave and develop in the near future in accordance with both internal and external factors. It is hoped that Japan's modest effort in developing a peaceful and stable world would be supported by its military. A significant naval presence in the North-Pacific area as the century nears its conclusion can be predicted but it does not mean a major Japanese regional force with missions on the Asian continent.[35]

Japan is indeed an unique example of a successful state having military power not commensurate at all with its massive economic strength. To end, it would be appropriate to quote David Williams. "Japan has reached the crowning heights of power. This is a singular achievement. Against enormous odds and the weight of history, Japan has transcended her obvious weaknesses to play the predominant role in a historic transformation: the shift of the centre of economic vitality and initiative from the Atlantic to the Pacific. More than the decolonization of the third world or

---

35. Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, The Defence Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study (Maryland, 1982), p.472.

the great European civil war of 1914 to 1945, this marks the end of the long era of Western domination of world history."[36]

36. David Williams, Japan Beyond the End of History (New York, 1994), p.4.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES:

Defence of Japan (Japan Defence Agency, Tokyo), various issues.

SECONDARY SOURCES:

Books:

Amravati, Mallappa, Japan-U.S. Alliance: A History of its Genesis (New Delhi: Concept Pub., 1985).

Anderson, Masako Ikegami, The Military Industrial Complex: The Cases of Sweden and Japan (England: Dartmouth Pub., 1992).

Aritomo Yamagata, The Rise of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

Aver, James E. The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces (New York: Praeger, 1973).

Axelbank, Albert, Black Star over Japan: Rising Forces of Militarism (New York: Hill and Wang Pub., 1972).

Barnds, William J., Japan and the US: Challenges and Opportunities (New York: N.Y. University Press, 1979).

Barnett, Richard J., The Alliance - America, Europe, Japan: Makers of Postwar World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

Barnett, Robert W., Japan's Concept of Comprehensive National Security (New York: Pergamon Brassey's, 1984).

Bedeski, Robert E., The Fragile Entente - 1978 Japan-China Peace Treaty in the Global Context (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983).

Bergner, Jeffrey T., The New Superpowers: Germany, Japan and the U.S. and the New World Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

Bienen, R., Power, Economics and Security: The U.S. and Japan in Focus (Boulder, Westview Press, 1992).

Borton, Hugh and Others, Japan Between East and West (New York: Harper, 1957).

Bowring, Richard and Kornicki, Peter, eds., The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Buck, James H., ed., The Modern Japanese Military System (California: Sage Pub., 1974).

Burks, Ardath W., Japan - A Post Industrial Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).

Calleo, David P., Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

Chapman, J.W.M.; Drifte, R. and Gow, I.I.M., Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence, Diplomacy and Dependence (London: Frances Pinter Pub., 1983).

Chan, Steve and Mintz Alex, ed., Defence, Welfare and Growth - Perspective and Evidence (New York: Routledge, 1992).

Chawla, Sudarshan and Sardesai, D.R., eds., Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia (New York: Praeger, 1980).

Chinworth, Michael W., Inside Japanese Defence - Technology, Economics and Strategy (New York: Brassey's, 1992).

Clapp, Priscilla and Halperin, Morton, eds., U.S.-Japanese Relations: The 1970s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

Clayton, James D., The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster (1945-1964) (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985).

Clements, Kevin, ed., Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo: U.N. University Press, 1992).

Clough, Ralph N., East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1975).

Cohen, Theodore, Remaking Japan - The American Occupation as New Deal (New York: Macmillan, 1987).

Colegrove, Kenneth W., Militarism in Japan (New York: World Peace Foundation Pub., 1936).

Daniels, Gordon and Drifte, Reinhard, eds., Europe and Japan - Changing Relationships since 1945 (Kent: Paul Norbury Publication, 1986).

Destler, I.M., Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japan Relations (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976).

Duno, Peter, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Miffin Co., 1976).

Ellison, Herbert J., Japan and the Pacific Quadrille - The Major Powers in East Asia (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987).

Emmerson, John K., Arms, Yen and Power - The Japanese Dilemma (New York: Dunellen, 1971).

Emmot, Bill, The Sun Also Sets (London: Simon & Schuster, 1989).

Endicott, John E., Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical and Strategic Factors (New York: Praeger, 1975).

Fei, Herbert, Road to Pearl Harbour - The Coming of the War Between the U.S. and Japan (New York: Atheneun, 1965).

Forbis, William H., Japan Today - People, Place and Power (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1981).

Garten, Jeffrey E., A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany and the Struggle for Supremacy (New York: Time Books, 1992).

Gilbert, S.P., ed., Security in Northeast Asia - Approaching the Pacific Century (Colorado: Westview Press, 1888).

Gregor, James A. and Chang, Maria Hsia, The Iron Triangle: A U.S. Security Policy for Northeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984).

Halliday, Jon and McCormack, Gavan, Japanese Imperialism Today: Coprosperity in Greater Asia (UK: Penguin Books, 1973).

Harkavy, Robert E., Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Hellman, Donald C., ed., China and Japan: A New Balance of Power (Massachussets: Lexington Books, 1976).

Holbraad, C., Middle Powers in International Politics (London: Macmillan, 1984).

Holland, Harrison M., Managing Diplomacy: The U.S. and Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).

_____, Managing Defence: Japan's Dilemma (New York: University Press of America, 1988).

Iriye, A., The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987).

Johnson, U. Alexis, ed., The Common Security Interests of Japan, the U.S. and NATO (Cambridge: Ballinger Pub., 1981).

Kaplan, Morton A., Japan, America and the Future World Order (New York: Free Press, 1976).

Kataoka, Tetsuya and Myers, R.H., Defending an Economic Power: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (Colorado: Westview, 1989).

Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers - Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).

_____, Preparing for the Twentyfirst Century (New York: Random House, 1993).

Kihl, Young Whan and Grinter, Lawrence E., Asian Pacific Security: Emerging Challenges and Responses (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1989).

Kyoko, Inone, MacArthur's Japanese Constitution - A Linguistic and Cultural Study of its Making (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).

Leaver, Richard and Richardson, James L., eds., The Post Cold War Order - Diagnoses and Prognoses (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993).

Linder, Staffan Burrestam, The Pacific Century: Economic and Political Consequences of Asian-Pacific Dynamism (California: Stanford University Press, 1986).

Masahide, Shibusawa, Japan and the Asia Pacific Region - Profile of Change (London: Croom Helm, 1984).

Maswood, S. Javed, Japanese Defence - The Search for Political Power (Institute of South East Asian Studies, Allen & Unwin, 1990).

Mathews, Ron and Matsuyama Keisuke, eds., Japan's Military Renaissance? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

McIntosh, Malcolm, Japan Rearmed (London: Frances Pinter Pub., 1986).

Morris, Ivan, Japan 1931-1945, Miltarism, Fascism and Japanism (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1963).

Murray, Douglas J. and Viotti, Paul R., eds., The Defence Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1982).

Nishihara, Masahi, East Asian Security and Trilateral Countries (New York; New York University Press,1985).

Olsen, Edward A., U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity - A Neo-Internationalist View (California: Stanford University Press, 1985).

Palmer, N.D., The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific (Massachussetts: Lexington Books, 1991).

Scalapino, Robert A., ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

Schaller, Michael, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

Segal, G., Rethinking the Pacific (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

Singh, Radha, Japan's Options for the 1980s (London: Croom Helm, 1982).

Sunoo, Harold Hakwon, Japanese Militarism: Past and Present (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975).

Tsurutani, Teketsuya, Japanese Policy and East Asian Security (New York: Praeger, 1981).

Viswanathan, Savitri, Japan: The New Challenges (Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1982).

Ward, Robert E., and Yoshikazu Sakamoto, eds., Democratising Japan - The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).

Weinstein, Martin E., ed., Northeast Asian Security After Vietnam (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1982).

Weldfield, John, An Empire in the Eclipse (London: Athelone Press, 1988).

Williams, David, Japan Beyond the End of History (New York: Routledge, 1994).

William, Dudley, ed., Japan - Opposing Viewpoints (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1989).

Wolferen, Karel Van, The Enigma of Japanese Power (London: Macmillan, 1989).

Articles

Acharya, Alka, `Japan's Defence Capability in Transition', Asian Strategic Review (New Delhi), 1991-92.

_____, `Japanese Defence in the 1990s', Asian Strategic Review (New Delhi), 1993-94.

Aker, James E., `Japan's Defence Policy', Current History (Philadelphia), Vol.87, no.528, April 1988, pp.180-82.

Baker, J.A., `America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.70, no.5, 1991, pp.1-18.

Bobrow, Davis B. and Hill, Stephen R., `Non-Military Determinants of Military Budgets: The Japanese Case', International Studies Quarterly (Cambridge, Massachussetts), 35:1991, pp.39-62.

Bosworth, S.W., `The U.S. and Asia', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.71, no.1, 1992, pp.113-29.

Brown, Eugene, `Japanese Security Policy in the post-Cold War era: threat perception and strategic options', Asian Survey (Berkeley, California), Vol.XXXIV, no.5, May 1994, pp.430-446.

Bundy, William P., `International Security Today', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Oct. 1974, pp.33-53.

Calder, Kent E., `Japan in 1991 - Uncertain Quest for a Global Role', Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol.XXXII, no.1, Jan. 1992, pp.33-41.

Cha, Dr. Young Koo, `The Changing Security Climate in Northeast Asia', International Defence Review (Surray, England), no.6, 1991.

Chuma, Kiyofuku, `What Price the Defence of Japan?" Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), Vol.34, no.3, July-Sept. 1987, pp.251-258.

Corning, Gregory P., `Japanese Views on Security', Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol.XXIX, no.3, March 1989, pp.272-276.

_____, `U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation in the 1990s - The Promise of Hi-tech Defence', Asian Survey (Berkeley, Callif.), Vol.XXIX, no.3, 1989, pp.268-286.

Cox, R.W., `Middle powermanship, Japan and Future World Order', International Journal (Toronto, Canada), Vol.44, no.4, 1989, pp.58-74.

Farnsworth, Lee W., `Japan in 1980: The Conservative Resurgence', Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol.XXI, no.1, Jan. 1981, pp.71-83.

Freedman, Lawrence, `Nuclear Strategy and Asia', The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis (Seoul), 5-1, Summer 1993, p.59.

Funabashi, Y., `Japan and America: Global Partners', Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.), no.86, Spring 1992, pp.24-39.

_____, `Japan and the New World Order', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.70, no.2, 1991, pp.102-122.

Gaddis, J.L., `Towards the Post Cold War World', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.70, no.2, 1991, pp.102-122

Garten, Jeffrey E., `Japan and Germany: American Concern", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.68, no.5, Winter 1989-90, pp.84-101.

Hanami, Andrew K., `The Emerging Military-Industrial Relationship in Japan and the U.S. Connection'. Asian Survey (Berkeley, California), Vol.XXXIII, no.6, June 1993, pp.592-609.

Haruhiro, Fukui, `Japan in 1988: At the End of an Era', Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol.XXIX, no.1,Jan. 1989, pp.1-11.

Hoffman, S., `A New World and its Troubles', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.69, no.4, 1990, pp.115-122.

Holbrooke, R., `Japan and the U.S.: Ending the Unequal Partnership', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.70, no.5, Winter 1991-92, pp.41-57.

Hook, Glem D., `The Erosion of Anti-Militaristic Principles in Contemporary Japan', Journal of Peace Research (Sage, London), Vol.25, no.4, 1988, pp.381-94.

Ikle, Fred and Nakanishi Terumasa, `Japan's Grand Strategy', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.69, no.3, Summer 1990, pp.81-95.

Johnstone, Bob, `Spending Up in the Land of the Rising Sun', Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong), Oct. 13, 1988, pp.62-66.

Katzenstein, P.J. and Okawara, N., `Japan's Security Policy: Political, Economic and Military Dimensions', International Spectator (Rome, Italy), Vol.26, no.3, 1991, pp.103-18.

Klare, Michael T., `Militarism: The Issues Today', Bulletin of Peace Proposals (London), Vol.9, no.2, 1978, pp.121-8.

Kohno, Masaru, `Japanese Defence Policy Making: The FS-X Selection (1985-1987)", Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol.XXIX, no.5, May 1989, pp.457-79.

Lincoln, E.J., `Japan in the 1990s: A New Kind of World Power', The Brookings Review (Washington D.C.), Vol.10, no.2, 1992, pp.12-17.

Maull, H.W., `Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Power', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.69, no.5, 1990, pp.91-106.

Panda, Rajaram, `Controversy over the Japanese Constitution', Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), April 1993, pp.105-35.

Polanka, P., `Towards a Pacific House', Survival (London), Vol.XXXIII, March/April 1991, pp.173-174.

Purrington Courtney and A.K., `Japanese Crisis Management During the Gulf Crisis', Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol.XXXI, no.4, April 1991, pp.307-23.

Rosecrance, R., `A New Concert of Powers', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.71, no.2, 1992, pp.64-82.

Sakanaka, Tomohisa, `Military Threats and Japan's Defence Capability7', Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol.XX, no.7, July 1980, pp.763-775.

Sammuels, R.J., `Reinventing Security: Japan Since Meiji', Daedalus (Cambridge, Massachussetts), Vol.120, no.4, 1991, pp.47-68.

Sasae, Keinichiro, `Rethinking Japan-US Relations', Adelphi Papers (London), no.292, Dec. 1994, pp.3-61.

Sato, Hideo, `Japan's Role in the Post Cold War World', Current History (Philadelphia), Vol.90, no.555, April 1991, pp.145-148.

Satoh, Yukio, `The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy', Adelphi Papers (London), no.178, 1982, pp.75-90.

Schmiegelow, M. and Schmiegelow, H., `How Japan Affects the International System', International Organisation (New York, N.Y.), Vol.44, no.4, 1980, pp.553-88.

Segal, Gerald, `Northeast Asia: New Order or a La Carte Security', International Affairs (London), Autumn, 1992, pp.755-767.

Taewoo, Kim, `A New Nuclear Policy for Japan: The Korea that can say No', The Korean Journal of International Studies (Seoul), Vol.XXV, no.2, Summer 1994, pp.195-222.

Takashi, Inoguchi, `Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytical Overview', Journal of Japanese Studies (Seattle, Washington D.C.), Vol.17, no.2, Summer 1991, pp.251-273.

Talbott, S., `Post-Victory Blues', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.71, no.1, 1992, pp.53-69.

Tamamoto, M., `The Japan that Can Say Yes: Groping for a World Role', World Policy Journal (New York, N.Y., Vol.7, no.3, 1990, pp.493-520.

Tarnoff, Peter, `America's New Special Relationships', Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.69, no.3, Summer 1990, pp.67-80.

Toshihiro, Yamauchi, `Gunning for Japan's Peace Constitution', Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), April-June 1992, pp.159-67.

Other Journals:

Asian Security, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, Brassey's U.K. (various issues from 1985-1994).

SIPRI Yearbook, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, London: Taylor and Francis (various issues from 1980-1994).

Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (various issues).

Newspapers:

Asahi Shinbun (Tokyo).
Bangkok Post (Bangkok).
Daily Telegraph (London).
Hindustan Times (New Delhi).
International Herald Tribune (Paris).
Statesman (Calcutta).
The Telegraph (Calcutta).
The Japan Times (Tokyo).
Times of India (New Delhi).
Tribune (Chandigarh).
Yomuiri Shinbum (Tokyo).

第２章　戦争の放棄

第９条　日本国民は、正義と秩序を基調とする国際平和を誠実に希求し、国権の発動たる戦争と、武力による威嚇又は武力の行使は、国際紛争を解決する手段としては、永久にこれを放棄する。

前項の目的を達するため、陸海空軍その他の戦力は、これを保持しない。国の交戦権は、これを認めない。

CHAPTER II. *Renunciation of War*

ARTICLE 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

SOURCE: INONE KYOKO, MACARTHUR'S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING (CHICAGO: THE UNIV OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1992)

Reference 38. Organizations of Self-Defense Forces

1. Organization of Ground Self-Defense Force

(As of July 1, 1991)



SOURCE : DEFENCE OF JAPAN (TOKYO, 1991)

2. Organization of Maritime Self-Defense Force

(As of July 1, 1991)



SOURCE: DEFENCE OF JAPAN (TOKYO, 1991)

3. Organization of Air Self-Defense Force

(As of July 1, 1991)



SOURCE: DEFENCE OF JAPAN (TOKYO, 1991)

Reference 37. Outline of Organization of Defense Agency and SDF

(As of July 1, 1991)



SOURCE: DEFENCE OF JAPAN (TOKYO, 1991)

Diagram 25 Outline of Deployment of U.S. Forces Japan

(1) Mainland (As of March 31, 1981)



(2) Okinawa



SOURCE: DEFENCE OF JAPAN (TOKYO, 1981)

Population: 124,834,000

	13–17	*18–22*	*23–32*
Men	4,414,000	4,808,000	8,778,000
Women	4,192,000	4,572,000	8,448,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

ACTIVE: 237,700, incl 160 Central Staffs (reducing), 8,000 women.
RESERVES: Army 44,600; Navy 1,100; Air 800.

ARMY: (Ground Self-Defense Force): 149,900 (incl 5,200 women).

5 Army HQ (Regional Commands).
1 armd div.
12 inf div (5 at 7,000, 7 at 9,000 each).
2 composite bde.
1 AB bde.
1 arty bde; 2 arty gp.
2 AD bde; 3 AD gp.
4 trg bde; 2 trg regt.
5 engr bde.
1 hel bde.
2 ATK hel pl, 1 more forming.

EQUIPMENT:
MBT: 1,200: some 271 Type-61 (retiring), some 873 Type-74, 56 Type-90.
RECCE: 75 Type-87.
AIFV: some 26 Type-89
APC: 300 Type-60, 300 Type-73, some 186 Type-82.
TOWED ARTY: 590: 105mm: 290 M-101; 155mm: 260 FH-70; 203mm: 40 M-115.
SP ARTY: 302: 105mm: 20 Type-74; 155mm: 200 Type-75; 203mm: 82 M-110A2.
MRL: 130mm: some 120 Type-75 SP.
MORTARS: 1,900 incl 81mm: 820 (some SP); 107mm: 560 (some SP).
SSM: 50 Type-30, 24 Type-88 coastal.
ATGW: 170 Type-64, 133 Type-79, 102 Type-87.
RL: 89mm: 70 3.5-in M-20.
RCL: 3,370: 75mm; 84mm: *Carl Gustav*; 106mm (incl Type 60 SP).
AD GUNS: 140: 35mm: 70 twin; 37mm SP; 40mm SP.
SAM: 180 *Stinger*, some 90 Type 81, 200 *Improved HAWK*.
AIRCRAFT: 18: 16 LR-1, 2 TL-1 (trg).
HELICOPTERS:
ATTACK: 72 AH-1S;
TRANSPORT: 3 AS-332L (VIP), 28 CH-47J, 72 KV-107, 180 OH-6D/J, 131 UH-1B/H, 33 TH-55 (trg).

NAVY: (Maritime Self-Defense Force): 43,100 (incl c12,000 MSDF air).

BASES: Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, Ominato.
Fleet: Surface units org into 4 escort flotillas, of 6–8 DD/FF each; based at Yokosuka (2), Sasebo and Maizuru. Submarines org into 2 flotillas based at Kure and Yokosuka. Remainder assigned to 10 regional/district units.
SUBMARINES: 17:
TACTICAL SUBMARINES: 15:
4 *Harushio* with 533mm TT (Jap Type-89 HWT) with *Harpoon* USGW.
1 *Uzushio* with 533mm 77 (Mk 37 HWT).
10 *Yuushio* with 533mm TT (US Mk 37, GRX-2 HWT), 7 with *Harpoon* USGW.
OTHER ROLES: 2: 1 *Uzushio* (trg).
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 62:
DESTROYERS: 7 DDG:
1 *Kongo* with 2 x VLS Mk 41 SM-2-MR, *Standard* SAM and *ASROC* SUGW; plus 2 x 4 *Harpoon* SSM, 2 x 3 ASTT and hel deck.
2 *Hatakaze* with 1 x SM-1-MR Mk 13 SAM; plus 2 x 4 *Harpoon* SSM, 1 x 8 *ASROC* SUGW (Mk 46 LWT) 2 x 3 ASTT, 2 x 127mm guns.
3 *Tachikaze* with 1 x SM-1-MR; plus 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT, 8 x *Harpoon*, 2 x 127mm guns.
1 *Amatsukaze* with 1 x SM-1-MR; plus 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT.
FRIGATES: 55: (incl 2 trg):
FFH: 24:
2 *Shirane* with 3 x SH-60J *Sea Hawk* ASW hel, 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT; plus 2 x 127mm guns.
2 *Haruna* with 3 x *Sea King* hel, 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT; plus 2 x 127mm guns.
8 *Asagiri* with 1 *Sea King* hel, 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT; plus 2 x 4 *Harpoon* SSM.
12 *Hatsuyuki* with 1 *Sea King*, 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT; plus 2 x 4 *Harpoon* SSM.
FF: 31:
6 *Abukuma* with 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT; plus 2 x 4 *Harpoon* SSM.
2 *Takatsuki* with 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x 4 ASW RL; plus 2 with 2 x 4 *Harpoon* SSM, 1 x 127mm gun; 2 with 2 x 127mm guns.
4 *Yamagumo* with 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x 4 ASW RL.
3 *Minegumo* with 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x 4 ASW RL.
2 *Yubari* with 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x 4 ASW RL; plus 2 x 4 *Harpoon* SSM
1 *Ishikari* with 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x 4 ASW RL; plus 2 x 4 *Harpoon* SSM.
11 *Chikugo* with 1 x 8 *ASROC*, 2 x 3 ASTT.
1 *Isuzu* (trg) with 1 x 4 ASW RL; plus 4 x 2 76mm gun.
1 *Katori* (trg) with 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x ASW RL.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 8:
MISSILE CRAFT: 2
2 lt *Sparviero* type PHM with 4 *Mitsubishi* SSM-1B.
TORPEDO CRAFT: 1 *Juichi-go* PFT with 4 x 533mm TT.
PATROL: 5 *Jukyu-go* PCI(.
MINE WARFARE: 38:
MINELAYERS: 1:
1 *Souya* (460 mines) plus hel deck, 2 x 3 ASTT, also MCM spt/comd.
MINE COUNTERMEASURES: 37:
1 *Hayase* MCM cmd with hel deck, 2 x 3 ASTT, plus minelaying capacity (116 mines).

SOURCE: MILITARY BALANCE '1993-1994'

26 *Hatsushima* MCC.
2 *Yaeyama* MSO
3 *Takami* MCC.
4 *Nana-go* MSI(.
1 *Fukue* coastal MCM spt.
AMPHIBIOUS: 6:
3 *Miura* LST, capacity 200 tps, 10 tk.
3 *Atsumi* LST, capacity 130 tps, 5 tk.
Plus craft: 4 LCT, 15 LCM, 21 LCVP.
SUPPORT AND MISCELLANEOUS: 20:
3 *Towada* AOE, 1 *Sagami* AOE (all with hel deck);
2 sub depot/rescue, 2 *Akizuki* and 2 *Yamagumo* trg, 2 trg spt, 7 survey/experimental, 1 icebreaker.

MSDF AIR ARM: (12,000);
93 cbt a (plus 15 in store), 75 armed hel.
7 Air Groups.
MR: 10 sqn:
9 (1 trg) with 87 P-3C (plus 15 in store);
1 with 6 P-2J.
ASW: 6 hel sqn (1 trg) with 75 HSS-2B, plus 24 in store.
MCM: 1hel sqn with 10 MH-53E.
EW: 1 sqn with 2 EP-3C.
TRANSPORT: 1 sqn with 4 YS-11M.
TEST: 1 sqn with 3 P-3C ac;
2 HSS-2B, 2 SH-60J hel.
SAR: 1 sqn with 7 US-1A.
3 rescue sqn with 10 S-61 hel, 3UH-60J.
TRAINING:6 sqn with 13 KM-2, 10* P-3C, 24 T-5, 23 TC-90/UC-90, 10 YS-11T ac; 10 HSS-2B, 12 OH-6D/J hel.

AIR FORCE: (Air Self-Defense Force): 44,700;
438 cbt ac (plus 54 in store), no armed hel.
7 cbt air wings; 1 cbt air unit; 1 recce gp; 1 AEW unit.
FGA: 4 sqn.
3 with 73 F-1.
1 with 21 F-4EJ (anti-ship).
FIGHTER: 10 sqn:
7 with 158 F-15J/DJ.
3 with 72 F-4EJ (being upgraded); 50 more in store.
RECCE: 1 sqn with 10 RF-4EJ. 4 more in store.
AEW: 1 sqn with 12 E-2C.
EW: 1 flt with 1 C-1, 4 YS-11.
AGGRESSOR TRAINING: 1 sqn with 20 T-2, 2 T-33.
TRANSPORT: 5 sqn:
3 with 30 C-1, 15 C-130H, 10 YS-11;
2 heavy-lift hel sqn with 20 CH-47J.
Plus 2 747-400 (VIP).
SAR: 1 wing (10 det) with 30 MU-2 ac; 22 KV-107, 6 CH-47J hel, 1 UH-60J. (UH-60J hel, being delivered.)
CALIBRATION: 1 wing with 2 MU-2J, 1 YS-11, 3 U-125-800.
TRAINING: 5 wings: 10 sqn: 40* T-1A/B, 64* T-2, 40 T-3, 64 T-4, 10 T-33A (to be replaced by T-4).
LIAISON: 11 *Queen Air* 65, 126 T-33.
TEST: 1 wing with C-1, 3 F-4EJ, F-15J.
MISSILES:
ASM: ASM-1.
AAM: AAM-1, AIM-7 *Sparrow*, AIM-9 *Sidewinder*.
AIR DEFENCE:
Ac control and warning: 4 wings; 30 radar sites.
SAM: 6 AD msl gp (18 sqn) with 180 *Nike-J* (*Patriot* replacing).
Air Base Defense Gp with 20mm *Vulcan* AA guns, Type 81 *Tan*, *Stinger* SAM.

FORCES ABROAD:

UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
CAMBODIA (UNTAC): 602 (engrs), plus 8 Observers, 66 civ pol.
MOZAMBIQUE (ONUMOZ): 53 (movement control).

PARAMILITARY:

MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY: (Coast Guard) (Ministry of Transport, no cbt role) 12,000:
PATROL VESSELS: Some 335:
OFFSHORE: (over 1,000 tons): 48, incl 1 *Shikishima* with 2 *Super Puma* hel, 2 *Mizuho* with 2 Bell 212, 8 *Soya* with 1 Bell 212 hel and 2 *Izu* and 28 *Shiretoko*.
COASTAL: (under 1,000 tons): 36.
INSHORE: about 250 patrol craft most(
MISCELLANEOUS: about 90 service, 80 tender/trg vessels;
AIRCRAFT: 5 NAMC YS-11A, 2 Short *Skyvan*, 16 *King Air*, 1 Cessna U-206G.
HELICOPTERS: 32 Bell 212, 4 Bell 206, 2 Hughes 369.

FOREIGN FORCES:

US: 43,100 Army (1,900): 1 Corps HQ; Navy (7,300) bases at Yokosuka (HQ 7th Fleet) and Sasebo; Marines (18,300): 1 MEF in Okinawa; Air (15,600): 1 Air HQ, 78 cbt ac.

KOREA: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (NORTH)

GNP	1991ε: won 49.2bn ($22.90bn)	
	1992ε: won 45.9bn ($21.10bn)	
Growth	1991ε: -5.2%	1992ε: -6.7%
Inflation	1991ε: 2%	1992ε: 3%
Debt	1991: $9.28bn	1992: $9.72bn
Def exp	1992: won 11.80bn ($5.54bn)	
Def bdgt	1992: won 4.48bn ($2.06bn)	
	1993ε: won 4.70bn ($2.19bn)	
$1 = won	1989: 2.23	1990: 2.14
	1991: 2.15	1992: 2.13

Population: 22,728,000

	13-17	*18-22*	*23-32*
Men	1,057,000	1,265,000	2,408,000
Women	1,035,000	1,242,000	2,374,000

SOURCE: MILITARY BALANCE '1993-1994'

No.	Town	Number of dead	Damaged or destroyed buildings	No.	Town	Number of dead	Damaged or destroyed buildings
1.	Tōkyō	95,996	755,735	16.	Hiroshima	118,661	67,860
2.	Yokohama	4,616	100,091	17.	Kure	1,939	23,589
3.	Kawasaki	768	38,514	18.	Matsuyama	251	14,300
4.	Shimizu	337	7,659	19.	Kōchi	434	12,237
5.	Numazu	318	27,444	20.	Uwajima	278	7,252
6.	Shizuoka	1,873	26,722	21.	Ube	254	6,233
7.	Shimoda	76	38	22.	Shimonoseki	324	10,168
8.	Hamamatsu	3,549	34,000	23.	Kita-Kyūshū	2,251	33,832
9.	Toyohashi	655	16,886	24.	Fukuoka	1,009	15,730
10.	Nagoya	8,625	141,951	25.	Ōita	116	2,486
11.	Ise	102	4,518	26.	Nagasaki	74,231	37,339
12.	Kōbe	8,841	154,564	27.	Nobeoka	292	3,765
13.	Ōsaka	12,620	343,613	28.	Miyazaki	132	2,397
14.	Wakayama	1,212	27,853	29.	Kagoshima	3,329	21,961
15.	Tokushima	1,451	16,300				



SOURCE: RICHARD BOWRING AND PETER KORNICKI, eds., THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF JAPAN (CAMBRIDGE: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS: 1993)

Reference 10. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and U.S. (Excerpts)

June 23, 1960 Treaty No. 6

Japan and the United States of America,

Desiring to srengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

SOURCE: DEFENCE OF JAPAN (TOKYO, 1991)

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

SOURCE : DEFENCE OF JAPAN
(TOKYO, 1991)

Chart 2: Japan: The Security of Its Sea Routes



Source: Gérard Chaliard and Jean-Pierre Rageau, ***A Strategic Atlas: Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers***, second edition, revised and updated (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 154. Copyright © 1983 by Librairie Arthème Fayard. English translation copyright © 1985 by Gérard Chaliard and Jean-Pierre Rageau. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

Chart 3: Japan's Industrial Areas and Key Imports (early 1980s)



Source: Gérard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, *A Strategic Atlas: Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers*, second edition, revised and updated (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 155. Copyright © 1983 by Librairie Arthème Fayard. English translation copyright © 1985 by Gérard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

Table 1
Changes in Japan's Defense Expenditures
1955–1986

Changes in Defense Expenditures (Original Budget)

(Unit: ¥100 million, %)

Item / FY	GNP (initial forecast) (A)	General Account (original) (B)	Growth from Previous Year	Defense Budget (original) (C)	Growth from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense Budget to GNP (C/A)	Ratio of Defense Budget to General Account (C/B)
1955	75,590	9,915	-0.8	1,349	-3.3	1.78	13.61
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23
1980	2,478,000	425,888	10.3	22,302	6.5	0.90	5.24
1982	2,772,000	496,808	6.2	25,861	7.8	0.93	5.21
1983	2,817,000	503,796	1.4	27,542	6.5	0.98	5.47
1984	2,960,000	506,272	0.5	29,348	6.55	0.99	5.8
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98
1986	3,367,000	540,886	3.0	33,435	6.58	0.993	6.18

Source: Defense of Japan, 1986. Japan Defense Agency

Table 2
Outline of Defense Expenses

Outline of Defense Expenses

Classification	FY 1986	FY 1985
Defense expenses	¥3,343.5 billion	¥3,137.1 billion
% growth from previous year	6.58%	6.9 %
Ratio to GNP	0.993%	0.997%
Ratio to general-account budget	6.18 %	5.98 %
Contract authorization and continuing expenditure	¥1,343.3 billion	¥1,254.9 billion
Future obligation (New)	¥2,418.3 billion (¥1,321.4 billion)	¥2,305.8 billion (¥1,232.8 billion)

Source: Defense of Japan, 1986. Japan Defense Agency

Money for the Military



. . . It is Still Far Behind Other Countries

Military spending as a percentage of gross domestic product. Figures for 1986.



*Includes military spending costs, which Japan separates from other military spending

Sources: Japanese Management and Coordination Agency; International Institute for Strategic Studies