

**ASPECTS OF THE MAGHREBI MIGRATION TO  
FRANCE, SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

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
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**CERTIFICATE**

Certified that the dissertation entitled "*Aspects of the Maghrebi Migration to France Since the Second World War*", submitted by **Manisha Rekhi** is in partial fulfilment of requirement for the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University and her own work.

We recommended with this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
**PROF. GULSHAN DIETEL**  
Chairperson

  
**DR. P.C. JAIN**  
Supervisor

*Dedicated to my  
Daddy and Ma*

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# **Chapter-1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

# CHAPTER I

## Introduction

In its most general sense 'migration is defined as the relative displacement of persons over a significant distance. A person who goes to another country and remains there for the rest of his life, is termed as a migrant. The same does not apply to anyone who stays in a country for a fixed duration. What should be the minimum duration of stay that differentiates migration from a visit? With respect to international migration the recommendation of the United Nations defines the displacement of a person for one year or more as "permanent", and thus as migration. A stay for a shorter period is classified as a visit.

The meaning of migration also varies according to how a "significant" distance is defined. The word 'migration' derives from the Latin word '*migrare*', i.e. to change one's residence; but by current definition it means to change one's community. If we regard a nation as a community then by this criterion, all international movements are included under the rubric of "migration". It has to be noted that the most important characteristic of migrants is whether or not they cross an international border. In practice, geographical distance is generally taken as the round measure of whether the migrant crosses into another country.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> David, L. Sills, "International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences", (New York, London: Macmillan Co. and the Free Press) 1971, p.261.



In most of the general models for analysing migration, it is presumed that the movement is generated mainly by economic forces. This may not always be the case. The correlation between economic compulsions and migratory movements may or may not be directly proportional. The rise of industrialism and the onset of the urbane culture increased the aspirations of the masses. The urge for upward social mobility soon spread to the impoverished areas. The youth of these regions though it viable to go oversees so as to improve their life style. Therefore, it can be said that for a certain period the primary motivation of the emigrants, especially the underdeveloped/developing countries, was predominantly economic. Coupled with this economic factors are religious operations, and also the infringement of political liberty. This was often cited motive for European immigration.

Thus, International migration, in the strict sense, can be defined as "the permanent movement of people, from one sovereign country to another. A comprehensive view of international migration must, therefore, include forced as well as free movement, and temporary as well as permanent movement".<sup>2</sup>

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

The social history of industrialization is the history of labour migration: concentration of capital requires movement of labour. Temporary labour recruitment and contract labour have been significant for centuries, throughout the capitalist world. Nineteenth century industrialization in Europe led to large scale

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p.268.

migration, both internal rural-urban and international. Most were unorganized, but Germany, France and Switzerland did develop systems of temporary recruitment between 1870 and 1914, making considerable efforts to prevent workers from settling.<sup>3</sup>

The mass destruction of the Account of World War pushed Europe into a morras wherein large scale rebuilding and restructuring was imperative. The Marshall plan for reconstructing Europe organised mass recuritment of foreign workers for the European Recovery programme. Labour migration was seen as a solution to postwar labour shortages. It was expected to be mainly of a temporary character. However, in view of low birth-rates, a certain amount of family-settlement was envisaged. In the case of France there was continuous migration of workers from 1945 to 1974. Official Nationale'd Immigration (ONI) was responsible for the migrants from European countries. Citizens of French colonies and former French colonies were allowed free entry until the late sixties. By 1970, there were over 600,000 Algerians, 140,000 Morroccans and 90,000 Tunisians in France.<sup>4</sup>

Migrant workers have played an important role in the rapid infrastructural build up and the subsequent economic growth of the industrialised countries during the post war period. Western Europe has experienced large influx of migrants from

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<sup>3</sup> Stephen Castles, "The Guest Workers in Western Europe - An Obituary", International Migration Review, vol.20, No.4, p.761.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p.763.

underdeveloped countries seeking employment. This influx was partly due to the labour shortage and receding demographic trends. This forced the European firms to import cheap, lowskilled and relatively powerless labour. The mid 1970's, industrial restructuring and transition to more specialised, flexible production has accompanied a recomposition of the work-force whereby fewer and generally skilled workers are employed in more automated factories. Consequently migrant workers have become more vulnerable to unemployment.

Migrant labour in the French industry have acted as a reserve labour force to be hired and fired according to the requirement of the employers. The French government's immigration policy has largely complied with the industry's changing need's for migrant labourers. Initially, the government allowed the recruitment and entry of migrant labourers without imposing official barriers. However, in the mid 1970's, the government's position shifted as it facilitated the firing and repartition of migrant workers partly due to industry's claim of overstaffing and economic recession.<sup>5</sup>

Geographically, Maghreb is made up of Algeria, Tunisia and Morrocco. It represents an important part of the Arab World. The three countries share a similar historical process starting from the Roman colonization to the achievement of political independence. They therefore share their colonial history, geographic conditions to a big extent even culture, language and religion. These include a very

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<sup>5</sup> A, Oberhauser, "International Mobility of Labor: North African Migrants in France", Professional Geographer, Vol.43, No.4, 1991, p.431.

young population, and rapid rural population growth and a heavy wave of European immigration followed by an equal massive wave of Maghrebi immigration into Europe. In fact, immigration to the Maghreb was so heavy from the end of the 19th century through to the early years of the 20th century that on the eve of their independence Europeans represented about 11% of the population of Algeria, 7% of the population of Tunisia and 4.5% of the population of Morocco. After independence, Algeria lost in a single year around one million Europeans. Similarly Morocco lost 3,500,000 Europeans and Tunisia lost 2,50,000 Europeans over a twelve year period. This large scale displacement of the Europeans was due to political reasons.<sup>6</sup>

As mentioned earlier, it was during the colonial period that the tradition of labour migration to France was firmly established. The initial wave of migration was largely temporary as the number of departures was matched by the number of returns. The post-colonial period saw the emergence of a vivid imbalance in this to and fro process of displacement. The departures decreased and the arrivals, back from Europe, increased.

The first wave of Maghrebi emigrants that was noticeable was during the time of the World War I. It was a relatively marginal phenomenon: it consisted of a number of traders who travelled to seek their fortunes in the expansive markets

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<sup>6</sup> UN Economic Commission for Western Asia: International Migration in the Arab World: Proceedings of an ECWA Population Conference, Cyprus 11-16 May, Vol.1 (Beirut), 1982, p.143.

of France. In 1914 the exodus of the "convoyeurs" as they were called in "Kabylia" began. These were labourers recruited for military work.<sup>7</sup>

To study this first wave of Maghrebi migration is interesting from several standpoints. In the first place, it showed none of the manifestations of that demographic pressure which characterized the years that preceded the Second World War and which increased markedly afterwards. By the end of the First war North Africa had furnished France with over 175,000 soldiers and more than 150,000 workers.

This represented a more or less forced migration of about 325,000 Maghrebis, most of whom were Algerians. Though the sources do not agree on the exact figures, the important fact is that it was considerable and that it indicated the magnitude of the phenomenon that was launched by the government dictate of that time. This has continued to the present day, through with periodic fluctuations, in the same massive proportions.

With the return of peace in 1918, all but several thousand soldiers and workers returned to the Maghreb and emigrated again between 1920-1924.<sup>8</sup>

The Second World War brought the flow of migrants to a complete halt and even induced many Maghrebis to return home. Consequently, over two third of these immigrants returned to their home countries. This enhanced the

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p.146.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p.148.

unemployment problem in those countries. The great wave of the post World War I migration to France began in late 1946. This year saw most of the travelling restrictions being lifted.

The migrant workers have played very important role in the the rapid economic growth of industrialized countries in the post war period. The competition for manpower among the industrialized countries in the 1960's saw immigrants beginning to branch out. A small number of Maghrebi immigrants headed for Germany, the Benelux countries, Switzerland and Scandinavia. The Maghrebi population residing in Western Europe now represent about a million & a half people, 90% of whom are established in France.

The first objective of this research will be to analyze the different patterns of migration. The pattering is significant in that this long period has seen different political and economic developments both in the host country as well as in the sending country. It affected the nature of migration including the job profiles of the workers, age structure, sex composition and flow migrants. Among the new immigrants who entered France in 1946, one out of fifteen entered the country with a work contract. By 1973 Maghrebis who were French residents represented 57% of the total Maghrebis in France. Passport carrying tourists and other travellers represented about 20% and women and children about 13%. By 1975 the increase in the population in France was probably due to the substantial migration of maghrebi families who came to France to join the breadwinners who had migrated

before them. Before the 1963 bilateral manpower agreement, Maghrebi immigrants were mainly of rural origin, young, illiterate and unskilled. After 1965, the immigration of family groups became more frequent. They were better educated and trained. Almost two-thirds of these immigrants were from urban areas. Thus, we see a change in the composition of immigrant Maghrebis. This marked a great change in the pattern of migration from the migrations in the earlier period. There has been a great increase in the number of skilled urban migrants.<sup>9</sup>

The change in the composition of migrants greatly effected the social as well as the economic and political status of the immigrants. Immigration often involves young males. This changes the demography of both the sending as well as the host country. Within the labour importing countries, the migrants have a maintenance cost that is much lower than that of the domestic labour. They live in ghettos which are overcrowded areas with sub-standard housing. Also, they have no access or little access to unemployment insurance, worker's disability and medical care. This to a sense of great insecurity.

The other important aspect to be highlighted is the comparatively low cost of social reproduction among Maghrebi migrants in France. It is related to their wage structure, the working conditions and the vulnerable position in the labour force. They are usually employed in the secondary sector of the dual labour market where jobs tend to be unskilled and generally, but not always, low paying. It

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.159.

connotes their inferior social status.

Another important aspect to be focused along with the secondary social status attached to Maghrebi migrant labourers is the partisan treatment by employers. It illustrates a racial and national prejudice. This is evident in a closer examination of their economic activities. They face a lack of job security due to cyclical and seasonal fluctuations and they also experience a discriminatory social relationship in the workplace.<sup>10</sup>

The shifts in the employment and government policy toward the migrant labour in France occurred in three phases. First, the foreign workers were recruited *en masse* during the 1950's and 1960's to work in the rapidly expanding industries. The second phase occurred during the 1970's when the economic crisis disrupted production in the French industry. Firms began to reduce their work force, laying off migrant workers in large numbers. The 1980's marked a third phase, when industrial restructuring accompanied a changing composition of the labour force. Social strife became more prevalent as a result of their worsening economic situation and this was accompanied by increased racism from certain political elements in France.<sup>11</sup>

A recent phenomenon that has appeared on the scene is the settlement of Maghrebi immigrant community. This has raised issue of ethnic aspirations and

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<sup>10</sup> A, Oberhauser, "The International Mobility of Labor: North African Migrants Works in France", Professional Geographer, Vol.43, No.4, 1991, p.432.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.431.



politics. Since the early 1980s, the youth of Maghrebi origin have proclaimed their right to difference. They are demanding the acknowledgement of their cultural, ethnic and religious differences.

Infact, it was due to the demographic in equilibrium that France accepted the Maghrebi immigrants. But by 1974 the demographic argument lost its cogency with the emergence of ghettos and the growing difficulty experienced by natives in mixing with foreigners (Arabs particularly). France also joined the bandwagon of anti-immigrant hostility when it passed through the period of unemployment resulting from the extended economic recession. Consequently, France reversed it's traditional immigrant policy. It suspended new immigration, induced immigrants to return home through a variety of administrative measures. This enhanced the unemployment problem of the Maghreb region which lacks in resources, agricultural setup and technology. Different rules were made by the French government to restrict immigration. This rendered a number of Maghrebi immigrants jobless and insecurity spread rapidly.

In the Maghreb region, once the men of the family leave the country to seek jobs abroad, the burden of the family is shifted to the women. These women, stifled in the backward and conservative regions of Maghreb, are not used to working outside the four walls of their house; the main obstacle being illiteracy and ignorance. On the other hand the families who migrate abroad pass through the cultural shock and take a long time to adapt themselves to the alien environment.

They generally remain alienated and therefore their acceptance in that foreign society becomes very difficult. It also effects the mental development of the children who cannot adapt easily to the new environment. In the former case they lack emotional and mental support of the male parent. In both cases their socialization capacity is hugely setback.

However, immigration was an undeniable advantage to their manpower exporting countries. It reduced their level of unemployment; the substantial remittances transferred here by immigrant workers helped to improve the balance of payment position of the exporter countries; it caused the skill of immigrant workers to improve steadily. On the other hand, when the flow of Migrants reversed, the former Manpower exporting countries found themselves saddled with a number of problems.

The shift in migratory flows from within Europe to under developed peripheral before the Second World War countries and the reverse trend following the Second World War can partly be explained by the changing levels of economic development. Within the regions, in general, migrant labour tends to move from low-income, mostly rural areas with high unemployment to industrial, urban areas with labour shortages with the rise of the European countries industrialied, employment levels fewer people chose to emigrate. Increased employment opportunities in these countries shifted the source of migrant labour to

underdeveloped regions such as the Maghreb in North Africa.<sup>12</sup>

In short, North African labour migration to France demonstrates that despite some gains to these less developed countries, such as employment for certain sectors of their population and income from remittances, the international mobility of their labour only enhanced the development inequalities between the labour-exporting and labour-importing countries. (Here, the Maghrebi and France) The complex social and economic situation of migrant workers as a secondary labour force in an industrialized country was a manifestation of this imbalance. During the post war period of capital expansion, crisis, and restructuring they were subject to poorer working conditions, inferior occupational status, and lower wages. Maghrebins, who make up nearly 40% of the approximately three million foreigners in France today are a dynamic and growing population. Their story represents some of the processes behind the growing social and economic inequalities between advanced industrialized and less developed countries.<sup>13</sup>

### **SURVEY OF LITERATURE**

Maghrebi migration to France started during the colonial period when the tradition of worker migration to France established firmly. That wave of migration was temporary in nature. But the root cause of this migration lies in the colonial history of this region which led to the strong ties of this region with France. In this

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p.433.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p.443.

period Maghrebi workers were mostly employed in the unskilled sector due to prevalent illiteracy. The primary sources which mainly deal with historical colonial background of this region are records (UN Economic commission for Western Asia, 1982) and books (Bohnen 1984, Berger 1975, Coale 1976, Krussel 1976, Nicholas 1980, Akerman 1976, Kindelberg 1967, Odgen 1989, Power 1979, Williamson 1994).

The migration during the post-war period and the general causes for this migration are dealt briefly in the following books Berk 1974, Bohning 1984, Hammar 1985, Power 1979, Kissel 1976, Nicholas 1980, Spengler 1979. The policy changes in France after 1970 have had a severe impact on the number of migrants coming from Maghrebi region. This policy change was influenced by the European Union's policy to recruit more workers from Eastern Europe. Book discussing this issue are Laytan-Henry 1990, articles related to this topic are Bovenkirk 1991, Ravenstein 1976, Castles 1975, Markham 1987, Coeffard 1982, Husband 1991, and Jain 1997.

The statistical data regarding migration trends, immigrant profiles etc. is the most important pillar of this study as it provides basic information. This is dealt with in the following primary sources- Commission of European Communities 1975, U.N. Economic Commission for Western Asia 1982. Books furnishing such statistics are - Hammar 1985, Kidd 1970, Coale 1976, Hemenz 1979, Bohning 1983, Kritz 1981, Peterson 1978, Wood 1983, Berelson 1974, Eyde 1987, Freeman

1979, Odgen 1989. The Articles related to this topic are: Castle 1986, Bohning 1983, Kritz 1981, Lever-Tracy 1983, Odgen 1991, Oberhauser 1991, Rist 1979. The various aspects of the socio-cultural problems faced by the immigrants in the foreign land and the hazards faced by their families back home are dealt concisely in different sources. The primary sources are CEC 1975, CEC 1976, CEC 1977, UNESCO 1983. The books which give brief idea about this point are- Baines 1985, Burney 1967, Berelson 1974, Castle 1985, Derham 1990, Duclan 1978, Eyde 1987, Layten-Henry 1990, George 1980, Kesselman 1984, Miles 1982, Power, 1979, Vander 1982, Willmott 1988. Articles that throw light on this areas are Braou 1983, Bovenkirk 1990, Lever-Tracy 1983, Bernard 1973, Piere 1980, Smith 1977, Miles 1978, Minet 1978, Oberhauser 1991.

The effect of migration is not one sided. It has impact on both the sending country as well as the host country. It alters the demography of both the participants and it effects the employment conditions, living condition, governments policy and also the culture of both nations. Although the remittances account for an increase in the national income and benefits individuals and their families, they also have a negative impact on domestic policy and economic development. Migrants and their families tends not to spend their foreign earnings on locally produced goods and services but on imported goods. Remittances can be inflationary in the labour exporting countries as they increase national income without increasing the real productive capacity. Economies are also quite vulnerable to rapid reduction in

remittances. In contrast, the labour importing countries particularly certain sectors benefit greatly from this cheap labour source. These issues are discussed in the following sources- primary sources CEC 1976, CEC 1977. The books which deal with these aspects are Castle 1984, Cornelius 1994, Declud 1978, Eyde 1987, Freeman 1979, Ravenstien 1976, Thomas 1972, Straubher 1993, Vangiendt 1977, Miller 1982, Miller 1981, Roger 1985. The articles which highlight these aspects are Braou 1982, Feldblum 1993, Husband 1991, Jain 1997, Miller 1981, Miles 1986, Rist 1979, Vangiendt 1977, Williamson 1989, Wihtol 1984.

The literature survey given above reveals the need for an extensive study of this phenomenon of migration. It is this imperative that will be addressed in this attempt to make a holistic and indepth study of the issue at hand.

### **THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE**

At a conservative estimate; there are about 13 million foreign workers currently residing in the countries of Western Europe. This huge reservoir of manpower has been of vital importance to the European market economies in sustaining rapid rates of economic growth since the Second World War.<sup>14</sup> Most European countries have participated in this huge exchange of population the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Switzerland are among the most important receiving countries.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Robert, Miles and Victor, Satzewich, "Migration, Racism nand Post-Modernism", Economy and Society, vol.19, no.3, August 1990, p.336.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.337.

The principle suppliers of the labour market have been the poorer countries of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean basin - especially Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the North-African countries, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.

The migration of workers from developing countries to the market economics of Europe is one element in the network of relationships linking the developed world with the less developed world.

There are two different, often contradictory theoretical approaches to the issue of international migration. The first is the Dependency Theory, which traces its intellectual origins to Marx and the post-Marxist theories on imperialism. The dependency model sees the migration of workers from the developing countries to the developed world as a form of neo-colonialist, capitalist exploitation. The alternative perspective for the analysis of migration derives from the paradigm of interdependence. Richard Cooper for example, lists international migration as one of the sources of modern international interdependence. The Marxist tradition also has made a significant contribution to this debate about the interrelationship between the development of capitalism and migration flows, both within and between nation states, and has provided a foundation for the development of an alternative approach to the dominant position of the sociology of 'race/ethnic relations'.

The initial stimulus to migration into post-1945 Western Europe is located in the interrelated processes of capital accumulation and uneven development which

create reserve armies of labour within the periphery of the world system.<sup>16</sup>

During the early post-war years, the process of capital accumulation resulted in an increase in the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour. In most cases, however, these internal reserves were exhausted during the early 1950s and were insufficient to fill all the unfilled vacancies. The respective states, and employers within various social formations, responded to the continued demand for unskilled labour, in some cases by implementing new labour saving technologies and in others through the recruitment of foreign born labour.<sup>17</sup>

Philippe Van Parijs (a Marxist theoretician) maintains that it is quite painful to look at the prospective effects of unrestricted immigration on the redistributive systems of the egalitarian richer countries. There is no way in which such a system could survive if all the old, sick and lazy of the world came running to take advantage of them.<sup>18</sup> He recognizes the right and indeed the duty of existing national governments to continue to restrict immigration, even though such restrictions were initially portrayed as conflicting with a basic ethical principle.<sup>19</sup>

Lewin maintains that the migration of workers from less developed to more developed economies has been a major characteristic of imperialism. It is an

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.337.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.337.

<sup>18</sup> Stephen, Adler, International Migration and Dependency, (Gower: Westmead, 1981), p.210.

<sup>19</sup> Robert, Miles and Victor, Satzewich, op.cit., p.337.



ongoing characteristic of the exploitation economic systems of weaker ones by stronger. The mechanism by which this occurs can be linked to be the success of advanced capitalist countries in world markets owing to their greater degree of technological sophistication. The resultant higher wages then attract workers from poorer countries. Levin also implies the existence of a reverse correlation between capital flows and migration flows in the period of monopoly capitalism. He further argues that the export of labour further weakens the less developed economy since it loses the best part of its labour force.

During the initial phase of mass labour migration, which lasted from around 1950 to 1973, the state was accorded a peripheral, instrumental role in the process of migration. State intervention, in the form of the formulation articulation and administration of an immigration policy, was only developed several years after the migratory process began. Thus, before 1973, migration is defined as a relatively spontaneous reaction to labour demand. But the minimal nature of state intervention was structured in the late 1950's. Till then the state migration policy were concerned only with short-term fulfillment of capital's labour requirements.

The period 1973-1974 was a turning point in the history of labour migration to post-war Western Europe. Each western state, with the exception of Britain where legislation had been passed in 1962, placed restrictions on the entry of migrants.

The repeated renewal of labour contracts and accompanying processes of

family reunification, without corresponding increases in state expenditure on public services demanded by the foreign-born workers and their families meant a sharing of services with the indigenous population. This competition for scarce resources resulted in increasing conflicts between the foreign-born and indigenous populations, and constituted a threat to the social order of the labour importing national states. Furthermore, foreign workers were becoming increasingly militant both politically and the shop-floor. Their presence became defined as a threat to the long term stability of the social order, and doubts were placed on the scope for their use as a docile and manipulable labour force.<sup>20</sup>

The restrictions imposed on migration, then signalled the emergence of a set of qualitatively new political priorities and concerns on the part of the respective states. Whereas prior to 1973, the state and capital both defined foreign-born labour in strictly economic terms, its value lying in its relative cheapness and its contribution to industrial production. After 1973 political and ideological considerations about the future stability of the nation state pushed these economic considerations into the background. Thus, theoretical approach with its economical determinants of migration flows and its significance for not only the migrant labour but also for the owners of capital and their agents ignores the considerable evidence of the state's concern about the political and ideological implications of migration 'especially after' the economic crisis of 1973-1974.

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p.337.

## **Chapter-2**

# **PATTERNS OF MIGRATION**

## CHAPTER II

### Patterns of Migration

Migration in its most general sense is defined as the relatively permanent movement of a person over a significant distance. But this kind of definition merely delimits the exact meaning to certain key terms. Various definitions are proposed by different authors for the term 'migration'; a few of them are mentioned below:

Human migration is the changing of the place of abode permanently or, when temporarily, for an appreciable duration as e.g. in the case of seasonal workers. It is used symbolically in the transition from one surrounding to another in the course of human life.<sup>1</sup>

Migration is a relatively permanent moving away of a collectivity, called migrants, from one geographical location to another preceded by decision-making on the part of the migrants on the basis of a hierarchically ordered set of values or valued ends and resulting in changes in the interactional system of the migrants.<sup>2</sup>

We define migration as the physical transition of an individual or a group from one society to another. This transition usually involves abandoning one social setting and entering another and different one.<sup>3</sup>

'Change of community' as an index of migration affords a very rough gauge of the meaning to be assigned to such indeterminate words as 'permanent' or 'significant' in "the usual definition of migration - the relatively permanent movement of persons over a significant

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<sup>1</sup> Leszek, A. Kosinski and R. Mansel Prother, People on the Move, Studies on Internal Migration, (Methuen and Co. Ltd.: London, 1975) p.3.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p.4.

<sup>3</sup> S.N. Eisenstadt, "Analysis of patterns of immigration and absorption of immigrants", Population Studies, vol.7, 1953, p.167.

distance".<sup>4</sup>

These definitions give us a clear idea about migration in terms of spatial criteria as well as the changes in socio-economic situation.

Thus, international migration may be defined in the same suit as a permanent movement of people, of their own free will, from one sovereign country to another. Transfer of this kind however counts only a small part of the redistribution of world population in last three centuries. A comprehensive view of international migration must also include forced as well as free movement.

Upto the beginning of the 19th century there were hardly any statistical records of international migration. Nevertheless it is possible to indicate the main orders of migration. The 19th century was the great age of mass migration from Europe across the Atlantic on their own free will whereas slave transportation to America from Africa by the English, Dutch and Portuguese was forced migration.

### COLONIAL PERIOD

As mentioned before, the first wave of Maghrebi migrants that was large enough to be noticed appeared about the time of the World War I. It was however relatively a marginal phenomenon: it consisted of a number of traders who travelled to seek their fortunes in France and elsewhere. This wave of Maghrebi emigration to France can be termed as free movement. In 1914 there was an exodus of the labour, from the Kabylia region "conveyers". They were recruited for military

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<sup>4</sup> W. Petersen, "A general typology of migration", American Sociological Review, vol.23, 1958, p.257.

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work from September 1915 onwards, Algerian labour was impressed by decree. By placing about 78,000 Algerians under impressment, the French Administration put their services at the disposal of the military command. Most of these Algerians were assigned to public and private munition factories, supply workshops, transport facilities and mines and gas refineries. They were also put to work for streets cleaning in the towns and as the trench diggers on the front rear lines. Then in 1916 the entire Algerian "native" population was conscripted and enrolled in the Algerian rifle corps alongside the volunteer soldiers. In 1917 another 17,000 were conscripted for work in the strategic factories of France.<sup>5</sup>

The study of this first wave of Algerian migration to France is important from several standpoints. It was a migration that was instigated by France and it showed none of the manifestations of demographic pressure which were peculiar to the migration of the post World War II period. By the end of the War of 1914-1918, Maghreb had furnished France with over 175,000 soldiers and more than 150,000 workers. This represented more or less forced migration of about 325,000 Maghrebis and the majority of these were Algerians. These figures indicate the magnitude of the phenomenon launched by the imperial French government at that time. This has continued to the present day, though with periodic fluctuations, in

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<sup>5</sup> UN Economic Commission for Western Asia, International Migration in the Arab World: Proceedings of an ECWA population Conference, 11-16 May, vol.1, (Beirut) 1982, p.147.

the same massive proportions.<sup>6</sup> In effect, once the "pump" was primed, the flow of migrants was maintained at more or less the same intensity in response to push or pull factors or simply the force of inertia inherent in all demographic phenomena.

With the return of peace in 1918, several thousand soldiers and workers returned to the Maghreb and emigrated again between 1920 and 1924. At that time there were approximately 100,000 Algerians, 10,000 Morrocans and 10,000 Tunisians in France. During that period, there was an unfavourable shift in general public opinion regarding "North Africans". This led the French authorities to establish controls on the immigration of Maghrebi nationals.<sup>7</sup>

The Maghrebi immigration which had already slowed by government regulations came to a halt due to world economic crisis of the 1930s. This reduced the total number of immigrants to 120,000 in 1930 and to 32,000 in 1936. Again in 1940 the Maghrebi population in France was estimated at less than 100,000. Over three quarters of them were Algerians.

Immigration came to complete halt with World War II and many Maghrebis even returned home. It is observed that over two-thirds of these emigrants returned to their home countries where they enhanced the unemployment problem. In 1946, it became obvious that the only effective measure to fight unemployment in rural

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p.148.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, pp.149.

Maghreb regions, lacking in fertile land, was to enhance and encourage emigration. The Algerian Directorate of Labour and Manpower recorded approximately 35,000 arrivals in France during 1946; notwithstanding the transport difficulties of the time. The census of March 1946 gave 22,000 as the number of Algerians in France -- this number was undoubtedly below the actual figure. Among the new immigrants, one out of fifteen entered the country with a work contract. Those immigrants who arrived on their own initiative did not go through any screening process or any control procedures beyond a health inspection administered upon departures from Maghreb. Even this health control was discontinued after 1950.<sup>8</sup>

On October 1946, almost 95 percent of travel restrictions were lifted. This new freedom of movement was only limited by the formality of the health card. The first period from 1947-1953, was characterized by the freedom of movement. Between this period the average number of arrivals in France was 106,000 per year. It exceeded the departures by 26,500 emigrants.<sup>9</sup> This figure represented a net positive balance for the manghreb in a period in which the harvest was poor. In 1957, there was a positive balance of 54,600 emigrants. This was the record year. Thus during the years of unregulated migration the net demographic pressure of Algerian emigrants was an estimated 25,000 emigrants per year.<sup>10</sup> The period

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p.149.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.150.

<sup>10</sup> Stephen Adler, International Migration and Dependence, (Gower: Westmead, 1981), p.72.



after this i.e. between 1955-1964, which covered the war of independence and the peace that followed upon the proclamation of Algerian independence, was one of relative freedom. In 1956, police control on arrivals and departures were established.

### **POST-COLONIAL PERIOD (1964-1975)**

Between 1954 and 1962 (the year of Algerian independence), the Algerian population of France doubled, and it doubled again between 1962 and 1973 when Algeria and France were no longer Colony and Mother country. In 1964, the semi-official Algerian newspaper "El-Moudjahid" had written that "the departure of our own brothers (for France) remains a necessity and serves the reciprocal interest of our two countries".<sup>11</sup>

When Algeria became independent there were considerable movements from and to France. Many Algerians returned home, but others went to work in France, encouraged by the right of free movement laid down in the Evian agreement.<sup>12</sup>

The accord of Evian, which set out in great detail the nature of relations between France and the soon to be independent Algeria were finally signed on March 18, 1962, following a year of negotiations between GPRA (Provisional government of Algerian republic) and the French government. After the decision of freeing Algeria, General de Gaulle was at pains to ensure that relations with the

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.76.

<sup>12</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe, (Oxford University Press: London, 1973), p.33.

ex-colony conformed as closely as possible to his conception of French interests in the area. The form of association envisaged by the General granted French aid and technical assistance in return for the safeguarding of French interests and for the privileged status for French industrial and commercial concerns. In recognizing Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara, the Evian accords guaranteed the French a privileged position with regard to discovery, exploitation and marketing of Saharan oil.

The question of migrant workers in France was, by all accounts, not disputed to a great extent, nor was it discussed and debated for long. There were infact only two clauses in Evian accord which referred directly to Algerian emigration in France. The first clause states that:

‘Barring conviction for a criminal offence, every Algerian is supplied with an identity card and is free to circulate between Algeria and France’. The second states clause that ‘Algerian nationals resident in France and notably workers will have the same rights as French nationals with the exception of political rights’.<sup>13</sup>

In fact, the Evian accord was, from the beginning, subject to a dual pressure. On the one hand, the European exodus from Algeria meant that the Evian quid pro quo was no longer intact while on the other the French felt that a renewed influx of Algerians seeking work in France would strain the absorption capacity of the French economy. The immigration of the Europeans themselves contributed to the satiation of the labour market in France.

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<sup>13</sup> Stephan Adler, *op.cit.*, p.74.

To control this prevailing situation, the French government requested negotiations so as to develop some kind of control over the Algerians in France. This desire to control the emigration was in fact voiced from both sides i.e., Algeria and France. The Algerian authorities, in one of their early official acts, supported the termination of the anarchic system. In November 1962, the Algerian government set up the "office national Algerien de Main d'oeuvre" (ONAMO) whose main task was to apply selective criteria to prospective emigrants and check the outflow.<sup>14</sup>

In April 1964, an agreement was finally signed by Gilbert Grandval representative of French government and the new Algerian Labour Minister, Mohammed Nekkache.<sup>15</sup> The main focus of this protocol was that as of July 1964, the arrival of Algerians in France would be fixed according to the availability of the labour in France. In other words the French were given right unilaterally determine the number of Algerians arriving in French labour market.<sup>16</sup>

The inadequacies of the 1964 protocol became obvious immediately. The annual contingent of Algerians was fixed by France at about 12000 per year, a level the Algerians considered insufficient and intended to reduce French dependence on Algerians workers in favour of those from other countries. In October 1968, a contingent of 35,000 workers was to be allowed to enter France each year for a

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.76.

<sup>15</sup> UN, Economic Commission for Western Asia, op.cit., p.162.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.76.

period of three years. In 1971, the contingent was fixed at 25,000 for the following two years, (i.e. 10,000 per year less than the previous contingent).

The period between 1947 to 1953 in Table 2.1 reveals that the average number of Algerian arrivals in France exceeded the number of departures by 26,500 workers (plus or minus 1000). The year 1951 shows a net positive balance of 54,600 Algerian workers. Till this period there was no emigration of women and children.

The period from 1955-1964 was one in which there was a relative freedom of movement. With the Evian agreement of 1962, this system of free movement was stalled. The 1964 protocol inaugurated a period of strict control of the movement of workers, who were subjected to annual quotas. This period as a whole characterized an increase in the average number of arrivals to 142,500. This was largely offset by the number of departures which was 12,300. This resulted in a net positive balance of 19,500 workers. This above mentioned figures included 13,900 men of above 17 years of age and 5,600 women and children under 17 years of age.

Table 2.1  
Algerian Emigration to France (1946-1975)

Year	Men (over 16 years)			Women and children			Total		
	Arrival	Departures	Net	Arrivals	Departures	Net	Arrivals	Departures	Net
Series A									
1946	34,929								
1947	66,234	23,251	42,983						
1948	80,714	54,209	26,505						
1949	83,500	76,455	7,045						
1950	89,405	65,175	24,230						
1951	142,671	88,081	54,590						
1952	148,662	134,083	14,579						
1953	134,133	122,560	11,573						
1954	159,354	134,090	25,264						
1955	193,662	169,872	23,790	8,164	3,499	4,665	201,826	173,371	28
1956	78,976	78,176	800	6,630	3,698	2,932	85,606	81,874	3
1957	69,355	54,768	14,587	6,674	2,969	3,705	76,029	75,737	18
1958	42,379	56,238	13,859	6,658	3,106	3,552	49,037	59,344	-10
1959	63,833	48,397	15,436	10,466	3,972	6,494	74,299	52,369	21
1960	72,462	54,499	17,963	9,379	3,771	5,608	81,841	58,270	23
1961	102,833	69,815	33,018	9,001	3,721	3,280	111,834	73,536	38

Table 2.1 - Continued

Year	Men (over 16 years)			Women and children			Total		
	Arrival	Departures	Net	Arrivals	Departures	Net	Arrivals	Departures	Net
Series B									
1960							93,088	86,242	6.8
1961							133,210	126,755	6.4
1962							180,167	155,018	25.1
1963	227,331	184,267	43,064	34,744	27,265	7,479	262,075	211,532	50.5
1964	231,448	198,812	32,636	38,095	26,929	11,166	269,543	225,741	43.8
1965	196,488	208,233	-11,745	31,605	29,141	2,464	228,093	237,374	9.2
1966	221,138	191,969	29,169	34,867	28,468	6,399	256,005	220,437	35.5
1967	183,293	175,861	7,432	27,646	23,792	3,854	210,939	99,653	11.2
1968	196,623	173,155	23,468	34,297	25,010	9,287	230,920	198,165	32.7
1969	225,281	199,924	25,357	32,366	30,395	1,971	257,647	230,319	27.3
1970	306,020	248,408	57,612	46,510	43,010	3,500	352,530	291,418	61.1
1971	356,232	321,269	34,964	53,085	51,208	1,877	409,317	372,477	36.8
1972	343,786	327,617	16,193	65,336	57,755	7,581	409,122	385,732	23.7
1973	396,470	367,741	28,729	79,518	67,073	12,445	475,988	434,814	41.1
1974	446,931	446,767	196	102,958	95,032	7,926	549,884	541,767	8.1
1975	473,498	480,192	-6,694	118,960	115,794	3,166	592,458	595,986	-3.5

Source: UN Economic Commission for Western Asia: International Migration in the Arab World: Proceedings of an ECWA Population Conference, Cyprus 11-16 May, vol.1 (Beirut) 1982, p.81.

The period between 1965 to 1969 shows the average number of arrival at around 200,000 men and average number of departures approximately touching 180,400 men. The year 1968 gave a negative net balance of - 11,745; 1967, though with positive net balance, had the male migrant number as low as 7,432 men. The years 1966, 1968 and 1969 show a positive average net balance of around 25,000 men. This period gives a very irregular picture with the net balance showing instability. Regarding the emigration of women and children, the average number of arrivals was about 30,000 and average number of departure was about 25,000 with the average net positive balance ranging from as high as 9,287 in 1968 to as low as 1,971 in 1969,

The next period taken from 1970 to 1975 gives the average number of male arrivals at 3,90,000 men with the average number of departure being about 380,000. In the subsequent years the net positive balance has a wide fluctuation in the yearly figures with 1970 having a positive net balance as high as 57,612 and 1975 giving a net negative balance of -6,694. Also, 1974 has positive net balance as low as 196 men. The years 1974 and 1975 shows a lean net balance because of the suspension of emigration by the Algerian government on 19 September 1973 as a reaction to the riots and the succeeding political and social unrest amongst Algerian emigrant workers in France.

As of the spring of 1975, Migration remained in suspended animation, over 8,00,000 Algerian continue to live and work in France and they and their

friends and relatives traveled quite freely and in very large numbers between two countries. The ban on new workers emigration stayed in force and is likely to remain.<sup>17</sup>

The two manpower agreements concluded with France in 1963, confirmed and strengthened the increase in the flow of Morrocans and Tunisian manpower into France. Their migration was regulated within the framework of National immigration office (ONI). At times, however during the periods of economic expansion, the number of workers who entered French territory clandestinely and later obtained work permits sometimes exceeded the number of workers who submitted to the complex procedure of registration with ONI.<sup>18</sup>

The emigration of workers of these two nationalities came to a stop in 1973 with the arrival of approximately 27,000 Moroccans and 21,000 Tunisians. In the years succeeding 1973, about 15,000 "registered" and 9,200 "unregistered" permanent workers emigrated to France.<sup>19</sup> The number of emigrants approximately doubled in the case of Moroccans and more than doubled in the case of Tunisians. After the French government suspended alien immigration in 1974, the number of emigrants from both these countries decreased sharply.

Though the decreed suspension was total, in principle, a few new arrivals

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.85.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p.306.

<sup>19</sup> UN Economic commission for Western Asia, op.cit, p.162.



were still recorded. These represented the "legitimization" of the workers who had already entered France, the completion of files already in process, and new contracts of limited duration.

The table 2.2 gives the number of arrivals of permanent Moroccan and Tunisian workers in France from 1946 to 1978.

From the above table it can be seen that from 1946 to 1961, the emigration from Morocco to France were trickling in very small number ranging from a minimum of 700 to a maximum of 2200 approximately. During this period, there is no record of any emigration from Tunisia. From 1962, the emigration gained pace due to the 1963 manpower agreement concluded by France with both Morocco and Tunisia. The annual average of emigrants from Morocco between 1962 to 1974 is about 15,615 workers. This ranges from a minimum of 8626 workers in 1962 to a maximum of 26,748 in 1973. Comparatively, the number of Tunisian emigrants has been low with an annual average of 12,582 from 1965 to 1973.

After 1973, due to the suspension of alien emigration by the French government, there was a marked decrease in the number of emigrants from both these countries. Recent statistics can be considered as negligible. (In 1973 only 2,905 Moroccan emigrants and 820 Tunisian emigrants were officially recorded.)

Table 2.2

## Emigrant from Morocco and Tunisia to France, (1946-1979)

Year of Migration to France	Moroccans	Tunisians
1946	1,439	
1947	2,258	
1948	992	
1949		
1950		
1951	1,308	
1959	705	
1960		
1961	3,924	
1962	8,626	
1963	11,094	
1964	17,502	2,730
1965	15,494	5,776
1966	14,331	6,631
1967	13,525	6,534
1968	13,339	6,109
1969	19,335	14,925
1970	24,077	11,070
1971	20,689	9,971
1972	17,328	9,890
1973	26,748	20,857
1974	14,072	4,190
1975	2,905	820
1976	1,802	797
1977	1,300	883
1978	251	106
1979	200	92

*Source:* UN Economic Commission for Western Asia: International Migration in the Arab World: Proceedings of an ECWA Population Conference, Cyprus 11-16 May, vol.1 (Beirut) 1982, p.84.

## SITUATION SINCE 1975

This phase began with the ban on the arrival of new foreign immigrant workers in 1974. It was a consequence of the oil crisis, economic depression and a general decline in the demand for unskilled labour. Although the accompanying ban on family reunification was soon moderated, this change in policy was of fundamental significance both to the character of immigration and to the ongoing political debate. Under the presidencies of Gis Card d' Estaing (1974-81) and Mitterand, immigration has remained central political issue. Between the censuses of 1975 and 1982 the total foreign population grew but rather more slowly and there was a decline in the number of foreigners in employment. Above all, there was a rapid increase in the family members of the migrant population. This reinforced the idea that temporary "immigrants were becoming permanent ethnic minorities". The main nationalities recorded in the 1982 census are shown in table 2.3. It records a rise in the proportion of foreigners from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) and Turkey. For some nationalities the rise was indeed remarkable: a 60 percent rise in the number of Moroccan nationals of where 30 percent were aged under fifteen.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Philip E. Ogden "Immigration to France since 1945: Myth and Reality", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.14-3, July 1991, p.300.

Table 2.3  
 Foreigners resident in France by nationality 1982  
 (Census count compared to Ministry of the Interior estimates)

Major nationalities	(a) Census of 7 March 1982	(b) Ministry of the Interior, 31 December 1981
Algerian	795,920	816,873
Portuguese	764,860	859,520
Moroccan	431,120	444,558
Italian	333,740	452,066
Spanish	321,440	416,372
Tunisian	189,400	193,203
Total (all nationalities)	3,680,100	4,223,928

*Sources:* (a) INSEE 1985, p.41; (b) Ministry of the Interior

These figures from the 1982 census reveal some insightful trends. The foreign population stood about 3.6 million but the share of those from the Maghreb and Turkey was about two-fifth of the total number, i.e. about 1.5 million. The largest nationalities were the Algerians, Portuguese, Moroccans, Italian, Spanish and Tunisians, though the role of European group has declined between 1975 and 1982. It is certainly true that compared with the inter-war years and with governmental interventions in 1948, France, by the 1980's, had turned increasingly to non-European sources for their labour needs.

High fertility amongst some groups, and a generally young age structure have meant a gradual rise in the proportion of births to foreign mothers; (Aground 11 percent in 1982, of which more than half were to North African mothers). In the Paris area this figure rose to some 20 percent of all births. The arrival of family

members, joining male migrant workers and the subsequent birth of further children is a powerful process in transforming the character of ethnic-minority population.<sup>21</sup> None the less, disparities in average family size and fertility are marked amongst the nationalities and they are linked with the process of geographical concentration. It has a considerable effect on the demand for housing, schooling and social services. Table 2.4 indicates the range of fertility levels from 1.7 children per woman for the Italian population to over 5 for the Moroccans and Tunisians. The table also illustrates a decline in fertility levels. In absolute terms, the number of births to women of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Nationality declined from 40,045 in 1982 to 39, 657 in 1986.<sup>22</sup>

Table 2.4  
Fertility for women of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian nationality born outside France living in the country in 1982 and 1985  
(average number of children per women)

Nationality	1982	1985
Algerian	4.98	4.24
Moroccan	5.18	4.47
Tunisian	5.37	4.67

*Source:* As adapted from 'Tribalat' (1988, p.201)

On October 1984 the council of ministers of France decided to deploy the police in a repressive Manoeuvre: the expulsion of immigrants was compounded by an exclusion from French territory for a specific length of time. In order to combat

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p.305.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p.306.

a traffic of illegal workers it was decided that fines on employers sentenced for keeping such workers were to be sustained. Furthermore, a number of measures were adopted in order to facilitate the control of immigrants, particularly those of Maghreb (North African) origin, because one of the lessons of 1982-83 legalization process was that a large proportion of illegal migrants had entered France as tourists from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

The increase in the number of identity checks in 1983 and the reinforcement of the frontier police corresponded to the first phase of two stage measures. The second phase was the 1984 law, which created a single resident act work permit, reasserted the right for families to be brought together and encouraged foreigners to return to their countries of origin through aid for reintegration. The Algerian government for its part, proved to be unwilling to go along with the forced repatriation of its nationals. Only voluntary repatriation was deemed acceptable. Even France's strategy of paying foreign workers to return to their countries of origin was a failure; only about 80,000 workers took advantage of these economic incentives, and most of the beneficiaries were Spanish and Portuguese. The practice of legalization continued although at a reduced rate; the primary beneficiaries of this process were nationals from EC member states, who constituted an increasingly large percentage of the legal migration flow.

In spite of the differences in interpretation revealed by the political alternance in government (1986-88), the 1984 law defined the institutional framework for

immigration. As early as 1989, the reassertion of the law of asylum led to sharp increase in the number of applicants.<sup>23</sup>

In 1993, with the arrival of new government, renewed legal measures were adopted. Immigration was controlled: 1) by a restriction in the conditions of admission and residence, aimed in particular, at mixed marriages of convenience and polygamy, but which also introduces an exit visa for nationals of "13 sensitive countries living in France" 2) by a reform in the right of a system and tougher screening of applicants 3) by a modification in the law of nationality 4) by a reinforcement of identity checks and by the creation of a single police whose role is to control the 80 million foreigners; to monitor those who illegally enter to leave France, every year, and to fight against illegal immigration and clandestine work by the foreigners.

Table 2.5  
Number of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians who acquired French nationality.

	Algerians	Moroccans	Tunisian
1983	305,355	43,1120	131,618
1986	320,900	504,000	202,000
1990	614,207	572,652	206,336
1994	597,244	562,754	200,244
1996	550,355	446,911	162,297

*Source:* Geographic hungaine de la Francy (1997), p.22.

<sup>23</sup> "Immigration in France", Actulait En France, September 1997, p.22.

Table 2.5 clearly shows the decrease in the number of persons who acquired French nationality. There is a sharp decline in this number from 1983 to 1996. This is due to the restricted policy of citizenship implemented by France to curb the large influx of immigration from the third world countries and especially the Maghrebi population which has largest share in the immigrant population.

### CONCLUSION

The ties of colonial dependence played a vital role in triggering and shaping the process of Maghrebi migration to France. In the period following the two World Wars, France required to recruit a massive number of foreign workers. It drew upon the colonies closest to its shores in order to meet the needs of agriculture, reconstruction and industry. In order to fill the gap in demographic structure caused by the decline in natality followed by an aging of the population and, most importantly, in order to replace those lost in wars. The government and private employers took to the negotiations of employment contracts, and the employment of migrants arriving of their own accord from the Maghreb. The flow of man power from surplus areas to the areas of scarcity was thus set off artificially. The colonial power, could not but grow larger under the pressure of demographic variables and the difficult economic and social conditions that prevailed on the eve of independence in the three countries of Maghreb added to this influx.

The period of extensive growth experienced by Europe between 1955 and



1972 reinforced and diversified the migratory orientation towards France and the other neighboring European countries. There was large scale recruitment of workers from Maghreb to France. But at present the demographic argument has lost its cogency with the emergence of a number of ghettos and the growing difficulties experienced by the native population in mixing with foreigners in general and the Maghrebis in particular. Even France was not able to resist the wave of anti-immigrant hostility, particularly when it passed through the period of extended economic recession leading to unemployment. This led France to reverse its traditional immigration policy. It suspended new immigration rigorously and induced immigrants to return home through a number of administrative measures. All these steps taken by the French government led to a sharp decline in the immigration from the Maghreb region into France. Steps were also taken to curb illegal immigration. All this has, in turn, intensified the problem of unemployment in the Maghreb countries.

The Maghreb countries are yet to bring into line employment objectives that are in tune with the new situation. A rational policy is yet to be formulated for the reintegration of the returning migrants into the national economy. Also needed is a search for other, more receptive outlets for emigration as a provisional measure, perhaps in the other Arab countries which still have considerable manpower needs.

## **Chapter-3**

# **SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STATUS OF THE MAGHREBI MIGRANTS**

## **CHAPTER III**

### **Socio-Economic and Political Status of the Maghrebi Migrants**

The socio-economic and political status of a societal group often gives a very clear idea as to the position of the given group in a particular society. The one primary pointer of a groups societal status is its social class. The class standing reflects the role played by such a group in the production process. The French term for this expression is *qualification professionnelle*. The classification of this term is basically between manual and non-manual or between skilled and semi-skilled labour. Similarly the political status of a group can be understood through the political rights enjoyed by that group alongwith the extent of their participation in the political process.

#### **SOCIAL SATUTS**

The social status of migrants are linked to different indicators like the role of the group in the production process, housing, education and also the training which equip them for skilled jobs. Other factors like family, social life, and racism also give us an idea about the migrant group. The above mentioned factors, infact determine the social status of migrants in a given nation.

#### **Skilled and semi-skilled/manual or non manual jobs**

The Table 3.1 is based on an official sample survey carried out in France in 1967. They exclude self-employed persons because the percentage of active

immigrants who come under this category was negligible. The table shows that the majority of the Maghrebi immigrants who came to France were manual workers. This concentration into the manual work category applies to all the three nationalities. The highest statistics belong to the Algerians and Moroccans. The majority of the workers in these groups are either unskilled or semi-skilled. If the unskilled and semi-skilled workers are clubbed together to represent the lowest societal stratum, we see that they are comprised of 70.3 percent Tunisians, 8.14 percent Moroccans and 87.2 percent Algerians.

The survey carried out in 1967 compares the position of the French and immigrant employees in the various industries. It was found that even though they worked in the same industries the French were mainly occupying the Managerial, Non-Manual and skilled positions, while the immigrants were concentrated in the manual occupations particularly the semi-skilled and unskilled ones. For instance in the metal industry 17 percent of French employees were managerial and technical staff; another 6 percent were in the non manual sector. While 59 percent did skilled manual work, only 18 percent of the work force were unskilled or semi-skilled. Contrastingly, less than 1 percent of Italians did non-manual jobs. Among the manual work force only 33 percent were skilled and the rest were unskilled or semi-skilled. The situation of the North Africans were even worse: 0.15 percent non manual, 5.7 percent skilled and 94 percent unskilled or semi-skilled. There seems little doubt that the situation shown by Lyon survey is more or less typical

of France. Nearly all managerial and non-manual jobs are taken up by the French citizens. The immigrants are mainly entrusted manual jobs and among them almost all the North Africans and the Portuguese are in the unskilled, manual occupations.<sup>1</sup>

From among the major groups of foreign workers, the Algerians are to be found most often in the least pleasant, most difficult, dangerous and arduous jobs. The distribution of the Algerian immigrants is in many ways significantly different from that of the total foreign population. They are more heavily concentrated in building and public works and less numbers are found in agriculture and the service industry. It is obvious, here, that the Algerians are heavily over represented as labourers and grossly under represented in the skilled sectors, especially as skilled workers and supervisors. The Algerians were employed mainly in two sectors: 40% in manufacturing and 37% in construction and public works.

In addition to these two sectors 58% of Morroccans were employed in the primary sector, 10% were in agriculture and 14% took up jobs in mining and quarrying industries. 60% of all the Tunisians worked in the two most favoured sectors above, while 10% have been engaged in the tertiary sector.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen Castles, and Godula Kosacks, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in West Europe, (Oxford University Press: London, 1973), p.81.

<sup>2</sup> U.N Economic Commission for Western Asia, International Migration in the Arab World: Proceeding of an ECWA Population Conference, Cyprus, 11-16 May, vol.1, (Beirut) 1982, p.169.

Table 3.1

## Foreign Employees in France by Occupational Categories, 1967 (percentage)

	Nationality							
	Spain	Italy	Poland	Portugal	Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia	All
Engineers & Managers	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.1	-	0.4	1.1	1.2
Supervisory personnel & Technicians	1.5	3.0	2.0	0.2	0.1	0.4	1.3	1.7
Non-manual workers	3.9	3.7	3.8	0.9	1.2	2.9	11.2	3.4
Skilled manual	31.5	41.1	24.5	28.8	11.5	14.9	16.1	25.2
Semi-skilled manual	536.5	35.4	42.3	35.1	38.0	46.0	32.0	36.6
Unskilled Manual	26.4	16.0	26.6	34.9	49.2	35.4	38.3	31.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*Source:* Adapted from, Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, "Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe" (Oxford University Press: London, 1973) p.80.

At least until the mid 1970's, the increase in the immigrants arrivals indicated, to a large extent, the demand for labourers in the French markets. The newly arriving migrants were concentrated mainly into the lowest socio-economic groups and in certain very clearly demarcated sectors of the economy. Yet there emerged a considerable variation among these groups nationalities and heterogeneity rather than homogeneity best describes the position of the migrant labourers. There was a clear hierarchy within the migrant population, related to the country of origin, reason of migration and the method of recruitment. "Some 50% of Algerian men in the workforce were classified as unskilled, compared to 13.2% of the French, 43% of Portuguese and 24.2% of Italians."<sup>3</sup> Industrial decline and rationalization of production modes decreased the vistas for employment in many sectors. This particularly affected the migrant workers. The Maghrebi workers vulnerability to job loss was related to their secondary status in the labour market. In response to the economic crisis and the declining employment opportunities the state restricted the influx of migrants.

During the Post War period of capital expansion, crisis and restructuring, Maghrebi migrant workers were subjected to poorer working conditions, inferior occupational status and lower wages. In spite of this, the Maghrebis, who make up nearly 40% of total foreign population in France today, are a dynamic and growing

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<sup>3</sup> Philip, E. Ogden, "Immigration to France Since 1945: Myth and Reality", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.14, no.3, July 1991, p.307.

population.<sup>4</sup> This condition indicates some of the processes behind the growing social and economic inequalities between the developed and less developed countries.

## **Housing**

Accommodation is one of the keys to adaptation in an urban environment: worker's health, mental balance and social integration. Living standards determine the opportunities a worker and his family may have of social and educational improvement. As far as foreign workers are concerned, the possibility of obtaining suitable accommodation is a big problem. Accommodation is not only a factor in the worker's overall health and his urban integration, it also makes it legally and materially possible for him to be joined by his family. It is useless to expect a man to adapt socially, if he is forced either by laws and regulations or by his social and economic factors to be single for a very long period. This enforced celibacy leads to sexual, emotional and moral disturbances which have unbalancing effects on the personality of the immigrant. Thus, finding accommodation for his family may enable him to find a reasonable solution to these difficulties.

In 1955 it was estimated that a further 30,000 units of accommodation and 100,000 beds would be required to solve the problem arising from the influx of

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<sup>4</sup> A. Oberhauser, "The International Mobility of Labour: North African Migrant Workers in France", The Professional Geographer, vol.43, no.4, November 1991, p.443.



foreign workers.<sup>5</sup> Immigrants are generally forced to accept tumbledown accommodation with poor lighting and defective sanitary arrangements. Often, due to lack of money, they are forced to crowd into unfurnished apartments and lodgings or private houses where, they are often exploited. It may be estimated that 80 percent of the immigrants who arrive in France have no promise of accommodation. In most of the cases, the foreigners are housed in communal living quarters meant for single persons: These communal living quarters are termed as "foyers in the paris area, and "canties" in the east of France.<sup>6</sup>

There is very clear evidence that the condition of Algerian's housing are distinctly worse than that of any other foreign group. The 1968 census showed that when 89 percent of foreigners lived in ordinary lodgings, only 70 percent of Algerians had the same facility. Nearly 8 percent of Algerians lived in "Habitations de Fortune", that is shanty towns, bidonvilles, and other accommodations built on unprepared sites without proper material.<sup>7</sup>

In addition, Algerian housings tend to be over crowded. Again, according to the 1968 census, nearly 60 percent of Algerians were heavily over crowded while only 30 percent of other foreigners were so described. In 1962 nearly 43 percent of the Algerian population lived in bidonvilles, temporary construction or

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<sup>5</sup> Descloiters, R., The Foreign Worker: Adaptation to Industrial Work and Urban Life, (OECD, 1965), p.130.

<sup>6</sup> Stephen Adler, International Migration and Dependence, (Gower: Westmead, 1981), p.117.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 117.

unfinished rooms. By 1968, only 28 percent were living in this way.<sup>8</sup>

In France, few foreign workers were provided with accommodation by their employers. In spite of this the accommodation provided by the employers without any public help is still the most common form of special housing for immigrant workers. As a rule, employers provide housing for single workers and there are only few firms which, for the sake of stabilizing their foreign labour force, provide some hostels or flats for foreign families.

The health and the social commission of F.N.L. Seminar assessed the number of single Algerians live in hotels or cafes at 92,245 in 1962. This meant that more than one-third of them were housed in this way. Also living in hotels were, 11,480 families. In other words, 32% of the Algerian families in France were in this situation. The Tunisians who inhabited hotels in 1968 had similar statistics in many respects to the one described above.<sup>9</sup>

Since these accommodations were overcrowded, it had a bad effect on the physiological development of children, with the physical conditions creating innumerable problems. The young children have no place for playing and enjoyment. Living in the middle of the city, they can hardly be let out on the streets. School children have no place to study or to pursue other activities. Washing and cooking are often done in the rooms. The lack of privacy for Married

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 118.

<sup>9</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, *op.cit.*, pp.292.

couples added to their stress.

Table 3.2

Number of people living in Bidonvilles in France and their nationalities

Nationality	Paris region		Rest of France		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
French	116	0.2	5,791	20.3	5,907	7.8
North Africans	20,436	42.8	11,355	39.8	31,791	42.1
Spanish	1,364	2.9	2,783	9.7	4,147	5.5
Portugese	15,311	32.7	234	0.8	15,545	20.6
Other Nationalities or unknown	9,600	21.4	3,556	29.4	17,956	24.0
Total	48,827	100	28,519	100	75,346	100

*Source:* Adapted from, Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, "Imigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe" (Oxford University Press: London, 1973) p.295.

It can be seen from the above table that the majority of bidonville dwellers are immigrants. In the Paris region, North Africans, Spaniards and Portuguese make 78.4% of the total. In the case of France as a whole their share is 68.2%. According to the 1962 figures given in the Algerian F.N.L. Seminar, the proportion of single Algerian men living in bidonvilles was 7%, the percentage that of Algerian families was 11. Altogether 9% of all Algerians in France were housed in bidonvilles.<sup>10</sup>

The majority of Maghrebi immigrants in France have had to find their

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p.295.

housing in the private market. Because of low incomes, discrimination and several other factors immigrants tend to have worse housing than the indigenous population. They sometimes find low quality dwellings in attics and old houses, but the general housing situation is so bad that they are often unable to achieve even this. Consequently, special type of housing for immigrants have been developed. The clandestine hostels, hotels, meubles, bidonvilles are the places where the immigrants live in almost complete segregation from the French. In conclusion, it may be said that the low socio-economic position of the immigrants in France finds one of its most obvious expression in the housing sector wherein immigrants are a part of the lowest stratum of society.

### **Educational and Vocational Training**

The majority of the immigrants are employed as unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers. They are recruited for those type of works which are not taken up by the indigeneous workers. Discriminatory regulations and practices tend to keep the immigrants in such jobs. But in addition to this there is an other reason which puts the immigrants at a disadvantage in the achievement - oriented industrial society: their lack of basic education and vocational training. When entering the new country, the majority of the immigrants are utterly confused by the fact that they are ignorant of the language of the receiving country.

According to a survey carried out in 1969, among North Africans living in worker's hostels in the Lyon region, 64.2 percent out of the 2,358 Algerians,

Morrocans and Tunisians spoke no French at all.<sup>11</sup> The most serious problem lies in the fact that most of the migrants have very poor educational background; many of them are illiterates.

It is extremely difficult to compare the real benefits derived by the various nationalities from the adult training facilities in France. This is partly due to the diverse nature of the facilities available. In addition to this, much of what workers get out of training depends upon what they take with them, to begin with in the way of

- a.) literacy b.) Industrial experience already acquired,
- c.) general social conditions, d.) psychological factors.

A number of inferences can be derived from table no. 3.3 Firstly, the absolute number of Algerians in the training centers almost doubled in seven years. Secondly, the Algerian position with regard to its proportion in the training places available has remained fairly constant in terms of Algerian representation among the total foreign trainees. In 1968 Algerians represented approximately 18% of the total foreign population. Interestingly, they were holding 35% of the places available for foreigners in the training centers. This position continued to be maintained in 1971. In fact, the percentage of Algerian population in the training centers have been roughly twice as numerous as its position among the total foreign population.

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.182.

Table No.3.3

The Evolution of the number of Algerians in Centeres of Professional Trainings (1965-1971)

Year	French trainees	Foreign trainees	Algerian trainees	% of Foreign of total	% of Algerians	Algerians of Total Foreign
1965	30,783	2,724	1,238	8	3.7	45
1966	31,945	3,541	1,546	10	4.4	44
1967	38,472	4,327	1,555	10	3.6	36
1968	39,021	4,892	1,713	11	3.9	35
1969	39,526	4,957	1,992	11	4.5	40
1970	34,382	4,361	1,735	11	4.5	40
1971	36,000	4,750	2,244	12	5.5	47

*Source:* Amicale des Algeriens en Europe, Conference Nationale Sen l' Emigration Alger, Patans des Nations, 12-14 January 1993, p.74.

Some immigrants may find it difficult to participate in the systematic literacy and language programmes due to cultural reasons. This is specially true for the Maghrebi muslim women. These women are often not allowed to leave their homes or to participate in any kind of social life. Often, the immigrant workers find it more difficult to find energy and time to participate in such course than their non-working wives. Those women who are from the Maghrebi patriarchal society who want to participate in these courses encounter a number of difficulties. If working, they have the added responsibility to run the household. Where they are not working, they have to look after children, usually the young ones. It is therefore not surprising that the propotion of women in adult education is lower than that of men. Out of 8,270 Algerians participating in the various courses organized by private associates, only 14 percent of them were women.

### **Family and Social Life**

Majority of the immigrant men who come on their own have now been joined by their wives and families. But despite this there are large number of single men who are either unmarried or have left their families in the country of origin. The group of single immigrant men tends to be regarded as a threat by the indigenous population. In addition to that they have certain specific social problems.

How do they spend their leisure time, once they have done their housework? They are often at a loss as they are unable to engage in stimulating activities. The choice of the activities is narrowed by factors like cost, language and

discrimination.

The lasting separation from their families have very harmful effects. People tend to become strangers to their own family. As a result the number of divorces increase. If the family of migrant workers is abandoned, the wife has to struggle with a worse economic situation as well as the psychological difficulties of rearing a fatherless family.

As a rule, women adapt at a faster pace if they work. This is often resented by their husbands. On the other hand, the woman prefer the equality of rights between the sexes and they also appreciate the better status accorded to working women. Many Maghrebi immigrant men, prejudiced because of their conservative muslim background, do not allow their wives to work or have any contact with the outside world. They feel that if they do so the traditional patriarchal structure of the family breaks down. As a result, the Maghrebis live in object poverty, in bidonvilles, where life continues in a way the people are accustomed to.

Immigrant children often come to resent their background as well as their parents as they do not learn the new language properly, lack proper societal integration and because of the stark realisation that they do not belong anywhere. At the same time, they resent the outside society which discriminates against their parents and themselves. The option of going back home is again hazardous because the children, who have spent most of their lives in France, will suffer. They will have to adjust once more to a completely new environment, and they will feel like



a stranger in their home country.

In the case of children whose both parents work, they do not go to school; either because there is nobody to make them go or, because they have to act as a child minder. This is very true in the case of the eldest daughter. Such children face an even greater difficulty in integrating into the new society than the other immigrant children. The reactions of boys from such unsettled backgrounds is haphazard. They often try to escape from the home as soon as possible. They learn the local dialect and join street gangs. The cases of juvenile delinquency are more common among such children than among those with more stable family life.

Both the parents and children are deprived of the protection of the extended family and they fail in adjusting to the new style of life in the French society where the nuclear family is the norm.

### **Racism**

More generally, North African or Maghrebi immigrants, originating from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, constitute at least 40%, or more than a million and a half of the foreign resident population. This accounts for approximately 8 percent of the total population of France. To this number we may add the growing population which is Maghrebi in origin but of French nationality. It has been estimated that there were 1.5 million Franco-Maghrebis in 1988, of this 1 million were Franco Algerians. This population accounts for the majority in the 2.53

million muslims estimated to be living in France.<sup>12</sup>

The settlement of contemporary immigrant communities, particularly Maghrebis, has raised the issues of ethnic aspirations and politics. Since the early eighties, the youth of Maghrebi origin have proclaimed their "right to difference". The so called second generation Maghrebi immigrant population have been demanding recognition of their collective cultural, ethnic and religious identities.

Discrimination and racism are perhaps the issues that defy evaluation is that they affect the daily life of immigrants. The Algerian government particularly sees racist attacks and physical violence against Algerians as the most serious problem faced by the Franco-Algerian community. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to measure the impact of such discriminations. Table 3.4 is the public opinion survey carried out by Institute National d'Etudes Demographiques" (INED) in November 1973 shortly after the racial violence in the south of France, the previous summer. In reply to the question 'what is your opinion on each of the following nationalities, good, fairly good, fairly bad or bad',<sup>13</sup> the given results were obtained. It clearly shows that the North Africans are regarded in the worst light from among the various nationalities, 55% of total population view them as either bad or fairly bad. The survey showed that 64 percent of French men thought that North Africans cannot integrate into French society and 57% disapproved of mixed marriages with

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<sup>12</sup> Miriam Feldblum, "Paradoxes of Ethnic Politics: The Case of Franco-Maghrebis in France", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.16, no.1, January 1993, p.54.

<sup>13</sup> Stephen Adler, op.cit., p.118.

Table 3.4

Attitude of French Population to various immigrant groups

	Italy	Spain	Portugal	Yugoslavia	Turkey	Black Africa	North Africa
Good	53%	55%	43%	30%	15%	28%	17%
Family Good	30%	30%	33%	21%	13%	29%	16%
Family Bad	6%	4%	10%	8%	9%	15%	34%
Bad	2%	1%	3%	2%	6%	8%	24%

Source: Stephen Adler, "International Migration and Dependence", (Gower: Westmead, 1981), p.112.

North Africans.<sup>14</sup>

Public opinion data demonstrates the general attitude of the French people towards the various nationalities. The table also reveals that Algerians are regarded less favorably than any other foreign group. Hostility towards the Algerians, like prejudice against the coloured, falls into the pattern of racialism originating as an ideological justification for colonial exploitation.<sup>15</sup> The primary function of the prejudice against immigrant workers is the concealing and legitimizing of the exploitation of their labour by alleging that they are congenitally inferior. Thus, prejudice serves the interest of the ruling class. Prejudice also concerns the attitude of the indigenous workers towards the capitalist social order. Prejudice is particularly widespread among workers, as a result of the repressive socialization process on the one hand and of their insecurity and fear of competition on the other.

Another reason for prejudice concerns the structure of the working class and the class consciousness of the indigenous workers. When workers hold a strong prejudice against their immigrant colleagues, they tend to support discriminatory measures taken by employers and government to ensure that the immigrant workers remain at the bottom of the labour market.

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p.120.

<sup>15</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, *op.cit.*, p.459.

## ECONOMIC STATUS

The way in which migration affects wages, profit, social mobility and long-terms economic growth are important factors in determining the changes in class position. The position of the migrant workers is the lowest in society and they are victims of various forms of exploitation. In spite of this, it has to be realised that in the majority of cases migration does bring them a net economic gain. This is simply because they are moving from unemployment, under employment or employment at very low wages in poor countries, to jobs in high wage economies. If there were no economic gains, migration would not have taken place or would have rapidly ceased.

Maghrebi migrant workers have played a vital role in the rapid economic growth of the industrialization of France during the Post War period. As mentioned earlier, France experienced a large influx of migrants from the underdeveloped Maghrebi countries seeking employment. This infuse was partly due to native labour shortages and downward demographic trends which forced French firms to look abroad for cheap, low skilled and relatively powerless labour.

Since the mid 1970's, industrial restructuring and the shift to more specialized, flexible production has accompanied a recomposition of the workforce, whereby fewer and skilled workers are preferred in more automated industries. Consequently, migrants have become more vulnerable to job loss.

The comparatively low-cost of social reproduction among migrants is related

to their wage structure, working conditions and considerable insecurity. Migrants are usually employed in the secondary sector of the dual labour market where the job tends to be unskilled though not always low paying. But it does connote inferior social status. They often involve hard or unpleasant working conditions and considerable insecurity. In contrast the more prestigious, skilled and high paying jobs are generally taken up by the natives. The secondary status attached to immigrants by the employers illustrates a latent racial and national prejudice that is evident in a closer examination of the economic activities. In France in the early 1970's, foreign workers were concentrated in labour intensive jobs -- in mining, metal work, and production, construction, public works and sanitation. The majority of migrant workers are manual labourers employed in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs.<sup>16</sup>

With the economic crisis of the mid 1970's, the role of the migrant labour in the French industry changed. Industrial decline and the rationalization of production led to a decrease in the employment opportunities of many sectors. This affected the migrant workers. Migrant workers vulnerability to job loss was also related to their secondary status in the labour market. The State also shifted its immigration policy restricting the influx of immigrant labour as a response to economic crisis and the decline in employment opportunities.

## Wages

Before the Second World War the typical labour market situation was one where there was a large excess of unemployment which resulted in competition between the workers for jobs. This led to low wages. But in the Post War era, the situation changed because the number of unfilled vacancies were more than the job seekers and the employers competed with each other for labour. This resulted in a rising trend with regard to wage rates.

The possibility of recruiting workers from abroad introduced a new factor. The unemployed masses of the less developed area like the Maghreb regions were a new source of labour supply. Potentially, their numbers were inexhaustible and they formed a type of industrial reserve force consisting of desperate, impoverished men, who could be recruited or sent according to the employer's interest.

In practice, immigration to France since the war has not been on a scale sufficient to reduce wages or even to stop them from rising. This has been mainly because of two reasons, firstly institutional restrictions made by the government and organised labour have prevented immigrant being used as a measure to reduce wages. Secondly labour is a heterogenous commodity -- the quality of work varies and depends on many factors so that immigrants are not always substitutable for indigenous workers.

The wages of the indigenous workers do not coincide with the general wage level in France, due to the fact that the wage level of immigrants is much below the

average. The immigrants are concentrated in those jobs which are no more taken up by indigenous workers due to either unpleasant working conditions or low wages. Immigrant workers have not been recruited into the economy as a whole. They are found only in low paid job sectors deserted by indigenous labour force. Once the immigrants entered these sectors, the lack of qualification, education, discrimination in employment and promotion regulations restricting occupational mobility resulted in their permanent stagnancy.

The large-scale entry of poorly educated men, lacking industrial training and experience, increased the supply of the unskilled labour force at a time when it would otherwise have declined. This resulted in keeping the wages of the unskilled workers low. Therefore, immigration aided in maintaining wage differences between skilled and unskilled work. Immigrants are concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled work. The benefit of the maintenance of high wage differential between skilled and unskilled work goes to the indigenous workers, who are more likely to have the education and training necessary to get skilled jobs.<sup>17</sup>

### **Unemployment**

In France, the national and ethnic minorities always tend to have higher unemployment ratio than the majority group, particularly during periods of economic crises. In 1954, foreigners formed 4 percent of the active population and 6.5 percent of the total unemployed. These figures exclude Algerians, whose rate

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<sup>17</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, *op.cit*, p.381.



of unemployment was even higher. They represented 1.3 percent of the active population and 4.1 percent of the unemployed.<sup>18</sup> In 1967, the Ministry of Social Affairs estimated that 18 percent of the Algerian workers were unemployed. Most of them came to France clandestinely. They spend months looking for a job and even when they are recruited, they do not exist officially. Ironically, even their unemployment remains hidden and they are often near starvation by the time they either find work or give up and drift home.<sup>19</sup>

France has very restrictive regulations regarding the employment of foreigners. They are completely barred from certain occupations like civil services and the legal profession. Certain other occupations are reserved for persons holding French qualification. Holders of foreign qualifications requires special permission to work as doctors, nurses, architects, accountants etc, and such permission is rarely granted. The aim of this regulation is to keep the foreigners out of certain desirable occupations, although this effects only a small propotion of immigrants.<sup>20</sup>

The majority of the immigrant workers who come to France clandestinely are initially in a very vulnerable position. On arrival, they get very bad jobs at very low wages as they are without papers and documents and are totally at the mercy of the employers who are willing to take them. Subsequently, if they become regularized, they are bound to these jobs and cannot leave them easily for better

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid. pp.87

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p.90.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 104.

options. Sometimes, skilled workers are compelled to take up jobs, that are not in accordance with their qualification. On the other hand, the workers who continue to be employed clandestinely are in a worse situation. They are paid very low rates and cannot take the help of law in case of disputes. They are completely dependent on their employer and have no job security. The number of such domestic workers have increased as a result of the regulations which has made regularization more difficult.

### **POLITICAL STATUS**

In its infancy immigration into France had been conceived in terms of permanent settlement of families, to turn foreigners into French men and women. As a result immigration accounted for a large share in the annual rates of total population increase. The present century particularly the decades since 1945 have seen major transformations in the French economy, wherein the historical evolution of capitalism created a particular sectoral labour demand. Some aspects of the labour flow have indeed been the result of migrant workers responding to the short term labour demand without much need to long terms strategies and government policies.<sup>21</sup>

It must be emphasized that the migrants have been accorded different legal statuses according to their place of origin. The citizens of the colonies and former colonies of France, have been given special status. The most important group in

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<sup>21</sup> Philip, E. Ogden, op.cit., p.297.

this section was the Algerians who had French citizenship and unimpeded entry to France until the Algerian independence. Consequently, they did not experience the full weight of legislation designed to control foreign immigration as a whole.

After 1974, the termination of foreign migration was followed by a new phase of migration associated with the process of family reunification. The situation of the migrants which had initially been linked primarily to the world of labour was transformed into a problem of integration into the society as a whole. The year 1980 initiated a period of high profile controversies regarding immigration. The passage of the "Bonnet law" in January 1980, after a year of parliamentary debates, hunger strikes and protests in the suburbs of Lyon, underlined the problems of the so called "second generation". It sought to address the demands of the illegal immigrants for the regularization of their position.

The settlement of this contemporary immigrant communities, particularly the Marghrebis, has raised many issues regarding their aspirations and politics. Since the early eighties, the youth of Maghrebi origin have proclaimed their "right to difference". This 'second generation' or 'Beurs' of the Maghrebi immigrant population have been demanding the acceptance of their collective cultural, ethnic and religious identities. They account for approximately 40 percent of the Maghrebi population in France and a large proportion among them are technically French, and thus hold a dual nationality. These groups have advocated a collective mode of political participation, through marches, protests and new associations. Later they

got engaged in electoral negotiations with the major political parties.<sup>22</sup>

The presence of the immigrants in the political system constitutes the other major challenge to the traditional French proscription against the public emergence of internal yet differentiated communities. More than any other phenomenon the emergence of the immigrants politically and the growth and efficacy of their association movements have led to speculations that the possibilities for ethnic politics are now opening up in France. The incidence of the Beur vote, their electoral organizations, their demands for the mosque, their collective mode of participation and their visibility as a specific group in French politics fits the ethnic politics format. Since the early eighties, especially from 1983 onwards, this associations and movements has been the way in which the immigrant groups and emergent beurs have emerged as pressure forces in French politics.<sup>23</sup>

Groups such as SOS-Racisme, have politicized issues which were previously relegated to the private sphere. Issues such as sexuality, interpersonal-relations, life style and culture were brought into the public arena. Islam has also played a significant role in organizing immigrant communities in French public life. Since the 1970's there have has been growing number of mosques, Koranic courses, new Islamic organizations, and demands for religious and cultural rights. The leaders of political social and cultural associations, like France plus, SOS-Racisme, FASTI,

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<sup>22</sup> Miriam Feldblum, op.cit., p.54.

<sup>23</sup> Catherine, W., Dewenden, "Immigration Policy and Issues of Nationality", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.14, no.3, July 1991, p.320.

Texline, JALB, as well as those heading the broadcasting stations, magazines and community centers became cultural and political elites in these populations.<sup>24</sup>

In organizing themselves on an ethnic basis in French politics, Franco-Maghrebis have centered their identity around muslim Maghrebi culture. When the association "Generation Beur" was created in 1988, it insisted on its muslim character even as it anchored itself firmly on the terrain of republican secular values. Though almost all the members of the population seemed to define themselves as muslims, only about half of them were true, practicing muslims. Belonging to this muslim Maghrebi community served as a functional entry into the sphere of French politics. The national organization "France plus" created in 1985, was composed largely of those people who had Maghrebi origin and dual nationality. This group was actively engaged in electoral politics. For the 1988 presidential elections, they organized constant drives to register the million or more Franco-Maghrebis, and in 1989 municipal elections, they not only organized their own candidate lists but they negotiated with parties on both the left and mainstream right for the electoral offices. Alongside its identification with the Muslim-Maghrebi culture, the organization has been insistently secular and integrationist. France plus clearly uses the ethnic politics.<sup>25</sup>

The idea of new citizenship emerged in 1986, in the context of a proposal

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp.59.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 61.

for redefining the criteria of political membership and participation. This was largely initiated by those who were more or less at the periphery of the French political system, namely "the second generation" living in the urban suburbs and the bi-nationals who are very active in local associations. This new citizenship is viewed as an answer to the crisis of democracy. The debate around the reform of the nationality code has contributed to a discussion on the possibility of dissociating nationality and citizenship. The second generation is claiming a more participative citizenship founded more on residence than on nationality and affiliation, within a multicultural society. They argue that local social movements are promoting a citizenship for all those who live together with the same problems. They have also introduced the idea that a new process of politicization must develop. It should be founded on concrete aims and practices with the right to democracy resting less on of the technicalities having a citizenship than in actually being citizens. The social actors, while claiming to be French, tend to advance exclusivist values such as 'being muslims in France' and 'muslims of France'. At the same time they advance the values of democracy, of the 1789 revolution, and of Europe. Some of them have become mediators in the cultural and political spheres.

The history of French trade union's response to the foreign workers has been one wherein we see an initial outright opposition. This stemmed from the long established belief that immigrant workers bring disadvantage to the indigenous labour force by keeping down the wages, causing redundancy and being an alternate

source of labour in times of recession and even disputes with the capitalist class. Internationalism has always been a strong cry that emanated from the labour movement. This was put to the test during the French trade union's approach towards the immigrant labour. Over the past two decades trade unions have tried to balance their internationalist position with their protectionist policy. It was important for trade unions to be seen as representing all the workers in the interest of solidarity and negotiating strength. In order to avoid splits within the working class, and consequently reduce their bargaining power, trade unions sought the membership of all workers. However, the two decades after 1945 witnessed an almost total opposition towards immigrant workers.

The two major trade unions of France -- Confederation Generale Dutravail (CGT), and Confederation Francaise Democratiquo du Travail (CGT) -- are closely aligned to French communist party. Over the last twenty years, they have tried to organise the immigrant workers. The CGT has its own language groups and foreign workers commissions and it opposes any foreign worker organizations outside its own regular organization. This policy has brought it into conflict with autonomous foreign workers group.<sup>26</sup> CFDT, formerly a catholic oriented trade union has now become a radical socialist union. The CGT has attracted muslim workers particularly Algerians. The CFDT differs from the CGT in certain demands for immigrant workers. It supports equal political rights, and permits more autonomy

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<sup>26</sup> Dave Eyde, op.cit., p.69.

to foreign workers within the workplace and also regionally. Foreign worker delegates are permitted, to form nationality groups. This is a move which CGT does not permit. The basic demand of both the major trade unions has been that foreign and indigenous workers should receive equal pay and working conditions. But even though they have made the demand, the increase in labour supply has not prevented the average wage levels from being kept down so as to sustain the health the economy as a whole.<sup>27</sup>

The major trade unions were opposed to immigration unless there was full employment in France. Even in 1965, the CGT expressed hostility to immigration. Later they organised a national conference on the problems faced by the foreign labourers, where in they recognized the need to organise the new workers. There were also suggestions that the immigrant workers should be prepared to stike for better wages despite their precarious legal position.<sup>28</sup>

The unions were united in the opinion that foreign workers should be allowed fuller participation at the workplace. Under EEC legislation, immigrant workers are entitled to vote in workplace elections, provided they are community nationals. In France, them should be from Algeria and certain other African countries. The stipulation in the regulation is that they should be able to read and write. The French government added the stipulation that they should be able to read

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp.70.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, pp.70.



and write French. This restricted the electoral participation considerably.<sup>29</sup>

On the other hand, the foreign workers are organised into their own associations which have exerted some influence on the government. The most notable of these organization is the AAE (Amical does Algerians on Europe). This is a quasi governmental organization whose representatives are almost accorded diplomatic status by the French government. There are close links between the AAE and the Algerian government, which use the AAE as a major instrument for the implementation of the government policy towards Algerian nationals abroad. The AAE trade union branch UGTA (Union Generale des Travailleurs Algerians) has close links with the major French trade unions, there by facilitating the intervention of the AAE in industrial disputes. There are numerous other such organizations in France, but their major role is so as to keep a check on the activities of their workers in France to prevent opposition to their government.<sup>30</sup> The French government welcomes these organizations because they tend to promote the idea of the foreign worker's neutrality in the host society affairs as a corollary of being loyal to the homeland.

## CONCLUSION

This analysis of the socio-economic and political status of the immigrants shows that an overwhelming majority of them are manual workers usually,

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp.71.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, pp.108.

unskilled or semi-skilled. In France, the older established European migrant groups - Italians, Spaniards, Poles tend to have rather higher socio-economic status than the Maghrebies. Immigrants tend to be at a disadvantage with regard to unemployment more frequently and for longer periods. The four main causes identified for the low position of Maghrebi immigrants in the labour market are: lack of qualification, their special aims, official restriction and discrimination. The last two causes are the result of the policies and attitude towards these immigrants by the French government.

Since the immigrant people and the indigenous people tend to be employed in different sectors, there is a division between immigrants and indigenous workers in social relationship and class organization. This, along with difference in language, culture and aims hinder the communication between the immigrants and indigenous people. This in turn affects their participation in the labour movement in some areas. The working class has a strong, traditional hostility towards the immigrants. Racism isolates immigrants from other workers and from the labour movement and it also threatens their livelihood. If the immigrants' difficulties are due to their low income, bad housing conditions, lack of social facilities and the absence of serenity resulting from the discriminatory government policies, then these difficulties can only be removed by a radical change in the position of the immigrants in the society. Migrants could be given training which would be useful if they return home. They could be given incentives to invest their savings in

industrial development. Industries could be situated in areas where the native country could utilize the skills of returning migrants. This would help to even out regional difference in income distribution. But this is only possible if there is a basic change in the relationship between rich and poor countries.

## **Chapter-4**

# **IMPLICATIONS FOR SENDING AND RECEIVING COUNTRIES**

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **Implications for Sending and Receiving Countries**

Migration from one region to another affects both the regions in a number of ways. The socio-economic and political spheres of the immigrant as well as the emigrant country is faced with a series of implications in this process of displacement. It usually involves the transfer of human resources from the poor countries to the rich. The skill and labour of these migrants provide valuable contributions in the various sectors of the country of emigration. Also, their remittances provide valuable investment capital to assist the industrial development of the country of origin. This aids in reducing disbalance in the labour market caused by the transfer of human resources. On the other hand, in case of the country of immigration migration affects the demography of the region. It also effects the political as well as the cultural spheres of the receiving country. It alters the wage level, the occupational promotion of the indigenious workers and the balance of payments in several ways -- favourable and unfavourable. Further it increases the productivity due to the increase in the labour force. The chapter analyse these implications in detail. Schematically, the chapter is divided into two parts. Firstly, the implications for the sending country are dealt with, secondly, the implications for the receiving country are looked into.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SENDING COUNTRY

### The Transfer of Human Resources

The process of migration involves the transfer of a very valuable economic resource namely human labour. In this case the human labour moves from the poor Maghreb region to France. The workers from the Maghreb countries who migrate to France are mostly unemployed in their country of origin. However, this does not change the fact that the country has invested considerable sum of money on their upbringing. The cost of upbringing includes not only the feeding, clothing and housing of person but also the health, education and other services provided to him until he reaches working age. Consequently, France enjoys the bloom of youth in its labour markets. These young workers make important contributions to the labour force, production and capital accumulation of France. This shift in the potential labour force is a loss for the country of emigration, i.e. the Maghreb region, as it has invested social capital in these people.

Thus, the transfer of human resources involves a very large economic cost for the sending countries. Yet many employers and economists speak of migration as a form of development aid for these developing countries. If this is so, then migration must have considerable benefits which out-weigh the cost of the social capital invested on a migrant by the country of origin.<sup>1</sup>

In the year of 1975, the total percentage of immigrant Algerian men over the

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe, (Oxford University Press: London, 1973), p.411.

age of 16 years was 79.92%. This indicates that the majority of the immigrants were from an age group which is often the peak time of their working capacity. This can be seen as Algeria's loss in that a major chunk of their active population as well as the substantial amount social capital that was invested has been depleted before the country could rake in returns.

In 1970, France received young workers whose "economic value" was high but whose rearing had cost France absolutely nothing. The bonus to the French economy by the arrival of the Algerian section of its labour workforce was estimated at 375 million dollars. The "cost of rearing" had been calculated at the Algerian rate. To calculate at the cost of rearing an indigenous worker in France over a period of 15 years the sum needed to be increased by a factor of five. The Overall economic benefits have also been great for France.<sup>2</sup>

### **Population and Labour force**

It is often claimed that the process of emigration helps to lessen the population pressures in overcrowded areas. This takes place in two ways; firstly, family emigration leads to a permanent reduction in the number of inhabitants. Secondly, when young men who are single, emigrate to other countries to work for a few years their marriage age gets raised. On the other hand, if they are married, they do not procreate as much as usual, due to separation from their wives. The temporary migration of Maghrebis to France without any dependents is very

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<sup>2</sup> Dave Eyde, Immigrant Labour and Government Policies: The Case of Federal Republic of the Germany and France, (Gower: Aldershot, 1987), p.451.

common. Such an emigration does not have a significant effect on the population situation of the Maghreb region where population size and its rate of increase is a big problem.

The effects of emigration on the labour market is of greater significance. Unemployment is the most cardinal motivation for migration. Governments too favour emigration because they hope that it will help to reduce their unemployment problem. The advantage for the migrants is clear. It is possible that the peasants and workers who remain at home may also benefit. A reduction to labour surplus may lessen competition between day labourers and push wages-up.<sup>3</sup>

As the impact of emigration on the economy as a whole tended to decline, it became clear to the planners that the employment situation in Algeria was still critical and that the pressure for emigration outstripped both the available contingent and the ability of the ongoing plans to keep pace with the arrival of new workers in the labour market. By 1973, the Algerians were in a situation where unemployment and migration pressure had been hardly at all touched by the planning of the previous seven years, although some regional situation has been dealt with quite successfully. Tizi ouzer is one outstanding example; having actually refused its share of the contingent and having been obliged to import some labour as a result of shortages. The Planning Directorate estimated that perhaps 70 percent

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<sup>3</sup> Stephen Castls and Godula Kosacks, *op.cit.*, p.412.



of the applicants for emigration in 1973 in fact already had jobs.<sup>4</sup>

The migration pressure that Algeria will experience clearly depends to the considerable extent on the success of "Agriculture revolution" in providing employment to the rural communities, thus slowing down internal migration towards the towns. In general, the modernizing and reforming of the agricultural system is long overdue.

The policy of reinsertion can be viewed as one vital step which Algeria has taken towards the ending of the massive migratory flows that have characterized its history for most of the 20th century. However, reinsertion still pertains only to skilled workers and so far the numbers involved have been quite small. In 1972-73, for example, the number of Algerian workers in France who requested jobs back home in Algeria was recorded as being only 614, of whom 73 percent were in any case unskilled workers.<sup>5</sup> The Algerian development is currently attuned to doing without emigration all together. But there is little doubt that doing without emigration may well hurt the Algerian employment situation.

The Algerian position is one in which only an economic and social development can provide an adequate solution for its rapid population growth. If implemented, it is felt that, the Algerians can support a much larger population and provide it with a high standard of living. The fact, however, is that the rate at

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<sup>4</sup> Stephen Adler, Internatitonal Migration and Dependence (Gower: Westmead, 1981), p.167.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p.171.

which Algerians enter the job market and the rate at which new jobs are created determines how many Algerians each year will be able to find work. Subsequently, the unemployed will become the likely candidates for emigration. Pressure to emigrate remains high in Algeria because hitherto the job creation has not kept pace with population growth. In the future, the governments should present realistic policies in relation to its success in providing the groundwork for future creation of employment opportunities.

It should be understood that emigration does not merely relieve Maghrebi countries with high unemployment of their surplus unskilled labour. On the contrary, the government and the recruiting agencies of the receiving countries make great efforts to attract the skilled and even the professional manpower.

### **Acquisition of Skills by Migrant Workers**

One of the most important potential benefits for the sending countries is the acquisition of vocational training and industrial skills by the migrants. If this takes place, it could provide an invaluable contribution to the economic development of the countries concerned.<sup>6</sup> A very high proportion of immigrant workers in France never progress beyond unskilled status. Even those who do gain promotion, the majority becomes semi-skilled workers. Semi-skilled means nothing more than knowing brief instructions as to how to carry out a specific operation, in a specific factory. This cannot be considered as adequate training for fulfilling the needs of

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<sup>6</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, *op.cit.*, p.414.

the home country in terms of skilled workers. This process of acquiring skills takes so long that the people concerned often settle down by the time their training is completed and never return to their native country. Therefore very few migrant workers who actually obtain training returns home.

Even if migrants do acquire skills, it is far from certain that these will correspond to the needs of the country of origin. More than one-third of all Algerian workers in France are employed in the building sector. Upto two-third of all Algerians in France who receive training at official centers learn the building trade. In Algeria there has been a pronounced decline in this sector in recent years and there is already a labour surplus, to this skilled labour. Therefore Algerians who gains skill in building work are likely to find themselves unemployed on returning home.<sup>7</sup>

It is extremely difficult to compare the real benefits that the various nationalities derive from adult training facilities in France. This is partly because of the diverse nature of the facilities available. Some are run by the Ministry of Labour; some by the Ministry of Education; a large number are organised by private groups and many are administered by individual factories and industrial enterprises for their own workers. In addition, most of what the workers get out of these training facilities depends upon what they take in with, them to begin with in the way of a) literacy b) breadth of industrial experience already acquired and c)

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p.415.

general social conditions and psychological factors.

Most of Maghrebis who enter France are either illiterates or have very basic education which are not in accordance with the educational qualifications required for any vocational training provided in France. Secondly, they lack the industrial experience at the time of arrival to France or their experience is not suitable for the French industries. Most important is their social conditions which hinders. Their attainment of skills and vocational training. They hardly have any motivation for undergoing training because it means lower wages and no overtime for a certain period. If they have their families with them, they can hardly dedicate all their non-working time to further their education, and if their families are in the native countries, the financial burden of supporting themselves and the families as well as saving some money makes it impossible for them not to do overtime. Therefore such workers simply do not have any time or energy left for the vocational training courses. Hence, it is mostly the young single immigrant workers who are likely to attend such courses.

Algeria has gained significantly from the potential of the repatriate workers who are better trained and more highly skilled than when they first left Algeria. The Algerian government made a concerted effort to attract the skilled workers who are in France back to Algeria. However, Madelline Trebous points out that there exist serious imbalances between the potential demands in Algeria and the number of expatriate skilled labour available. In the building and construction sector and to

some extent in metal working, there are more workers available in Europe than Algeria is likely to need over the next several years. To some extent, of course, Trebous' reasoning is circular, since the very reason for the departure of this type of labour was its very inability to find employment in Algeria. But Trebous makes the perceptive that there is much wasteful duplication of training in France which needlessly mimics skills already being acquired at home. Algerians are underrepresented in branches of activity in which Algeria suffers the most acute shortage.<sup>8</sup>

Similar imbalances occur in the skill levels also. The trades in which Algeria will probably be able to meet its requirements from domestic training programmes like building and metal are those which have the highest concentration of skilled workers in France. Those in which there are likely to be shortages of skilled workers in Algeria are activities which only have relatively few skilled Algerians in France. In the absence of policies to coordinate employment and training of the migrants in France keeping in view the future labour needs of the Maghreb region, only a few of the workers gain skills which can be useful upon return. The tendency of the returning migrants to set up small unproductive enterprise, particularly in the primary and tertiary sectors, is most likely to retard than assist economic development.

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<sup>8</sup> Stephen Adler, *op.cit.*, p.205.

## **Remittances**

The amount of money sent home to their dependents by the migrant workers is considered to be one of the most important benefits of migration. Besides improving the standard of living of the families, these remittances are said to ameliorate the balance of payments and to provide investment capital for assisting the industrial development. It is quite difficult to judge the scale of contribution made by remittances to industrial investment. Improvement in the balance of payment may help to make available the foreign currency which is required to buy machinery from the developed countries. But it is important to examine as to how the remittances are actually spent. In Algeria about two million people in rural areas live from such remittances. In some villages as much as 80 percent of total income came from migrant's transfer. In the first place the money is likely to be spent on better food, clothes and the like.<sup>9</sup>

Once the basic necessities have been fulfilled, the migrants usually spend large amounts on durable consumer goods. This is a form of conspicuous consumption which does nothing to raise the living standards in the long-run.<sup>10</sup> In general however, it would appear that migrant's remittances are not invested productively, although they certainly do help to improve the living standards of migrants' families and thus provide reasonable subsistence to a part of the

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<sup>9</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, *op.cit.*, p.418.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, pp.419.

population which would otherwise be destitute. There is a possibility that, when coupled with the rural income, the migrants' remittances may stimulate growth and productivity, especially in agriculture. It seems just as likely that the increased purchasing power of the migrant families will cause price-rise and will therefore redistribute food and land in their favour, though at the cost of the rest of the population.<sup>11</sup>

- Table 4.1

Transfers of Funds by Algerian Migrant workers to Algeria

1955	350 million NF
1958	400 million NF
1961	550 million NF
1963	600 million NF
1964	800 million NF
1965	707 million NF
1966	846 million NF
1967	967 million NF
1968	903 million NF
1969	1099 million NF
1970	1022 million NF
1971	1087 million NF
1972	1229 million NF
1973	1158 million NF

*Source:* Stephen Adler, International Migration and Dependence (Gower: Westmead, 1981), p.198.

N.B. Since the devaluation of the franc in 1968, the Algerian government maintains a special exchange rate at the old parity of 1 NF= 1 DA for the transfers of migrant workers, instead of the new rate of 1 DA = 1.20 NF.

<sup>11</sup> Stephen Adler, *op.cit.*, p.197.

From the Algerian point of view, the transfer of revenues by the Algerian workers in France has been an extremely important source of income for the country. Table 4.1 shows the amount transferred annually from 1955 to 1973. In absolute terms, the amounts transferred have doubled between 1963 and 1972, keeping in pace with the increase in the Algerian population in France in those years. But, in terms of the percentage of Gross Domestic Product they have fallen from 6 per cent or more of GDP in 1964 and 1967, to just 4.3 per cent in 1973. The remittances paid for 31 percent of Algeria's imports in 1968, but this was reduced to 18 percent in 1973. In 1968 the transfer of Migrants' savings was almost equivalent to the tax revenues received by the Algerian government from the oil companies operating there. By 1973 migrants' transfers accounted to only a quarter of the amount collected through petrol taxes.

Emigration is no longer considered as a high priority by Algerian government. Although unemployment remains a crucial and perhaps a growing problem, the government is trying to combat the situation internally through the large profits from its oil and gas industry. Through this endeavour they hope to lay the foundation of the industrial economy. Thus, the dependence on emigration as a safety valve for unemployment has diminished along with the country's reliance on migrants' transfers as a prop for its economy.

### **IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RECEIVING COUNTRY**

In looking at the effects on the receiving country, we need to distinguish



between migrant workers and indigenous workers, because their interests are often different or even contradictory. The general position of the migrant workers is the lowest in the society and they are exploited in various ways. Despite this, it is clear that a majority of migrant workers gain economically. The reason for this is that they move from unemployment, underemployment or employment at every low wages in their countries of origin which are poor and underdeveloped, to employment in high wage economies.

The immigration influence the economic interests of the landowner in the receiving countries. In developed countries, the supply of land is not elastic. Any increase in population - whether caused by immigration or by some other factor - will increase the demand for land. Changes in the distribution of the population or the in industrial structure may increase the value of land in some areas - especially the declining agricultured regions. Thus, most landowners will benefit economically from immigration as the average land value rise.<sup>12</sup>

Immigration has a direct impact on the wages and profit levels. Along with this, it affects the employment structure and may alter the wage differentials between different types of work. Immigration affects different industrial sectors variedly. It may change the relative profitability of the various types of investments for the capitalists.

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<sup>12</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, *op.cit.*, p.375.

## **Wages and Profits**

The Economic expansion since 1945 resulted in a long period of almost uninterrupted full employment in most of the west European countries. Prior to the Second World War, there was a large scale unemployment and lesser number of vacancies in a companies, resulting in competition between workers to get jobs. This led to low wages. But with the economic expansion the scenario changed. There were more number of unfilled vacancies than job seekers and there was competition among employers for labour. Subsequently, there was a rising trend in the wage rates. The recruitment of workers from abroad was conceived to meet this demand. The unemployed masses from less developed areas were a new source of labour supply. Their number was inexhaustible. It was seen as an external industrial reserve army which consisted of desperate and impoverished men, who could be recruited or sent away at the employers wish.

The immigration of Maghrebies to France was not sufficient to affect the wage system. There are two main reasons behind this: firstly, the government made institutional restrictions to immigrant labour. This prevented the immigrants from being used as wage cutters and have restricted their freedom to enter the country or to take up certain occupations. Secondly, the labour is not a homogenous commodity; the quality of work varies and it depends upon many factors. It meant that the immigrants could not always stand in for indigenous workers. Ironically, instead of effecting a reduction in wages, immigration helped in slowing down their

growth.<sup>13</sup>

Maghrebi immigrant workers are concentrated in jobs which are no more taken up by the indigenous workers either due to unpleasant working conditions or low wages. The immigrant workers have not been recruited throughout the economy but mainly in low paid job sectors. Once the immigrants join these sectors, they stagnate due to lack of qualification, education, discrimination in employment and promotion and also the regulations restricting occupational mobility.

The concentration of immigrant workers in low-wage occupations has two major implications. Firstly, it affects the evolution of wage differentials between the various sectors of employment. Secondly, it enhances the promotion of indigeneous workers.

The large scale entry of poorly educated Maghrebi workers lacking industrial training and experience increases the supply of unskilled labour at a time when it would otherwise decline. This helped in keeping the wages of unskilled work down. Thus, immigration tends also to maintain wage differential between skilled and unskilled work. Since these immigrant workers are concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled work, the benefit of maintaining a high wage differential between skilled and unskilled work goes to indigenous workers, who are likely to be educated and trained for skilled jobs.

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p.379.

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p.379.

## **Inflation**

The issue is whether immigration leads to monetary inflation or disinflation; as to whether it has a negative impact on the balance of payments or whether it causes a holding back of improvement in productivity. There is no general agreement on this debate. Some economists think that immigration is disinflationary; others assert that in the short run it is inflationary whereas in long run it is disinflationary.

The opinion that immigration is disinflationary is put most forcefully in Kindleberger. According to this theory the availability of additional labour supplies, which not being the initial cause of economic expansion in western Europe, has been the main factor in sustaining growth. Immigration, is of course, only one source of labour supply among others, but it is certainly an important one. Countries which have been able to secure large amounts of additional labour have grown fast; those with limited opportunities of increasing labour force have grown slowly. The mechanism by which abundant labour supply has a disinflationary effect and encourages growth, in Kindleberger's model, through holding back wages increase. When and if labour supplies become less flexible, growth rates are likely to slow as wages and profit falls. This according to kindlberger is the cause of the slowing down of European growth in mid-sixties.<sup>14</sup>

Economist who think that immigration leads to inflation tend to approach the

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p.385.

question from the demand side, rather than the supply side. This view agrees that additional labour supply raises total output but holds that this new output is more than outweighed by the consumption of the immigrants, so that, the output per head falls.<sup>15</sup> This means that immigration creates excess demand leading to price rise and inflation. Immigration tends to redistribute the income in favour of the capital by holding down the wages and increasing profits. In this model, the excess demand actually does not result from personal consumption of the immigrants who secure low wages as saving is their priority. Rather, this excess demand comes from the capital investment required to employ them. Whether immigration is inflationary in the short term but not in the long term or visa-versa depends on whether this additional investment on employing the immigrants will take place immediately after immigration or later on.

France does not appear to fit in Kindelberger model prior to 1957, as there was fast growth without large apparent increases in the labour supplies, until inflationary pressure brought about a slow down in 1963.

### **Productivity**

Increase in the labour force, whether caused by immigration or by some other factor, is likely to lead to an increase in the total output. Immigration affects productivity in contrastive ways, some beneficial and other harmful.

The economy can be divided into three sectors: the primary which

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p.386.

agriculture and extractive industries; the secondary consisting of manufacturing and construction and the tertiary comprise of the various services. The shift from the primary to the secondary sector is followed by an enormous growth in productivity. However the tertiary sector is less productive than the secondary sector. Therefore, a shift from the secondary to the tertiary sector means a reduction in production. It implies that an increase in the proportion of labour force in manufacturing may help more in raising the productivity rather than an actual increase in labour in all sectors. In fact, the immigrant workers do help to maintain and even increase the proportion of workers in the secondary sector. In France, the majority of the Maghrebi immigrant workers are engaged in the secondary sector. This has had beneficial effects on the productivity of the whole economy.

Immigration helps in improving the industrial capital in various ways. Immigrant workers help to enhance productivity in the case of a any new investment regulation which allows the recruitment of immigrant workers in a situation where indigenous labour is not available. This implies the presence of surplus capacity, or at least, the pressure from industrialists who realize that when labour shortages exist, growth is constrained evenwhen capital is available. Thus, immigrants are employed in response to such labour shortages in specific sectors which are no more taken up by the indigenous workers. The immigrant workers keep the production going in these sectors. If these neglected sectors were crippled, it would have adversely affected other related industries. This implies that

immigrant workers are of considerable importance. The migrant workers also develop shift working which help in increasing their income along improving the working capacity of the industries:-

A majority of the immigrant workers lack education, qualification and skills. This tends to reduce the average level of skill of the total labour force in the immigration country. This determines productivity. Actually immigration hardly has enough influence to hamper development even to a small extent because a majority of these immigrant workers are at the bottom of the labour market. On the other hand, they help to release indigenous workers from unskilled jobs.

If the increase in the labour supply reduces the growth in wage rates during periods of economic expansion, than it must also have the effect of keeping the profit rates up. The redistributive effect of immigration, therefore, increases the supply of capital in two ways: firstly, it increases profits as a proportion of the turnover, allowing increased reinvestment by industrialists; secondly, it raises the rate of return of investment, encouraging people to save and invest a high propotion of their incomes. Low wages and high profits are also likely to pull in money from abroad, providing further capital. With additional labour, industrialists are likely to expand as quickly as possible using traditional methods, without making great efforts to achieve rationalization and save labour.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p.403.



## **Impact on Social Environment**

Mass migration of Maghrebis to France has brought about certain problems to the indigenous population. Most of these immigrant workers are in low paid jobs and their priority is to save enough money to send home for their dependents. Therefore they live in accommodations with low rents and poor condition. Such accommodations are termed as ghettos or bidonvilles. A very few number of new buildings have been built to cope with the pressure of accommodation generated by immigration. Immigrants on the whole get low-grade housing, which might have been demolished if this pressure was not there, on the other would not have been used for accomdationy. Acceptance of such housing by immigrants have actually improved the housing standards of the indeginous population, because this made capital available for these indigenous people by renting and selling the low-grade housing. This facilitated the indigenous people to achieve newer and better housing in the suburbs. But the poorer indigenous people, who are not in a position to let or sell slum accommodation to immigrants are at disadvantage due to the high rents and also the delay in the clearance of slums. Therefore the low-wage earners and the unemployed lower classes have faced a worsening of living conditions.

In all the receiving countries, there is a popular belief that the immigrant workers have a very high rate of criminality. Therefore, indigenous population have a hostile attitude towards the immigrants, who are not only pecieved as criminals but also as unwilling and unable to integrate themselves into the receiving society.

On the other hand, the high rate of criminality amongst immigrant is because their chance of prosecution are far less than for indigenous people. An other reason is that the immigrant workers come into conflicts with the law because of their ignorance of the foreign law.

In recent decades there have been many challenges to the dominant French ideologies and institutional arrangements that refuse the notion and practice of ethnic politics. Some have arisen out of the general trends of the changing societal developments, the demands by the French groups for equality and the necessity of the state to manage and not to ignore the differences that ensue from the flow and settlement of contemporary immigrants in France. The most important ones have been those involving changes in institutional practice as the state has been confronted with managing differences. Also visible are the changes in the political process, as the 'association movements' and activities of the young immigrants and dual national generations emerged in the 1980s demanding for their cultural, ethnic and religious identities. These trends gave rise to the paradoxes of ethnic politics in France.<sup>17</sup>

## CONCLUSION

In the country of origin, the main economic benefits are experienced by the migrants and their families themselves. The alleviation of unemployment is also one of the gains. But it is uncertain as to whether migration helps in raising the income

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<sup>17</sup> Miriam Feldblum, "Paradoxes of Ethnic Politics: The Case of Franco-Maghrebies in France" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol.16, no.1, January 1993, p.56.

of the rest of the population. On the other hand, it has been seen that, in the receiving country migration leads to unequal distribution of income and the subsequent fall in the income of a certain group. Mostly the migrants the impact of migration on development is more important. Migrants' remittances might bring an indirect benefit by improving the balance of payments. An adverse outcome, however, is that the migrants rarely gain useful training which may fit into the need to country of emigration or even their native land if they choose to come back. It is also seen that their saving rarely provides capital for industrial development. Migration brings certain major disadvantages to the country of origin. First of all, there is an enormous transfer of human capital. In the case of the Maghrebi countries, where a major chunk of the people are unskilled the youngest and the most productive section who could have an important role to play in the development are displaced to another country.

In fact, the continuing migratory trend has its roots in traditional colonialism which took labour as well natural resources from the countries it dominated. The present day neo-colonialism still extracts capital from the underdeveloped countries in various ways, the main one being trade termed as fixed by the developed countries. The transfer of human resources in the form of migrant workers is an important part of this transaction. Thus, migration belongs to the neo-colonial system that exploiting the wealth of the third world.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosacks, Immigrant workers and class structure in western Europe (Oxford University Press, London, 1973), p.428.

This does not mean that migration must inevitably be a detriment for the underdeveloped countries. On the contrary, migration could be channelised as an aid for development. If the migrant gets to be trained in sectors which correspond the needs of home country, he could be an asset on return. But this can happen only if there is a based change in the relationship between the rich and the poor countries. Coordinated international policies providing technical assistance, training and investment could make migration an important development aid for backward regions. But the existing pattern of relationship between two world make these chances very remote.

## **Chapter-5**

# **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

## **CHAPTER V**

### **Summary and Conclusion**

The process of migration, as it has been observed in the study, ensues with the large scale displacement of social groups from one region to another. The concept can, for the purpose of analysis, be narrowed down to the movement of one nationality into a minority status within another nationality. Migration, which has been one of the defining traits of humans since time immemorial has been conceptualized as having its roots in a wide variety of reasons. If the travels of the early man was in search of greener pastures and more fertile land, Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt for a religio-politico-motive. Coming down in history, we see the large scale migration of the Irish into the new world (the Americas), once again to escape religious prosecution. The instances of colonial migration in search of wealth and the accompanying power is too numerous and obvious that it does not need an explanation. However, what has to be emphatically understood is that any study of migration especially in the post-colonial era has to be approached from political economy perspective.

This onus on economics is fundamental in the sense that all the modern patterns of migration, especially those from the ex-colonies of the erstwhile great maritime powers, have an underlying market reason. Coming down to the issue of the Maghreb influx to France, we see that it falls into a larger pattern of labour migration into Europe. Though we have proofs of sporadic Magreb trade

settlements in the pre-colonial and post-colonial times, it was indeed, the industrial needs of urban Europe that paved the way for this massive flow of labour forces from the Maghreb region into France. The massive devastation that Europe inherited due to the two World Wars led to the conception of the European Recovery Programme, of which France was an integral part. The cream of the French youth had been wiped out and there ensued an unprecedented situation wherein a severe labour shortage was felt, not only in the industry but also in the various developmental sectors. It was but natural that France used the human resources of its colonies in the Maghreb region. An equally vital point that should not be missed is the fact, that unlike the usual post-colonial migrations, the Algerians are accorded a special status by which they have access to dual citizenship. This has to be understood within the context of the strategic importance that France saw in the Maghreb region. On the part of the Algerians this was a provision which was potentially a catalyst that could increase its bargaining power with a formidable ally.

The trope of migration has been theorised in many ways, the two most popular models that try to understand the economic processes underlying migration are, the Dependency Theory and the Interdependency Theory. A close analysis of the Maghrebi immigration reveals that the former fits in more suitably here. All the claims of interdependence fall apart when we see that France stands to gain more from the whole process. The recent checks that have been put on the migration have to be seen in this light. The present level of development does not need any

more influx of cheap foreign labour.

Even from the perspective of the labour movement we see that migration is a setback. In France, it has created a situation in which the trade union movements get diluted. The suspicion that the native trade unions have towards the immigrants, in that they see them as a potential threat to their job security, not only isolates the immigrants but also becomes a stumbling block in their attempts to organising themselves. Either way the trade movement loses out to the capitalist forces.

This brings us to the question of ethnic pluralism. This is particularly relevant in the case of the second generation immigrants. The alienation, discrimination, and impoverishment that are the bane of these groups have virtually led to a ghettoisation which has made it impossible for the immigrants to adequately integrate themselves into the French society. The dilemma of the second generation immigrants is that though they have a technical claim to Frenchness, the French society refuses to accept them wholly. The rise of the right wing extremists among the native population has further worsened the situation. A direct fallout of this development is the alternate evolution of a proposed homogenised identity consciousness within the immigrant community. The inability of the French state to tackle this issue politically is because the migrant labour force was conceived as a temporal arrangement that could be disposed off once the need was over. Coupled with this, the typical French antipathy to accept the fact that the ethnic pluralism has come to stay. Checking future migrations and imposing bureaucratic restrictions on the migrants has failed to emerge as a solution. The apathy with which minority



policies have been formulated has in fact led to a politicisation of the minority issue wherein you find the second generation immigrants vociferously staking the claim that their right to difference needs to be respected and properly addressed.

The ramifications on Maghréb are even worse. The complacency that creeps into an economy that relies considerably on the remittances of the migrants is bound to be precarious. The changes that are brought about in the social set-up with respect to life style patterns are ominous. This is particularly true in the case of the migrants who return home. Their labour skills are quite often found to be misplaced in the native scenario. Moreover, such a large scale displacement of youthful labour will definitely leave the native country acutely in short supply of the man-power needed for their own development programmes. Consequently, the dependence of the domestic market on the foreign goods will increase. Though initiatives have been made by the Magreb countries to look for alternate sources of capital other than these remittances, they are yet to attain a secure level of self-sufficiency. It might be argued that this one-sided dependence of the native country on the developed receiving country, along with the racist prejudice meted out to the migrant population is an extension of the justification that was propounded by colonialist capitalism.

The effect that migratory patterns have on the skill-levels of the native population (both the migrants and non-migrants) are also found to be detrimental. The scenario in France is such that even the presence of training centres have not caused an upliftment in the level of competence of the migrant workers. Most of

them rarely proceed beyond the semi-skilled levels. The lack of a supportive educational machinery, along with the social and economic constraints results in a situation where the migrant workers find it extremely difficult to alternatively pursue vistas that could improve their skill and literacy. In the domestic front, we see that the abject poverty and the lack of developmental restructuring to improve the economy often leaves the native in a frame of mind where he feels that the only lucrative alternative is to migrate to a high level economy. What is being ignored here is an attempt at improving the social status that includes skill proficiency, education and societal awareness. The need to address the rapidly increasing unemployment problem by creating a system where more and more jobs can be generated within the country is long overdue.

Another aspect that deserves attention is the ongoing process of European unification with the emergence of a common currency and a single European market. It can be predicted that in the near future fortress Europe as a homogenous economic entity would be a definite reality. This would mean that the borders of Europe would be further tightened against immigrant influxes. The implementation of the common immigration policy of the European Union of which France is a signatory would mean that the French state will have to adhere with the dictates of the rest of Europe. The eastern expansion of the European Union which would bring in the erstwhile communist states would create a new wave of internal migration which would effectively close down the needs for migrant labour from outside Europe. However, one positive after-effect of this implementation would be

that the second generation Magrebi immigrants will also be eligible for all the human rights provisions that the common immigration policy draft has set out.

Another impact of this immigration policy would be that France will have to redefine the nature and scope of the special status that it has accorded to the Maghrebi nations. This will be particularly true with the reference to the dual citizenship question. The debate that heated up in the case of Britain pressing for special market concessions for the common-wealth countries is a pointer as to how the tension might build up within the European Union. That France was vehemently opposing the British claim would go against its claim for a special accommodation that it might want for Algeria. This would be more emphatic with the growing dominance that Germany has started enjoying within the Union. The primary position that France enjoyed within the EU had helped to keep this contradiction under wraps. Any opposition from any of the member states would mean that France will have to reformulate its policy imperatives with respect to the Maghreb.

This effectively means that the concept of migration will have to be reframed. Occasional displacement from the Maghreb region into France may still continue but a Europe that is heading towards greater centralism would definitely put an end to large scale migration. Maghreb would then have to look for alternate avenues for developmental options.

Structurally, this would mean that one should stop viewing the second generation Maghrebis as having a direct link with the native population. Both the migrants and the French state should start viewing their existence as a minority

entity that has a native French legitimacy. All future formulations should be taken up by considering this minority group as part of an ethnic plural reality this is prevalent in France.

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