

ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION - 1963-1980

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Master of Philosophy

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Certificate

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
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
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Map 1 Zimbabwe: provincial boundaries and major towns

MOZAMBIQUE



PREFACE

Zimbabwe is of great interest, for besides being one of the last countries to obtain independence, anti colonial forces also had to fight white settler regime. In this regard, ZANU's contribution in liberating Southern Rhodesia from the clutches of colonial rule had been significant. Since its inception in 1963 upto independence in 1980, it had to fight oppressive white regime, and undergo fluctuations and crises. The whole problem of independence of Southern Rhodesia must be viewed in the triangular context - blacks versus coloniser, Great Britain ; white settlers versus blacks ; and Great Britain versus settlers. In the light of this that ZANU's role should be understood. The key issues that this dissertation probes into are : firstly, causes and factors for the emergence of ZANU from the ZAPU ; Secondly, ZANU's nature of struggle and its impact on the National Movement in Southern Rhodesia ; thirdly, the influence of external forces on the ZANU in steering it towards the victory ; and finally, highlight the difference between National Movement in Zimbabwe and those in other African countries, particularly its neighbours Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

To understand the nature of ZANU's struggle against white colonialism between 1963 and 1980, this dissertation mainly used historical and analytical methods. Infact, the whole research is based on secondary data.

This dissertation is divided into three chapters with an introduction and conclusion. In the introduction, impact of the white settlements on the native Africans and the emergence of nationalism prior to the 1950s are discussed.

First chapter deals with the establishment of ZAPU, its consequent split and the emergence of ZANU out of it. In this, various factors and causes responsible for the formation of ZANU are enumerated.

The second chapter focuses on the ZANU's course of struggle till the independence of Southern Rhodesia. Major emphasis is laid on the nature of its struggle, major objectives, guerrilla tactics, etc.

Infact, all nationalist organisations were either directly or indirectly influenced by the external forces. So did the ZANU in Southern Rhodesia. In the final chapter the relations of ZANU with FRELIMO of Mozambique, China and the OAU are discussed.

Finally, in the conclusion a brief assessment of ZANU's contribution to the freedom movement is made. This apart, reasons for its success are also given.

INTRODUCTION

The area now known as Zimbabwe was settled by Bantu Iron-working agriculturalists over a period beginning about 200 B.C. By A.D.1000 a Shona speaking culture had established an empire which centered on what is now Great Zimbabwe.¹ Thereafter, new dynasties like Mutapo, Torwa and Rosv flourished. With the advent of the Portuguese slave-trading and finally the infiltration of the Nguni from the Zulu state to the South, these Kingdoms disappeared. The colonization of Zimbabwe was first undertaken by Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa company in 1890. By 1923, more than 35,000 Whites had settled in Zimbabwe and the region by then had been incorporated into the British Empire.²

In 1922, when mandate of the Charter Company was about to lapse, the voters of Southern Rhodesia were asked to decide in a referendum whether the territory should become a fifth province of South Africa. The proposal was rejected and Rhodesia then became technically a British colony. However, the 1923 constitution provided for a high degree of internal autonomy in the form of a self-governing colony. In 1953, Britain formed a federation of Southern Rhodesia with

1. See Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, *Zimbabwe : Politics, Economics and Society*, (London : Pinter Publisher, 1989), pp.8-9.

2. G. Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia", *Journal of Development Studies*, vol.vi, no.3, ff.197-234.

the two Northern territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, both of which, unlike Southern Rhodesia, were administered as colonial protectorates. The federation failed due to the conflict between the growing African nationalism in the North and the hesitant White reformism of the South and was later dissolved.³ The British Parliament granted a new constitution in 1961 by which it abjured its veto power over legislation in exchange for a declaration of rights and a multi racial constitution Council to review subsequent legislation.⁴

The arrival of European settlers since 1890 had a drastic impact on the African population. The settlers took the more fertile land and pushed the Africans to the waste land. By 1922, 64% of the Africa population was confined to reserves in tribal areas.⁵ Several acts such as Land Apportionment Act, Industrial Conciliation Act were passed which excluded Africans from the bargaining process and consolidated the power of the White minority.

In the years immediately after the attainment of self-rule, the Whites under the 1923 constitution speeded up the construction of a highly interventionist state to further their interests. The main motivation for strengthening

3. Howard Simson, *Zimbabwe : A Country Study* (Uppsala, 1979), p.14.

4. Ibid.

5. Andrew Astrow, *Zimbabwe : A Revolution that Lost its Way* (London : Zed Publishers, 1983), p.6.

the colonial state was the insecurity of the settlers in the hostile environment.

The colonial state from the days of the Company had concentrated on promoting European settlement and thus it was not surprising that it had to be at their service. Colonists with their aspirations to build a country like South Africa but lacking its wealth and a White population of similar size had to look towards the state early on for protection.⁶ During 1945-65, the state intervened more in the economy to secure the interests of the Whites. White farmers were the beneficiaries of a government system that set prices for many of their crops and guaranteed the purchase of those crops when they are marketed. Despite frequent declarations of their belief in 'Capitalism', the settlers by the 1950s were clearly developing a system best described as 'Socialism - for the Whites'.⁷

The earliest Zimbabwean resistance to British colonialism can be traced to the first Chimurenga War in 1896.⁸ It broke out in Mataberland, spread to Shona speaking parts of the country, and was finally put down only in 1897. This was a just a spontaneous uprising.

However, organizational forms of African nationalist politics emerged in the late 1920s. After the

6. Jeffrey Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (Oxford : University of California Press, 1990), p.18.

7. Ibid.

8. Chimurenga is a Shona word meaning 'liberation'.

Chimurenga war, Zimbabwean resistance was organised by African sponsored churches. The people could make their protest by supporting the foreign churches such as African-Methodist Episcopal Church, which opposed current settler policies. Foreign African churches were soon surpassed in their magnitude of influence by indigenous African churches like Zionist, the Vapostori movement and the churches of the White bird. They resisted tax collection, opposed the implementation of the Lord Apportionment Act in the early period, and sometimes anti-Government information.⁹ Some of the African political organisations also fought between the wars for the enfranchisement of Africans. The most famous among them was Rhodesian Bantu voters' Association, a movement entirely designed to create privileges for the educated Africans who were qualified to vote.

Thus, Zimbabwean nationalism in until 1950s was characterised by faith and honesty in the British rule. Most of the Nationalist Organisations aimed at reformation within the colonial set up. There is infact a parallel between earlier Zimbabwean nationalism and moderate phase of Indian National Movement. Both believed in good offices of the British and their forms of protest confined to constitutional methods like submission of petitions and organising silent protests. Throughout, they were cautious

 9. Eshmael Mlambo, *Rhodesia : The Struggle for a Birth Right* (London, Hurst and Company, 1972), p.109.

not hurting the sentiments of British rulers. However, there is one difference between them. Whereas earlier Nationalist organisations in Rhodesia directed their efforts against the White settlement and racism, moderate nationalists in India were more concerned with the attainment of self rule.

Chapter - I
ESTABLISHMENT OF ZANU

Until 1950s African political organizations had accepted white rule as inevitable and sought to improve the African social and economic position within the colonialist political system. However, because of the reluctance of the white establishment to broaden the political base of its rule, a sharp dichotomy between whites and Blacks developed over time. The White power structure was reluctant to permit reforms aimed at increasing African participation. Consequently, the Nationalists moved beyond the basic operational codes and tried to establish new rules of the game. To the degree they ceased to operate within the prevailing system, a turbulent political situation developed in which opponents were regarded as enemies.¹

Proto - Nationalist Organizations² had distinct undertones of nationalist sentiment but operated at a restricted level in both recruitment of members and political action. Their main contribution was the basis they provided for the subsequent movements - a set of policies for articulating grievances and events that set the

1. Giovanni Sartori, "Opposition and Control : Problems and Prospects," *Government and Opposition*, 1, no.2, February 1966, p.

2. "Proto-nationalism" is used by Patric O' Meara, *Rhodesia : Racial Conflict or Coexistence* (London : Cornell University Press, 1975), p.91.

parameters of confrontation. This apart, Nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia, as in other parts of Africa, was influenced by Second world war which led to increased urbanization and an expanded African political consciousness. As a result, a new educated elite who were exposed to western education began to emerge, and they started articulating the demands of the African people for democratic rights and participation. A number of leaders such as Joshua Nkomo, George Nyandoro, Jason Moyo and Micheal Mawema, who were later joined by others like Ndabaninga Sithole and Robert Mugabe, came to the fore front during this stage.³ They began to organize around wider political objectives and formed the basis of National leadership since late 50s. In respect to their methods and organisational skills they were influenced by freedom movements in Asia and other parts of Africa which gave impetus, enthusiasm and courage to them.

The emergence of the African National Congress (ANC) from a number of existing groups in 1957 marked the beginning of a new phase of nationalism in Southern Rhodesia. Before that it was a movement operating mainly in Bulawayo province where it had been started by Aaron Jacha in 1934.⁴ The leadership of the ANC was mainly comprised of

3. Patrick O' Meara, *Rhodesia: Racial Conflict or Coexistence* (London: Cornell University Press, 1975), p.98.

4. Eshmael Mlambo, *Rhodesia : The Struggle for a Birth Right* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1972), p.117.

Joshua Nkomo, President; J.R.D. Chikerama, G.B. Nyandoro, J.J. Moyo, J.W. Msika, Francis Neckwate, Peter Mutandwa and Peter Mudikaworm. It proclaimed elimination of all forms of discriminating practises and legislation which affected the social, economic and political progress of the underprivileged as its major objective. On the issue of land, it aimed to get rid of the land Apportionment Act and Native Land Husbandry Act⁵. The ANC welcomed white Rhodesians to join ~~the~~ although they felt a different title should be used because the term 'African' seemed to exclude members of other races. Nkomo, reacting to this, said that the words 'African' and 'National' applied to all peoples in Rhodesia, and he hoped that all races would support the organization.⁶

The ANC decided to operate at a constitutional level by means of petitions to ministers, public protests and memoranda to the government. Among its direct concerns were the establishment of a policy of 'one man - one vote' and opposition to discriminatory legislation.⁷ In addition to breaking down national racial barriers, the ANC hoped to overcome any existing ethnic differences within the

5. See Harold Simson, *Zimbabwe: A Country Study* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1979), pp.54-55.

6. Shumayarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1965), p.31.

7. Ibid., p.42.

organisation.⁸ Indeed the effect of this policy was that from the beginning several whites, Asians and coloureds became its members. The motto of the organization was 'forward ever, backward never'.

The ANC went into operation in both the urban and rural areas and had particular success in mobilizing African farmers in 1959 against the Native Nand Husbandry Act in what it referred to as 'operation sunrise.'⁹ This act ran contrary to the traditional concept of communal ownership and to the status of cattle within the traditional society. Because of the ANC's ability to capitalize on the discontent of African farmers, George Nyandoro of the ANC Commented: 'The Land Husbandry Act has been the best recruiter congress ever had.'¹⁰ The Minister of Justice and Law and Order at the time, Reginald Knight, conservatively estimated that there were 6,000 to 7,000 African members of the ANC.¹¹

It was because of the potentially strong rural base rather than large scale urban support and coupled with this its success in mobilizing blacks in all parts of the country that the white regime considered the ANC as a threat to its interests, and as a result, the government banned it in 1959.

8. The differences were mainly between Shona and Ndebele Tribes.

9. Cited in B.V. Mtshali, *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict* (New York : Hawthorn Books, 1967), p.69.

10. Ibid., p.70.

11. Patrick O' Meara, n.3, p.152.

Before its ban the ANC had provided a means of political expression for African who 'until' that time felt entirely excluded from the political process. Thus, the ANC clearly marked the beginning of a process of political education for Southern Rhodesian Africans.¹²

The ban on the ANC did not satisfy the settlers and they stepped up the repression on the Africans by passing the Unlawful Organization Act and the Preventive Detention Act. This convinced the nationalist leadership that little could be gained by pressurising the government, so they adopted the strategy of forcing Britain to accelerate the process of decolonization. They drew a distinction between the 'conservative' settlers and the more 'progressive' British colonialism. Such a perspective was strengthened by the very process of decolonization that was taking place elsewhere. The faith in the progressive nature of British rule as the legal authority over Rhodesia found its place at the centre of the nationalist strategy. Restoration of legality then became a major demand of the nationalists on the British government.

Meanwhile, the Nationalist Democratic Party (NDP) was launched in January 1960 by Micheal Mwama to replace the banned ANC.¹³ A number of leading members such as Joshua

12. *Rhodesia Herald*, (Salisbury), February 4, 1959.

13. See T. O. Ranger, *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia* (Heinemann, London: East African Publishing House, 1970), p.210.

Nkomo, Leopold Takawira, Samkange were involved in the functioning of the party. Its aims were to serve as a vigorous vanguard for removing all forms of oppression and for the establishment of a democratic government in Southern Rhodesia; to work for speedy constitutional reconstruction in southern Rhodesia-with the object of having a government elected on the promise of one man one vote; to work for the educational, political, social and economic emancipation of the people; to work with other democratic movements in Africa and the rest of the world; and to abolish colonial racism and all forms of racial oppression and economic inequality among nations. According to Mwama, the NDP sought majority rule, higher wages for Africans, land for those displaced by the Native land Husbandry Act, facilities for the education of African children, and better housing in the urban areas. However, the immediate objective of the NDP was to obtain representation at the constitutional conference in London, which had been called by Britain in the following year.¹⁴

The decolonization process in the rest of Africa, the problems facing Federation, disillusionment with the politics of partnership and Britain's decision to allow the NDP leaders to be represented at the constitutional conference were all a great stimulus for many more educated Africans to join the nationalist movement. It was at this

14. *Rhodesian Daily News* (Salisbury), July 25, 1960.

time such nationalist leaders as Ndabaninge Sithole, Herbert Chitepo, Robert Mugabe, Bernard Chidzero and Eroch Dumbutshena joined the struggle.

The meeting between the Nationalists, white settlers and the British government took place in February 1961 in Salisbury under the chairmanship of Duncan Sundys on the new constitutional proposals. The constitutional proposals of 1961 provided for a dual electoral role wherein 50 seats were reserved for white voters and 15 for Africans. It created two voters rolls - A and B - whose voting qualifications were based on financial and educational standards. Most of the whites were on the A roll but the overwhelming proportion of the Africans could get only the B roll. Further, since there were fifty constituencies in which the A-roll electorate predominated and only fifteen electoral districts in which B-roll votes were in the majority, it follows that the general effect was to give A-roll voters control over the legislative Assembly.¹⁵ The White Head government got a constitution which provided virtual autonomy under white rule by ending Britain's reserve powers to veto discriminatory Rhodesian legislation, while Britain was fully satisfied with a constitution that allowed for continuing its rule for decades but which provided for African rule in the long

15. O' Meara, n.3, p.13.

term. At first, the NDP delegates, led by Nkomo, gave their consent to this constitution. However, within the NDP, opposition to its initial position towards 1961 constitution had arisen. The membership of the NDP had never accepted the proposal. The NDP eventually decided to call for a boycott of the proposed referendum on the 1961 constitution.¹⁶

Its decision not to fight in the elections under the 1961 constitution meant that the NDP had to achieve its goal of majority rule by using extra parliamentary pressure. It had to operate under several disadvantages, for example, its membership was forbidden to organize in the rural areas, mass meetings were discouraged by different municipalities, members of the executive were harassed by the police under the provisions of the Law and Order Act. Sir Edgar white head's government's vigilance intensified. Nevertheless the NDP stepped up its opposition to the constitution through meetings. On the other hand, the white electorate was beginning to demand a tougher policy in regard to the nationalists. As a result, the NDP was banned on 9 December 1961.¹⁷

From 1962 onwards, the lines were more clearly drawn: the confrontation was becoming one between white and black

16. J. Day, "Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists and the 1961 Constitution", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.vii, no.2, pp.230-31.

17. Andrew Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way* (London: Zed Press, 1983), p.35.

nationalism. In the end, however, African leaders had come to realize that none of the reforms for which they were pressing - in particular majority rule- could be achieved without real political power, and that as long as the white minority had control of the resources of power they could not achieve their ends.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE'S UNION (ZAPU)

The realisation that nothing can be achieved without real political power culminated in the foundation of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in December 1961. It was the direct successor to the banned NDP.¹⁸ The structure and most of the officials were the same and only the name seemed to be different. It had the reputation of being the 'major' of the eventual two rival liberation movements¹⁹ in Rhodesia and of inheriting the past of African militancy and resistance. Infact, people did not recognize ZAPU as a new organization, so the organizational work was relatively easy.²⁰ During its months of existence it followed NDP tactics. As the only national party in existence in the early 1960s it attracted membership and support from every

18. Simson, n.5, p.55.

19. Two rival movements were ZAPU and ZANU.

20. Tembo Moyo, *Life History from the Revolution* (ZAPU), p.71.

tribe, region and class.²¹ Although the ban on the NDP had revealed to the Africans that the whites were determined to retain power by any tactics, even including terrorism, the Africans were still hopeful that British government would play the role of an honest broker between blacks and whites.

The ZAPU was a strong organisation right from the start, unlike the ANC and NDP, the ZAPU had very few problems in recruitment because of the good network. The belief in mass rallies was still supreme in the plans of ZAPU leaders; The ZAPU meetings were attended in thousands. A crowd of 20,000 Africans met Nkomo at the airport when he arrived from Newyork, where he had been to petition the UN special committee on colonialism.²²

However, the non violent policy was getting irrelevant due to the growing dichotomy between the ZAPU and the white establishment. This is evidenced by the following statements: Sir Edgar Whitehead felt that if the ZAPU wishes to fight this new constitution (1961 constitution) there is no other way of fighting it except through parliament that would be acceptable.²³ Dr Tichafa Parirenyatwa, deputy president of the ZAPU, countered: "the new constitution will be wrecked if there is no substantial number of African

21. Tribes include Shona, Ndebeles, Nguni; Classes include farmers, businessmen, tribal chiefs and educated sections.

22. See Eshmael Mlambo, n.4, pp.191-92.

23. *Rhodesia Herald*, December 18, 1961.

voters where the first election of African voters takes place in October this year"²⁴

As early as January 1961, the late Dr Parirenyatwa had put forward a sharply opposed position: "the ZAPU considers it essential to set aside the new southern Rhodesian constitution as a prerequisite for a new deal. It will therefore organize intensively against the voters registration campaign which, by placing a few Africans on the lower roll and reserving the upper roll for Europeans, is meant to deceive the outside world into believing that the African has now a substantial measure of participation in the running of his country when in reality 99% of the total African population will be excluded."²⁵ Robert Mugabe of the ZAPU maintained in December 1961 that there is no purpose in taking part because the chance of improvement in the franchise is very limited. we can exert extra parliamentary pressure and we believe that is the right course for us at the moment." Ndabaninga Sithole further stressed this position: "The new constitution attempts to reverse what had happened in Ghana, Nigeria, in what used to be French west and Equatorial Africa and free North Africa. It attempts to prevent what has happened in Tanganyika and what is about to happen in Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. In plain language, it purports to prevent

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

the Africans in Southern Rhodesia from getting their freedom and independence as other African countries have done."²⁶

The statement sums up the ZAPU's expectation that Africans in Rhodesia would ultimately be given their independence as had been the case in other parts of Africa; hence the ZAPU was not prepared to make so great a compromise within the white system and decided to withdraw from the 1962 constitution.

The withdrawal may be seen as a watershed in the movement towards 'anti system' politics or 'extra system politics' with all of its implications of violence and sabotage. ZAPU's objectives indicated the thread towards the conflict inherent in extra system politics. These objective are as follows : First, to fight for the immediate and total liquidation of colonialism, direct or indirect, and to cooperate with any international forces that are engaged in this struggle. Second, to establish a democratic state with a government based 'on one man one vote' and in which democratic liberties thrive. Third, to foster the spirit of pan-Africanism in Zimbabwe. Fourth, to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with such nations as are peaceful and friendly. Fifth, to eliminate economic exploitation and to struggle for economic prosperity in order to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest

26. *Zimbabwe African People's Union*, Circular no.2, January, 1962.

lack of human dignity in one's homeland. Moreover, the violence had the continued support of the urban masses. For nine months ZAPU followed in the foot steps of its predecessor, NDP. It gathered thousands upon thousands of faithful supporters. It collected thousands of pounds in donations and subscriptions, and the confiscated scooters of the NDP were replaced by Land Rovers and better motor vehicles.²⁹

Thus, ZAPU realized that there was little hope for change by constitutional means and began increasingly to resort to means considered unconstitutional. Furthermore, ZAPU was evolving an ideology based on the legitimacy of their cause rather than on the future reconstruction of society.

In fact, the popularity of ZAPU was so much that it made the white population believe that Africans were taking power. Some white businessmen even consulted NKOMO after the UN General Assembly had passed resolution 1747 XVI thinking that he would be the next ruler after Sir Edgar Whitehead. Meanwhile, a meeting called by J.T.Maluleke of Southern Rhodesian Africa Trade Union Congress to protest against working conditions and lack of freedom of speech and Assembly ended in riots. This resulted in strike action during May, 1962. Although it did not appear that the British minister was unduly concerned, no doubt the white

29. Patrick O' Meara, n.3, pp.119-20.

population was uneasy and Sir Edgar Whitehead was forced to throw his weight into the situation and decided to ban the ZAPU on 19 September, 1962.³⁰

The news about banning of ZAPU spread like a wild fire. There was a country wide wave of violence, attacks on government buildings and plantations, and riots in many urban areas. It is certain that the Africans in Rhodesia were frustrated by the bans which had been imposed on their movements since 1959, and that they were provoked by police and army arrogance and brutality. Police brutality was felt most ruthlessly in rural areas, where there is no press and Africans are less well educated and less equipped to protest.

ZAPU AFTER THE BAN

The immediate consequence of the ban was that internal rivalries within the ZAPU broke out. New doubts about party organisation, and what the party hoped to achieve and the means that it should employ had surfaced. The failure to make any headway towards majority rule brought into question the ability of the leadership. The leadership's vacillation at critical junctures as in the case of

30. Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society* (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1989), p.19.

constitutional conference added further to the problem. on a day to day level, members of the ZAPU began to show their discontent with the leadership's strategy. There was an increased frustration within the national movement, as the goals failed to be reached by way of the normal procedures within colonial framework. Rank and file members of the ZAPU organized their own acts of sabotage. Between January and September 1962 the Rhodesians admitted that there had been 33 petrol bombings, the burning of 18 schools and 10 churches, and 27 attacks on communications.³¹ The leadership of the ZAPU disassociated itself from such acts and attempted to have a moderating influence over the militants in the movement. Such moves by the nationalist leadership aroused and exacerbated differences within the movement and increased the frustration among the rank and file. Relatively insignificant differences over personality and tactical questions came to the fore front.

ROLE OF NKOMO

The bone of contention in the ZAPU was over the leadership of NKOMO. Infact, NKOMO had been the guiding Personality of ZAPU at that time. He Played an instrumental role in the Nationalist struggle even before ZAPU; he acted

³¹. Zimbabwe, *Report of the Joint Commission on Foreign Affairs and Defence* (Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service, 1980), p.157.

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as President of the ANC and represented the Party at the first conference of the All - African People's organisation in Accra in December 1958.³² In January 1960, he set up Southern Rhodesian Congress Committee abroad; he had lobbied widely in Africa and toured the United States; he appeared at the UN for the first time in October 1960 as an unofficial observer. Nkomo didn't return to Rhodesia until after NDP Congress that month elected him president of the party. He made numerous other trips abroad which became the subject of controversy in the later period.

The basic defect in Nkomo's approach was that instead of mobilizing the black masses, Nkomo and his associates gave full priority to winning support for the African Cause in Britain and lining up the United Nations and friendly African and other foreign governments to pressure the British government into intervening directly in Rhodesia. All these pressure failed to stay the British government in imposing the 1961 constitution.

Regardless of his role, the pressure on Nkomo after the ban of ZAPU began to mount. In 1963, because of pressures within Rhodesia, Nkomo decided that a government - in - exile would be able to achieve more, especially in international sphere and so he decided to move the ZAPU

 32. Richerd Gibson, *African Liberation Movements : Contemporary struggles against White Minority rule* (London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Rule Relation 1972, p.372.

executive to Dar-es-Salaam.³³ This move away from Rhodesia antagonized some members of the party executive who felt that the main struggle should be in Rhodesia. Nkomo, However, managed to convince his executive that such African leaders as Julius Nyrere of Tanzania thought that it was desirable to establish a base in Dar-es-Salaam. When the ZAPU executive arrived in Tanzania in April 1963 they found that Nyrere believed it best to remain in Zimbabwe. Consequently, many of top functionaries like Sithole, Takawira and Mugabe disillusioned with Nkomo strongly felt that he should be replaced.

CREATION OF ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION

Tangible indications of tensions within ZAPU appeared in July when leaflets were circulated in High field suggesting the need for a new party, despite the fact that an enthusiastic Nkomo had recently said that majority rule was just around the corner. Nkomo received concrete evidence of a possible split when he obtained copies of letters Eddison Zobgo was carrying from Dar-es-Salaam to Rhodesia.³⁴ At a mass meeting in Salisbury, he exposed the rebels- Sithole, Takawira, Morton Malianga and Robert Mugabe- to the public and subsequently dismissed them from the party.

33. Andrew Astrow, n.17, p.37.

34. See Gibson, n.30, p.373.

J.ZMoyo, Joseph Msika, and Clement Muchache stayed with ZAPU. Among others dismissed by Nkomo were Enos Nkala and Stanley Parirewa, who had gone to Dar-es-Salaam.

It is debatable whether Sithole planned to oust Nkomo from ZAPU and take over the leadership of the party or whether the circumstances surrounding the dismissal forced him to found a new party. However, one thing is clear. NKOMO was unwilling to countenance any dissent within ZAPU. From the beginning, Joshua Nkomo occupied a central position and had come to play an ever dominant role in the organization. This style within the party was one of a personalized rule whereas outside it was of an eloquent popular demagogy. His style and his seeming unwillingness to accept compromise attracted criticism and the eventual challenge to his position was perhaps the central issue that led to form an alternative party, the Zimbabwe African National union (ZANU) in 1963.³⁵

The ZANU was established by Ndabaninga Sithole with the blessings of Julius Nyrere of Tanganyika. It was formed last August after it had been realized that through weak, insincere and coward leadership of Nkomo of ZAPU, the struggle of the oppressed people of Zimbabwe had faltered and was strenuously grinding to a halt.³⁶

Because many ZANU supporters were Shonas and Nkomo and

35. Shamuyarira, n.6, p.195.

36. Ibid., p.197.

many of his followers were Ndebeles, a possible ethnic reason for the split had often been implied. While it can not be denied that ethnic tension existed in Rhodesia as a result of different cultural and language backgrounds and because of the nineteenth century Ndebele conquest of the Shona, widespread socialization into a modern, urban-based society has cut into the differences. While friction had periodically occurred between the two groups, intermarriage had also taken place. As Herbert Spiro maintains," the issue has so far been raised only in relatively unimportant contexts. Efforts were made within the Nationalist parties to transcend such divisions. Nkomo and Sithole and many other Ndebeles and Shonas had worked together in the ANC, NDP and ZAPU."³⁷ The split in the ZAPU leading to the establishment of ZANU was due to Nkomo's leadership rather than his Ndebele background but tensions with an ethnic basis have continued - in April 1970, for example a 'running battle took place in Lusaka between Shona and Ndebele supporters of ZAPU.

The ZANU right from the beginning aimed at a vertically supported movement - a grass root alliance organization of farmers, businessmen, students, chiefs and headmen, the professional men and women. It tried to attract more number of educated persons so as to lay a solid intellectual foundation for the party. Initially, ZANU never

37. Moyo, n.19, p.175.

loves to go from Capital to Capital; he loves to fly in times of trouble. Differences hardened, and in September 1963, Nkomo Commented:" as far as I am concerned there is no question of patching up with Sithole. He had committed political suicide.³⁹

Toward the end of 1963 considerable discontent was evident in the urban areas because of the presence of an overtly racist government, uncertainties surrounding the possibility of Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), and the limited facilities for African secondary education. Both ZANU and ZAPU nurtured this discontent. They attacked school teachers, boycotted schools, intimidated those who wished to attend or to teach. Government property was destroyed in both urban and rural areas. In addition the violence continued between ZANU and ZAPU.

In November 1963 the government banned Nkomo from attending all meetings for three months and the people's Caretaker Council (PCC) from organizing any meetings for the same period. The white government thus moved away from its decision to operate through the courts. In March, the Law and order Act was amended to extend restriction without trial from ninety days to one year, and also to give wider discretionary powers to the police. Shortly after Ian Smith became Prime Minister, Nkoma, Msika and Josiah Chinamano of

39. See Shamuyarira, n.6, p.210.

really developed the mass support of ZAPU. Nkomo, nevertheless, still retained mass support because of his remarkable ability on the one level to reorganize ZAPU and on the other to draw large crowds of followers. The ZANU, on the other hand, had a strong intellectual orientation and was more concerned with policy statements and ideological commitments than with structural problems; it did not have the resources that had been developed over time by previous nationalist organizations, and which ZAPU inherited.

On the day following the establishment of ZANU, Nkomo announced at Cold Comfort Farm, Salisbury, that the people's care taker council (PCC) had been formed as an executive to hold the leadership of ZAPU together. Other decisions made at cold comfort Farm were to center the struggle in Rhodesia, rather than to heavily rely upon outside intervention, and to make demands on Britain for a speedy transfer of power to the African majority.

After the formation of the ZANU, fighting broke out between supporters of ZANU and of ZAPU. On July 15, 1963, outside Salisbury airport when members of ZANU were waiting for the arrival of Sithole from Tanganyika.³⁸ The conflict between Nkomo and Sithole was fanned by accusations and counter accusations. Sithole referred Nkomo as a 'bully' and 'coward' who had attempted to rule by intimidation. He

38. See Patrick O' Meara, n.3, p.115.

the PCC executive were restricted to the remote area of Gonakudzingwa and then cut off from their followers and from active politics. Other leaders of both the PCC and ZANU were to follow Nkomo in restriction or detention. This was another step in a calculated attempt by the Rhodesian government to counteract the nationalists. Considerable violence resulted from Nkomo's restriction, particularly in Salisbury and Bulawayo. This was spasmodic and unorganized and was aimed primarily against Whites. On the pretext that nationalist movement is leading to violence, Smith government banned the ZANU, the PCC and the African daily news on August 26, 1964.⁴⁰ Subsequently, a state of emergency was declared in African suburb of High Field, Salisbury.

Thus, far from uniting the African masses, the split had the opposite effect. It weakened African opposition to white rule. In the pre-UDI period the nationalists fought each other more than with the white settlers. Moreover, it is of interest to note that the ZAPU-ZANU split was the first major structural division in African nationalist politics in Southern Rhodesia. In the past, African politics was characterized by division between the traditional and the modern, and the rural and the urban. However, the division of nationalist politics by the establishment of two

40. *Africa Today*, September 14, 1964.

distinct organizations was an entirely new variable. Because many of the leaders of the new organization had in the past been part of the ANC and the NDP, there were further complications.

CHAPTER-II

ZANU'S COURSE OF STRUGGLE TILL 1980

After its establishment in 1963, ZANU claimed the following as its objectives : to establish a Nationalist Socialist, Democratic Pan-African Republic; to create a separation of powers and adult suffrage; repeal colour discrimination and repressive laws; incorporate a Bill of Rights in the Constitution; bring all land under the control of Government as "people's trustees"; grant amnesty for all political prisoners; and to provide free health service, unemployment relief and compulsory free education. ZANU further maintained that it stood for democratic rule and that its character was non-social although it did believe in a predominantly African character for independent Rhodesia, which would be renamed Zimbabwe. In a policy statement it claimed that it represented the "fighting spirit" which began with an imposed rule in 1890. "We have a duty to ourselves and to the urban generation of Zimbabwe, and the duty is to free Zimbabwe. We are our own liberators,"¹ it further stated.

ZANU at first sought to realize these objectives through peaceful means. However, the ban in 1964 and subsequent declaration of emergency in the African suburbs

1. Ndabingi Sithole, *Mimeographed Letter*, 1964.

of Highfield, Salisbury had dashed such hopes and had effected a change in the strategy of ZANU. From now onwards, the leaders' activities were directed towards overthrowing the colonial system by unconstitutional means such as sabotage and terrorism. It is from Lusaka that these people planned subversive operations and directed against the government of Rhodesia, including the infiltration of armed terrorists and offensive materials into this country.² Thus, Lusaka became a base for both the PCC and ZANU from where they directed guerrilla activities, beamed propaganda broadcasts in English and the two vernaculars, and printed their various publications. However, ZANU leadership abandoned hopes of quick success for two reasons: they were met with strong retaliation from the Rhodesian military, which was reinforced by the South African politics and military; and ZANU experienced difficulties in obtaining recruits as it was still an elitist party and the organization did not percolate down to the masses.

At this juncture, a pertinent question can be asked as to how ZANU struggle differs from other struggles in the rest of Africa, and more specifically from the successful movements in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In an attempt to analyze the differences, it is necessary, at the outset, to draw a distinction between "domestic" and

 2. *Rhodesia, Terrorist incursions from Zambia: A Statement by the Prime Minister, the Honourable I.D. Smith*, (Salisbury : Government Printer, 1967), p.11.

"historic colonialism."³ Domestic colonialism implies the presence of the colonial power within the boundaries of a particular country, while historic colonialism indicates an overseas power of Britain. The white population of Rhodesia may be seen as a domestic colonial power, indeed one which is itself engaged in seeking independence from a historical power.⁴ The overthrow of an internal colonial presence posed particularly difficult problems in Rhodesia: the power structure has a greater commitment to the maintenance of the status quo; it is an entrenched position, and it has a wider sphere of influence.

Since it seemed hopeless to combat such a power by constitutional means, ZANU decided to move outside of the Rhodesian system. "The repressive laws of Southern Rhodesia, have ensured that no revolutionary nationalist movement can function within the country", wrote ZANU'S paper.⁵

If a new political party were to function, it must of necessity be a watered down. Any constitutional means of gaining the Africans' lost heritage in Southern Rhodesia have dwindled with the passage of time. Through bitter

3. See Patrick O'Meara, *Rhodesia : Racial Conflict or Coexistence*, (London: Cornell University Press, 1975), p.124.

4. The Rhodesian administrative and technical services were also difficult for Africans to penetrate because of white cohesion. White solidarity also meant that there was widespread unwillingness to supply arms, information or materials to African opponents of the system.

5. ZANU Publication, 1964, p.25.

lessons emphasized by time, the people of Southern Rhodesia know their only hope is through a revolutionary underground movement which will have to subvert the White supremacist regime of South Rhodesia before they harbour hopes of functioning normally within the boundaries of the country.⁶

This involvement shows the progression in Rhodesian Nationalist politics from 'system politics' to a "revolutionary situation" because of the hopelessness of operating through constitutional channels. And this also explains the difference between the freedom struggle in Zimbabwe which had to fight outside the system and those movements in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that operated within the system.

UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (UDI)

As the nationalists were busy in strengthening the ZANU, the Ian Smith government was contemplating to tighten the white control over blacks. This it thought could be possible only by breaking all contacts and relations with Great Britain. This came in 1965 when Smith government announced Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)⁷

6. *Africa Today* (Colorado), vol.2, n.1, August, September, 1963.

7. Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (London : Andre Deutsch, 1965), p.180.

Different reasons could be attributed for UDI. Firstly, African nationalists were unhappy about the new constitution, so, too, were many white rightists. The Whites apprehension was primarily due to the realization that African participation in government was now at hand; they felt that there would be competition for jobs and African would ask for rights to mix socially and to live in white areas. Moreover, in 1962 elections Sir Edgar whitehead lost, and liberal reform had come to an end. Following the election, the United Federal party was disbanded and became the opposition Rhodesian party.

Britain's immediate response to the UDI was to pass an act declaring the Rhodesian action void and to ask the Commonwealth to help suppress the revolution. However, British government was opposed to any settlement by military force but asked for universal support for measures designed to end the Smith regime and establish lawful government in its place. Immediate measures to be taken included the cessation of all British aid to Rhodesia, putting an end to the export of arms and ammunitions, restriction on the purchase of Rhodesian tobacco, and exclusion of Rhodesia from the sterling monetary area. In addition to these, Britain asked members of the United National not to accord recognition to the illegal Smith government and also to adhere strictly to economic sanctions.

British policy towards Rhodesia was based on two judgements: that there would be significant internal

opposition among both Africans and whites towards the Rhodesian Front party and UDI, and that sanctions would ultimately force white Rhodesians to accept British terms for independence.

Infact, from the point of African nationalists, UDI has provided the ZANU to move outside of the white political system. Until UDI, African leaders thought that the courts were prepared to judge fairly in all cases, but after UDI they realized that decisions on political crimes were regulated by the political tone of the country.

ZANU leadership opposed UDI tooth and nail. Rev. N.Sithole was arrested at Fort Victoria under the Law and Order Maintenance Act for urging Africans to oppose UDI. Thereafter, he was found guilty and sentenced to twelve months hard labour. Takawira, another leader, was sentenced to six months imprisonment for a subversive speech at Utmali.⁸

The first reaction of ZANU was to destroy its property and not life. The delay in attacking must have been due to the belief that the British government was serious in its intention to end the rebellion. Sabotage followed in the early months of 1964. To gain credibility, ZANU launched the first guerrilla unit, "the crocodile commando" in late 1964, attacking a police camp and killing

8. Ibid., p.184.

a white farmer.⁹ At this stage it was more symbolic than effective and was still organized within the framework of creating breakdown in law and order.

African politics in Zimbabwe, as well as in European-ruled Africa, began as 'reformist politics' but now we have entered the phase of 'take over' politics, as it is impossible for the present white minority to rule Zimbabwe for the benefit of the voteless African majority. Thus we have entered the period of political confrontation. The ZANU represents the fighting spirit and shows the unity of spirit between those who have gone and who are still living. "we have duty to ourself and that duty is to free Zimbabwe. We are our own liberators."¹⁰

BEGINNING OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

The UDI was crucial in transforming the national struggle of ZANU from non-violent or Sabotage oriented to an armed struggle. Its development was gradual for there was an absence of leadership with the requisite armed revolutionary orientation. Soon, however, the necessary orientation took place and a definite decision was taken by the ZANU Central Committee at Sikombala Restriction in 1965

9. R. Rustin, *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa : Rhodesia* (Paris : The UNESCO Press, 1975), p.91.

10. Quoted in MwEnoc (Lusaka, A ZANU Department of Political Affairs Pamphlet).

to establish abroad a Revolutionary Council with the task of executing an armed struggle. It was this transformation on the part of ZANU leadership which transformed the nature of the Zimbabweans' struggle for liberation.

The UDI also enabled ZANU to broaden its Social base. Initially, ZANU lacked solid bases of urban and rural support, either because of the lessening of rural discontent by the government or because of the limited scope of urban organisation. So it remained an elitist party. There has been spasmodic support but no sustained support which continued overtime or strongly united these disparate elements. There have been attitudes of protest, moments of defiance, sometimes sustained defiance, but each time people have lapsed back into acquiescence.¹¹ However, ZANU gradually moved from an elitist party to 'mass' based party by drawing supporters from among farmers, students, businessmen, chiefs and headmen.¹² The expansion of its social base is due to the strengthening belief among the people that white rule can be eliminated only by force.

The UDI provided an opportunity whereby ZANU'S military moved from words to deeds in April 1965, when the first five-men guerrilla units, reportedly trained in Ghana, hit a number of European farms. Their mission was to

11. Shamuyarira, n.7, p.40.

12. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson , *The Struggle for Zimbabwe* (London : Faber and Faber, 1981), p.8.

disrupt the May 1965 General Elections in Rhodesia. Most of the fighters were killed or captured and tried before white judges. Two of these members sentenced to death were hanged in 1965, with another African on 6 March 1965.¹³ The settler regime made it clear to its African opponents that the struggle ahead would be merciless.

Full scale guerrilla warfare was launched by ZANU from Zambian bases in April 1966, five months after UDI. The first clash of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), a military wing of ZANU, with the Rhodesian security forces took place near Sinoia on 28-9 April 1966.¹⁴ At the Battle of Sinoia, ZANLA scored a publicity coup which had profound psychological and political significance. Seven of their guerrillas-Simon Chimbodza, Christophere Chatambudza, Nathern Charumuka, Godwin Manyeranyara, Peter Ephraim Sherjera and David Guzuu- died in a fierce encounter with Rhodesian troops backed by helicopter guns.¹⁵ This particular day is celebrated as Chimurenga day by the ZANU. Thus, it became evident that ZANU was making a determined bid to start a generalized revolutionary struggle.

13. See Andrew Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way* (London : Zed Books, 1983), p.41

14. Martin and Johnson, n.12, P.10.

15. Ibid., p.11.

The initiative was immediately deplored by the British Government. Its position, despite all the massive illegalities of the settler regime, had always been to condemn all acts of terrorism, whatever be their motives and by whomsoever committed.¹⁶

Here a point should be noted about ZANU'S guerrilla strategy. Its strategy was largely influenced by China. ZANU received much of its support from China and the Maoist approach to guerrilla warfare was quite different from the theories of the Soviet Union, which supported the ZAPU. As regards ZANU and China relations we shall discuss in detail in the next chapter.

As we know, many of the ZANU leadership was detained after the ban in 1964. The ZANU president Sithole, his vice president Leopold Takawira, and Secretary General Robert Mugabe became prisoners. Only the mysterious death of Takawira in "diabetic Coma " On 15 June 1970, "freed" him from the prison. African Liberation Committee Executive Secretary, George Magombe, spoke of "suspicious circumstances" and said that Takawira was known to have "suffered under torture" in the maximum security prison. E.F.Mukuka Nkoloso, president Kaunda's personal representative at the liberation Centre in Lusaka, expressed the hope that this "noble spirit' would spurt and

16. *Rhodesia*, BIS (London : CIO Pamphlet R. 5864/70, April, 1970).

signal for a new war for the total liberation of Zimbabwe.¹⁷

CHANGE OF STRATEGY

In the sixties there had been a tendency among liberation movements and particularly ZANU, to believe that all that was necessary to end white minority domination was to train some guerrillas and send them home with guns. This would not only scare the whites but would ignite a wave of civil disobedience by blacks. It was a belief psychologically founded on the relative ease other Africans had in achieving independence in the early sixties. The guerrillas would go home and fire a few shots, the belief went, the people would greet them as their liberators and the colonial power would withdraw. The ZANU guerrillas thought that it was easy to just go, get a gun and fight but very hard for them to retreat. Gradually, it was realized that the people had to be mobilized if they were to conduct a successful struggle. Tangogara in particular had learned in China that it was vital to mobilize the people and it was that lesson which shaped 'future strategy.' He brought the new strategy which if you want to win a revolution it is not only a revolution of the gun but

17. Martin and Johnson, n.12, p.17.

a revolution of 'mobilizing the masses.'¹⁸

Moreover, with greater emphasis placed on militancy in ZANU, it was also inevitable that some leaders and rank and file members should feel after a relatively short while that the struggle was not proceeding towards victory at a rapid enough pace.

The internal contradictions that exploded inside ZAPU earlier now looked if it was ZANU'S turn. As the struggle was not proceeding at a rapid pace, complaints against the ZANU leadership were raised. Most of its guerrillas trained in the early sixties were either killed or captured. In Britain, an anonymous deserter from ZANLA, complained in an article published in the Guardian on 8 April 1968, the reason for his abandonment of the struggle: "some of my friends have returned to Rhodesia had been killed; Others have been captured. Why do I stand apart? There are two reasons. First, I do not have confidence in the military leadership and organisation which is very weak. But most important, I want a revolution, not just a nationalist armed struggle. You cannot have it half-way. I am a Maoist. The party should control the whole movement, military as well as political."¹⁹

18. Ibid., n.12, p.11.

19. See Gibson, *African Liberation Movement : Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule* (London : Oxford University Press, 1972), p.182.

Such straight forward 'ultraleftism' bear little resemblance to the step-by-step approach being followed by ZANU. Besides, the policies of the Rhodesian government, rather than moving towards social equality, had led to the intensification of the repression and the growing adoption by Southern Rhodesia of the laws and values of the apartheid system in South Africa. Thus, it seemed that this growing repression and to other personality and tribal tensions might cause serious damage to ZANU. Before that could happen, in mid-1971 ZANU's late National Chairman, Herbert Chitepo, spelt out the changed thinking publicly to the Rhodesians.²⁰ Special review conference of all members abroad met in Lusaka and approved the reorganization of the party's top leadership. More than a hundred delegates voted overwhelmingly to replace the sixteen member revolutionary council by an eight-member supreme council which would be chaired by Chitepo. This administrative reorganisation, it was claimed, would strengthen the party by facilitating policy-making and military decisions. In an interview published in a Danish Newspaper, he said, "it is useless to engage in conventional warfare with well-equipped Rhodesian and South Africa troops along the Zambezi." He further said, "a reassessment of strategy had taken place between 1969

20. Ibid., n.19.

and 1972. We have since tried to correct the tragic error by politicizing and mobilising the people before countering any attacks against the enemy. After politicizing our people it became easier for them to co-operate with us and to identify with our programme.²¹

ZANU'S new strategy which became the decisive factor of the war, 'Approaching the masses' in a new area of operation, had three aspects. The first was to know thoroughly and understand the area, and how it functioned. Second was that the guerrillas have got to study the characteristics of their people within that area. The third element was that if word of the process leaked out and the enemy pursues you, you must be prepared to fight. This was the key element of ZANLA'S strategy.²²

FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE (FROLIZI)

While ZANU kept stepping up its struggle, especially since the beginning of 1970, there was pressure and effort to bring the rival ZAPU and ZANU together to form a common front. The repeated failures of both the parties to unite infuriated the Zambian government, being a host country and directly affected by the situation in Rhodesia more than any other country. President Kaunda warned : "they

21. Ibid., n.19, p.183.

22. *Report of the Zimbabwe African National Union*, (Lusaka, Government Printer, 1970-1971).

have got to choose between coming together or forfeiting Zambia's readiness to accommodate them."²³

The threat produced immediate action, and on October, 1971 members of the two organizations announced at a Lusaka press conference that ZAPU and ZANU have merged to form the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). Named leader and chairman of the new Front was 29 years old Shelton Siwela, the former ZAPU military commander, while Godfrey Savanhu, formerly of ZANU was given the post of Secretary. Also from ZANU, Nathan Shamuyarira was put in charge of "foreign research" and financial affairs. Present at the press conference announcing the formation of Front were also James Chikerema and George Nyandoro, but it was stressed that the two former ZAPU leaders would merely hold junior posts in Frolizi's revolutionary command council.

Unity, however, was far from complete. Herbert Chitepo of ZAPU and many others refused to join the new group, as did the J.Z. Moyo faction of ZAPU. Thus, although reduced some what by defections, ZANU and ZAPU had definitely not gone out of business, and instead of two rival Zimbabwe liberation movements, there existed three. ZANU and ZAPU charged that FROLIZI was essentially a "tribal clique" from James Chikerama's Zezuri tribe, a Shona sub-group. It was

23. *Press Communique of the Zambian High Commission, London (No.49/1971).*

nevertheless expected that, after a short period of grace, the two groups of recalcitrants would be declared "prohibited immigrants."²⁴ by the Zambian government and swiftly expelled from the country, while FROLIZI would henceforth enjoy the exclusive backing of both Zambia and the OAU'S African liberation committee.

Meanwhile, the links between ZANU and FRELIMO developed. For FRELIMO the problem of ZANU'S creation in 1963 was complicated by a number of factors. In the first place, they know very little about the dissatisfaction within ZAPU. The reason why ZAPU received the support of FRELIMO in the early sixties was that ZAPU had over the years secured support of most progressive countries and movements around the world, while ZANU was initially able to attract little support. Against this background the relationship which emerged between ZANU and FRELIMO seems surprising. ZANU'S contacts with FRELIMO resulted in opening up the Tete front in the eastern province of Mozambique adjoining Malawi, Zambia and Rhodesia. This enabled infiltration of guerrillas and armaments into North-Eastern Rhodesia.²⁵ We shall discuss in detail the relation between FRELIMO and ZANU in the next chapter.

24. Gibson, n.19, p.183.

25. See Martin and Johnson, n.12, p.14.

STRUGGLE IN 1970'S

In the 1960s, ZANU had considerable difficulty in getting recruits. They chose to employ a method once widely used by the British Navy - *Press ganging*. Many young men from large Zimbabwean community in Zambia were '*Press-ganged*'²⁶ into going for training and therefore, desertions before, during and after training were not uncommon. A close associate of ZANU recalled "you were told you were going for national resource, and that your time had come. You were told you were a Zimbabwean, a member of the youth and that you were to go and save your country.. You were just told to pack and go. You had no choice."²⁷

The *press - ganging* were in part due to the pressure exerted on ZANU by the rest of Africa, particularly Tanzania and Zambia, through the Organization of African Unity. ZANU was totally dependent upon its hosts and the OAU special fund tended to be allowed according to results and the number of cadres. As recruitment in those days was difficult, it resorted to *press ganging* methods, which had adverse effects during the early stages of the struggle, for not only did the party lost support among civilians in Zambia and Tanzania, but some of the conscripted guerrillas themselves gave up to the Rhodesian army at the first

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p.23.

opportunity.'

In December, 1969, ten of the trained guerrillas were infiltrated into Zambia.²⁸ The following year, and for some time thereafter when ZANLA began to operate through Tete, their guerrillas passed through Zambia pretending to be FRELIMO guerrillas, and their armaments passed through as FRELIMO armaments.

In June 1970, a group of the guerillas including Urimbo, Chimurenga, Kadenguere, Chauke, George Magobeye, Mapunzarins and Kuzvipa were sent secretly to the Zambezi valley with the task of carrying out reconnaissance along the river from Feira on the border with Mozambique to Kariba on the eastern and of the huge man-made lake.²⁹ Moyame remembers the group as earnest and keen to fight although some were not really up to it, may be they were weak on political vision. He said that Justin Chauke and Amon Zindoga crossed into Rhodesia on the night of 4 December 1971 from Mozambique's Tete Province. They were members of ZANLA. Their mission was to begin laying the groundwork for protracted guerrilla warfare, and the first person they contacted on that belief reconnaissance visit was a local school master who had been in touch with FRELIMO guerrillas.³⁰

28. Mubako, "Aspects of the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement 1966-76," *International Conference on Southern African History* (Lesotho), 1-7 August 1977.

29. Martin and Johnson , n.12, p.26.

30. Ibid.

As the strategy of ZANU changed from *press-ganging* to 'people mobilization' more and more number of people joined the party voluntarily. The new strategy was paying rich dividends. In the course of their struggle, Urimbo, ZANLA's first provincial commander, and Chimurenga, the operational commander of ZANLA, swiftly recognized the importance of the 'Spirit Mediums' on the North-East. Early in 1972, Chimurenga made contact with one called Chipfeni, who later put him in touch with another named Chidyamuyu. He was in direct contact with Mbuyu Nehanda, an old woman probably in her mid-eighties, who had for more than sixty years been the medium of the Nehanda who was hanged in 1898 during first Chimurenga War. That Nahanda was reputed to have said before her death that her children would one day liberate the country. Chidyamuyu reminded the four guerrillas of this when they went to see him. Guerrillas met her and explained that they needed her guidance to launch the War of Liberation. The Guerrillas asked strategy, places to put arms, hide and routes to take. Chimurenga says that the spirit ordered them to take the medium to a place of safety where we would be able to give the plans for the war through her medium. Mbuyu Nehanda left her home and was carried on to Chifomba, a small place in the north-east. There a special house was built for her and she blessed war material and guerrillas going to the front.³¹

31. Martin and Johnson, n.12, p.130.

What should be noted about 'spirit mediums' was that it was merely a strategy on part of the ZANU to win over thousands of people who believe in the spirit. This strategy should be seen as a part of overall policy of 'approaching masses' to strengthen and consolidate the warfare against the White regime.

Besides, the first ZANLA guerrillas in the north-east built on trusted contacts already established by FRELIMO. A ZANU spokesman described the early cadres sent into the north-east as being more 'political commissars' than guerrilla fighters. They were trained in generalized guerrilla warfare and specialized mass mobilization. Considerable emphasis on political education was given. The National grievances - dealing with deprivation of land, limitations on the number of cattle a family could keep, restrictions on education and job opportunities, and the inferior African health service - were the cornerstone of political education. The writings of Marx, Lenin and Mao were discussed, the nature of capitalism and colonialism were analysed, and the history of Zimbabwe, its geography, climate, vegetation, agriculture, wild life, minerals industry, population and economic base, were taught.³²

The opening of the north-east front and the fact that fighting became continuous, not sporadic as it had been in the sixties, were to completely change the nature and scale

32. Ibid., p.144.

of recruitment. Prior to that, ZANU had difficulty in recruiting and resorted to *press-ganging* Zimbabweans in Zambia. Thus, a new phase of recruitment began in the north-east. Moreover, the Rhodesian army was a major mobilizing force for the guerrillas. After they had some battles with the Rhodesian army the latter retaliated by bombing places and chasing the people in the area where clashes took place. They really got the point. They saw innocent people being bombed, killed, so they decided, okay, why should I remain here. I better follow you. So the enemy helped than too. As the battle spread to other areas, mobilization was easier and recruitment intensified.

ZANLA'S change in approach also put White farmers in the individual position of having domestic workers sympathetic to the guerrillas. One centenary farmer with experience of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, said "the atmosphere among farmers here is very similar except that we know these chaps are using highly sophisticated weapons. I would call it Mao Mao rather than Mau Mau. ³³

With this renewed strategy, guerrillas attacked Altena Farm on Christmas New Year, on January 4. Ten members of the security forces had been wounded in landmine explosion, and one, corporal Norman Moore of the Rhodesian light infantry, had died from his injuries.³⁴ This marked the beginning of

33. Ibid.

34. K. Maxey, "The Continuing Fight for Zimbabwe," *African Perspectives*, no.1, 1976, p.93.

continuous war against the Smith regime.

AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL(ANC)

African National Council was formed in 1971 under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa specifically to oppose a constitution agreed on by the British and Rhodesian Governments, which, if implemented would have left the Africans a long way from the universal suffrage that they wanted.

Thus, the ANC sprang into life to give focus to African rejection of the 1971 compromise constitutional proposals put forward by Britain. The British sent the Peace Commission to Rhodesia to test African feeling. The answer often expressed through the ANC was a resounding "No". The commission went home to England, but the ANC continued to exist adding another quasi movement to Zimbabwe's nationalist sweepstakes. In December 1974, these four fragments of the Rhodesian African Nationalist movement - ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and ANC - did miraculously agree to unite by accepting the leadership of Muzorewa in new, expanded African National Council. So in 1974-75 the ANC became an umbrella organisation under which the leaders of the front-line states encouraged the old political notables (Muzorewas, Nkomo and Sithole in particular) to establish a common front and to begin negotiations with Smith and Vorster.

Some of the ZANU leaders were reluctant to join the New ANC whose purpose, initially at least was to negotiate since ZANU was not eager to abandon the guerrilla campaign in the North-East of Rhodesia that it had successfully sustained since 1972. However, all the major nationalist leaders, with the exception of some ZANU guerrilla commanders, did join the new party. However, the new umbrella ANC simply reverted to the old intense fragmentation among the old-grand leadership and the old line organisation.

Whatever optimism may have been generated by the ANC was dashed a fortnight later when the government detained thirty-three ANC officials and banned a meeting that Bishop was to address.³⁵ Nevertheless, Muzorewa said, he still favoured further talks with Smith, who, addressing the International Dental Conference, pronounced that the elimination of racial discrimination in Rhodesia would be disastrous for both Blacks and Whites.

ZANU's office in Lusaka had demanded that the Bishop cease talks with Smith, but the contacts continued through 1973 and into first three months of 1974. Muzorewa was strongly condemned in a letter dated 20 March 1974. The letter was signed by six members of ZANU's central committee, Ndabininge Sithole, then the president, Robert Mugabe, General-Seretary, Enos Nkale, Moton Maliange, Edgar Tekeru. The letter said that the detained central committee members had met and passed the following resolution: that this ZANU central committee at Salisbury prison is not

associated and does not wish to be associated with the ANC's negotiations with the illegal regime and the various postures and methods adopted by the ANC in such negotiations, that ZANU is and has always been an organisation apart from and independent of any other, and that therefor, no organisation has authority to speak on ZANU's behalf.³⁶ They regarded ANC's involvement in negotiations as disastrous and posing the greatest political threat to African political interests in a situation currently being militarily improved in the African's favour and which ought to be left to mature further for our maximum exploitation when the regime and its supporters are sufficiently ground down to yield meaningfully.

NHARI REBELLION

The year 1975 was bad to ZANU in that a small revolt against the top leadership took place, and two months later Hebert Chitepo, chairman of the ZANU was killed in a car bomb explosion.

The chain of events in 1975 began with a low-key secret meeting in the north-east, near Mukumbura, just over the border in Mozambique. The meeting was arranged through a District service officer in the area, but it was a junior

35. See Astrow, n.13, p.45.

36. R. Blake, *A History of Rhodesia* (London : Eyre Methuan, 1977), p.190.

man who met clandestinely with two ZANLA commanders, Thomas Nhari and Dakarai Badze, on 21 September 1974. Another two meetings were held in October and November respectively.³⁷ These meetings coincided with the temporary release of detained nationalist leaders to attend exploratory talks in Zambia. The main purpose of these meetings was to organize a rebellion. Their theme for mobilizing rebellion was that they were suffering in the bushes, while their leaders were comfortable in Lusaka and Salisbury who denying them better weapons to defend themselves with. Although they knew the ZANU philosophy were based on mobilization and protracted struggle, those like Nhari who had trained on the more sophisticated Russian armaments, felt that the light weapons they were using, mostly from China, were inadequate. Having made proper ground work, Nhari rebels tried to ambush Tongogara on the night of 10 December 1974, the eve of Smith's cease-fire broadcast. Fighting erupted in Lusaka's Kamwala township following this.³⁸ They had already kidnapped his wife and their small children, as well as nineteen ZANU officials including three members of high command.

Many of senior members of the high command had been out on mission. When the rebellion began Tongogara and

 37. John Day, "The Divisions of Rhodesian African Nationalist Movement," *The World Today*, vol.33, no.10, October 1977.

38. See Astrow, n.13, p.87.

Chitepo were in Rumania. The rebels complained that the "leadership is staying in Lusaka, and is wasting money. It is too old, we want young men. They demanded that whole high command from Tongogara down, must be replaced.³⁹

This was the situation Tongogara and Chitepo found when they returned from Rumania early in December. Tongogara had a briefing from a senior FRELIMO Commander, Franscisco Langa, who told him the dissidents who did not want to fight had come from home and taken control of the camp. Tongogara took this information to Sithole who was attending the meeting at Lusaka's Mulungashi Hall. Sithole asked him to keep it quiet because he felt it would weaken their position at the talks.

At a full meeting of the high command, Tongogara announced that he was going to Chifombo. He was joined by Nhongo and Urimbo. A strategy was worked out with FRELIMO commander Moyono that the rebels would be called to a meeting and disarmed. Tongogara, with part of a force of 250 newly trained cadre entered Chifombo.⁴⁰ They caught Badza and Nhari and executed them.

There were there underlying causes for the Nhari Rebellion : Sudden explosion in recruitment coupled with administrative deficiencies; enemy action; and the existence of disgruntled politician. Concerning the first cause,

39. Martin and Johnson, n.12, p.185.

40. Ibid., p.186.

within two years ZANLA forces had expanded from about three hundred to five thousand. However, the party's capacity to absorb, equip and feed such a number had not expanded correspondingly. Regarding the second cause, there is incontrovertible evidence that the Rhodesian regime had a very active hand in fomenting the revolt in ZANU. The third basic factor leading to the attempted coup in ZANU was the presence in Lusaka of disgruntled politicians who were prepared to exploit any situation to regain control of ZANU. Their chief motive force was the quest for personal power.

For the guerrillas, 1975 was also to be very trying time. Many senior commanders had been lost in the war or the rebellion, and commanders with less experience had been rapidly promoted to fill gaps in the command structure. The OAV had withdrawn recognition of ZANU, and OAU on 8 January at meeting of the Liberation committee in Das-es-Salaam, had specified that funds and support would go only to the ANC. The transit of arms and ammunition through Zambia were reduced to a smuggled trickle as relations with Kaunda's government deteriorated. The transitional government in Mozambique, was preoccupied with its own independence set for June.

Meanwhile, ZANU received another shock when its chairman Herbert Chitepo was assassinated when a bomb attached to his car exploded, killing him, a body guard

and a small child in a neighbouring garden. A ZANU party statement blamed it on the Smith regime's sinister scheme announced earlier this year, promising large sum of money to people who captured or eliminated guerrilla leaders.⁴¹

The death of Chitepo had shattering impact on the ZANU, The Nhari rebellion that preceded the Chitepo's death and subsequent arrest in Zambia of most of members of the military high command of ZANULA had disrupted the guerrilla warfare and brought the war to a standstill for almost a year at a time when it was just picking up.

Meanwhile, Mugabe had taken over the leadership of the ZANU after the death of Chitepo. The election of Robert Muzambane as president came at a time when revolution was passing through a critical period. The crisis coincides with the great crisis within the ZANU which was initially sparked off by the tragic and untimely murder of dynamic chairman Herbert Chitepo by the enemies of the Zimbabwe revolution and the subsequent attempted decimation of the leadership of the party's external wing by the Zambian government and later the defection of Rev Ndabaningwa Sithole to the ANC. Therefore, a gigantic task is being presented to the leadership and failure to perform it will involve the danger of a complete collapse of our revolution. The situation was such that any further delay would be fatal. It

41. G. Matatu, "Who killed Chitepo?", *Africa*, vol.7, no.8, May 1975, p.23.

is within the perspective that after much soul-searching and extensive consultations with all the external organs of the party, the rank and file of the party had come to the final irrevocable conclusion that the only man who can serve the revolution by providing a viable leadership in the liberation movement was Robert Mugabe.

PATRIOTIC FRONT

The Patriotic Front was formed on 8 October 1976 in Maputo, Mozambique by Mugabe of ZANU and Nkomo of ZAPU.⁴² However, it should be noted that this front included only two of the four political groups, and, as an alliance, not a party, it preserved the old identities of its members units, since Nkomo and Mugabe formed it, not from mutual trust or report, but to supplement their particular inadequacies.

We have already seen how from 1963, when Mugabe helped lead the revolt against Nkomo's leadership of ZAPU, until 1974, they were still bitter opponents. During parts of 1975 and 1976 they adopted differing tactics: Mugabe seeking guerrilla support abroad, Nkomo negotiating with Ian Smith in Rhodesia.⁴³ This alliance were purely of convenience, Nkomo with weak popular support in Rhodesia and without any effective guerrilla following, tried to lose any

42. Ibid., p.25.

43. Astrow, n.13, p.102.

reputation for moderation that he might have acquired in talking to Smith by allying himself with the fiercely spoken Mugabe, and hoped to strengthen his general standing by association through Mugabe. Mugabe, on the other hand, seeing that party was undergoing a turbulent phase in order to have respite till it overcomes all problems might have tried to ally with most experienced Nkomo who in the expansive pioneer days of 1957 to 1963 epitomized a united nationalist movement and who was the best known nationalist outside Rhodesia. Whether the motives which brought Nkomo and Mugabe together were sufficient to perpetuate their alliance must be doubtful. In fact, two elements of the Patriotic Front sometimes failed to coordinate. For example, in the bomb blast that killed eleven people in Salisbury store in August 1977, Nkomo blamed the Rhodesian authorities. While another Patriotic Front spokesman claimed credit for ZANU. These leaders wished to cut together their followers and put strain on the alliance. There were reports in 1977 of fighting between guerrillas from the two wings of the Patriotic Front. Since then, there was politics of change and counter change between ZAPU and ZANU over the year till the alliance broke down on the eve of the 1980 election which brought independence to Rhodesia .

Meanwhile, guerrillas of ZANU made lot of inroads into Rhodesia and controlled large areas of the country side, particularly in the Takawira sector stretching from the Mozambique frontier to just west of Salisbury and the

Nehand sector to the north which included Sinoia to the west and Norton to the South. Four ZANLA companies, each at least 150 strong, were located north, west, south and east of Salisbury. The strategy was to encircle the capital and other cities and towns in the country, cutting them off from each other. Advance groups had already infiltrated the cities on sabotage missions, such as the spectacular attack on oil storage depots in Salisbury by a Seven man ZANLA group.

By the middle of 1979 - the year of people's storm- the ZANLA forces inside the country numbered over 20,000. By the end of the year martial law had been extended to cover 95 percent of the country, and for the period between 1 January and 28 December, the death toll in the war totalled 7,729. The number of members of the security forces killed- 408- was almost 50 percent higher than previous year. The guerrillas killed numbered 4,290.⁴⁴ The cost of the war in financial terms was also rising sharply. Journalists who had been allowed to travel around the country had to be surprised by the extent of guerrilla penetration.

A few days before the common wealth summit opened in Lusaka on August 1, Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain said in Parliament: "the British government is wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia."⁴⁵ In Lusaka

44. Ibid., p.108.

45. Martin and Johnson, n.12, p.220.

summit, the principle of majority rule had now been accepted in Rhodesia. This was an important advance. Further it was felt that a democratic constitution is necessary which did not leave real power in the hands of the minority. It was also agreed that elections in order to be free and fair would be internationally supervised. Moreover, at Lusaka meet, a compromise was agreed that the elections would be supervised under British government authority, and with commonwealth observers.

Thatcher, as she had promised, moved swiftly. Invitation to a constitutional conference at Lancaster House to be chaired by Carrington were sent to the Patriotic Front leaders and Muzorewa government which included Smith and Sithole in the delegation. The conference opened on 10 September and concluded after forty-seven plenary sessions with an agreement on a new constitution, and on the arrangements for the transitional period preceding independence on 15 December.⁴⁶

Elections were held under the new constitution. All political parties participated for the first time. ZANU won the elections by a comfortable margin and took over control from white regime thereby putting an end to twenty years of struggle against colonialism. ZANU's victory was expected as it was the dominant party having support of

46. O'Meara, n.3, p.54.

Chapter-III

ZANU AND ITS EXTERNAL SUPPORT

ZANU AND CHINA

It is significant to note that the strategy of ZANU in the 60s was influenced by China. ZANU received both material and ideological support from China. ZANU'S first group of five guerrillas had gone to China for training on 22 September 1963. The group was led by Emmerson M'Nangagwa and included Jhon Shoniva, Eddison Shihuru, Jameson Mudavanhu and Lawrence Swoswe.¹ Their course lasted for six months and included military science and a period at the school of ideology. A second group, including William Ndangara, Bernard Muntuma, Silas Murhanges and Feli Santna, who had undergone basic training in Ghana in 1964, went to China in 1965 for advanced training as instructors. Early in 1966, Josiah Tongogara led a group of eleven to Nanking Academy in Peking where they underwent training in mass mobilization, strategy and tactics. This group returned to Tanzania in November 1966, after the Sinoia battle. 2

Several reasons can be attributed as to the close relationship between China and the ZANU. China's links with

1. *Interview with Emmerson M'Nangagwa, London, October, 1979, BBC Monitoring Service*

2. *Interview with Josiah Tongogara, Geneva, November, 1976, BBC Monitoring Service.*

ZANU were based on the Chinese suspicion about the Soviet imperialism in the region. By then Soviet Union was actively supporting Zimbabwe African People Union (ZAPU). As we know that in the 60's relations between Soviet Union and China breached over number of issues. After minor skirmishes between Soviet Union and China on their border, China considered Soviet Union as nothing more than a country aiming for dominance in the world, and proclaimed that it is the only true socialistic country. Since then as we see, China had been playing an effective role in world politics. Thus, it saw the ZANU a right partner in Southern Rhodesia.

China's Maoism seemed to have attracted the ZANU very much, which considered it as more relevant to Southern Rhodesia where it can be applied very effectively. The result was that ZANU changed its strategy to 'people mobilization' which enabled the party to increase its support among the people. For ZANU, the support of China was necessary because Soviet Union and other communist countries were supporting the ZAPU. This had put the ZANU in Hobson's choice. Besides, it needed material support in the form of arms and ammunition after it switched over to Guerrilla warfare. As China was ready to provide necessary support ZANU had to welcome it .

However, despite thick friendship between China and the ZANU in the 60s, it was not long lasting. This was evident in the 70s which clearly showed that ZANU's tactics and strategies were influenced more by FRELIMO than by any other

organisations or countries. By and large, ZANU's success was more due to its relationship with FRELIMO than China. Nonetheless, the contribution of China to ZANU in terms of materials, ammunition and the ideological support was enormous. That enabled the ZANU to consolidate its position against its tough rival parallel organisation, the ZAPU, in the 1960s even though China's interest in Africa was largely motivated by the imperialist desire to become the leader of communist world.

ZANU AND FRELIMO

The assistance from China in the sixties was not helping the ZANU very much. Most of the guerrillas trained in China were either killed or captured by Rhodesian forces. Also, the Rhodesian government increased its repression against the members of the ZANU. At this juncture, ZANU looked to FRELIMO for the support. The contact was crucial as it enabled the opening of the Tete front on 7.8 March 1968, in the eastern province of Mozambique (adjoining Malawi, Zambia and Rhodesia) from where ZANLA wanted to operate against white Rhodesian government. Here a new corridor was opened for infiltration of guerrillas and armaments into North-eastern Rhodesia.

For FRELIMO the problem of ZANU's creation in 1963 was complicated by a number of factors. In the first place, they knew very little about the pressure and dissatisfaction

within ZAPU prior to the split and they were therefore in adequately equipped to judge the significance of the new movement. When FRELIMO was created in Dar-es-Salaam in 1962 ZAPU already existed, FRELIMO had regarded the men who emerged as ZANU's leader as their allies in ZAPU only a year earlier. FRELIMO had been created from three separate movements and one of them, UDENAMO was trying to breakaway again and reemerge in its own right. Thus, not surprisingly in the circumstances, FRELIMO took the view that ZANU, like UDENAMO, represented dangerous divisionist and tribal secessionist tendencies. The possibility of any relationship in the early days of ZANU was therefore inhibited by what FRELIMO regarded as indisciplined behaviour of ZANU representatives and members.³ Moreover, while ZAPU had over the years secured the support of most progressive countries like Soviet Union and East European countries and movements around the world, ZANU was initially able to attract little support, and externally, ZAPU appeared to be the more consequential movement.

Against this background the relationship which emerged between ZANU and FRELIMO seems surprising, but infact it is not when one consider FRELIMO's commitment to independence and national unity through the armed struggle. A senior FRELIMO official complained. How did we start supporting

3. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe* (London : Faber and Faber, 1981),p.15.

ZANU after all this background ? When our natural ally ZAPU refused to fight with weapons in their hands, they violated all the principles. When ZANU accepted to fight with weapons in their hands then they became our allies.⁴ This is really the great point of difference.

Contact was established between FRELIMO and ZANU at a tentative meeting in Dar-es-Salaam's Twiga Hotel in 1968, where Edward Mondlane, then leader of FRELIMO, Oma Machel met the ZANU National Chairman, Hebert Chitepo, and Secretary for Defense, Noel Mukona, who was a major force in developing the relationship between the two parties. Nothing substantial was discussed, but a link ZANU was to build on was established. ZANU formally asked for access through Tete saying that they wanted to open a front in North East of Rhodesia. Machel explained FRELIMO's difficulties in Tete, where they had not yet consolidated their position and the difficulty of supplying arms because of serious problems with Zambia. However at the meeting FRELIMO agreed to consider ZANU's request. In the next meeting on 7-8 March, 1968, FRELIMO had agreed to open the Tete Front in the eastern province of Mozambique. And as FRELIMO consolidated its position in this war of Zone, a new corridor was opened for infiltration of guerrillas and

4. Martin and Johnson, n.3, p.17.

armaments into North-eastern Rhodesia. FRELIMO and ZANU, met again in 1970 at a ZANU house in Lusaka. Machel was accompanied by the same team but on the occasion Chitepo led the ZANU team, accompanied by Tongogara and four senior commanders.⁵ It was at this meeting they agreed to work together. The working relationship in those years was important in providing a substantial stimulus for waging a war of liberation as well as leading to the radicalization within ZANLA itself. By December 1972, when the war of liberation actually got underway, ZANLA guerrillas had established the groundwork for an effective people's war with the support of FRELIMO. The Mozambique border had proved to be ideal for guerrilla activity.

Meanwhile, in July 1975, FRELIMO government attained its independence. The FRELIMO's victory gave a new impetus to the ZANLA cadres as it had become relatively easy to carry out the operation against Rhodesian regime from Mozambique. And between August and September 1975 alone, over 10,000 Africans crossed into Mozambique. After FRELIMO took over power,⁶ it was estimated that there were 500 guerrillas operating from the North-east, 200 on the eastern border and many more attacking from across the border.⁷

5. Ibid., n.3, p.19.

6. See C. Legum, *Southern Africa: The Year of The Whirl Wind* (London: Rex Collings, 1977), p.120.

7. K. Maxey, "The Continuing Fight for Zimbabwe," *Africa Perspectives*, no.1, 1976, p.103

Between 1975 and 1980 ZANU consolidated its position and openly carried out its attacks on white Rhodesian government. Arms and ammunition were freely available. Even FRELIMO guerrillas participated in the attacks. Thus, the major reason why ZANU had won its war against the whites was due to FRELIMO's unflinching support to it. Besides providing material and moral support, FRELIMO also helped ZAPU in shaping guerrilla strategy from time to time.

THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICA UNITY (OAU)

The organisation of African unity was set up in 1963 at Addis Ababa with a view to become an inter-state institution in Africa. There are three broad identifiable purposes in the OAU charter. The primary goal is the promotion of the unity and solidarity of the continent. Secondly, unity is closely linked with another core purpose, defense of Sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. The final broad purpose was the eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa. There are many reasons for the inclusion of this goal. Many countries in Africa at the time of establishment of the OAU were still under colonial rule. Besides, colonialism subjugated Africans and created in them a feeling of inferiority. For many Africans, therefore, anti-colonialism was seen to be a moral crusade and a prerequisite for the realisation of the

African personality, let alone the Sine quanon for development. ⁸

The third objective is very much relevant to Southern Rhodesia which was still under white regime and struggling to become independent. In order to speed up the realisation of the objective of liberating African territories under colonial and racist minority regimes, the founding conference of the OAU set up a special committee, known as the African Liberation Committee (ALC). The main functions of the committee are (1) harmonisation of all assistance provided by African states for the liberation struggle and the management of the Special Fund that was set up for that purpose. (2) coordination of the efforts of the liberation movements. and (3) unification of liberation movement, where more than one exists so as to enhance their effectiveness.

Thus, the OAU's concern with colonial and white minority rule in the continent stems from a variety of sources. First, the new leaders of independent Africa believe that their own independence, freedom and security are indivisible from those of their brothers still under colonial rule. And, second the presence of colonial and white minority racist regimes in the continent is seen as an insult to the integrity of the black race.

8. Amadu Sesay, *The OAU after Twenty Years* (Olusola Ojo, and Orobola Fasehum-Boulder: West View Press, 1984, p.4.

The environment in which the OAU decolonisation policy was made influenced very greatly the strategies pursued by the organisation. The pervasive characteristics of dependence, underdevelopment and military weakness have served to limit the effective option available to organisation in its quest for decolonisation. Subsequently, the OAU has identified, adopted, and refined the strategies of moral suasion for the application of sanctions-diplomatic, social and economic.⁹

OAU AND ZANU

The Rhodesian problem was slightly different from that of the portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. While the potuguese territories were treated as cases of political decolonisation, the Rhodesian situation was seen as both a decolonisation issue as well as abolition of institutionalised racism. Since Britain was held to be responsible still for the territory, the OAU decolonisation strategy of moral suasion was accordingly directed towards that metropolitan country. This continued until the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965. Before then, at the founding conference of May 1963, member states had appealed to Britain not to transfer the power and attributes of Sovereignty to foreign minority

9. Ibid., n.7, p.15.

governments imposed on African peoples by the use of force and under cover of racial legislation.¹⁰

The tension between the minority rule and the demands for black majority rule in the constituent regions of the Central African Federation, which was formed in 1953, led to the collapse of that Federation in late 1963. It was at this time that ZANU was born. Initially it was ZAPU that received the support. After the split in 1963 and subsequent establishment of the ZANU, the OAU was in dilemma to give support to which of the parties. Meanwhile, the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia cognisant of the independence agitation of the other parts of the Federation braced themselves for UDI. The Rhodesian minority government severely repressed the nationalists in order to forestall anticipated mass African opposition to this impending illegal action. This brutal repression as well as the anticipated UDI prompted the OAU council of ministers in February 1964 to call once again on Britain to prevent the threat of Unilateral Independence or subtle assumption of power by the minority settler regime in Southern Rhodesia.¹¹

By mid-1964, the OAU efforts to convince Britain to prevent UDI had clearly failed. The recognition of this fact led the organisation to harden its attitude towards Britain.

10. *Africa Research Bulletin*, September, 1976, p.4168.

11. See Berhanykun Andemical, *The OAU and the UN* (New York :Africana, 1976), p.115.

The organisation's hard line was its recognition of the failure of moral suasion. Consequently, resolutions started to raise the prospect of sanctions against Britain and the territory. In August 1965 the OAU called on member states to reconsider all political, economic, diplomatic and financial relations with the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the event of this government granting and tolerating the independence of Rhodesia under a minority government. The organisation thwarted the use of force against the minority regime in the event of UDI.

However, when Rhodesian premier Ian Smith unilaterally declared the colony independent in November 1965, the OAU had no standing army, nor could it assemble an adhoc military force to combat Ian Smith. Rather than using force, the council of ministers met in an emergency session in Addis Ababa in early December and resolved "that if the UK does not crush the rebellion and restore law and order, and thereby prepare the way for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia by December 15, 1965, the member states of the OAU shall sever diplomatic relations on that date with the United Kingdom. But when the ultimatum expired on the 15th, only nine out of the lightly Six had complied with the resolution.¹² The majority of OAU states under

12. Andemicael, n.11, p.117.

conservative and pre-western regimes did not implement the resolution, partly because they were reluctant to antagonise Britain and partly because they had only a loose commitment to decolonisation.

The reluctance of the British government to use force against a regime with which it was having racial affinity, and the inability of the OAU to implement its own resolutions on Rhodesia, led the organisation to take the issue to the United Nations, i.e. to escalate the issue from a regional to a global level. The African group has successfully convinced the General Assembly that contrary to Britain's assertion, Rhodesia was not a self-governing territory.¹³

However, the African bloc was not able force the security council to impose mandatory sanctions until May, 1968, when it prohibited trade with and travel to Rhodesia. The political support of the UN for the OAU on the Rhodesian problem did not bring about the collapse of UDI, primarily because the Africans could not persuade the security council to extend sanctions to those states whose compliance was needed to make them successful-the neighbouring countries of South Africa and Portugal rather than Britain.

While the OAU was pressing for sanctions against the

13. Andemicael, n.11, p. 125.

open sympathisers of Rhodesia, Britain held intermittent talks with the illegal regime with the intention of bringing it to legality. The talks held variously in 1966, 1968 and 1971 did not resolve the problems, however. The OAU position on these talks was that there could not be an internationally acceptable solution to the Rhodesian problem which did not grant majority rule to Africans before independence.

From 1974 onwards, the OAU passed on the responsibility of bringing Rhodesia to legal independence to Front Line states. The strategic location of these states, plus their shared ideological beliefs with various factions in the nationalist movements, made them influential in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. ¹⁴

As regards relations between ZANU and OAU during this period, it can be said that the OAU always insisted that ZANU and ZAPU come together and form a common front against the minority white regime. When the efforts at unity failed the OAU had no other option but to recognise both ZANU and ZAPU as the leading nationalist organisations and to that end, it gave material and moral support to both of them.

A dramatic increase in the influence of these Front line states occurred after the coup in Portugal in April 1974. The subsequent independence of Mozambique and Angola had a traumatic impact on the minority regimes in

14. Amadu Sesay, n.7, p.25.

were no independence before majority rule and no acceptable settlement without the fullest participation and consent of the Patriotic Front and its fighting forces. Given these preconditions, then the Front line states rejected the Kissinger plan. The Kissinger plan sought to bring about "majority" rule in two years. In addition, the plan called for a transitional administration with an equal number of whites and blacks in the council of state, while the blacks would form the majority in the council of ministers.¹⁶ This would have compromised black majority rule. Consequently, the Geneva talks which followed the American plan collapsed.

Following the collapse of these Geneva talks, the initiative for resolving the Rhodesian problem passed on to the Commonwealth. The most important breakthrough came at the 1979 Lusaka meeting of the distinctive international organisations. It was decided at the conference that constitutional talks under the chairmanship of Britain be held to bring about the territory to legal and acceptable independence.

When these constitutional conferences opened at Lancaster House on 10 September 1979, the OAU was not a major participant. Its role was limited to that of an observer. The agreements reached in London among other things provided for general elections under commonwealth observation. The elections that were held under the

16.. Amadu Sesay, n.7, p.27.

Southern Africa, particularly Southern Rhodesia. Strategically, it exposed the Smith regime to more direct military attacks by the nationalists. On the economic front, the liberation of Mozambique opened Rhodesia to more affective economic sanctions which had not been possible before because Portugal had collaborated with Ian Smith to bust sanctions.

Essentially, the Front line states, as defacto 'OAU agents,' embarked upon two broad policies. First, they sought to unify as well as to legitimise movements that were perceived to be effective fighting forces and which were similarly interested in genuine black majority rule. And second, they set out the modalities for the resolution of the regional conflict.¹⁵

Front line states as unifiers and legitimisers brought about intergration of the factions in Zimbabwe into the African National Council (ANC) under Bishop Muzorewa in December 1974. Yet within three years the differences in the ANC led to its collapse. The resultant faction of Robert Mugabe's ZANU and Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU formed the Patriotic Front (PF). Thus the formation of PF means the shift of support of the OAU from ZANU to PF.

The second major function of the Front line states as noted was concerned with setting out acceptable modalities for resolving the Rhodesian problems. In the main, there

15. Amadu Sesay, n.7, p.26.

Lancaster House provisions brought to power the ZANU led by Robert Mugabe in April 1980.

Thus, the whole of relations between the OAU and ZANU must be understood from three angles. Firstly, right from the beginning, OAU was against division within the nationalist movement. For this reason, it throughout emphasised on the unity between ZAPU and ZANU eventhough it did give material and moral support to both the organisations when they failed to come together. Secondly, the OAU was itself a weak organisation incapable of implementing its decisions fully and effectively. This was because of lack of consensus among the member states; some of whom even had cooperated with Britain and South Africa at a critical juncture. Thirdly, despite OAU's active support to ZANU, nothing could restrain the white regime from being oppressive against ZANU. Because of this ZANU was less dependent on the OAU than on FRELIMO and other Front line states. In spite of several constraints in which it had to operate, OAU did act as a pressure body on Britain and white settler government and did play a crucial role in creating a strong public opinion against oppressive white minority regime.

Conclusion

This dissertation has sought to examine the role of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) since its inception in 1963 up till the independence in 1980. In the process, it also took into account the role played by other organisations such as African National Congress (ANC) and National Democratic Party (NDP) before ZANU's establishment, and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) a rival nationalist movement of ZANU. This dissertation mainly concentrates on logical narration of ZANU's course of struggle event by event. Moreover, it has also dealt with ZANU's external links with FRELIMO, China and OAU without whom its success would have become difficult.

As regards the cause of the split in ZAPU and subsequent emergence of ZANU, it can be said that psychological factors played a predominant role. These factors relate to personality differences, style of leadership of Joshua Nkomo, president of ZAPU. Ever since the formation of ZAPU, Nkomo had come to play a dominant role thereby isolating important leaders like Ndabaninga Sithole and Robert Mugabe. These leaders at a point of time felt the need of displacing or relegating the position of Nkomo. When they failed in their efforts, a new party was thought to be the only alternative. As a result, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) came into existence in 1963. It is a common place observation that nationalist

liberation movements frequently expend fighting each other than on fighting their acknowledged enemy. The relationship between ZANU and ZAPU, two of the nationalist groups in Rhodesia, exemplifies this conspicuous characteristic. Though there certainly have been differences in policy and strategy between ZAPU and ZANU, what is more observable about their activities over the decades is the similarity of the courses that they have both pursued. Thus, despite difference between these two organisations they never reached to the brink of major clashes. They had one common enemy that was Rhodesian government. Unlike, for example, the rival groups in the Angolan struggle for independence which each wanted to establish a different regime, both ZAPU and ZANU share similar nationalist goals. Thus, it does not seem possible to provide an explanation of the difference between ZANU and ZAPU in ideological terms.

ZANU sought to realize the goal of establishing Nationalist, Socialist, Democratic Republic through constitutional means. However, its hopes were dashed by white political system which was reluctant to accommodate reforms for public participation. Moreover, ZANU was banned by the government in 1964. This compelled the ZANU to operate outside of the white political system. Thus, from now onwards anti-system politics became inherent in nationalists' strategy, particularly ZANU's. The announcement of Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 sent a message to the nationalists that whites are

committed to go to any extent to preserve their power. Thus, the declaration was an indication that whites were determined to establish a system similar to South Africa. The UDI was an opportune time for ZANU which transformed its policy from non-violence to that of full fledged armed struggle. Unlike the movements in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which were peaceful, this transformation to a gurrilla warfare would definitely have to waste on force and violence.

During 1970s ZANU engaged in guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla war against Smith regime was protracted; the longer the war continues the stronger the nationalists became, both for their victory and the government that they will form. The prolonged guerrilla war had completely paralysed the Rhodesian Front's government. The extension of the struggle to ther parts of Zimbabwe and the intensification of war by the ZANLA forces compelled the Rhodesian government to close its borders with Zambia and Mozambique. The war threatened to bring the economy to a stand still. That is why Britain and its Rhodesian allies came increasingly to accept the principle of African majority rule. The factor that had the greatest effect on the relations between the Rhodesian government and the nationalists is undoubtedly the armed struggle of the ZANLA guerrillas. ZANU's military strength and popular support for its guerrilla campaigns had an incisive effect on the course

of struggle. And it is ZANU which played a crucial role in ensuing the victory of Zimbabweans.

As regards ZANU's external links with China, FRELIMO and OAU, they were crucial in helping ZANU to consolidate and fight against white regime. Without their support, ZANU would have faced a herculian task. Major support in the sixties came from China which supplied arms and ammunition to the ZANU. Maoism which stressed on 'mass line' strategy and which was more revolutionary than Marxism of Soviet Union attracted ZANU very much. Further, it is pertinent to note that while ZANU was supported by China, ZAPU received its support from Soviet Union. The United States on the other hand remained neutral. The intervention of external powers in Rhodesian crisis attracted the global attention. However, despite their affiliations, these countries wanted 'negotiated settlement' because of certain reasons. First, a decade long fight in portuguese held territories had cost heavy damage of life and property. So they did not want a war like this. Second, being a land locked country, sanctions on Rhodesia proved to be effective. More than this, the emergence of FRELIMO and subsequent achievement of independence under its leadership saved the country from being internationalised.

In the 70s ZANU gradually weaned away from china to FRELIMO for the latter's support is much more necessary than the former's because of geographical proximity. Throughout 70s ZANU was actively supported by FRELIMO. The

working relationship in these years was important in providing a substantial stimulus to the liberation movement leading to the radicalization within ZANLA itself. The result of these relationships was that FRELIMO had agreed to open the Tete Front in the Eastern province of Mozambique. After FRELIMO's victory in 1975 it became relatively easy to carry out the operations against the Rhodesian regime from Mozambique. The major reason why ZANU had won its war against the whites was due to FRELIMO's support to it. Finally, OAU's support to ZANU was also important. It gave both material and moral support to the nationalist organisation; It played a key role in compelling the member countries to enforce United Nations sanctions against the Rhodesian government. In the process, it also united all the Front line countries in complying with its resolution.

Thus the ZANU's contribution in liberating Southern Rhodesia from the shackles of colonial rule has been remarkable, for it had always remained in the forefront of the struggle. Three major factors can be cited as to its success. Firstly, unlike ZAPU, ZANU was a stable organisation; leadership of ZANU was clear about its goals and it never compromised until its main goal of independence was attained. Secondly, the shift towards guerrilla strategy had paid rich dividends to the party, which attracted not only masses but also paralysed the whites' economy. Finally, the active support given by

FRELIMO, China had a striking impact. But for them, ZANU would not have had any impact and also the liberation would have got delayed.

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