THE END OF IDEOLOGY THEORY :
AN ANALYSIS WITH REFERENCE TO THE WRITINGS OF DANIEL BELL AND SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

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School of Social Sciences

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PREFACE

As the present century is coming to an end, significant changes are occuring on the World Political and Social Planes. Ideological differences between capitalist West and the communist East appear to be collapsing. The communist countries, including Soviet Union, are attempting to introduce Market-Oriented economic reforms and democratic political institutions and processes along Western liberal lines.

These changes occuring today seem to come very close to what the "End of Ideology" theorists talked about in the 1950s and 1960s. This makes one interested in seeing if the similarities in the changes taking place today in the communist societies and the "End of Ideology" thesis developed decades ago are superficial or basic.

It is in the context outlined above that the present study, "The End of Ideology Theory: An Analysis with Reference to the Writings of Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset", is undertaken.

This dissertation traces what exactly is the 'End of Ideology' theory under what conditions it arose and how it became popular as well as critically evaluates the extent to which this theory is in line with the empirical development in Western societies of the time it became popular.

A point to be noted is that there is no single homogenous theory of the 'End of Ideology'. Yet, a common theme that communism in western capitalist countries became irrelevant in the wake of post-war economic boom and dilution of serious ideological differences between the left and right runs through the writings of all End of Ideology theorists.

The origins of the 'End of Ideology' debate can be traced to the Milan meeting of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1955. Edward Shils and Raymond Aron were among the prominent organisers and attended by, among others, Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset - the important writers who developed the debate in later years. On the 1955 meeting, Shils in his review article 'End of Ideology', for the first time pointed towards 'the politics of civility' as an alternative to ideological politics or the extreme Fascist, Nazi, Bolshevik and McCarthyist types. Around the same period, Raymond Aron referred to the end of ideological way of thinking in "The End of Ideological Age", the final chapter of his book "The Opium of the Intellectuals" (1955).

In the years following the second half of the Fifties and through the Sixties, besides Shils, Aron, Lipset and Bell, several writers like Arthur Schleisinger Jr., John Kenneth Galbraith, F.W. Watkins, etc. have contributed to the development of the "End of Ideology" theory.

This dissertation focuses mainly on an analysis of the writings of Bell and Lipset. The reasons for such a delimitation are: (1) feasibility of research, (2) the fact that Bell and Lipset are the most representive of the theorists who wrote on 'End of Ideology', and (3) the point that it is their writings which generated academic debate in the field.

The dissertation is organised in four chapters. Chapter one and two delineate the viewsof Bell and Lipset, respectively, on 'End of Ideology', and also show the differences between them. Chapter three is devoted to a 'criticism of the End of Ideology Theory', while the fourth chapter comes by way of conclusion and attempts to trace the sociological roots of the "End of Ideology" theory.

CHAPTER I

DANIEL BELL AND THE END OF IDEOLOGY

The "end of ideology" theory states that political theory and pratice which aim at radical social transformation have ended in the west. The reasons given for this are :(i) the disillusionment with previous forty years of Mass Movements, revolution and the socialist classless utopia projected by Marxism; (ii) Marxism - Leninism which has been the main carrier of ideology has been discredited as an ´intellectual political system; (iii) the class conflicts and system wide problems which give rise to ideology have generally been solved; (iv) the pressing problems of the society are no more amenable to political solutions; and (v) there is an emerging consensus between the Left and the Right on the principles of social organisation.

The theory differentiates between two kinds of society :The contemporary western society and that which preceded it. The latter, engaged in the process of industrialisation, was marked by constant class conflicts and social turmoil. This was the classical capitalist society where the only means of resolving contradictions was conflict which engendered ideology. By comparison, the

contemporary western society has solved the fundamental problems of industrialisation. In this society, the economic barriers separating social groups are gradually removed and the political significance of economic inequality disappeared. Consensus on basic social problems is obtained and social problems are reduced to those concerning administrative and technical management, thus ending the relevance of ideology. 'Ideology' is said to have relevance in the third world which has not yet solved the problems of industrialisation.

This theory sees "ideology" as a function of economic development i.e. while economic development has reduced ideological conflict in the West, underdevelopment made them relevant in the third world.

Daniel Bell, the Chief exponent of the 'End of Ideology' theory set the tone of the debate with the publication of his book, "The End of Ideology: on the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the 50s"1(1960) and more importantly the brief Epilogue "The End of Ideology in the West". It was in this Epilogue that Bell gave the title its fullest and clearest exposition.

In the 'Epilogue' Bell maintains that the 19th century ideologies, were now exhausted (without naming the specific ideologies). The reasons for their collapse are

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complex: They include : first, calamities, such, as, Moscow trials, Nazi-Soviet Pact, the concentration camps, suppression of Hungarian workers form one chain; second, social changes such as the modification of capitalism and the rise of the welfare state; and third, changes in intellectual attitudes such as, the decline of simplistic , rationalistic beliefs and the emergence of new stoic-theological images of man, e.g. Freud, Tillich, Jaspers, etc.[2].

In the changed circumstances, Bell argues, the old 'ideologies have lost their 'truth' and 'power to persuade' for the radical intelligentsia. But the 'end of ideology' affected more than this radical intelligentsia. Serious intellectuals everywhere no longer believed it possible to blue print a future of social harmony. On the other hand, a few classical liberals and a few conservatives thought state intervention as catastrophic. "In the western world, therefore, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a welfare state: the desirability of decentralised power: a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism". He says, in that sense too, the ideological age has ended[3].

To get a clearer understanding of what Bell means by 'Ideology' and 'End of Ideology' a proper study of the

'social changes' which have led to the End of Ideology has to be made. What does Bell mean by the 'rise of welfare state' and the modification in capitalism? In the 'introduction' to the 'End of Ideology' Bell says, that the book in the main deals with the social changes in the Americas of the 50's. These essays and his other writings shall be analysed since it is on the basis of these perceptions that Bell proposes his 'End of Ideology' thesis.

In 'The Failure of American Socialism', appropriately subtitled the tension of Ethics and Politics',[4] Bell dealt with 'why socialism is a failure in the United States? He argues that apart from all extraneous factors, like the abundance of natural resources, material vastness of America, open frontiers, the most important reason is the socialists' inability to resolve a basic dilemma of ethics and politics. The socialist movement could never resolve but only straddle the basic issue of 'either accepting capitalist society and seeking to transform it from within, as the labour movement did, or of becoming the sworn enemy and rejecting the capitalist society, as the communists did.

Bell here analyses American socialism in terms of Weber's distinction of 'ethic of responsibility' (or the acceptance of limits) and 'ethic of conscience' (or

dedication to the absolute ends)[5]. While the former is a pragmatic view which seeks reconciliation as its goal, the latter creates 'true believers' and are ideologies, according to Bell. Thus the dilemma seen in socialism is while it accepted American society in practice, it rejected and wanted to change the society in theory, and thus on crucial issues it found itself stymied.

Bell analyses the changes in 'Class' in America in 'The Breakup of Family Capitalism[6] and 'The prospects of American Capitalism' [Reviewing the theories of capitalism of Keynes, Schumpeter and Galbraith]. Bell views 'Family' and 'property' as the fundamental institutions of society and that in the last 75 years because of various reasons this relationship between the two is breaking down. The important reasons he cites are the decline of extended family narrowed the choice of heirs competent to manage the enterprise and the increasing 'importance of professional techniques required by the modern management also placed a high premium on skills rather than blood relationship[7]. At the turn of the century these changes coincided with Bankers taking control of Industry (Finance Capitalism) installing professional managers and marking the final separation of family and capitalism.

Sociologically, the breakup of Family Capitalism is linked to a series of shifts in power in Western Society as a whole, which is important for our study of 'End of Ideology'. Family capitalism meant social and political as well as economic dominance which is shown to have changed now. With this Bell sees two silent revolutions in the relation between power and class position in the modern society. That there is a change in the mode of access to power, where inheritance alone is no longer necessary and all determining; the other is change in the nature of the power holding itself. In so far as technical skill rather than property and political position rather than wealth is important[8]. This cuts at the basis of Marxian understanding of political power which views that owners of the means of production by virtue of their control over property also control the various organs of state. Bell contradicts this position by taking a pluralistic view of access to power and diffusion of power in society where through a countervailing of forces they are seen to be in a balance.

The changes in capitalism are seen by Bell to be fundamental, importantly the changes in the class structure of capitalist society. The proletariat, according to Bell, has lost all its revolutionary zeal in the advanced capitalist societies and moreover is being replaced by a new middle class which he calls the 'Salariat'. He presents a

theory of American Trade Unionism in his paper "The capitalism of the Proletariat"[9], to prove his point. Bell distinguishes two contexts in which the American Trade Union can be understood historically: one, as a social movement which under the guidance of the radical intellectuals challenges the established order, and two, as an economic force where, accepting the basic values of society, it fights for a bigger share in the national cake. Applying this distinction to the history of American Trade Unionism, Bell sees different phases in which either of them has dominated or co-existed.

While from 1860 to 1880, the dominant character is one of social movement. From 1880-1920, the two tendencies existed simultaneously. In the third phase from 1935-40, under the influence of Intellectuals socialists and communists Trade Unions became radical. In the present Phase - i.e. 1940 onwards - owing to a variety of reasons, the labour has lost its ideological flavour and has concentrated on Market Unionism. The important reasons are:

1) the war against Fascism has created a sense of national unity, a cause which made the groups on Left and Right to bury their differences and work on a common plank;

(2) Large industries came to accept the role of Trade Unions as institutional apparatus for settling the employees' grievances.

3) The need of newly built unions to consolidate their collective bargaining position in the plant, and

(4) The attack on the communists in the Union beginning in 1947 and the eventual elimination of their influence[10].

Apart from these causes which affected the nature of the working class, what have had a drastic effect were the replacement of radical blue collar proletariat with the white collar 'Salariat', the rise in the American Industry, the expansion of automation process between 1947-57, and the demand for new services, entertainment and recreation. All these resulted in the expansion of professional and technical staff.

The salaried groups, according to Bell and other advocates of End of Ideology, no more spoke the old language of labour nor can, they be appealed in the old class conscious terms. In the Aristotlean tradition this New Middle Class is seen to provide stability to the system by opposing any radical changes. Thus Bell concludes, "certainly the radical tradition of labour movement has vanished"[11].

These changes, i.e., changes in Unionism (from Radical to Marxist Unionism) in capitalism (axis of power from wealth to technical skill) in class structure (salariat from proletariat) are brought in to argue that relevance of 'ideology in contemporay society, by Bell. These changes also prove, for Bell, the failure of Marxism as an intellectual system in understanding the present society.

The Marxist belief in the inevitable polarisation in advanced capitalist society between capitalists and proletariat and the final victory of the latter has turned out to be an illusion. What with a bulging and conservative middle class and market oriented working class! Bell also challenges the fundamental theory of Marxian sociology, namely, that all social structure basically is class structure and class is the relevant unit of political analysis. According to him in actuality "in almost all societies, particularly in the West", we see "not only the rapid shrinking of the 'industrial working class but also the breakup of economic class as the fundamental axis of social structure. "In place of class identity multiple identities of gender, age, religion, education and occupation, ethnic identities etc. are coming to the fore"[12].

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'Status politics' is presented as an alternative analytical concept to 'class politics' to explain the Radical Right in America of the 1950's by Daniel Bell (Lipset and Richard Hofstadter, among others)[13]. In the explanation of McCarthyism, it is seen as an 'ideology' performing certain 'social, psychological' functions in a functionalist way. McCarthyism is seen as a result of prosperity and not depression as traditional political analyses explained. The prosperity created status groups who with a drive for recognition and respectability have sought to impose older conformities on the American body politic[14]. Though acknowledging that McCarthyism is also an ideology in the same sense of 'communism', he says that the fusion of ethics and politics in case of McCarthyism is a break with the American tradition of Pragmatism and thus does not contradict the 'End of Ideology' thesis.

What then did Bell mean by End of Ideology? The End of Ideology had two connotations in Bell: one, that the old ideologies - Socialism, Marxism, and laissez-faire Liberalism are dead and buried under the consensus of their earlier adherents; two, that Salvation through politics is rejected by Western intellectuals. No significant group any longer believed that politics could bring final solution to the human conditions or even that politics could radically transform society in any quick fashion. Though Bell lists

out Marxism, Socialism and laissez-faire Liberalism as the 19th century ideologies which have ended. What he appears to mean above all by 'End of Ideology' is the collapse of the socialist ideal. In the introduction to the 'End of Ideology' book he writes, "In the last decade we have witnessed an exhaustion of the 19th century ideologies particularly Marxism as an intellectual system that could claim truth for their view of the world". He acknowledges the fact that there are ideologies of the 'Right' as well as the 'Left' and that "one's historical context defines one's usage: and the word ideology was a product of the left and gained a distinct resonance in that context"[15]. Thus he associates 'ideology' mainly with movements which aim at radical restructuring of society by presenting the critique of the existing society basing on certain values (which he calls utopia). Bell takes the values of western liberal society like the Individual Rights, welfare state and pluralist politics as given, and though he holds on to them passionately, he does not rank them under 'ideology'.

How does then Bell define 'Ideology'?. The answer to this provides the key to his ideological biases and his interpretation of 'End of Ideology'. 'Ideology' according to Bell "is the conversion of ideas into social levers, it is the commitment to the consequence of ideas, "[16] and what

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gives force to ideology is its passion. For the ideoloque, he continues, "truth arises in action and meaning is given to experience by the transforming movement. Thus the latent function of ideology is seen to tap emotion which fuses emotional energies and channels them into politics". Ideology is here seen as secular religion. In performing these functions of channeling emotional energies into politics, Bell believes that the 19th century ideologies were successful. But the same ideologies today are said to have lost their former potential. "Bell visualises ideology here in terms of a fusion of ethics and politics, also as ideas having an independent role in History"[17].

In his definition of Ideology Bell borrows the Mannhiemian distinction of ideologies between what he called "the particular conception of ideology" and "the total conception of ideology"[18]. The particular conception is professed by individuals and groups who have certain values which are linked to the interests they have, i.e. Ideology in this sense masks the interests professed. On the other hand the total conception is an all inclusive system of comprehensive reality. It is a set of beliefs infused with passion and seeks to transform the whole way of life. It is this sense of ideology 'as a total conception', or as earlier defined as 'secular religion', which Bell uses when he proclaims that ideology has ended. Ideology, thus

defined, not only transforms ideas but people, as well. According to Bell, a social movement can be successful and rouse people when it can do three things: first, simplify ideas; second, establish a claim to truth; and third, in the union of the two, demand a commitment to action. The 19th century ideologies were successful as social movements by emphasising inevitability and by infusing passion into their followers.

Throughout Bells' writings occur scattered and passing comments on the intellectuals - the makers and bearers of ideology - and why they find ideology appealing. In 'Marxian socialism[19]. Bell considers the intellectual susceptible to elitist appeal of the Bolshevik hero, the pure and selfless man who made the intellectual's own lack of purity and commitment a cause of anxiety and guilt.

Who are these Intellectuals? And why are they seen by Bell as carriers of ideology? Why have they in contemporary society then moved away from Ideologies? What are the reasons, apart from the social changes already suggested?

As befits a sociologist, Bell is concerned not just with the content of ideas but also with their social origin. In an attempt to locate the source of ideological

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thinking he begins the analysis with a charactorological division of the intelligentsia into two main types: (a) the scholars and (b)the intellectuals. The scholar, Bell explains, "has a bounded field of knowledge, a tradition and seems to find his place in it, adding to the accumulated tested knowledge of the past" , while the Intellectual, "always begins with his experience, his perception of the world, his privileges and deprivation and judges the world by these sensibilities"[20]. The Intellectual's business then is not to understand the world but to change, or better still, to overcome it. The ideologies of 19th century, according to Bell, had the force of such intellectuals behind them.

But for these radical Intellectuals, the old indeologies have lost their truth and power to persuade, and for Bell, that the Intellectual no longer believes that one can get down 'blue prints' and through 'social engineering' bring about a new utopia of social harmony. These Intellectuals in the 19th century and early 20th century. Viewed politics as a moral crusade. After getting power when they had a chance to make real their dreams, they have become corrupt and failed. The form of this corruption, explains Bell, is the dogmatic single mindedness of vision. Thus the generation ensuing has glorified the gross atrocities, trials and secret pacts. As a reaction, the

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Intellectuals are said to have become more skeptical and pragmatic, who understood the 'limits of politics', heralding an End of Ideology and End of Marxism[21].

The left Intelligentsia in Americas of 40's and 50's as a result, has drifted away and tended to become anti-ideological. There was scepticism towards the rationalistic claims of socialists, that changes in the economic base would solve all the pressing problems. This, in fact, is a kind of anti-rationalism which appears to be closely linked to the vogue of Freudianism and Niebuhrian Neo-orthodoxy. No longer does the liberal intellectual feel compelled to change the world over, instead the feeling seems to be that the task is too great even to contemplate. Revolution has then been replaced by acquiescence[22].

Does 'End of Ideology' then mean an 'End of Utopia'? Bell favours not the total abondoning of utopia but a new kind of utopia. Reflecting a hard headed practical approach Bell pointed a kind of empirical utopianism, "there is now more than ever, some need for utopia in the sense that men need as they always needed some vision of their potential, some way of fusing passion and intelligence". Only now the component of utopianism proved vastly different from those of the past utopianism, "that the ladder to the city of heaven can no longer be a Faith

ladder but an empirical one"[23]. In the ideal foot steps of Karl Popper and Neibuhr Bell argues that this utopia has to specify where one wants to go, the process of achieving this objective and the cost involved.

Bell sees not only the loss of hope in radical politics but also the older counter beliefs or conservativism of laissez- faire. The conservatives have accepted the positive role played by the state, the welfarist measures undertaken by it, and they no longer see all planning as a road to serfdom. The radicals too have realised that unbridled state power instead of acting as a harbinger of human freedom heralds totalitarianism and is a threat to liberty and democracy. Therefore, in the western world, among the intellectuals, says Bell, there is a rough consensus on acceptance of welfare state, the desirability of decentralised power, a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism. The critics do not find fault with the social and political developments that End of Ideology theorists have traced. Rather, they note that the End of Ideology theorists draw certain conclusions pointing towards an end of all political ideals for ever, something not warranted by the facts.

While the old ideologies of the West have become exhausted by the march of western progress, new ideologies are said to have arisen in Asia and Africa. These

ideologies, according to Bell, are ideologies of Industrialisation, modernisation, pan-Arabism, colour and nationalism. The new ideologies unlike the old, are not being fashioned by the intellectuals along universal and humanistic lines. Rather, they are instrumentally parochial and employed by political leaders who have created them for purposes of rapid development and national power. Even some western liberals had embraced economic development as a new ideology. Bell has no quarrel with economic growth and modernisation as goals. What he fears is that the new elites would impose totalitarian means to achieve those goals and sacrifice the present generation for the future.

From what has ended in the "End of Ideology" Bell turns to what was coming in "The Coming of Post Industrial Society"[24]. Presenting a technocratic model of society, he develops on the ideas formulated in his earlier works. The shift of economy from that of goods producing to that providing services brought about changes in class structure. The central frame is again that the changes signify a new social order with new set of social problems which call for a new framework. The older frame of 'Left' 'Right' distinction being no longer useful, not only in domestic conflict but also in the International sphere, where the great divide between the east and west is seen to vanish

under the impact of technological or scientific revolution. In the "Cultural Contradiction of Capitalism"[25] published three years later, Bell sees a post industrial contradiction, while capitalist technology calls for rational intellect, the willingness and ability to think systematically, the capitalist culture has also created an increasingly self indulgent, emotional and hedonistic person. He criticises such impulses which created the cultural turbulance of the sixties.

To conclude, Bell, by End of Ideology means primarily end of Marxism, this has come about since it can no more motivate the intellectuals, who are seem as the prime carriers of ideology. This has happened because of two reasons : one, the intellectual has lost faith in rationality and progress after the bitter experience with ideologies in Fascist Germany and Communist Soviet Union.Two, the Social basis of ideological conflict have ended because of a consensus over welfare state, mixed economy and pluralist politics.

A detailed criticism of this position is under taken in chapter 3.

NOTES

1. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: on the exhaustion of political ideas in the Fifties', (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

2. Ibid., p.402.

3. Ibid., p.403.

4. Ibid., pp.275-299.

5. Max Weber "Politics as a vacation" in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (ed) H.H. Gerth and Mills, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) p.9.

6. "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" was part of the original paper presented by Bell at the Milan meeting of 'Congress for Cultural Freedom'. The footnotes here correspond to the article as published in his book The End of Ideology Op.cit.

7. Daniel Bell., op.cit., p.41

8. Ibid., p.45.

9. "The capitalism of Proletariat" by Bell originally appeared in the February, 1958 issue of Encounter. The footnotes correspond to the piece as published in his book The End of Ideology, Op.cit.

10. Ibid., p.217.

11. Ibid., p.223.

12. Daniel Bell as quoted in. Arvindam Sen's "Marxist Answer to Bells End of Ideology" in Liberation, January 91, Vol. 24, No.2, p.37.

13. Daniel Bell (ed) The New American Right (New York: Criterion Books, 1955).

14. Ibid., p.47.

15. Daniel Bell, End of Ideology, op.cit., p.17.

16. Ibid., p.480.

17. Ibid., p.480.

18. Karl Mannhiem _Ideology_ and _Utopia_: An _Introduction_ _to_ the _Sociology_ _of_ _Knowledge_ Louis Wirth and Edward Shils translated. (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1936).

19. "Marxian Socialism in the United States" in _Socialism_ _and_ _American_ _Life_ (eds) D.D. Egbert and S. Peirsons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952).

20. Daniel Bell as quoted in Henry David Aiken's "The Revolt against Ideology" in C.I. Waxman (ed) _The_ _End_ _of_ _Ideology_ debate (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), p.243.

21. James P. Young, _The_ _Politics_ _of_ _Affluence_ (California: Chaudler Publications, 1973), p.202.

22. Ibid., p.203.

23. Daniel Bell, _Ideology_ _and_ _the_ _Beau_ _Geste._

24. Daniel Bell, _The_ _Coming_ _of_ _the_ _Post-industrial_ _Society_, (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

25. Daniel Bell, _The_ _Cultural_ _Contradiction_ _of_ _Capitalism_, (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

CHAPTER II

LIPSET AND THE END OF IDEOLOGY

Democracy, for Lipset, "is the good society itself in operation"[1]. He does not treat it merely as a means through which diffferent groups can attain their ends or seek the good society. Democracy allows for institutions through which conflict and disagreement are expressed, and consensus and legitimacy are sustained. This prevents the accumulation of society's scarce products in the hands of only a few power holders. It is in this context, he studies the 'Decline of ideology'[2] or the decline in serious intellectual conflicts among groups representing different values.

Lipset's 'Decline of Ideology' has three dimensions : one, that there has been a decline in the intensity, and depth of ideological cleavage in the contemporary industrialised western society as compared to its industrialising past. Two, that there is less bitter political cleavage in the wealthier as compared to the poorer democracies; and three, that the ethnic groups or strata which have been admitted to citizenship are less likely to support ideological politics than when faced with a denial of citizenship.[3]

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The proof of the reduced intellectual conflict for Lipset lies in the proceedings of the world congress of Intellectuals on 'The Future for Freedom' held in Milan, Italy, in September, 1955. There was a general consensus among the delegates ranging from as diverse groups as socialists, Liberals and conservatives where it was acknowledged by all that the traditional issues separating the left and the right had declined to comparative insignificance. All agreed that the increase in state control which had taken place in various countries would not result in a decline in democratic freedom. The socialists no longer advocated socialism, they were as concerned as conservatives with the dangers of an all powerful state. The ideological issues dividing the Left and Right had been reduced to a little more or a little less of government ownership and economic planning[4].

The other conclusive proof for the decline of ideology for Lipset is Richard Crossman's study of the socialist parties in the developed west, which sees socialism as a myth[5]. Also that few socialist parties still want to nationalise more industry. This objective has been largely given up by the socialist parties of the more industrialised states[6]. With the above observations, Lipset

comes out with the sweeping historical statement that "these changes in western life reflect the fact that 'the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved; the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has recognised that an increase in overall state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions for economic problems". He continues, "that this very triumph of the democratic revolution in the west ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political action[7].

Setting forth that the ideological politics is declining, Lipset differentiates between 'ideological politics' and the class politics',which continues even in a democratic society and in fact which is even essential for the proper functioning of a democratic order. Lipset differs from Barrington Moore[8] and David Riesman[9] who put forward the thesis that partisan conflict based on class differences and left wing issues is ending, basing on the assumption that the economic class system' is disappearing and that the redistribution of wealth and income has ended economic inequalities of any political significance.

Lipset sees the party conflict between Republicans (who are seen as supporters of the wealthy) and Democrats (the supporters of the poor) as the continuation of a democratic class struggle. He contradicts the thesis that "affluent society" results in the end of "class politics", as it ignores the relative character of any class system. The decline of objective deprivation, low income, malnutrition does reduce the political tension levels of a society, but as long as some men are more rewarded than others by the prestige or status structure of society, men will feel relatively deprived. This gives the impetus for democratic class struggles, which shall continue, but it will be a fight without ideologies, without red flags and without May day parades[10].

In this approach to ideology, Lipset makes a distinction between 'Marxist Sociology' and 'Marxist Politics' and stresses that history has validated a basic premise of Marxist sociology at the expense of Marxist Politics. Marxist sociology assumes that cultural superstructures including political behaviour and status relationship are a function of the underlying economic and technological structure[11]. Here ideology is viewed as a phenomenon which emerges and recedes contingent upon societal and primary economic conditions. Where there are

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great disparities of wealth and resulting inequalities of social status and political power, the sharp contrast in life conditions create intense class conflict and sharply contrasting ideologies. If, therefore, marked class differences are reduced by redistributing wealth, status and power in society, ideology will disappear[12] which is said to have happened in the developed west, under the impact of modern technological developments, the creation of an affluent society and a fairer distribution. Hence, he claims that it is a triumph of Marxist Sociology at the cost of Marxist Politics, which falsely predicted that with economic development polarisation of classes will take place and with the emergence of class conciousness the capitalist society shall crumble of its own internal contradictions.

Here, it would be fruitful to examine in detail the changes in Western Society and economy which formed the basis of Lipset's "Decline of Ideology" argument. This shall be dealt in four parts. Firstly, the positive correlation between democracy and economic development, and between extremism and economic underdevelopment assumed by Lipset will be examined. Secondly, Lipset's contention, how 'Democracy is predicated upon legitimacy' and how by smooth handling of working class 'entry into politics' the Western societies have solved this problem of legitimacy will be

dealt with. Thirdly, his hypothesis of how affluence has helped the 'integration of Workers' and the emergence of a 'post-industrial' middle class which made possible the emergence of a consensus over 'conservative socialism' would be delineated. Fourthly, the role of intellectuals and the impact of affluence and other factors on them in shifting their attitudes from being the critics of society to an uneasy state of being defenders of statusquo, and their overall shift towards Right would be dealt with.

Lipset analyses the social requisites of democracy in 'economic development and democracy' Chapter II of "Political Man". He argues that stable democracies are most likely to occur in the most developed and affluent states, that abundance is a condition for institutionalizing the give and take of democratic politics. He delineates the correlation between economic development and democracy by showing the correlation between democracy and what he takes to be the various indicators of economic development, like wealth,, industrialisation, urbanisation and education.

The average wealth, degree of education, level of industrialisation and urbanisation is much higher for more democratic countries[13]. "Economic development largely determines the form of the class struggle by permitting

those in the lower strata to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist view of politics. A belief in secular reformist gradualism can be the ideology of only a relatively well to do classes",[14] argues Lipset.

Taking per-capita income as an index of economic development Lipset shows that there exists an inverse correlation between economic development and the strength of communists and other extreme groups. Though he qualifies this by saying that 'poverty per se is not the main cause of radicalism, and moreover, stable poverty breeds conservatism[15]. Since position in stratified system is always relative and gratification or deprivation is experienced in terms of being better or worse off than other people, he holds that it is not surprising that the lower classes in all countries regardless of the wealth of the country show various signs of resentment against the existing distribution of rewards by supporting political parties and organisations which advocate some form of redistribution.

Lipset believes that as the size of national income increases the distribution of consumption goods also becomes more equitable and the wealthier a country the less is status inferiority experienced as a major source of

deprivation. Increased wealth then serves democracy by reducing lower classes' traditional commitment to extremist ideologies.

The stability of any given democracy is not only dependent on economic development, Lipset sets forth that it is also based on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system. For Lipset, legitimacy largely depends upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided society have been solved.[15]

The crisis of legitimacy primarily a recent historical phenomenon and is a "crisis of change", which occurs during the transition to a new social structure, if all the major groups in the society do not have access to the political system. The loss of legitimacy is related to the ways in which different societies handle the "entry into politics" crisis, viz., the decision as to when new social groups shall obtain accessibility to the political process. In the 19th century these new groups were primarily industrial workers. Whenever new groups become politically active, like when the workers first seek access to economic and political power through economic organisation and universal suffrage, easy access to the legitimate political institutions tends to win the loyalty of the new groups to the system.[16]

Lipset is here elaborating on the theme originally suggested by T.H. Marshall[17]; and, that revolutionary class struggles in early industrial society were largely a phenomenon of the working class struggle for citizenship, and its ideological commitments eroded once the workers achieved industrial and political citizenship[18]. But where the workers were denied both economic and political rights, this struggle for redistribution of income and status has superimposed on revolutionary ideology. With the working class gaining political and economic citizenship Lipset sees that the socialist parties of Europe are shedding this 'integrationist approach'[19].

The characteristic pattern of stable western democracies in the mid 20th century is that they are in post-politics phase which he defines as a stage in which there is relatively little difference between the democratic left and right i.e., the socialists, moderates and conservatives. Representatives of lower strata are now part of the governing groups and members of the club[20]. The basic political issues of the industrial revolution, the incorporation of the workers to the legitimate body politic has been settled. Lipset proclaims that the key domestic issue today is "collective bargaining" over differences in

the division of total product within the framework of a Keynesian Welfare State and such issues do not require or precipitate extremism on either side.

The changing class structure and the resultant changes in the tenor of ideology suggested by Lipset has two dimensions: one, that as the class structure of the western societies has changed to produce an enlarged middle class and a more affluent and secure working class (the conditions described as being conducive to democratic politics by Lipset) the ideological divide is reduced. Two, that these societies are passing into new stage of development, known as 'post industrial' where the class linked politics has little relevance.

The underlying argument is that the growth of 'affluence'in western industrial democratic society has made possible a social system in which class conflict is minimised. Lipset argues that as wealth of a nation increases the status gap inherent in poor countries (where the rich perceive the poor as vulgar outcastes) is reduced[21]. As differences in life styles are reduced, so are the tensions in stratification. And increased education ensures the propensity of different groups to 'tolerate' each other to accept the complex idea that truth and error are not necessarily on one side.

Lipset delineates two general events which have occurred in post war era and are of considerable significance for class behaviour. On the one hand, many of the political and economic issues that occasion deep conflict between the left and the right were resolved in ways compatible with 'social democratic' ideology. On the other hand, the dominant strata discovered that they could prosper through certain socialist economic reforms which they opposed earlier. Now the need for government planning for economic growth and full employment is generally accepted. The welfare measures to assist deprived groups are viewed as proper, and the right to Trade Union and political representation of the workers to participate in decision-making affecting industry also was increasingly accepted. Thus Lipset demonstrates that 'domestic politics' in most of these societies got reduced to the politics of 'collective bargaining' i.e., to the issues of which groups should share a little more or less of the pie.[22]

This transition, according to LIpset, is also reflected in political and interest group behaviour. Large scale extremist groups have thus almost completely disappeared from Europe and the parties which subscribed to a relatively left wing Marxist view before World War II are now clearly moderate. social democratic parties and many a

socialist parties have given up their adherence to Marxism, class war and nationalisation[23].

The preceding discussion, might give a wrong impression as it misled many of his critics that by 'decline of ideology' Lipset meant only decline of left wing ideology. This is not true as Lipset also talks of the decline of right wing politics, which too thrived in the pre-war period. He mentions the right wing parties[24] which defended the traditional liberalism (laissez-faire) and conservatism, which have subsequently become weak and accepted the welfare state and planning.

"The integration of workers", says Lipset, "is also reflected in the increase in the 'economic strikes' as distinct from 'political strikes'". Lipset takes lower voter turnout in the developed countries too as an indicator to prove that there is a shift towards consensus and dilution of contentions over basic political values.

The emergence of a 'new middle class' is seen as a significant outcome of these structural changes. The increasing levels of clerks, salesmen, technicians, middle management and civil servants, a group which is so exposed to conflicting pressures from the Left and Right that it contributes to stablise class tensions.

These emerging societies are described as 'post industrial'[25] by Lipset, because the trends analysed by Marx - increased involvement of the labour force in the industrial productive apparatus. The growth of the factories, large farms, etc. have ended. Tertiary service occupations, rather than productive jobs, are growing rapidly. The proportion of manual workers is declining. The occupations that are expanding are white collar, technical, professional, scientific and service oriented. High levels of education are needed for such economies. Hence education, science and intellectuals become more important in such society.

Lipset in his study of "American Intellectual, their politics and status"[26] argues that intellectual political values are changing under the impact of social changes of the last half-a-century. This is significant since intellectuals are traditionally seen as critics of status-quo and as a group that plays a significant role in setting the issues before society. Lipset, unlike Bell, does not see Intellectuals, as the creators of ideology but treats them as a group which holds leftist values.

The reasons for traditional liberalism of American Intellectuals, says Lipset are : one, the historic ideology of the United States has been the equalitarian dogmas of the

'declaration of independence' which are fundamentally the values of the 'democratic left' everywhere; and two, the American Intellectuals felt underprivileged in comparison with their western colleagues as they have not been accorded the symbols by high status[27].

However, this leftist tendency of American intellectuals is breaking down in the last few years, and as a group they have shifted towards the centre, with most of them still on the left but a significant minority becoming conservative too. Many circumstances, holds Lipset, underlie this shift[28]. Firstly, and most important is the social consequences of prolonged prosperity. Secondly, it is the rise of communism and its perceived threat to freedom. Faced with the ideologies of future utopia, the intellectuals for the first time in history resorted to the defense of status-quo. Thirdly, the very success of moderate forms of leftism - the New Deal in UNited States, democratic socialism in Britain and Scandinavia - has removed the programmes of economic reform from the category of utopia to that of reality, with imperfections and 'inconsistencies.

Despite all these reasons, Lipset confesses that intellectuals are not comfortable and they have an uneasy feeling that they are betraying their obligations as intellectuals to attack and criticise. And that, finally,

their inherent tendency to oppose the statusquo, in the long run remains[29]. As the domestic politics, be it liberal or socialist can no longer serve as an arena for leftist criticism, the unfulfilled Intellectual "has turned from a basic concern with political and economic system to critiques of other sections of the basic culture of the society".[30]

IDEOLOGY IN THIRD WORLD

In the developed world, the affluence has made possible the growth of democracy and consensus and give and take politics, and the smooth handling of workers entry into politics which has solved the problem of legitimacy. The integration of workers solved by abundance of wealth, the change in the attitude of intellectuals, etc. have all made possible a decline in ideology. In the third world, on the contrary, argues Lipset, the social conditions generate ideologies and that they are necessary in countering communists. This is in tune with his correlation between economic underdevelopment and extremism which we have already discussed. In the third world the problems of underdevelopment still persist and the character of political institutions are still unsettled. Thus he says, "it is necessary for us to recognise that our allies in the

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underdeveloped countries must be radical, probably socialists, because only parties which promise to improve the situation of masses through widespread reform and which are transvaluational and equalitarian, can hope to compete with the communists"[31].

The radicals in power in these countries have to bear the resentment caused by industrialisation. The democratic leftist leader, suggests Lipset, must find a scape-goat to blame for these ills where the western Imperialist comes in handy. If not, warns Lipset, he will loose hold over masses who need the hope implicit in revolutionary chiliastic doctrine, a hope the communists are ready to supply. If the radical leader accepts the arguments that Marxism is an outmoded doctrine, that complete socialism is dangerous, he becomes a conservative and loses popular following.

Thus, says Lipset, "Ideology and passion may no longer be necessary to sustain the class struggle within stable and affluent democracies but they are clearly needed in the International effort to develop free political and economic institutions in the rest of the world. It is only the ideological class struggles within the west which is ending".[32].

Peter Steinfels rightly points out that, there is some thing dangerously condescending about such a view : condescending in so far as it tolerates ideology not simply as a cultural response to unresolved and fundamental political divisions but as a demagogic response to an allegedly greater need for finding scapegoats and mass indoctrination in the poor nations. It is also dangerous in so far as it approaches a doctrine of "two truths"; one for the knowing westerners and perhaps the more sophisticated non-western leaders, and the other, for the mass who need the hope implicit in revolutionary messianic doctrine.

Another important plank of Lipset's study of decline of political ideology in West is his conviction that political extremism has lost its support base and is on the decline. He studies political extremism in the United States in the context of two fundamental forces operating under the varying historical conditions of the American society, which he distinguishes as "status politics"[34] and "class politics". Class politics refers to political division based on the discord between the traditional left and the right i.e., between those who favour redistribution of income and those favouring the preservation of the "status-quo". While "status politics" refers to political movements whose appeal is to the not uncommon resentments of individuals and groups who desire to maintain or improve the

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social status[35].

Lipset's contention was that while class politics thrives in the period of depression, status politics predominates in times of prosperity. The period from thirties to forties (times of depression) saw the predominance of liberal sentiment in American politics and the political dynamic was in the hands of the left. The post-war period on the other hand, has seen a resurgence of conservative and rightist forces. This, conceives Lipset, has resulted from two factors - i) prosperity; 2) the change of foreign policy from being anti-fascist (rightist) to anti-communist (leftist). The 'Radical Right' which emerged in these conditions rejects the status-quo and is opposed to the welfare state, the labour movement, taxation and retrospectively the participation of United States in the world war [36]. Lipset argues that such a Radical Right has reached its optimum strength in 1953-54 and a recession will cripple its political power[37].

But the conditions of recession did not come, though his prophecy of weakening of Radical Right did take place. Lipset himself in his report on Milan Conference[38] talked of an emerging consensus, owing to prosperity, foregetting and not even acknowledging his earlier talk of a

recession[39].

So also while McCarthyism was explained, linking it to the tensions of prosperous society, which produces heightened status concerns and anxiety, "status politics"

rather than "class politics" seemingly characterised these periods. But the underlying tensions that supposedly created status crisis have continued and McCarthyism has disappeared. Thus, there is a limitation in his approach based on a distinction between status and class politics, as he agrees later[40].

While there are the extremist movements on the right, Lipset also talks of a decline of extremist movements of another variety; that of centre (apart from left) i.e.; Fascism. He describes the various social and economic conditions under which the middle class has become the source of political authoritarianism. In conjunction with his decline of ideology argument, Lipset emphasises that Fascism like other extremist ideologies has disappeared as a viable political force in the developed west owing to two reasons : i) the linkage and legacy of atrocities of Fascism and Nazism; ii) the structural changes have undermined the social base of such movements. The proportion of population in agriculture as also that residing in small towns declined

with industrial development. Conversely the advent of post-industrial society indicated the extent to which there had been a rapid growth in the numbers of those engaged in a pursuit that required advanced education, an anathema to extremist movements of all varieties[41].

Lipset proves at different levels the decline of extremist movements of the Left, Right and Centre: Communism, traditional authoritarianism and Fascism respectively. However, the Left, Right and Centrist groups which express themselves through democratic processes continue to exist

In conclusion one might say that Lipset's conception of decline of ideology was a reflection of the reduction of ideological tensions within advanced industrialised societies. This is related in a large measure to the growing affluence, to the incorporation of previously excluded strata into the body politic, the spread of education, and the seeming reduction of many of the extreme morbidities of industrial society through the institutionalisation of planning and welfare state.

But what are these specific ideologies he has in mind when he says there is a decline ? As is clear from the discussion, these are primarily Marxism and Socialism,

which in the process of industrialisation have built a social base in working class and with the decline of this social base owing to reasons cited before, have lost their relevance today. Another important ideology he speaks of is that of ´conservatism' which emerged as a reaction to

Marxism, to protect the existing relations of production and the status-quo. According to Lipset this has completely disappeared with the acceptance of welfare state, planning and status aid to the deprived. Thus, basically by decline,. he means that the ideologies of industrial society have now been replaced by a common ´concensus ideology' or by ´conservative socialism' or ´social democratic ideology'.

Then what in Lipset's sense is ideology? Lipset, unlike Bell, does not define it solely in terms of fusion of ethics and politics, subscribing to Weberian ethic of ultimate end and which in furtherence of utopia sacrifices the reality. Such ideologies, Lipset would call extreme ideologies. Though some times Lipset does define ideology in this sense, of an utopia (as in third World context) and as an emotive force, generally he means by ideology, the values, preferences and interests of different groups in society. Does the decline of these 19th century ideologies mean an end of ideology? Lipset, unlike Bell, holds that a commitment to the politics of pragmatism, the rules of the

game of collective bargaining, the gradual change (whether in the direction favoured by the left or the right), the opposition both to an all powerful state and to Laissez-faire, constitute distinct components of ideology. This, he calls 'conservative socialism', which has become the ideology of the major parties and groups in the developed states of Europe and America[42].

Bell and Lipset : A Comparison - Both the advocates of 'Decline of ideology' seem to be suggesting the decline of some 19th century ideologies of Marxism, Socialism, Laissez faire Liberalism. Yet they differ quite fundamentally about the causes of the decline of these ideologies, the desirability of such a thing, the notion of ideology and finally in the tenor and style of their arguments. While Bell views 'ideology' as a 'Fallen word' linking ideology with totalitarianism where ideology is seen as a monster which sacrifices individuals at the altar of ideas - Lipset's discussion of ideology is more neutral.

Similarly, while Bell bringsforth, in the causes for the decline, a host of catastrophes, social changes and changes in intellectual attitude, Lipset just talks of how "workers got integrated into the body politic" and then puts it into a sweeping historical statement that "the problems

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of industrial revolution are solved". Though at the superficial level these statements might suggest great differences, at the base, they both believe in the same things which led to the decline of ideology which includes, the affluence, the changes in class structure, in intellectual attitudes, in the emergence of a post industrial society and with it a new middle class, which following in the footsteps of Aristotle, they both believe would seek moderation in politics.

Lipset and Bell differ in the tenor of their debate. While true to his journalistic abilities Bell's aruguments are highly polemical, Lipset as an academic sociologist is more mature and supports all his statements with empirical data.

To some extent Lipset and Bell differ over the desirability of the decline of ideology, especially in the context of the third world. While Bell believed that ideologies in the Third world would lead to whole scale coercion of the population and detested it he acknowledged their presence[43]. Lipset visualizes a more positive role to ideology, in helping these Third world countries from falling a prey to communist utopia.

As for its relevance in the West, Bell was ecstatic about the end of ideology and its replacement by

politics of pragmatism and piecemeal social engineering. Lipset on the other hand is more cautious: "Such developments have their bad side, of course. Since all nations, no matter how affluent, retain many sources of human misery that men of goodwill seek to eliminate, non-ideological welfare democracies face the problem that they may no longer possess the internal leftist vigour to counter the forces endemic in all stratified societies which accumulate advantages for the "have groups".[44]

Lipset explains that he does not favour the decline in political interest but simply believes in the actuality of the event. He calls attention to three studies[45] which have attempted to systematically examine trends in ideological behaviour of political parties over time with the explicit purpose to test "decline of ideology" thesis in Norway, Japan and the Netherlands. Each of them, according to Lipset, concludes that it is valid for the politics of the country under investigation[46].

Nevertheless, we should not conclude that Lipset accepts the need for ideological conflict or debate over the accepted values of western societies. His acceptance of conflict is restricted to that channelised through democratic parties and believe firmly in the give and take of democratic politics. His conservative tendencies can be

guaged from his vehement rejection of all extremist politics and in viewing class struggle in the party conflicts, and more importantly justifying the lower voter turnout in west as a reflection of the stability of the system[47].

As a detailed criticism of his position will be taken in the next chapter it suffices to say here that his is the conservatism of American political sociology, which glorifies the present and judges the past and future by present standards and regards what exists as what ought to have existed: in short, that only 'Real is rational".

NOTES

1. S.M. LIPSET, <u>Political</u> <u>Man</u> (New Delhi: Arnold Heinneman, 1973), p. 403.

2. Lipset unlike other theorists uses the phrase ´decline of Ideology' and not ´end of ideology'.

3. S.M. LIPSET, "Some further comments on the end of ideology" in <u>American</u> <u>Political</u> <u>Science</u> <u>Review,</u> (1966), p.17

4. The original report on the Milan Conference by Lipset was published as "The state of Democratic politics" in ´<u>Canadian</u> <u>Forum,</u> 35, (Nov.1955) pp. 170-71.

5. Richard Crossman, "On Political Neurosis" <u>Encounter</u>, 2 May (1954), p. 66.

6. See, LIPSET, "Socialism, Left and Right, East and West" for details in <u>Confluence,</u> 7.2 (Summer 1958) pp. 173-192.

7. LIPSET, <u>Political</u> <u>Man</u>, op.cit., p. 406.

8. Barrington Moore. Jr., <u>Political</u> <u>power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Social</u> <u>theory</u> (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1958), p.183.

9. David Riesman, Introduction to Simon Bullit's <u>To</u> <u>be</u> <u>a</u> <u>politician</u> (New York : Doubleday & Co., 1959), p. 20.

10. LIPSET, <u>Political</u> <u>Man</u>, op.cit., p. 408.

11. .LIPSET, "The changing class structure and contemporary European politics", <u>Daedalus,</u> Vol. 93, (1964), p. 271.

12. Reo. M. christenson et.al.,(ed), <u>Ideologies</u> <u>and</u> <u>Modern</u> <u>Politics</u> (London - Oxford, 1971), p. 302.

13. Lipset supports his arguments by extensive empirical data. given in <u>Political</u> <u>Man'</u>, op. cit., p. 51-67.

14. Ibid., p.61.

15. Ibid., p.63.

16. Ibid., p.79.

17. T.H. Marshall, "Citizenship and social class "in his citizenship and social class and other essays. (Cambridge : cambridge University Press, 1950), p.1-85, Reprinted in The class, citizenship and social development,(Garden city : Doubleday, 1964), p.65-122.

18. Lipset, "The end of ideology and ideology of the intellectuals" in Joseph Ben David and Terry Nicholas Clark (eds) culture and its creators (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1977), p.31.

19. Lipset makes an analytic distinction between 'parties of representation' which strengthen democracy by participation in electoral politics and 'parties of integration' which have an ideology and are concerned with making the world to conform to their ideology.

20. For a review of evidence on social mobility see LIPSET "Equality and Inequality" in R.K. Merton and Robert Nisbet (eds) Contemporary Social Problems (New York : Harcout Brace, 1976) pp. 305-53.

21. LIPSET, in Daedalus, op. cit., p.271.

22. Ibid., p.272.

23. Ibid., p.274.

24. Ibid., p.274.

25. See LIPSET, "Predicting the future of Post-Industrial Society" in his (ed) The Third Century America as a post Industrial Society. (California : Hoover institution Press, 1979), pp.1-37.

26. LIPSET, "American Intellectual, their politics and status" in his 'Political Man' op.cit., pp. 310-343.

27. Ibid., p. 320.

28. Ibid., p. 341.

29. Ibid.. p. 342.

30. Ibid.. p. 409.

31. Ibid., p. 416, (1983 edition).

32. Ibid., p.417, (1983 edition).

33. Peter Steinfels, <u>Neo conservatives'</u> (New York : Simon and Shuster, 1979), p. 290.

34. LIPSET on status politics : See Lipset and Earl Rabb, <u>The politics of unreason: Right Wing extremism in America 1970-77.</u>(Chicago : Chicago University Press, 1978).

35. LIPSET, "The sources of the Radical Right" in David Bell (ed) <u>The new American Right</u>, (New York : Criterion books, 1955), p.167.

36. Ibid., p. 169.

37. Ibid., p. 217.

38. LIPSET, "The state and democratic Politics", <u>Canadian Forum</u>, 35 (Nov. 1955), pp. 170-171.

39. LIPSET, "The sources of the Radical Right" in the Daniel Bell (ed) <u>The New American Right</u> (New York : Criterion books, 1955).

40. LIPSET, "In predicting the future of a post industrial society" in Lipset (ed) <u>The third Century America as a post industrial society.</u> (California : Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 38.

41. LIPSET, <u>Political Man</u> (1983) op.cit., p. 501.

42. LIPSET, <u>Daedalus</u>, op.cit., p. 296.

43. Daniel Bell, <u>The end of Ideology</u>, (New York : Free Press, 1960), p.403

44. LIPSET, "My view from our Left" in chaim Waxman (ed) <u>The end of Ideology</u> debate (New York : Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), p.165.

45. Ulf Torgensen, "The trend towards political consensus" the case of Norway" <u>Acta Sociologica</u>: 6(1902) 159-172.

    Masaki Takane, "Economic growth and the end of ideology in Japan" <u>Asian Survey</u> 5 (1965), pp. 295-304.

    A. Hoogerwerf, ""Social Politics Strijdgunten Smeuland Vuur <u>Sociolgioche opids</u> 10(1963), pp.249-263.

46. LIPSET, "Some further comments on the end of Ideology"
     op.cit., <u>American</u> <u>Political</u> <u>Science</u> <u>Review</u> (1966) p.18.

47. LIPSET, <u>Political</u> <u>Man</u> op.cit., p.181.

CHAPTER III

CRITICISM OF THE END OF IDEOLOGY

The "End of Ideology" theory is severely criticised both by the right and the left. It is natural that a theory which makes sweeping statements about the logic of history, the nature of society, economy and classes, stratification and shifts in the axis of power from wealth in property to knowledge should come under a hail of criticism especially from the Left.

Firstly, and foremost, it has been argued that the 'decline' hypothesis is unrealistic and far fetched. Ideologies have not ended in the affluent West, as the race and poverty issues, the emergence of the New Left and the radical right and so on bear testimony. Nor are the ideologies about to disappear in the developing countries where, if anything, they are on the rise.

Secondly, the decline hypothesis embraces a value judgement based on vested interest and a commitment to the statusquo, the welfare state, "scientism" etc. It represents "a slogan of complacency". Since it assumes that there are no issues of great political consequence any longer. It assumes, moreover, that history is moving towards an ultimate static equilibrium in which, given the

economic growth, the developing countries will join the ranks of western capitalist societies. As such they argue, that the decline of ideology itself has an ideological tilt.

Thirdly, the decline hypothesis stands for "a fetishism of empiricism" and a denial of continued relevance of moral and human ideals.

Fourthly, the decline hypothesis confuses a shift in the arena of ideological conflict with a decline in ideology. While there has been a reduction of ideological cleavages surrounding old political issues, there has been a sharp increase of ideological disputes in new area.

Finally, the end of ideology was an instrument of cold war and that it was the response of the bourgeois political sociology to save the crisis ridden capitalist system.

What is striking about most of the critiques[1] of the decline hypothesis is their polemic nature and their misunderstanding of what the decline theorists meant by 'ideology', largely owing to the ambiguous way they have defined 'ideology'.

Before taking up the various criticisms in depth, it is necessary to clarify what the theorists meant by 'End

of Ideology' in brief so as to avoid confusion. It is to the credit of L.N. Moskvichov, the bitterest critique of the decline hypothesis from a traditional Marxist-Leninist basis for clarifying exactly what 'End of Ideology' means.

According to Moskvichov, the theory's advocates have certain considerable reservations. The theme is said to be applicable not to politics in general but only to internal politics, the political relations within the confines of a single country or a group of countries. Secondly, they have in mind only the industrially developed states of Europe and North America. The ideological approach continues to apply, however, to world politics and socio-class relations in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Thirdly, the end of ideology in industrially developed states of the West does not imply the demise of all ideology or the absence of any political or ideological differences. The phrase according to its authors means only that the so called universal ideologies no longer serve to guide mass political actions, and that it above all applies to Marxism - Leninism, and that in the advanced capitalist states acute ideological and political conflicts gradually died down[2].

While the criticism from the right, especially
from Henry David Aiken[3], and from traditional Left by L.N.
Moskvichov is highly ideological, a more balanced approach
is seen in the writings of the thinkers of the 'New Left'
who on the whole agree to the empirical content of the
thesis but criticise the normative component. Chief among
these critics are C. Wright Mills, Joseph La Palambora, W.
Rousseaus and James Farganis, Donald Clark Hedges and
Michael Harrington[4].

The rightist critiques see the theory as one which
disarms the West ideologically in the face of world
communism, in warding of the danger to the "free world" or
advocating ideology-free and politics- free literature.
Aiken writes that these assertions are simply wrong. The
oppopsite is surely the case, that politics and ideology
have extensively penetrated into all spheres of social life.
After all, "politics provides the primary themes of our
literature. Our most exigent moral perplexities are
overwhelmingly political"[5].

Aiken sees the prime danger of the "End of
Ideology" theory in its bringing about political and
ideological disarmament of the West in the face of world
communism. "Bell and his allies, following Popper, are
admirers of the 'open society'. But, of course, a

completely open society, if such ever existed, would not be a society, but a chaos. Were their political and social attitudes generally to prevail in the West, the result would be a pessimistic Carpe diem philosophy which would render us helpless in the world struggle against the ´ideology of communism"[6]. The justification of presence of "ideology" is thus not the prevailing social condition. But for these rightist critics the justification lies in preventing the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Nothing can be intellectually more dishonest than this stand.

Moskvichov, on the other hand, sees the writings of the ´End of Ideology' as glaringly anti-communist. He noted that the theory of the ´End of Ideology' is particularly popular among right wing social democrats and modern revisionists and serves in some degree to substantiate their ideas of liberal socialism, socialism with a human face or various models of socialist society"[7].

He takes to task the ´End of Ideologists' for their narrow concept of ideology which he sees as having the following characteristics:

a) dogmatism

b) utopism (in the sense that its ideals and prescriptions are unreliable);

c)   heightened emotionalism, bias and subjectivism which
      are incompatible with rational science;

d)   rhetoric and sumptuousness of language and formulation;

e)   ideology is portrayed as a means, or instrument of the
      public (which believes in it) in the interest of the
      power elite or the creator of ideology[8].

He argues that ideologies may have the above
mentioned characteristics but it is quite possible for them
to have completely different traits. That there are and
there could be ideologies which are scientific as against
the unscientific, universal as against selfish class,
undogmatic as against dogmatic and etc.

As La palambora correctly suggested, an ideology
may or may not be dogmatic, may or may not be utopian, may
or may not be attuned to the claimed rationality of moderns
science may or may not emphasize rhetoric or flamboyant
verbal formulations, and finally may or may not be believed
by those who articulate it[9].

The decline of ideology writers generally commit
one or more of all the errors implied above. For example,
ideology is said to apply only to passionately articulated
prescription. Evidently not to those which manifest calm
rationality. As Bell says what gives 'ideology its force

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is its passion'[10]. Thus owing to the inherent limitations of their concept of "ideology", what they mean by 'End of Ideology' is only those ideologies which go against the accepted values of society and especially of the Marxist variety.

Moskvichov sees three manifestations of the change which 'End of Ideologists' argued in the West i.e. from "pre-industrial" to "industrial society". First is the growing importance of specialists and the social programmes implemented by them, which are said to be devoid of ideology and are the modern effective methods of resolving social problems.

Second, the subsiding of the ideological polemic between the traditional left wing and right wing forces in capitalist society i.e. "political and ideological consensus."

Third, the decline of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology in the advanced capitalist countries[11].

According to Moskvichov the barriers which these theorists place between "ideological" and "technological" approaches to social problems is an illusory one. On closer observation, he says, it is evident that the so called technological approach which discards any ideological

principles and word norms is precisely in accord with bourgeois principles and norms and is a bourgeois class approach. The consensus between the left wing and right wing forces is a fake one, argues Moskvichov as it is not a genuine consensus between the workers and bourgeois for there cannot be any between them owing to their contradictory class interest. The consensus is only between social democratic leaders and the bourgeoisie, where the social democratic leaders are seen as renegades and are not true representatives of workers. On the contrary Moskvichov believes that there is a sharp intensification of irreconcilable contradiction and a deepening class and social conflict.

While Moskvichov's criticism that the End of Ideology's bias against the leftists is true, Moskvichov's analysis that there is a deepening class conflict in the developed capitalist West is far-fetched and wishful thinking.

In a highly emotive and polemic letter to the New Left[12] C. Wright Mills came to almost the same conclusion: namely, that the common denominator of 'End of Ideology' is not liberalism as a political philosophy but the liberal rhetoric, which became formal and sophisticated and used as an uncriticised weapon to attack Marxism.

According to Mill though the 'End of Ideology'
theorists talk about ending all ideologies they do not think
of ending their own ideological assumptions. Their
underlying assumption is that in the West there are no more
real issues or even problems of great seriousness. The
mixed economy plus welfare state plus prosperity - that is
the formula.

"If end of ideology has any meaning", says Mills,
"it pertains to self selected circles of intellectuals in
the richer countries. To speak of much of Latin America,
Africa, Asia and Soviet block is merely ludicrous"[13] 'End of
Ideology' he says, is in reality the ideology of an ending,
the ending of political reflection itself as a public fact.
He draws a parallel between the decline theorists and the
social realists, in the fact that both of these postures
stand opposed to radical criticisms of their respective
societies. He sees the theories of society and history of
these theorists as a 'fetish of empiricism' which stands
upon a pretentious methodology used to state levialites
about unimportant social areas.

As far as historical agency of change is
concerned, the 'End of Ideology', explains Mills, identifies
with the existing institutions, upon piecemeal reform but

never on agencies which might bring about a structural change of society[14].

The criticism of C. Wright Mills is based on a wrong reading of 'End of Ideology' as we have seen neither the end of ideologists see the decline of ideology in underdeveloped countries nor do they by 'End of Ideology' mean an end of political reflection. Though his yearning for a structural overhaul of society is utopian, his criticism of End of Ideologists as relying on the institutional changes and consensus are valid.

C. Wright Mills, in his recommendation of "Intellectuals" as the new 'historic agency of change', comes closer to End of Ideologists, who also see the exhaustion of radicalism of workers. Mills describes the belief of some radicals in the revolutionary role of working class in "advanced capitalist societies" as "running in the face of really impressive historical evidence that now stands against this exception - a legacy from the victorious Marxism that is now quite unrealistic"[15]. One social group, given its structural situation, which is most likely to be a source of continuing anti-establishment struggle is that of the intellectuals[16].

One specific criticism of the ´End of Ideology' has been made by some radicals who admitting a congruence of empirical judgement with their own evaluation of erosion of ideological controversy among the major party protagonists in the western democracies, still argue that those who have proclaimed the 'End of Ideology' have failed to recognise that the concept is a conservative ideological one and that it contributes to the undermining of efforts for rRadical change. The chief among these are Stephen Rousseaus and James Farganis and others include Alasdir Macintyre[17], James P. Young[18] and La palambora.

Bell-Lipset thesis, according to Rousseaus and Farganis, "is an apotheosis of a non-committed scientism" or what amounts to pragmatism leached of all its passion for social reform. It is derived from a misinterpretation of Max Weber : the distinction between Normative ´ought' and the empirical ´is' of the politics and the ineluctable tensions between the two[19]. Besides this misinterpretation, they feel that Bell- Lipset thesis is based largely on facts. Whether this represents a desirable state of affairs is quite another matter[20].

Elaborating on C. Wright Mills' argument, Rousseaus and Farganis claim that :a brute empiricist, devoid of any ´passions' is no more capable of describing

the world as it is than is an ideologue who views the world around him solely through the lens of his ideological weltanschaung. The hope or belief that the end of ideological cast of mind will make us to view the world uncolored by any value judgements is nothing but the delusion of an unsophisticated positivism; which in essence, is a flight from moral responsibility. For, they say, ´facts are themselves the product of our viewing ´reality' through our theoretical preconception which is then all conditioned by the problems confronting us[21].

Alasdir Macintyre says that the ´End of Ideology' thesis expressed something real and important about the developed societies in the 1950's. The political equality was not an illusion, but far from marking an end of ideology this, according to him, was a success of one ideology over that of others and it marks the conflict. He sees ´End of Ideology' as also an expression of this fake consensus, which is amply proved by the burst of radical protest in Late 60's and early 70's.

He takes to task Lipset's statement that with the incorporation of working class, the fundamental problems of industrial revolution are solved and that a consensus has emerged between the left and the right. Consensus, according to MacIntyre, is a concept correlative to that of

interest, the question of which interest are required and acknowledged and the question of whose voice is heard in the consensus is the same question. Following from this, MacIntyre argues that at everytime there are two types of interests : those whose interests are considered in consensus and those whose are not considered. So also there will be two kinds of politics: one 'the politics of those within' and the other 'the politics of those excluded'. The 'End of Ideology' thesis is one; it is the ideology of those concerned with legitimising only the former[22].

Joseph La Palambora, draws attention to the inconsistency of the thesis that ideology is on the decline when society reaches the level of social and economic modernisation, and projecting it into future as a law of history. 'Generalisations such as "more moderrnisation less ideology" involves secular trends that span centuries'. He writes : "my own impression about such long range trends is that, despite some interesting changes in the symbology of ideology, we are far from seeing the end"[23].

Furthermore, since the trend line is not unequivocally established, he argues, "we cannot say whether these short term phenomenon are part of a downward plunging graph line or merely a cyclical dip in a line which may essentially be flat or rising".

An important and quite valid observation about 'End of Ideology' is La Palambora's observation that it suffers from same limitations as do the writings about 'political development'. 'This Formulation seems to rest on the assumption that socio-economic and political development is moving in a deterministic, unilinear, culture-specific direction, whereby the future will consist of national histories that are monotonous repetitions of the Anglo-American story'[24].

The resurgence of Left Wing politics in the form of 'New Left' and the growth of mass movements based on excluded elements (ethnic minorities, women, students) are taken to constitute prima facie evidence to prove that the 'End of Ideology' writers were wrong. As H. Stuart Hughes concludes it has been the misfortune of Bell and his followers to have advanced their thesis at the end rather than the beginning of a non-ideological period in our history[25].

This radicalism which is taken to disprove the 'End of Ideology' thesis consisted of four different themes. The emergence of the youth culture, the dramatic rise of black power movements, the spread of liberation movements in the third world and the Vietnam war which radicalised a large student population.

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What really happened, according to Aron, is that the 'themes of social protest forgotten during coldwar are overshadowed by the economic success of the West have acquired new currency. He confesses that the weakening of the last great ideological system did not promote a pragmatic approach to problems but quite to the contrary encouraged widespread social protest[26].

Lipset, on the other hand, argues that the upsurge of radicalism in the 60's and 70's only proves his and David Riesman's generalisation that "the student movements' rise and fall in cycles" which is amply proved by evidence of protest in late 70's; and 80's[27]. He also makes it clear that even this cyclic rise does not disprove their theory as they did not by 'End of Ideology' mean end of political protest, which would continue and would be largely supported by students, excluded minorities and the intelligentsia. Implicit is the assumption that "inclusion" reduces the need for total ideologies on the part of previously excluded groups and the recognition that ethnic, racial or religious groups who are still deprived in citizenship terms will continue to find uses for extreme tactics and, occasionally, ideologies.

Daniel Bell argues that the new radicalism does not constitute an ideology as none of it spoke of economic

issues or was able to formulate a coherent political philosophy. It was moral and moralistic,[28] and what one saw in the West is not a political but a cultural phenomenon. But this is too naive an argument, to make a distinction between cultural and political protest. Though cultural, the underlying reasons were social and economic and the protest has a political dimension too.

To that extent it did go against the 'End of Ideologists' projection of emergence of pragmatic, give and take society, and a 'politics of civility'. Though as initially expounded by them if 'End of Ideology' is taken to mean the expansion of the total ideologies of the industrial era in the changed circumstances, the upsurge of incoherent radicalism does not affect the generalisation.

More importantly, these new movements, whether left or right - have embraced relatively small numbers of people. These movements, moreover, have been too seriously fragmented to be able to present a convincing and unified ideological front[29].

This criticism once again brings forth the relativistic character of decline hypothesis and its inapplicability to all situations. Keeping this shortcoming of decline hypothesis in mind, one can say that though there

is emergence of ideology in certain new areas (however incoherent), it does not contradict decline hypothesis.

In a sympathetic reading of 'End of Ideology', Dennis Wrong, a critic from the Left, sees it as a reaction to two partially related historical developments : the history of Soviet totalitarianism and the end of the class struggle. The history of Soviet totalitarianism according to Wrong, left the Left with blood on its hands and created an intense suspicion of politics as such, producing a shocked withdrawal. 'End of Ideology' included a fear of this distinctive mass totalitarian spirit "a kind of political hypochondria tends to result, viewing as safe only a politics of limited goals and compromise"[30].

Wrong agrees with the Bell-Lipset thesis that with the modification of late capitalism by welfare legislation redistributive taxation, the consolidation of powerful unions, and the acceptance by all political parties of Keynesian economic politics, the fundamental problems of the industrial revolution are solved. What he took issue over however, was the subsequent air of complacency, moderation being approved for its own sake.

He agreed that the intellectuals no longer believed in 'apocalyptic social transformation and in the post-bourgeois era class struggle was ceasing to be a

central issue and source of major social change. But he comments "when intellectuals begin to look at politics through the eyes of professional politician, they are failing to perform their role as unattached critics visionaries"[31]. Wrong was worried that utopia would` suffer the same fate that had overtaken ideology and become a 'fallen word'.

Wrong in his analysis of Bell-Lipset thesis, seems to confirm it, though the difference lies in the response to what has happened.While Bell and Lipset are satisfied with the staus quo, Wrong was thoroughly dissatisfied and still is in search of an alternative political ideology, a 'utopia' like C. Wright Mills.

Another important critic of 'End of Ideology' is William Delany who considers the theoretical framework of end of ideologists as inadequate, their empirical observation as impressionistic, and their political wisdom unimpressive. He says that Camus' plea for "absolute utopias" comes closest to the way the term was used by these writers. Delany distinguished a French and American school: The French (Simon Weil, Albert Camus and Raymond Aron)` was concerned with the criticism of society, anti-clericalism, individual liberty and the creation of new values and principles of moral conduct. The American school-Lipset,

Bell and Shills - were not anti-clerical and criticised the critics of society. And they, he argues, are conservative. He says the American version of the end of Ideology was basically a defense of contemporary organisational society against both socialist and liberal intellectual critics. Finally he says what Mannheim called utopias they call ideologies, what Mannheim called ideologies they never considered'[32].

Thus as seen from the various criticisms, it is the American New Left in particular that focussed most steadily on the 'End of Ideology' admitting, as had Mills and Wrong and Harowitz, some kind of a decline in political ideology but rejecting an end of all ideologies. This identifies the end of ideologists as conservative supporters of the status quo, drawing out implication and desperately searching for a new ideology (esp. Mills).

The critics had not challenged the substantive analysis of structural changes by the End of Ideologists, which cut at the heart of classical Marxist picture of and prediction about western society, about the inevitability of a deepening economic crisis and polarised class conflict under capitalism. The technological revolution, rise of the 'salariat' replacing the 'proletariat' as the occupation base of society is taken as fait accompli. What is

contested, and rightly so, is the air of complacency
following from this, and a glorification of moderation of
politics of limits, the messianic value attached to the
politics of social democracy and taking mixed Keynesian
Welfare economy as the end of evolution of human
civilization.

Herein lies the crux of the ideological nature of
the End of Ideologists: in their glorification of the
'present' i.e. what 'is' and deprecating any efforts at
changing the society in any radical way, terming such
efforts as 'utopian' and 'ideological. Is it not a fact
that even in the developed western capitalist societies the
basic human values, the values of equality or egalitarianism
prevail only partially, that there are many discriminations
against all varieties of minorities, that the modern welfare
state is only a compromise reached by the laissez-faire
liberalism for its survival ?

Their conservative ideological orientations are
clear in their talk of 'consensus' to the exclusion of
'conflict' and in their glorification of piecemeal social
change and in their reliance on the institutional changes.
In the face of deepening crisis, to call for an end of
ideology only shows their intellectual sterility.

Is the choice really between ideologically motivated totalitarianism and the piecemeal adjustments of social problems? Have we not achieved, what we achieved because of ideologies which stirred human imagination and channelled human emotions and energies ? With Clifford Geertz, we can conclude, "we may wait as long for the 'End of Ideology' as the positivists have waited for the end of religion"[33].

NOTES

1. An extensive list of the critiques of the 'End of Ideology' school is given by Seymour Martin Lipset, " The End of Ideology and the Ideology of the Intellectuals" in Joseph Ben David and Terry Nicholas Clark (eds.) Culture and its Creators (Chicago : the University of Chicago Press, 1977), p.286.

2. L.N. Moskvichov, The end of Ideology Theory:Illusions and Reality, (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1974) p.28.

3. Henry David Aiken, "The Revolt against Ideology", Commentary 37 (April'64), pp. 29-30.

4. C. Wright Mills, "Letter to the New Left", New Left Review 5 (1960), pp. 178.

   Joseph La Palambora, "Decline of Ideology: A dissent and an Interpretation". American Political Science Review 60, (March'66) pp.5-16.

   W. Rousseaus and James Farganis "American Politics and the End of Ideology" in Harowitz (ed.), The New Sociology pp.268-89. Donald Clark Hedges, "The End of Ideology". American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 26th April, 1967, pp.135-46.

   Michael Harrington, "The Anti-Ideology Ideologies" in C.I. Waxman (ed) The End of Ideology debate (New York : Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), p.342-351.

5. H.D. Aiken, op. cit., p.29.

6. Ibid., P.39.

7. L.N. Moskvichov, op.cit.. p.8.

8. Ibid., p.61.

9. La Palambora, op.cit., p.7.

10. Daniel Bell : The End of Ideology (New York : Collier Books, 1962) p.370.

11. Moskvichov, op. cit., p.100.

12. This letter is treated as the manifesto of the 'New Left'.

13. C. Wright Mills, op. cit., p.128

14. Ibid., p.106-107.

15. C. Wright Mills, Power Politics and People (New York :
    Baltimore Books, 1963), p.256.

16. Ibid., p.267.

17. Alasdir Macintyre, Against the Self-images of the Age
    (London : The Trinity Press, 1971).

18. James P. Young, "The Retreat from Ideology" in his The
    Politics of Affluence (California : Chandler
    Publication).

19. W. Rousseaus and James. Farqanis, "American politics
    and the end of Ideology" The British Journal of
    Sociology 14, (1963) p.348.

20. Ibid., p.350.

21. Ibid., p.351.

22. Alasdir Macintyre, op.cit., p.9.

23. Joseph La Palambora, op.cit., p.14.

24. Ibid., p.8.

25. H. Stuart Hughes as quoted in James P. Young's 'The
    politics of Affluence (California : Chandler
    Publications), p.204

26. Raymond Aron, "On the proper uses of Ideologies" in
    Joseph Ben David and Terry Nicholas Clark (eds),
    Culture and its Creators (Chicago : University of
    Chicago Press, 1977), p.3.

27. Seymour Martin Lipset, (rev.ed.) Political Man (London
    : Hienmann, 1983), p.541.

28. Daniel Bell, "End of Ideology Revisited" (Part-I) in
    Government and Opposition (Vol.23 No.2. 1988), p.143.

29. Reo. M. Christenson, "A postscript on Ideology: Two
     views" in Reo. M. Christenson et.al. (ed), <u>Ideologies
     and Modern Politics</u> (London : Oxford, 1971), p.301.

30. Dennis H. Wrong, "Reflections on the End of Ideolog-y"
     in C.I. Waxman (ed), <u>The End of Ideology</u> debate (New
     York : Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), p.118.

31. Ibid., p.123.

32. William Delany, "The Role of Ideology :A Summation" in
     C.I. Waxman (ed), <u>The End of Ideology debate.</u>

33. Clifford Geertz, in "Ideology as a Cultural System" in
     D.E. Apter (ed), <u>Ideology and Discontent</u> (London, 67),
     p.51.

CHAPTER IV

A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE END OF IDEOLOGY THEORY

A theory, apart from reflecting the times in which it arises, is also an outcome of the personal experiences of the theorists. In this chapter an effort is made to look at the socio-economic conditions of the post-war west, when the 'end of ideology' theory had become popular. The intellectual and political antecedents of the end of ideologists is surveyed to find a clue to their obvious anti-Marxist ideological predisposition.

The end of ideology intellectuals shared a common history which stretched back to the depression and beyond. They had come from the immigrant ghettos where their parents had settled upon arrival to America. They moved towards centre of the American life through a circuitious route, through left politics & cultural critiques of the 1930's.

Bell and Lipset, alongwith others were at 'city college'; where they pursued their radical politics as members of Trotskyist "young peoples socialist League" (YSPL). In this phase they were associated with partisan review which started as a magazine dedicated to radical literature and later rededicated itself to radical culture, only outside the world of Proletarian literature and

communist party politics. After 1945, they made a transition from 30's radicalism to post-war liberalism and some ended as conservatives. They succeeded in establishing a name for themselves and founded new journals: including Commentary & Dissent[1].

While in 1932, Bell gave street-corner speeches for socialist candidates, in the post war period he had become a defender of status-quo. This is the period when they all moved from the periphery towards the centrestage of American intellectual life, with well settled academic positions. What had affected these Jewish intellectuals most was the Nazi-holocaust in Germany. But having identified with American mainstream culture by then, they reacted to these changes more as Americans than Jews.

At a more general level, the mainstream American liberal culture itself has been changing, adjusting and readjusting according to the changing times. Once it was discovered that the Laissez-faire capitalism has no chance of survival, unless the evils of industrialisation are mitigated, the nature of liberalism underwent a radical change. From being a night-watchman state of the 19th century, it transformed into a social-welfarist state especially in the "New Deal" policies of President Roosevelt. The change in the mentality of these 'End of

Ideology' intellectuals can be seen from their changed reaction to the New Deal programme. While in the 30's they had mocked the New Deal policies, in the 40's they had come to see them as a blend of social democracy and evolutionary socialism, a view which allowed them to support the post war American situation without rejecting wholesale the general aims of their youth. They began to support a society which they had once criticised mercilessly and an economic and political system about which they had all harboured serious doubts.

The second world war was to effect everywhere an enhancement of the scope and intensity of state activity. The Beveridge plan in Britain and war involvement in the United States, entrenched the managerialist tendencies of the New Deal[2]. A broad consensus emerged that the future lay with the activist state and the mixed and managed economy rather than the free market. The relative success of war time planning convinced political leaders that the same techniques could and should be used to promote full employment in a context of rapid economic growth. Keynesian economics became the by-word. Against the background of the destruction wrought by war, in the post war period there ensued economic growth. Dissident voices were hard to find in this period of undisturbed prosperity[3].

On the practical plane, this was the period of cold war, where the two ideological systems of Marxism-Leninism and Liberalism clashed for dominance. The liberal intellectuals went all out to discredit Marxism-Leninism. The radicals of 30's who now identified themselves with American culture had more to prove. To undo their socialist past, they now took up the gauntlet against Marxism-Leninism. Their anti-Marxist rhetoric is clear in their association with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a body of American intellectuals formed with the purpose of mobilising western public opinion against the Soviet Union in 1950[4]. The justification for the criticism, was provided by defining Marxism as totalitarian ideology and making no distinction between this and the right wing Fascist ideology. Ideological politics are now defined as disruptionist politics and that "democracy can only exist where there is a civil politics"[5].

The end of ideology theorists formed the core of American Committee for cultural Freedom (ACCF), a subsidiary of Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) and published the magazines <u>Partisan Review</u>, <u>Commentary</u> and <u>The New Leader</u>. ACCF was formed in 1951, with not so noble a purpose of "counteracting mendacious communist propaganda and oppose all forms of thought control."[6] Bell spent a year working for CCF in Paris. Raymond Aron and Edward Shils were part

of the organisation Committee of the Milan meeting of the CCF in 1955. Bell and Lipset presented their papers here and it is at this meeting that the talk of consensus and irrelevance of ideological politics started[7].

The first conference of CCF took place in 1950, typically enough in West-Berlin[8] and thereafter every year conferences were held around themes like "The Future of Freedom". In these conferences a spectrum of intellectuals ranging from the right to the social democratic centre would address about the dangers of socialism and all forms of radicalism. Anti-communist tendencies were also clearly seen in the magazines Encounter (a supposedly literary magazine) brought out in 1953 under the auspices of CCF. Many of the articles were characterised by negative liberalism[9]. Encounter and CCF were junctions at which the intellectual concerns of the cold war liberals interacted with the real politics of anti-communism[10]. The hard anti-communism rested on two assumptions: (i) the Soviet Union was a totalitarian state in the same unqualified evil character as Nazi Germany, and (ii) it is committed to world revolution. Only American power stood in the way of this fanatical ambition to destroy freedom all over the world, and only American awareness of the threat could generate policies that would thwart it[11].

The fact that a considerable part of this activity was financed by the CIA should not draw us to the motives of the end of ideologists but neither should it be passed over lightly. Funds from CIA were channeled to the Congress via various respectable institutions such as Ford Foundation, and then passed on to the various journals which the Congress subsidised: e.g. Encounter[12].

How is it that such rabid anti-communist formulations in terms of end of ideology and end of radical politics convinced an entire generation?

The reasons are manifold:

i) Modern man's loss of faith in unilinear human progress;

ii) The end of ideology expressed something which was really happening. Only it was a clever mix of selective socio-economic and political facts with their own values; and

iii) it complemented the western efforts to curtail communism from its spread to the third world.

Loss of faith : The Nazi death camps, barbarism beyond all civilized imagination and the Soviet Labour camps had cast a pall on all utopian thinking. The war shattered the dream of progress and the perspective of steady humanizing and liberalising of social life and its institutions[13]. Out of

this came fear of mass action and emotional politics. After the war when fascism was defeated, Marxism alone came to be identified with such totalitarian politics. Man has become skeptical of human reason and human spirit, expressed in the grand designs of political ideology[14]. Questions were raised about the wisdom of revolutionary changes, which at a stroke undo the time tested institutions and norms, without building any new ones.

Admixture of Facts and values : The socio-economic and political changes which the end of ideologists refer to are in fact true. The affluent society, the welfare state, rise of technocratic mass society, rising middle class, betterment of living conditions of working class, certain socialist parties renouncing the goal of nationalisation etc.

What is not talked about, however, by the End of Ideologists is also important. The continuing importance of property- ownership and inequitable distribution of property, relative increase in income inequality, the exclusion of minorities from the supposed consensus are some of these. The 'selective facts are also interpreted through certain equations which were proved wrong very soon. These equations were : reduced inequalities cut across older class horizons[15]; the participations of workers through trade

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unions in the democratic process like any other sections of society implies success of pluralist politics;[16]; the existing inequalities do not affect political power[17]; the emergence of a large skilled middle class implies the rise of a "technocratic society"[18].

These equations were falsified when radicalism burst on to the American scene and poverty was rediscovered, immediately after the publication of Bell's 'End of Ideology' and Lipset's political man in 1960.

The affluent society & welfare state : After the depression years and the havoc caused by the two world wars, post war period showed relative stability and economic development. Production expanded at an unprecedented rate. Once the developmental role of the state was accepted, the state has come to perform many social welfare functions and provide social securities. This also led to the improvement in the living conditions of the working class. The expansion of industry and the tertiary sector meant an increase in the size of middle class, which is conservative and has an interest in the status-quo. Rise of Mass society meant the standardisation of products and services, removing the explicit differentials in the living conditions of the rich and the poor. The success of welfarist liberalism coupled with the brutal experience of an all powerful state

in Eastern Europe & Soviet Union, led many of the western social democratic parties to abandon their earlier commitment to public ownership[19], and substitute democratic politics for conflict politics. All this meant, as end of ideologists argued, a certain toning down of political rhetoric in the west and a reliance on the pragmatic and rational politics.

Nevertheless, if one had cared to look deep one could have found the material for dissent within these societies, like the New Left did. It is true that real incomes have risen in the post war period but so also have the inequalities. In mid 1950's in Britain 2/5th of all private property was with one per cent of population and 4/5th with ten per cent. In the United States 1/4th of all private property was with one per cent of population[20]. So also the rate of increase in standards of living was accordingly faster than the rate of increase in actual levels of living, thus retaining the grounds for dissent. Though there was an increase in the use of technology and a corresponding increase in technical manpower to talk of a 'technocratic model' is a fantacy, an utopia and an ideal type[21]. This view sees technicians as dominating the officials and management, and the modern technologically developed bureaucracy as guided by an exclusive reliance on a standard of efficiency. But the technicians act only as

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instruments (well developed) in reaching the targets fixed
by management and the overall direction of development is
given not by technicians but by political and business
bosses.

Democratic Pluralism : They hold that the process of
decisionmaking in U.S. consists of negotiation and
compromise among many factions and groups and that the
product is a reasonable appropriation of both democracy and
public interest[22]. But these advocates of pluralist
politics do not take into account the broader divisions in
society. They also treat all the groups as both equal and
similar. It rationalises the citizens' apathy where mass
participation is perceived as a threat and a precursor of
totalitarian democracy[23].

The belief that the fundamental problems of the
industrial revolutions have been solved was very soon made
to look ludicrous, by the rediscovery of poverty - the
uncovering of persisting forms of deprivation behind the
appearance of material affluence and the co-existence of
public squalor with private wealth. Even before Bell and
Lipset had published their books, the emergence of the black
civil rights movements in U.S.A., the deep political
divisions created by the American war in Vietnam - all these
destroyed the illusion of conflict-free, nonideological

politics almost as soon as it was proclaimed a reality. The
world depression of the 1970s; and 1980's. The return of
inflation and mass unemployment in developed capitalist
world and the undermining of the welfare state, confirmed
that the endorsement of the end of ideology was indeed no
more than a "political and intellectual reflection of the
post war capitalist boom, which came to an end almost
immediately"[24].

End of Ideology, Revisited : It is now argued by
the protagonists of the end of ideology theory that the new
cycle of disillusionment in the communist world vindicates
their position. According to Bell, there is a difference in
the present situation. The previous disillusionment was
moral, intellectual and political while the admitted
failures this time are primarily economic.[25] While the
1950's talk of end of ideology was an outcome of the
domestic social changes, the changes in eastern Europe and
Soviet Union are the propelling force for the recent talk on
end of ideology (End of History : Fukayama; victory of
liberal capitalism: Brezenski; end of ideology revisited:
Bell).

It is true that the changes taking place in
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union are cataclysmic, the basic
tenents of Marxism-Leninism are being questioned and the

dictatorship of proletariat and monopoly of communist party etc. are being examined (and given up) in the light of past experience. With a major restructuring of the existing economic system the centralised planning is coming to terms with the need to liberalise and market forces and private investment are being given an important role. On the political level, it heralded a democratic revolution and introduction of multiparty pluralist politics, whereby communist parties are deprived of their monopoly. The traditional conflict between the two ideological systems of communism and capitalism is breaking down. Gorbachev is talking of de-ideologization of international relations: "We believe that the rightness of one's ideology, the advantage of the system chosen by each people of their own free will and should be proved not by force of arms but by force of example".[26]

According to Fukayama something very fundamental has happened in the world history and that the recent events particularly, the rise of reform movements in the eastern bloc and the spread of consumer culture throughout much of the world indicate "the triumph of the west, of the western ideas"[27]

The crux of his argument is, what we are

witnessing is not just the end of cold war but the end history as such : that is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. Fukayama here holds history in the Hegelian sense, that is to say, the end of history means resolution of all ideological conflicts. But as Gertrude Himmelforbs points out, "the dialectic does not consist as Fukayama says in a beginning, a middle and an end but a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis, in which the synthesis of the preceding stage is the thesis of the present, thus setting in motion an endless dialectic cycle - and thus preserving the drama of history"[28]

These writers of victory of Liberation (Fukayama, Brezenski, Toffler) are making the same mistakes as the earlier end of ideologists : First, in seeing the changes in eastern bloc as a duplications of liberal values and an end of communism. But these changes are essentially a reaction against the distortions in these countries. That command economies are dismantled and liberalisation is taking place does not mean that it is the victory of market forces per se. Rather the change is addressing to the stagnation which the command economies have brought.

Second, even considering it as a victory of

liberalism over marxism it still does not exhaust the variety of ideological politics. Within the western developed world there is an assertion of conservative tendencies (New right, monetarism etc.), and a challenge is being posed to the western linear model of development by the new social movements (though still in a nascent stage).

The Post-War consensus in welfarism and redistribution is challenged by the radical right or libertarianism. Keynesian demand management and equalitarian redistribution have been questioned by an alternative individualistic view in which property is the right of every individual. The assumption that radicals should automatically look to the state as the chief instrument of reform has been challenged by a newfound faith in self help and the power of voluntary associations.[29] They want to revive the classical liberal notions of the night watchman state with minimal functions where taxation and redistribution are seen as immoral. The new Right thinkers advocate an entitlement theory of justice which insulates property holdings of individuals against any exploitations or redistribution.

The practical significance of these notions is visible in the politics of Reaganomics and Thatcherism and economics of Monetarism, in the cutting down of social

security measures whereby the disabled are left to the mercy of voluntary associations. Milton Friedman used the fall of Marxism - Leninism to remind the west that they must also "Struggle against domestic socialism in the post office, the public schools and in all other governmental programmes".[30]

On the other hand, the ecological limitations to the western developmental model is brought to light by various ecological movements.[31] The 19th century faith in perfectibility and progress is being challenged. The western model of development is linear, teleological and ethnocentric, while the new social movements enunciate the end of linear progress.[32]

Capitalism supposedly is the natural end of economic reforms for the new end of ideology theorists. But its economic efficiency generates not only pursuit of happiness but also human degradation. If capitalism and free enterprise were successful as its advocates claim why the broad appeal of socialism and marxism in the first place? Further, what sort of democracy is it that seems to make wealth, a prerequisite for political office and effectiveness? How many people of modest means are there in the U.S. Senate or House of people? What influence does on ordering citizen have in comparison with a large company.[33]

Though it is true that in west we find a mixed economy; a mixture of laissez-faire capitalism and socialism there is no consensus about the mixture itself. As Dahl succintly put it "a century or more of efforts to arrive at a feasible and politically acceptable mix of market, and non- market element has not provided a definitive stable or uniform solution"[34]

To conclude, it can be said that the 'end of ideology' theory is first a self image of the intellectual, who having left their own radicalism have become defenders of status-quo; the rationaliser of the prevailing social order. The totalitarian experiences of Fascism and Stalinism convinced them that all ideological politics are inherently anti-democratic. All this has coloured their selection of facts and implications drawn from therein. Second, the popularity of the theory was owing to the fact that it, to a certain extent, represented the mood of the post-war times. The relative stability and affluence has brought a complacency and a decline in radical politics in the west for a brief period. Third, the anti-Communist battle in the cold war period formed the basis of a broad political consensus in America at least until Vietnam war. The theory came about in a period when the west was still defining itself in terms of the soviet enemy and, while

doing so, was feeling both superior and victorious.

The latest talk of end off ideology rose in the conditions of set back of Marxist-Leninist ideology. But these theorists do the same mistake as the earlier ones, i.e. making sweeping historical statements on the basis of the observations of a very brief period.

1. Alexander Bloom, <u>Prodigal Sons</u>, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 6.

2. John Gray, <u>Liberalism</u>, (Milton Keynes : Open University Press, 1986), p. 37.

3. F.A. Hayek <u>The Constitution of Liberty</u>, published in 1960 did not receive recognition until the 1970's.

4. Christopher Lasch "The Cultural Cold War : A brief History of the Congress for Cultural Freedon" in <u>Towards a New Past</u>, (ed) B.J. Bernstein (new York, Random House, 67) p. 32.

5. Daniel Bell, "Sociodicy : A Guide to Modern State", <u>American Scholar</u>, Autumn, 1966, p. 712.

6. Peter Steinfels, <u>The New Conservatives</u> (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 29.

7. Ibid., p. 29.

8. The Second meeting of CCI was to be held in India, to convey to the third world the ills of communism. Nehru declined the permission. CCF had a branch in India, Jaya Prakahs Narayan was a member of this body.

9. <u>Times Literary Supplement</u>, 9 Oct. 1953.

10. Anthony Arblaster, <u>The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism</u>, (New York : Basic Blackwell, 1984), p. 313.

11. Norman Podhoretz, <u>Making it</u>, (New York : Random House, 1967), pp. 289-290.

12. Anthony Arblaster, op.cit., p. 311.

13. Ibid., p. 301.

14. Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Theory", <u>Political Science Quarterly</u>, LXVIII, Sep. 1953, p. 323.

15. Ralf Dahrendorf <u>Class and class Conflict in Industrial Society</u>, (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 231.

16. Lipset, <u>Politcal Man</u>, (New Delhi : Arnold Heinemann, 1973), p.

17. Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Murray J., Eselman, <u>American Politics, Policies, Power</u> and Change, (United States: D.C. Heath and Co., 1971), p. 138.

18. J.K. Galbraith, <u>The Affluent Society</u>, (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1958).

19. Anthony Arblaster, Op.cit., p. 324.

20. J.H. Westergaard : "The Myth of Classlessness", Blackness (ed), <u>Ideology in Social Sciences</u>, (Glasgous: Collins, 1975), p. 119.

21. Alvin W. Gouldner : <u>The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology</u>, (London, Macmillan, 1976), p. 257.

22. Kenneth M. Dolbeare :op.cit., p. 151.

23. Peter Steinfels : op.cit., p. 34.

24. Anthony Arblaster : op.cit., p. 325.

25. Daniel Bell : "The End of Ideology Revisited", <u>Government</u> and <u>Opposition</u>, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1988, p. 325.

26. M.S. Gorbachev : <u>Speeches and Writingss</u> (Oxford : Perganos Press, 1986), p. 233.

27. Francis Fukayamma : "The End of History ?" <u>The National Interest</u>, Summer, 1989, p. 8.

28. Francis Fukayamma : "The End of History Debate", <u>American Review</u>, Spring, 1990.

29. D.G. Green : <u>The New Right</u>, (Sussex; Weatsheaf, 1987) pp. 1-2.

30. Friedman, as quoted in Jeffery C. Goldforb's : "Post Totalitarian Politics : Ideology ends agains", <u>Social Research</u>, Vol. 57, Fall, 1990, p. 542.

31. J.N. Piekerse : "Dilemmas of Developmental Discourse", <u>Development and Change</u>, 22, Jan, 1991, p. 17.

32. Ibid., p. 17.

33. Jeffrey C. Goldfarb : op.cit., p. 543.

34. Robert Dahl : "Social Reality and Free Markets", <u>Dissent</u>, Spring, 1990, pp. 226-227.

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