

**COMMUNAL RIOTS IN ALIGARH AND MORADABAD:
A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY**

*Dissertation submitted to the
Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of*

Master of Philosophy

Supervisor:
Prof. Yogendra Singh

Submitted by:
Pravin Kumar Rawal



**CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI 110 067, INDIA**

1997



Date: 4th July, 1997

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify the dissertation entitled **COMMUNAL RIOTS IN ALIGARH AND MORADABAD: A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY** submitted by **Pravin Kumar Rawal** in Partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university. This is an original work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Prof. Yogendra Singh

Supervisor


Prof. J.S. Gandhi

Chairperson

for mummy, papa .
and babaju--
holding their fingers, i
learned to walk

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I owe a deepest sense of gratitude to my affectionate, inspiring and thought provoking supervisor 'Professor Yogendra Singh whose constant encouragement, cooperation and directions' result is this dissertation. He was not merely a supervisor to me but also a guardian who made me feel at home in JNU. His richness of thought, insight and understanding need no mention.

I avail this opportunity to try to put in words, though quite impossible, my heartiest gratitude to my family members. My sister Dolly and Chandu Bhai have been constant source of inspiration and encouragement. Their strong sense of confidence in me makes me comfortable even in worst of the situations. Ravi chacha-Veena Chachi, Nandan Babu-Saroj Chachi, and Dada Doctor have been a constant source of moral and financial support. Their contribution is so immense in my life that words fall short. My fraternity - Gaurav, Garima, Sonu, Mona, Usha Didi, Nisha, Lata, Deepu, Keeta and Saurabh need affectionate mention as they look upon me with great sense of respect and in a way contributed in my behavioral development. Seema, Shushila Didi and Dharmendra also deserve a mention in encouraging me. My nephews Rafiul and Anshu need to be mentioned as during my stay in Aligarh for this study, their loving intervention made me take few extra days, otherwise I could have completed the work earlier.

I take this opportunity to thank my friends Virendra, Gavendra, Mahendra, Arif, Om Prakash 'Naidu', Abdul Aziz and Farzana who provided a base of my thoughts during my days in AMU.

I also take this opportunity to thank my teachers. Shri Ganga Ram ji who performed my 'Upnayana'; at AMU Dr. (Mrs.) S.B. Ahmed, Dr. (Mrs.) Rashida Rana Siddiqui, Dr. P.K. Mathur, Dr. Jamal Siddiqui, Dr. Abdul Waheed, Dr. Abdul Matin and Dr. M.B. Mathur, taught me what Sociology is and contributed in developing in me a humane outlook.

Among my well wishers Prof. K. M. Mishra (Chachaji) and Dr. (Mrs.) Manisha Mishra (Chachiji), Ramesh Chacha, Usha Chachi, Shri Bhuri Singh, Th. Vikram Singh (Freedom Fighter), Shri. C.P. Singh, Shri. S.P. Singh, Shri. Fate Singh and Shri. A.N. Khan deserve a mention as they made me fearless at all levels.

Among my friends in JNU, Mohit ji, Mujeeb Bhai, Sujeet, Vijay, Rohit, Naveen and Bhup have been a source of fruitful discussions and a source of moral support.

Tulsi, Madhavan and Amrita, among my classmates, deserve a special mention as they made me feel comfortable in my initial JNU days. It would have been difficult for me to adapt to the new environment of JNU without their encouragement, inspiration and consolation. They have been a constant source of good insights, fruitful discussions, moral support and thought provocation. It is their humble contribution, precisely, which resulted in the form of this dissertation. I use fittest words to express my gratitude to them, though it is impossible as words have their limitations. Among my classmates, Shelly, Binita, Shiruthi Nanjappa, Ragini, Gomati, and Sheetal also have a right to be mentioned here as they always take my problems seriously and provide sympathetic solutions to them. It will be merely a formality if I dare thank them. They deserve a special place in this 'acknowledgment'. I don't know the words for such a mention.

Finally I would like to thank AMU's Maulana Azad Library staff; JNU Library staff and Teen Murti Library Staff for their immense help. My thanks are due to Shri. Mohinder P. Singh, who did a nice job in reading my unreadable handwriting and typing it. At last, but not least, my thanks are due to all strangers and those persons whose name I could not mention, who directly or indirectly helped me in completing this dissertation.

Kumar

Pravin Kumar Rawal

ABBREVIATION

PAC	-	Provincial Armed Constabulary
CRPF	-	Central Reserve Police Force
BSF	-	Border Security Force
AMU	-	Aligarh Muslim University
VHP	-	Vishwa Hindu Parishad
BJP	-	Bharatiya Janata Party
RSS	-	Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangha
SDM	-	Sub-Divisional Magistrate
CMO	-	Chief Medical Officer
SSP	-	Senior Superintendent of Police

CONTENTS

	Page No.
Acknowledgement	ii-iv
Abbreviation	v
Preface	1-2
CHAPTER ONE	
STUDY FRAMEWORK	3-22
CHAPTER TWO	
VULNERABILITY OF ALIGARH AND MORADABAD CITIES TO RIOTS: SOME FACTS	23-56
CHAPTER THREE	
ALIGARH RIOTS: A FRESH LOOK AT RIOT OF 1978	57-70
CHAPTER FOUR	
MORADABAD RIOTS: A FRESH LOOK AT RIOT OF 1980	71-81
CHAPTER FIVE	
COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS	82-85
BIBLIOGRAPHY	86-109

हिरण्यगर्भः समवर्त्तताग्रे भूतस्य जातः पतिरेक आसीत् ।
स दाधार पृथिवीं द्यामुतेमां कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम ।
.....यजुर्वेद ।१३।४।।

*He who is in the form of light and who created and incorporated in Him
The light gives sun, moon etc.,
Who is the lord of this whole created universe,
Who was present before the creation of this world,
Who is bearing on Him earth, sun etc.,
We bow to that pleasure giving holy god with love and devotion.*

.....Yajurveda |13|4||

PREFACE

The connotation of communalism today is highly complicated global issue which took into its fold India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, South Africa, England, Northern Ireland and other parts of the world.

The issue in India is a unique socio-historical phenomena of plural society. Not only secessionist movements, but also the separatist tendencies in a populace of our country, are the contribution of the communal divide. The thousands of problems have been posed by this communal divide in discovering methods for the amalgamation of cultures for nation building. It is a hindrance in achieving goals of nation building, social harmony and secularism. In post independence decades, the communal holocaust has shaken our faith in communal amity, as we have witnessed progressively worse expressions, one after the other, almost in all parts of the country. Punjab, Assam, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Gujrat appear to be badly in the iron grip of communal belligerence.

This study has five chapters. In chapter one, efforts have been made to construct a study frame work, which gives a detailed account of methodology - objectives of study, research design, hypotheses etc., conceptual clarifications, nature of communal conflict, and special account of the difference of Indian communalism from that of the other parts of the world.

In chapter two, we have tried to analyze the vulnerability of two cities of Uttar Pradesh - Moradabad and Aligarh, to riots. This chapter gives accounts of

economic, geographical, demographic, social and political dimension of the two cities; and also suggests that how structure of the cities is conducive for the eruption of communal riots.

In chapter three and four, we have taken up the specific famous riots of the two cities: Aligarh and Moradabad - Riots of 1978 and Riots of 1980 respectively. With the help of these two famous riots of respective cities the study gives us fruitful insights in examining the present day problem of communal riots. Since, the riots are not abrupt outcomes, it is worth analyzing the past riots which in one way or the other are important in analyzing present day riots and predict about the future. In these two chapters we also have tried to analyze the role of the public administration and the police which is also very significant.

It can be proved that the role of the administration is also decisive in eruption of communal riots by looking at the post Babri-Masjid demolition riots. After the demolition, to take only two cities of our study as examples, Aligarh witnessed communal riots at large scale but contrary to this and quite strange also, Moradabad did not witness any major riots. Here, the role of the administration can be traced out. Administration was alert enough in Moradabad to prevent the occurrence of any communal riots.

Chapter five is our conclusions of the study. In this chapter we have tried to compare the riots of the two cities - Aligarh and Moradabad and to generalize regarding the communal riots in India.

CHAPTER ONE

*"Where the mind is without fear
And the head is held high
Where knowledge is free
Where the world has not been broken up
Into fragments by narrow domestic walls
Where words come out from the depth of truth
Where the clear streams of reason
Has not lost its way
Into the dreary desert sand and dead habit
Where the mind is led forward
By thee into the ever widening thought and action
Into that heaven of freedom
My father
Let my country awake."*

--Rabindranath Tagore (Gitanjali)

STUDY FRAMEWORK

The series of communal clashes reported from different states leaves one with the inescapable conclusion that the religious zealots are out to make a mincemeat of peace; having already achieved a fair measure of success in their sinister effort. Some people have even pointed out a clearly discernible pattern in the violence grappling some states like Uttar Pradesh Gujrat, Maharastra, Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir. The communalists here seem to have perfected the technique of stabbing people at random and provoking the members of the community to which the victims belong. The police often find them at sixes and sevens even as the communalists come up with ingenious ways of snuffing out life and provoking riots. What all this adds up to is that peace can be destroyed at will by the fundamentalist elements who are in league with the anti-social elements and corrupt politicians.

There is every reason to believe that the passions whipped up by sensitive issues like the Ram Janmbhumi Babri-Masjid and the worsening situation in Jammu and Kashmir have a lot to do with the communal flare-ups and the strong sense of insularity between communities which is building up.

There is a powerful notion among the general public that the growth of religious fanaticism has greatly impeded the way of building up of a secular India. The people who believe in this do so vehemently but they do not sit back and rationally analyze the issue. Our objective is to see whether these impressions are logical conclusions or simply declarations with no proof to support them. The issue needs to be reexamined in the light of the resurgence of religious bigotry in the society and polity of India.

There is another issue attached to communalism. Often the phrase "communal" is used as something undesirable which needs to be looked down, we need to analyze what exactly does this word mean, and probe as to why a man becomes communal? What is as defined by fundamental rights and provisions of the constitution which provide for the freedom of conscience, profession and the practice and propagation of religion?

The problem of communalism and communal riots is not confined to religious community alone: it is today expanding among ethnic groups, linguistic communities and castes. It warrants a more careful study and a person should go into whys and hows of this phenomenon.

Some historians seek traces of causes of communal riots in the pre-independence and partition experiences.¹ Some attribute to the tyranny of Muslim rulers². It has often been said that history is the breeding ground of communal conflicts as it generates prejudices in the tender minds of

school going children. It is, therefore, suggested that the Indian history should be rewritten from the point of "national integration". But whether writing history will further aggravate the problem by damaging the people's faith and confidence in the sanctity of past records remains an unanswered and debatable issue.

Another school of scholars maintain that in India the minority communities are responsible for working against the secular values and it is they who ignite communal disturbances.³ They argue that these minority groups do not wish to integrate themselves into the mainstream of national life but, wish to organize themselves to maintain a separate identity. The communal riots are an expression of this "exclusiveness" syndrome for minorities, they say. This alleged trend of the minority community also needs an impartial exploration.

The government machinery is blamed by the minority communities who claim that they are not properly represented in it. They do not have faith in these "unsecular" government agencies and consider them "Partisan, biased and incredible"⁴. It should also be examined whether proportionate representation will help in secularizing minorities. Secularism demands the representation of all communities, but can this be done or is it just a concept? Such assumptions need to be dealt with scientific equanimity.

All modes of civil strife are not alike, so is the case with communal disturbances. It would be interesting to examine how communal disturbances are different from various modes of civil strife, like agitation, insurgency and terrorism because essentially they are all expressions of violence. No systematic work has been done to discern the differences between communal violence and other kinds of violence. Hence, this work lays stress on the systematic and scientific analysis of riots which have become an inescapable social reality.

There have been various studies on social realities in India but each one has adopted a single disciplinary approach. In such studies, the interpretation of social reality has been unidimensional or monolithic. We must understand that these approaches in their singular explanations are an endeavour to examine one fact. And this is not the complete social reality. A balanced view of reality lies in the multi disciplinary approach, as reality is multi-faceted. This issue needs a holistic approach for a clear understanding.

Communal riots in India, is exclusively an urban phenomenon. In rural India it is to a great extent absent. The communal consciousness, ideological symbols of caste, religion, kinship exist and operate strongly in Indian cities, as compared to Indian villages. What is different between the city and the village is that the pattern of relationship in the village is

unimodel, based on the predominance of agrarian economy, is multi-faceted. Otherwise, interpenetrating principles of social structure, kinship, caste and religion operate in both cities and villages. Ofcourse, they perform different functions in the cities from what they do in the villages.⁵

In the city, they tend to be complex and might become unmanageable, some times explosive. This is so with regard to communal riots. In the urban setting, the role of communal ideologies gets exaggerated due to the density of population, neighbourhood patterns and relative facilities for the manipulation of people by the vested interests, which exploit religion for communal purposes. Their effectiveness and viability increases in the urban context. The social structure of the city and the profile of communalism have a very close mutual relationship. It is an important insight that the urban studies have given us.⁶

Another consideration which was ought to be taken into account, is that all riots are not alike. In some riots, political factors dominate. In others economic rivalry and disparity play a vital role, and in some others, religious considerations are paramount. Many a time a configuration of two or three factors triggers off communal violence. The Aligarh riots of 1971 and that of 1978 (October-November) were based predominantly on political factors, but that of 1992 following Babri Masjid demolition were based on religious factors. The Faizabad communal tensions of 1982 were influenced

by religious controversies. The Meenakshi Puram riots could be attributed to a combination of social, economic and religious consideration. The Baroda riots of October, 1982, and the Ahemdabad riots of 1986 were the result of social, economic, political and religious factors. Hence, we need to understand the anatomy of communal riots with a clearer perspective.

THE NATURE OF COMMUNAL CONFLICT:

The communal conflict, manifested in the form of communal disturbances is primarily a result of social disharmony, disequilibrium and demagogy. It can be described as a social evil. In communal disturbances, layers of agitated emotions permeate in order to surcharge the atmosphere. Revenge, enmity and hatred are symptoms of the fury of one group against the other. The violence exercised by people can be described as violence of confrontation emerging from the wrath of one community against the other due to either injured status, prestige, or feelings. It can also be described as a release of volatile catharsis of masses.

The agitations are demonstrations of coercion in which the agitators register their protest for a demand for review or revision in existing structure or system or status.⁷ The agitations express demand for fulfillment mostly from the government.⁸ The attention of the government is drawn

through demonstrations, dharnas, and picketing. These demonstrations directly convey the grievances. The members who join such agitations resort to violence when all other method fail them. In terrorism, violence is the take off point used by assailants, who act in the most ruthless manner. The aim of exercising violence is to create psychological fear and scare. The terrorists also express demands which are mostly put forward to the ruling regime. The violence is exercised directly and indirectly. The direct method aims at exposing the government's incapability to check such attacks while the indirect method is to put pressure on the government through international agencies who are also in favour of their demands or to create an inter-nation opinion by highlighting their cause. Terrorism is based on propaganda carried out through violence. The range of operation is very wide. The problem of terrorism can be solved by political negotiations or through meeting their demands. It is based largely on foreign support.

Insurgency is an armed revolt by a group of people who have secured the popular support of masses or the society at large against the government in power. It is taught on the aspirations of masses. The violence exercised is more in terms of guerrilla warfare, that is 'hit-and-run' tactics. The insurgents are trained, highly motivated and mobile. In insurgency, the field of operation is limited to the area which is under such armed revolt. The confrontation is mostly with security forces. The problem is primarily

political but depends on the military strength for a settlement.

The above discussion, thus, described communalism in terms of social conflict which is different from other modes of civil strife. Various scholars point out that the incidents of communal conflict are detrimental to the smooth functioning of our social order. Our endeavour to build up a democratic, socialist and secular nation is hampered by such occurrences. The genesis of communal conflict lies in the structure of our society. There are endogenous or orthogenetic factors in its origin, growth and development. Any attempt to understand causes of social conflict should be sought within the society and not beyond it. The explanation for the incessant increase in the frequency of communal conflicts in India, has to be identified within the structure and functioning of the existing system.

THE INDIAN REALITY :

Social Science literature in the global context attributes a positive meaning of the term "communal". In India this term has been used to denote a negative phenomenon. There has been a trend which extrapolates the global meaning to understand communalism as it exists in India. For example, communalism has accompanied by common culture, history, interests and these characteristic features have been seen to have their basis

in religion.

Extrapolation of this understanding to analyse the phenomena of communalism has introduced certain distortions. The erroneous conception of community as a religious, caste or other ascriptive group focused thinking and research on incorrect lines. The other trend has been to understand communalism in relation to competing religious group identities. In this, communalism is to believe and propagate that the social economic and political interests of one religious caste or other ascriptive group of dissimilar, divergent and antagonistic to those of an other.

These notions are projected to negate the image of a genuine religious man, who is a non-communalist. In other words, communalism highlights only those aspects of religion which are antagonistic rather than those that are humanist and universal. In this sense, religion is only an instrumental cause for the growth of communalism.

Another popular notion about the communalism in India, is that the communalism is the result of the famous policy of British-‘Divide and Rule’. To counter this argument Promod Kumar suggests "Communalism is not a conspiracy of British. Communalism appeared due to the social conditions prevailing in India: the British used it to perpetuate their rule. There exist a reservoir of mistrust and suspicion among members of different religious groups which was exploited by the British colonialists.

And this practice has continued even after independence of these colonies." To suggest that why communalism was not vanished even after independence in India, Pramod Kumar argues, "it (communalism) is a development of disproportionately high loyalty to one's caste, tribe, religion or any group as against the normal requirement of prime loyalty to the nation state".⁹

Therefore, communalism has to be understood in relation to the contemporary reality of the multinational character of the Indian state. The vision of making India into a monolithic entity by evolving a canopy culture and producing a colourless homogeneity and, thereby, denying its various constituents their democratic right may be at the expense of democracy and secularism. Communalism is an outcome of the failure to resolve social problems in a secular and democratic way. The slogan of nationalism in independent India is not a cure for the ills of social inequalities, unemployment, denial of civil liberties, etc.

Further to view communalism as a product of 'uneven economic and political development of ascriptive groups', or 'co-existence of pre-capitalist institutions with modern institutions and capitalist path of development' may not be adequate to analyze communalism as an ideology of the middle class does not appreciate the distinction between the appeal and basis of communalism. Communalism has an appeal amongst the members of the

middle class. From this, it can not be inferred that it is the ideology of middle class. The danger of such understanding is that the solutions offered are generally confined to propagation of alternative ideology without questioning the structural basis which provides life force to the phenomena of communalism.

Louis Dumont's essay "Communalism and Nationalism" offers a perspective on understanding the nature of communalism in the context of tradition as well as a critique of the Marxist approach to nationalism and communalism.

Dumont's treatment of Marxism in the analysis of communal problem in India raises some basic questions. He agrees that communal issues can not be comprehended through deterministic notions of Marxist analysis. It has its roots in values and ideologies.¹⁰

The relationship between religion and communalism or the notion of communalism can not be explained from a purely economic perspective. Economic determinism becomes self defeating. It is inadequate because it does not reflect the complex realities of the social structure particularly in India.¹¹

One can not understand "Communalism" unless one has understood the notion of 'communal' and its meaning. It signifies a sacred and hierarchical principle. The communal principle is a basic characteristic of

the Indian tradition and its social structure. Indian social structure is communal in the sense that it is community conducted. In other words, it is hierarchical. The notion of hierarchy is basic to its understanding. What is hierarchy? Hierarchy is the encompassing of the utilitarian and individualistic principles of society by one that is sacred and communitarian. It has the supremacy of the transcendental principles in the value system and role definition in society. In a hierarchical society, the transcendental principle defines the utilitarian. In an egalitarian society it is the other way round. In India it is a transcendental principle such as god, religion or what ever we might call it, which defines the utilitarian principle; that is economy polity etc.¹²

Contrary wise, when economic and politics begin to define the sacred principles such as religion, then one has another model of society, a model not based on "communal" principles but one that is egalitarian, as is the modern western society.

Contrasting western society with the Indian, in the former the predominant notion is that of the egalitarian man. In India, the supremacy is of homo-hierarchical or hierarchical man. The equality theory is a part of the European tradition where the notion of secularism belongs. This notion is not an integral element of the Indian tradition, because it is a hierarchical tradition. Secularism is an European concept, where the

utilitarian rationality defines its fundamental principles. So, in order to understand communalism, one has to understand the role of ideology in a society's tradition; in order to understand the role of ideology one has to comprehend the principles of social structure. There is an organic relationship between the two.¹³ This is where the Marxist formulation of secularism, which establishes a mistaken causal relationship, is criticized.

One will have to examine the problem of communalism, not in the context of the notion of secularism as such, but in the context of nationalism, because secularism in the context of Indian tradition is a foreign ideology. It is an ideology which does not have its native germination in the Indian soil.¹⁴ The notion of tradition in the analysis of secularism and communalism is very significant.

From a different perspective, the problem of tradition and the significance of religion in social life is raised by many other sociologists. Prof. Y. Singh has written about the tradition of Islam in India. It is very important to look at Islam from the perspective of tradition. The Hindu-Muslim relationship was a relationship of two largely homogeneous traditions, not heterogeneous ones, both being passed on the principle of hierarchy. It is very interesting to begin from this perception. If we examine the Hindu and the Islamic traditions as such, we find a large measure of convergence, especially in terms of the fundamental role of the

sacred; but beyond a certain point there are basic divergence. The notions of community, the relationship between politics and religion all tend to be different in Islam and Hinduism. But the inter-relationship, the adaptive response is what is most significant.¹⁵

Our main proposition, derived from Y. Singh's formulation, is that fundamental values or transcendental values play a vital role in the social transformation of society. It is instrumental values that change first and initiate a process of social change. The transcendental values define the limits of the transformation.

As change in the instrumental values exposes the system to rapid transformation and social change, the complexity of tensions generated by it increases, and the strategy for the ideological management of the situation is required. If we are not able to manage it ideologically, then the structural dynamism of this social transformation, itself generates tensions and communal riots is one manifestation of this tension.¹⁶

Whatever one might say, the story of social transformation in the world as a whole is going to be such that, despite universal similarities on the instrumental or the technological level, its internal cultural pattern will be different, as such the pattern of transformation say in Japan or in Europe. Why should it be so? It is because ideologies are different. It is here that ideology becomes a fundamental issue. Otherwise if we take

economy or technology as a basic issue, then all societies should become uniform as a result of development. The cultural pattern of Japan and New England should be similar because both represent successful capitalist economies. Despite Japan being a modern example of capitalist development, its social structure is dissimilar to that of American society.¹⁷

Y. Singh rightly suggested in these words "indeed, it is a myth that all societies will become culturally uniform as they reach similar level of social development. Structural uniformity will be there, but one should not envisage cultural uniformity for a long time to come. And what is the scale of this 'long time'? Logically it is the time when fundamental or 'transcendental' value cease to be autonomously relevant. That is when god as a symbol becomes irrelevant. May be a day will come when most of our human conditions, human existence, will be explained by our bio-chemistry and our whole life and its world view will be determined by it, when death would have been abolished! At that stage one can possibly think of cultural homogenization along with structural homogenization. Otherwise the social patterns and their profiles will remain different."¹⁸

OBJECTIVES OF STUDY:

The problem of communalism has been approached by the Indian scholars with varying emphasis. The Marxist school relates communalism

to the class struggle between "haves" and "have-nots" to secure economic control. Some political scientists view it as a power struggle. The sociologists see it as a phenomenon of social forces operating in a social system. The religious school calls it a violent diadem of fundamentalists and conformist. The real causes have yet to be identified. Many suggestions have been offered for controlling communal conflicts including reforming the administration, particularly the working of police. This work does not attempt to discuss everything relating to the problem of communalism but has touched on one aspect-communal riots. The basic objectives of this study are:

- (a) to examine the causes of communal riots;
- (b) to analyze their broader and specific issues in its historic and present day connotation;
- (c) to assess its alarming growth which is affecting the society at large;
- (d) to identify the role of some communal organizations.

HYPOTHESES:

We have recognized a few hypotheses to be tested in the light of the above objectives. These are:

- (1) Communal riots have their roots in specific social structure,

characterized by manifest clusterization and polarization.

- (2) Transcendental values play a vital role in social transformation, manifested in the preaching of religious and communal organisation.
- (3) The more people are emotionally attached to their respective communities, the greater is the strains of polarization, hence, the more intensive is the communal riots.
- (4) Communal riot is not a product of a single factor but is the result of a multiplicity of factors.
- (5) Since communal riot reflects deep-rooted rivalries between the communities, and since it is a hypersensitive issue, media plays an important role to shape the mentality of the people.

RESEARCH DESIGN:

The data for the present study have been collected mainly through the secondary sources. We have attempted to study social, economic, political, and ethnic structures of the communities in two selected cities of the state of Uttar Pradesh namely Aligarh and Moradabad.

Uttar Pradesh is comparatively more vulnerable to communal flare-ups. More than a dozen communal riots occur in a year in different parts of the state besides continuous tension in some places. There has been a

three-fold increase in the last three decades in the number of communal parties or groups in the state and the spate of communal incidents remains unprecedented. Moradabad in Uttar Pradesh has been taken as a sample for a riot torn area. A majority of city's population comprise Hindus and Muslims who are at logger-heads with each other. Aligarh is purposely selected because it is designated as the land of muslim culture.

The secondary data used in the study is primarily from newspapers magazines, government records, etc.

References:

1. Ghaus, Mohammad (1973), Secularism, Society and Law in India, Vikas Publishing house Pvt. Ltd Delhi. p.46.
2. Irfan, Habib (1961), National Integration -Medieval Period, Indian History congress Proceedings of 24th session, Delhi, p.350.
3. See Ratna Naidu (1980), The Communal Edge to Plural Societies - India and Malaysia, Vikas Publishing house Pvt. Ltd. Delhi.
4. Prachand S.L.M. (1979), Mob Violence in India, Abhishek Publications, Delhi. p.119.
5. Singh, Y. (1992), "Communalism : Perspectives from Sociological Studies" in Kumar, Pramod (ed.), Towards Understanding Communalism in India, CRRID, Chandigarh, p.87.
6. ibid p.87.
7. Bayley, David, M. (1969), The Police and Political Development in India, Princeton University press, New Jersey, p.259.
8. Jain, C.M. & Sharma, S.L. (1981), Communal Anomie and the Problem of Government Control, p.47.
9. Kumar, Pramod (ed.), (1992), Towards Understanding Communalism, CRRID, Chandigarh, p.xxiii.
10. See Louis Dumont (1980): Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste and Its Implications, The Chicago University Press, Chicago.

DISS
303.62309542
R198 Co

TH6641

21 TH-6641
5222 N8

11. *ibid.*
12. *ibid.*
13. *ibid.*
14. *ibid.*
15. See Y. Singh, (1996), Modernization of Indian Tradition, Rawat Publications, Jaipur & New Delhi.
16. *ibid.*
17. Singh, Y. (1992), *op.cit.*
18. *ibid*, p.92.

CHAPTER TWO

मेरे हौसले इतने बुलन्द हैं,
कि पराये शोलों का डर नहीं।
मुझे खौफ अतिशे-गुल से है,
ये चमन कहीं जला न दे।

.....शकील बदायूनी

*(My Soaring Confidence has no fear of alien fires.
What I fear is the fire in the rose,
which could burn my garden down)*

.....Sakeel Badayuni

VULNERABILITY OF ALIGARH AND MORADABAD CITIES TO RIOTS : SOME FACTS

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF UTTAR PRADESH

Uttar Pradesh has the largest number of people among all the Indian states- about 139.1 million persons, according to the census of 1991.¹ It is the most populous state in the country and ranks fourth in area after Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Maharashtra. It covers about nine percent of the total area of India.² The skirmishes in social life in Uttar Pradesh have a bearing on the other major states nearby. Its proximity to Delhi, the capital of India, is of particular importance as any thing that happens in Uttar Pradesh is raised in the central corridors of power. It becomes a political issue of national importance.

The historically important cities are Agra, Rampur, Bareilly, Sharanpur, Moradabad, Badaunu, Lucknow, Faizabad, Jaunpur, Aligarh, Firozabad, Allahabad, Kanpur, Shahjhanpur and Varanasi. The British administration combined Agra and Oudh. The name was shortened to united provinces in 1935. In January 1950, the united province was renamed

as Uttar Pradesh.³ Another important feature of Uttar Pradesh is that both Hindus and Muslims earn their livelihood through trade, crafts, and industries. For instance, Moradabad is known for its brass industry, Aligarh for the lock industry, Firozabad for its glass work, Varanasi for silk, Shahjahanpur for its carpet units, Sambhal for its horn trade, Meerut for the scissors it manufactures and also the loom and sports items, Kanpur and Agra for leather works and so on. The competitive nature of the economy has created an antagonistic relations between different ethnic groups which is sometimes manifested in social tensions between diverse social and ethnic groups.

The *Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS)* has a strong hold in these areas because of the religious fervour of the Hindu populace and so is the case with *Jamaat-e-Islami*. Hindu and Muslim fundamentalism are lent fuel through these communal organizations. The *Hindu Mahasabha*, the *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* and the *RSS* are active in breeding communal consciousness in the cities and towns and the Muslim organization like *Jamaat-e-Islami*, *Islamic Sevak Sangh*, *Tabliq-e-Jamaat* etc. operate through their workers and volunteer to build up a Muslim consciousness through the Mosques and educational institutions.

There are monuments, religious places and sites of worship of different communities located side by side in different parts of the state. A

few religious places have turned controversial like *Ramjanmabhumi-Babri Masjid* in Ayodhya which is located in the same place. Both the communities put their claims and counter claims. The issue has raised a great furore and has created social disequilibrium not only in Ayodhya and Uttar Pradesh but in the whole of India. The famous call of Shahabuddin for non-attendance on the Republic Day and the subsequent post-ponement of this "Black Day" to 31st Jan, 1987, had kicked up much tension. The decision of *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* to start the construction of *Ramjanmabhumi* temple in October, '90 has further forced this issue to the centre stage of politics and into the life of the common man too. There are other controversial places too, like Mathura's *Krishna-Janmabhumi*. There is a masjid nearby which shares a wall of the temple, and Hindus claim that it is super-imposing on the real birth place of lord krishna.

In Varanasi, the *Kashiviswnath* temple has an adjoining mosque. The controversial Masjid in *Sambhal* is claimed to be the temple of *Lord Shiva* from the days of Prithviraj Chauhan. It was apparently demolished by the Mughal emperor Babar who created the mosque in its place. The Hindus still persist with this claim.

The objective of this inquiry is not to investigate into these claims. It merely underlines that such disputes disrupt to the harmony and generate hatred and tension.

Further, Uttar Pradesh, irrespective of political party at the head of affairs, is governed by caste, community and ethnic considerations. The Lok Sabha and state Assembly elections and elections to other local bodies are contested on such issues and votes are sought to be won on the strategy of "majority vote of minority" and "minority vote of majority". The political manipulations promote communalism by polarizing the people on communal lines.

The educational institutions run by the minorities work as centres of fundamentalism which ideologically orient the people to think in a particular way. The Aligarh Muslim University, which imparts education to Muslims also works as mechanism to control and 'manage' the political centres of the community to fulfil sectarian interests. The AMU had played a vital role in the Muslim politics of pre-independent India. The *Jamaat-e-Islami* is still active in propagating its programme through its students to build up a Muslim awareness in the context of minority problems.

Uttar Pradesh has many districts and cities which are riot prone. Some of these cities and townships are *Aligarh, Moradabad, Meerut, Sambhal, Badaun, Shahjahanpur, Varanasi, Allahabad, Firozabad, Agra, Barabanki, Kanpur, Lucknow and Saharanpur*. The areas linked to these places become very sensitive when rioting takes place.

After giving characteristic feature of the state of Uttar Pradesh, we now present a profile of our micro communities.

ALIGARH : A PROFILE

Aligarh is a historical city which has been a centre of education for Muslims since pre-independence days. Mohamadan Anglo-oriental college, which was formed by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, later developed into Aligarh Muslim University, one of the central universities in India, in 1920. It has played an important role in Muslim politics from the days of its emergence. Even today, it is not without its national importance. The decisions taken from the platform of the university Student's Union filters down the Muslim population. The university is, thus, the intellectual nerve centre of Muslims of India.

The population of the city, according to the census of 1991, is 3,296,758⁴. Aligarh is a city which has large and small scale cottage industries. The vegetable oil factory, lock industry, brass moulding works, are some of the manufacturing specialities of the city. Lock manufacturing is a common economic endeavour for both the Hindus and the Muslims. The lock industries of Aligarh has potential import market area. The brass work also engages members of both the communities. Most of those engaged in craftsmanship of brass are Muslims. The city of Aligarh has an area of 34.05 sq km.

Aligarh, in terms of ethnic belongingness, may be divided into two large segments. The one across the railway line consists of mohallas including Jhauhrapur, Lachhimpur, and Masudabad. In lines of occurrence of riots, Aligarh may be divided into two segments, the dividing line being the rail road, which passes through the centre of the city. On one side of the rail track lies the old habitation area and on the other, the new colonies. The old segment of the city is the centre of the trade, the main market and is heart of the city. It is the place where the lock and brass manufactures and then sales take place. Though there are colonies of Hindus on this side of the road, it is mainly clusters of Muslim habitations which are found. This segment is prone to riots. It includes localities such as Raghubir Puri, Sarai Sultan Resalaganj and Sarai Hakim.⁵

On the other side of the railway line lies the new habitation areas. The pattern of habitation of these areas is different from old colonies. In the old city, there is close proximity between the houses. In the new habitation area, the houses are separated by planned distances, thereby avoiding the huddling up of quarters.⁶

The absence of proximity minimises the evil effects of clustering. The habitation areas here include colonies such as *Shyam Nagar, Kela Nagar, Lekhraj Nagar, Tikaram Nagar, Surendra Nagar, Sudama puri, Vishnu puri, Naurangabad, Dodhpur* and a few of the public offices

including the AMU.

There have been many communal riots in Aligarh city. The *Varshney* caste among Hindus and the *Qureshees* among Muslims are the two social groups who are active during riots and have in their fold many criminal elements. The *Varshney* caste has sizeable Hindu population with a strong financial base in the local trade. They control the social and educational organizations too. The S.B. college (P.G.) is also of *Varshneys*. The *Qureshees* on the other hand, are also well organized. They have a number of city criminals under their control.

Both Hindus and Muslims have their own organizations through which mass mobilization is done. The Hindus have organizations like the *RSS*, the *Shiv Sena* and *Hindus Jagran Manch*. The Muslims have organizations like the *Muslim League* and *Jamaat-e-Islami*.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION :

The Hindus in Aligarh are engaged in trade, commerce and industry in various capacities. A good number are engaged in business too. The marketing is largely covered by them and, by and large, the Hindu sections of population are well off in comparison to the Muslim population. The Muslims are mostly labourers, workers in lock industry, artisans and

employees in AMU. The sizeable number of them are manufacturers of locks. Aligarh caters to a huge business for a lock industry and brass work.

The Hindus and Muslims are both engaged in the lock industry which is characterized by :⁷

- (1) a majority of Muslims works where the marketing is in the hands of Hindus in and outside Aligarh,
- (2) the number of Hindu labourers are now increasing in the city as villagers from nearby places have also started seeking employment in the lock manufacturing, and
- (3) there are leading Hindu manufacturers in competition with Muslim manufacturers. It provides an open rivalry and clash of interests.

STRUCTURAL LAYOUT OF THE CITY

The layout of the city can be discussed in the broad divisions- the old city area near the railway line consisting of dense living quarters, business centres, markets and industrial areas and the civil lines division which is comparatively a new portion of the city. It consists of civil lines, government offices and buildings like collectorate, courts, police lines, post and telegraph buildings and the AMU. These two divisions have structural variances which have their bearing on the communal relationship between




Figure 1: Aligarh Municipal Board : A map of famous Mohallas of Aligarh city

the Hindus and the Muslims in the city. These discernible differentials are:⁸

- (1) in the riot-sensitive areas in the old city, where the Hindus are in minority, the Muslims are in majority. In the non-sensitive areas, that is, civil lines division across the railway line, the majority population is of Hindus.
- (2) in the old city, the interpersonal relationship of Hindus and Muslims is business based, whereas in the civil lines division, it is based on social interaction, sharing of friendship, and communication at the family level.
- (3) in the old city business operations, and exclusiveness of living pattern co-exist whereas in the civil lines, there is no business connection.
- (4) whereas in the old city, the structure of buildings is vertical and contiguous resulting in great population pressure in comparatively small area, the clusters of population join invariably or run side by side or parallel; hence, living is a melange in the form of clusters. In the other division of the city, that is civil lines, the clusters are not interlinked and they do not exist in close proximity; hence, there is no cluster sensitivity.

The civil lines division has more open roads and its extent is wide. There is no dense living pattern and, therefore, the population pressure in relation to space provided is much less. In comparison to this, the pattern

of old city is much different. The only place where Hindus and Muslims coexist in the civil lines division, is the area of Marris Road, where the muslims are in minority. They are affluent (Nawabs) and live in harmony with Hindus. The inhabitation pattern here is class based or status - oriented. Another feature of the Marris Road area is that the house of the both the communities extent in large portions of land. It provides an open clean and posh layout in the area. Thus, the population density is minimal. Moreover, people residing in this are a interact with each other at class and family level, which provides a healthy social equilibrium. The educational level of the people residing in this area is also high, thus they tend to be more rational and secular in their approach. Understandably there have never been communal riots in this area.⁹

The habitation pattern of the old city of Aligarh provides cover to the people during riots as their respective clusters lie nearby. It also provides common meeting places to both the communities in-terms of markets which are mostly linked to the populated areas. The availability of targets becomes easier for rioters during the communal assaults. Due to heavy traffic on the roads and in the lanes of the market, great anonymity exists which helps in communal conflagration, as rioters find the passer-by good targets.

In the civil line division the case is almost the opposite. The area is well spread out, has a manageable population, lesser markets and traffic.

Consequently, the scope of mass mobilization and escalation of violence is absent except, perhaps, as is said to be, in the Aligarh Muslim University.

The government office buildings and the residence of government employees in this area also helps in the maintenance of social balance. The only place in this division which was subjected to the communal fury of rioters in 1979 was Shamshad Market which had lured communal Muslim students of AMU to escalate the violence as some of the shops in the Market were of Hindus.

There has been a noticeable trend among Muslims who reside in close proximity of Hindu clusters like those of *Manik Chowk, Mamu-Bhanja, Dubey ka Parao, Sarai hakim, Sarai Nawab and Sarai Ratan Lal*. These Muslims are shifting to safer places near the AMU due to the assaults by Hindus during earlier riots. These assaults are said to be an economic design of Hindus to depose the Muslims from this area. Such shifts in the Muslim population is visible in clusters, which are coming up in *Jamalpur, Sir Syed Nagar* and *Jivangarh*. The emerging Muslim clusters in *Jivangarh* and *Jamalpur* house the lower strata of Muslim community, whereas *Sir Syed Nagar* is a new cluster of elite Muslims.

Another interesting feature which needs special mention is that *Jamalpur* - a Muslim cluster- is emerging close to Hindu villages nearby. This proximity has now made Jamalpur riot prone and communally sensitive.

The *Upper Kote* which is the largest Muslim cluster, consists of *Sarai Miyan, Turkman Gate, Sarai Kutub, Kave ki-Sarai, Babri Mandir, Kala Mahal, Usman Para, Bani-Israilam* and *Jama Masjid*. These mohallas are also strategically placed that assault on Hindu population in markets of *Subhash Bazar, Sarafa, and Mahavir Ganj* is easy. The *Upper Kote* is located at a higher level. The crossing *Abdul Kareem* becomes very important as it is from this point that Muslims start riots. Hence, from the police point of view this forms a nucleus for riot management.

Similarly, *Phool Chauraha* is worst hit by Muslims of *Upper Kote*. In 1971, it was at this point that the Muslims came down in strength to attack and loot. The layout of *Phool Chauraha* renders a tactical advantage to the *Kasais* of *Upper Kote* who can always reach there under the cover of Muslim lane and after arson withdraw under the same cover. In *Manik Chowk, Manu Bhanja, Dubey Ka Parao, Sarai Nawab, Baniyan Para, Kawai Ganj* and *Bara-Guhar-Ali* the Hindus are in majority and they play havoc with the Muslims minority on occasions of rioting. The Muslims in these clusters are secure as they are surrounded by large Hindu clusters who settle scores by assaulting Muslims of *Upper Kote*. The Muslim cluster in these areas are easy targets for communal Hindu activists as the Muslims are few and incapable of facing the massive Hindu assaults led by RSS volunteers. Providing security in these pockets against communal assaults

becomes a challenge as by the time the police reach there these densely populated narrow lanes, great damage is already done.

HINDU-MUSLIM RELATIONSHIP SYNDROME :

Aligarh provides a common platform to both the communities for close competition in lock industries. Further the activities of the students' union of AMU also affect the political life of the city. The importance of AMU is known at national level. The Hindu population has always seen the University as a citadel of communal tension and have constantly, demanded that it be affiliated to the local degree college to provide a balance to the University population.

The local degree college : Shri Varshney post graduate college and Dharam Samaj Degree college - are highly dominated by Hindus, only a negligible number of Muslim students study in these colleges. A sense of exclusiveness felt by the Hindu and the Muslim students is visible in this division of students in educational institutions. Whenever the political activities of the AMU are hightended, the students of the local degree colleges tend to build tension in Hindu dominated areas as a counter move. The local population suffers due to this student unrest. Any demand, which arises from the Muslim population of the University, is believed or treated

as divisive to the Hindu interests. Such suspicion exists in the minds of the both communities; and the majority of Hindus and Muslims remain highly prejudiced against each other. Communal organizations fan these feelings further. The Hindu communal organization, the *RSS*, takes an aggressive posture against Muslims. This organization has some following in Hindu clusters like *Manik Chowk*, *Mamu-Bhanja*, and *Dubey Ka Parao* which are located opposite to Muslim clusters in proximity. Similarly *Jamaat-e-Islami*, *Muslim League* or other communal organizations have adopted anti-Hindu stances. Even political parties like the *Janta Party*, the *BJP*, the *Muslim League* or the *Congress* fight elections on the communal basis and not on ideology and nurse communal feeling to polarize population on communal lines¹⁰. Thus, "communal division" has always been a formula during elections and rioting in Aligarh. It is a clear case of balkanization resulting into communal conflagration.

POLARISED HABITATION PATTERN :

The population of Aligarh is clustered on communal lines and Hindu and Muslim Mohallas are clearly identifiable as exclusive clusters. The Hindu clusters in the Civil Lines which would be easily identified are : *Ghanshyampuri*, *Jwalapuri*, *Vishnupuri*, *Sudamapuri*, *ShyamNagar*, *Surendra*

Nagar, Hari Om Nagar, Janakpuri and Mahavir Park. The Muslim clusters are : *Amin Nishan, Sir Syed Nagar and Dodhpur.* In the other division which has been referred as the 'old city' consists of Hindu clusters known as *Raghubirpuri, Shivpuri Dubey ka Parao, Manik Chowk, Mamu Bhanja, Dwarika puri, Krishnapuri, Patel Nagar, Sasni gate, Jaiganj and Kanveri Ganj.* The Muslim clusters covering a large Muslim population are located at *Upper Kote* and in some other areas. Some of the Muslim clusters are : *Sarai Sultani, Sarai Miyan, Sarai Kaba, Hathi Ka Pul, Usman Para, Sarai Intkam Ali, Sarai Pir Baksh, Jangal Garhi, Sarai Jamal, Tantan Pura and Khai Dera.*

MORADABAD : A PROFILE

Moradabad is also a historical city which was known as '*Lakhnaur*' in ancient days. The land was also called '*Kathhar*' and the residents were known as '*Katharias*'. The present Moradabad city's biggest Mohalla '*Kathghar*', is dominantly inhabited by the '*Katharias*'. In the year 1632, the city was renamed as Moradabad and an 'Om-inscribed' stone to this effect is still available in the city's *Juma Masjid* which was then called '*Rustom Khana Masjid*'.

The city is situated on the banks of the river Ram-Ganga. On its northern part are located the Nainital valley and Bijnor; on southern side Badaun; and on eastern side Rampur, the city is stretched out of 116.5sq.km. The Moradabad district consists of six subdivisions (tehsils). These are: Moradabad, Thakur Dwara, Bilari, Amroha, Sambhal and Hasanpur. There are 24 police station in the district.

The Population of the District is 4,121,035 and stretched out over 5,967sq.km.¹² The urban population consists of 1,139,469 persons. and rural population is 2,981,566. The District consists of 2,224,855 males and 1,896, 180 females.¹³

In Moradabad district, there are six big wholesale food grain markets located at *Chandosī, Sambhal, Amroha, Bahjoi, Hassanpur* and *Dhamoura*. This district can be called a sugar cane growing zone. The district has small cottage and large scale industries including the industries of paper, cotton yarn, distillery, sugar mill, flour mill, glass products, milkfood, vegetable oil, chemicals, and the famous brass industry.¹⁴

Moradabad city is the trade centre for brass. This industry has assumed the status of cottage industry. In the old Moradabad city brass works are carried out in almost all the mohallas, Each mohalla is a site of brass industrial works. Brass is the life and soul of Moradabad.

The brass industry engages all the groups irrespective of their religion. The economic and industrial interdependence is easy in this place where both the communities meet on a common platform. Ironically, this meeting creates no adverse relationships between Hindu manufacturers and the Muslim workers.

The Muslim population of Moradabad prefers to remain encapsulated among themselves. They do not want to come out of the old Moradabad city preferring to reside in the Muslim mohallas giving rise to congestion in the existing clusters. The most talked Muslim cluster which is situated on the Rampur Road is Mustafabad. The population here is drawn mostly from Muslim labourers who have migrated from the villages to the city. The efforts to persuade the residents of these Muslim clusters to shift from the old city to new localities made by the development authorities and the Avas Vikas Parishad have failed. On the other hand, the new Hindu localities in Civil Lines have shown symptoms of planned settlement. The newly created '*Pital Nagari*' is again affected by such non-cooperation. Despite the availability of modern facilities, the industrial entrepreneurs are not ready to shift to this area. The accommodation allotted to brass manufacturers and traders are lying vacant and the efforts of administration seem to be failing due to the "clusters mentality". The Muslim and Hindu clusters exist side by side in this place. For example the mohallas in close

proximity, are: the Muslim mohalla *Makbara* and the *Katghar Gari Khana* of Hindus, the *Sarai Mussaini* of Muslims and the *Misrole* of Hindus, *Daulatabad* of Muslims and the *Deptyganj* of Hindus, *Asalat Pura* of Muslims and *Harpal Nagar* of Hindus, the mohalla *Tabela* and the *Chauraha Gali* of Hindus, the *Thaharis* of Muslims and the *Diwan Ka Bazar* of Hindus, *Nai Basti* of Muslims and *Kazal Basha* and *Banbta Ganj* of Hindus, the *Mufitola* of Muslims and the *Gujrati mohalla* of Hindus and the *Mughal Para* of Muslims and the *Barbalan* of Hindus.¹⁵

The district office of the *Jamaat-e-Islami* exists in the Moradabad city. The *Muslim League* is highly active and its state office exists in the city. Moradabad is known for its Muslim communal organization such as *Khaksar Party*, said to be a strong organization of Muslims in northern India. A large number of Muslims are on its roll and play an active role in riots. In 1980, it is said that volunteers of the *Khaksar Party* had initiated the trouble near the *Idgah* which triggered off riots.¹⁶

Though both Muslims and Hindus seem to live in peace, yet a dormant mistrust and apprehensiveness exists in the minds of the people. This is primarily because of the frequent riots which affect both the communities. Moradabad has recorded the maximum number of riots.

Life in Moradabad industrial city is costly and people have the purchasing power. The economy of the city is based on brass works. The

modernization of brass industry has struck a new trade balance. The bulk of the brass manufacturing is done by Hindus, whereas the labour is predominantly Muslims.

On the political front, elections are contested on the basis of community. During the elections, communal feelings are voiced clandestinely and propagation is done with a distinct communal tone. Communal politics is stronger than the ideological politics. Hence the contesting political party always aspires to choose a candidate who can fetch votes on both considerations. The winning candidates in the Parliament and the Assembly elections have always exploited this social disequilibrium. The history of Moradabad also indicates that it has always been vulnerable to Hindu-Muslim riots. The first known riot occurred in 1848 on the occasion of 'Muharram' procession.¹⁷ This outburst was followed by another riot in 1872. Similar riots followed in the late 1930s when the *Muslim League* gained a strong foothold and captured a large number of seats in the municipality. This gave a setback to the Congress. The roots of the communal hatred, tension and strain were strengthened with the attainment of power. In fact, sharing of political power has been an accepted mode of operation in this city for both the communities. This often results in riots. Brennan also has observed that it was during the decade of thirties that the Hindu communal groups in Moradabad began to

get organized under the banner of the RSS and the *Arya Samaj*. The Hindu organizations campaign against Muslims in general and *Muslim League* in particular. This campaign hastened the process of polarization and clusterization. The Muslims increasingly got dominance as a result of which the Hindus organized '*akharas*' (wrestling ring) and revived the '*Shuddhi*' and '*Sangathan*' movements.¹⁷

The population of Moradabad is distributed over different localities in terms of Hindu and Muslim habitation areas. Broadly speaking, Muslims represent nearly 49 percent of the total population of the city. It must be said that the Muslims of Moradabad are more powerful than the Muslims of any other district of Uttar Pradesh. Educationally, the Muslims lag behind primarily because they can provide employment to their wards within their traditional occupation of artisanship. In such situation, only a small number of Muslims prefer to send their children for higher education. The intellectual Muslims are aware of the fact and are trying to reverse it by arguing in favour of creation of new Muslim educational institutions. Their efforts have been aided by the financial contribution made by the Gulf countries. Donations by the affluent segments of the country have also gone towards creating favourable situations for the emergence of educational institutions.

COMMON FIELDS OF OPERATION AND CLASH OF INTERESTS:

Economically, Moradabad is predominated by small scale cottage industries. Such an industrial development impedes the petty workers from organizing themselves into a strong union. This seems to be a weakness of the Muslim artisan class of the city. On the other hand, the Hindus occupy managerial positions in export business and keep the Muslim artisans at the worker level with low wages. This is perceived by the Muslims to be an exploitation of their skills. However, it must be observed that the Uttar Pradesh government has intervened to safeguard the interests of the workers and artisans employed in the manufacturing units of Brassware through the Uttar Pradesh Brassware Corporation. But the achievement of the Corporation in terms of improving the quality of life of the workers has been negligible.¹⁹

The forces of modernization, it appears, have also worked against the economic interests of the Muslim artisan. For instance, before the advent of modernization, the Muslim brass artisans manufactured brass utensil for a variety of domestic uses. Suddenly with modernization, there was a marked preference among the middle classes in the cities (notwithstanding any ethnic belongingness) for steel utensils. What is also significant is that the steel industry fell into the hands of the Hindu traders.

It must be mentioned, however, that there were opportunities for the Muslims to bring about a radical transformation in the brass manufacture industry. They could have availed of the benefits that the foreign market held out to them, but they did not and Hindu traders scored over the Muslim artisans. They were experts in carving and they began to explore the non-Muslim European Market, which earlier showed no inclination towards these products. Hence, the economic setbacks of the Muslims during the last three decades have provided enough grounds for Hindu and Muslim polarization. This was by no definite design, but came about in the course of time.

Yet another historical force which has activated social transformation in Moradabad is the migration of Punjabis and Sindhis right from the partition period. The migrant Punjabis and Sindhis who landed on the soil of Moradabad were mainly businessmen. They were not without malice towards Muslims. History had made them the enemies of Muslims. It was the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab who chose to migrate to Pakistan and were, hence, considered responsible for the refugee status of the Sindhi and Punjabis. In Moradabad, these migrant groups put the Muslims out of gear in the economic field. The Punjabis and Sindhis found working in the brass industry quite favourable as their status as refugee migrants did not allow them substantial capital for investment for any trade. The brass

manufacturing, fortunately for them, was not capital intensive. This suited the migrant groups and in the beginning they started by working on one or a few processes for brass manufacturing but even then they posed a competition to the Muslim traders.²⁰

CONSTANT IRRITANTS FOR BOTH THE COMMUNITIES:

While analyzing riots, it has been found that there is always some kind of tension simmering before it erupts. In day-to-day life, no one bothers about these tensions and they remain dormant. But whenever a tense situation arises, the dormant emotional polarization becomes manifest and adds fuel to the fire. In Moradabad, at the initiative of Hindus, a temple was created in *Chiriya-Tola* in 1980. It is alleged that before the construction of temple, there were signs of mosque having been there. The Muslims claim that the Hindus have wounded their religious feelings by uprooting the mosque. When there is a communal tension in the area, the *Chiriya Tola* temple incident is in the minds of the Muslims as a glowing example of Hindu chauvinism.²¹

Another disputed structure is also a temple created in 1982 in the Kathgar mohalla. A place used for dumping of refuse, it was utilized by Hindus to create a place of worship. Infact it is said to be an illegal

encroachment made by the Hindus to preach their cult and deny others a public facility.²²

When the Muslims made modest efforts to erect a small mosque at *Kazipura*, the Hindus protested and spared no effort to stay the construction.

Yet, another source of irritation for the Muslims is the physical proximity between the Jama Masjid and the Valmiki colony, inhabited by Dalits. The Dalits in Moradabad breed pigs and these sometimes stray into the Muslim neighbourhood or near the mosque. The Muslims allege this to be a deliberate manoeuvre of the Dalits. One could site many instances where pig's meat has been thrown into the premises of the mosque.

PREJUDICE AND DISTORTED PERCEPTION:

The Muslims have established new localities of their own and opened new educational institutions. This has anguished the Hindus who argue that the Muslims are spreading in new localities of Moradabad with the intention of surrounding the Hindu localities from all sides of the city. What is worse is that they even invite Muslims belonging to the neighbouring states to settle in these colonies, the Hindus claim. Land is allegedly offered free to them or at low price. The new Muslim localities have emerged beyond the Ram Ganga on the National Highway. The newly constructed colonies

include *Momin Nagar*, *Islam Nagar*, *Mustafabad* and *Mumtaz housing society*. Beyond the crossing of *Kashipur*, on the road leading to *Rampur*, has emerged the Muslim locality of *Hayat Nagar*. It is alleged that some big plots of land have been purchased for setting up Muslim colonies on the *Rampur Road* and 'benami' Muslim localities are emerging on the Moradabad-Sambhal road. In the west of Moradabad city on the Delhi road, approximately seven kilometres away, seven acres of land were purchased two years before the 1980 riots. The Islamia Arabia University was under construction here. Similarly, about eight kilometres away from the city market at the *Kashipur* tri-junction on the *Rampur* road, the *Jamia Islamia Imdadia College* was under construction. In the south of Moradabad on the *Sambhal* road, *Mussarrat Montessori School* was constructed along with new Muslim colonies, namely *Rashmat Nagar*, *Mussarrat Nagar* and *Islam Nagar*. Further an educational institution *Hayat-ul-Ulema* (*Jamia University*) was already functioning in the city with the capacity of 550 students. Students from various states came here for education on '*Alam-e-Din*'.

The Muslim leaders explain the emergence of Muslim localities as a natural expansion process to accommodate the increasing population. The Hindus on the other hand, perceive such outskirts clustration of Muslim population as a deliberate encirclement of the city by Muslims and assign

a great negative value to the Muslim proliferation.²³

The Hindus also allege that the game plan, for setting up new Muslim universities and educational institutions, is to invite young Muslims from all over the country to Moradabad, so that they are in majority here. The Hindus perceive it as a ganging up of Muslim activists for violent communal expression. On the other hand, the Muslims argue that providing new educational facilities to Muslim boys and girls is a part of a reform programme for their community. The mutual distrust, apprehensiveness and suspicions help in speedy emotional polarization and mass mobilization of the polarized population in clusters.

If we look at the structural background and the historical process of change in Moradabad it would appear that both the Hindus and the Muslims have developed a communal and stereotyped perspective to view everything in terms of Hindu and Muslim domination. Let us now turn to the pattern of habitation followed by both the communities.

POLARISATION AND HABITATION CLUSTERING:

At the level of model building inductively, we had argued that the members of a community prefer to reside in a locality of their own preference and if their resources permit, they could like to reside in a




Figure 2: Riot Affected Areas in Moradabad City

locality belonging to members of their own community, caste and religion. Further more within the locality of one's own caste and religion, one would prefer to reside in a cluster of one's own class or occupational group for reasons of social security and economic benefit. This polarization and clusterization of ethnic groups is favourable in the event of communal conflict. At empirical plane, the clustering speedily gets emotionally polarized when the population is activated by communal organization or by fundamentalists. During the social tension the pattern of habitation and ethnic polarization increases rioting.

Let us look at the reality of the habitation pattern in Moradabad in terms of communal flare-ups. The city has a number of wards and localities as per municipal divisions. For instance, ward number one (*Kathghar Gari Khana*) which is predominantly a Hindu locality with 400 houses and population of about 3,000 persons in a close proximity (30 feet) to the Muslim mohalla *Makbara* which has roughly 200 houses and a population of 4,000 persons. It has a parallel cluster of population running from Indira Chowk to Gulab Bari Phatak. At the *Chamunda Chauraha*, Hindu and Muslim localities form a junction where *Mohalla Gari Khana*, *Kathghar*, *Singhman Hazari* of the Hindus and the *Makbara Avval* of Muslims meet.²⁴

In ward number three, *Indira Chowk*, *Chamaron Ki Pulia*, *Pir Gaib Road*, Muslims of *Makbara* and *Gal Sahib Road* come in close contact with

the *Jatawas* and *Valmikis*. The place is highly sensitive due to stress in the interpersonal relationships of both the communities. First, the stray pigs of these mohallas are constant irritants to the Muslims who treat them unholy, whereas the *Valmikis* do not control the movement of pigs. Further the area is badly congested and celebrations and festivities of one community encroach on the civic rights of the other community.²⁵

Ward number five, *Neem Wali Pyau* is another sensitive point where the Muslim cluster *Bag Bahadur Ganj*, with roughly 400 houses, runs parallel to the Hindu Mohalla *Bazar Ganj* with about 500 houses. The proximity between these two mohallas is only 20 feet. This ward has always been badly affected during the riots.²⁶

Similarly, at the Amroha Gate, Hindus come in close contact with Aslat Pura. The Muslim preponderance in this area hits Hindus of Amroha Gate badly during the riots. The clustering of houses is also diverse. The habitation pattern of '*Bhatti mohalla*' has two kinds of cluster, large versus small and mingled. In terms of population, the locality has more Muslims than Hindus with 350 houses of Muslims and 150 houses of Hindus.²⁷ What is strange about the clustering here is that the locality is not riot prone. It is inhabited by people of the two communities who have higher education, are economically well off, and are followers of common political party, that is the Congress.

The locality of Sidhi Sarai has both Hindus and Muslim households, the latter numbering about 400 and the former about 75. The Hindu households are mainly owned by '*Fasias*' who deal in the sale of fruits and vegetables. The '*Fasia*' group is adept in the use of explosive in their fruit orchards to scare away birds and animals. Though, they constitute a minority in the locality, they are considered to be dangerous in a riot situation. Infact, the clustering of '*Sidhi Sarai*' is such that the '*Fasias*' are in the centre and they are surrounded by Muslim habitation known as *Asalat Pura*. Yet the '*Fasias*' are bold because of their skill in causing injury to others despite their being in minority.

In the ward number seven, which is close to the railway station, the Hindu population dominates. The clustering of Hindus in the locality is of strategic importance because the Muslims alighting from trains or buses could easily be a target of attack by Hindus. On the other hand, in the Civil Lines area, the Hindus have roughly about 90 percent population against the Muslim population of 10 percent. Despite the fact that this locality has an overwhelming population of Hindus, it is not riot prone. This can be explained by the secular sentiments among the people. The occupational callings are also diverse. There is ethnic differentiations too. The control of the police station is also firm and stems all riots.²⁸

Ward number nine, the locality of Daulat Bagh has parallel clusters of Dalits and Muslims. This is on the Thana Nag Phani Road. It gets badly affected during the riots. Another feature is that lower castes like *Valmikis* have a deep rooted animosity for Muslims. Wherever, Muslims and *Dalits* co-exist, the area is found to be badly affected by riots. This could be because the two ethnic groups do not correspond well at the caste level.²⁹

The instances of clusteration and polarization can be further multiplied. For substantiating our point, it may be said that the polarization and clustering of groups have a strong bearing in the involvement of the people in a riot. However, it must be stressed that clustering and polarization is not sufficient enough though very important, to cause a riot. There are other latent forces too which get emotionally as well as structurally heightened in a particular situation. We have tried to identify the riot affected areas of Moradabad in terms of polarization and clustering. The maps showing the riot affected areas and the police stations and out posts are given for ready references.

The potential for communal riot depends on the social ties in the community, particularly on the overall density or frequency of ties, on the extent to which they are centralized in a few individuals, and on the process of communicating and coordinating actions through these ties. Mobilization

of masses for collective action is more likely when the members of the beneficiary population are linked by social ties than when they are not. What is important in social diagnosis is how and why social ties are important and what kind of ties are most important for collective action? In communal riots, the religious ties are especially relevant. In this research we consider only the direct ties between the leaders (organizers) and the participants, and between participants and participants; not the indirect ties that have often been investigated by social network theorists.³⁰

References:

1. Monorama Year Book 1996 (1996), Malyalam Manorama Kottayam, Kerala, p.456.
2. ibid p.665.
3. ibid p.667.
4. ibid p.667.
5. See Singh. V.V. (1993), Communal Violence, Rawat Publications, Jaipur, New Delhi
6. ibid.
7. ibid.
8. ibid.
9. ibid.
10. Prachand, S.L.M. (1979) The Aligarh Carnage, in Mob Violence in India, Abhikshek Publications, Chandigarh.
11. Singh, V.V. (1993), op.cit.
12. Census of India 1991, Primary census Abstract, General Population Part II- B(i), Vol. II, p.512
13. ibid p.572
14. '*Moradabad Mandal Udyod Ke Badlte Charan*' office of the Joint Director, Industries, Moradabad, 1986, pp.2-3.
15. Singh, V.V. (1993), op.cit

16. *ibid.*
17. District Gazetteer Moradabad, 1872.
18. Brennan Lance (1977) "From One Raj to Another: Congress Politics in Rohilkhand", in Congress and the Raj: Facts of the Indian Struggle, Arnold Heinemann, Delhi.
19. Singh, V.V. (1993), *op.cit.*
20. *ibid.*
21. *ibid.*
22. *ibid.*
23. *ibid.*
24. *ibid.*
25. *ibid.*
26. *ibid.*
27. *ibid.*
28. *ibid.*
29. *ibid.*
30. *Alba, Richard D., (1981), "From Small Group to Social Networks", in American Behaviourial Scientist, 24(5), pp. 681-94.
*Burt, Ronald (1978), "Cohesive Versus Structural Equivalence as a Basis for Network Subgroups" in Sociological Methods and Research, 7, pp.189-212.

*Freeman, L.C., (1979), "Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification" in Social Networks, 1, pp. 215-39.

*Marsden Peter V., (1981), "Introducing Influence Processes into a System of Collective Decisions", in American Journal of Sociology, 86, pp.1203-35.

CHAPTER THREE

अब तो मजहब कोई ऐसा भी चलाया जाए।
जिसमें इन्सान को इन्सान बनाया जाए।
जिसकी खुशबू से महक जाए पड़ोसी का भी घर
फूल इस किस्म का हर सिम्त खिलाया जाए।
आग बहती है यहाँ गंगा में, झेलम में भी
कोई बतलाये कहाँ जाके नहाया जाए?

.....नीरज

*Now, a religion to be lauched, in which a human being should be made human being.
Whose fregrence will linger even in neighbour's home,
that flower to be blossomed in every garden.
Fire is flowing in Ganges and in Jhelam too,
will somebody tell me
where
to go for a bath.*

.....Neeraj

ALIGARH RIOTS : A FRESH LOOK AT RIOT OF 1978

Before the riots, it is obvious that population goes through social cleavages and sentimental polarization in their cluster based structures. The explosion of communal riots is not abrupt, instead it occur over a period in which the atmosphere and moods are built for 'polarization'. Minor incidents result in tension in this cluster based population because of the conflicts in the interests of the communities. The reactions heighten polarization and mass mobilization becomes a natural sequence to these incidents. The fault is often of administration not to notice these trends and take appropriate action.

The communal riot of 1978 in Aligarh were not so abrupt, as it seems. The event which led to rioting was only an immediate cause or igniting factor. An analysis of this effect has been taken out to show empirically as to how the riot had actually come into being. Some points to reiterate our case.

SENTIMENTAL COHESION FOLLOWED BY RIOTS

A big deal of polarization, as explained in chapter two, takes place before rioting to demarcate the population. This process of polarization is

slow in less sensitive riot-prone structures and faster in hyper sensitive riot-prone structures.

An atmosphere of tension, prior to the outbreak of communal riots in 1978, was built up in Aligarh between the two communities on different issues and incidents, causing ultimately, the communal disturbance in the city. The polarization leading to cleavage was clearly visible in the riot. The riot of 1978 was quite severe although Aligarh had a long history of communal riots during the British period and after independence in the years 1947, 1952, 1962, 1977. The curfew was 90 hours long at a first stretch; yet signs of disturbances kept surfacing like incidents of stabbing, arson and loot in the city.

Some of the issues and incidents which surcharged the atmosphere of the city with hatred and tension before 1978 riots, are as follows:

- 1) The rules had been framed, whereby the admission of non-muslims in the university had become difficult, by the AMU which is well known for fermenting Muslim-Communal fanaticism. This had instigated resentment among other communities in general and Hindus in particular which in a way created suspicion and antagonism against Muslims in general and AMU administration in particular.

- 2) The conservative elements of the AMU demanded an independent status for the University in the month of August 1978, similar to the Vatican City in Italy where the Pope runs the administration of the city. It exhibited intention and designs of the communal Muslims who were dominated in the university, though their demand was impracticable.¹ Reacting to the Muslim demand, the communal Hindus started pronouncing with political clamour their old demand that all the colleges of Aligarh should either be affiliated to the AMU or that they should be allowed to establish a separate Hindu University at Aligarh.
- 3) A student of the AMU was run over by a bus in the month of September 1978. This incident infuriated the AMU students and they stopped the bus, beat up its driver and blocked the road going through the university campus. This incident had its repercussions in the city. The students of two degree colleges in the city - namely Dharma Samaj and Shri Varshney - situated at G.T. Road, and dominated by Hindus, also blocked the entire traffic at G.T. Road, to counteract the outrage of the students of AMU.² As a result tension was generated by these two groups of students. With the help of local leaders and by mobilizing police force, the road blocking was lifted from both ends of the city.

- 4) The decision of a young Brahmin boy to embrace Islam to marry a Muslim girl was another sensitive incident which created tension in the city. This incident was enough to provide basis of sharp criticism to Hindus. It was alleged by Hindus that a Hindu boy had been enticed by Muslims to desert Hinduism. The district authorities had no other alternative other than to send the Brahmin boy out of Aligarh city to bring back the situation under control, as atmosphere became highly tense.
- 5) The last incident was that there had been a wrestling bout between a Hindu and a Muslim wrestler at *Khereshwar*, a few kilometre away from Aligarh, in which the supporters of both sides clashed with each other. The situation was brought under control by police intervention.³

The above string of incidents makes it evident that an atmosphere of communal frenzy develops before the actual break of communal riots.

COMMUNAL ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN FOMENTING TENSIONS:

The notion commonly shared regarding Aligarh riots is that it can be eliminated if the communal polities in not allowed to rear its ugly head. The common belief among the people of Aligarh is that riots occur because

the communal leaders provoke innocent people to promote violence. It seems to be true since a close analysis of the circumstances in which the communal violence had broken out (in 1978 riot) confirms that different political parties had indeed given air to the communal passion of the citizens to get them polarized on communal lines. The main political parties and organisations seeking benefit from communal upsurge in the city were the *Muslim League*, the *RSS*, the *Muslim Majlis*, the *Jamaat-e-Islami* and the Congress.⁴

The Dalits and the minorities (Muslims) in Aligarh had always been voting since 1952 in favour of the congress. But during the emergency of 1975, the alleged atrocities on Muslims of Turkman Gate, rooted out the sympathy and faith of Muslims in the congress. As a result, the party had to suffer for it in 1977 elections.

The leaders of the congress party tried their best to win the hearts of the Muslims. The leaders toured the country pleading the cause of secularism and giving assurance of protection for the Muslims against the RSS. In this context it would be significant to mention that the communal riot of 1978 broke out at Aligarh only after a week of the visit of top leaders of the congress party. It is believed that the leaders of the congress party did not work to ease the communal tension in the city. It is also

Communal Organisations in Aligarh District*

Name of Communal Organisation	Stated Areas of Influence	Location of Office	Approximate Size of Membership	Activities
R.S.S.	Aligarh, Hathras Beswan, S. Rao, Iglas Khair & Atrauli	Dwarikapuri, Aligarh	3500-4000	It is active all over the district. Extends moral and material support to all agitations affecting Hindu interests. Its volunteers have played active role during the riots.
Shiv Sena	Aligarh, S. Rao & Hathras	Agra Road, Aligarh	4500-5000	Constituted recently. Mobilises Hindus for Hindu unity.
Hindu Sangram Manch	Aligarh City	-	150-200	Dormant but supports Hindu cause.
Tabliq-e-Jamat	Upper Kote, Civil Lines	-	450-500	Mobilises Muslims to remain faithful towards Islam and Shariat and act unitedly to protest against any Hindu movement, rally or procession.
Jamaat-e-Islami	Aligarh City	Islamic Nursery, Primary Schools, Upper-Kote, Aligarh	1000-11000	It has played an active part in all the riots & is now engaged in Babri-Masjid agitation and has remained instrumental in constituting an Action Committee.
Student's Islamic Movement	Aligarh Muslim University	Shmshad Market, Aligarh	125-150	Active in Aligarh Muslim University. Organised a section of students on Babri Masjid issue. Lays stress on minority character of Aligarh Muslim University while analyzing academic and other affairs of Aligarh Muslim University.

* Courtesy: Singh V.V. (1993), Communal Violence, Rawat Publication, Jaipur.

believed that the then president of U.P. congress party issued a statement which instigated the Muslims. The rumour was that the around 160 Muslims died in the rioting and this blame raised a lot of furore in the Hindu community. This allegation was later falsified by the findings of the Minority Panel which said that the fatal casualties from both the sides were only 28, though other unconfirmed sources tells that 40 persons had died in this riot.⁵ The important aspect of the statement of the then U.P. Congress president was that on such misgivings, communal hatred as rooted in the hearts and minds of the people, although there was very little evidence to verify the validity of the statement. Later on, people had reacted more severely which led to mis-information generation. The rumours started floating in clusters of both the communities.

This is worthwhile to say that the Muslim League and the Jamaat-e-Islami also did their best in spreading communal frenzy in the city. These organisations worked to mobilize the activities against the Hindus in the riot-prone areas of the city. The offices of *Jamaat-e-Islami* and *Tabliq-e-Jamaat* were in *Upper Kote* where communal leaders drove activists to attack the Hindu community.

The RSS has always remained at the centre of politics, although it does not claim itself to be a political organization. The organizers of RSS portray their organization as a social and cultural organizations but there are

instances when it has emerged as a militant Hindu organization. The VHP, openly claims to be a militant force and has proved this on many a occasions. In the riots of 1978 role of some Janata Party leaders having a RSS background, remained quite dubious. Several Panel, to name the few the minority Panel, the Akali Dal Panel, the Janata Party Panel (appointed by Mr. Chandra Chekhar) and panel by the Uttar Pradesh unit of Janta Party, found in their separate reports the RSS responsible in one way or the other for spreading the communal violence in Aligarh. It was believed that the funeral procession of Bhoora (a wrestler), who was said to be a member of the Congress Party sparked off the violence in the city. The civil administration which permitted riots cannot be escaped from the blame for such happenings.⁶ It seems that the RSS had only availed the opportunity provided in the politically activated environment to further their fanaticism.

ADMINISTRATIVE SLUGGISHNESS AND FACILITATION OF RIOTS

The laxity, lethargy and the alleged partisan attitude of the administration authorities also provided an opportunity for the outbreak of the communal riots and its escalation.⁷ Prior to the outbreak of communal disturbances. there had been several incidents and issues, as noted earlier, which had aroused the communal passion of either side, but the local

authorities did not initiate adequate measures to nip it in the bud. The situation was temporarily brought under control. Besides, a blunder was committed by the administrative authorities in permitting the dead body of Bhoora to be taken out in a procession which ultimately sparked-off the communal riot. The administrative authorities also could not succeed in dealing with the elements responsible for creating communal disturbances. The arrest of actual culprits was not made, as believed by the public in general. They were let-off due to political pressure. The riot was operated and escalated freely by such culprits. Thus the fuel was added to the fire by partisan attitude of authorities. It is alleged by the Muslims of Aligarh that the PAC always took actions against or shot Muslims only.

An impression in the minds of the people was created by inadequate action against the culprits and the withdrawal of the cases against them in the past, that they themselves would do justice as the courts would not provide justice to them. Many judicial commissions were appointed by the government to probe into the Aligarh riots but unfortunately, they ultimately proved to be futile as their reports remained lying in the office almirahs.

THIS IS HOW RIOT HAD PROGRESSED:

It was September 1978, there was a wrestling bout in *Khereshwar* Fair between *Bhoora*, a Hindu wrestler and his opponent, a Muslim wrestler. A

clash started between the supporters of two wrestlers immediately after the bout, and brick bats and lathi blows were frequently exchanged between them. The police intervened to bring the situation under control.

It was on 4th October 1978, while a local cultural society was conducting a musical programme in the aid of flood-affected people, Bhoora was amongst the audiences. Three Muslim youths took him away in a friendly manner. When they reached a lonely place they stabbed Bhoora and fled away. Bhoora was taken to the civil hospital where he was declared dead on 5th October 1978. The following day, a crowd of enraged persons took away the dead body of Bhoora from the civil hospital in a procession shouting slogans "*Khoon Ka Badla Khoon Se Lenge*" and "*Ek Ke Badle Das Marenge*". When the crowd reached the crossing of Abdul Karim Chowk, most of the shopkeepers lowered their shutters, while the shops of those who refused to do so were looted and burnt by the angry crowd. Muslims showered brick-bats on the crowd from their roof tops. And, as a result, a communal riot between Hindus and Muslims was sparked off. The news spread in the city like wilds fire. Only then, police came in action and resorted to repeated lathi charge which proved of no avail. Passions and fury of both the communities continued to rise.

Another incident of stabbing to death one Mr. Ganeshilal Saraf by a Muslim '*goonda*' in Upper Kote mohalla added fuel to the fire. The rioters

from Hindu community attacked Manek chowk and set fire to the houses in Muslim locality and assaulted men, women and children with knives, lathis and firearms. Many houses of Muslims were burnt and ten Muslims were killed. Only thereafter, the police opened fire and the rowdy mob dispersed. Curfew was clamped in the city and inspite of close patrolling, incidents of stabbing continued to take place. The relaxation in curfew thereafter took place on 8th October 1978 for a few hours which was continued on the following days and situation seemed to be returning to normality. But on 16th October 1978 the finding of body of a person who was killed, again instigated fresh violence. However, the authorities took timely action and brought the situation under control.⁸

About a month later, on 6th November 1978, during a fight between two Muslim '*goondas*', one stabbed the other. The injured person ran towards the police out-post. Seeing him wounded, the Muslims thought the some Hindus might have stabbed him. The assailant having a blood stained knife in his hand tried to escape, the Hindus inferred that he had stabbed some Hindu. In this confusion another communal disturbance sparked off. Muslims attacked Hindus in a narrow lane with lathis and knives in *Bani Israilam mohalla*. As a reaction, Hindus reached there and resorted to heavy brick batting at Muslims. Numerous incidents of stabbing and exchange of fire between the two communities resulted in the death of two persons and

injury to several persons. On the following day PAC arrested 70 persons from Muslims *mohalla Bani-Israilam*. The women of the Muslim community demonstrated before the district magistrate at Kotwali police station alleging that the culprits of Hindu community had not been arrested. The District Magistrate ordered the release of persons arrested by the PAC to bring the situation under control.⁹

Even then, a 24 hours curfew was clamped in the city. On 8th November 1978, the commissioner of Agra Division (who was at that time in Aligarh) ordered the relaxing of the curfew in the city from 8:00 am. to 5:00 pm. Within one and half hour about half a dozen incidents of stabbing took place in different localities. Thereafter, mohallas Saraikale and Sarai Miyani of Hindu community were attacked by a Muslim mob killing nine people. The police had to open fire on rioters. The police also had to resort to firing in *Mohalla Turkman Gate* in which a person was killed. There had been several incidents in different parts of the city in which bullets, grenades and acid bombs were thrown by both the communities at each other.¹⁰

It was on 9th November 1978, the houses were raided by the police in *Sarai Sultan* and 19 people were arrested and also guns and bombs were recovered. Among the arrested there were some office bearers of the RSS also. Two Hindu died in mohalla Sarai Kale while making bombs.¹¹

It was on the next day, 10th November 1978, the police arrested 19 Muslims from one locality and recovered fire arms and explosive from their possession.¹²

The PAC was replaced with CRPF and BSF, as it was observed that the performance and role of PAC was not satisfactory for Muslims, in most sensitive areas. In due course of time, the situation had become normal but it was again disturbed on 7th December 1978 after an incident of stabbing in *Mohalla Chirag Chian* and curfew had to be imposed on the city. Stray incidents continued for sometime until the situation was brought under control.¹³

This new look at the Aligarh riot of 1978 tells us how the problem of communalism (menifestation of which is communal riots) is deeply rooted in the social structure as the minor incidents, rumours, confusions etc. easily lead to big riots. It is in the psyche of the people all the time, what it needs to manifest in big violence, is only a spark.

References:

1. Vajahat Asgar (1978), "Aligarh Ke Bad", in Saptahik Dinman, November 10 to 16, December, the Times of India Publications, p.27.
2. *ibid.* p.27.
3. Prachand, S.L.M., (1979), "The Aligarh Carnage", in Mob Violence in India, Abhishek Publications, Chandigarh p. 117.
4. See Singh V.V., (1993), Communal Violence, Rawat Publication, Jaipur, New Delhi.
5. *ibid.*
6. *ibid.*
7. Op.cit Prachand S.L.M. (1979) P.117.
8. Op.cit Singh V.V. (1993)
9. *ibid.*
10. *ibid.*
11. *ibid.*
12. *ibid.*

CHAPTER FOUR

लोग टूट जाते हैं एक घर बनाने में।
तुम तरस नहीं खाते हो बस्तियाँ जलाने में।

.....बशीर बद्र

*People crumble down in making a home.
You do not take mercy in burning down localities*

.....*Bashir Badra*

MORADABAD RIOTS :

A FRESH LOOK AT RIOT OF 1980

It was the holy day of Id-ul-Fitar, 13th August 1980, and the historical riots took place in Moradabad. The riot was not an abrupt occurrence and it has to be analyzed with reference to the social structure, demographic layout and historical antagonism between the two communities, the quality of leadership, the role of rumours and above all ethnic polarization and tension building process.¹ M.J. Akbar, who visited Moradabad on 15th August 1980 provided a background report.² 'Arun', the local Hindi Newspaper and a local journal carried in two of its issues vital details of the riots.³

It was 13th August 1980, at about 9:30 in the morning, the *Id-ul-fitar* prayer was held at the *Idgah*. About 60,000 Muslims had gathered there. While the prayer was on, a pig said to be belonging to the *Valmiki* colony wandered in, violating all Muslim sense of sacredness. Some people later on asked the attending policeman, as to why the pig was let in. Guarding pigs is not a job of the police, said the policeman. An altercation followed and the policeman was injured by the angry crowd. It is alleged that the *Khaksar Party* had come with lethal weapons and they were prepared to trigger off communal riot.⁴

Describing the event M.J. Akbar observed: "Brickbatting from the crowd, firing by the police, an injury of a police officer and scores of 'namazis' shot dead - all took place within five minutes, while the prayer drew to a close".⁵

The bricks hit the SSP and the CMO, some police Inspectors and constables were also injured. Many other officials who had come to greet Muslim brothers fell prey to the mad orgy of Muslim rioters. Immediately, after the firing, there was a stampede in which about 100 people lost their lives. The crowd coming out of the *Idgah* roughed up policemen in different localities on its way. Later in the evening, *Chowki Gal Shaheed* was attacked by a Muslim mob which badly injured policemen, burnt a portion of the *Chowki* and carried away with them some arms and ammunition.

RUMOURS PLAYING A VITAL ROLE IN THE FLARE-UP:

It was a rumour that the police had killed 'hundreds' of Muslim which infuriated the Muslims who in turn attempted to attack the Hindu clusters and the police *Chowkis* of various places. On 14th August 1980, a rumour that a certain PAC platoon was wiped out by the Muslims and the local Hindu population was forced to identify culprits as Hindus gave a violent turn to the riots.⁶

The Hindus moved with fury after receiving the floating rumours of attack of Muslims on the police PAC Platoons, the SSP, and the magistrate on duty. Having learnt through rumours of the death of hundreds of Muslims in the police firing, the Muslims attacked police posts. Rumours spread in the city like wild fire exaggerating a number of Muslims killed in the police firing. A few even went to the extent of placing the death toll of Muslims at 'thousands'. The news of so called police atrocities on Muslims were being floated by communal leadership. The whole city was tense. No one was prepared to believe in government agencies. Even some sections of the press, within their wild imagination, contributed to the spreading of misinformation.⁷

The rumours of death toll of 'thousands' of Muslims and Hindus reached Chandausi, Amroha, Sambhal, and the nearby tehsils of Moradabad district. Thus, tension started building up in these cities. Some section of the press, in their endeavour to sympathise with the Muslims, rested the blame of the riots on the high handedness of the police. They assuaged the feelings of a community (Muslims) by themselves believing the rumours rather than by confirming facts. The existing tension was mounted by the identification of dead bodies, stray incidents of stabbing, and allegations and counter allegations of the communities.

POLARIZATION OF COMMUNITIES:

The occurrence of communal tension in Moradabad was not an overnight phenomena. The conditions for its growth had been assiduously nurtured over month with the knowledge and after discreet acquiescence of the district administration. It is said that in the general election of 1977, the Muslim league and the BJP candidates lost their seats to a slim majority of the Congress candidates, which left a scar on the Muslims.

The contribution of the proliferation of Muslim colonies and educational institutions, as discussed in chapter two, in inducing a sense of unease in the Hindus who began to grow more insular, is also very important to examine. Yet another disquieting was the murder of a Muslim youth named Javed. The Muslims alleged that the police killed Javed, whereas the police argued that Javed was killed by the villagers, as he was a notorious criminal. A Muslim leader, Dr. Shameem, however, succeeded in instituting a magisterial inquiry over the death of Javed. The police was considered as oppressive and communal minded by the Muslims.⁸

In the month of July 1980, the third event relates to the elopement of a Valmiki girl with a Muslim boy, a few weeks before the rioting. The Muslim youth was accused of kidnapping the girl who remained untraceable for a few days as she was kept underground. Following this, the *Safai*

Karmacharis (cleaners, mostly from *Valmiki* community) went on strike. The police, under pressure, were made to search for the girl. On 24th July, ultimately, when the girl was married, the marriage party was attacked and the bride was manhandled by the assailants. Some skirmishes between the police and the Muslims also took place and the girl was married under police protection. A scuffle between Muslims and Dalits took place when the *barat* (marriage procession) arrived near the mosque, playing music. For some time, the *Safai Karmacharis* refused to work in the houses of Muslims which created a lot of hue and cry in the Muslim community. The Hindus expostulated that the attack on the *Valmikis* by the Muslims was preplanned.⁹

The gradual polarization of the social groups was the result of the cumulative effect of these successive events, though they might not be strong enough to independently spark off rioting. The infuriated Muslims, after the incident at *Idgah*, divided themselves into various groups and attacked the people living in *Chowki Gal Shaheed*, *Chowki Nagphani*, and *Mohalla Barballan*. For days, curfew continued. Small incidents of violence continued. CRPF and BSF contingents were rushed and deployment was worked out based on cluster requirements. A thorough search was carried out by the police and large quantities of arms, ammunition and explosives were seized. A campaign was launched to arrest anti-social elements, communal activists and office bearers of communal organizations. The

arrests were made as following table shows:

Period	Arrests			
	Hindu	Muslims	Others	Total
Upto October 31, 1980	739	1,131	2	1,872
From Nov. 1, 1980 to Dec. 31, 1980	210	371	2	283
Total	949	1,502	4	2,455

Courtesy: Singh, V.V., (1993), Communal Violence, Rawat Publications, Jaipur.

The situation again started taking a turn for the worse, after the August riot, in October 1980. On 25th October, the Muslims attacked a 'peshkar' (one who permits entry in the office) of the SDM. He was seriously injured and later succumbed to injuries. On the next day, 25th October 1980, two men were killed. The mob gheraoed *Kathgarh*. It was 28th October 1980, three men were stabbed to death. On 30th October, again rioting started in *Mohalla Gal Shaheed, Indira Chowk, Aslat Pura* and *Chadda Palace*. The police had to resort to firing.¹⁰

Casualties in August-October, 1980 (Moradabad) Communal Riots

Period	Hindus	Muslims	Total
From August 13, 1980 to Sept. 12, 1980	23	121	144
From Oct. 25, 1980 to Oct. 31, 1980	5	13	18
From Nov. 1, 1980 to Dec. 31, 1980	-	-	-
Total	28	134	162

Courtesy: Singh, V.V., (1993), Communal Violence, Rawat Publication, Jaipur.

HOW POLICE PLAYED ITS ROLE:

The police could not organize its force in a systematic way, though it tried hard to deal with the situation. For example, a large size of the force was deployed at the site of the *Id* celebration, but the vulnerable spots in the city and localities remained unattended for long intervals. In reading the symptoms of tension building or in anticipation of riots, the intelligence agencies totally failed. The failure is manifested because a few weeks ago some skirmishes between *Valmikis* and Muslims had taken place due to the kidnapping of a Dalit girl and her subsequent marriage under police protection. Police also failed in attending the rumours promptly. For example the rumours that-

- a) the police attacked the Jama Masjid and killed thousands of Muslims;
- b) the poisoning of water supply in Moradabad;
- c) Muslims damaging the *Kali Devi temple*; and
- d) rumours relating to the discovery of large number of dead bodies could have been silenced.

The injured status of Muslims by negotiating with their leaders on the issue of *Idgah* firing could not be restored by the police and district administration. If the police and the administration could have convinced the Muslims that it were the Muslims who had beaten up the police and the civil

official to death on a minor issue of entry of a pig, and that the police had no option but to open fire in self defence, probably an understanding could have been reached. Undoubtedly, it was a hard task of convincing such a religiously cohesive and semi-literate community on the issue of 'pig entry'. Though logically speaking it was a minor issue, but for the Muslims, who fanatically believe in their religion, it was a big issue, as their religion Islam regards a pig as the most unholy creature on the earth. The failure of administration in this regard is not surprising.

The riots of October 1980 were not separate but an extension of the earlier riots in August to take revenge and settle score.

The curfew imposition took slightly longer time and the intervening time was utilized by miscreants to spark off more communal riots. If the administration had been quick to impose curfew many lives and loss of property could have been saved. The prevention of the attack on *Chowki Gal Shaheed* could have been made.

Saberwal and Hasan, commenting on the event of 13th August 1980, observed that nothing on that day can be constructed as an attack by Muslims on Hindus, it was rather the gross over-reaction of the police to the altercation at the Idgah, leading to Muslim's fury which in turn invited grotesquely illegal escalatory reprisals by the police upon them including the area adjoining the police outpost *Gal Shaheed*.¹¹

The allegations came from some people that the police was demoralized and some Muslim victims commented that the police acted with a bias and behaved callously with the Muslims. Even the press published a sensational story on police high-handedness but without objectivity and an analytical vision, which caused the police to feel aggrieved.

The Muslim League's and Muslim leader's role vis-a-vis the police's role was also controversial. The derogatory language was used by Muslim League leaders for policemen, little realizing that the police may react with violence as a means of self defence. In his article, S. Sahay observed, "it would appear according to the police that the provocation had come from the minority community, particularly members of the Muslim League. Some people standing behind the tents put up by the League had began firing at the police. It is immaterial whether one pig or more, as some people mentioned, had entered the *maidan*; the important fact was that at least 50 people had come armed to the '*Idgah*'. Why?"¹²

The objective of our research is not to enquire into the alleged police atrocities or to exonerate the police of the charge levied on them by the Muslim leadership. Our focus is to highlight the common trend of accusing the other party (in this case it is the police) without analyzing the constraints under which they have to resort to take action (in this case firing).

Mounting death toll of Muslims had been underlined by many Journalists.¹³ These journalists appeared to have the communal bias and sympathy. Furthermore, very few of them paid attention to the stampede which aggravated the calamity.

However, the imbalances in the death toll should not be the only factor to determine or proclaim the police to be partisan. The death toll of minority community appeared to be higher because, time and again the ebullient Muslims confronted the police by organizing violent attacks.

This fresh look at the communal riots of 1980 of Moradabad city, tells us that the occurrence of communal riots is not abrupt but rather a manifestation of cumulative frustration and tension; and how communal organizations plan the outbreak of communal riots. It also suggests that the habitation pattern is also very important factor which upbrings rumours and exaggerations, and the real cause and description of event is not emphasized. People get emotionally surcharged and resort to violence.

References:

1. Brennan, Lavce (1977), "From One Raj to Another: Congress Politics in Rohilkhand," in Congress and the Raj : Facts of the Indian struggle Arnold Heinemann, Delhi.
2. Akbar, M.J. (1980), "The Sunday", August 24, Calcutta.
3. "Arun : Moradabad Dunga Aunk" (Hindi) (1980), Arun group of Publications, Moradabad.
4. Saberwal, Satish & Hasan, Mushirul (1984), " Moradabad Riots 1980, causes and Meanings", in Communal Riots in Post-Independent India (ed.), Engineer, Asghar Ali; Sangam Book, Bombay, p.223.
5. Akbar, M.J., (1980), op.cit.
6. See Singh, V.V. (1993), Communal Violence Rawat Publications Jaipur & New Delhi.
7. ibid.
8. ibid.
9. ibid.
10. ibid.
11. Saberwal, Satish & Hasan, Mushirul, (1984), op.cit. p.223.
12. Sahay, S. "A Close Look - Moradabad and After," in The Statesman.
13. Saberwal, Satish & Hasan, Mushirul (1984) op.cit. p.209.

CHAPTER FIVE

अब कहो, आज क्या होता है? किसका समाज यह रोता है?
किसका गौरव, किसका सिंगार, जल रहा पंक्ति के आर-पार।
किसका वन-बाग उजड़ता है?

यह कौन मारता मरता है?

फूटता द्रोह-दव का पावक, हो जाता सकल समाज नरक,
सबका वैभव, सबका सुहाग, जाती डकार यह कुटिल आग।

जब बन्धु विरोधी होते हैं।

सारे कुलवासी रोते हैं

इसलिए, पुत्र! अब भी रुक कर, मन में सोचो, यह महासमर,
किस ओर तुम्हें ले जायेगा? फल अलभ कौन दे पायेगा?

मानवता ही मिट जायेगी?

फिर विजय सिद्धि क्या लायेगी?

..... 'दिनकर'

Now tell me what happens today? Whose society cries?

Whose pride, whose beauty, burning across the lines?

Whose garden gets destroyed? This is who, who kills and gets killed?

When fire of enmity and hatred explodes, whole society becomes hell;

Everybody's prosperity, every body's security, this uncouth fire gobbles up.

When brothers become enemy, whole family cries.

So, son! still stop, think in your heart, which direction this war will take you in?

Who will be able to give fruits of it?

When humanity will die, then what objective will victory achieve?

..... 'Dinkar'

COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS

In the beginning of our study, we tried to provide the conceptual clarifications related to communalism. In the beginning we raised some relevant questions based on a specific paradigm.

Our enquiry is based on the secondary sources available on the two cities of Uttar Pradesh- Aligarh and Moradabad regarding communal riots. A comparative study of the communal riots of these two cities reveals that the social relations depend on the combination of historic, economic and political factors. The character of these two cities of Moradabad and Aligarh have some striking similarities, both have the past record of communal strife.

Our comparative study further reveal that merely bi-polarity habitation is not a sufficient condition for rioting, though it is a necessary condition. There are certain sufficient conditions which are required for rioting. These are as follows:

- a) Animosity between bi-polarity based population.
- b) Common field of operation among masses.
- c) Potency in polarized population.
- d) Close-proximity in bi-polarity clusters.

The analysis of communal riots reveals that communalism is a unique phenomenon of the plural society where to a certain extent polarization is permissible within a frame of laws. In exploring the genesis of communal conflict, this comparative study reveals that the riot affected communities undergo a process of social cleavage in pre-riot situations. Our study suggests that the social cleavage is affected through the process of polarization.

It could be said that in the riot prone structures, the social dynamics of population is such that polarization becomes easy and rapid. This is primarily because of clusters of identifiable polarity-based-population. This social differentiation affects communication, cluster sensitivity, and potency. This study reveals that polarization can be based on multiple considerations, like economic, political and social though the cleavage may remain the same.

The role of police lies in identifying the symptoms or hightended sensitivity in the community as riots erupt owing to escalation of tension. The demographic habitation pattern of cluster based population is highly communication conducive. The mass mobilization is easy and vehement.

For the polarized population the common field of operation is revelry. This often results in clash of interests. This study shows that close proximity of the habitation pattern creates cluster sensitivity with reference to day-to-day interpersonal relationships.

Another conclusion can be drawn from our comparative study that the organized bodies like political parties or communal organizations play a considerable role in raising sentimental sensitivity amongst people. The study reveals that in Aligarh and Moradabad, these organizations had created a charged atmosphere before the eruptions of riots. These organizations had balkanized the society through a planned strategy.

This study also raises some issues which are relevant to Indian social life, in particular, the role of communal organizations in breaking communities and compelling the youth to resort to arms. The fundamentalist organizations' role is supported by militant gangs and this gives birth to phenomena called "religious extremism".

Following generalization can be made on the basis of our comparative study:

- (a) In certain demographic conditions communal disturbances are the result of reinforced polarization in cluster based population.
- (b) The 'cluster sensitivity' is created by the population cluster if located in close proximity, in the wake of adverse relationship. An enhanced degree of such sensitivity paves the way for the eruption of communal riots.
- (c) The common field of operation of these identifiable polarity-based-population are in the economic, political, social, and religious fields.

When the masses are antagonized, it works as a conflict - generating variable, and provides a basis for rioting.

- (d) The process of polarization is rapid in a social structure where the individual cluster populations are capable of withstanding social cleavage for a longer period of time.
- (e) Small irritants of interpersonal relationships of communities have a cumulative effect and just a spark triggers off riots.
- (f) The cluster-bound population in riot prone structures is highly communication conducive. Rumours are set afloat and individual confrontations are converted into community confrontations in such social structures.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abel, Hobert., (1964), "Community Association In Indian Politics - A Behaviourial Approach", Political Science Review, 3 (1): 11-119.
- Abid, H.S., (1965), The Destiny of Indian Muslims, Asia Publishing House, Bombay.
- Adhikari, Gangadhar, M., (1946), Resurgent Indian at the Cross-roads, People's Publishing House, Bombay.
- Adlon, A., (1949), Understanding Human Nature, Perema Books.
- Agarwal, R.M., (1943), The Hindu and Muslim Riots : Their Cause and Cure, International Social Literature Publishing Co.
- Agarwal, R.M., (1950), The Solution of the Whole Communal Problem of India, Lucknow.
- Ahmed Said U.Din, (1947), The Communal Pattern of India, S.M. Sharaf, Lahore.

- Ahmed Safi Nazeer, (1960), Will Islam and Muslims be Exterminated or Driven out of India?, Abdul Rashid Habash Khan, Delhi.
- Aiyar S.P., Mass Violence, Sachine Publications, Ajmer.
- Ake Claude, (1967), A Theory of Political Integration, The Dorsey Press, Homewood.
- Akhtar Jamna Dass, (1973), Pak Espionage in India, Oriental Publishers, Delhi.
- Albert J. Szymanski and Ted George Geertz, (1979), Sociology, D.Van N. Company.
- Allport F.H., (1924), Social Psychology, Houghton Miffton.
- Allport G.W., (1954), Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. I, Addison Wesley.
- Asch S.E., (1952), Social Psychology, Prentice Hall, N.J.

- Alkinson Dick, (1971), Orthodox, Consensus and Redical Alternative, Heineman London.
- Asghar Ali Engineer (ed.), (1984), Communal Riots in Post-independence India, Sangam Books (India) Ltd., Hyderabad.
- Asghar Ali Engineer and Moin Shakir, (eds.), (1985), Communalism in India, Ajanta Publications, New Delhi.
- Azad, A.K., (1959), India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative, Orient Longmans, Bombay.
- Aziz K.K., (1968), Ameer Ali: His Life and Work, S.M. Ashif, Lahore.
- Bahadur Lal, (1950), The Muslim League: Its History, Activities and Achievements, Agra Book Store Agra.
- Baig, M.R.A., (1968), On Different Saddles, Asia Publishing House, Bombay.
- Baig, M.R.A., (1974), The Muslim Dilemma in India, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi

- Banton, (1965), Roles: An Introduction to the Study of Social Relations, London.
- Baron, R.A., Byrne, D., (1977), Social Psychology, 2nd ed., Allyn and Bacon.
- Barrier, N.G., Roots of Communal Politics, Arnold Heinemann AB/S Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi.
- Barron, Wilton L., (1967), Minorities in a Changing World, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.
- Baxtern, Craig, (1969), The Jan Sang - A Biography of an Indian Political Party, John Murry, London.
- Bayley, David M. (1969), The Police and Political Development in India, Princeton University Press, New Hersey.
- Banerjee Nakuleshwar, (1941), Psychology of Indian Riots, Vishwa Bancee (Gantha Baithee), Calcutta.
- Bernard Jessie, (1957), The Sociological Study of Conflict, UNESCO.

- Bhatnagar C.P., (1971), Crisis in Indian Society, National, Delhi.
- Bird, (1940), Social Psychology, Appleton Century, New York.
- Blalock H.M. Jr., (1967), Towards a Theory of Minority Group Relations, New York.
- Bondurant J., (1965), Conquest of Violence- The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict, Berkeley University, California.
- Bose N.K., (1969), Problem of Indian Nationalism, Allied Publishers, Calcutta.
- Boskoff Alvin, (1972), The Mosaic of Sociological Theory, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York.
- Boulding Kenneth E., (1962), Conflict and Defence : A General Theory, Haffier Brothers, New York.
- Brennan, Lance (1997), Congress and the Raj: Facts of the Indian Struggle, Arnold Heinemann, Delhi.

- Broom and Selznick, (1963), Sociology: A Text With Adaptive Reading, New York.
- Broomfield J.H., (1968), Elite Conflict in a Plural Society, Oxford University Press, London.
- Brown Richard Maxwell, (1974), American Violence, Prentice Hall Inc. New Jersey.
- Burmah Baba Jyotee, (1947), Hindu Muslim Relations : A Study of Historical Background, Jagabaus Sahitya Chakra, Calcutta.
- Chakraborty, Anand, (1975), Contradiction and Change: Emerging Pattern of Authority in Rajasthan Village, Oxford University Press, Delhi.
- Chakraborty, Anand, (1978), Hindu and Mussalmans of India, Thackar Spink & Co. Calcutta.
- Chakraborty, S.M., (1978), Communalism : Problem and Remedy, National Integration Publication, New Delhi.

- Chattarjee, B.B., Singh & Rao C.R.S., (1967), Riots in Rourkela: A Psychological Study, Popular Book Service, New Delhi.
- Chaudhary Khalliquezaman, (1961), Pathway to Pakistan, S.M., Ashraf, Lahore.
- Chaudhary, M.L. Roy, (1941), Din-e-Illahi, (2nd ed.), Calcutta University, Calcutta.
- Clutterbuck, Richard, (1967), Riots and Revolution in Singapore and Malaysia 1945-1963, Faber and Faber Ltd. London.
- Cohen Percy, (1968), Modern Sociological Theory, Basic Books, New York.
- Collins, Barry and Lapierse D., (1975), Freedom at Midnight, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi.
- Cooley C.M., (1918), Social Process, Scriber, New York.
- Cooley C.M., (1964), Human Nature and the Social Order, New York.

- Coser Lewis A., (1977), Masters of Sociological thought,
Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, New
York.
- Coser Lewis A., (1956), The Functions of Social Conflict,
Free Press of Glencoe, III.
- Coupland R., (1942), The Indian Problem 1883-1935-
Hindu, Muslim Antagonism, Oxford
University Press, London.
- Curran I.A. Jr., (1951), Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New
Delhi.
- Dahlke M.O., (May 1952), "Race and Minority Riots: A Study
in Typology of Riots", Social Forces,
Vol. 30, pp.417-425.
- Dehrendorf Ralf, (1959), Class and Class Conflict in Industrial
Society, Stanford University Press,
Stanford Calif.
- Dalwai Hamid, (1970), Muslim Politics in India, Nchiketa
Publications, Delhi.

- Dasgupta, Jyotirindra, (1970), Language Conflict and National Development, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- David Daniel, (1970), Violence and Struggle for Existence, Jaeston Little Brown & Co., New York.
- Derrett G.D., (1968), Religion and the States in India, The Free Press New York.
- Desai A.R., (1970), Social Background of Indian Nationalism, Popular Prakashan, Bombay.
- Dharan K.V.S., (1966), You and Your Community, Asia Publishing House, Bombay.
- Dixit Prabha, (1974), Communalism : A Struggle For Power, Orient Longmans, Delhi.
- Dumont, Louis, (1980), Homo Hierarchicus, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
- Dutt T.K., (1945), Grave Digger in India, Dutt and Sons, Lahore.

- Farrell R.A., and Swigert V.L., (1978), Social Deviance, J.B., Lippincott Company, New York.
- Fichter Joseph M., (1957), Sociology, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Freyed B. (Trans.) (1939), The Development of Political Theory, Allan and Unwin, New York.
- Gandhi, M.K., (1925), Hindu Muslim Tension: Its Cause and Cure, Navjeevan Publishing House, Ahmedabad.
- Gangadharan M.K., (1970), Sociology of Revivalism: A Study of Indianization Sanskritization, Golwal Karism, Karamkar Prakashan, New Delhi.
- Ghurye, G.S., (1969), Social Tension in India, Popular Prakashan, Bombay.
- Gluckman, Max, (1956), Custom and Conflict in Africa, Free Press Glencoe III.
- Golwalkar, M.S., (1968), Bunch of Thoughts, Bangalore.

- Gopal Ram, (1959), Indian Muslims: A Political Study,
Asia Publishing House, Bombay.
- Guba, K.L., (1973), Passive Voices: A Penetrating Study
of Muslims in India, Thacker & Co.,
Ltd., Bombay.
- Gupta, G.R., (1976), Main Currents in Indian Sociology, 3
Vols., New Delhi.
- Gupta, Nand Lal (ed.), (1965), Nehru on Communalism,
Sampradayikta Virodhee Committee,
New Delhi.
- Gurvitch, G. and Moore W.R., (1980), Twentieth Century Sociology, Rawat
Publications, Jaipur.
- Hamid, Abdul, (1967), Muslim Separatism in India, Oxford
University Press, London.
- Hardert, R.A., Parkar H.A.,
Pfuhl E.H., Anderson W.A., (1977), Sociology and Social Issues, The
Dryden Press, Hinsdale III.
- Hardy, Peter, (1977), The Muslims of British India,
Cambridge University Press.

- Harnam, S., (1976), Plight of Muslims in India, B.L. Publications, London.
- Haq Muster U, (1981), Muslim Politics in Modern India - 1657-1947, Minakshi Publications, Meerut.
- Horowitz, Irving Louis, (1964), The New Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Kabir, Humayun, (1968), Minorities in the Democracy, Mukhopadhyay Press, Calcutta.
- Kabir, Humayun, (1969), Muslim Politics, Mukhopadhyay Press, Calcutta.
- Kaul, Jolly Mohan, (1963), Problems of National Integration, People's Publishing House, New Delhi.
- Khan, Abdul Majid, (1944), Communalism in India: Its Origin and Growth, Paramount Publications, Lahqre.

- Khan, M. Rafiq (ed.), (1970), National Integration: Its Meaning and Relevance, Manchetna Prakashan, Varanasi.
- Kuppuswamy, B., (1972), Social Change in India, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi.
- Kumar, Pramod (ed.) (1992), Towards Understanding Communalism, CRRID, Chandigarh.
- Levine, D.N., (1971), George Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms, University of Chicago, Chicago.
- Lewin, Kurt, (1948), Resolving Social Conflict-Selected Papers on Group Dynamics, Holt, New York.
- Loomis, Charles P. and Loomis, Zona K., (1969), Socio-economic Change and Religious Factors in India, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi.
- Madhok, Balraj, (1970), Indianisation, Hind Pocket Books Pvt. Ltd., Delhi.

- Majumdar, R.C., (1967), Three Phases of India's Struggle for Freedom, Bhartiya Press, Bombay.
- Mamoria, C.R., (1969), Social Problems and Social Disorganisation in India, Kitab Mahal, Allahabad.
- Mandelbaum, D.G., (1970), Society in India, (2 vols.) Berkeley.
- Manshardt, C., (1936), The Hindu Muslim Problem of India, George Allen & Unwin, New York.
- Mark, G. Swartz, Victor W. Turnel and Arthur Tuden (eds.), (1966), Political Anthropology, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago.
- Mathur, Y.B., (1972), Muslims and Changing India, Trimurti Publications, New Delhi.
- Mehta, M.R., (ed.) (1927), Gandhi On Communal Disorder, India Publisher, Allahabad.
- Mohammad, Ghaus, (1973), Secularism, Society and Law in India, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., Delhi.

- Morris, Charles, (1956), Varieties of Human Values,
University of Chicago, Chicago.
- Mujeeb, M., (1967), The Indian Muslims, Allen and
Unwin, London.
- Mukherjee, Radhakumud,
(1943), A New Approach to the Communal
Problem, Padma Publications,
Bombay.
- Murphy, Gardner, (1955), In the Minds of Man: The Study of
Human Behaviour and Social
Tensions in India, Basic Books, New
York.
- Nanavati, M.B., and C.N.
Vakil, (1951), Group Prejudices in India, A
Symposium, Vora & Co., Bombay.
- Naidu, Ratna, (1980), The Communal Edge to Plural
Society, Vikas Publishing House,
Delhi.
- Nathan, Glazer & Daniel P.
Moyinhan, (1975), Beyond the Melting, (4th Printing),
M.I.T. Press, U.S.A.

- Nehru, Jawaharlal, (1961), Communal Challenge to National Integrity via Speeches and Documents of the Day, Allahabad.
- Neil, J. Smelser, (1963), A Theory of Collective Behaviour, Free Press, New York.
- Panikar, K.M., (1955), Hindu Society at Cross Roads, Asia Publishing House, Bombay.
- Park, Robert Ezra, (1950), Race and Culture, The Free Press, Glencol III.
- Park, Robert Ezra, (1952), Human Communities, The Free Press, Illinois.
- Park, Robert Ezra, (1955), Society, The Free Press, Illinois.
- Parsons, T., Shils E., Naegele K.D. and Pitts J.R., (1965), Theories of Society, (2 vols.), The Free Press, New York.
- Phillips, C.H., & Wain Right M.D. (eds.), (1970), Partition of India: Politics and Perspectives, Allen & Unwin, London.
- Prachand, S.L.M., (1979), Mob Violence in India, Abhishek Publications, Chandigarh.

- Prasad, Rajendra, (1947), India Divided, Hindu Kitabs Ltd., (3rd ed.), Bombay.
- Rajendra, Pandey, (1986), Sociology of Under Development, Mittal Publication, Delhi.
- Riviers, J., (1930), Civilization and its Discontents, Cape & Smith, New York.
- Rosen, George, (1968), Madness in Society-Chapter in the Historical Sociology of Mental Illness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Rousseau, J.J., (1913), The Social Contract and the Discourses, Translated by Q.D.M. Cole, London.
- Roy, Smith William, (1938), Nationalism and Reform in India, Pale University Press.
- Savarkar, V.D., (1949), Hindu Rashtra Darshan, Laxman Ganesh Khare, Bombay.

- Schumpeter, J.A., (1957), Imperialism and Social Classes, (ed.) P.M. Sweezy, Translated by H. Norded, New York.
- Shah, A.B. (ed.) (1968), Challenges to Secularism, Nachiketa Publications, Bombay.
- Shakir, Moin, (1970), Khilafat to Partition, Kamlakar Prakhasn, New Delhi.
- Shakir, Moin (1972), Muslims in Free India, Kamlakar Prakashan, New Delhi.
- Shakir, Moin (ed.), (1973), Secularization of Muslim Behaviour, Minerva, Calcutta.
- Shakir, Moin, (1974), Muslim Attitudes: A Trend Report and Bibliography, Parimal Prakashan, Aurangabad.
- Sharma, G.N., (1968), Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan (1500-1800 AD) with Special Reference to the Impact of Mughal Influence, Lakshmi Narayan Agrawal, Agra.

- Sherman, H.J. & Wood, J.L., (1979), Sociology-Traditional Radical Perspectives, Harper and Row, New York.
- Siddique, Nafis Ahmed, (1976), Population Geography of Muslims of India, S. Chand & Co., Ramnagar.
- Simmel, George, (1955), Conflict, translated by Kurt H. Wolf, Free Press, Glencoe, III.
- Simmel, George, (1950), The Sociology of George Simmel, ed. and translated by K.H. Wolf, Free Press, III.
- Singh, Laxman, (1970) Political and Constitutional Developments in Princely States of Rajasthan (1920-49), Jain Brothers, New Delhi.
- Singh, V.V. (1993), Communal Violence, Rawat Publication, Jaipur & New Delhi.
- Singh, Y. (1996), Modernization of Indian Tradition, Rawat Publications, Jaipur & New Delhi.

- Sinha, V.K. (ed.), (1968), Secularism in India, Lalvani Publishing House, Bombay.
- Sardesai, S.G., (1966), Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, Orient Longmans, Bombay.
- Smelser, J.N., (1962), The Theory of Collective Theories, The Free Press, New York.
- Sorokin, P.A., (1928), Contemporary Sociological Theories, Harper, New York.
- Sorokin, P.A., (1927), Social Mobility, Harper Press, New York.
- Sorokin, P.A., (1941), Social and Cultural Dynamics, (4 Vols.) American Book Co., New York.
- Sorokin, P.A., (1957), The Crisis of Our Age, Dutton, New York.
- Sorokin, P.A., (1957), The Ways and Power of Love, Boston Beacon Press, Boston.
- Spencer, Herbert, (1984), The Man Versus State, London.

- Srivastava, Gopinath, (1970), "The Language Controversy and the Minorities, Atma Ram, Delhi.
- Starchey, J., (1922), Group Psychology and the Analysis of Ego, The International Psychoanalytical Press, London.
- Sumner, W.G., (1983), What Social Classes Owe to Each Other, Harper, New York.
- Sumner, W.G., (1985), Protectionism, Holt, New York.
- Swartz, mare J. (ed.), (1969), Local Level Politics, University of London Press Ltd., London.
- Szymanski, A.J., and Goertzel T.G., (1979), Sociology-Class Consciousness and Contradictions, V. Van Nostrand Co., New York.
- Tayabji, Badruddin, (1972), The Self in Secularism, Orient Longmans, New Delhi.
- Thapar, Romila, (1969), Communalism and the Writings of Indian History, Orient Longmans, New Delhi.

- Thomas, William Isaac, (1912), Race Psychology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Thomas, William Isaac (ed.)
E.H. Volkart, (1951), Social Behaviour and Personality, Social Sciences Research Community, New York.
- Thorndike, E.L., (1940), Human Nature and the Social Order, Macmillan, New York.
- Thrasher, F. Milton, (1926), The Gang, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Toynbee, A. Joseph, (1948), Civilization on Trial, Oxford University Press, London.
- Toynbee, A. Joseph, (1928), The Conduct of British Empire: Foreign Relations Since the Peace Settlement, Oxford University Press, London.
- Turner, Jonathan H., (1978), The Structure of Sociological Theory, The Dorsey Press Homewood, Illinois.

- Turner, Ralph H. & L.M. Kullian, (1972), Collective Behaviour, (2nd ed.), Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall Inc. New Jersey.
- Usman, Akhtar, (1971), Muslims in India, S.M. Shraf, Lahore.
- Vandeer, Zanden, (1975), Sociology, (3rd edn.), The Ronald Press Co., New York.
- Wagley, Charles & Marvin Harris, (1958), Minorities in the New World, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Weber, Max, (1950), The Hindu Social System, Translated by Hans Gerth and Don Martindale, University of Minnesota.
- Weber, Max, (1958), The Religion of India, Translate by Don Martindale and H.H. Gerth, The Free Press, III.

- Weber, Max, (1947), The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, Translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Talcott Parsons (ed.), The Free Press of Glencoe.
- Wirth, Louis, (1956), Community Life and Social Policy, E. Wirth Marvick and Albert J. Reiss, (ed.) University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Wold, Leonard, (1953), Principle Politics A Study of Communal Psychology, Hograth, London.
- Zafar, Iman (ed.), (1970), Rise of Muslims in Indian Politics: An Analysis of Development from 1885-1906, Bombay.
- Znaiecki, Florian, (1952), Social Actions, Farrar & Rinehart, New York.
- Znaiecki, Florian, (1952), Modern Nationalities, University of Illinos Press, Urnaba, III.
- Census Report of 1991, Government of India, Delhi.

**Laser Typesetting & Graphics Design By:
Mohinder P. Singh Phone: (011)-6969516**