

**SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY : THE CHINA FACTOR
(1962-71)**

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A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Roop Rashi". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the printed name.

(ROOP RASHI)

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PREFACE

South Asian region went through pains of evolution, before taking the shape as is apparent today. In this course of development, the years 1962 to 1971 hold particular importance. After 1947, the various dimensions of threat perceptions were in a molten shape. The role of China, as a factor in security patterns was fudged with other internal and external factors during the 1950's. This phase (1962-1971) resulted in consolidation of threat perceptions and evolution of alliance patterns, with China in focus. The researcher has tried to bring out China's role in the perspective of regional security.

The first chapter deals with security as a concept and perception, specifically in the region. Secondly, it discusses the background to the status of relationships in the region in the watershed year of 1962.

The second chapter studies the impact of 1962 war on India and the later phase of hostile coexistence of India and China. This enlists the impact of Sino-Indian war on security and security perceptions in the region.

The third chapter tries to follow the evolution of Sino-Pak axis. Herein, it deals with Sino-Pak border agreement, the Chinese support to Pakistan during Indo-Pak war of 1965 and thus consolidation of strategic and diplomatic alliance between China and Pakistan - Chinese motive being to achieve balance of power in the region with

reference to India.

The fourth chapter evaluates the impact of emergence of Bangladesh on South Asian security. Besides the Chinese support to Pakistan, the emergence of Sino-American detente, brought about through Pakistan, outlined a new dimension of South Asian security.

The fifth chapter deals with China and its relationship with the smaller states in the region. This tries to bring in focus the Chinese attempt at undermining India's influence through economic concessions and strategic moves. The cases dealt are - Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. A brief overview of Chinese attempt at undermining Indo - Srilankan relationship is also done. Paucity of time and resources forbade an indepth study of this aspects.

The last chapter spells out the main conclusions of the study.

Though utmost care has been taken in acknowledging the sources, yet the responsibility of any errors or omissions rests solely with me.

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

China, a large, adjacent extra regional power has had profound influence on South Asian Security. Any attempt to understand the impact of China on South Asian security has to first define security and its meaning as it holds true for the region. Only after such a general understanding, the role of China as a factor can be understood in a comprehensive way during the period of 1962 to 1971.

The term security has wider connotation than is believed generally. It is not merely concerned with defending the territorial integrity of the a nation but is also concerned with political and economic stability, ethnocentric harmony and societal integration. Thus it relates to all the aspects of nationalism regionalism and internationalism. Therefore, there is need to have an electric approach to understand all the nuances of omni dimensions of security¹

Moreover, security is not the only concept through which the national security problem can be approached. Most of the literature which attempts analyses or prescription is based on concepts of power and peace.

¹B.M.Jain, South Asian Security : Problems & Prospects (New Delhi, 1985), p. 3.

Those who favour the approach through power derive their thinking from traditional school of International Relations pioneered by E.H. Carr² & Hans. J. Morgenthau³ and those who favour the approach through peace are more loosely associated with Idealist school⁴.

The bias in security definitions towards great power and absolute security also reflects, firstly, the dominance of Realist school in International relations, with its emphasis on power, and secondly, an arcadian longing for simpler days where defence was clear and meaningful concept.

Walter Lippman defines, "..... a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."⁵

On the other hand Arnold Wolfers defines, "..... security in an objective sense, measures the absence of

²E.H.Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London, 1946, 2nd ed.).

³Hans. J, Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, Knopf, 1973).

⁴Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear : The National Security Problem in International Relations (London, 1983) p.7.

⁵Cited in Arnold Wolfers, Discord & Collaboration (Baltimor, 1962), p. 150.

threat to acquired values, in a subjective sense the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."⁶

Security problem becomes complex given the differentiations in domestic structure, institutional capacities and wide divergences in perceptions of the ruling elites of the region. Different political and economic systems tend to create problems for the functionality of the regional subsystem of security. Conflicting postures on the security aspects, in fact, become core security problems of the region. This aspect of security is articulated in the definition given by Michael H.H. Louw, "National security includes traditional defence policy and also the non-military actions of a state to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political entity in order to exert its influence and to carry out its internal and international objectives."⁷

Frank, N. Trager & F.N. Simonie define National security "that part of government policy, having its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and

⁶Wolfers, n5. p 153.

⁷Michael, H.H.Louw, National Security, (Pretoria 1978. The quote is from the introductory note entitled 'The Purpose of Symposium') cited in Buzan, n.4, p.9.

potential adversaries."⁸

The three levels of security problems are logical, perceptual and political. The perceptual problem rests on (a) the position as observed in relation to the thing viewed and (b) according to internal constitution of the thing viewer. Since positional perspectives vary in time and space hence complicate the problem. These differential positional perspectives which make the information base of the system as well as the differences in constitutional structure makes them see things differently.

As Barry Buzan puts it, the tendency to delay and distort the rationalizing effect of new information has major consequences for the national security problem since the international anarchy tends naturally to generate insecurity and suspicion, the perceptual factor feeds into the power-security dilemma, amplifying and perpetuating negative images.

As Jervis argues, this process is also inevitable because mental sets and theories of some sorts are necessary if any sense is to be made out of the huge volume of information in the first place.⁹ Jervis concludes that no formula will eliminate perceptions or reveal that image

⁸F.N. Trager and F.C. Simonie, Introduction to the study of National Security in F.N. Trager & P.S Kronenberg, National Security and American Society (Lawrence Kansas, 1975) p. 30.

⁹Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton, 1976), p. 176.

is correct. Faced with ambiguous and confusing evidence decision makers must draw inferences that will often prove to be incorrect.

The wide divergence in defining the concept is an indicator of the complexity of problem of security at an operational level as well. The interplay of local circumstances with the big powers have contributed to complicating bilateral relations between the countries of the region. They are also responsible for the Pavlovian behaviour of the comparatively weak nations of the region. The Pavlovian behaviour may be explained in terms of military stimulus provided within by the weapon suppliers with the underlying purpose of influencing their military, political, economic and national life. With this theoretical understanding in mind, the security problem of south Asia may be studied from following points of view.¹⁰

1. Concrete notion of security. This includes what exists in reality, for example the topography, demography, physical feature of security etc.

This is conceptualized by Jasjit Singh¹¹ in terms of the risk of concept of sovereign nation state in the West phalian order reoriented the national security paradigm sensitivity to the concept of national sovereignty which

¹⁰Jain, n. 1 p. 9.

¹¹Jasjit Singh "Defensive Security : The conceptual challenge" Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), January 1992, p.107.

itself channelled the security paradigm towards an open ended search for national security and also imparted a certain aggressiveness to the pursuit of national security.¹² Therefore, security became competitive and in certain circumstances confrontational and conflictual. He considers that dependence on Calusewitzian concept of "War as an instrument of policy", has guided the security and national policies of the national states for more than two centuries.

This leads to acquisition of armoury for acquiring national security.

2. Psychological notion of security : This involves mental process of conscious or subconscious world.¹³

Mistrust is one of the more powerful motives for adopting policies and postures that lead to national security paradigm based on imposing insecurity on another state¹⁴. The process of eliminating mistrust really lies in the domain of political relations.

3. Abstract notion of security : This includes theories as well as arguments including the mistaken ones. Abstract notion of security is autonomous and affects

¹²Anatol Rapoport "Introduction in Carl Von Calusewitz, On War, (New York, 1982) p .4.

¹³Jain, n 1, p. 11.

¹⁴Jasjit Singh n. 11. p.110.

the concrete notion.

Thus it was fully the recognition of the concrete notion of India's overwhelming superiority in terms of its size, resources, manpower, military capability that President Nixon quickly acknowledged "India's regional dominance".¹⁵

The psychological notion of security breeds fear, apprehensions and misgivings of severe magnitude. It involve simultaneously the good or bad images of ruler, the ruled and the foreign nationals of a country. For instance Indian's security dilemma was expressed in terms of threats from military rulers of Pakistan. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's outbursts against militarism of Pakistan did not give him levels of influence to decide long standing issues confronting two nations.¹⁶ Besides these three levels of notions, structural, functional problems and nature of societies and elites influence the problem of security in a region.

Analysis of threat perceptions of the two major actors of South Asia region i.e. India and Pakistan reveals the contours of problem.

In the case of India the first objective of Indian

¹⁵Gerald A. Hegan, "After the Title: The meeting of US Foreign Policy toward Pakistan in 1972-74". Comment on the Organization of the Government for conduct of Foreign Policy (Washington Vol. 7, June 1975), p. 162.

¹⁶Jain, n.1, p. 13.

strategy had been to neutralize Pakistan's anti-India propaganda, especially regulating its claim to Kashmir and second had been directed to neutralize Chinese threat. Unlike Pakistani threat which could be met through on Indian defence build-up, meeting the Chinese threat independently was considered beyond limits of Indian defense capabilities.¹⁷

In the case of Pakistan the major rather the most important threat had been from India. Given Pakistan's size and location, as well as terrain along the border, its strategists relied on the doctrine of offensive-defense reflected clearly in 1965 ad 1971. Another aspect during the period under observation was the hope that China would create two-front problem for India. Another level of strategy, was weapon acquisition and arms transfers from 1950s onwards¹⁸. In this case except for Chinese, no other were considered reliable suppliers of key weapons, whether for cash, credit or as a grant.

Besides this the structural-functional problems and the nature of societies are important influence on security. The structural problems arise because of globalization of foreign policy leading to a change in the

¹⁷Raju G.C. Thomas, "India" in Edward. A Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy (Ed.) Security Policies of Developing Countries (Massachusetts), 1980, p. 126.

¹⁸ Stephen P. Cohen "Pakistan" in Kolodziej and Harkavy, n.17, p. 105.

isolationist perspectives. The newly born nations, however, find it more difficult to adjust their responsibilities to the hopes and aspiration of their peoples in an unevenly balanced international system. The revolution in science and technology and weaponry has magnified the problem of security. In quest of security through the manufacture or induction of sophisticated weapons insecurity has become more manifest. Their capability to garner up an mobilize resources for security purpose has rendered the security complex more complex and abstruse. Moreover, due to domestic inhibitions, leaders are unable to take positive and prompt decisions to resolve bilateral problems. For the fear of domestic upheaval, leaders engaged in diplomatic parleys either seek to put off the problem for an indefinite period or try to seek ad-hoc solutions or sometimes refuse to budge an inch from their preconceived position. For example Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ayub Khan failed to resolve the Kashmir problem not because they were incapable of solving it, but because of fear of domestic stir in their respective countries.

These contentious issues are further complicated by external intervention in their domestic and foreign policies. Though the influence is marginal in most cases due to multiplication of political actors in the international system. However, smaller nations are torn

between internal subversions and external sabotage in the quest of latter's dominance in the region.¹⁹

It is with regards to this structural aspect that China assumes a threatening position to regional security. This arises out of direct threat perceived due to China's size and power and indirect threat through the intrusive diplomacy in the region. The perceived threat of India as a hegemonic nation earlier lead and continues to do so for the smaller states to join hands with China against India thereby destabilizing the security balance in the its attempt to achieve a balance of power in the region by neutralizing india. This aspect become apparent strongly during the period starting from 1962 with the growth and development of alliance with pakistan. The smaller nations like Nepal, Sri Lanka were also not insulated from this kind of intrusive diplomacy. These aspects will be elaborated in the later chapters.

Besides the structural problem of security there are certain functional problems such as power play, and the role of self-image of ruling leaders.

At the regional level security can be only relative depending on the coupling of common purpose and common desire.

Regional security in the developing world is like chimera. Mohammad Ayob uses the "third world". Though

¹⁹Jain, n. 1, p. 13.

regional security is perceived as an anti dote for intra and inter state conflicts, yet this concept overlooks the genuine inter-linkage between the history, ethnicity and society in evaluating the problem of security.²⁰

Yet another major factor outlined by S.D. Muni is the intensity and extent of great power's intervention through multifaceted channels. These interventions depend upon stakes which may be intrinsic or derivative. Intrinsic stakes are in form of assuring supply of vital raw materials including oil and strategic minerals, presentation of strategic base on facilities. Derivative stakes are of secondary importance limited to the objective of containing or reducing the presence and influence of a rival power.²¹ Chinese approach towards South Asian region reveals it. This points to the fact that domestic insecurity in the South Asian region has not been caused only by the internal developments but are results of interaction between these developments and external influence. Even relative security is not possible where structures of political and economic institutions are at variance with each other. If there are irresolvable contradictions within the political, economic and social systems of the countries of the region, capacity to evolve

²⁰Mohammad Ayoob, Regional Security and the Third World : Case Studies from South East Asia and the Middle East (London, 1986), p. 28.

²¹Ayoob, n.20, p. 30.

and strengthen security system is limited. The problem of south Asian region is that the structures of political and economic institutions within the member nations are not similar.

The other two factors influencing the security perceptions and perspectives are the nature of ruling elite of the subcontinent. The distinct and durable patterns of military and political security relations that occur in developing world are characterized as 'security complexes'. In South Asia the states i.e., India and Pakistan define their security problems primarily in terms of each other while they share the same complex. These complexes provide the entry for penetration of region by the greater powers.²² In case of South Asia, societies are traditional, narrow perspected, less creative and less radical.²³ They are still in embryonic form and have to mature themselves into progressive and democratic ones.²⁴ Majorities of them have neither adequate political awareness nor have any vision to understand the dynamics of change in the political and economic life. So psychological diversities, orthodoxy and reaction dominate South Asian societies that in turn lend to generate

²²Buzan, n.1, p. 105.

²³B.N. Pandey, South and South East Asia : 1945-1979 Problems and Policies (London, 1980), p. 16.

²⁴Stanley Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia (New York, 1982), p. 20.

tensions, and internal subversions. Political and military and authoritarian institutions in South Asia have proved incapable of absorbing stresses and strains emanating from diverse warring sections of societies. These kind of lack of cohesiveness creates a loophole in the security framework by making states susceptible to the spill-over effects of the neighbouring state's tensions and problems. So as far as the nature of ruling elite is concerned, in the context of South Asia the monarchical institutions in Nepal and Bhutan, military regime in Pakistan and presidential cum authoritarian governance in Sri Lanka are institutions opposed to parliamentary democracy in India thereby making it difficult to evolve a common perspective on security due to divergent perception. These divergences create a play field for extra-regional powers particularly for a big adjacent power like China.

In case of South Asia, the dominant expression of external involvement in South Asia has been through arms transfers. Yet the most major external incursion in the region was of China in 1962, which was regarded at the time as a conflict between titans and ideological struggle between communism and democracy, upon which the future of the world rested.

Later the regional levels of conflict were not only additive but interactive. Internal separatist and autonomist movements have regularly drawn encouragement and

at times direct support from outside that challenge the country they oppose. India's Naga rebels received support from China as Khampa tribals of Tibet were once supported by India.

Those interactive pattern revealed itself at a higher level where the individual south Asian states have regularly sought super power or Chinese support against a regional neighbour. Pakistan led the way for 1965 onwards to counter India²⁵.

As for China since 1949 the two major objectives guiding China's foreign relations are security and domestic needs in that order. In general China's foreign policy and relations have been hinged on its relations with two super-powers. This was particularly true of the cold war era that when its relations with one or two of them changes, its relations with many other countries invariable changed accordingly. The other factors can be listed as national interest ideology, nationalism, the balance of power, historical experience and cultural values, leadership and decision - making, revolutionary strategy, the theory of contradictions and the theory of three worlds.²⁶

²⁵Stephen P. Cohen. "South Asia" in Robert. S Litwak and Samuel F. Wells (Jr). Ed. Super Power Competition and Security in Third World (Cambridge, 1988), p. 162.

²⁶Chin Hu Hsuesch China's Foreign Relations : New Perspectives (New York, 1982), p. 4.

As far as South Asia is concerned in the Chinese strategic spectrum, China's goals and policies since 1949 have been to enhance its own security, assertion of sovereignty and affirmation of identity as a powerful state and finally looking at Asia in terms of both revolution and development.²⁷ At conceptual level Chinese hardly ever thought in terms of region. Chinese intervention in South Asia has been dictated by logic rather than a strategic doctrine.²⁸ It has been apparent that China has always attempted a certain distancing between the regional understanding and global understanding.²⁹ Here in South Asian internal dissensions have provided an opening to China giving it diplomatic clout in the region over the period of 1962-1971.³⁰

Thus an understanding of security perspectives and dilemma in the region helps to understand the strategic development before 1962 which became the foundation stone for the crystallization of Chinese threat in 1962 Sino-Indian War. A brief overview of the developments from 1949-1962 is being attempted to clearly map out the

²⁷Harry Harding, China's Foreign Relations in the 1980's (New Haven, 1984), p. 120.

²⁸Jain, n.1, p. 10.

²⁹G.P.Deshpande "Chinese Perspectives on South Asia: Retrospect and Prospect." in Ramakant Ed. China and South Asia (New Delhi, 1988), p. 17.

³⁰T. Karki Hussian "A Perceptual Framework of Sino Pak Relations" in Ramakant Ed. n. 23, p. 18.

strategic map before 1962 to enable one to understand the role played by China directly and indirectly during the period under observation.

The most important actor of the region in terms of size, population and political factors is India. This Indo-centricity makes India the Prime target of competition and hostility both by the regional and the extra regional powers. In 1950's Nehru based his China policy on the notion that the shared experience of humiliation at the hands of imperialistic powers gave China and India a common outlook on international affairs.³¹ The early promise of close Sino-Indian relation was based on anti colonialism and a species of Asian nationalism founded on the rock of conflicting national interests in the Himalayan wastelands. India's sympathy for the Tibetan freedom fighters, the sanctuary provided to the Dalai Lama and his entourage and India's close ties with the Soviet Union further irritated the Chinese leadership. On the other hand, the dominant Indian view was that China was an expansionist nation quick to use military power to pursue its objectives and determined to achieve a position of dominance in Asia at the expense of major countries like India herself. Indians realized the Chinese threat more specifically through its alignment with Pakistan and its meddling in Indian ethnic and ideological rebellions of the 1960's. In case of South

³¹Harding, n. 27, p. 141.

Asia it is the contradictions within the region than the common concern which mattered most for foreign policy of China in the region. The principal contradiction was, and continues to be between India and Pakistan.³²

China had been taking very much inconsistent stand on Kashmir. On March 16, 1956 Chau En Lai told the Indian ambassador that the people of Kashmir have already expressed their will. This position was later reaffirmed by Premier Chou En-Lai and Secretary General of Indian Ministry of External Affairs on July 16, 1961.³³ The Chinese government though accepting India's position in Kashmir refused to discuss the portion of Sino-Indian border under occupation of Pakistan government during their talks so as to retain their manoeuvrability vis a vis Pakistan. China's deliberate ambiguity in respect to Kashmir was the result of her expedient policy which aimed at, as provide by later developments, bringing Pakistan on her side at a later date and isolating India³⁴ China probably foresaw that someday or other the two Asian giants were bound to tread on each other's corns and come into conflict. History leaves its foot prints and painful sores, Chinese knew. That is why China carefully avoided

³²Deshpande, n. 29, p. 5.

³³C.J. Chacko, Sino-Pak Relations : A Legal study (Bombay, 1963), p. 105.

³⁴Surendra Chopra, Sino-Indian Relations, (Amritsar, 1985), p.18.

unequivocal commitment on Kashmir.

The Sino-Pak axis seems to have been built at Bandung in April, 1955 and developed rather quickly. Exchange of visits between the Chinese and Pakistani leaders, cultural delegation and a variety of goodwill missions started almost immediately after Bandung. The Pakistani press and scholarly journals began writing about China. During one year after Bandung, six articles and reproduction of Pakistanis and Chinese appeared in Pakistan Horizon alone.³⁵

This 'late blooming romance'³⁶ had certain limitations for Pakistan initially. It appeared to be in the "situation of a deep sea diver who is beginning a romance with a mermaid, conscious all the time that father-in-law is manning the air pump for him above"³⁷. But gradually these outrageous flirtations were accepted by the United States and Pakistan was used as a bridge for rendezvous with China by Kissinger in 1971, while the whole world knew he was down with Delhi belly.

The politics in northern sectors showed that how China assiduously cultivated Pakistan and shared fruits of aggression in that sector. Chinese strategy in her border

³⁵Hard , n. 27, p. 123.

³⁶Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 31 October, 1962 quoted in Chopra, n.35, p.19.

³⁷The Times (London), 23 January, 1964, quoted in Chopra, n. 35, p.20.

policy was to capture large tracts of the territory of a neighbour, which was made easier by the fact that the areas happened to be desolate and uninhabited mostly at high altitudes and then surrender later, under an agreement, parts of areas to show a spirit of accommodation. Nehru entrusted the security of northern border to a piece of paper i.e. Panchsheel.³⁸ Indian policy, on the other hand, despite Tibet was not to become embroiled in a dangerous conflict with its neighbour, unless its vital interests are directly threatened such as control over Himalayan border states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.³⁹ Still he made clear that Himalayan border states are in India's sphere of influence. Chinese argument regarding border was two fold. Firstly, the border had not been formally delimited and therefore, had to be negotiated between the two governments and if necessary be settled through joint survey and secondly, the boundary which India considered legitimate had been a legacy of British imperialism and no country which believes that colonialism is an evil had a right to benefit by the fruits of British aggression on China when India was under British rule.⁴⁰ It actually amounted to

³⁸G. Chaturvedi, India China relations : 1947 to Present Day (Agra, 1991), p. 108.

³⁹Michael Brecher, Nehru - A Political Biography (London, 1959), pp. 589-92.

⁴⁰B.L. Sharma, The Pak-China Axis (New Delhi, 1986), p. 128.

reinforcing China's expansionist doctrine that every border required fresh de-limitation.⁴¹ Pakistan played a more dubious role by giving China a vital stretch of territory east of Kashmir cease-fire line according to their border agreement. This was immediate to South Karakoram Pass and thus buttressed Chinese contention that the traditional customary boundary line between Sinkiang and the Indian subcontinent runs along the Karakoram watershed and not along the west of Aghil mountains. An extension of this principle on the other side of Karakoram gave to China the territory in Ladakh (Aksai Chin) which it had always wanted.⁴² Thus to sum it up it may be pointed out that both China and Pakistan shared the fruits of aggression by parcelling out Indian territory according to the agreement relating to northern sector of the Sino-Indian border and legitimised the aggression of both. China used the intrusive strategy with all its concomitants by exploiting the differences between India and Pakistan and acquired a tremendous logistic advantage over India. The Karakoram road system apart from giving China an easy access to Indian Kashmir, provided Beijing with an opportunity to leapfrog into Indian ocean, the strategic Gulf region and Africa.

⁴¹Sudhkar Bhat, India and China, (New Delhi, 1970), p.176.

⁴²Daljit Sen Adel, China and Her Neighbours : A Review of Chinese Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1984), p.192

In the late 50's India and her neighbours were experiencing severe problems. After 1954 Tibetan accord and the spirit of Bandung in 1955, the Indian government had reason to believe that it had a powerful but friendly state on northern border. (An illusion of 'friendliness' to be shattered later in 1962). Stability at economic level the military position was not strong. Pakistan, on the other hand was struggling to stabilize nation-state. To cope up with domestic problem it kept playing the e bogey of Kashmir on and on. Cylon was tense with Tamil - Sinhalese quarrels erupting in violence. Thence, the entire regional security of South Asia, as well as, its development and prosperity was, by 1958, depressingly precarious. Later it came to fore that 1958 onwards Chinese militancy took roots. In this context, Chinese claim to territory came along. Tibet, Indian frontier were once more advanced systematically and a hard line was taken towards Prime Minister Nehru in the Chinese Press, as quoted earlier.⁴³


Thus, the analysis of security at logical, perceptual and political level opens up the vulnerable points of in security in the south Asian region. There were so many chinks in the armour of regional security that made it easy for a highly pragmatic country like China, which kept

⁴³Wayne. A. Wilcox, Indian, Pakistan and Rise of China (New York, 1964), p. 58.

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
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ideological preferences aside, to undermine India's rightful influence in the region by trying to achieve balance of power in the region which forms its underbelly. This could be done by exploiting the differences.⁴⁴ The smaller countries of the region like Nepal started using China card in 1960's to counter Indian influence in a highly Indo-centric region. Chinese interest in Himalayan states became another cause of threat for the security in region. The porosity of borders made the Chinese influence feel stronger as any movement in one state had reverberations in others of the region. The international scenario, the cold war rivalry had their own contribution to exacerbate the regional rivalries and make the region a play ground for their interests, directly or indirectly.

The events of 1950s slowly reached a climax in the war of 1962 where by China showed India its place and acquired the most important position in the strategic calculations of not only India but Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka as well. The war of 1962 and its impact on the prevailing security level is discussed in the following chapter.

⁴⁴J.D., Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy (Berkeley, 1977), p.170.

CHAPTER - II

1962 SINO-INDIAN WAR : THE PRECIPITATION OF THE CHINESE THREAT

The 1962 Sino-Indian war precipitated Chinese threat not only for India but for the region as well. South Asia as a whole provides a relatively clear example of an important, middle level complex.¹ The heart of this complex is rivalry between India and Pakistan, two large states whose insecurities are so deeply intertwined that their national securities in term of political and military security, cannot be separated. Buzan does not consider China a part of security complex due to South Asia being peripheral to its primary security concerns. In South Asian security complex, the dominant role of local issues & relations in defining the national security priorities of the states within it is important. Since none of the South Asian country is strong as State, so the threats arising within their own boundaries are threats to national security as discussed at length in the first chapter. On top of these domestic problems, but frequently linked to them, lies a layer of local, inter state disputes which

¹Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. (London, 1983), p. 106.

defence the principal binding insecurities of the complex, as a whole. These are the boundary disputes of the glaring example of which is Kashmir dispute.

Besides these local rivalries and hostilities, the two major external patterns i.e. Sino-Soviet dispute and rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union affected South Asian security complex. The hard issue which connects South Asia with those larger complexes is Sino-Indian border dispute. Although relations between India and China were thought to be good during the 1950's, towards the end of the decade disputes over large ill-defined mountain boundary areas, and tensions over the consolidation of Chinese rule in Tibet, caused them to deteriorate. A short, sharp war in 1962 fixed an enduring pattern of insecurity for India. Not only was territory lost, and the Indian army humiliated, but also China came to be seen in India as a booming threat along its northern borders.²

To understand the 1962 Sino-Indian war, it is important to watch the unfolding of events from late 1950s'. The various perceptions regarding the war reveal the level of propaganda China had done against India and the later support it got from Pakistan in the same. As Neville Maxwell puts it, "Plainly China had no ground whatever for fearing an Indian attack; but she had every

²Ibid.

reason to expect it."³ This tries to project it just as a war of misperception and miscalculation only but fails to appreciate the effect it had on larger security issues in the region.

Despite the early 1950's atmosphere in Sino-Indian relations created by the five principles of peaceful coexistence, disputed border problems remained unresolved. The Chinese stand on border problems has been enumerated by Jing Hui⁴ as being:

- The traditional customary eastern sector border lies along the southern foot of Himalayas.
- The illegal McMohan line was a product of aggressive British policy.
- The region to the north of the Eastern sector of traditional border belonged to China. The British had never exercised jurisdiction there.

Finally, McMohan line is not a natural boundary but an artificial division of China's territory.

Therefore, despite talks on the issue were held, no solution was found. On this background of uncertainty, Tibet, China's province bordering on India, flared into rebellion in 1959. This coupled with deteriorating economic

³Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London, 1972), p. 374.

⁴Jing Hui "The Truth about the Eastern Sector of China India Boundary" in China Report (New Delhi), (25:1), 1988, p.112.

conditions in the rest of China, and a worsening split with the Soviet Union, meant that Beijing's confidence in handling problems, in southwest frontier was shakier than it might have been.⁵

On India's side, from 1950 onwards policy was governed by the realization of need for recognizing the fact of new China and a desire to bring about an understanding between People's Republic of China and other nations of the world.⁶ In other words India's concern was to work as an 'honest peace broker' in world affairs. That accounts for India's reaction to Chinese invasion of Tibet.

There was perceptible move on Tibet issue by China. Early in 1959, there was a major revolt in Tibet stemming from Chinese interference in local Tibetan affairs in contravention of 1950 Treaty. The world first learnt of rebellion when India started receiving thousands of refugees and finally when Dalai Lama found his way to Indian sanctuary. Moreover, Chinese made no secret of their territorial ambitions along India's northern frontier and moved to increase diplomatic contact with India's neighbours. Nepal was courted from 1954 and then Chinese moved to court Pakistan and Burma.⁷ India's mediatory role

⁵Gerald Segal Defending China, (Oxford, 1985), p. 140.

⁶K.N. Pannikar In Two Chinas - Memories of a Diplomat (London, 1955), p. 80.

⁷Wayne A. Wilcox India, Pakistan and Rise of China (New York, 1969), p. 59.

in the Korean question and the surrender of her special interests in Tibet inherited from the British contributed a great deal to relaxation over Tibet question. This contributed, by extension, to peace in the region. The change in latter's attitude towards former began in 1951 when first trade contacts were signed between the two countries. Yet having 'security' in mind India signed a Treaty with Bhutan on 8 August, 1949, whereby Bhutan agreed to be guided by the advice of Indian government in regard to its external relations. It signed another treaty with Sikkim on 5 December, 1950 by which special relations were established between India and the latter's foreign affairs and defence were put under India's control. On 31st July, 1950 India signed a Treaty with Nepal providing inter-alia that the two countries would inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to affect the friendly relations between India and Nepal.⁸

On 12 November, 1959, in pursuance of the same policy Nehru stated that boundary question between China and Sikkim and China and Bhutan also fell within the scope of discussion on boundary. He said we have publicly, and rightly undertaken certain responsibilities for the defence of Sikkim and Bhutan, if they are attacked. It is very

⁸G. Chaturvedi, India-China Relations : 1947 to Present Day (Agra, 1991), p. 112.

necessary for us to understand that if something happens on their borders, then it is the same thing as interference with the border of India.⁹

Diplomatic faux pas :

Another major issue was Tibet. After the invasion of Tibet by China in a commentary by People's Daily, it came to the fore that Nehru's reaction and philosophy on Tibet made the issue complicated. China considered that there was no ground to call rebellion in Tibet a national "Revolution" and describe putting down of rebellion as a national tragedy. Though they conceded that Indian Government had no desire to occupy Tibet or make it independent, yet China perceived India to be striving to prevent China from exercising full sovereignty over its own territory of Tibet. Herein came the question of fudging up vocabulary by trying to concede "suzerainty" (like India had over Bhutan and Sikkim) but not sovereignty over Tibet.¹⁰

Therefore, one view is that these and the like steps taken by India were taken amiss by the People's Republic of China and, therefore, by implication led China to pursue a programme to build up her influence in Nepal and other

⁹Nehru's reply to debate in Lok Sabha, 12 September, 1959, cited in R.K. Jain Ed. China-South Asia Relations : 1947-1980 (New Delhi, 1981), p.143.

¹⁰Jain, n.9, p. 129.

common neighbours of India and China.¹¹ But the Indian policy was governed by the consideration of need for friendship of all neighbours and by political necessity of taking security measures, as come within the range of possibilities.

Phase of Sino-Indian Friendship

From October 1949 to December 1956 were the years of friendship for India and China. From Geneva to Bandung the relationship has been characterized as like "high tide of Sino - Indian Friendship".¹² Nehru had long cherished the vision of "a thousand million strong cooperative of the Chinese and Indian peoples, the base of a larger Asian-African cooperative and ultimately a new cooperative world order."¹³ He was prepared to make any possible concession to Chinese misgivings in order to bring them round to an uninhibited, peaceful, and neighbourly attitude. All these related to peace for the region and defence of the country. In 1954 came Panchsheel having principles of mutual respect, non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Thus adherence to the spirit of 1954 agreement

¹¹S.K. Arora, "Indian Attitude Towards China" (International Journal (Toronto) (Winter 1958-59), cited in Chaturvedi, n. 8, p.114

¹²S.P. Varma, Struggle for Himalayas: A Study in Sino-Indian Relations (Delhi, 1965), p. 45.

¹³R.K. Karanjia, The Philosophy of Mr. Nehru (London, 1966), p. 68.

and the Bandung Accords in 1955, which elaborated on Panchsheel ideals became the theme of Indian diplomacy towards China from 1954 to 1959.

Cartographic Aggression: The controversy over maps : This had also begun in 1958. An Indian note drew attention of the Chinese government to a map of China which included four divisions of NEFA, some parts of northern U.P., and largest areas of eastern Ladakh as part of China. To this Chinese government replied in following way:

"The Chinese government believes that with the lapse of time, and after consultations with the various neighbouring countries and a survey of the border regions, a new way of drawing the boundary of China will be decided in accordance with the results of consultations and survey."¹⁴

Analytically, Chinese border policy can be considered to consisting of four stages:

- (a) Cartographic aggression.
- (b) Attacking border guards on the other side and maligning the other country for intruding into Chinese territory.
- (c) Provoking war psychosis among the people living in border areas before attack.

¹⁴Chinese Memorandum, 3 November, 1958 p. 47 cited in T. Karki Hussain, Sino-Indian Conflict and International Politics in the Indian Subcontinent, 1962-66. (Faridabad, 1977), p. 8.

(d) Systematically planning incursions by sending cattle breeders into coveted territory for grazing cattle.¹⁵

In August 1959 India and China had fought a brief but bloody clash over parts of disputed territory. In the summer of 1961 Indian reconnaissance discovered that in Aksai Chin area of China's western border, claimed by India, China had constructed a road linking Xinjiang and Tibet. Towards the end of 1961 India formulated a "forward policy", in the border area to give substance to Indian territorial claims. But the Himalayan winter soon terminated any movement for the moment. On 26 February 1962 China protested about the forward policy but it was not until late April that China resumed patrols in this western sector.¹⁶

Chinese Diplomacy

Chinese Prime Minister on 26 April made a written statement pointing out that the two countries shared the common desire to maintain friendly relations. The six points considered as common were put forward as:

1. Boundary dispute existed between China and India.
2. A line of actual control existed up to which each side exercised administrative jurisdiction.
3. In determining the border, certain geographical

¹⁵Daljit Sen Adel, China and Her Neighbours: A Review of Chinese Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1984), p. 191.

¹⁶Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Moo Hwang, China and Under Threat (Baltimore, 1980), p. 104.

principles such as water sheds, river valleys and mountain passes shall be equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary.

4. Settlement of the border should take into account national feelings of the two peoples towards Himalaya and the Karakoram mountains.
5. Pending a settlement both sides should keep to the line of actual control and should not put forward territorial claims as pre-conditions.
6. Each side should refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary.¹⁷

Shooting incidents were reported in May with ambiguous Chinese signalling in an attempt to deter Indian encroachment. In August 1959, Prime Minister Nehru announced that there were border incidents involving security forces of India and China, and released a white paper on the exchanges of notes concerning the border problem. Nonetheless there was no fundamental shift in Indian foreign policy, and when President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan offered, subject to an understanding on Kashmir, to join India in a military alliance for the defence of the sub continent, he was rudely rebuffed. The Indian defense minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, presumably with a full catalogue of reports and aerial photographs of regions involved, blithely continued to reflect that

¹⁷Peking Review No. 18 cited in Hussain, n.14, p. 18.

Pakistan was primary enemy. The same was reflected in deployment of forces, and the "political generals" affair which embittered relations between General Thimayya & Krishna Menon. Nonetheless, the Indian fixation over a relatively non-existent Pakistani threat remained a most mystifying aspect of Indian security policy.¹⁸

The weakness of Indian Defence Build up:

General K.S. Thimayya summarized this in these terms:

"Where as in case of Pakistan I have considered the possibility of a total war, I am afraid. I cannot do so in regard to China. I cannot even as a soldier envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own. It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security."¹⁹

Thus till 1962 the security of India against China rested on external political manoeuvring. This was reflected in 1950's in the Sino-Indian treaty on Tibet, whose preamble included the declaration of Panchsheel.²⁰

To make matters more confusing, in June China ignored the border problem and focussed on the brief crisis over

¹⁸Wilcox, n.7, p. 59.

¹⁹Cited by S.S. Khera, India's Defence Problem (New Delhi, 1968), p. 158.

²⁰Raju G.C. Thomas "India" in Edward A Kolodziej and Robert E Harkavy Ed. Security Policies of Developing Countries (Massachusetts, 1987), p.126.

the Taiwan straits. Early in July, Chinese attention was yanked back to the Askai Chin as a Chinese post at Galwan was cut off by the establishment of an Indian position. China responded by surrounding the India troops but not eliminating them. Chinese deterrence signals increased especially after a clash later in July resulted in casualties.

The next month was quiet as India indicated that there was still some room for talks on border issues. The lull ended on 22 August when India indicated for less willingness to negotiate and China resumed reporting border incidents. In early September Beijing clearly moved into another gear, on the one hand setting a firm date for talks (15 October) and on the other responding more forcefully to Indian posts established in territory claimed by China. In June India had established a post at Dhola across the disputed Macmohan line in North East Frontier Area (NEFA) but in September China began applying pressure to the position. At first, India seemed to respond to this pressure and on 19 September agreed to some sort of talks as China requested.²¹

These, already dim hopes, were darkened still further on 20 September when a border clash, apparently instigated by China, resulted in relatively heavy casualties. The Chinese policy on the crisis was less than consistent and

²¹Segal, n.5. p. 152.

Beijing did not reply to the 19 September Indian statement until 3 October. On 6 October, the atmosphere had clearly deteriorated, India finally made clear that talks were no longer possible. Chinese attempts at deterrence of India had all but failed. On 10 October an Indian patrol advanced, cut off a Chinese position near Dhola, and the PLA initiated a combat with a brief but swift victory. India ignored this last attempt at a forceful deterrence message and on 12 October Nehru reportedly ordered the Chinese to be evicted from the NEFA. It was apparently at this point, after the passing of 15 October deadline for talks, that China decided to "teach India a lesson".

Chinese aggressive posture started ruthlessly on 20 October. Indian troops withdrew swiftly, but in the three week lull after the PLA offensive, India made it plain that it was bloodied but not bowed. India sought a second round of conflict with China and a local offensive was launched on 14 November. It was easily rebuffed by China and Beijing moved to deliver the final crushing part of its military lesson. By 18 November PLA forces broke through Indian lines again. With the Indians in panic, China declared a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew its forces to the lines it had proposed originally, but was an aggression according to India.

The Chinese objectives in Sino-Indian war are overwhelmingly based on perceived vulnerability to Indian

territorial encroachments. Thus China sought first to deter India, and when that failed, to compel an Indian retreat. Analysts have already made clear that although China's signalling may have been faulty and its paranoia about Indian threats exaggerated, there is little dispute that Beijing was acting, as in Korea, out of defensive motives. The political objectives motivated the initial use of force, but military success provided the political leaders with new, and perhaps unexpected options. This was an exercise in forward defence with regards to India especially after Tibet. In May, after the first serious shooting incidents, China's verbal deterrence changed qualitatively when, it warned India privately that it would not sit idle by - a key phrase from the Korean war and that as, Allen Whiting points out, India should have recognized as serious.²² But this excessive warning in face of no new Indian moves, coupled with the wild fluctuations in the intensity of attention in Beijing given to frontier, did not make for clearest of communications. Only from July, the People's Daily warned about going to the brink of the precipice,²³ and the ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that China by no means can sit idle, but neither statements reflected any real increase in tension. Chinese warnings

²²Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor, 1975), pp. 58-9.

²³People's Daily (Beijing) 9 July 1962 cited in Segal, n.5, p.143.

were reviewed, beginning with the secret Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note of 5 September, setting the 5 October deadline for talks.²⁴ China began to integrate its military actions more urgently with the verbal warnings, on 8 September Chinese pressure was applied on Dhola post, but the fact that it came three months after the position was established, did little to reinforce India's belief in China's sincerity, On 13 September China had called Dhola post a "new development".

To make matters worse, after India on 19 September, seemed to accept the 15 October date, China opened fire near Dhola while issuing patently, false battle reports. Beijing's verbal position matched its new bellicosity by warning that China could not look on idly while its frontier guards are being mercilessly killed. On 6 October it was clear to China that its deterrence had all but failed when India swiftly rejected Chinese note of 3 October that held open the door to talks. China's last attempt to deter the Indian forward policy then followed with the 10 October attack at Dhola, but Nehru still declared that PLA has to be evicted from NEFA.²⁵

The coercive phase of Chinese objectives could not have been more successful. Indian forces were crushed. The massive Chinese troops, in what came to be known as human

²⁴Whiting, n.22, pp. 95-6.

²⁵Ibid, pp. 112-14.

waves, pressed forward in a series of long imbroken columns. "The Chinese operation" wrote Hanson W. Baldwin in the New York Times, "has been remarkable in its speed and effectiveness. This is particularly true because of the distance of the combat zones from the main centres of Chinese supply, the high altitudes and the rugged, almost trackless, region. The Chinese communist armies fight, and are supplied, like a swarm of army ants. They force whole village populations to serve as human carriers, as they did in Korea, and by dint of awful exertion and at the cost of countless lives they conquer nearly any terrain."²⁶

China seized all its objectives in the disputed territory and more, in little more than a day. But then Chinese objectives broadened. On 22 October China had claimed it was merely trying 'to prevent the aggressive Indian troops from reviewing their attack' and expanding the border clashes. China was concerned that India wanted to 'stage a come back' and 'launch fresh attacks'.²⁷ But if that were truly the case, then China might have imperiously announced its unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal in the third week of October (and still demoralized India). But apparently China was not prepared for such an easy victory. Objectives were, therefore, changed in the long run. China

²⁶Cited in Varma, n.12, p. 163.

²⁷Ministry of Defence (PRC) Cited in Segal, n.5, p.145.

got an opportunity not merely to defend its security that was accomplished but also to teach several people a lesson. Not only was India to be taught that it was no match for Chinese power in Asia, but its claim to lead the non-alignment also took a knock. Lessons were also no doubt intended for other more important, new spectators - the super powers. Recently emerged from the glimpse of the nuclear abyss in Cuba, the super powers could be shown that emergent China was a power to be reckoned with.

It is true that India gave China no reason to think that it had accepted Chinese terms for talks since the October fighting. But neither did India accept Chinese terms after November and then China seemed satisfied with its unilateral ceasefire. It is also notable that in the three weeks lull between combat, China showed no signs of pursuing a new deterrent posture. Certainly there was no coherent pacific intentions to talk when it was essentially gearing up its logistics for a purely punitive punch.²⁸

Thus there were three objectives of China. The first, one was of deterrence against perceived border encroachments. The second, compelling of India to withdraw was a striking success so much so that China found it convenient to pursue a third objective the teaching of a lesson to India and other onlookers. Here too China was

²⁸Zhou En-Lai People's Daily Observer (Beijing) 11 November, 1964 cited in Segal, n. 5, p. 145.

successful, if only because it picked on a weak and unprepared India.

China's main grudge, possibly, was of being treated at par with India by the West. Some Western writers put India at the same level with China using the phrase "Two Great Powers in Asia Policy".²⁹ China's basic aim was, therefore, may be to weaken and humiliate India, to gain strategic superiority over its Asian rival, to lessen Indian power and influence generally to hamper India's economic progress³⁰.

Analysis shows that during 1962 none of the super powers played any role. The only sympathetic role came forth by November 3, when the United States Air Force began air lifting military supplies to New Delhi. In the face of increasingly serious Chinese threat the United States government also held discussions with Great Britain and Canada towards reaching a broad and coordinated programme of military aid to India. This was related to 'umbrella plan-under Pentagon's control' to subserve the interests of the United States of America.³¹ Though significance of

²⁹George N. Patterson, Peking versus Delhi (London 1963), p. 29.

³⁰Norman D. Palmer "Trans-Himalyan Confrontation" Orbis, ^(LONDON) Winter 1963 Cited in Varma, n.12 p. 305.

³¹John Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations: Hostile Co-existence (London, 1967), p. 171.

Sino-Soviet split should not be underestimated.³² Though the understanding of Sino-Soviet split is necessary for appreciation of Beijing's policy in 1962, but it does not necessarily indicate that China saw itself as weak and needed an outlet like 1962 war to prove its mettle. The United State did not play much role during the war. Though after the war, Kennedy shared India's mutual defensive concern to thwart the design of Chinese aggression against the subcontinent and promised effective assistance in India's development and defence³³. Beijing was, therefore, far more interested in appealing to follow Third world states, as the context of 1962 border war involved China's prestige as Asian power far more than its relations with super powers.³⁴ Local Asian, such as Pakistan were particularly present in Chinese appeals of this type. This dimension will be dealt a little later. The Chinese press only began involving the United States in a direct way as responsible for Indian "aggressiveness" after the Cuban crisis had passed. Chinese comments both about Sino Indian war and the Cuban crisis, make it plain that China was concerned about the Soviet policy in the phase after China's first offensive. Yet super-power influence on Sino-

³²Segal, n.5, p.148.

³³Mohan Ram, Politics of Sino-Indian Confrontation (Delhi, 1973), p. 155.

³⁴Gerald Segal, The Great Power Triangle (London, 1982), p.46.

Indian border war remains marginal at most. Chinese operations were determined, overwhelmingly, by bilateral relations with India.

India and Colombo Proposals:

The Colombo proposals, put forward by Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Indonesia (through a conference held on 10 December, 1962 attempted to provide a basis for negotiations. The suggestion for eastern sector was that India could move up to McMohan line except for Thagla Ridge and Longju. Though initially welcomed by China they were to be conditioned by some "reservations" later. Reservations were against India's movement till McMohan line. This, in effect, meant a rejection of substantive part of the proposals. Nehru, stated in AICC meeting on 17 May, 1964 that India had taken the lead in accepting the Colombo proposals and the further initiative rested with China. China, on its part never reciprocated to this initiative. The later period can be characterized as of "hostile-coexistence".³⁵

This was because China feared that Indian efforts to make Colombo "mediation" into "arbitration" on the disputed frontier might succeed. To discredit India in eyes of Afro-Asians they sought to prove before Afro-Asians that Indians had become aligned with United States and become renegades

³⁵Nancy Jetly, India-China Relations, 1947-1977 : A Study of Parliament's Role in Making of Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1979), pp. 200-223.

of the Afro-Asian anti-Imperialist camp. Yet though Chinese propaganda was neutralized by Soviet support to India.³⁶

Impact on Pakistan Relations (Impact on region):

Pakistan's response to the 1962 war showed the realization of pragmatic approach that one's enemy is one's friend. Earlier in 1950's, through SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan had placed herself under some treaty obligations aimed at checking communist aggression. The attitude towards Chinese aggression got reflected in it's lodging protests with her western allies against supply of arms to India as an "unfriendly act towards Pakistan endangering peace of the world."³⁷ She called upon the Western countries that if they were to continue help to India, they should insist on India coming to a settlement with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. She described variously Chinese attack on India as illusory aggression³⁸ as really a figment of Indian imagination when Pakistan's SEATO and CENTO allies made it clear that their arms aid would enable the latter to meet Chinese aggression and expressed the hope that the common interest of Pakistan and India in the security of subcontinent would lead to a reconciliation of

³⁶Hussain, n. 14, p. 40.

³⁷Statement of Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali on November 22, 1962. cited in Varma, n.12, p.307.

³⁸Z.A. Bhutto's speech at Eighteenth Session of General Assembly of United Nations, Cited in C.J. Chacko Sino-Pak Relations (Bombay, 1963), p.97.

India-Pakistan differences.³⁹

Mohammed Ayooob stated:

"China and Pakistan have always had similar objectives and apprehensions as regards India and their long range policies have always run parallel. Both of them have precisely appreciated the area of coincidence in their objectives and policies. It is a result of this appreciation that they have always endeavoured to keep their records clear with respect to each other and to avoid irritants which might alienate one from the other. And they have done this in spite of the fact that one of them is a militant communist country and other a professed ally of the west."⁴⁰

Ayub Khan expressed that this emphasis by western countries on Chinese aggression and their consequential military aid and assistance to India in that context did "make a sense to Pakistan". India on the other hand, in spite of patent illegalities of Pakistani claims and acts had agreed with Pakistan on November 24, 1962 to explore all avenues to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters, so as to enable India and Pakistan to live side by side in

³⁹Joint Communique by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan on 21st December, 1962, cited in Chacko, n. 38, p.99.

⁴⁰Mohammed Ayooob, "India as a factor in Sino - Pakistani relations" International Studies (New Delhi) Vol. 9 (3), 1968, p. 281.

peace and friendship.

After 1962 war, China questioned India's sovereignty over Kashmir thereby carving out a niche for itself in the regional balance of power.

Pakistan was quite an important factor in China's invasion on India. By pushing India into receiving American arms China could pull Pakistan out of Western alliances and draw closer to herself⁴¹.

Pakistan kept on pursuing a double course of condemning India on the one hand and defending China as peace loving country on the other hand. Thus she stated that India was dreaming of domination over their neighbour and is in particular planning to attack Pakistan with its newly acquired arms.

Therefore for Pakistan, the border war between India and China in October 1962 provided an opportunity to cultivate China and prove its suspicion of India.

Thus Pakistan's reaction to 1962 war was three fold -

(i) considered India responsible for conflict as conflict stemmed from India's unrealistic and fallacious foreign policy. India had failed to base its policies on principles of peace and good neighbourly relations and hence the conflict.

(ii) Secondly, sharply disagreed with Western allies that China's attack constituted a major threat to entire

⁴¹Varma, n. 12, p. 148.

subcontinent.

(iii) It was highly critical of western aid to India.⁴²

That these allegations are false, could be seen from Pakistan's rejection of India's repeated offer to sign a no-war pact with the former. If Pakistan was genuinely apprehending aggression from the Indian side, there was no reason why it should reject the offer of a no-war pact with India.

Secondly, Pakistan charged that India, "was the original aggressor in the border dispute with communist China." she also persisted in saying that China, being a peace loving country, had no aggressive designs.

Then Pakistan tried to strengthen her relations with China by entering into a series of agreements with the latter. January 4, 1963 a trade agreement was concluded and in August 1963 an Air Link Agreement.

Referring to Pakistan's policy of duplicity the Indian representative at the Eighteenth Session of U.N. General Assembly said, "A country which once claimed to be the greatest crusader against communism, which joined organizations with the avowed objective of containing communism and obtaining military aid on that ground, apparently has no qualms now in contracting a 'marriage of convenience' with PRC, which is the only country in the world today which believes in inevitability of war and is

⁴²Hussain, n. 14, p. 51.

prepared to wage aggressive wars in furtherance of its national policy. The foreign Minister of Pakistan has recently informed Pakistan National Assembly that Pakistan has got some assurance from the largest state of Asia.... obviously referring to PRC that it would come to Pakistan's aid in case of confrontation between India and Pakistan. Apparently, Pakistan has greater faith in Chinese promise than in SEATO. From SEATO to Sino-Pak Agreement is indeed a remarkable metamorphosis. It does not require much imagination to discern this strange alliance... the common objective of keeping India militarily weak in order that it may be unable to resist aggression."

To gain the lost ground with Pakistan, the United States tried to pressurize India on Kashmir as an exchange for aid during the war. It took a number of steps to assuage Pakistan's feelings. President Kennedy stated:

"In providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan. All of our aid to India is for the purpose of defeating Chinese Communist subversion... our help to India in no way diminishes or qualifies our commitment to Pakistan and we have made it clear to both governments as well."⁴³

Thus during 1962 war the direct blow to India policy on security came. It was a blow to India's concept of Non

⁴³Richard P Stebbins Ed. Documents on American Foreign Relations : 1962 (New York, 1963) p. 27.

alignment and pursuance of peace through diplomatic measures too. On India's side, as regards Sino-Indian relation the Prime Minister reiterated that firstly, the aggression be undone to Indian satisfaction before normal relations could be restored. Secondly, he lamented that despite our friendliness China's behaviour towards India showed such utter disregard of the ordinary canons of international behaviour that it had shaken India's confidence in good faith. Finally, the regional dimension, to quote him "Himalyan barrier has proved to be vulnerable. If it is breached, the way to Indian plains and ocean beyond would be exposed; and the threat to India, would then, likewise, be a threat to the other countries of South and South East Asia. India's determination to resist aggression and retain her territorial integrity is, therefore, a vital factor in safeguarding of peace and stability throughout this area."⁴⁴

The year 1962 started an era of a unique alliance between Communist China and authoritarian Pakistan to curtail India's influence. This had direct and strong consequences for the region as well, as a very powerful neighbour started playing a very important role in the South Asian trouble waters. This meant, as President Ayub said that the American "stab in the back" was forcing his

⁴⁴Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru "Changing India" Foreign Affairs (New York), April 1963 in Jain n. 9, p. 276.

government into a most difficult position. He charged that the US course is still tending to "drive Pakistan to the wall". He warned that such a course "could force Pakistan to adopt unpalatable policies which would be bad for the United States and still worse for Pakistan."⁴⁵

Thus this year marked a new beginning in strategic thinking and postures of the regional players but putting China in the foreground of the strategic calculations in the region. Hence the phase started of close Sino-Pak relations, Super-powers disillusionment with Pakistan giving a leverage to India and creating regions of vulnerability in the security of the region. The axis got an impetus from the 1962 war. Speaking on this subject Bhutto told the National Assembly "we entered into negotiations with China in December 1960. Our negotiations were progressing in an unsatisfactory manner. Then at the time of Sino-Indian conflict an impetus was given to these negotiations"⁴⁶.

The evolution of Sino-Pak axis during the period will be elaborated on in the following chapter.

⁴⁵Telegram, From Spielman (Rawalpindi) to Secretary of State Oct. 21, 1963, Declassified Documents 1963 (76) 07 C cited in Mohammed Raziallah Azmi's "Regional Conflicts, Alliance and Non Alignment. The American Dilemma in South Asia 1962-1965" Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Villanova) vo. XVI (4) Summer, 1993. p.39

⁴⁶G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and The Major Power: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent (New York, 1975) pp. 178-81.

CHAPTER - III

EVOLUTION OF SINO-PAK AXIS

Sino-Pak axis developed around the security complex in the region. A Security Complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. Security complexes tend to be durable, but they are neither permanent nor internally rigid¹. The international system as a whole contains a large number of security complexes, some of which intersect or overlap, and some of which fit inside each other. Because of these complicated patterns, the boundary of any particular complex may be difficult to define with precision and the use of concept requires sensitivity of those states which occupy position in one or more complex. The links which tie together a security complex may be of many types - geographical, political, strategic, historical, economic, cultural and states outside the complex may play a major role within it, without the complex itself being central to their security concerns.

¹Barry Buzan, Peoples, States and Fears : The National Security Problem in International Relations. (London, 1983), p 106.

In case of South Asia the heart of complex as stated earlier, is the rivalry between India and Pakistan, two large states whose insecurities are so deeply intertwined that their national securities, cannot be separated. A number of much less powerful states are bound into complex for geographical reasons, including Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. China, Although an important actor in South Asian context is not part of security complex. What binds the South Asian security complex together is dominant role of local issues and relations in defining the national security priorities of the states within it.

On top of these domestic problems but frequently linked to them, lies a layer of local, inter-state disputes which defines the principle binding insecurities of the complex as a whole. The major example of such a dispute is the Kashmir issue.

Besides, these local rivalries, especially between Indian and Pakistan, not only define the South Asian security complex but also set the mould for its relations with the larger complexes around it. The two major external patterns which cut through the South Asian complex, one generated by Sino-Soviet dispute and other arising from the rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. This subcontinent became one of the few areas of the world in which all three major powers have been closely involved in rivalry with one another and where

China competed on a relatively equal footing with the two super powers.² This illustrates the way in which higher level complexes (that is, those composed of major powers which define their security in regional or global terms) penetrate and influence the pattern of relations generated within a local complex.³

The 1962 Sino-Indian War, and India's defeat caused the United States, Britain and Soviet Union to rush military aid to Delhi, the odd combination of East and West reflecting western slowness to register the significance of the Sino-Soviet split. It also transformed attitude towards military defence in India, resulting in a rapid doubling of manpower and expenditure, and adoption of serious long term plans for upgrading domestic defence production and procurement policies. These developments caused alarm in Pakistan, not only because of immediate shock of seeing its American ally ship arms to the enemy, but also because the burgeoning transformation of the Indian military threatened to push Pakistan into permanent inferiority on the subcontinent. A classic security dilemma was clearly in making here, with outside powers amplifying local patterns of insecurity. On the one hand Indian grew increasingly concerned at the prospect of a two

²J.D. Armstrong, Revolutionary' Diplomacy Chinese Foreign Policy and United Front Doctrine (Berkeley, 1977) p.152.

³Buzan, n.1, p. 108.

front attack by China and Pakistan and to meet this contingency it greatly increased its arms strength, moving closer to the Soviet Union as a supplier of arms and arms industries in the process. On the other hand Pakistan saw the growing weight of Indian arms almost wholly in relation to itself, worrying not only about its military security in general, but also about the rapidly declining prospects for resolving the Kashmir dispute in its favour.

The main feature of new Chinese policy towards South Asia was marked by its effort to isolate India by aligning itself with other countries which are on India's periphery. In that effort, China laid special emphasis on building up its relations with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal.

China at one level, claimed not to be involved in India Pakistan dispute saying that Sino-Pakistan boundary negotiations had not touched the question of ownership of Kashmir. Yet at another level accused India as is revealed in Chinese note to India, 21 February, 1963⁴,. "After the defeat of its military adventure against China, India encouraged by certain western powers redoubled its efforts to entice Pakistan into a joint anti China campaign. India has not only brushed aside the traditional Sino-Indian friendship of thousand years standing but is deliberately

⁴Chinese Note to India, 21 February, 1963 in R.K. Jain Ed. China South Asia Relations : 1947-1980 vol.1, (Delhi, 1981), p. 262.

sowing discord and sabotage the relations between China and other neighbours. The Indian Government's attitude is indeed that of a down right big nation chauvinism and expansionism". For about fourteen years (1962-1976) Chinese policy in South Asia was based on that strategy. It was with Pakistan, China developed a special relationship. A Sino-Pakistan alliance looked natural as both countries saw India as a threat to themselves. In the note of 30 June, 1962 the Government of India drew attention of the Chinese government to exploit for its own ends, the differences on Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani government. This came about in the calculated release of China - Pak joint communique at a time when delegations from India and Pakistan were attempting to resolve their differences on Kashmir and related matters. The joint communique was termed as a 'brazen attempt at legitimization of gains of aggression in the hope that Chinese government would, thereby secure Pakistani support to Chinese aggression on India and gains of this aggression.'⁵ The relationship with Pakistan became particularly close after the Sino-Indian border war. The friendship and understanding between the two countries led to a settlement of a Sino-Pakistani border after about six months of negotiation in 1963. China and Pakistan began moving together in what must count as one of the most

⁵Ibid. p. 249.

unlikely political associations imaginable.⁶ Pakistan saw the need for a more reliable ally against India than the United States had proved to be and the Chinese had demonstrated both the capability and the will to act against India in 1962. The Chinese for their part could hardly miss the containment implications of a Soviet-Indian axis.⁷ From Beijing's perspective, a tie with Pakistan not only proved a politically significant territorial passage to the Indian Ocean, but also offered prospects of deflecting India from Soviet purposes by keeping it preoccupied with its subcontinental disputes. The 1965 war between India and Pakistan quickly deteriorated into a military stalemate, but its political impact was to consolidate the intrusion of the Sino-Soviet complex into the South Asian one. Because of the war, the United States and Britain imposed an arms embargo on both sides, thereby opening the door for Soviet and Chinese influence. India and Pakistan were at a pitch of mutual fear and suspicious and sorely in need of weapon to make up their war losses. The Soviet Union lost no time in assisting India's rearmament, and China did what it could do to resupply Pakistan. By the later 1960s, as a result, the two security complexes, though still distinct were locked

⁶Mahinda Werake, "China & South Asia : Some Historical Perspectives." - in Shelton V Kodikara, South Asian Strategic Issues (New Delhi, 1990) p. 61.

⁷Buzan, n.1, p. 55.

together by alignments respectively between two weaker and two stronger powers in each complex, since Sino-Soviet complex centered on much large powers, however, its impact on South Asian affairs was relatively large, where as South Asian links were relatively peripheral in overall Sino-Soviet affairs.

As for Pakistan's geopolitical calculations, involving India as the centre, China, Soviet Union, and the United States have been contributors for its policy towards China.⁸ It has established strategic links with them Bhola observes that in the perceptions of Pakistani leadership China was and continues to be the only great power, which has been consistently sympathetic and responsive to Pakistan's requirements ; strategic, political, diplomatic and economic; because of the congruence of its strategic interest in the subcontinent with those of Pakistan. Pakistan's foreign policy revolved around one central concern its fear of India. It was this that had caused it to enter SEATO rather than any apprehensions about China as Beijing itself clearly understood. The area of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan bordered a region of China, both politically unstable and of considerable strategic importance. In Mid 50's therefore, China tried seeking friendly relations with both India and Pakistan rather than

⁸P.L. Bhola, "Pak and PRC" in Ramkant Ed. China and South Asia (Jaipur, 1988), p.12.

playing one against the other. That it why when Pakistan shifted towards U.S.A. in 1959 and proposed joint defence system in India, China considered it as opportunistic moves in the context of India-Pakistan relations rather than caused by the fears of China. The joint-defence offer was made conditional on Kashmir question being resolve by a plebiscite, which Pakistan believed would go in its favour. Nehru rejected the offer on the grounds that Pakistan's real objective was not to restrain China but to secure Kashmir.⁹

Pakistan which could ill afford to have two hostile neighbours, was quick to try to restore the damage that had been done to Sino-Pakistani relations in the early part of 1959. A further motive was its growing awareness of the fact that China would be Pakistan's natural ally against India if Sino-India relation continued to worsen. The Sino-Pakistan relations, any case were under^{no} specific strains and since Bandung had developed military ties.¹⁰ As expressed by L.F. Rush brook Williams.

"Soon after Afro Asian conference the Chinese assured the Pakistan government in a private message that there was no conceivable clash of interests between the two countries

⁹M. Ayooob "India as a factor in Sino Pakistan relations" International Studies, (New Delhi) vol. 9 (3), 1968.

¹⁰D.C. Jha, Indo-Pak Relations (Patna, 1972) pp. 30-32.

that could imperil their friendly relation, but this position did not apply to Indo-Chinese relations in which a definite conflict interest could be expected in near future"¹¹. An additional impetus to thi was given when the Kennedy administration began in 1960 to improve its relations with India. On October 6, 1962, having publicly declared that his policy towards Beijing had been erroneous, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to President John F. Kennedy requesting United State's assistance against China. The U.S. joined by Great Britain, "promptly responded with substantial amounts" of military assistance.¹² Two plane loads of British supplies arrived in India on October 29 and four planes with American equipment landed there five days late, two weeks of start of Sino Indian war on October 20.¹³ Nehru and Kennedy exchanged offer a dozen letters in next six months. Later President Kennedy sent a high powered delegation headed by W. Averell Harriman to New Delhi to assess India's long term needs. It arrived there no November 22, two days after the Chinese declared a unilateral cases fire and the

¹¹ L.F. Rush book Williams. The State of Pakistan (London, 1966) cited in Hussain. Sino-Indian Conflict and International Politics in the Indian Subcontinent 1962-1966. (Faridabad, 1977) p.69.

¹²Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965) p. 663.

¹³L.J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security : Defence Policies : 1947-65 (Dehradoon, 1967) p. 182.

intention to withdraw to their prewar positions. The Harriman Mission was soon joined in New Delhi by a British delegation led by Duncan Sandys, the secretary for Commonwealth Affairs. In December, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold MacMillan decided at their Nassau meeting that they would provide India with military assistance amounting to \$120 million on emergency basis.¹⁴ Thus, India became one recipient of Western military assistance without incurring any formal alliance or treaty obligation. The Chinese comment on the United States Commonwealth mission to India on 8 February, 1963 was :

The visit of the joint military mission shows that the Nehru government in order to step up into its anti-China campaign, will further throw itself into the embrace of the U.S. imperialism at the expense of India's sovereignty and national interests.

The so called neutrality and non-alignment of the Nehru government has long been cast to the winds. Its present plan to provide U.S. imperialism with military bases for operations against China has further exposed its military alliance with the western imperialists bloc. By following this, the Indian government will simply become a tool

¹⁴Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of India (Bombay, 1971) p. 388.

of U.S. war plan of "using Asians to fight Asians" and will itself gain nothing.¹⁵

It seemed to Pakistani leaders that both superpowers were lavishing its adversary with arms in competition with eh other. There was great resentment in Pakistan at the American military assistance to India, which, especially after the ceasefire and withdrawal was regarded as far in case of the exigencies of the situation. Pakistanis held the view that their vital security interests were being sacrificed by an ally. Ayub Khan complained that President Kennedy had not kept his promise (allegedly made during the Pakistani President's visit to Washington the previous year) to consult Pakistan before furnishing any military assistance to India.¹⁶ By improving India's military standing United states has strengthened India's stand on Kashmir, which now felt no major compulsion to make a major concession to Pakistan.¹⁷ In a secret session of Pakistan National Assembly President Ayub Khan Expressed gratitude to the United State for the substantial assistance it had given Pakistan, said that has government did not intend to withdraw from the alliances but would constantly assess

¹⁵Peking Review Commentary, Jain, n. 5, p. 260.

¹⁶Letter to President Kennedy, November 5, 1962 in Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography (London, 1967) p. 143.

¹⁷G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966 (New York, 1966) pp. 133-40.

the situation and try to improve relations with other countries particularly, China.¹⁸

Border Agreement :

Though the border war between India and China in October 1962 provided an opportunity to cultivate China and prove its suspicion of India,¹⁹ it was the year of 1963 that some the Pak-China alliance take shape and form. It would be fertile to deny that China began to cast deep shadows over Indo-Pak relation to the extent of coming to possible rapprochement over individual issues²⁰.

As regards border, informal approaches were made to China over the possibility of the two states negotiating a boundary agreement towards the end of 1959²¹ while the first diplomatic note on this subject was sent by Pakistan on 28 March 1961.²² China did not reply to this note until eleven months later, on 27 Feb, 1962, and it did not respond at all to the earlier approaches. Negotiations finally began during December 1962, shortly after Sino-India conflict had ended. Although the actual demarcation

¹⁸New York Times (New York) 22nd Novemebr 1962, quoted in Mohammad Raziallah Azmi "Regional Conflicts, Alliance and Non Alignment" in Journal of South Asian & Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XVI (4) Summer 1993, p.37.

¹⁹Hussain, n. 11, p.69.

²⁰Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, (New Delhi) Jain, n. 5, p. 246.

²¹Khan, n.16, p. 162.

²²Dawn (Karachi) 3 March, 1963 in Armstrong, n. 2, p. 158.

took some years to complete, an agreement in principle was reached by March 1963. The Pak-China Border accord, which was Beijing's "One diplomatic slap on India's mangled face"²³ opened a new era in Pak-China relations.²⁴

Confronted with the spectre of growing relationship between the super powers and India, Pakistan tried to readjust its foreign policy in such a way as to consolidate relations with its Kautilyan Friend²⁵. After the border agreement, a few months later, Pakistan became the first non-communist country to sign a civil aviation agreement with China national carrier, Pakistan International Airlines, obtained landing and transit rights in Shanghai and Canton. By border agreement Pakistan gave away thousands of square miles of Kashmiri territory to China.

Therefore the reason for China's initial reluctance to enter into negotiations over the border was probably its desire to avoid further alienation of India by appearing to give some legitimacy to Pakistan's control part of Kashmir. The text of 1963 border agreement emphasised that the agreement was provisional and would be renegotiated with "the sovereign authority concerned" if india and Pakistan

²³L.A. Sherwani, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Karachi, 1980) p. 93.

²⁴Azizul Haque, Trends in Pakistan's External Policy - 1947-71 : With particular Reference to PRC (Dhaka, 1985) p. 49.

²⁵Howard Wriggins, "The Balancing Process in Pakistan's Foreign Policy". in Armstrong, n.2, p.160.

resolved there Kashmir dispute.

The boundary agreement was described as 'historic' by China, "a notable milestone" by Pakistan and criticised by India as "illegal and invalidated law, and a collusive attempt at annexing part of Indian territory in Kashmir"²⁶

The Sino-Pak friendship started by Boundary Agreement was characterized as an example of 'Asian-African Solidarity' by China²⁷.

Fundamentally, American policy of propping up India drove Pakistan even closer to China and into what Dean Rusk later called the "fellowship of the frustrated".²⁸ Ayub claims on the other hand, that the sole purpose of the border agreement was "to eliminate a possible cause of conflict in future."²⁹ So the relationship between both China and Pakistan stood on bedrock of 'pragmatic orientation of foreign policy and security that are based on the national assessment of vital national security interest'³⁰. That is why in the border agreement Pakistan ceded to China 10,000 sq.km of India territory in Pok.

Pakistan's claim to 10,000 sq. km K2 Karakoram pass NJ

²⁶B.L. Sharma. The Pak-China Axis (New Delhi, 1968) p. 129.

²⁷Jain, n. 5, Vol. II Pakistan, p. 53.

²⁸Azmi, n.18, p. 45.

²⁹Khan, n.16, p. 162.

³⁰Raisul Raïf "China-Pak: The Strategic Lines". The Muslim, (Karachi) 26 June., 1987.

4842 triangle had been sought to be justified by quoting Indian protests regarding the Sino-Pak boundary agreement of March 1963. By giving away territories in a region close to Sinkiang where the Chinese faced Soviet divisions, Pakistan conferred immense strategic advantages to the Chinese and earned in return China's politico-strategic support to its stand on the Kashmir issue³¹ on 7 May, 1963, Nehru was cited as having stated "on 3 or 4th May simultaneous statements were made by the Government of Pakistan and China to the following effect. They say that the boundary between Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the defence of which is under actual control of Pakistan had never been formally delimited and demarcated in the past history. We have made it clear perfectly in the past both to the Pakistan Government and the Chinese Government about those parts of the frontier now in possession of Pakistan that we would not recognize any agreement arrived at between then and Pakistan."³²

Pakistan on the other hand viewed agreement as having implication that went far beyond just prevention of conflict in future and indeed regarded it as the first stage in the formation of an informal alliance between China and Pakistan against India. Despite the disclaimers

³¹P.S. Jayaramu, India's National Security and Foreign Policy, (New Delhi, 1987) p. 159.

³²Jasjit Singh "Siachen Glacier : Facts and Fictions" Strategic Analysis, (New Delhi) October 1989, p. 707.

in the text of agreement it undeniably brought China closer to a legal recognition of Pakistan's *de facto* control part of Kashmir, and Pakistan may have calculated that only a step beyond this for China to become committed to status quo in Kashmir and thereby to the defence of Pakistan itself. Chou En Lai in an interview with a Pakistani journalist did not confine himself to the pragmatic justification of the agreement that it was a means of preventing future conflict but argued that the actual demarcation that had been arrived at was legally defensible because it followed the boundaries shown on British maps in the nineteenth century. This suggested that Beijing would be unwilling to make any further territorial concessions and showed the boundary has to be renegotiated with India. Yet the speech of Foreign Minister Bhutto to Pakistani National Assembly on 17 July, 1963 contained the evidence of China's support. The speech goes like, "An attack on Pakistan's territorial integrity also involved the territorial integrity and security of largest state of Asia."³³ Though denying any formal or informal alliance with China Bhutto pointed out that in case of conflict, the area's geopolitics might come into play, and it was not possible to predict exactly how the situation would

³³Asian Almanac 17-20 July 1963, Armstrong, n. 2, p. 160.

develop³⁴.

Pakistan never thought that there was any need to enter into military collaboration with China to obtain Beijing's support on Kashmir issue³⁵. They had similar thoughts, similar attitudes, similar objective for example, "a common fighting task".³⁶ Pakistan clearly believed not only that they could count on China's support without having to sign an alliance treaty but this alliance system was important as it created uncertainty in the minds of Indian leaders as to the extent to which China would go in aiding Pakistan. On the other hand it allowed Pakistan to keep its options open in terms of winning support from two superpowers, since Pakistan could hold out the threat of a closer involvement with China in order to bring pressure to bear on the United States and Soviet Union. Ayub Khan did precisely that, when in an interview he denied that Pakistan and China had concluded a secret military pact but said on being asked about the possibility of such a pact being signed in the future.

The answer to this lies with the United States authorities. If India grows menacingly strong,

³⁴Dawn (Karachi) 9 October 1963 in Ibid, p. 16.

³⁵New York Times (New York), 27 February, 1964, Jayaramu, n.32, p.159.

³⁶Dawn (Karachi) 25 February, 1965 Cited in Sharma, n. 27, p. 121.

we shall be in a great predicament and shall have to look around for someone to help us. If we are attacked by India, then that means India is on the move and wants to expand. We assume that other asian powers especially China would take notice of that (emphasis added).³⁷

The publicly stated Pakistani view in 1963 was, then that China's own security requirements would inevitably involve China on Pakistan side should Pakistan security be seriously threatened. For the relationship between the two countries to deserve the title "informal alliance" it would be necessary for China to have the same understanding of the situation as Pakistan and for there be some evidence that the two countries had reached a private agreement that could be interpreted as establishing an informal alliance.

During 1963 there were no Chinese statements of support for Pakistan which implied the same degree of commitment as Pakistani speeches were suggesting. However, a commitment of sorts was given by China's trade minister at the end of year when he said that China would support Pakistan in the event of "fresh aggression" by India.³⁸ Beijing, on the other hand had on no occasion refuted the claims made in Pakistan concerning China's support, which

³⁷Ibid, 13 September, 1963 cited in Armstrong, n. 2, p.172.

³⁸The Times (London) 2 December 1963 in Ibid. p. 162.

suggest a tacit acceptance by China of the role in which Rawalpindi had cast it.

Pakistan's leader had calculated that China could be drawn into a commitment to the defence of Pakistani controlled Kashmir, if not of other parts of Pakistan, as a logical consequence of Sino-Pakistan border demarcation. Evens do appear to have developed in this way during 1963-64. In March 1963, Chen Yi had declared with reference to Kashmir issue, "The Chinese government has all along maintained a position of not getting involved in this matter and hoped it would be settled peacefully..... This attitude of ours is open and above board and consistent". However, throughout 1963 and first part of 1964, Rawalpindi sought to demonstrate its usefulness to China in a number of ways, with what may be assumed was the objective of causing China to shift from neutrality on Kashmir question. In April 1963 meeting of SEATO Ministerial Council, the Pakistani delegation clashed with the Anglo-American delegation over, among other matters, SEATO's attitude towards China, Ayub Khan also offered his good offices to China and the United States to assist in bridging the gulf between them. During the 1964 Laos crisis, Ayub was used as an intermediary for exchange of messages between the two sides.

Pakistan received its reward for these endeavours on China's behalf in February 1964, when Chou-En-Lai visited

Pakistan.³⁹ The joint communique' issued after this visit stated "The two sides expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan." This heightened India's concern. This formula was to be repeated in all subsequent Sino-Pakistan joint communiques. The wording represented a change of line by China, since the references to "the wishes of the people" which meant to imply that the question should be decided by a plebiscite among the mostly Muslim Kashmiri people.

During the discussions between Chou and Pakistani leaders, the Pakistan side stressed that Pakistani control of the whole of Kashmir would mean that India would have no land route to Ladakh, one key areas of contention in the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. It is also interesting that the joint communique did not say that the Kashmir question should be settled peacefully- even though just before the passage on Kashmir cited here, the communique stated "the Prime Minister and the President agreed that the border dispute between India and China should and can be resolved peacefully through negotiations". Later, Chinese public statements on Pakistan after this meeting generally contained a verbal commitment to Pakistan's "national independence and state sovereignty" as well as an

³⁹Shivaji Ganguli "Chou En-Lai in Pakistan", cited in Sharma, n.26, p.130.

expression to the effect that the two countries shared a "common cause of opposing foreign aggression and intervention."⁴⁰

Offensive Alliance: 1965 War With this kind of growth of Sino-Pakistan axis, Pakistan stepped up the tension in Kashmir in August 1965.⁴¹ Moreover Pakistan appeared to act with a confidence in 1965 that had been lacking earlier and that some believed stemmed from assurances it received from China. China-Pakistan had, in effect, formed an offensive alliance. It comes out from the facts that Rann of Kutch incident in April 1965, closely followed visits to China by Ayub Khan and to Pakistan by Chou-En-Lai and Chen Yi and that Chen Yi visited Pakistan unexpectedly in the first days of Kashmir conflict in September 1965 and Pakistan chose to assert its position in Indian controlled Kashmir by infiltrating guerrillas in a vain attempt to stir up an internal war and of course that China made its strongest intervention ever on the side of a non-communist state in the course of the war. Though for the most part, China's contribution had been indirect. This got reflected in Ayub's increased confidence - over confidence which led him to a policy of "leaning on India" in 1964-65. The Sino-Indian war revealed

⁴⁰Chaudhury, n. 17, p. 184.

⁴¹W.J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York, 1972) pp. 197-203.

some of the deficiencies of the Indian army, and Ayub could have assured that Pakistan's friendship with China raised apprehensions in India. Secondly, the riots in Kashmir during 1963 had encouraged the Pakistanis to believe that a determined move by Pakistan would meet with considerable local support.⁴² Nehru's death in May 1964 left India with a prime minister in Shastri who was regarded by many as much weaker than his predecessor. Moreover, the international climate was more favourable to Pakistan than it had been for some time, with the Soviet Union working towards an improvement in its relations with Pakistan and the United States beginning to have doubts about the post 1962 arms aid to India. Finally, Pakistan's success during Run of Kutch incident, the growing internal pressure in Pakistan for some thing to be done about Kashmir, and Ayub's self-confidence because of his, "record of almost unbroken success since 1951"⁴³ - all contributed to Pakistan's decision to send guerillas into Kashmir in August 1965. The Joint Communique issued after Ayub's visit in March 1965 has one passage on Kashmir which said :

The two parties noted with concern that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved in accordance

⁴²R Brines. The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (London, 1968) pp. 287-93.

⁴³Barnds, n.41, p.201.

with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan. Moreover, both official communique and the speeches made by China's leaders during the visit lacked the customary reference to China's support for Pakistan's sovereignty and independence.

This phrase had been used by China to indicate its commitment to Pakistan's survival and to imply that China could be considered as Pakistan's ally if the survival was threatened. Its omission was of great significance, especially if Beijing had been informed that Pakistan intended to force the Kashmir issue and may have been Beijing's way to warn Pakistan and reassure India of limits of China's commitment to Pakistan. Ayub Khan, though did not understand this and made a reference to the line: "The Chinese people staunchly support Pakistan's just struggle to oppose foreign intervention and threats and to safeguard independence and sovereignty" Ayub also made an unusual reference to the need for Asian unity against "imperialism" which can be interpreted as a polite bow to China's ideological preoccupations and a specific plea for Sino-Pakistani unity against India. Peiking, after breaking out of Rann of Kutch incident in April made statements to the effect as follows :

"The Chinese government and people fully sympathize with and support the solemn and just stand of Pakistan

government in opposing the Indian policy of military expansion and advocating settlement of border dispute through peaceful negotiations (emphasis added). yet if "India widened the conflict it would certainly come to no good end."⁴⁴

India saw in this a collusion of interests between China and Pakistan as reflected by a statement made by its External Affairs Minister:

This is a demonstration of aggressive partnership between the Chinese and the Pakistani government against India... This is nothing but open incitement to persist in its aggressive occupation of Indian territory in the Rann of Kutch under the umbrella of Chinese military threat against India and is further evidence of a Chinese collusion with Pakistan against India.⁴⁵

Chinese instructors in guerrilla warfare in Kashmir did not arrive in Pakistan until 1966. But the essentially defensive and limited nature of Sino-Pakistani alliance became clear during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965. Although much has been made in Pakistan to ingrain the public myth of China's support to Pakistan in 1965 war, the

⁴⁴Armstrong, n. 2, p. 166.

⁴⁵Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi) vol. 11 No. 45, May, 1965, p.99.

fact was that for public sympathy the bluff of military intervention was called.⁴⁶

The first statement by China against India came on 7 September, the day after India had dramatically escalated the conflict by launching an offensive into West Pakistan itself and ordering a general mobilization. This, the Chinese statement declared, "enlarged the local conflicts between India and Pakistan into a general conflict between the two countries". It considered it "a grave threat to ~~peace in this part of Asia.~~ The Chinese government sternly condemns India for its criminal aggression, expresses firm support for Pakistan in its just struggle against aggression and solemnly warns the Indian government that it must bear responsibility for all the consequences of its criminal and extended aggression".⁴⁷

The veiled threat was reiterated at the end of statement, "India's aggression against anyone of its neighbours concerns all its neighbours". Chinese leaders made it a point to explain their support on ideological plain using 'self determination' and 'anti-United States' as phrases to lash India.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Aabha Dixit "India, Pakistan and Great Powers" in Jasjit Singh Ed. India and Pakistan: Crisis of Relationship (New Delhi, 1990) p.18.

⁴⁷Peking Review (Beijing) 10 September, 1965 in Armstrong n.2, p.177.

⁴⁸Hussain, n. 11, p. 77.

Since Indian Govt. has taken the first step in committing aggression against Pakistan, it cannot evade responsibility for the chain of consequences arising therefrom". It was hinted that the "Chain of consequences" might include increased Chinese pressure on the Sino-Indian border - "The China government has served repeated warnings (about Indian border violations), and it is now closely following the development of India's act of aggression and is strengthening its defences and hightening its alertness along its borders"⁴⁹.

Therefore, by associating with Pakistan, during the conflict, China could now claim that any development in the sub-continent had become a matter of direct concern to itself.⁵⁰

This statement set the tone for China's subsequent moves and declarations on war. The aggressive tone of the diplomatic corrospondence shows that China had embarked on all out verbal offensive against India. Sawran Singh pointed out that Pakistan had found in China a common enemy against India : "Beginning as a marriage of convenience it was nourished by a common hatred for India and seems to now have become an integral part of foreign policies of China

⁴⁹Peking Review, n.47, p.178.

⁵⁰Hussain, n. 11, p. 78.

and Pakistan".⁵¹ On 10 September, the PLA units in Tibet were ordered "to be highly vigilant against provocations on the part of the Indian reactionaries, "and after a series of warnings China issued its dramatic ultimatum on 16 September demanding that India withdraw its alleged" military works for aggression on Chinese side of the China Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself" within three days or face consequences.⁵² Three days later, after what Beijing chose to interpret as "a conspicuous change of tune" by the Indian government, the ultimatum was extended to 22 September and later abandoned because, according to Beijing, the intruding Indian soldiers had "all run away".

Although China did not intervene in war, the issuing of ultimatum, containing references to Kashmir were sufficient enough to heighten security tensions in India. India's Foreign Minister Swaran Singh later told the Parliament:

".... China in conspiracy or collusion with Pakistan gave us an ultimatum and was ready to strike us at a moment when armies were locked in a combat with Pakistani forces⁵³."

⁵¹Rajya Sabha Debates Vol. 54 p. 81, Cited in Nancy Jetly, India-China Relations : 1947-1977 (New Delhi, 1975) p. 234.

⁵²Peking Review no. 39, September 1965. p. 12-13.

⁵³Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), Vol. 11 no. 11 Nov. 1965 p. 320-1.

Characterising the ultimatum as not a paper threat, Choudhury says that Chinese leaders would have intervened against India and it was Ayub Khan's unwillingness or inability to carry on a prolonged war which prevented a general war on the sub-continent.⁵⁴

Many western observers believed that China's aims were to prolong the war and obtain the maximum gains for China at minimum risk.⁵⁵ This interpretation would support the contention that the Sino Pakistani alliance was offensive.

China's aims appear to have been three fold: to Warn India that, while it would not support Pakistan's adventurism, it could not countenance a major shift in India's favour in the sub continental balance of power, to demonstrate China's credibility and influences as an alliance partner, and to serve notice that China's interests must be taken into account in any international settlement on the Kashmir question. The Chinese media ignored the crisis until India enlarged it into a general war in which Pakistan's survival might have been at stake. China became a major factor for South Asian Security there. Although China's ultimatum caused alarm throughout the world, its effect was precisely what Beijing had probably foreseen it would be; to increase the international pressure

⁵⁴G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (London, 1974) p. 206.

⁵⁵Brines, n.42, p. 372.

on both India and Pakistan to agree to a ceasefire. L.A. Sherwani quoted Prof. Anwar Syed, "By Linking Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani conflicts the Chinese fostered among the great powers a sense of urgency about terminating the India-Pakistan war and inhabited some of the great powers especially Soviet Union from siding openly with India and from putting as much preserve on Pakistan as they might otherwise have been inclined to do, contributed intentionally or inadvertently, to bring about a ceasefire on terms acceptable to Pakistan."⁵⁶ Secondly, as it had by now come to define its security interests in terms of its alliance with Pakistan, it needed to act in such a way as to demonstrate the credibility of its support to Pakistan. In forging alliance with Pakistan, China acted on Mao's views, i.e. "Proletariat must learn to forge alliances with such elements as may be willing to do so for a limited period against a common enemy". China's third concern was that of its general diplomatic isolation, and in particular its lack of seat on security council, might prevent it from having any influence on negotiations that will follow the war.

It was generally realized in India that Chinese ultimatum in 1965 showed that China was acting not merely in pursuit of border dispute but in line with its new doctrine of intervention in Asian questions and its self-

⁵⁶Ibid. p. 372.

assumed role of the protector of the nations of Asia.⁵⁷

Pakistan foreign minister claimed thorough Chinese support and exaggerated Chinese influence by saying that China had played a decisive role in the United Nations handling of the conflict and he called 20 September resolution "China's Resolution" as he believed it had shaken the United Nations into realizing the need for a permanent settlement of Kashmir question.

During the subsequent phase of ceasefire and the Tashkent Agreement China persisted in its diplomatic support to Pakistan over Kashmir question.

In 1966, Sino-Pakistani relations reached a peak, if measured by cultural, economic and military exchanges. On Pakistan's National Day 23 March, 1966 Chinese tanks and aircrafts were put on display for the first time.

In March, Liu Shao Chi visited Pakistan for the first time and reiterated China's pledge of support for Pakistan "Pakistan can rest assured that when Pakistani resolutely fights against foreign aggression in defence of its national independence and sovereignty Chinese people will stand unswervingly on their side and give them resolute support and assistance."⁵⁸ During the Indo-Pak conflict China had evolved a theory that it would support "the

⁵⁷Jetly, n. 51, p.239.

⁵⁸London Times, (London) 28 March, 1966 cited in Armstrong, n.2, p.170.

victim of aggression" Chen Yi emerged as a forceful exponent of "profound militant" friendship between China and Pakistan.⁵⁹

This reference referred to Pakistan's stand on Kashmir, on which issue China had edged even further towards support of Pakistan. The Sino-Pakistani joint communique following Liu Shao - Chi's visit referred to China's support for the righteous stand of Pakistani government on this issue "China's Yi, during a visit to Pakistan in 1966 was quite specific about Beijing's apprehensions concerning the possible effect of improved Indo-Pakistani relations and the increased influences of the Soviet Union, "The United States and the Soviet Union are trying by every possible means to plot joint India-Pakistani opposition to China and this is detrimental to China and harmful to Pakistan as well" He was assured by a Pakistani Minister that Pakistan would not be lured away from its friendship with China.

This nature of relationship can be gauged by the following statement of Marghub Siddique.

"China is an ally in peace and war. In peace it has shown the willingness to contribute both knowhow and materials to Pakistan's economic development retarded by harsh and exacting terms under which western assistance had

⁵⁹Chinese Note 16 September, 1965. Cited in Hussain, n. 11, p. 79.

been available in past; and in war it accorded unconditional and all out support as was demonstrated by it in the 1965. Indo-Pak war".⁶⁰

At cultural plain, Pakistan was the only one of China's non-communist friends not be publicly criticised during the cultural revolution. They signed a cultural agreement in accordance with spirit of Bandung Conference on 26 March, 1965.⁶¹

At economic plain China granted aid worth \$ 106.4 million. The quantum of military aid and supplies also rose, and covered a range of arms from small arms to major weapons and serviced all the three branches of armed forces.⁶²

First was the Chinese decision to build the Heavy Machinery Complex at Taxila in 1966. Taking advantage of US embargo, the Chinese rushed \$ 28 million in emergency supplies of T-55 tanks, Chinese variants of MIG-19's and ammunition. In July 1966, another deal worth \$ 20 M was signed.⁶³ The public impact of this Chinese decision was tremendous and provided a strong base for Sino-Pak military

⁶⁰Tapan Das, Sino-Pak Collusion and US Policy (New Delhi, 1971) p. 145.

⁶¹Jain, n.4, vol.II, p. 55.

⁶²Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal China and The Arms Trade. (London, 1985), p.160.

⁶³Y. Vertzberger "The Enduring Entente - Sino-Pak Relation 1960-80" The Washington Paper No. 95 (London, 1983) p.15.

relations. By 1970, Chinese weapons and systems constituted an overwhelming part of military arsenal of Pakistan.⁶⁴ A few IL 28S bombers were exported to Pakistan in 1966.⁶⁵ Pakistan received tanks 100 type 59's were supplied to only one state i.e. Pakistan. These were exported in 1966, when Pakistan received 100 over next two years.⁶⁶ The effect of Cultural Revolution, or China's perception of Pakistan's security needs, or both may have been the reason for the delivery of 110 Type 59's to Pakistan.

In artillery the supplies included 85mm anti-tank field guns, 100 mm and 130 mm field guns, 107 mm - multiple rocket systems, 60 mm and 82 mm mortars were supplied to these states. There is a view held by John F. Cooper that Chinese aid formed all or part of \$ 60 m interest free loan to Pakistan granted in 1964 July. although not labelled military assistance, and not formally announced until 1965, Chinese deliveries of weapons suggest it was a military agreement. He states that Chinese made T-34 and T-59 tanks and MIG-19 aircraft were seen in Pakistan during 1965.⁶⁷

⁶⁴Y. Vertzberger "The Political Economy of Sino-Pak Relations: Trade and Aid" p. 78. Asian Survey (Berkeley) Vol XXIII (5) May 1983, p. 648.

⁶⁵SIPRI Arms Trade Registers : The Arms Trade with the Third World (London, 1970-71) p. 40.

⁶⁶Gilks and Segal, n.62, p.19.

⁶⁷John F. Cooper and Daniel S. Papp Ed. Communist Nation's Military Assistance (Boulder, 1983) pp.108-9.

Other sources, however, notably Vertzberger and SIPRI Arms Trade register do not record Chinese aid arriving until 1966 apart from a few MIG-15 UTI trainers.

This enlists the quantum of military and economic support besides earlier diplomatic support. The South Asian region being Indo-Centric in character having the core relationship i.e. Pak-India relations, China emerged as an important, adjacent, extra-regional factor influencing the relationship and thereby stability of the region. Pakistan thereby was the medium of China's entry into the region already made aware of Chinese strength by the humiliating defeat incurred on India in 1962 war. The war of 1965 proved a boon for China for entering into a closer relation with Pakistan, despite the difference in their ideologies and state forms thereby. Elaborating on convergence of national interests between Pakistan and China, Bhutto, the architect of Sino-Pak strategic relationship wrote:

...India is an adversary of Pakistan and has a dispute with China... it is in China's national interests to support Pakistan and it is in 'Pakistan's national interest to develop friendly relations with China. Of all the countries which have received military assistance from the United States to combat communism, Pakistan alone has a fundamental common interest with one of the most powerful communist states. This is a unique

positions, a freak in the global permutations.⁶⁸

This came close to reflecting an alliance a curious mixture of defensive and offensive alliance against Soviet Union and India respectively. The geopolitical conflict between China and India during 1960's was one of the factors causing China to gravitate towards Pakistan. Z.A. Suleri wrote in Pakistan times that "friendship with China is the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy." This non-official spokesman of the regime known as 'Cleopatra of Pakistani Press' asserted that the rivalry between India and China in Asia was a compelling factor for Beijing's coming closer to Pakistan in a matter of "our deadly dispute with India" and "endorsing our policy on Kashmir". Another deciding factor", Suleri told, "was China's genuine interest in Pakistan's viability and capability in all fields of confrontation with India."⁶⁹ So once being led into alliance in 1963 Chinese policy revolved around a principle that is inseparable from both alliances and international systems: the balance of power. The aim was classic one of preventing the dominance of India in the region. China's sub-continental policy in general, may be depicted in terms of a threat to China's security producing a reaction by Beijing that was aimed at obtaining a more

⁶⁸Z.A. Bhutto The Myth of Independence (London, 1969), p. 148.

⁶⁹Das, n. 60, p. 146.

favourable regional balance of power, with China's reaction itself being conditioned by "imperatives and constraints arising out of China's geopolitical location"⁷⁰. China's primary objective in furthering this alliance was to increase its military and diplomatic power vis-a-vis an enemy, where China and Pakistan shared a common perception of threat.

Thus 1965 war was a destabilising factor for South Asian Security and was propelled by the misadventurism of Pakistan deriving overt and covert stimulation by the special relationship bordering "alliance in traditional form" with China. This brought forth the importance of Chinese factor for South Asian Security in open most starkly besides the threat it posed due to its size, conventional power, and now nuclear weapon too.

⁷⁰Armstrong, n.2, p.182.

CHAPTER - IV

EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH AND SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY

The emergence of Bangladesh brought forth a new chapter in South Asian regional context by the birth of another nation-state. The security dimension became prominent as this was the result of dismemberment of the erstwhile Pakistan. More so, because India had worked as the mid-wife performing the surgery. Thus, at one level the so called myth of Indian hegemony appeared to be true, at another level role of China became conspicuous. A major reason of the state of affairs for reaching the precipice was the building up of India against the Asian giant by Moscow and Washington in the earlier phase of 1960's. In reaction to this is the Beijing - Rawalpindi axis emerged.¹ Slowly United States also supported this and "Ayub's flirtation" with Mao got the nodding approval in President Nixon's visit in August 1969.

Thus, the Bangladesh crisis brought forth China factor in terms of undermining India. Indirectly, China - United States entente, which emerged during this period, was to

¹G.W. Choudhury, China in the World Affairs : The Foreign Policy of PRC since 1970, (Boulder, 1982), p.235.

give a new twist and turn to the strategic atmosphere in the region where the extra regional powers became almost direct players in the region. One group was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and India on one side, and another China, Pakistan and Russia. Pakistan's role as mid-wife in bringing the United States and China back together earned it a protection from both sides in economic, military, political and diplomatic terms. Thus, the emergence of Bangladesh was to turn another leaf in the South Asian security atmosphere.

The emergence of Bangladesh affected the power equation. The balance of power went against the Sino-Pak alliance ; so Beijing could no longer be obsessed with the policy of containing India's influence beyond the borders of Indian subcontinent.²

Preceding the emergence of Bangladesh the period was characterized by fluctuating alignments between the major powers and the subcontinent.³ Still the period after 1966 started with the assertion of Chinese support to Pakistan. Chin Yi during a visit to Pakistan in 1966 was quite specific about Beijing's apprehensions concerning the possible effect of improved Indo-Pakistani opposition to

²J.A. Naik, India, Russia, China and Bangladesh, (New Delhi, 1973), p.64.

³J.D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy : Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine, (Los Angeles, 1977), p. 172.

China (brought about by Super Powers) and this is detrimental to China and harmful to Pakistan as well." He was assured by a Pakistan minister that Pakistan would not be lured away from its friendship with China⁴.

Pakistan took special care to assure Beijing, whenever there was any occasion for misgiving or apprehension in the minds of Chinese leaders about Pakistan's drift away from close relationship with China. Not long after Bhutto's dismissal, the new foreign minister Sharifuddin Pirzada made a trip to China and soon after the announcement of Pakistan's arms deal with the USSR, foreign minister Mian Arshad Hussain went to Beijing to assure, Chinese leaders that "no power on earth can shake the friendship of our two peace loving countries."⁵ Writing on the eve of his visit to China, the pro-govt. daily, the Jung, remarked that his trip was a "mission of reassurance that third parties cannot disturb the rock like solidarity of Sino-Pak friendship." Yahya's trip to Moscow resulting in an arms deal, was followed, besides Arshad Hussain's trip, by visits of two other important dignitaries Fida Hasan and Yahya Khan himself to Beijing. In keeping with the sensitivity of the Chinese leadership, it was not until the beginning of 1968 that articles about the Cultural

⁴Dawn (Karachi), 16 Nov. 1986. cited in P.S. Jayaramu, India's National Security and Foreign Policy, 1987, p.174.

⁵Arshad Hussain's statement in National Assembly in June 1968. in Armstrong, n.3, p.170.

Revolution and that too applauding its successes and achievements appeared in the Pakistan Times.

President Ayub himself deemed it necessary to send a message to Premier Chou - En - Lai on the occasion of the Chinese National day 1 October, 1968, expressing his firm faith that "the close and good neighbourly relations that so happily exist between our two countries will continue to grow stronger for mutual benefit for the preservation of peace in the region. In a feature article on that occasion entitled "Growth of Sino-Pakistan Friendship," contributed by Misrhaj Barna in the Pakistan Times (3 Sept. 1968), the following words in the praise for China were written.

"China's support to Pakistan was complete and unhesitant. It was partly because of China that India dared not attack East Pakistan, cut of from its western wing. The assistance of China in the crucial hour was unparalleled in recent world history. Again, after the war, when the Western Powers, including the United States, put an embargo on arms sale to Pakistan, it was China which met all the immediate defence needs of Pakistan. Currently, first ordinance factory of East Pakistan is being set up with Chinese Financial and Technical assistance. China since then has reiterated a number of times that it would help Pakistan if India again commits aggression."⁶

⁶Cited in G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers : Politics of a Sub-divided Continent, (New Delhi, 1975), p.170.

In a long discourse on Sino-Pakistani relations before the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 2 November, 1968, foreign minister Arshad Hussain justified close relationship with China in these words:

"Pakistan's policy towards China is based on a careful assessment of Pakistan's immediate and long term interests. It would be incorrect to assume that these relations could be based on mere expediency or opportunism. The political aspect of Sino-Pakistan relations are of vital interest to Pakistan and friendship with China is of fundamental importance to Pakistan's security. Since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, the global policy aims of the super powers have tended to coincide over the issue of India's posture of confrontation with China. Although there is no possibility of any large scale military clash between China and India, certain foreign powers have given substantial military help in building up India's military capability. This military build up, coupled with India's militant outlook and hostility to Pakistan, has created a grave and continuing threat more to Pakistan than to China. China is well able to take care of itself...Considering the security problem with which Pakistan is faced as a result of Indian threats and the need to ensure minimum defence requirements, it is not difficult to visualise how much more vulnerable Pakistan position would be without Sino-

Pakistan friendship."⁷

Towards the end of 1968 when Bhutto came to be arrested and a widespread agitation against Ayub regime under the leadership of Maulana Bhashni came into existence, it became difficult for Beijing to either support the establishment and the opposition. Even when Ayub came to be replaced by Yahya in March 1969, it was not until 5 May 1969 that Premier Chon-en-Lai sent a message to the New President Chief Martial Law Administrator reminding him of the friendly relations and cooperation which was in "the common interests" of the two countries, that had "greatly developed in recent years." It reiterated the desire of the Chinese government to strengthen "as always" friendly and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan on the basis of five principles of peaceful coexistence. It assured Islamabad of the usual support to Pakistan against foreign aggression and interference and for the Kashmiri peoples' struggles for the right of self determination and expressed the hope that "through the joint efforts of both sides, the friendship between the Chinese and Pakistani people will continue to consolidate and develop."⁸

During the last years of Ayub's rule Beijing's silence

⁷J.P. Jain, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, (New Delhi, 1974), p.152.

⁸Pakistan Horizon, (Karachi), 1969, cited in R.K. Jain, China, South Asia Relations, : 1947-1980, Vol. II, (New Delhi, 1981), p. 194.

and the cautions and guarded nature of Chou's message to Yahya reflected the Chinese concern about the growing Pakistan--Soviet relations, which was evident from the arms deliveries that started coming into Pakistan at about the time Yahya took over and the support extended by the USSR to the establishment in Pakistan and the sudden visit of Premier Kosygin to Rawalpindi in May 1969. The period 1966-71 was one of fluctuating alignment, between the major powers and the subcontinent. In January, 1969 Indira Gandhi made first of several moves towards normalizations of relations with China, and although there was no reply from Beijing to the letter sent with this aims, yet Mao's exchange of affable remarks with India's *Charge-de-Affairs* on May Day 1970 were indicative of a move towards the end of normalizations.⁹ However, Beijing was anxious to avoid giving the impression to Pakistan that any improvement in its relations with India would be at the expense of Pakistan. Pakistan, as mentioned earlier had proved to be highly sensitive about marginal shifts of position by the major powers and usually had attempted to balance any such shift by moving closer to another.¹⁰ In 1969 the Soviet Union had proposed the formation of an Asian Collective Security System, and although Pakistan rejected this, it did so only after appearing to give the proposal serious

⁹Armstrong, n.3., p.171.

¹⁰Ibid., p.172.

consideration. In this way Pakistan implicitly indicated to Beijing that a Chinese rapprochement with India could result in closer ties between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. This is also suggested by the fact that during a visit to China in July 1969 by Air Marshall Nur Khan, Chon-En-Lai attacked the Soviet proposal but Nur Khan did not mention it. Though Pakistan was warned as the following statement of Chon-En-Lai suggests." It is only natural and perfectly just that the Pakistani people and the righteous world opinion have recently exposed and rebutted its (Soviet Imperialism) schemes." Nur Khan in his speech of 16 July 1969 thanked China profusely for the assistance given to Pakistan and referred to "the existing identity of views on problems of mutual interest" mainly to set at rest Chinese anxiety in the matter. Actually the reason why Nur Khan came out openly against the Soviet proposals was not only because they were considered anti-Chinese but also because they were regarded as pro-Indian and were as such unpopular in Pakistan. He also referred to the "outstanding success of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" which signified the extent to which Nur Khan could go to show Pakistan as the true friend and admirer of China. He at the same time characterized the strength of China as "a stabilizing factor in the maintenance of peace in the region" (a view diametrically opposite to the Indian view) and declared" China does not pose threat to any nation." On

10 April 1969 Yahya held his first press conference in which he said that there would be no imminent change in the country's foreign policy and assured continuation of Pak-China friendship."¹¹

Obviously, satisfied by the Pakistani attitude as reflected in Nur Khan's speech of 16 July and the private assurances he might have given to Chinese leaders, Chou-en-Lai in his speech of 16 July, spoke with confidence of Nur Khan's visit as having made "new contributions to the strengthening of friendly relations between the two countries" and asserted "no one on earth can undermine it." He added "Imperialism, modern revisionism and their lackeys have once again failed in their recent scheme to want only sabotage Sino-Pakistan friendship."¹²

Word 'lackeys' indicated 'India' in the context of the region. China and India had continued with their antagonisms as reflected in Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's statement in Lok Sabha, 22 December 1967:

"China continues to maintain an attitude of hostility towards us and ...spares no opportunity to malign us and to carry on anti-India propaganda not only against the Indian government but the whole democratic functioning and even

¹¹B.N.Goswami, Pakistan and China : A Study of Their Relations, (New Delhi, 1971), p.11.

¹²Pakistan Horizon, (Karachi), in n.3, p.289.

national integrity."¹³

Thus while for its requirements of sophisticated arms and large scale economic aid, Pakistan might have continued to try to expand its relations with the two super powers, the USA and the USSR, the strategic consideration was a compelling factor in inducing Pakistan to remain friendly with China and this made for the fact that the Chinese position in Pakistan remained dominant. Nur Khan's visit to Beijing confirmed the fact. The Pakistan Times of 19 July 1969 spoke of China as "natural ally" of Pakistan and Marghub Siddiqi called China "an ally in peace and war." After pointing to Sino-Indian relations, that continued to be strained with no likelihood of their being assuaged in the near future and China's genuine interest in Pakistan's viability and capability "in all fields of confrontation with India," Z.A. Suleri came to propound the theory of "a great identity of interest" with Beijing than with their great power ally and of Pakistan being "closer to" some than others"--almost a new version or revival of "special relationship"¹⁴ with China - in these words.

"The allegation that Pakistan's relations with China have undergone a change is humbug. No government in Pakistan can go against the requirements of the country's basic and compulsive interests. America and Russia cannot

¹³Jain, n.8, Vol. 1, p.273.

¹⁴Jain, n.7, p.155.

give up their partiality to India and that's that. That decides our attitude firmly and irrevocably."¹⁵

Throughout 1970 several India inspired rumours appeared suggesting that Sino-Pakistan relations were deteriorating. By 1970 China had also recovered from its internal upheaval, known as Cultural Revolution, and was looking for activating its diplomacy in the world arena. *The Hinshua*, while reporting on the meeting of the Afro-Asian solidarity committee in Rawalpindi, stated with confidence that the people of Pakistan would frustrate any attempt to put Kashmir problem in cold storage in name of "Indo-Pak amity's, indicating thereby Beijing's interest in maintaining tension between India and Pakistan.

Chinese Arms & Assistance: As possibilities of receiving arms deliveries from the two super power --the USA and USSR remained nil or insignificant as there was no hope of Pakistan over obtaining their assistance against India, Islamabad looked to Beijing for greater help in economic and military spheres. By dispatching high level Air Force and Naval delegations to China an attempt was made to forge closer links among the arms forces of the two countries.

Arms Supply: Pakistan had received a token supply of

¹⁵Z.A. Suleri, "Visit to China", 1970, cited in Tapan Das, Sino-Pak Collusion and U.S. Policy, (New Delhi, 1972), p.137.

Chinese weapons during or shortly after the 1965 war.¹⁶ Since then China has continued to be a major source of arms supplies to Pakistan. The International Institute of Strategic Studies reports that as of July 1971 Pakistan had 1611-28 light bombers and 64 MIG-19 interceptors out of a total of 285 combat air craft. She had 50 T-555 and 225-59 medium tanks in a total tank force of 870. Pakistan also had variety of smaller Chinese arms. In the spring of 1972 she received an additional 60 MIG 19s and 100 T-59 tanks an undisclosed number of surface to air missiles, patrol boats and other weapons, which mad eup for the losses sustained during 1971 war.¹⁷

The terms of chinese weapons were initially on favourable prices and easy credit terms.

From Gilgit to Kashgar: The Karakoram Friendship Highway, Impact on Security of the Region: On October 21, 1967 Pakistan and China signed an agreement to facilitate "overland trade between Gilgit and Sinkiang. Press reports at the time indicated that the agreement related to the old **silk route** extending from Gilgit through Hunga and the Mintaka pass onto Sinkiang, which trading Caravans had used for many centuries. The agreement according to the Times (London) of May 14, said that Chinese were to provide

¹⁶Anwar Hussain Syed, China & Pakistan : Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale, (Massachusetts, 1974), p.140.

¹⁷IISS, Strategic Survey, 1971, (London, 1972), pp.50-52.

assistance in building the Pakistani side of the road. The agreement was not published and secrecy regarding its detail gave rise to speculation that more than a limited passage of goods might be involved. In June, 1968, the two governments agreed to exchange two caravans from each side during the summer of 1969. In May 1968, the Indian minister of state for foreign affairs, B.S. Bhagat, told the Rajya Sabha that a motorable road was being built between Gilgit and Sinkiang, that China had already completed its portion of the road north of Mintaka, that Pakistanis were improving an existing 'jeepable' tract between Gilgit and Pasu (about 70 miles), and that they were building an additional twenty miles of new road between Pasu and Mintaka.¹⁸

The Indians contended that the road links represented a Sino-Pakistani threat to their security. In Indian note to China on 19 April, 1968 India protested that by entering into a so called agreement on a land route between Gilgit Agency and Baltistan in Kashmir and Sinkiang on Chinese side, Chinese government had gone a step further in interfering in India's internal affairs.¹⁹ If, in the absence of these links China wanted to put military pressure on Indian Kashmir she would either have to pull

¹⁸Statesman, (Calcutta), May 14, 1968 in Jain n.7, p.158.

¹⁹Jain, n.8, p.330.

troops away from her border with the Soviet Union, 220 miles south of Minaka or from India's northern border hundreds of miles up the Aksai Chin road all the way to Kashgar and turn southward to Mintaka pass. The distance involved had been reduced substantially and the building of Morkund - Kunjerab tract linking the Tibet Sinkiang road with the Gilgit-Sinkiang road. Thus Indian government protested to the Chinese and accused them of pursuing a "diabolical policy" with regards to Kashmir.²⁰ This allegation was not without substance as the volume of trade going over the road was limited and despite the estimates of Dawn that 2 million rupees' worth trade occurred on the passage, there was no justification of the initial outlay or even the recurrent cost of maintaining the roads. Hence the reasons for the road were political. Some quantities of Chinese military supplies could reach Pakistan with effective snow - ploughing machinery and on China's side access to Pakistan Kashmir and from there to the Indian side might, in certain contingencies, of certain help to Pakistan besides its own strategic advantage over India.

Throughout the cultural revolution period Chinese foreign policy remained at a low ebb, though from 1967 onwards, it visibly stepped up its support to the national liberation movements in the third world and called for

²⁰Statesman (Calcutta), June 27, 1969 in Jain, n.7, p.159.

armed overthrow of duly constituted governments there. Yet, in case of Bangladesh, later its policy was dramatically opposite due to its strategic interests.²¹

Yahya Khan's Visit to China

In October 1970, President Yahya Khan declared publicly from the United Nations rostrum that friendly relations with China, the USA and Soviet Union were 'the corner stones of our policy'.²² That Yahya Khan visited China as the head of 15 - Man team, that included several senior army officers and economic advisor M.M. Ahmed, came at a time when Pakistan had been anxiously seeking the help for coping its debt repayment difficulties and also maintaining its armed strength at a level that would serve as "an effective deterrent." As Pakistan Times put it, "Faced as it is with a overgrowing military might of hostile India, Pakistan has been trying to buy weapons from various sources. However, its efforts in Washington and Moscow have not had much success." That Beijing was in a receptive mood to meet Pakistani requirements was reflected in the **People's Daily** editorial welcoming "distinguished Pakistani guests" in which it was noted "with satisfaction" that Islamabad "defy outside pressure, firmly adhere to policy of friendship towards China" and by opposing the ploy of

²¹Nancy Jetly, India, China Relations - 1947-1977 : A Study of Parliament's Role in Making of Foreign Policy, (New Delhi, 1979), p.242.

²²Armstrong, n.3, p.174.

creating "two Chinas" actively stand for the restoration of Beijing's rights in the U.N.

In his banquet speech in Beijing on 11 November, 1970, President Yahya Khan stated that Sino-Pakistani friendship was "not based on expediency." He described China as a peaceful state which offered to resolve all its disputes with other nations through free and frank discussions. (A view just opposing the Indian understanding of Chinese diplomacy). After expressing his "deep gratitude" to the unstinted support" China extended" when our national existence was threatened by armed aggression from our neighbour" and gratefulness for the "substantial assistance made available to us in various fields" he assured Beijing of Pakistan's continued hostility towards India by its resolute support and persistence in securing for the Kashmiri people" their inalienable right of self determination." Yahya sought to impress upon his hosts Pakistan's strong posture against India by describing people of Kashmir as "a people in bondage" and grouping them along with the people in Indo-China or "African counties under colonial domination," which must be allowed unfettered exercise of their inalienable right of self determination and from where there must be" total withdrawal of all foreign forces" (implying Indian forces as forces of occupation). Vice Chairman Tung Pi-Wu in his banquet speech, though did not make a direct attack on

India but alluded to "some people" who were displaced with the continuous development of Sino-Pakistani friendly relations and were "even sowing dissension." He expressed, as usual Beijing's firm support to Pakistan in its just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national dignity and oppose foreign aggression and interference" and to the Kashmiri peoples' "just struggle for the right of self-determination." He declared that Chinese would always remain Pakistan's reliable friends.²³

In view of the past Chinese practice of not issuing communiques, Islamabad was not hopeful about a joint communique being issued. Beijing, however, obliged Yahya by agreeing to issue a joint communique in which China extended mild support to Yahya's recent offer on the withdrawal of troops with a view to enabling the people of Jammu and Kashmir to freely exercise their right of self determination. Moreover, China's ability to come to Pakistan's aid was enhanced by opening of two roads linking the countries in August 1970 and January 1971.²⁴

Thus the year 1970 ended with Beijing recovering the ground lost in 1966-69 in Pakistan (due to the Soviet Union's overtures) and, thus the consolidated Sino-Pakistani amity was well poised to reveal itself during the

²³Jain, n.7, p.158.

²⁴The Sinkiang-Pakistan road passed through Pakistan's part of Kashmir, thus providing China with a further interest in preserving the status quo in Kashmir.

Bangladesh crisis a year later. Apart from misjudging the outcome of elections in Pakistan (in fact calculations of many others had gone wrong and no one had thought that Awami League would be able to obtain an absolute majority even in National Assembly of Pakistan), an important factor which led Beijing to render support to Yahya was that a democratic set up in Pakistan was likely to release forces which could have favoured an accommodation and even friendship with India a possibility of which China was particularly sensitive.

Thus, being the state of affairs till 1970, the role of China during Bangladesh crisis can be examined in the following manner. During Bangladesh crisis and Indo-Pak conflict of 1971, Beijing's attitude had been two fold - Firstly, to continue to render support to military administration of Yahya Khan in his confrontation against India prevent Islamabad from giving in to pressure from one or the other of two Super powers and, secondly to work towards strengthening of its influence in East Pakistan in every possible way. Azizul Haque describes two features of Chinese policy during the period of liberation war of Bangladesh. Firstly, containment of India's influence in Asia, Secondly, limiting Moscow's influence in the third world.²⁵

²⁵Azizul Haque, Trends in Pakistan's External Policy 1947-1971 : With Particular Reference to PRC, (Dhaka, 1972), p.54.

The Chinese news agency denounced the Indian Governments "unilateral" banning of overflights of Pakistani civil and military air craft and also referred to the Jan Sangh as fanning "anti Pak sentiment" following the hijacking incident of an Indian plane. In the early stages of the crisis Yahya Khan sought a pledge of support from China against Indian attack. As only a united Pakistan could better serve as a counter weight to India, Chou-En Lai, in his message to Yahya on 12 April, 1971, laid stress on the unification of Pakistan and the unity of the people of the East and West Pakistan." It also stated that should India dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government will, as always firmly support the Pakistani government and the people in their struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence.²⁶

Thus, as regards, China interest it may be argued that the precise objective of Bangladesh policy at this stage must have been to prolong the struggle and to gain badly needed time for reviewing the Bangladesh policy in the light of changed favourable circumstances.²⁷ This clearly get reflected in the Beijing Review coverage.

"On Bangladesh the Chinese policy was for a political settlement within the framework of Pakistan. Mr. Chi Peng

²⁶Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), in Armstrong, n.3, p.174.

²⁷Naik, n.2, p.61.

Fee believed "the broad masses of Pakistani people are patriotic and they want to safeguard national unity and unification of the country. However, he hoped that a reasonable settlement would be sought by the rulers in Islamabad with people of East Pakistan."²⁸

Thus, the East Pakistan movement brought forth Chinese dilemma in terms of ideology. As ideologically, it should have supported the movement for Bangladesh considering it to be a bourgeois movement supported and sustained by Indian government and socialist Soviet Union. Yet China wanted an amicable solution between the west Pakistani and the nationalist east Pakistan. In supporting the freedom struggle of the Awami League leaders, which could by no stretch of imagination be considered as Maoists or faithful to Beijing, China saw the risk of not only losing its close friend and ally in Islamabad but also of seeing its influence disappear in east Bengal altogether. On the contrary, if the liberation struggle became prolonged there was every possibility of extremists and revolutionary Maoist elements gaining the upper hand in Bangladesh. If these elements could successfully scuttle the movement for autonomy or liberation, they were likely to receive preferential treatment at the hands of the military in Islamabad, which would in turn enable them to infiltrate into army and administration and to build their

²⁸Peking Review (Beijing) November 12, 1971, p.61.

organizational strength in east Pakistan. Even if they were not able to establish a Peoples Republic through revolution under the auspices of China, that too helped Beijing in having a powerful leverage to kind Islamabad to its wishes.

Over the years Beijing had been attempting to forge closer economic, political and cultural links with east Pakistan. Although Calcutta branch of the Bank of China was closed because it was found extending substantial amount of money for communist activities, its Dacca branch was opened which facilitated penetration of Chinese influence in east Pakistan. Beijing Radio broadcasts in Bengali, pamphlets published in Bengali by the foreign languages publishing house, Beijing and a number of Mao's works translated in Bengali and published in Dacca-were all good vehicle of popularizing Chinese communist ideology in east Bengal. In view of the multi farious channels of Chinese penetration and influence in east Pakistan, it was hardly surprising that a Bengali author in 1966 came to view Beijing's main interest not in Kashmir but in East Pakistan-the biggest prize that it could hope from cultivating friendship with Pakistan.²⁹

Thus, it can be observed that east Pakistan was a strategic link for China's political influence in Pakistan itself, because of Pakistan's reliance upon the Chinese

²⁹Pradip Bose, Sino Pak Collusion and East Pakistan, (Calcutta, 1966), p.66.

shield for protecting its eastern wing from India.³⁰

The National Awami Party which had been infiltrated by communists and was following a pro-Chinese line had not supported Muhib's 6 point programme. Similarly, when the trouble started with the army crackdown in east Bengal in March 1971, only one of four different communist groups in east Bengal still owing allegiance to Mao sternly opted out of guerilla struggle waged by the Mukti Vahini under the auspices of the Awami League.³¹ In the opinion of Beijing, success of the struggle for civil liberties and democracy would have paved the way for harmonious relations between Hindus and Muslims, which, in turn, made for Indo-Pak amity directed against China. Beijing sought to counter that threat by aspiring for a regime which was pro-Beijing and not confined to east Bengal.³² A secret document detected in Europe in 1964 and meant for a pro-Chinese communist leader of west Bengal, spelt out the Chinese ambition in the eastern region of Indian sub-continent. The goal of Chinese policy, as stated in that document, was establishment of a People's Republic of Bengal, which would not only include east Pakistan and west Bengal but also extend from Nagaland in the east of borders of Nepal in the

³⁰Naik, n.2, p.63.

³¹Richard Harris, "China's Attitude to Bangladesh Crisis", Das, n.15, p.138.

³²Bose, n.29, p.66.

west. In January 1967, leaflets advocating a "United States of Bengal comprising west Bengal, east Pakistan, Assam, Nagaland, Tripura, Sikkim and Bhutan were distributed widely in east Pakistan.³³

While Washington and Moscow suspended or stopped their aid to Islamabad after the army crack down in east Pakistan, Beijing continued its assistance to Pakistan. The birth of Bangladesh has introduced a new element in Chinese policies towards India and Pakistan. Since Bangladesh is located in the neighbourhood of Bhutan and Sikkim, Tibet, Burma and India's industrial centres in its eastern wing, it should be having more strategic importance for China.³⁴ Thus, a 7-member Chinese technical delegation arrived Islamabad to survey the possibilities of setting up a basic refractory plant in Pakistan, according to a Radio Pakistan report of 28 March 1971. China signed a protocol in Karachi on 28 April 1971 on the construction of a sugar mill in the public sector near Larkana.

By the year 1971, China's South Asian strategy became a function of its long term preoccupation with a perceived Soviet threat. Beijing attempted to counter Moscow's strategy by striking at New Delhi.³⁵ What had originally

³³B.L. Sharma, The Pakistan - China Axis, (Bombay, 1968), p.177.

³⁴Naik, n.2, p.34.

³⁵Steven I, Levine, "China and South Asia", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), 12(10), Jan. 1989, p.1107.

been a bilateral Sino-Indian confrontation now assumed the form of a **secondary or dependent** antagonism within the context of great power politics. Relations between China and India became hostage to the state of both Sino-Soviet and Indo-Soviet relations.

China's counter containment strategy took several forms. **First**, the PRC greatly strengthened its ties with Pakistan, elevating the relationship to the state of **defacto** alliance. **Secondly**, by forging a strategic relationship with the United States in the beginning of 1971 PRC hoped to effect a U.S. - Pak-China coalition that would out balance the Soviet Indian partnership.³⁶ Yet did not go for any direct intervention because of the policy of 'not fighting others battles'.³⁷

Thus continued policy of Chinese aid to Pakistan during the 1971 crisis. China pledged a total of \$307 million assistance to Pakistan which according to the editorial in Sun on 14 May, 1971, was interest free and, even in the form of grants-at times. In August 1971, the Bank of China transferred all its assets and offices in Karachi and Chittagong to the National Bank of Pakistan as a gesture of good will and later a Chinese team visited east Bengal in November to work out details in regard to laying of railway tracks and telegraph lines between Dacca

³⁶Ibid. p. 1117.

³⁷Haque, n.25, p.55.

and Chittagong.

During the east bengal crisis a Pakistani air force delegation consisting of instructors and cadets and led by Air Commodore Kamal Ahmad, undertook a two week "friendship visit" to China in April - May 1971. The purpose of visit was to negotiate the sale or lease of transport aircraft to Pakistan which could be used in carrying troops-and supplies from west Pakistan to east Bengal.³⁸ Chou-en-Lai offered not only help in rebuilding the economy of east Pakistan but also assured Yahya of additional military aid through Pak air force delegation. That China was supplying additional arms to Pakistan since the outbreak of freedom struggle was confirmed by Indian minister of defence production V.C. Shukla in Lok Sabha.³⁹

According to the **Daily Telegraph** (London 31 May, 1971) despatch, China had agreed to supply the bulk of weapons and equipments for the two new divisions - about 40,000 men - being raised by the Pakistani army at a time when the latter was taking action in the break-away Bangladesh.⁴⁰ More than a hundred military lorries were reported carrying military and other supplies from China daily along the newly opened Karakoram highway, named the **friendship**

³⁸The Hindu (Madras), 19 April, 1971 in Armstrong, n.3, p.175.

³⁹The Statesman (Calcutta), 1 June 1971 in Jain, n.7, p.164.

⁴⁰Armstrong, n.3, p.175.

highway at the time of its inauguration in February 1971. On the other hand, the shipment of the Chinese arms and ammunitions in about 100 crates was unloaded at Chittagong port in June 1971 under two senior Pakistani and three Chinese officers. The supplies included machine-guns, automatic rifles and long range mortars which would enable Pakistanis to pull back from forward positions.⁴¹

In August 1971, Beijing gave three 1,000 ton freighters at the rock bottom prices on interest free credits for use on the coast to transport supplies to areas where roads and railways had been disturbed by the freedom fighters. This, along with other commodity assistance, was provided out of the \$200 million loan announced by China in November, 1970.

According to a UNI report, quoting the Dacca correspondent of the Daily Mail (London), 200 Chinese guerilla warfare experts were flown to Bangladesh to train the Pakistani forces. The experts arrived in the wake of mounting Mukti Vahini attacks in the Mymensingh Sector during the third week of October. He added that the experts were sent by Beijing in response to an urgent appeal by Yahya Khan. Twenty training camps, each comprising of 250 Pakistani soldiers and 10 Chinese instructors, had set up

⁴¹Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 21 June 1971 in Jain, n.7, p.165.

in the forests near Dacca.⁴² The Daily Mail also reported that China was planning to build an arms, ammunition and an aircraft factory in Dacca next year.⁴³ On 30 November 1971, Radio Tokyo reported the Chinese military aircraft were ferrying arms to Pakistan. Islamabad on its part was reported to have lent China a complete engine of the F104 Star Fighter "presumably for the purpose of imitation."⁴⁴ According to an article in a Mongolian newspaper the Unen, China provided Pakistan facilities of fly military planes to the east over its territory and gave its massive military assistance in a bid to suppress the national liberation movement in Bangladesh. At the height of Indo-Pakistan war when US ships were close to India's southern shores, Beijing increased its troops on the northern borders of India.⁴⁵

Though the west Pakistani army crackdown on east Bengal population started on 25 March 1971, Beijing maintained a studied silence which was broken only on 4 April 1971, when Radio Beijing and the official press agency the NCNA reported Yahya's announcement of sending troops into east Bengal and his statement blaming

⁴²Armstrong, n.3, p.175.

⁴³Statesman (Calcutta), 30 October, 1971 in Jain, n.8, p.165.

⁴⁴Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), Das, n.15, p.137.

⁴⁵Armstrong, n.3, p.177.

"secessionist elements" who wanted independence for the eastern wing of Pakistan. On 6 April 1971, a Chinese note protested against the Indian government's "connivance" in a demonstration of several hundred Indians outside the Chinese embassy in New Delhi on 29 March 1971 and charged India with "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan." The demonstration was organised to protest against Beijing's giving aid Islamabad in "its war on the freedom, loving people of east Bengal."⁴⁶

However, the **Peoples Daily** commentator on 11 April 1971 came to justify the atrocities perpetrated by Yahya Khan on the unarmed people of east Bengal by calling them, "relevant measures taken by President Yahya Khan in connection with the present situation in Pakistan" which he said was "the internal affairs of Pakistan in which no country should or has the right to interfere." He accused the Indian government for openly interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan and "busily plotting for international intervention in league with the two super powers." He also denounced India for making inflammatory remarks over the Pakistan situation, a massing troops along the East Pakistani border and "even instigating armed plain clothes men to infiltrate into Pakistan for disruption and harassment," thereby, seriously prejudicing the security of Pakistan. He then resolutely supported "as

⁴⁶Jain, n.8, p.176.

always" Pakistan's just struggle for safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty and against foreign aggression and interference.⁴⁷

The **People's Daily** commentary was followed by Premier Chou's message to Yahya in which he sought to justify the handling of the situation in east Pakistan by the military administration of Pakistan when he referred to Yahya doing "a lot of useful work to uphold the unification of Pakistan and to prevent it from moving towards a split," and differentiated the broad masses of people from "a handful of persons who want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan." He declared emphatically that "what is happening in Pakistan at present is purely the internal affairs of Pakistan which can only be settled by Pakistani people themselves and which brooks no foreign interference whatever." He expressed confidence in the "wise consultation and efforts" of Yahya Khan and "leaders of various quarters in Pakistan," by which he presumably meant Bhutto and his ilk, about bringing the situation in Pakistan to normal again. Posing himself as a friend of Pakistan, Chou contrasted the Chinese attitude with that of USSR and the USA and accused India of "gross interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan by exploiting the internal problems," of Pakistan. In the end, the Chinese Premier assured Yahya of firm Chinese support was always"

⁴⁷Peking Review (Beijing) 16 Apr., 1971.

in case of "Indian expansionists date to launch aggression against Pakistan."⁴⁸

Pakistan perturbed by Indian going closer to the Soviet Union became more vituperative in its attack. On the other hand A radio Beijing commentary on 28 April 1971 endorsed Yahya's charge of "open and shameless interference" against India, of concentrating troops by India and of aggravating the situation "through instigating and materially supporting a handful of people to create turmoil."⁴⁹

That Pakistan attached great importance on its relations with China was evident from Yahya's message, on the anniversary of China's National Day, in which he urged China, "to continue to play a valuable role in preservation of peace in the world."

Z.A. Bhutto visited as the head of a delegation consisting of the three service - chiefs of Pakistan and high officials in the foreign office of Beijing from 5-8 November 1971. This visit was very significant seen against the background of the growing diplomatic isolation of Pakistan and the steadily diminishing sources of military supplies resulting from the pursuit of repressive policy in east Bengal. The visit drew a blank in terms of issue of a joint communique. Yet Chi Peng-Fei expression of great

⁴⁸Dawn (Karachi) 13, April, 1971 in n.7, p.175.

⁴⁹Jain, n.7, p.176.

concern "over the tension in the sub-continent" and of support to Pakistan. Despite this, the absence of words "territorial integrity" and national unity" as also the use of qualifying words "support as always" seemed to signify vagueness as to the extent of Chinese commitment. Robert Jackson considered that the vagueness was deliberate on the part of Beijing, born it was on the very accurate reading of the situation" that Pakistan was unable to retain east Bengal. Writing in *International Affairs* in January 1973 he wrote:

"The formula being pressed upon China by Pakistan was a commitment to the national unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan - a formula which implied a threat of war against India and defence of Yahya's position in east Pakistan. In the event Chinese deliberately decided not to adopt this phraseology, and the formula they chose instead referred to Pakistan's 'independence and state sovereignty.'" Obviously this was ambiguous in relation to east Bengal, although it certainly represented a firm commitment to the survival of nucleus of Pakistan in the west.

This position of course defined very precisely the character of Chinese stake in Pakistan - deeply committed to maintenance of a strong and independent west wing, but interested in east wing only to the extent that support for Yahya's position in the east was necessary if competition

from Russians for influence in Islamabad was to be written off."⁵⁰

The visit of a high powered 12 member delegation led by Li Shui-Ching, minister in the first Machine Building Ministry and including military and economic personages was one result of Bhutto's trip to Beijing. Beijing's support got reflected in the statement of Chinese council General in Pakistan.

"Pakistan could rest assure that the Chinese people will remain their reliable friends forever."⁵¹

In the third committee, the Chinese delegate Fu, Hao on 19 November 1971 accused India, though without naming it, for interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs, for creating the "so-called" question of refugees, for rejecting the reasonable proposals of Pakistan about relaxing tension and settling refugee question for exploiting the question of refugees in order to carry out "subversive activities" against Pakistan and for obstructing the return of refugees to their homeland.⁵²

After the Indian offensive in Jessore Sector on 21st November the Pakistani Ambassador in Beijing K.M. Kaisa had a "cordial and friendly" meeting with Chou-En-Lai on 24 November when he presented a letter from Yahya and Premier

⁵⁰Peking Review (Beijing) 26 Nov., 1971, p.19.

⁵¹Das, n.15, p.135.

⁵²Ibid.p.135.

Chou expressed "concern over India's military provocations along the east Pakistan border in the previous days."⁵³

An international level, on 26 November 1971 Chiao Kuanhua declared in the UN that Beijing would "as always" support the Pakistani people in their just struggle against foreign aggression," they criticized the Indo-Soviet treaty and denounced the USSR for encouraging India to launch barefaced armed aggression Pakistan.⁵⁴

A commentary in the *People's Daily* entitled "Indian Ambition to annex east Pakistan" of 3 December 1971 had to say, "The Indian Government, backed and abetted by social imperialism, is plotting to create a "Bangladesh" in East Pakistan in an attempt to divide Pakistan and realise its expansionist ambitions to annex east Pakistan. In fact the so called Bangladesh" is entirely a sinister means of the Indian government to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan, o divide and subvert Pakistan. The Chinese people are quite familiar with such Indian government's insidious tricks as creating Bangladesh...it was precisely the Indian government which engineered a rebellion in China's Tibet region...created the so called "Tibetan 'refugee' issue and energetically antagonized China."⁵⁵

1971 WAR: After the Indo-Pakistan conflict developed into

⁵³Ibid p.135.

⁵⁴^{Bose,} n.29, p.67.

⁵⁵Jain, n.8, p.162.

a full-fledged war with effect from 3 December 1971, Beijing opted for complete support on the side of Pakistan without caring for its effect on Sino-Indian relations or its future relations with Bangladesh.

This was to counter Indo-Soviet alliance, to undercut India's prestige and strength and to retain Pakistan as an outlet to Indian ocean.

Accordingly, China's support for Pakistan in the United Nations was the most direct and the strongest. China was the only country to vote against the Soviet draft resolution. But for China negative vote, it would have been adopted. Even when voting in favour of the US draft, the Chinese representative expressed his dissatisfaction with it as it failed to condemn "the term aggression" on Pakistan committed by India with the support of Soviet Union and also failed to voice support for Pakistan's just struggle against aggression." China's own draft resolution 5 December 1971 accused India of launching "large scale attacks on Pakistan, thus, gravely undermining the peace in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent" completely ignoring Pakistani air attacks of 3 December 1971. India was called upon to withdraw "immediately and unconditionally" its armed forces which it had sent into Indian territory for "counter attack". A call for the cessation of hostilities came later in the draft.

In the interventions of the Chinese delegate, India

was accused of not only committing aggression, but also of creating the refugee situation (the charge was ridiculed by the Soviet Ambassador who questioned, " why should India have taken upon itself the tremendous burden of carrying for ten million refugees and stated that the repression in east Pakistan was responsible for the creation of refugee problem): and the setting up of a "puppet regime in Bangladesh."⁵⁶

In his statements in the United Nations the Chinese representative went all out to denounce India and support Pakistan. He characterized as sheer fascist nonsense Indian assertion that the existence of Pakistani troops in east Pakistan constituted in itself a threat to India and traced India's expansionism to Nehru's **Discovery of India** which openly proclaimed that the south asian subcontinent and the Indian ocean was the sphere of influence of India.

China sought to comfort Islamabad by saying that although Pakistan had met with certain temporary difficulties it was winning "more extensive sympathy and support." It assured military Junta of Pakistan of Beijing's firm support and of China resolutely carrying out its "duties in and out of the United Nations."⁵⁷

On 16 December 1971, came another statement denouncing "joint conspiracy" of India and the USSR in intensifying

⁵⁶Jain, n.7, p.179.

⁵⁷Peking Review (Beijing) 17 December 1971, pp.11-12.

"subversion, interference and aggression against Pakistan" and condemning India of single handedly manufacturing it "so-called" Bangladesh was mainly directed towards exposing the "shameful role" of Moscow - "the back stage manger of Indian expansionism." It considered that Soviet Union was trying to turn India into a "Sub-superpower on the South Asian Sub-continent as its assistant and partner in committing aggression against Asia."⁵⁸

In referring to China's firm support to Pakistan then statement remarked that "We not only are doing this politically, but will continue to give them material assistance," Beijing admitted that it had not only supplied military hardware to Islamabad but also promised to do the in future.

China obviously desired Islamabad not to reconcile itself to the separate existence of Bangladesh and not to normalize its relations with India but to continue its flight against them.⁵⁹

Thus, it may be argued that no with standing all the criticism, China played a rather limited role, not going beyond mobilizing international diplomatic pressures against India. For that matter, even during the height of Indo Pak conflict it did not really seek to identify Pakistan's causes as its own, or create any diversionary

⁵⁸Ibid. pp. 10-11.

⁵⁹Jain, n.7, p.185.

tactics on Sino-Indian border. It did not also try to aggravate the situation by sending ultimatums to India, as it did in 1965. In fact, during the period it send only 3 protest notes to India. One in April objecting to Indian governments connivance in a demonstration held outside Chinese embassy to protest against. Beijing's aid to Islamabad in its war on the people of East Bengal and the other two in December, accusing India of encroachments in the Chinese territory. Indian government rejected all the three notes, terming the Chinese charges as baseless.⁶⁰ This Chinese mild support was primarily due to the fact that it feared Soviet reaction in the wake of activation of Indo-Soviet treaty. Moreover, while New Delhi could count on 'Moscow' support in the war, a stage had not reached in Sino American relations that Beijing could be sure of Washington's support on its side against Indo-Soviet thrusts in Tibet and Sinkiang, though unlike 1965, there was no danger of the USA joining hands with the USSR in support of India and against China.

Pakistan and Sino-American Detente : Besides China's direct and indirect influence during the 1971 war the major development during this period was the emergence of Sino-American Detente, in which Pakistan played the role of facilitator.⁶¹

⁶⁰Jetly, n.20, p.273.

⁶¹Syed, n.16, p.144.

When President Nixon visited Pakistan in July 1969 he requested President Yahya Khan's assistance in removing "misunderstandings" between China and the United States. Yahya responded affirmatively. The two Presidents met again in October 1970 in Washington where the Pakistani President arrived after a visit to the United Nations, which would seem to have been undertaken to give him an excuse of for visiting Nixon. Nixon asked Yahya to see if the Chinese would be willing to receive an important American official. Yahya had two private meetings with Chou-En-Lai in Beijing the next month and found, among other things, that the Chinese would rather receive the proposed American official openly than secretly. After that, numerous message between China and the United States passed through Yahya Khan.

The message and Yahya Khan's comments if any, were placed in a sealed envelop and carried by special courier to the Pakistani ambassador in Beijing or Washington, as the case might be. In Washington the ambassador delivered the package personally to Henry Kissinger; in Beijing to Chou-En-Lai. On some occasions Yahya Khan conveyed the message orally to the Chinese ambassador in Islamabad who then transmitted it to Chou-en-Lai.

In addition to principals and their advisors or associates (in the American case, Henry Kissinger), only a small number of individuals - the Chinese ambassador in

Islamabad, the Pakistani foreign secretary and ambassador in Beijing and Washington - knew that exchange between China and United States were proceeding through Yahya Khan. But the contents of the message were, at the time, known only to Nixon, Kissinger, Yahya Khan, Chou-En-Lai and in some cases, the Chinese ambassador in Islamabad.

In July 1971, Henry Kissinger, ostensibly on a tour of several Asian countries, stopped in Pakistan for a brief visit.. The day after his arrival in Rawalpindi he was said to be ill and resting in Nathiagati, a mountain resort in the North West Frontier Province. The government of Pakistan made elaborate arrangements to make it appear that Kissinger was indeed ill and resting. In fact a PIA plane had taken him to Beijing where he talked with Chou-En-Lai and arranged for President Nixon's visit to China the following year. The same plane brought him back to Rawalpindi just as secretly.

China and the United States were no doubt appreciative of Pakistan's role in bringing them together. But some Pakistani diplomats submit that this role may have contributed to her defeat and dismemberment later the same year. The Soviet Union was said to have been greatly angered by the fact that Pakistan helped her two great adversaries travel towards a detente. The fact of this detente, and also the manner of its coming about alarmed Moscow and New Delhi and hurried them towards a treaty of "friendship"

including mutual defense assistance provisions. Needless to say, it was Yahya Khan's responsibility, not that of Nixon or Chou-en-Lai, to calculate the consequences that the role asked him might have for his own country.

Thus Pakistan played a very important role to bring an opening in the sphere of the role of United States in the region. Yet the balance in the limited sense against India which was later broken down by dismemberment of Pakistan. This worsened the Pakistan's security problem. The role of China appeared at two levels, one with reference to its continued relationship with Pakistan, though at subdued level earlier than 1965 era and other level was opened by entente of the United States and China.

Thus three sets of relationships came to the fore, the triangular great power system; the essentially bipolar system comprising India and Pakistan ; and what may be termed a 'geopolitical' or 'pivotal' system, involving India Pakistan, the Soviet Union, China and the entry of the United States in the detente with China. These three systems became interlocked to such an extent that an action deriving its logic from one system would have to have an effect on another. In a typical chain of events on the subcontinent, a great power sought to improve its relations with a local power in the belief that in doing so it was promoting its interests against those of another major power. However, to the local powers this action was seen in

the light of their rivalry with each other, and one would attempt to counter the other advantage by moving closer to another major power. This in turn would cause a reaction by both the two great powers and China. Thus it complicated problem of South Asian security for years to come.

CHAPTER - V

CHINA AND THE SMALLER STATES

IN THE REGION

"Tibet is China's palm, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh and North East Frontier Agency of Assam are the fine fingers. Now that the palm has been restored to China, the fingers shall go with it."¹

- Chinese Communist Propaganda

This being the case, Chinese involvement at the Himalyan border and in the Himalyan border states became a very important dimension of the South Asian security. These states had a role of buffer zone between India and China.² The cases studied in this chapter include mainly Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.

Nepal: The essential Indo-centricity of the region made India particularly sensitive to the security of these border states. As early as in 1950, Nehru had assured the Parliament "it is not possible for any Indian government to tolerate any invasion of Nepal from anywhere".³

¹John Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations: Hostile Coexistence (London, 1967) p.197.

²P.S. Jayaramu India's National Security and Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1987). p. 125.

³Rowland, n. 1. 198.

Nepal, the most important of the Himalyan states, thus occupies a prime place in Sino-Indian contest for power and influence in the region in view of the strategic location. It is well known that British India's defence policy attached special importance to Nepal as it constituted a buffer between India and China. Maintenance of a close relationship with Nepal, therefore, came to be of cardinal importance from the point of view of India's own security and power position.

The role played by China in determining the security threat started in an indirect way. The extension of Chinese authority to Central Himalayas in 1951 was perceived by Nepal as an independent variable that could be utilized effectively as a counter to New Delhi's dominant influence in Kathmandu. China, on its part became interested in Nepal subsequent to its occupation of Tibet.⁴

The Indo-Nepalese relations started on uneven keel in 1950's, reflected in the 1950 treaty. In case of India and China for Nepal the aid became the tool of balancing China against India. The economic dimension of security got best manifestation in Indo-Nepalese relations. During the 50's the Indian aid in Nepal served the following purposes:

- to assure Nepal's political stability.
- To emphasize special relationship India shared with

⁴Shashi Bhushan Prasad, The China Factor in Indo - Nepalese Relations : 1955-72. (New Delhi, 1989) p. 133.

Nepal.

- To gain the goodwill by winning the support of the government and people of Nepal.
- To advance India's strategic interests by accomplishing a partial fortification through an aid programme.

This could be deduced from the fact that when India decided to build Gauchen air port, it sent a team of Indian Airforce, not from civil aviation department, to study Nepal's requirement. Secondly, both Gaucher airport and the Tribhuvan Raj path were constructed by Indian Army Engineers, not by civil engineers. Thirdly, when an MP asked for information on team findings, he was told by the Deputy Minister of Defence that it was not in the public interest to disclose that.⁵

In 1950, China occupied Tibet. In fact Nepal was as necessary to the security of India as Tibet to the security of China. In order to meet the new challenge posed by the Chinese occupation of Tibet, India endeavoured to enter into treaty relations with Nepal, guaranteeing its sovereignty and territorial integrity, Nehru declared on 6 Dec. 1950 :

Our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal has become still more acute and personal, in view

⁵Lok Sabha Debates, 1951 pt. 1. Vol. viii, in Prasad, n.4, p. 96.

of development across our borders, in China and Tibet.

Apart from our sympathetic interest in Nepal, we are also interested in security of our own country. From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier. Of course they are no longer as impassable as they used to be, but are still fairly effective. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also principal barrier to India. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened because that would also be a risk to our security.⁶

Further he said,

"Frankly we do not like and shall not brook any foreign interference in Nepal. We recognize Nepal as an independent country and wish her well, but even a child knows that one cannot go to Nepal without passing through India. Therefore, no other country can have as intimate a relationship as ours."

Kathmandu's official reaction to Nehru's pledge was indicative of country's traditional suspicion of Indian

⁶Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi. The publication Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India 1961) p. 435.

motives. Though at one time, the democratic leadership headed by M.P. Koirala, Nepal's first commoner Prime Minister had said, "India's defence is our defence."⁷ B.P. Koirala who had succeeded K. I. Singh asserted that Nepal would seek help from the United Nations rather than from India in an event of attack by China.⁸ So the rapport and cordiality that existed at highest level between Indian and Nepali leadership had started declining after King Tribhuwan's death in 1958. Under King Mahendra the assertion of national pride and desired autonomy of political action from India came about. The later domestic upheaval in 1960, by the dismissal of the Nepali Congress elicited a disgruntled reaction from Nehru who termed that as "not a step in advance, but a step backwards, and a step backward will have to be retraced sometimes or the other". Such statement's gave a justification to King Mahendra to describe India's reaction to his move as hostile and uncalled for interference in his country's internal affairs.⁹ Yet this, on Nehru's part, was articulation of concern for prospects of political instability in the strategically placed Himalyan Kingdom at a time when

⁷Bhola Chatterjee A Study of Recent Nepalese Politics (Calcutta, World Press, 1967 pg. 115-6) Cited in S.D. Muni, India and Nepal: A Changing Relationship (New Delhi, 1992) p. 40.

⁸Rowland, n.1, p. 198.

⁹Muni, n. 7, p. 43.

tensions were deepening in Sino-Indian relations. Under the circumstances, the Indo-Nepalese relations could not but deteriorate resulting in the steady erosion of the Treaty of 1950. From 1956, Tanka Prasad Acharya's government started expressing desire to change Nepal's "special relationship" with India in favour of "equal friendship" with other countries. Second setback came with Nepali demand of withdrawal of Indian Military mission. The new group was termed as Military Advisory group, with limited advisory role in 1958.¹⁰

On the other hand by 1954, a broad consensus emerged within the Nepalese political community on China question, favouring normalization. In 1955, Nepal established diplomatic relations with China. In the same year Nepal was admitted to U.N.O. The policy to balance India with China was reflected in the first ever women's delegation to China and first ever official cultural delegation in 1956. Then they concluded a treaty on Tibet on 20 September, 1956. Thus by normalizing relations with China on Tibet, Nepal recognized the growing power of China. On the surface the treaty might not have had any dangerous intentions. It was designed essentially to make status of Nepal in Tibet entirely subsidiary. Nevertheless, Sino-Nepalese treaty was not an entirely common place affair. The elimination of Tibet as a buffer state, change of Tibet into a Chinese

¹⁰Muni, n. 7, p.45.

military base, combined with increasing Chinese pressure for direct contacts with Nepal, had vastly upset the balance in the Himalayan region. It installed communist Chinese representatives in more than one place in Nepal. It permitted crossing of a vital border which affected the security of both Nepal and India. So even if there had been no injury to India contemplated, there was no doubt that the reordering of relations between China and Nepal involved necessarily greater watchfulness of Indian security interests on Sino-Nepal border.

After the Treaty, the Prime Minister paid a visit to China. Though under K.I. Singh "Special relations with India" became dominant theme again, yet during 1955-58 period Kathmandu took a number of steps which made India apprehensive of Nepal's close contacts with China and consequent growth of Chinese influence in the strategic belt south of the Himalayas, particularly in view of its uneasy relationship with China.

In 1959-60, B.P. Koirala's balance politics came to the fore and he maintained an attitude of strict neutrality towards the Sino-Indian border dispute.

On Chinese side, in 1956, Chou Enlai visited Nepal and reminded them of racial ties with Chinese. He referred to "blood ties between Nepal and China". The main aim of China's policy in Nepal during 1955-72 period was to complicate India's relationship with the Himalayan Kingdom

in order to limit New Delhi's ability to take effective action outside South Asian region.¹¹ With a view to achieve this objective China tried its best to hurt India's relations with Nepal, isolate India, eliminate Indian influence and draw Nepal into its sphere of influence.¹²

Nepal utilized the tactics of balancing India against China openly and successfully during the period following the dismissal of the Koirala government in King Mahendra in 1960. Even earlier B.P. Koirala had maintained an attitude of strict neutrality towards Sino-Indian border dispute. In a speech before the house of Representatives on 4 September 1959, B.P. Koirala had stated categorically that Nepal should not take sides" or get involved in border dispute between India and China. He declared that Nepal's relations with both India and China were more than verbal and formal" and they were so vital that nothing should be said and done to harm them. He was reported to have said at a later stage that the McMohan line was an issue between India and China about which he had nothing to say.¹³ B.P. Koirala again expressed his governments view that Nepal's policy of neutrality was viable both in context of the cold war

¹¹Leo E. Rose "King Mahendra's China Policy" in S.D. Muni Ed. Nepal: An Assertive Monarch (New Delhi, 1977) p. 234.

¹²V.P. Dutta China's Foreign Policy:1958-62 (Bombay, 1962) p.154.

¹³Prasad, n.4, p. 145.

between United States and the Soviet Union as well as India and China.

Earlier he balanced his visit to New Delhi by visit to Beijing in March in 1962 securing assurances of friendly intentions on China's part.¹⁴ The two agreements were outcome of this meet:

- (i) Scientific demarcation of China-Nepalese boundary, where Beijing assured Nepal that traditional border will not be disturbed and armed personnel will be out of frontier zone (12 1/2 miles.). Koirala expressed hope that newly concluded pact could "provide a very good background for the settlement of Chinese-Indian boundary dispute.
- (ii) second agreement, termed as a 'sweetener agreement' promised Rs. 11,00,000,000 aid.

Though there was a phase of Chinese traditional border policy of cartographic aggression¹⁵ showing Mount Everest as theirs, and another irritant, due to Mustang incident were eventually papered over in various ways, usually through Chinese concessions.

Consequently, by the end of 1960 Nepal's relations with both India and China were on even keel.

In case of Nepal, due to its landlocked nature, the

¹⁴Rowland, n.1, p.198.

¹⁵Daljit Sen Adil, China and Her Neighbours : A Review of Chinese Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1984), p.194.

domestic politics has had a great determining influence in directing the foreign policy formulations. So after coup, when King Mahendra realized that New Delhi was unwilling to provide the kind of guarantee that the royal regime considered vital for survival, it started getting closer to China again after a brief phase of trying to woo India. This policy would have had domestic fall out in terms of popularizing his regime at home and putting pressure on Indian government to change stand regarding the movement and activities of Nepali Congress rebels exiled in India.

King Mahendra's fraternising, attitude was demonstrated during his visit to China where he signed a boundary treaty in 1961 and an economic aid agreement providing for the construction of a road connecting Kathmandu a Lhasa.¹⁶ The boundary protocol came into being on 20 Jan. 1963 ; a Chinese attempt at cultivating Nepal against India. The summary:

The Protocol between the Government of the People's Republic of China and his majesty's government of Nepal relating to the boundary between the two countries" declares that the Sino-Nepalese joint boundary committee has successfully completed the task conferred on it by the Sino-Nepalese boundary treaty of October 5, 1961 with regard to establishing permanent boundary markers and has thereby clearly and formally demarcated the boundary line

¹⁶Prasad, n.4, p.146.

between China-Nepal."¹⁷

India welcomed the boundary agreement but objected strongly the road agreement. The potential breaching of the Himalyan barrier undermined the entire security system in the northern border area. The India annoyance was reflected in withdrawal of Indian assistance. The strategic facet of road became clear from the fact that it termed no economic or trade purpose of Nepal.¹⁸ It was a widespread feeling in India that the road would lead to a considerable increase in Chinese influence in Nepal and open up fresh possibilities of ideological and physical penetration- a cause of danger to India's security.

Besides the road agreement, there were many other documents such as Hostile Expeditions and International Law by Nepalese Guidance Ministry on April 1962, which further eroded Nepalese-Indian relations. New Delhi imposed an unofficial trade blockade of Nepal in September-October 1962. it would have undermined the entire Nepalese economy if continued for any length of time., To Nepal's good fortune Chinese launched a war against India and achieved military objective.

Thus due to 1962 war India had to revise its policies

¹⁷R.K. Jain, China South Asia Relations - 1947-1980 Vol. II (New Delhi, 1981) p.371.

¹⁸Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hongkong) 16 March, 1962, cited in Prasad, n.4, p.148.

radically through out Himalyan area to the advantage of Nepal.

Keeping this background in mind, the political manoeuverings of Nepal from 1962-1971 become clear. It must be kept in mind that in the security complex of Nepal, it was not the Indian army but Indian economic presence with which Nepal had to contend and, therefore, the policy of balance resulted in later playing China card to get more assistance.

From China's side the policy must be understood in the context of disturbances it caused (or was bound to cause) to India's security in the region. Thus, one of the important occupance of which encouraged China to activise its policy of weaning Nepal away from India's sphere was the neutral posture adopted by Nepal in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. The statement of Rishikesh Shaha (Nepalese Representative in U.N. General Assembly) at banquet, 23 Nov., 1962 testifies this attitude.

We have viewed with great concern the deterioration of the border dispute between our two neighbours - China and India. This has come as a shock to all countries in this region that have over the years began to acquire freedom in the course of security, unity and solidarity. Neither India nor China will win if Asia loses. We have nothing but friendship and goodwill

towards owe two great neighbours - China and India. We have never thought to play one neighbour against the other; because we know full well the danger in this kind of policy.¹⁹

The underlined statement reflects the duplicity as precisely that was what followed by Nepal, explicitly or implicitly. Herein the role of a researcher comes to unearth the 'things thought' underlying the 'things done' or 'said'.

From 1962 conflict afterwards India, faced with a hostile China, desperately needed good relations with Nepal, which having a five hundred miles stretch of the Himalayas, held position of key geographical importance from the point of Indian security. New Delhi realized that to cut off relations with Nepal would be to abandon a crucial front to Red China, that in the context of Chinese threat the friendship of Nepal was much more valuable to India than the form of government that prevailed there; and that King Mahendra non-aligned but essentially friendly was a great deal better than Mahendra non-aligned but thoroughly irritated.²⁰

This realization in India was simultaneous to the realization in Nepal over the potentially threatening consequences of acute imbalances in Indian and Chinese

¹⁹Jain, n.17, p. 371.

²⁰Prasad, n.4, p. 120.

military strength in the Himalyan area. Any further weakening of Indian position was not to his advantage. So Nepal was in urgent need of repairing the rift with India. That is why the visit by Lal Bahadur Shastri to Kathmandu on 2, March 1963 resulted in a joint communique smoothening out Indo-Nepalese relations which appeared to have deteriorated beyond the point of no return. Later Indian President Radha Krishnan in 1963, Minister of International Trade Manubhai Shah in February 1964, minister for irrigation K.L. Rao in March 1964, Swaran Singh in August 1964, Prime Minister L.B. Shastri in April 1965, Indira Gandhi in October 1961, Deputy. Prime Minister. Morarji Desai in 1967, President Zakir Hussain in 1968; External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh in 1969 and President Giri in 1970 visited Nepal to mend the fences with Nepal.

On Nepal's side, in the joint communique issued on 30 August, 1963, the King assured that Nepal's efforts to establish trade relations with other countries were in no way aimed against India's interest. Then followed King Mahendra's Delhi visit.

Nevertheless, Nepal used the China card blatantly to extract a variety of concessions from India. This is an illustrative example of how a big neighbour can influence security pattern just by the virtue of its position without any overt expression of power. The linkage of economics to security also becomes clear. The South Asian security

complex has more than just traditional strategic problems contributing to the threat perceptions.

The concessions involved an Indian assurance against the Nepali Congress leaders. Second, a number of economic concessions were obtained such as number of modifications in 1960 trade treaty and all possible assistance in the form of aid and numerous schemes financed and executed by the government of India for Nepal's economic development. Under the land reforms they replaced land owners of Indian origin in the fertile terai area of Nepal to which New Delhi issued only meekly worded objections.²¹ Finally, Nepal made an attempt to lessen its sole dependence on India in defence matters, through getting assistance from the United States of America and the United Kingdom. India, with the strategic calculation in 1965 persuaded Nepal to enter into a secret agreement with India on arms purchase whereby Kathmandu undertook to obtain all its military equipment from India, with a proviso to procure American and British assistance only when India was unable to provide so.²²

China, on its part during these years, had an objective of weakening, if not eliminating India's influence over the Himalayan Kingdom. The strategies

²¹Rose, n.11, p. 233.

²²Leo E. Rose, Nepal Strategy for Survival (Delhi, 1973), pp. 272-3.

pursued by China to achieve its objective were: (a) to issue statements from time to time expressing support for an independent and sovereign role for Nepal in the politics of the region; such statements were issued at the conclusion of visits of heads of state to each others' capitals; and (b) to conclude trade agreements and render assistance to Nepal in its developmental activities.²³

China started assuming the role of the defender of Nepal against foreign aggression. The most glaring example was the declaration by Chinese Vice Premier Marshall Chen-Yi on 4 Oct., 1962 that "in case any foreign army makes the fool hardy attempt to attack Nepal, China will side with Nepali people."

Later China demanded for the withdrawal of Indian technicians from Nepal's northern military check posts and for stopping use of Gorkhas by India against China during 1961-62. To generate goodwill with Nepal, China repatriated the arrested Indian Gurkha soldiers to Kathmandu, keeping a stand that since Nepal was China's friend China would deliver Gurkhas to their native country.

Later the years 1965 saw an exchange of visits between Nepal and China, 1966 aid of Rs. 150 million, 1967 an agreement for hydro electric station on SunKosi river, 20 mile south from Tibet border. In July China signed an agreement to carry out feasibility survey on cotton

²³Jayarammu, n.2, p.. 126.

cultivation in Terai region. Besides these, trade agreements between Nepal and China came into being in the years 1964, 1969 and 1971.

Thus China improved its position in Nepal by successive acts of diplomacy involving conclusions of treaties, grant of economic aids, exchange of delegations and personal visits. By adopting triple lines of actions consisting of a political line of communist indoctrination, a military line of securing control over strategic boundaries and a diplomatic line of discrediting and isolating India, China gained a strong foothold in Nepal. While in the first phase of its relations with Nepal, China was solely concerned with gaining good will of Nepalese people, it openly challenged the position of India in Nepal with a view to isolate New Delhi in the second phase, deliberately tried to embitter Nepal's relations with India in the third phase and consolidated its position in fourth phase to such an extent that even the government of Nepal was reluctant to do anything that might upset the Chinese. Thus China emerged as the most important external factor to reckon with while dealing with the security of the region on Nepal side.

The Indian military mission was against reconstituted in 1963 as Indian Military Liaison Group with its main task confined to coordinating Indian military supplies to Nepal.

The more severe blow to India's military presence came in 1969, when in process of negotiating a new trade treaty with India, Kathmandu suddenly demanded withdrawal of Indian personnel. Kirti Nidhi Bista, the then Nepali Prime Minister, wrote to government of India, a tense letter asking for the following :

- (a) withdrawal of Indian Military Liaison Group.
- (b) Withdrawal of Indian technicians and observers posted on Nepal's northern check-posts along the Chinese border.
- (c) No more consultations on security matters with India under the provisions of Treaty of 1950.
- (d) Termination of 1965 agreement seeking India's "permission and agreement" for import of arms by Nepal.²⁴

In some circles it was said that the Nepalese demand for withdrawal of Indian personnel was made under Chinese pressure.²⁵ The Red China supported Nepal's demand for withdrawal of Indian military personnel as "sound and reasonable". This Nepalese stand was to please China after the cultural revolution, where the denunciation of India, open disavowal of India's special relations with Nepal and staging of anti-India demonstrations were essential

²⁴Muni, n.7, p. 45.

²⁵The Times of India (New Delhi), 22nd July 1969 cited in Prasad, n.4, p. 154.

items on Bista's programme for pleasing Beijing. Thus the Chinese were determined prevent Nepal from not only to rejoin their enemies, but also bind the royal regime more tightly to their chariot²⁶.

China on its part during the early part of 1970's embarked on a pattern of indirect aggression through exerting pressure. The significance of Chinese power in Kathmandu extended beyond Nepal's boundaries to include Bhutan and Sikkim.²⁷ China attempted to encourage the pro-Beijing elements in Nepal to launch a movement for establishment of a Greater Nepal Federation consisting of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Darjeeling Hill Areas, NEFA (Arunachal) and Tibet.

Later India's role in the liberation of Bangladesh and the merger of Sikkim with the Indian Union as a pre-eminent power in the region led to suspicions in the minds of the Nepalese leaders that their own autonomy and sovereignty might suffer infringements in the hands of India.²⁸ It is such fears, coupled with the belief that situated as it was between the two most populous countries of China and India, Nepal should play neutral role in the politics of the region that led King Birendra to announce the proposal of

²⁶Hemen Ray, China's Strategy in Nepal (New Delhi, 1983) p.86.

²⁷Rowland, n.1, p. 200.

²⁸Muni, n.7, p. 70.

zone of peace for Nepal.

"We need peace for our security; we need peace for our independence, we need peace for development. It is with this earnest desire that I propose that my country, Nepal be declared a zone of peace."²⁹

Chinese stand of unequivocal support with pledge of Chinese support to Nepal's struggle against 'hegemonism and expansionism' indicted India. India's stand on Nepal's Peace Zone proposal which sounded like non-acceptance provided China an excellent opportunity to exploit the Nepalese fears vis-a-vis India.

Thus India's defeat in 1962 and later years deprived India of its traditional northern buffer of protection because of doubts in Bhutan and Nepal. This provided China a foothold of influence on the southern slopes of Himalayas overlooking the Gangetic heartland of Indian strength.³⁰

Bhutan : In the case of Bhutan as mentioned in the first chapter, China was an important factor in the relations between Bhutan and British India. China was always on the look-out to extend its influence into Bhutan and other Himalayan states. With the establishment of a Communist regime in China, there was no change basically in China's approach to its relations with Bhutan and other states

²⁹Jayaramu, n.2, p. 127.

³⁰Rowland, n.1, p. 201.

lying on its southern borders. So far as its neighbouring countries were concerned, the difference between the Chinese empire and Communist China lay in their power. While British India dealt with a "fiction" of the Chinese empire, India faced a resurgent and powerful China. The Government of India was not unaware of the strategic implications of the emergence of a vigorous and centralised China under Communist rule for Bhutan and other Himalayan countries. But it thought that the best way of precluding the influence of Communist China from these countries would be not to match China in military terms but to establish friendly rapport with the Chinese Government. In pursuance of this policy, India recognized Communist China without delay and acquiesced in China's occupation of Tibet in October 1950. Furthermore, it supported China's rightful place in the United Nations and concluded the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954 based on the five principles of Panch Sheel.

For nine years China did not question India's special treaty relationship with Bhutan. It gave an "unwritten recognition of India's special relationship with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim."³¹ The Chinese did so because they were not disposed to raise their border differences with India or the Soviet Union till they built up in their country an infrastructure for the growth of their political and

³¹Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia : Relations among China, India, Pakistan and the U.S.S.R. (New York, 1970), p. 34.

military power. Soon after founding the People's Republic of China in October 1949, they engaged themselves in national reconstruction. Towards the end of the fifties, they consolidated their power, built up an independent nuclear capacity and hence were in a position to settle scores with their neighbouring countries.

By July 1958, Communist China laid claim not only to vast Indian territory but Chinese maps also showed about 200 square miles of Bhutanese territory as part of Tibet - a manifestation of Chinese cartographic aggression³². In accordance with the Treaty of 1949, Nehru took up the matter with China on behalf of Bhutan. In a letter dated 22 March, 1959, Nehru wrote to Chou En-lai that the publication of Chinese map showing parts of Bhutanese territory as if they were in China, was not in accordance with long established usage as well as treaties.³³ Chou En-lai replied to Nehru in his letter dated 8 September, 1959, that the boundary question between China and Bhutan did not fall within the scope of "our present discussion". He also stated that China had "always respected the proper relations" between Bhutan and India. Nehru in his letter dated 26 September, 1959, made it clear to Chou En-lai that under its treaty relationship with Bhutan, "the Government

³²Adel, n.15, p.191.

³³White Paper 1954-59, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, cited in Kapileshwar Labh, India and Bhutan (New Delhi, 1974), p. 212.

of India are the only competent authority" to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations. Although China did not recognize India's special relationship with Bhutan, Nehru was firm to maintain it. He also held that India was bound to protect Bhutan against foreign aggression. When the Communist Chinese made propaganda that Bhutan and Sikkim were parts of the Chinese territory in the past and were "bound to return to the Chinese motherland" within a few years, Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha on 28 August, 1959:

"The Government is responsible for the protection of the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan and of the territorial integrity of these two states and any aggression against Bhutan and Sikkim will be considered as aggression against India."³⁴

Although the Indo-Bhutanese treaty of 1949 contained no reference to the defence of Bhutan, India assumed the responsibility for the defence of Bhutan because of China's ruthless actions in Tibet and its aggressive posture towards Bhutan. In 1959, both India and Bhutan were taken aback by China's military actions in Tibet. Nehru sincerely believed that China would honour Tibet's autonomy. He was shaken in his conviction when China obliterated Tibetan autonomy in 1958-59. China's accusation of India's complicity in the Tibetan uprising, and India's sympathy

³⁴Ibid. p. 213.

for and asylum to the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans who fled to India, shook to the foundation the entire structure of Sino-Indian relationship. Similarly the Tibetan revolt and its ruthless suppression by China made a deep impact on the Bhutanese authorities. The Chinese fought the Tibetan rebels in the vicinity of the northern border of Bhutan. The Bhutanese became aware of what happened in Tibet. Although they did not grant permission to Tibetan refugees to enter Bhutan, many of them infiltrated into their country and narrated the ghastly atrocities perpetrated by the Chinese troops on Tibetans. The flight of the Dalai Lama to India and the assemblage of Chinese troops near Bhutan's northern border alarmed the Bhutanese. Jigme Dorji, then Prime Minister of Bhutan, visited India in August 1959, and sought "a written guarantee" of Indian support in the event of a Chinese attack on Bhutan. As Nehru made it clear in the Lok Sabha that India was committed to protect Bhutan against any attack, there was no need for Bhutan to enter into a defence agreement with India.

In February 1961, a high-level meeting took place in Delhi presided over by Nehru and attended by the Maharaja of Bhutan, V.K. Krishna Menon, then India's Defence Minister, and the three Indian Chiefs of Staff, to formulate a new programme for the defence of Bhutan. The Indian Government decided to take some steps to counter any

Chinese attack on Bhutan. The strength of Indian defence forces available to defend Bhutan were substantially increased. An intensive study for Indian Air Force operations over Bhutan was undertaken. An elaborate survey of Bhutan's defence requirements was made³⁵

Chinese Diplomacy

China had no intention to attack Bhutan. What it intended was to break India's special relationship with Bhutan and establish direct relations with that country. In 1960, it made overtures through some private persons to Jigme Dorji, Prime Minister of Bhutan, for initiating direct negotiations on the border dispute between the two countries. It also offered considerable economic aid to Bhutan. The Chinese offer cut no ice with the Bhutanese. The Maharaja of Bhutan declared in 1961 that Bhutan had no desire to enter into direct negotiation with China. Although Bhutan declined the Chinese offer, its policy towards China was quite cautious. The Maharaja said that they did not want to be either friends or enemies of China.

Effect of 1962 War

Although China's offer cut no ice with the Bhutanese in 1960, it attempted to undermine India's relations with the Himalayan states by launching war on India in 1962. Possibly one of its objects in resorting to war with India

³⁵Lorne J Kavic, India's Quest for Security : Defence Polices, 1947-1965 (Dehradun, 1967) p.77.

was to demolish the dominant influence that India enjoyed in the Himalayan states. China succeeded in achieving its object to some extent. India's prestige and influence suffered in these states as a sequel to the reverses suffered by the Indian forces in the Sino-Indian war in October 1962. Prior to the war, India was generally reckoned by these states as a bulwark, as during the British rule in India, against any aggression from China. The Sino-Indian war drove home to them that India, unable to protect itself, would not be able to protect them in the event of an attack. Bhutan, which was already cautious towards China became still more careful in its gesture towards its powerful neighbour on the northern border. At a Press conference in Delhi on 26 October, 1962, Jigmie Dorji refused to be drawn into any discussion on the security of his country in the context of the Chinese aggression.³⁶ Nevertheless, China failed in its ultimate object inasmuch as Bhutan continued to stand by its treaty of 1949 with India and kept up the close co-operation of mutual benefits between the two countries. Bhutan made no efforts to maintain an equidistance between China and India as Nepal often did in the sixties. However, China's failure to supplant India in Bhutan did not deter the Chinese from attempting to subvert India's special relationship with

³⁶The Times of India, (New Delhi) 27, October, 1964 cited in Labh, n.31, p.215.

Bhutan. In 1964, the Chinese attempted to fish in the troubled waters of Bhutan. They took advantage of the assassination of Jigme Dorji, Prime Minister of Bhutan, to befriend Bhutan and denigrate India. Although no diplomatic relations existed between China and Bhutan, Chou En-lai, Chinese Premier, sent a condolence message to Jigme Dorji Wangchuk, the late Druk Gyalpo, over the death of Jigme Dorji. Besides, Chinese publicists put the blame on India for the incident. How they endeavoured to alienate the Bhutanese from India may be seen in what a *Jen-min Jihpao* commentator wrote about the plotters of the assassination of Jigme Dorji in 1964. The Commentator wrote:

"It is clear to all now that the plotters of the assassination were none other than those who have been trying hard to control Bhutan. In the past few years, the tendency for independence and freedom from Indian control was growing in Bhutan. Prime Minister Dorji had made great efforts in this respect. He had rejected India's aid and hoped that Bhutan would receive aid directly from other countries.³⁷

As a matter of fact, the persons behind Dorji's assassination were no foreigners but a few Bhutanese themselves who represented the conservative elements of the country and were unhappy with Dorji's attempts to introduce

³⁷Ibid, p.216.

reforms and modernization in Bhutan. They felt that Dorji "bartered his country, its tradition and antique ways of life for glamour and veneer of sophistication."³⁸ The crime was perpetrated on 5 April, 1964, when the King of Bhutan was away in Switzerland undergoing a medical treatment. The conspirators attempted to capture power through a *coup d'etat*, but the timely return of the King frustrated their design. The culprits were arrested and were executed after proper trial.

The fact that Jigmie Dorji was not anti-Indian but "anti-communist" demolishes the charge insinuated by the above commentator against India. It was Dorji who closed the Tibetan border with Bhutan, banned trade with Tibet, and launched the process of modernizing Bhutan with India's aid and co-operation. The fact remains, though China tried consistently to subvert Indo Bhutanese relationship which would have meant a dent in the security complex of Bhutan and larger regional complex. Though cartographic aggression, which characterized China's policy when the Great Leap had become Great Tumble by late 1960's was a direct manifestation of threat to the small Himalayan Kingdom.

Sikkim

Sikkim a small state, was of considerable importance

³⁸Pradyumna P. Karan, Bhutan : A Physical and Cultural Geography (Massachusetts, 1967) p.15

for India. (B.V. Keskar). It became protectorate of India in the 'Interest of law and Order', retaining internal autonomy and handing over the administration of external relations to the Government of India.

To this Beijing served notice on Delhi that China did not accept the claims to a special relationship in Sikkim made by India and refused to discuss the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan during the Boundary Commission meetings in 1958.³⁹

Later at thirty five miles from Gangtok, the Chinese continued to dominate the passes into Sikkim with 50-100,000 troops ready, digging trenches, building cantonments and gun-emplacements. A steady stream Chinese propaganda claimed that "Sikkim, Bhutan, Darjiling and Kalimpong are fingers on the hand of China, and belong to the great motherland, and that as they are at present with Indian and other spies, imperialists and war-mongers; they are lice in the clothing of China" and must be cleaned.⁴⁰

To that India warned that any attempt to liberate Sikkim will be opposed by India. China cast doubts on the validity of these agreements made with the Maharaja of Sikkim by claiming that he was not the true ruler of the country any way. They claimed that rightful ruler of the

³⁹George N. Patterson Peking versus Delhi (London, 1963), p. 233.

⁴⁰Patterson, n.39, p.243.

Sikkim was with China in Tibet and that the present Maharaja was usurper appointed by British and maintained by Delhi to further their own designs.⁴¹

On 8 September , 1959 Chau En Lai replied to Nehru's letter, making Chinese territorial demands official :

"In your Excellency's letter, you also referred to the boundary between China and Sikkim. Like the boundary between China and Bhutan, this question does not fall within the scope of our present discussion. I would like, however, to take this opportunity to make clear once again that China is willing to live together in friendship with Sikkim and Bhutan, without committing aggression on other ; and has always respected the proper relation between them and India"⁴².

This craving for Sikkim became clear by certain movements on Chinese side. The first one was when Chinese claimed the commemorative monument, erected on 13 September 1958 marking Nehru's visit, as the border.⁴³

Sino-Indian War and Sikkim - China started military build up in Chumbi valley. The young Maharajkumar of Sikkim

⁴¹Ibid, pp.243-44.

⁴²Ibid. p. 244.

⁴³Dr.Satya Narayan Sinha, The Chinese Aggression (New Delhi, 1964) pp. 106-11.

issued a statement on 1 Novemeber, 1962 that his state stood solidly behind India and that if Sikkim was attacked, the Sikkimese would fight to the best of their abilities. The expressed his satisfaction with Indian measures on Sikkim border.⁴⁴

Later in November, a state of emergency was proclaimed in Sikkim and the Government of India appointed Major General K.P. Candeth in Charge of forces there, a calculated defense. Three days earlier to this the Chinese government had lodged a 'serious protest' with the Indian embassy in Beijing against the Indian sides serious violations of Chinese territory and air-space across - China - Sikkin boundary. China alleged India of building 39 pill boxes, setting up barbed -wire barricades, digging communication trenches at Nathula and blocking the pass to hinder normal movement of border inhabitants. Main objection, therefore, was to Indian defensive measures which had resulted in closure of Nathula which linked Sikkim with Tibet.

To this came the denial of the Government of India on 16 January, 1963, expressing the hope that by making such a baseless charge China was not creating an excuse for further agression, just as it had done in NEFA and

⁴⁴Sudhakar Bhat, India and China (New Delhi, 1967) p.206.

Ladakh.⁴⁵ Later again on 24 March, 1963, Beijing lodged another 'serious protest' against the intensification of repairs of defense works, illegally set up in Chinese territory across the Sikkim-Tibet border. Inadvertently Beijing admitted that these were defence works. China considered these defence works, built on the north east and north of Nathula, as violating Tibetan territory, hence demanded immediate dismantling of these works and withdrawal of Indian troops from 'Chinese territory'. Another allegation against India was violation of Chinese air space by Indian aircraft.

These allegations were rejected by India as 'preposterous' and a 'justification for the continuing aggressive concentration of Chinese forces on Indian border'⁴⁶.

On 4th June, the Chinese demanded a joint investigation of "the case of Indian troops crossing the Nathu La and encroaching on Chinese territory. This demand was rejected by India. In an attempt to internationalise the Sikkim issue, Beijing raised it during the Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo in October 1964.⁴⁷

During the Indo-Pak war of 1965 India agreed to a joint investigations that China may not find a "pretext for

⁴⁵Jain, n.17, vol.1, p.307.

⁴⁶Bhat, n.44, p.207.

⁴⁷Ibid., p.208.

agressive action", as the Indian Premier Shastri put it.⁴⁸ New Delhi maintained that Chinese objections were to the protective defence works, which India had necessarily to undertake on her own side of border, 'against China's avowed objective of taking over Indian territory by force'.⁴⁹

Indo Pak war 1965

During the 1965 war China gave an ultimatum on 17 September, 1965

The Chinese Government demands that India dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boudnary itself within three days of delivery of the present note, and immediately to stop all its intrusions along the Sino-Indian boundary and the China-Sikkim boundary, return the kidnapped Chinese border inhabitants and the seized livestock and pledge to refrain from any more harassing raids across the boundary. Otherwise the Indian government must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising there form.⁵⁰

This deadline was extended on September 19. Earlier Chinese attempts to open second front for India, had got

⁴⁸Jain n.17, vol.1, p.381.

⁴⁹Bhat, n.44, p.208.

⁵⁰Jain, n.17, voll, p.395.

crystallized in firing on Indian troops in Ladakh and Sikkim to provoke India on 13 September, moving their forces close to Sikkim in Tibet border, building of a wall along Sikkim - Tibet' border across Jeleppla.

India, wisely, remained unprovoked making China to withdraw, on 24 September without waiting for the return of "captured Yak and goats". To this, the Western newspapers, notably Times commented that in this encounter the Chinese lost line most precious commodity in Asia - face⁵¹

Later on 2 October twenty Chinese troops crossed Yakla on Sikkim-Tibet border and fired on three man Indian observation post. November 13, 1965 witnessed 70-100 Chinese troops firing intensively in Donchuila area - well within the Indian territory of Sikkim - Tibet border. Chinese intentions became more apparent later on 12 December, 1965 when China linked the Sino-Tibet border at Nathula with a road to Lhasa, enabling them to bring heavier guns right up to Nathu La. 52.

Thus Chinese intrusions continued in one way or the other, either directly strategic or through intrusive diplomacy.

The Chinese reaction later to India's acquisition of Sikkim also reflects the strategic importance of Sikkim for Chinese interests in the region. This important development in the mid-seventies which strengthened India's

⁵¹Cited in Bhat n.44, p. 208.

position in the South Asian region was the integration of Sikkim with the Indian Union as the 22nd State with the status of an Associate State. The strategic implications of Sikkim's integration with India were indeed considerable. India's security situation in the Tibet-Sikkim region improved considerably. With Sikkim as part of India, any future military threat in the region could be handled with greater ease and effectiveness. Also, Sikkim's integration with India made it difficult for China to continue with its anti-Indian activities, as it had earlier done under the Chogyal. The development dealt a serious blow to the famous five finger legacy in the Chinese policy in the region. That perhaps explains China's sharp reaction to the developments in Sikkim. The *People's Daily* characterised the Indian action as "naked aggression" revealing its ugly expansionist features.

Chinese policy towards Sri Lanka

As regards Sri Lanka, China pursued its familiar South Asian policy of maintaining cordial and friendly ties through trade and economic relations. But as in the case of Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan, China was not able to drive any strategic wedge between Sri Lanka and India. This was perhaps due to the generally harmonious state of Indo-Sri Lankan relations. Two of the crucial issues which strengthened Indo-Sri Lankan relations and to that extent

reduced the chances for China to build-up an anti-India front were: (a) Indian Government's military support to the Government of Bandaranaike in countering the insurgency trouble (led by the Che Grevarrists) in 1971 and (b) India's decision in 1974 to recognise Sri Lanka's sovereignty over the island of Kachchativu. The dispute over the ownership of the island of Kachchativu - a legacy of the British rule - had eluded solution for a long time. The agreement, while recognising Sri Lanka's sovereignty over the island, made it clear that the fishing, navigation and pilgrimage rights of the two countries in the island would remain unaffected. India and Sri Lanka also agreed to explore and divide whatever mineral wealth was available in the area. Thus, while safeguarding the country's interests in the area Indian diplomacy deployed a degree of benignness towards its smaller neighbour by accepting its sovereignty over Kachchativu. Seen in the broader South Asian context, the settlement reflected some degree of freshness and initiative in India's diplomacy towards its neighbours.

The reservoir of goodwill and understanding that the Kachchativu settlement yielded result on the one hand in improvements in Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral relations and affected on the other hand, China's plans to gain strategic leverage with Sri Lanka.

Thus it may be analysed that by 1960, 'the Great Leap

had become great stumble which prompted the disgruntled Chinese leadership to start hard at the attempts to consolidate its position in its under belly. Since south Asian security complex is multilayered, starting from domestic stability having spill over effects as which much disturb once could result in destabilization. China becomes an important factor. The interest in Himalayas was basic to Chinese strategy from 1950's onwards only but after 1962 the attempts at influencing the security and stability through exacerbating the fears of small states against the so-called 'hegemony' of India were more fruitful. This phase actually extended till 1975, after acquisition of Sikkim by India, which was a blow to Chinese prestige as well.

CHAPTER - VI

CONCLUSION

The study has tried to understand China's role in the South Asian security during the period 1962-1971. This period is important because of the consolidation of Chinese threat in the security complex within the region. South Asia as a whole, according to Berry Buzan, is an example of a middle level complex. The heart of this complex is the rivalry between India and Pakistan, two large states whose insecurities are so deeply intertwined that their national securities, in terms of political and military security cannot be separated. In this security complex, two major external patterns had to play a significant role. The one was Sino-Soviet dispute and another rivalry between United States and Soviet Union. The hard issue which connected South Asia with these larger complexes was Sino-Indian border dispute as well as Indo-Pak rivalry.

China, a large, powerful, adjacent border extra regional power had interests in this region because of its being the underbelly and hence a key region for extension of its dominance and influence extendable to entire Asia. Due to geographic proximity, as also, absence of collective regional approach, Chinese leaders were eager to transform the subcontinent into its sphere of influence China's

entrenched strategic interests in South Asia coupled with strategic links with Pakistan, its boundary dispute with India and Bhutan, its propensity to destabilise the countries on its periphery, the tremendous enhancement of its military capability including its nuclear capability created far reaching security implications for the region.

South Asia, a newly decolonized region became susceptible to Chinese threat because security is not only concerned with territorial integrity but encompasses political economic stability, ethnic harmony and societal integration also which make it relate to all aspects of nationalism, regionalism and internationalism. This broader framework of security provided an opening for Chinese influence, not only at strategic level but economic and cultural levels too. The porous nature of borders of South Asian regional actors lending itself to the spill-over effects of national problems and the essentially Indo-centric character of the region made it susceptible to interference from extra-regional powers. This interference was reflected at two levels : one, direct threat, second, operating through the internal dissensions in the region still struggling to come to grip with the problem of consolidation of nation-states, complicated by complex, divergent and diametrically opposite threat perceptions.

The manifestation of Chinese direct threat was reflected in the struggle for Himalayas which was

complicated by Chinese border policy of cartographic aggression in the 1950's. Despite the earlier phase of friendship from 1949-1956, the relations started deteriorating. This aggressive stance at the borders resulted in the 1962 Sino-Indian war. The Chinese take-over of Tibet was one indicator of its aggressive mood and strategy of forward defence. The earlier phase of Sino-Indian war resulted in successful crushing of Indian forces and realisation of all Chinese objectives in the disputed territory. This was the coercive phase of Chinese objectives till mid-october. The later phase of onslaught gave China an opportunity to teach several people a lesson. Hence, not only was India taught that it was not a match for Chinese was in Asia, but its claim to lead the non alignment also took a knock. Lessons were also no doubt intended for other more important spectators - the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Recently emerged from the glimpse of the nuclear abyss in Cuba, the super-Powers could be shown that emergent China was a power to reckon with. Thus the year 1962 was a water-shed year for the security in the region. This resulted in hostile relations between China and India. China's attempts at destabilization got manifested in the support to Naxalbari, Mizo and Naga movements in late 60's also. The relations with India became the key factor conditioning Chinese role in the region from 1962-1971 at all levels - strategic,

political and economic, influencing the South Asian security.

Thus after 1962, the Chinese threat became manifest at two levels: one, in terms of the special relationship it developed with Pakistan and second : in terms of exerting pressure on the smaller states of the region through careful economic diplomacy.

Though Sino-Pak Axis had inception in the Bandung Conference, it grew by leaps and bounds after the 1962 war. While the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and India's defeat caused the United States, Britain and Soviet Union to rush military aid to Delhi, the same resulted in collusion of China's and Pakistan's interests. Chinese policy towards the region was of achieving a balance of power by undermining India and propping up Pakistan. As for Pakistan, besides its traditional, historical fear of India, the new support by West to India was a cause of alarm because the burgeoning transformation of the Indian military threatened to put Pakistan into permanent inferiority on the subcontinent. A classical security dilemma was clearly in the making with outside Powers amplifying local patterns of insecurity. On the one hand, India grew increasingly concerned at the prospect of a two-front attack by China and Pakistan. To meet this contingency it greatly increased its arms strength, moving closer to the Soviet Union as a supplier of arms, and arms

industries in the process. On the other hand, Pakistan saw the growing weight of Indian arms almost wholly in relations to itself, worrying not only about its military security in general but also about the rapidly declining prospects for resolving the Kashmir dispute in its favour. Therefore, despite ideological differences, China and Pakistan began moving together in what must count as one of the most unlikely political associations imaginable. From Beijing's perspective, ties with Pakistan not only proved a politically significant move to gain access to the Indian Ocean, but also offered prospects of deflecting India from Soviet purposes by keeping it preoccupied with its subcontinental disputes. As for Pakistan, it saw the need for a more reliable ally against India than the United States had proved. The Sino Pak border agreement in 1963, signing of a civil aviation agreement with China were the first steps in that direction. The border agreement had an underlying Pakistani motive of committing China to the defence of Pakistani controlled Kashmir.

The offensive alliance between both took roots from the onset of 1965 war. Chinese support was reflected in the threat to open the second front for India in Sikkim. China demanded that India withdraw its alleged military works on China-Sikkim border. The Chinese aims of offensive alliance were, firstly, to warn India that while it would not support Pakistan's adventurism it could not countenance a

major shift in India's favour in the subcontinental balance of power ; secondly, to demonstrate China's credibility and usefulness as an alliance partner; thirdly, to serve notice that Chinese interests be taken into account in any international settlement on the Kashmir question. In 1966, Sino Pakistan relations reached a peak, if measured by cultural, economic and military exchange. This phase witnessed arms transfers from China to Pakistan at a very large scale. Later Soviet Union's overtures to Pakistan made China suspicious of a joint Indian-Pakistani opposition to China. This was the phase of Chinese Cultural Revolution and despite being a non-communist state, Pakistan was not criticized, but was retained as a reliable ally. Thus during this phase China's subcontinental policy was conditioned by imperatives and constraints arising out of China's geopolitical location. China's primary objective in furthering this alliance was to increase its military and diplomatic power vis a vis an enemy, where China and Pakistan shared a common perception of threat. Thus Sino-Pak alliance was a major instrument of Chinese intrusive diplomacy in the region.

The emergence of Bangladesh brought forth a new chapter in the security calculations of the region. The unfolding of events preceding the breakup of Pakistan and birth of Bangladesh characterized a period of shifting alliances. The most important development impinging on the

security of the region was emergence of Sino-American detente brought about by Pakistan diplomacy's role as a mid-wife. The threat of Sino-Pakistan alliance made India gravitate towards USSR and finally enter into a security arrangement with the latter to overcome the threat posed by growing Sino-Pak - U.S. friendship. The construction of the friendship highway between Gilgit and Kashgar in 1967 was a source of threat to India from China. Yahya Khan's visit in 1970 strengthened the Sino-Pak relationship further. This being the background of the growing axis, China's support to Pakistan during Bangladesh crisis came at the diplomatic level. The Chinese ideology of support to the 'just' struggle for the right of 'self-determination' of Kashmiris took a round about in case of Bangladesh. Ideologically it should have supported the movement for Bangladesh but the consideration of it being a bourgeois movement supported and sustained by the Indian government and socialist Soviet Union forbade it to do so. Moreover, East Pakistan was a leverage for its sustained pressure on West Pakistan, strategically. That is why Beijing continued with assistance to Pakistan despite the army crackdown in East Pakistan, which had made Washington and Moscow suspend their aid to Islamabad. For China what had been a bilateral conflict with India assumed a form of secondary antagonism with Soviet Union's entry on the strategic scenario of South Asia. Thus China's counter containment strategy took

two forms; the PRC greatly strengthened its ties with Pakistan, elevating the relationship to the status of *de-facto* alliance, secondly, by forging a strategic relationship with the United States in the beginning of 1971 PRC hoped to effect a U.S. - Pak China coalition that would outbalance the Soviet - Indian partnership.

Thus Bangladesh crisis brought forth new dimensions for security in the region with involvement of the Super Powers. China on its part continued to aid Pakistan, help strategically by the lease of transport aircraft, offers of supplies of additional arms through Chittagong, guerrilla war-fare experts and later through increased troops concentration on the northern borders, besides diplomatically supporting Pakistan in the United Nations. China did not even recognize Bangladesh till quite some time. Thus with Bangladesh crisis three sets of relationships came to the fore; the triangular great power system; the essential bipolar system comprising of India and Pakistan and a geopolitical or pivotal system involving India, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, China and the entry of the United States in the detente with China. Thus China factor became integral part of South Asian security.

Another important aspect of Chinese role was through the sustained pressure on the Himalayan border states during this period. The 1962 war shook India's claim of guaranteeing security to the Himalayan states of Nepal,

Sikkim and Bhutan. Nepal's security, linked essentially to its domestic stability was put under pressure by China after 1962 war. Nepal on its part, derived an economic mileage by playing China card against India. Thus by exacerbating Nepalese fear of a strong 'hegemonic' nation in the South, i.e. India, China kept the pressure on the small landlocked state. Nepal, thus, occupied a prime place in Sino-Indian contest for power and influence in the region where Chinese were determined to prevent Nepal from not only to rejoin their enemies but also bind the royal regime more tightly to their chariot. Bhutan, on the other hand was victim of China's border policy from 1959 onwards particularly, after acquisition of Tibet, China's main motive was to break India's special relationship with Bhutan. But the efforts were not successful. The problem of Sikkim was an irritant with China. Following, its five fingers theory, China wanted Sikkim to be under its influence. The border incursions started in 1959 and Sikkim became a bone of contention in 1962 Sino-Indian war. The Chinese propaganda on Sikkim continued till 1965. Indo Pak war, and the Chinese ultimatum during that war was on Sikkim-Tibet border. Later India's acquisition of Sikkim as an associate state of the Indian Union was vehemently criticized by China.

Thus Chinese threat to India at contiguous level was generally politico-strategic and less military in

character. The objective was of checkmating India's strategic influence and power position in the region. Chinese leaders sought to achieve this by widening the strategic divergence between India and countries of the region which was done by skilful exploitation of bilateral disputes and irritants between India and these countries. Thus China factor was an important extra regional factor influencing the security of the region, which resulted in consolidation of specific patterns of security perceptions during this period which proved durable for years to come.

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