

**FOREIGN POLICY OF NEW ZEALAND
DURING THE COLD WAR AND AFTER:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY**

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "**Foreign Policy of New Zealand During the Cold War and After: A Comparative Study**" submitted by **R. Gopala Krishna Rao** in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M.Phil)** of the University, is his own work and has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this University or any other University to the best of our knowledge.

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**Dedicated
to
my parents**

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PREFACE

The changing face of New Zealand's foreign policy in a fascinating study in itself. The essential aims of New Zealand 's foreign policy is to protect the national security and to promote national interests.

The objective of this dissertation is do a comparative study of foreign policy of New Zealand in the Cold War and Post-Cold War period. The various aspects of New Zealand's foreign policy like security concerns, anti nuclear stance, trade and investment and their policy towards regional and international organizations were examined.

The first chapter has given a background to the historical growth of New Zealand's foreign policy since the end of Second World War.

The second chapter has analyzed the priorities of the two parties, viz., National party and labour party on the issues concerning the foreign policy. How the parties gave importance to issues reflecting the values they emphasise.

The third chapter deals with New Zealand's anti nuclear stance and its impact on ANZUS alliance. This chapter have also examined New Zealand's relations with Australia, South Pacific Islands and South East Asia in the Cold War period.

In fourth chapter the Post Cold War scenario would be surveyed which would include an assessment of changed security perspectives and a new attitude towards South East Asia, East Asia and South Pacific and Latin America.

The last chapter has concluding observations.

A large number of people helped me to complete this dissertation. I express my profound gratitude to my supervisor **Prof. Parimal Kumar Das** for his suggestions and constructive criticism, which helped me immensely in my work. In spite of his other busy occupations his help and guidance was always forthcoming. I place on record my deep sense of gratitude to him.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy consists of external actions taken by decision makers with the intention of achieving long range goals and short term objectives. Primary influence on foreign policy lies on the goals the policy seeks to achieve. These are security, welfare and preservation or promotion of values. The search for security is perennial. For small states like New Zealand, its foreign policy is marked by a sense of insecurity, mainly due to its geographical size, location and demography. This gave rise to its persistent plea for a protector against potential enemies.

Geographically, New Zealand lies in the South Western part of the Pacific ocean. To the west is Australia, 1600 kilometers away and in areas only 270,000 sq. kms. There are only three islands-North, South and Stewart separated by narrow straits. New Zealand has a coast line length of more than 1600 kms and the width upto 450 kms combine to provide, New Zealand a very lengthy coastline in proportion to its area, which provides it with numerous sites for harbours and ports suitable even for overseas ships.

New Zealand is a country of predominantly European settlement and as such, it had retained its traditional loyalties to the United Kingdom, as it gives a sense of security to the people.

New Zealand had established a fruitful economic partnership with Britain as bulk of the produce of wool, meat and dairy products were exported to it. New Zealand was certain that its interests were best served through Britain. As such they never aimed for an independent foreign policy. Prime Minister M.J. Savage, in 1939 said “Behind the sure shield of Britain, we have enjoyed and cherished freedom and self government, both with gratitude for the past and with the confidence in the future. We range ourselves without fear behind Britain. Where she goes, we go, where she stands, we stand: we are only a small and young nation, but we are one and all a band of brothers and we march foreword with a union of hearts and wills to a common destiny”.¹

New Zealand realised that on her own it could make little impact on world affairs, where as Britain was a great power capable of affecting the pattern of world events. Therefore, New Zealand foreign policy in the pre-second world war period, consisted chiefly in seeking to modify British policy in those areas where New Zealand has a strong interest.

During the Second World War, New Zealand displayed total faith in British leadership. But, the fear of the Japanese was reigning high in the minds of New Zealand and compelled New Zealand and Australia to ask Britain to step up security of its region. Britain compiled with the advice,

¹ How New Zealand is governed (ed.), Research board; Published by Research, Delhi: year not mentioned p-57.

but all myths of impregnable British Singapore base lay shattered, when Japanese successfully ran over Pearl harbour, Malays, Singapore and Burma. The Japanese onslaught southward in the pacific placed the survival of Australia and New Zealand in jeopardy for the first time in their history. This awareness of the British weakness in the Pacific caused the development a regional policy in the pacific. Thus the efforts of Dr. Evatt to develop a regional policy bore fruits, when Australia and New Zealand signed Australia-New Zealand Agreement on 21 January 1944 at Canberra. (Also known as Canberra pact). At this meeting, Foreign Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, H.V.Evatt and Peter Fraser, agreed that the experience of their two countries, their war efforts and their vital interests entitled them a voice in the control and destiny of the South pacific. Both the powers declared, With in the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of defence should be established comprising of the south west pacific and south pacific areas and that this zone should be based on Australia and New Zealand, streaching through the arc of islands north and north east of Australia, to West Samoa and the cook islands. ²

The underlying assumption was that Australia and New Zealand were destined to carry out in the pacific area (after 1945) certain regional responsibilities for the commonwealth of nations as a whole or for those members of the commonwealth of nations with an interest in the pacific. Thus, both the powers aimed for a claim to consultation and a say in the

². Ibid., p. 59.

future disposition of their area. This decision on the emphases on pacific regionalism brought sharp reaction from Britain and United States of America. Nevertheless, for New Zealand this was the first fruit of Australia- New Zealand joint diplomacy.

The Second World War changed the balance of power in the world. Japan was no longer a danger and as such, New Zealand no longer feared the Asian immigrants and it stopped the White New Zealand immigration policy. Beside, New Zealand government established in 1943, a career in foreign affairs service and department of external affairs was also set up. It made a beginning in stationing its own diplomatic representatives, where New Zealand's interests made their presence necessary. In particular, New Zealand sought to foster good relationships with its neighbours in the pacific and Asia and to increase the measure of security and welfare in these areas. New Zealand Government contributed over \$ 30,000,000 towards the economic development of south and southeast Asia and the education of their peoples under the Colombo plan of 1950.³

Woven into the post war policy was the traditional New Zealand belief in the principles of collective security and international justice to which the united nations has pledged support. Peter Fraser of New Zealand played a notable part in the foundation of United Nations, especially as the

³. Ibid., p.85

chairman of the committee which drafted the trusteeship section of the charter.

Even, before the defeat of Japan both Australia and New Zealand became uneasy about seeing the Pacific becoming an American lake. The result was a kind of Monroe doctrine against outside interference in the South Pacific. The ANZAC's agreed to continue to cooperate in war and peace. They served notice on an unnamed power that the possession of war time bases in the Pacific afforded no rights to post-war time bases in the Pacific afforded no rights to post-war sovereignty. Both the governments called for a conference with British support in 1947 at Canberra, where it was resolved to setup South Pacific Commission, with representatives of Australia, New Zealand, France; Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States, the South Pacific Commission proved a small cooperative venture between administering powers and it didn't concern itself with political, defence and security developments.

In 1949, Australia, New Zealand and Britain, reached an important agreement known as ANZAM. For coordinating their defence planning in the region covering, Australia, New Zealand and British territories. Though it gave solace to New Zealand, the rapidly expanding United States presence in the Pacific and impressive display of power in the Second World War compelled New Zealand to reconsider its regional policy.

When Britain returned to pacific after the Second World War to recapture its territories, it failed as the war had left Britain exhausted and incapable to recapture its lost territories. But the United States emerged from the war with a monopoly of atomic weapons. United States had maintained or used certain islands as bases.

However, in 1949 the United States interest in the pacific revived under the pressure of International events like, establishment of a communist regime in China and the Korean war. J.A.Camilleri describes 'the final victory of Mao Zedong forces in October 1949 and the out break of hostilities in Korea in June 1950 were all perceived by US as further deteriorating in the system and realized the need for stemming the tide of communist expansion, Unable to construct in the pacific a single strategic system comparable to NATO the united states began to explore the possibility of similar and separate military organization.⁴ As a result a security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States was signed, known as ANZUS. The three allies agreed, in the event of an attack on any of them that each of should meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. ANZUS has not wholly resolved the worries of New Zealand as it excluded Britain.

⁴ Camilleri J.A., ANZUS , Australia's predicament in the nuclear age. McMillan Company of Australia PTY LTD., Melbourne, 1987, p.3.

Nevertheless, as the security did not cover any of the Asian members, it left particularly South East Asia vulnerable due to its location and most exposed to communism. United States felt the need for united action to further resist communist expansion. New Zealand along with the Australia was keen to gain an extension of commitments in the region. This found the basic causes for the establishment of South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954. This treaty was very extensive . It comprised Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Britain, France, Pakistan, Thailand and Philippines. New Zealand government for the first time felt immensely pleased as United States had explicitly committed to the security of its neighbours. This led for the first time defence policy in New Zealand.

To cater to the New Zealand defence plan, ANZAM was mooted, through this plan, Australia and New Zealand concluded a British-Malayan Agreement in 1957 on external defence. But the British decision of total withdrawal from Malaya called for immediate initiatives and resulted in a five power defence agreements signed on 1 November 1971 with, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, United Kingdom and Singapore. Under the new arrangement in the event of any attack all five powers were to conduct joint consultation before joint or separate action. The control command was stationed at Singapore under ANZUK forces. New Zealand sent it forces in

the Vietnam war. This action was criticized by the local population, as they felt, New Zealand was in no way threatened by this war.

Even though, New Zealand has come of age in international relations after Second World War, deep down in its consciousness, there was a growing feeling of isolation and of necessity to formulate its own policies towards neighbours and to look beyond the towering shoulders of Britain and the United states. Thus, asserted the identity of small power in the United Nations and supported United Nations' efforts toward world peace and favoured regional security and pacts within the framework of the principles of the United Nations charter.

The British decision to join the EEC in 1973 was traumatic experience for New Zealand. The economy was almost wholly dependent on Britain. Now New Zealand has to look elsewhere, to Asia, Africa, Europe, Arab world and America. It added a new dimension to its economic outlook and a new orientation to its foreign policy.

Australia and New Zealand increasingly operated in foreign policy objectives, international financial and trade institutions. They favour peace and stability in the South Pacific. Their economics were further integrated with New Zealand-Australia free trade agreement of 1965-66. Followed the negotiations on closer economic relations (CER) in 1983.

A Big leap foreword in Foreign Policy came with the victory of the labour party in the election in 1984. Prime Minister, David Lange, gave a new look to it, when he imposed a ban on the entry of nuclear weaponed ships into new Zealand ports. He declared that “ Our foreign policy must make it clear that New Zealand is nobody’s puppet’ He continued,” New Zealand has matured into a truly independent Nation an foreign policy and trade initiatives must reflect that”.⁵

The labour government brought a change in foreign policy perspectives. It disallowed nuclear powered ships into the New Zealand posts. Access war granted only to those vessels which were confirm to be neither nuclear powered or nuclear armed.⁶ This policy conflicted with United States policy of neither confirm or deny. Later, New Zealand refused to let USS Buchanan, a war ship on its port and this resulted in cancellation of 27 joint exercise with New Zealand and also later New Zealand was suspended from the ANZUS.

New Zealand was also vocal about the French nuclear testing on the Moruroa atoll in the south pacific and also proposed south pacific nuclear

⁵ Parashar S.C., New Zealand and its Foreign Policy, *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. 7-8, 1984, p.68.

⁶ Pugh Michael C. New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy, p.37.

zone treaty. In spite of economic realities facing New Zealand, it followed its anti-nuclear stance.

Later, a change in government in New Zealand could not reverse the ban on nuclear vessel. However, Jim Bolger, the Prime Minister emphasized that this party supported being part of ANZUS security arrangements.

The New Zealand white paper published in 1991 stressed on self-reliance in partnership's especially with Australia. Also the new government aimed at re-establishing effective defence relationship with the other traditional partners, the US and Britain. Besides defence cooperation with the ASEAN was emphasized.⁷

Finally, the end of cold war saw a change in New Zealand Foreign Policy also, it increased its role in ASEAN and APEC and began increasingly participating in the world organizations and maintaining stability and world peace became the new tools of Foreign Policy.

⁷ Ibid., p.124.

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL AND LABOUR GOVERNMENTS IN NEW ZEALAND

For a small state like New Zealand its main aim of foreign policy is to interact with the outside world. Geographically isolated New Zealand reaches to rest of the world, in various ways. New Zealand interacts with the world in a multiplicity of ways both by instinct and by conscious choice. Although its population is less than that of many cities around the world, yet New Zealand seeks to do everything. New Zealand realizes that the cocoon state is not viable in modern independent world and it has no wish to prove herself an exception.

For New Zealand the globe is turned upside down. Australia is the immediate neighbour and is over 1000 miles away. New Zealand has an area of about 270000 sq. kms and according to latest information its population in about 3.6 million.¹

New Zealand extends from north to south for 1000 miles. New Zealand is perhaps the most physically isolated of the worlds economically advanced nations. The two main Islands North Island and South Island

¹ *Political Hand Book of the World*, 1998, State University of New York, Binghamton, New York, 1998, p.662.

exhibit considerable diversity, ranging from fertile plains to high mountains but are endowed for the most part with a relatively temperate climate. Majority population is of British Origin but the Maori, descendants of the original Polynesian inhabitants constitute 12% of the total population.

Although in New Zealand agriculture sector employs only 10 per cent of the labour force and account for only 6 per cent of GDP, meat, wool and dairy and fish provide more than half of New Zealand's export earnings. Exports and import of goods and services generally average a little under 30 percent of GDP. Agriculture Export are the major component of foreign exchange earnings. In the 1950s and 1960 united Kingdom took nearly two – thirds of the New Zealand's exports but by 1980s and 1990s it has been overtaken by Australia, Japan and USA. For imports it depends more on Australia and USA. The average growth rate of real GDP is more than 4 percent.²

With such a small area and population, New Zealand aspires to take part in the international politics as any other big country. It had taken part in various important agreements and alliances concerning the world politics.

² *Far East and Australasia* – 1998, Europa publications limited, London, 1998, p.722.

Political Parties and their priorities in Foreign Policy:

The Foreign Policy of New Zealand have been affected by the political colour of the government. New Zealand has two major political parties (National Party and Labour Party), which have alternated in government. They differ somewhat in their approach to foreign affairs because of the different values they emphasize. The Labour Party founded by trade unions and originally dedicated to advancing socialist principles, is a party of reform. It is concerned mainly with promoting social justice in New Zealand and it seeks to advance this idea and other humanitarian concerns; internationally as well. The Labour Party is anti-militarist and sympathetic to the aspirations of the developing countries.

The National Party on the other hand, is rooted in the planning and business communities, is a conservative party, interested in promoting free enterprise and protecting individual freedom. Its international outlook is focused on New Zealand basic national interest of trade and security. The National Party values close links with the New Zealand's traditional friends in the western democracies.

Both, the National and Labour governments have differed in the scope of their Foreign Policies; in the importance which they give to cooperation with allies and in the degree to which their Foreign Policies

have espoused moral causes and in the extent to which economic interests have taken priority in their foreign policies. However, two types of governments have not differed much in their participation in world affairs or in their propensity to become involved in conflict with other powers.

Parties strategy with regard to participation in world affairs.

New Zealand has participated in a large number of overseas military conflicts, this century has witnessed. It took part in the Boer War, the First and Second World Wars; the Korean war, the Malayan Emergency, the confrontations between Malaya and Indonesia and the Vietnam War. Both the National as well as labour has kept its tradition of sending military personnel abroad although at present it is sent mainly for the peacekeeping role.

The limited resources possessed by small countries like New Zealand, may hamper their participation in world affairs. However, there was a difference between National and Labour governments in their willingness to do this, although National government have been more willing to operate outside the United Nations Context.

The Muldoon National government from 1975-1984 sent troops to Zimbabwe in 1980 as a part of a commonwealth force monitoring

compliance with the cease-fire between Rhodesian security forces and the patriotic front guerillas. The following year, the government agreed to contribute troops to a multinational force in the Sinai to keep the peace between Egypt and Israel.

In 1982, National government assisted Britain's military effort in the Falklands. Finally in 1983, National government indicated that it would be prepared to contribute to the commonwealth peacekeeping force in Grenada after the American intervention there.³

The Labour government which followed, advised the United Nations that New Zealand was prepared to increase its commitment of personnel to the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations.⁴ In 1988, New Zealand contributed twenty eight military personnel to the United Nations force monitoring the cease-fire between Iran-Iraq. The next year, Labour government sent fourteen army Engineers and thirty two police officers to Namibia to participate in the implementation of the United Nations supervision for the independence of the country.

During the Gulf crisis of 1990, the New Zealand Airforce made thirteen mercy flights into the region, to transport refugees to various Asian

³ *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland) 7 November 1983.

⁴ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.38, No.1 (October-December 1987) pp.15-16.

Countries.⁵ However, the Labour government was reluctant to make a military contribution to the United States led forces in Gulf. Although it indicated to the allies privately, that New Zealand would send transport or surveillance aircraft's if United Nations requested it.⁶

With the return of the National government in power in 1990, New Zealand's participation in peacekeeping and peacemaking activity increased. One of the first acts of National government was to announce the contribution to the allies military force preparing to recover Kuwait from Iraq. Besides New Zealand National government contributed troops to four United Nations peacekeeping forces in Angola, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.⁷

Soon after taking office, National government announced that it would campaign for a seat for New Zealand on the United Nations security council and this was duly achieved in October, 1992.⁸

With regard to the commitment to the overseas aid, both the parties National and Labour differ. New Zealand's participation has been low

⁵ David McCraw, "New Zealand's Foreign Policy under National and Labour governments: Variation on the small state theme?" *Pacific affairs*, vol.55, No.4, winter 1992-93, p.9.

⁶ *New Zealand Herald*: 1 December, 1990.

⁷ David McCraw. *New Zealand Foreign Policy under National and Labour government: Variations on the Small State? – Pacific affairs* Vol.55, No.4, winter 1992-93 p.10.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.10.

compared to most of the developed countries. Even though, labour have been more committed to raise the aid contribution than National Party.

In 1964, United Nations set countries a target for aid contribution of '1 percent of their Gross National product with 0.7 per cent of GNP having to be official aid.

Under the National government during 1960s, the New Zealand aid remained below target level being at 0.28 per cent of GNP. The Kirk Labour government which came to office in 1972 made a determined effort to increase substantially the proportion of GNP given in aid. In each of the three years which followed he made determined efforts to increase the proportion of the Gross National products given in aid.

However, the Muldoon National government which followed allowed to percentage of GNP given in aid to drop and it reached a low of 0.25 per cent in 1984. The next labour government under David Lange, announced its intention of Quickly reaching higher level of aid. Consistent with reaching higher level the amount of aid allocated for the 1986-87 year represented a raise to 0.30 per cent of GNP.⁹ By 1990. The New Zealand officials aid measured by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was at a low of 0.22 per cent. The Bolger National

⁹ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.38, No.1 (October-December, 1971) p.63.

government cut New Zealand foreign aid allocation in its first few year in office and brought it down to 0.21 per cent.¹⁰

The New Zealand Foreign Policy gives a top priority to trade and more importantly the global trade as bulk of its foreign exchange earnings come from its exports.

With this aim, New Zealand has moved very diplomatically to open its foreign offices with main aim to promote its trade and as a result its attention has focused on those areas which have trade importance for the country. With this regard, New Zealand's interests are widespread geographically; Europe, Middle East, North America and East Asia are all important markets. Australia is the only one neighbouring partner and all partners lie beyond its own region.

Currently, New Zealand has only one diplomatic post on the entire African continent and only one in South American Continent and it has ten posts in Europe, three in middle east and ten in rest of Asia and five in North America.¹¹ This reflects the trade importance of those regions of New Zealand.

¹⁰ Dominion (Wellington) 30 December, 1992, p.2.

¹¹ David McCraw: New Zealand Foreign Policy under National and Labour Governments Variations on the "Small State", Theme?, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.55, No.4, winter 1992-93, p.11.

New Zealand does have a special interest in its own south pacific region, which is not related to trade. New Zealand's concern for the well being of its smaller Island neighbours with some of whom it has defence responsibilities for its reflected in the fact that a quarter of New Zealand's Diplomatic posts are located in the region.¹²

With regard to the scope of the Foreign Policy, there has been notable differences between the labour governments and National governments. Labour governments have tended to widen the scope of New Zealand's Foreign Policy activity where as National governments have tended to narrow it.

Under the National government the opening of diplomatic posts been related almost exclusively to the trade potential of the countries concerned. Whereas labour governments have been interested in the broadening New Zealand's Political contacts. An early indicator of this tendency was the first labour government opening a diplomatic post in the Soviet Union in 1944 in order to establish a more friendly relationship with a war time ally.¹³ The National party opposed the opening of the Moscow post and when they came to power in 1949 they closed the post down.

¹² Ibid., p.12.

¹³ Malcom Templeton, *Top hats are not being taken: A Short History of the New Zealand legislation in Moscow 1944-1950*, *New Zealand Institute of International Affairs*: Wellington, 1988, p.11.

During the 1950s the national government established several new posts in south East Asia as New Zealand became involved in the security of the region. Towards the end of 1960s and beginning of 1970s, National government opened several posts in the European community nations as New Zealand sought to retain access for its products in European markets.

When the labour government of Kirk came to power in 1972, it signaled its intention of widening the scope of New Zealand's representation by its first acts, i.e. diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China and an embassy was opened in Peking. New Zealand's first ambassador to China has said that trade was not the main reason for their action. Kirk government went on to reopen its diplomatic post in Moscow and with in three years into office, it lifted the number of New Zealand overseas post from thirty to forty five.

In contrast to this Muldoon National government increased New Zealand's total overseas post by only one in eight years. Most notably, it narrowed the political scope of New Zealand overseas network by closing down the post in India citing financial stringency whereas at the same time it national government established new posts in Mexico and Saudi Arabia as they believed to offer relative trade advantages.

The Labour government which came to power in 1984 again showed up interests in broadening New Zealand's political contacts. In 1985, it opened its first diplomatic post in Africa as a signal of its desire to be in touch with the aspirations of the countries of that continent. Labour government declared that politics rather than trade would justify an Embassy in Zimbabwe. In 1985, Prime Minister David Lange visited Zimbabwe to underline the Labour's interest in Africa. It was the first visit by a New Zealand Prime Minister to Sub-Saharan Africa. Lange wrote "the new complexities of New Zealand foreign relations imposed requirements that New Zealand should reach out beyond our immediate neighbourhood and own traditional friendship."¹⁴

Another indication of Labour's interests in extending the scope of New Zealand foreign policies was the re-opening of New Zealand's High Commission in India. Prime Minister David Lange said that 'National governments' decision to close the post had led to the New Zealand's isolation from one of the most populous countries in the world; a leader of the non-aligned movement and a preeminent advocate for Third World



¹⁴ Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the year ended March 1987 (Wellington: Government Printer) 1987, p.5.

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interests. Over time New Zealand restored its relationship with India and through India with many emerging countries of the Third World.¹⁵

However, during the labour governments second term it began to cut back New Zealand overseas network citing financial reasons and as such embassies in Peru and Bahrain were closed. At the same time New Zealand entered it foreign aid programme to Africa, and also reestablishing an aid programme to India. This was a reversal to the previous National Governments policy to spread of aid projects and focus more on the South Pacific and an ASEAN region. Despite this, bulk of the proportion of New Zealand aid continued to go to south pacific.¹⁶ Again under national government their policies reflected trade as most important aspect of foreign policy than political interest.

Economic Priorities in Foreign Policy

New Zealand governments what ever their political colour gave top priority to economic issues in its foreign policy. New Zealand prosperity is heavily dependent on trade. Despite this there occurred occasional

¹⁵ David Lange: *The Forth Labour Government : New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy* in Hyam Gold (ed.), *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy* (Auckland: Benton Ross, 1985), p.34.

¹⁶ J. Stephen Hoadly, "New Zealand, small states and foreign aid": in John Henderson, Keith Jackson and Richard Kennaway (eds.), *Beyond New Zealand : The Foreign Policy of a small state.* (Auckland: Methuen, 1980), pp.118-119.

differences between National and Labour governments in the priority they give to economic goals in their foreign policies.

The Muldoon national government was quite explicit that economic goals had the highest priority in its foreign policy, whereas the previous labour government had other priorities. Prime Minister Muldoon stated his government's outlook when he said in 1980s "Our Foreign Policy is trade. We are not interested in the normal foreign policy matters to any great extent. We are interested in trade".¹⁷ This priority was made evident the same year when New Zealand's ally, the United States called for an embargo on trade with Iran after Iran had taken staff hostage from the American embassy in Iran. New Zealand was unwilling to support such an embargo as its trade will be effected. In 1983, National government was challenged by the labour opposition to mount stronger opposition to French weapon testing in South Pacific. The minister of foreign affairs indicated his priorities to economic concerns, when he wondered if labour government would be prepared to pay the price, if the pressure on French could be a discontinuation of the access to its products to Europe.¹⁸

¹⁷ Derek round: "Our Foreign policy is trade", *New Zealand International Review*, vol.5, no.1 (Jan-Feb 1980) p.3.

¹⁸ New Zealand Parliamentary Debates vol. 453 (15 Sept. 1983) p.2248

However, labour government have always seen New Zealand foreign policy as being about more than trade. It is indicative of this fact the Lange labour government's most spectacular foreign policy initiative-the banning of nuclear weapons carrying vessels from New Zealand ports-was concerned with promoting disarmament. This policy led to a major rift with the United States. National government see the alliance with United States very important to New Zealand's economic interests as well as to its defence. The policy of labour not only brought an end to New Zealand's alliance with United States but it brought the risk of retaliation of US congress. Prime Minister David Lange wrote that "it was the assessment of the New Zealand government that the economic impact of the Nuclear free policy could be contained."¹⁹ However, he also admitted that the United States might, if it had chose, have damaged New Zealand's economic interests as easily as you might flick a caterpillars of your sleeve.²⁰

It was not only relationship with United states which was put at some risk by labour policy, it also annoyed British and they warned the labour government that New Zealand's anti-nuclear policies made it difficult for them to argue successfully New Zealand's case for better access to the European markets.²¹ Even though the warning was dismissed by David

¹⁹ David Lange: calling dead letter : New Zealand International review : vol. 4, No.4 (July-Aug. 1989), p.26.

²⁰ Ibid., p.26.

²¹ New Zealand Herald 28 April, 1987.

Lange, it is found that access was indeed effected by the unwillingness of British government to be as helpful as previously in the negotiation with the European Union partners.

However, a shift towards importance to economic consideration in the labour governments foreign policy came up during the Salman Rushdie affair in 1989. After the invoking of diplomatic sanctions against Iran by many European nations for its death sentence against British author, New Zealand was unwilling to publicly criticize Iran or Human rights abuses, when asked, if New Zealand wished to take part in International protest against Iran, Prime Minister replied. 'Not particularly'. He said it would be hard to explain why the government should cause New Zealand farmers to go out of Business because of a threat made to a book writer in London. There was a great concern in Europe for New Zealand's attitude, it was asked atleast to call back its Ambassador backhome, but, New Zealand announced he would be staying there.²²

However, in 1990s National Government which came to power announced; that its main concern in foreign affairs was the promotion of trade. Its election manifesto said that :they acknowledge the link between

²² *New Zealand Herald* 23 February, 1989, p.3

our foreign policy and our trade requirements and we will give priority to the promotion of trade at every opportunity".²³

Thus, on issue related to economy both the governments were following the same policies even though labours Anti nuclear stance clashed with the economic interests.

Priorities with Security of New Zealand

New Zealand under the government of both political colours has indeed sought to achieve its security goals in concert with other states. This characteristic of achieving a foreign policy goals through cooperation with other states is after they realized that they cannot obtain security by its own capabilities and it must rely on the aid of other states. Earlier, both the political parties were in agreement to achieve security goals but in recent times they have differed sharply over the importance New Zealand should give to cooperation with its allies.

In this regard, New Zealand before the Second World War relied on its relationship with Britain to fulfil its security as well as its economic goals. But after the Second World War, the relationship with the United States and Australia formalized in the ANZUS alliance, became the main

²³ *New Zealand Politics Some book.* (Palmerston North: Dun more press, 1992), p.206.

instrument for realizing security goals. For about two decades, after the ANZUS alliance was signed in 1951, maintaining a close relationship with its allies was a major objective of New Zealand's security policy and to this end the governments of New Zealand gave a high priority to cooperation with those allies. A Cabinet minister had said in 1965 by helping our allies, in matters affecting their national interests as well as our own, we have just claim on them in time of need.²⁴ One of the outcomes of this strategy was New Zealand's participation in Vietnam war. This was agreed by the government mainly to preserve New Zealand's security relationships with United States and Australia.

The labour party which came to power in 1972 believed that New Zealand alliance relationship should no longer be accorded the highest priority in New Zealand's foreign policy. This was a reaction to the New Zealand's involvement in Vietnam which was opposed by labour in opposition.

Labour Prime Minister announced that New Zealand intended to follow a more independent foreign policy not allowing its policies to be determined by the views and interests of its most influential ally.²⁵

²⁴ David Macrae. *Reluctant Ally: New Zealand entry into Vietnam war*, *New Zealand Journal of History*, vol. 15, No.1 April 1981, p.49.

²⁵ Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for year ended 31 March 1973 (Wellington: Government Printer, 1973), p.7.

One of the important independent policies of labour government was its proposal for the establishment of South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone which New Zealand sponsored at the United Nations in 1975. New Zealand went ahead with the action inspite of both United States and Australia opposed it on the ground that it could inhibit the operations of the United States Navy in the pacific. The Prime Minister W.E. Rowling told Australia in 1975 that he thought New Zealand relationship with the United State would accommodate the proposal without undue strain.²⁶ Even the defence chiefs warned the labour Prime Minister that the government policies were causing considerable alarm to its allies.

In contrast to this policy, National Government which followed, the labour in 1975, announced the governments view to renew the relationship with United States. The National government withdrew its support for nuclear free zone proposal as it perceived zone a threat to AUZUS. Prime Minister Muldoon said in 1976 “we believe that on ANZUS alliance stood New Zealand in good stead. We are determined to see that it continues to do this. The governments was conceived that ANZUS must remain strong and healthy became ANZUS was much more than a defence alliance”.²⁷ Even

²⁶ *The Nation* (Wellington) No.3, November 20, 1980, p.7

²⁷ *New Zealand Foreign Review*, vol.26, No.4, (April-June 1976), p.52.

the national party declared that it saw ANZUS Alliance as a central element in developing New Zealand's vital political, economic and technological as well as security interests.²⁸

The return of the labour government in 1984 saw a dramatic change in the New Zealand attitude to the ANZUS alliance. Labour government was willing to sacrifice the membership of the alliance in order to promote a disarmament policy, which impinged the united states interests. Labour did not set to end the ANZUS relationship but was determined to prohibit the entry of nuclear powered vessels into New Zealand ports. When New Zealand objected to entry of American Warship, the United States stopped the military cooperation and suspended the ANZUS security guarantee to New Zealand. By 1989, Prime Minister was suggests that New Zealand must consider withdrawal from ANZUS alliance.²⁹

This rift with the United States led to the greater defence cooperation with New Zealand's another ally Australia. The 1987 defence review sparked a breakdown of the defence relationship with the United States and pointed to the necessity of greater defence cooperation with Australia.³⁰ The

²⁸ New Zealand National Party, National Party 1975. *General Election Policy*, Policy No.-24, p.2.

²⁹ David Lange, Facing Critical Choices, *New Zealand International Review*, vol.12, no.12, July-August 1987, p.2.

³⁰ The defence of New Zealand. Review of defence policy 1987 (Wellington: Government Printer, 1987), p.14.

greater importance of New Zealand to Australia for a defence relationship was reflected when labour government decided to buy atleast two Australian built frigates to replace their fleet. Although there were sound strategic reasons for such a deal, however, the deciding factor was the Australian insistence that the purchase was a litmus test on whether or not New Zealand was serious about the defence cooperation.³¹

New Zealand government had maintained active part in the 1971 Five Power Defence agreement for defence of Singapore and Malaysia and it had retained its Unit in Singapore to facilitate bilateral training activities with the countries of that region.

However, the election of National government in 1990 saw their attempt to revive the alliance ties with United States. The National party had fiercely opposed the breakup of the alliance with the United States and in November 1989, it had even campaign for the repeal of the nuclear weapons ban in order to restore the alliance. Don McKinnon had stated that New Zealand must get back into the alliance as it means a lot to it as it gain to lot of influence for their international relations.³²

³¹ John Henderson, *Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into 1990s* (Auckland; Longman Paul 1991), p.89.

³² *Wakato Times*, 21 December 1990, p.2.

Thus regarding the foreign policy the national and labour governments had different set of priorities. The labour government major priorities were greater independence from allies and on the other hand, the national government stressed the priority of trade and the need to strengthen its ties with the allies in particularly United States. Both the parties were close to their party ideology and their priorities also reflected their stand on the domestic issues. However, the two types of governments have not differed much in degree of participation in world affairs.

CHAPTER III

NEW ZEALAND POLICY DURING COLD WAR: CASE STUDY OF ANZUS AND ANTI-NUCLEAR STANCE.

An important aspect of the New Zealand's Foreign Policy is its alliance with the super powers, and among the alliances ANZUS was the cornerstone of New Zealand Foreign Policy. ANZUS alliance had provided it with a sense of security and stability and status. New Zealand with its limited resources cannot provide itself a much needed security and protection. New Zealand entered into this alliance to secure security both defence as well as economic. It also entered into it with a to bring together in a formal association the liberal democracies and to have a strategic alliance. Similar to the one which was established in the North Atlantic as NATO.

ANZUS alliance was originally conceived as a part of the New fabric of peace to follow the US strategic interests. For New Zealand, ANZUS was to become a centre piece of foreign and defence policy and for the United States it served as one element in a multi-pronged security system designed to contain communist power and its influence in the Asia Pacific.

The war time collaboration between New Zealand, Australia and United States and the widespread public recognition of the America's role in protecting Australia, New Zealand against Japanese aggression and the

demonstration of American awesome military might, most strikingly reflected in the use of atomic bomb, created a new sentimental closeness which opened new chapter in New Zealand view of security.

The continuing conflict between the Nationalist and Communist forces in China and the rapid disintegration of British, French and Dutch colonial possessions in South East Asia left United States as a dominant power in the Asia Pacific region.

This dominant position of United States made Australia, New Zealand governments to consider a proposal for a pacific pact, which would include United States. In an interview with President Henry. S. Truman in September 1950, Australian foreign minister Percy Spender¹ remarked that there was no pacific organization comparable to NATO where Australia could raise questions affecting its vital interest.¹ Similarly New Zealand too was interested in retaining American interest in the pacific and ensuring a place in the formulation and determination of pacific policy. New Zealand had also emerged out of the cocoon of British Empire and it was facing the realities of small nations precarious position in the post war pacific.² But there was this difficulty in how the United States would be made to enter into a pact, Dv Evatt, the minister of external affairs for Australia sought to

¹ J.G. Starke. *The ANUS Treaty Alliance* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), p.102.

² Joseph A Camilleri *ANZUS-Australia Predicament in the Nuclear age* Macmillan Company of Australia, PTY LTD., 1987, p.2.

use the American request for base rights on Manus Islands as a lever with which to extract a regional security system comprising of Australia, New Zealand and United States.³ Earlier the United was not willing to enter into any formal commitments in the Pacific as it believed that these small countries could only make limited contribution to collective security. However, by 1950's several factors combined to create a different situation which made United States change its stance. Firstly, the victory of Mao Zedong's forces in China in October 1949 and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950 were perceived by United States as the evidence to stem the tide of communist expansion. Besides, the defeat of labour party in Australia as well as in New Zealand and the inclination of New government to forge a new relationship with USA, taking advantage of their common cultural, social and ideological heritage i.e. belief in democracy.

As a result United States began to explore a single strategic system comparable to NATO in Pacific and to build a series of military arrangements, the main intention was to build a loose but effective anti-Communist coalition centered on the United States and comprising of the countries situated on the rim of Western Pacific.

With the view, defence treaties were concluded with the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. From this

³ Ramesh Thakur, *'In Defence of New Zealand: Foreign Policy choices in the Nuclear age,'* West View Press: Colorado, USA, p.43.

initiative emerged the ANZUS Alliance treaty. ANZUS was to provide regional security and to become part of western security arrangements.

Even though the ANZUS treaty excluded Britain from it, New Zealand accepted it, as through this treaty it only wanted a unilateral declaration by the United States that it would protect New Zealand in case of an attack and New Zealand in return need not give any thing. Besides, it also allowed New Zealand to make other commitments and continue its trade involvement with Britain.

As a result, New Zealand also entered into another treaty, South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). This treaty had its main aim to check communist expansion in South East Asia and was directed against communist aggression.

Evolution of ANZUS

The period just after the second world war, was a difficult period for New Zealand. It took some time to adjust to the new external environment, particularly as the cold war had shattered the prospect of a global security system under the United Nations.

New Zealand began to explore new frontiers to a future security cooperation. At the same time, the deteriorating international situation,

particularly, communist threat, Korean war and intensification of cold war, made New Zealand become an active members of United States Sponsored system of collective security in the Asia pacific region. Hence, they made the decision to join ANZUS.

The justification offered for the military alliance with United States were: threat of communist expansion; the shield provided by the US nuclear umbrella, access to US military equipment and technology; participation in the US global intelligence network, enhanced scope for diplomatic influence in Washington and associated trade and economic advantages.⁴

Thus a security treaty between the United States Australia and New Zealand was signed in San Francisco on 1st September 1951 and entered into force on 29th April in 1952.

Terms of the Treaty

The principal guarantees of mutual assistance under the treaty are contained a Articles II, III, IV and V. under the Article II, (is almost identical to Article 3 of the NATO Pact), the partners are expected to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. This article embodies the concept which establishes the principle of continuous and effective self help and mutual aid as a prerequisite for US

⁴ Joseph A., Camilleri, ANZUS, *Australia's predicament in the nuclear age*, Mac Milan company of Australia, PTY, Ltd., 1987, p.130.

participation in collective security arrangements⁵ and united states expects its allies to contribute to the alliance system, that is, to assist atleast, regionally, in creating a ring of military power that would contain the communist bloc.

Article III provides for the mutual consultation in the event that any of the parties is threatened in the pacific. However, for the consultation to be activated, the threat need not be confined to an armed attack but might conceivable include instability, subversion or even an armaments policy which may be perceived as offensive in intent.⁶ On the other hand, parties are not required to do more than consult; they are not bound to any particular course of action. Moreover, the threat must be geographically limited to the treaty area, which is designated as the pacific.

The geographical limitation of the treaty are also embodied in articles IV and V which define the obligations of the parties in the event of armed attack against any one of them.

Thus, with this alliance, New Zealand achieved a sense of security. During the early years of the treaty United States showed little enthusiasm for the ANZUS pact, which operated principally as a means of exchanging

⁵ J.G. Starke, the *ANZUS Treaty Alliance*, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1965), p.102.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.110.

news and information and postering a common approach to problem.⁷ But, at the outset, ANZUS was more important to Australia and New Zealand than the United States as it was more involved in Europe. ANZUS represented an insurance policy at a low premium and it could also be suggested that crisis which might arise in the pacific were more likely to require Australia and New Zealand to fulfil their obligations to the United States than the United States to fulfil it to them.⁸

However, for New Zealand, ANZUS provided a readymade substitute to the declining European influence. During the early period, the two main objectives of New Zealand Foreign Policy were deepen the United States military commitment to Asia, particularly South East Asia and a mediating role aimed at the reconciliation of interests between the united states and United Kingdom.

During the 60's and 70's New Zealand government was forced to consider whether the costs outweighed the benefits. This issue was raised

⁷ Trevor Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States* (London: Oxford University press: 1969), p.145.

⁸ *Ibid*, p.138.

because of “military for contributions for Vietnam war from New Zealand and Australia were squeezed from the alliance”.⁹

With the participation in the Vietnam war gave raise to heated debate and political division in New Zealand. The New Zealand’s cooperation to foreword defence policy of United States brought a considerable soul searching and a measure of political interest.

Meanwhile, the withdrawal of Britain from East of Seuz placed more emphasis on ANZUS and ending of Vietnam war and collapse of SEATO brought the viability of ANZUS into question.

Equally, there arose some issues concerning nuclear testing in the pacific at Mururoa Atoll between 1967 and 1973. This issue brought in the Nuclear question high on the political agenda.

Anti Nuclear Policy:

The raising of nuclear issues brought a radical change in the New Zealand foreign policy. The first visit of a nuclear powered vessel to New Zealand had taken place in 1960, as a result of an invitation by the Prime

Ibid, p.315.

Minister Walter Nash when a US submarine come to New Zealand. Thereafter, occasional visits took place, during the following decade but there was no controversy or protest in this regard until the development of Vietnam war. The participation of New Zealand in the war brought a considerable soul searching and this issue along with French Nuclear testing in South pacific generated a wide ranging community concern. they were disturbed to see nuclear intrusion into a relatively peaceful South pacific.

From the mid 1970s, the focus shifted from French underground testing to visits by nuclear powered submarines, aircraft's carriers and cruisers to New Zealand ports. These visits brought to New Zealand the risk of possible involvement in the nuclear exchange; met with well organized opposition including protest, picketing and extensive campaign aimed at persuading authorities to declare their area nuclear free. With in five years deep concern over nuclear issues led to the emergence of large, diverse, complex and sophisticated peace movement with strong roots in New Zealand society and encompassing a wide range of organizational styles and political tactics.

In the parliamentary area, Labour party had a strong tradition of opposing nuclear weapons. During its term of office in 1972-1975, it was responsible for imposing a ban on nuclear ship visits, mounting vigorous campaign against French nuclear testing and establishing the ground work

for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The nuclear free zone put forward by the labour Prime Minister Bill Rowling in 1975 gained serious support from nearly all states in the region and was also endorsed by the South Pacific and United Nations General Assembly. Its failure to make progress emanated mainly from US resistance.

Following the defeat of the Labour Party in the December, 1975 election, the anti nuclear sentiment within the party gained momentum. In a 1977 conference, it carried a resolution advocating a non alliance posture for New Zealand. This position was further strengthened in the 1980 conference which proposed the withdrawal from ANZUS.

Besides, in the non-political sectors, this anti nuclearism gained momentum, many small parties and organizations opposed any nuclear entanglement on New Zealand's part. There were some who advocated a radical defence policy, advocating a ban on all warships from New Zealand ports, both nuclear and conventional and the establishment of South Pacific as a military free region.

Despite these protests, in contrast the National government wished to retain the existing ANZUS arrangements and offered only moderate resistance to French nuclear testing.

In 1980, Bill Rowling described the position of labour party in following terms “the labour government will adopt a more independent stance within the ANZUS alliance and will work towards the broadening of the alliance to emphasis non-military factors”¹⁰

Thereafter, New Zealand external policy, increasingly reflected the uneasy coexistence of conflicting pressures and preferences: one a hand it need to contribute to foreword defence arrangements and nuclear activities as prescribed by the policy of military arrangement with the United States and on the other, a desire to devise a more independent framework of regional cooperation.¹¹

An attempt to reconcile these two views were emphasized in the defence review of 1978, it said “earlier its military forces were concentrating is far off region like Middle East, Korea and South East Asia, but now it would contribute to strengthen the western world by helping preserve peace and security in their own regions particularly South Pacific¹².

¹⁰ Denis Mc Lean, New Zealand’s strategic position and Defence Policies in D. Ball (ed.), *The ANZAC Connection*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin – 1985, p.13.

¹¹ Ibid, p.13.

¹² *Defence Review*, 1978, New Zealand Department of Defence, Government, Printer, 1978, p.11.

The defence review of 1983 also reaffirmed New Zealand's commitment to ANZUS and accepted the deterrence as the foundation stone of a stable global balance of power. However it also stressed the need for a regional policy directed mainly towards security and integrity of New Zealand and later promoting the stable development in the South Pacific.¹³

Meanwhile explaining the New Zealand's value of ANZUS Minister of Defence wrote in his annual report that "New Zealand is not a nuclear power and does not become one by association with nations that are ANZUS is not a nuclear alliance. To suggest otherwise is nonsense¹⁴ and ANZUS rests only on an undertaking to consult.

Nevertheless, there was an overwhelming support for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone especially in the South Pacific. There were more consensus in favour of unilateral disarmament initiative. Because of size and isolation New Zealand was seen as well as placed to take steps in particular to terminate all existing involvements in nuclear activities and if need arises to revise ANZUS treaty and related arrangements. A nuclear weapons free

¹³ *Defence Review*, 1983, New Zealand Department of Defence, Government Printer, 1983, p.10.

¹⁴ David Lange, *New Zealand Security Policy*, Foreign Affairs, Vol.63, No.5, Summer, 1985, pp.10-11.

zone in New Zealand was widely viewed as a practical step New Zealand could take which far from encouraging isolationism, could form a part of an ongoing commitment to peace and disarmament.¹⁵

At the same time, there arose a thinking that the process of denuclearization could not be entirely divorced from ANZUS relationship. As a consequence, the ANZUS treaty became a subject of discussion and many non-governmental organizations who are in for anti nuclearisation favoured New Zealand's withdrawal from ANZUS. The hosting of America's nuclear warships was increasingly perceived as giving substance to the ANZUS alliance and indirectly expressing New Zealand's approval of United States nuclear strategy and weapons development. Most believed that New Zealand does not need nuclear weapons for its security as such it does not need them in their territory and this was echoed by the neighbouring South Pacific countries.

This anti-nuclear stance became an action issue in the 1984 elections. The Labour Party candidate, David Lange had reiterated his intention to exclude all nuclear weapons systems from New Zealand and its territories and to work under the United Nations to promote a nuclear weapons free zone in the South Pacific.

¹⁵ Ray Galvin, *A Nuclear Free New Zealand – Now!*, Auckland, Belmont Publishers, 1984, p.2.

On coming to office, David Lange's, Labour government lost no time in reaffirming its anti-nuclear agenda and developed a wide range of disarmament issues, including advocacy of the south Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Lange government was also under constant pressure from his own party circles to maintain its commitment to a nuclear free New Zealand's at any cost to the ANZUS alliance.

The labour government initiative did not rest primarily on environmental risks to which the visit of nuclear powered ships might expose New Zealand or on the possibility of a New Zealand being made a target for nuclear attack, for that visit by nuclear armed ships make, rather than, it is mainly justified on the ground that New Zealand had the opportunity to engage in a meaningful gesture of protest against the insanity of nuclear arms race. David Lange said the system of nuclear defence was fundamentally irrational and guaranteed only in security.¹⁶

¹⁶ David Lange, *Selection of Foreign Policy Statements* by New Zealand Prime Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 1985, p.17.

In the regional context, given the New Zealand's geographical isolation, the absence of external threats and the preoccupation of its small island neighbours with economic rather than military security, it made no sense for New Zealand to seek to be defended by nuclear weapons. New Zealand could continue to contribute to the security of the region, through defence aid (Maritime surveillance, training, and exercise) political corporation economic and social assistance.¹⁷ New Zealand aims to expand this constructive relationship with its neighbours within this framework.

The labour governments anti nuclear initiative was portrayed as a coherent response by New Zealand to regional and international situation and it was not aimed at ANZUS alliance or the United States. David Lange went on to describe this initiative only as a its commitment to democratic values and it remains an integral part of western alliance. David Lange justifying the anti-nuclear policy said "New Zealand has never been a part of any nuclear strategy. No nuclear weapons have ever been based or stored in New Zealand. New Zealand has not assisted and does not assist any system of strategic nuclear defence. ANZUS alliance of which New Zealand is a part has no formal command structure and imposes no specific military obligations on its members"¹⁸

¹⁷ Joseph A. Camilleri, *ANZUS, Australian Predicament in the nuclear age*, Macmillan Company of Australia, PTY, LTD., Melbourne, 1987, p.137.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.138.

In January 1985, United States formally requested New Zealand to allow a ship USS *Buchanan*, to visit in connection with the ANZUS Sea Eagle exercise due in March. After a period of indecision, the New Zealand government rejected, the American request. The *Buchanan* was capable of carrying nuclear armed ASROC anti-submarine weapons, though it was widely believed within the official circles, that it was not infact carrying them at that time. New Zealand government publicly sought assurance from the United States that USS *Buchanan* was not nuclear armed. This conflicted with American long standing policy of 'neither confirm nor deny', the nuclear status of its warships. To this Lange indicate that every request of the United States would be dealt by using its own intelligence source and defence information to determine whether the vessel was carrying nuclear weapons.¹⁹ The refusal of New Zealand government to grant permission made United States furious. The US quickly renewed the original application and Lange government once again described the request as unacceptable and advised the United States to send a vessel which would comply with New Zealand's policy²⁰ and asked united states to send a non-nuclear war ship.

However, Regan administration argued that it was highly unreasonable of New Zealand to expect to be defended by the United States in the event of war, while denying access in peacetime to the ships that

¹⁹ *Age*, 18 December, 1984, p.1.

²⁰ *Age*, 5 December, 1985, p.8.

would defend them. New Zealand was portrayed in Washington as a free rider, accepting benefits of alliance protection, but refusing to share the burden of alliance costs. The United States officials stressed that there was only one United States navy and Washington was certainly not going to create a non nuclear navy exclusively for the benefit of New Zealand.

Besides, there was a considerable American initiation at what was seen as a New Zealand's challenge to United States. The United States Ambassador to Australia who following to a *Buchanan* episode stated that New Zealand labour government has been a bad boy and must be punished."²¹

In the same year, labour government introduced in parliament, the anti-nuclear legislation on 10 December 1985 as New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control bill. The Bill implements in New Zealand, law of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty as well as NPT. The bill prohibits the entry of nuclear powered or nuclear armed vessels and dumping of radio active wastes into New Zealand territory. The responsibility for determining whether nuclear capable ships will be allowed for entry is placed on the Prime Minister with assistance from an advisory committee. The legislation also makes it illegal for New Zealand citizens to manufacture, acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear

²¹ Stuart Mac Millan , *Neither confirm nor deny: the Nuclear Ships Dispute between New Zealand and the United States*, Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1987, p.99.

explosive device or any biological weapon in New Zealand.²² The Bill came into force on 8 June 1987, when it was ratified by House of Representatives.

The US reaction to New Zealand's Anti Nuclear Stance

Following New Zealand labour governments decision not to allow the USS Buchanan entry into New Zealand, and legislation of antinuclear bill Regan administration announced that it had cancelled Roll Call exercise involving New Zealand, Australia, Britain and Canada and had also withdrawn an invitation for a small nuclear of New Zealand troops to participate in a military exercise in South Korea. United States also cancelled, all ANZUS exercise for the rest of the year, cut all visits of senior United States defence personnel to New Zealand with held much classified intelligence material, terminated all training of New Zealand armed personnel in United States following the completion of existing programmes and exclude New Zealand from its defence conferences.

In a bid to increase the impact of its sanctions, the United States signaled that it would soon impose a ban on the provision of American defence equipment to New Zealand and also request Australia to deny New Zealand personnel use of United States supplied equipment. This ban was to

²² Ramesh Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand Foreign Policy choices in the Nuclear Age*, West View Press, Colorado, USA, p.196.

effect all categories of Equipment on the US designed FFG frigates and equipment and virtually on all of the fighting aircrafts and helicopters.

The American aim was to bring pressure to bear directly on the New Zealand government and also indirectly through New Zealand defence and intelligence.

In addition of these, the United States sought to dissuade New Zealand from pursuing the course it had chosen by the implicit threat of economic retaliation. Although the possibility of trade sanction was not officially endorsed, the hints originating from different sources indicate that the trade relations between the two countries were not totally unrelated to political issues and New Zealand could no longer expect to enjoy the economic benefits it received as an ally. The status of New Zealand was down graded from an 'ally' to that of a 'friend'.

Beside these, other options available to United States was to possible termination of ANZUS partnership or New Zealand's exclusion from it. This option was supported by Congressman Solarz who called for ANZUS to be replaced by a two way relationship between Australia and United States.²³ This option was given some support when the ANZUS council meeting was cancelled. The United States also advised New Zealand that

²³ *Australian*, 18 February 1985, p.4.

Should it proceed with banning of United States nuclear warships, the United States would have to review its obligations under AUZUS and effectively terminate its alliance commitment to New Zealand.²⁴

Impact on ANZUS Alliance

After the US response to New Zealand stance on anti-nuclearism, Prime Minister David Lange made it clear that New Zealand's commitment to ANZUS is a conventional alliance and it does not oblige New Zealand to accept nuclear weapons and clearly stated that his country has no wish to be defended by nuclear weapons.²⁵

However, United States had blamed New Zealand's port and air access policies for the disruption of the alliance relationship between the United States and New Zealand and reiterated that access for allied ships and aircraft is essential for the effectiveness of the ANZUS alliance. United States on its part stated that it is suspending its security obligations under the ANZUS treaty and it also decided to confront the New Zealand government with a choice of either a nuclear ANZUS or no ANZUS.

This ban had a negative impact on the operational capabilities of New Zealand armed forces. Exercise with allies are extremely important for

²⁴ Age, 30 November 1985, p.1.

²⁵ David Lange, *In A selection of Foreign Policy Statements* by the New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, Information Bulletin, no.11, March 1985, p.8.

small navies and it is in this area, the New Zealand Navy has been most affected by the ANZUS split. In August, 1985, New Zealand Ministry of Defence revealed that it had to cancel and restructure Twenty two Joint exercise planned for 1985. This represented a loss of some 600 man days of training time.²⁶

New Zealand's Response to ANZUS Crisis:

New Zealand government had no wish to lose the ANZUS connection and it made efforts to resolve the situation. David Lange, the Prime Minister held that there should be no break up of the alliance as the alliance was not predominantly nuclear. And he believed that in the end, New Zealand and the United States would reach an accommodation because New Zealand regional use fullness as an alliance outweighed any part they would play in global nuclear strategy. His stand was that ANZUS alliance had become in operative only because the nuclear element in the alliance had become predominant and was of the view that New Zealand could exclude nuclear weapons and yet remain active in an alliance with a nuclear power.²⁷

²⁶ Peter Jennings, *The ANZUS split and New Zealand Armed Forces: Costs and consequences*, paper presented to the Australian Political Studies Association Conference; University of Auckland: New Zealand: (August 27, 1987).

²⁷ David Lange, *In A selection of Foreign Policy Statements* by the New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, Information Bulletin, no.11, March 1985, p.8.

In July, 1986, the United States government announced its intention to dense a new bilateral defence agreement with Australia and military obligation of United States to New Zealand were suspended. Besides, United States also announced its decision not to renew the 1982 memorandum of understanding whereby New Zealand was able to purchase military equipment from the United States at favourable rates. In response, Lange government defined a new defence policy based on increased self reliance for the country's military forces.

During that period, some voices were raised regarding the cost and benefits of staying in alliance leaving the anti nuclear stance. However, the 1987 white paper on defence reiterated the commitment of New Zealand to ANZUS obligation, but in conventional terms only.

The rationale for New Zealand's anti nuclear policy was expressed by Prime Minister David Lange in an address to the Dunedin branch of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs on April 30, 1987, he said...

... Nuclear weapons are themselves the greatest threat which exist to our future.. far from adding to our security; they only pat us more at risk..

... New Zealand cannot be defended by nuclear weapons and does not wish to be defended by nuclear weapons. We have disengaged ourselves from any nuclear strategy for the defence of New Zealand.

New Zealand does not believe that deterrence is divisible, and it is irrelevant to the security of New Zealand and South Pacific region.

David Lange further stated that, "When I think of worlds nuclear arsenals, I know that what New Zealand has done as a measure of arms control (excluding nuclearships from its ports) is a small step indeed. I also know that if we cannot take that step in New Zealand, we cannot take it anywhere. If we cannot start in New Zealand we cannot start any where."²⁸

Thereafter, certain world events like, end of the cold war in 1990 and the decrease in fear of nuclear war and creation of unipolar world eased tensions in the south pacific region. Another important aspect was the election of National Party government in 1990 ended the period of labour government. The New Prime Minister Jim Bolger, immediately devoted his attention to the restoration of ANZUS ties. He also announced that it would review the law banning visits of nuclear armed and nuclear propelled warships as a reaction to US government's decision to remove nuclear weapons from its surface naval vessels. In 1994 United States announced

²⁸ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, April, 1987, p.11.

that nuclear armed ships would not be dispatched to New Zealand ports acknowledging the New Zealand ban. In the later years, New Zealand took steps to improve its relations with the United States with in the ANZUS or outside of it.

Relation with the South Pacific Island States

During the early cold war period, New Zealand links with Britain and the United States 'remained close and overshadowed formation of attitudes and policies for New Zealand. They thought themselves as not of the South Pacific at all but as displaced Europeans. Thus they remained attached to their European origin.

It was in the 1970's that a change in their attitude towards the South Pacific region took place. Ministry of Foreign affairs annual report suggested that we must continue to devote greater effort and concern to the South Pacific.²⁹ This statement was further promoted by the labour government under Norman Kirk(1972-75) when he signaled the formulation of a new policy, a double barreled policy, which combines concern with new Zealand's immediate south pacific environment with the country's broader interest in the world at large.³⁰

²⁹ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Annual Report, 1971, Wellington.*

³⁰ Marshall, Russell, New Zealand and the Pacific, *World Review* June 1989, p.14.

Norman Kirk further explained that, "New Zealand Policies in the South Pacific are driven by two basic considerations first, our interests obviously lie in ensuring that the area is at all times well disposed, friendly, as prosperous as possible and stable and; secondly, the skill and effort we display in pursuing those objectives influence the views others beyond South Pacific about New Zealand itself."³¹

In other words, an effective and enlightened New Zealand policy in the South Pacific is an important part of New Zealand's overall external relations, as it serves a definite purpose in pursuit of wider policies to promote and protect New Zealand's essential political and economic, trade and security interests.

Another vital aspect of New Zealand policy towards the South Pacific is for domestic reasons, it is increasingly driven by a acknowledgement of the concerns of indigenous people of the region. The Cook Islands and Niue are self-governing in free association with New Zealand and Tokelau remain a New Zealand dependency.

As the new islands became independent, New Zealand realised that they share the very security concern. The New Zealand government realised their vulnerability; their economic fragility, their environmental concerns and enormous communication problems they faced. New Zealand by virtue

³¹ Ibid, p.14.

of its close geographical historical and cultural/ethnic ties, identified itself as one of the South Pacific Island states.

New Zealand was the first aid donor of to the region, recognizing its responsibilities, long before other international donors emerged. New Zealand has played a key role in improving bilateral links with the new countries. It also played a key role in the formation of South Pacific Forum and hosted the first meeting in 1971.

In the 1970's New Zealand took the lead in proposing a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific it was shelved when it was opposed by the incoming conservative governments in both New Zealand and Australia. However the circumstances became favourable for such a treaty again when labour government's coming to power in Australia and New Zealand, leading to the signing of the anti-nuclear Treaty on 6th August 1985 at a meeting of the South Pacific forum in Rorotonga, Cook islands.

In keeping its anti-nuclear stand Lange had been vocal critic of French nuclear testing on the Moruroa atoll in the South Pacific and New Zealand has criticized French nuclear testing in various forums including United Nations. Great emphasis was laid on environmental goals in New Zealand foreign policy. These tests were seen as danger to the health and the environment of the region. In a statement in General Assembly, on 26

September, 1986, the New Zealand Deputy Foreign Minister F.D.O. Hymn pointed that by conducting nuclear tests, French was thwarting the legitimate desire of the nations of the South Pacific to live in peace and safely in a nuclear free environment.³² Again on June 1990, New Zealand protested against the French nuclear test. Geoffrey Palmer, the Prime Minister of New Zealand spilled out “the New Zealand government deplores this future series of French nuclear tests – French must recognize that its nuclear testing programme will never be accepted in the South Pacific.”³³

New Zealand along with Australia has accepted, its special responsibilities to preserve the regions' well being and its security in on economic and political sense. David Lange, Prime Minister has noted that South Pacific has seen lot of changes in the political sphere in the recent past. There is a ready recognition in New Zealand that the political and management structures left behind when the colonial administration left the south Pacific are subjected to stress and strain – particularly in Fiji, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea.³⁴

In August, 1988, Mr. Lange said apart from its constitutional obligation to the Cook islands, Niue and Tokelau. New Zealand would have

³² *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, September 1986, p.21.

³³ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, June 1990, p.37.

³⁴ Russell Marshal, *New Zealand the Pacific*, *World Review*, June 1989, p.20.

to give serious consideration to any request for assistance from other government in the region.³⁵ This reflects the New Zealand interest to play greater role in the South Pacific region.

The coups in Fiji were widely perceived as setting an unfortunate precedent for extra constitutional political change and both New Zealand and Australia cut off their economic assistance to the military regime. Similar instability in other parts of South Pacific made New Zealand to increase their economic assistance and embark on new programmes of defence cooperation. This act was done in response to the Fiji government's threat to seek help from the Soviet Union and China.

New Zealand have been major provider of Economic aid to the South Pacific region. Most exports of the region enter Australia and New Zealand duty free under the South Pacific Regional trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), Economic assistance has been the principle weapon employed by Australia and New Zealand in Pursuit of strategic denial in the South Pacific. As most of the countries of South Pacific are dependent on economic aid and if New Zealand and Australia do not help them obviously, they will look elsewhere and it may not suit the security interests of both the countries.

³⁵ Ibid., p.20

An important part of New Zealand's South Pacific policy is the Defence Departments Mutual Assistance programme (MAP) which underscores the commitment to regional security. Under this programme, New Zealand can respond to requests for defence training and advice from the region. Even though it is essentially a defence programme, it has strong civic overtones, with New Zealand forces being used for development projects which impart engineering and trade skills. As such the MAP supplements foreign policy goals in pursuit of stability and peaceful development in the region.

On the civilian front, New Zealand has striven to enlarge the export base of the South Pacific which all suffer from lack of investment and foreign exchange, shortage of jobs and indigenous skills, through a focussed programme called the Pacific Island Industrial Development Scheme (PIIDS). This is specifically aimed at assisting the growth of the private sector in Forum Islands. It was designed to provide financial assistance and incentives for New Zealand Companies to develop manufacturing and process operations in the South Pacific states. It was later expanded to include agriculture and horticulture. This spirit of partnership dominates the New Zealand policy towards the South Pacific.

New Zealand's Asia policy was aimed mainly towards the security of their region. New Zealand government perceives the security threat to the Pacific region mainly from the aspirations of the Soviet Union and China.

The threat was believed to be focussed on South East Asia and the security of which was seen as vital to New Zealand. During the post war period, New Zealand was concerned to keep both Britain and United States committed to the defence of South East Asia and largely for this reason it cooperated with those powers in the regional security agreements.

New Zealand got involved into the Asian Security Policy with joining the nine power security treaty SEATO in 1954. Following the treaty, New Zealand agreed to commit its forces in peacetime to the Commonwealth strategic reserve based in Malaya. In 1957, New Zealand and Australia became associate with the Anglo Malaya defence agreement, following attainment of independence by the federation of Malaya.

New Zealand was also the founder member of Colombo plan aid programme, conceived in 1950 and directed towards development in Asia. Although, New Zealand was not enthusiastic to contribute, but later its aid soon reached respectable volume.

Two issues in the mid 1960's involved New Zealand in armed hostilities – first, Indonesia confrontation of Malaysia and the Vietnam war. New Zealand forces stationed in Malaysia assisted in the defence of Malaysia from the guerilla incursion in 1964. In 1965, New Zealand agreed

to request from South Vietnam and the United States to put combat units in Vietnam.

By 1970, the security Environment was changing. China was at odds with the Soviet Union, and seeking better relations with western nations. The United States was also seeking an accommodation of both China and Soviet Union. Britain declared its intention to withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia.

These events made, New Zealand realised that they had to formulate new and more self reliant policies concerning Asia. As a result, New Zealand decided to leave a small military force in Singapore after British Naval withdrawal. This continued military presence was to demonstrate New Zealand's interest in the security of Southeast Asia and to encourage the growth of actively regional defence grouping.³⁶

In 1972, New Zealand signaled its intention to widening the scope of New Zealand Policy, and its just act was the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China. An embassy was later opened in Peking. New Zealand first ambassador to China has written that trade was not the main reason for Kirk's action: it was hardly a secondly consideration at the

³⁶ David McCraw, from Kirk to Muldoon: change and continuity in New Zealand's Foreign Policy Priorities, *Pacific Affairs*, vol,55, no.4, Winter 1982-83, p.641.

time.³⁷ Later it also opened its diplomatic mission in Moscow. Later in the Election manifesto, National Party pledged to further develop relation with the peoples republic of China with a view to a mutually beneficial expansion of trade.³⁸

New Zealand also wanted to develop a new form of relationship with the South East Asian countries away from security in issues. This was made possible as a result of changed relationship among the major powers. Kirk said “The need has greatly lessened for New Zealand to consider its relationship with other countries; and particularly those of Asia and pacific primarily in terms of security.”³⁹ Kirk hoped to develop new regional forum that would unite China and Southeast Asia but found that the non-communist states of Southeast Asia were too suspicious of China and worried about their security accept new regional arrangements readily.⁴⁰ Therefore, New Zealand decided to concentrate supporting the existing arrangements. The Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) and on strengthening bilateral ties with the ASEAN states. Kirk Said” ASEAN... is seen by us a key grouping.. our desire is to do whatever we can from the outside to help it consolidate; both politically and economically.”⁴¹

³⁷ Bryce, Harland, *On our own: New Zealand in the emerging Tripolar world* (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 1992), p.46.

³⁸ New Zealand National Party, 1979, *Annual Election Policy*, Wellington.

³⁹ *Report of Ministry Foreign Affairs*, 1973, p.8.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.10.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.10 *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.23, no.12, December 1973, p.18.

Thus New Zealand continued its participation in the affairs of the Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN to build a better understanding between the countries.

The 1987, defence review, while acknowledging the New Zealand interest in South East Asia sets a scene for refashioning the New Zealand forces. The withdrawal of New Zealand forces from Singapore after more than 30 years of presence, reflects this reshaping. Similarly in economic front, the remarkable growth of ASEAN economies coincided with the New Zealand's efforts to diversify its export markets. New Zealand also values higher its dialogue relationships with ASEAN and is exploring new avenues for cooperation in economic and trade fields.

New Zealand and Australia

New Zealand's highest priority in its foreign policy event to maintaining close relationships with its allies and among them Australia was the foremost. The ANZUS alliance formalised these relationships for realizing security goals. For two decades after the ANZUS alliance was signed, the New Zealand foreign policy gave high priority to cooperating with Australia.

Even though the Canberra pact of 1944; asserted their close relationship, but it achieved very little. However, New Zealand and Australia realised difficulties in the changed circumstances and they attempted to create a permanent and effective machinery for defence and security collaboration. As a result, both New Zealand and Australia became an active members of the US sponsored system of collective security in the Asia Pacific region, hence, they joined the ANZUS and SEATO.

Since then, both the countries have worked closely in the ANZUS alliance. However, since the break down of the ANZUS alliance, due to anti nuclear policy of New Zealand government the ANZUS defence relationship has come in the prominence and has been given greater importance by both New Zealand and Australia.⁴²

In 1944, the ANZAC pact was signed by Australia and New Zealand the awareness of their geo strategic location was visible in Article 5 which mentioned; “the two governments agree to act together in matters of common concern in the South west and south pacific areas”. Article 13 stated that two governments had agreed to get up a regional zone of defence comprising the south west and south pacific areas”.. Under Article 15 they agree to assume full responsibility for policing or sharing in policing such

⁴² Peter Jennings, Prospects for the ANZAC Defence Relationships in the 1990's, New Zealand and International Review, 1990.

areas in the South west and South pacific as may from time to time be agreed upon.⁴³ Dennis McClean, New Zealand Secretary of defence from 1979 to 1988 argues that Australia and New Zealand with all their difference have more in common, perhaps than any other two countries on Earth. Therefore he points out they should do more together for their common good and even through they may not be an immediate threat to their security, both the countries face economic challenges from the outside countries in the region⁴⁴

Despite, the crisis in ANZUS, in the defence sphere, New Zealand did maintained close cordial relations with Australia. Lange government also supported the steady development of close defence cooperation between the two countries i.e. bringing together the defence ministries of two countries and advisors were regarded as a useful vehicle for strengthening collaboration in technology transfers and equipment purchases.

Besides, New Zealand is buying four frigates from the Joint frigate venture get up in Australia. Labour government faced strong criticism over the issue of this expensive deal. Peter Jenning points out that the frigate

⁴³ J.H.A. Hoyle, the Security of Small Island States in Desmond Ball (ed.), *The ANZAC connection*, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1995, pp.74-75.

⁴⁴ Denis Mc Lean A Case of Hang together or hang a separately , *The Australian*, 6 February, 1990.

decision can be seen as a victory for those New Zealanders who favoured maintaining alliance relationships and a broad focussed defence policy.⁴⁵

New Zealand and Australia, besides aiming at self reliance in defence, are also linked economically through the Closer Economic Relations (CER) Agreement signed in 1983. Through CER, free trade was established between the two countries. Even though, CER with Australia was established in 1983, the real progress in this agreement is seen only in the post cold war period, when the security consideration have taken a back seat and economic interests are gaining priority in its foreign policy. Through CER New Zealand and Australia aim to achieve full free trade in goods by 1990 and later its was extended to services sector also.

⁴⁵ Peter Jennings. *Alliance or Isolation? New Zealand post ANZUS Defence Policy*, autumn, 1990, p.15.

CHAPTER IV

NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD

With the end of Cold War, the New Zealand foreign policy made a big shift. The area was no more influenced by cold war politics and it had a great sense of relief.

During the cold war period New Zealand's foreign policy was fully integrated into the western efforts to contain the spread of communism, first in Europe and later in their own region. Independent of mind, New Zealand strongly encouraged (with other like minded states), the United States and Britain forward defence policy mainly to prevent the expansion of communism. New Zealand's commitment of military forces to the commonwealth strategic reserve was an expression of the seriousness of its intent.¹

Politically New Zealand sought to prevent the spread of communism in the region through a balance of 'firm political liberalism that sought to

¹ David Dickens, 'Peace and Opportunity : A New Zealand's View of Regional Security' *strategic analysis*, March 1997, p.1714.

remove the conditions that led to communism'.² From 1955, New Zealand's main security efforts were to concentrate on the defence of South East Asia firm to threat of a conventional communist invasion. This led to its joining South East Asian treaty organization. Besides, its armed forces were actively involved in the counter insurgency in Thailand, Laos, Malay, Singapore and Vietnam.³

However, the end of cold war has transformed New Zealand's security perception towards optimism. The ideological conflict between communist expansionism and western liberal containment has dissolved. In its place, New Zealand with an optimism saw an opportunity of peace and security fueled by massive economic growth.

New Zealand Security perception in the Post Cold War Period

New Zealand perceives that there is no direct threat to its security.⁴ However, New Zealand officials still prefer to the uncertainty generated by rapid economic growth; spliced with reference to the risk of political disorder , national and commercial rivalry, ethnic and religious strains and even war.⁵ New Zealand is not even concerned with the voices being raised

² Ibid., p.1714.

³ C. Pugsley unpublished draft of *The New Zealand Official history of Military involvement in Southeast Asia*.

⁴ Prime Minister Jim Bolger in 'preface' to *the Defence of New Zealand, 1991: A policy paper* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1991).

⁵ G. Hensley, *Regional Security in the Asia/pacific: Toward 2001*: speech given to the Royal United Services Institute (Canberra, September 1994), p.4

about the clash of civilization and interprets the rapid acquisition of new arms in the region i.e. Southeast Asia, as more the consequence of the dynamics of force modernization; fuelled by rapid economic growth than an uncontrolled arms race.

The main focus of the post cold war foreign policy of New Zealand is to normalize its relations with United States (under changed circumstances) and restore economic linkages with the countries of South East Asia and Asia Pacific and also to make a greater impact on the South Pacific region.

The post war policy clearly reflects its main focus is on developing economic relations and following a multilateral policy.

In this chapter we shall examine, the foreign policy of New Zealand with respect to United States, South East Asia, Asia Pacific, South Pacific and Australia, in the post cold war period and this would give us a clear idea of what changes it had made in the changed circumstances in its approach to foreign policy.

New Zealand and the United States

New Zealand actively sought to restore, as far as possibly the relations with the United States. In this endeavour, it had cooperated closely with the United States in the security field.

National government came to office in New Zealand in the midway of the Gulf War, National Government capitalized on the opportunity to restore its credentials among its traditional western alliances by joining the multinational force in the Gulf. Hercules aircraft and medical teams were dispatched to operate alongside American and British forces.

After the war, Prime Minister Jim Bolger, had a telephonic conversation with president George Bush – the first dialogue between the two countries leaders since the 1984 ANZUS crisis. This was a significant step towards the principle objectives outlined by Foreign Minister Don McKinnon i.e. of reasserting its bonafides in the Western alliance.⁶ This was helped by the appointment of Dennis McLean, as the ambassador to Washington who was regarded as a pro ANZUS hawk. Mc Lean is considered well connected with Pentagon, which is the main source of resistance in Washington to New Zealand's anti nuclear legislation.

There were signs since the Gulf war that Washington is mellowing its line on security links with New Zealand. The administration has partially reinstated intelligence sharing which was cut by the Regan administration in 1986. Even, President Bush, didn't make any reference to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy or United States navy visits, during the formal

⁶ Alistair Sands, New Zealand Security Policy under National, *Link* 26 April 1992, p.24.

acceptance of Mc Lean's credentials – as they had been recurrent themes in practically all United States official statements on United States -New Zealand relations.

National government besides its commitment to Gulf under the United Nations auspicious, made an application for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, this reveals the governments policy for restoring alliance ties with United States. It has supported United States on NPT, CTBT in the United Nations.

However, the stumbling block remained the anti nuclear legislation. Mc Kinnon the foreign Minister and Minister of Defence, warren cooper had urged that New Zealand must revive the ANZUS in order to enhance New Zealand's interoperability with the allied forces in future United Nations exercises.

The ANZUS alliance could not be restored, as long as powerful elements in the United States security community, especially the navy remained opposed to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policies. National government has reaffirmed that it would honour anti-nuclear legislation and likewise, United States reaffirms it inability to restore ANZUS alliance as it clashes with the navy's 'neither confirm nor deny' policy and therefore security links remain limited.

National government is also apprehensive to lock horns with labour over anti-nuclear law as, despite winning the election with wide margin, it confronts an economy in deep recession and that is widespread unrest especially in industrial sector and if government tampers with the anti-nuclear law, it would incite further protest and boost the opposition labours fortunes.

Jim Bolger, was cautious toward a suggestion floated by a Republican Congressman that the United States might ratify the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) and if New Zealand could accept American ships under a tacit understanding that they would not carry nuclear weapons. Bolger had stated that US-New Zealand relations are already much improved, and there is no rush.

Both nations have shown caution with regard to reviving ANZUS although signs of a warming trend are unmistakable. McLean said New Zealand had been out in the Cold for six years and it might take that length of time to return to the positive; warm relationship it once had".⁷

New Zealand has actively searched for opportunities to work closely with the United States in the security field. It is for this reason that New Zealand contributed to the United States influences and led to United Nations Missions in Haiti (Haiti being well outside New Zealand's area of

⁷ Ibid., p.25.

Strategic interest) and partially when it contributed to the Multi National interception force in Gulf.

By 1993, New Zealand began to Carve out a good working relationship with United States. In movement 1993 Prime Minister had a meeting with President Clinton of USA, and he declared his intention to review the relationship. As a result, United States administration announced its decision to restore senior level political and military dialogue. However, it made it clear “that this did not imply a return to an alliance relationship”.⁸ This was followed by a series of ministerial contacts at all levels and a normal political relationship with United States.

However, the United States regards the full restoration of security relationship as unfinished business until New Zealand non-nuclear legislation is amended to allow free access to United States ships and air crafts into New Zealand.

Both New Zealand and United States are however, working closer in trade. Bilateral trade between the two countries is over \$6 billion p.a. and is heavily weighted in Americans favour. US was investing in New Zealand, particularly in the telecommunications, food processing and transport sectors. The tourism sectors in also booming “There have never been more

⁸ Niel Walter, Dy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Record , July 1995, p.7.

New Zealand tourist in the states or American tourist in New Zealand as they are now".⁹ This show the people to people contact between the two nations is increasing and easing of mutual tension between them.

New Zealand and Australia

For the reasons of geography and historical association strong bilateral ties with Australia are important to New Zealand's foreign and defence policy. They both compliment longstanding links in the political, economic and trade areas.

While, New Zealand and Australia have similar regional outlooks, they are not the same. New Zealand and Australia both emphasize the importance of the region to their security, but New Zealand looks more to the South Pacific than Australia.

New Zealand foreign policy is more measured. It avoids public spats with neighbours such a Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, seeking instead to quietly work through differences, while working constructively, often in support, on issues with which common ground is shared.

⁹ Ibid., p.8.

The security relationship between New Zealand and Australia is close. New Zealand's closest defence relationship is with Australia. Indeed, an attack on Australia would be regarded by Wellington as an attack on New Zealand.¹⁰ The security of either New Zealand or Australia would be at risk if the other was seriously threatened and it is inconceivable that a joint response could not be forthcoming.¹¹

A significant cooperation exists in joint training exercises and logistics. Since 1991, these arrangements and understandings have been expanded under the informal rubric of the Closer Defence Relations (CDR) arrangement. CDR is not a treaty and entails no formal obligation. CDR is an agreement between the two governments to increase the effectiveness of both countries' armed forces through consultation, the development of complementary force structure, high levels of interoperability, improved coordination and to identify ways of providing support to the armed forces more cheaply and effectively. The essence of CDR is that it is a process not a goal. Closer Defence Relations between New Zealand and Australia move at a pace that both sides feel comfortable with.

Besides the ANZ leg of ANZUS continues to provide the formal basis for Trans-Tasman defence cooperation, and entails reciprocal security

¹⁰ *Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987*. (Wellington: Government Printer 1987), p.16.

¹¹ David Dickens, *Peace and Opportunity: A New Zealand View of Regional Security*, *Strategic Analysis*, March 1997, p.1727.

commitments and obligations. Both Australia and New Zealand has combined their efforts in various regional and international settings and number of peace keeping operations, thus, reinforcing their bilateral defence arrangements.

The Australia defence white paper (defending Australia) made very clear how important is the cooperation with New Zealand is to them by acknowledging “our defence alliance with New Zealand remains important to Australia’s defence policy. Indeed, in the more demanding strategic environment of the next century, it may become even more important.”¹²

The ANZAC frigate project and the NOWRA operations are evidence of CDR’s potential for delivering benefits to both countries if both the countries are prepared to work together at defence cooperation.

As of the economic relations between Australia and New Zealand, Australia is the largest trading partner of New Zealand. Both the countries launched in initiative in 1983. For a gradual and progressive liberalization of trade between the two countries. This agreement was named (CER) Closer Economic Relations. This initiative has been very successful in opening up of movement of goods and services across the Tasman. Supporting CER, Don McKinnon, Foreign Minister of New Zealand had

¹² Don McKinnon, Speech to Sydney Institute, Sydney, 9 February 1995, Ministry of Foreign affairs and Trade Record, February 19 95, p.11.

said “CER is also relevant to a consideration of the security policies of New Zealand and of Australia. We are a nation committed to collective security and with an economy significantly dependent on exports; so the linkage between stability and prosperity and economic and trade relationship is obviously an acute one for us. Because economic security is important to us we support trade liberalization domestically and internationally. We see the development of international trade rules as one way of ensuring that economic opportunities are shared by all. CER is a good example of this. It has involved both countries working together in order to gain the greater benefits of trade and economic growth”.¹³ With the success of CER, the two way trade between New Zealand and Australia in goods in worth nearly ANZ \$ 9.81 billion up to June 1998.¹⁴ This is an increase of by over 275 percent since CER’s inception in 1983. CER has also helped in improving the bilateral trade relations, as New Zealand is Australia’s largest export market and New Zealand is currently Australia’s fourth largest export market.¹⁵

The importance of CER to both the countries has been highlighted by the economic difficulties in Asia and their resulting impact on two

¹³ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, April 1998, p.17.

¹⁴ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, December 1998/Jan.1999, p.28.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.28.

economies. New Zealand was able to survive the Asian down turn only because of CER commitments.

The present focus of CER, after achieving the free trade in services and removal of all tariffs and quantitative restrictions on goods is on third generation regulatory initiatives. One such initiative is the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) came into operations in May 1998. The focus of the TTMRA is to concentrate on the five cooperative programme covering areas temporarily outside the scope of the arrangement. Other third generation CER initiatives, such as Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA) and Arrangements on Food Inspection Measures (AFIM) are undertaken to achieve free trade in services.

Both Australia and New Zealand are also closely monitoring the implications of the introduction of Euro in the view of major economic relations of the two countries are with European Union. Besides both the countries have reiterated their interest to work for WTO to achieve the ambitious agenda for a new comprehensive round of mulilateal trade negotiations.

New Zealand Foreign Policy towards South East Asia

New Zealand has well established political, security development and economic links with Southeast Asia. New Zealand was present at the

creation of most of the states of Southeast Asia and most closely involved with Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. New Zealand was also closely involved with the long independent Thailand. Even the relations with Vietnam, which were put on hold from late 1975 to late 1980s, are now developing rapidly.

New Zealand views ASEAN as having a process and political culture that offer a basis for wider intergovernmental arrangements. New Zealand became, the first dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1975. This gives a special status to New Zealand, in having access to Southeast Asian countries.

The post cold war, foreign policy mainly aims to have multilateral linkages and New Zealand aims to increase trade between the countries. Economic relations are growing, New Zealand exports over 8 per cent of its goods and services to ASEAN countries. Five ASEAN countries are among the top 20 markets and almost 20 percent of trade goes to these ASEAN countries.¹⁶ To improve the bilateral trade, New Zealand had participated in formations of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). AFTA is a process through which New Zealand interacts with ASEAN countries to reduce barriers to trade.

¹⁶ New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record, August 1997, p.5.

The New Zealand perception of ASEAN is captured by O'Brien "ASEAN stands effectively as the only piece of established intergovernmental machinery of any consequence in the wider Asia Pacific. A preference of collegiality intensive personal contact and informal networking has emerged as a comfortable method of intergovernmental dealing for much of modern Asia".¹⁷

New Zealand has set up an Asia 2000 foundation in 1994, with an aim to promote greater understanding of Asia among New Zealanders and strengthening New Zealand's linkages and encouraging the development of networks with an aim to bring stability and growth in trade. The main idea behind the Asia 2000 programme was underlined by Roger, Farrell, Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade they are:

- a) to raise public awareness of the importance of New Zealand's links with Asian countries,
- b) help develop the knowledge and sustain the enthusiasm of those working in Asian countries,
- c) enhance the role of education in promoting greater understanding and increased Asian skills,

¹⁷ T.O.Brien, *New Zealand and ASEAN: Current and Future Outlook, CSS Working Paper*, Wellington, February 1995, p.3.

d) advise the government on issue relating to New Zealand's economic interests in Asian countries.¹⁸

On the Security front, the post Cold War period has witnessed notable developments. Among them, the creation of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is significant. It is a assemble of ministers of twenty one Asia pacific countries, gathered to discuss the security issues. It has among them all ASEAN members plus all the major powers with pacific borders. (including the USA, Japan, China and Russia) and the EU. ARF has developed its own approach to political and Security dialogue which takes into account the circumstances of the region.

New Zealand has been active in the discussion of issues like East Timor and Bougainville and overlapping territorial claims around Spratly and Paracel Islands in south East Asia. Prime Minster J. Bolger has express that ARF process, strengthen political and security ties with our neighbours and help contribute to the stability of the Asia pacific region.¹⁹

Impact of East Asian Economic Crisis

Asian Economic Crisis has been a psychological shock to the region and an economic shock to New Zealand who are heavily dependent on these markets for exports.

¹⁸ Roger Farrell, The Year in Foreign Affairs and Trade, *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, October 1994, p.45.

¹⁹ J. Bolger, New Zealand in the World: External Agenda, *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, March 1996, p.14.

Don McKinnon has remarked that “economic crisis has done more in a few month to being home to New Zealanders our degree of dependence on the region than several years work of speeches.”²⁰ New Zealand and has responded positively to the request for assistance from the countries effected by crisis. New Zealand offered to Korea US \$100 million which helped Korea to counter problem of short term commercial debt. New Zealand gave, Thailand technical assistance on economic and public sector reform and also gave a two week training courses in New Zealand for Thai officials in economic restructuring. However, New Zealand has reinforced a deep level of commitment to Asia and reiterates that “this is a permanent and for better or for worse relationship”.²¹ This reflects a growing commitment of New Zealand on Asia for both trade and bilateral linkages.

New Zealand and Asia Pacific

The most important post war venture of New Zealand is into the Asia Pacific. New Zealand has been very vocal about their nearness to Asia Pacific. New Zealand was able to get membership of UN security council, because of the support of Asia Pacific region. Even during the tenure, it had made it clear they were very much an Asia Pacific voice among 15 members.

²⁰ Don McKinnon – New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record, November 1998, p.16.

²¹ Ibid., p.17.

As a result, New Zealand has been participating in all regional arrangements viz. ASEAN, ARF, etc. However, the most important assuring them is the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). Prime Minister had described it to a business community as probably most important trade liberalization group we belong to”.²²

APEC consists of 21 Countries, comprising of in Americas the United States, Canada, Mexico and Chile, in East Asia, China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and six of the ASEAN and in Southern Pacific – New Zealand, Australia and Papua New Guinea. All in all 21 dynamic Pacific Rim Countries.

For New Zealand Trade, the importance of APEC lies in, the amount of its dependence. APEC members provide 70 percent of two way trade including 10 of the top 12 export markets for New Zealand. Most of the capital and tourist flows also come from and go the Asia Pacific region. Additionally 80 percent of New Zealand foreign investment comes from with in APEC.²³

²² Richard Nottage, *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, November 1998, p.16.

²³ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, 10 August 1998, p.32.

Apart from this, APEC's core value lies in its pursuit of a regional community with raising standards of living and trade and investment liberalization are key means of realizing this vision. At their meeting in Bogor, Indonesia in 1994, APEC decided to establish a target of free trade and investment in the region, by 2010 for developed countries, including New Zealand and 2020 for developing countries. This ambitious goal has been reconfirmed by every subsequent leaders meeting.

Don McKinnon, Foreign Minister had said "APEC recognizes the reality that the economies on both sides of the pacific ocean are increasingly interdependent and integrated and both the economic and the political health of our region depends on managing intra Asian and trans-Pacific relations well".²⁴ Prime Minister Jenny Shipley has underlined the importance of APEC for New Zealand when she said, "there is no doubt in my mind that APES is vital to the future welfare of New Zealand. If it did not exist we would want to invent it."²⁵

New Zealand will host the APEC '99 summit. This summit is viewed in New Zealand as an opportunity to guide APEC process towards its goal of free trade and investment in the region and Prime Minister Jenny Shipley,

²⁴ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs in Trade Record*, September 1997, p.5

²⁵ Prime Minister Jenny Shipley, Address to Post APEC Luncheon, Auckland, 27 November 98, p.2.

announcing the agenda for 1999 summit said, they want to see (a) further substantive progress towards reducing barriers to the cost of trade and investment, (b) a credible APEC response to the economic crisis, (c) strengthening of the institutions and human resources in the region to deal with the economic challenges they face, (d) the building of broader support for APEC among the wider communities of which New Zealand is a part.²⁶

New Zealand has come a long way in its relations with Asia Pacific countries. For last 25 years, it had contributed to regional peace and stability and now it is aiming to achieve economic development through these processes.

Another addition to New Zealand's foreign economic policy has been the broadening the horizons and launching of focus Latin America programme in 1996 by New Zealand.²⁷ Latin America which was suffering from economic mismanagement, hyperinflation and political instability and threats of military regimes, had achieved an unprecedented level of economic growth through a combination of economic reforms and restoration of democratic political processes.

²⁶ Ibid., p.53.

²⁷ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, November 1998, p.38.

As a result, New Zealand began to explore avenues to improve trade relations. As such overseas investment in Latin America increased eight times between 1990 and 1997 reaching US \$ 50 billion. New Zealand trade with Latin America totals around \$ 777 million, which includes Mexico.²⁸ Trade between New Zealand is mainly dominated by dairy products, which amounts to about NZ \$ 370 million per year.²⁹

Investments of New Zealand to Latin America are concentrated mainly in the dairy and food processing sectors; forestry, building and packaging products. Tourism and education are seen as other sectors having potential for the future.

New Zealand is also very closely watching the continuing process of regional integration in Latin America as it has an important implication for New Zealand both in terms of opportunities and challenges.

New Zealand has established a CER/MERCOSUR dialogue with the countries of Latin America. MERCOSUR is a dynamic customs union of Southern cone, comprising of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Its purpose is the establishment of a large regional market and customs union free from tariff and non tariff barriers.

²⁸ Ibid., p.38.

²⁹ Ibid., p.38.

New Zealand in this regard has done, much work, various trade and quarantine agreements have been concluded to facilitate trade with Latin America. Beef exports to Chile were commenced in 1998 following a bilateral agreement. Similar agreements are underway for access to Argentina's beef and lamb markets. Besides, reciprocal access to New Zealand from these countries is also being processed for a variety of meat, fish, and live animal products.

Thus New Zealand government has left no stone turned to improve its trade relations with the countries. It has actively participated in all security as well as economic process being launched in the Post Cold War period and was very successful in achieving a lot in comparison to its size. This strengthens the aim of the National government which came to power in 1990 made it clear, that its main concern in foreign affairs was the promotion of trade. Its election manifesto stated "we acknowledge the link between our foreign policy and our trade requirements and we will give priority to the promotion of trade at every opportunity".³⁰ New Zealand is successful in achieving that aim in the post cold war scenario when mutual suspicious have given way to mutual cooperation for better economic and trade relations.

³⁰ Paul Harris and Stephen, (eds.), *The New Zealand Politics Source Book*, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1992, p.206

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

New Zealand since the Second World War has come a long way, in following an independent foreign policy. From the beginning, a New Zealand's world view was shaped by isolation and its foreign policy's main aim remained to overcome this isolation.

With this aim, it has participated in various world forums and had also been closely associated with United States and Britain. The Cold War brought to the New Zealand the harsh realities of world politics. For the first time it saw danger to itself. With the intensification of Cold War, New Zealand began to explore avenues for its security. As Britain remained no longer a powerful country and it began to look around for another reliable ally.

At the same time the Red Menace was looming larger over the region and this made the region susceptible to communist expansion. As such, New Zealand began to explore the possibility of a military agreements to counter the tide of communist expansion.

With this Intention, United States entered into series of defence treaties in the South East Asian region and New Zealand also participated in

it. Through these agreements, New Zealand aimed to get a security cover. Thus ANZUS and SEATO treaty came not being, they were both the part of Cold War strategy.

New Zealand had actively participated in ANZUS alliance and for a long period. New Zealand remained under the ANZUS umbrella. However, it never quite dominated New Zealand's international role. Deep down in her consciousness, there was feeling, of necessity to formulate her own policies towards, neighbouring Island states; of looking beyond the United States and Britain to assess her own national interests. New Zealand assumed defence responsibility of the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Island and developed special defence arrangement with Fiji and Tonga. Thus, it began to assert the identity of small powers in the United Nations. New Zealand supported United Nations efforts towards World Peace; creation of conditions of for universal security and favoured regional security pacts within the frame work of the principles of the United Nations. With this aim, New Zealand had participated in large number of overseas military conflicts mainly in the peacekeeping role.

An important aspect of New Zealand foreign policy is to its anti nuclear policy. Even though, New Zealand has perhaps least to fear from the direct consequences of a nuclear disaster, it had been very vocal about the dangers involved with the nuclear war. There were conscious efforts by

labour government to encourage the small territories of the south pacific to get control over their internal affairs to develop a sense of pacific community. New Zealand also strived for a coherent region policy independent of great power involvement and it coupled it with proposals for the establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

The anti nuclear stand taken by New Zealand brought it into a direct criticism by United States and it retaliated by suspending its obligations to the ANZUS treaty with the New Zealand, and cut all high level political, diplomatic and military links.

Even then, New Zealand what ahead to introduce Nuclear Free Zone legislations. However, there was a relief when, the cold war came to an end in 1990 and it felt that there was no danger of nuclear war anymore. As such, New Zealand actively sought to restore the relationship with United States at least at the political level. New Zealand cooperated closely with the United States during its term on the United Nations Security Council (1993-94) even though they took different positions on key issues such as Middle east and Israel. However, there remains to the full restoration of security relationship, which is not possible until New Zealand non-nuclear legislations is amended to allow free access to United States ships and aircraft's into New Zealand. This does not seem to happen in near future as

public opinion is strongly poised not to allow any nuclear armed or powered ships into New Zealand ports.

Another important aspect in New Zealand's foreign policy is the South Pacific Islands. In South Pacific, New Zealand seeks to promote political stability and economic well being. As the South Pacific Island and states became independent New Zealand realized the importance of security these states as they are vulnerable to the cold war politics. New Zealand was the first aid donor in the region, this was done to strengthen the bilateral links with the South Pacific countries. With this aim, New Zealand played a major role in formation of the South Pacific Forum; later in 1970s New Zealand took lead in proposing a Nuclear Free Zone in South Pacific. Thus New Zealand took a leading role in creating a nuclear free South Pacific. New Zealand took active part in the signing of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in 1985. (also known as Treaty of Rorotonga)

New Zealand was relieved to see the end of Cold War and now it began to concentrate on Economic issues with South Pacific countries. New Zealand took active part in driftnet fishing issue with the South Pacific countries and campaigned for banning driftnet fishing. This later led to a UN resolution in which all UN members agreed to phase out driftnet fishing. In South Pacific environmental issue and marine resource management are

very important; New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance was also aimed at eliminating the stockpiling of chemical or nuclear weapons in the South Pacific region which are a danger to the Pacific countries' environment.

New Zealand also has the desire to increase the standard of living of the people of South Pacific, as such it has South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) which allows unrestricted and duty free access to New Zealand markets from the South Pacific countries. Thus New Zealand had played a major role in South Pacific in cold war by giving security to the region and participating in the anti nuclear efforts and also by providing economic security through trade liberalization and tariff reductions. In post cold war period, it had concentrated on issues like aid and environmental issues concerning South Pacific.

Another important region for New Zealand is the South East Asia. New Zealand as mentioned earlier, has well established political, security, development and economic links with South East Asia. New Zealand was involved with Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia during the Cold War period. This was mainly focused towards curbing the influence of communism in the region. New Zealand got associated with South East Asian Treaty Organization in 1954 and also with Anglo Malayan defence

agreement with this aim. Later, it was involved in the Vietnam war and sent units for it.

New Zealand also developed relations with South East Asia, away from security issues. New Zealand became a Dialogue partner in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and during the later period of cold war, it interacted with South East Asia through this association.

In the post cold war period, with no threat of communist Expansion, New Zealand became comfortable and it followed multilateral diplomacy. New Zealand improved its relations with South East Asia nations. Asian Economy provide about one-third of New Zealand export receipt and also about one half of all new migrants.

Even during the recent economic crisis in South East Asia, New Zealand had responded positively to requests for assistance from the countries New Zealand mainly provided its technical assistance in economic and public sector reform.

New Zealand also in the Post Cold War period, actively participated in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) the first security forum covering the whole of Asia Pacific region to discuss the security issues in the region.

The strongest link New Zealand has is with Australia. They have close links in political, economic and trade areas. They both emphasize the importance of the region to their security. The Canberra pact of 1944 first laid the foundation of closer relationships, however, it was only through ANZUS and SEATO agreements which brought them real closer. They had worked closely in the ANZUS alliance throughout the Cold War period, until the anti nuclear stance of New Zealand made it to improve relations through ANZAC defence relationship. Despite the ANZUS crisis, in the defence sphere, Australia and New Zealand maintained close defence relations. New Zealand brought frigates from Australia in order to strengthen the relationship. Australia and New Zealand are closely linked economically through the closer economic relations Agreement signed in 1983. Though this, they aim to established free trade between the two countries. The CER had been a great success in opening up of the movement of goods and services across the Tasman. The Post Cold War period, a phase free of any security fear, both New Zealand and Australia has launched, Mutual recognition between the two countries in 1992. This means that a product able to be sold in one country can be sold in another. It also means that someone registered to practice in one country should be entitled to carry out an equivalent occupation in another. This agreements have brought closer both New Zealand and Australia.

Another important aspect of New Zealand's Post Cold War policy is towards Asia-pacific. During the cold war period this region was at the hub of Cold War politics as a result, New Zealand interaction with these countries was only through its allies. However, the creation of Asia Pacific Economic cooperation (APEC) in 1989, opened new avenues for trade, New Zealand became the founder member of this group and through APEC it aims to increase its trade and at present nearly 70 percent of two way trade of New Zealand is with the APEC members. New Zealand is optimistic about the APEC as it brings together most powerful and influential countries of the world namely, United States, China and Japan. New Zealand is also committed itself to a programme of transparent progressive tariff reduction to ensure competitiveness in export markets with MERCOSUR, the common market agreement of Latin American countries.

To sum up, New Zealand foreign policy is of optimism, despite some problems in the region. It views the world as being more at peace than any time in this century and New Zealand has sought to make the most of it in economic field, and play its role in regional security arrangement.

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APPENDIXES

THE ANZUS TREATY

Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of American (Entry into force 29th April 1952).

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with the peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Notiing that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan, to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outsides as well as within the Pacific Areas,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council, and the measures shall be terminated when the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position of further the purpose of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other

signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been give to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty in the English languages shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

FOR AUSTRALIA:

PERCY C. SPENDER

FOR NEW ZEALAND

C.A. BERENDSEN

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

DEAN ACHESON
JOHN FOSTER DULES
ALEXANDER WILEY
JOHN J. SPARKMAN

**SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY
AND DRAFT PROTOCOLS (TREATY OF RAROTONGA)**

PREAMBLE

The Parties to this Treaty

UNITED in their commitment to a world at peace:

GRAVELY CONCERNED that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all people;

CONVINCED that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose to life on earth;

BELIEVE that regional arms control measure can contribute to global efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race and promote the national security of each country in the region and the common security of all;

DETERMINED to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and beauty of the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their people and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace;

REAFFIRMING the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing to world security.

NOTING, in particular, that Article VII of the NPT recognize the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

NOTING that the prohibitions of emplantation and emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof contained in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapon and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof apply in the South Pacific;

NOTING also that the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or under water, including territorial waters or high seas, contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water applies in the South Pacific,

DETERMINED to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter;

GUIDED by the decision of the Fifteenth South Pacific Forum at Tuvalu that a nuclear free zone should be established in the region at the earliest possible opportunity in accordance with the principles set out in the communiqué of that meeting;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1 : USAGE OF TERMS

For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocols:

a) "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone" means the areas described in Annex 1 as illustrated by the map attached to that Annex;

- b) "territory" means internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic waters, the seabed and subsoil beneath, the land territory and the airspace above them.
- c) "nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it;
- d) "stationing" means emplantation, emplacement, transportation on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment.

ARTICLE 2 : APPLICATION OF THE TREATY

- (1) Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its protocols shall apply to territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free zone.
- (2) Nothing in this treaty shall prejudiced or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any state under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.

ARTICLE 3: RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Each Party undertakes:

- (a) not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;
- (b) not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device;
- (c) not to take any action to assist or encourage of the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear device by any state.

ARTICLE 4: PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

Each Party undertakes:

- (a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:
 - (i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
 - (ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).Any such provision shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusive peaceful non-explosive use;
- (b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system.

ARTICLE 5: PREVENTION OF STATIONING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

- (1) Each Party undertakes to prevent in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.
- (3) Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remaining free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage of straits.

ARTICLE 6: PREVENTION OF TESTING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Each Party undertakes:

- (a) to prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;
- (b) not to take any action to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

ARTICLE 7 : PREVENTION OF DUMPING

- (1) Each Party undertakes:
 - (a) not to dump radioactive wastes other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;
 - (b) to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in its territorial sea;
 - (c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping by anyone of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;
 - (d) to support the conclusion as soon as a possible of the proposed Convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific Region and its Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South Pacific region by dumping, with the aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone anywhere in the region.

(2) Paragraph 1(a) and 1(b) of this Article shall not apply to areas of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in respect of which such a Convention and Protocol have entered into force.

ARTICLE 8 : CONTROL SYSTEM

- (1) The Parties hereby establish a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with their obligation under this Treaty.
- (2) The control system shall comprise :
 - (a) reports and exchange of information as provided for in Article 9;
 - (b) consultations as provided for in Article 10 and Annex 4(1);
 - (c) the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA as provided in Annex 2;
 - (d) a complaints procedure as provided for in Annex 4.

ARTICLE 9: REPORTS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

(1) Each Party shall report to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (the Director) as soon as possible any significant event within its jurisdiction affecting the implementation of this Treaty. The Director shall circulate such reports promptly to all Parties.

(2) The Parties shall endeavour to keep each other informed on matters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange information by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all Parties.

(3) The Director shall report annually to the South Pacific Forum on the status of this Treaty and matters arising under or in relation to it, Incorporating reports and communications made under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and matters arising under Articles 8(2) (d) and 10 and Annex 2(4).

ARTICLE 10 : CONSULTATION AND REVIEW

Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties by other means, the Director, at the request of any Party, shall convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee established by Annex 3 for consultation and co-operation on any matter arising in relation to this Treaty or for reviewing its operation.

ARTICLE 11 : AMENDMENT

The Consultative Committee shall consider proposals for amendment of the provisions of this Treaty proposed by any party and circulated by the Director to all parties not less than three months prior to the convening of the Consultative Committee for this purpose. Any proposal agreed upon by consensus by the Consultative Committee shall be communicated to the Director who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties. An amendment shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by the depositary of acceptance from all Parties .

ARTICLE 12 : SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION

(1) This Treaty shall be open for signature by any Member of the South Pacific Forum

(2) This Treaty shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Director who is hereby designated depositary of this Treaty and its Protocols.

(3) If Member of the South Pacific Forum whose territory is outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone becomes a Party to this Treaty, Annex 1 shall be deemed to be amended so far as required to enclose at least the territory of that Party within the boundaries of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The delineation of any area added pursuant to this paragraph shall be approved by the South Pacific Forum.

ARTICLE 13 : WITHDRAWAL

(1) This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation by any Party of a provision of this Treaty

essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

(2) Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in advance to the Director who shall circulate such notice to all other Parties.

Article 14: Reservations

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 15: Entry into Force

(1) This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification.

(2) For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Article 16: Depositary Functions

The depositary shall register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and shall transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all Members of the South Pacific Forum and all States eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty and shall notify them of signatures and ratification of the Treaty and its Protocols.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at Rarotonga, this sixth day of August, One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five, in a single original in the English language.

Annex-1: South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

A The Area bounded by a line.

(1) commencing at the point of intersection of the Equator by the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea;

(2) running thence northerly along that maritime boundary to its intersection by the outer limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Papua New Guinea;

(3) thence generally north-easterly, easterly and south-easterly along that outer limit to its intersection by the Equator;

(4) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 163 degrees East;

(5) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 3 degrees North;

(6) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 171 degree East;

(7) thence north along the meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 4 degrees North;

- (8) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 180 degrees East;
- (9) thence such along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;
- (10) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 165 degrees West;
- (11) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 5 degree 30 minutes North;
- (12) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 154 degrees West;
- (13) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;
- (14) thence East along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian; Longitude 115 degrees West;
- (15) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 160 degree South;
- (16) thence west along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degree East;
- (17) thence north along that meridian to its southern most intersection by the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia;
- (18) thence generally northerly and easterly along the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 136 degrees 45 minutes East;
- (19) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10 degrees 50 minutes south, Longitude 139 degrees 12 minutes East;
- (20) thence north-easterly along the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to where it joins the land border between those two countries;
- (21) thence generally northerly along that land border to where it joins the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, on the northern coastline of Papua New Guinea; and
- (22) thence generally northerly along that boundary to the point of commencement.

B The areas within the outer limits of the territorial seas of all Australian islands lying westward of the area described in paragraph A and north of Latitude 60 degrees South, provided that any such areas shall cease to be part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone upon receipt by the depositary of written notice from the Government of Australia stating that the areas have become subject to another treaty having an object and purpose substantially the same as that of this Treaty.

Annex 2: IAEA Safeguards

- (1) The safeguards referred to in Article 8 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.
- (2) The agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, an agreement required in connection with the NPT on the basis of the material reproduced in document INFCIRC/153

(Corrected) of the IAEA. Each party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that such an agreement in force for it not later than eighteen months after the date of entry into force for the Party of this Treaty.

- (3) For the purpose of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-division of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices.
- (4) Each Party agrees upon the request of any other Party to transmit to that Party and to the Director for the information of all Parties a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the IAEA on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and to advise the Director promptly of any subsequent findings of the Board of Governments of the IAEA in relation in relation to those conclusions for the information of all Parties.

Annex 3: Consultative Committee

- (1) There is hereby established a Consultative Committee which shall be convened by the Director from time to time pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 and Annex 4 (2). The consultative Committee shall be constituted of representatives of the Parties, each Party being entitled to appoint one representative who may be accompanied by advisers. Unless otherwise agreed, the Consultative Committee shall be chaired at any given meeting by the representative of the Party which last hosted the meeting of the Heads of Government of Members of the South Pacific Forum. A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of half the Parties. Subject to the provisions of Article 11 decisions of the Consultative Committee shall be taken by consensus or failing consensus by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. The Consultative Committee shall adopt such other rules of procedure as it sees fit.
- (2) The costs of the Consultative Committee, including the costs of special inspection pursuant to Annex 4, shall be borne by the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation. It may seek special funding should this be required.

ANNEX 4: COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE

- (1) A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall, before bringing such a complaint to the Director, bring the subject matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the latter reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter.
- (2) If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring the complaint to the Director with a request that the consultative Committee be convened to consider it. Complaints shall be supported by an account of evidence of breach of obligations known to the complainant Party. Upon receipt of a complaint the Director shall convene the Consultative Committee as quickly as possible to consider it.
- (3) The Consultative Committee, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1, shall afford the Party complained of a reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation of the matter.

(4) If, after considering any explanation given to by the representatives of the Party complained of, the Consultative Committee decides that there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant a special inspection in the territory of that Party or elsewhere, the Consultative Committee shall direct that such special inspection be made as quickly as possible by a special inspection team of three suitably qualified special inspectors appointed by the Consultative Committee in consultation with the complained of and complainant Parties, provided that no national of either Party shall serve on the special inspection team. If so requested by the Party complained of, the special inspection team shall be accompanied by representatives of that Party. Neither the right of consultation on the appointment of special inspectors, nor the right to accompany special inspectors, shall delay the work of the special inspection team.

(5) In making a special inspection, special inspectors shall be subject to the direction only the Consultative Committee and shall comply with such directives concerning tasks, objectives, confidentiality and procedures as may be decided upon by it. Directives shall take account of the legitimate interests of the Party complained of in complying with its other international interests of the Party complained of in complying with its other international obligations and commitments and shall not duplicate safeguards procedures to be undertaken by the IAEA pursuant to agreements referred to in Annex 2(1). The special inspectors shall discharge their duties with due respect for the laws of the Party complained of.

(6) Each party shall give to special inspectors full and free access to all informatin and places within its territory which may be relevant to enable the special inspectors to implement the directives given to them by the consultative committees.

(7) The party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the special inspection, and shall grant to special inspectors privileges and immunities necessary of the performance of their functions, including inviolability for all papers and documents and immunity from arrest, detention and legal process for acts done and words spoken and written, for the purpose of the special inspection.

(8) The special inspectors shall report in writing as quickly as possible to the Consultative committee, outlining their activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by them, with supporting evidence and documentation as appropriate, the stating their conclusions. The Consultative Committee shall report fully to all Members of the south Pacific Forum, giving its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty.

(9) If the Consultative Committee has decided that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, or at any time at the request of either the complainant or complained of Party, the Parties shall meet promptly at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum.

DRAFT PROTOCOLS

(The following drafts protocols involve countries that are not members of the South Pacific Forum. They were therefore not adopted at the same time as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Consultations will be held with those countries, and the Forum will further consider the adoption of the Protocols at its next meeting in 1986, or earlier if practicable).

Protocol 1

The Parties to this Protocol
NOTING the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)
HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it is internationally responsible situated within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the prohibitions contained in Article 3,5 and 6, insofar as they relate to the manufacture, stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device within those territories, and the safeguards specified in Article 8(2)(c) and Annex 2 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

Each party may, by written notification to the depository, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligations under this protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

This protocol shall be open for signature by France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 4

This protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall enter into force for each state on the date of its deposit with the depository of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at _____, this _____ day of _____, One thousand nine hundred and eighty-_____, in a single original in the English language.

Protocol 2

The Parties to Protocol
NOTING the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)
HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty or its Protocols by Parties to them.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party further undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against:

- (a) Parties to the Treaty; or
- (b) any territories within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.

ARTICLE 3

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alternation to its obligations under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 6

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Government, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at _____, this _____ day of _____, One thousand nine hundred and eighty - _____, in a single original in the English language.

Protocol 3

The Parties to this Protocol.

NOTING the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alternation to its obligation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the treaty.

ARTICLE 3

The Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 5

This protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Government, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at _____, this _____ day of _____, One thousand nine hundred and eighty - _____, in a single original in the English language.