

The Anti-Mulki Agitation in Andhra Pradesh,
(1972-73)

By


K. Nalini Rao

1976

A dissertation submitted in Partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the M. Phil Degree of the
(Centre for Political Studies, School of Social
Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

SUPERVISOR

CHAIRMAN



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

PROF. C.P. BHAMBHRI
CHAIRMAN
CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES.

Gram-JAYENU
Telephone:
New Mehrauli Road,
NEW DELHI-110057.

To

The Dean,
School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
NEW DELHI.

Dear Sir,

Mrs. Nalini Rao is submitting her M.Phil thesis on "The Anti-Mulki Agitation in Andhra Pradesh (1972-73) under Dr. K. Seshadri". Since Dr. Seshadri is out of the country his signature on the thesis are not available. He has written to me an official letter that he approves the submission of thesis.

You are requested to accept it.

Yours sincerely,


(C.P. BHAMBHRI)

CONTENTS

Perface

Introduction 1

1. The Mulki Rules and the course of the Andhra Agitation. 16

2. The Role of Political Parties 41

3. The Legal background in the Mulki dispute 71

4. Conclusion 80

Bibliography 93-97

PREFACE

Acknowledgements:

This study forms a part of the M. Phil programme of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The research for the completion of this work was undertaken at the Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences under the Supervision of Prof. K. Seshadri.

My grateful thanks to Prof. Seshadri for his help and interest in my work, and his patience in bearing with my shortcomings.

My special thanks to Prof. C.P. Bhabri, without whose help this dissertation would not have been submitted.

My thanks are, in the main, due to the countless friends in Andhra Pradesh, who gave me so much of their time and actively helped in collecting the material needed for my research. My special thanks to Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, who readily agreed to be interviewed and spoke freely and frankly on the subject. Also to the many students, teachers, political workers, lawyers, doctors and peasants, who spent long hours in conversation with me, at Warangal, Hyderabad, Vijayawada and the neighbouring villages, and at Andhra University, Waltair. Their contribution to this study has been invaluable.

Any shortcomings in this study, despite the valuable help from all the people associated with me, are entirely my responsibility.

The Research Problem:

Since the Linguistic Re-organisation of the Indian Sub-continent, there have been several separatist agitations, some of which have been successful, whilst others have not. The case of Andhra Pradesh is particularly interesting because here this agitational phenomenon continues upto the present.

The problem is posed within the framework of the Marxist understanding on national movements. Marxist theory requires that in the investigation of any social question, the examination of events must be within definite historical limits, and distinguishing features of a given problem, from others in the same historical epoch, must be given due importance.

Thus we must distinguish between the 2 stages of capitalism in studying national movements. During the first stage (the progressive struggle against feudalism) the national movements draw all classes of the people into politics and during the second stage (fully formed capitalism) there is developed the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the mass of the toiling people.

However in a country whose state system combines pre-capitalist with capitalist forms a region which can claim rapidly developing capitalism becomes antagonistic to the pre-capitalistic system.

Such an antagonism would result in a demand for the Separation of the progressive region from the whole. Here lies the difference between countries where bourgeois-democratic reforms have been completed and countries where they have not.¹

Marx had considered the separation of an oppressed nation a step forward, not towards a split but towards concentration, both political and economic, but concentration on the basis of democracy.²

The purpose of this study was to attempt an explanation of the anti-Mulki agitation within this theoretical framework, since this agitation presents us with a movement not by the oppressed or backward region, but a movement for the separation of the more advanced region.

Methodological Note:

The Anti-Mulki agitation has been approached in a socio-historical framework, so as to go beyond just a description of a political event and facilitate analysis. I have relied on the Marxist method based on the materialistic conception of human history, where the mode of production influences existing social relations. If social relations are in contradiction with the mode of production then change must occur. But social change can take 2 forms—progressive

-
1. Lenin V.I. The National Liberation Movement in the East PP 83, Moscow 1952.
 2. Marx K. - Letters to Engels of June 7th and 20, 1866 and November 2nd and 30, 1867.

or reactionary.

The mode of production determines the level of economic development of the state so that we may characterise its social relations correctly. Social relations indicate the role of classes, as the conscious makers of history. In the case of India, we see both capitalist and pre-capitalist economic formations, reflected in the super structure in the form of a multi-national state under the control of the big bourgeoisie.

A historic-economic study of national movements has revealed, that in the period of the successful struggle of capitalism over feudalism the bourgeoisie has to capture the home market for which there must be politically united territories whose population speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language overcome. Multi-national states are therefore an indicator of economic and social backwardness in the development of capitalism.

One can now see the importance of the leadership of a movement for self determination or autonomy in terming it a peoples movement leading to social change. If the social class in the leadership doesnot represent the interests of the mass of the people such an agitation can only have a limited objective.

There has been a major problem in analysing the researched material due to my inability to speak and read Telugu. As most of the material was published in Telugu, I have had to rely on translations, which always lose some of the veracity.

I am grateful to Mrs. K. Varalakshmi Rao, and Ashok Rao for the translation.

Bibliographical Note:

The substantive sources of this study are:

1. Pamphlets and circulars, in Telugu, which were circulated by both the separatists and the integrationists, in the course of the agitation.
2. Personal interviews with all the leaders of the agitation, well-known political figures in Andhra Pradesh, and people from all walks of life, both in urban and rural centres.
3. Daily Newspapers reports covering the period of the agitation.
4. Background material on social and economic history is referred to in the bibliography.

Format and Structure:

The presentation of the study follows from the needs of the theoretical exposition.

The introduction provides the socio-historical background to the situation in Andhra Pradesh to see its influence on the problem under discussion.

The first chapter deals with the Mulki problem both, before and since the integration of the two regions of the state. It then goes on to detail the agitation itself, to throw light on the socio-political and economic factors in the context of which the agitation developed.

The second chapter concerns itself with the Political history of the Congress, and the Role of Political Parties in the development of democratic politics in Andhra Pradesh. The aim of this chapter to indicate the impact of the political leadership on events in the course of agitation.

The third chapter covers the legal argument which formed the basis of the controversy regarding the Mulki Rules and their application in the state. Both the integrationists and Separatists based their conflicting claims on constitutional validity, although the course of the legal argument has not been entirely consistent.

The fourth chapter functions as a conclusion, taking into account interpretations of the agitation, based on my investigations and stating the results of this study.

(K. NALINI RAO)

INTRODUCTION

The Anti-Mulki Agitation (1972-73) which grew into a demand for the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh into the Andhra and Telangana regions, once again brought into focus the political instability of the state. In the course of the five months of the agitation, 300 lives were lost, with countless numbers injured. All sections of the middle class, and particularly the professionals, participated in the agitation, which did not draw the working class or the peasantry into the separatist movement.¹ Administration and public life were at a standstill; communications were disrupted; Non-gazetted officers struck work for 108 days, and with the co-operation of the gazetted officers, were able to paralyse the services. Schools, colleges and other educational institutions were closed and students were active in participating in all the separatist programmes. Hospitals were shut down, and doctors ran free clinics. A successful no-tax campaign was run for two months, and the cumulative loss to the exchequer during the agitation was about 2 crores per month. In the 12 districts comprising the Andhra region all Panchayat Samitis, Municipal Councils, Bar Association, Chamber of Commerce and a significant number of Members of the Legislature supported the call for the separation of the state. A separate flag was also hoisted in the separatist

1. Defeat Separatist Conspiracy in Andhra Pradesh: CRajeshwara Rao C.P.I. Publication. PP 21. Also interviews with peasants in Krishna District, June 1973.

strong holds at the height of the agitation.

The Supreme Court decision revalidating the Mulki Rules on October 3rd created a fear amongst the Andhras in the capital city, that they would be asked to leave at any time.² The NGO's felt that at no time had there been an unbiased attempt at solving the problems that had arisen as a result of the integration of the services. It was said that due to the agitational approach of the Telangana region, the Government had given undue consideration to their problems because all their demands after the 1969 agitation had been conceded. The Telangana seperatists were of the opinion that Andhra Pradesh had been formed in the interest of the Andhras, who were destroying the legal and constitutional rights of the people of Telangana, and the Mulki Rules was one such privilege.

The Andhra NGO's had warned that the problems raised by the Mulki Rules were not only limited to the number of gazetted posts that would be lost to the Andhras, which meant more concessions to Telangana. It was argued that Telangana was being developed at the cost of Andhra. The State and Central Governments, however, made the implementation of the Mulki Rules Act a pre-condition to any serious dialogue on the grievences of the people of the two regions.

2. Interview with I.B. Ramakrishna Rao, President, NGO's Association (Andhra Region), Vijayawada, June 1973.

Deliberate over-simplifications, such as that the Mulki-Non-Mulki problem arose from the fact of some 300 to 400 gazetted posts, added to the aggravation of these who held the separatist view.³

Whilst the NGO's were agitated over the question of government service, particularly in the Capital city, the students were drawn into the agitation on the question of educational facilities, which were the best in the Capital. Despite the commonly held belief that the separatist agitation was engineered by landlords, rice millers and other vested interests, the educated and professional groups felt that the problems raised by this agitation reflected genuine difficulties of the people of the state. For this reason, they found the Prime Ministers 5 point formula unacceptable and from the end of November to the Middle of January, events took a violent turn, where the state Government had to call in the army and the Central Reserve Police to maintain law and order, and finally led to the installation of presidents Rule in the state.

The 5 point formula essentially extended the scope of the Mulki Rules whilst remaining vague as to the duration of the safeguards for the Telangana region, in terms of the policy of the Government, to bridge the gap between the two regions of the state. The definition of a Mulki was also left open to interpretation, and the appeal to leave the capital city as a free zone, was rejected. The Andhra separatists felt that the decisions had favoured the

3. Ibid.

TeLANGANA region once again and they would be only second class citizens in their capital city.

To understand the problem of regional imbalances, and to have a scientific understanding of a recurring political problem in Andhra Pradesh, one must view this agitational phenomena in the light of the development of the nationalities in India,

Theoretical Aspects:

The Indian Union, in the post independence period, is composed of various nationalities, major and minor, subscribing to a single political state. The Multi-nationality of Indians is a Historical reality, which was sought to be modified by the superimposition of Imperialism on the existing national pattern, to serve the interests of the colonisers.⁴

The nation, as a political entity, is a term of common usage in modern times, although a commonly acceptable definition has not emerged. Marxists have generally followed Stalin's definition in his "Marxism and the National Question" that " a nation is a historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make up, manifested in a community of culture". A nationality or a group of nationalities develop into a nation with the transformation from feudalism to capitalism where a popular or national

4. Karat Prakash, Social Scientist, No. 37, Aug. '75

consciousness develops as a result of the completion of the bourgeois democratic tasks.⁵ In the countries of Europe this meant the ability of the up-and-coming Bourgeoisie to free the economy of its feudal fetters. In the colonised countries, since they were drawn into the capitalist network under imperial rule, the national task also included national liberation, and the completion of the democratic revolution, which was essentially anti-feudal in character.

Seen in this context, a nationality can be defined as a historical community with its own language, territory, common culture and rudimentary economic ties.⁶ The transformation from nationality to nation formation can thus be seen to depend on the degree of success, in overcoming pre-capitalist relations, which hinder the free development of the market, which is the first school of nationalism.

The Indian National Movement:

In the case of India, its geographical isolation and super-imposition of the Brahminical culture, have created the impression of "oneness" in the sub-continent.⁷ This consciousness was heightened during the national movement for independence. Can one then say that India is a nation? Definitionally, we must answer in the negative, since the India sub-continent does not fulfill either the requirement

5. Stalin, J, *Marxism and the National Question*, Moscow 1912.

6. Karat Prakash, *Social Scientist* No. 37 Aug'75.

7. Habib I, *Emergence of Nationalities*, *Social Scientist*, No. 37 August 1975.

of a common language or a common culture. The national movement did play a dual role in the development of regional consciousness. On the one hand, it invoked loyalty to the Indian motherland in the struggle against the British; on the other, because of the necessity for mass support, politicalisation was injected into the regional literature, to lay the foundations for nationality consciousness; but the regional consciousness was always sought to be subjugated under the pressure of patriotism.⁸

It is clear that no one Indian nationality had ever played the role of an oppressor nationality, before or since 1947. However, the rising middle and small bourgeoisie have used the nationality slogans like linguistic redivision of the sub-continent, regional reservations, preference for the sons of the soil etc. as tools in their struggle against the all India bourgeoisie, to win a place for themselves in the political and administrative structure of the sub-continent.⁹

The big bourgeoisie, on the other hand requires greater centralisation which, when based on a stagnant economy, acts as a fetter on the expansion of the productive forces, with the result that the weaker and more backward sections and regions are made to bear the burden of the high cost of development both in human and material terms.¹⁰

8. Harrison Selig S. India-The Dangerous Decade pp 297(O.U.P.)

9. Ibid pp 5-6.

10. Character of the Indian State, Indian School of Social Sciences,, Trivandrum. Also see Roy A. India and Tsarist Russia, Social Scientist No.37 Aug'75 pp 29.

The national question (or the movement for linguistic states in India) can now be seen as an off-shoot of the wider social question: the realisation of the democratic revolution. Since urban capital in India has always backed rural vested interests, we can also see the close links between the upliftment of the peasant masses and the development of national consciousness. These vested interests, both rural and urban, unable and unwilling to come to a radical solution of the socio-economic problems, have often resorted to separatist movements, like the D.M.K. in Tamil Nadu, the T.P.S. in Telangana and the Andhra Senas in the Andhra region. These movements came in the face of the rising unity of the mass of the people in the face of economic misery. The vested interests used separatist movements to divert the attention of the people from the root causes of the problems of their daily life.¹¹

Demand for a Separate Andhra State:

The early demand for a separate Andhra State cannot be classified as a national demand because it did not include the Telugu speaking majority in Hyderabad State.¹² The Congress had led the movement for a separate Andhra State from the composite Madras State, but it was the united C.P.I. which mobilised the people behind the extended slogan for a Visal Andhra, including the nine Telugu speaking districts of the Telangana area.

11. E.M.S. Nambodiripad: New Age, June '53 pp 20-22.

12. Harrison Selig S, India- The Dangerous Decade: (O.U.P.)

Theoretically, the Congress had always viewed the demand for linguistic states as fissiparous, but within the party itself, there was a demand for a linguistic re-organisation, which paved the way for the creation of the Andhra State, despite the leadership not being very anxious to concede the demand for separation.¹³

The National Congress, being an All India party, did not operate on the basis of linguistic identities and local problems. It was only after it became evident that mass contact could not be established through a centralised "National Party", that the Congress was reorganised into linguistic units and the redivision of the Indian sub-continent into linguistic states was accepted "in principle".

The Andhra State had been in the process of formation for a number of years, but the Congress had shown a lack of foresight and no serious thinking was given to the problem of regional imbalances within the state. This fact, of regional imbalances, was to become both a historical and political liability in later years.¹⁴

The Andhra movement for statehood had two facets. On the one hand there was the antagonism between the Tamils and the Telugus, because the Tamils were the more prosperous of the two nationalities, and on the other the

13. K.V. Narayen Rao, Emergence of Andhra Pradesh, Popular Prakashan '73.

14. Interview with P.V. Narasimha Rao, New Delhi June 1974.

reservations in the minds of the leadership of the Rayalseema area, and later of the Telangana area, with regard to their future in a State controlled economically and politically by the leadership from the coastal area. That this fear was not only academic, is clearly seen in the fact that the regional issue was so successfully exploited in subsequent years by the dissidents within the congress, as well as the opposition parties, since Andhra has had uninterrupted Congress rule since the inception of the State.¹⁵

Telangana Problem:

Within this background must be fitted in the problem of Telangana, where the Telugu people had been under the yoke of the Nizam. The Congress party viewed the Telangana problem in a negative way; having broken up the Nizam's tri-lingual state, there were two possibilities: accession to the Indian Union or responsible government. The decision for the unification of all the Telugu speaking districts was to be taken only after the full implications of the strength of the opposition in the two regions of the state had been assessed. It would also reflect on the future of the other two components of the tri-lingual Nizams State.¹⁶

-
15. Harrison Selig S, Caste and the Andhra Communists, American Political Science Review, July 1956 and Interview with J. Bassevapunniah at Vijayawada 1973 June.
16. Interview with P.V. Narasimha Rao, New Delhi ^{June} '74 and M. Bassevapunniah, Vijayawada June '73.

The Congress was not inclined to consider the problems of the Andhra State, since it had been immediately faced with the armed uprising of the peasantry of the Telangana Region, and the range and influence of the united C.P.I., which had succeeded in mobilising the peasantry of the entire state on a common programme of land reforms. ¹⁷

In the case of Andhra, the Congress had gone against its own desire to postpone the linguistic reorganisation of the states only because the demand for a separate Andhra had become a cardinal issue in the 1951 elections. The J.V.P. report had clearly indicated the conditions under which linguistic reorganisation would be possible. The situation was precipitated due to the fast unto death of Sriramalu, a leading Congressman.

The Role of the Congress:

Once the Andhra State came into being in 1953, the Congress factions which had been latent during the struggle for Visala Andhra came into the open over matters of policy and ministerial posts. This has been a constant trend of uninterrupted Congress rule in the State, with the result that no major socio-economic changes were effected in the State. In this light, it becomes clear that agreements like the Sri Bagh Pact and the Gentlemen's Agreement were only levers in the struggle for power, having neither legal nor constitutional backing, and solely dependent on the integrity of the signatories.¹⁸ The tussle over the location of the capital of the newly formed state, the High Court and a rival to the Andhra University, makes it quite evident that here again the attempt was to keep alive regionalism.

17. New Age Nov. '55. Details are pursued in fairly detailed reportage of events in New Age during the Period Jan.-June '55.

18. Interviews with M. Bassavapunniam, Vijawada June 1973.

as a measure of strength for individual leaders in their struggle to secure a foot hold in the power structure of the newly formed state.¹⁹ Another significant factor was also the Kamma - Reddy rivalry, which is said to be as old as Telugu folk lore. The Kammass, with their stronghold in the delta districts, were the leaders in political activity. They were the first to mobilise behind the non-brahmin movement, and subsequently, with the communists in the course of the anti-congress movement since the congress was dominated by the Brahmins and the Reddys. However, after the 1955 elections, Kamma support, in the main, was channelised back into the Congress, since the Communist programme was not likely to serve their interests. Some researchers have mentioned the Kamma support to the Communists a factor of Kulak support, but they have not seen the equal importance of the concentration of agricultural labourers, who have been the bedrock of the Communist parties in the region. It is this factor which is more responsible for the anti-congressism of the Kamma's being overcome.²⁰

The Reddy's have been the backbone of the Congress, under a Brahmin facade. This may be a factor in explaining the degree to which the Rayalseema and Telangana areas were seeking accommodation with the Circar area, whilst no mention of the backward regions of the coastal area was made. Whilst in the initial years the Reddi's had been content to operate under the leadership of the Brahmins, in later years they combined with the Velamas to confront the Brahmin leadership of the Congress.

19, Harrison S. Jada - The Dangerous Decade O.U.P.

20. New Age Nov. '55 and Economic Survey of A.P. - NCAERT

Telangana Separatist Movement:

The Telangana movement was a reflection of the inability of the Congress leadership to come to terms with the developmental problems of the state. The Brahmananda Reddy Ministry had brought the State to a financial standstill, so occupied was it with containing and combating the dissident factions within the ruling party, who had been kept out of office for one reason or another. The situation had reached such a pass, that in June 1969 even the Rayalseema region backed up the Telangana agitation, by demanding redress of their grievances within a six month period.²¹ Both the Telangana and Rayalseema demands focused attention on the question of regional backwardness. Their weakness lay in the fact that they saw the solution to their developmental problems only through the safeguards, and therefore they were in confrontation with their own people. It was during the fifth month of the Telangana agitation that the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment Act, a part of the safeguards relating to requirement of residence in recruitment to government service, was struck down by the Supreme Court on the grounds of being unconstitutional, and the fate of the Mulki Rules hung in the balance.

The Congress governments had always considered the Gentlemen's Agreement a mere scrap of paper, a lever for disunity within the State. But this agreement had become the basis for discussion, if any political solution was to be arrived at to stop the fast disintegration of the State, which had once been in the vanguard of the linguistic movement. Instead the Telangana agitation for separation was viewed in the light of

21. New Age Jan.-June '69.

a law and order problem, to be settled by the army and the police. These methods hardened extremist attitudes, and once the various anti-Reddy factions lent their open support to the agitation, the Telangana Separatist Movement became an extremely serious move towards the bifurcation of the state.

The basis for the emotional involvement of the people in this movement lay in the fact that in the 12 years of uninterupted Congress Rule there had been no significant attempt at implementing land-reform and providing credit and inputs to the peasantry, without which there could be no progress in the state. On the other hand, the policy of prohibition in the Andhra Region added to the unpopularity of the Government, whilst resulting in revenue losses of the value of Rs. 30 crores which were being off-set with the help of increased taxation, wagefreeze and retrenchment, under the guise of an economy drive. This was a policy that effected a large number of NGO's and salaried employees.²²

The State Government did not implement important developmental projects like the Pochampad Project and rural electrification on the plea of paucity of funds. The Central Government also starved the State for developmental expenditure. Added to the economic problems, was the political crisis both in the state and the country. The National Congress was splitting on the question of the tactics to be employed to meet the growing economic stagnation in the country. The democratic movement was

split also on the question of the role of the Congress Government in the country. As a result, the separatist forces were able to arouse the emotions of the people and demand the resignation of the Brahmananda Reddy Ministry and the imposition of Presidents rule to seek time to work out a political solution.

The resulting solution was again an accord between the Prime Minister and M. Chenna Reddy, the leader of the Separatist Movement and the Telangana Praja Samiti. The main point of this agreement was to give an independent basis for political leverage to Telangana, without going into the reasons for and the solution of, the backwardness of the state in any new form. It still visualised separate functions for the two regions, which only added to the feeling of disunity.

The Andhra Separatist Movement can be said to have had its beginnings in the unresolved problems left in the wake of the Telangana accord. Since the Telanga accord was arrived at in the background of the Congress split and the need to mobilise support for Mrs. Gandhi against the opposition Congress, it was felt that without the T.P.S. the Congress could not form a Ministry in Andhra Pradesh.²³ It was also realised that the regional issue was still alive due to the lack of economic, social and political integration between the different regions of the state, and individual leaders created their factions on the basis of the regional issue to come to terms with their political rivals.

23. Hugh Gray, Asian Survey, April 74 vol. XIV, No4.

It becomes almost self-evident to state that the solution to the problem of regionalism in Andhra Pradesh can-not lie in assurances that safeguards should and must be implemented, but in a programme against unemployment, for land reforms and the ending of landlord oppression. It is this fact which explains why even the stronger section of the state came forward with a separatist demand, which is in itself a theoretical anomaly.

...

Chapter I

The Mulki Rules and the Course of the Andhra Agitation

In 1919, The Nizam, Mir Osman Ali, abolished the post of the Prime Minister and set up an executive council to assist him in matters of administration. The Council was headed by Sir Ali Imam, a Bihari. Upto this time, no attention had been given to the problem of the Civil service, which had no precise rules for recruitment.

Under Imam's guidance, the Hyderabad Civil Service Regulation, 132 8 F, to ensure fair and adequate opportunities to the people of the region, was issued. Rule 39 of this regulation, for the first time, made a residential requirement essential for non-natives. This was to make them on par with the natural born subjects. There was no mention of the word Mulki in this regulation.¹

Due to the deteriorating service conditions (from 1913 to 1934 82 officers were recruited, but none was from Telangana), the Mulki Rules in their present form were promulgated (1354 F), as an appendix to the above service rules.

After Independence the Telangana region received a large number of Civil Servants, deputed from other

1. Article by M. Narayana Reddy, M.L.A. Deccan Chronicle, November 20, 1972.

areas, to assist in tonning up the local administration. This arrangement continued for a longer time than was envisaged in the begining, so that in 1952, about 5,000 Non-mulki's had managed to secure employment in the Telangana region. In the wake of the Non-Mulki agitation of 1952, it was strongly represented that Telangana should not be included in the new Andhra Pradesh and the States Re-organisation Commission was also inclined to this view.²

The States re-organisation Commission however included the option for the Telangana region to merge with the Andhra region after a period of 5 years, if desired. Subsequently, an agitation was started in the Andhra region for one Telugu state, with assurances from the leading Congressmen of the Andhra region that the safeguards desired by the people of Telangana in the matters of education and employment, would be seriously implemented.

In a speech to the Andhra assembly on 25-11-55, B. Gopala Reddi, the Chief Minister, gave unilateral and unqualified support for the Telangana safeguards, without any distinction as to reservations for superior or subordinate services.³

At the same time, however, J.V. Narsing Rao, a leader from Telangana and signatory of the Gentlemens Agreement, declared that any forced merger would lead to perpetual conflict, therefore, since 80% of the population of the region was for a separate state, he did not advocate a

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

dogmatic view against two Telugu speaking states. In January, 1956, S.K. Patil was sent to ascertain the feelings of the people, as well as to report of the political situation in the state. He also recommended two separate states.

Whilst the separatists were mobilising their supporters, the integrationists were able to reach an agreement with the Telangana leadership in which two important conditions regarding recruitment to the services were stipulated.

- a) that recruitment would be made on the basis of the the two regions and
- b) that some kind of domicile rules would be prescribed to ensure that the correct proportions were maintained.

However, problems were not long in arising. The note submitted to the Home Ministry mentioned reservations upto the level of the subordinate services or the non-gazetted posts, whilst the agreement did not make any such distinction.⁴

When the enlarged state of Andhra Pradesh came into being on 1.11.56, the Mulki Rules were adapted by the State government, in accordance with the states reorganisation Act, read with article 372 of the Constitution. The Mulki Rules were to be applied to all offices, including the Secretariat and all composite offices. There was no controversy on the subject at that time. The Mulki Rules were repealed in 1959 and the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment Act was promulgated, as a replacement.

4. Ibid.

Needless to say, there were many and frequent infringements of the safeguards, which had formed the basis for the integrated state. In January 1969, the Telangana students began an agitation for the implementation of the safeguards in Khammam district, but within a month the demand had escalated into a separatist agitation. The Chief Minister Brahmananda Reddy called a meeting of all parties, and the dispute was solved under what came to be known as the "all parties accord". It was established and accepted that there had been lapses in the strict implementation of the safeguards, and a government order was issued to this effect. However, this order was challenged by a section of employees from the Andhra region and was finally referred to the Supreme Court which quashed the government order and struck down the Public Employment rules, resulting in the abolition of all safeguards. The Supreme Court had argued that no reservations were justified until article 16(3) of the Constitution was amended.⁵ The Central Government was not in a position to make the necessary amendment since the Congress did not have the two-thirds majority in Parliament. Besides, there was the precedent of the Golaknath ruling, which forbade any amendment of fundamental rights.

As an alternative, the Prime Minister announced the 8 point formula, and appointed the Wanchoo Committee to study the problems of the Mulki Rules. This committee was of the opinion that the Mulki Rules did not become valid only because the law that replaced the original

5. Refer to Chapter III.

Mulki Rules had ceased to exist. Also that Parliament was not competent to enact legislation relating to special reservations until article 16(3) was amended. This committee suggested regionalisation and decentralisation of the services. However, the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on 9.12.1970, revalidating the Mulki Rules, once again raised a live controversy. The state government made known its decision to stand by the High Court ruling, without giving any leadership in coming to a just solution of the grievances of the service personnel.

It is worth noting that the Telangana Praja Samiti, which had merged with the Congress (R) on 18.9.1971, had made the implementation of the Mulki Rules a necessary condition of its merger, and this fact was accordingly mentioned in the election manifesto of the Congress. However, on 18.2.1972, the High Court set aside its earlier ruling and declared the Mulki Rules invalid. The state government, on the advice of the Centre, pledged itself to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Chief Minister, P.V. Narshima Rao was hopeful that the Supreme Court decision would be a final solution to the problem of integration. It is clear that the Congress was not able to work out a political solution and the dispute was hoped to be resolved within the existing framework of safeguards, as was evident from the Prime Minister's election speech in Warrangal, in 1972. To put it briefly, the Mulki Rules had been conceived of in the nature of a protective measure for a major underdeveloped region of the state. From the

inception of the state, the Andhra leadership had been eager, even anxious, to assure the Telangana leadership of their willingness to accommodate the backward region, the government of the composite state had proclaimed its policy decision to implement the safeguards within the framework of an integrated state, and there had been no objections from any quarter in the initial years.

The Supreme Court judgement, validating the Mulki Rules on October 3, 1972, reopened the problem of safeguards which had stood in the way of integration between the two major regions of the state. The Supreme Court decision was based on the understanding that the Mulki Rules were valid at the time of the commencement of the constitution, and would continue to be valid until Parliament amended or repealed them. The states Re-organisation Act could not be considered such an amendment.

Since the Mulki Rules applied to recruitment to the civil service, the N.G.O.'s and even the gazetted officers were naturally concerned about their future, since the capital city happened to be in the Telangana region, and for all practical purposes Hyderabad City was considered to belong to the Telangana region.⁶ I.B. Ramakrishna Rao, the President of the Andhra region N.G.O.'s association declared that thirty million Andhras were being deprived off their right to seek employment in their capital city. He suggested that Hyderabad should be left as a free zone with regard to education and employment in all the composite offices. The N.G.O.'s wanted to show

6. Mystery of Telangana Surpluses, A.P. NGO's Association, Hyderabad.

that they were willing to accommodate the Telanga fears of being submerged by the Andhras, but educational facilities were the best in Hyderabad and government employment was in demand with the educated middle class of both regions. A UNI survey of unemployment based on employment exchange data revealed that educated unemployed on the live registers in Andhra Pradesh had risen from 3,24,797 in September, 1971 to 3,60,662 in September, 1972. A survey of employment opportunities revealed that the employment situation had been virtually stagnant since March, 1969, in the central government and private sectors. Only employment under the state government had risen and that in the public sector. Here lay the causes of student and youth unrest and their dependence on the state government and the public sector for jobs.⁷ On the state government's own admission⁸ there had been stagnation on the economic front, so that the Mulki Rules, in the original form became anomalous and difficult to implement in the state of Andhra Pradesh, which had inherited backwardness and imbalances, but also rich resources. With the N.G.O.'s and the students raising the demand for the abolition of the Mulki Rules, the need for the safeguards for the Telangana region, in the matter of state government employment, was being questioned.

Until October 13, 1972, no decision could be arrived at regarding the problem of the Mulki Rules despite an emergency meeting of the cabinet. In their talks with the Chief Minister and the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, some M.L.A's raised the question of shifting the capital

7. Mulki Tangle in Andhra Pradesh, The Communist Approach by R.B. Gaur, C.P.I. Publication pp. 15-16.

8. Ibid.

from the Telangana region, since the real bone of contention was the Capital city; if that was not an acceptable solution then consideration should be given to bifurcating the state. The Central Government was not in favour of bifurcation, but it did not spell out any alternative, preferring to leave the matter to the judgement of the Andhra Pradesh Government to find a solution.

In the meanwhile, the students raised the slogan for the repeal of Mulki rules, or their modification in the light of the 2:1 formula, and on October 23, at Eluru, the Students Action Committee called a meeting which was attended by the Chief Minister, who walked out of the meeting without conceding to the demands of the students. The next day the strike call was given for the abolition of the Mulki Rules. By October 30, the Andhra and Telangana Ministers had split on the Mulki issue, and likewise the service organisations. The Telangana faction was demanding the implementation of the Mulki Rules in full, with the right to decide the duration of the safeguards. The Andhra faction demanded the abolition of the Mulki Rules, and November 1 was observed as "rights protection day", with a view to forging a genuine alternative to the Mulki Rules. What had to be worked out was the kind of protection that could be offered to the Telangana region and for how long. The N.G.O.'s and the students, although willing for the Prime Minister to work out the modalities of a solution to the problem raised by the Mulki Rules did not attach too much hope to such a form of settlement, since it was commonly felt that the electoral strength of the

Telangana Praja Samiti would lend the Telangana view more weightage in any solution worked out by the centre. In a meeting with B. Gopala Reddi and M. Chenna Reddi, the Prime Minister was advised to keep in mind the importance of the time factor of the safeguards for the Telangana region as well as a definite ratio for state wide services and regionalisation in favour of the Mulki's. Although the leaders of both regions pledged themselves, publicly, to the integrity of the state, their extreme views (the Andhra's for the scrapping of the Mulki rules and the Telanganaites for their implementation in toto) deadlocked the Delhi talks with the Home Minister, Mr. Chavan.

The leadership was quite evenly divided on regional lines at the November 8 meeting of the Cabinet. The points of difference related to the level to which the services should be regionalised, employment rules for the composite offices as well as those which were only limited to Hyderabad, and the time limit for the existence of the safeguards for the Telangana region. The Telangana position was that the posts should be regionalised upto the level below the Head of Department that the Capital should remain in the Telangana region and that the safeguards should be in force as long as the Telangana region felt the need for them. The Telangana representatives were willing to compromise on the status of the capital, if reciprocal employment between the two regions was agreed upon.

The Andhra position was that regionalisation of posts should be effective upto the first gazetted post (Tehsildar), with the 2:1 ratio to apply to all the services that were located in the capital, and a time limit to be fixed beyond which

no safeguards should be necessary or permissible.

In the meanwhile, the students Action Committee met at Bapatla on November 10 to press for the abolition of the Mulki Rules, to pre-empt any political solution that may have been arrived at by the Chief Minister and his colleagues. They also called for the immediate shifting of the technical and agricultural universities from the Telangana to the Andhra region.

Whilst the people pressed for a solution, the Chief Minister deferred the problem by appealing to B. Gopala Reddi to study the situation, since he had been one of the signatories of the Gentlemen's Agreement. The Jana Sangh and the Swtantra party used this time to host public meetings and conventions to popularise the idea of a separate Andhra state, under the banner of the Andhra Praja Parishad, and made every effort to bring violence into the movement. G. Latchanna called for a plebisite for the people so that a truly 'popular' solution could be arrived at.

The Chief Minister had given November 6 as the deadline for negotiating, and this deadline was extended. On November 18, the Vijayawada station was cordoned off, and a bandh was called for on Nov. 20. Processions for separate Andhra and flags depicting the Andhra area began to appear. Number plates on cars were balcked out so that they did not carry the legend 'pradesh'. Railways, communications and Government offices were not allowed to function. The R.T.C. was also obstructed. However, inspite of the agitation being stepped up with weekly bandhs organised by the Joint Action Committee of students and funds being

raised by forced collection and donations from businessmen, the labourers from Telangana who travelled to the coast for the paddy harvest continued to do so without interruption.

Intensification of the agitation was triggered off by the content of the Chief Ministers formula for a solution. He sought to de-link the question of the Mulki rules from that of jobs for the Andhras in Hyderabad, to placate the N. G.O.'s. He gave an assurance on the maintenance of the 2:1 ratio in the services, but in Hyderabad reservations for the Mulkis would continue to exist. Reservations would also exist in the Technical colleges, with a promise to increase and improve facilities for education in both regions. He also stressed the importance of fixing a time limit for the existence of the safeguards, otherwise the problem of integration would last as long as the safeguards did. It is all indicative that the term safeguards was now referred to as protection.

The Telangana reaction to the Chief Ministers formula was extremely adverse. The Andhra leaders were willing to negotiate, although they also found the formula unacceptable. The Chief Minister was able to persuade the Telangana faction to take a flexible view of the period for which safeguards should continue. He was, however, unable to change the views of the Andhra faction regarding the regionalisation of the services and the status of Hyderabad city. Meanwhile, the Centre was ascertaining the opinions of the Legislators of both

regions on the scope of the Mulki Rules, to what extent they should be applicable and until when. Also, suggestions were called for to give the people of the state a sense of participation in the future of the state. With the refusal of the Chief Minister to abolish the Mulki Rules events took a violent turn and the movement which was becoming more and more populist, was still lacking in a proper form of organisation and leadership. The Jana Sangh and the Swatantra Party with the help of the funds they made available for the separatist cause, were able to influence the student section. The N.G.O.'s were anxious to involve the dissident Congressmen in the movement, but until the end of December, no body was willing to openly come forward to assume the leadership. The 'Jai Andhra' movement, as it was popularly called, was developing on two levels, one as the spontaneous and emotional involvement of the people against what they considered to be discrimination and in the face of the repression unleashed by the Central Reserve Police and the Army, which was deployed in the Andhra towns after the November 22, firings at Tenali, Ongol and Adulu. The other was on the level of official negotiations, where politicians of both regions were anxious to strike a hard bargain.

Nov.22, when the student demonstrators were fired at, and two students killed, the Anti-Mulki agitation was transformed into a separatist agitation, as a result of

the heightend emotional atmosphere. The Prime Minister, stated in Parliament that she was seeking the 'least unsatisfactory' solution to the problem, and in the face of this negative approach, ministers from the Andhra region made known their intention to resign from the cabinet, if the solution was not to their liking. The T.P.S. with 101 members in the assembly, declared that the people had twice shown their preference for a separate Telangana, and the only condition under which there could be a united state was if the Mulki Rules were strictly implemented. The Andhra representatives, made known their intention to do away with all protective clauses in the agreements with Telangana by demanding the abolition of the regional committee and separate budget for Telangana, to be replaced by development boards for all backward regions of the state.

By November 23, 15 people had been killed in the agitation, so the Centre had to finalise its thinking on the problem of Andhra Pradesh. The Centre sought to pacify Andhra sentiment by offering two deadlines, one for the application of the Mulki Rules in the Capital and another for the application of the Mulki Rules in the Telangana region. The Capital was the central feature in the dispute between the two regions, therefore, the issue of safeguards was sought to be divided between the region as a whole and the capital. To balance this concession the Andhra region, the applicability of the Mulki Rules was to be extended beyond the scope of the Public Employment Act which meant that it would be extended to include some of the gazetted posts also.

There was a demand for the resignation of the Chief Minister. The Telangana Bandh also resulted in firing and loss of life. The Centre now took the stand that once peace was restored, only then could a solution be worked out between the two regions. Under no circumstance could there be a division of the state.

A.K. Gopalan put forward the 3 point formula in Parliament in the hope of appeasing the agitators. He wanted to ensure that the 2:1 formula would be strictly implemented and this could only be done if legislation was enacted. Employees should be posted to all regions, and this should be the practice in all public corporations and semi-government concerns. The second point dealt with the question of resources, which should be distributed again according to the 2:1 formula regardless of the region from which they were collected. Special allocations were to be made in the case of the backward regions. Thirdly, no mechanical time limit could be considered for the abolition of the safeguards, because the protective measures should continue as long as the situation demanded.

The C.P.I. brought forward the 76 legislators formula which advocated the regionalisation of services and the application of the 2:1 formula in the composite offices, as well as a mutually agreed time limit for the period of regionalisation. This formula also advocated provisions for educational facilities for Andhras in Hyderabad.

With every intensification of the agitation, more confusion resulted from the numerous solutions that had

been put forward. No matter what the merits or the demerits of each formula, it was clear that until the Narshima Rao Ministry was brought down, there was going to be no letting up of the agitation.

The Centre, it was evident, would come up with a solution along the same lines as the Prime Ministers formula for Telangana in 1969. This solution had really not much bearing on the repeal of the Mulki Rules or their implementation. The problem was viewed as one of internal dissatisfaction amongst the different factions within the Congress. Since an agitational approach had been adopted by both groups, certain problems faced by the people of the state had been brought into focus which would have to be dealt with. The question of safeguards was only considered the means to an end. However, the excessive emphasis of all parties concerned regarding the problem of employment, pointed to the importance of the fact of unemployment in the state, and this was probably the motivating factor which drew large sections of the middle class into the agitation, particularly the organised sections. On November 28, the Prime Minister announced her five point formula. It was hoped that the law and order situation created by the agitation would be overcome, once a decisive stand had been taken by the Central leadership. Elaborate precautions were made to maintain law and order in the state, which indicated that there was apprehension about the acceptability of the formula. The important difference between the Telangana

separatist agitation and the Andhra Separatist agitation had been the fact that the former had been directed against the State Government, whereas the latter was directly confronting the Centre. The Telangana leadership were willing to abide by the Prime Minister's formula but the Andhra leadership was not, because there was a common feeling that the Centre favoured the viewpoint of the Telangana region.

The Prime Minister's formula laid down that the Mulki Rules would remain operative in Hyderabad City until 1977, and in the Telangana region until 1980. The reservations of Mulki would now be extended beyond the subordinate staff to include assistant civil surgeons and junior engineers, in the gazetted level. b) in composite offices the Mulki Rules would be applied in the 2:1 ratio. c) Various service cadres would be regionalised upto the first or second gazetted level, to provide adequate avenues for promotion of government servants. d) the existing educational facilities in Hyderabad and the Telangana region would be expanded so that the Mulki Rules would become superfluous. e) In Hyderabad there would be a composite police force, the details of which were to be worked out by the state government, prior to the implementation of the formula.

It was clear that the five point formula was an attempt at seeking adjustment in a situation where the initiative had already passed out of the hands of the Centre. It did not attempt any restructuring of the problem of regional underdevelopment. On November 30, the Students

Action Committee, supported by the Bar Association, Doctors and Junior Engineers, gave a call for an Andhra Bandh, finding the Prime Minister's formula unacceptable. The Telangana region also found the formula wanting. Despite the unfavourable reception given to the formula, by December 1, the Home Ministry began to work on appropriate legislation. The formula reflected the essentials of the Centres thinking on the Andhra situation. There could be no question of bifurcating the state under any circumstances; there would be no change in the leadership of Congress in the state. The Congress held 210 of the 260 seats in the state legislature, and although there had been opposition to P.V. Narshima Rao, he was accepted as Chief Minister because he was a nominee of the Centre. The third point that was sought to be established was that the Centre would not give in to coercion. Nothing was to be gained by pressure. However, the state government suggested amendments to include development boards for the backward regions of the state and the future of the regional committee.

The N.G.O.'s of the Andhra region decided to go on an indefinite strike, as soon as the formula was announced. They were joined by the civil surgeons and junior engineers and other professionals. Latchanna was relieved of his Swatantra party post to devote himself to the work of the Andhra Praja Parishad, which had threatened a no-tax campaign from December 15. The alternative to the 5 point formula was that the integrated state should have no Mulki Rules, or that there should be two states carved out

of the existing state. It was felt that the Prime Minister's formula extended the scope and applicability of the protection for Telangana even beyond what had been visualised by the Gentlemen's Agreement and the Public Employment Act. 'Jai Andhra' flags and buttons were distributed everywhere and December 15 was observed as Martyrs day.

The support for a separate state grew in momentum as 9 ministers resigned from the Cabinet, resulting in a political crisis in the state. The Telangana N.G.O.'s and other professional bodies, as well as the Telangana Praja Samiti backed up the demand for the separation of the state, by assuring its Andhra counterparts that all mutual problems would be "solved within a day", in a friendly spirit.⁹

As events snowballed, with not only unruly mobs setting fire to and destroying public property, where Central property was a special target, even normally law-abiding citizens began to take to the streets, including a large number of women. It was apparent that the state government was no longer able to handle the situation, and was incapable of giving the people any leadership to popularise the 5 point formula. What is surprising is the fact that having been warned by the High Court judgement two years earlier, validating the Mulki Rules, the state government should have been caught

9. Defeat separatist conspiracy in Andhra by C. Rajeshwara Rao, C.P.I. Publication PP 32.

by surprise.

It is claimed that a scheme had been prepared for the regionalisation of the services, but the status of Hyderabad had been a disputable point. The lack of foresight on the part of the state government, coupled with the fact that on May 2nd, 1972 the state government ordered a freeze of transactions in land, and on September 15, the land Ceiling Bill was passed, which was termed 'discriminatory and inhuman' by landed interests, made settlement of the problem very complex.

As the atmosphere became more and more vitiated, other issues like the Telangana surpluses and educational facilities were raised. It was even claimed that because of the subsidy given to Telangana, rural electrification in the coastal areas had been effected. Telangana leadership had come around to accepting the formula if certain amendments were made. The suggested amendments were that the Mulki Rules should apply to all first gazetted posts that were in the direct recruitment category (in the case of composite offices the regional offices would be considered Telangana offices). Secondly Hyderabad, being the only big city in the Telangana region, should be treated as a part of Telangana, and the safeguards should continue for the same length of time as in the rest of the region. All services should be regionalised, except the all-India services, and that the Mulki Rules should be applied with retrospective effect, from the date of the formation of the state. These amendments could be implemented under executive orders, during the period when

the Constitution could be suitably amended.

The Congress party in the state was also divided on regional lines. The dissidents called a meeting at Vijayawada, against the advice of the High Command. The conference was attended by 73 M.L.A.'s and 19 M.L.C.'s. B.V. Subba Reddy was elected the President of the Andhra Congress Karyacharna Samiti to fight for the separation of the state. Only 6 of the 200 Congressmen present at the meeting voted for integration. By December 20th, the Mulki Bill was passed by Parliament, despite strong opposition. The Jana Sangh, the Swatantra party, The D.M.K. the Akali Dal, the Socialist party and the Communist Party (Marxist) opposed the bill, whilst the Communist Party of India supported the bill. Strikes were called in both regions of the state and the separate Andhra flag was hoisted in many areas. The agitation was costing the exchequer 2 crores per month.

On January 17th, 1973, P.V. Narshima Rao resigned as Chief Minister. An ad-hoc committee was set up for the state congress organisation, to replace the High power committee, and it was manned by the opponents of the Chief Minister. The regional issue had been transformed into a party issue.¹⁰ On January 18th, President's rule was proclaimed in the state for a period of six months, and was later extended in the September, since no political solution acceptable to both parties could be arrived at. On December 10th, fourteen months after the popular government had been dismissed, J. Vengala Rao took over as the Chief Minister of the state.

10. Hugh Gray, Asian Survey, April 1974 14:4

The Congress had hoped that in the six month period of Presidents rule it would have been able to mobilise support for the five point formula, so that popular rule could be restored. In a rally in Hyderabad the T.P.S. and the non-communist opposition rejected the five point formula, although Chenna Reddy had assured the Prime Minister that he would not mobilise public opinion against the formula or start a counter agitation. The hard core separatists apart, even leaders like B.V. Subba Reddy paid lip service to the five point formula, whilst assuring the people that the Mulki Rules were on the way out, and the revenues of the capital would be available for the benefit of the Andhra region as well. They were also opposed to the regionalisation of the services. After consultations with the leaders of the state, and central leaders, the five point formula was slightly amended. It called for:

(a) accelerated development of the backward regions of the state, and planned development of the capital. There was to be a planning board at the state level with sub-committees for the different regions.

(b) recommended the institution of uniform arrangements throughout the state so that local candidates would get preference in the matter of admissions to educational institutions. As part of the plan to augment educational facilities, a new central university was to be set up in Hyderabad.

(c) Subject to the requirements of the state as a whole, local candidates would be given preference in the case of direct recruitment to non-gazetted posts other than for the composite offices and the police force (ii) corresponding posts in local bodies and (iii) the first level in the gazetted posts.

(d) along with the administrative reforms, a high powered tribunal to deal with grievances arising from service problems was to be set up, whose decisions would be binding on the state Government. It was hoped that this would minimise recourse to the judiciary.

(e) the constitution would be amended to give the President enabling powers to implement the above reforms.

(f) these changes would render the Mulki Rules and the regional committee unnecessary. Mr Rajamallu, chairman of the Telangana Regional Committee and Mr. Rajaram, confidante of the Chief Minister were in the consultations leading to the amended formula. Neither the Centre nor the state Government were willing to own responsibility of the formula, since the centre did not wish to give the impression that it was imposing a solution on the state, and the state Government did not wish to mediate in the conflict between the centre and the dissidents. The regional issue was clouded by the party issue.

The Chenna Reddy group was totally opposed to the new formula, but Chokka Rao tried to mobilise support for giving the formula a try. This again was a reflection of Congress factional politics. On October 2nd, 1973, the Congress

separatists agreed to accept the formula, with clarification being sought on the question of the services. However, the N.G.O. associations of both regions rejected the formula, as well as the professional organisations and the political elements behind the Andhra Sena.

As both sides wanted to study the scope of the new formula and the administrative steps ensure its implementation, the Andhra talks ran into trouble. The centre was reluctant to come out with clear definitions about the employment opportunities for the people of the two regions. The leaders of the agitation were equally keen to press for regionalism at the district and divisional level, to buttress their political positions. The ratio for employment was decided at 70-30 in favour of the local candidates, but just as in the case of the definition of a Mulki, the problem became the definition of a local candidate. Was the Mulki one born in the Telangana region, or was the Mulki one who had lived in the region for 15 consecutive years, with no returning to his place of origin? In the same manner, local could mean many different things.

Politicians of both persuasions, separatists as well as integrationists, wanted to come to a decision regarding the five point formula, because President's rule was not popular in the state and everybody wanted the popular government to be reinstated at the earliest. Raghuramiah, who had the support of the politicians of the coastal region, was asked to mobilise opinion for the formula, and include all the points under dispute or needing further clarification as an appendix to the formula. This would then be endorsed by the

Congress Legislature Party, so that there would be a commitment from all members of the party towards working for an integrated state. The agreement was to be implemented by the new ministry.

The leadership issue, therefore, assumed greater importance, because it would be the task of the new Chief Minister to implement the formula and preserve the integrity of the state. The formula aimed at promoting balanced development in the state, particularly in matters of education, employment and career opportunities in the public services. At no point was there any emphasis on the economic stagnation of the state. The agitation had highlighted the problems of the educated unemployed middle class, backed up by the professionals but their solution was again postponed. The development of backward areas, it was said, could only take place when the planning Commission brought out some specifications regarding the definition of backward area based on some objective factors. The task of defining these objective factors was also left to the popular government. The schemes for such development were to be financed by central as well as state resources. The Chief Minister would therefore have to head the state planning board. The special committees for the different regions would have to be manned by a substantial number of local employees, who would be better acquainted with their problems. The Chief Minister would again be the head of these committees, so that the local power lobbies would have to have his support.

For the planned development of the capital, the formula recommended a development authority, of which the Chief Minister would be the Chairman. It was therefore very urgent that the Congress organisation in the state should be on a proper footing since the agitation had seen the mushrooming of so many groups which did not subscribe to the discipline of the Ad-hoc committee for the state, and without organisational support the Chief Minister would not be able to fulfill his task. On December 10th Vengala Rao took over as Chief Minister, in a volatile atmosphere. The main aim, as visualised by the formula worked out by K.C. Pant and the home Ministry, was to make the safeguards for the Telangana region redundant, over a period of time. The final solution would however depend on the stand the separatist organisations took in the forthcoming elections, since both the students and the NGO's played a vital role in the electoral process.¹¹

11. Ibid.

Chapter II

The Role of Political Parties in the Andhra Separatist Agitation.

Congress:

Since its inception Andhra Pradesh had been under uninterrupted Congress rule. The popularity of the Congress in the state reflected the participation of the Andhra region in the National Movement, led by Gandhi. Again, it was the Andhra region which led in the movement for the linguistic re-organisation of India.

The delta districts have always predominated in the political field, due to their prosperity and the concentration of population. In the pre-independence period, the main threat to the Congress came from the united C.P.I. which broadened the demand for an Andhra homeland, to include the 9 telugu speaking districts of the Nizam's state. The strength of the Communists was a positive factor in bringing together the political leadership of the Congress, who did not have a common understanding or programme to work for. The moment the Communist threat was extinguished, in the wake of the Telangana peasant uprising, and the 1956 election victory, the Congress factions split up to cause disruption of every popular government in the state, resulting in political instability.¹

Politics in Andhra, with 70% of its population dependent

1. Harrison, S.S. "India - the dangerous decades"

on agriculture, have followed the fortunes of its two large peasant proprietor castes, the Kammas and the Reddy's. The Brahmins, except for pockets of control in Telangana, were relegated to a secondary position.²

One reason for the continuing hold of regionalism in the state has been the inability of the state government to overcome the relative backwardness in the state. The first popular government had promised to distribute 2½ acres of land to the families of the Toddy tappers, (a large number of whom had been affected by the prohibition policy of the Government) and to landless labourers. Under the pressure of the landowning lobby, the 30 lac acres under government control were not distributed to the needy. Instead special categories were created, under which land was distributed or was given as land gift to "political sufferers". Often the original cultivators were evicted to make room for the new owners. Peasants were also evicted from Inam villages and divided on regional and caste basis. This was done to accommodate the large scale migration of middle and rich peasants from the Andhra region.³

As a result of the land policy of the government, a non-confidence motion was brought against the Prakasam - Sanjiva Reddy Ministry. The main points of the dispute

2. Dagmar Bernstorff, Asian Survey 13:10, October '73, Pg. 959

3. New Age, October 3, 1955.

were cloaked under regional pressures. The location of the Capital and the High Court became elemental in bringing down the Ministry. The decision to make Kurnool the Capital, as a concession to Reddy sentiment, alienated public opinion, which favoured Guntur or Vijayawada for the capital. The second point of dispute was prohibition policy which was applied only to the Andhra region, resulting in unemployment and loss of revenue. The third point of dispute was the unilateral decision of the government to raise ministerial salaries to rs. 1,000/-, when the assembly had agreed on Rs. 500/-. The issue of Banazar lands vested with the Government, for which the united C.P.I. had carried on a consistent campaign, also featured. The degree of anti-congressism was indicated by the postponement of the district board elections, and direct elections were replaced by indirect elections so that the Congress would not lose its hold on grass root politics.⁴

Personally, both Prakasam and Sanjiva Reddy had not played a consistent role in the politics of the state. Prakasam had been a leader of the Gandhian movement, but he had had a very contradictory relationship with the Congress in Andhra. He had even left the Congress and joined Ranga's Krishak Lok Party, and only the post of Chief Minister lured him back into the Congress.

4. M. Bassavapmmiah, New Age Dec. 19. 1955.

Sanjiva Reddy had been one of the opponents of Vishalandhra, but once the state came into being, he was one of the signatories of the Gentlemens Agreement, and Deputy Chief Minister. Ranga, who had been an important peasant leader, split with the Congress on the location of the Capital and formed the Krishak Lok party, representing the demands of the Kulak lobby. Feedings were also embittered over the location of the High Court (at Guntur) and the plan to build a rival to the Andhra University, in Rayalseema.

For the 1956 elections the united C.P.I. placed the basic economic problems on their manifesto - land reforms and land ceiling, minimum wages, moratorium on rural debt, free primary education, irrigation projects and a united Andhra state with its capital at Hyderabad.

The Congress therefore decided to go into a United Front with all anti-communist forces, since in a house of 196 seats, 132 represented the coastal area where the C.P.I. was strong, due to concentration of agricultural labour, which had been the backbone of the success of the C.P.I. in the region.⁵

The Congress united front consisted of Rangas K.L.P. and the P.S.P., both of which would undermine the Kamma support to the C.P.I. Sanjiva Reddy was very reluctant to participate in the United Front because in his opinion the Kamma landlords were accommodated far in excess of their political strength, but in the face of the Communist threat, he agreed to this form of backdoor entry of the Kammals to the Congress. By 1957, however, the unity of the Congress was again disrupted and factionalism was rampant once more.

5. New Age, December 26, 1955.

Growing unemployment in the state added to increasing violations of the gentlemen's agreement, and the retrenchment drive of the government led to a student agitation in Khammam district in January 1969.⁶ The student wing of the Jan Sangh, the A.B.V.P. led with the slogan for separate Telangana, although it was also backed by Congress dissidents who were in the political wilderness for one reason or another. In April 1969, the Supreme Court struck down the Public Employment Act and all the factions against the Brahmananda Ministry came out openly in support of the separatist movement.

The Deputy Chief Minister, K.V. Ranga Reddy, a signatory of the Gentlemen's Agreement, Achuta Reddy, 1st. Chairman of the Regional Committee, Konda Lakshman, the Information Minister, Chokka Rao, the education Minister, were all for separation. In the leadership of the Congress group was M. Chenna Reddy, who had been disqualified from contesting elections for a period of 6 years for corrupt practices. The main purpose was to topple the Brahmananda Reddy Ministry, and the separatist slogan had tremendous emotional backing in the Telangana region. The separatist leaders also wished to ensure that other dissident groups were not lured into the government camp by the offer of ministries.⁷ The Congress landlord led sections divided up on regional lines.

6. New Age, January 26, 1969.

7. New Age, April 22, 1969.

The Kammas were of the opinion that the Telangana region added to the strength of the Rayalseema Reddy's, and supported the separatist movement. After the Prime Ministers 3 point formula, they felt that the Telangana region had won the political initiative and were awaiting the correct opportunity to become even. In the face of the inability of the Brahmananda Reddy Ministry to solve the crisis, President's rule was imposed, leaving things as they were. Because of the block vote of the Telangana Praja Samiti, whose Presidentship Chenna Reddy assumed, the Ruling Congress came to an understanding that the Chief Minister should be from the Telangana region, and that the safeguards would be strictly implemented. Having won 45.5% of the votes on the separatist platform, the T.P.S. was in a good bargaining position vis-a-vis the Centre, since the all-India Congress was splitting, and the two sections were mobilising support in all the states. As a result, statutory powers were given to the Regional committee, separate budget and accounts were to be maintained for the Telangana region, and for party purposes, the Telangana Pradesh Committee was created, giving the Telangana politicians political leverage in the state.

In spite of the accord, there was no movement towards integration. A few days after the agreement, the Prime Minister and Chenna Reddy made contradictory press statements, showing the lack of a common understanding. For the Telangana faction, the new agreement had only shelved the problem of separation, whereas the Centre had no intention of bifurcating the state. In any case, the agreement had no legal or

constitutional status, until there was Parliamentary legislation to back it up. Its success depended solely on the state Government and the administration.

With the overthrow of the Brahmananda Reddy Ministry the local strength and political vitality of Andhra Pradesh passed into central control. The Centre's attempt was to restructure the leadership in the state with a view to curb the control of the Reddy's over the political machinery of the state. This attempt at restructuring had been one important factor leading to the separatist agitation of 1972-73⁸. The centre wanted to break the hold of the traditional dominant agricultural castes, so as to establish direct links with politicians at the grass roots, without the strong factional leaders as intermediaries. The failure of the desire to restructure the Congress Organisation in the state can be seen in the manner in which the 1972 elections were conducted, and the separatist agitation that followed soon after, leading to the imposition of President's rule in the state.

The political success of the dominant agricultural castes was the direct result of land reforms, particularly Jagir abolition, in the early fifties in the Hyderabad region, where the power of the traditional elite was broken. The prestige of the Brahmins had been undermined by the anti-Brahmin movement all over the south⁹.

-
8. Damage Berntroff, Asian Survey "End of Reddy Raj- Attempt at restructuring Congress leadership in A.P. op. cit.
9. Eugene F. Irishik - Politics & Social Conflict in S. India Bombay 1969.

In the vacume created by the limited changes in the land owning pattern, the educated middle class had niether the means nor the leisure to participate in politics. With the introduction of democratic politics, the upper and middle levels of the land owning sections realised the necessity of controlling political life if they were to maintain their edonomic preminence. The joint family system provided them with the material basis for their political activity. Their control of politics can be seen in their control of the Panchayats (80% forward castes), the Legislative Assembly (43%) as well as the Congress organisations.¹⁰

P.V. Narasimha Rao, from the Telangana region, a Brahmin, was introduced as a Central nominee into this situation, in the face of stiff opposition. Unlike the other leaders, he had no faction of his own, and he was entrusted with the task of streamlining the state Congress Machinery and implementing the 8 point formula which brought the T.P.S. into the mainstream of Congress politics. An adhoc committee was formed for the Andhra region and a separate committee for Telangana. Election tickets had played an important role in political patronage, and now Telangana was to have this leverage too. Brahmanandan Reddy and his supporters were not included in any of these committee. These adhoc committees soon became faction ridden, with the result that the party organisation became fully occupied with political wrangling and had little time for the implemen-

10. Dagnar Bernstropp - Op. Cit.

tation of socio-economic programme. In the Andhra region, Narasimha Rao was faced with the problem of destroying the hold of Brahmananda Reddy and his supporters on the one hand, and opposition from Sanjivvya. In Telangana, Chenna Reddy was being opposed by V.B. Raju and Ramachandra Reddy. The district cadre supported the leadership of Chenna Reddy, whilst the intellectuals and the M.L.A.'s joined the Raju faction, since they had never accepted Chenna Reddy's leadership of the T.P.S. even at the time of the separatist agitation. The Chief Minister relied on the support of the Brahmins and the backward castes, who had always resented Reddy supremacy. As a first step, rebel congressmen were suspended, amongst whom the supporters of Brahmananda Reddy ranked highest. In fact, so thorough was the attempt that hardly a Zilla Parishad Chairman was left. The Centre subsequently was constrained to reinstate many of them.⁽¹¹⁾ The Centre viewed the restructuring process from two stand points, 1) to give added weightage to the Telangana region and ii) to redirect the domination of the landowning classes. To achieve this, it did not employ the base to centre method, and backed up vertical alignments with horizontal alignments.⁽¹²⁾

In pursuance of the above understanding, the Narasimha Rao Ministry passed an ordinance banning alienation of agricultural land on May 2, 1972. On September 4, the land ceiling bill (double crop, wet land, 10 acres per family)

11. Berntroff, D. Opp. Cit.

12. Ibid.

was passed by the Assembly. These two actions spurred the landowning sections into opposition.¹³ In the coastal districts, under the leadership of P. Thimma Reddy, the Revenue Minister, Ryotu Raksha Sanghams held meetings and demonstrations all over the state. The Bar Associations also supported their landlord clients. The proposal for the nationalisation of wholesale trade in food grains, brought traders and speculators into the opposition. The proposal to nationalise bus routes effected the private owners of busses, and the move to collect municipal taxes on the capital rather than rental value of urban property brought in the business community. The Narasimhan Committee's suggestions for the reconstitution of Parishads and Samiti's invited the wrath of these sections.¹⁴

The Chief Minister had his own personal animosities. His opponents disapproved of him on four counts. Firstly, that he had not tackled the economic problems either in the Andhra or the Telangana region. Secondly, he was not accessible either to his party colleagues or the administration, as a result of which the administrative machinery had become very sluggish under his stewardship. His critics attributed this to his reliance on the centre, accusing him of spending as much time in New Delhi as in Hyderabad.¹⁵ At this moment the Supreme Court judgement on the Mulki Rules was delivered. The Chief Minister welcomed the decision

13. Patriot, Feb. 22, 1973.

14. Ibid.

15. Hugh Gray, Asian Survey, 24:4 April 74, pp. 339.

because he hoped that the long outstanding problem would be solved finally. The political parties of the right had always championed the cause of separatism in the state, since they were not able to gain a foot hold in the state on any other grounds. They now combined with the Congress dissidents to bring down the Narasimha Rao Ministry.

One of the leading separatists, B.V. Subba Reddy identified three enemies of the Andhras - the integrationists, the Prime Minister and the Central Government. Samples of his oratory are now familiar all over the state, where he recommended that "the integrationists should be cut to pieces and thrown to the vultures", and if the demand for the separation of the state was not granted the country would be divided into two, with the South seceding from the North. He justified separation of the Andhra region on the grounds that there was nothing common between the people of Andhra and Telangana. Their cultures and traditions were different. With the support of Congress Ministers, the vested interests came to the forefront of the movement, and the separatist movement gathered momentum due to the role of the bureaucracy, which was generally sympathetic to separatist sentiments. Politicians like Ranga, who had recently left the Swatantra Party to rejoin the Congress, also joined the separatist bandwagon, and exhorted the Andhra Sena to organise itself like the RSS and adopt guerilla tactics in the fight for the bifurcation of the state.¹⁶

16. Andhra Jyoti, 5.1.73.

Having fanned the chauvinist emotions of the people of the Andhra region, the separatists joined with the separatist leaders of the Telangana region to make a common cause of their struggle for separation. There was no mass mobilisation in the Telangana region because the Prime Minister's five-point formula gave effective assurances to that region. Also a large section of the Telangana separatists had no faith in the opportunistic leadership of Chenna Reddy, who had used the 1969 movement for his own ends. At a joint meeting of separatists from both regions on 3rd February, Chenna Reddy said "the upsurge in Andhra is more than we saw in Telangana in 1969. We send our good wishes to them, with the assurance that we stand by them in their demand for bifurcation." (17) However, B.V. Subba Reddy did not paint a rosy picture of the division of assets between the two regions of the state, for on the same day he warned, at Narasaraopet, that if the state were bifurcated, the presence of the Telangana leadership would be necessary at all levels to ensure a fair distribution of assets. (18) There was already a hint of problems like the location of the capital, division of river waters, location of key industries between the Circars and the Rayalseema region, and N. Sanjiva Reddy, speaking in Hyderabad on February 7 reminded the Andhra separatist leaders of the reality of the Sri Baug pact. (19)

It was clear that the regional issue was volatile and temporary, since it was not rooted in any deep seated or

17. Indian Express, Feb. 4, 1973.

18. Ibid.

19. Defeat separatist conspiracy in Andhra C.P.I.
Publication - page 39.

enduring antagonism of the masses. Once the Narasimha Rao Ministry was brought down, and President's rule established, the movement petered out. In mid January, the 73 adhoc committees set up by the ex-Chief Minister were replaced by high powered committees manned by his opponents. In mid-December, J. Vengala Rao became the Chief Minister, again with central backing, and his task was to bring about a settlement between the two regions on the basis of the Pant formula which banked upon constitutional and administrative measures to make regional safeguards unnecessary. Once it was clear that even though the Telangana view and triumphed, there was rethinking on the matter of the removal of safeguards, the emotional drive went out of the separatist struggle.

Left Parties:

Communist Party (Marxist)

The General Secretary of the CPM, in a letter to the Prime Minister, characterised the Andhra separatist movement as the fourth round in the fractional war comprising the two regions of Andhra Pradesh. It was tragic, in the opinion of the party, that the centre had not intervened with a timely solution, since the integrity of the state had been in question. Instead the Mulki Rules issue was used to settle the war between factions within the Congress, who joined hands with the vested interests to serve their partisan ends. It was at the Centre's investigation that the state government had taken the problem of the Mulki Rules to the Supreme Court. The only purpose of the

agitation was to divert the attention of the people from the burning issues of the day. The CPM blamed the Centre for the disruption of normal life in the state, since the Mulki Rules problem was capable of solution.

The CPM therefore suggested legislation on the following lines:

- 1) Employment in Government service to be according to the 2:1 ratio at all levels. All employees should be posted to every part of the state instead of being confined to regions. The 2:1 ratio reflected the proportion of the population of the two regions, and this policy could be extended to all public corporations and semi-government concerns.
- 2) All allocations of resources of the state, the capital city, grants for administrative and developmental expenditure should be according to the 2:1 ratio, with special consideration and allocation to be made for the backward regions in both parts of the state.
- 3) The same principle should also be followed in the case of educational institutions.
- 4) A time limit should be fixed beyond which safeguards should not continue, but the time limit should not be mechanical, since only mutual understanding and confidence between the two regions could ensure the integrity of the state.

Such a programme would form a secure basis for the integration of the state.²⁰

20. Peoples Democracy, Nov. 19, 1972 (Letter of several Secretary to the Prime Minister).

The Congress was aware of the possibilities of the 2:1 formula, but had allowed regionalism to exist in the interest of various party factions. The Congress never took a hardline against the separatists, and even after the 1969 movement, the separatists were absorbed into the Congress. Again, the Centre showed a lack of foresight in allowing the Chief Minister to raise the Mulki issue in the Supreme Court, without working out a political solution to the problem and allowed the agitation to pressurise the popular government.

The agitation completely exposed the factionalism within the Congress and its links with the reactionary vested interests, particularly, the landlords and the traders, who used the students as their pawns. At the S.F.I. convention, the student wing of the party explained that unemployment was the basic cause of unrest, and this was a problem that had not featured in any solution. A Polit Bureau Resolution on January 11, denounced the firings at several places in the state and the handing over of the administration to the C.R.P. and the military.²¹ Such repression was not justified, since the Centre had always backed the separatists in the state, and was responsible for the present crisis in the state. The Mulki Rules Act and the five-point formula would only strengthen the separatist forces. The genuine difficulties of the salaried employees and the students were not heeded, and the Anti-Mulki agitation was one way in which

21. Peoples Democracy, Nov. 26, 1972.

to focus the attention of the centre on their problems. These difficulties were sacrificed in the narrow interest of the Congress Party in the State.

The CPM was for the integration of the State because united Andhra was in the interest of the democratic movement, comprising the working class, the peasantry and the toiling masses, and the Telugu speaking people as a whole. Therefore, it was against the Mulki Rules Act, which was not based on the objective criteria of the strength of the population of the state. Unilateral safeguards would not meet with the principles of equality and democracy, which could be the only basis for the unity of the people, nor could they be a solution to the problem of backwardness in the state. If the decision had been taken that the safeguards should go, then regionalisation of the services and separation of finances would not be in the interest of the people of the state, as they were elemental in perpetuating inequality. The Mulki Act and the five-point formula were therefore characterised as 'gimmicks'.²²

The separation of the state would be harmful to the economic and democratic development of the state, and would have a disruptive influence on the rest of the country. Big Business was interested in disrupting the unity of the toiling masses and that was the reason for its support of separatist movements. The problems of the people arose from the fact of Congress rule in the state, and if the people

22. Polit Bureau Resolution reported in Peoples Democracy, January 21, 1973. The CPI(M) also expounded its stand on the historical background of the separatist problem in Andhra Pradesh, by M. Bassevapunniah & Hanumantha Rao, in Telugu.

wanted to have a solution to their problems, then the masses of both regions would have to make common cause against the Congress, and not against each other. It was important to point out that the reason for the backwardness of Telangana was not because of Andhra exploitation, but the hold of Deshmukhs and feudal landlords who had been backed by the Nizam and the British and were now being supported by the Congress policies. Again, the Anti-Mulki movement was not directed against the exploiting sections of society or the corrupt administration in both regions, both of whom were acting under the goodwill of the Congress, but were directed against the toiling people of both regions. Thus the legitimate aspirations of the people were clouded by the anti-people character of the agitation, so that the support of the democratic movement in the rest of the country could not be gained. The CPM defended its formula on the following counts.

- 1) It was democratic, because it reflected the real strength of the people.
- 2) It was not pernicious, because it did not restrict a person to a region, which had been responsible for the narrow outlook and prejudice in the people of the different regions.
- 3) It would do away with the divide and rule policy, which was an important factor in causing estrangement between the people. The CPM did not assume leadership of the separatist movement, because it believed in national integration, which could only be achieved once the rule of

the exploiters had been overthrown. It was, therefore, opposed to dividing people on regional and nationality basis, or to championing the rights of the people of one area as opposed to another. In the state of Andhra Pradesh, it had fought for the unity of the Telugu people, which had resulted in the success of the people in overthrowing the Nizam's rule. In 1952, the call for unity also helped in the creation of Andhra Pradesh. Similarly, the united agitation for Nagajunsagar brought prosperity to the state.

The CPM believed that the force of habits, customs and sentiments amongst crores of people was a frightening force, as the separatist agitations had proved, but if led by the correct consciousness it could lead to revolutionary change instead of disruption.

The Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Party:

On the basis of the Provincial Committee resolutions distributed, it is possible to reconstruct the argument of the third section of the left movement in the state, which was the only section to actively support the separatist movement. The A.P. Revolutionary Communists made the following analysis of the movement:

- 1) The agitation had popular significance, because from a small agitation begun by the N.G.O.'s and students, on the question of unemployment, it was rapidly transformed into a struggle of the entire people of Andhra Pradesh. The significance of the agitation lies in the fact that all classes of people were involved, to such a degree that they were able to bring the government to a standstill. A noteworthy factor was the participation of professionals

like Doctors, Lawyers, School teachers etc. who had never been known to participate in agitations, and now they were boycotting hospitalism, courts, schools and colleges and joining the people on the streets, subjecting themselves to Lathis and arrests. Women also came out in large numbers to join the agitation.

2) The separatist struggle had exposed the old and the new revisionist parties (referring to the C.P.I. and the CPM) as being against the militant people's struggles, and collaborating with the ruling class. The A.P.R.C.P. was totally against the five point formula, both for theoretical and practical reasons.²³

3) In the midst of a people's struggle, the important thing was not to see who was participating, and under what kind of political programme. The significant question was against whom was this struggle directed, and which class of people were participating. This was considered to be the real Marxist - Leninist stand.

4) The only solution to the peoples problems was through long and protracted armed revolt. Elections brought no solutions. The Central Government was playing a double game, on the one hand negotiating with the separatist leaders, and on the other, unleashing repression on the people. The main purpose of the negotiations was to ensure that the clique loyal to the centre comes to power, in the fractional problems being faced by the Congress which was undergoing a political crisis.

23. Hats of to the heroic people fighting the Diabolic Congress Rule, A.P. Revolutionary Communist Party (M-L), in Telugu (P.C. Resolution).

5) It was the political and economic system that was responsible for unemployment in the state and the country as a whole. Therefore, it did not signify whether one was for or against the Mulki Rules. The employment situation would not change for the better. Therefore, if the people were agitating, particularly against the central government, it was considered to be a sign of overthrowing the political and economic system.

The A.P. R.C.P. took a very subjective stand in assessing the nature of the struggle, which was being led by landlords and businessmen, in pursuance of their demands. The aim of the agitation was to create a law and order situation in the state, and not to overthrow the government. (24)

Communist Party of India:

The C.P.I. was of the opinion that the 'Mulki tangle' was a very small issue, which could have been solved, had the Central Government shown some initiative at the outset, instead of allowing the situation to drift. As a result, the reactionary, vested interests, both inside and outside the Congress took advantage of the vacillation of the centre, to fan the flames of chauvanistic regionalism, so as to defeat the progressive legislation that had been introduced in the assembly. The Andhra situation was only a reflection of the nationwide attempt by the reactionary interests to create anarchy and chaos in the country. ²⁵

The C.P.I. supported an integrated state, because such agitations raised caste and parochial feelings. Secondly,

24. Ibid.

25. Serious situation in Andhra Pradesh implications for Democratic Movement C.P.I. Publication, 14th January, 1973.

the division of the state would create economic and administrative problems, and once the demand for the bifurcation of Andhra was granted, it would have repercussions on the rest of the country. The struggle for Andhra had been a part of the country wide movement for linguistic states, and its bifurcation would have a chain reaction. The telugu people were at war with each other because they failed to realise that it was centuries of feudal and imperialist exploitation that had left the entire Telugu territory backward, with serious regional imbalances within the overall backwardness. This gave rise to the demand for accelerated development through special privileges.

The C.P.I. accepted the validity of the safeguards, but felt that the Supreme Court judgement should not have been the basis for executive action, because the safeguards, in the form of the Mulki Rules, did not meet the needs of the reorganised state. Since the Supreme Court did not spell out who was a Mulki, the vested interes misrepresented the ruling to mean that no person belonging to a region other than Telangana could seek employment there. But this was a falsification, for only the 15 year residential qualification was applicable, and that also not to the composite offices, and organisations in the public or private sector. Secondly, the Supreme Court had left the matter entirely to the discretion of Parliament, and the delay in coming to a solution was therefore the result of the indecisiveness of the centre. Those in the state government did nothing to clarify the situation. They also divided up on regional lines. The people of the state were made the scapegoats in the internal power struggle of the Congress.

Although the C.P.I. had been actively making suggestions on the basis of which changes were to be made, when the five point formula was announced, it welcome the formula as a 'belated though practical' solution, which would maintain the integrated framework of the state. However, it was obvious to the C.P.I. ranks that such a formula would not satisfy everybody, but the opposition would have a lever if integrationists also criticised the formula. The C.P.I. therefore gave a call for left unity to accept and implement the formula. However, the Andhra Ministers then raised a demand for a regional committee to compare with the Telangana regional committee, and the cabinet was willing to recommend this demand. The C.P.I. considered this as a disruptive move, since the same conditions did not exist in the Andhra region as in Telangana. This was really an attempt to abolish the Regional committee which functioned as a parallel Telangana legislature.²⁶

The national Council, therefore, in a Resolution²⁷ undertook to work for the unity of the state, because a big state under a unified administration helped to properly develop the state to the advantage of all sections of the people. Secondly the movement for linguistic states was one step towards democracy, and to bifurcate Andhra would be to take the entire country backwards. The five point formula was an important means of strengthening the unity of the state.

26. Defeat separatist conspiracy in A.P. Resolution adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the C.P.I., Delhi 9th to 11th February, 1973.

27. Resolution of the National Council of the C.P.I. (6-10 December, 1972) on "Mulki Rules" Tangle in Andhra Pradesh.

RIGHT PARTIES:Swatantra Party:

Since the Andhra Separatist movement had paralysed the administrative machinery of the state, and rejected the authority of the Central Government for five months, it was characterised as a peoples movement. Therefore, the Swatantra Party was campaigning for the bifurcation of the state. It was critical of the view that Congress dissidents were responsible for creating a law and order problem in the state. The Swatantra Party argued that despite the Inidra wave, 10 out of the 14 constituencies had rejected the Congress (R) and the Prime Ministers attempt at integration was therefore unwarranted, since it was against the wishes of the people. It was for this reason that the five point formula had not pleased anybody. As a result, the Centre was forced to unleash terror in the form of the C.R.P., which had resulted in the massacre of 300 people as well as the loss of property worth lacs. The Centre had wantonly unleashed a blood bath in the state with its intransigent attitude. (28) Whilst analysing the Mulki crisis, the first thing to note was that the Supreme Court had contradicted its own judgement of 1969. Secondly, whereas the Mulki privelege had been denied to the Marathi and Kannada speaking areas of the Hyderabad State, it continued to apply to the Telangana region, and had been a source of

28. Resolution adopted at the 6th National Convention of the Swatantra Party in February, 1973. Resolution of April '73.

resentment for the people of the Andhra region.

On November 18, the party convened a conference at Guntur, which was attended by members of the Congress (O) and the Socialist Party and several independents. At this conference, the Andhra Praja Parishad was formed, to carry on the struggle for the bifurcation of the state. The N.G.O.'s and students were exhorted not to give up the time bound struggle for the separation of the state.

The unique features of the Andhra separatist agitation, according to the Swatantra view were a) the massive participation of women, b) the adoption of the Gandhian Technique of civil disobedience-fasts, mass processions, public meetings, boycott of the government, non-attendance in schools and colleges, courts, hospitals and the no tax campaign. It was clear that Gandhism only worked against an alien government, but was not successful in bringing about the peoples wishes. c) The demand for the bifurcation of the state was not sectional. During the agitation, administration, transport, education etc. were completely paralysed. That was the justification for inviting the C.R.P. and the army into the state. The senseless brutality of the C.R.P. only added to the tension in the state. It was necessary, therefore, to evolve a code whereby only in the case of an armed revolt would the police be authorised to resort to firing. The agitation was under the leadership of respected politicians like Latchanna, Satyanarayana, T. Vishwanatham and others, and was not a naxalite movement.

The leaders of the ruling Congress, instead of facing their electorate, had all run away to Delhi, or resigned from the party which had become a symbol of tyranny and repression. The sympathy of the people was reflected in the example of Cuddapah, where Rs. 10,000 was collected as land tax from the rural areas. This money was then used to pay a part of the salary of the N.G.O.'s. The Central and state governments' authority was thus completely undermined.

The demand for bifurcation was mutual, since both regions wanted the separation to take place. In a speech in Parliament, Piloo Mody, Chairman of the party, characterised the movement as a "beautiful movement", motivated by the N.G.O.'s and the students and not the vested interests. (29) The Swatantra Party, being free of the "cage of class conflict and class consciousness" supported the movement because it reflected the will of the people. It would therefore help any people's movement against the autocracy of the Prime Minister, since all democratic methods had failed to bring justice to the people of the country. (30)

Theoretically, the Swatantra party was against 'dogmas' like the linguistic states, because conflicts based on historical and cultural factors could override such principles. An example of this was the problem of Saurashtra, in Gujarat.

29. Text of Piloo Mody's speech, Lok Sabha, 1st March, 1973, on President's Rule in Andhra Pradesh.

30. (Andhra in Ferment by B. Ratnasabhapathy M.L.A.)

The party did not operate on the basis of some grand design, but rather on the need of the moment. Again, experience had proved that small states were more prosperous than the larger ones, taking the example of Punjab and Harayana, so why the dogmatic refusal to allow two Telugu speaking states?

Jana Sangh:

The Jana Sangh attributed the wave of discontent sweeping through the country to the uncertain economic future of the country, which had resulted in a tendency to settle problems on the streets. During the elections, the Ruling Congress had promised to banish poverty and bring political stability to the country. Its failure to accomplish this dual task was one factor leading to the Andhra separatist movement. In this state, within one year of the elections, the centre was forced to dismiss the popular government, and made a scapegoat of the Chief Minister it had imposed on the state. The Prime Minister had accused the opposition of being un-cooperative. When the Mulki Rules Act was hustled through Parliament, the entire opposition had warned against it as being anti-people. Demands for separate states had been raised since the re-organisation of the states, but the government had either ignored such demands or reacted to them in a piecemeal manner guided by adhoc needs instead of following a well thought out policy.

As a policy statement, the Jana Sangh was of the opinion that undue importance was given to the language issue and indifference was shown regarding economic development and

administrative efficiency. The movement for the bifurcation of the state had the support of the widest section of the people in both regions of the state, therefore, to regard it as representing only the vested interests was to close ones eyes to the reality of the problem of Andhra Pradesh.

The Jana Sangh wanted the centre to constitute another states reorganisation commission which would examine the various demands for separate states, keeping in view both economic and administrative efficiency. The Centre had made a prestige issue of the Andhra problem because, after the 1969 split in the congress, the rampant factionalism was sought to be dressed up in the garb of ideology. As a result, a mockery was made of the constitution, the office of the Governor was misused, and legislators were seduced with money. In Andhra Pradesh, the Ministry was obliged to resign, even though it had a clear majority, and this was evidence of the fact that the Congress was collapsing under its own weight. (31)

The political problem of Andhra Pradesh was reduced to a party problem and then solved by misusing the President's extraordinary powers. The five point formula was being opposed by the leading sections of the people. In spite of the publicity campaign mounted to gain its acceptance. The Congressmen who had been ardent separatists were now betraying the masses so as to be included in the new ministry.

31. Resolution of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh at the 18th All India Session, Kanpur and Resolutions passed by the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha, Hubli (Karnatak) 16-18th July, 1973.

The Jana Sangh, therefore, opposed the imposition of the five-point formula, on the grounds that it would only perpetuate tensions in the state and prolong the uncertainty of its future. This would seriously hamper the economic development of the state.

Basically, the Jana Sangh was committed to the principle of one country, one people and one culture, and had rejected every kind of separatism in the field of politics on the basis of religion, sect, language or province. Unless these narrow loyalties were replaced by Indianisation, there could be no foundation for Nationalism. Yet it supported the separatist movement, because it was against the very concept of linguistic states which would weaken the unity of the country. The other reason why the Jana Sangh had been against the linguistic states was its championing the cause of Hindi to replace English, as the national language.⁽³²⁾ If the unitary government visualised by the Jana Sangh failed, then the only alternative would be to have smaller states.

The Sangh's participation in the agitation was not really based on any principled stand; it was just fishing in troubled waters, to try to create a base for its dwindling fortunes in the state.

Socialist Party:

The socialist party had openly put forth its programme of coordinating the struggles of the oppressed sections of society, students, youth, workers and peasants. Secondly, it was committed to changing the structure of society, and

32. Bharatiya Jana Sangh, All India Working Committee, Rajkot, November 3-4, 1973.

not only with temporary solutions to problems as they arose. In terms of the political organisation, it favoured decentralisation, which would help the backward regions and strengthen local self-government bodies. (33)

The National Adhoc committee had passed a resolution on the situation in Andhra Pradesh that they supported the desire of the people of the state for bifurcation. In the face of the widespread and massive agitation, which was brutally suppressed by the police and the army, the Muzki Rules Act could only be regarded as a halting measure, which instead of easing the tensions in the area had resulted in the total dislocation of administrative and economic life of both regions. Unless the atmosphere was normalised, economic development would suffer.

The Andhra separatist movement was characterised as the democratically expressed wish of the people of the state for separation. Clamping Presidents rule in the state for fear that the assembly would vote for bifurcation was to crush the legitimate demand of the people. The S.P. therefore called for a no-confidence motion in the Lok Sabha, in coordination with other opposition parties, because the people of Andhra had been betrayed by the self-interest of the Congress. A special mention was made of the Prime Ministers arrogance and irrational posture, and her resignation from office was welcomed. (34)

The socialist party had never had any hold on Andhra

33. Socialist Party Bulletin Vol. I, No. 12, 1973, January.

34. Socialist Party Bulletin, Vol. 2 No. 1-2 March, 1973.

politics, and it was only acting as a member of the Grand Alliance against Congress Rule, which is why it did not really have an independent stand on the major issues involved in the Mulki problem.

Chapter III

The Legal background in the Mulki dispute.

During the Telangana agitation, the main dispute had been the infringement of the Public Employment Act and the rules framed under it for the use of surplus funds. The Chief Minister, Brahmananda Reddy had called an all parties conference, where it was agreed that non-domiciles working in protected posts in Telangana should be transferred to Andhra, and if necessary, supernumary posts should be created, so that nobody would be victimised.

The Andhra N.G.O.'s challenged this order in the High Court. A single bench of the High Court struck down the protective section of the Public Employment Act as ultra vires of the Constitution and violative of Article 16 (3), which did not permit domicile requirement for a region within a state. Article 16 clause 3 allows Parliament to make a law in a special case, prescribing any requirement as to residence within a state or Union Territory prior to appointment, as a condition of employment. Under Article 35 (a) this power is conferred on Parliament but denied to the state legislature; and under (b) any law in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (subject to adaptations under article 372) would continue to be in force until altered or amended or repealed by Parliament. By the first clause of article 16 equality of opportunity in employment is guaranteed; by the second clause there can be no discrimination, among other things on grounds of residence. However, to appease

local sentiments, particularly between more and less advanced states, a residential qualification may have to be prescribed. The exception in clause 3 bears on the kind of residence and its duration, rather than its location within a state. That the exception came as an amendment, indicates that a narrow construction was to be placed on the exception, and therefore the Public Employment Act, in so far as it related to Telangana, would be Ultra vires of the Constitution.¹

But a full bench of the High Court over-ruled this judgement and held the Act and the rules framed under it valid. The Andhra N.G.O.'s then appealed to the Supreme Court, which also struck down the protective section of the Public Employment Act. The purpose of this legal battle was apparent. The Telangana safeguards had been agreed upon for a period of five years. There had been three extensions of the period for the continuation of safeguards. The 1969 Telangana separatist agitation had emphasised the need for the continuation of safeguards, and the Prime Minister formula had conceded this point. Due to the pressure of unemployment with the state and central Governments being the single largest employers, and Government offices being concentrated in Hyderabad city, the Andhra N.G.O.'s were concerned with the problem of safeguards. On every dispute they would have recourse to the judiciary.

1. A.V.S. Narsimha Rao vs A.P.
(C.J. Hidayatullah) A.I.R. 1970, Se. 422
See also Mulki Rules, A Study by P.A. Choudhry.

The Union Government, therefore, appointed the Wanchoo Committee in April 1969 to examine the legal position with regard to the validity of domicile rules for a part of a state. This committee upheld the judgement of the single bench, and declared the Public Employment Act invalid.

However, until the Parliament exercised its power of amendment, the Mulki Rules, which were in force at the time of the commencement of the Constitution, would now become valid since the law repealing the Mulki Rules had been struck down.² The Supreme Court judgement on October 3rd was based on this understanding. The finer points of the Supreme Court ruling then spelt out the definition of a Mulki:

(a) as one who has been a permanent resident of the Telangana region for at least 15 years, with no intention of returning to his place of residence.

(b) that the Mulki rules were an integral part of the Hyderabad Civil Service rules, enacted by the Nizam, who according to the Supreme Court, was competent to enact such regulations.

(c) Under Article 372 of the constitution, these regulations would continue to operate, but in terms of the state of Andhra Pradesh, they would apply to the Telangana region only. This region had been made a unit for the purpose of the

2. P.L. Rao vs A.P. W.P. No. 65 of 1969 dt. 28.3.69.

A.I.R. 1971 (A.P.) 118.

per C.J. Kuarayya and J. Ekbote.

application of the Mulki Rules, with the necessary adaptation under article 372. The reason for Telangana being made into a unit for application of this protective clause had been the fact that the erstwhile state of Hyderabad had been a fully fledged state, and the Mulki Rules were operative in the whole state, of which Telangana had been a part.

(d) If these rules were restricted in their application to any particular category of service, then they would be termed discriminatory, and would not stand up to Article 14 of the Constitution. However, rule 39 of the enactment allowed enough flexibility within the existing framework of the state.

(e) Any amendment would have to be referred to the Regional committee, since the Mulki Rules applied to the 9 districts of the Telangana region, and services were on the scheduled list. After the Supreme Court judgement validating the Mulki Rules was announced, the Andhra separatists began the Anti-Mulki agitation, during which a demand for the bifurcation of the state was raised. The Prime Minister was requested by the state Government to arbitrate, and on 27th, November she announced the 5 point formula, on which the Mulki Rules Act of 1972 was based.

The Mulki Rules Act envisaged an integrated state of Andhra Pradesh, and whereas it did not elaborate on the

interpretation of 'Mulki' it settled the question of the applicability of the Mulki Rules.

The original Mulki Rules, as promulgated in 1919, contained preferences on grounds of birth descent residence etc and applied to all superior and inferior posts, except those which were specifically exempted. There was also no time limit for their continuation. With the advent of the Constitution in 1950, the original scope of the Mulki Rules was curtailed, and under Article 35 (b) only the residential requirement for employment was maintained, until such time as Parliament amended, altered or repealed this law. This alteration came in the form of the Public Employment (requirement as to residence) Act, 1957, which abolished all privileges akin to the Mulki Rules in all other parts of the country except Manipur, Tripura, Himachal Pradesh and the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh. This special treatment was given to Telangana as a result of the Gentlemens Agreement, which has signed before the enlarged state of Andhra Pradesh was formed, where safeguards were accepted as a necessary condition for the merger of the two regions.

These provisions were obviously meant to substitute for the Mulki Rules but the scope of the Public Employment Act was narrower than the original reservations, since it applied to subordinate posts, and for a period of five years. Extension was to be subject to review.

The Mulki Rules Act referred to the residential restriction only from the date of the formation of the state (1.11.56), and restricted its applicability to all non-gazetted posts, Tehsildars, Junior Engineers and Civil Surgeons. The Prime Minister described the Mulki Rules Act in the Lok Sabha as 'what was agreed upon, and a little more', referring to the provision for the direct recruitment of technical personnel. The law consequently, validated all the appointments made in contravention of the residential since 1.11.56 as well as in the case of the reserved posts. This was to ensure that no employee would either lose his job or be transferred out of Telangana, and no appointment would be declared invalid.

The second aspect of the law dealt with the problem of the duration of the safeguards. The Mulki Rules had also been applied in the Marathawada and Vannada areas of the erstwhile Hyderabad State, but after the dismemberment of the state, they were abolished in the above areas, but continued to be in force, although in an altered, form in the Telangana region. It is quite probable that but for the Gentlemens Agreement, they would also have been abolished in Telangana. It is in this context that the duration of the safeguards for Telangana assumed political importance.

The Andhra Pradesh Employment Rules were extended twice, so that they continued to be effective until 1972, long after the stipulated period in the gentlemens agreement. However, the Act itself was struck down in 1969, so that the benefits

of the second extension were denied to the Telanganan region. The 1972 Act fixed 1977-80 as the deadline after which the residential requirement for a specific period, prior to appointment in the capital city and the Telangana region, would stand repealed. The Central Government had assured Parliament that there would be no further extensions. The 1972 Act makes a further distinction, that between the Capital City and the rest of the region, owing to the peculiar situation created by the capital being in the Telangana region and yet servicing the Andhra region. It provided an earlier deadline for the capital, and in the intervening period of five years there would be a composite police force, and recruitment on the basis of 2:1 formula in the composite offices and other common institutions. This was to be an indication that the safeguards were only a short-term solution to the problem of disunity, the long term ideal being the 2:1 formula. However the experience of staff at the lower level, particularly junior engineers, indicates that there wasnt a very sympathetic attitude towards those who were directly affected by the application of the Mulki Rules. One reason for this unfortunate state of affairs may be that there were such frequent appeals to the Courts, because a clear policy decision had not been strictly implemented. Secondly, the executive and the judiciary were looking at

the matter of the safeguards for the Telangana region from two different points of view. Whilst the Courts dealt with the problem in purely legal terms according to the letter, the executive was subject to both human and political pressure. Safeguards had been agreed upon, but for a stipulated period of time. No penalty clause had been included in the case of any infringement. Even the Gentlemen's Agreement had been purely political document, subject to Parliamentary legislation. Such legislation was influenced by electoral realities, with the result the problem of Andhra Pradesh was only aggravated through the years, instead of coming closer to solution.

The Mulki Rules Act still leaves room for doubt as to who can be considered a Mulki. The judgement of Justice O. Reddi³ in connection with a writ petition of a junior engineer, challenging the action of the state Government in retrenching him, whilst his juniors were retained, on the grounds that he was not a mulki, comes closest to a definition - one who has been domiciled in the state for 15 years and not necessarily one who was born there.

A great deal has been made of the constitutional aspects of the Mulki issue, therefore it is interesting to see the place of clause 3 of article 16. Article 16 (3) was introduced to promote efficiency of service, without sacrificing the principle of equality. It was introduced to secure uniformity, and was not designed to prevent

3. Writ Petition No. 5006 of 1971

K. Kondala Rao vs Government of A.P. by Secy P.W.D.

persons from one state from seeking employment in other states. The law was meant to invite officials to develop an attachment to their place of work, rather than to force them away. It was certainly not meant to prohibit people from one part of the state to seek jobs in another part of the state. When clause 3 is read with clause 4 of Article 16, becomes evident that it was never the intention to include the alleged interests of backward regions within states.⁴

Therefore the Mulki Rules Act, as such is discriminatory, and yet to maintain status quo the Supreme Court gave a judgement by which the Mulki Rules became valid by default.

The legal position was quite clear. Only Parliament was vested with the authority to ammend or repeal or later any law in effect in the country. In the 1972-73 Anti-Mulki agitation, the Central Government, instead of placing the dispute before Parliament, had advised the state Government to apply to the Supreme Court for a final solution. The Supreme Court judged the Constitutional validity according to precedent and accordingly referred the matter back to Parliament. Both the pro-Mulki and the anti-Mulki protagonists began to pressurise the Government and since an immediate decision was not arrived at, events took a violent turn. Because the Centre had such a vital role to play, the Andhra separatist agitation was raised against the centre, unlike the Telangana agitation which was directed against the state Government.⁵

4. Dharmiah vs Chief Engr., Panchayati Raj, A.I.R. 1970 (A.P.) 236.

5. Mulki Tangle in Andhra Pradesh-The Communist Approach by Raj Bahadur Gour C.P.I. Publication, Pg. 11-13.

Conclusion

The Andhra separatist agitation had unprecedented mass participation, yet it did not result in any gains for the people of the state or for those sections who had actively fought for the bifurcation of the state. In fact, the Mulki Rules Act was openly favourable to the Telangana region. This is because the regional issue proved to be a volatile factor in the solution of the problem of economic development. The movement drew its strength from the fact that it raised two major problems faced by the salaried and middle classes of the state - the lack of employment and educational facilities, placed in the framework of regional imbalance and overall backwardness of the state. The weakness of the movement arose from the fact that the unity of the people was disrupted, so that the agitation could be used by vested interests as a vehicle for their limited objectives, without going into the fundamental problems of the majority of the underprivileged sections of the people. Consequently Senas proliferated, and once the N.G.O.'s withdrew their strike in early March, 1973 the backbone of the movement broke and resistance came to a standstill.

One people were divided by one language, because the unification process in Andhra was never allowed to flourish. Although it was claimed that the culture and traditions of the two regions differed, this was a fact that was difficult to prove. The power struggle between the different factions

of the Congress, in which caste lobbies had an important role, kept the regional issue alive, since the Congress held uninterrupted political power in the state. As long as the united C.P.I. had posed an organised threat to the Congress,¹ the factional leaders had remained united, but once the 1956 elections successfully returned the Congress to power, spreatism again surfaced.²

In 1950-51 there had been a Mulki Non-Mulki agitation in Hyderabad to focus attention on the problems of the local inhabitants who had been denied employment under an alien bureaucracy. After the decision of the Fazal Ali Commission, there had been a movement for separation. In 1967 there had been a power struggle between the Telangana leadership (headed by Chenna Reddy) and the Andhra leadership (led by Brahmananda Reddy), which had resulted in a serious movement for separation. In the background was the Namma Reddey rivalry, and both castes had used regionalism, which is the concern of the peasant middle class, in their attempt to gain political supremacy.

It is undeniable that the coastal, and particularly the delta region, was relatively more advanced than the other areas of the state. This uneven development had been one of the fundamental difficulties in forming the Andhra state and continued to be a perpetual cause for instability in subsequent years. However, this condition is not peculiar to Andhra Pradesh alone. It was in recognition of this feature that consitutional safeguards for backward regions and people had been provided.

1. The C.P.I. held 41 seats in the Andhra region and 45 seats

Given the historical weakness of the Telangana region, safeguards were felt to be essential, to accelerate the rate of its development. But in 1972, the Mulki Rules were regarded as discrimination against two thirds of the population of the state, and not as protection for a backward region. It was argued that inequality would be perpetuated for another decade if the Mulki Rules Act were to be implemented.

Whereas the Telangana separatists emphasised the infringements of earlier agreements, which had necessitated extensions beyond the initial period of five years, the Andhras felt that the development of Telangana had cost them a heavy price.

in Telangana and the combined strength would have been formidable. See Cross roads, March 21st, 1952, pg. 5.

2. Kamma's were concentrated in the Delta districts and spread over the other districts in the state. Reddis were concentrated in the 5 Royal Seema districts, particularly Cuddapha and Kuruoal. In the 1955-56 period the regional issue was exploited by Reddi leadership of the Congress, See speech by P. Sundarayya "We demand Free and Fair Elections", reported in New Age, 1955.

The Telangana leadership portrayed this antagonism as an Andhra conspiracy, and the material basis of the success of such propaganda had been the policy of divide and rule, which had stood as a stumbling block in the way of developing fraternal feelings amongst the people of the two regions. Services in the state were regionalised, which is why there had been a demand to post people to all parts of the state to rid them of parochial prejudices.³ Finances were divided, and according to the war of statistics, the myth of the Telangana surpluses arose from this separation of receipts whereas expenditure was combined, and all loans were to be repaid by the Andhra region which became the deficit region.⁴

The Mulki Rules Act seems to have gone deeper into the divide and rule policy, by substituting "local" as the unit of reference, instead of regional as in the previous agreements. The term local was hard to define, and this problem was left to the state government to spell out and implement. But this cannot be considered a final solution. A political decision will have to be taken regarding the future of the integrated state.

Although the call to abolish the Mulki rules and the wide support of the people at large, this was not the most pressing problem in a state in which the employment season was short, wages were low, prices of food grains high, and where 30% of the people did not have enough to eat.⁵

3. CPM alternative to Mulki Rules, Peoples Democracy, Nov:72.

4. The Andhra case for a separate state-A.P. NGO's and G.O.'s

Again, the peasantry and the working class were of the general opinion that the separatist movement was a landlord movement, since the leaders were their antagonists in daily life and, as such, the movement did not reflect their demands. The ryots and labourers did not go to Telangana either for employment or education. The substantive migration of middle peasants had more or less stopped, so that the consequences of the implementation of the Mulki Rules would be directly felt by government employees and Businessmen.

The peasantry had fought a united struggle with the Telangana peasantry for a Telugu state, and for the peasant there was no rationale for separation. His self-respect was not bought in Hyderabad. In the course of the agitation, landlords came out in significant numbers, supported their wives and children, resulting in anarchy, coercion and rowdiness. The disruption of communications only led up to profiteering which enhanced the sufferings of the people. However, in the early stages of the agitation the people were not able to stem the tide of the separatist movement, which was backed by powerful political and moneyed interests.

The peasants felt that separation would disrupt the most vital inputs for production, particularly irrigation and power supplies which served the integrated state.⁶ The

Association, Krishna Distt.

5. Interview with Ramayya, Kisan Sabha Activist, Arugolamu, Krishna Distt, June, 1973.

6. Protect Unity of Andhra Pradesh, A.P. Agricultural Labourers Union 15.1.73.

only gain from the bifurcation of the state would be for the politicians, who would have two sets of ministries instead of one. This would not bring any relief to the people.

It was the general opinion that the leaders of the agitation had control of the media so that every small event could be publicised to give an impetus to the movement. When the rural poor had protested against price rise, they had not been given the same publicity. It was also felt that the agitation gained the momentum that it did, despite its sectional appeal, because of the tolerant attitude of the authorities, who only used force when the Gandhian technique of civil disobedience had succeeded in creating a law and order problem. Once the law and order situation was under control, the agitation petered out because it did not involve the majority of the people. (7)

The movement had a broad programme to fight for the abolition of the Mulki rules and, failing that, to bifurcate the state. It was only towards the end of December, when the agitation was already two months old, that some formal organisations brought the different segments and senas together. This was due to the lack of leadership of the movement.

After the 1971 elections, there was polarisation amongst the people, as a result of the aspirations created by the Garibi Hatao programme. The land ceiling programme and the takeover of wholesale trade reflected the attempt of the government at redistribution of rural and urban wealth, to create a wider base for the Congress. There was a strong reaction from the rural vested interests, who wanted to bring down the Narasimha Rao Ministry. They were aided by the factional groups who

7. Interview with A. Sreeman Narayana, D. Sriramalu and other peasants and labourers at Gurunavaram, Krishna Distt. June, 73.

were also against the leadership of Narashima Rao.

Once the Anti-Mulki agitation took to the streets, the question of leadership became crucial. Although the Congress Legislature party was divided on regional lines, the separatist ministers and M.L.A.'s were not willing to assume leadership of the spontaneous movement. The student Action Committee had been acting as the co-ordinator of the day-to-day campaign for the bifurcation of the state, but even they were constantly in need of political backing, so that their demands would not be termed vandalism. The first politician to be appealed to was T. Vishwanatham, who was known to be sympathetic to the separatists. He did not come out openly in the leadership, but was guiding force and an important articulator of the separatists demands. The next stalwart politician was K. Venkatratnam, who was known as the steel man of Krishna District. He was a leading Kamma landlord who was able to influence the whole community with his political views. He mobilised the landlord sections, but only after the five point formula was announced did the programme of the agitation have something concrete to fight against. Before that, although V. Shivanathan favoured bifurcation both at Tiravur and Vijayawada he appealed to both students and Congress workers to await the Prime Ministers formula. Most Congressmen were only waiting for the Centre's solution to be made public before they came out in support of bifurcation, and not until then. His sudden death in December was a great loss to the separatist cause.⁸

8. Interviews with K. Mohan Rao, President, Andhra Region Bar Association, Vijayawada, June, 1973.

The Deputy Chief Minister was the next choice for the leadership of the separatist movement. Before the announcement of the five point formula he had been appealing to the people not to take an agitational approach, whilst mobilising support for the separation of the state. On November 17, at the giant meeting at Vijayawada, and later with the M.L.A.'s, he supported a resolution demanding the bifurcation of the state, if the Mulki Rules were not abolished. On December 31, at Tirupati, the separatist ministers and M.L.A.'s formed a committee for the implementation of the bifurcation of the state, of which Subba Reddy was elected Chairman. Through the first week of December, he and Bazi Reddy, the law Minister had campaigned for the formula as a victory for the integrationists. Both of them made a joint declaration for a united Andhra, and by the end of the month they had become the most ardent separatists. On January 11, at a public meeting at Vijayapuri he made a declaration that unless a date was fixed for the separation of the state, he would immolate himself. On January 11, at a public meeting at Guntur a decision was taken to Gherao the M.L.A.'s who did not support separation and to boycott all integrationist programmes. Once President's rule was imposed in the state, much of this kind of activity came to an end and the emphasis was on negotiations, between the centre and the state politicians. Despite his threat at self-immolation, Subba Reddy was never a popular leader.⁹

The Swatantra Party and the Jana Sangh were actively interested in the separatist movement, although they could not

9. Statements of B.V. Subba Reddy and others, 18.1.73.

offer an alternative to the Congress in the state. The Jana Sangh had sent A.B. Bajpayee on a study tour of Andhra to find out the facts of the situation. G. Latchanna was relieved of his party post by the Swatantra party to devote his full attention to the activities of the Andhra Praja Parishad. Latchanna had been an active Congressman in the politics of Andhra from the earliest days. He had been a signatory of the Gentlemen's Agreement, but when he was denied a ministry, he had voted with the Communists to bring down the Prakasan Ministry. After the 1956, elections he was once again with the Congress, and this time he was rewarded with a Ministry. During the Telangana agitation in 1969, the Congress had divided up along regional lines and Latchanna had been a supporter of the separatist movement. Now he was the only full time leader to work for the bifurcation of the state, in the hope of reviving his fortunes and those of the Swatantra party, which he had joined after the Narasimha Rao Ministry had taken office.¹⁰ One can see how only the political outsiders had anything to gain from the separatist agitation. Therefore, the opportunist leadership was successful in alienating the mass of the people from the main stream of the agitation. Localised initiative kept the agitation going for as long as it was logically possible to do so, but when the Congress ministers betrayed the separatist cause by accepting the five point formula, and the N.G.O.'s called off the strike, the main force of resistance was broken.

10. Ibid.

The grievances of the Andhra region had been posed by the N.G.O.'s in the following way: On account of the publicity given to the Telangana agitation, which had caused loss of life and property worth several crores, and the content of the 8 point formula, which was embodied in the five point formula suggested by the Prime Minister in 1972, the impression had been created that the people of Telangana really had some grievance, as a result of the domination of the Andhras. The Andhras had been betrayed by Sanjiva Reddy and Brahmananda Reddy for their selfish ends, as they had followed a policy of appeasement of the Telangana separatists. Since the application of the 8 point formula, the Telangana separatists. Since the application of the 8 point formula, the Telangana Regional Council and Separate budget had in fact made Telangana into a separate state, therefore, the Andhra demand was only to formalise an existing informal arrangement.¹¹

Andhra's in the political leadership were to be blamed for bartering away the rights of the people of the state. Every ministry in the state should have been representative of the 2:1 ratio, but this was never applied. In the Brahmananda Reddy council of 19 ministers, 9 were from Telangana. Narasimha Rao, with a cabinet of 29 ministers had 15 from Telangana.¹² The financial question was also put down in terms of gains to the Telangana region and losses to the Andhra region. At the time of the merger of the two regions, the funds of the Andhra state were a substantial amount. These monies were to

11. See footnote 4 above.

12. Ibid.

be disbursed according to the 2:1 ratio and here was the first concession to Telangana. The 2.38 crores for the development of the Capital was entirely debited to the Andhra region, but receipts were not shared according to the 2:1 ratio, being entirely appropriated by Telangana. The expenditure of the High Court, amounting to 40 lacs annually, was shared according to the 2:1 ratio, but the revenue from stamp and court duties was appropriated entirely by telangana, amounting to about 20 lacs per year. The Road Transport Corporation expenditure was again on the 2:1 basis, but the revenue of the routes that to Telangana. The expenditure of the Telangana Regional Committee was also borne by both regions, whereas the committee existed purely for the benefit of the Telangana region. The expenditure on education was also shared according to the 2:1 ratio, but in the Telangana region only 3% of the seats were reserved for the Andhras. The same was the case with the expenditure and receipts of the 47 common institutions in the state. Whereas the Andhra region became a deficit area, the Telangana region was declared as having a surplus, so the interest on central loans was also debited to the Andhras.

In the wake of the 1969 agitation the Regional Committee was granted additional powers relating to (i) university education (ii) methods of recruitment to the subordinate services in the Telangana region and (iii) ensuring adequate employment for the people of the Telangana region. This resulted in

intensifying the anti-Telangana feelings. Even after 16 years of an integrated state there were no uniform laws and rules covering the whole state. Even planning was regionalised.¹³ Despite the war of statistics unleashed by both parties, there was an element of truth in the complaints of the Andhra region. On the other hand, the Telangana complaint that the safeguards were never seriously implemented had also been substantiated, so that they could also justifiably insist on extensions. But the extension of safeguards was hardly a solution to the problem of backwardness.

The purpose of the linguistic re-organisation of the country was to raise the cultural level of the people by imparting education upto the highest level in the mother tongue and to carry on administrative work in the language of the state, so that gradually more and more people could participate in the political and economic life of the country.¹⁴ But even after 25 years of Independence this important task remains to be implemented so that reactionary and chauvanist forces have been successful in exploiting regional feelings to hold back the true democratisation of the country.

The Andhra separatist agitation cannot therefore be characterised as a peoples movement, although the struggle against unemployment, for economic development and education is a genuine struggle.

The facts of the case have proved that the struggle for the above demands cannot be successful if fought for on the basis

13. Ibid.

14. The organisation on the Indian National Congress on a linguistic basis in 1970 transformed it from a middle-class assembly of leaders into a mass movement, able to speak to people in their own tongue. This was achieved under pressure from the non-Hindi regions, and not as a conscious policy. Once it was no longer a patriotic necessity to

of regional prosperity, because the bifurcation of the state would not resolve the contradictions between the mass of the people of the state and the vested interests who have slowed down the pace of social change.

... subordinate internal grievances to the common anti-British struggle, regionalism came to the fore.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is arranged in 4 sections:

1. Newspapers used for reference.
2. Pamphlets and Party Literature.
 - (a) Integrationist.
 - (b) Separatist
3. General Readings.
4. Interviews.

1. Newspaper used for reference.

Hindu October 1972 to October 1973

Times of India October 1972 to October 1973

Deccan Chronicle November 1972

New Age

- January 1955 to May 1956

- January 1969 to June 1969

Patriot February 22nd, 1973

2. Pamphlets and Party Literature

(a) Integrationist:

1. Peoples Democracy November 1972 to March 1973.
2. Statements of B.V. Subba Reddy and others, 18.1.73 (T)
3. Goondaism of the Separatists must be resisted by the Democratic Movement 25.11.72 (T).
4. Truth about Vijayawada incidents - news reports 5.1.73 (T).
5. Only a United Andhra can bring development to Rayalseema 1.1.73 (T).
6. Protect Unity of Andhra Pradesh - A.P. Agricultural labourers union 15.1.73 (T)

7. Utilisation of Water Resources - Unity and Development of Andhra Pradesh - A.P. Peasants Association 17.1.73 (T).
8. "Mulki Tangle" in Andhra Pradesh, The Communist Approach (C.P.I. Publications) Raj Bahadur Gour, 18.12.72.
9. Defeat Separatist Conspiracy. C. Rajeshwara Rao C.P.I. Publications, February 1973.
10. The Historic Telangana Struggle- Some useful lessons from its rich experience - C. Rajeswara Rao (C.P.I.)
11. Mulki Rules as the cause of dismemberment of Vishal Andhra, M. Bassavapunniah, Communist Party (Marxist)(T).
12. Catastrophic Atmosphere in Vishal Andhra, M. Hamumantha Rao, Communist Party (Marxist) Publication (T).
13. Judgement on Mulki Rules Issue - Statement by P. Madhu, Secretary, B.F.I. State Committee, Andhra Pradesh (T).
14. Appeal by the State Working Committee (C.P.I.) to the students, employees and the educated sections who are spear-heading the separatist agitation. 28.12.72 (T).
15. A debate of Figures, A.P. Communist Samiti (T)

(b) Separatist

1. The real Truth about Telangana Surpluses by Separatists (T).
2. The Telangana - Andhra Problem, D.V. Siva Rao and Y.V. Hamumantha Rao, Advocates, Vijayawada.
3. Mulki Rules, A threat to our Unit, P.A. Choudhary.
4. Mulki Rules, A study, P.A. Choudhary.
5. The Andhra Case for a Separate State, compiled by the A.P.N. G.O.'s Association and G.O.'s association. Issued by P. Koteswara Rao, Chairman, Zilla Parishad, Krishna District, A.P.
6. Andhra in Ferment B. Ratnasabhapaty, M.L.A.
7. Text of Mr. Piloo Mody's speech, Lok Sabha, 1st March, 1973, on President's Rule in Andhra Pradesh.
8. Resolution adopted at the 6th National Convention in April, 1973.
9. Resolution adopted at the National Executive Meeting in New Delhi, February, 1973.

10. Who is responsible for this violence?
D.V. Siva Rao and Y. V. Hanumantha Rao.
11. The Mystery of the Telangana Surpluses, A.P.
12. N.G.O.'s Association, Hyderabad.
13. Hats off to the Heroic People fighting the Diabolic Congress Rule under Indira, Communist Party (Marxist - Leninist) (T).

4. General Readings

1. Balabusheviach, V.V. 'New Stage in the National Liberation Struggle of the People of India, P.P.H., Bombay 1950.
2. Bernstroff, Dagmar Eclipse of Reddy Raj? Attempted Restructuring of Congress Party Leadership in Andhra Pradesh, Asian Survey, 13:10 (October '73).
3. Bondurant, Joan V & Fisher. The Indian Experiment with Democratic Elections, Indian Press Digest, Monograph No. 3, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley 1956.
4. Bhargava, G.S. A study of the Communist Movement in Andhra, Siddhartha Publications, Delhi '55.
5. Gray Hugh Failure of the Andhra Separatist Agitation, Asian Survey, 24:4 (April 74) pg. 339. See also his article on the Telangana Agitation, Asian Survey, 11:5 (May, '71).
6. Harrison S. Selig. India The most Dangerous Decades, O.U.P. '60.
Caste, and the Andhra Communists, American Pol. Science Review (July '56).
7. Irschick Eugene F Politics & Social Conflict in South India, O.U.P. University of California Press, Bombay, 1969.
8. Lenin, V.I. The National Liberation Movement in the East, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1952.

9. Lingamurthy, V. Elections in Andhra, Indian Journal of Political Sciences Vol. XVI, No. 2, April - June '55.
10. Marx, K & Engels F. Collective letters, Moscow 1952.
11. Mookerji, R.K. The Fundamental Unity of India.
12. Narayan Rao, K.V. Emergence of Andhra Pradesh. Popular Prakashan '73.
13. Prakasam, T. Charges against Madras Ministry.
14. Regani, S. Highlights of the Freedom Movement in Andhra Pradesh, Ministry of Cultural Affairs, A.P., 1972.
15. Raja Rao, D.V. "Election Lessons" Swatantra, February 15, 1952.
16. Satyanarayana, K. Study of the History and Culture of the Andhras, Peoples Publishers, New Delhi, 1975.
17. Sitaramayya, Pattabi B. The History of Indian National Congress, Madras 1935.
18. Sundarayya, P. Peoples Rule in Visalandhra, Vijayawada, 1946(T).
19. P.I.B. Govt. of India New Delhi '1955. Prime Minister's Speech on Linguistic States.
20. Venkatarangiya, M. Freedom Struggle in Andhra Pradesh, 3 Vols. A.P. State Committee, 1965.
21. Venkatapayya, R. The Andhra Movement, Madras, not dated.

4. Interviews:

1. Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, Ex-Chief Minister, Andhra Pradesh, June, 1974, New Delhi.
2. Mr. M. Bassavapurniah, Polite Bureau member, C.P.M. June, 1973, Vijayawada.
3. Mr. N. Prasada Rao, Central Committee Member, C.P.M., June, 1973, Vijayawada.
4. Mr. K. Mohan Rao, Secretary, Bar Association.
Mr. G. Mirli Mohan, Secretary, State Lawyers Convention, June, 1973, Vijayawada.

5. Mr. V.T.M. Prasad, Secretary of Student Action Committee, Loyola College Students, June 1973.
6. Mr. M. Keshva Rao, Lecturer Loyola College Vijayawada, June 1973.
7. Dr. Venkataratnam, President of the Medical Association, June 1973, Vijayawada.
8. Dr. N. Venkateshawara Rao, President Medical Association of Andhra Pradesh (Service in Rural Areas,) Arugolamu, Krishna Dist. June 1973.
9. Mr. I.B. Ramakrishna Rao, President Andhra Pradesh N.G.O.'s Association. Vijayawada June 1973.
10. Mr. Sadananda, President All India Student Federation, June 1973, Hyderabad.
11. Mr. Ajay Sinha, Ex-student, Osmania University on student participation in Andhra Politics, June 1973, Hyderabad.
12. Mr. G. Venkateshwaralu, Ex-MIA Jagapet (reserved constituency for Schedule Tribe) June 1973.
13. Dr. Raidu, Rich peasant, Gunnavaram, Krishna Dist., June 1973.
14. Mr. G. Venkateshwara Rao, Secretary C.P.I. Block Committee Gunnavaram, Krishna Dist. June 1973.
15. Meeting with Agricultural Labourers at the house of Mr. A. Sreemanarayana, CPM candidate from Gunnavaram for M.L.A. Krishna Dist June 1973.
16. Mr. M. Ramayya, Surpunch, Arugolamu village Panchayat, June 1973.
17. Mr. Ramulu, Kisan Sabha activist, Kankipadu, June 1973.