

PAKISTAN AND THE GENEVA PROXIMITY TALKS

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DECLARATION

This is to certify that this Dissertation entitled
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Dedicated to My late Father
Chavala Venkaiah

CONTENTS

| | | Pages |
|--------------------|--|--------------|
| | Preface | 1-iii |
| Chapter I | Introduction | 1 |
| Chapter II | Geneva Proximity Talks and Pakistan | 33 |
| Chapter III | Geneva Accords | 65 |
| Chapter IV | Conclusion | 87 |
| | selected Bibliography | 101 |

PREFACE

The signing of the Geneva Accords on 14th April, 1988 was the outcome of the long indirect negotiations that were conducted between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General's Personal Representative Diego Cordovez to end the bloodshed and conflict in Afghanistan. The U.N. General Assembly resolution of 18 November, 1981 had authorised the secretary General to attempt to negotiate a peaceful political solution to the crisis. Negotiations began in June 1982 between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Since Islamabad refused to recognise the Peoples Democratic Party regime in Afghanistan, talks were conducted through the mediation of U.N. Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez in Geneva. They come to be known as "Proximity Talks".

In the first chapter, the background of the Afghan crisis which started from 1973 coup against King Zahir Shah and subsequent developments like the 1978 Saur Revolution, PDPA's social and economic policies, Soviet intervention, Afghan refugee problem in Pakistan and its effect on Pakistan's socio-economic and political spheres and the US-Pakistani involvement in the Afghan crisis.

The second chapter high lights the twelve rounds of ^{Geneva talks} and the Pakistani response o them. The achievements and failures of each round of talk also be discussed. The third chapter discusses the four agreements of the Geneva Accord and their implications for the concerned parties. The fourth and concluding chapter briefly disscusses the developments after signing the accords and Pakistan's unwillingness to settle the long-standing bloodshed in Afghanistan.

I am deeply thankful to my Supervisor and teacher, Dr. Kalim Bahadur who literally left no stone unturned in leading me through the maze of present research work. He took care in revising and bringing shape to the unwieldy and amorphous efforts of mine.

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CHAVALA BABU RAO

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan is a backward tribal society. Its population is about 15.5 million.⁽¹⁾ About 2.5 million follow a nomadic or seminomadic way of life. It is a multi-national state. The Pashtuns account for about half of the total population, the rest being Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Chahar Aimaks, Nuristanis, Baluchis and other ethnic groups. Over 98 per cent of the country's inhabitants profess Islam. The majority of the population is engaged in farming, a key sector of the economy, which accounts for approximately two-thirds of the national income. Agriculture in pre-Revolutionary Afghanistan was backward, characterised by a low technical level and the pre-dominant use of manual labour. On the other hand, industry is comparatively weak.

Afghanistan had been a coveted object by two rising imperialist powers. These were, British

1. S.V. Nair, Afghanistan: Perspectives for Reconciliation and Peace, PUNCHSHEEL, (New Delhi, 1988) P.2.

imperialism in the east and Czarist imperialism in the north. The tribal society was in a perpetual state of upheaval. Islam had been mixed with tribal mores and way of life. Moreover, the Afghan state had emerged only two hundred years ago. During these two centuries Afghanistan was faced with three invasions from British imperialism, which was entrenched in the Indian sub-continent. It was only with the rise of King Amanullah that Afghanistan became an independent and sovereign country.

King Amanullah introduced limited democratic rights and some governmental institutions. In the sphere of economic reforms attempt was made to eliminate the most archaic forms of feudalism for speeding up of the development of a new socio-economic system.² These reforms helped the new emerging classes, the new landlords and the national commercial bourgeoisie. These reforms adversely affected the dominant classes, the

2. Kalim Bahadur, "Geneva Accord And the Conflict in Afghanistan". Presented on 28th April, 1989 in International Convention on Cooperation for Peace, Security and Development in the Asia-Pacific Region in Global context. P.2.

orthodox elite of the Muslim clerics, tribal Khans, and big feudal landlords. Amanullah did not abolish feudalism and feudal exploitation of peasants.

The discontent endangered by the reforms was exploited by the Mullahs to organise an uprising which led to the overthrow of Amanullah in 1929. The uprising was led by Bacha Sagar. One of the supporters of Bacha Sagar was Mullah Shor Bazar Mujaddidi fore father of the President of the Mujahideen government in Peshawar. The Mujaddidi was supported by the British and the present serine of the family is in the well known power. The new regime annulled the economic and social reforms introduced by King Amanullah. Afghanistan once again went back to the dark ages. Schools were closed and education was controlled by the Mullahs. Ministries of Education and Justice were abolished, and justice was now controlled by the Shariat Court and women were deprived of even the rudimentary rights which they had received under Amanullah.³

3. Ibid. P.3.

Mullahs and big Khans controlled the country. The economy was also upset. Properties of the supporters of Amanullah and a large number of merchants were confiscated and plundered. Trade, both foreign and domestic, was paralysed.

Bacha Saqa was over thrown by Nadir Khan with the help of the British in India. Nadir was supported by the former enemies of Amanullah - feudal lords, Sardars, tribal Khans and orthodox Mullahs who had deserted Bacha Saqa. Nadir Shah was also backed by the new emerging classes - the liberal land owners, merchants and money lenders. Nadir Shah kept the privileges of the orthodox Mullah which had been granted to them by Bacha Saqa. The Nadir Shah regime was also close to the British rulers in India and he helped them in curbing the anti-imperialist freedom movement on the Frontier. The monarchy imposed by Nadir Shah, who was succeeded by his brother Zahir Shah, continued till 1973 when, in a Palace Coup, the latter was over thrown.

On the other hand, the role of Pakistan has

become an important factor in South Asian Politics. To a great extent the external and internal policies of the military rulers have begun to influence the course of events in Asia, particularly in South and South-West Asia. The birth of Pakistan, in 1947, aroused expectations among her people that they would become masters of their own destiny. But this aspiration has remained unrealised. However, the people of Pakistan continued to fight against an unrestrained repression even as the "Military Juntas" were trying to divert their attention by slogans of "Muslim nation", "Muslim Economy" and "Muslim Polity".⁴

Despite a lapse of forty one years after its independence a stable independent, and decisive political system is yet to be established in Pakistan. Right from its inception, the country has been plagued by instability and has been unable to free itself from personalised and autocratic rule. In its quest for political stability it has moved between sixteen years

4. V.D. Chopra, ed; Pakistan and the Asian Peace, Patriot Publishers (New Delhi, 1985) P.10.

of Civilian rule (1947-58 and 1972-1977) and about twenty four years of military bureaucratic governance (1958-1971 and 1977-88). The accidental death of General Zia-ul-Haq in August 1988, opened the doors, with deep rooted problems, for Civilian rule, headed by Ms. Benazir Bhutto.

Autocratic and military rule has been the bane of Pakistani politics. The concentration of power in a single leader has been the most striking characteristic of its political tradition. In spite of its meagre resources, an almost chronic instability and lack of legitimacy of the Gen. Zia's military regime, Pakistan continued to play a significant role both in South and South-West Asia.⁵ And, it also played a prominent role in the Afghan crisis.

Since 1947 relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have remained strained. Sometimes they have even reached the brink of war. The framework of Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan carries the deep imprint

⁵ R.G. Sawhney, Zia's Pakistan: Implications For Indian Security, ABC, (New Delhi, 1985) P.18.

of the British imperialist heritage of treating that country as a buffer and of defending the legitimacy of the Durand Line as the international border. When the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan on 27th December 1979, the "buffer" had disappeared, the situation in the region had changed, and Gen. Zia-ul-Haq's regime looked for outside support against its two powerful neighbours, viz. India and Afghanistan. The events in Afghanistan in which Pakistan had played a key role, were being used by Gen. Zia to improve Pakistan's bargaining position against China and the United States.⁶

The Indian sub-continent was partitioned in August 1947, and Pakistan inherited the controversial Durand Line as the border with Afghanistan. One consequence of this has been the continuation of hostile relations between the two neighbours. Pakhistan, a corollary of the Durand Line, has been the central issue and the source of the bitterness between Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁷

6. K.P. Misra, ed; Afghanistan in crisis, Vikas (New Delhi 1981) P. 84.

7. Ibid. P. 87.

Since many countries were involved in the Afghan crisis, the problem became complicated. Hence, the U.N. had to negotiate for a peaceful political settlement. In order to reach a comprehensive settlement of various issues involved, the UN conducted twelve rounds of indirect talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

To understand Pakistan's Afghan policy and its role in the Geneva Proximity talks, one must have to probe the developments which led to the out-break of the 1978 Saur Revolution, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, its subsequent effects on Pakistan and Pakistan's perceptions and consequent reactions to these developments. And also one has to examine the involvement of the US, China, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Moreover, the involvement of both the Super powers and other countries made the Afghan crisis complicated and it was to be settled through the UN sponsored proximity talks which were begun in June, 1982.

The roots of the on going crisis in Afghanistan can be traced to the July 1973 coup against King Zahir Shah staged by his own cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud.

The communists, particularly those who were in the army, had supported the Daoud. But the Daoud regime was slow in implementing the promised reforms and was not serious about them. After sometimes, even the pretensions of fulfilling the promises were openly given up. Daoud began to act much more according to his class character of a tribal Sardar. He appointed his friends, sons of friends, Sychophants and even members of the deposed royal family to important positions in his administration. He gradually began to depend more and more on a Coterie of advisors even for his day-to-day administration.

In the meantime the communist movement in Afghanistan had reached a turning point. In 1965, the Afghan communists promptly came out with a newspaper called Khalq ("People") published by Noor Mohammad Taraki in Afghanistan. In 1967 the Khalq group split into two. The break away faction headed by Babrak Karmal started its own newspaper, Parcham ("Flag"), in March 1968. Another splinter of the Khalq and the Parcham styled itself Shula-e-Javed ("Eternal Flame") and Sitam-e-Milli, respectively. Thus, apart from personal and

factional problems, there was a divergence in views as regards the preparedness of the Afghan masses to absorb the April revolution. The Khalq, the larger section with lower middle class connection, advocated the tactic of pushing ahead with a revolutionary secular policy ignoring the archaic feudal and Islamic base of the Afghan society. The Parcham with its upper middle class connection seemed to have been more anxious to make allowances for the unpreparedness of the Afghans for the revolution and the pervasive influence of the Muslim divines.⁸ The fact that the Khalq and the Parcham closed their ranks and worked unitedly for Daoud's removal under the banner of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Thus, two factions, Khalq and Parcham had come together in July 1977. Communists had supported Daoud in 1973 in the hope of the emergence of a democratic Afghanistan. Daoud was increasingly reverting to the authoritarian and monarchical ways of his predecessors. In the external sphere he tilted towards the West and the

8. Arundhati Roy, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Causes, consequences and India's Response. Associated Publishers (New Delhi 1987) P. 17.

Shah of Iran. Actually the revolution had been sparked by the indignation provoked by the brutal murder of Mir Akbar Khyber on April 17, 1978. Thousands of workers, students, youth and women and other poor people had been enraged by the murder of Mir Akbar Khyber, a respected trade union leader and one of the founders of the PDPA. Disturbances had broken out in Kabul that sparked off widespread demonstrations. This was how the instability and inability of Daoud's regime created the conditions for the out-brake of the 1978 April Revolution and which led to the toppling of his regime on April 27, 1978.

The April Revolution had been a controversial event as all revolutions are. Was the Saur Revolution brought about by Soviet manipulation or because of certain accidental events? There was no evidence that the Soviet Union had any direct or indirect role to play in bringing about the overthrow of the Daoud regime. Even sources usually hostile to the Soviet Union were unable to discover any Soviet hand in the out-broak of the Saur Revolution.⁹

9. Kalim Bahadur and others, Inside Afghanistan, Patriot Publishers (New Delhi 1985) P. 26.

After the Saur Revolution Nur Mohammad Taraki was elected as the President and the Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal was the Vice-President of the Council and also the first Deputy Prime Minister.

The objectives of the Saur Revolution were: elimination of all feudal and prefeudal remnants; combating the influence and conspiracies of imperialism; carrying out democratic land and water reforms, and; distribution of land to landless and small landholders, development of the national economy, upgrading the living conditions of the people ensuring the real cultures of the people of Afghanistan imbuing them with a progressive and new content, democratization of Socio-political life and pursuance of a peaceful foreign policy.¹⁰

People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, under Nur Mohammad Taraki, had initiated Socio-economic, educational and political reforms for restructuring the entire socio-economic and political fabric. The approach adopted to

10. Ibid. P. 27.

implement these reforms has shown negative impact especially due to their inexperience in implementing. The mistakes in implementing the reforms also led to the disunity and differences within the Party and the alienation of an increasing number of people from the revolutionary regime. This gave a boost to opposition forces to intensify their struggle against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

A major responsibility for these errors lay with the then leadership of the PDPA which soon after the removal of Taraki in September 1979, passed into the hands of Hafizullah Amin. He, in his drive for power, followed Sectarian policies and used factional tactics within the party which led to the alienation of a larger section of the Afghan people. He, even organised the murder of Nur Mohammad Taraki in September 1979. Thus, after Taraki, the hard measures which the Amin regime was taking to implement the socio-economic reforms, compelled a large number of people in the country to take refuge in Pakistan and Iran. The number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan swelled, bringing more strength to the rebel forces.¹¹

11. K.P. Misra, ed; n. 6, P. 96.

The official statement issued by the DRA Government, on 1st January 1980, had stated that a Revolutionary Tribunal consisting of many representatives of the people, ranging from civil and military party activists, to Muslim clergy and intelligentsia, workers and peasants, had given a verdict against Amin.¹² Thus, there was not much resistance in defence of Amin. By his repressive policies he had alienated a very large section of the PDPA members and the army men. Therefore, the allegation that he was killed by the Soviet army has no basis.

The Soviets had played a crucial role in the development and modernisation of Afghanistan since the late fifties. They had nothing to do with the actual revolution, any seizure of power in Kabul in April 1978. But they fully supported the Saur Revolution and extended to it considerable economic and military assistance. The Soviet Union justified her intervention in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, as its obligation under the 1979 Treaty of Peace and Friendship as well as by Article 51 of the UN Charter against the threat of alleged foreign intervention.

12. Kalim Bahadur and others, n. 9, P.26.

According to the 1979 Treaty:

Acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good neighbourliness as well as the United Nations Charter, the Parties to the treaty will consult each other and, with mutual consent, will take appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of both countries. In the interests of reinforcing the defence potentials of the Parties to the treaty, they will continue to develop co-operation in the military sphere.¹³

To understand the Afghan crisis, and the Geneva proximity talks to settle the crisis, one must also understand the Afghan refugee problem and its impact on Pakistan's socio-economic, political and strategic spheres, and how Gen. Zia used it to strengthen his position.

To understand the size and nature of the refugee problem one has to study its background. Historically the 1,500 mile long Afghan-Pakistan border has meant little to the Pashtun tribes who live on both sides of the Durand

13. Babari Sen Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics And Society - Revolution, Resistance, Intervention, (New Delhi, 1988) P. 85.

Line, that was fixed between Pakistan and Afghanistan by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, King of Afghanistan and the then British India Secretary of State Sir Mortimer Durand in 1893. Since then the Afghans were arguing that the line was meant only to indicate spheres of influences and not national boundaries.

Nonetheless, at the time of partition in 1947, the Durand Line became the official boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite Afghan protests. The border to this day is largely undemarcated and, particularly nomadic tribes in that area, have reasonably crossed back and forth from the mountains of Afghanistan in the summer to the warm Indus Plain in the winter. To the Pashtuns, the area on both sides of the border is Pashtunistan, and the Durand Line which cuts their area in half, has always been rejected as an artificial creation of the British. It is estimated that in the years' before the beginning of the 1970's and 1980's refugee influx, appropriately 75,000 Afghans crossed the border yearly. In addition it has been customary for Afghans to seek political asylum in Pakistan, or earlier in British India.

It is not unexpected, therefore, that as the trouble began in Afghanistan in 1970's, the Afghans would look towards the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan as a place of safety. There have been three stages of refugee flight, each corresponding to political events in Afghanistan.

The first refugee flight began to come out in July 1973, in the period following Mohammad Daoud Khan's overthrow of the Zahir Shah's monarchy. The refugees were largely political refugees, primarily religious fundamentalists and vested interest feudal groups who perceived Daoud's regime to be against their interests.

The second stage of refugee exodus from Afghanistan began shortly after the out-break of the 1978 Saur Revolution, while most Afghans greeted the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan with a wait and see attitude, it became clear to some other Afghans that there was something wrong. This was mainly that the PDPA government, with little understanding of the social and religious fabric of Afghanistan, attempted

to implement sweeping social changes in Afghanistan. While these changes were perhaps well meant, if naive, they plunged the country quickly into chaos. This was particularly due to the repressive policies of Hafizullah Amin, which ultimately made even PDPA supporters to leave the country as refugees to Pakistan. It is estimated that nearly a half-million refugees left Afghanistan at this time. Many intellectuals, University Professors and upper level bureaucrats were among the refugees who left for Pakistan and Iran.

In April 1979, the refugee population approached the figure of hundred thousand (100,000) and the flow at nearly 1,000 per day¹⁴. Thus, especially due to Amin's repressive policies the number of refugees multiplied rather rapidly. Pakistan appealed to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for assistance. The UNHCR urged the Pakistani government to establish official camps and to move the refugees away

14. Hafeez Malik, "The Afghan Crisis and its Impact on Pakistan", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. No. 3 (Spring, 1983) pp. 40-51

from the border for reasons of political and security importance.¹⁵ The exact number of refugee population is not known. The Government of Pakistan preferred to use higher estimates as it receives international aid based on head count, and the larger number also helped to dramatize the refugee problem.¹⁶

The Afghan crisis in general and the large concentration of refugees on Pakistani soil in particular, have given birth to many complex problems which are perhaps less obvious but quite disturbing. The Afghan refugee population is the largest in the world. The cost of maintaining it was put at around a million dollar per day in 1985.¹⁷

15. Craig Baxter, ed; Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Front-line State, (Washington, 1985) P. 94.

16. Ibid - 95.

17. Debra Denker, "Along Afghanistan's War-Torn Frontier", National Geographic, (June 1985) P. 788.

DISTRIBUTION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN IN 1985.¹⁸

| PROVINCE | CAMPS | REFUGEE POPULATION |
|--------------|------------|--------------------|
| NWFP | 77 | 13,06,695 |
| TRIBAL AREAS | 102 | 7,40,386 |
| BALUCHISTAN | 60 | 7,27,173 |
| PUNJAB | 10 | 91,552 |
| TOTAL | 249 | 28,65,806 |

The size of the refugee population creates logistical problems of providing shelter, Food, Water and other material needs on a very large scale. Thus, the Afghan refugee problem imposed many socio-economic and political problems on Pakistan.

As mentioned above, the cost of maintaining approximately three million refugees is about one million dollars a day. Pakistan meets about half of this cost while the rest comes from international donor countries and international aid organisations.¹⁹ Providing fodder and water for the animals and cattle that came along with

18. Craig Baxter, ed, n. 15, P. 94.

19. INDIAN EXPRESS (New Delhi) 6 December 1988.

the refugees caused constant difficulties for the Pakistan officials. The large concentration of refugees in certain areas has also caused ecological problems. Many forests have suffered because most of the refugees use wood for cooking and heating purposes.²⁰

The more affluent refugees have invested in various commercial ventures such as the transport business and real estate. Although the Afghan refugees were not allowed to purchase the immovable properties, the rich Afghans continue to manage to evade the rules. They have got around legal restrictions by obtaining, sometimes through bribery, national identity cards, domicile certificates or even passports. These developments not only raised property prices but also encouraged corruption. In addition, the house-rents have also soared in cities mainly because city dwelling Afghans were willing to pay higher rent which, in turn, pushed the rent ceiling beyond the capacity of the local lower middle and lower

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20. Zafar Samdani, "The Afghan Refugee: The Human Aspect", Pakistan and the Gulf Economist, (9-15 October 1986) pp. 24-5.

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classes.²¹ Afghan refugees were willing to work at lower than the market wages and have therefore secured many jobs. Consequently unemployment amongst local Pakistanis has increased.

Economic issues are, in many ways, linked with the social problems and have contributed enormously towards the existing social tensions. For example, transport, grazing land, property purchase, deforestation and unemployment have all contributed considerably towards the initial birth and later increasing the social tensions between the natives and the refugees.

In some areas where the refugees have settled, the existing sectarian balance has been upset leading to armed clashes. In Urban centres not only the increased rent ceiling caused frictions but also the 'Privileged Position' of the refugees for whom the refugee administration system atically provided all sorts of facilities raised many

21. The Nation, 2 June 1987.

questions among the local population. Since many poor Pakistanis do not enjoy most of the facilities extended to Afghan refugees the social animosities became a direct outcome of such a situation.

Another significant social problem that was hitherto non-existent in Pakistan, was the drug problem. Until the advent of the 1980's drug addiction was relatively unknown to most Pakistanis. Before the Islamic revolution in Iran most of the poppy crop was exported to Iran but with the advent of a new regime in 1979, exports to Iran altogether stopped. With the virtual vanishing of the Iranian market the growers began to set up labs in Pakistan with the objective of making more profitable heroin for export to the Western countries.²²

With Pakistan welcoming the Afghan refugees and Iran depriving the poppy growers of their market, the former became an obvious route to the West. One dangerous by-product of heroin smuggling through Pakistan was that a

22. The Newsweek, 6 October 1986.

massive increase of heroin consumption among the Pakistanis was noticed within a short span of time. In 1982 it was reported that out of 1.3 million addicts in Pakistan, roughly about 1,00,000 were heroin hooked and in 1986 the number of heroin addicts exceeded 4,50,000.²³ In 1987 the official count of addicts had risen to 19,01,225 which included 6,57,842 heroin addicts.²⁴ Since the advent of the Afghan crisis, the number has been steadily on the rise despite the governments earnest efforts to curb its consumption and to retrieve the hooked persons.

Another social problem confronting the Pakistanis is the enormously increased crime rate. It was alleged that the easy availability of large quantities of smuggled and unauthorised weapons and ammunitions has contributed substantively towards the increased rate of crimes.²⁵ Since Pakistan had been serving as

23. Yameen Mitha, "Pakistan's Heroin Problem", The Muslim, 14 August 1986.

24. The Muslim, 2 June 1987.

25. The Nation, 31 July 1987.

the conduit for weapon supplies to the Mujahideen, it was confirmed that Pakistani Political leaders and military officials were selling these arms on the black market for lower prices by which they have benefitted with huge profits.²⁶

As per Pakistani reports, a Chinese Kalashnikov, also known as the AK-47, was available for Rs. 15,000, while a locally - produced copy from the renowned gun-smiths of the area, costs a mere Rs. 7000. Its bullets are for only a rupee each. A grenade launcher costs just Rs. 25,000.²⁷ A combination of these factors have not only increased the availability of weapons but have also reduced the prices. Thus, cheap weapons which were easily attainable, in turn, seemed to have contributed its share towards increasing the crime rate.²⁸

26. Time, 9 December 1985.

27. Indian Express (New Delhi) 6 December 1988.

28. The Nation, 31 July 1987.

The presence of a large number of Afghan refugees has also caused many political problems in Pakistan. The number of refugees were swollen to more than three million and the time span has already covered ten years with no visible signs of an early return of the refugees.

The political problems that were in some way directly connected with the refugees and which need to be highlighted were the growth of terrorism, and sharp cleavages among the political parties regarding the Afghan refugees and their eventual return. The internal feuds between various Mujahideen groups and factions were manifested in the forms of irresponsible terrorist acts.²⁹

There was a divergence amongst politicians of Pakistan on how to deal with the refugee problem. Some political parties had taken advantage of the situation to the extent of cultivating the refugees in order to create vote-banks. It was also believed that refugees

29. Pervaiz Iqbal Chishti, "Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan" Strategic Digest, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, (April 1988) P. 534.

as well as drug runners have created political lobbies. In Baluchistan, most of the refugees were Pakhtoons who had increased the local population by 10 to 15 per cent. This has upset the delicate balance between the Baluchis and Pakhtoons.

Pak-Afghan relations, which were already tense due to the unresolved issue of the future status of Pakhtoons and Baluchis received a serious setback from the Afghan crisis. The border between the two countries has once again become hot as the rebel activities against the Afghan government supported and encouraged by authorities across the Durand Line have been increased. The Daoud-Brutto talks of 1976-77 came to an end, with a marginal possibility of resuming the negotiations on substantial issues, in the near future.

The overthrow of the Daoud regime by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan combining 'Khalq' and 'Parcham' groups in April 1978 was interpreted by Pakistan and the Western countries as a communist coup. Pakistan and Western strategists also regarded the event

as the part of a bigger plan of the Soviet expansion in Asia.

But the fact is that there was no major contradictions between the Soviet and Afghan interests, implying that there was no evident need for Moscow to overthrow the Daoud regime. Actually Moscow's relations with Kabul had always been friendly since 1921 as all the governments had agreed to refrain from permitting their territory to be used for anti-Soviet purposes.³⁰ The take over by Taraki was apparently occasioned by internal Afghan events rather than encouraged or ordered by the Soviet Union. Taraki himself denied that Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was communist or Marxist-oriented. He declared Moscow's hand in the coup and called it as the "Afghan Model, unparalleled in the region."³¹

In Pakistani perception the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan dramatically transformed Pakistan's geostrategic situation as it posed a serious threat to Pakistani

30. Surendra Chopra, ed., Perspectives on Pakistans Foreign Policy, (Amritsar, 1983) P. 326.

31. Ibid. P. 328.

security from a Super power. General Zia-ul-Haq fully exploited the Afghan situation and emerged as a valuable ally in US strategy in South Asian region.

It is well known that Pakistan under Gen. Zia has become the front-line State of the US. Afghan insurgents are provided with the necessary facilities on the Pakistani soil, financed and supplied the arms by the US, Egypt and China, to carry on the undeclared war against the DRA. Thus, the US objective in keeping the insurgency alive is part of its aggressive global policy against the Soviet Union and the democratic forces. With these objectives the US has resumed massive supplies of arms to Pakistan and has also been increasing, every year, its supplies to the insurgents. The aid jumped from \$ 120 million in 1984 to \$ 250 million in 1985, \$ 470 million in 1986, and \$ 630 million in 1987.³² Massive supplies of the US arms to Gen. Zia, strengthened the military establishment in Pakistan. That was one of

32. Selig S. Harrison, "Inside The Afghan Talks" Foreign Policy, No. 72 (Washington, Fall 1988) P. 50.

the main causes to reduce the strengthening of a democratic civilian regime taking over in that country, which might seek a peaceful solution to the Pak-Afghan problems.

General Zia-ul-Haq, who was close to the right-wing Jamaat-i-Islami, had a vested interest in blocking the progressive and democratic advance in Afghanistan. He wrongly perceived that, if national Democratic Revolution succeeds in Afghanistan, it will have serious repercussions in Pakistan. Even the democratic forces in Pakistan demanded that Gen. Zia must enter into a direct dialogue with Kabul to settle the Afghan refugee problem, but he did not do it against the wishes of the US to strengthen his narrow mass-based political power by saying that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was a threat to Pakistan.

The Afghan refugees in Pakistan served as a tool to whip up religious emotions, which in turn helped the military rulers in Pakistan to mobilise

support for themselves in Arab countries. It was openly said that Gen. Zia does not want the Afghan refugees to go back, since that will dry up economic and military aid from Arab countries.³³ Most of the refugees also did not show inclination to go back to Afghanistan since Pakistan was providing more opportunities to remain as refugees and live on without doing any work.

Thus, instead of solving the above mentioned socio-economic and political problems, the narrow mass-based military regime of President Zia used the Afghan crisis to legitimise its autocratic and dictatorial government. By the refugee problem in Pakistan the common man was mostly effected socially, economically and politically. The elite class, military officials and bureaucrats have benefitted mostly. By internationalising this issue Zia had been able to gain the maximum possible aid from the oil rich Arab-countries and the West, particularly the US. As a front-line State, Pakistan under Gen.

33. Kalim Bahadur, n. 9, P. 33.

Zia, thus received huge amount of aid and showed a reluctance to solve the Afghan crisis through the proximity talks which were initiated by the UN.

CHAPTER - II

GENEVA PROXIMITY TALKS AND PAKISTAN

CHAPTER IIGENEVA PROXIMITY TALKS AND PAKISTAN

In the gory revolutionary drama of Afghanistan the contending parties were five. Three were directly involved: Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and Pakistan; two others - the United States and about three million Afghan refugees, who were being sheltered in Pakistan, who were indirectly involved, though rebel activities rather than that of negotiation. The two parties most directly involved were Afghanistan and Pakistan. The resistance could not have assumed the proportions it has had if Pakistan refused to harbour the refugees to wage the so-called Jihad against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The Afghan resistance carried out large-scale insurgent operations, with generous assistance from the United States, Pakistan and several other countries including Saudi Arabia. Pakistan cast itself in a key role. It reserved for itself effective control of the movement of the arms and weapons mobilised by the US for the rebel activities. Pakistan was the recipient of a

\$ 3.2 billion package of military and economic assistance from the United States spread over the period 1980-86 and a \$ 4.02 billion package of economic and military aid for next term period.(1)

After the removal of Democratically elected government through the Military coup, the Zia regime was badly isolated throughout the world. The Zia regime needed something with which it would prop up its own image. Thus, the main reasons for Pakistan to interfere in Afghan internal affairs were internal. It had to put an end to the pressures exerted on the regime for restoration of democracy.² The economy was fast declining due to different factors, internal as well as those related to oil prices in the Gulf area and to the lack of foreign aid.³

The other reason was to crush the people's revolution in Afghanistan because if the revolution there succeed, it would naturally constitute a good example for the masses of Pakistan to follow.

1. Bhabani Sen Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society - Revolution, Resistance, Intervention (New Delhi, 1988) P.137

2. V.D.Chopra, ed: Afghanistan: Geneva Accords and After (New Delhi, 1986) P.50.

3. Ibid - 51.

Therefore, to divert the attention of the people from the internal situation, to prevent the positive impact of the Afghan revolution on Pakistan and break the isolation which gripped the Pakistani regime after the killing of Mr.Z.A.Bhutto. Pakistan opted for heavily supporting rebel activities in Afghanistan by saying that the Soviet intervention was big threat to it.

The Soviet Union and the United States were also involved in the Afghan crisis. The Soviet Union became the defender of the revolution with their intervention in the last week of December, 1979. On the other hand, the United States had tried its level best to spoil the achievements of the 1978 Saur Revolution.

Afghanistan has been traditionally friendly to the USSR which was the first great power to recognise its independence in 1919. The Soviet Union justified her intervention as its obligation under the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty. Moreover, developments in the region like the fall of Shah of Iran in January 1979, rise of conservative forces through Islamic revivalism in Iran and Pakistan, increased insurgency and rebel activities with foreign military assistance particularly the US

against the government of the DRA, the escalation of American military presence in the Persian Gulf, were perceived by the Soviet leaders as potential threats to its own national security interests. Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU described the Soviet decision to send troops to Afghanistan as "no easy decision". "To act otherwise" he said, would have meant to watch passively the establishment on our southern border of a seat of serious danger to the security of the Soviet Union⁴.

Thus, these developments in the region around Afghanistan, particularly precipitated the Soviet Union to despatch its troops into the Afghan territory on 27 December, 1979. It may be also noted that both the Taraki and Amin governments repeatedly requested for Soviet help to check outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the US had different reasons to support the cause of rebel and insurgent activities and to support the stand of Pakistan against Afghanistan. The government in Afghanistan was inherently anti-imperialist. The US, the leader of the imperialist world took it as its duty to do everything possible to topple the PDPA

PDPA government and to prevent its consolidation.

The overthrow of the Daoud regime by the PDPA in April 1978 was perceived by the United States as the communist coup in Afghanistan. The US strategists regarded the Soviet intervention as part of a larger plan of Soviet expansion in Asia and of acquiring control over the West-Asian oil and gaining access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean⁵.

With the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet intervention, the Gulf region acquired prominence in the US strategic perceptions during the latter part of the Carter Administration. President Reagan continued the initiative of his predecessors line to protect its interests. Since the Shah of Iran had gone and with him a major bastion of imperialism in the region was dismantled. The United States needed a new bastion in the place of Iran. Since Pakistan located in the vicinity of the region acquired more strategic importance for the United States⁶. Thus, Pakistan became, in the US perception, a 'front line' state to curb the Afghan revolution to

5. Ibid. P.93

6. Ibid. P.95

safeguard its imperialist interests.

Against the background of mutual distrust and suspicion in Pak-US relations resulting from the 1965, 1971 Indo-Pak wars Nov.1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Islamabad by a mob and burning of the American flag, number of cars and buildings; the US move to show tremendous interest in Pakistan is worth noting. In spite of the previous differences the United States resumed its strategic and military collaboration with Pakistan and to transform it into its strong ally to encourage rebel activities of the so-called Mujahideen groups. For this purpose, Pakistan received a huge package of military and economic assistance of \$ 3.2 billion over the period 1980-86 and \$ 4.02 billion for the next term period. There were open claims in the US, to turn Afghanistan into a 'Soviet Vietnam' and to make the Soviets 'pay' for their venture in Afghanistan⁷. Thus, the main objective in announcing the huge aid to Pakistan and supporting the insurgents was clearly indicated that it was against the soviet forces and achievements of the PDPA Government in Afghanistan.

7. Surendera Chopra, ed. Perspectives on Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Amritsar, 1983) P.331.

Both the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) were keen on a peaceful resolution of the Afghan crisis which included the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from that country. The DRA had announced its first plan for a peaceful solution of the Afghanistan problem in April 1980 and again in May the same year. The proposals had the backing of the Soviet Union. The central point of these proposals was to ensure the complete termination of aggressive actions against Afghanistan, of subversive activities, and all other forms of interference from outside in its internal affairs. These assurances were to be guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. Both Pakistan and Iran refused to enter into any negotiations with the DRA as they did not recognise the legitimacy of the DRA government then headed by Babrak Karmal.

The signing of the Geneva Accords, on 14 April 1988, was the outcome of the long indirect negotiations that were conducted between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under the auspices of the US Secretary General's Personal Representative, Diego Cordovez, to end the bloodshed and conflict.

On 14. May 1980, Afghanistan had put forward a comprehensive programme for a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan and normalisation of relations with Pakistan and Iran. Bilateral talks were proposed to work out agreements on the basis of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and mutually beneficial cooperation. Negotiations could be conducted provided that Afghanistan's sovereignty was respected and all hostile activities against it had ceased.

The reason why the United States was accepted as a mediatory party by Pakistan and Afghanistan is not due to the fact that the UN is an international body having experiences of previous mediation efforts, but because other countries which could be potential mediators were either overtly or covertly involved in the Afghan crisis⁸. Apart from that international bodies like NAM countries, organisation of Islamic countries have also demanded the U.N. to settle the Afghan crisis.

8. P.B.Sinha, "Geneva Talks on the Afghan Problem", Strategic Analysis, (August-September 1981) P.206-14.

Thus, the UN General Assembly resolution of 18 November 1981 had authorised the then Secretary General Mr. Waldhien to attempt to negotiate a peaceful political solution to the crisis. After consultations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, the negotiations began in June 1982. But Islamabad refused to recognise the People's Democratic Party regime in Afghanistan and also refused to have direct talks. That was why the talks were conducted through the mediation of the UN, Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, Diego Cordovez in Geneva. They came to be known as 'Proximity Talks'.

Since both the Super Powers involved in the Afghan crisis, security and peace was threatened in the south-Asian region in particular and in the world in general. Despite many international organisations and individual countries requests, the U.N. passed many resolutions by demanding that the concerned parties end the Afghan crisis.

The UN General Assembly, on 18 November 1980 called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and reaffirmed the right of the Afghan people

to determine their own form of government and to choose their socio-economic and political system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever. The General Assembly's decision was passed by vote of 116 in favour to 23 against, with 12 abstentions⁹.

Under other provisions of the resolution, the General Assembly called up on all parties concerned to work for a peaceful political solution and the creation of conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour, and the UN appealed to states, and national and international organisations to continue to extend humanitarian relief assistance to alleviate the hardship of Afghan refugees, in coordination with the United Nations High Commission For Refugees¹⁰.

The General Assembly also expressed appreciation of the Secretary General's efforts in the search for a solution

9. U.N.Chronicle (Washington, January 1982) P.31.

10. Ibid, P.32

of the problem and requested him to continue those efforts with a view to promoting a political solution. Also requested was the exploration of the means of securing appropriate guarantees for the non-use of force, or threat of the use of the force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Afghanistan and Pakistan and all neighbouring states on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each others internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the U.N. Charter¹¹.

The then U.N. Secretary General Mr. Waldheim appointed Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, then Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs on 11 February 1981 as his personal representative responsible for following up his efforts¹². Mr. Perez de Cuellar travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan in April 1981 and held discussions with senior officials of those Governments. Both the Governments emphasised their desire for a peaceful solution and welcomed the visit of the Secretary-General's representative

11. UN DOC S/14745 PP 15-16

12. Ibid . P.16

as a positive step that might lead to negotiations. The discussions focussed on the possible format for the negotiations. While the talks were not conclusive, both sides indicated that they expected them to be pursued further. The Government of Iran and other interested Governments were informed of these discussions¹³. The U.N. General Secretary also visited the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic in May 1981. It expressed its full support for a continuation of the efforts towards a peaceful solution of the problem¹⁴.

During Perez de Cuellar's subsequent discussions with the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan in July 1981, an understanding was reached on the substantive issues to be negotiated but differences remained on the question of the format of future negotiations. But both governments reaffirmed their interest in de-escalating tension in the area and in continuing the search for a peaceful solution.

13. UN Chronicle (Washington, January 1982) P.28

14. UN monthly chronicle (Washington, February, 1982) P.13.

On 24 August 1981, the Government of Afghanistan issued a statement in which it explained its position on a number of substantive questions and, with regard to the format of future negotiations, indicated its readiness to hold trilateral negotiations if Pakistan and Iran expressed such a desire. ^{15.}

In the second half of September and early October 1981, the Secretary General and his personal representative had held several discussions separately with the then foreign minister of Pakistan Agha Shahi and the Afghan Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost. While acknowledging the close interrelationship between the various issues involved, they stressed their respective priorities regarding the substantive issues to be negotiated. Also, the parties agreed to a preparatory discussion through Perez de Cuellar on those issues. ^{16.}

On January 1982 de Cuellar assumed the Office of Secretary-General of the U.N. In February 1982, he appointed Mr. Diego Cordovez, Under Secretary-General, as his personal representative for political affairs. From 11 to 19 April 1982 Cordovez visited Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, and met the respective heads

15. UN Chronicle. n.9, P-33

16. UN DOC S/15429. P-97

of Governments and foreign Ministers, and had detailed exchange of views to define the substantive contents and scope of the issues to be considered namely :

1. Withdrawal of foreign troops,
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States,
3. International guarantees of non-interference
4. The voluntary return of refugees to their houses.^{17.}

It was agreed upon, inasmuch as these issues were interrelated, that the discussions would be aimed at a comprehensive settlement. As far as the procedural arrangements were concerned, it was decided, as a first step, to hold a round of discussions through the intermediary, Cordovez in Geneva in Mid-June 1982.^{18.}

Pakistan agreed to have indirect talks not with the Afghanistan Government, but with the representatives of the ruling people's Democratic Party. Iran's participation in the talks was not insisted upon, since it was agreed that its representative in Geneva would be kept informed about the development at the Geneva talks. Iran was

17. Ibid. P-98

18. P.B. Sinha, "Geneva Talks on the Afghan Problem", Strategic Analysis, (September, 1982) PP. 337 - 43

unwilling to take any active part in the parleys, but it decided not to oppose them.

Pakistan did not insist on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops as a precondition to a dialogue and agreed to have indirect talks. Kabul also agreed to participate in talks under the auspices of the UN without pressing for recognition by Islamabad, but, on the conditions that the talks would not be focussed or linked with the resolutions of the UN, which had already been rejected by Afghanistan. Thus, after much deliberations, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to participate in the indirect talks.

Accordingly, the first round of indirect talks was held in Geneva from 16 to 25 June 1982.¹⁹ The discussions were wide-ranging and were carried out in a constructive spirit, the interlocutors had dealt with the specifics of each of the four agenda items mentioned above. They also exchanged views on possible approaches to overcome problems in the context of the comprehensive settlement and its implementation. As a result, it was

19. Ibid. P. 341

possible to define in much greater detail the positions of the interlocutors, to identify areas of agreement and to develop ideas as to the structure and contents of the comprehensive settlement. Thus, in the first round of talks, progress was made in efforts towards reaching an understanding of other point of view on important issues. The other major parties to the conflict, the US, the USSR and Afghan resistance groups were not involved in the talks. But the Soviet Union affirmed its support in finding a political settlement for the problem.²⁰

In January 1983, Cordovez met President Zia-ul-Haq, Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yakub Khan in Islamabad and other senior officials of the Government. In Kabul he met President Babrak Karmal, Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand and Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost. In Tehran he met Foreign Secretary Ali Akbar Velayati and other senior officials. These consultations were held to widen the understanding that was reached during the first round of proximity talks. In fact, additional understandings were reached on the nature and operation

20. D.R. Goyal, "Prospects of Pak-Afghan Talks", Main-stream, (New Delhi, 18 June 1983) pp. 9-10.

of a "Policy mechanism" that would be articulated in the comprehensive settlement and on the kind of provisions required to ensure its effective implementation.²¹ These consultations have also led to an agreement to conduct a second round of proximity talks.

At the end of March 1983, de Cuellar had paid a visit to the USSR. During which he exchanged views on the situation in Afghanistan with the new USSR President Yuri Andropov and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The Soviet Government expressed strongly in favour of a political settlement and supported categorically the continuation of Geneva proximity talks.

The second round of Geneva proximity talks was held in two phases: the first from 11 to 22 April and the second from 12 to 24 June 1983.²² During the talks, which were conducted in a very constructive spirit, substantial progress was made in the definition of the contents of the comprehensive settlement, its principles and objectives, the interrelationship amongst its four component elements and the provisions, including time-

21. Ibid. P. 10.

22. UN Doc S/16005 PP. 102-3.

frames, for its implementation.²³

The main effort of Diego Cordovez in the second round of talks was devoted to seek clarifications from Pakistan and Afghanistan of their respective stands on the major issues mentioned. UN draft for the settlement. He tried to focus his attention on infusing greater precision into the draft text, clarifying doubts and expanding the areas of understanding.

The second round of talks which aroused high hopes but were dashed to the ground by the rigid conditions of Pakistan, like withdrawal of Soviet Troops as a precondition for talks, and demand to consult Afghan refugee leaders. On the other hand, Afghanistan stressed on guarantees of non-interference from Pakistan, Iran, the United States and China.

During most of the negotiating efforts, the US did little to help Diego Cordovez, after insinuating that he was being used for Soviet propaganda purpose.²⁴

23. Ibid. P. 103.

24. Selig S. Harrison, "Inside the Afghan Talks", Foreign Policy (Washington, No. 72, Fall 1988) P.32.

In early 1983, when a break through appeared possible, the US sent negative signals ranging from Scepticism to bitter hostility. It also increased military and economic aid to Pakistan and made it not cooperate with Cordovez's efforts.²⁵ Yuri Andropov's professed readiness to withdraw Soviet forces was never tested, and shortly thereafter his death brought negotiations to a virtual stand still for sometime.²⁶ Thus, the US and Pakistan were the main actors to obstruct the progress of the second round of talks.

Diego Corovez paid a visit to the problem stricken area from 3 to 15 April 1984. He met Pakistani, Afghan and Iranian heads of governments and officials where they had responded positively to continue the talks. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated to Cordovez its desire and reaffirmed that it remained strongly in support of the legitimate interests and objectives of the Afghan people.²⁷ He also visited the USSR to exchange

25. "Pakistan as US-Saudi Surrogate in the Region", Organiser, (13 November 1983) P. 5.

26. Sellig S. Harrison, n. 24, P. 38.

27. UN. Doc S/16754, PP 70-71.

views on the situation with President Chernenko and Foreign Minister Gromyko. The Soviet Government encouraged him to continue the Geneva talks and reaffirmed its support for a negotiated political settlement.

Accordingly, a third round of "proximity discussions was convened at Geneva from 24 to 30 August 1984. In these talks, Pakistan affirmed its adherence to its well known four point stand by leaving its demand of Soviet withdrawal as a precondition for talks.²⁸ Pakistan also emphasised the importance of applying an integrated approach to the draft package of the settlement under consideration instead of a differentiated approach towards the four essential elements contained in the package. And Pakistan started to insist upon the time-frame and return of the Afghan refugees.²⁹ On the other hand, the Afghan delegation attempted to put the entire focus on the mutual guarantees of

28. Sultan Ahmed, "Pak Hopes over Afghan Issue Rest on Summit", Times of India (New Delhi 4 Nov. 1985)

29. Times of India (Delhi, 26 July 1986).

non-interference and non-intervention. Thus, the Third round of talks did not achieve much due to Pakistan's time-frame demand and changing its stand frequently by putting new conditions.

The US attitude to the Geneva talks process had been less than helpful. While realising the difficulties inherent in the situation, it was more concerned with promoting its own interests. The US openly claimed that "Afghanistan is gone" but they would make the Russians "Pay" by encouraging the Afghan resistance.³⁰ Thus, it was clear that, the US was very reluctant to give any meaningful support to UN mediation efforts.

Despite Cordovez's Persistent efforts the concerned parties agreed to hold the fourth round talks in February 1985.³¹ But at the beginning of 1985, the Government of Pakistan requested a postponement of the talks on account of the fact that elections had, in the meantime, been scheduled in

30. C.S. Sawney, Zia's Pakistan: Implications For India's Security, (New Delhi, 1985) P. 77.

31. UN. Doc S/17527. P. 10-11.

that country. And also due to a number of difficulties raised by both sides at that time, the talks had to be postponed.

After Cordovez's visit to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran from 25 to 31 May 1985 an understanding was reached that the political settlement should consist of a set of instruments that would include a bilateral agreement on non-interference and non-intervention; a declaration on international guarantees; a bilateral agreement on the voluntary return of refugees, and an instrument that would set out the interrelationships between the aforementioned instruments and the solution of the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Afghanistan and the USSR.³²

Accordingly, the fifth round was convened from 20 to 24 June 1985. During these talks, it was possible to complete the formulation of two draft bilateral agreements, one covering the principles of mutual relations

32. Ibid. P. 11.

in particular on non-interference and non-intervention; and the other containing all the arrangements for the voluntary return of refugees and also of guarantors.

Thus, at the fifth round of discussions, the first three instruments had been settled and only the fourth concerning "interrelationship", which would link the Soviet withdrawal, its time-frame and Pakistan's promise not to allow its soil for attacks on Afghanistan by resistance groups, was to be settled. When Cordovez formally submitted the texts to the Super powers, Moscow was quick to respond favourably. But Washington was reluctant, and it was not, until August 23, 1985, just four days before the scheduled start of the sixth round, given its verbal assurance to serve as a guarantor. Cordovez asked for this in writing, but received only a brief note to act as a guarantor. Thus, the US, from the beginning, discouraged the process of the Geneva indirect talks.

The sixth round of talks was held from 27 to 30 August 1985. In these talks the Minister of

Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan proposed to hold the talks directly on the instrument of interrelationships. But Pakistan rejected it. Therefore a draft instrument on interrelationships could not be considered. Thus, the sixth round of talks in August 1985 did not bring the parties any closer to a settlement. Pakistan was insistent that the Soviet's should announce a time-frame of their withdrawal. The Soviet Union refused to oblige and it became a strumbling block.³⁴

However, Michail Gorbachev, who had now become the Soviet leader, began to drop enough hints that he wanted his country out of Afghanistan. Under his leadership Moscow also began sending signals to Pakistan that it could hope for a massive economic aid from the Soviet Union. As a token of his intentions, he said at Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, that he would withdraw six regiments from Afghanistan, stressing the expectation that this unilateral step would be answered by a curtailment of outside interference in Afghanistan.³⁵ Further, Gorbachev supported the efforts of national

34. UN. Chronicle (August 1986) P. 31.

35. Y.D. Chopra, n. 2, P. 99.

reconciliation in Afghanistan, including setting up of a government with the participation in it of political forces which find themselves outside the country's borders³⁶

Nevertheless, Babrak Karmal made a specific time-table offer and Kabul submitted a draft of instrument four containing a 48 month time-table. But Cordovez warned that such an out-landish proposal would expose the negotiations at ridicule. On 4 May 1986, just hours before the start of the Seventh round Karmal was replaced President of the DRA by Dr. Najibullah.

The Seventh round of negotiations was held from 31 July to 8 August 1986 to consider two outstanding issues in the draft text of the instrument on interrelationships: the arrangements to ensure effective implementation of the settlement and the time-frame for withdrawal.

Indeed in May 1986, the Geneva talks process had not been able to overcome the rigid attitudes of

³⁶ Ibid. P. 100.

the concerned parties, but it was obvious that in the August 1986 talks there was a willingness to approach the problem anew with an open mind. Still there was a wide-gap between Pakistan's and Afghanistan's position on the time-frame and modalities for the withdrawal of troops. However, there was, some movement away from the original starting point. The reason for this delay was to find a mutually acceptable formula by both the countries regarding the length and modalities for withdrawal. Thus, the seventh round of talks could be able to bring about close understanding on withdrawal of the troops.

The eighth round of indirect talks was held from 20 November to 3 December 1986.³⁸ In these talks it became possible to resolve one of the outstanding issues. That was the arrangements for effective implementation of the agreements. An understanding was also reached on an "implementation assistance scheme" under which all aspects of the settlement would be "monitored" by the senior United Nations military personal.

38. UN. Doc S/18347. P. 10-11.

In December 1986, Mr. Abdul Wakil became Afghan foreign minister. Since the eighth round of talks, Pakistan and Afghanistan started responding positively with an open mind on the question of a time-frame for withdrawal of the Soviet forces.

The ninth round of proximity talks was held from 25 February to 9 March 1987.³⁹ The main item under discussion was the time-frame for the withdrawal, although certain other questions, including clarifications of the specific language of sections of the draft instruments, were also discussed. Pakistan and Afghanistan submitted two new proposals on the time-frame. Initially, Afghanistan announced that the troops would be withdrawn within the time-frame of about four years. In these talks it proposed an 18 month time-frame, but Pakistan demanded a seven months time-frame to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. But the USSR and Afghanistan agreed to withdraw troops within eleven months, but Pakistan did not agree.

From 7 to 10 September 1987, the tenth round of proximity talks was held at Geneva.⁴⁰ In these talks

39. Ibid. P.10.

40. UN, Doc S/19160 P. 60-61.

the USSR announced to pull out its troops from Afghanistan within nine months despite Pakistan's demand to withdraw its forces within seven months. At last Pakistan also agreed for this proposal. Thus, the USSR played an important and positive role in responding to all the demands that were raised by Pakistan, just for the sake of an early settlement for the Afghan crisis. And also Mikhail Gorbachev expressed strong support for setting up of a neutral and independent regime not hostile to the Soviet Union nor indeed to any of its neighbours. But in these talks Pakistan added new demands. It was to set up an interim government in Afghanistan before the Soviet troops start to withdraw their forces. Because of this demand, the UN had started to persuade Pakistan not to raise this demand. But Pakistan did not agree.

The Eleventh round of talks was begun in March 1988.⁴¹ Abdul Wakil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and Zain Noorani, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, headed the

41. UN. Doc. S/20146 P, 18.

delegations participating at the negotiations. The two guarantor Governments, the USSR and USA, appointed two high level officials, Ambassador Nicolai Kotirev and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Feck respectively, to carry out regular discussions with Cordovez during the negotiations. Thus, this round of talks brought four concerning parties together. During these talks, the conclusion of the accords was, however, stalled as two issues remained to be settled: Pakistan's demand that before they were signed, an interim Afghan coalition government be formed to replace the Najibullah regime before the Russians left Afghanistan, and the United States' insistence that the Soviets agree to stop their arms supplies to the Kabul regime simultaneously with a cut-off of US arms deliveries to the Mujahideen.

The UN mediator, ruled out Pakistan's pre-condition to the conclusion of the settlement, saying a transitional government was not a part of the four points that formed the basis of the Geneva negotiations. Nevertheless, Pakistan continued to maintain that unless a transitional government was first installed in Kabul, strife and bloodshed amongst the Afghans

would not end and the millions of Afghan refugees would not return to their homes.

However, Pakistan ultimately dropped this demand after Washington intensified its pressure, Diego Cordovez's persistent opposition to this demand, and the then Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo, openly defied Gen. Zia's stand and overwhelmingly mobilised Pakistani public opinion in favour of signing. At last Zia dropped his demand and agreed for signing. But Washington and Moscow agreed on formulation of positive symmetry⁴² on aid differences to their respective allies.⁴²

The last and twelfth round of proximity talks ended on 8 April 1988 when under-Secretary-General Cordovez announced that all the instruments comprising the settlement had been finalised and were open for signatures. On 8 April 1988, Gorbachev declared his readiness for a two phase nine month withdrawal, with the greater portion of Soviet forces to be removed in the "first phase i.e. by August 15, 1988."⁴³ But he went

42. The Hindu (Madras) 14 April, 1988.

43. Ibid.

even further, by specifying May 15, 1988 as the target date for the start of the pull out.⁴⁴ Thus, he gave the Reagan administration and Pakistan everything which they had demanded for and made it difficult not to accept the settlement.

Throughout the twelve rounds of Geneva proximity talks, the United States and Pakistan followed a rigid stand and showed reluctant approach at the quick settlement of the Afghan crisis. Pakistan had been changing its stand from talk to talk. In the beginning it opposed to recognise Afghan government, and demanded Soviet withdrawal as a precondition for talks. After settling these, it again started to demand to include insurgent leaders in the talks. Especially, on the question of time-frame schedule to withdraw Soviet forces, Pakistan was very rigid, and did not agree until other parties announced to withdraw within nine-months. That was why the proximity talks went on for over six long years despite Diego Cordovez's genuine efforts.

44. Ibid.

Thus, after a long process of indirect talks, on 14 April 1988, at the Palais of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar presided over the signing ceremony of the four instruments, known as the Geneva Accords. These agreements were signed by the Foreign Ministers of the Governments of Afghanistan and of Pakistan, as well as by those of the Soviet Union and the United States as Guarantor States.

CHAPTER - III

GENEVA ACCORDS

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The Geneva Accord was one of the major significant developments, in the history of international relations, indicating a subtle shift in the Super powers stance from one of confrontation to cooperation. Gorbachev's decision to withdraw forces from Afghanistan cannot be viewed in isolation from his overall policy of relaxing tensions in the world and specially in Asia.

Expounding his new policy at Vladivostok in July 1986, Mr. Gorbachev had called for a collective approach to Asian security on the line of Helsinki accord.¹ While announcing the withdrawal schedule on 8 February 1988, he expressed the hope that the solution of the Afghan problem would have the most profound impact on conflicts in the Middle East, the Gulf, Kampuchea and Central America.² Three months later, he again reiterated that the Soviet

1. Pakistan Horizon, (Karachi, July 1988) P. 117.

2. Ibid. P. 118.

pullout from Afghanistan constituted an "important landmark in the political settlement of regional conflicts threatening world peace"³. Thus, viewed in the context of his 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika', Gorbachev's decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan appears to be a product of this new political thinking⁴.

On the other hand, the decision to sign the Geneva Accords was a unanimous decision of the Government of Pakistan. It was approved by the full cabinet, the Prime Minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo and the President, Zia-ul-Haq. Pakistan also said that the decision was taken in the best interests of Pakistan, and on the advise of all friendly countries without exception⁵. After the conclusion of negotiations, Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zain Noorani stated that, the Government of Pakistan understands that the rights and obligations assumed by the Guarantor-States are

3. Ibid. P.118

4. Ibid. P.119

5. Ibid. P.51

consistent with the principles of equality and reciprocity and in consonance with the right of the Afghan people to freely determine their own political, economic and social system⁶.

The signing of the Geneva Accords on 14 April 1988 at the Palace of Nations at Geneva was the culmination of the six long years of laborious negotiations that were conducted between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's Personal envoy Diego Cordovez to end the nine-year long stalemate in Afghanistan. The signing of the accord will be historic not only because it seeks to resolve the Afghan crisis but also because of the promise of positive influence in other fields. In particular it is expected to help the current moves to reduce tensions in the world, and fits in with the new initiatives by the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev, which have already produced tangible results in the form of the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF)

6. Ibid. P.25

Treaty agreement, summits between the two global powers and their resolve to cut down strategic weapons.

The fact that, the Afghan crisis had its roots deep in the ground far beyond its territory, made it imperative to tackle the external factors. Being aware of that fact, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan made a number of concessions at the Geneva talks, thus much needed in impetus into the negotiation process initiated by the Afghan proposals of 14 May 1980 and 24 August 1981.

Although the instruments which later became the "Geneva Accords" were almost finalised in 1982, but several obstacles, some inherent in the nature of the problem and some absolutely extraneous to it, stalled the process for many years. The most outstanding of these are those obstacles related to the time-frame for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the mechanism of control and verification, the status of boundaries and the so-called problem of the future Afghan Government. All concerned parties had agreed to hold negotiations to overcome the intricacies

involved in the Afghan problem. Thus, the process which had begun, on 16 June 1982 was successfully concluded after twelve rounds and several phases of negotiations with the signing, on 14 April 1988, of the four instruments comprising the political settlement of the Afghan problem.

These four instruments are:

The first instrument was a Bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the principles of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention. This instrument reaffirmed the principle that the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were to be concluded in strict compliance with the principle of non-intervention and non-interference by states in the affairs of other states. It set out comprehensive and detailed obligations giving practical meaning to that principle of international law.⁷

The principles contained in it were derived essentially from the UN declaration of December 1981. Under this principle, Afghanistan and Pakistan assured

7. UN DOC DPI/935-40420 (July 1988) pp. 1-19

for sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment, and for the right of peoples to self-determination. Under this principle, the two parties were expected to refrain from the threat or use of force so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, from armed intervention, from support to secessionist activities against each other and from equipping and arming individuals and political, ethnic and other groups⁸.

The second principle was a Declaration of International Guarantees, given by the two designated guarantor states - the Soviet Union and the US, which undertook to refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and to respect the commitments contained in the Bilateral Agreement on the principles of Mutual Relations, which were contained in the first instrument⁹.

The third principle was a Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees. This set out the measures to be taken to

8. Ibid. P.4

9. Ibid. P.5

ensure favourable conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland and the understandings of the contracting parties to provide all necessary assistance in the voluntary repatriation process. The agreement also contained provisions relating to the practical arrangements required for the repatriation, and envisaged a possible role in that connection by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees¹⁰.

The fourth instrument was an Agreement on the Interrelationships for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan. This instrument outlined the diplomatic process leading to the comprehensive agreement on the component parts of the Accords. It also set forth the time frame for the withdrawal of the foreign troops, providing for a phased withdrawal: one half of the troops were to be withdrawn in three months, by 15 August, 1988; complete withdrawal was to be achieved in nine months¹¹.

A Memorandum of Understanding on monitoring

10. Ibid. P.6

11. Ibid. P.7

arrangements was also agreed to provide by the United Nations and incorporated it into the Agreement on Interrelationships. Two small military observer units, organised into inspection teams and stationed in Kabul and Islamabad, were to investigate complaints of violation of the instruments comprising the settlement¹².

In addition to the above mentioned four agreements, there was also instrument of "Symmetry" which was not included in any of one of four instruments. The principle of symmetry was raised by the United States in the eleventh round of proximity talks in March 1988. Under this idea, the Soviet Union was to halt military aid to the Kabul regime at the same time as Washington stopped arms supplies to the so-called Mujahideen. For this, the Soviet Union did not accept, on the ground that its 1978 Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Peace and Friendship relations with Afghanistan under which military assistance can be given, could not be equated with the US support and supply of arms to the Mujahideen¹³.

12. Ibid. P.18

13. Indian Express (New Delhi) 26 April 1988

However, the differences on this point were not allowed to scuttle the accord and a vague approach of "positive symmetry" was adopted. Under the principle of 'positive symmetry' both the super-powers retained the right to undertake supply of arms to their allies as before.

The conclusion of an international agreement was one thing and its implementation was another. This was true of the Geneva Accords between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There was nothing wrong with the conclusion of the Accord and everything was in its proper place¹⁴. After difficult and complicated negotiations which continued for six longg years, the document comprising the four agreements were finalised and signed.

But when it came to the implementation, the picture was rather different. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union took all the necessary steps in order to abide by their commitments under the agreements. Afghanistan undertook the commitments under the Geneva Agreements in two contexts, namely the withdrawal of

14. V.D.Chopra, ed. Afghanistan: Geneva Accords and After (New Delhi, 1988) P.129

Soviet troops and providing necessary facilities for the return of refugees. Although provisions of the document on non-interference were binding on both parties, there has never been any case of interference by Afghanistan in the affairs of Pakistan and therefore that question did not arise in the case of Afghanistan.

Withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan had been completed by 15 February 1989. Thus, the only part of the Geneva Accords which has been implemented has been the withdrawal of the Soviet troops as per the schedule. Even Islamabad and Washington have conceded to this fact.

Despite a number of social, political and financial constraints, Afghanistan had taken all possible steps to receive and rehabilitate the refugees. Regrettably, Pakistan has not only refused and continued to refuse to abide by its commitments under the Accords, but it has intensified its interference, particularly armed interference, against Afghanistan¹⁵. Many truck loads of weapons were being dumped into Afghanistan. In the first three months after signing of the accords, Pakistan

15. The Hindu (Madras) 18 June 1988

violated Afghan air space about fifty-nine times¹⁶. Pakistan also violated the Accords by conducting military training camps for seven groups of Mujahideen and facilitated for their Head Quarters in Pakistan. Pakistan also killed many civilians in Afghanistan to create terror and political turmoil in Afghanistan¹⁷.

Apart from launching a disinformation and misinformation campaign in the refugee camps to discourage Afghan refugees from returning, the Pakistani authorities, in collaboration with the Afghan armed opposition groups, had adopted stringent and harsh measures to check the mounting tide of the returnees. These violations not only violate the instrument on refugees but also violate the ~~right of movement of refugees~~ movement enshrined in paragraph two of Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and paragraph four of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¹⁸.

In order to be able to continue with these

16. Indian Express (New Delhi) 21 July 1988.

17. Indian Express (New Delhi) 12 September 1988

18. Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 18 December 1988.

unlawful activities with impunity, the Pakistani authorities have increasingly denied freedom of movement to the United Nations Good Officer Mission in Pakistan and Afghanistan (UNGOMPA), which was called upon to investigate reported violations under paragraph seven of the agreement on interrelationships. The UNGOMPA itself levelled allegations on Pakistan of its frequent violation of the agreements. Even it also informed the UN to check Pakistan from its frequent violations. The same was also levelled against Pakistan by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

Moreover, after the coming into force of the agreements, provision of proper accommodation and means of transportation to the UNGOMAP was delayed for a long time by the Pakistani authorities. Permission was withheld for several weeks for the establishment of UNGOMAP outposts along the frontier areas.

One need not labour hard to prove that all the above-mentioned activities stand in stark contrast to the letter and spirit of the Geneva Agreements and constitute grave and most serious violations of all

norms pertaining to inter-state relations. These activities made a mockery of respect for international obligations undertaken to desist from non-interference and non-intervention. Thus, Pakistan ridiculed the abiding provisions of the United Nations Charter relating to good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence among both the States.

It should be mentioned that after the signing of the accords and especially after the completion of the withdrawal of soviet troops from Afghanistan, interference from Pakistan had increased manifold. In the massive and unpremeditated attack on Jalalabad city which is very close to Pakistani border, began on 6 March 1989, alongside the forces of the Pakistan based armed opposition parties, two divisions of the Pakistani army i.e. division No.11 and 18 had openly participated in military operations¹⁹. Pakistan's main objective in supporting the attack on Jalalabad was to establish a parallel government by

19. The Times of India (New Delhi) 8 March 1989.

Mujhideen which will play according to their tunes against Afghanistan²⁰.

As a result of the interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by Pakistan, which was a full violation of the Geneva Accords, posed a serious threat to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan requested the United Nations Security Council to check the interference by Pakistan in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Despite the UN Security Council's repeated warnings, Pakistan continued its activities against Afghanistan.

In 1986, the PDPA under Dr. Najibullah initiated the policy of National Reconciliation, announced a six-month-long ceasefire in the war against counter revolutionaries and broad-based the DRA government by inducting non-party leaders into it²¹. In fact the policy of National Reconciliation had been dictated by the objective and subjective conditions of the country as the only realistic alternative to the ten years of war.

20. Ibid.

21. V.D.Chopra, ed. n.12, P.59.

In line with the implementation of this policy the PDPA gave up the monarchy of power and insisted and prepared to accept the parliamentary democracy, multiparty system, and the Government with a coalition character. To be more precise, the Government of Afghanistan attempted at forming a broad based coalition Government, in which all the involved parties were given a chance to participate.

In spite of Afghanistan abiding by the Accords, as well as initiating positive and constructive proposals for ceasing bloodshed and fraticide, Pakistan, the US and the Mujahideen groups controlled by them had turned a deaf ear to all the pronouncements of Afghanistan and the people of the world not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Moreover, the training camps of the Mujahideen groups which were supposed to be dismantled as per the Geneva Accords, are still functioning. Shipments of arms into Afghanistan continued unabated.

Initially, Pakistan and Mujahideen had claimed that the war was due to the presence of the Soviet

soldiers in Afghanistan. Had that been the case, the war should have ended by 15 February 1989. Nevertheless, apart from the old slogans i.e. "Islam is in danger in Afghanistan", Soviet occupation of Afghanistan etc. had been replaced by new slogan "Topple the Government in Afghanistan"²². Thus, it was very clear that, the US and Pakistan utterly violated the objectives and principles of the Geneva Accords.

To understand the developments after the signing of Accords and after the completion of Soviet troops withdrawal one must also probe the structure, objectives and style of functioning of the Mujahideen. There were three broad strands in the seven Mujahideen groups of Peshawar, which were formed under the banner of the "Ithad Islami Afghanistan" or "the Islamic Alliance of Afghanistan". Three of them were moderates and traditionalists, another three were hardliners and fundamentalists and the other one was in between the two extremes. What divides them was not only ideology but also tribal interests and other ethnic stamps.

22. The Hindu (Madras), 18 April, 1989

Ironically, it was the presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan that unified them into waging a joint struggle against the Kabul regime.

Even then, they maintained their separate identity for years after their inception in 1980 and the dividing line was maintained in their camps with four groups on one side and the three on the other. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops their rivalries and differences have surfaced. Especially their sharp differences pertained to the issue of the return of the ex-king Zahir Shah, who is in exile in Rome.²³

The most influential of the seven Mujahideen groups was the Hezb-e-Islami, one of the three wedded to extremism, which stood for an Islamic form of government and was consequently opposed to monarchy. It was equally bitter in its opposition to the communists. Two of its leaders by turn, had provided leadership to the Seven - Party alliance first by Yunis Khalis and later by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. However, the two leaders of the Mujahideen followed different lines with separate faction in the Mujahideen organisation. Both, Khalis and Hekmatyar were Pashtoon, the majority community consisting of nearly

23. News Time (Hyderabad) 21 July 1988

half of the country's population. But they could not attract the favour of the Afghan people for their misguided mission by Pakistan and the U.S to topple the mass based government in Afghanistan.²⁴ Burhamuddin Rabbani a former professor of the Kabul University and known as ustad (Teacher) Rabbani, headed the Jamiat-e-Islami. This group too stood for a government based on Islamic fundamentalism.²⁵

Thus, infighting and internal feuds had weakened the Mujahideen. There were also reports that clashes occurred between the Jamiat-e-Islami and Harket-i-Inquilab-i-Islami over the spheres of influence in the Hilmand province which resulted in about twenty casualties. Notwithstanding this, they had also tried to form an interim government after the soviet withdrawal, on the Afghan soil, but failed. Instead they announced its formation in Pakistan.²⁶

Moreover, the adamant approach of Mujahideen to the peace package isolated them from the people who were tired of war. The people hoped that after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops under Geneva Accords, the peace and normalcy would come to their country. And also the Mujahideen

24. Patriot, (New Delhi) 22 July 1988.

25. The Hindu, (Madras), 17 April 1988.

26. Statesman (New Delhi), 22 July 1988.

groups by continuing their armed attacks against Afghanistan, repeated by rejected the programme of a broad-based national government, that was initiated under the programme of National Reconciliation by the Afghan President Dr. Najibullah. Thus, the Mujahideen groups were made themselves as a massive hurdle against peaceful political settlement of the Afghan crisis by rejecting all kinds of peace initiatives.

Despite an agreement on the complete phased withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan an immediate ceasefire and peace could not be achieved. Instead, the USSR and the US, the two guarantors of the accords, agreed on the principle of positive symmetry under which they continued to supply arms to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In plain terms, the American position was that Moscow must end military assistance to the Kabul regime as it stops arms supplies to the Mujahideen. But the Soviet leadership had refused to accede to this demand on the plea that its ties with the government of Afghanistan date back to 1921 and the US had no right to meddle in

in these bilateral relations.²⁷ The more pertinent fact was that the Soviet Union has a lot to lose and nothing to lose by obliging the Americans in respect of Afghanistan.

It means that, there is no stop for the massacre of the innocent Afghans. In other words Geneva Accord was a peace treaty in name sake and there were many avenues kept wide open to violate the accords by Pakistan and the US. An understanding between the two Super powers to continue the supply of arms to their respective friends under the policy of positive symmetry had been enabled them to dump their arms in the South-Asian region. Under this policy, Pakistan has been acquiring modern weapons to maintain parity with India. This created a paramount tension from time to time, between Pakistan and India.

There are clear evidences that Pakistan has been providing arms and training camps to the Indian Punjabi terrorists to create instability and

27. The Times of India, (New Delhi), 2 April 1989.

encourage disintegration in India. Pakistan has been providing shelter for the wanted Indian terrorists. This has become the way for Indian terrorists to escape after committing major crimes. Since Pakistan has been actively involved in narcotic business, it also started to spread India. Thus, peace in the whole South-Asian region was scuttled because of the Pakistan's Afghan policy.

The withdrawal of the Soviet troops was not the lone demand of the Afghan people and the world community. The following fundamental demands had all along been made from the forums of Organisation of Islamic Unity, Non-Aligned Movement nations and the United Nations and other international agencies:

1. Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan;
 2. Restoration of independent and sovereign status of Afghanistan;
 3. Recognition of the inalienable right of Afghan people to design and formulate their own socio-economic and political system without any foreign intervention, and;
-

4. Creation of such conditions in and around Afghanistan which might guarantee safe and honourable repatriation of the refugees. But except the first demand the other three are not fulfilled.²⁸

The purpose of the Geneva Agreements was to remove the external factor in the ten-year old undeclared war imposed on Afghanistan from which the peace-loving people of that nation had suffered miseries, pain and disaster. The Afghan's hoped that the Geneva Accords would bring peace to their country. But, still there is no sign of peace in the near future.

Pakistan and the US still have to start to fulfil their obligations under the Accords. There appears to be no end to the continued bloodshed and strife in Afghanistan. Only a political solution and the implementation of the Geneva Accord will restore peace in Afghanistan.

28. Pakistan Horizon, n. 1; P. 114.

CHAPTER - IV

CONCLUSION

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Geography and history have given countries in the South-Asian region much that is common and it is only political divisions and boundaries which keep the people of the region away from each other. Since Afghanistan had been India's neighbour, for centuries, the people of India and Afghanistan had maintained close and cordial relations covering a wide spectrum of activities. The strategic position of Afghanistan had always been recognised by those who administered India at all times.¹

Throughout history, Afghanistan, a landlocked, harsh mountain region of primitive tribesmen, has been a cockpit of great power intrigue for its strategic location in South and South-West Asia. With Iran on the West, Pakistan on the South, China in the East and a thousand mile border with the Soviet Union on the North, Afghanistan has traditionally been the fulcrum where the great thrusts of empire met.

1. V.D. CHOPRA, ed., Afghanistan, Geneva Accord And After, (New Delhi, 1968) p. 20.

Ever since Pakistan became independent, in 1947, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have remained strained. Some times they have reached the brink of war due to inherent problems like acceptance of Durand Line as a boundary and Pakhtunistan.²

Autocratic and military rule has been the bane of Pakistani politics. The concentration of power in a single leaders has been the most striking characteristic of its political tradition. The imposition of Martial by Gen. Zia in 1977 caused an end the elected civilian government of Z.A. Bhutto. His Martial law regime was lost the popular support and political polarisation in the country had aggravated. At that time Zia was looking for a chance to prop up his own regime. His attempt to gain legitimacy by promising to enforce Islamic laws were also not showed any positive response.

On the other hand, in Afghanistan, the leftist government under Nur Mohammad Taraki seized power through 1978 Saur Revolution. The social and economic reforms introduced by the revolutionary regime had

2. K.P. Misra, ed. Afghanistan in Crisis, Vikas (Delhi, 1981) P. 84.

provoked powerful vested interests within the country.³ These interests, particularly, the feudal interests, which were closely associated with Mullahs, rose in revolt against the Government of Taraki. After the removal of Taraki in September 1979, Hafizullah Amin followed more sectarian policies which led to the number of Afghans to take refuge in Pakistan and given more strength to the rebel forces who were acting with the help of Pakistan and the U.S.⁴ At this juncture, the revolutionary Government in Kabul requested for Soviet help to check internal subversion and external intervention.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 dramatically transformed Pakistan's geo-strategic situation as it posed a serious threat to Pakistani Security from a Super power.⁵ Gen. Zia fully exploited the Afghan situation and emerged as a valuable

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3. Sadhan Mukherjee, Afghanistan : From Tragedy to Triumph. (New Delhi, 1984) P.102.
 4. Ibid. P. 135
 5. Babani Sen Gupta, Afghanistan : Politics, Economics, And Society- Revolution, Resistance, Intervention, (New Delhi, 1988). P. 281

ally in the U.S. strategy in the South Asian region. Thus the Soviet intervention totally changed the situation for Zia and for Pakistan.

The overthrow of Daoud regime by the PDPA in April 1978 was perceived by the US as the Communist coup and perceived the Soviet intervention as part of a bigger plan of the Soviet expansion in Asia. The U.S. started to support the insurgents to oppose the Soviet forces and to topple the PDPA Government.

As a matter of fact, Washington and Islamabad's military circle have, in a way, been the major beneficiaries of the Afghan situation. A part from the flow of arms to Pakistan from the U.S., the Soviet action gave the Zia regime a fresh lease of life to legitimise his own power and arm Pakistan with American assistance and internationalise the refugee issue to get maximum possible aid from other countries.

Thus, the Afghan crises made both the Super powers to confront each other and threatened peace in the south Asian region. Hence, the U.N. had to

involve to negotiate for a peaceful political settlement. The U.N. conducted twelve rounds of proximity between Pakistan and Afghanistan for over six years. Significantly, Yuri Andropov had attempted to find a way out of Afghanistan more than six years ago, for the same reasons that ultimately prompted Mr. Gorbachev to withdraw. The United Nations mediator Diego Cordovez, who negotiated the Geneva accords, found Mr. Andropov preoccupied with the diplomatic costs of the war in a meeting on March 28, 1983.

"He held up his hand" Mr. Cordovez recalled, "and pulled down his fingers one by one as he listed the reasons why the Soviet Union felt a solution had to be found soon to the Afghan problem. The situation was harmful to relations not only with the West, but also with the Socialist States, Muslim world and other Third World States". Finally, he said, "pulling his thumb down, it was harmful for the Soviet Union internally, for its economy and its society".⁶

The United States disturbed Mr. Andropov

6. Selig S. Harrison, "Retreat from Stalemate"

International Herald Tribune, (Washington, 19 February 1989).

and actively undermined UN efforts to test him in the negotiations. Hawks in the Reagan administration were clamoring for upgraded aid to the resistance in 1983 and saw no reason to let the Russians to withdraw from the Afghan quagmire.⁷ Cordovez found "Communication with the Americans generally more difficult, more constrained than the rapport (he) developed with the Pakistanis, the Russians, and the Afghans....."⁸

Mr. Gorbachev surprised Mr. Reagan at their Geneva Summit meeting two years later by pushing for an Afghan withdrawal agreement as a key to a broader improvement in superpower relations. Soon afterward he unveiled the first of a series of major concessions in the UN negotiations to settle the Afghan crisis as early as possible. Thus, these talks culminated in Geneva Accords to resolve the longstanding crisis, and promised to end civil war and bloodshed and also outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

The prospect for the future of the Geneva accords lies in the fact that, Afghanistan and the

7. *Ibid*

8. Selig. S. Harrison, "Inside the Afghan Talks"
Foreign Policy, Number 72, (Washington Fall 1988)
 P.44.

Soviet Union unilaterally took the decision to withdraw Soviet troops within nine months, which had been completed. It gave Afghanistan the opportunity to be independent and to enjoy full sovereignty.⁹ It has created an atmosphere conducive for Afghanistan and Pakistan to peacefully co-exist on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of the other country. It also provides the basis for averting big power confrontation.¹⁰

A year ago it was thought that the crisis had been defused that the main issue of foreign forces on the soil of Afghanistan had been solved. And by 15th February, 1989 the last Soviet soldier left the soil of Afghanistan.¹¹ Therefore, it was thought that the people of Afghanistan among themselves would be able to sort out the differences and issued peacefully according to their tradition and practice. But there are forces that are not interested in seeing Afghanistan at peace. The inalcitrant rebels, Mujahideen as they are called, who are stationed on the soil of Pakistan, are between Pakistan and Afghanistan for over six years. These talks culminated in Geneva Accords to resolve the longstanding crisis and promised to end civil war and bloodshed and also outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

9. INDIAN EXPRESS (NEW DELHI) 28 April 1989

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The Government of Pakistan understands that the rights and obligations assumed by the Guarantor-States are consistent with the principles of equality and reciprocity and in consonance with the right of the Afghan people to freely determine their own political, economic and social system. Thus, the Government of Pakistan signed the Accords to fulfil its objectives on the basis of understanding reflected in exchanges between concerned parties.

The prospect for the future of the Geneva Accords lies in the fact that Afghanistan and the Soviet Union unilaterally took the decision to withdraw Soviet troops within nine months, which had been completed. It gave Afghanistan the opportunity to be independent and to enjoy full sovereignty. It has created an atmosphere conducive for Afghanistan and Pakistan to peacefully co-exist on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of the other country. It also provides the basis for averting big power confrontation.

The only thing that the Geneva Accords achieved was the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan and the U.S, repeatedly violated the objectives and principles of the Geneva Accords by interfering in the internal those who have refused to recognise the possibility of change in Afghanistan. Backed by many forces outside Afghanistan, they are doggedly resisting change in Afghanistan.

A close look at the Geneva Accords reveal that certain issues involved in the crisis were left unresolved and some others were deliberately kept vague by leaving the doors kept wide open for violation and misinterpretation.¹¹

The Geneva settlement neither enforced a ceasefire between the warring factions nor did it specifically provided the strong steps for its implementation.

Despite an agreement, the U.S demanded for 'Symmetry' on the issue of supplying arms to Afghan rebels was in clear violation of the understanding that had been reached at Geneva. Under the plan of 'Symmetry' the US supplying of weapons unabated. Pakistan continues to serve as the conduit of these weapons to insurgents. The Mujabideen have been using the Pakistan territory to launch their assaults causing death and distruction in Afghanistan.

After signing the Geneva Accords Gen. Zia had changed his stand many times. On 13 May 1988, in intefview with The New York Times, Gen. Zia stated that Pakistan was for coalition government in Kabul based on the "One third formula" i.e. $\frac{1}{3}$ to the Mujahideen and other third for refugees.¹²

11. D.R. Goyal "Danger of Widening Proxy War" Secular Democracy Vol. XXII No. 4 (April, 1989) P. 23.

12. Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 14 May 1989.

Fortnight later in an interview with the Washington Post, Gen. Zia reversed himself and endorsed the Mujahideen position that "Najib or the FDPA must be excluded from a future government."¹³

This commitment was quite obvious in days of Zia. Selig S Harrison says that in an interview with Zia in July, "Gen. Zia made no secret of his desire to install a Pakistani satellite state in Afghanistan dominated by the Islamic Fundamentalist wing of his resistance"¹⁴ Then Harrison quotes President Zia as saying " We have earned the right to have a very friendly regime there. We took risks as a front-line State and we won't permit it to be like it was before, with India and Soviet influence there and claims on our territory. It will be a real Islamic State, part of a Pan-Islamic revival that will one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union. You will see".

President Zia vanished from the scene, of course, but even though in domestic policies his name and legacy have all but vaporated, his hand continues to be heavy upon Pakistan's Afghan policy.

Mr. Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, the President of the so called Afghan government in exile, on 14 April 1989 alleged that about six hundred Indian soldiers led by Gen. Swaran Singh

13. INDIAN EXPRESS (New Delhi) 30 May 1989.

14. Deccan Herald (Bangalore) 30 May 1989.

15. Ibid.

had arrived in Herat region of Jalalabad.¹⁶ This was totally baseless and malicious. The Pakistani Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) agency's public relations wing took the lead in spreading the canard. Despite the fact that Afghanistan has always occupied a high priority position in India's foreign policy and New Delhi had in fact all along been engaged in behind the scenes diplomatic moves with a view to resolving the Afghanistan tangle. Islamabad's objective has remained in the words of a noted Pakistani commentator "Keeping Indian influence out".¹⁷

The canard has the motive of camouflaging Pakistan's own interventions in Afghanistan. It is Pakistan which has transgressed underfoot many provisions of the Geneva Accords. Pakistan's military rulers had a vested interest in keeping the Afghan issue alive. Even the new civilian government is unable to change the US-Zia line on Afghanistan. Apparently, Afghanistan is too important for Pakistan to be left to the Afghans themselves. Its double-faced policy is obvious. Islamabad would have even recognised the interim Afghan government set up with its blessings. But for the charge of blatant violation of Geneva Accords recognition of the rebel "government" would attract and all

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16. Patriot (New Delhi) 14 April 1989.

17. Ibid.

the grave consequences that could follow. Pakistan might have taken that fraudulent step.

Thus, Afghanistan still remains a major tension ridden in global politics and an explosive crisis-point in south and south-west Asia effecting its security environment. The Geneva Accords signed on 14 April 1988 were hailed by all the right-thinking people and applauded by the Government of India as a good rational, political settlement of a complex issue.

The present scenario is that Afghanistan has sincerely and faithfully abided by the terms of the Accords, and has made continuous efforts for national reconciliation, broad-basing its government. The Soviet Union, despite Pakistan's intransigence and open help to the insurrectionary rebellious forces and despite the USA's connivance has scrupulously adhered to the commitment of the withdrawal of all its troops and following the objectives of Geneva Accords.¹⁸

Afghanistan is not an isolated issue. The feudal obscurantist reactionary forces which are given the needlessly dignified name of "fundamentalists" and Crusaders for Faith (Mujahideen) are actually attempting to reverse the

18. National Herald (New Delhi) 18 June 1989.

the process of social change and establish a reactionary regime that will back Afghanistan to the 16 century.¹⁹

Today, the world looks at Afghanistan in a clear light. One the one hand, Afghanistan and the USSR are strictly adhering to an international (Geneva) Agreement in letter and spirit, on the other hand, Pakistan and United States are flagrantly and unscrupulously violating the prime objectives of the same Agreement.²⁰

Thus, the Geneva Accords have failed to bring peace to this long-suffering nation. Nevertheless, this caused a serious doubt on the validity and reliability of the Geneva process to bring about peace.

Gen. Zia-ul-Haq died, but his Afghan policy did not die. From the beginning the people of Pakistan have been opposed to his Afghan policy. This has been proved in the recent elections, where the people of Pakistan voted against their military rulers and Martial Law as a whole.²¹

In March, 1988 Gen. Zia said that Pakistan would not sign the accords until an interim government had been formed. The then former Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo, openly defying Zia, mobilized overwhelmingly Pakistani Public opinion in favour of signing.²¹

19. Indian Express (New Delhi) 21 May 1989.

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20. Indian Express (New Delhi) 22 May 1989.

21. Selig S Harrison. n.8. P-100.

Thus, an important section of public opinion has been clearly indicated as they are against Zia's policies.

Begum Nusarat Bhutto, wife of the executed Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto had stated in 1980 that, if her party, 'Pakistan Peoples Party' (PPP) come to power, it would recognise the ^{Babrak Karmal} Government and pursue a policy of non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.²² The present Prime Minister Ms. Benazir Bhutto also publicly opposed to Zia's Afghan policy. Now, the PPP has come to power. Ms. Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister. Thus, since PPP had been stood against Zia's Afghan policy, hopes have started to be born in Afghanistan's long-suffered public and the world community of getting peace to the south Asia region and to Afghanistan in particular. The people of Afghanistan have the right to a free choice. But, this can be done through peaceful, political dialogue again in the spirit of the Geneva Accords.

22. K.P. Misra, ed :- Afghanistan in crisis, vikas (New Delhi) 1983, P-100

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