

US-AUSTRALIA SECURITY TIES: SHIFTING NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

KANNEGANTI RAMESH BABU



Centre for American and West European Studies

School of International Studies

Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Delhi- 110067

INDIA

2000



CENTRE FOR AMERICAN & WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "**US-Australia Security Ties: Shifting Nature of the Alliance**", submitted by **K. Ramesh Babu**, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, is his own work, and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.

We therefore recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Chintamani Mahapatra

Dr. CHINTAMANI MAHAPATRA
(Supervisor) 21.7.2000

Prof. B. VIVEKANANDAN
(Chairperson)

Dedicated to

- *My Parents and Teacher*
-

CONTENTS

Preface

Acknowledgements

CHAPTER I	Birth of ANZUS: The US Role.	1-25
CHAPTER II	ANZUS in Trouble and American Response	26-45
CHAPTER III	US-Australian Security Ties	46-69
CHAPTER IV	Australia's Search for an Independent Policy: Strategic Distance from Washington?	70-88
CHAPTER V	Conclusion	89-99
	Bibliography	100-105
	Appendix	i-iv

PREFACE

The United States and Australia have a history of close defense and security cooperation. American and Australian forces have fought together in World War I, World War II, in Korean war, Vietnam war and in the 1991 Gulf War. However, until after World II, Australia was largely dependent on Great Britain for its defense and security. Once the World War II was over, Canberra no longer looked at Britain for security guarantee. It was the US, which emerged as a superpower from the global war. Australia quickly switched its priority and sought security protection from the US. The result was the ANZUS treaty of 1952. The treaty is a trilateral alliance among Australia, New Zealand and the United State. It symbolises and formalises a close alignment of strategic interests between the US and Australia. It provides a framework for cooperation in areas such as intelligence sharing, defense technologies, logistics and other support arrangements.

Australian and US forces train and exercise together on a regular basis under the alliance partnership. Both the countries claim that defense facilities provided by Australia to the US contribute to global peace and stability.

However, the US-Australia bilateral relationship under the ANZUS flourished until trouble erupted in the alliance in 1985, following New Zealand's decision to ban port visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear capable naval vessels. It was around the same time that Canberra withdrew the use of Australian support facilities for American tests of MX missile soon after the U.S.S. Buchanan incident. It appeared for a while that ANZUS would no longer be a viable alliance. Nonetheless it survived. The rise of the Gorbachev phenomenon in the former Soviet Union, Denge Xiaoping's reforms in China, collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union raised questions about the relevance of alliance arrangements, such as ANZUS. Yet the ANZUS survived the end of the cold war. Why? What are the factors, which contribute to survival of ANZUS in the post-Cold War period? What are emerging security threats, which justify the continuation of ANZUS? How has Australia been managing its bilateral ties with the US since New Zealand stopped its full cooperation?

The present disseratation has made a modest attempt to answer these questions. The first chapter attempts to understand the global and regional factors that led to the signing of the ANZUS treaty. Chapter

two is an attempt to describe a crisis in the mid-1980s, which had the potential to breakup the ANZUS alliance. Since the alliance survived the crisis and US-Australia relations continued though minor ups and downs, chapter three analyses the world security parameters related to US-Australian relations. And the final chapter briefly tries to analyse the direction of Australia's national security policy in the emerging contest of Australia's domestic scene, regional developments in the Asia-Pacific and the global Changes brought out by the end of the Cold War. This dissertation is a modest attempt to understand the nature of US-Australia security relations. An attempt has been made to make a historical-analytical examination of the concerned topic.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have to admit that without continuous encouragement, support guidance and occasional pressure from my supervisor Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra, the present research work would not have seen the light of the day. I have learned tremendously from Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra insight and deep knowledge of US foreign and national security policies. I am greatly indebted to him. I take this opportunity to thank my teachers in American studies program of CAWES for their encouragement.

My special thanks are due to Dr. Abdul Nafey and Prof. Sudipto Das Gupta, for their encouragement and guidance in this particular work.

I acknowledge the help given by some of the staff of the Australian High Commission Library in New Delhi particularly Ms.Kirti Kaul whenever I went there for source materials. I am thankful to the staff of J.N.U. Library IDSA, and American Center Library.

I am thankful to my friends *Rajeev*, Jitender, Prasant, *Gajula*, *Shrinivas*, *Anil*, *Mark*, Banerjee, Vijay Bhaskar, Ashok Sharma, Suraj, Srujan, Narshingh, Amit, *Francis*, *Inder*, Mani, Shankar, and Burra Shrinivas for their constant encouragement. Last but not least I am indebted to Sanjay & Khan for their support in typing this work. I am very thankful to Mr.Natwar Singh, former Minister, Govt. of India, for his valuable suggestion in completing this work.

No effort has been spared to enhance the quality and accuracy of this work. However, I own the sole responsibility of shortcomings, if any, in this study.

Chapter-1

BIRTH OF ANZUS: THE US ROLE

ANZUS, a military alliance linking Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, was a trilateral Pacific pact which came into force on 29 April 1952. What was the need for the establishment of such a trilateral alliance so soon after World War II? Was there any real compulsion for creating such an alliance? Did the US perceive any threats to its interests in that part of the world? Was there any existence of threat to the security of Australia and New Zealand ? What then could be the factors which then led to the birth of ANZUS?

While the United States emerged as a dominant Super Power after World War II, Australia and New Zealand had lost the traditional source of their support and assistance for their security. Washington was concerned about the spread of Communism in various Parts of the world but it could not see any possibility of Australia and New Zealand coming under communist influence. However, Australia and New Zealand were more concerned about the possibility of a resurgent Japan than any kind of Communist threat to their societies.

London had all along provided security assurances to Australia and New Zealand. There was anxiety about the sort of arrangement that could guarantee Australian and New Zealand's security in an age of British incapability. After all, the world War II, had broken the backbone of the British power and influence. London was not able to sustain its own empire, let alone provide security to Australia and New Zealand.

Australia's Threat Perceptions

In fact, with the entry of Japan in the war against the allies in early 1940s, Australia for the first time felt an actual threat to her security. The Australian Cruiser Sydney was sunk by Japan's ally German raider in November 1941, and a few days later, on 7 December, Japanese planes bombed Pearl Harbor, and the Japanese army landed at Kota Bharu in northern Malaya. Three days later, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse were sunk by Japanese planes off the east coast of Malaya. Guam and Wake Islands fell within a few days, followed by Hong Kong, Borneo, Manila, Rabaul and Ambon in quick succession. Singapore fell on 15 February 1942. Of the Australian troops who had fought for the defense of Malaya 15,384 became prisoners of war, 1,789 died as a result of campaign, and 1,036 were wounded. Four days

later, Darwin was bombed by aircraft carriers and from Ambon. Dutch Timor was next attacked with more Australian losses, followed by more air raids on Broome, Wyndham and Darwin. Japanese submarines played havoc with coastal shipping; Sydney and Newcastle were shelled, and three under water midget submarines entered Sydney harbor. Thus Australia experienced direct enemy attacks on her own soil.

During this traumatic period Australia began to turn her attention from Britain to the US as the main source of security. On 29, December 1941, Prime Minister John Curtin of Australia had declared; “Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom... we know That Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its key-stone, which will give our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy.”¹

¹ Manning Clark, *A Short History of Australia* (Sydney, 1969), p. 241.

When the War came to an end, it was but natural, that Australia would seek an alliance relationship with the new Superpower..... The United States. Washington on the other hand, felt the need for putting in place a peace treaty with Japan. Several South East Asian countries and Australia which had fallen to victim to Japane's aggression only recently were not expected to feel comfortable with the idea of a peace treaty with Japan.

Had there been no Cold War, had there been no Communist victory in Chinese civil war and had there been no Communist aggression in the Korean Peninsula, even Washington would not have been hurrying for achieving a peace treaty with Japan. While Japanophobia appeared to be one of the prime motivations behind Australian efforts for an alliance relationship with United States, the US wanted to have as many countries as possible on its side, to realize a successful peace treaty with Japan.

The Japan factor worked as catalyst in negotiations towards an alliance treaty culminated in signing of an ANZUS treaty. The main problem for Australia was that the Japanese Peace Treaty; contained no provision for the restriction or limitation of Japanese armaments, and no provision for reparations on an appropriate scale for the damage and

suffering caused by Japan's aggression. Because of these fears Australia wanted a Pacific pact with the United States.

The link between the ANZUS Treaty and the Japanese Peace Treaty was well stated in a report of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1952. "As a result of World War II, these countries (Australia and New Zealand) feared the resurgence of Japanese aggressions and they were deeply concerned about the possibility of Japanese rearmament. Their natural inclination, therefore, was to think in terms of peace treaty, imposing no restrictions upon Japanese rearmament, only if the United States would formally express concerns for their security and agree to stand with them in the event of an attack. The security treaty between the United States on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other, gave these countries the assurance they needed, and at the sometimes served the national interest of the United States".²

In the mean time, the threat of Communism was becoming more and more visible in the Asia-Pacific region with the successful establishment of Communism has taken root in the mainland of Asia.

² Casey, R. G. *Friends and Neighbours Australia and the World* (London, 1954), p. 73.

Washington's diplomatic efforts had failed in China and the US government had to bring out a China white paper to explain to its people about what went wrong in China.

Australia at this time would not have thought of any eminent danger to its security from the New Peoples Republic of China. In fact there was no Communist insurgence of any kind within Australia to draw inspiration and support from the Communist Chinese. However, it is likely that policy makers in Australia would have at least shared Washington's concerns over possible expansion of communist influence to rest of Asia.

Months after, the emergence of Communist China, a war broke out in the Korean Peninsula between the Communist north and non-communist south. The United States and its allies interpreted the Korean war as of nothing but a demonstration of communist aggression. The United States got directly involved in the Korean war and led a multinational force under the auspices of United Nations to fight on behalf of non-communist South Korea. Australia was one of the countries which promptly backed the US War efforts. Negotiations for the ANZUS Pact in the backdrop of communist success in the

Chinese civil war, and North Korean invasion over the South across the 38th Parallel line appeared to be smooth and tension-free.

Thus it is not only Japanese fear of attack on Australia and New Zealand that led to the establishment of ANZUS alliance, the threat of communist expansionism also mattered most to the three ANZUS treaty partners. According to R.G. Casey, “well before the ANZUS treaty was drafted the spokesmen of the Australian government identified the immediate menace in the Pacific not as Japan but of communist imperialism. In fact, there is nothing in the text of the ANZUS treaty which expressly deal with; the problem of Japan”.³

The spokesman of the Australian government was correct in observing that the text of the ANZUS treaty mentioned nothing about the Japanese Peace treaty. But then it is also true that the same text did not mention anything about communism or the threat of “Communist imperialism”. Treaties of this kind normally do not stipulate at any threats of this types in black and white. Threat perceptions and motivations are generally implied and it is up to the political analysts to decipher them.

³ Ibid, p. 73.

However, Australia's interest and objectives were related to the building of security in the Pacific area. From the Australian perspective the ANZUS treaty was an agency for maintaining peace and stability in region. Australia's aim was to expand the area of security and to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.

It is significant to note that, it was not easy for the Australian government to easily carry the people with it while negotiating the ANZUS treaty. There were elements in the Australian body politic who were critical of the ANZUS treaty.

Bill Hyden of Australian labour Party for instance said, "We know that it (ANZUS) is the pay-off to the Japanese peace treaty, and though we are still grievously worried about the repercussions of that atrocious document, we accept this pact. But when we ask ourselves what is in it, we must be honest and admit that it does not give us anything that we have not already got although it does make existing understandings more vaild by putting them in writing. This pact has teeth, but they are irregular and are not a complete set. In his opinion, the agreement will impose more obligations on the Australian people than it will impose on the Americans".⁴

Another leader of the Australian labor party said; "This pact adds nothing to the world situations; it simply expresses in writing what has always been a fact, that is

⁴ Evatt Alan, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy (1938-67)* (Melbourne, 1967), p. 129.

the community of interest that exists between Australia and the United States. No country is in a position to attack Australia in the first instance without moving elsewhere on a scale that would inevitably cause a world war. Therefore, the chances that United States of America will be called upon to honour this pact in the event of an attack only one-tenth of the chances that Australia will be called upon to honour this pact in the event of United States becoming involved in a world War. I do not make that statement in criticism of the pact. Australia will not be attacked from Asia, or from anywhere in the Pacific unless a war first occurs in Europe. That is as true today as it was in 1939".⁵

It is a mistaken view to regard the ANZUS treaty merely as the result of a well timed and, clever diplomatic move by Australia in securing a 'Payoff' or 'reward' for its assent to the Japanese Peace treaty. It represents rather the fruit of efforts over the years, during the war and after the war by political leaders and servicemen, to create and maintain a relationship of confidence and common purpose between the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The benefits to the individual parties may not be equal, but they are certainly of vital importance for the smaller powers and of considerable importance to the United States. From an American perspective, the usefulness of the treaty was that it associated with United States what World War II had proved to be, on the one hand the principal sources of strength in South

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

West Pacific, and on the other hand also proved to be bases of infinite value in dealing with aggression originating in the Western Pacific.

As inheritors of total responsibility in the Western Pacific the Americans could hardly do less than to gain all the support, and take out all the inheritors, in the general area they could gain or take out. ANZUS was both insurance and support for the United States the benefits were in the end mutual. Despite all its ups and downs, the ANZUS treaty continued well till 1984-85

So, Australians were very clear about their defense strategy, as a result they had signed the ANZUS treaty of 1951. The ANZUS treaty provided a forum for regular discussions of a range of defense and foreign policy questions at various levels that i.e., at the levels of ministers, military representatives staff, and officials and for combined military exercise. The ANZUS Pact was conceived broadly as an interim but presumably long-term arrangements for the preservation of security in the Pacific, and the ANZUS council was empowered to maintain a consultative relationship with states, regional organizations, associations or other authorities in the Pacific.

The Purpose of the first ANZUS conference held at Honolulu in August 1952, was, in the words of U.S. secretary of state Dean

Acheson, to make a detailed survey of the Pacific area “over common interest and relationship in the light of Communist China’s threat to the security of the Pacific area.”⁶ In the beginning ANZUS was considered as a defense arrangement against a rearmed Japan as well as international communism, but later it became to be seen as a shield against Indonesian adventurism.

Australia always tried to emphasize the military aspect of the ANZUS treaty from the sake of her own security in future, and the first meeting of the ANZUS Council in Honolulu in August 1952 was devoted primarily to military discussion and planning which subsequently led to the Australian invitation to the United States to use the Manus Islands base, but it did not show an interest. Consultations have continued ever since, and the ANZUS Committee met on several occasions to consider close military collaboration to meet the Communist threat to Indo-China.

Although ANZUS did not automatically commit the US to war on Australia’s behalf, but only provided for action “to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes”, nevertheless in

⁶ Greenwood and Harper, (ed.), *Australia in World Affairs, 1950-55*, (London, 1957), p.161.

matters of defense the three members of the pact stood as one. Indeed, Australia considering ANZUS of the most important instrument of her alliance with the US and a great shield against foreign aggression.

New Zealand 's Threat Perceptions:

Now, it is worthwhile to find out the factors that made New Zealand to join the trilateral ANZUS Pact of 1951. Infact, Australian and New Zealand views mutually reinforce the proposition that ANZUS represents a vital defense asset against threats to the South Pacific and its environs. In spite of the relative security of New Zealand i.e., the lack of proximate threat, the country historically has maintained close and active defense cooperation with major power allies, initially the United Kingdom, more recently the United States, in addition to its even closer ties to Australia, reflects the cultural proximity of the dominions population to Britain as much of any real threat to New Zealand 's own interests.

Significantly, New Zealand's strategic thinking was strikingly similar to that of Australia. Given its small population and the geographical size New Zealand could not be expected to have any other foreign

policy other than joining Australia in search of a mechanism for maintaining peace and stability in the region.

New Zealand's attitude towards security in the aftermath of World War II were not unlike those in Australia. Both Countries were concerned about the threat from a remilitarized Japan, yet the leaders of the both conservative governments were also increasingly worried about possibility of Communist expansionism. In the 1950's, however, New Zealand politicians took a more relaxed view of the later problem than their Australian counterparts.

Australian and New Zealand leaders have perceived their countries as constituting a single strategic entity. Because of the resource constraints on New Zealand force, it was therefore natural for Wellington to allow a double dependency to develop in its security relations, first upon Australia, then derivatively, upon the United States. Newzeland, like Australia, looked to others for defense against major military threats, a role the United States inherited from the United Kingdom.

ANZUS is an important and significant to Australia and New Zealand as well. Both the countries have benefited from this trilateral alliance

partnership. "In an interview in march 1985, the Minster of defense Kim Beazley outlined five areas of defence and foreign policy where the co-operative relations under the ANZUS rubric was important.

- (1) Intelligence exchange
- (2) Direct influence with the U.S. government
- (3) Special access to U.S. equipment
- (4) Special opportunities for military exercises, and
- (5) Defense science cooperation".⁷

Same is true with New Zealand . Infact, "New Zealand documents also confirm these advantages".⁸

While Australia and New Zealand had clearly expressed the desire ot be part of a Pacific Pact led by the United State, how did Washington view the issue of regionalism in the Asian Pacific? Was it keen to setup regional organizations under its leadership in this part of the world?

To illustrate the place of regionalism in US Asian Policies, it is useful to look briefly at the motives which underpin, the US interests and

⁷ *National Times* Sydney, 8-14 March 1985.

⁸ *New Zealand Minister of Defense Release* 19, October, 1984.

engagement in regional cooperation in the early 1950s. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the impetus towards Asia-Pacific regionalism was almost exclusively dominated by Post-World War II and emerging Cold-War security concerns. “Australian and the Philippines were the principal countries pushing a concept of a pacific defense pact for fear of an insufficient American commitment to Asia in light of the potential for a Japanese revival, the growing power of the communist movement in China, and the general political uncertainty occasioned by the crumbling of western colonialism.”⁹

American Motivation

Washington’s attitude towards Asian regional cooperation was mainly guided by its strategic interests and Political objectives in the region. While the Second World War raged over the rest of the world, American Policy makers were already calculating how best to ensure US strategic interests in various regions of the Post-War world. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was confident of ultimate victory over the Japanese, and himself showed interest in the geopolitical requirements of the United States in the post-war era when the nation would have achieved its “Manifest Destiny” to be the pre-eminent

⁹ Evelyn Colbert, *South-East Asia in International Politics. 1941-50* (1972), pp 111-116.

military power in the world. In that future, Roosevelt and his closest military and national security advisers saw a vital need for access to strategically located overseas bases in different part of the world.

While analysing varioius dimensions of the future Asian scenarios, there were worries in certain quarters in Washington that the emergence of a “militant Asia or an Asiatic-European coalition” might hamper, the US interests in the Pacific region. The term “Asiatic-European Coalition” Probably meant the emergence of a powerful Commonwealth under British leadership or even the cooperation of the French and the Dutch along with their former colonies in such a coalition. The emergence of such a coalition in the immediate future was out of question, but the US policy makers were thinking “in terms of the future, the next twenty-five, fifty, one hundred years and beyond”. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, military adviser to the US President, put forth the point to the secretaries of war and the Navy and the Chiefs of staff of the Army and the Navy.

“It can be expected that effective munitioning capacity in East Asia will eventually result from the progressive industrialization of its vast population, approximately one-half of the world’s total. For the future security of the United States against a possibly unfriendly and militant

Asia or an Asiatic-European coalition, we must be able to continue to control the Pacific ocean. Such control is necessary not only that we can project our own offensive forces against the Asiatic mainland but also so that we can deny any enemy access to the western Hemisphere by way of the Pacific ocean. In arriving at this conclusion the Joint chiefs to staffs are not thinking solely in terms of the present but in terms of the future, the next twenty-five, one hundred years and beyond”¹⁰

The American fear of possible emergence of an “Unfriendly and militant Asia” was perhaps reinforced when certain apparently “Pan-Asiatic tendencies” appeared in the immediate Post-War period. These tendencies, to the American’s were reflected in the 1947 Asian Relations conference, the 1949 New Delhi conference on the Indonesian situation.

While taking steps to deal with “Pan-Asiatic anti-western” (actually anti-colonial) tendencies, the US policy makers had realised that efforts by the United States to organise the Asian countries to form a regional association would not go down well with the newly

¹⁰ Memorandum for the President, by William D; Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, 19 October 1946, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, modern military Branch, National Archives,

independent Asian Nations. After about two months of the 1949 New Delhi conference, the US officials were ready with a policy planning staff paper on the United States Policy towards South East Asia.

The Paper, rated “secret” in March 1949, states. “We should avoid at the outset urging an area organization, our effort should initially be directed toward collaboration on joint or parallel action and then, only as a pragmatic and desirable basis for intimate association appears, should we encourage the areas to move step by step toward formal organization, we should not give the impression of attempting to thwart such a move but should go along with them while exerting a cautiously moderating influence In order to minimize suggestions of American imperialist intervention, we should encourage the Indonesians, Filipinos, and other Asian States to take the public lead in political matters. Our role should be the offering of discreet support and guidance”.¹¹

In case of ANZUS, The initiative came from Australia and New Zealand. Moreover, these two countries in the Pacific had cultural affiliations with the west and were not newly independent countries.

Washington, D.C. Quoted in Chintamani Mahapatra, *American Role in the Origin and Growth of ASEAN*, (New Delhi, 1990), pp. 45-46.

¹¹ Ibid., P.48.

Both Australia and New Zealand did not suffer from some of chronic problems faced by vast majority of colonies in Asia and Africa. The test was thus very easy for the US to go ahead and conclude the ANZUS treaty.

However, the US policymakers and strategic thinkers had given both strategic and economic priority to Europe. As the cold war unfolded events in Europe, indeed deserved more American attention than any other part of the world. This American priority was reflected in the nature and type of the US commitment to Pacific security. Particularly, those of Australia and New Zealand as embodied in the text of the ANZUS treaty.

Are obligations under ANZUS ‘weaker’ than those under NATO?

One needs to examine the significant differences in the language of the ANZUS treaty and the workings of the NATO.

It is a curious fact that, the ANZUS treaty, the most successful initiative taken by Australian government in the field of foreign affairs in the post-war period, has until recent times been consistently criticised and ‘written-down’ by Australians both inside and outside Parliament. The most persistent line of attack has been to ‘damn’

ANZUS by comparing it 'unfavorably' with what is alleged to be the 'tighter' obligation under taken by the parties to NATO.

Leicester C. Webb for long contested this interpretation and pointed out that the relevant text of ANZUS did not support, this line of argument. In order to grasp the differences and to examine the obligations of the ANZUS treaty, it is useful to compare some of article of ANZUS treaty and NATO.

The Key articles of the respective treaties are as follows:¹²

ANZU Art IV (I) Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the
S: pacific area on any one of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Art V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the pacific.

¹² Leicester G. Webb (ed.), *Australia and SEATO*, (Melbourne, 1962) pp. 56-57.

~~TH83~~
~~Acc-21~~

TH-8521

NATO: Art V(I) The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defense recognized by article 51 of the charter the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attack by taking forth with, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

DISS
327.73094
R1451 Us

TH8521



However, there were other Australians who did not agree with well continued to feel that ANZUS was a weaker treaty compared with of NATO. During the debate in parliament on the Bill to ratify ANZUS, Arthur Calwell, deputy leader of the Labour Party, drew attention to the difference in wording between ANZUS and NATO and commented; "There is an obligation on the United States of America and on all the other participants in the European treaty to go to each other aid. The only guarantee that is given in the pacific treaty is that the nations will consult in common ... there is no real obligation in the

(Pacific) treaty on any body and on some grounds it would be better to have no treaty at all”.¹³

The above debate is to some extent right. There exists some weaker articles and obligations, in ANZUS when compared to NATO.

Is ANZUS anti-British?

There are debates about the ‘exclusion’ of Great Britain from ANZUS membership. This ‘exclusion’ was resented not merely by some sections of opinion in Great Britain, but also, in a degree, in Australia and New Zealand . There is no doubt that many British people or people of British descent were distressed by the fact that two of the ‘old dominions’ were prepared to enter into a military alliance with a foreign country despite the fact that the mother country, the most important member of the Commonwealth of Nations and its strongest military power, was not included as a member.

In order to understand this debate it is helpful to go into various questions raised did great Britain, before the treaty was signed, seek to be included? If so, was she deliberately excluded, and by whom, for what reasons? Did great Britain facilitate the creation of ANZUS, or did she endeavour to prevent its coming into existence?

¹³ C.P.D. Vol. 216. P. 741.

A careful analysis of available literature gives the following answers.

There is no doubt that the United Kingdom was fully consulted by Australia and New Zealand before signature of the treaty, and that she did not try to dissuade the two dominions from becoming parties. As per the official records shows, Sir Esler Dening a senior British diplomat, was present in Canberra during the Dulles visit, and was kept generally informed regarding the discussions.

On the other hand, the British foreign secretary, Mr. Herbert Morrison, Speaking in the House of commons on ANZUS treaty, said that “it would not have been unwelcome to the US if we had been included in the propped pact.”¹⁴ Later, when Churchill had returned to power, he told parliament: “I did not like the ANZUS pact at all. We did not have an entirely clean sheet on the matter when we took over power. I did not like it at all, and I am greatly in hopes that perhaps larger, wider arrangements may be made which are at present in force. But, as of say, it is not a matter where one can give directions. One has to endeavor to use influence and allow time to work”.¹⁵

From the above statement of the Prime Minsiter of England, we can understand that the Great Britain’s desire to be part of ANZUS but it

¹⁴ U. K. Parliamentary Debates 11. Of C., vol. 486 (1951) Cols. 2001-8.

¹⁵ U. K. Parliamentary Debates 11. Of C., vol. 516(1953) Cols. 973.

did not happen. On the other hand Australia sympathised with Britain's desire to be included in the pact, but if the United States was not willing to extend a membership to Britain there was nothing that Australia or New Zealand could do about it. In truth, however, Australia and New Zealand became allies of the United States in ANZUS not because they had come to love America more and Great Britain less, but because the facts of power in the Pacific had changed during and subsequently to the second World War. American military power became predominant in the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand therefore had to listen to America on the ANZUS membership matter.

It is quite clear that ANZUS treaty is most certainly not anti-British, but is essentially an attempt by small powers living in a danger area to search, ahead of the crisis, a workable understanding with great power dominant in that area. In order to prevent communism and Japanese aggression, Australia and New Zealand regarded the maintenance of American Power as an essential, hence ANZUS and later SEATO.

It is worthwhile to observe the ANZUS operational part and how Australia and New Zealand had committed to the ANZUS treaty. In order to understand the execution part of the ANZUS. A quick look into the history of the ANZUS is inevitable.

The Korean War of 1949-53, the formation of SEATO (1954) and the Vietnam War, are the test cases to the ANZUS treaty. The first ANZUS council meeting Honolulu in August 1952 had touched on Indo-China as a danger area of which defense plans were needed, and a French report “suggested that the United States wanted Australia and New Zealand send troops to support the emperor, Bao Dai”.¹⁶

So, it is clear that the Australians and New Zealanders had paid attention to the US global commitments through the ANZUS treaty. Not only this, the Indo-China crisis confirmed that the threat of total war lacked credibility and the United States needed more flexible strategy allowed by alliance systems.

Australians and New Zealanders participated in Vietnam War on behalf of the United States with great enthusiasm. In fact Australia and New Zealand were the countries which had given fullest support to Washington in Vietnam War, where as most of the countries including some western countries opposed the US involvement in Vietnam War. Relations among the three partners of ANZUS continued well until mid 1980s. The year 1984-85 had witnessed some tensions among the ANZUS treaty partners.

¹⁶ Trevor R. Reese, *Australia New Zealand and the United States 1941-68*, (Great Britain, 1969), P. 163.

Chapter-2

ANZUS in Trouble and American Response

The ANZUS alliance, born in the aftermath of World War II, reflected a deep-seated and very strong association that went well beyond security issues. It has been an effective alliance between states which respected each other's sovereignty and agreed to co-operate, without being coerced or cajoled, in matters of common defense. These unique qualities of ANZUS, its unity, sense of purpose and indeed its very viability, were all called into question by the crisis in the relations between New Zealand and the United States.

The crisis within ANZUS started in mid-eighties over the issue of naval visits. Two allies namely, the United States and New Zealand, who seemed to be friends no longer, were engaged in the process of dissociating themselves from the established framework of cooperation. The alliance, once a by word for close partnership, became unmanageable, and recriminatory. Resentment and accusations had replaced co-operation, consensus and consultation. Confusing signals and divergent perspectives characterized the interactions between New Zealand and the United States.

The crisis in ANZUS raised many questions about the nature of its alliances and more specifically problems of small states in an alliance system. It has raised many questions about changing perceptions of alliance commitments and obligations, about the scope of alliances and the role of nuclear weapons in an alliance. Most fundamentally, the crisis raised serious questions about security priorities, the right of each state in an alliance to determine its own interests, the role and relevance of alliances in the midst of second cold war and beyond, and the American capacity to maintain the system.

In this era of Nuclear warfare, the ANZUS crisis is an important international crisis. Stripped of its layers of rhetoric, and symbolism, it has become the most public and serious dispute within alliance over the role of nuclear weapons in promoting security. It has become a dispute over whether it is possible to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons while retaining a close political and economic relationship with the United States. It is a dispute about the pursuit of security between US globalism and New Zealand regionalism.

Advent of the Crisis

New Zealand's labour party swept to victory in general elections on 14 July, 1984. Ousting the conservative National Party government of Robert Muldoon, who had served as Prime Minister for the past nine years. As labour party leader, David Lange became the Prime Minister of New Zealand, the event sparked fears of potential rupture in relations with the US. The labour party leaders had made a campaign pledge to ban nuclear warships from within New Zealand's waters and renegotiate the nations military alliance with Australian and the United States.

The Labour Party had proposed to establish a 'nuclear free zone' in New Zealand. One crucial plank in the party's political platform was a commitment to ban all atomic powered and nuclear armed warships from New Zealand as an initial step toward making the nation a nuclear free country. This issue featured prominently in the campaign and appusently contributed to the Labour Party victory. Indeed, the victory in this election represented the culmination of a potent anti-nuclear movement that had been gathering strength for more than a decade.

David Lange, the new Prime Minister, moved rapidly to implement what he interpreted as his government's anti-nuclear mandate. He announced that New Zealand's ports would no longer be available to American warships which were nuclear powered or nuclear armed. At the same time, Lange reaffirmed his nation's allegiance to ANZUS and to a collective, conventional defense of the South Pacific region. In other words, New Zealand believed in maintaining closer security relations with the ANZUS partners, New Zealand wanted to continue its national policy objective of establishing a Nuclear free zone in the country.

New Zealand's Non-nuclear policy vis-à-vis ANZUS

The Labour Party's strong anti-nuclear stance had three significant dimensions. First, the party was opposed to the very idea of acquiring, possessing, developing or stationing nuclear weapons as a matter of Principle. Secondly, the New Zealanders were worried about nuclear tests conducted in their neighborhood for the possible impact of the nuclear fallout on their country. And finally the opposition to nuclear weapons stemmed from a strategic thinking that such weapons could make New Zealand a target of the America's nuclear adversaries.

It is important to note that New Zealand's Labour Party had been traditionally opposed to the very concept of nuclear weapons. During the 1960s, and 1970s, both the ruling party and opposition, the Labour Party had championed the cause of those who had carried conviction and sentiments against nuclear weapons. Even when the United States and its arch rival were involved in intense cold war activities and were indulged in a deadly nuclear arms race, some of the American alliance partners had refused to toe the American line completely on nuclear issues. According to R.D. Broday and Benham ; "Nuclear weapons have made alliance management an increasingly complex task".¹

The labour government headed by David Lange elected in July 1984 followed the old party line. Accordingly, its official policy was that, the craft of all allied forces, that would otherwise be permitted to visit New Zealand must conform in two positive terms, i.e., "not only must they be conventionally powered, but also "demonstrably conventionally armed".² Initially, this policy was not applied comprehensively, for example, the U.S. combat air craft, F-16s, capable of carrying nuclear weapons visited New Zealand in October

¹ R.D. Brody and H.A. Benham, 'Nuclear weapons and Alliance Concession' in D.G. Privitt and R.C. Sydner (eds) *Theory and Research on the causes of war* (New Jersey: 1969), p. 165.

² New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review 35 (January March 1985), p.3.

1984 for exercise without any opposition. It was in February 1985, that the New Zealand government took a bold step and rejected the US request to allow the visit of the U.S.S Buchanan, a twenty-three year old Adam Class guided missile destroyer, configured with the ASROC system and nuclear capable anti-submarine rocket.

The U.S.S. Buchanan Incident: The Climax

The victory of the Labour government in New Zealand coincided with Ronald Regan's second Presidential term. Regan was a great cold warrior, who had vowed to destroy the 'Evil empire'. The Regan administration officials were aware of the New Zealand Labour Party's anti-nuclear position. The US Embassy in Wellington was carefully monitoring the election campaign of elections of 1984 and posted the concerned officials of state department of Washington with all relevant information. The Labour Party's victory did create a minor ripple in Washington's security policy-making circles.

The Regan administration did not want to adopt any policy of confrontation vis-à-vis the New Zealand's new government stance on the nuclear issue. It first wanted to test David Lange's real motivations

and sought permission from the New Zealand government to dispatch the USS Buchanan a destroyer of the American navy.

A conventionally powered destroyer, the Buchanan was type of warship unlikely to be carrying nuclear weapons. The New Zealand officials demanded to know whether the Buchanan carried nuclear weapons, and when the United States refused to give that information, the New Zealand government denied port access to the vessel.

American Response to New Zealand's Nuclear Policy.

The Buchanan incident abruptly terminated by the Regan administration's policy of quiet diplomacy. Washington immediately announced several punitive measures. To start with it cancelled the ANZUS "Sea Eagle" naval exercise scheduled for spring 1985. It also called off visit to the U.S. military headquarters in Hawaii by the New Zealand Parliament's defense committee. There was a marked deterioration in New Zealand-United States relations. New Zealand's desire to maintain both its anti-nuclear stance and American goodwill was a pipe dream. After the Labour Party conference in September 1985 the deputy prime minister, Geoffrey Palmer visited the United States and issued an invitation for a non-nuclear capable ship to visit

New Zealand, Regan administration promptly turned down the invitation.

It was also reported that, the “Washington rebuffed a New Zealand proposal for a confidential United States undertaking that it send only conventional and non-nuclear capable ships to New Zealand on condition that the United States would not be asked publicly to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board the visiting vessels”.³

It was, however, unacceptable to the US. In fact, the US has been maintaining a policy of neither confirm nor deny, the presence of nuclear weapons on its naval ships. It was not wise on the part of the Lange government to expect the Regan administration to change this traditional policy to conform to the Labour Government’s anti-nuclear policy. To the contrary, the Regan administration mounted pressure on Wellington to alter its anti-US policy. The United States in addition announced that it would restrict the flow of intelligence information to New Zealand. the rationale for this action was most revealing. As an “American official stated that while New Zealand remained a ‘friend’, its status as a loyal ally was in question, and the sharing of intelligence

³ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 October 1985, p. 36.

data was predicted on allied status".⁴ Although president Regan expressed continued friendship toward New Zealand, the official policies of Washington reflected a clear disdain of the Lange's government anti-US, anti-alliance posture.

Since Brouhaha over the Buchanan incident, relations between New Zealand and its ANZUS associates continued to deteriorate. Under intense pressure from the US, Australia cancelled the ANZUS foreign Ministers meeting scheduled for July 1985 in Canberra. Australian prime minister asserted that such a conference was inappropriate, since "insofar as ANZUS is a trilateral relationship, virtually nothing of it is operative now".⁵ Bilateral meetings between Australian officials and secretary of state George Shultz held during the latter's for Eastern trip in July further underscored New Zealand's isolation.

Initially, the State Department stressed that its decision to curtail the level of military cooperation with New Zealand did not reflect any new policy to abrogate the ANZUS alliance. This remained Washington's official position throughout the spring and early

⁴ Rebert Kaylor, 'Storm Signals Fly for U.S. in South Pacific', in *U.S. News and World Report*, 4 March, 1985, pp. 31-33.

⁵ "Lange won't Confer with Shultz", in *Dallas Morning News*, 23 May, 1985.

summer, even as hope dimmed that the Lange Government would alter its policy on portvisits. Here, it is clear that neither the U.S. nor New Zealand was ready to scrap the ANZUS alliance, despite their differences over the nuclear issues.

However, the temperature was quite high in Washington. New Zealand's anti-American attitude in the midst of the cold war was considered outrageous by the US policy makers and legislators. Some legislators even began to doubt the viability of the decades long ANZUS alliance in the absence of full cooperation on strategic issues from one member country.

Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Asian Sub Committee, stated that New Zealand's port call policy raised "the gravest questions about the future of the alliance"⁶ and urged that serious consideration be given to abrogating the treaty. Other members, of the Congress most notably Senator Colliam Cohen, went to the extent of calling for eliminating trade preferences for New Zealand and invoking other economic sanctions.

⁶ House Debate on ANZUS in Congressional Record, 26 February, 1985, no. 21: H 695702.

The Regan administration officials understood the sense of the US Congress but did not resort to tough measures against New Zealand for fear of escalation of the crisis.

New Zealand nonetheless agreed to have adopted a confrontational approach. In mid-December 1985, the Lange Government ignored US warnings and introduced legislation banning all nuclear armed ships and aircraft from New Zealand. But New Zealand still wanted to the party to ANZUS. It is significant to study how Australia as a member of ANZUS maintained its relations with the super power America on one hand, and with the close neighbour New Zealand on the other hand.

Australian Neutrality

Australia found itself caught in the middle of the quarrel between its two alliance partners. Throughout the current crisis the Hawke government attempted to maintain cordial relations with both parties, tilting slightly towards the U.S. position on the question of port access while reiterating its support for New Zealand's long term objective of making the entire South Pacific nuclear-free.

Canberra was not in favour of coming down heavily on the Lange Government. Any hard-line approach, it was feared, could be interpreted as undermining the leadership of David Lange. Moreover, there was a danger that confrontation could further harden the attitude of New Zealand on the crucial issue of passage and port-calls of US naval vessels. Australia preferred to take a neutral position when the other two alliance partners were almost on a collision course.

Canberra endorsed U.S. plans to cancel trilateral naval exercises and postponed the ANZUS foreign ministers conference. At the same time it continued to conduct bilateral military exercises with New Zealand and apparently shared Wellington's renewed interest in the Moribond Canberra Pact of 1944, which provided for political and military collaboration between the two nations. Compared with Australian attitude of bemused tolerance towards New Zealand, Regan administration regarded support for its nuclear policy as the *sinequanon* of alliance membership.

Australia had followed a middle path by maintaining relations with both the United States and New Zealand. Australia had quickly grasped the delicate situation of the crisis and tried to come out clearly.

British Influence

As an ally of all the ANZUS members and having been, affected by New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy, Britain took a keen interest in the crisis. In February 1985 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher joined President Regan in condemning New Zealand's aggressive and anti-nuclear stance. The Thatcher government declared its readiness to help resolve the difficulties. The British officials and experts like Michael Armitage, director of British Defense Intelligence, and John Stanley, Minister for the Armed Forces, had tried to persuade the New Zealand government to abandon its hard-line position. However these British efforts fell on deaf ears.

The visit of Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse in February 1986 was rather unrewarding. Field house tried to convince New Zealand that its policy was weakening the free worlds ability to fight communism and sought to explain the subversive threat posed by Soviet fishing trawlers and merchant ships in Pacific. London went to the extent of threatening Wellington by saying that the latter's stubborn stance might lead to cancellation of defense cooperation between the two countries.

The Lange Government was stung by the British warnings. Prime Minister David Lange retorted that “if UK-New Zealand defense cooperation ended, it would not “be the end of the world”. New Zealand was “no longer a colony though the British had seen fit to send out an admiral to lecture us”.⁷ From, this it is quite understandable that New Zealand was in no position to change its nuclear policy. New Zealand was not convinced by either Britain’s warning or the US. Persuasion.

In theory, Britain was in a reasonable position to help defuse the crisis. But Wellington was not prepared to change its policy. The ANZUS crisis indicated not merely of divergences on nuclear issues within the alliances, but also the increasingly disconnected security interests of the member countries. Significantly the three ANZUS alliance partners were not able to come to a common agreement on the nuclear issue, since there was a clash between the global interests of the US and national or regional interests of New Zealand.

It is clear that the three ANZUS members had sharply different conceptions of what the alliance was and ought to be. New Zealand viewed ANZUS primarily as a political association, demonstrating

⁷ Michael C. Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence* (U.K. 1989), pp.

democratic solidarity and promoting regional stability through economic political and military cooperation. The United States regarded the alliance as merely one component in a global security network designed to deter Soviet expansionism. Australia's government straddled the issue, seeking to preserve both political and military dimensions of ANZUS while beginning to tilt toward New Zealand's views on the need to establish a non-nuclear environment in the region.

Even though the British influence had not produced any positive results in the ANZUS crisis management, it constituted a good beginning of the damage management efforts. Positive steps to normalise the relations between the US and New Zealand began to bear fruit, after a decade in 1994. In all these 10 years of time, there were some attempts made by both the parties to soften the relations, but nothing much could be accomplished.

There is no doubt that the anti-nuclear policy adopted by the Lange Government severely affected the otherwise cordial relations between New Zealand and the United States. Such a rift between the two alliance partners in the midst of a crisis in Indo-China so called Cambodian crisis.

However, neither New Zealand nor the United States allowed their differences over the nuclear issue to cloud their relations to an extent which would threaten the very existence of the ANZUS alliance. In other words, preserving the alliance was considered more important by the Regan Administration and later the Bush Administration.

If the ANZUS alliance would survive the crisis during the Cold War, could not the post-cold war US administration under the president-ship of Bill Clinton wind it up? The Clinton administration did not consider it to be in the US interest to wind up the ANZUS alliance. To the contrary, it desired to revise the cordial relations with New Zealand..... the tiny Pacific partner for long.

It was the Clinton Administration which “decided to resume top-level political contacts halted in 1987 when a left wing government banned ships carrying nuclear weapons or powered by nuclear fuel from entering New Zealand waters”.⁸ New Zealand reciprocated and hailed the American move. It had enabled both the countries to have a proper dialogue on both bilateral and broader strategic issues in the new context of the post-cold war era.

⁸ “New Zealand lauds U.S. Move to Mend Relations”. *Bangkok Post*, Bangkok, 21, February 1994.

Relevance of ANZUS

The end of the Cold War, however, sparked off debates on the relevance of ANZUS in the new era. This question gained momentum for several reasons. First, ANZUS alliance from American point of view never represented a high priority item in US foreign policy. Second, ANZUS alliance was a product of Cold War strategies of the US to contain communist expansionism. Third, ANZUS pact was a pay-off to Australia's support to Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951. What purpose would ANZUS serve in the absence of the Cold War and the Japano phobia?

Although Australian policy makers had developed concerns over the rising power of China and were apprehensive about the intentions of Indonesia, no one in Canberra was really worried about the possibility of an invasion of Australian territory in the post-cold war era. Why should then Australia swear upon its commitment to a treaty which appeared to have outlined its utility? In the changed circumstances of the 1990s and in the era of the 21st century, did ANZUS appear on anachronism?

Moreover, there is now no military confrontation of a global scope which would require an ANZUS to meet a perceived common enemy or threat. Should not the ANZUS partners follow the foot-steps of the Warsaw Pact allies?

It is significant to recall that a couple of years before the ANZUS ran into a crisis with the assumption of power by the left wing government of David Lange, the prevailing debate in Australia had questioned the strength and usefulness of ANZUS.

This alliance was considered by some as a “useless piece of paper” because each party was bound only to ‘consult’ and only to “act to meet the common danger according to its constitutional processes.

Desmond Ball in 1983 wrote; “The ANZUS treaty itself, however, is neither an absolute nor watertight guarantee, and nor is it the primary determinant of United States military assistance to Australia and New Zealand. Whether or not the United States would come to the assistance, and the conditions on which it would be forthcoming, would depend essentially on the calculation of interests made by the United States government at that time”.⁹

⁹ Young Whan Kihl and Lawrence E. Grintar (ed), *Asian-Pacific Security, Emerging Challenges and Responses*, (USA. 1986), p. 226.

So, ANZUS was basically regarded as an instrument for achieving the American global interests, where Australian and New Zealand interests composited a small part. However, such debates hardly had an impact on the thinking of the governments in Canberra and Wellington. Both Australia and New Zealand refused to buy the argument that ANZUS treaty was a “useless piece of paper”. They continued to believe what the Defense Review of New Zealand had stated way back in 1978: “ANZUS has been accepted by successive New Zealand governments as the ultimate guarantee of security in the region”.¹⁰

There was, however, little disagreement over the fact that the United States was the dominant partner of the alliance both during the Cold War and after the Cold War. Dominant partner in such regional security organization almost always have their say, when New Zealand stuck to its position on the nuclear issue, Washington could have closed down the ANZUS alliance. It chose not to do so, since the US strategic thinkers considered the treaty to be of relevance to maintaining and enhancing US interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 226.

Even in the post-cold war era, the United States values the relevance of the ANZUS treaty. It is part of its network of strategic pillars in the Asia-Pacific region. American facilities in Australia are far more important to the US than to Australia, simply because, the US has been a key player in Asia-Pacific politics, economy and in security related matters. In order to maintain American global interests, to hold on to its presence in the Asia Pacific region US basis and military facilities are of utmost importance.

It is a fact that only US desire would not work. Both New Zealand and Australia have also maintained that ANZUS would serve their strategic interests in the Post-Cold War era. First, the ANZUS would provide easy accessibility to Washington. Secondly, though there is no foreseeable threat to either Australia or New Zealand in near future, the complexity of the international situation in the Post-Cold War era induce these two countries to maintain their traditional ties with the only remaining superpower of the world.

CHAPTER-3

US-AUSTRALIAN SECURITY TIES

The Commonwealth of Australia and the United States have a long history of relations. These two nations have a similar socio-political evolution which have enabled their respective people to have relatively better understanding of each other. Both of these nations have a similar history of Anglo-Saxon immigration into a vast untamed continent, where they had to fight an incessant battle for possession and control of land and resources with the native people.

The relationships between Australia and the United States have evolved since 1870 onwards. The course of Australian development has innumerable resemblances to the course of American history. Perhaps one of the most outstanding of these is the way their political system evolved in to federation. During the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century, the colonies, which then numbered six, began to appreciate the benefits they would derive from concerted action. A movement was set on foot to form a federation of Australia in which each colony would become a state. The organization of this

Commonwealth was patterned after that of the United States of America.

The principles of individual freedom as seen in the US Bill of Rights are also found in the Australian constitution. The organization of the Parliament into an upper and lower house, one based on state representation and the other on population distribution, is similar to the House of Representatives of the US Congress. In other words Australians and Americans share the concepts of democracy, freedom and human rights.

While, the United States and Australia shared broadly a similar historical, cultural, social and political experience, they did not have any kind of security ties until after the beginning of World War II. It was in the backdrop of rapid Japanese military expansion in South East Asia and the vicinity of South Pacific that Australia felt need to look at the United States as the saviour, Prime Minister John Curtin, in fact, made an appeal on 27 December 1941 that his country would “look to America” for security of Australia and the region “without any inhibitions of any kind”.¹ This appeal was made at a time when the British protective shield, operating for more than a century and a half,

¹ J.A.C. Mackie (ed.) *Australia in the New World order* (London, 1976), p, 234.

appeared inadequate and a militarily vulnerable Australia was faced with the threat of a possible Japanese attack.

The thought of an alliance between Australia and America developed out of a wartime situation, survived the frictions of war and matured into a more formalized relationship in the Post World War II Period. The pre-war balance of power had collapsed with the defeat of Japan and Germany, the weakness of China, the decline of the British power and the emergence of United States as a superpower able to dominate the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. The nationalist revolutions and communist movements created an area of instability in South and South East Asia.

Australian diplomacy centered round an attempt to find 'a powerful and willing friend' to replace Great Britain, whose capacity to exert a decisive influence in South East Asia had greatly diminished. The potential threat to Australian security in the 1950s appeared to come either from a resurgent, rearmed Japan or from an expansionist China. The reversal of American policies in Japan and the determination to build a defence bastion against expanding communism in China caused concern in Australia. Security became linked with the problem of the kind of peace treaty to be concluded

with Japan. The Korean War added to Australian fears of the People's Republic of China. Australia's swift participation in the United Nations operations under the US leadership was not unrelated to the hope of establishing a firm and long-term working arrangement with the United States.

The ANZUS treaty, as discussed in the earlier chapter was the result of an Australian initiative. This initiative came largely from the then Australian foreign Minister Percy Spender who skillfully linked the conclusion of a moderate peace treaty with Japan with a security agreement with the United States.

The ANZUS treaty became the central pillar of Australian Security and one of the cornerstones of US-Australian ties. Each party recognized that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declared that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Strategic Significance

While the ANZUS treaty provided the basic foundation for defense cooperation between the United States and Australia, it was a

trilateral alliance. The Defense relations between these two countries were not just confined to the ANZUS treaty and several other areas of bilateral cooperation evolved and assumed a significant dynamics of its own.

There is no doubt that Australia is located in a geographically distant region, but the strategic thinkers of the new superpower, the United States, did not consider Australia as an area of marginal significance. Of course, during the excessive US attention on European affairs made Australia look like on area of Peripheral importance to the United States. However, a careful analysis would show that a quick succession of events in Asia and the signing of ANZUS treaty did indicate Australia's strategic relevance to the United States.

According to American strategic calculations, if left unattended Australia's potential value would have encouraged the adversarial powers to woo Australia. Australia's close ties with America's adversary could change the balance of situation in Southeast Asia, southern Pacific and in Indian ocean to Washington's disadvantage.

Located in the South Western Plank of US forward deployments in the Pacific region and washing the waters of Indian ocean, Australia

was too significant a strategic prize to ignore. Control Australia by an adversary could pose complicated security challenges to the US interests in this part of the world.

Had it not been for its strategic location, the United States would not have entered into Agreements with Australia for establishment of US military facilities in that country. In 1962, the Australian Prime Minister announced that the United States would establish a naval communications centre at North-West Cape in western Australia. In May 1963 formal agreement was concluded by which a 28-acre site was leased to the United States for a period of at least twenty-five years. The base was equipped with low-frequency radio to enable it to communicate with polaris submarines operating in the Indian ocean, and equipped with nuclear weapons.

“The United States defense facilities in Australia are undoubtedly important to America’s global strategic capabilities”.² Informed officials on both sides have stressed their importance. Some indication of US interest in retaining these installations was evident in official conformation of their importance despite strong domestic

² David Petit and Anne Hall (ed.,) *Selected Reading in Australian Foreign Policy* (Australia, 1973), p. 231.

Australian opposition during the Labor government of 1973, in Australia.

There are presently some ten US defense and scientific establishments in Australia. In all cases the facilities are established under joint US-Australian agreements and no third party is involved. Five of the facilities are controlled by Australia or jointly by Australia and the US. The remainder are under US operational control. According to Desmond Ball well known security analyst “Most of the installations undoubtedly have strategic significance but three are much more critical to the central global strategic balance”.³ These three are: North west Cape, Pinegap and Nurrungar. The first of these is under the operational control of the US navy, the other two are controlled or operated jointly with the US.

³ Desmond Ball, “American Bases in Australia, the Strategic Implications”, *Current Affairs Bulletin* Vol. 51, March 1975, p. 5.

The North West Cape Naval Communication Base

The North West Cape Naval communication station was commissioned in 1967. Its main purpose is communication with the US submarines in the Indian and western Pacific. It plays an important part in the command and control of submarines deployed in Australia's strategic environment. "North West Cape" is the largest and most powerful of the three principal very low frequency stations in the US world-wide submarine communications system".⁴ This station plays a very important part in the US global defence network. "While alternative facilities outside Australia are available to US navy, the operational capabilities of these in the region would be inferior to that of the North West Cape base".⁵

Pine Gap

The Joint Defense Research facility at Pine Gap became operational in 1969. It has two basic functions. The first relates to communication with satellites, especially early warning satellites and includes the command and control functions of these. This function

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 7.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 8.

includes continuous “real-time monitoring of any Soviet or Chinese ICBM, FOBS and some SLBM launchings”.⁶

Other capabilities of this installations are detection of nuclear explosions and the provision of ‘Post-attack information on the explosive energy and warhead type of enemy weapons.’⁷ The second function is related to the development of strategy of space technology. Satellites monitored by the Pine Gap facility are expected to develop capabilities ‘for the mid-course tracking of ICBMs for use in ballistic missile defense’.⁸

Pine Gap plays an important role in the US satellite early warning system, which has been described by the former Secretary of Defense, James ‘Schlesinger, as being one of the most important systems used by the US for early warning of missile attack. The part played by Pine Gap has been described by Desmond Ball in the following terms: “Although some of its functions are duplicated in part by other American installations in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the Satellite ground station on Guam, there are no satellite control facilities outside the United States which approach the \$ US 250-300

⁶ *ibid.*, p.9.

⁷ *ibid.*, p.9.

⁸ *ibid.*, p.10.

million Pine Gap base in terms of capital out lay, technical sophistication or strategic responsibility”.⁹

Nurrungar Space Communications Station

The joint Defense space communications station, Nurrungar, is located in the Woomera test site of Australia. It is the principal American military satellite communications ground station in the southern hemisphere. Nurrungar has two main functions. The first is to provide warning of long-range missile attack and the second is transmission of reconnaissance information from American reconnaissance satellites to receiving agencies in the United States. Nurrungar plays an important role in monitoring the development of Chinese strategic weapons. Its location is important to the US because “Australia is ideally suited for receiving pictures immediately after the satellite passes over China”.¹⁰

So, it is clear that these three facilities are of considerable, if not vital, importance to the US. They are part of a wider global system and as such interdependent. In this way both Australia and the United States have been interacting in different level of defense relations since

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 10.

the end of World War II. The basic relations of defense structure are same except some policy changes on both sides.

The Australian military officers regularly get training and exposure in the US military institutions. Australian military officers and planners learn, among other things, even American war doctrines including some of the doctrines related to fighting wars involving weapons of mass destruction. Since the two countries are close strategic partners, common training by using standardized military equipment is considered necessary. They also get exposure together to concepts of cooperation and tactical doctrines.

Among the larger exercise series in which the United States and Australia have largely participated, RIMPAC (from “Rim of the Pacific” – the Pacific rim countries) is a multinational combined arms exercise involving land and carrier based on aircraft, submarines, and a large number of major combatant and support ships: WALIANT USHER which began in 1981, involves amphibious activities often in Western Australia; and “the KANGAROO series, sponsored by Australia, a combined and joint operations exercise focussing on the air war”.¹¹ Australian and U.S. forces have exercised in Australia and in

¹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 44-8.

the Indian ocean, as well as in the Pacific. This is typical of the increasing pace of US-Australian exercises.

Interoperability

As early as World War II, the U.S., British, Canadian, and Australian armies established under the ABCA agreements a series of working groups designed to enhance interoperability. This set of organizations has been at work ever since, and continues to promote military capability. Because of the size of Australian forces, the country's battlefield contributions have often been made with those forces integral to larger allied operations.

Consequently, Australian defense planners are particularly aware of the importance of interoperability as a force multiplier for their combat effectiveness. This wariness is evident in the vigorous combined exercise programs and the carefully thought out material procurement programs of the Australian Defense force. For years the Royal Australian Airforce (RAAF) and the U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) have conducted combined operational exercises to maintain and develop their ability to work together. In terms of material "Australia is one of the few countries to fly American made F111s.

These air craft are equipped with the same advanced PAVE TACK electro official target designation system as some U.S. FIII's. PAVE TACK is an all-weather, day night highly precise targeting system. They also have new radar homing and warning system (RHAW), which detects radar emissions and warns of potential attack. Harpoon missiles and GBU-15 guided bombs are also slated for use by the FIII's".¹² This interoperability system is very effective between the US and Australia.

Research and Development

In terms of research, Australia and the United States are planning the co-development of a missile decoy system designed to protect ships from air-to-surface stand-off antishipping missile. In 1985, Australia agreed to assist in testing the U.S. MX missile, but later reconsidered and denied. This particular incident caused some tensions between the countries.

Intelligence cooperation:

One of the areas of closest and most effective defense co-operation has been intelligence "The UKUSA agreements concluded in

¹² Terry Gwynn-Jones, "The Royal Australian Air Force", *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, XI, 2 (Fall

1947 form the basis for signals intelligence (SIGINT) collaboration of not only the United States and Britain, but of Australia, Canada, and Newzealand as well. Similarly, the ABCA (America/Britain/Canada/Australia) accords provide a further umbrella for the sharing of defense intelligence. In some limited areas, the United States and Australia share intelligence provided no other country. Intelligence co-operation between the United States and Australia involves five types of activities: (1) land based facilities under U.S. direction or supporting US intelligence collection missions, on the continent; (2) exchange of intelligence information of diverse types; (3) cooperation in covert activities (4) various communications relay support roles and (5) U.S. technical support activities”.¹³

What are the changes in Australian defense policies? What are the security relations between US and Australia? Are there any major policy changes? If there are, what are the changes, and in what way are these changes affecting both the countries?

Australia has traditionally been dependent on US for its security and defense. With the end of the Cold War, does Australia need the US

¹³ “K G B Stealing Australia’s Secrets”, *Pacific Defense Reporter*, vol, XIV, No. 4 October 1987
P.16

security umbrella? Does it want an independent defense policy? During the 1980s, debate on the Australian self-reliance started. There was also opposition in Australian politics to the presence of the US bases? Is there any change in the Australian defense policy since then? The same questions are applicable to the US also.

The U.S. Role in Australian Security

The United States has been playing an important role in Australian security and defense matters. Among the most important U.S. contributions are “.

- (1) deterrence;
- (2) Providing Australian access to American defense material;
- (3) Assistance in training and doctrinal development, including the conduct of joint exercises:
- (4) Joint planning to facilitate coordinated defense;
- (5) Cooperation in defense research and development: and
- (6) Intelligence Sharing”.¹⁴

¹⁴ Australia, Department of Defense, *The Defense of Australia* 1987, p.4.

These are not insignificant contributions, since without them Australian defense activities would be either more expensive or less effective.

Australian security thinking has long embraced the concept of deterrence. The close alliance first with the United Kingdom and then with the United States reflects in part the perception that only superpowers can deter the threats to Australia's territorial integrity and political independence. Since Australia is the dominant military power of the South West Pacific, the principal threats to its security have not come from within the region but potentially and presumably from external powers. To deter these threats the commitment and capabilities of a much larger power have been perceived as useful. In the age of nuclear weapons, any nuclear attack on Australia only be deterred by an another nuclear power.

Table

United States: Expressed intentions and capabilities to assist Australia in a range of hypothetical situations.

<i>Type of crisis</i>	<i>Expressed US Intentions</i>	<i>Likely US capability to assist</i>
1. Isolated attack by a super power rival of the US	Full support would be provided	Likely that full support would be forthcoming
2. Attack by a super-power rival of the US in the context of a super-power conflict	Full support would be provided within capabilities	Unlikely to be able to divert significant away from the major
3. Heavy attack by a non-aligned major power	Unclear; may supply equipment, intelligence and diplomatic support	If this attack did not take place in the context of a major global conflict, the US could assist to the extent of its intentions
4. Heavy attack by a major allied to the US	Unclear; may supply equipment, intelligence and diplomatic support to both parties; may try to mediate; may favour Australia's opponent	As above
5. Heavy attack by neighbouring power	Expects Australia to be self-sufficient; may assist with heavy equipment supplies, particularly if attacking neighbour receives heavy support from a	As above

super-power rival

6. Other attacks by a neighbouring power	Australia expected to be self-sufficient	As above
7. Resource crises confronting Australia	As above	Australia might receive priority treatment if the US controlled scarce Resource supplies
7. The effects of eign wars and source conflicts	As above	As above

Source:- Ross Babbage, *Rethinking Australia Defense* (St. Lucia, Queensland, 1980). P.13

The United States' nuclear "shield" or "umbrella" therefore constitutes Australia's nuclear deterrent. Access to US defense equipment and supplies serves several Australian purposes. First, it means Australia does not have to develop a larger defense industry than its limited requirements can support. Second, it assures access to the most advanced weapons and non-lethal defense technologies in the world. Third, it assures access to ammunition and spare parts, so Australia does not spend more on a large inventory of its own. Fourth, it promises interoperability and automatically enhances the degree to which US and Australia can coordinate military activities. Fifth, only minimum purchases of advanced equipment need to be made. Finally,

access to the US production facilities across the board frees the Australian defense industry to focus on specialized needs and technologies of particular benefit to Australia. The diversity of U.S. equipment and material that has been transferred to Australia is too broad.

Differences over Defense issues in US-Australian relations.

In American eyes, Australia is, at best, one of many middle-ranking powers. Heavy emphasis upon the maintenance of a close affiliation with major allies traditionally has been perceived as an ideal means of enhancing the country's security at a time when realistically it could not be performed independently, but this dependence on the U.S. had created some tensions between these countries. It is worthwhile to find out the areas of differences in defense matters.

It is hardly surprising that the two countries as disparate in power and wealth as the United States and Australia encounter problems in their bilateral relationship. What is surprising is how little, in view of the asymmetrical nature of that relationship, these problems have disrupted effective cooperation in defense matter. A recurring theme of Australian complaints over several decades is that the United

States does not treat Australia as an equal partner. Whether in intelligence exchange, disclosure of communication activities or the security implications of the operations of US facilities on Australian soil, Australians have felt that they have been treated not as equal partners but as subordinate allies. Consequently, there has been a growing demand to allow Australian military officers to enjoy equal authorities in administering US military installations.

Australians become particularly incensed when it appears U.S. facilities are conducting operations contrary, or prejudicial, to Australian interests or policy. Rumours have often circulated widely concerning US interception of Australian communications. Use of these facilities for activities that Australia does not endorse; and actions taken through the installations that run counter to Australia's official international positions are strongly resented by successive governments in Canberra. As a result, the movement to curtail or restrict Washington's control over such US facilities is growing in Australia. The Australian government, which had agreed to support some US ships involved in evaluating the tests of the MX missile, reversed itself in 1985 due to domestic political pressure. While much was made of this reversal in Australia, it had little impact in bilateral

relations. The US government did not really see this policy as having any long-term implications for US-Australia bilateral ties.

The anti-nuclear movement in the Pacific too was not without repercussions in US-Australia relations. It is true that Australia went along with Newzealand to certain extent in support of the proposal to turn the South Pacific in to a nuclear free zone. However, Canberra did not want to take an extreme position in a way that would affect the US interests in the region adversely and to complicate its ties with Washington as and when a South Pacific Nuclear free zone was agreed upon, Australia made it a point to help craft the treaty draft in ways that could not hamper American security interests in the region.

However, the agony in Australia remained that US good behaviour was not always reciprocated by the United States. By the very definition of alliance relationship Australia expected ready access to Various Political circles in Washington. To Australia's, dismay, however, having access and exerting influence are two different things. Australia was not able to have its way in influencing decision making in Washington even in areas of vital security interests of the country.

In fact, even a cursory scrutiny of the relationship shows that for Australia access to Washington does not necessarily imply influence in Washington. In 1950-51 Australia wanted a harsh peace treaty imposed on Japan but could not get US support. Canberra sought to back the British policy during Suez crisis of 1956. Washington would not agree. In the early sixties, Australia sought to prevent Indonesia from taking over Western New Guinea (now Irian Jaya) but was again unable to obtain US support. In 1978 Washington broke a 1974 agreement to provide full information on developments at North West Cape and went ahead to install there important new equipment without Canberra approval. In the early eighties, when the, Regan administration was most hawkish pushing a limited nuclear war doctrine and under took a Strategic Defense Initiative, Australia despite its reservation could do nothing.

The level of Australia's access to US policies making circles was clearly reflected in the US attitude and treatment to a visiting Australia's parliamentary delegation in early 1990s. after their return, the delegation prepared a report. It said:

“Recognizing the value of first hand contact at the congressional level, the delegation was very pleased that, at the time of its visit to the United States, plans were underway for two congressional committee

delegations to visit Australia in the near future. The Delegation gave its strongest support for these visits.

It was therefore a matter of deep regret that, on returning to Australia, the delegation learned that both visits had been cancelled. The delegation was further disappointed to learn that the large contingent of US congress men initially indicating on intention to attend the inter parliamentary Union meeting in Canberra in September 1993 had shrunk to a single representative”.¹⁵

The Delegation was “pleased” with the access it received to Vice-President Al Gore and senior congressional figures, but in a significant observation it commented:

“It is telling that (during the Visit) Virtually the only news item on Australia carried by the major TV networks was that of a drunken koala..... the plight of Australian farmers or peace keeping in Cambodia failed to get or mention..... it was perhaps most disappointing to find that even elite think tanks pay little attention to our part of the world and what impact United states policies have on it”.¹⁶

After examining the above incidents and issues from Australian point of view, one can conclude that access to Washington does not

¹⁵ Report of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to the United States of America *Fighting Friendly Fire*, Washington D.C. Senate Printing office, 1993, p. 17.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 39.

imply influence in Washington, and the record shows conclusively that while Australia may have the access, when important and competing US interests are engaged, it lacked any influence whatsoever. So, it is a fact that the US has been maintaining a kind of give and take approach in the areas where it does not really matter much for Washington, the alliance partners or the South Pacific, however, still wanted to continue the alliance with the US.

Chapter: 4

AUSTRALIA'S SEARCH FOR AN INDEPENDENT POLICY: STRATEGIC DISTANCE FROM WASHINGTON?

“It is universally recognized that the period since 1989-91 has seen an historical earthquake. The entire pattern of world politics has been altered by the collapse of communism; the disintegration of Soviet Union; the new or revived ethnic, economic and security problems of Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, the uncertain future configuration of the European community, the economic troubles of Japan and their political consequences”.¹ The impact of the above situations have been reflected on many countries. The US-Australian bilateral relations also have started changing in a new direction. The Cold War strategies have been slowly fading away. The common enemy is dead.

With the end of the Cold War and the absence of any threat of nuclear armageddon, the centre of gravity of world politics has moved

¹ Harry G. Gelber “Advance Australia-Where?” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 46, 1992, p. 221.

from the political and strategic to the economic plane, that geopolitics is driven by geo-economics. Questions of national 'Strength' are discussed largely, often exclusively, in terms of economic performance. At this particular trans-formative phase, is Australia moving towards or away from Washington? Does Australia have its own security policy? With a considerable decline in American defense budget, the U.S is closing down some of its military bases in Asia-Pacific. Australia is more keen to have bilateral relations with Asian countries than never before. Why is it that Australia shifted its priorities to Asia? Does it mean the decline of American-Australian alliance? These questions need to be understood for a broader analysis of American-Australian relations in the post Cold War scenario. What is the Australian Policy in Asia-Pacific? These questions need to be understood for a broader analysis of American-Australian relations in the post Cold War scenario.

The continuing search for an Australian Identity

A fact which all Australians acknowledged, is that their future will largely be determined by the success and speed of their adjustment to its neighbourhood, that is South East Asia, North East Asia and the South West Pacific. On the other hand, the United Kingdom weakened

and drawing closer to a Europe increasingly preoccupied with its own problems and tensions. At the time Australians are witnessing in its north an explosion of energy, talent and dynamic economic growth.² Australian relevance and its capacity to influence other governments, especially in its own region, is therefore likely to decline, unless Australia can revitalise its economy and society. In these particular circumstances, Australia, more than most countries isolated as it is on the edge of South East Asia and the South Pacific. So, Australia felt that there is a need for friends and countries which will be responsive to its interests. Apart from APEC and the Pacific Forum, Australia is not a member of any powerful or well established political or economic bloc. Australia does not have a powerful neighbour on which to rely for protection. Although North East Asia is now its largest trading region, Australian markets still stretch across the world and, as a trading nation, it is imperative for Australians both to be engaged with the rest of the world and to position itself to exert some influence on other countries.³

² See, "Australia and Asia: A new Paradigm for the relationship", *Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, Vol. 3, no. 1&2, July 1999, p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*, Pp. 22-23.

Not being a major power and without natural allies other than New Zealand, Australia need to use its wits, its commonsense and its national assets in dealing with other countries. At the same time Australians can not ignore the realities of the global economy, the revolution in communications or its location on the edge of the Asia-Pacific region. Australia need, therefore, to project an image, which will be helpful in pursuing its national security and commercial interests. Australia is changing in a positive direction and seeking an Asian identity as distinct from its earlier enthusiasm for highlighting its cultural affiliations with Europe.

Australia's defense Policy – In relation to Asia

Australia has no land borders across which it might be threatened with invasion it's strategic location, maritime approaches and the inhospitable environment of much northern Australia continue to provide Canberra with a substantial natural barrier against any level of military assault.

Australia's neighbours are friendly and committed to regional stability. Australia faces no heavily armed neighbour with expansionist ambitions. There continues to be no identifiable military threat to this

nation, and none is in prospect. One of the major factors in Australia's secure strategic environment is the increasing resilience of South East Asia. The solid economic growth of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in particular provides long-term strategic stability to Australia's north. This coupled with the emergence of South Pacific cooperation increases the capacity of the region as a whole to resist military pressures. Australia's generally favorable strategic circumstances do not mean that they have no need for defense. It takes no time to build an effective fighting force in future. The end of the Cold War however, means changes in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Keeping all these changes in consideration Australia has formulated a defense policy. There are three central elements in Australia's defense policy.

“The first is the ability to defend ourselves. All nations have a responsibility to provide for the protection of their national sovereignty. For many years, Australia relied heavily on other nations for its security. Increasingly, however, we have taken greater national responsibility recognising that Australia can be defended, should it need to be, from within its own resources. The second, essential element is the promotion of regional security and stability, through effective partnership and cooperation with the region. Security cooperation provides an important bond between Australia and our neighbours. It aims to consolidate shared perceptions and

objectives among nations that are already basically well disposed to one another. We recognise that our security is linked inextricably with the strategic stability of the South East Asian region as the then Prime Minister Bob Hawke said in his address to the Asia-Australia Institute in May 1991: "*we should seek security in and with Asia*". Australia's involvement in the Five-Power Defense arrangements (FPDA) and the development of a good defense relationship with Indonesia in recent years are practical examples of our commitment to security in South East Asia. We also have fundamental interest in the prosperity and stability of Papua New Guinea and Island nations of the South Pacific. The joint declaration of principles with Papua New Guinea is a formal expression of our commitment to that nation's security. In the South Pacific, Australian Defense Cooperation plays a direct role in enhancing national security and economic development.

The third element of our Defense policy is strong alliances. Although Australia does not depend on the United States for protection, we do derive significant benefits from our close collaboration through access to advanced technology, training and exercises, and intelligence. These benefits give us a level of capability that would be difficult and vastly more costly for Australia to achieve by itself. Through our alliance with the United States, we also support, global security, in particular through the joint Australia/US Defense facilities. The facilities have played a major role in avoiding nuclear war and have been central to progress in arms control. They will have a continuing role in this regard. Australia's alliance with the US also provides a significant deterrent should this part of the world, face

substantial military aggression in the future. We also have a long- standing alliance with New Zealand, consistent with the common strategic outlook of both countries. We look to the enhancing of Closer defense relations with New Zealand over the next five years.⁴

A careful analysis of the above Australia's defense policy would reveal that Australian foreign policy has been changing according to the fast growing needs of the situations after the Cold War was over. Australia has recognized the need of the hour and trying to change its policy priorities. Australia is slowly evolving into a regional power in the Asia Pacific region. Australia no longer wants to completely depend on American security umbrella.

Australia's Policy on Regional Security

Australia has made a longstanding contribution to regional security through a range of bilateral and multilateral defense activities with the nations of South East Asia and South Pacific. Australia's contribution includes extensive ship visits, combined exercises, training and personnel exchanges, and more formal security arrangements with a number of countries in the region. A specific example of Australia's contribution to regional security is maritime

⁴ Government of Australia, *The Defense Corporate Plan*, (Canberra, 1992-1996) pp. 4-5

surveillance. For many years, Australia has assisted South Pacific nations to patrol their Exclusive Economic Zones. Australia has long established cooperation in this field with Malaysia, involving RAAFP-3C Orion Patrols over the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and consistent with the Timor Gap Treaty arrangements. Australia is co-operating with Indonesia in maritime surveillance in the Arafura Seas. A major aim of Australia's defense policy over the next decade will be to give more substance to its defense relations with regional countries. Australia's defense force, because it has been developed for the demanding task of defending its vast continent, has skills and capabilities well suited for co-operation with regional nations. The Australian defense force will continue to be structured for its priority task of defending the nation.⁵

The Australian Defense Force (ADFs) ability to contribute to peacekeeping is not a factor in force structure planning. Australian forces have nevertheless had a long involvement in peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world. This effort has been growing, and demonstrates Australia's commitment to the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. It's most recent and most significant

⁵ See, Gareth Evans, Bruce Grants, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the world of the 1990s* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991).

peacekeeping involvement was in Cambodia, where Australia provided forces for both the advance mission and the main peacekeeping force. Australia's substantial contribution to Cambodia is consistent with its fundamental interest in promoting stability and security in the region, and complements Australia's long standing diplomatic efforts for a Cambodian settlement.

The promotion of strategic stability and security in Asia Pacific region is of fundamental importance to Australia's policy of defense self-reliance, and is a key priority in Australian defense planning. Australia's security links with its Asian and Pacific neighbours have a long history, and are reflected in a network of strong bilateral relations and important formal agreements. The dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region makes Australia's task more complex today than it has been in the past. The pace of economic growth in Asia-Pacific region presents a combination of opportunities and challenges.⁶

Australia's principal defense alliances, involving formal, reciprocal undertakings to act together in case of conflict, are with the United States and New Zealand. These alliances, both formalised under

⁶ Ibid.

the ANZUS treaty, are now nearly fifty years old, and they reflect strategic and broader historical linkages.

Australia's and New Zealand's basic strategic interests converge strongly. The alliance is supported by the 1991 Closer Defense Relations (CDR) agreement which aims to foster closer consultation on defense planning between Australia and New Zealand, including on force structure development and operational compatibility of the respective defense force. CDR also aims to promote the efficient use of resources within the alliance and foster continuing close dialogue and cooperation.

Clearly, Australia share with New Zealand a defense relationship of great breadth, including activities such as cooperative defense equipment projects, a squadron of New Zealand Defense force (NZDF) A-4 aircraft based at Nowra, a wide program of exercises and exchanges, and close and regular contact between policymakers. Sustained commitment from both parties will help ensure an effective defense relationship. More over, credible and modern New Zealand capabilities would be useful in a number of operational settings.

ANZAC ships would be a major asset, while combat aircraft would be useful, including for close air support operations.⁷

In the South West Pacific, Australia is an important power capable of exerting considerable influence. Australia's objective is to maintain its position as the country with the strongest strategic presence in this region. Australia's primary long-term strategic interest is to prevent the positioning by any foreign power of military forces which might be used to attack Australia or its interests.

Australia's strategic interests in Papua New Guinea are especially compelling because of its size, proximity and existing military infrastructure. Australia aims to maintain its role as Papua New Guinea's key defense partner. The Joint Declaration of Principles (JDP) reflects the expectation that Australia would be prepared to commit forces to resist external aggression against Papua New Guinea. Australia's bilateral defense relationship with Papua New Guinea has experienced difficulties in recent years. The present John Howard government is firmly committed to re-building its relationship to effectively save the strategic interests of the two countries.⁸

⁷ See, INSIGHT, *Australia Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, vol. 5, no. 5, 24 April 1996.

⁸ *Ibid.*

The same considerations that apply to Papua New Guinea are also relevant to Australia's defense relationships and objectives in the Solomon islands, Vanuatu and, with less force, to other more distant Pacific Island Countries (PICs). Australia is trying to maintain its position as the key strategic power and primary defense partner of island countries. Over the past few years Australia has achieved this primarily through the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, under which Australia has provided a total of 22 vessels, together with the provision of Naval advisers to most PICs. This gives Australia an important military presence and influence, which Australia aims to maintain.

More broadly, Australia's approach to the security of the PICs has recognized that any attack on them or penetration by a potentially hostile power would be serious for Australia's security and that, as with Papua New Guinea, Australia would provide substantial support in the unlikely event that any of them faced aggression from outside the region.

South East Asia

Today's Southeast Asia is a major contributor to Australia's security. It is a region of medium powers, strong and self-confident

enough to resist pressure from without, cohesive enough to cooperate. Australia's strategic objective is to help maintain these positive elements and do what it can to lay the foundations for further strategic cooperation to meet new challenges that may emerge. This means supporting and developing a sense of shared strategic objective with as many of the countries of South East Asia as possible. This is being done through both Australia's bilateral relationship and Multilateral approaches including APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Each relationship in South East Asia is different, with unique constraints and opportunities. And while Australia enjoys good defense relations with almost all of them, it would be wrong to assume they automatically share all Australia's perceptions and priorities. Australia has many strategic assets in South East Asia. Foremost among them is a set of bilateral defense relationships with nearly all countries in the region.⁹

Indonesia is Australia's most important strategic relationship in Southeast Asia. This is not just because Indonesia is Australia's closest South East Asian neighbour, but also because its combination of population, territory, economic potential and political forces makes it

⁹ See, "Charting Australia's Regional Future: The white Paper on Foreign and Trade Policy". *Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, Vol. 1, no. 1, December, 1997.

the most influential country in South East Asia, and potentially gives it a substantial role in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

Malaysia and Singapore are Australia's closest defense partners in South East Asia. Australia has bilateral relationships with both countries which go back to colonial times and the early years of independence when Australia played a key role in their security and the development of their defense forces. These continuing close relationships are appropriate to Canberra's enduring strategic interests in the security of Malaysia and Singapore today. Malaysia is an outward looking nation, a leading member of the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) and of ASEAN. The Australian Defense force has a very long history of constructive engagement with Malaysia, bestowing practical benefits on both nations. Singapore's forces are the most advanced and effective in the region, making it a valuable partner for the ADF in terms of peacetime interaction.¹⁰

Thailand occupies an important strategic position and has considerable strategic potential. It has, with Singapore, the largest defense budget in South East Asia. Its armed forces are among the largest in ASEAN, and it supports the US presence in practical ways.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Bangkok looks to Australia for assistance in the modernisation of its armed forces. The Philippines also occupies an important strategic position in maritime South East Asia. Australia's interests would be well served by a strong Philippines, given its commitment to democracy and history of its non-threatening behaviour. It now has a growing economy and a nascent military modernisation program, although it still lags behind the East Asian tigers.

In the longer term, Vietnam has considerable strategic potential – its economy is growing rapidly and it is starting to modernise its military. Australia is working to lay the foundations now for a strategic relationship with Vietnam.

North East Asia

China will remain one of Australia's key relationships, with its approach based on shared interests and mutual respect. These principles provide the basis for a realistic framework for the conduct of the relationship, and offers the best prospects to maximise shared economic interests, advance Australia's political and strategic interests, and manage differences in a sensible and practical way. Clearly, the development of policies which serve Australia's national interests

while acknowledging China's political, economic and military growth, will continue to be a major priority for Australia. Its policies and actions will seek to show China that the strategic outcomes Australia seeks are consistent with China developing a key role on regional political, economic and security issues commensurate with its legitimate claims as an emerging major power. Australia will continue to place emphasis on developing multilateral structures like APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum which include China, engage it fully and potentially allow it to play a constructive leading role.¹¹

Australia has already taken significant steps towards developing strategic dialogue with Japan through the institution of political military talks complemented by modest military-to-military links. Japan's strategic interests converge quite strongly with Australia's. Australia share with Japan, an interest in continuing US engagement the freedom of navigation in the region, and the avoidance of increased strategic rivalry between the United States and China.

South Korea shares many of Australia's strategic interests. As an increasingly confident and capable middle power, South Korea is likely to be of increasing significance to the strategic architecture of

¹¹ Ibid.

North East Asia over the next 10-15 years. Certainly, the convergence of major power interests on the Korean Peninsula is likely to ensure that South Korea's profile in the strategic affairs of North East Asia will remain high, even if threat from North Korea recedes.¹²

There is little doubt that Australia's alliance with the United States is by any measure Canberra's most important strategic relationship. It is a major strategic asset and its preservation and development is among Australia's highest strategic priorities. The alliance is a complex relationship which operates at many levels and in many ways, including annual ministerial-level consultations. This bilateral arrangement involves a vast web of day-to-day bilateral cooperation in the maintenance and development of Australia's military capabilities, including intelligence cooperation, access to some of the most advanced military technologies, and intense service-to-service contact through training, exercises and visits. This co-operation provided Australian forces with technology and information, which is fundamental to Australia's defense capability. It will become more important in future, as Australian's become even more dependent on exploiting technology – especially information technology to maximize

¹² "Australia, Asia and Globalization", *Foreign Affairs and Trade Record*, Vol. 1, no. 1, December 1997.

its capabilities. Moreover, it makes the commitment of US combat forces to Australia's defense sufficiently likely to figure in the calculations of any would be aggressor.

However, the preceding description of Australia's growing ties with host of Asian countries is a clear indication that Canberra does not want to put all its security related eggs in the American basket. Slowly but steadily as Australia's economic interactions with Asian countries continuously grew, the Australian government thought it appropriate to establish cordial and political relations with the new economic partners. It significant to note that today more than half of Australia's trade is with Asia-Pacific rim. Australia's search for a new identity is also found in the changing pattern of its demography. Significantly, about forty percent of Australians or their parents have been born abroad. Australia has made it self an attractive place for Asian Students seeking higher education. According to one source, "more than 60,000 Asian students today have enrolled themselves in Australian universities and institutions of higher learning. In recent years Australia has brought about innovations in its immigration policy and

has sought to encourage more and more skilled Asians to emigrate to Australia".¹³

In view of the close linkages of economic, demographic, social and political issues with security perspectives of the country, the Australian government seems to be gradually adopting innovative approaches in its politico-security policies.

¹³ "Administering immigration Policy", *Insight*, vol. 5, no. 6, 31 May 1996, p. 6.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The United States does have a long history of sporadic contacts with Australia. But it was the World War II and the quick Japanese military expansion in South East Asia and in South Pacific region which established closer security ties between the two countries. When the war came to an end, the United States emerged as a superpower., Britain was on the verge of losing its empire and Australia was in search a long term strategic partner. The Australian fear of Japanese re-armament and the American fear of communist expansionism supplied the wherewithal for the emergence of closer strategic relations between Canberra and Washington. New Zealand and Australia were on the same boat and looking for a powerful ally. The leaders of these two countries were aspiring for a Pacific pact, drawing inspiration from the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or NATO. When the Cold War spilled over into Asia around the same time, and China went communist, the United States began to look for strategic partners in this part of the world.

The result of all these developments could be seen in the birth of a trilateral alliance involving the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The similar cultural background and the desire of all the three partners for a strategic alliance facilitated the birth of ANZUS with little or no pangs. Both Australia and New Zealand had the fear of Japanese aggression. They wanted to contain Japan in the Asia Pacific region. The fear of Chinese aggression was also one of the main reasons behind this idea of establishing a pact with the US. They felt that Britain was in no position to take care of the security needs of the Asia- Pacific region. Australians were quick in grasping the situation and found that there were no provisions in the Japanese peace treaty of 1951, which restrict Japan's aggression on Australia.

From American perspective, Washington wanted to establish a Pacific pact simply because of three reasons. First, it was desperate to contain communist expansionism in the South Pacific region, by then China was already a communist state. Secondly, Washington was smart enough to recognise Australian geographical significance and did not want to isolate New Zealand as it was a tiny power. Finally, the US felt the need for its military bases in this part of the world to contain communism.

Significantly, the ANZIS partners did not see a common threat. Washington was more worried about the spread of communism and Soviet influence in the Asia Pacific. Australia and New Zealand on the other hand faced little challenge from communism and were more apprehensive of a possible re-emergence of Japan as a formidable and expansionist power. However, when the US decided to go ahead with its plan to sign a peace treaty with Japan, it had to give assurances to its ANZUS partners against any Japanese aggression in the future. Australia, on the other hand, had to make its own compromise and to toe the American line on foreign affairs.

Keeping all these considerations in mind, Australia, New Zealand and the US, established a trilateral security alliance, the so called ANZUS treaty of 1951. So, this ANZUS treaty briefly had two goals in mind. From Australian and New Zealand's point of view, to contain Japanese aggression and from the US perspective, to contain communist expansion, and at the same time, to maintain global stability.

The ANZUS alliance started yielding results. In other words, Australians and New Zealanders were actively participated in the Korean War. This Korean War stood as a test case for the ANZUS

alliance obligations. Both Canberra and Wellington were committed to alliance obligations. Australia actively participated in the execution of US Cold War plans in the Asia-Pacific. It promptly joined the US-sponsored South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954. Yet another test case for the US-Australia security alliance came when a war broke out between South Vietnam and North Vietnam. Australia and New Zealand had stood by their big brother, the US. Both of them helped Washington even when some of the European states were opposing the US intervention in Vietnam. The Vietnam War had produced bitter experiences to the US. There was domestic opposition against President Lyndon B. Johnson's Vietnam policy. Not surprisingly, even Australia had some opposition in its domestic front. But Australian government had stood by its super power friend in Vietnam War. The end of the Vietnam War and the withdrawal of American troops from Indo- China did create apprehensions in the minds of Washington's Asian allies that the US would no longer be able to provide credible security in the face of formidable challenges to their security requirements.

The US had tried to convince its allies in the Asia- Pacific including Australia, that withdrawal from Vietnam did not mean end

of the US commitment in the region. Nonetheless, some regional countries, particularly Australia had begun to rethink its national security policy. The Australian debate reflected a desire to look for an alternative defense and security policy with special emphasis on self-reliance. It appeared as if the old Australian debate on the credibility of the ANZUS treaty had come back to life. After all, the US commitment to the security of ANZUS partners under the text of the treaty was much less than that of NATO allies. However, when the second round of Cold War started, with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia, there was no possibility of any demand to close down the ANZUS alliance.

The alliance more or less continued until a trouble in the mid-1980s. The year 1984 had witnessed some serious strains in ANZUS relations. The David Lange labour government of New Zealand had promised during the election campaign a ban on nuclear weapons and decided not to allow any nuclear powered or armed vessel in its waters. When Lange became the Prime Minister, he implemented the anti-nuclear policy. The tension between New Zealand and the US started when the USS Buchanan, a Adam-class destroyer was denied

entry into New Zealand waters. Washington took it very seriously and slashed New Zealand and cut-off all defense exchanges and information sharing.

Australia was caught in between the alliance partners. The crisis in ANZUS was the test case of alliance management in the world. The role of nuclear weapons and its implications had been different for various countries. In order to meet its national objectives, New Zealand had to overlook the American policy on neither confirm nor deny (NCND). New Zealand might had reached its non-nuclear policy, but it had lost the support and confidence of superpower America.

In these circumstances, Australia slightly shifted its stance towards Washington but at the same time it had taken care that it was not neglecting New Zealand either. Australia had maintained a neutral stance throughout the crisis. Australia had sympathised with Wellington's anti-nuclear stance and the same time listened to Washington. The British had in vain tried to persuade Wellington. Despite their differences over nuclear issue, both Washington and Wellington had tried to maintain their alliance relationship and both believed in sticking to the trilateral Pacific pact.

In a way, it was a triumph of Australian diplomacy which sought to convince the US and New Zealand that the divergence on nuclear issues should not be allowed to rupture the trilateral alliance. However, their differences over nuclear issues continued till early 1990s. In 1994 the US President Bill Clinton had taken initiative to curb the tensions between two countries. The efforts of the US were fruitful. Both Australia and New Zealand believe that their alliance obligations with the US are of utmost importance. They know that the ANZUS security pact is a concrete step in strengthening their relations with one and only superpower, the United States.

Australia has been maintaining strategic, defense relations with the US for almost fifty years. Defense co-operation between the two countries include a range of intelligence sharing, research and development, interoperability and maintenance of combined peace keeping forces under UN auspices. But there are some differences over defense issues between the two countries.

A recurring theme of Australian complaints over several decades is that the United States does not treat Australia as an equal partner. Whether in intelligence exchange, disclosure of communication activities or the security implications of the

operations of US facilities on Australian soil, Australians have felt that they have been treated not as equal partners but as subordinate allies. Australians become particularly incensed when it appears U.S. facilities are conducting operations contrary, or prejudicial, to Australian interests or policy. Rumours have often circulated widely concerning US interception of Australia does not endorse; and actions taken through the installations that run counter to Australia's official international positions are strongly resented by successive governments in Canberra. As a result, the movement to curtail or restrict Washington's control over such US facilities is growing in Australia. Despite of these differences, the US and Australia have been co-operating in international affairs like in the gulf war and Somalia, the recent example is East Timor. There has been a long record of strong co-operation between Australia and the United States on East Timor issue. Both Washington and Canberra have worked closely at all times, regularly exchanging views and perceptions at ministerial and departmental levels. Shared strategic-interests are the bedrock of the Australia - United States alliance.

Forty years after the US and Australia worked closely on security matters, a seismic change came about in international

relations. The Soviet Union collapsed, the Cold War ended and along with it the bipolar structure of the international system. The Soviet collapse coincided with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and followed years of Chinese economic reforms. In the new circumstances, the Warsaw pact organisation was closed down but the US did not close down either NATO or its wide network of bilateral/trilateral alliances. However, from the Australian side, there was a debate on the country's relationship with the US. In the post Cold-War era, Australia did not perceive a threat directly to its territorial integrity from any quarters. Why should then Australia continue to follow the traditional policy of maintaining close alliance with the US? Should not the ANZUS alliance be disbanded?

Whatever may be the debate, the Australian government did not think it wise to stop its closer security ties with the US. Its closer alliance relationship with the US for the first forty years since the inception of ANZUS meant closeness to a superpower. But now, it means closeness to the only superpower.

Since the future remained uncertain and new threats could emerge later, Canberra thought its alliance relationship with the only superpower should continue. However, in the light of the

developments in the region since the Vietnam War encouraged Canberra not to put all its security eggs in the American basket. The Australian policy of encouraging immigration from Asia and working towards the establishment of a multicultural society indicated that Canberra would no longer seek to maintain a western cultural identity and would rather shape its demographic profile on the basis of its geographic reality. Such a policy, it was thought, would enhance the country's security and reduce its concerns.

The rising economic activities in Asia, the emergence of Asian tigers and the rise of China as an economic power brought new challenges and opportunities for Australia. With the growth Australia's economic interactions with the economies of the Asia-Pacific countries, Australian policy makers increasingly realised that sources of the country's economic security are shifting from the West to the East. All these developments have led to closer defense and security relationship between Australia and the Asia-Pacific countries.

Do all these developments indicate that Australia is seeking to maintain a strategic distance from the US? Are there indications that the nature of US-Australia alliance relationship has been shifting

since the end of the Cold War? A careful analysis of these events would indicate that neither there is increasing strategic distance between Washington and Canberra nor is there a major shift in the alliance relationship between the two countries. The United States is not opposed to Australia's ambition for achieving defense self-reliance.

In fact, Australia's success in this field would reduce America's burden. Australia, on the other hand, has not adopted any serious policy that would challenge America's military leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. In other words, there are large areas of convergence of US-Australia security interests in this region in the post Cold-War era. The minor shift in the US-Australia alliance can be observed in the fact that over the years, Australia and the US have become increasingly interdependent. Continuation of presence of US military facilities in Australia serves as one among several examples in this regard.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Government Document & Speeches

"A Legacy of Freedom", speech by Hon'ble Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Forum 99, Meeting of the Australian American Education Leadership Foundation, Sydney 28, August 1999.

ANZUS Treaty, Australian Treaty Series 1952, No. 2, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

"Australia and Asia: A New Paradigm for the Relationship", speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Downer, to the Foreign Correspondent's Association, Sydney, 19 April 1999.

"Australia and United States: Old Friends and New Priorities". Speech by the Hon. Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the American Chamber of Commerce, Sydney 5, August 1999.

"Australia's Asia Policy, 1995", Asia-Australia Institute Lecture by Hon'ble Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, 1998.

"Australia's Place in the World", address by the Hon'ble Alexander Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the NSW Division of the Labour Party, Sydney, 26 November, 1996.

"Charting Australia's Regional Future: the White Paper on Foreign and Trade Policy", speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Downer, to the Foreign Correspondent's Association, Sydney, 29 August 1997.

Department of Defense, *Australia's Strategic Policy*, Canberra, Australia 1997.

"Governance in the Asia-Pacific: Challenges for the 21st Century", speech by Mr. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Perth, 18 August, 1999.

Government of Australia, *Strategic and Defense Policy: The Defense Corporate Plan (1992-96)*, Canberra, Australia.

Insight, Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade Publication, Vol. 5, No. 5, 24 Canberra, April 1996.

Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities*, Report to the Minister for Defense, March 1986, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986).

The Military Balance 1995-96, Report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, OUP, London.

The Military Balance 1998-99, Report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, OUP, London.

"The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region", speech by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, to the Commonwealth Club of California, July 21, 1997.

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington D.C., July 1994.

"US Relations with Australia and New Zealand", speech by Ralph L. Boyce, Deputy Asst. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 14 November 1999, at the Fullbright International Center Seminar.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

Babbage, Ross, *Rethinking Australia's Defense* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland press, 1980).

Baker, Richard W., *ANZUS States and their Region: Regional Policies of Australia, New Zealand and the United States* (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994).

Baker, Richard, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States: Fifty Years of Alliance Relations, Report of a Study Project* (Honolulu: International Relations Program, East-West Centre, 1991).

- Beddie B.D., *Advance Australian Where?* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1975).
- Bell, Coral, *Dependent Ally* (Canberra: Dept. of International Relations, The Australian National University Press, 1984).
- Bell, Roger, and Bell, Philip, *Implicated: The United States in Australia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993).
- Bercovitch, Jacob (ed), *ANZUS in Crisis: Alliance Management in International Affairs* (New York: St Martins Press, 1988).
- Brash, Donald T., *American Investment in Australian Industry* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1966).
- Crabb, Jr, Cecil V., *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy* (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1982).
- Evans, Gareth, and Grant, Bruce, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990's* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991).
- Gelber H. G., (ed) *Problems of Australian Defense* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1970).
- Halperin, Morton et. al, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Brookings Institution, 1974).
- Hoffman, Stanley, *Primacy on World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978).
- King, Peter (ed.), *Australia's Vietnam* (Australia: George Allen and Unwin Australia Pvt Ltd, 1983).
- Kissinger, Henry A., *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays* (Allahabad: A. H. Wheeler and Co., 1969).
- Meintyre, David W., *Back-Ground to the ANZUS Pact: Policy Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55* (Canterbury: Canterbury University Press, 1995).
- Pugh, Michael C., *ANZUS Crisis: Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Reese, Trevor R., *Australia, New Zealand, and the United States 1941-1968* (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1969).

Sapin, Burton M., *The Making of United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

Sawer, Geoffrey, *The Australian Constitution* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing, 1975).

Ward, Russel, *Australia* (New Jersey: Prentice hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1965).

Watt, Alan, *Australian Foreign Policy 1938-65* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).

Articles

Albinski, Henry S., "Responding to Asia-Pacific Human Rights Issues: Implications for Australian-American Relations", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 50, No.1, April 1996, pp.43-58.

Beaumont, Joan, and Woodwind, Gary, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 1993", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 48. No. 1, May, 1994.

Bharati, Jaya I., "Immigration and the Australian policy – A Development of Multiculturalism", presented in *National seminar on Towards Better Understanding of Australia – Polity, Economy and Society*, November 13-14, 1998, New Delhi.

Burchill, Scott, "Perspectives on Australian foreign policy", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No.1, May 1995.

Chesseman, Graeme, Mekinley, Michael, "Moments Lost: Promise, Disappointment and Contradictions in the Australian-United States Defense Relationship", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 46, 1992.

Dalrymple, Rawdon, "Australia, the United States, and our Pacific Future", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1989.

Gelber, Harry G., "Advance Australia: Where?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 46, 1992, pp. 221-47.

Goldsworthy, David, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 1995", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1996, pp. 199-207.

Huxley, Time, "South East Asia and Australia's Security", *Asia Pacific Community*, Winter 1984, No. 23, pp.40-58.

Kransnov, Viktor, "US Military Builders in the Asia and Pacific region", *International Affairs*, May 1987, No. 5, pp.96-101.

Lowe, David. "Mr. Spender goes to Washington", An Ambassador's Vision to Australian-American relations, 1951-58, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 24, No.2, May 1996, pp. 278-295.

Mahapatra, Chintamani, "American Military Bases in the Philippines: Some Reflections", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 12, No. 3, June 1988, pp.303-318.

_____, "Political and Security Trends in the Asia Pacific" *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 15, No. 3, June 1992, pp.197-208

Mediansky, Fedor, "Super Power Competition and Australia's Strategic Environment", *Australian Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 4, Summer 1984, pp. 352-362.

Morrison, Charles E., "The United States and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1994, pp. 63-73.

O' Connor, Michael., "Australia and its Strategic Position in the Asia-Pacific Region", *Indonesian Quarterly* , Vol. 17, No.35, 1989, pp.263-269.

Watanabe, Akio, "End of the Cold War and the Asia-Pacific Region", *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No.1, Spring/Summer 1991, pp.3-24.

Willensk, Peter, "Australian and US Approaches to the UN", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 42, 1996, pp. 280-92.

OTHER SOURCES

Newspapers

Australian

International Herald Tribune

New York Times

Sydney Morning Herald

The Hindu

The Times of India

Periodicals

Australian Outlook

Economist

Far Eastern Economic Review

Newsweek

Time

Australian Treaty Series

[\[Index\]](#) [\[Global Search\]](#) [\[Database Search\]](#) [\[Help\]](#)

Australian Treaty Series 1952 No 2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANBERRA

Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America [ANZUS]

(San Francisco, 1 September 1951)

Entry into force generally: 29 April 1952

AUSTRALIAN TREATY SERIES

1952 No. 2

Australian Government Publishing Service

Canberra

(c) Commonwealth of Australia 1997

SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE PARTIES TO THIS TREATY,

REAFFIRMING their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

NOTING that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

RECOGNIZING that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the

Pacific Area,

DESIRING to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

DESIRING further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

THEREFORE DECLARE AND AGREE as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to

include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.[1]

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that

Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

FOR AUSTRALIA:

[Signed:]

PERCY C SPENDER

FOR NEW ZEALAND:

[Signed:]

C A BERENDSEN

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

[Signed:]

DEAN ACHESON

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

ALEXANDER WILEY

JOHN J SPARKMAN

[1] Instruments of ratification were deposited for Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America 29 April 1952, on which date the Treaty entered into force.