

SEMIOTIC AND COGNITIVE STUDY OF FOLK NARRATIVES OF SOUTHERN TAMIL NADU

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CERTIFICATE

This dissertation entitled "SEMIOTIC AND COGNITIVE STUDY OF FOLK NARRATIVES OF SOUTHERN TAMIL NADU" submitted by Mr. M.RAMAKRISHNAN, for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy, is an original work and has not been submitted as far, in part or full, for any other degree or diploma of this or any other university.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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TO

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CHAPTER ONE
NARRATIVE ANALYSIS AND SEMIOTICS OF PASSION

Narratives are an expression of the activities of a society, embracing several aspects of culture. They are found everywhere and are present in myth, tale, tragedy, epic etc., performing different functions in human interaction. Within any society it cannot be dismissed simply as a form of amusement. It comprises the social approvals and disapprovals or criticisms of those who deviate from social norms.

The language of a narrative is a communicative expression that results when a series of denotative word choices are combined with verbal signals to establish a socio-psychological relationship between the narrator and the audience. So narrative is a way of linguistically representing past experience whether real or imagined.¹ In fact it is not repetition of what is heard. It is constructed and screened through the gamut of the narrator's personal, socio-cultural and cognitive filters. In many studies, the narrator is defined as a creative performer, interpreter, and composer of the narrative.² Various factors (such as sex, age, ethnicity of narrator and audience, audience's attitudes, narrative topic and narrative elements) influence a narrator in performing or not performing a narrative.³ A well-known folklorist Anna Leena Siikala says "that a narrative is embarked on either in reply to some external stimulus, such as request from the audience, so that the narrator may express something he considers important amusing or otherwise worth telling."⁴ A narrative is an ordered representation of all the primary and essential information concerning characters, events, and settings without which the narrative would not be well formed. Bal says that "a narrative is a series of logically and chronologically

related events" ⁵. While discussing the elements in narrative, Toolan notes that "narrative comprises events, characters and settings. The relationship between these three are remarkably variable".⁶

In a narrative text there is a recounted change from one state to another and event or change of state is the fundamental aspect of narrative. Culler says that "what the reader is looking for in a plot is a passage from one state to another— a passage to which he can assign thematic value".⁷

Narrative structure of a text is very much concerned with the meaning production. A narrative actually receives its meaning only from the world which makes use of it. To get its meaning beyond the narrative level we have to look at other systems such as the social, the economic and the ideological. We can claim that narrative as a major carrier of social processes and its social meanings can not be understood without sophisticated forms of narrative analysis.

A narrative has been seen as consisting solely of functions. Everything in it signifies something and it is a pure system which never has any wasted units. Any segment of a narrative is constituted as a unit which is presented as the term of a correlation. Each and every element in a narrative carries a meaning and they will give meaning on the same level or elsewhere in another level. So, we must segment the narrative and determine the segments of the narrative. These segments can be distributed into a small number of classes, in a word; and we must define the smallest narrative units. The narrative analysis can not be limited to a purely distributional definition of the unit. In his analysis of the structure of the myth, Levi-Strauss (1963) had specified that the constitutive units of mythic discourse acquire meaning only because they are grouped in bundles and these

bundles themselves are combined.

Linguistics has provided important insights to narrative analysis. A sentence in a narrative can be described linguistically on several levels such as the phonetic, phonological, grammatical and contextual. These levels are in a hierarchically-ordered relation. Each has its own units and its own correlations. As already mentioned, each and every unit which belongs to a certain level assumes meaning only if it can be integrated into a higher level. From a folkloristic point of view there are two levels that can be distinguished in narrative: the concrete level of the content and the abstract level of structure. The level of narrative structure has to be separated from the level of textual structure. On the level of narrative structure, two units can be conceptualized: the tale role and the action the tale role performs. On the basis of above mentioned concept various formalist models of narrative have been proposed. Models presented in Propp (Tr. 1968), Dundes (1964), Bremond (1966) and Jason (1971) represent a rough surface structure of the tale.

The study of narratives has captivated the attention of folklorists, literary scholars, linguists, psycholinguists, socio-linguists and anthropologists and they have contributed different orientations to research on narrative. Recent works on memory have highlighted the importance of subjective elements which the narrator brings to his narrative. The studies on schema theory by Mandler (1982) have triggered the shift in research on narrative. Some scholars view narrative as one of the cognitive instruments for coherently structuring the chaotic substance of past experience. The concept of narrative itself for them has come to acquire a broader meaning and is being viewed as a meta-level concept.

When Propp's 'Morphology of the Folktale'(1928) was published most of scholars were interested in historical and comparative study of narratives. So this original work was condemned in Russia, soon after it was published. Propp's work reached the west only via a few scholars notably the linguist Roman Jacobson.

Propp said that "as long as no correct morphological study exists, there can be no correct historical study. If we are incapable of breaking the tale into its components, we will not be able to make a correct comparison".⁸ Event or change of state is the key and fundamental of narrative. Propp's morphology of Russian fairy tale is basically an inventory of all and only the fundamental events, he calls functions. He notes that the functions of characters serve as stable, constant elements in a tale, independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled. They constitute the fundamental components of a tale. Propp analyzed his collection of fairy tales, looking particularly for recurring elements or features (constants) and random or unpredictable ones (variables). He found that the number and sequence of the functions in the tale are fixed. He identified 31 functions which appear in the tale in the same sequence.

Propp approaches the problem of plot-structure as a tool to find an extratextual linear model which would both provide a semantics of the plot and a structure of the tale. In his approach he extracted all the functions, and in order to extract he defines the function. For each function he gives a brief summary of its essence, an abbreviated definition in one word, and its conventional sign. For example, one of the members of a family absents himself from home — its definition is absentation, and its conventional sign is *B*.

The list of 31 functions of tale identified by Propp is as follows:

He begins with initial situation (α)

- (1) Absentation (β)
- (2) Interdiction (γ)
- (3) Violation (δ)
- (4) Reconnaissance (ε)
- (5) Delivery (φ)
- (6) Trickery (η)
- (7) Complicity (Θ)
- (8) Villainy (Α)
- (8a) Lack (α)
- (9) Mediation (the connective moment) (Β)
- (10) Beginning Counteraction (C)
- (11) Departure (↑)
- (12) The first function of the donor (D)
- (13) The hero's reaction (E)
- (14) Provision or Receipt of a magical agent (F)
- (15) Spatial translocation (G)
- (16) Struggle (H)
- (17) Branding or Marking (J)
- (18) Victory (I)
- (19) Lack liquidated (K)
- (20) Return (↓)
- (21) Pursuit (Pr)

- (22) Rescue (Rs)
- (23) Unrecognized arrival (O)
- (24) Unfounded claim (L)
- (25) Difficult task (M)
- (26) Solution (N)
- (27) Recognition (Q)
- (28) Exposure (Ex)
- (29) Transfiguration (T)
- (30) Punishment (U)
- (31) Wedding (W)

Propp's conception of dramatic personal are defined by the spheres of actions in which they participate and their spheres being constituted by the network of functions which are attributed.

Propp's spheres of actions are:

Villain

Provider

Helper

The-sought-for-person (and her father)

Dispatcher

Hero

False hero

By analysing some hundreds of Russian tales, Propp has succeeded in establishing the invariability of elements and relation which definitely constitute the form of the folktale. Propp's analysis is clearly not limited to the Russian

material. Attempts to study American Indian Tales by Dundes (1964) suggest that part of Propp's morphology may be cross-culturally valid. He says that "there can be no doubt that Propp's analysis is a landmark in the study of folklore".⁹ Thus, Propp's morphology provides a useful point of departure for studies attempting to identify oicotypes (special type of form which is isolated from other forms). It is true that Propp's study is only a first step, albeit a giant one. Many fruitful areas of investigation are opened up by Propp's study. Since the appearance of his work in English, there has been an ever increasing interest in attempting structural analysis of various folklore genres. Culler says that Propp is a "structuralist in a variety of ways: his roles and functions for example, are limited paradigms with various members, just as the phoneme is a functional unit which can be manifested in the various ways in actual utterances".¹⁰

According to Bremond, "Propp has simply pointed out the similarities in Russian tales, but has not succeeded in identifying any significant differences and he states that his method is simply... a linear array of events chronologically arranged one after other".¹¹ As an alternative Bremond develops a more complex model which retains Propp's basic unit of the function applied to actions or events. When these are ordered into sequences they will produce narratives. Bremond hypothesizes a basic formula: a function leading to a procedure, the function actualizing this potentiality, and the function that terminates the procedure by confirmation of its achievement.

Jakobson and Levi-Strauss influenced by Propp's work, took up the study of narrative tradition in the early 1950's. The stimulating effect of Propp's

seminal ideas is indicated in part by the number of studies it has inspired: Levi-Strauss (1960), Dundes (1962,1964) Bremond (1964), Greimas (1966)

Levi-Strauss and Greimas, completing and correcting Propp, have attempted an analysis, by coupling the chronologically unconnected actions, but which are linked by paradigmatic relations of opposition. The ultimate purpose of the structural and morphological studies in folklore is the discovery of the distinctive features of each genre, their relationships within the respective forms and their capacity to differentiate genres within the totality of oral tradition.

There are two distinctive types of structural analysis in folklore: (1) the structural or formal organization of a folkloric text is described following the chronological order of the linear sequence of element in the text as reported by informant. The structure of the tale is delineated in terms of these same elements and this type can be termed as syntagmatic analysis and (2) This approach is to describe the pattern which allegedly underlies the folkloric text. The elements in the narrative are taken out of the 'given' order and are regrouped in one or more analytic schema. This can be termed as paradigmatic analysis. Levi-Strauss presented a paradigmatic model as early in 1955, well before the English translation of Propp's work.

One of the most important differences in emphasis between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic analyses has been the concern or lack of concern for contexts. Structural analysis tried to relate the form of folkloric text to the culture in which it is found.

Levi-Strauss proposed his own method in order to enrich the Propp's 'Morphology' by insisting on the semantic and contextual aspects. Levi-Strauss

stressed on the usefulness of the theory of distinctive features based on the principle of binary oppositions. He sought to replace Propp's method by his own method (structuralism) and he did not want to describe the structure of the folktale by using Propp's formal framework. He insisted that form cannot be divorced from content, its structure is content itself and structure has no distinct content.

Levi-Strauss notes that "a universe of the tale will be progressively defined and analyzable in pairs of oppositions, diversely combined within each character..."¹² His analysis is based on a system of binary oppositions derived from linguistics where what is important is not the content of the individual terms but the distinctive contrast between them. Levi-Strauss by following the principle of distinctive features indicates the possibilities of reducing the number of Proppian functions. Claire Jacobson writes in her preface to 'Structural Anthropology' that "Levi-Strauss has long been one of the chief exponents of the structural method: he considers the relation among phenomena, rather than the nature of the phenomena themselves and the system into which these relations enter".¹³ Casson says that Levi-Strauss's principal aim is to discover universal structures and processes of the human mind through an examination in a range of societies of the superficially distinct cultural organizations of particular domains - the most thoroughly studied of which have been kinship and myth. The mode of analysis used in inferring these shared abstract properties of mind are admittedly impressionistic and intuitive, but they have led to insightful statements about the nature of culture.¹⁴

Greimas (1966), working along the line of Propp, undertook a formalization of narrative content. He has borrowed three key notions from the structural linguists. From Louis Hjelmslev he has adopted (1) the opposition between system and process (2) the idea of form of content and (3) the application of semantic distinctive features. He also adopted the notion of 'actant' from L. Tesnière.

Greimas introduced semiotic square, the visual representation of the logical articulation of any category, to reveal the more complex articulation of a semic category in terms of relations of contrariness, contradiction and implication. Greimas's analytical dictionary notes that the semiotic square is distinguished from logical or mathematical constructions, which are independent, as formulation of "pure syntax", from the semantic content.¹⁵ The semiotic square goes beyond the pure syntax of binarity to attempt to account for signification.

In his Structural Semantics (1966) Greimas says that the similarities and differences between at least two terms are perceived in terms of conjunction (presence of similar features) and disjunction (presence of dissimilar features). He describes the three levels of the narrative trajectory- a 'deep' level of fundamental syntax and semantics, a 'surface' level of narrative syntax and semantics and finally, discursive structures which defines different models of semiotic existence: virtuality/ (wishing or needing to do) - actualizational/ (being able and knowing how to do) - realizational/ (making to be of done). Here, we can say that the deep structures are virtual, the semionarrative structures are actualized and the discursive structures are realized.

Greimas pointed out that the ambiguity of 'Morphology' is that the term *dramatis personae* initially describes 'actors' and subsequently describes 'actants'.

By following Propp's own suggestion that certain of his functions can be coupled, Greimas reduces Propp's thirty-one functions to twenty functional categories. They are as follows:

- (1) Absence
- (2) Interdiction
- (3) Inquiry Vs Information
- (4) Trickery Vs Complicity
- (5) Villainy Vs Lack
- (6) Mandate Vs Hero's decision
- (7) Departure
- (8) Assignment of a test Vs confrontation of the test
- (9) Receipt of the helper
- (10) Spatial Translocation
- (11) Struggle Vs Victory
- (12) Marking
- (13) Liquidation of the lack
- (14) Return
- (15) Pursuit Vs Rescue
- (16) Unrecognized arrival
- (17) Assignment of task Vs success
- (18) Recognition

(19) Revelation of the traitor Vs revelation of the hero

(20) Punishment Vs wedding

Greimas transforms Propp's morphology to get his actantial model of the narrative by reducing seven spheres of action into a maximum of six actants arranged in three pairs (on the basis of the logic of syntax). They are as follows:

Subject Vs Object

Sender Vs Receiver

Helper Vs Opponent

This corresponds to Propp's spheres of action in the following order:

Propp's


hero Vs sought-for-person

father/dispatcher Vs hero

helper/provider Vs Villain or false hero

Greimas noticed the hero's syncretization with subject and receiver, and the sought-for-person's (and her father) syncretization with object and sender in some tales. Greimas, when he considers the syncretization of Propp's personae he takes the content of the tales into account. He found that one actant can be conceived of as subsuming two actors: villain and false hero constitute the actantial role of the Opponent, helper and provider constitute Helper, father and dispatcher constitute Sender.

Greimas's three sets of binary actantial categories can be represented as follows:




For Greimas, actants define a categorization of the actors of narrative that combine logic and empiricism in a functional analysis, and his term, semio-narrative structures for the actants articulates this combination. Greimas notes that the status of the object - actant of the sentence 'John has a pot full of gold coins' which has three different levels of interpretation:

Syntactic level : Actant : Object

Semantic level : Value : the seme 'richness'

Mode of manifestation: actor : the figurative object 'pot full of coins'.¹⁶

In his actantial model, subject Vs object represents a performantial syntagm of the narrative grammar. The subject has to perform certain kind of task, deeds etc., and it is articulated in relation to desire i.e., the subject desires to do something for the object (or the object deserves the value to receive the subject's task). At the same time, between sender and receiver communication or knowledge is articulated, and between helper and opponent power is articulated. This can be diagrammatically shown as :



Greimas pointed out that the above schema could be applied to non-narrative discourses also. Culler says that "Greimas gives very few examples to show that adequacy of his model of the sentence... he gives no indication as to how his model would deal with all the problems of relationships between sentences..."¹⁷

Vladimir Propp plays a vital role in the post-war narratology by emphasizing the actantial nature of narrative in his action or spheres of actions. But he does not provide any categories in his various studies that could help in analyzing passions. Greimas takes it as a crucial issue and his approach to the narrative analytical theory is based on action oriented. It is believed that linguistics can provide excellent theories for analyzing action, but it is, especially inadequate for analyzing passions. Working on the narrative text he reveals that in addition to complex actional dimensions, text has complex passional dimensions as well. Greimas's semiotic theory explores his thought which is the product of his time and it remains part of the episteme shaping the social sciences over the last fifty years. Greimas's theory has empirical content and his methodology constitutes the meeting ground for the theory of signs and

the human sciences. His methodology has helped the scholars to establish the missing link between epistemological and textual knowledge. His theory of action that considers subjects as active cognitive beings endowed with character and temperament. Most of the standard dictionaries define passion as "tendency to", "feeling that leads to" or "the inner state of one who is inclined to" etc., and this "tendency" we express in terms of behaviour or action. When the tendency leads to a "doing", we legitimately suppose that it implies a certain regulations of "being" with a view towards "doing". Passions are considered on the syntactic organization of the state of mind. In other words, the discursive aspect of the modalized being of narrative subject of passions, either simple or complex, are expressed through actor, and, alongwith actions which determine their actantial and thematic roles. The problem of passion is clarified by linking the study of the modal existence of the subject and modal component of the actantial structures. In narrative semiotics Greimas has identified a limited series of role of the subject that characterize various modes of existence of the narrative actant during its transformation. The following are the various modes of existence of the subject:

Virtualized Subject (Non-Conjoined)


Actualized Subject (Disjoined)

Realized Subject (Conjoined)

But when he negates the actualized subject and when it is presupposed by the realized subject he gets a fourth position,

Potentialized Subject (Non-disjunction)

Semiotic square for the modes of existence:



Greimas has noted that theories of passions are part of every major classical philosophical system which can be described as a taxonomy, a paradigmatic operation on lexemes, or in terms of modal syntax that sets in place two interdependent actions. His works happen to be part of the philosophical tradition, albeit he had raised the question that how to find a pertinent way of speaking about philosophical problems from a semiotic point of view. Greimas's semiotic theory attempts to consider linguistics as a way of thinking philosophically. The semiotic theory provides a number of philosophical concepts, and it also uses philosophy in terms of notions. He uses some terms such as agent, object, modalization, and actualization, etc. to imply certain philosophical assumptions.

He analyses the state of the subject in terms of modalities to lay the foundations for a semiotics of passions. Passion is paradoxically a phenomenon in which the object, becoming a value for the subject imposes itself on the subject. The object of value and the subject of the quest, the sender, and the receiver play very different roles in passion. For example the receiver is directly concerned with the passion. As for the sender, his role is considerably diminished by passion. In most of the passions the sender happens to be at the origin of the programme.

Action which can be defined as the syntagmatic organization of acts, the opposition between action, and passion always represent the conversion of the discursive level of the deeper and more abstract opposition between being and doing. The being of the subject is modalized by the modality of wanting, which actualizes (wanting-to-be-conjoined) in order to be realized (i.e., to be conjoined with the object of value). At the semiotic and the discursive level, the notion of value which we also consider with regard to the doing of the subject is the very heart of the theory. The modalization of the being of the subject has an essential role in the constitution of the competence of syntactic subject, and the concept of passion is closely linked to the concept of actor. Passion is one of the elements that contribute to the actorial individuation and is able to provide denomination for recognizable thematic roles. The relation between passion and actor, and thematic role and actantial role have opened up a new domain of research into passional typologies. The exploration of passional field, as Landowski (1979) remarked, closely involves all of the levels of the articulations of the theory of narrativity: not only the semio-narrative structures proper, not only the discursive structures but also the deep level abstract structures.

Greimas believes that the subject's relations to the object is mediated by the body, and at the same time, the body is a part of the world and subject. The body is also seen as an object situated between other objects and the world. The body is both action on the world and a perceiving, a sensing of the world. He introduces the crucial element of continuity in the relation of subject to world. When we consider perception, we see that the external world is composed of figures or signifiers in Saussurean terms. Greimas has found three kinds of

properties in perception: exteroceptive, interoceptive and proprioceptive. This idea helps researchers to explain what happens at the linguistic level between the natural world and natural language. According to another view of perception, the world is constituted by states of affairs that are transformed into states of feeling by the mediation of the body. It makes it possible for Greimas to introduce the notion of continuity by means of the body. The mediating role of the body becomes fundamental to understand how the external world is transformed into a signifying whole and such a proprioceptive component adds a pathemic dimension in which the cognitive forms of the imagination include a passionate component.

Greimas uses the concept of performance into the terminology of narrative in order to give a definition of the subject in terms of its status as the subject of doing. The subject must acquire a certain competence before it can become a performer. According to the logic of presupposition, the performing doing of the subject implies an existing competence for that doing. In some cases, the performing subject and the competent subject are different. For instance, even within a folktale the subject's competence can be acquired only with the help of a simulated performance of some other subjects. We know that subject's passion can be the result of a doing, either by itself or by another subject, and that it can lead to an act. Passion itself can be considered as an act, in the sense that when we consider "speech act". Subject of state can be affected by passion, for example, subject of "envy" is a pure subject of state.

Passion appears to be constituted syntactically as a series of activities: manipulations, reductions, tortures and so on. In passion, the obstinacy is

defined as a disposition to carry on a single minded-way, without being discouraged by obstacles. It offers us the particularity of maintaining the subject in a state of continuing to do, even if the success of the enterprise is jeopardized. In spite of the presence of wanting-to-do presupposed by doing, the subject abandons his programme and gives up when confronted by an obstacle.

A subject which can acquire competence according to being-able or knowing or both successively. At the narrative level competence is defined on the basis of wanting, being-able or knowing-how-to-do of the subject that presupposes performative doing. In any semiotic system, the production of an act of parole presupposes the existence of a langue. Therefore, the performance of the signifying subject presupposes the competence of that signifying subject.

Greimas attempts to show the way in which studying passion leads to a better understanding of literature or of a specific text. It also provides some means of introducing notions gleaned in the analysis of text to a general description of passion. There are two strategic means for describing passion in traditional philosophy: the lexicological and the narrative. This narrative means always concentrate on the structure of actions, for example, offense provokes a desire for revenge which in turn sets of an action of vengeance.

Various theoretical approaches can be adopted to describe the concept of passion. The componential analysis which is effectively used because passion can be distinguished and described through it. In this approach two or three fundamental primitives can be identified and which produce longer sequences formed by components of the primitives. Plutarch and Seneca initiated another

approach which concentrates on describing passions in terms of processes. They examined "ire" by showing the beginning of anger, its development, its end. They see that the passion of ire as a process that takes place over time. The examination of a "simple" passion (like greed) has permitted Greimas to postulate a phrastic model to account for it. But with a "complex" passion such as anger he is dealing with a discursive sequence constituted by an intertwining of states and doing.

In his lexical semantic study,¹⁸ Greimas carries out his analysis on the basis of lexical meaning of dictionary. It is proved through his analysis that lexemes are very complex discursive and narrative structures. So these lexematic descriptions constitute models that can anticipate subsequent discursive analysis. This lexical semantic approach is syntagmatic and even syntactic. It is contrary to the taxonomic and classificatory approach of most philosophers of the classical period in the theory of passion. Greimas collects and analyses lexical meaning of anger which present within the context of French culture. He takes dictionary definition for anger and for convenience's sake he constantly refers to the Petit Robert dictionary.

End Notes

1. E. Traught, and M.L. Pratt, 1980: 248
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3. N. Wolfson, 1982:24
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7. J.Culler, 1975:139
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9. Alan Dundes, 1968:xvi
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CHAPTER TWO
COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND CULTURAL MODELS

At the end of the nineteenth century, there was a proliferation of new sciences, several of which dealt with the nature of the human mind. In the 1950s these sciences converged to form the cognitive science. Casson says that "cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field that was originally formed around the joint interests of cognitive psychology and computer science, and now includes anthropology, and cognitive linguistics as well".¹ Gardner defines cognitive science as a "contemporary empirically-based effort to answer long-standing epistemological questions... concerned with the nature of knowledge, its components, its sources..."² He says further that the term "cognitive science is sometimes extended to include all forms of 'knowledge' animate as well as inanimate, human as well as non-human".³

Cognitive science deals with the concepts of the human mind in terms of knowledge, intelligence, concept formation and the whole domain of human thinking. At the same time, anthropology, linguistics and psychology are also interested in the study of human cognition. Cognitive science raised many questions in areas like reason, knowledge, experience and conceptual system. Scholars from various disciplines converged on the study of knowledge, its organization and its role in language understanding etc.

When cognitive science emerged as a new field in the mid-1970s, a number of researchers rallied around a certain philosophical view of mind. Lakoff refers to that philosophical position as "objectivist cognition".⁴ The following were the central claims of the objectivist cognition:

Rational thought is the algorithmic manipulation of arbitrary abstract symbols that are meaningless in themselves. But they get their meaning by being associated with things in the world. In objectivist cognition, the symbols and algorithmic operations of symbol manipulation are seen as constituting a language of thought. The symbols function as internal representative of external reality and the rules that manipulated the symbol do not make use of what the symbols mean.

Within one decade, many researchers had investigated objectivist cognitive in detail to show that such a theory of mind is fundamentally inadequate in many ways. That research points to a very different theory of mind, one that focuses on two things that were left out of the objectivist picture: (1) the role of the body in characterizing meaningful concepts, and (2) the human imaginative capacity for creating meaningful concepts.

Objectivist cognition failed in large measure because of its conception of meaning. The objectivist view of meaning as the relationship between symbols and the world, which failed empirically was also subjected to a logical inconsistency. Research done by cognitive linguists over the last fifteen years has shown that natural language is not just a system consisting of arbitrary sign as most linguists since the time of de Saussure have assumed it to be. Large areas of language structure turn out to be motivated as part of our cognitive system and can be reasonably explained. The notion of motivation and functional explanation have become the key concepts of the cognitive approach. Psychological experiments have shown that human reasoning is different from logical, or computational reasoning. People reason on the basis of the experience

of the world and not on the basis of logic.

Research in cognitive linguistics, cognitive anthropology and the philosophy of mind indicates that rational mental process of the sort involved in using language and drawing inferences make use of image schemas, which are non-finitary meaningful symbols of the sort excluded by the strict mathematical characterization of algorithmic manipulation. Image-schemas for containers, paths, links, force dynamics etc. are made meaningful by human sensory-motor experience. We know that meaning is not a thing and it involves what is meaningful to us. Nothing is meaningful in itself and meaningfulness derives from the experience of functioning as a being of a certain sort in an environment of a certain sort. We do not merely claim that experience strictly determines human concepts or modes of reasoning: rather the structure inherent in one experience makes conceptual understanding possible.

The theory of "experientialist cognition" ⁵ posits two sorts of concepts that are meaningful because of their role in bodily experience

1. Basic—level concepts
2. Image—schemas

These views have been worked out and argued in considerably detail in a number of books, including Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Fauconnier (1984), Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1983) Holland and Quinn (1986) and Johnson (1987)

The central claim of experientialist cognition is as follows:

Meaningful conceptual structures arise from two sources-

1. from the structured nature of bodily and social experience, and
2. from our innate capacity to imaginatively project from certain well-

structured aspects of bodily and interactional experience to abstract conceptual structures.

In the most general terms, these two theories contrast in the following ways:

1. Objectivist cognition treats human thought as a fundamentally disembodied one, but experientialist cognition sees human thought as essentially involving a kind of structured experience that comes from having human bodies, especially from innate human sensory motor capacities.
2. Objectivist cognition sees meaning as the association of symbols with external objects. Experientialist cognition views meaning as essentially involving imaginative projection, using mechanisms of schematization, categorization, metaphor and metonymy.
3. Objectivist cognition views thought processes as the manipulation of abstract symbols. Experientialist cognition posits a small number of general cognitive processes whose applications to abstract, highly structured cognitive models constitute reason.

Objectivist cognition ignores the human body for three reasons: (1) it has been thought to introduce subjective elements alleged to be irrelevant to the objective nature of meaning. (2) the reason has been thought to be abstract and transcendent; it is not tied to any of the bodily aspects of human understanding, and (3) it seems to have no role in our reasoning about abstract subject matters. Experientialist theories of cognition provide a view of the mind and of human nature that is very different from the view given by objectivist theories.

Imaginative structures play very vital role in human cognition. There are two kinds of imaginative structures: image schemata and metaphorical projection, that are experiential structures of meaning. They are also essential to most of our abstract understanding and reasoning. Johnson says that "metaphorical projections are not arbitrary but rather are highly constrained by other aspects of our bodily functioning and experience. "Experience" then, is to be understood in a very rich, broad sense as including basic perceptual, motor-programme, emotional, historical, social and linguistic dimensions".⁶

Experience involves every thing which makes us human beings bodily, social, linguistic and intellectual beings combined in complex interaction that make up our understanding of our world. Understanding via metaphorical projection from the concrete to the abstract makes use of physical experience in two ways: (1) our bodily movements and interactions in various physical domains of experience are structured. and (2) that structure can be projected by metaphor on to abstract domains.

Human understanding involves many perceptual and non-propositional structures of experience that can be metaphorically projected and propositionally elaborated to constitute our network of meanings. The human embodiment directly influences what and how things can be meaningful for us, the ways in which these meanings can be developed and articulated, the ways in which we are able to comprehend and reason about any experience. Most of our behaviours whether social or cultural, are decided by our culture or cultural knowledge.

Our society provides the cultural knowledge that is required for a person to be able to think and act in a certain way. The people of the society need that knowledge in order to behave in culturally appropriate ways. Cultural knowledge appears to be organized in sequences of prototypical events that one calls cultural models. These prototypical events or schemas are themselves hierarchically related to other cultural knowledge. A lot of cultural knowledge is organized in terms of ideals. We have cultural knowledge about ideal homes, ideal families, ideal mates, ideal jobs etc. Cultural knowledge about ideals leads to prototype effects. We make judgments of quality in terms of ideal cases rather than the non-ideal cases.

The notion of cultural models introduced by anthropologists focuses on the shared aspects of cognitive models within a culture. D'Andrade defines cultural model as a "cognitive scheme which is inter-subjectively shared by a social group".⁷ Cultural models are found in the folk theories people have about the phenomena surrounding them in their daily life. One of the characteristics of cognitive model is they represent our folk understanding of any particular concept for instance emotion. Naomi Quinn observes "that cultural models are presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behaviour in it".⁸

Cognitive models are taken to be propositional and image-schematic knowledge which is composed of certain entities and certain predicates. Philosophers interpreted proposition as involving the notion of truth values, that is, a proposition must assert something which can be either true or false.

Research in Psychology supports this idea in finding that perceived or otherwise recognized objects are necessarily involved in situations. That is, any sort of state of affairs can be picked out by propositions. The cognition of any object X, cognition of a situation in which X is involved, for example X is Y and relates to Z. A simple proposition consists of an ontology of elements (we call as arguments) and a basic predicate that holds those arguments. The over all structure of the proposition is thus characterized by a part-whole schema, where the proposition is equal to the whole , the predicate is equal to a part, and the argument is equal to the other parts.

Cognitive models are taken to be a reflection of experience and it represents a folk understanding of a domain. The experience that cognitive models incorporate and embody are culturally defined. Prototype cognitive models are defined in large part by conventionalized language use or linguistic expressions.

Cognitive models are directly embodied models. Cognitive models which structure our thought are used in forming categories and in reasoning. Concepts characterized by cognitive models are understood via the embodiment of the models.

The notion of cognitive models developed within cognitive linguistics has come from four sources:

- 1 Filmore's frame semantics (1982) ⁹
- 2 Lakoff and Johnson theory of metaphor and metonymy (1980)
- 3 Langacker's cognitive grammar(1986) and
- 4 Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces(1985).

It commonly happens that a number of cognitive models continue to form a complex and a cluster that is psychologically more basic than a model taken individually. These are referred as cluster models.¹⁰

We use cognitive models in trying to understand the world. In particular, we use them in theorizing about the world, in the construction of scientific theories.

Ordinary people without any technical expertise have theories, either implicit or explicit, about every important aspect of their lives. Cognitive anthropologists refer to such theories as folk theories or folk models. We have both folk and expert theories, each of them involve some idealized cognitive model, with a corresponding vocabulary. When we talk about the calendar, we have idealized cognitive model of the week domain.¹¹ Our model of a week is idealized. Seven days of a week do not exist objectively in nature. They are created by human beings. In fact, not all cultures have the same kinds of weeks.¹²

Cultural models are embodied, whether directly or indirectly by way of systematic links to embodied concepts. A concept is embodied when its content or other proportions are motivated by bodily or social experience.

Cultural models do not have the same existential status as cognitive systems, attitudes, or representations. They are not, so to say, psychologically present. Cognitive attitudes expressed in language, are the psychologically real status of human beings.

Models interact with cognitive system by supplying them with representations. This means that occasionally people have basic beliefs that are

identified as parts of some cultural models. Since both models and cognitive systems tend to be coherent, and therefore even a piece of model drags the rest of the models into a cognitive system, it is justified to say that cultural models partly determine what the cognitive system do. Cognitive systems are models in the production of behaviour, with cultural model supplying beliefs. Cognitive systems are composed of cognitive attitudes. Cognitive attitudes are founded upon representations from which cultural models can be abstracted. Cognitive systems produce and consume cultural models. So, cultural models are abstracted from the representations on the basis of what we think about epistemic necessity. They are shared data structure or shared pieces of required knowledge.

The theory of natural categorization advanced by Lakoff (1987) is based on conceptually complex prototypes and their metaphoric and metonymic extensions through image-schema transformations. Categories are defined by the necessary and sufficient conditions which specify the properties shared by all members of the category. Recent studies show that categories involve imaginative structures of understanding, such as schemata, metaphor, metonymy and mental-imagery. These structures typically depend on the nature of the human body specially on our perceptual capacities and motor skills. Such categories are formed on the basis of imaginatively structured cognitive models, and their nature is such that they could not correspond directly to anything in reality to extend to human experience. Empirical studies also show that most of human concepts are defined and understood only within a conceptual framework that depend on the nature of human experience. These concepts are neither

universal nor objective in a given culture. Johnson argues that "human bodily movement, manipulation of objects, and perceptual interaction involve recurring pattern without which our experience would be chaotic and incomprehensible".¹³

The issue of human categorization is central to the study of cognition. We possess the capacity to categorize things, it helps us to make sense of the complex phenomena we experience in the world around us. Human categorization is essentially a matter of both human experience and imagination, perception, motor activity, and culture on the one hand and on the other, metaphor, metonymy and mental imagery. We categorize entities, events, actions, emotions, spatial relationships, social relationships and abstract entities. We have categories for biological species, physical substances, artifacts and colour. Rosch and others(1976) have found that the 'basic level' category is :

1. the highest level at which category members have similarity perceived overall shapes.
2. the highest level at which a single mental image can reflect the entire category.
3. the level at which most of our knowledge is organized,
4. the level at which terms are used in numeral contexts and
5. the first level named and understood by children.¹⁴

Categories are understood using cognitive models of four types:¹⁵

1. Propositional model
2. Taxonomic model
3. Image schematic model and
4. Metaphoric and metonymic models.

Basic level category structures reflect the bodily nature of the people categorizing, since it depends on gestalt perception and motor-movements. Once the outside world is perceived as inhabited by this cultural fact that acts on the conception of human body. Most of natural categories are defined in terms of prototypes or prototypical instances, which combine the most representative attributes of a category. Most categories form part of a hierarchical structure whose superordinate categories pass their defining features on to the categories at the level below them, i.e, whatever is said of emotion is true for anger, its subordinate category, and whatever is said for anger is true for cold anger, but not vice versa.

The term schema was elaborated by Immanuel Kant who understood schema as non-propositional structures of imagination. But, by contrast, today schemata are typically thought of as general knowledge structure. Bartlett is generally credited with being the first to use the term schema in its contemporary sense. In recent time, the term frame has been used by linguists, especially, Fillmore (1976) and Chafe (1977) in discussing the relationship between structure in language and underlying schemata. Casson says that "Frame" is an appropriate term because what these language structures do is organize schemata for verbalization by focussing attention on certain variables and not on others. For example a number of lexical items can activate the commercial event schema, e.g. buy, sell, pay, cost, spend, charge".¹⁶ For Fillmore and Chafe the frame concept is not concerned with the organization of language itself, but rather with how lexical and grammatical forms both structure and express the underlying schematic representations. Casson says that schemata as knowledge

structures that are "the building blocks of cognition", pervade theorizing about cognitive organization and function in cognitive science.¹⁷

Schemata are conceptual abstraction that serve as the basis for all human information processing. The cognitive components of culture can be characterized as an information processing system which is based on a complex of learned schemata. Schemata are organized as hierarchical structurally and sequentially. Schemata at a higher level represent the most general concepts, and schemata at a lower level represent more and more specific concepts.

A schema consists of a small number of parts and relations by virtue of which it can structure indefinitely many perceptions, images and events. Event schemata, for example represent a wide range of activities and interactions, varying from simple actions like giving and taking to complex scenes. In studying event schemata investigators have devoted considerable attention to determining the elementary units out of which schemata for events are constructed. Schank and Abelson argue that "we understand many situations by fitting them into structural frameworks or schemata that include characters, settings, sequence of events, causal connections, goals and so forth, that are the means by which we organize on knowledge of the world".¹⁸ Rumelhart states that "schema is a data-structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory, and that there are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts: those understanding objects, situations, events, sequence of events, actions and sequence of action".¹⁹

Schemata differ in their distribution, some are universal, some idiosyncratic, and some cultural. Universal schemata are uniform in the human

beings because of innate faculties of the mind and inherent division in the natural world. Idiosyncratic schemata are unique to particular individuals as the result of their personal histories and life experiences. Cultural schemata are shared by members of particular societies. As Casson pointed out, there are three types of complex schemata found in the organization of cultural content: Object schemata, Orientation schemata, and Event schemata.²⁰ Orientation schemata that represent knowledge about special orientation and which are referred to as "cognitive maps". Organization of these schemata is hierarchical. Orientation schema represents our knowledge about spatial relations among objects and their relative position in the physical environment. Cognitive anthropologists are very much concerned with cultural schemata, i.e. with "the cultural part of cognition," as D' Andrade (1981) has recently phrased it. According to D' Andrade, the programme for studying cultural cognition consists in the search for commonalities in knowledge systems built into language in order to find out basic characteristics of human thought.²¹ Cultural Schemata always include a representation of the self because it assumes that ego and world are perceptually inseparable. Kuipers argues that cognitive maps contain three classes of representation. They are representations for knowledge about particular environments, descriptions of the current position of the self and representation of the process that manipulates the other two kinds of knowledge.²²

Cognitive maps²³ are not just assemblages of object schemata, but rather integrated conceptual systems that include specific object concepts in general representations of spatial knowledge. Attributes of orientation concepts are properties of physical space, e.g., up and down, above and below, tall and short

which are relative attributes because they are properties of relationship between object in physical space.²⁴

Investigators have devoted considerable attention in studying events concepts to determining the elementary units of event schemata. But linguistic research had postulated that predicates and case relations as elementary units of event schemata. These predicates consists of two things: primitive actions and primitive states. In which, primitive acts are predicates that specify active relationships in propositions and primitive states are predicates that specify non-active states of affairs. A current list of cases includes agent, object, recipient, experience, instrument, location, source, and goal. Casson says that event schemata represent a wide range of activities and interactions, varying from simple actions like giving and taking to complex scenes like ordering a meal in a restaurant.²⁵

Schemata that structure our bodily experience preconceptually have a basic logic. Abstract reason has a bodily basis in our every day physical functioning. So it is very obvious that basic-level and image-schematic concepts are directly understood in terms of physical experience. These provide sufficient foundation for a theory of general conceptual structures.

Image-schema plays two roles: they are concepts that can be directly understood in terms of their own structure, and they are used metaphysically to structure other complex concepts. The image-schema proposed include, the container schema, the part-whole schema, the link schema , the central-periphery schema, the source-path-goal schema, the front-back schema, the up-down schema and linear order schema. Mark Johnson's very important basic insight is

that experience is structured in a significant way prior to, and independently of, any concepts. Johnson makes an overwhelming case for the embodiment of certain image-schema for example the container schema, the part-whole schema, the link schema, the source-path-goal schema etc. A container schema has an interior, exterior and a boundary. The container schema defines the most basic distinction between in and out. We conceptualize an enormous number of activities in terms of containers. Many metaphors based on the container schema which extend our bodily-based understanding of things in terms of container schema to a large range of abstract concepts.

Each and every schema has bodily experience, structural element and basic logic. Bodily experience of the container schema is, as Johnson has pointed out, the fact that people constantly experience their bodies both as containers and as thing in container. Its structural elements are interior, boundary, exterior. A schema has all internal structure to yield a basic logic. The basic logic of container schema in which everything is either inside a container or out of it, p or not p. If container A is in container B and X is in A, then X is in B which is the basic one. Lakoff says that "schemas are not to be understood in terms of meaning postulates and their interpretation. Rather, meaning postulates themselves only makes sense given schema that are inherently meaningful because they structure our experiences."²⁶

The part-whole schema's bodily experience is: we are whole beings with parts, and our entire lives are spent with an awareness of both our wholeness and our parts. We experience our body as whole with parts. In order to get around in the world, we have to be aware of the part-whole structure of other objects. Our

basic level perception can distinguish the fundamental part-whole structure that we need in order to function in our physical world. It has a part, whole, a configuration as its structural elements. Its basic logic is that this is a systematic and irreflexible schema. A is a part of B, but B is not a part of A. The properties of link-schema: we have bodily experience for link schema since our childhood. Our first link in the umbilical cord. Throughout infancy and early childhood we hold into our parents and other things, either to secure our location or theirs. Its structural elements are two entities A and B, and a link connecting them together. It has a very simple basic logic: if A is linked to B, then A is constrained by, and dependent upon B. Symmetry is if A is linked to B, then B is linked to A. Our social and interpersonal relationship are understood in terms of link-schema.²⁷

When any sort of failure happened in pragmatic rule of one sentence, that sentence will not yield any meaning to hearer. But metaphorical sentences or expressions have different pragmatic rule. David S. Miall says that metaphor is defined as a usage which in semantically deviant and ways have to be found for explaining on semantic grounds how we recognize and interpret metaphors; non of which has met with general competence.²⁸

The study of metaphor has become a major topic in anthropology, linguistics, psychology and other cognitive sciences.²⁹ The use and study of metaphor is an alternative way of understanding creativity. It has been approached from a large number of perspectives for example Basso (1976), Johnson (1981), Ortony (1978, 1979, and 1980), and Sapir (1977). Casson says that in general terms, a metaphor states an equivalence between two concepts

from separate domains (1983:449) He gives an example "George is a lion", in which, the metaphor states and equivalence between a human being and an animal. In this metaphor, George is the tenor of the metaphor and lion is the metaphor's vehicle. Placing two concepts in juxtaposition, the metaphor forms a concept that subsumes both tenor and vehicle.

Metaphor is one of the chief cognitive structures by which we are able to have coherent, ordered experience that we can reason about and make sense of it. Metaphor is a pervasive mode of understanding in which we project patterns from one domain of experience to another domain of a different kind. In schema theory this metaphor depends on similarities and dissimilarities among the rules bound to the tenor and the vehicle. This line of research has been concerned with showing how schema theory can account for the comprehension of metaphors. Another line of research on metaphor employing schema theory deals with larger-scale metaphorical processes. Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) research on this line was concerned with the demonstration that much of every day experience is structured by metaphorical concepts.

Our conceptual systems impose the container structure on a variety of things that are not in fact containers. This is because there are certain directly emergent concepts like container with a clear structure that can be utilized in understanding concepts that have no such clear structure. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have shown that whole domains of experience are systematically conceptualized in terms of other domains of experience. These systematic cognitive mappings of one domain of experience, the source domain, on to another domain of experience, the target domain, are referred to as conceptual

metaphors. In their research on metaphor, they found that basic abstract concepts are not delineated in experience, such as argument, time, love, and ideas, are metaphorically structured in terms of other basic concepts that are more concrete in experience, such as war, money, travel, and food, respectively.

Metaphorical structuring is a matter of "experiential gestalts" - multidimensional structured wholes (i.e., schemata) that coherently organize experience in terms of natural dimensions of experience, e.g. participants, parts, stages, causes, purposes. Lakoff and Johnson argue that the systematicity of metaphorical concepts are a source of insight into and evidence for the nature of the human conceptual systems.³⁰

Metaphorical system is constituted by a variety of conceptual metaphors (like ARGUMENT IS WAR) and the metonymical system by a variety of conceptual metonymies (like physical agitation stands for anger)

There are three kinds of metaphors identified by Lakoff and Johnson. They are the analogical, the orientational, and the structural metaphors. Ontological metaphors are used in comprehending events, actions, and states. Events and actions are metaphorically conceptualized as objects, activities as substances, and states as containers. The container metaphor sees the human body as a bounded hollow thing which can be filled with different substances. The container metaphor of the human body is a special case of the boundary metaphor. Containers are bounded entities with surfaces, inside and outside. It is very obvious that every container has a boundary as its aspect. Whereas not every boundary is a part of a container and therefore it is justified to subsume container under boundaries. The first study to show systematic mapping was

Michael Reddy's (1979) analysis of conventional expressions for communications such as to put an idea into words, to load a sentence with thought, etc. All these expressions reflect concrete physical actions by which objects are put into container, sent in the container over to another person and there taken out again.

Oriental metaphors are used to structure abstract concepts that are not well grounded in experience in terms of concrete concepts arising from experience with spatial relationships, for example, up-down metaphor. Structural metaphors provide for the use of one highly structured and clearly delineated concept to structure another. In structural metaphors, the constituent structures of complex objects, orientations and event schemata serve as the means of structuring another complex schemata. "Argument is war" metaphor is an example of complex event schema. 'Life is gambling' is another example for, complex event schema. 'Love is a journey' is a structural metaphor based on an orientation schema.

Basic level concepts are meaningful to us because they are characterized by the way we perceive the overall shape of things in terms of part-whole structure and by the way we interact with things in our bodies. Image schema are meaningful to us because they too structure our perceptions and bodily movements. So the natural metaphors are meaningful because they are based on directly meaningful concepts and correlation in our experience. When conceptual metaphors involve two concepts, one is typically abstract and other is typically concrete. The more difficult concept is said to belong to the target domain and the concept in terms of which we try to understand this concept is the source

domain. Not only the target domain but also the source domain can be characterized by several cognitive models or schemas (which may be prototypical or non-prototypical)

Metaphor plays an important role in the study of emotional meaning and experience for a variety of reasons: (1) they are pervasive in the language we use to describe the emotion (2) a large part of our emotional understanding seems to be based on metaphor (3) we understand aspects of emotions in metaphorical terms and (4) metaphors that we use for emotional understanding have subtle consequences that can affect thought and behaviour in subtle ways. The structural aspects of conceptual metaphor consists of a set of correspondences between a source domain and a target domain. These correspondences can be factored into two types: ontological and epistemic. Ontological correspondences are the correspondences between the entities in the source domain and the corresponding entities in the target domain e.g., the container in the source domain corresponds to the body in the target domain. Epistemic correspondences are correspondences between knowledge about the source domain and corresponding knowledge about the target domain.³¹

Metaphor promises to reveal so much about cognitive structure. The study of metaphor should tell us something about how our ideas are related to another. Metaphor provides the linguistic realization for the cognitive activity by which language speaker makes use of one linguistically articulated domain to gain an understanding of another conceptual domain and similarly hearer grasps such understandings. Domains are cognitive representations which consist essentially of a group of meanings which share certain semantic components. In any

language, semantic domains consists simply of meanings which have common semantic components. How relevant such a domain is, how large it is, and at what level in the hierarchical structure, it may function depend solely upon the specific semantic structure of the language.³²

Perhaps the largest single domain in any language consists of entities, or objects which include man, tree etc. The next largest domain consists of events both action and processes. Physical actions in event domain include noise, roar, cry, and the emotive which included desires like love, desire, passion, and opposition to which included hate, be jealous of, fear-anxiety which included fear, worry, anxiety about, and sadness which included mourn, sorrow and sad. Relational domain has very abstract concepts like spatial (up, down, around, before) and temporal (when, while). Cognitive domains play very important role not only in metaphor and also in metonymy.

A major source of prototype effect is metonymy, a situation in which some sub-category of member or sub-model is used to correspond to the category as whole. In other words, these are the cases where a part stands for the whole category - in reasoning and recognition etc. Within the theory of cognitive models such cases are represented by metonymic models. Cognitive anthropology has had an important effect on the development of prototype theory, beginning with Floyd Lounsbury's (1964) studies of American Indian Kinship system. The next major contribution of cognitive anthropology to prototype theory was the colour research of Berlin & Kay (1969), and Paul Kay (1978). Anthropologists are perhaps more familiar with the prototype notion from its original application to colour categories in the work of Paul Kay and his

associates (1978). The extend of the notion from its earliest application to colour and such physical objects as birds and functions, to prototypical event sequence, has reached anthropology through linguistics.

Metonymy is one of the basic characteristics of cognition. People use one well-understood or easy-to-perceive aspects of something for representing either the thing as a whole or some other aspects or parts of it. In metonymy there should be "stands for" relation that may hold between two elements A and B. The metonymic model has the following characteristics:

1. There is a target concept A that is to be understood for some purpose in some context.
2. The concept A and the concept B should have a common conceptual structure.
3. B is either part of A or closely associated with the conceptual structures.
4. Compared to A, B is easier to understand, remember etc. and
5. A metonymy model is a model of how A and B are related in a conceptual structure, and the relationships is specified by a function from B to A.

Thinking in metonymic terms is very flexible. The wholes on the basis of which the inferences are derived can be various types: causal, conceptual, material, spatial, moral, fictional, religious, political, practical and statistical wholes.

We have tried to show how metaphorically extended and metonymically structured image schemata structure our understanding and reasoning. In our study we shall focus on the way in which people's experience is expressed in the narrative schema mediated by image schemata.

End Notes

1. Ronald, W.Casson, 1983:429
2. Howard Gardner, 1981:6
3. Ibid, p. 6
4. George Lakoff, 1988:119
5. The New Approach to Cognition is termed as 'experientialist cognition' by M.Johnson (1987) and George Lakoff (1987)
6. George Lakoff, 1987:xvi
7. Roy D'Andrade, 1981:190
8. Naomi Quinn, 1987:4
9. Fillmore's Frame Semantics (1982) is similar in many ways to schema theory of Rumelhart (1975)
10. Concept of Mother is base on a Complex Model in which a number of individual cognitive models combine to form a cluster model. See for detail George Lakoff (1987), p. 75
11. Idealized model of the word Bachelor given by Fillmere (1982) He suggested that to define bachelor we need two cognitive models; one for 'bachelor' and other about an individual. see George Lakoff 1987: p. 70 also
12. Ibid, p. 69
13. Mark Johnson, 1987:xix
14. Ibid, p. 133
15. Ibid, pp. 118-119
16. Ibid, p. 433
17. Ibid, p. 429
18. R.Schank and R.Abelson. 1977:41
19. Ibid, p. 441

20. D.E.Rumelhart. 1980:34
21. Roy. D'Andrade, "Culture and Cognitive Science", Momenrantum to Cognitive Science Committee, Sloan Foundation. p. 3
22. B.Kuipers, 1978:pp.132-134
23. V.Neisser Describes a cognitive map of an office and its setting, see, Neisser, V. p. 111-113; Linde and Labov describe the spatial layouts of apartment see 1975, and Lynch 1960, p. 46-83
24. An object has the vertical attributes depending on its position as a vertical and relative to a horizontal plane, see R.W. Casson, 1983, p. 446
25. Ibid, p. 4462
26. Ibid, p. 142
27. George Lakoff delineates a few image-schemas' properties in his "Cognitive Semantics" 1988, p. 141-144
28. David S. Miall (ed), 1982:xiii
29. The recognition of metaphor as central epistomological and semantic problem is obvious in the more recent treatments of figurative language, Ortony(1979), Hoffman and Honeck (1980), and Johnson (1981) are some of the prominent works in this direction.
30. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 1980:7
31. In this detailed analysis of the conceptual metaphor. Argument is war, G. Lakoff, and M.Johnson find a coherent structural correspondences between the two domains of experience. see Lakoff and Johnson 1980: p. 77-86
32. For analysis of domain structure, see Berlin (1967), Levickij (1971)

CHAPTER THREE
SEMIOTIC STUDY OF ANGER IN FOLK NARRATIVES

For the sake of convenience, we take three tales as samples among our tales. In the next phase of decomposition or destruction, the tales are dissected and separated into parts. We proceed to study by dividing the tales into many segments along the event criterion. We can find a subject in the narrative and we call it the narrative subject. In folk narratives, sometimes we have an individual subject or sometimes a dual one or many. In our study, the subject means the one who becomes angry. The following are the summary of the sample tales:

Sample Tale 1

A rich man was very proud of his wealth.

A sage visited his house and he expected that the rich man would dismount from the cot and do obeisance to him.

But the proud man did not leave his cot and merely shook his head.

————— I

The sage was very much annoyed and left the place feeling humiliated.

————— II

The sage pronounced a curse, as a result the rich man became a beggar.

————— III

Sample Tale 2

One day a wolf killed a goat in a nearby village without the knowledge of the villagers.

When the wolf was having a good meal out of it, some crows sitting on a tree started cawing. As a result, the villagers came to the spot and gave the wolf a sound beating. The wolf got angry. ————— I, II

The wolf killed all the birds as a revenge. ————— III

The next time the wolf brought a goat.

Neighbours of the wolf killed the goat and ate it up without knowledge of the wolf. ———— I

When the wolf came to know the fact he got angry. ————II

He killed all his neighbours as a revenge. ———— III

Sample Tale 3

When a sister came to her brother's place with her children, her brother was not there.

Her brother's wife did not invite her, and refused to give her even water.

————— I

A neighbour offered them everything and gave the address of her brother where he was working.

They met him and he felt very happy.

When he came to know what had happened to his sister he felt angry.

————— II

He wanted to punish his wife. So he came home and packed all the articles his sister liked. He handed them over to his sister. As a result his wife felt she was punished. ———— III

The concept of anger has three stages:

frustrating —————> discontent —————> aggressiveness.¹

I

II

III

We use the same number for our segments in the sample tales.

The subject feels frustrated in his hopes and rights. This state of frustration has been preceded by a prior state of non-frustration. It is a zero state

in which the subject has enjoyed its hopes and rights. This situation prior to frustration is an original state of the subject. We notice in the tales a neutral stage where the subject is not frustrated. The frustration of the subject happens in the next state. It is noted that even in a single tale sometimes the subject becomes frustrated many times. For example in our second sample tale, it happens twice.

The subject is getting frustrated for the following reasons:

1. When we prevent somebody from enjoying his object of value or when we maintain the disjunction of a subject from an object of value.
2. When we refuse someone goods or a privilege to which he has a right and that the subject believes that he could count on.

Two things are clear from our tales: (1) when someone stops the subject from having his object of value, the subject gets frustrated. (2) when the subject's close associate is stopped from having the object of value the subject is frustrated. The second tale is a very good example of the former and the third tale is of the later. We notice that culture plays a very important role in deciding someone's rights with respect to the object of value. For example, in tale III the sister has the right to enjoy her brother's property.

The verb 'to frustrate' includes both the rights and the expectations of a subject. Both the subject and its object of value are involved in the rights. But in the case of expectation only two subjects, the frustrated subject and the frustrating subject are involved. Frustration happens in some tales due to violation of the expectation of the subject. The sage expected that the rich man would get up dismount from the cot and do obeisance to him. When he did not

do this the sage felt frustrated. There are two kinds of expectations and the violation of these make the subject frustrated. They are, (1) a simple expectation, which place the subject in relation to an object of value, (2) a fiduciary expectation assuming or having a modal relation with other subject. The fiduciary expectation of the subject is based on a confidence or trust of the subject on another subject. The simple expectation is always modalized as wanting-to-be-conjoined. The simple expectation distinguishly the subject from the greedy subject which is modalized as wanting-to-conjoin. For example, someone wants to have meal: this actual need differs from the greedy person who wants to earn so much. When a docile daughter-in-law got a treasure accidentally, the jealous neighbours also wanted to get the treasure, (Tale X).


Since we are using the terms 'subject-of-state' and 'subject-of-doing' in our study, it is necessary to introduce them. The 'subject-of-doing' is the one who frustrates the other subject by any means. In contrast, the 'subject-of-state' is the one who is frustrated by some other subject or the subject-of-doing.

In an early phase of research into narrativity, Greimas tried to interpret Propp by saying that in each narrative there were a subject, an object, a sender, and a receiver. He calls them actants. After few years, examining things a bit more closely, he realized that it was a much more complicated matter, and the subject hero does not remain a subject all the time, it changes. The hero becomes a hero only at a given moment in the narrative route. So the actor is a site where both an actantial role and a thematic role are invested. It is also important to know that in semiotics there is an organization of positions, no longer of characters. We can make single distinctions within a single actor by considering

that actor as an empty continuum that is progressively filled. We can put two subjects into it. Some of our tales also has many subjects which fulfill the same actantial role. We have many subjects of doing in our tales I, III, VI, VII and IX.

A subject needs competence to engage in all kinds of actions. Every performance of the subject presupposes the subject's competence. In most of our tales the narrator does not mention the subject's competence and how it gets it, and it is presupposed that the subject has know-how either well or badly. The competence of the subject consists of 'wanting' and of 'being-able-to-know'. These modalities presuppose the power of the subject to want-to-know or not-to-want-to-know. The actualized subject has the competence to engage in action. Following the performance of the subject, when the doing has succeeded, we consider it as a realized subject. This realized subject is the subject-of-state which conjoins with its objects. A subject's semiotic existence is guaranteed by conjunction of the subject with its object-of-value.

Mode of Existence



Always, the subject-of-state is characterized only by opposition in the following way:

1. "At semio-narrative level:
 /Disjunction/ Vs /Conjunction/
 /Actualized/ Vs /Realized/

2. At the discursive level

/Tension/ Vs /Relaxation/

/Expectation/ Vs /Satisfaction/"³

The subject's expectation is formulated as follows:

$$S_1 \text{ wanting } S_2 \longrightarrow (S_1 \cap O_v)$$

Where, S_1 is the subject-of-state and S_2 is the subject-of-doing. In this case, aim of the subject-of-state is to conjoin with the object of value. For example, the wolf's aim is to be conjoined with its meal. On the contrary, in fiduciary expectation, the subject-of-state has a twofold relations: on the one hand with the object-of- value and, on the other, with the subject-of-doing. The subject's expectation is not a simple wish, that is, the subject-of-state which thinks that it can count on the subject-of-doing to realize its expectation or its rights. In fiduciary expectation, the expectation is based on the contract of confidence or a pseudo-contract (quasi-contractual relation between the subject-of-state and the subject-of-doing). This sort of contract is not a true contract but an imaginary one. This kind of confidence of the subject-of-state which is a result of either by spontaneous or repeated experience. There may be repeated experience of the subject with other subjects or with the same subject. The sage's expectation of obeisance from the proud man is the result of the repeated experience of the sage with everyone else in the village. It has the same formulation like simple expectation in the conjunctive obligation of the subject-of-doing.

$$S_1 \text{ believing } S_2 \text{ having to } \longrightarrow (S_1 \cap O_v)^4$$

In the process of expectation of the subject two things are involved: patience and impatience. Patience is the state of mind of the one who knows how to wait without losing his composure. Its corresponding modality is being-able-to-be. Patience characterizes from beginning to end, and it fills the space between the actualized subject-of-state and the realized-subject. Patience is co-existent with expectation. Sometimes the subject will lose its patience and will become impatient. If any failure happens in the expectation, this will frustrate the subject. The sage (fifth tale) expected that the old lady would return his grains as she promised. When the sage came to the threshing floor he had patience. When the sage came to her house the next time, he was impatient and angry.

The passional state of the subject is solved by satisfaction which is only one of the possible ways. The realization is always concerned about the S_1 and not S_2 , and the S_1 gets pleasure resulting from the accomplishment of what it expects. As we already pointed out anger has three components and among them discontent is the central point ("Passional Pivot"). Discontent consists of dissatisfaction and disappointment. In the case of disappointment there is the matter of confidence in the other, the failure of which puts into question once again confidence in self. In the case of an offense, it is self-confidence that is shaken by the loss of confidence in others as manifested in injury. But both dissatisfaction and disappointment can be formed by feeling of lack. These are two kinds:

- (1) Objectal lack (that is, lack of the object of value)
- (2) Fiduciary lack (that is, crisis of confidence)⁵

When we go back to Propp we can see the echoes of this two-fold lack in the initial situation of the narrative. The first lack is created by a theft of the object of value. The second, which is of a fiduciary kind is the result of violation of prohibition.

The frustrated subject which is in the discontent state, can be considered as the offended party. It will view the responsible person as an offending party. The frustrated subject gives the reason for its frustration on the basis of offense only. Intensity of discontent is always directly proportional to the degree of offense. The verb 'to offend', 'to wound someone's dignity (honour, self-respect)' is analyzed first of all as a structure made up of the subject-of-state and the subject-of-doing. In the case of offense, the suffering comes from the action of the subject-of-doing, where as in the case of disappointment, on the contrary, the inaction of the subject-of-doing is the cause. When the neighbours of the wolf killed and ate his goat it became angry. But in the later case, as when the sister-in-law refuses to invite her husband's sister (Tale I), when the old lady refuses to return the grain to the sage (Tale V) and when the proud man refuses to do his obeisance (Tale IV), the subject-of-state becomes angry. Be it be action or inaction, the subject-of-doing makes somebody angry, and as a result this offense takes the form of feeling of malevolence in the subject-of-state and afterward of vengeance. Sometimes the offense has more effect when it takes place at another level. In other words, it does not matter if the offense is an injury: the offender effectively wounds the offended party only if the later injures himself by reproducing this injury at another level. There are two kinds of injuries:

1. Moral injury, or an injury to one's honour
2. Physical injury

Even a denigrative doing will also be considered as an offense. Honour is very much the representation, the 'image' of self that a person fashions for himself as a function of his participation in social life. A person's denigrative doing causes injury to somebody's honour or self-respect. Regulation of passion is also possible by vengeance.

Aggressiveness is the third stage in anger. Aggressiveness of the subject-of-state can be expressed in the form of vengeance. Regulation of passion is also possible by vengeance. Vengeance is defined as the need, the desire to avenge oneself on the subject-of-doing. It is also an act which can be regarded in two ways:

1. "as moral compensation for the offended party by the punishment of the offending party.
2. as punishment of the offending party that morally compensates the offended party".⁶

Vengeance helps to rebalance the suffering of the antagonistic subjects. The subject-of-state uses vengeance as a means to reestablish the passional equilibrium which was disturbed as a result of an offense. When we consider our tales, most of them end with vengeance. Vengeance helps the subject-of-state to regulate its passional loss. In most of cases vengeance is expressed in the form of physical punishment. In the tale IV, the subject-of-state feels that it is wealth that makes the rich man very proud. To punish the proud man the sage pronounces a curse to lose his wealth and to make him beggar.

Occurrential events in folk narratives describe behaviour, and action of the subject-of-state and the subject-of-doing at the bodily level of their performance. In most of the tales we can see the sadistic nature of the subject that is, the subject is directly involved in the process of punishment. It means that the subject ignores the role of the judge or the middle man, both in the fictional world and in the real world. The deep moral is supposed to represent the deep significance of the folk-tale. For that purpose we have the tactic of moralization. In this process, we name one of the subject as a hero and the other as a traitor. But in narratives the tactic of moralization comes accidentally. A sadistic subject in a folk tale has the following sadistic syntagm: .

Suffering → Causing to suffer → Experiencing pleasure⁷

We know that one of the principle mechanism of folk tale is the lack and its liquidation. It means that when the subject has lost something its aim is to get it back. In most of folk tales not only the subject wants to conjoin with its object-of-value, but also it wants to enjoy or regain the pleasure by giving physical punishment to the anti subject (the subject-of-doing). When the subject is unable to take revenge, it seeks somebody's help. In the tale VIII a jackal helps the crow to kill the snake. When we talk about folk tale and its deep moralness we raise the question that why does not any subject want to solve a problem morally or ethically. It is clear that the subject always thinks about its object-of-value only. Most of the performance of the subject is to establish a moral value. In anger, the subject-of-state tries to establish the passional equilibrium. In folk

tales, the subject or hero tries to conjoin with its object-of-value. We may assume that there is a parallelism between the development of the passionate sequence and the fundamental articulation of the general narrative schema.

End Notes

1. A.J.Greimas, 1987:149
2. Ibid, p.155
3. Ibid, p.151
4. Ibid, p.152
5. Ibid, p.155
6. Ibid, p.160
7. Ibid, p.161

CHAPTER FOUR
COGNITIVE STUDY OF FOLK NARRATIVES

The first part of this chapter may be taken as an attempt to show the nature of a society in which my informants and myself belong. The present study is based upon my field work in 1993-1994 in the Tamil speaking village, Uremelalagian. The village, Uremelalagian comes under Tirunelveli district of Southern Tamil Nadu. Normally people who live in a particular village share a common language, common religious beliefs, and a common culture. There are two kinds of village present in Tamil Nadu. One is a homogeneous village in which a particular caste or group of people live. In this kind of village we cannot see any hierarchical status among the people on the basis of caste. But they might have hierarchy on the basis of sub-caste or clan and class or economic development. The second kind is heterogeneous village. In this, people of two or more than two castes live and they will have hierarchical relation among them on the basis of caste. Although a society consists of many castes or groups, they share a common culture and cultural activities.

Each caste community in a heterogeneous village has myths to explain how they became that caste. General studies of the caste system have shown that a caste cannot be considered as a self-contained whole, as a society in itself. But it is considered as a segmentary, or structural group in the entire social system. It is impossible to define a particular or individual caste by itself, that is, by features inherent in it or by permanent attributes of its essence. A caste is a shifting and elusive reality because its characteristics in each case depend upon the position it occupies in the whole system. We may expect to find in its internal constitutions, and principles which govern its external relation with other castes.

There are seven major caste communities which live in the village. They are: Thuluva Velalar, Muthaliyar, Aasari, Pillai, Chettiar, Parayar, Pallar, Sakkiliyar, and Kuyavar. They have hierarchical relations between themselves based on their social status in Tamil society. The village people have common shepherd, potter, blacksmith, scavengers and oil refiner. But every caste has their own washerman who will be considered as lower than the other caste people. Within washermans also there is hierarchy.

Most societies are classified on the basis of dominant types of economic activity. In the village, Uremelagian, the dominant type of economic activity is agriculture. An agrarian society is generally associated with the crop cultivation and cattle rearing. But along with agricultural and cattle rearing activity, there are other economic activities such as, weaving, pot making, etc. People of this village have agriculture as their major source of income. Land ownerships vary in agrarian communities, generally, there are big farmers, medium, small and landless people.

When a village has many castes, we can not see the equal distribution of land. Agrarian economy made fixed dwelling houses necessary. Living close together for protection and co-operation, the members of an agrarian village exhibit a strong in-group feelings. Since the whole of their social lives is wrapped up in a society they are inclined to view the entire outside world as an out-group. There is another 'we-feeling' which operates on caste basis, people show their caste based 'we-feeling' when any problem arises between two castes. Otherwise they will have 'we-feeling' on a village basis.

The culture of this people includes a tremendous amount of knowledge about the physical and social world. People have practical knowledge of how to obtain food, how to build a shelter, how to travel etc. Such knowledge is carefully taught to successive generations. Culture is abstract knowledge in the sense that it is manifested in behaviour and is the result of behaviour. Since culture must be inferred from observation of uniformities in behaviour, it is to some extent an imperfect, or appropriate, construct of the observer.

Culture is a complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, norms, morals, customs and other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society. A belief is an enduring organization of perception and the people who hold it consider it to be true. People have beliefs about the existence of ghosts, spirits, Mohinis (when an unmarried young girl dies she becomes a mohini) etc. They believe that supernatural entities are both sacred and profane, and they are both good and evil. They have lot of sentiments, closely related to belief and which are the chief element, articulated in the internal pattern of a social system. In the village very few individuals have high social status. Mostly the status of an individual may be ascribed or achieved. The ascribed status is one which an individual gets at the time of his birth. This may be based on caste and wealth. The achieved status shows how an individual has achieved the power over the objects of the world. In the village, rich people who inheriting hereditary land get their status very easily. The son or any member of that family naturally gets the status of the family. Some rich people among the "lower caste" also have social status. But the status of rich man among the "upper caste" is not to be compared with the status of "lower caste". Now-a-days education gives social

status for all people and this status will be considered as equal.

Every society has its own norms which the individuals are obliged to observe. Norms are the standard for determining what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, just and unjust, good and bad in social relationships. The norms are considered as rules of a village, in order to maintain harmony among the people and they cannot be violated by any one. They have special panchayats to punish the people who violate the social norms. In the village there are two kinds of panchayats. Every caste has its own panchayat. When a person violates the norms the people of the respective caste come together to give him punishment. When any problem arises between two caste communities it will be solved by a common panchayat. Sometimes members of the caste or village are excommunicated as a punishment for violation of the norms.

One striking feature of the agrarian society is the great importance of family. The entire family as a group participates in all kinds of agricultural work. Family is a fundamental unit of village life. The family is guarded by social customs and legal regulations which are not to be violated by family members. In this agrarian village all families come under the patriarchal type. In the patriarchal family the father is the head and possesses all powers. He is usually the owner and the administrator of the family property and rights. All members of the family are subordinated to the father. The family's eldest male descendent is the protector and ruler of the family enjoying full authority over the family members. He is the final arbiter in most of the family's decisions. The status of the family is the status of the individual. Most of patriarchal

families as far as this village is concerned, have patrilineal and patrilocal setup. Patrilineal is applied to descent in which a person has the right to have his family property after his father. After the father's death or in his old age the property will be shared and all the shares will be equal. When father has four sons, for example, and one daughter, he will give very little portion of property to his daughter. In this case she is the owner of that property and her daughter has only the right to get from her mother. If the father got the property by his hard work, in this case he has the right to do anything with the property. Sometime the youngest son or someone who takes care of his parents will receive maximum share.

Patrilocal residence is the rule or pattern by which the married couple establish residence with or quite near the parents of the groom. In other words, the groom does not leave his household or neighbourhood. All parents in the village like their son who settles down near his parents. But now a days parents and society like neolocal residence which is the rule in the society: the married couple establish their own residence in a new place that is, away from both groom's and bride's family.

Patrilocal system helps the family to live together and it also helps them to involve in their agricultural activities. The essential factor in the family is marriage. Marriage is a stable relationship in which a man and a woman are socially permitted to live together and to have children. Marriage is an institution in a society which admits man and woman to form a family. People of this village have endogamous marriage system, particularly caste endogamy. Marriage is allowed within the caste or the group. People prefer to marry from

the same caste of distant village. A man marrying his sister's daughter is permitted in all the castes. From the birth of child to its marriage the maternal uncle (tāi māman) has an important role. In Tamil society there are two kinds of māman; father's sister's husband is also considered as māman and mother's brother is also māman. To differentiate between these two uncles people use the term tāi (=mother), so that mother's brother is called tāi māman. Tāi māman's role is very important in child's earboring ceremony girl's puberty and marriage ceremony. Without knowledge of tāi māman the parents will not fix a groom for their daughter. Because, the maternal uncle has the right to marry his sister's daughter or his son has the right to marry his father's sister's daughter.

Even after a girl's marriage her brother's role remains very important. During marriage ceremony, the husband will tie tāli on the bride's neck. The tying of a string, with or without the well-known marriage badge or tāli, round the brides' neck has certainly a sacramental value. Mostly, the maternal uncle of the bride will offer the tāli. This tāli is called 'tāimāman tāli'. In all ceremonies maternal uncle's gift is very important, and the value of gift will depend upon his economic status. During the engagement the bridegroom should give bride price or 'parism' to the bride's family. This price will symbolize the interest of the bridegroom. The members of the caste and other very important, persons are invited for the wedding dinner. During the marriage close friends and relatives of the couple offer them gifts. Often people will give them gifts and prestations after marriage and dinner. These gifts are ordinary, reversible, affinal.

The next day after the marriage the newly married couple go to the nearest temple and waterfall, and their relatives also accompany them. Then, the

newly married couple will be invited to their relatives place as guests. Within one or two months everything become normal. Then the husband will go to the field for work. When the husband goes to the field, she will bring his lunch during the afternoon. Pongal, a Tamil festival, which is celebrated throughout Tamil Nadu in the first day of Thai of Tamil months. The first pongai will be considered as very important one for the newly married people. On the pongai day bride's brother brings her new clothes, pot (which is made up of an alloy of copper and zinc), sugarcane, and he will celebrate his sister's Thalai pongai (first pongai).

For her first delivery, her parents, their relatives with delicious dishes come to meet her and they will prepare a feast. They will stay for a day and in the next day, they bring their daughter with them. From the day of the delivery of child, its uncle's responsibility begins. If her brother marries a cruel wife or if she has a cruel mother-in-law, problem will arise in the relationship not only between brother and sister but also between herself and her parents. In this way, a society and its major units like family have everyday social activities. These activities directly or indirectly help the society to preserve its elements for its future generations. In an agrarian village, we can not see sudden cultural or social changes. The body of institutions and relationships are formed in the societies because of its members' companionship and the fellowship among that group of people.

We consider images, schemata patterns, and metaphorical projection like non-propositional structures as the components of understanding. It is evident that non-propositional structures play a vital role in our ability to comprehend an

object, person, event meaningfully. We need to explore the way in which our perceptual interactions and bodily movements within our environment generate schematic structures that make it possible for us to experience, understand, and reason about the world. In our study we focus on embodied patterns of meaningfully organized experience. It also helps to form the knowledge of a particular generic procedure, object, percept, event, sequence of events, or social situation. Here we can see how entities, abstract objects and events are expressed in everyday experience in society and how they are manifested in the narrative.

(1) Society operates as a container. (container-schema)

People perceive society as a container. The container schema consisting of boundary which distinguishes an exterior from an interior. This exterior boundary has some objects or substances inside. People feel that they are the inner parts of the society. Our every day experience prompts us to treat the entities as containers. We understand our own bodies as containers, in our body we ingest and excrete, take air into our lungs and breathe it out. We conceptualize an enormous number of activities in terms of container schema. We can find most of metaphors based on the container schema and we use them for abstract concepts also. This container schema is inherently meaningful to us by virtue of our everyday bodily experience.

Sometimes family is conceived as a container. The bride (stranger) is allowed into the family by marriage only. Mostly container has two kinds of substances; permanent and temporary. When we consider society, its permanent members are those who live in the society for a long time. But the temporary

members are always considered as strangers who come and live for a short time period. We can see how we experience body as a container and how we express this experience in terms of container schema: 'one day her anger boiled over' (tale 2); in this example the emotion anger is expressed in the form of metaphor. Here body is conceived as a container and anger is conceived as a fluid in the container. In this case the anger is conceptualized as increase in body temperature. When the heat increases the fluid in the container reaches its boiling point.

The anger is also expressed in the form of metonymy. The sage got angry and pronounced a curse (tale 4) here, aggressive verbal behaviour stands for anger. In this expression the angry verbal behaviour of the person which indicates the presence of anger. To understand this container schema we can look into another example (tale 4) When a person has a lot of money his pride will increase. It presupposes that as pride increases, its behavioural reactions increase. The increase in the intensity of pride is seen as being accompanied by an increase in the physical proportions of the body. When he lost his wealth he became humble. In the same tale the house is conceptualized as a container. 'Step out of the house', and 'stay out' mean that the person is out of the boundary line, that is his house. Sometimes caste is conceived as a container with a boundary line. In a particular caste, those who violate the social norms will be excommunicated by the people. It means that he is no more a member of that caste or he is outside the container.

(2) In-out image-schematic structure

This in-out image-schematic structure is mostly related with container

schema. It has some main elements:

- (i) Protection from, resistance to external forces. People who live in a society must feel safe. When they live together inside the society they feel that nothing will happen from outside. Their unity is the defense mechanism to resist the external forces.
- (ii) Limits and restriction of forces within the container. When people live inside the society they have to follow certain ways which are accepted and allowed by the society. Each and every society has its own rules and regulations for its people. People of a society have rules and regulations in the form of cultural knowledge to behave in appropriate ways, and that knowledge is taught by society only.
- (iii) The contained objects get a relative fixity of location. As far as the society is concerned, people are located inside the society.
- (iv) We experience transitivity of containment. People believe that if someone is in his house, the house is in the society, so that he is in the society.

In our tales we can see in-out orientations which consists of active organization of representations into meaningful, coherent unities. These examples are as follows:

Step out of the house... (tale 2)

Stay out till he... (tale 2)

the old man came out with.... (tale 3)

the snake came out and... (tale 8)

He threw her out... (tale 10)

out of their treasure... (tale 10)

only two people in the house... (tale 10)

Some of these sense of in and out involve clearcut physical orientation in space (but some of these for example, 'entering into a conversation' involve more abstract non-spatial relations). However they all require some activity of establishing relations, either among physical or among abstract entities or events. The in-out schemas show how pervasive, complex, and important image-schematic meaning structures are in our meaningful and coherent experience of the world.

(3) The part-whole schema:

People experience their body as wholes with parts. They apply this part-whole structure to other objects also. This schema is an asymmetric one, for example, if A is a part of B it does not mean that B is a part of A. It presupposes that if the parts are destroyed, then the whole is destroyed. In homogeneous society, families are considered as parts of the society. But in the case of heterogeneous society caste is only a part.

(4) Image-Schema transformations: The following are the transformation of image-schema.

1. Multiplex to mass: We imagine a group of several castes. Then we move from the group until the cluster of individual castes starts to become a single homogeneous mass. Now we move backward to the point where the society appears once again as a cluster of individual castes.

Schema consists of parts and its relations. The parts might consist of a set of entities. It has causal relations, temporal sequences etc. Normally, a given schema have a small number of parts standing in simple relations. From-To or

Path schema is a very good example for this. Its structure consists of three elements, a source point A, a terminal point B, and a vector tracing a path between them, and a relation specified as a force vector moving from A to B. We can find this recurrent structure manifested in a number of seemingly different events:

(1) The old lady was going to the field with nice food for her husband. (tale,3) (waking from one place to another)

(2) The sage gave the old lady two measures of Chōlam (tale 5) He took all the things to his sister's place and handed over to his sister. (tale 1)

(3) (When the wolves surrounded him he brought out a concealed stick) and gave them a sound beating. (tale 3)

(4) This transformation is very different from others. Here transformation from one state of entity to another state has happened. When a person is excommunicated his/her state changes from that of a member to that of a non-member of the society. A proud rich man (tale 4) becomes beggar. Here a person is undergoing a change from the state of being rich to the state of being poor.

member → non-member → person (state of a substance)

richman → beggar or poor → person (state of a substance)

(4) The Link Schema: This schema helps to link two different entities in which entity A is linked to B, then B is linked to A. Social and interpersonal relationships are understood in terms of the link schema. Male is linked to a female by marriage bond, banyan tree is linked to the supernatural beings such

as ghosts, and spirits by the link schema.

(5) Up-down schema: In this schema we interrelate body and space by recognizing the spatial unity of our body enactively through perception and bodily movement in space. In this schema we use our bodily experience with vertical objects. 'She climbed up a tall tree to pluck some fruits' (tale 6), and 'they saw a woman get down from the tree' (tale 10) are suitable examples for up-down schema. In our everyday activities we have experience with vertical objects (like tree, hill). We conceptualize that ghosts, spirits as invisible. Our ideas of ghosts, spirits and other supernatural beings are formed on the basis of cultural schemas.

In purposes-are-physical-goals schema there is a distinction between the domain of intention (or purpose) and the physical domain. In this domain of intention we have an initial state, a sequence of action and a final state. In the initial state our intention is not satisfied and in the final state it is satisfied. Here, source is the starting point, goal is the end point and the sequence of actions connect the source with the goal. In other words, movement along the path is the source domain and the achievement of our purpose is the target domain (eg. the man took the cold rice and left the place. He walked and walked for miles till he came to a deserted place. Tale 2)

Centre-Periphery Schema: We have numerous experiences of centre periphery relationships. When we look at a tree we perceive that the trunk is central for the tree and its branches are peripheral. When we consider something as central it means that thing is very important and in the same way, peripheral things are not important. If something happens to the peripheral units it will not affect the

whole but if anything happens to the centre it will affect the whole. Father is the centre of the family and children are peripheral, in the family schema.

We understand our experience with image-schemas and metaphorical projections. They give comprehensible structure and definiteness to our experience. They connect up different experiential domain to establish a measure of coherence and unity in our understanding of our world. A culture model is a cognitive schema that is inter-subjectively shared by a social group. In the tales, spaces are corresponded to narrative segments. Spatial units are postulated by events and characters. Our body is involved in the constitution of image-schemas. Hence they are referred to as 'embodied' or 'kinesthetic schemas'. These schemas are gestalt structures which interpret and frame our experience, expressions, and comprehension before any logico-combinatory operation can take place upon the conceptual units. Our new experiences, situations, etc. are metaphorically understood and expressed in terms of the already available embodied schemas. So body plays pivotal role in the subject-world system and external objects can not be defined and detached from the actual conditions under which they are presented for us.

CONCLUSION

Narrative is a pervasive phenomenon. It is a complex process that is shaped, evaluated and re-created in each narrative performance. It is obvious that folklore does not exist in a society. It exists in the lives of individuals. The ongoing narrative tradition represents both the individual narrator and the community. Each narrative event is a sort of negotiation between the community and the narrator. While the narrator has control over the narration, the community has control over the tradition.

Scholars in the field of folklore research assume the universality of narrative forms and the universality of their structural-formal features. Folk narratives are subjected to variation and change only on the thematic and stylistic levels, their structural features assumed to be universal. The communicative attributes of narrative in each particular culture are considered as a surface structure based upon universal principles of narrative differentiation. Any forms of folklore are just variation of basic structures which are permanently rooted in human thought, imagination and expression. Narrative generally has its own appropriate cultural, historical and symbolic substances.

The ultimate purpose of structural-morphological studies in folklore is the discovery of the distinctive features of each genre, their relation within the respective forms and their capacity to differentiate genres within the totality of oral tradition. The structural-morphological approach of narrative is based on a fundamental 'deep' structure expressed in the relation between the narrative components of a particular narrative. It is evident that the structure of narrative has a cognitive primacy in the formation of narrative.

We have presented in the first chapter certain basic elements of narrative, and narrative analysis. We have shown that narratives perform a very significant role in human interaction, human imagination, and they communicate to the audience some moral values. We also see how we use narrative as a way of linguistically representing our past experience whether real or imagined. We point to the need for sophisticated forms of narrative analysis. Although many scholars mostly from folkloristics, linguistics, anthropology, psycholinguistics and socio-linguistics have contributed on narrative analysis we have concentrated on Propp, Levi-Strauss and Greimas only. We have tried to show the contribution of Propp very briefly. We see how Propp's 'Morphology' of folktale is a fundamental study leading to works by Levi-Strauss and Greimas who adopt different approaches to narrative analysis. We have stressed on the usefulness of Levi-Strauss's application of the theory of distinctive features based on the principles of binary opposition. In the later part of the chapter we have concentrated on Greimas's semiotics of narrative and particularly his semiotics of passions. We have discussed the importance of semiotic square and, how the actantial model helps in the functional analysis of narratives, and how the linguistic theory is inadequate for analysing passion in narrative. We also focus on how Greimas's semiotics of passion gives a new methodology for analysing the passional components in the narrative, as well as on the way he analyses the concept of anger. We have employed his method to analyse our sample tales in the third chapter.

The second chapter on cultural model shows that the human experience gives meanings in terms of image-schemas, and that our bodily experience

determines human concepts or modes of reasoning. This chapter discusses the theories of objectivist cognition and that of experientialist cognition to explain the nature of meaning and reasoning. One important idea discussed in this chapter is the embodied nature of cultural models and how cultural models are directly or indirectly linked to the embodied concepts which is motivated by bodily or social experience. The later part of this chapter shows that cultural schemata are conceptual abstractions which serve as the basis for all human information processing. It has pointed out the claim of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson that whole domains of experience are systematically conceptualized in terms of other domains of experience, and that basic abstract concepts that are not delineated in experience are metaphorically structured in terms of other basic concepts. It also shows that how people use well understood or easy-to-perceive aspects of something for representing either the thing as a whole or some other aspects or parts of it. We discuss in this chapter how metaphorically extended and metonymically structured image schemata structure our understanding and reasoning. It also focuses on the way in which people's experience is expressed in the narrative schema mediated by image-schemata.

The third chapter presents the semiotic analysis of anger in folk narratives. For the purpose of this analysis, tales are segmented on the basis of the event criterion and these segments show the state of feeling of the subject have been numbered. The analysis was done on the basis of Greimas's lexical semantic approach to the analysis of anger. Our analysis shows that Greimas's methodology can be profitably applied to the study of Tamil folk narratives. This analysis shows us that there is a parallelism between the development of the

passional sequence and the fundamental articulation of the general narratives schema.

The first part of the fourth chapter gives a description of the relevant social context, and proceeds to analyse the way in which our perceptual interactions and bodily movements in our environment generate schematic structure. This chapter has focused on embodied patterns of meaningfully organized experience. We have tried to show how entities, abstract objects and events are expressed in everyday experience, and how they are manifested in the narrative. We have shown that our every day social and physical experience is expressed in terms of the already available embodied schemas. We see that the image-schema is conceptualized on the basis of bodily experience and it is manifested in the folk narratives. We discuss the importance of imagination in human cognition. In our cultural model analysis we show how people conceptualize their society and social aspects such as caste, family, individual, natural objects, supernatural beings etc. We see that meaning is always a matter of human understanding which constitute our experience of a common world. We also endorse the view that a theory of a meaning is a theory of understanding which involves image schemata, metaphorical projection etc.

APPENDIX
(TALES I-X)

Tale I

Once there lived a brother and sister. The sister was married to a very poor man, and lived in a distant place. The brother married a lady who was very cruel to everyone. One day the sister came to her brother's place with her children. At that time, her brother was not there and they met his cruel wife. She did not invite them, and refused to give them food, even water, and she also refused to allow them to take rest. A neighbour offered them food, shelter and everything, and even gave them her brother's address where he was working. She took her children to her brother's place where they met him. He felt very happy and asked her to stay for a day. In the meantime he came to know what his wife had done to his sister. He gave his sister everything which she needed and sent them back home. Then, he wanted to punish his cruel wife. He told his wife her brothers' houses were burnt to ashes in a fire accident, they were on the street and he had to give something. She felt very sorry over her brothers' fate and packed all the articles they needed. He took all these things to his sister's place and handed them over to his sister. When his wife came to know about the plan she felt she was punished.

Tale II

Once, there lived a man and his wife who were very poor. His wife nagged him everyday for being such a lazy good-for-nothing. The poor fellow would listen to all her abuses patiently, step out of the house whenever he could, and stay out till he felt it was safe to come home. One day her anger boiled over. She scraped together whatever stale food remained in her pots, tied it up, thrust it into his hand and asked him to go anywhere to earn something. The man took the cold rice and left the place. He walked and walked for miles till he came to a deserted place. He sat down under a banyan tree and he kept his bundle of rice on a branch and soon he was fast asleep. There were some forest spirits in the tree and they climbed down, and tasted the cold rice. They were pleased by that cold rice and they wanted to give him something in return for the food. When the poor man got up he found that there were four empty bowls. He banged the bowls on the ground, and at once, several lovely women appeared before him and served him all sorts of nice dishes. Soon, he came to know that he was indeed master of these nymphs. The next day he invited every family in the village and served them variety of new dishes. There was a proud rich man in the village who grew envious of his neighbour's name and fame. The rich man met the neighbour and found out the secret. Next morning, the rich man arrived at the same spot with a big basketful of fine dishes, and slept there. The same spirits tasted the food and got angry. They wanted to punish him in return for his food. So they left some magic bowls. He got up and brought them to his house. He invited the entire village and they gathered in his dining hall. Dozens of wrestler-like burly men came out of the bowls when he ordered. They seized the guests one by one, and shaved their heads in the hall. With the shining heads the guests left the place, and the burly men shaved the rich man's head too.

Tale III

Once there lived an old couple who had a small piece of land and lived entirely on cultivation. Every morning the old man used to go to the field, where his wife took some food in the noon for his meal. One day the old woman was taking some nice food which attracted some wolves. They fell upon the food and ate it up. The old woman went to her husband and told him what had happened. The next day, at noon the old man put on his wife's clothes and started walking with the cooked food. When the wolves surrounded him, he brought out a concealed stick and gave them a sound beating. Now the wolves wanted to take revenge. They planned to fall over the plough to damage it. But the old man understood their plan and fixed some nails. Instead of damaging the plough their bodies were scratched all over and they ran away. Then they wanted to cause damage to his cucumber field for revenge. When he again knew their plan he inserted some blades in all the cucumbers. Finding themselves beaten away the wolves ran away. The wolves were busy devising some other way to take revenge. One day the old lady made some nice curry, and invited all the wolves. She told them she wanted to tie each of them. They agreed and the old lady tied them separately. After the wolves were securely tied, the old lady gave the signal and, the old man came out with a stick and they were all beaten to death.

Tale IV

Once upon a time, there was a rich man who was very proud of his wealth. He was not ready to respect even a sage or old man in that village. One day a sage visited his house. When the sage came in he was seated on a cot. The sage expected that the rich man would dismount from the cot and do obeisance to him. The rich man, however, did not leave his cot but merely shook his head and asked the sage to be seated. At this, the sage was very much annoyed and left the place feeling humiliated. He pronounced a curse that the rich man would become a beggar and live as such for years, always begging for alms. Immediately after the sage left the place, the curse took its effect. At the end of that year, during the temple festival, a sage from a distant place came there. The rich man did all kinds of worship to the sage and pleased by his doings the sage removed his curse. The rich man recovered fully from his curse and lived happily and humbly thereafter.

Tale V

Once, there was an old couple who had no children. They had a very small plot of land but they had no money to plough or sow. One day, when the old lady was crying in the field, a sage came there and enquired about her problem. The sage gave her two measures of Cholam (a kind of maize) to sow, but she had to return four measures of grains at the time of harvest. When the sage left the place there was a heavy rain, and the very next day she ploughed the field and sowed. Within a few months the field was ready for harvest. On the harvest day the sage came to the place of threshing floor to ask his grain. She refused to give him and asked him to come after some days. After a few days the sage came to the village to get his grains back. When she saw him she asked her husband to pretend to be dead. She made him sit in a corner and she started to lament. The sage asked the neighbour what had happened to the old man. The neighbour told him her husband was dead. The sage asked the old lady to return his grains as she promised earlier. But she asked him to come after her husband's funeral ritual. The sage grumbled a curse and left the place. When the sage left the place she asked her husband to get up. But she did not get any response from him. Then she knew that he was dead. In this way the sage had taken revenge.

Tale VI

Long time ago, there lived six brothers and a sister. The brothers were all married. Their wives did not like their sister-in-law. They were jealous of the fuss the brothers made over the sister. Once, taking advantage of their husbands' absence, the sisters-in-law started ill-treating the girl. They asked her to fill an earthen pot which had a large hole in the bottom. When she did it with the help of a frog, they were angry but could not say anything. Next, they asked her to get a large bundle of fuel. A snake in the forest helped her to get the fuel. This time they were very much upset. Another day, they sent the girl to a field where pulse had been sown the day before to bring back all the grains by the evening. She did it by the evening with the help of pigeons. Finally they decided to kill her, so they asked her to pluck some fruits from a tall tree. When the girl started plucking the fruits, the wicked sisters-in-law quickly removed the ladder and came home. At night, on their way home the brothers came to the tree and sat to rest. They saw their sister and brought her home. They killed their wicked wives and thereafter lived happily with their sister.

Tale VII

Once, there lived a wolf in a forest. One day he went to the nearby village and killed a goat. When he was having a good meal out of it, some crows gathered on a tree and started cawing. The villagers came to the spot and gave the wolf a sound beating. So, the wolf got angry and wanted to take revenge on the crows. Shortly afterwards, a great cyclone with heavy rain hit that area. The wolf pretended to be sorry for the crows, allowed them all to take shelter in his house. When they had got in, the wolf killed and ate them all. Before dying the crows pecked the wolf and his body was severely wounded. He met a potter who gave him a pot and the wolf saw a shepherd boy. The wolf got a goat in lieu of a pot of ghee. When he brought the fine goat to his den, the wolves in the neighbourhood were jealous. When the wolf went to fetch some water they killed the goat and ate it, and they left behind only its skin. When he returned he saw what had happened and took the skin to a cobbler who made it into a drum. He took the drum to the bank of a river and began to play. All his neighbours came to the spot and asked him where such a fine drum could be got. The wolf said that there were such drums at the bottom of the river. Then, all the wolves tied stones around their neck and jumped into the river and were drowned. The clever wolf had his revenge on his enemies.

Tale VIII

There lived a crow family on a mango tree. At the bottom of the tree there was a hole where a snake lived.

This snake would crawl to the nest and eat the eggs of the crows as soon as they were laid. As it happened many times, the crow wanted to take revenge on the snake. So he met his friend, the jackal who told him a way to kill his enemy.

As the jackal advised, the crow flew to the river. There, when the king was taking his bath, the crow picked up his gold chain and flew away. The king's servants saw this and pursued the crow.

The crow went straight to the snake's hole and dropped the gold chain in it. When the king's servants dug up the hole, the snake came out and they beat it to death, and found the gold chain.

The crow family lived in peace thereafter.

Tale IX

Once, there was a cripple who lived with his mother and three elder brothers. All his brothers and their wives were clever and cheated him. They gave him very little land and asked him to take care of their mother. Within a few years, he became very rich and got married. This made his brothers very jealous and they became hostile to him. One night they went to his paddy field and burnt all the crop. Next day he saw the field and understood his brothers' wicked plan. He put the ashes in sacks and packed them up. Then he loaded all of them on a bullock cart. He sold everything in a co-operative market by a trick and got some money. When the news reached his brothers ears the next day, they burnt their paddy field. They packed everything and went to the same co-operative market to sell it. This time the officers and security men caught them and put them in jail. Now they hatched a plan to kill their younger brother. They put him in a sack and carried him to the seashore to throw him in the sea. On the way to the sea, they off-loaded the sack and went to answer the call of nature. When they went away the cripple came out of the sack and put the shepherd inside, and left home with his herd goats. The brothers carried the shepherd and threw him into the sea. When they came home they were shocked to see their cripple brother. He told them when he was sinking down in the sea, he saw his father who had 100 goats. He gave him all his goats and helped him to come out. The brothers also wanted to meet their father, and as they wanted he put them all in sacks and threw them in the sea. Thereafter he lived happily with his wife and mother.

Tale X

There was once a very docile daughter-in-law who was obedient to her mother-in-law. Every morning, the daughter-in-law would come to the old lady and ask her how many measures of rice she should cook for the day. The old lady would hold up her hand and the hand would show two or three outstretched fingers according to her fancy. The daughter-in-law would take the order silently.

One day the old lady died and the daughter-in-law was not able to make any decision. Her husband went to the potter and gave special instructions to the potter to make a clay image of his mother with one hand showing two fingers and the other three. The husband brought it home and planted it in a prominent place near the kitchen. If she happened to see the three-fingered hand, that day the rice-pot would overflow with boiled rice. One day the husband became aware that his rice bags were being emptied every few weeks, though there was only two people in the house. When he asked his wife, she told him the custom, according to which the daughter-in-law would spread a leaf before her mother-in-law and serve all the dished one by one. But actually what happened was as soon as she went into the kitchen her husband's elder brother's wife would come in quietly through a cleverly made hole in the wall, steal the food and vanish the way she came. But she thought her mother-in-law had dined off her leaf as usual. When he heard this custom her husband flew into a rage and beat up his wife. Then he threw her out, and her clay mother-in-law with her. She took the clay figure in her hand and walked into the night. She climbed on a

tree and tied herself to a branch with her sari. Some thieves came right under the tree where she was hiding and lowered their burdens from their backs, and sat down to share the loot. The poor woman began to shake with fear and lost her grip on the clay mother-in-law. It fell down with a big crash right on the gang of thieves. The thieves fled in all directions and they left all their loot behind. In the morning she gathered up the broken pieces of her clay and took the thieves loot and made her way back. When her husband heard the whole story he sent her to his elder brother's house to borrow a big measuring vessel. The elder brother's wife was curious to know what these poor people had to measure. So she stuck a piece of tamarind at the bottom of the measuring vessel before she lent it. When the measuring vessel was returned later the neighbours were astonished to see a gold coin was stuck to the tamarind at the bottom. The next day the neighbours met the innocent woman who told them it was all her mother-in-law's doing. The clever elder brother made a clay doll, put it in his wife's hand, took her into the jungle, and left her on the same tree. As expected, the same thieves came there to share the day's loot. As soon as they untied their bundles the woman on the tree threw down her doll on them. At once the thieves ran away, but they did not go far this time. They were suspicious and they wanted to see what had fallen down. They hid behind a tree and watched. They saw a woman get down from the tree and begin robbing their loot. With shouts of anger, they closed in on her, scolded for scaring them out of their treasure on a previous night and before she could say anything, beat her and left her tied to the tree.

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