

I hereby affirm that the research for this dissertation titled "Land Transfers and Family Formations; A Case Study of a Village in the Rayalaseema Region of Andhra Pradesh" being submitted to the Jawahar Lal Nehru University for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy was carried out entirely by me at the Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum.


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
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PREFACE

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Land as a productive asset^{1/} plays an important role not only in the functioning of rural economy but also in changing fortunes of the families and socio-economic groups. Other things being equal, larger the control over land by a family or a group of relatively homogeneous set of families, larger is its socio-economic and political power. At the other (lower) end of the scale vast multitudes of families without an access to land as a productive asset indulge in a day-to-day struggle for survival, either by working as bonded labourers, wage-labourers or marginal/small farmers and tenants. This, however, is not a new phenomenon in the agrarian economies, for it is merely a historical legacy.

While in the past—especially during the colonial times — intervention of the state in the affairs of the agrarian economies was primarily either to perpetuate an inequitous distribution of land and/or extract the maximum amount of land revenue from the cultivators, measures to help the small farmer to stand on his own, were few and far between. As the thrust of the governmental intervention as well as the logic of the then existing agrarian structure were in favour of the propertied groups of the society, the economic upward mobility of the small and medium farmers faced a number of hurdles. However, the incidence of these hurdles was not uniform in all places, for the regional specificities introduced variations in the nature and direction of these hurdles.

These regional specificities manifest in terms of agronomy, climate, irrigation, tax-burden, land-man ratio, cropping pattern, transport and the existing distribution of landholdings between the cultivating and non-cultivating caste categories. Upward or downward mobility of social groups had to take place primarily through land transfers and/or by

bringing the virgin soils under plough. In regions which witnessed dynamism in agriculture and activation of product and land markets, there existed a severe competition among cultivators for land, thereby boosting up the land values and exhausting the supplies of cultivable waste lands. In such situations, land transfers could take place only within the framework evolved by the social institutions and land, labour, and credit markets. In particular the land acquisitive ethos of social groups coupled with the family composition of consumer-worker ratio play an important role in their economic mobility.

On the other hand, in regions which lacked agrarian dynamism, plagued as they were by uncertain rainfall, poor soils, high tax burden, etc. land transfers might take a different direction. The sheer logic of a high land-man ratio may thwart further concentration of land holdings in the hands of the village oligarchies. This coupled with the existence of culturable wastes might provide some scope for the small and medium farmers to manoeuvre for land. In situations where state intervenes at least half-heartedly to alter the agrarian structure in favour of the social groups at the lower end of the scale and enable them to acquire some land, they are provided with some cushion to face the vagaries in the product and credit markets. But such situations may be few and far between in modern India. In majority of the cases, however, the instruments of the State are used more to perpetuate the inequitable distribution of land holdings.

However, the experience of post-independence India does seem to suggest a new direction to which the agrarian structure is moving. The data which were thrown up by the National Sample Survey and the World Agricultural Census Reports^{2/} for many states in the country do indicate that the distribution of operational holdings across the size classes has been becoming less inequitable over the recent times.^{3/} [Harpal Singh, 1976]

Taking the data^{4/} for Andhra Pradesh, one finds a decline in the absolute concentration of land cultivated in holdings^{5/} of 10 hectares and above, both in terms of percentage of households and area. On the other hand there is an increase in the percentage of household cultivating less than one hectare of land. The Lorenz ratio had fallen from 0.6292

in 1970-71 to 0.6023 in 1976-77. This had further slid down to 0.5698 in 1980-81. This decline in the Lorenz ratio for the distribution of land holdings suggests that the inequalities were declining over a period of time (See table 1 in Statistical Appendix)

Increase in the area under small holdings may be attributed to the following factors. Firstly, there has been considerable sub-division of land due to partitioning. Secondly, in order to evade the legislation on land ceiling, rich farmers had either sold off their excess holdings or resorted to benami (spurious) transfer of their excess holdings to their kith and kin. This legal (notional) transfer of holdings would, to some extent, distort the picture as reflected in the agricultural census data. [Laxmi Narayana Tyagi, 1976; 1639. V.S. Vyas; 1976 P.G.K. Panikar (et)al, 1978; 37-53; Harpal Singh, 1976; 12] A very small extent of land declared as surplus was, however, distributed among the landless poor.^{6/}

Coming back to the wider question, there is as yet, no concensus of opinion among the social scientists on the question of land transfers and family formation. The present exercise which is based on a case study of a village in the Rayalaseema region of Andhra Pradesh, hopes to make a modest contribution to the ongoing debate. Being a case study it has its own limitations in terms of its results being relevant and applicable to other regions. However, it is hoped that the insights obtained in the present exercise would initiate similar studies on other regions so that the emerging patterns would form a coherent whole and throw light on the question at hand.

The following are the main objectives of the study,

- i. to document and analyse the distribution of land holdings and cropping pattern in the village at the time of Re-settlement Survey in 1891 and comment upon the functioning of the economy and the role of the dominant castes.
- ii. to capture the nature and causes of land transfers over a long period of six decades from 1891 onwards and analyse the causes for land acquisition and alienation.

iii. to trace the impact of a few endogenous and exogenous variables on land transfers between 1948 and 1984 and comment, in passing, on a few significant features of the backward agriculture in a semi-arid zone.

iv. to map out the relative position of families in different size-class of land holdings as also different caste categories in the post-independence period and point out the emerging trends, and

v. to analyse the association between rates of family partitions and (a) Status of families in terms of landed assets at a point of time and over a time and (b) the emerging production organisation outside agriculture.

The following is the outline of our study. While Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on the issues, Chapter 3 provides an analytical framework within which land transfers are discussed. An account of methodology is furnished in Chapter 4 providing for a take off on analysis of changes in the village between 1891 and 1948, which are traced in Chapter 5. Chapters 6 to 8 document and analyse the interaction between the endogenous and exogenous variables and land transfers in the village. While Chapter 9 gives an account of the association between land transfers and family formations, the last chapter comprises of summary and conclusions.

Notes and References

1. According to All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey conducted in 1971, the value of land was 66 percent in the value of total productive assets in the rural areas.
2. These two important sources of information on distribution of landholdings i.e. NSS and World Agricultural Census, however, are, strictly speaking, not comparable. When the 1971-72 NSS data on land holdings are compared with 1970-71, Agricultural census data on land holdings, conflicting results emerge on the number of holdings and operated area. For detailed discussion for this sort of discrepancies see Laxminarayan and Tyagi, 1976, 1638
3. Various articles on the changes in agrarian structure in India were presented at the 36th Annual Conference of Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, November 17-19, 1976. For articles presented at the Conference See Conference Number, Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, July, September, 1976, Vol. XXXI, No. 3.
4. For showing the structural changes in agriculture in Andhra Pradesh, we made use of only the World Agricultural Census data. This is for three reasons. Firstly, we have excluded NSS data because the various surveys on land holdings conducted by it are not strictly speaking comparable with each other owing to differences in the meaning of concepts (Sanyal, 1976). Secondly, Agricultural Census estimates seem to be more reliable, as in most of the States the Agricultural Census estimates are based on the complete coverage of all holdings. On the other hand, NSS figures are based on sample survey (Laxminarayan and Tyagi, 1976: 1639). Thirdly, Agricultural Census estimates are available for most recent period. Since the Ceiling Act was passed in 1961, it would be interesting to see the changes in the seventies and eighties rather than in sixties.
5. These are operational holdings. An operational holding is defined by the World Agricultural Census as "all land which is used wholly or partly for agricultural production and is operated as one technical unit by one person alone or with others without regard to title, legal form size or location. A Technical unit is defined as that unit which is under the same management, has the same means of production such as labour force, machinery and animals" [Bureau of Economics and Statistics (1974) World Agricultural Census Report, 1970-71, Hyderabad pp. 27]
6. Although, the State government of Andhra Pradesh estimated that, it would acquire 20 lakh acres of land, the target was not achieved due to benami transactions etc. By 1st January, 1985, the government of Andhra Pradesh has taken over and assigned about 21,728 acres of wet land and 3,14,391 acres of dry land among 2,55,090 landless poor. [The Hindu, April 15, 1985]

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.0 Introduction

The objective of this Chapter is to provide an indepth review of literature on land transfers and family formations. Since land transfers and family formations are the two major factors that govern the mobility of peasant households from one socio-economic position to the other, our review of literature is carried out within the wider canvass of the studies on peasant mobility. Such an approach will help us not only to understand better the analytical and empirical issues involved in studying land transfers and family formation in agrarian economies, but also the manner in which these factors shape socio-economic mobility of peasant households. This chapter is divided into three sections. Section I discusses the Russian debate on peasant mobility. In Section II the studies on peasant mobility carried out in South Asia are discussed. In the final section the analytical issues emerging out of our review are highlighted.

I

2.1.0 The Russian Debate

A discussion on the origin of peasant mobility invariably takes us to the Russian experience, since "our modern discussions are the heirs of Russian heritage, inevitably mirroring ... the great arguement that raged between late nineteenth century and collectivization" (Charlesworth, 1979: 61).¹ The arguement which is summarised in Shanin (1972)

dealt with economic differentiation and polarization of peasantry in pre - 1917 Russia . The main participants in this argument were the Marxists and the Populists. While the Marxists had argued that penetration of capital was the important cause for differentiation of peasantry, the populists had emphasised on the demographic factors. In this section we will examine this debate to bring out its relevance for understanding peasant mobility in general and land transfers in particular.

2.1.1 Marxist View

According to the traditional Marxist view point, it is the penetration of capital which sets off the process of differentiation. And once started, it would eventually result in the emergence of bi-polar classes of agrarian bourgeoisie and rural proletariat. The following gives a bird's-eye-view of this process at work.

One can start with a medieval society whose hall-mark was self-sufficiency and follow up the historical path that leads to the differentiation of the peasantry. "The peasant family of the medieval period composed an economic society that was entirely ... self-sufficient, a society that produced not only its own food, but built its own home, furniture and utensils, forged its own implements of production" (Kautsky, 1980: 46). The peasants' dependence on the market, was therefore, limited. But with the dissolution of small peasant industry brought about by the urban industry and trade, the peasant's dependence on market and thereby on his cash-requirements had increased. The peasant wanted money not only for luxury goods, but also for his own consumption. Hence, there was need for the cultivation of commercial crops. At the same time, the cash-requirements of the landlord had also increased, because of his interaction with the industrial capital and hence he had started demanding 'money rent' instead of 'kind rent'. "Money rent presupposes a considerable development of commerce, of urban industry, of commodity production in general and thereby 'money circulation'" (Karl Marx, 1966; 797). The traditional relationship between the peasant and the land owner will be turned into purely cash, contract - based relationship (Lenin, 1972; 175-6).

As the peasant's dependence on market was increasing, his problems had also increased.

"He had no means of preventing a fall in prices or of selling grain for which there was no demand". Communication facilities had not developed adequately to "establish an equilibrium between the over production of one district and scarcity of another. Just as bad harvests pushed prices up, good ones forced them down" (Kautsky, 1980: 47). As agriculture assumed a commodity character, the gap between the peasant and the market also widened. "The merchant found a place between the producer and the consumer. Side by side with the merchant, came the usurer; in bad years the peasant's cash receipts were not sufficient to cover his requirements of cash; he was therefore compelled to borrow" (Kautsky, 1980: 47). Such borrowings often resulted in the mortgages and subsequent alienation of land. These peasants who lost their land, either partly or wholly, had to hire out their labour, since sustenance on agriculture would be difficult. Besides, since the small peasant industries were destroyed by the spread of capital, the peasants' dependence on wage income became all the more important, especially in lean seasons.

The peasants, who had been selling away their land due to vagaries of the markets, had soon joined the ranks of a rural proletariat. The features of this class were "insignificant farming on a patch of land, with the farm in a state of utter ruin (particularly evidenced by the leasing out of land), inability to exist without the sale of labour-power (= 'industries' of indigent peasants) (and) an extremely low standard of living..." (Lenin, 1972; 177).

On the other hand, some independent farmers who carry on commercial agriculture, owners of commercial and industrial establishments, the proprietors of commercial enterprises etc. constitute the other class—namely rural bourgeoisie or the well-to-do peasantry. These peasants combine agriculture with industries. "From among these well-to-do peasants a class of capitalist farmers is created, since the renting of land for the sale of grain plays (in the agricultural belt) an enormous part in their farms, often a more important part than the allotment. The size of the farm, in the majority of the cases, requires a labour force larger than that available in the family, for which reason the formation of a body of farm labourers, and still more of day labourers, is a necessary condition for the existence of well-to-do peasantry. The spare cash obtained by these peasants in the shape

of net income is either directed towards commercial operations or usury, which are so developed in our rural districts or, under favourable conditions is invested in the purchase of land" (Lenin, 1972: 177). Thus, the concentration of land ownership would also increase. Lenin also demonstrated that there was strong correlation between access to any one of the essential means of production and access to others in the regions of Russia that he analysed. It was those farmers with access to more land who also had more operated area, more draught animals, more implements and who use the more-advanced farming techniques.

Thus, "the old peasantry is not only 'differentiating', it is being completely dissolved, it is ceasing to exist, it is being ousted by absolutely new types of rural inhabitants — types that are the basis of a society in which commodity economy and capitalist production prevail. These types are the rural bourgeoisie (chiefly petty bourgeoisie) and the rural proletariat — a class of commodity producers ^{in agriculture} and a class of agricultural wage-workers" (Lenin, 1972: 174). Since the peasantry is ceasing to exist and property relations are solidly established in rural areas, the Marxists led by Lenin, strongly felt that the only progressive political programme was the expropriation of the means of production and organisation of farming on a collective basis.

2.1.2 Populist View

The Marxist vision of future development was questioned by a group of scholars, known as Populists or Organisation and Production School, led by A.V. Chayanov. This group while accepting 'the need for modernization and economic growth, as well as the necessity for spread of market relations', emphasised that there operate countervailing factors, specific to agriculture, which lend greater cohesion to the peasant society and ultimately prevent class polarization (Shanin, 1972, 46). Two types of countervailing factors were mentioned. External forces and powerful outsiders united the village against hostile environment and more fundamentally factors internal and specific to peasantry were at work, which reinforce the stability and cohesiveness (Mark Harrison, 1977: 129). They rejected ^{the} Marxists' argument

that peasantry was dissolving. For this school, inequality in land holdings did not indicate that the Russian peasantry was disappearing. On the contrary, they had argued that Russian peasantry was homogeneous, with 90 percent of households belonging to small farms, without employing wage labour. Hence, their vision of rural economic growth was based on capital intensive and highly productive family farms, participating in a large scale co-operative movement.

2.1.2.1 Chayanov's Model

Chayanov developed his model basing upon the pure family farm which is a production-cum-consumption unit, without employing hired labour.^{1/} (Chayanov, 1966:1). He saw little sense therefore in applying capitalist profit calculation to a peasant economy where there is no objective of profit maximization. A peasant household wants to maintain the internal equilibrium between the utility of their output and disutility of the effort that its production entails. Moreover, since it does not employ hired labour, the category of wages is largely absent from its calculation. Instead of the objective category of market wages, it has only the subjective category of disutility of labour or drudgery.

The internal equilibrium of the family labour farm takes place when the utility of the 'family labour product' equals the disutility of the drudgery that it entails. The exact amount of work that this level of output involves is the only objective category in the 'on-farm equilibrium' and is known as the degree of self-exploitation (Sivakumar, 1977:34). The degree of self exploitation is thus directly determined by the equilibrium level of output. Factors like the size and composition of the family would come from the demand side. On the supply side, the additional amounts of output involve increasing disutility. The size and composition of the family decide the disutility of additional output.

Chayanov used Consumer/Worker ratio as a key variable in explaining how the expansion and contraction of economic activities of peasant household depend upon endogenous factors rather than on exogenous factors, as Lenin argued. When a young family comes into existence,

the consumption pressure would be low and so also other factors of production. The biological growth of young family would cause a rise in consumer-worker ratio. This would lead to an increase in the intensity of labour i.e. self-exploitation among its working members and pulling in further factors of production by renting in more land, borrowing or saving. Such happening would be recorded as rise in the economic position of the household. The farm size would also increase. Later when the children become working members they would ease the consumption pressure. Slowly the degree of self exploitation decreases. Beyond this no more children are born in to the household and the consumer-worker ratio falls rapidly as children grow up. Though grown-up children would begin leaving the household, the work capacity of the household remains constant as other children keep reaching an adult's work capacity. Subsequently the consumer-worker ratio drops to one and slowly the farm size decreases. When all children leave the household, the demographic cycle is completed and the farm size returns to its initial stage (Carman Diana Deere and Alain de Janvry, 1981; 341).

Thus, a peasant household in its life time, according to Chayanov, experiences both an upward mobility and downward mobility. If one looks at a household at time t_0 , it may belong to the poor peasant category. But at time t_1 , it may move over to the rich peasant category. This micro dynamic picture holds true to the society as a whole. If one looks at a group of households at two points of time, the differentiation of peasantry may be prevalent at both the points, but considerable economic mobility would be taking place. Chayanov called this 'demographic differentiation'. The Leninist theory of differentiation is quite different from Chayanov's, for throughout its life cycle 'a household may lose or gain land not just because of demographic factors, but because of the interaction of the household with the wider economy. For instance a middle peasant may become small holder through loss of land due to bankruptcy or expropriation. Whereas favourable harvests and terms of trade may allow him to lease or acquire more land' (Carman Deana Deere and Alain de Janvry, 1981:341). Thus the expansion and contraction of household's economic activities would depend upon exogenous factors.

Chayanov's model was criticised by a number of economists. For instance Utsa Patnaik

(1978) felt that the populist theory had committed a fundamental logical error, by assuming the co-existence of family labour-based holdings with capitalist holdings with identical production functions. She felt it was impossible because "the same output produced with the same cost cannot give profit in one case (the Capitalist farm) and not give a profit in other (the family farm)" (416). Diana Hunt (1979) tested Chayanov's model and sought to modify it. Carman Diana Deere and Alain De Janvry (1981) had, however, shown how Chayanovian demographic differentiation model is complementary to the Leninist model of social differentiation. According to them although Chayanovian model of demographic differentiation is not so much helpful in explaining the dynamics of peasant society of Northern Peru, they feel that it is an "important explanatory variable when applied to choice of activity i.e. to the division of labour by sex and age and to sources of income over the life cycle" (Carman Diana Deere and Alain De Janvry, 1981: 337).

2.1.3 Shanin's Model on Peasant Mobility

Teodor Shanin in his study "The Awkward Class" sought to synthesise the two divergent views on Peasant mobility. Terming Peasant mobility as a complex process, he advanced 'multi-factorial explanatory model' to encompass all of them. According to him "the mobility recorded for a peasant society as a whole is a net balance of the oscillations of its component peasant households" (Shanin, 1972:77). He classified mobility into two types, viz., centrifugal mobility and centripetal mobility. Centrifugal mobility explains "changes in wealth of peasant households tending away from the mean i.e. it implies further impoverishment of poorer families and further enrichment of rich families." It leads to polarization of peasantry. Centripetal mobility explains "changes in the wealth of households tending towards the mean i.e. it implies relative impoverishment of rich families and relative enrichment of poorer families" (Shanin, 1972: 241). It leads to a levelling process.

Dynamic studies revealed that the peasant mobility was multi-directional in character i.e. "it consists to a great extent of opposing movements of individual households which cancel themselves out when analysis is confined to the study of the mobility as a whole. The net

mobility of a peasant society can be seen as the tip of an iceberg — the summary results of socio-economic changes of much greater magnitude" (Shanin, 1972: 74). Thus, both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies had contributed to the gross differentiation process in peasant society. He further noted that "the socio-economic position of a substantial numbers of Russian peasant households in the period studied fluctuated with a certain specific regularity. A peasant household, would for a time, rise in socio-economic terms with in the peasant community and then after reaching some peak undergo a decline. At a later stage the same household, having reached its lowest ebb, might again start to move upward and the whole cycle would recommence" (Shanin, 1972:76). He called this process as cyclical mobility.

2.1.3.1 Determinants of Peasant Mobility

According to Shanin, the important factors that determine peasant mobility are (i) Cumulation of economic advantages and disadvantages (ii) Land redivision (iii) Substantive changes (iv) Biological Determinants and (v) Random oscillations.

i. Cumulation of economic Advantages and Disadvantages: This factor implies that the larger the size and wealth of the household, greater are the opportunities for the accumulation and vice versa. A continuous cumulation of economic advantages and disadvantages would lead to polarization and eventually to centrifugal mobility.

ii. Land Redivision: Land redivision by village communes was a peculiar system specific to Russia. Shanin considered this as one of the important causes for centripetal mobility.

iii. Substantive Changes: This would imply 'transmutations of peasant households resulting in their appearance and disappearance with in the peasant communities' (Shanin: 1972:81). This term covers partitioning, extinction, merger and migration. While partitionings were common among richer households, the other sub-processes were common among poorer households. Thus the pulverizing effect of partitioning would be strong among wealthier strata and because of other factors substantial number of poor farmers would be constantly purged out. He therefore

concluded that substantive changes generated levelling tendencies and worked in a direction running counter to economic polarization.

iv. Biological Determinants: Shanin felt that biological determinants explained by Chayanov also accounted for peasant mobility in Russia. The demographic differentiation of old and new households in a given population cuts across economic differences and may lead to either centrifugal or centripetal trends and at the household level, to patterns approaching cyclical mobility. However, Shanin felt that evidence in support of these determinants was insufficient and hence attached a query to it while presenting his model.

v. Random oscillations: Random factors are "a form of multi-directional mobility generated by the idiosyncratic impact of general economic trends and chance factors on individual peasant households" (Shanin, 1972: 243). The above term covers factors like the nature, market and the state. The natural fluctuations of weather (timely and untimely rains) result in good and bad harvests. These fluctuations work through productivity and affect the agricultural surpluses of the peasant families enabling them to move either upward or downward. The impact of natural factors is reinforced by a relative rigidity in crop-rotation and may have also been associated with prevalent plant and livestock diseases. Market conditions such as terms of trade between rural and urban sectors, the availability of credit and wages of labour would influence the mobility of peasant households. State policies with regard to agriculture, such as land reforms, price policy would also influence the peasant mobility. The net impact of these factors on peasant mobility may vary from country to country depending on its development, technical advancement etc. Hence he admitted that the impact of random factors would have to remain hypothetical until further empirical studies can validate or invalidate it. He was also aware of the deficiency of Russian data on this aspect and was cautious enough to say "a comparative study of the peasantry in a developing society elsewhere in the world would seem to be the only way to clarify the issue" (Shanin, 1972: 115).

2.1.3.2. Critical Appraisal of Shanin's Model

With regard to determinants of peasant mobility objections were raised on substantive factors, biological life cycle and random factors.

Among the sub-processes of substantive changes, partitioning is the only factor, which clearly works for creation of centripetal tendencies. His proposition is that partitionings are common among wealthier peasant households and hence its pulverising effect would be more on that category. He put forward this proposition in order to buttress Chayanov's life cycle theory. But is it universally true that partitionings are common among wealthier households? Does partitioning create centripetal tendencies? We would deal with this question in the later part of this Chapter. But it should be interesting to note that even Lenin testified to the existence of larger families among the well-to-do strata of the peasantry. He felt that one of the reasons for the large size of the family was "the lesser desire of the well-to-do peasantry to divide up the land" (1972:94).

Random factors are important only in those countries which are backward in the field of science and technology. With the advancement of science and technology, man is able to overcome the limits imposed by the nature. The constraints and lags that nature imposes at times on cultivation and livestock are less bothersome in advanced countries. But the impact of these factors on peasant mobility in underdeveloped countries should not be ignored. With regard to biological life cycle theory of Chayanov, Shanin was less sure about its contribution to peasant mobility.

Population growth is one of the determinants of peasant mobility in the densely populated countries like India. As Lenski pointed out "in societies where there are not important new frontiers, either geographical or economic, surplus man power is usually driven downward in the class system in the direction of expendable class, which perform the unavoidable function of redressing the demographic balance" (Lenski, 1966: 290, cited in Schendel, 1979). There are other criticisms, which are not relevant here and hence we ignore them and proceed to studies on peasant mobility in South Asia.

II

2.2.0 Studies on Peasant Mobility in South Asia

Studies on peasant mobility in South Asia are few and far between. Studies on

differentiation and mobility of peasant households in this region were influenced by the Russian debate. However, the debate on mode of production^{2/} that took place in ^{the} seventies had over-shadowed the debates on peasant mobility. But there are a few studies which partially address themselves to the question of peasant mobility. Barring a couple of such studies, there was hardly any one which synthesises economic, sociological and anthropological aspects of peasant mobility. A brief review of these studies is in order.

2.2.1 Attwood (1979) had attempted to study peasant mobility in a village in western Maharashtra. Although, this village was famine stricken in earlier times, irrigation facilities were provided to the village in the late nineteenth century and by 1970, nearly 85 percent of total land was irrigated. He sought to collect data on land distribution at two points of time viz., 1920 and 1970. He formulated his hypothesis based on two well known positions — Marxian theory of impoverishment due to expropriation and exploitation by the rich and Malthusian theory of mass impoverishment due to population growth. Attwood had concluded that both upward and downward mobility took place in the village he studied. Some of the poor households, without land, moved up and became richer. Concentration of land in fewer hands had not taken place and in fact some of the rich had become poor. Although, the proportion of landless households in the village had increased, this could be explained mainly in terms of a large amount of immigration. He felt that many of these findings could be explained in terms of Malthusian theory of mass impoverishment. In other words Attwood comes to the conclusion that the Marxian theory of impoverishment fails to hold good in this village.

Attwood's study fails to capture the processes of alienation of land by big farmers and acquisition of land by small farmers. He had taken two time points i.e. 1920 and 1970 for his analysis but failed to trace the changes that took place in between them. Kudryavtsev (1981) pointed out that he had not explained the impact on land reforms on land distribution. Moreover, he did not bring the important variable in rural Indian life namely caste in the discussion. However, Attwood had not claimed that this village was representative as he

argued for similar studies to be carried out across different regions.

2.2.2 V.M. Rao (1972) had analysed the distribution of land and land transfers between 1956 and 1965 in 28 sample villages located in the Ryotwari regions of Maharashtra, where Attwood's survey village was situated. The results of Rao's study, in many cases, are similar to that of Attwood. The largest share of total area was bought by small holders, landless tenants, and other landless peasants (1972, A 137). The landlosers were larger land holders and the greatest share of the area sold belonged to them. He found out that the direction of land transfers were mainly towards cultivators, but not towards non-cultivating persons and usurers (A-140). The scope of the study, however, did not necessitate Rao to cover all other aspects of peasant mobility and hence, the study confined itself only to land transfers.

2.2.3 Willem Van Schendel (1979), a Dutch historian, had attempted to study peasant mobility in Bangladesh with the help of Shanin's theoretical framework.^{3/} He selected seven villages from three different geographical areas of Bangladesh, for an intensive study. Van Schendel observed that a combined process of polarization and pauperization was taking place in the three study areas. Between 83 to 93 percent of households in the study areas had experienced mobility since their inception. In three areas mostly downward mobility was recorded, but upward mobility for a small peasant was not an impossible dream. However, he felt that for a landless household, chances of an upward mobility were bleak and receding.

In a situation where there is less favourable land man ratio as a result of rapid population growth coupled with the absence of synchronised industrial development, pauperization is a likely possibility. This process would be hastened if there are low levels of agricultural productivity due to the absence of technological and institutional changes. There may be a levelling trend, if the economic decline of the poor is slower than that of the rich or mild polarization in the obverse case. But either way both poor and rich will decline in the absence of a strong countervailing force. This must have happened in

Bangladesh during the study period and Van Schendel therefore adds population growth as an important determinant for a large amount of mobility observed in Bangladesh.

He sought to reformulate Shanin's model by deleting land redivision, because it did not take place in that country. He felt that cumulation of economic advantages and disadvantages must have caused polarization of the peasantry. He dismissed Chayanovian life cycle by saying that "the impact of biological cycle is fragmented and limited and superceded by the impact of other determinants or peasant mobility (Schendel, 1979; 273). An important modification that Van Schendel made to Shanin's model is that the random factors are not random in their impact but act as systematically polarizing forces in rural Bangladesh. Among the sub-processes of substantive changes, partitioning accounted for large amount of mobility and all others are insignificant. He added one more factor, namely immigration, to the list of substantive changes.

2.2.4: Shergill (1985) examined why some farms grew while others declined in the Punjab. He criticised the two traditional approaches i.e. Leninist approach and Chayanovian approach, which try to explain the reasons for the gaining or losing of land. He criticised Leninist approach for "it draws conclusions about the past dynamics of farm size distribution from the current static picture of it" (Shergill, 1985: A 23). He developed an independent approach to study the causes for the growth or decay of the farms. He selected an equal number (30) of growing, decaying, and static farms and five characteristics of these farms. These characteristics are (i) economic structure (ii) resource endowments (iii) demographic characteristics (iv) adoption of new technology and intensity of input use and (v) economic performance. After a careful examination of these factors for all the farms he concluded that it is not the initial area owned by a family, as argued by the Marxists, that matters in economic competition and in determining its chances of gaining or losing land. He found out that these families differed little in area owned at the time of respective births as independent socio-economic units. He also rejected Chayanovian approach by saying that family size did not matter in gaining or losing land. He concluded that "it is the complex interplay of factors like growth

of family and male, adult members in it over time; size of owned land per male member at the time of birth of the household, education of male family farm workers, and their ability to adopt new technology quickly, employ large number of hired workers, attain high levels of economic efficiency and their success in keeping the growing family intact in a single extended unit that determine the chances of a peasant family gaining or losing land via the market" (Shevgil, 1985: A30).

Although, Shergil criticised Leninist approach for ignoring sociological factors in determining the distribution of land ownership, he has also committed the same mistake. Also he does not tell us the castes to which these decaying farms belong. After all, caste is an important factor which plays a crucial role in the acquisition of landed assets, education and in the adoption of new technology. Besides, he has not sufficiently examined about the factors that had led to the growth or decay of the farms over a time. More specifically, he does not explain the role of partitioning in the alienation of land in the decaying farms.

III

2.3.0 Analytical Issues

The foregoing review raises three major issues which are important to analyse land transfers and family formations in agrarian economies. These issues pertain to (i) Nucleated households and upward economic mobility (ii) Indicators of economic mobility (iii) Rates of partitioning across socio-economic categories. In this section we will examine these issues in detail.

2.3.1 Nucleated Young Households and Upward Economic Mobility

Chayanov argues that the increase in consumer-worker ratio in young families as a

result of increasing birth rate would force the working adults to work more to ease the consumption pressure. Consequently, it would lead to an upward economic mobility of the household as children reach the working age and start participating in farm activities. When the farm size has increased, a factor like partitioning would break it into various small units and these small units would experience the economic mobility. Now the question is, is it possible for young and poor households to experience upward mobility? The amount of land with which a young household begins is largely determined by social factors. "Whether a young household begins with a small patch of land or with a medium or large-size farm probably corresponds to the class position of the parents and the socially determined pattern of inheritance. Moreover, while a particular household may successfully struggle to defend its class position as, say, middle peasant and thus complete its life cycle in that category, most children that this household procreates^{and expels} are likely to initiate their own life cycles in other social categories, especially as semiproletarians and landless peasants in conditions of land scarcity" (Deere and Janvry, 1981; 341). Chayanov did not explain this point while explaining his model. Besides, this model is based on the assumption that land is freely available to the existing households as well as to the households who leave the parent units and start their own. As Chayanov himself admitted, this assumption is hardly realistic for densely populated countries, where land-man ratio is unfavourable and to that extent his model operates only under certain limitations.

The chances for a poor household to experience upward economic mobility are supposed to be bleak, because^{ee} they (i) face diminishing short-run returns and (ii) higher rents and lower yields on rented land than richer peasants, (iii) may obtain lower returns to non-farm work than middle and rich peasants and (iv) face relatively high prices for inputs and relatively low prices for the labour intensive products they produce" (Harrison, 1977; 134). As stated earlier, Van Schendel, while noting that upward mobility for small farmer is not an impossible dream, pointed out that for landless households chances for an upward economic mobility are bleak and receding (1979: 285-6). But some scholars do feel

that landless poor households experienced upward economic mobility (Rao, 1972: Attwood, 1979).

The chances for the poor to acquire land and other assets, however, depend upon the specificities of regions. In a dry zone, for instance, with favourable land-man ratio, deficient rainfall resulting in recurring droughts and out migration, land values oscillate at a lower level. This might allow even poor people to acquire a piece of land. Moreover, lack of caste rigidities also permit lower caste people to acquire land. Thus, the incidence of landlessness may be lower in such regions.

3.2 Indicators of Economic Mobility

In what terms the mobility of household should be expressed? Is it sufficient if we express mobility in terms of landed assets alone? Or, should we take other factors also in to our consideration? But the relevance of the above questions, to a great extent, depends upon the region in which one is studying peasant mobility. If it were to be a region where assured irrigation facilities exist and returns to land are certain, the farmers would be by and large investing their surpluses in land or related activities. Hence land may be a meaningful indicator of peasant mobility in these regions. But in a semi-arid zone where there are risks and uncertainties due to deficient rainfall and lack of assured irrigation facilities, the farmers would be reluctant to invest their surpluses in agriculture and related activities. (Mac Alpin, 1975). Land acquisitive ethos, which is a common phenomenon in irrigated areas, is at a lower level of intensity in semi-arid zones. Thus we find that significant chunk of agricultural surpluses in these regions are being invested in non-agricultural activities like money lending, mining, business etc. Moreover, the farmers in these regions devise their own insurance mechanisms to fight the scarcities and hunger in the event of drought or famine and they usually invest their surpluses in gold or silver, which can be liquified soon for consumption at different times (M.D. Morris, 1975: N.S. Jodha, 1975).

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Thus, expressing peasant mobility in terms of land in a semi-arid zone might not be sufficient and we need to take other factors also into account. In other words, one has to categorise the peasants on the basis of landed as well as non-landed assets. Viewed this way, the conclusions of Attwood and Rao, that upward mobility of small farmer households as well as landless was possible, have to be taken with some reservations. As pointed out by Krishnaji, upward mobility in the Marxian sense is a gradual sub-ordination of land to capital and not the movement of households from one size-class landholding to the next higher class^{4/} (Krishnaji 1979). Krishnaji ruled out such possibility i.e. landless households becoming rich as an unrealistic theoretical possibility (Krishnaji, 1980: A-43).

But categorisation of peasant households on the basis of information on non-landed assets is not free from problems. Also, one can find out even the information on the non-landed assets of the households for the current period of analysis. But one finds it difficult to elicit qualitative information about the households for an earlier period. Collection of data on ownership of land both at starting and various intermediate points is a less difficult task. That is why one usually takes land as the main, if not the sole, indicator of peasant mobility.

3.3 Rates of Partitioning Across Size Classes:

Among the determinants of peasant mobility, the category of substantive changes is important. Substantive changes consist of four sub-processes, namely, partitioning, migration, merger and extinction. Among these sub-processes, partitioning is important, since it generated considerable controversy and it accounted for ^omajor portion of mobility in various regions of South Asia (Van Schendel, 1979; K. Narayanan Nair, 1984).

Shanin's View: Shanin observed that "rates of partitioning correlated with the size and the wealth of peasant households. The pulverizing effect of partitioning was, therefore, strongest among the wealthier strata". (Shanin, 1972: 81). Hence, he considered that it is the only factor which clearly worked for the creation of centripetal tendencies among

wealthier households. The way it does so is also interesting. "It is a dominant tendency among large and wealthy farms, and if it is to result in downward social mobility, then it must be implied that large farms which break up lose indivisibilities and the co-ordination of labour, experiencing relative degradation of reproducible assets. Consequently, a limit is set to the development of capitalist enterprise and rich versus poor peasant class consciousness" (Harrison, 1977: 137) This way of looking at partitioning raises a number of questions. Is it universally true that partitionings are common among richer households? Does partitioning work for the creation of centripetal tendencies? Shanin's proposition has to be explained in terms of the specific peasant culture of Russian villages which attached social status only to senior male heads of household. Junior males could attain full status only through marriage and partitioning. Whatever the scanty data that we have on rates of partitioning do not support Shanin's proposition and in fact, with the help of Schendel's data one can question the very proposition itself.

In the villages studied by Schendel, the positive correlation between rates of partitioning and farm size, as pointed out by Shanin, is not clearly discernible. As much as 93 percent of poor households had partitioned during the period 1977-78 in Ghorshal and nearly 48 percent poor farmers had splitted in Goborgavi village between 1933 and 1977. However, the data on partitioning in Dhoneshor support Shanin's argument. Van schendel, therefore, argued that "far from being simply a determinant of levelling mobility in these villages, household splittings clearly contributed to polarizing trends as well" (1979, 264). He even noted that it was impossible to correlate partitioning with any particular economic category or with land ownership group, or number of adult males. The mobility of fragmented households, after partitioning, is difficult to predict. Therefore, he concluded that partitioning has contributed both to polarization and levelling tendencies.

Krishnaji's View: In this context, it would be interesting to see whether or not rates of partitioning are higher among rich households. Krishnaji argues that in

a peasant society, where capitalism is penetrating and where agricultural labourers and poor peasants are at one extreme and rich peasants and capitalist farmers at the other, the rates of partitioning would be higher among the former category than the latter. The agricultural labourers and poor peasants are usually involved in the market as sellers of labour power and buyers of wage goods and only to a limited extent as sellers of agricultural produce (Krishnaji, 1980; A-38). Since the labour market is characterised by a high degree of unemployment and there is uncertainty in finding work especially in the lean seasons, it may not confer any special advantage to a joint family and hence make intra-family income sharing difficult for these families. Since their participation as sellers of agricultural produce is limited, no gains would accrue to undivided households at the time of purchase of commodities. Thus, there are no economic forces which arrest partitioning among those households. Moreover, low levels of expectation of life among these households induce a faster than average time rate of reproduction (of households), which is realised through early marriage and which in turn induces them to split from the parental household (Krishnaji, 1980: A-38).

On the other hand, rich peasant and capitalist farmer households, whose economic activity is diversified and whose work is essentially supervisory in nature and is associated with not only cultivation but also the processing and marketing of produce, do not find any incentive to split the property. And in fact joint family is an added advantage to such families since their involvement in trade and transport confers economic advantage in buying (of inputs) and selling (of output). "What is important in this context is not merely the relationship between 'cumulation of economic advantage' based on land ownership and accumulation which is external to the household but also the diversification of economic activity within the household itself" (*ibid.*). Krishnaji gave salary earnings as an example to such diversification. Then, he hypothesised that 'rates of partitioning will be high among agricultural labourers and poor peasant households and low among rich peasant and capitalist farmer households' (*ibid.*). Since middle peasantry is not a homogeneous category

as far as market involvement is concerned and it contains some who resemble small peasants and some who resemble rich peasants, he expected that rates of partitioning among middle peasants to lie between those of rich and poor peasants.

Conclusion :

In this chapter, we have examined the origin and development of the debate on peasant mobility in Russia and South Asia and brought out the important analytical issues that are relevant for the study of land transfers and family formations. These issues will be examined further with the help of data as collected from the village level study, which is discussed in subsequent chapters. As a prelude to this, in the next chapter, we will develop an analytical framework for studying land transfers.

Notes and References

1. Though Chayanov defined family labour farms as those which rely basically on family labour in their production activity, they may sometimes employ hired labour without affecting the significance of family labour. Such farms are defined as 'half-labour' farms.
2. This debate is summarised in Sudhakara Reddy B.K(1984) Thorner, Alice (1982a, b, c)
3. He purposefully opted for a study of the relatively unknown peasantry of Bangladesh as he felt that the peasant society here is different from that of Pre-1917 Russia. Moreover, there are differences in political rule, density of population (land-man ratio) and socio-economic institutions. Van Schendel, hoped that a study on peasant mobility in a poor country like Bangladesh would provide illuminating insights into the extent to which local differences influence peasant-mobility and shed some light on the concept of 'gen tric' nature of peasantry itself (Van Schendel, 1979; 19)
4. Lenin made a distinction between these two, i.e. social differentiation and simple differentiation. He called the process of formation of two essential classes of capitalism i.e. proletariat and bourgeoisie as social differentiation, while simple differentiation indicates only inequality in land holdings.

CHAPTER 3

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING LAND TRANSFERS

3.0 Introduction

Historical analyses of land transfers have to be conducted in terms of land tenure, tax burden on the cultivators, cropping pattern, irrigation, yield, land-man ratio, the relative bargaining position of land owners, tenants and labourers in the land lease and labour markets and above all the land acquisitive ethos of the different socio-economic groups in the rural areas. Land transfers, thus, are a product of the mutual interaction of these variables. The relative strengths of the concerned variables however are a function of the specificities of the regions under study. For instance, in an irrigated zone certainty of yield, soil fertility and a faster growth of population would result in a heavy pressure on cultivated land thereby leading to stronger bargaining power of the land owners and creditors vis-a-vis tenants, labourers and borrowers. It will have its impact on agrarian structure through land transfers. But in a semi-arid zone which is devoid of economic infrastructure-especially irrigation -- factors like risk and uncertainty in the crop yield might pave the way for shortages, droughts and famines. This would in turn have its impact on the density of population, land-man ratio and the relative bargaining positions of the rural groups with varying degrees of access to land as also their acquisitive ethos. The main objective of this chapter is to develop a conceptual framework, by taking the variables listed above. To begin with, in Section I we will outline a general framework for analysing land transfers. Subsequently, in Section II, the role of regional specificities in the process of land transfers is briefly discussed.

3.1 General Framework

Let us start with land tenure as a variable affecting land transfers. Land tenure systems would be greatly affected by the specific policies pursued by the governments at different points of time. In the colonial context this was all the more true. During the British rule — both under East India Company and later under the crown — the policies pursued by the respective governments left their deep impact on the agrarian structure in general and land transfers in particular. British India witnessed three major types of land tenure viz. Permanent Zamindari Settlement, Inamdari Settlement and Ryotwari Settlement. Although, all the three settlements were prevalent in some degree or other in all parts of Andhra at the beginning of 19th century, Permanent Zamindari Settlement was most prominent in Coastal Andhra while in Rayalaseema region it was the Ryotwari Settlement.^{1/}

Under the Ryotwari Settlement of land tenure cultivators were given pattas or title-deeds on their lands. The Settlement was "an agreement made by the government immediately with the Ryots or cultivators of land to the complete exclusion of intermediaries" (Nilmani Mukherjee, 1962: XIII). In theory what was sought to be legalised and institutionalised was peasant proprietorship involving a direct relationship between the owner cultivator and the government. But in practice it did not prevent either tenancy or inequitable distribution of landholdings in the village. For after all, the Ryotwari System of 1800 did not involve redistribution of land. All it did was to accept the then existing structure of land distribution and determine revenue according to a "fixed valuation of soil in each field, supply of water, proximity to market and other local circumstances.... (T)he amount of revenue realised annually varied according to conditions affecting crop and each year" (Nilmani Mukherjee, Robert Eric Frykenberg, 1969; 219)

As the direct relationship between the cultivator and the government was not to the exclusion of either tenancy or inequitable distribution of land holdings, the village elite who invariably came from the upper castes had a greater say in matters affecting land acquisition, control and transfers. In the non-Inamdari or non-Agraharam villages, it was the

dominant cultivating castes who had an unquestionable sway over land control. The other communities in the village had to play only a subordinate role in the rural areas. In any case, in conformity with the dictates of the political economy the best lands in the village were cornered by the socially powerful groups, while others had to subsist on less fertile lands and/or lands located at a distance from the village.

More often than not, colonial regimes imposed a heavy burden on the cultivators -- both in the Permanent Zamindari and Ryotwari areas.^{3/} This was especially so in areas where cash crops so called like cotton indigo and others were grown. The phenomena of heavy taxation and involuntary growth of commercial agriculture were mutually reinforcing. While the absence of irrigation and prevalent soil types imposed constraints on the cultivators' choice of crop-mix, the very fact that taxation was heavy in the Ryotwari areas (like Rayalaseema) which incidentally were also more suited to the growth of cash crops like cotton and indigo would compel the farmers, both big and small, to grow commercial crops to meet their cash requirements. However, if the monsoon is erratic, which often it is in the dry districts in South India, agricultural yield becomes uncertain and small and middle farmers would get caught in the debt-traps laid by the big farmer/merchant creditors. In practice whether land-transfers from the small to the big farmers would actually take place or not would depend a great deal upon the calculus of the creditors on the viability, profitability and political feasibility of extended holdings. Notwithstanding the uncertainty of rainfall in the regions, if the big land owner /merchant feels that the cultivation of the additional fields is possible as there are enough wage-labourers available in the region, he might be ready to acquire the lands of the indebted farmers and cultivate them with the help of wage-labourers. On the other hand, if he visualises shortage of working hands, he might resort to leasing out these additionally acquired lands to the small farmers or land-less tenants. In any-case, land control of the big farmers/merchants would be greatly strengthened.

The above would be to a large extent influenced by density of population. The larger the density of population, lower would be the land-man ratio. While in the irrigated

zone crops are relatively assured and, either because of natural increase in population or influx of immigrants from the less developed areas of the neighbourhood, there would be higher density of population, lower land-man ratio and an intense 'competition' among the tenants and labourers in the land-lease markets and labour markets, respectively. Such situations are more advantageous for the big land owners as they have an upper hand in these markets. While rents could be hiked up, agricultural wages might be kept at lower level. There would be equally intense competition in the land market and land values would be higher and increase at a faster rate. As land becomes a prized asset assuring a regular income, land control assumes greater significance here compared to the dry region.

But in the dry areas where rainfall is erratic and uncertain and state plays a minimal role in providing the economic infrastructure, droughts and famines often claim a death toll, and out-migration of labourers, marginal and small farmers with their livestock to the relatively more protected areas is a common phenomenon in times of scarcity and the scope for manoeuvrability of the big-farmer/merchant creditors to acquire the lands of the small and marginal farmers is limited. In a region where there is low density of population, high land-man ratio with low quantum of draught animal stock per acre, as also the availability of cultivable waste lands, the creditors had to operate under the constraints of shortage of working hands, less competition in the lease markets and a cushioning provided by the possibility of bringing the waste lands under plough by the small farmers and labourers. To reiterate the argument, less competition in the land lease market, shortage of working hands and availability of culturable wastes, would to a certain extent, inhibit the land acquisitive ethos of the big-farmer/merchant. This would in turn affect the concentration of land ownership in the rural areas. It is possible that in an irrigated area compared to the dry region, both inequitable distribution of land as well as its concentration would proceed at a faster rate. This is due to the fact that in the irrigated zone land, labour, credit and product markets would be activated at a faster rate and there would be an overall dynamism in agriculture (G.N. Rao, 1985). Contrasted to this, in the dry region, notwithstanding the fact that the colonial regimes provided rail-transport in these cotton-growing regions much earlier (1866)

than the irrigated areas (1891), the overall absence of dynamism in agriculture left the land, labour and credit markets comparatively less activated*

II

Regional Specificities

Besides the general framework described above, certain specificities of a village or a smaller segment of a region would leave their impact on the question of land transfers. In villages or areas where historically the non-cultivating upper caste like Brahmins or Kshatriyas own a larger chunk of the cultivated areas, increasing pace of urbanization and spread of education make these communities gradually lose interest in agriculture thereby providing scope for the remaining dominant cultivating castes like Reddies (in Rayalaseema) and Kammas (in coastal Andhra) to chip in and fill the vacuum created by the outmigrating upper castes. In other words, balance of power would gradually shift in favour of the resident dominant cultivating castes through land transfers in their favour. However, where the State steps in to regulate the land transfers or at least affect agrarian structure, however half-heartedly, through land reforms this process of shift of power in favour of resident dominant cultivating castes would encounter hurdles. They have to devise ingenious methods to beat the legal system, to the extent it is possible. Where law and demographic factors impose further constraints on the manipulative capacity of the dominant and land acquisitive cultivating castes it is the less dominant cultivating castes/groups which would emerge as the new dynamic groups. Their ability to acquire land control would be further strengthened where, like a semi-arid zone, culturable wastes are available. While the dominant castes gradually lose interest in acquiring further additions to their land holdings, either because of out-migration of working hands or other constraints in the land-lease and labour markets, the existing cultivable wastes would be found attractive by the less dominant cultivating castes. If there are no political or legal hurdles facing the intermediate castes to bring these lands

* For a schematic representation of processes of land transfers in both semi-arid zone and irrigated zone See Appendices I & II at the end of the Chapter.

under plough, it would further impose constraints on the resident dominant cultivating castes to lay claims on the cultivable wastes and extend their ownership holdings. Thus, even before the intervention of the State with land reform legislation i.e. prior to 1956 the upper segments of the cultivators were constrained to limit their ownership holdings. And with the advent of land reforms, further acquisition of land by these people became all the more unattractive. Their investible surpluses had to seek outlets not in landed assets but in avenues outside agriculture.

As for the intermediate castes below the dominant cultivating caste categories like Yadavas and Gonds in Rayalaseema region, since they start with a relatively low land base there is larger scope for them to operate both as land-leasers as well as land-buyers. If there are only a few leakages from their family income by way of expenses towards social ceremonies and education of their children, their investible surpluses keep accumulating and their primary concern becomes acquisition of more and more landed assets.^{4/}


Land Reforms are generally ineffective in providing relief to the tenants or alter the distribution of land. But in exceptional cases where excess lands over the ceiling are distributed to the members of the depressed community, the bargaining position of these cultivators-cum-labourers would be strengthened. Besides, if non-agricultural employment opportunities are also made available, it would set these people on motion to become marginal and small cultivators.

Conclusion


Thus, all in all, the relative position and power of the socio-economic groups in the country side is product of historical and contemporary forces. While the historical forces would set the pace and direction of land transfers, the variations in the movement of land transfers at any point of time would be affected by the dominant contemporary forces. In this process the relative balance of economic power would change, bringing about significant changes in the socio-political power of the rural groups. Land transfers thus act as catalytic agents in bringing about the sweeping changes in the country side. It should, however, be noted that land transfers thus are affected not only by the socio-cultural and legal factors emanating both from within and outside agriculture.

Appendix I

Land Transfers in Semi-arid Zone



Appendix II

Land Transfers in the Irrigated Zone

Notes and References

1. Punganur, Karvetinagaram, ^{and} Banaganapalle were some of the prominent Zamindaris of Rayalaseema. For a functioning of the Punganur Zamindary See K.S.S.Seshan (1984). Tenurial Structure in an Andhra Zamindari: PUNGANUR
2. For an understanding of the functioning of the Ryotwari Settlement in Rayalaseema, See Nilmani Mukherjee (1962) The Ryotwari System in Madras 1792-1827
3. Comparatively the Inamdari villages were lightly taxed. For a discussion on tax burden in coastal Andhra See G.N. Rao (1973). Changing Conditions and Growth of Agricultural Economy in the Krishna and Godavari Districts: 1840-1890.
4. In Coastal Andhra balance of power has been slowly changing among different castes. The agriculturally dynamic ^{castes like} kamma^s are gradually looking for avenues of investment outside agriculture, thus giving scope for the hitherto less dominant communities like Kapus, Goudas and yadavas to acquire landed assets. For a historical account of land control in coastal Andhra See G.N. Rao, Dimensions of Land Control in Coastal Andhra; A historical View, A.P. Economic Association, Conference papers, March 1984.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

4.0 Introduction

As we discussed in the previous chapter, our approach to the study of land transfers and family formations is partly historical and partly contemporary. This in turn requires not only the collection and analysis of historical data on land transfers, but also the linking of the historical changes with the current status of village households. Such an analysis is carried out for the village under study with the help of secondary data available from village records and primary data collected through a sample survey. The sources and limitations of the secondary data, the methodology employed in the collection of primary data, and the procedure for the regeneration of land distribution for earlier years based on the survey data are briefly discussed in this chapter.

4.1 Sources and Limitations of Secondary Data:

In order to analyse land transfers in the village in a historical perspective, we have made use of the Report of the Village Resettlement Survey (1891), Karnam Account (1948) and Record of Rights (1982). The data on ownership holdings available from these sources are fairly reliable. The reasons for this are following:

- i. Prior to Resettlement Survey of 1891, Government received reports to the effect that in Madras Presidency there was large scale evasion of

land revenue payments due to the collusion between the rich and dominant cultivators and the village revenue officials (Dharma Kumar, 1979; 231). In order to prevent evasion of land revenue the resettlement that was usually carried out once in 30 years was sought to be made rigorous for 1891.

ii. Regarding the accounts (1948) of the village karnam, it was a practice in these villages that when the karnikam (office of the village accountant) changed hands the new incumbent would thoroughly check up the data on landownership to his utmost satisfaction and rewrite the village land revenue accounts bringing them upto date. And karnikam did change hands in 1948 in the Village. Hence, these accounts can be taken as fairly accurate.

iii. As far as the 1982 data are concerned, since the Record of Rights for this year was specifically designed to revise and bring up-to-date the data on ownership holding of individual households, the revenue administration had taken utmost care to record the exact extent of land under each owner. Therefore, we have no reason to doubt the reliability of these data.

In order to study the process of land transfers the above data were supplemented with the information on tenancy, movement of prices, acquisitive ethos of different castes and their mobility, out-migration of land owners, cropping pattern etc.

4.2 Collection of Primary Data

In order to study the interaction between land transfers and family formations, we have conducted a sample survey in the village. The survey was conducted during the months of May and from August to October 1984. The details of the sampling procedure used in this survey, the type of information collected, and its reliability etc. are given below.

4.2.1 Selection of Households

The whole survey was divided into two phases. In Phase I, we have conducted a

door-to-door census of all the households in the village and collected basic information on land owned, land leased out, land leased in, caste, occupation and age of the head of the household. On the basis of this information we have classified households according to caste and land owned by them. The distribution is given in table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Classification of Households according to Caste and Size Class of Land holding in the Village

Size Class of land-holding (acres)	Caste of the household	Upper Castes	Yadava	Valmiki	Harijan	Artisan castes	Minority religions	All Castes
0		3	5	29	15	2	14	68
0 - 5		6	41	79	91	21	18	256
5 -20		23	61	55	20	15	12	186
20 -40		15	16	13	2	1	5	52
40 +		19	5	5	Nil	Nil	Nil	29
All Classes		66	128	181	128	39	49	591

Source : Village census conducted by the author in May, 1984.

In the second phase of the survey we have made adjustments to the distribution of households given in Table 4.2. This adjustment was done taking into consideration the following facts.

- i. A household is usually defined either in terms of 'Consumption Unit' or 'Production Unit'. For instance, if it is defined in terms of consumption unit a household

will constitute of all those members who eat from the same kitchen and live under the same roof. On the otherhand, if it is defined in terms of production unit a household will constitute of all those members who jointly cultivate the land or participate in business or trade and share the produce or profit. However, these definitions might not hold good under all circumstances. For example, two households living under one roof, may take food from two different kitchens. Moreover, it is not uncommon to find nucleated households maintaining relations with either parent family or collaterals as far as cultivation of land is concerned. In the context of studying land transfers we propose to define a household a little broadly. In this village most of the households are identical in terms of production and consumption unit. However, there are some households which had parted only in terms of consumption unit, but still retain property rights to the land holding of the parent household and do not share either produce or the cultivation expenses. In such cases, we have taken them as two households.

ii. During the survey, we discovered that some of the respondents -- especially from Harijan Caste -- had under-reported the extent of their ownership holdings. This was due to the fact that the government of Andhra Pradesh had, around this time, launched a welfare scheme under which all those families owning less than five acres of land were to be supplied with rice at subsidized rates. As we approached the Harijan families for purpose of the census, fearing that they would cease to be beneficiaries under this welfare scheme if they were to report truthfully, they had underreported their ownership holdings. Secondly, some Harijans were given surplus land by the government. But all the members might not have got the land. Hence, a member (brother or son of the head of the household) in the household, hoping to get a piece of land for himself, had given the information that he was landless. But when we visited the household it was found out that all the members were living together. However, we could rectify this under-reporting.

The distribution of households taking into account our definition of a household

and correction for the under-reporting of the owned land is given in Table 4.2. From 591 households in the village, we have drawn a stratified sample of 66 households for detailed enquiry by using simple random sampling. The size of the sample number of households selected for detailed enquiry is also given in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Adjusted Classification of Households according to Caste and Size Class of Landholding

Size class of land holding (acres)	Caste of the household	Upper Castes	Yadava	Valmiki	Harijan	Artisan Castes	Minority religions	All Castes
0		Nil	3 (1)	10 (1)	Nil	2 (1)	14 (3)	29 (6)
0 - 5		9 (2)	43 (4)	89 (4)	98 (5)	21 (3)	22 (4)	282 (22)
5 -20		23(3)	61 (2)	38 (2)	28 (5)	15 (2)	8 (2)	173 (16)
20 -40		5(1)	16 (3)	30 (4)	2 (2)	1 (1)	5 (1)	59 (12)
40+		29(5)	5 (2)	14 (3)	Nil	Nil	Nil	48 (10)
All Classes		66(11)	128(12)	181 (14)	128(12)	39 (7)	49 (10)	591 (66)

Note: Figures in brackets indicate the number of sample households

Source: Village census conducted by the author in May, 1984.


4.3.0 Nature and Reliability of the Data

From these households, we collected information on land transfers — through sale, purchase, partition and governmental intervention, land lease particulars, mortgage of land and demographic particulars for 36 years prior to 1984. We have collected information on liability, wealth of households — which includes houses, gold, livestock, durable consumer goods and deposits in commercial banks — sources of income and household enterprises for current period i.e. for the year 1984.

In order to enhance the quality of the data collected we cross-checked the data from our individual respondents with other elders in the village and also with the information available in the Sub-Registrar's Office and village Revenue Office. The fact that the author of this study himself is a native of the village helped very much in doing all these verifications. Our cross-checking had shown that the information furnished by the respondents were fairly accurate.

4.4 Regeneration of Land Distribution in the Past

Agricultural households are amenable for being studied historically. This is precisely what we did in our survey. For each of the 66 sample households (existing in 1984) we traced back the history of each household and reconstructed its line of descent from the past to the present (1948 to 1984). This can be described clearly as follows:



In the diagram above, B2 is one of the sample households. On the basis of information collected, we reconstructed the evolution of this household, which is exhibited in the above diagram. In 1948, household X owned 18 acres of land. It broke into three households (i.e. A, B, C) in 1949. While household A inherited 8 acres, households B and

C inherited 5 acres of land each. Household A, which acquired 40 acres of land by 1984, did not split during the period 1949-1984. Household B, which acquired 16.5 acres of land by 1961, broke into two households (i.e. B₁ and B₂) in 1962. While B₁ had acquired 8 acres of land, B₂ had acquired only 5 acres. These households did not break in the subsequent period. The land holding of household C was 15 acres in 1961, but by 1974 it became 9 acres. This household had partitioned into three units (i.e., C1, C2 and C3), each household inheriting 3 acres of land.

While tracing back the history of landholding, we have taken it only in legal sense. It includes only land owned and excludes lands leased in and/or held on temporary mortgage from other families. When land holding is divided only nominally, i.e., on paper but not effectively, the holding is taken as one entity. Moreover, we will not include the land holding owned by collaterals. To give an example, for the purpose of estimation and analysis of land distribution, we have used only the history of landownership of B₂ (in above case) and information on partitioning along its line of descent.

Using the histories of land ownership of the sample households, we estimated land distribution for the years 1984, 1974, 1961, 1956 and 1948. The rationale behind the selection of these time points was the division of the whole period into three sub-periods. i. Period of Land Reforms (1948-1961) ii. Period of Decline in the levels of economic activity (1961-1974) and iii. Period of Revival in the levels of economic activity (1974-84). This periodization is further explained in Chapter 6. The methodology of regeneration of land distribution from the survey data is given in the Appendix to this chapter.

Since we have data on land ownership position at the village level for the year 1948 (karnam account), it provides a scope for cross checking the validity of the method adopted. It is interesting to note that the estimates of the proportion of households in each size class, their share in the total land and their average land (obtained through

Table 4.3: Comparison of Distributions of Land Ownership based on Official Data and Regenerated Data (1948)

Size Class of the land holding (in acres)	Land Distribution based on official data			Regenerated land distribution based on Survey date		
	Percentage of household	Share in total land	Average land (acres)	Percentage of household	Share in total land	Average land (acres)
0	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
0 - 5	26.2	3.5	2.6	27.59	5.0	3.76
5 - 20	44.63	25.73	10.96	46.90	22.0	10.08
20+	29.17	70.77	50.41	25.51	73.0	61.55
All Classes	100.00	100.00	20.48	100.00	100.0	15.52

Sources: 1. Karnam account of the village, 1948.

2. Survey data.

regeneration of land distribution) compare very closely with those of the official estimates (See Table 4.3).

Appendix IRegeneration of Land Distribution based on Survey Data

We have a two-way stratified (caste and size of land ownership holding) random sample of households existing in 1984. On the basis of this sample we estimated the caste-wise land holding distributions of 1984 and also the overall (pooled over castes) land distribution.

Now, for each of these sample households we have its land ownership holding at time points 1974, 1961, 1956 and 1948. Thus, we can estimate the caste-wise backward transition probabilities from one land holding size class to another, for the periods 1984 to 1974, 1974 to 1961, 1961 to 1956 and 1956 to 1948. On the basis of these caste-wise transition probability matrices for the different periods, we can estimate the land distributions at time points 1974, 1961, 1956 and 1948, for each caste, starting with the estimated land distribution of 1984.

Let us consider the period 1984 to 1974, for a given caste. Let

n_{ij} = Number of sample households which are in land size class i in 1984 and in class j in 1974.

P_{ij} = Estimated proportion of households which are in land size class i in 1984 and in size class j in 1974.

By our estimation procedure

$$P_{ij} = \frac{n_{ij}}{n_{i\cdot}} \quad \text{where } n_{i\cdot} = \sum_j n_{ij}$$

Let $P_{i\cdot}$ = Proportion of households in size class i in 1984.

Let $P_{\cdot j} = \sum_i (P_{i\cdot} \times P_{ij})$
 $P_{\cdot j}$'s give us land distribution in 1974

In order to estimate the size class-wise average land ownership and the share distribution of the land ownership in 1974, we have followed a procedure stated below.

Let \bar{x}_{ij} = Average Land ownership of the n_{ij} sample households

$\bar{x}_{.j}$ = Estimate of average land ownership of size class j in 1974.

Taking \bar{x}_{ij} as the estimate of the average land ownership in 1974 of the households which are in size class i in 1984 and class j in 1974, we have

$$\bar{x}_{.j} = \sum_k P_i \cdot P_{ij} \cdot \bar{x}_{ij} / P_{.j}$$


Share in land of j^{th} size class in 1974

$$= \frac{P_{.j} \times \bar{x}_{.j}}{\sum_j P_{.j} \times \bar{x}_{.j}}$$

Name of the Taluk	Area		Number of Villages		Number of Towns
	Sq. Kms	Sq. Miles	Inhabited	Un-inhabited	
ALUR	1,588.7	613.4	94	Nil	Nil



ANDHRA PRADESH
ALUR TALUK
KURNOOL DISTRICT

ADONI TALUK



- State Boundary
- - - District Boundary
- Taluk Boundary
- 6 - Village Boundary with Location Code Number
- ⊙ Taluk Headquarters
- MOLAGA VALLI** Names of All Large Villages with Minimum Population of 5,000 with Location Site
- R.S. Railway Broad Gauge
- SH Railway Metre Gauge
- SH State Highways
- Other Roads
- River
- Symbolic Representation of Villages: 5,000 and above Persons
- " " 1,000 to 4,999 Persons
- ▲ " " 500 to 999 Persons
- " " 200 to 499 Persons
- " " Less than 200 Persons
- PO TO Post Offices, Telegraph Office
- PS Police Stations
- RH Rest House, Travellers' Bungalow
- ⊕ Hospitals, Primary Health Centres, Dispensaries, Child and Maternity Welfare Centres

Village Under Study



CHAPTER 5

CHANGES IN LAND DISTRIBUTION IN THE VILLAGE

5.0 Introduction

In the agrarian economies a given pattern of land control or more specifically land ownership and changes thereof in the subsequent period would vitally affect the relative position of the socio-economic groups. The changes in land ownership are a product of several factors such as socio-legal institutions, cropping pattern, fluctuations in the product, labour and credit markets, quantum of land available for cultivation, acquisitive ethos of the economically homogeneous groups or caste categories etc.

It is often stated by the critics of British rule in India that the structural changes carried out in the domain of property relations, heavy land revenue demand that was imposed and unfavourable product and credit markets tilted the economic balance against the independent peasant proprietors thereby resulting in an increase in the concentration of land ownership in the hands of rural oligarchies. In other words, as the process of commercialization of agriculture got intensified changes taking place in the product, credit and labour markets enabled the oligopolistic groups in the land and credit markets to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the other sections of the rural society.

While the main thrust of such an argument is acceptable at a general level, attempts at its empirical validation have not been found to be too many. Such a rare exercise has been made by Dharma Kumar (1979) for Madras Presidency. According to her barring a few districts like Ganjam, Krishna, South Arcot, Tanjore there was no concentration of land holdings between 1853 and 1946-47 in the erstwhile Madras Presidency. Incidentally, it is interesting

to note that both Tanjore and Krishna districts possessed large tracts of land under the canal system. Even in Ganjam, tank irrigation was quite significant.^{1/} While this might lead one to infer that assured irrigation enhances productivity of land leading to food surpluses, the rate of growth of population might be higher in these areas partly due to the large scale in-migration.^{2/} This would not only lead to a progressive decline in the per-capita net cultivated land, but also to a gradual increase in land values and intense competition among buyers in the land market (Sayana, 1952; 14-15). A slump in the product prices and vagaries in credit market leave the vulnerable sections of the peasantry pauperized leading to a concentration of land ownership.

While this may be a possible explanation for changes in the land distribution in the irrigated tracts, what factors make the concentration of land ownership less possible in the purely rainfed areas such as Rayalaseema in Andhra Pradesh? To ask however a more fundamental question, what had happened to the land distribution in the semi-arid zone which happened to have witnessed the growth of commercial agriculture from almost the beginning of the 19th century. According^{to} Dharmakumar's analysis at a district level such a concentration of land ownership had not taken place in the Rayalaseema region between mid 19th to mid 20th centuries. Bruce Robert (1983) also felt that concentration of land holdings had not taken place in Bellary district during the period 1890-91 and 1945-46 (64-66).

Our concern in this exercise however is not with the entire Rayalaseema region but only with a village in Kurnool district. Hence the inferences that Dharma Kumar drew for the Presidency at the level of districts are strictly speaking not comparable with our own, based as they are, on a single village. Dharma Kumar and Bruce Robert made an extensive use of patta data and carried out a detailed analysis of concentration of land ownership. It was a pioneering attempt which threw up a number of insights into the functioning of the agrarian economy of Madras Presidency.

Such macro level studies help us to appreciate better the broad contours of the dynamics in the rural society. However, they have to be supplemented with micro level studies which,

notwithstanding their limitations for generalizations, help us to obtain certain insights into the relative mobility of socio-economic groups in the rural economy. For instance, their rise and fall in the villages in terms of land ownership can not be captured with an analysis of patta data alone. As a matter of fact the use of patta data, although inevitable for a district level analysis, is not free from criticisms. (Mihir Shah, 1984: 136). It has been pointed out that "agrarian differentiation can only be adequately measured in terms of differences in scale of production which is not fully reflected in acreage ...(and) ... patta data refer only to ownership holdings..." (ibid). However valid this criticism might be, in a historical time span, measurement of agrarian differentiation without an analysis of ownership holdings is a difficult task. Admittedly, results based on an analysis of ownership holdings, have to be supplemented at least with qualitative information on tenancy, product prices, weather, socio-legal institutions and the like to obtain a fuller picture of land distribution.

As we pointed earlier, for the analysis of land transfers in a historical perspective we depend on the Report of the village Resettlement Survey (1891), data provided by the karnam and Record of Rights (1982). Admittedly, we still could not altogether avoid the potential criticism that acreage might not reflect the differences in the scale of production. But with our intimate knowledge of the village^{3/} as also a detailed sample survey that we carried out, we could get qualitative information. This extra information, it is hoped, would provide helpful complementarities to the quantitative data on ownership holdings.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In Section 1, we will give a brief background of study area i.e. Rayalaseema. In Section 2, we will analyse the changes in the concentration of landownership in the village during the period, 1891-1948.

I

5.1.0 An Economic Background of the Study Area

The village selected for an intensive study is presently in the Alur taluk of

Kurnool district of Andhra Pradesh. Prior to the first phase of the States' Reorganisation in 1953, the village was with the Bellary district of the erstwhile Madras Presidency. Barring the language spoken in Bellary (which is Kannada) there are any number of similarities in climate, soil, occurrence of food shortage, cropping pattern, land-man ratio etc. between Bellary and the four districts of Rayalaseema region viz. Kurnool, Cuddapah, Anantapur and Chittoor. Being in the semi-arid zone these districts presented significant elements of homogeneity. Present day Rayalaseema districts of Kurnool, Cuddapah, Anantapur and Bellary district of Karnataka were ceded to the East India Company by the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1800.^{4/} Soon after the acquisition of these districts the Company introduced Ryotwari Settlement.

5.1.1. The Ryotwari Settlement and its impact on the Economy

Ryotwari Settlement, was "a settlement made by the Government immediately with ryots or cultivators to the exclusion of intermediaries"^{5/} Under this settlement/^{the} government usually received its dues in the form of a money assessment fixed on the land under cultivation. Not being a pecuniary commutation for its share of the produce the assessment varied according to each year's produce. The ryotwari assessments were generally very heavy,^{6/} especially under the old system in ceded districts and this remained as a persistent evil in the first half of the 19th century. ^{7/} Agricultural development was hampered and "most of the farmers were, if not annual bankrupts, atleast annual applicants for remission". Among the Ceded districts this land tenure had affected the Bellary district most. Although the fine quality of black soil was available in plenty, the farmers used to abandon it. "In the taluk of Gooty no less than 24,751 acres of black land assessed at cantorary Pagodas 16406 (at c. pagodas 2-1-8 to cfs 10 per acre) had been abandoned and not an acre of black land had been newly occupied in the taluk. In lieu of it, red land chiefly had been occupied and such fields were assessed at one fanam or under per acre" (Nilmani Mukherjee, 1962; 269). Similar reports of abandonment were received from all parts of the district. The abandonment of rich black soil fields, which were often

near to the village, and occupation of red (inferior) soil had not only increased the cost of cultivation and supervision problems but also led to less agricultural production. The Collector felt that over assessment was the most important factor causing depression. Unambiguously he stated that "It is the system of field assessment which had caused this evil" (Nilmani Mukherjee, 1962: 271)

5.1.2 Frequent Crop Failures

Another significant factor of the Region's economy was frequent crop failures and consequent shortages and even famines. There were scarcities in 1802-04, 1805-07, 1824, 1884-85 and 1900 and famines in 1833, 1854, 1866, 1876-78, 1884-85, 1891-92 and 1896-97. In other words, except the second and fifth decades of 19th century, every other decade had experienced widespread droughts or famines. The debilitating impact of these droughts and famines in the already precariously poised economy of the backward region needs hardly to be emphasised. Besides, these famines had severely affected the growth of population and more so in Bellary district. Among these famines, the 1876-78 famine was considered to be great and severe in its intensity. "Bellary district suffered more terribly in this visitation than any other district in this Presidency. It was calculated that in those two years more than two fifths of its inhabitants (3,30,000 souls) died of starvation or disease (Francis, 1904: 130). The decade 1890's can be called the decade of famines, since two famines and one scarcity had occurred in this area. From these two famines, however, little or insignificant human mortality had occurred, although cholera and morbidity did cause some deaths. On the whole, the population growth had been slow or insignificant in the Ceded districts in general, in Bellary district in particular. "At the Census of 1891, fourteen years after the famine (of 1876-78) the population of (Bellary) district as a whole continued to be smaller than it had been in 1871 and even by 1901 the total increase in the thirty years since 1871 had amounted to only 4 percent" (Francis, 1904: 130).

Low Density of Population

The growth on population was severely hit by the famines and mass outmigration. Although significant outmigration used to take place from these districts to Mysore and Bombay, their gain by immigration was almost negligible (Francis, 1904: 52). As a result, the density of population used to be less in these areas. Francis (1904) noted that "when compared with the country in the South and West of the Province (Madras), it is a very thinly populated tract supporting less than half the number of persons to the square mile which those more fertile areas maintain (Francis, 1904: 52). Thus, as shown in Table 5.1, the density of population was less in the Bellary compared to a rich district, Krishna, in coastal Andhra.

Table 5.1: Density of Population and Land-man ratio in Bellary district and Krishna for the period 1901 to 1931

Year	BELLARY					KRISHNA				
	Popu- lation	Area in Square miles	Total area Cropped	Density of Popula- tion (P/Sq)	Land man ratio	Popu- lation	Area in Square miles	Total area Cropped	Density of Popula- tion (P/Sq)	Land man ratio
1901	947214*	5714	2270332	166	2.3	1744138*	5907	2184537	296	1.25
1911	969436*	5714	2425557	170	2.5	1997535*	5907	1842437	338	0.92
1921	862370*	5713	2214873	151	2.6	2133314*	5907	1753127	361	0.82
1931	969774*	5713	2464535	170	2.5	1254208**	3547**	1098814	354	0.88

* represents the population of the district according to the Census taken in these years.

** In 1925 there was a reorganization of districts under which the newly formed district of West Godavari had acquired a few taluks of the Krishna district. Hence, for 1931, area and population of Krishna District show a decline.

Source: 1. Figures on Population and area are obtained from the District Gazetteers
2. Figures on total cropped area are obtained from various issues of Agricultural Statistics of India.

5.1.3 Availability of Culturable Wastes

Large tracts of culturable wastes were available in the ceded districts compared to wet districts of coastal Andhra. Assured irrigation, in the coastal Andhra, had not only enabled a higher rate of growth of population to come into existence but also attracted the labouring sections of the less developed districts to flock to these areas periodically. "By the turn of the twentieth century, particularly in coastal Andhra, available waste lands were brought under cultivation. In the Krishna-Godavari delta, the lands were so fully cultivated that there was no place for cattle to graze". (A. Sathyanarayana, 1984; 51). This had implications for land-man ratio and land market. As shown in table 5.1, since the growth of population was slow and culturable wastes were available in plenty in Ceded districts, the land-man ratio continued to be favourable in these areas compared to rich and irrigated districts, like Krishna, of Coastal Andhra.

5.1.4. Land Market in Ceded Districts

Since large parts of coastal Andhra were endowed with fertile alluvial soils and irrigation network in addition to relatively assured rainfall, land market developed faster in Coastal Andhra as compared to the Rayalaseema with its uncertain rainfall, poor soils and uncertain yields. Generally, land in coastal Andhra was considered to be a prized asset. As a matter of fact "the number of sales of agricultural land is higher on the average in the deltaic and in well developed tracts than in the dry upland or backward areas ... (T)he reasons are not far to seek. The canal irrigated areas, for instance, are also the densely populated areas and the prices of such lands are very high, which naturally create the conditions for a competitive wide land market. Again wet lands or lands under some secure source of irrigation have reason to be attractive, since there is certainty of harvest, as compared to the purely rainfed lands or lands under unsecure irrigation sources. Every cultivating ryot, as a matter of fact, would be eager to secure at least one plot of wet land, if possible by purchase or alternatively by taking on lease, to have

a wider distribution of employment for himself and for his family workers and also to secure fuller utilisation of his operations equipment and work animals (Sayana, 1952, 14-15). This sort a competitiveness among farmers would naturally push up the land values in deltaic regions compared to dry regions.

Land Values:

Table 5.2 indicates that between 1893 and 1924, land values were very low in the dry districts compared to the irrigated districts of the erstwhile Madras Presidency. Though land values were low in dry districts, only few people were prepared to buy the lands. As Sayana observed "in some localities of Ceded districts where ryot population is thin and soils poor, lands are not attractive and they seldom enter in the land market..." In some of the villages of Bellary and Anantapur districts "lands were so unattractive that almost nominal amounts were paid for large tracts of lands even in the land boom years...." (Sayana, 1952; 64-65)

Table 5.2: Land Prices in Andhra (1893-1924)

Taluk and type of soil	BELLARY			Type of soil	KRISHNA		
	Average price per 1893-94. (in Rupees)	Average price per acre 1914-18 (in Rupees)	Percentage increase between 1893-1918		Average per acre 1901-05 (in Rupees)	Average price per acre (1920-24) (in Rupees)	Percentage increase between 1901-1924
Adoni(Black)	12	50	316	Delta wet	139	598	330
Alur(Black)	6	38	533	Delta Dry	87	175	101
Bellary(Black)	6	29	383	Upland Wet	125	471	276
Siruguppa	7	27	350	Upland dry	31	118	280

Source: Cited in A. Sathyanarayana (1984) Agrarian Relations under the Impact of Colonial Rule in Madras Presidency, 1900-1940

Land Lease Values:

Along with land values, land lease values had also remained low in Ceded districts in the last decades of 19th century. Sub-letting was less prevalent due to the poor quality of soil, unfavourable climatic factors and the poor and uncertain yields. The number of people who were leasing in lands was small and settlement officers had come across many cases "... in which dry lands of very poor quality have been leased out for the mere payment of the assessment just to keep the lands under cultivation instead of suffering them to deteriorate" (A. Sathyanarayana, 1984; 63). In Bellary district the non-cultivating pattadars amounted only to 8 percent of the total. Thus the land lease values were low in dry districts when compared to the irrigated districts of Madras Presidency and this is clearly evident from Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Land Lease Values in Andhra 1893-1924

BELLARY DISTRICT				KRISHNA DISTRICT			
Taluk	Average lease value per acre 1893-99 (in Rupees)	Average lease value per acre 1914-18 (in Rupees)	Percentage increase 1893-1918	Type of the soil	Average lease per acre 1901-05 (in Rs.)	Average lease per acre 1924-25 (in Rs.)	Percentage increase 1901-25
Alur	2	6	200	Delta wet	27	72	166
Adoni	2	7	250	Delta Dry	7	15	114
Bellary	1	5	400	Upland Wet	13	50	207
Siruguppa	2	9	350	Upland dry	4	9	125

Source: Cited in A. Sathyanarayana (1984) Agrarian Relations under the Impact of Colonial Rule in Madras Presidency, 1900-1940.

Thus, as a result of frequent famines and droughts in the region of Rayalaseema mass-out migration had taken place. The population growth was also slow. The availability of vast culturable wastes and slow growth of population resulted in high land-man ratio. Since land was easily available and the soil was poor, land market was not properly developed. This was evident in low land values and rents. Thus, the land market was not sufficiently developed in these parts.

II

Changes in the Land Distribution in the Village

5.2.0. We have given a brief background of our study area i.e. Rayalaseema region in general and Bellary district in particular in the previous section. With this background, let us proceed to comment on changes in the agrarian structure of the village, that were brought about in a period of roughly fifty years i.e. 1891-1948.

5.2.1. Changes in Concentration of Land Ownership in the Village (1891-1948):

Interesting changes in the distribution of land ownership had taken place during the period 1891-1948. (See Table 5.4). A striking feature in 1891 distribution is that the top 4 percent of households owned more than 24 percent of land and the average land per household was 163.51 acres. Bottom 4.36 percent of households owned a very small extent of land i.e. 0.03 percent. The Lorenz ratio was .518 (with complete equality $LR = 0$: with complete inequality $LR = 1$). These findings suggest that to begin with land distribution was unequal.

Inequalities had only marginally increased between 1891 and 1948. The Lorenz ratio had gone up from 0.518 to 0.585. The concentration of land had also increased. In 1948 only 2.5 percent of households owned 23.52 percent of total land and their average land had gone up to 192 acres from 163 in 1891. The bottom class had swollen and nearly 8 percent of households were added to this class. Their share in the total land had slightly increased

Table 5.4: Changes in Land Distribution in the Village

Size Class (acres)	1891				1948			
	Number of hou- seholds	Percent- age of households	Percentage share in total land	Average land (acres)	Number of hou- seholds	Percentage of house- holds	Percentage share in total land	Average land (acres)
0.0- 2.5	12	4.36	0.03	0.20	52	11.85	.78	1.32
2.5- 5.0	26	9.45	1.34	3.83	63	14.35	2.72	3.88
5.0-10.0	42	15.27	4.30	7.59	100	22.78	8.12	7.31
10.0-20.0	84	30.03	17.02	15.00	96	21.85	15.61	14.61
20.0-30.0	37	13.45	11.80	23.62	59	13.44	15.96	24.32
30.0-40.0	24	8.73	11.07	34.12	22	5.01	8.45	34.35
40.0-50.0	17	6.12	10.07	43.89	10	2.28	4.97	44.66
50.0-60.0	9	3.27	6.79	55.92	9	2.05	5.56	55.59
60.0-70.0	4	1.45	3.49	63.84	5	1.14	3.46	62.28
70.0-80.0	5	1.82	5.08	75.28	6	1.37	4.94	74.07
80.0-100.0	4	1.45	4.75	87.91	6	1.37	5.91	88.57
100 & above	11	4.00	24.30	163.51	11	2.51	23.52	192.30
All Classes	275	100.00	100.00	26.94	439	100.00	100.00	20.48

Sources: 1. Resettlement Survey of the Village 1891

2. Karnam Account of 1948.

to 0.76 percent and the average land owned by them went upto 1.32 acres.

The results of this micro level exercise are not in conformity with the conclusion of Dharmakumar's macrolevel study. In a semi-arid zone, where land man ratio was favourable, population growth was slow and culturable wastes were available, one would expect that the inequalities would not be glaring. The inequalities might not become worse as a result of cultivation of culturable wastes over a time. These results indicate that a complex process had been in operation which calls for a detailed explanation. We shall make^ω caste-wise analysis of land transfers in order to know the processes involved in the changes in concentration of land. But before we do that let us have a look at the traditional occupations of various castes in the village.

5.2.2 Occupations of various Castes in Random Village

Brahmins and Reddies were both landlords and cultivators. Though these two castes used to cultivate the lands with the help of agricultural labourers, Reddies' dependence on them was less compared to the Brahmins. This was because of being essentially an agricultural community participation of household members — including females — in the agricultural operations has not been a social taboo for the Reddies. However, since such a taboo exists for the Brahmins they depended entirely on wage labour for carrying on their cultivation. The traditional occupation of Lingayats, Tambalas and Vaisyas was business and money lending.

Though the traditional occupation of yadava community was sheep rearing and cultivation of land; hiring out in the labour market by small farmers and occasionally even by the middle farmers of this caste was not uncommon. Artisan castes which include Blacksmith, Goldsmith, Potters, Barbers and washermen have their respective traditional professions, apart from the cultivation of land. Although the occupation of Muslims was trading, gradually they turned to agriculture, especially from 1930's onwards.

Valmikis were by and large agricultural labourers, but we do find cultivators even among them. There are two sects in Harijan Caste i.e. Madiga sect, whose traditional occu-

pation was clearing carcasses and making shoes and ropes from the animal hides and Begari or Mala sect whose traditional occupation was digging graves. Harijans were usually employed for cleaning the cattlesheds and for buffalo rearing. Due to rigid caste system Harijans, as we will see later, were less preferred for doing agricultural work and employment of Harijans as attached labourers was not in wide practice prior to 1950s. Keeping this as a background, we shall analyse the caste-wise land transfers.

5.2.3 Changes in Caste-wise ownership of Land:

Table 5.5 clearly shows the changes that had been taking place during the period 1891-1948. Brahmins were the single largest land owning caste in 1891 controlling 36 percent of the total village land. Next in order were the Reddies with 20 percent. Thus, together, they owned about 62 percent of the total land in the village in 1891. Valmiki and Yadava communities owned 12 and 10 percent of land, respectively. Other communities were insignificant as far as land ownership was concerned. By 1948, Brahmins had lost their supremacy; they came to occupy only 20 percent of total land. Reddy, Valmiki and Yadava communities fared well, possessing 30, 15 and 14 percent of total land respectively. Muslim community had also improved its position, while other communities failed to register any significant improvement.

These changes raise a number of interesting questions. Why did the Brahmins lose land? How did they lose it? How did other communities manage to acquire land? How did the Reddy community manage to maintain and even improve its dominance during the period 1891-1948? What were the factors behind there land transfers? Was it because of demographic factors or non-demographic factors like commercial farming, socio-cultural Institutions etc.? We shall attempt to answer these questions in the ensuing paragraphs.

5.2.3.1 Land Control by a few Castes around 1891

According to the Resettlement Survey of 1891 Brahmins, Reddies and Valmikis together controlled nearly three-fourths of the total occupied land in the village. While Brahmins

Table 5.5: Changes in Land Ownership by the Different Caste groups

CASTE	1891				1948			
	Number of Families	Extent of land owned (Acres)	% of land owned	Average land of the household (Acres)	Number of Families	Extent of land owned (acres)	% of land owned in total land	Average land of the household (acres)
Brahmins	87	2682.60	36	30.83	61	1776.45	20	29.12
Reddys	44	1949.55	26	44.31	50	2749.14	30	54.98
Yadavas	50	758.00	10	15.16	77	1266.06	14	16.44
Artisans	8	121.98	2	15.25	13	169.37	2	13.03
Valmikis	33	911.79	12	27.63	126	1366.65	15	10.60
Harijans	N.A*	124.38	2	N.A	41	243.60	3	5.94
Muslims	13	330.35	4	25.41	39	750.98	8	19.26
Non-Brahmin and non-cultivating Upper Castes	40	575.35	8	14.38	32	699.29	8	21.85
All castes	275	7454.00	100	27.11	439	8991.54	100	20.47

Source: As in Table 5.4

in 1891

* The Number of Harijan families/ is not known, as the names against the lands owned by Harijans were not given in the village Resettlement Report. However, one could identify the total land in the possession of the Harijans under the Service Inams.

and Reddies together held as much as 62 percent of total land. Valmikis held 12 percent of total land. According to the village legend, ^a Brahmin Prime Minister working in the Court of

Nawab of Adoni extended considerable patronage to his fellow castemen by arranging them land grants by the government. In addition lands were also granted to the families of karnam (village accountant) as per the usual practice. Similarly the village Reddy or Munsiff would be granted some lands. In Andhra as in other places in the country the office of the village Munsiff^{8/} would invariably be vested with the dominant cultivating castes. In this village the dominant cultivating caste happens to be ^{the} Reddies. Thus in addition to the traditional dominance of the Reddies in land control and socio-political life, the semi-bureaucratic position of a few Reddies in the Revenue hierarchy must have helped those families to acquire larger control on land. Lastly, Service Inams were also granted to the lowest categories in the village administrative hierarchy. Talaris who would be at the beck and call of the village karnam and Munsiff used to be favoured with land grants. And in this ^{village} Talari's were usually picked up from the Valmiki community. This explains how nearly 1387 acres comprising of nearly one-fifth of the total cultivated land in the village was under the possession of the Village Revenue Officials viz. Karanam, Munsiff and Talaris in 1891. In addition to these, kammari (Ironsmith) and ^{Harijans} we're also given land grants for looking after the horses of the visiting dignitaries from the Nawab's Court.

5.2.4.0 Reasons for Alienation of Land by Brahmins

Though Brahmins had owned 36 percent of total occupied land, they were not basically owner-cultivators. They were largely leasing out their land to the hard-working peasant communities and only a few among them cultivated lands with the help of agricultural labourers. Over a period of time they had to out-migrate from the village due to unfavourable seasons, non-availability of sufficient working hands and potential tenants in periods of droughts and famines, tax burden (land revenue) and social conflicts, which were specific to the village.

5.2.4.1 Disastrous Seasons

We have already noted the intensity of famines in Bellary district. As stated

above nearly ten famines had visited this district in 19th century. Of them, the 1876-78 famine was considered to be very severe and its adverse impact was most felt in the Alur taluk. It "...suffered more severely in this famine than any other taluk in the district and its population in 1901 numbered only a few hundreds more than it did in 1871, thirty years before...." (Francis 1904, 209)

5.2.4.2 Non Availability of Working hands

The Brahmins had suffered both during the period of famine and after. Their agricultural operations^{which} came to a standstill could not immediately be renewed in the post-famine period, due to the decline in the number of agricultural labourers and potential tenants. Starvation deaths and mass out migration of agricultural labourers and small farmers had greatly reduced the number of agricultural labourers and tenants available in the village. These out-migrants could not come back to the village immediately after famine due to poor communication facilities.^{9/} Francis had observed that ".....though considerable emigration has taken place from it (Bellary) to Mysore and Bombay Presidency and its gain by immigration is almost negligible" (Francis, 1904; 52). These factors could have reduced the number of working hands available in the village. We will look at the data on the changes in number of agricultural labourers at taluk level, since village wise data are not available. In 1891, 15.4 percent of total population of the taluk were working as agricultural ^{labourers} and by 1901 the figure came down to 14.0.^{10/} (Charies Benson, 1895; C. Benson and Marjoribanks 1908). Gradual decrease in the number of agricultural labourers had pushed up the money wages in the district.

5.2.4.3 Increase in Money Wages

Money wages began to increase as a result of shortage of agricultural workers in this region. This is discernible from the following data. Since the village data on money wages are not available, we have presented the district figures for 27 years,

beginning from 1873, in Table 5.6. The years 1877, 1888, 1889 and 1891 witnessed failure of monsoons and consequent shortages and famines. It was precisely in this period that the money wages of agricultural labourers rose. Incidentally in the

Table 5.6: Average Monthly Wages of Agricultural Labourers in Bellary District at the end of each year: 1873-1899.

Year	Rs. per month	Year	Rs. per month
1873	4.00	1887	5.00
1874	4.00	1888	5.31
1875	4.00	1889	5.31
1876	4.00	1890	3.95
1877	6.00	1891	4.12
1878	4.00	1892	4.31
1879	4.00	1893	4.31
1880	4.00	1894	4.56
1881	4.00	1895	4.56
1882	4.00	1896	4.56
1883	4.18	1897	4.50
1884	4.27	1898	4.56
1885	4.00	1899	4.69
1886	4.00		

Source: Dharma Kumar, Land and Caste in South India pp.163

irrigated districts like Krishna and Godavari where cultivation was protected from the vagaries of monsoons and the areas were endowed with larger quantum of labour force,

money wages, as shown in Table 5.7, by and large remained lower compared to the districts like Kurnool and Cuddapah of Rayalaseema (G.N. Rao, 1981: 101 & 102). To come back to our argument, the higher levels of money wages as well as their increases in periods of shortage and droughts put the Brahmin cultivators to stress and strain.

Table 5.7: Average Daily Wage-rate for rural Unskilled Labour

Year	Coastal Andhra					Two districts of Rayalaseema	
	Ganjam district	Visakhapatnam district	Godavari district	Krishna district	Nellore district	Cuddapah district	Kunool district
	Rs-a-p	Rs-a-p	Rs-a-p	Rs-a-p	Rs-a-p	Rs-a-p	Rs-a-p
1877-78	0-1-7	0-1-4	0-3-3	0-3-6	0-3-0	0-2-7	0-4-4
1878-79	0-1-8	0-1-7	0-3-0	0-3-6	0-3-9	0-2-7	0-3-9
1879-80	0-1-7	0-1-7	0-2-9	0-3-7	0-3-0	0-2-3	0-4-0
1880-81	0-1-6	0-1-7	0-2-9	0-3-3	0-3-4	0-2-8	0-3-9
1881-82	0-1-4	0-1-6	0-2-10	0-3-6	0-2-10	0-2-3	0-3-6
1882-83	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
1883-84	0-1-5	0-1-4	0-2-9	0-3-4	0-2-10	0-2-4	0-4-0
1884-85	0-1-6	0-1-6	0-2-9	0-3-5	0-2-10	0-3-3	0-4-9
1885-86	0-1-9	0-1-7	0-2-9	0-3-5	0-3-2	0-3-0	0-4-11
1886-87	0-1-8	0-1-5	0-2-10	0-3-8	0-3-5	0-3-2	0-4-11
1887-88	0-1-9	0-1-6	0-2-8	0-3-7	0-2-11	0-2-11	0-5-18
1888-89	0-1-8	0-1-7	0-2-7	0-3-8	0-2-8	0-2-9	0-5-2
1889-90	0-1-8	0-1-6	0-2-8	0-3-4	0-2-7	0-3-0	0-5-2
1890-91	0-1-8	0-1-8	0-2-9	0-3-4	0-2-8	0-3-2	0-7-7
1891-92	0-1-8	0-1-9	0-3-2	0-3-3	0-2-8	0-3-0	0-5-6
1892-93	0-1-9	0-1-10	0-3-3	0-3-5	0-2-8	0-3-0	0-2-4
1893-94	0-1-11	0-1-11	0-3-3	0-3-4	0-2-8	0-2-8	0-2-3
1894-95	0-2-0	0-2-1	0-3-2	0-3-3	0-2-8	0-2-9	0-2-9
1895-96	0-1-11	0-2-0	0-3-2	0-3-5	0-2-9	0-2-8	0-2-9

Source: Cited in G.N. Rao (1981) 'Transition from of Subsistence to Commercialised Agriculture; Problems, Potentialities and Results: pp.102;

Note : To capture even the minute changes in the wage-rate the old denomination are retained.
Sixteen annas made one Rupees and twelve pies made on annas

Old New
16 annas = 1 Rupee
1 annas = 6 paise

5.2.4.4 High Rates of Taxation

The incidence of land revenue per head for a Ryotwari village was higher in Alur taluk than in any other taluk in the district. It was 3-2-8 (Rs-A-P) per head whereas the incidence in the district was 1-15-11 (Rs-A-P) (Statistical Atlas of Madras Presidency: 1911). The high incidence of land revenue caused lot of strain to Brahmin cultivators. These Brahmin families, with 36 percent of the total land and insufficient rainfall leading to failure of crops, found it difficult to pay high taxes. Our enquiries in the village had revealed that some of the Brahmin families could not pay land revenue and hence their lands were acquired by the government. Even in the event of famine revenue remission were not granted and they were treated for leniently than the smaller land holders, as it was considered that landlords were in better position to meet their revenue obligations (Benson, 103).

5.2.4.5 Social Conflicts:

The immediate reason for Brahmins' departure from the village was the atrocities committed by village Munsiff, who belonged to dominant peasant community of Reddies. He had a liason with a Brahmin woman and Brahmins could not tolerate this. They registered their protest and since Brahmins in these parts were generally mild mannered lacking in physical prowess, they could not counter the physical force of the village Munsiff and his goondas. The village Munsiff silenced a young Brahmin boy, who revolted against him, by burying him alive.

Thus to repeat, the changing fortunes in agriculture, increase in cost of cultivation as a result of increase in money wages, high tax burden along with social conflicts in the village forced the Brahmins to leave the village and take up jobs in service sector in the nearby towns.

5.2.5 Out migration of Brahmins:

According to the oral history of the village the out migration of Brahmins had

started during the 'hayam' or 'regime' of the notorious village Munsiff, Thimma Reddy, As per the village Settlement Survey, he was alive in 1891. Hence outmigration of the Brahmins from the village must have taken place in the last phase of the 19th century.

5.2.5.1 Land Sales by Brahmins:

Our enquiries in the village revealed that Brahmins did not sell their lands when they were leaving the village. This could be because of low land values. As we have already noted, land values were very low due to low growth of population and availability of culturable wastes, resulting in favourable land man ratio. Thus due to low land values, Brahmins could not sell their lands. Land lease values were also very low (See 5.1.4)

5.2.6 Changes in Cropping Pattern

Land market started developing in response to the changes in cropping pattern. Prior to 1800, in Rayalaseema there prevailed by and large a subsistence economy with no or little monetization. Though people were producing cotton, it was basically used for their self requirements. While explaining the extent of Cotton cultivation in the Madras Presidency for the period 1800-1850, Sarada Raju noted that "Cotton cultivation was not extensive (in 1812) and the cotton grown in many districts was inadequate for local consumption (emphasis ours (1941:59)). For the cultivation of cotton, the waste land was believed to be a great source. But, since the land revenue rates were high, the cultivators were reluctant to bring waste lands under plough for the cultivation of cotton. Munro stated that in Ceded districts a reduction of 25 percent in revenue demand would, in the course of ten or fifteen years, result in increase of a million or a million and quarter acres and cotton could be grown to any extent that could possibly be required" (Sarada Raju, 1941: 89; Nilmani Mukherjee, 1962: 266).

In the first half of the 19th century the cultivation of cotton was very difficult.^{11/} and hence the cotton was not extensively cultivated. But the introduction of Ryotwari Settlement with its concomitant high rates of land revenue at the beginning of 19th century forced the cultivator to think in terms of crop-mix that ensures both food and fodder as

well as ready cash to pay the land revenue. The cultivator therefore began to grow cotton along with food grain. In Bellary the area under cotton had increased from 84,000 acres in 1812 to 214,000 acres by 1850. The prices of cotton also began to increase from 1865 onwards as a result of Civil War in U.S.A., in which the supply of cotton from that country had come down sharply and this induced the cultivators to grow cotton on a large scale. The transportation facilities had also improved with the advent of the railway line connecting Madras and Bombay across Rayalaseema region in 1866. As a result of all these factors area under cotton had substantially increased and the same is discernible if one looks at changes in cropping pattern in the village between 1891 and 1924. (See Table 5.8)

Table 5.8: Changes in Cropping Pattern in the Village (1891-1924)

Crop	1891		1924	
	Extent in acres	Percentage of total cultivated land	Extent in acres	Percentage of total cultivated land
Korra	NIL	NIL	2981.05	31.67
Pulses	1278	49.50	54.01	0.57
Jowar	597	23.15	3108.98	33.03
Other Cereals	60	2.35	49.65	0.53
Oil Seeds	23	0.89	NIL	NIL
Cotton	602	23.39	3135.29	33.20
Tomato	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Coriander	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Safflower	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Others	19	0.72	84.53	1.00
All Crops	2579.0	100.0	9413.51	100.00

Source: Resettlement Surveys of the Village, 1891 & 1924.

Table 5.9: Changes in Cropping Pattern in Bellary District and Alur Taluk (1869-1941)

(in '000 acres)

Year	BELLARY DISTRICT				ALUR TALUK			
	Area under food grains & crops	Area under cotton	Area under other crops	Total area Cropped	Area under food grains & crops	Area under cotton	Area under other crops	Area under all crops
1869-70	1689* (73.0)	328 (14.0)	310 (13.0)	2327 (100.0)	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
1901	1821 (76.85)	329 (13.89)	219 (9.26)	2369 (100.0)	306 (78.49)	79 (20.25)	5 (1.26)	390 (100.0)
1911	1876 (75.73)	445 (17.96)	157 (6.31)	2477 (100.0)	252 (74.85)	78 (23.1)	7 (2.06)	337 (100.0)
1921	1567 (64.61)	654 (26.96)	204 (8.43)	2425 (100.0)	257 (66.75)	120 (31.09)	8 (2.16)	385 (100.0)
1931	1614 (64.17)	480 (19.09)	421 (16.94)	2515 (100.0)	222 (61.21)	97 (26.84)	43 (11.95)	362 (100.0)
1940-41	1465 (56.0)	593 (23.0)	535 (21.0)	2593 (100.0)	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A

Sources: 1. 1869-70 figures are obtained from Proceedings of the Madras Government, dated 1st March, 1870, No.673, Public Works Department.

2. Figures for the years 1901, 1911, 1927 and 1931 are obtained from District Gazetteer of Bellary

3. 1940-41 figures are obtained from Agricultural Statistics of India.

* Prior to 1885, Bellary District included many parts of present Anantapur District.

Note: Figures in brackets indicate the percentage of total cropped area.

The total cropped area in the village had more than trebled - from 2579 acres in 1891 to 9413.51 in 1924. However, it should be noted that 1891 was a drought year and hence the total cropped area was likely to have been much less than the normal figure. Striking changes in cropping pattern are visible in Table 5.8. Foodgrains were grown on nearly 75 percent of total land and cotton was grown in little over 23 percent of land cultivated in 1891. By 1924, cotton had become an important cash crop in the village and it was grown on one-third of the total cultivated land. Though the percentage of area under food grains had come down from 75 percent to 65 percent, the absolute area under them had gone up from 1935 acres to 6144 acres. These changes are not specific to the village. As shown in Table 5.9 similar changes took place in taluk as well as in district.

5.2.7 Rising Prices of Cotton

The increase in the areas under the cultivation of cotton was primarily due to increase in the prices of cotton. Steep rise in the cotton prices was recorded in the first two decades of twentieth century (MacAlpin, 1982: 882) and this must have had induced them to grow more cotton for the market. As a result of changes in cropping pattern and relatively high growth of population in the first two decades of 19th century (See Table 2 on trends in population in the village in Statistical Appendix), land market started developing from the turn of the century. This is clear from tables on increase in land values and land rents. (See 2.1.4) Although the land values were low in dry districts compared to deltaic districts, in the last decade of 19th century, the rate of increase in land values during the period (1893-1924) was high in dry districts than in irrigated districts. Such an increase in land values was especially impressive in Adoni and Alur taluks in Bellary district. The reason for this was not difficult to find. In blacksoil the cultivation of industrial crops (especially cotton) was favourable and the cotton prices were also on the increase during this period. These two factors favoured large scale cultivation of cotton and thereby causing significant

demand for blacksoil in these two taluks. This village also has more than 80 percent black soil and the demand for this land began to increase from the turn of the century. This demand was met partly by the cultivation of culturable wastes and partly by buying a few parcels of land sold by Brahmins.

5.2.8 Culturable Wastes

According to Resettlement Survey of the village, more than 1335 acres were unoccupied and pattas for this land were not issued. But by 1924 most of the land was occupied. As a result of spread of commercial farming and increase in population many enterprising farmers from intermediary/backward castes had come forward to bring in those lands under plough. We have tried to see caste-wise acquisition of culturable wastes by 1948.

Table 5.10: Caste-wise Acquisition of Culturable Wastes by 1948

Caste	Extent of acres	Percentage of land acquired by each caste
1. <u>Upper Castes</u>		
a. Reddy	217.23	16.27
b. Other upper Castes	67.32	5.04
2. <u>Backward Castes</u>		
a. Golla /Yadava	406.98	30.48
b. Valmiki	255.28	19.19
3. Artisans	29.06	2.10
4. Harijans	36.03	2.70
5. Muslims	168.00	12.58
Unoccupied in 1948	155.36	11.64
All Castes	1335.26	100.00

Source: Karnam Account of 1948.

Table 5.10 suggests that yadavas, valmikis and Reddies along with Muslims under the plough brought much of uncultivated areas in 1891. More than 54 percent of unoccupied land in 1891 was brought under the plough by backward castes like yadava and valmiki and Harijans and Artisan castes. Muslim community brought 12.58 percent of total land, whereas Reddies brought 16.27 percent of total unoccupied land in 1891.

Initially Reddies and Brahmins had occupied all those fertile lands near the village and these lands were of mixed soil. Since the economy of the village was more or less subsistence in the first half of 19th century, Brahmins and Reddies preferred mixed soil, which is favourable for the cultivation of food grains and pulses. This is evident from the data on cropping pattern in 1891. The lands that were unoccupied around 1891 and subsequently occupied by enterprising farmers as a result of spread of cotton cultivation, which comprised of black soil, situated at the periphery of the village. But one should not take these lands as being less fertile. For the demand for blacksoil had increased a great deal as a result of spread of cotton cultivation, since it is highly favoured in this soil. Thus, even if yadavas occupied lands situated at periphery, they were not inferior as far as fertility of the land and profitability of cultivation was concerned.

3.2.9 Which Castes had acquired ^{the} Brahmins' Land?

As land values were increasing in the first two decades of twentieth century, the Brahmins started alienating the lands. Unlike cultivable wastes, Brahmins' lands, which were arable and fertile, had to be purchased. Only those communities which were fairly well off could purchase these lands. In other words only rich farmers were able to purchase Brahmins' land. On the other hand livestock, family labour and an enterprising and hardworking ethos, free from social taboos were essential to bring the culturable wastes under plough. Yadavas and Valmikis filled in this role well.

By comparing the land ownership positions at two points of time i.e. 1891 and 1948 , we would know about the communities which gained or lost land in 1948. Barring Brahmin community all other communities gained land. That means these three communities must have gained from those three sources, i.e. Brahmins' land, culturable wastes and lands held under Kattubadi Inam (land subject to quit rent or assigned by higher authority for militia and police maintenance (Eric Stokes, 1977: 55)) and village Service Fund. We did not include the lands held under Kattubadi Inam and village Service Fund (VSF) in the 1891 land distribution because the names of the people who were controlling these lands were not given in the 1891 Re-Settlement Survey. We have therefore deducted the lands held under Kattubadi, VSF and culturable wastes acquired by that community during that period, so that the residue would give us the net land purchased by each community from Brahmins. We have presented the figures in Table 5.11

Table 5.11 suggests that Reddies, Muslims and Valmikis were those people, who had purchased lands from the Brahmins. Reddy and Valmiki communities could have purchased land since these communities owned land from 1891 onwards. Besides, Reddy households had been prominent in ^{the} credit market. Some Reddy households were lending grain loans as well as money loans. These households had acquired land from small and marginal farmers in the 1930's depression. Since, many households from this community were rich during this period, they could have purchased lands from Brahmins. These lands were virtually fallow from the time Brahmins had left the village and the cultivation of these large tracts became difficult for Reddi landlords. These lands were therefore leased out to enterprising farmers from yadava, valmiki and Harijan Communities. Later on, when these lands became arable, Reddies had re-occupied them by evicting these tenants. That was why, even if some of the Reddi landlords owned as much as 300 acres, the cultivation had not become difficult for them.

Muslim Community, on the other hand, throws altogether a different picture. This village was gradually becoming an important cotton trading centre as a result of spread of

Table 5.11: Acquisition of Land Alienated by Brahmins

CASTE	Land owned in 1891	Land owned in 1948	Total land acquired in 1948 (3-2)	Acquisition of culturable wastes	Acquisition of Kattubadi lands & village service fund	The total land from culturable waste, Kattubadi land, village service fund (5 + 6)	Net land purchased from Brahmins (4-7)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Brahmins	2683	1776	-907	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Reddies	1950	2749	+799	217	72	289	510
Upper Castes	575	691	+116	67	46	113	3
Muslims	330	751	+421	168	20	188	233
Yadavae	758	1263	+505	407	96	503	2
Valmikis	912	1337	+425	255	23	278	147
Harijans	124	244	+120	36	34	70	49
Artisan Castes	122	169	+ 47	29	8	37	10
All Castes	7454	8981	+1526	1180	299	1479	954*

* The net land purchased from Brahmins (954) is not equal to net land lost by them (907) because, when the 1924 Resettlement Survey was conducted, some land from neighbouring village was taken and granted to Harijans. And hence, the Harijans had only obtained land from government and not from Brahmins.

Source: 1. 1891, Resettlement Survey
2. Karnam Account of 1948

cotton cultivation in the last decades of 19th century. Prior to that, Molagavelli (a

nearby village) situated on the Madras-Bombay line, was an important cotton trading centre. But this village was inaccessible to bullock carts during ^{the} rainy season. Since, this ^{village} became a road junction around the turn of ^{the} century, cotton began to be marketed in the village itself. Initially, the trading was carried ^{out} largely by Muslim community. This could have helped them to acquire land from the Brahmins.

5.2.10 Socio-Cultural Institutions:

Though Harijan Community was also equally industrious and hard-working, it could not move up the ladder due to some countervailing forces like socio-cultural institutions. One might find it surprising that Harijans historically owned land in this region. Favourable land man ratio, and presence of large tracts of culturable wastes coupled with the prevalence of less rigid caste system permitted even the socially handicapped communities like Harijans to acquire land. Moreover the inam land granted by the Government in return to their services was also significant and they owned 2 percent of total land in 1891. By 1948, they managed to increase their share by 1 percent inspite of the socio-cultural Institutions which worked against them.

Importance of Socio-Cultural Institutions:

One is aware that the outbreak of epidemic diseases like cholera and smallpox was frequent in 19th and early 20th centuries. There was a superstition among Harijans that if cholera broke out, it was because they displeased ^{the} Goddess of cholera (Mariamamma) and they ^{would} have to rectify their mistake by celebrating Mariamamma Devara, thus propitiating the Goddess. Francis (1904) observed that "By the sides of the roads often a wodden frame-work, mounted on little wheels and bearing three rude wooden images. This is the car of Mariamamma, the goddesses of small-pox and cholera, and her son and daughter. When disease breaks out the car bearing her and her children is taken round the village with music and other due ceremony and then dragged to the eastern boundary. By this means the

malignant essence of the Goddesses is removed from the village" (60-61). Harijans would sacrifice animals and would invite the relatives to this ceremony ^{12/}.

In the first quarter of 20th century, Harijan families were by and large subsistence families and they hardly used to realise any surplus at the end of the year. In order to celebrate the Devara, they had to borrow loans from village money lenders. Though the credit worthiness of Harijans was always discounted by the village money-lenders, a villager, belonging to the Reddy Community, who was both ^a moneylender and landlord, was prepared to lend them loans. It was not because he had any faith in Mariamamma or confidence in their credit worthiness. It was because he used to accumulate substantial quantum of grain surpluses at the end of each year and at that time the market for the coarse grain was rather limited. Thus, in order to clear his stocks, he used to lend them 16 to 30 seers of jowar and 8 Rupees in cash. But the condition was that the repayment should be made purely in terms of money for which promisory notes were written by the debtors and submitted to the moneylender.

The Harijans feel that due to demographic pressure and consequent strain to feed large families, their elders could not repay the loans. (They be moaned 'పంచకొండ్ల అయిదుగురు క్రయనాశ'. Literally meaning one got multiplied to five). But most of these land transfers took place in late twenties and early thirties. In other words their problems were accentuated by the Great Depression. They even recalled their elders saying that even if they were producing abundant quantities of cotton and jowar, the repayment in terms of money, had created problems with low agricultural prices and low level of monetization. Slowly the debts got accumulated and they got entrapped into the debt bondage. Slowly the demographic pressure also intensified in Harijan families and the repayment became next to impossible. Gradually almost all the inam lands held by the Madigas in Harijan Caste were directly transferred in to the hands of the village moneylenders.

These socio-cultural institutions, it appears, had affected only Madiga sect in

Harijan Caste. Unlike Madigas, Malas, another sect among Harijans, were not staunch devotees of Mariamamma. Malas' participation in the celebration of ceremonies of Mariamamma was therefore insignificant. Mala and Madiga communities were given 34.09 and 90.74 acres, respectively, as service inam in 1891. Mala community had retained their 34.09 acres, where as Madigas managed to hold on only to 17.13 acres, thus losing as much as 73.61 acres. But the Mala sect fared better compared to Madiga sect. Beginning with only 27.40 percent of land in total land owned by Harijan community in 1891, Mala sect improved its position by acquiring 52.36 percent of total land owned by Harijans by 1948. Thus it was largely because of Malas' contribution that the overall Harijan caste could improve its position from 2 percent in 1891 to 3 percent in 1948.

To sum up as we have already noted, when Brahmins left the village around 1891, the land market was not sufficiently developed. But, as cotton slowly became the major cash crop, the demand for land picked up momentum. This was partly met by the cultivation of culturable wastes as also land sales transacted by the Brahmins. While people who brought cultivable wastes under plough were the hard working communities like yadava and Valmikis, Reddies and Muslims had purchased most of the land from Brahmins. Secondly, small farmers from the Valmiki and Harijan castes were often required to borrow for consumption from the moneylending landlord families belonging to Reddi community. Economic calamities like depression and natural calamities like famines coupled with demographic pressure within their families had incapacitated them from repaying the debts and this in turn resulted in the alienation of their lands to the creditors.

Thus during the period, 1891 -1948, the direction of land transfers was towards the money lending rich landlord families. The social prestige attained by the rich landowning families induced them further to purchase lands from them i.e. small and middle farmers and interlinking of markets also facilitated such land transfers. Therefore, concentration of land ownership had increased during the period 1891-1948.

Notes and References

1. However it is surprising that in the Godavari district, another irrigated zone, such a concentration of land ownership had, apparently, not taken place.
2. In the last quarter of 19th century nearly 6 percent of total population in Godavari district constituted migrant population. For details See G.N. Rao "Transition from a subsistence to Commercialised Agriculture, Problems, Potentialities and Results - A Study of Krishna District of Andhra in the 19th century." Paper presented in the Seminar on Commercialization in Indian Agriculture Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, 1981: 94;
3. It so happens that the author is a native of the village under study.
4. These three districts -- Bellary, Cuddapah and Kurnool -- came into the possession of East India Company in 1800. While the districts of Bellary and Cuddapah were ceded to East India Company by Nizam of Hyderabad, "for the maintenance of, in perpetuity, of a body of troops known as Hyderabad subsidiary force and in payment for the troops furnished during Mysore wars" (Maclean, 1877:21), the rights of sovereignty by the Nizam over Kurnool were vested with the Company from 1800 to 1839. However, in 1839 Kurnool district had come into hands of the East India Company
5. Under the Ryotwari Settlement a direct relationship between the owner cultivator and the government was sought to be established. But Nilmani Mukherjee and Frykenberg argue that infact such direct relationship was not established. They say that the Ryotwari Settlement had failed to alter the social system that was prevalent at that time and policy makers and officials had to compromise with village elite, mirasidars' rights etc. However, whether or not Ryotwari System had reduced the influence of village elite is still debatable point. For details see Nilmani Mukherjee and R.E. Frykenberg (1969) "The Ryotwari System and Social Organisation in Madras Presidency" in Robert Eric Frykenberg (ed) Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History, pp.217 to 226.
6. The collection of Land revenue from the produce of that year had severely affected the ryot and obstructed him from making any attempt to undertake developmental activities in the land. The ryots were reluctant to improve the soil, as increase in production would mean more payment of land revenue to the government. Although Munro attributed the unsatisfactory agricultural production in this region to the poverty of the people, N. Mukherjee refuted such an explanation by saying that "to the ryot poverty and high assessment were much the same thing. The one was the cause of the other. Poverty prevented the ryot from making the land productive and the high assessment deprived him of the fruits of his labour". For details see Nilmani Mukherjee (1962) Ryotwari System in Madras, p.259;
7. The Ryotwari System was first tried in Baramahal in the 1790's by captain Alexander Read. His assistant, Munro introduced this system in Ceded districts around 1800. Although the Government abandoned it for a brief period ^{dually} 1808-1819, it was reimposed in 1819.
8. Such categories of headman (Patel, Reddy, Kapu, Naidu) were claiming, apart from exercising

political and revenue management, proprietary right on culturable wastes and assumed quasi - landlord's role by leasing out these culturable wastes. Interestingly these villagers played an important role in Madras and Bombay territories than in the North in 19th century. For a detailed discussion on this aspect see Eric Stokes (1977) "Privileged Land Tenure in Village India in the Early Nineteenth Century" in Robert Eric Frykenberg (ed) Land Tenure and Peasant in South Asia .

9. The villagers tell a story that the people, who migrated out to farthest areas like Maharashtra, came back only after seeing a leaf of jowar plant carried by a bird (Their belief is that jowar was grown only in this area). The important point that is to be noted here is that people had migrated out from the village and did not return immediately in the post-famine period.
10. However, the use of Census estimates for incidence of agricultural labourers in British India. For details See C. Ramamanochar Reddy (1980) "Census Estimates of The Incidence of Agricultural Labour in British India: Reliability and Possible Adjustments" (mimeo)
11. The cultivation of cotton in the first half of 19th century was "exhaustive and expensive". In black cotton soils, it was more expensive due to abundant growth of Nutt which had to be eradicated at a high cost and once in 12 to 20 years. Besides, it was completely dependent on monsoons and hence extremely precarious. For more details See Sarada Raju, (1941) Economic Conditions in the Madras Presidency 1800-1850.
12. Even now the Harijans celebrate Devaras. As cholera broke out, Harijans celebrated the Challa Devara on 28th August, 1984.

CHAPTER 6

LAND TRANSFERS: (1948-1961)

6.0 Introductory Remarks on the Changes in Distribution of Land Ownership in the Village (1948-1982):

With the help of village level macro data (official), we have seen in the previous chapter, how, during nearly six decades, from 1891 onwards, concentration of landownership (among land owning households) had marginally increased. But during the subsequent period i.e., from 1948 to 1982, the concentration of land ownership had remained more or less constant. The Lorenz ratio, which was 0.58 in 1948, remained more or less same. There was substantial increase in the proportion of households falling in the bottom size class of land holding. (See Table 6.0.1). Households owning land below 2.5 acres formed about 12 percent of the total number in 1948. But by 1982 they formed nearly 31 percent. While the average land owned by these families had gone up from 1.32 acres in 1948 to 1.94 acres in 1982, the same for the top size class owning 100 acres or above had declined from 192 acres to 127 acres. While the share of the bottom class had increased from about 0.78 percent to 4.77 percent that of the top class declined from 23.52 percent to 8.13 percent during the same period.

Changes in the Caste-wise Distribution of Land Ownership:

Looking at Table 6.0.2, which provides us changes in caste-wise distribution of land ownership, one notices that the share of land owned by the two upper castes, viz. Brahmins and Reddies had declined — the former substantially and the latter only marginally.

Table 6.0.1: Changes in Land Distribution in the Village -- 1948-82

Size Class (acres)	1948				1982			
	Number of House - holds	Percentage of house- holds	Percentage of Share in total land	Average land (acres)	Number of house- holds	Percentage of house- holds	Percentage of Share in total land	Average land (acres)
0.0 -- 2.5	52	11.85	0.78	1.32	230	30.71	4.77	1.94
2.5 -- 5.0	63	14.35	2.72	3.88	123	16.42	5.02	3.82
5.0 --10.00	100	22.78	8.12	7.31	151	20.16	11.91	7.39
10.0 --20.00	96	21.85	15.61	14.61	111	14.82	17.22	14.54
20.0 --30.00	59	13.44	15.96	24.32	47	6.28	12.26	24.42
30.0 --40.00	22	5.01	8.45	34.35	35	4.67	13.19	35.28
40.0 --50.0	10	2.28	4.97	44.66	19	2.54	8.89	44.80
50.0 --60.0	9	2.05	5.56	55.59	14	1.87	8.34	55.78
60.0 --70.0	5	1.14	3.46	62.28	7	.93	4.79	64.06
70.0 --80.0	6	1.37	4.94	74.07	2	.27	1.59	74.53
80.0 --100.0	6	1.37	5.91	88.57	4	.53	3.89	90.98
100.0 & above	11	2.51	23.52	192.30	6	.80	8.13	126.81
All Classes	439	100.00	100.00	20.48	749	100.00	100.00	12.50

Sources: i. Karnam Account of 1948

ii. Record of Rights of the Village, 1982

While the share of Brahmins went down from 20 percent in 1948 to 3 percent in 1982, the corresponding decline for the Reddies was from 30 percent to 28 percent. The shares of

Table 6.0.2: Changes in Land Ownership by Different Caste Groups

CASTE	1948				1982			
	Number of families	Extent of land owned (acres)	Percentage of land owned	Average land of the house hold (acres)	Number of families	Extent of land owned (acres)	Percentage of land owned	Average land of the house hold (acres)
Brahmins	61	1776.45	20	29.12	8	236.67	3	29.98
Reddies	50	2749.14	30	54.98	87	2619.69	28	30.11
Yadava	77	1266.06	14	16.44	168	2195.62	24	13.07
Artisans	13	169.37	2	13.03	43	403.34	4	9.38
Valmikis	126	1336.65	15	10.60	162	1622.33	17	10.01
Harijans	41	243.60	3	5.94	169	628.26	7	3.72
Muslims	39	750.98	8	19.26	75	906.21	9	12.08
Non-Brahmin and non-cultivating upper castes	32	699.29	8	21.85	37	746.46	8	20.17
All Castes	439	8991.54	100	20.47	749	9358.58	100	12.50

Source: 1. Karnam Account of 1948,

2. Record of Rights, 1982.

Yadavas, Valmikis and Harijans had registered an increase. While Yadavas enhanced their share from 14 percent to 24 percent, Valmikis and Harijans increased their shares from 15 percent to 17 percent and 3 percent to 7 percent, respectively. It should be interesting to analyse the nature of land transfers leading to changes in the land distribution noted above.

Tables 6.0.1 and 6.0.2 portray macro evidence (official) of land ownership position at two points of time viz., 1948 and 1982. We will analyse the factors responsible for such changes with the help of the micro data on land transfers collected from the sample households. It is convenient to look at these land transfers in three periods of time characterised by three specific factors. viz., (i) The advent of land reforms, 1948-1961 (ii) The decline of the village economy, 1961-1974 and (iii) the revival of the economy, 1974-1984. The basis for such periodization are, (i) the impact of land reform legislation and the consequent adjustments made by the land owning communities and (ii) changes in the crop cycle, crop mix and levels of economic activity in the village.

We will discuss the land transfers during the first period i.e. Land Reforms period in this Chapter and the land transfers in the subsequent two periods will be discussed in Chapters VII and VIII respectively. The Land Reforms period has been further divided into two sub-periods — (i) Pre-Tenancy Reform Period (1948-56), (ii) Post-Tenancy Reforms Period (1956-61). This chapter is presented in three sections. In the first section, the land transfers in the pre-tenancy reforms period will be discussed. The second section deals with the land transfers in the post-tenancy reforms period. The impact of the land transfers in these two sub-periods on land ownership will be analysed in the last section.

I

Pre-Tenancy Reforms Period (1948-56)

6.1.0 The talk of land reforms had been in the air in India much before the State Governments passed legislations in the late fifties and early sixties. Depending upon the level of awareness of the land owning classes, land transfers and eviction of tenants had been taking place even from the early fifties. Hence, the period 1948-56 is taken to see how the

impending land reforms had influenced the land transfers. The impact of such land reforms on land transfers will be analysed with the help of the survey data on land transfers collected from sample households.

6.1.1 Caste-Wise Analysis of Land Transfers:

Yadava households were the highest net gainers of land during this period. Table 6.1.1 shows that this community had acquired as much as 32 percent of total land. However, in turn they lost about 16 percent. Valmiki households come next in order, gaining 22 percent but losing 14 percent of total land. Harijans had gained nearly 17 percent of total land and lost only 8 percent of land. The upper caste households were the principal land losers during this period. These households had lost as much as 57 percent of total land and gained only 26 percent of land. Even among upper caste households -- which include Brahmins, Reddies, Lingayats and Vaisyas -- it was Brahmins who lost much of the land. Infact alienation of land by Brahmins was not specific to this village in this region. V.V. Sayana, in his study on land transfers in the Telugu speaking districts of Madras Presidency for the period of 1930's and 40's, also noted that "land has been rapidly moving from the Brahmins..." (V.V. Sayana, 1952: 21).

As we have pointed earlier, Brahmins started migrating out of the village from the nineties of the last century. Although majority of them still retained their rentier interests in land, a few of them started disposing^{of} their lands. In 1948, 61 Brahmin families owned 1776 acres of land in the village, although a majority of these families were living outside the village. These absentee Brahmin land holders were mostly leasing out their lands to the Yadava tenants.^{1/} Initially there was an intense competition in the landlease market and land rents were also paid promptly.^{2/} The tenants themselves used to visit the place where the Brahmin landowners lived to pay the land-rent. Over time, with falling agricultural prices and frequent crop failures, tenants found it

Table 6.1.1: Land Transfers (Caste-wise) 1948-1956

Caste of the sellers Caste of the Buyers	Caste-wise Share (%) in Total Land Transacted through Market						
	Upper Castes	Yadava	Valmiki	Harijan	Artisan Castes	Minority Religions	Share (%) in total purchases
Upper Castes	19.02	3.82	3.00				25.84
Yadava	16.66	9.33				5.61	31.60
Valmiki	7.78	2.72	3.41	7.74			21.65
Harijan	9.58		7.11				16.69
Artisan Castes	2.41						2.41
Minority Religion	1.81						1.81
Share (%) in total sales	57.26	15.87	13.52	7.74	Nil	5.61	100.00

Source: Survey Data

Table 6.1.2: Reasons for Alienation of Land (1948-56)

Reason for alienation Size Class of landhold- ing of sellers	Share (%) in Total Sales of Land due to Reasons							Share (%) in total sales of land
	Debts or mortga- ges	Major family expenses	Fear of Tenancy Reforms	Out Migr- ation	Acquisi- tion by government	Gift such as dowry	Miscella- neous Reasons	
0								
0 - 5	5.62			2.19			1.49	9.30
5 - 20	16.88	14.98	13.40			2.33		47.59
20 - 40		6.14	8.24					14.38
40+			28.73					28.73
All Classes	22.50	21.12	50.37	2.19		2.33	1.49	100.00

Source: Survey Data

difficult to pay the land-rents. As payment of rents became irregular, the Brahmin land owners living in far-off places found it difficult to make annual visits to the village for their rent collection. Hence, even before 1948, some of them started alienating their lands while others who lived in the nearby towns continued to remain as absentee landlords.

The early fifties witnessed an intense awareness among the substantial land-owners in Andhra about the impending legislation on land reforms in the state. There were innumerable instances — where fearing the legislation big landowners desperately disposed of their lands.^{3/} Added to this, before the legislation on tenancy had been passed in 1956, there were elections to the State Assembly of Andhra in 1955 when it was generally felt that the Communist Party would come to power. Although it did not actually happen such a fear among the substantial land owners had hastened the process of land transfers — especially benami transfers.^{4/} Admittedly, awareness of these problems among the big cultivators in the Rayalaseema region was not of the same order as in Coastal Andhra. But the educated sections, from the non-cultivating caste categories who were mostly in the service sector in the urban areas—especially absentee landlords of the region—sensed a threat to their landed assets. Hence, they started disposing of their lands.

6.1.2 Reasons for the Alienation of Land

In the village under study, the impending legislation of land reforms did generate land transfers. This is seen from the fact that about half of the land transacted was due to the fear of tenancy reforms^{5/} (See Table 6.1.2). It also shows that more than 22 percent of land was sold due to debts on mortgages.^{6/} The farmers used to borrow money for three reasons; consumption expenditure, unfavourable seasons and payment of bride price. We will elaborate these factors below.

(a) Consumption Loans: Small and middle farmers, having taken loans for consumption

expenditure, often failed to repay them due to the vagaries in product market. As we have pointed out earlier, this region had been growing cotton since the beginning of 19th century. Crop failures and violent fluctuations in product prices had ruined some middle and small farmers; in the process helping a few clever operators in the village. The following is one such case encountered during our survey.

Saranappa according to the villagers was a 'spoiled young man' from an upper caste. In the early 1940's, after getting married, he joined as gumastha (clerk) under a local cotton trader, who belonged to lower caste. Later on some differences arose between them and Saranappa left the employer to start his own trade in cotton. Soon he started realising huge profits by interlocking various markets. He used to lend grain loans, seed loans and money to his regular asamis (customers). Some of them could not pay back the loans and he had acquired their lands, thus in the process pauperising some small and middle farmers.

Thus, small farmers could not repay the loans, borrowed for consumption and agricultural purposes, due to crop failures, vagaries of market and their weak position in the credit market.

(b) Unfavourable Seasons:

In the mid-thirties and mid-forties, the villagers had experienced two famines (popularly known as Adoni karavu and Chinnahotur karavu). Although the human mortality^{7/} was insignificant (thanks to the relief works around the village) most of the farmers were affected by these famines. Some small and marginal farmers who had incurred debts failed to repay them on time and thus lost their lands.

(c) The System of Bride Price:

In addition to weak resource base, crop failures and occasional famines, one social practice that ruined some families was the bride price or teravu or the obverse of dowry. It was prevalent among majority of the castes. According to this system the

"bridegroom has to pay a fixed bride price to the bride's parents and the price of a widow was very generally one-half of that of maid" (Francis, 1954; 66). Hence, the marriage of sons became financially a burdensome task. This system had worked against those families which had a number of unmarried boys. Obviously, the practice was favourable to those families which had daughters to be married off.

Venkata Setty had four sons and the marriage of the two elder sons had ruined the household. For these marriages he had to borrow huge loans from money lenders to pay bride price. He failed to repay the loans due to his weak resource base. He had alienated 11.22 acres to an upcoming ryot and became landless. This system had given rise to another social institution namely Illarikam. According to this institution, after marriage, bride and groom would go and stay permanently in bride's place. Illarikam marriages would take place only in those cases in which the girl is from a wealthier family. Venkatesetty's third son had to go for Illarikam, thus mitigating financial situation of the family.

The system of bride price used to work in favour of those households which had a number of unmarried girls. A few of such households had in fact acquired small pieces of land with the money received as bride price. One such case is illustrated below;

Jayamma got Rs.200 as bride price when she married off her daughter in the late 1940's. She owned initially 8 acres of land. She had a 4-acre parcel of land far away from the village which posed her some supervision problems. Being a widow, with two younger sons, she wanted to dispose of the 4-acre parcel and purchase 6 acres of land near the village. She could do so with the money received as bride price for her daughter as also from the sale proceeds of the distant land.

Thus, the system of 'bride price' helped the households, which had unmarried girls (like our Jayamma). But, sometimes it even affected the households not connected with the bride price. In the 1930's and 40's, young boys from Yadava and Valmiki castes used

to work as attached labourers in the houses of Reddies for a year or so. Under this arrangement, they would get the bulk of the wage payment (Gasam) at the end of the year and this would come handy for the payment of bride price. If these employer-households were unable to pay this bulk amount to the attached labourer, then they had to borrow loans from the money lenders which sometimes resulted in the alienation of their land.

Subba Reddy was a big farmer cultivating his lands with attached labourers. Chinna Yellappa, a young man from Yadava caste joined him as attached labourer with the hope of earning money for his marriage. As Subba Reddy for some reason was financially hard-pressed, he had to borrow loans from a commission agent in the Adoni cotton market. Later on he was unable to pay the debt which eventually led to the alienation of 20 acres of land.

On the whole, this peculiar system of bride price led to the alienation of as much as 21.12 percent of the total land from the sellers.

6.1.3 Size Class-wise Acquisition and Alienation of Land through Market:

During this period i.e. 1948-56, more than one third of the land was purchased by rich farmers, who own more than 40 acres of land. To be specific, rich farmers purchased about 36 percent of land and sold away only 5 percent (See Table 6.1.3). Middle farmers, who own more than 20 acres of land, but less than 40 acres of land, had lost 10 percent of land and gained only 6 percent of land. Small farmers, falling in the size class of 5-20^{7/}, had lost as much as 81 percent of land and gained 36 percent of land. Thus, the small farmers' net loss of land was 46 percent. Marginal farmers, who own less than 5 acres of land, had gained 10 percent of land and lost 4 percent. The landless households had purchased 13 percent of land. One interesting phenomenon during this period was, while middle and rich farmers had purchased most of the land from Brahmins, small farmers had purchased from other castes. It should be

Table 6.1.3: Size Class-wise Acquisition and Alienation of Land through Market

Caste of the seller Size class of the buyer (acres)	Share(%) in the total Land Transacted through Market							Share (%) in total purchase	Share (%) in total sales	Net gain/loss
	NBUC*	Yadava	Valmiki	Harijan	Artisan castes	Minority religions	Brahmins			
0	11.54	1.20						12.74	-	+12.74
0-5				1.83			8.15	9.98	3.87	+ 6.11
5-20	2.48	8.89	10.85	5.91			7.41	35.54	81.43	-45.89
20-40			2.67				3.57	6.24	10.14	- 3.90
40+	9.15	5.78				5.61	14.96	35.50	4.56	+30.94
Share(%) in Total Sales	23.17	15.87	13.52	7.74		5.61	34.09	100.00	100.00	0.00

* NBUC : Non-Brahmin upper castes

Source: Survey Data

interesting to analyse the reasons for this phenomenon.

Around this time the Brahmins of the village used to own land holdings, the average size of which was around 20 acres. Brahmin landowners, by and large, preferred to sell their holdings at one point of time and be done with it. While the small farmers with scanty resources and little savings at the end of the agricultural year found it difficult to purchase these big holdings, rich farmers with substantial resources and better access to credit facilities were in an advantageous position in the land market. Only in exceptional cases the Brahmin land owners were willing to be considerate towards their tenants and sell the lands in parcels at different points of time. One such case is described below.

In 1950, Haji Saheb, Althaf Hussein and Abbas Ali were small farmers. Together, they used to lease in 18.18 acres from a Brahmin absentee landlord who was staying in a town, 300 Kms. away from the village. All on a sudden one day the landlord descended on the village and announced his decision to sell his 18.18 acres of land. But the three tenants did not have cash resources to buy up 18.18 acres of land. They offered to buy the land in two holdings of 9.09 acres each to which the landlord agreed to after a great deal of persuasion. Eventually the sales were executed at two times.

But such consideration on the part of the Brahmin land owners was, as stated above, an exception rather than a rule. Hence, the Brahmin lands were, by and large, purchased by the rich farmers from the Reddy and Yadava communities.

Thus, anticipating tenancy reforms, Brahmin landlords had alienated their lands in the village. These lands were purchased by rich farmers belonging to upper castes—especially Reddies and Lingayats — and the Yadavas. While Brahmins sold away their lands due to the fear of impending land reforms, other non-respondent households in the village had lost lands due to consumption pressure, family problems like payment of bride price and unfavourable seasons. In the next section, land transfers in the tenancy reforms period are analysed.

II

Tenancy Reforms Period — (1956-61)

6.2.0 This period had witnessed two landmark in the history of land reforms in Andhra Pradesh. There were two enactments on land reforms — one on tenancy and the other on ceiling on agricultural holdings. The Andhra Cultivating Tenants Protection Ordinance was promulgated on 10th July 1956 and an act was passed on

13th September, 1956. "It sought to give protection to certain categories of tenants in the state from unjust eviction. This act provides for (a) fixation of maximum rent (b) minimum period of lease (c) procedure for determination of fair rent in case of disputes and for remission of rent (d) circumstances under which the landlords could terminate the tenancy and (e) machinery for settlement of disputes". (Partha Sarathy and Prasada Rao, 1967; 130). The Andhra Pradesh Ceiling (on Agricultural Holdings) Act was passed in 1961. "It puts a limit on the maximum size of cultivated holding, this being $4\frac{1}{2}$ times the family holding and gives the power to the government to acquire the surplus land. The ceiling limit varied between 27 and 324 acres, depending upon the type of the land (ibid., 1967; 2). This act which was amended in 1973 came into force from January 1, 1975. The impact of these two legislations in Andhra Pradesh was clinically analysed by Parthasarathy and Prasada Rao (1967), as also P.T. George (1967). While the impact of tenancy reforms on land transfers in the village under study is analysed in this section, the impact of Ceiling Act will be analysed in the subsequent chapters.

6.2.1 Caste-wise Analysis of Land Transfers:

In this period also, Yadava households had acquired much of the land transacted. Table 6.2.1 shows that, these households, while losing only 5 percent of land, had acquired as much as 47 percent of total land. Harijans had acquired 11 percent of land. Valmikis, while losing 17 percent of land, had acquired only 12 percent of land. Like in the previous period, the upper/caste households had lost much of the land. This caste, while acquiring only 21 percent of land, had lost as much as 57 percent of land. During this period also, Brahmins had alienated most of the land by showing unusual eagerness to sell. But middle and small farmers, with scanty resources, found it difficult to purchase their land. Even rich farmers had to borrow to purchase land.

Sudharsana Reddy was a very rich farmer, who owned nearly 170 acres of land in 1956. Two Brahmin landlords together had come forward to sell 40.60 acres of land. But he did not have sufficient cash resources to

Table 6.2.1: Land Transfers (Caste-wise) (1956-61)

Caste of the buyers \ Caste of the sellers	Cost-wise Share (%) in Total land Transacted through Market						Share (%) in total purchases
	Upper castes	Yadava	Valmiki	Harijans	Artisan Castes	Minority religions	
Upper Castes	19.96		.95				20.91
Yadava	31.77		8.48			6.88	47.13
Valmiki	4.27		7.59				11.86
Harijan						11.36	11.36
Artisan Castes		4.91					4.91
Minority Religion	.71					3.12	3.83
Share in total sales	56.71	4.91	17.02			21.36	100.00

Source: Survey Data

purchase 40 acres of land. So he borrowed from his relatives and a commission agent in Adoni to purchase the land. However, Sudharsana Reddy had to sell away all the jewellery to repay the debt, when the household had partitioned in 1962.

Since middle and even rich farmers did not have money, the demand for Brahmins' land was not sufficiently high. Consequently, land values had crashed. The average sale value of dry land in this area in 1945 was Rs.500 per acre (V.V.Sayana, 1952:35). But as a result of abundant availability of Brahmins' land for which enough demand was not forthcoming the land values dwindled down to Rs.328 per acre in the village during this period. In spite of the decrease in land values, not many farmers had come forward to purchase Brahmins' land. Hence, Brahmins had to accept late payment for land sales. One such case is described below:

Raghavendra Rao had been leasing out his 7.8 acres of fertile land to Dharma Reddi. In 1957 Raghavendra Rao asked Dharma Reddi to purchase his land. Although Dharma Reddi was a middle farmer, owning 39 acres of land, he did not have enough cash to purchase the land. As Dharma Reddy expressed his inability to buy up the land, Raghavendra Rao had agreed for accepting a delayed payment. But the condition was that Dharma Reddi had to mortgage all his immovable property to him (Raghavendra Rao). On the very day when Dharma Reddi bought the land from Rao, the former had to mortgage all his immovable property including the land that he had bought.

Such cases of sales by the Brahmin landowners were not few. They reflect the eagerness and haste with which Brahmins wanted to dispose of their lands.

6.2.2 Reasons for Selling Land;

Tenancy reforms appeared to have influenced the Brahmin land owners a great deal in disposing of their lands. Nearly 32 per cent of total land was sold due to the tenancy reforms (See Table No.6.2.2). Interestingly, as much as 49.91 percent of land

Table 6.2.2 Reason for Alienation of Land (1956-61)

Reason for the sale of land Size class of sellers	Share (%) in Total Sales of Land due to Reasons							Share (%) in total sales on land
	Debts or mortgages	Major family expenses	Fear of tenancy reforms	Out-migration	Acquisition by government	Gift such as dowry	Miscellaneous Reasons	
0								
0 - 5	12.33							12.33
5 -20	37.58		14.02	14.04				65.64
20 -40			10.02					10.02
40+			7.7				4.31	12.01
All Classes	49.91		31.74	14.04			4.31	100.00

Source: Survey Data

was alienated due to either debts or mortgages. This shows that the factors that we have explained in the last section, viz., market forces, unfavourable seasons and demographic factors were still at work. The impact of all these factors was most felt on small farmers and resulted in their out-migration. Most of the families after losing land in the village migrated out to the nearby towns and started working in construction and other spheres of activities in the informal sector. During this period more than 14 percent of land was alienated by the out migrants.

6.2.3 Size Class-wise Acquisition and Alienation of Land through Market:

Rich farmers had gained 59 percent of land, by losing only 9.5 percent of land. Their net gain was nearly half of the total land transacted during this period. As shown in the table 6.2.3, small and middle farmers were not losers. While the net loss

Table 6.2.3: Size class-wise Acquisition and Alienation of Land through Market

Caste of the Size Class of the buyer	Share (%) in Total Purchases							Share (%) in total purchase	Share (%) in total sales	Net loss/ Net gain
	NBUC*	Yadava	Valmiki	Harijan	Artisan castes	Minority religions	Brahmins			
0								Nil	Nil	
0 - 5							4.06	4.06	4.0	+0.06
5 - 20	4.20	4.91	9.66			10.20	2.30	31.27	66.5	-35.23
20 - 40						5.24		5.24	20.0	-14.76
40+	1.42		7.36			5.92	44.73	59.43	9.5	+49.93
All Classes	5.62	4.91	17.02			21.36	51.09	100.00	100.0	0.0

*
NBUC : Non Brahmin Upper Castes

Source: Survey Data

of small farmers was 35 percent, the marginal farmers' net loss was 15 percent. As we noted earlier, since the Brahmins' landholdings were usually large, only rich farmers could

purchase their lands and, hence, the share of rich farmers in the total purchases was high.

III

6.3 Changes in Distribution of Land Ownership (1948-61)

6.3.0 In the introductory remarks to the present chapter, we noted that the concentration of land had remained more or less same during the period 1948-1982. We also noted that, we will look at the survey data on land transfers collected from the 66 sample households from the village, in order to comment upon the observations made on changes in the distribution of land ownership. With the help of these data, we have regenerated distribution of land ownership for the time points of 1948, 1961, 1974 and 1984. For details, see the chapter on methodology. We will present the results of the period (1948-61) in this chapter and the results for the periods 1961-74 and 1974-84 will be presented in the subsequent chapters. Now let us present the changes in distribution of landownership during the period 1948-61.

6.3.1 Changes in Distribution of Land Ownership

In 1948, more than 27 percent of the households were landless. While 20 percent of the households were marginal farmers, 34 percent of the households were small farmers. More than 10 percent of total households were rich. Rich farmers had controlled more than half of the land. Their average land was 86.65 acres. Small farmers had controlled 22 percent of land, while middle farmers owned only 15 percent of the land. The average land of small farmers was 10.08 acres where as middle farmer's average land was 28.62 acres.

By 1981, the percentage of landless households remained unchanged. But the proportion of rich farmers had increased from 11 to 13 percent. Their share in the total land also increased from 58 percent to approximately 66 percent by 1961. The average land

ownership had also gone up from 86.65 acres in 1948 to 90.43 acres in 1961. On the

Table 6.3.1: Distribution of Land Ownership 1948-61

Size of the land holding (acres)	1948			1961		
	Percentage of household	Percentage of the share of land	Average land (acres)	Percentage of the total households	Percentage of share of total land	Average land (acres)
0	27.5	0.0	0.0	27.5	Nil	Nil
0 - 5	20.0	5.0	3.76	17.26	2.97	3.14
5 - 20	34.0	22.0	10.08	36.0	23.03	11.68
20 - 40	8.0	15.0	28.62	5.99	8.34	25.42
40+	10.5	58.0	86.65	13.25	65.66	90.43
All Classes	100.0	100.0	15.52	100.00	100.00	18.26

LR (excluding landless households) = 0.62

LR (excluding landless households) = 0.62

LR (including landless households) = 0.72

LR (including landless households) = 0.72

Source: Survey Data

other hand, while the proportion of marginal farmers had declined from 20 percent to 17.26 percent, the proportion of small farmers had increased from 34 percent to 36 percent by 1961. While the share and average land of marginal farmers had declined, the share as well as average land of small farmers had increased. The proportion of share and average land of middle farmers had declined. The Lorenz ratio for 1948 distribution of land was 0.615 (excluding landless households). It was 0.721 when landless households were included. The Lorenz ratio for 1961 distribution of land (including and excluding landless households) remained more or less the same during this period.

The reasons for the stability in the concentration of land ownership are not far to seek. Earlier, we have noted that Brahmin absentee landlords were the principal

landlosers in both the periods i.e. 1948-56 and 1956-61. These Brahmin absentee landlords had started alienating their landed assets due to tenancy reforms. We have also noted that since the size of Brahmins' landholding was usually large, only rich farmers belonging to upper castes and Yadava caste could purchase them. In other words, land had moved from one caste (Brahmins) to other castes (Reddies and Yadavas), but not from one size class to another. And hence, the concentration of land ownership remained unaffected.

To sum up, during this period, the Brahmin landlords had alienated most of the land to rich farmers belonging to Reddy and Yadava castes due to the fear of tenancy reforms. Only a little land was transferred from Brahmins to small farmers. Hence, the concentration of landownership remained unchanged.

Notes and References

1. The demand for land leasing had mostly come from the Yadava and Boya/Valmiki communities. But, as the Brahmin land owners were unsure of the 'loyalty' of the Boya tenants, they preferred the more docile Yadava tenants.
2. There was a saying in these parts. హాపనేళ్ల సొమ్ము అనరాదు meaning 'Money due to the Brahmins should not be appropriated'. Hence land rents were paid promptly.
3. For instance, V.V. Sayana cited one instance of a Vakil (Pleader) of Sankili village of Bobbili estate in the Viskhapatnam district who created a stir in his area by executing 13 land transactions in a short time. Such cases were aplenty in the coastal Andhra.
4. The communists appeared to be invincible before the elections. But much to the delight of the landed interests, although communists doubled their votes, they won hardly 15 seats for the State Assembly.
5. At the time of the survey, we asked the question "what is the reason behind the land transfer" or "why did he (non-respondent) sell the land? In the case of native sellers of land, our respondents knew the 'actual' reason behind the land alienation. But in the case of Brahmin absentee landlords, only few respondents could clearly say that it was because of tenancy reforms. Many of the respondent buyers are ignorant of tenancy reforms even today. We probed a little deeper and started enquiring about the Brahmin absentee landlords, their economic background etc. Many respondents informed us that Brahmin landlords were desperate to sell their piece of land, although there were no compelling economic reasons for these sales. After a careful enquiry of the transfer of land, we have inferred that these land transfers were motivated by the impending tenancy reforms.
6. Although we have clubbed these two reasons, they are slightly different. Usually a farmer in the village takes a consumption loan (chebadhullu) and it consequently becomes a loan. If land transfer were to take place at this stage it could be due to debt. If it leads to a promissory note and mortgage of land, leading to land transfer, then we can say that it is motivated by mortgage of land.
7. However, a plague had broken out in between these two famines and more than 10 people died causing desertions from the village. Cholera also broke out around this period in the village.

CHAPTER 7

THE DECLINE IN THE LEVELS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (1961-1974)

7.0 Introduction

In the village under study cotton was an important crop in the early sixties. It accounted for about one third of the net sown area and constituted major source of cash income for the households in the village. The villagers' sustenance very much depended upon the success of cotton. A bumper harvest of cotton may tide over the deficits of previous years, while its failure would not only worsen the debt position but also force the farmer to take new loans. From sixties onwards cotton crop did fail in the village and hence, the cotton economy of the village shown a rapid decline. This had significant effect on the economic conditions of the households. In this chapter, the impact of the decline in the cotton economy on the village's land market is analysed. There are three sections to this chapter. First section examines the factors responsible for the decline in the cotton economy and second section deals with its impact on the land transfers. In the last section, the impact of land transfers on ownership and distribution of land will be analysed.

I

Factors Responsible for the Decline in the Cotton Economy

7.1.0 As we already noted cotton had become an important cash crop in the Rayalaseema

region by the turn of the century and it continued to be so in the first half of 20th century (See 5.2.6). In order to understand the importance of cotton, one has to know the crop-cycle.

7.1.1 Crop Cycle in 1865:

In a letter written to the Secretary, Board of Revenue in 1865, the Collector of Bellary gave a detailed account of crop cycle in the district^{1/} (See Table 7.1.1)

Table 7.1.1: The Particulars of Duration of Crops and Crop Cycle

Name of the crop	Time of Sowing				Time of Harvesting			
	From		To		From		To	
	Month	Date	Month	Date	Month	Date	Month	Date
A. MUNGARI CROPS								
1. Bajra	June	5th	July	2nd	October	27th	November	25th
2. Pulses	June	5th	July	2nd	September	27th	October	11th
3. Jowar (Brown)	May	1st	June	30th	October	1st	November	30th
4. Korra	June	5th	August	12th	November	26th	January	27th
B. Hingari Crops								
1. Jowar	September	1st	September	30th	February	1st	February	28th
2. Cotton	July	3rd	September	23rd	March	9th	June	19th

from

Source: Letter of A. Hathaway, Collector of Bellary to R.A. Dalzell, Acting Secretary to the Board of Revenue, dated 26th September 1865, No.194. Proceedings of Board of Revenue, 23rd October, 1865, p.2967

It is interesting to note that the same crop cycle was followed till 1974. The villagers

had been growing two types of crops. They were Mungari or early crops and Hingari or later crops.^{2/} Mungari crops, which include Bajra, Pulses, Jowar (brown) and korra, were generally sown in the months of May and June and harvested in the months of August and September. Hingari crops, which include Jowar (white) and cotton, were generally sown in July and September and harvested in March to April.

7.1.2 The Significance of Mungari and Hingari Crops:

The significance of cultivation of Mungari and Hingari crops lay in the fact that these two types of crops contained a good crop-mix which ensured both food and fodder as well as cash for the farmer to pay the land revenue. When a superintendent of government farms asked the farmers, why they were growing cotton, they replied that cultivators of cotton was done in order to pay the land revenue. (Annual Report from the Superintendent of Government Farms 1876 p.36; cited in Sarada Raju, 1941: 41). The other Mungari crops however were grown for subsistence. From the statement of Francis, one would know that similar attitude was prevalent at the turn of the century also. "With the rains of June a considerable area ... is sown with cholam, korra, cambu and pulses (Mungari crops), all of which the ryot necessarily requires to support himself and his cattle". On the other hand "with the later rains he (the ryot) sows the cotton which pays his assessment and puts money in his pocket" (1904; 80). Thus Mungari crops were basically subsistence crops, while cotton, an important Hingari crop, was grown to pay land revenue and to meet other expenses.

Similar attitude continued among the ryots in the dry parts of Rayalaseema region till 1970. Small and marginal farmers usually grow Mungari crops. Because their food surpluses would be exhausted at the end of agricultural season i.e. in the month of May and June and they would face the scarcity of food grains. If they grow Mungari crops, these crops can be harvested by the month of July. Another advantage

of these crops was that one can harvest them at any time. In other words, whenever the situation of food surplus worsens, the ryot would pluck a basket of bajra for this would suffice the family for a day or two. The rich and middle farmers whose surplus realization capacity was fairly good, would grow other cash crops like groundnut, chillies etc. Thus, harvesting and choice of Mungari crops depended upon economic category, and the Hingari crops, especially cotton, were grown by more or less all the farmers in order to pay land revenue as well as repay the loans.

7.1.3 Credit Requirements:

A peasant has to borrow loans at every stage of cultivation as also for consumption expenses. It is customary to divide loans into two types i.e. productive loans, which are borrowed for the sake of agricultural purposes and unproductive loans, borrowed for the repayment of old debts or to meet the expenses on social ceremonies. But the extent of credit required for productive and consumption needs varies from region to region and may even from one farmer to another. As Sayana puts it "the degree of producer finance will be governed by the size of farm operations, as also by the nature of farming. For example, for irrigated and garden cultivation or for intensive and commercialized agriculture the credit requirements are greater than in dry and light crop regions. Apart from the size of a farmer's family or its economic condition, in regions where there are frequent crop failures and the store of grains get exhausted before harvests are reaped, the extent of consumer finance of ryot will be heavier and frequent". (1949:149).

Likewise, in our village also, the ryots usually take loans either for consumption and social ceremonies or for repayment of old debts. The farmers, mainly small and marginal farmers, would hardly realise surpluses and their grain surpluses would be over by the month of May or June. After paying debts that were incurred in the previous year, the farmer would be left with little money to purchase grain in the

market. Prior to 1974, the farmers used to have few employment opportunities at the end of an agricultural year. Besides, a number of social ceremonies and festivals that come around this period would further ruin the household.^{4/} The villagers, thus, used to face innumerable problems in the months of May to August. There was a saying 'కార్తికము వస్తే కటకటా డంటి' literally meaning 'As the month of Karthika arrives, life becomes hard'. The farmers had to approach the sahukar or money lending landlord for Nagu^{5/} or grain loans for consumption and money for agricultural operations as well as for social ceremonies. Borrowing money from these sources, however, may not be an easy affair, for these village moneylenders would never lend money at a short notice. The borrower had to go around the moneylender for about ten days, carrying out all sorts of big and small tasks for him.^{6/} They had to undergo a period of uncertainty, anxiety and humiliation. Whenever the villagers take Chebadullu (handloans) from Sahukar or moneylender-cum-landlord, they would be entered in account book and they should be repaid after the harvest.

It should be noted that here harvest would mean only cotton harvest. Since cotton was an important cash crop in the village till 1974, these loans could be repaid only when cotton is sold in March or April. Till then there was little possibility to repay these loans. Only when there was bumper harvest of cotton and its prices were high, the farmers could repay the loans borrowed in the last year. On the other hand, when the crop failed, the farmer could not repay the loan. Thus, the success of cotton crop was very important for the ryots in the village under study. The frequent failures of cotton crop therefore would ruin the economy of the household and thereby the village economy. During this period i.e. 1961-1974, cotton crop frequently failed and consequently village's economy deteriorated.

7.1.4 Decline in the Productivity of Cotton:

The average yield of cotton per acre had shown a declining trend in kurnool district

between 1958-59 and 1972-73. Taking district as a whole one finds that during a period of fifteen years the average yield of cotton crop had fallen from 28.8 kgs per acre in the three year period ending with 1960-61 to 18.61 kg per acre in the three year period ending with 1972-73 (See Table 7.1.2). It was noted that there was decline in the area and production

Table 7.1.2: Average Yield of Cotton per acre in Kurnool District

Average for 3 year period ending with	Average yield of cotton per acre (Kgs)
1960-61	28.80
1963-64	24.33
1966-67	25.26
1969-70	20.36
1972-73	18.61

Source: (Annual) Statistical Abstract of Andhra Pradesh, Various Issues, Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.

of cotton in Rayalaseema region. The area under cotton had declined from 6.73 lakh acres in 1956-57 to 4.94 lakh acres by 1967-68. The production also declined from 0.83 lakh bales (or 149 lakh kgs) to 0.66 lakh bales (or about 119 lakh kgs) during the same period. (Altaff Hussein and Nawab Jain, 1970: 163)✓

It is customary to seek the explanation for changes in cropped area through changes in agricultural prices in area. In a study of cotton production and marketing by NCAER, it was found that "the area and price changes in Kurnool do not reveal any trend or pattern suggesting any influence of cotton price on acreage. Changes in area, when compared with current year's price change, reveal that in some years both

area and price have increased while in some years both have decreased. In some years, area decrease is accompanied by a price increase. Comparison of the current year's area changes with a lagged price (price of previous year) shows a similar confused picture" (NCAER, 1971:9). Although this study has given the figures only for the period of 1955-56 to 1966-67, we have put together data till 1976-77 (See Table 4.3). Even

Table 7.1.3: Area and Price Changes of Cotton in Kurnool District

Year	Area under cotton (acres)	Percentage of change in area	Price (Current year) Rs. per quintal	Percentage change in current price	Lagged Price (Rs. per quintal) (one year)	Percentage change in lagged price
1955-56	412673	-	52.25	-	63.15	-
1956-57	451126	+ 9.3	73.95	+41.53	52.25	-17.26
1957-58	320132	-29.1	74.33	+ 0.5	73.95	+41.53
1958-59	354594	+10.8	62.83	-15.47	74.33	+ 0.5
1959-60	321481	- 9.3	77.91	+24.00	62.83	-15.47
1960-61	411044	+27.9	85.76	+10.08	77.91	+24.0
1961-62	430541	+ 4.7	82.14	- 4.2	85.76	+10.08
1962-63	434508	+ 0.9	105.44	+28.4	82.14	- 4.2
1963-64	538158	+23.8	103.98	- 1.4	105.44	+28.4
1964-65	442746	-17.7	108.21	+ 4.1	103.98	- 1.4
1965-66	322139	-27.2	140.63	+30.0	108.21	+ 4.1
1966-67	348907	+8.3	263.13	+87.0	140.63	+30.0
1967-68	377497	+ 8.2	294.32	+11.8	263.13	+87.0
1968-69	347467	- 8.0	294.32	0	294.32	+11.8
1969-70	370914	+ 6.7	167.50	-43.1	294.32	0
1970-71	367818	- 0.8	242.33	+44.6	167.50	-43.1
1971-72	357506	- 2.8	253.40	+ 4.6	242.33	+44.6
1972-73	311791	-12.8	180.82	-28.6	253.40	+4.6
1973-74	347946	+11.6	224.80	+24.3	180.82	-28.6
1974-75	361282	+ 3.8	387.58	+72.4	224.80	+24.3
1975-76	161895	-55.2	329.56	-14.9	387.58	+72.4
1976-77	168643	+ 4.2	378.46	+14.8	329.56	+14.9

Sources: 1. 1955-56 to 1966-67 figures are obtained from NCAER

2. For 1967-68 to 1976-77 figures, the source is same as in 7.1.2

during the period of 1966-67 to 1976-77, the area and price changes in Kurnool do not reveal any consistent association. Thus, it appears that for the decline in the production changes in cotton prices do not seem to be an important reason. One author while looking into the effect of price and rainfall on the production of cotton in Rayalaseema region noted that "the multiple correlation co-efficient is very low indicating a poor relation between production, prices and rainfall. The partial correlation co-efficient indicate slight influence of rainfall on the production. However, the elasticity of production with reference to rainfall is 1.18 and is highly significant. This means that cotton crop has not received adequate rainfall during the period under study (1955-56 to 1967-68). Any increase in rainfall would contribute to higher yields" (1970; 167). Thus it is clear that the area under cotton in Kurnool district was more sensitive to changes in climatic factors rather than price. In this context, it would be useful to know the agronomic conditions of cotton plant.

7.1.5 Agronomy of Cotton:

The following statement describes well the agronomy of cotton crop. "The cotton plant is uncommonly sensitive to vagaries of weather. Continuous rains or a long spell of dry weather may prevent the sowing of the crop at the proper time, hinder seed germination or retard crop growth. Heavy rains, continuous high winds or excessive drought at flowering and fruiting times may cause heavy shedding of buds and young bolls, thereby ruining the crop. An early frost may kill the plant prematurely. Untimely rains and a heavy humid weather during the later stages of the season may spoil the produce, lower its spinning properties or promote the attack of pests and diseases ... During the period of fruiting, day temperature of 80° to 90° F and cool nights are needed for the best results. Plenty of sunshine and dry period are essential when cotton reaches maturity. Cotton plant cannot stand frost..."

(Planning Commission, 1963; P.5). Thus, the success of cotton depends on so many factors and the deficiency of any one of the factors mentioned above would ruin the cotton crop. Now, we will mention the factors that could have ruined the cotton crop in this village under study during this period.

i. Rain Deficient Years: The Source cited above mentioned that the cotton crop was affected in the years of 1957-58 and 1960-61. Besides, there were droughts in the years 1960-61, 1963-64 and 1965-66. Since rain was deficient during these years cotton crop was badly affected in this area.

ii. Heavy Rainfall and Depressions in Bay of Bengal: Table 7.1.1 reveals that cotton used to be sown between 3rd July and 23rd September. The plant would reach flowering stage in November and December. One of the conditions for the success of cotton crop was that there should be no rain in these months. Also plenty of sunshine was needed. But from 1974 onwards, there is change in weather pattern. This region had been receiving much rainfall in the months of October and November. Besides, the depressions that usually set in Bay of Bengal around this period would cause much damage to the crop, for whenever such depressions set in, the sky becomes cloudy and cotton plant receives scanty sunlight. Hence, the plant gets attacked by the pests etc.

When we look at the data on rainfall in Alur taluk, it may not reveal a pattern suggesting changes in weather (See Table 3 in Statistical Appendix). We can only infer from the table that from 1974 onwards, this taluk had been receiving much rainfall during months of November and December. There is another factor which is not evident from the data on rainfall. That is spread of rain in a month. Data reveal that, from 1975 onwards, the rainfall in the months of October and November was fairly widespread due to depressions in the Bay of Bengal. But these data do not reveal anything about cloudiness of the sky in these months.

We have had long discussions with a number of farmers in the village. Besides

corroborating in unison that weather did become unfavourable, they stated that the cultivation of cotton crop was no longer profitable because of low yield and the recurring problem of pests. Added to these the social anarchy prevalent in the village at that time had resulted in thefts and consequent lack of safety for the cotton crop.

iii. No Safety for the Crops: Crops were unsafe in the post 1960 period. Some miscreants from the Valmiki community used to steal the crops from the fields, when the owners were away. These activities were initially encouraged by the big ryots in the village for their political ends. When police interfered, these ryots used to give them protection. Later on when they faced economic hardships due to failure of monsoons these miscreants started stealing the crops from the fields of these very ryots; of all the crops, cotton posed grave problem to the farmers, for its plucking operations would continue for three months and the farmers had to pass through a period of anxiety. That was one reason why cotton cultivation became unattractive by 1974.

iv. Long Duration of Cotton Crop: The duration of cotton crop was very long. Table 7.1.1 reveals that cotton was generally sown in the months of July and September. But harvesting would begin only in March and it would continue till June 15th. Thus, the duration of this crop was very long. Hence, farmers had to wait for a long time to sell cotton and realise money in order to repay the debts. Even if they could start getting cotton from March onwards, it was not possible to sell cotton in small quantities. For if they sell cotton in small quantities to the middlemen in the village, the farmers would get lower prices. Besides, since the supplies of cotton will be larger and prices will be lower in the month of March, the farmers usually preferred to wait till July to get fair price. Thus, although farmers were getting cotton by March, they could sell it only in July or August. Consequently, having little money on hand, they depended greatly on the moneylenders.

Thus, during this period, cotton failed in a number of years due to droughts,

heavy rainfall in the months of November and December and depressions in the Bay of Bengal. Even if cotton was successful in some of the years, due to absence of safety for the crops, the farmers could not reap the full harvest that was due to them. Besides, since cotton was a long duration crop, the farmers were looking for short-duration crops, which could withstand the changes in weather pattern and could attract little attention of thieves in the village. They ultimately settled on new cropping pattern. (Changes in cropping pattern that were noticeable from 1974 will be discussed in the next chapter). But the process of transformation was painful and tortuous for farmers in the village. We will next see the impact of failure of cotton on land transfers in the village.

II

Impact of Decline in Levels of Economic Activities on Land Transfers

7.2.1 Caste-wise Acquisition and Alienation of Land:

Unlike in the earlier period, the Valmiki caste was the principal gainer during this period. This caste, while gaining 51 percent of land transacted, lost 39 percent (See Table 7.2.1). The net gain of this caste was 11 percent. Although the net gain of Valmiki caste was lower than that of Yadava caste, we still call Valmiki Caste as the principal gainer, because Valmikis had lost mainly to their fellow caste-men. Out of 39 percent of total land lost by Valmikis, as much as 31 percent of land was lost to their fellow caste-men. Thus, the Valmiki caste was the principal gainer. Yadavas gained 23 percent of land, but lost only 9 percent of land. Upper-caste households lost as much as 34 percent of land, but gained only 16 percent of land. Like in the earlier period the upper-caste households were the principal landlosers. However, there is one

Table 7.2.1: Land Transfers (Caste-wise) (1961-74)

Caste of the sellers Caste of the Buyers	Caste-wise Share (%) in Total Land Transacted through Market						Share(%) in total purchases	Net gain or loss
	Upper castes	Yadava	Valmiki	Harijan	Artisan Castes	Minority religions		
Upper Caste	10.21	3.26	-	2.57			16.04	-17.74
Yadava	8.23	5.62	5.04	1.93		2.35	23.17	+14.29
Valmiki	13.77		31.26	5.70			50.73	+11.4
Harijan			2.46	0.61		1.38	4.45	- 8.71
Artisan Castes				1.94		0.85	2.79	+ 2.79
Minority religions	1.57		0.57	0.41		0.27	2.82	- 2.03
Share (%) in total Sales	33.78	8.88	39.33	13.16		4.85	100.00	0.0

Source: Survey Data

difference. In the earlier periods it was Brahmins who constituted the majority of the upper caste landlosers. But during this period non-Brahmin households lost much of the land. (See Table 7.2.3). As we noted earlier, Valmikis lost much of the land to their fellow castemen. The reasons for this interesting phenomenon are: Changes in the occupational structure and caste-consciousness among Valmikis.

i. Changes in the Occupational Structure of Valmikis: Francis noted that at the turn of present century, Valmikis were either "part-cultivators and herdsmen or were engaged under government as constables, peons, village watchmen and so-forth" (1904:70). But the occupations of the Valmikis had changed over time. Many Valmikis are now engaged

Table 7.2.2. Reasons for the Alienation of Land (1961-74)

Reasons for Alienation of land Size class of land-holding of sellers	Share (%) in The Sales of Land due to Reasons							Share(%) in total sales of land
	Debts or mortgages	Major family expenses	Fear of Tenancy Reforms	out migration	Acquisition by the Govt.	Gift such as dowry	Miscellaneous Reasons	
0								
0 - 5	06.06	2.93	2.73	1.28		1.03	0.20	14.23
5 - 20	36.93	5.96		2.95		3.23	2.95	52.02
20 - 40	02.92		0.44	0.74		2.07	4.08	10.25
40+	13.09					4.52	5.89	23.50
All Classes	59.00	8.89	3.17	4.97		10.85	13.12	100.00

Source: Survey Data

in sheep-rearing activities in the village. With the surpluses acquired, some of the households had entered the credit market as well.

Bhimanna is a 60 years old shephard. When Bhimanna's father died in the early 1940's, he did not inherit any land from him, but 20 sheep. Gradually the number rose to 250. Although, many died in the late 70's due to an unknown disease, he still owns 70 sheep. From 1962 onwards slowly he started acquiring land and presently he owns 94 acres. He started lending seed and grain loans as well as money. Eventhough he declined to reveal the particulars of his lending operations, we come to know that he used to lend only to the valmikis and Harijans and acquired the defaulters' lands. Some of our respondents also borrowed from him.

Thus, some of the surplus realising families in the Valmiki community had entered the credit market and started lending money and grain to their fellow caste men. Some of them must have lost their lands to these households, when they were not able to repay the loans.

ii. Caste-Consciousness among the Valmikis: Valmikis are increasingly becoming aware of their caste identity.^{7/} They view themselves as belonging to one fraternity and the rest of the village as another. Hence, the small farmers in Valmiki community preferred to sell their land to their own fellow caste-men. The case of Naganna illustrates this point.

Naganna owned 3 acres of land in 1961. He took some money for consumption purposes from a moneylender belonging to an upper caste. Gradually the loan amount got accumulated and Naganna could not repay the loan. The money lender started pressurising Naganna either to sell him the land or repay the money. Naganna, however, did not want to sell him the land and instead he wanted to sell it to 'his men'. Eventually, he did sell it to a small farmer from his community and repaid the loan.

Thus, these two factors i.e. changes in occupational structure and caste consciousness among Valmikis had influenced them to sell most of their land to their fellow caste-men.

Coming back to the question of land losers of this period, Harijans and Muslims had lost much land. This was because of failure of cotton crop and demographic pressure in houses.

7.2.2 Reasons for Selling the Land (1961-74): AS we pointed out earlier, the economy of the village declined due to decline in cotton economy. It was the usual practice in the village that at the beginning of the year, a small farmer takes money for consumption requirements and agricultural operations from money-lenders. The amount with interest had to be paid back, after the harvest of cotton in the month of March or April next year. But, since cotton crop failed frequently during this period, the small farmers could not repay the debts and they got accumulated over a period of time. The

impact could be still higher on those families which had more demographic pressure. This had led to alienation of land by them.

The above reasons for alienation of land are evident from Table 7.2.2. 59 percent of land was lost because these households either had debts or mortgaged their land. Nearly 11 percent of land was lost because of gifts in the form of dowry etc. Nearly 9 percent of land was lost because these households had major family expenses such as marriage thereby resulting in the alienation of land. 13 percent of land was sold due to miscellaneous reasons such as border disputes, or because fields were far away and posing supervision problems. Nearly 5 percent of total land was alienated by those households who were migrating out. Thus, during this period sizeable extent of land was sold by the households for failing to repay the debts they incurred. These households mainly belonged to the category of small farmers.

7.2.3 Size Class-wise Acquisition and Alienation of Land

Unlike in the last period small and marginal farmers were the principal land gainers during this period. While small farmers had gained roughly 35 percent of land, marginal farmers had acquired 25 percent of total land. (See Table 7.2.3). Even landless households had gained land (15.5 percent) during this period. Middle farmers had acquired 8.2 percent of total land. Whereas rich farmers had obtained only 17 percent of total land which was far less compared to the proportion of land they obtained in the previous period.

The reasons for acquisition of sizeable extent of land by small farmers and marginal farmers were, change in the direction of land transfers, diversification of investment and availability of alternative employment opportunities.

Important reason for the swelling of the 5-20 class was change in the direction of land transfers. Credit market was dominated by Reddis, Vaisyas and Lingayats in

Table 7.2.3: Size class-wise Acquisition and Alienation of Land through Market

Caste of the Size class of the Buyers	Share(%) in the Total Land Transacted through market							Share (%) in the total land purchased	Share(%) in the Total sales	Net gain or loss	
	NBUC	Yadava	Valmiki	Harijan	Artisan Castes	Minority religion	Brahmins				
0	3.08	2.98	5.89	1.54		2.01		15.50	-	+15.50	
0 - 5	13.68		9.15				1.88	24.71	13.67	+11.04	
5 - 20		1.23	23.54	9.01			1.27	35.05	46.04	-10.99	
20 - 40	2.28	2.15		0.62			3.15	8.20	14.31	- 6.11	
40+	8.44	2.52	0.75	1.99			2.84	16.54	25.98	- 9.44	
All Classes	27.48	8.88	39.33	13.16			4.85	6.30	100.00	100.00	0.0

NBUC: Non Brahmin Upper Castes

Source: Survey Data

this village during 1930's and 1940's. From 30's onwards Yadavas had also joined in and started lending money as well as grain loans. By 1950's these money lending households had acquired some of the land from Brahmins and defaulters from various castes like Yadava, Valmiki, Harijans etc. Some of these households owned as much as 150 to 200 acres in 1961. These households (mainly Reddies) had come to know about the Ceiling (on Agricultural Holdings) Act of 1961 and hence started transferring their lands to others through spurious transactions. Naturally, they stopped purchasing land. But they advanced loans to a number of farmers in the village many years back and these loans got accumulated over a period of time. These small farmers were not in a position to repay the loans and the only option left for them was selling away their lands. But money lending landlords ^{were} / not interested in purchasing their land. The landlords of the village devised clever methods to meet such situations. Take

the case of Rama mohana Reddy, a landlord of the village.

Rama mohana Reddy lent some money to Khaja Hussein Saheb, who was a middle farmer with a large family. Being indolent and extravagant he did not show much interest in the cultivation of land. The loan amount got multiplied over a period of time and it had become almost impossible for Khaja Hussein to repay it. Hence, he requested Rama mohana Reddy to purchase the piece of land, which he had mortgaged to him. But as the money lending landlord was not interested in the land, he asked his follower Mareenna to purchase the same. Mareenna was not only a Harijan leader but also a contractor. As his household was upcoming economically, he could purchase land from Khaja Hussein. Rama manohar Reddy by performing the role of mediator shot three birds at one stroke. Firstly, he got his money back. Secondly, he could appease a Harijan leader on whom he could bank for Harijan votes and thirdly, he could overcome the problem of land reforms by not acquiring Hussein's land himself.

Like Rama manohar Reddy, the other money-lending landlords were encouraging their followers or small farmers in the village to purchase land from the potential defaulters. Hence, the direction of land transfers had changed from one of land being transferred from small farmers to rich farmers to that of transfers from small farmers to small farmers with rich farmers/ landlords acting as go-betweens. In other words, even if a marginal or small farmer had incurred debt and in the payment of which he had to lose his land he would be made to sell his land to a small farmer instead of his rich-farmer creditor.

Secondly, as cotton crop was frequently failing thereby enhancing the risk and uncertainties in agriculture, the rich farmers started diversifying their investments into non-agricultural activities. This is well illustrated by the case of Saranappa, whom we had occasion to refer to earlier.

We noted earlier that Saranappa started acquiring land by interlocking

the markets. This household had added 47 acres in the first period i.e. 1948-61, 11.5 acres in the second period i.e. 1961-74 and only 4 acres in the last period i.e. 1974-84. This household had realised the risk and uncertainties in agriculture in these parts. For example, in one of the rain-deficient years they could sow only 3 out of the 68 acres they owned. Saranappa lost interest in agriculture and started diversifying his economic activities. He had set up a flour mill with an initial investment of Rs.35,000 in 1962 and now the household is primarily receiving its income from it. But the household did not stop advancing cash, seed and grain loans to small and middle farmers. This continues to be a profitable proposition.

Prior to 1948, rich households were acquiring much land for it carried social prestige in the village. Although there was risk in agriculture in earlier times, there was no legal bar on the quantum of land acquired. But now one exists. Secondly, with increased monetization of the economy opportunities in other avenues of investment are larger now compared to earlier times. Hence, they (rich households) are seeking greener pastures in non-agricultural activities like flour mill, petty-business etc.

and
 Alienation of Land by Small/Marginal Farmers: On the other hand due to the decline of village economy the small and marginal farmers started going through a miserable life. The loans borrowed for consumption and agricultural operation could not be repaid due to frequent failure of cotton crop and lack of safety for the crops. These loans got accumulated over a time and led to the alienation of land by small and marginal farmers. Since rich farmers were reluctant to purchase land, they started selling the land to small and middle farmers.

Acquisition of Land by Small and Marginal Farmers: Why was it that while some small farmers were losing land due to the factors explained above, the other small farmers could acquire land? What were the factors behind this phenomenon? The

reasons are not far to seek. Since cotton cultivation had become quite risky during this period, many small and marginal farmers turned to non-agricultural activities like sheep rearing, bufflow rearing etc.

Pothanna had inherited only 5 acres of land from his father. Prior to the death of his father, Pothanna was working as a shepherd boy in the house of Thanmanna, who belonged to Yadava caste and who owned more than 300 sheep in the early 1950's. Pothanna after the death of his father, left the house of Thanmanna and purchased half-a-dozen sheep. Gradually this number rose to 150 and now he is so much associated with sheep rearing that he is called Gorrela Pothanna (Sheep Pothanna). Pothanna later on purchased 19 acres of land and constructed a nice house in the Valmiki Street.

Some of the small and marginal farmers, belonging to Valmiki caste, taking advantage of the ineffectiveness of local police and disunity among dominant cultivators in the village, started stealing the crops from the fields. Some of them had attained an upward mobility.

Papanna inherited only 5 acres from his father. He has four sons and two of them are notorious in the village for their stealing activities. They were caught by the police many a time and earned a bad record. The household had acquired 20 acres of land during this period from mainly their fellow caste-men i.e. Valmikis.

The situation had also helped the petty-business men

We noted earlier that Venkanna Setty lost land due to loans borrowed for the marriage of his sons. His son Ramaiah Setty, opened a small shop selling cigarettes, beedies and pippements. When the crops were unsafe and the law and order situation got deteriorated, Ramaiah Setty exploited the situation to his maximum advantage. He started buying the stolen crops at lower rate from people like papanna's sons (See the above case) and selling them in Adoni market at a higher price. He had even encouraged such thieves by advancing them some cash etc. He earned sizeable profits

and acquired 12.19 acres of land during this period.

Now let us see the sources of investment for purchasing lands by marginal and small farmers.

Of the total land gained by marginal farmers, 66 percent had accrued to those, whose primary occupation was sheep rearing. The Valmiki households, which participated in stealing activities, had acquired 9 percent of land. More than 24 percent of land was gained by a marginal farmer, due to a chance factor of having come in to possession of gold deposited with him by an acquaintance.

Of the total land acquired by small farmers, interestingly, as much as 41 percent of land was gained by small farmers who were associated with the stealing activities. Nearly 30 percent of land was acquired by the small farmers whose occupation was only agriculture. About 19 percent of land had accrued to those small farmers, whose primary occupation was sheep rearing. A small farmer gained 9.05 percent of land as dowry. Thus, marginal and small farmers had experienced upward economic mobility either because a non-agricultural source of income like sheep rearing or because of stealing of crops.

Acquisition of Land by landless Households:

It is interesting to note that while the households with substantial land holdings had experienced several hardships, the landless households had gained some land during this period. As we have mentioned earlier, the upward mobility for landless households may be possible in a semi-arid zone, especially when the condition in credit and labour market are favourable. But during this period, the credit market was quite unfavourable and labour market was quite uncertain for agricultural labour households in the village. Hence even a section of small farmers, leave alone marginal farmers and agricultural labourers, had experienced several hardships like unfavourable monsoons, failure of crops, the pressure from moneylenders for repayment of loan and consequent alienation of land etc. Then how did this happen? In other words how could landless households gain land during this period?

It can happen if a household has more than one source of income. In a semi-arid zone like ours, non-agricultural sources of income (however small they are) would make a lot of difference. For instance, if a person is employed as peon in some government office or as gang worker in railway department, he would bring home some money every month. This amount can be used towards the expenditure on consumption and agricultural operations. Hence his dependence on money lenders would be minimum. With the savings from agricultural and non-agricultural earnings the household can acquire a piece of land.

Hence, we have tried to look into the occupation of the landless households before the acquisition of land. 48 percent of total land acquired by landless households, was accrued to the landless households who were in petty business like coffee shop or beedi bunk. Nearly 21 percent of total land was acquired by a contractor, who did not have any land at the beginning of the period. A harijan household with the help of remittances from outside the village could purchase nearly 7 percent of land. A household, which had a fixed income earning member in it, could acquire 12 percent of land. Thus although these households were landless at the beginning of the period, they were having some non-agricultural source of income and because of that they could acquire land.

III

Changes in Ownership and Distribution of Land (1961-74)

7.3.0 Earlier we have noted that, the concentration of land ownership remained more or less ^{the} same during the period of 1948-82 (See 3.0 in the previous chapter). We have also noted that the concentration of land remained unaffected during the first sub-period

of 1948-61. This was mainly due to the acquisition of Brahmins' land by rich farmers belonging to the Reddy and Yadava castes. Now we will see the changes in distribution of land ownership during the period 1961-74.

7.3.1 Changes in Distribution of Land ownership:

Striking changes in the distribution of land ownership had taken place. The proportion of landless households had increased from 28 to 31 percent (See Table 7.3.1)

Table 7.3.1: Distribution of Land Ownership (1961-74)

Size of the land holding (acres)	1961			1974		
	% of households	% of share in total land	Average land in (acres)	% of households	% of share in total land	Average land (acres)
0	27.50	Nil	Nil	30.87	Nil	Nil
0 - 5	17.26	2.97	3.14	20.20	7.88	4.99
5 -20	36.00	23.03	11.68	27.59	29.35	13.63
20 -40	5.99	8.34	25.42	12.54	28.58	29.20
40+	13.25	65.66	90.43	8.80	34.19	50.58
All Classes	100.00	100.00	18.26	100.00	100.00	12.81

LR(excluding landless households) = 0.62 LR(excluding landless households) = .48

LR(including landless households) = 0.72 LR(including landless households) = .64

Source: Survey Data

The proportion of marginal farmers had increased from 17.2 percent to 20 percent. Their share in the total land as also their average land had gone up. Significantly the proportion of small farmers had declined from 36 percent to 29 percent. Their share in

the total land as well as average land had declined. The proportion of middle farmers had increased from about 6 percent to 13 percent. The share of middle farmers in the total land had increased from a meagre 8 percent to 29 percent. The average land they owned had also gone up. The proportion of rich farmers had come down from 13 to 9. There is significant decline in the share as well as average land of rich farmers. While the share of rich farmers in the total land had declined from 66 percent to 34 percent, the average land they owned had fallen from 90.43 to 50.58. Thus the concentration of land ownership had declined. The Lorenz ratio also had come down from .62 (among land owning households) in 1961 to 0.48 in 1974, suggesting that significant decline in inequalities had taken place during this period.

These changes in the distribution of land ownership raise a number of interesting questions. Why had the proportion of landless households, marginal and middle farmers increased? What is the reason for the steep decline in the share and average land of rich farmers during this period? Why did the share of middle farmers substantially increase? What were the reasons behind the changes in the land ownership? Was it because of demographic factors or non-demographic factors? We will answer the above questions in the ensuing paragraphs.

Reasons for the Decline in the Share and Average Land of Rich Farmers:

One of the important characteristics of this period was that the land acquisitive ethos of rich farmers was blunted. Unlike in the earlier period, the rich farmers had acquired only 18 percent of total land. Besides, they resorted to all the ways to alienate their land. Land had become unattractive due to land reforms and risk and uncertainties in agriculture.

The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act was passed in 1961. Unlike the Brahmin absentee landlords, the non-Brahmin rich farmers in the village were unaware or less bothered of the land reforms, till they were passed. The legally

accepted size of family landholding in these parts was 54 acres. In 1961, six of our respondents possessed more than 54 acres of land and they started looking for ways to dispose of their land. They could do so through (i) Partitioning and (ii) Benami transactions.

Our respondents, therefore, lost as much as 81 percent of total land lost through partitioning during this period. On the average, rich farmers had lost 50 acres through partitioning. Sub-division of family land holding was rapidly taking place during this period. Some of the landlords distributed land to wives, sisters and daughters. Secondly, the rich farmers had resorted to benami transactions to reduce their size of landholding. They had given land to the attached labourers, family retainers etc. But unlike in coastal Andhra, where the landholdings alienated through benami transactions were pooled together for joint cultivation, in these parts the rich farmers who had sold their lands did not bother to continue the cultivation surreptitiously.

Change in the Direction of Land Transfers: Besides, since there was legal bar for the acquisition of land, the rich farmers were reluctant to acquire the land. But these rich farmers advanced loans to a number of small farmers in the village many years back and these loans got accumulated over a period of time. These small farmers were not in a position to repay the loan and only option left for them was selling away the land. But since the landlords were not interested in the acquisition of land, they (like Rama mohana Reddy, see case in 4.2.4) cleverly changed the direction of land transfers. In other words, even if a marginal or small farmer had incurred debt and in the payment of which he had to loose his land he would be made to sell his land to a small or middle farmer, instead of his rich ^{farmer/} creditor. As a result of change in the direction of land transfers, it was small and middle farmers who bought these lands and therefore their share and average land had gone up.

On the other hand, due to the decline of the economy and lack of safety for the



crops, a section of small and marginal farmers were facing several hardships. The loans borrowed could not be repaid, due to the failure of cotton crops. When the farmer could not pay the debt, owing to such crop failures, the debt increases year after year with interest. ⁶As long as there was sufficient margin between the value of assets and the debt outstanding, the creditor may not press hard for repayment. But when the creditor doubts the repaying capacity of this debtor, the landed property has to be mortgaged sooner or later in lieu of the debt taken (V.V. Sayana, 150; 1949). He had to alienate the land if the financial strain at home is also otherwise severe. Thus, many small and marginal farmers had to alienate land.

Landless households, who mainly hailed from Harijan castes, suffered more than small and marginal farmers. Their employment opportunities had decreased and unlike some small and marginal farmers, they could not participate in stealing activities, for they were meek and submissive. Some of the landless households had migrated out to far off places in search of work and food. Some of them started begging in the village. Since the food secured through begging was hardly sufficient for even one meal a day, they often had to eat several non-edible wild roots and leaves.

Ellamma's husband was a small farmer in 1960 and he had two brothers. He had lost 8 acres of land for the marriage of his brothers. Since the employment opportunities had declined, two of his brothers had migrated out. Ellamma's husband died in 1969. Ellamma recollected that she spent her days in a miserable manner, she was obviously reluctant even to recollect them. She was not called for agricultural works, for she did not have even a single implement for weeding (Kur chika) etc.^{8/} All those workers who had implements were preferred. So she had to go for begging. But the food secured through begging was hardly sufficient for even one meal a day. So she had to eat wild roots and leaves. While giving the explanation for the cause of death of her children in the womb itself, she lamented ⁹they died because I have taken wild roots and leaves (Balusaku) when I was pregnant.¹⁰

To sum up, as a result of decline in the levels of economic activities, small and marginal farmers were alienating their lands. Since the acquisitive ethos of rich farmers was blunted due to land reform, they were not acquiring the small farmers' land and changed the direction of land transfers. As a result, the small and middle farmers gained most. Besides, rich farmers were transferring the lands through benami transactions to the small and middle farmers. They had sub divided the family holdings through partitioning. In other words, land was transferred mainly from the category of rich-farmers to small and middle farmers and hence, the concentration of land ownership had come down. In the process the middle peasantry strengthened its position.

Notes and References

1. Letter from A. Hathaway, Collector of Bellary to R.A. Dalyell, Acting Secretary to the Board of Revenue, dated 26th September, 1865, No.194. Proceedings of Board of Revenue, 23rd September, 1865 p.5971.
2. The two words i.e. Mungari and Hingari had originated from Kannada language. Mungari had come from Mundegari, in Kannada Munde means before or early; Hingari had come from hindegari. Hinde means later.
3. The introduction of Ryotwari Settlement had encouraged the growth of cash crops. Prior to 1800, farmers were growing mainly grains in these areas. However they had to grow cotton and indigo after 1800. If they had cultivated nothing, but grain "they would have nothing where with to pay government rent as they and their families could and would consume the whole produce of the land, they having to content themselves at present with only two meals per day instead of three" The Superintendent to whom the remark was made believed that there was a good deal of truth in it. See Sarada Raju (1941), p.91.
4. Dussara (Vijaya Dasami) and Ugadi, or Telugu New year day are ^{the} two big festivals in the village. Dussara usually comes in the month of September and in this month, the villager hardly used to have cash resources to celebrate this festival. That is why, instead of having the usual and relatively costly dish, Bhakshyamulu (భక్ష్‌యములు), they used to have Jowar Payasam or Jaggery and Jowar food. Only for Ugadi, they used to take Bhakshyamulu. This only shows that these farmers hardly used to have cash resources in the months of May to September to celebrate festivals till 1974. Under these circumstances, they had to approach local money-lenders for borrowing loans.
5. The lagu loans or grain loans, as in K. Nagaraj's (1981) South Kanara, are very significant in the village. lagu loan system is prevalent in the case of Korra and Jowar. The rate of interest in this type of loans is 50 percent per year. If 4 kadavas (a measurement of 32 seers) of korra or Jowar is lent in the month of June, 5 kadavas of korra or Jowar should be repaid by November or December. Seedloans also exist in the village. If 100 kgs a groundnut is lent in the month of May, 150 kgs of groundnut should be repaid. In this case the rate of interest is 100 percent per year. In case of cotton seeds, the system is different. If 10 kgs of cotton seeds are lent in the month of July, the same amount of cotton should be repaid by March or April.
6. The villagers recollected various incidents related to village money-lender - cum-landlord. Whenever a festival was approaching, 20 to 25 villagers used to flock near the house of the landlord from early hours in the morning. The landlord, after having breakfast, used to come out and lead them to the nearby fields, without saying a word about the loans. In the field, he would start clearing the weeds. Out of reverence and politeness the farmers would start clearing the weeds. This would continue till mid-afternoon on that day and the followers may have to do this work with hungry stomachs. After making them work like this for about 3 to 4 days, the moneylender-cum-landlord would lend them money with lot of fuss as if he was doing them a great favour.

7. Since the main purpose of this study was to examine the trends in area and production of important crops in Rayalaseema region, the authors did not study the reasons for decrease in the area and production of cotton. For details see Altaff Hussein and Nawab Jain, (1970) 'Trends in Agriculture' in Venugopal Reddy (ed), Planning and Development of Backward Regions: A Case Study of Rayalaseema.
8. This phenomenon was emerging since 1960's. Till then, they (Valmikis) were mainly with Yadavas. They developed a feeling that Yadavas had betrayed them. As numerical strength and level of consciousness among them had been increasing, their ambition to seize political power from Reddies at the village level had increased. For the first time, in 1981, a candidate from Valmiki community contested for the presidentship of village Panchayat and was defeated by a Reddi candidate at the polls. As they felt that they were betrayed by Yadavas and Artisans, they raided the homes of these people in the village. CRPF had to be brought in and one Valmiki youngman was wounded in the police firing.
9. శుభ్ర (kurchika) is a basic agricultural implement, which every agricultural labourer should possess. In the absence of this implement, the agricultural labourer will not be employed by the Ryots -- especially in lean seasons.

CHAPTER 8

THE REVIVAL IN THE LEVELS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (1974-84)

Introduction:

During the last ten years, the economy of the village under study has been recovering rapidly from its earlier declining trend. The introduction of more remunerative and regular income generating crops, improvement in credit facilities, availability of more employment opportunities in the non-agricultural sector and the distribution of surplus land among landless households were the important factors that had contributed to this process.

The objective of this chapter is to analyse how these developments had affected the direction of land transfers and its effect on the ownership and distribution of land in the village. This chapter is presented in three sections. In Section I, the factors contributing to the revival of the economy are discussed. While in Section II the impact of these changes on the direction of land transfers is traced, its effect on the ownership and distribution of land is analysed in the last section.

I

Factors Contributing to the Revival of the Economy

3.1.1 Changes in Cropping Pattern:

There were significant changes in the cropping pattern of the village under study. In 1924, while 33 percent of total area was under cotton, area under total grains comprised of 64 percent. Table 8.1.1 reveals that, while staple crops like jowar and Kanna continued to be the dominant crops, cotton lost its supermacy. Although, more area was brought under

Table 8.1.1 Changes in Cropping Pattern in the Village under study 1924-82

Crop	1924		1982	
	Extent in acres	% in total cultivated land	Extent in acres	% in total cultivated land
Korra	2981.05	31.67	2215.82	22.62
Jowar	3108.98	33.03	2587.90	26.42
Cotton	3135.29	33.30	790.65	8.07
Tomato	Nil	Nil	660.00	6.74
Coriander	Nil	Nil	2341.74	23.91
Safflower	Nil	Nil	767.24	7.83
Others	188.19	2.00	430.74	4.41
All Crops	9413.51	100.00	9794.09	100.00

Sources: 1. Resettlement Survey Report of the Village, 1924

2. 1982 figures were obtained from Taluk Office, Alur

plough, cotton was increasingly replaced by the new crops such as coriander, safflower and tomato. However, we lack data^{1/} to establish when exactly the changes in the cropping pattern began to take place in the village. Our discussions with the villagers revealed that these changes began to take place from the early seventies. This is largely corroborated by the taluk level and district level data^{2/} on changes in cropping pattern (8.1.2). In the early seventies, in Alur taluk about 4 percent of the area was under coriander and the area under safflower and tomato was about 2 percent. In other words, it suggests that these crops were in their earlier stages of introduction in the region. However, during the last decade the area under these crops has shown rapid increase in the taluk. It is important to note that the introduction of these crops must have taken place at a faster rate in the village surveyed. This is reflected in the higher percentage of area under these crops in the village compared to ^{that of} the taluk.

These changes in cropping pattern have generated a larger quantum of employment to the village labour force than in the past. Under the present crop-calendar, (See Table 8.1.3) agricultural activities would begin with the preparation of tomato seedlings in the

Table 8.1.2: Changes in Cropping Pattern in Alur Taluk

Crop	Percentage in total cultivated area	
	1973-74	1982-83
Jowar	28	34
Korra	22	15
Other Cereal	4	6
Cotton	36	7
Coriander	4	26
Safflower	1	3
Tomato	0.5	1
Others	4.5	8
All Crops	100.0	100.0

Source: Taluk Office, Alur

Table 8.1.3: Duration of Crops and Crop-Cycle in the Village under study, 1984

Name of the Crop	Time of Sowing				Time of Harvesting			
	From		To		From		To	
	Month	Date	Month	Date	Month	Date	Month	Date
<u>i. Mungari Crops</u>								
1. Bajra	May	24th	June	16th	September	15th	October	12th
2. Pulses	May	24th	June	16th	October	15th	November	13th
3. Korra	May	24th	June	16th	September	18th	December	24th
4. Tomato	June	1st	July	14th	September	15th	February	10th
<u>ii. Hingari Crops</u>								
1. Pure Korra	June	27th	July	19th	September	18th	December	24th
2. Cotton	August	17th	September	3rd	February	8th	April	3rd
3. Jowar	September	13th	September	27th	February	20th	March	10th
4. Coriander	September	27th	October	23rd	December	20th	January	10th
5. Safflower	September	27th	October	23rd	February	15th	March	16th

Source: Personal Investigation

second week of June and their transplantation would take place after a month. In the month of July, men and women would be busy with transplantation of tomato crop as well as sowing of other crops like korra, coriander, safflower and jowar. Between the transplantation and early harvest of tomato hoeing has to be done for all the crops by women.

From mid-September to mid-February, large number of women labourers are required for plucking operations of tomato. During this period, the plucking operations of coriander and cutting operations of korra would also provide ample opportunities of employment to both men and women. This would be followed by the harvesting of korra and coriander. After the harvesting of korra and coriander, the cutting operations of safflower and jowar would commence. Thus, from June to March, the agricultural workers are provided with fairly good employment opportunities.

In addition to the new crop-calendar, one factor which enhanced the employment opportunities for the labour force in the village was the spread of flower gardens around the village. This was largely facilitated by the well irrigation which had come up with the government support extended in the drought years of 1977 and 1981. The recent development in this region is to tend jasmine flower gardens, since the demand for jasmins in the marriage season (March to July) is fairly good. Plucking of jasmins is labour intensive and the demand for labourers (especially women) is high during this season. These gardens are fairly widespread in the neighbouring villages like Atikulagundu and Nalakadoddi. The daily turnover of jasmins is approximately five quintals.^{3/} In these gardens nearly 350 women and children are employed from the village itself.

The marketing of some of the crops also had provided ample opportunities of employment for the work force in the village. Tomato was one such crop. Since the village under study has a road junction, the marketing of tomato crop came into being as early as in 1973. The tomato market would start functioning from September onwards, providing both direct and indirect employment opportunities for nearly 200 to 250 labourers.

The growth of cultivation of these crops has contributed to a regular flow of cash income to the farmers. Unlike in the case of cotton which takes about 6 months to harvest after sowing, tomato and coriander are ready for harvesting in less than 3 months. Tomato seedlings are planted in the month of January and the first harvest of tomato reaches the market in September. In the following months, till January, there is continuous harvesting of this crop. Similarly coriander is sown in the month of September and October and harvested in the months of December and January.

8.1.2 Spread of Quarry Works Around the Village:

Since this village is surrounded by small rocky hills, quarrying activity is intense during the recent times. Apparently, the demand for stone chips has gone up in recent years and the orders are frequently placed by government departments like Railways, Public Works Department and Roads and Building Department — for their construction activities.

Quarry works are mostly carried out by the Harijans. It is interesting to see the reasons for such specialization by a single caste. The traditional occupation of Harijans viz., preparing footwear from animal hides was gradually eroded and as we have already noted, they are now less preferred by the village ryots for carrying on agricultural operations. The appointment of a Harijan as an attached labourer was not a widespread practice till 1950. This was so because the attached labourer had also to do some sundry jobs — like bringing water from the well — besides the agricultural operations and the rigidity of the caste system discouraged such a practice. However, the Harijans began to be employed as attached labourers after 1950's and the annual wage that a Harijan attached labourer got was far lower than the amount paid to Valmiki or Yadava attached labourer.

Prior to 1950, Harijans were less preferred as agricultural labourers because the demand for doing agricultural works was chiefly met by the Valmikis and Yadavas. But during 1948-61 when Yadavas and some of the Valmikis became owner-cultivators by buying up lands their temporary withdrawal from the labour market enabled the Harijans to fill in the gap and do the agricultural jobs. However, when the village economy had deteriorated during the sixties, pauperization of certain families again increased the number of labourers in the village. Besides, the members of middle farmer families also started competing for employment opportunities due to the decline in economic activities. Once again the Harijans were sidelined and people from other castes were preferred. The disgusted Harijans had slowly turned to quarry works, which were gradually picking up during the period 1961-74 in this region and they acquired some skills in these tasks. The increase in remuneration for these works had attracted other Harijans as well.

Moreover, before 1976, the landlessness of Harijans had also compelled and enabled them to move to different places where these works were carried on.

These works are available for at least nine months in a year. Work is stopped only when a contract expires at the end of the year and/or when the plucking operations of coriander are at a peak. The Harijan labourers found that plucking of coriander was more remunerative than quarry work.^{4/} Besides, in the post-1976 period when some lands were distributed to the landless Harijans they had jobs to do on their own farms like plucking the coriander etc. Barring such occasions, the Harijan workers would have quarry works more or less throughout the year.

8.1.3 Distribution of Surplus land:

Many agricultural labourers, mainly belonging to Harijan caste and minority religions gained some land during this period as a result of redistribution of land by government. The total land surrendered by big ryots of the village under the Ceiling Act was 659 acres. More than 54 percent of the land was given to 129 persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes. Nearly 39 percent of the land was given to 97 persons belonging to backward castes. More than 7 percent of land was distributed among 16 persons belonging to upper castes. On the average they secured 2.71 acres of land per family. Though there were irregularities in the distribution of the surplus land, by and large, every Harijan family managed to secure a piece of land. There were also instances in which more than one person in the same family secured land. At the same time there were some families, which had managed to save land by transferring it to others through benami transactions. Table 6.0.1 reveals that 19 families owned more than 60 acres in 1982. Despite the fact that the irregularities were committed, by and large, all families own a piece of land and we could trace very few landless families in the village. This is not surprising, because, as we have already stated, the land-man ratio is still favourable at 2.72 in this village and this allowed almost all families to own a piece of cultivable land.

8.1.4 Changes in Credit Situation:

The introduction of short duration crops and new crop calendar (See Table 8.1.3) has reduced the farmers' dependence on moneylenders. From the second week of January, there is continuous harvesting and sale of tomatoes. On the average

there would be a weekly income of Rs.200 from sale proceeds of tomato crop on an acre of land. Thus, although the cultivation of tomato is risky^{6/} and labour intensive, farmers began to grow this crop, as it provided them with a continuous flow of income.

As for coriander, it is harvested in the months of December and January. The income obtained by selling this crop is useful for meeting expenses on marriages and major agricultural operation in the summer. Thus, the present crop calendar is well suited to meet the cash requirements of the farmers thereby enabling them to avoid going to the village moneylenders.

The expansion of employment opportunities in quarryworks and distribution of surplus land among landless households also had their impact on the lending activities of money lenders. With the availability of employment opportunities throughout the year, the Harijans and other weaker sections ceased to approach the moneylenders for loans. Besides, the landless households, who were the beneficiaries under the programme of redistribution of surplus land, not only started receiving agricultural income from their lands, but also began borrowing loans from financial institutions by pledging their land.

The fact that the influence of the moneylenders on the economy of the village got substantially weaker is evident from source-wise data on outstanding debts by our sample households (See 8.1.4). Out of the Rs.2.39 lakhs borrowed by the respondents, as much as Rs.2.16 lakhs or 90 percent of the total loan was borrowed from the institutional sources. Only Rs.15000 or 6 percent of total loan was borrowed from the moneylenders.

Table 8.1.4: Outstanding Debts in the Village surveyed (source-wise)

Source of Credit	Debt outstanding	
	in Rupees	% of total debt
State Bank of India	1,79,030	75.0
Co-operative Society	33,800	14.2
Agricultural Office	2,750	1.2
Money lenders	15,350	6.4
Relatives and Other Sources	7,800	3.2
Total	2,38,730	100.0

Source: Survey data

The large scale flow of institutional credit to the households in the village is a recent phenomenon. Although the co-operative institutions had started extending both short-term and long-term credit from as early as 1954, the quantum of credit advanced by these institutions earlier was less. Between 1970-75, the total amount of money advanced by the co-operative society was only Rs.10,400 and between 1975 and 1980, it advanced nearly Rs.60,000. These amounts are certainly small compared to the amounts lent after 1980. Besides, as they were by and large confined to richer sections of peasantry, they failed to create any impact on poorer sections in the pre-1980 period.

We have information about the total amount of loans advanced by the financial institutions, like State Bank of India, Village Co-operative Society and Agricultural Development Office of the village under study. The lending of money was hastened by these institutions after 1980 and this reached a peak point in 1984, probably because this happened to be an election year.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total amount advanced by all Credit Institutions</u>
1982-83	1,90,333
1983-84	4,44,200
1984-85	6,80,306

Thus, prior to 1980, only meagre credit facilities were available to the common ryot of the village and the performance of these institutions was also not satisfactory. This had forced all the small and middle farmers to approach private sources for their credit requirements. These farmers were often entrapped in debt bondage as a result of unfavourable seasons and consequently lost their lands. But after 1980 the credit facilities have not only been improved but also remained well within the reach of the small and middle farmers.

II

8.2 Impact of the Revival in the Levels of Economic Activity on Land Transfers

8.2.0 It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the economy of the village under study has improved significantly during the last ten years. The impact of this change on land transfers is analysed across caste-groups and size-class of landholding in the next section.

8.2.1 Caste-wise Land Transfers:

Table 8.2.1 on caste-wise land transfers shows that the Yadavas were the principal gainers during this period. They acquired nearly 27 percent of land, but lost only 3 percent. Hence, their net gain was 24 percent of total land transacted. Harijans and Valmikis,

Table 8.2.1: Land Transfers (Caste-wise)

Caste of the buyers \ Caste of the sellers	Caste-wise Share (%) in Total Land Transacted through Market						Share (%) in total Purchases	Net gain or loss
	Upper Castes	Yadava	Valmiki	Harijans	Artisan Castes	Minority religions		
Upper Castes	15.60					4.80	20.40	-46.97
Yadava	19.55	1.42				5.92	26.89	+23.65
Valmiki	11.57	1.82	7.20	0.90	1.22	4.31	27.02	+16.71
Harijans	17.83			0.49			18.32	+16.93
Artisan Castes	1.11				0.33		1.44	- 0.11
Minority Religions	1.71		3.11			1.11	5.93	-10.21
Share(%) in Total Sales	67.37	3.24	10.31	1.39	1.55	16.14	100.00	

Source: Survey Data

by acquiring 17 percent each, came next as net gainers of land. The acquisition of land by Harijans was possible due to redistribution of land by the government. Upper caste households were the principal land losers. These households, while losing as much as 67 percent of land, gained in their turn only 20 percent. Their net loss was nearly 47 percent. Among the upper caste households, it was the households belonging to Reddy, Lingayat and Vaisya castes that lost much of the land. In other words, Brahmin households did not lose as much land as they did during the period 1984-61. As shown in table 8.2.3, of the 67 percent of total land as much as 51 percent of land was alienated by households belonging to non-Brahmin upper-castes.

8.2.2 Reasons for Alienation of Land

More than half of the land was lost because of either debts or mortgages (See Table 8.2.2). Although in the present period the economic conditions of small farmers had largely improved due to introduction of new crops, better employment opportunities and credit facilities

Table 8.2.2: Reasons for Alienation of Land (1974-84)

Caste of the seller Size class of the seller (in acres)	Share (%) in Total sales of Land due to Reason							Share (%) in Total Sales
	Debts or mortgages	Major family expenses such as marriage	Fear of tenancy Reform	Out migration	Acquisition by the government	Gift such as dowry	Miscellaneous Reasons*	
0								
0 - 5	8.15	1.00		5.70		0.65		15.50
5 - 20	22.37			8.15			8.51	39.03
20 - 40	16.16	3.37					7.41	26.94
40+	6.60	0.47			6.65	0.11	4.70	18.53
All Classes	53.28	4.84	-	13.85	6.65	0.76	20.62	100.00

Source: Survey Data

* Miscellaneous Reasons include Border disputes, supervision problems of far off land etc.

some of them had to alienate lands due to the debts incurred during the previous period. Other important reasons for the alienation of land were, (1) Out-migration (2) Miscellaneous reasons such as border disputes, problems of supervising the far off fields and (3) Acquisition of surplus land by the government.

8.2.3 Size Class Position of the Buyers:

During this period small farmers had gained nearly 36 percent of total land transacted. Significantly, these farmers had mainly gained land from upper castes -- Brahmins, Reddies, Lingayats and Vaisyas (See Table 8.2.3). Middle farmers by acquiring 33 percent of land came next in terms of acquisition of land. The landless households had acquired 17 percent of land and this was possible mainly due to land reforms. The surplus land that was acquired from the upper-caste households was redistributed among landless agricultural labourers from the Harijan and Valmiki communities.

On the other hand, rich farmers obtained only smaller extent of land (8 percent) compared to the earlier period. As we noted earlier, land acquisitive ethos of rich farmers was blunted due to land reforms. Since the ceiling laws on land holdings did not affect the small and middle farmers, they showed interest in the acquisition of additional

Table 8.2.3: Size class-wise Acquisition of land through Market

Size class of the seller (acres)	Caste of the seller	Share (%) in the total land purchased						Share (%) in total land purchased	Share (%) in total land sold	Net gain in loss of land	
		NBUC	Yadava	Valmiki	Harijan	Artisan Castes	Minority religions				Brahmins
0		14.05						2.57	16.62	-	+16.62
0 - 5		3.28		2.76	0.39		0.38		6.81	19.88	-13.07
5 - 20		11.60	1.43		1.00	0.49	7.75	13.36	35.63	33.27	+ 2.36
20 - 40		14.78	1.81	7.55			8.01	0.79	32.94	24.69	+ 8.25
40 +		6.94				1.06			8.00	22.16	-14.16
All Classes		50.65	3.24	10.31	1.39	1.55	16.14	16.72	100.00	100.00	0.0

Source: Survey Data

NBUC : Non-Brahmin Upper Castes like Reddies,
Lingayats and Vaisyas

landed assets. Thus, the direction of land transfers had changed from rich farmers to small and middle farmers.

III

Changes in the Distribution of Land Ownership

It is evident from the foregoing analysis that the direction of land transfers in the village under study had been moving in favour of small and middle farmers and that the land acquisitive ethos of the rich farmers had sharply declined. We also noted earlier that the incidence of landlessness declined due to the distribution of surplus land. The impact of such changes is clearly reflected in our estimated land distribution as given in 8.3.1. The trends that are evident from the table are the following.

1. The percentage of landless households had declined from 31 in 1974 to 4 in 1984. While the percentage of marginal farmers had increased from 20 to 48, their share in the total land owned had gone up from 8 percent to 14 percent. However, their average land owned went down from 4.99 acres to 3.90 acres. Though the percentage of small farmers had increased from 28 to 29, their share in the total land declined from 29 percent to 26 percent. Their average size of landholding declined from 13.63 acres to 11.38 acres. The percentage of

middle farmers declined from 13 to 10 with a concurrent fall in their share of land from 29 percent to 24 percent. The average size of landholding of this category had shown a marginal increase from 29.2 acres to 30.3 acres. Though the percentage of rich farmers had remained more or less the same, their share in the total land increased from 34 percent to 37 percent and their average size of landholding increased from 50.5 acres to 57.8 acres.

2. The estimates of the inequality in land distribution also show interesting trends. The Lorenz ratio on land distribution for all the households in the village declined from 0.64 in 1974 to 0.58 in 1984. This decline in the inequality was largely due to the sharp reduction in the incidence of landless households in the village. However, the Lorenz ratio on land distribution for land owning households increased from 0.48 to 0.56.

Table 8.3.1: Distribution of Land Ownership (1974-84)

Size of the class (acres)	1974			1984		
	Percentage of Households	Percentage of share of land	Average land (acres)	% of households	% of share in total land	Average land (acres)
0	30.9	Nil	Nil	4.8	Nil	Nil
0 - 5	20.2	7.9	4.99	47.8	14.4	3.91
5 -20	27.6	29.3	13.63	29.1	25.5	11.38
20 -40	12.5	28.6	29.20	10.1	23.5	30.34
40+	8.8	34.2	50.58	8.2	36.6	57.84
All Classes	100.0	100.0	12.81	100.0	100.0	12.99

Source: Survey Data

LR(excluding landless households) = 0.48
LR(including landless households) = 0.64

LR(excluding landless households) = 0.56
LR(including landless households) = 0.58

The reasons for this, presumably, could be because of the increase in the relative importance of marginal farmers among the landed households in the village.

To sum up, the levels of economic activity in the village had improved due to the advent of new crops, increase in the employment opportunities outside the agriculture and redistribution of surplus land among landless labourers. Although, one is not sure whether or not new crops had increased the overall incomes of the farmers, one is, however, pretty certain about their role in reducing their dependence on the moneylenders by providing

them with a regular flow of income. Also, the new cropping pattern provided ample employment opportunities to the agricultural labourers. Such expansion of employment opportunities coupled with the distribution of surplus land and easy accessibility of credit facilities had reduced the influence of moneylenders on the village economy. These changes had significant impact on land transfers. Since the land acquisitive ethos of the rich farmers was blunted, the new direction of land transfers was towards small and middle farmers. As stated earlier, this was mostly facilitated by the improvement in the economy of the village. Along with a reduction in landlessness, land transfers during this period had reduced the inequalities in land distribution among village households.

Notes and References

1. Normally data on cropping pattern for individual villages for the previous 10 years are maintained at the record room of the Taluk office. Unfortunately, in spite of our best efforts, we could not find such data for our village in the taluk office at Alur. They were simply not available. Hence, one has to use the taluk and district level statistics as ^{an} proxy for the changes in cropping pattern of the village under study.
2. Even at the district level, area under cotton had fallen from 17 percent in 1963-64 to 11 percent in 1975-76. During the same period, the area under coriander increased from 0.4 percent to 2 percent. Slow increase in area under safflower and tomato was also visible.
3. These figures are arrived at after talking to the jasmine traders in village under study and various flower gardeners both in this as well as in the neighbouring villages.
4. Plucking of coriander in a group is remunerative. 20 labourers form a gang under a male head, who would go around the fields to arrange the agreements. Since 20 labourers can pluck coriander in 10 acres in a day and the remuneration is Rs.50 to Rs.60 per acre, a labourer would get Rs.25 to 30 per day. The remuneration in quarry works is about Rs.10 per day at the maximum.
5. The cultivation of tomato as a rainfed crop is not only difficult, but also risky. A brief description of cultivation of tomato would portray the precarious nature of the crop. Farmers begin growing tomato seedlings in the last week of June and transplantation would take place after 32 days. If it rains in the last week of July, there would be no problem, but if it does not, it would pose problems to the farmers. They have to transplant the seedlings in the last week of July or else they would go waste. On such occasions, they carry water from water-ponds, filled by the early rains, to the fields either by bullock carts or on the back of labourers along with the seedlings. If the rains are further delayed, they have to carry the water by ^{the} means explained above, to irrigate the thirsty plants with one or two mugs of water. Thus, they would postpone the death of plant for one or two days. When it rains, they would replace the dying and dead plants with new seedlings purchased from other farmers in this or the neighbouring villages.

CHAPTER 9

LAND TRANSFERS AND FAMILY FORMATIONS (1948-1984)

9.0.0 Introduction

The impact of socio-economic and institutional changes on land transfers during the last three and half decades in the village under study has been the subject of our analysis in the preceding chapters. However, a coherent picture of the process of land transfers will be obtained only if we bring into our analysis the influence of land transfers on family formations. Such an analysis will also help us to throw some light on the existing controversy on the relationship between the economic status of households and the behaviour of partitioning among them.

This chapter is divided into three sections. Section I discusses some of the issues relating to the concepts and measurement of partitioning of households which are important to the study of family formations. In Section II, the relationship between family formations and land transfers during the entire period 1948-84, as also in the sub-periods, is analysed both by the size class of holdings and caste categories. The main findings of this chapter are summarised in Section III.

9.1.1. Concept and Measurement of Partitioning:

An understanding of the concept of partitioning is in order. Generally, partitioning is understood as the creation of new households as a result of split in the parent households. It can be defined as a split of household in terms of either consumption unit or production unit or both consumption and production units. The limitations of these three ways of defining partitioning are the following:

i. Since land is the main productive asset in peasant societies, if partitioning is defined only in terms of production unit then landless households would get excluded.

ii. In some cases partition of the consumption unit might take place, without a follow up division of the landed assets. Households nucleated in such fashion might continue to cultivate the land jointly and share the produce.

iii. The breaking up of the consumption unit and production unit of a family might occur at different timepoints, depending on the size-class to which the household belongs. In the case of small and marginal farmers, the partitioning of these two units occurs at different points of time. The reasons for this are the following: (a) The production unit of small farmer's land holding after the partitioning may not be viable (b) There may be still unmarried girls and boys in the parent family for whose marriages, the parents might retain land with them. (c) The parents might have borrowed loans for consumption and agricultural expenses, for the repayment of which they may retain the land. After the completion of all the obligations i.e. marriage of children and repayment of loans, if the piece of land still remains (which is quite unlikely) they might distribute it among themselves. On the other hand, in the case of rich farmers, because of the strength of their asset position, breaking up of consumption and production unit might

often take place simultaneously. Even after partitioning, the nucleated households of rich farmer families (depending on the number of sons and the total land owned) might get large parcels of land, the cultivation of which would be viable. Even if the family had obligations like repayment of loans etc., it might sell away some of the movable assets like gold before partitioning and distribute land among themselves (See the case of Sudarsana Reddy in 6.2.1).

In our analysis we have defined partitioning as split of households in terms of production unit or consumption unit. In order to take care of the limitations of this definition, while calculating rates of partitioning, when a household splits only in terms of consumption unit, we have attached notional share of the landed property to the new unit. For instance, even though a marginal farmer's household had partitioned only in terms of consumption unit, legally speaking, nucleated households should get a share in the landed property. We take that legal share of land into account for calculating the rates of partitioning by size class of landholding

9.1.2 Measures of Partitioning:

In what form one should express the association of partitioning with size class category? Is it in terms of percentage of households partitioned or rates of partitioning? Shanin treated these two as one and the same. Thus, although he often noted that rates of partitioning were correlated with the size and wealth of the household, he did not present rates of partitioning while discussing the substantive changes. What he presented was only percentage of Russian households that experienced partitioning (Shanin, 1972: 81-82). For instance, he noted that in Soviet Union from 1920 onwards, "no less than one third of all households in the richer stratum underwent partitioning during each consecutive period of three years" (1972:87). Thus, when he was talking about rates of partitioning what he had in mind was only percentage of households which experienced partitioning over a period of time i.e. the incidence of partitioning.

Krishnaji, on the other hand, used rates of partitioning. This is the rate at which a given number of households grow over a period of time, due to partitioning (in a closed society). These two forms of expression are different from each other and,

infact, at times can behave in an opposite direction*. The relationship between Shanin's incidence of partitioning (I) and Krishnaji's rates of partitioning (R) can be explained as follows,

$$R = I.(p - 1)$$

where p = Average number of splits per household, which experienced partitioning.

As it is evident from the above equation, the rate of partitioning (R) is sensitive to both the incidence of partitioning (I) and average number of splits per household which experiences partitioning. For a given incidence of partitioning the value of R will increase as the number of splits increases. Also the value of R

* The following hypothetical examples would show how these two measures behave in an opposite manner.

Situation	Number of households	Households experiencing partitioning	Number of additional households at t_2
Situation I	620	400	500
Situation II	620	400	1200
Situation III	620	350	1200

Situation I

a. Shanin's incidence of partitioning: $\frac{400}{620} \times 100 = 64.52$

b. Krishnaji's rates of partitioning: $(\frac{1120}{620} - 1) \cdot 100 = 80.65$

Situation II

a. Shanin's incidence of partitioning: $(\frac{400}{620} \times 100) = 64.52$

b. Krishnaji's rates of partitioning: $(\frac{1820}{620} - 1) \cdot 100 = 194.00$

Situation III

a. Shanin's incidence of partitioning = $(\frac{350}{620} \times 100) = 56.45$

b. Krishnaji's rates of partitioning = $(\frac{1820}{620} - 1) \cdot 100 = 194.00$

Thus, depending on the number of additional units, that had come about due to partitioning, rates of partitioning would change. Although the incidence of partitioning is the same in the first two situations, the rate had substantially increased in the second situation.

will change as the value of I undergoes a change. All these issues will be evident and from the estimated values of R, I/\sqrt{p} for the various sub-periods of our study given in the subsequent sections.

II

9.2.0 Land Transfers and Family Formations (1948-84)

Estimated values of the average annual rates of R and I by size class of landholding for the period 1948-84 are given in Table 9.1. It shows that the annual

Table 9.1: Size Class-wise Rates and Incidence of Partitioning (1948-84)

Size Class of land holding (acres)	* Annual Average rate	Annual Average Incidence	Average no. of splits per hh experiencing partitioning	Change in the share (%) of total land owned
0	.0457 (3)	.0180 (3)	3.54	Nil
0 - 5	.0358 (1)	.0158 (2)	3.26	+ 9.79
5 -20	.0609 (4)	.0204 (4)	3.98	+ 4.57
20 -40	.0368 (2)	.0128 (1)	3.87	+ 9.01
40+	.1000 (5)	.0278 (5)	4.60	-23.37
All Classes	.0539	0.0190	3.84	00.00

* Since, the periods chosen are of varying lengths, the average annual rates are presented in order to make ^a meaningful comparison

Note: Figures in brackets indicate the ranks

Source: Survey Data

average incidence of partitioning for all size classes was about 1.9 percent per annum and that of R about 5.4 percent per annum. The average number of splits per household which experienced partitioning (p) was 3.8.

There is significant difference in the values of R, I and p across size class of landholdings. While the values of these variables are the highest for the rich farmer category (i.e. above 40 acres), they are the lowest in the marginal and middle farmer category. It is also significant to note that the rich farmer category for whom the values of R, I, and p are the highest also happens to be the size group that lost land during this period. On the other hand, the marginal and middle farmer groups for whom

these values are the lowest are the main gainers of land.

There is also a close relationship between rates and incidence of partitioning and acquisition/alienation of land across caste categories (See Table 9.2). The Yadava

Table 9.2: Caste-wise Rates and Incidence of Partitioning (1948-84)

Caste	Annual Average rate	Annual Average Incidence	p*	Change in the share (%) of total land owned
Upper Castes	0.0480 (3)	0.0194 (3)	3.47	+ 6.08
Yadava	0.0890 (6)	0.0217 (6)	5.10	-30.62
Valmiki	0.0369 (1)	0.0173 (1)	3.14	+18.43
Barijan	0.0490 (4)	0.0195 (4)	3.51	+ 6.45
Artisan Castes	0.0687 (5)	0.0205 (5)	4.34	+ 1.20
Minority Religions	0.0425 (2)	0.0179 (2)	3.37	- 1.54
All Castes	0.0549	0.0193	3.84	0.00

p* = Average number of splits per household which experienced partitioning

Note : Figures in brackets indicate the ranks

Source : Survey Data

caste, for which the values of R were the highest, had lost as much as 31 percent of total land. The Valmiki caste, which was the principal land gainer, had exhibited the lowest values of R and I.

It is evident from the above analysis that, though there is no clear pattern in the rates and incidence of partitioning across size classes of landholdings, they are higher among the richer households. This is further confirmed by the higher rates and incidence of partitioning among Yadavas who along with Reddies happened to constitute majority of rich farmers in 1948. In order to understand the factors responsible for higher rates and incidence of partitioning among richer size groups, it is necessary to examine these variables for the various sub-periods. Such a sub-period-wise analysis, it is hoped, provides us with insights which would be helpful in understanding the interaction between period specific variables and family formations.

9.2.1 Pre-Tenancy Reform Period (1948-56)

During this period, the values of R and I appear to behave inversely with size class

of landholding; the values of these variables are the lowest for the rich households. The reason for this lies in the fact that they were the principal gainers of land during this period. They gained as much as 31 percent of total land transacted. It is interesting to note that although landless households gained 13 percent of total land transacted through market, the values of R and I were highest for them. Since these households were landless to begin with, the behaviour of partitioning among them cannot be explained through acquisition and alienation of land, but through other factors such as employment opportunities (See Table 9.3).

Table 9.3: Size class-wise Rates and Incidence of Partitioning (1948-56)

Size of land holding (acres)	Annual Average Rate	Annual Average Incidence	p*	Change in share (%) in the total land owned	Net gain or loss in total land transacted
0	.0663 (5)	.0350 (5)	2.90	Nil	+12.74
0 - 5	.0338 (3)	.0088 (1)	4.90	-1.00	+ 6.11
5 -20	.0400 (4)	.0175 (4)	3.30	-0.25	-45.89
20-40	.0125 (2)	.0162 (3)	1.80	-3.22	- 3.90
40+	.0119 (1)	.0090 (2)	2.32	+4.47	+30.94
All Classes	.0416	.0195	3.13	.0.00	.0.00

* = Average number of splits per household experiencing partitioning

Note : Figures in brackets indicate the ranks

Source: Survey Data

Among the various caste groups, the highest values of R and I were recorded for the Harijans. They also gained about 9 percent of total land transacted. However, since the Harijans households constituted the maximum number of landless households prior to 1975, the dynamics behind partitioning can not be explained through land transfers (See Table 9.4)

The values of R and I were the lowest for the upper castes. But their alienation of land was very high during this period. They lost about 31 percent of the total land transacted through market. The reasons for this, presumably, could be the following. As we discussed in an earlier chapter (See 6.2.0), among the upper caste households — Brahmins, Reddies, Lingayats and Vaisyas — it was Brahmin absentee landlords who constituted the

Table 9.4: Caste-wise Rates and Incidence of Partitioning (1948-56)

Caste	Annual Average Rate	Annual Average Incidence	p*	Change in share (%) in the total land owned	Net gain or loss in total land transacted
Upper Castes	.0111 (1)	.0084 (2)	2.32	+1.97	-31.42
Yadava	.0318 (2.5)	.0079 (1)	4.00	-2.37	+15.73
Valmiki	.0318 (2.5)	.0159 (4)	3.00	+1.90	+ 8.13
Harijan	.0760 (6)	.0380 (5)	3.00	+0.50	+ 8.95
Artisan Castes	.0553 (5)	.0138 (3)	4.00	-1.30	+ 2.41
Minority Religions	.0319 (4)	.0223 (5)	2.43	-0.70	- 3.80
All Castes	.0416	0.0195	3.13	0.00	0.00

p* : Average number of splits per household experiencing partitioning

Note : Figures in brackets indicate the ranks.

Source : Survey Data

maximum number of landlosers and the land alienated by them was purchased by the Reddy and Lingayat households. Since Brahmin absentee landlords were staying away from the village, they were not included among our sample households. Hence, the behaviour of partitioning among Brahmin households is not reflected in the rates of partitioning among upper caste households. On the other hand, the land transactions with Brahmin households were included in the total land alienated and acquired by upper-caste households. However, the estimated values of R and I pertained only to Lingayats and Reddies. This limitation of our survey data must have resulted in the odd relationship between R and I and land transfers. The Yadava and Valmiki households who were the principal gainers in the land market during this period, understandably, exhibited lower values of R and I.

6.2.2. Period of Tenancy Reforms (1956-61)

Data on the estimated values of R, I and p for the period 1956-61 are given in table 9.5. As it is evident from this table, both R and I are found to behave inversely with the size of landholding. The rich farmer households, who acquired bulk of the land transacted during this period, had the lowest values of R and I. On the other hand, the

landless households, whose share in the total purchases was nil, attained highest values of I and R. Small farmers who alienated bulk of the land had the second highest values of R and I. The main difference between this period and the earlier period is that the values of these variables increased at a slightly faster rate in the present period than in the previous period.

The behaviour of partitioning among caste-categories during this period appears to be almost similar to that in earlier period. The lowest values of R and I are noted for Yadavas who acquired bulk of the land transacted. In the case of upper castes the value of I is the lowest, but that of R higher and this is due to the higher value of p. Although these households had observed lower value of I, the alienation of land from them was highest. The reason for the odd relation between the values of R and I and land transfers of upper caste households is the same as we cited for the earlier period (See Table 9.6).

Table 9.5: Size class-wise Rates and Incidence of Partitioning (1956-61)

Size of land holding (acres)	Annual Average Rate	Annual Average Incidence	p*	Change in the share (%) in the total land owned	Net loss or gain in total land transacted
0	.0702 (4)	.0374 (4)	2.88	Nil	--
0 - 5	-	-	-	-1.03	+ 0.06
5 -20	.0535 (3)	.0258 (3)	3.07	+1.28	-35.23
20-40	.0304 (2)	.0010 (1)	4.04	-3.44	-14.76
40+	.0184 (1)	.0184 (2)	2.00	+3.19	+49.93
All Classes	.0477	.0243	2.95	0.0	0.0

p*: Average number of splits per household, that experienced partitioning

Note : Figures in brackets indicate the ranks

Source : Survey Data.

6.2.3 Period of Decline in the Levels of Economic Activity (1961-74):

The behaviour of partitioning across the size class of landholdings is sharply different from that of the earlier periods. The inverse relationship between size of

Table 9.6: Caste wise Rates and Incidence of Partitioning (1956-61)

Caste	Annual Average Rate	Annual Average Incidence	p*	Change in the share (%) of total land	Net loss or gain of land in the total land transacted
Upper Castes	.0625 (4)	.0083 (1)	8.50	+0.80	-35.8
Yadava	.0095 (1)	.0095 (2)	2.00	-1.17	+42.22
Valmiki	.0294 (2)	.0143 (3)	3.10	+0.10	- 5.16
Harijan	.1140 (6)	.0623 (6)	2.83	-0.70	+11.36
Artisan Castes	.0359 (3)	.0359 (5)	2.00	+1.00	+ 4.91
Minority Religions	.0637 (5)	.0306 (4)	3.08	-0.03	-17.53
All Castes	.0477	.0243	2.95	0.00	0.00

p* Average number of splits per households which experienced partition

Note: Figures in brackets indicate the ranks

Source: Survey Data

landholding and the values of R and I noted in the earlier periods has changed into a strong positive relationship during this period. The values of these variables are ^{the} lowest among landless and marginal farmers who gained bulk of the land transacted. On the other hand, rich and middle farmers, who had the highest values of R and I, had lost sizeable extent of land during this period. In the case of small farmers, though they accounted for loss of ^a sizeable extent of land, the values of R and I are relatively lower among them. (See Table 9.7).

Among the various caste groups, highest values of R and I were observed among upper caste households as also in the Yadava and artisan castes. It is interesting to note that unlike in the previous periods, the principal losers of land during this period were the non-Brahmin upper caste households. Therefore, the rates and incidence of partitioning were high among them. In the case of Yadavas, their share in the total land had declined by 0.14 percent, but their net gain in total land transacted was ^{the} highest (14 percent). The rates and incidence of partitioning are also found to be relatively high among this group. The artisan caste households, who were the net gainers of land during this period, recorded higher rates and incidence of partitioning (See Table 9.8).

Table 9.7: Size class-wise Rates and Incidence of Partitioning (1961-74)

Size of land holding (acres)	Annual Average Rate	Annual Average Incidence	p*	Change in the share (%) in total land	Net loss or gain in total land transacted
0	.0188 (2)	.0136 (2)	2.38	-	+15.50
0 - 5	.0174 (1)	.0053 (1)	4.27	+4.91	+11.04
5 -20	.0466 (3)	.0243 (3)	2.92	+6.32	-10.99
20-40	.1151 (4)	.0367 (4)	4.13	+20.24	- 6.11
40+	.1335 (5)	.0390 (5)	4.42	-31.47	- 9.44
All Classes	.0488	.0204	3.39	0.00	0.00

p*: Average number of splits per household which experienced partitioning

Note : Figures in brackets indicate the ranks

Source: Survey Data

Table 9.8: Caste-wise Rates and Incidence of Partitioning (1961-74)

Caste	Annual Average Rate	Annual Average Incidence	p*	Change in share (%) in the total land owned	Net loss or gain in total land transacted
Upper Castes	.0825 (4)	.0273 (4)	4.02	-2.6	-17.74
Yadava	.0892 (5)	.0348 (5)	3.56	-13.9	+14.29
Valmiki	.0254 (3)	.0149 (3)	2.70	+15.4	+11.40
Harijan	.0082 (1)	.0082 (1)	2.06	-0.2	- 8.71
Artisan Castes	.1184 (6)	.0365 (6)	4.24	+1.8	+ 2.79
Minority Religion	.0158 (2)	.0119 (2)	2.34	-0.5	- 2.03
All Castes	0.0488	0.0204	3.39	0.00	0.0

p* : Average number of splits per household which experienced partitioning

Note : Figures in brackets indicate the ranks

Source : Survey Data

The significant difference in the behaviour of partitioning across size classes of landholdings and caste groups arose due to the following factors. As we noted earlier,

this period was characterised by ^{the} decline in the economic activities of the village due to decline in the cotton economy. Consequently, small and middle farmers had lost their lands. Hence, we would expect higher rates and incidence of partitioning among them than in the case of others. But our results are contrary to this expectation.

The reasons for this are not far to seek. Although small farmers were losing land due to decline in the economy, rich farmers could not purchase these lands. Their land acquisitive ethos was blunted due to land reforms and hence, they changed the direction of land transfers towards small and middle farmers. Therefore, it was those small farmers who were involved in non-agricultural activities, like sheep-rearing and crop stealing that were buying up the lands alienated by another section of small farmers. Thus, since a combined process of alienation and acquisition of land from small farmers was taking place during this period, it resulted in relatively lower rates of partitioning among them.

The very high rates and incidence of partitioning among the rich farmers (who belonged to upper castes and Yadavas) were due to the Land Ceiling Act. Sub-division of land was rapidly taking place among rich farmers. About 80 percent of the land that was lost by them during this period was through partitioning:

6.2.4 Period of Revival in the Levels of Economic Activities (1974-84):

During this period the strong positive relation between size of landholding and the values of I and R as observed in the earlier period had disappeared. Instead, the emerging pattern appeared to be erratic. However, a close relationship was observed between the rates and incidence of partitioning and land transfers in the case of all size classes of landholding except the small farmers. Marginal farmers who were the principal landlosers had experienced higher rates and incidence of partitioning (See Table 9.9). Similar pattern was also observed in the case of rich farmers. In the case of middle farmers, who were the principal landgainers, the values of R and I were lower.

Among the caste groups, except in the case of Harijan and households belonging to minority religions, there is no correspondence between rates and incidence of partitioning and acquisition and alienation of land. Harijans, who were the net gainers of land, had relatively lower rates of partitioning and households belonging to minority religions, who were net losers of land, had relatively higher rates of partitioning (See Table 9.10).

Table 9.9: Size class-wise Rates and Incidence of Partitioning (1974-84)

Size of land holding (acres)	Annual Average Rate	Annual Average Incidence	p*	Change in the share (%) in total land	Net loss or gain in total land transacted
0	.0277 (2)	.0255 (4)	2.09	Nil	+16.62
0 - 5	.0740 (5)	.0451 (5)	2.64	+6.5	-13.07
5 -20	.0395 (4)	.0160 (2)	3.48	-3.8	+ 2.36
20-40	.0175 (1)	.0066 (1)	3.66	-5.1	+ 8.25
40+	.0365 (3)	.0218 (3)	2.21	+2.4	-14.16
All Classes	.0381	.0240	2.59	0.00	0.00

p* : Average number of splits per households which experienced partitioning
 Note: Figures in brackets indicate the ranks.

Source: Survey Data

Table 9.10: Caste-wise Rates and Incidence of Partitioning (1974-84)

Caste	Annual Average Rate	Annual Average Incidence	p*	Change in the share (%) in total land	Net loss or gain in total land transacted
Upper Castes	.0068 (1)	.0034 (1)	3.00	+5.8	-46.97
Yadava	.0457 (4)	.0256 (4)	2.78	-13.1	+23.55
Valmiki	.0515 (5)	.0334 (6)	2.54	+1.0	+16.71
Harijans	.0172 (2)	.0172 (2)	2.00	+6.9	+16.93
Artisan Castes	.0769 (6)	.0192 (3)	5.00	-0.2	- 0.11
Minority religions	.0362 (3)	.0306 (5)	2.18	-0.4	-10.21
All Castes	.0381	.0240	2.59	0.00	0.00

p*: Average number of splits per household which experienced partition
 Note : Figures in brackets indicate the ranks
 Source: Survey Data

It is interesting to note that the rates and incidence of partitioning among landless households, which were very high during the first two periods, had sharply declined in the subsequent periods. Since many landless households came from Harijan

caste (prior to 1975), similar trend is also visible in this caste (See Tables 9.3 to 9.10). An important factor that had arrested the rates of partitioning among these households is the organisation of work in quarry activities, which is explained below.

Most of the Harijans, who work in quarry activities, have a gunman in their families. The gunman employs four labourers. Together these five people can break one mandi of stone chips in a day. The gunman is paid Rs.60 per mandi. Of this amount he pays Rs.5 as commission to the agent. The daily wages for men, women and children are Rs.9,7 and 4 respectively. The tendency in these works is that gunman employs all the members from his family as labourers, so that co-ordination becomes easier and family earnings will be larger. This tendency of gunman to employ all the family members (including women and children) for quarry works, is arresting partitioning among these families.

Another factor that has resulted in the arresting of partitioning among these households is the non-viability of ^{their}landholding. As we noted earlier, many landless households in 1974 obtained a piece of land ^{each} which was about 2.5 acres. Also from some families more than one person could secure land. Since the cultivation of this small plot of land is non-viable, two or three brothers in a family come together to jointly cultivate these plots of land. In some cases, merger between the families of brother and sister had also taken place. Since there are distinct advantages in having a joint family for quarry works and cultivation of land, these households tend to stick together.

III

Concluding Remarks

9.3.1. The main findings of the present chapter are summarised below:

1. We found that Shanin's measure of partitioning of households is inadequate. Hence, we have applied Krishnaji's indicator to measure the rate of growth of households through partitioning. We found that these two measures can behave in an opposite manner depending on the average number of splits per household which experienced partitioning (p).
2. An inverse relationship between rates and incidence of partitioning and size class of landholding was observed in the case of the two earlier periods i.e. 1948-56 and 1956-61. But during 1961-74 this inverse relationship had disappeared and a strong

positive relationship had emerged. However, for the subsequent period of 1974-84 we do not find any pattern.

3. There is a close relationship between the rates and incidence of partitioning and alienation and acquisition of land. In other words, the size class of landholding or caste category which was the net gainer in the total land transacted, had lower rates of partitioning and vice versa.

4. The reason for lower rates and incidence of partitioning among rich farmers in the first two-periods was the acquisition of sizeable extent of land by rich farmers belonging to non-Brahmin upper castes and Yadavas from Brahmin absentee landlords. The reason for higher rates and incidence of partitioning among rich farmers in the period 1961-74 was the impact of Ceiling (on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1961.

5. We have observed a declining tendency in the rates and incidence of partitioning among landless households (who are mainly Harijans). Since most of these households participate in the quarry activities, the larger size of the family is advantageous for them. The organisation of work in these activities is such that it is favourable for the large sized families. Hence, it tends to reduce partitioning among them. Non-viability of their land holding was also found to be another factor slowing down the the rates of partitioning among them.

Appendix

A Note on Measurement of Family Partitions

Krishnaji formulated his hypothesis based not on primary data on partitioning across the size classes, but on secondary data on household size. His arguments run on the following lines. Starting with a universal positive correlation between the family size and wealth of the household, one can infer that a family can be larger either because of demographic factors like birth and death rates or non-demographic factors like partitioning. Family size increases with birth rate and decreases with death rate. Partitioning reduces the average size of the household. Krishnaji himself notes that death rates can be expected to be higher among poor people. It is again believed that the levels of fertility among the poor are also high. But he noted that since "the tendency towards nucleation being more prominent among labouring households such a tendency will reinforce the effects of high mortality and counteract the possibly high fertility levels to keep the average family size low" (1980, A-39). Thus, he feels that since the mortality rate is high and fertility rate is also high, 'nucleation' is the principal factor which reduces the family size of poor people. On the other hand, for the higher size of family among rich people, lower rates of partitioning are the basic reasons. Since the dynamics of family size is outside the scope of this exercise, let us revert to partitioning.

Although, we are not able to emphatically deny Krishnaji's hypothesis, one point however, is emerging. If one were to follow his measure of association of partitioning with size-class category, there are reasons to believe that the results will be misleading. This is so because, his measure will not take the average number of nucleated households into account. As we already noted, the rates of partitioning are very sensitive to the average number of splits per nucleated households (p) we have data on the average number of splits per nucleated households (p). This number is mostly correlated with the size of the households (See Tables 9.1 and 9.7). From this data, we can indirectly infer that

the number of surviving sons is low among poor people and high among rich. This positive relationship between the average number of nucleated households and size of the household follows even from Krishnaji's argument. When fertility and mortality rates are high among poor farmers, they result in fewer surviving sons and daughters. Since partitioning will take place only among surviving sons, the average number of nucleated households will be low among poor farmer households.

When the average number of nucleated households is correlated with the size class of the household, there is reason to believe that we always get higher rates of partitioning among richer households. Earlier we demonstrated this with the help of hypothetical examples. This can also be demonstrated with our own data, Table 9.6 reveals that although the incidence of partitioning was lowest among upper caste households, the rate of partitioning was higher among them. This was because of higher average number of splits per household which partitioned (which was 8.5) Table 9.10 also reveals similar case. Although, the incidence of partitioning was relatively lower among Artisan caste households, the rate was highest among them. This was again due to higher p . Thus, depending on the average number of splits per household which partitioned (p), the rates of partitioning also change in a wild manner.

We are, however, not stating that Shanin's incidence of partitioning is a good indicator. Infact this also has certain problems. When one is calculating the incidence of partitioning during a particular period, if a household got partitioned twice during the same period, one faces the problem whether to take it as being partitioned once or twice. Also, if a household got partitioned (once in terms of production unit and later in terms of production unit) similar problem arises. Hence, we feel that, what one has to do is to evolve an indicator which can take care of all these problems. This however could not be done for the present exercise.

In the present exercise, we did face these two problems. In the case of families breaking up twice during a specific period under study, we have counted the partitioning only once while calculating incidence of partitioning. Whereas in the case of splitting of a family in terms of production and consumption units at different points of time in period, we have taken only split of production unit into account.

CHAPTER 10

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

10.1 Peasant mobility of which land transfers and family formations form important elements, has been a subject of intense debate among the social scientists for quite sometime. A consensus on this subject, however, is yet to emerge. The present exercise is a modest contribution to this on-going debate.

10.2 In a given region land transfers are affected both by endogenous and exogenous variables. The endogenous variables specific to a region are rainfall, soil type, rate of growth of population, pattern of distribution of land holdings, socio-cultural institutions affecting such a distribution etc. The exogenous factors are many and varied. They are legislation affecting land holdings, large scale immigration of people into a region, intervention of the state in terms of provision of economic infrastructure such as transport, or irrigation or subsidized inputs like seeds, fertilizers and cash loans on soft terms, intervention by nature in the form of floods, cyclones, deficient/^{or}excessive rainfall or fluctuation in world trade affecting the market for the product of the area etc. Although such a broad, two-fold classification of endogenous and exogenous factors is acceptable at a general level, it should, however, be noted that at times mutual interaction between these two sets of factors should not be ruled out*.

10.3 Land Transfers, to be sure, are a product of myriad processes at work. They can be disentangled to the extent that one can point out the significant factors that affect a specific area or a region during a certain period of time. However, one should be

* For instance provision of irrigation by the State in a region might enhance soil fertility and yield and offer scope for a change in crop-mix. Similarly, intervention by the State through legislation on land distribution in favour of one section as against the other might alter the bargaining powers of these groups in the credit, land and labour markets as also their land acquisitive ethos.

cautious in making generalisations based on a few case studies of either a village or a region. Although useful in providing some insights into the processes at work, a case study has certain built-in-limitations in drawing up inferences applicable for a macro level picture. Keeping this limitation in mind let us proceed to sum up the results of the present study and make a few concluding observations.

10.4 The study tried to trace the contours of land transfers in a village in the Rayalaseema region of Andhra Pradesh, approximately for a period of a century, spanning both in pre-independence (1891-1947) and post-independence (1948-1984) periods. However, due to constraints posed by the non-availability of data a deeper analysis could be carried out only for the post-independence period. Let us start with the colonial period.

10.5 The village under study which was located in the erstwhile Bellary district of Rayalaseema came under the rule of the East India Company in 1800. The Company soon introduced a system of land revenue collection known as the Ryotwari Settlement which not only perpetuated the then existing inequitable distribution of landholdings but also imposed heavy assessment rates on the cultivators. We do not have historical data from 1800 onwards on the asset distribution position in the village, much less on land distribution. But if the regional studies are any indication it was unlikely that this village could escape the rigours of the Ryotwari Settlement, unfavourable seasons, low yield, droughts, famines, mortality, out migration and general agricultural backwardness.

10.6 However, we do have information on the distribution of village land during the last phase of the 19th century. According to the Re-settlement Survey which was carried out around 1891 there were about 275 households in our village with ownership claims on 7454 acres of cultivated land. By 1948 the number of families in the village had gone up to 439 and the extent of land owned expanded to a little over 8990 acres.

While the average extent of land owned by a family in 1891 was 27.11 acres, it came down to 20.47 acres by 1948. Inequalities in land ownership had increased only marginally between 1891 and 1948.

10.7 The above analysis ran in terms of size class of ownership holdings. Land transfers have another dimension in the Indian Context viz., Caste. Who were the dominant land owning communities in the village around 1891? And during the next six decades i.e. till 1948, who were the land-gainers and who were the land-losers? In other words, how was the (economic) power-balance shifting across the castes in the village? And what are the implications of such shifts, if any, for a macro perspective? These are some of the questions that need to be answered.

10.8 In the village under study, around 1891, Brahmins and Reddies were traditionally the two dominant upper castes and together they had control over 62 percent of the total cultivated land. But after nearly six decades i.e. by 1948 the share of the Brahmins in the village land went down from 36 percent in 1891 to 20 percent and that of Reddies increased from 28 percent in 1891 to 30 in 1948. As a matter of fact while Brahmins were the net land-losers, all the cultivating castes turned out to be the net gainers between 1891 and 1948. However, while the richer sections of the village could purchase lands from the out-migrating Brahmins, others especially Yadavas and Valmikis could gain land mostly by bringing the available cultivable wastes around the village under plough. Besides these land transfers or acquisitions at broad levels of caste categories, small farmers from the Valmiki and Harijan communities, who were often required to borrow consumption loans from the moneylending rich farmers of the Reddi Community lost their lands to the latter as they failed to repay their loans.

10.9 It was in 1956 that tenancy legislation was passed in the state of Andhra.

But both before and after the passage of the legislation the absentee (Brahmin) land owners started disposing of their holdings by evicting the tenants. An important factor that facilitated such evictions was the lack of awareness on the tenancy reforms among the tenants. As Partha Sarathy and Prasada Rao noted in a wider context, wherever tenants displayed such awareness like in Telangana, tenancy reforms could atleast be

partially successful (1969; 330). But as against Telengana, in the Andhra region of which Rayalaseema forms a part, lack of tenant's awareness of the land reforms often made them losers in the land lease market.

10.10 In the village under study, although some absentee landowners offered to sell their lands to their tenants, often times the latter could not afford to buy, as they were mostly small farmers without much liquidity or credit/worthiness. Also, as the lands under sale were fairly large holdings, only rich farmers from the upper castes, as also a few Yadava cultivators could buy up those lands. Thus, as most of the land alienated during the period 1948-61 was from rich farmers to rich farmers, concentration of land ownership almost remained unchanged.

10.11 Cotton was the major cash crop of this village till 1960. However, during the period 1961-1974. The economy of the village passed through a period of stress and strain, primarily due to the frequent failure of the cotton crop. A decline in the cotton economy had set in due to a combination of several factors such as unfavourable monsoons and consequent damage to the crop compounded by the problem of pests, decline in yield and crop-thefts. Due to the recurrent crop losses, small farmers who were often indebted to the village moneylenders had to face the problem of land alienation.

10.12 But, significantly, the money lending landowners took care not to buy the debtors' lands themselves for fear of violating the Land Ceiling Act of the State which came into operation in the early sixties. The strategy that they adopted was to make the debtors sell their lands to the small and middle farmer households who had diversified their economic activities. Thus, families who had resorted to sheep-rearing or those who had salary earners as members or such of those who were indulging in crop -- thefts and thus could afford to accumulate some cash reserves, were encouraged by the village moneylenders/rich farmers to buy these lands and in the process clear the debts in question. The rich farmers had also tried to reduce the size of their land holdings through partitioning and benami transactions. Due to these factors described above, concentration of land ownership in the village had declined.

10.13 As for the period subsequent to 1974, it has been characterised by a general revival of the village economy facilitated by the introduction of new crops, increase in the employment opportunities both within and outside agriculture, redistribution of surplus land among landless labourers — especially the Harijans—and an increasing role played by the institutional credit agencies thereby reducing the role of the money lenders. These changes had significant impact on land transfers. Since the land acquisitive ethos of ^{the} rich farmers was blunted during this period the new direction that the land transfers acquired was towards small and middle farmers.

10.14 To sum up, land transfers viewed historically can be seen in two sets of terms (a) acquisition/alienation of land of families with different size-classes of land holdings and (b) Caste categories.

i. From 1891 to 1948 movement of land transfers was from the large non-cultivating families to the large cultivating families. On the eve of tenancy reforms i.e. in 1950's, absentee land owners had successfully disposed of their lands to the middle and rich farmers residing in the village. But on the eve of legislation on land ceiling in 1961, the rich farmers ceased acquiring lands any further from the small and marginal farmers who were indebted to them. Instead, the movement of land transfers was guided from one section of the small farmers to the other sections with cash reserves. As excess lands over ceilings were distributed to landless farmers, landlessness as a stark economic problem ceased to exist in the village. This ofcourse was quite contrary to the general feature of non-implementation of Ceiling Act in the State.

a

ii. When the subsistence economy of the small and section of the middle farmers was threatened by periodic failures of monsoons, declining cotton yield and crop-thefts and they were alienating their lands to the creditors, the debtors in particular and farmers in general changed the crop-mix favouring short-duration crops and avoided the grip of moneylenders and halt the process of land alienation.

iii. Over the years the small and poor farmers could bring the cultivable wastes under plough and acquire some economic cushion against the rigours of subsistence economy

in a semi-arid zone.

iv. Inequalities of land ownership in the village had declined between the period 1948-1984. This is consistent with the picture available at a macro level.

Land Transfers viewed in terms of caste categories exhibited the following features:

i. Brahmins who were the single largest land owning community in the village had not only alienated their land but a great majority of them had out migrated from the village in search of jobs elsewhere.

ii. Like in the other regions of Andhra, when the Brahmins left the village the existing dominant cultivating community viz., Reddies filled in the vacuum and strengthened their position still further. However, unlike Kammas, their counterparts in coastal Andhra, Reddies in Rayalaseema were slower in diversifying their economic activities beyond agriculture.

iii. It was the non-dominant cultivating communities like the yadavas and a section of Valmikis who could bring the cultivable wastes under plough. This provided them with some land base to diversify their activities into sheep rearing, petty trade etc.

iv. Overall, the economic power balance has been gradually moving away from Reddies, the dominant cultivating caste of the village.

10.15 So far we have tried to sketch out the interaction between a few endogenous and exogenous variables on the one hand and land transfers on the other. A logical extension of this analysis would be an empirical validation of the association between land transfers and family formations at the village level.

10.16 In the present exercise an inverse relationship between rates and incidence of partitioning and the size class of land-holding could be observed in the case of two periods viz., 1948-56 and 1956-61. These results come closer to Krishnaji's hypothesis on family formations. However, for the period 1961-74, one finds a positive relationship between rates and incidence of partitioning and size class of landholding. Although, these results come nearer to Shanin's argument, one has to note that the observed higher

rates of partitioning among rich farmers* were largely due to the impact of land reforms and Chayanov's life cycle theory is less relevant in this context. As we noted earlier, since the rich farmers acquired sizeable extent of land during the first two periods (i.e. 1948-56 and 1956-61), the rates and incidence of partitioning were lower among them. However, in the third period (1961-74) as they were losing land due to Ceiling Act, the rates of partitioning showed a decline. In other words, what affects the family formation is not so much the size class of land holdings per se but the fact whether families within a size class are acquiring or alienating the land. If families within a size class become the net gainers in the land market than they tend to exhibit lower rates of partitioning. On the other hand if they are the net losers, their rates of partitioning, in all likelihood, would increase.

10.16 Krishnaji noted that there may be some forces which prevent partitionings among poor and landless households. He mentioned "a type of labour contacts which ensure continuity of employment to the members of the labourers' family" (1979:15). Similar phenomenon is observed in the village under study. For, we notice that as quarrying activities are carried out by a small group of workers, usually members of the same family from the poor and marginal farmer households — especially Harijans — found it advantageous to stick together as a unit at the workspot. This in turn tends to influence them to stay on as members of a single consumption unit in their home. In other words, production organisation in certain instances slows down the rate of family partitions.

10.17 The major thrust of this exercise may be articulated in terms of the following propositions, which have a bearing on the on-going debate on peasant mobility.

i. In contrast to the conventional wisdom which expects land reforms to cause only levelling tendencies, in our study we observed that while tenancy reforms caused

* Similar phenomenon i.e. higher rates of partitioning among rich farmers was observed by Sheela Bhalla (1977) in her study on Punjab. She noted that since the new agricultural technology is scale neutral, the rich farmers are not finding any economies of scale in joint family and hence, the partitionings are more frequently taking place now than before. However, whether new agricultural technology is scale neutral or not is a debatable point.

polarization tendencies, ceiling laws helped strengthen levelling tendencies. Overall, the levelling tendencies appeared to be stronger than the polarization tendencies.

ii. According to one School of thought partitioning of families would lead to levelling tendencies (Shanin), while the other school predicts polarization tendencies (Krishnaji and other Marxist thinkers). But our findings suggest that both these tendencies are possible. However, the levelling tendencies may have an edge over the polarization tendencies.

iii. Shanin, associating the process of outmigration mostly with poorer households, predicts the coming into being of the levelling tendencies. But in our study we find that outmigration is associated with a non-cultivating land owning community as well as ^{cultivating} poorer households. This had eventually resulted in both the polarization and levelling tendencies. However, the former is found to be stronger than the latter.

iv. On the impact of random factors on peasant mobility we find ourselves in disagreement with Schendel, according to whom they would mainly cause polarization tendencies. As random factors like rainfall deficiency or a generally unfavourable weather, polarization tendencies might be set in motion. But farmers can try and break the crop-rigidity by experimenting with a different crop-mix and this might halt the process of polarization. As a matter of fact if a suitable crop-mix is discovered, the tendencies of polarization might be reversed to that of levelling.

v. Small and marginal farmers might acquire the landed assets and experience upward mobility with the help of non-agricultural activities like sheep rearing etc.

vi. As for the impact of cumulative ^{economic} advantages and disadvantages, a great deal depends upon the land acquisitive ethos of the rich farmers in the village. If as a result of state intervention in agrarian structures, the land acquisitive ethos of the rich farmers is blunted, their accumulated surpluses might be diverted to the diversified (non-agricultural) activities. If, in such a situation, land transfers take place

mainly among the non-rich farmers, it might result in the levelling tendencies.

As visualised above, if considerable drain of investible surpluses from the agricultural to non-agricultural sectors takes place, it points out to the important fact that ~~consideration~~^{of} land transfers alone as a major factor affecting the process of peasant mobility needs to be modified.

Statistical Appendix

Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Household Operational Holdings and Area, Andhra Pradesh, 1970-71, 1976-77 and 1980-81

Size Class (in hectares)	1970-71			1976-77			1980-81		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Below 1	45.97	8.00	0.44	46.66	9.29	0.47	51.86	13.10	0.5
1 - 2	19.64	11.28	1.44	20.37	12.76	1.47	20.93	16.7	1.5
2 - 4	17.37	19.19	2.77	17.38	20.81	2.80	16.04	23.31	2.7
4 - 10	12.71	30.81	6.08	12.12	32.32	6.24	9.06	28.73	5.9
10+	4.31	30.72	17.87	3.47	24.82	16.74	2.11	18.69	16.5
All Classes	100.00	100.00	2.51	100.00	100.00	2.34	100.00	100.00	1.9

Note: 1. Percentage of Operational Holdings
2. Percentage of Operated Area
3. Average Size of the Holding (in ha)

Source: 1. 1970-71 figures are obtained from Government of Andhra Pradesh (1974) World Agricultural Census Report, 1970-71, Issued by Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Hyderabad.
2. 1976-77 and 1980-81 figures are obtained from Government of India (1984) "Provisional Data on Number and Extent of Operational Holdings, 1980-81 - Andhra Pradesh" Agricultural Situation in India, Vol.39: No.1, (April)

Table 2: Trends in Population, in Alur Taluk and the Village under Study

Year	ALUR(Taluk)			Village Surveyed		
	Total Population	Area (in sq.miles)	Density of population (per sq.m)	Total Population	Area (in sq.miles)	Density of population (per sq.mile)
1871	94,282	677	139	1772	15.54	114
1901	98,568	686	144	1762	15.54	113
* 1911	100,181	582	172	2354	15.54	151
1921	90,007	582	155	1830	15.54	118
1961	134,177	613.14	219	3505	15.54	226
1971	140,177	613.14	229	3465	15.54	223
1981	139,306	613.14	227	3571	15.54	230

* The decline in population is primarily attributable to influenza epidemic of 1918.

Sources: i. Bellary District Manual, 1872
ii. District Gazetteer of Bellary, 1901, 1911, 1921
iii. Resettlement Survey of the Village, 1924
iv. District Census Hand Books, 1961 & 1971
v. 1981 figures were obtained from Taluk Office, Alur.

Table 3: Month-wise Number of Rainydays in Alur Taluk 1954-83

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1954	-	-	-	-	2	7	7	8	3	7	-	1	35
1955	-	-	2	2	7	5	3	15	7	7	2	-	30
1956	-	-	-	3	3	5	7	7	10	10	5	-	50
1957	-	-	-	1	5	6	9	3	5	3	-	-	32
1958	-	1	1	6	6	2	6	4	5	3	3	-	37
1959	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1960	-	-	1	1	-	7	5	1	10	5	3	-	33
1961	-	-	-	1	5	5	9	3	2	5	2	-	32
1962	-	-	-	3	3	4	3	10	10	3	1	-	32
1963	-	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
1964	-	-	-	-	-	3	8	5	9	4	4	-	33
1965	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
1966	-	-	-	-	2	-	9	3	8	2	4	1	29
1967	-	-	-	2	4	5	5	4	6	6	-	-	32
1968	-	1	2	-	3	5	4	2	10	6	2	Nil	35
1969	-	-	1	1	5	2	5	9	5	9	2	Nil	39
1970	-	-	1	2	3	1	8	9	7	3	-	-	34
1971	-	-	1	2	3	2	2	2	5	7	-	-	24
1972	-	1	-	2	2	5	3	2	7	5	1	1	29
1973	-	-	-	-	1	3	2	8	3	9	1	-	27
1974	-	-	1	3	4	3	1	6	15	8	1	-	42
1975	-	-	-	-	5	5	11	3	9	18	5	-	56
1976	-	-	-	2	2	6	4	7	4	2	2	1	30
1977	-	-	-	-	4	6	3	9	1	8	5	-	36
1978	-	1	-	2	6	3	7	11	9	5	4	3	51
1979	-	2	-	-	2	4	7	4	10	6	4	-	39
1980	-	-	-	2	2	3	7	5	6	-	2	-	22
1981	2	-	1	1	5	6	3	11	12	4	4	1	50
1982	-	-	-	2	7	4	7	5	7	4	5	-	41
1983	-	-	-	-	2	4	3	5	9	7	-	-	30

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