THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTRASTATE ETHNIC CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled **"The United Nations and Intrastate Ethnic Conflict: A Case Study of Somalia"**, submitted by Mr. Arpit Rajain in partial fulfilment for the award of degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is his own work and has not been submitted to any other University for the award of the Degree

We recommend that it should be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Acknowledgement

This research work makes an attempt in understanding the complexity involved in the specific instance of intervention of United Nations in the crisis in Somalia

CONTENTS

PREFACE

The prime focus of this study is the critical appraisal of the multilateral response to the crisis in Somalia. The United Nations involvement assumes significance as it exemplifies one of the first cases of international action in response to state collapse in the post-cold war era. The United Nations role has important implications as it represents novel forms of experimentation in multilateral peace operations. The study also seeks to examine the manner in which the traditional peacekeeping is exhibiting the tendency of a shift towards second generation peacekeeping in the case of Somalia. The study also analyses the gradual transformation in the United Nations' response to what was essentially an interstate conflict to a case of intrastate conflict involving the collapse of civil order, entailing substantial loss of life.

The study seeks to analyse whether a normative consensus has emerged in international organisations under which international involvement in an internal crisis is justified. Although there does seem to be some form of international endorsement in favour of intervention in a wide range of situations like ethnic cleansing, disruption of delivery of humanitarian relief, genocide, violations of cease-fire agreements, collapse of state machinery etc., the study questions the effectiveness of the multilateral involvement.

The study seeks to demonstrate that even when international institutions get involved in intrastate conflict, their capabilities are often far from optimal and they can achieve only limited success. This is true even for the United Nations, an organisation with its greater expertise and atleast potentially greater resources than regional groups like the OAU (Organisation of African Unity). The efficacy of United Nations has been limited due to multifarious problems. These problems are related either to the nature of the conflict or to the structural aspects of the institution itself.

The study argues that the United Nations involvement in what was essentially a case of strife within domestic jurisdiction eventually became almost a infructuous operation to an extend that the organisation had to fall back on invoking the provision of Chapter VII 'use of force' which till that point of time had a latent existence. United Nations had been asked to perform functions that it was not intended to perform, infact even being pushed to its constitutional limit to perform the designated tasks. Indeed one can interpret the mandate to use 'all necessary means' as an effort to authorise compulsory disarmament of recalcitrant factions.

The United Nations operation in Somalia, however, cannot be dismissed as being an abject failure. The organisation, nevertheless,

did achieve partial success in delivering humanitarian relief to hundreds of thousands of Somalis who were close to starvation.

This study seeks to answer several questions related to intrastate ethnic conflict and the role external intervention is warranted. What role do international organisations have in a situation of breakdown of civil order and state machinery? What is the ideal timing for an intervention by the international organisations? What mandate should an operation like this have in order to be successful? What is the role of external actors? Do non-state actors have role, if so what sort of? Can the superpower(s) contribute to the intervention, if yes, how would the other contributing nations view their participation? What role do the other regional organisations play in such a situation? The other relevant propositions that relate to the role of United Nations in Somalia include an evaluation of the factional reconciliation process, preventive diplomacy and the efforts to construct political institutions in an imploded state.

Much introspection and retrospection has been done, primarily in the West on the United Nations involvement in Somalia, with most of them blaming in the United Nations for the operation. This study has attempted to appraise the involvement as a complex interplay of forces of disintegration within a third world state and a US led United Nations response.

The appraisal relies mostly on primary sources such as United Nations publications and documents: Security Council Official Records: Statements and Resolutions, General Assembly: Statements and Resolutions and United Nations Press Releases. The United Nations has reorganised and renamed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This Department has conducted extensive research in one of its Units focussing on the lessons learnt from the intervention in Somalia. The United Nations sources has helped in reaching a balanced United Nations centric viewpoint. Substantial work has also been done by prominent think tanks on this issue. International Peace Academy has evolved a policy forum entitled "Peacebuilding Efforts in Somalia: Legacies of the International Intervention",[1] CATO Institute conducted a study by Ted Gelen Carpenter,[2] it focuses primarily on the US role in Somalia and proves how the US security interests were not served by participating in the intervention. Mohamed Sahnoun from the US Institute of Peace having headed a United Nation Fact Finding Mission to Somalia has written on all aspects of the United Nations involvement in Somalia.[3] Kenneth Allard from the Institute for National Strategic Studies has discussed

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[1] Ameen Jan, "Peacebuilding in Somalia", (International Peace Academy, New York), 1995
[2] Ted Galen Carpenter, ""Setting a Dangerous Precedent in Somalia", (Cato Institute, Washington DC), 1992
[3] Mohamed Sahnoun, "Somalia: The Missed Opportunities", (United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC), 1994

the operational lessons from the Somalia Peacekeeping Operations.[4]

Terrance Lyons and Ahmed I Samatar from the Brookings Institution

have analytically discussed state collapse and have scrutinised the

decision to intervene. They have suggested Modals of Political

Strategies also.[5] Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland, has

written about his experiences about a visit to the land.[6]

A host of books by authors such as Paul Diehl,[7] [8] Alan James,[9]

Geoff Simmons,[10] Rodalfo Stevenhagen[11], Anthony Parsons[12], Indarjit

Rikhye,[13] and others including M.S. Rajan[14] [15], Mohamad Osman

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[4] Kenneth Allard, "Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned", (National Defense University Press, Washington DC), 1995

[5] Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, (The Brookings Institution, Washington DC), 1995

[6] Mary Robinson, A Voice for Somalia, (The O'Brien Press, Dublin), 1992

[7] Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, (The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore), 1994

[8] Paul F. Diehl, and Sonia Jurado, United Nations Election Supervision in South Africa? Lessons from the Namibian Peacekeeping Experience, ACDIS Occasional paper, (ACDIS, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign),1992

[9] Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, (Macmillan, London),1990

[10] Geoff Simmons, The United Nations: A Chronology of Conflict, (St. Martins Press, New York),1994

[11] Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development & Human Rights, (United Nations University Press, New York), 1990

[12] Anthony Parsons, From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1995, (Penguin Books, London), 1995

[13] Indarjit Rikhye Michael Harbottle and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future, (New Haven: Yale University Press, Yale) 1974,

14 Rajan, M. S., World Order and the United Nations, (Har-Anand Publications, New Delhi), 1995

15 Rajan, M.S., United Nations at Fifty and Beyond, (Lancers Books, New Delhi),1996

Omar[16] and articles in prominent journals have contributed in making the field rich in relevant literature.

The study at hand has aimed to examine the origin and gradual diversification of the 'peacekeeping' - a term that does not find mention in the Charter. It then moves on then analyse the situation in Somalia with a background of the extended fabric of peacekeeping. After the United Nations Operations in Somalia, the study has tried to bring out various lessons that international organisations can keep in mind.

The first chapter analyses the origin and gradual evolution of the role of the United Nations in various conflict situations. It attempts to observe the pattern in the change of mandate from one operation to another. The United Nations mandate was gradually diversified to include, by the end of the cold war, cases of intrastate conflict. With the new norm now in increasingly being in favour of multilateral response to cases of genocide, political order falling apart and restoration of breakdown of government machinery, the United Nations does seem to get involved in cases of domestic civil strife. The Somalia situation warranted an intervention.

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16 Mohamed Osman Omar, The Road to Zero: Somalia's Self-destruction, (HAAN Associates, London), 1992

The second chapter deals with United Nations Operation in Somalia I, and the various steps it took in the restoration of civil society there. The historical and political circumstances that contributed to the deterioration of the condition in Somalia have been analysed. The chapter has benefited immensely from the valuable insight into the gradual deterioration of Somalia recorded by a Somali diplomat.[17] The chapter further appraises the initial world reaction and the multilateral response in the form of Operation Restore Hope. The first part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia as well as the role of United Nations and its agencies in the defeat of the famine have been critically analysed. Operation Restore Hope could not bring stability and order in the country. The United Nations decided to modify its strategy of dealing with the crisis, thus UNOSOM II was brought about.

Chapter three revolves around the second United Nations Operation in Somalia. The factional reconciliation process initiated by the United Nations to bring the warring clans to the negotiating table and the response of the respective warring factions to the initiation has also been analysed. The turning point in the UNOSOM's presence in Somalia came when Aideed's forces started attacking the United Nations forces and pictures of American soldiers, being dragged

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[17] Mohamed Osman Omar, The Road to Zero: Somalia's Self-destruction, (HAAN Associates, London), 1992

through the streets of Mogadishu were beamed all over the world. The United Nations was compelled in such circumstances to engage itself in a lot of soul-searching with contributing states unwilling to let their forces face direct aggression. The will of the contributing states prevailed, consequently UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia. Somalia is now on its own although assisted by a large number of international non-governmental organisations.

The causes of limited success achieved by UNOSOM-I and UNOSOM-II stimulated the analysts to examine as to why a systematic multilateral response by the United Nations could not achieve the enlarged mandate it had set for itself. Chapter IV briefly summarises the lessons learnt from the United Nations involvement and subsequent efforts by the international community to evolve a strategy that would be devoid of the kind of limitations which were inherent in the United Nations involvement in Somalia.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The provisions in the United Nations Charter for intervention in conflict resemble those of the League of Nations but they are laid out more explicitly and rely more on an increasing order of coercive measures. The Security Council can take cognisance of both kind of disputes – (i) disputes which may endanger international peace and security; (ii) cases of threats to the peace or breaches of peace, or acts of aggression. In the former case, the Council, when necessary, may call on the parties to the dispute to settle their disputes by arbitration, judicial settlement, negotiation, inquiry, mediation and conciliation. Chapter VI deals with these disputes. In the latter case, the Council is legally empowered to take a stronger action under Chapter VII. Under articles 41 to 47 of the Charter, the Council also has the right to give effect to its decisions not only by coercive measures such as economic sanctions, but also finally through the use of armed force. Under Article 25 of the Charter, the member states agree to abide by and to carry out the Council's decisions.

According to Chapter VI (articles 33-38) of the United Nations Charter, dealing with the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, protagonists have been given a number of dispute-resolution alternatives. Beyond the options of mediation and judicial settlement the United Nations,

through the Security Council, is empowered to investigate the dispute (Article 34) and recommend means (Article 36) or terms (Article 37 and 38) of settlement.

When it comes to the use of force, the United Nations has to have both the rationale as well as the necessary legitimacy to take collective action. Chapter VII lists some of the courses of action for the United Nations members to take should the peaceful methods of settlement fail.

This chapter introduces the concept of peacekeeping, which has not been mentioned in the Charter. It traces its evolution as a concept and as a process from the cold war period to the 1990s.

THE CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING

The word 'peacekeeping', as such, does not exist anywhere in the Charter. The word can appropriately be called an invention because there is no real legal, constitutional, or structural basis for such operations.

The term, 'peacekeeping', has in reality been used to designate a wide range of activities. For instance the United States troops that participated in the invasion of Grenada were called the Caribbean

Peacekeeping Force. The then United States President Ronald Reagan even termed the MX missile as "Peacekeeper". The Government of India sent a large contingent of Indian Armed Forces to the island of Sri Lanka to help the country tide over its largely ethnic based conflict. This was known as the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF).

Peacekeeping, in the above sense, would amount to some unilateral effort to help maintain peace in another country. But these efforts often lack legitimacy or credibility. A more accepted definition of peacekeeping would be "...any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of a long standing dispute."[1] Specialists as well as diplomats often lump together several compilations in an attempt to define peacekeeping. The International Peacekeeping Academy, which has devoted substantial time to the study of peacekeeping, has this definition to offer: "The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace."[2] The emphasis of the above definition is on multinational forces. A NATO or an EU are capable of sending

[1] Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore), 1994, p.4.
[2] Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future, (New Haven: Yale University Press, Yale), 1974, p.11.

multinational forces in any part of the world but a multinational force under the United Nations flag would carry far more credibility and legitimacy.

According to Arthur M. Cox, peacekeeping is "an extraordinary military art because it calls for the use of soldiers not to fight and win, but to prevent fighting, to maintain cease-fires and to provide order while negotiations are being conducted."[3]

Peacekeeping has been 'habitually' associated with the name of the former United Nations Secretary-General, Dag Hammarsjkold, who has had enormous influence in not merely refining concepts about peacekeeping but also in applying these concepts. Indeed Hammarsjkold laid the foundations of a process of this form of conflict resolution. As indicated earlier, the Charter provisions are silent on the term and as such the word does not exist anywhere in the entire document. However, Hammarsjkold conceptually located it between the sixth and the seventh chapters of the Charter.

Hammarsjkold's strategies and tactics for advancing the concept of peaceful settlements of disputes included—

1) Negotiations with the United Nations (2) Mediator missions (usually by the Secretary General himself) who employed preventive diplomacy

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[3] Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping, (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC), 1971,p.19.

(a) to stabilise the situation on a day to day basis; (b) to be quietly helpful to a third party which has any possibility of bringing the warring parties to the conflict to the negotiating table; (3) Fact finding missions; and (4) Recommendations by the representative organs.

He made a distinction between the use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes. He believed that the United Nations's ability to play a constructive role in a conflict resolution depended upon the locus of interests in disputes. Hammarsjkold did not regard the United Nations Charter to be a complete document, but repeatedly stated that its peacekeeping and human progress potential needs have not been fully harnessed. He said, "international organisation as expressed in the United Nations, was more advanced in this stage of world history than in sense of world community that it supported."[4]

Over a period of time certain norms started developing about this rather new term of 'peacekeeping'. One can again attribute these norms to the role that Dag Hammarsjkold played in the evolution of the term itself. These norms can broadly be summed up as the following:

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[4] Andrew W. Cordier, "Motivations and Methods of Dag Hammarsjkold" in Andrew W. Cordier and Kenneth L. Maxwell, (ed.), Paths of World Order, (Columbia University Press, New York), 1967, p.20.

a) The peacekeepers have to essentially be United Nations and their United Nationness follows from the fact that they come from a vast number of countries that are the members of the United Nations.

b) The peacekeepers have to be lightly armed and will represent the United Nations only and not their parent country.

c) The peacekeepers essentially have to be in the conflict situation to 'protect' (defend) rather than open fire (attack).

d) These peacekeepers will not open fire except in cases of self-defence.

e) For the purposes of self-defence these peacekeepers will always be lightly armed.

f) The peacekeepers will not play a partisan's role but will be in the conflict situation to try to end the conflict (i.e. conflict resolution rather than conflict escalation).

g) The United Nations commanders are constantly under the pressure to use peaceful rather than forceful methods of securing compliance.

h) The end motive of any operation is to create an atmosphere conducive for peaceful negotiations.

i) The permanent five were not to contribute their armed forces to the various peacekeeping operations.

j) The United Nations forces were not to enter in the territory of any sovereign state without the prior permission of the state.

The underlying assumptions of this framework were:

(a) the great powers of that time were not supposed to increase their influence beyond their borders; and (b) the world is 'sick' of war and that in all future endeavours the member states would look forward to the United Nations to help it solve their disputes.

The Charter does contain some provision for the institutionalisation of the system of peacekeeping that can be traced in Chapter VII. The foundation of such a framework can be traced in Article 43, which has provision for the member states to 'earmark' national military contingents for the use by the United Nations. There also exists in Article 45 a provision for Military Staff Committee; however, the idea of a Military Staff Committee has never been translated into a reality.

PEACEKEEPING IN THE COLD WAR

Peacekeeping, as a measure to deal with the question of conflict resolution within the framework that the Charter provides, is not merely innovative, but also as some cases have shown has helped resolve the conflict. As a non-enforcement mechanism, peacekeeping began its life in 1948, arguably, while dealing with the Palestine issue. Since that time peacekeeping has evolved and grown in size,

complexity, effectiveness, legitimacy and now with the sun having set on the cold war, in mandate also.

The state of Israel was created following a United Nations vote partitioning Palestine in the teeth of Arab opposition in 1948. Within twenty-four hours the first war erupted. With the United Nations effort extending to over nine months an armistice agreement was signed. In 1956 the Suez Canal was nationalised as Israeli, French and British troops attacked Egypt. On 2 November 1956 the General Assembly met in an emergency session and passed a resolution supported by the US, USSR and other countries calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. This action of the United Nations marked the end of the British and the French influence over the region.

The Korean conflict attracts particular interest as it involved a very active United Nations participation in those early days of the organisation in a large-scale military operation through collective security. This was to repel the North Korean aggression of 25th June 1950. The United Nations set precedent by adopting the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution'. The General Assembly claimed its right to make recommendations for the maintenance of international peace and security. The important lesson that was learnt was that the success of any intervention also calls for more conciliatory and detached engagement than merely donning the clock of legality and legitimacy.

So, while an armistice restored the status quo, no progress could be made in resolving the basic problem of reunification.

The crucial role-played by the Secretary-General and the Security Council and its ONUC (Organisation des Nations Uni au Congo) under most unpredictable circumstances in Congo was of a great significance. To put a brake on the process of disintegration of the country and stop the Belgian troops, the Secretary-General quickly sent more than 10,000 troops from 8 countries. Congo was the largest operation undertaken till then. Its original mandate was initially established to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The mandate of ONUC (the operation in Congo) was subsequently modified to include maintaining of territorial integrity and political independence of Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal from Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations command, and all mercenaries. Despite the murder of Lumumba by Katangans and the international indignation that followed, the United Nations did not falter. After a two and a half years of violent struggle, the United Nations was able to bring about peace in January 1963 and Katanga united with Congo. This operation had the largest number of casualties—250. The operation was started in 1960 and ended in 1964 partially for financial reasons (for it cost the United Nations about

$402 million). The mandate of this operation shifted, although very nominally away from the traditional mandate given to any peacekeeping operation.

The Yemen operation in 1963 proved to be an another learning point in the evolution of the United Nations peacekeeping. The force was constituted to bring the warring group to the negotiating table (Yemen was caught up in the web of a civil war). In the limited time it stayed on the land the force was able to achieve its goal and the operation ended in September 1965.

The Cyprus operation too in some ways tested the existing fabric of United Nations peacekeeping. This operation too had been set up to tackle some law and order problems but it turned out to be much more. The main function of the operation was to prevent a recurrence of fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions. After the hostilities of 1974, UNFICYP's mandate was expanded. Now the UNFICYP's work included supervising cease-fire and maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and of the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot forces. In the absence of any political settlement to the Cyprus problem the force continues to its presence on the island.

A UNOGIL (United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon) was another important United Nations mission set up in 1958. It was established to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders. After the conflict had been settled, tensions eased and UNOGIL was withdrawn. The United Nations Interim Force continues to remain in Lebanon (this was deployed in March 1978).

The United Nations involvement in Angola in the 1980s illustrates all the new problems that a mission could face. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) had been established by the Security Council in December 1988 to supervise the withdrawal of the fifty thousand strong Cuban contingent with all their arms and equipment. Earlier without any United Nations involvement, Portugal, the USSR and US had succeeded in forging a cease-fire agreement through the Lisbon Peace Accords. This agreement was predicated on 'free and fair' election-taking place between September and November 1992. In March 1992, the Security Council agreed to extend the mandate whereby the UNAVEM would observe and verify the forthcoming elections. The UNAVEM started with less than 450 unarmed observers, with an additional 100 after the decision to monitor elections was taken and another 400 during the actual elections. Compared to this, in next door Namibia, in 1989, nearly eight thousand United Nations personnel had been deployed to organise (not

simply to monitor and verify) elections among a small population. Considering that Angola is the size of Germany, France and Spain put together and had never experienced the development of any political institutions, such resources coupled with the limited nature of the mandate, were scanty to say the least.[5]

What the United Nations gained or learned during the various peacekeeping operations that it undertook is not hard to locate. Most of the peacekeeping operations that were undertaken, for instance, Greece (UNSCOB), Lebanon (UNOGIL), Congo (ONUC), Yemen (UNYOM) concentrated on reporting back to the United Nations about the situation or at best trying to bring about negotiations (at times successfully), but not doing anything that seemed out of the way or beyond a certain set framework. During the cold war the United Nation's peacekeeping operations decreased to a very great extent mainly due to the super power rivalry.

PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

The main efforts during the cold war peacekeeping operations was to separate antagonistic forces, monitor the cease-fire and discourage the resumption of hostilities. Nevertheless, with the demise of the cold war the international system has undergone a sea change.

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[5] Anthony Parsons, From Cold War to Hot Peace, (Penguin Books, London), 1995, p.142

One change has been on the growing disparity of the demand and the expectations for interventions in a given conflict situation. There now exist more possibilities of a consensus within the Security Council, with the United Nations having been given new assignments that have stretched the existing United Nations fabric and "blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, both in mandate and in enforcement."[6] In the various operations that were undertaken after the end of the cold war, Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, one or the other convention was flouted. For instance, the old norm of taking consent from the parties to the conflict before intervening, the norm of using light weapons (in Bosnia even air raids were carried out), opening fire though not in self defence, and other norms were routinely flouted.

In the various peacekeeping operations that were undertaken in the post cold war era, somewhere in an effort to restore government or protect the population or in promoting transition to democracy or even in trying to bring the parties to a conflict, "the operation seemed to loose focus and slide into a Chapter VII enforcement posture."[7]

With the cold war having been relegated to history, ethnic conflicts, the undercurrents of which were always there, have come to the forefront, demanding not just intervention by the United Nations

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[6] SJR Bilgrami, "United Nations: With and Without the Cold War", in M.S. Rajan (ed.), United Nations at 50 and Beyond, (Lancers Books, New Delhi), 1995, p.242

but also testing the limits of existing norms. Most of these ethnic conflicts are matters that fall within the ambit of being 'internal' matters, thereby being under 'domestic jurisdiction', and hence not comprising directly as 'threats to international peace and security'. Hence it is difficult to establish the legal basis for intervention. Among the other norm that has been challenged to the limit is the often-debated shift from 'state system values' to human rights values'. In addition, within the ambit of human rights is the thought on differentiation between collective human rights and individual rights. Also "...the historical tension between state sovereignty (relating authority to a defined territory) and 'national sovereignty' (relating authority to a defined population) seems to be tilting to the disadvantage of the state."[8]

Scholars have debated at length this new thinking about the limit to which sovereignty can be stretched as well as the circumstances in which members of the international community can legitimately initiate 'humanitarian intervention'. Stanley Hoffmann has argued that, "it is time that the principle of the United Nations has applied only to South Africa be generalised: No state should be able to claim that the way it treats its citizens is its sovereign right if this treatment is likely to create international tensions."[9] While Thomas

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[7] *ibid.*
[8] J Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations", International Relations, Vol. 48 (Winter 1994), p.108
[9] Stanley Hoffmann, Avoiding New World Disorder, New York Times, February 25, 1991

Weiss and Larry Minear have suggested "the world is poised between the cold war and an embryonic new humanitarian order...in which life threatening suffering and human rights abuses become legitimate international concerns irrespective of where they take place."[10]

In the 1990's the most fundamental unit of international politics, the state, has been under constant questioning and relentless pressure: the nation by new and revived cultural cleavages, the state by the forces of economic and political liberalisation and heightened popular expectations.[11] In the same way, the tensions between the international norms of self determination and territorial integrity have shifted in favour of self determination.

The norms that today govern the intervention of the United Nations in any conflict situation are far different than what was there in the past. One could conveniently say that a new set of norms has now replaced the older conventions. For instance, today it is generally believed that when the domestic ethnic violence may spill over the borders and disturb the peace of a region, then a sort of consensus begins to develop in favour of intervention. This also is in tune with the basic objective of maintaining international peace and security.

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[10] Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear, "Preface" in Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear, Humanitarianism across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War,(Boulder: Lynne Rienner), 1993, p.vii

[11] Crawford Young, "The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality, in Crawford Young", (ed.), The Rising tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay?, (University of Wisconsin Press) 1993, p.3

Moreover there is norm against violation of human rights. When domestic ethnic conflicts are associated with large-scale abuses of human rights, ranging from repression of free expression to genocide, the United Nations is increasingly urged to react. Finally, where a large section of the population is victimised by violence resulting from ethnic conflict, the United Nations is expected to react.[12] David Scheffer, in his essay on Humanitarian Intervention versus the State Sovereignty, in fact goes ahead and outlines five categories of exceptions to the Article 2(7) prohibitions against interference in states internal affairs:

- First, the obvious exception is a Chapter VII enforcement action as stated in Article 2(7) itself.

- A second exception to Article 2(7) is international treaty commitments. These commitments include, for example, the many international and regional human rights treaties, including the Convention Against Genocide.

- A third exception is the presence of anarchy or the absence of consensual authority.

- A fourth exception exists when consent to intervene would be required from an illegitimate government.

- The fifth and probably most important exception is in the case of systematic violation of the human rights of large groups of people

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[12] Milton J Esman, & Shibley Telhami (ed.), International Organisations and Ethnic Conflict, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London), 1995, p.12

within borders. This condition has been repeatedly articulated as an exception to Article 2(7).[13]

The framework constructed by Hammarsjkold, therefore, began developing cracks. There was a need felt in some operations to have an increased mandate of the United Nations role in a conflict situation.

A case in point where the United Nations, perhaps, had a wide mandate was its role in Cambodia. In 1991, representatives of the major actors in the conflict, namely, the Vietnamese-backed government, Prince Sihanouk and his supporters, and the Khmer Rouge (rulers of Cambodia before their overthrow in a Vietnamese invasion) signed a peace agreement, which provided for an end to the civil war and set up the mechanisms for peaceful democratic transition in the country. This agreement was facilitated by United Nations sponsored negotiations. The United Nations had an extremely ambitious mandate, of which the UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) was a central part. "The United Nations was charged with supervising the cease-fire and disarming the various factions, repatriating refugees, maintaining law and order, conducting some governmental functions and most significantly, organising,

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[13] David J. Scheffer, "Humanitarian Intervention versus State Sovereignty," in <u>Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Implications for the United States Military Military</u>, (United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC),1993,p.13-14.

conducting and monitoring democratic elections."[14] Despite complications such as Khmer Rouge's hostility, delayed full deployment of the UNTAC and their scant knowledge of the Cambodian history, culture or politics, let alone any word of the difficult Khmer language, there were successes. In Cambodia the Security Council and the Secretary-General were lead players from the outset in the formulation and the meticulous pre-planning of the largest operation ever undertaken by the United Nations, surpassing even the Congo in size and scope, carrying out an effective mandate covering almost all aspects of the life of the country.

INNOVATION THROUGH EVOLUTION

The United Nations record in peace operations -- before, during and after the cold war has been long, varied, distinguished and innovative although there have been periods when the United Nations has come under fire from all quarters: the member states, the states facing the intervention as well as the contributing states. Peacekeeping operations have come to encompass three distinct activities, which have evolved as "generations" of United Nations operations.

Traditionally peacekeeping was considered as unarmed or lightly armed. United Nations forces stationed between hostile parties

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[14] Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore), 1994, p.197

to monitor cease-fire, troop withdrawal while political negotiations went on. "They provided transparency--an impartial assurance that the other party was not violating truce --and raised the cost of defecting from and the benefits of abiding with the agreement by the threat of exposure, the potential resistance of the peacekeeping force, and the legitimacy of the United Nations mandates."[15]

The second category, called the second-generation operations by the Secretary-General involves a complex, multi-dimensional process that often supplements to the existing military, police or civilian functions underway. The United Nations does carry a fine record of success in the second generation of peacekeeping operations with diverse operations such as those in Namibia (UNTAG), El Salvador (ONUSAL) and Cambodia (UNTAC). The tasks that the United Nations undertakes in such operations are not limited to merely managing truce. The United Nations serves as a peacekeeper in facilitating a peace treaty among the parties, resettling the refugees and supervising the transitional civilian authorities and as peacebuilder by monitoring and organising implementation of human rights, national democratic elections and rehabilitation of the shattered economy.

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[15] Michael W. Doyle, Introduction to the Report of the 25th Veinna Seminar on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the Next Century, (International Peace Academy, New York), 1995, 2-4, March.

The third generation operations involve low-level military operations which extend from the protection of the supply of humanitarian aid to the enforcement of cease-fires and if necessary the process which former Secretary-General Boutras Boutras Ghali termed as 'post conflict peace building'. This would involve the necessary assistance in the process of rebuilding the so-called imploded states. Unfortunately, insightful doctrines for these peace enforcing operations appeared just as Somalia and Bosnia exposed their limitations in practice.

IMPLODED STATES AND PEACEKEEPING

An imploded state is where the normal institutions of a state are near collapse, or have collapsed and a state of anarchy exists. The main factors responsible for this are: a very weak state fabric, there having been little or no consolidation of political institutions after the process of decolonisation, and the state institutions prone to falling trap to civil or ethnic strife, as has been the case in Bosnia or in Somalia. Added to this is the factor of a prolonged struggle for power combined with natural disaster like famine. A typical United Nations response to this situation after a lot of outcry has been raised in the world media is that of sending a peacekeeping force. Boutras Ghali termed this as the process of peace building.

In an operation like the Namibia and Cambodia the United Nations undertook the reconstruction of the state institutions along with humanitarian assistance. In some cases like the Somalian case as well as the Bosnian case and others like Rwanda consent by definition was not available, but then the question arises – who does the United Nations seek consent from?

Gradual erosion of the institutions of governance within a state, with or without external assistance, and the slipping away of the state into anarchy, does lead to a threat to international peace and security. Notwithstanding the fact the state organs are virtually non-existent it remains a political reality and the state system does provide the best governance. The attempts so far have been entirely on the humanitarian assistance and an expansion of the existing mandate of the operation.

In the recent years the United Nations has been called upon to react to the problems of presence light arms and warring groups. "This is a task that the peacekeeping forces are ill-equipped to deal with either in terms of the legitimacy, or the mandate, or the operational aspect of implementing such a mandate."[16]

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[16] Jasjit Singh, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operation", Strategic Analysis, July 1996, p.549.

In 1990's the nation state, the most fundamental unit of the international system, has been under relentless pressure, questioned by new or revived cultural cleavages, by the forces of economic and political liberalisation, and heightened popular expectations. "Collapsed states pose a difficult challenge for the international community."[17] The humanitarian consequences of political disintegration and anarchy in the form of famine, the destruction of economic infrastructure, human right abuses, refugee movement and internally displaced persons compels international action as the fallout of the chaos cannot be limited to a small geographic region. "Political disintegration generates instability and threatens neighbouring states through refugee flows, the stimulation of illegal trade in weapons and other contraband, and because the communities imperilled by state collapse often cross border and can appeal to neighbouring groups for involvement."[18]

The question really is what makes a state slip into a state of anarchy? What are ethnic groups? Why do different ethnic groups fight for their rights? What factors determine the UN's intervention in a conflict situation? How is it that some missions are instituted when much damage has already been done and when it is sent as humanitarian assistance how does it become armed humanitarianism?

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[17] Terrance Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, <u>Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction,</u> (The Brookings Institutions, Washington D. C.), 1995, p.3

[18] *ibid*

Somalia provides an excellent example where all these questions have attracted much attention and media hype.

ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC GROUPS

A complex dilemma that besets the human society at all times, perhaps, has been its quest for equality and fraternity among all on one hand, and the consciously created structured inequalities and discriminatory practices by human beings against their own fellow beings on the other. But what exactly is the basis for ethnic identity? Individuals identify with families, age, sex groups, religions, classes, villages and towns, ethnic and national communities as well as humanity as a whole. These affiliations rarely come into conflict except in the times of war (where one allegiance can override another). "Identity in other words is situational."[19]

This social construct is centred on the individual and it sees collective identities as composed of aggregates of individual identities, or dimensions of thereof. So, the individual is not treated as the key to defining and explaining the nature and durability of collectiveness. Instead, the properties of collective cultural identities become the centre of attention.

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[19] J Okamura, "Situational Ethnicity", Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1981, p.452-465

THE ATTRIBUTES OF ETHNIC TIES

One must focus primarily on the collective level of community and identity in order to grasp the nature and power of nationalism. The particular collective cultural identity of concern here is ethnic. Ethnic group is a named human population, with shared memories, and cultural elements, with a myth of common ancestry.[20]

First, names are vital, essential not merely for identification but also to be used as expressive emblems of the collective personality. With a name emerges a sense of community feeling.[21]

Second, shared memories, the indicators of which are situated in traditions handed down by generations to help create a sense common history and destiny.[22]

Third, cultural elements, is more variable. This would include crafts, architecture, food music, dress, craft, laws, customs and traditions. Some people have even debated including language as a decisive criterion of ethnicity though one could argue that one language could include more than one ethnic community.[23]

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[20] *ibid*
[21] *ibid*
[22] *ibid*
[23] *ibid*

Fourth, the belief of a common ancestry. For ethnic nationalities and their followers, the ethnic is indeed a 'super family' -- extended in space and time to distant relatives over many generations.[24]

ETHNIC GROUPS AND NATIONALISM

Ethnic nationalism is that politicised social consciousness centred upon on ethnic identity born out of shared commonalties seeking to achieve unity, autonomy and group interest by mobilising ethnic based constituencies. In the light of large-scale nationalism, it would appear that ethnic nationalism is not fundamentally different from the ideal type nationalism; it exhibits most of the characteristics of nationalism.[25] The significant point of departure is rooted in the motives and ambitions of ethnic nationalism, which are small in scale and limited in dimension. There are times when the political ambitions of various ethnic groups in a pluralistic society come into conflict. More often than not the powerful state apparatus dominated by the dominant ethnic group delimits the perimeters of ethnic nationalism, and prevents its full-throated expression. It is this retarded and incipient nature which differentiates it from large-scale nationalism.[26]

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[24] *ibid*

[25] Dawa Norbu, , <u>Culture and Nationalism in Third World Politics</u>" (Routledge, London, New York),1992 p.181

[26] *ibid*

Nationalism operates not along class lines within society nor along national boundaries but along ethnic lines in confrontation with the generalised other. The ethnic group is a discrete social organisation vessel within which mass-mobilisation and social communication may be effective.[27] It therefore, calls for the ethnicity specific approach to nationalism because each ethnic group corresponds to a specific culture through which nationalism is expressed in spite of this very few scholars have ventured to diagnose the essentially nationalist character of ethnic conflict.[28]

Dominant ethnic groups have monopolised not only state power but also state nationalism, which condemns ethnic nationalism as 'anti national'. The dominant ethnic group projects the inter group conflict within the society misleadingly and downplays it nationalist characteristics, a trend which has dangerous implications for the nation state.[29] That it is a revolt against the state and its power structure at all levels[30] is seldom admitted. Instead, it is almost universally depreciated and termed "parochialism, primordialism, sub-nationalism, separatism, tribalism, regionalism, ethnic revivalism etc. This phenomenon is not appreciated anywhere more so by the United

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[27] *ibid p. 182*
[28] *ibid*
[29] *ibid*
[30] Urmila Phadnis as quoted in Dawa Norbu op cit

Nations as 90% of the United Nations members are multi-ethnic states and therefore, are dormant or active centres of ethnic conflict.

But the ideal of national state has proved elusive. Some decades ago, it was widely believed that parochial or sub-national ethnical loyalties would give way under the imperatives of development; state-wide loyalties or an over-arching sense of national identity would eclipse them. This has not been the case. Ethnic loyalties have proved stubbornly inter-acceptable and, class has become a significant basis for political mobilisation.[31] Nation-building too as a process has not been a success as far as the Melting Pots concept goes. That the state would be one huge pot in which under the growth of development, the various ethnic groups would shed their narrow ethnic identities and merge. Since this has not occurred, today, what the scholars study is not 'Melting Pot' but 'Salad bowl' where all ethnic groups retain their individual identities and work in cohesion towards development process without shedding their individual identities. [32]

Ethnic nationalism is not only subordinated to the international factor but also to the state structure. The development in a post-colonial state is characterised not so much by nation building as is commonly assumed as much by state building. We only need to glance

[31]David Welsh, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict", Survival, Vol. 35, No.1, Spring 1993, p.63-80.

[32] Dawa Norbu, op cit p.24

at the ever-increasing defence expenditure to realise this. It is only the dominant ethnic group in a state that tends to project its ideas, thought, belief and ideology as best. The nation building theories have often been oblivious of the process where the dominant racial ethnic group does not remain content with merely having a favoured position in society. It seeks to impose its will on the whole of society, mould it in its own image, monopolise the instruments and offices of the state, and thus make its rules the law of the land.

A question that repeatedly warrants one's attention is why do ethnic minorities become objects of socio-economic discrimination and deprivation even in pluralistic societies championing multiculturalism, equality and protection for all before law? What makes minorities put up resistance against majorities or dominant groups? In a multicultural society, social discrimination is definitively connected to the structural processes of society's development. At times, an economically or culturally privileged minority may find its traditional interests suddenly being questioned by a ethnically different majority which also may in some cases be holding the reins of the governance. A minority will stand up to defend what it considers is its legitimate rights, that are being denied, whereas a dominant majority will argue against the undue privileges that the minority desires to command. Normally different ethnic groups within a state have their own well-defined space and they tend not to compete with each other on perfectly

victims of discrimination that may over a period accumulate.[33] Usage such as language by different groups and verbal and non-verbal features of customary behaviour develop during the process of society's development. This also encompasses processes such as industrialisation, technological growth, state expansion and even ambitions of ethno-national self-determination.

One point that needs mention here is the new international norm that has in the recent past developed in favour of human rights. This relates to the highly positive emotive response that the advocacy of human rights can draw from diverse constituencies when used as the normative basis to justify group rights.[34] Given the multi-ethnic nature of the third world states, if human rights get endorsed as the right to 'ethno-national self-determination' they are likely to pose a grave threat to country's national integrity. Related closely to this issue is the concept of failed state. Jack Snyder has succinctly described the link between the two by describing ethnic nationalism as 'the default option'. According to Snyder, ethnic nationalism 'predominates when institutions collapse, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people's basic needs and when satisfactory alternatives are not

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[33] Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development & Human Rights, (UN University Press New York, 1990), p.79

[34] Mohammad Ayoob, State-making, State-breaking and State Failure: Explaining the Roots of 'Third World' Insecurity" in Luc Voa de Gobr, et al (eds), Between Development and Destruction: an Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States, (Macmillan, London 1996) p.67--89

available'.[35] This has been true not only for the erstwhile Soviet Union but also of many third world states. The other factor that has had a negative impact on the process of state building is the process of decolonisation which some states in their ernesty took too much interest with not so good consequences. There were not many states that were ready for independence when they were imposed independence upon. In case a state is not in a position to undertake the process of nation building there is no point in it getting independence; the state merely slips into political chaos.

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[35] Jack Snyder, Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State, Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, p.12

CHAPTER II

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA - I

Introduction

It is important to study the international community's efforts in Somalia, in detail, for several reasons. It was in many respects a bold experiment that tested the ability of the international community to help a people overwhelmed by famine and anarchy. Its size and complexity render it ideally suited for analytical study. The operations in Somalia, taken as a whole, had successes in many spheres, due to the combined efforts of some governments, the United Nations and non-governmental organisations. It was for the first time that the United Nations had invoked the provisions under the Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in an operation that was essentially an intrastate conflict. The United Nations can pride itself in the fact that when it withdrew from Somalia, there was no more starvation and district and regional councils had been established in parts of the country.

In addition, it was certainly another "mission related success" that the United Nations terminated the Somalia mission when it became apparent that some of its objectives were not within reach.

Consequently, the withdrawal from Somalia was conducted in an exemplary way and can be considered an organisational masterpiece. It is important not to lose sight of these successes and to examine in some depth, the elements that made them possible.

While the successes needs to be recorded, it is imperative to analyse those aspects where success was not achieved, especially since the operations cost the lives of 154 peacekeepers. There were some controversial aspects of the mission which had an impact upon the credibility of United Nations peacekeeping and whose repercussions were felt in subsequent peacekeeping operations.

The troops and civilian personnel on the ground are at the cutting edge of peacekeeping. It is they who feel the direct effects of the Security Council's decisions; of the international community's political and material support; of the Secretariat's executive direction and management; and of logistical and administrative support. Members of the Security Council, troop contributing governments and the Secretariat, therefore, have a special responsibility to learn from the experience of Somalia, so that they are better prepared to maximise opportunities for success in future operations.

The Somalia experience has highlighted and brought into focus some important and perennial aspects of peacekeeping that need to be addressed urgently. These include the importance of matching mandates with means, the requirement for the United Nations to explain its mission better to the local population as well as in the international media and the need for troop contributing governments to prepare their people psychologically for the risks inherent in peacekeeping operations. Simultaneously, the importance of a unified command, the circumstances under which the use of force may become unavoidable even in self defence, and those in which the use of force may be counterproductive also needs to be understood.

Historical setting

The easternmost country in Africa, Somalia encompasses a broad band of desert and semi-desert territory. The Somalis, a people of nomadic and pastoral traditions, share a common religion (Islam) and a common written language, which has only recently developed a written form. The Jamhuuriyada Soomaaliyeed or the Somali Republic was established on July 1 1960. Divided into French, British and Italian sectors at the end of the 19th Century, Somalia was partially reunited in 1960 when British Somaliland in the North and the Italian administered Trust Territory in the South

achieved their independence and promptly merged to form the United Republic of Somalia.

Little economic growth has been achieved in the last twenty-five years and the country remains one of the world's poorest. Most of Somalia's land is suitable only for raising livestock. Some foreign exchange has been earned through a livestock related product called 'Myrrh', widely used as incense in the Gulf. Less than two percent of the land area can sustain food crops and this area lies between the Shabelle and Juba rivers in the South. With so little fertile land, the country has always had a structural food deficit although it has traditionally been an exporter of livestock. It has also been particularly been vulnerable to periods of drought and crop failures. A quarter of a million nomads lost most of their livestock in a devastating drought in 1974-1975. The vast exodus of ethnic Somalis and related peoples from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia into Somalia in the late 1970s created further pressure on scarce land and water resources, and led to a major humanitarian crisis.

Political background

Divided into French, British and Italian sectors at the end of the nineteenth century, Somalia was partially reunited in 1960 when British Somaliland in the North and the Italian administered

Trust Territory in the South achieved their independence and promptly merged to form the United Republic of Somalia. The British wanted to continue their influence but were opposed by Washington and Moscow, both making their own strategic calculations. Somalia spent much of the next two decades in trying to align itself with either Washington or Moscow.

The Somali Youth Congress (SYL) was the country's first political party at the time of independence and formed the Republic's first government. In 1967 Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was elected as President and his chosen candidate Mohammed Haji Ibrahim Egal was appointed the Prime Minister.

Military units of Major General Mohammed Said Barre ousted the Egal regime on October 21, 1969, in an action that included the assassination of President Shermarke. Going through various crests and troughs both internally and externally, Said Barre continued his rule. Internally he nationalised the foreign banks and the local self-government was reorganised. Civilian government was nominally re-instituted following the popular approval of a new constitution on August 25, 1979, the one party election of a Peoples Assembly on 30th December and the Assembly's

election of General Said Barre as President on 26th January1980.
Externally there was a conflict with Ethiopia (started on 21 October
1980). This continued till March 1982. In 1986 Said Barre suffered
severe injuries in an automobile accident.[1] Barre recovered from the
accident to become the country's sole candidate for a re-election of a
seven-year presidential term in December 23, 1986. But the
country's first direct balloting generated intense speculation as to a
successor.

The Somali economy was devastated during the Said Barre
period. The exchange rate shot upto 1$ = 2620 Somali Shilling in
1985. The survival for the common man became a struggle. A large
number of civil servants, whose average income was less than US$5
a month, were forced to seek additional private work to cope with
the burden imposed by the growing inflation.[2] While the masses
were suffering greatly, the ruling elite and the members of the upper
stratum of the population were leading a luxurious lifestyle. The
basic amenities including clean drinking water, hospitals, and
schools, colleges could not be constructed or maintained due to the
lack of funds. The President sensed the growing discontentment
against his regime and reshuffled his cabinet with cosmetic effect.

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[1] An accident for which he could not even be provided the basic first aid in the country's best
hospital and medical teams and had to be rushed from Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia.

[2] Mohamed Omar Osman, The Road to Zero: Somalia's self Destruction, (HAAN Associates,
London), 1992, p.200.

Those inducted or removed were always the same old faces. The President continued the cosmetic changes with little or no effect. Even when the ministers were no longer holding their posts they continued to live in their big houses and continued their ministerial privileges. The President also continued to do something, which only contributed to the existing undercurrent of the simmering fire: he continued to appoint people from his own clan to various senior level posts thereby sowing the seeds of ethnic conflict.

1990 was a crucial year in the history of Somalia, as it seemed evident that the country would either slip into ethnic and civil strife or there would be a coup. A number of armed groups had sneaked into the capital carrying heavy machine guns, artillery pieces and even rocket launchers. There was heavy shelling in and around Mogadishu and finally on 27th January 1991 Said Barre fled the capital concealed in a military tank.[3]

The fall of the Somali dictator Said Barre in January 1991 heralded a struggle for power between the various faction leaders that had led the various clan-based military movements against the Barre regime. Ali Mahdi Mohammed, of the United Somali Congress was made the president following a series of conferences in Djibouti

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[3] *ibid* p.202

in 1991. General Mohammed Farah Aideed who led the final military offensive soon challenged this arrangement. Intense fighting broke out between Ali Mahdi and Aideed in November 1991 resulting in widespread loss of life and destruction of physical infrastructure. 'Scorching' practices used by the retreating Barre forces earlier that year resulted in inability of the local population to farm the land. [4] With the decreasing farm growth there was a scarcity of grains and the chain further led to malnutrition. By the onset of 1992 large areas were engulfed by a widespread famine.

Operation Restore Hope

The International Red Cross (ICRC), World Food Program (WFP), various other NGO's and the United Nations found it very difficult to deliver humanitarian relief with the ever increasing instances of banditry, theft and the extortionist practices of the faction militias. By now the United Nations Secretariat, the UN Security Council, the Organisation of African Unity (OAS), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) had started discussing the situation with some with a greater participatory interest.

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[4] 'Scorching' was a practice in which the fields were burnt so that nothing could be tilled on them.

On 27 December 1991, the then Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar informed the President of the Security Council that he intended to take an initiative in an attempt to restore peace in Somalia. So after consulting the incoming Secretary General Boutras Boutras Ghali, the then Under Secretary General for political affairs James Jonah led a team of senior United Nations officials to Somalia aiming at brokering peace. On January 23, by its resolution 733 (1992) the Security Council urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and decided that all states should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia.[5] When Jonah was about to land in Mogadishu, Aideed ordered shelling of the airport and so the plane carrying Jonah had to be diverted to a place that was under the control of Aideed. Sensing the itinerary of Janoh, Aideed took him to various parts of the areas under him and ensured that he got nowhere close to the boundary of the place where he could cross over to the areas under the control of Ali Mahdi. But later when Jonah did get an opportunity to visit the areas under Ali Mahdi, he negotiated with him and quickly declared that Aideed was the main culprit who was not coming to the negotiating table. This added fuel to the fire and Aideed became fiercer and indulged in more non-co-operation with the United Nations.

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[5] United Nations Press Release IHA/431, 12 February 1992

On 31st January the Secretary-General invited the LAS, OAU and OIC as well as interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aideed to send their representatives to participate in consultations at the United Nations Headquarters from 12 to 14 February. The talks succeeded in getting the two factions in Mogadishu to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of cease-fire and to a visit to Mogadishu by a joint high-level delegation composed of representatives of the United Nations and the three organisations.[6] This delegation after intense negotiations in Mogadishu managed to get the two factions at war in Mogadishu to sign on 'Agreement on the Implementation of a Cease-fire'. This agreement also included the acceptance of a United Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor cease-fire. This was a major breakthrough though the United Nations failed to take advantage of this cease-fire in which the firing had actually stopped for three and a half months.

Following this, on 17th March 1992 the Security Council adopted resolution 746 (1992), "supporting the Secretary-General's

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[6] *ibid.* In the document it is categorically mentioned this does "...not in any way imply recognition of any Somali group or faction."

decision to send a technical team to Somalia"[7] By July the fighting

had begun again and with the onset of the famine as well as the non-

supply of the relief the situation worsened. Driven by a strong public

opinion the US President George Bush communicated to the United

Nations in November 1992 that the US was willing to assist the

United Nations in delivering humanitarian relief. The US wanted to

increase its influence in the Horn of Africa mainly due to strategic

reasons. It can also be argued that this was another exhibition of the

'New World Order' of President George Bush.

When the World looked up to the United Nations to respond

there was one dilemma that the organisation faced. "There was no

model for the United Nations to follow in its efforts to bring

humanitarian assistance and peace to the people of Somalia[8]

UN Involvement

Much before the military observers and peacekeepers were

sent in 1992, the UN had significant presence in Somalia

particularly in the field of humanitarian assistance. From the 1970s

the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations

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[7] S/RES/746 (1992), 17 March 1992, Official records of the Security Council, Forty Seventh Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1992, Document S/23445

[8] 'The UN & Somalia' 1992-96: Blue Book Series, Vol. VIII, (Department of Public Information, New York), UN, 1996, p.5.

Children's Fund (UNICEF) were functional. But as the problem rose to alarming proportions it seemed that the United Nations was inadequately prepared to tackle the crisis. At the height of the problem, in 1992, out of a total estimated population of 8 million, approximately 4.5 million Somalis required urgent external assistance, of those, some 1.5 million people were at immediate risk of starvation, including 1 million children. But when the civil war swept Mogadishu in December 1990 and January 1991, the United Nations closed its offices in Somalia and along with most diplomatic missions and international organisations evacuated its personnel from the country. The office in Mogadishu was reopened in August 1991 only to be closed again in November 1991. On 15 January 1992, Somalia's interim Prime Minister Arteh Ghalib appealed to the Security Council to convene to consider the 'deteriorating situation in Somalia, particularly the fighting in Mogadishu.[9] On 23rd January the Security Council adopted its first resolution on Somalia, resolution 733 (1992), in which it urged all the parties to the conflict to "cease hostilities and agree to a cease fire and to promote the process of reconciliation and of political settlement in Somalia."[10] And decided that "...Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall... immediately implement a general

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[9] S/23445 20 Jan 1992

[10] Official records of the Security Council, forty-seventh Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1992, S/RES/733 (1992), 23 January 1992

and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia..."[11]

On 17 March 1992, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 746 (1992), urging the continuation of the United Nations humanitarian work in Somalia and strongly supporting the Secretary-General's decision to send a technical team.[12]On 27 and 28 March, agreements were signed between the rival parties in Mogadishu resulting in the deployment of United Nations observers to monitor the cease-fire of 3rd March 1992.[13] The agreement also included the deployment of United Nations security personnel to protect United Nations personnel and humanitarian assistance activities.

The Secretary-General then recommended the establishment of a United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), comprising 50 military observers to monitor the cease fire, and a 300-strong infantry unit to provide United Nations convoys of relief supplies with a sufficiently strong military escort to deter attack and to fire in self-defence, showed deterrence proving in effective. By its resolution 751[14] of 24 April 1992 the Security Council established

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[11] *ibid*
[12] S/RES/746 (1992), 17 March 1992
[13] http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/missions/unosom1.htm
[14] S/RES/751(1992), 24 April 1992

the UNOSOM.[15] It also requested the immediate deployment of cease-fire observers, agreeing to the deployment of Security force for humanitarian operations as soon as possible and calling on the international community to support the 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance.

In resolution 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, the Security Council approved the proposal to establish four operational zones – Berbera, Bossasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo – and strongly endorsed sending a technical team to Somalia.[16] On 24 August 1992, the Secretary-General requested an increase in the authorised strength of UNOSOM to create the four operational zones. For each zone, UNOSOM would be provided with a military unit of 750, all ranks. Hence the total force rose to 3500.[17] The United Nations Security Council authorised this increase by resolution 775 (1992)[18]. On 8th September it was agreed to a further addition of three logistical units, raising the total authorised strength of UNOSOM to 4219 troops and 50 military observers. The first group of security personnel arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992. In tandem with these preparations, the Secretary-General sought to improve

[15] **Duration** April 1992 -- March 1993, **Strength** 50 military observers, 3500 security personnel, upto 719 logistic support personnel and some 200 international civilian staff, **fatalities** 8 (military personnel), **Expenditures** $42, 931,700 net
[16] S/RES/767 (1992), 27 July 1992
[17] http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/missions/unosom1.htm

[18] S/RES/775 (1992) 28 August

planning and co-ordination of humanitarian action under a 100 Day

Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance. The

plan had eight main objectives:

- Massive infusion of food aid

- Aggressive expansion of supplementary feeding

- Provision of basic health services and mass measles immunisation

- Urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene

- Provision of shelter materials blankets and clothes

- Simultaneous delivery of seeds tools and animals vaccines with food rations

- Prevention of further refugee outflows and the promotion of returnee programmes

- Institution building and rehabilitation of civil society

Of the $82.7 million requested for its implementation, a total of

$67.3 million was received.[19]

But implementing all these objectives became increasingly

difficult. Continuing disagreement between various factions,

different clans, their animosity towards each other, increased

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[19] http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/missions/unosom1.htm

expatriate staff made the effective deployment of the UNOSOM impossible. Sahnoun resigned as the special representative of the Secretary-General and was replaced by Mr. Ismat Kittani of Iraq on 8 November 1992.[20] On 28th October 1992, General. Aideed declared that the Pakistani UNOSOM battalion would no longer be tolerated in Mogadishu. These are often the difficulties on the ground that makes peacekeeping such a difficult task. Mohammed Mahdi's forces shelled ships carrying foodstuff as they tried to dock into Mogadishu followed extensive shelling of the airport. Coming under heavy fire, on 13th November the Pakistani troops returned fire.

Unified Task Force

On 24th November 1992, the Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Security Council informing the Council of a series of disturbing (mentioned above) developments in Somalia. He stated that it might become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations efforts in Somalia.[21] Within five days, on 29th November 1992, the Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Security Council presenting five options for the Security Council's consideration. They were:

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[20] *ibid*
[21] S/24859, 27 November, 1992

1) To continue and intensify the efforts in recent months of UNOSOM in the strength of approximately 4,200 troops authorised by resolution 775 (1992).

2) To abandon the idea of using international military personnel to protect humanitarian activities, withdraw the military elements of UNOSOM and leave the humanitarian agencies to negotiate the best arrangements with the various faction and clan leaders.

3) To undertake a show of force in the city of Mogadishu, in order to create conditions for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief and to deter factions and other armed groups...from withholding co-operation with the UNOSOM.

4) To take a countrywide enforcement operation undertaken by a group of member states authorised to do so by the Security Council.

5) ....For a countrywide enforcement operation to be carried out under UN command and control.[22]

Various such initiatives and the deteriorating situation in Somalia led to the Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), in which the "Security Council...(authorised) the Secretary-General and member states under the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."[23]

As Jeffrey Clark put it, "Resolution 794 catapulted the Security Council into a radically different stance regarding collective interventions for humanitarian principles - perhaps not unintentionally as a precursor to an expanded intervention in Bosnia or Iraq."[24]

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[22] *ibid*

[23] S/RES794 (1992), 3 December 1992
[24] Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia" in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed), Enforcing Restraint, (Council Of Foreign Relations Press, New York), 1993, p.204.

Geoff Simmons[25]has argued that the US got a blank cheque: "...it was authorised to send troops, whenever it wanted, to the African mainland." Although the forces that were being sent had the United Nations sanction and an authority that flows from the Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, yet, in Somalia there were heated debates on the 'new colonisation'. On 6th December, the United Somali Congress, the most powerful of the military factions called for talks on the planned intervention.

The American troops started pouring in on 8th December 1992. The media put up a high attendance. A WFP official said that the intervention seemed stage-managed. It reflected the US domination of the media, as there had been people and organisations working in Somalia prior to the United Nations intervention and in extremely demanding conditions, but were never applauded by the media. It seemed that that the media was there to cover the US presence and then reflect the same back home to influence the public opinion in the US in favour of the intervention, which, served no direct US security interests. The operation was a test ground for future conflict resolution.[26]

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[25] Geoff Simmons, UN: A Chronology of Conflict, (St Martins Press, New York), 1994 p.195
[26] Mr. P.S.Sandhu in an interview with the author (WFP Official, Mogadishu 1991-1996), Chandigarh, May26, 1998

The UNITAF made its entry with a show of force. Warships patrolled the coast and helicopters flew over Mogadishu as soldiers fanned out across the city. As a result of this the Somali militiamen disappeared from the streets and took their weapons with them. The airport was secured and a WFP aeroplane with foodstuffs was allowed to land. At its peak strength, the UNITAF consisted of approximately 37,000 troops, including about 8,000 on ships offshore. The largest contingent was from the US, with peak strength of 28,000 marines and infantry. Besides the US, there were 20 other contributing countries with about 9,000 soldiers. Within 3-4 weeks the UNITAF's forces were in control of nine key towns: Mogadishu, Baidoa, Baledogle, Kismayo, Bardera, Hoddur, Belet Weyne, Jalaaqsi and Merca.[27]

In sanctioning the UNITAF, the Security Council's foremost goal had been to address the immediate humanitarian crisis. In a message to the people of Somalia, the Secretary-General sent hope and goodwill and said, "the UN intends to restore the hope of the Somali people. The unified military command which is arriving in Somalia under the United Nations mandate comes to feed the

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[27] S/24976, 17th December 1992

starving, protect the defenceless and prepare the way for political, economic and social reconstruction."[28]

The Famine Defeated

Operation Restore Hope at last permitted the full implementation of the UN 100-Day Action Programme. The situation started improving. This improved situation made it possible for the United Nation agencies and various NGO's to strengthen their staff in Somalia. The UNICEF expanded its operations. The WHO opened a central pharmacy in Mogadishu. "Indeed, by January 1993, food and medical supplies were getting through to almost all the towns of southern and central Somalia, with immediate and dramatic results."[29] With the worst of the famine now over, the UN and its partners began to address the challenge of helping the Somalis revive agricultural production, rebuild their livestock herds and restore the country's shattered services and infrastructure. Action was also taken by international agencies and NGO to tackle the causes of population displacements and refugees flows and prepare for repatriation and resettlement.

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[28] United Nations Press Release SG/SM/4874, 8th December 1992

[29] 'The UN & Somalia' 1992-96: Blue Book Series Vol. XIII 1996, Department of Public Information, UN, New York, 1996, p.35

In a report to the Security Council on 3rd March 1993, the Secretary-General highlighted some of the challenges that lay ahead as Somalia strove to return to normalcy.[30] The first was to facilitate the return of refugees and to help resettle the even larger numbers of internally displaced persons.[31] Second, work had to be provided for the millions of Somalis who were unemployed. This was essential to channel the young militias from violence to peaceful productive pursuits.[32] A third major challenge was to rebuild Somalia's national and regional administrative capacity, which was non-existent.[33]

The Secretary-General also stressed the importance of eliminating the landmines. Initial estimates suggested that there were about 1 million mines most of which had been planted north-west. Mines were hazardous to civilians, posed obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian relief and rendered the land unsuitable for farming or grazing. UNHCR, which re-opened its offices in Hargeisa in March 1993, began a mine clearing operation to facilitate the repatriation of refugees from Ethiopia and Djibouti and UNOSOM II was later to start assisting Somali NGO's to begin additional mine-clearance programmes.

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[30] S/25354, 3 March 1993, addenda S25354/ add1, 11 March 1993 & S/25354 addl2, 22 March 1993
[31] *ibid*
[32] *ibid*
[33] *ibid*

At the Third Co-ordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993, the United Nations unveiled a comprehensive Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for all of 1993, budgeted at $159 million. The programme included projects in 11 priority areas. These included the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees to the rehabilitation of water and sanitation systems and the re-establishment of water and sanitation systems and the re-establishments of public administration.

The United States Central Command was following a four-phased programme to realise the objectives of securing major airports and seaports, key installations and food distribution points, and providing open and free passage of relief supplies, with security for convoys and relief organisations and those supplying humanitarian relief. The number of United States forces were expected to build to approximately 28,000 personnel, to be augmented by some 17,000 UNITAF troops from over 20 countries. In addition to United States forces, UNITAF included military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India[34], Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand,

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[34] For the entire UNOSOM operations India had contributed 4,686 troops. **Source** 'United Nations Peacekeeping', (Department of Public Information, UN), New York, 1995

Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

On 3rd March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

The presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, despite the improvement, a secure environment had not yet been established, and incidents of violence continued. "There was still no effective functioning government in the country, no organised civilian police and no disciplined national army. The security threat to personnel of the United Nations and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGO's was still high in some areas of Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. Moreover, there was no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security continued to be a matter of grave concern."[35]

UNOSOM II would therefore seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. The

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[35] http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/missions/unosom1.htm

people in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, through achieving national reconciliation so as to recreate a democratic Somali State.

Conclusion

Overall, UNOSOM I was a mixed success, in moderating the armed conflict and safeguarding humanitarian assistance. It also made some progress in conflict resolution. There were, of course, various shortcomings of the operation and some unfortunate choices made by the United Nations and the leading states in the peacekeeping operations.

First, humanitarian assistance is difficult to achieve over a very large area. It was no surprise that peacekeepers were attacked and the supplies that were in various warehouses were looted for the greater profit margin in the black market. The small contingent of lightly armed peacekeepers was not sufficient to do the protection duty.

The second problem that the operation faced was in terms of response. When the United Nations answered the call of humanity, it did not have a model to look upto. It was essentially created to maintain 'international peace and security' but this being an

intrastate ethnic conflict, the United Nations was still groping in the dark about an adequate response.

When the supplies started coming in, there were more incentives in stealing the supplies than in distributing them. This was the third problem. Various militia groups had built in incentives in disrupting the shipments. There were enormous profit margins to be reaped from the black market by selling the same supplies. Furthermore, many of the armed groups operating in Somalia were not under any the control of any faction or organisation that went for negotiations. Effectively, even if an agreement was reached between three-four factions for cease-fire, even one small group of armed men could shatter the delicate peace. A peacekeeping force is often ill equipped in terms of weapons and mandate in such a situation. Consent from all the parties to the conflict is necessary for implementing a cease-fire, which if is absent, leads to shattering of the fragile peace.

In terms of mandate it has to be clear between the choice of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The initial operation was a peacekeeping operation but was modified by new functional role of humanitarian assistance. The US military presence -- heavily armed --trying to enforce -- does not fall into any category. But then this

operation itself was a benchmark where for the first time Chapter VII's provisions were invoked. The peacekeepers included a contingent from a superpower -- the US, the peacekeepers especially those from the US were not lightly armed. But then on the positive side it were the presence of these peacekeepers that led to some deterrent effect on the looting of the supplies, and made the delivery of humanitarian supplies a comparative success in the later part of the operation until the onset of the UNOSOM II.

CHAPTER III

## UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA - II

Introduction

The UNITAF (Unified Task Force) was conceived only for a small and temporary exercise in peace enforcement. Its mandate was the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of international relief aid to the beleaguered Somali public – and then hand over operational responsibility to a United Nations peacekeeping mission. On 3rd March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report containing his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 (1992), and proposed that the mandate of UNOSOM II was to cover the whole country and include enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.[1]

UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia II) established to take over from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) - a multinational force, organised and led by the United States, which, in December 1992, had been authorised by the Security Council to use "all necessary

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[1] S/25354, 3rd March & addenda S/25354 Add.1, 11 March 1993 and S/25354/ Add.2, 22 March 1993

means" to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. The mandate of UNOSOM II was to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. Its main responsibilities included monitoring the cessation of hostilities, preventing resumption of violence, seizing unauthorised small arms, maintaining security at ports, airports and lines of communication required for delivery of humanitarian assistance, continuing mine-clearing, and assisting in repatriation of refugees in Somalia.

UNOSOM II was also entrusted with assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure. In February 1994, after several violent incidents and attacks on United Nations soldiers, the Security Council revised UNOSOM II's mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods. UNOSOM II was withdrawn in early March 1995.[2]

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[2] http://www.ipacademy.org/somalia2.htm

Madeline Albright, the then United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations called the UNOSOM II "an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations".[3]

The transition from the UNITAF was not going to be easy and as the first peace-enforcement operation authorised and commanded by the United Nations, it would be in the words of the Security Council "an expression of the international communities determination not to remain a silent spectator to the sufferings of an entire people for no fault of their own."[4]

By adopting resolution 814 (1993) on 26th March 1993, the Security Council increased the size and mandate of UNOSOM II, giving "UNOSOM II responsibility under Chapter VII of the Charter for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia after a transition from UNITAF."[5] There was no model for the organisation to follow but it was on the verge of setting up one; there remained however many unanswered

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[3] The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Vol. VIII, (Department of Public Information, United Nations), New York, 1996, p.44.
[4] S/25354, 3 March 1993 & addenda S/25354/Add. , 11 March 1993 and S/25354/Add. 2, 22 March 1993
[5] S/RES/814 (1993), 26 March 1993

questions about the undertaking to which the international community had committed itself.

POLITICAL SITUATION

The United Nations realised that the process of nation building had to start by laying the foundation stone of the political structures. The Secretary-General pointed to two primary obstacles at the political level (a) deep divisions between the two main factional alliances, the group of twelve supporting Ali Mahdi and USC/SNA led by General Mohammed Farra Aideed and (b) the continued rejection by USC/SNA (United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance) of all political initiatives undertaken by UNOSOM II.[6] As requested by the Security Council resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a further report on 6 January 1994, in which he described the results achieved by UNOSOM II in fulfilling its mandate in the three interrelated fields---political, humanitarian and security.

Regional Councils - The main tasks of the regional councils was to implement humanitarian, social and economic programmes in co-ordination with Transitional National Council (TNC)"since the Secretary-General's 12th November 1993 report, two additional regional council had been formed, bringing the total number of regional councils

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[6] Reference paper 'The UN and the Situation in Somalia' (Department of Public Information, UN), UN, New York, 1995,p.20

to 8, excluding 2 in the north-west. Three more regional councils were expected to be inaugurated in near future."[7]

District Councils - 14 additional councils were certified during November and December 1993, bringing the total to 53 out of 81 districts (excluding the north west). A team of UNOSOM II paid visits to each district to assess the particular support needed by local governments. But there were some obstacles also. The USC/SNA refused to participate in the process and at times even created shadow USC/SNA district councils.

Transitional National Council - with the exception of the USC/SNA faction, participants in the Addis Ababa meetings expressed a strong intention to work towards the rapid establishment of TNC.[8] UNOSOM II received nine nominations for representatives from the 15 political factions.

Police and Justice - Some progress was made as it was very important to have the institutions in the absence of United Nations military forces in Northeast. UNOSOM II established 107 police stations with 6737 policemen at regional and district levels, 311

[7] *ibid*

[8] The Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was convened on 15th March 1993 in Addis Ababa. Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative Lansana Kouyate of Guinea chaired it and was attended by the leaders of 15 Somali political movements and LAS, OAU, OIC and NAM.

judicial personnel in eight regions and 26 districts and over 700 prison

officers in 2 regions.[9]

Disarming rebel groups - One of the major tasks designated to the

UNOSOM II under the Addis Ababa agreement was the disarmament

of all Somali factions and armed groups who terrorised the people and

created hindrance to the smooth flow of humanitarian supplies. "The

priority that UNOSOM II gave to disarmament generated the hostility

of a few clan leaders, fearful of losing their powers towards

UNOSOM.[10] They had not only refused to disarm rather chose to

retaliate under extreme circumstances. "On 5th June, 25 Pakistani

soldiers were killed, 10 were missing and 54 were wounded in a series

of ambushes and armed attacks against UNOSOM II troops

throughout south Mogadishu by Somali militiamen."[11]

The United Nations had to respond adequately. The future of

United Nations peacekeeping itself was at stake. In case of non-

response from the United Nations, signal would go out to other conflict

areas in the world that attacks on United Nations personnel could be

carried out with impunity. The incident led to international outcry and

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[9] Reference paper 'The UN and the Situation in Somalia' op cit, p.21
[10] United Nations Peacekeeping, (Department of Public Relations, United Nations), New York, 1995, p.138
[11] *ibid*
[12] S/RES/837 (1993), 6th June 1993

in many quarters to question United Nations's involvement in a conflict situation without prior consent from the parties to the conflict.

"The Security Council therefore adopted unanimously resolution 837 (1993), in which it reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was authorised under resolution 814 (1993) to take 'all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attack' on UNOSOM II personnel, including their 'arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment."[12] During the discussions on this resolution in the Security Council, the representative of Pakistan affirmed that his country would continue to contribute troops for peacekeeping efforts around the world, while the representative of Great Britain vowed that the international community would "not tolerate renewed attempts by the warlords[13] in Somalia to challenge UNOSOM in the exercise of its mandate", while the United States representative warned that those responsible for this would "pay a heavy price" for it.

These statements reflect commitment to a cause despite setbacks, from the representative of Pakistan and stinks of arrogance from the British and United States representatives. It also seems to reflect the loss of neutrality of their respective forces. The statements

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[13] Abdi Samatar, 'Dictators and Warlords are a Modern Invention', Africa News, December 21, 1992

reflect vengeance that on the ground translate to retaliation thereby setting dangerous precedents for the United Nations.

The United Nations with a view to finding the culprit launched an investigation.[14] Thus the UNOSOM operation and more so, the US forces operation now focussed in an attempt to capture him. Aideed's hand was in fact strengthened among his clan (Habr Gedir) members who perceived UNOSOM II's activities as an attack against their entire clan[15]. Such a launch against any one party to a conflict damaged the 'neutral' reputation of a United Nations force. By the time the hunt for Aideed was aborted in October 1993, UNOSOM II and the image of United Nations had taken such a beating that" it was subsequently unable to play the role of an effective interlocutor in the Somali conflict." [16]

POLITICAL PROCESS

Factional Reconciliation Process

The Factional Reconciliation Process was a pragmatic response to the prevailing situation in Somalia. The various faction leaders were the only political players in the Somali political fabric at the time the

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[14] S/RES/837 (1993), 6th June 1993 requested the Secretary-General to 'urgently inquire into the incident' Prof. Tom Farer of American University (Washington DC) submitted the report indicting Aideed for the incident.

[15] http://www.ipacademy.org/somalia2.htm

[16] http://www.ipacademy.org/somalia2.htm

UNOSOM II was established .The United Nations twice convened the faction leaders in Addis Ababa (January and March 1993) in an effort to negotiate agreements with them in order to ease the passage of humanitarian relief without sustaining casualties.[17]

This process had fundamental flaws. The faction leaders who were called to the negotiating table seemed to have vested interests in not allowing the negotiations to succeed. They seemed to derive their power from the fact that United Nations called them to the negotiating table thereby lending some credence to their existence and secondly deriving their power from representing their clan against other clans. There seems to be no move of converting factions into political parties and maybe at a later stage getting them to contest an election.[18]

The United Nations did not engage into a wider debate and reconciliation process involving clan and religious leaders, elders and other authority figures, focusing instead solely on the leaders of the fifteen factions. These conferences in Addis Ababa "divorced the faction leaders from the larger clan constituents that they ostensibly represented."[19]

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[17] http://www.ipacademy.org/somalia2.htm
[18] http://www.ipacademy.org/somalia2.htm

[19] http://www.ipacademy.org/somalia2.htm

The United Nations thought that holding elections was the logical conclusion of its existence in Somalia and it did seem that the United Nations had less time at its disposal. The initiatives that the United Nations undertook, Addis Ababa (twice) and Nairobi were in quick succession. Soon after the Nairobi agreement fighting broke out yet again in Somalia.

UNOSOM II also set up an office of Human Rights to investigate and facilitate the "prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law required under Secretary-General Resolution 814(1993) of 26 March 1993, the expert would collaborate with UNOSOM and its recently established office of Human Rights. The establishment of a local Somali human rights committee could facilitate, when conditions permit, on the spot investigation of violations of Human Rights"[20]

PROGRESS AROUND THE COUNTRYSIDE

The continued fighting in and around Mogadishu from June to October 1993 inevitably disrupted relief and rehabilitation activities mainly because the sorties could not land in the capital. Following the June 5 incident involving the Pakistani forces, the relief supplies had been curtailed. However, it goes to the credit of the relief agencies that

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[20] Mohamed Osman Omar, The Road to Zero: Somalia's Self Destruction, (HAAN Associates, London) 1992, p.202

they were able to continue in the humanitarian programmes in most parts of the country despite the fact that Mogadishu was a major distributing point for supplies for the interior of the country. "While the bloodshed in Mogadishu was making headlines around the world, gains were being made throughout much of the rest of Somalia".[21] The United Nations co-operated with 43 NGO's to assist in the rehabilitation efforts.

Funds were a problem; in terms of donors by November 1993, only $32 million of the $159 million needed had been pledged for the implementation of the Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for 1993.[22] In several parts of the country the necessary institutions and governmental structures were set up. "The UNOSOM II had also developed, together with the Mogadishu's legal and judicial community, mechanisms for the selection of judges and magistrates in Mogadishu, and has provided resources and assistance to the prison population in that city. It has also encouraged the development of judicial and penal systems..."[23] UNOSOM II also tried to establish a functioning judicial system. Somalia's pre-war legal system had already been weakened by the large-scale migration of educated professionals from the country led to large-scale violation of the judicial system a common thing.[24] UNOSOM II's Justice Division helped to set

[21] *ibid*
[22] The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, op cit, p.56
[23] S/26317, 17 August 1993
[24] Mohamed Osman Omar, The Road to Zero: Somalia's Self Destruction, op cit, p.204.

up an interim judicial system, based on the Somali Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal Code of 1962. The Indian Penal Code, which had been in force in the north west prior to 1960, were used in accordance with a decision of the 'Somaliland, inter-clan Council Conference' which had meet in Borama during the first half of 1993 to discuss issues relating to 'independence of Somlialand'.[25] The interim system would have three levels of courts: district courts, regional courts and courts of appeal.

Barring certain pockets, the starvation had largely been eradicated. With some assistance from a good rainfall and provision of seeds and tools by the United Nations agencies, the harvests improved in 1993, providing about half of the country's cereal needs. "Food was being increasingly targeted at the most vulnerable population groups, and through food for work and school feeding, for projects to rehabilitate schools, hospitals, water, sanitation and other services."[26] The free food distribution fell from 35,000 to 7400 tons a month at the WFP, this was not due to any shortages, rather a reflection of the improving situation. Meanwhile the FAO, ICRC and various other NGO's reactivated the livestock exports to the Gulf countries.

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[25] The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, op cit, p.59

[26] *ibid* p.57

Large number of children who were dying of various diseases now came under the preview of mass scale vaccination programme launched by UNICEF and NGO's. "By November 1993, 32 hospitals and 81 maternal and child health centres were in operation..."[27] Teacher training had resumed, textbooks were being written and distributed. 51 schools had re-opened and some 71,000 children enrolled. The figures do tell a much impressive story but still much had to be done in terms of internally displaced persons and refugees.

In various parts of the country UNOSOM II was trying to bring about the culture of peaceful conflict resolution for inter-clan warfare. UNOSOM II brought together over 150 elders representing more than 20 various clans and sub clans and all of them signed an agreement to end all hostilities.[28] UNOSOM II also set up an Office of Human Rights to investigate and facilitate the "...prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law required under the Security Council resolution 814 (1995) of 26th March 1993, the expert will collaborate with UNOSOM and its recently established Office of Human Rights. The establishment of a local Somali Human Rights Committee could facilitate, when conditions permit, on-the-spot investigation of violations of human rights.[29]

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[27] *ibid*

[28] The Conference was held in Kismayo on 6th August 1993

[29] A/48/510, 26th October 1993

THE BATTLE IN MOGADISHU

"Following efforts to determine if peaceful compliance with resolution 837(1993) might be possible, UNOSOM II forces on 12 June 1993 began a systematic drive to restore law and order in South Mogadishu by destroying or confiscating the USC/SNA's weapon stocks and by neutralising its broadcasting facilities.[30] Various units from UNOSOM II and the Quick Reaction force of the US destroyed large quantities of heavy weapons and ammunition and destroyed Radio Mogadishu. Admiral Howe publicly called for the arrest of "those responsible for the attacks of 5th June".[31]

Acting on behalf of the UNOSOM II, Quick Reaction Force carried out part of the mandate that involved attempts to forcibly disarm the militia. Seeing this happen, the militiamen retaliated by killing 5 Moroccan, 2 Pakistanis, and 3 Italians. The militia tried to counter the retaliation fire from UNOSOM by putting women and children in front of the crowds, and the civilian casualties increased. The Quick Reaction Force on 12th July 1993 bombed a compound in South Mogadishu where militiamen were supposed to be hiding. It was a place suspected to being used by USC/SNA. Soon after the attack, the

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[30] The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, op cit, p.51
[31] United Nations Press Release SG/SM/5009, 12 June 1993

troops swept through the area to confiscate weapons. Journalists from the international press too covered the event. On seeing such a stage-managed event, a large crowd of Somalia gathered and in the ensuing mob violence four journalists were murdered.

After these events the UNOSOM II continued a coercive disarmament programme in south Mogadishu. The US deployed its Rangers and Quick Reaction Force in and around Mogadishu. The Rangers launched an operation in South Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 aimed at capturing a number of key aides of General Aideed who were responsible for various attacks on the UN personnel. During this operation two helicopters of the US were shot down by the Somali militiamen using sophisticated weapons such as rocket propelled grenades. "While evacuating the 24 USC/SNA detainees, the Rangers came under concentrated fire. Eighteen US soldiers lost their lives and 75 were wounded. One US helicopter pilot was captured and subsequently released on 14 October 1993. The bodies of the US soldiers were subjected to public acts of outrage, and the television stations around the world broadcast the scenes.[32] The operation had the mandate of the Secretary-General which flowed from the resolution 837(1993).

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[32] The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Third Edn. (Department of Public Information, UN), New York, p.301

Following the incident, the US reinforced its Quick Reaction Force with a "Joint Task Force consisting air, navel and ground forces equipped with MIA-1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles."[33] The tragedy lay bare the complicated operational structural of UNOSOM II in which the Rangers reported to the United States rather than the UNOSOM command in Mogadishu. "The 3rd October operation was planned and ordered by the United States forces acting independently of UNOSOM and it was communicated to the UNOSOM II staff...only just before the Rangers set off in their helicopters."[34] This exposed the massive co-ordination gap between the UNOSOM II troops and the Quick Reaction Force. Although the Quick Reaction Force was for the time being reinforced, President Bill Clinton announced that the US forces would be withdrawn from Somalia by 31st March 1994. By November the manhunt for Aideed was called off and a Commission of Enquiry into responsibility for attacks on UNOSOM personnel was instituted.

President Bill Clinton's Somalia policy constantly kept receiving reminders from the thousands of letters and phone calls to Pentagon from the hapless relatives of the US Rangers urging the government to withdraw. The reinforcements that reached Somalia, besides being heavily armed also played a very partisan role. A third norm too was

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[33] 'United Nations Peacekeeping', op cit, p.140

[34] The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, op cit, p.55

broken that of conventional peacekeeping not having superpower forces involvement. The Somali operation, having had many firsts, had more trouble in store for Somalia in general and the entire fabric of peacekeeping in particular as in this operation the US forces led the front and in some cases did not respond to the United Nations command and instead took commands from their headquarter. The US forces went berserk in trying unsuccessfully catching General Aideed. "In July 1993, the London based human rights group African Rights published a catalogue of Human Rights abuses of the United Nations forces in Somalia. The document describes abuses in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Belet Weyn, claiming that there is 'prima facie evidence that UNOSOM forces have committed a number of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention."[35] There were constant reports of attack on political meetings, gathering of unarmed civilians, demolition of houses and atrocities on civilians.

The death of the American soldiers proved to be the turning point in the international community's involvement. The 'CNN Effect' which earlier had generated sympathy for those affected by the famine, now was broadcasting images of a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by a jeering mob. Although temporarily the US forces were bolstered but the final nail in the coffin had been hit.

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[35] Geoff. Simmons, The United Nations A Chonology of Conflict, (St. Martins Press, New York),1994,p.200

From the events of October when the US forces came under heavy retaliation fire one straight problem can be identified, General Aideed was anyway against the US led United Nations forces in Somalia and always attacked them for what he thought to be an 'invasion of the white man'. But UNOSOM fell in the trap "...it violated the cannon of neutrality which has been the centrepiece of the peacekeeping strategy...the shift in the United Nations policy supported by the major powers, to arrest General Aideed and those responsible inherently removed the force from an impartial position. United Nations troops became embroiled in a local conflict as they searched the streets of Mogadishu for General Aideed."[36]

UNOSOM II'S MANDATE EXTENDED

"On 18th November 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, renewed the mandate of the UNOSOM II for a period of six months, expiring on 31st May 1994."[37] The Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to "...submit an up-dated plan for UNOSOM's future by 15th January

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[36] Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore), 1994, p.188

[37] 'United Nations Peacekeeping', op cit p.139

1994 so that the Council could undertake a fundamental review of the missions mandate by 1st February 1994."[38]

The Security Council also called all Member States to contribute troops and particularly make financial contributions to rehabilitation projects in those regions where progress on political reconciliation and security had been made.

The Secretary-General visited the Horn of Africa in mid-October 1993 and presented the Security Council with three new options to reauthorize UNOSOM II's mandate. The first of these options was that the mandate of UNOSOM II remains unchanged.[39] "UNOSOM II would assist voluntary disarmament, but would retain the capability to resort to coercive disarmament and initiate counter-measures if faction attacked the UNOSOM II personnel."[40]The second was taking a conscious decision not to use coercive methods but to rely entirely on support from Somali parties.[41] The third option was to reduce the troop strength, concentrate mainly on maintaining security of the seaports; airports and keep supply routes open for humanitarian assistance.[42]

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[38] S/RES/886, 18 November 1994
[39] S/26738, 12 November 1993
[40] The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, op cit p.64
[41] S/26738, 12 November 1993

[42] *ibid*

THE WITHDRAWL

By Security Council Resolution 897 of 4th February 1994, the Security Council reduced the size of UNOSOM II and gave the mission a revised mandate without the enforcement powers.[43] Despite some tentative signs of progress towards political reconciliation and communal healing, in the end the efforts proved futile, as the co-operation from various factions proved elusive.

The pull out of UNOSOM II from Somalia began in November 1994 and was completed in March 1995. During the final stages of the operation, support for the withdrawal was provided by the Combined Task Forces "United Shield" (Force comprising of contingents from France, India, Malaysia, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, the UK and the US). "Violence was also directed against these personnel. On May 16th, five Nepalese soldiers and on 18th July two Malaysian soldiers, 22nd August seven Indian soldiers, while nine days later three doctors of the Indian contingent were killed in an attack on a field hospital."[44] After a final review of preparations by (the then) Under-Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who visited Somalia from 8th to 10th February, the final phase of the withdrawal got underway. With major reductions in troop strength, it was no longer possible to extend support the humanitarian

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[43] S/RES/ 897 (1994) 4 February 1994

[44] S/1994/614, 24 May 1994

staffs, who were advised to evacuate their offices and shift to Nairobi by 14 February 1995. "The mission withdrew in March 1995, but the United Nations retained a strong humanitarian presence in Somalia..."[45]

The withdrawal of UNOSOM II marked a point of transition in the efforts of the United Nations to succour a people and a country caught in the vortex of famine, civil war and the collapse of all institutions of government.[46]

In his reports to the Security Council, in the beginning of 1994, the Secretary-General pointed out to the substantial progress with the Group of Twelve (Somali parties) in the creation of district councils and regional councils and to a start in the recreating police forces, and judicial services, as well as improvements in the humanitarian and social areas -- agriculture, nutrition, schools and health--some resettlement of displaced persons. But there was no progress on the reconciliation between the Group of Twelve and the SNA of General Aideed.

In the final analysis, it is easy to criticise the operation, its mandate and implementation. But there is no doubt that "...the

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[45] The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, op cit p.68

[46] The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping op cit p.315

successful defiance by a local 'warlord' of the might of the US combined with that of the United nations had dealt a severe blow to the international authority"[47] and the fabric of peacekeeping.

CONCLUSION: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

One can count a number of failures but on the final analysis, one cannot underplay the successes. Success was the greatest in the humanitarian field. Millions of Somalis benefited from the activities of the United Nations while a quarter of a million of lives were saved. There were achievements also in terms of trying to revive a dead state. The judiciary, police and other law and order enforcing agencies were revived. Some 8,000 men were deployed in 82 district stations. In addition, some 46 district courts, 11 regional courts and 11 appeal courts were all functioning by March 1995 mainly due to assistance from the United Nations.

Although the factional reconciliation process did not succeed but the process of creating local governance structures had mixed results. With the departure of the UNOSOM II the local political currents surfaced. "A process of civilisation" of clan leadership is evident, with the power of the faction leaders waning as the prospects of inter-clan conflict subsided in many areas...the emergence of clan-based civilian authorities is essentially a centrifugal political tendency with Somalia

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[47] Anthony Parsons, From Cold War to Hot Peace, (Penguin Books, London), 1995, p.205

splitting along clan lines in terms of political, military and administrative functions, and is resulting in cementing of clan divisions.[48]

Another notable success has been the growth of Islamic authorities across the country in different clan areas such as Luuq, Bulo, Hawa, north Mogadishu, Jowhar, Belet Weyn and Kismayo. Somalia largely being an Islamic state, the law and order problem now came to be tackled according to Islamic law or Sharia.

"The withdrawal of UNOSOM II did not mean that the United Nations was abandoning Somalia."[49] Infact many NGO's and United Nations agencies are carrying on the work but with a focus on rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction. On a report to the Security Council on the mission to Somalia the Secretary-General suggested that the UN continue to assist the Somali people to achieve political settlement and provide humanitarian and other support services "provided that the Somalis themselves demonstrate a disposition to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and to co-operation with the international community." [50]

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[48] http://www.ipacademy.org/somalia2.htm
[49] The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping op cit p.316
[50] S/1994/1245, 3 November 1994.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Before the United Nations stepped in to the crisis in Somalia, it was well aware, that it was setting out into uncharted waters. The depth of the crisis made it imperative that the international community act in an effort to avert the tragedy. Under such circumstances the United Nations can take considerable satisfaction in having curbed the rampant violence and saved many lives. At the same time it is imperative to remember that not all objectives were attained. The prominent among them were of course the goal of achieving political reconciliation

By the time the last peacekeeping forces left the shores of Somalia in March 1995, the acute phase of the emergency in Somalia had been overcome. There was a vast difference of situation from the time since the United Nations had entered about three years ago. However, it still was far from being normal and the essential needs of the population could not still be met. Additionally, the political uncertainty and the state of violence existed. In such a situation the few humanitarian gains made by some peacekeeping contingents including that from India were reversed. The world waited for large-scale annihilation and chaos to return once the United Nations forces

came out, but there was marked improvement in the situation. By November 1995 most of the humanitarian aid workers of various aid agencies had returned to their respective field offices. United Nations relief programmes had been successfully started at 15 of the 18 regions.[1] Since the peacekeeping forces had been withdrawn, the Secretary General, in search of peace and reconciliation, established a small political mission. The Security Council had earlier agreed to this.[2] The USC/SNA and most other political factions had agreed to the establishment of this mission except the faction of General Aideed.

The failure of the Somali factions to achieve national reconciliation hampered by large-scale disarmament and demobilisation and because of disengagement over either modalities or timetables for implementing the disarmament provisions of the Addis Ababa agreements to which they had committed themselves. The crisis of governance and the absence of political institutions led the United Nations to develop strategies for a post-UNOSOM period to maintain effective operations as also to ensure that their relief and rehabilitation activities had the most positive impact besides reaching the intended beneficiaries. They focussed on community based efforts, adopting a low-profile regional approach.

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[1] A/50/447, 19 September 1995

[2] S/1995/451, 6 June 1995

Developing a Strategy for Peacebuilding

How should UNOSOM II have undertaken the peacebuilding mandate that was given by Security Council Resolution 814? Most fundamentally, it should have translated its mandate into an overall plan, or broad strategy for peacebuilding. UNOSOM II's peacebuilding strategy should have considered, as a central element, how to demilitarise, or "civilianize," inter-clan politics. As such, its efforts should have concentrated on restarting civilian-led political processes, rather than supporting reconciliation at the factional level. This was not necessarily an "either-or" choice, but could have been undertaken in a subtle fashion by involving the faction leaders within a larger envelope of leadership that included other civilian elements. The strategy should have aimed to replace, in the long-term, the faction leaders with civilians as the principal power brokers in Somalia.

In the short-term, this type of effort would have resulted in institutionalising the existing divisions among the various Somali clans, as local administrative structures began to emerge which reported to their clan authorities. Over time, however, these quasi-independent entities may have sought to re-establish linkages, and created a loose federation based on economic and other interests.

Political and Institution-Building Efforts

With this strategy, UNOSOM II's efforts at political reconciliation should have been focused on the clan, and not just the faction level. The factions were a product of the clans in Somalia and derived their authority from the support given to them by their clans. UNOSOM II-sponsored reconciliation conferences should have, therefore, involved a broad base of clan leadership, including the faction leaders, elders and religious leaders, professionals, and other civilian elements. This kind of effort would have had to take place in Somalia itself, and at the clan rather than national level to start with. However, given the strengthened position of the faction leaders because of UNITAF's decision not to undertake a concerted and widespread effort at disarmament, finding such civilian leadership would have been difficult at the time. The March 1993 Addis Ababa meeting also created problems, as it focused exclusively on the faction leaders. As such, UNOSOM II's task of broadening the base of its reconciliation efforts had been complicated by the international efforts that preceded it.

Notwithstanding these potential difficulties, given that the Addis Ababa agreement of the faction leaders called for the creation of civilian structures of government, UNOSOM II should have insisted on engaging the broader clan leadership in an effort to help them develop a plan to implement the agreement. UNOSOM II's mandate from

Resolution 814 should have been seen as a mechanism that would allow it to help the local actors implement their agreement, rather than providing an independent vehicle to undertake peacebuilding.

Moreover, grassroots political development efforts should have been integrated with the political reconciliation effort at the clan level. Support for these efforts should have been sought from the clan leadership at the "centre" of the clan-controlled areas, rather than from the more remote levels of administrative districts and regions, as part of an overall package of UNOSOM II assistance toward reconciliation and longer-term peacebuilding in Somalia. For example, the Rahanweyn clan leadership in Baidoa (including the Somali Democratic Movement, or SDM, faction and its two sub-divisions) should have been encouraged to create local government structures in far-flung Rahanweyn-populated areas such as Hoddur. This method, while somewhat less "grassroots" oriented, would have resulted in the creation of stronger and more authoritative civilian administrative structures. Training and other assistance to these more authentic councils could have then formed an important element of UNOSOM II's efforts to "civilianize" clan politics in Somalia.

UNOSOM II's support for re-establishing a judicial system, including police, should also have been tied to the formation of governance structures at the clan level, and the express involvement of

the clan and local leaderships should have been sought in the process of forming these entities. Political guidance for the creation of such institutions should have come from authentic, civilian-oriented Somali leadership. In the absence of such leadership, UNOSOM II should have refrained from undertaking any efforts at institution building. This approach would have resulted in a staggered series of initiatives, beginning with institution-building assistance to "Somaliland," which had formed its own civilian government, followed perhaps by efforts in the northeast and other coherent clan-controlled zones.

Economic Support

Economic support from the international community could have been effectively linked with the "civilianisation" effort of UNOSOM II. A key program in this regard should have been demobilisation, which would have been commensurate with an overall strategy of demilitarisation. Demobilisation, first of all, would have had to be carried out within clan-controlled zones, and would have been only partially undertaken until sufficient confidence was built among the different clans. Hence, many clans would have maintained sufficient military strength to defend themselves against any real or imagined threat from other clans, but may have demobilised militias that were not deployed at the front lines. An incentive for such partial demobilisation could have been the availability of international

assistance programs for the creation of alternative employment for the ex-militia members.

Role of the Military

Militarily, the situation in Somalia had changed dramatically from the time that UNITAF was deployed in December 1992 to when UNOSOM II assumed military control in May 1993. The situation at the end of 1992 required enforcement provisions to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief, which was UNITAF's mandate. An implicit threshold of human suffering had been crossed in late 1992, which required forcible international action. In mid-1993 the limited number of inter-clan skirmishes, while resulting in some civilian casualties, did not cross a humanitarian threshold that was commensurate with the costs, including the loss of neutrality of an application of force by the international community.

UNOSOM II should have interpreted its military mandate as assisting in the implementation of the overall mandate of the mission. This mandate should have been clearly defined as the peacebuilding activities set out in Resolution 814. The peacebuilding mandate that UNOSOM II was given did not require the same type of enforcement capability as UNITAF, especially if coercive disarmament was not to be attempted. In this environment, UNOSOM II should have interpreted its Chapter VII mandate to justify, in the first instance, its presence in

Somalia without the consent of a national government -- since none existed -- and, in the second instance, to protect the continuing humanitarian relief and other civilian efforts that were to be undertaken by UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II's military strength should, therefore, have been calibrated with the need to support international humanitarian and civilian efforts, and been a function of the size of these efforts in Somalia. Most important, UNOSOM II should have maintained impartiality among the various factions, which UNITAF did not need to do. This would have meant that UNOSOM II would not become involved in inter-clan skirmishes, as in fact it did not, instead leaving the clans to resolve their differences themselves and lending its political support when required. However, its Chapter VII mandate would leave open the possibility of undertaking enforcement action if another humanitarian emergency were to arise.

An impartial UNOSOM II military presence could also have been used to monitor the clans' demobilisation efforts. This would have required military observers, as opposed to peacekeeping troops, to monitor demobilisation processes where they were occurring with the express consent of the clan leaders concerned. Such monitoring could have been used as a confidence-building measure among the various clans by providing a degree of transparency in their respective demobilisation efforts. As the situation improved across Somalia, the military presence of UNOSOM II could have been phased out.

Organisational Structure

Finally, at the organisational level UNOSOM II's civilian components should have been considerably smaller. The core staff should have been a political team around the SRSG, supported by professional co-ordination and liaison staff and logistics personnel. Appointing the UNDP Resident Representative to a senior position, such as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in UNOSOM II should, have structurally linked other United Nations agencies, and particularly UNDP, to UNOSOM II, for example. These organisational linkages would have provided the necessary expertise that UNOSOM II required both at the level of emergency response and with respect to the development orientation that it required to undertake peacebuilding. The involvement of other UN agencies and programs in UNOSOM II should have been supplemented by close and effective co-ordination with bilateral aid agency representatives in Somalia and with other multilateral lending institutions, such as the World Bank. UNOSOM II itself should have been decentralised, with strengthened offices in the various zones, or clan-controlled areas, and a small, mobile headquarters in Mogadishu. This type of light, flexible structure would have prevented UNOSOM II from becoming hostage to events in a particular part of the country, as it became in Mogadishu, and would have diffused the structural economic impact of its presence.

The Ambiguous UN agenda in Somalia

A point that has not received much attention is that Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the members of the Security Council had been disturbingly vague about the United Nations' long-term political objectives in Somalia, other than the cliché of restoring order. "What is the United Nations position, for example, on Somaliland's bid for independence? Given the long-standing United Nations bias for perpetuating the international status quo--even when it means trying to preserve artificial and inherently unstable political entities such as Sudan and Zaire--it is highly probable that United Nations 'peace-keepers' will try to discourage, if not forcibly suppress, the breakaway republic."[3] Boutros Ghali's emphasis on the goal of "reconciliation" of all Somali factions would seem to leave little room for the option of secession. Expecting the minority groups and the dominant clans such as Issak have demonstrated amply that they would want to determine their own destiny. What then in such a situation should the United Nations have done?

Since insecurity in many areas of Somalia continued to hinder the pace of recovery it was understood that there was also needed humanitarian assistance to the disadvantaged groups. While recognising the fragility of such a process the United Nations agencies

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[3] http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbreifs/fpb-020es.html

were also committed to the task of rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economy as well as the political institutions.

UNOSOM II's departure created a political vacuum, particularly in Mogadishu. The prospect of another serious confrontation between Ali Mahdi and Aidid emerged. Instead, this sudden change in the political status quo helped push both faction leaders toward accommodation through encouraging the creation of a joint Mogadishu Port Authority. This joint authority was seen as the nucleus of a regional authority for Benaadir, which includes Mogadishu and its immediate environs. The port authority functioned smoothly for a period of two months, but did not have the time to mature into a more stable political entity before the June 1995 the split between Aideed and his erstwhile ally and financier, Osman Atto, caused it to collapse.

PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION
Refugees

Some refugee camps in Kenya were closed down because of the large number of the Somalis repatriated, yet no less than 140,000 Somali refugees were still in Kenya. While another 310,000 Somali refugees were registered in the camps at Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea as of November 1995. A large number of people had been internally displaced and continued to be a major source of worry for the United Nations. The International Organisation for Migration had

identified109 camps for internally displaced persons in Mogadishu, suggesting a total displaced population of some 54,000 in the city out of an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 internally displaced persons in the countryside.

Judicial Institutions

The re-establishment of a Somali justice sector, comprising a judicial, police and penal system, was a significantly more difficult undertaking. Proper functioning of these institutions requires the framework of a local political authority that can provide legitimacy and direction. Rather than using the existing political authorities -- namely the factions -- to provide this local framework, or alternately, allowing the emergence of civilian political structures to oversee the police and penal institutions, UNOSOM II embarked upon setting up a justice sector in what was essentially a vacuum.

Health and sanitation

United Nations, its agencies and various NGO's stressed the need for the revitalisation of health, sanitation and education services. The UNICEF, WHO, WFP and NGO's continued to support health-care facilities, expanding their coverage by November 1995 to include 131 maternity health-care centres, 99 out-patient dispensaries, 470 health posts and 21 hospitals. The UNICEF immunised over 95,000 children against tuberculosis and another 143,000 against four other

preventable diseases between September 1994 and July1995. By June 1995, concerted action by WHO, UNICEF, WFP, UNESCO and Medics sans Frontiers (Belgium and France) brought under control an outbreak of cholera in Kismayo and Mogadishu.

POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE POST-UNOSOM PERIOD

The first political trend that can be identified was that in some parts of the country, the departure of UNOSOM II allowed for local political currents to surface. A process of civilisation of clan leadership was evident, with the power of faction leaders waning as the prospects of inter-clan conflict subsides in many areas. The old divisions along district and regional lines no longer hold in areas like the north-eastern and southern regions. Civilian authorities are forming in these areas to perform governance functions, much like the emergence of clan-based civilian government in the "Republic of Somaliland" in 1993. The best recent example of this "civilisation" of clans is the Digil and Mirifle (sub-clans of the Rahanweyn) reconciliation process, which resulted in the regions of Bay, Bakool, and parts of Gedo and Lower Shabelle forming a Supreme Governing Council of Digil Mirifle after the departure of UNOSOM II. Whereas this process was soon interrupted by Aideed's invasion of the area in September 1995, the Rahanweyn continued to organise against Aideed with the formation of a Rahanweyn Resistance Army. A similar pattern was also evident among the Darod clan in the Northeast regions of Bari, Nugal and

Mudug, as well as in parts of the Sool and Sanaag regions of "Somaliland."

A second political development following UNOSOM II's departure has been the growth of "...Islamic authorities across the country in different clan areas"[4], such as in Luuq (where they existed even before UNOSOM II), Bulo Hawa, north Mogadishu, Jowhar, Belet Weyn, and Kismayu. These authorities have responded very effectively to the problem of crime in their areas by instituting courts where accused criminals are judged according to Islamic law, or shari'a. This has had a visibly positive effect on crime, which was previously rife in many of these areas. The judges of these courts are the religious leaders, or shaikhs, of the community. The shari'a authorities also perform policing functions, with several technical vehicles of the factional militia having been converted to police vehicles.

The relationship between the shari'a authorities and the faction leaders was dynamic. The shari'a authorities have, for the most part, been established with the consent of the local faction leaders to perform basic governance tasks within their area of control. To date they have not crossed clan boundaries. However, the shari'a authorities have often been established when the power of the faction leaders has been very low in order to bring stability to the area.

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[4] http://www.ipacademy.org/somalia2.htm

There are certain inherent contradictions in an Islamic political system being established in Somali society, particularly a radical one. First, the roots of shari'a are not particularly strong in Somalia. As a pastoral society, Somalis have traditionally conducted their affairs according to a nomadic customary law called Xeer, with shari'a being applied only within the area of family law. Second, more radical manifestations of Islamic politics are generally witnessed in settled, urban environments where growing social and economic disparities tend to favor such political expression. At the same time, two decades of autocratic rule under Siad Barre, followed by five years of anarchy and violence, may have contributed to a sufficient change in the social fabric to allow for the development of Islam as a political force in Somalia.

A third notable trend, although less prominent, has been the growth of peace constituencies primarily at the local level in various areas. Somali professionals, businesspersons, former diplomats, peace activists and other civilians began supporting peace and started taking their own initiatives. Somali Peace Line initiative, a notable although nascent inter-clan peace movement, and the Somali NGO Consortium, a network of Somali professionals were two examples of this type of mobilisation.[5] These educated middle-class movements and formations,

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[5] http://www.ipacademy.org/somalia2.htm

which were not allowed sufficient breathing room to grow during the UNOSOM II period, can potentially play a critical role in helping to restore normal commercial activity and functions of governance and administration once peace is restored in Somalia.

The District and Regional Councils that UNOSOM II had helped to create were appropriately supported by training in basic administrative functions, such as preparation of budgets, taxation, and accounting. The Swedish Life and Peace Institute provided this training. The Councils were also provided basic equipment, such as typewriters, stationary, and furniture, to enable them to function. While this assistance was important, it did not overcome the more basic problems concerning the selection and authenticity of the councils.

One reason for the lack of effectiveness of the councils, even with administrative training, was their inability to collect tax revenues and provide basic social services for the population. This inability was a result of both: the very limited revenue base and the unwillingness of the local population to pay taxes, a factor that was linked at least partially to the lack of political authority, or authenticity, of the councils. The second reason was that most international NGOs, the principal providers of social services in many areas of the country, were not willing to work in co-operation with the nascent local

administrations. A partnership between the NGOs and the local administrations would have helped to build the capacity of those authorities, and would also have given them greater legitimacy within their communities. At the same time, the international NGOs argued correctly that this would unnecessarily bureaucratise their work and provide legitimacy to institutions that were not genuinely authoritative.

The legacy left behind by these institutions building efforts has been diverse. The District and Regional Councils are in the process of being subsumed into wider clan-based civilian authorities. The United Nations Development Office and the Swedish Life and Peace Institute have been of great assistance in this.

LESSONS LEARNT

The United Nations office responsible for peacekeeping operations was reorganised and renamed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The objective of the Department was to improve the capacity to plan, conduct and manage peacekeeping operations. The DPKO identified a number of lessons that could be implemented in a similar situation of a peacekeeping operation. Some of these lessons have been reproduced here.

1. There is need for a clear and practicable mandate.

An effective peacekeeping operation commences with a clearly defined and practicable mandate. This lesson has been well learned in the United Nations, resulting in some successes in subsequent peacekeeping operations as well as some tragedies. The formulation of a clear and practicable mandate for a peacekeeping operation remains the responsibility of the Security Council. The Secretariat regularly provides the Council with information on situations under consideration. In addition, the Council has increased the number of its own fact-finding missions to areas of conflict to assist it in determining its action. These missions have enabled the Council to determine new mandates or adjust existing ones. For example, it was after the Council mission to Somalia in October 1994 that the members determined that the UNOSOM mandate must be terminated.

2: Chapter VII and Chapter VI operations should not co-exist, and transition from Chapter VII to Chapter VI must be smooth.

It has been acknowledged that the United Nations is not yet capable of launching a large-scale enforcement action and that whenever in the foreseeable future it is necessary to launch such an operation under a Chapter VII, it should be done by either a single State, as occurred in Rwanda in Frances's Operation Turquoise, or by a coalition of States, as was done early in Haiti. There is wide agreement

that it was a mistake in Somalia for a Chapter VII operation (UNITAF) to co-exist with a Chapter VI operation (UNOSOM I). This lesson was well applied in Haiti, where a multinational force with Chapter VII powers was phased out before a Chapter VI operation, UNMIH, was deployed. . Transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping should be closely co-ordinated with the Secretariat to avoid the chaotic situations that developed in the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

3: Peacekeeping forces should not enter a conflict area if there is no political will among the parties towards reconciliation.

Since a peacekeeping force has no enforcement powers, it should only be deployed when the parties to a conflict have consented. There is a need to enhance the capacity of the United Nations for sustained negotiations in reaching a comprehensive peace agreement that would allow the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. When an operation is established in a failed state, it may often be necessary to undertake civic activities and assist in repairing or developing political and economic infrastructures.

4: Mandates must be matched with the means to implement them.

It is the responsibility of the Security Council, the General Assembly -- especially its Advisory Committee on Administrative and

Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) -- and Member States in their individual capacity to provide peacekeeping operations with sufficient resources. Unfortunately, this lesson has still not been well learned. Much has depended on the political will of Member States to act. Where such will existed, the resources were found, and where it was lacking, the resources were not made available.

Attempts are being made to sensitise Member States to the need to provide peacekeeping operations with the required resources. Before the renewal of each peacekeeping mandate, troop-contributing countries, Security Council members and Secretariat officials now meet to review the operation.

5: Integrated planning is essential in order to deal with the multidimensional problems in peacekeeping operations.

Recognising the need for detailed planning and co-ordination in the context of present- day complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the DPKO in early 1994 established the Mission Planning Service (MPS). The result has been a qualitative improvement in mission planning. Important improvements instituted in the planning process are being constantly refined in the light of experience. This was reflected in the well-planned and executed withdrawal of UNOSOM.

MPS activities include: generic guidelines and procedures to streamline the process of mission planning; generic guidelines for troop-contributing countries, from which mission-specific guidelines are formulated; the preparation of standard operating procedures for essential functions; and in-house studies pertaining to important issues such as command and control, co-ordination, rules of engagement, structure of mission headquarters, etc.

Present-day peacekeeping operations are multidimensional, and besides the military, they could have humanitarian, civilian police, civil affairs, electoral, rehabilitation and repatriation components, each intimately linked to the other. In order to promote an integrated approach to planning, a Framework for Co-ordination between the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Political Affairs and Humanitarian Affairs has been designed, covering all planning and preparation activities at Headquarters, from the early warning signals to close-down of a peacekeeping operation.

6: Operation in the field should be based on a fully developed, integrated structure headed by the SRSG.

The Secretary-General has issued directives that his Special Representative in a peacekeeping operation has authority to co-ordinate all United Nations activities in the mission area. However, for the SRSG to be effective, he needs to be provided with his own

discretionary funds for peace-building. This would enhance his/her leverage both with the parties and with the humanitarian agencies.

When peacekeeping operations go hand in hand with peace-building efforts, the operation is likely to be more acceptable to the local population. A lack of funds for peace-building in Rwanda went a long way to undercut UNAMIR.

7: Secretariat communication with the field must be clear.

Interdepartmental co-ordination has improved greatly since the establishment of UNOSOM, with working groups of desk officers responsible for the different areas in the substantive departments meeting regularly. The Secretary-General's Task Force, which consists of the Under-Secretaries-General and the Assistant Secretaries-General of the relevant departments, meets often to co-ordinate Secretariat directives and action

The Situation Centre, which was established in DPKO in May 1993 to maintain round-the-clock communications with the field, provides near real-time information about activities in the mission areas, and collates and disseminates incoming information to all concerned.

8: The timely deployment of well-trained personnel is essential.

Despite the lessons learned from UNOSOM, United Nations peacekeeping operations have continued to suffer from delays in the timely deployment of military, police and civilian personnel. However, improvements have been made to expedite the deployment of essential personnel to all mission areas.

An important function of the Mission Planning Service has been the establishment and management of the Stand-by Arrangements System designed to improve the Organisation's capacity for rapid deployment. Under the system, participating Member States provide the Organisation with information about their possible contributions (military, civilian police and civilian specialists) to peacekeeping operations, and about maintaining them in an agreed state of readiness. To date, 47 countries have officially expressed their willingness to participate in the system.

The efficacy of the system is largely dependent on detailed information provided by participating Member States, as to the availability of resources specified in each of the stand-by arrangements, to enable advance planning. Currently, commitments made do not adequately cover the entire spectrum of resources required to mount and execute peacekeeping missions. Deficiencies exist in the

areas of communications, logistics, medical, engineering and transportation.

The availability of trained personnel, military and civilian, would enhance the timely deployment of personnel to peacekeeping operations. In June 1993, a Training Unit was established in DPKO. This unit has written training guidelines, manuals and other materials to assist Member States in preparing their military, police and civilian personnel for peacekeeping assignments. The unit has contributed substantially towards improving and standardising peacekeeping training through publications, seminars and workshops, and special training activities.

The Civilian Police Unit (CIVPOL), in the Office of Planning and Support of DPKO, was established in May 1993 and is now responsible for all matters affecting civilian police in peacekeeping operations.

9: Command and control must be unified, and channel of command and directives clear.

The Secretary-General has addressed this issue in his Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace". The need for a unified command has become more apparent in the light of the UNOSOM experience. Effective command and control in peacekeeping operations demands that parallel command structures should be vigorously discouraged and

that the normal unified command and control system should always apply. In order to discourage troop contingents from seeking direction from their home Governments, rules of engagement should be made as clear as possible and all operations should be within the Security Council mandate that establishes an operation

Troop-contributing countries should be provided with as much information as possible and given an effective channel at the UN Headquarters to express their views. The newly developed system of regular consultation between the Secretariat and troop contributors at United Nations Headquarters is enhancing the flow of information.

10: Logistics problems incapacitate an operation.

Structural improvements to bring logistics personnel and administrative elements within the ambit of one department have been devised by the incorporation of the Field Administrative and Logistics Division into DPKO. With that, steps have been taken to improve the logistics situation of a peacekeeping operation, especially during the start-up phase. The proposed Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, will serve as a centre for the management of peacekeeping assets. It would maintain the master inventory and oversee the receipt and delivery of equipment and supplies for missions. Mission Start-up Kits shall be assembled at the base from surplus assets of the United Nations

Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UNOSOM and ONUMOZ.

11: There is a need for early budgetary allocations and proper management of funds.

The Secretary-General is authorised (with ACABQ approval) to enter into commitments up to $50 million, per Security Council decision, with a cumulative total of $150 million outstanding at any one time. This allows a more realistic initial commitment authority to enable new operations to start immediately, because sufficient funds for the initial procurement and deployment of equipment and troops will be available.

The General Assembly endorsed recommendations contained in a report of the Secretary-General (A/48/945) for a revised format stressing standard costs and comparative analysis. The new process/format will improve both the timely preparation and analytical review of peacekeeping budgets.

12: There is need for a public information strategy.

The goal of an information programme in a peacekeeping operation is to enhance its effectiveness, both in the area of the mission and internationally, by fostering a better understanding of the United Nations mandate. The information aspect should consist of an internal

programme within the area of the mission, and an external programme for the international community at large, particularly troop-contributing and donor nations.

13: There must be clear guidelines for disarmament and demobilisation, and these activities must be carried out with the agreement of the parties.

A peacekeeping force is not suited for non-voluntary disarmament and demobilisation. It is always better to have disarmament and demobilisation requirements incorporated into the agreements between the parties prior to the establishment of peacekeeping operations, as was done in the Mozambique agreement preceding ONUMOZ

However, demobilisation is an expensive exercise, and Member States need to provide resources that will enable the demobilised personnel to be reintegrated into the community.

14: The humanitarian component is essential to the success of peacekeeping operations.

The Department of Humanitarian Affairs has created a Policy Analysis Division whose function, inter alia, is to learn from experience and make recommendations to improve ongoing and future operations.

Humanitarian co-ordination has also been strengthened through various inter-agency mechanisms:

(a) the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and other inter-agency forums bring together the key humanitarian actors, and serve an important function in identifying and responding in a timely, co-ordinated and, if possible, preventive manner to emerging crises. These mechanisms have gained increasing importance;

(b) the use of inter-agency assessment missions has also increased and has become an important way of responding rapidly, appropriately and in a co-ordinated manner to complex emergencies;

(c) humanitarian co-ordinators have been given clear terms of reference. Progress has also been made in speeding up the appointment of such co-ordinators. For example, humanitarian co-ordination mechanisms in Rwanda were a significant step forward compared to previous crises;

(d) the process of allocating resources through the Consolidated Appeal Process and the use of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund have also seen important improvements; and

(e) enhancing the departmental capacity to provide administrative and financial backstopping for field co-ordination, particularly in facilitating the rapid contracting of humanitarian co-ordination personnel.

It is regrettable that a country for which the international community has done so much has shown no signs of improving. At the present time the international community does not seem to have either the will or the resources to intervene effectively in support of a failed state. "Moreover, the international community will not continue its efforts to resolve an international dispute when it becomes evident that the political will for a solution is lacking among the protagonists."[6] Such a state loses its place as a member of the international community. However, the United Nations does continue to assist the people of a failed state.

The Charter of the United Nations provides for the admission to the international community of a country which gains the attributes of a sovereign State, for instance, through independence or decolonisation. It does not provide for any mechanism through which the international community can respond when a sovereign State loses one of the attributes of statehood, such as its Government.

The nation states have been under all sorts of pressures, forces of economic and political liberalisation and heightened popular expectations. Various clans and ethnic groups in a state stretch the fabric of a state, in pursuit of their aims, to an extent that often the

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[6] "The UN and Somalia", 1992-96: Blue Book Series Vol. VIII, 1996, (Department of Public Information, UN), New York ,p.87

state is on the verge of breakdown. There has always been a tension between the international norms of self-determination and territorial integrity. As earlier mentioned, in the 1990s there seems to be a shift in favour of self-determination. National sovereignty and self-determination, however, are fraught with controversy because individuals and groups differ on their preferred sense of national identity.

Collapsed states and states that have failed to protect the fundamental rights of citizens like right to life, pose a difficult challenge not only to the maintenance of the international peace and security concept of the United Nations as also for the international community at large. As the international system is essentially state-centric, forces inimical to this system fill the vacuum when the state structure has collapsed. Drug traffickers, money launderers, extremist political movements, secessionist ethnic groups and terrorist groups often by use of force fill in such vacuum.

The situation in Somalia shows little signs of stabilisation and continues to deteriorate. Until the political will in the country among the parties to the conflict to reach a peaceful solution to their dispute develops, long lasting peace may be elusive. The international community has tried this with force as well as with diplomacy but has met with limited success. The other possibility is that the international

community and the United Nations equip themselves with new instruments to address such issues; until then Somalia may remain the way it is and the various international government and non-governmental organisations would continue to do their work the way they have been doing!

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APPENDIX A

Somali Clans and Political Parties

Somali society can be divided into two tribal groups: Samal and Sab. The larger Samal group includes the following clans:

- Hawiye
- Darod
- Issaq
- Dir

The Sab group includes the Digil and Rahanwein clans. All of these clans are themselves sub-divided into several sub-clans and family groups.

Political movements were created fairly recently along the lines of the clan structures.

1. *United Somali Congress* (USC). The USC was created by the Hawiye clan in central Somalia around Mogadishu. It is, however, currently split into two factions one till recently led by Mohammed Farra Aideed (now expired) and the other led by Ali Mahdi.
2. *Somali Salvation Democratic Front* (SSDF). The SSDF was created by the Majertain sub clan of the Darod, who live in North East Somalia.
3. *Somali National Front* (SNF). This is the movement of the Marehan sub clan of the Darod, who live in Southern Somalia on the Kenyan border: the former President of Somalia Siad Barre, belongs to this sub clan.
4. *Somali National Movement* (SNM). The SNM was created by the Issaq clan of north western Somalia. Since May 1991, the SNM has proclaimed the independence of Somaliland in this region.
5. *Somali Patriotic Front* (SPF). The Ogadeni, a sub clan of the Darod who live partly in Southern and partly in Central Somalia, founded the SPF. It is currently split into two factions.
6. *Somali Democratic Movement*(SDM). The SDM is the movement of the Rahanwein clan, most of whom are sedentary farmers who live in Southern and Western Somalia. This clan is also split in two factions.
7. *Somali Democratic Association* (SDA). The SDA is the party of the Dir clan living in North Wetern Somalia.

There are numerous smaller parties in Somalia, as well as coalitions of parties such as the Somali National Alliance (SNA), which is a group of pro-Aideed factions.