

Democratic Instability in Kyrgyzstan: Tulip Revolution and Beyond

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "Democratic Instability in Kyrgyzstan: Tulip Revolution and Beyond" submitted by me in the partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of degree of "MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY" is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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DEDICATED TO MY PARENTS

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CHAPTER: ONE

INTRODUCTION

The origin of the democracy can be trace back to ancient Greece. Like other words ending in 'cracy', democracy is derived from the Greek word kratos, meaning power, or rule. Thus democracy means 'rule of the demos' (the demos referring to people, although the Greek original used this to mean the poor or the many). However the simple meaning of rule by the people does not get us very far. The problem with democracy has been its very popularity, a popularity that has threaten the term's undoing as a meaningful political concept. In being almost universally regarded as a good thing, democracy has come to be used as little more than a hurrah word, implying approval of a particular set of ideas or system of rule. 'Democracy is perhaps the fanciest word in the world of public affairs' (Bernard Crick 1993: 12).

Among the meaning that has been attached to the word democracy are the following

- A system of rule by the poor and disadvantaged
- A form of government in which the people rule themselves directly and continuously, without the need for professional politicians or public officials
- A society based on equal opportunity and individual merit, rather than hierarchy and privilege.
- A system of welfare and redistribution aimed at narrowing social inequalities
- A system of decision making based on the principle of majority rule
- A system of rule that secures the rights and interest of minorities by policing checks upon the power of the majority
- A means of filling public offices through a competitive struggle for the popular vote
- A system of government that serves the interests of the people regardless of their participation in political life.

Perhaps a more helpful starting point from which to consider the nature of democracy is

Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, delivered in 1864 at the height of the American civil war. Lincoln extolled the virtues of what he called, 'government of the people, by the people and for the people.' What this makes clear is that democracy links government to the people, but that link can be forged in a number of ways: government of, by and for the people. The precise nature of democratic rule has been the subject of fierce ideological and political debate.

Development of Democratic Regimes and Concept

Democracy first flourished in the Greek city-state, reaching its fullest appearance in ancient Athens. There the citizens, as members of the assembly, participated directly in the making of their laws. A democracy of this kind was possible only in a small state where the people were politically educated, and it was limited since the majority of population was slaves or non citizens. Athenian democracy fell before imperial rule¹, as did other ancient democracies in the early Italian cities and the early church. In this period and in the middle ages, ideas such as representation crucial to modern Western democracy were developed.

Doctrines of natural law² evolved into the idea of natural rights, i.e. that all people have certain rights, such as self-protection, that cannot be taken from them. The idea of contract³ followed, that rulers and people were bound to each other by mutual obligations. If the sovereign failed in his duties or transgressed on natural rights, the people could take back their sovereignty. This idea, as postulated by John Locke, strongly influenced the development of British parliamentary democracy and, as defined in the

¹The creation and maintenance of an unequal economic, cultural, and territorial relationship, usually between states and often in the form of an empire, based on domination and subordination.

²A law or body of laws that derives from nature and is believed to be binding upon human actions apart from or in conjunction with laws established by human authority.

³The idea of social contract belongs to emerging concept of democracy and idea against the theory of divine origin of state.

social contract theory of Jean Jacques Rousseau, helped form the philosophical validation for the American and French Revolutions. The idea that equality of opportunity can be maintained through political democracy alone has long been challenged by socialists and others, who claim that economic democracy through economic equality and public ownership of the major means of production is the only base upon which a true political democracy can be erected. English settlers in America faced boundary conditions that emphasized the importance of the individual and helped in breaking down class distinctions and prejudices. These led to a democratic political structure marked by a high degree of individualism, civil liberty, and a government limited by law. In 19th century emphasis was placed on expansion the license and improving the machinery for enabling the will of the people to be more fully and directly expressed.

Since the mid-20th century, most political systems have described themselves as democracies, but many of them have not encouraged competing political parties and have not stressed individual rights and other elements typical of classic Western democracy. With the collapse of one-party Communist rule in Eastern Europe, the fall of authoritarian dictatorships in Latin America, and the end of some one-party states in sub-Saharan Africa, however, the number of true multi party democracies has increased. Despite the increase in the number of countries holding multi party elections, however, the United Nations issued a study in 2002 that stated that in more than half the world's nations the rights and freedoms of citizens are limited, thus adaptation of democratic institutions did not brought the change in essence.

State of Democracy in Central Asia comparative study

The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought with it a series of newly independent states that have had various experiences in the nature, extent, and degree of democratic institutionalization and democratic consolidation. Central Asian countries show great differences in there democratic performance and institutional development, since all of

the Central Asian states acquired more or less the same political culture⁴ and institutional set up from the Soviet ancestor, but all the post Soviet Central Asian moved ahead with their own political – democratic institutions (Landman and Larizza et. al 2006: 1).

1. With the exception of Turkmenistan, all the countries have formally established semi-presidential institutional designs, where the President is the Head of State and the Prime Minister is the Head of Government. In practice, however, there has been the tendency for the concentration of power in the Presidency (less so in Mongolia), which has compromised the democratic value of horizontal accountability. Even in Mongolia, where there is greater cooperation between the President and Prime Minister, sitting MPs serve simultaneously in the cabinet, which in a relatively small Parliament compromises horizontal accountability.
2. All the countries have persistent problems with the full protection of civil and political rights, where everyday forms of human rights violations are common and severe in Uzbekistan, which has had significant problems with arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extra-judicial killings; and in Turkmenistan, where the political system is governed through the personal whim of the President himself.
3. All the countries have unstable degrees of problems in socio-economic development as they have struggled to make a transition from command economies to those that are more based on the market. Large state firms and state-subsidized features of these economies have been dismantled in relatively rapid fashion, which has eroded the social safety net. Coupled with the historical and cultural inexperience with market mechanisms, the new market economies have been plagued with increasing inequality and corruption, which serve to undermine the progressive realization in economic and social rights, thereby serving to undermine what other democratic advances have been made.
4. Despite the formal trappings of democratic institutions in the Central Asian

⁴ Political culture may be defined as the political psychology of a country or nation (or subgroup thereof). Political culture studies attempt to uncover deep-seated, long-held values characteristic of a society or group rather than ephemeral attitudes toward specific issues that might be gathered through public-opinion surveys. Several major studies using a political culture approach appeared.

countries, there remain severe limits on real political participation, real protection of rights to free speech, assembly, and association, and the ability for significant opposition groups to form. There has thus been a process of 'de-democratization'⁵ taking place that is coupled with increasing executive power and authority.

5. All the countries have been potentially subject to the international relations and foreign policy strategies of primarily China, Russia, and the United States. The five central Asian republics are strategically located between South Asia, the Middle East, and Russia, where the desire for access to oil and the prosecution of the 'war on terror' has meant that these countries are of great strategic interest. The United States has had air bases in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but after increasing tensions between the international community and Uzbekistan over human rights violations primarily related to the Andijan crisis in May 2005, the Parliament in Uzbekistan voted to ask the US to leave the base. In addition, Mongolia has sent a limited number of troops to the conflict in Iraq, which was rewarded by a visit from President Bush in late 2005.
6. Continued deterioration in the protection of human rights and the absence of real democratic reform in Central Asia has meant that many international donors have either reduced or stopped altogether the extension of loans, grants, and other forms of overseas development assistance.

Types of democracies

Democratic theories has a number of variants such as Liberal democracy, Participatory democracy, Deliberative democracy, people democracy, Popular democracy, Radical democracy, Parliamentary democracy, Multi party democracy, etc. since the democracy has a number of variant thus it will not be possible to study all in one chapter thus this chapter will introduce only few of them.

⁵ De democratization is a process by which a democratic regime in reverse movement transforms into any other form of political system, lacking democratic principles and values.

Liberal Democracy

Liberal democracy, also recognized as constitutional democracy, is a ordinary form of representative democracy. According to the main beliefs of moderate democracy, elections should be free and fair, and the political procedure should be competitive. Political pluralism⁶ is usually defined as the existence of multiple and distinct political parties. A liberal democracy may take different constitutional forms: it may be a constitutional republic; as the United States, India, Germany or Brazil, or a constitutional monarchy, such as the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada or Spain. It may have a presidential system (United States, Brazil), a parliamentary system (Westminster system, UK and Commonwealth countries, Spain), or a mix, semi-presidential system (France).

Liberal democracy traces its origins—and its name—to the European 18th century, also known as the Age of Enlightenment. At the time, the vast majority of European states were monarchies, with political power held either by the monarch or the aristocracy. The likelihood of democracy had not been seriously well thought-out by political theory since classical remains, and the widely held belief was that democracies would be inherently unstable and chaotic in their policies due to the changing whims of the people. It was further believed that democracy was opposing to human nature⁷, as human beings were seen to be naturally evil, violent and in need of a strong leader to control their negative impulses. Many European monarchs held that their power had been designed by God, and that questioning their right to rule was equal to blasphemy. The dominions of the British Empire became laboratories for liberal democracy from the mid 19th century onward. In Canada, responsible government began in the 1840s and in Australia and New Zealand, parliamentary government elected by male suffrage and secret ballot was established from the 1850s and female suffrage achieved from the 1890s (Blainey 2004: 163).

6 Political pluralism is a participatory type of government in which the politics of the country are defined by the needs and wants of many. Political pluralism is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. This is similar to the government of the United States of America.

7 This idea was put forward by the theorists of absolute monarchy, like Hobbes, and Machiavelli, according to this thought human being is naturally power seeking and self centric, thus power less than absolute power will not work.

The Institutional Logic of the Liberal Democracy

It is essential to liberal democracy not only that individuals are morally equal, but also that on average individuals are better able to know their own interests, values, and goals than any means or class who might seek to rule over them as guardians (Dahl 1989). So, while democrats do not claim that individuals are equally skilled to take part in joint self-governance, they do view the moral and epistemological claims of individuals to self-rule as crucial considerations in matters of power distribution. Most of the institutional problems of democracy reside in three problem areas that follow: (a) distributions of decision-making powers; (b) structuring processes of collective judgment; and (c) constituting collective agents of the people.

Democratic theory has usually been worried mostly with the first of these problems: how to hand out and re combined the powers of decision making. And, indeed, these are usually the toughest problems of democratic theory, as famously recognized by Hamilton in *The Federalist*: “in framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself ” (Hamilton et. al. 2000: 10). Since Hamilton’s time, the powers of the state have grown dramatically, so much so that bureaucracies generate their own powers, elites, and interests, often in conjunction with powerful social and economic powers, so much so that schools of democratic theory from Michels through Schumpeter and Luhmann have held to the view that, at best, the powers of the state can be checked by the people, but certainly not directed (Bobbio 1987; 78 Sartori 1973: 174).

J.S. Mill’s on Liberal democracy.

In his essays, *On Liberty* and *Considerations on Representative Government*, John Stuart Mill set out what is often considered the first systematic explication and defense of liberal democracy. As a pro democrat, Mill welcomed the progress in equality about which

Tocqueville was anxious; yet in a review of *Democracy in America* he still enthusiastically recommended the work to his fellow Britons, among other reasons because he found Tocqueville's warnings about the tyranny of the majority⁷ well taken (Mill 1835:40). In particular Mill agreed with Tocqueville's claims that majority, mass culture stifles free and informed thought and that an omnipotent majority could oppress a minority. Taken together, Mill's essays may in large part be read as a sustained effort to confront this problem by the straight forward method of combining democracy and liberalism.

In giving his principle content, Mill listed the most important liberties to protect, namely the freedoms of sense of right and wrong, thought and feeling, holding and expressing opinions, pursuing one's life plans, and combining with others for any (non hateful) purpose. Because these civil liberties naturally and directly affect only those who enjoy them, people should be let off from the interference, paternalistic or otherwise, by others and especially by the state, including the democratic state. Mill devoted little space to working out the details of how the liberties are to be protected, but it is clear that in general he thought there should be areas of citizens' lives free of state regulation and legal limits on what even a democratically mandated government can legislate. That is, he privileged preservation of a difference between private and public realms and the rule of law. Regarding democracy, direct citizen participation in the affairs of government is, in Mill's view, to be encouraged primarily for its functions of engendering confidence in people about their ability to govern themselves and of developing intellectual talents and communal, moral values. However, since direct participation is impossible in a large society, Mill thought that 'the ideal type of a perfect government must be a representative democracy' (ibid 1859: 7).

Varieties of liberal-democratic theory

7 The phrase "tyranny of the majority" used in discussing systems of democracy and majority rule, is a criticism of the scenario in which decisions made by a majority under that system would place that majority's interests so far above a dissenting individual's interest that the individual would be actively oppressed, just like the oppression by tyrants and despots.

With the immunity of one of these supplies, almost no theorist ready to accept the liberal democratic label would wish to make substantive changes in Mill's classification of democracy and liberalism, though there is clearly room for many differences over how best to defend civil liberties or structure delegate democracy. For example, about representation some theorists favor parliamentary and others presidential systems of government, some (including Mill) proportional representation, others first past the post⁸ representation, some a free hand for elected officials, others provision for inter-election responsibility such as recall. These and other such differences are clearly very important at the level of ongoing liberal democratic practice, but their link to general theory is no more than indirect. Similarly, debates over how to understand civil liberties – for example, whether or not endorsement is a form of expression to be protected as freedom of speech or whether limits on campaign financing are a violation of civil rights – reflect differences over the application of liberal-democratic principles rather than differences over the principles themselves.

Participation

In most controversies of political theory the line between principled differences and variations in use, explanation, or stress is unclear. One omission is in Mill's eagerness for participation. This is the element of his characterization of liberal democracy in the list above that is not shared by all liberal-democratic theorists like Giovanni Sartori or William Riker. In fact, some critics of liberal democracy from the direction of participatory democracy see in Mill's participationism a going away from liberal-democratic theory (Pateman 1970:28–34). If Mill held that democracy should only be by direct participation or that representative democracy is not only necessary, but a necessary evil, these critics would be right. However, Mill thought that representative democracy had some positive features of its own (such as making it easier to ensure that government decisions would be made by educated people) and that, when feasible, it should be combined with direct participation. Because a measure of participatory

⁸ First-past-the-post voting refers to an election won by the candidate(s) with the most votes. The winning candidate does not necessarily receive an absolute majority of all votes cast.

democracy, though limited, is allowed to be possible and sought-after by theorists even more closely identified with liberal democracy than Schumpeter, such as (Dahl 1970: 102-2, 1989: 338-39), a case can be made to consider this an area of disagreement within liberal-democratic theory, rather than as a dividing line between it and alternatives.

Equality

Other differences concern equality. Mill is often and in important respects justly classified an egalitarian. He was among the few males of his time convincingly to advocate expansion of the franchise to women (Mill 1869: 126), and his views on the distribution of wealth put him headed for the socialistic end of a range of stances on the question of how far liberal democrats should maintain on politics favoring social and economic equality. Ronald Dworkin (1983) may also be located somewhere in the egalitarian 'camp,' as, according to most interpreters, John Rawls, and Dahl has moved in this direction over the course of his career (Dahl 1956). Robert Nozick (who does not classify himself a liberal democrat) insists that liberal principles dictate anti-egalitarianism (1974). The late Isaiah Berlin, while not explicitly anti-egalitarian, was sceptical about sanctioning more than formal, political equality in the name of liberal democracy.

For Mill 'the pure idea of democracy' is 'government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented,' which requires proportional representation so a minority is not denied government representatives (Mill 1861: 302-3). However, this egalitarianism does not carry over to the vote, where Mill's view differs with most other liberal-democratic theorists. On the normal view, political equality is a central value and is interpreted as equality in the polling booth. Mill did not agree: 'I do not look upon equal voting as among the things that are good in themselves,' he announced, and he went on to explain that by granting the educated and the uneducated equal votes, a democracy harmfully declared 'ignorance to be entitled to as much political power as knowledge'

Participatory democracy

Participatory democracy is a process emphasizing the broad role of constituents in the direction and act of political systems. Etymological roots of democracy (Greek demos and kratos) imply that the people are in power and thus that all democracies are participatory. However, participatory democracy tends to advocate more involved forms of citizen participation than traditional representative democracy. Participatory democracy strives to create opportunities for all members of a political group to make meaningful contributions to decision-making, and seeks to expand the range of people who have access to such opportunities. Because so much information must be gathered for the overall decision-making process to succeed, technology may provide important forces leading to the type of empowerment needed for participatory models, especially those technological tools that enable community narratives and correspond to the buildup of knowledge. Effectively increasing the scale of participation, and translating small but effective participation groups into small world networks, are areas currently being studied. Some scholars argue for refocusing the term on community-based activity within the area of civil society, based on the belief that a strong non-governmental public sphere is a requirement for the emergence of a strong liberal democracy (Simone Chambers, Will Kymlicka 2002 240). These scholars tend to stress the value of separation between the realm of civil society and the formal political realm (Seligman 1992: 105-6).

Participatory democracy in practice

In the US there is a long tradition of local government where 'all' take part in a town meeting that decides important issues, in India local government use to be in practice early from the Rig Vedic phase, in form of sabha and the samiti. There has been variation as to who was included by 'all', as in the past women, non-freeman and 'undesirables' like shudra's were not allowed to participate so far. After independence India started a new experience of participatory democracy by adopting the Panchayati Raj institutions.

Table 1. What contributes to participatory democracy working?

Component	What makes it easier
<p>All can raise an issue, suggest solutions, take part in the final decision</p> <p>face to face meetings</p> <p>Much discussion-all who want to can contribute</p> <p>Tendency to want consensus</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Equality between group members ● feeling comfortable together ● small groups ● homogeneity ● no time limits ● small groups ● equality between group members ● feeling comfortable together ● etiquette of conflict ● homogeneity ● equality between group members ● feeling comfortable together

Democracy in Practice; (Helena Catt 1999: 46)

A simple example of participatory democracy is labor; feminist and the environmental movement⁹, both the feminist and environmentalist philosophies oppose hierarchy and seek a decentralized and inclusive form of decision making. Thus the groups are seeking

⁹ New social movement; based on identity, The term new social movements (NSMs) is a theory of social movements that etc. attempts to explain the plethora of new movements that have come up in various western societies roughly since the mid-1960s (i.e. in a post-industrial economy) which are claimed to depart significantly from the conventional social movement paradigm, like labor movement, environmental movement, feminist movement

to practice what they preach and are prepared to put in the necessary time to make the system work. The basic participatory democracy structure is used in a very similar way across the range of organizations. Rothschild uses eight criteria to differentiate the 'collectivist-democratic' from the 'bureaucratic' organizational ideal type (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 194). Not all of these differences relate to the decision-making structure but some do: authority; fulfillment; negligible set rules; the ideal of group of people. Essentially the authority for decisions 'resides in the collectivity as a whole' so all decisions must be made or authorized by the group. In reaching a decision fulfillment is to the consensus of the collective. The structure is as informal and non-hierarchical as possible, to enhance equality and participation.

Rousseau

Almost without exclusion participatory-democratic theorists have appealed to the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and specially his *The Social Contract* (published in 1762) for support. Rousseau stood against the earlier modern contract theorists, especially Hobbes. On Hobbes' view egoistic individuals in a natural state are provoked by mutual fear to submit themselves to a sovereign authority in exchange for security¹⁰. Observing that for Hobbes, as for Locke, personal liberty is the prime motive for entering into a compact, and surrender to a sovereign authority, whether a king or, as in Locke's version, a majority government, is its result, Rousseau asked how liberty and surrender can be prepared to accept: 'if the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation how can he pledge them without harming his own interests?' This poses the guiding problem of *The Social Contract*, namely to 'find a form of association . . . in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before' (Rousseau 1762:13–14).

10 Both the philosophers Rousseau and Hobbes, has different conceptions about the human nature, thus they came out with different systems of political rule. Hobbes man is self centric, egoistic unable to cooperate and live with each other peacefully, thus unable to rule in broader interest. Thus rule of a monarch with absolute power is only option. But Rousseau's man is civilized and peaceful, ready to live with each other peacefully, ready to sacrifice self interest for the broader social interest, thus a kind of participatory democracy is Rousseau's only option.

While most challenges to Hobbes by other contract theorists questioned his view that the sovereign should be an absolute monarchy, Rousseau focused on the prior act whereby individuals in the state of nature agree to submit themselves to any form of political authority. He argued that in order to be legitimately binding this agreement must be unanimous and that to achieve its aims people must give up all their powers, since if anything were left outside of possible public control, it could be insisted that other things should be exempted and the point of the contract to create a public authority would be defeated. Together these conditions mean that a legitimate and effective contract involves each person giving up all of his powers to everyone else. The effect is to create a 'moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will'.

The will that this body politic or 'public person' acquires is the famous 'general will,' and it is by reference to this that Rousseau thought he could solve the problem he had set himself. The key is that the general will embodies a moral essential for people to promote common interests. Just how (or whether) this permission is derived from the originating contract is a matter of ongoing dispute among scholars concerning themselves with Rousseau's theory, but assuming it makes sense to say that in giving their powers over to each other people undertake to promote and preserve their common interests, Rousseau can claim that they are at the same time bound to one another (in looking to the common good) and free (since the essential to act in this way is something they have willingly created themselves) (Frank Cunningham 2002: 124).

In a central passage of *The Social Contract* Rousseau announces that there is 'often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will' explaining that 'the latter considers only the common interest' while the former 'is no more than a sum of particular wills'. This passage makes it impossible to interpret the general will simply as what everyone might agree to or what the majority votes in favor of. Rousseau does remark that the general will is the opinion of the majority, but this obtains only when citizens are using their votes to express an opinion about whether the proposal 'is in

accord with the general will' and only when 'all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority'. Nor could the general will simply be that upon which there is agreed agreement, since this might be reached by people each looking only to private interests but leading to a common result, such as the fear-driven contract in Hobbes' scheme (Harrison 1993: 55). Feminist critics criticize Rousseau on the ground that in his participatory democratic structure women's do not have any space, so for what ever the view of critics is do not matter, Rousseau is the philosopher of participatory democracy as Mill belongs to liberal democracy.

Deliberative democracy

Most fundamentally, deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their representatives. Both are expected to justify the laws they would impose on one another. In a democracy, leaders should therefore give reasons for their decisions, and respond to the reasons that citizens give in return. But not all issues, all the time, require deliberation. Deliberative democracy makes room for many other forms of decision-making (including bargaining among groups, and secret operations ordered by executives), as long as the use of these forms themselves is justified at some point in a deliberative process. Its first and most important characteristic, then, is its reason-giving requirement.

The reasons that deliberative democracy asks citizens and their representatives to give should appeal to principles that individuals who are trying to find fair terms of cooperation cannot reasonably reject. The reasons are neither merely procedural ("because the majority favors the war") nor purely substantive ("because the war promotes the national interest or world peace"). They are reasons that should be accepted by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation (Amy and Dennis 2004: 5).

A question about the deliberative democracy always remains that, what goal or goals it is supposed to serve? There are different responses to this question if it is interpreted to ask what deliberative democracy is supposed ultimately to achieve. For some it is a value

deliberative democracy for its ability to allow citizens and politicians 'to live with moral disagreement in a morally constructive way' (ibid 1996: 106). In some writings Habermas regards 'discourse politics' as required to overcome and prevent crises of political legitimation, and more recently he specifies that 'deliberative politics' are essential for integrating the realistic, the moral, and the community/identity defining ('ethical') dimensions of life in a constitutional state. Benhabib and Bernard Manin see deliberative democracy as central to legitimizing political arrangements and outcomes, but for Benhabib legitimacy is linked to rationality, while for Manin equal participation in deliberative processes confer legitimacy. Whatever differences there are among deliberative democrats about ultimate goals, they agree that, at least as a proximate goal, sincere democratic deliberation will encourage citizens to seek consensus over common goods. The process of articulating reasons and offering them in public forums 'forces the individual to think of what would count as a good reason for all others involved' (Benhabib 1996 :75).

What Purposes Does Deliberative Democracy Serve?

The general aim of deliberative democracy is to provide the most justified idea for dealing with moral divergence in politics. In pursuing this aim, deliberative democracy serves four related purposes (Amy and Dennis 2004: 10) *the first* is to promote the legitimacy of collective decisions. This aim is a response to one of the sources of moral disagreement shortage of resources. Citizens would not have to argue about how best to hand out health care or who should receive organ transplants if these goods and services were unlimited. In the face of scarcity, deliberation can help those who do not get what they want, or even what they need, to come to accept the authority of a shared decision. *The second* purpose of deliberation is to promote public vigorous perspectives on public issues. This aim responds to another source of moral disagreement limited kindness. To be sure, politicians are not automatically transformed from representatives of special interests into trustees of the public interest as a result of talking to one another. The background conditions in which the deliberation takes place are critical. Deliberation is more likely to succeed to the extent that the deliberators are well informed, have

relatively equal resources, and take seriously their opponents' views.

The third purpose of deliberation is to promote jointly respectful processes of decision-making. It responds to an often ignored source of moral disagreement—incompatible moral values. Even fully altruistic individuals trying to decide on the morally best standards for governing a society of abundance would not be able to reconcile some moral conflicts beyond a reasonable doubt. They would still confront, for example, the problem of abortion, which pits the value of life against the value of liberty. *The fourth* purpose of deliberation is to help correct these mistakes. This aim is a response to the fourth source of difference, incomplete understanding. A well-constituted deliberative forum provides an opportunity for advancing both individual and collective understanding. Through the give-and-take of argument, participants can learn from each other, come to recognize their individual and collective misapprehensions, and develop new views and policies that can more successfully withstand critical analysis. When citizens bargain and negotiate, they may learn how better to get what they want. But when they deliberate, they can expand their knowledge, including both their self-understanding and their collective understanding of what will best serve their fellow citizens (Amy and Thompson 2004: 11).

People Democracy

The term person is derived from the orthodox communist regimes that sprang up on the Soviet model in aftermath of Second World War. It is here used, however, to refer broadly to the various democratic models that the Marxist tradition has generated. Although they differ, these models offer a clear contrast to the more familiar liberal democratic ones. Marxists have tended to be dismissive of liberal or parliamentary democracy, seeing it as a form of bourgeois or capitalist democracy. Nevertheless, Marxists were drawn to the concept or ideal of democracy because of its clear egalitarian implication. The term was used in particular to design the goal of social equality brought about through the common ownership of wealth (social democracy in real sense), in contrast to political democracy, which establishes only the facade of equality.

Marx believed that the overthrow of capitalism would be a trigger that would allow genuine democracy to flourish. In his view, a full communist society would come into existence only after a transitional period characterized by the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. In effect, a system of bourgeois democracy would be replaced by a very different system of proletarian democracy. Although Marx refused to describe in detail how this transitional society would be organized, its broad shape can be defined by his admiration for the Paris commune of 1871, which was a short lived experience in what approximated to direct democracy. Marx predicted however that as class antagonism faded and fully communist society came into existence, the proletarian state would simply wither away.

The form of democracy that was developed in twentieth century communist states, however owed more to the ideas of V.I. Lenin than it did to those of Marx. Although Lenin's 1917 slogan "all the power of Soviets" (the workers and soldiers and sailors council) had kept alive the notion of commune democracy. In reality power in Soviet Russia quickly fell into the hand of the Bolshevik party. In Lenin's view, this party was nothing less than the vanguard of the working class. Armed with Marxism, the party claimed that it was able to receive the genuine interest of the proletariat and thus guide it to the realization of its revolutionary potential. This theory became the corner stone of 'Leninist democracy, in the USSR and it was accepted by all other orthodox communist regimes as one of its core features of the Marxism –Leninism.

Democratic transformation in Post Communist States

There are two discourses of the democratic transformation from communist Soviet states into other forms of political regimes, *first* 'cooperative approaches to regime change', *second* 'Non cooperative model of transition' according to the first model of transformation, static, unseen structures do not make democracies or dictatorships people do (McFaul, Michael, 2002: 214, 220, 222). Structural factors such as economic development, cultural influences, and historical institutional preparations manipulate the formation of actors'

preferences and power, but ultimately these forces have causal significance only if translated into human action. Individuals and the decisions they make are especially important for explaining how divergent outcomes result from similar structural contexts. The importance of agency has for decades figured prominently in theories of democratization. Dankwart Rustow's seminal article in 1970 first refocused the lens of inquiry on actors, and then the four-volume 1986 study edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, resurrected elites as the central drivers of regime change (ibid: 215). This school posits that division within the ruling class begins the process of political liberalization, while strategic interaction between elites from state and society establishes the mode of transition and the type of regime that then emerges. Elite groups are constructed as real actors with autonomous causal power to influence the course of regime change (Anditter 1986: 120) The model—especially as developed by O'Donnell and Schmitter, Karl, Huntington, and Przeworski—identifies four sets of choice-making actors in the transition process: soft-liners and hardliners within the ruling elite of the ancien regime, and moderates and radicals among the challengers to the ancien regime. Many modes of transition can result from the tactical interaction of these actors. Most rampant has been democracy by imposition—a path in which the soft-liners from the ancien régime set the terms of transition—but pacted transitions have received the most theoretical attention. A democratic outcome is most likely when soft-liners and moderates enter into pacts that find the way the changeover from dictatorship to democracy. If the transition is not pacted, it is more likely to fail (Terry Lynn Karl 1997: 50).

In summing up the results of their multi volume study, O'Donnell and Schmitter declare that “political democracy is created by stalemate and dissensus rather than by prior unity and consensus.” Philip Roeder makes the same claim in his analysis of post communist transitions: “The more heterogeneous in objectives and the more evenly balanced in relative leverage are the participants in the bargaining process of constitutional design, the more likely is the outcome to be a democratic constitution.” When both sides realize that they cannot prevail unilaterally, they settle for solutions that provide partial victory (and partial defeat) for both sides. Democratization requires a stale-mate—“a prolonged

and inconclusive struggle” (Rustow 1970: 352).

Przeworski extends the case to posit that uncertain balances of power are most likely to produce the most democratic arrangements: “If everyone is behind the Rawlsian veil, that is, if they know little about their political strength under the eventual democratic institutions, all opt for a maximin solution: institutions that introduce checks and balances and maximize the political influence of minorities, or, equivalently, make policy highly insensitive to fluctuations in public opinion” (Przeworski 1986: 87). This approach emphasizes the strategic process itself as the primary causal variable producing successful transitions. Roeder argues “Democracy emerges not because it is the object of the politicians’ collective ambition but because it is a practical compromise among politicians blocked from achieving their particular objectives” (Roeder 1994: 208). It is therefore the dynamics of the strategic situation, not the actors and their preferences, that produce or fail to produce democracy.


second ‘Non cooperative model of transition’ is actor centric approach according to which democratization offer a useful starting point for explaining transformations of post communist regimes. Actors did cause regime changes in this part of the world, and because many of them claimed to be building democracy, the transitions to democracy literature offers a useful starting point and appropriate language for analyzing post communist transitions. So unlike Huntington, who asserted that “negotiation and compromise among political elites were at the heart of the democratization processes,” in fact they were not. In imposed transitions, one side took advantage of its more powerful position to craft institutions that benefited it more than they benefited the weak. If the powerful adhered to democratic principles, then they imposed institutions that widely distribute the benefits of the new polity. Such decisions about institutional design were undertaken initially not out of obligation, compromise, or even interest but out of a normative promise to democracy. If the powerful believed in democratic principles, then they imposed democratic institutions. But if they believed in autocratic principles, then they imposed autocratic institutions (McFaul and Michael 2002: 223).

The logic of these arguments bears a strong similarity to realist or distributional accounts of institutional design. The crafting of new institutions democratic or otherwise is framed as a zero-sum game, in which one side obtains its most favored outcome and the other side must settle for second-best and third-best outcomes. These institutions are not competent and they do not enhance the welfare of all, but they can be stable (North 1990). In transitions to democracies, the losers usually obtain second-best outcomes, but even they make relative gains over the status quo stake. In transitions to dictatorship, the losers' gains are much less considerable. The transition is not a deal but an altercation with winners and losers. For democratic philosophers and political theorists, negotiation, bargaining, moderation, deadlock, and conciliation are the material of successful democratic systems, whereas dispute, violence, and hegemony are its enemies. This approach to explaining regime change in the post communist world (and maybe elsewhere) also deliberately leaves out many components of earlier theories of democratization. For instance, the design of institutions is assigned little explanatory power regarding either regime emergence or regime stability. If powerful democrats draft the rules, it does not matter what electoral system is adopted or whether a parliamentary or presidential system is established (Beck and Clarke et al World Bank, 2000.) Different kinds of democracy can work equally effectively and endure equally long. What matters most is that the powerful are committed to the democratic project.

Conclusion

The world history and ideas after the 'the end of history' phase is dominated by the concept and movement of democratization, now it is a fashionable term to adopt. All type of political regimes do not matter what their nature is trying to identify itself with the democracy. Democracy in western world is result of the gradual historical development, the political adaptation of democratic form was result of consecutive developments in society, and economics. Liberal democracies in these countries came into existence after the adjustment of all types of the contradiction from within, thus democratic regimes are more stable here.

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Most of the third world countries which gained freedom in mid 20th century, and the second world countries after post Soviet phase adopted the democratic form of government from above, thus all kind of social, political and cultural contradiction persisted there. These contradictions at a point of time ruptured the structural set up of democracy, and transform these regimes back into authoritarian or military dictatorship. Thus democratic transformation in post Soviet countries more or less belongs with the convenience of the ruling elite of these countries, first hand they accepted the democratic structures but done nothing to transform the political culture of the county in accordance with the democratic set-up, but the role of mass media and the social networking sites and the Internet helped to import the democratic culture in these countries thus the demands of accountable and responsible government started to raise from within.

CHAPTER – 2

Development of democratic Institutions in Kyrgyzstan

During the first years after gaining their independence, the Central Asian republics could have had a chance to democratize their societies, as their governments declared their intentions to abandon Soviet authoritarian practices and to open their societies to political reforms. Indeed it was this promise to embrace democratization and civil society values, which these and all other former Soviet republics made in the early 1990s, that allowed analysts to talk about the ‘third wave of democratization’.

The realities of the political development, however, show that the picture is much more complex, and that political liberalization and changes do not necessarily lead to the establishment of a sustainable democratic system. The introduction of a democratic constitution, which guarantees most important freedoms and sets the principles of a democratic state, does not necessarily lead to the establishment of a democratic society. The parliamentary and presidential elections in these republics were based on a multi party system and legitimate political opposition was allowed to take part in the electoral process in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Yet, the governments found ways to manipulate both the elections and the electorate. The constitutional guarantees of the freedoms of information and independent mass media do not stop incumbent leaders intimidating journalists and independent media outlets for criticizing government officials, and using loopholes in the existing laws to prosecute independent journalists using legal means.

In fact, during the seventy years of Soviet rule the traditional base of Kyrgyz political structure did not change, so for the tenacity of regional, clan and tribal loyalties, as well as personalization patron-client relationships, was often strengthened rather than

diminished by Soviet rule and Soviet ethnic and nationality policies (John Glenn 1999: 116). In some cases, to be sure, Soviet-fostered urbanization altered the social dynamic of the clan system creating an urban Kyrgyzstan with more superficial clan affiliations. The post-Soviet governing elite is, thus, faced with contradictory choices and policies. On the one hand, the new state class feels itself required, in the process of state-building in the post-communist era, to create and emphasize an entirely new national identity; albeit an identity based upon a magically conjured, almost entirely artificial pre-Soviet Kyrgyzstan "nation" that never existed. Thus stability was the major Soviet concern toward the Central Asian countries, not to modernize the region and put it into an uncertain future, in this regard the study concern will be focused on the evolving formal and informal democratic institutional phenomenon in Kyrgyzstan.

Evolution of Civil Societies in Kyrgyzstan

Following the March 24 popular demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan that resulted in the ousting of the Akayev government, the ability of Kyrgyz civil society to impact political processes in the country became difficult to deny. Although experiencing their own difficulties and weaknesses, Kyrgyz civil activists were able to influence the country's political processes since the late 1990s and the turn of this century. Compared to regional neighbors, Kyrgyzstan always maintained a liberal policy in fostering the activity of local NGOs. By the early 2000s, the number of registered NGOs exceeded 3,000. Kyrgyz civil society lived through quantitative and qualitative changes, shimmered with various strategic themes, and experienced different degrees of success in lobbying for various interests and participating in a broader political process. The overall conclusion remains clear - in the fourteen years of independence Kyrgyz civil society had achieved an enormous degree of development (Marat 2005: 268).

In the last few years a number of leading civil society organizations has emerged whose participation on the political scene was difficult to deny. Among them such NGOs as Interbilim, Citizens against Corruption, the Institute for Regional Studies, Diamond and Umut were capable of effectively collaborating with external donors and to design their

own projects concerning various issues. Some NGOs, also merged in coalitions and unions based on specific areas of activity: the promotion of transparency in the government, poverty alleviation and rural development, charity and gender issues. As a result, while the number of registered NGOs declined, there emerged few influential players in the third sector able to intervene in policy building and implementation processes. Early Kyrgyz NGOs were formed just a few months after Kyrgyzstan gained independence. Most of them have grown larger and stronger since then, while the government sector has seen numerous reshuffles and crises. Moreover, compared with political parties, NGOs are far more permanent. Therefore, NGOs enjoy a more positive image than political leaders among the local public.

Today, several thousand NGOs are registered in Kyrgyzstan, with hundreds being known to a wider public for their active work. Shukurov further notes that local civil society groups have used credits and grants allocated by the international community much more efficiently than the government. NGOs make public issues that the state is often not capable of solving. For example, a handful of NGOs have been actively working on gender issues, poverty reduction, border delimitation, the population's access to water and sanitation, and environmental protection. Some of these issues later became part of official policy. In some way Kyrgyz NGOs help the government abide by the numerous international conventions signed by Kyrgyzstan during the early years of its independence, among them those on human rights, emigration and poverty (Marat 2008: 238).

Relation between Civil Society and democracy

Numerous studies have argued that the effects of civil society are positive, an argument often defended by reference to the work of NGOs in promoting development, labor solidarity, democratic accountability, and post-materialist causes in the developing world (Anheir, 2004). Scholars have verified that NGOs can challenge the abuses of executive or legislative authority, and minimize arbitrary policies imposed by the state. Sometimes they are able to compel properly authorized state authorities to prosecute, penalize,

sanction, or punish errant public officials (Schmitter, 1993). NGOs can act as an institutional alternative that can monitor the transparency and efficacy of legislation and can expose to the public the intensity or forms of client–patron relations, prebendalism, cronyism, and nepotism in governance at the local or national levels (Burnell and Calvert 2005: 45; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004: 245).

Associational NGOs also have mechanisms that can promote social tolerance which can minimize political violence and defuse ethnic rivalries (Varshney, 2001). Dense NGO activity can also establish a constant flow of information to the masses that can expose governmental malfeasance or inefficiency with high regularity or publicity (Schedler, 1999a, 1999b). Such NGOs can typically form an organized entity that can give the mass public a vehicle to articulate their demands or grievances, especially in states that have fluid and ideologically empty party systems, as is common in transitional states, thereby building a solid constituency of active economic and political reform (Rollin F. Tusalem 2007)

But basing the argument on NGOs can be problematic. NGOs are usually non profit organizations that gain at least a portion of their funding from private sources. The fact that some are prone to be dependent on international funding has led some scholars to argue that NGOs are not really local actors of civil society. Rather, they are beholden to the interests of larger international forces that promote globalization directives, structural adjustment policies, and the interests of international financial donors (Kamat 2002; 43, Mendelson and Glenn, 2002 103). Some NGOs are partially funded by the state or elite structures domestically, and hence their developmental or state-accountability agenda can be co-opted by external forces that do not truly represent societal or sectoral interests. Like-wise, the reverse is true: excessive NGO pluralism and its independence from the state can make NGOs free to impose the agenda of their donors or commercial supporters without accountability from the state. Hence, NGOs can devise development policies that are destructive without external monitoring from experienced and established state agencies (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 16).

Nonetheless, contemporary scholarship is strongly committed to the idea that the organizations of civil society play a strongly positive role in facilitating democracy. We may trace this back to the work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) linking civic culture with the growth of liberal democracies, but the tendency is particularly pronounced since the publication of Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993). Civil society, it is said, promotes democratic sustainability and enhances state institutional performance.

Implicit in this theoretical discourse is a historically path-dependent argument. That is, a state with low levels of civic associationalism is more prone to having institutions with substandard performance in terms of bureaucratic effectiveness, while states with an abundance of vibrant autonomous groups are more likely to experience effective governance. Variation in the strength of civil society is therefore the key determinant that made Northern Italy an industrial region with much promise and economic development and Southern Italy a backward region, prone to amoral familism, vertical client-patron relations, and economic underdevelopment.

Other scholars agree: membership in voluntary organizations, such as labor unions, guilds, professional organizations, clubs, bowling leagues, bird watching clubs, and other organized groups promote a sense of community. A nation that has a strong sense of civic-mindedness and membership in such organizations should expect to have citizens that are tolerant of diversity, have a high level of mutual trust, and are more compromise seeking (Tusalem 2007: 365). Thus, a strong civil society promotes an associational culture which can facilitate a network and web of social connectedness that enhances ever deeper levels of communitarianism and social integration. As such, a state with high levels of civil society promotes a democratic political culture, which is a pattern of widely shared attitudes and values supportive of democratic institutions and procedures. It is argued that once civil society is formed, it creates social capital, a reservoir citizens can tap (like a savings-bank account) that will allow them further to cultivate elongated social networks. These networks will promote a strengthened sense of democratic citizenship that will compel citizens to demand state accountability.

Although there have been controversies surrounding Putnam's empirical claims, as we note in the following section, recent scholarship has validated the claim that high levels of civic associationalism play an instrumental role in the process of democratization (Foweraker and Landman 1997: 53). For instance, from Eastern Europe and Latin America to Central Asia organized and associational groups gathered to sign petitions, promote anti-regime rallies and demonstrations against despotic regimes, and concomitantly remained active in calling for the accountability, transparency, and responsiveness of state institutions many years after democratic transition. Solidarity in Poland, Namfrel in the Philippines, and other anti-authoritarian civil society groups played critical roles in dismantling the authoritarian anciens régimes.

A supportive political context

The political context within which autonomous social organizations exist makes a huge difference to the development of a healthy civil society. In the longer term, however, open political regimes provide a more appropriate context within which civil societies are able to thrive. Such systems can provide a legal and regulatory framework guaranteeing the rights of social groups; they permit the existence of lively media enabling social organizations to communicate their values and programme; and their political elites act in ways that reinforce an acceptance of social diversity and political difference. In other, whilst a fully democratic order is not essential for civil society, development in this direction does appear to provide the optimum conditions for its survival and growth. In this sphere, as in others, Kyrgyzstan offers an ambiguous picture. The tiny mountainous republic of Kyrgyzstan, which acquired independence as a result of Soviet collapse, was seen in the early 1990's as an 'island of democracy' within which flourished a vibrant realm of social organization. President Askar Akaev spoke often of the need to create a lively civil society if democratization was to proceed, and new social organizations sprang up in most of the larger cities. Yet this was a country where more 'modern' forms of self-organization had not developed before 1989 and which had no experience of liberal democratic rule. Hence the development of both civil society and democratization

proceeded in parallel rather than linear fashion, with the fate of civil society as much dependent on the activities and actions of political elites as its own self-organizational capacities (Anderson 2000: 82).

Glasnost' and perestroika came late to Kyrgyzstan. Under the leadership of Absamat Masaliev the local party apparatus stifled reformist impulses, maintained tight control over the media and resisted attempts to create popular fronts along the lines seen in other Soviet republics. Then, in May 1990, a number of social groups joined together to create the 'Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan' (DDK) which called for market reform and genuine democratization. Initially the party leadership resisted all such calls, but the mishandling of the inter-ethnic conflicts in Osh led to a discrediting of Masaliev's leadership, and in October 1990 his attempts to take the newly created executive presidency were thwarted by the republican parliament (Huskey, 1997: 654-660).

Askar Akaev, chosen to lead the republic in October 1990, may have been a compromise candidate but he quickly stamped his mark upon Kyrgyz politics. On the day of his selection by the deputies he also met with leaders of various social groups demonstrating outside the parliament building. In a succession of speeches Akaev made clear his commitment to the Gorbachevian vision of reform, and under his leadership the political atmosphere in Kyrgyzstan became much more relaxed. The official media adopted a more open approach to political reporting, and a number of independent papers began to appear, social organizations flourished and few faced any problems in gaining legal recognition. More importantly for our purposes, Akaev made frequent reference to the need to establish a vibrant civil society that would provide a foundation for democratization. This approach continued after the attainment of independence at the end of 1991.

The number of social organizations grew exponentially, and during his first three years in office the president held frequent meetings with journalists and with the leaders of political parties, social organizations and religious communities. Sceptics suggested that this was largely an attempt to co-opt social organizations and blunt their critique

(Anderson 1994:79). For all these criticisms, during the early 1990s Kyrgyzstan remained the most open of the Central Asian states, and exhibited a relatively high degree of social pluralism. By 1994, however, there were signs that Akaev had lost some of his initial enthusiasm for democracy, or at least the slavish attempt to follow Western political models.

At a formal level this changed rhetoric posed little challenge to Kyrgyzstan's embryonic civil society because there was no suggestion that existing liberal official responses to social organization would be changed. Nonetheless, it may have sent certain signals to the political elite, suggesting that not all the democratic niceties needed to be observed in this transition period. Moreover, from mid-1994 onwards there were growing signs that Kyrgyzstan's experiment with pluralist politics was becoming a little frayed round the edges. Several critical journalists were subject to criminal prosecution, ostensibly for libel, during 1994 and subsequent years. These developments suggest that what we have seen in Kyrgyzstan since the late 1980s should be seen in terms of 'liberalization' rather than 'democratization' (J. Anderson, 1996). But changed government rhetoric made civil society to adopt more proactive tactics, nepotism and corruption level increased within government circle, which diminished government legitimacy, and increased NGO's acceptance in Kyrgyz government even more than the government.

A supportive economic context

Within the context of post-communist transitions the assumption would be that the gradual reduction in the state's grip over the economic sphere and the strengthening of the private sector would create new interests which gradually develop their own organizational networks (White Howell & Xiaoguan, 1996: 94).

In addition some would emphasize the linkage between economic development and democratization, for economic differentiation creates cross-cutting identities that mitigate the worst effect of more exclusive ethnic, tribal or religious ones, and permits individuals to associate with a variety of types of social organization. In practice the situation is more

complex. Though economic change does indeed create new interests, in the post-communist context these are often not so clearly separated out from the state as the model might indicate and, as the Chinese case suggests, the new economic interest groups might not always be supportive of democratization (Wank, 1989, Hall (ed.), 1995: 56-79).

From the time of his selection as President in late 1990 Askar Akaev made clear his commitment to economic reform, and early policies were geared up towards rapid mercerization. Following the Russian example most prices were liberalized at the beginning of 1992, with subsidies retained only on those goods deemed essential for public well-being. Simultaneously the government proclaimed its commitment to privatization and the diversification of economic ownership in both industrial and agricultural sectors (Dabrowski 1995, Pomfret, 1995:269-297). Privatization led to a situation where perhaps two-thirds of the state sector was formally in private hands by the end of 1996 and consideration was being given to selling off major state assets in the transport and energy sectors. None of these changes went without criticism. The Communist Party claimed that the government was throwing out all aspects of the old system regardless of their performance, whilst trade union organizations pointed to the deleterious effect of reform on the vast majority of the population, who had seen their living standards collapse since independence.

From the civil society perspective the impact of economic liberalization has been ambiguous. Economic control has been removed from the hands of the state and ownership has been diversified, yet effectively the economy remains dominated by a tiny minority of the population. As in other successor states, many of these people were members of the old nomenklatura and/or traditional patronage networks, able to utilize their positions to gain control over economic assets. Because of this many of the more successful businessmen already had access to key government policy makers and thus had little need of autonomous social organization. Though various associations of businessmen have emerged in the mid-1990s, most of these have failed to develop strong organizational or mobilizing capacity. The same could be said for most of the agrarian organizations and trade unions that have appeared, with the latter remaining weak in the

workplace despite their frequent proclamations on the need to protect the victims of reform. In late 1997 leading businessman Valerii Khon helped to create a Party of Economic Renewal whose declared aim was to defend business interests and create a strong middle class (Anderson, 1998). Yet there is at present little reason to believe that this will achieve more lasting success than the other small political parties that sprang up during the 1990s. And even if economic interests do successfully develop organizational mechanisms for defending their interests, there is precious little evidence so far to suggest that they will act in a civil fashion.

One might also argue that the very nature of economic reform has helped to ensure that economic differentiation can only to a limited degree stimulate the development of an autonomous sphere of self-organization. With the initial stages leading to mass impoverishment, the possibility of even thinking about creating or joining social organizations as been restricted, whilst the same development has if anything helped to strengthen traditional patronage networks, it might be possible to see traditional networks as a part of 'civil society' in Kyrgyzstan in so far as they reinforce ties of social solidarity that help people to survive a difficult transition and offer a sensitivity to 'local sentiment and personal sensitivities' that the state cannot match (Roniger 1998:74).

Political Liberalization in Kyrgyzstan

(A) Political Development Since 1991

In 1985 the world witnessed the emergence of a new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, whose name soon became closely associated with liberal reforms that came to be associated with the terms perestroika (reorganization and decentralization; glasnost (openness, transparency, debate) and samoupravlenie (active participation) in nearly all spheres of the Soviet society. Gorbachev's policy of liberalization had a significant impact on politics in all Union republics, including Kyrgyzstan. The result was a thorough shake-out of the local leadership, renewed interest in the history and cultural heritage of Kyrgyz and rising demands for greater Kyrgyzstani autonomy (Dukenbaev

2003:379).

The primary result of perestroika in Kyrgyzstan (1985-1991) was changes in the republic's leadership. In November 1985 Turdukhan Usubaliev, who had continuously ruled the republic as First Secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party since the sixties, was replaced by Absamat Masaliev, who in turn was replaced as the Republic's dominant political figure by Askar Akayev, who in October 1990 became the first president of Kyrgyzstan. Simultaneously there was a rise in nationalist feelings among various ethnic groups; mainly Kyrgyz, Russian and Uzbek. These resulted in bloody interethnic conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Osh region in the summer of 1990. These clashes sparked an exodus of Russians and other non-titular ethnic groups and the emergence of inter-ethnic tensions (Dukenbaev, 2003:26). Also, as a result of freedom of speech and the newly independent mass media, there began an evaluation of Kyrgyz history and a resurgence of interest in Kyrgyz culture; a rise in political participation and the beginnings of contested politics. Finally, there came the creation of political parties and movements, economic reforms and the emergence of a private sector.

Other factors that contributed to creation of the liberal political regime in Kyrgyzstan in comparison to the other Central Asia states is a cultural one. In the opinion of John Anderson there were aspects of a "tribal democracy" – such as political equality of its members, the selection of a tribal leader through relatively competitive elections, tribal mobility and, accordingly, the lack of effective and institutionalized mechanisms for coercive power. These characteristics, which sustained a degree of debate and consultation in a tribe, would have been unthinkable in the settled oases to the west of modern Kyrgyzstan and have been embedded in the nomadic tribal culture for many centuries. All these factors contributed to the more open and democratic nature of Kyrgyz politics during the nineties (Anderson 1996:2-3).

There are also economic and international reasons for Kyrgyzstan becoming the most liberal state in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan was one of the poorest regions of the Soviet Union. Its unexpected independence left the country virtually helpless and in desperate

need of attracting significant economic assistance and international support; primarily from the West. The government quickly realized that the primary means for getting financial aid was to move in the direction of openness, economic restructuring and democracy. Such policies would satisfy the expectations of major Western donor states. In so doing, Kyrgyzstan quickly became a “favorite child” of the international donor community, managing to get strong support from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan received substantial political and economic support from the United States, Germany, Switzerland, Japan and Turkey. As a result, Kyrgyzstan became one of the leading states for liberal political and economic reforms not just in Central Asia, but also in the entire CIS (Dukenbaev 2003:28).

(B) Constitutional Amendments and Presidential Powers

There is no question that the 1993 Constitution was more liberal and provided better conditions for the formation of a democratic society than did its Soviet predecessor. It divided the government into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. It created some checks and balances on presidential power and emphasized basic human rights. At the same time, the Constitution gave the president broad political powers which created the conditions for domination of the political system by the executive. For example, he received power to appoint the prime minister, determine the structure of the government, appoint various key political figures at the national level, as well as the heads of the regional administrations. These officials are the most powerful representatives of the president and his administration at the regional and local levels. Appointed by the President and serving at his pleasure, they control the regional budgets and are easily able to secure the compliance of local representative bodies. Also, the President enjoys the right to veto legislation passed by Parliament and, in some cases, to dissolve the legislature. This has gradually diminished the political role of parliament.

As a result of constitutional amendments approved in manipulated national referendum in 1996, 1998 and 2000, the scope of presidential power substantially increased while simultaneously limiting the power of the parliament. The amendments transferred to the


President the right of Parliament to approve the appointment of cabinet ministers chosen by the Prime Minister. The Parliament also lost to the President the right to determine the main issues of domestic and foreign policy. These had been granted to the legislature by the 1993 Constitution. These amendments also led to the creation of a new two-chamber parliament, which replaced the previous politically stronger one. The earlier structure was unicameral with the same number of deputies in total (105). These amendments were justified on the grounds that only in this way can effective reforms be pushed through against the resistance of vested interests (Anderson, 1997:313-16). In reality this led to the concentration of power in the hands of executive and the marginalization of the legislature.

Another sign of presidential authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan was the fact that Akayev ran for a third term in 2000. It became possible after manipulating an interpretation the Constitutions of 1978 (Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic) and 1993 (Kyrgyz Republic). Thus, according to the official explanations, Akayev had the right to run again because his first presidential term started in 1990 according to provisions of the Constitution of 1978 when he was chosen by Parliament. This changed with the adoption of the Constitution of 1993. The argument the government made was that his election in 1995 actually became his first term, allowing him to run again in 2000 for what he claimed was a second but everyone else saw as a third term. These arguments were clearly terminological manipulations. In fact, Akayev, was elected to a third term: 1990, 1995 and 2000 and, thus violated Article 43 of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Other Constitutional changes were approved in a nation-wide referendum on 2 February 2003. This time the changes were initiated by the political crisis that followed the above mentioned clashes between police and marchers in Aksy in March of 2002. This event caused the first serious political crisis in the history of independent Kyrgyzstan and resulted in the resignation of the government and some concessions from Akayev. These included the dismissal of some of his more odious high-ranking officials, an invitation for opposition leaders to join the new government and, most importantly, the promise to give up some of his enormous powers and share authority with Parliament and the Cabinet of

Ministers (Askat Dukenbaev and William W. Hansen 2003:31).


Table: 2



Quality of governance: rule of law, 1996-2004 (World Bank)

However, in reality the constitutional amendments did exactly the opposite. They resulted in strengthening the current regime; i.e., presidential authority. The most important of these amendments are: (1) immunity of the president and his family members from prosecution upon his retirement; (2) replacement of the bicameral parliament with a unicameral one having seventy-five deputies, and (3) abolition of party-list voting for parliament, destroying proportional representation in favor of a single member majoritarian runoff system. One might question why a president, preparing to leave office, might need an immunity law for himself and his entire family.

Table: 3



Quality of government effectiveness, 1996-2004 (World Bank)

Thus, having begun almost as parliamentary republic according to the norms of the 1993 Constitution, Kyrgyzstan became a presidential republic, confirming Juan Linz's warnings that "presidentialism" is not be a guarantor of effective governance and, moreover, can increase the probability for a non-democratic regime outcome during transitional periods (Linz and Valenzuela 1994:85).

The Constitution of Kyrgyzstan is the supreme law of the Kyrgyz Republic (Article 10). The constitution currently in force was passed by referendum on 21 October 2007 and it is based on the first post-Soviet constitution originally adopted on 5 May 1993, a year and a half after the country had gained independence from the former Soviet Union. The 1993 constitution had been amended several times: the last two amendments after the Tulip revolution were adopted under pressure from protracted public protests in the capital Bishkek, but they were annulled in September 2007 by the Constitutional Court,

which restored the 2003 constitution and paved the way for another constitutional referendum in October 2007. The first draft of the constitution, adopted after the 2007 constitutional referendum, put the National Security Service and the Prosecutor-General's Office under the control of the legislative branch of government. The president would need legislative approval to dismiss heads of the Central Election Commission and the Accounting Chamber. The political party with the most members in parliament would appoint the Prime Minister. Parliament membership would be increased from 75 to 90 seats. Opposition lawmaker Azimbek Beknazarov said, "With regard to the formation of the government, if a party wins more than 50 percent of the seats in parliament, one of its representatives will automatically be prime minister. If no party has a majority, then the president will entrust the party that garnered the most votes with the task of choosing a prime minister. The prime minister will form the government that will be approved by the president"(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2006).

Party system in Kyrgyzstan

The collapse of communism left Kyrgyzstan, as well as other post communist states, with the remnants of its previous political system and little foundation for a new multi party system. The development of stable party systems in the former Soviet Union is essential not only to the internal security of each state but also to the stability of the region as a whole. As part of developing democracy, the newly independent states face many similar processes and problems in forming multi party systems. Kyrgyzstan has been dubbed the bright light of democracy in Central Asia, yet only the first semblances of a party system are beginning to arise. As recent events demonstrate, a conclusion that Kyrgyzstan is or is not democratic would be premature (Koldys 1997: 228).

Like all of the other post-Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan faces not only the burdensome task of developing new political institutions but also the constraints of the institutional legacy of socialism. Two such institutional constraints stand out in particular. Kyrgyzstan's 1993 constitution preserved the majority electoral system; however, in the unsettled political circumstances, it is challenged by many political actors who prefer

proportional representation or a mixed system over the majority system. Although well intended and again prima facie a step toward greater democracy, another institutional influence that had serious implications to party system development was the October 1994 amendment/supplement to the parliamentary electoral law, which included provisions allowing public associations and “local communities” (essentially local government councils) to field candidates alongside political parties, labor collectives, meetings of voters at their place of residence, and self-nominated candidates, it was Kyrgyz way to develop a multi party system.

Evolution of the Electoral System and Election Regulations

After getting freedom Kyrgyzstan adopted the majority system for all elected posts, that is, a second round was required for the two top candidates if none of the competitors received 50 percent plus one of the votes. It was a carryover from the Gorbachev (and pre-Gorbachev) Soviet electoral system. The Constitution of Kyrgyzstan adopted in May 1993 and the January 1994 Law on Elections to the Jogorku Kenesh (the Kyrgyz equivalent of the parliament, formerly known as the Supreme Soviet) officially maintained the majority system of the 1989 Law on Election of the Supreme Soviet of (then) Kirghizia after the declaration of independence in 1991. Despite calls for proportional representation and multi member districts, even at the time the 1989 law on elections was adopted, the majority system continued to be retained. The party system is still in its incipient stage and is subject to multiple influences (Koldys 1997: 105).

Table 4.

Majoritarian	Mixed	Proportional Representation
	Armenia	
Azerbaijan (2002-)	Azerbaijan (1991-2002)	
Belarus		
	Georgia	
Kazakhstan (1991-1998)	Kazakhstan (1998-2007)	Kazakhstan (2007-)
Kyrgyzstan (1991-1999, 2005-2007)	Kyrgyzstan (1999-2005)	Kyrgyzstan (2007-)
		Moldova
Tajikistan (1991-2004)	Tajikistan (2004-)	
Turkmenistan		
	Russia (1991-2007)	Russia (2007-)
Ukraine (1991-1994)	Ukraine (1994-2006)	Ukraine (2006-)
Uzbekistan		

Electoral formula in national parliamentary election in CIS states, 1991-2008

In 1999 the new electoral code of Kyrgyzstan introduced new electoral system with proportional representation. “The natural effect of this act was to form a six deputy association including three main political orientations: ‘the left wing’ (Kyrgyzstan”, ‘Communists of Kyrgyzstan’), ‘the right wing’, (the right Coalition), ‘the centralists’ (‘Eluchun’, ‘Unanimity’, and ‘Regions of Kyrgyzstan’). This is testimony that Kyrgyzstan is moving towards forming a sustainable three-party political system and passed into a higher level of democracy – from democracy of persons to party democracy”. The author adds, “At the same time there exists a problem as well: in Kyrgyzstan the political system is flabby and amorphous. The parties are weak and don’t have at the local level an extensive network and representation. They don’t have

necessary branches to involve all the masses and to be able to influence them at a local level. Therefore, it is of great importance to establish not only an efficient legislature, meeting the specific needs of the country and national interests, but also to create the necessary prerequisites for development of political parties that form the government. Unfortunately, all these efforts thus far have proved ineffective” (Kurmanov 2003: 4-7). The strange phenomena that occurred in Kyrgyzstan during the last parliamentary elections created much suspicion and doubts concerning the stability, continuity and even institutionalization of party system. The ultimate victory of one party that was formed only about two months before the elections shows that parties in Kyrgyzstan not only do not have strong roots in the society, but also cannot be analyzed or even described by most of the criteria of institutionalization. In contrast to Armenia, where parties have already certain roots in the society, that is not the case with Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan government and the parliament were the target of suspicion, distrust and hatred, which resulted in the color revolution”. Causes of revolution were also the existence of certain networks within the government and parliament, that some scholars and politicians call clans. Clans are usually perceived as informal organizations comprising a network of individuals linked by kin relations (Collins 2006 and Shryock 1997). Thus, viewing clans as informal organizations comprising a network of individuals linked by kinship relations, Collins argues that patronage is a key element that binds clan members to each other. Informal network suggests that relations based on certain interests can last longer and bear the form of already other kinds of relations, consequently have ‘unwritten rules’ and norms that possess affiliation and identification with a certain network. Thus, clans can be regarded as groups that can be characterized by clientelist relations. Collins assumes that there are several conditions that helped clans to exist. These are: 1. late state formation, due in large part to colonialism, 2. late formation of a national identity, 3. the absence of market economy.

All the above mentioned causes of clantalism can be found in Kyrgyzstan. Here clans became increasingly important when the regime was losing power both in the case of soviet power, and when Akaev lost his power. This strong identical separation in the country and political life of Kyrgyzstan creates obstacles for party system

institutionalization.


Freedom of Press

Freedom of press is the most important variable of democratic functioning, David Easton in his system analysis and Gabriel Almond in his structural functional approach gave to much importance to mass media as a feedback functionary, a most important component of political system. Alexis de Tocqueville, a shrewd observer of democracy in America, wrote in his book on the subject:

“At the present time and oppressed member of the community has only one method of self defense he may appeal to the whole nation. The only means he has of making this appeal is by the press. Thus the liberty of the press is infinitely more valuable among democratic nations than among all others... the press places a powerful weapon within every man’s reach, which the weakest and loneliest of them all may use... printing has accelerated the progress of equality, and it is also one of its best correctives... the press is the chief democratic instrument of freedom.”

The new constitution of Kyrgyz Republic gives wide and solid legal guarantees to the press. It proclaims that everyone in the country has a right to “free expression and dissemination of thoughts, ideas, and views, to the freedom of publishing, broadcasting and dissemination of information,” This freedom is one of our basic human rights which, under our Constitution, belongs to everyone from birth and is recognized as absolute and inalienable, and protected by law and courts from any violations (Akayev 1994:3).

Table: 5



Press Freedom, 1994-2004 (www.freedomhouse.org)

According to the Freedom House, during 1996-2000, the rating of the independent media in Kyrgyzstan was relatively stable and fixed at the 5.00 score throughout these years (Adam Smith Albion, 2006). Starting 2001 situation began to change. According to Adam Albion, the developments after September 11, 2001, when both USA and Russian airbases were moved to Kyrgyzstan, influenced President Akaev's position on the international arena and have raised his profile. Albion writes this allowed Akayev to "clamp down on his domestic opponents still further" (Albion 2006: 23). The situation related to media independence also got worse. In 2002, the year marked by the violent suppression of demonstrations in the southern Aksy region, the score given by Freedom House declined to 6.00. And in 2003 and 2004 – it reflects the continuation of the sharp harassment of media freedom in the country and the score Kyrgyzstan receives is 6.00 and 5.75 respectively. As the latest 2007 FH's report confirms "Akayev gradually reduced the boundaries in which opposition groups and independent media were allowed


to maneuver”

Civilian control of military and police

The armed forces in the Kyrgyzstan consist of the army (8500 active personnel), the air force (4000 active personnel), the National Guard (manned by army personnel), and a border guard (5000 personnel). The President of the Kyrgyzstan is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He has the power to appoint and remove from office the Commanders of the Armed Forces. In the event that Kyrgyzstan faces aggression or a threat of aggression, the President has the power to declare ‘general or partial mobilization’, a state of war, or impose martial law. In the latter two cases, he has to ‘submit [this matter] promptly’ for the consideration of the Jogorku Kenesh (the Kyrgyz Parliament) [Article 46 (8), Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic]. Further, Article 9 (2) provides that the approval of two-thirds of the whole number of deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh is required to launch a military attack in the event of aggression. The Jogorku Kenesh can also impose martial law in the country or declare a state of war in the face of aggression [Article 10 and Article 58 (23), Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic]. It has the power to ‘affirm or invalidate’ Presidential decrees on matters of war and peace. It is also entrusted with deciding on the manner in which to use the Armed Forces outside the country’s borders with the aim of fulfilling its interstate commitments for the preservation of peace [Article 58 (24), Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic]. The Jogorku Kenesh has the power to introduce military ranks²⁵ and the President has the power to confer them [Article 46 (4.3), Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic].

The National Security Council is ‘the chief agency of defense policy’. Established in 1994, it consists of the President as its Chairman, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the State Secretary, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Chairman of the State Committee for National Security and the Commander of the National Guard (Olcott 1996). The Ministry of Defence has operational command of military units.

Table: 6



Government expenditure on military (% of GDP) ACROSS COUNTRIES, 1990-2003.

Developments and trends in Kyrgyz Media after Tulip Revolution

Whether the media played a really major role during the revolution is arguable. Of course, we should not underestimate its role; media had its influence on the events and helped to spread information that may have brought more demonstrators on the streets of Bishkek. Thus media seek to gain its share from the results of revolution, and Bakiyev made some claim in this regard. As Elvira Sarieva, managing director of the Inter news-Kyrgyzstan writes, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, at that time the acting President of Kyrgyzstan prior to the elections in July made three main promises related to media. The first promise was to provide transparent distribution of the frequency waves among television and radio stations, since more that 30 companies were struggling for two years to obtain frequency (Elvira Sarieva, interview, 2006). This was not solved and government and Bakiyev government delayed issues of giving radio and TV frequencies to potential mass media outlets. The second promise of Bakiev was related to decriminalizing libel.

However, this was not implemented.

Table 7. Summary of the findings based on the conduct research done by Elena Parfenova- 2007

Criteria	Kyrgyzstan
Media law and there implication	No positive change
Sate Control of Media	-
Journalistic culture/professionalism	Slight setback
Access to information	No positive change
Violence against Journalist	-
Scope of the independent media	Slight improvement
Overall trends	No positive change

Table 8. Rating of Kyrgyzstan in the World Press Freedom index

Year/country	Kyrgyzstan
2003 <i>(out of 166 countries)</i>	104 th place(32.00 score)
2004 <i>(out of 167 countries)</i>	107 th place(35.25 score)
2005 <i>(out of 168 countries)</i>	111 th place(32.00 score)
2006 <i>(out of 168 countries)</i>	123 rd place(34.00 score)

Source: Adopted from: Reporters without Borders, *World Press Freedom Index*. Accessed on http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=639, 9 May 2007

However when Kyrgyzstan is compared with other Central Asian countries it, of course, remains relatively more advanced in terms of press freedom. For example, Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian country where international radio stations such as Radio Azattyk (RFE/RL Kyrgyz Service) and BBC Kyrgyz Service are working freely and airing their programs on FM, UKW and Medium waves. Radio Azattyk also has two weekly TV shows aired by KTR (MTRK). The TV shows were launched only after the Tulip revolution (Inconvenient Questions - in May 2005; Azattyk Plus TV show for youth – in January 2006) So for, in regard to the media independence there are some slight improvements since Bakiyev was not able to exercise such strict measures of control and harassment as Akayev did during the last years of his rule (2002-2005). However, the scope of such liberation should not be overestimated as Bakiev during the year 2006 was becoming increasingly less tolerant to the criticism from the side of independent media and the signs of the new forms of pressure could be observed.

Conclusion

Democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan were not the result of a gradual historical development; these institutions were introduced into the country after gaining independence from Soviet Union. But once these institutions were introduced a gradual development started, a number of constitutional amendments, civil and government efforts make this transformation possible, a most important non institutional change, related with political culture made the actualization of the democratic institutional and behavioral changes possible. Since Tulip revolution the process of democratic consolidation gained movement. Non-institutional democratization process related with the emergence of civil society and modern pressure groups are few of the most dynamic prospects for the democracy in the country. There are few challenges for the Kyrgyz democracy also for example, religious fundamentalism, clanism corruption, external intervention, criminalization and drug trafficking are few of those challenges. But the attraction of Kyrgyz common population towards democracy is the most dominant prospect for the democracy

CHAPTER- 3

Challenges to Democracy in Kyrgyzstan

A political system is sum of the entire social, political, cultural and economic phenomenon, mutually dependent on each other, since political culture of a country is highly influenced by its domestic culture thus the negative characteristics of a culture influences political system negatively, and vice versa. A country with parochial culture, leads towards an authoritarian and corrupt government and Kyrgyzstan is not an exception in this regard. So for political culture in every country is formed in a specific political environment and affected by specific political events, such as wars, colonization and anti-colonial struggles, domestic and regional turbulences, in this regard Kyrgyzstan has undergone a drastic transformation during the post Soviet era. For much of the 20th century, the republic developed within Moscow's trajectory of political, social and economic influence. The Kremlin's leaders tried to implement the Soviet type of modernization, which, if successful, should have changed Kyrgyz society and promoted its sustainable development. Yet Moscow was unsuccessful to remove some important features of the pre-Soviet society (such as kinship, tribal and clan identities and affiliations), devotion to the people's cultural heritage (such as Islamic values), etc and failed to resolve the tensions and conflicts which have existed within the society for generations, these unsettled conflict became one of the potential risk for Kyrgyzstan.

In the post-Soviet era, the legacies of the past inescapably interacted with the domestic and external influences. In this environment of major political changes, the political culture could not be constant and rigid. We could see that what was absolutely undesirable during the Soviet era is acceptable these days. Some features, such as multi-party competitive elections, were not known in the republic, but became a norm in the 1990s. Clearly, the ruling elite use all means, including authoritarian procedures, if it feels that its positions are threatened by the democratic process. Yet there are some limits in imposing authoritarian actions beyond which society is ready to resist.

Challenges for democracy in Kyrgyzstan are many; these challenges can be put into two categories *first* long term causes, like criminalization, corruption, nepotism, economic stagnation – unemployment etc. These variables influence the system gradually in a long time framework. *Second* immediate cause, like Aksy event influences the political system all of sudden, some specific events play its role in such circumstance.

Criminalization

During the period of influence of former president Askar Akayev, criminal leaders had the comparative liberty to plan, cooperate or conflicting with state actors whenever their interests matched or diverged. Similarly, political leaders were oftentimes concerned in maintaining friendly relations with criminal groups to secure weight over opposing forces in the political and business spheres. Over 20 organized criminal groups with dominant leaders and active membership reaching 100 people existed in Kyrgyzstan during Akayev time (Marat 2008: 126).

Throughout the 1990's, powerful criminal leaders played most dominant role in politics, there help was often sought by the political leaders, for providing personal security and weight over the competitors from opposition political parties and leaders. Kyrgyzstan law enforcement agencies are infamous enough for corruption and there links with the criminal groups. On the scale of 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt), Kyrgyzstan had average rating of 2.2 on Transparency International's corruption index between 1991 and 2007. Akayev was not longer able to eliminate unwanted political figures (Erica Marat, 2008: 87).

Opposition movement led by Kurmanbek Bakiyev declared the change of political regime as being necessary to reduce corruption and the criminals' control over national politics. With the 2005 elections and their violent aftermath, the power of organized crime leaders in the country's politics grew. Southern Kyrgyzstan's drug barons are known to operate paramilitary forces, under the pretext of martial arts sport clubs, in

particular the alysh (traditional wrestling) clubs, Akayev himself did not deny his ties with the influential criminal leaders. Under Bakiyev, the country's longtime nation-wide criminal number one Akmatbayev was officially acquitted of charges of triple homicide and multiple cases of racketeering. Kyrgyzstan in the late 1990s developed into a major transportation passage for Afghan drugs smuggled northward through Tajikistan. In particular, the southern areas of the country were badly hit by this development. However, few indications existed that the highest political levels had been seriously affected by organized crime networks.

Criminal actors create problem for the political system in developing countries depending on their role and nature in the country. The relationship between the state structures and the organized crime in developing countries can be categorized into two common types. Depending on the state ability to wish to exercise control over the activity of organized criminal groups and their leaders, the state and the underground world might coexist as two separate, yet interacting experience, or have a merge between them (Bailey and Godson 2000: 56-60).

Both types of state crime relationship produce deferent impacts on state operation. The first type of organized criminal network connected through underground links representing a strong parallel authority outside the official state structures. In this type of the state structures functionary like border guard and police might be involved into organized crime. This category is characteristic of a weak state; Kyrgyzstan represents the first type of state crime relationship. In Kyrgyzstan the second type criminal network functioning was dominant under the Akayev regime because he has more popular approval rate, legitimacy (ibid). Licit and illicit business was under the direct or indirect control of a small fraction of the government officials.

The dynamic shift towards the first type of organized criminal grouping started after the tulip revolution of 2005. Tulip revolution did not brought any qualitative change in nature of the political regime, previous administrative structures could not be replaced by the new, thus criminal organizations once again established their coordination with the ruler

class, this coordination established due to mutually dependent interest of both entities, since Bakiyev did not entertained popularity rate like Akiyev and the state structure became weaker than before, thus criminals started to function with greater liberty from the state. (Marat 2008: 22-27).

The control of communities of sportsmen is another particular characteristic of the relationship between the state and organized crime in the post soviet Central Asian states. The trend of retired and active sportsmen being recruited into the criminal organizations emerged in the early 1980's (Yan Otlavsk, 2003:3). Usually ex-wrestlers and fighters were special scrutiny by the soviet government. Sportsmen could have a strong manipulation on younger sportsmen and younger people in general. Special legislation was developed in 1981 that facilitated the imprisonment of doubtful sportsmen. According to Kazakh expert Yan Otlavsky the legal reinforcement against sportsmen only pushed them to build stronger links with the criminal world of the Soviet prisons, (ibid). Sportsmen communities were also actively mobilized in riots precipitating the march 24 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Thus organized criminal groups in Central Asia and other post – Soviet states are known for being comprised of former sportsmen and soviet inmates, sometimes these groups are infamous for having connection with or being control by the political figures. Multiple causes are behind the rise of criminal groups in Kyrgyzstan, but the single most important impact on state legitimacy no one can deny, gradually eroding legitimacy pushed the Kyrgyz democracy into the trap of uncertainty. Day by day increasing public frustration was important cause of the tulip revolution and instability afterwards.

Corruption

One of the most important causes of disappointment against the political regime in Kyrgyzstan is corruption. When Bakiyev took over the power from Akiyev after the Tulip revolution he pledged to make a fight against the corruption his main concern. To this end he took several brave steps, he selected multimillionaire businessman Danyar Usenov to businesses allegedly acquired illegally by Akayev's family, and retained a

Viennese law firm to examine leads outside the Kyrgyzstan. Usenov's commission got off to a running start when it documented more than a hundred companies with ties to Akayev, yet the anti corruption campaign had practical limits. Passionate actions such as elimination of Akayev era cadres the government would have risked annoying hurt elites into resorting to external means to protect their interests. He appointed members of his family to reward the government posts. Bakiyev also played strong arm politics to solid his base in the months before the July 2005 balloting, dismissing local and regional officials whom he saw as unfriendly or unreliable and naming allies to take their place, Many of his cabinet ministers prior to donning the color of change, had benefited financially from serving in Akayev's government and continue to gather vast fortunes.

General Causes of Corruption

with the end of ideology (debate) and the advent of postmodern discourse the effort to search the universal definition and ideology is consider as a nonsense effort to do, in this regard an effort to search the general/universal phenomena in theoretical perspective is a great challenge. But it is easy to search some general causes of few social phenomena like corruption in the age of democratization and globalization, these characteristics are as follows.

1. Financial/ Economic Factors:

Studies that examine corruption show that low income level and low wages of civil servants are the main cause that drives them to corruption. In particular, civil servants who uphold their lives with very low wages and have no security for the worries of the future are easily involved by appealing offers in exchange for special treatment for few entities.

Dimension of the government is another determinant of corruption. Corruption, when defined as 'using public power for private gains' indicates the connection to government activities. Therefore, the complete size of the government with respect to the economy and/or huge government interference via set of laws and licenses create larger

bureaucracies, and increases the appeal for bureaucrats to abuse their public positions.

2. Political Factors behind corruption:

Passion of political contest is another determinant of corruption. In countries with firm self-governing institutions, the channels for expressing voters' reaction are open, thus encouraging actions against corruption either by seeking to reduce dependence on corrupt officials or by raising the operating cost to officials who connect to corruption.

Countries with more political competition have stronger public force against corruption through laws, democratic elections, the independent press, etc., compared to authoritarian regimes with little sensitivity to public demands against corruption. In democratic regimes where similar government goods are supplied at least by two government agencies, contest between agencies reduces the level of bribe. In such an environment, any citizen who faces a demand for bribery in one of the government agencies can decide to have a job done without having to bribe or get it done much cheaper.

In authoritarian regimes, the level of corruption varies with the weakness of the government. The level of corruption is lower in monarchies, where power and bribe collecting are centralized, than in the authoritarian regimes where the central government is weak and various government agencies impose independent bribes on private agents who seek complementary permits from these agencies (Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1993: 599-616).

3. Juridical Factors:

A badly working juridical system creates supportive conditions for corruption and reduces the cost of engage in corruption. In a such surroundings characterized by the lack of transparency and clear rules, laws and processes are interpreted and easily broken by corrupt government officials in their own favour.

The efficiency of laws is another issue when dealing with corruption. In some countries the process is vital to decide administrative cases against civil servants engaged in corruption is slow and bulky. Cases last too long because of loopholes in the laws. In addition, judges themselves are vulnerable to corruption or easily influenced by politicians. The factors stated above damage the use/role of penalties against corruption.

4. Cultural Factors:

In addition, country-specific cultural norms influence the level of corruption. Corruption is common in countries where the following practices are observed: gift-exchange in business dealings, loyalty to kinship, clan-based loyalties and subordinates highly dependent on their superiors in a paternalistic way. From an ethical point of view, it is clear that corruption is evil. But as members of a value-neutral discipline, some economists point to possible merits of corruption. This group, inspired by Leff⁸ and Huntington, claims that corruption increases the ability of an economy by making easy the process of bureaucracy and by giving firms and individuals a means to avoid heavy regulations and useless legal system (Huntington 1968:34). However, empirical evidence refutes the 'efficiency hypotheses.

Various theoretical and pragmatic studies discuss negative effects of corruption, two negative impacts of corruption on economic development are: First, corruption discourages investment by raising the cost to latent investors. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy shift a country's investments away from the highest value projects such as health and education, into valueless projects that offer better opportunities for corruption (Kaufmann and Wei 1999:75-79).

Causes of Corruption in Kyrgyzstan

One can count a number of causes of corruption in developing countries; the level of corruption in a country is a litmus test for the state of state functioning. Since in introductory paragraph of the chapter the public grievances against the Akiyev

government are discussed in brief thus it is necessary to know the root causes of corruption in Kyrgyzstan.


(1) After liberty, Kyrgyzstan suffered a strong decrease in income level due to the loss of financial support from the central union budget that amounted to 13 per cent of GDP. All economic indicators worsened and hyper inflation, joblessness and decrease of real income led to a striking increase in poverty. Although price and exchange rate firmness was achieved as a result of actions taken during the reform process, in 2000 GNI per capita was still US \$270, and 51 per cent of the population was living under the poverty line (*World Bank, 2002*). The standard wage was around US \$22 per month in May 2007 with salaries of civil servants paid in arrears. Under these situations, one may suppose that a government worker would find it hard to oppose the attraction to accept any offer of a bribe.

(2) Although reforms reduced corruption, the reform process itself, especially privatization efforts, had the reverse effect. The scandal regarding the sale of state owned stakes in the Mailuu-Suu bulb plant is an exciting example of corrupt privatizations. The tender commission's decision to sell the Kyrgyz government's share in the plant to a Russian company, BABC faced strong protest from the losing company, Aurora, because it made the highest bid while the winner BABC made the lowest. The main argument of the bid commission was fascinating: Aurora presented only a one-page business plan, while the winner presented eight business plans on 145 pages. The Kyrgyz Industry Minister explained why the Kazakh bidders were unnoticed by the tender commission from the opening: their field of profession is banking, not industry. Despite liberalization, government set of laws via licenses and permissions are still high in Kyrgyzstan Lack of transparency and incompatible request are other negative characteristics of regulations in Kyrgyzstan. According to the *Economic Freedom Index*, the massive, non-transparent and poorly applied regulatory system promotes corruption in Kyrgyzstan (O'Driscoll and Feulner, et al. 2002: 45).

(3) Even though Kyrgyzstan is the most democratic country in Central Asia in terms of constitution, laws, civil society, freedom of expression and governance, it is still far below a wanted level. In fact, the *Nations in Transit* report, where reform processes of TC are assessed, points out that the democratization score of Kyrgyzstan in the last two years has worsened. In this regard when it comes to the freedom of the press, Kyrgyzstan is ahead of countries in the region. However, political weight over opposition newspapers, journalists and information channels is omnipresent. The major means of influence are state owned newspapers and TV channels. Besides politicians' direct influence over state owned media, the economic decline in the country reduced the movement of newspapers and harmed privately owned profit-making newspapers the most, giving benefit to the state owned papers. Another means of influence is pressure against journalists and newspapers via closure of well-known opposition newspapers, defamation cases against independent journalists and media outlets. For instance, in 1995 Askar Akayev ordered criminal investigations to be started against two journalists because he felt they had insulted him. This phenomena gives space for the corrupt practices in administration, because free and fair media is an instrument of continuous vigil at government functioning.

(4) After independence, Kyrgyzstan introduced the first post-Soviet constitution. During the reform process abundant new laws were introduced and/or old ones amended. Although Kyrgyzstan has sufficient laws, enforcement is weak. The judicial process has traditionally been incompetent. The lack of capacity, support, information and well-educated judges cause settlement processes time taking and substantial backlogs. Political influence over the judicial system and corruption in the legal system are two other major lacunas for a well-functioning legal system in Kyrgyzstan. The president can directly influence justices and procurators since under the Constitution, he has the authority to appoint and fire the procurator-general, deputy procurators general, oblast procurators.

Table: 9



Corruption perception across countries

Source: Transparency International

Impact of regionalism and Clanism

For centuries the institutions of the customary society in Central Asia created an unseen but powerful network of the tribal, communal or clan identities, loyalties and relations. These entities extended into the political scene; as well into 20th century the national identities were weak and immature in the region. In fact, the institution of the customary society have been so deeply rooted that even the Soviet institutions could not wipe out or go through them, despite merciless measures (Abazov 2003:126).

The political and social changes during the Soviet era, however inevitably transformed the traditional forms of political activity, as the traditional tribal and communal borders were cut through by radical administrative changes, newly formed administrative units – rayons (district) and oblasts (provinces) emerged as the basic units. Political competitions between the representatives of district or provinces are also well known in the domestic

politics of the major democracies in the west. What made the regionalism different in Central Asia was the one party system, enforced the representatives of the same party to openly compete with for the power and influence, what made the regionalism in Central Asia different to other Soviet Republics was reinforced by the remnants of tribal or communal loyalties. Last but not the least, the nomenklatura system of political recruitments and promotions ensured strict hierarchical rules the rise of gifted individuals on the nomenklatura ladder from the city or district level of the political hierarchy to the oblast and then to top (republics or national) unavoidably every politician had roots in a particular rayons and oblast and expected assistance, help and votes from his or her relatives or fellow colleagues. Foundation of regionalism in Central Asia was built around oblast level clans and conventionally representatives of various oblasts competed with each other for power and influence at the national level (Luong, Jones 2002: 185). After Kyrgyzstan declared its independence in 1991 the clanism based on regional connection continued to shape political conduct and became even more visible in Kyrgyz political culture. Politicians have openly recognized the phenomenon of clanism in Kyrgyzstan's politics. Moreover during various elections to parliament or local government; they openly appealed to the support of the regional clans and attempted to use their tribal and community links.

In Jogorku Kenesh too, its members also formed parliamentary coalition and often voted according to regional attachment. In fact, the formation of regional clans in the Jogorku Kenesh became easier when Kyrgyzstan adopted its new constitution in 1993 and the state discarded the Soviet quota practices (proportion for the women, ethnic minorities, trade unions etc.). In the new political environment all the members of Jogorku Kenesh have been elected directly from there electoral districts and the regional clan support became more important than ever (Abazov, 2003). This development produced north south divide in Kyrgyz politics also, there is a historical division between the North and South of Kyrgyzstan. This division is the reason of the rivalry between the regional clans. With the political and radical economic changes practically destroyed the middle class in Kyrgyzstan, which was formed during the Soviet era, as according to United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1990's more than 71% of the population

struggled below the poverty line and another 20% could be classified as 'poor'. In a time of economic collapse and social uncertainty, more and more people turned to the customary institutions and to customary forms of social mobilization, which could provide some forms of social security and support. The institutionalization of the regional clans in the political life of Kyrgyzstan damaged the emerging western style political organizations in the republic in many ways.

Firstly, these organizations were established and were constantly encouraged to adopt western style of political participation. *Secondly*, there members could not overcome the legacy of the clan politics and clan rivalry. They found themselves divided deeply within themselves, as there was permanent struggle between the representatives of different clans. *Thirdly*, these parties failed to set up their electorate base around the country and to become truly national parties, as many of these organizations were based in the capital, Bishkek, and could not attract votes in the provinces, such as in Jalalabad, or Osh (ibid 127).

Another important factor related with clanism in Kyrgyzstan is family, in Central Asian culture a family is a very important social connection where social identity submerges. Being a family member or related with a family clan is a most important identity for many individuals, particularly in the rural areas. Interpersonal relations among family members are strong. At the side of strong emotional connections, family ties are often used as means of financial support. Elders' often lives together with the family members and are treated with notable respect; the level of interpersonal trust is much higher among family members than among friends or companion.

In Kyrgyzstan, as in other Central Asian countries, the acts of nepotism are extensive in political circles since the ruling elite consist of a broad network of family members and relatives usually selected by the head of the state. Both Asker Akayev and Kurman Bkiyev were often accused of introducing their family members and relatives in highest state posts. For example Asker Akayev promoted his elder daughter, Bernet Akayeva, as a deputy of Kyrgyz parliament and his son, Aider Akayev, as consultant to the finance

minister and deputy of the parliament as well. President's daughter Bernmet Akayeva headed American University in Central Asia as well as the party Alga Kyrgyzstan (onward Kyrgyzstan). Her husband Adil Toygonbaev supervised cement-state factory in Kant, mercury plant in Kadamzhaj, sugar factory in Karbalta, Manas Airport, and network of gasoline stations Shnos, Kyrgyz Telecom. Also whole media empire such as TV channel Koort, the Newspaper Vechernij Bishkek, Radio station Love Radio, advertising agency Airek and News agency Kyrgyz Info, were under the control of Adil Toygonbaev.

Furthermore Askar Akaev's son Aidar Akaev, when he was 29, became the adviser of Minister of Finance and the president of Olympic committee of the country. And also under his control were network of gasoline stations NK Alians, Kyrgyzneftgaz, GSM operators BITEL and FONEX, TV channel NBT and TV channel Piramida (Jyldyzbek Joldoshbek Ulu 2008). Moreover, both presidents wanted there their children to run for presidency (Fergana 2005). One of Mr. Bakiyev's key platforms when he came to power after Tulip revolution in 2005 was that he would end the nepotism with which the ousted Askar Akayev had ruled. But politics came full circle and opponents have accused his regime of being even more corrupt and authoritarian. In addition to Maxim Mr. Bakiyev's other son Marat and three of his brothers all held senior positions in the government (Ulu 2008: 8).

There is a symbiotic interrelationship between clan, region, elites and class. The clan system, in its pre Soviet, Soviet and, so far, in the post-Soviet period, should be seen as a complex of "...vast patronage networks that are related to ethnic and geographic factors" (Alisher Khamidov, 2002). In Kyrgyzstan there are the broad clan groupings, referred to as wings. The northern wing contains seven clans of which two are the Buguu and the Sarybagysh. The former dominated early Soviet Kyrgyzstan, but its power declined and it was replaced by the Sarybagysh from which Akayev and many in the state class come (Dukenbaev and Hansen, 2003:152). In most cases clan loyalties trump other kinds of identities. A clan identity tends to correspond to a region of the country as that particular region is the traditional home of the clan, and a multiplicity of sub-clans, even though its

members may have migrated far afield. For example, a second or third generation southerner born in Bishkek (the north) would still identify with his grandfather's or great grandfather's clan and sub-clan in a mountain region of the south. Of course, given a variety of contingent variables (marriage, place of abode, education, and opportunity to travel) these identities are strengthened or weakened. As suggested above, the major political cleavage is between elites. Southern elites have been, by and large, circumvented when it comes to access to state power. Since access to the state tends to determine access to resources, there is resentment.

Power Struggle among Elite

Political changes do not happen outside of historical and social background. Thus, some patterns of interethnic relationships during the February March 2005 and further events in Kyrgyzstan could be explained with reference to both pre independence and post independence developments. Soviet nationality policy was dealing with ethnicity and the way some of its faulty practices (such as ethnic ranking, advantaged status, ideological discrepancies, institutionalization of ethnic home lands) have been repeated during post independence nation building process contributed politicization of ethnicity, gradual creating of self conscious ethnic communities. Among the cost of such politicization was the violent quarrel of Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities in the southern cities of Osh and Uzgen on the threshold of Soviet collapse. This awful event following Akayev's policy of "Kyrgyzstan is our common home," which aimed to address and include numerous national minorities, was display that heterogeneity, and not structural causes, economic hardships and institutionalized political ethnicity, was apparent as challenging and potential for conflict. In result, political volatility in 2005, similarly to immediate result of the Soviet collapse, showed occurrence of the same pattern-over problematization of ethnicity and failure to identify and deal with structural causes of ethnic differentiation (Karakulova 2006:12).

Here I will argue the reason why change of elites during the "Tulip revolution" increased instances of inter ethnic clash and emigration of non-titular afterwards was not because of

the deeply seated ethnic cleavage per se, but due to reification of ethnic group ness though intra-ethnic power struggle dynamics, patterns of political mobilization by the opposition, media conflict discourse, as well as by the very fact of volatility. The first two factors, i.e. intra-ethnic power competition and oppositional mobilization dynamics, had their primary influence during the “revolution,” whereas the other two came about after the government in the Kyrgyz Republic was changed (ibid 15).

According to Melvin, the center regional developments in post independence Kyrgyz Republic have been marked with clear South-North political competition, which was intensified already under the perestroika policies. Interpretation of the causes of the Tulip revolution, both in the media and academic writings, have been Following this pattern and seeing 24 March events as North-South political clash. Whether clan rivalry has been political reality or constructed myth, the argument here suggests that the regional struggle significantly reified ethnic identities during the February-March events in Kyrgyzstan and was one of the contributing factors for emergence of the ethnic conflict narrative in the media (Saipov 2005: 26).

Concentration of power in the regional capitals after the collapse of the USSR produced fears on the part of non-titular populations who lost their Moscow support. Moreover, the tight grips on power in the hands of the capital elites and their refusal to put up interests of the regions through confederal arrangements intensified rivalry between the clans, producing more ethnically traditional opposition in the regions (Kadyrov 2005). However, because pre independence order in Central Asia did not form exclusive regional identities, marginal elites could not challenge centralized nation-building project launched by the northern elites.

The ousting of the Akaev’s administration by seizure of the “White House” in Bishkek was seen by many as a victory of the southern political elites over northern ones (Eurasianet, 2005). Universal discourse on regional conflict and presence of two potential presidential candidates from South (Bakiyev) and North (Kulov) produced numerous speculations in the media on the possibility of civil war between the two regions, as

though people really divide themselves into “southerners” and “northerners,” unless the two strongest leaders negotiate a joint form of governing. Thus, decision of the interim government to form tandem with a southerner, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, as a President, and a northerner, Felix Kulov, as a Prime Minister was seen as a righteous political move (Temirbaev 2005, Arcady Dubnov 2006).

Besides that, the patterns of regional division and the way political mobilization was carried out by the opposition, including bringing the people from the southern region on the buses for protests (Elnura Osmonalieva,2005), it seems that only further exacerbated the North-South cleavage failing to create democratic inclusion of all social segments in the movement.

KYRGYZSTAN: cultural-political divisions



The evidence to this could be the wide-spread blaming, it is hard to say whether the regional divide has been more a product of politicization and media effect or it represents a real political and social cleavage. But the argument here suggests that the regional struggle (whether objectively existing or perceived) substantially reified ethnic identities during the February-March events in Kyrgyzstan and was one of the contributing factors for emergence of the ethnic conflict narrative. The latter happened due to several reasons.

First, the triumph of the southern opposition meant for many win of the more ethnically conservative “Kyrgyz nationalists” over more Russified metropolitan and “multicultural” northern Kyrgyz elites. Second, the rising ethnic polarization within the Kyrgyz has had an affinity of scaring away national minority communities (Melvin, 2002;245). It produced sense of elimination on the part of non titular from decision making process, as they were not permitted to get drawn in the ethno-regional Kyrgyz difference. Politically significant Uzbek minority community, whose support was used by the early Akaev’s administration, was growing more and more isolated. That was in a way catalysts of the “revolutionary” protest, were also a sign of blunted ethno politics. Ethnic background of a certain candidate came to be important because ethnic communities seek political representation, but also because political candidates themselves either directly or tacitly manipulating with ethnic identity to gain essential support.

The most dangerous thing in electoral ethno politics is that victory of a certain candidate is anticipated into a victory of the whole ethnic group a candidate appealed to and claimed to represent. On the one hand, representatives of the Uzbek communities were anxious about possible victory of some ethnically Uzbek candidates fearing protests by the Kyrgyz, but on the other hand, success of these candidates meant willpower of the whole minority group social and political status Therefore, increased polarization of internal divisions within Kyrgyz elites, as well as stratification between ethnic communities, which stems from the Soviet organization of power relations in Central Asia - both improved reification of ethnic identity putting it on the ‘foreground’ (Abdurasulov, 2006). The Russo phone population has been generally passive in political life throughout Central Asian region and rather loyal to Akayev’s government.

Therefore, there have been little attempts on the part of oppositional forces to target this particular group for their support. The situation with the Uzbek minority was rather different. Oppositional forces, together with the youth organizations, such as Kel-Kel movement, tried to mobilize Uzbek population despite the fact that the majority of them seemed to be pro Akayev. Thus before and the Tulip revolution one of the biggest cause of flux and challenge for the nation building process is north south division, another face

of the problem is the authoritarian nature of regime and deprivation of the democratic norms, unless democracy has great potential to promote peace and cooperation in a country full with diversity.

Table: 19

*Table 1.1 Ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan according to the 1989 and 1999 population census.
Source: UNDP LIFE project²²*

Ethnic group	1989 census	%	1999 census	%
Kyrgyz	2,229,663	52.4	3,128,147	64.9
Russian	916,558	21.5	603,201	12.5
Uzbek	550,096	12.9	664,950	13.8
Ukrainian	108,027	2.5	50,442	1.0
German	101,309	2.4	21,471	0.4
Tatar	70,068	1.6	45,438	0.9
Dungan ²¹	36,928	0.9	51,766	1.1


Economic Stagnation and Poverty

In order to understand the reasons of economic stagnation and poverty in Kyrgyzstan, we should take into the consideration the legacy of the Soviet planned economy. During the Soviet period, the economy of the Central Asia “has been tremendously dominated by the extraction of raw materials and the production of agricultural goods” (Glenn, John, 1999: 137). As a result of the Soviet planned economy, Kyrgyzstan became an agricultural country. The main agricultural products were tobacco, cotton, various fruits and vegetables, wool and sheep. Accelerated economic development of Soviet Kyrgyzstan, which concentrated on agricultural production has led to the environmental destruction of the land. Furthermore, “In the Soviet division of labor, traditionally Kyrgyzstan was one of bigger producers of animal husbandry products” (Niazaliev, Ouran, 2004:59). Total number of sheep was more than 10 million in 1985. As a result, the remarkable decline in the number of sheep after the collapse of the Soviet Union raised other economic problems.

On the other hand, as in all Soviet Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan's most of the industrially skilled workforce was composed of Slavs. In Soviet Kyrgyzstan, "Russians and other Slavs dominated the technical and engineering professions" (Huskey Eugene, 2002:50). Following the collapse of the USSR, there was a massive emigration of Russian's from Kyrgyzstan. Especially the ethnic conflict in the Osh region that occurred in 1990 increased the emigration of the Russians'. In general, from 1989 to 1994, the proportion of Russians in Kyrgyzstan has dropped from 21.5% to 17% (Kynev, Aleksandr V., 2008). Consequences of mass emigration of Russians were not slow to affect the Kyrgyzstan's economy. There was a catastrophic insufficiency to fill the workplaces which were released with their departure.

It is clear that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent Kyrgyzstan faced with a host of economic difficulties. As, Kyrgyzstan's role in Soviet economy was to provide primary supplies for industries located in the European parts of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the USSR, Kyrgyzstan right away lost its Soviet era suppliers and customers. For these reasons, "Kyrgyzstan's small and uncompetitive industrial enterprises quickly became bankrupt and many closed entirely" (Gleason, Gregory, 2003: 65).

Table: 10



As a result, unemployment has increased dramatically. In addition to these economic

problems, most of the productive machineries of bankrupt or closed industries were sold as a scrap metal to China. All of these negative developments led to the economic stagnation, unemployment, poverty and corruption. “The deepening crisis of unemployment in the countryside fed large-scale migration to the cities, which tensed urban social services and endangered political stability” (Huskey and Eugene 2003:74). Obviously, newly independent Kyrgyzstan’s one of the leading goals was to solve the economic stagnation. In order to achieve this, Kyrgyzstan defined new economic reforms. However, the 1998 financial crises in Asia and Russia slowed the pace of economic growth and followed by a new recession. By 2003 “the level of unemployment increased by 6.2 percent with the number of unemployed persons making up 9.0 percent of the population, reaching the highest level since independence” (Botoiarova and Nuska 2005). In addition, in 2004 Kyrgyzstan’s total external debts reached 2 billion USD which account for 70 percent of GDP and 50 percent of its population was living below the poverty line. Also corruption was one of the hindering factors of economic conversion. In response, the government did not adopt adequate anti-corruption campaigns in order to prevent it. The anti corruption campaign “was often used to remove or threaten unwanted politicians” (Koichumanov and Talaibek et al 2005 :).


In short, post-Soviet economic stagnation led to the unemployment, corruption and impoverishment. Poverty led to the emigration and also internal migration from rural areas to cities, in given bellow data GDP growth rate of economy from 2000 – 2005 shows a continuous up and downs in 2000 the growth rate is zero while in 2005 it is -0.2 thus a highly transitional and unstable economic growth pattern one can observe.

The National Statistical Committee Kyrgyzstan reported that GDP growth for the first half of 2010 had slowed to 5% (compared to the first half of 2009). This suggests that GDP during the second quarter declined by some 5%—and by an enormous 13% in June (compared to June 2009). Since 5% GDP growth for the first half of 2010 was not so bad—especially if social peace can be restored and the economic situation turned around in the second half of the year. Unfortunately, But further released projections by the Ministry of Economic Regulation and Trade (MERT), showed the GDP forecast to

declined by nearly 9% in 2010 for the year as a whole. These mean a fall of GDP in the second half of the year by at least 20%. MERT expected the bulk of this decline to occur in the southern regions that have been most affected by the ethnic conflict. GDP in Osh city is projected by MERT to fall 48% that year; declines of 38% and 30% are forecast for the Osh and Jalalabad regions, respectively. Sharp contractions in the service sector and in agricultural production, caused the large reductions in household incomes and spending, the decline in the first half of 2010 was 12%. For a country in which about a third of the population lives at or below the poverty line, and which is already suffering from serious socio-political and ethnic tensions, such economic trends became disastrous.

On other hand the internal migration led to the formation of ‘poverty belts around the big cities, mainly in Bishkek. These ‘poverty belts’ consist of mainly young people which have no jobs and stable sources of income. This means that, ‘poverty belts’ composed a critical mass that could be mobilized into action (Kynev, Aleksandr V., 2008). Consequently, economic stagnation and poverty surely can be shown as a main reason of the “Tulip Revolution”.

Table: 12



The country’s economy during Bakiyev regime has been deteriorating and the hydro power sector continued to be mismanaged. Winter 2008 was marked by regular rotating blackouts, while double-digit inflation peaked at the end of summer. In the meantime, the opposition in Kyrgyzstan was slowly regrouping to challenge the government, gradually

increasing the oil and gas prices affected the economy even more negatively, thus economic slowdown and turbulent economic condition prepared the ground for the popular anger to take its shape.

Table: 12, Key economic indicators of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2000-2005

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
GDP, real growth (%)	5.4	5.3	0.0	7.0	7.0	-0.1
Inflation, (%)	18.7	6.9	2.0	3.1	4.1	4.1
Unemployment, (%)		7.8	8.6	8.9	9.0	9.1
Current transitions account, (%)	-5.7	-1.6	-3.1	-4.2	-3.4	-8.1
Wide money growth, (%)	12.1	12.2	35.1	34.5	33.6	17.4
Primary budget deficit, (% to GDP)	-6.9	-4.4	-5.1	-4.3	-3.4	-4.1
Foreign debt, (% to GDP)	102.0	94.15	114.5	104.2	95.5	77.1

Source of information: NSC, NBKR, Ministry of Finance, IMF.

Role of External Actors and Civil Societies in Tulip Revolution

Kyrgyzstan had long been a preferential target for Western government and non-governmental help; it boasted hundreds of NGOs and relatively active groups of journalists and political activists, almost all of whom had some access to funding from Western partners. For the most part, Western diplomats and NGO activists worked mainly with this local world of donor-funded civil society; a relation with government was sometimes restricted to a small number of relatively reformist ministers or officials. This rather virtual political world has a number of specific characteristics: it is predominantly based in Bishkek, with occasional forays to Osh and one or two other larger towns; it includes a higher than normal proportion of NGO activists, English speakers and young people; and it speaks a language of political liberalism and reform which is largely (although not completely) at odds with internal discourses within the

political elite. It is often oblivious to call “the disjunction between visions of democracy as promoted by many international actors in the region and the actual social, political and economic conditions in Central Asia” (Adamson 2002: 157-160).

Diplomatic engagement by Western countries in Bishkek was traditionally fairly limited, with only a US embassy and a German embassy representing EU and North American states. Other EU states had representation in neighboring Kazakhstan, but few were engaged with Kyrgyz affairs on an everyday basis. The US embassy made up for the limited diplomatic presence with a relatively high degree of activity, particularly from 2004 onwards. US diplomats aimed to put pressure on Akaev to publicly commit to step down from power in October 2005, and this provided an additional problem for Akaev in his search for a viable succession strategy. In reality, it seems that there would have been only a muted international reaction if Akaev had decided to simply run for a third term. It was domestic pressure that made it difficult for Akaev to ignore constitutional details completely. However, it was arguably easier for Akaev to cast this political pressure in international terms, and begin to blame the US and its associated NGOs for ‘interference’ in the internal politics of Kyrgyzstan. By 2004, Akayev, concerned by parallels with the situation in Georgia, had begun making outspoken statements against what he termed the ‘export of democracy’, comparing it with the Bolshevik idea of exporting revolution (Saralaeva 2004: 21, Toursunof 2004: 4).

Other phenomena that the government viewed as threats were in fact remarkably benign. There were visits to Kyrgyzstan from activists from Georgia, for example, who were presumably trying to spread knowledge about protest tactics. This type of knowledge transfer has been presented as an important element in developing modular revolutions (Beissinger 2007), but the few Georgians who came to Bishkek seemed to have little impact on the situation.

Contributions in the state-controlled press attacked the National Democratic Institute (NDI), in particular, although most of its programming was hardly threatening to the regime. The state-run daily, *Slovo Kyrgyzstana*, claimed that the US was orchestrating a plan for revolt and that ‘the aim is to orchestrate mass unrest and disturbances, and thus

overthrow the legitimate authorities and create a puppet government that is wholly dependent on external forces' (Saralaeva 2004: 15).

There were two main funding channels for NGOs from Western governments and foundations, through direct grants to local NGOs, or engagement with international NGOs, which had offices in Bishkek. For the most part, local NGOs revolved around one or two key figures, and they were not very effective in broader, structural terms, but played an important role in addressing human rights issues, and maintaining domestic pressure on government policies. There were also several active international NGOs with offices in Bishkek.

NDI and the International Republican Institute (IRI) both had a range of programmes that were designed to assist in developing democratic institutions. For the most part, these programmes were failures in their own terms – programmes focused on training and developing political parties, for example, never achieved any grip in the Kyrgyz political context, where political parties were only formed by single political figures in response to formal constitutional demands or fundraising issues. Programmes to reform parliament, by developing viable committee systems, for example, also achieved little noticeable progress. Other groups, such as IFES, which specialized in election processes, seemed relatively inactive in Bishkek by late 2004. The Soros Foundation in Kyrgyzstan, the counterpart of which was alleged to have been active in Georgia in the Rose Revolution, was notable for its efforts to maintain a low profile and avoid politically controversial topics. Other US-funded NGOs, such as Freedom House, also maintained a relatively low profile ahead of the elections, with the partial exception of a programme to support independent media.

The media was one area that attracted considerable international funding and sometimes diplomatic attention. Few independent newspapers, critical of the government, survived, but often faced refusal by the state publishing company to issue their newspapers. An independent publishing house, with US funding and support, was established, and was used to print newspapers like the Russian-language MSN, one of the most outspoken of

the Russian-language newspapers. At the time the media did indeed seem critical in developing opposition to Akaev, but in retrospect the importance of Bishkek-based newspapers may have been exaggerated. Certainly, accounts suggesting that Internet blogs were somehow significant in the outcome of events (Kulikova and Perlmutter 2007: 46) now seem rather exaggerated in retrospect. The role of the independent printing house was clearly important in allowing the opposition newspaper MSN to be published. However, MSN was a Russian-language newspaper mainly distributed in Bishkek, so it was not accessible to many people in rural areas.

Table: 19




Figure 3.40. Total US Military and economic assistance

Source: USAID overseas loans and grants (greenbook) www.qesdb.cdiie.org/gbk/

However, its news was often transmitted orally, and its stories about the excesses of Akaev's family were widely known within a short period of time, and certainly fuelled the anti-Akaev sentiment of some protestors. Probably more influential was the Kyrgyz-language service of Radio Free Europe, which was rebroadcast too much of the country until its service was interrupted by the government on the eve of the elections. However, news distribution still relied heavily on rumor and informal networks of political leaders and activists rather than formal media outlets.

Aksy Events

In the political history of the countries, there are some significant turning points. As other countries in the world, sovereign young Kyrgyzstan has experienced some special events in its new political history. An Aksy event is one of them, which was a turning point in Kyrgyzstan's political history. Aksy events occurred, between January and November 2002, in Aksy district of Jalal-Abad province. The cause of this event was the politically motivated arrest of Azimbek Beknazarov, who was the Member of Parliament from Aksy district. As a deputy of the Jogorku Kenesh, Beknazarov became one of the strong critics of Akaev's policy.

Particularly he powerfully criticized the Chinese-Kyrgyz agreements, signed in 1996 and 1999, which put Kyrgyzstan under a compulsion to transfer its borderline territory to China. These agreements were signed by Askar Akaev without advance information of parliament. "Beknazarov claimed that these lands contain valuable water resources, as well as the graves of people who died fleeing to China to avoid arrest by Russian troops in the 1916 uprising" (Olcott and Brill 2005).

Azimbek Beknazarov more and more criticized the government and called for Akaev's impeachment. This criticism of the government and Askar Akaev, led to the Beknazarov's arrest. On 5th of January 2002, he was arrested on charges of misuse of power, when he was investigating the murder case as a district prosecutor in the Toktogul region in 1995 (Radnitz and Scott 2005: 64-78).

Undoubtedly this arrest was politically prearranged by government in order to curb the opponent figures who could challenge the Akaev's regime. Akaev's team was intended to neutralize Beknazarov by fabricating charges, as they had done earlier with another rival, Felix Kulov. "However, with the arrest of Beknazarov, the government considerably overplayed its hand. Instantly there were complaining demonstrations organized by Beknazarov's regional associates and fellow clan members." The authorities did not

accept the series of public protests as a serious threat as long as they were peaceful and not very visible. But the demonstrations and demonstrates started to increase steadily. On 17th of March 2002, protestors started to march towards the Kerben, which is county town of Aksy district. The police was ordered to avoid the protestors from entering the Kerben. This led to the clashes between the police and the protestors. Scared by the size of the demonstrators, “the police and security forces opened fire, killing six citizens and injuring more than 60 people” (Abazov 2003: 23). This led to the nation-wide public restlessness and protests demanding Beknazarov release and President Askar Akaev’s resignation.

After these developments, on March 19, the government released Beknazarov hoping to keep away from further violence. Protestors also, demanded punishing those who responsible in the death of innocent people. In order to placate the opposition, several people “at the top levels of government, including the head of the Presidential Administration, Amanbek Karypkulov, were then accused of negligence and dismissed from Office”.

Furthermore, Askar Akaev failed to learn the lesson of Aksy events, which showed clearly that the government was lack of well trained riot control formations. On the other hand Akaev did learn one thing from the Aksy events, “that firing on an unarmed crowd could lead to civil war, and for all his unwillingness to resign, he choose to draw the line at that” (Olcott, Brill, 2005: 128-38). Also police did not want to take a responsibility for firing on unarmed crowd in March 2005. All of these factors confirm that Aksy events were one of the main reasons which led to the “Tulip Revolution”.

Conclusion

It should be clear from the above account that Kyrgyzstan is a state in a more or less permanent political and economic crisis. The bright promise of democracy, independence, development and freedom in a post-Soviet world has dimmed markedly in the face of increasing political authoritarianism and economic decline exacerbated by

massive misgovernment. Large numbers of people now look back on the Soviet period with nostalgic glances; longing for the political and economic stability provided of those years. The current regimes has presided over significant de-industrialization, loss of jobs, increases in poverty and homelessness, and significant declines in educational and health care standards, all exacerbated by massive, endemic corruption.

New economic policies introduced altogether with the guidelines from the IMF and the World Bank, helped Kyrgyzstan to adopt a development without employment generation, on the other hand since the Russian trained man power left Kyrgyzstan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, thus manufacturing industry could not gain momentum with the new economic policies. Economic liberalization demands reforms in the administrative set-up of related country, i.e. need of good governance and transparency into administration, but Kyrgyz government did nothing in this regard. Corruption into the higher level of the administration was/is common thing to happen, economy is dominated by the ruling class, this phenomenon curtails chances of entrepreneurship in the economic life of the country, result was shrinking ratio of middle class in Kyrgyz society, due to increasing unemployment and economic stagnation about 70% of the Kyrgyz population is living below the poverty line, on the other hand 5% of the elite population was becoming more richer, these economic developments eroded the legitimacy of both the Akayev and Bakiyev government.

Another important variable of political legitimacy are the interest groups, the blood circulatory system of the political process, an universal definition and type of these interest groups is next to impossible, thus it will not be conducive to analyze the interest groups of a country on the western democratic pattern. The developing countries can have quite a different set-up of interest groups, for example the cast and religion based pressure groups. These pressure groups can influence the political process either in positive or in negative way, if government fulfills only the majority interest, it creates dissatisfaction in minority interest, thus when ever these interests get chance to up root the political regime they utilize this chance, this is one of the most dominant cause of political instability in Kyrgyzstan.

CHAPTER- 4

Tulip Revolution toward a Democratic Consolidation or an Endless journey

Tulip revolution gave a hope for strong and sound basis for the democracy, in Kyrgyzstan because it was based on justified and legitimate demand to improve the corrupt and discriminatory administrative structure, criminalization etc. some of the Central Asian expert claimed that Tulip revolution was result of the evolving democratic culture within the country. Common peoples were at the road to demand for the administrative reform and control the corrupt practices in overall political, social and economic arena of life. These hope fed up soon when after some time the Bakiyev government once again went back at the same track of Akiyev government and made its all possible effort to control over the political power in authoritarian way.

What was the nature of Tulip revolution in this regard there is a number of varying views for some it was a revolt of drug-dealers, special operation of a foreign intelligence service, a revenge of southern clans, and for some it was a result of badly falsified elections'. The diversified explanation of the causes behind the revolution makes the single causation theory quite suspected (Heathershaw 2007). after the Tulip revolution Few of the enthusiastic academicians have claimed that it is a democratic revolution, one can notice the same level of optimism in the remark of Ariel Cohen who wrote in March 2005, 'the people of Kyrgyzstan have spoken – and acted' and a 'wave of democracy is sweeping the former Soviet Union' (Cohen 2005). Political developments since 2005 have cooled expectations of democratic transformation that is why what appeared as a democratic revolution proved to be 'a limited rotation of ruling elites' (Tudoroiu 2007: 315), while Scott Radnitz qualified the same events as nothing more than a 'transfer of power' (Scott Radnitz 2006: 133)

Democratization in Kyrgyzstan Tulip Revolution and Beyond

Kyrgyzstan presents quite a distinct case of democratic transformation in Central Asia, according to a few regional experts Kyrgyzstan have made several achievements in this direction, like the freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the existence of a vibrant civil society and active political opposition, and decisive steps in economic liberalization. In comparison to other Central Asian republic where strong presidential system is characteristic of political regime, Kyrgyzstan presents itself as 'island of democracy' in Central Asia (Anderson 1999).

The question, so far, what were the causes behind the easy democratic transformation of Kyrgyzstan, while the other Central Asian countries could not do so? There are a number of explanations in this regard. First the Askar Akayev's role in this regard is important enough, his efforts put Kyrgyzstan at liberal, and democratic path of transformation, his liberal views were known before he came to presidency (Spector 2004 27-28, Olcott 1996: 89).

Second important cause of the easy democratic transformation in Kyrgyzstan is the role of external state and the non state actors, they played important role, in Kyrgyz democratization process. Few of the liberalization policy became possible only due to the western financial support, since Kyrgyzstan do not have enough natural resources, thus when it got independence, it was Kyrgyz compulsion to depend on western democratic countries for the financial and technical support for the state building process. Liberal policies of early 1990's according to this view were the compromise between the Kyrgyz authority and the western donors, the donation was given at some conditions and democratization was one of them.

Third explanation of democratization process in Kyrgyzstan is weakness of Akayev regime, in early 1990's Kyrgyzstan was economically weak state, there was not enough resources and product to export and generate capital, thus to fulfill the economic need of the country Akayev sold Kyrgyzstan as a world model of democracy (Huskey 2001:75).

Political weakness of Akayev was another cause, since we know that he came into power in opposition of conservative Marxist, he find himself unable to control the political opposition thus he opened and democratized the state structure to deter the Marxists. The most important democratic achievement by Kyrgyzstan is emergence of vibrant civil society; it is the most vital promoter of democratization than any other institution. The blame at the civil society is that they are being financed by the western countries thus propagating their interest in Kyrgyzstan; these NGO's highly depend on western grants for their functioning and existence (Juraev 2008:256)

Since it is discussed that some academicians have claim that Tulip revolution was a democratic revolution and kind of electoral revolution, but the further developments in Kyrgyzstan proved this optimism wrong and the constitutional amendments further proved to be only a result of bargaining among the Kyrgyz elites, which resulted in three official constitutional reform enacted within two years in which last one established the presidential dominance over rest of the organs of the government and the institutions of self government were curtailed by gradually.

But why the hopes and prospects for democracy did not last long? Few scholars gives a simple cause behind this phenomena, they claim that it was not the common Kyrgyz people who lost the battle for the democracy but it was leadership who theft the dream from the common Kyrgyz peoples, they blame Bakiyev regime who betrayed the idea of democratic revolution (Martha Olcott, 2005:95). Another view in this regard is that the Tulip revolution was nothing like a revolution but it was rearrangement of government, a simple kind of elite transfer, thus it was a gradual historical evolution of democratization like process thus a discourse like fraud with revolution is of no use. But this view accepts the continuous evolution of democracy in Kyrgyzstan (Wood 2001:46).

According to another view the electoral revolution in post Communist countries could not became successful because of the 'local capacity to produce powerful democratic consequences declined as the model moved from its original site in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia to Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan' (Bunce and Wolchik

2006). East European countries have direct links with the western democratic countries, most of them are members of EU, or the NATO, thus phenomena of democratization got more strength in these countries, while the Central Asian countries have different experience in this regard thus the democratization process could not be stabilized there.

Elites Alignment against the Akayev Regime after Tulip Revolution

Elite coalition is an important phenomena in Kyrgyz politics the Tulip revolution was a result of rearrangement of a groups of elites against the Akayev regime, thus it seems more useful analytically to think of Kyrgyz elite structures as a lobby consisting of a limited but rather stable pool of politically relevant elites. Within this lobby, shifting coalitions determine the relative power position of each actor at a given moment in time. Due to the high degree of fluctuation and instability in elite coalitions, exclusion from the dominant coalition usually is only temporary and rarely amounts to exclusion from the elite lobby as such. To put it differently, a member of today's ruling coalition may well be tomorrow's opposition leader and vice versa, without ever losing his position as politically relevant member of the elite lobby. This extreme instability in elite alignments naturally produces a high degree of uncertainty and irregularity and is arguably one of the major forces driving Kyrgyz political dynamics.

The tulip revolution is not exception in this respect. At the elite level, the Revolution was supported by a coalition of disaffected political elites that had joined forces in the People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan (PMK) since September 2004 and had accepted Kurmanbek Bakiyev as their leader. But they had not common principle based agreement, as soon as the revolution ended the coalition started to crumble. In the aftermath of the Revolution and in the context of a series of political crises that hit the country in the first post-revolutionary months, differences soon resurfaced and led to the another coalition from some of former allies of revolution time (ICG 2005 and 2006).

The opposition movement soon consolidated into another movement of reform called as 'For Reforms' (Za Reformy). The first of the former revolutionaries to fall out with the

new president was Azimbek Beknazarov, an influential supporter of the Revolution and the leader of the nationalist Asaba (Banner) party who had been appointed prosecutor general after the overthrow of President Akayev. More defections were prompted by parliament's refusal to confirm the president's appointments to several cabinet posts between August and December 2005.

The most famous of these cases was that of Roza Otunbaeva, former ambassador to the US and the UK under Akayev, deputy leader of the anti-Akayev opposition movement Ata Zhurt, and acting foreign minister after the Revolution. With parliament repeatedly refusing to endorse Otunbaeva as foreign minister, she ultimately defected from the ruling coalition and became a leader of the movement for constitutional reform in 2006; she emerged as the leader of popular uprising during the 2010th successful uprisings. Another key figure in both the revolution of 2005 and the protest movement a year later, Member of Parliament and chairman of Ata Meken (Fatherland) party Omurbek Tekebayev, resigned from his post as speaker of the Zhogorku Kenesh in spring of 2006 following a personal row with Bakiyev and joined the opposition.

This incident was followed a couple of weeks later by the resignation of Minister for Trade, SDPK leader and key revolutionary Almazbek Atambayev in protest against the president's failure to implement reforms of Minister for Trade, SDPK leader and key revolutionary Almazbek Atambayev in protest against the president's failure to implement reforms.

By early 2006 many important actors defected from the president camp to form the opposition movement, 'For Reforms' (Za Reformy). Reforming the constitution and limiting the power of president was the key demand of opposition movement. Constitutional reform was the key objective of the Tulip revolution, for this purpose a constitutional draft committee was established in chairmanship of parliamentary speaker Omurbek Tekebayev that came up with a draft constitution significantly limiting presidential power in June 2005.

After having won the election in July 2005 Bakiyev however formed his own committee

and postponed the reforms till 2010. Till the first anniversary of Tulip revolution a single reform objective was not fulfilled by the Bakiyev government. Whether the constitutional reform was coalition's key demand there was differences over whether other demands should be raised or not. More radical representatives of the opposition including Azimbek Beknazarov of Asaba, Omurbek Tekebayev of Ata Meken, and Temir Sariyev, at that time affiliated with SDPK and later founding member of Ak Shumkar, soon began to call for the president to step down, thus evoking uneasy memories of the 2005 events. Another section of reform movement SDPK insisted that constitutional reform is the only goal and can be fulfilled by cooperation with the authority. This section of opposition started to negotiate with presidential camp during 2006 protest for reform without consulting with the opposition ally.

Role of Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan after the Tulip Revolution

There are a number of actors who play vital role in democratization process, the political parties, independent media, trade unions, business associations, human rights groups and a wide variety of civil society non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but the role of civil society in democracy is most important one due to its nature. In a traditional and divided society like Kyrgyzstan political parties are not based on secular identities and issues. The parochial identities, like cast, religion, ethnicity, clan ism etc. are use as instrument of political mobilization. Whether the civil society organizations play broad and most inclusive role in these type of traditional society, thus in their popularity graph is more high than the political parties.

Another cause of popular image of civil society in comparison to political parties is - Parties have been especially suspect in the post-communist countries that suffered under a party repression and have yet to develop a system of strong parties that can control deep and stable loyalty from important sectors of society. Considerably, it was in these countries that the concept of civil society was re-energized – during the communist period as a movement representing the interests of a united citizenry against the state, and

in the post-communist period as an advocate of reform, accountability, and transparency. Whereas parties have lacked internal democracy and have often had to rely on corrupt oligarchs for financing, civil society organizations have had more reliability. They stand for high principles and focus on solving practical problems. They have close ties to the press and to think-tanks and thus have a greater capability for policy advocacy and public opinion polling and analysis. They are familiar to collaborating with partner NGOs in their own and neighboring countries and have had success in tapping into international networks and sources of funding. They also offer attractive opportunities to young people with talent and idealism (Gershman 2004:156).

Thus it becomes necessary to understand the civil society activity in Kyrgyzstan to understand the post Tulip revolution politics of Kyrgyzstan. Following the Tulip Revolution and amid continuous political instability in the country, Kyrgyz political leaders habitually accused local non-government organizations of dependence on foreign financing; some politicians even saw local civil society groups co-operating with foreign donors as an encroachment on national sovereignty. Representatives of the ruling regime often labeled NGO leaders as ‘grantoedy’ (grant-eaters), doubting their genuine intentions to promote greater transparency in the government and civic participation. However, despite Kyrgyzstan’s deteriorating democratic record and rampant corruption, there is still a level of freedom of speech in the country. The NGO community in Kyrgyzstan remains vibrant and diverse. There are signs of local NGOs moving away from dependency on external financing and consolidating actions across organizations (Erica Marat, 2008:238).

Local NGO leaders counter criticism with the argument that government and pro-regime mass media outlets voice their disapproval of NGOs in order to find a scapegoat for the country’s persisting political and economic instability since the change of regime. In fact, Emil Shukurov, the leader of an ecological NGO, says that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan have proven to be more stable than the political domain. Most of them have grown larger and stronger since then, while the government sector has seen numerous reshuffles and crises. Moreover, compared with political parties, NGOs are far more permanent.

Therefore, NGOs enjoy a more positive image than political leaders among Kyrgyz common peoples. Today, several thousand NGOs are registered in Kyrgyzstan, with hundreds being known to a wider public for their active work. Shukurov further notes that local civil society groups have used credits and grants allocated by the international community much more efficiently than the government. NGOs make public issues that the state is often not capable of solving. For example, a handful of NGOs have been actively working on gender issues, poverty reduction, border delimitation, the population's access to water and sanitation, and environmental protection. Some of these issues later became part of official policy. In some way Kyrgyz NGOs help the government abide by the numerous international conventions signed by Kyrgyzstan during the early years of its independence, among them those on human rights, emigration and poverty.

With all above mentioned successes there are some NGO's workings as private business making their efforts to get the foreign grants; partially government institutions are also blamed for this happening. Since in most of the cases government gets the foreign grants and distributes it among the NGO's, in such cases all those NGO's have good relation with government gets more grants. This is the reason why for some extent NGO's are also corrupt.

Another pitfall among Kyrgyz NGOs is the frequently-held perception that their own work is purely antagonistic toward the government. Few NGO's are able to collaborate with the government in a constructive way, but instead only criticize its activity. Thus the conclusion that we can draw from above study proves that, whether 24 March is an ambiguous day for the Kyrgyz public with mostly unpleasant associations, nevertheless, the day should be celebrated because of the opportunity it provided for civil society groups. In effect, the Tulip Revolution and the events following it were a crash course for Kyrgyz citizens in civic education, their rights to vote, the meaning of the constitutional reform, and the importance of transparent governance. Today, the ruling elites are neither able to suppress all professional journalists nor silence all experienced NGO

leaders. While taking decisions, Kyrgyzstan's political leadership must calculate possibilities of public unrest and the rise of opposition against them.

Challenges for Democracy in Kyrgyzstan; Post Tulip revolution Scenario

Tulip revolution was related with a number of wishes, related with democracy and actual democratic transformation, openness into administration and end of poverty and misery from Kyrgyzstan, but all these wishes proved to be wishes only did not transformed into reality. Once again Bakiyev government went back at the same track where previous administration was running. Since in previous chapters we have discuss in brief the causes of democratic failure into Kyrgyzstan but the circumstances in post Tulip phase was quite different than before thus it is necessary to know the causes of democratic upheaval in this phase in separate headings.

The Bakiyev Ministry the Root Cause of all the Problems

In the 16 December parliamentary elections, Ak Zhol gained the majority of seats. The party became a dominant political fraction in the parliament and infamous for being stuffed with unprofessional people with uncertain political views. As one political observer in Bishkek commented, despite a better representation of women, ethnic minorities, and young politicians: 'The parliament is full of "dead souls" willing to follow the regime' (E. Marat, 2008).

The new Kyrgyz government, formed following the elections, consisted mostly of old faces who had survived the numerous reshuffling efforts of Akayev and the change of presidents in March 2005. Bakiyev surrounded himself with loyal political supporters primarily interested in the continuity of the current political regime and their public offices. The president's choice of Igor Chudinov – a former businessman, director of

KyrgyzGaz, and minister of energy – as prime minister came as a surprise for many. The energy sector in Kyrgyzstan was known for its endemic corruption, and Chudinov was often regarded as part of a chain of corrupt management.

Soon the political administrative spaces were fill up with the Akiyev's time politicians and administrative officers infamous for corruption and authoritarian tendencies, Former Bishkek mayor Arstanbek Nogoyev was appointed minister of agriculture. Nogoyev was Bakiev's loyal political follower, notorious for carrying out all of the president's orders during his mayoral The new minister of education, Ishengul Bolzhurova, had been a loyal friend of former president Akayev and his family, but she reoriented her support towards Bakiev's regime in a matter of days. A number of other ministers, including those for justice and foreign affairs, had proved their lasting loyalty to Bakiyev before the parliamentary elections and retained their posts. In the international arena, Kyrgyz officials became more unpredictable for Western partners, often failing to fulfill their commitments to international agreements.

Furthermore, the constitutional referendum in October 2007 and the parliamentary elections of December 2007, as well as the banning of public demonstrations in central Bishkek, showed the Kyrgyz government's disregard of its commitments before the OSCE. Bakiev's loyal parliament, strong supporters in the government, and informal control over major economic resources allowed him to largely disregard Western principles. Thus available variables indicate that the Tulip revolution prove to became only power shift from one elite to another with no any qualitative change in essence, thus uncertainty was the only result with such a regime.

Criminal World after the Tulip revolution

As it has been discussed in previous chapters that the criminalization in Kyrgyzstan was one of the major cause of Tulip revolution, but Bakiyev government did not too much to deal with the challenge. Since March 2005 brought a change in regime but this change also brought about changes in the criminal world, adjusting state-crime relations. Before

the Tulip Revolution, some political and criminal leaders interacted whenever their interests met and often conflicted over ownership of businesses. However, the chaotic division of political and economic powers among members of the new government led by Bakiev, on the one hand, and leaders of organized criminal groups on the other cost the lives of three parliamentarians and a number of criminal leaders.

Yet, the most substantial change in state-crime relations occurred following the death of notorious criminal kingpin Rysbek Akmatbayev in May 2006. But the vacuum created by his death was soon filled up by another mafia Kamchy, he was so influential that once again build up a shared interest with the Kyrgyz authority.

Kyrgyz economy has three vital sectors like - hydroelectric sites, customs controls and the banking system. All three sectors are interlinked, often being interwoven with illegal activities such as extortion of businesses, smuggling of drugs and weapons, and intimidation of political opponents. Under Bakiev, the criminal world became more centralized, while more high-ranking officials are reported to be involved in criminal activities. This is as an important difference to Akaev's regime, during which criminal leaders, although sharing some links with state officials, were mostly from the non-state domain. Approximately 10–12 high-ranking officials in the president's administration and ministerial cabinet determine the country's entire economic policy and political climate. Meanwhile, unlike before, non-state organized criminal groups and their leaders are no longer able to significantly influence the political domain, thus marking a sizeable shift in state-crime relations in the country.

Role of External Actors, in Post Tulip Kyrgyzstan

While Kyrgyzstan is facing numerous challenges from within the country, the geopolitical interests of various countries further complicate the situation. The major actors—Russia, the United States, the European Union and China—are competing for strategic space in this small country. Russia and the US both have military bases in Kyrgyzstan. Given the re-set in the US–Russia relationship, there seems to be some level

of comfort between the two countries, at least on the surface. But Russia still has more levers to pull in the Central Asian region compared to the US. It has been trying to safeguard its interests through bilateral and regional mechanisms. Kyrgyzstan remains an important member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

However, what is important to note is that during the recent crisis, despite a formal request by Rosa Otunbayeva to intervene, the Russian response was somewhat lukewarm. It provided humanitarian help to Kyrgyzstan but made no military intervention. The organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the US were more forthright in their approach towards a new Kyrgyz interim government.

US diplomacy increased after the June crisis. This needs to be viewed in the context of Washington's requirement of the military base which is crucial for its military operations in Afghanistan. President Obama's meeting with Kyrgyz leader Rosa Otunbayeva in September 2010 indicates Kyrgyzstan's increasing importance for Washington. China views the US military base with some suspicion and is trying to woo Kyrgyzstan through its economic diplomacy by providing loans and building infrastructure to secure its economic and energy interests. The great power politics which is still unfolding offers both opportunities and challenges for Kyrgyzstan to manage its relations with these outside actors.

The situation in Kyrgyzstan is still very complex. Its experiment with parliamentary democracy has yet to fully materialize. Nevertheless, it is the first time in the history of independent Kyrgyzstan that not only were parliamentary elections held openly, fairly and in a democratic manner but the first step towards parliamentary democracy was taken when President Roza Otunbayeva addressed the first session of the new parliament on November 10, 2010. However, the future of parliamentary democracy will depend on how far the ruling elite is able to better the lot of the people, address its inter-ethnic problem, create more jobs and provide better education to its youth and finally attract more foreign investment by introducing adequate economic reforms. It will be equally important for the new government to manage its relations with major external players

without getting into any one camp. Given the complex nature of socioeconomic problems in Kyrgyzstan, the international community will have to pool in more economic resources for the 5.3 million people of Kyrgyzstan.

Post Tulip revolution Kyrgyzstan Institutions reforms and Constitutional Development

Kyrgyzstan is the only country where two governments have changed since independence from Soviet Union. This development happened even after government efforts for the political and economic reforms. The Kyrgyz constitution was approved on 5 May 1993. The president's powers were enhanced by a referendum held in February 1996 and then again in February 2003. The 313-member Jogorku Kenesh of the Soviet era was divided into a 105-member bicameral parliament in 2000, which was elected for a five -year term, composed of the legislative assembly (the lower house, with 60 deputies) and the assembly of people's representatives (the upper house, with 45 deputies).

After the February 2005 revolution the Jogorku Kenesh became unicameral chamber of deputies consisting of 75 members, elected for five years term. In August 2006, three draft constitutions were submitted to President Kurmanbek Bakiyev (BBC monitoring, 31 august 2010) Prior to the submission of these drafts, on 27 May 2006, an opposition rally attended by some 10,000 people in Bishkek submitted a 10-point reform programme to the president and prime minister to be implemented by September 2006.³ The new constitution was adopted on December 30, 2006. On 27 June 2007, the president signed legislation amending Kyrgyzstan's criminal codes replacing death penalties with life sentences. The new legislation mandates that arrest warrants be issued and prison sentences for some crimes are reduced. Despite these attempts, the political system of

3 The 10 points are: (1) a new draft constitution; (2) the punishment of those responsible for the shooting of demonstrators in Aksy in March 2002; (3) an end to 'family business' and a real fight against corruption; (4) guarantees of freedom of the press; (5) economic reform, including the return of all economic functions to the cabinet; (6) a stepped-up fight against crime; (7) an end to the use of state-controlled media to denigrate political opponents; (8) an end to monopolization and price-gouging in the construction sector; (9) compensation for merchants' losses in looting during the night of 24 March 2005; and (10) an end to 'unconstitutional' attempts to limit free speech and demonstrations

Kyrgyzstan was termed by some experts as ‘sustained and quasi-managed chaos’ (Olcott 2007:254).

In the post-Tulip revolution period, the political system had become fragile, with various political and economic groups competing for greater influence. During 2006–2009 Kyrgyzstan witnessed increasing instability and violence, civil unrest and political assassinations.

2010 Uprising a continuous Journey from Tulip Revolution

After a two-year period of instability and mass protests between 2005 and 2007, Bakiyev managed to reform the constitution and consolidate his power. This was based on personal loyalty. Roza Otunbaeva, the interim president who came to power in 2010, noted while being an MP that “Today, there are five Bakievs working in the ‘White House’ on the top echelons of the power. I do not speak about their numerous relatives who have captured all floors of the ‘White House’ (Bukasheva 2010: 89).

Deep social discontent arose from the inexorable repression of political opposition and independent mass media. The new regime managed to eliminate the majority of leaders of the opposition – some were imprisoned, some ran away, and others disappeared under mysterious circumstances. The same methods were used against free mass media: independent publishers were closed through the courts; and journalists were killed in circumstances which many saw as the work of the special services. About 20 oppositional politicians and journalists have fled the country accusing Bakiev’s regime of intimidation.

In 2008, one more scandal erupted – the Chairman of the Central Electoral Committee, Klara Kabilova, made a statement that she was forced to run from the country because of threats from the son of the president. In a public video appeal she claimed: “I am offended and intimidated by the son of the president – Maxim Bakiev, but I consider that Maxim mistaken – the people of Kyrgyzstan are not cattle and did not elect a herd of

rams, and Kyrgyzstan is not his inherited patrimony . . . Neither I, nor the people of Kyrgyzstan elected Maxim as the president of the country” (Kirgiziia: posle zajavlenija). An even bigger shock came in March 2009, when the former head of the president’s administration, Medet Sadyrkulov, who had resigned and joined the opposition one month earlier, was found burned together with his driver and a political strategist. In December 2009, several journalists, who criticized the ruling elite, were physically attacked including one, Ganadyi Pavliuk, who was later murdered in Kazakhstan. Kazakh authorities claimed that Kyrgyz Security Forces were involved in his murder.

All these instances of repression of opposition leaders and independent journalists intimidated the population, and at the same time provoked mistrust of the ruling elite: “Fear was spreading in the country, which quickly turned into a deep anger directed against Bakiev. During the period of 2008–2009 local businesses were unable to solve the problems resulting from the world economic crisis. At the same time, the state proved similarly incompetent in minimizing the consequences of the economic crisis. At the end of 2010, the government took the unpopular decision to increase tariffs for public services, including energy, heating, and mobile communications. Heating costs rose 400% and electricity by 170% in February 2010 (Asman). According to the former Minister of Economy, Akylbek Zhaparov, after the authority “picked the pockets of people who hardly made both ends meet, the patience of the people has burst” (Shamshiev). This decision led to a growth of discontent from the impoverished segments of the population, which then contributed to the political struggle for power. In essence we can see that all the causes behind Tulip revolution remained as potential cause for the next revolution.

Regime change in 2010, prospects for Democracy and Making of new Constitution,

The deteriorating socio-economic situation coupled with falling living standards, rampant corruption and ethnic problems within the country led to the anti-government protests that led to the overthrow of the Bakiyev government on 7 April 2010. A few weeks prior

to the overthrow of the Bakiyev government, a group of opposition leaders had formed the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the People's Kurultay (assembly) to coordinate the protest. On April 7, 2010 the CEC assumed power with Roza Otunbayeva as president declaring that the CEC would stay in power for six months to oversee a new constitution and the parliamentary and presidential elections planned for October 2010. However, subsequently it was decided that presidential elections would be held in December 2011.⁴

In mid-May waves of political unrest erupted in Jalalabad city, followed by explosive violence in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan on June 11–14, 2010. Despite the worst ethnic violence in Osh and Jalalabad, which left 400 dead and forced tens of thousands to flee, many across the border into neighboring Uzbekistan, the provisional government went ahead with the referendum on a new, more democratic constitution on June 27, 2010. The voters approved the new document. The government claimed a turnout of 72.2 per cent, of which 90.5 percent voted for the new constitution. Despite some scepticism about the figures, the referendum was viewed as a crucial validation of the interim government's legitimacy (Recknagel 2010:76).

The positive aspect of the new constitution is that its framers have tried to adapt and modify the Western model to suit their own political realities rather than adopting an existing Western constitution. The aim is to have more than one powerful national leader. Under the new government there will be two top posts—a president and a prime minister. However, what needs to be worked out in practice is the division of power between the two. It was noted by the chairman of the constitutional council, Omurbek Tekebaev that a basic framework is in place. The president has the right to veto or refuse to sign any laws, except for laws related to budget and fiscal policy. This measure ensures greater parliamentary control and is aimed at preventing any future leader from ruling by decree, which is the practice in other Central Asian states. The new constitution also tries to

⁴The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan, Asia Report No. 193, August 23, 2010, International Crisis Group, *Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses*, Asia Briefing No. 102, April 27, 2010.

balance the power of various political parties in the parliament. It inputs a ceiling on the powers of the individual parties by limiting them to a maximum of 65 seats in the 120-seat chamber. This means that the number is enough for a party to have a simple majority, but it also implies that a party would have to form a coalition to rule effectively. The constitution also provides space to opposition factions. They will control two very important committees—the budget committee and the security, law and order committee. Thus the government set up by a parliamentary majority will certainly have to cooperate with an opposition faction (BBC Monitoring Global Newline, 2010).

According to the new constitution, if no political party is able to get more than half of the seats in parliament in the elections, the president can ask a particular faction to form a coalition for a parliamentary majority and nominate a prime minister within 15 working days. If the party selected by the president fails to do so it will still get a further two chances. If even after these two additional attempts the parliamentarians are unable to form a coalition, then the president will be obligated to announce early elections. During the recent elections, five parties won enough votes to enter parliament. The Ata-Jurt party which has a strong hold over the ethnic Kyrgyz in the south got 28 of the 120 seats. The Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SKDP), a pro-government party, won 26 seats, Ar-Namys 25, Republika 23, and Ata-Meken got 18 seats. As per the constitution, President Roza Otunbayeva mandated the parliamentary faction of the SKDP to form an alliance and commissioned the leader of SDPK Almazbek Atambaev to form the government (Darya Podolskaya, 2010).

Future challenges for new government

Recent developments in Kyrgyzstan have generated new hopes amongst the Kyrgyz people for the first parliamentary democracy to be created in the Central Asian region. However, these hopes are not without challenges, which the country will have to confront while implementing these new political reforms. The real test and future of parliamentary democracy in Kyrgyzstan will depend not on the new constitution but on how it will be applied in practice. The confusion over the number of votes, the opposition's complaints,

varying interests of political parties and charges of procedural irregularities have already slowed down the process of government formation.

Table 15. Incentive and mechanisms of mass mobilization.

	2005 Tulip Revolution		2010 April uprising	
	Incentives	Mechanisms	Incentives	Mechanisms
Local level	Material and solidary incentives (payments, solidarity with relatives and friends)	Formal institutions (political parties, NGOs), informal institutions (patronage networks, traditional institutions)	None	None
Regional level	Material and solidary incentives (access to resources, solidarity with relatives, friends and countrymen)	Formal institutions (political parties, NGOs), informal institutions (patronage networks, traditional institutions)	Material and solidary incentives (protection of oppositional leaders, solidarity among members of political parties)	Material and solidary incentives: formal institutions (political parties)
National level	Purposive incentives (Akaev's dismiss	People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan	Purposive incentives (Bakiev's dismiss	Telecommunications, Mass media, Internet.

Conclusion

The causes of social protest during two mass mobilizations are similar. Neopatrimonial rule and its derivative – the monopolization of main resources flows – led to discontent among businessmen, the political elite, and also a significant part of the wider population. The oppression of oppositional leaders and independent mass media, plus the violation of the human rights and the liberties of citizens led to further dissatisfaction. These abuses were taking place against a background of social disparities; poor people were getting poorer, while the ruling elite was appropriating national companies for cheaper prices. This situation increased the desire for protests among all levels of the population. On an organizational level, the two mass mobilizations differed greatly: the organized mass mobilization in 2005 sharply contrasts with the spontaneity of the events on 7–8 April 2010. The Kyrgyz revolution of March 2005, as well as other “color revolutions”, were carried out by various political forces (political parties, movements, etc.), and NGOs. However, the particularity of the Kyrgyz revolution consists in the fact that, here, patronage networks and traditional institutes have played a very active and probably a major role. Interaction between political forces, NGOs, patronage networks and traditional institutes led to mass mobilization with the result that the authority was changed.

While the Tulip Revolution has failed to fulfill its promises and meet the hopes of Kyrgyz citizens, nevertheless, it has proved Kyrgyz civil society’s longevity and stability. Bakiev replicated Akaev’s worst mistakes while discontinuing some of the more positive features of his predecessor. Bakiev changed the constitution to suit him, and formed a loyal political party; corruption is widespread and threatens to drive the hydro-energy sector into greater chaos. But although Kyrgyzstan has previously seen pro-regime political parties rising and falling with their members constantly changing political loyalties, civil society groups that were formed in the 1990s continue to function today. That is, the change brought by the ‘revolution’ is lacking positive connotation, while stability of civil society is a reassuring sign. The Kyrgyz public in general has become more politicized, seeking ways of expressing its disagreement with Bakiev’s policies.

With that, the local public has a greater trust of NGOs compared to political parties. NGOs and their leaders are able to consolidate masses more efficiently and genuinely than the government.

Even though 24 March is an ambiguous day for the Kyrgyz public with mostly unpleasant associations, nevertheless, the day should be celebrated because of the opportunity it provided for civil society groups. In effect, the Tulip Revolution and the events following it were a crash course for Kyrgyz citizens in civic education, their rights to vote, the meaning of the constitutional reform, and the importance of transparent governance. Such education is yet to be gained by the citizens of neighboring states. With regard to Kyrgyz politicians, in the process of numerous intrigues over access to public offices, they have learned the importance of relations with the public and mass media outlets. Today, the ruling elites are neither able to suppress all professional journalists nor silence all experienced NGO leaders, it shows the level of strengthening of democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan.

CHAPTER – 5

Conclusion

It is clear that the post-communist countries have followed a variety of trajectories in the period since the fall of Soviet Union in 1991. While some have been able to establish a stable, consolidated democracy, others have produced well-entrenched authoritarian structures while others seem stuck in the morass of facade democracy. Kyrgyzstan the isles of democracy in Central Asia, is a quite favorable source of research for a political scientist to know how a political institution evolves in a particular type of political culture. Since Kyrgyzstan presents an example of parochial kind of political culture, where people are not aware too much about their political system irrespective of the nature of government there which is due to their relations with a particular cast clan or religion. In such a country participatory democracy is a pure mimicry, since exception of it is possible. Indian experience in this regard is noticeable. But one should also notice a long Indian history of freedom struggle, social reform, gradual introduction of parliamentary democratic institutions by the Britishers, and the zealous democratic Indian elites, all these were powerful source of stable democratic regime in India. Kyrgyzstan lacks such factors and thus a stable democratic regime has been a great challenge here.

Hypotheses:

- Due to highly centralized political structure, the power elite inherited from the soviet era, lack of autonomous, free and fair electoral system, lesser role of civil society, and lack of mechanism for accountability of government, the power structure transformed into authoritarianism.
- If system for free and fair election, decentralization, and proper distribution of power, with the view of national unity and integrity, is managed the democracy will promote stability and inclusiveness in place of instability.

Hypothesis Verification

Since my first hypothesis is about the causes of democratic instability in Kyrgyzstan, thus the focus of my third chapter is to justify or falsify all these variables in their role in democratic instability. Study proves that criminalization, corruption, economic stagnation, poverty, nepotism and the clan system are the challenges for the democratic stability in Kyrgyzstan. First, Criminalization of politics and economy both are set back for the state legitimacy, and minimize the state capability and makes democratic elections, openness, power sharing and the proper transfer of power, quite impossible. Criminal groups facilitate corruption in administration; they reduce the administrative capability and level of openness in the administration. Thus, by analyzing the role of criminal groups on different grounds it is justified that they had their role in democratic instability into Kyrgyzstan.

Second variable behind the democratic instability is nepotism, whether it was Akayev government, or Bakiyev's, both are blamed for giving high administrative posts to their family members but whether it was an important cause for dissatisfaction against both the regimes or not it is not clear, because in a parochial type of political culture it is an accepted norm in the society to facilitate it's family members into high political and administrative posts, Indian politics in this regard is an example, many political parties in the country are family dominated, but it is not a cause of dissatisfaction against the political parties and political system. Thus this portion of hypothesis is falsified on this ground since my one of chapter deals with so many factors related with nepotism. Another variable of my first hypothesis is civil society – civil society in Kyrgyzstan is not developed enough, thus the civil society does not act as a safety valve of the political system all the time. This assumption is true for all type of political institutions whether it is democratic or non democratic type, due to the nature of the civil society.

Since the civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of

the state, and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.

The differentiation among the state, market and civil society is not clear enough in all the developing countries in Central Asia in general and Kyrgyzstan in particular. Thus these institutions intervene into the sphere of each other often that is why the role of these institutions cannot be generalized in developing countries. So it is impossible to justify or falsify the role of civil society in democratic stability and instability altogether. Whatever the theoretical perspective about the role of civil society is, since the members of civil society are the most aware and educated members of society, they help to build up the public opinion, on specific policy issues and government functioning, in this regard the role of NGO's before and after the Tulip revolution cannot be denied. Thus, for a great extent it is justified that the civil society is playing a vital role in democratization process of Kyrgyzstan.

Fourth independent variable for the democratic instability of my hypothesis is clan system. In traditional societies, role of the interest groups based on parochial identities is more important than the interest groups based on professions. But the means used by both types of interest groups is quite distinct. While profession based modern interest groups rely on peaceful method of bargaining and pressure creating, the parochial/traditional kind of interest groups most of the time use the violent means to protect their interests. In the case of Kyrgyzstan the communal riot between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks is based on the same pattern of interest protection, thus at this ground clan system is challenge for the stability in Kyrgyzstan and this trend became more evident after end of the Soviet quota system of representation and the majoritarian electorate system deteriorated the condition

further (Abazov 2003).

In developed western democracies, the power elite is described as consisting of members of the corporate community, academia, politicians, media editors, military service personnel, and high-profile journalists. But in a country like Kyrgyzstan where the traditional pattern of the society is so dominant there the role of the clan and religion based identity is dominant enough, so power elites comprise of the dominant clan and religious leaders and clan system is one of the main causes behind the violent power struggle among power elites in Kyrgyzstan.

My introductory chapter deals with different discourses of democracy whether it is liberal democracy, participatory form of democracy, deliberative form of democracy and democratic transformation in post Communist state, the study prove that a thing like universal democratic value does not exist. Democratic institutions and values are relative to a particular society and culture, all the variables in related study indicate toward the same relativist phenomenon. Further the subject of my study was to know the process of historical evolution of Kyrgyz democratic institutions, the progressive changes can be categorized into two categories.

1. Institutional development before the Tulip revolution, government's efforts of this time mostly focused on the stability of regime and making strong grip at the power structure, thus changes of this time period were mostly related with the reverse democratic development.
2. Institutional development after the Tulip revolution, this development phase can be identified as two steps ahead and one step back, thus authoritarian and democratic both kinds of development was characteristic of this phase.

My second chapter deals with different causes of instability in Kyrgyzstan, during the verification process of hypothesis I have analyzed these variables in details. The final objective of my study is to find out the outcomes of the Tulip revolution, central theme of my fourth chapter deals with the same issue, since Kyrgyzstan is going through a phase of rapid transformation, thus it will be quite immature to say about the outcomes of the revolution, but it will not be difficult enough to find out the immediate outcome of the

revolution.

1. As it is true with all the revolutions, world over, that the revolution is immediate change of power elites at higher level, it is also true with Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, top level ministers and his family members were replaced by Bakiyev and his family members, but like all the revolutions power elites at middle level here maintained their position. All the corrupt and authoritarian practices like nepotism and criminalization remained unchanged.
2. Civil society, strengthened after the revolution, they gained new confidence with their success in the revolution, constitutional amendments decreased presidential powers and thus Bakiyev was not a strong president like Akiyev. After the Tulip revolution democratic institutions i.e. traditional and nontraditional became stronger.

In conclusion it can be claimed that study fulfills most of the objectives, which it had set to fulfill.

The Appropriate Institutional set-up for Kyrgyzstan

Presidential form of government is well suited for a country where constitutionalism is strong enough, or in other word constitution controls the authoritarian use of political and administrative power, and secures the rights of the people by the means of check and balance, and separation of power. But constitutionalism is more than the document arrangement, it belongs to a kind of advance and developed political culture and political system and Kyrgyzstan lacks on all these grounds. Thus, Presidential form of government will be definitely converted into an authoritarian one, in conclusion it can be claimed that both the governments of Akiyev and Bakiyev transformed into a authoritarian and corrupt type because of the over centralization of political power and lack of institutional and non institutional means to check the misuse of political power.

Thus Indian experience of federalism can be useful for Kyrgyzstan also, where the federal government is more powerful than the state government. Indian federation easily can transform itself into a unitary type if an emergency like situation raises, but

federation cannot misuse its power, because of the institutional and non institutional arrangements are there to regulate it.

Although additional precautions will have to be taken to prevent identity based parties from dominating the government, the borders of the regional governments in Kyrgyzstan should be drawn along ethnic lines so that all the major ethnic groups in the country have significant control over their own political, social, and economic affairs.

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