

**ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND ISLAMIC
MOVEMENTS
IN THE 2011 EGYPTIAN UPRISING**

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DECLARATION


I declare that the dissertation entitled “**Role of Civil Society and Islamic Movements in the 2011 Egyptian Uprising**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.


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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The year 2011 would be documented in the world history as the year of Arab anger for the demands for democracy, freedom, dignity, free and fair participative parliamentary elections, cry for transparent government and the regime change. This was a time of excitement to implement the promises for socio, economic and the political changes. In between the economic and political crisis, civil society movements and politically motivated Islamist movements had raised these issues together in the West Asian and North African regions. Both movements were committed to bring social justice and democracy, participative and fearless politics. Their interconnectedness were influenced against the existing long term authoritarian regimes. It flowed from the streets to streets and from the borders to borders of the Arab countries. Meanwhile, it toppled the Governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. Thus the 2011 was recognized as the year of Arab awakening, Arab Spring, Arab uprising, Arab revolution, Arab upheaval and Arab angry against long term unchanging, authoritarian and dictatorial governing systems.

According to history, human race have witnessed hundreds of revolutions, uprisings, rebellions and social movements across all centuries in all over all continents. Although many of them have seen glorious moments as well as many have not seen the light of glory. Nevertheless, their characterizations are more or less similar in their life-cycle's dynamism. That would be starting from the deterioration of the socio, economic, political and financial conditions during the pre-revolution period. And it will go to the way they are born, the reasons of its ignition and the motivations behind the revolutions, actions and reactions during the revolution period. Finally, it will lead to the development of the new era.

Arab Uprising was not completely a revolution. Each and every countries had a different context and the social situations for uprising. Hence there are lots of different opinions and analysis about these uprisings and its causes. These uprisings were not only happened by the angry of the jobless youth. But there were other

historical background and reasons which also have become triggering factors behind this uprising. Arab uprising is an uncompleted phenomenon. In the future it may take any kinds of diversions or new forms. Whatever those may be the consequences, the uprising opened a huge opportunity to the future.

Egyptian uprising had the ingredients of protest through the cartoon, music, story, poetry, information technology, comedy, humor, ideology and the essence of the holy books. Arab uprising has questioned the conventional religious ideas as well as the Euro- American concepts on the social consciences of Arab public. Not only the rules and regulations of the religion, but its possibilities were discussed, dictated and implemented through the uprising. Europeans and their other critics changed their mind set about the Arabs. According to the Europeans the word Arab was a synonym of uncivilized population until this uprising had happened. But somehow, now it became the synonym of springs, hopes, enthusiasms and optimisms. Egyptian uprising have cracked two central myths of the international society especially the Western society on the Arabs. There was a concept about Arabs that they are not “mature” for democracy and Arab societies are “exceptions” from the other political vibrant society, so they are depended to others to do the political reformations and to solve the internal problems. It was approved broadly after the uprising that political Islam also can lead the government and deal with the demands and complaints of the society and it can be active as the alternative to dictatorship. People were demanding democratizing state institutions, organizing democratic and fearless elections and reforming the notorious security apparatuses. Huge efforts were need to make to match the political participation with the demands for equality and socio- economic development. Citizens were protesting for the translation of the uprising into the sustainable change as they felt their lives have not improved yet. They had to keep the foreign interventions in a distance and other vested interest groups to not take away the essence of the uprising.

The Uprisings happened in the Arab world since late 2010 and early 2011 have been differently described as “Jasmine Revolution”, “Arab Awakening”, “Middle East Revolution” “Arab Renaissance” and the “Arab Spring” mainly demanding freedom, democracy, dignity and also an end to authoritarian rule. The people have been rejecting the humiliation, degradation, corruption, nepotism, the absence of rule of

law, political transparency and the fear created by the authoritarian regimes for decades in some form or the other. In this series the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” became an inspiration for other Arab countries. The situation of Egypt was not different from the other Arab countries. Mubarak regime had already lost its legitimacy a long time ago.

The Egyptian uprising of 2011 was called as the “25th January revolution” which took place following a popular uprising from Tunisia that began on 10th December 2010. Egyptian uprising was a diverse movement of demonstrations, marches, plaza occupations, riots, non-violent civil resistance, acts of civil obedience and labour strikes. Millions of protesters from different socio-economic and religious backgrounds demanded the stepping down of the dictatorial Mubarak regime. It was the important Islamic, anti-capitalist, nationalist, communist and feminist currents of the uprising. More than 800 people were killed and 6000 were seriously injured by the clashes between the protesters and the national security forces. About 90 police stations were burned throughout the country.

The capital city of Cairo was described as “a war zone” during the uprising. Frequent violence and clashes were seen in the port city of Suez, Ismailia, Mansoura, and Alexandria. Egyptian uprising had become an inspiration to the uprisings in Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria and Libya. The 16 days uprising were very valuable to the Egyptians. Mubarak had tried to form a new Government under Ahmad Shafik who was the then aviation minister in the Mubarak regime and the former chief of Egypt’s Air Force. Egyptian Central Security Force was very loyal to Mubarak. But during the uprising they were gradually replaced by huge reserved military troops. Looting and open theft were happened when the police force were replaced. Vice President Omar Suleiman was appointed to move for the further future solutions and Mubarak dissolved his Government asking Ahmad Shafik to form a new Government. Even though Muhammad Al Baradei became a major figure of the opposing the Mubarak regime, this was a leaderless uprising.

The popular uprising in Egypt was mainly caused by a combination of three deficits: economic, political and dignity. Economic deficit means poor living standards, high inflation, unemployment and growing economic inequality. Political deficit means no

rule of law, lack of political freedom and public accountability and also the increasing corruption. Dignity deficit means the absence of respect for human rights due to suppression and oppression by the authoritarian regime. The increasingly well educated, globalized and politically awakened young segments of the society were the driving force behind the uprising. They were particularly motivated by the indignity of their political and economic context. It was not merely by the demands and grievances of the middle class people. Rather than it was raised and moved by all sections and classes of the people.

There were four groups in the Arab uprising. Arab civil society, Muslim Brotherhood, reformative religious groups, and new, educated, young generation who had no association with any religious organizations or political groups. They were the central, focal point of uprising. These four groups were in continuous contact and communication to uphold the uprising and its essence.

The Uprising of 25th January 2011 in Egypt was not the first or the beginning of the protest movement. Egypt had witnessed three types of collective protest movements over the past five years. The first was directly connected to the formation of the Egyptian Movement for Change (*Kefaya*) at the end of December 2004. This was mainly a civil society movement. Their protests raised the slogan “No to extension or to inheritance or corruption” and “Enough” of the continuing conditions in Egypt since 1981. *Kefaya* was a new phenomenon which was not known to Egypt before. It was able to raise the ceiling of protest by criticizing the President and his family, and all the ministers. The second wave of protest movements took a new economic approach as protesters raised wage-related demands and asked for improved working conditions in the light of high prices and the worldwide economic crisis. These civil society movements had no political demands; rather their main focus was to improve living conditions. The protest was organized by textile workers in Egypt’s various factories in Kafr el-Dawar and Mahalla el Kubra. The third wave was launched on 6th April, 2008 by the new young middle class groups, the professionally well-educated, who emerged as a new political and social force. This new force slowly turned to the internet; by making it as a new protest arena. This group used Facebook to mobilize over 70,000 members. The content of the debates was for the right to free speech, to eradicate nepotism in Government and to stabilize country’s vulnerable

economy. Egyptians were repeatedly stressing the need for comprehensive political reforms, for economic opportunities for the growing and well educated youth population, for a better redistribution of the wealth, and for the establishment of accountable and transparent governance.

Mubarak's government became unable to contain these young people, and the question has been raised about this new force which is keen to see political change in Egypt. People called for the overthrow of Mubarak regime as they felt that as long his regime remains due to martial law, the political process for democratization and human rights would remain a mirage. There was no doubt about the Mubarak regime controlling and suppressing civil society in Egypt. Thus, the main political trends in the country namely Islamist, liberal, leftist, and nationalist sought to create some kind of civil and social movements. The *Kefaya* (Enough) movement, which was trying to put an end to the rule of President Hosni Mubarak, did not achieve its goal, as they could not establish an effective social base in the Egyptian society.

Soon the focus shifted on the role of Muslim Brotherhood, the largest Islamist Movement in Egypt. Most Egyptians expected the Muslim Brotherhood to play a better role in order to bring democracy, as Muslim Brotherhood had proved their political strength in the 2005 elections and people had lost their confidence in the authoritarian regime. They did not like the democracy which the Mubarak regime was pursuing by Western support. Even then the mainstream public and policy debates in the West had ignored some basic sociological, historical, and ethical questions on political development in the Arab world, especially in Egypt. There were two observations about Egypt. The first one was on the anxiety surrounding the role of Islamist Movements and its religion-state ideology in Egypt. The second one was on the role of secular civil society movements in the uprising and their open minded support towards these political aimed Islamist Movements.

There were different predictions among the political scientists that the Arab uprisings and the democratic movements happening in West Asian countries would be a sign of a new era in the region. There was also a very strong opinion from another point of view that elements and balance sheet of old regimes clinging to power and the emerging political structures will not be much different from the older ones. Secular

civil society and the Islamist movements are the most visible streams in Egypt. Both movements had aspirations and future visions. When we compare the Arab world to the others, it is observed that they are very weak in taking the progressive footsteps towards the democracy. Whatever the predictions were going on, these civil society and Islamist movements have totally replaced the stereotypical understandings and imaginations that there was a cultural reason for lack of democracy and mature political culture. Soon the Egyptian people proved that they can also bring change and build a bridge across political and ideological differences to ensure rights, dignity and participative government.

In this whole movement, connection between civil society and Islamist Movements was not complementary. But they participated together in the movement; in different ways. In Egypt it was an attempt to experiment the possibility of a unique civil society emergence constrained by the Islamist movements. This is a complex interplay between civil society and Islamist Movements in the backdrop of the current Arab uprising while the Islamist Movements have been misunderstood by the actions of certain extremist organizations as well as the media. The civil society including Coptic Christians, Women and other minorities were given their major votes and support to the Islamist Movements in the first experiment of democratization.

25th January 2011 uprising of Egypt resulted in the fall and collapse of 30 years long Mubarak's regime and his power within 16 days. Since 25th January to 11th February more than 800 people were killed and more than 6000 were seriously injured. These all were the quantitative facts of the one side of this uprising. And, as for the other side of this uprising, there were a lot of explanations about its birth, bringing up, trigger, and its dynamism of the pre-uprising period and during the uprising as well as after the uprising. Egyptian uprising had its own similarities to, and differences from all other uprisings that happened across the West Asia. Social media and digital activism have proved that the Arabs can do uprisings, protest and reformation activism themselves. Many of the researchers and intellectuals have invested all their efforts to explain and theorize these uprising in many aspects.

This study has been divided into three chapters. The first chapter **Causes and Courses of Arab Uprising in Egypt** focuses on the social, political, economic and

religious causes of the Egyptian uprising and its different courses and periods. It analyses different human rights issues and violations happened in the Mubarak era which lead to the uprising. It is focusing on what were the main causes which finally pushed millions of citizens to the Egyptian streets and squares. It examines the elements which tore down the wall of fear that had prevented Egyptian society for decades from holding their leaders accountable.

The second chapter **Influence of Secular Civil Society Movements** captures the strong intervention of the civil society movements in the Egyptian uprising. It provides the different role of the various civil society movements and its influences in the Egyptian society before and during the uprising. It examines how are civil society movements, those are neither political parties nor religious groups, took to the streets. It tries to analyze how is the ordinary people shaking the foundations of entrenched authoritarian Mubarak regime and emerging as a new and the crucial political actors.

The third chapter **Political Islamist Movements and Its Contributions** tries to analyze the historical background of the political aimed Islamist movements, its birth, brought up stages, services and contributions to the Egyptian society. And it will focus on its main role in the uprising.

A rough and harsh spirit of flag-waving celebration prevailed. Women in full face veil's painted their daughters' faces in the colors of the Egyptian flag. Young men danced to thrumming drum beats on balconies, lampposts, and trucks. There were many signs bearing the dual images of a crescent and cross, as the symbol of Muslim-Christian unity. Many had said that they had to remember "the martyrs"- the people who gave their lives to change Egypt to a new society of justice and freedom. Vendors sold plastic cups emblazoned with the pictures of martyrs. There were signs that the demonstrators had not forgotten their disappointment with what seemed to be American support for Mubarak until the end of the revolt. Though the demonstrators had returned to remove most of the graffiti around the square, one billboard remained inscribed with a message in English: "USA Admin — we will get democracy with our will. Play your games with the tyrant."

CHAPTER 2

Causes and Courses of Arab Uprising in Egypt

Egyptian uprising had a lot of causes as its own. Thirty years of dictatorship by Mubarak and his authoritarian and autocratic rule, corruption, the emergency law, the faulty constitution, economic distress (40% of Egyptians were living under the international poverty line), growing calls for constitutional, economic, political and social reforms, artificiality of the latest parliamentary elections and the inspirations from the successful popular uprising in Tunisia as well as the increased emergence of civil society organizations were the main factors behind the Egyptian uprising. Egyptians got a new energy charged with a new kind of positivity, gathering empowerment, stern determination, national pride and solidarity in order to uphold the dignity of their own nation. That was a peaceful and youthful grassroots uprising involved by different political, religious and social groups. It was completely a leaderless uprising. At the same time Muslims and Coptic Christians were expressed their unity throughout this uprising. All of them had determined that Egypt will not go back to its old stature where it was before January 25.

The National Democratic Party (NDP) has been governing the Arab Republic of Egypt for many decades since its establishment in 1978. The NDP continued to dominate national politics by monopolizing and maintaining an overriding majority in the popularly elected People's Assembly and the partially elected Shura Council (Consultative Council). The Government was deriving its governing authority from the 1971 constitution and subsequent amendments. Executive authority resided with the president and the cabinet. Hosni Mubarak became the 4th President of Arab Republic of Egypt when the then President Anwar El Sadat was assassinated. He continued since 1981 until 11th February 2011 and became the longest-serving President in Egypt's history; the 30 years. In 2005 President Hosni Mubarak won a fifth consecutive six-year term with 88% of the votes in the country's first presidential election, which was marred by low voter turnout, charges of fraud, and government efforts to prevent opposition candidates especially Muslim Brotherhood from participating effectively. The civilian authorities did not always maintain effective control of security forces, which committed numerous serious violations of human

rights. Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) Government had been maintaining one-party ruling system under the continuous emergency laws and restrictions. Egyptians had believed that Mubarak's Government has been receiving the support of the West and the annual aid from the United States by maintaining policies of suppression and ban towards the political Islamist movements, civil society organizations and other reformative organizations. That is why Mubarak was compared to Pharaoh many times by the Arab media and by the Islamists because of his authoritarian rule.

Emergency Law

Emergency law was not a new thing for Egypt. It was enacted firstly in 1958 as Law No. 162 of 1958. Gamal Abdel Nasser was the president then. The same law secondly implemented by Anwar al Sadat during and after the six days war with Israel in 1967. And there was an 18 months break for emergency in between the early 1980s and until the ends of 1981. Following the assassination of Anwar al Sadat on 6th October 1981, it was re implemented by Mubarak until his toppling. After one year of Mubarak's resignation the head of the Military-Junta, Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi had promised at the time of first anniversary of the 25th January uprising, to partially lift the country's three-decade-old state of emergency. He said the tool for suppression would be used only to deal with the acts of thuggery like violence and attacks. But people did not believe it. At last the state of emergency expired completely on 31st May 2012 by the new elected Government after the uprising.

During these entire emergency periods, the law was enforced, the powers of police were extended, fundamental constitutional rights were suspended, and heavy media censorship was implemented. This law prohibited all non-governmental political activities, street demonstrations, and non-approved political organizations especially the political Islamist movements and its reformative activisms. Unregistered financial donations and collections were also formally banned by this law. Many innocent youth were detained under this law and more than 50,000 social-political activists were imprisoned as political prisoners. Under this state of emergency the police and Government were allowed to imprison any person whom they target for any period of

time whenever they want. There were long time indefinite imprisonments without any reasons, evidences, charge sheets and less trials. When the uprising was spread throughout Egypt day by day, Mubarak was threatening the people giving the warning that opposition group like Muslim Brotherhood could come into power in Egypt, if Mubarak Government did not conduct the parliamentary elections and other related process in his own responsibility. But People did not accept the justification of emergency law by giving the warning about Muslim Brotherhood or other opposition groups. Pro-democracy activists said emergency law is against the fundamental rights. It is always against the democratic principles and values, which includes the rights of every citizen to get the fair trial and to cast their valuable votes as per their wishes and ideologies without any force or fear, they argued.¹

Police Brutality

Mubarak regime has been running a notoriously brutal police state for decades in addition to the dictatorial rule. According to the report from the U.S embassy in Egypt police brutality and abuse were common and widespread in Egypt. Many of the domestic and international groups have provided cellphone live evidences and video clips in front of the investigation teams. According to the 2009 Human Rights Report by the U.S State Department “Domestic and International human rights groups reported that the Ministry of Interior (MOI), State Security Investigative Service (SSIS), police, and other Government entities continued to employ torture to extract information or force confessions. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights documented 30 cases of torture during the year 2009.² In numerous trials defendants alleged that police tortured them during questioning. During the same year activists and observers circulated some amateur cellphone videos documenting the alleged abuse of citizens by security officials. For example, on 8 February, a blogger posted a video of two police officers, identified by their first names and last initials, sodomizing a bound naked man named Ahmed Abdel Fatteh Ali with a bottle. On 12 August the same blogger posted two videos of alleged police torture of a man in a

¹ Amira Howeidy, ‘Revolution in Their Eyes’, *Al-Ahram*, 16-22 June 2011, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1052/eg3.htm>.

² 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt, ‘U.S Department of State’, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136067.htm#

Port Said police station by the head of Investigations, Mohammed Abu Ghazala. There was no any indication that the Government investigated either case.”³

Highly tighter internet control, kidnappings of innocent civilians, disappearing of innocent youths, brutal torture and abuse by police, and rampant bribery to get license or permit and even a Government document. Criminalization of police and their torture were very systematic and endemic in Egypt. Arbitrariness and unpredictable attacks of security forces in dealing with the citizens, restrictions on the freedom of expression and association, monitoring and terrorizing the political opposition and lack of pluralism, monopoly of the state over the legitimate form of political, social, cultural and religious discourses and the repeated violations of human rights also became the main factors for the Egyptian uprising. Egypt was continuing its slide from authoritarian state to mafia state. The responsible authorities were silent as they do not have any answer to give the people. The then Interior Minister Habib al-Adly, who was in this position since 1997, was impenetrable and incapable to control the torture scandals in the police force. He utterly failed in handling the police force as well as the terrorist incidents in Sinai between 2004 and 2006. Many embassies were running police training programs and other form of collaboration with the Ministry of Interior in Egypt. But yet Egyptian police force remained as criminals hobnobbing with drug barons and involved in endless bribery and brutality.

The brutal killing of Khalid Said by two police officers on 6th June 2010 in Alexandria also increased the angry of the people against the Mubarak regime and his police force. Khalid Said was browsing internet in a café in the Sidi Gaber area in the district of Cleopatra in Alexandria. Then two police men came and dragged him and asked him to give them money and then beaten him to death. People were witnessing this including the cafe owner at 11:30 pm. Ministry of Interior and police told that he was a criminal and he swallowed a bag of drugs. But the eyewitness told that the bag was carried by policemen not by Khalid. About more than 1000 people protested in Alexandria during the funeral for Khalid Said. A facebook page called “We are all Khalid Said” (*Kullunaa Khalid Said*) was made by Wael Ghonim, Google’s Middle East marketing director and it helped the people to gather for protests and

³Rashid Khalidi, ‘Preliminary Historical Observations on the Arab Revolutions of 2011’, *Jadaliyya*, 21 March 2011, www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/970/preliminary-historical-observations-on-the-arab-re

demonstrations. This page was instrumental in mobilizing a younger generation of Arabs to the January 25 protest meetings. This protest invited a nationwide attention. Different political activists, human rights advocates from the Youth of the Egyptian Association for Change, the April 6th Movement, the *Kifaya* Movement, the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, the Association for Freedom of Thought and Rights and several NGOs had protested in the central Cairo in Lazoghly square in front of the Ministry of Interior and demanded the resignation of the minister. Mohammed El Baradei, the famous opposition leader and the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, led a rally in 2010 in Alexandria against alleged abuses of the police force and visited Khalid Said's house to offer condolence. Another protest happened in Talaat Harb, downtown Cairo also. Demonstrators were chanting loudly 'oh Egyptian, tell us what you are waiting for after blood was shed'. For this protest, social media were helpful in unifying Egyptian voices and activists across the globe over Egypt's brutal police state.

Egypt was a state which suppressed the youth, protesters and Islamic Movements as well as new voice for the reformative changes. The Government also had oppressed Egyptian media to conceal the truth and reality from the people. Foreign journalists have been cracked down when the uprising was spreading day by day throughout the Egypt. Al- Jazeera office was closed down and its staff members were detained in Cairo. Cell phone lines were cut off for the starting few weeks and internet connections were blocked off. It means Mubarak Government was using the old suppressive mentality of '50s and '60s. He failed to recognize the context of the current scenario.

For that Egypt was slowly becoming a police state where the suspected people were suppressed, oppressed and killed in jails and streets. Mubarak used about 1 million police to confront the protest in Tahrir square and the other parts of Egypt. Every Friday the protesters gathered in Tahrir square in a mass level and demanded the stepping down of Mubarak. Then Mubarak tried to put his Vice President Omar Sulaiman to build a new Government in order to make the people calm and quiet. Muslim Brotherhood had a discussion with Omar Sulaiman at first phase. Brotherhood also did not recognize the main demands of the civil society at beginning. People did not agree with these discussions and making a new

Government under Omar Suleiman or Ahmad Shafik. They demanded Mubarak and his followers must go.

Inheritance of Power

People had felt that Mubarak is a pro-American and keeping its interest for Israel since 1981 and wanted to handover the power into his son on the forthcoming election of September 2011. This was the common feeling that Mubarak and his family members and relatives have been stealing the national wealth of Egypt for many decades. Since the beginning of 2000 it had heard that the younger son of Mubarak would be the next President of Egypt after his father's period. Since the beginning of 2000 most of the Egyptian Media also propagated Gamal Muabarak as the successor of Hosni Mubarak. Gamal Mubarak tried to receive the media attention, as there were no any other apparent heirs to the post of presidency. Bashar al Assad came into power in Syria in June 2000, when he succeeded his father, Hafiz al Assad. This inheritance method in Syria was become highly debated in Egypt when the political scenario was moving same as to Syria. Egyptians were not ready to follow the Syrian method in Cairo. Hosni Mubarak recognized this situation very early and he also tried to move his bureaucracy in order to remove the obstacles coming in front of his son, the next successor, Gamal Mubarak. An online campaign named National Initiative against Power Inheritance started with the opposition protests in 2006. It formed because of the re-election of Muabark in 2005. They demanded the political change, a fair election with more than one candidate and wiping out of power inheritance from father to son like Syria and the other Arab, G.C.C countries. Mubarak denied the news about succession. But the people did not believe it. Because Gamal Mubarak became the Deputy Secretary General of NDP. By then was the leader of leading party's policy making committee. Despite the weak health condition of Mubarak, he refused to appoint Vice President to run the administrative matters. Analysts said Gamal Mubarak was considered as the de facto President of Egypt.

Freedom of Speech and Press

The Egyptian constitution provides complete freedom of speech and the press. But the Governments partially restricted this right in practice through harassment, censorship,

arrests and illegal detentions under the emergency law. But the young generation largely used the modern social networking Media such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, internet cartoons and all kinds of other information technology based facilities.

New information technology and usage of social networking Media were the easy tools used for spreading the essence of uprising. The youth portrayed cartoons and graphic pictures of their reasons, demands and the causes of uprising. Then they spread this messages through the internet with the real causes such as decades-old state of emergency laws, lack of legitimacy of the state, police brutality, civilian torture Egyptian foreign policy, lack of free elections and freedom of speech, increasing unemployment, food price inflation, low wages, corruptions as the main factors the Egyptian uprising.

Protesters' primary demand was to end the Hosni Mubarak's regime and his succession plans; and then the end of emergency law, and the end of injustice. There were different drivers of change involved in bringing the uprising. Egyptian demographic challenge was another factor. Highly increased Egyptian demography had a lot of social problems. Population growth was combined with urbanization, rapid expansion of university students, westernized, secularized and graduated jobless youth (two-third of Egyptians are under 30, and each year 700,000 new graduates chase 200,000 new jobs) etc.⁴

Economic Deficit: Increased Corruption, Poverty and Male prostitution

The economic policies of Mubarak regime was the other main factor which caused to the uprising. Egypt is a country of 83 million people. High living cost, unemployment, male prostitution, poverty and inadequate food security problems were common in Egypt. Government neglected the youth completely. City's young men, most of them had become prostitutes as the only hope of earning a living. In the 1990s, Luxor became the center of male prostitution in the West Asia. The studs sold themselves to older foreigners, who arrived throughout the year for unabashed, but for

⁴ Korotayev, Andrey V and Zinkina, Juliya V, "Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis" *Middle East Studies Online Journal* –ISSN 2109-9618- Issue no.5, Vol.2 (2011):57-95.

the most part locally denied, sex tourism.⁵ Luxor's mayor, Samir Farag, was arrested after Mubarak's ouster on charges of rampant corruption, as were many other mayors up and down the country. A few years earlier the same mayor had told an Arabic-language newspaper that as many as 30 percent of Luxor's young men had married an older foreign woman, and in most cases this was -covert prostitution-the latter being both illegal and shameful for the conservative locals to openly acknowledge⁶. In Cairo about 20 million people mostly impoverished individuals struggled to eke out a living. During Mubarak's tenure it seemed miraculous that Cairo's inhabitants managed to survive from one day to the next. The traffic congestion, compounded by the blatant refusal of drivers to follow even basic rules of the road, meant that travelling from one district to another could take up the best part of a day.

Political and Ideological Background

It is possible to identify the most salient features of the Mubarak regime as an important prerequisite to understanding the status of the Egyptian civil society. A prominent Egyptian intellectual, Galal Amin, professor of economics at the American University in Cairo, provides us with a clear analysis of the case of the Egyptian state in the era of President Mubarak.⁷

He focused on four perspectives:⁸

First: The Theory of the Soft State

Situation in Egypt can understand by applying the theory of the famous Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal on the soft state, which is considered to be major cause for the persistence of poverty and underdevelopment. Egypt is a country where laws do not apply, not only because of the legal loopholes, but because nobody respects laws in a soft state. The privileged people have money and power to protect themselves

⁵See a detailed discussion of male prostitution in Luxor, see Chapter.6, "Lost dignity", in John. R. Bradley, *Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)

⁶"Foreign Women Threaten Social Fabric of Luxor", *Al-Bawaba*, February 3, 2007, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus.f-chat/1293954/posts>.

⁷Galal A. Amin, *Egypt and Egyptian in Mubarak's Era 1981-2008*, Cairo: Dar Mirit, 2009.

⁸Hamdy A.Hassan, "Civil Society in Egypt under the Mubarak Regime", *Afro- Asian Journal of Social Sciences*. Vol.2, No 2.2 Quarter II 2011.

when they break the law, and the unprivileged protectors of laws are obliged to receive bribes to turn a blind eye on breaching the law in such states licenses and permits are for sale. Thus corruption emerges everywhere. The Soft State encourages corruption, and the spread of corruption increases its softness. Perhaps the most prominent example of such a case in Egypt is reflected on the aftermath of an earthquake in 1992, which was only forty seconds vibration. Then the government as well as the society recognized that the Egyptian state functions were almost paralyzed and seemed to be out of control. When the government was ineffective in front of the unexpected disaster in responding to this natural calamity, there Muslim Brotherhood signed a crucial role and services like a parallel government. Brotherhood quickly filled the void in disaster relief, opening shelters and providing medical aid. It revealed the Government's failure to deal adequately with Egypt's severe housing problem.

Second: The Nature of the Ruling Elite

In Egypt the natural death of politics is a common thing. The elites surrounding President Mubarak differ from their peers who worked with Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat. Specifically the ruling elites in the Mubarak era did not have political experience before assuming power. This is happening because of the nature of the president. Mubarak was very different from Nasser and Sadat. In the economic field he adopted neither open door nor closed door policies. He did not fight with Israel nor sign new agreements with it. Mubarak was a third type of man to carry out the required tasks. They had completed loyalty to the system. But they had no any interest in politics or public affairs. They never posed any challenge to the real policy makers in Egypt.

Third: Poor Distribution of Wealth

The poor class constitutes a major proportion of population in Egypt. According to the UNDP Annual Report 2008, at least 20 per cent of Egyptian citizens live below the

poverty line.⁹ 14.7 per cent of children do not go to school. Many scholars noted that over the past twenty years the ability of the poor to satisfy their basic needs like food, clothing, education, health, and transportation have been in decline. At the same time, the wealth was compiled during the early years of the open door economic policy has begun to draw public attention. Stories about the enormous wealth gained by the currency traders and contractors were widespread among the masses. The people watch the increasing number of expensive wedding parties held in luxurious hotels just to prove outstanding success achieved by these traders and contractors in the accumulation of enormous wealth.

There was no doubt that the sudden wealth achieved by some people in the first year of adopting open doors policy adopted by Sadat did not cause the same frustrations among the poor that were raised due to illicit enrichment of some individuals that has occurred in the last twenty years under Mubarak's regime. Wealth was associated with the previous capacity of many Egyptians to migrate those who did not migrate were merely living in the era where a general increase in income was usually associated with generous spending by the state. The Craftsmen's wages were increased because of this migration. Perhaps the most important manifestation of indecency of wealth in the year of President Mubarak's rule was the source of this wealth. The sources of personal wealth in Egypt were no longer associated with mediation such as trading, entrepreneurship and brokerage. Because this was the case at the early years of the open door policy. But rather, the seizure of state funds has become the most important sources for personal enrichment in Egypt. In the light of low rates of growth and declining levels of spending by the government and people alike, there is nothing left for acquiring wealth except asset stripping, and the easiest prey of these assets in a soft state is the property of the state itself. Such property may be represented in state-owned land that was offered for sale, or funds deposited in state banks for loans or the property of public companies to be privatized. Personal enrichment without cause never ever stopped during the past twenty years. Outright

⁹ UNDP (2009). Capacity Development: Empowering People and Institutions. www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/corporate/undp_in_action_2008.html.

corruption as well as deficiencies in the regulation of public and private- sector business practices provided great opportunities for enormous fortunes in a short time span. This has led to increased anger and frustration among the poor Egyptians.

Four: Corruption from Politics to Culture

The Mubarak era has been marked by the emergence of some of the features that allowed new facets of corruption to flourish among the intelligentsia. The policy of the new era has proven that it does not differ from the policy adopted by Sadat. Many scholars argued that this stagnant situation would eventually lead to despair and loss of hope in any change, which constitutes suitable milieu for the emergence of intellectual opportunists. Whereas they had relinquished hope for any change in the near future on the general level. They never give up their personal ambitions to achieve better status. Some of the real reformers were making great efforts to make progressive characteristics in such unfavorable conditions to withdraw themselves from the political frustrations. Some other intellectual and talented persons they changed themselves regarding the situations and contexts, and they revealed their political opinions and gained their own positions standing on their own opinions. On the other hand, a large number of untalented editors, columnists and editors in chief in some of the state owned journals had falsely adopted sensitive positions in the media. The outcome had been unprofessional performance and irrelevant writing, unread or appreciated by the majority of Egyptian readers. In fact these writers do not care about readers as much as they care about their loyalty to those who have the political power. It can be said that after a slight period of political opening in the 1980s and very early 1990s, the Mubarak regime had progressively limited opportunities for the dispersal of power beyond the president.¹⁰

Conclusion

Galal Amin described in his analysis of Egypt as a country, it was a soft state ruled by a part of elite group of people mostly from the military who allowed the whole wealth of the nation to be circulated among the mighty opening up all the doors for

¹⁰Brownlee, Jason, "The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarak's Egypt", *Journal of Democracy* – Vol 13, No.4, October 2002, pp. 6-14.

corruption. As he described this soft state remained as just a place on earth even the intelligentsia lived along the dictators. So, in the upcoming chapters, this analogy on the Egyptian society will be deeply discussed along with roles of the Islamic Movements and Civil Society movements in Egyptian uprising.

CHAPTER 3

Influences of Civil Society Movements

The debates on civil society became a moving area of interest of academician on West Asia in the 1990s due to a number of developments within and beyond the region. Many observers like Ali. M. Ansari pointed out that 'the immediate reason why scholars went in search of civil society and the green shoots of democracy was the onset of the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 and the popular scepticism surrounding its motivation'¹¹. Authoritarianism, rentier nature of many G.C.C states, pan-Arab nationalism, the crisis of traditional political organizations, the marginalization and the suppression of Islamist and the left ideologies and the overall legitimacy crisis of a large piece of states in West Asia have to be taken into account for meaningful understanding of civil society in this part of the world.¹²

In Egypt, Islamist Groups had succeeded in using their considerable resources to gain the unavoidable influence within Egypt's plural or civil society. Even though civil society in Egypt was a very large and influential one, the authoritarianism and autocratic rule was a big threat to them. Dissents were brutally suppressed. Egyptian rulers exploited their authoritarian power and military capability against their own civilians like Islamists, human rights activists and the active members of civil society organizations. Still the situation is not so changed from the old. Thus they ceased to be productive participants in its political process and social development. This had deprived the people of their powerful role in political development.¹³

In Egypt's case, it is to be noted that the ideological and theoretical debate concerning issues of social evolution and development was generally state centered, and relied heavily on theoretical concepts such as bureaucratic authoritarianism, oriental

¹¹ Ali M. Ansari, *Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change* (London Chathan House, 2006), 2nd edn., p.18.

¹² A.K.Ramakrishnan, "Politics of Civil Society in West Asia", *West Asia: Civil Society, Democracy and State* (Ed.), New Century Publications. New Delhi. India.2010. pp. 25.

¹³ A.K.Pasha, "Changing Egyptian Role in West Asia and North Africa", *Egypt in a Changing World*, National Publishing House. New Delhi.2003. pp.218.

despotism and the Asiatic mode of production.¹⁴ For some considerable time the state seemed formidable enough to have subdued society through its authoritarian mechanisms such as the military, the security institution and the centralized economy¹⁵.

It is very clear that most of the structural changes that took place in Egypt since 23rd July 1952 military coup. There was no any secular civil society movement behind this operation and the further changes. Until this 25th January uprising, military and authoritarianism had played a crucial role to sustain that condition in the Egypt. This alliance of military and authoritarian regime was considered as true for the restricted political diversity in Sadat period and for the controlled liberal policy in Mubarak period. Authoritarianism under the shadow of military was called as political Pharaonism or Pharaonic political system as many political observers said. Under this system the rulers enjoyed unlimited and unquestioned authority. Egypt had to seek for “second liberation” from authoritarianism after its “first liberation” from British colonialism. The controversial constitution amendment in 1980, which was practically perpetuated the period of the presidency to lifetime. In which the president could run for an unlimited number of terms rather than one term as was initially stipulated in the 1971 constitution. The growing number of civil society movements and NGOs were the sign of the democratic progress in the Egyptian society. In Egypt it was a mass movement towards the consolidating authoritarianism.

Evolution of Civil Society Movements in Egypt

Egypt has a long history of civil society movements and its progressive footsteps, which extends over a period of almost 200 years. Apart from the other Arab countries, the civil society in Egypt gives a distinctly different picture of the gradual development and progress. The beginning of civil society movements in its modern form took place as early as the year 1821 during the rule of Muhammad Ali Pasha.

¹⁴For several excellent discussions of this phenomenon see: Ninette S. Fahmy, *The Politics of Egypt: State-Society Relationship*. London: Routledge, 2002. And Hamdy A. Hassan, (Ed.), *Democratic Transition in Egypt (in Arabic)*, in *Democratic Transition in the Arab World during the Nineties, Al-Mafraq*, Al Albeit University, 2000. pp 3-6.

¹⁵Since the 1950s, the nature of personal authoritarian rule in Egypt has remained virtually unchanged. See Maye Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

The first non-governmental organisation in Egypt, the Greek Association in Alexandria, was founded in 1821. Since then until this 25th January uprising of 2011, there are five phases of gradual development in the history of civil society movements in Egypt.¹⁶

The First Uprising: Muhammad Ali Pasha and his dynastic era (1821-1881)

At the beginning of the 19th century Egypt, witnessed for a several changes that accompanied the modernization project. The first inception of civil society in Egypt came as a result of these changes.¹⁷ Muhammad Ali Pasha was known as the 'Father of modern Egypt'. A large number of students as well as the emergence of a national bourgeoisie created a working and middle class professionals under the rule of Muhammad Ali Pasha. The Geographical Society was formed in 1875 and was soon followed by several charitable Muslim and Christian organisations in order to prevent the Western religious conversion attempts and to support national causes. These religious organisations were funded by endowments, which helped to create many public institutions such as the Agouza Islamic hospital, founded by the Islamic Charitable Association, and the Al-Masa'i Al-Mashkoura School, founded by the Al-Masa'i Al-Mashkoura Coptic Charitable Association in the Menoufiya governorate in 1881. Some of the founders of civil society organizations were high functionaries or members of the Royal Family who had travelled to Europe and tried to transfer the European civil society experience to Egypt.

The British Colonial Phase (1882-1922)

In this period civil society organizations started as a struggle movement in defence of the interest of the Egyptian society. So throughout Egypt there was a large number of increase of modern, voluntary organizations such as trade unions (1898), the co-

¹⁶ Maha Abdel Rahman, *The Politics of UN-Civil Society in Egypt*, *Review of African political Economy*, Vol.29, No.91, 2002, and: Mustapha Kamel, *A Civil Society in Egypt?*, in Augustus Richard Norton, (Ed), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol.1, New York E.J.Brill,1995,pp.269-293. See also: Hassanein Tewfik, *State and Development in Egypt, Political Aspects: Comparative Study* (in Arabic), *Research Centre on Developing Countries*, Cairo University, 2000.pp 211-219

¹⁷ Muhammad Ali Pasha, who ruled Egypt from 1805 until 1848, was the founder of modern Egyptian State. He brought several reformation programs aiming at creating a modern Egyptian society. He built and started many schools for producing engineers, doctors and specialists.

operatives (1908), political parties (1907), chambers of commerce (1910), professional associations (1912) and the feminist movement (1919).¹⁸ Cairo University was established in 1908 and it was funded by an endowment from a royal princess. Civil society developed to evolve with the formation of professional syndicates. Thus they started Lawyers Syndicates in 1912 and syndicates for doctors, journalists and engineers in 1940s.¹⁹ The Urabi Revolt or Urabi Revolution was a nationalist uprising in Egypt in between 1879-1882 against the Egyptian ruler Khediv Tawfik Pasha and the British Colonial forces. This uprising was led by Colonel Ahmed Urabi Pasha. But at last Urabi forces defeated and exiled from the Egypt.

The Liberal Phase (1922-1952)

This was the period of King Farouk, the tenth ruler of Muhammad Ali Pasha dynasty. The liberal phase was marked by the adoption of the Constitution of 1923 at the time of King Fuad I. This constitution was regarded as the most liberal constitutions, as it guaranteed a number of rights and basic freedoms like the freedom of association and expression. That is why this constitution provoked the colonial forces and they tried to suspend this completely or to rebuild as another constitution after keeping their interests by the adequate changes. This phase witnessed a flourishing of civil society. There were a lot of publications including more than 80 daily newspapers, as well as weeklies, magazines in both Arabic and European languages. Civil society also upgraded by the active discussions and debates on the raising questions of transparency and accountability of government, demand for free elections, and rights for working class unions. At last these demands caused to overthrowing of Farouk government by the military coup by Free Officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser on 23rd July 1952. That was a new step of development both state and civil society in Egypt. The number of non-profit organizations continued to grow rapidly, and by the 1952 military revolution there were more than thousand such organizations.

¹⁸Hamdy A.Hassan, "Civil Society in Egypt under the Mubarak Regime", *Afro- Asian Journal of Social Sciences*. Vol.2, No 2.2 Quarter II 2011.

¹⁹Qandil, Amani. *Al-Mujthama 'al Madani Wa ad-dawla fi Misr* (Civil Society and the State in Egypt). *Al-Mahrousa Publishing House*. Cairo, p 24-25

The Nasserist Phase (1952-1970)

When Nasser came into the power by the support of military, the power concentrated in the hands of state which imposed its authority on civil society. During this phase, about six constitutions were officially promulgated all by presidential decrees. The constitution of 1956 was an exception. It was approved by referendum. All of these constitutions were controlled, formed and concentrated in the hands of a small governing elite group led by Nasser. In this elite group the executive authority had a special power over both the judiciary and the parliament.

The Nasserite State restricted and constrained the organizations of civil society by developing a corporatist populist regime.²⁰ The working class movement was subject to a large number of special policies and rules and regulations, such as the abolition of trade unions and the imposition of one trade union for each trade. Also, a single Federation of Trade Unions was formed with the aim of controlling and dominating all working class activities. The State imposed forcefully its domination on all civil society activities through a law enacted in 1964. This law gave the administrative authority a special right to refuse the formation of civil society organizations, dissolution, or amalgamation of any civil association without recourse to the judiciary. Even students and feminist movements were also subject to similar restrictions imposed by the populist state.

The Final Phase: From Sadat and Mubarak until the 2011 Uprising

This phase was arrived with the beginning of open-door policies of Anwar al Sadat. It became heralded for the arrival of a market economy and a multi-party system of governance. But the ultimate decision to create several parties was under taken by the President Sadat. In 1971 Sadat launched the Corrective Revolution that by official description “delivered the country from injustice, terrorism and corruption” (*al-Akhbar al-Yaum*, February 23, 1980). In 1972 he expelled about 17,000 Soviet experts. In 1973 he launched the October war “with massive popular support and in defiance of the defeatist spirit the Soviets tried to spread in the country” (*al-Ahram*, June 8, 1980). In 1974 the President declared “Open Door Policy” “to free the

²⁰Ibid, pp. 160-165.

country's economy from the restrictions that had for so long bound it." In 1975 he took the decision to reopen the Suez Canal to International navigation. In 1976, Sadat reportedly said; "We were forced to cancel the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty after it was proven that the Soviets merely intended by this treaty to impose their will and perpetuate their domination over the country" (*al-Ahram, June 8, 1980*). In 1977, Egyptian President went to Jerusalem, as he put it, "to address the Israeli people with frankness. None of the Arab leaders could have dared to embark on such an initiative" (*al-Ahram, June 8, 1980*). In 1978 Sadat signed the Camp David Accords and in 1979 the peace treaty with Israel.²¹ After all Egyptians felt that Sadat has moved Egypt firmly into the Western sphere, while in the past, Nasser had turned to the East and welcomed the Russians. The dove of peace and the open door- these were the main symbols which have been woven into the welcome of the west in Egypt. Civil Society organizations as well as Islamists were viewers in front of the Sadat's policy making. Both groups were provoked, very angrily, because of his open door policies. At last it led to his assassination. And Mubarak became the President of Egypt.

In the mid-1980s, the state actively reduced its role, giving civil society the opportunity to play a bigger role with the economic transformation. In the early 1990s, the Mubarak regime embarked on an economic liberalization process, which was aided by the structural adjustment projects of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition to the economic conditionalities imposed by these institutions, they have advocated for civil society organizations to assist the state in development. In 1994, the International Conference on Population and Development was held in Egypt, which was a milestone for the promotion of the civil society organizations as partners in the new economic liberation process. As its result, the number of civil society organizations doubled from 7,593 in 1985 to 16,000 in 1991.²² This growth continued to increase until there were 30,000 civic associations in Egypt in the run up to the January 25th uprising. Half of these constitute development and religious associations. The rest is composed of sports, youth, social clubs, trade and industry chambers, professional syndicates, and trade and workers

²¹Raymond William Baker, "Sadat's Open Door: Opposition From Within", *Social Problems*, Vol.28, No.4, April 1981.

²²Hamdy A. Hassan. "The State and Civil Society in Africa: A North African Perspective". *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 2009, Vol.3 No.2:66-76

unions.²³ Different Ministries had endorsed the development of civil society organizations as well. For instance, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Youth had created channels for co-operation with NGOs on gender sensitive approaches, population growth and for the promotion of the youth clubs across the country.²⁴ By the end of 2008, there were some 30,000 civil society organizations in Egypt, or approximately one for every 2,800 Egyptian residents. Only a minority of those, however, was active. Religious and development associations together represented more than half of all associations. Other important groups include sports, youth and social clubs and co-operatives. There were 115 trade and industry chambers, 24 professional syndicates and 22 workers' unions organized under a common federation. Moreover, there are currently 24 legally registered political parties. Mere numbers, however, do not represent the true strength of civil, especially as some organizations became ineffective and exist on paper only.

Civil society movements in Egypt host a proliferation of interest groups such as professional syndicates, workers' trade unions, businessmen associations and some civil enterprises representing specific private interest. There are 89 such organizations, with an aggregate membership of some 7 million. However, the relation between the state and these bodies was rather ambiguous. In the case of trade unions it amounts to a relation of patron or client, as the General Trade Union was simply a state run organization. Although the right to strike is recognized in democratic regimes, the Egyptian state adopts security measures to oppose any attempt to exercise this right by the workers who suffered due to the Structural Adjustment Policies pursued by the Egyptian Government.

In the case of professional syndicates, the state had to deal a serious interaction with the Islamic Movements, which grew strongly in the Syndicate of Engineers, the medical professionals and lawyers. But Mubarak regime failed to do deal with Islamist Movements. The state resorted to the legislature to counter this growing threat by promulgating Law 100 in 1993, a law which was prepared and issued in just three days. The limited number of businessmen associations and their scant

²³ Hamdy A. Hassan. "Civil Society in Egypt under the Mubarak Regime", *Afro-Asian Journals of Social Sciences* 2, No.2.2 (Quarter II,2011), pp1-18

²⁴ Center for Development Services, *An Overview of Civil Society in Egypt: Civil Society Index Report for the Arab Republic of Egypt* (Cairo: Centre for Development Services, 2005)

membership did not hamper them from acquiring significant influence starting from the late seventies, as the Egyptian state reverted to liberal privatization policies. One notable such organization is the Egyptian American Council created by Presidential Decree in 1975. Other such prominent organizations include the Egyptian Businessmen Association created in 1977, the Economic Committee for Alexandria Businessmen in 1983, the Association of Investors of 10th Ramadan City in 1986, and the Association of Investors of 6th October City in 1986. The powerful influence of these Businessmen's Associations could be attributed to many things. For instance there was no opposition between these organizations and the state because they share the same political and ideological tendencies concerned with the liberalization of state and society. The small number and membership of businessmen associations allows them to better coordinate in defence of their common interests, their main role is to support business and economic growth. Thus the similarity of their interests has meant a greater degree of cooperation rather than conflict and antagonism.

Although the multiparty law was promulgated in 1976, its statute (statute) was not issued until July of the next year. This law, and its many amendments, instituted many restrictions and limitations on political parties functioning in Egypt. According to the ballot on 26th March, 2007, Article (5) was amended to prohibit "the establishment of any religious party." The political system of Egypt is a multiparty system, within the framework of the basic elements and principles of the Egyptian society as stipulated in the Constitution. Political parties were regulated by law. Citizens had the right to establish political parties according to the law and no political activity shall be exercised or political parties established on a religious authority, on a religious basis or on discrimination on grounds of gender or origin". Although many new parties were created on paper and practice, bringing the total number to 24 parties, but a true multiparty system had not yet existed in Egypt. They are Al Nour Party, led by Emad Abdul Ghafoor, Building and Development Party (*Hizb Al-Bina'a Wa Thnmiyyath*), led by Tarik Al-Zumar, Authentic Party (*Hizb Al-Aswala*), led by Ehab Shiha, Freedom Egypt Party (*Hizb Misr Al-Hurriyya*), founded by Amr Hamzawy, Egyptian Alliance Party, headed by Muhammad Al-Gilany, Equality and Development Party, started by Egyptian actress Tayseer Fahmy and her husband Dr. Ahmed Aboobaker, Islamic Labour Party (*Hizb Amal Al-Islami*), headed by Ibrahim Shoukry, Liberal Egyptian Party (*Hizb Al Misri Al-Liberali*), headed by Mahmoud Al-Phir'oni, Wasat

Party (*Hizb Al-Wasat*), led by Aboo Elala Mady and Essam Sultan, Justice Party (*Hizb Al-Adl*), led by the famous economist Muna El Baradei and the democracy activists Mustwaffa Al-Naggar, Socialist Party of Egypt (*Al-Hizb Al-Ishthiraki Al-Misri*), led by Ahmad Bahauddeen Sha'aban, *Tagammu* Party (National Progressive Unionist Party), led by Sayyed Abdul Aal, Workers and Peasants Party, led by Kamal Khalil, Egyptian Communist Party (*Al Hizb As-Shuyooie Al Misri*), led by Salah Adly, Egyptian Social Democratic Party (*Al-Hizb Al Misri Ad-Demokrathi Al-Ijthimaae*), led by Mervat Tallawy Constitution Party (*Hizb Ad-Dasthoor*), led by Muhammad Al Baradei Free Egyptian Party (*Hizb Al- Misriyyeen Al-Ahrar*), led by Ahmad Hassan Said, Arab-Democratic Nasserist Party (*Hizb Al Arabi Ad-Demokarathi An-Naseri*), led by Diauddeen Daoud, Democratic Front Party (*Hizb Al-Jabhathi Ad-Demokarathiyya*), led by Saeed Kamel, Egyptian Green Party (*Hizb Al-Khudr*), led by Dr. Abdul Moneim Al-A'sar, Ghad El Tawra Party (*Hizb Ghad Al-Thowra*), led by Ayman nour, Egyptian Reform Party (*Hizb Al-Isolah Al Misri*), led by Essam Abdul Basith and Egyptian Patriotic Movement (*Al-Harakathul Watwaniyya Al-Misriyya*), led by Ibrahim Darwish and Ahmad Shafeek.

Still civil society sector in Egypt has a rich history. But with the decline of Egypt's economy since 1990, there has been a gradual reassertion of NGOs and self-help in Egypt. Such Private initiatives were aimed at needy and impoverished communities. Most of these NGOs have been actively working throughout the country to provide economic, social, and political services to a largely poor population. However, the main concern of these NGOs includes increased attention to the situation of marginalized groups such as the rights of street children and human rights issues are of a political nature, such as cases of torture, the issues of political Prisoners and the prosecution of journalists. Over the past twenty years a number of issues had come to constitute the core agenda of NGOs in Egypt. The first was anti-corruption. Egypt had attempted many times to educate citizens and to establish information centres and networks. Several local NGOs such as Egyptians Against Corruption (EAC), the Egyptian Transparency Organization (ETO) for Human Rights had been working on fighting corruption but complaint was that they have to face a lot of legal and administrative obstacles to do well as they wish. Second, the value of citizenship emerged as an input to promote a culture of tolerance and rejection of intolerance through the activities of civil society. There was a rejection of the discrimination

between the Egyptians on the basis of religion and citizenship. Third was the issue of reform. There were repeated calls by civil society organizations to form a united front in the face of corruption and tyranny, and to establish a union for all professional syndicates in Egypt. Even though there were a lot of civil society movements they could not form their own formation to lead the country, where Muslim Brotherhood and its new-born Freedom and Justice Party gained the goal and the influential belief of the majority in the civil society. It has been analysed that, because of that impression they supported Brotherhood and its political party to make and lead a democratic, reformative government in their first experiment.

Historically, most of the civil society organizations, especially professional unions and syndicates were dominated by the state. Workers had 23 organized trade unions, which were the part of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Egypt. Because of its close association with the state, the federation did not get any enjoyment of credibility from the public.²⁵ There are 21 syndicates in Egypt. The most active and semi-independent are the Bar Association, the journalists, the medical doctors, and engineers associations. Syndicates were mainly dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However the state implemented and enacted Law 100/1993 to reduce the Islamist hegemony on these syndicates, which became dominated by the members of the then ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) of Mubarak from the end of the 1990s until the ousting of Mubarak in 2011 uprising. Other Associations such as teachers and commerce group, have historically supported government policies, and they have rarely undertaken independent actions. State legitimacy did not increase and the state did not tolerate the opposition parties and groups against it. But they tolerated Business associations and chambers of commerce. These bodies have mostly supported the economic liberalization policies, which the Mubarak regime forcefully enacted at the down of the new millennium. Hence, these kinds of associations and chambers were the part of state to protect their economic interest, and the same time they did not challenge the regime's accountability and authority. Individually these organizations flourished economically by the state as they enjoyed positive relationship with the state. Automatically the state forced to develop these bodies as an extension of the state and not an

²⁵ Mustapha K. Al-Sayyid, "A Civil Society in Egypt?" *The Middle East Journal* 47, no.2 (Spring, 1993): 228-242.

independent civil society that would enrich the public sphere.²⁶ The Mubarak regime envisioned an increase in the number and scope of civil society organizations to promote social and economic development under the state's interest and aims, without any adherence to their role in promoting democratization. Accordingly civil society law number 32/1964, which was highly restrictive to the freedom of civil society, was effective until 2000. It was replaced briefly by a more liberal law, number 153/1999. However this was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court. It had not been submitted to the *Shura* Council (Upper House) for deliberations before being enacted as a law. Three years later the government enacted the law 84/2002, a highly restrictive piece of legislation on civil society's freedoms. It stipulated that all non-profit organizations should be registered with the Ministry of Social solidarity or face criminal penalties. In addition, this ministry must approve the different activities of civil society organizations, and the ministry has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of any organization and dissolve it, if it receives foreign funds or if it is affiliated with international groups without official permission.²⁷

As Mubarak had observed syndicates, unions, business associations, and service based organizations, it continued to harass Islamists, pro-democracy actors like human rights organizations, non-religious social movements. For that purpose they regularly accused them of being agents of foreign regimes or 'spies' seeking to destroy the Egyptian state. It had two famous examples also. In 1998 and in 2000 there were two famous defaming and arbitrary arrests and detention cases against directors of human rights organizations. The first case was against Hafiz Abou Saeda, the director of the Egyptian for Human Rights, who was detained as a consequence of human rights report that blamed the security apparatus for torturing and unlawful detaining 100 Egyptian Copts in al-Koshh village of Upper Egypt. The second was against Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Professor at American University in Cairo (AUC), and the director of Ibn Khaldun Center for Human Rights, whose organization monitored the 2000 parliamentary elections. He was detained allegedly receiving "unlawful" funds from foreign foundations, publishing misinformation and corruption.

²⁶ Amy Hawthorne, "Middle Eastern Democracy: is civil Society the Answer," *Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series* 44 (March 2004).

²⁷ Transparency International, *National Integrity System Study: Egypt 2009*, (Cairo: Transparency International, 2010)

Even after the enactment of the civil society law in 2002, state security forces continued their harassment and torture against the pro-democracy organizations and activists. Activists from new protest movement like *Kifaya*, Youth for Change, April 6th Movement were regularly harassed, arbitrarily abducted, detained, and arrested.²⁸ The regime as well as the public media referred to these as “minority spies” in order to legitimate and justify the harassment against them.²⁹ The Human Rights Association for Legal Aid was dissolved by the state in 2007, accusing that they were receiving foreign funds without the consent of the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Al-Nadeem Center for Prisoner’s Rights organization activists also were attacked by the state in 2008 due to their prison inspections. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights were threatened by the officials from the Ministry, accusing their receiving of “unlawful funds”.³⁰ Because of the continuous allegations and accusations of the government on these civil society organizations, the public and the common civilians also misunderstood about these organizations. Ahamad Abdul Hady, the President of Egyptian Youth Party, accused the same on members of April 6 Movement of being agents of foreign donors who had strategic interests in Egypt.³¹

Civil Society Movements in the Uprising

Civil society movements revealed the lack of legitimacy of Egyptian regime as they imposed the police systems that did not respect freedom of opinion and expression, assembly and association on one hand and had been forging the will of the people for several decades. Not only the Egyptian civil society movements, but the other movements from the foreign countries also supported the Egyptian uprising publicly. They had networking relations with each other.

The following were the main demands of the Egyptian civil society movements:

- The amendment of national legislation in line with the international law of

²⁸ See the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights’ Report from 2004 onwards concerning the detention of Activists, available at <http://www.en.cohr.org>.

²⁹ *6th April Movement*. “For the third year in a row April 6 Youth Challenge Egypt’s Ruling Democratic Party,” available at <http://6april.org/english/modules/news/article.php?storyid=16>.

³⁰ Transparency International, *National Integrity System Study: Egypt 2009* (Washington: Transparency International, 2009)

³¹ Mohamed Gharib, “Political Parties Against April 6 Movement”, *Al-Masry al-Youm*, May 4, 2008.

human rights;

- The abolition of emergency laws in force in a number of Arab countries especially in Egypt;
- In lieu of international standards; elections to be free and fair, and supervised by independent election commission, not just namely but in practical terms, and to allow monitoring of these elections, locally and internationally, and limiting the appeals in the elections to the judiciary authority only;
- To respect academic freedom in Arab universities in Egypt;
- To respect and establish media freedom and the right to access information;
- To ensure the right of everyone the right of assembly, political organization, union and association;
- Release all prisoners of opinion;
- The realization of social justice, the rule of law, independence of judiciary, wise governance, the separation of wealth and power, and real separation between the these three authorities, limit the presidencies of the Republic for only two terms per person;
- To hold an emergency session of the Human Rights Council to consider the gross and systematic violations in Egypt, and the formation and despatch of an international commission to investigate abuses and police brutality committed there and
- To send a fact- finding team urgently from the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to document the abuses that have been committed.

Kifaya, Youth for Change, and April 6th Movement were the pro-democracy organizations who played a crucial role in the 25th January uprising in Egypt in 2011. When the Tunisian uprising, the famous Jasmine revolution, successfully took place, these three civil society movements were able to mobilize Egyptians through new framing techniques which combined with economic rights with political rights such as “food, freedom, and human dignity”. There were various street protests and campaigns against the corruption. The largest and highly influenced Islamist movements like Brotherhood and An-Noor were far from these street protests. In the middle of the uprising they also joined with these civil society organizations. After the

dynamics of the 18 day uprising that ended with the ouster of Mubarak from the 30 years old long dictatorship. Even Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and Islamists appreciated and supported the pro-democracy protest of the civil society organizations. But after the two weeks of Mubarak's stepping down the SCAF's security personnel detained many activists of these pro-democracy organizations as well as the Islamists. More than five human rights organizations were raided by security personnel. One organization was shut down by the SCAF. Several Egyptian and foreign workers were arrested accusing them of the distribution of foreign funds and making threats to the national security of Egypt.³² Whatever the accusations raised against these activists were the same when Mubarak regime had done his period. Even after this popular uprising took place in Tunisia and Egypt and its continuation were taking place in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, the public media in Egypt accused these protesters as "spies" of Egypt.³³ More restrictions, limited rules and regulations against civil society organizations were implemented in the new civil society draft law, which was released in January 2012. The draft law' 2012 poses more restrictions on associational freedom than the law 84/2002. According to this draft law, civil society organizations and associations will only be allowed to work on issues of social justice and development. Severe criminal penalties may be imposed on unregistered organizations. Before affiliating with other foreign organizations and accepting the foreign funds and aids, all organizations should receive prior approval from the Ministry of Social Solidarity.³⁴

Future of Civil Society in the post 25th January Uprising

It was very clear that the ousted Mubarak regime and its elite class supporters as well as the military do not want civil society organizations to become independent and autonomous from the state. At the same time, they wanted to establish domination on these organizations to ensure their hegemony over the Egyptian society. Islamist movements may not yield under these interests, especially Muslim Brotherhood. So

³² May Shams El-Din, "Security Forces Prosecutors raid Five NGOs, shut" *The Daily News Egypt.com*, available at <http://thedailynewsegypt.com/human-a-civil-rights/security-forces-prosecutors-raid-five-ngos-shut-down-one-dp2.html>.

³³ See for instance *Al-Ahram* coverage of the NGOs' prosecutions from December 30, 2011 until February 2012.

³⁴ The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, "Restrictive Draft CSO Law Announced by Egyptian Ministry of Social Justice and Solidarity" available at <http://www.icnl.org/news/2012/26-jan.html>

they will target the civil society groups to ensure their hegemony and controls. However, since 25th January uprising, new trends have been emerged in civil society activities. Civil society actors, including pro-democracy activists, social organizations, members of different syndicates and associations have advocated their right to the complete “independence” from the state. After Mubarak stepped down, more than 300 independent unions have been established. Independent labour unions have been formed, those who had occasionally developed in different governorates, to protect the interests and rights of workers.³⁵ Labour activists mobilized workers to demonstrate against their managers or against the government in order to re-establish their basic rights. These included their right to bonuses, minimum wage and better working conditions as usual. At last, it can be observed with the several examples of different civil society actors on gaining their natural independence from state hegemony, these new and emerging dynamics are very important steps in developing a strong, vibrant and independent civil society in Egypt after this popular uprising. That only can pave the way to a stable democracy. However, in spite of these positive developments many disappointing steps have been taken by the SCAF. The defaming campaigns, the crackdown against different pro-democracy activists, the new draft law on civil society, and the continuing accusations are clear indicators that, whenever the military or the SCAF will intervene in the administration of Egypt, there the regime, whoever it is, would be unwilling to move Egypt toward a real democratization process, which expands the public sphere for more freedoms, civic and political participation as well as free, fair and periodic elections.³⁶

Still the restrictions were followed by many civil society organizations, such as legal restrictions (embodied by the NGO law of 2002), security related restrictions (especially the State Security Investigation Service), or financial restrictions which had prevented them from leading public action during and after the uprising in 2011. These rules and regulations were especially restricted for professional associations and advocacy groups. In contrast charitable and religious organizations and its NGOs

³⁵ Omayma Kamal and Mohamed Gad, “Independent Unions: Stories of a Nation that Rises Up”, (Arabic) *Al-Shorouk News*, March 27, 2011.

³⁶Nadine Sika, “Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt: The Road not yet traveled”. *Democracy and Society*, A publication of the Centre for Democracy and Civil Society, Vol.9, Issue 2, summer 2012, George Town University.

were considered as traditional, partly autonomous and peaceful.

Although many newly formed civil society organizations were created after the 2011 uprising. They still facing the same old problems. They have organizational set up but unable to either successfully influence government decision making or establish proper communication channels with the citizenry. Most of the civil society organizations are not well organized in a cadre set up like Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamist organizations. The allegation of US foreign funding against these civil society groups is still remaining. Several headquarters of these organizations have been raided by security officials many times to check the documents about the foreign funding. But, as the Egyptian military has been receiving the US foreign funding, even they cannot also take a strong step against these civil organizations from receiving US funds. But a Gallup poll found that 85 percentage of Egyptians reject US indirect aid to Egyptian civil society groups. Because of the public support and official and international public polls, most of the civil organizations have got an encouragement to the rejection of US foreign funding and aids.³⁷

In 2007, the Ministry of Social Solidarity declared that there were 21,500 NGOs in Egypt. But a survey released by the General Federation for Associates and Non-Governmental Institutions, conducted by the Directors of Social Solidarity, counted 15,154 NGOs - a difference of more than 6,000. According to the Cabinet Information and Decision-Support Centre in late 2011, these organizations numbered just short of 29, 0004. But the same time the minister of social security and social affairs told *al-Gomhuria* newspaper in February 2012 that there were 37,000 such organizations in Egypt.³⁸

And again, still these civil society organizations facing lots of challenges. The geographical distribution of civic associations was not correlated to social needs. All data showed that the governorates with the lowest rankings in the Human Development Index have the lowest per-capita share of NGOs. Although upper Egyptian governorates have a lower Human Development Index than the rest of

³⁷<http://www.gallup.com/poll/153512/egyptian-opposition-foreign-aid-increases.aspx>, March 29 2012, Egyptian opposition to US and other foreign aid increase.

³⁸An interview with Nagwa Khalil, Minister of Social Affairs and Insurance, *Al-Gomhuria* newspaper, 15 May 2012.

Egypt. Only half of the per-capita share of NGOs were located in these governorates in 2007. The situation in Upper Egypt did not improve after the 25th January uprising. But it has been only further centralized. Most of the NGOs have only low level co-operation among them. There is no clearly defined relationship between civil society and state. Because of this inadequate relations and above-mentioned restrictions civil society organizations are far from influencing state policies and government decisions. Before the uprising, the primary role of civil society was to influence public economic policies and reduce their impact on certain segments of society.

One reason for state confrontation with civil associations and the use of legal action to suppress them may be the apprehension of the domination of such associations by the Islamists. The Islamic trend had experienced and implemented the religious fervour. Its political views were capable to mobilize the Egyptian society in the name of religion, for a long time. It also relies heavily on the financial means at its disposal. Islamist organizations enjoyed greater efficiency and a stronger social base in Egypt through this independent civil society. It is widely believed that civil society is secular in ideology, civil in behaviour, legally recognized, and supportive of democratic values guided by politically aimed Islamist movements.

Conclusion

Even after the 18 days uprising, in December 2011 the State Security forces tried to crack down on civil society institutions. Their suppression continued on human rights organizations and international foundations putting the allegation that civil society organizations promote a national security threat along with Islamist movements to the Egyptian state. By this uprising civil society organizations had expected more freedoms, more rights by the support of new laws and constitution and ultimately the independence from the state authoritarianism. Through these suppressions even after the uprising, they felt their optimism and dream for a democratic transition is becoming a mirage. It is visible that, Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which holds the highest executive powers in the interim governing system after the uprising, is not willing to advance a real democratization process. Real democratization process means more liberties, equality, free and fair elections due the

process of law.³⁹

Can the Civil Society movements in the West Asia come to the forefront of the people movements or were there such movements in that part of the world were some questions raised in the whole discourse on the West Asia's road to Democracy and human rights in general, especially in Egypt. But it's highly visible in the analysis above that, a state which have been under the rule of the military for decades including the colonial rule, has nurtured and powered several Civil Society organisations. In the latest uprising, these groups came to the front and lead the people to dethrone a dictator and helped the country to take its steps to transition to democracy.

³⁹Nadine Sika, "Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt: The Road not yet traveled". *Democracy and Society*, A publication of the Centre for Democracy and Civil Society, Vol.9, Issue 2, Summer 2012, George Town University.

Chapter 4

Political Islamist Movements and its Contributions

In the starting of the 20th century Arab countries were under the European colonies. They were protected regions under Europeans. Spain, France, Italy, and Britain were controlling Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and Gulf Countries respectively. These European forces selected their own Governments from these regions those who were keeping the interests and benefits of Europeans. There were some freedom fighting movements against this European invasion, but most of them were centralized by some individuals or groups. There were no any freedoms fighting movements like in India or any Islamist Movements with a huge platform.

In Egypt it has been proved that the religious associations and groups have wide grass root support and firmly grounded influences by its cadre character. *Al-Ikhwan al Muslimun*, the Muslim Brotherhood is the largest deep-rooted Islamist Movement in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is famous in their charity services as they have been working like a parallel government institutions far better than the authoritarian regimes. That is why they got the entire attention, consideration and the good hope from the people for the reformation of Egypt. People were watching how Brotherhood and its intellectual leaders were treated and tortured under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. One major intellectual in the Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, was jailed in 1954 and executed in 1966 by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Qutb's writings and speeches influenced many Egyptians.⁴⁰ He preached an interpretation of Islam that became the intellectual foundation as well as enthusiastic content of contemporary Islamist associations. When the protesters demanded the resignation of Mubarak, he tried to threaten the people saying that "if I will step down now, the Muslim Brotherhood will come into power". But people neglected such threats of Mubarak in a deserved manner. At the same time most of the media were propagating the allegation of fundamentalism and terrorism upon the Brotherhood and its intellectuals. But people recognized the 83 years old Brotherhood and its new born Freedom and Justice Party

⁴⁰D.N. Wilber, *United Arab Republic* (New Haven, 1969), p.74, cited in Abdal Monein Said Aly and Manfred W. Wenner, "Modern Islamic Reform Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt" *The Middle East Journal*, vol.36, no.3, Summer 1982, p.343.

have earned a political maturity and a long term experience throughout the Egyptian history.

Brotherhood like Islamist organizations proliferated after the 1967 Arab-Israel War, principally among college students on campuses throughout Egypt. At first they were encouraged by the government, until Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 turned them against the state. Thereafter, the government became the principal target as these associations raised an ethical campaign against what they saw as official corruption and injustice. Many had participated in the state-supported campus Islamic associations of the 1970s.⁴¹ Their popular appeal and success seriously alarmed Egypt's government and threatened the routine way the state operated. Unwilling or unable to change, the administration instead sought to eliminate and eradicate this challenge. As state persecution increased and government corruption deepened, the battle intensified to establish a moral protest based on Islam. Arrests and mistreatment intimidated and silenced many among those who participated in Islamic development associations. This reduced the provision of important welfare and charity services even more. Throughout Egypt, communities witnessed major decline in the local development projects that were closely connected to moderate Islamic associations. As successful programs and services closed for lack of funds and authorization, the government did nothing to compensate by providing its own. These Islamic efforts had, in fact, first been initiated because of the absence of government action. Subsequently, the state did nothing to fill the vacuum left when it forced these associations and their members to suspend their activities. This in turn provoked even more anger and anxiety from those who had benefited from these charitable acts and good deeds. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak were tried to suppress and oppress the Muslim Brotherhood. The same Muslim Brotherhood and its new political wing Justice and Development Party got the opportunity to lead the Egypt by the support of secular civil society Movements.

Muslim Brotherhood is now considered in Egypt as a socio –political movement with a generic Islamist programme rather than the *Al Noor Party* or *Al Jama'a al Islamiyya* in Egypt. The Brotherhood differs from other comparable groups whether on the right,

⁴¹M.S. Agwani, "Religion and Politics in Egypt". *International Studies*, 14, July 1974, pp. 379-99; MS Agwani, *Religion and Politics in West Asia* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1992), pp. 20-48.

left or centre only in the context of its agenda. The ideology of Muslim Brotherhood, the practice of Hasan al Banna and the political criticism of Sayyid Qutub now became an ideological vitality in more than 60 countries. The Tunisian *An-Nahda* organization, *Hamas* in Palestine and *Jama'ath-e-Islami* in India and in its neighbouring countries are also the by organizations of Brotherhood aiming the same ideology and different way of activism.

Brotherhood has earned a flexibility and adaptability in international level. That is the major characteristics of Brotherhood which changed as acceptable to secular civil society. This flexibility is not only found in its activists but also its natural extension from the lower class to middle class and to upper class, which marks its general, intellectual and political outlook, those who have a special personality and calibre ability when we will study about their entire biography. Most of the Islamist groups have perpetually suffered historical and geographical retreat over the long term periods because of their puritanical straight lines of their intellectual and political vision and by the inadequate flexibility and adaptability suitable to the living geographical context and the contemporary situation. In Egypt Muslim Brotherhood has overcome that situation. That is why secular civil society supported Brotherhood and its political wing and they elected the first democratic president in the first experiment after the overthrowing of the long term dictatorship. The first time of the Uprising, Muslim brotherhood had to support civil society. Because civil society was came to protest against Mubarak. After many weeks Brotherhood came into the mainstream and supported the public sphere. When the protest was in very serious, Muslim Brotherhood had tried to discuss with Omar Suleiman, the Vice President of Mubarak. But civil society did not support those kinds of efforts of Muslim Brotherhood.

Muslim Brotherhood in the beginning: The King Farouk era

Egypt is the intellectual centre of the Arab world, where Muslim Brotherhood, *Al-Ikhwan al Muslimoon*, the single and most powerful and prolific Islamist movement was born in 1928 from the idea of the famous intellectual Hasan al Banna of 22 years old school teacher. He started this movement recruiting six members of the Suez Canal Company. In the beginning Muslim Brotherhood was a social and religious

organization. Now this is the ideological grandfather organization of more than 85 other Islamist organizations in the dozens of countries. Associates, members, core activists and supporters of these organizations and its many branches are now more than tens of millions. Hasan al Banna founded the society of Muslim Brothers in the provincial town of Ismailia during a riotous political period. The son of a cleric encouraged the Egyptian society in order to stand against the British occupation. Banna had totally rejected the Western culture and their economic exploitations, including Christian missionary activity. Not only the religious pious speeches but Banna spoke about the weakness of Muslim society, emerging corruption, social inequality and the foreign exploitation also. Ismailiyya was a home of Suez Canal Company and the military troops. It was a very challenging place for Banna as the majority natives were very poor there and the town was filled with luxurious homes of foreigners. A contradictory living condition was led there. Western influence spread throughout the education, culture, language, law, social habits and values. Banna was very afraid of this change which is fighting with ethics and morality of the monotheistic ideology. Banna thought Muslims are weaken because they were fallen out of touch with their faith. He found from his study that the independence of Egypt, progress, development and welfare of the society would be coming back when the Muslim society will return to the sincere faith and the basic religious principles.⁴²

Aiming the renewal of Islamic principles, that restored the religious remembrance of application of Sharia or Islamic law, Hasan al Banna formed Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 as a social welfare society devoted to Islamic revival and social reform. Since the beginning this Movement worked as a parallel government which built mosques, schools, youth centres, Qur'an study centre and other many charitable works. It undertook literacy campaigns, economic enterprises and small scale workshops. This attracted the poor workers in Egypt. Brotherhood was the first mass social and political movement with the ingredients of religion and religious politics.

The Brotherhood had 50 nationwide branches by 1934 and it increased rapidly expanding 300 branches by 1938 including more than 50,000 members. When Banna

⁴²I.M. Hussaini, *The Moslem Brethren* (Beirut: 1956), pp.16-38., and R.P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London, 1969), pp.24-37, Saed Hawwa, *The Muslim Brotherhood* (Delhi Hindustan Publications, 1996), pp.12-34, Zohurul Bari, *Re-emergence of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt* (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1995),pp-32-46.

was assassinated in 1949 it had more than 2000 branches with an estimated 500,000 members. This became the largest organized force in the country. Gradually it became the mother organization of all political aimed Sunni Islamist movements in the Muslim world. Lower –middle class people were the essence of this movement. Working class, Suez Canal Company employees, artisans, labourers, merchants and civil servants were the primary phase members of Brotherhood movement. Banna was a charismatic speaker, influencing personality and efficient organizer. His preaches reached throughout the villages. Non-elitist character of this movement was an important source of its strength. The educated and professional middle class people were the backbone of this movement and they gradually made their leaders from this professionals. Within two years after the formation of the movement, correctly in 1930 Brotherhood increasingly involved in the politics taking strong positions in the domestic and regional affairs. Demanding the Evacuation of British forces from Egypt, brotherhood started its anti-imperial struggle from their homeland. They raised an awareness and funds for the general strike in Palestine in 1936. To support Palestine and to make the awareness among the people Brotherhood published and distributed pamphlets, newsletters, and a weekly newspaper which had managed social, cultural and religious issues. As it is a cadre movement regular party meetings, public meetings, rallies and conferences also had been conducted by the organization. Thus Banna became a revolutionary figure preaching religion and politics throughout Egypt. By giving the open support, Hasan al Banna had sent a lot of freedom fighters from the Brotherhood to Palestine for its independence from the Israeli occupation in 1948. This led to get an allegation of militia movement by the suppressing government. After that most of the leaders and activists were arrested and Brotherhood offices were raided. Palestine war effort of Brotherhood gave to the government to suppress more giving a lot of different allegations. In between these arrests and imprisonments, Prime Minister Al Nuqrashi Pasha was assassinated on 28th December 1948. The allegation came upon the Brotherhood in spite of Hasan al Banna's repeated denouncement had been come.⁴³ But less than two months later Banna was assassinated by members of Egyptian political police. It made a large sympathy to Hasan al Banna and Brotherhood in Egypt. And after that most of the ordinary viewers became the core members of Muslim Brotherhood. This sympathetic

⁴³Walid M. Abdel Nasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt. Perceptions of International Relations, 1967-1981* (London: Kegal Paul, 1994)

influence was not only in the Egypt but in other Arab-Muslim world also witnessed to this inspiration to the formation of new political aimed Islamist movements from the ideology of Hasan al Banna and his Muslim Brotherhood movement in order to establish the Islam based politics and national administration following its rules and regulations.

The political Islam or Islamic politics was openly declared and practically implemented by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 20th century as an organizational structure. Political Islam was discussed as a hot topic after the uprising of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It was gradually evolved in the Egyptian society and significantly became the unavoidable presence over the 8 decades between its birth and its rise to power. Its first public attempt to run an office in 1940s was repeatedly banned. Then they continued their struggle against the illegal ban and illegitimate suppression upon them. Then they went through a militant phase in 1950s and 1960s, when the allegation of the political assassination raised against its activists including the assassination attempting against then President Gamal Abdul Nasser. A massive crackdown was undertaken against this organization and thousands of its members were imprisoned and brutally tortured. Allegations of the reactive extremism and violent Jihad were fabricated upon them. But Muslim Brotherhood totally rejected the allegation of the political assassination and extremist reaction in the late 1960s. It called for laws of Sharia to be implemented in the Egyptian society of the Muslim majority state. It rejected peace accord of Anwar al Sadat with Israel. Under the banner of other parties the independent Muslim Brotherhood candidates stood for elections since 1980s. In 2005 it won 88 seats in the parliament.⁴⁴

The Brotherhood had faced very cruel oppression and repression under three successive presidents- Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar al Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak- who had allowed some of the movement's social welfare services but gradually they tried to reduce Brotherhood's political activities and participations. Even after the successful winning in the elections in 2005 and became the largest opposition group in the parliament, its leaders ,members and activists were arrested and imprisoned without any reasons and charges.

⁴⁴Altman, Israel, "Islamic Movements in Egypt", *Jerusalem Quarterly* (10), winter 1979, pp.87-105.

The Egyptian uprising in 2011 was an unexpected responsibility for the Brotherhood. They were brought to the Tahrir square. After Mubarak's stepping down, Brotherhood made a new political wing named Freedom and Justice Party in order to move the electoral process to form a new nation. After the 8 decades long suppression and torture, Brotherhood won the most powerful bloc defeating the opposition group by holding 216 seats in 498. This was a historical mandate and clear approval from the majority of the Egyptians for Brotherhood. Most of the civil society movements and the independent people supported Brotherhood and its newly formed political party.

Muslim Brotherhood in the Nasser Era

Egypt was defeated in the Arab –Israeli war held in 1948. King Farouk was the ruler of then Egypt. After this defeat a secret revolutionary movement named Free Officers Movement (*Harkat ad-Dubbath al Ahrar*) was founded by Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser Hussein. British supported monarchy of King Farouq of Egypt was deposed by a military coup on 23rd July 1952 led by this junior military officers under the leadership of the main public figure General Muhammed Naguib. Gamal Abdul Nasser was the planner of this military coup. The participating officers governed Egypt through the RCC (Revolutionary Commanding Council), with Muhammed Naguib as president and Nasser as his deputy. The Free Officers Movement promised national independence, social justice, development and democracy. Free Officers Movement's members were not only the army officers but rather they were the wealthy elite, middle class, young workers, government officials and junior officers. All of them had a deep relations and co-operations with Muslim Brotherhood including Nasser. A young army officer Anwar al Sadat was a very sympathetic to the Brotherhood's ideas.⁴⁵

The Brotherhood firstly welcomed the military coup by Gamal Abdel Nasser. But its length was very short. The military did not return back to their barracks as they promised at beginning. To gather their powers military started to eliminate rebels, rivals, dissolve political parties, and put former senior regime officials on trial. Muslim Brotherhood activists and leaders also were arrested and detained for the

⁴⁵ A.K. Pasha, "Religion and Politics in Egypt and Iran", *Egypt in a Changing World*, New Delhi, National Publishing House (2003) pp. 223-239

fabricated cases. In October 1954 another allegation came upon Brotherhood, when one person attempted to assassinate Nasser during his visit to Alexandria. Following this assassination attempt Nasser ordered a crackdown against Muslim Brotherhood and put Egyptian President Muhammad Naguib under house arrest. Subsequently Nasser assumed executive office and was nominated for the post of Presidency from the deputy. Thus he became the second President of Egypt since June 1956 to until his death. Over the next decade, thousands of Muslim Brothers were arrested without any provocation or attack. Others went into exile. This crackdown against this largest Islamist movement continued until Nasser's death in 1970.

Nasser's period, the 1960s, were a particularly dark period for the easy path of movement. The famous political intellectual Sayyid Qutb's writings like "The mile stones", and his speeches were spread throughout Egypt as anti-imperialist and anti-Nasserist government. Sayiid Qutub criticized the Western civilization of Egypt under Nasser and of authoritarian governments in Muslim countries. Qutub was arrested following allegation of the assassination attempt against Nasser in 1954 and spent a decade in prison where he wrote Quranic translation "In the shadow of Quran" (*Fil-Dilalil Qur'an*). This translation was influenced in the Egyptian society and it resulted against the military regime of Gamal Abdul Nasser. Qutub's ideas were later influenced all over the political Islamist movement. He was released from prison in 1964. But was soon rearrested for allegedly plotting as assassination against Nasser. In 1966 he was executed.⁴⁶

After intense internal debates and discussions, the Brotherhood moved away from Qutub's ideas and it declared total rejection of violence from its basics to end by giving the priority to religious propagation rather than to political power. The major change happened in the publication of *Preachers*, rather than the judgments and *Fatwas* by Hasan al Hudeiby, the general guide of the movement.

⁴⁶Louis J. Cantori, "Religion and Politics in Egypt", in Michael Curtis, ed., *Religion and Politics in the Middle East*, Colorado, Westview, 1981, p.83

Muslim Brotherhood in the Sadat Era

Anwar al Sadat became the third President of Egypt succeeding Nasser in 1970. Sadat was very sympathetic to Brotherhood. He released many of its leaders from prison and used them as the counter balance of Nasserist rivals. Although the movement was legally controlled and partially banned, its students' wing had freedom to work in the university campuses. Islamist students' wing swept elections between 1975 and 1979, until the government dissolved the students unions. The group was even then allowed to propagate its message (*Dawa*, or the call) and to continue its charity based social welfare activities. They started circulation of religious publications and two newspapers associated with the movement in 1976.⁴⁷

Sadat called himself as the "Believer President". He also introduced Sharia into the Egyptian constitution. Article 2 of the 1971 constitution declared that "the principles of the Sharia are a principle source of legislation" (Previous constitution had only just mentioned that Islam was the state religion). In 1970s people's discussions and debates became very religious. From the secularist character of the public it was slowly running to the religious conservatism and into the seeking of puritanical religious principles. This trend was not only in Egypt, but seen across the Arab world. Illegal formation of Israel state was a major turning point for this transformation as well as the new hopes came from the political aimed Islamist movements. The Arab-Israeli war in 1948, 1967 and 1973 were also the particular reasons behind this religious uprising in 70s. The 1973 war was designed by Sadat using Islamic emotions and symbolism. He never used the emotions of Arab nationalism. The Arabs lost their militaries and some of the important and strategic territories. Israel also frightened and alerted the status quo even though they had the support of Western forces. Both sides, especially Israel and Egypt encouraged to move positively towards peace agreements and its related negotiations. Sadat decreased his dignity and the majority of the Egyptians, especially Islamists felt as shame when he visited Jerusalem after this war and signed Camp David peace treaty with Israel. Egypt was the only Arab country which visited Israel at first time after its illegal formation and the continuous

⁴⁷ Abdal Sattar el Tawila, "Conflict between Sadat and the Moslem Fanatics", *New Outlook*, 24 (9), December 1981, pp. 18-19 and Israeli Raphel, "The Role of Islam in President Anwar Sadat's Thought", *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, no.1980, pp. 1-12.

wars including its neighbour Egypt. Sadat became unpopular and Egypt became isolated among the Arab world. After these wars nation's economic conditions became very worst. It led to the bread riots in 1977s. Sadat gradually became more authoritarian. He started the way of crackdown against his opponents. Armed members of Islamic Jihad assassinated Sadat on 6th October 1981 when he was during a parade to commemorate the 1973 war with Israel.⁴⁸

Muslim Brotherhood in Mubarak Era

During Mubarak's 30 year rule, the Muslim Brotherhood became an unavoidable power in Egypt. Hence they proved their presence and active participations in politics. They participated including elections into the parliament, professional syndicates and unions, students' councils and even faculty associations. Very increasingly Brotherhood successfully gained control of unions for doctors, pharmacists, engineers, and lawyers. At last Mubarak regime changed the election rules to block Brotherhood from dominating those groups.

But Brotherhood had a different political strategy since 1980s. They participated in the parliament election even though they were banned and controlled. Hence their candidates made an alliance with the *Wafd* party for the 1984 election. This alliance gained more than 15% of the votes, or 8 seats for the Brotherhood and 48 seats for the *Wafd* party in a 448-person legislature. The same methodology implemented again in the 1987 election. Brotherhood made alliance with Labour party and *Al-Ahrar* party. That alliance also gained 17% of the vote of 56 seats in which 36 went to Brotherhood.

Keeping the maximum ideology and its puritanical disciplines, Brotherhood could to participate in the democratic electoral process and to make alliances with the secular political parties. This strategy of Brotherhood made a large influence in Egypt. They

⁴⁸Abdal Sattar el Tawila, "Muslem Group in Egypt and their Opposition to the peace", *New Outlook* September-October 1980, pp. 45-46.

gained this political maturity by campaigns, voters' mobilization, media outreach, and parliamentary affairs- the process of democracy.⁴⁹

The Brotherhood was not Egypt's only Islamist movement at the end of 1990s. There were other Islamist movements including Salafi organizations and some extremist reactionary movements. During the 1990s some reactionary Muslim organizations increased their attack against Mubarak regime as well as the Coptic Christians, the largest minority community in Egypt. Foreign tourists also were attacked even in the Upper Egypt. The brutal terrorist attack was held in Luxor in 1997. In which more than 60 people were killed. Most of them were European tourists. As usual the allegation came including against Muslim brotherhood. Accusers told the teachings and writings of Brotherhood intellectuals are the master brain and essence of all extremist-reactionary-armed groups. Western countries also blamed Brotherhood for this tourist attack. Although Brotherhood had renounced and rejected openly the violence is not their way to propagate Islam and political Islamism, the Brotherhood had often to pay a big price too. After the assassination attempt against Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995 by some reactionary Muslim organisations, the regime cracked down all Islamist groups, especially the Brotherhood. It was the same torturing, suppression, long term imprisonment, filing cases and arresting without any reasons and evidences, such as all kinds of human rights violations implemented upon them. Whenever they will be accused and tortured since its formation, then they got the major support of the society and their sympathy to Brotherhood. The growth of Brotherhood increased after each and every imprisonment and brutal killings.

In the 2000 parliamentary election Muslim Brotherhood got 17 seats despite of the alleged electoral fakes. In 2005 it got 88 seats in the People's Assembly. It was the largest number any opposition group had ever won. Mubarak had decided to hand over the power to his son Gamal Mubarak. Hence Brotherhoods growing emergence and ground support by each and every elections became a big threat against his son's succession. Cracking down and suppression were the only way of Mubarak. Over the next five years he restricted the political space generally as his son had to come into power within this five years. In the December 2010 election the ruling party of

⁴⁹H.R. Dekmejian, "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives", *The Middle East Journal*, 34 (winter 1980), p.5.

Mubarak 90% of parliamentary seats. When the brotherhood felt about the fake election and fraudulent electoral process are being held as like a reality, Brotherhood withdrew themselves from that kind of fake election and fraudulent poll.

This 90 % victory of Mubarak regime disappointed the people, even those who were not supporting Brotherhood and its ideological discourses ever. Most of the people were not the supporters of Mubarak and his successor Gamal Mubarak, the elder son. So people were irritated by Mubarak's continuation and his decision to continue the Syrian model succession. Less than two months later of this December 2010 election, on 25th January 2011, following the successful uprising in Tunisia, a huge protest held in Cairo demanding the political change, regime change, changing of existing worst economic condition and so and so on. Both the regime and Brotherhood were taken by surprise. Younger Brotherhood activists participated in the initial demonstrations, but as individuals not by the organisational decisions. The Brotherhood leaders were waiting and seeing the movements of all protest organised by the civil society against Mubarak. After getting a clear picture after many days, organisation decided and called for joining the protest. Only then the scale of the uprising became clearly visible and understood. The entire viewers recognized the organisational credibility, discipline, power of the cadre structure, and influence of Muslim Brotherhood. Civil society movements were scattered because of the absence of an influential leader to lead the uprising. After the entrance of Brotherhood the organisation totally became a temporary guide and leader to the entire protest movements. Despite more than 800 protesters were killed and about 6000 people were injured, Mubarak's security forces defeated to overcome the emergence of the angry youth and their peaceful demonstrations and protests in Tahrir Square and other places. 18 days after the uprising began, Mubarak was compelled to stepping down from the power by the forceful demand of the peaceful civil disobedience.

Role of Sheikh Yousuf al-Qaradawi

Sheikh Yousuf al-Qaradawi is the President of the International Union for Muslim scholars (IUMS) and the most prominent Egyptian Islamic theologian in the Arab world and within the Sunni branch of Islam. He was a beginning member and activist of Muslim Brotherhood. He is the leading figure behind the popular website "Islam

online” and best known for his weekly talk show program on *Al-Jazeera, al-Sharia wal Hayath* (Sharia and life) and the most influential clerics and unofficial leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. He is an Islamist and he is a part of the Brotherhood school of thought. But his appeal goes beyond the Islamist spectrum, and in that sense he is not an Islamist figure, he is an Egyptian figure with a national profile.

He had been imprisoned under King Farouk in 1949, and again three times during the reign of former president Gamal Abdul Nasser, until he left Egypt for Qatar in 1961. After 20 years he appeared in Egypt to deliver a public speech in 1981. And after 30 years he returned to Egypt in the wake of Egyptian uprising. Qaradawi was the vocal critic of Mubarak and his regime. He had vehemently supported the protest against the aging leader. He returned to Cairo on the same 18th February 2011 after 30 years of semi-exile life in Qatar. Without Bahraini uprising he had vociferously supported all the other uprisings that roiled Arab countries in 2011 by giving its Islamic justification and Fatwa from Qatar. In Tahrir square he led Friday prayers on 18th February, addressing an audience estimated to exceed two million Egyptians. It began with an address of “Oh Muslims and Copts”, referring to Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority instead of the customary opening for Islamic Friday sermons “Oh believers and Muslims”.⁵⁰ His Friday sermon called on Egyptians to preserve their national unity. He warned that if the military drags its feet on reform, another uprising could begin. Attempting to assure Coptic minorities, he stated that sectarianism was over, and he praised Copts for linking hands to form a human shield protecting Muslims while they prayed during the uprising. “In this square the sectarianism has been died. The regime planted sectarianism here. In Tahrir Muslims and Christians joined their hands for a better Egypt” Qaradawi added.⁵¹ He then told Egyptians were under the jail and imprisonment of darkness for 30 years and its before also. They came out of the lamp. He reminded the crowds that mainstream Egyptian society takes their faith seriously, and that democracy will almost certainly lead to stronger role for faith in public life. He demanded the immediate release of political prisoners and opponents and called for the new military leaders to quickly restore the civilian democratic electoral rule. “We demand from the Egyptian Army to free us from the government

⁵⁰Dan Murphy, “Egypt Revolution Unfinished, Qaradawi tells Tahrir Masses”, *Christian Science Monitor*, February 18, 2011, <http://www.csmonitor.com/world/Middle-East/2011/0218/Egypt-revolution-unfinished-Qaradawi-tells-Tahrir-masses>.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* pp.1-2.

that was appointed by Mubarak” Qaradawi declared.⁵² “We want a new government without any of these faces whom people can no longer stand” he added. “Protect and keep this revolution. Don’t you dare let anyone steal it from you” he warned the youth behind this uprising. As the uprising there intensified in recent weeks, Qaradawi had used his platform to urge Egyptians to rise up against Mubarak. His son- Abdul-Rahman Yousuf al-Qaradawi, is an Egyptian poet who supported the uprising. Sheikh Qaradawi had long argued that Islamic law supports the idea of a pluralistic, multiparty, and a civil society justifying the counter attack of Hamas against Israel and American force in Iraq and Afghanistan as their own “resistance” not a “violence”.⁵³

Most of the Western dailies wrote about his return, and speech in sermon in Tahrir square resembling Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran from Paris. Indeed, the triumphant Friday *Khutuba* (speech) of the most prominent Sunni clerics in the West Asia on 18th February in Tahrir square, or sermon to adoring Muslim masses, was resembled as the symbolic of an Islamic revival begun by the “Al-Manar Modernists”—Jamal Ad-Din Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida--- more than a century before he took the stage at Tahrir square, the epicentre of the protests. As his sermon was non-sectarian and broadly political, the turnout was also a reminder that political Islam is likely to play a larger role in Egypt than it has for decades. Being a Sunni cleric Sheikh Yousuf al Qaradawi had involved in the political matters regarding the global issues. This was the difference between him and other clerics. Not only in Egypt or in Brotherhood, Qaradawi’s spiritual and political influence has been spread all over the West Asia because of his political interventions and support.

⁵² *ibid*.pp.1-2.

⁵³ Kirkpatrick, David D. (2011), "After Long Exile, Sunni Cleric Takes Role in Egypt", New York Times, February 18, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/world/middleeast/19egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

Role of Freedom and Justice Party

After this 18 days of uprising and the stepping down of Mubarak the Muslim Brotherhood established a formal political party named *Al-Hurriyya wal Adala* - Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in June 2011. The party's top three leaders came directly from group's highest body, The Guidance Bureau. Mohammed Morsi was elected as the party's new chief, Essam al Eian was chosen as Vice President, and Mohammed Saad al Katatny became the Secretary-General. All three has previously been elected to parliament and were deeply involved in the Brotherhoods' political activities. Morsi was an American-educated engineering professor. Erian was a medical doctor and well-known Brotherhood spokesman. And Katatny was a German-educated microbiology professor. Rafiq Habib, a Christian intellectual was named as a second Vice President.

The Muslim Brotherhood had thought of establishing a political party a few years ago. But it did not implement because of the internal resistance and different opinions. Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Mohammad Badie was also against this formation of new political party. But the unexpected uprising forced them to change and to form a common political platform to go forward along with all people including those who are keeping distance with Muslim Brotherhood and its ideology. Thus they formed Freedom and Justice Party officially on May 2011 and practically on June 2011. And they separated the works and responsibilities in order to focus on it and to co-ordinate each other. So FJP will only focus the political developments and political process involving in the long term politics. But Brotherhood will focus on the internal Islamic preaching and charitable works along with the political support and assistance to FJP. But it did not mean that they are two separate entities. Brotherhood gave explicit directives to their members not to join any party other than the FJP and those who chose to join other political parties they cannot work with Muslim Brotherhood as its Islamist activist.⁵⁴

After the 2011 uprising, the law on political parties was modified. Although the registration of political parties with a religious identity was still banned, the Muslim

⁵⁴Wadah Khanfar, "Those who Support Democracy should Welcome the Rise of Political Islam" *The Guardian* 27 November 2011. www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/27/islamist-arab-spring-west-fears.

Brotherhood was able to register the Freedom and Justice Party, presenting it as a “civil” party. Freedom and Justice Party declared its manifesto that they are committed to ensure the rights and privileges of all Egyptians. They said they will protect the essence of pluralism, social justice, human rights, and freedom of expression, belief and worship. Party openly said they are focusing to make a “civil state with Islamic reference” not a theocratic one. They declared they are committed to popular sovereignty and to the Sharia law as the main source of legislation to make a modern state, to establish democracy, to ensure women’s rights, and to build national unity. To overcome decades of authoritarianism, corruption and mismanagement FJP sought a gradual and comprehensive reform and the ground support of the people.

During the first year after the stepping down of Mubarak, the Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party were very cautious and pragmatic to keep the relations with Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). They kept a distance being uncritical and supportive. Unlike the Tahrir protesters’ demand for the sudden and immediate political change and transfer of power to civilian authority, the Brotherhood initially accepted the military’s political timeline and gradual transition plan after the long calculation that it would ultimately be beneficiary for Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party.

Ameen Iskandar, Waheed Abdul Majeed and Muhammad Sa’eed Idrees like Egyptian social activists and intellectuals became the candidates under FJP even though they are not the supporters or members of Muslim Brotherhood. This is a new change from the Brotherhood. Brotherhood can remain this experiment forever. They formed FJP in order to protect the politics and its ethics in a particular manner as they argued. That is why they separated politics from the established religious missionary activities. But their aim has to be completed yet. Their victory in the Presidential election and Parliament election is a big significance to become more independent from the Brotherhood. Formation of FJP may be by the influence of the experiment of AKP in Turkey. Ultimately it is the clear-cut victory and approval to Brotherhood. Still FJP is not a ruler’s party it is people’s party it has to rule after some process. Morsi is only a custodian of this People’s Movement. Party should take the first decision in each and every problems rather than Brotherhood. So FJP will be more

and more independent from the brotherhood. Morsi has resigned from the membership and the official responsibilities of the Brotherhood. He has to keep equal distance from the Brotherhood and the other civilians. They should not feel that Morsi is a biased person and they were neglected. He should not show any separation among them.⁵⁵

Conservative businessmen, urban professionals of rural background, low-income earning Muslim families in the cities and in the countryside and the ordinary Egyptians those who care about jobs and transparency and want to see clean pair of hands that inspires more credibility than the divided secular parties supported Freedom and Justice Party in the elections. Then they got 47% votes in the legislative elections in 2011. Along with this FJP had ordered to military for a timely transition of power to democratically elected and legitimated civilian authorities. FJP wants the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to recognize the legislative powers of the parliament and allow it to form a government based on election result, although it has tried to avoid direct confrontation with the military.

Election Performance of Freedom and Justice Party

After the 2011 uprising two elections and two referendums were held. The first one was the referendum for seeking about the preference of election, whether Parliament election should be held first or the constitution building. In which, Muslim Brotherhood gave the first preference to the parliament election. And secondly the elected Parliament members should build the constitution. 71% people supported this decision and the idea of Brotherhood in the referendum. Muhammad El Baradei, Amr Mousa, Hamdeer Swabahi, pro-Mubarak people and the military were against this decision. But Muslim Brotherhood got the support of 71% Egyptians. And later the first Parliament election was held. In which Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist alliance including Salafi movements got 70% seats. After coming the result military declared the election null and void and they cancelled the election result saying minor reasons and justifications and dissolved the parliament. The next year Presidential

⁵⁵*In These Times*, 'Beyond the Media Radar, Egypt's Arab Spring Pushes Forth,' *In These Times*, 4 May 2011, www.inthesetimes.com/working/entry/7269/beyond_the_media_radar_egypts_arab_spring_pushes_fou_rth/.

election was held. Muslim Brotherhood activist and the leader of Freedom and Justice Party leader Dr. Muhammad Morsi was elected by 51.7 % votes. The opposition candidate got only 49.8%votes. Most of the secularists, liberalists and the pro-Mubarak people and military groups were stood against the Brotherhood candidate. These three elections were held under the clear observation of SCAF and Mubarak government. Then the constitution referendum was held. That was very controversial draft constitution referendum. In which also, Muslim Brotherhood got 2/3 majority of votes. Within two years there were four democratic elections. In all elections Muslim Brotherhood won by the support of civil society. This may be the rarest of rare election result in which one party democratically elected continuously four times within two years. This legitimacy and accountability approved by the majority of the people were a clear evidence for the gradual growth of political Islamist movement.

Al-Nour Party

The Politics of Salafist Movements was a new phenomenon revealed in the Arab Uprising. Their entrance into the Parliamentary electoral politics in Egypt was really surprising to the Islamist Movements and to the entire Arab political observers. The alliance of three Salafist Movements got 25% of the votes in the first free and fair election, or 125 of 498 seats in the lower house of parliament where Muslim Brotherhood got only 40% even though it is an oldest movement and has the long term political inheritance in Egypt. Together with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist alliance captured about 70% of the total votes. Salafist Movements became very progressive at the middle term of the uprising. The protests and parliamentary politics were not a new thing to the Brotherhood. But it was new thing for the Salafist Movements. They had to prepare from the beginning and basics. Despite this, they did their duty at the very valuable moment of other major Islamist movements. Most of the Salafist Movements in Egypt were formed very early than the Muslim Brotherhood. But they had not entered into the politics at all. They were focusing only on the religious and spiritual things related to the mosques and rituals. That is why they have been never treated and tortured like Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist Movements have had before by their dictators. They were silent to speak against these dictators because they believed whenever the freedom would be existing to pray for five times, then no one should speak against their rulers. They believed the democracy

is anti-theocracy and not to co-operate and participate in administration and politics with Non-Muslims and secularists ever. They were living in the oldest theory ignoring the context and essence of those theories and the meanings of those bylines. But the Arab Uprising diverted themselves from their own theory. *Hizb Al-noor* (Al Noor Party) was the political platform of *Adda'wa Assalafiyya*, the Alexandria based Salafi movement. They had started one TV channel in 2000 and then it became very popular in Egypt. *Adda'wa Assalafiyya* leader Imad Abdul Gafoor was behind this recent formation of Al Noor Party. *Aswala* Party, and *Al Bina'u Wa Thanmu* Party also co-operated with Muslim Brotherhood by supporting their Presidential candidate. When the controversial declaration for the draft constitution was happened, then Al-Noor Party supported Morsi to go forward. Then that was seemed like a combination of School of thought of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab and Hansan Al Banna. The surprising thing was that the broad mentality of Salafist and Islamist Movements to co-operate each other and share the difficulties and benefits of the Government together. Muslim Brotherhood can incorporate and contain the Salafist movements as like they could contain civil society movements.⁵⁶

The beginning of Salafist Political Party

In the Egyptian electoral politics, the entrance of Salafism is a new phenomenon. Salafism is well known as ultraconservative puritan ideologues. They were rejecting the participation and the activism of the parliamentary politics. But in the 2011-12 elections in Egypt, Salafi groups emerged as the second largest Islamist vote bank from the political backwater. Now they can play a crucial role during the political transition in Egypt.

Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis were not a united strength keeping with cadre disciplines and they have been a loose coalition of groups and individually they were very strict who espoused strict interpretations of Islam and called for implementation of Sharia law in all of the Muslim majority countries. For them, they strictly consider and very obediently follow only the first three generations after Prophet Muhammad as the ideal Islamic society after the founding of the faith in the

⁵⁶Khalil al Anani, "The New Puritans", *Islamists are Coming: Who They Really Are*, Robin Wright (Ed.), United State Institute of Peace Press, 2011, www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/egypt.

seventh century. They generally hold conservative and often illiberal and kind less views on gender relations, minority rights, and even their own personal freedoms.

Political Salafism is a heterogeneous phenomenon in its character. They are different kinds, degrees, dimensions and diversions in content, decisions and activism. Different Salafi groups keeping their socio-religious views ranging from the far right to the left. Some of them is still waiting for the re-creation of God's rule on earth like Prophet Muhammad had implemented in Madina. Other groups are more modesty and they want to implement traditional morals, manners and forms of justice. In the matter of implementing Sharia, some groups are different in terms of the time frame and context. Some want to begin moving soon. Other some want the gradual slow process for implementing Sharia, even if it takes decades or centuries. Though, Salafists are locally stronger than nationally.

In Egyptian Salafi groups, there are a generational divide. The old generation were not ready to accept the uprising and protests against a Muslim ruler as they believed in the puritanical scripts of Prophet Muhammad. They believed Mubarak is a Muslim ruler who gives the right and freedom to pray five times in mosques. Prophets sayings and its contexts were entirely different when he said the protest against a Muslim ruler is *Haraam* (to be forbidden). But the new young generation was more willing to reach beyond its own undeveloped circle. When the old generation considered the act of suicide by Bu Azezi, the Tunisian street vendor, which sparked the Arab uprisings, to be forbidden or *haram*, the new generation called him as martyr. New generation had been in Tahrir square where old generation did not support the uprising.

Like other charitable organizations, Salafi groups also developed a large ground support based on providing grassroots social services, including welfare, medicines, educational helps and supports and food for the needy. Many Salafis are middle-class professionals. Egyptian elites and lower-class people also the part of this movement. Salafis made inroads in Egyptian society partly because the government tolerated their social activities as a counterweight to the more political Muslim Brotherhood.

Salafist movement originated from the Alexandria University when most of the students left their activism from *Al Gama'a al Islamiyya*, the counter leftist and

Nasserist Islamic group emerged in 1970s. By the mid-1970s, the radical and violent way of activism of *Al Gama'a al Islamiyya* lost their own activists especially students. Most of them gathered and formed a new conservative and peaceful group based on the Wahabi school of thought. It was named as "The Salafi Call" or *Ad Da'wa as Salafiyya*, in the late 1970s from the Alexandria University.

The Salafi Call was created largely because of the political and ideological differences with other Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, which tried to dominate the Egyptian Islamist scene in the 1970s. This movement was formed by the particular interest and influence of Saudi Arabia. The Call's chief founder Sheikh Mohammad Ismail al Moqaddim was a surgeon who had educated from Saudi Arabia and influenced by Saudi Salafi thinkers such as Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baaz and Sheikh Mohammad bin Swalih al Othaimin, who were the religious last words of Saudi Wahhabism.

The major Salafi leaders included Sheikh Yasser Burhami, Sheikh Ahmed Farid, sayyid Abdel Azim and Mohammed Abdul Fatah were leading this *Ad'Dawa As' Salafiyya* movement. It had not a formal organizational structure and disciplinary rules and regulations like Brotherhood.

In 1986, followers founded Al Furqan Institute for preparing Preachers, Imams, and Orators, a school for religious education. This Al Furqan became the main venue of the Salafi movement. Through this institute, the Movement directed Salafi activities across the country through social, youth, and district committees in the 1980s and 1990s. They published a magazine named *Ad'Da'wa* to subscribe their ideology and activism information through the growing education network. But in 1994, as the movement's influence grew, the government closed the institute, dissolved its executive council and banned its monthly magazine.

This Salafi movement had avoided their political participation in the Egyptian politics. Because the government provided no political space for any Islamists to participate. Despite their decision to avoid the politics, many Salafi leaders were arrested during President Hosni Mubarak's last decade in power. The movement even remained silent when one of its members, Sayyid Bilal, was arrested and tortured to

death in January 2011, a month before Mubarak was toppled. When popular uprising erupted and protests were held against Mubarak, Sheikh Burhami's faction criticized the protesters and called on Salafis to withdraw from the demonstrations and keep distance from all protests against a 'Muslim ruler'.

However after the 18 days uprising, Salafi leaders heavily involved in politics. As the Salafi movement had different political perceptions and opinions they formed three political parties based on those views. *An-Noor* (The light) *Al-aswala* (The Authenticity) and *Al-Fadila* (The virtue). These three parties formed a coalition—the Islamic alliance—to field candidates in Egypt's first fair and free democratic election in 2011-12.

Basically the ideology of all three parties is uncompromising. They advocate rigid application of the Sharia which they believe entails gender segregation, strict Islamic dress for women and social restrictions especially in the tourism field, arts, festivals, and all other entertainments. The controversial statement of Abdul Moneim al Shahat who was a senior Nour Party official, made Egyptians very angry when he interpreted the meaning of democracy as a 'forbidden' (*Haraam*) and "blasphemy" (*Kufr*). He had mentioned about the famous Egyptian Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz's writings and lyrics as "atheist literature" that promoted "prostitution and drugs". Some other leaders had mentioned Egyptians do not cast their votes to liberal, secular and non-Muslim candidates in the elections. Such statements had negative impact on their parties.

Since 2011 uprising, Salafis had tried to inject themselves and their ideas into the center focus of political debates. They were surprisingly well organized in their first elections despite their total political inexperience. They built alliances and coalitions with different political forces. *An-Noor* and *Aswala* parties joined the Democratic Alliance, led by the Muslim brotherhood and including the liberal *Wafd* Party. But on the eve of elections the two Salafi parties withdrew from the alliance when they felt the Brotherhood is dominating in the alliance and their own candidates are marginalized in the name of alliance. The two Islamist parties then formed an alliance with the Building and Development Party, the political arm of *Al Gama'a al Islamiyya*. Many leaders of this Islamic group were imprisoned in between the 1980s

and 1990s when it had advocated violence against regime. By the end of 1990s, the group had formally rejected its violence and then many of its members were released. In 2011, the group fielded candidates for parliament through the building and development party. Pious Egyptians always supported Islamist groups, especially Muslim Brotherhood. When Salafi alliances came most of the pious people supported them also because of their social networking and financial helps in the economic crisis period of Mubarak. Saudi Arabia and other G.C.C states also had funded these Salafi groups for their Islamic charities and preaching. Thus the Salafis achieved sweeping victories in some rural constituencies and on the outskirts of Cairo. They had explained their experience about their works and others like secularists and liberalists “They did not come to our streets, did not live in our hamlets, did not wear our clothes, did not eat our bread, did not drink our polluted water, did not live in the sewage we live in, and did not experience the life of misery and hardship of the people”, explained Salafi leader Sheikh Sha’aban Darwish. In addition, said Nour Party spokesman Mohammed Nour “Other parties were talking to themselves on Twitter, but we were actually on the streets. We have other things to do than protest in Tahrir”.⁵⁷

Election Performance of Salafi movements after the Uprising

All Islamist groups won 70 % of the seats in Egyptian parliament elections after the uprising. But in the first parliamentary elections, the main battle was happened between different types of Islamists. It was not between secularists and Islamists. Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist movement cannot necessarily work together toward a common Islamist political or social agenda in Parliament. The clear divergence between these two groups such as interpretation and the way of implementation of Sharia, gender relations and representations in the electoral parliament, views and perceptions on democracy and the different level of range of issues creating a huge deviation between these groups. Hence they can only stand under an umbrella political spectrum in order to protect some situational adjustments for the common interest of the community and the entire nation.

⁵⁷ibid

Salafis views the Brotherhood as insufficiently Islamist and too compromising with others. On the contrast, Muslim Brotherhood views Salafi positions as overly rigid, insufficiently centrist and inappropriate in a modern Egyptian as well as West Asian context. Muslim Brotherhood have shown many times its aims in past parliament elections that they are not shrinking in the religious, cultural matters or only Mosque related issues. But rather their basic and primary focus is on politics and in reestablishing the political Islamist government in Egypt.

At the end of every phase of elections, Nour Party chief Imad Abdul Ghafoor had told that they want to be independent from the Freedom and Justice Party and its decision maker Muslim Brotherhood. He openly said brotherhood might try to marginalize Nour Party portraying them the trouble makers. He raised an allegation that the other parties have this experience in the past who had made alliance with Brotherhood before. After the 2011-12 election Nour Party's leaders became very liberal rather than their extremist theological pragmatism. The Nour Party stressed for the separation of legislative, judiciary and executive powers. They raised their voice for justice, equality, fear free elections, right to elect their leaders whether it is local or national instead of the authoritarian and dictatorial positioning.

Future of Salafist Politics

Salafist political parties are still new to the politics of Egypt. For many years they were rejecting the democracy and democratic election system as they believed that the contemporary democracy was made as per the Western concepts. Now they partly approved that the democracy is a tool or instrument to the gradual implementation of Sharia. In Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution it was already enshrined that the Sharia would be the source of legislation. But how strictly it should be implemented? This is the main debatable issue between the Islamist groups and in between the Salafist movement. A new idea of medical tourism promotion was the main proposal of Salafist movement to increase the national economic health. Because Egypt is a regional center for the health care depended by the Arab and African people. Yet despite the conservative extremism, inexperience, immaturity in politics and the rejection of Western democratic system, the Salafis have demonstrated their adaptability to Egypt's new political environment and their amassing ground support

and success. Their accountability was established larger than the liberal and secular parties in Egypt. This accountability and public support of Salafis would be depended on their performance and commitment of An-Noor Party inside the parliament and the outside also such as the relations with America, Israel, minority, women, secularists, liberals and most importantly with Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party.⁵⁸

Thoughts of Rachid Al Gannouchi and Global Changes of Islamist Movements and its Influence in Egyptian Uprising

The 2011 popular Arab Uprisings happened in some of the Arab nations of West Asia and North Africa was because of three main deficits: economic, dignity and political. Arab streets witnessed huge protests in order to uphold their own identity and maintain their economic and political dignity. The ideology behind these protests was not just the Islam. Socialism, Liberalism and the anti-colonial democratic ideologies also have given their contributions in a big level. But the new player in this ground, Islamic Politics; formed by the uprisings, was initiated by Rachid al Gannouchi, the Islamic ideologue from Tunisia. He put forwarded own thoughts about the Islamic politics and followed the ideas of earlier scholars in that school of thought. His studies, experiences, rethinking, re-analyzing, criticism, and corrections in the perceptions of Islamic politics made a new kind of Islamic political analogy to the entire Islamist Movements. He criticized the old political thoughts of Hasan Al Banna, Sayyid Qutub and Abul A'ala Moududi and openly declared that their theory and concept of the formation of Islamic state is absolutely inappropriate and impracticable in the contemporary context.⁵⁹ In the new political discourses he re-defined the democracy, secularism, civil rights, civil society, one party ruling system, multi-party ruling system, coalition government system, co-operation with *Jahiliyya* society, participation with communism, reformation of *Khilafath*, and inappropriate implementation of Sharia in an inappropriate context. The thoughts of Islamic intellectuals like Sayyid Qutub and Abul A'ala Moududi were totally rejected secularism and democracy as they were the teachings of European political theories as

⁵⁸ibid

⁵⁹Mujeeb Rahman Kinaloor, "Arab Vasantham Roopappedutthunna Nawa Islamika Rashtreeyam" (The New Islamic Politics Emerged by The Arab Uprising), *Prabodhanam Arab Vasantham Special*, 2013, pp. 66-72, www.prabodhanam.net/index.php?isid=104.

well as anti-religion and anti-Islamism. Islamist Movements were following these perceptions for a long term, but in the new context emerged after the Arab Uprisings they started to follow Gannouchian thoughts and ideas. They applied Gannouchian theory in the Arab Uprisings and its aftermath processes in some countries. The concept of a global Islam does not exist in any form after the fall of Ottoman Sultanate. That idea of global Islam or one Islam followed across the globe in one format, politically and spiritually became a dream after the existence of nation states, republican countries and independent constitutions and its own governance.

Emergence of New Islamists and New Islamic Politics

Since early 2000 and in between the uprising a new terminology has been formed as “New Islamists” and “New Islamic Politics”. The word “New Islamists” does not mean a new class. It is the old class which has brought a new colorful change in the new Arab world. Until yesterday, the Islamists were in jails and streets or suppressed and tortured by their rulers. Now they toppled their dictators and long term pyramid rulers and came into power with a clear route following the democratic system. By this uprising, not only the regimes but the Islamist Movements also have been changed totally in their policies and programs. Uprising started in Tunisia which gave the first chance to the Islamist political movement. In the elections happened after the popular uprising in Tunisia, *An-Nahda*, the Islamist group, Rashid Al Ganouchi who is its ideologue and leader, got more than 40% votes by getting 89 seats in which 42 seats were reserved for women. In the next month Justice and Development Party in Morocco got 107 seats out of 395. In Egypt, Freedom and Justice Party of Muslim Brotherhood came into the first position and Al-Noor Party in to the second position. Mohammad Morsi also gained 51.7% votes in the Presidential election. Wherever the waves of uprising reached, there Islamist Movements proved their strong presence rather than the other parties. An unexpected uprisings as well as the unexpected arrival of the Islamist Movements into the power and the system totally changed whole scenario in the West Asia. Analysts called this as the rebirth or reformation of the Islamist Movements. Now these Islamist Movements slowly becoming the part of the public platforms which are acceptable and inclusive for everyone in the society. Islamist Movements widely formed its own independent political parties, later,

sometimes they became umbrella organizations by giving enough representations to minorities, women and non-Muslims.⁶⁰

In the light of new developments happening in the West Asia, the discourses and discussions about the formation of the theocratic states in through democratic ways almost took a new dimension. From the discussions of the possibility of the religious groups coming to power by elections, now the discussions are on how they can sustain in societies where the modern civil society movements and highly charged new generation those who are educated and interacting with developments happening in outside their respective countries in a global village setup. All Islamist Movements are now talking about the formation of a democratic civil state or a civil state with an Islamic reference not the Sharia state. Only some Salafi movements are still arguing for the implementation of Sharia law. But that also not a preferable thing in front of the other major Islamist Movements even to the Muslim Brotherhood. All are still working to establish and sustain a powerful democratic political system. They do not speak about Sharia. They do not divert the written constitution into the Sharia. *An-Nahda* openly declared that the power would be entirely to the people not to the Sharia. Justice and Development Party in Morocco also declared that the democratic state and the struggle against the corruption would be the main aims of the constitution not the Sharia Law.

Changing stands of Islamist Movements with democracy and secularism

Islamist Movements re-examined their stands towards secularism and democracy. They recognized that the democracy nowadays is only a tool or mere a device and not a system. The understanding has been changed as; it can be used to determine the implementation of the other systems. Democracy is giving the freedom to speak and talk. When they compare Monarchic and dictatorial worlds to democratic systems, Islamist Movements get more benefits from the idea of democracy than the implementation of sharia. Because the terminology of Sharia has been misused and misunderstood by Media as well as the extremist armed organizations like *Taliban* and *Al-Qaeda*. That is why Islamist Movements talking about only the establishment of democracy knowingly neglecting an inappropriate implementation of Sharia. The

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definition and understanding of secularism also has been changed. The contemporary Secularism is really means the inclusive pluralism. As per the understanding of New Islamists, Inclusive Pluralism is the nature of Islam. According to them, the Holy Quran has described that the pluralism made by God in order to recognize each other. So Islamist Movements can support pluralism believing and standing in monotheism. Rachid Al Gannouchi and *An-Nahda* party didn't allow writing down that the Islamic Sharia would be the sources of law of nation. He declared not the Sharia, but the ultimate aim of the Sharia (*Maqasid Al- Sharia*) is considerable and it would be kept in the future. Sharia means the public consciences and public support of the people with their sincere and satisfactory permission and not the forceful implementation with armed force. In Egypt Muslim Brotherhood also followed his thoughts and methods in the matter of Sharia.⁶¹

Islamists did never argue the credit of the Arab Uprising as their own and they did not hijack the uprising ever. In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood was not ready to stand for Presidential election at first. They had declared that they want only the administrative participation not the entire leadership. Hence they did not declare their own Presidential candidate at first. But when the Mubarak's candidate was declared and they felt the revolution might be diverted, then they decided to keep and sustain the essence of the uprising and the demands of the Egyptian youth as well as to prevent the intervention of the West. Then they went for a candidate of their own. In Tunisia *An-Nahda* is in the leading role of the administrative front. They have a coalition government with leftist and secularist parties. In the history of the Islamic countries, Tunisia is the only one and first which gave a major representation to the women in the state administration.

Changing Contexts and Changing Policy Programs

Islamist Movements were formed after the demolition of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1924. British imperialist allies destroyed the unity of the Islamic states and implemented there the policy of divide and rule system. Theoretically and practically the reformation of the *Khilafath* system was the ultimate aim of the all Islamist

⁶¹Dr.Abdussalam Vaniyambalam, "Islamika Prasthaanangal Maarukayaanu" (Islamic Movements are Changing), Prabodhanam Arab Vasantham Special, *Prabodhanam Arab Vasantham Special*, 2013, pp.58-63, www.prabodhanam.net/index.php?isid=104.

Movements when they were formed at first. At that time the secularism was totally well known as anti-religious one. It was not like the definition of contemporary secularism. Communism and democracy were also seemed as enemies for the Islamist Movements. Islamist Movements and their intellectuals were born and brought up by fighting with these anti-religious theories and ideologies, which were considered as the anti-theocracy, anti-Semitism, anti-*Khilafath* system and ultimately anti-Islamism. Hasan Al-Banna was talking about the single party ruling system and one party Government of the Islamists. But Brotherhood recognized the context and situations and they corrected him since 1960's. They started to propagate about the multi-party system and coalition Government against the dictatorship. They corrected Sayyid Qutb by saying that the *Jahiliyya* Society, ie the ignorant society before Islam and those who have no knowledge about the basics of Islam, should not be kept in a distance from the participation and co-operation of administration. Gannouchi remembered that Islamists never reject the democracy and secularism being a European concept and its own creation. Instead of that, Islamists should reform and redefine the European democracy and secularism in the concept of Islam. When he criticized the influencing thoughts of Sayyid Qutb and Moududi, he was condemned at first from the Islamist Movements. But later, Gannouchi's thoughts were accepted and implemented by Islamist groups in many parliamentary electoral systems before the uprising and in making the regimes during the uprising. The co-operative and inclusive politics would be applicable to end the authoritarian and dictatorial rule. That is why Brotherhood activists had contested election on behalf of Wafd Party and Ahrar Party, when they were banned.⁶²

Another notable development happened in the uprising was the way the Islamist movements changed the form of the jargons they used in naming the parties or movements they are associated with. Just before and during the uprising, Islamist Movements formed their own public platform as independent political parties. They used the words like freedom, justice, development, peace, construction, salvation and welfare for the nomenclature of the parties. Though there were hurdles in naming those with the prefixes and suffixes of 'Islamic' or '*Islamiyya*', the way they chose the words those showcase the universal urge for freedom and dignity connotes the

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way Islamic Movements changed. Most of the Islamist Movements have been trying to follow Erdogan model for last decades and started to speak about plural society rather than the singular society. They applied an inclusive democracy. The old meaning of secularism and democracy was changed, so Islamist Movements also changed. Now they understand democracy is the progressive form of the Islamic Shura system. Secularism is nowadays considered as the co-operation, sympathy and participative pluralism between the religion and the unity in diversity. These kinds of secularism are the essence of Islam, the Islamist movements practiced. Now they are ready to co-operate with communism also. Islamist Movements have been running now through the path of reformation. Arab uprising gave them a chance to be more practical rather than theoretical speeches.

An inclusive and co-operative politics are implemented by Islamist Movements. Now they can adjust with the leftist and secular parties. In the very key positions they can apply the secularists. Thus *An-Nahda* made its alliance with the famous secular parties like “*Atthakaathul*” and “Congress for Republic” (CPR). The President post was also given to Congress for Republic Party. Gannouchi had openly declared about this kind of alliance Government before the election result was declared.

By keeping a long distance with micro observations, these Islamist political parties making relations and seeking economic support from United States and European Union also. This is also a big change of the Islamist movements in the contemporary scenario, especially in Egypt. United States and its allies were seemed as enemies in the view point of Islamic Movements. Even still they didn't change their perceptions. But even though, they have created a new political version for the co-operation in as far as possible manner. That is why these Islamic Movements still depending upon them. Soon After the election held, Rachid Al Gannouchi had visited America and other European countries and tried to bring their foreign capitals into Tunisia. The Muslim Brotherhood leaders had also done the same thing after their election.

Western Interventions and the Rise of Political Islamism

In the western discourse, Islamists are seen as newcomers to politics, who are motivated by a radical ideology and lack of parliamentary political experiences. In

fact, they have played a major role in the Arab political scene since the 1920s. Islamic movements have often been in opposition, but since the 1940s they have participated in parliamentary elections, entered by making the alliances with secular, nationalist and socialist groups, and participated in several governments – in Sudan, Jordan, Yemen and Algeria. They have also forged alliances with non-Islamic regimes, like the Nimeiri regime in Sudan in 1977. It is argued that a number of other events have had an impact on the collective Muslim mind, and have led to the maturation of political Islam, the much-debated Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The rise of political Islamism in Iran in the wake of the 1979 Revolution made perfect sociological and political sense. The social conditions in the decades before the revolution, that was a specific by-product of the authoritarian modernization policies of the Western-backed Pahlavi regime, created fertile ground for the rise of Islamic Revolution. These policies undermined the forces of democratic secularism and liberalism. It also inadvertently strengthened the forces of political Islam.

The military coup in Sudan in 1989; the success of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front in the 1991 elections and the army's subsequent denial of its right to govern; the conquest of much of Afghan territory by the Taliban in 1996 leading to the establishment of its Islamic Emirate; and the success in 2006 election of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections were some motive examples for the other Islamist Movements. The victory of Hamas was not recognized, nor was the national unity government formed. Instead, a siege was imposed on Gaza to suffocate the movement. Perhaps one of the most influential experiences has been that of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, which won the elections in 2002. It has been a source of inspiration for many Islamic movements. Although the AKP does not describe itself as Islamic, its 10 years of political experience have led to a model that many Islamists regard as successful. The model has three important characteristics like a general Islamic frame of reference; a multi-party democracy; and significant economic growth. These varied political experiences have had a profound impact on political Islam's flexibility and capacity for political action, and on its philosophy, too.

Despite this, the Islamic political discourse has generally been balanced. The Tunisian Islamic movement has set a good example. Although *An-Nahda* suffered under Ben

Ali's regime, its leaders developed a tolerant discourse and managed to open up to moderate secular and leftist political groups. The movement's leaders have reassured Tunisian citizens that it will not interfere in their personal lives and that it will respect their right to choose. The movement also presented a progressive model of women's participation, with 42 female *An-Nahda* members in the constitutional assembly. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak were tried to suppress and oppress the Muslim Brotherhood. The same Muslim Brotherhood and its new political wing Justice and Development Party got the opportunity to lead the Egypt by the support of secular civil society movements.

Muslim Brotherhood is now considered in Egypt as a socio –political movement with a generic Islamist programme rather than the Al Noor Party or *Al Jama'a al Islamiyya* in Egypt. The Brotherhood differs from other groups whether on the right, left or centre only in the context of its agenda. The ideology of Muslim Brotherhood, the practice of Hasan al Banna and the political criticism of Sayyid Qutub now became an ideological vitality in more than 85 countries. The Tunisian *An-Nahda* organization, *Hamas* in Palestine and *Jama'ath-e-Islami* in India and in South Asian neighbouring countries are also the by organizations of Brotherhood aiming the same ideology and different way of activism. Brotherhood has earned a flexibility and adaptability in international level. That is the major characteristics of Brotherhood which changed as acceptable to secular civil society. This flexibility is not only found in its activists but also its natural extension from the lower class to middle class and to upper class, which marks its general, intellectual and political outlook, those who have a special personality and calibre ability when it will be studied about their entire biography. Most of the Islamist groups have perpetually suffered historical and geographical retreat over the long periods because of their puritanical straight lines of their intellectual and political vision and by the inadequate flexibility and adaptability suitable to the living geographical context and the contemporary situation. In Egypt Muslim Brotherhood has overcome that situation by cooperating with secular civil society and participating in the democratic election process.⁶³

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Conclusion

Global media also gave an unlimited importance and focus on Islamist movements in order to criticize and do post-mortem. This also compelled the Islamist Movements to recognize and identify themselves separately from the extremist-armed organisations. Ultimately they forced to change their views, theories and policies even in changing the names of their new formed organisations in order to avoid misunderstandings and fears about it. This at last helped the Islamist Movements and influenced in the uprisings until the formation of a new Islamic politics from the intellectual thoughts of Rachid al Gannouchi and the practical model of Rəcəp Tayyib Erdogan.

CONCLUSION

Since the end of 2010, three words like Arab Uprising, Civil Society, and Islamic Movements have been discussed with more and more importance in the contemporary West Asian discourses. Along with one new question, whether civil society and Islamist Movements are or were complimentary or contradictory in the contemporary Arab Uprising, the whole discourse on the actors of uprising taking new routes as the combining nature of these two movements in the act was a new phenomenon. In Egypt the positive role and effect of both the groups have been proved within the 18 days long uprising and in the process. And they proved that they were not contradictory in winning the uprising and became more complimentary in bringing at least partial democracy and freedom from the military controlled dictatorial ruling system. Both groups had a lot of bitter experiences since its formation. Apart from that, some civil society groups were irritated by this uprising, it can be seen that, they were clinging to the old authoritarian regimes and military. Both groups have a lot of possibilities to do more things in an instable Egyptian politics and society. The interconnectedness of civil society and Islamist movements were highly used throughout the 2011 Egyptian uprising. Thus they were able to overthrow the authoritarian Mubarak regime and to bring the democracy to that part of the world and to keep distance with military intervention from the democratic process in a distance. If Egypt wants the complete democracy and full independence from the military, the groups, the Islamist movements and civil society movements have to unite and work together until their aim and inspiration for dignity, democracy and independence would be fulfilled. It was the times of immense change in Egypt and in the Arab world. The fast unfolding events do have tremendous policy implications, but their commitment to a democratic and independent Egypt enables them to have a positive standing in the emerging political arrangement.

Arab society has no satisfying, enough democratic institutions. Transformation to democracy was a strange process in most of the West Asian countries. The case of Egypt was also not different. So after this uprising, whether it is in Egypt or other West Asian regions, civil society movements could play a crucial role than the political and ideological movements. The universal aspirations for freedom, dignity and democracy have been emerged in the Arab society because of these civil society

movements as well as the Islamist organizations. In Egypt there are three main demographic factors which are influential in different manner such as Arab, African and Islamic. Hence, on the basis of language, religion, culture and geography there would be unifying things in between the society in the different region in West Asia; though the process of unification will be complex when above said factors put into test. So the activism of civil society in Egypt would reflect in such situations also. The fruits of uprising would be there for permanently, even though some regions of G.C.C States were remained untouched. In the recent decades, Muslim Brotherhood became a wide grass root movement in the entire West Asia which cannot be avoidable from the main stream of the society. Political, economic and religious factors also played a crucial role in the Egyptian uprising. Still Egyptian uprising is incapable in bringing the national aspirations, especially in solving the grievances of youth. Uprising has to move forward in order to bring the structural changes. In the political landscape of the Arab world the alliance of political Islam and secular civil society would be emerged more and more whenever the military would intervene to make obstacles in the easy way of bringing democratically elected and legitimate government for the stability and prosperity of the nation.

Egyptian Arab Uprising was the sign board for the transformation to democracy for the other regions in West Asia. Since the 1950s there has been a kind of military controlled republican ruling system in Egypt. By challenging Mubarak and his autocratic rule strongly, the civil society and Islamist movements tried to build Egypt as a democratic state and for that they gathered in Tahrir square. Tahrir square was the epicenter of Egyptian uprising. It was the culmination point where the Islamist movements and Civil Society groups came together and shared the space to raise their voice against the dictator. Protests and demonstrations were continued after the 18 days uprising. But it was very difficult to bring a sudden change without a disciplinary structure. Because of the absence of political process and democratic institutions Egypt cannot recover from then condition of uncertainty about the future just with the civil society support and the leadership of Islamist movements; but it was visible from the way the protests happened, coming together of these groups will be beneficial for the future. Uprising changed Egyptian's political perceptions. But yet they have to change the existence of decade's long relations between military and authoritarian alliance. And they have to make another new democratic concepts and

views as well as rebuilding of new democratic institutions. They should be patient for the stability of the government and the electoral systems. They won't hope more and in sudden action as it has to overcome a lot of structural obstacles and limitations even though the government has changed. The elected government, whether it is Islamic or secular, has to give a gradual but immediate and maximum change in economic, security and employment field. Because, these were the first and the main challenges in front of the upcoming governments after the uprising. The way things happened in Egypt gives a lesson for the upcoming Egyptian government that, it has to consider its secular character as well as the Islamic spirit of the majority. Because the victory of the uprising is not only of the secularists or the Islamist. So the elected government has to protect the hopes of the participants of the street protests and demonstrations, mainly the well-educated youth and the diverse character of civil society and Islamist movements. Even if the elected government wants to build a new constitution they also should keep these diversities in the making of new constitution. By analyzing the plural societies behaved towards the elected governments, this diversity is not a simple thing. It is clearly seen that Egyptian society is a diverse society in its nature, culture, its civil society, and its Islamist organizations. Whoever the government, they should keep the rights of youth those who brought the uprising and led it to a victory, and the rights of minority, women, civil society organizations and Islamist movements.

America has been helping the Egyptian military giving them money since 1978 Camp David accords. It has averaged about two billion American Dollars, per year. Mubarak left his chair by leaving Egypt in a worst condition. Hence, the new government should participate the opposition also in the administration to rebuild the nation. Islamist organizations also changed their agenda to build a civil state with Islamic reference. The future will be troublesome if the Islamist movement go in the way of their own ways if they get elected instead of taking along all other groups including the opposition. Each and every uprising and revolution, there would be a counter uprising and revolution. This is the common nature of every revolution. In such a situation there is a question how civil society and Islamist movements and the newly elected government will deal and react to it. It may also become the reason for return of old military control and authoritarian government. If the election process and the elected government hijacked or overthrew by military it may be the return to the

old dictatorial era. The people never tolerate such kinds of returns to the military-authoritarian era from the gradual and progressive democratic footsteps.

Suppressed for a long decades, both Islamist movements and pro-democratic civil society could start articulating their commitment to the universal aspirations for freedom, dignity and democracy. Whenever their cooperation, convergence, interconnectedness, unity to stand in a common platform, adaptability, adjustment mentality for the common purpose and complementary togetherness would work to re-establish these aspirations, there the military and pro-Mubarak regime civil society organizations as well as the foreign interventions cannot go forward by neglecting the opinion and demands of the pro-democratic civil society and Islamist movements.

As the military has still a major influence, power, intervention and the control in the administration and in the constitution formation, the 2011 Egyptian uprising won't remain as a revolution happened in Iran. This can be said that, it was just a revolutionary footstep and process in order to bring a large revolution towards completing the aspirations of the people. All revolutions are uprisings. But all uprisings are not revolutions; history proves that. So in Egypt also, it was not a complete revolution. It may take time. But this uprising became a cause to pave the way of the revolution. If the civil society and Islamist movements go peacefully in order to establish the complete independence of their nation they can achieve it gradually. Because the Arabs, especially the youth will never go back to the old situations before the 25th January 2011. Arab youth, whether they are men or women have got an inspiration to speak loudly coming into the street. Most of them are well educated and professionally qualified to understand the things and changing situations of this globalized era. They can express their opinions, information, democratic aspirations through the new technology and social media. Each and every moment they can share the pictures, news, videos, press conferences, military attacks, protests, and demonstrations through these internet tools such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, and emails than the newspapers, televisions, and news channels.

Egypt has been witnessed about 70 years long British Colonialism started in 1882. After that it witnessed for 60 years long authoritarian and military administration by Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak in the name of socialism, secularism and liberalism. Now it has witnessed for uprising and the democratic Parliamentary politics and the

administration of the Islamist groups. Still Egypt has to overcome the long decades old worst situations and economic conditions. Hence, civil society movements and Islamist movements should be patient to the gradual economic growth of the nation. Any impatient activities coming from the both side would cause to be worst the conditions and situations in Egypt.

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