"Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1983-86"

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

PUSHKAR

CENTRE FOR AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067, INDIA
1991

जवाहरलाल नेहरु विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

Centre for American &
West European Studies
School of International Studies

CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN CHILE, 1983-86" submitted by PUSHKAR, in partial fulfilment of the Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) in Jawaharlal Nehru University, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is an original work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Professor R. Narayanan
Supervisor

Professor R. Narayanan
Chairman

GRAM : JAYENU TEL. : 667676, 667557 TELEX : 031-73167 JNU IN

C O N T E N T S

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have taken its present shape without the help I received from a number of people.

I wish to thank H.E., the Ambassador of Chile to India, Dr. Eduardo Ortiz, for giving me valuble time to discuss with him various aspects of Chilean history and politics.

I am also grateful to my friend and teacher, Dr. Sergio Carrasco of the University of Chile, for my first insights into Chilean life and culture.

Dr. R. Narayanan was always patient and open to my endless arguments. His encouragement all through my M.Phil. made all the difference.

The credit for typing out this manuscript goes to Chaher. I doubt if anyone could have done a better job. The errors in the dissertation are mine alone, of facts or interpretation.

Pushkar

New Delhi
July 1991

PREFACE

In September 1973, a military coup led by General Augosto Pinochet ousted the democratically-elected Marxist government of Salvadore Allende. For the next 16 years Chile was ruled by a military-authoritarian regime that exercised its authority through a combination of sheer power and the institutionalization of what came to be called "authoritarian democracy". The right-wing regime took upon itself the task of eliminating all leftist elements in Chilean society and engaged in a high level of coercion that earned it notoriety for human rights abuses. All democratic rights and privilages were suspended and a conscious policy of "depoliticization" together with a programme for economic recovery was formulated. The implementation of a new order was completed with the 1980 Constituion which gave the armed forces an unprecedented direct political role and Pinochet an almost life-long say in national affairs.

The Pinochet era can be roughly divided into two phases--the first, from the coup to the implementation of the new Constitution in 1981; and the second, from 1981 to 1989. It is the second phase of Pinochet's rule that attracts attention. From a situation of almost no opposition as late as 1980-81, by mid-1983 a mass movement seemed to be gathering momentum, to protest against military rule and demand a return to democracy.

The first large-scale protest against the military regime took place on 11 May 1983 in Santiago. It marked the begining of monthly protests and the demonstrators began to swell in number, including the upper-middle and middle class. Opposition forces combined under the Democratic Alliance and the Popular Democratic Movement. Few concessions could be had through dialogue with the regime. The two concrete expressions of the opposition--the National Accord and the Demand of Chile were summarily rejected by Pinochet.

In this project, we have attempted to analyse three years of the struggle for democracy (1983-86) that ended with the moderate section of the opposition accepting and resigning to a constitutional transition to democracy. There can be several starting points to this project. For one, we must consider the Chilean exception of a tradition of democracy. This makes it difficult to explain one and a half decades of military rule. Secondly, the breakdown of democracy did not come about with the coup, the process had begun under the reformist governments of Eduardo Frei and Allende. There is no doubt,however, that the military reversed all existing political, social and economic trends and brought about a major restructuring on the lines of a free-market authoritarian model. In this context, how can one explain the rise of an opposition movement by 1983? Was it political repression and economic crisis that brought thousands of Chileans to the streets? If so, Pinochet was a failure in the sense that the "depoliticization" he attempted, could not, in the face of

adversities, prevent a "repoliticization" of Chilean society.

The Chilean opposition was a complex variable in the period of our examination. Containing elements from the extreme-left to the centre-right, and plagued by the historical "three-thirds" divide of Chilean society, the opposition found it difficult to come to terms with the ongoing political developments.

In the wake of a return to democracy in Chile, several aspects of the period 1983-86 need serious deliberation. The problems facing the civilian government of Patricio Aylwin are a legacy of military rule and the form and direction the protest movement took in the period of our consideration. The historical "three-thirds" split of the electorate between the forces of the left, centre and right further complicate the political scenario.

A major limitation of this project is the almost total reliance on secondary sources. The researcher has used the more important texts on Chilean history and polity to provide the background to the advent of military rule in Chile. The proximity of the period under study to the present has limited the amount of available material on the subject, but an effort has been made to supplement our information with newspapers and magazines.

The basic chapterization scheme followed in the project is as follows:

Chapter I is an overview of the evolution of Chilean democracy from 1833 to 1964. An emphasis is placed on delineating the main features of national politics.

Chapter II examines the reformist years of the Frei and Allende administrations to assess their role in the processes that culminated with the 1973 coup. The first phase of military rule is also dealt with in this chapter.

Chapter III deals with the crisis of the military regime and the background to the protest movement.

Chapter IV contains a chronological survey of the years 1983-86. The various actors in the ongoing political processes have been dealt with at length. An attempt is also made to analyse the various dimensions of the confrontation between the military regime and the opposition.

C H A P T E R I

EVOLUTION OF CHILE'S DEMOCRATIC POLITY, 1833-1964

The somewhat isolated geographical location of Chile has not in any way precluded that country from occupying an important place in the politics of the Latin American region. Most recently, the sixteen years of military-authoritarian rule of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte gave way to a democratic government in what was easily one of the more peaceful transitions to democracy ever seen in Latin America. The Partido Democrata Cristiana (PDC, Christian Democratic Party) led coalition government has, in its first few months of power, given every indication that democracy is back in Chile to stay. The shadow of the military and its leader Pinochet looms large upon Chileans, but the fact remains that the country has been historically accustomed to democratic rule than to any other form of government.

Nineteenth century Latin America was, with few exceptions, the hunting ground of caudillos and the regional politics was characterized by political instability, chaos and disorder. Political independence from the Iberian colonizers was not harnessed in building stable, strong and workable governing institutions.

Chile, in strong contrast to most of Latin America, saw political stability and order especially from the 1830s on and democratic practices and institutions came to be firmly implanted as the country progressed. The armies of liberation, having served to achieve independence (1810) came to be "relegated" to a "secondary" role of maintaining peace at the borders. The military was confined to the barracks and civilian supremacy confirmed in the political sphere.

Chile is, in many ways, not a typical Latin American country. Three features of Chilean polity merit emphasis and a detailed discussion. First, Chile has a deep-rooted tradition of democracy and, over the last hundred years in particular, witnessed a high level of party competition, open and relatively fair popular elections combined with a high respect for democratic freedoms. Second, military intervention and rule has been an exception rather than the rule in Chile. The military has always been a "political force", a pressure-group that has influenced but not dictated or directed national policies for any considerable length of time. Third, authoritarianism in general, in spite of the tradition of democracy and a noninterventionist military, has been an important element of Chilean polity over the years.

It is for these reasons that even as the military firmly established itself in national politics following the successful 11 September 1973 coup against the Unidad Popular (UP) government of President Salvador Allende and successfully "imposed" a new constitution, significant opposition to military-authoritarianism remained and at the first given opportunity rose to challenge the government's legitimacy and authority, using both constitutional and extra-constitutional means. The period 1973-1989 stands out as a blot in Chilean history, and the return to democracy may be said to have restored the Chilean political tradition.

A common utterence in Chile is, "No Somos tropicales" ("we are not like those other Latin Americans"). An attempt is made in the following sections to delineate the three features of the country's polity which we have identified earlier with a view to understand the struggle for a return to democracy in the early 1980s.

The Autocratic Republic (1830-1890)[1]

On 18 September 1810, a Cabildo abierto ("town

---

1 The division of Chilean history into three broad periods for the purpose of the present discussion is based on the studies of; Brian Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism (New York, 1979); Arthuro Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime", in Larry Diamond and others, Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, Colorado, 1989), vol.4, pp. 158-206; Federico G. Gil, "Chile: Society in Transition", contd....

meeting) in Santiago accepted the resignation of the governor, Francisco Carrsco, and proclaimed the creation of a national junta. In the years 1810-1830 "...the new nation alternated between dictatorship and anarchy".[2] Two distinct political tendencies were also beginning to appear; they were later to result in the creation of Chile's earlier parties.

> One favoured a real republic, free and democratic, and the liberalization of social institutions accordingly, regardless of the lack of traditions and political habits; the other demanded a strong centralized government ...and aspired, in general, to a system which would not break completely with colonial traditions, one which would not modify the existing structure of society.(3)

The former were known as the liberales or pipiolos (liberals or novices) and the latter as pelucones (conservatives or bigwigs). It was "...the chaos of public finance that brought to the fore businessmen and military leaders who ended two decades of near anarchy with a conservative restoration".[4]

---

contd. from pre page

in Martin C. Needler (ed.), Political Systems of Latin America (New York, 1970), edn.2, pp. 392-427. The sub-division into smaller historical periods is also based on the same.

2 ibid, Valenzuela, p.162.

3 Gil, n.1, pp.399-400.

4 Loveman, n.1, p.134.

In April 1830, conservative forces defeated the liberal army in the Battle of Lircay and, led by a merchant, Diego Portales, an alliance of military leaders, merchants, prominent landowners and the Church set about to establish a unique political regime in Chile. The solution to the political disorder of the past was found in establishing a strong, centralized government that emphasized restoration of legitimacy, law and order, public morality and fiscal integrity, and one that did not tolerate opposition or criticism. This marked the beginning of the "autocratic republic" or the "centralized oligarchical rule".[5] The Constitution of 1833 institutionalized what historians have called the "Portalian State". Ironically, Portales played almost no official role in elaborating the Constitution through its character owed as much to him as to its principal author, Mariano Egaña.

> This conservative document not only restricted the suffrage through literacy and property qualifications, but also provided for a very strong presidency by giving the Chief Executive the power to select and control directly all administrative officials, to name Supreme Court justices and to veto Congressional legislation. Further...it reestablished the right of primogeniture...and declared Roman Catholicism the state religion, at the same time prohibiting the "public exercise of any other faith whatsoever". (6)

---

5 The phrase is used by James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), p.79.

6 John R. Stephenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1942), p.12.

The Constitution of 1833 formalized the anti-democratic principles that both Portales and Egaña stood for, and the common disdain they had for democracy, popular suffrage and liberalism. The document maintained existing class relations and made possible effective governence, economic recovery and above all, political stability.

The establishment and consolidation of "limited" or "formal" democracy was to take place within the framework of the Constitution of 1833 and the autocratic republic that emerged in the Chile of the 1830s. It will however be a mistake to locate the factors that led to the consolidation of Chilean democracy in the Constitution of 1833 or in events that occurred in that particular decade. The authority structures that were established in the 1830s must be distinguished from the process of actual consolidation which took many more years and which was aided by a set of different factors.[7]

---

7 See Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile and the Breakdown of Democracy", in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline (ed.), Latin American Politics and Development (Boston, 1979), p.234. Rustow has noted the importance of distinguishing between establishing and consolidating institutions of democracy. Consolidation involves a lengthy process of "habituation", which is not necessarily unilinear; there can be reversals and even breakdown. Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", Comparative Politics (New York, N.Y.), vol.2, no.3, April 1970, pp.337-63.

The policies of President Joaquín Prieto (1831-1841), a successful war against the Peru-Bolivia confederation (1837-1838) and the "martyrdom" of Portales served to solidify the new government. The military victory in particular had a profound effect on Chileans, as it was to have forty years later in the War of Pacific (1879-1883). Defeat of the Chilean army would have magnified political divisions and seriously imperilled governmental stability.[8] The War strengthened the belief of the Chileans that they were one nation and contributed significantly to Chilean nationalism at a time when it was needed most.

The War also made a national hero of General Manuel Bulues and elevated him to the presidency. In his two 5-year terms in office (1841-1851), Bulnes took important steps to implement the principles set forth in the Constitution. He refused to rule autocratically and relied on the cabinet to carry out the main tasks of government. The cabinet itself was drawn from different sectors of public opinion and members were periodically changed to reflect new pressures and interests.

---

8 Francisco Antonio Encina, Historia de Chile (Santiago, 1941-42), vol.9, p.493. Cited in Valenzuela, n.1, p.162.

Executive power was paramount but the judiciary and legislature developed, partly in response to the influence of imported liberalism or perhaps the desire of certain elites to emulate British parliamentarism, and partly due to the support provided by Bulnes. For example, in November 1841, Congress agreed to suspend legislation authorizing tax collection as also the budget bill until the executive submitted an expanded legislative agenda. The President's acceptance of the congressional demands was an implicit recognition of the legitimacy of legislature checks on government policy. As Congress became more assertive the cabinet responded by trying to capture it by manipulating the electoral process. The perversion of suffrage however contributed, in the long run, to reinforcing the legitimacy of the legislature as a full-fledged branch of government.[9]

The decisive control of the military by civilian authorities set Chile apart from other Latin American governments. Bulnes ruled as a civilian and set a precedent for following presidents who, even if they were from the military, served without uniforms. The National

---

9 The growing assertiveness of the Congress came to be felt from the second half of the nineteenth century and was the crux of the conflict between the executive and legislature.

Guard came to be favoured at the expense of the regular army.[10] Bulnes's identity as a victorious general helped keep the traditional military elite at bay until 1851 when Concepción-based army officers sided with other discontented elements of Chilean society to challenge the government by force.

The political institutions of post-1833 Chile were propped up by substantial economic prosperity that may be partly explained as a consequence of political stability. Under successive administrations the enormous tasks of reorganizing public finance, rationalizing commercial policy and determining the direction of economic development were adeptly handled. Chile's role as a supplier of raw materials to and receiver of manufactured goods from the developed capitalist nations came to be accepted. Mining and agriculture thrived as the state took the initiative in improving dock facilities, obtaining foreign credit, introducing railroads etc. Foreign trade gave the government a ready and expanding source of income from customs revenues. This enabled the state to undertake extensive public works projects and to invest large sums of money in education etc. The continuity

---

10 The National Guard was a force of loyal citizen soldiers, ten to twenty-five times the size of the peacetime army, composed mainly of lower-middle class civilians.

of government policy was helped by the fact that each successive president was facilitated by the method of selecting presidents, each appointing his successor.[11]

Thus, "consolidation of authoritarian government ...gave Chile a truly national political system with administrative capabilities that paved the way for impressive economic growth ...".[12] The same "economic expansion created new economic interests, made social stratification more complex, and exacerbated regional animosities ...".[13]

Since the economic growth of the country came to be closely tied to the expansion of the State, it soon began to generate bitter opposition from the traditional conservative elite; central valley landowners, regional interests and Church officials realized that the State was cutting into their power-bases. The Church-State issue[14] and the conflict between the executive and the legislature were central in the rise of opposition to the State.

---

11 G.F. Scott Elliot, Chile (London, 1907), p.208.

12 Loveman, n.1, p.150.

13 ibid, p.152.

14 The so-called "religious question" involved secularizing cemeteries, civil marriage, public education and, more generally, separation of Church and State.

"... by midcentury the State was not simply a tool of economic elites but had...attained a considerable degree of autonomy..." from the traditional elite not only because of "growing governmental institutionalization and ...the ability of State officials to manipulate the verdict of the electorate" but also the "...system of revenue collection tied to an export economy".[15] An entirely new profession of urban-based government functionaries, political leaders and intellectuals appeared on the national stage and espoused a liberal creed.[16] They relied on the State for their positions and had a stake in the expansion of governmental authority. Therefore, "...control of the State and its expenditures became the most important political issue of the time".[17]

Chile's first real party, the Conservative Party, was founded in 1857 and became the foremost expression of elite discontent over the decreasing power and autonomy of rural areas and the challenge to the Church's monopoly over educational, cultural and family life. The cause of Conservatives was furthered by an alliance with some

---

15 Valenzuela, n.7, pp.237-8.

16 The "Generation of 1842" was a liberal intellectual movement whose beginnings coincided with the creation of the University of Chile in 1842. They were strongly secular with an impressive influence in decision-making circles at the time when the Chilean State was undergoing an expansion of its role in national life.

17 Valenzuela, n.7, p.238.

ideological liberals who supported the State in matters relating to the Church but opposed its authoritarian nature especially on grounds of electoral intervention, limited suffrage and democratization. The Radical Party, representing anti-clerical and mining interests, as well as landowners from the south, merchants and small businessmen, was founded in 1861[18] "...as a reaction against oligarchic rule".[19] Its main demands were "...constituional reform, state supervision over education, administrative decentralization, and freedom of suffrage".[20]

In 1859, discontent with the government from various quarters led to a civil war in which, as in 1851, the State, with the help of National Guard, was victorious. This put an end to any wishful thinking on the part of opposition elements to contemplate victory through armed challenge. Chile now witnessed a consolidated attempt to expand suffrage, bar official manipulation of the electoral process, limit executive authority, decentralize administration etc. The change from an "autocratic republic" to a "liberal

---

18 Gil, n.1, puts the year of the founding of the Radical Party in 1861, see p.401. Loveman, n.1, p.182, in 1863; and John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford, California, 1958), p.73, in 1862.

19 ibid, Johnson, p.73.

20 Gil, n.1, p.401.

republic" had occurred.[21]

During the administration of President Federico Errázuriz (1871-1876) a Congressional majority of the Conservatives under the leadership of José Manuel Irarrazaval enabled a dramatic liberalization of the electoral system. The 1871 constitutional amendment prohibited immediate presidential re-election. The office of the president thus came to be limited to a single 5-year term and his veto power was also restricted. The Electoral Reform Act (1874) also increased the size of the electorate by 300 per cent from 50,000 in 1872 to 150,000 in 1878, as suffrage was extended to all literate males.

The War of the Pacific altered the national life of Chile in all its aspects. The victory provided material benefits in the form of territory and nitrates, and resulted in far-reaching changes in the country's economic life, necessitating major structural adjustments and readjustments in Chilean society and polity. Chile became another example of a late-industrialising capitalist society with early and

---

21 ibid, Gil's division of Chilean history separates the period of "autocratic republic" (1830-1860) from the "liberal republic" (1860-1890) though only a "social transformation" and not a "political transformation" had occurred.

persisting quasi-parliamentary politics where urbanization and modernization did not occur as a consequence of industrialization, rather, there only took place a semblance of industrial expansion relative to the concentration of the population in urban settlements.[22]

If nitrates brought wealth to the government in the form of export revenues it also "...brought a grave risk - an exaggerated dependence upon foreign markets which was in the future to unbalance Chile's internal economy"[23] and lead to social unrest of a magnitude that eventually resulted in military intervention in politics in the 1920s. The nitrate economy created an ever-expanding workforce and the beginnings of a truly industrial wage proletariat which would in the era of the "parliamentary republic" acquire the centre stage with the so-called "social question".

In the short-run, the nitrate wealth enabled the government to successfully withstand all political-social pressure from various social groups as also the military,

---

22 Nicos Mouzelis, "On the Rise of Postwar Military Dictatorships: Argentina, Chile, Greece", Comparative Studies in Society and History (Cambridge, New York, N.Y.), vol.28, no.1, January 1986, p.58.

23 Gil, n.1, p.402.

as everyone was able to get a piece of the cake. The military victory further cemented the political institutions that had been evolving over the decades though the very basis of the existing political problems - the conflict between the president and the Congress, remained and during the presidency of José Manuel Balmaceda (1886-1891) resulted in a Civil War (1891).

The civil war remains a controversial subject to date but may perhaps be best understood in terms of "... the complex relationships between the changes in Chile's political economy wrought by the war of the Pacific and the persistence of long-standing political issues, such as the 'religious question' and the constant tension between the Congress and the exeuctive".[24] The Congress backed by the navy, defeated the president, backed by the army, and ushered in almost four decades of "parliamentary republic" or "oligarchic parliamentarism"[25] where "... presidential influence became almost extinct and parties grew at will".[26]

The period of the "autocratic republic" was the infant stage of Chilean political evolution. The country's

---

24 Loveman, n.1, pp.196-7.

25 The term is used by Nicos Mouzelis, n.22, pp.56-57.

26 Gil, n.1, p.400.

democratic institutions and procedures made significant advances even though citizenship was sharply restricted. Chile did not deviate substantially from other nascent democracies in this respect. More importantly, there were several decades in which political authority was vested in elected presidents and Congress wielded substantial influence over the formulation of public policy. When existing social, political and economic relations would not sustain the changes that occurred over the previous five decades, a civil war resulted. The victory of Congressional forces may actually have positively influenced Chilean democracy and reduced authoritarianism of the past.

The Chilean military underwent radical changes towards the end of the period of our discussion. The War of the Pacific provided the rationale for the existence and maintenance of a professional and organized army. In 1885 the Chilean government contracted Captain Emil Körner of the Imperial German Army to become sub-director of the Escuela Militar[27] (Military School) and to direct the modernization of Chilean armed forces. The Academia de Guerra (War College) was founded in 1886, the same year the first military periodical appeared and a military club, Circulo Militar, was established in Santiago.

---

27 The Escuela Militar was the oldest such national institution in Latin America. It was founded in 1817 by Bernardo O'Higgins.

In the Civil War, the bulk of the army remained loyal to Balmaceda but Körner and his followers sailed north to Iquique, the revolutionary capital. In less than six months Körner trained an army of 10,000 officers and troops which ultimately defeated the regular army.

The victory of Congressional forces elevated Vice-Admiral Jorge Montt (1891-1896) to the presidency. Montt was elected by his civilian colleagues and governed without uniform but he took steps to enlarge the army and intensify the German-oriented modernization begun before the Civil War. In 1895, Körner contracted thirty-six foreign officers to serve as instructors in the Chilean army.

The Prussianization of the Chilean army wholly altered its nature and content. There is almost no criteria for making any comparisons between the pre- and post-1885 Chilean army. "Prussianization set ambitious professional officers against their superiors, against their incompetent colleagues, and against politicians ..."[28]

---

28 Frederick M. Nunn, "Emil Körner and the Prussianization of the Chilean Army", in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr. (ed.), The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America (Lincoln and London, 1978), p.78.

It "...created an army elite which magnified its role in Chilean society and politics..."[29] and went on to capture political power in the 1920s. The Chilean army at that point of time was the best-equipped land fighting force and the best-educated officer corps in Latin America.

The Parliamentary Republic (1891-1925)

After 1891, the centre of gravity of Chile's political system shifted from the executive to the Congress. Governmental authority became diffused, weakened and finally decentralized as a multiplicity of political parties and factions sprang up and electoral reforms placed supervision of elections and registration in the hands of 267 municipal administrations. "Politics became an elaborate log-rolling game centered in Congress, in which national resources were divided for the benefit of local constituents".[30] If liberalization of suffrage resulted in "...the transformation of elite factions and proto-parties into large-scale party organizations and networks"[31] it also made corruption a way of life. Money-power rather than muscle-power became the way to influence electoral outcomes. "Chilean politics became little more than a frank struggle for privilege and high office...Chile had

---

29 ibid.

30 Valenzuela, n.1, p.166.

31 Valenzuela, n.7, p.241.

won her electoral liberty, but in practice it meant nothing more than 'liberty to indulge in fraud and birbery'."[32] Parliamentary rule also ensured a high degree of ministerial instability with constant coalition shifts and complex electoral pacts. In the period of the parliamentary republic there existed 121 different cabinets with a total of 530 ministers.

Whatever be the criticism of the "parliamentary republic" it must be conceded that it made a positive contribution to the case of democracy in Chile. The period saw the institutionalization of respect for civil liberties and political liberalization in the Chilean polity. It also allowed for the evolution of the press, a growing recognition of the legitimacy of opposition movements and parties and for a formal respect for the procedures of liberal democracy. The growth of political parties and labour unions were all positive signs in the evolution of Chilean democracy. The period of "parliamentary republic" may be seen as an inevitable step closer to the democratic ideal and practice which the term had come to apply towards the beginning of the twentieth century.

The ultimate failure of the parliamentary era was its inability to deal with the "social question". The

---

32 Stephenson, n.6, p.20.

nitrate economy had altered the nature and size of the Chilean workforce and its high level of dependence on the international market meant periodic labour-capital conflict and political crises. The Partido Democrata (Democrat Party) had already ushered in a populist ideology in Chile which later went on to take socialist and communist manifestations of militant labour unions. The growth of the Chilean labour movement can be traced to these years of politico-economic upheaval.

The emergence of the social question coincided with "...truly dramatic demographic, technological, and economic changes in Chilean society".[33] The advancing urbanization of the population, the extension of rail lines, telegraph networks etc. contributed to making Chilean society and economy truly national and modern. These developments occurred alongwith a stagnation and decay of the agricultural sector and contributed to highlight the limitations and weaknesses of the parliamentary republic.

The hypocrisy and the contradictions of the parliamentary era permitted a certain latitude for

---

33 Loveman, n.1, p.232.

political and social organization by the working class. The political system was usually able to tolerate the worker press and even moderate representation of the working class. The newly emerging middle class also found some scope for gaining political influence.

Labour unions were the subject of repression by both the State and the capitalists, both national and foreign. The army served to demobilize industrial militancy on an increasing level as in Valparaíso (1903), Antofogasta (1906) and the most brutal of all, the Iquique Massacane of 1907 which left 500-2000 workers dead. Congress repeatedly refused to adopt labour legislation or even to enact piecemeal reforms to ameliorate the worst abuses of labour.

In 1920, the Chilean right consisted of the Conservative, National, Liberal and Liberal-Democratic parties representing both the traditional conservative elites as well as newly emerged mining, industrial and business bosses. The Radical Party represented the upper-middle class and the middle class and had become a potent force in national polltics on the basis of its growing demands for reform. The urban labour identified itself with parties such as Partido Democrata, Socialists, anarchists and Syndicalists.

World War I set in motion economic and political forces that brought the end of the parliamentary regime and replaced nitrates with copper as a principal source of foreign exchange and government revenues. The temporary war-time boom saw Chile prosper with the increased international demands for copper and nitrates. This state of affairs ended as quickly as it began with the development of synthetic nitrates reducing the demands for Chilean nitrates and the inevitable post-war national depression. The "social question" now assumed gigantic proportions and the country seemed headed for another civil war - between the political and economic oligarchy who dominated parliamentary politics, and the supporters of reform.

A new style of politics emerged in Chile with Arturo Alessandri Palma -- "mobilisation politics".[34] The Chilean middle class and the middle class Radical and Democratic parties carried Alessandri to victory in the 1920 presidential elections. President Alessandri's administration (1920-1924) faced the same problems as his

---

34 Petras, n.5, pp.117-8. "Mobilisation politics involved: an appeal to popular interests, to spark mass participation in politics; the introduction of political power as a means of achieving social and economic reform for the 'common man'; an attack on traditional elites and authority; and the appearance of the politician who 'goes to the people'". Petras, n.7, pp.117-18.

predecessors and the methods he used to deal with existing socio-economic problems did not differ fundamentally from those used earlier. Ministerial changes, threat to delay budget and tax bills, failure to authorize the military garrison to remain in Santiago etc. continued despite the economic crisés and spread of labour conflict. Congress refused to pass social laws introduced by the Alessandri administration.

In mid-1924, with government salaries in arrears, a mounting budget deficit, rampant inflation and failure to deliver on even the most modest of campaign promises, Alessandri supported legislation to provide a salary for congressmen. This was the immediate cause for the 5 September, 1924 military intervention and the first time in over hundred years that military men had played a direct role in governing the nation.

In power, the military enforced those social laws that Alessandri had been unable to pass, relating to labour accidents, union organization, social security etc. and which were also related to military conditions such as improvement of salaries, police reorganization etc.

A new military coup on 23 January, 1925 spearheaded by Carlos Ibáñez brought Alessandri back to power to serve

the remaining ten months as the constitutional president of Chile. With the support of the military and Ibáñez as Minister of war, Alessandri now began to implement an extended programme of law reform and a new Constitution.

The Constitution of 1925 shifted the balance of power from Congress to the executive. It also introduced direct popular election of the president, an independent electoral tribunal to review election results and prohibitions against Congressmen serving as ministers or government employees. The president's term was extended to six years with no immediate re-election permitted. Congress retained important budgetary authority and could override vetoes but lost the traditional methods used to immobilize executive policymaking. The new Constitution officially recognized the role of political parties in national politics. The document also brought the separation between the Church and the State and was accepted on 18 October 1925.

The expanding role of the Chilean military had begun with the Prussianization of the armed forces from the late 1880s on. The political immobility and the intensifying social question became a concern for the military since the government used it frequently to suppress labour movements, and also because the military developed a new orientation.

Military dissatisfaction with the politics of the parliamentary republic and with the economic ailings of the nation began to manifest itself from the early twentieth century. In 1907,[35] 1911-1912, 1915[36] and 1919[37] there were hints of the military becoming an interventionist body with nationalist orientations.

Finally, Alessandri's elected successor Figueroa Larraín had to bow to national and military pressure and Ibáñez was appointed the President of the Republic on 22 May 1927. The military's advocacy of social, political and economic reform and hostility toward liberal democracy had finally succeeded in imposing its version of reform and democracy on the State.

Direct military rule in Chile saw a period of economic recovery. Amidst a new flurry of economic activity the political repression of the regime seemed

---

35 Officers of the Santiago garrison established a "Liqia Militar" as a lobby to secure better conditions and benefits for the army.

36 The 1915 military movement aimed at placing in power a strong government able to end the political anarchy preventing national progress and development.

37 The 1919 conspiracy among high-ranking officers intended to avoid political chaos and end the dangers of communism.

unimportant to most Chileans. An important social law in the form of the 1931 Labour Code was produced and notwithstanding its limitations, it did bring about a formal recognition by the State of the right of workers to organize, to petition employers for improved working conditions, to strike and to have the work place regulated by the Labour Department.[38]

Dependence of the Ibáñez government on nitrate and copper revenues, as well as increased levels of foreign investments and loans made the regime as vulnerable to international economic changes as previous administrations. The economic failures of the regime led, in July 1931, to a "general strike" by professional associations, white-collar workers and students demanding a return to constitutional government. "Violence in the streets, resurgence of political opposition in all sectors including the military, and the insoluble economic dilemma forced Ibáñez to resign ...."[39] For the next one and a half years the country went through several civilian and military governments, six in all "controlled" the country within a 101-day period in 1932.

---

38 The Labour Code incorporated the "social laws" of 1924 and created an elaborate framework for a modern industrial relations system. It created, in general, a highly paternalistic and authoritarian system: worker petitions and strikes were linked to individual firms, activities of union federations was severely restricted, gave the government the authority to order a "return to work" in national interest, in practice it meant that illegal strikes easily began to outnumber legal ones.

Polarization and Mass Participation (1932-1964)

In September 1932 General Bartolomé Blanche assumed provisional executive authority and scheduled the presidential election for October, thus bringing to an end the so-called "Socialist Republic" under the alternating leadership of Marmaduque Grove , Carlos Dávila, and an alliance with the Nueva Acción Publica ('New Public Action'). Alessandri was elected president a second time and for the next four decades Chile experienced legally elected civilian governments. Until September 1973 Chile was the only Latin American country where competitive multiparty politics combined with presidential government, uninterrupted by coups, assassinations or revolutions, determined the occupants of the presidency, Congress and higher policy-making positions in the national government.

The second Alessandri administration (1932-1938) laid emphasis on national unity, order, economic recovery and constitutional rule. The government faced the problems of depression-induced unemployment,[40] the continual threat of new military intervention and a growing militancy of the left.

---

39 Loveman, n.1, p.253.

40 The world depression led Chile towards an adoption of import-substitution industrialization policy and the period from the 1930s on saw significant industrial development.

The "Republican Militia" served as both a temporary counterbalance to the military and a threat to leftist movements until its dissolution in 1936. By then an attempted coup had been crushed in December 1933 and through political purges the officer corps was brought under presidential control.

The economy recovered but inflation accompanied progress. Chilean agriculture failed to meet adequately the food demands of urban centres and mining regions. Control of prices and agricultural exports became a major concern. It led to the creation of Comisariato General de Subsistencia Y Precios (General Commissariat of Subsistence and prices) and the Junta de Exportacion Agricola.[41] The mechanism used for an artificial depression of producer prices for agricultural commodities was through a policy of discrimination against the rural labour movement and repression of agricultural unionism.[42]

---

41 Loveman, n.1, p.267.

42 Alessandri's policies toward rural labour set the tone for four decades of administrative, legislative and physical repression against them. In June 1934 Carabineros marsacarred more than a hundred peasant protestors in Bío Bío. Peasants in Ranquíl found their leaders murdered when they rose in armed conflict against landowners.

Ironically enough, Alessandri promoted the development of the legal union movement under the provisions of the Labour Code and the 1930s witnessed substantial increase both in the number of legal unions as well in membership. Industrial relations came to conform to the provisions of the Labour Code with the successful channeling of class conflict within State-established institutions.

Reformist and leftist political parties had made deep inroads into the country side and had begun to threaten the control of landowners over the votes of peasants, the condition that guaranteed the dominance of the elite in Congress. The left gained in confidence and numbers, and pressed Alessandri for reforms in the hacienda system; the return to democracy made the right seek restoration or reaffirmation of their status and privileges, many of which had been reversed in the period 1924-1932. The need of political stability pushed Alessandri to an ever more explicit alliance with the right and a hardening of attitude toward the left.

The Chilean society and party system, according to Lipset and Rokkan, became complete by the 1930s.[43] There was a progressive decline of the old politics of factions,

---

43 Seymor Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York, 1967), pp.50-56.

personalist cliques and traditional alignments and the emergence of a clear left-centre-right system of political cleavage.

In the post-1932 period, six political parties came to dominate national politics well into the 1960s - the Conservative, Radical, Socialist, Communist and the Christian Democratic. The electorate was divided almost equally among the three political tendencies and there was no dominant tendency or party. The inability of one single party to win a majority and impose its will meant that presidents were invariably elected by coalitions or were forced to build governing coalitions with opposing parties in Congress after the election. Pre-election coalitions tended to disintegrate after a few months of the new administration and cabinet shifts could reflect new party alliances or an executive decision to govern with the help of technocrats or even personal loyalists. The fragmentation of the party system made it difficult for presidents to control legislative action or even to maintain the total support of their own party.

The Radical Party became the most important political organization in national politics until their domination was challenged by the Christian Democrats from the late 1950s. Every Chilean president until Eduardo Frei was either a Radical or owed his office to the support of Radicals.

The shift of the second Alessandri administration to the right and the ever-increasing influence of the left led the Radicals to seek an alliance with the Socialists and Communists. The Comintern's August 1935 policy providing for joint action with social democratic parties and the willingness of Socialists to overcome their differences with the Communists enabled the formation of Popular Front in March 1936. This heterogeneous alliance came up with (necessarily) a declaration of objectives that was mild, vague and ambiguous.[44] The 1938 presidential elections gave the Front candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-1941) a narrow victory. Significantly, it was only after key military officers informed the right's candidate, Gustavo Ross Santa Maria that they could not prevent Aguirre's inauguration did the right concede defeat.

Three Radical administrations served Chile until 1952, and until 1948 with a left coalition. Considerable progress was made in creating an industrial infrastructure, broadening the base of social participation beyond a small elite and increasing the State's role in the development

---

44 The Popular Front declared its objectives to be restoration of democratic liberties, economic nationalism and socio-economic reform.

process. The government expanded social services in areas such as health, education and social security. The CORFO (State Development Corporation) was created to plan and direct the import-substitution industrialisation process. However, in the early 1950s Chile found herself plagued by the same problems which had dominated the national stage in the 1930s - inflation, unemployment, rising prices etc.

"The Achilles' heel of the Front was the heterogeneity and social conflicts of the groups it comprised".[45] The Radicals were themselves divided over the front from the beginning. Their functioning soon came to reflect the typical centre party it represented, a little to the right or the left as per matters of convenience.

The Socialists were always internally divided and this became all the more apparent once they joined the government.[46] The Communists stayed outside the government for most of the time and gained the popularity in the 1940s at the expense of the Socialists. However, both the Communists and the Socialists helped elect Juan Antonio

---

45 Petras, n.5, p.124.

46 The Socialists divided over the policies of the Front government and split into an anti-government left-wing, Partido Socialista de Trabajadores (PST) which competed with the Communists over control of the labour unions.

Ríos to the presidency (1942-1946) although his administration renewed links with the right in making policy decisions. The Communists ended with opposing the Socialist presence in the government and supported Gabriel González Videla in 1946. They occupied cabinet posts in the González administration (1946-1952) without attempting to carry out socio-economic changes they stood for and which was also ostensibly the reason for their criticism of the Socialists. President González, on his part began to woo the Socialists into joining the government as the country witnessed a Communist-led labour conflict, and strikes more extensive than those of 1939-1941. He subsequently passed Law 8811,[47] Law 8837[48] and Law 8987 (which outlawed the Communist Party).[49]

The Chilean military made its presence felt during the three Radical administrations. Until the Communist

---

47 Law 8811 outlawed agricultural strikes and severely limited the rights of rural workers to present labour petitions and to engage in collective bargaining. In effect, agricultural unionization was made impossible .

48 Law 8837 gave the president (González Videla) extraordinary powers to deal with subversion.

49 Law 8987 or the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy outlawed the Communist Party and remained in effect until 1958.

withdrawal from the Front,[50] many army leaders were alarmed by Communist demands on President Aguirre. Military anti-Marxists and Fascists plotted against the administration seeing it as a weak government unwittingly paving the way for a "Red takeover".

A military coup was organized for 9 June, 1939 by General Aristo Herrera Ramirez with a group of anti-communist junior officers. The plot was uncovered and the general retired. The same general planned another coup for 25 August, 1939 which failed yet again. By the end of August the Communists had withdrawn from the government and the military no longer desired to overthrow the regime and the Ariostazo[51] disintegrated.

At the end of World War II, when Communist agitation acquired threatening dimensions, the Complot de las Patitas de Chancho (The Pigs Feet Plot) was planned under General Ramón Vergara to force President González to appoint a military cabinet, to suppress communism with brute force

---

50 The Communist withdrawl came after the Moscow-Berlin Pact of 1939.

51 See Frederick M. Nunn, "New Thoughts on Military Intervention in Latin American Politics : The Chilean Case", Journal of Latin American Studies (Cambridge, New York, N.Y.), vol.7, part 2, 1975, p.273.

and to stabilize the country through legislations and authoritarian rule. The plot was uncovered and suppressed but the government soon passed Law 8987 or the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy which outlawed the Communist Party and excluded its members from participation in the labour movement.

The 1952 presidential elections saw economic difficulties and political repression became important issues with a highly fragmented, weary and frustrated electorate. Ex-dictator Ibáñez was elected president" ...as an authoritarian,'above politics', antiparty candidate".[52] Ibáñez promised electoral reforms, an end to corruption and eventual elimination of anti-communist legislation.

The second Ibáñez administration (1952-1958), as in the 1927-1931 period, was highly personalistic, authoritarian, repressive and in some ways, innovative. For example, Ibáñez used the existing laws to repress agricultural unionism and the urban labour movement, but eliminated the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy prior to leaving office. He also introduced electoral

---

52 Loveman, n.1, pp. 292-3.

reforms which reduced the landowners' control over rural votes and which made deep inroads in the hacienda system. However, in the short-run, the administration's political and economic policies adversely affected the urban and rural poor. The country was in any case approaching the limits of import-substitution industrialization policies. Ibáñez dealt harshly with labour agitation during 1955-1957, rioting in Santiago (1957) and confined labour leaders and communists in detention camps.

By 1958, Chile had enough of the ex-dictator and rejected his policies totally. The removal of the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy paved the way for a fresh coalition between Socialists and Communists, the Popular Action Front (FRAP), which almost captured power.

The military continued to be interested in national politics right through the Ibáñez period. In the 1952 elections itself, some military leaders feared that Congress would not confirm his election. Between his election and his confirmation and inauguration, a group of Santiago-based officers vowed to secure the presidency for Ibáñez in the event of Congressional chicanery.

In 1955, President Ibáñez formed the La Línea Recta (Straight Line) intending to, among other things, retire all officers who did not swear loyalty to him and army support for unconstitutional means to restore economic stability and social discipline.[53]

Toward the end of the Ibáñez administration, the Radicals found their centre domination being challenged by the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) but helped elevate Jorge Alessandri (the ex-President's son) to the presidency. In the wake of the Cuban Revolution, Chilean politics had taken a different turn. The United States proposed the Alliance for Progress as a counter to revolution and containment of communism and American money was poured into Chile.

Alessandri was a firm believer in the benefits of private enterprise and minimum government intervention in the economy. He opposed reforms of any kind but the mounting Marxist and Christian Democratic pressure as well as proposals from the Alliance for Progress led to a "flower pot reform" in the agricultural sector.[54]

---

53 Nunn, n.51, pp.275-6.

54 60,000 hectares of public lands and well-recompensed private estates were converted into small and medium-size farms.

Thus, in the third period of its evolution, the Chilean State had developed into a large and complex set of institutions. The State, as we have seen, played the dominant role in the country's economy.[55] Government agencies came to be responsible for health care, social security benefits, regulation of prices and wages and settlement of labour disputes.

The country also witnessed the development of a varied number of interest groups, from student unions to neighbourhood councils to Church groups.[56] Most groups sought to maximize their political clout before the State by organizing national associations with national headquarters, as for example the Society for Industrial Advancement (SOFOFA), the National Agricultural Society (SNA) and others.

The President continued to be the source of major initiatives in the political process. The competitive party system acted as the major check on executive authority. Even though the legislature was no more the focal point of the system, it could modify and reject executive proposals.

---

55 Valenzuela, n.7, p.245.

56 See Paul W. Drake, "Corporatism and Functionalism in Modern Chilean Politics", Journal of Latin American Studies, vol.10, part 1, May 1978, pp.83-116.

> The key to the Chilean system...was the continuing importance of political parties and a party system tied to the legislature, the principal arena for political give-and-take... Party structure, permeating all levels of society, served as crucial linkage mechanisms binding organizations, institutions, groups and individuals to the political centre.(57)

The victory of Eduardo Frei in the 1964 presidential elections was to erode the bases of the "Chilean system" as it had evolved over the years and lead to a breakdown of democracy.

Conclusions

Thus, Chile, an exception in the Latin American context, saw the foundation and consolidation of democracy from the nineteenth century onwards. It must be recognised that the process of consolidation has been an on-going one and the "reformist" policies of the Frei and Allende administrations created conditions that led firstly, to the breakdown of the civil-military balance (if there was one), and subsequently to a breakdown of democracy and military intervention and rule. Chile was carried along the tide of militarisation of the State, the predominant

---

57 Valenzuela, n.7, p.247.

Latin American phenomenon in the 1960s. The Chilean golpe of 1973 destroyed the shibboleth, "it can not happen here" and provoked a re-examination of civil-military relations in the country.

According to the political-crisis literature, all countries face severe challenges in developing democratic institutions and, depending on the timing and sequence of those challenges, have greater or lesser success in achieving democratic stability.[58] The challenges vary in kind and number but the crises of national identity - Chile's successful war against the Peru-Bolivia Confedration in 1837-1838 and the victory in the War of the Pacific helped this cause; political authority and participation - for example, the objective civilian control of the military through the nineteenth century and the progressive democratization of the country's polity over the years; are crucial. Besides, the sequence and timing of the appearance of these problems on the historical scene can seriously affect the political outcome - Chile followed a somewhat "optimal" sequence and the timing was also favourable, for example, the participation crises did not become a critical issue until after central authority structures had been established.

---

58 See Leonard Binder et al., Crises and sequences in Political Development (Princeton, N.J., 1971).

We have examined the above mentioned factors in this section but they do not seem to provide a lead to an examination of the breakdown of democracy in Chile. The "democratic tradition", a "apolitical military" and the continuing importance of authoritarianism in general would in fact suggest conclusions that disprove our argument. One perhaps needs to re-emphasize that Chilean democracy rested on not only a fragile, if effective, civil-military balance but also on the continuation of existing socio-economic relations(for example, the hacienda system).

Nunn has dismissed the "effective civil-military balance" in Chile as a myth based on, in turn, on four other myths which suggested that military intervention and rule in Chile were highly unlikely.[59] A "tradition of democracy", an "apolitical tradition" on the part of the military, the strength of the "middle class" and certain civilian reform policies, do not, according to Nunn, reduce the possibilities of military intervention. However, if these factors do not contribute toward an effective civil-military balance, then, it may be useful to approach the issue from a different angle. What are the factors that lead to military intervention and rule? Is it theoretically logical to speak of an effective civil-military balance? And, if Chile was among the most democratic of all Latin American nations, what were the factors responsible for the collapse of all existing political-economic structures and the emergence of a military regime that came to last seventeen long years?

---

59 Nunn, n.51, p.272.

C H A P T E R II

BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRACY AND ADVENT OF MILITARY RULE, 1964-1981

The failure of successive administrations since 1932 to effectively handle the socio-economic changes undergoing in a developing, modernizing Chile may have been partly responsible for the emergence of the Partido Democrata Cristiana (PDC) in the forefront of the country's political centre. The party altered the character of the centre by projecting a distinct ideology that set it apart not only from the political right and the left but also from the Radical Party especially in terms of the flexibility characteristic of the latter. The Christian Democrats gave Chile a vision of a "Revolution in Liberty", which, alongwith Allende's "Peaceful road to Socialism", are cited as good examples of successful "progressive reformism".[1] The progressive reformism of "Eduardo Frei and his Partido Democrata Cristana and subsequently... (of) Salvador Allende and his Unidad Popular leftist coalition" however had the effect of breaking the fragile balance on which Chilean democracy rested.[2] The period 1964-73 was a significant phase of Chilean history where

---

1 See Helio Jaguaribe, Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study (New York, 1973). pp.496-528.

2 ibid, p.500.

an attempt was made to develop an alternative to the Cuban model of "change", which failed to the extent of provoking a military intervention and rule that lasted seventeen long years.

The breakdown of Chilean democracy was the result of a widely varying set of factors about which there is by no means an unanimity among students of the subject. The 1973 golpe led to a re-examination of the basis of Chilean democracy as well as of civil-military relations. Comparisons were made between the situation in the 1920s with those in the early 1970s.[3] In both cases, the country's political development along a democratic path was interrupted by the armed forces which acquired a political role to restore order and stability. General Augusto Pinochet was seen as a new version of Ibáñez, or even Balmaceda and Portales. However, it would seem that all comparisons become superficial if we account for one new element in the Chile of the 1960s viz. communism. The impact of the Cuban Revolution on Latin American politics cannot be underemphasized, both in terms of its applicability to Chile, and the antipathy it generated amongst a good percentage of Chileans, thus creating a political environment

---

3 See for example Harold Blakemore's "Back to the Barracks : The Chilean Case", Third World Quarterly (London), vol.7, no.1, January 1985, pp.44-62.

highly charged with pro- and anti-communist rhetoric and action. In effect, it made both the parties of the right and the left more rigid and together with the presence of a new type of centre party that was less given to compromise, resulted in an extreme polarization of Chilean society at a time when popular mobilization was at its peak. The conditions of disorder, chaos and near-anarchy in 1973 may have been immediately caused by highly adverse economic conditions but its roots lay in the political sphere.

The 1973 coup in Chile followed similar phenomena in Latin America, in Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966) and Peru (1968) for example. Carrying Nunn's argument further,[4] a "tradition of democracy"; an "apolitical tradition" on the part of the military; the strength of the "middle class" and civilian reform policies, under certain conditions; need not act as brakes to political action on part of the military for the simple reason that these "positive" trends are often true, as in the case of Chile, with several qualifications and reservations. This section analyzes some aspects of these and related features and highlights the breakdown of democracy as a process that preceded and led to military intervention and rule. The Frei and Allende

---

4 Frederick M. Nunn, "New Thoughts on Military Intervention in Latin American Politics : The Chilean Case", Journal of Latin American Studies (London), vol.7, part 2, 1975, pp.271-304.

administrations are dealt separately without denying their continuity as progressive reformist governments. A brief discussion of the causes of military intervention in Chile leads to the concluding part of the chapter--the first ten years of the military-authoritarian rule of Pinochet.

Several factors brought a new dimension to the 1964 presidential elections--the electoral reforms of 1949, 1958 and 1962, the emergence of the PDC as a major contender, the Cuban Revolution and the resultant U S initiative especially the Alliance for Progress, the urgent need for reforms in the agricultural sector--and left Chile on the brink of experiencing "change" as never before.

The 1949 electoral reforms enfranchised Chile's women and the percentage of women registered to vote increased from approximately 10 per cent in 1949 to 19 per cent in 1957.[5] The 1958 reforms aimed at abolishing "corrupt electoral practices" had the effect of radicalizing Chilean polity. The system of joint lists was removed;[6]

---

5 James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), p.108.

6 The system of joint lists was a long-established tradition of political pacts that permitted parties of opposing ideological persuasions to structure agreements for mutual electoral benefit. Its abolition made pre-election arrangements less "political" but eliminated an important tool for cross-party bargaining. See Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime", in Larry Diamond

contd...

Congressional authority was curbed with the executive given control of the budgetary process, the Congress was thus restricted in its ability to allocate fiscal resources; and the system of a single ballot issued by the State introduced. The 1962 revision of the electoral code strengthened penalties for non-registration and established permanent voting lists. Voting became a legal right and a legal duty for most adults and only the literacy clause prevented the creation of a truly "mass electorate".[7]

The ideological and organizational evolution of the PDC stems from Catholic social doctrine and from dissident and more progressive elements within the Conservative Party. The Papal social encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragessimo Anno (1931) established the foundations of official Catholic response to the dilemmas of industrial society and the international challenge of Marxism. These encyclicals and similar doctrinal statements as well as the writings of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain inspired the creation of the Falange National in 1938. Santiago's Catholic

---

contd. from pre page
and others, Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, Colorado, 1989), vol.4, p.182.

7 The literacy clause was removed by the 1970 constitutional reforms which also reduced the voting age from 21 to 18.

University and San Ignacio provided the anti-communist and Catholic social doctrinal education in the 1920s and 1930s and most of the PDC leadership could be traced to these institutions.

The Falange enjoyed limited electoral success and in 1957 merged with the Conservative Social Christian Party and the Agrarian Labour Party to acquire its present content and nature. The PDC finished third behind the Popular Action Front (FRAP) and the Liberal-Conservative coalition in the 1958 presidential elections. However, in the 1960s, factors as varied as a rising Catholic labour movement, deteriorating national situation, "international Catholic offensive" (1957-64),[8] the threat of communism and massive U S and European Christian Democrats' support, the visit of Juana Castro (Fidel Castro's sister) to Chile, etc., propped the PDC as a major contender for the presidency as an alternative to the FRAP.[9]

---

8 Brian Loveman, Chile : The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism(New York, 1979), p.314.

9 The PDC has been dealt with in numerous scholarly works. See for example, Alan Angell, "Chile: The Difficulties of Democratic Reform", International Journal(Toronto), vol.24, no.3, summer 1969, pp.515-28; and "Christian Democracy in Chile", Current History(New York,N Y.), vol.58, no....., pp....., 1970; Paul E. Sigmund, "Eduardo Frei and the Christian Democrats", in Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., eds., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations(Englewood Cliffs,N.J., 1970), pp.9-12; Michel Fleet, The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy(Princeton,N.J., 1985).

The PDC ideology "is generally vaguely defined; there is no general agreement on the meaning...of basic ideas".[10] The Christian Democrats claimed to be adopting a middle way between capitalism and communism with an all-embracing organic view of the "communitarian society" or Christian Socialism. They called for recognition of the right of the worker to organize and participate in national life; greater involvement of all the people in the political life of the country through the establishment of organized interest groups, a more decentralized political system and greater participation in elections; and state action to limit the powers of private concentrations of economic power, especially in the countryside and the copper industry. And not the least, the Christian Democrats advocated the policies proposed by the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America (CEPAL) which stressed the need for struuutural reforms in the agricultural sector, the unfavourable terms of trade and on the necessity of economic integration of Latin America.

However, what made the PDC a different centre party was their markedly different political style. "Unlike their predecessors, the pragmatic Radicals, the Chilean

---

10 Petras, n.5, p.198.

Christian Democrats conceived of themselves as a new and vital ideological force in Chilean politics, a middle road between Marxist transformation and preservation of the status quo".[11] In fact, the PDC can be said to have carried the "mobilization politics" of Arturo Alessandri to its greatest heights.

Revolution in Liberty

As Chile moved towards the 1964 presidential elections, the political right and the centre as well as the U.S. tried to prevent what almost occurred in 1958--a left victory.[12] Both the PDC and the FRAP candidates promised reform and an orientation towards achieving four principal goals : maintenance or consolidation of political democracy, including an increasing political participation of the masses; nationalist orientation of the economy and of the whole society in general; and enlargement of the extent of socio-economic participation of the rural masses, particularly through a combination of more and better urban employment with several welfare measures.[13]

---

11 Valenzuela, n.6, p.183.

12 In the 1958 presidential elections Allende polled 356,499 votes to Jorge Alessandri's 389,948.

13 Jaguaribe, n.1, pp.500-01.

The major parties of the FRAP coalition, the Communist and the Socialist parties were born in 1922[14] and 1933 respectively and the roots of Marxism/leftism in Chile could be traced to the late nineteenth century labour movement and the Democrat Party (1887). The labour movement gave the left a firm base of popular support and their success at the polls increased progressively until 1958. However, the advent of the PDC with their popular mobilization strategy meant competition to the left in the sectors that were traditionally their stronghold--the rural and urban poor. The intensified party competition increasingly polarized Chilean society and made both the left and the centre less amenable to a "give-and-take" policy characteristic of Chilean democracy.

The March 1964 by-election in Curicó gave the FRAP candidate a decisive victory and persuaded the right (Democratic Front) to throw in their lot with the PDC as the lesser of the two evils. This pre-electoral pact with the right enabled Frei and the PDC achieve the rare distinction of obtaining an absolute majority of the vote, 55.5 per cent to Allende's 39.5 per cent. However, there

---

14 Loveman, n.7, puts the years of the founding of the Chilean Communist Party in 1922, p.304; Donald W. Bray, "Salvador Allende and the Marxist Left", in Fagen, n.8, puts the year as 1921, p.12.

was no right candidate, unlike in the past, to reveal the "three-thirds" split of the electorate.[15] Since the PDC and the FRAP had promised agrarian reform, rural unionization and enforcement of labour laws in the countryside, they possibly shared the votes of the rural and urban poor.

The economy that Frei and the PDC inherited was in a progressively deteriorating state in terms of overall economic growth which was far short of the rising expectations of an expanding population. The country's economic dependence and the influence of large foreign business interests had continued to grow and received a fillip with the Alliance for Progress. The foreign, particularly U S investments and ownership of the copper-mining industry had always generated antagonism among Chileans and led to periodic political crises. The almost age-old problem of inflation also continued to plague Chile. However, it was the agricultural sector that was the major cause for alarm. The continuation of the hacienda system had led to low agricultural productivity for most years and total produce failed to keep pace with the demands of the increasing population (2.5 per cent annually between 1953-64).

---

15 See Chapter 1, p.26.

Once in power, the Frei administration tried to prove that their "Revolution in Liberty" was not empty rhetoric and attempted to carry out a sweeping reform programme encompassing every area of national life. All the persisting problems of the country received government attention-- - inflation, balance of payments, agriculture, taxation, public health, education and vocational training, labour, etc. "Almost every aspect of the government's programme threatened either the political and economic privileges of the traditional elite or menaced leftist influence over organized labour and the urabn and rural poor".[16]

Three factors limited the success of the Frei administration. Firstly, official policy makers tended to clearly and precisely outline the government's short- and long-term goals in overly optimistic terms. Consequently, their success and accomplishments in several areas, often impressive, fell short of publicly pronounced objectives. Secondly, the PDC tried "to govern as a single party and refused to deal with opponents unless they had to".[17] They "ignored the facts that they had achieved the presidency with official endorsement from the rightist

---

16 Loveman, n.8, p.315.

17 Valenzuela, n.6, p.184.

parties and that their unprecedented 1965 majority in the Chamber of Deputies was obtained with the support of traditionally right-wing portions of the electorate".[18] Lastly, the presence of "two distinct tendencies in the party; the populist and the corporatist" led to intra-party conflicts to various levels "over the pace character, and objectives of agrarian reform...that eventually proved fatal to the 'Revolution in Liberty'".[20]

Despite the PDC's majority control of the House of Deputies, the FRAP and rightist representatives managed to delay or even block passage of key legislation. Programmes such as the "Chileanization" of the copper industry, agrarian reform/agricultural unionization, tax-reform, wage-price stabilization and proposals to stimulate industrial growth, all faced obstruction by the opposition.[21] It was only by 1966-67 and after considerable

---

18 J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile and the Breakdown of Democracy" in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, ed., Latin American Politics and Development (Boston, 1979), p.249.

19 Petras, n.5, p.199. For more details on the corporatist and populist tendencies within the PDC, see pp.198-219.

20 Loveman, n.8, pp.323-24.

21 This was in a way a new version of the historical struggle between the executive coalitions and the Congress, complicated by a single-party control of the executive and the uncompromising attitude of the PDC.

negotiation and compromise that the copper legislation, agrarian reform[22] and agricultural unionization legislation clear the Congress.

One area where the Frei government's failure was most marked was in decreasing Chile's economic dependence and reducing the influence of foreign capital on its economy. The financial constraints of the "Revolution in Liberty" led the administration into getting entangled with the U S far more than was acceptable to even most party members. The American connection of the PDC exacerbated the internal divisions within and strengthened the opposition.

The Christian Democrats set up a pace for reform which they themselves were not able to sustain. Two new groups were, in particular, mobilized as never before — the urban shanty-town dwellers and the peasants. The latter rapidly became unionized once the peasant unionization law was approved in 1967 or were included in the peasant

---

22 The agrarian reform was put into effect in 1965, with some additional legislation approved in 1967. The adopted plan foresaw the distribution of land to 40,000 families by 1970 through a system in which an initial three-year joint exploitation by the peasants and the Chilean National Development Corporation in asentamientos (land colonies) gave the new farmers the necessary training and technico-economic means for their subsequent autonomous exploitation of the farms, as family or cooperative units. From 1965 to 1968 about 15,000 families were granted land in the asentamientos, totalling more than 1.3 million hectares.

cooperatives that were set up in the lands expropriated under the government's new agrarian reform programme. The director of the Institute for Agrarian and Livestock Development (INDAP), Jacques Chonchol, believed it necessary to go beyond the bounds of existing law in the unionization of rural labour and in support for agrarian reform. Such fissures within the PDC apart, the agrarian reforms could not be implemented without alienating the right whose votes had elected Frei. And no matter how successful the government was, the FRAP could always urge more rapid and extensive changes. Official encouragement and in many cases a subsidization of the formation of thousands of organizations among Chile's urban and rural poor upset the equilibrium of Chilean society and caught the Christian Democrats at a point where they had failed to solve the fundamental problems they themselves had identified before coming to power. Their programme of political mobilization made impossible the attainment of economic objectives. The government also generally refused to use the police or the military against labour and illegal land occupations; farm seizures (tomas), worker-declared "expropriation" of farms and factories, illegal strikes, etc., began to occur ever more frequently.

It will be wrong to characterize the Frei administration's "experiment" with progressive reformism a total failure. The general economic situation improved and state income increased; the living conditions of thousands of rural workers, tenants and other beneficiaries of land reform, did improve; critical political and administrative reforms were enacted; impressive gains were made in the areas of education and public health; and the new tax-system did generate substantial internal revenues. Despite such achievements, the PDC vote in the 1969 Congressional elections went down to 29.8 per cent from 42.3 per cent in 1965.

Loveman's conclusions about the Frei years do seem harsh but not far from the truth:

> The reformist legislation of the Frei years and the massive organizational drive encouraged by the Christian Democratic administration provided substantial leverage for further fundamental reforms in Chilean society. In this sense the Christian Democrats definitively destroyed the cornerstone of Chilean formal democracy as it had functioned since 1932, without providing anything but the vaguely conceived notion of a "communitarian" society to replace it.(23)

---

23 Loveman, n.8, p.325.

In 1969, the tacnazo strike among the officers and men of the Tacua and Yungay regiments called for the ouster of the minister of defence and for better pay and services for the armed forces.[24] This military movement sputtered and dissolved very soon but it reminded Chileans that breach of military discipline could not be ruled out. The government pushed legislation through the Congress to pacify the military but, on 19 November, issued an official declaration threatening severe action against anyone seeking to subvert the discipline of the armed forces. A "state of emergency" was declared for reasons of "public calamity"/to prevent the"commission of crimes or the occurrence of events affecting the security of the state".

As the 1970 presidential elections drew near it became almost certain that the PDC would not win. Their policies and programmes over the past six years had alienated the right who, it was certain, would have nothing to do with them. The left had seized the initiative and become increasingly more and more radical. This was most evident in the creation of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), an organization which rejected electoral politics

---

24 The tacnazo strike was so-called because it involved the Tacna regiment.

in favour of direct action. This "new left" drew inspiration from the Cuban Revolution and emerged as a threat to the "old left". Outbursts such as -

> You seek agrarian reform, not agrarian revolution! Urban reform, not urban revolution! University reform, not university revolution! Social reform, not social revolution! (25)

were directed against the Communist and the Socialist parties and was typical of the MIR which believed that Chile had only two alternatives - revolution or misery.

A new left coalition, Popular Unity (UP), that included the Socialist, Communist and most of the Radical parties plus a number of smaller parties chose Salvador Allende as their presidential candidate yet again. The UP electoral programme called for revolutionary changes in Chile's political, economic and social structures to overcome the exploitation and misery imposed upon the people by

---

25 A MIR leader Luciano Cruz in confrontation with the Socialist senator Carlos Altamirano at the University of Concepción where its impact was most felt since its inception in 1965. See Robert Carl Hirschfield, "Chile's MIR: The Anatomy of a Revolutionary Party", Monthly Review (New York,N.Y.), vol.18, no.9, February 1967, pp.20-23. Cruz's statements are cited on p.21.

"monopoly capitalism, imperialist exploitation and class privilege". Since the PDC's reformism had not solved Chile's problems, the UP proposed a "Peaceful road to Socialism".

The PDC was unable to structure a pre-election coalition with either the left or the right, more so because its candidate Radomiro Tomic declared his unwillingness to do so and decided to compete with Allende by attempting to appear even more revolutionary than the UP. The right's candidate was an old Jorge Alessandri who had the combined support of the National Party, alienated middle class groups and a large number of urban and rural workers still attracted by the "Alessandri" label. Alessandri seemed a likely victor but his age and lack of vitality, among other factors, put him in second place with 34.9 per cent of the vote to Allende's 36.2 per cent, Tomic finishing last with 27.8 per cent of the vote. The UP's share of the vote actually decreased from that obtained by the FRAP in 1964 and Allende's slim plurality indicated, more than anything else, the deep schisms within Chilean society in 1970.

Angell's observations in a 1969 article about Chilean polity since 1938 seem in retrospect more than

prophetic:

> A similar sequence of events appears in the development of every political experiment since 1938 - and there has been a variety of experiments ranging from the Popular Front of 1938, through the restoration of a former military 'populist' Ibáñez, the return of the Alessandri dynasty in 1958, to the Christian Democrats' triumph of 1964. The first stage of the sequence is great enthusiasm; the second an attempt to fulfil the electoral promises; the third stage is the greater or lesser failure of that attempt; the fourth the break-up of the electoral coalition; and the final stage is the rejection at the next election of that coalition - if it is intact and able to contest the election.(26)

Peaceful Road to Socialism

Since no candidate received an absolute majority in the 1970 presidential elections, the outcome had to be decided in the Congress, forcing the creation of a post-election coalition. The PDC demanded passage of a package of constitutional guarantees with the UP's support prior to the Congressional vote on Chile's next president. The idea was to buttress Chile's existing political system with constitutional amendments against the in-coming Allende administration's plans for a new institutional order. Even

---

26 Alan Angell, "Chile: The Difficulties of Democratic Reform", International Journal (Toronto), vol.24, no.3, Summer 1969, p.515.

as the bargaining was on, the U S President, Richard Nixon ordered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to do everything necessary to prevent Allende from taking charge. Extreme right-wing groups and the U S based multi-national, International Telephone and Telegraph provided the Chilean connection in the attempt to kidnap the commander-in-chief of the Chilean army, General René Schneider, which was expected to turn the PDC votes against Allende or provoke a military coup, with the MIR or the militant section of the UP held guilty for the "adventure".[27] The ploy failed and on 3 November, 1970, Salavador Allende Gossens received the presidential sash and led the first ever democratically elected Marxist government to power.

Allende's minority status and his lack of majority support in the Congress meant that, like other presidents before him, he too would have to tailor the UP's "revolutionary" programme to the realities of coalition politics in order to succeed. However, his election itself

---

27. The U S role in Chilean affairs during Allende's administration is discussed at length in James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York and London, 1975). Also see James Petras and Robert Laporte Jr., "U.S. response to Economic Nationalism in Chile", in James Petras, ed., Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution (Toronto, 1973), pp.195-230.

touched off an extraordinary reaction from many sectors of Chilean society; right-wing political parties and movements, entrepreneurial associations, white-collar unions, groups representing commercial and small-business interests and others who feared that a pro-Moscow, Marxist-Leninist system might be established to their detriment. The new president also inherited a political system where terrorism was on the rise and the challenge to civilian authority existent. The Marxist dominated coalition, as mentioned earlier, naturally evoked an uncompromising and active opposition of the U S. It was unthinkable to the U S policy-makers that Chile drift the Cuba way.[28] From the outset, U S foreign policy, both diplomatic and covert, made no bones about their intention to disrupt Chile's economy. Efforts were made to cut off or st ifle Chile's credit from international lending agencies, to provide financial and moral support for the regime's opponents and to maintain friendly relations with the military. Such limitations on the Allende administration meant that the changes envisaged by the UP needed to be structured within the framework of traditional democratic practices and constitutional procedures.

---

28 For example, the U S Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger said, "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people". cited in Petras, n.5, p.vii.

The UP government set out to effect a massive income redistribution programme through differential wage and salary re-adjustments to benefit the poorest Chileans. The measure was taken in part to stimulate the economy by increasing demand, in part to strengthen the government's electoral support as well as to satisfy the expectations of the left's working-class bases, for whom socialism principally meant a better standard of living. The policy was successful initially but soon led to an inflationary trend and by mid-1973 the annual rate of inflation reached 300 per cent and the real income of workers and salaried employees had fallen to below those of pre-UP years.[29]

The administration nationalized the U.S. interests in the copper mines. It also took over a broad range of industries as well as the private banking sector. However, it was in the agrarian-rural sector where the UP, like the PDC before them, initiated changes that quickly went

---

29 A complete account of the political, economic and social policies of the UP is provided by Stefan de Vylder, Allende's Chile: The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular (London and New York, 1974). See also, James Petras, "Chile after the elections", Monthly Review, vol.25, no.1, May 1973, pp.15-23.

beyond their control.[30] On the one hand, the UP accelerated expropriations of farm land using Frei's agrarian reform law, but on the other, they attacked the asentamiento system and alienated the beneficiaries. The government experimented with collective farms, state farms and regional production units with the result that the agricultural economy became disorganized and close to disintegration. Production in the agricultural sector fell after 1971 and Chile was forced to import food and thus waste valuable foreign exchange. The methods used for dealing with shortages, agrarian reform and construction of the public sector exacerbated political tensions and made the economic crisis even more pronounced.

The ideological and political fragmentation within the UP was another aspect which the administration was unable to deal with in an effective manner. Certain pro-UP sections engaged in farm and factory seizures and illegal strikes in which workers demanded nationalization or expropriation of the enterprises where they were employed. The government on its part worked out a legal mechanism, through Article 171 of the agrarian reform

---

30 Federico G. Gil and others, ed., Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of the Socialist Years, 1970-1972 (Philadelphia, 1979), evaluates the political process during these years and also discusses government policies in the agrarian sector.

law enacted by the Frei government, to convert farm seizures or illegal strikes into de facto transfers of managerial responsibility for rural estates.[31] In other instances, the policy of favouring rather than repressing working-class actions, even where they contradicted government policies or were illegal, was followed.

In sum, the UP strategy of a bold use of state power to swing the balance in their favour did not work. Their economic measures aggravated inflation and generated difficulties on a high proportion of the population and the nationalization schemes alienated not only the economic elites but also small businessmen and a major percentage of the middle-class. The opposition decided that the government was giving way to illegal acts and in some cases, even promoting them. The activities of the MIR had the effect of radicalizing the opposition and hardening their position on several issues. The compromises necessary to permit even a functioning, workable system

---

31 Article 171 provided that "in case of lock-out or illegal owrk stoppage that, for any reason, suspends exploitation of a rural enterprise, the President of the Republic can order resumption of labours...with the intervention of the civil authority...and the support of police if necessary". The law gave the government official assigned to 'intervene' the farm 'all the prerogatives necessary to continue operation of the enterprise'. See Loveman, n.8, p.338.

became impossible with the failure of the Congress, political parties, courts and other state institutions which had previously served as viable arenas to resolve conflict. "Contending groups resorted to mobilizing even greater numbers of their followers to 'prove' their power capabilities. Politics spilled out of the chambers of government onto the streets, exacerbating an atmosphere of fear and confrontation".[32]

A number of factors may account for the failuue of Allende and the breakdown of democracy that ended with military intervention.[33] As said earlier, conflict within the UP over tactics was an important cause of the tragedy of the "Peaceful road to Socialism". The inability to appreciate the class structure of Chilean society and the popular support for its policies may also well have been

---

32 Valenzuela, n.6, pp.185-86. Also see, Henry Landberger and Tim McDaniel, "Hypermobilization in Chile, 1970-1973", World Politics (Princeton), vol.28, no.4, July 1976, pp.502-43.

33 For failure of the UP, see, Joseph P. Farrel, The National Unified School in Allende's Chile (Vancouver, 1985); Sergio Bitar, Chile:Experiment in Democracy (Philadelphia, 1985); Francois Borricand, "Chile: Why Allende Fall?", Dissent (New York, N.Y.), Summer 1974, pp. : L. Whitehead, "Why Allende Fell", World Today (London), November 1973; and Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh, 1977).

the undoing of the UP. The UP's tendency to ignore the basics of coalition politics resulted in a politico-economic crisis that went beyond the control of a civilian administration. The president was left to merely employ the rhetoric of a revolution, whereas, in reality, he lacked the power to make a success of his programme and policies.

The split within the UP coalition is perhaps the factor which explains not only the failure of the Allende administration but also the breakdown of Chilean democracy. The intra-party conflict was bad politics, more so where a democratically-elected Marxist government was supposedly trying to implement changes within a legal and "non-revolutionary" framework. The link with the military's intervention is easier to appreciate if the nature of the civilian regime is taken into account.

The UP was a coalition of independent parties with longstanding ideological differences. The status quo was formalized in a political pact drawn just before the elections and included a quota system that apportioned positions in the state administrative apparatus. The "effect was to build in from the very inception... a systematic inability to arrive at a single clearly defined .....policy".[34]

34 ibid, Farrel, p.46.

Between 1970 and 1973, the coalition was basically split into two groups; the radicals and the moderates, neither of whom were able to dominate the party.

Contradictory UP statements on various policies discredited the government and the opposition used it to characterize the administration as disorganised and incapable of reaching and executing decisions. Even where a decision was seemingly taken, those who disagreed continued to publicly expound and push their own position. For Allende himself, maintaining coalition unity came before coherent decision making. This lack of internal coherence was a destabilizing factor and one that the opposition exploited to the hilt.

One of the major issues over which the in-fighting within UP was most pronounced related to the desire for long-term structural transformation of the economy on the one hand, and perceived short-term needs seen in terms of increasing electoral support. The inherent contradictions between the push for structural transformation and the "redistributive and expansive" policy led to a severe disequilibrium of the economy. This is not to deny that the economy did not suffer as a result of conditions not within the UP's control, the U S

offensive being a case in point.[35]

The UP's Basic Programme was directed at the social sector and structural changes in both agriculture and industry envisaged for a gradual transition to socialism. "What was at stake was nothing less than a revolutionary transformation, one which was changing the structure of power and would open the way for control by the state and the workers over a decisive sector of the economy".[36] In this context, the intra-coalition disputes proved costly, resulting in an intensification of the class conflict within the state, a replica of a similar phenomenon in Chilean society. There was a growing polarization within the institutional framework, between the executive and the legislature as the UP pushed projects of drastic social transformation even though it enjoyed only a minority of the vote and lacked cohesion within its own ranks. Such tactics raised the question of the government's legitimacy and opposition to the regime spread and consolidated to create a conspiratorial Comando Gremialista incorporating truckers, merchants, retailers, industrialists,

---

35 See Armando Uribe, The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile (Boston, 1975). Uribe was a high government official in Allende's government and the book deals with every aspect of the U.S.' role in Chile.

36 Bitar, n.33, pp.94-95.

agricultural landowners, white-collar professionals, women's groups, etc.[37] Chile became a politically divided nation as the government sought to implement its brand of socialism.

The political centre in Chile has, historically speaking, acted as the bridge between the left and the right and played a pivotal role in national politics. Given the UP's partial political power, it was imperative that an alliance be worked out with the centre. Instead, the UP made no serious conciliation efforts and the attitude of the Christian Democrats changed from one of "constructive criticism" to "obstructionnist opposition".[38] The PDC desired to be the major opposition party independent of the right, supporting social change through constitutional means and thus further complicating matters. The formation of a stable alliance with the UP became impossible. It seems that the likelihood of an agreement decreased precipitously in 1972 and by the end of that year Allende seemed to be the only one negotiating seriously or even attempting to do so.

---

37 Gremio is loosely used for professional and occupational associations. The Comando Gremialista was created sometime in October 1973 to put up a cohesive set of demands to the government.

38 Fleet, n.9.

As Chile's political and economic situation deteriorated, thousands of women from upper-middle and working class homes began the banging of pots and pans to symbolize the government's inability to resolve the economic crisis in general and food shortages in particular. The protests against the government reached the streets where pro-and anti-government demonstrators often clashed. In October 1972, a strike called by 40,000 members of the Independent Truckers' Association saw the mobilization of shopkeepers, professional and economic associations, clerks and students taking an openly political turn. The protestors directly challenged the UP government and its programme. The right-wing National Party as well as the PDC actively supported the opposition movement even though it was often beyond their control.

The government declared a "partial state of emergency" and military officers took over the responsibility of maintaining law and order. The opposition, under the comando gremialista, continued to confront the government with demands that would have amounted to abrogation of the UP's programme. Pressure was mounted in the legislature by attempts to impeach four of Allende's ministers. An

important decision that was to have far-reaching consequences was taken at this time —— the induction of the military into the government. The various political actors went on to concentrate on the 1973 Congressional elections which came to be seen as the decisive confrontation between the government and the opposition.

The Congressional elections "symbolized the final polarization of Chilean politics as the government and the opposition faced each other as two electoral blocs".[39] The results indicated a political stalemate with the opposition failing to gain the two-thirds majority it needed to impeach Allende and the UP, on its part, was left without majority control in either house of the Congress. The military moved out of politics only to return by August 1973 in the face of new strikes and armed confrontations as well as an abortive coup attempt by the Second tank regiment of Santiago in June 1973. Military units searched the country for arms, concentrating on leftist groups and organizations and allowing the gremialista and right-wing political movements to gain the upper hand. Increasing violence in the streets and

---

39 Valenzuela and Valenzuela, n.18, p.256.

slums of Santiago, political terrorism by both left and right-wing groups and an imminent state of politico-economic chaos elicited a call by the majority opposition in the Congress for the military to intervene to guarantee institutional stability, peace, security and development. On 11 September, 1973, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and other service commanders led a well-coordinated, brutal and highly successful golpe that ended the experiment of "Peaceful road to Socialism".[40]

Military Authoritarianism in Chile

The military and the critics of the UP saw the intervention of the armed forces as a benevolent act carried on behalf of the people. The Allende administration's policies had resulted in the virtual destruction of the nation's institutional structure and the military carried out "a liberating revolution" from above. Politicians had betrayed the nation by engaging in demagogy and by allowing the Marxists to gain control of the State. Chile's political and economic crisis was the result of a "corrupt" political system, the Chilean variant of liberal democracy had only brought doom to the majority of people by facilitating a Marxist/Communist to take power as president.

---

40 Allende died in the course of the coup. The exact details of his death are difficult to ascertain but it is believed that he shot himself. However, there are others who believe that he was murdered.

The military felt that it was obliged to undertake as its "historic mission" the transformation of the country's political institutions and a restructuring of the economy and society. The country needed to be purged of the politicians who had betrayed the trust of the people and only by "extirpating the Marxist cancer" could the nation be saved from further disaster. The most important and immediate objective of the junta therefore came to be the creation and consolidation of a new institutionality founded on real democracy, one which could vigorously be defended from its enemies.[41]

Thus, the raison d'etre of the Chilean military regime was the demobilization of the popular(left) sector, the promotion of peace, stability and economic growth and the elimination of all perceived obstacles and threats to facilitate the development process within a capitalist framework.[42] The regime tended to concentrate on policy

---

41 See, "The Reasons of the Junta, 1973", reprinted and edited from Three Years of Destruction: ASIMPRES (Chilean Printers Association, n.d.); and Declaration of Principles of the Chilean Government, quadrilingual edition(Embassy of Chile, Washington D.C., 1974).

42 "The government of Allende was incompatible with the survival of freedom and private enterprise in Chile (and) that the only way to avoid their extinction was to overthrow the government", Interview with Orlando Sáenz, leading businessman and a key organiser of anti-Allendists in the 1970-73 period, Cauce (Santiago), vol.1, no.20,28 August - 3 September, 1984, p.11.

goals such as promotion of new investment, curbing inflation, accelerating export growth and creating an environment of social stability. However, the first task of the authoritarian regime was to establish its legitimacy even as it carried out a wave of repression to eliminate all opposition.

Immediately after coming to power, the military junta closed the Congress, banned the UP and placed all other political parties in indefinite recess. The junta also took over executive and legislative powers leaving the judicial structure intact, apart from a purge of about 20 judges. The Supreme Court was forced to abdicate its constitutional role in supervising military tribunals because a "state of internal war" had been declared.[43] The military tribunals themselves assumed responsibility for trying leaders of the previous government and other political enemies of the new regime. All first-level government posts were occupied by military officers and anti-UP/Allende civilians were given second-level positions. Provinces came under military control except where sympathizers of the coup held the governor's post.

---

43 In any case, the Supreme Court which had supposedly upheld the rule of law against the unconstitutional acts of the Allende administration, expressly approved the validity of the Decree Laws of the junta even though they were in violation of the Constitution and the law. Thus, not surprisingly, according to Decree Law No.527 of 26 June 1974, the judiciary remained independent though subject to funding authorizations provided by the junta.

A regime of the extreme-right composed of Generals Augusto Pinochet, Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, José Toribio Merino and César Mendoza Duran replaced one of the extreme-left. The difference was that the latter did not engage in imprisonment of citizens on political grounds; the press, radio and television were free to give their versions of events; the universities were completely autonomous; and political life was not hazardous to one's life. The four-member junta changed all that — unauthorized assembly was banned, press censorship imposed, the right of habeas corpus suspended and the rights of labour unions abridged. The most distinctive aspect of the regime was not merely its resort to repression of all dissent, violation of civil liberties and use of torture[44] but the level of overall coercion employed.[45]

Approximately 10-30,000 Chileans were killed during the September coup. Political arrests in the first eighteen months of military rule approximated 95,000. Another 2,000 or so were believed to have "disappeared" and more than

---

44 According to the International Commission of Jurists, "On some occasions authorities at the highest level are known to have admitted privately that they know torture is carried on, and assert that they are unable to stop it". Cited in Alan Angell, "Chile One Year After the Coup", Current History, vol.68, no.401, January 1975, p.11.

45 According to Angell, ibid, the high level of overall coercion employed was due to the worry of some top officials "that there is insufficient control over armed forces at the local level".

10,000 fled into political exile.[46] President Pinochet replaced the "state of internal war" by a "state of seige" after the regime celebrated its first anniversary. However, night curfews remained in force until 1978 and restrictions on motirized transport also continued "to save fuel".

The military itself was not spared. The National Bureau of Intelligence (DINA), and from 1977 onwards, the National Centre for Investigations (CNI), supervised the activities of the three services and helped Pinochet achieve an impressive degree of personal control over the military. Potential rivals like Generals Carlos Prats, Hector Bravo, Sergio Arellano and Javier Palacios were rapidly retired or eliminated.[47] Premature retirements, exiles and deaths affected hundreds of lower-rank officers as well.

The cleaning-up of the Chilean system was not limited to political and military dissidents. A drastic purge of the educational system, especially universities, led to

---

46 Varying estimates are given by different sources. See for example, Amnesty International, Chile (London, 1974); and International Commission of Jurists, Final Report of the Mission to Chile (Geneva, 1974), The figures given are not necessarily those from either of the two sources.

47 Carlos Prats was assassinated in Buenos Aires in September 1975.

dismissal and arrest of thousands of teachers and students. Military officers took over the rectorships and student unionization was virtually abolished.[48] Periodic arrests of university intellectuals continued to occur and in some cases certain departments were purged of all its teachers. In schools, teaching material considered Marxist or revolutionary in nature was banned. Many of the educational reforms of previous years were reversed. The labour unions were purged of their leadership and the national labour confederation, Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT) was outlawed by Decree Law No.12 of September 1973. Until 1978, strikes were prohibited and were allowed only after granting employers the free use of scabs. A 1978 labour law permitted union elections but candidates had to be approved by the government.

Thus, the Chilean military articulated two basic aims:

> The first was to destroy the parties of the Left and their collaborators...military leaders were convinced that it was not only foreign Marxists who were to blame for Chile's predicament...the Left had been able to make inroads because of the inherent weaknesses of liberal democracy...Thus, their second objective was to engineer a fundamental restructuring of Chilean political institutions and political life, aimed at "cleaning" impurities from the body politic while creating a new political order...(49)

---

48 The appointment of rectors was parceled out among the services, so that Pinochet named the army general who became the rector of the University of Chile, while Merino appointed one of his own colleagues to the post at the Catholic University.

49 Valenzuela, n.6, p.190.

The repressive tactics employed by the military achieved, to a greater or lesser degree, the first of the above-mentioned objectives. This effort at political demobilization was not merely an attempt to establish "national security" by eliminating threats of "subversion" and "totalitarianism", it was designed to effect a complete break with a "traditional, liberal, naive and defenseless democracy".[50]

The task of restructuring Chilean society and economy was one which, given the military's lack of experience in governance and the absence of a precise blueprint for a foundational programme, the junta had to undertake in an ad hoc and arbitrary fashion.[51] Gradually, the military settled in its political role and together with the process of legitimizing its rule it transformed Chile so completely that the country came to be looked on as a model for similar regimes elsewhere. Pinochet rose above the other members of the junta to become the President of the Republic in December 1974 while retaining his posts

---

50 Interview with Enrique Ortuzar, head of the government's Constitutional Commission, Ercilla(Santiago), 14 July, 1976, pp.1-8.

51 The authoritarian nature of government made economic restructuring easier while the existence of "the Chicago boys" saw the junta's objectives being realised. See Phillip O'Brien, "Authoritarianism and Monetarism in Chile, 1973-1983", Socialist Review (Berkeley, California), vol.14, no.5, September-October 1984, pp.47-52.

as commander-in-chief of the army and a voting member of the junta. The degree of personal control Pinochet came to exercise were due to four fundamental factors: the disciplined and hierarchial nature of the armed forces and the growing power of the secret police, the use of the framework of traditional constitutional legality to justify one-man rule, the support of most of the business class and significant sections of the middle class and the continuing sharp divisions in the opposition.[52]

The Chilean military did not exclude civilians in the formulation of public policies. As Nunn has noted, Chilean officers have always relied on civilian counsel to formulate and implement policy.[53] Pinochet, as we shall see later in the chapter, came to be dependent on a specific group of academics, technocrats and theoreticians to justify the regime's actions and create popular support for its policies. One of the most important influences was a Catholic integralist group whose leading theorist, Jaime Guzmán, was particularly responsible for shaping the post-

---

52 Valenzuela, n.8, p.189. Also see pp.190-96.

53 Frederick M. Nunn, "Chile Since 1973: Historical and Political Perspectives", Latin American Research Review, (Austin, Texas), vol.14, no.2, 1979, pp.287-94.

1973 politico-social institutions.[54]

In the period 1973-80, the junta promulgated a number of "emergency decrees" and introduced institutional changes throughout Chilean polity. These various "Constitutional Acts" and programmes of "modernisation" were to culminate in the Constitution of 1980, a document basic to an understanding of the Pinochet regime and the struggle for democracy in the 1980s.

The junta published "The Declaration of Principles of the Chilean Government" in March 1974, barely six months after the coup. Guided by "the inspiration of Portales" and an eclectic "fusion" of anti-Marxist nationalism and "Christian and Hispanic traditions", the junta declared that it intended "to inaugurate a new era" by planning "a creative and stable political system" for the future. The document contained "the essence of the philosophy which... inspired the action of the junta" in its endeavour to make Chile one of the foremost nations of the region and the world.

---

54 See Thomas G. Sanders, "Military Government in Chile", in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr., ed., The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America (Lincoln and London, 1978), pp.270-87.

Enunciated at a time when political repression was at its peak, the Declaration confirmed that "the Government of Chile will energetically apply the principle of authority and drastically punish any outburst of disorder or anarchy". The military would remain in power for an indefinite period "because the task of reconstructing the country morally, institutionally, and materially requires a profound and prolonged action".

These principles emanated from--the rejection of both the totalitarian statism of Marxism and the materialism and political freedom of developed western societies; the function of the State as the guarantor of the "general common good" and individual "personal fulfilment" attainable through "restraint, poise, consideration, the positive and genuine respect for the well-being of others" and "conditional supervision"; and the regeneration of Chilean nationalism, characterized by "spiritual integration", "national planning", "authoritarian, impersonal and just government" and "functional decentralization".[55]

The Declaration was an effort at sloganeering or what has been called "military messianism" on the part of the armed forces to legitimize their rule by establishing

---

55 Declaration of Principles...,n.41.

a continuity with Chilean history and political culture.[56] In a country whose motto is "by reason or by force" (por la razon o la fuerza), the military found it convenient to successfullly invoke the tradition of political stability and concern for legality to reinforce its political control.[57]

The ideology that emerged out of the Declaration has been described as "organic statism" as different from fascism.[58] Nunn aptly sums up the document as:

> ...an ingenously paradoxical and highly euphemistic document, for it fuses what we ...call corporative decentralization with classic statist and geopolitical theory. It assures Chileans of human rights, freedom, dignity, democracy, individualism, law and order, and progress, while clearly espousing authoritarianism as the means to such ends.(59)

On 26 June, 1974, the junta passed Decree Law No.527 which directly took the constitutional framework of the 1925 Constitution and applied it to the military government.

---

56 The phrase "military messianism" is used by Michael Francis and Hernan Vera-Godoy, untitled manuscript on Chilean military governnment, University of Notre Dame, 1975. Cited in Gabriel Marcella, "The Chilean Military Government and the Prospects for Transition to Democracy", Inter-American Economic Affairs (Washington, D.C.), vol.33, no.2, Autumn 1979, p.6.

57 Valenzuela, n.6, p.189.

58 Sanders, n.54, p.288.

59 Nunn, n.53, p.288.

It specified that the junta would exercise legislative and constitutional powers, while its president (Pinochet) would have executive power as "Supreme Chief of the Nation".[60]

By 1975, however, the junta and its civilian collaborators were already discussing "a new institutional order" to replace the constitution and the political institutions framed by it.[61] In the prologue to "The National Objective of the Government of Chile" published in December 1975, the government announced that the "people of Chile have begun...the task of reconstructing the national destiny". This involved "making a reality in all its parts...the Declaration of Principles...(and) constructing a political-institutional regime based on the Christian concept of man and society, the principle of subsidiarity of the State... and with loyalty to its legitimate national tradition".[62] The government wished to create a "new democracy" which could only be accomplished through the formation of "a new National Political System" and, significantly, through "formation of new generations(instilled) with the concepts of love of God, of the Fatherland, of the family...".

---

60 For the text of Decree Law No.527, see Eduardo Soto Kloss, Ordenamiento Constitucional(Santiago,1980), pp.145-53.

61 Jaime Guzmán had written as early as 1974, "We consider that important reforms should be introduced into our institutional regime in order to complete the strengthening of presidentialism..." cited in Sanders,n.54, p.273.

62 The principle of "subsidiarity" was explained by the junta in the Declaration. See Brian Loveman "Government

The National Objective delineated a general outline for a political system "purified of all political/party influence" and in which "the diffusion of doctrines or the organisation of groups which intend to destroy the fundamental bases of the new State will not be tolerated". Thus, the vision of the junta was to enforce severe limits upon popular suffrage and traditional political organisations and other forms of autonomous political participation and electoral competition.[63]

Finally, the philosophical and institutional orientations of the junta took the form of four "Constitutional Acts" adopted between December 1975 and September 1976. These decrees moved Chile in the direction of a formalised "Constitutional dictatorship", which, in retrospect, seems to be exactly what the junta had in mind in 1973, even though no one was prepared for the degree of control Pinochet came to exercise. Pinochet did not formally abolish the 1925 Constitution and commit to a timetable for

---

and Regime Succession in Chile", Third World Quarterly, vol.10, no.1, January 1988, p.264, n.10.

63 The National Objective of the Government of Chile (Santiago, 1975). The Declaration and The National Objective were not the only attempts at justifying and promoting the military's ideology. For example, see Enrique Campos Menendez, ed., Pensamiento Nacionalista (Santiago, 1975); Arturo Fontaine and others, Nuestro Camino (Santiago, 1976); and Cuadernos del instituto de Ciencia Politica, Universidad Catolica de Chile (Santiago, 1976-77), nos.1-12.

transition from the junta administration to a more permanent political framework. It was only when he felt that he had consolidated his power and position did he announce the so-called "Chacarilla Plan" in July 1977.[64]

The "Chacarilla Plan" basically provided a framework for the gradual transition from military rule to a system of "authoritarian democracy". The political system envisaged in the document reserved a new and permanent role for the armed forces, and, at the same time, permanently excluded a large number of Chileans from political participation.

Two events in the following period demonstrated Pinochet's control over the country as well as the newly acquired political skills of the military. In the first week of January 1978, Pinochet responded to a United Nations charge of human rights violation in Chile with a call for national referendum. Chileans were asked to vote "yes" or "no" on the following resolution:

> In the face of international aggression unleashed against the government of the Fatherland I support(General) Pinochet in
> .....

---

64 The "Chacarilla Plan" was announced in the wake of an American offensive on the human rights issue under the Carter administration. All political parties had been abolished only a little earlier in March 1977.

> his defence of the dignity of Chile and I reaffirm the legitimate right of the Republic to conduct the process of institutionalization in a manner befitting its sovereignty.(65)

75.3 per cent of the Chilean voters favoured "yes", 20.4 per cent "no" and 4.3 per cent were null or blank. Despite criticism from various quarters, Generals Merino and Leigh, the Church, the PDC and others, over things such as the text of the consulta, no one could deny that Pinochet had won the first round in electoral politics.[66] This victory was interpreted as a popular affirmation of the government's legitimacy and Pinochet used it to manipulate the resignation of Leigh.[67]

The regime also implemented a programme of "seven modernisations" focusing upon a new labour code, educational, welfare and health policy reforms, and restructuring the system of judicial administration.[68] In the backdrop of the

---

65 Cited in Marcella, n.56, p.10.

66 For various views of the consulta, see ibid, pp.10-11.

67 Leigh was forced to resign because he was publicly critical of the government's social policies. His outbursts gave a negative image to the regime which Pinochet could ill-afford.

68 For more detail on the "seven modernisations", see, Brian Loveman, "Military Dictatorship and Political Opposition in Chile, 1973-86", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (Coral Gables, Florida), vol.28, no.4, Winter 1986-87, pp.1-38.

"seven modernizations" and a strong economic recovery, Pinochet submitted the project for a new Constitution and a "novel" political system to a plebiscite on 11 September, 1980, the seventh anniversary of the coup. The plebiscite resulted in a favourable vote by more than two-thirds of the electorate. The opposition's claim that extensive fraud and intimidation had occurred was somewhat neutralised by the fact that about 30 per cent of the voters had rejected the new Constitution.

The text and content of the new Constitution was essentially an extension of earlier government documents beginning with the Declaration.[69] Among other things, it also contained a formula for a gradual transition to a political system that reduced the role of the country's representative institutions.[70] In an almost vertatim

---

69 The government had initially promoted the creation of the "Group of Constitutional Studies" or the "Group of 24" that was to function independently of Jaime Guzmán and the Constitutional Committee. However, the "Group of 24" soon fell out of favour since it was extremely critical of the regime in keeping with its composition which included academicians, writers, lawyers and former politicians who had little sympathy towards the military.

70 The transitory provisions of the Constitution are discussed in the next chapter with reference to the personalization of military rule in Chile and the internal dissent within the armed forces as an institution.

reference to the 1833 Constitution, the document advocated a strong presidential system to solve problems "above the interest of groups that are opposed to the common good". Articles 39-41 in particular greatly expanded the authority of the President and the executive branch at the expense of the legislature. Provision for "states of constitutional exception" made all civil liberties and individual rights subject to suspension for varying periods of time.

In a significant departure from the past, the armed forces were given a dominant political role in the new system. The National Security Council enabled military officers to permanently occupy legislative and administrative functions. The Constitution also made an attempt to legally depoliticize policy-making and administration in accordance with the logic that politics was responsible for the crisis in the 1970-73 period. References to the evils of Marxism/Communism and the economic and political chaos of those years strengthened the military's stand on various issues. The Constitution prohibited the propagation of any doctrine that advocated violence, etc.; all groups, movements, organisations or parties that advocated such ideas; and any political party participation by labour leaders.[71] In the final analysis, the Constitution represented the zenith of Pinochet's power and authority.

---

71 Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile: 1980 (Embassy of Chile, n.a., n.d.).

Another feature of military-authoritarian rule in Chile related to economic changes in terms of reviving the process of capitalist development without casting the State in the role of a dynamic entrepreneur that presided over and participated in a somewhat uneasy alliance of domestic and foreign capital. The junta gathered a team of conservative economists to restructure the economy along free enterprise lines. The emphasis was on stimulating private investment, removing free-market restrictions, dismantling the state sector of the economy in favour of private ownership and reallocating productive resources in accordance with the theory of comparative advantage.

"The Chicago boys", as these economists came to be called, were influenced by Milton Friedman and the orthodox monetary theories taught at the University of Chicago. They identified two factors for the country's economic predicament throughout the twentieth century; the closed and highly protected nature of the economy and the excessive interference of the government in economic affairs. Therefore, policies had to be oriented towards establishing a set of free-market mechanisms based on the principle of "neutrality"/non-discrimination to determine all economic decisions. The focus on economic efficiency implied that considerations of distribution of income or wealth were

dismissed. It was believed that the higher economic growth that would result from the new development strategy would automatically yield positive results for all through what is termed as the "trickle-down" effect.[72]

Thus, the breakdown of Chilean democracy occurred, in a true sense, only after the military seized power in 1973. The generals launched a massive anti-communist and anti-politics campaign that sounded the death knell of the "democratic culture" which had flourished in Chile for the better part of its two hundred years of history. The operation was carried out in a precise and systematic manner and seemed to have had the desired effect with the implementation of the 1980 Constitution. However, in our view the process of the democratic breakdown began earlier; in the period of the Frei and Allende administrations the government increasingly found itself in a position where it failed to satisfy the demands of an increasing percentage of the electorate in a climate of political polarization with the three blocs , the right, the left and the centre less and

---

72 The economic policies of the government are treated at length in the next chapter. In sum, the effect of the free-market authoritarian policies of the Chicago boys served to isolate them not only from most sections of the dominant classes and other government officials but eventually led to their dismissal by Pinochet.

less willing to compromise and moving towards a situation of open confrontation. The military intervention was, in a way, symbolic of a reaction against the existing "type" of government, and, as we shall see in the concluding chapter, a similar reaction developed against the military regime in the midst of an economic crisis in the early 1980s.

A detailed study of the causes of military intervention and rule and comparisons with similar events in other Latin American countries are beyond the nature and scope of this study. It will suffice to emphasize that the Chilean case was unique in many ways; the personalization of power, the level of repression, the"three-thirds"split of the electorate, the free-market authoritarian model, the kind of institutionalization attempted and the very fact that such a form of government came into existence in a country where democracy had strong roots. Our attempt has been to highlight these and other aspects of the Chilean military government in its first phase, i.e., in the period 1973-81, where it went from strength to strength. The second phase is dealt with in the concluding chapters where we have analyzed the challenge that came to be

posed to the military's domination. It is debatable if this phase marked the beginning of a decline in power of the armed forces but in the period we are going to consider, i.e., from 1983-86, it is certain that the military did not find itself in a weaker position vis-a-vis the other contenders of power. However, there is no doubt that Pinochet was forced to make major adjustments and shifts in several policy matters to be able to enjoy the same privileges and status that he had prior to 1981.

C H A P T E R III

THE CRISIS OF THE MILITARY REGIME, 1981-1983

The 1980 Constitution served to institutionalize the military-authoritarian regime of General Pinochet even as the rest of Latin America was beginning to witness the rumblings of a "democratic revolution". The plebiscite which endorsed the new Constitution reflected the degree of control and success Pinochet enjoyed at that time, unparalleled as it was not merely in the context of Chilean history but also in the annals of modern dictatorship. The irony of the Chilean case was that the country had been one of the more stable democracies in the region and in the space of ten years one man seemed to have succeeded in eroding the very values Chileans were once proud of and destroying in the process the edifices of all democratic structures and institutions.

The implementation of a new Constitution also meant that a reversal of the process of authoritariansim would be extremely difficult and complicated. The transformation of Chile's "political culture" was complete--a country where the "national sport" was politics, Congress was in permanent recess, political parties outlawed, habeas corpus ignored, dissidents jailed, exiled or killed, and it was all "legal".

The fact that the regime emphasized upon Chileans that its policies and actions were not only necessary but also within a legal framework may have gone a long way in contributing to the long life of a system of government that was alien to that country. Perhaps a more important contributing factor towards the same cause was the subtle balance Pinochet achieved in his policy of repression: it was just enough to quiet political activity but insufficient to arouse the opposition to join hands to present a combined and concerted front which could challenge his hegemony. The average Chilean learned to live with fear and accept without daring to complain whatever Pinochet gave him.

Reaction to the new Constitution:

It is sometimes argued that if the 1980 Constitution represented Pinochet's greatest success, the decline began soon thereafter. Themes such as the growth of opposition, the growth of social protest the question of Pinochet's survival began to be discussed for the first time since he acquired power.[1] However,

---

1 For example, see Alan Angell, "Pinochet's Chile: the Beginning of an End"?, The World Today, (London), vol.41, no.2, February 1985, pp.27-30.

in many ways nothing changed. The economic collapse from mid-1981 on gave the impression that Pinochet was beginning to lose his grip, especially since other aspects of his rule also came to be subjected to challenge by sectors which had hitherto staunchly supported him. A closer analysis reveals that there was not yet the presence of any organisation/individual which offered an alternative. The opposition was not in a position where it could dictate terms. It may have acted as a pressure group to which Pinochet responded most effectively. Chile was still in the process of developing such an alternative and the picture was both one of optimism on one level and of despair on the other. The beginning of social protests forced the military to re-adjust and re-define its position on certain issues but at no stage was the situation beyond Pinochet's control. The crisis, if there was one, was not one of the regime but merely of its policies. What certainly happened was that a decade of atrocities and excesses committed by the men in uniform for the sake of national interest made "fear" a secondary issue. It is doubtful if the majority of Chileans ever accepted the permanent political role the armed forces had come to play even though they might have supported the coup. The significance of the opposition protests lies in the fact that nothing like that had occurred in Pinochet's Chile, at least not on that scale.

Opposition to the regime always existed but was never visible. The biggest failure of the regime was that once repression was thought to have succeeded in eliminating all opposition and the new Constitution came into force, the beginnings of a strong popular movement suggested that all was not well. The popular protests made an important point.- Chileans had not resigned themselves to Pinochet's rule and were seeking to find an alternative to him.

It will be useful to review the premises on which the logic of the Chilean military regime was based. The 1973 coup occurred in an atmosphere of a high level popular mobilization and activity that accentuated the ongoing political and economic crisis. The popular sectors were, in turn, confronted by the dominant sectors and the armed forces acting as an institution. The triumph of the latter was made possible to some extent by their co-option of the middle classes who were made to believe that the military had intervened merely to restore peace and order. The armed forces were performing a benevolent act on behalf of the masses so that Chile could once again enjoy the political stability it always had. At that stage there was little to hint at the shape of things to come.

For the middle classes, the support to the coup indicated their desire for positive changes in their socio-economic conditions where the PDC and the UP had failed them.

For the dominant classes it meant a chance to regain what they had lost during the two previous reformist governments. However, even though the coup meant different things to its supporters, it was ultimately tied to the issue of development. The country seemed to have run out of options to solve its most pressing problems and the military certainly projected itself as the answer to Chile's woes.

The military regime attempted to bring about, what is termed as, a "bourgeois or capitalist revolution". Their rationale was to end "populist society" and to reconstruct domestic capitalism, reorganising society from the top down and re-inserting this domestic capitalism into the international system. It was only the armed forces which had the repressive power necessary to implement such a project. However, this also required taking into confidence the various capitalist factions and the technocratic and intellectual groups from the dominant classes since naked power alone could hardly be conducive to the survival of such policies or of the regime itself.

The task that the armed forces took upon themselves was an extremely difficult one given the fact that the existing socio-economic structures had been shaped by at least two hundred years of a broadly democratic system of governance. It was not surprising that the military inserted the word "democracy" to a form of rule that had

nothing remotely close to the same. The military regime intended to end the "compromise state" and to achieve the anti-populist utopia of eradicating politics altogether. The new political regime earned the label of "new authoritarian /protected/exclusive democracy" and excluded the alternatives for changing the system and the sectors that represented them. A restricted political arena was formed despite recognition of popular sovereignty expressed in the polls vote and with a safety valve in the form of a military veto.

The "new democracy" was instituted from above and required for its success a social transformation of the kind that had been forced upon in the political sphere. Chilean society had not, however, undergone the necessary structural changes to sustain this new political system and it was beyond the capability of the armed forces to force or accelerate the same. This contradiction resulted in a crisis of the regime and with the economy showing signs of crumbling, there was nothing to shield the rulers from the open show of discontent by the ruled. The regime's base of civilian support increasingly narrowed and it was forced to go on the defensive as thousands of Chileans took to the streets to protest not merely against the adverse economic conditions but against the State itself.

The beginning of mass protests against the regime coincided with the economic crisis but was not wholly caused by it. It was a reaction to the "new democracy" that had come to mean the hegemony of the capitalist classes and other dominant sectors. The Chilean masses did not accept the "democracy" that the Constitution had come to define--Pinochet's victory had not indicated any desire on their part to accede to military-authoritarian rule but merely an acceptance of the "order and stability" the regime had brought about. The Constitution failed the very people who had voted for it. Chileans were already, by then, looking forward to a transition to a more "traditional" form of government.

The experience of military rule and the evolution of the "new democracy" gave way to other ideas of democracy. This was largely due to the lack of any real foundation of the political order that the military envisaged. Authoritarian capitalism was unable to insure the viability of the political model. In the midst of foreign debt, unemployment, world recession, destruction of the productive structure, incapacity of state action and the resurgence of civil society, the transition to the new democracy became a call for crisis management. The return to a more traditional democracy came to be seen as a lesser evil for even the dominant classes.

The first idea of democracy that emerged in the 1980s was the traditional one, as it had functioned in Chile in the pre-coup years, where the rule of law and the principle of popular will prevailed. This form of democracy put limitations to social change and subordinated the popular sectors to the institutional framework. The same fragile balance that sustained Chilean democracy since the 1930s had to be maintained with social pacts or agreements playing a predominant role in the functioning of government. The second idea of democracy was linked to the ideological evolution of the left and included the need for an active participation of popular demand to implement social transformation. Political democracy and social transformation were seen as inseparable concepts. The weakness of this conception of democracy lay in that the principle of social transformation could be abandoned under the pretext that democracy was in danger or that the democratic principle could be ignored since the kind of social change envisioned required a revolutionary approach.[2]

---

2 The Allende administration was a victim of its abandonment of democratic principles. It found its attempts to bring about social reform through constitutional means come to nought and adopted a more revolutionary approach that ended with the military coup.

Revolt Against Pinochet:

11 May, 1983 marked an important turning point in recent Chilean history with children staying away from school and in the early evening hours, the traditional form of protest, the banging of pots and pans by Chileans from all walks of life, shattering the "calm" of Pinochet's rule. It was not merely the economic crisis or even the recent socio-political changes that led to such an incident. Nor was it, as we have said earlier, any indication that Pinochet was beginning to lose his grip. It was the culmination of policy impacts since 1973 which resulted in shifts and dislocations of the Chilean social fabric. In the ultimate analysis, it was the response of a society which had developed a certain culture and values over a period of one hundred and fifty years.

There are at least four aspects of military rule in Chile that need to be discussed in the context of the beginning of mass protests by Chileans: the extent to which Pinochet himself attained by far the dominant position; the appearance of rifts between the services, partly as a result of Pinochet acquiring a superior status, but also due to strong differences of opinion about the return to democracy and the timetable for it; the support from within the political right and much of the business groups

and professional societies; and the collapse of the economic model. None of these features were independent of the other and did influence, in one way or another, the direction that Chilean politics took from 1981 onwards.

As commander-in-chief of the army at the time of the coup, Pinochet was destined to be the primus inter pares of the service chiefs after Allende. Though the Chilean navy has historically been the "senior service" and the key factor in Chile's success in the two major wars she won in the nineteenth Century, the army is the largest force and its garrisons lie within the national frontier. Further, the 1980 Constitution, unlike the 1833 and the 1925 Constitutions, made direct references to service hierarchy. The Transitory Provisions state in Article 18(K) that "the order of precedence of the members of the governing junta" is first, the army commander; second, the navy; third, the air force; and last, the police.[3]

Pinochet's dominance derived from other sources as well--although the services each have their own intelligence branches, the national organ, the DINA from 1973-78 and then the CNI, was under his firm control. It was responsible for at least three assassination attempts abroad, two of which were successful, on key opponents of

---

3 Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile: 1980(Embassy of Chile,n.a.,n.d.)

the government--General Carlos Prats, the last "Constitutional" commander-in-chief of the army under Allende, in Buenos Aires (September 1975); Orlando Letelier, Allende's last Defence Minister, in Washington D.C. (September 1976); and the unsuccessful one on Bernardo Leighton, a leading Christian Democrat, in Rome (October 1975). Within Chile, changes in the military hierarchy during the 1970s removed possible rivals and the designation by the junta of Pinochet as its President in June 1974, followed in December by his assumption of the title of President of the Republic, consolidated his position.

Pinochet's own energy and the selling of his image as the selfless soldier who had saved the nation from anarchy, and would not abandon his responsibility to see that the threat of anarchy would not reappear, also strengthened his position relative to other service commanders. However, the growing personalism, the almost messianic mission to extirpate Marxism from Chile and the methods by which that mission was being carried out, did not go unchallenged within the junta.

General Gustavo Leigh, head of the Air Force at the time of the coup, grew increasingly critical of Pinochet over several issues and had to be dismissed in

July 1978.[4] His successor, Fernando Matthei, also spoke out in similar terms but kept short of an open confrontation. Admiral José Toribio Merino, the Navy's representative on the junta, was also not always able to see things Pinochet's way. In December 1977 when Pinochet announced his intentions for a consulta without consulting his colleagues, Merino allied with Leigh in sending a strong public letter of disagreement in protest against Pinochet's growing dominance in the junta and the country.

The 1980 Constitution and in particular the transitory provisions it contained, also caused friction between Pinochet and the junta members. Transitory Article 14 made Pinochet President until 1989--the first eight-year term after implementation of the Constitution. Pinochet was also given a number of "special" powers during the first term of office.[5] As President, Pincohet would not participate in the junta directly, but would name a general officer from the army to join his navy, air force and police counterparts in this entity. The junta would continue to

---

4 Harold Blakemore, "Back to the Barracks : The Chilean Case", Third World Quarterly (London), vol.7, no.1, January 1985, pp.44-62. According to Angell, Leigh resigned, following which eight generals and two other officers were dismissed. 10 more officers resigned in protest, leaving only two of the original complement of 21 generals in the Air Force. See Alan Angell "Chile After Five Years of Military Rule", Current History (Philadelphia, Pa.), vol.76, no.444, p.58.

5 Political Constitution...,n.3.

exercise all legislative and other functions not specified as the exclusive prerogatives of the President under the new Constitution.[6]

Unlike all future presidents who would not be allowed to be reelected, Transitory Article 26 allowed Pinochet the possibility to get reelected. At the end of the first term, the commanders of the three armed services and the police would nominate one person to serve as President from 1989 to 1997, subject to ratification by the voters in a national plebiscite. This nomination was to be made at least ninety days prior to completion of the 1981-89 presidential term and communicated to the President.[7]

Thus, the transitory provisions did not conceal the fact that Pinochet was the man in-charge. Rather, it made its point in an almost crude manner. The resentment within the armed forces over the timetable of transition to democracy and the personalization of power in Pinochet's hands could not have been insignificant. There is no reason to believe that the other service chiefs were beyond personal ambitions or did not resent the fact that they owed their position to Pinochet. The Leigh affair, however, helped to discourage any open opposition to Pinochet. Moreover, Pinochet had, over the years,

---

6 Article 19 of the Transitory Provisions, ibid.

7 Article 27 of the Transitory Provisions, ibid.

succeeded in moulding the officer corps into a loyal group of followers completely beholden to Pinochet for their careers. All colonels promoted to the rank of generals were required to provide the army commander with a signed letter of resignation, which Pinochet could use at any moment to end a general's career.

Loyalty was assured in other ways also. Under military rule, officers enjoyed privileges they had never dreamed of. In addition to increases in pay and fringe benefits, officers could look forward to attractive rewards such as ambassadorships or membership on boards of public and semi-public organisations. The carabineros also gained status and benefits when they were transferred out of the Ministry of Interior and "elevated" to co-equal status with other members of the armed forces.

The military regime also re-established traditional norms of obedience to authority and hierarchy of rank, practices that had eroded in the final months of Allende's rule. This meant that a sharp separation between the military as institution and the military as government was established. Officers in government service reported to their superiors in government, not in the military.

> By serving both as president and commander-in-chief of the army with direct responsibility over the institution, and by strictly observing the separation of the military as government from the military as institution, Pinochet avoided the inherent tensions that develop in military regimes between officers occupying government positions and those serving in the institution itself.(8)

Argentina's prosecution of military commanders following restoration of democracy served to engender a kind of defensive solidarity among many officers within the armed forces. The prospect of restoration of a democratically elected civilian government not only threatened prospects for career advancement and existing benefits but also raised the spectre of criminal prosecution for a large number of Chile's military personnel.

The Chilean military regime's success was also based on the strong support from key civilian sectors. The traditional political right--the National Party and the Radical Democrats for example, provided the main civilian support to the coup and later staffed government ministries and policy-making positions under the military government. Besides, right-wing groups such as the Patria y Libertad and many others welcomed the coup and actively

---

8 Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime", in Larry Diamond and others, ed., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, Colorado, 1989), vol.4, p.193.

supported attacks on the UP and against organised labour, the working-class and community organisations. Thus, the right not only suppported the government but worked actively to secure the long-term political objectives of depoliticizing Chilean society and preventing a return to the demagogy and politics of the past.

Over the years, the right witnessed some fragmentation and an array of "nationalists", gremialistas, "liberals", "conservatives" and the old National Party attempted to re-define their position with respect to the government, military rule, legitimacy of the Constitution and the type of post-Pinochet government which would be most desirable. This "Group of 8", a loose alliance of diverse elements on the right who supported the military government was dissolved in 1984.

The Chilean right, and in particular, the business groups were profoundly affected by the economic policies of the military government which transformed the economy from a State-supported, import-substituting industrialization model to an export-oriented economy with low tariff barriers and few government subsidies. Although many businessmen went bankrupt because of these policies, the majority remained a strong pillar of the government.

The new breed of dynamic business leaders who came up with the opening of the economy to the world market saw military rule a far preferable alternative to the uncertainties of democratic politics.

The Debacle of the "Economic Miracle"

The economic policies of the military government was perhaps the most spectacular aspect of the changes that occurred since 1973. Faced in September 1973 with a bankrupt economy reeling from an inflation rate of 700 per cent, the new regime, after an initial lag, produced in the late 1970s an expansion of the economy of an extent that one could talk of the Chilean "economic miracle". This prosperity went just as quickly; by 1982, industry and agriculture were destroyed by foreign competition, high interest rates and the paralysis of economic activity; a third of the population was either unemployed or earning a minimal amount in government "make-work" programmes; the gross domestic product fell by 14 per cent; and the foreign debt soared to $ 17 billion, making Chile one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world on a per capita basis.

The Chilean economic model evolved under Pinochet was based on 5 key variables: (1) market liberalization, in order to make the price system the key mechanism for

the allocation of resources in the economic system; (2) elimination of the economic and social functions of the State; (3) unfettered opening of the economy to the world market; (4) formalization of a private capital market; and (5) absolute intervention in the labour market and police control of trade union activity. The economic model was the foundation for a capitalist system that was to be based on the unfettered free-play of private enterprise in the framework of a private economy with competitive markets, absolute mobility of finance capital, automatic and neutral adjustment mechanisms for the economic crisis and a type of state that would guarantee the imposition of such a model.[9]

There are two ways to examine the junta's economic policies: in terms of its components, i.e., the stabilization programme and the structural transformation programme; or a chronological study according to the phases of various policy changes implemented.[10] Our attempt here is to highlight the basic features of the regime's economic policies in a chronological order upto the collapse of the model in 1981-82.

---

9 Alex E. Fernandez Jilberto, "Military Bureaucracy, Political Opposition, and Democratic Transition", Latin American Perspectives (Newbury Park, California), Anibal Yáñez trans., Issue 67, vol.18, no.1, Winter 1991, p.37.

10 Karen L. Remmer, "State Change in Chile, 1973-1988", Studies in Comparative International Development (New Brunswick, N.J.), vol.24, no.3, Fall 1989, pp.5-29, examines the economic policies of the regime through its various phases. Our examination is based on the same.

In the period immediately after the coup, the junta concentrated on "gradual stabilization, the restoration of market mechanisms and the regularisation of property relationships".[11] Thus, tax reform reductions in government employment, removal of price controls, lowering of import tariffs and other restrictions on foreign trade and investment, restoration of illegally seized businesses and lands to their former owners etc., marked the first phase which lasted until April 1975.[12]

The "gradualist" policies of the preceding period were then replaced by one of "shock treatment" due to a sharp drop in copper prices, the principal export, and the OPEC-imposed 500 per cent increase in imported oil prices. The measures adopted were: sharp cuts in fiscal expenditures, new taxes, a tight monetary policy, increased rates for public enterprises, further reduction of tariffs and other import barriers, promotion of international competition and denationalization (except in the copper industry).

The overall philosophy behind these measures was what the government's statement of principles of March 1974

---

11 See Alejandro Foxley, Latin American Experiments in Neo-Conservative Economics (Berkeley, 1983) for an overview of such policies.

12 Sebastien Edwardes and Alejandro Cox Edwardes, Monetarism and Liberalization: The Chilean Experiment (Cambridge, Mass., 1987).

called the "principle of subsidiarity"--the doctrine that the state should intervene only in areas in which the private sector cannot act--as well as the belief that opening Chile to the outside world would produce efficiency in resource allocation and enable it to become prosperous on the basis of the principle of comparative advantage.

The predictable and immediate impact of the shock treatment was a deep recession. Industrial production and the gross national product dropped sharply, unemployment rose to 16 per cent, real wages fell by 40 per cent and there was a wave of bankruptcies. High unemployment and related inequalities in the distribution of both personal and family income were to remain predominant features of the economy through the 1970s and 1980s.[13]

The shock treatment and its attendent programme of structural reform helped to stabilize prices, promote non-traditional exports and legitimize the government's policies. Chile was able to attract the international bank loans upon which the "economic miracle" of the late 1970s was based. The success of the second phase, despite the social cost involved, created favourable conditions by 1978 for a consolidation of changes in the state during the third phase, that of the Chilean "economic miracle", that lasted until 1983.

---

13 Ibid.

Table 1

Basic Economic Statistics, 1973-1982

Year	Inflation (percentage)	Unemployment in Greater Santiago (percentage)	GDP(annual percentage rate)	Net External debt (US $ billions
1973	508.1	4.7	- 3.6	4,000
1974	376.0	9.7	5.0	4,700
1975	340.0	16.2	-11.3	5,200
1976	174.0	16.8	4.1	5,100
1977	63.5	13.2	8.6	5,400
1978	30.3	14.0	7.3	6,911
1979	38.9	13.6	8.3	8,463
1980	31.2	11.8	7.8	9,413
1981	9.5	11.0	5.7	12,553
1982	20.7	21.9	-14.1	13,892

Note: The Net External Debt figures of 1973 to 1977 are rounded-off.

Source: CORFO, Chile Economic Profiles, and Memoria Annual del Banco Central de Chile.

The Chicago boys then introduced a series of "modernisations". The government privatized large sectors of the national health service, stripped the semi-official professional associations of their power to set fees and regulate conduct and set the ground rules for establishing a system of private universities and professional schools to supplement, and in some cases, replace, Chile's public education system. The government began to transfer control

over primary education to appointive local advisory councils and mayors. The most significant reform was a total reorganization of Chile's antiquated and complex social security system, replacing most of the public insurance programmes with contributory retirement programmes run by banks and financial institutions. It must be noted that the military's retirement programme was kept within the state.

A new Labour Plan was also pushed forward in response to growing labour unrest, pressure from the US and the threat of an international boycott. The 1979 code established a new legal framework for labour organisations and collective bargaining. Trade unions were given the right to represent their members, though on highly disadvantageous terms. The legislation limited collective bargaining to the plant level, gave employers the free use of scabs, provided for employer lock-outs, impeded agricultural unionization and strictly regulated strikes on terms favourable to employers.

The collapse of the Chilean model began with an exchange rate policy known as tablita. In June 1979, as part of an effort to decrease inflation and to control the money supply, the government tied the Chilean peso to the dollar and announced that there would be no further changes

in the official rate of 39 pesos to the dollar. In the next two years the dollar appreciated against European currencies and Chile's inflation exceeded the US rate by about 18 per cent. The peso became substantially overvalued, foreign goods became very cheap and Chilean exports correspondingly expensive, producing a spectacular decline in domestic sales and employment and an economic contradiction. Imports of consumer goods rose steadily and Chilean indsutry and agriculture were unable to compete with foreign goods, which were subject to a very low uniform tariff of 10 per cent. The resulting trade defecit was financed by international banks and the tablita made foreign borrowings particularly attractive.[14] The debt incurred was not considered a problem since it corresponded to private rather than public borrowing.

In the havoc wreaked by the fixed exchange rate and the lack of tariff protection, the largely unregulated financial structure collapsed. In 1981, the government was forced to rescue several banks and financial institutions in violation of its principles of non-intervention. The government, however, continued to rely upon a process of "automatic readjustment" even as the exchange rate depreciated more than 30 per cent in early 1982 relative to early 1979.

---

14 The government had also eliminated control on foreign borrowing in 1979.

Massive speculations against the peso pushed real interest rates above 40 per cent. As labour costs also rose, Chile found itself in adverse international conditions--there was a 50 per cent drop in copper prices, import costs for oil increased with the 1979 OPEC price increase and there was also a sharp rise in international interest rates.

Devaluation finally came in June 1982 but it was a case of "too little too late". By January 1983, the gross national product had fallen by 14 per cent and unemployment had reached 21 per cent. The government was forced to take over most the productive resources of the country including banks. The private debt was also nationalized and right-wing critics described these actions as the "Chicago road to socialism". By March 193, leading politicians, including those from the right, formed a multipartidaria and called for a return to democracy and a change in economic policy.[15]

---

15 The economic policies of the regime have been dealt with extensively. See, Cristian Moran, "Economic Stabilization and Structural Transformation: Lessons from the Chilean Experience, 1973-1987", World Development (Elmsford,N.Y.), vol.17, no.4, April 1989, pp.491-502; Tim Congdon, "Move to the Free-market Economy: Chile 1975-85", Development Policy Review (London), vol.3, no.2, 1985, pp.146-51; Sebastian Edwardes, "Stabilization with Liberalization: An Evaluation of Chile's experiment with Free-market Policies, 1973-83", Economic Development and Cultural Change (Chicago,Illinois), vol.33, no.2, January 1985, pp.223-54; Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, "The Monetarist Experiment in Chile: A Critical Survey", World Development,vol.11, no.11, November 1983, pp.905-26; Carlos Fortin, "The Failure of Monetarism: Chile 1973-85", Development Policy Review, vol.3, no.2, 1985, pp. 137-46 and "The Failure of Repressive Monetarism:Chile,1973-1983",Third World Quarterly, vol.6, no.2, April 1984, pp.310-26.

The most damaging aspect of the economic policies implemented by the regime was its differential impact on different social sectors. The inequalities of income increased throughout and the poorer sections suffered with rising unemployment, decline in real wages, inflation, wage and salary controls, restrictions on union organization and fiscal austerities.

Table 2

Income Distribution, Household Monthly Consumption
(1981 dollars)

Households	1969	1978
20% Poor	$164	$113
20% Lower Middle Class	255	203
20% Middle Class	337	297
20% Upper Middle Class	443	456
20% Wealthy	862	1,112

Source: National Statistical Institute(INE), Household Budget Surveys, as analysed in Rene Cortazar, "Chile: Distributive Results 1973-1982", presented to the University of California, Davis, November 1982.

In the industrial sector, large conglomerates and financial groups organized on the basis of family and personal connections (called piranhas), bought up bankrupt and denationalized industries at highly favourable terms.

This increasing concentration of industrial capital in a few hands was neither a temporary shift nor was confined to the industrial sector; a similar trend towards concentration of land in a few hands could be observed in the rural sector.

The government made feeble efforts to ameliorate the economic conditions of the lower income groups.[16] However, what it aimed at was to reduce the social welfare component of public spending by redirecting benefits towards only the poorest groups. It expanded the supplementary food programme,[17] family allowance scales for blue- and white-collar workers and altered the social security system to equalize benefits.[18]

Thus, in the period 1981-83, Pinochet's Chile found itself entangled in a web of problems that were of its own doing. Its political designs in the form of a new Constitution served to generate opposition from its supporters, the right-wing civilians and the armed forces. The collapse of the economic model further eroded the regime's base of

---

16 For example, it introduced subsidies for firms hiring additional labour, promoted a labour training programme and in September 1975, initiated the Minimum Employment Programme (PEM).

17 The supplementary food programme provided milk and protein blends to children, pregnant/nursing mothers.

18 Chile's social welfare system has historically favoured middle-rather than lower-income groups. The regime's policies cut into middle class interests and earned their hostility.

support. A regime based on repression of all dissent and trying to legitimize its rule was confronted by difficulties it had not bargained for. The military was used to eliminating physical opposition but ran short of answers in solving political and economic problems of this kind. To a neutral observer, the regime seemed to have outlived its utillty, that is, if eradication of communism and restoring "peace" and "stability" was the logic of military intervention and rule.

The result of this crisis was the beginning of mass protests from May 1983. However, the protestors and other opponents of the regime were divided over the issues which had driven them to oppose Pinochet. There was no doubt that most Chileans wanted a change, an alternative to military rule and a re-establishment of democracy before 1989, a clear indication of their rejection of the new political order. A survey conducted in Santiago in mid-1983 reflected this view: 21.6 per cent felt that the best government formula for solving national problems was the current government; 15.0 per cent wanted a government without Pinochet but with military participation participation or directed by a leadding politician of the right; 24.2 per cent desired a new government formed by the opposition but without Communists; and 22.7 per cent wanted a government

formed by the opposition without exclusions. 75 per cent favoured "re-establishment of full democracy" before 1989 in clear opposition to the provisions of the 1980 Constitution.[19]

The stage was thus set for a struggle against the military regime for a return to democracy.

---

19 Hoy (Santiago), 19-25 October 1983.

C H A P T E R IV

PINOCHET OR DEMOCRACY? 1983-1986

In the preceding chapters, we have outlined Chilean polity as it evolved since the early years of its independence. An attempt was made to analyze the background of Chilean democracy in terms of its historical development. An equal emphasis was placed on explaining the tradition of democracy and the apolitical nature of the Chilean military. That the military took a back seat in national politics because civilian authority came to be established with the 1833 Constitution and that early presidents helped consolidate this dominance of the head of the executive were also highlighted. The military played its professional role to perfection in the two major wars in 1837-38 and 1879-83 and functioned as a pressure group in politics. Political elites did not resort to establishing any alliance with the armed forces to capture power. The Prussianization of the armed forces from the 1890s helped develop a distinct ideology that was both professional and nationalistic. The same generation of officers intervened in politics when the parliamentary republic failed in its objective of solving the basic national problems including the "social question".

The 1925 Constitution defined the rules of national politics until the 1973 coup which signalled an end of democracy. From the early decades of the twentieth century,

the popular sectors, inclusive of workers, peasants, shanty-town dwellers, youth, women and various categories of labour, both employed and unemployed came to play an increasingly important role in national politics with the advent of Radical, Socialist and Communist Parties.[1] The earliest concrete attempts at reform began with the Popular Front government in 1938 and threatened the privileges of the traditional ruling classes. Very soon the ideological split between the political right, centre and left reflected in the "three-thirds" split of the electorate and coalition politics became the dominating feature of Chilean democracy. The Cuban Revolution had a profound impact on Chilean life and the left gained in stature and strength during the 1960s. The emergence of the PDC as a new centre party with a programme of "Revolution in Liberty" was an alternative path towards positive social change and met with some degree of success. The social mobilization tactics of both the PDC and the left created conditions of extreme polarization in Chilean society when the Marxist-dominated UP coalition came to power in 1970. The failure of political parties to play the game of coalition politics led to political and economic chaos and the subsequent military intervention to restore normalcy.

---

1 For a concept of the "popular sectors", see Philip Oxhorn, "The Popular Sector Response to an Authoritarian Regime: Shanty-town Organizations Since the Military Coup", Latin American Perspectives (Newbury Park, Calif.), Issue 67, vol.18, no.1, Winter 1991, pp.66-91.

The arrival of the Chilean military to the centre-stage of national politics was in part a reaction to the election of a Marxist as president. However, besides the anti-communist ideology of the military and the right, the failure of the PDC and the UP to adopt a more flexible stance, and a lack of cohesion in the economic and social policies of Allende contributed to the breakdown of democracy. For the next 16 years, the Chilean military was to remove the vestiges of democratic rule in the country and pave the way for an "authoritarian democracy".

Initially, the coup had the support of the right as well as the PDC. The anti-Marxist policy of the military also found favour with the right, most of the PDC, the gremialistas and most non-partisan professional associates. Even the Catholic Church called on the people to cooperate with the new regime in restoring order, even though the Permanent Committee of the Episcopal Conference lamented the violence and the bloodshed of the coup.[2]

The opposition to military rule began even as the dust settled on the new political reality of uniformed men occupying government offices. This chapter begins with a

---

2 B. Smith, "Old Allies, New Enemies: The Catholic Church as Opposition to Military Rule in Chile, 1973-79", in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., Military Rule in Chile (Baltimore, Md., 1986), pp.273-9.

overview of the early opposition to Pinochet's rule. The period considered is 1973-81 when there was an absence of large-scale resistance to military rule owing to the coercive nature of the State. It was only in the years 1983-86 that the opposition to military rule evolved a somewhat mass character and engaged in overt confrontations with the rulers. The second section deals with the protest movement of 1983-86 in a chronological order and brings out the various dimensions of Chilean polity as it was perceived by the various actors. An analysis of important political developments in relation to the military regime, the right and the opposition is also attempted. The role of the popular sectors in the struggle for democracy is provided with an objective of assessing their likely influence in the future course of national politics.[3]

Early Opposition to Military Rule

A great deal of middle class support for the coup eroded over the first few months of military rule. The very scope and intensity of physical repression no doubt influenced this "shift" but it must have also dawned on many Chileans that the military was there to stay. In

---

3 The importance of the popular sectors can be attributed to their being perhaps the largest single social sector in Chile. See Oxhorn, n.1, p.79.

January 1974 the PDC wrote to the junta that

> a lasting order cannot be created on the basis of repression. We feel that these are not the best ways to reestablish harmony and unity among the Chilean people, and as with any injustice it can only give rise to unnecessary suffering and to division, resentment and hatred.(4)

The pro-coup Christian Democrats had expected a gradual restoration of a modified democratic system which would allow Eduardo Frei to be reelected as president. As the main political opponents of UP, with strong links to not only the middle class but also the labour movement, peasant organisations, professional and business associations, etc., the Christian Democrats had the potential to threaten the military regime on a legal basis. They also had their newspapers, radio station and a variety of newsletters and communications to party-linked social organisations.[5]

The slightest of criticism led to reprisal against the PDC member who had dared defy the military's authority. Bernardo Leighton found that he was forbidden to enter Chile

---

4 Cited in Alan Angell, "Chile One Year After the Coup", Current History (Philadelphia, Pa.), vol.68, no.401, January 1975, p.14.

5 Brian Loveman, "Military Dictatorship and Political Opposition in Chile, 1973-1986", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (Beverly Hills, C.A), vol.28, no.4, Winter 1986-87, pp.1-38.

because he called for the unity of all democratic forces against the junta during his visit to Rome. Patricio Aylwin, then a Senator and Chairman of the PDC was told not "to write again in terms other than those fitting an administrative authority of a party in recess addressing the government of a nation".[6]

It was not only the PDC among the pro-coup elements that turned against the military regime in its early months in power. The economic policies of the regime had already begun to hurt most sectors of Chilean society. The professional associations (gremios) and the white-collar unions began to plead for a relaxation in the "cure" that the junta had found for reviving the economy. The Independent Truckers' Association, which had led the October 1972 strike against Allende,[7] published an open letter complaining that the junta's regulations and controls were almost as detrimental to its interests as those of the previous government.[8]

The labour unions were subjected to immediate repression by the regime and the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT) was dissolved. However, though labour's response to

---

6 Angell, n.4, p.14.

7 See Chapter 2, p.71.

8 In El Mercurio (Santiago), 24 February 1974.

the military regime's policies were halting, it showed a determination to resist to the best of its ability. By January 1974, the Central Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) joined together workers from Christian Democratic and gremialista movements, including those of public employees, maritime workers,bank employees, health workers, metal workers and others, and attempted to obtain government recognition of its status as a legitimate voice. The junta gave these groups a public forum by recognizing them as spokesmen for organised labour in order to coopt the non-Marxist labour and gain support for its programmes. Since the CNT excluded all leftist elements it failed to gather any immediate mass support. Inevitable conflicts arose between the gremialistas who were pro-military and the Christian Democrats who saw themselves as responsible labour opposition. This undermined the chances of any long-term alliance capable of defending the interests of the labour force. Eventually, even the gremialistas and the conservative among the white-collar and public employee organisations found themselves at loggerheads with government policies.

The MIR took upon the task of armed resistance against military rule. There were bank raids and even rumours of a deal with the air force over a cessation of hostilities and a release of prisoners. The death of

Miguel Enríquez, a prominent MIR leader, in a gun-battle in Santiago in October 1974 proved a setback to guerrilla activities.[9]

By 1978, a moderate faction had developed within the armed forces leading to some restraints on repressive acts by the government. There also seemed to be a little more tolerance of critical statements made by political and labour leaders. Eduardo Frei, the former president, called for a swift return to democracy and a revised political role for the military. A dissident group of Christian Democratic labour leaders issued a declaration asking for a restoration of civil liberties and for the right of collective bargaining. About 300 students signed a letter to Pinochet demanding that the universities be rid of military control and denouncing the dictatorial regime. The Roman Catholic Church continued its condemnation of human rights violations by the military.

The dissatisfaction against military rule led to a debate within the junta over the advantages and dangers of continuing the repression of political dissent as opposed to a response to internal and external criticism by allowing

---

9 Angell, n.4, p.42.

open debate and broader political participation. In particular, the air force commander-in-chief, Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, argued for a more open system.

The PDC drafted an important political document to speed up the political democratization of Chile against the "authoritarian democracy" which the junta had in mind. The Party called for the immediate formation of a Movement of National Democratic Restoration and appealed to all political parties to work together for a swift return to constitutional rule.[10] The PDC proposal called for a 3-stage return to democracy.[11]

Exiled UP leaders had already published a similar proposal in Europe. It seemed that both the PDC and the UP were seeking a rapproachment and speaking in terms of "letting history judge who was responsible", a reference to the left's accusations about the PDC role in the coup.[12]

General Leigh was forced to resign on 24 July 1978. Around the same time occurred the earliest rumblings among certain civilian sectors. There were important strikes in

---

10 Latin America, vol.11, no.41, 21 October 1977, p.325.

11 The first stage would reestablish fundamental human rights; the second would call for a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage; and the third stage would be a full return to parliamentary democracy with an elected president, ibid, p.324.

12 Salvatore Bizzarro, "Rigidity and Restraint in Chile", Current History, vol.74, no.434, February 1978, p.68.

the copper mines of Chuquicamata and in the steel mills of Huachipato. Students began to demand some degree of participation in the running of the universities. Small businessmen, like the truckers who were led by León Villarín, issued proclamations declaring that they were no better off under military rule than under Marxist rule.[13]

In course of time, it was the Roman Catholic Church which had come to provide a fragile umbrella of protection for a variety of human rights research, social service and opposition to the regime. The desire of the military to acquire the support of the Church as a source of legitimacy, and the willingness of the Church leadership to collaborate in the "work of reconstruction" provided them with a degree of insulation from the assaults launched against other organisations and individuals.

The National Committee to Aid Refugees (CONAR) was established soon after the coup, creating a nucleus around which an active opposition to the government's repression was able to organise. From October 1973 onwards, the Committee of Cooperation for Peace (COPACHI) began to serve as a social work organisation to the victims of State terrorism.[14] Shortly thereafter, Cardinal Raul Silva

---

13 See interview with Leon Villarín in Hoy (Santiago), 13 September 1978, p.21.

14 Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez dissolved COPACHI in December 1975 owing to its proved links to underground and clandestine activities.

Heuriquez established the Vicariate of solidarity, the single most important umbrella organisation which provided social services to the poor and opposed the human rights abuses of the government. Right through the period of military rule, the Vicariate was the foundation of moral and legal resistance to the military.[15]

After the government issued a new Labour Code in June 1978, there were signs of a strengthening of labour union coordination at the national level leading to powerful demonstrations of working class discontent. The first labour group to form was the Group of Ten, who were mostly moderate Christian Democrats who had remained in their posts after the coup and enjoyed the support of the Church. This was followed by the formation of Coordinadora Nacional, a more explicitly left-wing group of union leaders working closely with Church groups and trying to act jointly with the Group of Ten. There was an impressive display of unity when four groups, including the Group of Ten and Coordinadora Nacional, got together to demand union freedom, economic

---

15 The Church's opposition was never a substitute for an overt political opposition which could offer an alternative to military rule. It also suffered from internal division with some bishops continuing to support the military. For details of the role of the Chilean Catholic Church in opposition to military rule, See, Smith, n.2; Stephen R. Bowers, "Pinochet's Plebiscite and the Catholics: The Dual Role of the Chilean Church", World Affairs (Washington D.C.), vol.151, no.2, Fall 1988, pp.51-58.

improvements and a return to democracy.[16]

As we have seen in Chapter II the educational system came under military control and the universities were subjected to purges.[17] In subsequent years of military rule, university enrollment fell and there was a dramatic alteration of overall university environment. Political organisations (unions of both students and teachers became dangerous and difficult. There were instances of individual faculty members and students voicing opposition to the government's policies but, by and large, Chilean universities did not generate any significant resistance to the regime until the 1980s.

There were however an expanding number of "independent " research institutes, as well as loosely connected groups of scholars and technicians, who emerged as a source of intellectual revitalization and eventually, vocal sources of

---

16 The two other groups were the Frente Unitariode Trabajadores and the Union Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT). It was ironic that the junta's union turned against its policies. See the report by Ana Maria Foxley in Hoy, 13 September 1978, p.9.

17 See D. Levy, "Chilean Universities Under the Junta: Regime and Policy", Latin American Research Review (Albuquerque, New Mexico), vol.21, no.3, 1986, pp.95-128.

opposition to the regime. The Academia de Humanismo Cristiano served as an umbrella for many of these groups.[18] The military's insistence on "decentralization" and "privatization" spawned a number of relatively autonomous research centres, often bringing together members and supporters of the same political party. These groups produced clandestine films, solid investigations of Chile's history and the impact of the military regime.[19] However, like the Catholic Church, none of these groups had the mass base or influence necessary to challenge Pinochet's hegemony.

The labour movement refused to be cowed down by the regime's policies and was one of the most active among the opposition to Pinochet. Strikes in copper mines, among railway and port workers, in factories and service industries, confirmed the survival of a heterogenous opposition to the government's policies. Government employees, teachers, shopkeepers and truckers, often led by former anti-left individuals, joined the opposition to government policies, even as some of them sought "a responsible military officer"

---

18 For example, Facultad Latinoamévicano de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Centro de Estudios de Planificación (CEPLAN), Grupo de Estudios Agro-Regionals (GEA), Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigaciones en Educación (PIIE) and others.

19 A film maker was the subject of Gabriel Garcia Marquez's book, Calndestine in Chile (London, 1988).

to head a transition government.[20] However, the external support for labour's demands acted as a constraint on government policy. Threatened by an international boycott, the military institutionalized a new industrial relations system with the 1978 Labour Code.[21] Further restrictions were placed on labour union activity and relationships between labour and political parties in the 1980 Constitution.[22]

These measures were resisted, to a degree, by the various labour and professional associations. Militant and public opposition by the Coordinadora Nacional Sindical (CNS) led to the arrest of the organisation's president and Secretary-general.[23] In June 1980, the CNS presented

---

20 Brian Loveman, "Chile", in Albert Blum, ed., International Handbook of Industrial Relations (Westport, CT., 1981), pp.84-97.

21 G. Falabella, Labour in Chile Under the Junta, 1973-79, Working Paper No.4 (London, 1981), gives a good outline of the main provisions of the new industrial relations under the military.

22 See Chapter III, Fundamental Rights and Obligations, in Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile (Embassy of Chile, n.a., n.d.)

23 The CNS was a loosely structured alternative to the CNT and included members previously affiliated to CUT. It was formed in June 1975.

a number of economic and political demands on the government, thus engaging in an illegal act under the terms of the Constitution and labour laws. Some Christian Democrats who opposed both the policies of the government and the resurgence of the left in the CNS, formed the Union Democrática de Trabajadores (UDT) in April 1981. The UDT challenged the government's "labour plan" and called for renewed political party activity and a legitimate political role for labour, even as it rejected unity with the CNS and other leftist organisations.

In some ways, the fragmented labour movement temporarily replaced the outlawed political parties as the major visible political opposition to the military regime. The CNS presented a national petition to Pinochet, signed by over 400 labour leaders, which brought threats of prosecution under Article 8 of the Constitution.[24] Prominent ex-politicians signed declarations of support only to be sent into exile. Union activity continued and so did retaliation by the military.[25]

---

24 Article 8 prohibited the propagation of "totalitarian ideas" or concepts of "class conflict". See Political Constitution, n.6.

25 In early 1982, the president of the Agrupación Nacional de Empleados (ANEF) and the vice-president of the UDT, Tucapel Jiménez, were assassinated.

The parties of the left survived the repression by the military and were able to maintain some linkages to workers, students, peasants and community organisations. The Communist Party went underground and established a directorate in exile. By 1976, the entire internal leadership was captured but a clandestine apparatus, with moral and financial support from leaders based in Moscow, had already been created. Some sections of both the Communist and Socialist parties came to favour armed confrontation while others did not give up ideas of Constitutional politics.[26] In 1977, the party's Central Committee adopted a "programme for the reconstruction of Chilean society" which combined nationalistic economic measures with calls to create new democratic institutions. However, by 1980, important Communist leaders publicly acknowledged the need for all types of struggle and moved closer to the MIR. The definite change in tactics aggravated the difficulty of forging a broad-based opposition coalition against the military government since there were also serious doubts over the Communist leaders' control over tefrorist groups such as the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (MRPF). The revival of armed struggle also served to vindicate Pinochet's allegation of Soviet imperialism and Marxist terrorism.[27] On the other hand, the partyIs ability

---

26 C. Furci, The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism (London, 1984).

27 There were obvious external links of the Communist Party, from the short-wave broadcasts into Chilé from the Soviet Union to the residence of party workers in Moscow.

to maintain a clandestine organization, to recruit new cadres and to take dramatic initiatives, restored its credibility to its historical claim as vanguard of revolutionary struggle in Chile.

The Socialists were not as united as the Communists and especially after 1973, they split into a number of personlaist and ideologically hostile factions. The two major factions were headed by Clodomiro Almeyda and Ricardo Lagos respectively; the former accepted all methods of struggle while the latter favoured a moderate line. In the 1980s, some Socialists and other small groups including the Christian Left (LC) and the Radical Party sought to forge a new ideological consensus called the Convergencia, espousing a middle path. A Bloqué Socialista was also formed but the Socialists declined in strength during the Pinochet years although they did come into their own from 1983 onwards.

We have already examined the opposition to military rule within the services themselves over issues varying from the nature and scope of repression to the timetable for transition to democracy. The division among the political right has also been the subject of a brief survey in relation to its support and opposition to Pinochet. The 1980s saw increasing political activity in the face

of major changes undergoing in Chile both in the political and economic spheres. Beginning in May 1983, a wake of open opposition to the military regime surfaced and this is perhaps the right stage to review the movement against military rule. A brief outline of the role of the popular sectors in Chilean polity with some reference to the period of our discussion is first attempted.

The popular sectors became a force to reckon with during the Frei and Allende administrations and in the turbulent years of 1970-73, displayed a tendency to go beyond the control of traditional political parties. The reformist policies of Frei and Allende led to a high degree of mobilization among the popular sectors as well as increasing levels of political consciousness. Their emergence on the national scene, however, threatened the stability of Chilean democracy and created panic and fear among the upper and middle classes.

In the post-1973 period, it was the popular sectors which bore the brunt of the policies of the Pinochet regime. In the face of extreme repression, there emerged a visible base-level organizational activity in Chilean shanty-towns (poblaciones), and most prominently in Santiago. The status of Santiago lies in that it is not merely the state capital but a primate city, where about 40 per cent of Chile's population resides. This also explains why most expressions of political, social and economic discontent centred in Santiago.

The emergence of organizational activity during Pinochet's rule was representative of an attempt to restructure the social fabric of a society virtually destroyed by the progressive dismantling of the State's social welfare apparatus. Besides, the locus of political activity had shifted to the grassroots level in the face of State repression at the national level. The cessation of political party activity under authoritarian rule may have led the urban poor to re-create a public space for the expression of the interests of the lower classes.

After 1973, thousands of organisations emerged in the shanty-towns of Santiago, grouping together approximately 200,000 people in 1986.[28] The issues concerning such organisations centred on human rights, the process of forging a unified popular movement, as a new social actor, and the capacity of the people in the shanty-towns to deal with the mounting socio-economic problems which they confronted. Thus, there came to be several types of organisations, associations for subsistence, such as soup kitchens and urban family gardens; demand-oriented associations addressing housing issues and utility bills; local coordinating bodies grouping all community organizations at the local and district

---

28 Guillermo Campero, Entre la sobrevivencia y la acción politica: Las organizaciones de pobladores en Santiago (Santiago, 1987).

level; and organizations for national social and political representation, such as the United Slumdwellers Committee (CUP).[29] Other popular sector organizations included women's and youth groups and organizations to protect human rights.

The imposition of military-authoritarian rule severed the links of the political parties with popular sector organizations. When the protests began in May 1983, Chilean parties sought to win over these organizations to expand their base of support. This relationship was ideally conceived in terms of the party's ability to control and moderate the aspirations of popular sector organizations. However, profound changes had occurred in the nature of popular sector organizations. Years of organizing experience in the absence of traidional political party activity generated the expectation that organizational autonomy would be respected by political parties. Above all, the popular sectors found that political parties continuously referred to the necessity of helping those most in need but lacked concrete proposals for addressing their problems. Such tensions between the popular sector organisations and popular parties had many concrete manifestations. Numerous

---

29 See James Petras, "The New Class Basis of Chilean Politics", New Left Review (London), no.172, November/December 1988, pp.67-81.

organizations were undermined by direct party intervention in their internal activities as or example, the April 1986 Congreso Unitario de Pobladores .

The popular sector organizations engaged in a variety of actions in the period 1983-86; utility payment strikes and illegal electircity hook-ups; land seizures for housing;[31] raids on supermarkets and warehouses; raids on passing trucks and trains; demonstrations and street actions, including erection of barricades and prolonged fighting; destruction of government-related offices and symbols in shanty-town neighbourhoods; and self-help actions.

There is no doubt that the popular sector organizations played a key role in shaping the struggle against the Pinochet regime.

> Popular sector organizations became focal points in the Chilean political process under the military regime due to their capacity to mobilize people, their association with the more violent aspects of social mobilization...and their claim to be legitimate representatives of perhaps the largest single social sector in Chile.(32)

---

30 See Philip Oxhorn, "The Popular Sector Response to an Authoritarian Regime: Shanty-town Organizations Since the Military Coup", Latin American Perspectives (Newbury Park, California), Issue 67, vol.18, no.1, Winter 1991, pp.80-2.

31 30 takeovers between 1980 and 1985 involving 51,447 participants. Petras, n.29, p.76.

32 Oxhorn, n.30, p.79.

As we will see through the course of this chapter, the primary target of Pinochet before any day(s) of national protest were the shanty-towns of Santiago. The raids were usually aimed at the arrest of militants and leftist guerrillas and seizure of arms. Indeed, the existence of local party militants, especially Communists, in some shanty-towns, explains the higher level of political activism, as was the case with La Victoria. Party militants with a history of organization and an ability to maintain democratic ties with the local community, coupled with a tradition of political activism in some communities in the pre-1973 period also go in explaining the higher political activism in certain shanty-towns.[33]

It has been necessary to discuss the role of the popular sectors in the struggle for democracy since there is a tendency to overlook the crucial role they played in protests, demonstrations and other visible forms of show of discontent. They were relevant not merely in terms of their numerical strength but also because they displayed more vigour in their endeavour to restore democracy. The largely unemployed and semi-employed members of Santiago's shanty-towns had nothing to lose and everything to gain with the fall of Pinochet's dictatorship.

---

33 See Cathy Schneider, "Mobilization at the Grassroots: Shanty-towns and Resistance in Authoritarian Chile", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 67, vol.18, no.1, Winter 1991, pp.92-112.

Assault On Pinochet:

The first truly mass demonstration against the Pinochet regime since 1973 was not really intended. The National Workers Command, a loose grouping of labour unions headed by the leader of the General Copper Workers' Federation, Rodolfo Seguel, had called for a protest against the economic measures of the government and authoritarian rule in general. The response to this call was unexpected. On 11 May 1983, the silence of Santiago was shattered by the banging of pots and pans (Cacerolaza) and honking of automobile horns not only in the lower class neighbourhoods but the middle and upper middle class localities as well. The protest was to signal an end to the fear of government repression, opening the way for more demonstrations of increasing intensity, and for a regrouping and rejuvenation of the fragmented and ineffective opposition forces.

The regime's response was expected--two people were killed and 200 arrested.[34] In subsequent protests the same month, the police clashed with demonstrators to restore order leaving two dead, 150 injured and a further 1600 arrested.[35] The Government Social Communication Agency restricted the news broadcasting activities of three radio

---

34 New York Times, 13 May, 1983.

35 Time, 23 May, 1983. (Chicago, Ill.),

stations for their support of the illegal "strike called by the copper workers. These radio stations had broadcast interviews, news, commentaries and other items intended to serve political goals".[36]

On May 17, leaders of the labour unions which had taken part in the 11 May "day of national protest" met the Interior Minister, Enrique Montero, to discuss their grievances. Nothing came out of these talks. Instead, labour leaders found themselves facing court action for violating State security laws. The protestors responded by making the Command a permanent organisation for carrying out agitation against the regime.[37] The Command called for another national protest on 14 June. However, there were unions which argued that there was not adequate organisation for work stoppage and favoured a boycott of schools and a traffic slowdown. A confrontational attitude had by then led to a situation where there seemed to be no way back. About 200 students made an attempt to occupy the library at the University of Chile, Santiago and in the imminent clash with the police lasting more than two hours, 15 were left injured.[38]

---

36 Summary of World Broadcasts (Reading), 17 May 1983.

37 The National Workers Command consisted of the General Copper Workers' Federation, the National Union Coordinating Board, the Democratic Union of Workers, the General Private Workers' Confederation and the Unitary Workers' Front.

38 Time, n.35.

Thousands of Chileans took to the streets on the peaceful 14 June "day of protest" to express their unhappiness with the regime. The protestors included labour leaders, conservative and leftist politicians, students, business leaders and farmers. Seguel had declared:

> We are pacifist in attitude and active in behaviour. If they hit us with clubs, we will endure. We will speak with them only of a serious return to democracy.(39)

Thus, a return to democratic rule became the basis for the movement which over the next three years was to go from strength to strength.

The protest however turned violent when in some working class communities, residents lit bonfires in the streets, threw rocks and looted stores. In other places, students burned make-shift barricades and fought pitched battles with the police. There is evidence that much of the violence may have been instigated by government security forces anxious to discredit the overwhelmingly peaceful protests. In the worst ever scenes of violence in 10 years of military rule, three people died and 200 arrested in Santiago.[40]

---

39 Time, 27 June 1983.

40 Ibid.

Meanwhile, the confrontation between labour unions and the government hardened with the arrest of Sequel and other leaders for violating "national security". The General Copper Workers' Federation announced that it would strike at some mines in the north on 16 June and in others on 17 June.[41] They also demanded the immediate release of all its leaders.

The Interior Minister, Montero ruled out any politicization of the strikes because the Constitution did not permit it. He then moved swiftly against the striking copper workers and displayed the awesome power of the regime. The editors of all the country's publications and the directors of all television and radio stations were summoned and warned against printing any news about protests, strikes, political parties or labour unions. At the same time, striking workers and union leaders were fired, their union headquarters closed and meetings or assemblies in the mining communities prohibited.

Within a matter of days, the regime effectively broke the national strike. Thousands of workers showed up to apply for the copper miners' jobs and labour leaders found themselves pleading to Montevo for a re-instatement of fired workers. Montero agreed to examine the situation of each miner on an individual bases, contributing to further insecurity in mining communities. He, and later Pinochet, struck a conciliatory note by hinting at a willingness on the part of the government to try to solve the serious

41 New York Times, 16 June 1983.

indebtness problems of striking miners.

On 17 June, Pinochet, seemingly under pressure, said in a nationally televised speech that he would not step down ahead of schedule but would make a number of concessions to the protestors.

> We shall advance decisively along the Constitutional path that the Chilean people---approved in the ---referendum of 1980... I have ordered that the system for authorizing the return of exiles be reviewed immediately...(and) to rescind the requirement of previous authorization for the publication and distribution of books.(42)

Pinochet also proposed to publish debates of what has been secret meetings of the Government's legislative commission over new laws. He however warned that he would "decisively confront the agents of subversive violence" and that "political activity" would be excluded in regard to trade unions.[43] The same month, 128 political exiles returned to Chile, including the PDC leader, Andres Zaldivar Larrain and the widow of the slain former Foreign Minister, Orlando Letelier.

Military action against the copper miners continued with the armed forces taking control of some mines to clamp down on anti-government political activity by unions. Union

---

42 Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 June, 1983.

43 Ibid.

rights were suspended and meetings banned at the State-owned El Salvador and Chuquicamata mines. In the face of this onslaught, the already dismissed copper workers planned another general strike towards the end of the month. Coalition of Chilean unions, students and some professional associations went on strike on 23 June but found that most Chileans had ignored the call. Their demand for Pinochet's removal was soon softened to that of more democracy. The collapse of the largely ineffectual general strike seemed to signal an end of the protest movement and Pinochet made it known that he would not allow any more protests against the government.

The Chilean political parties found themselves catapulted into national politics almost by accident. Their role in the May and June protests was negligible since the fear of immediate arrest or exile without trial and the lack of any legal standing could hardly have boosted their morale. The failure of the regime to prevent mass protests may have convinced them to play a more active role and with the majority of union leaders arrested, the political parties moved into the vaccum. A massive organizational effort was not required for maintaining the momentum of the previous protests since setting a date for the July national protest and publicizing it could not be a difficult task.

---

44 New York Times, 28 June 1983.

The government made the task of the political parties easier. The Magistrate of Santiago arrested three Christian Democratic leaders, Gabriel Valdes, Jorge Lavandero and José de Gregorio for printing thousands of leaflets calling for the July protest. Press censorship and widespread popular confusion had previously hampered news of the demonstration. With the arrests of the three leaders and the broad international cry it engendered, the word spread that another protest was in the offing. Largely through word of mouth and pamphlets, Chileans learned that the protest was scheduled for 12 July. A government communique of the same day announced imposition of a curfew from 8 p.m. to midnight in view of the distribution of pamphlets "aimed at disrupting public order" and the consequent likelihood of "acts of violence".[45] It was the first early evening curfew to be ordered by the Pinochet government since 1973.

As dusk fell over Santiago, tens of thousands of people began beating pots and pans from the upper class neighbourhoods of Vitacura, to middle class La Reina and working class La Valledor. The absence of motor traffic dramatized the event and the police responded harshly, firing shots into the homes of protestors. In the densely populated slum of La Victoria, gangs of unemployed youth

---

45 Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 July 1983.

defied the curfew, barricading the streets with burning tyres and chanting "down with the dictatorship". Army patrols were called out for the first time in many years and clashes with protestors left two dead, 9 injured and more than 500 arrested.[46] Interestingly, the protests were not as massive as the previous ones but they occurred in defiance of the curfew, which was not the case earlier.

A Chilean appeals court ordered the release of the jailed Christian Democratic leaders ruling that their call for peaceful protest against the government did not threaten national security. The Supreme Court followed this up by upholding the dismissal of charges against the political activists. The ruling was hailed by opposition leaders who decided that it implicitly affirmed the legality of peaceful demonstrations. Gabriel Valdes soon announced the creation of a five-party opposition Democratic Alliance (AD) that called on the resignation of Pinochet.

The series of social protests led Pinochet to reshuffle his cabinet and include a number of civilians including Sergio Onofre Jarpa as Interior Minister. Jarpa was one of the founders and head of the conservative National Party and represented important sections of the business community. He proposed that the government deal firmly with the protests but establish a dialogue with the non-communist opposition to reach agreement on a series of

---

46 Time, 25 July 1983.

measures that would open up the political process. The idea was that a dialogue would help to diffuse the social tension by channeling the energies of opposition political groups into a preoccupation with the open political environment.

The Democratic Alliance consisted of the Christian Democrats, the Carlos Altamirano, Ricardo Lagos and Carlos Briones wing of the Socialists, the Radicals, the Social Democrats and the Republicans. In the months of September and October, Jarpa held three separate dialogues with Alliance leaders under the auspices of the Arch bishop of Santiago, Francisco Fresno. Jarpa sought to obtain support for a joint commission to examine party laws. The Alliance made three demands in the negotiations: the dissolution of the National Centre for Information (CNI); the resignation of Pinochet; and the convocation of a provisional government, and a constitutent assembly to write a new Constitution and schedule prompt elections.

The Alliance overestimated its strength and underestimated the government's power. Jarpa had not been empowered to give ground and he himself realized that he had little political clout. The Minister of Interior had lost its control over the police, which was under the Ministry of Defense, and over interior government, which was under Pinochet. More significantly, Pinochet refused

to honour his commitment to go along with a genuine opening-up of the political process. Compounding Jarpa's problems was Pinochet's unwillingness to give him and his colleagues greater voice in economic policy, the sine quo non to satisfy business supporters of the regime. Jarpa soon began to encourage the formation of a new right party, partly as a reaction to the newly formed Independent Democratic Union, which was set up by elements close to the Chicago boys.

The "dialogue" was a victory for Pinochet. It gave him some breathing time and took the edge off the protest movement. Many Chileans welcomed Jarpa's style of finding a solution through negotiations. More importantly, the talks succeeded in dividing the opposition - between these who did and those who did not wish to negotiate - without yielding to any liberalization. The disconcerted among the opposition felt that the Alliance leaders were being used by the government; they criticized Valdes and his colleagues for not pressing for the resignation of Pinochet. The authorities further undermined the position of the Alliance by enacting in secret a far-reaching anti-protest law that held the leaders of a protest criminally responsible for violence. The Magistrate of Santiago announced that any opposition

demonstrations would require payment in advance to the authorities of a certain amount of money for every square metre of public property occupied by the protestors.[47]

The failure of AD's peaceful mobilization and dialogue and the intransigence of the regime benefited the Communist Party which formed an alternative movement, the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), in October. The MDP also enjoyed the support of the Clodomiro Almeyda section of the Socialist Party and received strong support from other organisations, including the popular sectors, Church-affiliated groups and solidarity groups who had lost faith in the AD.

The MDP pursued a two-pronged strategy; on the one hand, it advocated insurrection and political violence by encouraging and leading armed terrorist groups such as the MRPF; on the other, it preached unity of all anti-Pinochet forces, a proposition attractive to those who felt that an opposition unified only in its opposition to Pinochet could be effective by virtue of its sheer magnitude.[48] This strategy seriously challenged the AD's claim to

---

47 Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile's Political Instability", Current History(Philadelphia,Pa.), vol.83, no.490, February 1984, p.72.

48 Edgardo Boeninger, "The Chilean Road to Democracy", Foreign Affairs(New York), vol.64, no.4, Spring 1986, pp.812-32.

hegemony of the political opposition. The call for insurrection brought the support of the radicalized popular sectors while the "unity" slogan was effective in other instances.

By the end of October, the AD called for an indefinite end to talks with the government. At the same time, it entered into talks with the MDP and other opposition groups in an effort to coordinate strategy for future national protests.

Meanwhile, the protest movement continued in Chilean cities. The Agusut protests were even more violent - 26 civilians died and more than a 1,000 were wounded by gunfire.[49] This time the protests were spread over two days (11-12 August) and there were no signs of either the demonstrators or the regime backing out of a direct confrontation. The appointment of Jarpa and his call to the people not "to create an atmosphere of chaos and violence" went unheeded.[50] The government also announced that it would lift the state of emergency that had been in effect since 1977, on 29 August, but did not abolish the "emergency powers" of Pinochet. Terrorist acts by extreme-left groups continued and the Santiago Governor Carol Uruza and a bodyguard were gunned down in an ambush. The suspected

---

49 Time, 22 August, 1983.

50 Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 August 1983.

killers were shot a week later. However, the state of emergency was replaced by a "state of disturbance". Following the September protests, the "state of disturbance" was extended for six months. Continuing internal disturbances, that included monthly protests and demonstrations, bomb blasts that frequently darkened central Chile, ambushes and assassinations, continued without signs of declining in intensity, and led to the reimposition of the state of emergency in March 1984. Military commanders once again had the power to order curfews, prohibit public gatherings and ban publications. Pinochet continued to maintain that the opposition leaders were "agents of violence" and that a Moscow-led plan of political destabilization would be met with the necessary force.

The picture that emerged over a year and more of the rise of opposition against the military regime was more of confusion than anything else. Most sections of Chilean society participated in the anti-government campaign in one way or another - from workers to students and professionals. But there is no doubt that neither the AD nor the MDP could effectively channelize the forces available to them in the right direction. The lack of agreement among the opposition on strategy always left Pinochet in a better position to defuse any crisis. Physical repression was a necessary

fallout of the movement but it could be justified only because "normal" protests tended to turn militant with the slightest of provocation. The increasing violence associated with the protest movement diminished, rather than increasing its overall effectiveness. Large sectors of the lower middle and middle classes, which constitute a large percentage of Chile's population, feared unrest and violence more than their opposition of the government. Similarly, terrorist actions helped to strengthen rather than undermine government authority.

There was never any question of a popular uprising capable of defeating the highly professional armed forces or forcing the disintegration of the military. Opposition leaders consequently oriented their efforts at convincing the military that the regime was no longer viable. Disorder and mass protests undermined Pinochet's credibility and the government's slogan that "Chile Advances in Peace and Order". It was hoped that massive protests would eventually convince military officers that their own credibility and that of the government was at stake unless they removed Pinochet and initiated a transition process.

It is argued that militant protests only reinforced the military's determination not to violate its own legality.[51]

---

51 Arturo Valenzuela, "Prospects for the Pinochet Regime in Chile", Current History, vol.84, no.499, February 1985, p.80.

The military was sworn to uphold its Constitution and its government. Military officers feared that a violation of that legality would only lead to political unrest or a hostile government that would undermine its institutional integrity. The intensely anti-Communist military officers were also worried by the rise of the left which would not only threaten their basic privileges but also their own personal security and that of their families.

There is also no doubt that in the period 1983-84 and even later, Pinochet was able to maintain his control over the armed forces. There were divisions within but were not strong enough to threaten his authority. The air force commander Fernando Matthei made public his wish for an accleration of democracy.[52] This may have influenced the junta to prevent a Constitutional proposal by Pinochet to install a designated Congress in 1989 for fear that such a Congress would be completely controlled by Pinochet and would render them redundant. The opposition hoped to divide Pinochet from the armed forces but the army and the police remained loyal and the navy and the air force lacked the power to impose its will over the army. In the ultimate analysis, the differences between Pinochet and the other junta members were not profound enough to make them want to test their strength in a policy of open confrontation.

---

52 Interview in El Mercurio (Santiago), 23 September 1984.

It is necessary now to take a look at the opposition and its strategies for gaining a return to democracy. The political parties that reappeared on the scene were essentially the ones that existed prior to the coup, but a decade of military-authoritarian rule had decisively altered relations between them and the issues that divided them. There remained an ideological climate of mutual distrust impeding efforts at a unified opposition even though there were some encouraging signs of reconciliation and wide-spread acknowledgement of past mistakes.

Parties whose leaders were at each other's throats during the Allende years, such as the PDC and the Socialists, became close colleagues in the AD. The split between the Socialists and the Communists was however complete, mostly as a consequence of changes in years of foreign exile and domestic repression. The Communist Party had since 1980 flirted with "armed struggle" and allied itself with the MIR.

The divisions within the Chilean opposition were based on three issues: whether to employ selective violence against representatives of the regime or to keep exclusively to non-violent resistance; whether to include or exclude the Communists in the movement; and whether to negotiate for concessions from the government or attempt to force it from office.

The Christian Democrats were probably the strongest and least divided of the major opposition forces and produced well-documented and rational policies for a future democratic Chile.[53] Their influence in Pinochet's Chile came as a result of their magazine Hoy and their radio station, both of which offered the most reliable source of news to Chileans. They claimed that the Party represented the natural "centre" of Chilean politics, capable of becoming the decisive force by swinging its weight to the left or the right. And this was exactly the dilemma of the PDC. A closer cooperation with the right would distance the party from the MDP, whereas closer ties with the MDP would make cooperation with the right impossible. The historical support of the middle class was also dependent on the shift to the right or left. In the period 1983-84, the party committed to mobilization of the population alongwith the MDP under its centre-left president, Gabriel Valdes. The moderates feared that the thetorical excess and inflammatory ideologizing of these gatherings foreshadowed a poloarization of the sort that occurred in the Allende years.

---

53 See the Party's publication, Un Planteamiento paro el futuro: Proyecto Alternativo (Editorial Aconagna, 1984) and Mark A. Uhlig, "Pinochet's Tyranny", New York Review of Books, 27 June, 1985, p.39.

The Socialist Party, as we have seen, came to be divided into two main factions. The first faction was a moderate, Social-democratic wing led by Altamirano and Lagos and rejected "armed struggle" against Pinochet, believing that such a strategy would heighten military and middle class fears of social chaos and also harden the government against the possibility of handing back power to civilians. These Socialists were prepared to accept the Communists in the AD, a major point of conflict with the Christian Democrats.

The second faction of the Socialists, led by Almeyda, was "revolutionary" and unstructured. It allied with the Communists on the basis of a mutual distrust of democratic institutions. The Alemyda Socialists' differences with the Communist Party were over the issue of formal ties with the Soviet Union. They themselves forged closer links with Fidel Castro and Cuba although Almeyda continued to reside in East Berlin.

The Communist Party made a major shift with its acceptance of violent tactics. It reflected in part the views of a new generation in the party who believed that anything less than the threat to life and limb would not induce the military to leave power. The Communist leaders however emphasized that they desired a formal recognition by the moderates, although they maintained their distance from the MDP. Their acceptance of armed

struggle reduced its credibility as a potential partner of the AD.

A progressive disillusionment of several sections in the right owing to Pinochet's unwillingness to cooperate with Jarpa was a natural outcome in the wake of the concurrent economic crisis. The unresolved allegiance to the military gave way to some apprehensions about its future political role. The prolonged retention of political powers by the armed forces came to be seen as a liability and it was almost certain that once the opposition forces moderated some of their policies, the right would cooperate in opposing Pinochet. The bulk of the Chilean right did not favour the military regime any more but it neither crossed over to the opposition. It however defined its attitude as independent of the regime through the National Party and the National Unity Party. The trend within the right reflected that of the other opposition forces - a democratic-wing and an authoritarian, extreme-wing.

Pinochet Strikes Back

On 5 November, 1984, the Chilean cabinet resigned after the week's political unrest had left 14 dead.[54] This gave Pinochet a free hand to reorganize the military

---

54 New York Times, 6 November 1983.

government and the following day, a state of siege was imposed for the first time since 1977. In a speech to the nation Pinochet said:

> I have declared a state of siege throughout the country to take effect today...in order to put an end to the criminal escalation of terrorist and subversive activities and to prevent the type of disruption of public order that has been affecting the tranquility of the people.(55)

The navy commander, José Merino argued that the state of siege did not mean that the junta had hardened its position. The head of the CNI, General Fernando Paredes said that the objectives of the state of siege was to restore peace. The move was directed against "vandals and Soviet Communist henchmen who operate in the country".[56]

The reimposition of a state of siege was a severe blow to the experiment with abertura, the political liberalization which Pinochet had toyed with. Six magazines were closed and forced out of business.[57] This was done to "prevent the propagation of rumours". The siege allowed the government to tap legally telephones, open mail and hold prisoners indefinitely without charges. The headquarters

---

55 Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 November 1983.

56 ibid, 9 November 1983.

57 The magazines were - Cauce, Analisio, Apsi, Fortin Mapocho, La Bicicleta and Pluma y Pincel. Hoy was subjected to "blanket censorship".

of the Socialist bloc (an alliance of the Christian Left and the Socialists of the AD) and the MDP were raided. At least 20 members, believed to be the organizers of the ongoing protest movement, were arrested and sent into internal exile. Chile became an occupied country once again. Working class neighbourhoods, mostly the slum districts of Santiago like La Victoria, were surrounded by troops in successive raids. Thousands were herded into the soccer stadium for questioning and 237 were arrested.[58]

The resignation of the cabinet was an intriguing aspect of the whole exercise because almost the same cabinet members (including Jarpa) resumed their posts the following day. Perhaps the cabinet resigned only to allow Pinochet to impose a state of siege. It was also believed that Jarpa was staying on only as long as Pinochet could appoint a successor. Another theory is that Jarpa continued to hope to persuade Pinochet to moderate his course and preserve the gains of abertura.

The imposition of the state of siege took even the right by surprise. Government officials close to Pinochet privately confessed that the move was an admission of failure on the part of a government that had promised progress with order. Both the National Party and the

---

58 Newsweek (New York, N.Y.), 26 November 1984.

National Unity criticized the state of siege. They feared that the drastic measure would set back further any propsect for a broad agreement on a return to democracy.

The Catholic Church also denounced the imposition of the state of siege. Archbishop Fresno drafted a six page pastoral letter in which he warned the government against blaming the Church for the country's political problems. The letter also included a call for a 24-hour period of fasting and prayer on 23 November, four days before the political parties plan for two days of protest. The letter said:

> I want to be prudent, but I will not be a coward...all of us must pray in silence and also talk about what we can do to build peace in Chile, based on truth, love and justice.(59)

With the press and the opposition muzzled, the Church remained one of the few open channels of redress.

The government again carried out raids into Santiago's shanty-towns to render ineffective the protests of 27 and 28 November. Government troops patrolled the streets and such hard-line tactics seemed to have undercut the opposition's call for national strike. However, there was no end to violence. Scores of bombs exploded all over the

---

59 Time, 26 November 1984.

country, dozens of stores were looted and there were incidents of police clashing with demonstrators. Pedro Correa of the National Party warned:

> Since there are no political organisations capable of channeling the hopes and needs of the public these demands will be exploited by the irresponsible groups and movements lacking sufficient organization to resist extremes.(60)

The government's response was to extend the state of siege for a further 90 days.

The tough stance adopted by Pinochet was evident in the cabinet reshuffle effected in February 1985. Jarpa and Finance Minister Luis Escobar Cerda found themselves excluded and the government extended the state of siege until 6 May. Pinochet defended his actions with familiar statements of "internal convulsion" and plots by the Soviet Union and Cuba to subvert his government. Repression by the regime continued unabated. In March, the bodies of three men, two of whom were members of the Communist Party and the third of the Vicariate of Solidarity, were found with their throats cut. General César Menedoza, head of the police put the blame on "international communism". A special prosecutor was appointed to investigate a new wave of kidnappings and murders. In August, the

---

60 Newsweek, 12 November 1984.

prosecutor released his report indicting 14 Carabineros, including three colonels. The suspects were barred from leaving the country but only a military court could try the guilty since the Carabineros had been inducted into the military by Pinochet. Mendoza and two other subordinate Carabinero generals were forced to resign.[61]

The cracks within the military began to show in the face of months of protests and demonstrations, loss of support from previous supporters in the upper and middle classes and charges of corruption and fraud. There was a growing perception in the armed forces that by refusing to step down before 1989, Pinochet threatened to take everybody down with him. Pinochet's meetings with the other junta members turned into "veritable battlefields". Maithei as well as José Mevino made their displeasures felt quite openly.

Raids into Santiago's neighbourhoods continued through May and June but the issue of a re-imposition of a state of seige met with dissent from other junta members. The government defended its raids by saying that the purpose was to "find common delinquents and subversives" and claimed to have seized weapons and explosives.

---

61 Newsweek, 12 August 1985; Facts on File (New York) 17 May 1985.

Continuing terrorist acts by the MRPF helped to substantiate the government's actions. However, Pinochet's labelling of political opponents as Marxist was not really true. A poll released by the Santiago-based Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences disclosed that only 13 per cent of Chileans considered themselves Marxist and 73 per cent agreed that "radical changes" were required in the government.[62]

In July, the government lifted the state of siege. The reasons were not internal but were related to vote in favour of a $ 55 million World Bank loan. The US immediately dropped its opposition to the loan. The Interior Minister Ricardo Garcia Rodriguez maintained that the state of siege was lifted because of a marked decline in terrorism (which was not true) and that it would be replaced by a state of emergency. The magazines banned in November were allowed to reopen but the government retained the right to control political news, impose curfews and make arrests for upto five days without any changes.

Three significant changes had occurred at the national level during 1985: the new orientation of the Socialists in a clearly democratic direction; the propensity of the PDC to form alliances and act as a

---

62 Cited in Time, 2 June 1985.

political bridge; and the emergence of an independent right-wing which was often critical of the government. Each of the three blocs responded positively to a call for national reconciliation made by Archbishop Fresno who was in the unique position of enjoying a good rapport with the left, and as a conservative was trusted by the right. By August 1985, the opposition had pushed forward the National Accord for a Transition to Full Democracy.

The National Accord was the most important development in the struggle for democracy until then. For the first time, the left, centre and right were unified in a formal commitment that was neither a political alliance nor a government programme but a pact on the rules of governing.

The Accord proposed minimum indispensible Constitutional reforms - changing the procedure for Constitutional amendments and altering the system of presidential succession; giving guarantees in the socio-economic field; specific, immediate measures to restore political liberties and permit a process of transition; and matters of concern for the armed forces like support for combating terrorism, condemnation of anti-democratic coups, etc.[63]

---

63 See Boeninger, n.48.

The Accord had a favourable impact on public opinion and on the armed forces. Matthei in particular was impressed by what the opposition had to offer. However, the Accord did suffer from several weaknesses. The signatories did not agree on a strategy concerning deadlines and methods - the right felt that Pinochet complete his term in office (1989); the AD parties wanted the return to democracy to be effected as soon as possible. The right also favoured negotiation to social mobilization which they felt led to violence and reaction by the armed forces and increasing influence of the left. The AD parties insisted that only mass mobilization could lead to success.

Pinochet categorically rejected the Accord and in a move to counter the opposition tried to exacerbate the existing contradictions between the parties to the Accord. He accused the signatories of being vague on matters such as guaranteeing property rights, outlawing anti-democratic forces and dealing with human rights abuses. He adroitly managed to shift focus on issues which the Accord signatories disagreed, thus creating considerable friction among them. The government also denounced the joint participation of of the Christian Democrats and the Communists in social protests to indicate an ambiguity and unreliability of the PDC, an issue to which the right was extremely sensitive.

By the end of 1985, the National Accord seemed to have served the purpose of weakening Pinochet but its own survival was doomed. The government lost credibiility but the opposition forces seemed to have gained nothing in terms of possessing sufficient cohesion to enforce a political change in the near future.

The opposition forces under the AD and the MDP - organized in the first few months of 1986 to continue the pressure on Pinochet to resign and concede a transition to democracy. The idea was that differences apart, military rule had to end. The AD was able to gather some support and confidence from the right while the MDP retained its hold over the left. The tempo of the protest movement was kept up with international criticism and the adoption of a US-backed resolution in the United Nations.[64] This was a major departure from the past where the US had abstained or voted against resolutions condemning Chile. The resolution indicated that the US was no longer willing to back Pinochet in his endeavour to prevent a transition to democracy.

July 1986 marked a turning point in the political situation. The proliferating civic, community, party and trade-union groups converged towards an unified opposition challenging the legitimacy and authority of the Pinochet

---

64 Facts on File, 21 March 1986.

regime and openly questioning its legal basis; the 1980 Constitution. Over 200 social organizations had joined to form the Assemblea de la Civilidad (AC) in April 1986. It represented the highest level of social and political unity achieved by the opposition since 1973. On 26 April, the AC had presented Pinochet with the so-called "Demand of Chile" which synthesized the repressed needs of a wide spectrum of social forces interested in the removal of Pinochet. The Demand was an offensive against Pinochet of a level that only the unity of the opposition forces and the increased popular mobilization could have made possible. The regime was given 30 days to respond to its demands, failing which a national strike was to be called on 2 and 3 July. Through the month of May, Chileans responded to symbolic daily one-minute work stoppages; boycotts of products sponsoring programmes on the State-controlled television network; and refusal to pay property taxes and other payments to the government. The government responded in the usual manner. The police and army troops conducted raids in Santiago's shanty-towns to arrest suspected terrorists.

The government's failure to respond to "Demand of Chile" left the AC headed by Juan Luis González, no choice but to carry out its July general strike. The two days were marred by violence especially in the shanty-towns.

Barricades were built and rocks thrown at passing vehicles. The police acted swiftly and efficiently. At least seven people were slain in the 48-hours of the strike, including a 13-year old girl. There were also a number of bomb blasts around Santiago on the nights of 1 and 2 July. In the three largest cities, Santiago, Valparaíso and Concepción, 95 per cent of the cargo trucks stayed off the road for the two days. Public transport was scarce and offices were vacant.[65]

González described the protests as a "gigantic" success. However, this success proved to be a worrisome development for many sections of the AC. The increasing militancy and autonomous actions of the social movement seemed to have gone beyond the control of the political parties. The centre-right parties were frightened by the "barricadismo" and "militarisation of politics". The tactical political success of a unified opposition raised grave strategic socio-economic questions. The centre-right opposition including the PDC was hesitant to participate in a movement which it could not control. The extreme popular mobilization had not served positively in the past and moderate leaders were frightened by the prospect of a hardening of the military's stance. The AD

---

65 Facts on File, 11 July 1986.

quickly set about to redefine its position and moved towards a policy of accommodation with Pinochet.

The AD's decision to back out from the 4 and 5 September protests took the sting out of the protest movement. A few days later, Pinochet survived an assassination attempt by the MRPF and reimposed a state of siege.[66] The discovery of an arms cache in the end of August had already raised the possibility of a leftist takeover. It is also believed that the AD's decision to withdraw from the movement was prompted by the US.[67]

Pinochet regained the initiative after the AD's withdrawal and the imposition of a state of seige. This two-pronged strategy of repressing the social movements and the left opposition while once again offering dialogue with Centre-right groups ensured that Chile would undergo only a Constitutional transition to democracy. There has been a lot of criticism regarding this development but as we have seen in our survey of Chilean history, a Constitutional transition alone could have ensured a transition as well as the survival of democracy. The "struggle for democracy" became purely institutional with the AD choosing to negotiate for a space within the strict parameters defined by the

---

66 Ibid, 12 September 1986.

67 James Petras and Fernando Ignacio Leiva, "Chile: the Authoritarian Transition to Electoral Politics", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 58, vol.15, no.3, Summer 1988, p.97.

Constitution. This "political realism" of the AD contributed to a strengthening of Constitutional rule in Chile and despite its limitations, especially as regards the dominant role of Pinochet and the armed forces, the realization of the continuing "three-thirds" split of Chilean society, was an important aspect of the three years of struggle against the regime.

As we have seen, one of the essential components of the strategy of the centre-right opposition was not questioning the political nature of the State. It was this issue which separated the AD from the MDP. The former concentrated on a radical critique of the political regime and its actions and searched for a negotiated solution to the crisis and the replacement of military-authoritarian rule. The strategy of social mobilization was used to make Pinochet give way to a transition before 1989 but his intransigence to do so as well as the fragmentation of the opposition severely limited the prospects of any severe disruption of the system. Even the concept of democracy varied - some talked about the overall democratization of society, aiming essentially toward the legitimacy of social and economic egalitarianism; others linked the transition to the establishment of a democratic political system.

C O N C L U S I O N

CONCLUSION

A dominant tradition of Chilean political process since 1938 has been the "three-thirds" divide of society among the forces of the left, centre and right. This near equal division of political power has rendered the impossibility of majoritarian governments. Over the years, Chilean national executive have been elected by coalition or forced to build one with the centre party/parties providing the required flexibility to sustain the system.

Between 1930s and 1960s, the Radical Party admirably fulfilled the role of the centre party. The emergence of the Christian Democratic Party since then, has upset the delicate balance on which Chilean democracy was placed. The Christian Democrats conceived of themselves as a new and vital ideological force and were unwilling to act as a fulcrum between the left and the right. They propagated a distinct middle road between Marxist transformation and preservation of the status quo. The party sought to expand the strength of the centre at the expense of both the left and the right. The strategy adopted was one adopted by the left, of popular mobilization, but the emphasis was on reform as opposed to revolution.

The PDC, and the Popular Unity (UP) after them, however, failed in their efforts to upset the tradition of the "three-thirds" politics. Every Chilean administration has necessarily required the support of two of the three blocs for its political survival. The Frei and Allende administrations

admittedly, confirmed this reality. The subsequent regime was not based on "force" alone, but on the support of the right and the centre, i.e., two of the three blocs in Chilean politics. The regime's survival for more than a decade can partly be explained by the polarisation of Chilean society during the years of progressive reformism. The military used this to its advantage and attempted to eliminate the left and consolidate its rule by winning over the centre. In the long-run, however, the political and economic policies of the military progressively eroded its middle class support and weakened the political balance engineered by the military to its own detriment. The emergence of popular protests reflected an evolving new equation--of the centre moving from the right to the left.

The tradition of the "three-thirds" bedevilled as much the military as it did the previous governments. It was the perceptions and proclivities of the left, centre and right that determined the direction of national politics in the years 1983-86. Both the left and the centre desired a return to democracy as well as changes in the economic policies of the regime. However, both were internally divided in terms of defining their relationship with each other as well as with the military and the right. The left was distrustful of the PDC due to its role in the Allende years and the coup. The centre was fearful of a dominating left which they felt had created a condition of near-anarchy in 1970-73 leading to a situation where

military intervention became inevitable. The centre had the choice of finding its allies from sections of the right which were critical of the political institutions created by the military regime. The continued support of the right for Pinochet and military rule was partly due to the absence of any other alternative at that juncture. The memories of the years of high-pitched reformism deterred most of the right to move away from Pinochet. The continuing violent acts by the extreme-left groups strengthened their belief that a return to democracy could be detrimental to their interests.

The first two opposition coalitions, the Democratic Alliance (AD) and the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP) represented the centre and the left respectively and engaged in joint action during the monthly days of protest. The AD, however, kept its options open, as was evident from its acceptance of opting for a dialogue with Jarpa, with the exclusion of the MDP from the process. This reflected, to an extent, the AD's willingness to bargain with the military regime in preference to resolving differences with the left. The induction of Jarpa achieved what Pinochet intended--expose the divisions within the opposition and buy time for himself. However, what Pinochet had not bargained for was the loss of significant support from the right once the abertura was suspended.

Pinochet's failure to continue the "game" of negotiation and compromise pushed the right to accomodate with the AD, and the AD to work towards forging a unified platform with the MDP and force the regime to back down from its commitment to the timetable for transition prescribed for in the Constitution. The creation of the Assemblea de la Civilidad (AC) was as much a consequence of an increasing cooperation between the left and the centre as of Pinochet's intransigence. It would seem that such an analysis overemphasizes the schisms between the left and the centre. But the fact remains that the middle class support or at the least, tolerance of the military regime, was in preference to a "revolutionary" government.

Any attempt at analyzing the basis of Chilean democracy since the 1930s and the platform and policies of successive governemnts, suggests that the success or failure of various administrations depended to a large extent on their ability to preserve the status quo and bring about significant economic development to the benefit of the social sectors dependent on two of the three blocs. The Pinochet government channeled its resources for the benefit of the social sectors associated with the centre and the right. However, economic failures in the 1980s progressively eroded its support base. A similar trend was available in the political sphere where the authoritarian democracy prescribed in the Constitution disappointed the middle classes as also some sections of the right.

It was the fear of the popular sectors and the left that once again drove the AD to withdraw its support from the AC and accept the "Pinochet Plan" for a return to democracy. The assassination attempt on Pinochet in 1986 and the discovery of an arms cache renewed fears of a leftist takeover. There can be no denying the negative impact of the violent tactics used by by the extreme-left in the cause of attainment of unity between the left and centre oppositions. Two questions need careful examination by future researchers: i) could the extreme-left afford such an option at that critical juncture? ; and therefore, ii) could it have been engineered by Pinochet himself to sabotage or subvert the agonising abertura process?

Be that or it may, the years of struggle for democracy may be summed up in terms of the varying perceptions of Chile's "three-thirds". While the opposition made significant advances in terms of overall strength, it failed to force Pinochet to make any concrete concessions. The divisions within the armed blocs were as distinct in 1986 as in 1983.

The left continued to oppose Pinochet and military rule in varying ways. The formation of a credible alliance with the centre, however, remained a dream. The Socialists and the Communists were unable to reconcile to act together and themselves were plagued by dissent over basic policies. The extreme-left stuck apparently to its plans for an armed insurrection to destabilize and overthrow the regime. The

relatively united centre preferred to strike a deal with the right and the moderate left rather than risk the consequences of a full-scale mass movement against the regime. The right came to be divided itself, as was eveident from the formation of the new National Party and the National Unity Party in opposition to the Independent Democratic Union, which consisted of hard-line pinochetistas. The armed forces were unable to remain united in the face of pressure for changes. The support lent to the National Accord by the air force commander, Fernando Matthei, exemplified the divisions within the military.

Pinochet was able to survive these tumultous years because the dissent and disaffection towards his regime were for different reasons and emanating from varied quarters. In the process, the opposition forces failed to agree and unite to a common strategy or proffer an alternative to military rule. The carrot-and-stick policy helped Pinochet gain time and put the pressure on his opponents. The opposition on its part made limited advances in the three-year period. There was no doubt that a significant percentage of Chileans wanted a return to democracy but it was clear that in view of a perceived threat from the left, an extra-constitutional strategy was found unsuitable to attain the desired goals, conceding the repressive and Constitutional powers available to the State to prevent the same.

By 1987, the majority of the opposition resigned or

agreed to accepting the plebiscite as a fact of political life. Opposition leaders called on Chileans to register in the electoral rolls and an unprecedented 92.1 per cent of voting age adults had done so when registration closed. A series of new laws adopted in 1988 permitted some legal political activity. The opposition buried its past differences to form the Democratic concertación and organise a "No" campaign to defeat Pinochet. The Communist Party and sectors of the socialist left strongly objected to this"participation in the legality of the regime". It was only very shortly before the elections that the Communists lent their support to the campaign. In a high voter turn-out of 97 per cent, 54.71 voted for "No" to Pinochet and a high 43.1 for "Yes" in the 5 October 1988 plebiscite. The verdict was accpeted by the armed forces and the right giving Pinochet no choice but to hold elections in December 1989 and allow a transitional government to come to power for four years.

The strategy of the concertación yielded some success, although there were severe limitations to its range of action. The opposition was able to make no dent in the timetable and basic mechanisms of transition. Some modifications were made in the Constitution, but they were fashioned by both the opposition and the military before they were voted in July 1989 and the approved amendments contained only some of the changes desired by the concertación.

The concertación remained intact until the presidential and Congressional elections and named Patricio Aylwin Azocar,

the president of the PDC, as its presidential candidate. The coalition also contained the two Socilaist parties, the PS Arrate and the PS Almeyda and the Partido por la Democracia (PPD), initially formed to create an "instrumental" party to contest the plebiscite. A centre-right party, the Partido Acción de Centro (PAC), two Radical parties, the Christian Left (LC), the Humanist Party completed the coalition.

The contesting parties of the right were the National Renovation (the former National Party and the National Unity Party) and the Independent Democratic Union. The two formed an electoral pact, Democracy and Pro gress, to fight the elections and named Hernán Buchi, the high-profile Finance Minister who was responsible for the post-1985 economic recovery, as their candidate. A successful businessman, Francisco Javier Errázuriz, presented himself as the third, non-party candidate.

The concertación predictably won the presidential election with 55.18 per cent of the vote to Buchi's 29.39 per cent, with Errázuriz finishing last with 15.53 per cent of the vote. A peculiar electoral system allowed the right to win half the legislative seats with a mere one-third of the popular vote, at the expense of the concertación and PAIS, an electoral alliance of the more radical of the left parties, including the Communist Party. The opposition gained 72 of the 120 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 22 of the 38 contested seats in the Senate.

The electoral results gave both the concertación and the parties of the right something to cheer about. However, what the results failed to reveal was the continuing "three-thirds" divide of the electorate. It is possible that if the left were to break away from the coalition, it may become the the second political force after the Christian Democrats. The Communist Party elected neither Deputies nor Senators but this can be attributed to the electoral system which secured an over-representation of the right, as well as to the lack of reciprocal support from former allies, the Socialists. The Communists' estimate is that they received 15.8 per cent of the vote where they stood, but as it stood only in its areas of traditional strength, then it can be assumed that its national vote was much lower than the 16.2 per cent it received in the last Congressional elections of 1973.

Even as democracy returned to Chile, doubts were raised over its future. The legacy of Pinochet's rule and the constitutional transition have imposed several limits on the redemocratization process. The 1980 Constitution limits Aylwin's powers vis-a-vis the armed forces. Pinochet will remain the commander of the army and a voting member of the National Security Council until 1997. Several military officers continue to serve as permanant members of the Council. There are also 9 Pinochet-nominated Senators alongwith 16 from the right to block passage of "unpleasant" reforms. The Constitution also forbids the president to appoint, remove or

retire the commanders of the armed services; shields the military budget from legislative cutbacks; and reserves 10 per cent of Chile's annual income from the sale of copper for the military. Constitutional amendments are nearly impossible and require the support of three-fourth of the Senators and Deputies.

In its initial phase, the Aylwin administration has taken positive steps to tackle the major problems confronting the country. The National Renovation has at times cooperated with the concertación to enable significant changes to be initiated in both the political and economic spheres. The Commission on Truth and Reconciliation has published its report, the so-called Rettig Report, which holds the military guilty of human excesses in the period 1973-89. Efforts have been made to alleviate the lot of Chile's poor, "social justice" being a top priority on the government's agenda. However, a wave of violence in the first half of 1991 seems to have given the initiative back to Pinochet. It remains to be seen if the sacrifices of thousands of Chileans who died at the hands of the military yields any positive develpments in the long-run.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, 1980 (Embassy of Chile, n.a., n.d.).

Secondary Sources

Books

Angell, Alan, Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile (London Oxford University Press, 1972).

Andrain, Charles, Political Change in the Third World (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1988).

Bauer, Robert J., Chilean Rural Society from the Spanish Conquest to 1930 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975)

Boorstein, Edward, Allende's Chile: An Inside View (New York: International Publishers, 1977).

Budiman, Arief, Chile Under Allende: the Mobilization and State Strategies in a Democratic Transition to Socialism (California: University of California, 1981).

Collier, Simon, Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967).

Debray, Régis, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allend: (New York: Vintage Books, 1971).

de Vylder, Stefan, Allende's Chile: the Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

Fagan, Richard R., and Wayne A.Cornelius Jr., eds., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations (New Jersy: Prentice-Hall, INC, 1970).

Fagg, John Edwin, Latin America--A General History (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1969).

Furci, Camelo, Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism (London: Zed Books, 1984).

Hanke, Lewis, ed., History of Latin American Civilization: Sources and Interpretations: The Modern Age (London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1969).

Jaguaribe, Helio, Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973).

Johnson, John J., Political Change in Latin America: the Emergence of the Middle Sectors (California, Stanford University Press, 1958).

Lopez, George A., and Michael Stohl, ed., Liberalisation and Redemocratization in Latin America (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1987).

Loveman, Brian, and Thomas M. Davies Jr., The Politics of Antipolitics: the Military in Latin America (Lincoln & London: Nebraska Press, 1978).

_____, Chile: the Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

Petras, James, Political and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

_____, ed., Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution (Toronto: John Wily & Sons, Inc., 1973).

_____, and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975).

Pike, Frederick, Chile and the United States (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963).

Ortiz, Eduardo, Chilean Politics, 1931-32 (Liverpool: Ph.d thesis, University of Liverpool, 1980).

Perlmutter, Amos, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977).

Silvert, Kalman H., The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America (New Orleans, Louisiana: The Hauser Press, 1961).

Wolpin, Miles D., Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972).

Wiarda, Howard J., and Harvey F.Kline, ed., Latin American Politics and Development (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979).

Articles in Peridicals

Alexander, Robert J., "The Army in Politics", in Harold Eugene Davis, ed., Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958).

Ames, Barry, "Military and Society in Latin America", Latin American Research Review (New Mexico), vol.23, no.2, 1988, pp.157-69.

Angell, Alan, "Chile: the Difficulties of Democratic Reform", International Journal (Toronto), vol.24, no.3, Summer 1969, pp.515-28.

_____, "Labour and Politics in Chile", in Raymond Carr, ed., Latin American Affairs: St.Antony's Papers, No.22 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.107-35.

_____, "Chile: From Christian Democracy to Marxism?", Current History (Philadelphia), vol.60, no. 354, February 1971, pp.84-89, 117.

_____, "Problems in Allende's Chile", Current History, vol.64, no.378, February 1973, pp.57-60, 86.

_____, "The Soldier as Politician: Military Authoritarianism in Latin America", in Dennis Kavanagh and Gillian Peele, ed., Comparative Government and Politics: Essays in Honour of S.E.Finer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), pp.116-43.

_____, "Chile One Year After the Coup", Current History, vol.68, no.401, January 1975, pp.11-14, 42.

_____, "Chile After Five Years of Military Rule", Current History, vol.76, no.444, February 1979, pp.58-61, 88-89.

_____, "Pinochet's Chile: the Begining of the End?", The World Today (London), vol.41, no.2, February 1985, pp.27-30.

Arellano, José-Pablo, "Social Policies in Chile: an Historical Review", Journal of Latin American Studies (London), vol.17, part 2, November 1985, pp.397-418.

Arienza, Marisa, and Carlos A. Mallmann, "Argentina on the Road to Democracy: Comparisons with Chile and Uruguay", International Social Science Journal (Paris), vol.38, No.1(103), 1985, pp.31-46.

Barkey, Henri J., "Why Military Regimes Fail: the Perils of Transition", Armed Forces and Society (California), vol.16, no.2, Winter 1990, pp.169-92.

Bell, Peter D., "Democracy and Double Standards: the View from Chile", World Policy Journal (New York), vol.2, no.4, Fall 1985, pp.711-30.

Bizzarro, Salvatore, "Rigidity and Restraint in Chile", Current History, vol.74, no.434, February 1978, pp.66-69.

Blakemore, Harold, " Back to the Barracks: the Chilean Case", Third World Quarterly (London), vol.7, no.1, January 1985, pp.44-62.

Boeninger, Edgardo, "The Chilean Road to Democracy", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.64, no.4, Spring 1986, pp.812-32.

Bowers, Stephen R., "Pinochet's Plebiscite and the Catholics: the Dual Role of the Chilean Church", World Affairs (Washington,D.C.), vol.151, no.2, Fall 1988, pp. 51-58.

Burbach, Roger, "Chile's Transition", World Policy Journal, vol.6, no.1, Winter 1988-89, pp.169-202.

Congdon, Tim, "Move to the Free Market Economy: Chile 1973-85", Development Policy Review (London), vol.3, no.2, 1985, pp.146-51.

Constable, Pamela, and Arturo Valenzuela, "Is Chile Next?", Foreign Policy(Washington,D.C.), no.63 , Summer 1986, pp.58-75.

_____, "Pinochet's Grip on Chile", Current History, vol.86, no.516, January 1987, pp.17-20, 38-40.

Corbett, Charles D.,"Politics and Professionalism: the South American Military", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.16, no.4, Winter 1973, pp.927-51.

Dallas, Roland, "Chile's Problem of the Three-Thirds", Contemporary Review (London), vol.244, no.1418, March 1984, pp.125-30.

Drake, Paul W., "Corporatism and Functionalism in Modern Chilean Politics", Journal of Latin American Studies, vol.10, part 1, May 1978, pp.83-116.

Edwardes, Sebastian, "Stabilization with Liberalization: an Evaluation of Chile's Experiment with Free-Market Policies", Economic Development and Cultural Change (Illinois), vol.33, no.2, January 1985, pp.223-54.

Ellner, Steve, "The Latin American Left Since Allende: Perspectives and New Directions", Latin American Research Review, vol.24, no.2, 1989, pp.143-67.

Falcoff, Mark, "Chile: the Dilemma for U.S. Policy", Foreign Affairs, vol.64, no.4, Spring 1986, pp.833-48.

_____, "Chile: Pinochet, the Opposition and the US", World Affairs, vol.149, no.4, Spring 1987, pp.183-94.

Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo, "The Monetarist Experiment in Chile: a Critical Survey", World Development (New York), vol.11, no.11, pp.905-26.

Fortin, Carlos, "The Failure of Repressive Monetarism: Chile, 1973-83", Third World Quarterly, vol.6, no.2, April 1984, pp.310-26.

_____, "The Failure of Monetarism, Chile 1973-85", Development Policy Review, vol.3, no.2, 1985, pp.137-46.

García, Alvaro, and John Wells, "Chile: a Laboratory for Failed Experiments in Capitalist Economy", Cambridge Journal of Economics (London), vol.7, no.3, 1983, pp.287-304.

Hirschfield, Robert Carl, "Chile's MIR: the Anatomy of a Revolutionary Party", Monthly Review (New York), vol.18, no.9, February 1967, pp.20-23.

Jilberto, Alex E. Fernández, "Miliatary Bureaucracy, Political Opposition, and Democratic Transition", Latin American Perspectives (California), Aníbal Yáñez trans., Issue 67, vol.18, no.1, Winter 1991, pp.33-65.

Johnson, Dale L., "Chile: Before and During", Science and Society (New York), no.4, Winter 1982-83, pp.461-76.

Kirsch, Harry, "University Youth a Social Protagonist in Latin America", Cepal Review (Santiago), no.29, August 1986, pp.191-202.

Kusnetzoff, Fernando, "Urban and Housing Policies Under Chile's Military Dictatorship, 1973-85", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 53, vol.14, no.2, Spring 1987, pp.157-86.

Loveman, Brian, "Military Dictatorship and Political Opposition in Chile, 1973-86", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (California), vol.28, no.4, Winter 1986-87, pp.1-38.

_____, "Government and Regime Succession in Chile", Third World Quarterly, vol.10, no.1, January 1988, pp.266-80.

Lowy, Michael, and Eder Sader, "The Militarisation of the State in Latin America", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 47, vol.2, no.4, pp.7-40.

Marcella, Gabriel, "The Chilean Military Government and the Prospects for Transition to Democracy", Inter-American Economic Affairs (Washington,D.C.), vol.33, no.2, Autumn 1979, pp.3-19.

Monteón, Michael, "Chile Under the Dictator", Socialist Review (California), vol.16, no.3 & 4, May-August 1986, pp.99-118.

Moran, Cristian, "Economic Stabilization and Structural Transformation: Lessons from the Chilean Experience", World Development, vol.17, no.4, April 1988, pp.491-502.

Mouzelis, Nicos, "On the Rise of Postwar Dictatorships: Argentina, Chile, Greece", Comparative Studies in Society and History (New York), vol.28, no.1, January 1986, pp.55-80.

Nunn, Frederick M., "Chile Since 1973: Historical and Political Perspectives", Latin American Research Review, vol.14, no.2, 1979, pp.287-94.

_____, "New Thoughts on Military Intervention in Latin American Politics: the Chilean Case, 1973", Journal of Latin American Studies, vol.7, 1975, pp.271-304.

O'Brien, Philip, "Authoritarianism and Monetarism in Chile, 1973-83", Socialist Review, No.77, vol.14, no.5, September-October 1984, pp.44-79.

Oppenheim, Lois H., "The Chilean Road to Socialism Revisited", Latin American Research Review, vol.24, no.1, 1989, pp.155-83.

_____, "Introduction", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 67, vol.18, no.1, Winter 1991, pp.3-14.

Osiel, Mark J., and Eliza Willis, "Is Chile Headed for a Showdown?", Dissent (New York), vol.31, no.2, Spring 1984, pp.207-24.

Oxhorn, Philip, "The Popular Sector Response to an Authoritarian Regime: Shantytown Organizations Since the Military Coup", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 67, vol.18, no.1, Winter 1991, pp.66-91.

Parkin, Vincent, "Economic Liberalism in Chile, 1973-82: a Model for Growth and Development or a Recipe for Stagnation and Impoverishment?", Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol7, no.2, 1983, pp.101-24.

Petras, James, "Chile After the Elections", Monthly Review, vol.25, no.1, May 1973, pp.15-23.

_____, and Ignacio Leiva Fernando, "Chile: New Urban Movements and the Transition to Democracy", Monthly Review, vol.39, July-August 1987, pp.109-24.

_____, _____, "Chile: the Authoritarian Transition to Electoral Politics: A Critique", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 58, vol.15, no.3, Summer 1988, pp.97-114.

_____, "The New Class Basis of Chilean Politics", New Left Review (London), no.172, November/December 1988, pp.67-81.

Philip, George, "Military Authoritarianism in South America: Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina", Political Studies (Guildford, England), vol.32, no.1, March 1984, pp.1-20.

Putnam, Robert D., "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics", World Politics (New Jersy), vol.20, no.1, October 1967, pp.83-110.

Ranis, Peter, "A Two-Dimensional Typology of Latin American Parties", The Journal of Politics (Florida), vol.30, no.3, August 1968, pp.798-832.

Reif, Londa L., "Seizing Control: Latin American Military Motives, Capabilities and Risks", Armed Forces and Society, vol.10, no.4, Summer 1984, pp.563-82.

Remmer, Karen L., "Public Policy and Regime Consolidation: the First Five Years of the Chilean Junta", The Journal of Developing Areas (Illinois), vol.13, no.4, July 1979, pp.441-61.

_____, "State Change in Chile, 1973-88", Studies in Comparative International Development (Georgia), vol.24, no.3, Fall 1989, pp.5-29.

Schneider, Cathy, "Mobilization at the Grassroots: Shantytowns and Resistance in Authoritarian Chile", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 67, vol.18, no.1, Winter 1991, pp.92-112.

Sigmund, Paul E., "Free-Market Authoritarianism", in Robert Wesson, ed., Politics, Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), pp.1-15.

Sloan, John W., "The Policy Capabilities of Democratic Regimes in Latin America", Latin American Research Review, vol.24, no.2, 1989, pp.113-26.

Valenzuela, J. Samuel, and Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile and the Breakdown of Democracy", in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, ed., Latin American Politics and Development (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979), pp.233-61.

Valenzuela, Arturo, "Eight Years of Military Rule in Chile", Current History, vol.81, no.472, February 1982, pp.64-68, 88.

_____, "Chile's Political Instability", Current History, vol.83, no.490, February 1984, pp.68-72, 88-89.

_____, "Prospects for the Pinochet Regime in Chile", Current History, vol.84, no.499, February 1985, pp.77-80, 89-90.

_____, and Pamela Constable, "The Chilean Plebiscite: Defeat of a Dictator", Current History, vol.88, no.536, March 1989, pp.129-32, 152-53.

_____, "Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime", in Larry Diamond and others, ed., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, vol44 (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp.158-206.

Newspapers, Magazines and Others

Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.)
Ercilla (Santiago)
Facts on File (New York)
Hoy (Santiago)
Newsweek (New York)
New York Times
Summary of World Broadcasts (Reading, England)
The Economist (London)
The Times (London)
Time (Chicago, III.)